Podcasts about Guangzhou

I interview Helen about Auras, and she educates us! She also tells us about her book about Auras.This is a video podcast on Spotify and YouTube.Want to know more about Helen?"Helen is a spiritual leader, yoga and meditation instructor, Feng Shui master, aura reader, tarot card designer, fine arts painter with a new gallery coming next month, flamenco dancer, and now an author who would love to share her story with you.Helen started her career on the non-spiritual path but felt unfulfilled and needed to make a life change. Helen was born in Guangzhou, China, raised in Hong Kong, and now calls Huntington Beach, CA her home. She has an undergraduate degree in psychology and social work from Nanjing University in China, and a master's degree in interior architecture and design from the Academy of Art University in San Francisco. She has published three academic peer-review articles and four conference proceedings during her Ph.D. studies in tourism and hospitality management at Temple University in Philadelphia while researching the human sensory experience pertaining to design. This path all led her to believe that her purpose is more than interior design, leading her to start Helen Creates Beauty to help others.In her new book that just launched this week, The Aura Color Wheel: What Your Soul's Aura Reveals about Your Inner Gifts, Wounds, and Lessons, she dives into how someone can tap into their true potential and life's purpose."https://helencreatesbeauty.comhttps://www.auracolorwheel.com/embodyyourlightThis Course will help you:Gain Crystal Clear Clarity of Your Soul's Purpose and Evolution PathReclaim Your Sovereignty to Embody Your LightAwaken Your Internal GPS: Your Soul & Spirit Team.Inspire to Take Soul-Aligned Actions to Embody Your Highest Self.Cultivate a routine spiritual practice to sustain your high vibrational and conscious living.A community of high-vibe souls for continued support.Ripple effects: your family and close friends will notice your radiance!A 10-Week Soul Purpose Embodiment Live Online CourseEmbody Your LightSat Oct. 18enrollment ends fri oct 17, 11:59pmHelencreatesbeauty on socials!Support the podcast! Subscribe and listen!Thank you for watching and listening!

The China Import and Export Fair has opened in Guangzhou. This year's event has reached record highs in exhibitors and booth numbers, with more than 32,000 companies showcasing over one million new products.

Last time we spoke about the Battle of Taierzhuang. Following the fall of Nanjing in December 1937, the Second Sino-Japanese War entered a brutal phase of attrition as Japan sought to consolidate control and press toward central China. Chinese defense prioritized key rail corridors and urban strongholds, with Xuzhou, the JinPu and Longhai lines, and the Huai River system forming crucial lifelines. By early 1938, Japanese offensives aimed to link with forces around Beijing and Nanjing and encircle Chinese positions in the Central Yangtze region, threatening Wuhan. In response, Chiang Kai-shek fortified Xuzhou and expanded defenses to deter a pincer move, eventually amassing roughly 300,000 troops along strategic lines. Taierzhuang became a focal point when Japanese divisions attempted to press south and link with northern elements. Chinese commanders Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, Tang Enbo, and Sun Lianzhong coordinated to complicate Japanese plans through offensive-defensive actions, counterattacks, and encirclement efforts. The victory, though numerically costly, thwarted immediate Japanese objectives and foreshadowed further attritional struggles ahead.   #171 The Flooding of the Yellow River Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. We last left off with a significant event during the Xuzhou campaign. Three Japanese divisions under General Itagaki Seishiro moved south to attack Taierzhuang and were met by forces commanded by Li Zongren, Sun Lianzhong, and Tang Enbo, whose units possessed a decent amount of artillery. In a two-week engagement from March 22 to April 7, the battle devolved into a costly urban warfare. Fighting was vicious, often conducted in close quarters and at night. The urban environment negated Japanese advantages in armor and artillery, allowing Chinese forces to contend on equal terms. The Chinese also disrupted Japanese logistics by resupplying their own troops and severing rear supply lines, draining Japanese ammunition, supplies, and reinforcements. By April 7, the Japanese were compelled to retreat, marking the first Chinese victory of the war. However both sides suffered heavy losses, with around 20,000 casualties on each side. In the aftermath of this rare victory, Chiang Kai-Shek pushed Tang Enbo and Li Zongren to capitalize on their success and increased deployments in the Taierzhuang theater to about 450,000 troops. Yet the Chinese Army remained hampered by fundamental problems. The parochialism that had crippled Chiang's forces over the preceding months resurfaced. Although the generals had agreed to coordinate in a war of resistance, each still prioritized the safety of his own troops, wary of Chiang's bid to consolidate power. Li Zongren, for example, did not deploy his top Guangxi provincial troops at Taierzhuang and sought to shift most of the fighting onto Tang Enbo's forces. Chiang's colleagues were mindful of the fates of Han Fuju of Shandong and Zhang Xueliang of Manchuria: Han was executed for refusing to fight, while Zhang, after allowing Chiang to reduce the size of his northeastern army, ended up under house arrest. They were right to distrust Chiang. He believed, after all, that provincial armies should come under a unified national command, which he would lead. From a national-unity perspective, his aspiration was not unreasonable. But it fed suspicion among other military leaders that participation in the anti-Japanese war would dilute their power. The divided nature of the command also hindered logistics, making ammunition and food supplies to the front unreliable and easy to cut off. By late April the Chinese had reinforced the Xuzhou area to between 450,000-600,000 to capitalize on their victory. However these armies were plagued with command and control issues. Likewise the Japanese licked their wounds and reinforced the area to roughly 400,000, with fresh troops and supplies flowing in from Tianjin and Nanjing. The Japanese continued with their objective of encircling Chinese forces. The North China Area Army comprised four divisions and two infantry brigades drawn from the Kwantung Army, while the Central China Expeditionary Army consisted of three divisions and the 1st and 2nd Tank Battalions along with motorized support units. The 5th Tank Battalion supported the 3rd Infantry Division as it advanced north along the railway toward Xuzhou. Fighting to the west, east, and north of Xuzhou was intense, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. On 18 April, the Japanese advanced southward toward Pizhou. Tang Enbo's 20th Army Corps, together with the 2nd, 22nd, 46th, and 59th corps, resisted fiercely, culminating in a stalemate by the end of April. The 60th Corps of the Yunnan Army engaged the Japanese 10th Division at Yuwang Mountain for nearly a month, repelling multiple assaults. By the time it ceded its position to the Guizhou 140th Division and withdrew on 15 May, the corps had sustained losses exceeding half of its forces. Simultaneously, the Japanese conducted offensives along both banks of the Huai River, where Chinese defenders held out for several weeks. Nevertheless, Japanese artillery and aerial bombardment gradually tilted the balance, allowing the attackers to seize Mengcheng on 9 May and Hefei on 14 May. From there, the southern flank split into two parts: one force moved west and then north to cut off the Longhai Railway escape route from Xuzhou, while another division moved directly north along the railway toward Suxian, just outside Xuzhou. Simultaneously, to the north, Japanese units from north China massed at Jining and began moving south beyond Tengxian. Along the coast, an amphibious landing was made at Lianyungang to reinforce troops attacking from the east. The remaining portions of Taierzhuang were captured in May, a development symbolically significant to Tokyo. On 17 May, Japanese artillery further tightened the noose around Xuzhou, striking targets inside the city.  To preserve its strength, the Nationalist government ordered the abandonment of Xuzhou and directed its main forces to break out toward northern Jiangsu, northern Anhui, and eastern Henan. To deter the Japanese army's rapid westward advance and penetration into northern Henan and western Shandong, many leading military and political figures within the Nationalist government proposed breaching dams over the Yellow River to delay the offensive, a strategy that would have been highly advantageous to the Nationalist forces at the time. Chiang Kai-shek vetoed the proposal outright, insisting that the Nationalist army could still resist. He understood that with tens of millions of Chinese lives at stake and a sliver of hope remaining, the levee plan must not be undertaken. Then a significant battle broke out at Lanfeng. Chiang also recognized that defeat could allow the elite Japanese mechanized divisions, the 14th, 16th, and 10th, to advance directly toward Zhengzhou. If Zhengzhou fell, the Japanese mechanized forces on the plains could advance unimpeded toward Tongguan. Their southward push would threaten Xi'an, Xiangfan, and Nanyang, directly jeopardizing the southwest's rear defenses. Concurrently, the Japanese would advance along the Huai River north of the Dabie Mountains toward Wuhan, creating a pincer with operations along the Yangtze River.  Now what followed was arguably the most important and skillful Chinese maneuver of the Xuzhou campaign: a brilliantly executed strategic retreat to the south and west across the Jinpu railway line. On May 15, Li Zongren, in consultation with Chiang Kai-shek, decided to withdraw from Xuzhou and focus on an escape plan. The evacuation of civilians and military personnel began that day. Li ordered troops to melt into the countryside and move south and west at night, crossing the Jinpu Railway and splitting into four groups that would head west. The plan was to regroup in the rugged Dabie Mountains region to the south and prepare for the defense of Wuhan. Li's generals departed reluctantly, having held out for so long; Tang Enbo was said to have wept. Under cover of night, about forty divisions, over 200,000 men, marched out of Japanese reach in less than a week. A critical moment occurred on May 18, when fog and a sandstorm obscured the retreating troops as they crossed the Jinpu Railway. By May 21, Li wired Chiang Kai-shek to report that the withdrawal was complete. He mobilized nearly all of the Kuomintang Central Army's elite units, such as the 74th Army, withdrawn from Xuzhou and transferred directly to Lanfeng, with a resolute intent to “burn their boats.” The force engaged the Japanese in a decisive battle at Lanfeng, aiming to secure the last line of defense for the Yellow River, a position carrying the lives of millions of Chinese civilians. Yet Chiang Kai-shek's strategy was not universally understood by all participating generals, who regarded it as akin to striking a rock with an egg. For the battle of Lanfeng the Chinese mobilized nearly all of the Kuomintang Central Army's elite forces, comprising 14 divisions totaling over 150,000 men. Among these, the 46th Division of the 27th Army, formerly the Central Training Brigade and the 36th, 88th, and 87th Divisions of the 71st Army were German-equipped. Additionally, the 8th Army, the Tax Police Corps having been reorganized into the Ministry of Finance's Anti-Smuggling Corps, the 74th Army, and Hu Zongnan's 17th Corps, the new 1st Army, equipped with the 8th Division were elite Nationalist troops that had demonstrated strong performance in the battle of Shanghai and the battle of Nanjing, and were outfitted with advanced matériel. However, these so-called “elite” forces were heavily degraded during the campaigns in Shanghai and Nanjing. The 46th Division and Hu Zongnan's 17th Corps sustained casualties above 85% in Nanjing, while the 88th and 87th Divisions suffered losses of up to 90%. The 74th Army and the 36th Division also endured losses exceeding 75%. Their German-made equipment incurred substantial losses; although replenishment occurred, inventories resembled roughly a half-German and half-Chinese mix. With very limited heavy weapons and a severe shortage of anti-tank artillery, they could not effectively match the elite Japanese regiments. Hu Zongnan's 17th Corps maintained its national equipment via a close relationship with Chiang Kai-shek. In contrast, the 74th Army, after fighting in Shanghai, Nanjing, and Xuzhou, suffered heavy casualties, and the few German weapons it had were largely destroyed at Nanjing, leaving it to rely on a mix of domestically produced and Hanyang-made armaments. The new recruits added to each unit largely lacked combat experience, with nearly half of the intake having received basic training. The hardest hit was Li Hanhun's 64th Army, established less than a year prior and already unpopular within the Guangdong Army. Although classified as one of the three Type A divisions, the 155th, 156th, and 187th Divisions, it was equipped entirely with Hanyang-made firearms. Its direct artillery battalion possessed only about 20 older mortars and three Type 92 infantry guns, limiting its heavy firepower to roughly that of a Japanese battalion. The 195th Division and several miscellaneous units were even less prominent, reorganized from local militias and lacking Hanyang rifles. Additionally, three batches of artillery purchased from the Soviet Union arrived in Lanzhou via Xinjiang between March and June 1938. Except for the 52nd Artillery Regiment assigned to the 200th Division, the other artillery regiments had recently received their weapons and were still undergoing training. The 200th Division, had been fighting awhile for in the Xuzhou area and incurred heavy casualties, was still in training and could only deploy its remaining tank battalion and armored vehicle company. The tank battalion was equipped with T-26 light tanks and a small number of remaining British Vickers tanks, while the armored vehicle company consisted entirely of Italian Fiat CV33 armored cars. The disparity in numbers was substantial, and this tank unit did not participate in the battle.  As for the Japanese, the 14th Division was an elite Type A formation. Originally organized with four regiments totaling over 30,000 men, the division's strength was later augmented. Doihara's 14th Division received supplements, a full infantry regiment and three artillery regiments, to prevent it from being surrounded and annihilated, effectively transforming the unit into a mobile reinforced division. Consequently, the division's mounted strength expanded to more than 40,000 personnel, comprising five infantry regiments and four artillery regiments. The four artillery regiments, the 24th Artillery Regiment, the 3rd Independence Mountain Artillery Regiment, the 5th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment, and the 6th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment, possessed substantial heavy firepower, including 150mm heavy howitzers and 105mm long-range field cannons, placing them far in excess of the Nationalist forces at Lanfeng. In addition, both the 14th and later the 16th Divisions commanded tank regiments with nearly 200 light and medium tanks each, while Nationalist forces were markedly short of anti-tank artillery. At the same time, the Nationalist Air Force, though it had procured more than 200 aircraft of various types from the Soviet Union, remained heavily reliant on Soviet aid-to-China aircraft, amounting to over 100 machines, and could defend only a few cities such as Wuhan, Nanchang, and Chongqing. In this context, Japanese forces effectively dominated the Battle of Lanfeng. Moreover, reports indicate that the Japanese employed poison gas on the battlefield, while elite Nationalist troops possessed only a limited number of gas masks, creating a stark disparity in chemical warfare preparedness. Despite these disparities, Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government were initially unaware of the updated strength and composition of the Doihara Division. Faced with constrained options, Chiang chose to press ahead with combat operations. On May 12, 1939, after crossing the Yellow River, the IJA 14th Division continued its southward advance toward Lanfeng. The division's objective was to sever the Longhai Railway, disrupt the main Nationalist retreat toward Zhengzhou, and seize Zhengzhou itself. By May 15, the division split into two columns at Caoxian and moved toward key nodes on the Longhai Line. Major General Toyotomi Fusatarou led two infantry regiments, one cavalry regiment, and one artillery regiment in the main assault toward Kaocheng with the aim of directly capturing Lanfeng. Doihara led three infantry regiments and three artillery regiments toward Neihuang and Minquan, threatening Guide. In response, the Nationalist forces concentrated along the railway from Lanfeng to Guide, uniting Song Xilian's 71st Army, Gui Yongqing's 27th Army, Yu Jishi's 74th Army, Li Hanhun's 64th Army, and Huang Jie's 8th Army. From May 15 to 17, the Fengjiu Brigade, advancing toward Lanfeng, met stubborn resistance near Kaocheng from roughly five divisions under Song Xilian and was forced to shift its effort toward Yejigang and Neihuang. The defense near Neihuang, including Shen Ke's 106th Division and Liang Kai's 195th Division, ultimately faltered, allowing Doihara's division to seize Neihuang, Yejigang, Mazhuangzhai, and Renheji. Nevertheless, the Nationalist forces managed to contain the Japanese advance east and west of the area, preventing a complete encirclement. Chiang Kai-shek ordered Cheng Qian, commander-in-chief of the 1st War Zone, to encircle and annihilate the Japanese 14th Division. The deployment plan mapped three routes: the Eastern Route Army, under Li Hanhun, would include the 74th Army, the 155th Division of the 64th Army, a brigade of the 88th Division, and a regiment of the 87th Division, advancing westward from Guide); the Western Route Army, commanded by Gui Yongqing, would comprise the 27th Army, the 71st Army, the 61st Division, and the 78th Division, advancing eastward from Lanfeng; and the Northern Route Army, formed by Sun Tongxuan's 3rd Army and Shang Zhen's 20th Army, was to cut off the enemy's retreat to the north bank of the Yellow River near Dingtao, Heze, Dongming, and Kaocheng, while attacking the Doihara Division from the east, west, and north to annihilate it in a single decisive operation.  On May 21, the Nationalist Army mounted a full-scale offensive. Yu Jishi's 74th Army, commanded by Wang Yaowu's 51st Division, joined a brigade of Song Xilian's 71st Army, led by the 88th Division, and drove the Japanese forces at Mazhuangzhai into retreat, capturing Neihuang and Renheji. The main Japanese force, more than 6,000 strong, withdrew southwest to Yangjiji and Shuangtaji. Song Xilian, commanding Shen Fazao's 87th Division, launched a sharp assault on Yejigang (Yifeng). The Japanese abandoned the stronghold, but their main body continued advancing toward Yangjiji, with some units retreating to Donggangtou and Maoguzhai. On May 23, Song Xilian's 71st Army and Yu Jishi's 74th Army enveloped and annihilated enemy forces at Donggangtou and Maoguzhai. That evening they seized Ximaoguzhai, Yangzhuang, and Helou, eliminating more than a thousand Japanese troops. The Japanese troops at Donggangtou fled toward Lanfeng. Meanwhile, Gui Yongqing's forces were retreating through Lanfeng. His superior strength, Jiang Fusheng's 36th Division, Li Liangrong's 46th Division, Zhong Song's 61st Division, Li Wen's 78th Division, Long Muhan's 88th Division, and Shen Ke's 106th Division—had held defensive positions along the Lanfeng–Yangji line. Equipped with a tank battalion and armored vehicle company commanded by Qiu Qingquan, they blocked the enemy's westward advance and awaited Japanese exhaustion. However, under the Japanese offensive, Gui Yongqing's poor command led to the loss of Maji and Mengjiaoji, forcing the 27th Army to retreat across its entire front. Its main force fled toward Qixian and Kaifeng. The Japanese seized the opportunity to capture Quxingji, Luowangzhai, and Luowang Railway Station west of Lanfeng. Before retreating, Gui Yongqing ordered Long Muhan to dispatch a brigade to replace the 106th Division in defending Lanfeng, while he directed the 106th Division to fall back to Shiyuan. Frightened by the enemy, Long Muhan unilaterally withdrew his troops on the night of the 23rd, leaving Lanfeng undefended. On the 24th, Japanese troops advancing westward from Donggangtou entered Lanfeng unopposed and, relying on well-fortified fortifications, held their ground until reinforcements arrived. In the initial four days, the Nationalist offensive failed to overwhelm the Japanese, who escaped encirclement and annihilation. The four infantry and artillery regiments and one cavalry regiment on the Japanese side managed to hold the line along Lanfeng, Luowangzhai, Sanyizhai, Lanfengkou, Quxingji, Yang'erzhai, and Chenliukou on the south bank of the Yellow River, offering stubborn resistance. The Longhai Railway was completely cut off. Chiang Kai-shek, furious upon hearing the news while stationed in Zhengzhou, ordered the execution of Long Muhan, commander of the 88th Division, to restore military morale. He also decided to consolidate Hu Zongnan's, Li Hanhun's, Yu Jishi's, Song Xilian's, and Gui Yongqing's troops into the 1st Corps, with Xue Yue as commander-in-chief. On the morning of May 25, they launched a determined counterattack on Doihara's 14th Division. Song Xilian personally led the front lines on May 24 to rally the defeated 88th Division.  Starting on May 25, after three days of intense combat, Li Hanhun's 64th Army advanced to seize Luowang Station and Luowangzhai, while Song Xilian's 71st Army retook Lanfeng City, temporarily reopening the Longhai Line to traffic. At Sanyi Village, Gui Yongqing's 27th Army and Yu Jishi's 74th Army captured a series of outlying positions, including Yang'eyao, Chailou, Cailou, Hezhai, Xuelou, and Baowangsi. Despite these gains, more than 6,000 Japanese troops offered stubborn resistance. During the fighting, Ji Hongru, commander of the 302nd Regiment, was seriously wounded but continued to fight, shouting, “Don't worry about my death! Brothers, fight on!” He ultimately died a heroic death from his wounds. By May 27, Chiang Kai-shek, concerned that the forces had not yet delivered a decisive victory at Lanfeng, personally reprimanded the participating generals and ordered them to completely encircle and annihilate the enemy west of Lanfeng by the following day. He warned that if the opportunity was missed and Japanese reinforcements arrived, the position could be endangered. The next day, Chiang Kai-shek issued another telegram, urging Cheng Qian's First War Zone and all participating units to press the offensive. The telegram allegedly had this in it “It will forever be a laughingstock in the history of warfare.” Meanwhile on the other side, to prevent the annihilation of Doihara's 14th Division, the elite Japanese 16th Division and the 3rd Mixed Brigade, totaling over 40,000 men, launched a westward assault from Dangshan, capturing Yucheng on May 26. They then began probing the outskirts of Guide. Huang Jie's Eighth Army, responsible for the defense, withdrew to the outskirts of Guide that evening. On May 28, Huang Jie again led his troops on his own initiative, retreating to Liuhe and Kaifeng, leaving only the 187th Division to defend Zhuji Station and Guide City. At dawn on May 29, Peng Linsheng, commander of the 187th Division, also withdrew his troops, leaving Guide a deserted city. The Japanese occupied Guide without a fight. The loss of Guide dramatically shifted the tide of the war. Threatened on the flanks by the Japanese 16th Division, the Nationalist forces were forced onto the defensive. On May 28, the Japanese 14th Division concentrated its forces to counterattack Gui Yongqing's troops, but they were defeated again, allowing the Japanese to stabilize their position. At the same time, the fall of Shangqiu compelled Xue Yue's corps to withdraw five divisions to block the enemy in Shangqiu, and the Nationalist Army shifted to a defensive posture with the 14th Division holding Sanyizhai and Quxingji. To the north of the battlefield, the Japanese 4th Mixed Brigade, numbering over 10,000 men, was preparing to force a crossing of the Yellow River in order to join with the nearby 14th Division. More seriously, the 10th Division, together with its 13th Mixed Brigade and totaling more than 40,000 men, had captured Woyang and Bozhou on the Henan-Anhui border and was rapidly encircling eastern Henan. By the time of the Battle of Lanfeng, Japanese forces had deployed more than 100,000 troops, effectively surrounding the Nationalist army. On May 31, the First War Zone decided to withdraw completely, and the Battle of Lanfeng ended in defeat for the Nationalists, forcing Chiang Kai-shek to authorize diverting the Yellow River embankment to relieve pressure. The consequence was a deteriorating strategic situation, as encirclement tightened and reinforcement options dwindled, driving a retreat from the Lanfeng front. The National Army suffered more than 67,000 casualties, killed and wounded more than 10,000 Japanese soldiers, Lanfeng was lost, and Zhengzhou was in danger.  As in Nanjing, this Chinese army might have lived to fight another day, but the effect on Xuzhou itself was horrific. The city had endured Japanese bombardment since August 1937, and the population's mood swung between cautious hope and utter despair. In March, Du Zhongyuan visited Xuzhou. Before he left Wuhan, friends told him that “the city was desolate and the people were terrified, all the inhabitants of Xuzhou were quietly getting on with their business … sometimes it was even calmer than Wuhan.” The Australian journalist Rhodes Farmer recalled a similar image in a book published at war's end, noting the “ordinary townsfolk who became wardens, fire-fighters and first-aid workers during the raid and then went back to their civil jobs.” Yet the mid-May departure of Nationalist troops left the city and its outskirts at the mercy of an angry Imperial Army. Bombing continued through the final days of battle, and a single raid on May 14, 1938 killed 700 people. Around Xuzhou, buildings and bridges were destroyed—some by retreating Chinese forces, some by advancing Japanese troops. Taierzhuang, the scene of the earlier iconic defense, was utterly destroyed. Canadian Jesuits who remained in Xuzhou after its fall recorded that more than a third of the houses were razed, and most of the local population had fled in terror. In rural areas around the city, massacres were repeatedly reported, many witnessed by missionaries. Beyond the atrocities of the Japanese, locals faced banditry in the absence of law enforcement, and vital agricultural work such as planting seed ground to a halt. The loss of Xuzhou was both strategic and symbolic. It dealt a severe blow to Chiang's attempt to hold central China and to control regional troop movements. Morale, which Taierzhuang had briefly boosted, was battered again though not extinguished. The fall signaled that the war would be long, and that swift victory against Japan was no longer likely. Mao Zedong's Yan'an base, far to the northwest, grasped the meaning of defeat there. In May 1938 he delivered one of his most celebrated lectures, “On Protracted War,” chiding those who had over-optimistically claimed the Xuzhou campaign could be a quasi-decisive victory and arguing that, after Taierzhuang, some had become “giddy.” Mao insisted that China would ultimately prevail, yet he warned that it could not be won quickly, and that the War of Resistance would be protracted. In the meantime, the development of guerrilla warfare remained an essential piece of the long-term strategy that the Communist armies would pursue in north China. Yet the loss of Xuzhou did not necessarily portend a long war; it could, instead, presage a war that would be terrifyingly short. By spring 1938 the Chinese defenders were desperate. There was a real danger that the entire war effort could collapse, and the Nationalist governments' notable success as protectors of a shrinking “Free China” lay in avoiding total disaster. Government propaganda had successfully portrayed a plan beyond retreat to foreign observers, yet had Tokyo captured Wuhan in the spring, the Chinese Army would have had to withdraw at speed, reinforcing perceptions of disintegration. Western governments were unlikely to intervene unless convinced it was in their interests. Within the Nationalist leadership, competing instincts persisted. The government pursued welfare measures for the people in the midst of a massive refugee relief effort, the state and local organizations, aided by the International Red Cross, housed large numbers of refugees in 1937–1938. Yet there was a harsher strain within policy circles, with some officials willing to sacrifice individual lives for strategic or political ends as the Japanese threat intensified. Throughout central China, the Yellow River, China's “Sorrow”, loomed as the dominant geographic force shaping history. The loess-laden river, notorious for floods and shifting channels, was banked by massive dikes near Zhengzhou, exactly along the line the Japanese would traverse toward Wuhan. Using the river as a military instrument was discussed as a drastic option: Chiang and Cheng Qian's First War Zone contemplated diverting or breaching the dikes to halt or slow the Japanese advance, a measure that could buy time but would unleash enormous civilian suffering. The idea dated back to 1887 floods that cost hundreds of thousands of lives, and even in 1935 Alexander von Falkenhausen had warned that the Yellow River could become the final line of defense. In 1938 Chiang, recognizing the futility of defeating the Japanese by conventional means at Zhengzhou, considered unleashing the river's force if necessary to impede the invaders. The political and strategic calculus was stark: protect central China and Wuhan, even if it required drastic and morally fraught measures. A more humane leader might have hesitated to break the dikes and spare the dams, allowing the Japanese to take Wuhan. But Chiang Kai-shek believed that if the dikes were not breached and Wuhan fell within days, the Nationalist government might be unable to relocate to Chongqing in time and would likely surrender, leaving Japan in control of almost all of China. Some have compared the choice to France's surrender in June 1940, underscoring that Chiang's decision came during the country's most terrifying assault, with Chinese forces much weaker and less trained than their European counterparts. The dilemma over whether to break the Yellow River dikes grew out of desperation. Chiang ultimately ordered General Wei Rulin to blow the dike that held the Yellow River in central Henan. There was no doubt about the consequences: floods would inundate vast areas of central China, creating a waterlogged barrier that would halt the Japanese advance. Yet for the plan to succeed, it had to be carried out quickly, and the government could offer no public warning in case the Japanese detected it and accelerated their movement. Xiong Xianyu, chief of staff in the 8th Division at the time, recorded the urgency of those hours in his diary. The Japanese were already on the north bank of the Yellow River, briefly delayed when the Chinese army blew up the railway bridge across the river. The destruction of the dikes was the next step: if the area became a sea of mud, there would be no way the Japanese could even attempt to reconstruct the bridge. Blasting the dikes proved easier in theory than in practice. Holding back such a massive body of water required substantial engineering, dams thick and well fortified. The army made its first attempts to blow the dike at the small town of Zhaokou between June 4 and 6, 1938, but the structure proved too durable; another nearby attempt failed as well. Hour by hour, the Japanese moved closer. Division commander Jiang Zaizhen asked Xiong Xianyu for his opinion on where they might breach the dams. Xiong wrote “I discussed the topography, and said that two places, Madukou and Huayuankou, were both possible.” But Madukou was too close to Zhaokou, where the breach had already failed, presenting a danger that the Japanese might reach it very soon. The village of Huayuankou, however, lay farther away and on a bend in the river: “To give ourselves enough time, Huayuankou would be best.” At first, the soldiers treated the task as a military engineering assignment, an “exciting” one in Xiong's words. Xiong and Wei Rulin conducted their first site inspection after dark, late on June 6. The surroundings offered a deceptive calm: Xiong recounted “The wind blew softly, and the river water trickled pleasantly.” Yet gauging the water level proved difficult, hampered by murky moonlight and burned-out flashlights. They spent the night in their car to determine precisely where to break the dike as soon as day broke. But daylight seemed to bring home the consequences of what they planned to do, and the soldiers grew increasingly anxious. Wang Songmei, commander of the 2nd Regiment, addressed the workers about to breach the dike: “My brothers, this plan will be of benefit to our country and our nation, and will lessen the harm that is being done to the people.In the future, you'll find good wives and have plenty of children.” Wang's words were meant to reassure the men of the political necessity of their actions and that fate would not, in the traditional Chinese sense, deny them a family because of the enormity of their deeds. General Wei confirmed that Huayuankou was the right spot, and on June 8 the work began, with about 2,000 men taking part. The Nationalist government was eager to ensure rapid progress. Xiong recorded that the “highest authorities”,, kept making telephone calls from Wuhan to check on progress. In addition, the party sent performers to sing and play music to bolster the workers' spirits. Senior General Shang Zhen announced to the laborers that if they breached the dam by midnight on June 8, each would receive 2,000 yuan; if they achieved it by six the next morning, they would still be paid 1,000 yuan. They needed encouragement, for the diggers had no artificial assistance. After the initial failures at Zhaokou, Wei's troops relied entirely on manual labor, with no explosives used. Yet the workers earned their payments, and the dike was breached in just a few hours. On the morning of June 9, Xiong recorded a rapid shift in mood: the atmosphere became tense and solemn. Initially, the river flow was modest, but by about 1:00 p.m. the water surged “fiercely,” flowing “like 10,000 horses.” Looking toward the distance, Xiong felt as though a sea had appeared before him. “My heart ached,” he wrote. The force of the water widened the breach, and a deadly stream hundreds of feet wide comprising about three-quarters of the river's volume—rushed southeast across the central Chinese plains. “We did this to stop the enemy,” Xiong reflected, “so we didn't regret the huge sacrifice, as it was for a greater victory.” Yet he and the other soldiers also saw a grim reality: the troops who had taken on the task of destroying the railway bridge and the dikes could not bear the flood's consequences alone. It would be up to the government and the people of the nation to provide relief for the countless households uprooted by the flood. In fact, the previous evening Commander Jiang had telephoned to request assistance for those flooded out of their homes.   Wei, Xiong, and their troops managed to escape by wooden boats. Hundreds of thousands of farmers trapped in the floods were far less fortunate. Time magazine's correspondent Theodore White reported on the devastation a few days later “Last week “The Ungovernable” [i.e. the Yellow River] lashed out with a flood which promised to change not only its own course but also the course of the whole Sino-Japanese War. Severe breaks in the dikes near Kaifeng sent a five-foot wall of water fanning out over a 500-squaremile area, spreading death. Toll from Yellow River floods is not so much from quick drowning as from gradual disease and starvation. The river's filth settles ankle-deep on the fields, mothering germs, smothering crops. Last week, about 500,000 peasants were driven from 2,000 communities to await rescue or death on whatever dry ground they could find”. Chiang's government had committed one of the grossest acts of violence against its own people, and he knew that the publicity could be a damaging blow to its reputation. He decided to divert blame by announcing that the dike had been broken, but blaming the breach on Japanese aerial bombing. The Japanese, in turn, fiercely denied having bombed the dikes. White's reporting reflected the immediate response of most foreigners; having heard about the atrocities at Nanjing and Xuzhou, he was disinclined to give the Japanese the benefit of the doubt. Furthermore, at the very time that the Yellow River was flooding central China, the Japanese were heavily bombing Guangzhou, causing thousands of casualties. To White, the Japanese counterargument—that the Chinese themselves were responsible, seemed unthinkable: “These accusations, foreign observers thought, were absurd. For the Chinese to check the Japanese advance at possible sacrifice of half a million lives would be a monstrous pyrrhic victory. Besides, dike-cutting is the blackest of Chinese crimes, and the Chinese Army would hardly risk universal censure for slight tactical gains.” But, of course, that is exactly what they had done. During the war the Nationalists never admitted that they, not the Japanese, had breached the dikes. But the truth quickly became widely known. Just a month later, on July 19, US Ambassador Johnson noted, in private communication, that the “Chinese blocked the advance on Chengchow [Zhengzhou] by breaching the Yellow River dikes.” Eventually some 54,000 square kilometers of central China were inundated by the floods. If the Japanese had committed such an act, it would have been remembered as the prime atrocity of the war, dwarfing even the Nanjing Massacre or the Chongqing air raids in terms of the number of people who suffered. Accurate statistics were impossible to obtain in the midst of wartime chaos and disaster, but in 1948 figures issued by the Nationalists themselves suggested enormous casualties: for the three affected provinces of Henan, Anhui, and Jiangsu, the number of dead was put at 844,489, with some 4.8 million becoming refugees. More recent studies place the numbers lower, but still estimate the dead at around 500,000, and 3–5 million refugees. In contrast, the devastating May 1939 air raids on Chongqing killed some thousands. Xiong reflected in his diary that the breaching of the Yellow River dikes was a sacrifice for a greater victory. Even to some Japanese it seemed that the tactic had been successful in the short term: the first secretary at the US Embassy in Wuhan reported that the flood had “completely checked the Japanese advance on Chengchow” and had prevented them taking Wuhan by rail. Instead, he predicted, the attack was likely to come by water and along the north shore of the Yangtze. Supporters of the dike breaches could argue that these acts saved central China and Chiang's headquarters in Wuhan for another five months. The Japanese were indeed prevented from advancing along the Long–Hai railway toward Wuhan. In the short term the floods did what the Nationalists wanted. But the flooding was a tactic, a breathing space, and did not solve the fundamental problem: China's armies needed strong leadership and rapid reform. Some historians suggest that Chiang's decision was pointless anyway, since it merely delayed the inevitable. Theodore White was right: no strategic advantage could make the deaths of 500,000 of China's own people a worthwhile price to pay. However, Chiang Kai-shek's decision can be partly explained, though not excused, by the context. We can now look back at the actions of the Nationalists and argue that they should not have held on to Wuhan, or that their actions in breaching the dam were unjustifiable in the extreme. But for Chiang, in the hot summer of 1938, it seemed his only hope was to deny Japan as much of China for as long as possible and create the best possible circumstances for a long war from China's interior, while keeping the world's attention on what Japan was doing. The short delay won by the flooding was itself part of the strategy. In the struggle raging within the soul of the Nationalist Party, the callous, calculating streak had won, for the time being. The breaking of the dikes marked a turning point as the Nationalists committed an act whose terrible consequences they would eventually have to expiate. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In late 1937, China's frontline trembled as Japanese forces closed in on Wuhan. Chiang Kai-shek faced a brutal choice: endure costly defenses or unleash a desperate gamble. Chiangs' radical plan emerged: breach the Yellow River dikes at Huayuankou to flood central China, buying time. The flood roared, washing villages and futures away, yet slowing the enemy. The battlefield paused, while a nation weighed courage against civilian suffering, victory against devastating costs.

