Podcasts about Yamashita

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Best podcasts about Yamashita

Latest podcast episodes about Yamashita

Rainy Day Rabbit Holes: Pacific Northwest History and Humor
74. Maury Island Incident with Steve Edmiston

Rainy Day Rabbit Holes: Pacific Northwest History and Humor

Play Episode Listen Later May 28, 2025 50:25


✨ UFOs, Men in Black, and Maury Island Mysteries (with Steve Edmiston) | Part 1 ✨ Summary:In this first episode of a three-part series, Shea and Jody sit down with filmmaker, lawyer, and UFO expert Steve Edmiston to uncover the wild story behind the Maury Island Incident — the Pacific Northwest's own UFO conspiracy that helped birth the Men in Black legend! We dive into:

The Twenty Minute VC: Venture Capital | Startup Funding | The Pitch
20Product: Figma CPO on How Figma Builds Products: What Works, What Does Not | How Figma Does Testing and Product Reviews | The Future of Design, Engineering and Product with Yuhki Yamashita

The Twenty Minute VC: Venture Capital | Startup Funding | The Pitch

Play Episode Listen Later May 16, 2025 61:51


Yuhki Yamashita is the Chief Product Officer at Figma, where he leads the development of one of the world's most beloved design platforms. Previously, he was Head of Product at Uber, overseeing the core rider experience used by millions globally. A master of product storytelling and team-building, Yuhki has redefined how world-class digital products are built and scaled. Items Mentioned in Today's Episode:  04:30 – "Simple is Lazy?" — Yuhki Challenges Product Dogma 07:45 – The Secret Behind Figma's New Product Ideas (Hint: Users Hack It First) 09:00 – From Hack Week to Roadmap: How New Figma Products Are Born 10:00 – Are PRDs Dead? Yuhki's Spicy Take on the Death of Specs 12:30 – The ‘Screenshot Test': Can Your Product Explain Itself in 1 Frame? 14:15 – Code Layers and ‘Living Designs'—This Demo Blew Everyone's Mind 15:30 – Designers vs Coders: Who Really Owns the Future of Product? 17:45 – The Most Controversial Product Decision Inside Figma 19:00 – Why Figma's Org Structure Could Kill the PM Role (For Real) 21:00 – Should Everyone Be a Designer and a Builder Now? 23:15 – Will Figma Have Fewer Engineers in 5 Years? 24:00 – Cursor, Windsurf & AI Coding Tools—What Figma Engineers Really Use 25:30 – AI's Dual Power: Lowering the Floor, Raising the Ceiling 27:00 – Figma's Biggest Product Flop? Yuhki Owns It 29:30 – The Magic of Product Storytelling—Even for Boring Compliance Tools 31:00 – Why Joy Must Be in the Product (and How Figma Bakes It In) 33:00 – Does Product Market Fit Even Mean Anything in 2025? 35:30 – Is Great Design Enough? Or Is It ALL About Distribution? 37:15 – Dylan's Secret to Early Growth: Hacking Design Twitter 39:00 – Community Mistakes Startups Keep Making 41:00 – The One Thing Yuhki Wishes He Could Change at Figma 43:00 – Should They Have Launched 4 Products at Once? Time Will Tell 45:00 – When Do You Know a New Product Is Doomed? 46:30 – Why Designers Still Don't Ship What They Design (and How to Fix It) 48:00 – From Uber to Figma: Yuhki's Playbook for Massive Product Swings 53:00 – The Adobe Deal Breakup—How Figma Rallied 56:00 – What Yuhki Needs to Improve as a Leader (His Own Feedback Review) 58:00 – The Product Leader He Admires Most—and Why 59:30 – What Figma Still Gets Wrong About Product Culture Please read the offering circular and related risks at invest.modemobile.com. This is a paid advertisement for Mode Mobile's Regulation A+ Offering. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. Investing in private company securities is not suitable for all investors because it is highly speculative and involves a high degree of risk. It should only be considered a long-term investment. You must be prepared to withstand a total loss of your investment. Private company securities are also highly illiquid, and there is no guarantee that a market will develop for such securities. DealMaker Securities LLC, a registered broker-dealer, and member of FINRA | SIPC, located at 105 Maxess Road, Suite 124, Melville, NY 11747, is the Intermediary for this offering and is not an affiliate of or connected with the Issuer. Please check our background on FINRA's BrokerCheck.

