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Last time we spoke about the invasion of Mindanao. In April 1945, the US launched the invasion of Mindanao under General Eichelberger, focusing on Illana Bay. Initial assaults were swift, and American forces quickly captured vital areas due to the disarray among Japanese troops, who were struggling with low morale and supply shortages. The Japanese were under significant pressure, with commanders ill-prepared to mount a robust defense as American troops advanced toward Davao. Fierce battles unfolded, including attempts to seize key positions, but Japanese forces, that included remnants from earlier campaigns, faced overwhelming and relentless assaults. Despite stiff resistance in some areas, the Americans ultimately made considerable territorial gains, significantly weakening Japanese positions. This successful operation in Mindanao laid crucial groundwork for further advances in the Pacific theater, marking a decisive phase in the war as the tide turned heavily in favor of the Allies. As this chapter closed, it was evident that the end of Japanese resistance in the region was drawing near. This episode is the Allied Invasion of Borneo Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. A long time ago, in a galaxy far away we talked about the Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies. Now it is time to talk about how the Dutch strikes back. . . well not exactly, but I wanted to finish the star wars reference. For an extended period, the Australian forces that had valiantly fought on the island of New Guinea during a crucial phase of the Allied war effort had been assigned to garrison duties in remote areas, conducting minor offensives against a desperate enemy more concerned with obtaining food than engaging in battle. At the same time, General MacArthur deemed it politically unwise for Australians to take a prominent role in reclaiming the Philippines, an American territory, and he also found it politically unfavorable for American troops to participate in restoring Dutch and British authority in the Indies. Recognizing the urgent need to secure the oilfields of British and Dutch Borneo to supply accessible oil for the push toward Japan, Lieutenant-General Leslie Morshead's 1st Australian Corps was designated for the operation to retake Borneo, known as Operation Oboe. Should note that after a period of illness, suffering from malaria and a skin condition, the fighting General George Alan Vasey had finally recovered by February 1945. General Blamey, who still had doubts about his physical fitness despite Vasey being given an A by an Army medical board, reluctantly appointed him to command the 6th Division, then in action in the Aitape-Wewak campaign. Vasey then flew north to take up his new command. The aircraft Vasey was travelling in, RAAF Lockheed Hudson A16-118, took off from RAAF Station Archerfield on the afternoon of March 5, 1945. Due to a cyclone that was ravaging the Queensland coast at the time, the aircraft crashed into the sea about 400 metres out from Machans Beach, just north of the mouth of the Barron River, 2 kilometres short of the Cairns Airport. Vasey was killed in the crash along with all those on board. His body was recovered from the crash site and was buried with full military honours in Cairns cemetery along with those of Major-General Rupert Downes and Lieutenant-Colonel G. A. Bertram. Vasey's concern for his men outlived him. The men called him 'Bloody George', not after his casualties, but after his favourite adjective, and Vasey's personable style of command attracted immense loyalty from them. "Vasey owns the 7th," wrote a Melbourne journalist, "but every man in the division believes he owns Vasey." Thus now it fell to General Steven to retain command of the 6th Division at that time already engaged in combat at Aitape-Wewak, the initial plan was to land Brigadier David Whitehead's 26th Brigade at Tarakan on April 23 to establish an airstrip for supporting aircraft for subsequent operations, specifically an assault on Balikpapan by the remaining forces of Major-General George Wootten's 9th Division on May 18. Following that, ten days later, a brigade was set to land at Bandjarmasin to secure air support for the planned invasion of Java by the entire corps on June 27. Ultimately, the operations at Bandjarmasin and Java were cancelled; the Tarakan landing was postponed to May 1; the Balikpapan invasion would instead be conducted by Major-General Edward Milford's 7th Division on July 1; and the 9th Division was tasked with the invasion of Brunei Bay on June 10. Consequently, by the end of March, Morshead's headquarters and the entire 9th Division had relocated to Morotai, where they would prepare and rehearse for the impending invasion. In March 1944, General Doihara Kenji organized the 7th Area Army to establish a new defensive line across Malaya, Singapore, Sumatra, Java, and Borneo. Yes you heard that right, General Doihara Kenji. For those of you who listen to my Fall and Rise of China podcast, this guy is that infamous intelligence officer who worked on nearly all the significant false flag operations during the second sino-Japanese war. Working as an intelligence officer he played a key role in the orchestration of the Huanggutun Incident, Mukden Incident, kidnapping of Emperor Puyi and Marco Polo Bridge Incident, amongst countless other “incidents”. He was a bonafide mastermind behind numerous false flag operations and the Manchurian drug trade earning the moniker Lawrence of Manchuria. Now, anticipating an impending enemy invasion, Lieutenant-General Yamawaki Masataka reorganized the Borneo Defence Army into the 37th Army in September, placing it directly under General Terauchi's Southern Army. This force gradually received reinforcements from the 56th and 71st Independent Mixed Brigades, the 25th Independent Mixed Regiment, and several smaller units. Despite this, the command was understrength and poorly equipped, as most of the available equipment and experienced troops were reassigned to more critical locations in the Southwest Pacific. By the end of the year, under the leadership of Lieutenant-General Baba Masao, the 37th Army had stationed the majority of Major-General Nozaki Seiji's 56th Independent Mixed Brigade at Tawau, Major-General Yamamura Hyoe's understrength 71st Independent Mixed Brigade at Kuching, most of Colonel Iemura Shinichi's 25th Independent Mixed Regiment on Tawi-Tawi Island, Rear-Admiral Kamada Michiaki's 22nd Naval Special Base Force at Balikpapan, along with three battalions in Sandakan, two battalions and a naval unit in Tarakan, and one battalion each in Kudat, Beaufort, and Miri. However, in 1945, both Baba and Terauchi recognized that the enemy was likely to first target strategic locations on the east coast before establishing a strong presence in western Borneo to prepare for an invasion of Malaya. Consequently, they decided that the majority of the 37th Army should be concentrated around Brunei Bay, leading to orders for the 56th Independent Mixed Brigade to march overland toward northern Borneo. The 370th Independent Battalion remained in Tawau, while the 369th Independent Battalion was sent to garrison Bandjarmasin. Additionally, half of the 454th Independent Battalion was dispatched to Balikpapan, and the other half to Bandjarmasin. This left only the 455th Independent Battalion and part of the 2nd Guard Unit at Tarakan. Early in April the strength of the Japanese force on Tarakan was estimated at about 4000 of whom 2500 were base troops. On the eve of the attack, however, largely because of information indicating that a battalion had been moved from Tarakan to Balikpapan, it was estimated that only 1500 to 2000 troops remained on the island. Aerial photographs showed five gun positions on the south-eastern tip of the island covering the channel along which ships normally entered Tarakan. Round Lingkas and Tarakan there seemed to be 15 anti-aircraft guns, and 9 medium and 5 light anti-aircraft guns seemed to be round the airfield. The whole of Lingkas beach was protected by parallel rows of posts, rails and pipes driven into the mud and extending into the sea to a distance of 125 yards from high-water mark; and between the beach and the road was an anti-tank ditch about 25 feet wide. A group of oil tanks was near the beach and, as it was possible that the Japanese might try to impede an attacker by flooding the oil over the sea and the swamp near the Pamusian River and setting it alight, the air force had taken pains to destroy these tanks. Field works could be seen; there were concrete pill-boxes built by the Dutch; and it was suspected that, here as elsewhere, tunnels had been dug into the hills. Units stationed at Sandakan were also ordered to move toward Brunei, leaving the 554th Independent Battalion behind. Furthermore, due to the challenges in supplying Tawi-Tawi, the 25th Independent Mixed Regiment was withdrawn to Borneo in February and instructed to march toward Jesselton, where it was expected to arrive in May. During this time, little was done to enhance the island's defenses, and the overland marches took a significant toll on the soldiers' stamina. Meanwhile, enemy air raids intensified, severely disrupting communications. Between April 11 and 29, Air Commodore Arthur Harry Cobby's Australian 1st Tactical Air Force, along with Major-General Paul Wurtsmith's 13th Air Force, conducted several air assaults on Tarakan and Tawau, targeting oil storage tanks, artillery positions, radar stations, defenses, and various buildings. On April 27, Rear-Admiral Forrest Royal's Task Group 78.1 departed Morotai, carrying Whitehead's 26th Brigade, protected by Admiral Berkey's cruisers and destroyers. Over the next two days, this force executed a naval bombardment on shore targets while a minesweeping unit cleared and marked the approach route within 800 yards of the beach and Sadau Island. Early on April 30, the 2/4th Commando Squadron landed unopposed on Sadau, where they established an artillery battery to support the engineers in clearing obstacles from the invasion beaches. After successfully completing the task with just a few sniper and mortar attacks, the main convoy reached the southwest coast of Tarakan Island an hour before sunrise on May 1. Following a heavy air and naval bombardment prior to landing, Whitehead's assault waves began their approach to the shore, supported by rocket fire from the LCI gunboats. Around 08:00, the 2/23rd and 2/48th Battalions landed on Green Beach and Red Beach, respectively, without facing any opposition. However, once they moved inland, they encountered intense fire from Lingkas Hill and Roach. The 2/23rd Battalion launched an attack and captured both locations while the 2/48th took the Finch and Parks positions as they advanced to secure the Collins Highway ridge. Throughout the day, the remaining units of the 26th Brigade landed despite poor beach conditions and overcrowding, with the 2/24th Battalion held in reserve along Anzac Highway. By nightfall, the brigade managed to hold an area 2,800 yards wide at the base and up to 2,000 yards deep. Early on May 2, the 2/23rd seized Milko with minimal resistance, advancing further north to the Pages feature and Hospital Spur. Simultaneously, the 2/48th quickly secured Lyons and the junction with Burke Highway, while the 2/24th effectively attacked the Wills, Sturt, and Frank positions with support from aircraft and artillery. In the late afternoon, as one company moved up Anzac Highway toward the airfield, Lieutenant-Colonel George Warfe's other companies converged on the Essex feature, which was captured without opposition during the night. The next morning, the 2/24th attacked the airfield from the south and east; although they successfully took the airfield ridge at a high cost, their late assault on the Rippon position to the north was repelled by determined enemy defenders. At the same time, the 2/48th conducted reconnaissance towards the Peter and Sykes features, while the 2/23rd managed to secure the area between Gleneleg Highway and Pamusian. However, their assaults on Hospital Spur and Tarakan Hill were unsuccessful. Fortunately, Burke Ridge was found abandoned on May 4. By then, Whitehead had already instructed the 2/23rd to advance east and join the 2/24th in their attacks on the airfield, with the 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion and the 2/4th Commando Squadron taking over their positions in the west. The commandos then launched an attack on Tarakan Hill. Despite being initially held down by fierce enemy fire, they eventually forced the defenders off the high ground through sustained pressure, tank support, and a sweeping maneuver to the right. Simultaneously, the 2/48th advanced and successfully took control of the Evans feature, while a company from the 2/24th attacked the Peningkibaru stronghold after an intense artillery barrage, managing to secure the position just in time to fend off the Japanese who had retreated during the bombardment. Additionally, Warfe planned another assault on Rippon, but heavy Japanese shelling ultimately compelled him to call it off. On May 5, as the commandos and pioneers continued to diminish the remaining strongholds on Tarakan Hill, the 2/48th successfully cleared the road north to Otway, although they faced greater resistance near Sykes. Rippon was also discovered to be abandoned and was swiftly captured, though the Japanese still controlled the high ground to the north. Finally, on May 6, the 2/48th launched another attack on Sykes and successfully cleared the hill this time. While capturing the airfield and town accomplished Whitehead's primary objective, the Japanese continued to hold the rugged interior of Tarakan, indicating that much fighting lay ahead until the garrison was completely defeated. By the evening of 6th May fairly copious information obtained from prisoners and Indonesians and from captured documents indicated that the enemy had about 390 naval troops in the Mount Api area, about 400 troops and civilians in the Fukukaku headquarters area, 200 from Sesanip along Snags Track to Otway, 300 on Otway and in District 6, 300 in the Amal River area and 60 at Cape Juata. Having lost the airfield and the water-purifying plant and hospitals "the enemy at this time was displaying a decided disinclination to hold ground. In particular he was shunning any ground which could be subjected to heavy bombing, shelling, or attack by tanks; or against which large-scale attacks could be launched by our troops".The enemy was now directing his operations to delaying the attackers, particularly with mines, booby-traps, suicide raids, and isolated parties fighting to the death in tunnels and dugouts. After the unsuccessful general attack on April 19, which yielded minimal gains, Generals Hodge and Buckner were preparing to push the offensive southward, fully aware that breaching the first Shuri defense ring would be a slow and costly endeavor. On the western front, the primary enemy positions on Kakazu Ridge had been entirely circumvented, with General Griner directing his troops to advance and focus on cleanup later. Consequently, on April 20, the majority of the 165th Regiment secured the coastal region before launching a southern attack that encountered immediate and fierce resistance in the rugged terrain north of Gusukuma, particularly around Item Pocket. The center of the Japanese resistance lay in the I section of Target Area 7777, which came to be called "Item Pocket", in military terminology I is called Item. Actually, the pocket was the hub of the enemy position; from it, like spokes of a giant wheel, extended four low ridges, separated from each other by ravines and rice paddies. Potter's Ridge ran north from the hub, Charlie Ridge to the northeast, Gusukuma Ridge to the southeast, and Ryan Ridge to the southwest. Lying between Gusukuma and Charlie Ridges and sloping to the east was a cone-shaped hill called by Americans "Brewer's Hill." A gulch ran along each side of the hill Anderson's Gulch on the north and Dead Horse Gulch on the south. Both ran in an easterly direction, crossing Route 1 at small bridges just north of Gusukuma. The ground was superbly suited for active defense. Typical Japanese positions were connected by tunnels along the sides and under the crests of the ridges; Ryan Ridge, in particular, was honeycombed with such defenses. From Item Pocket the enemy had excellent command both of the coastal areas to the north and west and of the open land to the east where Route 1 ran north-south. The Japanese had long been aware of the defensive value of this position against either a beach landing on the northwest or an attack from the north. Months before the Americans landed, Japanese troops and Okinawan laborers were boring tunnels and establishing elaborate living quarters and aid stations. The area was held by two companies of the 21st Independent Infantry Battalion of the 64th Brigade, 62nd Division, supported by an antitank company, a machine gun company, and elements of antiaircraft, artillery, and mortar units. At least 600 Japanese occupied the Pocket, reinforced by several hundred Okinawans. Only through persistent effort was the 1st Battalion able to reach a position east of Gusukuma by nightfall, while the 2nd Battalion successfully took control of Potter's Ridge and Fox Ridge but failed in its attempts against Ryan Ridge and Item Pocket itself. The leading platoon was well up on the slope of Ryan when Japanese on top opened up with mortars, machine guns, and artillery, cutting off the rest of Company E. While the company commander, his clothes torn by bullets, and the rest of the company straggled back to Fox Ridge, the leading platoon continued doggedly ahead. Its leader, T/Sgt. Earnest L. Schoeff, managed to reach the top with eight of his men despite almost constant fire. He was ordered by radio to hold until relief came. The men hugged the ground as darkness slowly descended. Then from three directions from fifty to sixty heavily armed Japanese set upon the Americans. In wild hand-to-hand fighting the nine men beat off the attack. Pfc. Paul R. Cook fired four cases of ammunition into the enemy, shooting down at least ten before he was killed. With grenades, rifle butts, and the enemy's own weapons, Schoeff and his men killed another dozen before the Japanese withdrew. With two of his men killed, another missing, and two wounded, Schoeff led the survivors back to his company during the night. To the east, the 106th and 105th Regiments tried to advance south towards the village of Iso and the Pinnacles but were hindered by heavy enemy gunfire. In response, Colonel Winn dispatched his 2nd Battalion to maneuver around the East Pinnacle to reach the village of Natama, where Companies F and G were ultimately repelled by a strong Japanese counterattack. As they retreated in chaos, they faced an ambush from Japanese infiltrators, resulting in significant casualties. Despite these challenges, the 106th Regiment and Winn's 3rd Battalion managed to bypass the West Pinnacle and advance with relative ease, halting 200 yards southwest of Iso. Additionally, Winn's 1st Battalion fought its way to the western edge of Kakazu village and nearly cleared Kakazu Ridge to its eastern point before being ordered back to the escarpment to support the 2nd Battalion and halt any enemy breakthroughs. At the same time, General Bradley ordered the 381st and 382nd Regiments to advance toward Nishibaru Ridge and the Tanabaru Escarpment. In response, Colonel Dill's 3rd Battalion moved along Tombstone Ridge, clearing out the enemy from caves and tombs, and reached the southern end just in time to join Colonel Halloran's 1st Battalion for a surprise offensive against Nishibaru. They quickly captured the crest but were ultimately driven back by the determined defenders. However, this partial victory prompted Halloran to deploy the 2nd Battalion in the afternoon for another assault to the south. By day's end, the 381st was entrenched along the northern slope of Nishibaru Ridge, though at a significant cost. Further west, Dill's 2nd Battalion also pushed forward despite persistent fire from the Rocky Crags, where attempts by the 184th and 17th Regiments to attack were unsuccessful. They could not catch up with the 3rd Battalion. Meanwhile, General Arnold targeted Ouki Hill, but his initial assault was quickly halted by enemy mortar and machine-gun fire. Two armored flamethrowers successfully advanced 400 yards ahead of the infantry, neutralizing an enemy mortar position on Ouki Hill's west slope. Consequently, the Americans concentrated their mortars and smoke to cover the enemy positions, allowing a composite company to launch a surprise attack that secured the crest of Ouki Hill, although the isolated troops would soon have to fend off a series of fierce counterattacks. The next morning, the 32nd Regiment launched an attack down Skyline Ridge with two companies. However, they were quickly halted by mortar fire at a deep road cut in the middle of the ridge. Despite this setback, the troops persevered, largely due to Sergeant Theodore MacDonnell's efforts, and eventually gained control of the entire forward face of the ridge. When, east of the road cut, a man in the stalled third platoon, Company E, was killed, Sgt. Theodore R. MacDonnell, a gist Chemical Mortar Company observer, was impelled to drastic action. MacDonnell had frequently joined men on the line and shown qualities of a determined infantryman. Now, infuriated, he gathered up a handful of grenades and ran in the face of the machine-gun fire along the slope to a point underneath the spot where he believed the enemy gun to be located, and then started up the 20-foot embankment. When he looked over the crest he failed to spot the gun, but he did see three enemy soldiers and grenaded them. He made two trips to the bottom of the embankment for fresh supplies of grenades, but it was not until his third trip to the crest that he located the machine gun. MacDonnell then slid back to the bottom, grabbed a BAR, and mounted the embankment with it, only to have the weapon jam after the first shot. He skidded to the bottom, seized a carbine, and went back up for the fifth time. On reaching the crest he stood up and fired point-blank into the machine-gun position, killing the gunner and two covering riflemen. MacDonnell then hurled the machine gun down the slope behind him. A mortar that he found in the position was also sent crashing down the hillside. Sergeant MacDonnell was later awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his heroism on this occasion. Lt. Fred Capp, commanding Company E, sent troops to reinforce MacDonnell immediately, and the position was consolidated. Then Company F, on orders given as a result of this sudden development, pressed the attack down Skyline Ridge, and by 18:00 the entire forward face of the ridge was occupied and only a knob at the lower tip was causing trouble. To the west, while Colonel Pachler's Company B attempted another attack on Rocky Crags, Dill's 3rd Battalion reorganized and encircled to reach Nishibaru Ridge via the 381st Regiment, launching an eastward assault that made good headway until they were met with fierce enemy counterattacks that forced them to halt. Simultaneously, Halloran coordinated an attack on Nishibaru, which was successfully repelled by the defenders. Colonel May's 3rd Battalion was then deployed to fill the gap at the gorge. Overnight, a large number of Japanese troops had moved from the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment to set up mortars and machine guns in the Kakazu Pocket, prompting the 27th Reconnaissance Troop to advance toward Kakazu, where they became pinned down at the village's edge. As a result, Colonel Stebbins' 3rd Battalion was ordered to position itself on Kakazu West. Looking west, the majority of the 105th and 106th Regiments were tasked with neutralizing the Pinnacles, but with little success. They did manage to clear the road to the escarpment's summit of mines and obstructions to facilitate tank movements. Finally, Colonel Kelley's 2nd Battalion launched another unsuccessful attack across the mouth of Item Pocket, while Company F attempted to advance along the coast using amphibious tractors but was likewise repelled by intense fire from Ryan Ridge. The 1st Battalion also pushed southwest into Gusukuma, but without armor support, they made minimal progress against the machine guns in the village and fire from Item Pocket attacking from the right rear. The enemy's defense was very effective on the east. Here the 1st Battalion had a major supply problem on its hands. Two blown bridges along Route 1 east of the Item Pocket were holding up vehicles of support units. During the previous night, fire from the Pocket had driven off an engineer platoon working at the site and killed the platoon leader. Early on the 21st Lieutenant Golden, the Bailey bridge expert, came up with ten truckloads of material. His engineers worked for an hour but had to stop in the face of almost ceaseless fire from the Pocket. Colonel Kelley then ordered scouts to find another stream crossing. A bulldozer cut a bypass around Anderson's Gulch near the railroad, but when, about 10:00, the operator nosed his machine out in the open, he was shot in the ear. General Griner, in Colonel Kelley's observation post at the time, ordered Lt. Col. Walter F. Anderson, commander of the 193rd Tank Battalion, to push the bypass through. Anderson himself climbed into his battalion's sole remaining "tank-dozer" and completed the bypass. A 47-mm. anti-tank gun, hitherto silent, scored a direct hit on Anderson's tank, killing him and a guide. The bypass was now blocked and had to be abandoned. This break-down in supply over Route 1 seriously affected operations east of Gusukuma. Colonel Mahoney's 1st Battalion attacked southwest early on the 21st into Gusukuma, but without tanks or cannon the troops made little ground against machine guns in the village and fire from Item Pocket on the right rear. Mahoney's left company did reach a point 400 yards north of the village of Yafusu, the farthest advance yet registered by 24th Corps since April 19, but here the troops were stopped by a network of enemy positions. Concerned about the significant vertical separation between his battalions, Kelley decided to deploy his 3rd Battalion in an effort to fill the gap and simultaneously penetrate Item Pocket. Consequently, the American forces advanced through Dead Horse Gulch, with Company K fighting nearly to the center of the pocket. However, they were ultimately compelled to retreat due to heavy losses and intense counterattacks. On April 22, Kelley opted to hold and enhance his current positions while conducting extensive patrols. Looking to the east, as the 105th Regiment regrouped following a night counterattack from Kakazu, Stebbins' 1st Battalion systematically located and neutralized enemy positions behind them along the escarpment. Brigadier-General William Bradford also took command in the Kakazu area, bolstered by the 3rd Battalion, 17th Regiment, and most of the 2nd Battalion, 165th Regiment, successfully containing the pocket. Further west, the 383rd Regiment replaced the weakened 382nd, while the 2nd Battalion advanced down Nishibaru Ridge to capture the village and higher ground facing Hill 143 to the south. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion made minimal progress toward the Gate of the Tanabaru Escarpment. Additionally, Pachler's Company B initiated another attack on the west side of the Rocky Crags, supported by howitzers, tanks, and armored flamethrowers. However, once again, they faced hand grenades and knee mortar shells raining down from above, resulting in heavy casualties and the need to retreat. Finally, the 32nd Regiment maintained control of the forward face of Skyline Ridge but made no attempt to advance, while patrols scoured extensive sections of the southern slope to reach the abandoned eastern face of Hill 178. That night, artillery provided cover to the beleaguered defenders as Colonel Yoshida's 22nd Regiment took over along Skyline Ridge. Following several days of inactivity, 41 kamikaze planes were once again launched on April 22. They successfully sank the minesweeper Swallow and one LCS, while also damaging two destroyers and another minesweeper, resulting in the loss of 25 aircraft. The next day, the 32nd Regiment remained stationed on the north slope of Skyline Ridge, except when conducting patrols or securing caves. This allowed the Japanese defenders to withdraw overnight from their remaining positions around Hill 178. With Company B worn out, the rest of the 1st Battalion, 17th Regiment joined the assault on the Rocky Crags, which fell with little resistance. To the west, medium tanks and armored flamethrowers finally launched a direct attack on Nishibaru Ridge and the Tanabaru Escarpment, successfully destroying most of the enemy positions, although few territorial gains were made. Further west, Winn's 1st Battalion executed a surprise attack on the East Pinnacle, managing to capture the position after fierce hand-to-hand combat. At the same time, the remaining defenders at West Pinnacle initiated a desperate banzai charge towards Iso, where they were ultimately overwhelmed. Kelley then ordered Company I to conduct a probing assault on Ryan Ridge and Item Pocket, while Company C ascended Brewer's Hill but was unable to descend the steep side to join the fight. On April 24, no new attacks were launched due to a confusing mix-up of orders, but preparations were made for an assault the following day. After an artillery barrage, Bradford's task force finally attacked the Kakazu Pocket with four battalions; however, they faced no enemy resistance, as the Japanese had abandoned their positions overnight. To the east, the beleaguered defenders in front of the 96th Division had also retreated, leading to the fall of the Tanabaru Escarpment, its village, Hill 143, and the rest of Nishibaru Ridge without opposition. In a similar manner, the 17th Regiment ascended Hill 178 with only a few scattered artillery rounds landing nearby. The Japanese forces had resisted fiercely for five days, but with the first ring of Shuri defenses breached at multiple points, they chose to withdraw under the cover of heavy mist and light fog the night before. Even so, this advancement was minimal, and it was clear that reaching Shuri would take considerable time given the rate of progress over the first three and a half weeks of the operation. Nonetheless, Buckner believed that any significant landing on the Minatoga beaches or between Machinato airfield and Naha could not be logistically supported and would be vulnerable to strong enemy counterattacks. Therefore, he dismissed proposals to deploy the 77th Division or the 1st Marine Division for these efforts. Instead, it was decided to move the 3rd Marine Corps and the 77th Division from northern Okinawa and Iejima to replace the 24th Corps in the Shuri area. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In April 1945, the Allies launched the invasion of Borneo, led by General Morshead. Swift assaults secured strategic areas against demoralized Japanese troops. Despite fierce resistance, American forces gained ground, crippling Japanese defenses. This victory marked a pivotal moment in the Pacific War, signaling the end of Japanese influence in the region.
Great new WW2 history book about General Macarthur and PhilippinesSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
The Korean peninsula was split into two countries after the Second World War. The Soviet backed North and the U.S. backed South. North Korea tried to unify the two by invading South Korea in June 1950. Initially North Korea had great success. It pushed South Korea's small military aside and rushed down the peninsula while the United States tried to get forces onto the peninsula. The North Koreans were finally stopped around the port of Pusan at the very bottom of the Korean peninsula. While fighting around Pusan was going on, the U.S. commander, General Douglas MacArthur, contemplated his next move. Instead of using his growing force to reinforce Pusan, MacArthur chose to do something far more risky. He would conduct an amphibious landing deep in the rear of the North Korean army, cut its logistics, and cause it to collapse. The place he picked for this landing was the port of Inchon. Robert D. Heinl, Jr. tells the story in "Victory at High Tide: The Inchon Seoul Campaign."
In this powerful, first-person interview, 97-year-old World War II veteran Frank Wal, Jr. reflects on his life, service, and the events that shaped a generation. From the hardship of losing his mother at age eight, to enlisting in the U.S. Navy at just 17, Frank takes us through his remarkable journey—from radar duty aboard LSD-25 to witnessing the aftermath of kamikaze attacks and passing the USS Indianapolis just before its fateful sinking. Frank shares his firsthand memories of Okinawa, the atomic bomb's impact on Japan, the occupation of Tokyo, and even a surprise encounter with General MacArthur. He speaks candidly about post-war life, teaching science and serving as a principal, building a life with his wife of 68 years, and raising four children. Frank's story is a story of war, but it's also a reflection on resilience, service, and the quiet strength of the Greatest Generation.
Historian Hampton Sides describes one of the most brutal ground battles ever fought – the 17-day Battle of Chosin Reservoir, which began on the 27th of November 1950. The conditions were relentlessly difficult – frigid temperatures, frozen, rocky ground, and an enemy that kept coming in waves. And they weren't the North Koreans who General MacArthur had expected. No this was Mao's Red Army. More than 120,000 Chinese soldiers surrounded 30,000 US Marines and UN troops. What was a desperate situation could have been much worse, save for the incredible bravery of the Marines and the sage leadership of U.S. Marine battalion General Oliver Prince.Hampton Sides, in his excellent book On Desperate Ground, explains how General Smith's strategic thinking preserved the lives of many of his men, helping them receive supplies during the battle and eventually break through enemy lines to find a path to safety. It's a rosing tribute to the “Chosin Few!"Heroes Behind HeadlinesExecutive Producer Ralph PezzulloProduced & Engineered by Mike DawsonMusic provided by ExtremeMusic.com
Last time we spoke about the invasion of iwo jima. General LeMay's B-29 bombers targeted Japan, inflicting heavy damage on Kobe and Ota's Nakajima factory, though at a cost of lost aircraft. Meanwhile, U.S. forces prepared for the Iwo Jima assault. On February 19, Marines landed amid intense bombardment, facing fierce Japanese resistance. Progress was slow, with heavy casualties. By February 21, they fought to capture Mount Suribachi. Amidst the chaos, kamikaze attacks struck American carriers, causing significant losses and foreshadowing the brutal battles ahead. In the midst of a relentless rain on February 22, Colonel Liversedge led the 28th Marines in a fierce assault on Mount Suribachi, facing determined Japanese resistance. Despite harsh conditions and significant casualties, the Marines pushed forward. On February 23, they reached the summit, raising the American flag to symbolize their hard-fought victory. The Secretary of the Navy, inspired by the moment, declared it would ensure the Marine Corps' legacy for centuries. As battles continued, the Marines faced heavy losses but remained resolute in their mission. This episode is the fall of Manila Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. As we last observed in Manila, General Griswold's forces had effectively confined the remnants of Admiral Iwabuchi's troops to Intramuros, the South Port Area, and the Philippine Commonwealth Government buildings located at the southeastern edge of the Walled City. Available information led to the conclusion that the Japanese defenses were strongest on the southern and eastern sides of the Walled City and that the Japanese expected attack from these, the most logical directions. Japanese garrisons in the Legislative, Finance, and Agriculture Buildings just across Padre Burgos Street southeast of Intramuros could cover these approaches. The 37th Division could, of course, take the government buildings before launching an assault on Intramuros, but it would be easier to attack the government buildings after Intramuros fell. Conversely, planners deemed it feasible to strike into Intramuros from the west, since Japanese defenses along the west wall, across Bonifacio Street from the Manila Hotel and the South Port Area, appeared weak. But in this case, American troops would first have to clear the South Port Area and then, advancing from the west, would have to attack toward much of their own supporting artillery. The artillery's best positions for close support were on the north and northeast, across the Pasig, and on the east, in the area south from the General Post Office to the City Hall, and much of the artillery ultimately did fire from these areas. About halfway from the northeast to the northwest corner of Intramuros the ancient wall ended, providing direct access into the Walled City at the Government Mint. The only other obstacle on the north was a low sea wall running along the south bank of the Pasig, and Japanese defenses along the north face appeared weak except at the northeast corner. Planners therefore decided that there would be an excellent chance to execute a successful amphibious assault from the north bank of the Pasig against the north-central side of the Walled City. Given that the Japanese defenses were strongest on the southern and eastern sides of the Walled City, and that the ancient wall ended at the Government Mint between the northeast and northwest corners of Intramuros, it was decided to initiate an amphibious attack from the north bank of the Pasig River targeting the north-central section of the Walled City, executed by the 129th Regiment with close artillery support. However, aware that the Japanese had established a complex tunnel system for rapid troop movement within Intramuros, General Beightler deemed it essential to conduct a secondary assault on Quezon Gate near the northeastern entrance to keep the Japanese forces off balance and to split their attention. Since the Japanese had fortified this area with strong pillboxes just inside the walls, the division concluded that heavy artillery would be required to create an additional breach in the thick wall just south of Quezon Gate, where the 145th Regiment would launch its attack. Furthermore, as the Japanese could target the advancing troops with enfilade fire from the three government buildings to the south, Allied artillery would need to neutralize these buildings during the assault on Intramuros. Lastly, the 1st Cavalry Brigade positioned to the west and southwest of Intramuros would block any potential escape routes for Japanese forces from the Walled City. So far, General MacArthur had severely restricted the employment of air in the metropolitan area. In late January and early February Marine Corps SBDs had bombed or strafed a few pinpointed targets in the North and South Port Areas and had also hit some obvious Japanese gun positions in the open areas of Luneta Park and Burnham Green. One or two strikes may also have taken place against specific targets within Intramuros, but all in all it appears that planes of the Allied Air Forces flew no more than ten or twelve individual sorties against targets within the city after February 3. Before that time both carrier-based and land-based aircraft had presumably limited their strikes to targets within the port areas and to oil storage facilities in Pandacan and Paco Districts. Of course some bombs had gone astray during these strikes and had caused damage within Intramuros, while additional damage within the Walled City had resulted from both American and Japanese artillery fire the first two weeks of the battle for Manila. When approached with General Griswold's plan to carry out an intensive aerial bombardment against the Walled City, MacArthur once again objected: “The use of air on a part of a city occupied by a friendly and allied population is unthinkable. The inaccuracy of this type of bombardment would result beyond question in the death of thousands of innocent civilians. It is not believed moreover that this would appreciably lower our own casualty rate although it would unquestionably hasten the conclusion of the operations. For these reasons I do not approve the use of air bombardment on the Intramuros district.” However, General MacArthur had previously issued orders limiting air operations in the metropolitan area, leading him to reject this proposal. Not wanting to rely solely on infantry for the assault, Griswold and Beightler decided to organize a significant artillery preparation, as they were not explicitly prohibited from using artillery. After several unsuccessful attempts to persuade the Japanese in Intramuros to surrender or release the numerous Filipino civilians they were holding hostage, Griswold initiated the bombardment of Intramuros on February 17, creating several breaches in the east wall. On February 22, Allied artillery began targeting the north wall to breach it and eliminate a Japanese stronghold at the Government Mint, while additional guns took up positions for the final barrage before the infantry assault the following morning. Between 07:30 and 08:30 on February 23, the Americans executed the last preparatory bombardment, effectively damaging the walls of Intramuros and covering much of the interior. Once the supporting fire ceased, the infantry assault commenced, with the 3rd Battalion, 129th Regiment swiftly crossing the Pasig River without opposition and advancing through the Government Mint into Intramuros. Simultaneously, the 2nd Battalion, 145th Regiment climbed over the breach south of Quezon Gate and entered through the gate unopposed, quickly moving southwest toward Letran University. Ten minutes into the assault, Griswold's artillery resumed fire for the next half hour, deploying high explosives, smoke, and white phosphorus across a 100-yard-wide area between the east and west walls. This aimed to seal off the southern third of Intramuros, preventing the Japanese forces there from observing movements to the north or sending reinforcements. The total artillery and mortar fire supporting the assault amounted to 230 tons, equivalent to over 11,650 rounds. By 08:50, the 129th and 145th Regiments connected at Letran University, with the 129th advancing toward Beaterio Street and Fort Santiago against minimal resistance, while the 145th cleared Letran University and secured the first two blocks southwest of Quezon Gate. At 10:45, the 1st Battalion of the 145th Regiment moved through Parian Gate and headed south. As American troops pushed deeper into Intramuros, the Japanese began to recover from the artillery bombardment, offering sporadic resistance from isolated machine-gun and rifle positions. Nonetheless, the 129th successfully cleared the west wall north of Beaterio Street and captured Fort Santiago in the afternoon. However, the 145th had to halt its advance about four blocks southwest of Quezon Gate as the Japanese started releasing nearly 3,000 civilian hostages from San Augustin and Del Monico Churches. Once the civilian evacuation was complete, American tanks and self-propelled artillery targeted Japanese positions within those churches and other strongholds in the southwestern section of Intramuros. Despite the efforts, the troops were unable to reach the south or west walls before nightfall due to fierce resistance. Meanwhile, the 1st Squadron, 12th Cavalry, along with the 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry, began clearing the South Port Area, facing relatively light opposition except at one strongpoint. Meanwhile, the 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry, and elements of the 148th Regiment contained the enemy at the government buildings. On February 24, while the 129th was finishing operations at Fort Santiago, the 145th continued its offensive, successfully cornering the last pockets of resistance in its area into the Aquarium, situated in a bastion at the southwest corner of Intramuros. Although the resistance was fierce in this location, a tunnel linking the bastion to the main wall was unexpectedly left unguarded, allowing Company C to break through into the Aquarium with ease. The final assault commenced in the afternoon, resulting in 115 Japanese casualties as the last organized resistance within Intramuros was overcome. In total, approximately 1,000 Japanese were killed, and 25 were captured during the assault on Intramuros, with the Americans suffering 25 killed and 265 wounded. Concurrently, the cavalrymen completed the clearing of the South Port Area and turned their attention to the government buildings, which would necessitate another intensive preparatory bombardment. The imposing, columned façade of the Philippine Commonwealth's Legislative Building--the Philippine Capitol--fronted on Padre Burgos Street opposite the southeast corner of Intramuros and lay 150 yards south of the City Hall. About 100 yards south of the Legislative Building was the Bureau of Finance, and another 250 yards to the south-southeast, near the intersection of General Luna and San Luis Streets, lay the main building of the Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce. Architecturally similar to the old Senate and House Office Buildings in Washington DC, the three government structures were modern, earthquake-proof edifices constructed of heavily reinforced concrete. The oblong Legislative Building, with wings four stories high and a central portion rising another two and a half floors, was constructed around two open courtyards. The Finance and Agriculture Buildings, both five-story trapezoids, each featured a central courtyard. The buildings were strong not only by virtue of their construction but because all approaches to them led across wide open ground. Sandbag emplacements and barricades of other types blocked all readily accessible doors and windows, and window-emplaced machine guns covered all approaches. Despite the fact that the Japanese in the three buildings had advantages of position and elevation that permitted them to endanger American and Filipino movements over large areas of Manila, the 14th Corps and the 37th Division at first considered starving the Japanese garrison out. But the two headquarters soon decided this would take too long. Information from prisoners and Filipino hostages who had escaped from the buildings indicated that the Japanese garrisons in the three structures had sufficient strength, ammunition, food, and water to withstand a protracted siege. On February 26, after an hour of final artillery preparation, the 1st Battalion, 148th Regiment entered the ground floor of the Legislative Building from the rear, while the 5th Cavalry attacked the Agriculture Building; however, both units were successfully repelled by the determined defenders. The following day, after a failed attempt to smoke the Japanese out of the Legislative Building, heavy artillery was used to demolish the north and south wings, leaving only the damaged central section, which was subsequently cleared by the infantry. At the same time, the 5th Cavalry cleared out the apartment building and several nearby structures in preparation for another attack on the Agriculture Building, which commenced on February 28 following a three-hour artillery bombardment that caused significant portions of the building to collapse. Facing no initial resistance, the cavalrymen quickly accessed the remnants of the first floor but soon encountered strong opposition from pockets of resistance at the northwest and southeast corners. With support from tanks and armed with small arms, bazookas, and portable flamethrowers, the 5th Cavalry managed to clear the above-ground debris by nightfall, although a few Japanese soldiers remained hidden in basement areas. Ultimately, on March 1, after a failed appeal for surrender, demolitions along with burning gasoline and oil eliminated the last of the Japanese resistance. During this time, artillery, tanks, and tank destroyers relentlessly bombarded the Finance Building from various angles. Eventually, the 1st Battalion of the 148th Regiment would clear the remnants of this building during their final assaults on March 2 and 3. Late on March 3, Griswold joyfully informed Krueger that organized resistance in the Manila area had come to an end. The cost of reclaiming Manila was significant, with over 1,000 Americans killed and 5,500 wounded in the metropolitan area between February 3 and March 3. In contrast, the Japanese suffered approximately 16,000 fatalities in and around Manila. During periods of calm in the fighting, Japanese troops often vented their anger and frustration on the city's civilians, committing acts of violent mutilation, rape, and massacres in schools, hospitals, and convents. This led to the deaths of at least 100,000 Filipino civilians, both from deliberate actions by the Japanese during the Manila massacre and from artillery and aerial bombardments by American and Japanese forces. If you listened to the very first episode of this podcast series, I actually began it with what is known as the Manila massacre. During lulls in the battle for control of Manila, Japanese troops took their anger and frustration out on the civilians in the city. Violent mutilations, rapes, and massacres occurred in schools, hospitals and convents, including San Juan de Dios Hospital, Santa Rosa College, Santo Domingo Church, Manila Cathedral, Paco Church, St. Paul's Convent, and St. Vincent de Paul Church. The Bayview Hotel was used as a designated "rape center". General Yamashita was convicted as a war criminal for the Manila massacre, although Admiral Iwabuchi's marines had committed the atrocities and Yamashita had earlier ordered him to evacuate Manila. By the end of the Battle of Manila, the public transportation system no longer existed; the water supply and sewage systems needed extensive repairs; the electric power facilities did not function; most of the streets needed repaving; and 39 out of 100 or more large and small bridges had been destroyed, including the 6 over the Pasig River. The University of the Philippines and the Philippine General Hospital were largely irreparable. Lower class residential districts north of the Pasig and upper class apartments south of the river had been destroyed; the Philippine Commonwealth's government's center had been wiped out; the 400-year-old landmark of Intramuros had been nearly razed; severe damage had been inflicted on the economically important installations in the North and South Port Areas; and the industrialized Paco and Pandacan Districts had been badly battered. Many buildings still standing would ultimately have to be torn down as unsafe for occupancy. Millions upon millions of dollars' worth of damage had been done and, as a final shocking note of tragedy, an estimated 100000 Filipino civilians had lost their lives during the battle. However, Manila was officially liberated, marking the end of nearly three years of Japanese military occupation in the Philippines. Following Manila's fall, Krueger aimed to eliminate the Shimbu and Shobu Groups to finalize the liberation of Luzon. Meanwhile, MacArthur deemed it crucial to establish a safe, direct shipping route through the central Philippines to support the creation of large air, naval, and logistical bases on Luzon. Consequently, he instructed the 6th Army to secure southern Luzon and the Bicol Peninsula while also ordering General Eichelberger's 8th Army to seize the islands in the Visayan Passages and the northern part of Samar. To facilitate the southern Philippines Campaign, MacArthur reassigned the 40th and 41st Divisions, the 19th and 34th Regiments of the 24th Division, and the 503rd Parachute Regiment back to the 8th Army. Additionally, he designated the 37th Division to garrison Manila. With the 43rd Division sent south to replace the 40th at Clark Field, Krueger assigned the recently arrived 33rd Division, led by Major-General Percy Clarkson, to take control of the Damortis-Rosario sector. Meanwhile, as the 188th Glider Regiment cleared Ternate Island, Krueger also decided to deploy the 11th Airborne Division and the 158th Regiment to secure the northern shores of the Visayan Passages and open Batangas and Balayan Bays. However, this left only the 1st Cavalry Division and the 112th Cavalry Regiment available for operations against the Shimbu Group, leading Krueger to reluctantly redeploy the 6th Division south to reinforce the 14th Corps, leaving just the 25th, 32nd, and 33rd Divisions under the 1st Corps for operations in northern Luzon. After making these adjustments, Krueger and Griswold began strategizing their offensive eastward against General Yokoyama's Shimbu Group, which had recently received the Noguchi Detachment from the Bicol Peninsula. To ensure the security and recovery of the Manila Bay area, General Patrick's 6th Division was tasked with first capturing Wawa Dam and its pipeline connections, followed by securing Ipo Dam and its related facilities, essential for meeting Manila's water needs. Meanwhile, General Hoffman's 2nd Cavalry Brigade was assigned to secure the Antipolo-Tagig region. Between February 20 and 22, even before the fierce fighting in Manila began to ease, the 7th Cavalry crossed the Marikina River to take control of Taytay and then ventured into the Sierra Madre foothills. The 8th Cavalry followed suit, crossing the river to secure Tagig. On February 23, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade advanced east toward Antipolo, but General Noguchi effectively utilized artillery and conducted small-scale nightly infiltration attacks, successfully harassing and delaying the cavalrymen, who could only measure their progress in feet. Noguchi's effective passive defense meant that by March 4, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade was still a mile and a half from Antipolo, having incurred heavy casualties during this frustrating advance. Among the wounded was General Mudge, who was temporarily replaced by Hoffman as commander of the 1st Cavalry Division. On February 22, the 6th Division also began crossing the Marikina River, with the 20th Regiment fording at Marikina town and the 63rd Regiment crossing at Montalban and San Mateo. Facing no resistance, the 20th Regiment advanced a mile into the steep, grassy hills northeast of Marikina, while the 63rd probed into the high ground east of San Mateo by the evening of February 23. The troops initiated an assault on General Kobayashi's primary defenses at Mounts Pacawagan and Mataba, but made minimal progress before the 1st Regiment arrived from Bataan on February 25. With this new reinforcement, Patrick launched a coordinated attack involving three regiments against Pacawagan and Mataba. However, by March 4, they had only secured a tenuous foothold on the northern crest of Pacawagan, as the efforts of the 1st and 20th Regiments were entirely unsuccessful. Meanwhile, noticing an uptick in guerrilla activity in the Bontoc and Baguio areas, which indicated a potential major enemy offensive on Baguio, and considering the possibility of an airborne assault in the Cagayan Valley, General Yamashita began reorganizing his forces while preparing the defenses of the triangular redoubt in northern Luzon. He kept most of the 103rd Division stationed in the Aparri and Vigan sectors, assigned the 177th Independent Battalion to secure the naval air base at Tuguegarao, and started organizing eight provisional companies from the remnants of the 2nd Parachute Group at Echague. He tasked the 10th Division with defending the Salacsac-Balete Pass sector to the last man, gathered the remnants of the 2nd Tank Division at Dupax to reform as an understrength infantry division, and relocated the 105th Division to Bagabag, where it would be bolstered by the 10th Regiment. Additionally, he assigned these three divisions to Major-General Konuma Haruo's self-sufficient Bambang Branch, transferred the 19th Division to the Bontoc area to combat the enemy guerrillas, tasked the Hayashi Detachment with holding San Fernando, began moving the worn-out 58th Independent Mixed Brigade north to defend Route 9, and ordered the fatigued 23rd Division to continue containing the enemy in the Rosario-Baguio sector. General Swift's 1st Corps, which had recently lost two divisions, was focusing its main efforts against Baguio. Clarkson's 33rd Division was set to advance north along Route 11, while General Gill's 32nd Division would move northwest through the Ambayabang, Agno, and Arodogat valleys from the south and southeast. Meanwhile, General Mullins' 25th Division planned to launch a holding attack on the Bambang front. However, in mid-February, as Clarkson's forces continued to pressure Japanese troops entrenched along the Hill 600-Hill 1500 ridgeline, they learned that General Sato's withdrawal to the north was already in progress to bolster the San Fernando front. Additionally, the 130th and 136th Regiments successfully cleared the last Japanese forces from the north-central part of the ridgeline by February 22, although they were unable to capture the Hill 600 complex. At the same time, the 32nd and 25th Divisions conducted extensive patrols in their areas, discovering that the Japanese were guarding every approach to the north as various units made contact with Japanese outposts. During this period, the Americans also identified the Baguio-Aritao supply road. Severing this link in the Japanese defensive network would provide the 1st Corps with a significant tactical advantage. Given that the Baguio end of the supply road was more heavily defended and that breaking through to Aritao would threaten the critical Bambang and Bagabag positions, Krueger and Swift decided that the 25th and 32nd Divisions would concentrate their efforts on the Bambang front, while the Baguio front would be maintained in a holding capacity. Volckmann's missions as assigned by 6th Army, which assumed control of USAFIP(NL) on January 13, were to gather intelligence, ambush Japanese patrols, seize or destroy Japanese supplies, disrupt Japanese lines of communication, and block Japanese routes of withdrawal into and exit from the Cagayan Valley. It was not, apparently, initially intended that Volckmann's force would engage in sustained efforts against major Japanese units, and there seems to have been little hope that Volckmann's, or any other guerrilla unit, would ever become effective combat organizations. The most help General MacArthur and Krueger probably expected was in the form of harassing raids, sabotage, and intelligence. But Volckmann--and other guerrilla leaders on Luzon as well--interpreted his missions as broadly as his strength and armament permitted. By the end of February USAFIP(NL) had cleared much of the west coast of Luzon north of San Fernando and also controlled the north coast west of Aparri. Volckmann had rendered Route 11 between Baguio and Tuguegarao and Route 4 from Libtong to Bagabag virtually impassable to the Japanese. Indeed, one of the main reasons that Yamashita moved the 19th Division north had been to regain control over the two vital highways so that supplies could continue moving into the final redoubt. While USAFIP(NL) did not possess sufficient strength to attack major Japanese concentrations or to hold out against large-scale punitive expeditions, it had diverted and pinned down Japanese forces that could undoubtedly have been used to better advantage elsewhere. It would appear that by mid-February USAFIP(NL) had accomplished far more than MacArthur or Krueger had either expected or hoped. Meanwhile, the 121st Regiment secured the highway from Vigan south to Libtong, with Company L capturing Cervantes and pushing the 357th Independent Battalion into the Bessang Pass. Elements of the 121st then shifted their focus to San Fernando, which they attempted to attack unsuccessfully in late February and early March. Following Swift's new strategies, the 33rd Division began patrolling the approaches to Baguio in the last week of February, successfully overrunning the last Japanese positions on Hill 600 and in the Arodogat Valley. Along Route 11, the 71st Regiment executed a successful fighting withdrawal, while American patrols along the coast occupied Agoo and advanced to Pugo with minimal resistance, only to encounter the first sections of the Tuba Trail defended by elements of the 64th Regiment. On the main front, the 25th Division commenced its advance to Puncan on February 21, while the 32nd Division began its push up the Villa Verde Trail toward Santa Fe. The 127th Regiment broke through the trail's outpost line on February 24; the 35th Regiment advanced unopposed along Route 100, reaching Carranglan on February 26; the 161st Regiment targeted high ground overlooking Puncan from the west and successfully secured the trail junction on February 28, diverting the enemy's attention; and the 27th Regiment pushed north along Route 5, facing fierce resistance while clearing the Lumboy area on February 27. On Villa Verde, the 127th Regiment advanced to the Cabalisiaan River crossing by March 1, where they once again defeated the 10th Reconnaissance Regiment. After leaving one battalion to secure the crossing, the 127th continued their advance and encountered the weakened Japanese defenders on March 3. Recognizing the threat to the Salacsac Pass, Konuma promptly sent reinforcements to the 10th Reconnaissance Regiment and ordered General Iwanaka's recently reorganized 2nd Tank Division to prepare for deployment to the Salacsac Pass, taking command of all troops along the Villa Verde Trail. While these reinforcements were en route, the 127th Regiment continued to assault the remaining positions of the 10th Reconnaissance Regiment, ultimately reaching the western entrance of Salacsac Pass on March 5. Meanwhile, to the south, a battalion from the 35th Regiment descended a rugged trail into Puncan from the northeast and secured the heights overlooking the damaged town on March 1. The next day, as patrols entered the deserted Puncan, the rest of the regiment cautiously advanced west along Route 100 from Carranglan, occupying Digdig without resistance on March 3. Over the following two days, organized resistance began to crumble throughout the Lumboy-Puncan area, with Mullins' three regiments successfully connecting at Puncan and Digdig after the encirclement of a 1,250-man enemy force. Concerned about these developments, Konuma quickly decided to bolster the 10th Division with the Takachiho Unit and the majority of the 10th Regiment. Additionally, the 2nd Battalion of the 126th Regiment began its advance up the Ambayabang Valley on February 25, successfully reaching Lawican by March 5. In response to this new threat, Yamashita swiftly directed his reserve 16th Reconnaissance Regiment to secure the upper reaches of the Ambayabang. Finally, to the south, the Americal and 24th Divisions were tasked with initiating operations to secure the Visayan Passages. Consequently, on February 19, the 1st Battalion of the 182nd Regiment landed on Capul Island and launched an assault on Biri Island the next day. After discovering other unoccupied islets near Samar, the battalion established a base at the northwestern tip of Samar, ultimately defeating the last organized resistance in that region by March 1. Meanwhile, elements of the 19th Regiment landed on Verde Island on February 23, managing to secure the island by March 3. The 1st Battalion of the 21st Regiment made an unopposed landing on Lubang Island on February 28, and the 1st Battalion of the 132nd Regiment successfully captured Ticao and Burias Islands on March 3. Additionally, on the morning of February 23, a task force comprising the 1st Battalion of the 188th Glider Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 511th Parachute Regiment, a Provisional Reconnaissance Platoon from the 11th Airborne Division, several guerrilla groups led by Lieutenant-Colonel Honorio Guerrero, along with supporting artillery, tank destroyers, and amphibious tractors, executed a carefully coordinated rescue of 2,147 internees from an internment camp near Los Baños on Laguna de Bay. The 1st Battalion of the 188th Glider Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Soule, launched a diversionary ground attack from the west, while the majority of the 1st Battalion of the 511th Parachute Regiment crossed Laguna de Bay using amphibious tractors. Company B of the 511th Parachute Regiment parachuted directly into the camp, and the Reconnaissance Platoon along with the guerrillas, who had already infiltrated the area, created chaos throughout the camp. The task force eliminated the Japanese garrison of about 250 guards and managed to escape through enemy-held territory before the Fuji Force could mount a counterattack. The casualties were minimal: only 3 Americans and 2 Filipinos lost their lives, while 2 Americans and 4 Filipinos were injured. However, starting two nights after the raid, the 17th Regiment, along with Kempeitai police and Filipino Ganaps, began terror raids in the surrounding barrios, resulting in the deaths of up to 1,500 Filipino civilians over the next few nights. It was now time to leave the Philippines and return to New Guinea to support the ongoing Australian campaign in Aitape-Wewak. Previously, Brigadier Martin's 19th Brigade had fought its way to Malin and Abau, while Colonel Buttrose's 2/5th Battalion secured Perembil, Asiling, Samisai, and Maharingi. On January 12, Brigadier Moten directed the battalion to initiate a three-pronged offensive toward Luwaite, Bulamita, and Bombisima. The advance was rapid, as patrols encountered only small enemy groups, and all three objectives were successfully captured by the end of January. After the capture of Malin, the 2/8th Battalion and the 2/9th Commando Squadron patrolled the rugged terrain between Nimbum Creek and the upper Danmap for three weeks, facing some resistance on Long Ridge. Due to this pressure, General Aotsu's force received additional reinforcements in the latter half of January before withdrawing to join the defenses of the 20th Division, while General Mano's 41st Division retreated to Balif and Salata. Meanwhile, General Stevens had ordered Brigadier Roy King's 16th Brigade to relieve the 19th at the Danmap, but catastrophic floods hindered the completion of this relief in the south before the month ended. In the north, the 2/1st Battalion took over from the 2/11th Battalion on January 24 and began advancing patrols along Nambut Hill, where they faced significant resistance. Due to these patrols, the Australians launched a company attack on February 4, which the defenders easily repelled. Following a heavy air bombardment, the enemy stronghold was captured on February 7, and another company took McNeil's Creek four days later. Meanwhile, the 2/3rd Battalion initiated an assault on Long Ridge, inflicting considerable casualties on the enemy at Cory's Spur. At this juncture, Stevens decided to sequentially capture But, Dagua, and Wewak, as well as Maprik in the mountains, and to push eastward. The 16th Brigade was the first to advance to Wank Creek and then to the Anumb River. King promptly sent the 2/1st Battalion to secure Nambut Creek while the 2/3rd Battalion moved to the Wolhuk Creek-Una Creek line. By February 18, the 2/1st Battalion had fully secured Nambut Hill, with one company advancing along the coast and pushing the Japanese across the creek the next day. By February 22, the area up to Balam Creek was occupied, and barges had delivered supplies at Wank Creek for four days. The following day, they reached the Anumb River and began patrolling toward Sowom while a sloop bombarded enemy positions along the coast. Finally, on February 28, the 2/2nd Battalion relieved the weary 2/1st Battalion and started preparing for operations against But. Simultaneously, the 2/3rd Battalion successfully established the Wolhuk Creek-Una Creek line and sent patrols northward to connect with both the 2/1st and 2/2nd Battalions. In early February, the 2/5th Battalion launched an attack on Salata, Balif, and Balaga, sending three companies southward. Salata and Bombeta were captured on February 3, followed by Balif three days later, while Balaga remained successfully defended. The 2/6th Cavalry Commando Regiment was tasked with supporting Moten's advance toward Maprik, prompting the 2/10th Commando Squadron to move to Ami. After the Australians secured the Balaga-Numango area on February 13, Buttrose dispatched two companies to capture Barangabandangi and Malahun, which fell by February 17. At this time, the 2/10th Commando Squadron had also advanced northeast of Ami to Walahuta, Kualigem, and Amahaur, resulting in several Japanese casualties. Meanwhile, the 2/7th Commando Squadron conducted patrols deep into the Atob River and the headwaters of the Screw River. The 2/5th Battalion was preparing for relief by the 2/7th Battalion but first needed to fend off a strong counterattack at Malahun on February 23. During the 2/5th's advance, most of the 40th Division withdrew south into a densely populated garden area bordered by the Nanu and Amuk Rivers. This southern flank could not be overlooked as the Australians moved toward Maprik, so Moten sent a company from the 2/6th Battalion to advance through M'Bras, Asanakor, Yubanakuor, and then east to the heavily fortified Sinahau villages, pushing the enemy toward Maprik for destruction. Additionally, a rumor was spread among the locals that the commandos would advance on Maprik via Ami, which successfully prompted the Japanese to reposition most of their forces to the north and northeast. Meanwhile, by early March, the 2/7th Battalion had completed the relief of the 2/5th Battalion and successfully occupied Asanakor on March 7, followed by Inimbi on March 8, Yubanakuor on March 9, and Balangabadabil, Ilahop, and Armimin on March 10. To the north, the 2/2nd Battalion also finished its relief at the Anumb. Additionally, the 2/3rd Machine-Gun Battalion and the 2/9th Commando Squadron took over from the 2/3rd Battalion in the mountainous region. The latter began advancing towards Arohemi on March 4, where they encountered a strong Japanese force that resisted for three days. After a significant airstrike, the Australians managed to clear the area west of the Anumb River by March 9. Simultaneously, the 2/2nd Battalion pushed forward to Simbi Creek, successfully clearing the area and reaching the Ninahau River by March 12. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Manila is finally over. The capital of the Philippines came at a terrible cost for the Americans, Japanese and innocent Filipino civilians. It would be only a matter of time until the Americans moped up the Philippines and continued onwards to the Japanese home islands.
General Douglas MacArthur's iconic cap, one of the most amazing artifacts in our museum, is a finalist for a conservation prize from VAM – the Virginia Association of Museums (VAM). Currently the cap is on VAM's Virginia Top 10 Endangered List. The list helps raise public awareness of amazing artifacts in Virginia museums and the importance of preserving these artifacts. General MacArthur's cap is an internationally recognized symbol of America keeping promises, of civilian control over the military, of liberation and peace, and of triumph over fascism and militarism. MacArthur wore this cap from 1936 to 1961, through many important moments in American history. In 1942, saltwater exposure caused the cap to shrink as he escaped the besieged island of Corregidor aboard PT-41. Arriving in Australia during one of the darkest periods of the war, he wore the cap as he famously promised "I Shall Return.” When he kept that promise in 1944, he was wearing the cap as he was pictured wading ashore in the Philippines. He was also wearing the cap when he presided over the surrender of Japan, the Occupation of Japan, and the Korean War. VAM invites members of the public to vote for the artifact they would like to see receive a $1000 conservation prize. MacArthur's cap has been assessed by a conservation specialist, and we have a plan for its conservation – but winning this prize would help jumpstart our efforts to fully fund this project. Your vote can help preserve MacArthur's cap!You can vote once daily, from FEB 11 – FEB 28, 2025. VOTE: VA's Top 10 Endangered Artifacts - Vote DailyLearn more about VAM: Virginia Association of Museums | VAMHave a comment about this episode? Send us a text message! (Note: we can only read the texts, we can't reply) Follow us on:Twitter: @MacArthur1880; @AEWilliamsClarkFacebook: @MacArthurMemorialwww.macarthurmemorial.org
The successful Allied capture of Inchon and Seoul, together with the Eighth Army’s breakout from the Pusan Perimeter, forced the North Korean army to rapidly retreat northward and brought the Allied forces to the 38th Parallel. Now, General MacArthur was faced with a decision…should the Allies dig in and consolidate their gains, daring the North Koreans to attack them? Or should they advance further to the north and take control of all Korea? In this episode, Evan and James discuss MacArthur’s fateful decision to…well, listen, and you will find out! Retreat, Hell! In this episode, Sean and James discuss the 1952 film Retreat, Hell!, which presents a sweeping overview of the legendary First Marine Division’s actions in the Korean War, from training camp, to the Inchon landing, to their battles with Chinese forces in North Korea, and finally to their eventual evacuation. Get ready to join in a rousing chorus of the Marine Corps Hymn with Sean and James as they review this fun flick.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
The MacArthur Memorial is in Norfolk, VA, the hometown of General MacArthur's mother, but General MacArthur was not born in Norfolk. He was born in Little Rock, Arkansas, at the Little Rock Barracks. Today that building houses the MacArthur Museum of Arkansas Military History. To discuss MacArthur's birthplace, the MacArthur Memorial Podcast hosted Stephan McAteer, Museum Supervisor of the MacArthur Museum of Arkansas Military History. Learn more about the MacArthur Museum of Arkansas Military HistoryHave a comment about this episode? Send us a text message! (Note: we can only read the texts, we can't reply) Follow us on:Twitter: @MacArthur1880; @AEWilliamsClarkFacebook: @MacArthurMemorialwww.macarthurmemorial.org
Last time we spoke about the invasion of Luzon. As Operation Mike 1 commenced, General Swift's 1st Corps prepared to assault Lingayen Gulf while General Griswold's 14th Corps rehearsed at Huon Gulf. Despite successful diversionary strikes, Japanese forces anticipated an invasion. On January 2, enemy ships were spotted heading towards Luzon, confirming fears of a large-scale operation. Kamikaze attacks intensified, damaging Allied vessels, including the USS Long, which sank after being hit. Amidst bombardments, Filipino citizens demonstrated resilience despite the destruction, reflecting their loyalty and hope during the turmoil. As dawn broke on January 9, Kinkaid's amphibious convoys approached Lingayen Gulf, initiating a fierce assault. Preceded by heavy bombardments, American forces landed on the beaches, facing minimal resistance. The 14th Corps advanced toward key locations, while the 1st Corps secured strategic positions despite enduring sniper fire. By nightfall, they established a significant beachhead. Despite sporadic Japanese counterattacks, American troops pressed forward, and reinforcements were deployed to maintain momentum. The stage was set for a crucial campaign in Luzon. This episode is the South China Sea Raid Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. As we last left off, the 1st and 14th Corps had just successfully established a beachhead on Lingayen Gulf. On January 11, General Krueger further reinforced his position by landing additional reserves, aiming to effectively confront the formidable enemy forces entrenched in the eastern hills. Concurrently, Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet units made their entrance into the South China Sea to execute an ambitious raid known as Operation Gratitude. This operation was prompted by misleading intelligence reports suggesting that the hybrid battleship-carriers Ise and Hyuga were stationed in Cam Ranh Bay. In response, Halsey ordered Admiral Bogan's Task Group 38.2 to launch an assault on these supposed targets. This task group was primarily composed of the battleships New Jersey and Wisconsin, which were directed to bombard the bay and eliminate any Japanese vessels that had sustained damage from prior airstrikes. To enhance their operational capabilities, Halsey established Task Group 38.5, specifically designed for night operations, which included the night-capable carriers Enterprise and Independence. On January 12, aircraft from these carriers were deployed for a predawn reconnaissance mission over Cam Ranh Bay and its adjacent waters in search of enemy targets. Despite their efforts, the search yielded no results, indicating that the earlier intelligence had been inaccurate. Nevertheless, all three carrier groups proceeded with their planned strikes at 07:30, while the surface action group advanced toward Cam Ranh. Halsey's strategic gamble proved to be remarkably successful. Although the Ise and Hyuga were not present in the bay, American aviators discovered a wealth of enemy shipping, including three significant Japanese convoys. Sherman's TG 38.3 encountered the most valuable target off Qui Nhon north of Cam Ranh. This was convoy Hi-86 with nine merchants and a heavy escort. The convoy had departed Cape St Jacques on January 9 and was headed north. The escort comprised light cruiser Kashii and five kaibokan. Late on January 11, it reached Qui Nhon Bay and anchored. After leaving Qui Nhon Bay, it was discovered by TG 38.3. In two large attacks, aircraft from Essex, Ticonderoga, Langley, and San Jacinto laid waste to the convoy. None of the nine merchant ships in the convoy survived this onslaught. Cargo ships Yoshu Maru and Eiman Maru (loaded with bauxite and raw rubber), along with tanker San Luis Maru, were sunk. The other six ships were damaged and forced to beach. Otsusan Maru (a cargo ship converted to tanker), passenger-cargo ship Tatebe Maru, cargo ship Kyokuun Maru, cargo ship Yusei Maru, ore carrier Tatsubato Maru, and cargo ship Banshu Maru No. 63 all became constructive total losses. The escort for this large convoy met a similar fate. Light cruiser Kashii was hit amidships by a torpedo in the early afternoon. This was followed by two bomb hits aft that detonated her depth-charge magazine. Kashii sank stern first with 621 members of her crew; only 19 survived. CD-23 was attacked north of Qui Nhon and sunk with her entire crew of 155 officers and men. CD-51 suffered the same fate. After she blew up and sank, her depth charges detonated with fatal consequences for any survivors; 159 men were lost. From the entire convoy, only kaibokans Daito and Ukuru, and corvette CD-27 survived, albeit in a damaged state. As a result, Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 conducted an impressive total of 984 strike missions throughout the day. This relentless assault led to the sinking of the light cruiser Kashii, two minesweepers, eight kaibokans, two subchasers, five transport ships, fourteen cargo vessels, and nine oilers. Additionally, four kaibokans, one subchaser, three transports, four cargo ships, and two oilers were damaged. This operation marked the highest number of ships sunk by airstrikes in a single day during the war, showcasing the effectiveness of the American air campaign and the critical role of intelligence in naval warfare. In addition to inflicting significant damage on Japanese shipping, the aviators under Admiral Halsey achieved remarkable success by claiming the destruction of 113 enemy aircraft, both in the air and on the ground, while sustaining the loss of 23 American aircraft. The impact of these operations extended beyond aerial engagements; critical infrastructure was also targeted. Airfields, docks, and oil storage facilities located between Tourane and Saigon suffered considerable damage. Notably, the railway station in Nha Trang and a vital bridge on the route connecting Saigon to Bien Hoa were also affected, disrupting transportation and supply lines. Meanwhile, Bogan's surface strike group was unable to locate any Japanese vessels during their operations and instead focused their firepower on bombarding Cam Ranh Bay, further demonstrating the ongoing conflict's intensity. Turning to the situation in Luzon, the 1st and 14th Corps were poised to advance their offensives. To the west, the 185th Regiment and the 40th Reconnaissance Troop initiated a push toward the recently vacated Port Sual. The 160th Regiment maintained a watchful presence at Aguilar, while patrols from the 148th Regiment ventured into towns occupied by guerrilla forces, specifically Urbiztondo and Bayambang. In the eastern sector, the 6th Division was temporarily held back to prevent the creation of a potentially hazardous gap along the front of the 1st Corps. However, the reinforced 43rd Division continued its advance against the most formidable Japanese defenses encountered on Luzon to date. Along the coastline, the 158th Regiment dispatched patrols into Damortis, discovering the town largely deserted. The 172nd Regiment attempted an attack on Hill 580, which ultimately proved unsuccessful, while the 63rd Regiment was deployed to close the widening gap between the 158th and 172nd Regiments. The primary objective of these coordinated efforts was to defeat Major-General Sato Bunzo's 58th Independent Mixed Brigade and secure control of the Damortis-Rosario road. The Damortis-Rosario road, a 2-lane, concrete-paved section of Route 3, led east from the junction of Route 3 and the coast road at Damortis, about 8 miles north of San Fabian, to the junction of Routes 3 and 11, 8 miles inland and a mile east of Rosario. Seizure of the Damortis-Rosario stretch of Route 3 would present 1st Corps with an easy means of access to Route 11, in turn providing a 2-lane asphalt-paved axis of advance toward Baguio along the deep valley of the Bued River. Equally important, if the 1st Corps could quickly gain control over the Damortis-Rosario road and the Routes 3-11 junction, the corps could largely overcome the threat of counterattack against the 6th Army's beachhead from the north and northeast. The Damortis-Rosario road ran sometimes across wooded ravines and sometimes over ridge tops for 3/4 of the way to Rosario, and then continued across open farm land and through Rosario to a junction with Route 11. The road was dominated by broken ridges and steep-sided hills to both the north and the south for the first 5 miles inland. South of the road the hills and ridges were grass-covered; to the north many of the draws and ravines contained thick scrub growth. Bare, steep heights north, northeast, and east of Rosario controlled the Routes 3-11 junction. The 58th Independent Mixed Brigade, defending the Damortis-Rosario road, had all the advantages of observation, while the relatively soft rock and dirt mixture of the hills and ridges gave the brigade ample opportunity to indulge in what was soon to appear to the 1st Corps as the Japanese Army's favorite occupation--digging caves and tunnels. Achieving this would mitigate the threat of a counterattack against the 6th Army's beachhead from the north and northeast. With the security of its left flank assured, the 14th Corps could then accelerate its advance toward General Krueger's main objective: the Central Plains-Manila Bay region. This strategic maneuvering was crucial for consolidating American forces and ensuring a successful campaign in the Philippines. At the same time, the 169th Regiment faced ongoing challenges at Hill 318 and the southern part of the Japanese-held third ridgeline, while the 103rd Regiment made unsuccessful attempts to advance toward the Hill 200 complex, which was firmly defended by the 2nd Battalion, 64th Regiment. Meanwhile, General Tominaga executed his final large-scale kamikaze attack during the Philippines Campaign, successfully damaging two destroyer escorts, one destroyer transport, and five merchant ships. The final attacks were recorded on January 13. Only two suicide aircraft were dispatched, both IJA Ki-84 Franks. One surprised the crew of escort carrier Salamaua. Unengaged by antiaircraft fire, the Frank hit amidships. One of the aircraft's bombs exploded on the hangar deck and the second passed through the ship creating a hole near the waterline. The carrier was left without power while major fires took hold. Damage control was ultimately successful, but not before 15 were killed and 88 wounded. Salamaua was out of the war until April. Also on this day, attack transport Zeilin was hit by a probable IJN aircraft conducting an impromptu suicide attack. Ultimately, the 4th Air Army was scheduled to evacuate to Formosa on January 15, marking the end of the threat from Japanese air power in the Philippines, although the Allies were not yet aware of this. Since the initial kamikaze assault on the Mindoro-bound convoys on December 13, Japanese aircraft had sunk 24 vessels and damaged 67 others. Casualties from these air attacks aboard ships were approximately 1,230 men killed and 1,800 wounded, while the Allies estimated they had destroyed around 600 Japanese aircraft during the same timeframe. Back in Lingayen Gulf on January 13, the 172nd Regiment once again advanced up the grassy, steep slopes of Hill 580, successfully securing most of the area against fierce resistance. Simultaneously, the 63rd Regiment attacked north from Hill 247 and captured Hill 363, despite lacking artillery support. Artillery support was to have been provided by the 43rd Division's 155-mm. howitzer battalion, the 192nd Field Artillery Battalion, since the 63rd Regiment's own 105-mm. battalion had been sent south with the rest of the 6th Division. Unfortunately, the 192nd Field Artillery did not learn it was to support the 63rd until after dark on January 12, and could not start moving to good close support positions until daylight on the 13th, after the 63rd had started its attack. Unlike a 105-mm. battalion, the 192nd did not normally operate in direct support roles and lacked the forward observers and communications the lighter battalions possessed. The 192nd might therefore have been expected to take some time to prepare for its direct support mission, but the battalion reported it could have provided some support--with at least one battery--by noon on the 13th had not Colonel Ralph C. Holliday, commanding the 63rd Regiment, insisted that wire be laid for artillery liaison officers and forward observers, a job that was not completed for almost 36 hours. Colonel Holliday may have been influenced in his decision by the fact that the artillery's SCR-610 radio did not work efficiently in the broken terrain of the middle ridge line where the 63rd was attacking. It was not, indeed, until the 43rd Division had supplied the 192nd Field Artillery with infantry SCR-300 sets that the battalion was able to establish satisfactory radio communications. Then, on January 14, the first radio brought up to the battalion's forward observers was promptly destroyed by Japanese artillery, which also cut wire that had already been laid. Support was again delayed, so the entire battalion was not in position and ready to give the 63rd Regiment the support it needed until midafternoon on January 15. Meanwhile the 169th Regiment completed the clearing of the southern end of the ridgeline, while the 103rd Regiment continued its unsuccessful efforts to take Hill 200. To the west, the 6th Division established a fortified line extending from Malasiqui to Manaoag. They promptly dispatched reconnaissance units to the east and south to gather intelligence on enemy movements. The 185th Regiment achieved a significant victory by successfully assaulting Port Sual, while the 160th Regiment engaged in several skirmishes with the reinforced 23rd Reconnaissance Regiment, which had retreated from Port Sual at the onset of the conflict. Meanwhile, patrols from the 148th Regiment advanced into Wawa, strategically located between Bayambang and Urbiztondo. The following day, the 185th Regiment continued its momentum by capturing the crucial road junction town of Alaminos on the Bolinao Peninsula. Some of its elements also pushed northward toward Cabalitan Bay, where they discovered that Allied Naval Forces had already landed to establish a seaplane base, enhancing their operational capabilities in the region. Looking to the east, the 103rd Regiment made gradual but consistent progress along Hill 200, while the 169th Regiment executed a costly frontal assault to clear Hill 318, suffering significant casualties in the process. The 172nd Regiment advanced north along the third ridge, successfully seizing Hill 565 despite facing scattered resistance. The 63rd Regiment continued its slow advance northward, persistently harassed by Japanese artillery and mortar fire, which impeded their progress. Additionally, the 158th Regiment initiated an offensive toward Rosario but was quickly compelled to retreat due to intense Japanese artillery and machine-gun fire. In contrast, General Yamashita, while cautious about launching a major counteroffensive, recognized the necessity of limited offensive actions to regain the initiative. He believed that such actions would effectively disrupt the enemy's advance inland. Consequently, he ordered General Nishiyama's 23rd Division to conduct a robust raiding attack against the San Fabian-Alacan sector during the night of January 16. This strategic decision aimed to exploit the element of surprise and inflict damage on the enemy forces, thereby buying time for his troops to regroup and fortify their positions. In a strategic initiative aimed at maximizing the destruction of enemy weaponry, supplies, and critical base installations, the 58th Brigade, along with the 71st and 72nd Regiments, was instructed to assemble specialized "suicide" raiding units. These units comprised carefully selected soldiers, heavily armed with automatic firearms and supported by demolition teams trained for explosive operations. In addition, a fourth unit was to be formed from the Shigemi Detachment of the 2nd Armored Division, which had recently positioned itself on the southern flank of the 23rd Division. This unit would consist of a mobile infantry company and a medium tank company. The operational plan called for these units to breach the enemy's beachhead perimeter simultaneously at various locations on January 17. Their objective was to swiftly execute their missions and then withdraw to safety. As preparations for this limited counteroffensive unfolded, the American forces continued their own offensive operations, which had commenced on January 15. In this context, the 158th Regiment launched an eastward assault, successfully advancing approximately 1,000 yards. Meanwhile, the 63rd Regiment cautiously pushed forward over a mile and a half northward from Hill 363. The 172nd Regiment made a rapid advance to the Cataguintingan road junction, effectively establishing a battalion at the edge of Route 3, about a mile and a half west of Rosario. In contrast, the 169th Regiment encountered challenges during a two-pronged attack on Hill 355, leading General Wing to order the regiment to bypass the hill to the south and reposition overland to Route 3 at barrio Palacpalac. Conversely, the 103rd Regiment achieved significant success in their assault on the Hill 200 complex. Further to the west, patrols from the 185th Regiment advanced westward, successfully reaching Dasol Bay. Additionally, a battalion from the 129th Regiment crossed the Agno River at Wawa and continued south along a dusty gravel road toward Camiling. Other elements of the 160th Regiment also moved down from Aguilar to Camiling, consolidating their position in the area. After completing refueling operations over the previous days, Task Force 38 resumed its northern advance to launch an assault on Formosa on January 15. Despite Admiral McCain's recommendation to cancel the strike due to inclement weather conditions, Admiral Halsey opted to proceed with the operation. As a result, a series of airstrikes were executed against Formosa and the Pescadores Islands throughout the day. The 16 fighter sweeps conducted during this operation managed to destroy only 16 Japanese aircraft in the air and an additional 18 on the ground. However, the bombing missions targeting enemy shipping proved more effective, leading to the sinking of the destroyers Hatakaze and Tsuga, along with one transport vessel and two merchant ships, albeit at the cost of losing 12 American aircraft. Following these strikes, Task Force 38 redirected its course toward Hong Kong, which came under attack on January 16. Unfortunately, the American forces encountered severe weather conditions and faced intense anti-aircraft fire. This resulted in a limited success, with the Americans sinking just one transport ship, five oilers, one cargo vessel, and one guardboat. Additionally, they inflicted damage on the destroyer Hasu, three destroyer escorts, one corvette, one transport, and one oiler. The strikes also caused significant destruction to key infrastructure, including Kai Tak Airport, the Kowloon and Taikoo docks, the Aberdeen dockyard, the Kowloon-Canton railway, and the Macau Naval Aviation Center. In a broader campaign, the Americans executed secondary strikes against Canton and Hainan Island, as well as targeting several airfields along the Chinese coast, particularly between the Leizhou Peninsula and Swatow. However, this ambitious operation came at a steep cost, with Task Force 38 suffering a total loss of 49 aircraft—27 due to operational issues and 22 as a result of enemy action. With the South China Sea Raid concluded, Admiral Halsey directed his fleet toward the Luzon Strait, adhering to Admiral Nimitz's request. Ultimately, Halsey's aggressive campaign resulted in the destruction of approximately 300,000 tons of Japanese shipping and an estimated 615 Japanese aircraft, all at the expense of 201 American planes. Returning to the Lingayen Gulf, Wing's offensive operations persisted on January 16. The 63rd, 158th, and 172nd Regiments continued their assaults toward the town of Rosario. However, they encountered fierce resistance from the determined Japanese defenders, which significantly hampered their progress. In contrast, the 169th Regiment achieved a notable advancement by reaching Palacpalac, while the 103rd Regiment successfully captured the strategically important Hill 200 complex. From their newly secured positions, elements of the 103rd Regiment pursued the retreating Japanese forces toward Pozorrubio. Meanwhile, two reinforced companies advanced toward Potpot, and both towns ultimately fell into American hands on January 17. In a broader strategic context, General Krueger directed General Griswold to dispatch additional troops south of the Agno River in preparation for a decisive push toward Manila. By January 17, the 14th Corps had established outposts at key locations including Moncada, Nampicuan, Anao, and Paniqui, solidifying their control over the area. Simultaneously, Japanese General Nishiyama was preparing to initiate a local counteroffensive by nightfall on January 16. However, the 72nd Regiment's raiding unit was unable to participate due to enemy penetrations disrupting their plans. On the northern front, Sato's raiding unit conducted a minor raid against an artillery position held by the 158th Regiment, but this attack proved largely inconsequential. In contrast, the raiding unit from the 71st Regiment executed a more impactful maneuver by advancing down the Bued River valley. They successfully infiltrated the rear installations of the 172nd Regiment, where they ignited a gasoline dump, damaging several trucks in the process. This raid resulted in the deaths of two American soldiers and injuries to eight others. At Palacpalac, confusion reigned as the retreating 2nd Battalion of the 64th Regiment inadvertently engaged with the perimeter of the 1st Battalion of the 169th Regiment. This chaotic encounter cost the Japanese approximately 100 men before they retreated in disarray, further illustrating the tumultuous nature of the battlefield. In a dramatic turn of events, the tank raiding unit launched a surprise attack on the newly established outpost at Potpot. Initially, the first two tanks managed to breach the perimeter, unleashing a barrage of machine-gun fire in all directions as they sped away down the road toward Manaoag. However, the remaining tanks, along with their infantry support, encountered fierce resistance from determined defenders, leading to a sharp and intense fire fight that lasted two hours. Despite their initial success, the attackers were ultimately repelled. As dawn broke, the two tanks that had previously penetrated the defenses returned down the Manaoag road, but this time they met their demise, successfully destroyed by the defenders who had regrouped and fortified their positions. Since the onset of the invasion, the 1st Corps had suffered significant casualties, with approximately 220 men killed and 660 wounded. In stark contrast, Griswold's forces experienced far lighter losses, with only 30 killed and 90 wounded. With the enemy's counterattack thwarted, the 43rd Division managed to secure positions that effectively reduced the likelihood of another large-scale surprise offensive from the Japanese forces. However, to completely eliminate the remaining threats, Commander Wing recognized the necessity of securing control over the Rosario junction and establishing a solid hold on Route 3 to the south of this critical point. The challenge was considerable, as Japanese artillery, mortars, and machine guns positioned on the surrounding high ground commanded all approaches to Rosario. Consequently, Wing had no choice but to restrict the 172nd Regiment to a defensive holding action on its left flank while directing its right flank to seize the high ground immediately to the north and northwest of Rosario. In addition, the 63rd and 158th Regiments were tasked with neutralizing the enemy stronghold along the Rosario-Damortis road. To expedite the capture of the road junction, Wing also planned for the 103rd and 169th Regiments to launch an offensive drive north along Route 3. This coordinated effort aimed to strengthen their strategic position and diminish the Japanese threat in the region, ultimately paving the way for a more secure and stable front. In response to the evolving battlefield situation, General Krueger ultimately ordered General Mullins' 25th Division to secure the right flank previously held by Wing's forces. This strategic move prompted the 27th and 161st Regiments to begin the process of relieving the 103rd and 169th Regiments. By doing so, the 6th Division would be able to resume its advance, now directed towards Urdaneta and the Cabaruan Hills, critical areas for the ongoing campaign. To the west, Krueger aimed to maintain the 14th Corps along the Agno River line until General Swift's 1st Corps could effectively neutralize the enemy resistance stretching from Damortis to Urdaneta. This would enable Swift's forces to maneuver southward alongside Griswold's corps. However, General MacArthur was eager to initiate a southern advance toward Manila as soon as possible. Consequently, he instructed the 14th Corps to reposition its main forces back to their previous outpost line south of the Agno by January 20. Following this, the corps was to launch an offensive towards Tarlac and Victoria. Once they established a presence along the Tarlac-Victoria line, the corps would prepare to advance toward Clark Field, a vital objective necessary for the successful neutralization of Japanese strongholds at Iwo Jima and Okinawa. To bolster this offensive, MacArthur also planned to deploy the 11th Corps on the western coast of Luzon, just north of the Bataan Peninsula. This amphibious operation aimed to disrupt Japanese defensive strategies in the Clark Field area, thereby enhancing the overall effectiveness of the Allied campaign. In contrast, in reaction to the loss of the Hill 200 complex, Japanese General Yamashita ordered the 2nd Tank Division to advance immediately into the Tayug sector. There, Lieutenant-General Iwanaka Yoshiharu would take command of the 10th Division forces already stationed in the region. The armored units were tasked with positioning themselves along the trail north of San Nicolas and on both sides of the Ambayabang River, with the objective of containing any potential enemy advances to the east. Additionally, the Shigemi Detachment received orders to move its main forces from San Manuel to Binalonan, where they were to defend the town resolutely, prepared to hold their ground against any assault. In addition, General Okamoto was tasked with positioning his main forces to secure the immediate approaches to San Jose. Meanwhile, General Tsuda's 105th Division was instructed to advance northward through Cabanatuan as quickly as possible to establish defensive positions behind the 10th Division, specifically at Minuli and north of Carranglan. However, not all of these strategic plans could be effectively executed. By January 17, Yamashita discovered that the Villa Verde Trail was impassable for tanks and trucks, rendering it unusable for the planned armored movements. Furthermore, the terrain in the Tayug-San Nicolas area proved to be unsuitable for armored operations, complicating the situation further. On January 17 the 14th Area Army commander belatedly learned that the 10th Division had never concentrated at San Jose and that it had made no real effort to dispose itself along the entire Tayug-Umingan-Lupao-San Jose defense line for which it was responsible. General Okamoto, the division commander, had decided that he did not have sufficient strength to hold the relatively open ground assigned to him. Most of his 39th Regiment was with the Kembu Group; the bulk of the 10th Regiment, greatly understrength, was attached to the 103rd Division for the defense of northern Luzon; and, at least as late as of January 15, he had received no word as to when he might expect the attached Tsuda Detachment to arrive in the San Jose area from the east coast. He had therefore withdrawn most of his troops up Route 5 from San Jose and had started disposing them along the line Yamashita had intended the 105th Division to hold; leaving behind only a reinforced infantry company and two artillery battalions to secure the all-important railhead. Okamoto had directed the 10th Reconnaissance Regiment to remain in the San Nicolas area, and he stationed three or four rifle companies of his 63rd Regiment along the Tayug-Lupao line and in rising ground to the southwest. Confronted with these unexpected developments, Yamashita concluded that he had no choice but to accept the redeployment of the 10th Division as an established fact. Consequently, he ordered the 2nd Tank Division, which had already begun its movement toward Tayug, to concentrate its main forces southeast of Tayug to safeguard the immediate approaches to San Jose. Additionally, the 6th Tank Regiment was assigned to position itself in Muñoz to cover the southwestern approach to the area. To further bolster defenses, Tsuda was instructed to deploy two of his five advance battalions to San Jose. However, as these tactical adjustments were being made, it became necessary to shift focus away from Luzon and turn attention toward Leyte, where the final operations on the island were unfolding. It is important to note that the majority of General Suzuki's forces had successfully retreated to the Villaba-Mount Canguipot region, although some strong elements remained isolated further to the east. With General Eichelberger's 8th Army assuming control of the island, American forces commenced the final phase of operations to secure Leyte, methodically working to eliminate any remaining pockets of resistance. From January 1 to February 15, the 11th Airborne Division conducted patrols in the Burauen area, where they engaged and successfully eliminated a well-entrenched enemy force positioned on the southern slopes of Mount Majunag. Meanwhile, the 96th Division carried out extensive patrols in the eastern mountainous regions before taking over from the 11th Airborne Division. In the southern part of the island, the 7th Division launched numerous patrols and deployed a reinforced battalion that effectively neutralized all enemy forces in the Camotes Islands. Additionally, the 77th Division focused on clearing various pockets of enemy resistance located in northwestern Leyte. By late January, the Americal Division arrived to assist in the cleanup operations in Samar and Leyte, a mission that was successfully completed by February 24, with support from the 1st Filipino Regiment. However, during this time, Japanese General Suzuki was formulating his strategy for Operation Chi-Go. This operation involved the amphibious movement of several military units to different islands within the Visayas using large motorized landing barges. Suzuki's initial plan entailed deploying the majority of the 1st Division to establish a garrison on Cebu Island, while the headquarters of the 35th Army was to relocate to Davao. This strategic move would enable him to take direct command of military operations on Mindanao. Following this, he intended to dispatch the 41st and 77th Regiments to Mindanao, assign the 26th Division to the Bacolod area on Negros Island, and send the 5th Regiment along with units from the 102nd Division to Cebu. Furthermore, the 16th Division and the 68th Brigade, commanded by General Makino, were to remain in Leyte to engage in guerrilla warfare tactics. The 102nd Division presented certain difficulties. There had been instances of 40 to 50 deserters fleeing to Cebu or Negros on boats they had built for themselves. Deserters that were apprehended were court-martialed. General Suzuki for some time had been out of touch with General Fukei, the commanding general of the 102nd Division, which was in the Mt. Pina area. By chance, one of Suzuki's officers learned that Fukei was planning to evacuate to Cebu. Suzuki was incensed since he and his staff felt that Fukei "was violating the military code in taking these steps without consent." He therefore ordered Fukei to remain at Leyte. Fukei did not answer but his chief of staff sent the following reply: "We appreciate the efforts of Army but at the present time we are very busy preparing for retreat. The division commander and chief of staff are unable to report to Army Headquarters." Suzuki was "entirely displeased" with the reaction of Fukei and sent his chief of staff, General Tomochika, to investigate the situation. When Tomochika arrived he found that Fukei, with his chief of staff and some headquarters personnel, had already left for Cebu. The sequel to these events was that Suzuki relieved Fukei of his command and ordered him to remain on Cebu until he received further orders. Upon the arrival of Suzuki in Cebu in the spring of 1945, Fukei was sentenced to confinement for thirty days. Suzuki asked IGHQ in Tokyo for authority to court-martial Fukei but no reply was forthcoming. In the end, Fukei was released and later returned to command of the 102nd Division. In the midst of ongoing military operations, Suzuki implemented measures to ensure that the forces stationed on Leyte could sustain themselves. He instructed his troops to make the most of local resources by utilizing available food and materials. This included directives to cultivate sweet potatoes and Indian corn, with the hope of sourcing all necessary provisions from the surrounding areas outside their operational base. However, the Japanese forces faced significant challenges due to relentless American air raids and mop-up operations, which severely hindered their ability to procure supplies. The hostile environment made it difficult for them to plant and harvest the crops they had intended to grow. Despite these obstacles, the Japanese managed to capitalize on the conclusion of the harvest season. They were able to secure substantial amounts of food that had been stored by local Filipinos, including a considerable quantity of coconuts and sweet potatoes. By early January, the 1st Division began its gradual movement toward Cebu, successfully transporting around 800 men to the island by mid-January. Unfortunately, the situation worsened as enemy PT boats established a stringent sea blockade, rendering maritime transportation impractical until mid-March. This blockade left approximately 2,000 men from the 1st Division, along with other units of the 35th Army, stranded on Leyte. Simultaneously, the Imahori Detachment, alongside the Mitsui Shipping Unit and the 77th Regiment, advanced to the southern Matag-ob area and subsequently moved toward Villaba, reaching their destination in early February. The majority of the 26th Division also made progress, arriving in the region north of Ormoc in mid-January before commencing a northwestward movement. By February, they successfully established contact with the rest of the 35th Army. Meanwhile, the remnants of the 16th Division could only reach the Valencia area in February, where they would remain until the end of the month. For the foreseeable future, the Japanese units left behind on Leyte faced the daunting task of defending against the advancing Americal Division and the 1st Filipino Regiment, which were steadily gaining ground. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Admiral Halsey launched Operation Gratitude, targeting Japanese shipping. Despite misleading intel, they decimated enemy convoys, showcasing the effectiveness of airstrikes and securing strategic advances in Luzon. American forces advanced through Luzon while Task Force 38 struck Formosa and Hong Kong. Despite fierce Japanese resistance and challenging weather, the Allies steadily gained ground, though both sides suffered significant losses in the campaign.
Last time we spoke about the Victory at Leyte. In the Ormoc Valley, General Krueger's forces pushed the Japanese into a retreat toward Palompon. As the Americans advanced, they faced entrenched enemy positions and challenging terrain. On Christmas Day, the 77th Division successfully captured Palompon, cutting off the Japanese's main route. General Suzuki, forced to relocate his headquarters, prepared for a counteroffensive. Despite fierce resistance, American troops continued to push forward, eliminating remaining Japanese units and securing strategic positions along the coast as the year closed. As General Eichelberger's 8th Army took command of Leyte Island, the 77th Division relieved other units in preparation for future operations. Meanwhile, American forces faced fierce resistance while securing strategic positions on Samar and Mindoro. Despite enemy air assaults, they successfully disrupted Japanese plans, including a failed counter-landing. In Bougainville, Australian troops engaged in intense fighting, capturing Pearl Ridge after fierce battles. Their victory provided a crucial vantage point for future offensives, marking a significant moment in the campaign. This episode is the Aitape-Wewak Campaign Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. As previously discussed, General Dunckel's task force successfully invaded Mindoro. Despite recent enemy efforts to reclaim control of the island, the Americans managed to establish airfields that enabled land-based aircraft to target specific locations on Luzon while also safeguarding the assault and resupply ships heading to Lingayen Gulf. This location was chosen because it had direct access to Luzon's key military objective, the Central Plains-Manila Bay region, and it featured the best and most extensive landing beaches on the island. With General Eichelberger's 8th Army taking charge of Leyte and Mindoro, General Krueger's 6th Army was assigned to capture and secure a beachhead at Lingayen Gulf and then advance south through the Central Plains to seize Manila and open Manila Bay. Furthermore, air and logistical bases would be established on Luzon to support future operations against Japan, and the legitimate government of the Philippine Commonwealth would be reinstated in its capital. For Operation Mike I, the reconquest of Luzon island, the Southwest Pacific's intelligence estimates concerning Japanese strengths, dispositions, capabilities, and intentions on Luzon were reasonably accurate from the start of planning. The abundance of information must be attributed in large measure to the efforts of guerrillas on Luzon, an island that was becoming a veritable hotbed of guerrilla resistance, both American-led and Filipino-led. Carefully nurtured by MacArthur's headquarters, especially after mid-1943, the guerrilla organizations had grown steadily in strength and effectiveness not only as sabotage units but also as valuable sources of information. The Leyte invasion in October 1944 gave great encouragement to the guerrillas, who redoubled their efforts in preparation for the invasion of Luzon, which they realized could not be too far off. Throughout 1944 supplies of all types had been sent to the guerrillas, first by submarine and later by airdrop and clandestine inter-island transportation. After the establishment of the Allied base on Leyte, the flow of supplies increased by leaps and bounds. The guerrillas themselves established a network of radio communications that soon came to be sustained and, to some extent, controlled by MacArthur's headquarters, which also sent into Luzon special intelligence parties to develop new sources of information and provide guerrilla efforts with more effective direction. In the end, one of the major difficulties Southwest Pacific intelligence agencies had was not obtaining information from Luzon but rather sifting the plethora of guerrilla reports, which attained every conceivable degree of accuracy and detail. Once sifted, the information had to be evaluated and correlated with that received from other sources such as radio intercepts, captured documents, and prisoner interrogations. MacArthur allocated the majority of his Army's ground combat and support forces, most of General Kenney's Allied Air Forces, and nearly all of Admiral Kinkaid's Allied Naval Forces ships and landing craft. He needed to ensure enough forces to defeat a strong Japanese garrison, secure a beachhead against potential fierce resistance, advance south through the Central Plains against expected strong defenses, defend the beachhead from anticipated counterattacks, and secure the Central Plains-Manila Bay area within four to six weeks. Krueger was assigned command of the 1st Corps, which included the 6th and 43rd Divisions, as well as the 14th Corps, comprising the 37th and 40th Divisions. In reserve were the 25th Division, the 11th Airborne Division, the 158th Regiment, the 13th Armored Group, and the separate 6th Ranger Battalion. Supporting these units were 13 nonorganic field artillery battalions of various calibers, two chemical mortar battalions, two additional tank battalions, the majority of five engineer boat and shore regiments, four amphibious tractor battalions, and 16 engineer aviation battalions, totaling approximately 203,000 personnel, of which 131,000 were classified as combat troops. By the way, since I mentioned one, for those curious, a Chemical Mortar Battalion were US Army non-divisional units attached to infantry divisions during WW2. They were armed with 4.2-inch chemical mortars. Chemical shells were on standby during WW2, to be used in retaliation should the enemy employ chemical weapons first. Toxic agents such as phosgene or mustard gas could be used as well as white phosphorus. Additionally, Eichelberger's 8th Army was tasked with conducting a subsidiary landing on Luzon with the 11th Corps, which included the 32nd Division and the separate 112th Cavalry and 503rd Parachute Regiments. Furthermore, MacArthur designated the 33rd and 41st Divisions as General Headquarters Reserve and made plans to send the 33rd and 38th Divisions, along with the 1st Cavalry Division and the 19th and 34th Regiments, to Luzon within two months. Krueger's plan for the Lingayen assault, set for January 9, involved an amphibious attack on the southern beaches of the gulf, which were lightly defended but presented numerous obstacles that impeded maneuverability. Aiming for a swift landing with a robust force to achieve tactical surprise, Krueger opted for a broad front assault, with Major-General Innis Swift's 1st Corps landing on the eastern beaches near San Fabian and Major-General Oscar Griswold's 14th Corps on the western beaches facing Lingayen town. Each corps would land two divisions side by side, with one regiment from each division held in floating reserve. The initial missions of the two corps were the same: to capture the beachhead area within their designated zones, protect the flanks of the 6th Army, and maintain communication with one another. Both corps were also ready to advance quickly inland to secure a crossing over the Agno River, which would serve as the starting point for the final push south toward Manila and Manila Bay. Anticipating some congestion on the beaches, Krueger decided to keep the 25th Division, the 158th Regiment, and the 13th Armored Group afloat until January 11. On that date, the 158th would land on the extreme left of the 1st Corps to block the coastal corridor along the eastern shore of the gulf, preventing any Japanese counterattacks from the north. Similarly, the 25th Division and the 13th Armored Group were also ready to be deployed in Swift's area for both defensive and offensive operations. To facilitate the amphibious assault, Kinkaid took direct command of Task Force 77, which comprised the entire 7th Fleet, along with some Australian and Dutch vessels assigned to MacArthur, as well as warships borrowed from Admiral Nimitz's Pacific Ocean Areas. Kinkaid organized his Luzon Attack Force into several combat components, with Admiral Barbey's Task Force 78 tasked with landing the 1st Corps and Admiral Wilkinson's Task Force 79 responsible for the 14th Corps. Admiral Oldendorf once again led the Bombardment and Fire Support Group, which included six battleships and five heavy cruisers, while Admiral Berkey headed the Close Covering Group of four light cruisers. This time, Kinkaid's escort carriers were under the command of Rear-Admiral Calvin Durgin, who had a total of 17 escort carriers to provide convoy protection, conduct airstrikes on the target area alongside pre-assault minesweeping and bombardment, and offer close air support for ground operations until that responsibility was handed over to Kenney's land-based aircraft. Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet would once again play a crucial role in the operation by targeting enemy airfields, while also being ready to provide direct support if the Japanese gathered enough surface forces to initiate a significant naval confrontation. Meanwhile, Kenney's Allied Air Forces were tasked with safeguarding the convoy's sides and rear through overwater reconnaissance and attacks on enemy facilities in the southern Philippines and the Dutch East Indies, with General Whitehead's 5th Air Force responsible for carrying out most of these missions. Additionally, army aircraft were to protect convoys traversing central Philippine waters and offer air support for ground operations whenever possible. To complement Operation Mike I, a comprehensive deception strategy was in place, aimed at diverting the enemy's attention to a potential Allied threat against Formosa and southern Japan through naval activities in nearby waters. Consequently, Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 launched its initial strikes in support of the Lingayen operation on January 3 and 4. Although poor weather conditions hindered attacks on Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands, they still achieved moderate success. MacArthur also aimed to mislead the Japanese into believing that the primary focus of any Allied offensive on Luzon would be directed towards western Batangas or the Bicol Provinces. Therefore, on January 1, Company I of the 21st Regiment advanced on Bongabong along Mindoro's east coast, beginning the clearance of northeastern Mindoro. The next day, Company B of the 503rd Parachute Regiment started operations on the northwestern coast, moving towards Mamburao. On January 3, Company K of the 21st Regiment landed without opposition at Buenavista on the southwestern shore of Marinduque Island and established positions to set up radar installations. Meanwhile, other troops continued their advance toward Calapan, ultimately intercepting the recently landed enemy raiding unit at Pinamalayan on January 8, compelling it to retreat back to Calapan. Although some Japanese forces managed to reach Mansalay on the southeast coast of Mindoro and infiltrated overland toward San Jose, all attempts to raid enemy airfields were unsuccessful. Conversely, the 21st Regiment successfully captured Calapan on January 24, resulting in approximately 135 Japanese casualties, while the Americans incurred the loss of 1 soldier killed and 7 wounded. By the end of the month, Dunckel's forces had killed 170 Japanese and taken 15 prisoners, at a cost of 16 American soldiers killed, 71 wounded, and 4 missing, not including casualties from Japanese air attacks, which raised the Allied totals to 475 killed and 385 wounded. Looking back to Luzon, General Yamashita was also focused on finalizing plans and preparations to counter the impending enemy assault. During the latter part of December, battle preparations proceeded with discouraging slowness. Overburdened transport facilities, enemy strafing and bombing attacks, guerrilla interference and an acute shortage of automotive fuel impeded progress in every direction. On the other hand, there were numerous indications that General MacArthur was virtually ready to strike. In the Batangas area, enemy air reconnaissance was conspicuously frequent, while the dropping of dummy parachutists and the activity of small surface craft along the coast also caused grave alarm in the 8th Division. Other reports indicated that guerrilla forces were beginning to assemble in the mountains east of Manila, and that enemy submarines were delivering arms to guerrillas in the Lamon Bay area. Yamashita accurately predicted that the invasion would occur between January 10 and 20, targeting either the Batangas area or Lingayen Gulf. However, recognizing that he lacked sufficient forces for a decisive battle, particularly given the decimation of Japanese air power and the enemy's air superiority. As of the 1st of December the Japanese Army and Navy had probably had a combined air strength of some 500 planes in the Philippines, the bulk of them based on Luzon. This strength had been largely destroyed by Allied air strikes in support of the Mindoro operation and during Japanese air attacks against Mindoro-bound convoys and the Mindoro beachhead area. By the 20th of December, the Japanese Naval Air Service in the Philippines had no more than 30 planes, and the Japanese Army Air Force was down to approximately 100 first-line combat aircraft. About that date, some 50 naval planes flew to Luzon from Formosa to renew attacks against Mindoro, and shortly thereafter, it appears, a few Army aircraft also came down from Formosa or the home islands to reinforce Luzon. Many of these planes were lost during continued attacks against Mindoro until, by 31 December, the Japanese had probably no more than 150 operational aircraft left on Luzon, and about a third that many on other fields in the Philippine archipelago, for a total of about 200. Yamashita planned to execute a coordinated delaying strategy, launching local counteroffensives only when conditions were favorable. This approach aimed to deplete enemy resources and buy valuable time to reinforce Japanese defenses in Formosa and the Ryukyus. Consequently, on December 19, Yamashita finalized a new operational outline that established two forces: one to cover northern Luzon and the other for central and southern Luzon. The plans outlined an initial strategy for the forces defending coastal regions to inflict significant damage on the enemy during their landing. This would be followed by delaying actions aimed at hindering the capture of crucial inland communication hubs and airfields. The final phase would involve a sustained last stand in the three mountainous areas previously identified as zones of ultimate resistance. To delay further enemy operations against Formosa and the Ryukyus, Yamashita decided to strengthen the northern sector, as its mountainous terrain and limited access routes from the central Luzon plain offered the best tactical conditions for prolonged resistance. As a result, Southern Luzon would be nearly stripped of troops to reinforce the second-largest concentration of forces in the mountains east of Manila. Yamashita positioned the 103rd Division in the Aparri coastal area, with three battalions stationed on the northwest coast; the 23rd Division, along with the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade, near the eastern shore of Lingayen Gulf; the 10th Division in the San Jose, Umingan, and Natividad sectors, along with the 11th Independent Regiment at Baler and Dingalan Bays; the 2nd Tank Division as a mobile unit in the Cabanatuan-San Miguel area, with the 6th Tank Regiment in Manila; the Manila Defense Force responsible for Manila and the surrounding mountains, with a garrison on Corregidor and the 39th Regiment on the Bataan Peninsula; the 8th Division securing key communication points to the east and west of Lake Taal, as well as important coastal positions in Batangas; the majority of the 105th Division stationed in the critical area east of Manila, while the Noguchi Detachment continued to hold Bicol; and the 82nd Brigade occupying coastal positions in the Lamon Bay region. Upon its arrival on Luzon, the 19th Division was tasked with gathering its main forces south of San Leon, while also deploying units to secure critical locations around Tuguegarao and Echague. Additionally, the 2nd Mobile Regiment and the newly landed 2nd Glider Regiment were ordered to bolster defenses in the Clark Field area, which was primarily protected by ground air units. However, by the end of the month, due to the slower-than-anticipated withdrawal of the 105th Division, Yamashita instructed the 8th Division to relocate its main forces to the region east of Manila, leaving only the 17th Regiment stationed in Batangas Province. Lieutenant-General Yokoyama Shizuo then took command of the Shimbu Group, which encompassed all forces in the southern half of Luzon, below a line approximately extending from Manila to Lamon Bay. That is gonna be it for the Philippines today as we now need to head over to the Aitape-Wewak region. In the coastal sector the 19th Brigade had moved forward in accordance with Stevens' orders of 26th November that it should relieve the 2/7th Commando Squadron, clear the enemy from the area west of the Danmap, and concentrate round Babiang and Suain in preparation for operations east of the river. A company of the 2/4th Battalion had therefore relieved the 2/7th Squadron at Suain and Babiang on the 29th and 30th November. In the next 16 days patrols clashed with small groups of Japanese on seven occasions, and killed 28 without loss to themselves. By 17th December the main body of the 2/4th Battalion was at Suain, with a company at Idakaibul and one at Babiang. In the second week of December, the squadron expanded its control by establishing outposts at Yasile and Yambes, from which they successfully repelled several minor Japanese attacks. On 11th December an enemy patrol approached the perimeter held by Byrne's troop at Yambes. The Australians held their fire until the Japanese were 35 to 50 yards away, killed 6 and, during the day, 2 more. There were patrol clashes that day and on the 13th. At 1.30 a.m. on the 15th an enemy force of at least 35 attacked. This time the Australians let the leading Japanese come to within three yards of the perimeter then fired with automatic weapons and threw grenades. After pressing the attack for a while the enemy withdrew, dragging away their wounded and about 10 dead. By mid-December, the commandos had advanced along the coastal sector to the Danmap, over 40 miles from Aitape and approximately 20 miles into the Torricellis, without encountering significant enemy forces. The majority of Lieutenant-General Mano Goro's 41st Division was positioned south of the Danmap, with the reinforced 237th Regiment under Major-General Aotsu Kikutaro occupying forward positions between the Anumb and Danmap Rivers. Following the defeat at the Driniumor River, General Adachi's 18th Army implemented a strategy to minimize contact with the enemy. They positioned outpost forces for ambush and scattered their units across a broad area, especially in locations where they could cultivate food and regain their strength. Despite these measures, many soldiers faced hunger, malnutrition, and illness, and they often lacked essential modern military equipment. Meanwhile, on December 12, Stevens instructed the seasoned 17th Brigade, led by Brigadier Murray Moten, to relieve the 2/7th Squadron at Tong and conduct patrols south towards Mimbiok and Yanatong, southeast to establish a base at Musimbe, and east to set up a base at Musu. Subsequently, the 2/7th Squadron was to relocate to Makuir and scout a route through Chem to the Dandriwad River and Babiang, aiming to establish a forward base on the Danmap, about five miles east of Makuir. In line with this plan, Moten dispatched Major Ian McBride's Piper Force, consisting of two companies from the 2/5th Battalion, which arrived at Tong on December 20. That day Major Goode of the 2/7th Squadron reported that, except for foraging parties, the area which he had been ordered to patrol had been cleared of the enemy. The squadron had killed 26 Japanese and lost two killed and five wounded; two attached Papuan police had been wounded. The squadron's headquarters were now moved to Lambuain and it began its new task: to clear the Walum area. Walum village was occupied on 30th December after clashes in which several Japanese were killed. Documents captured by the squadron that day indicated that the main enemy line of communication from the coast to Balif was via Walum- Womisis-Womsak. At the same time, Piper Force occupied Musimbe and Musinau, coinciding with the arrival of the rest of the 2/5th Battalion in the Yambes area. Meanwhile, Stevens ordered the 19th Brigade to seize the Abau-Malin line and eliminate the enemy at the Danmap. On December 14, Martin sent the majority of the 2/4th Battalion to cross the river, with one company successfully fighting through Lazy Creek to reach Rocky Point. As the other companies assembled, the 2/8th Battalion began its advance into the foothills to establish a forward base at Idakaibul and move towards Malin. Patrolling from Lazy Creek the 2/11th had two sharp clashes with the enemy force west of Niap on 30th and 31st December, three Aus- tralians and 11 Japanese being killed. At Matapau village, early on 2nd January, from 30 to 35 Japanese attacked the perimeter of Captain Royce's company. Artillery fire was brought down and the Japanese with- drew leaving six dead. This was the beginning of five days of sharp fighting against Japanese who seemed determined to stop the advance along the Old German Road. As soon as the enemy's attack had been repulsed Royce's company pushed forward along the road to a spur whence the artillery observer, Captain Lovegrove, might direct fire. A platoon crossed the little Wakip River at 10.20 a.m. but came under fire from Japanese on the steep-sided spur. The infantry withdrew and accurate artillery fire was brought down. At 2.10 p.m. the spur was occupied and from it Lovegrove directed fire on a pocket of Japanese so close that he had "to almost whisper his orders into the phone". In the day 14 Japanese were killed, and two Australians killed and five wounded, of whom four remained on duty. Next day, and on the 4th and 5th, there was sharp fighting round the spur and towards Niap, and on the 6th, after a strike by 11 bombers and a bombardment by the artillery, a platoon attacked across the Wakip but was held by the resolute enemy pocket at Niap. On January 7, the Japanese defense was finally breached when three tanks broke through the beach and entered the town, followed by infantry. The next day, the leading company of the 2/8th Battalion entered Malin without facing any opposition. However, the 2/11th Battalion struggled to advance towards Doreto Bay, as the determined defenders repelled their attacks for another ten days. On January 18, a company executed a successful flanking maneuver through the foothills to Nimbum Creek and eventually positioned itself south of Abau, capturing the town two days later. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred Buttrose had sent one company to assault Perembil and secure the Musu area, while another advanced through Sumul towards Maharingi, and McBride's company at Musinau moved eastward to patrol deep into the south. On January 3, the Australians unexpectedly drove a strong force of the 238th Regiment from Perembil, though they had to fend off several counterattacks in the following days. Continuing their advance, Asiling fell on January 9, followed by Samisai two days later, and another company secured Maharingi by January 15. Now, it is time to return to the Marianas to prepare for the next missions of General Hansell's 21st Bomber Command. The United States military took steps to improve Saipan's defenses after the damaging raids of November 27. In a frantic effort to detect future intruders, Admiral Hoover stationed two destroyers 100 miles northwest of Saipan to provide early radar warning, and an AN/TPS-3 radar was rushed to Saipan from Oahu by air. The destroyers in some instances gave ample warning, but on other occasions the enemy planes still managed to come in unannounced. Arnold became frustrated that the microwave early warning radar set still was not in use; and on December 3 Admiral Nimitz ordered that the highest priority be given to installing the radar. Despite this, it still was not ready until after the conclusion of the Japanese air campaign. Two B-24 Liberator bombers fitted with air-to-air radar sets were also dispatched to Saipan. This was the first use of airborne warning and control aircraft by the United States, but they were not used in combat. To maintain pressure on the enemy following the San Antonio strikes, he conducted a night radar mission with 30 Superfortresses on November 29, although it was unsuccessful. This mission was part of his preparations for a daylight attack on the Nakajima Aircraft Plant in Ota, scheduled for December 3. By D minus I weather reports were forbidding: at bombing altitudes over Ota, winds were reaching velocities of I 80 miles per hour or more. At 01:30 on the 3d it was decided that the only hope for the day was to go back to Musashino where visible bombing might be possible." Crews had already been briefed twice for the target; the 73d Wing hurriedly cut field orders and by 0945 eighty-six bombers were heading for Tokyo. Seventy-six got over the city to find clear weather but high winds; 59 planes bombed visually from a mean altitude of 28,700 feet with poor results. Out of this mission, six bombers were lost, and another six were damaged, resulting in just 26 bombs hitting the plant area, causing minimal damage to buildings and equipment. Once again, the strike was disappointing. Musashi's records indicate that twenty-six bombs fell in the plant area with some small damage to buildings and equipment and almost none to machinery; Japanese casualties were moderately high. Strike photos, the command's only source of information, seemed to show even less damage, and for these slight results the command had paid dearly, with six B-29's lost and six damaged. In response, on December 7, several Japanese aircraft, including two squadrons of Ki-67 bombers, launched a coordinated attack from both high and low altitudes, destroying three B-29s and damaging 23 others. This assault was observed by Lieutenant-General Millard Harmon, the commander of Army Air Forces in the Pacific, who had been sent by Nimitz to coordinate an extensive attack on Iwo Jima's installations using both air and surface forces. On December 8th, at 0945 twenty-eight P-38's swept over the island, followed at 1100 by the B-29's and at noon by the Liberators. Hoover's crusiers began seventy minutes of shelling at I 347. The bomb load carried by the planes forcefully illustrated the difference in performance between the heavy and very heavy bomber at 725 miles tactical radius: the 62 B-29's dropped 620 tons, 102 B-24's only 194 tons.” All told, enough metal was thrown to produce a good concentration on Iwo's eight square miles, but because the bombers had been forced to loose by radar, results, so far as they could be judged from photography-handicapped, like the bombing, by adverse weather-were much less decisive than had been expected. Eyen so, the enemy's raids on Saipan stopped until 25 December. Although the results were not as decisive as hoped, the enemy raids on Saipan were temporarily halted. On December 13, Hansell sent 90 Superfortresses to bomb the Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Works in Nagoya. The choice for primary visual target was the Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Works at Nagoya, and the same company's aircraft works was named as radar target; strays, it was hoped, would spill into crowded Nagoya, Japan's second city and an industrial center of great importance. The engine works, still in top priority for 21st Bomber Command, lay in the northeast section of Nagoya, about two and a half miles from Nagoya Castle. The plant was considered by the JTG as a single target though it actually consisted of three separate but closely related units of the vast complex comprising the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.: I) the No. 2 Engine Works, responsible for research, design, and manufacture of prototype engines; 2) the No. 4 Engine Works, which between 1939 and 1945 manufactured 44,004 engines, the most important model being the Ha-102, a 1,000-horsepower motor used on the Nick and Dinah 2; and 3) the No. 10 Engine Works, which furnished castings and forgings for all Mitsubishi engine plants. On the 13th, the 73d Wing was able to get ninety bombers up, most of them carrying ten 500-pound GP's but one squadron from each group loaded with incendiary clusters. As on previous missions, a number of planes failed to reach the primary target: sixteen B-29's aborted and three bombed targets of opportunity. Japanese resistance was lively and, in all, four B-29's were lost, thirty-one damaged. Despite significant losses, the recent bombing campaign demonstrated improvement, resulting in the destruction of an assembly shop and seven auxiliary buildings. Additionally, damage was inflicted on an assembly shop, a prototype engine-manufacturing facility, two other shops, and 11 buildings, leading to approximately 351 casualties. The bombing, if of less than pickle-barrel precision, showed improvement. Strike photos indicated that 16 per cent of the bombs dropped had fallen within 1,000 feet of the aiming point and that 17.8 per cent of the roofed area had been destroyed?' Although this in itself was encouraging, had intelligence officers been able to read from their photos the whole story, there would have been even more optimism on Saipan. At the No. 4 Engine Works an assembly shop and 7 auxiliary buildings were destroyed, and an assembly shop and 11 buildings were damaged; at the No. 2 Engine Works a prototype engine-manufacturing shop and 2 other shops were damaged; and personnel losses ran to 246 killed and 105 injured. For the first time, the 21st Bomber Command made a noticeable impact on the aircraft industry, prompting the Japanese to start relocating equipment to underground facilities. Plant officials calculated that the attack reduced productive capacity from 1,600 to 1,200 engines per month; after December 13 parts were no longer machined at No. 4 Engine Works, and engine production was limited to assembling parts on hand and those received from other plants. Mitsubishi officials had been considering the advisability of dispersing the Nagoya facilities ever since the fall of Saipan. After the strike of December 13 the transfer of equipment to underground sites began, but even at the end of the war the movement had not progressed far enough to allow production in the new plants. Five days later, Hansell dispatched 89 B-29s to target the Mitsubishi Aircraft Works in Nagoya. The Mitsubishi Aircraft Works was the giant assembly plant which used most of the engines produced in the No. 4 Engine Works. Located on reclaimed land at the northeast corner of Nagoya harbor, it was, like the engine works, composed of three integrated plants: I) the No. I Airframe Works for research and experimental engineering; 2) the No. 3 Airframe Works, which built navy planes-Zeke and Jack fighters and Betty bombers; and 3) the No. 5 Airframe Works, which manufactured bombers and reconnaissance and transport planes for the army. Large, compact, and conspicuous, this complex offered an excellent visual target, and the proximity of the harbor's shore line made it suitable for radar strikes as well. On this 18 December attack many planes, as usual, failed to follow the flight plan so that only sixty-three planes bombed the primary target. Cloud cover was heavy and forty-four of these dropped by radar, to add considerably to the damage caused by an earthquake on 7 December. Though few bombs were plotted in the area, 17.8 percent of the roofed area appeared to have been destroyed. The No. 3 Works suffered extensive damage to the sheet-metal, heat-treatment, fuselage assembly, and final-assembly shops, and at No. 5, approximately 50 per cent of the total assembly area was damaged. Casualties, in dead and injured, amounted to 464. On December 22, Hansell was compelled to alter his tactics and initiated a daylight incendiary mission. Unfortunately, only 48 B-29s targeted Mitsubishi's engine works due to poor weather, resulting in minimal damage. The Nagoya mission on the next day, though using only incendiaries, was not in fulfillment of Norstad's request; it involved only 78 bombers dispatched instead of IOO and it was planned as a daylight precision attack. The weather turned bad, however, and before the last formations were over Nagoya the target was covered by 10/10 cloud. Only forty-eight planes bombed the Mitsubishi plant and they had to drop by radar; strike photos were few and revealed little. Actually there was not much damage to reveal: 252 fire bombs fell in the area of the No. 4 Works, damaging a few buildings but hurting no machine tools and causing no loss to pruduction On Christmas night, the newly renamed 6th Air Army, led by Lieutenant-General Sugawara Michio, launched its final significant assault on the Marianas, deploying 25 aircraft to bomb from both high and low altitudes. This attack resulted in the destruction of one B-29, serious damage to three others, and minor damage to 11. Overall, the Japanese had deployed over eighty planes over Saipan and Tinian, losing around 37, while managing to destroy 11 B-29s, seriously damaging 8, and causing minor damage to 35. Finally, on December 27, Hansell's last mission involved a return trip to Nakajima, where only 39 out of 72 dispatched B-29s caused little damage to the Musashi plant, although an incendiary attack unfortunately set a hospital on fire. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In a fierce battle for control, forces devised a strategy to defend coastal regions and key locations in Luzon. As troops repositioned, Australian commandos clashed with Japanese units, achieving victories despite challenges. Meanwhile, U.S. bombers targeted Japanese industrial sites, inflicting damage but facing heavy losses, marking a pivotal struggle in the Pacific theater.