A Chinese Reformer in Exile: Kang Youwei and the Chinese Empire Reform Association in North America, 1899-1911 is an encyclopaedic reference work documenting the exile years of imperial China's most famous reformer, Kang Youwei, and the political organization he mobilized in North America and worldwide to transform China's autocratic empire into a constitutional monarchy. Chinese in Canada, the United States, and Mexico formed at least 160 Chinese Empire Reform Association chapters, incorporating schools, newspapers, military academies, women's associations, businesses, and political pressure campaigns. Based on Robert Worden's 1972 Georgetown University Ph.D. dissertation, a multinational team of historians contribute new insights from 50 years of additional scholarship and previously unknown archival materials. Robert L. Worden, Ph.D. (1972) Georgetown University, retired in 2007 after 34 years at the Library of Congress where he authored more than 100 Asia-related studies for government agencies, and numerous China-related books, articles, and book reviews of personal interest.  Jane Leung Larson is an independent scholar whose broad-based research on the Chinese Empire Reform Association evolved from studying the papers of her grandfather Tom Leung, Kang Youwei's student in Guangzhou and host, travel companion, and confidant in North America.  Li-Ping Chen is a visiting scholar in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Relevant Links Open Access of A Chinese Reformer in Exile here Sweet Bamboo: A Memoir of a Chinese American Family by Louise Leung Larson here NBN interview for Transpacific Reform and Revolution: The Chinese in North America, 1898-1918: here Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

A Chinese Reformer in Exile: Kang Youwei and the Chinese Empire Reform Association in North America, 1899-1911 is an encyclopaedic reference work documenting the exile years of imperial China's most famous reformer, Kang Youwei, and the political organization he mobilized in North America and worldwide to transform China's autocratic empire into a constitutional monarchy. Chinese in Canada, the United States, and Mexico formed at least 160 Chinese Empire Reform Association chapters, incorporating schools, newspapers, military academies, women's associations, businesses, and political pressure campaigns. Based on Robert Worden's 1972 Georgetown University Ph.D. dissertation, a multinational team of historians contribute new insights from 50 years of additional scholarship and previously unknown archival materials. Robert L. Worden, Ph.D. (1972) Georgetown University, retired in 2007 after 34 years at the Library of Congress where he authored more than 100 Asia-related studies for government agencies, and numerous China-related books, articles, and book reviews of personal interest.  Jane Leung Larson is an independent scholar whose broad-based research on the Chinese Empire Reform Association evolved from studying the papers of her grandfather Tom Leung, Kang Youwei's student in Guangzhou and host, travel companion, and confidant in North America.  Li-Ping Chen is a visiting scholar in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Relevant Links Open Access of A Chinese Reformer in Exile here Sweet Bamboo: A Memoir of a Chinese American Family by Louise Leung Larson here NBN interview for Transpacific Reform and Revolution: The Chinese in North America, 1898-1918: here Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

A Chinese Reformer in Exile: Kang Youwei and the Chinese Empire Reform Association in North America, 1899-1911 is an encyclopaedic reference work documenting the exile years of imperial China's most famous reformer, Kang Youwei, and the political organization he mobilized in North America and worldwide to transform China's autocratic empire into a constitutional monarchy. Chinese in Canada, the United States, and Mexico formed at least 160 Chinese Empire Reform Association chapters, incorporating schools, newspapers, military academies, women's associations, businesses, and political pressure campaigns. Based on Robert Worden's 1972 Georgetown University Ph.D. dissertation, a multinational team of historians contribute new insights from 50 years of additional scholarship and previously unknown archival materials. Robert L. Worden, Ph.D. (1972) Georgetown University, retired in 2007 after 34 years at the Library of Congress where he authored more than 100 Asia-related studies for government agencies, and numerous China-related books, articles, and book reviews of personal interest.  Jane Leung Larson is an independent scholar whose broad-based research on the Chinese Empire Reform Association evolved from studying the papers of her grandfather Tom Leung, Kang Youwei's student in Guangzhou and host, travel companion, and confidant in North America.  Li-Ping Chen is a visiting scholar in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Relevant Links Open Access of A Chinese Reformer in Exile here Sweet Bamboo: A Memoir of a Chinese American Family by Louise Leung Larson here NBN interview for Transpacific Reform and Revolution: The Chinese in North America, 1898-1918: here Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

A Chinese Reformer in Exile: Kang Youwei and the Chinese Empire Reform Association in North America, 1899-1911 is an encyclopaedic reference work documenting the exile years of imperial China's most famous reformer, Kang Youwei, and the political organization he mobilized in North America and worldwide to transform China's autocratic empire into a constitutional monarchy. Chinese in Canada, the United States, and Mexico formed at least 160 Chinese Empire Reform Association chapters, incorporating schools, newspapers, military academies, women's associations, businesses, and political pressure campaigns. Based on Robert Worden's 1972 Georgetown University Ph.D. dissertation, a multinational team of historians contribute new insights from 50 years of additional scholarship and previously unknown archival materials. Robert L. Worden, Ph.D. (1972) Georgetown University, retired in 2007 after 34 years at the Library of Congress where he authored more than 100 Asia-related studies for government agencies, and numerous China-related books, articles, and book reviews of personal interest.  Jane Leung Larson is an independent scholar whose broad-based research on the Chinese Empire Reform Association evolved from studying the papers of her grandfather Tom Leung, Kang Youwei's student in Guangzhou and host, travel companion, and confidant in North America.  Li-Ping Chen is a visiting scholar in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Relevant Links Open Access of A Chinese Reformer in Exile here Sweet Bamboo: A Memoir of a Chinese American Family by Louise Leung Larson here NBN interview for Transpacific Reform and Revolution: The Chinese in North America, 1898-1918: here Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/asian-american-studies

A Chinese Reformer in Exile: Kang Youwei and the Chinese Empire Reform Association in North America, 1899-1911 is an encyclopaedic reference work documenting the exile years of imperial China's most famous reformer, Kang Youwei, and the political organization he mobilized in North America and worldwide to transform China's autocratic empire into a constitutional monarchy. Chinese in Canada, the United States, and Mexico formed at least 160 Chinese Empire Reform Association chapters, incorporating schools, newspapers, military academies, women's associations, businesses, and political pressure campaigns. Based on Robert Worden's 1972 Georgetown University Ph.D. dissertation, a multinational team of historians contribute new insights from 50 years of additional scholarship and previously unknown archival materials. Robert L. Worden, Ph.D. (1972) Georgetown University, retired in 2007 after 34 years at the Library of Congress where he authored more than 100 Asia-related studies for government agencies, and numerous China-related books, articles, and book reviews of personal interest.  Jane Leung Larson is an independent scholar whose broad-based research on the Chinese Empire Reform Association evolved from studying the papers of her grandfather Tom Leung, Kang Youwei's student in Guangzhou and host, travel companion, and confidant in North America.  Li-Ping Chen is a visiting scholar in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Relevant Links Open Access of A Chinese Reformer in Exile here Sweet Bamboo: A Memoir of a Chinese American Family by Louise Leung Larson here NBN interview for Transpacific Reform and Revolution: The Chinese in North America, 1898-1918: here Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies

Last time we spoke about the Nanjing Massacre. Japanese forces breached Nanjing as Chinese defenders retreated under heavy bombardment, and the city fell on December 13. In the following weeks, civilians and disarmed soldiers endured systematic slaughter, mass executions, rapes, looting, and arson, with casualties mounting rapidly. Among the most brutal episodes were hundreds of executions near the Safety Zone, mass shootings along the Yangtze River, and killings at improvised sites and “killing fields.” The massacre involved tens of thousands of prisoners, with estimates up to 300,000 victims. Women and children were subjected to widespread rape, mutilation, and terror intended to crush morale and resistance. Although the Safety Zone saved many lives, it could not shield all refugees from harm, and looting and arson devastated large parts of the city. Foreign witnesses, missionaries, and diary entries documented the extensive brutality and the apparent premeditated nature of many acts, noting the collapse of discipline among troops and orders that shaped the violence.    #169 Nanjing has Fallen, the War is not Over Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Directly after the fall of Nanjing, rumors circulated among the city's foreigners that Tang Shengzhi had been executed for his inability to hold the city against the Japanese onslaught. In fact, unlike many of his subordinates who fought in the defense, he survived. On December 12, he slipped through Yijiang Gate, where bullets from the 36th Division had claimed numerous victims, and sailed across the Yangtze to safety. Chiang Kai-shek protected him from bearing direct consequences for Nanjing's collapse. Tang was not unscathed, however. After the conquest of Nanjing, a dejected Tang met General Li Zongren at Xuzhou Railway Station. In a brief 20-minute conversation, Tang lamented, “Sir, Nanjing's fall has been unexpectedly rapid. How can I face the world?” Li, who had previously taunted Tang for over-eagerness, offered sympathy. “Don't be discouraged. Victory or defeat comes every day for the soldier. Our war of resistance is a long-term proposition. The loss of one city is not decisive.” By December 1937, the outlook for Chiang Kai-shek's regime remained bleak. Despite his public pledges, he had failed to defend the capital. Its sturdy walls, which had withstood earlier sieges, were breached in less than 100 hours. Foreign observers remained pessimistic about the prospects of continuing the fight against Japan. The New York Times wrote “The capture of Nanking was the most overwhelming defeat suffered by the Chinese and one of the most tragic military debacles in modern warfare. In defending Nanking, the Chinese allowed themselves to be surrounded and then slaughtered… The graveyard of tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers may also be the graveyard of all Chinese hopes of resisting conquest by Japan.” Foreign diplomats doubted Chiang's ability to sustain the war, shrinking the question to whether he would stubbornly continue a losing fight or seek peace. US Ambassador Nelson Johnson wrote in a letter to Admiral Yarnell, then commander of the US Asicatic Fleet “There is little left now for the Chinese to do except to carry on a desultory warfare in the country, or to negotiate for the best terms they can get”.  The Japanese, too, acted as if Chiang Kai-shek had already lost the war. They assumed the generalissimo was a spent force in Chinese politics as well, and that a gentle push would suffice to topple his regime like a house of cards. On December 14, Prime Minister Konoe announced that Chiang's losses of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and now Nanjing, had created a new situation. “The National Government has become but a shadow of its former self. If a new Chinese regime emerged to replace Chiang's government, Japan would deal with it, provided it is a regime headed in the right direction.” Konoe spoke the same day as a Liaison Conference in Tokyo, where civilian and military leaders debated how to treat China now that it had been thoroughly beaten on the battlefield. Japanese demands had grown significantly: beyond recognizing Manchukuo, Japan pressed for the creation of pro-Japanese regimes in Inner Mongolia and the north China area. The same day, a puppet government was established in Japanese-occupied Beijing. While these demands aimed to end China as a unitary state, Japanese policy was moving toward the same goal. The transmissions of these demands via German diplomatic channels caused shock and consternation in Chinese government circles, and the Chinese engaged in what many regarded as stalling tactics. Even at this late stage, there was division among Japan's top decision makers. Tada, deputy chief of the Army General Staff, feared a protracted war in China and urged keeping negotiations alive. He faced strong opposition from the cabinet, including the foreign minister and the ministers of the army and navy, and ultimately he relented. Tada stated “In this state of emergency, it is necessary to avoid any political upheaval that might arise from a struggle between the Cabinet and the Army General Staff.” Although he disagreed, he no longer challenged the uncompromising stance toward China. On January 16, 1938, Japan publicly stated that it would “cease henceforth to deal with” Chiang Kai-shek. This was a line that could not be uncrossed. War was the only option. Germany, the mediator between China and Japan, also considered Chiang a losing bet. In late January 1938, von Dirksen, the German ambassador in Tokyo, urged a fundamental shift in German diplomacy and advocated abandoning China in favor of Japan. He warned that this was a matter of urgency, since Japan harbored grudges against Germany for its half-hearted peace efforts. In a report, von Dirksen wrote that Japan, “in her deep ill humor, will confront us with unpleasant decisions at an inopportune moment.” Von Dirksen's view carried the day in Berlin. Nazi Germany and Hirohito's Japan were on a trajectory that, within three years, would forge the Axis and place Berlin and Tokyo in the same camp in a conflict that would eventually span the globe. Rabe, who returned to Germany in 1938, found that his account of Japanese atrocities in Nanjing largely fell on deaf ears. He was even visited by the Gestapo, which apparently pressed him to keep quiet about what he had seen. Ambassador von Dirksen also argued in his January 1938 report that China should be abandoned because of its increasingly friendly ties with the Soviet Union. There was some merit to this claim. Soviet aid to China was substantial: by the end of 1937, 450 Soviet aviators were serving in China. Without them, Japan likely would have enjoyed air superiority. Chiang Kai-shek, it seemed, did not fully understand the Russians' motives. They were supplying aircraft and pilots to keep China in the war while keeping themselves out. After Nanjing's fall, Chiang nevertheless reached out to Joseph Stalin, inviting direct Soviet participation in the war. Stalin politely declined, noting that if the Soviet Union joined the conflict, “the world would say the Soviet Union was an aggressor, and sympathy for Japan around the world would immediately increase.” In a rare moment of candor a few months later, the Soviet deputy commissar for foreign affairs spoke with the French ambassador, describing the situation in China as “splendid.” He expected China to continue fighting for several more years, after which Japan would be too weakened to undertake major operations against the Soviet Union. It was clear that China was being used. Whatever the motive, China was receiving vital help from Stalin's Russia while the rest of the world stood on the sidelines, reluctant to upset Japan. Until Operation Barbarossa, when the Soviet Union was forced to the brink by the German Army and could no longer sustain extensive overseas aid, it supplied China with 904 planes, 1,516 trucks, 1,140 artillery pieces, 9,720 machine guns, 50,000 rifles, 31,600 bombs, and more. Despite all of this, all in all, China's position proved less disastrous than many observers had feared. Chinese officials later argued that the battle of Nanjing was not the unmitigated fiasco it appeared to be. Tang Shengzhi had this to say in his memoirs“I think the main purpose of defending Nanjing was to buy time, to allow troops that had just been pulled out of battle to rest and regroup. It wasn't simply because it was the capital or the site of Sun Yat-sen's mausoleum.” Tan Daoping, an officer in Nanjing, described the battle “as a moderate success because it drew the Japanese in land”. This of course was a strategy anticipated by interwar military thinker Jiang Baili. It also allowed dozens of Chinese divisions to escape Shanghai, since the Japanese forces that could have pursued them were tied down with the task of taking Nanjing. Tan Daoping wrote after the war “They erred in believing they could wage a quick war and decide victory immediately. Instead, their dream was shattered; parts of their forces were worn out, and they were hindered from achieving a swift end”. Even so, it was a steep price was paid in Chinese lives. As in Shanghai, the commanders in Nanjing thought they could fight on the basis of sheer willpower. Chinese officer Qin Guo Qi wrote in his memoirs “In modern war, you can't just rely on the spirit of the troops. You can't merely rely on physical courage and stamina. The battle of Nanjing explains that better than anything”. As for the Brigade commander of the 87th division, Chen Yiding, who emerged from Nanjing with only a few hundred survivors, was enraged. “During the five days of the battle for Nanjing, my superiors didn't see me even once. They didn't do their duty. They also did not explain the overall deployments in the Nanjing area. What's worse, they didn't give us any order to retreat. And afterwards I didn't hear of any commander being disciplined for failing to do his job.” Now back in November of 1937, Chiang Kai-shek had moved his command to the great trinity of Wuhan. For the Nationalists, Wuhan was a symbolically potent stronghold: three municipalities in one, Hankou, Wuchang, and Hanyang. They had all grown prosperous as gateways between coastal China and the interior. But the autumn disasters of 1937 thrust Wuhan into new prominence, and, a decade after it had ceased to be the temporary capital, it again became the seat of military command and resistance. Leading Nationalist politicians had been seen in the city in the months before the war, fueling suspicions that Wuhan would play a major role in any imminent conflict. By the end of the year, the generals and their staffs, along with most of the foreign embassies, had moved upriver. Yet as 1937 slipped into 1938, the Japanese advance seemed practically unstoppable. From the destruction of Shanghai, to the massacre in Nanjing, to the growing vulnerability of Wuhan, the NRA government appeared powerless against the onslaught.  Now the Japanese government faced several options: expanding the scope of the war to force China into submission, which would risk further depletion of Japan's military and economic resources; establishing an alternative regime in China as a bridge for reconciliation, thereby bypassing the Nationalist government for negotiations; and engaging in indirect or direct peace negotiations with the Nationalist Government, despite the failure of previous attempts, while still seeking new opportunities for negotiation. However, the Nanjing massacre did not compel the Chinese government and its people to submit. On January 2, Chiang Kai-shek wrote in his diary, “The conditions proposed by Japan are equivalent to the conquest and extinction of our country. Rather than submitting and perishing, it is better to perish in defeat,” choosing to refuse negotiations and continue resistance.  In January 1938 there was a new escalation of hostilities. Up to that point, Japan had not officially declared war, even during the Shanghai campaign and the Nanjing massacre. However on January 11, an Imperial Conference was held in Tokyo in the presence of Emperor Hirohito. Prime Minister Konoe outlined a “Fundamental Policy to deal with the China Incident.”The Imperial Conference was attended by Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, Army Chief of Staff Prince Kan'in, Navy Minister Admiral Fushimi, and others to reassess its policy toward China. Citing the Nationalist Government's delay and lack of sincerity, the Japanese leadership decided to terminate Trautmann's mediation. At the conference, Japan articulated a dual strategy: if the Nationalist Government did not seek peace, Japan would no longer regard it as a viable negotiating partner, instead supporting emerging regimes, seeking to resolve issues through incidents, and aiming either to eliminate or incorporate the existing central government; if the Nationalist Government sought reconciliation, it would be required to cease resistance, cooperate with Japan against communism, and pursue economic cooperation, including officially recognizing Manchukuo and allowing Japanese troops in Inner Mongolia, North China, Central China, and co-governance of Shanghai. The Konoe cabinet relayed this proposal to the German ambassador in Japan on December 22, 1937: It called for: diplomatic recognition of Manchukuo; autonomy for Inner Mongolia; cessation of all anti-Japanese and anti-Manchukuo policies; cooperation between Japan, Manchukuo, and China against communism; war reparations; demilitarized zones in North China and Inner Mongolia; and a trade agreement among Japan, Manchukuo, and China.  Its terms were too severe, including reparations payable to Japan and new political arrangements that would formalize the separation of north China under Japanese control. Chiang's government would have seventy-two hours to accept; if they refused, Tokyo would no longer recognize the Nationalist government and would seek to destroy it.  On January 13, 1938, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Chonghui informed Germany that China needed a fuller understanding of the additional conditions for peace talks to make a decision. The January 15 deadline for accepting Japan's terms elapsed without Chinese acceptance. Six days after the deadline for a Chinese government reply, an Imperial Conference “Gozen Kaigi” was convened in Tokyo to consider how to handle Trautmann's mediation. The navy, seeing the war as essentially an army matter, offered no strong position; the army pressed for ending the war through diplomatic means, arguing that they faced a far more formidable Far Eastern Soviet threat at the northern Manchukuo border and wished to avoid protracted attrition warfare. Foreign Minister Kōki Hirota, however, strongly disagreed with the army, insisting there was no viable path to Trautmann's mediation given the vast gap between Chinese and Japanese positions. A second conference followed on January 15, 1938, attended by the empire's principal cabinet members and military leaders, but without the emperor's presence. The debate grew heated over whether to continue Trautmann's mediation. Hayao Tada, Deputy Chief of Army General Staff, argued for continuation, while Konoe, Hirota, Navy Minister Mitsumasa Yonai, and War Minister Hajime Sugiyama opposed him. Ultimately, Tada acceded to the position of Konoe and Hirota. On the same day, Konoe conveyed the cabinet's conclusion, termination of Trautmann's mediation, to the emperor. The Japanese government then issued a statement on January 16 declaring that it would no longer treat the Nationalist Government as a bargaining partner, signaling the establishment of a new Chinese regime that would cooperate with Japan and a realignment of bilateral relations. This became known as the first Konoe statement, through which Tokyo formally ended Trautmann's mediation attempt. The Chinese government was still weighing its response when, at noon on January 16, Konoe publicly declared, “Hereafter, the Imperial Government will not deal with the National Government.” In Japanese, this became the infamous aite ni sezu (“absolutely no dealing”). Over the following days, the Japanese government made it clear that this was a formal breach of relations, “stronger even than a declaration of war,” in the words of Foreign Minister Hirota Kōki. The Chinese ambassador to Japan, who had been in Tokyo for six months since hostilities began, was finally recalled. At the end of January, Chiang summoned a military conference and declared that the top strategic priority would be to defend the east-central Chinese city of Xuzhou, about 500 kilometers north of Wuhan. This decision, like the mobilization near Lugouqiao, was heavily influenced by the railway: Xuzhou sat at the midpoint of the Tianjin–Pukou Jinpu line, and its seizure would grant the Japanese mastery over north–south travel in central China. The Jinpu line also crossed the Longhai line, China's main cross-country artery from Lanzhou to the port of Lianyungang, north of Shanghai. The Japanese military command marked the Jinpu line as a target in spring 1938. Control over Xuzhou and the rail lines threading through it were thus seen as vital to the defense of Wuhan, which lay to the city's south. Chiang's defense strategy fit into a larger plan evolving since the 1920s, when the military thinker Jiang Baili had first proposed a long war against Japan; Jiang's foresight earned him a position as an adviser to Chiang in 1938. Jiang had previously run the Baoding military academy, a predecessor of the Whampoa academy, which had trained many of China's finest young officers in the early republic 1912–1922. Now, many of the generals who had trained under Jiang gathered in Wuhan and would play crucial roles in defending the city: Chen Cheng, Bai Chongxi, Tang Shengzhi, and Xue Yue. They remained loyal to Chiang but sought to avoid his tendency to micromanage every aspect of strategy.  Nobody could say with certainty whether Wuhan would endure the Japanese onslaught, and outsiders' predictions were gloomy. As Wuhan's inhabitants tasted their unexpected new freedoms, the Japanese pressed on with their conquest of central China. After taking Nanjing, the IJA 13th Division crossed the Yangtze River to the north and advanced to the Outang and Mingguang lines on the east bank of the Chihe River in Anhui Province, while the 2nd Army of the North China Front crossed the Yellow River to the south between Qingcheng and Jiyang in Shandong, occupied Jinan, and pressed toward Jining, Mengyin, and Qingdao. To open the Jinpu Railway and connect the northern and southern battlefields, the Japanese headquarters mobilized eight divisions, three brigades, and two detachments , totaling about 240,000 men. They were commanded by General Hata Shunroku, commander of the Central China Expeditionary Army, and Terauchi Hisaichi, commander of the North China Front Army. Their plan was a north–south advance: first seize Xuzhou, a strategic city in east China; then take Zhengzhou in the west along the Longhai Railway connecting Lanzhou and Lianyungang; and finally push toward Wuhan in the south along the Pinghan Railway connecting Beijing and Hankou. At the beginning of 1938, Japan's domestic mobilization and military reorganization had not yet been completed, and there was a shortage of troops to expand the front. At the Emperor's Imperial Conference on February 16, 1938, the General Staff Headquarters argued against launching operations before the summer of 1938, preferring to consolidate the front in 1938 and undertake a large-scale battle in 1939. Although the Northern China Expeditionary Force and the Central China Expeditionary Force proposed a plan to open the Jinpu Line to connect the northern and southern battlefields, the proposal was not approved by the domestic General Staff Headquarters. The Chinese army, commanded by Li Zongren, commander-in-chief of the Fifth War Zone, mobilized about 64 divisions and three brigades, totaling roughly 600,000 men. The main force was positioned north of Xuzhou to resist the southern Japanese advance, with a portion deployed along the southern Jinpu Railway to block the southern push and secure Xuzhou. Early in the campaign, Chiang Kai-shek redeployed the heavy artillery brigade originally promised to Han Fuju to Tang Enbo's forces. To preserve his strength, Shandong Provincial Governor Han Fuju abandoned the longstanding Yellow River defenses in Shandong, allowing the Japanese to capture the Shandong capital of Jinan in early March 1938. This defection opened the Jinpu Railway to attack. The Japanese 10th Division, under Rensuke Isogai, seized Tai'an, Jining, and Dawenkou, ultimately placing northern Shandong under Japanese control. The aim was to crush the Chinese between the two halves of a pincer movement. At Yixian and Huaiyuan, north of Xuzhou, both sides fought to the death: the Chinese could not drive back the Japanese, but the Japanese could not scatter the defenders either. At Linyi, about 50 kilometers northeast of Xuzhou, Zhang Zizhong, who had previously disgraced himself by abandoning an earlier battlefield—became a national hero for his determined efforts to stop the Japanese troops led by Itagaki Seishirō, the conqueror of Manchuria. The Japanese hoped that they could pour in as many as 400,000 troops to destroy the Chinese forces holding eastern and central China. Chiang Kai-shek was determined that this should not happen, recognizing that the fall of Xuzhou would place Wuhan in extreme danger. On April 1, 1938, he addressed Nationalist Party delegates, linking the defense of Wuhan to the fate of the party itself. He noted that although the Japanese had invaded seven provinces, they had only captured provincial capitals and main transport routes, while villages and towns off those routes remained unconquered. The Japanese, he argued, might muster more than half a million soldiers, but after eight or nine months of hard fighting they had become bogged down. Chiang asserted that as long as Guangzhou (Canton) remained in Chinese hands, it would be of little significance if the Japanese invaded Wuhan, since Guangzhou would keep China's sea links open and Guangdong, Sun Yat-sen's homeland, would serve as a revolutionary base area. If the “woren” Japanese “dwarfs” attacked Wuhan and Guangzhou, it would cost them dearly and threaten their control over the occupied zones. He reiterated his plan: “the base area for our war will not be in the zones east of the Beiping–Wuhan or Wuhan–Guangdong railway lines, but to their west.” For this reason he authorized withdrawing Chinese troops behind the railway lines. Chiang's speech mixed defiance with an explanation of why regrouping was necessary; it was a bold public posture in the face of a developing military disaster, yet it reflected the impossible balance he faced between signaling resolve and avoiding overcommitment of a city that might still fall. Holding Xuzhou as the first priority required Chiang Kai-shek to place a great deal of trust in one of his rivals: the southwestern general Li Zongren. The relationship between Chiang and Li would become one of the most ambivalent in wartime China. Li hailed from Guangxi, a province in southwestern China long regarded by the eastern heartland as half civilized. Its people had rarely felt fully part of the empire ruled from Beijing or even Nanjing, and early in the republic there was a strong push for regional autonomy. Li was part of a cohort of young officers trained in regional academies who sought to bring Guangxi under national control; he joined the Nationalist Party in 1923, the year Sun Yat-sen announced his alliance with the Soviets. Li was not a Baoding Academy graduate but had trained at Yunnan's equivalent institution, which shared similar views on military professionalism. He enthusiastically took part in the Northern Expedition (1926–1928) and played a crucial role in the National Revolutionary Army's ascent to control over much of north China. Yet after the Nanjing government took power, Li grew wary of Chiang's bid to centralize authority in his own person. In 1930 Li's so‑called “Guangxi clique” participated in the Central Plains War, the failed effort by militarist leaders to topple Chiang; although the plot failed, Li retreated to his southwest base, ready to challenge Chiang again. The occupation of Manchuria in 1931 reinforced Li's belief that a Japanese threat posed a greater danger than Chiang's centralization. The tension between the two men was evident from the outset of the war. On October 10, 1937, Chiang appointed Li commander of the Fifth War Zone; Li agreed on the condition that Chiang refrain from issuing shouling—personal commands—to Li's subordinates. Chiang complied, a sign of the value he placed on Li's leadership and the caution with which he treated Li and his Guangxi ally Bai Chongxi. As Chiang sought any possible victory amid retreat and destruction, he needed Li to deliver results. As part of the public-relations front, journalists were given access to commanders on the Xuzhou front. Li and his circle sought to shape their image as capable leaders to visiting reporters, with Du Zhongyuan among the most active observers. Du praised the “formidable southwestern general, Li Zongren,” calling him “elegant and refined” and “vastly magnanimous.” In language echoing the era's soldiers' public presentation, Du suggested that Li's forces operated under strict, even disciplined, orders “The most important point in the people's war is that . . . troops do not harass the people of the country. If the people are the water, the soldiers are the fish, and if you have fish with no water, inevitably they're going to choke; worse still is to use our water to nurture the enemy's fish — that really is incomparably stupid”.  Within the southern front, on January 26, 1938, the Japanese 13th Division attacked Fengyang and Bengbu in Anhui Province, while Li Pinxian, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the 5th War Zone, directed operations south of Xuzhou. The defending 31st Corps of the 11th Group Army, after resisting on the west bank of the Chi River, retreated to the west of Dingyuan and Fengyang. By February 3, the Japanese had captured Linhuai Pass and Bengbu. From the 9th to the 10th, the main force of the 13th Division forced a crossing of the Huai River at Bengbu and Linhuai Pass respectively, and began an offensive against the north bank. The 51st Corps, reorganized from the Central Plains Northeast Army and led by Commander Yu Xuezhong, engaged in fierce combat with the Japanese. Positions on both sides of the Huai shifted repeatedly, producing a riverine bloodbath through intense hand-to-hand fighting. After ten days of engagement, the Fifth War Zone, under Zhang Zizhong, commander of the 59th Army, rushed to the Guzhen area to reinforce the 51st Army, and the two forces stubbornly resisted the Japanese on the north bank of the Huai River. Meanwhile, on the south bank, the 48th Army of the 21st Group Army held the Luqiao area, while the 7th Army, in coordination with the 31st Army, executed a flanking attack on the flanks and rear of the Japanese forces in Dingyuan, compelling the main body of the 13th Division to redeploy to the north bank for support. Seizing the initiative, the 59th and 51st Armies launched a counteroffensive, reclaiming all positions north of the Huai River by early March. The 31st Army then moved from the south bank to the north, and the two sides faced across the river. Subsequently, the 51st and 59th Armies were ordered to reinforce the northern front, while the 31st Army continued to hold the Huai River to ensure that all Chinese forces covering the Battle of Xuzhou were safely withdrawn. Within the northern front, in late February, the Japanese Second Army began its southward push along multiple routes. The eastern axis saw the 5th Division moving south from Weixian present-day Weifang, in Shandong, capturing Yishui, Juxian, and Rizhao before pressing directly toward Linyi, as units of the Nationalist Third Corps' 40th Army and others mounted strenuous resistance. The 59th Army was ordered to reinforce and arrived on March 12 at the west bank of the Yi River in the northern suburbs of Linyi, joining the 40th Army in a counterattack that, after five days and nights of ferocious fighting, inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese and forced them to retreat toward Juxian. On the western route, the Seya Detachment (roughly a brigade) of the Japanese 10th Division crossed the Grand Canal from Jining and attacked Jiaxiang, meeting stiff resistance from the Third Army and being thwarted, while continuing to advance south along the Jinpu Railway. The Isogai Division, advancing on the northern route without awaiting help from the southeast and east, moved southward from Liangxiadian, south of Zouxian, on March 14, with the plan to strike Tengxian, present-day Tengzhou on March 15 and push south toward Xuzhou. The defending 22nd Army and the 41st Corps fought bravely and suffered heavy casualties in a hard battle that lasted until March 17, during which Wang Mingzhang, commander of the 122nd Division defending Teng County, was killed in action. Meanwhile, a separate Japanese thrust under Itagaki Seishirō landed on the Jiaodong Peninsula and occupied Qingdao, advancing along the Jiaoji Line to strike Linyi, a key military town in southern Shandong. Pang Bingxun's 40th Army engaged the invaders in fierce combat, and later, elements of Zhang Zizhong's 333rd Brigade of the 111th Division, reinforced by the 57th Army, joined Pang Bingxun's forces to launch a double-sided pincer that temporarily repelled the Japanese attack on Linyi. By late March 1938 a frightening reality loomed: the Japanese were close to prevailing on the Xuzhou front. The North China Area Army, commanded by Itagaki Seishirō, Nishio Toshizō, and Isogai Rensuke, was poised to link up with the Central China Expeditionary Force under Hata Shunroku in a united drive toward central China. Li Zongren, together with his senior lieutenants Bai Chongxi and Tang Enbo, decided to confront the invaders at Taierzhuang, the traditional stone-walled city that would become a focal point of their defense. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Nanjing falls after one of humanities worst atrocities. Chiang Kai-Shek's war command has been pushed to Wuhan, but the Japanese are not stopping their advance. Trautmann's mediation is over and now Japan has its sights on Xuzhou and its critical railway junctions. Japan does not realize it yet, but she is now entering a long war of attrition.

Xeno Legendium Islamic Folklore Puisi Pujian Seratus Kata Bai Zizan Dari Kaisar China Hong Wu Dinasti Ming Kepada Nabi Muhammad SAW Podcast Edition oleh Muhammad Hamzah Sakura Ryuki.Pada masa Dinasti Ming awal, Kaisar Hongwu (Zhu Yuanzhang, 1328–1398 M), pendiri dinasti tersebut, dikenal sebagai penguasa yang sangat menghargai kebijaksanaan spiritual lintas bangsa. Setelah mendengar kabar tentang ajaran Islam dari para utusan Muslim Asia Tengah dan para pelaut Arab yang datang ke pelabuhan Quanzhou dan Guangzhou, Hongwu menunjukkan rasa hormat mendalam kepada Nabi Muhammad ﷺ. Dalam catatan kuno dari arsip istana dan naskah para ulama Hui (Muslim Tionghoa), disebutkan bahwa sang kaisar menulis sebuah puisi penghormatan untuk Rasulullah ﷺ. Puisi itu menggambarkan beliau sebagai “Cahaya dari Barat yang menerangi Timur”, dan menyebut Nabi sebagai “pemimpin umat yang membawa jalan lurus bagi seluruh bangsa di bawah langit.” Bait-bait puisi tersebut menyanjung akhlak Nabi sebagai lambang kesempurnaan moral dan keadilan yang menyeimbangkan langit dan bumi.Kaisar Hongwu kemudian memerintahkan penerjemahan ajaran Islam ke dalam bahasa Tionghoa klasik agar dapat dipelajari oleh rakyat dan pejabatnya. Ia memuji Nabi Muhammad ﷺ sebagai “Guru Besar dari Barat” yang diutus oleh Tian (Allah Yang Maha Esa) untuk mengajarkan keadilan, kasih sayang, dan kesucian hidup. Puisi penghormatan ini menjadi simbol awal dialog spiritual antara peradaban Islam dan Tiongkok, menggambarkan hubungan saling menghargai antara iman dan kebijaksanaan. Hingga kini, salinan dan interpretasi puisinya masih ditemukan di kalangan Muslim Hui di Yunnan dan Nanjing, sering dibacakan dalam acara keagamaan sebagai tanda kehormatan seorang kaisar besar yang mengakui kemuliaan Nabi terakhir ﷺ dengan penuh hormat dan cinta.

“Our Teacher” is a collection of essays written by students of Falun Dafa (also known as Falun Gong). This series is comprised of their personal experiences with the practice and their interactions with Dafa's founder, Mr. Li Hongzhi, when the practice was first taught to the public. The writings were originally published on the Minghui […]