Kings and Generals: History for our Future
3.150 Fall and Rise of China: February 26 Incident

Kings and Generals: History for our Future

Play Episode Listen Later May 12, 2025 38:00


Last time we spoke about Operation Chahar. In the turbulent year of 1935, tensions surged in North China as the Kwantung Army defied Tokyo's orders, encroaching deeper into Chahar province. This period was marked by widespread anti-Japanese sentiments, fueled by local revolts and the assassination of pro-Japanese figures, which infuriated Japanese authorities. On May 20, the Kwantung Army launched an offensive against a bandit group led by Sun Yungqin, seeking to exert control over the demilitarized regions established by earlier agreements. Their swift victory forced the resignation of local officials opposing Japanese interests. As chaos escalated, the Chinese government, under pressure to appease Japan, dismantled anti-Japanese factions and dismissed key leaders. The climax in this saga came with the signing of the He-Umezu Agreement, stripping China of authority in Hubei and Chahar, signaling Japan's increasing dominance and setting the stage for further exploitation of the region.   #150 The February 26 Incident Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. While this podcast is supposed to be given through the Chinese perspective, I apologize but yet again I need to jump over to the Japanese side. You see, a very pivotal moment during the Showa era would occur in the year of 1936. I think it's crucial to understand it, and the underlying issues of it, to better understand what we will be stuck in for the unforeseeable future, the Second Sino-Japanese War. I've briefly mentioned the two factions within the Japanese military at this time, but now I'd really like to jump into them, and a major incident that made them collide. In the aftermath of WW1, 2 prominent factions emerged during this tumultuous period: the Kodoha, or Imperial Way Faction, and the Toseiha, or Control Faction. Each faction represented distinct visions for Japan's future, deeply influencing the nation's course leading up to World War II. The Kodoha rose to prominence in the 1920s, driven by a fervent belief in Japan's divine destiny and its right to expand its imperial reach across Asia. This faction was characterized by its adherence to traditional Japanese values, rooted in the samurai ethos. They viewed the Emperor as the embodiment of Japan's spirit and sought to return to the moral foundations they believed had been eroded by “Western influence”. The Kodoha was often critical of the West, perceiving the encroachment of Western thought and culture as a threat to Japan's unique identity. Their ideology emphasized a robust military force, advocating for aggressive campaigns in regions like Manchuria and China to assert Japan's dominance. Contrasting sharply with the Kodoha, the Toseiha began to emerge as a more dominant political force in the late 1930s. The Toseiha embraced a pragmatic approach, advocating for a disciplined military that could engage effectively with the complexities of modern warfare. They recognized the importance of retaining some traditional values while also integrating Western military techniques. Rather than rejecting Western influence entirely, the Toseiha believed in adapting to global shifts to ensure Japan's strength and security. The Toseiha's moderation extended to their governance strategies, as they prioritized political stability and control over radical ideology. They saw this approach as crucial for creating a robust state capable of managing Japan's expansionist ambitions without provoking the backlash that Kodoha tactics elicited. Their more calculated approach to military expansion included securing partnerships and pursuing diplomatic solutions alongside military action, thereby presenting a less confrontational image to the world. Now after Manchuria was seized and Manchukuo was ushered in, many in the Japanese military saw a crisis emerge, that required a “showa restoration' to solve. Both factions aimed to create military dictatorships under the emperor. The Kodoha saw the USSR as the number one threat to Japan and advocated an invasion of them, aka the Hokushin-ron doctrine, but the Toseiha faction prioritized a national defense state built on the idea they must build Japans industrial capabilities to face multiple enemies in the future. What really separated the two, was the Kodoha sought to use a violent coup d'etat to make ends meet, whereas the Toseiha were unwilling to go so far. The Kodoha faction