Una oración para los padres Señor, concédenos hijos que sean lo suficientemente fuertes para saber cuándo son débiles; que no se dobleguen en la derrota, pero que sean humildes y gentiles en la victoria. Concédenos hijos cuyos deseos no sustituyan a sus acciones; hijos que te conozcan a Ti y se conozcan a sí mismos. Guíalos, te rogamos, no por el camino de la facilidad y la comodidad, sino por el camino de las dificultades y los desafíos. Concédenos hijos cuyos corazones sean puros y cuyos objetivos sean elevados; hijos que aprendan a dominarse a sí mismos antes de intentar dominar a otros. Y después de todas estas cosas, añade, te pedimos, un sentido del humor, para que puedan ser serios, pero sin tomarse a sí mismos demasiado en serio. Entonces nosotros, sus padres, nos atreveremos a susurrar: no hemos vivido en vano. (Basada en una oración del General MacArthur)
Last time we spoke about the invasion of Mindoro. Ormoc fell on December the 10th. The 149th Regiment cleared the airstrip at Buri, while the Japanese launched a desperate attack on airfields, only to be repelled by American forces. Amid chaotic battles, the Japanese attempted maritime reinforcements, but their vessels were met with devastating American fire, sinking transports and crippling their efforts. By December 13, the American advance continued through heavy resistance, leading to intense skirmishes, showcasing bravery and the struggles faced on both sides during the conflict. On December 14, US troops of the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, advanced against stubborn Japanese defenses near Limon. While under fire, they strategically pushed forward, capturing enemy positions and equipment. Despite heavy artillery, Troop G utilized flamethrowers and close combat, overcoming formidable foxholes, helping to secure vital ground. Meanwhile, Admiral Nimitz prepared for future invasions, and General MacArthur postponed operations to protect his forces. The successful landings on Mindoro marked a pivotal moment, signaling the approaching assault on Luzon. This episode is the Third Arakan Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. As we left off last week, General Bruce's 77th Division had effectively advanced to Linao and Cogon, securing Ormoc. Meanwhile, General Sibert's 10th Corps had pushed the weary Japanese forces in the north back to the Lonoy area, with both divisions preparing to continue their assaults through the Ormoc Valley toward Valencia, in line with General Krueger's strategy. To address the emerging situation, the 68th Brigade was mobilizing to support the 1st Division, while the 5th and 77th Regiments were making their way to Huaton to participate in a counteroffensive against Ormoc; however, only the 77th Regiment would reach its destination in time. Concurrently, the isolated 16th Division in the central Leyte mountains was gradually withdrawing from the Burauen front, losing strength with each passing day, and the 26th Division was gathering north of Talisanyan to prepare for the final retreat to Ormoc. On December 16, with the port secured, Bruce's forces were poised for the next stage of their advance north along the Ormoc corridor. Given that his patrols reported minimal enemy resistance west of Highway 2, Bruce aimed to encircle the Japanese forces from the east with the 306th and 307th Regiments, while the 305th would advance along the highway. Following this plan, the 305th Regiment quickly eliminated the remaining enemy positions in Cogon and proceeded 400 yards north of the road junction toward Tambuco. Meanwhile, the 307th swiftly moved through the neighborhoods of Jalubon, Liloan, Bao, and Catayom to San Jose, where they encountered and defeated two platoons of paratroopers. The 306th Regiment also advanced to Jalubon but then shifted north toward Tipic to bypass Huaton and directly assault Valencia. Looking north, while the 126th and 127th Regiments fought bravely against an enemy that restricted the division's progress to just a few dozen yards each day, the 12th Cavalry Regiment continued its advance toward Lonoy. Ultimately, the successful American assault on December 16 left the Japanese defenses exposed, prompting General Suzuki to alter his offensive strategy once more, immediately directing his forces to conduct a delaying action to facilitate a final retreat toward Libongao. Meanwhile, Bruce intensified his attack on December 17. As a result, the 305th Regiment encountered stiff resistance while attempting to reach Tambuco. The Japanese had constructed defensive positions along Highway 2 in the southern part of Ormoc Valley. At the road junction of Highway 2 with the road to Liloan were many trenches three to four feet deep and parallel to the highway. Trenches had also been dug along the sides of a machine gun emplacement that occupied a slight elevation commanding Highway 2 both to the north and to the south. On both sides of the road from Cogon to Catayom foxholes lined Highway 2, in the ditches and under the shacks. Some of these positions were dug on a slant and were six to seven feet deep. At Tambuco the foxholes extended along the highway for 400 yards, with machine gun emplacements on the sides of the foxholes. Other positions along Highway 2 consisted of poorly integrated foxholes and machine guns that covered the road. The field artillery pieces between Tambuco and Catayom were placed along the highway, with the exception of a 75-mm. gun that guarded a bridge and was well concealed inside a roadside shack. At 0830 on 17 December the 305th Infantry moved out along Highway 2. At 1000 the 1st Battalion reported that it was advancing at the rate of 100 yards every ten minutes against light opposition. By 1145 the 305th Infantry was fighting through Tambuco. At a road junction just north of Tambuco, it eliminated some enemy resistance and the advance slowed down. The regiment moved forward to a point about 300 yards north of the road junction and established its night perimeter, which extended 300 yards to the northeast along the Tambuco-Dolores road in order to forestall any Japanese counterattacks from that direction. On the same day the 306th Infantry pushed its attack northeast at 0800. The advancing troops almost immediately encountered Japanese who, apparently taken by surprise, were unable to offer organized resistance. At 1040, when the forward elements were 1,000 yards southwest of Cabulihan, the opposition stiffened and the regimental commander therefore committed the 3d Battalion on the left of the 2d Battalion. The advance continued. As the regiment neared Highway 2, resistance became more intense. The 306th Infantry encountered the Japanese who were fleeing northwest from the assault of the 305th Infantry and the heavy artillery that accompanied it. (Unknown to the Americans, General Suzuki and his staff were among the retreating Japanese. Suzuki succeeded in escaping to Libongao, where he established a new headquarters for the 35th Army.) At 1440 the 306th Infantry reached Highway 2 between Catayom and Cabulihan and proceeded north toward Cabulihan, its objective. Advance elements of the 3d Battalion reached the outskirts of the town but withdrew three or four hundred yards to take advantage of more commanding terrain. After combat patrols had cleared the area, the 306th Infantry established its night perimeter five hundred yards south of Cabulihan at 1600. General Bruce had ordered the 307th Infantry to remain in San Jose until further notice. Since the guerrilla forces had reported a large number of Japanese in the area, General Bruce had made arrangements to soften the sector with an aerial bombardment and artillery fire before the infantry attack. In response to Bruce's request, fifteen P-40's from the V Fighter Command had been made available by General Whitehead for an air strike against the Valencia area. The 155-mm. guns of the 226th Field Artillery Battalion at Daro began firing on Valencia and the airstrip on the morning of 17 December and hit a Japanese ammunition dump. At 1245 the artillery fire was halted for the air strike, and for fifty minutes the area was bombed and strafed. With the conclusion of the air attack, at 1335, the artillery began anew to pound the area. "The medium artillery . . . reached out from Ormoc and the 'Long Toms' . . . from Daro joined in the fighting." In the meantime the 902d Field Artillery Battalion moved forward to a point from which it could support the advance of the 307th Infantry. At 1415 the artillery fire stopped and the 307th Infantry moved out astride the San Jose-Valencia road toward Valencia. Though the artillery fire and aerial bombardment had driven some of the Japanese from the area, a strong well-equipped force, including a number of paratroopers, remained to oppose the 307th Infantry. The regiment pushed forward, however, and at 1640 its leading elements were on the southwestern edge of the airstrip and within 1,000 yards of Valencia. The 307th Infantry formed its night perimeter on the edge of the airfield and made preparations to continue the attack on 18 December. During 17 December, despite the disorganization of the Japanese forces, Colonel Imahori of the 12th Independent Infantry Regiment tried to reach Ormoc, but he was unsuccessful. A few enemy artillery shells landed in the Ormoc area but that was all. General Bruce wrote later: "The men got a laugh because the General's latrine, unoccupied, was struck. He wished about that time that he had remained up front which he had reached by landing in a cub plane on an unimproved jungle road." The following morning, as supplies and ammunition for the 306th and 307th Regiments were running dangerously low, Bruce dispatched an armored column through the 305th's lines, which bypassed enemy strongholds and successfully delivered supplies to both regiments. The 305th Regiment then faced minimal resistance as it advanced toward Huaton, with its 3rd Battalion decisively eliminating all enemy opposition along the Dolores road. Simultaneously, the 306th Regiment steadily pushed toward Valencia, successfully reaching the southern edge of the town, while the 307th secured the airstrip without any resistance. As General Gill directed his forces northward, the 126th Regiment successfully seized a ridge east of the road, advancing closer to the main enemy defensive line located north of Lonoy. On the morning of December 19, the 126th launched another offensive, overrunning numerous enemy positions and advancing 200 yards before being replaced by fresh troops the following day. Meanwhile, the 12th Cavalry encountered only light and sporadic resistance in its efforts to secure Lonoy, although its 2nd Squadron faced tougher opposition while assaulting a knoll southeast of the barrio. To the south, following the fall of Valencia, the 5th Regiment reached Libongao just as Bruce prepared to press forward in the northern campaign. Thus, the 307th Regiment steadily advanced north along Highway 2, engaging an advanced battalion from the Takahashi Detachment, while the 306th moved successfully northwest across the terrain to a position 300 yards south of the Palompon road. On this day, Suzuki received news of the enemy's invasion of Mindoro, along with General Yamashita's orders to conduct a strategic delay on Leyte. In response, he commanded all his forces to begin a gradual withdrawal towards Palompon, leaving Libongao for Matag-ob. On December 20, the 306th Regiment reached the Palompon road and dispatched its 1st Battalion west towards the Togbong River, while the 3rd Battalion turned east towards Highway 2. At the same time, the 307th Regiment launched an assault on the Libongao positions and successfully defeated the 5th Regiment, compelling the Takahashi Detachment to retreat towards Matag-ob, where they established Suzuki's final delaying position. Additionally, as the exhausted 126th Regiment was relieved, the 12th Cavalry began moving south from Lonoy to intercept the enemy's retreat route at Kananga. On December 21, as the 1st and 102nd Divisions began their withdrawal towards Palompon, the 12th Cavalry successfully captured Kananga and established contact with patrols from the 77th Division. Consequently, Highway 2 was finally open from Ormoc to Pinamopoan, and the Ormoc Valley, where the Japanese had fiercely resisted the American advance, was now firmly under the control of the 6th Army. General Mudge, commanding general of the 1st Cavalry Division, said of the 12th Cavalry: “As a result of the stout-hearted efforts of the 12th Cavalry Regiment, elements of the Division are within 2500 yards of making contact with forward elements of the 77th Division. Considering the fact that the regiment has been reduced to 50% strength by the rigors and deprivations of 40 days in the mountains, the display of courage, stamina, and drive on the part of the 12th Cavalry is a credit to the best traditions of the United States Cavalry.” However, we must now shift our focus from the Philippines to Burma to follow the progress of Operation Capital. Previously, while General Sultan's offensive in the north was advancing well, General Slim's eastern push, led by General Rees' 19th Indian Division, encountered less resistance than anticipated. This indicated that the enemy was rapidly retreating to stronger defensive positions behind the Irrawaddy River. As a result, Slim's strategy to encircle General Katamura's 15th Army on the Shwebo Plain was compromised, necessitating a significant adjustment to his offensive. His forces, stretched from Tamu, were at risk of counterattack while attempting to cross one of the most formidable river barriers. Therefore, Slim aimed to find a way to not only cross his troops over the Irrawaddy without major issues or interference but also to gain the decisive advantage needed to engage the Japanese on his terms, targeting them where their defenses were weakest. In just a few days, Slim and his team devised a new strategy known as Operation Extended Capital. The objective was to convince the Japanese that nothing had altered and that the 14th Army's advance was still primarily directed toward Mandalay, with its two corps crossing the Irrawaddy to the northwest of the city. The core of Slim's revised plan involved General Stopford's 33rd Corps, which, bolstered by the 19th Division and the 268th Tank Brigade, would maintain its planned crossing of the Irrawaddy north of Mandalay. Meanwhile, General Messervy's restructured 4th Corps would tactically cross the river much farther south in Pakokku, allowing them to launch attacks on Meiktila and Thazi, crucial points along General Kimura's communication lines that supported both the 33rd and 15th Armies. The towns of Meiktila and Thazi represented ground that was vital to the enemy defense, a concept 14th Army had first learned painfully in Arakan. The railway and main road from Rangoon ran through Meiktila before bending north on their way to Mandalay, and the town formed a natural location for supply and ammunition dumps, airfields and hospitals. If Slim could cut off both Honda and Katamura's corps from this vital logistical center, the Japanese ability to resist General Stopford's inexorable pressure in the north around Mandalay would be fatally weakened. Slim recognized that without Meiktila, Kimura could not hope to sustain a prolonged battle for Mandalay. Indeed, it might even prove to be the decisive act in the destruction of the whole of Kimura's army. Thus, the northern advance by 33rd Corps would be a deception to hide the decisive strike by 4th Corps to the south. If Slim could attract the greatest possible number of enemy divisions towards the northern crossing points (where, after all, Kimura expected him to strike), he could minimize opposition to the real focus of his attack in the south. This would provide Slim with, as he put it, ‘not only the major battle I desired, but the chance to repeat our old hammer and anvil tactics: 33rd Corps the hammer from the north against the anvil of 4th Corps at Meiktila – and the Japanese between.' Simultaneously, a new offensive was gearing up in the south. Unable to execute Operation Dracula, an intended amphibious assault on Rangoon, Admiral Mountbatten was resolved to initiate an offensive in the Arakan region. Codenamed Operation Romulus, it aimed for General Christison's 15th Corps to again attack Akyab, marking the third attempt to regain Arakan since the war began. Christison's strategy involved a three-pronged attack into northern Arakan, with Major-General George Wood's 25th Indian Division advancing on the right along the coast, Major-General George Bruce's 82nd West African Division in the center within the valley of the Mayu river, and Major-General Frederick Loftus-Tottenham's 81st West African Division on the left in the Kaladan river valley. Expecting heightened Japanese resistance along the Donbaik-Rathedaung-Myohaung line, Christison suggested that while his three frontline divisions engaged the Japanese forces with aggressive attacks, Brigadier Peter Young's 3rd Commando Brigade would land in the Japanese rear on the Myebon peninsula, followed closely by Major-General Cyril Lomax's 26th Indian Division, in a bid to finally capture Akyab. Facing them was General Sakurai's 28th Army, which included the Sakura Detachment, organized around three infantry battalions from the 55th Division along with the 55th Reconnaissance Regiment, stationed along the Godusara-Buthidaung-Kindaung line and the Kaladan Valley. Lieutenant-General Miyazaki Shigesaburo's 54th Division was responsible for defending the remainder of the Mayu Peninsula and the coastal area extending to Taungup. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Sakuma Ryozo's diminished 55th Division occupied the Irrawaddy Delta region, and Major-General Yamamoto Tsunoru's 72nd Independent Mixed Brigade was positioned near the oilfields at Yenangyaung. Additionally, the Katsu Force, centered around the 153rd Regiment, was near Yenangyaung, while the Rangoon Defense Unit, which included the Rangoon Anti-Aircraft Unit and various logistical elements, was tasked with protecting Burma's primary port. Sakurai's strategy, known as Operation Kan, entailed a defensive stance on the Mayu Peninsula and Yenangyaung, along with safeguarding the southwestern coast near Bassein against potential amphibious assaults. As the defenders slowed the enemy's progress towards their fortified positions, the 54th Division would be promptly sent to launch a counteroffensive. Depending on the nature of the attack, units from the 55th Division and Katsu Force would also participate in this counterattack. If a significant battle erupted near Rangoon, the reserve 2nd and 49th Divisions would be deployed without delay. Meanwhile, with the 26th Division being withdrawn for rest, the 25th Division preparing to move towards Rathedaung, and the 82nd Division advancing into the Kalapanzin Valley, the 81st Division was dispatched on October 1 to progress through the Mowdok Mountain Range toward Kyauktaw. As they moved southward across challenging and nearly impassable terrain, the West Africans expected to capture Mowdok by October 18, effectively eliminating the last Japanese forces from Indian territory before progressing through the Kaladan Valley. The 55th Reconnaissance Regiment stationed at Paletwa endured multiple assaults until early November, at which point they received orders to retreat to the Kaladan line. On December 15 the Japanese launched a strong attack with artillery support against the 6th (West African) Brigade. Private Kweku Pong, number two on a Bren, was wounded and separated from his section. Well armed with 12 magazines, he engaged the Japanese with short bursts for hours as they searched for him, until he eventually lost consciousness from loss of blood. Havildar Umrao Singh's gun section of the 30th Mountain Regiment was supporting the brigade when it was overrun and his officer badly wounded. With two other men he defended the position with rifles, bayonets and grenades until they were rushed and he defended it by swinging a rammer until borne down and bayoneted. The Japanese were eventually driven off when both men were found; Singh was awarded a VC and Pong an MM. Slim never changed his view that Africans would be ‘lost' without British guidance; but he probably never heard of Kweku Pong, who found himself alone, badly wounded in the middle of the night with Japanese rampaging through the bush around him and a battle going on behind. No white man was there to tell him what to do, no African NCO nor any other African for that matter. Nobody would have blamed him for lying doggo, but instead he showed considerable courage and good tactical sense. For this action, the 5th Gold Coast Regiment was awarded the unique honor ‘Tinma'. Meanwhile, by late November, Wood had sent the 51st Indian Brigade to assist the African offensive in the Kalapanzin Valley. After successfully completing this mission, the 25th and 82nd Divisions launched their assault on Buthidaung on December 12. Wood's strategy involved a series of coordinated moves, with units leapfrogging one another, while the pace of the advance depended on how fast the sappers could repair the routes for the subsequent vehicles. Significantly outnumbered, Major-General Sakurai Tokutaro's troops were ultimately forced to evacuate Buthidaung on December 14. In response to the escalating enemy pressure in both the Kaladan and Mayu regions, the 28th Army ordered the Matsu Detachment, consisting of three battalions from the 54th Division, to take over control of the Kaladan front, while Major-General Koba Tomotoki's forces advanced toward Tinma. However, Loftus-Tottenham wisely decided to outflank this position, compelling the recently arrived detachment to withdraw, while other African units successfully made their way to Kyauktaw by the month's end. At the same time, the 53rd Indian Brigade progressed along the Kalapanzin River, and the 82nd Division managed to overcome strong resistance at Kindaung village in late December. On the night of December 21, the 6th Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Regiment undertook a night march exceeding 20 miles to capture Donbaik, which was taken without resistance. It was only at this point that the remains of the Valentine tanks and crews lost two years prior were discovered. The Sakura Detachment, having reached its limit, had no option but to retreat towards Myohaung, where they would be supported by the Matsu Detachment during their final withdrawal to Prome. With no opposition encountered, the two West African divisions successfully made contact on January 4, resulting in the complete clearance of the Kalapanzin valley. Meanwhile, looking north, Slim had initiated Operation Extended Capital on December 19. In line with this, Stopford instructed the 19th Division to advance along the west bank of the Irrawaddy to launch an attack on Shwebo from the east, while the 2nd British Division, having crossed the Chindwin at Kalewa, approached Shwebo from the west. After capturing Shwebo, the 19th Division was to pivot eastward to secure bridgeheads across the Irrawaddy north of Mandalay, while the 2nd Division continued south towards the Irrawaddy bend near Sagaing. Slim aimed to create the impression that the entire 14th Army was advancing on Mandalay by associating the 19th Division with the 4th Corps. Additionally, the 20th Indian Division was tasked with crossing the Chindwin at Kalewa and moving downstream to capture Monywa. Meanwhile, Messervy was organizing his dispersed divisions to commence their advance down the Gangaw valley, from Tamu to Pakokku. In the lead would be the Lushai Brigade and the 28th East African Brigade, tasked with clearing the enemy from Gangaw and subsequently advancing to Pakokku. The tour de force of deceptions against the Japanese would aid the crossing of the Irrawaddy. Slim's intention behind the plan, known as Cloak, was to conceal the main crossing until the last possible moment by persuading the Japanese to believe that the force preparing to move down the Gangaw valley to cross the river near Pakokku and seize Meiktila was merely making a feint to distract attention from the attack on Mandalay by 33rd Corps from the north. Until now 14th Army's commanders had been reluctant to use any but the simplest signals deceptions, but now they were enthusiastic even to the detriment of operational communications. Thus, three schemes were adopted: Pippin, which covered the withdrawal of the 5th Indian and 11th East African Divisions; Stencil, which created a dummy 4th Corps Headquarters that appeared to control formations under 33rd Corps; and Cloak, which was designed to give a false impression of the forces operating – that the forcing of the Irrawaddy would take place away from the real main effort, and that any movement the Japanese saw in the Gangaw valley was itself only a diversion. There is no doubt the speed the advance into central Burma achieved was in no small measure due to this deception scheme, which also used political channels, displays and deception devices dropped by Mosquitos and Beaufighters. Following them, the 7th Indian Division aimed to capture Pakokku, secure the west bank of the Irrawaddy, and establish a bridgehead across the river. Once this bridgehead was established, the 17th Indian Division and the 255th Tank Brigade would cross the Irrawaddy and race towards Meiktila. However, before initiating this advance, Messervy needed to enhance the pathway through the valley to facilitate the movement of his artillery and armored units. The Lushai Brigade, already forward, also needed artillery support before launching their assault on Gangaw. Therefore, while Messervy's engineers promptly began upgrading the road and track south of Kalemyo, only Stopford's units would engage in combat in late December. Moving swiftly, the advance elements of the 2nd Division, along with the tanks from the 254th Brigade, passed through Pyingaing on December 23 and continued towards Paga, successfully overcoming several rearguard positions held by elements of the retreating 33rd Division, which eventually reached Monywa in early January. At the same time, the 19th Division captured Wuntho and began its advance southward towards Shwebo. In the meantime, Messervy's engineers worked diligently for two weeks to prepare the track, and by the end of the month, his field artillery was en route to Gangaw. The 28th East African Brigade departed Imphal on December 22, followed by the 7th Division four days later. However, in the northeast, Sultan continued his northern offensive with minimal success. With the Ledo Road now extended from Kamaing to connect with the Myitkyina-Bhamo road, the 112th and 113th Chinese Regiments received orders to eliminate the Japanese rear guards along the final segment of the road to China. In the period between the split of the CBI Theater in October 1944 and the fall of Bhamo on 15 December, the Ledo Road engineers under General Pick brought the survey of the Ledo Road from a point just below and east of Kamaing, 211 miles from Ledo, to a juncture with the Myitkyina-Bhamo road. The Ledo Road was to bypass Myitkyina, for there was no point to running heavy traffic through an inhabited place, and Myitkyina's supply needs could be served by an access road. Metaling and grading were complete almost to Mogaung. The Mogaung River had been bridged near Kamaing, and a temporary bridge placed across the Irrawaddy. Tonnage carried on the road for use within Burma was steadily rising. In early October it had carried 275 tons a day; by the latter part of the month the rate was twice that. Immediately after Bhamo's capture, the advance headquarters of the road engineers was moved to that town. A combat supply road was made from Mogaung, below Myitkyina, to a point just ten miles west of Namhkam. The 113th Regiment advanced up the valley along the established road from Panghkam, while the 112th proceeded through the hills. The primary assault was to be led by the 30th Chinese Division, with its 90th Regiment advancing straight along the road toward Namhkam, while the 88th and 89th Regiments executed a shallow envelopment to the south of the road. Although conditions were favorable for a rapid advance into the Shweli valley, the commander of the 90th Regiment hesitated, causing delays along the flanks, as they formed the center of the Chinese line. Concurrently, Sultan ordered the Mars Task Force to embark on a challenging march through the hill country to the Mong Wi area, aiming to cut off the Burma Road near Hosi and effectively encircle the enemy 33rd Army. The 50th Chinese Division, which had been following the 36th British Division down the Railway Corridor, was set to occupy the vacated positions at Tonkwa and Si-u. Its objective was to cross the Shweli near Molo and proceed southeast to capture Lashio. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Amidst fierce battles, General Bruce's troops advanced against Japanese forces in Leyte, securing key positions and paving the way for further assaults amid strategic retreats. In a strategic deception, Slim's forces advanced on multiple fronts, aiming to outmaneuver the Japanese, ultimately leading to decisive victories in Burma and weakening enemy defenses.
The Japanese attacked the Philippines almost simultaneous with their December 7th, 1941 attack on the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor. Following Japanese air attacks, the Japanese 14th Army landed in the Philippines on December 8th. By January 1942, the Japanese had U.S. and Filipino forces bottled up on the Bataan Peninsula. Those U.S. and Filipino forces surrendered on May 8th. It is arguably America's worst military defeat ever. Among the roughly 12,000 Americans taken prisoner were four Navy doctors. John Glusman tells their story in “Conduct Under Fire: Four American Doctors and Their Fight for Life as Prisoners of the Japanese, 1941-1945.”
Last time we spoke about the fall of Ormoc. The Japanese prepared their Wa offensive as General Arnold's troops advanced toward Ormoc. On December 5, American forces engaged in fierce fighting for Hills 918 and 380, facing entrenched enemy positions. By December 6, Japanese troops launched a surprise attack on American camps, but a swift counteroffensive from General Swift helped reclaim the Buri airfield. Despite initial gains, poor weather hindered Japanese reinforcements, allowing American forces to stabilize their positions and push back the enemy. Then the 148th battalion launched an attack on Buri. The advancing American troops faced fierce Japanese resistance, with intense battles over strategic locations like the San Pablo airstrip and Hill 380. Despite setbacks, forces rallied, utilizing effective tactics to outmaneuver the enemy. As reinforcements arrived, the Americans secured critical positions and engaged fiercely in Ormoc, leading to significant Japanese losses. The capture of Ormoc disrupted enemy supply lines, marking a pivotal victory that forced the Japanese to keep sending troops into a deteriorating situation. This episode is the Invasion of Mindoro Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Building on our discussion from last week, there were several other events occurring simultaneously with the fall of Ormoc on December 10. At Buri, following a half-hour of concentrated artillery fire, the 1st Battalion of the 149th Regiment launched a final assault that swiftly cleared the airstrip and eliminated the enemy paratrooper forces. Later that evening, the 3rd Battalion of the 13th Independent Regiment arrived in the area in a disorganized state after a challenging march, and with their last reserves of strength, they attacked Burauen town. At 19:30 the Japanese launched their final concentrated attack against the airfields. They began to fire at the administration buildings of the Fifth Air Force, and some of the bullets went through the plywood walls of the house of Maj. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead. "The General ducked a bullet, ordered someone to find out who the blankety-blank was responsible and that he'd blankety-blank better stop or think up a blankety-blank good reason." The air force personnel were pushed back until they reached the hospital, where they halted and held. They then counterattacked and drove the enemy away from the area. The Japanese left thirty of their dead behind them. This marked the retreat of the surviving Japanese forces, indicating the conclusion of the battle for the airstrips. Meanwhile, General Arnold's 7th Division continued its limited offensive through the challenging mountainous terrain, with the 17th and 184th Regiments reaching Malitbog by the end of the day. To the north, General Cunningham's 2nd Squadron, which had been engaged with the bulk of the 102nd Division, was finally relieved by the 2nd Squadron of the 7th Cavalry, initiating their westward movement to rejoin the rest of the regiment at the Leyte River. There, the 126th and 127th Regiments struggled to breach the defenses of the 1st Regiment, while the 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments made slow progress through the mountains towards Mount Cabungaan, effectively bypassing the Mount Pina position. In the process of reducing the Japanese-held area, it was estimated that an enemy force of 500 to 600 men had been wiped out. From 28 November to 9 December, the 12th Cavalry remained in the Mt. Badian and Hill 2348 sector, sent out westward patrols, and slowly moved westward. On 10 December, General Sibert decided to have elements of the 1st Cavalry Division debouch from the mountains onto Highway 2 south of the 32d Division and in the Lonoy area. This move was to be concurrent with the expected advance of the 32d Division down the highway. The 1st Squadron, 12th Cavalry, was in the vicinity of Mt. Cabungaan, and the 2d Squadron, on Hill 2348, was 2,000 yards northeast of the 1st Squadron. An enemy strong point existed to the north of the perimeter of the 1st Squadron. The 12th Cavalry spent 10 December in making preparations for a two-squadron assault against this enemy force. The plan was for the 1st Squadron to attack at 0830 while the 2d Squadron from Hill 2348 supported the attack by enveloping the left flank of the enemy. In furtherance of this plan Troop E of the 2d Squadron moved off Hill 2348 at 0800 toward the southwest and dug in for the night just north of Mt. Cabungaan. On the morning of 11 December, an intense mortar and artillery concentration was placed upon the enemy position in front of the 1st Squadron. The fire was so close that fragments frequently fell on the waiting assault troops. After this fire, the 1st Squadron with Troop A in the lead moved out at 0715. At the same time Troop E attacked from the northeast. The enemy defenses consisted of seven or eight pillboxes and many caves dug into the very rugged terrain. The men of Troop A, closely followed by Troop B, charged up the hill "throwing grenades and firing from the hip." The hill fell to the 1st Squadron at 1003 after very heavy hand-to-hand fighting. Troop E had been held up by the terrain and was unable to assist the 1st Squadron. After the capture of the Japanese position, patrols established contact with Troop E at 1200. The regimental reconnaissance platoon returned from the vicinity of Lonoy with the information that the Japanese had prepared strong defensive positions in that area. The platoon had gained a good observation point 900 yards east of Lonoy. The next several days were spent in sending out patrols and moving the 2d Squadron to the position of the 1st Squadron. Meanwhile, on December 9, Admiral Okawachi had launched what would turn out to be his final TA convoy. This convoy, consisting of three destroyers, two subchasers, and six transport ships carrying the Takahashi Detachment and the Ito Naval Landing Unit, departed from Manila on December 9. A day earlier, the Camotes Detachment had also been dispatched individually via landing barges. In light of the recent enemy landings at Deposito, three units were assigned to deploy in Ormoc and support General Tomochika's forces in defending the city. However, by December 11, Ormoc had already succumbed, and the convoy finally arrived in Leyte, where it was immediately targeted by American fighter planes. Near Palompon, two transports were struck and left immobilized, prompting an urgent order for the Takahashi Detachment to disembark there and assist the Camotes Detachment during its landing at Palompon. Meanwhile, two destroyers and two transports carrying the Ito Naval Landing Unit continued to Ormoc, where four American destroyers awaited them. This led to a chaotic battle, as artillery, mortars, tank destroyers, and the destroyer Coghlan opened fire on the transports as they unloaded the SNLF Marines northwest of Ormoc. Consequently, one transport was sunk, and another was damaged, necessitating an escort back to Palompon to offload its remaining cargo. Despite this, over 200 Marines managed to land by nightfall, although they could not connect with the Imahori Detachment situated north of Ormoc. At 2330 on 11 December the 77th Division beach defense units observed a Japanese convoy, which was transporting the Special Naval Landing Force, steaming into Ormoc Bay with the apparent intention of landing at Ormoc. The Japanese evidently thought that Ormoc was still in their hands. The first craft noticed by the U.S. forces was a landing barge with about fifty men, heading directly for the Ormoc pier. By the time the barge came within range of the shore weapons, all shore units were alert and waited with guns trained upon it. They withheld their fire until the barge was within fifty yards of the pier and then all weapons converged their fires upon the craft. The first rounds squarely hit the barge, which immediately burst into flames. The Japanese clambered atop the gunwales and are reported to have screamed, "Don't shoot," under the mistaken notion that their forces still occupied Ormoc. The harbor was lit up by the burning barge and 60-mm. illuminating shells. During the night the Americans discovered that another enemy vessel, about the size of an LST, had pulled into shore northwest of the town under cover of darkness and was busily engaged in discharging troops and equipment. The tank destroyer guns of the 307th Infantry, emplaced along the beach within 1,000 yards of the vessel, opened fire on it while forward observers from the 902d Field Artillery Battalion directed artillery fire upon the landing area and inland. The enemy vessel attempted to pull out to sea, but after proceeding less than fifty yards it burst into flames and sank. About 150 men, two tanks, a number of rifles, mortars, and machine guns, and a quantity of ammunition had been unloaded before the vessel sank, but most of the supplies, including four ammunition trucks, had been destroyed by American fire while the vessel was unloading. The early dawn of 12 December revealed another ship of the same type farther west near Linao. The artillery, mortars, and tank destroyer guns opened up against this vessel as it fled along the shores of Ormoc Bay, and their fire followed until it was out of range. Before the fire ceased, heavy clouds of smoke billowed from the vessel as it moved at a snail's pace. During the night the American fire had to be closely coordinated, since American vessels, including a resupply convoy, were in the bay. Not a single U.S. craft was damaged. Troops of the Special Naval Landing Force who had disembarked got in touch with Colonel Imahori, who immediately ordered them to go to Highway 2 as the reserve unit of the 12th Independent Infantry Regiment. It was impossible for them to carry out the order, since the 77th Division had advanced north from Ormoc. They thereupon decided to join a naval airfield construction unit at Valencia, but again they failed. In the latter part of December, the men of the Special Naval Landing Force were in the eastern part of the Palompon area without having taken part in the battle for the Ormoc corridor. On the journey back to Manila, the Uzuki was sunk by two PT boats near Leyte on December 12. The rest of the convoy was also assaulted by 46 aircraft off Cebu, leading to the sinking of the Yuzuki and one transport. This incident marked the final TA convoy of the war, as the fall of Ormoc made the operation pointless. Similarly, plans for a counterlanding at Carigara Bay with the 39th Regiment were also scrapped. The nine TA convoys successfully transported an estimated 45,000 men and 10,000 tons of supplies and equipment to Leyte; however, this came at a significant cost. The Southwest Area Fleet incurred losses that included one light cruiser, nine destroyers, three submarines, three subchasers, two frigates, and 26 transports. Additionally, during enemy carrier strikes on Luzon and the Visayas, the fleet lost one heavy cruiser, two light cruisers, five destroyers, one submarine, three subchasers, three frigates, 19 transports, and four oilers. On December 11, General Bruce launched an aggressive defense of Ormoc, planning to advance his troops daily to establish new forts or blockhouses by nightfall until Valencia was secured. Consequently, the 307th Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 306th Regiment attempted to cross the Antilao River but encountered intense fire and were quickly pinned down. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion of the 306th managed to advance despite facing increasing resistance from the Imahori Detachment at Cogon but was ultimately compelled to withdraw due to heavy enemy fire. At the same time, the bulk of the 305th Regiment repositioned to the right of the 307th, while the 17th and 184th Regiments completed their limited offensive, successfully crossing the Talisayan River without opposition and reaching the Binoljo area, with the 2nd Battalion of the 184th advancing to Ipil to establish contact with the 77th Division. At this stage, General Yamagata's units had retreated into the mountains, regrouping north of Talisanyan to initiate their final withdrawal to Ormoc. However, their escape route had been entirely cut off, and they were being pursued from the east by the bulk of General Swing's 11th Airborne Division. As General Gill's offensive progressed, his infantry began assaulting enemy artillery positions in the north. Simultaneously, the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry launched an attack against the 102nd Division units; however, the defenders managed to hold the cavalrymen back at the hill's base. Meanwhile, General Suzuki was hastily retreating toward Huaton, where he was expected to arrive by December 13. His strategy involved waiting for the 5th and 77th Regiments to reach his position before executing a robust counterattack to reclaim Ormoc. The 68th Brigade was tasked with bolstering the beleaguered 1st Division, which had incurred over 3,000 casualties since the start of hostilities. Returning to the frontline developments, the previous day's intense fighting compelled Bruce to solidify his positions on December 12. He organized the delivery of supplies and supporting artillery to bombard enemy defenses while dispatching strong patrols for reconnaissance. At the same time, the 17th and 184th Regiments successfully gathered at the Panilahan River in preparation to reinforce the 77th Division. On the following day, after a significant artillery bombardment, a specialized attack force led by Colonel Paul Freeman, comprising two companies from the 305th Regiment, was dispatched to assault Colonel Imahori's primary blockhouse at Cogon. Meanwhile, the remainder of the regiment targeted other enemy positions along the ridge. While the infantry managed to advance to the ridge, Freeman's companies were unable to progress further, ultimately forcing the 305th to retreat. Simultaneously, the 307th Regiment advanced westward along the Ormoc-Linao road and successfully captured Linao. Although the 77th Division had pushed its western boundary forward by approximately 1,000 yards during the day, the central front lines remained largely unchanged since morning, necessitating General Bruce to launch another attack the following day. Meanwhile, Arnold sent the 32nd Regiment to connect with the 11th Airborne Division to aid in its withdrawal from the mountains. On the morning of 13 December the 2d Battalion, 126th Infantry, with the assistance of its tanks and heavy mortars, pushed past the Japanese who had held up its advance. In the face of most determined opposition the battalion moved south, destroying the pockets of resistance which had been bypassed. At the end of the day the 2d Battalion had advanced 400 yards to a position 200 yards north of a roadblock set up by the 3d Battalion, 126th Infantry. The 3d Battalion, less Company L, which was to remain on the high ground overlooking the road, was to attack south on the east side of Highway 2 and come abreast of the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry. At 1521 the 3d Battalion reported that six enemy tanks were coming up the highway. After heavy fighting, the Japanese tanks withdrew at nightfall and returned to the south. The 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry, the southernmost unit of the division, made plans to dislodge the enemy force between it and the 3d Battalion. The contested ground consisted of an open space 600 to 700 yards long and 200 to 300 yards wide, at the southern end of which were two knolls. The 1st Battalion had men on both knolls but did not control the northern end of the sector where the Japanese had dug in and were using machine guns, mortars, and rifles. The 1st Battalion charged against the Japanese and rooted them out with grenades and mortar fire. Except for this action, only slight gains were registered during the day. The men of the battalion were hungry, having been without food since the previous afternoon. The commanding officer of the battalion renewed a request for additional rations and ammunition, since the one-third ration that had been received the day before was insufficient. The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 127th Infantry received orders from the regimental commander to advance south with the 1st Battalion on the left, pinch out the 3d Battalion, 126th Infantry, and link up with the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry. The 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, moved out in a column of companies and had advanced 400 yards when it encountered forty to fifty Japanese on a ridge to its front, about 150 yards west of the road. The enemy threw blocks of TNT and grenades against the battalion, effectively pinning down the troops. A night perimeter was established. The 2d Battalion, 127th Infantry, moved abreast of the regiment's 1st Battalion throughout the day. Its advance was bitterly contested by the Japanese, who employed machine guns, mortars, and rifles against the battalion, which dug in for the night under fire. At 1630 the 11th Field Artillery Battalion fired upon fifteen Japanese who were walking along the road south of Lonoy and killed twelve of them. The night of 13-14 December was not quiet. At 2300 an enemy force from the 1st Infantry Regiment broke into the command post of the 126th Infantry. The Japanese set up a machine gun in the area and attacked with grenades and rifles. Bitter hand-to-hand fighting ensued but by 0325 the enemy force was evicted and the area had quieted down. At 0630, with the coming of dawn, the Headquarters Company got things in order and everyone was "happy to hear sound of comrade's voices." Six Japanese were killed and two Americans and two Filipinos wounded. On December 14, nearly all battalions of the 126th and 127th Regiments were actively advancing and maintaining physical contact with one another, successfully pushing over two miles south of Limon. At 0730 on the morning of 13 December, the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, moved out and came under fire from two Japanese machine guns well emplaced on a cliff. The ridge narrowed to ten feet with sixty-degree slopes, making forward passage almost impossible. The troops were pinned down. In the meantime, Troop F of the squadron worked south in an attempt to envelop the rear of the enemy force but was unable to do so and returned. The 2d Squadron established night perimeters near the same positions it had held the previous night. On the following morning the 75-mm. and 105-mm. artillery and the 4.2-inch and 60-mm. mortars began to register heavy fire on the Japanese strong point. At 1200 Troop G of the 2d Squadron jumped off, attacking the enemy position frontally while Troop F moved in from the rear. Employing flame throwers, Troop G steadily pushed forward and by 1445 had knocked out four enemy bunkers and destroyed several machine guns. Of more importance, it was fifty yards beyond the enemy front lines. Troop F also continued to advance. By the end of the day the enemy force had been rooted off the high ground, and the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, was in firm possession of the ridge. The unit captured a quantity of enemy ordnance, including 12 light and 3 heavy machine guns, 9 grenade launchers, and 73 rifles, together with considerable quantities of grenades and ammunition. Before the ridge was secured, "over 5000 rounds of artillery fire had been placed on [the] . . . position without appreciably affecting it." On 14 December, the 12th Cavalry was ordered to continue west to Highway 2 and assist the advance of the 32d Division, to establish a roadblock on the highway, and to attack the hostile forces to the north between it and the 32d Division. In furtherance of this order, the 1st Squadron, less A and C Troops, moved west on 15 December toward a previously reconnoitered area that was about 1,800 yards east of the barrio of Lonoy. This site, a banana plantation, was chosen for its observation facilities to the west and as an excellent dropping ground for supplies. The 1st Squadron, having encountered little opposition, closed on the area before dusk. Thereupon the rest of the regiment was ordered to close in on the area before nightfall on 17 December. At 0930 on 14 December Colonel Freeman prepared his special assault force to renew the attack. Before the jump-off, artillery and mortars laid their fire on the blockhouse and beyond. Under cover of artillery fire the troops cautiously moved out at 1030 with Company L on the right and by 1105 they had advanced 100 yards. Company L knocked out two pillboxes with flame throwers and a tank destroyer gun. Company E found every step of the way contested. The troops used hand grenades and bayonets and literally forced the enemy out of the foxholes in tough hand-to-hand fighting. Capt. Robert B. Nett, the commanding officer of Company E, although seriously wounded, refused to relinquish his command. He led his company forward and killed seven Japanese with his rifle and bayonet. Captain Nett was awarded the Medal of Honor. While Company E was so engaged, Company L on its right advanced through dense foliage and burnt the Japanese out of their foxholes and the bamboo thicket with flame throwers. The company was assisted by armored bulldozers from the 302d Engineers. For a hundred yards on all sides of the blockhouse, the enemy had dug many deep foxholes only a few yards apart. All the foxholes were covered, some with coconut logs and earth, and others with improvised lids of metal and earth. One was protected by an upturned bathtub. The armored bulldozer drove over the positions, its blades cutting off the tops of the foxholes, after which small arms fire into the holes killed the occupants. The crews of the tank destroyers not only fired point-blank at targets but opened the escape hatches and dropped grenades into the foxholes. At 1240 the blockhouse, or what remained of it, was secured. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 305th Regiment executed a flanking maneuver around the blockhouse, subsequently shifting 1,000 yards to the east to intercept the enemy's communication lines along Highway 2. On December 15, the 77th Division consolidated its positions and dispatched small patrols, effectively securing the port of Ormoc. Since the initial landings, the 77th estimated that they had killed 3,046 Japanese soldiers and captured 9 prisoners at the expense of 103 soldiers killed, 318 wounded, and 26 missing. With the 184th Regiment taking over the defense of Ormoc, Bruce's troops were now able to prepare for their advance toward Valencia and beyond, aiming to connect with General Sibert's 10th Corps, which was still making its way southward. However, we must shift our focus from Leyte to address another significant development in the Philippines. While Admiral Nimitz was strategizing his invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa—topics we will delve into further in the future—General MacArthur reluctantly postponed the Mindoro operation until December 15 to give Admiral Kinkaid time to assemble a robust escort carrier group to protect General Dunckel's Western Visayan Task Force during its landing on Mindoro. This group, composed of six escort carriers, three aging battleships, three cruisers, and 18 destroyers commanded by Rear-Admiral Theodore Ruddock, was tasked with safeguarding Admiral Struble's Task Group 78.3, now renamed the Mindoro Attack Group, alongside Admiral Berkey's Close Covering Group, which included three cruisers and seven destroyers. Additionally, Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 was ordered to assist Operation Love with a series of strikes against the main airbases on Luzon. Although the prime airfield locations on Mindoro were situated in the northeast, perilously close to Japanese air concentrations in Luzon, MacArthur chose to establish a beachhead and airfield sites near San Jose in the southwest corner. The 503rd Parachute Regiment was designated to land on the Green and Blue Beaches around the Bugsanga River, while the majority of the 19th Regiment would come ashore at the White Beach near Mangarin Bay. Meanwhile, General Yamashita had been convinced since early November that Leyte would fall, prompting him to strategize for the defense of Luzon. He thought the Americans would try to establish advance air bases in the western Visayas rather than on Mindoro, as the Japanese believed Mindoro had limited suitable locations for operational airfield construction. This belief hindered Yamashita's ability to reinforce either these positions or the already weakened defenses on Luzon, as Field Marshal Terauchi persistently pressured him to send all available reinforcements to Leyte. Realizing he could not engage in a decisive battle on Luzon without substantial reinforcements, Yamashita began planning a delaying defense strategy, where his existing forces would conduct operations aimed at exhausting enemy resources. In preparation for the worst-case scenario, the 14th Area Army started organizing positions for a prolonged defense in the mountainous regions around Baguio and north of San Jose, west of Tarlac, and east of Manila. At this stage, Yamashita had the 61st Independent Mixed Brigade stationed on the Batan and Babuyan Islands, the 103rd Division in northern Luzon, the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade in the Lingayen Gulf area, the 2nd Tank Division near San Miguel-Cabanatuan, the 8th Division in Batangas Province, the 11th Independent Regiment in the sectors around Baler and Dingalan Bay, the 82nd Brigade in the Lamon Bay region, the remainder of the 105th Division in the Legaspi and Naga areas, and most of the 23rd Division in the San Jose and Umingan sectors. In addition, the Manila Defense Force, established on November 1, comprised four provisional infantry battalions and five infantry companies, tasked with defending Manila and the Bataan Peninsula. Furthermore, the 8th Division was charged with the defense of Mindoro; however, the island was only protected by two provisional companies from the 359th Independent Battalion, which were deployed there to bolster the local naval garrisons and air personnel. On December 12, Struble's convoy finally set sail from Leyte Gulf towards Mindoro. Struble's forces steamed on through the Mindanao Sea unmolested until the afternoon of 13 December. Japanese Army and Navy planes had had the three groups under surveillance since 0900, but had not attacked pending receipt of information on the force's destination. In midafternoon ten Japanese Navy planes, including three designated as suicide bombers--the dread kamikazes--flew up from a field on Cebu and found the Allied force off the southeastern corner of Negros Island. Unobserved by lookouts and undetected by radar, which nearby land masses blanketed, one kamikaze flew in low over the water and crashed with a mighty roar on the light cruiser Nashville, Admiral Struble's flagship. Combined explosions from the plane's bomb and ship's ammunition wrecked the flag bridge, the communications office, and the combat information center. Over 130 men were killed outright, including General Dunckel's chief of staff, the 310th Bombardment Wing's commander, Admiral Struble's chief of staff, and Task Group 78.3's communications and medical officers. The wounded, numbering about 190, included Dunckel, who was painfully but not seriously injured and burned. Struble and Dunckel quickly transferred to the destroyer Dashiell, which also took aboard some of the members of both officers' staffs. The rest of the staffs and the wounded sailed back to Leyte on the Nashville, protected by the destroyer Stanly. Later that afternoon, another kamikaze struck the destroyer Haraden, which also had to return to Leyte, resulting in 15 fatalities and 25 injuries. Additionally, Admiral Shima's 2nd Striking Force was instructed to relocate from Lingga to Camranh Bay in anticipation of a potential sortie. Despite this, the Americans continued their advance, and fortunately for them, the Japanese were searching in the western Visayas, causing them to miss the opportunity to attack on December 14. Meanwhile, McCain's carriers launched a significant strike against Luzon, while Ruddock's carriers effectively diverted enemy attention with attacks on air concentrations in Panay and Negros Islands. By late afternoon of the 14th the location of the convoy in the southern waters of Mindoro Strait made it clear that the objective lay beyond the western Visayas. For the first time Fourteenth Area Army estimated that the landing would take place on Mindoro and ordered the 8th Division to alert its outposts there. It was also a serious possibility,, however, that the enemy might strike directly at Luzon. General Yamashita therefore issued a warning to Area Army forces throughout central Luzon. As a further precaution, the Nagayoshi Detachment, which was awaiting shipment to Leyte, and the 71st Infantry Regiment of the 23d Division, which had just reached Manila, were ordered to deploy immediately to Bataan Peninsula and Batangas, respectively, to meet potential enemy landings in those sectors. The Navy and air commands in Manila saw much greater probability of a landing on Luzon than on Mindoro. They therefore directed all subordinate units and installations to prepare for action against both enemy amphibious forces and possible airborne attack groups. Additionally, Army and Navy aircraft were quickly organized to target enemy shipping. Meanwhile, Struble's convoy anchored near San Jose and began preparations for the landings, which would catch the few defenders of Mindoro off guard. As troops transferred to the landing crafts and surface vessels commenced the pre-landing bombardment, McCain's carrier aircraft launched another assault on Luzon, inflicting substantial casualties. Assisted by Ruddock's carriers, they successfully shot down eight out of fifteen kamikaze attackers targeting the shipping off the island. For the loss of 35 aircraft, the Americans estimated they destroyed around 450 Japanese planes during this operation. Nevertheless, the Japanese continued their assault, damaging two LSTs that would later sink, as well as one LSM. In the heroic action, the destroyer USS Moale (DD-693), under the command of Commander Walter M. Foster, went alongside the burning LST-738 (which was loaded with aviation fuel and ordnance) to rescue crewmembers. Several explosions aboard LST-738 caused damage to Moale as she pulled away. Some pieces of shrapnel were two feet square and they put four holes in Moale's hull. Gunner's Mate Ed Marsh reported that a one-gallon jar of vaseline from the LST's cargo splattered on one barrel of his twin 40 mm Bofors AA gun, providing unwelcome lubrication. Moale suffered one fatality and thirteen wounded. In addition, Moale also rescued 88 survivors. Despite this damage, they were unable to prevent the successful landings of the 19th Regiment and the 503rd Parachute Regiment, which quickly unloaded and advanced seven miles inland to secure the objective beachhead line. Consequently, the few Japanese units present in the area were compelled to retreat inland toward Bulalacao. Meanwhile, engineers promptly began construction on the new Hill Drome, which would be completed by December 20. The second Ellmore Field was projected to be ready for limited use three days later and for continuous dry-weather operations by December 28, a week ahead of schedule. On the morning of December 16, a slow-moving tow convoy consisting of small tankers, barges, and LCTs, accompanied by destroyers, arrived off Mindoro after suffering the loss of a small Army tanker that was sunk and a destroyer that was damaged by kamikaze attacks during the journey. Concurrently, McCain carried out his final strike against Luzon, unfortunately resulting in the sinking of the hellship Oryoku Maru, which was carrying 1,620 prisoners of war, with over 200 lives lost. The burden of taking their fellow soldiers' lives would not be the only consequence for the Americans, as the fierce Typhoon Cobra soon battered Task Force 38, sinking the destroyer Spence and damaging nine additional warships. Despite these significant losses, the Mindoro operation was ultimately a complete success. Although MacArthur aimed to launch his amphibious invasion of Lingayen Gulf just 15 days after capturing Mindoro, considerations such as the lunar and tidal conditions at Lingayen Gulf, the necessity to rest and replenish the units of Kinkaid's 7th Fleet, and the ongoing slow progress in airfield construction on Leyte—required for establishing a much larger airbase at Mindoro—ultimately compelled him to delay Operation Mike I until January 9. Conversely, the invasion of Mindoro, signaling that the final advance on Luzon would soon take place, prompted Terauchi to recognize that Leyte was a lost cause. As a result, the decisive battle at Leyte was immediately halted, the 35th Army was instructed to hold the southern Philippines for as long as possible, and the 14th Area Army was ordered to expedite its defensive preparations on Luzon and quickly respond to the enemy landing on Mindoro. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Intense battles unfolded as American forces aggressively pushed back a chaotic Japanese retreat, marking a pivotal moment in the fight for Ormoc, while enemy convoys faced destruction and retreat marked the war's shifting tide. US forces battled fiercely on Leyte and Mindoro, overcoming Japanese resistance and kamikaze attacks to secure key positions for the Luzon invasion.
In this sermon by Chris Romig, the dual meaning of Advent is explored, focusing on both the first and second comings of Jesus. Chris delves into Revelation 1:7-8, emphasizing the foundational importance of this chapter. Verse 7, which describes Jesus' return with the clouds, is highlighted to signify that every eye will witness His second coming. Chris stresses the term "behold," calling for attention to Jesus' climactic return and references both the Old and New Testament where clouds symbolize God's presence. He likens this to General MacArthur's WWII return to provide a relatable historical context. Advent, as Chris explains, is a time not just for reflecting on Jesus' birth but also for anticipating His return. He emphasizes the importance of recognizing both Jesus' first coming as a suffering servant and His second coming as a triumphant king. Chris recounts meeting two elderly church members, including a WWII veteran, to draw parallels to Jesus' return. He discusses the groups mentioned in Revelation 1:7 – those who pierced Jesus and the tribes of the earth – relating them to various modern-day audiences who have rejected God. He also underscores the significance of Christians praying for Israel, highlighting God's enduring covenants with them. The sermon touches on high Christological themes in Revelation, affirming Jesus' dual nature as fully God and eternally existent, embodied in the Alpha and Omega statement.
Last time we spoke about Fall of Peleliu. As American forces pressed down the Ormoc Valley, General Kataoka launched a counterattack with limited success, and Colonel Hettinger's 128th Regiment clashed at Breakneck Ridge but couldn't capture Corkscrew Ridge. Meanwhile, Japanese troops fortified defenses, resulting in intense fighting along Kilay and Shoestring Ridges. By November 23, the Americans had solidified their positions around Limon, disrupting Japanese supply lines and forcing a shift in enemy tactics. Simultaneously, Colonel Nakagawa's last forces on Peleliu fought desperately. As American flamethrowers targeted enemy caves, Nakagawa, with only a few soldiers remaining, chose an honorable death, marking the brutal end of the battle. American forces eventually secured Peleliu after extensive losses. Hidden Japanese troops would later survive in caves until 1947, finally surrendering. Lastly China's Operation Ichi-Go saw brutal losses as Japanese forces captured Guilin and Liuzhou, killing civilians and decimating Chinese forces. This episode is Operation Capital Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. By the end of November, General Gill's 32nd Division had successfully secured the Limon area and was prepared to advance south toward Ormoc. However, they first needed to clear enemy forces from Kilay Ridge. At the same time, General Arnold's 7th Division had strengthened its position on Shoestring Ridge and was preparing to attack the rear of General Yamagata's 26th Division, which was moving east to participate in an offensive against the Burauen airstrips. In the north, Colonel Clifford's 1st Battalion had been under heavy pressure in recent days. With the arrival of the 2nd Battalion, 184th Regiment, however, he was now ready to go on the offensive. On December 1, following intense preparations, the Americans launched an attack on the Japanese-held knolls at the southeastern end of the ridge. They captured the first knoll easily but were halted by intense fire on the second. The next day, Colonel Hettinger's 2nd Battalion continued the assault, this time overcoming all resistance and securing Kilay Ridge for the Americans. Clifford's relieved battalion had suffered 26 killed, 2 missing, and 101 wounded, yet estimated Japanese casualties at 900. Meanwhile, by November 30, General Cunningham's 112th Cavalry Regiment had advanced to a ridge roughly 2,500 yards east of Highway 2 and about 5,000 yards southeast of Limon. Here, they encountered a heavily fortified enemy force that held its ground. Unable to dislodge them, Cunningham sent Troop A northwest on December 2 to connect with the 126th Regiment at the Leyte River. Meeting no resistance, the 1st Squadron also began moving northwest, while Cunningham's 2nd Squadron continued its attempts to take the Japanese-held ridge without success. Facing south, Arnold planned to advance northward with two regiments side-by-side, but his offensive would be postponed until the 17th Regiment arrived on December 3. The next day, patrols were sent forward in preparation for a full assault, reaching as far north as Balogo. Meanwhile, the Japanese were finalizing their own Burauen offensive, codenamed Operation Wa, set to launch on December 5. However, the plan was already faltering: by the end of November, the 16th Division was reduced to only 2,000 men, and the 26th Division was still moving slowly to its assembly point. In response, the recently arrived 3rd Battalion of the 77th Regiment, brought to Ipil by landing barges, was promptly sent to support Yamagata. The 68th Brigade, expected to arrive shortly, was to secure the Albuera sector, blocking any enemy advance toward Ormoc. Additionally, General Tominaga planned to airdrop two regiments from the 2nd Raiding Brigade onto the Burauen airstrips to coordinate with the ground attack. Meanwhile, the Imahori Detachment, pushed out of Daro in late November, remained on standby for action in the Ormoc sector as it retreated toward Dolores. At sea, Admiral Okawachi had deployed the seventh convoy of Operation TA, organized into three echelons to transport supplies and equipment. The first group, consisting of three submarines and one subchaser, departed Manila on November 28 and reached Ipil two days later, successfully unloading cargo but losing one submarine grounded at Masbate. The second group of two submarines left Manila on November 30, unloading at Palompon the next day, although both were later destroyed in a nighttime destroyer sweep. On December 1, a third group of three transports, T-9, T-140 and T-159 and two destroyers, Take and Kuwa, under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Yamashita Masamichi, departed Manila, reaching Ormoc the next day, where they were attacked by a separate destroyer division during the night. The convoy, under Lieutenant-Commander Yamashita Masamichi, was docked at Ormoc City when it was engaged at 00:09 on December 3 by three ships of Destroyer Division 120 under the command of Commander John C. Zahm. The American destroyers attacked the transports as they were unloading but came under heavy attack from Yokosuka P1Y "Frances" bombers, shore batteries, submarines that were known to be in the harbor, and the Japanese destroyers. As a result, Kuwa was sunk and Commander Yamashita was killed. Take also attacked Cooper with torpedoes and escaped, though with some damage. Cooper finally sank at about 00:15 with the loss of 191 lives (168 sailors were rescued from the water on December 4 by Consolidated PBY Catalina flying boats). At 00:33, the two surviving US destroyers were then ordered to leave the bay, and the victorious Japanese successfully resupplied Ormoc Bay once more. This phase of the Battle of Ormoc Bay has gone down in history as the only naval engagement during the war in which the enemy brought to bear every type of weapon: naval gunnery, naval torpedoes, air attack, submarine attack, shore gunnery, and mines. Meanwhile, as the Battle of Leyte continued, Generals MacArthur and Krueger were preparing the crucial invasion of Luzon. On October 3, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved MacArthur's Operation Musketeer III over a possible invasion of Formosa, which would have required moving along extended and vulnerable supply lines. However, naval commanders feared an Allied convoy navigating the narrow waters of the central Visayas would be vulnerable to heavy air attacks from numerous nearby enemy airfields. This concern prompted the Americans to plan a preliminary operation, codenamed Love. One option involved securing positions in Aparri to provide fighter cover for supply ships, which could then take a safer route around northern Luzon through open seas. MacArthur, however, favored capturing Mindoro to establish airfields that would protect naval convoys en route to Luzon. Although enemy air attacks posed a risk during the initial invasion and resupply of forces on Mindoro, the establishment of these airfields would give the Allies a shorter, safer route to Lingayen Gulf with improved air protection and reduced exposure to the unpredictable typhoon season compared to the northern Luzon route. The Mindoro operation was scheduled for December 5, followed by a large-scale invasion of Luzon with landings at Lingayen Gulf on December 20, anticipating that the airfields on Mindoro would be operational by then. For Operation Love III, Krueger organized the Western Visayan Task Force, which included the 19th Regiment and the 503rd Parachute Regiment, under the command of Brigadier-General William Dunckel. The initial plan involved a combined airborne and amphibious landing on December 5 to secure the San Jose area near the southwest coast, facilitating the immediate use of its airstrips to support the Luzon operations and counter the numerous enemy airfields on the peninsula. However, delays in the development of airfields on Leyte and the ongoing need for air support for Leyte ground forces led to significant changes in the original Mindoro plan. Consequently, the airborne phase was canceled, and arrangements were made for the parachute regiment to be transported by sea. Ultimately, the prolonged development of airfields on Leyte, resulting in insufficient air support, combined with the urgent need to rehabilitate essential naval units, led to a ten-day postponement of the Mindoro operation to December 15. This delay impacted the Leyte campaign significantly, allowing the released shipping to be utilized for an amphibious assault on Ormoc. As a result, on November 23, General Bruce's 77th Division landed on Leyte in the rear areas of the 24th Corps and was readied for this new assault. Krueger decided to deploy this division for a major push to expedite the conclusion of the Leyte campaign. However, we must now shift our focus from the Philippines to recent developments in New Britain. Following the initial landings at Jacquinot Bay, the 6th Brigade was fully assembled at Cutarp by December 16. Their mission was to halt the Japanese forces from moving westward from Wide Bay and to conduct patrols toward Milim. At the same time, the 13th Brigade was tasked with safeguarding Jacquinot Bay against potential enemy advances from the north or south. To the north, the 36th Battalion was positioned at Cape Hoskins, with two of its companies deployed to Bialla Plantation by December 6 to patrol towards the Balima River and counter any Japanese offensives from Ea Ea. Under this increasing pressure, the enemy was compelled to retreat, leaving the Ea Ea-Ulamona region clear. Due to this unexpected withdrawal and the challenges of beaching barges at Bialla, General Ramsay decided to permit the 36th Battalion to advance toward Ea Ea. After leaving a small detachment at Cape Hoskins, the Australians landed unopposed at Ea Ea on January 13, while a New Guinea company similarly landed on Lolobau Island. To the south, half of the 14th/32nd Battalion successfully landed at Sumpun on December 28, moving closer to the Japanese buildup at the northern end of Henry Reid Bay. By January 7, the rest of the battalion had gathered at Sumpun, and by the end of January, they conducted an amphibious operation to set up a new base at Milim. At the same time, the 6th Brigade also started moving into the Kiep-Milim area, completing this transition by February 11. However, we will now shift our focus away from New Britain and turn our attention to Burma to discuss the continuation of Operation Capital. As previously noted, by the end of November, General Slim's 14th Army had effectively chased the retreating Japanese troops to the Chindwin River, while General Festing's 36th Division advanced to Pinwe, tightening the noose around General Katamura's 15th Army from the north. To the east, General Li Hong's 38th Division had successfully encircled Bhamo, and General Li Tao's 22nd Division along with Colonel Easterbrooke's 475th Regiment were progressing along the Bhamo-Myitson road. On the Salween front, General Wei's Y-Force captured Longling and Mangshi, the key targets of his offensive. However, amid the intense fighting at Mangshi, the 53rd Army executed a broad flanking maneuver through the mountains towards the Chefang Pass, where General Matsuyama's 56th Division was establishing new positions. Fortunately for Matsuyama, the Yoshida Force, anticipating this movement, launched a successful counterattack south of Kongjiazhai, effectively stalling the enemy advance long enough for the withdrawing Japanese forces to regroup. Meanwhile, Wei had dispatched the 71st Army to advance along the Burma Road and the 6th Army to break through Mengga, launching a rapid assault on the hastily prepared Japanese defenses on November 24. The 2nd Army chose to bypass these defenses, continuing south towards Wanding. Despite fierce resistance from the defenders, the determined Chinese forces made significant progress in the following days, ultimately compelling the outnumbered Japanese to withdraw to Wanding on November 28. In response, General Matsui's 113th Regiment established a delaying position at Zhefang, successfully repelling enemy attacks until December 1, which provided crucial time for the retreating forces to regroup at Wanding. By that time, however, Wei's divisions were significantly weakened, lacking 170,000 men from their required strength due to a lack of replacements. As a result, the Chinese command decided to postpone their offensive for thirty days while they awaited additional supplies and reinforcements, as well as a decisive victory at Bhamo that would enable Wei to connect with General Sultan's forces. Meanwhile, while the 30th Division advanced towards Namhkam, the 38th Division had been persistently assaulting Colonel Hara's garrison in the final two weeks of November. On 15 November, the 113th Regiment attacked and took the outpost positions south of Bhamo and, although the defenders were successful in twice retaking them, on the 17th the positions were finally relinquished. The enemy force brought increasing pressure on the Bhamo outpost positions on all sides while completing preparations for a general attack on the main core of resistance. In the enemy's preparation for the general attack, concentrations of artillery fire and air bombardment caused severe damage. Planes flying out of Myitkyina, averaged 200 sorties a day between the middle of November and 4 December. Every building in Bhamo was destroyed and all defensive positions were badly damaged. Early in the air bombardment period, fire destroyed most of the rations and food supplies began to run dangerously low. Despite the heavy bombardment, the Garrison continued to fight calmly and effectively. Meanwhile, north of Bhamo, where the Chinese had not moved closer to the city than the containing detachment the 113th had left opposite the Japanese outpost at Subbawng, the 114th was making more progress. That regiment bypassed the Subbawng position on 21 November and moved two miles west along the south bank of the Taping River into Shwekyina. Outflanked, the Japanese quickly abandoned Subbawng and the rest of the 114th came up to mop up the Shwekyina area, freeing advance elements of the 114th to move directly south through the outlying villages on Bhamo. On 28 November the 114th was pressing on the main northern defenses of Bhamo. In this period of 21-28 November the division commander, General Li, did not alter the mission he had given the 113th of entering Bhamo, but by his attention to the 114th he seemed to give tacit recognition to the altered state of affairs. The first Chinese attack on Bhamo itself was given the mission of driving right into the city. Made on the south by the Chinese 113th Regiment, the attack received heavy air support from the 10th Air Force. It succeeded in moving up to the main Japanese defenses in its sector, but no farther. American liaison officers with the 113th reported that the regimental commander was not accepting their advice to coordinate the different elements of the Allied force under his command or supporting him into an artillery-infantry-air team, and that he was halting the several portions of his attack as soon as the Japanese made their presence known. However, the 113th's commander might well have argued that he and his men faced the most formidable Japanese position yet encountered in Burma. Aerial photography, prisoner of war interrogation, and patrolling revealed that the Japanese had been working on Bhamo since the spring of 1944. They had divided the town into three self-contained fortress areas and a headquarters area. Each fortress area was placed on higher ground that commanded good fields of fire. Japanese automatic weapons well emplaced in strong bunkers covered fields of sharpened bamboo stakes which in turn were stiffened with barbed wire. Anti-tank ditches closed the gaps between the lagoons that covered so much of the Japanese front. Within the Japanese positions deep dugouts protected aid stations, headquarters, and communications centers. The hastily improvised defenses of Myitkyina were nothing like this elaborate and scientific fortification. Manned by some 1200 Japanese under Colonel Hara and provisioned to hold out until mid-January 1945, Bhamo was not something to be overrun by infantry assault. Although the Chinese managed to destroy several enemy outposts beyond the fortress town, they were unable to penetrate the formidable defenses established by the fierce Japanese troops. After a significant air and artillery bombardment, the 113th Regiment launched another attack at the beginning of December but once again failed to achieve a breakthrough. In contrast the 114th's aggressive commander had been most successful in the early days of December. With less than half the air support given the 113th and with no help from the 155-mm. howitzers, he had broken into the northern defenses and held his gains. The decision to give the 114th first call on artillery support posed a problem in human relations as well as tactics. This was the first time the 38th Division had ever engaged in the attack of a fortified town. All its experience had been in jungle war. Faced with this new situation, the 113th Regiment's commander seemed to have been at a loss to know what to do. The 114th, on the contrary, had gone ahead with conspicuous success on its own, and now was being asked to attempt close coordination with artillery and air support. Its commander hesitated for a day, then agreed to try an attack along the lines suggested by the Americans. The tactics developed by the 114th Regiment by 9 December took full advantage of the capabilities of air and artillery support. Since the blast of aerial bombardment had stripped the Japanese northern defenses of camouflage and tree cover it was possible for aerial observers to adjust on individual bunkers. So it became practice to attempt the occupation of one small area at a time. First, there would be an artillery preparation. Two 155-mm. howitzers firing from positions at right angles to the direction of attack would attempt to neutralize bunkers in an area roughly 100 by 300 yards. Thanks to the small margin of error in deflection, the Chinese infantry could approach very close to await the lifting of fire. The 105's would lay down smoke and high explosive on the flanks and rear of the selected enemy positions. Aerial observers would adjust the 155's on individual positions. When it was believed that all Japanese positions had been silenced the Chinese infantry would assault across the last thirty-five yards with bayonet and grenade. As casualties increased, Hara's garrison continually weakened under relentless assaults, with the outnumbered soldiers bracing themselves to fight to the last man in defense of Bhamo. Determined to prevent the Bhamo Garrison from meeting the same fate as the Lameng and Tengchong Garrisons, General Honda ordered Colonel Yamazaki Shiro's reinforced 55th Regiment to advance towards Namyu and execute a surprise counterattack to assist Hara's beleaguered troops. Departing from Namhkam on the night of December 5, the Yamazaki Detachment stealthily made their way to Namyu, where the 90th Regiment had recently established its primary position atop Hill 5338. Additionally, General Naka's 18th Division was instructed to support this initiative, with Lieutenant-Colonel Fujimura Yoshiaki's 56th Regiment ordered to move through Tonkwa to join the attack. Due to the enemy's successful Ichi-Go offensive, General Wedemeyer and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek made the decision to withdraw the elite 22nd and 38th Divisions from Burma. They planned to deploy these divisions to defend Kunming as part of the Alpha Plan. Not even the most optimistic Chinese could for the moment interpret that the Japanese thrust was confined to the American air bases in China, and no one on the Allied side could feel really sure where the 11th Army would halt, though the summer uniforms worn by the Japanese suggested to American observers that the Japanese might be outrunning their supply lines. Theater headquarters thus concluded that Chongqing and Kunming were under direct, immediate threat. In response, having adopted the code name Alpha, Wedemeyer first presented a detailed plan to the Generalissimo on November 21. This plan was divided into several phases. The period to December 31 was set for Phase I of ALPHA, in which the Chinese forces in contact with the Japanese in south and southeast China would try to slow their advance. The Americans would assist in demolitions, help plan prepared positions, and give the maximum of air support. American officers would fill liaison and advisory roles with the Chinese Army down through division level. Other Americans would work closely with the operations, intelligence, and supply officers of higher Chinese headquarters. Plainly, the mission of Phase I was to win time within which to complete a concentration for defense of Kunming. In Phase II, Chinese forces would be placed across the principal avenues of approach to Kunming while a central reserve would be built up around Kunming itself. To guarantee the availability of dependable Chinese troops two divisions of the Chinese Army in India would be flown in from Burma, together with the 53rd Army from the Salween front. About 87500 troops would be brought to the Kunming area from less menaced sectors of China. As a result, although Sultan was able to keep the 38th Division and intended to send the 14th Division back to China, General Liao was instructed on December 5 to ready the 22nd Division for airlift to China, with Colonel Easterbrooke's 475th Regiment assigned to relieve them north of Tonkwa. However, before this relief could occur, the Fujimura column attacked Tonkwa on December 8 and effectively pushed back the Chinese garrison. The Japanese continued their assault northward the next morning, but this time, Chinese-American forces were able to stop the enemy's progress. In the following days, Japanese patrols further tested American positions, and sporadic artillery and mortar fire harassed soldiers in their foxholes, but no significant assault took place. While the Chinese withdrew on December 12, American patrols discovered the enemy's apparent assembly areas, leading to artillery fire directed at them. Meanwhile, following a heavy artillery bombardment, the Yamazaki Detachment surprised the 90th Regiment on December 9th. The battalion received a heavy bombardment followed by a Japanese attack which penetrated its lines and isolated its 1st and 2d Companies. This was bad enough, but worse followed the next morning. Colonel Yamazaki massed three battalions in column to the east of the road, and, attacking on a narrow front, broke clean through by leap-frogging one battalion over another as soon as the attack lost momentum. The third Japanese battalion overran the 2d Artillery Battery, 30th Division, and captured four cannon and 100 animals. The battery commander died at his post. Despite this setback, the Chinese remained undeterred, exhibiting a fighting spirit that surprised the Japanese. The 88th Regiment swung its forces toward the Japanese penetration, which was on a narrow front, and since the terrain was hilly in the extreme the Japanese could see Chinese reinforcements converging on the battle site. So vigorously did the Chinese counterattack that one lone Chinese soldier fought his way almost into the trench that held Colonel Yamazaki and the 33d Army liaison officer, Colonel Tsuji. Writing in his diary, Tsuji remarked: "This was the first experience in my long military life that a Chinese soldier charged Japanese forces all alone." The Chinese, comprising as they did three regiments of a good division, could not be indefinitely withstood by the four Japanese battalions. Destroying the four pack howitzers they had captured, the Japanese sought only to hold their positions until the Bhamo garrison could escape. Facing intense pressure from a numerically superior enemy, Yamazaki managed to fend off Chinese counterattacks over the subsequent days, striving to create a favorable moment for the Bhamo Garrison to withdraw. By December 14, with the 114th Regiment advancing into central Bhamo, Hara's remaining 900 soldiers destroyed all their artillery and focused their efforts on the southern front. As night fell, they desperately climbed the steep 50-foot banks of the Irrawaddy and charged the Chinese lines at daybreak. Utilizing the cover of early morning fog, Hara's men successfully penetrated the Chinese positions and began their final retreat towards Namhkam. Once the garrison was safe, the Japanese term for "success" was relayed to the waiting Yamazaki Detachment, which subsequently began to disengage, having suffered 150 fatalities and 300 injuries. The Bhamo Garrison, on the other hand, sustained approximately 310 killed and 300 wounded since the onset of the Allied offensive, with about 870 of the original 1,180 men surviving. At this point, only 50 miles remained between Sultan's forces and Y-Force. Meanwhile, the Fujimura column attacked again on December 13. The Japanese activity had apparently been preparation for attack, and on the morning of the 13th men checked their weapons with care and looked to the arranging of their ammunition in convenient spots. The American positions had the advantage of excellent fields of fire across open paddy fields. Looking toward the south and the west, the men of the 475th could see the dark green mass of leaves, trunks, and brush making the jungle that hid the Japanese assembly areas and, farther back, the Japanese gun positions. Following a ten-minute preparation, the Japanese attacked one American flank at 0600 and the other at 0610. The 475th's fire power met the Japanese as soon as they were clearly defined targets, and stopped the attacks within an hour. At one point a Japanese force of about a platoon tried to cover the open space by a concerted rush only to be cut down with thirty or forty casualties. There were no further Japanese attacks that day. The following morning, the 14th, the Japanese repeated their tactics of the 13th, and that effort too was beaten off, at the cost of several men killed. The 475th's entry into combat had the result on the men noted by observers in many previous wars, for they now spent hours digging themselves in more deeply and improving their positions. The 3d Battalion to the north near Mo-hlaing was subject only to artillery fire. That the Japanese at one point were actually within small arms range of the 2d Battalion while apparently not capable of doing more than shelling the 3d with their infantry guns suggested that the 3d might be able to take in reverse the Japanese pocket that pressed on the 2d Battalion. After two days of fierce combat, Easterbrooke's troops ultimately prevailed, launching a robust counteroffensive on December 15 that secured the Tonkwa area. Following these minor operations, both sides experienced a week of skirmishes around the American perimeter defenses until the final Japanese withdrawal, as the Bhamo Garrison had already been liberated. By the end of the battle, the 475th had lost 15 men killed, while an estimated 220 Japanese casualties were inflicted. Following these developments, Honda reorganized his forces, instructing the 56th Division, along with the attached Yamazaki Detachment, to defend the Wanding-Namhkam sector. He also dispatched the Yoshida Force and the 4th Regiment to reserve positions in Hsenwi while retaining the 18th Division at Mongmit. To the west, after the captures of Kalemyo on November 14 and Kalewa on November 28, General Tanaka's 33rd Division was compelled to establish new positions in the Shwegyin-Mutaik sector. In response, Slim directed the 4th Corps to cross the Chindwin River and seize Pinlebu. The 268th Indian Brigade was dispatched across the river at Sittaung, followed by Major-General Thomas “Pete” Rees' 19th Indian Division on December 4. Meanwhile, the 11th East African Division fought fiercely to expand the bridgehead at Kalewa. For the crossing a ‘Chindwin Navy' was formed, with two wooden gunboats mounting a Bofors and two Oerlikon cannons and two pairs of Browning machine-guns. They were built at Kalewa and named Pamela, after Mountbatten's youngest daughter, and Una, after Slim's. Thus Slim became the only general to have designed, built, christened, launched and commissioned ships for the Royal Navy. Their task was to protect the Inland Waterways Transport's lighters, barges and launches, built by Fourteenth Army's Chief Engineer, Brigadier Bill Hasted, who felled forests to create them and for which outboard motors were flown in. The IEME recovered MV Ontario, patched, caulked and repainted her. In due course IWT craft carried some 38000 tons of stores. The task of establishing a firm bridgehead across the Chindwin was accomplished by the East Africans clearing a series of Japanese positions along either side of Myittha river gorge on December 2 after recce by the Sea Reconnaissance Unit (SRU). As the bridgehead was expanded, bridging equipment for what, at 1154 feet, would be the longest floating bridge in the world was assembled and constructed in sections on the Myittha and floated down to the Chindwin and completed in just 28 working hours between December 7 and 10. Meanwhile Brigadier Mackenzie's 32nd Indian Brigade completed its three-day crossing of the Chindwin at Mawlaik using only two rafts named ‘Horrible Charlie' and ‘Stinking Henry'. Unbeknownst to the British and Indian forces, Katamura had already set his withdrawal to the Irrawaddy River in motion, ordering the beleaguered 15th and 53rd Divisions on December 1 to fall back to Kyauk Myaung and Kyaukse, respectively. On December 4, the 33rd Division began its gradual retreat toward Monywa, leaving the 213th Regiment behind as a rear guard to monitor the enemy in the Shwegyin-Mutaik sector. The 31st Division, now under Lieutenant-General Kawata Tsuchitaro, would cover the retreat from its positions at Kambalu and Shwebo. Consequently, Rees, acting on Slim's orders to take risks for speed, made swift progress through the challenging Zibyu Range, with his advance elements connecting with the 36th Division at Banmauk on December 16. After a lengthy pause regarding the Pinwe situation, Festing's patrols entered the towns of Indaw and Katha without opposition on December 10. From these locations, the 26th and 72nd Indian Brigades were set to move towards Kunchaung, while the 29th Indian Brigade continued its advance along the road to Takaung. Throughout this period, Japanese resistance was significantly less fierce than anticipated. Consequently, just days into the operation, Slim realized that his original strategy to encircle Katamura's 15th Army on the Shwebo Plain in front of the Irrawaddy would be ineffective. If the Japanese were indeed planning to fight from behind the river, the 14th Army would be extended from Tamu and exposed to counterattacks at a critical moment while attempting to cross one of the most daunting river obstacles. A revised strategy was therefore necessary, but Slim had only one card left to play for this situation. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. General MacArthur was now preparing a massive invasion of Luzon. Amidst ongoing air attacks, plans shifted to secure Mindoro for air support. Meanwhile, in Burma, Chinese and Japanese forces clashed over Bhamo, with the Japanese garrison ultimately escaping. It seemed everywhere things were going badly for the Japanese, how much longer would they hold out?
Last time we spoke about the battle of Ormoc Bay. Amid the fierce Battle of Leyte in November 1944, American and Japanese forces clashed across rugged terrains and stormy weather. A typhoon swept the island, halting supply lines, while Colonel Verbeck's forces launched a determined assault on Breakneck Ridge, advancing against Colonel Miyauchi's well-defended lines. Meanwhile, Japanese reinforcements suffered devastating losses from American air raids. Through relentless attacks and strategic maneuvers, the Americans gained ground, signalling the turning point toward Japanese retreat and Allied victory on Leyte. Meanwhile a Japanese convoy led by Rear-Admiral Sato suffered devastating losses to Allied submarines and air attacks while attempting to transport troops. Concurrently, Australian and American forces launched aggressive operations in New Guinea, and American B-29 Superfortresses, despite some challenges, intensified the bombing campaign against Japan. This episode is the Fall of Peleliu Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. In our previous update, General Gill's 32nd Division had arrived to relieve the exhausted 24th Division and take charge of the main offensive down the Ormoc Valley. During this lull in the battle, General Kataoka took advantage of the pause to reposition his 1st Division and ordered Colonel Miyauchi's 57th Regiment to counterattack toward Breakneck Ridge. The counterattack had limited success, ultimately leaving the 57th Regiment significantly weakened. On November 16, Colonel John Hettinger's 128th Regiment moved in to relieve the 21st Regiment at Breakneck Ridge but was unable to capture Corkscrew Ridge following a fierce battle. Simultaneously, General Cunningham's 112th Cavalry was deployed to secure and patrol the Mount Minoro area, while Colonel Clifford's reinforced 1st Battalion advanced to Kilay Ridge behind Japanese lines, where it faced artillery fire and unsuccessfully attempted to link up with Colonel Chapman's 2nd Battalion roadblock on Highway 2. To the south, the 32nd Regiment moved toward Baybay to launch a second push toward Ormoc, initiating an advance north to the Damulaan-Caridad area on November 14. Meanwhile, General Yamagata's 26th Division, including Colonel Saito Jiro's 13th Independent Regiment, advanced in the same direction with plans to assault Burauen, setting up a confrontation with the American forces on Shoestring Ridge. By November 17, Hettinger's 1st Battalion had entrenched on the slopes of Corkscrew Ridge while the 3rd Battalion progressed roughly 1,000 yards down the highway, securing a ridge about 500 yards north of Limon. At the same time, Clifford's patrols finally made contact with Chapman's 2nd Battalion, but they struggled to establish a communication line due to the strong enemy presence between them. The following day, Clifford positioned machine guns for a firefight against the enemy on a ridge to the southeast. Throughout the night and into November 19, Japanese machine-gun fire targeted the perimeter, successfully disabling one gun and surrounding Clifford's southernmost outpost, eventually forcing the Americans to withdraw. Meanwhile, Hettinger's 1st Battalion launched another assault on Corkscrew Ridge on November 18, though it achieved only minor gains. Additionally, Colonel Kora Keijiro's 49th Regiment infiltrated the enemy's left flank, initiating a two-pronged advance toward Colasian and Capoocan, but this had limited impact on Gill's offensive. As a result, Hettinger's 1st Battalion continued its siege of Corkscrew Ridge until November 20, while the 3rd Battalion held positions on a ridge overlooking Limon. On November 20 and 21, Japanese forces also gained ground against Clifford's defenses on Kilay Ridge. At the same time, the 32nd Regiment had established a defensive stance on Shoestring Ridge, while the 13th Independent Regiment fortified the opposite ridge with trenches, machine-gun pits, and other installations, sending a reinforced battalion eastward toward Burauen. On November 22, the 11th Airborne Division arrived to relieve the 7th Division, which subsequently redeployed to the west coast. Gill resumed his offensive, sending Hettinger's 2nd and 3rd Battalions south while the 1st Battalion contained Corkscrew Ridge. The Americans fought their way to Limon, establishing defensive positions along a tributary of the Leyte River south of the town after repelling a fierce Japanese counterattack. Meanwhile, Japanese assaults intensified on Kilay Ridge, pushing back Clifford's troops, though they held firm. Fortunately, the Japanese did not press further on November 23, as Kataoka needed to reorganize his forces following the fall of Limon. To support the division's left flank along the Limon-Ormoc highway, he dispatched the 49th Regiment and his reserve battalion, coinciding with the arrival of the 1st Regiment to reinforce the heavily weakened 57th Regiment. However, the withdrawal of the 49th created a significant gap between the 1st and 102nd Divisions, which the 126th Regiment quickly exploited, advancing through the Hill 1525 area to strike at the enemy's rear. The 128th Regiment also took this time to realign and consolidate its positions, focusing the next three days on extensive patrols and placing harassing fire along an east-west ridge overlooking the highway about 1,000 yards south of Limon. Additionally, on November 24, the 112th Cavalry began advancing southwest from Mount Minoro toward the highway with a similar objective. With the occupation of Limon, the Battle of Breakneck Ridge concluded, costing the 24th and 32nd Divisions a total of 1,498 casualties, while the Japanese suffered an estimated 5,252 fatalities and had eight captured. The American victory was largely aided by the establishment of a roadblock south of Limon by Chapman's 2nd Battalion and the defense of Kilay Ridge in the Japanese rear by Clifford's battalion. From November 12 to 23 the 2nd Battalion, 19th Regiment had defended the roadblock under extremely difficult conditions. The operations report of the 24th Division graphically summarizes the deeds for which the battalion received a presidential citation: “These bearded, mud caked soldiers came out of the mountains exhausted and hungry. Their feet were heavy, cheeks hollow, bodies emaciated, and eyes glazed. They had seen thirty-one comrades mortally wounded, watched fifty-five others lie suffering in muddy foxholes without adequate medical attention. Yet their morale had not changed. It was high when they went in and high when they came out. They were proud that they had rendered invaluable aid to the main forces fighting in Ormoc corridor, by disrupting the Japanese supply lines and preventing strong reinforcements from passing up the Ormoc road. They were proud that they had outfought the Emperor's toughest troops, troops that had been battle trained in Manchuria. They were certain they had killed at least 606 of the enemy and felt that their fire had accounted for many more. And they were proud that this had all been accomplished despite conditions of extreme hardship. 241 of the battalion's officers and enlisted men were hospitalized for skin disorders, foot ulcers, battle fatigue, and sheer exhaustion.” These units, facing constant fire and heavily outnumbered, prevented General Suzuki from reinforcing Limon. Abandoning a potential counteroffensive here, Suzuki redirected his primary efforts to the Burauen front for his Wa offensive. Despite Yamagata's preparations for combat, the effectiveness of the 26th Division depended heavily on acquiring more heavy weapons, ammunition, and equipment. Thus, a convoy with three transports and a submarine chaser departed Manila on November 23, carrying the essential supplies to Ormoc. As night fell over Shoestring Ridge, Saito finally launched his main offensive against the stretched defenses of the 32nd Regiment. Artillery, mortars, and machine guns provided cover for two companies advancing forward to capture sections of the ridge. The next morning, the 2nd Battalion of the 32nd Regiment reorganized its defensive positions, enabling the Americans to push back a Japanese force that had penetrated south of the Palanas River and east of Hill 918. Meanwhile, General Tominaga initiated a large-scale air offensive to support Operation TA's latest convoy, deploying sixty planes from the 2nd Air Division to strike the Leyte airfields, while thirty Navy aircraft targeted enemy shipping in Leyte Gulf. Over the next four days, daily air attacks were conducted in the Leyte area, and the 7th Air Division carried out coordinated strikes against enemy bases on Morotai. However, on November 24, the convoy's transports were sunk by an air attack off Masbate Island, just as another convoy consisting of three transports and one destroyer was dispatched to Ormoc. This convoy was similarly destroyed the next day off Marinduque Island by carrier aircraft, resulting in a complete operational failure. Back in Leyte, on the night of November 24, Saito's troops launched another ferocious assault on enemy positions, beginning with the heaviest artillery barrage the 32nd Regiment had yet encountered. The Americans quickly responded with their own supporting weapons, effectively repelling repeated Japanese attacks. Only Company K was pushed back, but American artillery, mortars, and machine guns prevented the Japanese from exploiting this breakthrough. After failing to penetrate the front lines, Saito's troops desperately attempted to neutralize the artillery supporting the 32nd Regiment before ultimately retreating, allowing the defenders to regroup. By nightfall, the Japanese employed the same tactics as in their previous assault but were ultimately pushed back after a fierce grenade battle and some close-quarters fighting. At the same time, Kataoka's newly deployed reserve battalion launched an attack on Kilay Ridge during the night. However, the weary defenders were able to fend off the assault, resulting in casualties for both sides. After reinforcing Shoestring Ridge, the 32nd Regiment faced another attack on the night of November 26. At 2100 Colonel Saito renewed the assault against the American position, following the pattern set by the previous night actions. The Japanese first laid down mortar and machine gun fire, and then heavy-weapons fire of the 13th Infantry Regiment hit the right platoons of Company G, shifting to the east in about fifteen minutes. Immediately afterward, about a battalion of Japanese infantry attacked Company G, while twelve machine guns started to fire from a ridge 1,200 yards to the east. The Japanese moved into the fire of their own heavy weapons. The 32d Infantry, using all of its artillery batteries, mortars, machine guns, and rifles, started throwing lead against the enemy force as fast as its men could load and fire. The Japanese, employing an estimated fifty machine guns, continued to come on. "All hell broke loose" as the enemy shot off flares to guide their own artillery fire. The sharp declivity in front of the American lines did not allow for a close concentration of friendly artillery fire. Just as it appeared that the lines were to be overrun, some more enemy flares went up, and the Japanese withdrew, covered by heavy machine gun and mortar fire. Colonel Finn, taking advantage of this fortunate circumstance, hastily rearranged riflemen to fill gaps caused by casualties and replenished his ammunition supplies. The mortars of the regiment continued to fire into the draw. After a short lull Colonel Saito renewed the attack. There was no preparatory artillery fire, but the mortars and machine guns introduced the assault. The attack did not seem as determined as the previous one, though the number of troops was apparently about the same. The 32d Infantry again called down all types of fire upon the enemy. Elements of the 13th Infantry Regiment continued to advance, although "the carnage was terriffic," and attempted to pass through the American lines. A strong enemy group moved into a bamboo grove on a nose in front of the center platoon of G Company. From this position the enemy launched an attack which the company resisted with grenades and bayonets. As Colonel Finn later reported: "The battle continued to flare up and die down as the valiant soldiers fought like devils to hold our lines." The 81-mm. mortars from the mortar platoon of H Company fired 650 rounds in five minutes, and fire from the 60-mm. mortars was "practically automatic." After an hour's intense fighting, the enemy force withdrew. Unbeknownst to the Americans, however, the left and center platoons of Company G fell back in confusion during the fight, allowing the Japanese to infiltrate the American lines in the bamboo thicket previously occupied by the center platoon. The Japanese had not attacked the left flank of Company G. These troops heard the battle raging to the right and the sounds of the Japanese forming below them. A non-commissioned officer in charge of a listening post sent a man to get permission for his 3-man group to withdraw. After receiving permission he shouted the order from a distance of 50 yards. As the men from the listening post started back, they were joined by the left platoon and two squads from the center platoon. Within 45 minutes the two platoons, less one squad, plus the section of heavy machine guns, were moving south on the highway. "There was no thought in their minds that the withdrawal was not authorized." After proceeding down the road 250 yards they met the executive officer of Company H who ordered them back. It was too late, the damage was done. Though the left platoon was able to regain its position without trouble, the two squads from the center platoon found the enemy well dug-in in the bamboo thicket where the squads had been. It was later learned that there were about 200 hostile troops with 20 machine guns in the thicket. The Japanese were within the American lines and in a position from which they could fire on A Battery and the flanks of Companies E, L, I, and K. Although the surprised defenders managed to contain the infiltrators—who seemingly did not recognize the Americans' precarious situation, as they made no attempt to capitalize on it—the situation remained unstable until the 1st Battalion, 184th Regiment arrived on November 27 and regained the lost ground. At this point, all the assault elements of General Arnold's 7th Division had crossed to the eastern shore of the Camotes Sea, and reinforcements were en route. On November 28, the 184th Regiment relieved the exhausted defenders on Shoestring Ridge and successfully repelled a small Japanese attack that night. Meanwhile, Yamashita decided to shift most of his division toward Burauen to initiate Suzuki's planned offensive, leaving only a small detachment to prevent the Americans from reaching Albuera and cutting off the base of his attack. By the end of November, the 184th had successfully taken control of Shoestring Ridge and the Bloody Bamboo Thicket, although it was unable to advance further north due to the enemy's strong resistance. At the same time, Tominaga made an unsuccessful attempt to drop off a raiding unit over Burauen on November 26, marking the first use of a tactic that would be repeated in the coming weeks. On November 27, Admiral Okawachi launched another convoy carrying heavy equipment for the 26th Division, which successfully reached Ormoc Bay overnight. However, it was intercepted by PT boats the following day, resulting in the loss of one frigate and one subchaser during the encounter. The convoy faced further attacks from aircraft on November 29, which sank one transport before the remaining ships departed for Manila. On their return journey, the last two vessels were ultimately destroyed by air strikes. Back in Leyte, on November 29, Clifford's exhausted troops managed to fend off one final heavy assault before being relieved by Hettinger's 2nd Battalion. By the end of the month, the Americans had solidified their positions on Kilay and Shoestring Ridges and were prepared to advance their two offensives against Ormoc. However, we must now shift our focus from the Philippines to Peleliu, where Colonel Nakagawa's remaining 700 men continued to hold out against American assaults with their dwindling strength. At the beginning of November, Colonel Watson's 323rd Regiment had taken over the task of neutralizing the Umurbrogol Pocket, with Colonel Dark's 3rd Battalion on Walt Ridge and Mortimer Valley being the last unit remaining from the 321st Regiment. After a brief pause in combat at the end of October, operations became more active again on November 2. Watson's 2nd Battalion successfully attacked the Five Sisters from the southwest, while elements of the 1st Battalion advanced north along the ridges west of Death Valley, pursuing the remaining Japanese forces from South Pocket. Meanwhile, part of the 3rd Battalion moved slowly south through the ridges and rugged terrain at the northern end of China Wall. However, before Watson could continue his offensive, heavy rains began on November 4, escalating into a typhoon that persisted for four days. By November 12, no significant progress had been made by any unit, with slow patrols and sandbagging ongoing. The 81st Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop and elements of the 321st Regiment focused on securing additional offshore islets north of Peleliu. Attacks in the Umurbrogol resumed on November 13, with Watson's 1st Battalion advancing eastward from the ridges west of Death Valley, and his 2nd Battalion pushing north into the gorge and Wildcat Bowl, though little ground was gained in the following days. Despite this slow advancement, a key center of resistance was identified in the rough terrain west of central Death Valley. On November 16, oil was sent forward through a hose from fuel tanks set up in covered positions 300 yards distant and poured into a large cave which seemed to be the center of the new-found defenses. Ignited by white phosphorus hand grenades lobbed into the cave, the flaming oil produced such promising results in driving Japanese into the open or killing them, that the same method of conquest continued to be used by the 1st Battalion and in other parts of the pocket. Over the next five days, tanks and LVT-flamethrowers targeted enemy caves at the bases of China Wall and Five Brothers, effectively destroying or sealing all accessible enemy positions and leaving Nakagawa with only 150 men still capable of fighting. By November 21, infantry patrols could operate largely unimpeded throughout Wildcat Bowl and the southern section of Death Valley. The next day, the 323rd launched an assault on the China Wall, where the majority of Nakagawa's weary troops were entrenched, effectively compressing the enemy into a space measuring 125 yards wide by 285 yards long. Meanwhile, on November 23, Five Brothers Ridge was finally cleared. The following day, a second assault on the China Wall gained additional ground, leaving only 57 enemy troops alive. To enable tanks and LVT-flamethrowers to access the central hollow of China Wall, engineers began constructing a ramp up the east wall at the northern end of Wildcat Bowl. As the ramp ascended, Nakagawa realized his situation was hopeless. On November 24th, Nakagawa burnt the regimental colors and performed harakiri. He was posthumously promoted to lieutenant general for his valor displayed on Peleliu. His final message to General Inoue read “Our sword is broken, and we have run out of spears.” The 57 remaining soldiers were divided into 17 small teams, instructed to hide during the day and raid American positions at night. With the enemy largely absent, American forces cautiously advanced into the area. On November 26, tanks and LVT-flamethrowers moved up the completed ramp to bombard caves and other defenses in the hollow center of China Wall. The next morning, as units from the north and south finally linked up, Watson declared that hostilities had come to an end. What General Rupertus had anticipated would last only four days had, in fact, extended to nearly two and a half months. The 323rd suffered significant losses during that battle, with approximately 118 soldiers killed and 420 wounded. The overall casualties for the Battle of Peleliu reached over 1,573 American deaths and 6,531 injuries. In contrast, the Japanese forces experienced a total of 10,695 men killed and 301 taken prisoner. Although the fighting was officially declared over and Peleliu secured, isolated groups and individual Japanese troops remained hidden in pockets and caves, primarily in the northern part of the island and the Umurbrogol mountains. For several months afterward, the units of the 81st Division assigned to garrison the island continued to root out stragglers and seal off caves. Many of these soldiers would survive in the mountains and swamps until the war's conclusion and beyond. In fact a Japanese lieutenant with 26 men of the 2nd Infantry soldiers and eight 45th Guard Force sailors held out in the caves in Peleliu until April 22nd of 1947 and surrendered after a Japanese admiral convinced them the war was over. The effort to reduce the Japanese pocket around Umurbrogol Mountain is often regarded as the most challenging battle faced by the U.S. military throughout the entire war. The 1st Marine Division suffered heavy losses and remained inactive until the invasion of Okinawa began on April 1, 1945. During their month on Peleliu, the 1st Marine Division incurred over 6,500 casualties, representing more than one-third of the division's strength. The 81st Infantry Division also experienced significant losses, with approximately 3,300 casualties during their time on the island. Postwar analyses indicated that U.S. forces required more than 1,500 rounds of ammunition to kill each Japanese defender. They expended a staggering 13.32 million rounds of .30-caliber ammunition, 1.52 million rounds of .45-caliber, 693,657 rounds of .50-caliber bullets, 118,262 hand grenades, and 150,000 mortar rounds.The battle sparked considerable controversy in the United States, as many believed that the high number of American casualties was unjustified for an island with minimal strategic importance. The Japanese defenders were incapable of hindering potential U.S. operations in the Philippines, and the airfield captured on Peleliu did not significantly influence subsequent military actions. Instead, the Ulithi Atoll in the Caroline Islands was utilized as a staging ground for the Okinawa invasion. The casualty rate from this battle surpassed that of any other amphibious operation in the Pacific War. Moreover, coverage of the battle was limited, as only six reporters were motivated to report from the shore, influenced by General Rupertus's prediction of a quick victory within three days. The battle also received less attention due to General MacArthur's return to the Philippines and the Allies' advance toward Germany in Europe. The battles for Angaur and Peleliu illustrated the typical patterns of Japanese island defense, yet few adjustments were made for the subsequent battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Naval bombardment before the amphibious assault at Iwo Jima proved to be only marginally more effective than at Peleliu, while the preliminary shelling for Okinawa saw significant improvements. Underwater demolition teams, known as frogmen, conducted operations at Iwo Jima that confused the enemy by targeting both coasts, but this tactic later alerted Japanese defenders to the precise assault beaches during the Okinawa invasion. American ground forces gained valuable experience at Peleliu in assaulting heavily fortified positions similar to those they would encounter again at Okinawa. Admiral William Halsey Jr. recommended canceling the planned occupation of Yap Island in the Caroline Islands. He also suggested that the landings at Peleliu and Angaur be abandoned in favor of deploying their Marines and soldiers to Leyte Island; however, this recommendation was ultimately overruled by Admiral Nimitz. Turning our attention to China, we need to discuss the conclusion of the pivotal Operation Ichi-Go, as the 11th and 23rd Armies pressed on with their offensives against Guilin and Liuzhou. Back in August, following battles in Hunan and Guangdong, the 11th and 23rd Armies of the IJA initiated offensives toward Guilin and Liuzhou, respectively. The NRA troops defending the region were primarily remnants from the Battle of Hengyang, resulting in only 20,000 soldiers being present in Guilin on November 1 when the Japanese commenced their assault on the city. The Chinese government recognized that it could not hold Guilin but chose to prolong the battle for political reasons, sending food and supplies to those besieged. Most civilians had fled Guilin weeks earlier, leaving the city heavily scorched by fire. Defenses were reinforced with pillboxes, barbed wire, and Guangxi troops commanded by Muslim General Bai Chongxi. General Joseph Stilwell, who had a good relationship with Bai, made considerable efforts to supply American munitions to Bai's forces. Trenches were also dug throughout the hilly terrain. By early November, General Yokoyama's forces had effectively surrounded Guilin, with the 3rd and 13th Divisions ready to advance toward Liuzhou, while General Tanaka's units were also preparing to move north following the fall of Wuxuan. Consequently, most of Yokoyama's troops continued to tighten their grip on Guilin, where the determined defenders inflicted heavy casualties on the Japanese as they facilitated the withdrawal of American personnel. Additionally, the 13th Division advanced through Yongfu on November 6, the 3rd Division captured Luzhaizhen on November 8, and the 104th Division began its movement toward the area west of Liuzhou. On November 9, just as the 11th Army initiated its main assault on Guilin, General Okamura assigned the 3rd and 13th Divisions to the 23rd Army to enhance coordination for the attack on Liuzhou. Fortunately for them, the Chinese forces offered minimal resistance, leading to the city and its airfield falling the next day. Simultaneously, with the support of the 5th Air Army, Yokoyama successfully captured Guilin, achieving the primary goal of Operation Togo II. To eliminate the retreating enemy forces, the 23rd Army continued its advance westward. On November 15, the 104th Division took Xincheng, while the 3rd Division captured Yizhou and the 13th Division moved towards Hechi, effectively cutting off the Chinese retreat and destroying the remaining enemy troops. The 3rd Division then advanced north, capturing Huanjian on November 27, while the 13th Division continued west, successfully taking Nandan on November 28 and Dushan on December 2. In response, Tanaka dispatched the 22nd Division and the 23rd Independent Mixed Brigade to capture Nanning, which fell by November 28. By early December, elements of the 22nd Division joined forces with the Indochinese garrison near Shangsi, marking the conclusion of Operation Ichi-Go. After ten days of fierce fighting, the Japanese forces captured Guilin and entered Liuzhou on the same day. Sporadic fighting persisted as Chinese forces retreated rapidly. By November 24, the Japanese had taken control of 75 counties in Guangxi, encompassing about two-thirds of the region. Reports indicate that they killed 215,000 civilians in reprisals and during crossfire, injuring over 431,000. After the fall of Guilin and Liuzhou, the majority of NRA troops lost their morale and retreated without ever confronting the enemy, leading to significant losses in both equipment and personnel. This event became one of the most devastating defeats of the entire Second Sino-Japanese War. Nevertheless, despite having destroyed the airbases in this area, the USAAF could still launch attacks on the Japanese mainland from their other bases. While the Japanese achieved some objectives of Operation Ichigo, it ultimately expanded the territory they needed to defend and significantly weakened their lines, creating a favorable scenario for future counterattacks by Chinese forces. After destroying enemy air bases and annihilating the main enemy forces in the Guilin-Liuzhen area, the 6th Area Army assigned the 22nd Division and the 22nd Independent Mixed Brigade to the 11th Army to secure strategic locations in the region, while the 23rd Army returned to Guangzhou and the Leizhou Peninsula. By the operation's end, Japanese losses were estimated at around 100,000 killed, 200,000 wounded, and significant material losses, including 1,938 small river vessels and 367 aircraft. In contrast, Chinese losses totaled approximately 310,000 killed, 410,000 wounded, and 80,000 captured, along with substantial war material losses, including 312 Allied aircraft, resulting in the deaths of 100 Americans. Additionally, the entire Japanese offensive resulted in the deaths of approximately 500,000 civilians. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The fight on Leyte gruels on as the fight for Peleliu finally came to an end. The controversial battle of Peleliu would have major ramifications for American planners going forward. In China, absolute horror was continuing to be inflicted upon the Chinese people, leaving to the massacre of hundreds of thousands in a war that just never seemed like it would end.
Step back in time with me, Kim Dixon, as we honor the courage and resilience of those who shaped history on November 11, 1944. Ever wondered how pivotal moments unfolded on the world stage during World War II? This episode promises to enrich your understanding with stories of General MacArthur's triumphant return to the Philippines, Admiral Nimitz's vital Pacific maneuvers, and General Patton's unstoppable drive in Europe. We also turn our gaze homeward to Weber County, recognizing the valor of local servicemen and the community's significant financial support of the war effort. As we approach the last Veterans Day of World War II, these narratives offer both a tribute and a lesson in sacrifice and solidarity.In a heartfelt exploration, I share the poignant tale of Seaman First Class Kenneth W. Manful and the fate of the USS Albacore, representing the silent heroism of the 52 U.S. submarines lost during the war. These stories, memorialized in places like the Honolulu Memorial and Ogden City Cemetery, serve as stirring reminders of the personal costs of conflict. By exploring these chapters, you ensure the legacy of these brave souls endures. Tune in to preserve their memory and express gratitude for their sacrifices. Follow along on Apple Podcasts as we continue to share these vital stories of courage and commitment.