Hey guys, what you are about to listen to is an extremely graphic episode that will contain many scenes of gore, rape, human experimentation, honestly it will run the gambit. If you got a weak stomach, this episode might not be for you. You have been warned.  I just want to take a chance to say a big thanks to all of you guys who decided to join the patreon, you guys are awesome! Please leave a comment on this episode to let me know what more you want to hear about in the future. With all of that said and done lets jump right into it.   Where to begin with this one? Let start off with one of the major figures of Unit 731, Shiro Ishii. Born June 25th, 1892 in the village of Chiyoda Mura in Kamo District of Chiba Prefecture, Ishii was the product of his era. He came from a landowning class, had a very privileged childhood. His primary and secondary schoolmates described him to be brash, abrasive and arrogant. He was a teacher's pet, extremely intelligent, known to have excellent memory. He grew up during Japans ultra militarism/nationalism age, thus like any of his schoolmates was drawn towards the military. Less than a month after graduating from the Medical department of Kyoto Imperial University at the age of 28, he began military training as a probation officer in the 3rd regiment of the Imperial Guards division. Within 6 months he became a surgeon 1st Lt. During his postgraduate studies at Kyoto Imperial university he networked successfully to climb the career ladder. As a researcher he was sent out to help cure an epidemic that broke out in Japan. It was then he invented a water filter that could be carried alongside the troops.   He eventually came across a report of the Geneva Protocol and conference reports of Harada Toyoji as well as other military doctors. He became impressed with the potential of chemical and biological warfare. During WW1 chemical warfare had been highly explored, leading 44 nations to pass the Geneva Protocol or more specifically  “Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare”. Representatives from Japan were present at this conference and were involving in the drafting and signing of the Geneva Protocol, but it was not ratified in Japan at the time. Ishii's university mentor, Kiyano Kenji suggested he travel western countries and he did so for 2 years. Many nations were secretive about their research, but some places such as MIT were quite open. After his visit Ishii came to believe Japan was far behind everyone else in biological warfare research. After returning to Japan Ishii became an instructor at the Imperial Japanese Army Medical School. Japan of course lacked significant natural resources, thus it was a perfect nation to pursue biological weapons research. Ishii began lobbying the IJA, proposing to establish a military agency to develop biological weapons. One of his most compelling arguments was “that biological warfare must possess distinct possibilities, otherwise, it would not have been outlawed by the League of Nations.”   Ishii networked his way into good favor with the Minister of Health, Koizumi Chikahiko who lended his support in August of 1932 to allow Ishii to head an Epidemic Prevention Laboratory. Ishii secured a 1795 square meter complex at the Army Medical College. Yet this did not satisfy Ishii, it simply was not the type of work he wanted to do. The location of Tokyo allowed too many eyes on his work, he could not perform human experimentation. For what he wanted to do, he had to leave Japan, and in the 1930's Japan had a few colonies or sphere's of influence, the most appetizing one being Manchuria. In 1932 alongside his childhood friend Masuda Tomosada, Ishii took a tour of Harbin and he fell in love with the location.   During the 1930's Harbin was quite a cosmopolitan city, it was a major trading port and diverse in ethnicities and religions. Here there were Mongols, Russians, Chinese, Japanese, various other western groups in lesser numbers. Just about every religion was represented, it was a researcher's paradise for subjects. Ishii sought human experimentation and needed to find somewhere covert with maximum secrecy. He chose a place in the Nan Gang District of Beiyinhe village, roughly 70 kms southeast of Harbin. It was here and then he began human experimentation. One day in 1932, Ishii and the IJA entered the village and evacuated an entire block where Xuan Hua and Wu Miao intersected. They began occupying a multi-use structure that had been supporting 100 Chinese vendors who sold clothes and food to the locals. They then began drafting Chinese laborers to construct the Zhong Ma complex to house the “Togo Unit” named after the legendary admiral, Togo Heihachiro. The Chinese laborers were underpaid and under constant watch from Japanese guards, limiting their movement and preventing them from understanding what they were building, or what was occurring within the complex. The complex was built in under a year, it held 100 rooms, 3 meter high brick walls and had an electric fence surrounding the perimeter. One thousand captives at any given time could be imprisoned within the complex. To ensure absolute secrecy, security guards patrolled the complex 24/7. Saburo Endo, director of Operations for the Kwantung Army once inspected the Togo Unit and described it in his book “The Fifteen Years' Sino-Japanese War and Me”, as such:   [It was] converted from a rather large soy sauce workshop, surrounded by high rammed earth wall. All the attending military doctors had pseudonyms, and they were strictly regulated and were not allowed to communicate with the outsiders. The name of the unit was “Tōgō Unit.” One by one, the subjects of the experiments were imprisoned in a sturdy iron lattice and inoculated with various pathogenic bacteria to observe changes in their conditions. They used prisoners on death row in the prisons of Harbin for these experiments. It was said that it was for national defense purposes, but the experiments were performed with appalling brutality.The dead were burned in high-voltage electric furnaces, leaving no trace.    A local from the region added this about the complex “We heard rumors of people having blood drawn in there but we never went near the place. We were too afraid. When the construction started, there were about forty houses in our village, and a lot of people were driven out. About one person from each home was taken to work on the construction. People were gathered from villages from all around here, maybe about a thousand people in all. The only things we worked on were the surrounding wall and the earthen walls. The Chinese that worked on the buildings were brought in from somewhere, but we didn't know where. After everything was finished, those people were killed.”    Despite all the secrecy, it was soon discovered prisoners were being taken, primarily from the CCP and bandits who were being subjected to tests. One such test was to gradually drain a victim of blood to see at what point they would die. The unit drew 500 cc of blood from each prisoner every 3-5 days. As their bodies drew weaker, they were dissected for further research, the average prisoner lasted a maximum of a month. Due to the climate of Manchuria, it was soon established that finding methods to treat frostbite would benefit the Kwantung army. Ishii's team gathered human subjects and began freezing and unfreezing them. Sometimes these experiments included observing test subjects whose limbs had been frozen and severed. The Togo team reported to General Okamura Yasuji, the deputy commander in chief of the Kwantung army from 1933-1934 that the best way to treat frostbite was to soak a limb in 37 degree water. According to the testimony of a witness named Furuichi at trial done in Khabarovsk , “Experiments in freezing human beings were performed every year in the detachment, in the coldest months of the year—November, December, January and February. The experimental technique was as follows: the test subjects were taken out into the frost at about 11 o'clock at night, compelled to dip their hands into a barrel of cold water and forced to stand with wet hands in the frost for a long time. Alternatively, some were taken out dressed, but with bare feet and compelled to stand at night in the frost during the coldest period of the year. When frostbite had developed, the subjects were taken to a room and forced to put their feet in water of 5 degrees Celsius, after which the temperature was gradually increased.”   Sergeant Major Kurakazu who was with Unit 731 later on in 1940 and taken prisoner by the Soviets in 1945 stated during the Khabarovsk trial , “I saw experiments performed on living people for the first time in December 1940. I was shown these experiments by researcher Yoshimura, a member of the 1st Division. These experiments were performed in the prison laboratory. When I walked into the prison laboratory, ve Chinese experimentees were sitting there; two of these Chinese had no fingers at all, their hands were black; in those of three others the bones were visible. They had fingers, but they were only bones. Yoshimura told me that this was the result of freezing experiments.”   According to Major Karasawa during the same trial Ishii became curious about using plague as a weapon of war and captured plague infected mice to test on subjects in the Zhong Ma Complex “Ishii told me that he had experimented with cholera and plague on the mounted bandits of Manchuria during 1933-1934 and discovered that the plague was effective.”   According to Lt General Endo Saburo's diary entry on November 16th of 1933, at the Zhong Ma complex “The second squad which was responsible for poison gas, liquid poison; and the First Squad which was responsible for electrical experiments. Two bandits were used by each squad for the experiments.  Phosgene gas—5-minute injection of gas into a brick-lined room; the subject was still alive one day aer inhalation of gas; critically ill with pneumonia.  Potassium cyanide—the subject was injected with 15 mg.; subject lost consciousness approximately 20 minutes later.  20,000 volts—several jolts were not enough to kill the subject; injection of poison required to kill the subject.  5000 volts—several jolts were not enough; aer several minutes of continuous current, subject was burned to death.”    The Togo Unit established a strict security system to keep its research highly confidential. Yet in 1934, 16 Chinese prisoners escaped, compromising the Zhong Ma location. One of the guards had gotten drunk and a prisoner named Li smashed a bottle over his head and stole his keys. He freed 15 other prisoners and of them 4 died of cold, hunger and other ailments incurred by the Togo unit. 12 managed to flee to the 3rd route army of the Northeast Anti Japanese united Army. Upon hearing the horrifying report, the 3rd route army attacked the Togo unit at Beiyinhe and within a year, the Zhong Ma complex was exploded.    After the destruction of the Zhong Ma complex, Ishii needed a better structure. The Togo unit had impressed their superior and received a large budget. Then on May 30th of 1936 Emperor Hirohito authorized the creation of Unit 731. Thus Ishii and his colleagues were no longer part of the Epidemic Prevention Institute of the Army Medical School, now they were officially under the Kwantung Army as the Central Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department. Their new HQ was located in Pingfan, closer to Harbin. Their initial budget was 3 million yen for the personnel, 200-300 thousand yen per autonomous unit and 6 million yen for experimentation and research. Thus their new annual budget was over 10 million yen.    Pingfan was evacuated by the Kwantung army. Hundreds of families were forced to move out and sell their land at cheap prices. To increase security this time, people required a special pass to enter Pingfan. Then the airspace over the area became off-limits, excluding IJA aircraft, all violators would be shot down. The new Pingfan complex was within a walled city with more than 70 buildings over a 6 km tract of land. The complex's huge size drew some international attention, and when asked what the structure was, the scientists replied it was a lumber mill. Rather grotesquely, prisoners would be referred to as “maruta” or “logs” to keep up the charade. Suzuki, a Japanese construction company back then, worked day and night to construct the complex.    Now many of you probably know a bit about Unit 731, but did you know it's one of countless units?  The Army's Noborito Laboratory was established (1937) The Central Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of the North China Army/ Unit 1855 was established (1938)  The Central Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of Central China/ Unit 1644 (1939)  Thee Guangzhou Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of South China Army/ Unit 8604 (1942)  The Central Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of the Southern Expeditionary Army/ Unit 9620 (1942).    There were countless others, detachments included Unit 1855 in Beijing, Unit Ei 1644 in Nanjing, Unit 8604 in Guangzhou, and later Unit 9420 in Singapore. All of these units comprised Ishii's network, which, at its height in 1939, oversaw over 10,000 personnel.   Victims were normally brought to Pingfan during the dead of night within crammed freight cars with number logs on top. They were brought into the building via a secret tunnel. According to a witness named Fang Shen Yu, technicians in white lab coats handled the victims who were tied in bags. The victims included anyone charge with a crime, could be anti-japanese activity, opium smoking, espionage, being a communist, homelessness, being mentally handicap, etc. Victims included chinese, Mongolians, Koreans, White Russians, Harbin's jewish population and any Europeans accused of espionage. During the Khabarovsk trial, Major Iijima Yoshia admitted to personally subjecting 40 Soviet citizens to human experimentation. Harbin's diversity provided great research data. Each prisoner was assigned a number starting with 101 and ending at 1500. Onec 1500 was reached, they began again at 101, making it nearly impossible to estimate the total number of victims. Since the complex had been labeled a lumber mill to the locals, most did not worry about it or were too afraid to do so. The prison's warden was Ishii's brother Mitsuo who made sure to keep it all a secret.    Ethics did not exist within Ishii's network of horrors. Everything was done efficiently in the name of science. Pingfang was equipped for disposing the evidence of their work in 3 large incinerators. As a former member who worked with the incinerators recalled “the bodies always burned up fast because all the organ were gone; the bodies were empty”. Human experimentation allowed the researchers their first chance to actually examine the organs of a living person at will to see the progress of a disease. Yeah you heard me right, living person, a lot of the vivisections were done on live people. As one former researcher explained "the results of the effects of infection cannot be obtained accurately once the person dies because putrefactive bacteria set in. Putrefactive bacteria are stronger than plague germs. So, for obtaining accurate results, it is important whether the subject is alive or not." Another former researcher said this “"As soon as the symptoms were observed, the prisoner was taken from his cell and into the dissection room. He was stripped and placed on the table, screaming, trying to fight back. He was strapped down, still screaming frightfully. One of the doctors stuffed a towel into his mouth, then with one quick slice of the scalpel he was opened up." Witnesses of some of these vivisections reported that victims usually let out a horrible scream when the initial cuts were made, but that the voice stops soon after. The researchers often removed the organ of interest, leaving others in the body and the victims usually died of blood loss or because of the removed organ. There are accounts of experiments benign carried out on mothers and children, because yes children were in fact born in the facilities. Many human specimens were placed in jars to be viewed by Tokyo's army medical college. Sometimes these jars were filled with limbs or organs but some giant ones had entire bodies.   Vivisection was conducted on human beings to observe how disease affected each organ once a human dies. According to testimony given by a technician named Ogawa Fukumatsu “I participated in vivisections. I did them every day. I cannot remember the amount of people dissected. At first, I refused to do it. But then, they would not allow me to eat because it was an order; gradually I changed.” Another technician Masakuni Kuri testified  “I did vivisection at the time. Experiments were conducted on a Chinese woman with syphilis. Because she was alive, the blood poured out like water from a tap.”   A report done by Shozo Kondo studied the effects of bubonic plague on humans. The number of subjects was 57 with age ranging from toddlers to 80 years old with mixed gender. The study used fleas carrying plague that were dispersed upon the local population in June of 1940 at Changchun. 7 plague victims were Japanese residents. The report stated the plague spread because of lack of immunity by the townspeople. Subjects' survival time ranged from 2-5 days, with only 3 surviving 12, 18 and 21 days. The subjects were infected with Glandular, Cutaneous or Septicemic plague, but most had the Glandular variety.     In addition to the central units of Pingfang were others set up in Beijing, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Singapore. The total number of personnel was 20,000. These satellite facilities all had their own unique horror stories. One was located in Anda, 100km from Pingfang where outdoor tests for plague, cholera and other pathogens were down. They would expose human subjects to biological bombs, typically by putting 10-40 people in the path of a biological bomb. A lot of the research was done to see the effective radius of the bombs, so victims were placed at different distances. At Xinjing was Unit 100 and its research was done against domesticated animals, horses particularly. Unit 100 was a bacteria factory producing glanders, anthrax and other pathogens. They often ran tests by mixing poisons with food and studied its effects on animals, but they also researched chemical warfare against crops. At Guangzhou was unit 8604 with its HQ at Zhongshan medical university. It is believed starvation tests ran there, such as the water test I mentioned. They also performed typhoid tests and bred rats to spread plague. Witness testimony from a Chinese volunteer states they often dissolved the bodies of victims in acid. In Beijing was Unit 1855 which was a combination of a prison and experiment center. They ran plague, cholera and typhus tests. Prisoners were forced to ingest mixtures of germs and some were vaccinated against the ailments. In Singapore after its capture in February of 1942 there was a secret laboratory. One Mr. Othman Wok gave testimony in the 1990s that when he was 17 years old he was employed to work at this secret lab. He states 7 Chinese, Indian and Malay boys worked in the lab, picking fleas from rats and placing them in containers. Some 40 rat catchers, would haul rats to the lab for the boys to do their work. The containers with fleas went to Japanese researchers and Othman says he saw rats being injected with plague pathogens. The fleas were transferred to kerosene cans which contained dried horse blood and an unidentified chemical left to breed for weeks. Once they had plague infected fleas in large quantity Othman said "A driver who drove the trucks which transported the fleas to the railway station said that these bottles of fleas were sent off to Thailand." If this is true, it gives evidence to claims Unit 731 had a branch in Thailand as well. Othman stated he never understood or knew what was really going on at the lab, but when he read in 1944 about biological attacks on Chongqing using fleas, he decided to leave the lab. Othman states the unit was called Unit 9240.  As you can imagine rats and insects played a large role in all of this. They harvested Manchuria rat population and enlisted schoolchildren to raise them. In the 1990s the Asahi Broadcasting company made a documentary titled “the mystery of the rats that went to the continent”. It involved a small group of high school children in Saitama prefecture asked local farmers if they knew anything about rat farming during the war years. Many stated everybody back then was raising rats, it was a major source of income. One family said they had rat cages piled up in a shed, each cage built to carry 6 rat, but they had no idea what the rats were being used for. Now hear this, after the war, the US military kept these same families in business. The US army unit 406 which was established in Tokyo to research viruses wink wink, would often drive out to these farms in their american jeeps collecting rats.  Getting fleas was a much tricker task. One method was taking older Chinese prisoners and quarantining them with clothes carrying flea or flea eggs and allowing them to live in isolated rooms to cultivate more fleas. These poor guys had to live in filth and not shave for weeks to produce around 100 fleas a day. Now Unit 731 dealt with numerous diseases such as Cholera.  Some experiments used dogs to spread cholera to villages. They would steal dogs from villages, feed them pork laced with cholera germs and return them to the villages. When the disease finished incubating the dogs would vomit and other dogs would come and eat the vomit spread it more and more. The dogs were also stricken with diarrhea and the feces spread it to other dogs as well. 20% of the people in villages hit by this died of the disease. Former army captain Kojima Takeo was a unit member involved in a Cholera campaign and added this testimony "We were told that we were going out on a cholera campaign, and we were all given inoculations against cholera ten days before starting out. Our objective was to infect all the people in the area. The disease had already developed before we got there, and as we moved into the village everyone scattered. The only ones left were those who were too sick to move. The number of people coming down with the disease kept increasing. Cholera produces a face like a skeleton, vomiting, and diarrhea. And the vomiting and defecating of the people lying sick brought flies swarming around. One after the other, people died." I've mentioned it a lot, Plague was a staple of Unit 731. The IJA wanted a disease that was fast and fatal, Cholera for instance took about 20 days, plague on the other hand starts killing in 3 days. Plague also has a very long history of use going back to the medieval times. It was one of the very first diseases Ishii focused on. In october of 1940 a plague attack was conducted against the Kaimingjie area in the port city of Ningbo. This was a joint operation with Unit 731 and the Nanjing based Unit 1644. During this operation plague germs were mixed with wheat, corn, cloth scraps and cotton and dropped from the air. More than 100 people died within a few days of the attack and the affected area was sealed off from the public until the 1960s.  Another horrifying test was the frostbite experiments. Army Engineer Hisato Yoshimura conducted these types of experiments by taking prisoners outside, dipping various appendages into water of varying temperatures and allowing the limbs to freeze. Once frozen, Yoshimura would strike their affected limbs with a short stick and in his words “they would emit a sound resembling that which a board gives when it is struck”. Ice was then chipping away with the affected area being subjected to various treatments, such as being doused in water, exposed to heat and so on. I have to mentioned here, that to my shock there is film of these specific frostbite experiments and one of our animators at Kings and Generals found it, I have seen a lot of things in my day, but seeing this was absolute nightmare fuel. If you have seen the movie or series Snowpiercer, they pretty much nail what it looked like.  Members of Unit 731 referred to Yoshimura as a “scientific devil” and a “cold blooded animal” because he would conduct his work with strictness. Naoji Uezono another member of Unit 731, described in a 1980s interview a disgusting scene where Yoshimura had "two naked men put in an area 40–50 degrees below zero and researchers filmed the whole process until [the subjects] died. [The subjects] suffered such agony they were digging their nails into each other's flesh". Yoshimuras lack of any remorse was evident in an article he wrote for the Journal of Japanese Physiology in 1950 where he admitted to using 20 children and 3 day old infant in experiments which exposed them to zero degree celsius ice and salt water. The article drew criticism and no shit, but Yoshimura denied any guilt when contacted by a reporter from the Mainichi Shimbun. Yoshimura developed a “resistance index of frostbite” based on the mean temperature of 5 - 30 minutes after immersion in freezing water, the temperature of the first rise after immersion and the time until the temperature first rises after immersion. In a number of separate experiments he determined how these parameters depended on the time of day a victim's body part was immersed in freezing water, the surrounding temperature and humidity during immersion, how the victim had been treated before the immersion ("after keeping awake for a night", "after hunger for 24 hours", "after hunger for 48 hours", "immediately after heavy meal", "immediately after hot meal", "immediately after muscular exercise", "immediately after cold bath", "immediately after hot bath"), what type of food the victim had been fed over the five days preceding the immersions with regard to dietary nutrient intake ("high protein (of animal nature)", "high protein (of vegetable nature)", "low protein intake", and "standard diet"), and salt intake. Members of Unit 731 also worked with Syphilis, where they orchestrated forced sex acts between infected and noninfected prisoners to transmit the disease. One testimony given by a prisoner guard was as follows “Infection of venereal disease by injection was abandoned, and the researchers started forcing the prisoners into sexual acts with each other. Four or five unit members, dressed in white laboratory clothing completely covering the body with only eyes and mouth visible, rest covered, handled the tests. A male and female, one infected with syphilis, would be brought together in a cell and forced into sex with each other. It was made clear that anyone resisting would be shot.” After victims were infected, they would be vivisected at differing stages of infection so that the internal and external organs could be observed as the disease progressed. Testimony from multiple guards blamed the female victims as being hosts of the diseases, even as they were forcibly infected. Genitals of female prisoners were infected with syphilis and the guards would call them “jam filled buns”. Even some children were born or grew up in the walls of Unit 731, infected with syphilis. One researcher recalled “one was a Chinese women holding an infant, one was a white russian woman with a daughter of 4 or 5 years of age, and the last was a white russian women with a boy of about 6 or 7”. The children of these women were tested in ways similar to the adults.  There was also of course rape and forced pregnancies as you could guess. Female prisoners were forced to become pregnant for use in experiments. The hypothetical possibility of transmission from mother to child of diseases, particularly syphilis was the rationale for the experiments. Fetal survival and damage to the womans reproductive organs were objects of interest. A large number of babies were born in captivity and there had been no accounts of any survivor of Unit 731, children included. It is suspected that the children of the female prisoners were killed after birth or aborted. One guard gave a testimony “One of the former researchers I located told me that one day he had a human experiment scheduled, but there was still time to kill. So he and another unit member took the keys to the cells and opened one that housed a Chinese woman. One of the unit members raped her; the other member took the keys and opened another cell. There was a Chinese woman in there who had been used in a frostbite experiment. She had several fingers missing and her bones were black, with gangrene set in. He was about to rape her anyway, then he saw that her sex organ was festering, with pus oozing to the surface. He gave up the idea, left and locked the door, then later went on to his experimental work.” In a testimony given on December 28 by witness Furuichi during the Khabarovsk Trial, he described how “a Russian woman was infected with syphilis to allow the scientists to and out how to prevent the spread of the disease.  Many babies were born to women who had been captured and become experimental subjects. Some women were kidnapped while pregnant; others became pregnant aer forced sex acts in the prisons, enabling researchers to study the transmission of venereal disease   Initially Unit 731 and Unit 100 were going to support Japan's Kantokuen plan. The Kantokuen plan an operation plan to be carried out by the Kwantung army to invade the USSR far east, capitalizing on the success of operation barbarossa. Unit 731 and 100 were to prepare bacteriological weapons to help the invasion. The plan was created by the IJA general staff and approved by Emperor Hirohito. It would have involved three-steps to isolate and destroy the Soviet Army and occupy the eastern soviet cities over the course of 6 months. It would have involved heavy use of chemical and biological weapons. The Japanese planned to spread disease using three methods; direct spraying from aircraft, bacteria bombs and saboteurs on the ground. This would have included plague, cholera, typhus and other diseases against troops, civilian populations, livestocks, crops and water supplies. The main targets were Blagoveshchensk, Khabarovsk, Voroshilov, and Chita. If successful the Soviet Far East would be incorporated into Japan's greater east asia co-prosperity sphere. Within Kantokuen documents, Emperor Hirohtio instructed Ishii to increase production rate at the units, for those not convinced Hirohito was deeply involved in some of the worst actions of the war. Yet in the end both Emperor Hirohito and Hideki Tojo pulled their support for the invasion of the USSR and opted for the Nanshin-ron strategy instead.    On August 9th of 1945 the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and invaded Manchuria. In response, the Japanese government ordered all research facilities in Manchuria to be destroyed and to erase all incriminating materials. A skeleton crew began the liquidation of unit 731 on August 9th or 10th, while the rest of the unit evacuated. All test subjects were killed and cremated so no remains would be found. The design of the facilities however, made them hard to destroy via bombing, several parts of the buildings left standing when the Soviets arrived. While most of the unit's staff managed to escape, including Ishii, some were captured by the soviets. Some of these prisoners told the Soviets about the atrocities committed at Pingfang and Changchun. At first the claims seemed so outrageous, the Soviets sent their own Biological Weapons specialists to examine the ruins of Ping Fang. After a thorough investigation, the Soviet experts confirmed the experiments had been done there. The real soviet investigation into the secrets of Unit 731 and 100 began in early 1946, thus information was not readily available during the Tokyo Tribunal. Both the Americans and SOviets had collected evidence during the war that indicated the Japanese were in possession of bacteriological weapons though. Amongst the 600,000 Japanese prisoners of war in the USSR, Major General Kiyoshi Kawashima and Major Tomoio Karasawa would become essential to uncovering the Japanese bacteriological warfare secrets and opening the path to hold the Khabarovsk trial. The Soviets and Americans spent quite a few years performing investigations, many of which led to no arrests. The major reason for this was similar to Operation Paperclip. For those unaware, paperclip was a American secret intelligence program where 1600 German scientists were taken after the war and employed, many of whom were nazi party officials. The most famous of course was Wernher von Braun. When the Americans looked into the Japanese bacteriological work, they were surprised to find the Japanese were ahead of them in some specific areas, notably ones involving human experimentation. General Charles Willoughby of G-2 american intelligence called to attention that all the data extracted from live human testing was out of the reach of the USA. By the end of 1947, with the CCP looking like they might defeat Chiang Kai-Shek and the Soviet Union proving to be their new enemy, the US sought to form an alliance with Japan, and this included their Bacteriological specialists. From October to December, Drs Edwin Hill and Joseph Victor from Camp Detrick were sent to Tokyo to gather information from Ishii and his colleagues. Their final conclusion laid out the importance of continuing to learn from the Japanese teams, and grant them immunity. The British were also receiving some reports from the Americans about the Japanese Bacteriological research and human experimentation. The British agreed with the Americans that the information was invaluable due to the live human beings used in the tests. The UK and US formed some arrangements to retain the information and keep it secret. By late 1948 the Tokyo War Crimes Trial was coming to an end as the cold war tension was heating up in Korea, pushing the US more and more to want to retain the information and keep it all under wraps.  With formal acceptance, final steps were undertaken, much of which was overseen by General Douglas MacArthur. On May 6, 1947, Douglas MacArthur wrote to Washington that "additional data, possibly some statements from Ishii probably can be obtained by informing Japanese involved that information will be retained in intelligence channels and will not be employed as 'War Crimes' evidence.” Ishii and his colleagues received full immunity from the Tokyo War Crimes Trial. Ishii was hired by the US government to lecture American officers at Fort Detrick on bioweapons and the findings made by Unit 731. During the Korean War Ishii reportedly traveled to Korea to take part in alleged American biological warfare activities. On February 22nd of 1952, Ishiiwas explicitly named in a statement made by the North Korean FOreign Minister, claiming he along with other "Japanese bacteriological war criminals had been involved in systematically spreading large quantities of bacteria-carrying insects by aircraft in order to disseminate contagious diseases over our frontline positions and our rear". Ishii would eventually return to Japan, where he opened a clinic, performing examinations and treatments for free. He would die from laryngeal cancer in 1959 and according to his daughter became a Roman Catholic shortly before his death.  According to an investigation by The Guardian, after the war, former members of Unit 731 conducted human experiments on Japanese prisoners, babies, and mental patients under the guise of vaccine development, with covert funding from the U.S. government. Masami Kitaoka, a graduate of Unit 1644, continued performing experiments on unwilling Japanese subjects from 1947 to 1956 while working at Japan's National Institute of Health Sciences. He infected prisoners with rickettsia and mentally ill patients with typhus. Shiro Ishii, the chief of the unit, was granted immunity from prosecution for war crimes by American occupation authorities in exchange for providing them with human experimentation research materials. From 1948 to 1958, less than five percent of these documents were transferred to microfilm and stored in the U.S. National Archives before being shipped back to Japan.

This week on Sinica, I chat with Peking University's Professor Wang Dong (王栋), an international relations scholar at the School of International Studies at Peking University, where he also serves as Deputy Director and Executive Director of the Office for Humanities and Social Sciences and the Institute for Global Cooperation and Understanding. Professor Wang's scholarship and public commentary focus on U.S.–China relations, Cold War history, and the uses of historical memory in diplomacy. He has been an especially thoughtful voice in connecting the Flying Tigers legacy with today's efforts to stabilize and strengthen the people-to-people ties between our two countries.Check back in a day or two for the full podcast page and the transcript!See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, co-host Tianyu Fang makes his debut on the show to join me in interviewing his Stanford classmate and talented writer Jasmine Sun, who studies the anthropology of disruption. This summer, she took a trip to China with a group of friends with different levels of China experience, from people raised in the country to total novices. She reflects on how it hit, and how a group of young people reckoned with the reality of Chinese hypermodernity, which she wrote about in a terrific essay titled "america against china against america: notes on shenzhen, shanghai, and more."Check back on this page in a couple of days for the full podcast page with time stamps and recommendations!See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Está indo para a próxima edição da Canton Fair e não sabe como funciona a alimentação durante a feira? No episódio de hoje, Rodrigo Giraldelli mostra a rotina de almoço e opções de comida dentro do Complexo da Canton Fair, direto do Pazhou Complex em Guangzhou. Ouça até o final e veja como funciona a alimentação dentro da feira, quais são as opções de comida para os visitantes e como você faz o seu pedido em um dos restaurantes. Além disso, você vai entender como a China Gate organiza a rotina de alimentação dos nossos grupos de viagem: café da manhã reforçado em hotel 5 estrelas, jantares de qualidade fora da feira e o suporte completo do time da China Gate para que você tenha a melhor experiência na sua viagem de negócios para a China. CONHEÇA NOSSOS PLANOS E VIAJE PARA A MAIOR FEIRA DE NEGÓCIOS DO MUNDO COM TODO SUPORTE DA CHINA GATE: https://play.chinagate.com.br/vou-pra-canton-outubro/

This week on the Sinica Podcast, I chat with well-known author and public intellectual Yascha Mounk about his recent fascination with China, his approach to learning about the country and learning Chinese, and his thoughts on how China fits into the current crisis of Western liberal democracy.7:15 – Yascha's experience of living in China and learning Chinese12:18 – Yascha's perspective on China's strengths and weaknesses20:12 – China in a global comparative perspective: Generational aspirations and demographic decline29:45 – China's Soft Power vs. Japan, Korea, and the U.S.45:30 – Media narratives on China: have they shifted?54:20 – Western Liberalism confronts China01:07:07 – Backlash & criticism01:11:35 - Polarization and “China as enemy” narrativesRecommendations: Yascha: The Leopard by Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa (book), The Leopard (1963) (movie)Kaiser: A Thousand Small Sanities: The Moral Adventure of Liberalism by Adam Gopnik (book)See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Viele begegnen China mit Skepsis und Angst und fürchten vor allem den Militär- und Polizeistaat. Heute möchte ich darüber aufklären, wie ich die Polizei in China wahrnehme und dabei meine bisherigen Erfahrungen in China einfließen lassen. Hintergrund: Zwei sehr interessante Begegnungen mit der Polizei hatte ich erst vor wenigen Tagen in Peking.
 Erwähnte Begriffe:
 - Pài chū suǒ (派出所): lokale Polizeistation
 - Kunming (Stadt)
 - Guangzhou (Stadt)
 - Guangdong (Provinz)
 - Fujian (Provinz)
 - Hebei (Provinz)
 - Xinjiang (Provinz)
 - Gùgōng (故宮): Verbotene Stadt / ehemaliger kaiserlicher Palastkomplex
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This week on Sinica, I speak first with retired Senior Colonel Zhou Bo, a frequent commentator on Chinese military and security affairs and a prolific writer now at the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University, and with Rana Mitter of the Harvard Kennedy School and author of Forgotten Ally, a book about World War II in China.I will update this page when the transcript is ready. Check back in a couple of days!See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, I chat with Dave Kang (USC), Zenobia Chan (Georgetown), and Jackie Wong (American University in Sharjah, UAE) about their new paper in International Security titled "What Does China Want?" The paper, which has generated quite a bit of controversy, takes a data-driven approach to examine the claim that China seeks global hegemony — that it wants to supplant the U.S. as a globe-spanning top power. I'm traveling much of this week, so I'll update this podcast page when the transcript comes back!See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

The World Intellectual Property Organization has published the Global Innovation Index 2025 top 100 innovation clusters, with the Shenzhen-Hong Kong-Guangzhou innovation cluster ranking the first globally.