was made up mostly of junior and youthful officers, typically country boys as we would call them. These were young men whose families were not the blue bloods, farmer types. They viewed the dramatic changes of Japan in light of their own family experiences, many were impoverished by the dramatic changes. A very specific thing these Kodoha boys hated were the Zaibatsu. The Zaibatsu were large Japanese business conglomerates, primarily active from the Meiji period until WW2. They combined various industries, including banking, manufacturing, and trading. Prominent examples included Mitsubishi and Sumitomo. The reason they hated the Zaibatsu was because they believed they were influenced by western thought and that they super succeeded the authority of the emperor. More or less you can think of it as “we hate the fat cats who are really running things”.   Now the Toseiha faction were willing to work with the Zaibatsu to make Japan stronger. Basically they believed them to just be a necessary evil, you had to play ball to get things rolling. Random note, Hirohito's brother Prince Chichibu sympathized with the Kodoha faction and repeatedly counseled his brother that he should implement direct imperial rule even if it meant suspending the constitution, aka a show restoration. Hirohito believed his brother who was active in the IJA at the time was being radicalized. Now I cant go through the entire history of it, but this time period is known as the “government by assassination” period for Japan. Military leaders in the IJA, IJN and from within the Kodoha and Toseiha factions kept assassinating politicians and senior officers to push envelopes forward. Stating all of that, I now want to talk about the February 26th incident and I will add I am using a specific source, simply because it's my favorite. That is Herbert P Bix's Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan. In late 1934, several officers from the Imperial Way faction at the Army Cadet School were arrested for plotting a coup. Although there were no immediate repercussions, the following year, two of the same Kodoha officers, named Isobe Asaichi and Muranaka Takaji were arrested again for distributing a document accusing Toseiha faction officers, like Major General Nagata Tetsuzan, of previously drafting coup plans against the government. This time, the army's upper echelons responded firmly, condemning Isobe and Muranaka's accusations as acts of disloyalty, resulting in both officers losing their commissions. Meanwhile, other Imperial Way officers sought retaliation against Nagata, who was rumored to be planning a major purge to eliminate factionalism within the army. Tatsukichi Minobe was a Japanese statesman and scholar of constitutional law and in the 1930s he began a movement bringing up the very real issue with the Meiji constitution in relation to the role of the emperor. In August 1935, amid a populist movement denouncing Minobe's interpretation of the constitution, Lt colonel Aizawa Saburo from Kodoha faction entered Nagata's office and fatally attacked him with his katana. This marked a significant escalation in the military struggle over state reform and the push for increased military funding, which was intertwined with the movement against Minobe. Meanwhile anti- Prime Minister Okada factions within the army, continuing to use slogans like “kokutai clarification” and “denounce the organ theory,” intensified their attacks on the emperor's advisers and hereditary peers. Senior generals from the Kodoha faction arranged a public court-martial for Aizawa, held by the 1st Division, a group heavily populated by Kodoha officers based in Tokyo. When Aizawa's trial commenced on January 12, 1936, his defense team transformed it into an emotional condemnation of the Okada cabinet, the court entourage, and Minobe's constitutional theories. This strategy garnered support across the nation, even reaching unexpected places like the imperial palace, where Dowager Empress Teimei Kogo, a staunch rightist, expressed sympathy for Aizawa. However, before the trial could progress, a military mutiny disrupted proceedings in the capital. Shockwaves rippled through the army after Army Minister Hayashi dismissed Kodoha member General Mazaki from his position overseeing military education and ordered the transfer of the 1st Division to Manchuria, which ignited the largest army uprising in modern Japanese history. The uprising was orchestrated through a series of meetings held from February 18 to 22 by key individuals including Nishida, Yasuhide Kurihara, Teruzō