Hoje no Influencers da Ciência: Dorothy Hill, a pioneira que quebrou barreiras na geologia australiana! Em 1960, ela se tornou a primeira mulher professora em uma universidade australiana, abrindo caminho para futuras gerações de cientistas. Sua jornada começou com uma paixão por fósseis em Mundubbera, que a levou até Cambridge para seus estudos avançados.No episódio de hoje, apresentado por Jey Carillo, você vai aprender que a Dorothy não era apenas uma cientista brilhante - era uma mulher multifacetada que pilotava aviões, jogava hóquei pela seleção australiana e, durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial, trabalhou incansavelmente no serviço naval, decodificando mensagens para a divisão do General MacArthur. Seu trabalho revolucionário sobre corais fósseis se tornou referência mundial, e em 1970 ela alcançou outro marco histórico ao se tornar a primeira mulher presidente da Academia Australiana de Ciências.Hoje é dia do "Influencers da Ciência", um Spin-Off do podcast "Intervalo de Confiança". Neste programa trazemos o nome de Influencers que de fato trouxeram algo de positivo para a sociedade, aqueles que expandiram as fronteiras do conhecimento científico e hoje permitiram o desenvolvimento de diversas áreas.A Pauta foi escrita por Tatiane do Vale. A edição foi feita por Leo Oliveira e a vitrine do episódio feita por Tatiane do Vale em colaboração com as Inteligências Artificiais Dall-E, da OpenAI. A coordenação de redação e de redes sociais é de Tatiane do Vale. A seleção de cortes é de responsabilidade Júlia Frois, a direção de Comunidade de Sofia Massaro e a gerência financeira é de Kézia Nogueira. As vinhetas de todos os episódios foram compostas por Rafael Chino e Leo Oliveira.Visite nosso site em: https://intervalodeconfianca.com.br/Conheça nossa loja virtual em: https://intervalodeconfianca.com.br/lojaPara apoiar esse projeto: https://intervalodeconfianca.com.br/apoieSiga nossas redes sociais:- Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/iconfpod/- Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/IntervalodeConfianca- Linkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/company/iconfpod- X (Twitter): https://twitter.com/iConfPod
Last time we spoke about the Battle of Leyte Gulf. General MacArthur's forces landed on Leyte, prompting a response from Admiral Toyoda. Kurita's 1st Striking Force was sent to attack Leyte Gulf, while Shima's force faced confusion and delays. Japanese naval forces were hit hard by American submarines, with significant losses including the sinking of the Atago and Maya. Despite efforts, Japanese counterattacks faltered. On October 24, American forces secured key positions, and MacArthur announced the re-establishment of the Philippine government amidst ongoing naval battles and air attacks. During the fierce Battle of Leyte Gulf, Musashi endured multiple torpedo and bomb hits from American aircraft but continued to fight as it took on severe flooding. Despite efforts from Kurita's fleet, Musashi was eventually abandoned and sank, marking the largest ship ever sunk by air attack. Nishimura's force faced relentless torpedo strikes and a decisive night battle, with the battleship Fuso and cruiser Mogami being heavily damaged or sunk. Ultimately, Nishimura's forces retreated, and the Americans achieved a significant victory. This episode is the Last Carrier Battle Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Where we last left off during the Battle of Leyte Fulg, the 10th and 24th Corps had established successful beachheads at Palo-Tacloban and Dulag. In response, Admiral Toyoda launched Operation Sho-Go, mobilizing the full strength of the Imperial Japanese Navy to eliminate enemy warships and transports at sea. However, after losing three heavy cruisers to submarines, Admiral Kurita's 1st Striking Force faced severe damage from Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 38, culminating in the sinking of the battleship Musashi by the end of October 24. Shortly after the Sibuyan Sea engagement, Admiral Nishimura's Force C was annihilated by Admiral Kinkaid's 7th Fleet at the Surigao Strait. Despite these setbacks, Admiral Shima's 2nd Striking Force was approaching the area. Meanwhile, the Americans had identified Admiral Ozawa's decoy force by the end of the day. In response, the aggressive Admiral Halsey chose to leave San Bernardino Strait unguarded and pursue the depleted Japanese carrier force to the north, aiming to finish off the IJN. Unknown to him, Kurita, with four battleships, six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and several destroyers, was advancing towards San Bernardino Strait to attack Kinkaid's transports and escort carriers from the rear. This set the stage for one of the final and largest naval battles of the Pacific War. To the north, as the Battle of Surigao Strait was in progress, radar-equipped aircraft from the Independence detected Admiral Matsuda's battleship carriers and later Ozawa's carriers in the early hours of October 25. However, due to a transmission error, the location of the Japanese forces was reported inaccurately. After the rendezvous of three of Halsey's four carrier task groups just before midnight on October 24, TF 38 headed north with every expectation of achieving a great victory. At 0100hrs on October 25, five radar-equipped aircraft flew off Independence to search out to a distance of 350NM. Contact was gained at 0205hrs on Force A and at 0235hrs on the Main Body. Because of a transmission error, the position of the Japanese forces was given incorrectly. The wrong position was plotted out some 120NM nearer to TF 38 than it actually was. In fact, TF 38 and Ozawa were actually about 210NM apart. Despite this, Mitscher's carrier was readying for morning strikes while Admiral Lee's Task Force 34 was being reorganized. Meanwhile, Kurita's 1st Striking Force surprisingly navigated through San Bernardino Strait during the night without encountering resistance, proceeding towards Leyte Gulf and a confrontation with Rear-Admiral Thomas Sprague's escort carriers near Samar. However, the movement of Shima's force was not coordinated with Nishimura's. Shima designed his advance so he could attack separately from Nishimura's force. The gap between the forces was originally five hours, but Shima reduced this to two hours by the time his force began entering the strait. As he entered Surigao Strait on the night of October 24/25, Nishimura issued reports during the early part of his transit, which Shima received, but when he met serious resistance, the reports stopped. Shima was therefore unaware of the virtual annihilation of Nishimura's force. The only information available was gunfire flashes in the distance and snippets of radio traffic from Nishimura's ships under attack. Oldendorf was aware that a second force was moving to support Nishimura. The first firm indication of this was a contact report from the PT boats on Shima's force at 0038hrs. Oldendorf knew he was dealing with two widely spaced Japanese forces. Just as Nishimura was forced to deal with incessant PT boat attacks, now it was Shima's turn. These turned out to be more than a mere nuisance. Shima's introduction to combat came at about 0315hrs when PT-134 mounted an ineffective attack. One PT boat managed to hit the cruiser Abukuma with a torpedo at 03:25, causing a significant explosion and slowing her to 10 knots, forcing her to exit Shima's formation. As Shima advanced, he observed several ships ablaze and saw the destroyer Shigure retreat before detecting a radar contact 13,000 yards away. Without Shima's approval, his chief of staff ordered the two cruisers to maneuver for a torpedo strike against the distant and indistinct radar contacts. At 0422hrs Nachi and Ashigara each fired eight Type 93 torpedoes at the radar contacts. In fact, these were Oldendorf's flagship Louisville followed by Portland. Despite the element of surprise, the Japanese torpedo attack completely failed. Immediately after firing its torpedo broadside, Nachi faced disaster. The burning Mogami had loomed out of the darkness minutes before. Nachi's skipper failed to grasp that Mogami was underway, not stationary, and he failed to take proper measures to avoid the damaged cruiser. As Nachi was unable to pass forward of Mogami, the two ships side-swiped each other forward at 04:23. Frantic last-second maneuvers lessened the impact of the collision, but the result was still dramatic. Nachi took the worst of it, suffering a large gash in her bow at the waterline on her port side. Damage to the bow reduced her speed to 18 knots. Shima's four destroyers then continued north but failed to locate any targets. Fearing inevitable destruction, Shima decided to retreat south at 04:35. Although Oldendorf had dispatched his cruisers and destroyers to pursue the fleeing Japanese, his forces did not aggressively pursue, allowing Shima to escape. In the end, Oldendorf's pursuing cruisers only managed to catch the damaged Mogami and Asagumo, which they unsuccessfully attacked at 05:29. Despite sustaining additional hits, the Mogami continued to fight, escorted southwest by the destroyer Akebomo. The Asagumo, however, came under attack again at 07:02 and sank 19 minutes later. As Asagumo slipped under the waves, all that was left of Nishimura's force were hundreds of survivors in the water. Rescue efforts by at least four American destroyers resulted in only a handful being picked up. When one of Oldendorf's destroyer skippers asked at 07:35 what to do with the hundreds of men still in the water, Oldendorf simply replied, “Let them sink.” Japanese survivors who reached shore were, in many cases, killed by local inhabitants. While it seemed the Mogami might escape, Sprague's Taffy 1 group carriers launched their first strikes before 06:00. Four Avengers attacked the cruiser at 07:41 but failed to score any hits. Around 08:40, 21 aircraft also targeted Shima's force, but only inflicted minor strafing damage on the destroyer Shiranuhi. Before Sprague could continue his air attacks, new developments were occurring off Samar as Kurita's warships approached Rear-Admiral Clifton Sprague's Taffy 3 group. At 06:44, a lookout from the Yamato made visual contact, though he mistakenly identified the escorting destroyers as heavy cruisers and battleships. Kurita's initial orders increased the confusion generated by the first contact at 06:44. He ordered “General Attack” at 07:03, meaning that each ship or division proceeded on its own against the Americans. This tactic abandoned any pretense of coordination between the various elements of the 1st Striking Force. Battleships Yamato and Nagato remained together, but Kongo and Haruna operated individually. For most of the engagement, the six heavy cruisers operated in three groups of two. The two destroyer flotillas, each led by a light cruiser, were kept to the rear by Kurita. He held his destroyers back to maintain their fuel reserves by not having them maneuver at high speeds, instead sending his heavy cruisers ahead to pursue at full speed. This precluded them from screening the heavy ships and kept them out of position to make a torpedo attack. The General Attack decision was a critical error. It resulted in a loss of control by Kurita and a melee for the next two hours. His rationale for ordering an immediate, but uncoordinated, attack was to close the range as quickly as possible and knock out the carriers' flight decks. Throughout the battle, Kurita maneuvered to keep the weather gauge; by so doing, he could prevent the carriers from turning into the wind to conduct flight operations. Meanwhile, an Avenger from Kadashan Bay sighted Kurita's force at 06:47 following radar contacts. Despite his surprise, Sprague immediately ordered Taffy 3 to head east, increased speed to 17.5 knots, directed every ship to lay smoke, and launched all available aircraft at 06:55. Realizing the gravity of the situation, Sprague began sending clear text messages at 07:01 to report his predicament and request assistance. Sprague's main objective was to delay the Japanese forces until reinforcements could arrive. To achieve this, he decided to use smoke screens and continuous air assaults, supported by Taffy 2's aircraft, to hinder Kurita's ships. As Kurita's cruisers advanced north, Sprague opted to maneuver southwest, moving closer to Leyte Gulf and the potential assistance from the 7th Fleet. Starting at 06:59, Kurita's battleships began firing from long range, with their salvos becoming more frequent and accurate. To mitigate this pressure, Sprague directed his forces into a rain squall from 07:06 to 07:15. Once clear of the squall, he changed course southward towards the approaching help from Leyte Gulf. Meanwhile, as Kurita's ships continued east before turning south, the range of Sprague's carriers was extended, and the rain and smoke impaired the accuracy of the Japanese gunners. Sprague also ordered his three destroyers to launch a torpedo counterattack to shield the escort carriers as they emerged from the squall. The Johnston, charging through enemy fire, engaged the cruiser Kumano with gunfire to close the distance for a torpedo attack. At 10,000 yards, the Johnston fired all ten of its torpedoes, scoring a critical hit that slowed the cruiser and forced it to retreat. It was inevitable that Evans would pay a price for approaching so close to a collection of enemy cruisers and battleships. This came at 0730hrs in the form of three large shells (possibly fired from Yamato) and a number of smaller shells that struck Johnston. The armor-piercing shells failed to explode, but damage was extensive. The aft machinery room was destroyed, which reduced speed to 17 knots. Most of the 5in./38 guns were knocked out, but after repairs were made during a providential 10-minute respite as a squall passed over, three were brought back online. The battleship evaded the torpedoes at 07:33 and retaliated with devastating gunfire against the Hoel. By 07:30, all operational aircraft were airborne, prompting Sprague to order the initial attacks on the heavy cruisers approaching his port quarter. Unrelenting American air attacks were the main reason for the Japanese defeat. Taffy aircrews were not highly trained for maritime attack, and torpedoes or armor-piercing bombs were in short supply. Most Avengers were launched with bombs instead of more effective torpedoes for two reasons. Torpedoes took more time and preparation to load, and the deck crews on Taffy 3 did not have the luxury of time. Also, once loaded with a heavy torpedo, the Avengers could only be launched if the escort carrier steamed into the wind. Moving downwind, like Taffy 3 was forced to do for most of the action, did not get enough wind across the flight deck. The first attacks by Taffy 3 aircraft were conducted in groups of two or three with aircraft not properly armed for attacking ships. Because Taffy 3 could not steam into the wind while being pursued by Kurita's force, recovering aircraft during the battle was impossible. When they ran out of ordnance or fuel, they had to land on Taffy 2 or fly 100NM to the newly opened airfield at Tacloban. Even when lightly armed or unevenly unarmed, the aircraft made unceasing strafing runs in the case of the Wildcats or dummy bombing runs in the case of the Avengers. These attacks were poorly coordinated, but the Japanese, on the receiving end of incessant attacks, saw it differently. After the battle, Kurita and others commented that the attacks were well coordinated, skillful, and aggressive. At 07:35, ten Avengers struck the cruiser Suzuya just as Vice-Admiral Shiraishi Kazutaka was boarding, scoring a near miss that reduced her speed to 20 knots and took her out of the battle. The damaged Hoel then attempted a second torpedo attack on the heavy cruiser Haguro at 07:50 but failed to hit the target. However, this attack forced the Superbattleship Yamato to open fire at 0659hrs. Her third salvo straddled White Plains, with one of the shells striking the carrier and causing some underwater damage. Around 0800hrs, to evade torpedoes fired from Hoel aimed at Haguro, Yamato turned due north. This evasive maneuver forced her to the north for almost ten minutes until the torpedo tracks disappeared, placing her at the rear of Kurita's formation and effectively removing her from the battle for a period. Nagato opened fire at 0701hrs at a carrier assessed to be 36,000 yards away. After the three salvos, the battleship stopped firing having hit nothing. At 07:54, the Heermann launched seven torpedoes at Haguro, but they missed. Destroyer escorts Samuel B. Roberts, Raymond, and Dennis also joined in the attack but also failed to score hits, though they managed to escape unharmed. The Heermann subsequently launched a second torpedo attack on the Haruna at 08:00, but once again, none of the torpedoes hit their mark. Despite using smoke and evading shell splashes, the Heermann avoided damage. The first ship to succumb to the barrage of Japanese shellfire was the crippled Hoel. After her run against Haguro, and only able to make 17 knots, she was trapped between Kongo on one side and four heavy cruisers on the other. Using every possible method to evade the storm of shells directed against his ship, Kintberger survived for well over an hour after the first hit was recorded. Hoel took as many as 23 hits, but the actual number will never be known since most passed through the ship without exploding. The final engine was knocked out at 0830hrs, bringing the ship to a halt. As the crew abandoned ship under continued fire, the Hoel finally rolled over at 08:55. Meanwhile, the Japanese cruisers continued to close in on the escort carriers. Under fire from the battleships, Sprague's initial course was to the eastsoutheast at full speed—17.5 knots. As the Japanese heavy cruisers began to pressure his formation's port quarter, Sprague was forced to alter course to the southwest. Kalinin Bay was at the rear of the formation. She took a battleship shell at 0750hrs (probably from Haruna) that went through the hangar deck and out of her unarmored hull. As many as 14 other hits followed, all probably from 8in. shells. Kalinin Bay retaliated against the cruisers at 18,000 yards with her aft 5in./38 gun. The smoke generated from all six carriers and from the destroyers and destroyer escorts on their starboard quarter succeeded in hiding the carriers from direct Japanese observation for much of the battle. The Japanese shot slowly and methodically with four-gun salvos, allowing the escort carriers to chase salvos. The smoke and evasive maneuvering kept damage to a minimum, but of the six escort carriers, four were eventually hit. Fanshaw Bay took six 8in. hits, all forward, that killed three and wounded 20. White Plains took a probable 6in. hit and suffered light damage. Kitkun Bay was not hit but suffered several personnel casualties from near misses. St. Lo suffered no damage during the battle. The Gambier Bay bore the brunt of enemy fire, with an initial shell igniting a fire at 08:10. Ten minutes later, a devastating hit reduced her speed to 11 knots and forced the carrier to lag behind the rest of the formation. At 08:22, Yamato reentered the fray, intensifying the assault on the carrier. Heermann closed on the carrier at 0841hrs to find her burning and listing 20°. Continued Japanese fire resulted in more hits, with most of the armor-piercing shells passing through the ship. Hit by as many as 26 shells from Yamato, Haruna, and several cruisers, Gambier Bay went dead in the water at 0845hrs; five minutes later, the captain gave the order to abandon ship. Gambier Bay capsized at 0907hrs, one of only two carriers sunk by gunfire during the entire war. Meanwhile, at 08:26, Sprague ordered the destroyer escorts on the starboard side of the formation to position themselves between the carriers and the Japanese heavy cruisers on their port side. As John C. Butler and Dennis engaged the enemy cruisers, the latter sustained minor damage from two hits. Samuel B. Roberts also was struck at 0850hrs. At 0900hrs, the destroyer escort was hit by two or three 14in. shells from Kongo. The large shells tore a huge hole in the side of the ship and knocked out all power. A total of six shells hit the ship. This prompted an order to abandon ship at 0910hrs for the crew of 178. Half (89 of them) did not survive. Samuel B. Roberts sank at 1005hrs. During this time, Rear-Admiral Kimura Masatomi instructed his destroyers to launch a torpedo attack at 08:45, targeting Kalinin Bay. Fortunately, Johnston detected the new threat and made a daring suicide charge through the smoke. Evans engaged Yahagi with gunfire at 7,000 yards, and several hits were gained. Then Evans engaged the next destroyer in column, again claiming several hits. Kimura ordered his torpedoes fired from about 10,500 yards—not an ideal range for even the formidable Type 93. Yahagi launched seven torpedoes at 0905hrs, followed by three destroyers beginning at 0915hrs, Urakaze fired four, Isokaze eight, and Yukikaze four. Evans may have been responsible for Kimura's premature torpedo attack, but now his ship was about to pay the ultimate price. The Japanese destroyers and Yahagi took Johnston under fire, joined by as many as three heavy cruisers. The hits began to pile up. By 0920hrs, Evans was reduced to conning the ship by yelling orders through an open hatch on the fantail to men below turning the rudder manually. At 0945hrs, Evans finally gave the order to abandon ship. The Japanese destroyers closed in and continued to pound the wreck. After an epic fight, Johnston rolled over and sank at 1010hrs. Most of the crew of 327 got into the water, but 186, including Evans, were lost. Meanwhile, Rear-Admiral Felix Stump's Taffy 2 group began their strikes against Kurita's fleet, with 15 Avengers and 20 Wildcats successfully hitting the Haguro with a bomb at 08:25. Five minutes later, six Avengers and 20 Wildcats from Taffy 3 joined forces with 16 Avengers and 8 Wildcats from Taffy 2 to launch a major assault on the enemy cruisers. At 08:50, the Chokai was attacked, and by 09:05, it had sustained severe damage from a bomb hit. The destroyer Fujinami arrived to assist at 10:18, but by then, the cruiser was immobilized. The destroyer evacuated the crew and sank the Chokai with torpedoes. At 08:54, four Avengers targeted the Chikuma, landing a critical torpedo hit that caused significant flooding. With American aircraft focusing on the Japanese warships, Kurita decided to withdraw at 09:11, planning to regroup and return to Leyte Gulf. Another attack against Suzuya was mounted at 1050hrs by as many as 30 aircraft. This time, a near miss amidships turned deadly. Shrapnel from the bomb ignited the torpedoes in the starboard forward mount, igniting a fire that caused other torpedoes to explode at 1100hrs. The explosion caused extensive damage to the secondary battery and the machinery, which left the ship unmaneuverable. For a second time in the morning, Vice Admiral Shiraishi had to transfer, this time to Tone. The fires reached the remaining torpedoes, with a large explosion resulting at 1200hrs. In turn, this caused the magazine of the secondary battery to explode, and soon the entire ship was an inferno. Surviving crewmen were taken off by destroyer Okinami after the order to abandon ship was given at 1300hrs, and at 1320hrs Suzuya sank. Twohundred forty-seven men were lost. The Tone suffered a bomb hit at 12:40, and three minutes later, Noshiro experienced minor damage from near misses. The destroyer Nowaki was tasked with rescuing Chikuma's crew and then scuttling the crippled cruiser, which was completed by 11:00. Due to these air attacks and fearing total destruction if the battle continued, Kurita signaled Toyoda at 12:36 to abandon the attack on Leyte Gulf and began his retreat north. During this withdrawal, Kurita's force faced attacks from 37 Avengers and 19 Wildcats at 12:45, resulting in only minor damage to Nagato and Tone. Subsequent strikes by Stump's carriers were also ineffective, but Sprague's carriers' total of 441 sorties that day was a notable accomplishment. At 13:15, 100 aircraft from Admiral McCain's carrier, which had been recalled on October 24 and were now arriving in the area, launched one of the longest carrier strikes of the war. Despite their efforts, they were unable to inflict additional damage. A follow-up strike at 15:00 with 52 planes also failed, allowing Kurita to escape. Tremendously outgunned, the commander of Taffy 3, Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague, began to plead for help minutes into the battle. As Kurita pressed his advantage, these pleas became more urgent. In response, Oldendorf recalled his advance guard at 0723hrs. Kinkaid ordered Oldendorf to bring his entire force north at 0847hrs to assist the escort carriers. He formed a task force of the battleships California, Tennessee, and Pennsylvania, because they had the most armor-piercing shells remaining. They were escorted by three heavy cruisers and 20 destroyers with 165 torpedoes. The next strike consisting of ten Avengers, each with two 500lb bombs instead of torpedoes, escorted by five Wildcats, all from Ommaney Bay, went after Mogami. The Avenger pilots claimed five hits on the cruiser; in fact, only two bombs struck the ship. By the time the attack concluded at 0910hrs, Mogami was dead in the water after the failure of her last turbine. New fires raged beyond control and the danger of the forward 8in. magazine exploding (the others had been flooded) put the entire crew in danger. After evacuating the remaining crew, the Akebono scuttled Mogami at 13:07, resulting in the loss of 191 men. Additionally, in the morning, Taffy 1 faced Admiral Onishi's first kamikaze attack. The first ship to be attacked was Santee. At 0740hrs, a kamikaze commenced its dive, gained complete surprise, and encountered no antiaircraft fire before hitting the ship forward on the flight deck. Fires from the resulting explosion were quickly put out, but not before 43 men had been killed or wounded. Within five minutes of the fires being extinguished, submarine I-56 slammed a torpedo into the ship. The converted tanker shook it off with no casualties and no loss of capability. The final aircraft also selected Petrof Bay but ended up going after Suwannee after it was damaged by antiaircraft fire. It struck the carrier on the flight deck forward of the aft aircraft elevator. The Zero's 551lb bomb exploded, creating a hole on the hangar deck. The fires were put out within minutes, and within two hours flight operations had resumed. The suicide pilots approached the remaining five escort carriers at low level before popping up to altitude a few miles from their target. At this point they were detected on radar, but no interception by defending Wildcats was possible. At 1049hrs, Kitkun Bay was attacked by a single Zero. The pilot failed to hit the carrier's bridge, but his aircraft hit the port-side catwalk before crashing into the sea. The ship incurred damage when the Zero's bomb exploded close alongside. Two more suicide aircraft were dispatched by antiaircraft fire. The last two Zeros selected White Plains for their attentions. One came in from astern but missed the ship after crashing into the water close aboard the port side. The other was deterred by antiaircraft fire and headed toward St. Lo. The last kamikaze was the most skillful. At 1053hrs, the Zero came in over the stern of St. Lo and dropped his bomb before performing a shallow dive into the flight deck amidships. The aircraft slid off the bow, leaving a trail of fire on the flight deck from its fuel. The fire was no problem to deal with, but the bomb penetrated the flight deck and exploded in the hangar deck, where six aircraft were being fueled and armed. The resulting explosion forced the ship to be abandoned, and 32 minutes after being struck, the ship sank with 114 crewmen after the fires reached its magazines. St. Lo was the first ship sunk by kamikaze attack. At 1110hrs, another four kamikazes appeared and selected Kalinin Bay for attack. Two were shot down by antiaircraft fire. The other pair both scored glancing hits. One Zero was hit by antiaircraft fire, remained in control, and then hit the flight deck at a shallow angle and slid overboard. The second hit the ship with a glancing blow aft. Looking north, despite losing contact with Ozawa's force overnight, Mitscher decided to launch an initial strike of 130 aircraft, led by Commander McCampbell, by 06:00. At the same time, he dispatched search aircraft, which reestablished contact with Ozawa's now reunited Main Body at 07:10. The American strike was then directed toward the enemy, and McCampbell's planes successfully located Ozawa's carriers at 08:10, beginning their assault. Despite encountering 13 Zeros on combat air patrol, the Helldivers struck first at 08:30, targeting the enemy carriers. They were followed by strafing Hellcats and torpedo-armed Avengers. The hour-long attack resulted in significant damage: Zuikaku was hit by three bombs and one torpedo, leading to fires, flooding, and a severe list; Zuiho sustained a single bomb hit causing fires on the hangar deck; Chitose was heavily damaged by three near misses that ruptured its unarmored hull, causing flooding and a severe list, and it sank at 09:37 with 904 casualties; the light cruiser Tama was torpedoed and had to make its way to Okinawa for repairs; the cruiser Oyodo suffered light damage from a bomb hit; and the destroyer Akizuki was hit amidships, caught fire, and broke apart before sinking following a major explosion. As this attack unfolded, Mitscher launched a second wave of 36 aircraft, which arrived at the target area around 09:45. Under McCampbell's coordination, these planes focused on the carrier Chiyoda, which was hit by one bomb and several damaging near misses that caused flooding and a list, ultimately bringing the carrier to a halt. Simultaneously, he deployed search aircraft, which reestablished contact with Ozawa's now reunited Main Body at 07:10. With the American strike directed towards this position, McCampbell's planes successfully located the enemy at 08:10 and began their assault on Ozawa's carriers. The Japanese were aware of the impending arrival of the initial strike, since radar aboard Zuikaku had detected the American aircraft at 08:04 about 110NM to the southwest. Four Zeros were already on CAP; these were joined by the last nine fighters on Zuikaku. Such a meager CAP meant that survival of Ozawa's ships depended on their ability to throw up accurate anti-aircraft fire and maneuver adeptly under dive-bombing and torpedo attack. According to American pilots, Japanese anti-aircraft fire was heavy and began with a display of multi-colored explosions at 15NM out as Ise and Hyuga fired sanshiki-dan incendiary shells from their 14in. main battery. The small Japanese CAP raced toward the approaching American formation, but the escorting Hellcats prevented them from reaching the Helldivers or Avengers. Essex Hellcats claimed nine Zeros, but one Hellcat was shot down and its pilot left in the water to witness the unfolding attack; he was rescued after the battle. The Helldivers launched the initial attack on the enemy carriers at 08:30, followed by strafing runs from Hellcats and then torpedo attacks from Avengers. Zuikaku came under attack from dive-bombers and torpedo bombers from Intrepid, and two light carriers. Five minutes into the attack, Zuikaku was hit by three bombs amidships, which created a fire on the lower and upper hangar decks. Just minutes later, a torpedo launched by an Avenger from either Intrepid or San Jacinto struck the ship on her port side. One of the engine rooms was flooded, and one of the shafts was damaged and had to be shut down. The ensuing flooding caused a severe list, but this was quickly corrected to a manageable 6°. The veteran carrier had an experienced and capable damage-control team. By 0850hrs, the fires were extinguished, and 23 knots were restored using the starboard shafts. However, steering was uneven, and the ship's transmitters were out of commission. Since she was no longer suitable as a flagship, plans were made to transfer Ozawa and his staff to cruiser Oyodo. Before this could happen, the second strike showed up. Zuiho was caught out of formation launching aircraft when the first attack began. Enterprise's strike group targeted the veteran light carrier known to her crew as a lucky ship, since she had survived three earlier carrier battles. Reports from Enterprise air crew stated that the carrier was left dead in the water and on fire. In exchange, one Enterprise Avenger was seriously damaged by antiaircraft fire and was rolled over the side of the carrier when it landed back onboard. Another Enterprise Hellcat was lost to Zero attack. Intrepid Helldivers also selected Zuiho for attack and claimed hits. In fact, Zuiho suffered three near misses followed by a direct bomb hit at 0835hrs. The explosion caused fires on the hangar deck, but these were out by 0855hrs. After the dive-bombers did their work, torpedo bombers from Essex and Lexington attacked Zuiho, but no hits were gained. Light carrier Chitose was crippled early and was the first of Ozawa's carriers to sink. At 0835hrs, she was attacked by dive-bombers from Essex and Lexington. Helldivers from Essex reported dropping 12 bombs and claimed 8 hits, leaving the carrier burning and listing. In fact, Chitose suffered three near misses along her port side. This was enough to rupture the carrier's unarmored hull. The resulting flooding knocked out two boiler rooms and caused a severe 27° list. Damage-control efforts reduced the list and kept power, but steering was only accomplished by using the engines. At 0915hrs, progressive flooding knocked out the starboard engine room and speed fell below 14 knots. Ten minutes later, flooding caused all power to be lost and the list increased to a dangerous 30°. Hyuga was directed to tow the carrier, but her condition was beyond salvage. Chitose sank at 0937hrs with the loss of 904 officers and men; another 601 were saved. Light cruiser Tama was attacked by torpedo bombers from Belleau Wood and San Jacinto. One torpedo hit the ship in her boiler room. After emergency repairs, the cruiser was ordered to proceed independently to Okinawa at her best speed of 14 knots. Oyodo was also subjected to attack and was slightly damaged. At 0848hrs, she was struck by a bomb and two rockets and recorded near misses from bombs. The cruiser's speed was unimpaired. Large destroyer Akizuki also came under attack from aircraft in the first strike. At 0842hrs the ship was struck amidships and set afire. The ship lost power and fell out of formation. Within minutes, a large explosion was noted amidships and at 0856hrs Akizuki broke in two and quickly sank. The cause was either a torpedo or a bomb hit that detonated torpedoes in the amidships torpedo mount. The commanding officer and 150 officers and men were pulled out of the water before more air attacks forced destroyer Maki to abandon rescue operations. Meanwhile, as this attack unfolded, Mitscher launched a second strike of 36 aircraft, which reached the target area around 09:45. Coordinated by McCampbell, these planes focused on the carrier Chiyoda, which was hit by one bomb and several near misses, resulting in flooding and a severe list, ultimately bringing the carrier to a halt. The climax of Halsey's battle of annihilation against the Main Body should have been an engagement by Task Force 34 with six of the world's most powerful battleships. But this was never to be. The plight of the escort carriers off Samar brought a flurry of urgent pleas to Halsey for assistance. These began at 07:07 with a plain text message from Kinkaid. In response, Halsey ordered Task Group 38.1 to steam west from Ulithi to support Kinkaid, but otherwise remained focused on crushing Ozawa with the rest of Task Force 38. This changed when Nimitz weighed in at 10:00 with an inquiry on the location of Admiral Lee's battleships, which finally prompted Halsey to order Task Force 34, supported by Task Group 38.2, south at 10:15. At this point, Task Force 34 was some 42NM away from Ozawa's remnants. This order was executed at 11:15 when the battleships turned south, yet the change of orders came too late. Even at their best speed, the battle line could not arrive off San Bernardino Strait until about 01:00 on October 26. At 13:45, Task Force 34 also slowed from 20 to 12 knots to fuel destroyers, something that took until 16:22. By noon, as Ozawa transferred to the Oyodo, Mitscher launched his third strike. Launched between 1145hrs and1200hrs, the third strike was the largest and most effective of the day. It was active over the target area from about 1310hrs to 1400hrs with some 200 aircraft, 75 percent of which had taken part in the initial strike in the morning. The strike coordinator was Commander T. Hugh Winters from Lexington. By this point, the Main Body's formation was in a shambles. Two carriers were located to the north with a battleship and what was reported as two cruisers. Another carrier was located some 20NM to the south on fire and listing. A second battleship, a cruiser, and a destroyer were nearby the crippled carrier. Winters ordered TG 38.3's 98 aircraft from Essex, Lexington, and Langley, to go after the two operational carriers. Aircraft from Lexington focused on Zuikaku. By 1100hrs, Ozawa had departed his flagship and transferred to Oyodo. The nine surviving Zeros on CAP were forced to ditch around 1030hrs, so for the rest of the day the Americans faced no air opposition. Zuikaku worked up to 24 knots shortly after the third strike was spotted at 1308hrs. The attack by Helldivers and Avengers was well coordinated, with the Avengers coming in from both bows in an anvil attack. In less than ten minutes, Zuikaku was subjected to six torpedo hits—two on the starboard side and four on the port side. The first was a hit at 1315hrs that failed to detonate. The last of the six hit at 1323hrs. Within minutes of the last torpedo hit, the mighty carrier was listing to port by 14° and was dead in the water after all power was lost. In addition to the torpedoes, four bombs hit the ship, which resulted in renewed fires on the hangar decks. At 1327, with the list increasing to 21°, the crew was ordered up to the flight deck. The captain gave a final address and then the ensign was lowered. Finally, after this touch of the dramatic, the crew was ordered to abandon ship at 1358hrs. The ship rolled over at 1414hrs and took the captain, 48 other officers, and 794 enlisted men with her. Essex's strike focused on Zuiho. When aircraft from TG 38.4 arrived, including Enterprise's second strike of six Hellcats, ten Helldivers, and five Avengers, most were also directed at Zuiho at 1310hrs followed by more at 1330hrs. At 1317hrs, the carrier was hit by one torpedo on her starboard quarter. According to Japanese accounts, one small bomb hit the aft elevator, followed by seven very close near misses, and then 60 more near misses. Bomb fragments caused flooding in the starboard engine room and created a 13° list. Mitscher's fourth strike, launched around 13:15 and reaching the target area by 14:45, involved 40 aircraft but only achieved ten near misses on the Zuiho and four near misses on the battleship Ise. Despite this, the Zuiho ultimately sank at 15:26, with 215 men lost. At 16:10, Mitscher launched his fifth strike, while a strong surface force under Rear-Admiral Laurance DuBose closed in on Chiyoda to finish her off. DuBose's force first encountered Chiyoda dead in the water with light cruiser Isuzu nearby preparing to rescue survivors. Isuzu quickly fled, leaving the heavy cruisers to open fire at Chiyoda at 1624hrs from some 20,000 yards. The carrier responded with her 5in. dual-purpose guns, but against a stationary target the American cruiser scored quickly and often and after 15 minutes the carrier was a mass of flames. A towering column of black smoke marked Chiyoda's final moments. At 1655hrs, the carrier rolled over—there were no survivors from her crew of 970 men. Between 17:10 and 17:40, the fifth strike, consisting of 85 aircraft, targeted the Ise. However, due to pilot fatigue, only one bomb hit the battleship, with 34 near misses causing minor flooding. The sister ship, Hyuga, which was positioned south of the Main Body, experienced seven near misses but no direct hits. Mitscher then launched a final strike of 36 aircraft at 17:10, which reached the target area about an hour later but failed to cause further damage. Overall, Task Force 38 executed 527 sorties against Ozawa's force that day, marking the most intense effort by fast carriers against naval targets up to that point. Despite the lack of significant air opposition and heavy but largely ineffective anti-aircraft fire, the results were underwhelming. The limited damage can be attributed to heavy anti-aircraft fire, effective ship maneuvering, and pilot fatigue from previous attacks on the Sibuyan Sea. The Battle off Cape Engaño was not over yet. As DuBose's mop-up force continued north, they encountered three destroyers rescuing survivors from Zuikaku and Zuiho. At 18:52, DuBose's light cruisers engaged the Hatsuzuki, which tried to resist but was ultimately destroyed by the intense gunfire, sinking at 20:59. DuBose ceased his pursuit at 21:30. This decision was timely, as Hatsuzuki's distress calls led Ozawa to advance south with three battleships and one destroyer at 20:41. Finding no targets, Ozawa turned back at 23:30, bringing the battle to an end. On his retreat, two wolf packs were lying in wait. Although Ise avoided significant damage from a powerful torpedo attack at 18:44, the Tama, already damaged, wasn't as fortunate. The cruiser was proceeding independently to Okinawa at 14 knots after taking a torpedo in the first air attack. Jallao's skipper fired three torpedoes from her bow tubes, but they all missed. He quickly lined up another shot with the four stern tubes. Three of the four hit, and two exploded. The damage was catastrophic, causing Tama to break in two and quickly sink. There were no survivors from the crew of some 450 men. Meanwhile, Halsey had dispatched the fastest ships from his battle line at 16:22 in a last-ditch effort to intercept Kurita's force before it could navigate the San Bernardino Strait. However, they arrived too late, as aircraft from Independence detected Kurita's force moving through the strait at 21:40. The only ship that did not make it was the destroyer Nowaki, which, overloaded with survivors from Chikuma, was attacked by the American forces at 00:54 on October 26 and was swiftly sunk by 01:32. During this time, General Krueger's offensive persisted with General Sibert's 10th Corps and General Hodge's 24th Corps making steady progress inland. To the north, cavalry units secured San Juanico Strait, while Colonel Newman's 3rd Battalion captured Hill C and Colonel Chapman's 2nd Battalion took Hill B despite heavy resistance. Additionally, Chapman's 1st Battalion secured Hill 85, and the majority of the 3rd Battalion advanced towards Castilla, 8000 yards southwest of Palo. Further south, a patrol from the 383rd Regiment reached the Binahaan River and linked up with Chapman's Company K; the 382nd Regiment pushed beyond Aslom and Kanmonhag; Colonel May's Company K attempted, but failed, to capture Tabontabon; the 17th and 184th Regiments consolidated their newly captured positions on Burauen while sending patrols towards Dagami; and the 32nd Regiment made some headway toward the Buri airstrip but was still unable to capture it. By October 26, Shima's two heavy cruisers and two destroyers had successfully evaded several PT boat attacks and made their escape. However, the damaged cruiser Abukuma, under the protection of destroyer Ushio, was struck by 43 B-24 heavy bombers in the Sulu Sea. Usually high-altitude attacks on ships were totally ineffective, so the bombers came in at an altitude of about 6,500ft. In the first attack, Abukuma took a direct hit in the area of her bridge at 1006hrs and another aft. The second group of bombers scored a damaging near miss forward, and then a direct hit aft that knocked out one of the shafts and the steering equipment. The resulting fires spread to the engine rooms and the torpedo mounts located aft. When the fires reached the torpedoes, four exploded at 1037hrs. A third attack at 1044hrs brought only near misses. Abukuma was mortally damaged but remained afloat long enough for 284 of the crew to leave the ship. The veteran cruiser, part of the force that attacked Pearl Harbor, sank at 1242hrs with the loss of 220 men (added to the loss of 37 from the torpedo hit from the PT boat). As they came in at a lower altitude, Abukuma and Ushio were able to account for three bombers in this action. On the same day, kamikaze attacks resumed against Taffy 1. Three Zeros penetrated the CAP and attacked Suwannee, which had completed repairs from the prior day's suicide attack. One Zero hit the flight deck and smashed into a group of ten aircraft parked on the bow. The aircraft were quickly engulfed in flames that spread down into the hangar bay, where another ten fueled aircraft were preparing to be brought up to the flight deck. The resulting fires on the hangar deck were put out, followed two hours later by the fire on the flight deck. The crew paid a high price for saving their ship— 85 dead, 58 missing, and 102 wounded. Other kamikazes selected Sangamon and Petrof Bay for attack; both carriers reported being near-missed. The initial success of the kamikaze attacks, including one carrier sunk and five damaged, gave the Japanese hope that they had found a way to halt the American naval advance. This marked the beginning of the Kamikaze era in the Pacific War. As Kurita's force moved through the Sibuyan Sea, Admirals McCain and Bogan launched a strike at 06:00 with 257 aircraft. Despite this effort, the exhausted pilots managed only three bomb hits on Kumano, causing moderate damage. Aircraft from Wasp and Cowpens also found Kurita's main force. Noshiro was able to evade six torpedoes aimed at her, but at 0852hrs one struck with devastating effect. The ship lost all power and within minutes developed a 26° list to port. The next attack was conducted by aircraft from Hornet. A second torpedo hit the lightly protected cruiser at 1039hrs, and at 1113hrs she sank bow first. By this point, Kurita's destroyers were down to their last few tons of fuel, forcing them to reduce speed. Destroyers had to shift fuel among themselves to reach a tanker positioned at Coron Bay. Hayashimo was forced to temporarily anchor off Semirara Island south of Mindoro. She was attacked by Avengers from 1045hrs to 1050hrs, and had her bow blown off by a torpedo. As a result, she was grounded and sank in shallow water off Semirara Island. Kurita's remaining ships managed to reach Coron Bay or Brunei, except for the destroyers Fujinami and Shiranui, which were sunk by air attacks on October 27, resulting in the loss of their crews, including those from Chokai aboard Fujinami. By the end of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the IJN had been effectively decimated. Despite suffering a severe defeat, Admiral Mikawa assessed that he still had enough resources to carry out Operation TA, which involved transporting reinforcements to Ormoc. On October 24, the cruiser Kinu and the destroyer Uranami escorted five transports through intense strafing fire to Cagayan. After boarding the 41st Regiment, Admiral Sakonju's convoy set sail the next morning and successfully landed the reinforcements at Ormoc early on October 26. Although they faced occasional enemy air attacks, they did not incur significant troop losses. Sakonju then sent three transports to Manila, but these were targeted by aircraft from Sprague's carriers. The attacks resulted in two bomb hits on Uranami and three on Kinu, leading to the sinking of both ships in the Visayan Sea. Another transport proceeded to Bohol, embarked the 169th Independent Battalion, and landed them at Ormoc on October 27. Although the Leyte beachheads were secured against sea-based attacks, the Americans could not control all surrounding waters, allowing Generals Yamashita and Suzuki to continue reinforcing the island. This marks the conclusion of the Battle of Leyte Gulf. In exchange for the loss of one light carrier, two escort carriers, two destroyers, one destroyer escort, one submarine, one PT boat, 255 aircraft, and about 2,000 men, the Americans had destroyed approximately 300 enemy planes and sunk 28 warships, including the carrier Zuikaku (the last survivor of the Pearl Harbor attack), three light carriers, three battleships, ten cruisers, and eleven destroyers, with a total of 12,000 Japanese casualties. Despite losing all his carriers, Ozawa fulfilled his expected role and managed to survive the battle with two battleships and two cruisers. After the war, he noted that the final three strikes were not damaging, and his chief of staff remarked that he was unimpressed with the American pilots' quality. In contrast, Halsey faced severe criticism for his controversial decision to leave San Bernardino Strait unguarded while moving his entire force north. If he had employed more strategic thinking and embraced decentralized decision-making, Mitscher's carriers could have engaged and defeated both Ozawa and Kurita. Nishimura also performed his duties effectively; despite losing his life and almost his entire force, he diverted the 7th Fleet's surface forces, leaving Kinkaid's transports and escort carriers vulnerable to Kurita's attack. The Shima force contributed nothing to the mission but survived largely intact. Kurita demonstrated bravery throughout the battle but was occasionally indecisive. Although he was not responsible for the losses at the Sibuyan Sea and was unlucky with his lookouts misidentifying cruisers and battleships among Sprague's escort carriers, he faced American tactics that he perceived as skillful. Sprague's desperate maneuvers to avoid annihilation were seen by the Japanese as tactical excellence. Kurita acknowledged the effective performance of American destroyers, which broke up his formation with torpedo attacks and utilized smoke screens effectively. Both Kurita and his chief of staff found the American air attacks to be relentless, aggressive, skillful, and well-coordinated, considering them the most proficient attacks encountered by the 1st Striking Force throughout the battle. In the end, Toyoda's Sho-Go plan was fundamentally flawed and destined for failure. Although it contained some clever elements that exploited weaknesses in the US Navy's command structure, it was ultimately incapable of success and served only as a means of the IJN's destruction. Even if Kurita had advanced into Leyte Gulf, it would have provided no significant military advantage for the Japanese and would likely have led to the complete destruction of Kurita's forces. The failure of Sho-Go left the Japanese without a fleet and with no realistic hope of defeating the Americans. However, the emergence of Kamikaze attacks allowed Japan to continue the war for a while longer. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Imperial Japanese Navy was virtually annihilated during the battle of Leyte Gulf. Few of her mighty warships remained and now she would cling to desperate measures to try and force the Americans to sue for an early peace to retain pieces of her empire. How long could Japan drag this war on?
Last time we spoke about the Return to the Philippines. Admiral Halsey, in preparation for the Leyte invasion, devised a strategic ploy to lure the Japanese forces by feigning vulnerability. Despite significant air engagements and the heavy damage to two cruisers, Halsey's forces maintained control. Meanwhile, a massive convoy approached Leyte, and the Japanese launched a desperate counterattack. The battle severely depleted Japan's air strength, leading to the birth of the Kamikaze Corps. As Davison's carrier aircraft attacked, Japanese forces struggled due to bad weather and underestimated the Americans. General Terauchi activated Sho-Go 1, targeting Leyte, despite disagreements with General Yamashita. Pre-landing operations saw U.S. Rangers secure islands, while heavy bombardments prepared Leyte for invasion. MacArthur's forces landed amidst fierce resistance, capturing key positions. Though logistics were disorganized, U.S. troops gained ground, marking the beginning of a decisive battle in the Philippines, with the Japanese struggling to counter. This episode is the Battle of Leyte Gulf Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. As previously mentioned, General MacArthur's forces successfully landed on Leyte, with General Sibert's 10th Corps landing in the Palo-Tacloban sector and General Hodge's 24th Corps at Dulag. In response, Admiral Toyoda activated Operation Sho-Go, ordering Admiral Kurita's 1st Striking Force to move to Brunei Bay and destroy enemy warships and transports in Leyte Gulf. Meanwhile, Admiral Shima's 2nd Striking Force prepared to support counter-landings led by Vice-Admiral Mikawa Gunichi's Southwest Area Fleet. The planning for Admiral Shima's small force was emblematic of the shambolic state of the IJN organization for the battle. His force was originally assigned to Ozawa as part of the Main Body. Then it was detached to go down to Formosa to mop-up Halsey's Third Fleet in the aftermath of the Battle off Formosa. Then it was assigned to the Southwest Area Fleet based in Manila to spearhead an envisioned counter-landing on Leyte. The commander of the Southwest Area Fleet, Admiral Mikawa, determined that the Shima force was not required to accomplish the counter-landing mission. On October 19 Toyoda rejected this and instructed Mikawa to use the Shima force as part of the counter-landing force. In spite of this and after confirming that the counter-landing operation did not require Shima's force, Mikawa sent orders to Shima on the afternoon of the 19th that he was not required to stand by to support the counter-landing. Early in the afternoon on October 21, the Combined Fleet again ordered Shima to take part in the transport mission and ordered his force to Manila. At this point, two forces were assigned to the counter-landing operation with a total of five cruisers and eight destroyers. This was a very questionable use of the Combined Fleet's limited resources. Kurita's 16th Cruiser Division was detached to reinforce the effort, and Admiral Ozawa's depleted Main Body was tasked with luring the enemy north, allowing Kurita to break through to the landing zone. Vice Adm. Ozawa's Task Force Main Body sortied from the Bungo Channel, at the southern entrance to the Inland Sea, on the afternoon of October 20, immediately after receiving the Combined Fleet battle order. To heighten its effectiveness as a lure, the Ozawa Force sortied with all of the 3d Carrier Division, made up of the regular carrier Zuikaku and the light carriers Zuiho, Chitose, and Chiyoda. The total number of aircraft available to put aboard these ships, however, was only 108. These belonged to the poorly trained air groups of the 1st Carrier Division and represented about half the normal complement. In addition to the half-empty carriers, the force comprised two battleships (Ise, Hyuga), three light cruisers(Oyodo, Tama, Isuzu) and eight destroyers (31st Destroyer Squadron). At around 06:00 on 21 October, Japanese aircraft attempted to bomb the Allied ships in Leyte Bay. An Aichi D3A dive-bomber dove for Shropshire, but broke away after heavy anti-aircraft fire was directed at it. The Aichi, damaged by Bofors fire, turned and flew at low level up the port side of the nearby Australia, before striking the cruiser's foremast with its wingroot. Although the bulk of the aircraft fell overboard, the bridge and forward superstructure were showered with debris and burning fuel. Seven officers (including Captain Dechaineux) and twenty-three sailors were killed by the collision, while another nine officers (including Commodore Collins), fifty-two sailors, and an AIF gunner were wounded. Observers aboard Australia and nearby Allied ships differed in their opinions of the collision; some thought that it was an accident, while the majority considered it to be a deliberate ramming aimed at the bridge. Following the attack, commander Harley C. Wright assumed temporary control of the ship. Since Kurita lacked air cover, Tominaga's forces were regrouping in the Philippines to bolster Japanese air strength for Operation Sho-Go, while Admiral Fukudome's 2nd Air Fleet was assembling in the Manila area. At the same time, with communication lost with General Makino's 16th Division.Because of the typhoon of October 17-18, signal communications were impossible. Roads were washed out and impassable. Bridges were down; and for about a week from the time the storm first hit the island, elements of the 16th Division were scattered and out of contact with one another. While trying to assemble its forces for operations, the Japanese were then hit by enemy bombardment, which further severely disrupted General Makino's radio-telegraphic communications. Additionally, the evacuation of Tacloban by the division rear echelon, which began early on October 20, necessitated the abandonment of permanent wireless installations and resulted in complete severance for 48 hours of all contact between the 16th Division and higher headquarters at Cebu and Manila. During this critical period, 14th Area Army and 35th Army were completely without knowledge of developments on Leyte. General Suzuki initiated the Suzu Plan, preparing the 41st Regiment and two battalions of the 102nd Division to move toward Ormoc. General Terauchi, having decided that the decisive battle would be fought at Leyte, directed General Yamashita to place the provisional Tempei Battalion and the 20th Antitank Battalion under Suzuki's command and ordered Lieutenant-General Yamagata Tsuyuo's 26th Division to prepare for early deployment to Leyte. Additionally, reinforcements from the 1st Division and the 68th Brigade, soon to arrive in the Philippines, were assigned to the 35th Army. The Japanese anticipated that the enemy would not move inland until the beachheads at Tacloban and Dulag were connected, so they aimed to gather reinforcements in the Carigara area before launching a major counteroffensive to crush the invading forces. In the meantime, Makino's 16th Division was tasked with holding off the enemy advance in eastern Leyte long enough to allow reinforcements to assemble. Reacting swiftly to the enemy landings, Makino sent the reserve 1st Battalion, 20th Regiment, and the 7th Independent Tank Company to strengthen the defenses at Palo and Dulag, respectively. General Krueger, however, intended to move quickly through Leyte Valley, aiming to secure key roads and airfields before the Japanese could regroup and mount a solid defense. The 1st Striking Force departed Lingga at 01:00 on October 18 and headed to Brunei Bay on the north coast of Borneo. At Brunei, Kurita's ships refuelled, and Kurita took the opportunity to confer with his officers. The details of Sho-1 reached Kurita's force during the day on October 18. This made for a dramatic conference and reflected the unease many felt about the plan. Many officers at the conference were appalled that the fleet was being risked attacking empty transports and doubted that they would ever get close to Leyte Gulf. Kurita probably had his own doubts about the plan, but after many of those present expressed their doubts, Kurita reminded them of the “glorious opportunity” they had been given. “Would it not be a shame to have the fleet remain intact while the nation perishes?” posed Kurita, and followed with the plea: “What man can say that there is no chance for our fleet to turn the tide of war in a decisive battle?” Whatever their doubts, the crews and ships of the 1st Striking Force departed Brunei at 08:00 on October 22 and headed northeast through the Palawan Passage. Kurita's 3rd Section—consisting of the old battleships Fuso and Yamashiro, heavy cruiser Mogami, and four destroyers—stayed behind. These ships departed at 15:00 and headed to the Balabac Strait and then into the Sulu Sea. If all went according to plan, they would storm Leyte Gulf through the Surigao Strait and meet Kurita's ships inside the gulf on the morning of October 25. To the north, General Mudge's 1st Cavalry Division continued advancing northwest along San Juanico Strait, with the 7th Cavalry liberating Tacloban with minimal resistance. The 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments faced tougher opposition in the southwestern foothills, where Colonel Royce Drake was killed by enemy machine-gun fire, but they managed to secure Utap and Caibaan despite the swampy terrain. To the south, Colonel Aubrey Newman's 34th Regiment repelled a strong enemy counterattack, resulting in 600 Japanese casualties, before launching an assault on Hill 332. Although only the northern knoll was captured by nightfall, the 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment consolidated its position on Hill 522, while the 2nd and 3rd Battalions advanced towards Palo, with the 2nd successfully entering the town. Further south, Japanese artillery positioned on Catmon Hill targeted the beachhead area while General Bradley's 96th Division advanced. Colonel May's 1st Battalion attacked the Japanese positions at Labiranan Head, the remaining forces of the 383rd Regiment moved west to a point north of Tigbao, and Colonel Dill's 382nd Regiment made slow progress towards Tigbao. At the same time, General Arnold's 7th Division, after repelling two minor tank attacks, began advancing west toward the Burauen airstrips, with the 32nd and 184th Regiments moving side by side. The 184th faced minimal opposition as it captured the Dulag airstrip and continued moving forward about 1000 yards beyond the beachhead, whereas the 32nd had to overcome several bunkers and pillboxes to reach its objective. The next day, both regiments continued their westward advance, with the 184th stopping after 2800 yards due to increased enemy resistance, waiting for the 32nd to close the gap. To the north, May's 1st Battalion secured Labiranan Hill and San Roque, while the rest of the 383rd Regiment advanced to Anibung to surround Catmon Hill, and the 382nd Regiment pushed through Tigbao and Canmangui. In response to these developments, Makino decided to reorganize his southern forces to better defend Catmon Hill and Burauen, with the 20th Regiment largely disengaging and retreating towards Hindang. Simultaneously, the 34th Regiment captured Hill 332, while Lieutenant-Colonel George Chapman's 19th Regiment defended Palo from strong enemy counterattacks. The 3rd Battalion managed to reach the town, allowing the 2nd Battalion to launch an attack towards Hill B, though it was unable to capture its crest. Further north, while the 7th Cavalry secured the hills around Tacloban, Brigadier-General William Chase's 1st Cavalry Brigade continued to face challenges advancing up the western foothills. In the morning, Kurita set sail from Brunei and headed northeast through the Palawan Passage, leaving Vice-Admiral Nishimura Shoji's Force C behind to advance through the Surigao Strait into Leyte Gulf. Taking the direct route along the west coast of Palawan, the 1st Striking Force was detected by submarines Darter and Dace in the early hours of October 23. After reporting the enemy task force to Admirals Halsey and Kinkaid, the submarines executed a coordinated attack at 06:10. The first torpedoes struck Atago just as Kurita was having morning tea with his chief of staff. In total, four torpedoes hit the cruiser, dooming her instantly. Nineteen officers and 341 sailors went down with the ship. Kurita and his staff were thrown into the water and had to swim for their lives. The second salvo from Darter hit cruiser Takao, steaming behind Atago. Two torpedoes hit the cruiser, killing 32 crewmen and wounding another 30. Takao was not only out of the battle, but her heavy damage put her out of the war. After eventually reaching Singapore, she was deemed unrepairable.On Dace, Claggett observed Darter's devastating attack. Claggett identified a Kongo-class battleship for attack and began his approach. Six torpedoes were fired from a range of 1,800 yards toward the target, which was actually heavy cruiser Maya. The cruiser took four hits on her port side and sank in a mere eight minutes, taking with her 16 officers and 320 men. Kurita narrowly escaped the sinking of the Atago, later transferring to the battleship Yamato after sending two destroyers to escort the damaged Takao back to Brunei. The submarines then endured ineffective counterattacks from Japanese destroyers, although Darter ran aground on a reef while pursuing Takao. This successful submarine attack not only diminished Kurita's force by three powerful cruisers but also provided the Americans with the location of the 1st Striking Force. In response, Admiral Oldendorf's fire support group established a battle line across the mouth of Surigao Strait, and Halsey ordered his dispersed carrier groups to prepare for battle, recalling Task Group 38.4 immediately. Additionally, Vice-Admiral Sakonju Naomasa's 16th Cruiser Division, en route to Mindanao with the 41st Regiment for Ormoc, was tracked by submarine Bream near Manila Bay early on October 23. This led to a torpedo attack that critically damaged the heavy cruiser Aoba, forcing her to return to Japan, where she would never be operational again. Despite these challenges, the first reinforcement successfully arrived in Ormoc on the same day after an uneventful voyage. At the same time, the IJA and IJN air forces were rapidly assembling their resources in the Philippines in preparation for a coordinated air offensive set to begin on October 24, a day before the scheduled fleet attack. To the north, Ozawa's substantial but ineffective decoy force was positioned due east of Okinawa, moving south into the Philippine Sea, while Shima's 2nd Striking Force neared the Coron Islands. Back in Leyte, Krueger's offensive was advancing as well. In the north, the 8th Cavalry had moved through the 7th and successfully captured a bridge over the Diit River. On October 22, elements of the 5th Cavalry were sent to Tacloban to act as a guard of honor for General MacArthur. The guard of honor, consisting of 1st Lt. John Gregory and thirty enlisted men of the 5th Cavalry, arrived at Tacloban later on October 23. President Osmeña of the Philippine Commonwealth was also present, having come ashore for the occasion. A simple but impressive ceremony was held in front of the municipal building of Tacloban, though the interior of the edifice was a shambles of broken furniture and scattered papers. A guard of honor of "dirty and tired but efficient-looking soldiers" was drawn up in front of the government building. General MacArthur broadcasted an address announcing the establishment of the Philippine Civil Government with President Osmeña as its head. Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland then read the official proclamation. President Osmeña spoke appreciatively of American support and of the determination of the Filipinos to expel the enemy. "To the Color" was sounded on the bugle, and the national flags of the United States and the Philippines were simultaneously hoisted on the sides of the building. Colonel Kangleon of the guerrilla forces was then decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross. Few Filipinos except representatives of the local government were present for the ceremony. Apparently the inhabitants had not heard of it, or did not know that they were permitted to attend. Information quickly spread, however, that the civil government had assumed control, and as General MacArthur and his party left town the civil population cheered them. The 1st Cavalry Brigade continued its slow advance through challenging terrain before being reassigned to support the overstretched 24th Division in its rear. Newman's 1st Battalion made an unsuccessful attempt to capture Hill Nan, and the 19th Regiment similarly failed to take Hill B. On the night of October 23 Col. Suzuki Tatsunosuke, the commanding officer of the 33rd Regiment, led a raiding detachment, armed with rifles, sabres, grenades, and mines, into Palo from the southwest. Using Filipino civilians in front of them, the men of the detachment tricked the guards at the outpost into believing that they were guerrillas. The Japanese were thus able to capture two machine guns and a 37-mm. gun. They penetrated to the town square and charged, throwing explosives into houses, trucks, and a tank, and broke into an evacuation hospital where they killed some wounded. They then moved toward the bridge and mounted the captured machine guns on it, firing until their ammunition was exhausted and then abandoning the guns. The American guards on the other side of the bridge, however, were able to fire upon the bridge and its approaches so effectively that they killed fifty Japanese, according to a count made the next morning. The raid was completely broken up, and sixty Japanese, including Colonel Suzuki, were killed. The American casualties were fourteen killed and twenty wounded. To the south, the 383rd Regiment secured the Guinarona River, while the 382nd conducted patrols. Even farther south, Arnold deployed the 17th Regiment, reinforced by the 2nd Battalion of the 184th Regiment and the 767th Tank Battalion, to push through his advance elements and continue the assault westward, with the other two regiments trailing 1000 yards behind. This "flying wedge" maneuver proved highly effective, with the infantry securing San Pablo airfield and the tanks advancing to the western edge of Burauen. They disrupted the disorganized enemy forces and killed Colonel Hokota Keijiro, commander of the 20th Regiment. Meanwhile, at sea, Kurita's intact warships advanced into Mindoro Strait by nightfall, while Nishimura's force was crossing the Sulu Sea. To the north, Ozawa's decoy force was deliberately broadcasting messages to draw enemy attention. Shima was also directed to penetrate Surigao Strait to support Nishimura's assault, as Mikawa had determined that the 2nd Striking Force was not needed for the counter-landing mission. On Leyte, the troops continued their engagement on October 24, unaware of the impending major naval battle. In the northern region, to secure San Juanico Strait and prevent Japanese reinforcements from Samar, the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry landed successfully at Babatngon; Troop C of the 8th Cavalry did the same at La Paz; and the rest of the 1st Squadron advanced to Guintiguian. By nightfall, these cavalry units had to repel a strong counterattack from the 2nd Battalion, 9th Regiment, which was stationed in Samar. To the south, Newman's 1st Battalion secured Hills Nan and Mike; his 2nd Battalion fought its way to a small hill southeast of Hill C; Chapman's 2nd Battalion continued its unsuccessful assault on Hill B; and his Company K captured San Joaquin south of Palo. Further south, the 382nd Regiment pushed through Hindang, causing the 20th Regiment units to retreat, and also secured Anibung, while the 383rd Regiment began patrolling its area. Meanwhile, the 17th Regiment, supported by the 184th, advanced along the road to Burauen, fought through the town, and began preparing for a push north to Dagami. Additionally, the 32nd Regiment attacked toward the Buri airstrip but was eventually forced to withdraw. At dawn on October 24, the crucial air phase of the Sho-Go plan began, with 200 aircraft of the 1st and 2nd Air Fleets taking off from Clark Field to patrol the waters east of Luzon. At 08:20, Admiral Sherman's carriers were finally spotted, prompting the launch of three waves of Japanese aircraft for an attack. The first attack in the morning was intercepted by seven Hellcats from Essex led by Commander David McCampbell, the air group commander. The quality of the Japanese air crews was very low. McCampbell methodically proceeded to shoot down nine Japanese aircraft, for which he was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor, and his wingman claimed six more. After the record action, he managed to return and land in extremis on Langley because the Essex's deck was too busy to accommodate him although he had run short of fuel. Altogether, aviators from Essex were credited with 24 downed enemy aircraft, and fighters from Lexington 13. Despite the Hellcats' rough handling of the incoming Japanese strike, fleet air defense was never airtight. At 0938hrs, one Judy divebomber used clouds for cover and then made a skillful attack against light carrier Princeton. The aircraft's 551lb bomb hit in the middle of the flight deck some 75ft forward of the aft elevator. It penetrated several decks to the ship's bakery, where it exploded. The resulting blast reached into the hangar deck where it engulfed six fully armed and fully fueled Avengers. These aircraft caught fire and soon exploded with a blast so powerful both ship's elevators were thrown into the air. Water pressure was knocked out, which allowed the flames to spread quickly. All non-essential personnel were ordered off the ship at 1010hrs, followed by all but the fire-fighting personnel ten minutes later. In response, the cruiser Birmingham came to Princeton's aid but sustained severe damage from a major explosion and had to retreat to Ulithi, leading to Princeton being scuttled later in the afternoon. The subsequent two waves of Japanese aircraft were successfully intercepted, resulting in the loss of 67 Japanese planes by the end of the day. Meanwhile, Tominaga launched full-scale attacks on enemy invasion shipping in Leyte Gulf with minimal results. The failure to neutralize Halsey's carriers and Ozawa's undetected diversion mission allowed Admiral Mitscher to conduct a series of strikes against Kurita's force. That morning, American reconnaissance aircraft detected Kurita's 1st Striking Force south of Mindoro, prompting Admiral Bogan to dispatch 45 aircraft under Commander William Ellis to attack the battleships Yamato and Musashi as they neared the Sibuyan Sea. At approximately 10:30, aircraft from the Intrepid and Cabot began their attack. The lead group of Japanese ships included the huge Yamato and Musashi. Of these two, Musashi was nearest, so Commander Ellis selected her as the main target. He split the 12 Helldivers into two six-aircraft divisions to attack both battleships with their 1000lb bombs. The two nearest large ships were the subject of the Avengers' attack. Two were ordered to go after heavy cruiser Myoko and the other six were directed against Musashi. These were divided into two three-plane sections in order to execute an anvil attack. The four Avengers from Cabot were allocated against Yamato in the center of the formation. American pilots all remarked on the ferocity of the antiaircraft fire from the multi-colored 5in. bursts to the streams of tracers from the 25mm guns. The Japanese also used Type 3 incendiary shells from 18.1in. and 16in. main battery guns. Despite the spectacular appearances of this barrage, Japanese anti-aircraft fire was generally ineffective. The giant Type 3 shells proved totally ineffective, and Japanese records indicate that the battleships fired a relatively low number of 6in. and 5in. shells during each attack, indicating that the fire-control systems were taking too long to generate a targeting solution. These and the ubiquitous 25mm guns damaged many aircraft, but of the over 250 aircraft that attacked during the day, only 18 were shot down. Though the numbers confirm the ineffectiveness of IJN anti-aircraft fire, the American aviators displayed great courage pressing home their attacks through what was described as an impenetrable wall of flak. Musashi was hit with one torpedo, leading to flooding and listing, and another torpedo struck the cruiser Myoko, which had to return to Singapore. For most of the day, Musashi was the center of attention. Due to a fault in the design of her side belt, slow flooding entered the adjacent boiler room. The effect of some 3,000 tons of water was a 5.5° list, which was quickly reduced to a single degree by pumps in the affected boiler room and counterflooding on the opposite. Facing Musashi's intact antiaircraft batteries, one Avenger was shot down before it launched its torpedo and a second went down after deploying its weapon. The two Avengers that attacked Myoko were even more successful. At 1029hrs, one torpedo hit the heavy cruiser on her starboard side aft. Her propulsion system was damaged, and her top speed reduced to 15 knots. The cruiser fell astern of the formation. Kurita was forced to send her back to Singapore for repairs without destroyer escort. Since Myoko was the flagship of Sentai 5, at 1100hrs the commander transferred to cruiser Haguro. Myoko limped back to Singapore but was out of the war. Four of Kurita's heavy cruisers were out of the battle before they had a chance to engage an enemy ship. Cabot's small group of torpedo aircraft attacked Yamato, but the battleship dodged all torpedoes directed at her. Concurrently, Nishimura's fleet was located by an enhanced search operation from Admiral Davison's carriers. At 09:18, 16 Hellcats and 12 Avengers from the Enterprise attacked the Yamashiro and Fuso battleships, hitting the latter with two bombs, though the damage was minimal. Operating to the west of Nishimura was Shima's Second Striking Force and also in the area was Shima's detached Destroyer Division 21 with three ships, which was hurrying to rejoin Shima's main force after having completed a transport mission to Manila. Franklin's air group was assigned the northern sector of the Sulu Sea. It spotted the three ships of Shima's Destroyer Division 21 off Panay. Attacking high-speed destroyers was a challenge for any airman, but at 0813hrs Wakaba was hit by a bomb and several near misses. The damage proved fatal—45 minutes later, Wakaba sank with the loss of 30 men. Franklin launched a follow-up strike of 12 Hellcats and 11 bombers that reached the two remaining destroyers just before noon. Only one bomb hit was scored against Hatsushimo, which did little damage. The Japanese commander decided to head back to Manila with the survivors of Wakaba. Inexplicably, he failed to notify Shima of his decision. Destroyer Division 21 was out of the battle. After this initial strike, Bogan sent a second wave of 42 aircraft, which targeted Musashi between 12:07 and 12:15. Again, Helldivers opened the attack. The 12 bombers scored at least two direct hits and five near misses. One 1,000lb hit forward and passed through Musashi's bow without exploding. The second hit just to the port side of the stack and penetrated two decks before exploding. The resulting damage forced the abandonment of the port-side inboard engine room, which reduced the ship to three shafts. A fire near one of the boiler rooms was quickly extinguished. Adding to the chaos, Musashi's steam siren was damaged, and it continued to sound off and on for the remainder of the action. Once again Intrepid's Avengers deployed to conduct an anvil attack. Of the nine aircraft, eight got their torpedoes in the water and headed toward the huge battleship. As was the case for the entire series of attacks, it is impossible to precisely trace the number of hits suffered by Musashi; American and Japanese records do not even coincide on the overall number of attacks during the day. It is probable that the second wave of Avengers put three torpedoes into Musashi's port side. One hit near the stack on the junction of the outboard port engine room and the port hydraulic machinery space; it caused slow flooding but little else. Another hit forward of the armored citadel and caused massive flooding into several large spaces. The last confirmed hit occurred abaft Turret No. 2. Despite these three additional hits, Musashi remained on an even keel, but was noticeably down by the bow. In exchange, Musashi antiaircraft gunners forced one Avenger to ditch some 15 miles away and shot down two Helldivers. During this attack, Japanese records indicate nine Type 3 shells were fired. American pilots were impressed that they were engaged at 25,000–30,000 yards, but no aircraft were damaged. This damage reduced Musashi's speed to 22 knots, prompting Kurita to slow his formation. Despite taking four torpedoes, Musashi's skilled damage-control teams managed to keep it afloat throughout the day. At 10:50, Sherman launched 58 aircraft from the Essex and Lexington, focusing on Musashi again at 13:30. With her speed reduced and unable to fully maneuver, she was a much easier target. Despite the heavy fire directed against them, the Helldivers performed their mission of preparing the way for the torpedo bombers. At least four 1,000lb bombs hit Musashi. Three hits caused minimal damage as they impacted near the forward 18in. turret and exploded in the unoccupied crew accommodation spaces below. Damage from the final hit that exploded on contact when it hit the starboard side of the stack was not serious, but the explosion devastated many nearby 25mm triple mounts and caused heavy casualties among the gun crews. While the Helldivers added to the topside carnage, damage from the Avengers was much more serious. Three more torpedo hits were confirmed in the third attack, bringing the total to seven. Two struck forward of the armored citadel on either side of the bow. The design flaw of having comparatively little compartmentation in the unarmored forward section of the ship led to massive flooding. In addition, the explosions forced the hull plating outward creating what looked like a huge plow throwing water up as the ship moved forward. Another torpedo struck the starboard side close to the previous starboard side hit. This increased flooding and forced the abandonment of the starboard hydraulic machinery room. A possible fourth hit was reported by some witnesses near the forward 6.1in. triple turret on the starboard side. This assault resulted in at least four bomb hits and three torpedo hits, causing severe flooding. Despite this, Musashi continued to fight, but with its speed reduced to 12 knots, Kurita ordered it to move west with destroyers Shimakaze and Kiyoshimo. Additionally, the cruiser Tone was struck by two bombs during this attack, sustaining only light damage. At 14:26, 12 Helldivers and 8 Hellcats from the Essex launched an assault on the Yamato and Nagato, delivering three bomb hits to the Yamato and two to the Nagato, though the damage was not severe. The fifth air attack of the day was the most intense, with 65 aircraft from the Enterprise and Franklin taking off at 13:15 to strike the heavily damaged Musashi at 15:10. The results against the near-defenseless battleship were devastating. Of the 18 Helldivers that dove on Musashi, 11 claimed hits. On this occasion, the aviators' claims were not inflated. Japanese sources agreed that within minutes, Musashi was pounded by ten 1,000lb bombs. This barrage can be detailed with some degree of certainty. One bomb hit forward of Turret No. 1 and added to the damage there from earlier bombs. Another bomb hit the roof of the same turret and failed to penetrate its thick roof armor. Another hit to the starboard side of the turret and penetrated two decks before exploding against the main armored deck. Two bombs hit together between the forward 6.1in. turret and the superstructure, exploded on contact, and did minimal damage. Another two hit just to port in the same general area, penetrated two decks, and exploded on the main armored deck without penetrating. The eighth bomb hit the port side of the massive superstructure and exploded on contact, causing devastation to nearby 25mm mounts and their crews. Another projectile hit the top of the superstructure and destroyed the main battery fire-control director and its rangefinder. The resulting explosion caused significant personnel casualties on the bridge and operations room totaling 78 killed and wounded. Among the wounded was the ship's captain. The final hit landed abaft the superstructure but caused only minor damage. Musashi was equally helpless against the Avengers. The eight Enterprise Avengers conducted an anvil attack, and all claimed hits. At this point in the action, the accounts of Musashi's surviving crewmembers are not reliable. It is certain that four more torpedoes hit the ship. The first was on the port side in the area of the magazine for Turret No. 1. Another hit on the port side was recorded abeam the superstructure, flooding one boiler room. The third hit to port was placed just aft of the stack. It was in the same area of an earlier hit, and it immediately flooded the outboard engine room. The only confirmed hit on the starboard side occurred in the area of Turret No. 2. On top of the four confirmed hits, some Japanese accounts mention as many as six more. Two of these struck amidships on the port side but did not explode. All attacking aircraft returned safely, confirming the ineffectiveness of Musashi's defenses at this point. At 15:21, Helldivers targeted the Haruna, but only managed five near misses. The increasing intensity of the air attacks throughout the day indicated that Japanese land-based air forces had failed to neutralize Halsey's carriers. Consequently, at 15:30, Kurita ordered his fleet to change course westward, away from the San Bernardino Strait, hoping that this maneuver would reduce the pressure from air attacks and allow Japanese air forces to achieve better results. Meanwhile, Bogan launched his third strike of the day at 15:50, with 31 aircraft under Ellis targeting the Musashi one final time. However, due to fatigue, the attack was ineffective. After this last air strike, Kurita decided to head back towards the San Bernardino Strait and instructed the sinking Musashi to beach itself on Sibuyan Island at 17:15. Before this could be executed, the battleship sank at 19:36, resulting in the loss of 1,023 lives. Thus, the Musashi became the largest ship ever sunk by air attack in what was the largest air-sea battle in history up to that point. Despite losing 18 aircraft, the Americans succeeded in sinking the Musashi, torpedoing the Myoko, and damaging three other battleships to varying extents. Nevertheless, the 1st Striking Force emerged in better condition than anticipated, with the Musashi absorbing much of the torpedo and bomb damage and allowing the other ships to weather the attack. Kurita planned to navigate San Bernardino Strait during the night, proceed down the east coast of Samar, and reach Leyte Gulf around 11:00. Meanwhile, Admiral Mitscher's search planes had located Ozawa's carriers at 16:40. By afternoon, Ozawa had launched most of his aircraft in an attack on Sherman, but the final assault by the once formidable IJN carrier force achieved only limited success, with 28 planes lost before retreating to the Philippines. Remaining undetected, Ozawa then dispatched two battleship carriers and four destroyers under Rear-Admiral Matsuda Chiaki southward, drawing American attention to his position. In the aftermath of the Battle of the Philippine Sea, the Americans did not know that the IJN had no prospects of replacing its lost aviators. Because the majority of the carriers themselves survived the battle, and the Americans knew other carriers were being added to the force, the IJN's carrier force was still a threat. The intelligence Halsey received on the IJN's carrier force indicated that it was fully capable. In every other major battle of the war, the IJN carrier fleet was the main threat. The Pacific War had become a carrier war and surface forces had been firmly supplanted as the primary striking force. The Americans had no way of knowing that the Japanese had turned this thinking on its head in their planning for Leyte Gulf. Nimitz wanted to destroy the Combined Fleet and thus gain an increased measure of operational freedom for future operations. He was disappointed that this did not occur at Philippine Sea and thus had inserted the instruction to Halsey that the destruction of the Japanese fleet would be his primary objective if the opportunity was presented. Achieving this not only would eliminate the main threat to the invasion, but it would cripple the IJN's ability to interfere with future operations. As the assessment from the aviators was that Kurita's force no longer posed a threat, at 19:50 Halsey ordered his entire force north to crush what he assessed as the primary threat: Ozawa's carrier force. He decided to do so with the entirety of his force. By doing so, he decided to ignore the threat posed by the Kurita force, which was headed toward San Bernardino Strait. He kept his whole force together, because that was how TF 38 fought and because, as he stated after the war, he did not want to divide his force in the face of the enemy. A decisive victory was most likely if the carriers of TF 38 worked with the battleships of TF 34. This was USN doctrine and Halsey fully supported it. At 20:22, Task Force 38 set course north, with the three carrier groups in the area meeting just before midnight. Earlier, at 20:05, a night reconnaissance aircraft from Independence had reported that Kurita's formidable surface force was heading back toward the San Bernardino Strait. This news raised concerns among several of Halsey's subordinates, including Bogan and Lee, but they were dismissed by the resolute Halsey. As a result, the 3rd Fleet's full strength continued northward toward Ozawa's decoy force, leaving the San Bernardino Strait completely unprotected. This left Kurita's battleships unopposed between themselves and the American landing vessels, except for Kinkaid's vulnerable escort carriers off Samar's coast. Meanwhile, the detection of Nishimura's force on October 24 gave Kinkaid enough time to prepare for a battle at Surigao Strait. Oldendorf set up his battle line under Rear-Admiral George Weyler near Hingatungan Point in the northern part of the strait, providing maximum sea space while still constraining Japanese movement. Eight cruisers in two groups were positioned south of this line, with 24 destroyers stationed to screen the battleships and cruisers and positioned on both flanks to launch torpedo attacks against the approaching Japanese. Additionally, 39 PT boats were deployed in the southern approaches to the strait and into the Mindanao Sea to provide early warning and execute torpedo attacks when possible. The main issue was that the battleships were primarily equipped with high-explosive shells and would only engage once the Japanese forces were about 20,000 yards away. Moreover, Kinkaid had intercepted an order from Halsey to assemble a powerful task force of fast battleships. Misinterpreting the order's unclear wording, Kinkaid mistakenly believed Task Force 34 was coming to defend San Bernardino Strait, allowing his forces to concentrate on Surigao Strait instead. Despite Kurita's delays, Nishimura pressed on to breach the strait, advancing with the heavy cruiser Mogami and three destroyers. Little is known about Nishimura's precise thinking as he approached the strait. He was planning on arriving off Tacloban at 0430hrs on October 25 in accordance with Toyoda's master plan that had Kurita's force arriving off Leyte a short time later. This schedule fell apart after Kurita's advance was thrown off schedule on the afternoon of October 24 when he temporarily turned around in the face of intensive air attack in the Sibuyan Sea. At 2013hrs Nishimura sent a message to Toyoda and Kurita that he planned to arrive off Dulag at 0400hrs the next morning, a half hour later than planned. This was only a minor change; much more important was the receipt at 2200hrs of Kurita's message that he would not be in the gulf until 1100hrs. This meant that Nishimura's force was on its own when it executed its attack into the gulf. However, Nishimura did not change his plan after learning of Kurita's revised intentions. He was determined to force the strait in darkness and in so doing draw forces away from Kurita's main attack. The battle began at 2236hrs when PT-131 gained radar contact on Nishimura's main force. The three boats of the section headed toward the contact to make a torpedo attack. Two of the boats were slightly damaged, but one was able to close within torpedo range. News of the contact did not reach Oldendorf until 0026hrs on October 25. Another section sighted the advance group built around Mogami at 2350hrs and two of the boats fired a torpedo at the cruiser. Neither hit its target. Demonstrating the confusion in any night battle, at about 0100hrs Mogami was hit by a 6in. shell from Fuso. Though a dud, it killed three men. About an hour later, PT134 closed to within 3,000 yards of Fuso and fired three torpedoes. Again, all missed. This running series of encounters continued up until 0213hrs. Of the 39 boats, 30 contacted the Japanese and launched 34 torpedoes. None of Nishimura's ships was hit. While Nishimura's force was successfully fighting its way up the strait in good order, he kept Kurita and Shima informed of his progress. At 0040hrs, the two parts of Nishimura's force reunited. First blood went to the Japanese, since ten PTs were hit, and one (PT-493) sank, with a total of three dead and 20 wounded. Though unable to exact any attrition on the Japanese, the PTs had provided an invaluable service informing Oldendorf of Nishimura's location and strength. Based on an earlier report from one of Mogami's scout aircraft on the location and numbers of USN ships in Leyte Gulf, Nishimura appeared to believe that the battle would occur inside Leyte Gulf and not in Surigao Strait. If he really believed that Oldendorf would not use favorable geography to his advantage, he was sorely mistaken. Having survived the PT boat attacks with no damage, Nishimura now faced a much more deadly threat. This came in the form of five Fletcher-class destroyers under the command of the aggressive Captain Coward. Two other destroyers from Coward's Destroyer Squadron 54 were left on picket duty and did not take part in the torpedo attack. The five destroyers assigned to the attack were arrayed to conduct an anvil attack (with torpedoes coming in from both bows of the enemy target), with McDermut and Monssen from the west and Remey, McGowan, and Melvin from the east. Approaching at 30 knots, Coward's ships would launch torpedoes guided by radar, and refrain from using their 5in. guns so as not to give their positions away. Once the torpedoes were on their way, the destroyers would break off and head north along the coast to clear the area and reduce the possibility of a friendly fire incident. What ensued was one of the most successful attacks of the entire war. Shortly after 03:00, Coward's three eastern destroyers launched 27 torpedoes from a range of 8200 to 9300 yards at the advancing Japanese ships. They scored two critical hits on the Fuso at 03:08, causing flooding and fires. The battleship, unaware of the severity of the damage, veered off course and headed south, ultimately sinking at about 03:45 with 1620 lives lost. The Americans claimed that the torpedoes had split the Fuso in two. Meanwhile, Coward's two western destroyers fired a full salvo of 20 torpedoes at 03:10. In response, Nishimura changed course, exposing his screen to danger. By 03:19, three torpedoes from McDermut struck the Yamagumo, which exploded and sank within two minutes; another torpedo hit the Michishio amidships, causing it to sink 15 minutes later after coming to a halt; and a final torpedo hit the Asagumo, damaging its bow and reducing its speed, forcing it to withdraw from the battle. McDermut's ten torpedoes were the most effective salvo of the war from any American destroyer. Monssen's torpedo attack resulted in a single hit on the battleship Yamashiro, causing some flooding and reducing her firepower by a third. Following Coward's devastating torpedo strike, six more destroyers, divided into two groups of three, approached Nishimura's force from the west along the coast of Leyte. The first group commenced their attack at 03:23, launching 14 torpedoes from a range of 6500 to 6800 yards, but only one torpedo struck the Yamashiro, temporarily slowing her to 5 knots. The second group of destroyers fired 15 torpedoes at 03:29, but none of their torpedoes hit their targets, and the gunfire from both sides proved ineffective. After this failed assault, nine destroyers in three sections of three approached Nishimura's weakened column from both flanks. The first two sections, attacking from either side, fired a half-salvo of five torpedoes from each destroyer, but none hit. Before the final section could launch its attack, a fierce gunnery battle was underway. The gunnery battle began at 0351hrs when the first American cruiser opened up. Two minutes later, West Virginia commenced fire from 22,800 yards. All ships fired at the largest radar return of the three Japanese ships, which was Yamashiro. The American barrage grew as each battleship gained a fire control solution. The three ships with the most modern fire control systems did most of the work. California joined in at 0355hrs from 20,400 yards followed by Tennessee one minute later. The three battleships with the less capable Mk 3 fire control radar struggled to gain a firing solution. Maryland opened fire at 0359hrs by ranging her Mk 3 radar on the shell splashes from the other battleships. Mississippi took until 0412hrs when she fired a full salvo at Yamashiro from 19,790 yards. Pennsylvania never gained a good solution for her 14in. main battery and failed to fire a single salvo. Unbeknownst to Nishimura, the Americans had executed a "T" maneuver, leaving his ships able to fire only their forward guns while the enemy could unleash full broadsides. Concentrating their fire on the Yamashiro, Oldendorf's cruisers and battleships landed several hits during the 18-minute engagement. By 03:56, the Yamashiro was seen burning amidships, aft, and in the bridge area. Despite this, the battleship fought back fiercely, targeting the cruisers Phoenix, Columbia, Shropshire, and Denver, though no hits were achieved. The Mogami endured severe damage during this engagement, with the cruiser Portland focusing its fire on her and inflicting heavy harm. In the early phase of the battle, she took several 5in. hits from American destroyers. In the first minutes of the withering barrage from Oldendorf's cruisers and battleships, Mogami sustained more damage, including a hit on one of her 8in. turrets. After firing four Type 93 torpedoes at 0401hrs against the gun flashes from enemy ships to the north, she came under fire from heavy cruiser Portland. Two 8in. shells hit Mogami's bridge at 0402hrs, killing her commanding officer, and other shells disabled two engine rooms. The new commanding officer decided to break off the action and head south at slow speed. While headed south, she encountered the Second Diversion Attack Force. As American gunfire pummeled Yamashiro's superstructure, the last destroyer group approached head-on, closing to within 6200 yards before launching 13 torpedoes. Before the torpedoes could reach their targets, the destroyers came under friendly fire and further assault from Yamashiro's guns, resulting in the Albert W. Grant taking 18 hits before being withdrawn. Observing the friendly fire, Oldendorf ordered a ceasefire at 04:09, allowing Nishimura to begin a retreat south. However, by 04:11, the Yamashiro had been hit by three torpedoes from the final destroyer salvo, causing a severe list and bringing the battleship to a halt. Yamashiro's valiant yet ultimately futile resistance ended at 04:19 when she capsized to port, taking Nishimura and 1625 others with her. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The largest naval battle in human history had only just begun. As many historians argue, given the fateful decision of Halsey to try and knock out the IJN combined fleet, the transports had been left completely open to an attack. Absolute carnage could unfold on an unprecedented scale…perhaps enough to cause America to rethink continuing the war?
General Douglas MacArthur's forces began landing at Leyte on October 20, 1944. That's the day MacArthur took the famous picture wading ashore at Leyte, but there was a lot more to the operation than that. Why was Leyte chosen over Mindanao? How prepared were Japanese commanders for the invasion? How did the Japanese army and navy try to repel the invasion? Did MacArthur really hope to take part in the Battle of Leyte Gulf aboard the USS Nashville? MacArthur Memorial historians Jim Zobel and Amanda Williams sat down to discuss these questions and more.Have a comment about this episode? Send us a text message! (Note: we can only read the texts, we can't reply) Follow us on:Twitter: @MacArthur1880; @AEWilliamsClarkFacebook: @MacArthurMemorialwww.macarthurmemorial.org
Last time we spoke about the Formosa air battle. In mid-1944, General MacArthur and Admirals Nimitz and Halsey debated their next move in the Pacific. MacArthur, intent on a direct assault on the Philippines, clashed with Nimitz, who favored invading Formosa. MacArthur's persuasive tactics, political savvy and to be more blunt, threats during a rather dramatic visit to Honolulu, convinced President FDR to prioritize the Philippines. Despite MacArthur's grandstanding, FDR did not completely abandon the US Navy's plans, and MacArthur's plan would require significant Naval support, with carrier strikes planned to soften Japanese defenses. In October, Halsey's carriers launched devastating strikes against Formosa, leading to heavy Japanese losses and disrupting their air power. Despite some fierce counterattacks and damage to American ships, including the cruiser Canberra, the American forces achieved air supremacy. The successful air campaign set the stage for the invasion of Leyte, marking a pivotal shift in the Pacific War. This episode is the Return to the Philippines Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. We last left off the week before the grand return to the Philippines, Admiral Halsey had dispatched his carrier forces to neutralize enemy bases in Formosa in preparation for General MacArthur's Leyte invasion. However, Admiral Toyoda's response was unexpectedly strong, resulting in two cruisers being torpedoed, which forced Admiral Mitscher to order a retreat eastward under pressure from Japanese aviators. On October 15, while the cruisers Houston and Canberra were being towed under the protection of Admiral McCain's carriers, Halsey directed Admirals Bogan and Sherman's task groups to withdraw eastward out of sight. At the same time, Admiral Davison's forces carried out intermittent air raids on northern Luzon to keep enemy aircraft at bay. More significantly, Halsey decided to turn the situation into an opportunity. He instructed McCain's units to send out open messages, pleading for assistance. This tactic, which Halsey called the "Lure of the Streamlined Bait," was designed to mislead the Japanese into believing that this task group was all that remained of the fleet, enticing them to move in for the kill. Halsey's other task groups, which had withdrawn eastward, would then return to engage and destroy the enemy. On October 14, Japanese aviators claimed two carriers, one battleship and one heavy cruiser sunk, and one small carrier, one battleship and one light cruiser set afire. The exaggerated claims of the Japanese air force were accepted jubilantly on the home islands. The people felt that the American Navy had indeed been given a death blow, and the Finance Ministry distributed "celebration sake" to all households in the country to commemorate the event. The Tokyo radio made the unfounded claim that "a total of 57 enemy warships including 19 aircraft carriers and four battleships were sunk or heavily damaged by the Japanese forces… the enemy task forces lost the majority of their strength and were put to rout." It also predicted that the Allied losses would delay the invasion of the Philippine Islands by two months. Admiral Halsey's reaction was to report that "all 3rd Fleet Ships reported by radio Tokyo as sunk have now been salvaged and are retiring towards the enemy." The exaggerated claims of success made by Japanese pilots further convinced Toyoda to continue the assault, despite heavy aircraft losses. Meanwhile, Admiral Shima's strike force was already rushing south from the Inland Sea to support the air forces. However, Shima's force was not the only one speeding towards the battlefront. On October 13, Admiral Barbey's convoy, consisting of over 470 ships and carrying the 24th Division and the 6th Army Service Command, finally departed Hollandia, heading toward the designated "Far Shore," Leyte. The next day, the convoy crossed the equator without ceremony. By October 15, Task Force 78, which included the 1st Cavalry Division, joined the massive convoy. With General Sibert's full 10th Corps now en route to Leyte, the plan was to rendezvous with Admiral Wilkinson's Task Force 79. Over the course of about two weeks, General Hodge's 24th Corps had been transported from Hawaii to Eniwetok and then to Manus Island. On October 11, the LSTs carrying the assault battalions departed Manus, followed by Wilkinson's convoy of 267 ships, which left the Admiralties three days later. Their progress was steady, and by October 17, Wilkinson's tractor groups began joining the 7th Fleet. This combined fleet formed the largest convoy ever seen in the Pacific up to that point. Meanwhile, during the Formosa Air Battle, Japanese aviators launched multiple strikes against Task Groups 38.1 and 38.4 from dawn to dusk on October 15. Fortunately, the American carriers' reinforced combat air patrols effectively minimized damage, with only one glancing bomb hit on the Franklin. In retaliation, Admiral Mitscher's pilots claimed to have shot down more than 100 Japanese planes. Additionally, Admiral Davison's carriers attacked enemy air concentrations in Luzon, though they faced heavy resistance from Vice-Admiral Teraoka Kinpei's reorganized 1st Air Fleet. These engagements continued over the next two days, with American forces estimated to have destroyed 99 enemy aircraft on the ground and 95 in the air by October 19. On the morning of October 16, Mitscher's carriers conducted long-range searches to determine if the enemy had fallen for Halsey's trap. Meanwhile, Japanese morning reconnaissance flights over the western Philippine Sea spotted three enemy task groups with a combined total of 13 carriers in the vicinity, forcing Toyoda to reluctantly cancel Shima's planned attack. As a result, no surface engagement materialized from Halsey's "Lure of the Streamlined Bait." However, 247 naval aircraft were promptly dispatched from Okinawa, Formosa, and Luzon to locate the enemy groups. McCain continued to fend off persistent Japanese air assaults, which managed to land another torpedo hit on the Houston. Hellcats from light carriers Cabot and Cowpens did great execution against a Japanese formation of over 100 aircraft. However, three Jills penetrated the screen. One twin engine plane fought through the CAP and ships' anti-aircraft batteries, surviving just long enough to put a torpedo in the water before the plane itself crashed into the sea. The torpedo struck the after portion of the starboard side of the Houston, blowing 20 men overboard and spreading gasoline fires in the waters around the cruiser. The explosion set fire to the starboard tank that held fuel for the ship's reconnaissance floatplanes, causing a major fire in the aircraft hangar, though the remaining crew suppressed the blaze within fifteen minutes. Flooding from this hit degraded the ship's buoyancy and stability further. Another 300 men were evacuated afterward, leaving just 200 aboard to continue damage control efforts as the ships withdrew. Despite the cruiser suffering significant damage, the towing operation carried on, slowly guiding the task group towards Naval Base Ulithi, which they eventually reached on October 27. On October 17, the Japanese were still in pursuit of the retreating fleet, but contact was lost, and further attacks were aborted. Nevertheless, the Formosa Air Battle had one final chapter. After the successful strike on Okayama on October 14, General LeMay deemed the damage extensive enough that it wasn't necessary to send all available B-29s for mop-up operations. On October 16, only the 444th and 462nd Bombardment Groups were dispatched to hit Okayama, while the 468th targeted Heito, an airbase and staging field east of Takao. Of 49 planes airborne against Okayama, only 28 bombed there, but they were aided by five stragglers from the 468th Group. To even things up, a formation of 11 planes from the 444th flew calmly by its Okayama target and struck at Heito through an error by the lead bombardier. Other B-29s bombed alternate or chance targets at Takao, Toshien, Swatow, and Sintien harbors; at Hengyang; and at several airdromes, including Taichu on Formosa. This dual mission was less smooth than the October 14 raid, but no losses were reported. The next day, 23 B-29s from the 40th Bombardment Group attacked the Einansho Air Depot near Tainan to complete the Formosa campaign. Heavy cloud cover prevented 13 of the bombers from reaching the target, so they diverted to bomb Takao harbor instead. Despite these challenges, LeMay's bombers inflicted significant damage overall. By the end of the Formosa Air Battle, the Japanese had launched a total of 761 offensive sorties. Toyoda's pilots reported that nearly the entire 3rd Fleet had been sunk and the American carrier force was in ruins. For comedic effect why not go through the real list shall we: Japanese claims were finally listed as follows: Sunk: 11 carriers, 2 battleships, 3 cruisers, 1 destroyer (or light cruiser). Damaged: 8 carriers, 2 battleships, 4 cruisers, 1 destroyer (or light cruiser), 13 unidentified ships. In addition, at least 12 other ships set afire. These exaggerated claims were heavily promoted by newspapers, although figures like Toyoda within the IJN remained skeptical. In reality, the Japanese air forces were decisively beaten at Formosa, losing around 171 planes in the initial defense and another 321 during attacks on Mitscher's fleet—a total of approximately 492 aircraft. The Second Air Fleet, comprising the main strength of the Navy's base air forces, had lost 50 per cent of its strength and was reduced to 230 operational aircraft. The First Air Fleet and Fourth Air Army in the Philippines were left with a combined operational strength of only a little over 100 aircraft. Of 143 carrier planes used to reinforce the Second Air Fleet, about one-third, with their flight crews, had been lost. Allied estimates, however, place Japanese losses as high as 655. In addition to these aircraft losses, Japan suffered significant casualties among air personnel, which severely weakened Admiral Ozawa's 3rd and 4th Carrier Divisions and left General Yamashita with limited air support for the defense of the Philippines. On the other hand, Halsey's forces lost only 89 aircraft, with two cruisers suffering serious damage. The radar-guided Hellcats easily repelled the fragmented Japanese attacks, causing no delays to the American operations and inflicting no serious damage on Task Force 38. This defeat significantly diminished Japan's ability to defend the Philippines, as their surface forces were now left without effective air cover. In the aftermath of the battle, the aggressive Vice-Admiral Onishi Takishiro assumed command of the 1st Air Fleet and initiated the creation of a suicide corps, recruiting volunteers to dive-bomb enemy vessels. Thus, the Kamikaze Special Attack Corps was born. Captain Motoharu Okamura, in charge of Tateyama base and the 341st Air Group Home is theorized to be the first officer to propose the use of kamikaze attack tactics. Commander Asaichi Tamai asked a group of 23 student pilots whom he had trained to volunteer for the first special kamikaze attack force, all of them did so willingly. The names of the four subunits within the Kamikaze Special Attack Force were Unit Shikishima, Unit Yamato, Unit Asahi and Unit Yamazakura. LeMay reported the destruction of 65 buildings and damage to 9 out of the 80 at Okayama's assembly plant, along with the destruction of 7 hangars and 16 buildings and damage to 9 others at the airbase. As a result, LeMay's intelligence team estimated it would take between four and six months to fully restore the Okayama plant to full operational capacity. His final strike of the month occurred on October 25, targeting the Omura Aircraft Factory, with 78 B-29 bombers successfully taking off. Over Omura, 59 planes dropped 156 tons of bombs, while 11 hit various other targets. Despite moderate resistance, one bomber was lost during the attack. Strike photos and subsequent reconnaissance showed significant damage, especially in the aluminum fabrication area. Over the following three months, Omura would become a primary target for Operation Matterhorn, though the 20th Bomber Command also conducted additional strikes to support Allied operations in Southeast Asia, China, and the Philippines. Meanwhile, minesweepers and other vessels had cleared the way for amphibious flotillas. In the early dawn of October 17 the minesweepers began their work on the channel approaches to Suluan Island. By 06:30 they had accomplished their task and then began to sweep the waters of the landing areas in Leyte Gulf until the storm forced them to suspend operations. At 12:59 they resumed sweeping with great difficulty. Until A Day, intensive area and tactical mine sweeping continued. The sweepers started at dawn each day and worked continuously until nightfall. By October 19 it was known that the Japanese had heavily mined the approaches to Leyte Gulf but that there were no mines within the gulf itself. However the northern part of the main channel into the gulf was not considered safe. By the same date sweeping had been completed in the southern half, 186 mines having been destroyed. At about 01:35 on October 19, the destroyer supporting the mine-sweeping units which were in the gulf struck a floating mine and while maneuvering away from the area struck another. The ship was disabled and retired from action. By A Day, a total of 227 mines had been destroyed and a passage approximately six miles wide had been cleared just north of Dinagat Island. All ships were therefore directed to enter Leyte Gulf through that portion of the strait. As the minesweepers came close to the land, boats containing Filipinos moved out to welcome the advance party of liberators. The reception they met was not enthusiastic. Admiral Oldendorf "suspected that some might have come seeking information so detained them aboard their respective ships… Directed no further patriots be taken aboard ship."With Halsey's forces still in the Formosa-Ryukyus region, these ships were under the air cover of General Whitehead's 5th Air Force and Admiral Kinkaid's escort carriers. While minesweepers and demolition teams worked to clear mines, remove transport barriers, and perform beach reconnaissance, Company D of the 6th Ranger Battalion prepared to land on Suluan Island on October 17. Supported by fire from the USS Denver and in heavy rain, the Rangers successfully landed on the beach at 08:05 without opposition. The men immediately filed south 500 yards on a trail along the coast and then headed east toward the lighthouse. On the way, four buildings, one of which contained a Japanese radio, were found and set ablaze. The company then continued along the trail. Suddenly the enemy fired from a concealed position, killing one man and wounding another. When Company D went into attack formation, the enemy force disappeared into the heavy jungle bordering the trail. The march was resumed and the company reached its objective without further incident. The lighthouse, which had been damaged by naval bombardment, and adjoining buildings were deserted. Unfortunately, a Japanese radio station successfully reported the enemy convoy's approach and the start of the Rangers' landings, revealing that Leyte was the Americans' ultimate target. In response, Toyoda swiftly initiated Operation Sho-Go, ordering Vice-Admiral Kurita Takeo's 1st Striking Force to move from Lingga anchorage to Brunei Bay, preparing to strike the enemy invasion fleet. Just after midnight on October 18, Kurita's ships departed Lingga anchorage and began their trek to Leyte. Sentai (Division) 16—heavy cruiser Aoba, light cruiser Kinu, and destroyer Uranami—was ordered to detach from Kurita's command and head to Manila. These ships were all among the oldest in Kurita's fleet, but it was a mistake to detach them for a secondary transport mission when they would have been better used to augment the decisive attack planned for Kurita's force. Simultaneously, Shima's 2nd Striking Force, reinforced by Kurita's detached 16th Cruiser Division, was tasked with supporting counterlandings. The Second Striking Force, for this newly-assigned mission, was to be composed only of the Fifth Fleet (two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, seven destroyers) plus the 16th Cruiser Division (one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser, one destroyer) detached from the First Striking Force. Under this plan, the 16th Cruiser Division was ordered to proceed to Manila, while the Second Striking Force main body, then at Amami Oshima in the Ryukyus, was ordered to go first to Mako, refuel, and then proceed to the Philippines. By noon, another order was issued to Ozawa's Main Body, despite its depleted air power, to coordinate a sortie from home waters in support of the attack planned for the morning of October 25 in Leyte Gulf. The mission of the Ozawa force was of vital importance to the success of the over-all plan. It was to act as a decoy to draw off the main strength of the enemy naval forces covering the invasion operations in Leyte Gulf, thus allowing the 1st Striking Force to penetrate to the landing point and smash the enemy's troop and supply ships. To heighten its effectiveness as a lure, the Ozawa Force sortied with all of the 3rd Carrier Division, made up of the regular carrier Zuikaku and the light carriers Zuiho, Chitose, and Chiyoda. The total number of aircraft available to put aboard these ships, however, was only 108. These belonged to the poorly trained air groups of the 1st Carrier Division and represented about half the normal complement. In addition to the half-empty carriers, the force comprised two battleships, three light cruisers and eight destroyers. Ozawa fully anticipated that his fleet would be completely wiped out, but this sacrifice was deemed essential to achieve the primary objective: destruction of the entire enemy invasion force. As a result of the transfer of the flying groups of the 3d and 4th Carrier Divisions to Second Air Fleet for the Formosa air battle, the Task Force Main Body had lost much of its planned striking power. The mission assigned to it was therefore less offensive than that assigned in the original Sho-Go battle plan. The original plan had called for a diversionary attack by the Ozawa Force against the enemy's main carrier task forces. Under the more general terms of the 18 October plan, however, Vice Adm. Ozawa was left discretion to choose an attack target more commensurate with the strength of his force. Meanwhile, Davison's carrier aircraft launched attacks on air bases around Manila and Legaspi, but neither the 1st Air Fleet nor the 4th Air Army could respond due to adverse weather. As these strikes were carried out in difficult conditions, General Terauchi concluded by nightfall that a significant enemy operation was underway. He then activated the Army component of Sho-Go, instructing Lieutenant-General Tominaga Kyoji to target enemy ships near Leyte. Should the enemy successfully land, General Suzuki's 35th Army was ordered to delay their advance until reinforcements arrived, with the goal of launching a counterattack to defeat the Americans by October 25. Given the recent actions on Suluan and the American naval presence in the Leyte Gulf, the Army and Navy IGHQ sections surprisingly coordinated their response, with the IJA staff approving the Southern Army's request to implement Sho-Go 1. It was determined that the coming decisive battle for Japan was the Philippines. One major difference was the battle's location. Terauchi, Yamashita, and other Southern Army officers believed it would be Luzon, not Leyte. With Sho-Go 1 focused on Leyte, the Japanese would have to fight in the central Philippines, without extensive defensive works or major airfields. Yamashita would also use his limited shipping to send reinforcements to Leyte. If the Japanese lost Leyte, there might not be sufficient strength to defeat decisively any American offensive on Luzon. Deploying the few IJA units to Leyte would make a Luzon defense harder to accomplish. Sho-Go 1 could hand the control of the Philippines to the Americans. Eventually, Terauchi agreed to the IGHQ position of making Leyte the primary location to fight the Americans. Believing that Halsey's fleet had been defeated off Formosa, Terauchi now thought the Americans could not sustain any major operations or contest reinforcement convoys, both poor assumptions that would later cause suffering for the IJA. Yamashita disagreed with Terauchi and the IGHQ about designating Leyte as the prime battle site; but on October 22, Terauchi finally ordered Yamashita and the Fourth Air Army to make Leyte the main point of attack. His opinion was: “The opportunity to annihilate the enemy is at hand.” However Yamashita was convinced that the Americans had greater strength than anticipated, given the continued American carrier aviation's presence. Meanwhile, by 12:30 on October 17, the Rangers had successfully landed on Dinagat Island, finding no Japanese forces there. On the morning of the 18th, the ship's address system clanged out general quarters. The men went below, put on their gear, and checked their weapons. At 0900 the troops were told to prepare to disembark. They bolted up the ladders and spilled out over the deck to the davits. The boats were lowered and the first wave started for the beach. At the same time the guns from the destroyer and frigate which had escorted the transport concentrated fire against the shore line for twelve minutes. Three minutes later, the boats grounded on a coral reef forty yards from the beach, and the men waded the remaining distance to shore. They encountered no resistance and at 1038 the company commander, Capt. Arthur D. Simons, notified the battalion commander, "Beachhead secured, supplies ashore. No resistance. No casualties." The company set up a channel light. They quickly set up a navigation light at Desolation Point to guide the main convoy. However, bad weather and tides delayed the landing on Homonhon Island. Colonel Mucci's Company B finally made it ashore the next morning without opposition and installed another navigation light. At the same time, Tominaga attempted to retaliate but was thwarted by a violent storm. In the afternoon, Kinkaid's forces, supported by Mitscher's carriers, conducted minesweeping and direct-fire missions on the Leyte beaches to protect the underwater demolition teams. Admiral Oldendorf's warships heavily bombarded the southern beaches, paving the way for transports to enter Leyte Gulf by the following evening. These pre-landing operations, which continued through October 19 on the northern landing beaches, alerted General Makino to a potential secondary landing closer to Tacloban. This maneuver would outflank the main strength of the 16th Division and directly threaten his headquarters. In response, Makino relocated his headquarters from Tacloban to Dagami and ordered the 33rd Regiment to reinforce the Palo-San Jose coastal sector, while the 2nd Battalion strengthened the southern defenses. Despite these last-minute efforts, Makino's forces were unprepared for the overwhelming assault. The heavy naval gunfire had destroyed many defensive positions and disabled most of the 22nd Field Artillery Regiment's guns. Furthermore, although the weather now favored Tominaga's counterstrikes, American carrier operations had been so effective that he was unable to challenge their air superiority. Despite the optimism of the High Command with regard to the prospects of gaining eventual air superiority in the battle area, it was already evident that the air phase of Sho-Go was not working out as intended. Those plans had envisaged mass air attacks against the invading enemy naval forces and troop convoys beginning prior to their arrival at the landing point. The enemy, however, had forestalled these plans by striking at Leyte before the planned concentration of Japanese air strength in the Philippines had been completed, and before the Navy's base air forces had time to recover from losses sustained in the Formosa Air Battle and earlier enemy carrier strikes on the Philippines. The 1st Air Fleet, already in the Philippines, had been reduced to an operational strength of less than 50 aircraft. The 2nd Air Fleet, which had lost half its strength in the Formosa Battle, had not yet begun its redeployment from Formosa to the Philippines. Although the 4th Air Army had sustained relatively lighter losses, its strength was widely dispersed. Before it could operate effectively in the Leyte area, it had to concentrate at forward bases in the central Philippines, an operation rendered both difficult and dangerous by enemy action, bad weather, and the virtually useless condition of many of the forward fields due to continuous rains. Under such unfavorable conditions, the concentration required a minimum of several days, and in the meanwhile the enemy was able to operate in Leyte Gulf against extremely light air opposition. On October 19, when weather conditions finally permitted an air attack against the enemy invasion fleet, no more than five naval and three Army aircraft could be mustered against the steadily increasing concentration of enemy shipping in Leyte Gulf. By the evening of October 19, the preliminary operations were nearly complete, with most of Kinkaid's fleet positioned outside the gulf. Since the minefield at the entrance hadn't been fully cleared, the ships entered slightly south of the entrance's center, avoiding the main channel and staying close to Dinagat's northern point. Meanwhile, Suzuki had already activated the Suzu Plan, with units from the 30th and 102nd Divisions preparing to move toward Ormoc. However, before they could depart, Oldendorf began October 20 with two simultaneous pre-landing bombardments, each involving three battleships. After two hours of battleship fire, cruisers and destroyers followed with high-explosive shells, causing significant damage. At the same time, Kinkaid's escort carriers launched bombing and strafing runs against suspected defensive positions and airfields, severely disrupting Makino's radio and telegraph communications. At 0800 the first anchor chains of the vessels had rattled out; LCVP's were quickly swung over the sides; boats circled mother ships and moved to their rendezvous areas. The LCI mortar and LCI rocket ships took their places at the head of the assault waves. It was now 0945, fifteen minutes before H Hour. The LCI's raced simultaneously to the shores of Leyte, raking the landing beaches with rocket and mortar fire. The bombardment grew heavier and more monotonous. Hundreds of small boats, flanked by rocket ships and destroyers, headed toward the beaches; thousands of rockets hit the beaches with the rumble of an earthquake. It was impossible to distinguish one explosion from another in the unbroken roar. By 09:30, the 21st Regiment successfully landed on Panaon Island without resistance, securing control of the entrance to Sogod Bay. Fifteen minutes later, the transports sped toward Leyte's shores, led by LCI gunboats, which pounded the beaches with rockets and mortar fire. At 10:00, Sibert's 10th Corps, covered by a heavy rocket barrage, landed on the White and Red Beaches, marking the Americans' return to the Philippines. Admiral Fechteler's transports delivered General Mudge's 1st Cavalry Division to White Beach, where the brigades landed side by side, with the 8th Cavalry Regiment held in floating reserve. Facing only small arms and machine gun fire, the 1st Squadron of the 7th Cavalry Regiment swiftly secured the Cataisan Peninsula and its airfield, while the 2nd Squadron captured San Jose and advanced across the Burayan River, reaching a point 3000 yards from the beach. The 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments had to navigate a deep swamp to access Highway 1, then pushed westward until they encountered enemy resistance near the foothills of Caibaan. At 10:40, Mudge's reserve began to land, followed by the division artillery at 13:30. Meanwhile, to the south, Barbey's transports landed General Irving's 24th Division on the shallow Red Beach, with the 19th and 34th Regiments landing abreast in battalion columns. The Japanese permitted the first five waves to land, but when the remaining waves were about 2000 yards offshore, they unleashed heavy artillery and mortar fire, sinking several landing craft and causing significant casualties. The first elements of the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, inadvertently landed 300 yards north of the assigned area and were immediately pinned down by heavy machine gun and rifle fire. The commanding officer of the regiment, Col. Aubrey S. Newman, arrived on the beach and, noting the situation, shouted to his men, "Get the hell off the beach. Get up and get moving. Follow me." Thus urgently prompted, the men followed him into the wooded area. To the south the 19th Infantry, with the 3d Battalion in the lead, had also struck heavy opposition on its sector of the beach. Through error the first waves of the regiment landed almost directly behind the 34th Infantry and 800 yards north of the proposed landing point. The later waves landed at the planned spot. Company K did not land on schedule, because its command boat broke down. Going in under heavy fire, the company had all its officers except one killed or wounded. One of its platoons was unable to make contact with the rest of the company until the following day. Upon landing, the first waves were immediately pinned down by intense machine-gun and rifle fire. Despite this, the Americans successfully stormed the initial defenses of the 33rd Regiment. By 12:15, the 34th Regiment had cleared the beach of enemy forces, and after a preparatory concentration, its 3rd Battalion advanced approximately 400 yards. The 2nd Battalion then moved through the 3rd, crossed Highway 1 at 15:50, and established positions for the night 100 yards west of the highway. To the south, the 3rd Battalion, 19th Regiment had reached Highway 1, while the battered 1st Battalion followed behind under heavy fire. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion landed and advanced cautiously, as the 1st Battalion pressed toward Hill 522 amidst fierce resistance. Hill 522, which rose directly from the river's edge north of Palo, overlooked the landing beaches and its upward trails were steep and winding. Hill 522 presented the most significant terrain feature which would have to be overcome before the American forces could push into the interior from Palo and it constituted one of the chief objectives for A Day. Three months earlier General Makino had started to fortify it, impressing nearly all of the male population of Palo for the work. By A Day they had constructed five well-camouflaged pillboxes of rocks, planking, and logs, covered with earth. Numerous tunnels honeycombed the hill; the communications trenches were seven feet deep. They eventually encircled enemy positions and began to make steady progress up the hill. By dusk, Companies B and C had captured the hill's crests and successfully repelled several enemy counterattacks. This achievement secured Hill 522, which commanded the route into the interior and overlooked Palo, the gateway to Leyte Valley. At 14:30, General Douglas MacArthur landed on Red Beach alongside President Sergio Osmeña, who had taken over from Manuel Quezon following his death on August 1. So if you go on Youtube you can see the footage of MacArthur et al wading ashore and to this day there is a monument to this iconic moment. MacArthur made a radio broadcast to the Filipino people, declaring, “People of the Philippines: I have returned. By the grace of Almighty God our forces stand again on Philippine soil—soil consecrated in the blood of our two peoples. We have come dedicated and committed to the task of destroying every vestige of enemy control over your daily lives, and of restoring upon a foundation of indestructible strength, the liberties of your people” He had finally fulfilled his promise to the Filipino people. Further south, Hodge's 24th Corps encountered more resistance as it landed on Orange, Blue, Violet, and Yellow Beaches at 10:00. Under the transport of Rear-Admiral Forrest Royal's ships and the protection of LCI gunboats, General Bradley's 96th Division landed with its regiments positioned between the Calbasag River and the town of San Jose. The 382nd Regiment successfully disembarked on the Blue Beaches at 09:50, followed by the 383rd Regiment on the Orange Beaches ten minutes later.As they advanced inland, both units faced intermittent mortar and artillery fire from the 9th Regiment positioned on Catmon Hill. Colonel Macey Dill's 3rd Battalion initially encountered obstacles such as tank barriers made of coconut logs, debris on the beach, and heavy bombardment from Hill 120. However, with mortar and naval gunfire support, the battalion eventually captured the hill and repelled several enemy counterattacks, though they were unable to continue the advance due to deep swamps. In contrast, Dill's 2nd Battalion managed to push about 2,500 yards inland despite the intense heat and swampy conditions. To the north, Colonel Edwin May's 1st and 2nd Battalions were similarly hindered by an unexpected swamp but still succeeded in securing San Jose and the head of the Labiranan River, advancing approximately 2,600 yards inland. By 18:00, Bradley's artillery had been landed, although the 381st Regiment remained in floating reserve. Further south, Admiral Conolly's transports landed General Arnold's 7th Division between the Calbasag and Daguitan Rivers, with regiments landing side by side. Companies L and K of the 3rd Battalion, 32nd Regiment landed abreast. Company L, on the left, ran into heavy fire from Japanese machine gunners who had waited until the leading elements of the company exposed themselves. The Japanese were entrenched in bunkers emplaced in hedgerows and banana groves. The pillboxes, which were mutually supporting, were located at the ends of the hedgerows and occasionally in the middle of an open field. Each pillbox had machine guns and anti-tank guns. Company L suffered a number of casualties and was pinned down. The enemy gunners then turned to Company K and stopped its forward movement. In the space of 15 minutes, 2 officers and 6 men of the 3rd Battalion were killed, and 1 officer and 18 men wounded. Of the medium tanks that had come ashore at 10:30, 3 were sent to support Company L and 2 to support Company K. The latter 2 were knocked out before they could adjust their fire on the pillboxes. The leading tank sent in support of Company L was knocked out by a direct hit from an antitank gun. With 2 tanks remaining, it was decided to hit the flanks of the entrenched pillboxes at 13:45. A platoon of Company K went to the right and another platoon from the company to the left. Simultaneously the remaining elements of the 2 companies, coordinating with the tanks, assaulted the pillboxes. The heavy volume of fire kept the enemy guns quiet until they could be finished off with grenades. The pillboxes were knocked out without further casualties. Paralleling the route of advance of Company L were several hedge fences, behind which were enemy machine guns and mortars. Although under heavy fire, the company was able to break through the first barriers with the aid of the tanks. At 16:30, since the enemy fire continued in volume, the 32nd Regiment withdrew and established a defensive position for the night. Meanwhile, the 184th Regiment landed its 3rd Battalion at Yellow Beach 2, directly in front of Dulag, and its 1st Battalion at Yellow Beach 1, which was farther south and separated by a swamp. Both beaches saw surprisingly little resistance, allowing the 184th to advance more quickly than expected, successfully capturing Dulag and reaching its airfield.Behind them, the reserve 2nd Battalion and the 3rd Battalion of the 17th Regiment landed after midday. The 3rd Battalion pushed west and south with minimal opposition, successfully securing the bridge over the Daguitan River at Dao. By the end of the day, both corps had fallen short of their beachhead objectives, with Hodge's 24th Corps achieving particularly modest results. Despite this, the Sixth Army had successfully landed assault forces along the entire eastern coast of Leyte and gained control of Panaon Strait, with casualties totaling 49 killed, 192 wounded, and 6 missing. Most of the 16th Division had retreated during the naval and air bombardment before the landing, which allowed the Americans to secure most coastal defenses before the enemy could regroup. Consequently, the only Japanese forces encountered were those left behind to delay the invasion. A more substantial enemy engagement was yet to come. Air opposition to the invasion was minimal, as Tominaga and the naval air forces continued to concentrate their strength in the Philippines in preparation for a major air offensive scheduled to begin on October 25. However, 37 Army and Navy planes attacked the invasion shipping off Leyte. At 1600, on 20 October an enemy torpedo plane was sighted as it aimed its torpedo at Honolulu. Despite the skillful maneuvering of Captain Thurber to evade, the torpedo found its mark on her port side. 64 men were killed and 35 were injured. Flooding caused a temporary severe list, but the ship was saved by efficient damage measures. But Honolulu was out of the fight. Honolulu sailed out the next day, arriving at Manus on 29 October for temporary repairs, and then steamed for Norfolk, Virginia, on 19 November, arriving on 20 December via Pearl Harbor, San Diego, California, and the Panama Canal. Unfortunately, not all went well with logistics. Although 107,450 tons of supplies had been landed on Leyte by the end of A-Day, it was a haphazard operation. The Navy was responsible for transporting the troops and supplies to the target area. Ships' companies unloaded the cargo from the cargo vessels and transported it in small craft to the beaches. Many of the ships had been improperly loaded for the journey to Leyte. The cargo should have been so loaded that articles first needed would be the last put on board; instead it had been stowed haphazardly, with little attention given to the problem of unloading. As a result of the faulty stowage of supplies on the ships, many badly needed items were at the bottoms of the holds, and articles that would not be needed until later in the operation were piled on top of them. The supplies were set ashore in random fashion and then were carelessly thrown on trucks and other vehicles. This sort of handling resulted in a loss of carrying capacity, in slow removal of the loads, and in a consequent delay in the return of vehicles to the landing beaches. Thus, officers complained about the disorganized effort to deliver, store, and distribute supplies. This was a precursor of future resupply problems. As the landings proceeded about as smoothly as could be hoped, Halsey would order Task Groups 38.1 and 38.4 to head to Ulithi on October 22, as he doubted that the Japanese would mount a major operation in response to the American invasion. And yet, the Japanese were about to come calling for another decisive battle. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. General Douglas MacArthur had finally done it, he had returned to the Philippines making good on his promise to the Filipino people. It was a colossal effort and thus far it was going very well all things considered. However little did the Americans know, but the IJN was about to toss the kitchen sink at them, literally, in an all or nothing battle to the death.