This week on the Sinica Podcast, I welcome back Evan Feigenbaum, Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Evan served for many years as a State Department official, was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia and Central Asia among his numerous positions in government, and was instrumental in building the U.S.-India relationship after 2000 — only to watch Trump round on India in recent months, slapping large punitive tariffs on the South Asian giant ostensibly over its purchases of Russian oil. What motivated Trump? And how does this look from New Delhi and from Beijing? Will China capitalize on the strains in the U.S.-Indian relationship? Listen and find out.As this show is news pegged, I decided to release it as soon as I finished the edit, rather than wait for the transcript. I'll update this podcast page when the transcript comes back.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Red tourism, visiting locations with historical significance to the Communist Party of China, is sweeping the nation as China celebrates the 80th anniversary of victory in the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggressionfrom1931 to 1945 and the World Anti-Fascist War.在中国庆祝中国人民抗日战争（1931-45）和世界反法西斯战争胜利80周年之际，参观对中国共产党具有历史意义的地点的红色旅游正在席卷全国。Jinggangshan city in East China's Jiangxi province has seen bookings to its Red tourism scenic spots rise by 22 percent this summer, according to travel portal Qunar. The city is considered a cradle of the Chinese revolution where the CPC established its first rural revolutionary base in 1927.根据旅游门户网站去哪儿网的数据，今年夏天，中国东部江西省井冈山市红色旅游景点的预订量增长了22%。这座城市被认为是中国革命的摇篮，1927年中国共产党在这里建立了第一个农村革命根据地。Bookings to other renowned Red tourism spots such as Yan'an in Shaanxi province and Shaoshan in Hunan province have increased by 20 percent and 12 percent, respectively, year-on-year, according to Qunar.去哪儿网的数据显示，陕西省延安市和湖南省韶山市等其他著名红色旅游景点的预订量同比分别增长了20%和12%。"I'm deeply touched by the perseverance, upbeat and unyielding spirit of Chinese soldiers during their long and arduous fights against the Japanese invasion in the 1930s and 1940s," said Ye Mingsheng, 17, while visiting the Taihang Memorial Museum of the Eighth Route Army in late July with his parents.7月下旬，17岁的叶明生和父母一起参观太行八路军纪念馆时说：“中国士兵在20世纪三四十年代长期艰苦的抗日战争中表现出的毅力、乐观和不屈的精神让我深受感动。”。He said visiting the memorial hall was like attending an immersive history lesson, where he could feel the difficulties the Chinese soldiers had faced during the war, and their optimism and unyielding determination have also inspired him. "The trip has intensified my national ethos," he said.他说，参观纪念馆就像上了一堂身临其境的历史课，在那里他可以感受到中国士兵在战争期间面临的困难，他们的乐观和不屈不挠的决心也激励了他。他说：“这次旅行强化了我的民族精神。”。Cai Miao, a manager from travel agency Tuniu, said that some recently released movies have intensified people's desire for Red tourism this summer.途牛旅行社经理蔡淼表示，最近上映的一些电影加剧了人们对今年夏天红色旅游的渴望。Dead To Rights, for example, which is set during the Nanjing Massacre in 1937, tells the story of a group of Chinese civilians seeking refuge in a photo studio and risking their lives to expose atrocities committed by the Imperial Japanese Army. The film was released on July 25, and from that day to Aug 3, travel bookings to Nanjing increased by 16 percent from the period of July 15 to July 24 on Tuniu.以1937年南京大屠杀为背景，告诉了一群中国平民在照相馆避难，冒着生命危险揭露日本帝国军队暴行的故事。这部电影于7月25日上映，从那天到8月3日，途牛的南京旅游预订量比7月15日到7月24日增长了16%。"Tour products to Nanjing, capital city of East China's Jiangsu province, have been some of our bestsellers this summer. Many of our customers said the most important stop of their trips to the city is to visit the Memorial Hall for the Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders, which memorializes those killed in the Nanjing Massacre by the Imperial Japanese Army," Cai Miao said.蔡淼说：“今年夏天，前往中国东部江苏省省会南京的旅游产品一直是我们最畅销的产品之一。我们的许多客户表示，他们此行最重要的一站是参观日本侵略者南京大屠杀遇难者纪念馆，该纪念馆纪念在日本帝国军队南京大屠杀中遇难的人。”。She added that young Chinese people were the majority taking Red tourism trips this summer, either with their families or during company team building events.她补充说，今年夏天，大多数中国年轻人都会和家人一起或在公司团队建设活动中参加红色旅游。"Places including Beijing, Nanjing in Jiangsu, Guangzhou in Guangdong and Changsha in Hunan province have been the most popular destinations for Red tourism trip goers this summer," she said.她说：“今年夏天，北京、江苏南京、广东广州和湖南长沙等地一直是红色旅游者最受欢迎的目的地。”。Qunar said that several Red tourism destinations have launched theatrical performances or outdoor shows based on stories of the CPC's development to attract tourists.去哪儿网表示，一些红色旅游目的地已经根据中国共产党的发展故事推出了戏剧表演或户外表演，以吸引游客。It said that ticket bookings to the theatrical performance — The Great Turning Point in Zunyi, Guizhou province, had increased threefold this summer. The performance centers on the Zunyi Meeting in 1935, a landmark event in the history of the CPC, as it largely determined the fate of the Party at a critical juncture for its survival.据报道，今年夏天，贵州遵义《大转折》的门票预订量增加了两倍。这场演出以1935年遵义会议为中心，这是中国共产党历史上的一个里程碑事件，因为它在很大程度上决定了党在生死关头的命运。Zhang Jinshan, a tourism planning and development researcher at Beijing Union University, said that Red tourism is a combination of Red culture — a culture related to the CPC and its revolutionary history, and travel.北京联合大学旅游规划与发展研究员张金山表示，红色旅游是红色文化——一种与中国共产党及其革命历史有关的文化——和旅游的结合。"The increasing popularity of Red tourism among Chinese people, especially the young adults and children, enables the nation's younger generations to learn the values and ideals of the CPC, and the hardships Chinese people experienced to establish the People's Republic of China," he said, adding that visiting Red tourism spots can also remind people of safeguarding the homeland and cherishing the hard-won peace.他说：“红色旅游在中国人民，特别是年轻人和儿童中的日益普及，使国家的年轻一代能够了解中国共产党的价值观和理想，以及中国人民为建立中华人民共和国所经历的艰辛。”他补充说，参观红色旅游景点也可以提醒人们保卫家园，珍惜来之不易的和平。atrocitiesn.（尤指战争中的）残暴行为

Nighttime dining, shopping and travel are thriving across China this summer, injecting fresh momentum to economic growth at a time when the country has prioritized consumption as its top priority this year.今年夏季，我国夜间餐饮、购物、旅游等消费业态蓬勃发展。在国家将消费列为今年工作重点的背景下，夜间经济为经济增长注入了新动能。The market size of China's nighttime economy has so far surpassed 50 trillion yuan ($7 trillion), said marketing consultancy Zhiyanzhan.More restaurants have extended business hours and launched delivery services to attract late-night diners and increase revenue.市场咨询机构智研瞻产业研究院数据显示，目前我国夜间经济市场规模已突破50 万亿元（约合 7 万亿美元）。为吸引夜宵客、提升营收，越来越多餐饮企业延长营业时间，并推出外卖服务。Huda Restaurant, a popular crayfish eatery in Beijing's bustling Guijie Street, is operating four outlets in the same area, cumulatively serving more than 6,500 customers daily on average. During peak hours on some nights, customers sometimes have to wait in line for three hours, according to the restaurant.位于北京繁华簋街的热门小龙虾餐厅“胡大饭店”，在该区域布局了 4 家门店，日均总客流量超 6500 人次。据餐厅介绍，部分夜晚的高峰时段，顾客有时需排队 3 小时才能就餐。"Tourists are often unable to wait that long to dine in. Some choose the takeaway option, or order deliveries to their hotels. Some 70 percent of our takeout orders come from nearby hotels, as many tourists tend to order deliveries at night after their daytime sightseeing in the city," said Zhang Shengtao, deputy general manager of Huda.“很多游客等不了那么久，有的会选择打包带走，有的则直接点外卖送到酒店。我们约 70% 的外卖订单来自周边酒店 —— 不少游客白天在市区观光后，晚上习惯点外卖。” 胡大饭店副总经理张胜涛说。"We take food delivery platforms as an important supplement to our operations, as the platforms allow customers to search for our restaurant from different channels. With no increase in the number of staff members and no change in restaurant areas, delivery services can help raise order volumes and lead to profit growth," Zhang said.他表示：“我们把外卖平台当作经营的重要补充，这些平台能让顾客通过多种渠道找到我们。在不增加员工、不扩大门店面积的情况下，外卖业务能帮助提升订单量，进而带动利润增长。”The restaurant chain said diners aged between 25 and 39 account for a large share of its total customers, while consumers opting for deliveries are mainly aged between 18 and 35.该餐饮连锁品牌透露，25 至 39 岁的顾客占堂食总客流的较大比例，而选择外卖的消费者以 18 至 35 岁人群为主。Hong Yong, an associate research fellow at the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, said the availability of nighttime dining meets the demand for late night snacking among urban white-collar employees and many young consumers, especially as more people stay up late, work overtime, or venture out for social entertainment, and late night dining gradually becomes a part of their daily routine.中国国际贸易促进委员会国际贸易经济合作研究院副研究员洪勇指出，夜间餐饮的普及，满足了城市白领及众多年轻消费者的夜宵需求。如今熬夜、加班、外出社交娱乐的人群增多，夜宵逐渐成为他们日常生活的一部分。"Nighttime economic activities such as dining, night tours and shopping provide richer consumption scenarios, and meet consumers' demand for leisure and entertainment, social interaction and emotional release," Hong said.“餐饮、夜游、购物等夜间经济活动，提供了更丰富的消费场景，满足了消费者休闲娱乐、社交互动、情感释放的需求。” 洪勇说。"The expansion of nighttime consumption scenarios will help promote the diversification of consumption formats, encourage higher frequencies of spending, effectively stimulate domestic demand and promote sustained economic growth momentum," he added.他补充道：“夜间消费场景的拓展，有助于推动消费业态多元化，提高消费频次，有效激发内需，为经济持续增长注入动力。”According to a report released by the Ministry of Commerce, 60 percent of China's urban consumption takes place after dusk. At large-scale malls, sales between 6 pm and 10 pm usually account for over half of the whole day's revenue.商务部发布的报告显示，我国60% 的城市消费发生在傍晚之后。在大型商场，18 时至 22 时的销售额通常占全天营收的一半以上。Shui Tea Shop, a tea drink brand based in Jinan, Shandong province, now operates some 1,400 stores nationwide, which are mainly located in Shandong, Jiangsu and Hebei provinces, as well as Tianjin and Beijing.总部位于山东济南的茶饮品牌“阿水大杯茶”，目前在全国拥有约 1400 家门店，主要分布在山东、江苏、河北三省及天津、北京两地。Since June, some of its stores began to extend their business hours. Now, over 300 stores operate until 11 pm, more than 100 stores operate until midnight, and a further 100 outlets are open beyond midnight. The extension of business hours will last until the end of September, the company said.该公司表示，自今年6 月起，部分门店开始延长营业时间：目前超 300 家门店营业至 23 时，100 余家营业至次日 0 时，另有 100 家门店营业至凌晨之后，这一延长营业时间的举措将持续至 9 月底。"After extending the business hours, there has been a clear trend of growth in store revenue, and some stores have experienced sales growth of over 100 percent compared with the period before the extension," said Wei Qun, director of delivery services at A-Shui Tea Shop.“延长营业时间后，门店营收增长趋势明显，部分门店销售额较延长前增长超 100%。” 阿水大杯茶外卖业务负责人魏群说。"Nighttime sales have been especially high in Jinan and Qingdao of Shandong, as well as Tianjin. Stores with higher revenues are mainly located in core business circles, and nighttime sales mainly come from orders for deliveries," Wei said.“山东的济南、青岛以及天津等地的夜间销售额表现尤为突出。高营收门店主要集中在核心商圈，夜间销售以外卖订单为主。” 魏群介绍。He added that in summer, many consumers are interested in having barbecues and crayfish at night, and restaurants providing such meals located in core business districts have largely extended their operating hours. Their popularity has also driven the sales growth of beverages, as certain drinks pair nicely with these kinds of food.他还提到，夏季夜晚，不少消费者喜欢吃烧烤、小龙虾，核心商圈内提供这类餐食的餐厅大多延长了营业时间。这些餐饮的火爆也带动了饮品销量—— 部分饮品与这类食物搭配口感更佳。In addition to the catering sector, many sightseeing spots have extended their opening hours this summer, and upgraded night tourism products to meet the diverse demand of travelers. Besides driving an increase in ticket revenue for scenic spots, it has promoted the growth of related businesses such as catering, accommodation and shopping in surrounding areas.除餐饮行业外，今年夏季，多家景区延长开放时间，并升级夜间旅游产品，以满足游客多样化需求。这不仅推动景区门票收入增长，还带动了周边餐饮、住宿、购物等关联业态的发展。The government has encouraged more industry players to actively develop the night tourism economy.政府也积极鼓励更多市场主体参与夜间旅游经济发展。According to a guideline issued earlier this year by the State Council, China's Cabinet, the holding of more nighttime activities such as folk performances, lantern fairs, temple fairs, and light and shadow shows has been encouraged, and different regions could develop water night tours based on local conditions.今年早些时候，国务院印发的指导意见明确，鼓励举办民俗展演、灯会、庙会、光影秀等夜间活动，各地可结合实际发展水上夜游项目。In addition, the government will support the upgrading and renovation of lighting services at night in commercial areas, and the optimization of support facilities such as parking lots and public transportation, according to the document.意见还提出，将支持商业街区夜间照明设施升级改造，优化停车场、公共交通等配套设施。In Guiyang, Southwest China's Guizhou province, a three-day international kite festival that included nighttime events attracted more than 163,000 tourists in July, netting tourism revenue of over 60 million yuan, according to the local government.据贵州省贵阳市政府消息，今年7 月举办的为期三天的国际风筝节（含夜间活动），吸引游客超 16.3 万人次，实现旅游收入超 6000 万元。Night markets, roadside concerts in parks, trunk markets and other nighttime consumption scenes were attractive to tourists.夜市、公园路边音乐会、后备箱集市等夜间消费场景，对游客具有很强的吸引力。"This type of nighttime cultural tourism model, with feature activities as its core, gathers popularity and forms a consumption loop, and has become an effective way to boost the nighttime economy," said Mu Qianyi, an analyst of LeadLeo Research Institute, a market research provider based in Shanghai.“这种以特色活动为核心的夜间文旅模式，能聚集人气、形成消费闭环，已成为拉动夜间经济的有效方式。” 上海市场研究机构头豹研究院分析师穆芊伊说。Mu added that new technologies and scenarios such as drone light shows at night will help enrich the experiences of tourists. The improvement in the quality of scenes naturally enhances the attractiveness and vitality of nighttime cultural tourism, and could help inject new impetus into economic growth.穆芊伊补充道，夜间无人机灯光秀等新技术、新场景，将进一步丰富游客体验。消费场景品质的提升，自然会增强夜间文旅的吸引力与活力，为经济增长注入新动力。Particularly, Shanghai has been developing a booming nighttime economy, and the city's after-dark economy index has maintained the top position in the country for five consecutive years. This year, it has been followed by Guangzhou, Guangdong province, and Chengdu, Sichuan province, said Rising Lab, a city-oriented big data platform of Yicai Media Group.值得关注的是，上海夜间经济持续繁荣。第一财经传媒集团旗下城市大数据平台“第一财经研究院” 数据显示，上海夜间经济指数已连续五年位居全国首位，今年紧随其后的是广东广州与四川成都。In Shanghai, nighttime lighting covered 75 percent of the city's area last year, and nighttime public transportation covered 1,975 square kilometers, which significantly helped to improve the local nighttime consumption environment, the platform found.该平台还发现，去年上海夜间照明覆盖面积占全市面积的75%，夜间公共交通覆盖范围达 1975 平方公里，这一配套设施的完善显著改善了当地夜间消费环境。

Building the Future: Carol Yu on Nurturing China's Tech StartupsIn the latest episode of the Asia Business Podcast, we're joined by Carol Yu, the dynamic founding partner and Associate Dean of Shenzhen InnoX Academy. This episode delves into Carol's journey from her academic roots in Guangzhou, through her formative years in the U.S., and back to her entrepreneurial endeavors in Southern China. Carol shares insights into the innovative model of InnoX Academy, which nurtures entrepreneurial talent and incubates tech startups in a region famous for its rapid technological advancements.Meet Carol Yu: The Visionary Behind InnoX AcademyConnect with CarolCarol Yu is no stranger to pioneering new paths. Her academic journey took her from Guangzhou to the U.S., where she pursued higher education in economics and public policy. Her passion for innovation and education ultimately led her back to China, where she co-founded Shenzhen InnoX Academy with Professor Li Zexiang. Professor Li, renowned for his role in launching DJI, has been instrumental in promoting tech innovation in Shenzhen, a hub for hardware technology.InnoX Academy: A Unique Model for Incubating TalentThe Shenzhen InnoX Academy stands out for its commitment to fostering young talent. Unlike traditional accelerators like Y Combinator focused primarily on product and pitch, InnoX provides a comprehensive nurturing environment. Carol elaborates on the academy's approach: starting with students who often have no clear project idea, InnoX offers a systematic empowerment platform. This includes a talent pool, curated curriculum, supply-chain resources, and a focus on both technical skills and go-to-market strategies.Combating Challenges: Bridging Technical Expertise and Entrepreneurial SavvyA key challenge faced by InnoX Academy is bridging the gap between technical innovation and commercialization. Carol notes that many young innovators possess deep technical skills but lack understanding of market dynamics and business management. The academy addresses this by providing industry-experienced mentors from leading firms like DJI, BYD, and Huawei, who guide students in transforming their innovative ideas into market-ready products.The Hardware Renaissance: Rethinking Global StrategiesCarol discusses the shifting perception of hardware in tech industries. As software business models saturate, the combination of hardware innovation with AI and robotics creates new opportunities. Shenzhen's capability to rapidly iterate and commercialize products presents a distinct advantage. InnoX Academy enables projects to achieve cash flow positivity within 18 months and even bypass traditional funding needs by directly moving towards IPOs.Navigating Geopolitical Landscapes: Expanding Beyond ChinaThe discussion also touches on the global ambitions of Chinese entrepreneurs amidst shifting geopolitical tides. Carol acknowledges the challenges brought by heightened tariffs and geopolitical tensions. Yet, she emphasizes the resilience and adaptability of entrepreneurs in pursuing the lucrative U.S. and European markets through strategic pivots, such as leveraging Singaporean bases or separating hardware and software development.The Role of Education: From Stanford and Harvard to InnoXReflecting on her educational experiences at Stanford and Harvard, Carol praises the environments that shaped her entrepreneurial spirit. Stanford imparted a boundless belief in possibility, while Harvard provided a deeper understanding of global policy dynamics. These influences are evident in her leadership at InnoX, where she underscores the importance of values-driven entrepreneurship and the power of positive societal impact.Conclusion: A Future-Forward Vision for Global InnovationCarol Yu's work with InnoX Academy embodies a forward-thinking model that intersects innovation with cultural understanding and business acumen. She continues to inspire the next generation of entrepreneurs not only to succeed in markets but to create meaningful global impact. As the world navigates complex challenges, the narratives from leaders like Carol provide invaluable insights into the evolving landscape of global business and technology.Timestamps00:00 Introduction and Guest Welcome01:08 Carol Yu's Background and Career Journey05:28 Professor Li and the Birth of DJI10:14 InnoX Academy and Talent Development11:25 Challenges and Strategies in Talent Selection13:28 Empowerment Platform and Curriculum18:09 Shared Factory Platform and Market Integration18:54 Innovation and Industrialization in China24:13 Funding Strategies and Road Shows25:11 Challenges in Hardware Business28:02 Global Expansion and Geopolitical Challenges29:40 Advice for Chinese Companies Entering Global Markets30:44 Impact of US-China Trade Relations ProducerJacob ThomasFollow UsLinkedInApple Podcasts

This week on Sinica, I'm delighted to be joined by Dan Wang, formerly of Gavekal Dragonomics and the Paul Tsai Law Center at Yale University, now with the Hoover Institute's History Lab. Dan's new book is Breakneck: China's Quest to Engineer the Future, and it's already one of the year's most talked-about books. In this conversation, we go beyond what's actually in the book to discuss the origins and implications of the Chinese "engineering state" — the world's biggest technocratic polity — and what the United States should and should not learn from China. We discuss how Dan's ideas sit with Abundance by Derek Thompson and Ezra Klein, and much more. Don't miss this episode!See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Artificial intelligence has been a frequent topic on Sinica in recent years — but usually through the lens of the two countries that have produced the leading models and companies: the United States and China. We've covered generative AI, national strategies, governance frameworks, and the geopolitical implications of AI leadership.This webinar, broadcast on the morning of August 14, broadens that lens to explore how other countries — and especially Ukraine — are approaching AI in the public sector. Around the world, governments are experimenting with AI well beyond chatbots and text generation: China's “City Brain” optimizes traffic, energy use, and public safety; U.S. agencies are streamlining services and automating benefits processing; and elsewhere, smart grids, predictive infrastructure planning, and AI-enabled e-governance are reshaping public administration. These projects reveal both the promise and the complexity of bringing AI into government — along with valid concerns over privacy, fairness, and inclusiveness.We'll look at what lessons Ukraine might draw from U.S. and Chinese experiences, the opportunities and challenges of adapting these practices, and the strategic risks of sourcing AI solutions from different providers — especially in the context of Ukraine's eventual postwar reconstruction.Joining us are three distinguished guests:Dmytro Yefremov, Board Member of the Ukrainian Association of Sinologists, with deep expertise in China's political and technological strategies and Ukraine's policy landscape.Wang Guan, Chairman of Learnable.ai in China, bringing extensive experience in AI applications for public administration and education.Karman Lucero, Associate Research Scholar and Senior Fellow at Yale Law School's Paul Tsai China Center, whose work focuses on Chinese law, governance, and the regulation of emerging technologies.Thanks to the Ukrainian Platform for Contemporary China, the Ukrainian Association of Sinologists, and the Center for Slavic, Eurasian, and East European Studies at the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill for organizing and sponsoring today's event. Special thanks to Vita Golod for putting together the panel and inviting me to moderate.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Join me for a conversation with four fantastic panelists about nuclear safety and security issues brought on by Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and more broadly on the state of nuclear security globally during this era of dramatic change.This program was made possible by the Ukrainian Platform for Contemporary China and the Center for Slavic, Eurasian, and East European Studies at the University of North Carolina Chapel Hill.Nickolas Roth is Senior Director for Nuclear Materials Security at the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). Nickolas works at the intersection of arms control, risk reduction, and institutional resilience, and previously directed nuclear security work at the Stimson Center and contributed to Harvard's Project on Managing the Atom.Mariana Budjeryn is a Senior Research Associate with Managing the Atom at Harvard's Belfer Center and author of Inheriting the Bomb, a definitive study of Ukraine's post-Soviet disarmament and the limits of the Budapest Memorandum. Her scholarship grounds today's debates about guarantees, coercion, and nuclear restraint.Pan Yanliang is a Research Associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). He studies the Russian and Chinese nuclear industries and the nuclear fuel cycle, and works on CNS engagement with Chinese counterparts—giving him a distinctive cross-regional vantage.Lily Wojtowicz is a Research Fellow at the Hertie School (Berlin) and a USIP–Minerva Peace & Security Scholar, whose work focuses on extended deterrence credibility, European security, and alliance adaptation under great-power rivalry.5:19 - The Gap Between Coercive Rhetoric and First-use Thresholds11:26 - The Implication of Ukraine's allies regarding weapons 17:26 - Golden Dome21:30 - China's Position on Nuclear Weapons29:25 - How Belarus Altered European Debates 31:13 - Civilian Nuclear Power 38:32 - North Korea's Support for Russia40:59 - Beijing on NATO and Asian Security43:09 - Europe's Reaction to Nuclear Risk45:44 - Nuclear Risk in the Russia-Ukraine War52:56 - Trump's Impact on Kremlin Nuclear Thinking1:01:52 - US-China Nuclear Relations1:04:49 - Ukraine's Nuclear DisarmamentSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

The Guardian's senior China correspondent, Amy Hawkins, visits factories threatened by US tariffs in Guangzhou, south China, as the deadline for a US-China trade agreement approaches with no deal yet in sight. Help support our independent journalism at theguardian.com/infocus

【欢迎订阅】 每天早上5:30，准时更新。 【阅读原文】 标题：China's Small Workshops Are Hurting. Trump's Tariffs Are Only One Reason. The U.S.-Chinese cease-fire left exporters with crippling tariffs, worsening a slowdown for light industry factories caused by China's shift to advanced manufacturing. 正文：It was 96 degrees in the shade with high humidity and no wind on a Tuesday afternoon in a Guangzhou factory district, the heart of China's garment manufacturing. Operating sewingworkshops were sweltering, but roughly half of the hundreds of factories sat dark, doors closed and lacking their usual bustle. Bright red signs on walls and poles advertised industrial buildings for sale or rent.知识点：garment /ˈɡɑːmənt/，n. an item of clothing.（服装；衣服）• The store sells a range of garments for men and women.这家商店出售各种男女服装。获取外刊的完整原文以及精讲笔记，请关注微信公众号「早安英文」，回复“外刊”即可。更多有意思的英语干货等着你！ 【节目介绍】 《早安英文-每日外刊精读》，带你精读最新外刊，了解国际最热事件：分析语法结构，拆解长难句，最接地气的翻译，还有重点词汇讲解。 所有选题均来自于《经济学人》《纽约时报》《华尔街日报》《华盛顿邮报》《大西洋月刊》《科学杂志》《国家地理》等国际一线外刊。 【适合谁听】 1、关注时事热点新闻，想要学习最新最潮流英文表达的英文学习者 2、任何想通过地道英文提高听、说、读、写能力的英文学习者 3、想快速掌握表达，有出国学习和旅游计划的英语爱好者 4、参加各类英语考试的应试者（如大学英语四六级、托福雅思、考研等） 【你将获得】 1、超过1000篇外刊精读课程，拓展丰富语言表达和文化背景 2、逐词、逐句精确讲解，系统掌握英语词汇、听力、阅读和语法 3、每期内附学习笔记，包含全文注释、长难句解析、疑难语法点等，帮助扫除阅读障碍。

Local authorities have confirmed that two people among those trapped by a rain-triggered landslide in Guangzhou on Wednesday have died.