Last time we spoke about the conquest of Angaur and the Japanese Triumph in China. By October 18th, the remaining Japanese on Angaur were compressed into a small area, and by the 21st, resistance had ceased. The Americans suffered 264 killed and 1,355 wounded, while approximately 1,300 Japanese were killed. Over in China, Hara's forces suffered heavy losses during a delaying action at Momauk, with troops joining Bhamo's defense by November 16. The 113th Regiment maneuvered to encircle Bhamo from the south, while the 114th Regiment approached from the north, creating a loose encirclement. The 22nd Division's movement prompted concerns of severing key rail lines, leading Japanese forces to reposition defensively. Despite intense fighting, including a strong Chinese offensive on November 19, the Japanese withdrew from key positions, allowing Chinese forces to capture Mangshi and secure a strategic airfield for resupply, significantly impacting the campaign's dynamics. This episode is the Formosa Air Battle Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. As we last saw on Peleliu, General Rupertus' 1st Marine Division, bolstered by Colonel Dark's 321st Regiment, successfully secured the island after approximately two weeks of intense fighting. However, Colonel Nakagawa's isolated and outnumbered garrison continued to resist in the Umurbrogol Pocket. As left by nature, the Umurbrogol Pocket was much like the Ibdi Pocket on Biak Island, but larger and rougher. Like Ibdi, the Umurbrogol originally had a thick cover of tropical trees and dense jungle undergrowth which, as the result of continued air, naval, and artillery bombardment (including extensive employment of aerial napalm strikes), was gradually knocked down or burned away. Again, as on Biak, the Japanese had improved upon nature. There were many artificial or semi-artificial caves which had been constructed to protect approaches to the inner sections of the pocket, and the Japanese had improved almost every natural cave. Where no caves were available or could be constructed, the defenders employed rock faults and crevices for defensive positions. Digging new entrances to existing caves or even cutting new levels within some caves, the Japanese were well prepared to execute a long and bloody holding action along the many ridges. These ridges, with the exception of the Five Sisters group at the southern side of the pocket, were generally parallel and oriented north-northeast to south-southwest. Steep-sided and fissured, many of them had razor-back summits upon which no cover could be found. The ridges were separated by deep draws, gullies, and wider valleys, the floors of which were strewn with coral boulders or coral outcroppings similar to stalagmites. Steep as they were, the sides of some ridges also were covered with such chunks and outcroppings. In late September, the exhausted infantrymen, who were tasked with containing the pocket while the Marines cleared northern Peleliu, made several heavy assaults. They only managed to reach the X-ray phase line, marking what was believed to be the northern edge of the core Japanese defenses, before being relieved by the 7th Marines. With Colonel Hanneken's 1st and 3rd Battalions now holding the X-ray line, Rupertus planned a strong attack southward while other Marine units maintained their positions on the western and southern sides of the pocket. On the morning of September 30, the attack was launched. However, fierce Japanese resistance, heavy rain, fog, and sickness hindered the 7th Marines' progress southward by October 2. On the following day, Hanneken's 2nd Battalion, supported by tanks, secured a foothold along the eastern side and top of Walt Ridge, while the 3rd Battalion finally captured the eastern slope of Boyd Ridge. By October 4, however, the 7th Marines had suffered such heavy losses and were so depleted that Rupertus was left with no choice but to relieve them as well. As a result, Colonel Harris's 5th Marines were once again thrust into action. On October 7, following an hour-long artillery and mortar barrage, the 3rd Battalion, along with six tanks, advanced into Mortimer Valley. However, Nakagawa's determined defenders continued to resist fiercely, successfully repelling two powerful tank-infantry assaults, causing heavy American casualties. Our old friend Eugene Sledge with K Company, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, wrote about fighting in this area, it is as follows “Johnny led us on up through a jumble of rocks on Hill 140. Company K's line was emplaced along a rock rim, and we set up the mortars in a shallow depression about twenty yards behind it. The riflemen and machine gunners in front of us were in among rocks along the rim of Hill 140 facing east toward Walt Ridge and the northern end of the infamous Horseshoe. We had previously attacked that valley from its southern end. From the rim of Hill 140 the rock contours dropped away in a sheer cliff to a canyon below. No one could raise his head above the rim rock without immediately drawing heavy rifle and machine-gun fire. The fighting around the pocket was as deadly as ever, but of a different type from the early days of the campaign. The Japanese fired few artillery or mortar barrages, just a few rounds at a time when assured of inflicting maximum casualties. That they usually did, and then secured the guns to escape detection. Sometimes there was an eerie quiet. We knew they were everywhere in the caves and pillboxes. But there was no firing in our area, only the sound of firing elsewhere. The silence added an element of unreality to the valleys. If we moved past a certain point, the Japanese opened up suddenly with rifle, machine-gun, mortar, and artillery fire. It was like a sudden storm breaking. More often than not we had to pull back, and not a man in the company had seen a live enemy anywhere. They couldn't hope to drive us off by then or to be reinforced themselves. From that point onward, they killed solely for the sake of killing, without hope and without higher purpose. We were fighting in Peleliu's ridges and valleys, in terrain the likes of which most Americans could not even visualize, against an enemy unlike anything most Americans could imagine”. In response to this setback, Rupertus halted further offensive operations and ordered his forces to maintain pressure on the Japanese stronghold through sustained artillery fire and aerial bombardments. Over the next two days, this relentless bombardment cleared so much foliage and undergrowth that visibility across the ridges improved significantly. This allowed the attacks to resume on October 9, and although no ground was gained initially, Harris's 2nd Battalion succeeded in securing Wattie, Baldy, and 120 Ridges on October 10. They then pushed south to capture the tactically vital Hill 140. From this position, a Marine howitzer provided critical support to the 5th and 7th Marines as they cleared an area approximately 700 yards long and up to 200 yards east beyond the previous containment lines along West Road. However, on October 14, Dark's 321st Regiment began moving up to relieve the Marines, as General Geiger had decided to end Marine participation in the Battle of Peleliu. Just before they were relieved, Eugene Sledge wrote a passage about moving through positions in October, finding numerous dead, stinking in the hot sun. One corpse he found made a significant impact on him, here is the passage. “As we moved past the defilade, my buddy groaned, “Jesus!” I took a quick glance into the depression and recoiled in revulsion and pity at what I saw. The bodies were badly decomposed and nearly blackened by exposure. This was to be expected of the dead in the tropics, but these Marines had been mutilated hideously by the enemy. One man had been decapitated. His head lay on his chest; his hands had been severed from his wrists and also lay on his chest near his chin. In disbelief I stared at the face as I realized that the Japanese had cut off the dead Marine's penis and stuffed it into his mouth. The corpse next to him had been treated similarly. The third had been butchered, chopped up like a carcass torn by some predatory animal. My emotions solidified into rage and a hatred for the Japanese beyond anything I ever had experienced. From that moment on I never felt the least pity or compassion for them no matter what the circumstances. My comrades would field-strip their packs and pockets for souvenirs and take gold teeth, but I never saw a Marine commit the kind of barbaric mutilation the Japanese committed if they had access to our dead. When we got back to the gun pit, my buddy said, “Sledgehammer, did you see what the Nips did to them bodies? Did you see what them poor guys had in their mouths?” I nodded as he continued, “Christ, I hate them slant-eyed bastards!” “Me too. They're mean as hell,” was all I could say.” About mid-October, a number of command changes occurred in the Palaus area. On the 12th, for instance, the 1st Marine Division was relieved of all responsibilities other than continuing the fight in the Umurbrogol Pocket. The 321st Infantry took over the defenses along the eastern arm, while the Island Garrison Force assumed responsibility for the area south of the pocket. On the morning of October 12, the command post of the 3rd Amphibious Corps moved ashore and General Geiger, the corps commander, declared that the assault and occupation phase of operations on Peleliu was ended. The exact meaning of this announcement is not clear, especially in relation to Admiral Fort's somewhat similar declaration of September 30, stating that Angaur, Peleliu, Ngesebus, and Kongauru had been captured and occupied. However, General Geiger's announcement seems to have been made in preparation for the 1st Marine Division's imminent departure from the Palaus. The statement also bears relation to the passing of control of operations in the Palaus from the 3rd Fleet and Admiral Halsey (as then represented by Admiral Fort's Western Attack Force headquarters) to the Headquarters, Forward Area Central Pacific (Task Force 57), under Admiral Hoover. On the 13th General Geiger issued orders alerting the 321st Regimental Combat Team to relieve the 1st Marine Division elements still at the Umurbrogol Pocket. The next day, control over all operations in the Palaus passed from Admiral Fort to Admiral Hoover's command. With the relief of the Marines at the Umurbrogol, the remainder of the battered 1st Marine Division then began preparations for leaving the Palaus. At the same time, the 1st Battalion, 323rd Regiment, fresh from operations at Ulithi Atoll, started preparations to relieve Marine units in the southwest corner of the pocket, with the rest of the regiment to follow. Consequently, the Marines prepared to depart from the Palaus, with Dark taking over responsibility for the reduction of Umurbrogol. Since September 29, the Marines had endured an additional 1,000 casualties, bringing their total to 1,252 killed and 5,274 wounded. In return, they estimated having killed between 850 and 1,000 Japanese soldiers, leaving roughly 1,000 defenders in the shrinking pocket as the 321st moved back in. After a failed local attempt to capture the northernmost peak of the Five Brothers Ridge on October 16, Dark launched a general attack the next day, which resulted in a modest gain of about 125 yards and the neutralization of some caves to the east. On the morning of October 18, the attack resumed, with Dark's 2nd Battalion successfully capturing three peaks of the Five Brothers, thanks to support from mortars, tanks, and LVT-mounted flamethrowers. However, undeterred by this overwhelming firepower, the Japanese immediately counterattacked and reclaimed the three peaks by nightfall. On the southwest side of the pocket, Nakagawa had also sent infiltrators through tunnels and connecting caves to raid the enemy lines, forcing Geiger to redirect elements of the 7th Marines and 323rd Regiment to address this new southern pocket. After much effort, most of the infiltrators were finally pushed north on October 23, though mopping up in the Southern Pocket wasn't completed until November 3. Meanwhile, on October 19, following a deadly napalm strike, Dark's 1st Battalion advanced up to 50 yards along the ridges west of Hill 140 with the help of howitzers and much-needed sandbags. The battalion's men, lying prone on the ground, inched their sandbags forward with rifle butts or sticks, laboriously expanding their hold and almost realizing the infantrymen's dream of portable foxholes. The next day, General Mueller formally assumed command of the Peleliu campaign. Following some reconnaissance and a napalm strike, the 321st resumed its assault on October 21, making significant progress by advancing over 100 yards and capturing the northernmost peak of the Five Brothers. On the subsequent day, Dark launched a coordinated attack with his 2nd Battalion securing the first three Brothers, the reinforced 1st Battalion struggling to breach Death Valley, and the 3rd Battalion sweeping through Mortimer Valley with tank support. After this achievement, while Colonel Watson was bringing the remaining 323rd Regiment to the Umurbrogol area, the only major progress was the capture of the fourth Brother on October 23. Two days later, the 323rd began relieving the weary 321st Regiment. By this time, Dark had lost 146 men killed and 469 wounded on Peleliu. As Watson took over, Nakagawa's forces had been reduced to about 700 effective troops, including those lightly wounded. The pocket's dimensions had also been compressed to an average north-south length of about 600 yards. Fortunately for the defenders, heavy rains, fog, and poor visibility significantly hampered Watson's operations in the Umurbrogol Pocket from October 26 to November 1. This period was used mainly for mortar barrages, napalm strikes, defense enhancements, and extending sandbag fortifications. Despite this pause, Nakagawa launched near-nightly counterattacks over the six days, primarily targeting the Five Brothers, which mostly resulted in further casualties for the defenders. To understand the eventual reduction of the Umurbrogol Pocket, we will need to shift our focus to the plans and preparations for General MacArthur's grand return to the Philippines. Previously, General MacArthur, along with Admirals Nimitz and Halsey, decided to abandon the preliminary operations for Mindanao and Yap in favor of a direct assault on Leyte. To be much more frank General MacArthur was having a turf war with Admiral Nimitz. After the Marianas campaign, the endgame of Nimitz island hoping across the Pacific forced the Joint Chiefs of staff to make a choice, to invade the Philippines, or leave it to wither on the vine and instead invade formosa. Admiral King, the joint chiefs of staff, Admiral Leahy and General Hap Arnold all favored the Formosa option. For quite awhile Nimitz got everyone onboard with this plan as Formosa was a logical choice being only 900 kms away from Japan and its seizure would cut off southeast asia from the home islands. With Formosa the Americans could even begin an invasion of southern CHina to aid their allies there and toss plenty of B-29s at the home islands from a much closer location. But then there was the force of nature that was Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur argued Formosa would be “a massive operation, extremely costly in men and shipping, logistically precarious and time consuming.” And he was willing to take his case straight to Washington. In July of 1944 he along with Nimitz went to Honolulu to meet with FDR. MacArthur bitterly protested the meeting, as he knew full well FDR was trying to get re-elected for a fourth term “humiliation of forcing me to leave my command to fly to Honolulu for a political picture taking junket.” So not to be outdone by FDR, MacArthur showboated, by landing early with. He went to a local shop in a limousine he borrowed, and had his staff place a 4 star general insignia upon. He wore khaki trousers a brown leather air force jacket and the cap of a Filipino Field Marshall, going out into public waving at crowds gathering to see the president. When he moved into a cabin to meet with FDR he refused to change into cooler attire stating to FDR , “you haven't been up there where I came from, and it's cold up there in the sky.” MacArthur then pretended Nimitz was not in the room and dominated the strategic discussions and attempted at every possible moment to impose his will on the rather ailing and sickly president, whose physical decline had become more apparent. During a private meeting between the two MacArthur said this to FDR “Mr. President, the country has forgiven you for what took place on Bataan. You hope to be re-elected president of the United States, but the nation will never forgive you if you approve a plan which leaves 17 million Christian American subjects to wither in the Philippines under the conqueror's heel until the peace treaty frees them. You might do it for reasons of strategy or tactics, but politically, it would ruin you” Rather ironic given it was his responsibility to defend those he was now blackmailing FDR to save. But the truth of the matter was, MacArthur had stolen the American press and American peoples hearts, his grand statement to return to the Philippines was a huge issue. There of course was the other issue, MacArthur could run on the Republican ticket against FDR. Some would allege FDR was bullied into an invasion of the Philippines because of this. To twist FDR's arm, MacArthur assured him the losses in retaking Luzon would be minimal “Mr. President, my losses would not be heavy, any more than they have been in the past … your good commanders do not turn in heavy losses.” Despite it being a slight against Nimitz, MacArthur's arguments did twist his wrist. That evening FDR spoke to his doctor Ross McIntire stating this “Give me an aspirin before I go to bed. In fact, give me another aspirin to take in the morning. In all my life nobody ever talked to me the way MacArthur did.” When leaving back on his plane, MacArthur turned to his aide and boasted, “We've sold it.” and when he returned to his South West Pacific Area Command HQ in Brisbane, MacArthur informed his staff, “the President has accepted my recommendations and approved the Philippines plan.” MacArthur was a bit too optimistic, although FDR agreed to invade the Philippines he did not do so without recommendations of his joint chiefs of staff. The Navy was to bear the brunt of furnishing air support in the early stages of the campaign. By arrangement with Admiral Nimitz, the Carrier Task Force from Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet was to strike northern Luzon and Okinawa or Formosa, or both, from A Day minus 10 to A minus 7. From A minus 4 through A Day, strikes were to be made on Luzon, the Cebu-Negros area, and the Leyte area in support of the landings. As soon as the Palau air base facilities would permit, shore-based air forces from the Central Pacific were to operate in the Bicol area. The Allied Naval Forces was to furnish carrier aircraft as protection for convoys and naval task forces and, supplemented by aircraft of the 3rd Fleet and the Allied Air Forces, to provide direct air support for the landings. In addition, it was to furnish protective air support and cover by carrier aircraft prior to A Day for the preliminary landings in Leyte Gulf and for the mine sweeping. On September 24, General Kenney issued his order for the Leyte operation and assigned missions to the Allied Air Forces. He designated General Whitehead's 5th Air Force as the Air Assault Force. It was to support the operation by intensified air activities against enemy installations, destroy hostile air and surface forces in the Celebes Sea and assigned areas in the Philippine Archipelago, and provide air defense for existing bases and forces in transit to Leyte within range of its capabilities. It was also to be prepared to establish, on order, land-based air forces on Leyte. The 13th Air Force was to support the missions of the 5th Air Force, while the Royal Australian Air Force Command was to destroy Japanese installations and sources of raw materials in the Netherlands Indies. Additionally, Halsey's 3rd Fleet was to be on standby to support the Leyte operation, with the objective of "destroying enemy naval and air forces in or threatening the Philippine Area." Submarines from both the Southwest and Central Pacific Areas would provide support through offensive reconnaissance of likely Japanese routes, maintaining observation and lifeguard services, and offering weather reports and strategic patrols. On the ground, General Krueger's 6th Army would lead the Leyte assault, taking over the operation after the disbandment of Alamo Force on September 25. With this force moving to the Philippines, General Eichelberger's 8th Army was assigned garrison duties in New Guinea, New Britain, the Admiralties, and Morotai. For King II, Krueger's forces included General Sibert's 10th Corps, consisting of the 1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions, totaling 53,000 men, and General Hodge's 24th Corps, comprising the 7th and 96th Divisions, totaling 51,500 men. The corps originally designated for the canceled Yap operation was reassigned to the 6th Army, replacing the 14th Corps, which was meant to carry out the initial Leyte landings after securing Mindanao. However, the 14th Corps was still in the process of being relieved at Bougainville. To further support the operation, Krueger kept the 32nd and 77th Divisions in reserve, totaling approximately 28,500 troops. Krueger's plan involved an advance team landing Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Mucci's 6th Ranger Battalion on the islands guarding the approaches to Leyte Gulf on October 17. As the Rangers took control of these small islands, Admiral Oldendorf's Fire Support Group would initiate a comprehensive bombardment campaign in preparation for the landings. Minesweepers and underwater demolition teams would also begin clearing natural and man-made obstacles from the gulf. On October 20, Admiral Barbey's Task Force 78 was to transport and land the 10th Corps, while Admiral Wilkinson's Task Force 79 was tasked with landing the 24th Corps. The reinforced 21st Regiment was scheduled to land at 09:30 near Panaon Strait, at the southeastern tip of Leyte, to secure control of the entrance to Sogod Bay. Further north, the 10th Corps was to land two divisions abreast in the Marasbaras and Palo areas at 10:00, while the 24th Corps would simultaneously land two divisions abreast in the Dulag area, about 15 miles to the south. Major-General Verne Mudge's 1st Cavalry Division was to capture Tacloban and its airfield and secure control of San Juanico Strait, while Major-General Frederick Irving's 24th Division seized Palo and advanced northwest through the Leyte Valley. The two divisions would then converge on Carigara at the northern end of the valley. Hodge's strategy involved Major-General James Bradley's 96th Division landing between Dulag and San Roque to secure a segment of Highway 1 within its operational zone, as well as Catmon Hill and the Dagami-Tanauan area. Since Bradley's task was relatively easier, the 381st Regiment was designated as Krueger's floating reserve. At the same time, Major-General Archibald Arnold's 7th Division was tasked with coming ashore in the Dulag area. One part of this division was to move south to capture the Highway 1 bridge and the Daguitan River crossings at Dao, while the main force advanced along the Dulag-Burauen road to take Burauen and then push on to Dagami. From there, Arnold's troops were expected to be ready to seize Abuyog and Baybay, eliminating enemy forces on the west coast and in southern Leyte. With the successful completion of these objectives, Krueger aimed to break the backbone of Japanese resistance. Consequently, with Leyte Valley and its airfields and base sites secured by the 6th Army, the 10th Corps would then advance south through the Ormoc Valley towards Ormoc, while the 24th Corps would move north from Baybay along the Ormoc Bay coast to link up with Sibert. Meanwhile, General Yamashita relied on General Suzuki's 35th Army, which consisted of four divisions and two independent mixed brigades dispersed across the central and southern Philippines. Specifically, Leyte was defended by Lieutenant-General Makino Shiro's 16th Division, experienced veterans of the initial Japanese invasion of the Philippines. Aside from minor forces left on Luzon and Samar, Makino commanded the full combat strength of the 16th Division, supplemented by 4th Air Division ground units, 35th Army service units in the area, and elements of the 36th Naval Guard Unit stationed at Ormoc and Tacloban. Anticipating that enemy landings would most likely occur in the Dulag-Tarragona-Abuyog sector, Makino strategically positioned the majority of his troops in fortified coastal positions between Abuyog in the south and Palo in the north, with the densest concentration around Dulag. By October, the 16th Division had completed three lines of trenches along the shoreline, but these defenses were weak and inadequately placed. The field positions were old-type long connecting trenches prepared in three echelons. These were difficult to defend and easily discovered from the air since camouflage was lacking. The only effective positions were the cave emplacements for artillery, which had been constructed on Catmon Hill. About 60% of the defenses constructed were completed by the time of the invasion. In the event of an enemy invasion, Suzuki kept the 30th Division and three battalions of the 102nd Division as a mobile reserve, ready to be deployed to destroy the enemy wherever they landed. This strategy was known as the Suzu Plan: if the enemy landed at Davao, the mobile reserve would reinforce the 100th Division; if they landed on Leyte, the main force of the 30th Division and three battalions of the 102nd Division were to land at Ormoc to support Makino's defenders. Meanwhile, back in September, Mitscher's fast carriers had conducted several strikes against the Philippines, leading to the near destruction of Japanese air forces and shipping in the region. To prevent air reinforcements to the Philippines, Halsey ordered Admiral Sherman's carrier-based aircraft to launch strikes against enemy aircraft staging areas in the Ryukyus, particularly Okinawa, on October 10. These strikes successfully destroyed an estimated 111 planes and sank or damaged 34 ships. Simultaneously, a cruiser force under Rear Admiral Allan Smith shelled Minami Torishima. The following day, the carriers under Admirals McCain and Davison carried out a feint attack on northern Luzon, sinking two more ships off Aparri. As the attack on the Ryukyus began, Admiral Toyoda was at Shinchiku in northern Formosa, returning to Tokyo after a command inspection in the Philippines intended to boost morale. Upon learning of the strikes, Toyoda believed that the American carriers in the northern Philippine Sea were vulnerable to his powerful land-based air forces. Over 1,800 aircraft were allocated for Sho in total, but they were widely dispersed across the four operation regions. About one third of them were not battle-ready due to casualties and a lack of parts or trained pilots. When the fighting began, Vice-Admiral Fukudome Shigeru (commander of the 2nd Air Fleet based in the Kyūshū-Okinawa-Formosa district) had approximately 700 planes ready in Formosa and Kyushu. 100 or so aircraft in the Seto Inland Sea was later added to his command. Over the next four days, an additional 690 or so planes flew in from bases in Japan and China. Toyoda saw this as a prime opportunity to deal a crippling blow to the enemy fleet and disrupt the Allied invasion timeline. Consequently, he decided to risk all available naval air power in a determined effort to destroy Mitscher's carrier forces, taking personal command of the battle operations in Formosa on October 10. As anticipated, Halsey planned to launch strong carrier-based strikes against Formosa on October 12 and 13. Mitscher's four task groups were assigned targets in southern, northern, and central Formosa, as well as the Takao area. Additionally, General LeMay's first two B-29 strikes of October were scheduled to support the attack, targeting the Okayama aircraft repair and assembly facility in Takao with 170 sorties. Originally set for October 11 and 14, these strikes were postponed to October 14 and 16 due to unfavorable weather forecasts. After a rapid overnight approach on October 11, Mitscher's carriers reached their positions off Formosa the next morning. All four task groups completed launch of predawn fighter sweeps by around 06:00 hours. Because the Japanese were on alert, Grumman F6F Hellcat fighters from all four groups were intercepted by enemy aircraft and moderate to intense anti-aircraft fire was universally reported. Air-to-air engagements were fiercest over northern and central Formosa, where aircraft from Rear Admiral Gerald F. Bogan's TG 38.2 and Rear Admiral Frederick C. Sherman's TG 38.3 operated. Sherman's USS Lexington and USS Essex claimed almost 50 enemy aircraft shot down between them. Bogan's task group contained three Essex-class carriers – USS Intrepid, USS Bunker Hill and USS Hancock. Intrepid and Bunker Hill claimed over 50 Japanese aircraft destroyed, making the combined claims for the two groups around 100. Many of Japan's more experienced pilots were killed during the first wave of American air raid. American carrier air groups had suffered minimal personnel losses with nine U.S. aircraft shot down with three pilots subsequently recovered by nearby ships or submarines. These lopsided results were in part due to a lack of experience among Japanese pilots. IJAAS fighters stationed to the north of the Philippines were still in training. The bulk of enemy fighter aircraft reported by U.S. aviators were Japanese Army types, primarily the Nakajima Ki-44 (Allied reporting name "Tojo"), Kawasaki Ki-61 ("Tony") and Nakajima Ki-43 ("Oscar") models. Even though there were some experienced Japanese naval aviators operating at this time, IJNAS Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighter units reconstituted after the Battle of the Philippine Sea were still learning to work together and did not execute the kind of section or division flying that yielded tactical advantage. By the third strike, the Hellcats had established air dominance over Formosa, with Admirals Bogan and Sherman each claiming over 50 Japanese aircraft destroyed at the cost of nine American planes shot down. This enabled the Americans to carry out four strikes during the day preceded by a fighter sweep. The Hellcats quickly gained air control over Formosa against the 230 Japanese fighters on the island. By the third strike of the day, the Americans faced no air opposition. A total of 1400 sorties were carried out on this day, sinking or damaging 24 vessels off the Pescadores and Takao. This led Toyoda to order the activation of the air component of Operation Sho-Go at 10:30 on October 12. Although over 1,900 dispersed aircraft were assigned to Sho-Go, most did not arrive in the forward area for several days. Consequently, Vice-Admiral Fukudome Shigeru's 2nd Air Fleet began preparing up to 800 planes in southern Kyushu for an attack, supported by Admiral Ozawa's newly-reconstituted flying groups from the 3rd and 4th Carrier Divisions. Though the day's remaining carrier strikes by Hellcat fighters, Curtiss SB2C Helldiver dive bombers, and Grumman TBF Avenger torpedo bombers did significant damage to military installations on Formosa, they failed to completely neutralize Japanese air power based on the island. Lead aircraft on 14 October had made photos revealing Navy damage which included four buildings destroyed and nine damaged out of eighty at the assembly plant, and five hangars destroyed at the air base. Many surviving structures would be destroyed by B-29 raids during the later days of the battle, however. The only Japanese attack that day involved about 45 torpedo bombers, which mistakenly reported two carriers as damaged. Meanwhile, the T Attack Force, a special unit for operations in adverse weather, conducted a strike within a sudden typhoon from 19:00 to 20:20 before landing on Formosan bases. Their efforts were largely ineffective as American ships used smoke screens and evasive maneuvers to avoid damage. Eight Japanese aircraft were shot down by ships' guns during the night, and three Mitsubishi G4M "Betty" bombers were claimed by night fighters from the USS Independence. USS Pritchett suffered damage from friendly fire, but no damage from enemy aircraft was incurred. On October 13, Mitscher's forces resumed strikes against Formosa and the Pescadores with up to 600 aircraft, encountering less opposition but achieving only minor damage due to poor weather. Despite this, Halsey reported the destruction of 520 Japanese aircraft, the sinking of 37 ships, and 74 probable sinkings over the two days. At dusk, the carriers came under attack from 32 planes of the T Attack Force. Despite Belleau Wood's combat air patrol shooting down 16 enemy aircraft, six G4M bombers managed to evade the interceptors and launched a series of determined attacks on Davison's carriers, releasing four torpedoes before all six were eventually downed by shipboard anti-aircraft guns. Fortunately, the torpedoes missed their targets. One torpedo ran just ahead of the USS Franklin, and another ran too deep and passed beneath the carrier. One of the Bettys attempted to crash into Franklin on its way down but glanced off the flight deck and slid over the starboard edge of the ship into the water. However, McCain's carriers faced more challenges as eight B6N2 bombers, evading radar by flying low, attacked the group. While six of the bombers were shot down by anti-aircraft fire, one successfully torpedoed the cruiser Canberra, killing 23 crew members and causing severe damage. The torpedo struck the cruiser in a vulnerable spot—under the main armor belt between both firerooms. The ship lost all power, laying just 90NM off Formosa. As a result, Halsey organized a unit to tow Canberra to safety, necessitating an additional day of protection for the damaged cruiser. On October 14, Mitscher launched early morning fighter sweeps to suppress enemy air power over Luzon and Formosa, while the newly-formed unit escorted Canberra. Japanese reports claimed two carriers were sunk and one was burning, leading Toyoda to believe the enemy retreating east had been severely damaged. Consequently, Fukudome ordered his full strength of 450 planes to launch from southern Kyushu, and Vice-Admiral Shima Kiyoshide's 2nd Striking Force was deployed to sweep the waters east of Formosa. However, before the Japanese could counterattack, 130 B-29s from Chengdu attacked Formosa in the afternoon, with 104 bombers successfully dropping about 650 tons of bombs on Okayama and 13 hitting secondary targets. A dozen planes made emergency landings at friendly fields in China, one crashed near Changteh whence its crew walked out, and one was listed as missing. This was a cheap price to pay for very severe damage done to Okayama installation. At 15:25, Fukudome's initial wave of 124 planes attacked Bogan's carriers. A formation of 25 Yokosuka D4Y "Judy" dive bombers, using cloud cover to evade detection, was intercepted by the group's combat air patrol. Only a few Japanese planes made it past the American fighters. The surviving bombers were able to put two bombs in the vicinity of the Hancock, and one hit the forward port side gun tube without detonating on impact. No serious damage was inflicted by this attack. At around 17:00 a large formation of enemies showed up on radar headed towards TG 38.3. As before, a great many of these were shot down by combat air patrol. The surviving enemy planes flew down to the water level to evade further radar detection. These planes – torpedo bombers and fighters – successfully ambushed the formation just minutes later. Evasive maneuvers, squall weather, and poor fighter cover on the part of the Japanese helped TG 38.3 escape without suffering any significant damage. The only bright spot for the Japanese was another twilight attack by the T Force by 52 aircraft against TG 38.1. Four Jills broke through to attack light cruiser Houston. Three were shot down, but the last succeeded in placing a torpedo in another vulnerable spot that flooded the engineering spaces and caused all power to be lost. As a result, Halsey was left needing to tow two cruisers to safety. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. By hook or by crook, General MacArthur bullied FDR into allowing an invasion of the Philippines. To soften up the new targets, strikes were unleashed against Luzon, Formosa and Okinawa. Despite a strong Japanese defense, American air superiority was achieved through aggressive carrier strikes, leading to the destruction of numerous Japanese aircraft and ships.
Last time we spoke about the ongoing battles of Peleliu, Angular and Operation Ichi-Go. On September 23, Colonel Venable's regiment struggled to breach Lake Salome's defenses, leading to tactical changes and propaganda attempts to force Japanese surrender, which ultimately failed. The American command underestimated Japanese resolve, resulting in heavy bombardments and a strategic advance. By September 26, American forces had divided Peleliu and isolated Japanese defenders, facing fierce resistance but making significant progress. On September 27, 1944, Company F secured two ridges in Peleliu but struggled with Japanese forces entrenched in caves, halting progress. Despite controlling the northern shore, Marines faced persistent underground resistance from skilled Japanese miners. Meanwhile, the 5th Marines captured Hill 3, Ngesebus Island, and Radar Hill. In October, Japanese offensives continued against minimal resistance. This episode is the Japanese Triumph in China Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. In our previous episode, General Mueller's infantry on Angaur had driven Major Goto's isolated forces into the Romauldo Pocket by October 1. After this victory, it was decided to shift away from costly full-scale infantry assaults. Instead, tanks, mortars, and artillery were deployed to target the remaining enemy positions directly. On 6 October artillery and mortars undertook an especially heavy bombardment. From 0700 to 1030, 155-mm. howitzers fired at especially chosen targets, including a suspected Japanese observation post, while 105-mm. howitzers, 4.2-inch mortars, 81-mm. mortars, and 60-mm. mortars laid concentrations on the flanks and rear of the remaining Japanese-held area to prevent any Japanese from escaping. At 1030 the artillery and mortars switched to smoke shells to blanket the Japanese area and at 1035 these weapons ceased fire. Following the bombardment, two companies were dispatched to feint attacks on the Japanese flanks, aiming to force them out of their fortified positions. The defenders, deceived by the ruse, were then subjected to another intense artillery and mortar barrage, which inflicted significant casualties. Additionally, in the afternoon, a major concrete and steel emplacement, likely serving as Goto's command post, was uncovered and destroyed by direct fire. With the enemy defenses considerably weakened, infantry operations resumed, focusing on sniper teams, small patrols, ambushes, and booby traps to encircle the remaining Japanese forces and cut off their supply and escape routes. Over the next few days, the Americans also rescued 183 captive natives during the final stages of their assault. The Japanese had under their control in the final pocket a number of Angaur natives, three of whom had managed to make their way into the 322nd Regiment lines after a surrender broadcast on October 1. These related stories of hardships suffered in caves where the Japanese had kept them closely guarded and also told the 322nd that more natives were being held in the northwest pocket. First attempts by native volunteers to lead some of the others out were unsuccessful; but on October 8,137 more natives made their way out of the pocket to an area where elements of Company B, 306th Engineers, were working. The next day, three native volunteers led 90 more out of the pocket. About 1/5 of the total of 183 natives rescued from the Japanese needed extensive medical attention and all the rest were suffering from malnutrition. The healthier ones rebuilt their own village and some were ultimately used as labor on various projects at Angaur. On October 13, a coordinated attack was launched, with the 1st Battalion advancing from the west and the 2nd Battalion pushing from the north and northeast. Despite fierce resistance, by October 18 the Americans had successfully compressed the remaining Japanese into a pocket approximately 100 yards long and 50 yards wide. The following night, Major Goto was killed, and by October 21, the last pockets of resistance were eliminated. The engagement ended two days later when the Americans realized they had eliminated nearly all the Japanese troops, with only a few stragglers remaining. By the conclusion of the Battle of Angaur, approximately 1,300 Japanese soldiers had been killed, and 45 were captured. The Americans, on the other hand, suffered 264 men killed and 1,355 wounded, primarily from the 322nd Regiment. To be more specific the 321st Infantry's part in the operation had cost that regiment 26 men killed and 135 wounded. The 322d Infantry, which fought longer and against stiffer opposition, lost 211 men killed and 772 wounded. Despite the heavy losses, capturing Angaur proved crucial in securing the Palaus and removing the island group as a threat to Allied lines of communication across the western Pacific toward the Philippines. Airdrome construction on Angaur was begun on 20 September, F plus 3, by the 1884th and 1887th Engineer Aviation Battalions. The first plane, a C-47, landed on the field on F plus 28, 15 October. Four days later two 6,000-foot landing strips were completed and work on taxiways, gasoline storage, and other air-base installations was well along. Air-base construction on Angaur presented difficult problems. There was available no conveniently located Japanese airfield which the Allies could repair, improve, and expand. Instead, the work had to begin at the beginning. Jungle had to be cut away, swamps filled, and rough terrain leveled. There was no hope that an airstrip could be prepared in three or four days as had been the case on many other islands in the Pacific. The completion of two 6,000-foot runways by 19 October, F plus 32, represented a considerable accomplishment. In defending Angaur, the Japanese lost a well-equipped, highly trained, and well-led infantry battalion. While this force might have been more effectively deployed elsewhere in the Palaus, it succeeded in its mission of delaying the American advance. Meanwhile, General Ishii of the 32nd Division decided to reinforce the limited Japanese presence in Morotai to hinder the development of an enemy airbase capable of supporting an assault on the Philippines. Consequently, three temporary raiding detachments from the 10th Expeditionary Unit and the 211th and 212th Regiments were formed, with the 210th Regiment preparing a battalion as a follow-up force. On the night of September 26, Ishii's reinforcements began their movement to Morotai in barges, with two detachments successfully landing near Tilai and the other near Cape Posiposi despite interference from Allied PT boats. Enemy patrols around the island's perimeter blocked the use of coastal tracks, forcing the reinforcements to navigate through dense jungle. As the concealed Japanese raiders made their way toward Major Kawashima's main force in the Pilowo-Sabatai River area, the 3rd Battalion of the 210th Regiment landed in the Boesoboeso sector on October 9. The raiding detachments finally joined up with the 2nd Provisional Raiding Unit on October 20. Without waiting for the 210th battalion, Kawashima initiated a series of new infiltration raids, some of which reached the airfield itself. Although these reinforcements created some disruptions by harassing Allied outposts, they did not significantly impact the situation at Morotai. This was due to high disease rates among the reinforcements and the inability to deliver enough supplies through the Allied air and naval blockade. General Anami decided more decisive action was needed to prevent the enemy from utilizing their airbase effectively. He instructed Ishii to deploy as much force as possible to Morotai to destroy the enemy. In response, Ishii planned to send additional reinforcements, including the main forces of the 210th and 211th Regiments and the 18th Shipping Engineers. By November 16, approximately 1,900 troops successfully landed south of Wadjaboela, with Colonel Kisou Ouchi taking command of all Japanese forces on Morotai. Raiding activities intensified in December, but with the new year, American torpedo boats further tightened the blockade, making it impossible for the 32nd Division to supply the ammunition and rations needed for a major offensive. Unable to dislodge the enemy from Morotai, the Japanese eventually had to withdraw to the center of the island, where they remained until the end of the war. The most notable Japanese response to the Allied landing was a series of frequent but mostly ineffective air raids. The first raid occurred on September 16 when a solitary enemy aircraft dropped three bombs on the Red Beach area, causing no damage. Between September 15, 1944, and February 1, 1945, General Sudo's 7th Air Division conducted 82 raids on Morotai, involving 179 sorties. The initial 54 raids caused minimal damage, with only twelve Allied soldiers wounded by October 4. However, the later raids resulted in 42 Allied aircraft destroyed, 33 damaged, 19 men killed, and 99 wounded. Despite these efforts, Morotai was successfully developed into a crucial base for the return to the Philippines. In Bougainville, with General Griswold's 14th Corps initially slated for the Leyte invasion, efforts were made to replace it with the Australian 2nd Corps. Although Griswold's corps would not participate in the October 20 operation, advance elements of General Savige's headquarters landed on October 6 to facilitate the transition. By mid-November, the 7th Brigade had relieved the 129th and 145th Regiments, and on November 22, Savige officially took command of Allied operations on Bougainville. By December 12, the replacement of American frontline troops by Australians was complete, and with only a few service personnel remaining, all American troops had departed by February 1, 1945. Despite having 30,000 men—though always short on heavy equipment and shipping—Savige's forces were considered sufficient to continue monitoring the Japanese and defending the perimeter around the airfields from any potential counterattacks. However, General Blamey disagreed with this approach and preferred a more aggressive strategy. He wanted his troops to actively seek out and destroy the enemy by patrolling deep into Japanese-held territory, targeting supply areas and bases to starve and eventually annihilate the Japanese garrisons. This shift in strategy signaled the start of a new offensive phase in the Bougainville Campaign. At the same time, attention shifts to North Burma, where the Allied campaign continued after the victories at Myitkyina and Mogaung. However, the strained relationship between General Stilwell and Chiang Kai-Shek was approaching its breaking point. Confronted with the impending loss of Guilin, Stilwell persuaded President Roosevelt to issue an ultimatum to Chiang, threatening to cut off American aid to China unless Stilwell was given full command of all forces in China. Chiang, perceiving this as an attempt to dominate China, countered by demanding Stilwell's immediate replacement and welcoming any other qualified American general. As a result, on October 19, Stilwell was recalled and replaced by Major-General Albert Wedemeyer by the end of the month. The China-Burma-India Theater was then reorganized: Lieutenant-General Daniel Sultan took over the India-Burma Theater, while Wedemeyer assumed command of the newly established China Theater. However, Wedemeyer would only serve as chief of staff to Chiang, not taking effective command of the Chinese forces. Thus, no American officer would be held accountable for the loss of eastern China. Nonetheless, this represented another significant diplomatic victory for Chiang Kai-Shek, though it would be his last for many years. However, it also marked the end of his relationship with Roosevelt, who had previously championed China's and the Generalissimo's interests. Meanwhile, upon taking command, Wedemeyer faced open dissent among the Chinese Nationalists, with local commanders in eastern China on the verge of insurrection against Chiang's regime, as he had refused to supply arms to those defending against the Japanese advance in Operation Ichi-Go. There were many detailed reports that the east China commanders bitterly resented the Generalissimo's failure to support them. When Hengyang fell on August 8, Chinese claiming to be emissaries of these men presented to American authority a plan for a separatist regime and pleaded for American support. Unknown to the Americans, Chinese making identical representations had been negotiating with the Japanese since the winter of 1943-44. Intelligence reports were received at US headquarters to the effect that the Generalissimo's attitude toward the east China campaign reflected an understanding between him and the Japanese under which they would leave him undisturbed in southwest China if he in turn would not interfere while they took the airfields that presented so obvious a menace to the Japanese homeland. In 1951 a group of senior Japanese staff officers of China Expeditionary Army were interrogated on the question of Sino-Japanese relations in 1944. They denied that there had been any understanding between the Japanese and the Chinese Central Government. Two of them, Lt. Cols. Yoshimasa Okada and Yoshio Fukuyama, stated that an agreement was reached between the Japanese 23rd Army at Canton and the local Chinese commander, General Yu Hanmou, in February 1944 under which General Yu agreed not to disturb Canton when the Japanese marched north from it. Yu kept his word, according to Okada, even though the Generalissimo was ordering him to attack Canton. The Japanese officers agreed among themselves that there had been extensive contact with dissident Nationalist commanders in southeast China, and stated that through many channels they had sought to inform the Chinese that the east China drive offered no threat to them, but only to the US airfields. One of Wedemeyer's key objectives was to prevent China from fragmenting into warring factions. Additionally, he observed that air transport was delivering supplies to China at unprecedented rates, with 35,131 tons arriving in October 1944—four times the amount sent to support Stilwell in October 1943. The strength of the Allied forces in northern Burma and the weakened state of the Japanese meant that time was on Wedemeyer's side; each day China remained an active belligerent bolstered the prospect of significant American supplies soon being available. Consequently, his mission involved continuing support for General Chennault's 14th Air Force, General LeMay's 20th Bomber Command, and air transport over the Hump; further training and advising the Y-Force in Yunnan and the Z-Force in eastern China; and assisting the Generalissimo with military operations against the Japanese. Speaking of Chennault's 14th air force, by November 1944, they now had an average strength of 398 fighters, 97 medium bombers, and 47 heavy bombers. In that same month the Fourteenth received 13,578 tons of supplies flown in over the Hump, of which 9,357 tons were gas and oil. From the Kunming airfields, the China Wing of the ATC flew these supplies to Chennault's forward fields, this intratheater transport being of course a charge on Hump tonnage. The apparent crisis in east China made it seem advisable to use all available Chinese trucks for concentrating the Chinese for the defense of Kunming; the quartermaster truck companies of the SOS were not by themselves enough to support the Fourteenth Air Force. These resources of air power, unimpressive in contrast to what Allied commanders had in Europe or the Pacific, but a good deal more than the Japanese had in China, were divided among two composite wings--the 68th and 69th--the 312th Fighter Wing, the Chinese-American Composite Wing (CACW), and the 308th Bombardment Group (H). An example of Chennault's flexibility, the 68th Wing had three fighter squadrons assigned, with bombers attached as the mission required. The 69th had four fighter squadrons and three medium squadrons. With headquarters at Kunming, it was shifting its attention from the campaign in Burma to the defense of Kunming against a Japanese attack from the south or southeast. The Chinese-American Composite Wing, headquarters at Peishiyi, had two fighter groups and one bombardment group. The 312th had two fighter groups (50 P-47's, 60 P-51's, and 6 P-61's), a total of five squadrons, protecting the B-29 fields at Cheng-tu. After the air effort and the attempts to move tonnage to the airfields and to the troops, the remaining US project in China was liaison with and training and observation of Chinese troops. On the Salween front, liaison and technical advice was given in the forward areas, while troop training continued in the rear. In east China, the reluctance of the Chinese to attempt a stand after Hengyang's fall on August 8 led to the withdrawal of almost all the Americans who had tried since January 1, 1944 to train a second 30 Divisions in east China. The so-called Z-Force Operations Staff that remained comprised an observer group with the headquarters of the Chinese 9th War Area and a liaison team of 28 under Col. Harwood C. Bowman in the city of Liuchow. This handful of Americans, in the first months of Wedemeyer's command, sought to give technical aid to the Chinese defenders of Guangxi while sending a flow of information back to theater headquarters in Chongqing. They provided air-ground liaison, supervised demolitions, helped distribute the 500 tons of munitions flown into east China in late October 1944, and helped with administrative and logistical matters. The remaining 625 men of Z-FOS, including the headquarters, were in Kunming, their future mission dependent on Wedemeyer's estimate of the situation. While these events were unfolding, Allied forces in northern Burma were preparing to launch an offensive with six divisions to eliminate the remaining Japanese presence in the region and establish a new supply route to China. Following the capture of Myitkyina and Mogaung, efforts were underway to organize two new Chinese armies, while experienced Chinese divisions continued their rigorous training in anticipation of resuming their advance southward. As the new commander of the Northern Combat Area Command and the Chinese Army in India, Sultan had the New First Army, under General Sun Liren, included the 30th and 38th Divisions. The 38th Division had been engaged since 30 October 1943, and had previously taken a creditable part in the First Burma Campaign of 1942. The division had been trained, re-equipped, and brought up to strength at Ramgarh Training Center in Bihar Province, India. Its sister division, the 30th, was also Ramgarh-trained. Its 88th and 89th Regiments had fought at Myitkyina. There was also New Sixth Army consisting of the 14th, 22nd, and 50th Divisions, commanded by General Liao Yaoxiang. The 22nd Division had fought in the First Burma Campaign, then been rebuilt at Ramgarh. It had been in action since January 1944. Lastly there was General Festing's 36th Division, and the recently-formed 5332nd Provisional Brigade at his disposal. Current plans called for brigading the 1st Chinese Separate Infantry Regiment, which had been trained at Ramgarh in long-range penetration tactics, with two American regiments, the 475th Infantry and the 124th Cavalry. The combined unit would be the equivalent of a division, but would have the designation 5332d Brigade (Provisional). To carry out the project, the 5332d Brigade (Provisional), known later as MARS Task Force, was activated 26 July 1944. Brig. Gen. Thomas S. Arms assumed command the same day. The activating order provided for most of the brigade's subordinate units to be attached to it as they arrived in India or were activated--as of 26 July the brigade was still very much in the preparatory stage. Thus, the 475th Infantry Regiment (Long Range Penetration Regiment, Special), Lt. Col. William L. Osborne, was not activated until 5 August 1944. It included many survivors of the original American experiment in long-range penetration tactics--GALAHAD, or "Merrill's Marauders." Its companion regiment, the 124th Cavalry (Texas National Guard), Col. Milo H. Matteson, arrived in India on 30 August 1944. It did not reach the brigade's training area until 27 October. Also attached were the 612th Field Artillery Battalion (Pack), Maj. John W. Read, and six quartermaster pack troops. In mid-August 1944 the training area which had been set up about ten miles north of Myitkyina on the west bank of the Irrawaddy began receiving members of the 475th Infantry Regiment. The area was designated Camp Robert W. Landis in honor of the first member of GALAHAD to be killed in action. Unit after unit started moving into Camp Landis as the 5332d began to put on flesh and assume the likeness of a pair of regimental combat teams. Another battalion of pack artillery, the 613th under Lt. Col. James F. Donovan, the 18th Veterinary Evacuation Hospital, the 44th Portable Surgical Hospital, the 1st Chinese Separate Infantry Regiment, Col. Lin Kuan-hsiang, arrived during the fall. Unfortunately, after overseeing the 5332nd's organization and training, Arms was injured in a motor accident and was succeeded by Brigadier-General John Willey on October 31. In support of Operation Capital, it was agreed that Sultan's forces would advance through the Katha-Bhamo area towards Kunchaung, Sikaw, and Namhkam in mid-October, followed by a southern advance to the Mogok-Mongmit-Lashio line in coordination with General Slim's push towards Mandalay. Sultan planned a three-pronged attack south from Myitkyina into Japanese-held territory in northern Burma. The British 36th Division and the Chinese 50th Division would advance south along the Railway Corridor to secure the Katha-Indaw area; the Chinese 22nd Division would move southeast to capture the Broadway airstrip northeast of Katha and establish a bridgehead over the Irrawaddy at Shwegu; and the Chinese 38th Division, followed by the 30th Division, would move south from Mogaung to secure the Bhamo-Mansi area. By the end of August, Festing's forces had followed the 53rd Division to Pinbaw, then advanced cautiously until they secured Nanma in September. The British moved out on 15 October. At first, contact was light, but by the time they reached Mawlu on 31 October Japanese posts were stronger and closer together and their artillery and mortar fire was progressively heavier. However, at Mawlu the 36th was eighty miles south of Mogaung and very near the great bend of the Irrawaddy which was the goal for 15 December. The Japanese stiffened at Mawlu, and the 1st Battalion, Royal Scots Fusiliers, met artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire that took thirteen casualties. By evening the town was occupied. Road conditions were very bad, for the ground was still wet, and vehicles had trouble moving. After occupying Mawlu the division paused until 9 November. There were brushes with Japanese, snipings, patrol actions, but no heavy fighting. Festing used the lull to bring up the 72d Brigade, and so make his advance one of brigades in line, with the 72d on the east, the 29th on the west. The 72d would make the main effort. Moving down a dry-weather road parallel to the railway tracks, elements of the 72d Brigade on 10 November met stubborn resistance a few miles northwest of a railway station called Pinwe. It came from a cluster of bunkers, which together with heavy artillery fire and the identification of Japanese from a number of units all pointed to one conclusion for the 36th--it had met the Japanese main line of resistance in this area centering on Pinwe. The Pinwe area was well adapted to defense. Farther north the 36th had fought its way over rice fields, but here the bush made an impenetrable screen on either side of the jungle tracks. Flanking movements were so difficult that they were judged to be impossible. Frontal attacks after artillery and air preparations became the order of the day. The Japanese lines at Pinwe were held by the 119th Regiment, 53d Division. Pinwe was the hardest fighting the 53d had encountered, and the 119th received a diploma of merit for its work there. At night their infiltration parties harassed the British rear areas and sought to destroy their artillery. On one occasion, they thrust so deftly into the British positions as to cut off two companies of infantry, which had to be withdrawn at night. The fighting resolved itself into British attempts at prying the Japanese out of their strongpoints, while maintaining a close guard against Japanese raiding parties. In these days the 72d Infantry Brigade, which had been trying to force its way over the stream covering the principal Japanese positions, took heavy casualties and had to be relieved by the 29th Infantry Brigade. On 25 November the British did put a company across the stream, but found they could not reinforce or supply it. The 53d Division was also ordered to execute limited but bold attacks to its front. To relieve the pressure on the 53d Division, the 15th Division was directed to attack the right flank and rear of the enemy 36th Division along the Meza River. Although the attacks of the 15th Division and the counterattacks of the 53d failed to destroy the enemy, they were successful in checking the offensive of the 36th and enabled the 53d Division to hold the line for approximately three weeks. The order to the 53d showed the DiVision commanders the caliber and determination of the new Army commander and the 53d's success in holding bolstered the sagging combat spirit of the entire 15th Army. Pressure on the 53d Division increased as the weeks went by; and when enemy elements infiltrated into the gap between the 53d and 15th Divisions in late November, the 15th Army finally ordered the 53d to withdraw to Katha and the sector north of Tigyaing. The 15th Division was ordered to withdraw its right wing to maintain contact with the revised battle line of the 53d Division. The 15th Army finally issued orders to the 53d and 15th Divisions directing the commencement of the withdrawal movement to the Irrawaddy River line on 1 December. The 33d Division was directed to withdraw on 4 December, giving the Division additional time for disposal of munitions in its area. From positions in the Kamaing area, far behind the outposts held by the 36th Division in the Railway Corridor, the 22d began its march on 15 October. It was to move southeast toward Mogaung, but bypassing the town to save ten miles, then toward Pinbaw, then Hopin. As the march got under way it appeared that the long rest after combat had left troops and animals in poor condition. The troops were traveling as light as possible, but fatigue was evident when after three days the division reached Hopin. Predawn departures were ordered to keep to a minimum the time spent marching under the full sun, and a day of rest was spent at Hopin. At Hopin the division turned east, to take a route that would sorely test the marching powers of its troops, for the chosen trail led over the ridge that marked the eastern boundary of the Railway Corridor, down into a plain formed by a tributary of the Irrawaddy, where the old Chindit airstrip BROADWAY was located, and up again over a hill mass overlooking the Irrawaddy valley. On 26 October the division reached the airstrip, twenty-seven miles southeast of Hopin. General Liao Yueh-shang, commanding the New Sixth Army, of which the 22d Division was part, flew in to BROADWAY, and gave the division detailed orders for the final move to the Irrawaddy. The division was formed into two columns. On the west, the 64th Regiment was directed to take Shwegugale, which lay on the south bank downstream from Shwegu. The 65th and 66th were to move off as one column, then to split into combat teams just north of the Irrawaddy and cross on a broad front. Kachin irregulars and patrols reported there were no Japanese ahead, and after a three-day rest the division resumed its advance. On 3 November the division occupied the north bank of the Irrawaddy without opposition. The troops rested while commanders studied maps and waited for rubber boats and outboard motors to be airdropped. Three days later the 64th Regiment crossed the Irrawaddy and took Shwegugale against light opposition. Next day the 65th Regiment took Shwegu, and the division had its first objectives. Meanwhile, after the unsuccessful Dan offensive, General Honda reorganized the 33rd Army. The 56th Division resumed defending Longling and Mangshi, while the 18th Division took over the defense of Namhkam. Although the Yoshida Force and the Bhamo Garrison remained with the 33rd Army, the 2nd Division was reassigned to the area army and began relocating to the Pyinmana-Toungoo area by the end of October to be available for operations in central Burma. Unbeknownst to Honda, he was soon to encounter the full force of Sultan's renewed offensive. Major-General Li Hong's 38th Division had departed from Myitkyina on October 15, advancing cautiously along the road to Bhamo with minimal contact until October 28. On that date, they encountered Japanese patrols two miles north of the Taping River, which were quickly dispatched. At Myothit was the Japanese outpost line of resistance; the Chinese patrols speedily found that the Japanese meant to defend it. Strong Japanese positions were seen on the south bank, and the commander of the 38th Division, General Li Huang, saw that he would have to force a defended river line unless he could turn the Japanese position. General Li decided to use the 112th and 114th Regiments, which had been the main body of the 38th, as an enveloping force. Since they were some seven miles to the north the 112th and 114th were out of contact with the Japanese and well placed to make a wide swing to the east. The two regiments began their march through the hills, while the 113th made a show of activity around Myothit to keep the Japanese attention focused there. Once again envelopment proved its worth. The Japanese were too few to defend a long line, and the enveloping force was able to cross the Taping at an unguarded bridge upstream, go around the right end of the Japanese outpost line of resistance, and emerge on the Bhamo plain on 10 November. Pressing on west toward Bhamo, the enveloping force met a strong entrenched Japanese force at Momauk, which is eight miles east of Bhamo and is the point at which the Myitkyina-Bhamo road swings to the west for the last stretch into Bhamo. Here there was savage fighting between the 114th Regiment and the Japanese defenders. Heavily outnumbered, the Japanese outpost at Momauk was driven into the main defenses at Bhamo. The appearance of its survivors, some without rifles, others without shoes, depressed the Bhamo garrison. Hara's forces endured significant losses as they conducted a delaying action at Momauk, with the remaining reconnaissance units joining the defense of Bhamo by November 16. Meanwhile, the 113th Regiment moved west along the south bank of the Taping River and approached Bhamo from the north. However, instead of directly attacking the town, the 113th Regiment repositioned south and southeast of Bhamo. Concurrently, the 114th Regiment advanced west from Momauk to encircle the town from the north, creating a loose encirclement around the Japanese outposts in the Bhamo suburbs. This maneuver allowed the 112th Regiment to bypass the confrontation entirely and continue south towards Namhkam. By early November, Japanese patrols had also detected the presence of the 22nd Division in the region between Bhamo and Katha, apparently moving towards Mandalay. Fearing that this force might sever the Mandalay-Lashio rail line by advancing through Mongmit, Honda's staff decided to keep the 55th Regiment stationed at Namhkam and reassign the rest of General Naka's 18th Division to Mongmit to prevent the effective separation of the 15th and 33rd Armies. While the 64th Regiment remained to secure the crossing area, the 22nd Division advanced towards Man Tha along the main road south from the Japanese stronghold of Bhamo, which was captured without incident on November 14. Continuing along the Bhamo-Myitson road, the Si-u area was secured by late November, with Colonel Ernest Easterbrook's 475th Regiment also moving there after bypassing Bhamo successfully. Meanwhile, after a period of recovery due to heavy losses in September, General Wei's Y-Force was preparing to resume its Salween offensive. On October 29, Lieutenant-General Huang Jie assaulted Longling, defended by the 146th Regiment's main force with artillery support up to 1,700 rounds and 30-40 air sorties per day carried out by 37 P-40s of the 14th Air Force. Elements of the 200th Division attacked from the south and west, targeting positions behind Colonel Imaoka's defenses, while two divisions of the 71st Army exerted heavy pressure from the north. With many positions being devastated and numerous defenders killed or wounded, General Matsuyama ordered the 146th to retreat from Longling to Mangshi on November 3. Although the Japanese managed a midnight withdrawal, the Chinese succeeded in capturing their main objective. The Japanese respite, however, unsettled the Americans, who promptly urged Chiang to continue the offensive. Following the Generalissimo's orders to advance on November 9, Wei directed the newly arrived 53rd Army through the hills north of the Burma Road to Chefang, while the 2nd and 6th Armies moved south towards Mangshi, and the 71st Army proceeded down the road itself. Against the expected offensive, the 56th Division consolidated its defense around Mangshih with eight infantry and two artillery battalions on an established defense perimeter. The Yoshida Force, which was under the direct command of the Army at Wanting, was assigned the missions of protecting the rear of the 56th Division with its main force in the area north of Chefang and the 3d Battal- ion in the Menka area. At the same time, the 3d Battalion of the 146th Infantry Regiment was moved from Mangshih to join the Yoshida Force. A detachment of about 100 replacement troops was assigned to hold Chefang Pass. Although the 56th Division continued to be optimistic about its chances of holding against the expected Chinese attack, Army Headquarters took a less hopeful view. The Division was ordered to conduct a flexible holding operation north of Wanting and not cling too tenaciously to Mangshih. After a strong Chinese offensive on November 19, and following Colonel Tsuji's insistence, Matsuyama had no choice but to withdraw during the night to the Chefang Pass. General Matsuyama was strongly in favor of conducting a holding action in the Mangshi area and merely directed a partial withdrawal of his forces to be effected on November 22, 23 and 24. Col. Tsuji, of the 33rd Army headquarters, was present at the 56th Division headquarters and warned the chief of staff against over-optimism. Tsuji stressed the point that, once the withdrawal had been decided upon, the Division should withdraw simultaneously from the entire line to the south of Chefang Pass, preferably on the eve of the general attack or on the following night, at the latest. However, Col. Kawamichi, the Division chief of staff, would not change the order because it had already been passed down to the subordinate units. Subsequently, following an inspection of the front lines and an observation of enemy activity on the 18th, Tsuji came to the conclusion that the enemy would launch a general attack at dawn on the 19th or early on the 20th. He bluntly advised General Matsuyama to change his division order and at his insistence the order was changed to a withdrawal at midnight on November 19 to Chefang Pass. At dawn of the 19th, the Chinese launched a heavy attack in an attempt to envelop the entire line, just as Tsuji had predicted. All frontline units held in their prepared positions and inflicted heavy losses. Throughout the day they were able to check the enemy, but with the tremendous forces arrayed against the Division it is probable that many of the positions would have been overrun the following day. The Division, however, succeeded in withdrawing from the entire line at midnight on November 19.As a result, the strategic Mangshi airfield fell to Wei, enabling him to land supplies rather than relying solely on airdrops. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Despite the heavy losses, capturing Angaur proved crucial in securing the Palaus and removing the island group as a threat to Allied lines of communication across the western Pacific toward the Philippines. General MacArthur was getting closer to his ultimate goa
What do Rita Hayworth, General MacArthur, and a ping-pong playing cat have in common? They're all featured in this episode of MASH! Ethan and Vanessa discuss the 4077's deluge of wounded and the news reels that are spliced in between. MacArthur Ticker Tape Parade https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1986/10/29/625986.html?pageNumber=42https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ticker-tape_paradeHarvest Moon Ball https://swungover.wordpress.com/table-of-contents/hmb2/https://www.youtube.com/@swungover/videosAnthony Palmer https://www.imdb.com/name/nm0658115/Music credit: “Feel Good Rock” by Jason Shaw, https://audionautix.com/ Cover Art by M. Cameron https://www.plaguedoctorart.com/Contact the show: mashmouthpod@gmail.comSocials: @valiantlyoffbalance on Instagram @OfficialVOB on Twitter @mashmouthpod on Instagram @EthanWasCool on Instagram and Twitter @unvanesscessary on Instagram
In today's fast-paced digital world, where communication is often reduced to quick texts and bold social media statements, have we lost the art of nuance? Join Trent as he explores this crucial aspect of leadership that can shape not only the trajectory of our organizations but also enhance our personal relationships. In this episode, learn how nuanced communication can guide leaders to make better decisions, facilitate open dialogue, and invite feedback. We'll discuss the concept of "nuanced decisiveness," showcasing historical examples like General MacArthur's tunnel vision during the Korean War versus George Washington's flexible strategies in the Revolutionary War. Tune in to discover practical steps to enhance your leadership through thoughtful communication, open-mindedness, and humility. Rediscover the balance between confidence and adaptability and learn how nuanced leadership can lead to more effective decision-making and stronger teams.
Last time we spoke about the invasion of the Palau Islands. General Rupertus's 1st Marine Division was tasked with attacking Peleliu, while General Mueller's 81st Division would land on Angaur. Prior to the landings, extensive neutralization of Japanese airfields was carried out by Allied forces. On September 6, carrier-based aircraft attacked the Palaus, significantly damaging enemy targets but encountering minimal resistance. The invasion fleet, led by Admiral Fort, began landing operations on September 15. Despite strong Japanese defenses, especially around Peleliu's rugged coral ridges, the Marines made some progress but faced intense resistance. Notable figures such as Eugene Sledge, author of “With the Old Breed,” provided personal insights into the brutal conditions faced. The landing saw heavy casualties and challenges, including ineffective pre-landing bombardments and fierce counterattacks, but the Marines managed to secure key positions by the end of the first day. The 81st Division then proceeded with landings on Angaur on September 17, facing lighter resistance but difficult terrain. This episode is the Battles of Peleliu and Angaur Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Last time we left off, Peleliu and Anguar had just been amphibiously assaulted by US Marines. While the landings on Angaur were underway, General Rupertus pressed on with the Peleliu offensive on September 17. In the southern sector, Colonel Hanneken's 7th Marines made headway against the isolated Japanese defenders. The 3rd Battalion cleared a minefield and captured the southeast promontory, while the 1st Battalion took on the southwestern promontory but only managed to secure half of it due to fierce enemy resistance. To the north, the 1st and 5th Marines advanced further, encountering the Umurbrogol Mountains for the first time, where Colonel Nakagawa had fortified his defenses. On the left flank, Colonel Puller's 1st and 3rd Battalions encountered minimal opposition as they moved along the relatively flat coastal plain but had to halt their advance when the 1st Battalion was impeded by a reinforced concrete blockhouse. On the right, Colonel Harris' 2nd Battalion progressed well while staying hidden from Japanese artillery and mortar fire. However, despite reaching their objectives by mid-morning, Harris' 1st Battalion faced difficulty when Puller's 2nd Battalion, after making initial gains, was halted by the Umurbrogol defenses. They fought hard to secure Hill 200 but were immediately met with fire from the next ridge. Additionally, Harris' 3rd Battalion was pinned down by heavy flanking fire from the left. That night, additional armor was sent to the 7th Marines to support the ongoing operations in the south. The next morning, Hanneken's 3rd Battalion launched a final assault. During the night of D+2, additional armor (tanks and 75mm gun-mounted halftracks) was brought up and at 10:00 on September 18 the advance was resumed. Again progress was painfully slow with many reserve elements being attacked by Japanese from bypassed caves and underground emplacements. At 13:44 elements of Companies A and C reached the southern shores, though the area being assaulted by Company B was still heavily defended. Tank support had withdrawn to re-arm and before Company B was in a position to resume the attack, a bulldozer was needed to extricate the gun-mounted half-tracks, which had become bogged down. At that time, several explosions were heard from the Japanese defenses and it was found that remaining Japanese defenders had finished the job for the Marines. The final handful leaped from the cliff tops into the sea in an effort to escape, only to be picked off by Marine riflemen. With the taking of the two promontories, the southern part of Peleliu was secured. 1/7 and 3/7 squared themselves away for a well-earned rest, while headquarters reported "1520 hours D+3, 7th Marines mission on Peleliu completed." Unfortunately, this was not quite the case. Despite the slow progress and intense Japanese resistance, the Marines managed to secure the southern portion of Peleliu by the end of September 18. At the same time, the 1st and 5th Marines continued their fierce and costly push north. On the right flank, Colonel Harris's 2nd Battalion faced only sporadic resistance as it cut through the dense jungle. The Americans eventually reached a causeway leading east to Peleliu's northeastern peninsula, a potentially dangerous obstacle to their advance. After a successful patrol, Harris opted to call in an airstrike before crossing, but the strike missed its target and hit the area while the Marines were crossing. Despite this, the bridgehead was established, though further casualties were incurred due to friendly artillery and mortar fire. With this new foothold, Harris redirected his 3rd Battalion eastward across the causeway to support the 2nd Battalion's advance. On the left flank, the 1st Marines, having sustained 1,236 casualties, were urged by Rupertus to "maintain the momentum." This led Colonel Puller to commit all available reserves, including engineers, support personnel, and Hanneken's reserve 2nd Battalion. The 1st Marines suffered about 240 casualties during the 17th and in Japanese counterattacks the ensuing night; the 3rd Battalion was reduced to about one third of its original strength; and two companies of the 1st Battalion were practically finished as fighting units. On the other hand, there was some reason for optimism. Progress on the 17th had been measured in hundreds of yards in the rough, high ground at the southern end of the central ridges and strong Japanese resistance had been overcome. Whatever optimism may have existed was not to last too long. On the 18th, in what the Marine Corps' history of the operation characterizes as "savage and costly fighting," elements of the 1st and 7th Marines managed to advance more than 500 yards in the center, principally along the ridge lines and hills oriented north and south. But the advance during the day was held up at a group of peaks which seemed at first to form a continuous ridge line that was oriented more east and west than the rest of the Peleliu ridges. Soon, the name Five Sisters came to be applied to a cluster of peaks forming the western side of the terrain feature. A towering hill at its eastern extremity, separated from Five Sisters by a saddle, was designated Hill 300, or Old Baldy. With the 7th Marines held up in the center, at Five Sisters, the units on both sides of the central ridges halted so as not to create exposed flanks. Puller's 3rd Battalion made progress along the coastal plains but had to pause to stay in contact with other units. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion struggled against the Umurbrogol Mountains, capturing Hill 210 before being forced to withdraw due to a fierce Japanese counterattack on Hill 200 behind them. At Anguar, following a three-hour artillery bombardment supported by aircraft, General Mueller's 321st and 322nd Regiments resumed their advance north and west with tank support. After linking their advances, Colonel Venable pushed west and reached the high ground where Major Goto had established his main defenses, while Colonel Dark made significant progress south until his forces encountered the formidable defenses at Green Beach. The night of 18-19 September was noisy and nerve-racking all along the front and few troops got much sleep. Minor Japanese attacks harassed the exposed salient held by the 3d Battalion, 322d Infantry, while bats and large land crabs helped the Japanese to create distraction and started troops firing on nonexistent enemy infiltrators. Apparently no casualties resulted either from Japanese action or indiscriminate small arms fire. Friendly artillery fire did, however, cause some casualties. About 2030, four or five 105-mm. shells from the 316th Field Artillery Battalion hit the lines of the 2d Battalion, 321st Infantry, killing 4 men and wounding 15 others. The artillery fire was stopped before further damage could be done. On September 19, following a night of numerous Japanese infiltrations and small-scale counterattacks, the 322nd Regiment swiftly secured Saipan Town and advanced to the north shore of Garangaoi Cove. Meanwhile, the 321st Regiment successfully attacked and captured the Green Beach fortifications from their vulnerable side. To manage the exposed Japanese forces on the beaches, Dark's 2nd Battalion, supported by tanks, maneuvered left and progressed down the southwest of the island, halting just short of the shoreline by nightfall. At Peleliu, Harris' Marines made headway towards the Ngardololok area, overcoming light resistance and quickly dispatching the few enemy stragglers they encountered, reaching Purple Beach by day's end. However, in front of the O-3 line, Puller's weary troops, having endured a grueling night of Japanese counterattacks, resumed their assault on the Umurbrogol Mountains. Despite some local advances, by evening on 20 September the 1st Marines had been stopped and, ". . . as an assault unit on the regimental level, had ceased temporarily to exist," having suffered almost 1,750 casualties, well over half its strength. Relief was absolutely necessary, not only because casualties were heavy but also because the survivors were physically exhausted from heat, lack of water, and continuous combat. Elements of the 7th Marines therefore relieved all 1st Marines units except those along West Road. While the 7th Marines took over from the exhausted 1st Marines on the right, the 5th Marines continued their advance through western Peleliu, securing its two peninsulas, including Island A and Ngabad Island, by September 21. General Mueller, concerned lest the Japanese reported on the south break through gaps or weak points in the forward lines, had special defenses in depth set up at RED and BLUE Beaches, utilizing Shore Party and antiaircraft troops. All units were alerted to expect Japanese attacks during the night. The division expected (and perhaps hoped) that the Japanese still believed to be located in southern Angaur might launch a suicidal desperation charge during the night or at dawn on the 20th. The night proved very quiet until, toward morning, some small, scattered Japanese parties infiltrated through the lines of both regiments. There was no banzai effort--rather, these Japanese troops were apparently attempting to escape to the northwest hill mass from positions in the mangrove swamp and GREEN Beach 3 areas. Action at dawn was limited to a mopping-up operation directed against four Japanese discovered in the headquarters area of the 2d Battalion, 321st Infantry. By 11:00 on September 20, Mueller reported to General Geiger that all organized resistance on Angaur had ended and that the island was secure. General Mueller's statement was probably prompted by his realization that the remaining Japanese were compressed into the northwest hills and by the reports that about 850 of the enemy had been killed through the 20th. This casualty figure was an overestimation. Probably fewer than 600 Japanese had been killed through the 20th, and Major Goto still had possibly 750 men with which to conduct an organized defense in the northwest. On orders from General Inoue, Goto planned no final banzai attack which would decimate his forces. Instead he withdrew over half his force to rugged terrain and emplaced them in natural or prepared fortifications. His lines of defense in the northwest were well conceived; many of his positions were mutually supporting; the amphitheater configuration of the bowl provided him with defensive areas whence heavy cross fires could be directed at attackers; the broken coral, with its crevices, fissures, caves, and ridgelets, gave him defensive advantages at least as good as those at the Ibdi Pocket on Biak; and he had available a number of artillery and anti-tank weapons, heavy and light mortars, and heavy and light machine-guns, most of them so emplaced as to give maximum support to his riflemen. In addition, he could still exercise effective control over the men he had gathered in the Lake Salome bowl. For whatever it was worth, Goto was ready to conduct a protracted defense, though the best he could hope for was to tie down the 322nd Regiment. Nevertheless, the real issue at Angaur--securing the prospective airfield area--had already been decided. To the north, while southern Angaur was being secured, Venable's men were probing the enemy's northwestern defenses with a series of company-sized attacks. These attacks allowed the Americans to gather crucial information about Goto's remaining positions, centered around the Lake Salome bowl. Venable discovered that organized resistance was still strong, prompting him to rearrange his units for a final push. Following a heavy artillery and air bombardment, the 322nd Regiment attacked the bowl with tank support, initially making some gains but soon encountering obstacles due to the terrain and enemy fire. By the end of September 21, Venable deemed the newly gained positions too exposed and decided to withdraw to the previous night's defenses. Meanwhile, the 1st and 7th Marines continued to face heavy casualties as they fought through the Umurbrogol Mountains, with the latter advancing less than 175 yards after two days of intense combat. Nakagawa's fierce defenders managed to halt the 1st Marine Division on the rough and well-defended terrain, resulting in a total of 4,000 casualties by this time. After visiting the front, Geiger decided to replace the battered 1st Marines with Dark's 321st Regiment, which had suffered minimal casualties and had completed its mission at Angaur. The 1st Marines by this time reported 1749 casualties. One Marine later described the fighting in the Umurbrogol, which attests to the level to which the 1st Marines had deteriorated: "I picked up the rifle of a dead Marine and I went up the hill; I remember no more than a few yards of scarred hillside, I didn't worry about death anymore, I had resigned from the human race. I crawled and scrambled forward and lay still without any feeling towards any human thing. In the next foxhole was a rifleman. He peered at me through red and painful eyes. I didn't care about him and he didn't care about me. As a fighting unit, the 1st Marines was finished. We were no longer human beings, I fired at anything that moved in front of me, friend or foe. I had no friends, I just wanted to kill." OnSeptember 19, he also dispatched Colonel Arthur Watson's reserve 323rd Regiment to secure Ulithi Atoll. After a successful reconnaissance mission, the infantrymen landed on September 22, discovering that the atoll's airfield and seaplane base had been abandoned by the Japanese. The Americans later established a major advanced fleet anchorage, a Marine airbase, and a Navy seaplane base there. Ulithi Atoll contained a 300-berth anchorage and a seaplane base. Occupation of these Western Caroline islands provided still another base from which future operations against the enemy could be supported. The construction of an airstrip on Ameliorate Island made possible fighter plane protection for the anchorage and afforded a base from which US aircraft could continue neutralization of the nearby Japanese bases on Yap. Together with Angaur and Peleliu Islands to the southwest and Guam, Tinian, and Saipan to the northeast, the capture of Ulithi Atoll completed a line of American bases that isolated Japanese holdings in the Central and South Pacific. The occupation of Ulithi Atoll further denied it to the enemy as a fleet anchorage, weather and radio station, and possible air and submarine base, in addition to precluding its use by the enemy to observe and report the activities of American forces in the sector. By September 25 the unloading of all the support ships had been completed and Vice Admiral John H. Hoover, Commander, Forward Areas Western Pacific, took over the task of developing Ulithi Atoll into an advanced fleet base. Within a month after its capture, more than 100 Navy craft from self-propelled types to lighters, floating drydocks, barges, landing craft, and seaplane wrecking derricks were en route to the island. During subsequent operations in the Philippines, the Pacific Fleet found Ulithi to be an extremely valuable base. Prior to the invasion of Okinawa, the island served as a staging area for fleet and amphibious forces. The atoll thus fulfilled a vital strategic role in the final phase of the Pacific War. On that day, Venable resumed his assault on the Lake Salome bowl. The coastal offensive faced little resistance, but the attack through the southern defile encountered heavy enemy fire. Despite this, the troops reached the shores of Lake Salome. However, Venable was severely wounded during the action and had to be evacuated, with his troops retreating to more defensible positions by nightfall. The main strength of the attack was placed on the right (southeast) section of the bowl, and tanks fired along the eastern rim about 200 yards in front of the leading elements. The mediums had been undisturbed by enemy fire all morning, but, apparently attracted by an incautious grouping of officers and men near the lead tanks and defile exit, a Japanese anti-tank gun opened fire from a hidden emplacement along the east rim. Three officers (including Colonel Venable, who was in the forward area to observe the new attack) and one enlisted man were severely wounded and had to be evacuated. During the retirement on the 22nd, one of the three forward tanks was so badly damaged by a mine or buried shell that it could not be moved through the defile. This tank blocked the defile's northern entrance and prevented the withdrawal of another medium, which had to be destroyed to keep it from falling into Japanese hands. In four days of fruitless effort to push into the bowl from the south, three tanks and two 75-mm SPM's had been lost. Heavier infantry losses also began to be sustained now that the Japanese, cornered, were fighting to the death. On that day, for instance, the 2nd Battalion lost 2 men killed and about 35 wounded. At 0730 on the morning of the 23d, the 2d Battalion, with Companies B, C, and E attached, continued the attack into the bowl from the south. Companies B and C worked up the east shore of Lake Salome. Companies I and G pushed toward the southwest and western shores, while Company F paid particular attention to caves along the southwest rim of the bowl. During the first part of the attack all companies moved forward rapidly, and Company I reached the northwest corner of the lake without much trouble. But Company B, pushing forward against increasingly heavy Japanese fire from the north, was pinned down by this fire when it reached the northeast corner of the lake. Company C was sent north on B's right to try to outflank the enemy machine gun and mortar positions from which the fire on Company B originated. The intention was to flush the Japanese from their positions and push them southwest and south against the main body of the 2d Battalion. But Company C could make little progress toward the northern section of the bowl, and its own position became precarious as Japanese mortar and machine gun fire increased and the 1st Battalion's own 81-mm. mortar ammunition ran out, making further mortar support impossible. Japanese fire continued to increase and the positions of all forward companies became untenable. A general withdrawal to the defile entrance was ordered. The withdrawal was painfully slow; companies were broken up; all units suffered more casualties. One small group of Company I, separated from its parent unit, worked over the cliffs and ridges at the bowl's western rim to the coast at BLACK Beach. Company B, retreating in small segments, lost men as it withdrew from the northeast corner of the lake. All told, the 2d Battalion and attached companies lost 18 men killed and over 75 wounded during the day. Concurrently, as the 1st and 7th Marines continued to struggle with the formidable Umurbrogol Mountains, Harris' Company G successfully secured the undefended Carlson Island, finally completing the 5th Marines' original mission. Despite concerns about a potential enemy attack on Koror and Babelthuap after the Peleliu operation, General Inoue decided to reinforce Nakagawa's beleaguered garrison. By 21 September effective Japanese infantry strength in the central ridges was down to 1,300 men. That, of course, does not paint a true picture of the situation in the central pocket. A trained soldier, well armed, can be tenacious on the defense in such terrain as the central ridges of Peleliu whether or not he be trained for infantry service. There were probably 4,000 Japanese troops (including the 1,300 infantrymen) still firmly ensconced in the central pocket as of 21 September, and there were at least 1,000 more troops in the Amiangal Mountain area at northern Peleliu. Nevertheless, Colonel Nakagawa, commanding the Peleliu Sector Unit, clearly needed reinforcements if he was to hold out much longer. There were perhaps 30,000 Japanese troops in the northern Palaus to draw from, including two battalions of the 59th Infantry, two battalions of the 15th Infantry, and four or five recently organized infantry battalions of the 53d Independent Mixed Brigade. The Japanese were not to reach their destination undetected. At 0535, the destroyer H.L. Edwards spotted seven enemy barges about 1,000 yards northeast of Akarakoro Point at the northern tip of Peleliu, obviously headed for the island. The destroyer opened fire, sinking one barge before the remainder reached the beach. A combination of bombing and strafing, naval gunfire, and artillery hit the barges on the beach, and by 0845 the cruiser Louisville reported all barges destroyed. The enemy version of this incident agrees only in part with the American account, adding that "despite receiving severe enemy air and artillery fire at a point two kilometers off the coast, they made a successful landing at 0520 hours under the command of 1st Lieutenant Murahori". Knowing that some Japanese forces had reached Peleliu, Rupertus decided to deploy his own reinforcements between the central ridges and the western shore, targeting the enemy's weak spot for an offensive up the western coast. The 7th Marines supported the Army by attacking enemy positions from the south and center, with Hanneken's 3rd Battalion advancing along the high ground to the right rear of the 321st. After relieving the 1st Marines, Dark sent patrols up the coastal flat to Garekoru, encountering little opposition initially. However, Dark's 2nd Battalion faced heavier resistance in the afternoon and had to retreat, postponing the northward advance until the next day. During the night, Inoue sent the remainder of the 2nd Battalion, 15th Regiment, and despite being shelled, most reinforcements reached Peleliu. By September 23, the Americans had secured important footholds on Peleliu and Angaur. However, intense fighting remained, with the 321st Regiment relieving the 1st Marines against Nakagawa's fortified positions, while the 322nd Regiment continued to attack Goto's defenses on the northwest hills. Yet that is it for the Palau's as we now need to turn to Mortai. General Persons' troops quickly secured and expanded the island perimeter, successfully repelling the enemy's night raids with little difficulty. An example of these raids is the September 18 attack. This is the Japanese report: “On 18 September the main body of the 2nd Provisional Raiding Unit, which had moved into position along the upper Tjao, launched a strong night infiltration attack with the objective of disrupting the enemy's rear area in the vicinity of Doroeba and Gotalalmo. Although deep penetration of the enemy lines was achieved and considerable casualties inflicted, the attack failed to reduce the beachhead or to interfere with the enemy's rapid preparation of Doroeba airfield.” In truth, the Americans easily repelled this attack, suffering very few casualties. These raids would continue throughout September and October. American engineers were busy constructing a new fighter strip at the Pitoe Drome area. This strip was scheduled to be ready for use by September 29 but was eventually abandoned and downgraded to an emergency field. A number of factors influenced the decision to abandon the site, which was renamed Pitoe Crash Strip. Japanese air reaction had been so ineffectual that the need for a fighter base on Morotai was not as urgent as had been expected. Aircraft based on escort carriers, some of which remained in the Morotai area for weeks, were able to keep away most of the Japanese planes, and their efforts were supplemented by long-range land-based fighters from Sansapor. Moreover, the line of approach which planes had to use to land on Pitoe Crash Strip interfered with that of the more important bomber base at Wama Drome. Finally, the terrain at the crash strip was by no means as well drained as that at other locations on the Doroeba Plain, and it was necessary to expend much engineer effort to keep the strip operational. The new field, which acquired the designation Pitoe Drome, was located about 1,200 yards north of Wama Drome. Construction proceeded slowly at Pitoe Drome because so much engineer effort had to be devoted to the completion of Wama Drome. By 4 October almost 7,000 feet at the new site had been cleared, but it was not until the 17th, D plus 32, that even one runway was surfaced, let alone taxiways and dispersal lanes. Meanwhile, the construction of a new bomber field at Wama Drome faced significant delays due to heavy rainstorms and a shortage of suitable surfacing material. Despite almost constant struggles with soggy ground and tropical downpours, engineers managed to make 4,000 feet of Wama Drome operational by October 4. However, the overall progress on building Morotai's new airbase, intended for the upcoming invasion of the Philippines, was slower than anticipated. Nevertheless, the Tradewind Task Force was disbanded on September 25, as the island was considered secure enough. General Hall then assumed command of the Morotai base as the commander of the 11th Corps. However, unbeknownst to the Americans, who believed the only possible Japanese response to the invasion was the ineffective air raids already carried out against them, troops in Halmahera were preparing to embark on a dangerous mission to reinforce Morotai and contest control of this key island. In the meantime, after the successful invasion of the Palaus, new developments were unfolding on the Philippines front following Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 38's recent successful strikes. These strikes had revealed an unexpected vulnerability in the enemy's air defenses, prompting Admirals Halsey and Nimitz to cancel the Yap operation, thereby freeing up many resources for the Philippines Campaign. Approximately 500 aircraft, or about 57% of the 884 believed to be in the Philippines, were rendered nonoperational or destroyed during these air attacks. Consequently, General MacArthur decided to cancel the preliminary Mindanao operations and instead make a direct jump from the Palaus-Morotai line to Leyte on October 20. Shortly after this change in schedule, MacArthur informed the Joint Chiefs that he could advance from Leyte to Luzon by December 20, two months earlier than planned. Meanwhile, the carrier raids on Mindanao and the Visayas strengthened the Southern Army command's belief that the Allies were preparing for an early invasion of the Philippines. As a result, Marshal Terauchi recommended accelerating the reinforcement of the Philippines, activating Operation Sho-Go, and authorizing the 4th Air Army to employ its main strength against enemy carrier task forces. This was in contrast to the current policy of not committing available air strength against enemy raiders, which was failing to conserve Japanese air power for a decisive battle. However, Tokyo denied these last two requests while also receiving concerning reports about General Kuroda's neglect of his duties as field army commander. In the middle of September, IGHQ decided to replace General Kuroda with General Yamashita. Not only did General Kuroda have a concept of the Philippine operations that differed from that of his superiors, but he was charged with neglecting his duty as field army commander. Lt. Col. Yoshie Seiichi of the Personnel Bureau of the War Ministry, who had been sent to the Philippines to investigate personnel matters in the Southern Army, said of the incident: “Stories reached the War Ministry that Lt. Gen. Kuroda was devoting more time to his golf, reading and personal matters than to the execution of his official duties. It appeared that his control over staff officers and troops was not sufficiently strong and that there was a good deal of unfavorable criticism of his conduct among the troops. There were also indications that discipline was becoming very lax. On September 4, I left Tokyo under orders . . . to investigate. As a result I obtained many statements substantiating the unfavorable stories in regard to Lt. Gen. Kuroda. The recommendations of all the staff was that Lt. Gen. Kuroda be relieved as soon as possible, and be replaced by Gen. Yamashita . . . who was a superb tactician and excellent leader.” Random note, for those interested, over on my personal podcast at the Pacific War Channel I did a single episode covering how Yamashita became the Tiger of Malaya and plan to do more pieces on him as I find him to be one of the more interesting generals of the Pacific War. Before an effective change in command could take place, the Japanese were about to experience a more dramatic display of Allied offensive power that they would soon encounter in the Philippines. On September 18, Mitscher's Task Force 38 was ordered to head back toward the islands for a major strike against Luzon, the heart of Japanese control in the Philippines. The American carriers achieved complete surprise and successfully attacked Luzon three days later. Despite the fierce defense by approximately 42 Zeros, between 09:30 and 18:00 on September 21, four waves of over 400 aircraft targeted the harbor area and airfields around Manila with bombs and strafing runs. The assault on the harbor and shipping along the west coast resulted in the sinking or severe damage of 34 vessels totaling over 100,000 gross tons, while the raids on the airfields inflicted significant damage on grounded aircraft. At 0610 the following day, 22 September, search planes discovered the enemy carrier groups still lurking off the coast of Luzon, and at 0730 a hit-and-run attack was carried out by 27 Japanese aircraft, with reported bomb hits on two carriers and one cruiser. Naval air units at Legaspi attempted to carry out a second attack on the enemy carriers during the late afternoon, but the attack force of 19 planes failed to locate the carrier groups. Following the failed Japanese hit-and-run counterattack, Mitscher continued his assaults on Manila, destroying an estimated 110 aircraft in the air and 95 on the ground, and sinking or damaging 44 vessels. After the apparent withdrawal of enemy carriers, the Japanese decided to relocate their remaining ships in Manila Bay to other anchorages, many of which were directed to the secure docks of Coron Bay. However, Mitscher's carriers returned on September 24 to launch further strikes against Luzon, including a raid by about 96 Hellcats and 24 Helldivers on Coron Bay, which resulted in the sinking or damaging of 10 more vessels. Additional attacks on other targets led to the sinking or damaging of 12 more ships. Despite the ongoing air attacks, the Imperial Japanese Navy still deemed it premature to fully activate Operation Sho-Go, believing the decisive battle would take place in or after late October. Meanwhile, the Imperial Japanese Army accelerated its preparations to defend the Philippines. The reserve 1st Division was ordered to move to the islands immediately, and plans were made to assign ten surface raiding regiments to the area. On September 26, as plans for air reinforcement to the Philippines were being approved, General Yamashita was confirmed as the new commander of the 14th Area Army. He arrived in the Philippines on October 6 and found the situation "unsatisfactory," with poor planning for the Leyte campaign and many of his staff unfamiliar with the conditions in the Philippines. Lt. Gen. Makino Shiro, now commanding the 16th Division, which was the major force on Leyte, had directed his efforts since April 1944 toward the construction of defensive positions on the island. The first line of defense, which was on the east coast in the Dulag area, was practically completed by the middle of October. The third defensive line was in the middle of Leyte Valley in the vicinity of Dagami. The second line of defense was between the two others, while the bulk of supplies was assembled in the central mountain range at Jaro. The distribution of the other troops at the time of the American landings was as follows: one battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment in the Catmon Hill and Tanauan district, and the main strength of the 33d Infantry Regiment in the Palo and Tacloban area. The larger part of the 33d Infantry Regiment, which was less adequately trained than the other regiments, had arrived on Leyte in mid-September from Luzon. Its officers were unfamiliar with the terrain and did not fortify their positions. However, the supply situation was favorable, with Manila serving as the main Japanese depot in the region. Following established plans, he instructed his subordinates that the Area Army would "seek decisive battle on Luzon" while in the central and southern Philippines, the focus would be to delay the enemy's advance and prevent them from securing naval and air bases. However, the September air strikes had led to a noticeable increase in guerrilla activity and civil disorder due to widespread destruction and panic. Small Japanese garrisons were attacked, pro-Japanese Filipinos molested and intimidated, and communications disrupted. In central Luzon there were indications that some guerrilla units were planning a move to the Lamon Bay area in order to be the first to cooperate with an American landing force, and on Negros and Panay guerrilla raids on Japanese airfields became boldly persistent. The Fourteenth Area Army feared that, as soon as enemy forces landed, the guerrillas would not only give them direct assistance as scouts and guides, but seriously hamper Japanese operations by attacking rear communication lines. Consequently, martial law was declared across the archipelago in anticipation of enemy landings. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Despite fierce and costly combat, American forces made significant advances in the Palaus, securing critical islands and establishing bases. The battle for Peleliu was marked by high casualties and intense fighting, with heavy losses on both sides. The successful capture of strategic locations like Ulithi Atoll and the subsequent strikes on Luzon further demonstrated Allied dominance and strategic planning in the Pacific Theater.
Last time we spoke about the end of Operation Dan. In Yunnan, by late July, General Wei's Y Force worked to eliminate Japanese garrisons at Tengchong, Mount Song, Pingda, and Longling. The 33rd Army prepared for Operation Dan, anticipating resistance from General Honda's garrisons until September. The fall of Myitkyina prompted Honda to expedite his plans. Reinforcements were expected in Mandalay by September. General Matsuyama's forces, cut off and surrounded, provided support only through radio messages. At Tengchong, Colonel Kurashige vowed to defend against relentless attacks. Chinese forces, after intense fighting and bombing raids, breached the city's defenses. Despite heavy casualties, the Japanese resisted fiercely. Major Kanemitsu's garrison defended Moung Song with dwindling supplies. The Chinese forces employed siege tactics and underground mines to break Japanese strongholds. The Chinese launched coordinated attacks, capturing key positions and ultimately compelling Japanese retreats. This episode is the Invasion of Morotai Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. After the Marianas fell and Sansapor was captured, the Allies set their sights on their next objectives: the Palaus and Halmahera, slated for simultaneous invasion by mid-September. The Japanese had stationed the 14th Division at Palau and the 32nd Division at Halmahera as their primary defenses. The Halmahera-Morotai area had not assumed much importance to the Japanese until early 1944, when they began to develop Halmahera as a focal point for the defense of the southern approaches to the Philippines. In addition to the 32d Division, the Japanese had on Halmahera innumerable service organizations, and they completed or had under construction nine airfields on the island, most of them in northern Halmahera. On that island they concentrated nearly 30,000 men, including at least 11,000 combat troops. On Halmahera, General Ishii commanded approximately 11,000 troops to safeguard nine airfields, despite having already lost most of their air power. Meanwhile, Morotai Island was defended by around 500 Formosans of the 2nd Raiding Unit, led by Major Kawashima Takenobu. General Ishii planned to counterattack from Halmahera if the Allies landed on Morotai, but soon realized Allied air and naval superiority would foil these efforts. Following their defeat in the Marianas, Tokyo reassigned the Bonin Area Group directly under its command and placed the Palau Area Group under the Southern Army, leaving General Mugikura's 31st Army to defend Truk and other isolated outposts. General Inoue fortified Palau with elaborate defenses along the coast and inland, manned by 21,000 Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) troops, 7,000 Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) personnel, and 10,000 laborers. The IJN had by 1944 constructed numerous reinforced concrete blockhouses and bunkers plus dug an extensive tunnel system near the end of the northeast peninsula as well as taking full advantage of Peleliu's natural caves. This elaborate, multi-level tunnel system could shelter 1000 troops. These defenses, tunnels, the airfield, and the many support facilities were built by the 204th, 214th, and 235th Construction Battalions, mostly manned by Koreans and Okinawans. Detachments of the guard forces manned eight 120mm dual-purpose, and about three 200mm coast defense guns. There was no ammunition for the 200mm short guns nor did any ships report being fired on by coast defense guns. The 114th and 126th Anti-aircraft Units manned single and twin-barreled 25mm automatic guns (estimated at 30) and 13.2mm machine guns. A dozen 20mm cannons, removed from destroyed aircraft, were set up on makeshift mounts, mostly around the airfield. His strategy emphasized prolonged attrition over suicidal charges, aiming to exhaust the American forces. In preparation for the intense pre-landing bombardment, Inoue instructed his troops to utilize natural terrain features like coral caves and sinkholes, tactics that proved effective against the advancing Allies.Based in Koror, the Japanese commander stationed Colonel Nakagawa Kunio's 2nd Regiment on Peleliu, the reinforced 1st Battalion of the 59th Regiment on Angaur, and deployed the 15th and 59th Regiments across Babelthuap and other islands. Major-General Yamaguchi Takeo's 53rd Independent Mixed Brigade defended the central islands, complemented by 4,000 personnel from the Imperial Japanese Navy on Peleliu. Prior to General Inoue's arrival in the Palaus, the defense of the Palaus had been under the command of Vice-Admiral Ito Yoshioka. Upon his arrival on Koror, where he established his headquarters, Inoue appointed Colonel Nakagawa Kunio as Peleliu's new commander, with his 2nd Regiment (Reinforced). Nakagawa was a most able commander, possibly one of Japan's finest defensive tacticians, in the same league as General Kuribayashi on Iwo Jima. Nakagawa would make full use of all his defenses and troops on Peleliu, making the Americans pay dearly for every inch, as he had been ordered to do. Although a very capable commander, the appointment of an Army colonel over a Navy vice-admiral caused a great rift between the Army and Navy on Peleliu, which deteriorated into farce. To resolve matters and calm the Navy down somewhat, Inoue sent Major-General Murai Kenjiro from his headquarters on Koror Island to Peleliu to provide the Army with sufficient rank to satisfy the vice-admiral's honor, although the defense of Peleliu seems, to practical purposes, to have remained in the hands of Nakagawa. It appears that Murai, after inspecting Nakagawa's defensive works and battle plans for the defense of Peleliu, was content to let Nakagawa continue without interference from himself, lending only the weight of his rank to acquire the required cooperation of the Navy elements on Peleliu. Nakagawa, divided the island into four defense sectors, each manned by an infantry battalion. His 1st Battalion, alongside the 14th Division Tank Unit and Engineer Company, served as a mobile reserve for counterattacks against potential landings. Meanwhile, Admirals Nimitz and Halsey had been planning Operation Stalemate, targeting Palau since May 29. Originally slated for September 8, General Geiger's 3rd Amphibious Corps would assault Peleliu and Angaur, with General Hodge's 24th Corps landing on Babelthuap. Intelligence was gathered by aerial reconnaissance photographs. Also, in June 1944 the submarine USS Seawolf (SS-197) carried out photographic reconnaissance of the invasion landing beaches. A further reconnaissance was carried out by the submarine USS Burrfish (SS-312) on Peleliu and Yap beaches. An 11-man reconnaissance group of underwater demolition team (UDT) frogmen landed on the Peleliu beaches from the Burrfish for closer investigation relating to water depth, location of potholes and sandbars, and obstacles. With thousands of Japanese on the island they understandably did not reconnoiter inland, and the rugged terrain of the interior would come as an unpleasant surprise to the Marines. A similar operation was carried out on the Yap invasion beaches, but this time only two of a five-man reconnaissance team made it back to the pick-up point. After several unsuccessful attempts to locate their missing comrades the remaining two men returned to the Burrfish. After this incident, Admiral Nimitz banned any further missions of this type. Given delays in the Guam operation, Operation Stalemate was canceled on July 7, replaced by Stalemate II. An unusual staff arrangement was established to plan Stalemate II. IIIAC was committed to take Guam under General Geiger. The IIIAC staff would thus be unable to plan the Palaus operation, which it was to execute. Consequently, Major General Julian Smith, designated to command the Expeditionary Troops, was tasked to plan the operation using his own small staff augmented by some IIIAC staff officers. This temporary planning staff was designated X-Ray Provisional Amphibious Corps. It would plan the operation and IIIAC would execute it – an awkward arrangement, but necessary in order to maintain the increasing tempo of operations. As Commander, Expeditionary Troops, Smith was also to be in control of all ground action in the western Carolines; a position roughly analogous to that of General Krueger of ALAMO Force in the Southwest Pacific. X-Ray was finally dissolved on August 15, 1944. This revised plan scheduled Geiger's forces to land on Peleliu with the 1st Marine Division and on Angaur with the 81st Division on September 15, while the 77th Division remained in floating reserve and the 5th Marine Division in area reserve. Then, on October 8th, the 24th Corps planned to launch an assault on the islands of Yap and Ulithi in the western Carolines. This was aimed at securing an additional airfield and fully neutralizing Truk and the remaining islands in the group. For this operation, Halsey divided his 3rd Fleet into two main echelons: his Task Force 30, which included covering forces such as Admiral Mitscher's Fast Carrier Task Force (now Task Force 38), and Admiral Wilkinson's Task Force 31, the Joint Expeditionary Force. At Peleliu, General Rupertus' 1st Marine Division was to land with five battalions advancing over the White and Orange Beaches on the southwest coast. The 1st Marines were to land on the left, pushing up the western shore to clear Japanese forces from ridges overlooking the airfield; the 5th Marines would land in the center to secure the airfield; and the 7th Marines on the right to capture the southern end of the island. Meanwhile, at Angaur, Major-General Paul Mueller's 81st Division planned a two-pronged amphibious assault. The 322nd Regiment was to land on Red Beach on the northeast coast, while the 321st Regiment would land on Blue Beach about 2000 yards to the southeast. Both forces would then push inland to secure a first phase line approximately 300 yards from the beaches, before continuing their advance west and south. The reserve 323rd Regiment was tasked with a feint landing at Beach Black on the northwest coast, with potential deployment to Ulithi if the Palau operations proved successful. Meanwhile, General MacArthur aimed to establish an airbase in the Halmahera area, strategically positioned between the Vogelkop and Mindanao. This location would provide crucial flank protection against Japanese forces in the Dutch East Indies and support land-based operations for the upcoming invasion of Mindanao. Optimistically, in mid-June, MacArthur had tentatively scheduled the invasion of Mindanao for October 25. Nimitz, however, believed that MacArthur's hope of reaching Mindanao by October 25 was too optimistic. During conferences at Pearl Harbor in July, called at the suggestion of Nimitz to coordinate Southwest and Central Pacific plans for the Morotai, Palau, and Mindanao operations, Southwest Pacific planners learned that less amphibious craft and assault shipping could be made available to them than had previously been anticipated. Moreover, restudy of range and weather factors made it appear somewhat risky to depend upon the ability of Morotai-based aircraft to provide air support for Southwest Pacific forces on Mindanao after carriers had to leave the latter area and before airdromes could be developed there. To obtain adequate land-based air support for the Mindanao invasion force, MacArthur returned to discarded plans to seize air-base sites on the Talaud Islands, about equidistant from Morotai and Sarangani Bay, Mindanao, where the first landings in the Philippines were then scheduled to take place. The employment of amphibious means for the Talaud operation would delay preparations for Mindanao, as would the development of airdromes on the Talauds. Finally, to have the invasion of Mindanao take place much before the middle of November would involve a conflict in timing with anticipated employment of assault shipping and carrier support by Admiral Nimitz for the occupation of Yap and Ulithi in the western Carolines, an operation scheduled for the first week in October. MacArthur therefore revised his program to call for the invasion of Morotai on September 15, the Talauds on October 15, and Mindanao on November 15. As Allied carriers were engaged in the Palau operation, MacArthur needed a target within range of fighters and medium bombers stationed at Sansapor. Thus, Morotai Island was chosen for Operation Tradewind due to its perceived light defenses and ample space for airfield and light naval base facilities. General Krueger selected the 31st Division and the 126th Regiment, totaling approximately 28,000 troops under the overall command of General Hall's 11th Corps, for this operation. Admiral Barbey's Task Force 77, comprising 12 destroyers, 2 APAs, 5 APDs, 1 LSD, 39 LCIs, 12 LSTs, and 12 LCTs, along with a covering force led by Admiral Berkey and an escort carrier force under Rear-Admiral Thomas Sprague, facilitated the amphibious movement. Additionally, Vice-Admiral John McCain's fast carrier group provided support. Anticipating minimal resistance, the landings were planned near prospective airfield sites on the Doroeba Plain in southwest Morotai. General Hall's strategy involved the 155th and 167th Regiments landing on Red Beach on the southwestern coast to swiftly capture the abandoned Pitoe Drome and secure the new Pitoe Airfield site. Meanwhile, the 124th Regiment landed at White Beach, about 1500 yards to the south, to secure the Gila Peninsula and the Wama Airfield site. The reserve 126th Regiment was scheduled to land the following day, with its 1st Battalion initially supporting the 124th Regiment's operations at the beachhead. Both the Palau and Morotai operations were supported by a coordinated strategic air support program. Admiral Hoover's land-based aircraft were tasked with neutralizing Japanese airfields at various islands including Yap, Woleai, Truk, Ponape, Pagan, Bonin, and Marcus Islands. Concurrently, General Kenney's Allied Air Forces reinforced these efforts and targeted enemy air centers in Palau, Mindanao, western Dutch New Guinea, Halmahera, the Talaud Islands, the Moluccas, the Celebes, and the Arafura Sea islands. Additionally, Mitscher's fast carriers embarked on an ambitious campaign, launching strikes from the Bonin and Volcano Islands to the Palaus and Mindanao between late August and the start of the invasions. This strike had a twofold objective: the temporary neutralization of Japanese airfields on those island groups and, more important, the creation of a diversion on the north preceding stronger attacks against targets in the Philippines and western Carolines. Carrier action in the latter area was to begin on 6 September, with strikes on the Palaus, Yap, and Ulithi. The bulk of the carrier forces was to leave the western Carolines on the afternoon of the 8th to take up positions off Mindanao. Japanese airfields on Mindanao presented difficult targets because they were scattered over that large island, but it was believed that the cluster of airfields and associated installations in the Davao area would provide profitable targets for carrier-based aircraft attacks. The Davao and Sarangani Bay areas, as well as Japanese shipping routes from Davao to Zamboanga and thence north toward Manila, were also expected to provide profitable targets. Strikes against airdromes and shipping in the Mindanao area were to be carried out on 9 and 10 September, while on the 10th and 11th part of the carrier force was to hit the Palaus and Yap-Ulithi again. Rear-Admiral Ralph Davison's carrier-launched aircraft struck Chichi Jima and Iwo Jima from August 31 to September 2. The Fast Carrier Task Force continued with strikes on Yap and the Palaus from September 6 to 8, and on Mindanao from September 9 to 10. Enemy air resistance was surprisingly weak throughout these operations, prompting Halsey to redirect plans for a follow-up attack on Mindanao to the Central Philippines. While the Japanese forces in the Philippines hastened to complete preparations against anticipated Allied invasion, enemy carrier-borne aircraft served sudden warning on September 9 that the date of this invasion was fast drawing near. In the first large-scale air operation by the Allies against the Philippines, an estimated 400 carrier planes staged a devastating ten-hour offensive against southern Mindanao, concentrating their attacks on Davao, Sarangani, Cagayan and Digos. Since Japanese air patrols had failed to discover the enemy task force, the attacks achieved complete surprise and inflicted widespread and severe damage to ground installations, airfields, anchorages, and lines of communication. Reconnaissance units of the 1st Air Fleet immediately flew off search missions, which revealed that the attacks originated from three enemy naval task groups boldly maneuvering in the waters southeast of Mindanao. As per the Sho-Go directives, however, the 1st Air Fleet withheld retaliatory action pending further developments. Ground and naval units in the Davao area were nevertheless ordered on the alert to meet the possible contingency that an invasion attempt would follow the air strikes, and the Japanese armed forces throughout southern Mindanao became tense with expectancy. A feeling of nervousness gripped the weak local forces at Davao and rapidly spread to the large Japanese civilian colony. A wave of wild rumors swept the city. On September 10, a second series of heavy enemy raids aggravated this state of alarm. The city and harbor were reduced to a shambles and communications paralyzed. Panic and civil disorder broke out. Less than 48 hours after the termination of the raids on Mindanao, the enemy struck again; this time in the central Philippines. On the morning of 12 September, a navy radar picket station on Suluan Island, in Leyte Gulf, broadcast over the general air-warning net that a vast formation of enemy carrier planes was heading westward toward the Visayas. Since the Suluan Island lookout was only about twenty minutes' flying time from Cebu, the air forces there could not be alerted quickly enough to put up an effective defense. By 0920 the enemy planes were already swarming over the Cebu airfields, where the main fighter strength of the First Air Fleet was based following its transfer from Davao. Although the attacks extended over the entire Visayan area and later took in Tawitawi, in the Sulu Archipelago, the Cebu fields appeared to be the principal objective. In the three days over which this air offensive continued, the First Air Fleet suffered damage to 50 Zero fighters on Cebu alone, while in other areas 30 additional aircraft of all types were rendered non-operational. Flight personnel suffered numerous casualties, and training was disrupted. Heavy damage was also sustained by Army air units. The 13th Air Brigade, made up of Type I fighters, was so hard hit that it had to be ordered back to Japan for regrouping, while the 45th Fighterbomber Regiment was reduced to half strength. In addition, 11 transports totalling 27,000 gross tons and 13 naval combat vessels were sent to the bottom of Cebu harbor.The unexpected weakness in enemy air defenses led Nimitz to reconsider bypassing Yap and Mindanao, instead focusing forces on an early invasion of Leyte. McCain's group continued with attacks on Zamboanga, the Talauds, and Menado en route to Morotai. Meanwhile, between September 1 and 14, Kenney's aircraft conducted heavy raids on Japanese air bases within range of Morotai, effectively isolating the island. Targeted locations included Halmahera, the northern Celebes, Ceram, western New Guinea, and Mindanao. After rehearsals and preparations were completed, Barbey's convoy departed Aitape on September 9. Two days later, they rendezvoused at Maffin Bay with the majority of General Persons' 31st Division. The entire convoy departed the area on September 12, joined the next day by the covering force and escort carriers. The voyage proceeded smoothly, and Barbey successfully reached Morotai on the morning of September 15. Meanwhile, McCain's carrier aircraft conducted a bombing and strafing mission over Japanese air bases in the Manado area, destroying 28 enemy aircraft. Kenney's bombers also struck Japanese air installations on Batjan Island, while Berkey's cruisers and destroyers shelled enemy positions along Galela Bay. Barbey's surface warships conducted a bombardment of the landing area. During the naval and air bombardment, assault ships moved into their assigned positions west of the landing beaches efficiently and without confusion. The initial waves formed quickly and landed the 155th and 167th Regiments on Red Beach at 08:30, followed by the 124th Regiment on White Beach one minute later. Encountering no opposition, the troops swiftly reorganized on shore and advanced toward their objectives inland. By 13:00, the 167th Regiment had secured Pitoe Drome, and by 15:00, Colonel Starr's 1st Battalion had secured Gila Peninsula. Other units also advanced inland, establishing the 2000-yard beachhead line. Although there were some minor skirmishes, the Japanese could not mount significant resistance against the overwhelming Allied force and retreated into Morotai's rugged interior. The day's action resulted in seven wounded among the 124th Regiment and the loss of twelve Japanese soldiers, with one captured. Beach conditions, however, proved unexpectedly poor, severely hindering the unloading efforts. Consequently, starting on September 16, all the LSTs, along with numerous LCTs and LCMs, had to be unloaded at Blue Beach, a favorable landing spot on Pitoe Bay's shores. Simultaneously, as the reserve 126th Regiment was disembarking, Persons resumed advancing inland against minimal opposition. Swiftly, they secured a perimeter around the Pitoe Drome area, spanning over 7000 yards wide and approximately 5000 yards deep. Following this, American patrols were dispatched to eliminate small Japanese groups, radar stations and observation posts were established on various offshore islands and Morotai's coastline, and efforts were made to expand the perimeter to the Sabatai River to accommodate additional bivouacs and supply installations. Leaving Morotai behind, attention shifts to Burma to explore the aftermath of Operation U-Go. Following the decisive victories at Imphal-Kohima, General Slim opted to pursue retreating Japanese forces toward the Chindwin River, despite the need for rest among his weary British-Indian divisions. Consequently, the 23rd Division spearheaded the pursuit to Tamu, at the head of the Kabaw Valley, where Major-General Charles Fowkes' 11th East African Division took over in early August. Meanwhile, to the south, General Evans' 5th Division pressed toward Tiddim, encountering stubborn resistance from General Tanaka's 33rd Division. Slim's strategy aimed for both divisions to eliminate remaining Japanese forces west of the Chindwin and converge at Kalemyo. Subsequently, the Tiddim road would be abandoned as a supply route in favor of the Kabaw Valley and aerial resupply drops. As a result, the 31st Division, now led by Lieutenant-General Kawata Tsuchitaro, successfully reached Sittaung. Their mission was to cover the withdrawal of other units in the region. Meanwhile, the 33rd Division faced challenges as it conducted delaying actions along the Tiddim road, with the added threat of East African forces potentially cutting off their withdrawal route towards Yazagyo. Japanese delaying tactics were always the same, and the means of dealing with them was also always the same. A crater would be found beyond which the lead infantry would come under fire and would have to be filled or covered using a Valentine bridgelayer, while air strikes would break up the blocking position to allow tanks from 3rd Carabiniers forward to support them. To disrupt Tanaka's communications south of the road, an ad hoc light unit, the Lushai Brigade, was deployed. By mid-August, General Mutaguchi ordered his forces to commence withdrawal towards the Zibyu Range. The 15th and 31st Divisions were directed to cross the Chindwin River by August 25, despite shortages of small boats. At the beginning of the crossing operation, a serious setback was experienced. It had been planned to bring small boats upstream to the crossing area with supplies for the Army and to utilize the same boats to evacuate casualties and heavy weapons south to Kalewa. Because of the enemy air activity over the Chindwin River, it was impossible to bring the boats to the crossing points. As a result, approximately 3000 sick and wounded were forced to cross the river and continue to the rear on foot with increasingly heavy death losses. By August 31, they were expected to reach the eastern bank of the Chindwin, with the 15th Division consolidating along the Pinbon-Pinlebu line by the end of September and the 31st Division reaching Shwebo by mid-October. By the end of August, key command changes occurred following the setbacks of Operation U-Go. Lieutenant-General Katamura Shihachi replaced General Mutaguchi as commander of the 15th Army, while Lieutenant-General Kimura Heitaro took over from General Kawabe as commander of the Burma Area Army. Kimura Heitaro, noted for his strategic flexibility and acumen, subsequently directed the 33rd Army to secure a defensive line from Lashio to Mandalay, safeguarding the right flank of the 15th Army. The 15th Army, in turn, was tasked with holding the Irrawaddy River from Mandalay to Pakkoku, while the 28th Army was assigned to defend the Yenangyaung oilfields, the Arakan coast, and the Rangoon delta. Meanwhile, on September 12, the 33rd Division crossed the Manipur River and proceeded with their retreat towards the Kabaw valley. They left the 215th Regiment to guard the rear at Tonzang, while units of the 5th Division infiltrated the area between Tonzang and Kalemyo to disrupt Tanaka's withdrawal and mount significant attacks against the 215th. By September 20, the Japanese forces were forced back to Tiddim, where the 214th Regiment covered the retreat of the rest of the division. Simultaneously, the 26th King's African Rifles moved east from Tamu to Sittang, crossing the Chindwin River on September 8 to assess enemy strength across the river and prepare bridgeheads for a broader crossing. Encountering unexpectedly strong resistance, they were compelled to retreat back across the river. Under persistent pressure, the Japanese evacuated Tiddim on the night of October 6. Tanaka consolidated his division in the Kalemyo-Kalewa area by the end of October, while pursuing forces captured Fort White and Kennedy Peak. On October 10, the 4th King's African Rifles launched an assault on Leik Ridge, suffering significant casualties but ultimately securing the main hill twelve days later. Meanwhile, after withdrawing from Mogaung, the 53rd Division regrouped at Mawhun by September 10, where they successfully defended against enemy units until the end of the month. They then retreated towards Pinwe and came under the command of the 15th Army on October 5. Following the Quebec conference in September, a strategic overview of Burma emerged: the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved two plans. The first, codenamed Dracula, proposed an amphibious assault on Rangoon with a target date of March 15, 1945. The second plan, Capital, aimed at the conquest of north and central Burma, with General Slim suggesting an overland capture of Rangoon as part of the operation. Initially skeptical, the Americans reluctantly agreed to Dracula, contingent on ensuring that northern Burma received adequate resources. However, due to Allied setbacks at Arnhem and during the Battle of the Bulge, it became clear that reinforcements from the European theater could not be spared for the Rangoon offensive. Consequently, it was announced that the operation would need to be postponed until after the 1945 monsoon season. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After intense Allied operations in the Pacific, including the capture of the Marianas and Sansapor, attention turned to the Palaus and Halmahera. Japanese defenses were formidable, with significant troop concentrations and elaborate fortifications. Despite setbacks, Allied forces meticulously planned and executed operations, paving the way for further strategic advances in the region.