This week on Sinica, Paul Triolo of DGA Albright Stonebridge and tech investor Ryan Cunningham join to talk about their observations and insights from the World AI Conference (WAIC), held in July in Shanghai, and what it tells them about China's ambitions in the fast-moving world of artificial intelligence. Don't miss this one!04:21 - Ryan on his Edgerunner fund06:23 - Impressions of the World AI Conference in Shanghai13:52 - Approaches to AI development in the US and China24:04 - China's role in global AI safety 33:42 - AI market: US vs China38:20 - AI diffusion in China44:56 - AI safety frameworks52:06 - Domestic development of Chinese AI1:04:06 - Pressure of Domestic AI Alternatives1:08:43 - Can AI have a dual role in the U.S.?1:17:25 -Paying it Forward 1:20:16 - RecommendationsPaying it Forward: Kevin Xu, Kyle Chan, Helen Toner (Rising Tide Substack), Piotr Mazurek and Felix Gabriel (LLM Inference Economics from First Principles).Recommendations: Paul: Neil deGrasse Tyson - Origins: Fourteen Billion Years of Cosmic Evolution (book), Sara Imari Walker's Life As No One Knows It (book)Ryan: Armored Core VI: Fires of Rubicon (video game)Kaiser: The Studio (TV series), Platonic (TV series)See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

First of all - sorry about the diferent mic.  But this way we get the episode.  I'll see what I can do to make things better for next ep - and all will be back to normal by the one after that.Anyway - 19th Century Chinese Food?What can I tell you?  It would have looked much the same as lots of the food you will find right now around the Pearl RIver Delta, the old district of Canton - now known as Guangzhou.But this episode is not just about the food - it also looks a bit into how the US and China started dealing with each other.  How did that stream of labor from China - that would be essential in the gold fileds and then the construction of the US railroads get a foot hold in California.While there is much made of the Chinese presence in New York - and how they influenced east coast culture - there is the less well known story of China and the early west.So grab your dried fish, pickled vegetables, boiled millet and see what's there.Music Credit: Fingerlympics by Doctor TurtleShow Notes: https://thehistoryofamericanfood.blogspot.com/Email: TheHistoryofAmericanFood at gmail dot comThreads: @THoAFoodInstagram: @THoAFood& some other socials... @THoAFood

Your Daily Prayer

Dr Philip Smith, Digital and Education Editor of Gut and Honorary Consultant Gastroenterologist at the Royal Liverpool Hospital, Liverpool, UK interviews Professor Tao Zuo from the Guangdong Institute of Gastroenterology, The Sixth Affiliated Hospital of Sun Yat-sen University, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, Guangdong, China, on the paper "Dietary whey protein protects against Crohn's disease by orchestrating cross-kingdom interaction between the gut phageome and bacteriome" published in paper copy in Gut in August 2025.   Please subscribe to the Gut podcast on your favourite platform to get the latest podcast every month. If you enjoy our podcast, you can leave us a review or a comment on Apple Podcasts (https://apple.co/3UOTwqS) or Spotify (https://spoti.fi/3Ifxq9p).

This week on Sinica: On my final two days in Shaxi in Yunnan, Chris Thomas and Stephanie Li, the hosts of the marvelous YouTube channel Chinese Cooking Demystified, joined me for some cooking and lots of chatting about food! We recorded this show together and focus our conversation on their heroic attempt at a taxonomy of different Chinese cuisines. We don't talk about all 63 that they identify, but we do get into their04:31 - Flavors of Yunnan 08:44 - On balancing between the “exotic” and “normal” China 11:53 - The origin story behind “Chinese Cooking Demystified”14:56 - The Breath of the Wok (Wok Hei, 鑊氣 / huo6 hei3)21:05 - A Comprehensive Taxonomy on Chinese Cuisine 32:25 - Correlations between dialects and cuisine 37:15 - Efforts behind the work39:09 - Promoting local specialties44:23 - Chinese identity and food trends52:30 - "Minority" cuisine in Yunnan01:00:52 - Yunnan cuisine and the Chinese hipster generation01:05:52 - Dali dish recommendationsRecommendations: Chris & Steph: Shunde Lao Baby, Pin Nuo, Lao DongbeiKaiser: Taking time off to do something you love!See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

I'm in Shaxi, a wonderful little town in the Dali Bai Autonomous Prefecture, and I was joined here by the Columbia economic historian Adam Tooze, who shared his thoughts on what he sees happening on the ground in China. Adam's been in China for the last month and reflects on his experiences learning about the country — and even attempting the language!03:49 - The economic situation in China10:42 - Patterns of consumption in China14:38 - China's industrial policy and renewable energy 18:52 - China vs. the U.S. on renewables26:15 - China's economic engagement with the Global South33:13- Beijing's strategic shift and Europe's rethinking37:49- The recent European Parliament paper42:43 - Learning about China as an “Outsider” 51:31 - Adam's evolving views on China 59:30 - Paying it Forward01:01:07 - Recommendations Paying it Forward: Kyle Chan, Pekingology.Recommendations: Adam: Caught by the Tide, Jia Zhangke (movie).Kaiser: Empire of AI: Dreams and Nightmares in Sam Altman's OpenAI, Karen Hao (book), Vera, or Faith, Gary Shteyngart (book).See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Even after shifting to student-centered learning, it's easy to fall into familiar routines: sparking a project, guiding students along, and quietly doing the heavy lifting ourselves. But what does it take to fully hand over the reins—and trust students to direct their own learning? In this episode, inquiry-driven educator Robynne Esther shares how she made that shift herself, and the practical tools she now uses to support real student independence, without sacrificing structure. From co-creating checklists to guiding expert research and using visible thinking strategies, Robynne walks us through how to scaffold agency without oversteering it. You'll hear: How inquiry provocations can open up—not narrow—student-led direction What expert groups and feedback loops look like in project-based units Why the right checklist isn't about control, but about clarity How thinking routines help students reflect, take risks, and follow their curiosity The subtle mindset shifts that allow teachers to lead by stepping back Whether you're refining your role as facilitator or looking for ways to help students take the next leap in self-direction, this conversation offers inspiration—and strategy—you can put to use right away. Connect with Robynne: LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/robynne-esther-24990771/  Dive Deeper into Student-Centered Environments: Get the 12 Shifts Book  Robynne's Bio: Ever wonder how to spark genuine curiosity in your students? Robynne Esther has spent 15 years, including seven within the PYP, unlocking that secret through inquiry-based and project-based learning. She has empowered teachers across Hong Kong, Guangzhou, and Shanghai to adopt 21st-century learning through engaging IBL/PBL & AI workshops. Currently inspiring young minds at DSHK, Robynne leads Grade 6 Project-Based Learning and teaches Grade 4 Inquiry, fostering classrooms buzzing with collaboration and community. But her journey's even richer than that! She's an AFHEA-accredited mentor who has guided aspiring teachers at Sunderland University and has even spent time as a pastry chef in Hong Kong's Soho district. Robynne brings this uniquely diverse background to her exploration of the fascinating intersection of PBL and IBL. Join her as she shares her insights on their similarities and differences.

This week on Sinica, in a show taped in early June in Washington, Kaiser chats with Tong Zhao (赵通) of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a leading expert on Chinese nuclear doctrine, about why the PRC has, in recent years, significantly increased the size of its nuclear arsenal. Zhao offers a master class in the practice of strategic empathy.03:12 – China's nuclear doctrine: core principles06:56 – Xi Jinping's leadership and nuclear policy12:33 – Symbolism vs. strategy: Defensive or offensive buildup?16:55 – What's driving the nuclear expansion?28:33 – Trump's second term: Impact on China's strategic thinking34:34 – Nukes and Taiwan41:45 – Washington and Beijing nuclear doctrines perceptions48:04 - China's perspective on the Golden Dome program52:32 - China's Stance on North Korea's nuclear program 01:01:00 - Beijing's View on North Korean troops in UkrainePaying it forward: David Logan, at Tufts UniversityRecommendations:Tong: Yellowstone, TV series Kaiser: Gomorrah, TV series See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

In 2014, the writer Christopher Beam published a humorous, heartwarming story in The New Republic about an unlikely team of American football enthusiasts in Chongqing who went on to defeat their archrivals in Shanghai to win a championship. The piece was optioned by Sony Pictures, and had some big names attached, but was ultimately never made — not, at least, by an American studio. Eleven years later, Chris has written about a film that was made: Clash, produced by iQiyi, hit theaters in China earlier this year and followed the Chongqing Dockers in the same story arc, but with important and telling differences. His new story was published in The Atlantic, and he talks to me about the Dockers and the long, strange story of the film that wasn't and the one that was.03:50 – The Meaning of Chinese YOLO05:33 – Chris's First Meeting With the Chongqing Team13:11 – Chris McLaurin's Background15:54 – American Football as a Symbol of Masculinity19:50 – The Failed Hollywood Adaptation25:34 – First Impressions of the Film31:55 – Bridging Perspectives: Can a Movie Speak To Both Sides?36:42 – A Lost Moment in GlobalizationPaying it Forward: Viola ZhouRecommendations: Chris: Rejection by Tony Tulathimutte (short story collection)Kaiser: Becoming Led Zeppelin (documentary); the Beijing-based artist Michael Cherney.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, I chat with Stephen Platt, historian at UMass Amherst and author, most recently, of the book The Raider: The Untold Story of a Renegade Marine and the Birth of U.S. Special Forces in World War II. Like his previous works, Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom and Imperial Twilight, it offers a compelling narrative history of an overlooked chapter through a deeply empathetic and well-researched examination of individual lives. Please make sure to listen to the excerpt from the audiobook at the end of this podcast.04:21 - Evans Carlson: A forgotten hero07:49 - The Real Carlson vs. the constructed Carlson10:04 - The book's origin12:20 - Carlson's ideological transformation16:50 - Carlson's religious beliefs and public perception20:04 - Emerson's influence on Carlson's thinking 23:46 - Inner conflicts: Soul-searching or regret?27:15 - Carlson's relationship with President Franklin D. Roosevelt30:39 - Gung Ho Meetings: meaning, practice, and legacy33:34 - Zhu De's influence on Carlson 40:28 - Carlson's relationships with Agnes Smedley and Edgar Snow47:49 - Hopes for U.S.-China alliance 51:57 - Carlson's death and his legacy 58:01 - Lessons from CarlsonPaying it Forward: Peter Thilly, Emily MokrosRecommendations: Stephen: 11.22.63 by Stephen King; Ted Chiang (author); Otoboke Beaver (band); Book of Mormon (musical)Kaiser: Wobbler (band); The Religion by Tim Willocks; Zappa (2020)See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, I chat with Jostein Hauge, political economist and an Assistant Professor in Development Studies at the University of Cambridge, based at the Centre of Development Studies and the Department of Politics and International Studies, and author of the book The Future of the Factory: How Megatrends are Changing Industrialization.3:09 – Self Introduction: Jostein Hauge4:23 – Anti-China Sentiment in Western Discourse7:40 – Misconceptions and Prevailing Narratives10:08 – Technological Transfer and the Political Economy12:18 – Historical Periods of Economic Rivalry 14:36 – Evolving Industrial Policy: From Japan's MITI to China and the U.S. today18:59 – China's Contemporary Industrial Policy: Quality or Quantity? 21:13 – China as a Rising Power: Is History Repeating?24:18 – The Sustainability of China's Industrial Policy 26:43 – China, Overcapacity, and Global Imbalances34:07 – Overcapacity: Economic Reality or Ideological Construct?36:04 – China's domination in the renewable energy market39:13 – China's greenhouse gas emissions43:17 – How China is reshaping the IP regime 48:14 – The U.S. national security stance and the trade war with China55:10 – Europe's approach to ChinaPaying it forward: Kyle Chan at High CapacityRecommendations:Jostein: The White Lotus (TV Series)Kaiser: The Raider: The Untold Story of a Renegade Marine and the Birth of U.S. Special Forces in World War II by Stephen R. PlattSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, I speak with Kendra Schaefer, the partner at Trivium China who heads their tech practice. She recently published a fascinating paper looking at the Cyberspace Administration of China's comprehensive database of generative AI tools released in China, and she shares the insights and big takeaways from her research on that database. It's a terrific window into what Chinese firms, both private and state-affiliated, are doing with generative AI.03:51 – Mandatory registration of generative AI Tools in China10:28 – How does the CAC categorize AI Tools?14:25 – State-affiliated vs. non-state-affiliated AI Tools18:55 – Capability and competition of China's AI Industry22:57 – Significance of Generative Algorithmic Tools (GAT) registration counts26:06 – The application of GATs in the education sector29:50 – The application of GATs in the healthcare Sector31:00 – Underrepresentation of AI tools in other sectors32:56 – Regional breakdown of AI innovation in China36:07 – AI adoption across sectors: how companies integrate AI40:21 – Standout projects by the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS)42:42 – How multinationals navigate China's tech regulations47:50 – Role of foreign players in China's AI strategy49:38 – Key takeaways from the AI development journey53:41 -– Blind spots in AI data57:25 – Kendra's future research directionPaying it Forward: Kenton Thibaut.Recommendations:Kendra: The Chinese Computer: A Global History of the Information Age by Thomas Mullaney.Kaiser: the Rhyming Chaos Podcast by Jeremy Goldkorn and Maria RepnikovaSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Jeremy Goldkorn joins for this largely unedited throwback to the early, sweary days of the show. We talk about the announcement made on Wednesday, 28 May 2025, on the "aggressive" revocation of Chinese student visas for students with Party "connections" or who study "critical fields." You've been warned!See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

  Last time we spoke about the Xi'an Incident. In December 1936, tensions in China erupted as Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek faced a revolt led by his commanders, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. Disillusioned by Chiang's focus on battling communists instead of the Japanese invaders, the generals swiftly captured him in a coup. Confined in Xi'an, Chiang initially resisted their demands for a united front against Japan but eventually engaged in negotiation with Zhang and the Chinese Communist Party. As public sentiment shifted against him, Chiang's predicament led to urgent discussions, culminating in an unexpected alliance with the communists. This pact aimed to consolidate Chinese resistance against Japanese aggression, marking a critical turning point in the Second Sino-Japanese War. By December 26, Chiang was released, and this uneasy collaboration set the stage for a more unified front against a common enemy, though underlying tensions remained between the factions.   #152 China Prepares for War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Before we jump into the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, which I honestly have no idea how long will take us, I thought it would be a good idea to dedicate two episodes to how both China and Japan prepared themselves for war.  Going all the way back to the 1910s, Chinese intellectuals began to view an outright conflict between Japan and China was inevitable. In the discussions about China's strategic options, Jiang Fangzhen pioneered a strategy of protracted warfare, a concept that would later shape China's approach during the Sino-Japanese War. Having studied in Japan during his youth, Jiang developed a keen understanding of the Japanese government and military. As early as 1917, he predicted that China and Japan would become embroiled in a long-term conflict, with the battleground likely to be west of the Peiping–Wuhan and Guangzhou–Wuhan railways. In his work titled "Guofang Lun" or “On National Defense”, Jiang reiterated the importance of protracted warfare as a means to thwart Japan's aspirations for a swift victory. He argued that China should leverage its vast population and extensive territory to extend the conflict, gradually wearing down Japanese strength and turning the situation to its advantage. Jiang recommended that China not focus on defending its coastal regions but instead confront the enemy west of the Peking–Wuhan Railway.   Chiang Kai-shek would eventually come to share Jiang's belief that “the longer the war drags on, the more advantageous it will be for China.” Despite significant public criticism, both the Nationalist government and General Zhang Xueliang, decided against military resistance when Japan invaded Manchuria in September 1931 and attacked Shanghai in 1932. Chiang was particularly hesitant to engage Japan directly, as he was also dealing with a Communist insurgency in central China. He feared that Chinese forces would suffer quick defeat, predicting that Japan would capture key coastal areas and critical infrastructure within just three days, crippling China by dismantling its military and economic lifelines. Following the invasion of North China Chiang was forced to adopt a firmer stance. The Nationalist government proposed a dual strategy of pursuing peace and security while simultaneously preparing for war. If peace proved impossible, China would mobilize its resources for ultimate victory through prolonged conflict. This approach was formalized in the National Defense Plan, which China adopted by prioritizing protracted warfare as its core strategy. After the Sino-Japanese clash in Shanghai on January 28, 1932, the Military Affairs Commission devised a plan that divided China into four defense areas along with a preparation area. While some troops were assigned local security, commanders were directed to concentrate their remaining forces for potential confrontations with Japan. That year, the Military Affairs Commission issued General Defense Guidelines that outlined two strategic responses to a potential Japanese invasion. The first, conservative approach focused on maintaining key positions and utilizing protracted warfare to impede the enemy. The second strategy advocated for decisive battles in key regions to thwart Japan's ambitions and protect China's territorial integrity, prioritizing disengagement from Japanese forces along the Yangtze River and coastline. In August 1935, German military adviser General Alexander von Falkenhausen provided recommendations to Chiang Kai-shek based on his predictions of Japanese advance routes into China. He identified three main routes: one from northern Hebei to Zhengzhou, the second from Shandong toward Xuzhou, and the third crossing the Yangtze River to Nanjing and onwards to Wuhan. He suggested treating the Yangtze River as the primary combat zone and highlighted Sichuan as a possible retreat area. Taking all of this into consideration. in 1936, a draft of a new National Defense Plan divided the country into four zones: a war zone, a defense zone, an internal security zone, and a preparation area. The war zone encompassed ten provinces and established strategies for retreating to predetermined defensive positions when necessary, with Sichuan designated as the main base for the war. In January 1937, the Chinese General Staff Department introduced its annual War Plan, outlining three possible military conflict regions between China and Japan. It proposed two main strategies: Proposal A emphasized sustained combat and retreat to fortified positions if the situation became unfavorable, aiming to eventually go on the offensive against Japan. Proposal B focused on repelling Japanese invasions along the coast and from the north, prioritizing counter offensives against Japanese units stationed near key locations. To prepare, the NRA completed several critical projects outlined in its plans, establishing military supply depots in Nanjing, Bengbu, Xinyang, Huayin, Nanchang, and Wuchang to manage logistics for supplies across various strategic railways. These depots were equipped to sustain the military, with ample ammunition and provisions, including 60 million rounds of small-arms ammunition and food for hundreds of thousands. Despite these preparations, not all projects were completed by the time war broke out in July 1937. In contrast to the Japanese military's tactics, Chinese forces prioritized defensive strategies. For example, at the Mount Lushan Military Officer Training Camp in July 1934, Chiang Kai-shek outlined four possible approaches against Japan, favoring a defense-as-offense strategy. Other options included building fortifications, tenaciously defending key positions, and employing guerrilla warfare through irregular forces to constrain enemy advances. Chiang stressed the importance of national mobilization for the war effort.  There was a significant disparity in equipment between the Japanese and Chinese armies. To give you an idea, each Japanese division included a mechanized group featuring thirty-nine light military vehicles and 21 light armored cars, supplemented by 6,000–7,000 horses, 200–300 automobiles, and specialized troops such as poison gas teams. In contrast, Nationalist divisions lacked any of these capabilities, a typical nationalist division theoretically had an armored regiment, but this unit was equipped with fewer than 72 armored vehicles. Another major weakness of the Nationalist forces was their insufficient artillery. In 1936, a division was officially assigned one artillery battalion, which was divided into three batteries totaling twelve guns. It also included a mechanized cannon company with four direct-fire weapons. By comparison, a Japanese division boasted four infantry regiments and one mountain artillery or field artillery regiment, with each artillery regiment comprising three field artillery battalions and one howitzer battalion. The infantry regiment itself included a mountain artillery section with four mountain guns, while the infantry battalion had one Type 70 mountain gun section with two guns. In total, a Japanese division possessed sixty-four artillery pieces of various calibers, four times the number of a Chinese division and of significantly higher quality. In reality, in 1936, twelve of the twenty elite Chinese “reformed divisions” still lacked artillery battalions. The ordnance available in the “reformed divisions” mostly consisted of the outdated Type 60 mountain gun. Nationwide, very few of the 200 divisions were equipped with any artillery, and those that did often used obsolete field artillery pieces or mountain artillery provided to local forces. Some units even relied on trench mortars as a makeshift solution. The artillery weapons came from various countries, but they frequently lacked necessary observation and signal components, and were often low on ammunition. The majority of mountain guns and field artillery were of the Type 75, which, while capable of providing fire support, had limited range and inflicted minimal damage. To give you an idea of the striking inadequacy of the Chinese artillery, during the Shanghai fighting in 1937, the mountain artillery of the Guangxi 21st Army Group could only reach targets within 1,200 yards, while Japanese field artillery had an effective range of 8,000 yards. Chinese-made mountain artillery suffered due to inferior steel-making technology; the gun shields were constructed from low-quality steel, and the barrels often overheated after firing just a few rounds, increasing the risk of explosions. Additionally, the equipment of local forces varied greatly in quality. In fact, some local units had superior equipment compared to Nationalist units. For example, before the Sino-Japanese War, troops from Yunnan were equipped with French antitank guns and heavy machine guns, which were better than the German water-cooled machine guns used by the Nationalist forces. However, the majority of local troops relied on inferior equipment; the 122nd Division under Wang Mingzhang from Sichuan, noted for its brave defense of Tengxian County during the Xuzhou Battle, was armed with locally produced light and heavy machine guns that frequently malfunctioned, and their Type 79 rifles, also made in Sichuan, were often outdated, with some dating back to the Qing Dynasty. These weapons had limited range and sometimes malfunctioned after fewer than one hundred rounds. Now before the war, both Nationalist and local forces acquired weaponry from diverse foreign and domestic sources. Even domestically produced weapons lacked standardization, with those made in Hanyang and Manchuria differing in design and specifications. Arms manufactured in Germany, France, Russia, Japan, and Italy were similarly inconsistent. Consequently, even within a single unit, the lack of uniformity created significant logistical challenges, undermining combat effectiveness, particularly in the early stages of the war. Despite Nationalist ordnance factories producing over three million rounds of small-arms ammunition daily, the incompatibility of ammunition and weapons diminished the usable quantity of ammunition. Chinese communications infrastructure was inadequate. In the Nationalist army, signal units were integrated into engineering units, leading to low-quality radio communications. In emergencies, telegrams could remain undelivered for days, and orders often had to be dispatched via postal services. By 1937, the entire country boasted only 3,000 military vehicles, necessitating heavy reliance on horses and mules for transport. To effectively equip twenty Nationalist divisions, 10,647 horses and 20,688 mules were needed, but by the end of 1935, only 6,206 horses and 4,351 mules were available. A statistic from 1936 indicated a 5 percent mortality rate among military horses, with some units experiencing a rate as high as 10 percent. The distribution of weaponry led to disputes during army reorganization efforts following the Northern Expedition. Although Chiang Kai-shek's forces were part of the regular army, the quality of their equipment varied significantly. Domestic production of weapons was limited, and imports could not close the gap. Priority was given to small arms; through army reorganization, Chiang aimed to diminish the influence of forces less loyal to him. Nationalist army staff officers observed that troops loyal to Chiang received the best weapons. Northwest and Northeast forces, having cultivated good relations with the KMT, were similarly better equipped, while Shanxi troops received inferior supplies. Troops associated with the Guangxi Clique were given even poorer quality weapons due to their leaders' stronger political ambitions. Troops regarded as “bandit forces,” such as those led by Shi Yousan, Li Hongchang, and Sun Dianying, were naturally assigned the least effective weaponry. This unequal distribution of arms increased some local forces' inclination to align with the KMT while alienating others, which inadvertently led to additional turmoil in the aftermath of the Northern Expedition. Logistical accounting within the Nationalist military was severely lacking. Military expenditures accounted for a significant portion of government spending, roughly 65.48 % in 1937, with personnel costs being the largest component. However, military units prioritized boosting their own resources over accurate accounting. Surpluses were not returned but rather utilized to reward military officers and soldiers for merits in battle, care for the wounded, or to create a reserve. Conversely, if deficits arose, troops would resort to “living off vacancies,” a practice in which they would fail to report desertions promptly and would falsely claim new soldiers had arrived. Military leaders typically appointed their most trusted subordinates to serve as accountants and logistic officers. As the war commenced, these issues became readily apparent. During the Battle of Shanghai in 1937, frontline soldiers sometimes went days without food and went months without pay. Wounded soldiers and civilians had to search tirelessly for medical treatment, and when main forces relocated, they often abandoned grain, ammunition, weapons, and petroleum along the way. General Chen Cheng, the commander in chief during the Battle of Shanghai, noted, “This phenomenon clearly revealed our inability to supply frontline troops, indicating that China remains a backward country with poor management.” Many logistical shortcomings severely impacted troop morale and combat effectiveness. In a 1933 speech, Chiang Kai-shek acknowledged that poor food, inadequate clothing, and ineffective logistics contributed to widespread desertion. Soldiers were further demoralized by reduced or embezzled salaries. A lack of professional medical staff and equipment hampered healthcare efforts, leading to high disease and mortality rates. According to official statistics from 1936, approximately 10 percent of soldiers fell ill annually, with a mortality rate as high as 5 percent. Japanese military authorities reported that one in three wounded Japanese soldiers died, while a Dutch military officer present during the early stages of the Sino-Japanese War observed that one in every two wounded Nationalist soldiers perished. Due to inadequate equipment and limited transport options, Nationalist forces were compelled to recruit farmers and rent vehicles, as they lacked essential facilities such as tents. This reliance on local resources inevitably led to frequent conflicts between military personnel and civilians. China is clearly a vast nation with an extensive coastline, requiring the construction of several significant fortresses during the modern era. These included Wusong, Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Jiangning, and Wuhan along the Yangtze River, as well as Zhenhai, Humen, and Changzhou along the seacoast. Except for the Wuhan fortress, built in 1929-1930, all other fortifications were established during the late Qing Dynasty and featured uncovered cannon batteries. These fortresses suffered from inadequate maintenance, and many of their components had become outdated and irreplaceable, rendering them militarily negligible. Following the January 1932 Shanghai Incident, the Japanese military destroyed the Wusong forts, leaving the entrance to the Yangtze River completely unfortified. Consequently, there were no defenses along the coastline from Jiangsu to Shandong, allowing the Japanese to land freely. In December 1932, the Military Affairs Commission established a fortress group tasked with constructing fortresses and defensive installations, seeking assistance from German military advisers. After the North China Incident in 1935, the Nationalist government accelerated the construction of defensive structures in line with national war planning, focusing particularly on Nanjing. The Nationalists prioritized building fortifications along the seacoast and the Yellow River, followed by key regions north of the Yellow River. The government also ordered a significant quantity of heavy artillery from Germany. This included several dozen pieces of flat-fire antiaircraft and dual-purpose heavy artillery, which were installed at fortifications in Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Nanjing, and Wuhan. By the summer of 1937, the construction of nine fortified positions was complete: Nanjing, Zhenjiang, Jiangyin, Ningbo, Humen, Mawei, Xiamen , Nantong, and Lianyungang. In total, China had established 41 forts and equipped them with 273 fortress cannons. Some defensive installations were poorly managed, with many units assigned to their perimeters lacking training and access to proper maps. The barbette positions in the fortresses were not well concealed and could hardly store sufficient ammunition. Troops stationed at these fortresses received little training. Despite these shortcomings, the fortresses and fortifications were not entirely ineffective. They bolstered Chinese positions along the defense line stretching from Cangxian County to Baoding and from Dexian County to Shijiazhuang, as well as in southern Shandong.  Before the war, China's political and economic center was situated along the seacoast and the Yangtze River. As Japanese influence expanded, the Nationalist government was compelled to establish bases in China's inner regions, very similar to how the USSR pulled back its industry further west after Operation barbarossa.The Japanese attack on Shanghai in 1932 prompted the Nationalists to relocate their capital to Luoyang. On March 5, during the Second Plenary Session of the KMT's Fourth Congress, the Western Capital Preparation Committee was formed to plan for the potential relocation of all governmental bodies to Xi'an in the event of full-scale war. In February 1933, the Central Political Conference approved the Northwest Development Bill, and in February 1934, the National Economic Commission set up a northwestern branch to oversee development projects in the region. On October 18, 1934, Chiang Kai-shek traveled to Lanzhou, recording in his diary that “Northwest China has abundant resources. Japan and Russia are poised to bully us. Yet, if we strengthen ourselves and develop northwest China to the fullest extent, we can turn it into a base for China's revival.” Interestingly, it was Sichuan, rather than the northwest, that became China's rear base during the 2nd Sino-Japanese War. In October 1934, the Communist army evacuated its Soviet base in southern China, initiating the Long March that would ultimately end in the northwest. By this time, Chiang Kai-shek had decided to designate Sichuan as the last stronghold for China. In January 1935, the Nanchang Field Headquarters of the Military Affairs Commission, responsible for combatting the Communists and serving as the supreme military and political authority over most provinces along the Yangtze River and central China, dispatched a special advisory group to Chongqing. Following this, the Nationalist army advanced into Sichuan. On February 10, the Nationalists appointed a new provincial government in Sichuan, effectively ending the province's long-standing regionalism. On March 2, Chiang traveled to Chongqing, where he delivered a speech underscoring that “Sichuan should serve as the base for China's revival.” He stated that he was in Sichuan to oversee efforts against the Communist army and to unify the provincial administration.  After the Xinhai revolution, the Republic of China was still suing the Qing Dynasty's conscription system. However, once in power, the Nationalist government sought to establish a national military service program. In 1933, it enacted a military service law, which began implementation in 1936. This law categorized military service into two branches: service in the Nationalist army and in territorial citizen army units. Men aged eighteen to forty-five were expected to serve in the territorial units if they did not enlist in the Nationalist army. The territorial service was structured into three phases: active service lasting two to three years, first reserves for six years, and second reserves until the age of forty-five. The Ministry of Military Affairs divided China into sixty divisional conscription headquarters, initially establishing these headquarters in the six provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, and Hubei. By December 1936, approximately 50,000 new soldiers had been drafted. The military service law disproportionately favored the middle and upper classes. Government personnel were exempt from enlistment, allowing privileged families to register their children with government agencies. Similarly, students in middle and higher education were excused from service, while youth from poorer backgrounds often felt compelled to enlist due to financial constraints that limited their educational opportunities. Village and town leaders were responsible for executing the recruitment process and frequently conspired with army recruiters. Recruitment principles often favored wealthier families, with guidelines stating that one son should be drafted for every three sons, two for five sons, but no drafts if there was only one son. Wealthy families could secure exemptions for all their male children, while poor families might see their only son conscripted if they were unable to provide the requisite bribe. Town and village heads wielded significant power in recruitment. This new recruitment system also created numerous money-making opportunities. Military personnel assigned to escort draftees to their units would often allow draftees to escape for a fee. Additionally, draftees could monetize their service by agreeing to serve as substitutes for others. For some, being drafted became an occupation. For example, in 1936, 600 individuals were drafted in the Wuhu area of Anhui province, and accounts from regional administrators indicated that every draftee had either been traded, replaced, or seized. Beginning in 1929, the Nationalist government also instituted military training for high school students and older individuals. Students were required to participate in one theoretical class and one practical class each week, totaling three hours. Starting in 1934, students had to complete a three-month military training program before graduating. Graduates of military academies were employed as military instructors. By the end of 1936, over 237,000 high school students had undergone military training. This student military training was overseen by the Society for the Implementation of the Three People's Principles of Sun Yat-sen, which also provided political education and sometimes gathered information on students' political beliefs.  Although the Nationalists made significant efforts to improve the military training of both officers and troops, they inherited deep-seated challenges that they were unable to completely overcome. A lack of facilities, outdated training manuals, low regard for military instructors, and the ongoing influence of regionalism and warlordism hindered progress. The Japanese would also later exploit these shortcomings of the Nationalist army. The Central Military Academy, which evolved from the Whampoa Military Academy established in 1923 in Guangzhou to train officers for the Northern Expedition, became the primary training institution for junior military officers. The academy offered a basic course, lasting eighteen months, which included general education, specialized training in various subjects, and field practice. This was followed by a two-year cadet training program focused on developing the skills necessary for junior military officers. Seventeen classes were admitted before the outbreak of war. Admission to the academy was highly competitive, with military officers receiving attractive salaries. For instance, in 1935, the academy received 10,000 applications for the twelfth class, but only 7% were accepted. Upon graduation, cadets were typically assigned to divisions within the Nationalist army loyal to Chiang Kai-shek. Their training, influenced by German advisors, resulted in a high-quality cadre. In modern China, most sergeants were veterans. While some units provided training for sergeants, a lack of formal education led to their diminished status. Truly qualified sergeants were rare. During his tenure as Minister of Military Training, General Bai Chongxi proposed establishing a sergeant school and creating a professional noncommissioned officer system; however, the Ministry of Military Affairs opposed this on financial grounds. While commanding officers enjoyed rapid promotions, military instructors did not. Furthermore, there was no system for transferring instructors to field commands or assigning commanders to military academies for extended periods. Despite minor updates to cover modern warfare concepts such as tank warfare and machine guns, Qing Dynasty military manuals were still in use at the Central Military Academy at the start of the war. Yeah, 1937 they were still rocking the old Qing books. Following the establishment of the Ministry of Military Training, a bureau for military translation was set up to evaluate existing course materials and translate military manuals, but its contributions were limited. Another significant shortcoming of military instruction focused on theory at the expense of practical application.  To enhance the quality of military officers, the Nationalist army instituted specialized schools for artillery, infantry, transport, engineering, and signals starting in 1931. These institutions were considered to have high-quality administrators and facilities. The Nationalists adopted German military training models, replacing the previously used Japanese models. They appointed German advisors to oversee instructor training at military academies and established three instructional divisions. By the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, 15,000 students had graduated from programs with a German military influence, resulting in the creation of about fifty combat divisions from these instructional units. However, the progress of other Nationalist army units was limited because their training was not aligned with contemporary battlefield realities. Before World War I, troops operated in close formations due to limited firepower. The widespread introduction of machine guns after World War I necessitated a shift to dispersed formations. Although a new drill manual issued by the Ministry of Military Training in 1935 introduced small-group tactics, few units adopted these methods. General Chen Cheng highlighted another underlying issue in 1938, commenting on the outmoded focus on parade ground drills and formal military manners. He noted, “We have paid too much attention to stereotypical formality and procedures of no practical use. Sometimes, even though soldiers could not get a haircut or take a bath for several months, their camps had to be in order. They underwent intensive training in close-order drill but learned little about gun handling, marksmanship, or maneuvering. This was inappropriate in peacetime, yet we continued this practice even after the Sino-Japanese War started, even using it on highly educated youth.” In contrast, the Communist army simplified training, emphasizing two essential skills: live-fire exercises and physical endurance, which significantly enhanced troop effectiveness in the challenging terrain characteristic of the Sino-Japanese War. Ultimately, the Nationalist army's training did not reach all soldiers. Only about half of all combat soldiers received adequate training, while the rest were neglected. According to statistics from the time, there were approximately five million military personnel during the Sino-Japanese War, with three million serving in logistics. Most of these logistics personnel had received little training, leading to disastrous consequences for overall combat effectiveness. As warfare has become more complex, the role of highly trained staff officers has become increasingly important. Napoleon developed operational plans close to the front and communicated orders via courier. During World War I, military commanders collected information at their headquarters and utilized telephones and automobiles to relay orders to the front lines. In World War II, with the battlefield expanding to include land, sea, and air, senior commanders often made decisions from headquarters far from the action, relying on a significant number of staff officers with specialized skills to keep them informed. In China, however, the staff officer system was underdeveloped. By 1937, only about 2,000 commanders and staff officers had received training. Prior to the Sino-Japanese War, most commanders managed staff work themselves, with staff officers serving primarily as military secretaries who drafted orders, reports, and maps. Many staff officers had no formal military training, and as a whole, the branch lacked respect, causing the most talented officers to avoid serving in it. The situation was even more dire for staff officer departments within local forces. For example, in March 1937, Liu Ziqing, a graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy, was appointed as the director of political instruction in the Forty-fourth Army, a unit under Sichuan warlord Liu Xiang. Liu Ziqing's account illustrates the dysfunction within the ranks: “The commander in chief was not supposed to manage the army and even did not know its whereabouts... But he could appoint relatives and former subordinates—who were officials and businessmen as well—to the army. Each month they would receive a small stipend. At headquarters, there was a long table and two rows of chairs. Around ten o'clock in the morning, senior officers signed in to indicate their presence. Those with other business would leave, while the remaining officers sat down to leisurely discuss star actresses, fortune-telling, business projects, mah-jongg, and opium. Occasionally they would touch on national affairs, chat about news articles, or share local gossip. In the afternoons, they primarily played mah-jongg, held banquets, and visited madams. Most mornings, the commander usually presided over these activities, and at first, I reported for duty as well. But I soon realized it was a waste of time and came very rarely. At headquarters, most staff members wore long gowns or Western-style suits, while military uniforms were a rare sight.” Most senior military personnel were trained at the Baoding Military Academy during the early republic. 2/3rds of commanders in chief, 37 %of army commanders, and 20 % of division commanders were Baoding graduates. Higher-ranking officers were more likely to have launched their careers there. In contrast, only 10 % of division commanders and a few army commanders were graduates of the Whampoa Military Academy. Additionally, commanders trained in local military schools and those with combat experience accounted for 1/3rd of all commanders. While the prevalence of civil war provided opportunities for rapid promotion, it also hindered officers' ability to update their training or gain experience in different military branches. German advisors expressed their concerns to Chiang Kai-shek, emphasizing that officers should first serve in junior roles before taking command. During one battle in 1938, Chiang noted, “Our commanders in chief are equivalent only to our enemy's regiment commanders, and our army and division commanders are only as competent as our enemy's battalion and company commanders.” Despite not viewing high-ranking Japanese officers as great strategists, Nationalist officers respected them as highly competent, diligent, and professional commanders who rarely made critical errors. The infantry was the primary component of the Nationalist army, with middle and junior infantry officers constituting over 80 %of all army officers. A 1936 registry of military officers listed 1,105 colonels and 2,159 lieutenant colonels within the infantry, demonstrating a significant outnumbering of Baoding graduates at ranks below lieutenant colonel. However, the quality of middle and junior infantry officers declined during the Sino-Japanese War; by 1944, only 27.3 % of these officers were from formal military academies, while those promoted from the ranks increased to 28.1 %. In 1937, 80 % of officers in an ordinary infantry battalion were military academy graduates, but this percentage dropped to 20 % during the war. Its hard to tell how educated soldiers were before the war, but it is generally believed that most were illiterate. In 1929, sociologist Tao Menghe surveyed 946 soldiers from a Shanxi garrison brigade and found that only 13 percent could compose a letter independently, while the rest had either never learned to read or were unable to write. In contrast, in August 1938, General Feng Yuxiang found that 80 percent of a regiment in Hunan were literate. Regardless, during the Sino-Japanese War, the quality of recruits steadily declined. More than 90 percent of soldiers were illiterate, and few possessed any basic scientific knowledge, which hindered their ability to master their weapons. On the battlefield, they heavily relied on middle and junior officers for guidance.  In autumn 1933, General Hans von Seeckt, the architect of the post World War I German army, visited China at the personal invitation of Chiang Kai-shek. In his recommendations for military reform, he identified China's greatest problem as its excessively large forces drawn from diverse backgrounds. He stated, “At present, the most pressing goal is to... establish a small, well-equipped army with high morale and combat effectiveness to replace the numerous poorly armed and trained forces.” He suggested forming an army of sixty divisions and recommended the establishment of a training regiment for military officers to equip them with the skills needed for modern warfare. Chiang Kai-shek accepted von Seeckt's proposals, and on January 26, 1935, he convened a National Military Reorganization Conference in Nanjing. On March 1, the Army Reorganization Bureau was established in Wuchang, under the leadership of General Chen Cheng. In the same month, General Alexander von Falkenhausen took charge of the German Military Advisors Group. Before war broke out, around nineteen divisions, roughly 300,000 troops received training from German advisors and were equipped with German-style weapons. At the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, the forces stemming from the First Army of the National Revolutionary Army and the Whampoa cadets, who had fought in the Northern Expedition, held the highest reputation and were referred to as the “core central forces” by the Japanese. Other notable forces included the Guangxi Army, Northwestern Army, Northeastern Army, some Uyghur units, the Guangdong Army, and the Shanxi Army. In contrast, provincial forces such as the Yunnan Army and Sichuan Army were viewed less favorably. Nationalist forces were generally far inferior to those of the Japanese enemy. In 1937, General He Yingqin noted that Nationalist forces had failed to prevail in 1932 and 1933, even when outnumbering the Japanese by 4-1.  In November 1937, during a national defense conference, Chiang Kai-shek stated, "In recent years we have worked hard, prepared actively, and achieved national unification. By the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, we were in a better domestic situation and had improved military preparedness compared to before. Since 1935, our strength has doubled. It increased by more than two to three times since January 1932 or September 1931 [when Japan attacked Shanghai and Mukden]. If peace had been achievable, we should have delayed the war for two or three years. Given an additional three years, our defensive capabilities would have been drastically different... Now, if we merely compare the military strength of China and Japan, we are certainly inferior." However, such assessments were overly optimistic, as Chiang failed to recognize that Japan's military capabilities would not have stagnated. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek certainly was dealt a difficult hand of cards for the upcoming poker match he was to play. Yet the Chinese were resilient and they had to be for the absolute horror that would be inflicted upon them from 1937-1945. Until this point, their enemies had been far more lenient, the Empire of Japan would show no mercy.

A bonus episode this week. On May 22, I moderated a panel organized by Vita Golod and the UNC Center for Slavic, Eurasian, and East European Studies. The focus was on the U.S.-Ukraine Mineral Security Partnership, and it features Ivan Us, Chief Consultant at the Center for Foreign Policy at the National Institute for Strategic Studies; Jim Mullinax, a Senior Foreign Service Officer and former Consul General at the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu (closed in 2020); Grzegorz Stec, Senior Analyst and Head of the Brussels Office at MERICS; and Xu Qinduo, journalist at CGTN and Senior Fellow at the Pangoal Institution. The panel explores the background and the implications of the minerals deal, signed on May 1, 2025, for the ongoing war in Ukraine, and prospects for post-war reconstruction. I hope you enjoy what I thought was a fascinating conversation.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, I chat with Eva Dou, technology reporter for the Washington Post, about her terrific new book about Huawei. From its prehistory to its fight for its life under tremendous U.S. pressure, she tells its story in a way that's both deeply engaging and very evenhanded. 04:53 – Meng Wanzhou's case and its impact on media interest in Huawei07:13 – How did Ren Zhengfei's experiences in the PLA shape the corporate culture of Huawei?10:21 – The impact of his father on Ren Zhengfei 13:42 – Women in Huawei's leadership and Sun Yafang as a chairwoman 18:41 – Is Huawei a tool of the state?23:21 – Edward Snowden's revelations and how they influenced the perception of Huawei 26:34 – The Cisco lawsuit influence on the company's approach to foreign markets 28:07 – Reasons for Huawei working with embargoed or sanctioned states30:46 – Huawei's international expansion 33:04 – Huawei's management style and internal competition 36:33 – Meng Wenzhou's detainment as a turning point for Huawei and China-U.S. relations38:09 – Ren Zhengfei's media campaign and narrative shift after the Meng affair40:44 – Huawei's involvement in Xinjiang's surveillance 43:09 – Huawei's success in shaping 5G standards despite global pushback46:27 – The “Huawei index”: tracking Chinese investment abroad through Huawei's market presence48:35 – Huawei's push into chip development amid sanctions: real progress or just hype?52:23 – Huawei: a proxy, a leading or lagging indicator, or just a bellwether?54:11 – Huawei's “too big to fail” status: benefits and risks amid U.S. government pressure56:29 – Huawei's perspective on the backlash from sanctions58:19 – Concluding question: about Huawei's ownership and governancePaying it forward: Raffaele Huang at The Wall Street JournalRecommendations: Eva: The Party's Interests Come First by Joseph Torigian; Yang Jie at The Wall Street Journal; Piranesi by Susanna ClarkeKaiser: Adolescence on Netflix; Kyle Chan's high-capacity.com See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