Last time we spoke about the fall of Guam and actions in New Guinea. General Shepherd's Marines had secured the Orote Peninsula, while General Turnage's Marines pushed the Japanese northwards. General Bruce's 77th Division prepared for an eastward assault, and engineers attempted, but failed, to build a supply road to Yona. Geiger's offensive began on July 31, with Marines quickly capturing Agaña and advancing despite dense jungle and resistance. The 77th Division faced tough terrain but liberated 2,000 Guamanians. The push north continued, facing logistical challenges and mined roads. By August 7th, coordinated attacks cleared key areas, culminating in the defeat of remaining Japanese forces by August 11. Guam was back in American hands although scattered Japanese forces continued guerrilla warfare until the war's conclusion. Thus the Marianas campaign had finally come to a conclusion, and now the allies were adding more bass of operation to hit the Japanese home islands. This episode is the Fall of Myitkyina Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. This week we are diving back over to the northern Burma front. Despite holding Myitkyina through a rainy, muddy summer-long siege, by late July, the Japanese had been gradually cornered into a small perimeter, cut off from all supply lines and running short on ammunition. The situation worsened due to a leadership crisis, between the two Japanese leaders was a matter of semantics. Colonel Maruyama of the 114th Regiment who was in charge of the defense of the city, interpreted his orders to “facilitate the future operations of 33rd Army ‘by securing the vital areas in the vicinity of Myitkyina',” as a call to defend the city street-by-street, house-by-house. When General Minakami of the 56th Division arrived, he pointed out that all Maruyama had to do to satisfy his orders was simply to continue to deny the Allies access to the Ledo-Kamaing road. Minakami thus found himself in a rather difficult position in regard to the command of the Myitkyina Garrison. Maruyama had conducted an excellent defense, was fully familiar with the situation and, because of his position as former commander, exercised considerable authority. Shortly after Minakami's assumption of command, General Honda asked how long Myitkyina could stand. Minakami replied that the garrison might be able to hold out for as long as two months. A few days later, Honda was surprised to receive a second message stating, "The Myitkyina Garrison finds it difficult to hold with the poor defense facilities and meager supplies of ammunition." The Army staff concluded that the first message was undoubtedly Minakami's personal opinion as it reflected his determined character and that the second message incorporated the views of Maruyama who was more cognizant of the actual situation. In order that there should be no doubt as to the importance of holding Myitkyina, Honda sent the following message, "Maj. Gen. Minakami will defend Myitkyina to the death” — a message sent with deep regret and sadness according to the staff officers who wrote and dispatched the order. Heavy casualties had reduced the Japanese forces from around 3,000 to fewer than 1,500, further weakening the garrison's defensive capabilities. This number included the heavily wounded and hospital patients, who could only be evacuated by drifting down the Irrawaddy River on rafts, often intercepted by the unforgiving Kachin Levies. On July 24, eight rafts and a boat laden with Japanese were attacked on the Irrawaddy by Kachins of the OSS Detachment 101. Twenty-four Japanese were killed, two captured, and then it was learned these were hospital patients fleeing Myitkyina. Three more Japanese seized by friendly Burmans revealed that hospital patients were being evacuated by the simple expedient of letting them drift down the river on rafts. As these fierce defenders began to falter, General Wessels felt ready to launch his final push. Reinforced by the 149th and 90th Regiments, the American-Chinese forces made daily gains of several hundred yards during the last days of July, though at a significant cost. As the Japanese-held area shrank, counterattacks became less dynamic, captured positions were less fortified, and many Japanese dead were found to be severely wounded men returned to the line. Unbeknownst to the Americans, the desperate defenders had requested a withdrawal to the east by the end of the month. Though Minakami had intended to fight to the last, he ultimately agreed to preserve his men's lives. On the night of August 1, the Japanese began their escape, crossing the Irrawaddy east of the town. Weighing the many evidences that control of the situation was rapidly passing into their hands, Wessels and his colleagues drafted a new plan of attack. It included an ingenious device, credited to General Pan Yu-kun of the 50th Division. A raiding party, formed into fifteen heavily armed sections, was organized and briefed on infiltrating Japanese lines facing the 50th Division. Having made its way through the Japanese lines in darkness, it was to remain hidden until 0430 when the 50th would assault while the raiders spread confusion behind the Japanese lines. Meanwhile, air reconnaissance revealed many rafts moored against the Irrawaddy within the Japanese lines. "At 0300 hours (3 August), when the moon went down and rain and thunder set in, the raiding party of the 50th Division moved out. The approach was detected only once and some shots were fired at the raiders, who hit the ground. The Chinese did not return fire however, and after laying low for a while, moved out again quietly and cautiously." While the raiders created confusion behind Japanese lines, the 50th Division launched a full attack, quickly overwhelming the remaining enemy positions and capturing 187 prisoners, thus securing Myitkyina for the Chinese. However, about 800 Japanese managed to escape eastward and later rejoined their allies. Minakami was not among them. As the 3rd of August meandered on in a haze of gunfire, blood and rain, Minakami went to sit with his back against a tree. There came the sound of a pistol shot. Japanese officers nearby sprinted to the scene. The general's orderly was in tears. They found Minakami's body erect against the tree trunk, facing northeast, towards Japan. The ten-week siege resulted in approximately 3,000 Japanese killed or captured; 972 Chinese killed, 3,184 wounded, and 188 evacuated due to illness; and 272 Americans killed, 955 wounded, and 980 evacuated sick. Overall, the total American-Chinese casualties in 1944 amounted to 13,618 Chinese and 1,327 American casualties. A week later, the Galahad Unit, reduced to only 130 combat-effective men from the original 2,997, was disbanded. The fall of Myitkyina was General Stilwell's greatest victory, earning him a promotion to full general on August 1, two days before the city fell. The attack was costly in terms of suffering and losses, but the Mogaung-Myitkyina area was a significant prize. It allowed Ledo Road builders and American transport planes to move to Myitkyina and enabled ground forces to link up with other Chinese forces in neighboring Yunnan. As the fighting moved further south down the Hukawng and Mogaung valleys, it became safer for transports to use the lower, more southerly routes to China. This, in turn, increased Hump deliveries to China from 13,686 tons in May to 18,235 tons in June and 25,454 tons in July. While the Allies celebrated victories in northern Burma, the situation in China was dire as the Ichi-Go offensive resulted in many Chinese casualties. By August 1, General Yokoyama had amassed 110,000 troops around Hengyang, equipped with five heavy artillery pieces, fifty mountain artillery pieces, and 40,000 shells. Conversely, General Fang's resilient defenders had dwindled to 3,000 exhausted troops, with their defenses largely destroyed. General Xue Yue's reinforcements had failed to reach Hengyang, leaving the Chinese forces to rely on the 46th Army to launch an attack along the railway. On August 4, Yokoyama initiated his main offensive. The 68th and 116th Divisions launched a significant assault from the south and southwest, while the 58th Division quietly positioned itself near the enemy's northern defenses. Initially, progress was slow. However, by August 5, Yokoyama's forces had captured Yoping and School Hill. The next day, the 116th Division secured part of the city's defenses. On August 6, the 58th Division breached the city walls from the north, forcing Fang to redeploy troops to counter this new threat. Intense street fighting broke out on August 7 as the defenders valiantly tried to repel the Japanese attacks. By nightfall, the 68th Division had overrun the southern defenses and entered part of the Walled City. Gradually, enemy troops began to surrender, and before dawn on August 8, after 48 days of fierce resistance, Fang was compelled to surrender. Following the capture of Hengyang, Yokoyama declared the successful completion of the initial phase of Operation Togo and promptly began preparations for the subsequent offensive. In this phase, the Japanese reported casualties of over 3860 killed, 8327 wounded, and 7099 sick, with an estimated Chinese casualty count exceeding 100,000, including 8400 killed and 5000 captured in Hengyang alone. To spearhead the next stage of Operation Togo targeting Guilin and Liuzhou, General Okamura Yasuji's 6th Area Army was established on August 25, comprising the 11th, 23rd, and 34th Armies, along with the 27th, 40th, 64th, and 68th Divisions, alongside additional support units. This allowed General Hata to focus on countering potential American landings on the Chinese coast while Okamura directed the offensives in eastern China. Ahead of this operation, Lieutenant-General Tanaka Hisakazu of the 23rd Army initiated a preliminary offensive in late June, positioning the 23rd Independent Mixed Brigade in the northeastern sector of the Luichow Peninsula, advancing the 22nd Independent Mixed Brigade to the Tanjiang River, securing the Jiangmen area with the 22nd Division, and capturing the Qingyuan sector with the 104th Division. By late August, Yokoyama had deployed six divisions along the Shuangfeng-Leiyang line, poised to eliminate the enemy in the district west of Hengyang. On August 29, he launched the offensive, with over 100,000 troops advancing southwest amidst heavy artillery bombardment. Intense ground and aerial combat ensued, resulting in the loss of 10 Japanese planes and 15 enemy aircraft. Despite fierce resistance from Chinese defenders over three days, their entire line collapsed on September 1, prompting a retreat towards Shaoyang, Qiyang, and Jiahe. However, the Japanese advanced relentlessly, covering nearly 100 kilometers in the following days without pause. By September 5, both Qiyang and Huochangpingzhen had fallen, followed by the seizure of Lingling Airdrome on September 8 by the 3rd Division. Progressing along a north-south axis, Japanese forces secured Shaoyang and Changning, while the 58th Division captured Dongan on the same day. With initial objectives achieved, Yokoyama ordered further pursuit, with the 3rd and 54th Divisions converging in the Quanzhou area by September 14. Meanwhile, Tanaka prepared for his offensive, with the bulk of the 104th Division moving towards Taipingzhen, and a raiding unit conducting a wide envelopment maneuver along the Zhukeng-Huaiji road towards Wuzhou by September 6. Subsequently, the 23rd Brigade began its northward march from Suixi. However, Tanaka's offensive wouldn't commence for a couple of weeks. Turning to the broader context of the Pacific War, General Stilwell celebrated a major victory with the fall of Myitkyina, while General Slim's successful defense against Operation U-Go further bolstered Allied morale in the CBI Theater. In Thailand, Prime Minister Phibun's regime faced a significant crisis as Japan struggled to meet the country's essential import needs, leading to inflation, rationing, shortages, black markets, smuggling, corruption, and profiteering. The anti-Japanese Free Thai underground movement, spearheaded by Regent Pridi Banomyong, infiltrated the government, stoking public discontent against both the Japanese occupiers and Phibun's administration. As a result, following the downfall of the Tojo government, Phibun found himself compelled to step down in late July. For his part, Phibun also was thinking of ways, he claims, to prepare to turn against the Japanese. Part of these preparations included proposals to move the capital to remote Phetchabun, north of Bangkok, and construct a “Buddhist City,” a sort of center for world Buddhism, near Saraburi—both grandiose projects in typically extravagant Phibun style. Moving to the isolated, mountain-ringed Phetchabun, Phibun later argued, would facilitate a Thai uprising against the Japanese. Yet on July 18, the Tojo government in Japan resigned, and only six days later the Thai National Assembly turned down both government bills and forced the resignation of Phibun as prime minister. The deputies in the assembly voted against these plans motivated in part by the fall of Tojo, who was closely associated in their minds with Phibun, in part by their feeling that the war was turning against Japan, and in part by their feeling that Phibun was too closely identified with an authoritarian past that must now be buried for the sake of improving relations with the Allies. Politician Khuang Aphaiwong then assumed his position as Prime Minister on August 1. Serving as a compromise candidate, he navigated between Phibun's supporters and the opposition while maintaining cooperation with the Japanese and safeguarding Free Thai members who had collaborated with the Allies. Meanwhile, in China, the success of Operation Ichi-Go led to another leadership crisis. Despite the initial rejection of Stilwell commanding troops in China in 1942, the effective Japanese offensive posed a threat of defeat to the Chinese Government, reigniting the debate over command authority. This was especially significant as Chinese troops under Stilwell's command were achieving significant victories in northern Burma. However, Stilwell's vocal criticism of Chiang Kai-Shek's corrupt regime and incompetent generals strained their relationship. Chiang favored General Chennault, who proposed that with a monthly allocation of 10,000 tons for operations in northern China, his 14th Air Force could halt the Japanese offensive. Despite his strained relationship with Chennault, Stilwell redirected Hump allocations to increase the 14th Air Force's allocation to 8,425 tons, although he couldn't secure an additional 1,500 tons from the Matterhorn allocation. Chennault's aircraft managed to disrupt the Japanese advance, but failed to halt it completely. In late June, Stilwell faced criticism when Vice-President Henry Wallace visited Chongqing. While Wallace persuaded Chiang to allow a small American observer mission into Communist territory, he also recommended Stilwell's recall due to his perceived lack of diplomacy and strained relations with the Chinese leadership. Nonetheless, Stilwell maintained the backing of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and President Roosevelt eventually nominated him to lead the China Theater, on the condition that he make every effort to avoid upsetting the Generalissimo. In July, the President attempted to persuade Chiang to accept this arrangement, but the Generalissimo employed various diplomatic maneuvers to reject the proposal, agreeing "in principle" only after an unspecified period for his forces to adjust. He also requested the presence of a presidential representative to facilitate smooth relations between himself and Stilwell. Major-General Patrick Hurley was appointed to this role and arrived in China in August. Concurrently, the Dixie Mission arrived in Yan'an, where over the following months, American observers assessed Communist society, military tactics, and guerrilla operations, issuing reports that commended them and suggested increased collaboration. Following the fall of Hengyang, tensions escalated in China, with rumors swirling about potential coup plans involving Marshall Li Zhongren and General Xue Yue against the Generalissimo. Meanwhile, Chennault urged Stilwell to divert Hump airlift capacity to supply ground forces in eastern China, a move opposed by Chiang, who feared supporting potential insurgents with lend-lease equipment. Stilwell, anticipating his imminent assumption of leadership in the China Theater, refrained from challenging Chiang's stance. With significant developments looming, the intensifying rift between Stilwell and Chiang foreshadowed the downfall of one of them. Elsewhere in the South Pacific, General MacArthur's troops had finished their final offensive in New Guinea and were preparing to return to the Philippines by way of an intermediate stop at Halmahera Island. To the east, Rabaul was completely surrounded, enduring heavy bombardment from Allied air forces. Meanwhile, on Bougainville, the remaining forces of the 17th Army had retreated to the island's southern region, unable to launch further counterattacks. The living conditions of the Japanese soldiers, never good under the best of circumstances, became increasingly desperate. Added to the dangers that forward troops always faced, such as contact with large American combat patrols, was the growing specter of starvation. Sealed off from regular supplies from New Ireland or New Britain, General Hyakutake's army had to depend entirely on its own laborers to acquire food. The normal rice ration of 750 grams of rice for each soldier was cut in April 1944 to 250 grams, and beginning in September there was no rice ration. A large portion of the available army and naval personnel had to be put to work growing food. Allied pilots took delight in dropping napalm on these garden plots whenever possible. The native workers who had been impressed into service were the first to defect, but soon many soldiers also just walked away from their units, taking the chance of surviving in the jungle on what could be gathered. After the failure of the March attack, morale in most units became deplorably low. There were instances, normally unimagined in the Japanese army, of open insubordination and even mutiny. Although General Hyakutake dreamed of a midsummer offensive, it became obvious that no operations as large as that smashed in March could be undertaken for months, if ever. Thus, almost as if by agreement, both sides adopted a defensive posture that minimized the conflict in the no-man's-land between them. In the Central Pacific, significant progress had been made over the past year, marked by the complete capture of the Gilbert, Marshall, and Mariana Islands, strengthening the Allied presence and providing a launching point for future offensives into the heart of the Japanese Empire. The next target for Admiral Nimitz was the Palaus, to be invaded concurrently with Halmahera. However, the architect of this southwestern advance was not Admiral Spruance, who had been overseeing operations with the 5th Fleet. Instead, it was Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet, known as the "Department of Dirty Tricks," that had been strategizing the next moves from Hawaii. Now, Admiral Halsey was set to assume command of the Pacific Fleet, leading the charge to the Palaus and the Philippines. This rotation in leadership between Halsey's 3rd Fleet and Spruance's 5th Fleet was orchestrated by Nimitz to maintain operational tempo and confuse the Japanese. The alternating command structure allowed for continuous planning of future operations while the active fleet conducted current ones. However, Tokyo was apprehensive about a potential invasion of the Philippines and sought to bolster its defenses. Following the surrender of the US Army Forces in the Philippines, the 14th Army, led by Lieutenant-General Tanaka Shizuichi, worked to establish military administration, secure cooperation from civilian institutions, and quell guerrilla groups across the countryside. Despite their endeavors, their control over certain regions, particularly in the Visayas and Mindanao, remained fragile. Allied submarines and aircraft from Australia and New Guinea also delivered supplies like signal equipment, weapons, explosives, propaganda materials, and counterfeit currency to support the guerrilla forces, further impeding Japanese efforts. Additionally, with the deteriorating situation in the South and Central Pacific, more troops were redirected from the Philippines' garrison to other areas, weakening the 14th Army, now commanded by Lieutenant-General Kuroda Shigenori since May 19, 1943. Undermanned and stretched thin, the Japanese halted their suppression operations in August, hoping that the imminent declaration of independence by the Second Philippine Republic would lead guerrillas to surrender. However, this strategy backfired, as the guerrillas only grew stronger during the pause. Consequently, Kuroda restarted intensive suppression operations in 1944, but guerrilla activities escalated in anticipation of the imminent liberation by American forces. As a result, the guerrillas gained strength in the following months, providing valuable intelligence to MacArthur's forces in preparation for their eventual return. Given this context, it was evident that the 14th Army would be ill-equipped to withstand an American invasion under the current circumstances. Due to its crucial strategic location bridging Japan and the southern region rich in natural resources, Japan couldn't risk losing the Philippines. It served as their primary rear base supporting the main defense perimeter. The Philippines were also to play the role of a rear base of operations–an assembly and staging area for troops and supplies and a concentration area for air reserves, to support operations at any threatened point on the main defense perimeter from the Marianas south to Western New Guinea and the Banda Sea area. To implement these plans, IGHQ in October 1943 directed the 14th Army to complete the establishment of the necessary base facilities by the spring of 1944. Major emphasis in this program was laid upon the construction of air bases. The Army alone planned to build or improve 30 fields in addition to 13 already in operational use or partially completed. The Navy projected 21 fields and seaplane bases to be ready for operational use by the end of 1944, expanding its total number of Philippine bases to 33. Line of communications and other rear area base installations were also to be expanded and improved. Of the 30 Army airfields projected in October 1943, six had been generally completed by May 1944, and 24 under construction. Of the 21 projected Navy fields, 15 were still incomplete by then. Consequently, in early 1944, the decision was made to strengthen the garrison in the Philippines. Initially, this involved reorganizing and expanding existing garrison units to establish four new independent mixed brigades. These brigades were primarily tasked with suppressing guerrilla activity, while infantry divisions were assigned to defend against potential enemy landings. However, despite the estimation that at least seven divisions were necessary for the defense of Luzon, the Visayas, and Mindanao, only the 16th Division was available. Additionally, it was deemed crucial to bolster air strength with at least two air divisions, anticipating Allied invasions in Halmahera and Palau before advancing to the Philippines. Plans were formulated in March to deploy reinforcements within eight months. In mid-May, General Terauchi relocated his headquarters to Manila to oversee operations more closely. Concurrently, efforts were made to transport the 30th Division to Mindanao and bring the 4th Air Army to Manila. Furthermore, the Philippines were reinforced with the 2nd and 4th Air Divisions, the latter being tasked with constructing 30 new airfields. In June, approximately 20,000 inexperienced replacements were transported to the Philippines to bolster the recently-formed independent mixed brigades, filling them up to division strength. Subsequently, in July, the 100th, 102nd, 103rd, and 105th Divisions were activated, along with the establishment of the 54th and 55th Independent Mixed Brigades. It's ironic that despite this reinforcement, the main Japanese forces were as inexperienced as the Philippine Army during MacArthur's defense. Nonetheless, Terauchi was resolute in further fortifying the Philippines to prevent its fall, unlike MacArthur's situation. By mid-July, the reinforced 58th Independent Mixed Brigade arrived at Lingayen. Later that month, the 14th Army underwent reorganization into the 14th Area Army, with units directly under its command tasked with defending the northern Philippines. Meanwhile, the 35th Army, led by Lieutenant-General Suzuki Sosaki, was established under the 14th Area Army to defend Mindanao and the Visayas. Additionally, Tokyo finalized plans for decisive battle operations, codenamed Sho-Go, covering the Philippines-Formosa-Ryukyus-Japan-Kuriles area. This determined the disposition of Army and Navy air forces across the Pacific, with the Philippines receiving the reorganized 1st and 2nd Air Fleets and the 4th Air Army. The Philippine garrison was strengthened to a total of nine divisions and four brigades, with the 1st Division at Shanghai and the 68th Independent Brigade at Formosa designated as general reserves. Defenses and fortifications were constructed at Luzon in preparation for the decisive battle there. Known as the Combined Fleet Top Secret Operations Order No. 84, issued on 1 August, this fixed the new tactical grouping of naval forces for the Sho-Go Operations. Almost the entire surface combat strength of the Fleet was included in a Task Force placed under the overall command of the First Mobile Fleet Commander, ViceAdm. Ozawa Jisaburo. This force was broken down into three tactical groups: (1) the Task Force Main Body, directly commanded by ViceAdm. Ozawa and consisting of most of the Third Fleet (carrier forces): (2) the First Striking Force, commanded by Vice Adm. Kurita Takeo and made up of the Second Fleet with part of the 10th Destroyer Squadron attached: (3) the Second Striking Force, commanded by Vice Adm. Shima Kiyohide and composed of the Fifth Fleet plus two destroyer divisions and the battleships Fuso and Yamashiro. The First Striking Force would be stationed at Lingga Anchorage, while the Task Force Main Body and the Second Striking Force would be stationed in the western part of the Inland Sea. However, if an enemy attack was expected, the First Striking Force would advance from Lingga Anchorage to Brunei, Coron or Guimaras while the Task Force Main Body and the Second Striking Force remained in the Inland Sea and prepared to attack the north flank of the enemy task force. During August, the Navy Section of Imperial General Headquarters also took action to give the Combined Fleet more unified operational control of naval forces in order to facilitate the execution of the Sho-Go plans. On 9 August the General Escort Command and units assigned to naval stations were placed under operational command of the Combined Fleet, and on 21 August the China Area Fleet was similarly placed under Combined Fleet command. On 10 August the 1st Carrier Division, reorganized around two newly-commissioned regular carriers, was added to the Task Force Main Body. Vice Adm. Ozawa, Task Force Commander, meanwhile set 15 October as the target date for completion of the reorganization and training of the 3d and 4th Carrier Division air groups. Concurrently with these preparations, steps were taken to strengthen the antiaircraft armament of combat units. Accordingly, the Japanese sought to deploy the 8th and 26th Divisions, the 2nd Tank Division, and the 61st Independent Mixed Brigade to the Luzon region for a decisive battle. However, enemy submarines posed a constant threat. Since February, they had been patrolling the South China Sea, targeting the Hi Convoys supplying Japanese territories in Southeast Asia and Japan itself. During these engagements, Admiral Ijuin was killed aboard the patrol boat Iki. Between August 18 and 25, Admiral Kajioka's Hi-71 convoy, carrying the 26th Division, was attacked by six American submarines. The escort carrier Taiyo, destroyers Yunagi and Asakaze, two oilers, four transports, and three kaibokans were sunk, with 7420 soldiers of the 26th Division lost. The submarine Harder was the only American vessel sunk in retaliation. Kajioka's Hi-72 convoy, returning from Luzon, was also attacked, resulting in the sinking of his flagship, the kaibokan Hirato, and the loss of the destroyer Shikinami, three transports, and one oiler. Despite these setbacks, advance units of the 8th Division, 2nd Tank Division, and 61st Independent Mixed Brigade successfully reached the Philippines in September. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After months the siege of Myitkyina had finally ended. The Japanese had held out as long as they could, but lack of supplies and rather terrible leadership lost them the fight. Meanwhile, in China, Japanese offensives intensified, challenging Chinese defenses and leadership. It seemed war was coming to the Philippines, where the Japanese prepared to fight to the death.
Last time we spoke about invasion of Guam and Tinian. Japanese forces, led by General Obata on Guam and Colonel Ogata on Tinian, prepared defenses with trenches, pillboxes, and artillery. The Americans bombarded these defenses extensively. Despite resistance, they successfully landed on Guam and Tinian, securing beachheads. Intense fighting ensued, with Marines facing heavy casualties. Despite Japanese counterattacks, American forces gradually expanded their footholds, leading to the eventual containment of the Japanese on Orote Peninsula. The Japanese launched a fierce assault against Marine positions on Guam, engaging in close combat with heavy casualties on both sides. Despite initial success, the Japanese offensive was repelled by intense artillery and machine-gun fire, leaving the remaining enemy forces to defend Orote Peninsula. On Tinian, after extensive naval bombardment, Marines landed successfully, repelling Japanese counterattacks and establishing a beachhead. Despite heavy Japanese casualties, the Marines suffered relatively few losses, ultimately breaking the enemy's resistance. This episode is the Battle of Sansapor Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Following the successful capture of Noemfoor and Biak, the Allies possessed ample air and supply bases to advance to the Vogelkop Peninsula, fulfilling General MacArthur's aim of establishing a vital airbase supporting further operations northwestward, potentially towards Mindanao or via Halmahera. Initially considering Manokwari as a non-critical objective, MacArthur's plan centered on seizing Sorong and Waigeo Island for crucial supply and air bases in New Guinea. However, the rapid pace of Pacific theater operations raised doubts about the feasibility of bringing the Klamono oilfields into production before the war's end, prompting the cancellation of exploitation plans by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs assumed responsibility for the direction and coordination of oil rehabilitation projects in the Dutch East Indies and undertook necessary liaison with British and Dutch agencies. By mid-February 1943 they had decided that military units would at least start all oil rehabilitation and exploitation projects in the Indies, although the final development of the oil resources might be left to civilian agencies. MacArthur was instructed to plan the location and timing details of oil rehabilitation projects in the Indies, and, subject to the Joint Chiefs' approval, execute those plans. At the same time, the Joint Chiefs directed that the organization of special military petroleum production and refining units begin. The requisite troops, most of them US Army engineers and many especially recruited from civilian pursuits, soon began to assemble and train in California. Orders were also placed with manufacturers for the special production and refining equipment, which was sent to California as it was obtained. While these steps were being taken to coordinate oil rehabilitation projects, it had become obvious that in accordance with MacArthur's plans the first significant oil producing region that could be recaptured in the Netherlands East Indies would be the Klamono district on the Vogelkop Peninsula. The Klamono oil was especially valuable in that it could be used as fuel for naval vessels without refining beyond a little "topping" to remove excess naphtha. With limited effort, the wells could be expected to bring in some 16000 barrels of crude oil per day; with additional development, about 25000 barrels. Such production would presumably save the Allies considerable shipping space and time, for, instead of the long haul from United States ports, navy bunker fuel could be produced and topped as necessary much nearer to the scene of combat. With the oilfields no longer a priority and aerial surveys indicating unsuitable conditions for airstrips on Waigeo, MacArthur opted for ground reconnaissance of the Mar-Sansapor area. This exploration revealed promising landing beaches and potential airfield sites, albeit requiring significant effort to develop. Consequently, MacArthur directed Alamo Force to secure the lightly-defended Sansapor-Mar area instead of Sorong-Waigeo, scheduling a landing for July 30. General Krueger tasked General Sibert's 6th Division with Operation Typhoon, designating the 20th Regiment at Wakde-Sarmi as reserve and arranging relief by Major-General John Persons' 31st Division. Admiral Fechteler's Task Force 77 had devised a strategy: to deploy Colonel Forbie Privett's 1st Regiment, consisting of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, onto the Red Beaches northeast of Mar. Concurrently, Sibert's 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop was tasked with securing Middleburg Island. Following the landings, airfields were to be constructed at these sites. The subsequent phase involved Privett's 3rd Battalion executing a shore-to-shore movement to establish a PT base on Sansapor's Green Beach, scheduled for the day after the initial landings. To set this plan in motion, the 31st Division commenced unloading operations at Maffin Bay on July 14 and successfully relieved Sibert's units four days later. The two regimental combat teams of the 31st Division, the 155th and the 167th, which operated at Wakde-Sarmi had no previous combat experience but received much valuable training in a series of patrol actions, company-sized scouting missions, and battalion reconnaissances in force. General Persons wanted to mount an offensive to drive the Japanese from a main line of resistance which they had established in the low hills between Metimedan Creek and Sarmi, but the demands for labor at the Maffin Bay staging area and the necessity for committing many troops to the defense of that area made it impossible to assemble sufficient strength for such an attack. Then, by the time the 6th Division's requirements had been met, the 31st Division itself had to begin preparations for another operation. The 31st Division therefore had to confine itself principally to its patrolling missions, both west and east of the perimeter. Patrols east of the perimeter were sent out to hunt down stragglers from the Japanese Hollandia garrison, and most of them, comprising armed natives of the Wakde-Sarmi area, were led by a Dutch officer, 1st Lt. C.J. Sneeuwjagt. Meanwhile, work went on at the Maffin Bay staging area; and during the period July 18-August 31 a daily average of 2,500 tons of various supplies was unloaded at the bay. During the same period the 31st Division lost 39 men killed, 195 wounded, 34 injured, and 3 missing. The division in turn killed 294 Japanese, found 497 dead, and captured 14 others. However, the deployment of the 6th Division faced delays due to heavy congestion in the Wakde-Sarmi area. It wasn't until July 27 that Sibert's combat units began departing from Maffin Bay towards Sansapor. Maintaining the element of surprise was paramount to General Krueger, hence no preliminary naval or air bombardment was conducted in the Sansapor-Mar area. Instead, General Kenney's aircraft targeted Japanese bases at Manokwari, Sorong, and the Halmahera-Ceram-Ambon region. To further deceive the Japanese, Fechteler's convoy took a circuitous route to approach Sansapor, apparently arriving undetected around 05:00 on July 30. As anticipated, no opposition was encountered, and the first wave successfully landed at 07:01. While Privett's troops swiftly unloaded on the mainland, one LST proceeded toward Middleburg Island. By 07:30, it began deploying the amtracs carrying the reinforced 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, which safely landed by 08:00. Encountering no resistance, the island was promptly secured, and the troop regrouped before setting sail for nearby Amsterdam Island, which was also secured unopposed by 11:30. Upon returning to the mainland, following the incident where three unarmed Japanese were killed, Privett's 2nd Battalion proceeded inland and eastward. They successfully established defenses along low hills roughly 800 yards from the shore. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion encountered challenges navigating through dense jungle undergrowth. At 07:40, the 3rd Battalion landed and moved west along the beach to the Wewe River mouth, preparing for the next day's advance to Sansapor. By nightfall, all units were ashore, securing the desired beachhead perimeter. The following day, Privett's 3rd Battalion embarked for Green Beach at Cape Sansapor, meeting no resistance upon landing at 08:44. They then proceeded south along the beach to secure Sansapor Plantation and Village by 10:00. While Cape Sansapor proved unsuitable for the planned PT boat base due to reef-bound shorelines and poor beaches, Amsterdam Island emerged as a promising alternative location. Subsequent operations in the Sansapor-Mar area involved patrolling to eliminate scattered Japanese groups, expanding the beachhead, and safeguarding airfield installations. A significant event occurred on August 3 when 92 sick or wounded Japanese and Formosan troops were captured at a Japanese hospital near Cape Opmarai. Concurrently, General Anami acknowledged the untenable positions on the northeastern Vogelkop and General Ikeda's 35th Division abandoned Manokwari on July 16, embarking on a challenging overland march towards Sorong with limited supplies. Around the same time, General Teshima's headquarters at Manokwari and other small garrisons in the region commenced an overland journey to Windehsi. By August 15, as units of the 35th Division approached the Kor River, the 63rd Regiment moved into the vicinity, engaging in skirmishes with retreating Japanese forces. In these encounters, they eliminated 17 enemy combatants and captured 4. By August 31, the 63rd Regiment had further success, neutralizing 155 Japanese soldiers and capturing an additional 42, with minimal losses on their own side: 3 soldiers killed and 4 wounded. Similarly, patrols from the 1st Regiment on the western flank encountered retreating Japanese forces, resulting in the elimination of 197 enemies and the capture of 154, with only 4 soldiers wounded by the end of August. The total casualties for the Typhoon Task Force amounted to 14 killed, 35 wounded, and 9 injured, while they managed to account for 385 Japanese and Formosans killed and 215 captured. Ikeda's division remnants reached Sorong on August 25 after enduring a grueling 40-day march. Additionally, construction of the Middleburg strip was successfully completed by August 14, and the Mar Drome was slated to be operational by September 3 to accommodate Kenney's fighters and medium bombers. Transitioning to Tinian, following the successful landing on July 24 and the subsequent destruction of the Japanese counterattacking force, General Schmidt's primary objectives for July 25 included landing the 2nd Marine Division and expanding the beachhead. While General Watson's Marines disembarked swiftly, General Cates' 4th Marine Division initiated their advance at 10:00. Colonel Jones' 23rd Marines navigated through dense canefields and underbrush along the coast beyond the O-1 Line. Colonel Batchelder's 25th Marines executed an enveloping maneuver against Mount Maga, securing its summit after intense combat supported by mortars and tanks. Colonel Hart's 24th Marines swiftly moved south and eastward, reaching the O-2 Line. Upon arrival, Colonel Wallace's 8th Marines assumed control of the far left flank and proceeded slowly through the rugged coastal terrain and dense undergrowth toward Ushi Point. Following the successful capture of a Japanese stronghold, the Marines advanced unopposed, advancing 200 yards past O-2 swiftly. However, the day brought hardship for the 14th Marines, facing heavy counter-battery fire resulting in the loss of 13 soldiers killed and 22 wounded. Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 conducted a reconnaissance-in-force of the western Carolines and launched a third raid on the Volcano-Bonin Islands to thwart enemy bomber interference, resulting in the destruction of five ships, damage to others, and the loss of 13 enemy planes for only 16 aircraft lost. The next day, Schmidt's undermanned divisions, later reinforced with 1782 replacements to fill Saipan-related gaps, commenced the advance to the O-3 Line. While the 23rd Marines steadily advanced with minimal resistance towards the vicinity of the O-4 Line, the bolstered 25th Marines cleared Mount Maga and, securing the summit of Mount Lasso, advanced into the O-4A Line virtually unchallenged. Meanwhile, the 8th Marines rapidly secured the Ushi Point flats and its airfield, Colonel Stuart's 2nd Marines swiftly advanced eastward, securing Asiga Point upon reaching the east coast by 12:30, and Colonel Riseley's 6th Marines, after landing, pushed southward to establish a line abreast of the 2nd Marines. On July 27 and 28, encountering minimal opposition, the Marines advanced southward in a concerted effort, with riflemen in formation and skirmishers leading the way. The NTLF G-2 Lieutenant Colonel Thomas R. Yancey came to a conservative conclusion on July 27 that summarized not only that day's enemy situation but the entire operation's enemy situation as well: “Without saying so, he seemed to indicate the importance of all units conducting aggressive patrolling far to the front: To date there have been no indications that our front line units have encountered the 50th Infantry Regiment in force [since the first night's counterattacks]. It is believed that this unit is largely intact and it is known that they are well equipped and seasoned troops. They are capable of intervention at any time and may be expected to offer a strong opposition when encountered.” In the same report, Yancey noted that the "most likely enemy capability" was: "To fight a delaying action, withdrawing to, and organizing further defenses in, the high ground in the southeastern end of the island." Faced with this enigmatic enemy situation, General Schmidt formulated his scheme of maneuver and assigned his objectives on July 27 and 28 to facilitate an irregular "elbowing" advance. From the front lines held on the morning of July 27, Objective O-4 was near for the 4th Division, far for the 2nd Division; once Objective O-4 had been reached, the emphasis would shift--Objective O-5 would be near for the 2nd Division, far for the 4th Division. The Corps' attack on these two days, then, would find the 2nd Division carrying the ball on July 27, the 4th Division on the 28th. On the first day the 2nd Division would push forward at 07:30, the 4th Division at 10:00; on the second day the 4th Division would attack at 07:00, the 2nd Division at 10:00. Variations in these attack hours were consistent with plans to punch first with the left, then with the right. Principal advantage of this arrangement was that the bulk of the supporting fires could be allotted first to one division, then to the other. Not only did the 14th Corps Artillery mass its fires to support the main effort, but two 105mm howitzer battalions of the division executing the secondary attack were also made available to support the principal thrust in each case. Despite the gradual progress made by Cates' Marines as they secured key positions on higher terrain, they successfully reached the O-4 Line by the end of the first day. Simultaneously, Watson's Marines made significant strides on more favorable terrain, aided by tanks, covering a distance of 4000 yards to also reach the O-4 Line. The following day, amidst worsening weather conditions, the 2nd and 6th Marines quickly moved forward to secure the O-5 Line. The weather at Tinian had been unpleasant. Nearly every day featured rain squalls, gusty winds, and ominous clouds. And yet, for Jig-Day and three days following, the seas remained calm enough for reasonably convenient shore activities. The "three days of good weather" that Admiral Hill had considered vital had already expired. On the afternoon of 28 July the weather got worse--much worse. This condition resulted from the effects of a typhoon that built up west of the Marianas and sent its swells and winds against Tinian's west coast. The seas surrounding Tinian changed to a dirty gray-blue as the winds mounted and the waves boiled over one another and grew into larger, uglier masses. Surf roaring against the tiny WHITE Beaches and their rocky flanking shelves forced temporary suspension, at 1800 on 28 July, of all unloading over the beaches. On the left flank, after intense artillery bombardment, Cates' Marines swiftly advanced to the O-5 Line, then, supported by naval forces, resumed their march to secure Gurguan Point and its airfield, advancing to the intermediate O-6A Line, with Jones' 23rd Marines covering a total distance of 7300 yards. On July 29, with half of the island under control, Schmidt directed his forces to push beyond the O-6 Line. Accordingly, the 24th and 25th Marines advanced with minimal resistance and reached the O-6 Line. Although Watson's Marines faced initially light opposition, resistance intensified as they crossed the O-6 Line. The 6th Marines managed to secure advantageous positions just shy of the intermediate O-7A Line, while the 2nd Marines encountered opposition around the Masalog Point hill, halting their progress. The next day, Cates' Marines resumed their southward advance, encountering resistance from Japanese machine-gunners and riflemen entrenched in coastal caves. While tanks engaged the enemy, the 24th and 25th Marines surged forward, effectively securing Tinian Town and its airfield, and eventually reaching the O-7 Line. On the right flank, Watson's Marines also pressed southward, with the 2nd Marines swiftly securing Masalog Hill and advancing along the coast despite heavy machine-gun fire, reaching O-7, while the 6th Marines advanced against sporadic resistance, also reaching O-7. Additionally, the 8th Marines took position at the center of the corps' line. With the capture of four-fifths of the island and over 3000 Japanese either killed or captured, Schmidt's Marines successfully pushed the remaining Japanese forces under Colonel Ogata's command into an unnamed ridge between Lalo and Marpo Points at Tinian's southern end. On July 31, following a massive artillery, air, and naval barrage, the Marines launched another assault to the south. The 24th Marines made significant progress along the coast and on less steep cliffs, securing the road to the ridge top. The 23rd Marines faced stiffer resistance but advanced with remarkable discipline, aided by tanks, gaining high ground. On the right flank, the 2nd and 6th Marines advanced against light machine-gun and mortar fire, reaching the intermediate O-8A Line. In the center, the 8th Marines encountered stronger resistance but managed to establish a foothold on the zigzag road to the top. By nightfall, a 600-yard gap emerged between the 8th and 23rd Marines, which the Japanese could exploit. At 23:00, a banzai charge was repelled; however, at 01:00 on August 1, a 150-man force blocked Wallace's rear road and launched an attack. A counterattack force was quickly organized, driving back the enemy. Ogata's final banzai charge at 05:15 was directed at the left of Company E but failed to breach Marine defenses. Both Colonel Wallace and the enemy commander probably still Colonel Ogata had realized the tactical implications of the cliff-line penetration. Both knew that it provided a route over which thousands of Marines could move into the Japanese rear. The two commanders' reactions were classic. As soon as one of his battalions grasped a toe hold, Wallace exploited the success by committing his reserve there. The enemy commander, as soon as he received word of the penetration, ordered a counterattack to throw the Marines off the cliff and restore the position. Each selected a tactically sound course of action. Only one could be successful. At dawn, as the Japanese began to withdraw, Cates' Marines continued the attack southward, with the 24th Marines reaching the O-8 Line at Lalo Point, and the 23rd Marines, after encountering a sheer cliff, retracing their steps to reach the cliffline in front of O-8. On the right flank, the 8th Marines swiftly advanced to O-8A and moved alongside the 6th Marines toward the cliffs overlooking the water. Finally, the 2nd Marines secured the high ground to prevent enemy escape along the east coast. Despite not reaching Marpo Point, organized resistance crumbled, leading Schmidt to declare Tinian secure at 18:55. Organized resistance had ceased. But on the early morning of August 2, an enemy force–estimated variously from 100 to 250–struck headlong into the command post of the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines. Headquarters personnel, armed for the most part with carbines and pistols (although two automatic rifles were also used), considered the enemy group very well "organized." Initially, personnel of the aid station bore the brunt, but soon everyone in the headquarters group–clerks, communicators, corpsmen, assault engineers, mortarmen, and staff personnel–rallied behind their commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Easley, to defend themselves. The Japanese, carrying rifles, grenades, and machine guns, hurled themselves at the Marines with characteristic violence. As soon as one fell, another took his place. In search of substantial assistance, Captain John R. Steinstra, Headquarters Company commander, dashed to the nearby Company F, 6th Marines, acquired a medium tank and a rifle platoon, and led them back to the fight. Here was welcome reinforcement to the 3rd Battalion Headquarters Group, which had fought the enemy at close quarters for over two hours. The machine barged into the battle with guns blazing, and the tide turned. The battalion executive officer later stated that he considered the tank's appearance "vitally important" to the outcome. Those enemy soldiers who remained on their feet hastily departed the area. Daylight made results of the enemy effort visible: 119 Japanese bodies lay almost side by side in and around the 3rd Battalion command post. But the Marines had also taken casualties, one of the dead being Colonel Easley. Nearly 400 Japanese perished in the week following the island's capture. From August 7 onward, the 8th Marines conducted cleanup operations on Tinian until January 1, 1945, eliminating an additional 542 Japanese at the cost of 38 killed and 125 wounded. Throughout the Battle of Tinian, a total of 5,745 Japanese were killed and 404 captured, while American losses amounted to 389 killed and 1,816 wounded. Similar to Saipan, around 4,000 civilians either took their own lives or were killed, but unlike Saipan, the majority—approximately 13,000 civilians—were interned. On April 15, 1944, there were 16,029 civilians residing on Tinian, out of which 1,658, primarily consisting of women, children, and the elderly, were relocated to Japan prior to the American invasion. Approximately 2,610 civilians lost their lives during the conflict. Journalist Robert Sherrod observed that most casualties occurred due to direct combat, as the Americans heavily utilized artillery, aerial bombardment, and naval attacks, often forcing civilians to seek refuge alongside soldiers. Some perished from diseases, thirst, or hunger. Tragically, some were also victims of atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers, such as being tied together and attacked with grenades. Instances of mass suicide occurred, notably at the "Suicide Cliff," where parents threw their children off the 120-foot precipice, and some civilians were pushed by Japanese soldiers. According to a captured Japanese soldier, a large group willingly perished in caves at the military's behest. By August 1, only 2,468 civilians had been documented, but within three days, this number surged to 8,491. The 2nd Marine Division established a camp for civilians at Ushi Point Airfield, while the 4th Marine Division set up another at the ruins of Churo village, which became a permanent settlement for all displaced civilians. By October 15, Camp Churo housed 10,926 civilians, comprising mainly Japanese and Korean nationals, with nearly half being children under 15 years old. The military administration struggled to provide adequate care due to shortages of relief supplies. Seabees oversaw the construction of temporary shelters initially, which were later replaced by more durable structures using salvaged materials. The internees also supplemented their provisions by salvaging food and cultivating gardens, with Seabees stepping in to provide improvised diesel stoves as firewood became scarce. In late 1945, Admiral Spruance, who succeeded Nimitz as CINCPOA, ordered the repatriation of all Japanese and Korean civilians, a process completed by late 1946. Shifting focus to Guam, by July 25, General Geiger's Marines had secured two beachhead areas, with General Turnage's 3rd Marine Division advancing on the Fonte Plateau and General Shepherd's brigade sealing off the Orote Peninsula. Despite a fierce enemy counterattack on both fronts, Japanese resistance was effectively shattered. On July 26, while mop-up operations continued in General Turnage's sector, General Shepherd's Marines prepared to assault Orote. Following coordinated air, naval, and artillery bombardment, the 4th Marines launched their attack at 07:00, making swift progress. However, the 22nd Marines faced delays due to enemy artillery fire, necessitating the 4th Marines to extend their line to cover the exposed flank. Although the mangrove swamp hindered Colonel Schneider's Marines, they successfully cleared the area by afternoon, establishing contact with Colonel Shapley's forces at RJ 15, albeit with a slight eastern bend in their line. Meanwhile, Shepherd's units encountered mines, pillboxes, and bunkers, halting their advance by nightfall. On the morning of July 27th, the offensive recommenced, yet the 4th Marines encountered difficulties in penetrating the robust enemy defenses without tank support. However, once the mines were cleared, the Shermans neutralized enemy positions, enabling the Marines to take control of the ridge ahead, although they couldn't advance further through the coconut grove. Meanwhile, the 22nd Marines, moving alongside Shapley's 3rd Battalion along the inland road, faced delays due to the swamp. They encountered numerous obstacles including pillboxes, trenches, dugouts, and mines near the old Marine Barracks. Remarkably, the determined enemy abandoned their fortified line around 5:00 PM after a substantial bombardment, allowing Schneider's Marines to swiftly advance ahead of the 4th Marines and seize strategic terrain by nightfall. Following another intense bombardment, Shepherd's forces prepared to attack on July 28th. Despite Japanese resistance, Schneider's tank-supported advance reached the O-4 Line by 10:05 AM, creating a significant gap between Marine regiments. Nonetheless, the 22nd Marines persisted, fighting through the Marine Barracks and halting just 100 yards east of Sumay. Meanwhile, the 4th Marines faced slow progress and fierce opposition, stopping within 150 yards of the airfield. On June 29th, Shepherd launched a final assault after yet another heavy barrage, with both regiments successfully advancing the entire length of the airstrip against minimal resistance, establishing a defensive line 150 yards beyond the strip by 2:00 PM. As the 22nd Marines redirected their efforts to clean up the devastated Sumay area, effectively eliminating the last remaining enemy stronghold the next day, the 4th Marines continued their advance northward, with a combined tank and infantry patrol reaching the tip of the peninsula. With the peninsula now under control, the American flag was once again raised over the ruins of the Marine Barracks.General Shepherd proclaimed “On this hallowed ground, you officers and men of the 1st Marine Brigade have avenged the loss of our comrades who were overcome by the numerically superior enemy three days after Pearl Harbor.” Orote saw over 2500 Japanese casualties, while Marine losses amounted to 115 killed, 721 wounded, and 38 missing. Moving northward, following a failed Japanese counterattack, Takashina's forces were preparing to retreat further into the island's interior, but the Americans were relentless in their pursuit. After regrouping and subjecting the enemy to heavy bombardment, battalions from Turnage's regiments launched an assault towards the Fonte Plateau on July 27, albeit encountering stubborn resistance from the still-active enemy. Meanwhile, Colonel Butler's 3rd Battalion successfully advanced to the D-2 Line on the same day. Following successful defense against several small-scale enemy counterattacks overnight, Turnage initiated the main push towards the objective beachhead line on the morning of July 28. The depleted 3rd Marines, with Colonel Craig's 2nd Battalion attached, launched another assault, encountering minimal resistance and securing the D-3 Line by afternoon, thereby completely controlling the abandoned Fonte area. Further bolstered by the 3rd Battalion, 307th Regiment, the 9th Marines made progress in their attack towards the strategic Chachao-Alutom-Tenjo ridgeline, marking a significant initial victory. Simultaneously, the 2nd Battalion, 307th Regiment, supported by units from the 305th Regiment, advanced towards Mount Tenjo from the south. Under the protective cover of artillery neutralization fire, Craig's 3rd Battalion effectively demolished a concrete emplacement at the center of Mount Chachao's summit and swiftly secured the beachhead line adjacent to Mount Alutom. Simultaneously, General Bruce's infantry units swiftly captured Mount Tenjo, with Craig's 1st Battalion joining them by day's end. The 21st Marines faced minimal resistance, eliminating remaining enemy pockets around the radio towers and reaching the designated beachhead line. Thus, Turnage's attack objectives were achieved, extending the beachhead line across the entire front. Additionally, the 21st Marines overran the 29th Division command post near the Fonte River, resulting in Takashina's demise as he supervised his retreating units. Consequently, General Obata assumed direct command of the remaining forces, adhering to Takashina's plan for a strategic withdrawal to Mount Santa Rosa, with delaying positions established at Finegayan and Mount Barrigada. The Japanese launched eleven localized counterattacks against Turnage's beachhead line on July 29, all of which were successfully repelled, inflicting 800 casualties on the attackers. The 3rd Marine Division then focused on consolidation and reorganization for the remainder of the day while rear areas were cleared of enemy presence. In the meantime, as the 306th Regiment secured the unoccupied Mounts Alifan and Taene, Bruce had also dispatched several patrols to the southern end of the island since July 27, successfully discovering by the end of July that the sector had been completely abandoned. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The allies chose to focus on the Vogelkop Peninsula over the Klamono oilfields, as MacArthur's focus shifted to the Mar-Sansapor region for airfield development. The Marines faced a horror show in Tinian but managed to secure her while progress was made on Guam. The Americans were clawing ever closer to the Japanese home islands.
Last time we spoke about battle of Noemfoor. General MacArthur initiated a successful offensive on Noemfoor, with General Patrick's troops securing a beachhead. American forces encountered minimal resistance, occupying key positions. Despite initial skirmishes, American defenses held firm, inflicting heavy casualties. Meanwhile, in Aitape, ongoing clashes saw American forces repelling Japanese assaults. Despite setbacks, American defenses held, and preparations for a counteroffensive were underway. The Japanese breached American lines, occupying a 1300-yard gap but faced intense resistance. Martin ordered counterattacks and reorganization of forces along the X-ray River-Koronal Creek line. Despite some delays, American forces repelled Japanese assaults. In the Battle of Imphal, British-Indian troops repelled Japanese attacks, leading to their retreat. Operation Crimson saw successful naval and air assaults on Japanese positions, though with some setbacks. Admiral Somerville's diplomatic transfer followed, amidst reorganization of SEAC's higher officers due to internal conflicts. This episode is the First Bombing Campaign against Japan Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Our week's story first takes us over to the China Theater. Last time we spoke about China, the 11th Army's progress was halted at Hengyang in early July due to the resilient defense led by General Fang and a severe shortage of ammunition. General Yokoyama had to pause the offensive until his artillery unit could arrive to bolster the siege. Meanwhile, the 64th Division was dispatched to Changsha to relieve garrison duties. Despite these setbacks, the 13th Division secured Leiyang by July 4, and the 40th Division took control of Yongfeng on the same day, followed by Zhajiang on July 6. Although Hengyang was nearly surrounded, the Japanese forces had to entrench due to lack of supplies, which were delayed and harassed by General Chennault's aircraft. Seizing this opportunity, General Xue Yue sent reinforcements and launched counterattacks against the besiegers. The 58th Army recaptured Liling on July 8 before being pushed back by the 27th Division two days later, while the Chinese forces began encircling Maoshizhen from the southwest by mid-July. By July 10, Yokoyama had received sufficient artillery and ammunition to resume the attack on Hengyang. Despite heavy air and artillery support, the 116th Division's assaults from the southwest failed to breach Fang's defenses once again. On July 15, the Japanese launched another assault, this time managing to displace the exhausted defenders from their outer positions and into the city itself. Two days later, the 13th Division also gained control of the airfield on the east bank of Hengyang and strategic points along the railway near the town. Despite these territorial gains, they were deemed insufficient considering the significant loss of life endured during the intense fighting of that week. Consequently, Yokoyama decided to pause the offensive once more on July 20, intending to concentrate his forces around Hengyang. The 40th and 58th Divisions were already en route to reinforce the front lines. However, during this period, two significant aerial operations occurred. Initially, following the bombing of Yawata, General Arnold ordered a subsequent night raid on Japan to underscore that Operation Matterhorn marked the beginning of a sustained bombing campaign, distinct from the isolated nature of the Doolittle raid. This was followed by a 100-plane attack on Manchuria and a 50-plane attack on Palembang. Two days after the Yawata show General Arnold informed Wolfe that, despite the depleted fuel stocks in China, it was “essential” to increase pressure against Japan. Immediate objectives were: a major daylight attack on Anshan, small harassing raids against the home islands, and a strike against Palembang from Ceylon. When Arnold asked for an estimate of the command's capabilities, Wolfe's reply was none too hopeful. With low storage tanks at Chengdu (only 5000 gallons) he could not with his own resources build up for an all-out mission to Anshan before August 10. Ceylon fields would not be ready before July 15, and either the Palembang mission or the night raids would delay the Anshan attack. In spite of Wolfe's cautious estimate, Arnold on June 27 issued a new target directive calling for a 15-plane night raid over Japan by July 10, a minimum of 100 planes against Anshan between by July 30, and a 50-plane mission to Palembang as soon as Ceylon airfields were ready. To meet this schedule, Wolfe was admonished to improve radically the operations of C-46s and B-29s on the Hump run. He outlined conditions necessary for fulfilling the directive: build-up of his B-29 force and a flat guarantee of ATC Hump tonnage. Even when it was decided that the command would get back its 1500 tons for July, Wolfe's operational plan set up the Anshan mission for 50 to 60 B-29s, not 100 as Arnold wanted. Arnold received this plan on July 1. On the 4th General Wolfe was ordered to proceed immediately to Washington to take over an “important command assignment” and two days later he departed. Thus General Wolfe was in reality sacked, leaving General Saunders to assume temporary leadership. Subsequently, on July 7, the requested night raid was carried out, involving 18 B-29s targeting the Sasebo Naval Base, with an additional six attacking other sites in Nagasaki, Omura, Yawata, and Tobata. Of the 24 bombers, 11 successfully bombed Sasebo using radar; individual planes struck Omura and Tobata, while the B-29 assigned to Yawata inadvertently bombed the secondary target at Laoyao harbor. Two other bombers, experiencing fuel-transfer issues, redirected to bomb Hankow, narrowly missing it by 20 miles. Despite witnessing explosions in all targeted areas, the damage inflicted on Japanese infrastructure was minimal. Only one bomber sustained damage, yet the successful attack heightened panic within the Home Islands. After the disastrous loss of Saipan, it was clear to many of Japan's elite that the war was all but lost. Now Japan needed to make peace before the kokutai and perhaps even the Chrysanthemum Throne itself was destroyed. Tojo had been thoroughly demonized by the United States during the war, thus for the American people, Tojo was clearly the face of Japanese militarism. It was thus inconceivable that the United States would make peace with a government headed by Tojo. British historian H. P. Willmott noted that a major problem for the "doves" was that: "Tojo was an embodiment of 'mainstream opinion' within the nation, the armed services and particularly the Army. Tojo had powerful support, and by Japanese standards, he was not extreme." Tojo was more of a follower than a leader, and he represented the mainstream opinion of the Army. This meant his removal from office would not end the political ambitions of the Army who were still fanatically committed to victory or death. The jushin, elder statesmen, had advised Emperor Hirohito that Tojo needed to be sacked after Saipan and further advised against partial changes in the cabinet, demanding that the entire Tojo cabinet resign. Tojo, well aware of the efforts to bring him down, sought the public approval of the Emperor Hirohito, which was denied. Hirohito sent him a message to the effect that the man responsible for the disaster of Saipan was not worthy of his approval. Tojo then suggested reorganizing his cabinet to retain his position, but was rebuffed again. Hirohito said the entire cabinet simply had to go. Once it became clear that Tojo no longer held the support of the Emperor, his enemies had little trouble bringing down his government.The politically powerful Lord Privy Seal, Marquis Kōichi Kido spread the word that the Emperor no longer supported Tojo. Thus after the fall of Saipan, he was forced to resign on July 18, 1944. Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa and General Koiso Kuniaki were appointed by Hirohito to form a new government, with Koiso ultimately becoming Prime Minister as Tojo's replacement. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Shimoyama Takuma's 5th Air Army discovered Chennault's aircraft and two Chinese squadrons concentrated at Guilin airfield on July 13. Seizing this opportunity, Shimoyama launched a daring raid that caught the Allies off guard, resulting in 80 aircraft destroyed on the ground. Despite this initial setback, Chennault's P-51 Mustangs maintained superiority over the Zero, downing 88 Japanese aircraft in the following weeks at the cost of 27 Allied planes. In Hengyang, preliminary artillery bombardment commenced on July 27 as Yokoyama's forces prepared for their final offensive. Despite minor attacks in the subsequent days, little progress was made while the Japanese awaited the arrival of the 58th Division. Concurrently, the 27th and 34th Divisions advanced towards Lianhua to eliminate the 58th Army, resulting in heavy casualties and their subsequent withdrawal. By August 1, Yokoyama had amassed 110,000 troops around Hengyang, along with heavy artillery and mountain artillery pieces. In contrast, only 3,000 exhausted Chinese troops remained, valiantly resisting despite being cut off for over a month. Returning to Matterhorn, Arnold insisted on a meticulously planned daylight attack involving 100 planes to be executed in July. Saunders managed to fit in the Anshan strike at the month's end by delaying Palembang until mid-August. The primary target was the Showa Steel Works at Anshan in Manchuria–specifically, the company's Anshan Coke Plant, producing annually 3793000 metric tons of metallurgical coke, approximately ⅓ of the Empire's total. About half of this was used by Showa's own steel works, second in size only to Imperial's, and the rest for various industrial purposes in Manchuria, Korea, and Japan. The secondary target was Qinhuangdao harbor whence coking coal from the great Kailan mines was exported to Japan. Tertiary target was the Taku port near Tianjin, which handled coal, iron ore, and pig iron. And as a last resort, bombers were to hit the railroad yards at Zhengxian, a possible bottleneck along a Japanese supply route. Aiming point at Anshan, as at Yawata, was to be a battery of coke ovens and again the bomb load was set at eight soo-pound GPs per plane. Consequently, on July 25, 111 B-29s began staging to China, with 106 successfully arriving four days later. However, on July 29, only 72 B-29s managed to take off for the Anshan strike due to rain muddying the runway at Guanghan, preventing the 444th Group from launching. Mechanical issues further hindered eleven bombers from reaching Anshan, resulting in one bombing Qinhuangdao, two targeting Zhengxian, and four hitting other targets of opportunity. Despite these challenges, the sixty B-29s that reached Anshan maintained formation and bombed from altitudes close to the designated 25,000 feet under clear skies. However, the first wave mistakenly bombed a by-products plant adjacent to the aiming point, enveloping it in thick smoke. Anti-aircraft opposition was relatively light, with heavy flak damaging five B-29s and Japanese fighters downing only one bomber, whose crew escaped with the help of Chinese guerrillas. B-29 gunners claimed three probable hits and four damaged Japanese fighters. Chinese forces aided in rescuing a stranded bomber near Ankang. The plane was on the ground for five days while an engine, spare parts, tools, and mechanics came in by C-46 from Hsinching to effect an engine change and other repairs. Air cover was furnished by 14th Air Force fighters, who shot down a Lily bomber during a night attack. With full assistance from the Chinese and American garrisons at Ankang, the B-29 took off on August 3 and returned to Chiung-Lai. Another B-29 crash-landed in Vladivostok. Fortunately, on July 30, the wet strip at Kwanghan had dried sufficiently to launch 24 bombers of the 444th, albeit nearly five hours behind schedule. However, they were too late for Anshan, with 16 bombing the Taku port and three targeting Zhengxian instead. The day's efforts, though not flawlessly executed, brought encouragement to the command. American reconnaissance reported significant damage at Anshan, including hits and near misses on several coke-oven batteries, related installations, and the by-products plant. Taku and Zhengxian also showed substantial damage. The command gained valuable insights into conducting daylight missions, and despite the loss of five B-29s, it was deemed acceptable. That is all for now for the China theater as we now need to jump over to Burma. Meanwhile, in north Burma, General Wessels decided to resume the offensive on July 12. Following a heavy air and artillery bombardment, a coordinated attack was launched, supported by 39 B-25s and the 88th Fighter Squadron, which successfully dropped 754 tons of bombs on Myitkyina. However, approximately 40% of the bombs landed among American troops north of Sitapur, resulting in casualties and confusion. Consequently, the coordinated attack stalled, with minimal gains by the 88th and 89th Regiments. Subsequently, Wessels' forces reverted to patient day-by-day advances, pushing back Japanese forces gradually. The tightening grip around Myitkyina was evident, with previously separated units now in close contact, preventing Japanese movement. Further south, General Stilwell directed the weary Chindit brigades to converge on Sahmaw and eliminate the 18th and 53rd Divisions. West African troops fought for control of Hill 60 to the north, while the depleted 111th Brigade engaged in battles at Taungni and the heavily fortified Point 2171. Stilwell also ordered the 300-man 77th Brigade towards Myitkyina, but Brigadier Calvert opted to cut off radio communications and withdraw his men to Kamaing, eventually evacuating them to India. After returning back to Allied lines, Calvert and Lentaigne drove to Stilwell's headquarters, where they found the general at a table with his son and Boatner. Then, speaking with the same sort of blunt honesty that Stilwell prided himself on, Calvert went into a long monologue explaining that despite their crippling losses and lack of heavy weapons, his men had sacrificed so much at Mogaung that now they had nothing left to give. To order the survivors into combat now was to pass nothing more than a death sentence. Stilwell seemed stunned at Calvert's contained monologue. Then his shock turned to scathing anger towards his own staff. “Why wasn't I told?' he demanded. It quickly became obvious to Calvert that Stilwell had not realized the true tribulations his Chindits had gone through since the gliderborne invasion some months ago. As Calvert later wrote: “It became obvious from Stilwell's repeated ‘Why wasn't I told? Is this true?' that his sycophantic staff had kept the true nature of the battle from him.” Overcome with the truth of it all, Stilwell apologized. “You and your boys have done a great job, I congratulate you.” Calvert was then allowed to evacuate his brigade. Their campaign was finally over. The other brigades, nearing the edge of their endurance, didn't experience the same fortune and had to persist in battling against the determined Japanese defenders. With morale faltering, Major Masters' only opportunity for success came through a bold flank attack on July 9 led by Company C of the 3/9th Gurkhas. As the Gurkhas fell back in disarray, savaged by machine-guns firing straight down the ridge, the surviving men scattered, diving into the jungle. Major Gerald Blaker moved on alone, firing his M1 carbine, yelling: “Come on, C Company!” Seeing him, the Japanese threw grenades. Braving the blasts despite an arm savaged by shrapnel, he charged the Japanese. At the last moment, the enemy gunners found the range and a volley of seven bullets plunged into Blaker who fell against a tree, bleeding profusely. He turned his head to call on his men: “Come on, C Company, I'm going to die. Take the position.” The Gurkhas surged forward, bayonets glinting in the dull light, crying: “Ayo Gurkhali, the Gurkhas have come!” Point 2171 then fell into Allied hands. 50 Japanese dead were counted on the summit. Major Gerald Blaker sacrificed his life during the assault and earned a posthumous Victoria Cross. Shortly thereafter, the 14th Brigade relieved the exhausted 111th, which now counted only 119 fit men; and on July 17, Stilwell finally authorized the evacuation of Masters' men. Thankfully, the seasoned 36th Division under Major-General Francis Festing would arrive in the frontline area to replace the depleted Chindits by the end of July, enabling General Lentaigne's remaining forces to be brought back to India. The final to depart were the West Africans, who assisted the British in capturing Hill 60 on August 5, prompting the Japanese to withdraw towards Pinbow and Mawhun. Since the inception of Operation Thursday, the Chindits had suffered 5000 casualties, including killed, wounded, or missing, 3800 of them after Wingate's demise. Their unconventional warfare had effectively diverted numerous potential reinforcements away from Imphal and Myitkyina; severed the 18th Division's supply line, rendering its holding operation futile; and highlighted the importance of air supply as the sole means of sustenance during military campaigns, a lesson pivotal in the 14th Army's subsequent offensives. Shifting focus to Yunnan, by the beginning of July, General Wei's Y Force had successfully halted General Matsuyama's counteroffensive in the Longling region. In the interim, General Kawabe's Burma Area Army was formulating strategies to address the impending aftermath of Operation U-Go's unfavorable results. Following the completion of the 15th Army's retreat in central Burma, plans were set in motion for Operation Ban, a defensive maneuver aimed at countering anticipated Allied advancements along the Irrawaddy River. Concurrently, General Sakurai's 28th Army was organizing Operation Kan in anticipation of potential Allied incursions along the Bay of Bengal coastline. Additionally, General Honda's 33rd Army initiated preparations for Operation Dan, a synchronized offensive designed to repel the invading Chinese forces eastward across the Nujiang River and deep into Yunnan, thus thwarting the establishment of a land route between India and China by the Allies. Consequently, the 2nd Division under Lieutenant-General Okazaki Seisaburo was reassigned to the 33rd Army on July 19 to partake in the offensive, while Matsuyama's 56th Division was tasked with maintaining defensive positions in Yunnan. The 18th and 53rd Divisions were directed to safeguard the western flank against potential assaults originating from Myitkyina. Subsequently, Matsuyama opted to relocate his primary force from Longling to Mangshi, where he planned to rendezvous with Okazaki at a later date. To facilitate this relocation, Colonel Matsui's task force was dispatched on July 5 to dislodge the 76th Division from Mukang. Following a stealthy infiltration behind enemy lines on July 7, Matsui launched a surprise attack the following day, compelling the Chinese forces to retreat. With the route to Mangshi cleared, the 56th Division vacated Longling and began regrouping in the Mangshi vicinity, leaving a modest garrison of 2500 men to secure Longling. Throughout July, the city faced intense aerial and artillery bombardments, culminating in the capture of East Hill by the 87th Division on July 17. Fortunately, Y Force's efforts were now focused on the previously bypassed blocks at Tengchong, Lameng, and Pingda, as the Chinese prioritized securing the flow of supplies to the front lines. At Tengchong, Colonel Kurashige was compelled to abandon Feifeng Hill after his 3rd Battalion departed to join Matsui's task force, leaving him with just 2025 men. Facing him, Lieutenant-General Huo Kuizhang's five divisions spread out around Tengchong, occupying the surrounding heights. Despite attempts at medium-level bombing causing severe damage to the residential area, it only resulted in rubble piling around Japanese positions. Thus, entrenched in their dugouts, the Japanese remained steadfast and successfully repelled Chinese attacks, with the Chinese managing to take Kaoliang Hill only by July 9th. Meanwhile, from the south, the 2nd Reserve Division severed Tengchong from Longling and initiated unsuccessful assaults against Laifeng Hill. By mid-July, with the city completely encircled, Huo was poised to launch a coordinated assault, but heavy rains delayed the operation. Concurrently, with the arrival of the 8th Army at Lameng, General Song aimed to continue his attacks against Major Kanemitsu's garrison. Following a night-long artillery bombardment, the 1st and 39th Divisions fiercely assaulted Japanese positions on July 5th, successfully overrunning some of them and destroying Kanemitsu's main water reservoir. However, despite ammunition shortages, Japanese counterattacks pushed them back to their original positions by nightfall. In the second week of July, Song deployed the 82nd and 103rd Divisions for an attack against Kanemitsu's southwest defenses, initially achieving success but ultimately being repelled by Japanese counterattacks. In the meantime, the Pingda garrison, devastated by cholera, was reaching its breaking point. Consequently, the Matsui Force was dispatched to provide relief on July 11, successfully reaching their designated gathering point northwest of Pingda after a challenging two-day march. On July 13, Matsui's initial assaults only secured the forward positions of the 226th Regiment; however, the following day, they managed to breach the Chinese defenses, delivering much-needed supplies to the Pingda Garrison and evacuating its sick patients. Having performed its mission, the Matsui Task Force started its return trip on the morning of 15 July. The following evening, an enemy group was discovered near Chungchai and the Task Force prepared to attack. Just before the actual launching of the attack, Col. Matsui received a message from division headquarters stating that, "A powerful enemy force is advancing toward Mangshih. The Matsui Force will return as soon as possible." To the north, Song opted to halt the sporadic attacks and initiated a synchronized assault with his four divisions on July 23. Backed by intense artillery fire, the Chinese exerted significant pressure, eventually overrunning the Hondo Position by the end of July. Only the timely intervention of Japanese fighters halted the offensive. Further north, following the subsiding of the storms and a heavy air bombardment, Huo finally launched a general offensive on July 26, supported by artillery and mortars. Moving swiftly and with strength, the Chinese successfully demolished all fortifications on Laifeng Hill, compelling the Japanese, grappling with ammunition shortages and heavy casualties, to abandon their other outposts in the vicinity. The Chinese attack that followed revealed that previous experiences with Japanese positions had not been wasted. The Chinese infantry moved off quickly, on time, and as whole regiments rather than squads committed piecemeal. Mortar and artillery fire was brought down speedily on suspected Japanese positions, and the infantry took full advantage of it by advancing again the minute it lifted. Having taken one pillbox, the Chinese infantry kept right on going rather than stopping to loot and rest. At nightfall they were on top of the mountain and had taken a fortified temple on the summit. After mopping up the next day, the Chinese tallied about 400 Japanese dead. They themselves had lost 1200. Nevertheless, the speedy capture of Laifeng Hill was a brilliant feat of arms and dramatic evidence of the capabilities of Chinese troops when they applied proper tactics While the simultaneous attack on the southeast wall of Tengchong did not breach the massive wall, the Chinese now held a solid position in the sparse cluster of mud huts just outside the wall. Yet that will be all for today for the Burma-Yunnan front as we now are heading over to the Marianas. As we remember, Admiral Spruance devised a plan to initiate the invasions of Guam and Tinian following the capture of Saipan. Tinian's strategic significance stemmed from its close proximity to Saipan and its relatively flat terrain, making it more suitable for bomber airfields compared to its mountainous counterpart. However, its natural features also posed challenges for a seaside landing, with most of its coastline characterized by steep cliffs. Consequently, the American forces had limited options for landing: the well-defended beaches of Tinian Town, particularly the northeast Yellow Beach at Asiga Bay, or the less fortified but narrow White Beaches on the northwest coast. However, the latter option risked congestion and immobility due to the confined space. After assessing the landing beaches firsthand, they opted for the latter, anticipating lower resistance. General Smith's Northern Landing Forces were tasked with this operation, although there were some changes in the chain of command. Smith was appointed commander of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, overseeing all Marine Corps combat units in the region. General Schmidt assumed command of the 5th Amphibious Corps and the Northern Landing Forces, while Major-General Clifton Cates replaced him as commander of the 4th Marine Division. Additionally, Admiral Hill assumed command of a reorganized Northern Attack Force for the amphibious assault. The strategy outlined was for Cates' 24th and 25th Marines to land on the White Beaches on July 24, securing a beachhead line encompassing Faibus San Hilo Point, Mount Lasso, and Asiga Point. This offensive would receive heavy artillery support from Saipan, as well as backing from carrier-based aircraft, Aslito airfield-based planes, and naval gunfire. One of the main justifications for the final decision to land over the unlikely beaches on the northwestern shore of the island was the feasibility of full exploitation of artillery firing from Saipan. Consequently, all of the field pieces in the area except for the four battalions of 75-mm. pack howitzers were turned over to 14th Corps Artillery during the preliminary and landing phase. General Harper arranged his 13 battalions, totaling 156 guns and howitzers, into three groupments, all emplaced on southern Saipan. Groupment A, commanded by Col. Raphael Griffin, USMC, consisted of five 105-mm. battalions, two each from the Marine divisions and one from V Amphibious Corps. It was to reinforce the fires of the 75-mm. pack howitzers and be ready to move to Tinian on order. Groupment B, under the 27th Division's artillery commander, General Kernan, was made up of all of that division's organic artillery except the 106th Field Artillery Battalion. It was to reinforce the fires of Groupment A and also to be ready to displace to Tinian. Groupment C, commanded by General Harper himself, contained all the howitzers and guns of 24th Corps Artillery plus the 106th Field Artillery Battalion. It was to support the attack with counterbattery, neutralization, and harassing fire before the day of the landing, deliver a half-hour preparation on the landing beaches immediately before the scheduled touchdown, and execute long-range counterbattery, harassing, and interdiction fire. Concurrently, General Watson's 2nd Marine Division would stage a feint near Tinian Town before landing behind the main assault force post-beachhead establishment. Meanwhile, General Griner's 27th Division would remain on standby in corps reserve, ready to embark on landing craft at short notice. A notable logistical innovation for Tinian involved a dual shuttle system to prevent congestion. Loaded trucks and Athey trailers shuttled between Saipan's base supply dumps and Tinian's division supply depots, while amphibious vehicles directly transported supplies from ship to shore to division dumps, aiming to minimize beachside handling of supplies. Additionally, General Geiger's 3rd Amphibious Corps, comprising the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, assisted by Admiral Conolly's Southern Attack Force, were tasked with capturing Guam. Due to formidable coastal defenses, Geiger's plan necessitated landings north and south of Apra Harbor on July 21, bypassing the heavily fortified Orote Peninsula. General Turnage's 3rd Marine Division was tasked with landing on the shores between Adelup Point and the Tatgua River mouth, proceeding southward to occupy the eastern area of Apra Harbor. Simultaneously, General Shepherd's 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was to land between Agat village and Bangi Point, then pivot northward towards the base of the Orote Peninsula. The establishment of a secure beachhead line from Adelup Point to Facpi Point was crucial before Geiger's forces could launch their assault on Orote Peninsula and subsequently secure the rest of the island. With the 27th Division committed elsewhere, Major-General Andrew Bruce's 77th Division, slated to assemble at Eniwetok by July 18, was designated as the new reserve under Geiger's command. The 305th Regiment was assigned to land behind Shepherd's Marines to reinforce the beachhead line. To optimize support for the troops, Conolly divided his Southern Attack Force into two: his Northern Attack Group, backing the 3rd Marine Division's landing, and Rear-Admiral Lawrence Reifsnider's Southern Attack Group, aiding the 1st Provisional Brigade's landing. Coordination of pre-landing bombardments was planned between Conolly's ships and aircraft, synchronized with scheduled strikes by aircraft from Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The time had finally come for the Japanese home islands to be subjected to the horrors of modern bombing campaigns. It would begin gradually, but would escalate to a literal horror show that starved the population of Japan into submission. Meanwhile Hideki Tojo was finally sacked, though by no means was he gone.
John O'Loughlin discusses the life and times of his father Thomas F. O'Loughlin, Jr. who worked in the deep state and rubbed shoulders with General MacArthur, J. Edgar Hoover, and John F. Kennedy. John surmises that his father was taken out by the deep state for attempting to do what was right by acting on Kennedy's orders to reign in the CIA. Thomas O'Loughlin, Jr. was assigned to the office of SACSA which had been created to oversee the CIA. It appears that O'Loughlin, Jr. later began to investigate illegal CIA drug trafficking before rapidly and mysteriously developing an illness that led to his untimely death at the age of 51. John believes the hidden hand of the British is still behind everything and currently they are hellbent on destroying Russia and China. We should not fall for their fear mongering and PSYOPS that puts us into a paralyzed, panicked, and defensive state. Watch on BitChute / Brighteon / Rokfin / Rumble / Substack Geopolitics & Empire · John O'Loughlin: Thomas O'Loughlin, Jr.'s Struggle Against the Deep State #447 *Support Geopolitics & Empire! Become a Member https://geopoliticsandempire.substack.comDonate https://geopoliticsandempire.com/donationsConsult https://geopoliticsandempire.com/consultation **Visit Our Affiliates & Sponsors! Above Phone https://abovephone.com/?above=geopoliticseasyDNS (use code GEOPOLITICS for 15% off!) https://easydns.comEscape The Technocracy course (15% discount using link) https://escapethetechnocracy.com/geopoliticsPassVult https://passvult.comSociatates Civis (CitizenHR, CitizenIT, CitizenPL) https://societates-civis.comWise Wolf Gold https://www.wolfpack.gold/?ref=geopolitics John O'Loughlin Websites McDuff Lives!: The Life and Untimely Death of Thomas F. O'Loughlin, Jr. https://www.amazon.com/McDuff-Lives-Untimely-Thomas-OLoughlin/dp/B09FCCR6QC McDuff Lives on Rumble https://rumble.com/user/McDuffLives John O'Loughlin on X https://x.com/leytedriver John O'Loughlin Substack https://cancercidejournal.substack.com McDuff Lives Website https://mcdufflives.com About John O'Loughlin John's mission is to expose the criminal takeover of our government which has occurred over his lifetime and that of his father, Thomas F. O'Loughlin, Jr. (1920-1971). During his first year at The College of William and Mary in Virginia, John's father suddenly was diagnosed with cancer. The next spring, on June 6, 1971, he died. The story of Tom O'Loughlin's career in the Navy, the FBI, and finally at the highest Special Operations command at the Pentagon and how John's suspicions grew into this mission is told in John's biography of his father, “McDuff Lives!, the Life and Untimely death of Thomas F. O'Loughlin, Jr.,” (2021, Amazon) Available below. John's popular YouTube Channel, “McDuff, Kennedy's Man to Smash the CIA,” was taken down by YouTube in 2021. His work survives on his YouTube back-up channels, “McDuff Lives 2” and “McDuff Lives 3,” where many of his videos are still available. However, John has moved to Rumble for his base of video broadcasting, and his live broadcasts and archive are at “McDiffLives” and “McDuff Archive” channels on Rumble. *Podcast intro music is from the song "The Queens Jig" by "Musicke & Mirth" from their album "Music for Two Lyra Viols": http://musicke-mirth.de/en/recordings.html (available on iTunes or Amazon)
John O'Loughlin discusses the life and times of his father Thomas F. O'Loughlin, Jr. who worked in the deep state and rubbed shoulders with General MacArthur, J. Edgar Hoover, and John F. Kennedy. John surmises that his father was taken out by the deep state for attempting to do what was right by acting on Kennedy's orders to reign in the CIA. Thomas O'Loughlin, Jr. was assigned to the office of SACSA which had been created to oversee the CIA. It appears that O'Loughlin, Jr. later began to investigate illegal CIA drug trafficking before rapidly and mysteriously developing an illness that led to his untimely death at the age of 51. John believes the hidden hand of the British is still behind everything and currently they are hellbent on destroying Russia and China. We should not fall for their fear mongering and PSYOPS that puts us into a paralyzed, panicked, and defensive state. Watch on BitChute / Brighteon / Rokfin / Rumble / Substack Geopolitics & Empire · John O'Loughlin: Thomas O'Loughlin, Jr.'s Struggle Against the Deep State #447 *Support Geopolitics & Empire! Donate https://geopoliticsandempire.com/donations Consult https://geopoliticsandempire.com/consultation Become a Member https://geopoliticsandempire.substack.com Become a Sponsor https://geopoliticsandempire.com/sponsors **Visit Our Affiliates & Sponsors! Above Phone https://abovephone.com/?above=geopolitics easyDNS (use coupon code GEOPOLITICS for 15% off!) https://easydns.com LegalShield https://hhrvojemoric.wearelegalshield.com Wise Wolf Gold https://www.wolfpack.gold/?ref=geopolitics John O'Loughlin Websites McDuff Lives!: The Life and Untimely Death of Thomas F. O'Loughlin, Jr. https://www.amazon.com/McDuff-Lives-Untimely-Thomas-OLoughlin/dp/B09FCCR6QC McDuff Lives on Rumble https://rumble.com/user/McDuffLives John O'Loughlin on X https://x.com/leytedriver John O'Loughlin Substack https://cancercidejournal.substack.com McDuff Lives Website https://mcdufflives.com About John O'Loughlin John's mission is to expose the criminal takeover of our government which has occurred over his lifetime and that of his father, Thomas F. O'Loughlin, Jr. (1920-1971). During his first year at The College of William and Mary in Virginia, John's father suddenly was diagnosed with cancer. The next spring, on June 6, 1971, he died. The story of Tom O'Loughlin's career in the Navy, the FBI, and finally at the highest Special Operations command at the Pentagon and how John's suspicions grew into this mission is told in John's biography of his father, “McDuff Lives!, the Life and Untimely death of Thomas F. O'Loughlin, Jr.,” (2021, Amazon) Available below. John's popular YouTube Channel, “McDuff, Kennedy's Man to Smash the CIA,” was taken down by YouTube in 2021. His work survives on his YouTube back-up channels, “McDuff Lives 2” and “McDuff Lives 3,” where many of his videos are still available. However, John has moved to Rumble for his base of video broadcasting, and his live broadcasts and archive are at “McDiffLives” and “McDuff Archive” channels on Rumble. *Podcast intro music is from the song "The Queens Jig" by "Musicke & Mirth" from their album "Music for Two Lyra Viols": http://musicke-mirth.de/en/recordings.html (available on iTunes or Amazon)
Last time we spoke about the fall of Saipan. General Smith's coordinated attacks on June 27th led to significant progress, with the 4th Marine Division notably advancing. The 27th Division encountered resistance, and casualties rose. By early July, Americans gained ground, pushing toward Marpi Point. Japanese resistance remained fierce, but American forces steadily advanced, capturing strategic positions. The assault on Petosukara was swiftly countered, but intense action unfolded in the Makunsha region. The 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines faced a fierce enemy thrust, with over 200 attackers killed. Facing defeat, General Saito ordered a suicidal assault, resulting in a chaotic and desperate charge. Despite heavy losses, American forces repelled the onslaught. The battle lasted until midday on July 7, with sporadic skirmishes continuing. Efforts to persuade cave occupants to surrender intensified, yet many civilians chose mass suicide. Saipan was declared secured after extensive casualties on both sides. This episode is the battle of Noemfoor Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. General MacArthur unleashed a new offensive, seeing General Patrick's troops successfully landed on Noemfoor with little opposition, securing a beachhead. While the 3rd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Regiment was being airdropped on July 4, Colonel Sandlin's 3rd Battalion continued eastward through scattered minefields toward Kornasoren Drome, meeting no resistance. Simultaneously, the 1st Battalion crossed the Kamiri River and occupied Kamiri village without encountering any opposition. Moving out of Kamiri, the American forces followed a southeastern road to a sizable Japanese garden area, where they faced resistance on Hill 201. The Japanese garden area was about 600 yards long, east and west, and 350 yards across, north to south. The ground was devoid of large trees except for a few atop Hill 201, but thick, secondary jungle growth covered the eastern and southern slopes of the hill, while the rest of the garden area was overgrown with partially cultivated papaya, taro, and cassava, all averaging about eight feet in height. The trail from Kamiri village passed over the southern slope of Hill 201, and 300 yards away, near the eastern edge of the gardens, joined the main road from Kamiri Drome to Namber Drome, located about six miles to the south. Another trail ran along the eastern side of the hill, branching to the north and northwest at the northeastern corner of the low terrain feature. To counter this, a double envelopment tactic was initiated, with Company C seizing Hill 180 to the north while Company B pushed the Japanese southeast over Mission Hill, a lower terrain feature situated southeast of Hill 201. By 15:15, the battalion secured the ground on both flanks of Hill 201 and consolidated around the hilltop for the night, establishing a tight defensive perimeter. At 05:20 on July 5, the Japanese launched an attack along the southern and southeastern sides of the perimeter with mortar support. The American forces responded with a deadly barrage of mortar and artillery fire, driving the enemy back and neutralizing their machine-gun positions. Some Japanese managed to get through the mortar and artillery barrages and continued up the sides of the trail from the south through fire from Company D's machine guns. The enemy found cover behind a low, 150-yard-long log fence which led from the southeast toward the center of the 1st Battalion's defenses. While the fence afforded some protection, the attacking infantrymen were silhouetted as they tried to clamber over the top. The main body of the attacking force therefore kept down behind the fence, trying to crawl along it to the top of the hill. Advancing cautiously, the attackers encountered sustained machine-gun and rifle fire from the defenders atop the hill, as the fence did not extend beyond the outer defenses of the 1st Battalion. The assault quickly deteriorated into a sequence of small suicide charges carried out by groups of three to six Japanese soldiers. The 1st Battalion now sent patrols out over the battlefield. From prisoners it was determined that the attacking force had consisted of 350 to 400 men--the 10th and 12th Companies, 219th Infantry, reinforced by approximately 150 armed Formosan laborers. During the morning over 200 dead Japanese were counted around the 1st Battalion's perimeter, and the number of enemy dead found or enemy wounded captured on subsequent days along trails leading south from the hill indicated that virtually the entire original attacking force had been annihilated. By 06:30, the skirmish had concluded, with over 200 Japanese casualties tallied. Following this engagement, operations on Noemfoor transitioned into a series of patrol activities as Allied forces extended their dominance over the island and rapidly expanded the airfield facilities. On the morning of July 6, Sandlin's 2nd Battalion executed an amphibious landing on the deserted Namber Drome following a brief naval bombardment. By July 10, intensive patrolling had only encountered small Japanese groups, leading Patrick to conclude that no significant organized enemy presence remained on Noemfoor. To eradicate the remaining opposition, the 503rd Parachute Regiment was dispatched to the island's southern sector while the 158th addressed the northern half. By the end of August, Sandlin's efforts had resulted in the death of 611 Japanese soldiers, the capture of 179, the loss of 6 American lives with 41 wounded, and the liberation of 209 slave laborers. The Japanese had never brought the Melanesians of Noemfoor entirely under their control, for the natives had either offered a passive resistance or had faded into the interior to live off the land. A few were impressed into service by the Japanese, while others who were captured but still refused to cooperate were executed. The natives greeted the Allied landings with great enthusiasm and came out of hideaways in the hills carrying Dutch flags which they had concealed from the Japanese. Under the direction of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration, the natives were gradually resettled in their old villages. Late in July the village chiefs gathered in formal council and officially declared war on the Japanese. Thereafter, native cooperation increased. Up to August 31 the natives had captured and brought to Allied outposts more than 50 Japanese and had killed another 50. One tale of horror concerns the Javanese on Noemfoor. According to information gathered by the NICA Detachment, over 3000 Indonesians were shipped to Noemfoor in late 1943, mostly from Soerabaja and other large cities on Java. The shipment included many women and children. The Japanese, without regard to age or sex, put the Javanese to work constructing roads and airfields almost entirely by hand. Little or no clothing, shoes, bedding, or shelter was provided, and the Javanese had to supplement their very inadequate allowance of rations by shifting for themselves. Driven by hunger, many attempted to steal Japanese rations but for their pains were beheaded or hung by their hands or feet until dead. Starvation and disease took a steadily increasing toll. The dead were periodically collected for mass burial, and survivors alleged that many of the sick were buried alive. It was considered probable that not more than 10 or 15 Javanese were killed accidentally by Allied forces. Yet only 403 of the 3000-odd brought from Java were found alive on Noemfoor by August 31. Meanwhile, Colonel Jones pursued the remnants of Colonel Shimizu's Noemfoor Detachment to Hill 670 in the south. From July 13 to 16, both sides engaged in fierce combat for control of the hill, with the Japanese ultimately managing to evade capture. Contact was reestablished on July 23 near Inasi, but Shimizu eluded capture once more. The primary Japanese force was finally located on August 10 near Hill 380, prompting Jones' 1st and 3rd Battalions to converge in an attempt to trap the enemy. However, on August 15, Shimizu once again evaded capture, slipping away towards Pakriki. Although the Japanese forces were either captured or eliminated by August 17, Shimizu evaded capture or death and remained at large by the operation's conclusion. Jones' forces endured 57 fatalities and 302 injuries, but managed to neutralize over 1100 Japanese soldiers and apprehend approximately 560 individuals, while liberating an additional 194 enslaved laborers. This brings the total casualties for the Battle of Noemfoor to 1730 Japanese casualties, with 740 taken prisoner, and 63 American fatalities, 343 wounded, and 3 missing, alongside the liberation of 403 slave laborers. Transitioning to the developments on the Aitape front post-Operation Persecution, significant changes occurred under General Gill's command starting May 4. The defensive setup in the Aitape region was revamped, and Colonel Howe's 127th Regiment bolstered its eastern positions, with the Nyaparake Force extending patrols to the Danmap River. However, General Nakai's advance forces arrived in early May. Shortly after 2:00am on 14 May, after a short preparation by grenades, light mortars, and light machine guns, 100 to 200 Japanese of the 78th Infantry, 20th Division, attacked from the east against the coastal sector of the perimeter. This assault was broken up by rifle and automatic weapons fire and by lobbing mortar shells to the rear of the advancing enemy group. The Japanese disappeared into the jungle south of the narrow beach. For the next hour Captain Fulmer's mortars placed harassing fire into suspected enemy assembly points east of the small stream. Meanwhile, the eight-man outpost reported that many small parties of Japanese were moving up the beach within 300 yards of the main perimeter and then slipping southward into the jungle. Such maneuvers seemed to presage another attack. The second assault came about 0330, this time against the eastern and southeastern third of the defenses. The Japanese were again beaten back by small arms and mortar fire, but at 5:00am they made a final effort which covered the entire eastern half of the perimeter. This last attack was quickly broken up and the Japanese quieted down. About 7:30am on the 14th, elements of Company A, 127th Infantry, began moving into the forward perimeter to reinforce Captain Fulmer's beleaguered units. The 1st Platoon of Company C and the 81-mm. mortar section also moved forward in preparation for continuing the advance. General Martin took charge of the East Sector on the same day, relocating all troops except the Nyaparake Force to the west bank of the Driniumor River. The East Sector forces were supplied by a variety of methods. Units along the coast were supported directly by small boat from BLUE Beach or by native ration trains moving along the coastal track. Supplies to the Afua area went south from the coast along the Anamo-Afua trail or, later, over the inland track from the Tadji fields through Chinapelli and Palauru. Wheeled transport was impracticable except along short stretches of the coastal track. In early June, when the Japanese ambushed many ration parties which attempted to reach Afua, experiments were made with air supply from the Tadji strips. Breakage and loss were heavy at first, but air supply rapidly became more successful as pilots gained experience and ground troops located good dropping grounds. A dropping ground cleared on the west bank of the Driniumor about 2200 yards north of Afua soon became the principal source of supply for troops in the Afua area. Communications during operations east of the Driniumor were carried out principally by radio, but between units along the river and from the stream back to higher headquarters telephone became the principal means of communication. Keeping the telephone lines in service was a task to which much time and effort had to be devoted. The Japanese continually cut the lines, or American troops and heavy equipment accidentally broke the wires. The enemy often stationed riflemen to cover breaks in the line, thus making repair work dangerous. Usually, it was found less time consuming and less hazardous to string new wire than to attempt to find and repair breaks. As a result, miles of telephone wire soon lined the ground along the trails or was strung along the trees in the Driniumor River area and back to the Tadji perimeter. Despite this adjustment, Nakai escalated pressure, advancing beyond Yakamul by month's end. In response, Gill replaced the Nyaparake Force with the 1st Battalion, 126th Regiment, which swiftly recaptured Yakamul and Parakovio. Despite initial success, Nakai's forces launched a heavy counterattack in early June, reclaiming Yakamul by June 5. In the meantime, additional Japanese units had been conducting exploratory missions inland against Afua since the beginning of the month. However, Howe's 1st Battalion ultimately succeeded in repelling them. This allowed Martin's forces to establish an outer defensive line along the Driniumor River. From there, they continued forward patrols toward the Japanese lines. While the 41st and 51st Divisions struggled to move personnel and supplies to the forward assembly area, Nakai efficiently organized a counter-reconnaissance screen along Niumen Creek to prevent East Sector troops from gathering intelligence about deployments farther east. On June 20, due to the increasingly dire situation in Western New Guinea, the 18th Army was suddenly transferred from 2nd Area Army control to the direct command of the Southern Army. Although General Terauchi's directive was to execute a "delaying action at strategic positions," General Adachi opted to adhere to his original plans for a westward offensive. He was determined to maximize the effectiveness of his forces while they still possessed fighting capability, aiming to divert as much enemy strength as possible away from the Western New Guinea battlefront. Sensing an imminent heavy enemy assault, Generals Krueger and MacArthur decided to reinforce Aitape with General Cunningham's 112th Cavalry Regiment, arriving on June 27, and Colonel Edward “Ted” Starr's 124th Regiment, expected to arrive in early July. They also expedited the shipment of the 43rd Division from its New Zealand staging area to Aitape, necessitating the establishment of Major-General Charles Hall's 11th Corps. Upon assuming command of the task force on June 29, Hall reorganized his forces and implemented several troop redeployments in preparation for the looming enemy attack. By June 30th, Adachi had completed concentrating his forces in the assembly area. Consequently, he swiftly initiated preparations for launching an attack against the Driniumor River line on July 10th. His strategy involved Colonel Nara Masahiko's 237th Regiment crossing the river and launching an assault westward towards Koronal Creek, and northwest to clear Anamo and other Paup villages. Meanwhile, the 78th and 80th Regiments were tasked with clearing the Afua area and advancing all the way to Chinapelli. Success in this endeavor would pave the way for Japanese units to advance towards the Tadji airstrips. Furthermore, a Coastal Attack Force was designated to carry out a diversionary maneuver along the coast, aiming to engage the enemy and constrain them with artillery fire. In early July, as the Japanese finalized their preparations, Hall and Martin made the decision to dispatch robust patrols east of the Driniumor to the Harech River. However, these patrols were only able to advance as far as Yakamul, where they encountered only the enemy's forward units. Consequently, on July 10th, Hall and Martin ordered the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment, and the 2nd Squadron, 112th Cavalry to conduct a reconnaissance mission across the Driniumor. Subsequently, the infantry faced significant resistance as they pushed towards Yakamul, while the cavalry's progress was limited to about a mile due to the dense jungle terrain. Despite these efforts yielding disappointing results, a captured Japanese soldier disclosed that their attack was imminent that night. However, this critical piece of information was mistakenly disregarded by the American command, leaving Adachi and Nakai poised to launch their counteroffensive. Around midnight, the assault commenced with the 1st Battalion, 78th Regiment charging across the Driniumor River, facing Company G of the 128th Regiment along a narrow front. The Japanese attacked in two or three screaming waves, broadening the front after the first assault by throwing in the rest of the 78th Infantry and possibly elements of the 80th Infantry. Japanese reconnaissance had been good--the attackers knew the locations of company and battalion command posts all along the American defenses but not quite good enough. The enemy did not know that Company G had been reinforced during the afternoon of 10 July nor, apparently, had he discovered that the company's front was protected by low barbed wire. The attacks of the 78th Infantry were thrown back with heavy losses. Machine gun and mortar fire from the 2d Battalion, 128th Infantry, accounted for many Japanese, numbers of whom were caught as they tried to cross the barbed wire in front of Company G. According to Japanese sources, the results of American artillery fire were even more disastrous. As soon as the enemy attack had begun, the 120th and 129th Field Artillery Battalions had started firing previously prepared concentrations along the bed and east bank of the Driniumor. The Japanese units in or near the impact areas suffered heavy casualties. The 1st Battalion. 78th Infantry, was quickly reduced from 400 to 30 men, principally as a result of the American artillery fire, which also destroyed large numbers of artillery weapons, machine guns, and mortars. Despite this, the Americans, skillfully backed by artillery support, ultimately repelled them with significant casualties. Following this initial repulse, Martin concluded that a reconnaissance in force was unnecessary and ordered the units involved to retreat behind the Driniumor River. Confusion among many Japanese units, arriving late, had delayed the commencement of the 80th Regiment's attack, which was directed at Company E and was similarly pushed back. But a second wave of attackers, probably comprising the 237th Infantry and heretofore uncommitted elements of the Right Flank Unit, began pouring across the Driniumor toward Company E at approximately 0200. The new attackers overran the company command post and surrounded most of the unit's widely separated strong points. Fighting continued in the company sector for a little while, but the unit could not long withstand the overwhelming enemy pressure. Company organization and communications broke down. Worse still, the troops began to run out of ammunition. A general withdrawal commenced. By 03:00, the Japanese had breached a gap approximately 1300 yards wide in the American lines, physically occupying that territory. Fortunately, the following hours remained relatively calm as the 78th and 80th Regiments regrouped to the south to resume the offensive. This lull enabled Martin to dispatch the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment to counterattack along the Anamo-Afua trail, aiming to reinforce the 2nd Battalion's positions. Initially encountering no resistance for the first 1500 yards, the Americans were eventually halted by intense enemy fire at 10:30, compelling them to retreat back to Tiver. This fierce opposition convinced Martin that the enemy could advance directly westward with minimal hindrance towards the Tadji strips unless he abandoned the Driniumor River line. He decided to reorganize his forces along the secondary delaying position at the X-ray River-Koronal Creek line, preparing for further counterattacks against the Japanese. Accordingly, while Company F maintained their position along the coast, the 128th Regiment began to fall back towards the creek. Further south, Cunningham opted to withdraw his cavalrymen in two stages, successfully reaching X-ray by midnight. However, communication issues delayed Howe's 3rd Battalion, with most of the unit arriving at the river the following day. A small contingent had to engage in combat with Japanese forces and couldn't reach X-ray until July 13. Despite this, Krueger and Hall disagreed with the decision to abandon the Driniumor, promptly deploying the 124th Regiment for a potential counterattack. Martin, who was instructed to hold his position, was replaced by Gill, assuming direct command of the divided covering force, now split into North and South Forces. However, before the American counterattack could commence, Nara's infantry launched an assault towards Tiver and Koronal Creek on July 12. The 128th Regiment successfully repelled them after a fierce confrontation. Meanwhile, Adachi dispatched the main body of the 41st Division and the reserve 66th Regiment towards the Driniumor, augmenting pressure on the Paup coast. To the south, Nakai's units gathered across the river near Afua and Kwamrgnirk, preparing for a final northward push. Finally, at 07:30 on July 13, the American counteroffensive commenced as the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment swiftly moved from Tiver to Chakila, only to be ambushed by Japanese artillery. Nevertheless, precise artillery counterfire silenced most of the enemy artillery, enabling the Americans to advance eastward toward the mouth of the Driniumor. Meanwhile, the 124th Regiment under Starr's command advanced southward along the Anamo-Afua trail, facing strong opposition from the 237th Regiment. Despite encountering resistance, they managed to reach the river, although still positioned considerably north of their designated centerline. Cunningham's South Force began its eastward movement from the X-ray River at 10:00, successfully overcoming enemy positions along several stream crossings to reach the Driniumor near Afua. Consequently, all original crossing points on the Driniumor fell to the Allied forces, isolating the 20th Division and the 237th Regiment several miles west of the river's bank. By nightfall, Nara had regrouped his 237th Regiment for another assault on the 2nd Battalion, 128th Regiment. Company E demonstrated its combat effectiveness by holding firm and repelling the Japanese forces, with the rest of the battalion successfully defending against subsequent small-scale attacks, marking the conclusion of Nara's offensive actions. The following morning, Gill's forces consolidated their defensive positions along the reformed river line, albeit with a 1500-yard gap remaining in the center. Yet this all for today with Noemfoor as we now need to head over to the India-Burma theater. The final phase was coming for the Battle of Imphal. By the start of July, the reopening of the Imphal–Kohima Road facilitated the resupply of the 4th Corps, enabling them to launch an offensive against the fatigued and under-resourced troops under General Mutaguchi's command. Additionally, three brigades from General Stopford's 33rd Corps advanced from the north, swiftly joining General Gracey's 20th Division in an endeavor to reopen the Ukhrul Road. Under intense pressure, General Yamauchi's battered 15th Division units hastily abandoned Tongou and Sokpao, leading to the 80th Brigade occupying Lamu by July 2. The next day, the ailing general, who had long fallen out of favor with Mutaguchi, was carried from the battlefield on a stretcher and later died in a hospital at Maymyo. Lieutenant-General Shibata Uichi replaced him and promptly prepared the 51st and 67th Regiments to retreat. To cover their withdrawal, the newly arrived and utterly exhausted 60th Regiment was tasked with attacking towards Lamu, while General Miyazaki's troops assembled behind Ukhrul. However, the 60th Regiment was so weakened that its attacks were easily repelled, and the 67th Regiment retreated in disorder, leaving the 51st encircled. On July 8, Colonel Omoto's troops fiercely broke through the encirclement in three columns, allowing Stopford's brigades to finally overcome Japanese resistance at Ukhrul and capture the town. This forced Shibata to regroup his forces along a new line from Lungshong through Sangshak to Sakok, ultimately enabling the British-Indian forces to reopen the Ukhrul Road by July 10. With both supply roads reopened, the arrival of Stopford's brigades from the north, and the Japanese forces nearly routed, General Slim decided it was time to go on the offensive. Slim's plan involved the 33rd Corps taking over the Shenam Saddle and the Tamu–Palel Road while the 4th Corps cleared the Japanese from the Silchar Track and the Tiddim Road. On the other hand, Mutaguchi was still planning a combined attack on the Palel area involving the 15th Division, remnants of the 31st Division, and some units from the 33rd Division. Although he issued an attack order, the divisions were too battered to comply. The overall situation of the 15th Army went from bad to worse and the only hope remaining was to rally the 31st at Humine, give the troops a few days rest and then, after a reorganization, to dispatch them to the northern flank of the Yamamoto Detachment to capture Palel. In early July the 31st Division was concentrated in the area east of Myothit but discipline had disintegrated to the point that the Division could scarcely be termed a combat force. The Torikai Unit was organized with the 138th Infantry Regiment (less one battalion); the 2d Battalion, 124th Infantry Regiment and one artillery battalion to reinforce the Yamamoto Detachment. At the same time,the 15th Army ordered the 33rd Division to attack Palel from the south with the 214th Infantry Regiment. The newly formed Torikai' Unit, however, failed to join the Yamamoto Detachment and the order for the 33rd to attack Palel was never carried out. Consequently, on July 9, General Kawabe had no choice but to order preparations for a withdrawal to a line connecting the Zibyu Mountains, Mawlaik, Kalewa, and Gangaw. Mutaguchi intended to begin the retreat on July 16, directing the 15th Division towards Sittaung, the 31st Division to Thaungdut, and the 33rd Division to Tiddim, while the Yamamoto Detachment would hold the Shenam Saddle until July 24 and then retreat to the Kuntaung-Moreh line to cover the main Army's withdrawal from the Kabaw Valley. On the southwest front, General Tanaka's forces had already started retreating from the Bishenpur area, leaving a small covering force at Ningthoukhong to prevent a pursuit by the 17th Division. As a result, General Cowan's brigades made limited progress against the stubborn rearguard, ultimately securing Ningthoukhong on July 16 after heavy bombardment, coinciding with Mutaguchi's general withdrawal. By the middle of July, Japanese resistance centered on Ningthoukhong Kha Khunou. A small hamlet about 300 meters wide and 500 meters long, it lay to the immediate south of Ningthoukhong. Despite probing attacks by the 48th Indian Brigade's infantry and artillery firing on their defenses, the Japanese held on. Finally, in the early hours of 16 July, this small space was subjected to what some describe as one of the heaviest artillery concentrations yet in the Burma Campaign; in the space of an hour, approximately 9,000 shells were fired on Ningthoukhong Kha Khunou. Fortunately for the Japanese, they had withdrawn from the village just before the shelling began. By the time it ended, the village had been completely flattened and was pockmarked with waterlogged craters. And so the last Japanese stronghold in the Imphal Valley was taken. The 63rd Indian Brigade also reached and occupied the Laimanai area around the same time. The 5th Indian Division, the other division in the reconstituted IV Corps, now took over and commenced the chase of the Japanese 33rd Division down the road towards Tiddim. The 5th Division, now led by Major-General Geoffrey Evans, continued the pursuit while Stopford's brigades harassed the disordered retreat of the 15th and 31st Divisions. Despite their efforts, the 15th and 31st Divisions reached Thaungdut by early August, and the 33rd Division managed to assemble around Chikha by mid-August, under significant pressure and the serious threat of having their withdrawal route cut off. The 33rd Division distinguished itself by displaying almost superhuman fighting power and repeatedly launched counterattacks against the pursuing British-Indian 5th Division. The Yamamoto Detachment, however, had failed to cover the Yazagyo area and, in mid-August the 33rd Division found itself the vicinity of Chikha facing the serious threat of having its route of withdrawal cut by the enemy which was infiltrating into the Yazagyo area from Moreh and Shuganu through the Kabaw Valley. On the south-eastern approach to Imphal, the two armies continued to face each other on the Shenam Saddle. Yamamoto Force remained in place on these heights and the front line was still on Scraggy. It was in the second half of July that a final, concerted effort was made to evict Yamamoto Force and push it down the Tamu–Palel Road towards the India–Burma frontier. Led by the 23rd Indian Division , the operation involved five brigades in a three-pronged attack. The central thrust was by the 37th Indian Brigade on the Shenam Saddle, with the support of all available artillery and tanks; the 5th British Brigade was deployed behind it and readied to provide assistance. D-day was to be 24 July. The 1st Indian Brigade was sent through the hills on the right, to arrive behind the saddle. The two were to push the Japanese back on the road. It was hoped their withdrawal route would be cut by the 49th Indian Brigade, which would arrive on the road after looping in from the far left; the 268th Indian Brigade would be to its left, protecting its flank. Before the Japanese could retreat, the 49th Brigade had cut off General Yamamoto's withdrawal route by looping in from the far left. However, Mutaguchi had sent Colonel Sato Genpachi's reserve 61st Regiment to Tamu, which quickly counterattacked and reopened the route. Consequently, Yamamoto withdrew to Moreh, allowing Roberts to swiftly capture Nippon Hill and Scraggy. Within two days, the 23rd Division advanced down the road, forcing the Yamamoto Detachment to retreat toward Mawlaik on July 30. This marked the end of the Battle of Imphal and Operation U-Go, the Japanese Army's largest land defeat. Estimates vary, but about 30,000 Japanese soldiers died and 23,000 were injured during the operation, including 6,000 killed at Kohima and 16,000 at Imphal. Additionally, the INA lost about 2,000 dead and 2,000 wounded. On the other hand, the British-Indians suffered 16,000 casualties, with over 12,000 at Imphal. Though Mutaguchi's plan was initially effective and nearly succeeded in capturing Imphal, he underestimated the enemy's ability to resist his troops and quickly bring reinforcements. Slim's overall strategy for Imphal succeeded, as the Japanese overextended themselves from the Chindwin River to the Imphal Valley, just as he had predicted. A crucial factor in the British-Indian success was the air support, which kept the 14th Army supplied despite the road to Kohima being cut off. Ultimately, in an attempt to thwart a potential British-Indian advance into Burma, Mutaguchi's 15th Army was utterly decimated by the failed attempt to capture Imphal. This failure allowed Slim to seize the moment and launch a rapid offensive into Burma, countering the Japanese U-Go plan. The Allies thus gained the upper hand, marking the beginning of the end for Japanese control over Burma. As a final note for this week by late July, Admiral Somerville executed Operation Crimson, a coordinated naval and air assault on Japanese airfields in Sabang, Lhoknga, and Kutaraja. Departing Trincomalee on July 22, Somerville's Task Force 62, comprising two carriers and four battleships, arrived off Sabang on the morning of July 25, ready to commence the bombardment. On 5th July 1944 the carriers Victorious and Indomitable arrived in Colombo. The former sailed with Illustrious on 22 July for Operation ‘Crimson', a bombardment of Sabang by the battleships over which the carrier-borne aircraft were to provide cover and take photographs of the damage. Illustrious embarked the same aircraft as before with Victorious for a total of thirty-nine Corsairs; together they comprised 47 Naval Fighter Wing commanded by Lieutenant Commander Turnbull. The force assembled for the operation was designated TF 62 and the carriers were supported by Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, Renown, Richelieu, Nigeria, Kenya, Gambia, Ceylon, Cumberland, Phoebe, Tromp, Relentless, Rotherham, Racehorse, Raider, Roebuck, Rocket, Rapid, Quilliam, Quality and Quickmatch. The submarines Templar and Tantalus were deployed to ASR positions. The carriers operated only thirty-five miles north of Sabang, not far from the battleships, which approached their bombardment positions at 06:40. The initial launch was planned for thirty-three minutes before sunrise but this proved to be too early as the morning was exceptionally dark and the launch was delayed for five minutes. Even then it was too early and the form-up was clumsy and slow, delaying departure. The fighters were briefed to attack Sabang, Lho Nga and Kotaraja airfields but 1838 NAS made a bad landfall since maps lacked detail and no photographs were available. When the target airfields were found it was still too dark for accurate strafing but the enemy was alert and opened fire as soon as aircraft came within range. To aircrew accustomed to the excellent intelligence material by then available in the Home Fleet, this caused concern and it had to be accepted that it was difficult to obtain good targets without losing the element of surprise. At very low level on a dark morning, flying at 400 knots with flashes from antiaircraft gunfire all around, camouflaged aircraft in revetments were inconspicuous and the strafing runs were not a success. One Corsair was shot down but the pilot was rescued. Concurrently, the battleships targeted harbor facilities and military barracks at Sabang, while cruisers and destroyers shelled radar and wireless stations and engaged enemy shore batteries. After the main bombardment, the destroyers Tromp, Quality, Quickmatch, and Quilliam entered Sabang harbor, attacking Japanese positions and launching torpedoes, sustaining light damage from return fire. On the return journey, two enemy reconnaissance aircraft were intercepted and shot down by fighters. Additionally, ten Zeros attacked Somerville's convoy but were intercepted by 13 Corsairs, leading to two Zeros being shot down and another two damageFollowing this engagement, British pilots noted that the Japanese airmen were not as proficient as they had been in 1942. Although Operation Crimson's outcomes were not spectacular, Somerville's final offensive was still deemed successful enough. Due to health concerns, he was subsequently transferred to diplomatic duties at Admiral Mountbatten's request. Currently, Admiral Mountbatten was moving toward a complete rearrangement of the higher officers in SEAC. From the time of his arrival in the Far East, he had had trouble with his three commanders in chief. When the Imphal crisis arose, Mountbatten was dissatisfied with General Giffard's conduct of operations, and when he later found Giffard taking what Mountbatten considered a highly negative approach toward an aggressive conduct of operations he resolved to ask for Giffard's relief. Mountbatten's relations with Admiral Somerville had been equally difficult. Somerville had refused to treat him as a Supreme Commander and in Mountbatten's opinion tried to make him simply the chairman of a commanders-in-chief committee. As for the RAF commander, Air Chief Marshal Peirse, Mountbatten was not seeking his relief because he did not wish to change all of his principal subordinates simultaneously. After his relief, Somerville was placed in charge of the British naval delegation in Washington DC in October 1944 where he managed—to the surprise of almost everyone—to get on very well with the notoriously abrasive and anti-British Admiral Ernest King, the United States' Chief of Naval Operations. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Battle of Noemfoor was just getting started, seeing General Douglas MacArthur not giving the Japanese a moment to catch their breath. Meanwhile the battle for Imphal was finally coming to a bitter end as Mutaguchi's megalomaniac operation was clearly a disaster.