  Last time we spoke about the February 26th incident. Within the turbulent “ government of assassination” period of 1936 Japan, a faction of discontented junior officers, known as the Kodoha, believed that their emperor, Hirohito, was being manipulated by corrupt politicians. In a desperate bid for what they termed a "Showa Restoration," they meticulously plotted a coup d'état. On February 26, they launched a rebellion in Tokyo, attempting to assassinate key figures they deemed responsible for undermining the emperor's authority. The young officers executed coordinated attacks on prominent leaders, resulting in several deaths, while hoping to seize control of the Imperial Palace. However, their plan unraveled when their actions met with unexpected resistance, and they failed to secure strategic locations. Dark snow blanketed the city as Hirohito, outraged by the violence, quickly moved to suppress the uprising, which ultimately led to the downfall of the Kodoha faction and solidified the military's grip on power, ushering in a new era marked by militarism and radicalism.   #151 The Suiyuan Operation Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So we last left off with the February 26th incident breaking out in Japan, but now I would like to return to China. Now we spoke a little bit about some influential Japanese politicians in the previous episode. Prime Minister Satio Makoto oversaw Japan from May 1932 to July 1934, succeeded by Prime Minister Keisuke Okada from July 1934 to March 1936. The foreign policy of Japan towards China during the Saitō and Okada administrations exhibited a notable paradox, characterized by two conflicting elements. On one hand, Foreign Minister Hirota championed a diplomatic approach that emphasized friendship, cooperation, and accommodation with China. On the other hand, the military actively undermined the authority of the Nationalist government in northern China, creating a significant rift between diplomatic rhetoric and military action.    The Okada cabinet then endorsed the Army Ministry's "Outline of Policy to Deal with North China" on January 13, 1936. This policy document explicitly proposed the eventual detachment of five provinces, Hubei, Chahar, Shanxi, Suiyuan, and Shandong from the Nationalist government in Nanking. The approval of this outline marked a pivotal moment, as it represented the first official government endorsement of the military's longstanding agenda and underscored the army's evolution from a mere rogue entity operating in the region to the de facto authority dictating the course of Japan's policy towards China. Despite this, on January 22, during the 68th Diet session, Hirota reaffirmed his dedication to fostering better ties with China, to which a representative from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded positively. The Nationalist government in Nanjing also expressed interest in engaging in formal negotiations. However, this diplomatic initiative quickly faltered, and the expected discussions in Nanjing never took place. Shortly thereafter, a mutiny by young army officers on February 26, 1936, led to the fall of the Okada cabinet. Following Prince Konoe Fumimaro's refusal of the imperial mandate to form a new government, Hirota stepped in to establish a cabinet on March 9. General Terauchi Hisaichi was appointed as the Minister of the Army, Admiral Nagano Osami took charge of the Navy Ministry, and Baba Eiichi became the finance minister. Hirota briefly served as foreign minister until Arita Hachirö, who had just submitted his credentials as ambassador to China on March 6, returned to Japan. The Hirota Koki cabinet, established immediately following the February 26 incident further entrenched military influence in politics while allowing interservice rivalries to impede national objectives. In May 1936, Hirota, influenced by army and navy ministers, reinstated the practice of appointing military ministers solely from the ranks of high-ranking active-duty officers. He believed this would prevent associations with the discredited Imperial Way faction from regaining power. By narrowing the candidate pool and enhancing the army's power relative to the prime minister, Hirota's decision set the stage for army leaders to leverage this advantage to overthrow Admiral Yonai's cabinet in July 1940. Arita began his new job by meeting with Foreign Minister Chang Chen while hearing views from the Kwantung Army chief of staff General, Itagaki Seishiro. Yes, our old friend received a lot of promotions. Itagaki had this to say about the Kwantung Army's policy in China "The primary aim of Japan's foreign policy, is the sound development of Manchukuo based upon the principle of the indivisibility of Japan and Manchukuo. If, as is probable, the existing situation continues, Japan is destined sooner or later to clash with the Soviet Union, and the attitude of China at that time will gravely influence operations [against the Soviet Union]." The Kwantung Army's was growing more and more nervous about the USSR following its 7th comintern congress held in July and August of 1935. There it publicly designated Japan, Germany and Poland as its main targets of comintern actions. Japanese intelligence in the Red Army also knew the Soviets were gradually planning to expand the military strength so they could face a simultaneous west and east front war. This was further emboldened by the latest USSR 5 year plan. Alongside the growing Red northern menace, the CCP issued on August 1st a declaration calling upon the Nationalist Government to end their civil war so they could oppose Japan. By this time the CCP was reaching the end of its Long March and organizing a new base of operations in Yenan in northern Shanxi. The developments by the USSR and CCP had a profound effect on Japan's foreign policy in China. The Kwantung Army believed a war with the USSR was imminent and began to concentrate its main force along the border of Manchukuo. The Kwantung Army's plan in the case of war was to seize Vladivostok while advancing motorized units towards Ulan Bator in Outer Mongolia, hoping to threaten the Trans-Siberian Railway near Lake Baikal. Their intelligence indicated the USSR could muster a maximum of 250,000 troops in eastern Siberia and that Japan could deal with them with a force two-thirds of that number. The IJA at that point had inferior air forces and armaments, thus urgent funding was needed. The Kwantung Army proposed that forces in the home islands should be reduced greatly so all could be concentrated in Manchuria. To increase funding so Kwantung leadership proposed doing away with special allowances for Japanese officials in Manchuria and reorganizing the Japanese economic structure. The Kwantung leaders also knew the submarine base at Vladivostok posed a threat to Japanese shipping so the IJN would have to participate, especially against ports and airfields. All said and done, the Kwantung Army planned for a war set in 1941 and advised immediate preparations. On July 23, 1936, Kanji Ishiwara presented the army's document titled “Request Concerning the Development of Industries in Preparation for War” to the Army Ministry. He asserted that in order to prepare for potential conflict with the Soviet Union, Japan, Manchukuo, and North China must have the industries critical for war fully developed by 1941. Ishiwara emphasized the urgent need for rapid industrial growth, particularly in Manchukuo. He followed this request on July 29 with a draft of a “Policy on Preparations for War” regarding the Soviet Union, advocating for immediate reforms to Japan's political and economic systems to facilitate economic expansion and lay the groundwork for future fundamental changes. However, he cautioned that if significant turmoil erupted in economic sectors, Japan must be ready to execute a comprehensive overhaul without delay. At the same time, the Hirota cabinet initiated a review of its policy towards China. In the spring of 1936, a secret committee focused on the Current Situation was formed, consisting of officials from the Army, Navy, and Foreign ministries. Their discussions led to the adoption of the "Measures to Implement Policy toward China" by the Four Ministers Conference on August 11, along with the "Second Outline of Policy to Address North China," which the cabinet approved as part of the "Fundamentals of National Policy" on the same day. The first of these documents outlined the following actionable steps: “1. Conclusion of an anti-Communist military pact. a) To prepare for the conclusion of such a pact, a special secret committee of military experts from both countries should be organized. b) Their discussions should cover the scope and substance of the pact and ways and means of realizing the objectives of the pact.  2. Conclusion of a Sino-Japanese military alliance. A special secret committee, composed of an equal number of delegates from each nation, should be organized to prepare for the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance against attack by a third country.  3. Acceleration of solutions of pending questions between China and Japan. a) Engagement of a senior political adviser: The Nationalist government should engage a senior Japanese political adviser to assist in the conduct of the domestic and foreign affairs of the Nationalist government. b) Engagement of military advisers: The Nationalist government should engage military advisers, along with military instructors. c) Opening of airline services between China and Japan: Airline services between China and Japan should be opened immediately. To realize such a service, various means should be used to induce the Nanking authorities to establish an airline corporation in North China, to begin flights between Formosa and Fukien province, and to start test flights between Shanghai and Fukuoka. d) Conclusion of a reciprocal tariff treaty: A reciprocal tariff treaty should be concluded promptly between China and Japan, on the basis of the policy approved by the ministries concerned, with regard to the abolition of the special trade in eastern Hopei province and the lowering of the prohibitively high tariffs. For this purpose Japan should, if necessary, propose the creation of a special committee composed of Japanese and Chinese representatives.  4. Promotion of economic cooperation between China and Japan. Japan should promote cooperation with the common people of China to establish realistic and inseparable economic relations between China and Japan that will promote coexistence and co-prosperity and will be unaffected by changes in the Chinese political situation. “ The document also included suggestions for Japan's economic expansion into South China. This included tapping into the natural resources of the provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi, building a railway between Guangzhou and Swatow, and establishing air routes between Fuchoz and Taipei, which would connect to services in Japan and Thailand. It also called for survey teams to be dispatched to explore the resources of Sichuan, Gansu, Xinjiang, and Qinghai provinces, and for support to be provided to the independence movement in Inner Mongolia. However, these initiatives presented significant challenges. The preface to the "Second Outline of Policy to Deal with North China" cautioned, "In implementing this policy, we must carefully consider the Nanking government's prestige and avoid actions that could prompt it to adopt an anti-Japanese stance in response to the desires of the Chinese people."  On September 19th, six fundamental points for a settlement in North China were dictated to China to “establish a common defense against communism, promoting economic cooperation, lowering tariffs, initiating an airline service between the two nations, employing Japanese advisers, and controlling subversive Koreans." September 22 was set as the deadline for a response from China. While agreeing to some Japanese requests, the Chinese included several counter-demands that the Japanese found completely unacceptable. These demands required Japan to “(a) refrain from using armed intervention or arbitrary actions in its dealings with China, (b) recognize China as an equal and sovereign state, (c) avoid leveraging antigovernment groups or communist elements, and (d) remove any derogatory references to China from Japanese textbooks. The Chinese also insisted that any agreement regarding North China “must precede the annulment of the Tanggu and Shanghai cease-fire agreements, the disbanding of the East Hopei regime, a prohibition on unauthorized Japanese flights over North China, a ban on smuggling activities by Japanese, the restoration of China's right to control smuggling, and the disbandment of the illegal East Hopei government along with the armies of Wang Ying and Prince De in Suiyuan”. Now that mention of a Prince De in Suiyuan brings us to a whole new incident. This podcast series should almost be called “the history of Japanese related incidents in China”. Now we've spoken at great lengths about Japan's obsession with Manchuria. She wanted it for resources, growing space and as a buffer state. Japan also had her eyes set on Inner Mongolia to be used as a buffer state between Manchukuo, the USSR and China proper. Not to mention after the invasion of North China, Inner Mongolia could be instrumental as a wedge to be used to control Northern China. Thus the Kwantung Army began fostering a Mongolian independence movement back in August of 1933. They did so through a special organ led by chief of the general staff Koiso Kuniaki. He began work with the Silingol League led by Prince Sonormurabdan or “Prince So” and another influential Mongol, Prince Demchukdongrob or “Prince De”. Prince De was the West Sunid Banner in Northern Chahar. Likewise the Kwantung Army was grooming Li Xuxin, a Mongol commoner born in southern Manchuria. He had been a bandit turned soldier absorbed into Zhang Xueliangs army. Li had distinguished himself in a campaign against a group of Mongols trying to restore the Qing dynasty to further establish an independent Mongolia. During Operation Nekka Li had served in a cavalry brigade under Zu Xingwu, reputed to be the best unit in Zhang Xueliangs Northeastern border defense army. He led the army's advance unit into western Shandong. Afterwards Li suddenly became friends with Major Tanaka Hisashi, the head of the Special Service Agency at Dungliao where he defected to the Kwantung Army. He soon was leading a force too strong to be incorporated into the Manchukuo Army, thus it was disbanded, but his Kwantung Army buddies encouraged him to move to Tolun in Rehe province. At one point during the Nekka campaign, Li's army was threatened by a strong Chinese counterattack, but they had Manchukuo air support allowing them to capture Tolun. This victory launched what became the East Chahar Special Autonomous District with Li becoming a garrison commander and chief administrator.  Back in time, upon the founding of the Chinese Republic, the affairs of Inner Mongolia fell upon the Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs. This was reorganized in 1930 into the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs when the provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan and Ningxia were organized. Prince De had been a member of a nationalist group known as the Young Mongols, although his aim was self-determination for Inner Mongolia within China, not independence. The Nationalist government's support for Chinese settlement in Mongol territories and its disregard for Mongol perspectives quickly triggered a rise in Mongol nationalism and anti-Chinese feelings. This was exacerbated by the government's introduction of a law on October 12, 1931, requiring local Mongolian administrative units to consult with hsien officials on matters concerning their administration. The nationalist sentiment was further fueled by the presence of the neighboring Mongolian People's Republic in Outer Mongolia and the establishment of Xingan province in western Manchuria by Manchukuo authorities in March 1932. This new province included the tribes of eastern Inner Mongolia and granted them greater autonomy than other Manchukuo provinces while banning Chinese immigration into it. When Nanjing did not react to these developments, Prince De and his supporters took steps toward gaining autonomy. On July 15th, 1933, Mongol leaders from western Inner Mongolia gathered at Pailingmiao for two weeks to deliberate on a declaration for regional independence. Although many princes were initially hesitant to take this step, they reconvened on August 14 and sent a cable to Nanjing announcing their decision to create an autonomous Mongolian government. The cable was signed by Prince So and Prince De. Over the following two months, additional conferences at Pailingmiao were held to organize the new government, which would operate under Nanking's guidance but without involvement from provincial chairmen. On October 22, Prince Yun, head of the Ulanchap League and a close ally of Prince De, was elected to lead the new regime, with Prince De assuming the role of chief of its political affairs bureau. After receiving a cable from the Mongolian leaders in August, Nanjing quickly sent Minister of the Interior Huang Shao-hung and Xu Qingyang, head of the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, to halt the movement. However, the Mongols declined to travel to Kalgan or Kueisui to meet Huang. In November, as the leader of a special commission appointed by Nanjing, Huang reached an agreement with Yun De and other Mongolian leaders concerning a proposal that abandoned the Mongols' demand for an autonomous government. This agreement was later altered by Nanjing, and its essential points were excluded from a measure approved by the Central Political Council of the Kuomintang on January 17, 1934. The dispute reignited, fueled by the Nationalist government's rising concerns over the anticipated enthronement of Pu Yi in Manchukuo. On February 28, the Central Political Council enacted a measure that outlined "eight principles of Inner Mongolian autonomy" and created the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Council. Since these principles did not grant authority over foreign and military affairs, powers explicitly reserved for the central government in the January measure, they were seen as a concession to the Mongols and were accepted. On March 7, the central government issued regulations to establish a semi autonomous regime for Inner Mongolia, which was officially launched at Pailingmiao on April 23. Although the council was led by three moderate princes, Prince Yun, supported by Princes So and Sha, the real administrative authority was held by Prince De, who served as the secretary-general. Most of the twenty-five council members were of Mongolian royalty, through whom Prince De aimed to fulfill his objectives. Nevertheless, the Nationalist government seemed to consider the council merely a token gesture to placate De, as Nanking never provided the promised administrative funds outlined in the "eight principle declaration." Was not much of a shock Prince De sought support from the Kwantung Army, which had established contact with him as early as June 1934. Japanese pressures in North China were starting to alter the power dynamics, and after the first Western incident in Jehol in February 1935, it compelled the relocation of Sung Queyuan's army from Chahar to Hopei, providing encouragement to Prince De. In May, he met with Kwantung Army Vice Chief of Staff Itagaki Seishirö, Intelligence Section Chief Kawabe Torashirö, and staff officer Tanaka Ryükichi, where he was officially informed for the first time about the Kwantung Army's intention to assist him. On July 25, the Kwantung Army drafted its "Essentials of Policy toward Inner Mongolia," which regarded Japanese support for cooperation between De and Li Xuxin as part of their strategic preparations for a potential conflict with the Soviet Union. Shortly after this policy was adopted, a conflict arose over who had the authority to appoint the head of the Mongol Xukung banner, situated north of the Yellow River and Paot'ou. Following the death of the previous administrator, Prince Xu declared that he had taken control of the position. In response to a request from the local abbot, Prince Yun, acting in his capacity as chairman of the Mongolian Political Council, dismissed Xu. Xu then turned to Nanking through Suiyuan Provincial Chairman Fu Zuoyi, arguing that the central government held the authority to appoint heads of administrative units. In retaliation, Prince De dispatched troops to Xukung. On November 10, Fu presented a mediation proposal, which was rejected since it not only failed to acknowledge Shih's dismissal but also demanded the withdrawal of De's forces. De refused to pull back, further intensifying his hostility toward the Nanking government. In December, the Kwantung Army attempted to move Li's forces from eastern Chahar into the six Xun to the north of Kalgan, which serves as Chahar's granary. Following the Qin-Doihara agreement, Matsui Gennosuke from the Kalgan Special Service Agency secured a deal to separate these six districts from the southern region predominantly populated by Chinese; a Mongolian peace preservation corps was tasked with maintaining order in the northern area, while a Chinese corps was responsible for the south. During the discussions for an autonomous regime centered around Song Queyuan in North China in November 1935, Kwantung Army troops were concentrated around Gubeikou. To exert pressure on Song's rear, the Kwantung Army proposed replacing the Chinese peace preservation unit in the area north of Kalgan with Li Xuxin's army, which would establish this territory as its base.   The operation commenced on December 8. In a surprise attack just before dawn, Li captured Paochang. By December 12, despite facing strong Chinese resistance and the heaviest snowfall in sixty years, Li, aided by Kwantung Army planes disguised as those of the Manchukuo Airline Corporation, had taken control of Kuyuan. Further advances were halted by an order from Kwantung Army headquarters, and on December 13, it was reported that, had the operation not been stopped, Tokyo would have issued an imperial command. The operation had faced opposition from the Tientsin army, which feared it would weaken Song Queyuan's position just as they were informing Tokyo that the autonomy movement was going smoothly. Additionally, both Britain and the United States publicly expressed strong opposition to the Kwantung Army's involvement in the autonomy movement. However, the directive was ultimately prompted by the emperor's anger upon discovering that a unit of the Kwantung Army led by Colonel Matsui Takurö had advanced to Tolun to support Li's progress. Although Li's advance was halted, the operation undeniably contributed to the formation of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council.   Although the operation was halted, the Kwantung Army remained committed to its objectives. They contended that Li's army's advance into the six districts north of Kalgan was merely a peace preservation unit moving into territory within the truce line established by the Tanggu Agreement. Consequently, on December 29, they ordered Li to advance southward. Li peacefully occupied Changpei the following day and entered Shangtu on December 31. Manchukuo civil officials were appointed to oversee the six districts, and the currency of Manchukuo was introduced, although the existing tax system initially remained unchanged. The Kwantung Army allocated silver worth 6 million yuan to support administrative expenses. This outcome, known as the Eastern Chahar incident, marked a complete success for the Kwantung Army, which then redirected its focus toward Suiyuan Province. Each year, the Kwantung Army developed a secret plan for covert operations for the following year. The 1936 plan included strategies to secure air bases for routes connecting Europe and Asia, targeting Tsinghai and Sinkiang provinces, Outer Mongolia, Western Mongolia, and even remote areas of Ningxia province. In January 1936, staff officer Tanaka Ryūkichi formulated a document titled "Essentials of Policy Toward (Northwestern) Inner Mongolia." This document advocated for the establishment of a Mongolian military government to facilitate Japanese operations in northwestern Mongolia and suggested pushing Fu Tso-yi out of Suiyuan into Shansi province. Tanaka's proposals were incorporated into the final plan of the Kwantung Army, ultimately leading to the Suiyuan incident of November 1936. In February 1936, a meeting at Pailingmiao, where Prince De proposed the independence of Inner Mongolia, resulted in the departure of Prince So and several other Mongolian leaders from the coalition. They sought to establish a rival political council at Kueisui under the protection of Fu Zuoyi. By April, De and his supporters decided to form a military government at Tehua in Chahar, which was officially inaugurated in June as the Inner Mongolian government, headed by De with Li Shou-hsin as his deputy. This new government quickly signed a mutual assistance treaty with Manchukuo, and the emperor granted De the title of prince.   In July, at a conference in Tehua, Tanaka was appointed as the head of the Special Service Agency for Inner Mongolia with the mission of implementing the army's Intelligence Section plans. He traveled to Pingtiqüan alongside Chief of Staff Itagaki and Intelligence Chief Mutō Akira to propose a local anti-Communist agreement to Fu. After failing to convince Fu, he attempted to persuade Sun Tien-ying to form a puppet army but managed to recruit only a bandit from Suiyuan, Wang Ying. The February 26 mutiny in Tokyo heightened anti-Japanese sentiments in China, resulting in increased violence. By August, the construction of an airplane hangar in Paot'ou was halted due to riots by local Chinese residents. On August 13, a group of fifteen Japanese, led by Nakajima Manzo, was ambushed while delivering ammunition to a pro-Japanese leader who was shortly thereafter assassinated. Chinese soldiers from Wang Qingkuo's 70th Division carried out the attack, and tensions escalated as the arrival of ammunition and Japanese laborers in Kalgan prompted border villages to strengthen their defenses.   By late September, Tanaka's "Guidelines for the Execution of the Suiyuan Operation" received approval, with operations set to commence in early November. The plan evolved from a covert mission into a personal initiative by Tanaka, financed largely through funds from the Kwantung Army's secret services and profits from special trading in eastern Hopei. Tanaka claimed to have transported 600,000 yen to Tehua in October and later sent 200,000 yuan into Inner Mongolia, estimating total expenses at approximately 6 million yen. He acquired new weaponry from the disbanded Northeast Army and established three clandestine forces: Wang Ying led 500 men, including artillery; Qin Xiashan commanded 3,000 from Sun Tienying's army; and Chang Futang also led 3,000 specialized units. During strategic meetings, Tanaka dismissed proposals for unified command and refusing to integrate secret units into the Mongolian army. He advocated for the slogan "Overthrow Chiang Kai-shek," while Matsui managed to include "Independence for Inner Mongolia."   The Japanese had developed the entire battle strategy. The 1st Army, commanded by Li Xuxin, would serve as the left flank, while the 2nd Army, led by Demchugdongrub, would be positioned on the right. Wang Ying's forces were designated as the central force. Their initial targets would be Hongort, Xinghe, Tuchengzi, and Guisui city, followed by a division to seize Jinging, Baotou, and Hetao. On November 13, Prince Demchugdongrub's and Wang Ying's forces left Shandu in two columns to assault Xinghe and Hongort. By the 15th, 1,500 troops reached Hongort, where they engaged the 1st Cavalry Division led by Peng Yubin. The next day, Ryukichi Tanaka, Demchugdongrub's chief advisor, sent two cavalry brigades and one infantry brigade to capture the town, effectively overrunning its defenders. Meanwhile, Wang Ying dispatched a smaller group to secure Tuchengzi.   Fu Zuoyi established his headquarters in Jining that same day. After assessing the situation, he concluded that if the enemy secured Hongort, it would diminish his defenders' morale. Consequently, he launched a counterattack. Peng Yubin led a joint force of the 1st Cavalry Division and Dong Qiwu's 218th Brigade to confront around 400 of Wang Ying's men defending Hongort and Tuchengzi. By 7 AM on the 18th, Tuchengzi was reclaimed, and at 8:30 AM, the 1st Cavalry Division entered Hongort, charging through 500 of Wang Ying's soldiers. The struggle for Hongort persisted for over three days, resulting in nearly 1,000 casualties before Fu Zuoyi regained control.   As the tide shifted against the invaders, Fu Zuoyi initiated an offensive toward the Bailing Temple, the rear base of the enemy, well-stocked and defended by 3,000 men under Prince Demchugdongrub. Fu Zuoyi ordered the 2nd Cavalry Division, along with the 211th and 315th Brigades, the 21st Artillery Regiment, and a convoy of 20 trucks and 24 armored vehicles to assault the Bailing Temple as quickly as possible. Taking advantage of the Mongolian chaos, Fu Zuoyi's 35th Brigade executed a flanking maneuver west of the Bailing Temple amid a severe snowstorm.   At 1 AM on the 24th, the battle for the Bailing Temple commenced as the Chinese engaged the Mongolians for the fortified positions around the temple. From 2 to 4 AM, the Chinese advanced closer to the temple walls, facing artillery and machine-gun fire. They launched desperate frontal assaults against the city gates, suffering heavy losses. A fierce stalemate ensued, with Japanese aerial bombardments causing significant casualties to the Chinese forces. Fu Zuoyi subsequently ordered all armored vehicles to converge at the main city gate. Despite intense fire, the armored cars managed to breach the gate, allowing Chinese infantry to flood into the temple area. The resulting carnage within the temple walls led to 900 Mongol deaths, with 300 captured as the rest fled. The Chinese suffered 300 casualties but secured the strategically vital rear base, along with a substantial stockpile of provisions, including 500 barrels of petrol, 600 rifles, 10 machine guns, vehicles, and field guns. Following the devastating defeat at Bailing Temple, the invaders regrouped at Xilamuleng Temple. On the 28th, the Japanese sent 100 vehicles to transport 3,000 troops to prepare for a significant counteroffensive to recapture Bailing Temple. On the 29th, Wang Ying personally led 2,000 cavalry north of Shangdu to Taolin in an attempt to contain the enemy. However, after he left the bulk of his forces at Xilamuleng Temple, officers from the Grand Han Righteous Army secretly began negotiating to defect to the Chinese side, undermining the forces needed for the counterattack against Bailing Temple.   The counteroffensive commenced on December 2nd, with 10 armored vehicles and 1,000 Mongol troops leading the charge at 6 AM. They were pushed back by the heavily fortified 211th Brigade, which was well-supplied with machine guns and artillery. The following day, at 3 AM, the Mongols attempted a surprise attack but faced an ambush as they crept toward the temple. They incurred hundreds of casualties, with 230 men either captured or having defected. After this, the counterattack stalled, as the Mongol forces couldn't approach within 3 miles of the temple. Subsequently, the Chinese 2nd Cavalry Division launched a pincer maneuver, causing significant casualties among the invaders. By 9 AM, the enemy had suffered 500 casualties and was in retreat. At 7 PM, Fu Zuoyi ordered another counteroffensive. By the next morning, hundreds more had been lost, and several hundred soldiers were captured. With such heavy losses, the defense of Xilamuleng Temple weakened significantly, prompting more officers to defect to the Chinese. Late on the 4th, Fu Zuoyi assembled a force comprising two cavalry regiments, one infantry regiment, one artillery battalion, four armored vehicles, and a squadron of cars to launch a nighttime assault on Xilamuleng Temple.   Meanwhile, the 2nd Cavalry Division clashed with Wang Ying's cavalry 30 miles northeast of Wulanhua. Wang Ying's 2,000 cavalry had been raiding nearby villages to create diversions, drawing enemy forces away from the Bailing-Xilamuleng theater. By the 9th, Wang Ying's cavalry were encircled in Xiaobei, where they were nearly annihilated, with Wang escaping with around a hundred guards toward Changpei. On the 7th, some Grand Han Righteous Army officers set in motion plans to defect to the Chinese side. Early on the 9th, these officers led their men to invade the residence of Japanese advisors, killing all 27 Japanese officers under Colonel Obama. Simultaneously, Fu Zuoyi's forces executed a flanking maneuver against the Xilamuleng Temple amidst the chaos. With mass defections, the Chinese forces surged into the temple area, resulting in the invader army disintegrating in confusion and surrender. After seizing the temple, the invaders were routed, their lines of communication severed, and only isolated pockets continued to resist. Taking advantage of the confusion, Fu Zuoyi launched simultaneous attacks, attempting to capture Shangdu. However, Yan Xishan sent him a telegram, ordering him to halt, stating that Shangdu fell under the jurisdiction of Shanxi and not Suiyuan.   In response to the loss, Tanaka planned a counteroffensive with Qin's troops, but Chiang kai-shek commanded a strong defense of Pailingmiao, successfully outmaneuvering Tanaka's strategies. The resurgence of Chinese forces led to the disintegration of Qin's troops, who revolted and eventually joined the Nationalist army. The Kwantung Army aimed to redeploy its forces for recovery but faced opposition from Tokyo, which criticized the situation. After Chiang kai-shek was kidnapped by Zhang Xueliang on December 12, Tanaka and Prince De seized the opportunity to reassess their strategy. Ultimately, the Kwantung Army decided to abandon efforts to reclaim Pailingmiao, marking the official end of hostilities on December 21. The Suiyuan incident ultimately strengthened Chinese resolve against Japan and increased international distrust.   The defeat of Japan's proxy forces inspired many Chinese to advocate for a more vigorous resistance against the Japanese. The triumph in Suiyuan was celebrated throughout China and surprised the international media, marking the first occasion where the Chinese army successfully halted a Japanese unit. Delegations traveled from as distant as southern Chinese provinces to encourage the defenders to continue their fight. Captured Japanese weapons and equipment served as proof of Japan's involvement in the conflict, despite Japan's Foreign Minister Hachirō Arita claiming that "Japan was not involved in this conflict in Suiyuan at all." After his defeat, Prince Demchugdongrub and his Inner Mongolian troops retreated to northern Chahar, where he had to reconstruct his army due to significant losses. The Japanese implemented new regulations for the Mongolian Army to enhance its effectiveness, and efforts to recruit new soldiers commenced.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. More incidents and more battles to seize territory raged in North China. However things did not go according to plan for the Japanese and their puppets. The tides had turned, and now a more angry and invigorating China would begin lashing out against the encroachment. It was only a matter of time before a full blown war was declared. 

The Sinica Network proudly presents a new podcast: China Talking Points, featuring Kaiser Kuo (host of the Sinica Podcast), Eric Olander (host of the China-Global South Podcast and China In Africa Podcast) and Andrew Polk, co-founder of Trivium China and host of its podcast. We'll be joined regularly by Lizzi Lee, Fellow on Chinese Economy at the Asia Society Policy Institute's (ASPI) Center for China Analysis. Tune in live every other week for unscripted thoughts on the major China-related news of the week.This week, we focused on the truce in the trade war that Donald Trump launched with the so-called "Liberation Day" tariffs of April 9. U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer met with top Chinese trade negotiator He Lifeng and his team in Geneva over the weekend, and we look at what came out of those meetings and what we can expect to happen next. We also discussed the dogfight that took place between India and Pakistan last week, in which the Pakistani air force claims to have downed as many as five Indian planes, significant for China because the Pakistani planes were Chinese-made J10-C fighters. Eric, who wrote about the Chinese reaction to this and offered his take on the reasons for their success, managed to incur a lot of online Indian wrath — an occupational hazard — but presents a compelling case for why the fully integrated Chinese military systems gave Pakistan the edge.Watch us live on YouTube starting May 28th. Check out the new Sinica Network YouTube channel here!See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

I had scheduled a show to record while I was in Providence last week, but it fell through and had to be rescheduled, so please give this talk I delivered at Carnegie Mellon last month a listen!Hope you enjoy.KaiserSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, I chat with veteran Wall Street Journal reporter Bob Davis, who has covered the U.S.-China relationship for decades. He recently published a new book called Broken Engagement, which consists of interviews with U.S. policymakers who were instrumental in shaping American policy toward China from the George H.W. Bush administration through the Biden administration. It's an eye-opening look at the individuals who fought for — and against — engagement with China.2:58 – Bob's thoughts on engagement: whether it was doomed from the start, when and why there was a shift, people's different aspirations for it and retrospective positioning, and whether it could have a transformative effect 13:28 – The Nancy Pelosi interview: her approach, her Taiwan visit, and her critique of capitulation to business interests17:18 – Bob's interviews with Charlene Barshefsky, Lawrence Summers, and Bob Zoellick: the WTO accession, the China shock, Zoellick's “responsible stakeholder” concept, and diplomacy as an ongoing process 27:24 – The Robert Gates interview: security-focused engagement, and his shift to realism 31:14 – Misreading Xi Jinping34:42 – Bob's interviews with Stephen Hadley and Ash Carter regarding the South China Sea 39:19 – The Matt Pottinger interview: his view on China and how COVID changed everything 46:14 – Michael Rogers' interview: cyber espionage and cyber policy 51:25 – Robert O'Brien's interview: the “reverse Kissinger” and Taiwan 54:14 – Bob's interview with Kurt Campbell: his famous Foreign Affairs essay, differentiating between decoupling and de-risking, and technology export restrictions and trade deals 59:28 – The Rahm Emanuel interview: his response to wolf warrior diplomacy1:01:57 – Bob's takeaways: the long-term vision of engagement, introspective interviewees, and his own increased pessimism Paying It Forward: Lingling Wei at The Wall Street Journal; Eva Dou at The Washington Post and her book House of Huawei: The Secret History of China's Most Powerful Company; and Katrina Northrop at The Washington Post Recommendations: Bob: The TV series Derry Girls (2018-2022) and Curb Your Enthusiasm (2000-2024); and Margaret O'Farrell's novels, including Hamnet and The Marriage Portrait Kaiser: The BBC and Masterpiece series Wolf Hall: The Mirror and the Light See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.