Last time we spoke about operation forager and the Changsha-Hengyang campaign. On Saipan, General Holland Smith's forces advanced with the 4th Marine Division targeting Hill 600 and the 2nd Marine Division capturing Mounts Tipo Pale and Tapotchau. The 27th Division supported these efforts, encountering resistance and challenging terrain. Meanwhile, the 27th Division, under new leadership, made progress despite difficulties. Concurrently, Japanese forces initiated a three-pronged assault in Hunan, capturing significant territory despite supply challenges and heavy rain. On June 11, the 40th Division took control of Yiyang while the 34th Division moved toward Yuelu Mountain. The 68th and 116th bypassed Changsha towards Guanqiao, with the 3rd and 13th facing resistance near Liuyang, which fell on June 14. Xue Yue retreated to Liling as Chinese defenses crumbled. Concurrently, the U.S. initiated Operation Matterhorn, targeting Japan's industrial sites. Despite challenges, the initial bombing runs prompted further strategic bombings, marking a significant phase in the Pacific War. This episode is the Fall of Saipan Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. As we last saw, the Americans had begun their advance into Central Saipan. They achieved significant success on the right with the 4th Marine Division, but faced difficulties breaking through on the left and center. Following the victory in the Philippine Sea, Admiral Turner successfully completed unloading operations, landing approximately 60,000 troops and 75,000 tons of supplies by June 26. To maintain air superiority, Admiral Mitscher conducted raids on the islands of Pagan, Tinian, Guam, Rota, and Iwo Jima, and continued these raids over the next few days, despite ongoing Japanese night air attacks against the American beachhead. In a strategic effort to keep the Japanese unsettled and unable to prepare for counterattacks, Carrier Task Group One raided Pagan Island on June 23rd. The neighboring islands in the Marianas were also not ignored; almost daily photo reconnaissance missions were conducted over Guam and Tinian to monitor any changes in their situation or positions before the landings. On June 25, Carrier Task Group Three carried out intense bombing raids on Guam and Rota to further incapacitate the airfields and installations there. The first significant naval raid following the battle, beyond routine operations, was an attempted strike against the Volcano-Bonin group, which escalated into a substantial air battle initiated by the Japanese. At 6:00 on June 24th, Vice Admiral Joseph J. Clark's Task Group 58.1, comprising the Hornet, Yorktown, and Bataan launched a long-range fighter sweep of 48 Hellcats against Iwo Jima, which was intercepted by numerous enemy fighters. In the ensuing battle, four U.S. Hellcats were lost, while Japanese losses were estimated at 68 fighters and bombers. Despite this defeat, the Japanese attempted another attack against Clark's task group with the remnants of their local air force. This attempt ended disastrously for them, as U.S. interceptors shot down an additional 46 aircraft, bringing the day's total to 114. Task Group 58.1, having completed its mission without bombing the airfields, safely returned to Eniwetok without incident. On the opposing side, after the fall of Mount Tapotchau, General Saito organized a final line of resistance between Tanapag, Radar Hill, and Tarahoho. In a brief resume on the morning of 27th June, Major General Igeta summarized the situation: “The summit of Tapotchau was occupied yesterday evening. Front line units tried to retake it with a night attack, but did not succeed as planned. In Donnay the enemy broke through with a number of tanks, but their advance was slow. Thereafter, no great change in the situation. The defense force, along with the firmest possible defense of its present front line and its activities toward annihilation of the enemy, is at present setting up with a line between Tanapag--Hill 221 (Radar Hill)--Tarahoho as the final line of resistance… Meanwhile, about 50 men of the 118th Infantry are improving their positions on the east side of Hill 343, and one company of the 136th Infantry is improving its position on Hill 268, and about 50 men of the 118 Infantry are digging in on the north side of that hill. The main body of the 9th Expeditionary Force, about 200 men, and about 100 men from the 9th Tank Regiment are consolidating their positions north and east of there in the high ground (Chacha water area).”Although the pre-landing preparations had been largely ineffective, continuous naval bombardment during the battle forced his troops to stay low and defend under intense pressure. For the June 27 attack, General Smith ordered the three divisions to advance side by side and capture the O-6 Line. On General Schmidt's front, progress was swift. The 23rd Marines advanced quickly, facing only sporadic rifle fire from the villages of Donnay and Hashigoru, and reached their objective. Meanwhile, the 165th Regiment moved rapidly through the hills but struggled to maintain contact, requiring the deployment of a battalion from the 24th Marines to fill the gap and repel an enemy tank attack. In the center, the 106th Regiment encircled Hell's Pocket and established a cordon at the north end of Death Valley, although they made little progress against Hill Able. To the left, General Watson's Marines advanced about 200 yards along Mount Tapotchau's western slopes while the division realigned its lines. Despite largely ineffective pre-landing preparations, the continuous naval bombardment during the battle forced enemy troops to stay under cover and defend under intense pressure. In General Saito's words “The practical experiences of the defense forces of Saipan… have to do with the power of the enemy naval bombardment. If there just were no naval gunfire, we feel with determination that we could fight it out with the enemy in a decisive battle.” Underwater mines, which the Japanese had used as land mines, were found along the road and railroad in the vicinity of Donnay. Tanks detoured these mined areas without difficulty, however. A Japanese supply dump, found near Hashigoru, contained new clothing, ammunition, and infantry weapons. Lieutenant Colonel Dillon's 2nd Battalion, moving through the matted vegetation and ragged cliff line along the coast, experienced difficulty keeping abreast of the faster-moving 3d Battalion. Since a detailed search of the gnarled coast line could not be instituted without sacrificing the momentum of the attack, Colonel Jones ordered the 1st Battalion to follow Dillon's unit at 400 yards, mopping up and investigating suspicious areas. By 4:40pm the 23rd Marines had trudged to objective O-6. Both battalions immediately dispatched security-reconnaissance patrols to their front but made no contacts with the enemy. The next day, Major-General George Griner arrived to assume command of the 27th Division, immediately reorganizing his units and deploying the reserve 3rd Battalion, 105th Regiment. The 3rd Battalion, 106th Regiment had suffered heavy casualties in its Death Valley fight. By June 28 its effective strength of riflemen numbered approximately 100, and it was reorganized into a single rifle company. Among the 3rd Battalion's casualties on June 28 was the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Harold I. Mizony, USA, killed in action when two Japanese tanks unexpectedly appeared just forward of his battalion observation post. By chance, the two enemy vehicles had found a lucrative target; commanders of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, together with their company commanders, were gathered to plan the next move. Tightly grouped a short distance behind them were the men of the two battalions, waiting for the orders that would send them into action. Within a matter of moments the enemy tankers reaped an awful harvest, including 12 killed and 61 wounded, and then disappeared unscathed. On General Watson's front, Major Hunt's 2nd Battalion continued to fight across the open canefield toward its objective, a low ridge line north of Tipo Pale. Japanese riflemen and machine gunners, secure in their hillside grotto, raked the clearing with grazing fire. Light flame-thrower and medium tanks were available to the 6th Marines, but their use in this instance was limited because of difficult routes of approach to enemy positions, and support had to be delivered from long ranges. This left the task to the infantrymen. As everywhere demonstrated, reduction of cave positions proved a slow, painful job. By late afternoon the situation had improved slightly and the volume of Japanese fire had diminished somewhat, but the 2nd Battalion's unceasing efforts since 6:30 found it still short of the ridge line objective and very tired. A great store of energy had been burned in moving across the murderous field, yet more effort would be required. It appeared that the Japanese were rooted to the pock-marked ridge line. The Tipo Pale strong point, at which Company K, 6th Marines, had been whittling for many days, finally was secured on 28 June, permitting the company to rejoin its battalion. The tenacious Japanese soldiers in this pocket had sold their lives but had exacted from the 6th Marines a high price in time, men and effort. The 8th Marines encountered tough Japanese resistance and difficult terrain while advancing against four small hills known as the Pimples, achieving minimal progress. Meanwhile, Schmidt, positioned well behind the 27th Division, received orders to maintain current positions. However, the 23rd Regiment conducted patrols beyond its lines up to 500 yards, and the 165th Regiment secured Hill 700 to complete the movement to the O-6 Line. Over the following two days, combat fatigue and the need for the 27th Division to catch up slowed the Marine divisions almost to a halt. Beginning their attack at 11:00 on June 29, the 3rd Battalion, 105th Regiment successfully closed the gap on Griner's right flank by about 800 yards, eventually linking up with the 24th Marines the next day. On the left, the 106th Regiment encountered heavy resistance but eventually captured Death Valley and Hell's Pocket, establishing contact with the 8th Marines by June 30. Behind them, the 2nd Battalion, 165th Regiment secured Hill Able and the remaining portion of Purple Heart Ridge. Meanwhile, the Marines and the 165th Regiment conducted patrols, cleared out remaining enemy forces, and fortified their positions. The 6th and 8th Marines also made some limited progress northward, culminating in the capture of Bill's Pimple. During the night of June 30, the Japanese commenced their withdrawal towards Saito's final defensive line in an organized manner despite facing artillery fire. This new defensive line, though shorter, provided an opportunity for Saito to regroup his troops and strengthen their defense. However, failure to hold this position would spell disaster for him and his soldiers. Upon learning of the Japanese retreat, the American forces resumed their offensive on July 1, encountering stubborn resistance from remaining Japanese pockets that needed to be cleared out. The following day, General Smith's forces launched a coordinated attack. On the left flank, Colonel Stuart's 2nd Marines swiftly advanced through Garapan, Flametree, and Sugarloaf Hills, while the 6th Marines made significant gains after neutralizing an enemy stronghold. The 8th Marines, after securing the Pimples, faced heavy Japanese resistance at Limestone Hill. In the meantime, evacuation of casualties had become a problem: Marines had fallen on the open field, and all attempts to rescue them only resulted in more men being hit. The scheme finally adopted, and the one which brought success, was for a tank to position itself between the casualty and the limestone hill. By following directly behind the tanks, hospital corpsmen could then move safely to the wounded, apply hasty bandages, give them a shot of morphine, and place them on stretchers. Then, carefully coordinating their moves with the tank by talking to the driver through the sound-powered phone on the rear sponson, the stretcher bearers would precede the tank from the site, all the while shielded from Japanese fire. White phosphorous rounds dropped on the hill by the 81mm mortar platoon plus frontal blasts from the chaperoning medium tanks also contributed to the success of this resourceful project. The fact that only small arms fire spattered against the thick hulls of the tanks indicated that the Japanese had no heavier weapons readily available in the limestone hill. By dark, all wounded had been rescued, but the task of seizing the hill still remained. Only a clever night tank raid, utilizing illuminating shells and flamethrower tanks, could eliminate this stubborn Japanese position. In the center, the 106th Regiment advanced despite sporadic fire, while the 105th Regiment had to overcome the Papako strongpoint to make modest gains. With the arrival of the 27th Division at the O-6 Line, the right units could resume their advance. Consequently, the 165th Regiment encountered minimal opposition, advancing 1700 yards, while the 23rd and 24th Marines made virtually unopposed progress to the intermediate O-6A Line. On June 3, the general offensive persisted, now targeting the O-7 Line. On the front under Watson's command, the 2nd Marines successfully took control of the remaining portions of Garapan, though they encountered difficulty clearing Mutcho Point on the town's northwestern edge. Duty in the town had little to commend it; battered skeletons of what had once been buildings, and humans, and animals, dotted the area; the choking smell of death hung about like a fog. And everywhere were the pieces of corrugated iron which the Japanese and natives had used as roofing for almost every structure from the hen house to the bank. To step on one of these huge rattling sheets was to inform everyone thereabouts of one's presence. Garapan's trash and garbage dump appearance was further enhanced by odd clothing, shoes, papers, books, and miscellaneous bric-a-brac strewn through the area. Perhaps the only bright point was the copious wells, providing adequate water for the 2nd Marines to bathe away some of the filth on their bodies. The 6th Marines also advanced, halting 1000 yards from the coast, while the 8th Marines faced minimal resistance and gained approximately 1000 yards. Meanwhile, Schmidt's three regiments advanced side by side and in formation, making swift progress over challenging terrain but were ultimately halted before Hill 721 and 4th of July Hill. Nonetheless, the 24th Marines managed to capture Radar Hill, situated at the center of Saito's final defensive line. In the central area, Japanese delaying units hindered the 27th Division's progress towards the coast, with the 106th advancing another 1000 yards and the 165th about 500 yards. During the night of July 3rd the 165th Infantry command post became the scene of violent activity when 27 Japanese advanced into the installation, apparently by mistake. All of the Japanese intruders were killed with no loss to personnel of the 165th. In the morning, when an identification could be made, Colonel Ogawa Yukimatsu, commander of the Japanese 136th Infantry, was discovered among the dead. Piecing the story together, it appears that Ogawa and his headquarters group had been by-passed by U. S. advance and that he was attempting to displace to the northeast when he blundered into the 165th's command post. Detailed instructions pertaining to the establishment of Saito's final line of defense were found on his body, providing the Americans with valuable intelligence for future operations. The next morning, Griner's forces continued their northward advance, successfully securing Flores Point and the surrounding high ground. To the right, despite a disappointing artillery barrage, Schmidt's Marines swiftly captured Hill 721 and 4th of July Hill, with a bold patrol securing Hill 767 to the northeast. On the left flank, while the 2nd Marines cleared Mutcho Point and Tanapag Harbor, the 6th and 8th Marines rapidly pushed to the coast, reaching the O-7 Line. Watson's involvement in the offensive came to an end, with subsequent shifts in the axis of attack by the 27th Division and the 4th Marine Division towards the northeast. Mindful of the significance of the day in American history and pleased with progress at Saipan, General Holland Smith distributed the following message to the landing force on the evening of July 4th: “The Commanding General takes pride on this INDEPENDENCE DAY in sending his best wishes to the fighting men on Saipan. Your unflagging gallantry and devotion to duty have been worthy of the highest praise of our country. It is fitting that on this 4th of July you should be extremely proud of your achievements. Your fight is no less important than that waged by our forefathers who gave us the liberty and freedom we have long enjoyed. Your deeds to maintain these principles will not be forgotten. To all hands a sincere well done. My confidence in your ability is unbounded.” The entire northern part of the island remained to be seized, including the important Marpi Point area; and this demanded a swing of the axis of attack to the northeast. Holland Smith, therefore, split the unconquered portion in half, assigning the left segment to the 27th Division and the right to the 4th Division. To allow sufficient time for the juggling of frontages and zones, the attack hour was delayed until noon of 5 July. Generals Griner and Schmidt, of the 27th and 4th Divisions respectively, were to "conduct such adjustment of their lines or make minor attacks prior to King-hour as they [deemed] necessary to launch a coordinated attack. . . ." The 4th Division's thrust had pushed well into the newly-assigned zone of the 27th Division, so that the previously described reliefs and shifts were necessary. The Japanese forces remaining in the upper end of the island were poorly equipped, supplied, and often in poor health, yet they maintained high morale and a readiness to fight to the end. In the final push northward, Griner assumed control of the western front on June 25th. However, the advancement of his 105th and 165th Regiments was hindered by difficult terrain and strong resistance from fortified positions around Harakiri Gulch. On the right flank, the 24th and 25th Marines made successful progress to the O-8A Line after the 23rd Marines secured the intermediate O-7Z Line. Despite concerns of a potential Japanese counterattack during the night, accurate artillery fire dispersed enemy concentrations. The following day, Griner aimed to reach Makunsha by midday, but faced slow progress against obstacles like Harakiri Gulch and along the coastline. Consequently, Smith decided to adjust division boundaries, allowing Schmidt's Marines to expand northwestward, envelop the 27th Division north of Makunsha, and assume responsibility for the entire front for the sweep to Marpi Point. Under this revised plan, the 27th Division resumed its assault in the afternoon, breaking through a coastal ditch but encountering resistance at the Gulch. Meanwhile, the 23rd Marines, on Schmidt's front, pushed northwest and northeast, with limited progress towards Makunsha. The 24th Marines gained approximately 1800 yards, and the 25th Marines secured Mount Petosukara, where 800 civilians surrendered. Overnight, attempts to counterattack against Petosukara were swiftly thwarted, but significant action unfolded in the Makunsha region. For the 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines, stationed to protect the regiment's exposed left flank, the action was particularly vicious. Just before dawn the enemy rushed forward, armed with grenades and "idiot sticks," encouraging themselves with loud shouts and screams. Though this thrust failed to penetrate the Marines' lines, some of the enemy fell within five yards of the foremost foxholes. The action report of the 3d Battalion, 24th Marines, estimated the number of enemy killed in this attack at "more than 200." On July 6, facing the complete breach of his last line of defense and with no options left, Saito realized the futility of the situation. With his forces depleted of essential supplies and under relentless artillery barrage, he issued orders for the remaining troops to execute gyokusai, a final suicidal assault aimed at inflicting maximum damage on the enemy. Several days prior to Saito's final order the assembly of remaining Japanese forces had begun. Some Japanese were out of reach behind U. S. lines, others were hidden in the deep shadows of caves, but all available were mustered. Marpi Point, Paradise Valley and Harakiri Gulch were sites for mobilization and reorganization. Many provisional units were formed in an effort to achieve some degree of tactical unity among the assorted groups and individuals. Weapons and equipment were wanting and some Japanese were armed only with grenades or crudely-fashioned spears. One Japanese staff officer, Major Kiyoshi Yoshida who participated in the battle estimated the total participants at 1,500, many with no weapons. In the light of subsequent events, however, his estimate appears too low. Assuming that he was misinformed on this point, it is not at all surprising; even at the assembly points, U. S. artillery and mortar fire hampered Japanese efforts to organize their troops and an accurate count was impossible. As the conglomerate force moved toward Makunsha, which would serve as a point of departure, it was subjected to persistent, heavy concentrations of artillery fire. This resulted in a limping approach with leaders calling upon every conceivable device to maintain the unity of their commands. Greater silence by the sprawling force would have helped; early in the evening patrols from the 27th Division Reconnaissance Troop had detected unusual activity. This had resulted in the large number of unobserved fire concentrations thrown into the Makunsha vicinity. By nightfall, Generals Saito and Igeta, along with Admiral Nagumo, performed seppuku after a final meal, while Colonel Suzuki Takuji gathered 3000 Japanese fighters, including naval and support personnel, unarmed civilians, and the injured, for a final desperate charge. The blow fell at 4:45am. First and hardest struck were the isolated positions held by the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 105th Infantry. The attack on these units hit from front, flank and, after moving through the gap, the rear. Almost as soon as the attack was launched, communications to the rear were cut. It was then simply a matter of two isolated battalions of soldiers fighting for their lives. This they did and did well. Some of the soldiers stacked so many dead Japanese forward of their positions that it was necessary to move to get fields of fire. Major McCarthy, commanding the 2d Battalion, described the onslaught: “It reminded me of one of those old cattle stampede scenes of the movies. The camera is in a hole in the ground and you see the herd coming and then they leap up and over you and are gone. Only the Japs just kept coming and coming. I didn't think they'd ever stop.” The sheer weight of this attack, its ponderous momentum, carried it through the soldiers' lines. In addition, hundreds of Japanese moved past the isolated defense area, using the gap on the right. The fanatical surge then carried to the 3rd Battalion, 105th Infantry, located on the high ground overlooking Harakiri Gulch. Here the soldiers were on better defensive terrain; the Japanese had to climb up to them. The lines held, and the Japanese suffered staggering losses. This portion of the battle did not cease with the coming of daylight on 7th July but continued until midafternoon. Next to feel the impetus of the determined thrust was the 3d Battalion, 10th Marines, in firing positions about 500 yards southwest of Tanapag Village. The Japanese mass that struck this unit was apparently that portion of the banzai force which had moved through the gap between the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 105th Infantry. Hardest hit were Batteries H and Headquarters and Service, in position on the left of the railroad track. Batteries I and G, set up on the right of the track also got into the fight, although they were not as closely engaged as the other two. The only battery that actually fired its howitzers during the melee was H, the others being forced to remain silent by the presence of other artillerymen to their front. During the early phases of the battle, before Battery H was forced to abandon its firing positions, one of its howitzers was turned completely around to engage a Japanese medium tank which had ploughed through to the rear. At a range of less than 50 yards the artillerymen sent 105mm shells crashing into, and destroying, their armored target. Eventually, however, the pressure from Japanese infantrymen was too great; Battery H's outnumbered survivors pulled back. In the frantic confusion and haste of the retreat, they failed to remove the breech blocks or firing locks from the howitzers. The Japanese, oddly enough, neither used nor destroyed the weapons while they had control of the area. Battery I had been attacked at 0455, with Japanese advancing astride the railroad track. The first thrust was repulsed and the Japanese fell back to reorganize. A series of actions, followed this same pattern, continued until 0650, when all of the battery's small-arms ammunition was expended. At this time the battery commander, Captain John M. Allen ordered the firing locks removed from the howitzers and the unit to fall back to the positions of Battery G. Here the two batteries continued the fight until relieved by elements of the 106th Infantry later in the day. Located directly behind Battery H, headquarters and service personnel of the battalion were forced to retire after heavy, close-in fighting. Among the 136 casualties in the battalion was the commanding officer, Major William L. Crouch, who was killed. Japanese killed in the encounter numbered 322. Even as the Japanese surged directly against the 3rd Battalion, brother artillerymen of the 4th Battalion, 10th Marines, in position to the southeast, received pressure from the fringe of the main enemy tide. In defense of its firing positions, the battalion killed about 85 Japanese. Despite the turmoil of the banzai attack, the 4th Battalion responded on the morning of 7 July to an urgent request for support originated by the 23d Marines, fighting down the cliffs above Makunsha. By 05:30, they had advanced further, reaching the command post of the 105th Regiment, where Bishop's hastily assembled American forces, aided by artillery, managed to repel the attack. Concurrently, secondary assaults were launched in Paradise Valley and Harakiri Gulch but were promptly quelled by American firepower. By midday, the banzai charge had been effectively halted, and the few surviving Japanese soldiers retreated to Mamushka, engaging in sporadic skirmishes with American troops throughout the day. Despite a counterattack by the 106th Regiment, they were forced to halt just 200 yards short of the Tanapag perimeter, and by midnight, the remaining American survivors were successfully evacuated. During this engagement, the 105th incurred 406 fatalities and 512 injuries, while Marine artillery units sustained 45 deaths and 82 injuries. On July 8, at 04:30, the remaining Japanese forces launched another attack on the 106th's positions, only to be swiftly repelled. Against the coastal portion of this line the Japanese executed a vigorous thrust during the night of July 7th. Though the strength, organization and planning of this second attack were weak by comparison with the previous effort, the vigor and determination with which it was executed did not vary. Shortly after midnight a report came from the observation post atop Hill 767; Japanese force moving south. Enemy "feeler" patrols probing for weak spots were engaged as early as 3:00am, but the information that they took back to their commanders must not have been encouraging. No holes existed. The attack, launched about 4:30am, struck the 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, along the beach. Grazing defensive fires swept across the flat beach like a scythe, cutting all in its path. The Japanese never seriously threatened penetration of the lines and those that attempted to swim around the flank were spotted and killed. Shortly after 7:00am the Japanese attack petered out and died. The 106th Infantry estimated that it had slaughtered about 1,000 of the enemy, while at the same time its own losses were practically negligible. Watson's Marines then assumed control over most Army units and conducted cleanup operations for the ensuing two days. They discovered a total of 4,311 Japanese casualties, including those inflicted earlier by artillery and naval bombardment. Meanwhile, Schmidt's regiments, supported by the 2nd Marines, faced resistance as they advanced northeast and northwest. The NTLF Operation Order for 8 July instructed the 2d Marine Division, less detachments, to "advance in the present 27th Infantry Division zone of action, pass through elements of [that] division on its front line, attack, mop up and destroy enemy elements. . . . Upon passing through the 27th Infantry Division assume operational control 165th Infantry and 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, . . . assume tactical control within the assigned zone of action at 0630 [8 July]." Upon passage of its lines the 27th Division would revert to NTLF reserve. No effective resistance was offered the 2nd Marine Division after it had passed through the 27th Division on the morning of 8 July, although large numbers of poorly armed and totally disorganized enemy were encountered. Some Japanese used the familiar device of hiding in caves and firing from the deep shadows, but the bulk seemed eager to die and made headlong rushes at the Marines. This foolish expenditure simplified the mop-up. The 6th Marines' action report characterized the day's activities as an "attack . . . against a disorganized, swarming mass of Japs . . . waiting for the final death blow. . . ." Adding the hundreds found strewn through its zone to the number that it disposed of, the 6th Marines made a "conservative estimate" for 8 July of 1,500 dead Japanese in its area. On more rugged terrain inland the 8th Marines encountered much the same type of resistance. Here, with more caves to investigate, the sweep was somewhat slower. One wooded pocket encountered, a deep ravine, caused a minor delay. The tactic that previously had worked so well was again employed: one company stayed behind to contain and mop-up while the rest continued the push. The 8th Marines' zone, being inland of the main path of the banzai attack, contained fewer enemy bodies; but, even so, there was conclusive evidence that a terrific battle had taken place.With this final push, Turner declared the island secured, although General Jarman's garrison troops continued mop-up operations for several months. Following the declaration that the island was secured, efforts to induce cave-occupants to surrender were intensified. Interpreters, using public address systems, pleaded with people in caves to come out. The device was not only attempted from land but from sea as well. LCI gunboats moved close inshore and broadcast promises of good treatment, for which they were answered with fire from Japanese soldiers in the caves. Even some of Saipan's leading citizens, who had surrendered and received good treatment, talked to those in the caves, urging them to yield. But, for the effort expended, the results were not encouraging. The primary reason for this failure was that the people had been saturated with Japanese propaganda to the effect that the Americans intended to torture and kill them. This had been repeated so often that the people came to believe it. At this time the very zenith of horror occurred. Hundreds of civilians, believing that the end had come, embarked on a ghastly exhibition of self-destruction. Casting their children ahead of them, or embracing them in death, parents flung themselves from the cliffs onto the jagged rocks below. The places they jumped from would become known as "Suicide Cliff" and "Banzai Cliff". Some waded into the surf to drown or employed other gruesome means of destroying themselves. How many civilians died in this orgy of mass hysteria is not known, but it is estimated that around 1000 committed suicide. A commander of a patrol craft (YP) said that the progress of his boat around Marpi Point at this time was slow and tedious because of the hundreds of corpses floating in the water. On July 13, Colonel Riseley's 3rd Battalion executed the last Marine operation on Saipan, successfully assaulting Maniagassa Island, resulting in 14 Japanese deaths and the capture of 15 others. By the end of the battle, almost the entire Japanese garrison of approximately 28,000 personnel had been eliminated. About 1,700 were taken prisoner, including roughly half who were Korean laborers. Nearly 10,000 Saipan civilians, roughly 40% of the population, perished, with another 14,000 interned. American forces suffered approximately 16,500 casualties, comprising 3,100 fatalities and 13,000 wounded out of a total assault force of 71,000. This casualty rate, exceeding 20%, was comparable to Tarawa and marked the costliest battle for the Americans in the Pacific theater up to that point. That is all for today with Saipan as we now need to head over to New Guinea. General MacArthur's next offensive was to be the invasion of Noemfoor Island, codenamed Operation Cyclone. Noemfoor served as a crucial staging ground for Japanese forces destined to reinforce the Biak Detachment, owing mainly to its possession of two vital airfields. Despite being guarded by a modest contingent, primarily consisting of six infantry companies from Colonel Shimizu Suesada's 219th Regiment, the Japanese presence on the island was scattered, rendering their defense disorganized. Allied estimates of Japanese strength on Noemfoor were too high, for there were not more than 2,000 Japanese on the island. Probably not more than 900 of these could be counted infantry effectives. In addition to the 2,000 Japanese, there were 600-odd Formosan laborers and approximately 500 Javanese slave laborers. The 3d Battalion, 219th Infantry, contained the bulk of the combat troops, but there were also present about 180 men of the 2d Battalion, 219th Infantry, and a like number of the 222d Infantry, 36th Division, troops which had been unable to reach Biak. The Japanese garrison on Noemfoor was commanded by a Colonel Shimizu, who was also the commanding officer of the 219th Infantry. Another unit, commanded by a Major Mori, but apparently under Colonel Shimizu's operational control, seems to have been a provisional organization containing mostly armed service personnel and numbering about 600 men. General Krueger, anticipating minimal resistance, tasked Colonel Sandlin's 158th Regiment with Operation Cyclone, overseen by General Patrick. The assault was to be facilitated by Admiral Fechteler's Task Force 77, supported by cruisers under Admiral Berkey and aircraft from the 5th and 13th Air Forces, which had been conducting preparatory bombings on Noemfoor and enemy air bases in the Vogelkop Peninsula. Patrick's strategy involved landing on Yellow Beach, where the enemy's defenses were perceived to be strongest, aiming for swift American control over Noemfoor's airfields. In many essentials, the landing plans for Noemfoor were very similar to those used at Biak; but in one major essential the Noemfoor landing plan differed radically from that employed at Biak. At the latter island the HURRICANE Task Force had used a beach which, while within easy marching distance of the principal objectives and the main concentration of enemy troops, was relatively undefended. But at Noemfoor, the landing was to be made in the face of the enemy's strongest defenses, known to be located in the Kamiri Drome area. YELLOW Beach, as the landing area was designated, extended approximately 800 yards along the western end of the airfield, which was situated almost at the high water mark. The reef presented fewer hazards there than elsewhere, since it was somewhat narrower than at most other points along the island's coast. The relative narrowness of the reef at Kamiri would also permit LCIs, LCTs, LCMs and LSTs to approach to within 450 yards of the beach, which was believed to be firm at the airfield. Moreover, landing at YELLOW Beach had the advantage of placing the assault troops immediately on their objective, permitting a rapid seizure of Kamiri Drome before the Japanese could recover from the shock of the naval and air bombardments. Enemy forces on the island would be split, and those stationed at Namber and Kornasoren Dromes would be isolated. To minimize casualties during the assault, the landing plan required the most intense naval bombardment witnessed in the Southwest Pacific Area thus far. Additionally, Krueger kept the 503rd Parachute Regiment on standby at Hollandia for airdrop once a suitable landing zone was secured, with the 34th Regiment stationed at Biak in reserve. With all preparations finalized by the end of June, Fectheler's unit set off from Toem at 18:00 on June 30, reaching southeastern Biak around 17:40 the following day. Subsequently, the American forces sailed towards Noemfoor, commencing deployment off Yellow Beach by 05:00 on July 2. Prior to the landings, the island had endured significant bombardment from General Kenney's aircraft the previous day, with additional air assaults conducted leading up to the arrival of the troops. As the soldiers readied for the shoreline assault, Berkey's cruisers and Fechteler's destroyers bombarded Yellow Beach and its surroundings for approximately 50 minutes. Immediately before the landing, air bombardment, like much of the naval gunfire, was directed against the low coral ridges and hills behind Kamiri Drome. It was believed that the most determined enemy opposition would come from positions in these ridges, and to neutralize these possible defenses the 33 B-24's, at approximately H minus 15 minutes, dropped 500-pound bombs along the ridge lines. The intensity of the Allied air and naval bombardment effectively dispersed most of the Japanese forces from the beach or kept those remaining pinned down. With the cessation of bombing, the initial wave of troop-carrying LVT's approached the outer edge of the reef, supported by rocket fire from LCI gunboats. Encountering no resistance, Sandlin's 1st and 2nd Battalions disembarked near a coral ledge overlooking Kamiri Drome. The American forces then commenced advancement in the west, east, and south directions to expand the beachhead, facing only minor resistance from caves approximately 500 yards from the eastern end of Kamiri Drome. Simultaneously, Sandlin's 3rd Battalion landed and swiftly joined mop-up operations at the east end of the airstrip, enabling the 2nd Battalion to turn southward towards the Kamiri River without encountering opposition along the way. By 4:00, the 158th had successfully secured a rectangular area approximately 3000 yards wide and around 800 yards deep, reaching south to the banks of the Kamiri River. Despite enemy mortar fire, unloading operations had progressed well, with over 7100 men, 500 vehicles, and 2250 tons of supplies successfully brought ashore by evening. American casualties for the day were limited to 3 killed, 19 wounded, and 2 injured, while the Japanese suffered 115 dead and 3 captured. In anticipation of potential Japanese resistance elsewhere, Patrick had requested reinforcements, leading Krueger to order Colonel George Jones' 503rd Parachute Regiment to advance to Kamiri. On July 3 around 05:15, regimental headquarters and the 1st Battalion began loading onto 38 C-47s at Cyclops Drome, with plans for the other two battalions to drop over the following days. Launching was completed by 07:47, with successful arrival over Noemfoor at 10:00. The leading C-47's paratroopers were on the ground just ten minutes later. The planes were to fly over Kamiri Drome in flights of two each, the first plane at a height of 400 feet and the second echeloned slightly to the right rear at 450 feet. Subsequent flights were to follow at a distance of 300 yards. Contrary to plans, the first two C-47s flew over the strip at a height of about 175 feet, and the next eight planes all flew below 400 feet. Dropping from this low altitude caused the paratroopers in the first ten C-47s to suffer many casualties; more casualties resulted because the planes flew over the strip two abreast. The broad formation caused many paratroopers to land off the southern edge of the 100-foot-wide runway in an area where Allied vehicles, bulldozers, supply dumps, and wrecked Japanese aircraft were located. Additional hazards beyond the cleared area were jagged tree stumps, trees partially destroyed by pre-assault air and naval bombardments, and a number of anti-aircraft gun emplacements. The drop resulted in 72 casualties among the 739 men dropped on July 3, including 31 severe fracture cases, many of whom would not be able to parachute again. Despite these challenges, Jones's 1st Battalion took control of approximately 2000 yards in the center of the defenses around Kamiri Drome upon arrival, allowing Sandlin's 2nd and 3rd Battalions to concentrate at the eastern end of the field and expand the perimeter. These battalions then proceeded eastward toward Kornasoren Drome, encountering well-prepared but unmanned defensive positions. Additionally, the 1st Battalion conducted patrols south of the Kamiri River but encountered only a few scattered enemy soldiers. The next day, Jones' 3rd Battalion initiated their drop on Kamiri Drome. They encountered casualties, with 56 jump injuries among the 685 paratroopers who landed by 10:25. Given the significant injuries from both drops, Krueger and Patrick opted to transport his remaining battalion via water. They would arrive at Noemfoor by July 11. But for now, let's shift focus from Noemfoor to the Wakde-Sarmi area to discuss its final clean-up. Following the main conflict's conclusion on June 25, General Sibert directed the 3rd Battalion, 1st Regiment and the 3rd Battalion, 63rd Regiment to clear Lone Tree Hill. By June 30, they successfully secured the area. On the same day, the 1st Battalion, 20th Regiment moved through the defile south of the hill and encountered only a few stragglers. Seeking to fully secure the Maffin Bay staging area, Sibert extended the perimeter to the Woske River on July 1 through the 1st Regiment's efforts. By July 4, elements of the 63rd occupied Hill 225, seizing the crest of Mount Saksin the following day. However, Hill 265, located southwest of Hill 225, presented greater challenges due to Japanese resistance and difficult terrain. Yet by July 9, the 1st Battalions of the 1st and 63rd Regiments secured the hill crest, previously held by elements of the 224th Regiment. With the capture of Hill 265, the last enemy stronghold in the Maffin Bay region fell. Meanwhile, General Tagami abandoned the idea of a decisive battle in the Woske sector, opting instead to withdraw the majority of his 36th Division toward Sarmi and Sawar, with remnants of the 224th Regiment assuming defense of Woske. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The fall of Saipan pierced the Japanese inner defensive perimeter, now the home islands were vulnerable to strategic bombing. The battle claimed nearly 50,000 casualties and at least 8000 civilian deaths. The intense percentage of casualties suffered by the Americans would have a profound effect on future American planning for the Pacific War.
In this latest episode, MacArthur Memorial historians Jim Zobel and Amanda Williams answer some of the more popular and/or unique questions about General MacArthur we have received from MacArthur Memorial Podcast listeners and on social media.Have a comment about this episode? Send us a text message! (Note: we can only read the texts, we can't reply) Follow us on:Twitter: @MacArthur1880; @AEWilliamsClarkFacebook: @MacArthurMemorialwww.macarthurmemorial.org
Jase's famous line was “stolen” by Arnold and General MacArthur, though it's obvious that it originated with Jesus. Jase gets sucked into a kids' movie thanks to the U2 soundtrack, and Phil's early duck-call business makes the perfect illustration for a debate about salvation. The guys encourage self-examination in everyone to see whether Jesus lives in their hearts, and Zach describes the “empty hands of faith.” In this episode: Acts 19; Acts 18:20; Acts 10:44; 2 Corinthians 13:2 https://philmerch.com — Get your “Unashamed” mugs, shirts, hats & hoodies! https://ICouldBeWrongButIDoubtIt.com/ — Get your copy of Phil's best-selling book now! -- Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
Last time we spoke about the remarkable success of Operation Reckless and Persecution. Colonel Oliver Newman led the drive towards Hollandia's airfields, encountering scattered opposition and discovering large undefended Japanese supply dumps. General MacArthur was forced to postpone future plans until May 21st. Meanwhile, Allied submarine interceptions disrupted IJN troop movements, and Task Force 58's airstrikes neutralized Truk. Within Burma, General Stilwell's offensive faced challenges from Japanese resistance and heavy monsoon rains. Despite setbacks, the 22nd Division aimed to capture Inkangahtawng while Chinese forces engaged the enemy along various fronts. Chindits continued Operation Thursday, facing logistical hurdles and Japanese attacks. Colonel Kinnison's Marauders encountered strong resistance near Tingkrukawng, while Colonel Hunter's force successfully surprised the Japanese at Myitkyina. This episode is the Japanese Defeat at Imphal and Kohima Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. We are jumping right back into the heat of General Mutaguchi's insane Operation U-Go. Poor General Yamauchi after suffering a devastating defeat at Nungshigum, was now facing allied tanks he simply had no answer for. Yamauchi ordered his men to dig in around Sendgmai and Kanglatongbi, basically so they would at least be hung around the Kohima-Imphal road. The allies answer to this was 6000 sorties, dropping 1000 bombs in the sector. It was a tremendous amount of damage, but the Japanese did benefit from bunkers. Yamauchi's 15th Division due north of Imphal were now being contained successfully, allowing General Briggs and Roberts to initiate their own counter offensives by the end of April. Simultaneously the 33rd Division was struggling to advance upon Bishenpur and the Shenam Saddle; over at Kohima, General Sato's 31st Division was reluctantly falling onto the defensive as the looming threat of a full British-Indian counteroffensive was dawning upon them. Imphal was still facing a grave threat from the Japanese along the Tiddim Road. Mutaguchi was personally directing the 33rd Divisions actions around Bishenpur at this time. Mutaguchi planned a three-pronged attack, one prong along the Tiddim Road, another down south from the Silchar Track by the 215th Regiment and a lastly from the north by the 214th Regiment. For the assault the 33rd Division received reinforcements in the form of the 14th Tank Regiment; the 2nd Battalion, 18th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment; and the 1st Anti-Tank Battalion from the Yamamoto Detachment. In late May they would also be receiving the 151st regiment and the 14th Tank regiment, amongst other units. This of course meant other units like the Yamamoto Detachment were being deprived of men, thus they in turn would be reinforced. The Yamamoto Detachment received the 2nd battalion, 51st regiment who were previously engaged with the Chindits at Indaw. They would arrive at Kampang after the fall of Crete West. Now in preparation for Mutaguchis renewed offensive the IJA would be tossing aircraft against the Gun Box in Bsihenpur. The Japanese Army Air Force made four air raids on the Gun Box position in Bishenpur in the first ten days of May. There was good reason for this, for at Gun Box the 32nd Indian Brigade had concentrated its artillery support. This included four 3.7in. howitzers, eight 25-pdrs, six 6-pdrs and three A/A guns. From here the guns were able to support the infantry's actions both on and around the Silchar Track, as well as the villages on the Tiddim Road such as Potsangbam. The Japanese heavy field artillery was at Khoirentak. The 215th regiment meanwhile performed some preliminary attacks against the positions at Ngarangial. Attacks began in early May against positions between Wireless Hill and Ngarangial, with two battalions attacking from the north and one from the south. The enemy, in strong positions, withstood a series of attacks which continued until the middle of May. While Mutaguchi waited for reinforcements to arrive so he could renew his southern offensive, Generals Yamamoto and Gracey were slugging it out for control over Crete West. The extremely exhausted 3rd battalion, 213 Regiment finally made a break through against the Lynch Pimple on the 8th, forcing the 80th Brigade to evacuate Crete West two days later. On the night of the 10th, Yamamoto launched his first attacks against Scraggy Hill, which was extensively shelled, followed by a massive infantry assault: in classic style, wave upon wave of Japanese soldiers crashed on Scraggy, overwhelming its forward defenses. A point was finally reached in the night when the British battalion commander on Scraggy felt that the hill would fall unless supporting artillery fire was directed on his own positions. This was called in and the Japanese advance finally halted on the morning of 11th. But parts of Scraggy were now under the control of Yamamoto Force, which dug in. General Scoones reacted by relieving the exhausted 20th Division with the fresher 23rd Division of General Roberts. The new arrivals were shocked to see the conditions on the forward positions of the Shenam Saddle. Scraggy stood out. The Japanese were on part of the hill, while the rest of it was under British control. Trenches and bunkers covered the feature; in places, mere meters separated the two sides' front trenches. Bits of body parts of soldiers lay everywhere and a terrible stench covered the hillside. Now Cowan was planning a counter to Mutaguchis incoming offensive. He planned for an anvil and hammer maneuver; the hammer would be the 63rd Indian Brigade recently relieved from Sekmai in the first week of May by the 89th Indian Brigade. They would push down from Bishenpur towards Potsangbam, Ningthoukhong and even further south while the 48th Brigade established a roadblock on the Tiddim Road around Torbung, deep behind enemy lines. Cowan hoped to crush the 33rd Division along the road between his hammer and anvil while also cutting off the incoming Japanese reinforcements. Thus Brigadier Ronald Cameron's 48th Brigade stealthily advanced south along the eastern shore of Lake Loktak, crossed the Manipur River at Shuganu. It was a long grueling march. Simultaneously, Brigadier Guy Burton's 63rd Brigade advanced south against Potsangbam on the 10th. In their frustrated push southwards on the Tiddim Road, Burton's men had to deal first with the determined Japanese defense of Potsangbam. Burton took over on the 9th from Mackenzie's 32nd Indian Brigade, which had gained a foothold in the village the day before and was now to give its full attention to the Silchar Track. The 63rd Indian Brigade put in a first attack on Potsangbam on 10th. This involved two Gurkha battalions, each supported by a troop of tanks from the 3rd Carabiniers. The area they targeted was the main part of the village east of the Tiddim Road. The initial full frontal attacks failed to make much progress. Burton then changed tack against the Japanese, who had withdrawn to their main defenses south of the Potsangbam turel. He called for a heavy artillery bombardment from the same direction as before in the northern half of Potsangbam to make it appear that he was repeating the previous line of attack. Except this time he instructed one of his battalions to pass secretly behind the other and make for the area to the immediate east of the road. The move worked and the road through the village and its immediate vicinity were captured by the 15th. The Tiddim Road through Potsangbam was now open, although the Japanese still held on in parts of the village. But it had all taken much longer than expected. While the anvil at Torbung was about to be put in place, the hammer had only inched forward. After a long and difficult march, the brigade arrived near Torbung in mid-May. The roadblock was set up on 17th where three nullahs crossed the road near Milestone 33. To the east were several low-lying hills where brigade headquarters was established, centered on one called Point 3404. The sluggish Khuga River flowed between the hills and the road. In the Torbung sector, the Americas surprised Lt. Colonel Matsuki of the 33rd Supply Regiment, who was given the mission of reopening the line of communications using whatever troops were available in the immediate area. A composite company from the 33rd Supply Regiment, which had been deployed in the Mountainous area west of Churachandpur, held Hill 4358 against several enemy attacks. On the night of 17th, approximately 100 men of the 33rd Supply Regiment were gathered from rear elements to make the first attack on the roadblock. The attacking group was mounted on trucks and the leaders miscalculating the location of the enemy position drove squarely up to the roadblock and the entire attacking unit was virtually annihilated. Mutaguchi reacted furiously to this by unleashing artillery fire upon Point 3404 and the roadblock from the surrounding hills. Cameron's guns responded with retaliatory fire. Simultaneously Mutaguchi tossed his 1st battalion, 67th regiment against the Torbung roadblock, but Cameron's men held on inflicting tremendous casualties against the Japanese. Meanwhile Burton unleashed an attack against the hills immediately west of the road in the hopes of cutting off the supply line of the 214th and 215th Regiments. The 63rd rigade set off on 18th; the next day it had captured the villages of Tokpa Khul and Kha Aimol, and near them Three Pimple Hill and OP Hill respectively. This directly threatened the 33rd Divisions HQ at Laimanai. Mutaguchi reacted by abandoning the assaults from the west and south, and redirected the 215th Regiment to deal with Burton's 63rd division. All three of Sasahara's battalions were thrown into the counterattack, the first of which went in on the 20th. Another major assault was made two days later; both were driven off. The Japanese lost over 110 men. But they persisted and put in further attacks over the next week, frustrating any further movement southwards for the 63rd Indian Brigade. The Japanese failed to clear Burton's position, their relentless attacks would completely pin down the 63rd Brigade, thus preventing any further movement southwards. Now at this point the 32nd Brigade had managed to recapture Wireless Hill, prompting Mutaguchi to abandon Potsangbam by the 24th. The 4th Independent Engineer Regiment and 2nd battalion, 213th Regiment fell back to Ningthoukhong. Mutaguchi then tossed another battalion to help out in the attack against Burton's 63rd division. Without further support of the hammer, Cameron's anvil force had to repel a coordinated tank-infantry attack on the 21st and again on the 23rd. The 2nd Battalion, 154th Infantry Regiment and a composite company from the 14th Tank Regiment attacked on the 21st and again on the 23rd but were not only unsuccessful in dislodging the enemy, but also suffered extremely heavy losses. Two tanks were destroyed during these attacks. Though the anvil held firm, Burton's failed attempts to continue the push south would ultimately force Cameron to abandon the roadblock and head back. On May 24th, the 48th Brigade was fighting through Bishenpur heading up the road finally linking up with the other brigade around Potsangbam. Thus the Torbung roadblock was an enormous success for Cowan, his men had inflicted 500 casualties and disrupted Mutaguchi's plan completely. Now Mutaguchi chose to go ahead with only part of his original plan, the attack from the north that would be carried out by Colonel Sakuma Takayoshi's 214th regiment. To oversee the Bishenpur offensive, Major-General Tanaka Nobuo was appointed in command of the 33rd Division. Leaving Bungte on the night of the 19th, Sakuma's 1st battalion advanced south to attack Bishenpur from the north, while the 2nd battalion moved north from Wainen and attacked Hill 2926. Yet as they tried to storm Point 2926, they were beaten off by a platoon of the 7/10th Baluchs. Failing to take the peak, they captured the southern part of the feature and parts of the adjacent Maibam village. The 1st battalion proceeded with their assault against Bishenpur targeting the area at the northern end of the village, near the junction between the Tiddim Road and the Silchar Track. This is also the area where the Gun Box was. Once they had managed to infiltrate the road junction area, however, the Japanese were repeatedly counter-attacked in the next few days, British tanks firing on their positions at close range. Without any anti-tank guns and the British tanks firing on their positions at close range, they were ultimately wiped out. Back over with the 2nd Battalion, they had successfully captured Maibam village and Hill 2926, very close to Cowan's headquarters, so the British would have to direct several reinforcements to lay siege on these enemy positions. Early on the 26th, Sakuma directed a composite company to launch a last charge on Bishenpur from the north, but this attack would also end in failure. Cowan then directed the brigade-strength Woodforce to evict the Japanese from Hill 2926. Woodforce consisted of the 50th Indian Parachute Brigade's HQ, commanded by Brigadier Woods and was a composite force of tanks, artillery, sappers and infantry. Taking over the front on the 26th, Woodforce mounted robust counter-attacks over the next two days, finally overcoming all opposition and recapturing the hill and Maibam by the 29th. With most of the 33rd Division fighting to reopen the Tiddim road at Torbung, Sakuma's 214th Regiment was left to extricate itself as best it could. But the fall of the Torbung roadblock on the 24th also allowed Mutaguchi's reinforcements to finally reinforce Ningthoukong in preparation for an attack on Potsangbam. At this point, the balance of power had shifted very definitely to the allies. Sakuma's early success at Hill 2926 was the closest any Japanese would get to Imphal from the south. Meanwhile General Yamamoto's attacks against the Shenam Saddle resumed on the 20th, with his men rushing the crest of Scraggy in waves throwing gelignite bombs and grenades, but ultimately getting pushed back each time. Meanwhile the 2nd battalion, 51st regiment and 1st battalion, 60th regiment began an attack against Gibraltar, a very steep hill along the saddle. Their initial attacks were repelled easily, but on the night of the 23rd they managed to gain a foothold on Gibraltar's crest and this in effect cut off the 37th Indian brigade at Malta and Scraggy. With the Fourteenth Army units on Malta and Scraggy cut off, the fate of the entire Shenam Saddle now hung in the balance, but the very next day the hill was recovered by a counter-attack led by the 5/6th Rajputana Rifles and 3/10th Gurkha Rifles. Gibraltar would be the farthest the Japanese would be able to advance on the Shenam Saddle and the closest they came to breaking through; and from then on, a stalemate developed with neither side making any important moves. After the Japanese had been evicted from Gibraltar on the 24th, they did not follow up with another major attempt to push through the Shenam Saddle for a fortnight. But there was never really a quiet moment on these heights. Sniper fire was ever-present, as was the booming of artillery guns. The situation was the worst on Scraggy, where both sides continued to maintain their respective positions. The British and Indian units here would be fired on from Nippon Hill, besides being subjected to rifle fire, mortaring and grenade attacks from Scraggy itself. To the north, General Brigg's resumed his counteroffensive against Molvom, tossing his 9th Brigade into a series of attacks against the Japanese held Hump. The infantry put in several attacks against the Hump, suffering increasing casualties. The men of the 3/14th Punjabis attacked Hump at least half a dozen times that month. Despite it all, the Japanese were still found in their bunkers at the end of May. Sited on the reverse slopes of Hump, their bunkers were difficult to target by guns firing from the other side. Even when they were hit, they were so solidly built that they suffered little damage. The defenders of Hump would wait until the 3/14th Punjabis neared the crest; they would then let loose a barrage of machine-gun fire and grenade attacks. Attack after attack had to be called off in the face of such furious resistance. Though heavy artillery and mortar fire and repeated air strikes were called in on it, the tenacious Japanese defenders would successfully repel all British-Indian attacks throughout early May. On the other side, realizing the vital need for artillery support, General Yamauchi decided to bring to the front the field guns that had been left east of the Chindwin River. He also was reinforced with the 2nd Battalion, 67th Regiment, which would seize Lamu on May 10th, securing the rear of the 15th Division. On the 15th, thanks to the timely arrival of the 89th and 123rd Brigades, Briggs was able to renew his assaults in front of Sekmai with greater intensity, finally clearing Kanglatongbi and the hills to the immediate east six days later. Colonel Matsumura responded by creating new defensive positions around Modbung. As the month came to a close, Briggs decided to concentrate both his division's brigades on the Imphal–Kohima Road. The 9th Indian Brigade was to be brought on to the road, swapping places with the 89th Indian Brigade, which would move to the Iril River Valley. The opening of the Imphal–Kohima Road was a far greater priority than clearing the Mapao– Molvom Range. The Japanese defenders of the latter would be left where they had hung on for weeks. In any case, the opening of the road was likely to encourage them much more to leave than any direct attacks on their positions. On May 15th Yamauchi was relieved of his command. Yamauchi had really drawn the short end of the straw. As he admitted at the time, his men simply had no answer to the British tanks. His men had thrown themselves into the jungle as lightly as possible in order to strike Imphal quickly, so they did not have effective anti-tank weapons. Ymauchi's division was always the Japanese weak spot, but they valiantly had refused to lift their roadblock at Kanglatongbi. As a last desperate throw, Yamauchi had ordered the use of poison gas. Yamauchi was also a man who understood how strong the allies were, especially America. Unlike the xenophobic and ignorant Tojo and Mutaguchi, Yamauchi had spent time in the USA and this led him to be quite pessimistic. Regardless, without anti-tank weapons it was quite hopeless. Yamauchi was carried from the battlefield on a litter and would later die in a hospital in Maymyo. Back over at Kohima, Generals Stopford and Grover were continuing their counteroffensive. Brigadiers 4th Brigade were occupying Oaks Hill when on May 1st, they began to descend during The Royal Scots stopped their advance and reoccupied Oaks Hill, the brigade artillery back in Jotsoma was on standby to pound any Japanese positions the Norfolks, who were pressing on down the ridge, encountered. The Japanese, alert now to the dangerous presence of enemy troops above them, moved up against Oaks Hill and fought hard to expel the Royal Scots during that first night, with no success. The morning that followed a night of screaming, fear-inducing attacks found the jungle undergrowth littered with Japanese bodies. It was usual practice for the Japanese to take away their dead and wounded, but on this occasion there were too few Japanese survivors for the task. As the Royal Scots repelled numerous enemy counterattacks, the Norfolks were continuing their descent towards the GPT ridge. On May 4th, the Norfolks found themselves in a good position to assault the crests of the ridge. They stormed up catching the Japanese by surprise, managing to seize numerous bunkers. At the same time, the 161st Brigade was able to seize the area southeast of Two Tree Hill, but the Japanese had a complex bunker system there preventing them from linking Jotsoma with Pulebadze. The bunker complex on GPT Ridge was much more substantial than the British had expected, with literally dozens of small, carefully sited bunkers littering the entire area with interlocking arcs of fire, while the entire position was also covered by Japanese machine guns further to the east on the Aradura Spur. No sooner would one be discovered and attacked, than another would open up against the attackers from somewhere else. Until the entirety of GPT Ridge was cleared, Goschen's brigade could not enjoy the shortcut through to Jotsoma via Two Tree Hill; the road to Imphal remained in Japanese hands and their machine guns continued to spray fire on 6th Brigade's exposed right flank. Within the center the 6th Brigade was attacking Kuki Piquet and FSD Hill. While the attack against Kuki Piquet was not seeing much progress, they did gain a toehold atop FSD Hill. Further north, the 5th Brigade were able to bypass the 138th regiments position on Merema Ridge. They managed to secure a small part of Naga Village by the end of the day. Being close in proximity to General Sato's HQ, the response from the Japanese was a series of fierce counterattacks. THe 33rd battalion, 14th regiment stormed the Cameron Highlanders who did not have time to consolidate their success by digging in, and heavy Japanese mortar fire at daylight forced the Jocks back to the western edge of the hill. Here Hawkins had them dig to secure the ground that had been seized and the Worcesters, who had protected the flanks of the night advance, were called up to help build a defensive position able to resist counterattack. The rain was by now constant. Everyone was drenched to the skin. The next morning the Japanese Air Force made one of their occasional forays into the deep valley that flowed out of the Kohima Ridge westward, but to limited effect. Meanwhile Brigadier Frederick Loftus-Tottenham's newly arrived 33rd Brigade was in the process of reinforcing the exhausted 6th Brigade at Kohima Ridge, with preparations being made for a renewed general counteroffensive. Meanwhile, over on Pulebadze on the 6th, B Company of the Norfolks, commanded by Captain Jack Randle, was ordered to seize the remaining part of the bunker position at the bottom of GPT Ridge, while the 4/lst Gurkhas of , assisting the breakthrough in the center against Kohima Ridge and Jail Hill, were to attack the lower, western slopes of GPT Ridge. In these attacks the Norfolks were to seize the remaining Japanese bunkers but at high cost, in which Capt. Randle was awarded the posthumous VC. The Norfolks remained in the positions they had seized and, after a night of heavy rain, a further attempt to attack the remaining Japanese positions was made at first light on the morning of 7 May by the 4/lst Gurkhas and the Royal Scots. It was important that this operation was successful, as at 10.30am an attempt was to be made by the 1st Queen's - part of 33rd Indian Brigade, who had arrived at Kohima exhausted and malaria-ridden from Arakan the day before - on Jail Hill. If the machine-gun nests on GPT Ridge could be wiped out before the Queen's attacked they would enjoy a much higher chance of success. The only result of this failed assault would be the death of Brigadier Goschen, shot by snipers. The Queen's, aware that 4th Brigade had not managed to secure GPT Ridge, nevertheless went in against Jail Hill as planned and were slaughtered. In retrospect the attack was premature, but Stopford continued to demand speed to remove the Japanese stranglehold on Kohima in order to relieve beleaguered Imphal. There was a belief in some higher quarters - held in particular by those whose only experience of the terrain came from reading a map in the comfort of a headquarters tent in the rear - that 2nd Division's offensive lacked pace. These accusations were preposterous to the hard-pressed men on the ground. It was impossible for commanders and staff officers in the rear who could not see the ground to understand how a small piece of jungle-topped hillside could absorb the best part of a brigade; how a small group of well-sited bunkers could hold up an advance until every single one - together with every single occupant - had been systematically destroyed; how only medium artillery could penetrate the roof of a Japanese trench; how only direct and short-range sniping by Lee/Grant tanks was guaranteed to defeat a Japanese bunker; how the desperate terrain, incessant rain and humidity led even the fittest men to tire quickly and what an extraordinarily determined opponent they faced. With few exceptions, the Japanese gave in only when they were dead. Every conscious man who could lift a weapon fought until he collapsed. Due to these defeats, the British-Indian morale plummeted, even though Sato's men were also facing a serious supply problem that was further weakening them with each passing day. Nevertheless, the Japanese continued a brave defense under heavy artillery, mortar and aerial bombardment. Sato's defensive technique, while it was not going to enable him to break through Kohima by dint of offensive action, was designed to do the next best thing: to draw the enemy onto defences of great complexity and depth and to break them there, both physically and morally. In so doing his troops had to withstand the sort of conditions few other soldiers in history could have survived. They did so, and very nearly succeeded in persuading Stopford that battering through Kohima was an impossible task. Between the 4th and the 'Black 7th', for instance, the 38 3.7in. mountain guns dug in around Jotsoma fired over 3,000 rounds, the 48 25-pdrs fired over 7,000 rounds and the big 5.5in. guns of the medium artillery fired more than 1,500 shells at the Japanese positions, not to mention the almost continuous salvoes from the 3in. mortars of the infantry battalions and the constant strafing and bombing by Hurricanes and Vengeance dive-bombers. For the next few days, General Stopford's brigades were slowly reducing the Japanese defenses. British progress, though slow, remained sure, even though it seemed to the troops on the ground as if this battle would go on for ever. 4th Brigade cleared GPT Ridge on 11 May, by which time further costly attacks by the British 6th and 33rd Indian Brigades had finally forced the Japanese to relinquish their hold on Pimple, FSD and Jail hills, the latter of which was captured by the Queen's and C Company, 4/lst Gurkha Rifles. The tide was slowly - and painfully - beginning to turn. On the days that followed, the positions seized on 11 and 12 May were carefully consolidated, the remaining Japanese being exterminated one by one, sniper by sniper and gun by gun. The Berkshires cleared FSD Hill on 12 May, discovering that the Japanese had honeycombed the hill with tunnels, creating an elaborate underground fortress that included a battalion headquarters, repair shop, ammunition storage dump and hospital. Those Japanese bunkers on the western edge of the ridge that remained out of reach of the British artillery could now be engaged directly and at pointblank range by the Lee/Grants, trundling up the road that divides DIS and Jail hills. They did so to the cheers of the British and Indian infantry, who found themselves hugging the ground as the 75mm smashed the enemy foxholes only metres from them, the ground shaking and the shockwave of the blast sucking out their breath and showering them with dirt and debris. The capture of the southern part of Kohima Ridge a full 37 days after the arrival of Sato's units would force the Japanese to retreat to a secondary defensive line north of Aradura. On the 15th, patrols of the 5th Brigade advanced down from Naga Hill, securing Treasury Hill before meeting up with the exhausted victors of Kohima Ridge who were advancing along the Imphal road. Yet that is all for the India front, as we now need to jump back over to check out what is going on with Operation Ichi-Go. After the fall of Xuchang, General Uchiyama dispatched some units south to attack Luohe, while the bulk of his 12th Army advanced north to capture Luoyang and hopefully annihilate General Enbo's 31st Army Group. On May 2nd, General Uchiyama dispatched the 110th Division against Dengfeng, the 62nd Division against Yuzhou and the bulk of his 37th Division, 3rd armored division and 4th cavalry Brigade against Jia and Ruzhou. On 2nd, the 4th Cavalry Brigade defeated the enemy force in the sector southwest of Yingchiaochen and, on the 4th, advanced to the sector northwest of Linju. The 3rd Armored Division routed the retreating enemy heading west and, on the 4th, mopped up the enemy in the vicinity of Linju. Also on the 4th, the 37th Division arrived at Linju. On the same day, the 7th Independent Mixed Brigade occupied Hsiangcheng. on the 3rd the 62nd defeated the 29th Army at Yuzhou while the 3rd Armored Division and the 4th Cavalry Brigade pursued the retreating Chinese towards Ruzhou. On the 4th, Uchiyama's main forces were able to capture Ruzhou and the 110th Division managed to dislodge the 13th Army's position east of Dengfeng. After this Uchiyama's main forces enveloped the area, annihilating the 13th and 29th Armies at Dengfeng while the 62nd and 110th Divisions made a frontal assault of the city. Alongside this the 7th Independent Mixed Brigade attacked the enemy near Likouzhen. Yet before Uchiyama's men could complete the envelopment, General Enbo's men pulled out towards Tangjiezhen and Changshuixiang around midnight on the 5th. On the 7th, the 37th Division and 7th Brigade managed to envelop Tangjiezhen, and with air support inflicted heavy casualties on the outflanked defenders. Simultaneously, the 27th Division captured Luohe and Suipin. General Yokoyama had dispatched the 11th Independent Brigade to aid Uchiyamas men from the south, facing little resistance as they captured Queshan and Zhumadian before linking up with the 27th Division on the 11th. On the other side, General Jiang Dingwen's 1st War Area Army was regrouping the bulk of its forces along the Luoyang-Yiyang line. General Okamura Ysuji ordered the 12th Army to advance upon Luoyang while Lt General Yoshimoto Teiichi's 1st Army crossed the Yellow River to try and cut off the Chinese retreat at Xin'An and Xiashichiang. Having defeated the enemy in the sector southwest of Dengfeng, the 12th Army continued to keep the enemy in the Loyang area under strict observation while, at the same time, it ordered the 110th Division to pursue the enemy toward Iyang, the 62nd Division to pursue them toward Pingteng, the main force of the 3rd Armored Division toward Iyang and Hsinan and the 4th Cavalry Brigade to the western sector of Pingteng. Okamura dispatched his reserve 63rd Division led by Lt General Nozoe Masanori to try and break through at Sishuizhen so they could join the attack upon Luoyang. They were successful and in the process, defeated the 177th Division and managed to reach the northeastern sector of Luoyang by the 12th. With assistance from the 59th Brigade coming from the west, Nozoe captured Xin'an by the 14th. The 62nd Division and the 4th Cavalry Brigade captured Pingdengxiang on the 13th and part of the 110th Division captured Yiyang on the 14th. Most of the 110th Division, however, moved to Lungmenchieh below Luoyang. The 3rd Armored Division also reached the area southwest of Lungmenchieh at this point. The 37th Division, meanwhile, was directed to move towards Sunghsien. These actions effectively enveloped Luoyang as Uchiyama had his 110th Division advance through the Luohe River Valley; Yoshimoto's men advance to Sanmenxia which would fall by the 18th. The 37th Division captured Song alongside the aidromes at Luoning and Lushi by the 20th. But the main effort would be made by the 63rd Division assisted by elements o the 110th Division who launched the assault against Luoyang, being defended by the 36th Army Group. On the 19th, the 63rd Division initiated its attack against enemy positions on the outskirts of Loyang, however, the enemy positions were so strong that the battle situation did not progress as planned. As a result of this the North China Area Army ordered the 12th Army to place the main force of the 3rd Armored Division and 4th Cavalry Brigade together with part of the 110th Division under the command of the 63rd Division commander. At the same time, the 63rd Division was ordered to defend the railway east of Mienchih. At 1pm on the 23rd, the 12th Army dispatched the 63rd Division to attack Luoyang Castle from the north and northeastern fronts of Luoyang to the northeastern corner of the castle while the 3rd Armored Division was to attack the castle from the western front toward the northwestern corner of the castle. The Army also directed the Cavalry Brigade to capture and destroy the enemy which it was expected would flee to the south at the line of the Lo Ho. On the 24th, the Army-called on the enemy in Luoyang to surrender but they refused. At 1pm, therefore, the Army opened its attack and, on the 25th, completely occupied the castle. During this battle, Lieutenant-General Li Jiayu would heroically die covering the retreat of the remaining troops of his battered 36th Army Group. With the fall of Luoyang and the near destruction of the 1st War Area, Operation Kogo ended in a resounding success for the Japanese, thus securing the South Beijing-Hankou railway. The Japanese estimated over 32000 Chinese casualties and some 7800 troops captured. In turn, they claimed to have lost only 2000 casualties. Interestingly, Operation Kogo also saw the Henan peasants attack the Kuomintang forces in revenge for the Yellow River flood of 1938 and the Henan Famine of 1942. As told to us by General Jiang Dingwen "During the campaign, the unexpected phenomenon was that the people of the mountains in western Henan attacked our troops, taking guns, bullets, and explosives, and even high-powered mortars and radio equipment... They surrounded our troops and killed our officers. We heard this pretty often. The heads of the villages and baojia (village mutual-responsibility groups) just ran away. At the same time, they took away our stored grain, leaving their houses and fields empty, which meant that our officers and soldiers had no food for many days… Actually this is truly painful for me to say: in the end the damages we suffered from the attacks by the people were more serious than the losses from battles with the enemy." In the end, the peasants would be able to disarm over 50000 troops, picking their weapons to defend themselves from the Japanese, but also causing much damage to the Nationalist defense. For their role in this disaster, Generals Dingwen and Enbo would be relieved from their commands, with General Chen Cheng later taking over the 1st War Area in July to oversee its recovery. Meanwhile, the Japanese would continue to prepare for Operation Togo, the Hunan offensive. Yet to finish off this episode we also need to mention some progress in the future plans to invade Wakde. Admiral King had requested support from the British Eastern Fleet. At this time the Eastern Fleet was organized into three forces for Operation Transom, the invasion of Japanese occupied Surabaya. Force 65 consisted of Battleships Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, Renown, the French battleship Richelieu, two cruisers and eight destroyers, under the direct command of Admiral Somerville; Force 66 consisted of aircraft carriers Illustrious, Saratoga, two cruisers and six destroyers, under the command of Rear-Admiral Clement Moody aboard Illustrious. Force 67 was the replenishment group and comprised six tankers, a water distilling ship and the cruisers London and Suffolk. Somerville commanded the entire fleet from Queen Elizabeth. The warships were drawn from six navies, the capital ships being accompanied by three American destroyers, four British cruisers and three destroyers, four Australian destroyers, a Dutch cruiser and destroyer and a New Zealand cruiser. The Australian light cruiser HMAS Adelaide also sailed from Fremantle in Western Australia to protect the tankers while they were at Exmouth Gulf; this allowed their two escorting cruisers to augment Force 66 during the attack. Two squadrons of Supermarine Spitfire fighters were transferred from No. 1 Wing RAAF at Darwin to Exmouth Gulf to protect the Eastern Fleet while it refueled and Australian and American maritime patrol aircraft were assigned to operate offshore. Each carrier had an air group made up of units from their parent navies. Illustrious embarked two squadrons equipped with 14 Vought F4U Corsair fighters each and two squadrons with nine Avengers. Saratoga's air group comprised a squadron with 26 Grumman F6F Hellcat fighters, a squadron with 24 Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bombers and a squadron operating 18 Avenger torpedo bombers, as well as a single Hellcat allocated to the Air Group Leader. As for Surabaya, its defenses against air attack at the time of Operation Transom included a few anti-aircraft guns, whose crews were inadequately trained. Radar stations and a network of observer posts were also sited to detect minelaying aircraft. The Japanese forces stationed in the city included the Imperial Japanese Army's 28th Independent Mixed Brigade and the headquarters of the Imperial Japanese Navy's 2nd Southern Expeditionary Fleet under Vice-Admiral Mikawa Gunichi. Because of the distance to be covered from Ceylon and the Royal Navy's lack of experience in underway replenishment, the final plans for the operation involved the Eastern Fleet refueling at Exmouth Gulf in Western Australia before striking Surabaya. Force 67 was the first element of the Eastern Fleet to sail, departing on April 30th. Forces 65 and 66 sailed on May 6th. The Allied ships proceeded to Exmouth Gulf on a course that kept them at least 600 miles from Japanese airfields to avoid being detected or attacked. The carriers air wings practiced the attack they would conduct on Surabaya three times during the voyage. The warships arrived at Exmouth Gulf on 14 and 15th ofMay. The Eastern Fleet departed Exmouth Gulf on the afternoon of the 15th and proceeded north. It arrived at the flying off point at 6:30 am local time on the 17th without being detected by the Japanese. One British and seven American submarines also took up positions near Surabaya, the southern entrance to the Strait of Malacca and the Bali, Lombok and Sunda Straits to support the Eastern Fleet. The submarines were positioned to rescue Allied aircrew that were forced down, attack ships that tried to escape from Surabaya and intercept any Japanese warships that attempted to attack the Allied fleet. Operation Transom opened up with 76 aircraft launched from Illustrious and Saratoga. The aircraft launched by the carriers were organized into two strike forces. Force A was made up of nine Avengers from Illustrious, twelve Dauntless dive bombers and an escort of eight Corsairs. Force A's Avengers were to bomb the Braat Engineering Works and the Dauntlesses the oil refinery. Force B was to attack shipping and dock facilities in Surabaya's port. It comprised twenty-one Avengers and six Dauntlesses escorted by eight Corsairs and twelve Hellcats. The commander of Saratoga's air group, Commander Joseph C. Clifton, led both carriers' air wings during the attack. All of the aircraft were launched and formed up with the rest of their force by 7:20 am. Two British Avengers crashed during takeoff, their crews being rescued. The attack on Surabaya commenced at 8:30 am. The Japanese had not detected the aircraft as they approached, and were taken by surprise. The two forces made a well-synchronized attack, Force A approaching Wonokromo from the south and Force B attacking the port from the north. No Japanese fighter aircraft were encountered, and the anti-aircraft guns were largely ineffective. One of Saratoga's Avengers was shot down, and both members of its crew became prisoners of war. The two forces claimed to have damaged 10 ships, demolished the Wonokromo oil refinery and the Braat Engineering Works, destroyed 16 aircraft and leveled several buildings. Saratoga and her three escorting American destroyers detached from the Eastern Fleet shortly before sunset on the 18th, and proceeded to Fremantle. The remainder of the Eastern Fleet reached Exmouth Gulf the next morning, and sailed for Ceylon before sunset after refueling again. Adelaide and one of the Australian destroyers that had been attached to the Eastern Fleet left Exmouth Gulf bound for Fremantle after the tanker group departed on 19 May. The Eastern Fleet arrived back at Ceylon on the 27th. Saratoga reached Bremerton, Washington, on June 10th and after a refit re-joined the Pacific Fleet in September 1944. Though the Japanese would not really divert any forces from western New Guinea in response to the raid and despite the fact that the Japanese claim that not much damage had been inflicted on their shipping or shore facilities, with only one vessel confirmed sunk, Operation Transom would provide Somerville's Eastern Fleet important experience of carrier strike operations and exposure to superior American carrier tactics. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Allies were gradually countering Operation U-Go as the intense battles at Kohima Ridge and Pulebadze saw British-Indian forces slowly gaining ground amid heavy casualties. Meanwhile, Operation Ichi-Go saw major Japanese successes in China. Lastly Operation Transom saw British-Dutch-American successful carrier strikes against Surabaya, yielding experience despite limited damage.
Last time we spoke about Operation Reckless, Operation Persecution and the Japanese retreat in New Britain. General Douglas MacArthur unleashed his two amphibious assaults, opening up the Western New Guinea Campaign. Both Operation Reckless and Persecution achieved complete surprise upon the Japanese. Múltiple Japanese units already performing withdrawals were caught into a chaotic new flight when the allies landed and began seizing key territory such as Hollandia and Aitape. The Japanese commanders fell into disarray leaving some to seize command and order further withdrawals in the face of hopeless battles. Yet again, forces already used to retreating through rough terrain without adequate provisions, were hitting the jungle track. Morale was all but collapsing in New Guinea. Over on New Britain matters were similar as the Japanese continued to retreat under heavy pressure from American patrols. Competent commanders would lose their lives beside their men in another hopeless battle. This episode is the Drive for Myitkyina Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Operation Reckless and Persecution were tremendous successes. There was very little opposition for the men advancing upon Hollandia, the Japanese simply did not even attempt to defend their well developed defenses there. The drive towards Hollandia's airfields was led by the 1st Battalion, 186th regiment. From Leimok Hill to Brinkman's Plantation, they did encounter opposition, but it was scattered and uncoordinated. Colonel Oliver Newman was very cautious, he believed thousands of Japanese were still around the airfields. Just before they came across the airfields, they found large, undefended Japanese supply dumps. This would be one of many Japanese supply dumps captured through the following days, as General Eichelberger recalled “There were more than six hundred supply dumps. There were clothing dumps as high as houses. There were ammunition dumps everywhere. There were pyramids of canned goods and tarpaulin-covered hills of rice which looked like Ohio haystacks. There were saki and beer. There were tons and tons of quinine and other medical supplies, which, as a result of our landing, never reached the Japanese troops at the front. I believe Hollandia was the richest prize—supply wise—taken during the Pacific War”. These types of discoveries indicated the Japanese were extremely desperate. By May 4th, Major General William Gill's 32nd Division had just arrived at Aitape to relieve the 163rd regiment, who were earmarked to take part in the next amphibious assault. The terrain, alongside the weather was dreadful at Hollandia, making it impossible to provide the needed airfields suitable for heavy bombers without some legendary engineer work. General MacArthur considered it necessary to seize and develop new heavy bomber airfields in the Wakde-Sarmi-Biak region in order to neutralize enemy bases in the western Caroline. To be honest given the track records of these amphibious assaults in causing absolute mayhem for Japanese commanders, forcing them to keep on running, it was a great idea to keep the pace up. With the knowledge General Tagami's 36th Division was still in the region and that the enemy might still seek to reinforce that said area before the allies could land there, MacArthur initially planned to send the full 41st Division against Wakde-Sarmi on May 15th, once the Hollandia fields were ready to support the amphibious assault. However supply congestion at Hollandia's beaches was thwarting such designs. Admiral Barbey proposed that D Day be postponed until May 21 and gave two reasons for the postponement. First, tides would be higher in the Wakde area on the 21st than on the 15th. Second, postponement would allow orderly and complete preparations to be made. Congestion was severe at the Hollandia beaches, where the bulk of the 41st Division was to stage. Lack of lighterage and beach space, combined with an inadequate road net, hampered unloading of equipment, supplies, and troops which were pouring into the Hollandia area. The arrival of such supplies and units, some of which had to be reloaded for Wakde-Sarmi, seriously interfered with mounting the 41st Division. As such, General Krueger decided that the operation could be started no earlier than the 16th but that unless important strategic considerations dictated otherwise, the 21st would be much preferable. Additionally, a number of engineer and air force organizations were scheduled to arrive at Hollandia on the 12th, either for employment there or to be staged for Wakde-Sarmi. The shipping bringing these units to Hollandia was needed to support the Wakde phase of the new operation, which could not begin until the vessels were reloaded. As beach congestion at Hollandia remained a major problem, this reloading could not be accomplished quickly. It was therefore proposed that the Wakde landings be postponed at least another day to the 17th. Although MacArthur initially approved the proposed delay, new aerial photography of the coastal area from Sarmi eastward to Wakde indicated the ground conditions of the region were not suited for heavy bomber airstrips. Thus MacArthur decided that the Sarmi portion of the operation should be axed and instead they would focus on Wakde Island slated for D-day May 17th. 10 days after the capture of Wakde, or as soon as the airfields were repaired, the allies would next hit Biak, where more suitable airstrip sites were known to exist. General Doe thus prepared the Wakde Landings, Codenamed Operation Tornado while General Fuller's remaining regiments were expected to seize the airdrome areas on Biak. Over on the other side, General Anami planned to send the 36th division over to perform an immediate counterattack against Hollandia, but was denied. General Adachi over to the east had more freedom to act. The 18th Army had found itself cut off from all provisions and supplies, thus deprived of every possibility of rejoining the 2nd Area Army west of Hollandia, for the crucial defense of Western New Guinea. Because of this Adachi reasoned the best move for his 55,000 troops was to perform some quick actions before their strength was sapped out. Thus on April 26th, Adachi ordered the 20th, 41st and 51st Divisions to prepare a counterattack against the enemy beachhead at Aitape. Adachi hoped such a bold action against his enemy's rear might force a major diversion of the enemy eastwards, in turn hampering their drive against Western New Guinea. Now back in mid-February the Japanese were adjusting their forces in the Central Pacific. They had established the 31st Army in Saipan, formed around the 52nd and 29th Division, led by Lt General Obata Hideyoshi. The bulk of the 52nd division, led by Lt General Mugikura Shunzaburo had landed in Truk mid-February, Lt General Takashina Takesi's 29th Division meanwhile were still in the progress of traveling to the Marianas, escorted by the destroyers Kishinami, Asashimo and Okinami. The bulk of the division departed Busan on February 24; but the convoy would be torpedoed some 200 km south of Okidaitōjima by the submarine Trout on February 28. The 18th Regiment, led by Colonel Monma Kentaro suffered 1657 deaths, including its commanding officer, and 570 wounded. Because of this the 18th regiment was landed at Saipan to recover; 50th regiment was diverted to land at Tinian under the command of Colonel Ogata Keiji and the 38th regiment was sent to Guam on March 4th. Allied submarine interceptions of these troop movements was no mere coincidence. The submarine activities were frequently guided by 'Magic' intelligence relating to ship movements which was collected by intercepting and decrypting encoded radio transmissions. The IJN routinely broadcast the location and intended route of convoys under its protection, and decrypting these messages allowed Allied naval commanders to alert submarines in the vicinity of convoys. The submarine commanders were free to plan their interception and attack where conditions were most favorable. The IJN's faulty anti-submarine doctrine also contributed to Japan's shipping losses. The Navy had placed a low priority on protecting merchant shipping from submarine attack before and during the early years of the war and convoys were not routinely assembled until 1943. Vast swathes of Japanese shipping was being sunk in early 1944. There were two large reasons for this. Number 1) obviously the IJN was greatly diminished and thus allied submarines were operating further into enemy territory. Number 2) fixing the torpedo issue, yes those pesky Mark 14s/15s were now hitting hard and providing enormous results. In response to this emerging crisis, the Japanese established the Grand Escort Fleet Headquarters, under the overall command of Admiral Oikawa Koshiro, to coordinate convoys and implement a standard doctrine. The first order of business was to increase the average size of Japanese convoys from 5 ships to "large" convoys of 10 to 20 ship in order to assign more escort ships to protect against enemy submarine activity. To further reinforce the Central Pacific, the Japanese also created nine expeditionary units from the forces of the 1st and 7th Kwantung and 8th Korean Armies. They also decided to assign the 14th and 43rd Divisions of Lieutenant-Generals Inoue Sadae and Saito Yoshitsugu to General Obata's command, designated Truk Sector Group. To support them, the IJN decided to combine the 4th Fleet and the 14th Air Fleet on March 4th to form the Central Pacific Area Fleet, under Admiral Nagumo. Between March-April, the 31st Army was assigned the priority for shipping, so Nagumo would send a total of eleven large convoys collectively known as the Matsu Fleet to bring said reinforcements to the Central Pacific. Though the deadly American submarines would hunt relentlessly to prevent these reinforcements, they would only be able to sink the light cruiser Tatsuta, the destroyer Asanagi, six transports and one submarine chaser, so the Matsu Fleet was considered as largely successful. By mid-April the success of the Matsu Fleet allowed the IJN to allocate more shipping to the 2nd Area Army. Thus the Take-Ichi convoy was formed to carry the 32nd division of Lieutenant-General Ishii Yoshio and the bulk of the 35th division to Western New Guinea. The large convoy consisting of 15 transports was escorted by an unusually strong force under Admiral Kajioka consisting of minelayer Shirataka; destroyers Asakaze, Shiratsuyu, Fujinami and Kuri; Mikura-class escort ship Kurahashi; Type D escort ships No. 20 and No. 22; gunboats Ataka and Uji; minesweepers No. 22 and No. 101; and submarine chasers No. 37, No. 38 and Tama Maru No. 7. They departed Shanghai on April 17th enroute for Manila. Unbeknownst to the Japanese allied code breakers were decrypting their radio signals and managed to figure out the convoys departure and arrival points. The Submarine Jack was given the coordinates and intercepted Kajioak's convoy around nightfall of April 26th. Jack fired 19 torpedoes from long range, managing to sink the 5425-ton freighter SS Yoshida Maru No. 1, which was carrying the entire 210th Regiment of the 32nd Division. 3000 soldiers and their commander Colonel Koike Yasumasa all drowned with the ship. Its moments like these I always find myself taking a step back. Thousands of men fighting on all these islands in the Pacific, absolute carnage in places like New Guinea, Guadalcanal, later on Peleliu….one submarine and woosh, a regiment gone. The allied submarine campaign during the Pacific War, did a lion's share of work, horrifying work. War is a horrible thing. The remaining convoy ships continued to Manila, arriving there on April 29th. Upon reaching Manila, however, Lieutenant-General Ishii Yoshio learned that his 32nd Division was reassigned to the 2nd Army to further reinforce western New Guinea, so a new convoy of eight transports would resume the journey to New Guinea on May 1st, carrying the bulk of the 32nd and 35th Divisions. You can bet after hearing what happened to the 210th regiment on the Yoshida Maru, these men were dreading to sail again. They had every reason to feel that dread, as the American intelligence operators figured out the convoys departure and arrival information again. They pinpointed the convoys route, speed, daily noon positions, everything. This time the submarine Gurnard intercepted Kajioka's convoy in the Celebes Sea on May 6. Gurnard's captain, Commander Herb Andrew submerged his boat and made a cautious approach to avoid detection by aircraft. He reached a firing position 4 hours later and fired 6 torpedoes at 2 transports. Only 1 of these torpedoes struck its mark, and a 2nd salvo missed its intended targets but hit another transport. Andrews then turned his boat and fired further torpedoes from Gurnard's stern torpedo tubes which hit a 3rd transport. One of the Japanese destroyers then counterattacked Gurnard and forced Andrews to break off his attack. The destroyer was traveling at too great a speed for its detection gear to function, however, and did not damage the submarine, despite dropping approximately 100 depth charges. Two hours later, Gurnard rose to periscope depth and found that a major effort to rescue troops and equipment from the torpedoed transports was under way. That night, the submarine also torpedoed one of the crippled transports which was still afloat. In the end, its attack successfully sank transports Aden Maru (5,825 tons) and Taijima Maru (6,995 tons) as well as the cargo ship Tenshinzan Maru (6,886 tons). Although the Japanese rescue effort was relatively successful, 1290 troops were killed, The 4th Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment was completely destroyed and much of their equipment was lost. Due to these heavy losses, the Take-Ichi convoy finally docked at Halmahera on May 9th, where the remnants of the 32nd and 35th Divisions were ultimately unloaded. General Ikeda's 35th division, including the 219th regiment from Palau were shipped over to Sorong, with the 219th left to guard the St.Andrew Strait Islands. General Ishii's 32nd division, was retained at Halmahera to garrison the island. The terrible loss of the Take-Ichi convoy forced the Japanese leadership to acknowledge it was no longer possible to reinforce Western New Guinea, thus General Anami would have to fight with what he had on hand. Alongisde this, IJA General HQ decided to pull back the perimeter of the absolute defense zone in the southern area to a line extending from Sorong to Halmahera, with units at Geelvink Bay, Biak and Manokwari ordered to hold out as long as possible to delay the enemy advance. Anami did not like the orders one bit, as he belived the forward line should be aggressively defended to secure the valuable land holding air bases between Palau and Western New Guinea. What Anami was not aware of, was that the IJN combined fleet were preparing for the famed decisive naval battle in the area. This was part of Admiral Toyoda's Operation A-Go. Under the plans elaborated by the Combined Fleet, the First Mobile Fleet, and the First Air Fleet were assigned the principal roles in the projected battle. The former assembled its surface strength at Tawitawi in the Sulu Archipelago on May 16th, while the land-based units of the First Air Fleet continued to be widely deployed in the Marianas and Carolines to take advantage of any tactical opportunity that might arise. Tawitawi was chosen as the main staging point for the First Mobile Fleet because of its proximity to both the refueling facilities of Balikpapan and the sea area which the Navy High Command expected to be the scene of the decisive battle. It was also safely beyond the range of enemy land-based air power and afforded greater security against Allied intelligence than other anchorages in the Philippines. Orders are orders, thus Anami ordered General Teshima to hold onto Geelvink Bay at all costs while also contuining to secure the Sarmi area as a lifeline for the 18th Army who were being cut off from east of Hollandia. While Admiral Ozawa's 1st Mobile Fleet assembled its at Tawi Tawi for Operation A-Go and Admiral Kakuta's 1st Air Fleet deployed its land-based units in the Marianas and Carolines, Admirals King, Nimitz and Spruance had also been planning their invasion of the Marianas, aiming to secure Saipan, Tinian and Guam as advance air and naval bases to allow striking of the Philippines, Formosa and Okinawa. After the landings at Hollandia and Aitape, Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 realized there was very little opposition and he still had plenty of strength to continue operating. Thus Nimitz decided to carry out a preventive strike against Truk, to ensure that the Japanese would not be able to build up their air power before the Marianas invasion scheduled for June. Intelligence reports indicated that the Japanese had been rebuilding their strength at Truk. Indeed Truk's air garrison had grown enough to be a concern again. By late March, 30 flyable Zero fighters had been pieced together from aircraft destroyed during the February raids. Additionally, aircraft were being withdrawn from bypassed bases in the Marshalls and sent to Truk. By April, the Japanese had 104 flyable aircraft at Truk: 6 G4M twin-engine bombers, 12 D4Y1s dive bombers/reconnaissance bombers, 13 B5N or B6N torpedo bombers, 55 Zero fighters, 10 J1N1 night fighters, and 8 floatplanes used for observation and reconnaissance. Moen No. 1 airfield housed the G4Ms and 20 Zero, while Eten had the rest of the Zeros and all the night fighters. The single-engine bombers, the D4Y1s, B5Ns, and B6Ns, were all at Param, with the floatplanes at Dublon. There were another 63 unserviceable aircraft scattered throughout Truk's airfields. Admiral Spruance's 5th fleet would also conduct a bombardment of the Satawa and Ponape islands. On its return from Hollandia, Task Force 58 traveled to Truk, arriving shortly before dawn on April 30th and immediately tossed a fighter sweep consisting of 84 Hellcats. 5 Nakajima bombers from Param were aloft doing a dawn sweep, something that had become routine since February. Truk's radar detected the inbound US aircraft when they were 30 minutes out, shortly before the scout's interrupted radio report. The warning gave the Japanese ample time to launch air cover. Before the US fighters arrived, Moen No. 1 had scrambled 20 Zeros, Eten another 29, and Param its remaining eight Nakajima bombers. Yet the 57 Japanese aircraft were brushed aside, nearly 25 Zeros were shot down at the cost of 2 Hellcats. Just like we saw in February, Task Force 58 began staggering air strikes throughout the day. The carriers launched full deckloads seeing fighters, dive bombers and torpedo bombers continously over Truk for the entire day. Task Force 58 performed 2,200 bomber sorties, 467 of which were flown by fighters carrying bombs. In all, US Navy aircraft dropped 748 tons of bombs during the two-day operation. The Hino Maru No. 2, a 1,500-ton cargo ship and auxiliary gunboat, was hit and heavily damaged by a bomb by an Avenger from USS Cabot during the attack's first day. It sank four days later on May 4. The Sapporo Maru, a 600-ton auxiliary provision stores ship, was bombed on April 30 and sank north of Fefan. The 300-ton auxiliary minelayer Minsei Maru and 20 other craft were also destroyed in the harbor during the two days of raids. While a small haul when compared to February's results, these losses further reduced the number of vessels remaining in Truk Atoll. This increased the difficulty of moving supplies and personnel between the different islands in the lagoon, further decreasing Truk's usefulness as an outpost. Additionally, the Japanese submarine I-174 was detected 20 miles south of the atoll on May 1. Aircraft from the light carrier Monterey teamed up with the destroyers MacDonough and Stephen Potter to sink the submarine. Whether the submarine was fleeing Truk or heading back to it after a patrol is not known. Its loss contributed to the decision to abandon Truk as a submarine base later in 1944. The Japanese losing 23 auxiliary vessels and one submarine, but this time the American bombers also targeted Truk's shore facilities, giving special attention to the airfields on Moen and Eten, the Dublon naval headquarters and oil storage tanks, and Fefen's docks warehouses and ammo dumps. On the morning of May 1st, the Japanese attempted several straggling strikes against the American carriers, but none managed to cause any damage. The largest attack against the US fleet contained 8 bombers, D4Y1 dive bombers, and Nakajima torpedo bombers which survived the first day's attack. They found Task Group 58.2 and Task Group 58.3 at 8:15am, making a series of attacks against aircraft carriers in both groups. Met by heavy antiaircraft fire, they were shot down, most before they could drop their torpedoes or bombs. Only one came close enough to drop a bomb, which fell near the Lexington but caused no damage. Task Force 58 contuined to pound Truk throughout the day before finally retiring towards Majuro during the night. Based on interpretation of post-strike aerial photography, US intelligence estimated 40 percent of the buildings on Dublon, 80 percent of those on Eten, 75 percent of those at Moen, 20 percent of the buildings on Fefan, 15 percent of those on Param, and 80 percent at Ulalu were destroyed during the airstrikes of April 30 and May 1. Roughly 423 buildings and six hangars were destroyed, 44 others were damaged, 59 Japanese aircraft were shot down, a further 60 were destroyed on the ground, 36 were left damaged, and only 12 were still flyable. All of this cost Mitscher 35 aircraft, with another 33 damaged. Furthermore, half the airmen shot down were rescued by planes or by submarines. Thus the threat posed by Truk was yet again neutralized. After this, Admiral Montgomery's carrier group Task Force 58 was given orders to hit Minami Torishima and Wake Island for mid May. Leaving Majuro on May 15th, Montgomery assemled his forces about 420 miles southeast of Marcus Island on the17th. On the 19th, light carrier San Jacinto hunted for enemy picket boats north and west of Minami Torishima. At 7:28am a Avenger of VT-9 and a Hellcat of VF-9 found and attacked an enemy trawler 475 miles north of Marcus Island. They dropped their bombs and strafed it with machine gun fire. No direct bomb hits were obtained but the target was well covered with machine gun fire. The Japanese trawler was left dead in the water and down by the stern, with a 1/4 miles oil slick and debris behind it. No personnel were visible on the boat. Meanwhile fleet carriers Wasp and Essex launched a predawn fighter sweep. A flight of 4 night fighters launched at 5am from the Wasp on an intruder mission over Marcus Island, but the Essex had to cancel its flight of night fighters. At 11:15, another air attack commenced. Aircraft dove through antiaircraft bursts with bomb blasts occuring all over the island. At one time the entire island was completely smothered by smoke and dust, but the Anti-aircraft fire contuined undiminished. After the planes left, explosions and fires continued on Marcus Island for some time. They managed to inflict a moderate amount of damage to buildings, shot down one G4M and sunktwo small boats; ut the defenders' anti-aircraft fire was ferocious, successfully shooting down 4 American planes and damaging another 69. On May 21st, San Jacinto rejoined the group and also reported sinking one sampan. Montgomery's carriers then launched a series of composite carrier strikes against Wake on May 23, further damaging many installations there and sinking a slugger and three barges, at the cost of only one plane. But that is all for carrier actions today as we now need to jump oer to the Burma front. General Stilwell was contuining his offensive, with the 22nd division advancing south towards Inkangahtawng. General Lioa's 65th Regiment plus the 3rd Battalion, 66th regiment were advancing down the Kamaing road when they ran into Japanese resistance north and west of Inkangahtawng. The 64th regiment was kept behind to guard the Japanese flank until May 3rd, while the rest of the 22nd Division awaited better weather to perform a coordinated attack against the town. But this was Burma, and Burma is going to Burma. There was an outbreak of monsoons that quickly prevented the effective use of tanks and made supply movement over the Ledo Road a nightmare. By June about one inch of rain fell daily. Though supply convoys could still move from Ledo to Shingbwiyang, the combat trail from Shingbwiyang south was very difficult. The road was graded to Tingkawk Sakan known also as mile post 164 and metaled almost to Mile Post 138. However, rainfall had blocked the road over the flats north of Tingkawk Sakan. At the end of June the situation was unchanged. The Japanese stand at Kamaing and the heavy rains immobilized the survey party and the road trace. As the flood waters rose in the valley, they effectively barred armor from moving south to Mogaung or Myitkyina. Thus on May 3rd, the 64th avaned east across the Kamaing Road to try and cut the trail 500 yards south of the Hwelon Hka. The next day presented clearer skies, so the Chinese troops initiated their attack. Once Inkangahtawn fell, the 22nd Division would hold the area for several weeks while the first elements of Lt General Pen Yukun's 50th Division arrived to the front to reinforce them. To the east, General Sun's 114th regiment were engaging General Tanaka's 55th regiment along the Lahkraw Hka. To break the stalemate along the Lahkraw Hka, the Chinese 114th Regiment had to clear away the Japanese observation posts in the hills. The 1st battalion, 114th on the regiment's east flank cut around the flank of the 55th Regiment on April 28th, while the 2nd battalion, 114th pushed the same Japanese unit back a few hundred yards. This bending process continued during the next two days, and the 114th Regiment was well south of the enveloped Japanese flank and within half a mile of Wala. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 114th then began moving straight south, leaving behind them pockets of determined Japanese who held up the 3rd battalion, 114th. The Chinese managed to envelope the Japanese, pushing them all the way to Wala. The 113th Regiment also came back into line at the end of April to put frontal pressure on the Japanese positions along the Lahkraw Hka and Tigrawm Hka while the 112th Regiment held its salient without attempting to move. Though the Japanese managed to stabilize their lines on the creeks east and west of Wala, a company of the 114th would cross the Nawngmi Hka on May 6th, thus starting the advance southwards again. Two days later, the 114th's advance became general, while on the east, at Stilwell's order, the 112th began to gather its companies to take Warong. On the 9th, the 114th Regiment finally took East Wala and Hlagyi and subsequently linked with the 112th Regiment pushing south towards Warong. The 114th's penetration, driving deeper into the Japanese lines, began to approach the 112th's outposts just north of Manpin. By the 12th the 114th and 112th Regiments were able to maintain communications, with very few Japanese between them. The 114th's penetration further weakened the position of the Japanese facing the 113th Regiment, which in turn began to roll up slowly from east to west as its 1st and 2nd Battalions pressed on to Wala and Maran. Between the 28-30th, Merrills End Run Force began the long grueling advance upon Ritpong. K Force moved out on 28 April; H Force, on 30 April. The so-called trail over the pass was more nearly a route used by the Kachins; in some places there was no path. Twenty pack animals slipped and fell off the narrow, muddy way. It was a grueling march for men who had already marched 500 miles and fought several battles, most of the time on K ration. Before End Rrun Force reached Ritpong, it had only one contact with the Japanese. A few of the enemy were flushed from cover by the 1/88th, but it was feared the Japanese held Ritpong in strength. On May 5th, the Japanese 2nd Battalion, 114th Infantry Regiment made contact with the K Force at Ritpong, 16 miles northwest of Nsopsup, and a four day battle ensued. The Battalion was forced to withdraw to Tingkrukawng, about eight miles to the southeast. There, after several skirmishes, contact with the enemy was lost for a period of five days. On the 5th, when the leading elements of K Force were a mile from Ritpong, Colonel Kinnison began an envelopment to hit the village from north and south. The 3rd Battalion managed to cut its way through the woods and place itself across the southern approaches to Ritpong on the 6th. Meanwhile, the 89th Regiment tried to take Ritpong from the north but failed. Next day an American reinforced company attacked Ritpong from the south but was stalled by a machine gun nest. Merrills Marauders would block the trail to the south, while the 80th Regiment contuined to hit their enemy positions. As the Chinese captured Ritpong on the 9th, M Force had had one skirmish with Japanese, routed them, and begun to cut its own paths. The march was fatiguing in the extreme; fully half the animals died of exhaustion or fell into the gorges. The men were farther harassed by fevers and dysentery, but they were only two days behind H and K Forces To the south, General Lentaigne's Chindits were contuining Operation Thursday. Yet under the overall direction of Stilwell, the Chindits were no longer a “special force”, now they were line infantry tasked with the traditional role of advancing and seizing well defended objectives, for which they did not have the training nor equipment to do effectively. Brigadiers Brodie and Ricketts men covered the general Chindit movement heading north. The plan called for closure of Aberdeen, Broadway and White City before the Monsoon broke. It was now the turn of 14 Brigade to play a major role. The new Block near Hopin would cut the road and rail link to the town of Mogaung. Meanwhile Major Masters' 111th Brigade began to establish the Blackpool Stronghold on May 5. The site was occupied on the night of May 5/6, and Masters spent the entirety of the following day setting up defenses. What he should have done was immediately attack the Japanese-held village of Namkwin just ahead of his positions. Instead, he busied himself with preparing the stronghold. It was a critical mistake, and says much about the lack of enterprise from the brigade. Blackpool Block was finally established on May 7th, with the King's Own's 46 Column the first to arrive at the site. They came under fire as they dug in. For the next 5 nights they would be attacked by a railway unit based out of Pinbaw. The railway unit was using 105mm guns firing from up the valley, while troops from Pinbaw attacked for the next five nights, held at bay by the rifles and machine guns of the King's own Rifles, and the mortars, which Masters had gathered from the battalions and wielded as single battery of eight. Despite the strong defense, in one section of the northern line nicknamed the “Deep” which was the tip of the “boar's nose,” the Japanese were as close as 10 to 20 yards from the wire. Enemy snipers took shots at anything that moved while the King's own snipers and Bren gunners occupied hidden places among the shattered trees, firing whenever they saw the target, after which a cry would resound amid the quiet that followed: “got him!” The Japanese brought up a single 75mm artillery piece from Pinbaw, with which they shelled the camp, blasting the airstrip with impunity and setting the gliders and Dakotas on fire, until May 13 when Masters came into possession of three airlifted 25-pdr guns, allowing him to hit back. Overhead Cochran's Air Commandos mounted sortie after sortie against the Japanese positions but it was clear they could not maintain the ante. The dark clouds of the monsoon were gathering in strength. After the successful establishment of Blackpool, Brigadier Calvert's 77th brigade began advancing north towards Mogaung on the 8th. The night night, White City was abandoned as Brigadiers Broddie and Ricketts marched north to defend Blackpool. On May 11th, Lt General Takeda launched an attack against White City, but was surprised to find it abandoned. It then advanced to the then-abandoned Broadway and onwards to the Namkwin area, where the Blackpool stronghold was located. Having rushed through empty Broadway and White City, the 53rd Division thus tore into the zone in strength. Takeda Kaoru's 53rd Division began pursuing Broddie and Ricketts forces. For the next few days Master's troops continued to repel increasingly stronger and stronger Japanese attacks. Masters quote “Where in the name of God were the floater brigades? White City had been evacuated 13 days earlier and 14th Brigade was supposed to come straight up here. My brigade had marched 140 route miles in 14 days to establish this block. Surely those bloody nitwits could cover 120 route miles in 13 days? Where the hell were they? Where were the West Africans?… 20 bloody battalions, 40 flaming columns of Chindit bullshit sat on their arses and drank eat and wondered how we were getting on.” In mid-May, the 3rd Battalion, 114th Regiment and 2nd Battalion, 146th Regiment tried to break through towards Kamaing and Myitkyina to reinforce Tanaka's spent defenders and would join in on the attacks against Blackpool. The 2nd Battalion, 2nd Field Artillery Regiment would also support their attacks. The Japanese continued their efforts to quickly crush Blackpool Block. A Company-strength attack on May 14 was backed by artillery support. It was repulsed, the Japanese losing 60 killed. They returned the following morning, when another 50 were killed. Air strikes were called in to further punish the enemy. Then the monsoon took hold and air support and supply became more difficult – Lalaghat and Hailakandi were fair weather fields. The Japanese also retaliated through a single heavy mortar, firing 60lb bombs, note in comparison, Chindit's standard 81mm mortar fired a 10lb bombs. Delayed by the outbreak of the monsoons on May 15, the brigades of Brodie and Ricketts had managed to secure the vital Kyunsalai Pass, but they failed to get close enough to provide significant support for the stronghold. At the same time, the flooding of the Namyin river would leave Calvert's 77th Brigade unable to aid Masters in the defense of Blackpool; and Morris Force, which had successfully cut the Myitkyina road, was too far to the east to come into the stronghold's assistance. The monsoons had also hampered the airdrop of supplies, so the Chindits would have to make their five days' rations last up to 14 days. Meanwhile, proceeding from Ritpong, K Force feinted towards the Japanese supply point at Nsopzup in order to attract the Japanese attention while H Force advanced directly to Myitkyina. On the 12th, Colonel Henry Kinnison's Marauders engaged the 2nd Battalion, 114th Regiment, near Tingkrukawng. The Japanese at Tingkrukawng were strong enough to pin both of K force's combat teams to the ground and then to halt the Chinese when they were committed. Attempts to envelop the Japanese failed. Since H Force was proceeding unmolested, Merrill told Kinnison to withdraw. K Force then picked up H's trail and followed it to Myitkyina. While K Force was fighting at Tingkrukawng, H Force kept on to a river just south of the village of Namkwi on the Mogaung-Myitkyina railroad and about two miles from the principal Myitkyina airstrip that lay almost due west of Myitkyina itself. Despite the several brushes with the Japanese, Kachin informants were sure that the Myitkyina garrison was not on the alert. To ensure surprise, before Colonel Hunter and his force bivouacked for the night of the 16th they rounded up the local Burmans and kept them under careful watch. Kinnison would reach Hkumchet by the 17th, where the Colonel had to be evacuated because he had contracted a deadly mite typhus, dying shortly after with shocking speed. In all, 149 men contracted this little-known scourge. While M Force was about to reach Arang, H Force began an attack of Pamati and the Myitkyina airstrip on the 17th. The 150th Regiment was ordered to take the airstrip, while GALAHAD personnel took the Irrawaddy ferry terminal at Pamati. The other airstrip, north of the town, was left alone for the present. The attack went like a service school demonstration, for though the Japanese knew Myitkyina was in danger, the actual assault was a complete surprise. Colonel Maruyama, the Japanese commander, had two understrength battalions of the 114th Regiment in the town of Myitkyina and in its little suburb of Sitapur. There were 100 more men of the 15th Airfield Battalion on the north and south airstrips, 318 men from labor and service units on various details in Myitkyina, and 320 patients in a military hospital. Perhaps 700 able-bodied Japanese were present when the battle began. They took the Japanese by complete surprise and subsequently securing both positions. As soon as Hunter considered his hold on the major airstrip secure, he sent the prearranged code signal, “Merchant of Venice”, which meant the process of supply and reinforcement could begin. Consequently, some reinforcements began to be flown into the airstrip, though to the disappointment of General Merrill most of these were engineers and anti-aircraft instead of the needed infantry. Back at his HQ, Stilwell was exultant. The brilliant seizure of the Myitkyina airstrip was the height of his career and the grand climax of the North Burma Campaign, as his forces had driven 500 miles into Burma and won engagements against seven Japanese regiments in the last six months. Stilwell's triumph also came right on time, as American planners in Washington were beginning to adopt the British position suggesting an end to offensive action in north Burma. Stilwell's bold stroke at Myitkyina would instead see the Americans issue a directive encouraging Admiral Mountbatten's command to exploit the opening of the Ledo Road and to secure enough of north Burma to protect the Allied hold on China's lifeline. After the capture of the airstrip, Hunter immediately sent two battalions of the 150th Regiment to take Myitkyina. One battalion of the Chinese 89th Regiment, which had arrived from Ledo, would defend the air strip while two battalions of the 150th Regiment attacked Myitkyina. The other battalion of the 150th Regiment would be in reserve at the strip. They would encounter the 114th Regiment HQ and its 1st Battalion. As early as 1700 on 17 May Colonel Maruyama had also brought the 3rd Company, 148th Regiment, 56th Division, in across the Irrawaddy to reinforce Myitkyina. Following the wrong road, however, they went to Sitapur instead, where they were ambushed by the Japanese. On encountering Japanese rifle fire, they lost direction completely and engaged in fighting among themselves. Furthermore, some Marauders would continue toward Zigyun to secure the ferry crossing south of the city. On May 18, as more Chinese battalions were flown to reinforce the Chindits, the 150th again moved against Myitkyina; but repeating the mishap of the day before, the Chinese became confused, fought among themselves, and ultimately drove themselves right back out of the town. Nonetheless, the Siege of Myitkyina had just begun. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The invasion of Hollandia and Aitape was such quick successes it allowed the Americans to bombard further islands. The Take-Ichi convoy improved the transportation of troops, but it also came at a horrifying cost. The loss of such shipping was yet again the paint on the wall for the Empire of Japan. Despite this the IJN was fully committed to forcing a decisive naval victory.
Last time we spoke about the beginning of Operation Ichi-Go, the war in the Burma front and the war in New Guinea. Hundreds of thousands of IJA troops stormed countless areas in China. Chiang Kai-Shek was caught somewhat with his pants down, his best men were in Burma, there was little his defenders could do against such raw power. Xuchang fell and soon the Japanese were marching upon Luoyang. Over in Burma the British, Indian, American and Chinese alliance was continuing to both attack and defend. In the north Stilwell led the offensive, while Slim led the defensive in the south. The Chindits fought like lions to defend White City, but ultimately would give up strongholds to seek out new ones. Over in New Guinea the Japanese continued their frantic retreat under heavy pressure from the Australians. As bad as the situation was, the Japanese were in for another nasty surprise in Green Hell. This episode is the invasion of Western New Guinea Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Last week we saw the effective conclusion of the Eastern New Guinea Campaign. It was a colossal campaign beginning with the Australian defense along the Kokoda Track, then the blood battle of Buna-Gona, the drive upon Lae-Salamaua, the march north upon the Huon Peninsula and Finisterres, and after taking Madang it was finally over. Yet while the book was closing upon Eastern New Guinea, the book on Western New Guinea was just about to be opened. The pace of the offensive against the Japanese in New Guinea accelerated greatly in the first half of 1944. This was primarily because General MacArthur feared unless he made quick progress he would lose the reins over where the allies would drive upon the Japanese home islands. MacArthur of course sought to advance upon the Philippines, while the Joint Chiefs favored the Navy's central thrust more so. Despite MacArthur's continuous war against his colleagues and superiors and his continuous complaining he lacked support, he had been provided the means to carry out numerous amphibious assaults that could lead to his ultimate goal. MacArthur's operations against New Britain, Saidor, Los Negros and Manus clearly indicated allied superiority over the Japanese in terms of men, ships and airpower. By April of 1944, MacArthur had nearly 750,000 men under his command. His major components were 6 US infantry divisions, one cavalry division, 3 separate regiment combat teams and 3 special brigades. The Australians were gradually being relegated into a secondary role, but could still provide 5 additional divisions and enough separate brigades to form another 2 divisions. General Kenney's air force had grown so large, they could now mount 200 aircraft raids against a variety of targets with little fear of Japanese retaliation. What MacArthur needed was more and more forward airfields so he could hurl fighters and bombers deeper into the Japanese inner perimeter. In a lot of respects, the Japanese position in New Guinea was all but hopeless. Although they still had more than 350,000 troops in the Southwest Pacific area, many were isolated with little chance of receiving reinforcements or supplies. There was also an enormous amount of confusion amongst the various commands, made difficult by enormous distance and the lack of effective naval power. Overall command of Japanese forces as far as Wewak was technically under Lt General Fusataro Tshima, whose HQ was at Manokwari on the Vogelkop Peninsula. It was Tshima who ordered General Adachi to withdraw his 18th Army over to the Hollandia area. Fortunately for MacArthur, Adachi procrastinated heavily, believing a landing would be made at Hansa Bay. All of the heavy bombing by the 5th air force against the coast near Wewak supported his beliefs. Not too long ago we spoke about Operations Reckless and Persecution, the invasion of Hollandia and Aitape. Admiral Barbey had already departed the staging points and rendezvous northwest of Manus Island by April 20th. The large convoys sailed west from the Admiralty Islands until dusk, whence they turned southwest towards Hollandia. Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 was providing escort while also launching strikes against Wakde, Sarmi and Sentani airfields on April 21st. Over the next three days the carrier aircraft neutralized the remaining airpower in the Wakde-Sarmi area. Early on the 22nd, the two task forces separated, with the Persecution Task Force heading southeast towards Aitape and the rest, designated Reckless Task Force, proceeded to a point 20 miles offshore between Humboldt and Tanahmerah Bay. Now the allied troops were ready to hit the beaches, but awaiting them was a large concentration of Japanese…however it was mostly a concentration of Japanese personnel rather than combat troops. While initial attention was focussed on the Geelvink Bay area, the 2nd Area Army command was also concerned over the weak condition of the defenses of Hollandia, which lay just east of the 140th meridian in the 8th Area Army zone of responsibility. An order to dispatch an element of the 36th Division to that sector was issued but was quickly revoked on the ground that it would weaken the defenses of Geelvink Bay without appreciably strengthening Hollandia. A large section of the New Guinea coast between Wewak and Sarmi thus remained practically undefended. General Anami promptly dispatched a staff mission to 8th Area Army headquarters at Rabaul to press for reinforcement of the Hollandia area, and a similar recommendation was communicated to Imperial General Headquarters during December. Two battalions of the 6th South Seas Detachment, temporarily stationed on Palau, were dispatched by the High Command. This force arrived in Hollandia on March 4, but numbered only 240 men, since approximately 1000 men, including the detachment commander, had been lost en route to submarine attacks. No other action was taken, however, since both 8th Area Army and 18th Army, after the loss of Finschhafen, were more immediately concerned with checking further enemy penetration of the Dampier Strait region. Thus roughly 10,000 IJA and 1000 IJN personnel were at Hollandia, most support units led by Major-General Kitazono Toyozo and aviation units from General Inada's 6th air division. When Tsihima ordered Adachi over to the Hollandia area and he procrastinated, this prompted the leader of the 2nd Area Army, General Korechika Anami over at Davao to become concerned. Anami sent his chief of staff over to Wewak to convince Adachi to pull out, but when Adachi finally began withdrawing, he only had two regiment on the trail by the time of the American landings against Hollandia and Aitape. Major General Toyozo Kitazono only arrived in the area 10 days before the invasion and for an unexplained reason never officially took command. This is why Tshima's appointed air officers, Inada ended up being thrown the command. Inada only really had 500 effective combat troops, mostly from the 6th South Seas Detachment. These units belonged to General Anami Korechika's 2nd Area Army, which had been transferred recently from Manchuria to oversee the defense of the eastern Dutch East Indies and western New Guinea, and for the projected and later canceled invasion of northern Australia. Random note, I recently made a Youtube short mocking that canceled australian invasion on my youtube channel, it was a wild idea. Thus Anami's command was now formally around the 2nd, 18th and 19th armies. Lt General Kitano Kenzo's 19th Army had been garrisoning Timor, the Lesser Sunda Islands, Sumbawa, the Banda Sea Islands and some key points in Northwestern New Guinea with their HQ located at Ambon. Lt General Tshima Fusutaro's 2nd Army as I had mentioned was assigned overall defense of Western New Guinea, with Lt General Tagami Hachiro's 36th Division landing at Sarmi and Biak in early March and Lt General Ikeda Shunkichi's 35th Division preparing to come to Manokwari. The 14th Division originally part of the 2nd Army was diverted to defender Palau. Furthermore, to further support the 2nd Area Army was Vice-Admiral Endo Yoshikazu's 9th Fleet, three southern expeditionary fleets, and the 7th Air Division of Lt General Sudo Einosuke. At Hollandia, the headquarters of Admiral Endo and Generals Kitazono and Inada had arrived at the same time by mid April. Though General Adachi had placed Kitazono in formal command of all units there, the transport commander had no time, as to develop a comprehensive defense plan for Hollandia, thus as I previously mentioned, command really fell onto Inada and Endo. The Japanese would be woefully unprepared for what was to come. Over at Aitape, meanwhile, there were only a handful of replacements from the 20th Division, along with some naval and support personnel, so the situation looked even wrose for the 1000-man garrison. Preceding the amphibious assaults, Admiral Crutchley's surface fleet was going shell the Tanahmerah Bay area while Admiral Mitscher's carrier planes bombed the waters off the Tanahmerah beaches to explode possible mines, also finishing off the Hollandia airstrips and the remaining aircraft there. Crutchley's warships picked up their landmarks through the mist as best they could, and at 6sm the roar of 8-inch guns from the heavy cruisers HMAS Australia and HMAS Shropshire shattered the silence of the steaming tropical morning. To this din was added the sharper crack of 5-inch and 4.7-inch weapons from American and Australian destroyers. The fire continued until 6:45, by which time 600 rounds of 8-inch and 1,500 rounds of 5-inch and 4.7-inch ammunition had been expended. As for the aerial strikes, despite the unfavorable weather, Task Force 58 managed to maintain planes on air alert over the Hollandia area since dawn. No enemy aircraft flew up from the Hollandia fields, and the few apparently operational planes sighted on those strips were strafed. In general there were no indications that Japanese defenses or defenders existed in the Tanahmerah Bay area. Task Force 58's scheduled bombing and strafing missions for that region were therefore canceled. Meeting little opposition, LCVP's carrying the first wave of the 19th and 21st Regiment approached Red Beach 2. As the leading wave of LCVP's, approached RED Beach 2, which was obscured by smoke from the naval bombardment, a rocket barrage was laid on the landing area by one Seventh Fleet LCI and two landing craft,, of the 542nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment. Machine guns mounted aboard the leading LCVP's kept up a steady fire against the beach. There was no answer from the Japanese, and the only opposition to the landing was scattered small arms and light automatic weapons fire from points far on the flanks of the beach and from a small island in Tanahmerah Bay. This fire was so quickly silenced by supporting destroyers that the assault waves suffered no casualties before reaching shore. Thus tactical surprise was achieved in Tanahmerah Bay, as the Japanese had only a few lookouts in the sector. General Irving's 24th Division successfully landed and the 3rd Battalion, 19th Infantry, quickly secured the northern portion of the beachhead and immediately dispatched patrols east and north to probe suspected enemy positions. The 1st Battalion, following the 3rd ashore, went into an assembly area to act as local reserve and to make ready to aid in unloading supplies at the water's edge if that proved necessary. The 2nd Battalion, 21st Infantry, took the southern half of Red Beach 2 with similar ease. The 3rd Battalion of that regiment quickly followed the 2nd ashore and sent Company I south to look for the trail expected to connect with Red Beach 1 at Dépapré. Simultaneously, LVT's carrying Lt Colonel Thomas Cliffords 1st battalion, 21st Regiment crossed coral barrier reefs on their way to Red Beach 1. Cliffords men landed completely unopposed and would spend an hour trying to locate the road leading to Lake Sentani and her airfields. Clifford left A Company at the beach while the rest trekked it over the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail at 8:37am, still encountering no enemy opposition whatsoever.Moving through fire lanes down which no bullets flew and past pillboxes in early stages of construction, the battalion column reached the village of Mariboe at 1047 hours. Only a few scattered enemy rifle shots had been encountered during this march and the village was secured without opposition. Over three miles by trail inland from Dépapré, Mariboe was the 24th Division's first inland objective. It was evident from scattered Japanese equipment in and around Mariboe that the Japanese had recently evacuated the village not long before the 1st Battalion's arrival. Colonel Clifford halted his men. Since radio communication with the division command post on Red Beach 2 had been lost, he sent messengers back over the tortuous trail to report progress to General Irving. At the same time patrols were sent toward Kantomé, nearly two miles southeast of Mariboe. They reported few signs of enemy activity along the trail beyond Mariboe. Colonel Clifford apparently did not wait to re-establish contact with higher headquarters but, acting on his patrols' reports, ordered the battalion to push on. Encountering little opposition along the main trail, the unit reached Kantomé about noon. When Irving arrived to Red Beach 2 at 9;30am, he found a major logistical problem had formed at his main beachhead. Behind the narrow beach, a wide, impassable swamp was discover, it covered most of the area that the men had planned to use for the bivouac and supply dump area. Thus supplies soon began to pile up on the beach. This was an especially serious circumstance, for the landing plans had called for moving almost all troops and supplies overland from Red Beach 2 to the road inland. Construction of a road between the two beaches was soon found impracticable and when, after a day and a half of hard work, engineers had succeeded in driving a few yards of road into the hills south toward Red Beach 1, the project was discontinued. The small completed stretch did serve some useful purpose. On D-Day two batteries of 105-mm. howitzers were dragged along the road as far as possible to a cramped position on a little ridge immediately south of Red Beach 2. From this site the howitzers could deliver some fire support for troops advancing inland from Red Beach 1, but the direction of this fire was limited by a number of hills nearby. The same stretch of road also provided dispersal space for a few of the many vehicles which had been unloaded at Red Beach 2 on D-Day. Additionally, a limited dispersal area, rendered inaccessible by a small stream and by an arm of the swamp, was discovered at the northern edge of the beach, and ultimately the 542nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment constructed a road into this space. Artillery, ashore within an hour after the initial landing, was emplaced there to deliver fire on inland targets. But the fill used to build this road stopped the flow of the little stream which had drained the swamp into Tanahmerah Bay. To prevent a rise in the swamp's water level, a drainage canal was cut directly through the center of the beach. This procedure speeded the outward flow of swamp water, lowered the water level a little, and created a small additional dry area behind the beach, but it did not provide sufficient dry land for dispersal of all the troops and supplies scheduled to land on Red Beach 2. Eventually Irvings men found some dry flat dispersal areas behind the beach, allowing the supply shuttles to continue their work uncongested. Colonel Cliffords battalion would make the main thrust for the division while the remainder of Colonel Charles Lyman's 21st Regiment moved over to Red Beach 1. Colonel Clifford possessed little or no knowledge of the situation to the rear other than the difficulties presented by terrain. Ahead, 10,000 Japanese were thought to be concentrated around the airfields. Jangkena was on flat, swampy ground and was not an easily defensible position. Should the 1st Battalion push on to Dazai, also on flat ground, Japanese troops might outflank the unit, cut its line of communications to Dépapré, and destroy it at leisure. If the Japanese bypassed the battalion they could cut off the advance of the rest of the 21st Infantry at any one of the many defiles over the first two or three miles of the trail inland from Dépapré. Colonel Clifford therefore decided to pull his men back to Kantomé for the night, leaving only outposts along the trail east of that village. Kantomé was located near the foot of the Takari Hills, which he thought would present a serious obstacle to any Japanese flanking maneuvers. It was a fortunate decision, as around midnight elements of the 22nd Airfield Battalion had advanced overland around his 1st battalions outposts, striking at their left flank. Meanwhile, General Heavey's landing craft carrying the leading waves of the 162nd and 186th Regiments, supported by rocket fire and by Rear-Admiral Russell Berkey's cruisers, likewise met no Japanese resistance as they landed General Fuller's troops on the White Beaches. Company A of Colonel Harold Haney's 162nd Regiment rapidly secured Cape Pie while Company I of Colonel Oliver Newman's 186th Regiment secured Cape Tjeweri. With Jautefa Bay in hand, Newman's 3rd Battalion was then landed on White Beach 4 in preparation for an advance towards Leimok Hill and Pim. The first objective, Leimok Hill, lay 1,800 yards northwest of Pim. Part of the battalion secured the hill by 1000, and other elements advanced southward toward Pim. That village and its usable jetty were secured, against light opposition, by 1645, while Suikerbrood Hill, on Jautefa Bay south of Pim, was cleared by 1800. The danger that enemy troops atop dominating heights near Pim might make White Beach 4 untenable was over. The 3rd Battalion then established a night perimeter at Pim, extending its defenses along a trail leading west from that village to the point at which the Pim-Hollandia track joined the main road inland to Lake Sentani, thus securing the roadhead from which movements to inland objectives had to begin. Over at White Beach 1, Haney's 3rd Battalion advanced quickly to take Pancake Hill at around 8am, only meeting sporadic rifle fire. After taking the hill, they began pushing up the shores of Humboldt Bay, encountering no resistance as they advanced upon Jarremoh Hill. It seemed clear to the Americans, the Japanese had been taken by complete surprise, not expecting an amphibious assault against Hollandia so quickly, so they had pulled back to the Sentani Lake Airfield sector. Now further south, Haney's 2nd Battalion were advancing to a track that connected Hollandia with Pim, trying to make contact with the 3rd Battalion over at Jarremoh Hill. Meanwhile Newman's 1st Batallion was advancing upon Leimok Hill. Though the men wanted to keep pushing towards Hollandia during the late afternoon, Fuller decided to dig in for the night while warships and artillery softened up the city. When General Anami over at his HQ in Manado heard of the invasion he immediately ordered the 23rd Air Flotilla of Rear-Admiral Ito Yoshiaki to toss whatever he could against the allied surface ships and force along the beaches. He also ordered the 18th army to break through Aitape to rush over and help the Hollandia garrison and for General Tshima to dispatch a regiment force as well to Hollandia. Thus General Tagami got his 224th regiment together for the advance to Hollandia, expecting to get there for early May, while General Nakai's 20th Division continued to close in on Aitape. Anami also wanted to send the main part of the 36th Division to perform a counterattack in Hollandia's direction as he thought it vitally important to delay the enemy as much as possible so a better defense of Western New Guinea could be organized. Yet General Terauchi Hisaichi of the Southern Army declined his request to do so on the basis a counteroffensive would simply denude the already weakened defenses of Western New Guinea. Meanwhile General Doe's Persecution Task Force was carrying out their landing against Aitape. The landings would be preceded by naval gunfire from Captain Albert Noble's Destroyer force, aerial bombardment from escort carriers of Rear Admiral Ralph Davisons Task Force 78 and from General Kenney's air force. Meeting zero resistance and under the cover of a rocket barrage, the LCPR's landed the men of Colonel Francis Mason's 163rd Regiment by 6:45. Despite the lack of resistance, an immense amount of smoke and poor visibility prevented the troops from landing at Beach Blue, and instead they came ashore at Wapil. Just like at Hollandia, they had achieved tactical surprise at Aitape as the Japanese fled in a panic under naval gunfire. Mason's got his 2nd Battalion to swing west and quickly seize the Waitanan Creek while the 1st battalion was being landed. Then the 2nd Battalion formed a defensive position at the Pro Mission while the 3rd Battalion sent patrols east to establish an outpost near the mouth of the Nigia River. Back over at the beaches, General Doe landed some Australian engineers who began repairing the Tadji Fighter airstrip. The No. 62 Works Wing, Royal Australian Air Force, had come ashore at Blue Beach during the morning and had been able to start work on Tadji Fighter Strip at 1:00pm. Repairs continued throughout the night under floodlights, the lack of Japanese opposition and the urgency of the task prompting General Doe to push the work. Although it had been hoped that the strip would be ready for use on D+1, terrain conditions were such that necessary repairs were not completed on schedule. Thus it was 9:00 on April 24th before the Australian engineers, who had worked without break for almost forty-eight hours, could announce that the airstrip was ready. At 4:30pm, 25 P-40s of No. 78 Wing, RAAF, landed on the field, and the balance of the wing arrived the next day. The ground on which the fighter strip was located was so poorly drained that it was not until April 28th, after steel matting had been placed on the field, that it could be used continuously. The works wing then moved to Tadji Bomber Strip to aid the 872nd and 875th Engineer Aviation Battalions. The latter two units passed to the operational control of Wing Commander William A. C. Dale of the RAAF, who, besides commanding the works wing, was Persecution Task Force Engineer. Extensive repairs were necessary at the bomber strip and that field was not ready for use by fighter and transport planes until May 27th and for bombers until early July. While the engineers worked, Colonel Merle Howe's 127th Regiment also landed, while Mason's man expanded the perimeter further west, securing the incomplete Tadji west airstrip and the mouth of the Raihu River by the end of the day. Simultaneously, Colonel Cliffords men continued their advance from Kantomé to Sabron, whereupon, Fuller finally decided to launch his assault on Hollandia, with Colonel Haney's 2nd and 3rd Battalions rapidly moving down the ridge to seize the abandoned town by 11:15am. To the south, Colonel Newman had his 1st Battalion pursue the fleeing enemy, and in the process rapidly secured Brinkman's Plantation and then repelled a very uncoordinated Japanese counterattackby the 6th South Seas Detachment and General Kitazono's 42nd independent motor car battalion. At 8:00am on the23rd the 1st Battalion left its night positions on Leimok Hill and started out over the main track, passing through the 3rd Battalion. The movement was supported by the 205th and 218th Field Artillery Battalions, set up near Cape Pie, and by aircraft from the carriers of Task Force 58. By 9am the 1st Battalion had reached Brinkman's Plantation, about 2,200 yards by trail southwest of Pim. So far, there had been no opposition. Now Companies A and C parted from the main body to patrol northwest up the Borgonjie River. Proceeding to a fork about 2,000 yards upstream, the two companies repulsed a series of unco-ordinated attacks which were launched against the right flank of the 186th Infantry during the afternoon by a Japanese force estimated at 150. The two companies remained at the stream-branching during the night of 23-24 of April, and on the latter day they moved overland southwest to rejoin the main force on the Pim-Lake Sentani trail. Meanwhile General Inada's aviation personnel already at the Sentani airfield alongside those currently retreating there were cut off from their ration and ammunition supplies which happened to be stored near the coast. Facing the hopeless situation of having to conduct a proper defense of the airfields with less than a week's worth of rations, little small arms and machine gun ammunition, no artillery at all and with two different enemy forces converging upon them, General Inada seized full command and led the weak garrison to retreat towards Genjem. Their rear guard was proved by General Kitazono's troops. During that same afternoon, two platoons of Cliffords Company B, leading the advance from Sabron, safely crossed a small stream but soon found themselves in the middle of a well-concealed Japanese ambush on the east bank. Rifle and heavy machine gun fire made the stream's steep banks untenable, and the forward platoons hurriedly withdrew to the west, leaving four dead men behind. In response to this, Irvings artillery and Admiral Mitscher's carrier aircraft began to bomb and strafe the area, but Cliffords B Company was nonetheless unable to break through. An artillery duel emerged during the night keeping the men of the 1st Battalion wide awake. They were also being supplies with great difficulty via hand-carry over the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail. Fortunately the 24th Division's plans for the Hollandia operation had taken into consideration many of the potential logistic problems that might be encountered in the Tanahmerah Bay area. The division G-4 Section had made a detailed study which had shown that a full infantry regiment could be supplied by hand-carry from Red Beach 2 over the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail inland as far as Jangkena. When no road connecting Red Beach 2 with Red Beach 1 had been found, the division moved the main supply point to Dépapré, from which the advance inland would be supported. With this change in plans, the G-4 Section undertook new computations and calculated that the hand-carry distance could be extended to Dazai. This conclusion was based on the assumption that adverse weather conditions would not make the Dépapré-Lake Sentani road nearly impassable. On 23 April heavy rains started to turn the road into a quagmire through which struggling men could scarcely carry their own equipment and food, to say nothing of extra supplies for the leading battalion. By evening on that day logistic support of the 21st Regiment had therefore become a major problem. There was no question but that the regiment would have to be supported by hand-carry, for it was estimated that at least two weeks' hard work by engineers would be required before the road from Dépapré as far as Mariboe could be made passable even for jeeps. But the 1st Battalion had already advanced east of Dazai, beyond which point, according to the G-4 estimates, support by hand-carry would be next to impossible. Because of the logistical issues, General Eichelberger decided to make the Humboldt Bay area the principal task force landing site, allowing the 41st division to drive further inland. On the 24th, Newman's 3rd Battalion passed through the 1st and seized the Koejaboe area, only stopping there until the 2nd battalion came over to reinforce the continued advance. During this action however, most of the Japanese continued their retreat towards Genjem unmolested. Over in the west, Irving ordered Clifford to consolidate his forward positions around Sabron and Dazai as he now realized the continued rapid advance inland was no long possible as a result of their hand-carry logistics scheme and the weather was taking quite a turn for the worse hampering air drops. Back over at Aitape, Mason's troops crossed the Raihu and by midday the 2nd Battalion secured the town. However General Doe was dissatisfied with the pace of the westward advance, and he therefore suggested to Alamo Force that the 163rd's commander, Mason be relieved. This step was approved by General Krueger, although the regimental commander remained in control of his unit until 9 May, only two days before the 163rd Infantry began loading for another operation. For the next few days, the 163rd patrolled further inland and would fall into a heavy engagement at Kamti on the 29th. At the Kapoam villages, about twelve miles up the Raihu, elements of the 3rd Battalion encountered the only signs of organized Japanese resistance found in the Aitape area to 4 May. At one of these villages, Kamti, some outpost troops of the 3rd Battalion were surrounded by an estimated 200 Japanese who made a number of harassing attacks on 28 and 29th. These skirmishes cost the battalion 3 men killed and 2 wounded, while it was estimated that the Japanese lost about 90 killed. On the 25th, Colonel Lymann's two forward battalion resumed their march, heading through some dense jungle being met by sporadic enemy small arm fire. They eventually dug in around the vicinity of Julianadorp. Meanwhile Colonel Newman had his 3rd battalion advancing west along the main road to Nefaar while some LVT's transported his 1st battalion over Lake Sentani to a point on the western shore of Nefaar. Neither force faced much opposition and together would perform some patrolling of the Cyclops Drome during the afternoon. Back over at Aitape, Colonel Howe's 127th Regiment finished their occupation of Tumleo, Seleo and the Ali Islands and now were beginning to send patrols east towards Afua. On the 26th, Colonel Newman had his 1st Battalion seize the Cyclops Drome while his 2nd Battalion took some LVTS to capture the Sentani Drome. Shortly after midday both Battalions rapidly secured the airdromes under light enemy resistance. Despite a serious supply situation, Lyman's 1st and 3rd Battalion resumed the advance, only encountering one enemy bunker at Ebeli Plantation. It had been impossible to drop supplies from the air on April 25 and even hand-carrying had been stopped late in the afternoon by heavy rains which had flooded many small streams. Parts of the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail were now knee deep in water. The two forward battalions were low on ammunition, and they would have to go on half-rations if the supply situation were not quickly improved. But General Irving was again optimistic about the weather, believing that air supply would be successful on the 26th. Furthermore, he had received information which indicated that the Japanese were evacuating the airfield area. For these reasons he considered that a continuation of the advance would not be unduly hazardous. In ordering the advance, the division commander was knowingly pushing his men far beyond the limit at which they could be supplied by hand-carry. If the airdrop should again fail or if track conditions should not improve, one of the two forward battalions would probably have to be echeloned back along the trail to augment the carrying parties, and the advance would probably have to be halted. Should enemy opposition prove stubborn, the forward battalions might have to withdraw, perhaps as far as Dazai, to replenish their meager supplies of rations and ammunition. General Irving was taking a calculated risk which assumed the success of the airdrop and an absence of determined Japanese opposition. By the afternoon of the 26th, the Hollandia Drome was secured after a successful airdrop at Dazai. After this the objectives of Reckless had been achieved. Mop up operation would continue up until June 6th, as Fuller's 41st Division cleared out Cape Soedja and the Cyclops Mountain. They would end up flushing out Japanese on Hill 1000 and Irving's 24th Division sent out patrols west towards Marneda, Demta Bay and Gemjem. By 6 June the they had all killed 405 Japanese and had taken 64 prisoners in the Genjem-Demta region. Many more Japanese were found dead of starvation or disease along the trails in the same area. During the same time period, Eichelberger's task force would develop Hollandia into a major base from which future operations would be support. In the end casualties for Operation Reckless amounted to 124 deaths, 1057 wounded and 28 missing for the Americans. The Japanese suffered 3300 deaths, 661 captured. On April 30th, 7220 Japanese from Hollandia's garrison would assemble at Genjem where General Inada began a gradual withdrawal in 11 echelons towards Sarmi. By May 7th, all echelons departed Genjem for a very long march through some of the worst terrain in New Guinea. Two-thirds of the garrison reached the Tor River by June. It's estimated 93% of their strength would succumb to the deadly jungles, lack of provisions and rampant cases of malaria. Meanwhile to secure the Tadji airstrips against Japanese attacks from the direction of Wewak, Colonel Howe sent Company C by boat to Nyaparake on April 28th where they set up outposts further inland around Charov and Jalup. By May 4th, further patrolling by the 127th regiment had discovered no trace of organized enemy units, thus Operation Persecution was successfully completed. During the operation 525 Japanese were killed, 25 were captured while the Americans suffered 19 deaths and 40 wounded. That is all for the New Guinea front as we are now traveling over to New Britain. After the Battle of Talasea and the area was secured, Colonel Smith reached the conclusion that the enemy was withdrawing as rapidly as possible to Cape Hoskins. He decided to send patrols to Numundo Plantation. A reconnaissance patrol on March 10th found enemy positions at Bola and Santa Monica Plantation evacuated, but came upon entrenched enemy at Garilli. On 11th Captain Andrew Haldane's Company K left Bitokara with orders to proceed to Numundo on a three-day patrol, a time estimate that was to prove too optimistic. Company K reached Garilli to find it empty of the enemy, but just north of Patanga encountered Japanese small-arms, automatic-weapons and mortar fire. For four days the Marine patrol made slow progress, fighting an enemy who made a stand in the heavy vegetation approximately every 200 yards and then withdrew effectively before the advance guard flankers could close in. On the evening of the 16th the company entered Kilu where the Japanese made their final stand. While the two forces battled, a Marine landing craft appeared offshore and as it approached the beach the enemy diverted what apparently was a 75mm field gun from the ground action to the "naval force". In the boat was Lieutenant Colonel Deakin who had obtained permission from Colonel Smith to transport a section of 81mm mortars to Captain Haldane's assistance. Although the Japanese bracketed the craft, they failed to hit it and the weapons were landed without casualties. Shortly after the heavy mortars began lobbing shells toward the enemy, the Japanese broke contact and the Marines reached Numundo 48 hours later without finding the Terunuma Detachment again. The 1st Battalion also set up an ambush at Garu which was productive of enemy dead and prisoners for awhile. Company I replaced Company K at Numundo and in turn was replaced on 25 March by the 2nd Battalion. Inasmuch as the enemy continued to straggle eastward singly and in small groups with little or no communications, patrols were kept busy returning over and over again to the same villages and plantations in hopes of catching unwary Japanese. Such hopes frequently paid off. On the 30th the 2nd Battalion moved southeast from Numundo to San Remo Plantation, described by one Marine as "a very pleasant place." From that point patrols probed westward to the Kulu River and eastward into the Cape Hoskins area as far as Buluma. Overall the patrols saw 3 men killed with 8 wounded while accounting for 151 Japanese killed and 68 taken prisoner. Meanwhile, Matsuda, Komori and Terunuma;s Detachments all were performing withdrawals. Komori dispatched his force to the rendezvous point in successive echelons. He himself left Didmop with the rear guard, back on February 28th, reaching Augitni via Vakan on March 1st. The following morning he started his hospital patients along the evacuation route and sent a detail of 250 men to Bulawatni to help transport provisions. Yet the Marines at Iboki were becoming increasingly troublesome, though quite unaware that they faced anything more than starving stragglers. When Company A, 1st Marines entered Talawaga on the 5th, Colonel Sato felt the hot breath of pursuit on his neck and moved to the trail fork where he assumed command of the combined force. The next morning the Komori Group resumed its withdrawal in a northwesterly direction along the right prong of the trail fork, while Sato prepared to follow with his command on the 7th. At this point the ways of these two officers parted, and thenceforth each pursued his individual course toward the destiny that awaited him. On the 6th the Komori Group, with Major Tobuse's 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry in the lead, covered 16 km's on the trail running northeast from the fork toward the coast to reach what the Japanese called the "North Road." After the first day on the trail, Komori's progress becomes difficult to follow, owing to his use of place names occurring in no other reports or maps. It was slow and difficult at best, because of rain and mud, and the necessity for wide detours to find fords through deep streams and safe passages through or around extensive swamps. His immediate force numbered about 200, and on March 8th he recorded the Tobuse Battalion a half-day's march ahead. He sighted occasional enemy reconnaissance planes, and on the 12th U.S. landing craft fired upon his men as they attempted to cross the Kuhu River, obliging them to take to the jungle and swamps. The broad Via River stopped his force on the 14th. When improvised rafts refused to float, the major and 15 others swam across. The rest, through weakness or timidity, declined to follow this excellent example, and it took two days and a wide detour inland to get the whole group to the right bank. Then, on the 17th, provisions ran out. Thus the weakening men came by painful stages to Kometto (Eleanora Bay) and the welcome coconuts of Linga Linga Plantation on the 21st. But the wide Kapuluk River posed a formidable obstacle to further progress. They tried first to swim the Kapuluk near its mouth, but 18 men of the 2nd Company were swept away and 12 of them drowned, only the captain reaching the far bank safely. A patrol far upstream failed to find any fording point, so the troops spent the rest of the day building rafts. These managed to stay afloat, but broke apart so frequently that another two days were required for the passage. Then came the real heartbreaker on the 24th: they reached Kou only to find the provisioning post evacuated. On the 25th an officer patrol encountered a U.S. patrol, and once more the group had to detour. On the 26th Komori hired a native to guide him to Numundo Plantation, at the eastern base of the Willaumez Peninsula. But evidently the man had a change of heart, for the major recorded next day that, lacking a guide, "we advanced using a compass." They now entered a region of extensive swamps, intersected by another major obstacle: the two-pronged Kulu river. The column got across this stream on the 27th, but lost five more men in the swift current. The survivors emerged from the swamps on the 29th and followed the river southward. On the 31st Komori made his final diary entry, eloquent in its stark simplicity: "We are very tired and without food." Apparently at this point malaria laid the major low. Ordering his men to continue toward Cape Hoskins, he took refuge in a native village, accompanied only by his executive officer, his orderly and a corporal attached to his headquarters. For lack of further diary entries, obscurity shrouds the last week of his life. Most of the Japanese forces reached Malalia by the end of March, but Marine patrols were becoming increasingly troublesome. On the 11th, elements of the 1st Marines landed at Linga Linga, patrolling further inland. Company E landed at the Kulu River mouth at the base of Willaumez Peninsula. There the Marines encountered 4 enemy stragglers, killing three and taking one prisoner. Then they moved westward to Kandoka, where they were joined by two platoons of Company F, brought over by boat. There they established a roadblock, just in time to catch Sato's rear echelon. Second Lieutenant Richard B. Watkins was in command of the trail block. At 9am Watkins led his group inland from the village over some faint trails which he hoped the Japanese main body might be using. The Marines had proceeded about a mile and a half and were about to cross a stream in a sparsely wooded area when they sighted two Japanese standing with slung rifles, apparently resting. Watkins had about decided to dispose of these when they moved off in a northeasterly direction, followed almost immediately by a large body of their compatriots. Lying where the Japanese could easily have spotted them, the Marines counted the 73 enemy soldiers and noted the equipment cited above. Conspicuous among them was a tall, burly officer being carried on a litter. The Japanese were cutting fresh trail through the jungle, and fortunately were too intent on their work to discover the patrol. They made excruciatingly slow progress, however, and Watkins did not dare to move until the last man had disappeared. He then returned with all speed to Kandoka, sending a runner ahead with his report. At the village he met Major Brush who had come over from Yaluiai with one squad on what he had intended as merely a routine inspection. He promptly radioed his command post to send a rifle platoon and a 60mm mortar section to the scene and ordered Watkins to hold the trail block with one rifle squad, one machine-gun squad and two mortar squads while he himself set off with the rest of the troops available in an effort to overtake the Japanese from the rear. Before his own departure that morning, Watkins had sent a six-man patrol under Sergeant Frank Chliek to an inland village some two miles south of Kandoka, right where the Japanese appeared to be heading. The lieutenant promptly dispatched a native messenger there with a warning; then, when firing broke out in that direction, he surmised, correctly, that Chliek had become engaged and took the remaining rifle squad and hurried to his assistance. He arrived to find the sergeant and his men crouched on high ground by the east-west trail with dead Japanese all around them. The volume of fire was intense, the pattern not at all clear. As it turned out, Chliek had stumbled upon the column somewhere near its head and, taking advantage of his superior position, immediately opened fire. Major Brush's force, which had been closing rapidly, was on the opposite side of the valley at this time; hence, at sound of the first shots, had hastened to the scene and struck the Japanese column's other flank. In order to avoid becoming involved in a fire fight with that group, Watkins ordered Chliek's patrol back to Kandoka and followed with his own squad at a slower pace. Brush caught up with him shortly, whereat a counting of heads showed that, miraculously, the Marines had not sustained a single casualty. Here is the aftermath as Watkins recalls it: “On the following morning I took a 20 man patrol through the battle area. We counted 55 dead including 3 officers. It was quite easy to believe that perhaps 20 more died in scattered positions throughout the dense underbrush. The dead were all within a 100 yard stretch of trail. We encountered 2 more Japanese who had evidently just come upon the scene who were sitting side by side staring dazedly at the destruction and did not even turn their heads when we approached.” The burly officer previously observed on a litter proved to be Colonel Sato. Evidently Sergeant Chliek's patrol had struck the enemy column at precisely the point where he was being carried, for the colonel had only had time to leap to his feet and draw his sword to fight back before the Marines' fire riddled him. Seeing their leader fall, those Japanese farther forward took off in mad flight, while those behind were cut off by the converging of the two patrols. Thus perished one of the few Japanese to deserve much credit for the performance of the 65th Brigade on New Britain. Although the rear echelon attacked by the two patrols comprised less than half of Sato's total force, the group, as such, ceased to exist with the death of the leader who alone had held it together. Units split into components, these into smaller parties, straggling eastward over a variety of trails, often hacking their own way by compass azimuth. Throughout April, the 17th Division continued their retreat towards Rabaul, managed to repel multiple marine patrol attacks around Cape Hoskins. General Sakai's survivors finally got to Rabaul between April 16th and May 15th, erecting the last bulwark of defense for the South Pacific. On April 6th, the journey of another Japanese commander came to an end. The body of the already deceased Major Komori was captured at the San Remo Plantation by the 2nd Battalion, 5th marines. They came upon the outpost, suddenly face to face with a group of four bedraggled Japanese. It was one of those abrupt encounters that allow little time for reflection or deliberation. The flurry of fire that followed killed three of the enemy and wounded the fourth, who promptly surrendered. Komori had apparently died of malaria along the way. For the 5th Marines, too, was nearing its journey's end, so far as New Britain was concerned. With promotion of the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Buse took over on an acting basis, and General Smith returned to Cape Gloucester to relieve General Shepherd as Assistant Division Commander. Units attached to the regiment followed, and representatives of the Army's 185th Infantry arrived to inspect positions preparatory to replacing the 5th, just as other 40th Infantry Division elements were doing in the Cape Gloucester area with a view toward relieving the entire 1st Marine Division. Last clash of the campaign occurred onthe 22nd of April, when a 2/5 patrol intercepted a party of Japanese, killing 20, including two officers, and suffering the regiment's last fatality on New Britain. Three days later the whole 185th RCT moved into Talasea and San Remo, and at 1530 command of the area formally passed to the Army. LCM's carrying the 1st and 3rd Battalions back to Borgen Bay cleared Talasea at 1630, followed by those carrying 2/5 from San Remo at 2000. The movement was reported complete at 1930 on the 26th, and men of the 5th learned that the 1st Marines had departed this island of evil memory the previous day and that they would follow as ships became available. Soon they would be relieved by Major-General Isaac Rapp Brush's 40th Division, which took responsibility for Cape Gloucester, Arawe and Talasea by the end of April. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Thus Operation Reckless and Persecution were both successful. Now MacArthur had a strong foothold in Western New Guinea seeing the Japanese continued their frantic retreat wherever allied forces seemed to pop up. Over in New Britain, the Japanese were losing formidable commanders as they too were on the retreat, things were simply disastrous for the empire of the rising sun.
Last time we spoke about the defense of India. General Mutaguchi's megalomaniac dream of invading India was tossed into motion. Battles were raging over countless features and against formidable allied boxes such as the Lion Box. Yet Mutaguchi had relied far too heavily on seizing the allied supply depots while promising his subordinate commanders they would have ample supplies for their tasks. Those like General Sato became so angry with their superior they pretty much were acting insubordinate. The effort to take Kohima fully and thrust into India was falling apart battle by battle. Meanwhile within China, General Chennault's 14th air force was causing major problems for the Japanese, forcing them into action. Operation Ichi-Go was formed, a colossal offensive to neutralize airfields and perhaps end the China Problem once and for all. Meanwhile the Royal Navy received some breathing room in the mediterranean sea and were now moving into the Pacific Theater. This episode is Operation Ichi-Go Unleashed Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. The Imperial Japanese Army, largely because of the losses incurred by the Imperial Japanese Navy and logistical constraints, was virtually powerless to stop the allied advance in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. Imperial HQ predicted further losses in early 1944 and General Douglas MacArthur was expecting to sweep up the northern New Guinea coast so he could retake the Philippines. New Guinea was thus seen as a holding operation to delay the allied advance. With its shorter supply line, the Philippines was now being regarded as a good location to block MacArthur's advance towards the home islands. Everyone of course was still waiting for the decisive naval battle. But back on the mainland, the IJA were not dependent on the IJN, their logistical constraints were not the same at all. Hence suddenly in 1944, the IJA decided to unleash incredibly large and bold offensives in Burma, Northern India and of course in China. On New Years day of 1944, Chiang Kai-Shek cabled President FDR warning him that the strategy they and Stalin had agreed on at the Tehran Conference in November of 1943, fully emphasizing the European Front was leaving China open to a major attack. “Before long Japan will launch an all-out offensive against China.” Yet western intelligence disagreed with Chiang Kai-Shek's sentiment. While General Stilwell was completely focused on recapturing Burma, Chiang Kai-Sheks fears were about to be proven correct. In April of 1944, Operation Ichi-Go was launched. It was the largest military operation in Japanese history, it was also a last ditch effort to finally solve the so-called China Problem. It was obvious to the IJA, the IJN were losing the maritime war in the Pacific, thus they were determined to toss the dice in China. If they were successful, overland supply lines from Burma to Korea could be secured. In addition it would be a hell of a bargaining chip when negotiating with the Americans. If they could finally end Chiang Kai-Shek's Kuomintang government, America would be facing the extremely formidable task of having to invade and reconquer China. Of course the immediate war aims were to knock out General Chennault's air force some he would not be able to bomb Formosa or the home islands. Emperor Hirohito recalled in his Dokuhaku Roku, post-war testament “One shred of hope remained—to bash them at Yunnan in conjunction with operations in Burma. If we did that we could deal a telling blow to Britain and America …” By early April General Hata had amassed 62,000 men, 52,000 Japanese and 10,000 collaborationist units alongside 800 tanks, 1550 artillery pieces, 250 aircraft, 15550 motorized vehicles and 100000 horses. This would turn into 150,000 troops, and believe it or not that was the advance guard of a campaign that would eventually involve 500,000 troops. They would be supplied with enough ammunition for two years. The IJA air force amassed 200 bombers with enough fuel for 8 months to support them. Over the next 9 months, battles would be fought over 3 regions, Henan in central China to the east of Nanjing; Hunan and Guangxi in south China east of Hong Kong and Guangdong province and south of the Yangtze River. While Ichi-Go was unleashed, Chiang Kai-Sheks crack troops, the Y-Force based out of Yunan province, alongside Merrill's marauders were busy fighting alongside Stilwell in northern Burma. In spite of the efforts to keep Ichi-Go secret, during early 1944, the Chinese began fortifying their defenses and redeployed troops on a large scale to strengthen their frontlines. Chiang Kai-Shek knew something was coming, but his commanders believed a large-scale Japanese offensive in China was impossible by this point of the war. The Japanese began carrying out a heavy bombardment campaign, targeting Henyang, Guilin, Chongqing and against the heavy concentration of Chinese troops advancing in the Yangtze river area. The aerial attacks greatly hampered the KMT's logistical lines. The Chinese reacted by unleashing their frontline artillery, destroying the Bawangcheng bridge on March 25th. The Japanese hastily went to work repairing the bridge as Lt General Uchiyama Eitaro's 12th army would need to cross as pertaining to Operation Kogo. Kogo was the first phase of the battle aimed at opening the Pinghan Railway that ran from Beijing to northern Wuhan. South of Beijing is the Yellow River, that runs southwest to east. Uchiyama's plan was initially to cross the Yellow River and secure the Zhengzhou area before driving south towards the Luohe area, where the Japanese would ultimately prepare for a drive towards Luoyang. On the night of April 17th, the main part of the 37th division crossed the Yellow River and advanced towards Zhongmu. The Japanese rapidly penetrated the defenders positions, taking them by surprise. Three KM's in front of Zhongmu, they waited for the 7th independent Mixed Brigade to follow up behind them. The 7th Independent Mixed Brigade had crossed the Yellow River at the same time as the 37th Division, attacking the flank of the enemy facing the crossing point of the main body of the Brigade. Shortly after dawn the main body of the Brigade began crossing the river at a point near the left flank of the 37th Division. On the 19th, part of the 37th Division attacked Zhangzhou, completely routing the Chinese defenders while the bulk of the Division advanced towards Lihezhen. Meanwhile the 110th Division advanced upon Bawangcheng with the 62nd Division and 9th Independent Brigade following behind them. The 62nd Division was accompanied by the 3rd Armored Division and 4th Cavalry Brigade, setting out for Luohe with their tank support. The 110th División continued their advance towards Micunzhen, capturing the town by the 24th. On that same day the 9th Independent Brigade seized Sishuizhen, but would be unable to break through the 177th Division's defenses. After a breakthrough was made at Zhengzhou, the 3rd armored division and 4th cavalry Brigades tanks advanced past the infantry to puncture the Chinese formations, forcing a quick rout. Meanwhile the 62nd Division, 37th Division and 7th Brigade reached the east-west line of Lihezhen and prepared for an assault on Xuchang. The Chinese simply were unable to respond to this. Chiang Kai-Shek and his commanders assumed this was a punitive expedition and that the Japanese would sooner or later turn back as they had always done in the past. As such, only the 15th and 29th Armies were sent to reinforce Xuchang to contain the Japanese offensive. Yet on the other hand, Uchiyama had also decided to divert his tanks and cavalry northwest, preparing for the future attack on Luoyang. On the 30th, Uchiyama's forces began attacking Xuchang, shattering the Chinese defenses at extreme speed and fully occupying the city by May 1st. The 62nd Division encountered the 15th and 29th Armies at Yingqiaozhen, battering them so heavily, the Chinese were unable to reinforce the vital railway. Two infantry battalions and one field artillery battalion of the 37th Division and the 27th Division departed Xuchang to continue marching south in order to re-open the Beijing-Hankou railway. The North China Area Army estimated that Tang Enbo would assemble his main force near Yehhsien, planning to advance to Yencheng and then wheel to the northwest in order to capture this force. However, the main force of the 31st Army Group of General Tang Enbo turned its advance to the north. The Area Army, therefore, changed its plan and decided to turn toward Loyang directly after the capture of xuchang, rather than to wait until Yencheng was captured. Yet we will have to wait until next week to find out what happens to General Tang Enbo's forces as we are now traveling over to Burma. Don't worry Operation Ichi-Go is just starting. After the capture of Walawbum in early March, General Stilwell ordered Merrill's Marauders to perform a wide envelopment, to cut the Kamaing Road behind General Tanaka's 18th Division while the 22nd Division with tank support drove down the Kamaing Road from the north. Two Marauder battalions led by Lt Colonel Charles Hunter set out on March 12th, reaching Janpan 4 days later. Once there they received new orders from Stilwell to head south through the hills along the Warong trail, then make their way to Kamaian to block the road at Inkangahtawng. Meanwhile Merrills 1st battalion and their Chinese allies were facing strong enemy resistance. From bivouac areas in the hills northeast of Shaduzup, on the Kamaing Road, the 1st Battalion of the 5307th, followed by the 113th Regiment, moved out on the morning of 13 March to put the northern clamp across the Kamaing Road just south of the Jambu Bum, in the vicinity of Shaduzup. I & R Platoons followed some fresh footprints into an enemy bivouac and stirred up a hornet's nest of Japanese. There was brisk skirmishing, and though the Americans managed to cross the Numpyek Hka just beyond, the Japanese had been alerted and proceeded to delay them expertly. Lieutenant-Colonel William Osborne, commander of the 1st Battalion, decided to cut a fresh trail around the Japanese. This was painfully slow business, and waiting for an airdrop took another day. On 22 March, when Colonel Hunter to the south was one day's march from his goal, aggressive patrolling by Red Combat Team revealed that the Japanese had blocked every trail in the area through which Osborne had to pass, so again Osborne elected to make his own trail, this time over ground so rough that the mules had to be unloaded. The maneuver succeeded, and no Japanese were seen on 23 or 24 March. Osborne's march would have been greatly aided had he known Tilly's Kachin Rangers were in the same general area. By March 22nd they reached Hpouchye. Additionally the 22nd Division and Colonel Browns tanks had been halling it through the Jambu Bum, making slow progress against heavy enemy resistance because of a lack of tank-infantry coordination. It was difficult to coordinate infantry and tank action, because the tankers found it hard to distinguish their countrymen from the Japanese. A few such cases of mistaken identity and the 22nd's men were understandably reluctant to get too close to the tanks. I remember a circumstance in WW1, when the IJA were laying siege to the German concession of Tsingtao. There was a small British force sent to aid the Japanese and so much friendly firing occurred, the IJA forced the Brits to wear their greatcoats to distinguish them from the Germans. So you know, it happens. By March 20th, Stilwell's forces crossed the ridge, reaching Hkawnglaw Hka, but yet again the lack of tank-infantry coordination led them to pull back. Once over the Jambu Bum, the 22nd found the road down to be mined and blocked with fallen trees. Two days were lost in clearing the road, and then three battalions made a frontal attack, guiding on the road. Next day they tried a co-ordinated tank-infantry attack and the leading tank platoon reached the Hkawnglaw Hka about four miles south of Jambu Bum, destroying a few machine guns and taking four antitank pieces. But the infantry would not follow the tanks and dug in two miles short of the stream. The tanks patrolled till dark, then fell back to their own lines. Over in the east, Hunter's men departed Janpan and reached Inkangahtawng on March 23rd, setting up two road blocks. Hunter sent out patrols and quickly discovered Kamaing was wide open, yet the delay of Stilwell's others units would force General Merril to deny any attempts to attack south. Tanaka's reaction to the roads blocks were pretty intense. Beginning on he 24th, vigorous Japanese counterattack followed on another. The Morita Unit, about two companies strong were a hastily assembled force drawn from a battalion gun platoon, an engineer company, a medical company, and division headquarters; they were given two 75-mm. guns, placed under command of the 18th Division's senior adjutant, and rushed south to Inkangahtawng. Tanaka also ordered the 2nd battalion, 114th Regiment over at Kamaing to attack north along the Kumon Range. The attacks were so intense, Hunter's men were forced to pull back to the Manpin Area by March 24th. Meanwhile, Merrill's 1st Battalion advanced to Chengun Hka, placing them really close to Tanaka's headquarters at Shaduzup. To the north, the 64th and 66th Regiments managed to link up, but the relentless Chinese assaults continued to fail against the tenacious defenders costing the attackers many tanks and lives. It was the 2nd battalion, 66th's turn to lead on 21 March. Again the tanks got well ahead of the infantry. A combination of ambush and counterattack by the Japanese cost five tanks, and then the Japanese came on up the road, almost overrunning the battalion headquarters, which was saved by the courage of two engineer platoons that had been clearing the road. That night the 1st battalion, 64th, which had been making the enveloping move, came in from the east and cut the Kamaing Road, right in the segment held by the Japanese. A tank attack on the 23rd found Japanese antitank guns just south of a small stream north of the Hkawnglaw Hka that prevented the tanks from outflanking the position. The guns knocked out the three lead tanks in quick succession, blocking the road. After heavy fighting at the stream crossing, the tanks finally had to withdraw, leaving the derelicts. In the afternoon the two flanking battalions made their way up the road and joined the 66th. Unfortunately, the meeting of the 64th and 66th Regiments did not signal the end of Japanese resistance. Japanese and Chinese positions on the road were thoroughly intermingled, making movement in the immediate area extremely hazardous. An attempt to break the deadlock with the tanks failed when the device chosen to identify the Chinese infantry backfired. Both the Chinese and the Japanese waved white cloths at the tanks. The armor moved blithely on into a nest of Japanese antitank men, who destroyed five tanks with magnetic mines, effectively blocking the road. General Liao, the 22nd Division's commander, now cut a bypass road for the tanks around his west right flank. A tank platoon tried it, could not cross a ravine improperly prepared for tank crossing, came under artillery fire, and had to be withdrawn. General Liao then committed his 65th Regiment to the main attack, applying immense pressure, prompting Tanaka to order his frontline regiments to withdraw 10 kilometers. On March 28th, Merrill's 1st Battalion established themselves along the Nam Kawng Chaung on the Japanese rear, from where they would be able to attack Tanaka's headquarters. Surprised, the Japanese chose to bypass the roadblock and evacuated their position via a track to the west. This resulted in Japanese resistance softening up, allowing the 65th Regiment to secure Shaduzup by March 29. At the same time, Hunter's encircled Marauders were fiercely resisting the enemy attacks at Nhpum Ga, with his 3rd Battalion subsequently taking up positions at the Hsamshingyang airstrip to the north. The men were extremely fatigued, facing constant marches, dysentery, malaria and malnutrition. They fought on for 5 days under constant attack, successfully pushing back the relentless Japanese assaults. On its hilltop the garrison, though suffering no shortage of food or ammunition, aside from the monotony of diet which was itself a hardship, suffered from an acute shortage of water. There were no plaster casts for the wounded, and they took their sulfadiazine dry. The pack animals could not be protected from the Japanese fire. When dead, their carcasses could not be buried, and the stench and the carrion flies added more miseries to the battle. Sergeant Matsumoto, who had played an important part at Walawbum, was a pillar of strength to the garrison, constantly scouting between the lines, overhearing Japanese conversations, and informing Colonel McGee accordingly. On one occasion, when Matsumoto learned of plans to surprise a small salient at dawn, the Americans drew back their lines, booby-trapping the abandoned foxholes. Punctually the Japanese attacked, straight into the massed fire of the waiting Americans. Throwing themselves into the foxholes for cover, they set off the booby traps. Matsumoto completed the debacle by screaming "Charge!" in Japanese, causing a supporting platoon to throw itself on the American guns. An ailing General Merrill would be evacuated to Ledo, leaving Colonel Hunter to assume formal command of the Galahad Unit. He then sent his 3rd Battalion to counterattack, unsuccessfully attempting to clear the trail as the Japanese repelled all his assaults. Finally on April 4th, Hunter got a breakthrough. The Japanese were believed to be moving ever more troops up the Tanai and it was believed that the 1st Battalion, which had been ordered to aid, would not arrive for four more days at least. Hunter's reaction was to attack on the 4th with everyone but the sick and the mule skinners, with his large patrols called in and Kachins used to replace them. A fake fight, using carbines, which sounded like the Arisaka rifle, was staged to deceive the Japanese, and the air support made three passes at them. The first two were genuine, the last a feint which made the Japanese take cover, only to come out and find the American infantry on them. Hunter's force gained that day and came within 1,000 yards of the besieged. About this same time Capt. John B. George and a small party, sent north by Hunter to find the Chinese regiment which Hunter understood would support him in this area, met the 1st battalion, 112th regiment at Tanaiyang, about eight miles northeast. After an interval, presumably used to obtain permission to do so, its commander moved toward Hsamshingyang. His first element arrived at the airfield on 4 April and was used to guard a trail junction. Despite this increasing pressure the Japanese made a very heavy attack on the Nhpum Ga garrison, actually reaching the foxholes at one point, and being driven out by two soldiers using hand grenades. Over the next few days, the Marauders were reinforced by the 112th regiment and Merrill's 1st battalion, allowing Hunters men to crawl closer and closer to Nhpum Ga. By Easter Sunday, the Japanese vanished, leaving cooking fires and equipment. There was no pursuit, as Stilwell wanted no movement beyond Nhpum Ga as they were facing large supply issues at this time. The battalion of the 114th made its way to Myitkyina, where General Tanaka, anxious about the town, added it to the garrison. The 1st Battalion, 55th Regiment, however, withdrew towards the vicinity of Warong. The Marauders had suffered 59 deaths and 314 wounded during the Inkangahtawn roadblock engagement and the siege of Nhpum Ga. The Galahad Unit and 114th regiment suffered so heavily from exhaustion, the men would be very weakened for future engagements. Further to the south, Stilwell was concerned about the recently offensives aimed at Imphal and Kohima, but he was relieved somewhat, when at the Jorhat conference of April 3, attended by Slim, Lentaigne, Stilwell and Mountbatten, he was told the situation was under control and for him to continue his northern offensive. During the conference, Slim also notified the others he had decided to divert the Chindits 14th and 111th Brigades, further south to help out his 4th Corps. However Brigadiers Fergusson and Calvert argued strongly against it, not wanting to get tangled up in the battle for Imphal. Calvert instead wanted to preserve White City and Broadway whilst Fergusson wanted another attempt at Indaw. The Chindits were still formally under the command of Stilwell in May and he wanted them to hold firm at Indaw to prevent the flow of Japanese reinforcements going north. It was estimated the Chindists could endure roughly 90 days of this action and would need to pull out my mid-June. This estimation did not sit well with Stilwell. General Lentaigne wanted to abandon the strongholds around Indaw and move north closer to Stilwell's forces. Therefore, Calvert's brigade would be prepared to open the drive to the town of Mogaung by attacking Mohnyin. Before this could occur, General Hayashi would initiated a general attack against White City on the night of April 6. The attack began with a three hour artillery bombardment, then the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 4th Regiment; and 3rd battalion, 114th Regiment stormed Calvert's defenses. When the shelling died away, Hayashi's three infantry battalions attempting to punch a hole along the southeast perimeter of the stronghold, defended by the Lancashire Fusiliers, Gurkhas, and other West Africans of the 6th Nigerian Regiment. Secure behind a row of machine guns with a line of mortars behind them, the defenders opened fire. Bullets and projectiles whipped through the air, the bright flashes of tracers lending an ethereal air to the proceedings. Rounds poured into the attacking Japanese who began to suffer heavy casualties. Determined bands of Japanese brought up Bangalore torpedoes to destroy the wire, but all malfunctioned. The battle went on for most of the night. The Chindits fought like lions throughout the night and managed to toss back numerous enemy attacks. Then to their dismay 27 IJA medium bombers appeared, blowing holes in the wire. The Bofors engaged them, shot down six and claimed six probables. Desperate efforts were made to repair the defenses before the next attack came in. White City received over 100,000 yards of barbed wire and 600 50ft coils of Dannert wire. The wire was 20 yards thick in places and festooned with mines and booby-traps. Dakotas continued to pour reinforcements into White City. The transport planes were relegated to flights during dawn and dusk times, but they kept coming, concentrating reinforcements at White City. Fresh companies of troops materialized to take up station, until in the words of Lt. Norman Durant of the South Staffords, the place was a “complete babel, for it contained British troops, West Africans, Chinese, Burmans, a New Zealand RAF officer, Indians, and an American Neisei who acted as interpreter, or better said interrogator of prisoners. Large groups of West Africans from the 7th and 12th Nigerians landed, filling out the columns and battalions already at White City. As the planes continued to bring in reinforcements, Calvert managed to muster roughly seven battalions in and around “White City” against Hayashi. Over the next few nights, Calvert's defenders continued to repel Hayashi's attacks, until he was finally relieved by Brigadier Abdy Rickett's 3rd West African Brigade on April 10th. This allowed Calvert to lead a strike force against Hayashi's HQ at Mawlu from the south. While the Japanese continued their onslaught of White City, Calvert's strike force advanced to Thayaung, before effortlessly seizing Sepein on the 13th. Then the 7th Nigerians fell upon Mawlu, prompting the HQ staff to flee south in a rout. With Mawlu now in their hands, the Nigerians soon found themselves under heavy fire, pinned down for the next four hours under relentless Japanese firing and dive-bombing by Japanese aircraft that put in a surprise appearance. Soon, the Gurkhas at Sepein also reported that they were under fire from the main Japanese positions at the edge of the village, hidden under mounds of flowering lantana scrubs. The sight was inordinately beautiful and lethal, concealing hordes of Japanese infantry, whose gunfire twinkled through the red, yellow, purple and green of the scrub. Three Gurkha ground attacks failed to dislodge the defenders and the men were becoming dispirited. Calvert decided to withdraw. As dusk settled at Mawlu, Vaughn began to pull his troops out of Mawlu and under the cover of a mortar barrage, taking with him a large collection of vital documents and an even larger trove of Japanese ceremonial swords and military equipment, which would serve as presents for Air Commando and RAF aircrews at White City. While this was going on, Brigadier Brodies 14th Brigade were advancing to the Wuntho-Indaw railway where they managed to successfully attack the main bridge close to the Bonchaung Station, interdicting the 15th Division's lines of communication. To the northeast, Morris Force captured Myothit on April 9 and then continued to set up ambushes on the Bhamo-Lashio Road. Back at White City, Calvert decided to try and get behind the enemy from the flanks and hit them from the rear, pinning them against the stronghold's wire. On the night of April 16, the Nigerians prepared an ambush on the Mawlu-Henu road, subsequently killing 42 Japanese. Yet realizing his strike force had trapped 2000 Japanese, Calvert ordered his men to infiltrate forward while the West Africans at White City launched an attack. This was met by a vicious and chaotic Japanese response as Hayashi's men tried to break free. During these actions its estimated the Japanese suffered 700 casualties while Calvert suffered 70 men dead with 150 wounded. The last Japanese attack against White City occurred on April 17th. After this Calvert felt he could hold White City indefinitely, but Lentaigne was concerned with the looming monsoon season, so he ordered White City and Broadway to be abandoned on May 3rd in favor of a new stronghold codenamed Blackpool. The site chosen for Blackpool originally codenamed “Clydeside” was a stretch of hilly ground by the railway, near the village of Namkwin, some 32 km southwest of Mogaung. There was water and suitable places to build an airstrip and deploy the 25-pdr artillery guns when they got them. Beyond a large tract of paddy was a hill, which the troops christened “Blackpool Hill” which curved like the sharp-spined back of a wild boar, with the head down, fore-arms and legs extended sideways. The Blackpool position effectively blocked the railway and main road at Hopin, drawing closer to Stilwells forces. The 11th Brigade had already been dispatched to the north to establish Blackpool. The now rested 16th Brigade managed to capture the Indaw West airfield by April 27th, facing no opposition. Ferguson noted, “This second approach to Indaw was an anti-climax, and for two reasons. First, just before we went in we were told that even if we captured the airfield of Indaw West, no troops, no divisions would be available from India for flying in: all hands and the cook, it seemed, were tied up in the great battle for Manipur. We were to capture the field for two or three days and then to abandon it…. Secondly, it was early apparent that the birds had flown. The Queen's got right on to the airfield without a shot being fired.” Lentaigne also decided to abandon the Aberdeen stronghold, evacuating Ferguson's men along with other units. Meanwhile, by the end of April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had also decided that capture of Myitkyina was of vital importance to increase the Hump tonnage. This of course was heavily influenced by the new opportunity for land-based bombers in Chinese airfields to bomb Formosa, the Ryukyu islands, the philippines and the eastern Chinese coast. Now to capture the Moguang-Myitkyina area, Stilwell would receive the Ramgarh-trained 30th Division,the 50th and 14th Divisions, all of which were airlifted over the Hump in April. Stilwell's plan was to drive down the Mogaung valley on Kamaing with such vigor as to persuade General Tanaka that this was the principal effort. The final directive on the 23rd, was for the 22nd Division to attack, rather than hold, and to swing the 64th and 65th Regiments around General Tanaka's left flank, while the 66th Regiment fought down the road. Once again the 112th was told to block off Kamaing from the south. The orders directed the "22nd and 38th to be in Pakhren and Lawa areas by April 27. As Stillwell would remark in his diary “Now I've shot my wad,". Meanwhile the Marauder-Chinese force, now codenamed End Run would sneak east over the Kumon Range to attack Myitkyina directly. Tanaka's mission at this point was to hold Kamaing with all his strength until the rainy season while the 53rd Division, led by Lieutenant-General Kono Etsujiro moved to reinforce him. Elements of the 53rd Division began to sprinkle into the Indaw Area, but the Japanese HQ for northern Burma, from the newly activated 33rd Army led by Lt General Honda Masaki could not decide to commit them towards either Kamaiang or Myitkyina. Thus Tanaka's hopes for a counterattack were lost. Tanaka received two understrength regiments, the 146th and 4th in April and May, both of whom had suffered terrible losses against the Chindits the previous month. By mid-April General Sun's 38th Division was assembling in front of Tingring with the 114th regiment locked down in a fight with Tanaka's 55th regiment. After a visit to the Sun's command post on April 11th, Stilwell wrote in his diary: "At least it looks like a start! The piled-up inertia is terrible. . . ." On the next day the 114th Regiment relieved the 113th on the line of three villages all named Tingring. This move placed the 114th and 112th in line, the 112th to the east forming with its lines a small salient about Nhpum Ga. The 114th Regiment was operating in rugged terrain which was almost as much an obstacle as the delaying positions directly about Kamaing defended so skillfully by the Japanese. On at least one occasion the 114th lost its way and had to be located by aerial reconnaissance. The battle raged so heavily, it forced the 55th regiment to pull back, while the 114th regiment fought a Japanese rearguard from Hill 1725. By April 20th, they finally secured Tingring and quickly began a march south. On April 23, Stilwell ordered Liao to commence the drive south from Warazup, with the 22nd Division trying to make their way along Tanaka's extreme left flank. The Chinese forces were advancing slowly however, very apprehensive because Chiang Kai-Shek had ordered Generals Sun and Liao to be as cautious as possible. And that is all for today on the Burma front as we now need to jump over to New Guinea. The last time we were talking about New Guinea, General Shoge's 239th regiment at Madang were getting ready to cover the continued Japanese retreat to Hansa and Wewak. On the other side, General Vasey's men were in hot pursuit. To the east, the 58th/59th battalion and Shoge's 3rd Battalion were patrolling extensively in the Bonggu-Melamu area, playing a sort of game of hide and seek. Several patrols just missed one another in the Wenga, Barum, Damun, Rereo and Redu areas. There were also several clashes. For instance, on March 26, reports from local natives and police boys indicated that the Japanese were again approaching Barum, which had become the main trouble area, from the direction of Damun just to the north. Both sides engaged one another with fire, particularly mortar bombs, but the brush was a cursory one with neither side gaining any advantage. Exchange of fire and a few sporadic attacks by the Japanese continued for about five hours from 5 p.m. While Corporal Tremellen, in the leading section, was moving among his weapon-pits, with a Bren gun in his left hand and two magazines in his right, he was attacked but, not being able to bring his Bren into action, he bashed the Japanese over the head with the Bren magazines. This Japanese thus had the distinction of probably being the only one to be killed by the Bren magazine rather than what was inside it. This would all last until April 11th, when the Japanese had finally withdrawn back to Madang. To the west, the 57/60th Battalion departed from Kwato on April 5 to rapidly secure Aiyau. From there they immediately sending patrols towards the Bogadjim Plantation. At this point, however, General Morshead had finally decided that it was time for Vasey's 7th Division to get some rest, so General Boase's 11th Division would assume responsibility for all units in the Ramu Valley and the Finisterres on April 8. Over at Atherton, General Herring had also retired in February, so General Savige had been appointed to command his 1st Corps. When recommending Savige's appointment Blarney had written to the Minister for the Army: “Two officers have been considered for this vacancy, Major-General S. G. Savige and Major-General G. A. Vasey. Both have been very successful in command in New Guinea operations, and I have some difficulty in determining the recommendations to be submitted, since each is capable and very worthy of advancement to higher responsibilities. Having regard to their respective careers, however, I recommend that Major-General S. G. Savige be appointed.” The significance of Blameys final sentence is a matter for speculation. It could hardly refer to past careers since Vasey's experience in command was wider than that of Berryman, a contemporary who had recently become a corps commander, and no less than Savige's. Alongside this Blamey also decided to do a changeover of corps HQ, seeing Savige take over 2nd Corps in the New Guinea front On April 10, the 57/60th then managed to break through the Japanese bridge positions to the high ground beyond at Bau-ak while patrols reconnoitered Bwai on the Gori River. The attack on the 10th on the enemy position at Bridge 6—two step heavily-timbered spurs running down from each side of the Ioworo River and making a defile was described by Hammer as "a textbook operation and in actual fact it developed perfectly " . One platoon advanced down the road to "fix" the enemy positions while the remainder of the company encircled the enemy position to come in from the high ground to the north . In the first encounter the leading platoon lost two men killed and two wounded. While it engaged the enemy with fire the rest of the company with Lieutenant Jackson's platoon in the lead clambered into position and , later in the day, clashed with the enemy in a garden area on one of the spurs. For a while the Japanese held on, but the pressure of the Australians and the accurate fire from Private Hillberg's Bren in an exposed position in the enemy's rear forced them to withdraw . Towards dusk an Australian patrol moved down a track towards the road where a small Japanese band was found to be still resisting with machine-gun fire . The Australians did not attack for they were sure that the enemy would disappear during the night. As expected there were no signs of the Japanese next morning at Bridge 6 only bloody bandages and bloodstains on the tracks to remind the Australians of yesterday's fight. McCall occupied the area and sent patrols forward to Bau-ak, the last high ground overlooking Bogadjim. Two days later, Brigadier Hammer sent strong patrols forward to Bogadjim and Erima, which found no enemy resistance in front and managed to secure both important hubs by April 15. At this point, while the 18th Brigade began to be evacuated back to Australia, Brigadier Hammer decided to withdraw the 58th/59th Battalion and the 2/2nd Commando Squadron, as the 57/60th would be the only one to continue the advance to Madang. On April 17, however, General MacArthur instructed Savige that a brigade from General Ramsay's 5th Division should relieve the 32nd Division at Saidor in preparation for the Hollandia-Aitape operation's, so the 8th Brigade and portions of the 30th Battalion would be flown to Saidor five days later. Thus the 300 odd troops were carried over to Bogadjim as Savige ordered the 15th BRigade to rest up and for the 30th battalion to take Madang. Hammer was anxious to get there first, so he had immediately dispatched patrols to Amele and Madang on April 20th. Shoge was able to fully evacuate Madang and join his comrades as they fled for Hansa. Amele was secured by the 24th, but the Australians would find it very difficult to cross the Gogol River afterwards. After this the 30th battalion and Hammer's patrols landed at Ort and resumed their advance. Both units cleared the Japanese from the Huon Peninsula, before entering an abandoned Madang. During the Australian advance an enemy mountain gun fired a dozen shells, and there was a sudden burst of machine-gun fire and a couple of grenade explosions from somewhere in the Wagol area. The machine-gun fire did not appear to be directed at the Australians and the shells from the gun landed out to sea. In all probability this was the final defiant gesture by the rearguard of the 18th Army as it left its great base of Madang which had been in Japanese hands since 1942. Madang had been heavily hit by Allied air attacks and possibly some demolitions had been carried out by the retreating Japanese. The airfield was cratered and temporarily unserviceable; the harbor was littered with wrecks, but although the two wharves were damaged they could be repaired and Liberty ships could enter the harbor. The Australian advance through the Markham, Ramu and Faria Valleys was a tremendous ordeal. The 7th division suffered between September 18, 1943 and April 8, 1944 204 killed and 464 wounded while it was estimated the Japanese suffered 800 killed, 400 wounded and 800 died from disease. The occupation of Madang ended the Huon Peninsula and Ramu Valley campaigns. Meanwhile, the remainder of the 5th Division assembled at the Madang-Bogadjim area, fanning out patrols to the west and sending small detachment of the 30th Battalion to land on small islands off the coast, preparing a future advance against Alexishafen. Shoge's detachment rejoined its parent division, the the 41st Division over at the Hansa area, allowing General Katagiri's 20th Division to continue their advance to Wewak. The 51st Division who had already arrived at Wewak got to watch the allied airshow as Hansa and Wewak we bombed without mercy, seeing countless barges destroyed. This would hamper Katagiri's efforts to cross the Ramu and Sepik Rivers. Meanwhile General Nakai came across an alternative route in late April known as the Wangan-Garun–Uru-Kluk-Bien-Marienburg-Kaup route. This allowed the 20th Division to resume their march to Wewak. On April the 29th a barge carrying Katagiri was intercepted by a PT boat. General Katagiri was killed in the engagement, leaving Nakai to assume formal command of the Division. After May 1, the 41st Division then began to follow Nakai's route across the river, with all Japanese units leaving Hansa by May 15th and finally arriving at Wewak at the end of May after a 20-day movement. Meanwhile General Adachi's plan for the coming weeks of April was for the 20th Division to immediately head towards Aitape, while the 51st Division would reinforce Hollandia once the 41st Division had reached Wewak. As such, a force was created around the 66th regiment led by Major-General Kawakubo. They were dispatched on April 19th, but would fail to arrive on time and would have to turn back to defend Wewak. Additionally, Adachi personally sent a part of his units under direct command to reinforce Hollandia. Now after the neutralization of Hollandia and the Palaus, General Teramoto's remaining air units would have to move over to Manado and Genjem on April 15th, leaving only 25 serviceable aircraft from Major-General Inada Masazumi's 6th Air Division at Hollandia. After April 3rd, although plagued by bad weather, the 5th Air Force virtually owned the air over Hollandia. There would be only one resurgence of air opposition, on April 11th. The Japanese 14th Air Brigade staged a small fighter force to Wewak which, despite the loss of a Tony to the 8th Fighter Squadron, shot down three P-47s of the 311th Fighter Squadron, a new organization that had lately arrived from the United States and had only begun operations at Saidor on April 7. The enemy force perhaps had withdrawn to Hollandia by the next day, because some twenty enemy fighters pounced on a straggling B-24 there and shot it down. Aerial gunners of the 403rd Bombardment Squadron claimed destruction of one of the interceptors, and the 80th Fighter Squadron claimed eight others destroyed. In this action, Captain Richard I. Bong scored his twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh aerial victories, thus topping the score of twenty-six victories established by Rickenbacker in World War I. Promoted the same day to major, Bong was taken out of combat and returned to the United States on temporary duty at the suggestion of General Arnold, who feared adverse reaction among younger pilots if Bong were to be lost in combat after establishing such a record. Three were also small night attacks, combining 5th Air Force Liberators with Navy PB4Y's and Catalinas, made against Wakde Island during the early morning hours of 6, 13, and 16 April. These attacks seem to have been more profitable than similar missions against the Sentani airfields, probably because Wakde was only a small island easily identified by radar and so jammed with military objectives that a hit anywhere would be damaging. A captured Japanese diary recorded that the 6 April raid killed eleven men, destroyed a barracks, cratered the runway in five places, and destroyed or severely damaged ten planes. A daylight attack against Wakde by seven squadrons of Liberators was scheduled for 6 April, but weather forced its cancellation. The 24th and 41st Divisions were also carrying out their last rehearsals for Operation Reckless. Allied ground and amphibious forces had been engaged in final preparations and training for the coming assault and, on 8, 9, and 10 April, had undertaken last rehearsals. The 24th Division's rehearsal at Taupota Bay, on the coast of New Guinea south of Goodenough Island, was incomplete. Little unloading was attempted, and the area selected did not permit the employment of naval gunfire support. The 41st Division had a more satisfactory rehearsal, with realistic unloading and naval fire, near Lae, New Guinea. The Final loading began on April 10th, with the LCIs leaving their loading points six days later in order to allow the troops aboard to disembark at the Admiralty Islands for a day of exercising, resting, and eating. Ships carrying the Persecution Task Force, meanwhile, moved out of the Finschhafen area on April 18 and on the same day rendezvoused with the vessels bearing the 41st Division towards the Admiralties. All convoys under Admiral Barbey then moved north around the eastern side of the Admiralties and, at 7:00 on April 20th, the various troops assembled at a rendezvous point northwest of Manus Island. Thus, all seemed ready for the beginning of another amphibious assault. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Imperial Japanese Army tossed a final hail mary attempt to improve the war situation with the grand Ichi-Go offensive. If they could manage to seize their objectives, this would perhaps give them a better hand at the negotiating table. Because the allies certainly would not be keen on having to liberate most of China, it was a very bold strategy.
General MacArthur's multi-city state funeral concluded in Norfolk, VA on April 11, 1964. Join MacArthur Memorial historians Amanda Williams and Jim Zobel for a discussion of the events and logistics associated with this final salute to General MacArthur. Follow us on:Twitter: @MacArthur1880; @AEWilliamsClarkFacebook: @MacArthurMemorialwww.macarthurmemorial.org
Last time we spoke about General Douglas MacArthur's operations against western New Guinea Operation Desecrate One, and the death of Admiral Koga. MacArthur unleashed hell from the skies above against Hollandia and other key target in the Western parts of New Guinea. Accompanying this was Operation Desecrate One, a carrier raid against Palau followed by strikes on Yap and Woleai in the eastern Carolines, in order to prevent the Japanese from reinforcing Western New Guinea. Lastly the commander in chief of the IJN, Admiral Koga, like his predecessor, met his end at the hands of an aircraft crash. But the Japanese had not just lost their commander in chief, they also lost the Z Plan to the allies. The Z Plan documents were taken by Filipino guerillas and found their way to Nimitz who would put them to good use in the future battle of the Philippine sea. This episode is the Battle of Kohima Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. We are back in the exciting Burma Front to start off this podcast. The Japanese attack against Imphal was being directed by the ambitious and to be frank, quite insane General Mutaguchi Renya. Mutaguchi sought to seize Imphal by a combination of guile, dislocation and surprise. Mutaguchi needed to destroy the British-Indian army at Imphal while also cutting off their rear escape at Kohima. Operation U-Go, was not Go-ing very well, yet I made a pun. The Indian troops were digging their heels in, providing much more resistance than expected. Added to this the Chindits unleashed Operation Thursday, delivering a dangerous thrust into the Japanese flank. Now last we left off, the Japanese 33rd and 15th divisions were launching their first attacks against Imphal, while General Sato's 31st division advanced northwest upon Kohima. Sato's intentions were to cut off the British-Indian defenders by taking Kohima and seizing the vast depots and stores of Dimapur. To defend Kohima and Dimapur, General Slim had given the task to Major-General Robert, whose HQ was at Dimapur. Robert had the Kohima Garrison at his disposal, roughly 2500-strong men led by Colonel Hugh Richards since March 22nd, built around the 1st Assam Regiment. The 1st Assam Regiment was led by Lt Colonel William Felix “Bruno” Brown, and they had orders to “fight to the last man” at the Jessami-Kharasom position. Now relief was going to be provided by Lt General Montagu Stopford whose 33rd corps, formed around the 5th and 7th indian divisions and British 2nd division arrived in early april. Stopford planned to concentrate his men at Jorhat, about 105km north-east of Dimapur, where they could be ready to launch a counterstroke against Dimapur. A single brigade would be dispatched as soon as it arrived to defend the Nichugard Pass, about 13km south-east of Kohima on the road to Dimapur. They would support the 161st Brigade already at Dimapur and the 23rd Long Range Penetration Brigade of Brigadier Lancelot Perowne was going to reinforce Kohima by April 12th. Lancelot's group would disrupt and cut the Japanese lines of communication back to the Chindwin. Meanwhile, General Yamauchi's 15th division and General Sato's 33rd division were on their way towards the Imphal-Kohima road. South of them was the Honda Raiding Unit, built around the 3rd Battalion of the 67th Infantry Regiment. Their job was to cut off the road at the Kangpokpi Mission in the Ukhrul area. Luckily for Honda and his men, they were able to dodge the catastrophic battle at Sangshak. His unit would reach the road by the 28th, blowing up a bridge near Kangpokpi. There were other units performing similar roles, such as Colonel Matsumura Hiroshi's 60th regiment who were given the task of cutting off the road at Satarmaina. After the Battle of Sangshak, the Hiroshi's Unit advanced through Lamu, Tongou, Shongphel, Nungga and Angam cutting the Imphal-Kohima Road at Satarmaina by April 3rd. There was also Colonel Omoto Kisaso's 51st regiment, who advanced against Hill 4950 by March 31st encountering little to no resistance. After this they advanced further and took Hill 4192 on April 1st. Up in the north, the 3rd battalion, 138th regiment had advanced through Layshi without much opposition while the bulk of the division approached Jessami. On the 26th, Colonel Torikai Tsuneo's 138th regiment crashed into defensive positions held by the 1st Assam Regiment who held their enemy at bay for 5 days. General Slim watched over the developments at Sangshak and Jessami with great interest. Then a unit captured Japanese order from Sangshak confirmed his worst fears. “Within a week of the start of the Japanese offensive, it became clear that the situation in the Kohima area was likely to be even more dangerous than that at Imphal. Not only were the enemy columns closing in on Kohima at much greater speed than I had expected, but they were obviously in much greater strength.” Slim had expected a strike against Kohima by a Japanese regiment, but the entire 31st Division was on its way. “We were not prepared for so heavy a thrust. Kohima with its rather scratch garrison and, what was worse, Dimapur with no garrison at all, were in deadly peril.” Luckily, the rapid arrival of the 161st Brigade at Dimapur and the dispatch of the 33rd Corps to reinforce Kohima could give him a fighting chance. Both locations received attacks on the 26th, and over the next five days both units held their own. But they had lost communications with Kohima, and recall orders could not be issued. A American colonel flew a Piper Cub to airdrop orders, which Brown finally received on the 31st. Brown pulled back April 1st, but Lt Young never got the message. On his own ordered his men out. “I shall be the last man,” he declared, and with difficulty got his company moving toward Kohima. No one ever saw Young alive again, nor was his body identified. The 1st battalion, 58th regiment had also been dispatched from Ukhrul on the 24th and would cut the Imphal-Kohima road at Tuphema by March 30th. After the disastrous battle at Sangshak, General Miyazaki ordered a battalion to head over to Pulomi, while the 3rd battalion, 58th regiment advanced to Kohima via Chakhabama and the rest of his unit advanced to Kohima using the road. Sato planned to launch a two-pronged assault against Kohima, with Colonel Fukunaga Ten's 58th regiment from the south while the 138th regiment swung around Naga village to cut off the Dimapur road. This saw a race to feed units into Dimapur before the Japanese arrived. The first units of Major General Grover 2nd division arrived in piecemeal to Dimapur between April 1st and 11th. They came by small-gauge steam train arriving at Dimapur in a panic. The undefended base area expecting attack at any moment and riven with rumors of the impending arrival of the Japanese. Stopfords men were still several days away by the end of March, prompting Slim to order Brigadier Dermot Warren's 161st brigade to rush over to Kohima. By April 3rd, Stopford established his HQ at Jorhat, where he made a disastrous blunder. Stopford at this point was still under the belief the Japanese main objective was Dimapur. He had some false intelligence indicating Japanese units were at any moment in the process of outflanking Kohima. With this knowledge he ordered 161st to evacuate Kohima immediately. For the units currently at Kohima, they could not believe the order. Warren, Colonel Hugh Richards and the civilian Deputy Commissioner, Charles Pawsey - were aghast at, and vehemently protested the decision. When told that the Japanese were outflanking Kohima to the north Pawsey scoffed, retorting that if true, 'my Nagas would have told me'. Major General Ranking, believing that Stopford was making a mistake, went over the head of his new superior officer and called Slim directly by telephone to petition him to leave Warren at Kohima. General Slim, perhaps unwilling to overrule Stopford, and in any case as convinced as Stopford that Dimapur was the Japanese objective, confirmed Stopford's original order. Warren's 161st Brigade, which had been in the process of organizing the desperately needed defense of the ridge, left Kohima virtually undefended only one day before Japanese attacks began. Had Warren's men been allowed to remain where they were the trauma of the siege that followed would have been much reduced and the stranglehold that Sato was able to maintain on the vital road to Imphal for two long months would have been significantly weaker than it turned out to be. Thus reluctantly, Warren pulled his men back towards Nichugard Pass, leaving only Colonel Richards with the original garrison. Meanwhile Sato's unit were rapidly advancing through the mountainous terrain of the Naga Hills. Japanese and INA reconnaissance patrols were able to help the unit forage for food on the go, adding to their speed. Perhaps they took some time to eat turtle eggs like Wingate advised. Sorry just had to bring up that weird one, been stuck on my mind. On the morning of April 4th, the 58th regiment began assaulting the southern edge of Kohima at GPT ridge while Miyazaki's other units were advancing through the hills and valleys leading into Kohima from the east. Colonel Hugh Richard alerted Stopford of the Japanese assault, who immediately realized his grave error. Stopford desperately sent Warren's men back over to Kohima. Yet only 446 men of the 4th Royal West Kents would manage to get to Kohima in time to help her garrison. They dug in on Kohima Ridge, which is really a series of hills running north-south along the road to Imphal. Gently sloping saddles connect each feature. Since development as a supply base a year earlier, some of its various hills had become known by their function. From south to north, they were GPT “General Purpose Transport” Ridge, Jail Hill, DIS “Detail Issue Store”, FSD “Field Supply Depot”, Kuki Picquet, and Garrison Hill. A northwest extension of Garrison Hill housed a hospital and became known as IGH “Indian General Hospital” Spur. Thick woods, interspersed with the town's and base's structures, covered most of these hills. Garrison Hill was terraced and landscaped, and included the home, complete with clubhouse and tennis court of the deputy commissioner for the area, Charles Pawsey. The Imphal-Dimapur Road skirted the ridge to the east before turning west past Garrison Hill. Treasury Hill and a Naga Village settlement overlooked the ridge from the northeast; those heights also extended north to the hamlet of Merema. Southward loomed the imposing Pulebadze Mountain, whereas three miles to the west rose a knoll topped by the village of Jotsoma. Kohima Ridge thus was overlooked by surrounding heights: Pulebadze to the south, Jotsoma to the west, and the Naga Village/Merema to the east and northeast. The same night they dug in on the ride, Sato had just launched attacks against Garrison Hill. The remainder of the brigade were not able to get in and would remain on Jotsoma ridge to the west, where Warren had emplaced his mountain guns to support the defenders. On April the 5th, the action kicked up with Fukunaga's 58th regiment attacking from the south while a vanguard overcame the Shere Regiment's sentries on the Naga Hill to the north, successfully securing a place for their artillery at Naga village. 4 mountain guns would support Miyazaki's attack, also allowing the Japanese to seize the GPT ridge. In a surprise raid, elements of the 3rd battalion, 58th regiment were able to grab the old town part of Kohima and Treasury Hill. As a result of this, Miyazaki wrongly assumed the enemy had simply withdrawn from Kohima, so he ordered his men to begin an advance upon Cheswema. This in turn gave the defenders some time to reinforce their lines. Japanese pressure on the perimeter increased on the morning of April 6, with repeated attacks by the 58th Regiment on Jail Hill. Heavy artillery and mortar fire quickly denuded trees of their foliage, snapping branches and scattering jagged splinters to accompany the whine and hiss of exploding shrapnel. By 11am the surviving defenders were forced off Jail Hill and down into the steep valley through which ran the road, and then up into the relative safety of the trees on DIS Hill, where Major Shaw's C Company were desperately digging in. The Japanese attack was relentless and, although they secured Jail Hill dominating the south-eastern edge of the Kohima Ridge, they suffered extensive casualties, including Captain Nagaya, the commander of 3rd battalion, 58th Regiment, who was killed. Major Donald Easten was also ordered to retake Jail Hill with D Company, 4th Royal West Kents, but by now the Japanese had already dug deeply into the hillside and could not be ejected without considerable expenditure of life. Easten took his company and dug them in around FSD Hill. Since Jail Hill dominated the southern edge of the ridge defensive lines, the disappearing tree cover quickly became a problem for the defenders who were becoming more and more visible to the enemy. It got some bad, the defenders were soon forced to only move positions at night. A company of the 4/7th Rajputs were able to reinforce Kohima by the end of the night, yet overall now 2500 defenders were surrounded by over 15,000 Japanese. The lost of GPT and Jail Hill also meant the defenders had lost access to water, excluding a small spring on Garrison Hill. Richards was forced to limit the men to a single pint of water per day. On the night of the 6th, a company of the 2nd Battalion, 58th Regiment launched a frontal attack against DIS Hill screaming wildly. The fire from the awaiting Royal West Kents scythed into the attackers, as did bombs from Sergeant Victor King's mortars, landing within meters of the West Kent positions. Miyazaki kept sending more and more men, until some infiltrated the defenders positions ending in a confused hand to hand combat brawl. By dawn on the 7th, a counterattack from FSD Hill would be broken by the ferocious Japanese machine-gun and artillery fire. Sergeant-Major Haines led a spirited attack against these positions, dashing 37 meters up the hill with a mixed group of West Kents and Gurkhas, bayonets fixed and lobbing grenades amongst the bashas. Those Japanese who ran were cut down by waiting Bren guns; those who stayed put were burned alive as the thin structures caught fire. The bakery, whose large brick ovens in peacetime produced several thousand loaves of bread each day, was more impervious to these tactics, but combat engineers destroyed the doors with the help of large quantities of gun cotton. Instead of merely blowing in the doors the ensuing explosion destroyed the entire building, only the brick ovens inside withstanding the blast. Escaping Japanese were brought down by rifle fire. Unusually, two Japanese soldiers were taken prisoner, and although one died later of his wounds, the other provided details about the strength and dispositions of the attacking forces. Captain Shiro Sato, Nagaya's successor in charge of 3rd, 58th Regiment, was killed. Over 60 Japanese were killed in this struggle alone, leading the men to mutter among themselves that this was a worse ordeal than Sangshak. One of the problems now encountered by the men of C and D Companies of the Royal West Kents was the fact that hundreds of bodies lay littered across the position, some of friends but mostly of Japanese, attracting clouds of slow-moving bluebottles that feasted on the carpet of corpses covering the ground. Attempts were made to remove bodies where it was possible, but snipers and the sheer number meant that it was not possible to dispose of them all. As the days went by the effects of artillery bombardment dispersed some of the remains, with the result that DIS Hill became an unpleasant place to defend at best, and injurious to health at worst. The West Kents attempted to burn the bodies at night, but this had a poor effect on morale as the appalling smell of burning flesh drifted across the position. Where they could, the Japanese cremated their dead. Realizing his enemy was strongly entrenched, Miyazaki now decided to order his 3rd battalion to turn back. Meanwhile the bulk of Torikai's forces were just reaching the battlefront, so Miyazaki ordered his 1st battalion to reinforce their attack. Sato was under the belief they would be capturing the ridge at any moment, so he ordered Torikai to cut off the Kohima-Dimapur road, within the vicinity of Zubza. Sato also dispatched the reserved 124th regiment to Cheswema to get ready for an operation in the north. Torikai's 2nd battalion advanced into the Dzuzu valley, and their 6th company occupied Zubza, effectively cutting off Warren's base at Jotsoma. During that night the Japanese launched both real and 'jitter' attacks against the southern perimeter. During the next morning it was discovered, Japanese soldiers had infiltrated back onto DIS Hill during the confusion of the night, placing soldiers and a machine gun in a bunker on the top of the hill. Despite the Japanese machine guns posted on top of the hill, a hero would emerge to knock them out. A fearless 29-year-old Lance-Corporal John Harman demonstrated the type of behavior that was to lead within days to the award of a Victoria Cross, and his death. Realizing that the Japanese machine gun could cause untold damage if unchecked he crawled alone up the hill, standing up at the last minute to charge the Japanese-held bunker. Miraculously the enemy fire tore into the empty air above his head, and Harman reached the bunker door, coolly extracted the pin from a grenade, released the firing lever, counted to three, on a four-second fuse and lobbed it inside. The occupants were killed instantly and Harman returned triumphant with the captured machine gun down the hill to the cheers of his comrades. The Japanese would launch attacks through the day, gradually pushing the defenders up the hills towards Kohima. General Mutaguchi then personally ordered Sato to continue past Kohima and seize Dimapur. Now Sato and Mutaguchi did not get along well, but he reluctantly obeyed the command, sending his 3rd battalion, 138t regiment along the Merema track to Bokajan. Yet all of a sudden General Kawabe, countermanded the order and instead ordered Sato's battalion to rapidly be recalled. This was one of those famed “what if” moments. What if Sato had turned a Nelsonian blind eye to the counter order, or if he had delayed its official receipt for another 24 hours? Sato was apparently happy to obey Kawabe and withdraw to Kohima partly because his deep-seated animosity toward Mutaguchi led him to assume the army commander's demands were motivated solely by visions of military glory. Sato's hatred of Mutaguchi blinded him to the strategic possibilities offered by continuing his offensive through to Dimapur, and lost for the Japanese a crucial opportunity for victory in 1944. The failure to secure Dimapur while the British were in a state of confusion at the speed and scale of Mutaguchi's march on Delhi was indeed, as General Slim recognized, one of the great missed opportunities of the Burma war. It led directly to the failure of the Kohima thrust, and contributed to the collapse of the entire Operation. It was the consequence of Sato's lack of strategic imagination, framed by Kawabe's rejection of what he regarded as an attempt by Mutaguchi to secure for himself undying glory. What he and Sato for that matter failed entirely to see was that Mutaguchi was right. The capture of Dimapur might have been the decisive strategic movement of the campaign leading to a dramatic worsting of the British reminiscent of Malaya and Burma in 1942. Despite the megalomania and terrible planning on Mutaguchi's part for even initiating Operation U-GO, to not try and make it work was even more criminal. On the morning of the 9th, the Japanese once again managed to infiltrate the DIS Hill and again corporal Harman lept into action and mounted a solo attack to remove the threat. Covered by two Bren guns firing from his left and his right, Harman dashed up the hill. Frantically the Japanese returned fire but in their excitement fired wide. Harman reached the trench and, standing 4 meters to its front and firing his Lee Enfield from the hip, shot four Japanese dead, before jumping into the trench and bayoneting the fifth. He then stood up, triumphantly holding the captured enemy machine gun above his head, before throwing it to the ground. The cheers of his comrades reverberated around the hill. Harman then nonchalantly began to walk back down the slope. Unfortunately he had forgotten that with the denuded foliage he was in full view of the Japanese positions on Jail Hill. Unheeding of the shouted cries of his comrades to run, he leisurely made his way back down to his weapon pit, only to be struck by a burst of machine-gun fire in his back just as he reached safety. Donald Easten ran out into the Japanese fire, and dragged Harman into a trench. Within a few minutes, however, this extraordinarily brave man was dead. On that day, Warren dispatched the 1/1st Punjabs to break through towards Kohima, but they ran into a number of log-covered bunkers at Piquet Hill, held by the 6th Company, 138th Regiment. The Japanese fired upon them causing 25 casualties by the day's end. Upon the ridge the killing continued. Large numbers of fiercely brave Japanese from the 58th Regiment were killed by the remorseless chatter of the British Bren guns, as during the night three successive assaults were made on C and D Companies of the Royal West Kents, the Japanese being denied success by the interlocking fire of eight Bren guns, whose red-hot barrels had to be changed repeatedly. Casualties on both sides were high, the Japanese attempting to gain access to the hill from the road by use of ladders, seemingly unperturbed by their losses. On the northern side of Garrison Hill the 138th Regiment again launched attacks against A Company. The attack was held, Bren guns, bayonets and grenades in the darkness bloodily halting Japanese ambitions. Victor King's mortars fired in support, the bombs landing with superb accuracy in front of Maj. Tom Kenyon's positions. It had seemed for a while that sheer weight of numbers would overwhelm the much-reduced A Company, but the reliable Brens, considerable reserves of grenades, the accuracy of King's mortars and the determined courage of the Royal West Kents denied the penetration so desperately desired by the Japanese. Low on ammunition and suffering heavy casualties, the decision was made to abandon DIS and FSD Hill's on the night of the 10th. To make matters worse the monsoon rains had come early, and heavy, driving rain on 10th, together with the effects of battle and of sleep deprivation, had pushed men to the edge of exhaustion. Tea was rationed to half a mug per man. Fortunately, the rain somewhat made up for the acute lack of water within the perimeter, men lying back in their weapon pits and trenches to allow the rain to fall directly into parched, open mouths. It was found that a trickle of water was available from a pipe leading onto the road behind the ADS, behind the Japanese positions. Dangerous nightly journeys were made, through hundreds of wounded lying in the open, down the slope to the road, to fill hundreds of water bottles. The exhausted men made their way off the hills under Japanese sniper and mortar fire. On the 11th, A company over at Garrison Hill were still managing to hold strong against numerous assaults over the tennis court. During the night they were relieved by B company. Meanwhile Grover had finally assembled his 2nd division at Dimapur and dispatched the Cameron Highlanders and 2nd battalion, Durham light infantry with Lee-Grant tank support to open a road back up to Warren's HQ. The next day, while B company was repelling more assault, the 1st battalion, 58th regiment advanced upon Jotsoma from Pulomi, but could not penetrate through the defensive line. At the same time, the 3rd Battalion, 138th Regiment advanced to Khabvuma, though and was likewise unable to break through towards the Kohima-Dimapur Road. On the 13th, which would become known to the besieged British garrison as “black thirteenth”, B company continued to resist suicidal Japanese assaults across the tennis court, Japanese artillery managed to kill many men atop the IGH Spur. Casualties were mounting, the Royal West Kents had lost a total of 150 men by this point. 3 Dakotas had tried air supplying, but they accidentally dropped atop the Japanese position on Kohima Ridge. Over at FDS Hill, the situation was quite desperate as the Japanese were squeezing the British from the ridge and to prevent them from using the supplies raining from the sky. Captain Mitchell of the Rajputs was killed on the morning of 12th, and furious counterattacks against the Japanese who had infiltrated amongst C and D Companies of the Royal West Kents failed to remove the intruders; A Company, after their short rest on Kuki, now moved to support C and D Companies. That night the Japanese attempted to rush FSD Hill. The defenders were ordered to wait until they could see the whites of the Japanese eyes before opening fire. During a lull in the fighting Private Peacock from A Company dropped off, exhausted with fatigue. When he came round he discovered that he was sharing his trench with a Japanese officer who had assumed that Peacock was dead. Unable to find his rifle Peacock leapt at the officer and strangled him after a fierce struggle with his bare hands. Then, to make sure, he ran him through with the man's own sword By the 14th, the Assam Rifles relieved B company over at Garrison Hill, where Richards commemorated his remaining men for the bulwark defense. “By your efforts you have prevented the Japanese from attaining this objective. All attempts to overrun the garrison have been frustrated by your determination and devotion to duty…”. Meanwhile a patrol of the 4/7th Rajputs had advanced up the western valley. The patrol had the unfortunate result of raising some expectations of relief on the ridge. To the fighting men still desperately resisting every Japanese encroachment this made little difference to their lives. Instead, life and death continued their seemingly arbitrary, parallel journeys. The shattered hillside was now almost bare of foliage, the remaining trees standing forlornly, others leaning drunkenly where shells had smashed the trunk or branches. The ground was a churned morass of mud, which the defenders shared with rotting corpses, excrement and the inevitable detritus of war: scattered equipment, discarded helmets, broken weapons and unexploded shells. Yet the troops all knew that they had achieved a remarkable feat of endurance, and resistance. On the 15th the 1/1st Punjabs had finally broken through Piquet Hill and reopened the road to the garrisons perimeter. By the 16th, the 5th Brigade linked up with Warren's troops for the first time.The Japanese did not let up at all. On the 17th, they finally seized FSD Hill and stormed Kuki Piquet, overcoming some depleted defenders with their sheer weight of numbers. It seemed the exhausted Kohima Garrison were doomed, now crammed into a small area. Then B Company, 1/1st Punjab with Lee-Grant tanks arrived on the 18th, just in time to give the boys a fighting chance. Under heavy Japanese sniper and artillery fire, Warren and Grover's men advanced towards the besieged ridge positions. The 1st battalion, Royal Berkshire regiment made it to Kohima on the 20th to relieve Richards spent garrison. On 19 April, the day before the first of the relieving troops made their way onto the position, Hurribombers strafed the Japanese positions, Dakotas dropped ammunition, water and food accurately on the ridge and the 25-pdrs of the 2nd Division pounded away relentlessly, firing from Zubza. The relief took place in the nick of time. The men of the 1st Battalion, Royal Berkshire Regiment, could not believe their eyes or noses as they climbed up onto Summerhouse Hill on the morning of April 20. Warned by anxious defenders to keep their heads down, many gagged at the repulsive smell of death and excrement that hung like a repressive fog over the position, weighing the hill down with the stench of horror. As Japanese bullets and shells continued to fall the weary veterans of the siege made their way down the gulleys adjacent to the IGH spur, strewn with Japanese corpses, to waiting trucks, guarded by the Lee/Grants. The fresh relief troops on the road were astonished by what they saw when the red-eyed, unshaven survivors made their way quietly out of the trees, but were in no doubt that they were witnessing the end of the first phase of one of the grimmest struggles of the entire war. The Indian troops called out 'Shabash, Royal West Kents!' in warm acknowledgement of what all the defenders of the Kohima Ridge had achieved, congratulating the tired, bearded scarecrows even as shells fell among the convoy, injuring some of the wounded again and killing some, even as they were being lifted into the trucks. As the trucks crawled down the pitted road towards Jotsoma, and then Zubza, before making their slow way down through the green mountains into hot, steamy Dimapur, the exhausted survivors had long collapsed into deep, delicious sleep. Their ordeal was over. After 16 days of brutal siege, 278 men had been killed or wounded in a small stand, but one that would prove decisive for the CBI theater. Yet that is all for today on the Burma front as we now need to hope over to the Admiralties. The campaign for the Admiralty islands was coming to an end, now General Swift's division just had to mop up the islands of Los Negros and Manus. Over on Los Negros, the 5th Cavalry at Papitalai had been pushing west towards the Papitalai Mission since March the 14th. They were still encountering heavy resistance, requiring support from heavy artillery and aerial bombardment. At 7:30am on the 15th, Troop A advanced after artillery and mortar concentrations, towards their third objective without any resistance. Troop A dug in there and Troop B sent out patrols 200 yards to the front. Yet still no opposition was encountered. Difficulties of supplying the troops over an extended supply line which consisted of 1 and a half miles of narrow, rutted, and slippery trail prevented further advance. Troop C, aided by a section furnished by the 82d Field Artillery Battalion, took 5 hours for a round trip. The 1st Squadron's last objective was the largest knob, Hill 260, on which it was now estimated were 100 well-entrenched Japanese. By the 17th, sufficient supplies had been brought up to enable Troop C, which had relieved Troop A, to push on toward this knob. After the usual artillery and mortar preparation, Troop C, protected in the rear by Troop B which was dug in on the third objective, advanced to within 50 yards of the hill crest before being stopped by machine-gun and rifle fire. Squadron commander Lt. Col. Charles E. Brady then dispatched Troop B north to envelop the enemy from his left flank. Although Troop B had to cut its way laboriously and noisily through the jungle, the envelopment was highly successful. The Japanese put up little resistance and both troops moved onto the hill and secured it by 1:10pm. About 40 or 50 dead Japanese were counted, although the total, which was impossible to determine in the jungle, was undoubtedly much higher. The 1st Squadron's losses in the day's attack were four killed and seven wounded. Meanwhile, patrols from the 12th cavalry had been going around inland in the region southwest of Papitalai Mission and Lombrum. They found more resistance than anticipated. After failing to connect the perimeters, Troops A and B were landed at Chaporowan Point on the 16th where more patrols advanced along the coast, also finding some resistance. Over on the Rossum Road, Troop F of the 7th cavalry were seeing their fare share of resistance at a position 800 yards down the road. Though the cavalrymen were able to push through to the northern edge of Old Rossum, the Japanese fought so hard, Troop F was forced to withdraw. Because of this action, the position was bombed on the 21st before a full assault was launched by the 1st Squadron, 7th cavalry. This time the cavalrymen were able to secure the northern edge of Old Rossum with the support of artillery and tanks. On the 23rd, the squadron pressed their attack, gradually edging through Old Rossum. To gain 1000 yards here the Americans suffered 68 casualties, then on the 24th they yet again had to withdraw undering increasingly heavy Japanese fire. Finally on the 25th, the 1st Squadron, 8th cavalry relieved the battered men. After a heavy artillery and aerial bombardment, the Japanese defenders were finally broken. That day saw the 8th cavalry suffered 7 dead, 29 wounded, for the Japanese it was close to 100. Overall the 2nd Brigade had suffered 36 deaths, 128 wounded in the week of fighting over the Rossum area, they estimated they had killed 200 Japanese. The 2nd Brigade would patrol inland for the next two months, penetrating deep jungles, swamps and high mountains. In the end they would count a total of 586 dead Japanese on Manus. Meanwhile General Chase ordered a brigade to complete the occupation of Los Negros on March 21st. The 1st Squadron, 5th cavalry and 2nd Squadron, 12th cavalry attacked southwest towards some highground, due west of Hill 260. Troop C of the 12th cavalry advanced towards Juarez Village, supported by Troop B who performed an encircling maneuver against the retreating enemy. The 2nd Squadron, 5th cavalry would manage to clear the southern portion of Los Negros with an assault against Palapi Hill. All of Chase's units were successful in their assaults, though they faced tough resistance. For the following days, the Japanese would fight back against the invaders and by the 25th, over 500 of them paid the price with their lives. Since February 19th, 1917 Japanese had died on Los Negros, while the 1st Brigade had suffered 143 killed and 408 wounded. There were also mop up operations against the outlying islands with the 1st Squadron, 7th cavalry landing on Pityilu island on the 30th; the 1st Squadron, 12th cavalry assaulted Koruniat and Ndrilo islands on the 1st of april and the 2nd Squadron, 12th cavalry attacked Rambutyo on the 3rd. The 7th cavalry faced heavy resistance from a 60 man garrison on Pityilu, the 12th cavalry found no Japanese on Koruniat and Ndrilo and only a handful of Japanese were found on Rambutyo. On the 9th of april, the 1st Squadron, 12th cavalry landed on Pak island and with that the liberation of the Admiralty islands was complete. In total, General Krueger reported 326 killed, 1189 wounded and 4 missing while also counting a total of 3280 Japanese killed and 75 captured. General Krueger would go on to partially explain the heavy enemy losses in the Admiralties operation were due to, "Our troops were gaining superiority on the ground against an enemy whose tactical knowledge envisioned only the offensive." Allied tactics of guaranteeing naval, air, and artillery superiority to the troops in each operation were making the heavy proportion of Japanese casualties an expected result in the Pacific. In the Admiralties invasion, fire from destroyers kept the enemy under cover during the landing and the artillery gave the troopers an enormous advantage against an enemy who possessed only two 75-mm mountain guns and one 70-mm howitzer. Bad weather had greatly restricted air operations during the first week after the invasion, and the weather probably accounted in part for the weakness of enemy air defense throughout the campaign; but the constant pounding of Japanese air bases within range of the Admiralties was a more important factor. General MacArthur's decision to send a limited number of men and ships to take an enemy stronghold far in advance of Allied-held territory, and within striking distance of enemy planes, had proved worth the risks involved. At a small cost, the neutralization of Rabaul and Kavieng was completed; and from the new base in the Admiralties, Allied air and naval forces could now launch surprise attacks on the Dutch New Guinea coast and could threaten essential enemy sea lanes within a 1500-mile radius including the Marianas, the east coast of Mindanao, and the southern limits of the Celebes Sea. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Fate had rolled her dice yet again, and the Japanese had lost another decisive moment whereupon they could have perhaps changed the entire war in the India-Burma front. Likewise General Douglas MacArthur gambled by attacking the Admiralty Islands, but it would pay off heavily. It seems the allies were winning with every hand dealt to them.
Last time we spoke about Operation Thursday and the ferocious counteroffensive on Bougainville. The Chindits embarked on their second great raid, this time better equipped, better trained and more numerous than ever. With a literal armada of beasts of burden they marched through Burma, forded the Chindwin and began attacking and establishing strongholds. This was all done in coordination with Slim and Stilwell's forces, trying to break the Japanese and gradually seize back lost territory. Wingate had his work cut out for him as the Chindits were providing real results, yet unfortunately he would not have long to see them. Wingate was killed in a B-25 crash and it felt like the personality of the Chindits left with him. Over on Bougainville the Japanese tossed as much as they could to try and break through the Americans perimeter to hit the airfield, but it was all for naught. This episode is the Bombing of Hollandia and Palau Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Operation Brewer saw General MacArthur tossing cavalrymen against the eastern side of Los Negros. General Swift's 1st Cavalry Division successfully landed on Los Negros and managed to secure Seedler Harbor quickly. After this, General Chase's 1st Brigade was given the task of mopping up the island. By march 11th daily patrols had determined that the entire area from the Mokerang Peninsula to Southeast Point and as far west as Porlaka was generally free of the enemy. The 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry pushed its perimeter at Momote west and south to the water barriers of Lemondrol Creek and Ihon Lagoon. The 12th Cavalry beachhead at Salami continuously patrolled into the interior and encountered so few Japanese that it was clear the enemy lacked sufficient numbers to harass the troops on the peninsula. West of Lemondrol Creek was a completely different story. While the troops holding the beachheads from Lombrum to Papitalai waited for supply channels to be established, they probed to locate the center of enemy resistance. The 12th Cavalry was responsible for the beachheads at Papitalai Mission and Lombrum. The 2nd Squadron had captured Papitalai Mission and on the 11th the 1st Squadron took over Lombrum Point, relieving the 7th Cavalry so they could attack Manus Island. The 5th Cavalry held the Papitalai perimeter with Troop F. When that regiment extended its control over the area east of Lemondrol and Porharmenemen Creeks on the 11th, the 2nd Squadron moved into the Porlaka area while the 1st Squadron on the left flank was concentrated near Southeast Point. It was planned that the 12th Cavalry would do most of its fighting in the northern sector moving inland from the coastal positions to cut oil the Japanese hammered at by the 5th Cavalry as it pushed west on both sides of Lemondrol Creek. Since the 8th, every Troop F patrol from Papitalai had run into enemy resistance in the hilly country to the west. Although small patrols of squad size or slightly larger were held up day after day by resistance about 800 yards west of Papitalai, these first encounters did not reveal the full strength of the enemy pocket. When an attack by a platoon of Troop E, reinforced by two tanks, two bazookas, and flamethrowers, was repulsed on the 11th, the strength of the enemy strongpoint became clearer. The enemy was well dug in along the ridge, marked by a series of knobs, running west from Papitalai. The highest point, Hill 260, about 2,500 yards from Papitalai, not to be mistaken for Hill 260 on Bougainville by the way, this was probably the center of the enemies defense. However, on two knobs east of 260, well-defended outposts prevented any movement farther into the interior. The position 800 yards from Papitalai which had repulsed Troop E was defended by a platoon with knee mortars and at least 3 machine guns. The total enemy strength facing the 5th Cavalry was estimated at 150 to 200 Japanese. Now that was the ongoings of Los Negros, but Brigadier General Verne Mudge's 2nd Brigade was now preparing to invade Manus island. American intelligence was unsure of the disposition of the enemy on Manus. A rough estimate was that 2700 Japanese were concentrated there and would most likely make a stand at Lorengau. The Americans expected the Japanese would put up a last losing fight. But because of the lack of knowledge of their numbers and disposition on the largest island of the Admiralties, this would require careful planning for the invasion. Fighting into the interior where the mountain range would provide defensive positions and through the swampy forests covering the rest of the island would not be easy. There were only 4 roads winding about the island and converging at Lorengau would be suitable for moving vehicles, and long stretches of these red-clay roads would be impassable in rainy weather. Surrounding jungle and swamps would confine any large-scale movement to the roads. Therefore, the plan was to pin the enemy to the coast where it was hoped he had concentrated his main strength. Mudge planned to land Troops A and C of the 8th cavalry regiment at the Yellow beaches of Lugos Mission. When the 8th Cavalry had secured a beachhead, including the Lugos Mission itself, each squadron would advance east, the 1st Squadron along the coast using the Number Three Road, and the 2nd along an inland road known as the Number One Road, to execute a wide sweep toward Lorengau. If a sizeable garrison was concentrated at fortified Lorengau, the inland arm of this attack would prevent the enemy from escaping along the only road leading west to the mountain areas. Prior to the assault, 3 patrols had been sent to Bear Point on Manus and on the islands of Butjo Luo and Hauwei. Mudge planned to deploy artillery at these places to aid in his assault. Bear Point was found to have no enemy, but unfortunately it was not a suitable place for artillery placement. The northern island of Butjo Luo was an excellent site for artillery and was found to be unoccupied. Hauwei would turn out to be another story. The American patrol moved out from Salami on an LCV and a PT boat, landing without opposition on the western end of the island. Major Carter S. Vaden of the 99th Field Artillery Battalion, threw two grenades into a well camouflaged bunker about 10 yards from the beach and the party progressed inland. Immediately after the grenade explosions, a mortar shell landed on the beach in the rear of the party. From three sides, machine-gun, rifle, and mortar fire opened up. Fortunately, the grenades had evidently sprung a planned ambush prematurely and the party was not cut off from the rear. Using their submachine guns, the men of the patrol were able to hold back the enemy. They were aided by some supporting fire from the PT Boat and the .30-caliber machine gun of the LCV. After 2 and a half hours they managed to withdraw to the water's edge. The PT boat had returned to its tender after the commanding officer was wounded, and the coxswain of the LCV shouted and motioned for the cavalrymen to get on board, but only five of them reached the boat, as the others were engaged with the enemy on shore. The LCV had troubles of its own; enemy mortar and machine-gun fire found its range and wounded all on board except two. Then the LCV grounded on submerged coral and sank 200 yards offshore after receiving a direct hit from a mortar. The wounded men, put into lifejackets, floated about in the water. When the remaining members of the patrol on shore were wading out toward the LCV, 6 Japanese attempted to set up a machine gun on the beach. The men cut them down with their submachine guns. Still under fire, the cavalrymen swam out to the survivors of the LCV, making a group of 18 men out in the water. Failing to attract the notice of the destroyers nearby, the tired men had to stay in the water for 3 hours until a PT boat picked them up. At the same time a destroyer closed in to the island to draw hostile fire and bombard enemy positions on the western end. Hauwei was going to need extra help to be secured. The 2nd Squadron, 7th cavalry departed from Lombrum Point on the 11th and landed on Butjo Luo. The next day, Destroyer gunfire and rockets as well as 105-mm concentrations from the 61st Field Artillery Battalion at Mokerang point battered Hauwei. Then Kittyhawks of the 77th Pursuit Squadron at Momote airfield bombed and strafed the Hauwei. After all of this, the 2nd Squadron landed on Hauwei meeting slight resistance at the beach. They advanced 300 yards further inland where they became pinned down by heavy rifle, machine gun and mortar fire. The Japanese were firing upon them from some bunkers, prompting the 2nd Squadron to dig in and allow the artillery teams to hit them throughout the night. During the night the 61st Field Artillery Battalion from the north end of Mokerang Plantation fired 1,000 rounds to harass the enemy. This fire was directed so accurately and carefully that it was brought down on the enemy within 100 yards of the cavalrymen's positions without any casualties to our troops, and helped minimize enemy activity during the night. At 10am on the 13th, with the support of a medium tank, the cavalrymen stormed the bunkers along the edges of the island. The Japanese put up a valiant fight, but they lacked anti-tank weaponry. By 12pm, the 2nd Squadron successfully mopped up the enemy, suffering 8 deaths and 46 wounded. They estimated they had killed 43 Japanese who were all naval personnel. Having secured the two islands, now one artillery battalion set up at Butjo Luo and two others upon Hauwei. The next day at 7:00am the 3 artillery battalions opened fire upon the Lorengau Township area. This target was chosen to divert the enemy's attention from the landing beaches around Lugos Mission. Meanwhile 4 destroyers bombarded Lorengau with their 5-inch guns. Then 18 B-25's from Nadzab bombed and strafed the Lugos Mission and the beach areas until H - 5 minutes. Between 9:07 and 9:25, they dropped 81 500-pound bombs, strafed with more than 44,000 rounds of machine-gun fire, and cleared the target just as the troops were coming ashore. The 8th cavalry departed Salami, heading for the Yellow Beaches covered by 3 rocket boats. The wave of buffaloes drew up to the beaches, and it appeared that they were going to make it without opposition until an enemy machine gun opened up from east of the landing beaches. Immediately the buffaloes responded with their own machine-gun fire, and two PT boats closed in to support. With 100 rounds from a flak boat added to this fire the machine gun was silenced. Two waves of landing craft followed the buffaloes to the shore in rapid succession and the narrow beaches, backed either by jungle or a high bluff, were soon congested with assault troops. On the eastern beach, Troop A began a vigorous drive toward Lugos Mission and the Number Three Road leading to the Lorengau airdrome. Captain Raymond J. Jennings, led the troops to storm the bluff where Lugos Mission was located and overran the mission before the few Japanese who had survived the bombardment could put up effective opposition. The men worked their way into the mission compound and cleared out the area with grenades. Troop A was soon on its way along Number Three Road leaving behind it, some 20 dead SNLF, without the loss of a single cavalryman. Meanwhile Troop C advanced west 800 yards to a ridge where they stopped and dug in, having accomplished their mission of establishing a defensive perimeter to protect the landing of successive elements. Other waves of the 1st and 2nd Squadrons began landing ashore as the 7th cavalry took up the beachhead. The 2nd squadron advanced over some ridges towards the Number One Road, while Troop A reduced enemy bunkers progressing roughly a mile from the beach. By 11:20am, they came across 3 mutually-supporting bunkers that halted their advance. It took Troop B's support alongside artillery and aerial bombardment to destroy the bunkers to they could advance. Meanwhile the 1st Squadron emerged out of the jungle into a clearing at 5pm, where they occupied a ridge overlooking the southern edge of the airdrome, where they would dig in. The 2nd Squadron reached Number One Road, where they ran into 3 bunkers. The following morning with tank support the squadron overran the bunkers and advanced northeast towards Lorengau. The cavalrymen would destroy 7 bunkers during their trek, before halting 100 yards before Lorengau. To the north, Troop A was clearing a coconut grove north of the airstrip, from which Japanese snipers were harassing them throughout the night. Troop C advanced along the southern edge near the airstip where they came across another pack of bunkers. Since the snipers north of the strip had been cleared out by noon, an attack could be made in the open. Troop B, supported by light tanks on their left advanced down the strip, followed by Troop D and the squadron HQ. Troop A advanced across the strip and then east along the north edge. By 1:00pm Troop C managed to destroy two bunkers using grenades, forcing the Japanese inhabitants to flee out into the open where they were cut down. Troop C then was about to dash across the airstrip when they suddenly became pinned down by friendly fire from Troop B who were trying to disengage the enemy before them. The 1st squadron suffered 9 deaths and 19 wounded during the action. Mudge then ordered them to relieve Troop C, who were holding some high ground south of the airstrip. On the morning of the 17th after extensive naval and artillery bombardment, Mudge launched a coordinated attack with the 2nd Squadron advancing south of the airstrip and the 1st Squadron assaulting the bunkers that had held up the 8th cavalry's advance. The bombardments had nearly annihilated the bunkers, allowing the 1st squadron to face only slight resistance. They soon attacked a secondary Japanese position further east upon a ridge. This position was also met with artillery and mortar fire and would fall by 11:30am. After this the cavalrymen were able to obliterate the remaining pillboxes and advance across the pulverized airstrip. Meanwhile the 2nd Squadron of the 7th and 8th cavalry regiments linked up along the Number One Road near Lorengau. The 8th Cavalry had encountered little resistance on the road, destroying whatever bunkers were encountered with the aid of fire from medium tanks. The light tank accompanying the squadron had a track blown off by the first Japanese anti tank mine encountered in the operation. By 1pm, all the front-line troops around the airstrip to Number one Road linked up forming a general advance. By this point the backbone of the enemies resistance had been broken, leaving little to resistance them. For the next 1,500 yards to the river, it took them 2 hours because the Japanese had hurriedly put in large quantities of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. They had been emplaced, however, with no prepared plan, and many were poorly camouflaged or left lying completely on the surface. The Japanese had also dug holes and refilled them without emplacing any mines. As the cavalrymen slowly made their way to the river, they suffered a few casualties from the mines. The 7th cavalry reached the Lorengau River by 3pm, from there they dispatched a reconnaissance platoon who quickly came under fire from bunkers atop some hills overlooking Lorengau. Lorengau was sheltered in a valley surrounded by jungle-covered hills rising to 400 feet. The Japanese believed an attack would come from the sea, thus many of their defenses were sited to cover the shoreline. The offshore approaches and the three roads entering the settlement from the east, south, and north were also covered by defensive positions. From the position held by the 2nd Brigade, the only approach to the town was over a sandbar at the mouth of the Lorengau River, a slow-moving stream 20 yards wide and 10 to 20 feet deep, except at the sandbar. The beach area, which the troops would then have to cross, was heavily protected. Naval demolition mines, containing 20 pounds of black powder and detonated by a master switch located in a control bunker up the hillside, covered the beach. About 100 yards inland from the beach a series of rifle pits and gun emplacements were constructed on the side of a dike which paralleled the shore. On the hills surrounding the harbor, beach, and town about a dozen heavy bunkers were used to reinforce the fires of beach defenses and to add depth to the position. As usual these bunkers were carefully camouflaged, although the concentration of naval and artillery fire as well as repeated bombings had disclosed the location of several. Mudge ordered the men to dig in for the night on the west bank of the river and establish a perimeter defense against some expected counterattacks that would not develop in the end. The next morning, after a mortar and artillery bombardment, the 2nd Squadron, 8th Cavalry advanced down from its ridge positions to the mouth of the broad river, with its Reconnaissance Platoon leading. Upon fording the river, the cavalrymen only faced a handful of machine-guns. Facing almost no opposition, the squadron was thus able to secure Lorengau, counting 87 dead Japanese in the remains of the town. Colonel Ezaki seemed to have disappeared during the battle over Papitalai leaving his men leaderless. The Japanese naval troops in desperation began retreating towards Rossum, with American patrols hot on their trail. There would be a furious fight down the Rossum Road. 1st Lt. James M. Concannon captured an enemy map of the area during his patrol to which he exclaimed, "Well, here goes Concannon to get himself a Purple Heart!" Lt. Concannon's platoon had been ordered to go along Number Two Road which went to Rossum and from there to Kelaua Harbor, through the heart of the Japanese defenses indicated on the captured map. Hardly had the platoon crossed the outpost line still held by Troop E along Number Two Road when it came under fire from a pair of bunkers sited to cover the track. Lieutenant Concannon and one of his men were wounded. The platoon sergeant assumed command and attempted to flank the position. When the attempt was not successful, the sergeant decided to withdraw and report, as his mission was one of reconnaissance. Upon receiving the information that the enemy was in position not 200 yards from the outpost line, Colonel Bradley directed Major Shore to send Troop A back up the track to neutralize the enemy position. The troop was reinforced with machine guns and two 37-mm antitank guns. Troop A of the 8th cavalry were ordered to deal with the newly discovered enemy bunkers. Corporal Peter J. Armstrong and Armando V. Valencia set their heavy machine-gun in position at a range of 30 yards from one of the bunkers. Having disclosed his position by laying a continuous burst of fire on the bunker, Corporal Armstrong was wounded by sniper fire. Armstrong continued firing until a grenade knocked him unconscious. Although the gun had been hit in several places and was leaking a steady stream from its water jacket, Corporal Valencia took over and continued firing at the bunker slits until the machine-gun froze; then he fired with his submachine-gun until it was knocked out of his hands by an enemy bullet. In the meantime the mortars had obtained four direct hits on the bunkers, and the anti-tank guns had made two. Corporals Armstrong and Valencia were later awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, and for its action during the day Troop A was given a unit citation. After taking out the stubborn position, Troop A advanced along the road under heavy sniper fire, until they were relieved by Troop C. Troop C immediately was met with a heavy Japanese counterattack shortly after nightfall. The counterattack was launched by 8 Japanese using rifle grenades and small arms. Considering the size of the attacking force, the casualties of the troop were heavy: 2 killed and 10 wounded. All the Japanese were killed, largely due to a quick adjustment by the forward observer of the 61st Field Artillery Battalion followed by four volleys fired for effect. By this point the Americans had achieved all their objectives for the Admiralty Islands campaign, the only thing left to do was mop up the islands. The remaining IJA troops were now withdrawing across the Loniu Passage over to Manus. The 8th cavalry were soon given the task of clearing the eastern end of Manus, while the 7th cavalry would clear out the Rossum Road. Yet that is all for this campaign as we are now heading over to New Guinea. General MacArthur was planning his new Western New Guinea offensive. After the directives given on March 12th, Admiral Nimitz had been instructed to provide support for his Hollandia operation. The Japanese began their occupation of Hollandia early in April of 1942 but paid little attention to the region for a year. Then Allied air reconnaissance disclosed that the enemy was constructing airfields on the Lake Sentani Plain. This development progressed slowly until late 1943, by which time successive reverses in the air and on the ground in eastern New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago, together with increasing shipping losses in the same region, began to demonstrate to the Japanese the vulnerability of their air and supply bases east of Hollandia. In late 1943 and early 1944, the Japanese built 3 airfields on the Lake Sentani Plain and started a fourth at Tami, on the seacoast east of Humboldt Bay. In addition, because of shipping losses east of Hollandia, the Japanese began to develop Humboldt Bay into a major supply base and transshipment point. Large ships would unload at Hollandia, whence cargo would be carried by barge to points southeast along the coast of New Guinea as far as Wewak over 215 miles away. Much of the cargo of the large ships remained at Hollandia to build up the base there. Admiral Nimitz decided to dispatch two fast carrier groups of Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 to conduct fighter sweeps against Hollandia and the Wakde-Sarmi area in order to keep their airfields neutralized. MacArthur south for the carries to support the troops for 8 days after the landings. But Nimitz believed this would put the carriers in risk, because the Japanese would be able to launch aircraft from all over the Dutch East Indies or even the Philippines. It was decided Task Force 58 would remain in the Hollandia region for only 3 days after the landings were made. As a result MacArthur opted to supplement using land-based aircraft against Hollandia. To obtain this he would need to capture an airfield in Northern New Guinea, just east of the main objective. He chose an Aitape, it was a lightly guarded area and already partially developed by the Japanese, such as the incomplete airfields around the Tadji Plantation. Once the men landed ashore at Aitape, allied forces could provide flank protection for Haollandia against any westward actions by the Japanese 18th Army. For the assault against Aitape, MacArthur planned to use the 8 escort carriers of Task Force 78 under the command of Rear Admiral Ralph E. Daviso. Now for the amphibious assault, Admiral Kinkaid gave the job to Admiral Barbey's task force 77 who were divided into 3 attack groups. They would bring over General Eichelberger's 1st corp who would perform the Hollandia operation, codenamed Operation Reckless. I think it is a pretty suitable name for a MacArthur operation. For the Hollandia part of the operation, the 19th and 21st regiments of Major General Frederick Irving's 24th division would land at Tanahmerah Bay; the 162nd and 186th regiments of General Fuller's 41st division would land at Humboldt Bay. For the operation against Aitape, codenamed Persecution, the 163rd regiment of the 41st division led by General Doe would perform the initial landings. To soften up the enemy, General Kenny's air forces began bombing Wewak and Hansa in mid March, then in early April they began neutralizing the airfields to try and deceive General Adachi into believing they were the next allied target. Additionally, MacArthur asked Admiral Spruance to perform a carrier raid against the Palau Islands, codenamed Operation Desecrate One, followed by strikes on Yap and Woleai in the eastern Carolines, in order to prevent the Japanese from reinforcing Western New Guinea. Admiral Mitscher's carriers departed Majuro on the 22nd of March and made their way around the Carolines, trying to sneak past Truk undetected. Despite their best efforts, Japanese search planes from Truk managed to spot them on their 3rd day at sea. This prompted Admiral Spruance to advance the day of the raid from April 1st to March 30th. Meanwhile after sighting the allied naval forces, Admiral Koga ordered an evacuation of Palau, seeing a large number of warships and merchant shipping flee the area for Tawi-Tawi. The US submarines Gar, Blackfish, Tang and Archerfish were stationed to operate against the withdrawing ships and as plane guards. On the 23rd, Tunny sank the Japanese submarine I-42 and damaged the 14,850-ton tanker Iro. To the north of Palau, during an attack on the 26th, Tullibee was hit and sunk by her own circling torpedo. Bashaw torpedoed a 4,317-ton freighter escorted by the destroyers Minazuki and Yuzuki. On the 29th, the super battleship Musashi departed Palau under cover of darkness to avoid an expected air raid, and encountered Tunny, which fired six torpedoes at the battleship; five of them missed, but the sixth blew a hole 5.8 meters in diameter near the bow, flooding her with 3000 tonnes of water. The torpedo hit killed 7 crewmen and wounded another 11. After temporary repairs, Musashi sailed for Japan later that night and arrived at Kure Naval Arsenal on April 3. On the 30th, Task Force 58 reached its assembly point 90 miles south of the Palau Islands. The Task Force was met with a Japanese air strike consisting of mostly Betty's and Oscars who were easily swept aside. Then fast carriers Enterprise, Bunker Hill, Hornet, Yorktown and Lexington launched their first air strikes against Palaus. For the next day and a half, the Americans flew hundreds of sorties over these islands, striking the airfields and shooting down all planes they could find. The attacks saw 40 Japanese ships at Palau and Angaur sunk, another 4 were badly damaged. 93 aerial victories would be won over Palau and Avengers from Lexington, Bunker Hill and Hornet laid extensive mines around the channels and approaches to Palau. This was the first tactical aerial mining of the Pacific War performed by carrier aircraft. In response, Admiral Koga asked for help from neighboring islands. He received 9 B6N torpedo bombers from Yap who attempted a night attack against Task Force 58 on the 31st. Unfortunately for the Japanese, 4 Hellcats from Cabot managed to intercept them, successfully shooting all of them down. Koga certainly had a lot on his plate. Due to the recent attacks against Truk and now Palau, Koga decided to transfer his HQ from the Musashi to Davao on March 31st. Most of his senior staff and cryptographers boarded 3 H8K flying boats enroute to Mindanao from Palau. All 3 of the flying boats ran straight into a typhoon just off of Cebu, two of them got lost. These flying boats were carrying Admiral Koga and Vice Admiral Fukudome Shigeru, his chief of staff. Koga's plan would end up crashing enroute to Davao, killing all aboard. Thus another commander in chief of the IJN forces had met his end to a plane crash. The other plane carrying Fukudome crashed off the coast of Cebu. Fukudome had a harrowing experience, but escaped the aircraft and began swimming to the island. To make matters even worse, while swimming Fukudome was grabbed by Filipino guerillas who brought him over to Lt Colonel James Cushing. Cushing was a former engineer in the Philippines who helped organize a resistance movement. Now captured Fukudome was certainly a large prize, yet a even bigger one came on April 3rd. A Filipino shopkeeper named Pedro Gantuangoko spotted a box floating offshore on the 3rd and picked it up in his fishing boat. The box contained a red leather briefcase carrying the Z plan. Fukudome had assumed the box sank with the aircraft, but in a twist of fate it did not. Now while this was going on, Lt Colonel Seiiti Ohnisi had dispatched troops to search for survivors of the aircraft crash and for the box containing the Z plan. Ohnisi hundreds of Filipino villagers interrogated, tortured and killed, entire Filipino villages were burnt to the ground. Eventually Ohnisi cornered Cushing and they struck a deal. On April 10th, with Japanese forces on Cebu hot on the heels of the guerillas, the American commander, Lt-Colonel Cushing, arranged to return Fukudome and the other prisoners to the Japanese in return for a cessation of the massacre of Filipino civilians. Three days later, the Filipinos who had found the box containing Plan Z and the code book when it washed ashore, turned them over to Cushing. The codebook was recognized for what it was when the guerillas discovered the Japanese were offering a 50000 peso reward for its return. On April 27, Cushing arranged for the items to be picked up by the submarine Crevalle. Traveling mostly on the surface for speed, and diving only when needed, the submarine survived depth charging twice, finally arriving at Darwin on May 19. From there, the documents were flown to Brisbane later that day. Allied codebreakers looked forward with anticipation to the arrival of the codebook, since they had been stymied by changes to the IJN code since the summer of 1942 and had not “read the enemy's mail” in any detail since the week before the Battle of Midway. The documents outlined the new strategy for the defense of the inner perimeter islands around Japan with the intention of drawing the US fleet in for a decisive showdown. The documents were sent to Admiral Nimitz and would prove extremely valuable during the Battle of the Philippines Sea. The documents were so vital, the Americans performed a covert operation sending them back to the Philippines by submarine and placed near the wreckage of the flying boat by American divers. It was one of the greatest intelligence coups of WW2. Thus Admiral Koga was dead, the Z plan fell into allied hands and the IJN was now leaderless. Koga's death would not be announced until May and he was replaced by Admiral Toyoda Soemu. Koga was promoted to Marshal Admiral posthumously and granted a state funeral. According to pilot Nagatsuka Ryuji: “The death of Admiral Koga, successor to Admiral Yamamoto, had been another shock for the Japanese nation. These distressing circumstances had forced the naval and military Chiefs of Staff to resign. They had been replaced by General Tojo and Admiral Shimada.” Now back to the invasion, on April 1st Rear-Admiral John Reeves' carriers launched airstrikes against Yap and Ulithi, with the three task groups then attacking Woleai. 25 American aircraft were lost, with 26 out of 44 aircrews rescued thanks to submarine Harder. Meanwhile, the fleet's Hellcats win 111 aerial victories and destroy 46 grounded aircraft on the three atolls. With this, Task Force 58 successfully removed Palau as a threat to the Hollandia-Aitape operation. Alongside this South and Southwest Pacific land-based aircraft from bases in eastern New Guinea and the Admiralties, bombed islands in the eastern Carolines and undertook many long reconnaissance missions. Meanwhile Kenney's air forces were busy neutralizing enemy air bases in Western New Guinea and the eastern islands of the Dutch East Indies. Most of the strategic support missions flown to western New Guinea were undertaken by US 5th Air Force while the Royal Australian Air Forces Command took responsibility for the majority of the strikes against the islands in the eastern Dutch East Indies. The operations were intensified roughly 6 weeks before the landings at Hollandia and Aitape. On March 30th, Kenney shifted the weight of his attacks from the Wewak area to Hollandia, where the Japanese 6th Air Division had recently retreated from Wewak and received strong reinforcements. The airforces also performed a full aerial reconnaissance taking photos of Hollandia's 3 airdromes on March. Added to this were radio intercepts and intelligence ereports, allowing the allies to estimate the Japanese had around 351 aircraft there. With this information at hand, Kenney launched Liberators armed with small 20 pound fragmentation bombs to perform a concentrated bombing against the enemy airfield. Since the Allies hoped to rehabilitate the Hollandia strips as quickly as possible, hits on the runways with heavy ordnance would be avoided. Fighter cover would be provided by long-range P-38's, which would escort the bombers over the target, and by shorter-range P-47's, which would meet the bombers near Aitape, beat off pursuing fighters, and shepherd them home. Medium and light bombers would continue attacks on the airfields at Wewak to prevent their use by Japanese fighters. The Liberators with their P-38 and P-47 escorts would smash the anti-aircraft defenses while the medium and light bombers would drench the area with bombs. On March 30th, 7 B-24's hit Hollandia dispersals as 75 Liberators of the 43rd bombardment group and 59 P-38s of the 80th, 431st and 432nd Fighter Squadrons swept over Hollandia's airstrips and dropped nearly 6000 bombs. To make matters worse for the Japanese, they suffered from insufficient radar warning, many of their aircraft would be on the ground refueling after some morning patrols. The 5th Air Force found countless enemy aircraft parked wing tip to wing tip along the runways, a lethargic anti-aircraft reaction. 25 or more fighters made "eager" passes against the 65th Bombardment Squadron, whose gunners claimed two destroyed. The 80th Fighter Squadron engaged a reported 35 to 40 hostile fighters, destroying 7 of them. The 431st Fighter Squadron claimed one Tony damaged, but the 432d encountered no enemy fighters. Japanese interception seemed badly disorganized. The planes milled about with little evident formation, and most of the pilots appeared to have little desire for a fight. Over 100 aircraft were destroyed as the Japanese were caught completely unprepared. Japanese prisoners-of-war and captured documents later revealed that the reason the bombing operation was so successful was because the Japanese high command erroneously transported too many airplanes to Hollandia from the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies but did not transport more pilots and maintenance crews with the airplanes. There was no way for them to build appropriate defensive shelters to protect all 400 aircraft and also there were not enough trained pilots who could fly all of those airplanes at the same time so many perfectly operational aircraft were left sitting there with no aircrew to maintain them. The morale at Hollandia airbase was very low during the bombing operation, with many Japanese soldiers and airmen hiding in bunkers instead of manning anti-aircraft artillery and getting airplanes into the air. Most of these Hollandia soldiers and airmen were rear-echelon and not combat-oriented at all because most of the combat-trained divisions from the 18th Army were recently sent further east towards Wewak in anticipation of amphibious landings that would never come thanks to the deception and feints carried out by General Kenney. The P-38s then withdrew to Nadzab as soon as the bombers cleared their targets; and the P-47s, meeting the Liberators near Aitape, convoyed them home without incident. So successful was this first raid that one squadron reported that “Hollandia had really been Wewaked”. The next day, Kenney launched a nearly identical mission, with 7 Liberators and 52 P-38s bombing the dispersal at Hollandia, Cyclops and Sentani airdromes. 153 tons of 100 pound demos, frags and incendiary bombs were dropped. The Japanese anti-aircraft fire was more accurate this time around and 56 Japanese fighters gave the allies a fight. However the pilots were inexperienced and unaggressive. The Americans estimated 14 aircraft were shot down while they suffered the loss of one P-38. After the air strike, the total number of destroyed aircraft on the ground reached 199. At this point the Japanese scrambled to withdraw their remaining serviceable aircraft out of Hollandia. On April 3, Kenney sent his heaviest air attack to date. 66 B-24s escorted by 21 P-38s dropped 492 1000-pound bombs on anti-aircraft defenses. An estimated 30 Japanese Tonys and Oscars attempted without success to break up the bomb runs, and B-24 gunners claimed 2 fighters destroyed, while the 21 escorting P-38's of the 80th Squadron claimed downing ten. Then, 96 A-20s escorted by 17 P-38s strafed and dropped 100-pound para-demolition bombs over grounded aircraft, stores, and other targets of opportunity. The 432nd Squadron, covering the A-20's with 17 P-38's, encountered about 20 Japanese fighters and claimed 12 definitely destroyed, against the loss of one P-38. Finally, 76 B-25s escorted by 36 P-38s swept the strips at noon, scattering parafrags and parademos and strafing everything in sight. Only 3 Japanese fighters were encountered in this last attack, which were all shot down. After the end of the raid, Hollandia was so badly mauled that it could no longer be considered a major air installation. A Japanese seaman after hearing of the Allied mission of April 3rd against Hollandia, although seemingly confused as to imperial folklore, correctly assessed the Allied victory: "Yesterday, the anniversary of the birthday of Emperor Meiji, we received from the enemy, greetings, which amount to the annihilation of our Army Air Force in New Guinea." After April 3rd, the 5th Air Force virtually owned the air over Hollandia. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Admiralty Islands campaign was coming to a swift close, seeing MacArthur secure the valuable islands like Los Negros and Manus. MacArthurs new campaign to hit Western New Guinea and the Dutch East Indies, certainly began with a bang as General Kenney's air forces had basically claimed air supremacy, the Japanese were in full panic mode.
March 20, 1942. General Douglas MacArthur vows "I came through and I shall return" after escaping the Japanese-occupied Philippines. This episode originally aired in 2023.Support the show! Join Into History for ad-free listening and more.History Daily is a co-production of Airship and Noiser.Go to HistoryDaily.com for more history, daily.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.
Last time we spoke about the invasion of Eniwetok and the end of Operation HA-GO in the Burma front. While Operation Hailstone was going on, the invasion of Eniwetok was greatly sped up as the Americans were simply too fast at conquering the Marshall islands. Codenamed operation Catchpole, Eniwetok was hit with the same kind of overwhelming force applied to Kwajalein and other islands. Aerial, naval and land base artillery smashed the defenders into submission before forces were landed. The Japanese launched so daring night time infiltration attacks, but were hopeless to stop the American seizure of the island. Within the Burma front the Japanese invaders were shocked at the performance of the newly improved Indian Army. Operation HA-GO was an utter disaster and worse it had weakened the Japanese to the point now the allies were going on the attack. This episode is the invasion of the Admiralty Islands Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. The war for the South Pacific is reaching its climax. The allies are securing western New Britain, the Solomons and the Huon Peninsula. The Japanese are simply overwhelmed. The Japanese air forces have been utterly annihilated, their warships are being drained of fuel, are worn down by the war and are seemingly no longer ready for that decisive naval battle envisioned by Isoroku Yamamoto. The men are battle-weary, food is becoming more scarce, malnourishment is spreading. All those strung out at the furthest islands are basically being left to die. To end the misery for those in the South Pacific, the capture of the Admiralty Islands was one of the last steps in Operation Cartwheel and would seal off the Bismarck-Solomons area from supply and reinforcement, denying their use to the Japanese for effective air and naval operations, and left garrisons totaling over 100000 troops in isolated impotence In the South Pacific, the Admiralty Islands, that of Manus and Los Negros stood at the northeastern exist of the Bismarck Sea. They commanded the important strategic point some 600 miles from Rabaul, 820 miles from Truk and 1370 miles from Mindanao Island. The joint chiefs believed Seeadler Harbor had the potential to become a major naval anchorage for the Pacific Fleet and perhaps the springboard for the invasion of the Philippines. Back on April 7th, 1942 a Japanese destroyer and a merchant ship had landed invading forces at Lorengau, driving off the hundred or so Europeans who had been living there. At that time the only airstrip was at Lorengau, the administrative center for the group of islands. Apparently the Admiralties were not considered significant in the offensive phase of the Japanese conquest of the South Pacific area, for it was not until February 1943, that construction forces started to build a 5000-foot airstrip at Momote Plantation on Los Negros and to put the 3000-foot Lorengau airfield into operational use. After October 1943, the Momote field and the smaller Lorengau strip served as ferrying stops on the replacement routes to Wewak, Hollandia, and Rabaul, until Allied air attacks destroyed the effectiveness of the Admiralties' base. Seeadler Harbor was also being used for surface craft and possibly for seaplanes. In late 1943, General MacArthur had assigned General Krueger's Alamo Force at that time based in Finschhafen to plan the seizure of the Seeadler Harbor area, with the aim of establishing an airdrome and light naval facilities for the support of subsequent operations along the north coast of New Guinea. On February 13th however, MacArthur ordered Krueger to seize all of the Admiralty islands and to build air bases at Lorengau and Momote. This was to be Operation Brewer, beginning on April 1st. However one of Lt General Kenney's spotter planes noticed there was no sign of life on the Admiralty Islands and this prompted MacArthur to move up the time table, to the end of February. It would be quite a mistake. MacArthur's chief of intelligence, Colonel Willoughby, was convinced Kenney's intelligence was incorrect and information from ULTRA intercepts seemed to support his claims. It seemed Kenney had been fooled. The Japanese appeared to be absent on the islands, because Colonel Yoshio Ezaki had ordered his men not to move during the day, so as to conceal their work constructing two new airstrips and to conserve anti-aircraft ammunition. In spite of Kenney's arguments that the Japanese looked vulnerable, MacArthur's staff officers were not at all happy at the idea of taking such a high level risk assaulting them. Even Kenney would note “we had already outrun the capabilities of our supply system.” Ignoring the limitations, MacArthur was determined to take the islands, but would later reminisce “I felt that the situation presented an ideal opportunity for a coup de main which, if successful, could advance the Allied timetable in the Pacific by several months and save thousands of Allied lives.” This of course is MacArthur we are talking about and the capture of the Admiralty Islands would advance his timetable to retake the Philippines, so for him it was a no brainer. There was also the on going race. MacArthur was obviously taking notice of Admiral Nimitz's thrust into the Central Pacific, and what a thrust it was. The Gilberts and Marshalls were falling in extremely surprising speed. MacArthur, fully aware of the risks of forwarding Operation Brewer, nevertheless did so and would cover his tracks by describing the invasion as “a reconnaissance in force” The misgivings of this decision would be apparent when a covert reconnaissance mission led by Lt J.R McGowan and 5 other men of the 158th infantry reported on February 27th that the island were “lousy with Japs”, but by that point it was too late to pull back. For the operation, Krueger would assign Major-General Innis Swift's 1st Cavalry Division, which was training intensively in the Oro Bay area. Although the 1st Cavalry Division was dismounted for operations in the Pacific, it retained its organization as a cavalry unit with two brigades, each made up of two reinforced regiments. In addition to supporting units, each regiment comprised two squadrons of three rille troops and a heavy weapons troop. Air offensives against Rabaul and Wewak continued throughout February, seeing an enormous reduction in the Japanese ability for air action. On the 22nd and 23rd, Captain Burke's Destroyer Squadron 23, consisting of Destroyers Charles Ausburne, Stanly, Converse, Spence and Dyson made a daring sweep in the Admiralty island area. They managed to sink the 3800 ton Japanese tug Nagaura due east of Lorengau. 3 of his destroyers then sailed south of New Hanover where they sank a IJN minelayer and a cargo ship before turning around the coast of New Ireland. They encountered no shipping there, so they fired 1500 five-inch shells into Duke of York Island in order to damage the airfield under construction. Meanwhile the other 2 destroyers sailed north of New Hanover and bombarded the enemy base at Kavieng. At this point MacArthur realized the Japanese could not mount any significant air or naval support to defend the admiralties. He also believed Los Negros islands was lightly held and that they was a “coup de main” opportunity. As someone who speaks french as a second language, I gotta say its so weird how we anglophones use these random french phrases for things haha. Thus MacArthur decided to change his plans somewhat. In place of the scheduled assault set for April 1st, he now was tossing the “reconnaissance in force” I mentioned early against the Momote airstrip on Hyane Harbor and that it should be carried out no later than February 29th. The force performing this was to be known as the Brewer Reconnaissance Force; it consisted of 3 rifle troops and the heavy weapons troop of the 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry Regiment: 800 men with their complement of light and heavy machine guns, rocket launchers, and mortars. With them was a platoon from Battery B, 99th Field Artillery Battalion, carrying two 75-mm pack howitzers, four 50-caliber machine guns, and small arms. The 673rd Antiaircraft Machine Gun Battery, a unit of some 80 men, was equipped with twelve 50-caliber machine guns as well as individual weapons. Air and naval liaison officers and a shore fire control party were scheduled to land with the attacking force; Headquarters Troop, 1st Cavalry Brigade, would furnish a reconnaissance and a communications platoon. Arrangements had also been made for a detachment from the Australian New Guinea Administration Unit, usually called ANGAU; this group was to assist chiefly in gathering intelligence, patrolling, recruiting, and dealing with the native population as their villages were liberated. If these men found Momote to be adequately defended, then they would establish a perimeter and await reinforcements, thus the reconnaissance turns into an invasion.With just 5 days to plan, General Kenney's 5th air force was given the task of bombing the objective area and northern Ireland. Meanwhile Admiral Barbey's destroyers were going to perform a heavy bombardment to cover the approach and landings. A patrol from the Alamo Scouts landed on the southeastern coast of Los Negros from a Catalina flying boat on the night of February 27th. They performed a reconnaissance, quickly discovering Colonel Ezaki Yoshio's forces were present. Yoshio's HQ was at Papitalai, the bulk of troops at Lorengau with garrison units were on Rambutyo, Peli, Pak, and Pityilu Islands and at the inland village of Kawaliap. One battalion was also at Papitalai covering HQ. The 2nd Battalion, 1st Independent Mixed Regiment at Salami and 1st Battalion, 229th Regiment at Hyane Harbor with its main elements south of Momote. It was obvious the enemy was still present in force. The Scouts discovered a large bivouac area on the southeast part of Los Negros and reported that the region between the Momote air strip and the south coast was as I mentioned earlier "lousy with Japs." This further allowed Admiral Barbey to make more specific bombardment plans. Three fire support areas had been established for the attack group, consisting of nine destroyers and the three destroyer-transports which were carrying the reconnaissance force. These areas covered the entire seaward side of Los Negros from the south coast to the northern end of Salami Plantation. In the final plans the attack group would bring the weight of its firepower against targets around Hyane Harbor and to the north. Additional fire to cover the southern part of the island would be furnished by another task group of two cruisers and four destroyers, which would meet the convoy at Cape Cretin. It was decided to split this latter group, giving one cruiser and two destroyers responsibility for the Japanese bivouac area, southwest of the Momote strip, which the Alamo Scouts had located. The other cruiser and two destroyers would fire on targets in the Lorengau-Seeadler Harbor region. In the 15-minute bombardment, scheduled from H-35 to H-20, 5-inch naval guns were each to expend approximately 350 rounds. Under the air force plan, two groups of heavy bombers would attack ground targets on Los Negros from H-28 to H-20. Two minutes later, four groups of medium bombers were to bomb and strafe the landing area until the first wave was ashore. Following H Hour a squadron of medium bombers and six smoke planes were to be on air alert for further missions. The Japanese did not anticipate a landing would be made at Momote, thus only a few elements of the 1st battalion, 229th regiment were there while the bulk of their forces were concentrated at the beaches of Seeadler Harbor and on the other side of the island. Now despite the Alamo scouts best efforts, there was quite a lot of unknown variables. In light of that the landings would be done simplistically. 3 waves of 12 LCPRS would carry the troops to White Beach, lying near Jamandilai Point. From there the reconnaissance force led by Brigadier-General William Chase would advance and hold Momote airstrip. If this proved too difficult, the men would be loaded back up and return to Oro Bay. Now in the event of a successful landing, the remainder of the 5th cavalry regiment would come over 2 days later and the rest of the cavalry division, the main body of the Brewer force, would follow the reconnaissance and support forces as soon as shipping could be made available. On February 27, the 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry led by Lt. Colonel William E. Lobit loaded up at Oro Bay, and the following morning departed aboard 3 APDs and nine destroyers under the command of Rear-Admiral William Fechteler. They would rendezvous with Admiral Kinkaid's light cruisers at 13:26, around Cape Cretin, with General MacArthur onboard, and finally would arrive at a point about 10 miles south of Los Negros at 6:00 on February 29. While the troops climbed aboard their LCPRs, Fechteler's destroyers opened fire on their assigned targets. Unfortunately, when the LCPRs reached the line of departure, about 3700 yards from the beaches, the defenders responded with heavy machine-gun and battery fire.At H-28 minutes enemy machine-gun fire opened on the boats, whom began maneuvering radically as they could. Machine-gun fire was also directed against the destroyers and the Phoenix group to the south. Heavier shore batteries opened up; flashes could be seen from d gun near Southeast Point on the island, and what appeared to be 3- or 4-inch shells landed in the vicinity of the Flusser and the Mahan. In response the Phoenix and Mahan fired upon the batteries and 9 B-25's strafed and bombed the area. Their participation was limited by a heavy overcast and a low ceiling. Of the 40 B-24s scheduled to arrive during the naval bombardment, only 3 appeared before their appointed time to bomb the target area at H-47 minutes. The planned missions of four groups of B-25s fared little better, only nine appearing and these later than scheduled. No communications had been established with the B-25s nor could any of the planes be seen from the flagship, so the plan was called off for stopping naval gunfire at H-20 minutes to permit low-level bombing and strafing. The naval bombardment was continued for another 15 minutes. The order to cease fire was given at H-5 minutes and, although no aircraft were visible, starshells were fired as the attack signal for any strafers that might be in the vicinity. The first wave of LCPRs reached the shore at 8:17, meeting slight enemy fire. Troop G led by 1st-Lieutenant Marvin Henshaw rushed beyond the narrow beach to the edge of a coconut plantation, taking cover under fallen trees and kunai grass. Here they laid prone, forming a rough half-circle with a 50-yard radius. They saw scattered groups of the enemy fleeing inland, some as far away as the other side of the air strip. Lieutenant Henshaw killed one with a long distance shot, and members of his platoon killed another. Not one of the soldiers who landed in the first wave was a casualty. As the bombardment lifted, the defenders gradually came out of their dugouts and began subjecting the returning boats to cross-fire. As the second wave approached, the enemy fire became so heavy, the LCPR's were forced to turn back so the Mahan, Flusser and Drayton could further bombard them. At 08:23, the second wave finally landed, moving swiftly past the troops of the first wave to a point 100 yards inland. 22 minutes later, the third wave landed, rapidly fanning south and establishing a line 300 yards inland by 09:00. Meeting slight opposition, the cavalrymen managed to secure the Momote airstrip by 9:50 and completely unloaded by 12:50. 4 of the LCPRs had been left out of action during the landings, so the reconnaissance force could not be evacuated. From the positions held by the first waves, the troops then gradually moved forward to cover the whole dispersal area of the airdrome, sending patrols beyond the airdrome which identified evidence of concerning recent Japanese activity. As patrols sent out beyond the airdrome began to report back, the commanders could decide the next move. One patrol had scouted 1,000 yards west to Porlaka without contact, and another almost as far north as the skidway before meeting any enemy, there was plenty of evidence that the Japanese had recently been in the vicinity in some strength. One patrol that went about a mile south found the hastily vacated quarters of a high-ranking officer, as well as a bivouac area, and fired at a fleeing Japanese officer. Another found three big kitchens and a warehouse of food. Although the Japanese in the area had offered negligible resistance, our command expected a change in the near future. Captured documents revealed that 200 antiaircraft personnel had been encamped nearby. Given this information, General Chase decided to pull back to a perimeter due east of the airstrip and had the cavalrymen dig in for the night. During the afternoon the reconnaissance force organized its defenses, which presented many difficulties. A good foxhole required back-breaking efforts, because the soil was heavy with coral. Since there was no barbed wire to put around the beachhead, men and weapons had to be spaced closely and every man available used for the perimeter defense. The 40 field artillery officers and men were assigned sectors for close-in defense, because their two pack howitzers could not cover the critical space in front of the defense line from such a shallow depth as the perimeter allowed. They took over these sectors after the howitzers had blasted away for a while at the Japanese known to be in the skidway area. For heavy weapons support, the twelve 50-caliber machine guns of the antiaircraft unit were moved into positions along the front line. Signalmen strung the perimeter with wire to make the necessary hook-ups for officers in the chain of command, and removed the radio sets for communication with Sixth Army Headquarters from an advanced position to a more sheltered bomb crater. Outposts were stationed beyond the strip on the far edges of the dispersal area. Meanwhile, MacArthur came ashore during the afternoon and decorated the first man to land, Lieutenant Henshaw, with a Distinguished Service Cross. He decided to stay, ordering Chase to hold his position until the follow-up force arrived. MacArthur then returned to the Phoenix, which got underway shortly afterwards at 5:29 for Cape Sudest, taking with it all the ships except two destroyers. On the Japanese side, Colonel Ezaki immediately ordered the 1st Battalion, 229th Regiment to attack the beachhead during the night and annihilate the enemy or die trying. Suspicions that the Momote landing was a diversion, however, would prevent him from sending the rest of his troops to assist. Colonel Ezaki issued the following orders to the infantry battalion defending the Hyane Harbor sector: “Tonight the battalion under Captain Baba will annihilate the enemy who have landed. This is not a delaying action. Be resolute to sacrifice your life for the Emperor and commit suicide in case capture is imminent. We must carry out our mission with the present strength and annihilate the enemy on the spot. I am highly indignant about the enemy's arrogant attitude. Remember to kill or capture all ranking enemy officers for our intelligence purposes…” As ordered, 200 men with 3 mortars; 2 platoons of the 229th Infantry and 1 platoon of crept up to the Americans during the night. Yet by the time they reached the American line, their movement was no longer coordinated and they could only achieve some minor infiltrations. Groups of 7 to 15 Japanese edging in, flinging grenades at the weapons that fired. The only way the Japanese could be seen was by the light of grenade explosions or when the attackers got close enough so that a cavalryman crouched in a fox hole could see them silhouetted against the sky. Many of the Japanese were cut down by machine-gun and rifle fire, but some got through and succeeded in cutting all telephone lines. Although infiltrations occurred on all edges of the perimeter, the attack was heaviest near the shore on the southern side. Here some Japanese reached the shore in the rear of the main defense line by swimming in from the sea with life preservers. The vegetation bordering the beach provided protection for these infiltrators. One group found an opening in the left flank of Troop E, holding the south sector, next to the field artillery unit that held along the shore. The enemy penetrated Troop E's defense line, entirely isolating the 3d Platoon. Without communication with its troop, the unit had to fight it out alone against very heavy attacks. Come daylight, the majority of the Japanese survivors had disappeared back into the jungle, leaving 66 dead against 7 Americans killed and 15 wounded. However, those who had infiltrated and reoccupied some of their former pillboxes and fortifications in the perimeter had to be cleared out by the tired cavalrymen. During the afternoon, patrols were also sent west and north to check how much strength the enemy had and the perimeter was further contracted and tightened. At 5:00, 2 companies of the 229th regiment made another coordinated effort against the perimeter, yet its intensity was lowered by the death of the battalion commander. The afternoon was free from enemy activity except for a patrol which was discovered inside the perimeter at about 4:00. The patrol's mission was evidently to kill or capture the American commanding officer. It was led by Captain Baba, the commander of the battalion who made the major attack on the preceding night. Although operating in broad daylight, the patrol came close to succeeding. The Americans were confident that the morning's mop-up had taken care of all the enemy within the perimeter. Secondary growth was thick in the area and the Japanese were unnoticed until they were within 35 yards of the task force command post. Once the group was sighted, a considerable amount of fire was placed on it. The Japanese lay concealed in the undergrowth and a single sniper pecked away with his rifle in the direction of the CP. Not knowing the size of the party, Major Chiaramonte set out with four men "to get the sniper." The task force commander and his executive officer directed the movement of the group either right or left according to movements in the underbrush, and the soldiers and Major Chiaramonte opened up whenever they detected any movements. As Major Chiaramonte and his party finally entered the area on which they had been firing, they heard a click followed by grenade explosions. Three of the Japanese had committed suicide. Another rolled over on his back and used his sword to commit hara-kiri. Fifteen dead officers and sergeants were counted, including Captain Baba. Thus, the attackers were kept beyond the perimeter until nightfall, when the attack finally stopped. On March 2, after clearing Jamandilai Point by 10:45, 6 LSTs landed the 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry plus artillery and Seabees. While the troops landed, Captain Emile Dechaineux's and will be honest very curious how Americans would pronounce that one, like i've said before there is no rhyme or reason as to how Americans pronounce french last names haha, well Dechaineux's destroyers bombarded Hauwei Island and Hyane Harbor. With reinforcements in hand, General Chase launched a new attack to extend his perimeter. At 2:15 B-25's, P- 38's, and P-47's bombed and strafed the area. The western half of the airfield and the dispersal area were softened up for the ground attack, and the skidway and Hyane coast beyond were also targets. Bombs were also dropped on the strip of land forming the northern arm of the harbor. After this at 3:00 the two cavalry squadrons advanced across the airstrip, rapidly taking the entire aerodrome against light opposition and finally digging along a new perimeter. To block possible enemy landings from across Hyane Harbor, two anti-aircraft batteries and E Company of the 592nd Boat and Shore Regiment defended the shore. Seabees formed an inner defense line to the west and northwest of the brigade. Six rough trenches were dug out by a bulldozer and ten men stationed in each. The remainder of the 40th Construction Battalion elements remained in their trench on the right flank, which was now a secondary line behind the troopers. The critical north and northwest sectors were the 2nd Squadron's responsibility. They prepared their positions with careful attention to interlocking bands of machine-gun fire, while the 1st Squadron dug in on the left flank. The first night in the enlarged beachhead passed by without a crisis. An attack came at 9:00pm, but it was not as severe as expected. The chief enemy effort was to push machine-gun parties and infiltration groups through the 2nd Squadron's sector, and in particular through that held by Troop G. Communication lines were cut, radio equipment was slightly damaged, and a few Japanese penetrated as far as the field artillery positions. The artillery, prepared for interdiction fire, was not called on. The following morning, a systematic search for enemy troops within the position was started and all Japanese within the perimeter were killed while the Seabees began work on the airstrip. At the same time, Krueger arranged with Barbey to expedite the movement of the rest of the cavalry division. The 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment was to arrive on March 4; the remaining units of the 1st Brigade would arrive by March 6; and the 2nd Brigade was to arrive on March 9. At this point Colonel Ezaki realized his situation was desperate, his 1st battalion, 229th regiment was being obliterated. He moved his HQ from Papitalai to Papitalai Mission and began concentrating his garrison units at Lorengau. He also ordered the 2nd battalion ,1st independent regiment at Salami to perform an assault from the north, coordinating with the 229th regiment. Their advance was slowed by constant naval and land artillery fire, but they got into position by the night of March 3rd. The Americans expected the attack, as prior, an enemy officer patrol had attempted to land on the shore of Hyane Harbor. The platoon leader of the shore company guarding the beach there allowed the boat to come in to land, then opened fire, killing all members of the patrol. Among the valuable documents discovered on the bodies was one which gave the information that a strong attack would be launched that night. With this knowledge, the Americans fortified their front line defenses. Since infiltration was still the greatest danger for a small force holding a large perimeter in jungle and darkness, the front line positions were of prime importance. To offer as little space as possible for infiltration, each troop in the line would use all three of its rifle platoons. Automatic weapons covering front-line positions were basic in the fire plans; each of these weapons, in turn, was protected by two, three, or four dugouts on both flanks and rear manned by two or three riflemen. The approaches to these positions were strewn with mines, and trip signals were made of empty "C"-ration cans with lumps of coral inside for clappers, and hung on lengths of wire strung taut ten inches off the ground. In organizing defenses, good use was made of Japanese revetments, built to protect their airplanes in the dispersal bays on the airstrip. These revetments were steep banks of earth reaching some 15 feet high; usually a large one was at the end of a bay with two smaller embankments flanking it to form a pattern which, from the air, looked like cleats on the sole of a football shoe. Near the crest of some of these mounds, on the reverse slopes, cavalrymen dug foxholes. Two 30-caliber water-cooled machine guns were then placed on the flat ground alongside the bunker and mounted to fire across the front of the position. All the 81-mm mortars were massed near the center of the perimeter, while all the 60-mm mortars were moved close to the front line. The water-cooled 50-caliber machine guns of the antiaircraft were returned to their units, except for those on the northern end of the air strip. This side of the perimeter faced the skidway, whence the chief attack was expected. Patrols had met the greatest opposition when working in this direction and toward Porlaka; enemy barges and troop concentrations had also been sighted on the northwestern shore of Hyane Harbor. Nearby naval units would also coordinate by firing upon any Japanese concentration discovered. At 9pm the Japanese began their attack as a single Japanese bomber dropped 8 bombs. As soon as the plane had departed, two yellow flares went up from the vicinity of Podaka, and a tracer, apparently 20-mm, was fired almost vertically from a position in front of the Troop B sector to the southwest. Almost immediately an attack supported by mortar fire was launched there as well as against the position held by Troops F and G to the northwest. The attack against the 1st Squadron on the southwest was relatively light, the enemy strength here being estimated later at two reinforced platoons. Since the 1st Squadron's sector was covered by a heavy growth of secondary jungle forest, infiltration was a great danger. The sited positions of our automatic weapons were of little value in the darkness, so the cavalrymen picked up the guns and fired them from the hip. The Japanese moved automatic weapons forward apparently with no other plan of action than to set them up in the open in front of our lines, depending on darkness to conceal their positions. The excited talking of the crews gave their positions away and they became easy targets for the defending riflemen. The attackers were blanketed by mortar fire accurately placed 20 to 50 yards in front of the perimeter. Nevertheless, many of the enemy did infiltrate, some as far as the south end of the air strip where they hid in heavy brush or climbed trees to begin sniper operations at dawn. Because of the relative weakness of the attacking force, there was never any real danger that the 1st Squadron's positions would be overrun. The attack upon the 2nd Squadron's position on the northwest was a greater threat, with over a battalion, as later estimated, advancing on this sector from the direction of Pori aka and the skidway against the whole of Troop G's position and the right flank of Troop F. Apparently the enemy's intention was to drive our troops from their perimeter and occupy the north end of the air strip. The attacks against the sector held by Troops E and F were limited to infiltrations toward mortar positions and command posts. The rear installations were covered hy enemy mortar fire and machinegun fire while Japanese with grenades closed in on them and overran the positions. The Seabees, holding their secondary defense line behind the cavalry on the north side of the perimeter, also felt the effects of the furious attacks. Cavalrymen whose guns were knocked out, or who had run out of ammunition, carne back to the Seabees' trenches. When a weak place developed toward the left side of the Seabees' positions, their extra ammunition was at the other end of their line. First the men passed the ammunition to the front line by throwing the boxes from hole to hole, but when that seemed too slow they got out of their holes and ran with it, holding it low. The Japanese advanced relentlessly, talking and singing though damaged and hampered by antipersonnel mines and booby traps, until they were cut down by the fierce machine-gun fire of the cavalrymen. Yet more and more kept coming behind them, marching over the bodies of the first. The Americans hunkered down in their holes and fired upon anything that moved, continuing to inflict heavy casualties. The Japanese attempted a number of tricks and were occasionally successful. Somehow they learnt the names of platoon leaders. On one occasion a Japanese yelled, "Retreat, Thorne, the whole regiment's falling back to another line." This caused the mortar platoon commanded by 1st Lt. William D. Thorne to leave their positions. Not only did the platoon suffer three casualties, but it was unable to direct its mortar fire during the rest of the night. Another trick was to have individuals move about in front of the perimeter to draw the fire of machine guns. Then two or three snipers would fire tracers at any weapon that disclosed itself, enabling a mortar to open up on the position. Several cases of wiretapping of a 90-mm anti-aircraft battery took place between 10:30 and midnight, the wire-tapper claiming to be, on one occasion, a certain officer commanding a platoon, and on another, a sergeant. He reported in each case the disruption of our plans and the success of the enemy. Since his voice was not recognized, his messages were not heeded. However, a later message, although believed false, made the 211th Coast Artillery (AA) Battalion change its CP. At 11:30 a single enemy plane with landing lights on made several runs at a low altitude dropping flares. In spite of orders to hold their fire, the anti-aircraft battery opened up on the fourth run and drove the plane to the north, where it dropped bombs on Japanese positions. Japanese using knives and grenades managed to get themselves into Troop G's defenses. A ferocious counterattack by the cavalrymen would shortly regain the positions just in time to face another strong frontal attack, in which more Japanese were cut down in front of the 2nd Squadron. By daylight, the infantry attacks were finally over, with the cavalrymen counting over 750 Japanese dead as they established a new outpost line on March 4. Against them, the Americans lost 61 killed and 244 wounded, 9 of the dead and 38 of the wounded were Seabees. That same day was met with another heavy bombardment of the Japanese positions, then the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry landed against slight enemy resistance. The defensive perimeter was strengthened again and the damage of the previous night was repaired. Colonel Ezaki now believed that his troops had successfully pierced the American first line of defense and thus ordered to continue the attack that night; but upon learning the truth and how many casualties he had suffered, he decided to cancel the attack and ordered a general withdrawal towards Lorengau, leaving some units to hold Papitalai and delay the American advance. 600 men had been lost in the skidway area and in the attacks upon the perimeter. The remaining 200, with an additional 100 stragglers from other disorganized units, were ordered to retreat through Salami Beach and across Papitalai Harbor to Papitalai Mission. Natives on Mokerang Peninsula later told the Angau Party that the Japanese retreat developed into a rout. They were panic-stricken; some did not even wait to take paddles for the native canoes that they had appropriated for their escape to Papitalai Mission. Not more than 80 Japanese, frantic from fear and exhaustion, arrived at the mission to bolster the force already there. By the 5th, General Swift arrived to the secured beachhead in the Admiralties, and with the arrival of the 12th Cavalry Regiment the following day, he was now ready to launch an offensive west towards Seeadler Harbor, the Lorengau airdrome and north against Salami Plantation. The same day, to clear the way for the 2nd Brigade's landing at Red Beach, General Swift ordered the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry to move across the skidway to a point about 500 yards north. Despite a thorough artillery support, the advance did not go smoothly, with the Japanese immediately launching a strong attack from both Porlaka and the native skidway. Luckily the few Japanese who penetrated the position were killed, around 25 of them and the attack was broken up by mortar and artillery fire. At 4:30, the squadron finally began their offensive, moving with difficulty across a mined area and only gaining about 500 yards by nightfall. The next morning, the squadron advanced, with the 12th Cavalry soon joining them. Despite the occasional pillboxes and the congested trail, the cavalrymen made ample progress towards the beaches of Seeadler Harbor and closed in on Salami by 4:30. To further secure the harbor, General Swift planned to clear the enemy presence at the Mokerang Peninsula, Papitalai Mission and Lombrum Point. That day, the 5th Cavalry had already begun the work of clearing the southern shore of Seeadler Harbor by pushing patrols west from the airstrip. Finding much more enemy corpses that opposition, Troop F would be able to establish a bridgehead at Porlaka. At 12:00 on the 7th, after an artillery bombardment, a reconnaissance patrol consisting of 40 volunteers from Troop B, led by Capt. William C. Cornelius advanced across Lemondrol Creek and successfully landed on Papitalai against an estimated 50 Japanese defenders. Captain Cornelius, leading the first wave, was reported to have single-handedly killed four of the enemy with rifle fire and grenades while operating 50 yards in advance of the troops. Yet severely wounded, he would die the next day; for his courage and leadership he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. The Japanese quickly withdrew. Simultaneously after a heavy air and artillery bombardment, the 2nd Squadron, 12th Cavalry departed Salami and advanced across Seeadler Harbor to land on Papitalai Mission, meeting heavy resistance. By nightfall, Troop G had secured a beachhead, though it would have to break up three determined counterattacks during the night. This ultimately forced the Japanese to pull out from their beach defenses at Papitalai Mission and retreat towards Lorengau, allowing the cavalrymen to secure the beachhead the following morning. By 12:00 on the 8th, supplies for the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry's attack on Lombrum Plantation also began arriving at Red Beach over the difficult road from Momote. Equipping the 12th Cavalry and the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry, at Salami with enough supplies to carry on their overwater attacks was a difficult and hazardous operation. The single road from Momote to Salami was impassable for most vehicles during the days when the supplies were most urgently needed. Buffaloes got through by going overwater part of the way, but the rest of the essential supplies had to be dropped from airplanes or sent in LCMs from Momote around Mokerang Peninsula. The sending of LCMs into Seeadler Harbor was an operation which was possible only after continued naval efforts from D-Day on. Magnetic mines, dropped by American planes in May 1943, were presumably still in the harbor and had to be removed. To make entry into the harbor safe for their forces, destroyers also had to neutralize the Japanese harbor defense guns, which had already proved effective. The destroyers and minesweepers worked to accomplish these missions, but even by 7 March, when six LCMs loaded with supplies were to make their way around the point, it was not certain that enemy resistance on the islands guarding the harbor had completely disintegrated. LCMs then successfully landed TROOP E, F and G on Lombrum two hours later against sporadic fire. The Americans extended their perimeter by 5:00, successfully completing the task of securing Seeadler Harbor while other units of the 12th Cavalry secured the Mokerang Peninsula to cover the north flank of the 2nd Brigade's landing. On the 9th, the 2nd Brigade successfully landed at Salami while destroyers pounded the main Japanese positions at Lorengau. This ended the first phase of Operation Brewer. The Americans had suffered a total of 116 killed and 434 wounded during their occupation of Los Negros while counting 1288 enemy dead by March 8. Their next objective would be Lorengau airdrome on Manus Island, but that it for the Admiralties as we now need to travel over to New Britain. Over on New Britain, General Rupertus was planning to invade the Willaumez Peninsula in order to cut off the Japanese retreat line there and take the Talasea airdrome. He assigned the 5th marines under Colonel Oliver Smith for the task. They were going land at a point about midway on the west coast of the Willaumez Peninsula north of Volupai, labeled Beach Red. The chosen zone of operations was about as good as the Marines could have found. It presented them with a short, comparatively flat route to their objective which might make possible utilization of tanks. A dirt track approximately four miles long connected Beach Red with Bitokara, and although it was not designed for motor transport, the Marines could hope. Beach Red contained about as much depth as Beaches Yellow 1 and Yellow 2 in the Gloucester landings, but was more confined on its flanks. Its 350 yards of sand nestled between a cliff on the right and a swamp on the left. The cliff constituted the northwestern slope of Little Mt. Worri, a mass rising 1360 feet above the beach and enfolding the native villages of Liapo to the south and Volupai on the west. Overlooking this smaller mountain from the south was Big Mt. Worri, higher by 300 feet and with a more encompassing base. Included in its ridge line was Mt. Schleuther, on the peninsula's eastern coast which dominated Bitokara, Talasea and the Waru villages from an altitude of 1130 feet. Volupai Plantation was 400 yards inland from Beach Red, containing a collection of small buildings and groves of coconut palms and cacao trees. Volupai track, linking Beach Red with Bitokara, skirted the northern bases of the several mountains. The country, except for the plantations and villages, was typical of New Britain: overgrown jungle and underbrush. Sea and air control in the New Britain area had passed so completely into Allied hands that it was decided to transport the assault forces from Iboki to Volupai in a convoy of 38 LCMs, 17 LCVPs and 5 LCTs, with only 5 PT boats as escorts. Furthermore, on March 3rd, an amphibious patrol landed on Cape Bastian and managed to contact friendly natives in order to learn that the enemy had a weak presence in the area. This was the reinforced 7th Company, 54th Regiment, which had been sent by General Sakai to defend Talasea while the bulk of the Matsuda and Komori Detachments retreated towards Malalia. Sakai was planning to engage the enemy in a decisive battle with the entire force of the 17th Division; but on February 23, General Imamura had ordered him to withdraw towards Rabaul. Thus Sakai assigned the 17th Provisional Battalion to secure Toriu; the 2nd Battalion, 53rd Regiment to hold Ulamona; the 39th Anti-Aircraft Battalion to remain at Malalia; the 17th Engineer Regiment to facilitate the crossing of the Kapuira River; and the 17th Transport Regiment to establish supply depots at Ubai, Butiolo and Sulu. He also ordered the bulk of the 54th Regiment to leave some naval units at Gasmata and begin to retreat towards Amio and then Ubai, where barges were to finally evacuate the detachment. Over in Bougainville, General Griswold's 14th Corps had just taken over the protection of the Cape Torokina base. As such, nearly 62000 men were stationed in the area, defenses were consolidated, and an impressive artillery complement under Brigadier-General Leo Kreber was directed to cover the perimeter. During this period of consolidation, the most important actions were the establishment of an important Fijian outpost at Ibu village. One of the most effective units operating under corps command was the 1st Battalion of the Fiji Infantry Regiment. This battalion, consisting of 777 enlisted men and 34 officers, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel J.B.K. Taylor of the New Zealand Army, whom arrived at Bougainville in late December. Taylor was wounded the first night ashore and was replaced as commander by Major Gregory Upton, who was in charge of the battalion during its long-range patrols in late December and January. The Fijian troops were well trained, proud of their uniforms and ability to march, and according to reports, loved to sing a wide variety of Fijian songs as well as the more modern American tunes. Almost immediately after their arrival, plans were under way to use their unique abilities as jungle fighters to establish a combat outpost far to the east of the mountain range, most of which was controlled by the Japanese. The managed to gain valuable information on Japanese movements before withdrawing in late February, and a successful expansion of the perimeter east of the mouth of the Torokina River. But the first real test of the Corps in Bougainville was approaching. Under immense pressure from his superiors, General Hyakutake had been preparing to launch his main counterattack, codenamed Operation TA, since early January. He assembled over 15000 men from his total strength of nearly 40000 to take part in the operation. General Kanda the 6th Division commander was given command of the force and his mission was simple. 3 task forces, named after their commanders; the Iwasa unit of Major General Iwasa Shun consisting of the 23rd Infantry Regiment, the 2nd Battalion of the 13th Regiment, attached engineering troops, and two batteries of light field artillery and a mortar battalion–in all, approximately 4,150 men; the Magata Unit, commanded by Colonel Magata Isashi, consisting of most of the 45th Infantry Regiment (less 2nd Battalion), with artillery, mortar battalions, and engineers attached–a total of approximately 4,300 men; The smallest of the forces, the Muda Unit, commanded by Colonel Muda Toyohorei , consisted of the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 13th Regiment and an engineering company–a total of 1,350 men. These 3 units would attack strongpoints in the American perimeter. Thus, the Iwasa Unit was to strike towards Hill 700 on the right flank of the 37th Division line and then drive directly toward the two Piva airfields, which Hyakutake planned to capture by March 10; the Magata Unit was to take the low ground west of Hill 700 and then drive south to capture the Torokina airstrip by March 17; and the Muda Unit was to seize Hills 260 and 309 in the Americal sector and then capture the strategically-important Hill 608 by March 10. Bougainville was about to see some major action. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Despite the admiralty islands certainly holding significant enemy units, General MacArthur went ahead with his reconnaissance in force and turned it into a full blown invasion. Yet again MacArthur proved, he was willing to do whatever necessary to make sure the drive of the Pacific pointed in the direction of the Philippines.
Last time we spoke about the landing at Saidor and the drive against Sio. The Australians were still advancing across Shaggy Ridge when General MacArthur unleashed an amphibious assault against Saidor to cut off the Japanese escape and isolate Sio. Numerous features were seized up the large ridge and the Americans successfully amphibiously assaulted Saidor and seized their airfield. General Adachi placed the 51st and 20th divisions under the command of General Nakano, who was tasked with advancing to Gali to try and secure a new supply point. Meanwhile efforts were made to try and contain the new threat in Saidor while simultaneously holding back the Australians in the south. Over on new britain the airdrome was seized as Colonel Katayama launched a failed counter attack against the Marines. The Marines tossed back the attack and began their own advance further inland. This episode is Ledo Road Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. The Americans had landed at Cape Gloucester, Saidor and were carrying out massive attacks against Rabaul. As we had seen previously, on November 5th, aided by bad weather, a surprise air raid was made by the USS Saratoga and Princeton, led by Rear-Admiral Frederick Sherman that inflicted heavy damage to 4 cruisers within the harbor; Maya's engine room was smashed by a bomb killing over 70 men; a 500 lb bomb hit Mogami; Takao took 2 500 lb bomb hits while 3 500 lb bombs narrowly missed Atago killing 23 seamen and caused severe damage to the ship's plating. 2 other cruisers and 3 destroyers also suffered light damage. Captain George Chandler flying a P-38 fighter pilot described how “There were B-24 bombers up high and B-25 bombers attacking right down on the deck dropping ‘frag' bombs on the airplanes along the runways … we did our best work at high altitude, but we also took part in combat a thousand feet off the ground.” The devastation caused Admiral Miniechi Koga to withdraw his forces to Truk, thus ending the IJN threat to Bougainville. A Japanese naval officer would later admit that they had given up on Bougainville mainly because of “the serious damage received by several Second Fleet cruisers at Rabaul by carrier attack …” The successful raid against Rabaul left Halsey ecstatic. “It is real music to me and opens the stops for a funeral dirge for Tojo's Rabaul.” On November 8th, reinforcements led by Rear-admiral Alfred Montgomery task force 38, with the new fleet carriers USS Bunker Hill, Essex and Independence. With the added carrier strength on November 11th, a follow up air raid was made seeing the IJN cruiser Agano torpedoed and badly damaged, while 35 Japanese aircraft out of 120 launched in a counter attack against the carrier force were shot down. Montgomery would not lose a single ship. Admiral Koga's decision to send carrier pilots to bolster Rabaul had quite literally blown up in his face. Koga's air fleet had lost 43 of its 82 Zeros, 38 of its 34 Vals, 34 of its 40 Kates and 6 Judy spotter planes. Over 86 of his 192 experienced pilots and crew had perished, and he had only inflicted minimal damage to Nimitz fleet, it was a disaster. Yet the fantastical reports from Japanese pilots kept pouring in, claiming the air battles over Bougainville were infact won by the IJN air forces. Newspapers in Japan reported victories that added up to the destruction of 5 American battleships, 10 carriers, 19 cruisers and 7 destroyers. The reality was the destruction of 2 cruisers, the USS Birmingham and Denver. By mid november Vice Admiral Kusaka was finding it difficult to sustain attacks against allied convoys feeding supplies to Empress Augusta Bay. On November 12th, Rabaul only had 113 Zero's of which only 59 were operational. Crews were suffering from malaria and other diseases, no one was granted rest as they were limited in personnel and under constant attack. The quality of ground crews and pilots was deteriorating every week. From November 12 through December 16, the daytime skies over the Gazelle Peninsula remained relatively quiet, as the US carrier forces had departed to support operations in the Central Pacific. AirSols received a new commander on the November 20th, Major General Ralph Mitchell who continued to support operations in Bougainville and General Kenney's Fifth Air Force was supporting preparations for the landings in western New Britain. The lull gave Admiral Kusaka a brief opportunity to recuperate as replacements began to arrive from the Marshalls and Truk. The Imperial Japanese Navy would take six months to replenish its carrier pilots with less well-trained and inexperienced replacements. In the meantime the carrier fleet itself, Japan's most expensive and precious strategic asset, was forced to remain idle in Truk as Nimitz began his island hop through the Central Pacific Meanwhile the Torokina airfield had become crude but operational. The Seabees had created a single 4750 foot by 200 foot strip. It lacked taxiways, hardstands and buildings, but by December 10th it could launch aircraft. Soon the Seabees would carve 2 additional landing trips in the jungle 3 miles further inland. The first would be a mile long, the second 8000 feet or so for bombers. Unlike the Japanese airfields on the Gazelle Peninsula which would take more than a year to complete, both of these American airfields took a month. You often hear, especially from marine veterans of the pacific, praise for the Seabees, such a colossal advantage in logistics paved the way to victory. A massive fighter sweep was launched on December 17 consisting of 32 Corsairs, 24 F6Fs, and 24 RNZAF Kittyhawks from airfields at New Georgia and Vella Lavella who rendezvoused at Torokina, topped off their fuel tanks, and hit Rabaul. The strike was led by Major Greg “Pappy” Boyington, the commanding officer of Marine Fighter Squadron 214, better known by its nickname, the "Black Sheep Squadron". The three types of aircraft had different flying characteristics and different cruising speeds. The Kittyhawks, slowest of the bunch, took off first. The plan was for them to come in at 15,000ft, and lure out the Japanese. Next came the Hellcats, flying above the Kittyhawks. And the last were the Corsairs, who flew top cover. It was a long flight over open water, calculated to make the pilot of a single-engine aircraft nervous. If the engine failed it was a long swim home. They were intercepted by 35 Zeros, with the Kittyhawks getting the first jump on them. After the Kittyhawks made their first pass, shooting down a Japanese fighter, the advantage switched over to the more agile Zeros. The Kittyhawk squadron leader's plane was fatally damaged and a second Kittyhawk went down after colliding with a Zero. Remarkably, both pilots survived. Meanwhile the Hellcats and Corsairs, at high altitudes, were coming up empty. The Corsairs circled Lakunai field finding no targets. Pilot Boyington exchanged insults with an English-speaking Japanese officer over the radio, but despite his challenges found no targets in the air. When all aircraft returned to base, the score was even. Two Kittyhawks and two Zeros were lost; one each due to the collision and one shot down by both sides. It was a rather disappointing fighter sweep, but would become just one of many against Rabual over the course of the next 3 weeks. The next raid came two days later seeing 48 B-24s launched, but 32 were forced turned back. The remaining 16 bombers escorted by 51 were intercepted by 94 Japanese fighters, yet they also suffered from the bad weather. Less than half made contact with the enemy. In the resulting fight, 5 Zeros were shot down and 10 allied aircraft were lost, but only two were shot down. The other eight were due to a mid-air collision and landing mishaps, all near home. The weather persisted to be so bad, it was only on the 23rd another sortie could be launched. B-24s escorted by Corsairs and Hellcats bombed Lakunai. Radar gave the Japanese some early warning and nearly 100 Zeros were scrambled. 60 made contact with the bombers after they hit Lakunai. No bombers were lost, but 2 Corsairs were shot down in the ensuing dogfights. Yet the Americans had a twist, they followed up the raid with a fighter sweep of 48 Corsairs. They arrived 15 minutes after the bombers left, surprising the airborne Japanese fighters, most of whom lacked radios. 6 Zeros were shot down, several others damaged and only 2 Corsairs lost. 2 days later, another fighter sweep preceded by bombers was launched claiming 18 aircraft kills, but it was probably closer to 5. In comparison the Japanese pilots would claim 55 kills, a number greater than the american force sent. On the 27 another sweep was launched against Cape Gloucester downing 7 Japanese aircraft for one American. 28 Corsairs returned the next day but this time the Japanese held the advantage, sandwiching the Marines between 2 large groups of Zeros. 3 Corsairs were shot down, but so were 3 Zeros, with 2 others badly damaged. On 30th 36 Liberators escorted by 20 Hellcats and 20 Corsairs, bombed Rabaul. 1 B-24 was lost on the raid, hit by antiaircraft fire. No air combat occurred. On New Years day 15 B-24s and 68 escorting fighters met heavy fighter opposition. 40 Zeros had been sent to Rabaul from Truk, manned by veteran pilots. 1 B-24 was shot down, and two others badly damaged. On January 2 48 US fighters raided and on the 3rd another 44. The two sweeps took out a handful of fighters. The last sweep was on the 5th seeing another 2 zeros downed. Meanwhile back on December 24th, Admiral Sherman's task force 37 raided Kavieng. The operation had two purposes, 1) was to distract attention from the landings at Cape Gloucester and 2) to interdict sea traffic between Truk and Rabaul. The 5000-ton naval transport Tenyru Maru was sunk and several other ships were damaged. After this task force 37 made several raids against Kavieng through January 4th. They managed to shoot down 10 Japanese fighters, damaged IJN cruiser Noshiro and destroyers Fumizuki and Satsuki. On Janaury 6th, the bomber strip at Piva became operational, thus Rabaul was now within range of allied light and medium bombers, basically it was pounding time. On January 7th, 16 Avengers and 24 Dauntless raided Tobera airfield. From medium altitudes the Avengers dropped 2000lb pounds smashing the paved runways. The Japanese managed to shoot down 3 fighters and one dauntless, but Tobera was temporarily not operational. It was the first time any Rabaul airbase was neutralized from bomb damage. This would be followed up on the 11th by a low level attack against Vunakanau by B-25's, damaging 8 parked aircraft. Then on the 14th, Simpson Harbor was attacked by 16 Avengers , 36 Dauntless and fighter escorts. The Japanese tossed 84 fighters but the allies held such a tight formation it was difficult to get at the bombers. 2 bombers were lost before reaching Lakunai; 1 to a mid-air collision and 1 to antiaircraft fire. When the Allied aircraft finally arrived, clouds shielded Lakunai so the bombers switched to targeting the ships in Simpson Harbor. The Avengers carried 2,000lb bombs, limiting their effectiveness. Regardless, they landed hits on the 15,400-ton-displacement oiler Naruto, and thus ended its goal of becoming the Hokage. . . sorry folks could not resist that one. The destroyer Matsukaze was also damaged alongside 5 other vessels. AirSols came back to hit simpson harbor and blanche bay 3 days later sinking the Komaki Maru, Kosei Maru, Yamayuri Maru, Hakkai Maru and Iwate Maru. To take down the combined 30,000 tons of shipping AirSols lost 8 P-38s, 1 Hellcat, 1 F4U, 1 Avenger, and 1 Dauntless. The rest of January saw so many raids, sometimes 2-3 on the same day, thus I can't spend the entire podcast listing their actions, but the losses were brutal. For the Americans they would lose 23 aircraft between January 23rd-30th, for the Japanese it was around 37. By the end of the month, Rabaul was being bled dry of planes, thus the rest was withdrawn to Truk with around 40 pilots. To make up for the withdrawal, Admiral Koga brought over the air groups of carriers Junyo, Hiyo and Ryuho on the 25th adding 62 zeros, 18 vals and 18 kates to Admiral Kusakas dwindling forces. Does that not sound like performing the exact same action that saw such devastating losses in late december to early january? Yes, yes it does. Moving over to New Britain, General Shepherd had just smashed the Japanese positions along Suicide Creek. While seizing Suicide Creek some Americans captured a Japanese dispatch saying “It is essential that we conceal the intention that we are maintaining positions on Aogiri Ridge. Concerning the occupation of this position, it is necessary that Aogiri Yama is maintained.” While making arrangements for the Japanese assault against Target Hill one, Lieutenant Abe had occasion sent field dispatches to Warrant Officer Kiyoshi Yamaguchi, one of his platoon leaders. The dispatch mentioned command post locations, hour of attack, and other orders. Yamaguchi, with that seemingly incredible indifference to basic security which the Japanese so often demonstrated, simply stuck the dispatch in his pocket and carried it with him to the assault. Marines found it on his body the following morning, thereby gaining their first inkling of the existence of a terrain feature which appeared as such on none of their maps but upon which the Japanese appeared to place great importance, for reasons not yet clear. Aoigiri Ridge was not in the American maps and it was currently held by the 2nd battalion, 53rd regiment and 2nd battalion, 141st regiment. Behind the ridge was a wide trail leading to Magairapua, connecting Matsuda's HQ with Borgen Bay. The trail was heavily used and concealed extremely well from American aircraft. Back over at the American lines, by January 5th, the 3rd battalion, 7th marines had pulled back into the reserve, allowing the weapons company, 7th marines to occupy the extreme left along the shore to prepare for Shepherds offensive against Hill 150. The new formation launched their attack at 11am on the 6th. Tanks surged forward to smash a roadblock held by the 2nd battalion, 141st regiment on the left trail. Artillery was deployed on a nearby hill hitting the Japanese lines as A company tried to break through but was quickly pinned down by the roadblock. The tanks eventually burst through the roadblock sending the Japanese packing. The americans advanced through the increasingly swampy terrain, facing weaker resistance. B company crossed a small stream and stormed Hill 150 during the afternoon, securing it. Further right, C company and the 3rd battalion, 5th marines were surprised to be held up by extremely heavy fire from the until then unknown feature, Aogiri ridge. The men had no other choice than to pull back to a safe distance to dig in as they reported back the presence of the heavily fortified position. The Japanese would unleash carnage upon the men for 2 days whenever they tried to press forward. On the 7th the commanding officer of the 3rd battalion, 5th Marines, was wounded and replaced by Lt Colonel Lewis Walt. The next day, Walk's men were cautiously inching forward under heavy enemy fire through dense jungle, when they first encountered the ground rising in steepness. At this point Walt realized the feature had to be Aogiri Ridge. On the 9th, the assault battalions resumed their attacks, this time with heavy artillery support against Aogiri ridge. Walt was reinforced with Companies K and L from the 7th marines, but the advance was extremely slow and painful. Two Japanese bunkers were knocked out with white phosphorus grenades, but that ended the limited gains. Walt personally began pushing a 37mm gun excruciating foot by foot up Aogiri ridge, firing a volley of canisters every few feet. Somehow he managed to get the gun up the steep slope into a decent position to sweep the ridge, allowing the gain of a foothold on the crest of Aogiri. The loss of the ridge was a huge threat to Matsuda and Katayama's positions, so the latter decided to throw his reserves in a desperate but ferocious counterattack. At 1:15am on the 10th, Katayama sent his recently arrived 3rd battalion to attack the reverse slope. However the Marines held firm and would end up repelling 5 consecutive banzai charges with a fury and persistence unparalleled in the campaign. On the 4th try a Japanese major and two company officers succeeded in knifing through the Marine cordon almost to Colonel Walt's fox hole, 50 yards behind the front line. At that instant one of two short rounds in a 60-round artillery barrage burst in a tall tree almost directly overhead, and the major died there, sword in one hand and a pistol in the other. The 5th charge was blunted by artillery and the Japanese finally cut their losses and pulled back. The Japanese had suffered immense casualties, seeing all 3 of their battalions depleted, forcing Katayama to pull off Aogiri ridge that very night. The morning of the 10th saw Walk's men securing the feature and then discovering the vital Magairapua trail. The marines went to work mopping up the area until January 12th, whereupon Shepherd planned to seize Hill 660. The feature was guarded by the 6th company, 141st regiment supported by a number of guns of the 30th machine cannon company. The fresh 3rd battalion, 7th marines, led by lt colonel Henry Buse Jr were to perform the main assault, with the 1st battalion extending the perimeter behind them. To help the effort, the weapons company,7th marines of Captain Buckley would begin constructing a roadblock between the eastern base of Hill 660 to the shore of Borgen Bay, hoping to cut off the defenders escape route. At 08:00am on the 13th, after artillery, mortars and the 5th Air Force performed a bombardment of the area, the last Marine offensive commenced. A intricate system of small arms and automatic weapon positions going up the summit unleashed fire upon the marines, quickly pinning down I company. L Company attempted swinging to the right, but were also pinned down. Engineers worked a light tank forward far enough to place fire across a gorge demolishing the more troublesome enemy weapons. By late afternoon, together with artillery supporting fire, the pinned-down companies were rescued and withdrawn for the night. Meanwhile the Weapons company worked with their bulldozer, by 1030 they had skirted the eastern base of the hill and set up an all-around perimeter. There they dug in clearing fields of fire for about 60 yards to both north and south, placing their half-tracks and tanks in supporting positions. The only opposition they encountered during the advance was by two Japanese machine guns and emplaced near the summit of the hill. With all said and done they successfully cut off the Japanese line of retreat. On the morning of the 14th, the 3rd battalion resumed their assault, with their leading companies advancing to the right working their way up. One unit nearly got atop the crest before coming under fire from heavy machine guns. They got to a position where they could bring 60mm mortars to bear, and went to work neutralizing the machine gun positions before a final surge carried them across the summit. The Japanese fled down the crest heading east, coming straight into the line of fire of the Weapons company below. The result was a terrible rout, seeing many escape to the safety of the swamps to the hills southeast. By the end of the 14th, the marines had seized Hill 660 and were performing mop up operations through the following day. At 5:30am on the 16th, Katayama ordered the 6th and 11th companies, 141st regiment to counter attack Hill 660. Soon the marines were face to face with a large banzai charge, seeing the fighting getting up close and personal. But small arms, rifles, 60mm mortars and 81mm artillery broke the Japanese. Over 110 Japanese bodies would be found after the fight. This ended Shepherds offensive, as the remnants of Colonel Sumiya's forces began to arrive to the Borgen Bay area. Over the next few days, the exhausted 7th marines were relieved by the 5th marines and 2nd battalion, 1st marines who had recently been recalled after completing their mission at Green Beach. After suffering the defeated in Borgen Bay, General Sakai decided to order the 1st battalion, 54th regiment to reinforce Talasea and for Matsuda to launch a last ditch effort, a suicidal one at that, to obliterate the enemy. But the men were in no condition for such an offensive, thus Katayama elected to postpone it for now. Since every man was needed for the defense of Borgen Bay, Colonel Sato took the remainder of his commander and departed Rooke Island to join the main body. Now that Hill 660 was secured, the Americans began a new method of patrolling; this time their patrols would specifically seek out and destroy what was presumed to be exhausted Japanese units, before the division would attack the defensive line at Borgen Bay-Itni river. Yet that is it for new Britian, as we are going to be traveling over to the CBI theater. Between November 22 to December the 1st, two conference were held between the Allied leaders. The first was the Cairo or “sextant” conference on November 22-26th, between President FDR, Sir Winston Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek. The second was held in Tehran on November 28-December 1st between FDR, Churchill and Joseph Stalin. You might be asking, why did they all not meet up together. The crux of it was the Soviet-Japanese neutrality Pact and to a lesser extent, though probably not in Chiang Kai-Shek's mind, Stalin was aiding the CCP. Because the Soviets had not declared war on the Japanese, it would not look to good if they met with the leader of China, likewise Chiang Kai-shek was not too forthcoming to meet with Stalin. The easy fix was to just have two different conferences. Overall the conferences did not really touch too much upon the Pacific war. But Stalin did promise to declare war on Japan within ninety days after the end of the European War. In return he demanded military and logistical concessions in Manchuria, maintenance of Outer Mongolia under Soviet control as well as sovereignty over the Kuril Islands that stretched from north of Japan to Russia's Kamchatka Peninsula. When Chiang Kai-shek heard about this he had suspicious and noted “The influence of this conference on China will be great. I hope Roosevelt isn't plotting with Churchill and Stalin against me.” Soon his suspicion would turn to anger when he discovered there were secret protocols relating to Manchuria. Stalin had made some assurances to Mao Zedong that once the Soviets were in the war against Japan, they would have forces to bear down into China to help tip the scale for the CCP against the NRA. Yet after the war, it would seem promises made by Joseph Stalin were not always kept. Another important aspect of the conferences was the British decision to cancel Operation Buccaneer, the invasion of the Andaman Islands, because Admiral Mountbatten's landing crafts were required for landings in southern france. The Joint chiefs of staff were livid at this, because it came at the same time the Japanese were reinforcing Burma. FDR overruled them and agreed to the British decision and this in turn greatly pissed off Chiang Kai-Shek. Yet at the same time, the Cairo declaration had lifted up the morale for the Chinese army and people to continue their war against the Japanese. The declarations made by the Tehran conference implied publicly that the CBI theater was all but abandoned to the mercy of Japan's air and land forces. Thus it would be no coincidence the Japanese thought it ripe to launch an all-out offensive against China. In the meantime, the rather aggressive Admiral Mountbatten was trying to salvage what he could of the situation. To try and please Chiang Kai-Shek, he proposed Operation Pigstick. The operation was something Mountbatten had wargamed a bit, it was to be a landing on the southern Mayu peninsula aimed at hitting Akyab. He began assigning landing craft for the amphibious operation, only to be immediately slapped down by Alanbrooke and told to return 3 fast tank landing crafts that were direly needed for operations against Italy. Mountbatten hoped to retain 2 slower tank landing craft, but Cunningham requested them. Pigstick was to be 2 divisions plus 2 brigades who would be used in a southward advance down the peninsula and 1 division in an amphibious assault aimed at surrounding and destroying not less than 20,000 Japanese. An additional landing similar to PIGSTICK, could perhaps be launched in the Ramree-Cheduba area, could take staging areas that would put 15 Corps within reach of Rangoon. Speaking of Ramree, if any of you have heard this kind of myth about over 1000 Japanese being eaten by crocodiles on that island, over on my personal channel the pacific war channel I did a full investigation into the so called “ramree island massacre” story. A little sad about its performance not going to lie. Dramatically improved my lackluster animation skills for it, came out really well and I did a silly impersonation at the beginning, anyways check it out its a fun one! Alongside Pigstick, Mountbatten changed the Tarzan operation into Operation Gripfast, calling for an offensive on north and central Burma with an airborne landing at Indaw to sever the Japanese line of communications to Myitkyina. But now Chiang Kai-Shek was very wary of anything British, so he rejected the plans on December 19th. Alongside pissing off Chiang Kai-Shek, his estranged wife, Joseph Stilwell was also again angry with the British, particularly Mountbatten. At one point Mountbatten proposed moving certain American units into the Hukawng valley to help the offensive there and Stillwell burst out ‘I should like it placed on record that I am responsible for the training of all American forces in this theatre and I am the person to decide when they are adequately trained and can move forward.' Mountbatten replied: ‘I accept that in principle, but would remind you that these troops are being trained under British officers. I am responsible for operations and will decide when units move into the fighting lines. In other words, general, I should like to place on record that I am Supreme Commander out here and what I say goes.' Stilwell took it good-humouredly and laughed. ‘We none of us dispute that,'”. That day Stilwell wrote a letter to his wife, referring scathingly to Mountbatten as ‘the glamour boy. He doesn't wear well and I begin to wonder if he knows his stuff. Enormous staff, endless walla-walla but damn little fighting . . . And of course the Peanut is unchanged. The jungle is a refuge from them both.' The men would all share some screaming matches against another, until Stilwell would shock everyone by exclaiming “I am prepared to come under General Slim's operational control until I get to Kamaing.” It was a truly bizarre idea, Mountbatten asked how such a thing would work, and both Slim and Stilwell asked to discuss the matter amongst themselves. The two men would agree on tactical essentials such as getting more Chinese divisions for the Ledo force and to use the Chindits to assist in hitting Myitkyina. Slim and Stilwell shook hands and Stilwell said to him ‘I would fight under a corporal as long as he would let me fight.' Slim would later reflecte ‘In practice this illogical command set-up worked surprisingly well. My method with Stilwell was based on what I had learnt of him in the Retreat – to send him the minimum of written instructions, but, whenever I wanted anything, to fly over and discuss it with him, alone. Stilwell, talking things over quietly with no one else present, was a much easier and more likeable person than Vinegar Joe with an audience. Alone, I never found him unreasonable or obstructive. I think I told him to do something he did not approve of on only two or three occasions, and on each he conformed, I will not say willingly, but with good grace.' In the end Operation Pigstick never became a reality, because the landing crafts were needed for the Italian campaign and thus the hope of meeting Chiang Kai-sheks continued demand for an amphibious operation was gone. It was almost like the British never intended to go through with such a thing in the first place, woops that is just my opinion. Meanwhile the British-Indian command elected to start a new operation in Arakan. The brutal hard-won lessons of 1st Arakan battle had been absorbed in India Command, with senior British officers determined to avoid similar mistakes. The new operation was the subject of meticulous reconnaissance, planning, and rehearsals. A series of lectures, war games, models of the grounds and syndicate discussions were held for commanders, staff and regimental officers whom carefully considered countering Japanese offensive tactics and assaulting prepared defensive positions like those witnessed at Donbaik. A carefully planned programme of continuous, progressive and intensive training was put in hand for all corps and divisional fighting, support and administrative troops to practice necessary skills, including using brigade boxes, aerial resupply and the infiltration and envelop- ment of enemy positions. This comprehensive training programme culminated in intensive rehearsals and combined arms training with artillery, tanks and close support aircraft carried out near Lohardaga, over ground resembling Arakan, simulating attacks on mock Japanese defensive positions on jungle-clad hills. General Auchinleck assigned the 15th corps, reconstituted at Ranchi with the 3 best trained divisions available: Major-General Harold Briggs' 5th Indian Division; Major-General Frank Messervy's 7th Indian Division and Major-General Christopher Woolner's 81st West African Division.The 26th Indian Division formed the corps reserve. Command of the 15th corps would be given to Lt General Philip Christison. The plan called for the 5th and 7th Indian divisions to advance along the summit of the Mayu range towards Maungdaw and Buthidaung while the 5th and 6th west african brigades would provide flanking protection. On November 1st, the 2 Indian divisions began their advance and by mid november would make contact with a Japanese outpost.As the 7th Indian division advanced astride the Kalapanzin River they ran into stiff resistance. Efforts to dislodge Japanese defenders near Awlanbyin and Letwedet, showcased the formidable difficulties that attacking Japanese defensive bunker positions presented. Most were built on razor-back ridges, through which were burrowed fire positions, affording a limited approach, while the reverse slopes protected troops from view and bombardment. With the precipitous Goppe Pass initially only suitable for porters, pack transport and pack artillery, 7th Indian Division quickly devised other methods to overcome enemy defenses, since normal stereotyped, set-piece attacks stood little chance of success without supporting field artillery. Aircraft proved an ineffective substitute, moreover, with dive-bombing having only a transitory effect since the broken terrain and dense jungle absorbed blast leaving defenses and morale largely intact unless a lucky direct hit was made. The Indian forces began to infiltrate and bypass the well-entrenched Japanese defenses, giving the impression they would soon unleash a frontal attack upon them at any moment. General Messervy's would say of the action “'We will undoubtedly have a Neapolitan sandwich of British - Japs - British, but it will be one made by ourselves, and with the initiative in our hands it will soon be transformed to British - British - Jap.” They were gaining ground and with it valuable combat experience. On the night of November 30th, the 15th Indian Corps commenced large-scale operations to drive in the Japanese outpost line astride the Mayu Range. A series of brisk skirmishes were fought by 33rd Indian Infantry Brigade on the jungle-cloaked ridges south of Awlanbyin quickly evicting small determined parties of Japanese infantry from carefully prepared platoon and company defensive localities. This was by no means an easy task since most heavily camouflaged positions were built atop steep hillsides overlooking paddy fields that provided an open field of five and difficult going for advancing troops. Earlier directions about infiltration paid off in practice. An attack on Awlanbyin west redoubt from the rear through thick jungle achieved complete surprise. Although a neighboring Japanese position initially held out, its garrison withdrew on 2nd December after being cut off. The 33rd Brigade columns crossed the Ngakyedauk Chaung and occupied the area from Ngakyedauk village to the ridge about 1.5 miles north-west of Sinohbyin village. By December3rd, they extended the area of operation to the hills overlooking Maungyithaung and Sinohbyin. The 89th Brigade, meanwhile, pushed forward down Tatmin Chaung and established forward positions on the hills south of the chaung, one mile west of Tatmingyaungywa. By mid-month, 7th Indian Division had reached the main enemy positions covering the Tunnels and Buthidaung, and the opening of the Ngakyedauk Pass to wheeled traffic in late December considerably eased resupply and allowed the divisional artillery to join the formation. However, both the Indian divisions were under orders not to get engaged in serious fighting with the Japanese, so the advance stopped there. It is also important to note, in November 1943, Spitfires were deployed in Bengal for the first time. The 615th and 617th squadrons were based in Chittagong to protect the vital port and also to cover the Arakan. Within one month, the Spitfires destroyed four Japanese photographic reconnaissance aircraft. Previously, the Dinah's range, speed and height had enabled them to fly with impunity over the Allied forward bases and the Hurricanes were unable to catch them. The Japanese reacted by sending out fighter sweeps in order to test the Spitfires and whittle down Spitfire strength. However, by the end of December, the Japanese lost 22 aircraft, another 33 were damaged, and the Allied loss was only 13 aircraft. The greatest air battle occurred on the last day of 1943. On that day, No. 136 Squadron destroyed 12 and damaged 11 when a mixed force of Japanese fighters and bombers attempted to attack the light naval force along the Arakan Coast. The Japanese carried out one strategic attack when on 5 December 1943, 60 bombers and fighters, including some naval aircraft, in two waves bombed Calcutta. The Japanese lost two aircraft and another five were damaged. The three and a half squadrons of Hurricane fighters, including half a squadron of night fighters which were defending the area lost five aircraft and another six were damaged. To the west the 5th Indian Division had also encountered stiffening resistance from Japanese outposts as it advanced southwards along the coastal plain towards Maungdaw, through the foothills further north and along the spine of the jungle-clad Mayu Mountains. They soon discovered that overcoming Japanese bunker defenses presented particular difficulties. As the division would report "The great difficulty in attacking Jap "hill top" positions lies in the concealment of the actual bunker or weapon pit' one brigade commander later wrote, and in the practical impossibility of deploying attacking troops in thick jungle, particularly where the approach runs along the top of a razor backed ridge.' In each case, patrols infiltrated between these localities isolated them from supplies and reinforcements with the result that Japanese normally gave up ground without a contest. A newsletter prepared by the HQ of 5th Indian Division reported: 'The only way to deal with the Jap def positions is by INFILTRATION. Recent experience has shown that the Jap has produced nothing new in def tactics... It is almost physically impossible in hilly and thick country to have every post covered by another, the posts can be eliminated piece- meal by infiltration tactics.' After the outline of the main Japanese defenses became apparent this approach was also increasingly applied at brigade level. At the end of December 1943, the 5th Indian Division held the area from the sea to the crest of the Mayu Peninsula and the 7th Indian Division moved into the Kalapanzin Valley. By the end of the month they reached Maungdaw. The advancing 5th Indian Division discovered that frontal assaults could not be completely avoided, however, when Japanese troops were determined to stay put. During this advance, the 161st Brigade moved to the high ground to the northeast of Bakkagona about five miles to the north of Razabil. On 30th December, 161st Indian Infantry Brigade assaulted Point 124, but the 4/7th Rajputs were held up by dense jungle and heavy mortar and machine fire and suffered heavy casualties. For six days assaults continued with the forward infantry regularly reaching the Japanese defenses before being driven off by showers of hand grenades and supporting machine-gun from every other enemy defensive position within range. Only after a 'policy of strangulation, starvation, and attrition was adopted', did its defenders withdraw. The 5th Indian Division immediately began probing the main Razabil defenses, while its 123rd Indian Infantry Brigade patrolled the western foothills of the Mayu Range and northern side of Razabil, particularly two hill positions dubbed Wrencat and Wrenkitten. To do so an indirect approach was again advocated by Major-General Harold Briggs in note on tactical policy issued on 4th January, stressing the importance of patrolling to identify positions held by the Japanese and infiltration to seize vital ground in their flanks or rear that would either provoke Japanese counterattacks or force a withdrawal. Meanwhile Stilwell arrived to Shingbwiyang on December 21st and assumed command of the Chinese forces in India. To relive the trapped battalion of the 112th regiment at Yupbang Ga, Stilwell and General Sun planned to send the entire 114th regiment to break the Japanese center at Yupang Ga to rescue the 112th, then hook north to envelope the northern fragment of the Japanese defensive line. On December 24th, they unleashed artillery and launched the infantry into the Japanese lines. The 114th regiment managed to envelop the Japanese right flank by the afternoon and soon a breakthrough emerged allowing for them to make contact with the 112th. Sun's men then surrounded the Japanese pocket during the night and would wipe them out the next morning. And thus the Chinese had gained their first victory at Yupbang Ha, though the Japanese still held the river crossing, so Stilwell began plans for another assault set after Christmas. On December 28th, Sun ordered 3 battalions to attack the north, while the 1st battalion, 112th regiment would sweep to the right, getting behind the 3 Japanese outer strongpoints. The chinese forces rapidly broke the Japanese outer defenses creating a breach while the 1st battalion, 114th regiment broke through the river defensive line. The Japanese tossed a large counterattack, but it would be repelled by the night time. Now Yupbang Ga was in allied hands as the surviving Japanese companies split into smaller groups trying to hold out for many days. With the fall of Yupbang Ga, the Japanese were forced to withdraw from Sharaw Ga as well, so elements of the 2rd battalion, 113th Regiment were be able to seize it by December 30. In the meantime, as the 22nd Division's 65th Regiment had been sent towards the Taro Plain to try and secure the southern flank, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 114th Regiment had been sent south to cross the Tanai Hka at the Kantau ford in an effort to cut off the enemy withdrawal line. By the end of 1943, with the loss of 315 killed and 429 wounded, Sun's 38th Division had gained complete control of the Tarung Hka. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Things were deteriorating for the Japanese on New Britain as American Marines were seizing features and gradually pushing them into Borgan Bay. Within the CBI theater a ton of drama amongst the high commanders was surprisingly not resulting in disaster, as operations in Burma were kicking off with great results. Perhaps Burma could be saved.
Last time we spoke about Operation Backhander, the landings at Cape Gloucester. General Douglas MacArthur unleashed another cog in the machine that was his drive back to the Philippines. The 1st Marines under General Rupertus were back in the action, spearheading the landings at Cape Gloucester. The landings were successful and multiple allied units began advancing towards the airdrome. Colonel Sumiya realized the futility of attempting a defense upon the open ground against American armor, so he pulled his units away towards Razorback Hill from which they could launch harassment maneuvers against the new American perimeter. Over on New Guinea the Australians continued their drive towards Sio, pushing the Japanese even further north in the process. The Japanese were being attacked in multiple places without the ability to contest them everywhere. What would the Japanese commanders do to establish a proper defense? This episode is Landing at Saidor Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Last week we left off with General Nakai unleashing a counteroffensive against Kesawai. The counteroffensive was successful at pushing the Australian commando's out of the area to prevent them from encroaching upon Madang. These actions worried General Vasey who thought the Japanese might follow them up with an offensive against Dumpu. Vasey elected to carry out a punitive attack along Shaggy Ridge. Perhaps a refresher as I think I did once describe it, but Shaggy Ridge is located six miles north of Dumpu. The razorback ridge has one elevation of more than 5,000 feet, running roughly southeast to northwest. The highest point on the ridge is known as the Kankirei Saddle. There are also three high elevations along the ridge that the Australians named the Pimple, the Intermediate Snipers' Pimple, and the Green Sniper's Pimple. The Japanese had constructed four miles of defenses along the northern part of the ridge. These positions dominated the trail along which the Australians would eventually have to cross. The trail was narrow, only two to three feet wide, and there were drops on either side of 300 to 500 feet. The Japanese had also constructed a rough road on the coast side to a point between the Mindjim and Faria Rivers, making supply to the defenders much easier. The Pimples were the strong points, and the Japanese had built fortified posts with machine guns and deep trenches on each. Vasey's punitive force consisted of the 2/16th battalion under the temporary command of Major Garth Symington. Patrols had been sent to figure out decent approaches for an attack against the Pimple, but everything indicated there was only a narrow path to perform a frontal assault from. Thus Symington planned to assault the Pimple and exploit for about 400 yards along the ridge with Captain Christian's B Company while Captain Anderson's D Company maneuvered behind to consolidate the ground gained. Fortunately Symington would be receiving aerial support from the American 41st Squadron and Australian No. 4 Squadron, artillery support from the 8th battery and 54th battery and back up from the 2/27th battalion who would launch a diversionary attack against the Japanese along the Faria River and Mainstream area. During the morning of December 27th, the assault began with 16 Kittyhawks and two Boomerangs bombing the Pimple followed by artillery. Dive bombing, strafing and artillery fire was intense causing reverberation and roars that could be heard up and down the Ramu Valley. An hour later, B Company's leading platoon departed their startline under the foliage of the rainforest to scale the rock face leading to the pimple. Although the bombardment was stunning, the dazed Japanese defenders quickly responded to the invaders by tossing grenades from the well sited pillboxes atop the pimple. The Australians dashed forward and wiped out the forward pillbox, securing their toehold on the ridge. With the artillery firing further forward the Australians were soon able to capture the second pimple feature just 100 yards ahead, successfully clearing the Japanese from their entrenchments. However at this point, B company came across a strong rock bunker. They first allowed the artillery to smash it, then they tossed grenades while trying to outflank the defenders. A Japanese defender refusing to surrender, covered the entrance to his pillbox with a groundsheet and for about two hours flicked away the grenades thrown at him before they could explode. Eventually he was blasted out when a grenade was tied to the end of a bamboo pole which was poked into the pit, the pin being pulled out by a length of string. More than 100 grenades were thrown during the day at the rock bunker in front of the second pimple. As hard as they tried it was impossible to outflank as the sides of the razorback guarding the bunker were almost perpendicular. Christian was forced to pull B company back and dig in on the second pimple. Meanwhile, D company came up to relieve the exhausted men of B company. To deal with the bunker menace, Australian Pioneers chiseled a track along the cliff face towards it and designed a special bomb consisting of a grenade placed in a chemical and sealed in a field ration tin. During the morning of the 28th, D company advanced over their newly cut track and hurled the new bombs successfully blowing up the enemy bunker. While this was occurring, Lt Scott's 18th Platoon was advancing down the eastern slope of Shaggy Ridge attempting a encircling maneuver against the third pimple. At 10.50 a.m Scott reported being at the base of the third pimple and a quarter of an hour later the artillery and mortars began firing smoke to cover his Platoon's advance. At the foot of the objective Scott ordered his platoon sergeant, Longman, to take a small party of Owen gunners up the third pimple. Under heavy enemy machine-gun fire Longman and three men charged an enemy machine-gun post near the top. Two of his men were wounded but Longman and the other man continued to advance upon the enemy post and eventually silenced it with Owen-gun fire. To reach the enemy post they had to pull themselves up a steep slope with one hand and fire their Owens with the other. Still under heavy fire from other enemy posts the two men covered the evacuation of the two wounded and neutralized the fire of another enemy post 40 yards away which was opposing the advance of the rest of the platoon, led by the wounded Scott, up the cliff face. Nine minutes after Longman led the first assault, Scott was in possession of the third pimple and was covering the advance of Lieutenant McCaughey's 16 Platoon to the fourth and highest pimple, later named McCaughey's Knoll, farther along the ridge. The two platoons then dug in on the newly-won ground. During the afternoon, the battered Japanese attempted a counterattack but were easily repelled, suffering a total of 28 dead during the battle against Symington's three killed and eight wounded. After the pimples were captured, the fighting fell into a series of artillery duels and patrol skirmishes. With the Pimples in hand the Australians could observe Madang. Vasey at this time acquired further support from General MacArthur who relieved his exhausted brigades with the 18th and 15th brigades. Meanwhile General Adachi sensed key points in the Madang area were not defended well enough, so he ordered the bulk of the 41st division to advance from Wewak to Madang. In early december, the 2nd battalion, 237th regiment and 2nd mountain artillery battalion of the 41st group were deployed at Karkar island. However the movement of the rest of the division was sent to the Gogol area and was heavily delayed by storms that caused numerous rivers to overflow. But now we are shifting gears and heading over to the Huon Peninsula where a new allied landing was about to occur. In early December, General MacArthur finally decided to act upon a suggestion put forward by his assistant chief of staff Lt General Stephen Chamberlain. Chamberlain argued Saidor on the south side of the Huon Peninsula should be occupied in order to construct an advanced air and naval base. MacArthur waited until two days before the Arawe expedition, before giving orders to Krueger to prepare plans for a landing against Saidor. Because of limited landing craft the landings would need to be pushed until January 2nd. The operation was code named Michelmas and initially it was thought the 503rd parachute infantry could be airdropped over Saidor, but a limited number of aircraft killed this one in the crib. Thus the 32nd division who had been earmarked for the canceled Gasmata landings were chosen for the task. The general outline for the operation was discussed at a conference held on Goodenough island on December 20th attended to be Barbey, Major General William Gill, Whitehead commanding the 32nd division, Colonel Clarence Martin commanding the 126th regiment and other staff officers. Allied intelligence reports indicated the Japanese had few forces in the Saidor region. Nevertheless, the plans called for landings in force on three beaches codenamed Red, White and Blue on the west shore of Dekay's bay. If the Americans could successfully seize Saidor, this would cut the Japanese retreat from Finschhafen and therefore would trap another Japanese division at Sio. Krueger selected the 126th Regiment for the task after they were rebuilt following the Battle of Buna-Gona and retrained in amphibious warfare. Brigadier-General Clarence Martin would act as the commander of the new Michaelmas task force. MacArthur did not have much time to carry out ground reconnaissance, thus the 3 beaches selected were chosen primarily from aerial photograph data. They would prove to be quite narrow, rocky and exposed to heavy seas. Because the allied intelligence indicated few Japanese forces in the area, MacArthur elected not to perform a preliminary aerial bombardment. Admiral Barbey's amphibious force were now well experienced veterans with amphibious landings, so the last minute notice did not hinder them too much. On January the 1st, Martin's men were tossed onto 9 APD's, 17 LCI's and two LST's supported by 9 of Barbey's Destroyers and Admiral Crutchley's Cruiser force, hoping to intercept some IJN forces. Yet Crutchley would be disappointed as Admiral Koga had his hands full with something cooking up at Rabaul and Kavieng and could not afford to dispense units to Saidor. What could hinder the landings was air forces from the IJA at Wewak, though they were considerably weakened with just 39 fighters, 17 light bombers and 7 heavy bombers available after so many allied air strikes. The landings went off smoothly. The beaches were hit by more than 2000 shells within 20 minutes prior to the first LCV landings at around 7am. Two battalions of the 126th landed abreast without opposition and quickly established a perimeter. Soon a 3rd battalion passed through and extended the perimeter further left upon high ground, just southwest of an unserviceable airfield. Captain Meredith Muggins, who played a key role in the capture of Sanananda, recalled his impressions of this seemingly uneventful landing: “When we landed at Saidor it was an amazing sight. There were dozens of warships bombarding the coast. The sound was like a rolling thunder and the smoke hung along the ground. As we approached the beach, air attacks began. Heavy bombers dropped their load of high explosive from a few thousand feet. Then came in the B-25 strafers shooting everything in sight, clobbering positions. Behind them came fighters to give the Japs a final working over. There was very little opposition when we landed. We found a few wandering around in shell shock. What a contrast from the days at Buna and Sanananda, only a year before, when we were fighting with rifles, grenades, and rocks!” Thus 8000 troops were landed ashore by the end of the day. The only real resistance came in the form of some air raids from Wewak beginning at 4pm. 9 Japanese Nakajima Ki-49 (Helen) aircraft, escorted by up to 20 Zeros and Kawasaki Ki-61 (Tony) fighters bombed the beach area at 4:30pm. There were three more air raids during the night, and 49 over the course of the month, but most were quite small. Thus on Januaruy the 3rd MacArthur triumphantly stated “We have seized Saidor on the north coast of New Guinea. In a combined operation of ground, sea and air forces, elements of the Sixth Army landed at three beaches under cover of heavy air and naval bombardment. The enemy was surprised both strategically and tactically and the landings were accomplished without loss. The harbour and airfields are in our firm grasp. Enemy forces on the north coast between Sixth Army and the advancing Australians are trapped with no source of supply and face disintegration and destruction.” The Saidor area and her landing strip were in allied hands and further men and supplies would be brought over without enemy interference. Over on the Japanese side, General Adachi had the understrength and exhausted 51st division garrisoning Sio while the 20th division was retreating from the Finschhafen area. On December 30th, Adachi arrived to Kiari where he ordered the 51st to advance to Bogia, once the 20th had arrived at Sio. Since mid December, some units, such as the bulk of the 66th regiment had already made it to Bogia, where they could be rehabilitated, leaving just the 3rd composite battalion of the 66th regiment, the 3rd battalion HQ, the 10th company and one machine gun company to garrison Gali under the leadership of General Muroya. Just as Adachi was preparing to depart on January 2nd, he received word of the allied landing at Saidor which effectively opened up a new and important threat against his isolated forces. Adachi believed it was now useless to hold on to Sio and the Vitiaz Strait, since enemy troops were also landed on New Britain. Furthermore his main base at Madang was now vulnerable. Thus Adachi placed General Nakano in command of both divisions now designated the Nakano force and ordered him to advance the forces to Gali by submarine to try and secure the new key supply point while the Shoge detachment would delay the Australian advance to Sio. Nakano would therefore have to break through or bypass Saidor overland to arrive safely at Madang. Additionally the 41st division was ordered to depart Wewak immediately and advance overland towards Madang. General Nakai was given orders to advance his detachment towards Saidor to try and contain the American advance as long as possible and this would only leave the 2nd battalion, 78th regiment under Colonel Matsumoto Matsujiro on the Kankirei Saddle-Shaggy Ridge area. On January 3rd, Lt General Goro Mano was flown directly to Alexishafen to assume command of all units in the Madang region, including the Matsumoto detachment. Back over in Saidor, the Americans began to send patrols and an outpost was setup at Sel on January the 5th while the 3rd battalion, 126th regiment skirmished with other American patrols at Teterei and Biliau. General Muroya managed to secure Gali without much difficulty. Meanwhile, upon receiving the news of the Saidor landing, Brigadier Windeyer's 20th Brigade continued their advance, expecting the march to be a lot easier. After fording the Sanga River on January 3rd, the 2/17th battalion advanced to the Sazomu river while fighting off elements of Colonel Miyake's rearguard. At this point General Katagiri's forces were in a full retreat towards Kiari, only performing some rearguard against around Kelanoa. Thus the 2/17th advance went pretty much undisturbed as they reached the Dallman River on January 6th. Kelanoa offered more defensible positions, so Windeyer cautiously sent some patrols to scout the area out, trying to avoid unnecessary casualties. At 8 a.m. on the 8th the 2/17th resumed their advance and half an hour later their leading company was met with some fire from a track junction. There seemed to be about 40 determined Japanese with four machine-guns holding the area. The Australians killed 8 Japanese and lost 2 in the process with another 2 wounded. As the company could make no headway without further casualties they withdrew to a kunai patch south-east of the track junction so that artillery mortars and machine-guns could hit the Japanese. The position was hit with mortar heavily causing the Japanese to withdraw during the night. The next day at 9:30am the Australian battalion advanced through the position finding abandoned pill boxes, foxholes and several dead Japanese. Later during the day, a group of 30 heavily armed Japanese fire upon the battalion 1500 yards from the Buri River. The Australians unleashed artillery, mortars and machine guns upon them until 4pm when some tanks arrived forcing the Japanese to flee. Meanwhile the Japanese were able to repair 12 barges which were quickly used to evacuate wounded towards Gali. Unfortunately, allied PT boats were lurking in the area like sharks. The PT boats unsuccessfully attacked Adachi's submarine that was bringing him back over to Madang but managed to destroy one barge carrying 100 wounded near Herwath Point and damaged others. Most of the wounded would reach Gali by the 10th and 20th division advanced past Kiari on the 9th and were drawing closer to Gali. The 2/17th crossed the Buri River on the 10th and reached the Kapugara river the next day without opposition. General Nakano departed Kiari with his division heading for Gali. It was now only the Shoge detachment that stood in the path of the Australians. The Shoge detachment received orders on January 13th to withdraw towards Sio using an exhausting inland route going from Nambariwa to Nokopo. The Australians would soon enter the ruins of Nambariwa finding the Japanese had destroyed numerous large dumps. Nambariwa had been the principal Japanese supply base for the Finschhafen area, both banks of its river had been barge loading points. There were numerous facilities such as barge workshops, engineer store dumps, hospital areas and bivouac areas. By January 15th the Australian forces would occupy Sio uncontested. General Wootten's 9th division had completed its mission and it would be their last action in New Guinea. Wootten had received word in early January that the 8th Brigade led by Brigadier Claude Cameron was being brought over to Finschhafen to relieve the 24th Brigade. Now with the fall of Sio, General Berryman ordered the 5th division now under the command of Major General Alan Ramsay to take over the forward area. Mop up operations would continue for a week, until the 4th battalion, 8th brigade and 5th division officially took over Sio. The advance from Fortification Point to Sio saw the 20th Brigade suffer 3 deaths, 13 wounded and 958 sick from malaria, mosquitoes remaining a larger foe than the Japanese as usual. The 20th brigade had marched 50 miles in 24 days and counted a total of 303 dead Japanese and captured 22. Within the 4 months campaign going back to September 22nd, Wootten's 9th division had suffered 283 deaths and 744 wounded, but estimated they killed 3099 Japanese, captured 39 and inflicted around 4644 wounded. Now we are heading back to the boys on New Britain. With the airdrome secured and a strong defensive perimeter surrounding it, General Rupertus radioed the commander of the 6th Army “First Marine Division presents to you as an early New Year gift the complete airdome of Cape Gloucester. Situation well in hand due to fighting spirit of troops, the usual Marine luck and the help of God…” General Krueger expressed himself as "delighted." At his advance headquarters at Port Moresby General Douglas MacArthur, presented the airdrome to the people of the United States with his compliments and sent Rupertus the following dispatch: “I extend my heartiest congratulations to your officers and men. I am filled with pride and gratitude by their resourceful determination in capturing Cape Gloucester. Your gallant Division has maintained the immortal record of the Marine Corps and covered itself with glory.” General Rupertus raised the US flag on an improvised staff above the main strip with simple ceremonies on December 31. Soon American engineers were being brought over to repair the airfield as the Japanese sent nightly air raids to hamper these efforts. The Japanese still held several operational airfields within range, but their efforts to bomb the Americans positions were hampered by terrible weather. They also never massed air forces to attack in great strength, thus the damage was always minor and easily repairable. To the east, assistant commander of the 1st Marines, Brigadier General Lemuel Shepherd assumed command of the forces within the Yellow Beach perimeter. Due to the lack of Japanese resistance around the airdrome, the Marine commanders were convinced General Matsuda was retaining the bulk of his strength in the Borgen Bay area, thus leaving Colonel Sumiya out to dry. Shepherd elected to take his force and use them to clear up the Borgen Bay area. On January 1st he proposed to hold fast on the left and center of the Yellow Beach perimeter, while his right line consisting of the 3rd battalions of the 7th and 5th Marines would advance southeast. On the other side, Colonel Katayama had just arrived at Magairapua with his 2nd battalion on January 1st. It seems at this point Matsuda made an error. Perhaps its because he was essentially a transportation expert rather than a combat leader, perhaps it was due to his failed initial attacks, but he decided to place Katayama in command of all the forces in the Brogen Bay area. Now designated the Katayama detachment, these forces were the 2nd battalion, 53rd regiment and 2nd and 3rd battalions 141st regiment.There would also soon be Major Tatsumi Asaschichi's 3rd Battalion who were still en route from Nigol and Cape Bushing. Katayama first tackled his command by underestimating his enemy's strength. Katayama ordered an offensive in force against Target Hill to be led by Captain Mukai Toyoji's 2nd battalion, 141st regiment. Major Takabe Shinichi's 2nd Battalion, 53rd Regiment, would attack the center of the marine perimeter to confuse the Americans and prevent them from reinforcing the hill. At this time Target Hill was being defended by the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, more particularly their A Company . This unit was deployed with its 1st Platoon defending the area on the left between the beach and swamp, the 2nd Platoon holding a series of strong points on such dry ground as could be found in the swamp itself, and only the 3rd Platoon on the hill proper. Unbeknownst to Katayama, Shepherd had begun his offensive at 10:00am on the 2nd. The 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, under the temporary command of Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis B. Puller and 3rd Battalion, 5th Marinesunder the command of Lieutenant-Colonel David S. MacDougal were advancing abreast southeast towards Suicide Creek. The terrain they were traversing was particularly brutal. The 3rd battalion had to hack their way through the jungle going some 300 yards where they would come across well prepared Japanese positions. The 5th battalion had a longer distance to travel, but would encounter less resistance at the early phase. The 5th battalion attempted an encircling movement from the west, the assault troops soon encountered the face of the same Japanese pocket that was holding up the 3rd battalion and were halted in turn. As a result, the attacking lines on the night of 2 January, and throughout 3 January, resembled a huge letter "U", with the enemy strong point contained on three sides. Recognizing Suicide Creek was a major obstacle, the Japanese had sited their positions skillfully to cover it. Time after time Marines attempted crossings, only to be fired upon from invisible positions. The Japanese had become experts at field fortifications. The jungle curtailed both their attackers' freedom of movement and enhanced their own concealment: Marines would need get within just a few feet of the emplacements in order to locate them, by which time few were left alive to spot them for others. Even their lack of fortification materials--cement and steel reinforcing--reacted in favor of the Japanese, for the earth-and-log bunkers which they improvised were too soft-surfaced to detonate bazooka rockets, the heaviest weapons the infantry was capable of bringing to the point of contact. To support these bunkers, they had dug deep foxholes between and under the flaring buttress roots of the giant trees characteristic of the region, camouflaging them with foliage and cutting cunningly interlocking fire lanes. Artillery and mortar shells and air bombs were all but useless in reaching these positions, owing to the fantastically high forest cover that usually caused tree bursts, to which the deeply dug-in enemy was virtually invulnerable. The marines gradually surrounded the well prepared positions of the 2nd battalion, 53rd regiment during the night, but they could do little else as each attack brought failure. Under the cover of darkness and Marine mortar fire, Katayama's assault troops and engineers hacked their way to the lower slopes of Target Hill. They did their best not to make any noise as they attempted scaling it, but the Marine defenders heard them. On January 3rd they launched their attack, unleashing artillery, mortar and 20mm machine cannon fire from below the hill. However most of the artillery missed the hill altogether, and the 20mm cannon fire was not causing much damage. Company D's mortars replied from their positions behind the hill, but the high angle of fire precluded effective damage to the advance enemy elements which had actually worked their way to positions about 20 feet from the Marines' front emplacements by then. Katayama's 5th company leading the assault fought bravely and with great determination, but against the steep terrain and inadequate support, against a very alert enemy proved too much for them. By dawn the attack had died down and the 5th company was virtually annihilated. Further to the west, the 53rd regiments secondary attack had achieved little more and suffered heavily for it. The Japanese were now trying to resist Shepherds attacks along the Suicide Creek while engineers of the 17th Marines were building a corduroy causeway across the coastal swamp to enable tanks to come into the action. By the morning of the 4th, following a 15 minute artillery bombardment, the first Sherman wallowed through the shallow water and mounted itself on the opposite bank. Soon the other Shermans followed and their 75mm guns began to absolutely devastate the Japanese emplacements from point blank range. Shepherd's assault battalions surged forward across their whole front, encountering no further opposition. Encouraged by the victory and the apparent death or withdrawal of all Japanese in contact to the immediate front, General Shepherd ordered the advance to continue, changing direction to south-southeast. Meanwhile, the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, pinched out by the successful sweep of its former front and the tying-in of 3rd battalion and 1st battalion on their left, executed a wide swing inland, made contact with the right of 3rd battalion, 5th marines extending the line westward. By the nightfall, Shepherd held a 4 battalion strong front against Katayama's positions at Aogiri Ridge and Hill 150. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Michaelmas, the landings at Saidor were a great success, forcing General Adachi to shift numerous units around, scrambling to remedy the situation. Yet with so many Japanese units trapped, isolated and continuing to retreat north, would they ever be able to halt the allied advance?