Andō, Hisashi Kōno, Takaji Muranaka, and Asaichi Isobe. Their plan was relatively straightforward: the officers would assassinate the most prominent adversaries of the kokutai, seize control of the administrative center of the capital and the Imperial Palace, and present their demands, which included the dismissal of certain officials and the establishment of a new cabinet led by Mazaki. They did not establish long-term goals, believing that those should be determined by the Emperor. However, it is suspected that they were prepared to replace Hirohito with Prince Chichibu if necessary. The young Kodoha officers felt they had at least implicit support from several influential Imperial Japanese Army officers after making informal inquiries. This group included figures such as Araki, Minister of War Yoshiyuki Kawashima, Jinzaburō Mazaki, Tomoyuki Yamashita, Kanji Ishiwara, Shigeru Honjō, as well as their immediate superiors, Kōhei Kashii and Takeo Hori. Later, Kawashima's successor as Minister of War remarked that if all the officers who had endorsed the rebellion were forced to resign, there would not have been enough high-ranking officers left to replace them. To articulate their intentions and grievances, the young officers prepared a document titled "Manifesto of the Uprising" “Kekki Shuisho”, which they intended to present to the Emperor. Although the document was authored by Muranaka, it was written under the name of Shirō Nonaka, the highest-ranking officer involved in the plot. The document aligned with Kokutai Genri-ha ideals, criticizing the genrō, political leaders, military factions, zaibatsu, bureaucrats, and political parties for jeopardizing the kokutai with their selfishness and disregard for the Emperor, and emphasized the need for direct action: “Now, as we face immense foreign and domestic challenges, if we do not eliminate the disloyal and unjust who threaten the kokutai, if we do not remove the villains obstructing the Emperor's authority and hindering the Restoration, the Imperial vision for our nation will come to naught [...] Our duty is to purge the malevolent ministers and military factions surrounding the Emperor and eradicate their influence; we shall fulfill this mission.” Seven targets were selected for assassination for "threatening the kokutai". Keisuke Okada served as Prime Minister, where he notably advocated for the London Naval Treaty and supported the "organ theory" of the kokutai. His actions reflect a commitment to international agreements and specific ideological principles at the time. Saionji Kinmochi, a Genrō and former Prime Minister, also supported the London Naval Treaty. However, his influence extended further, as he played a role in prompting the Emperor to establish inappropriate cabinets, impacting political stability. Makino Nobuaki, the former Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and Foreign Minister, was another key figure who supported the London Naval Treaty. He notably prevented Prince Fushimi from voicing protests to the Emperor during this period, and he established a court faction in collaboration with Saitō, further entrenching political alliances. In his capacity as Grand Chamberlain, Kantarō Suzuki supported the London Naval Treaty but faced criticism for "obstructing the Imperial virtue," suggesting tensions between political decisions and traditional values. Saitō Makoto, who served as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and former Prime Minister, was involved in advocating for the London Naval Treaty and played a significant role in Mazaki's dismissal. He, too, formed a court faction with Makino, indicating the intricacies of court politics. Takahashi Korekiyo, as Finance Minister and former Prime Minister, engaged in party politics with the aim of diminishing military influence. His approach was focused on maintaining the existing economic structure amid the shifting political landscape. Finally, Jōtarō Watanabe, who replaced Mazaki as Inspector General of Military Education, supported the "organ theory" of the kokutai yet faced criticism for refusing to resign, despite being considered unsuitable for his position. On the night of February 25, Tokyo experienced a heavy snowfall, which uplifted the rebel officers as it evoked memories of the 1860 Sakuradamon Incident. During this event, political activists known as shishi assassinated Ii Naosuke, the chief advisor to the Shōgun, in the name of the Emperor. The rebel forces, organized into six groups, began mobilizing their troops and departing from their barracks between 3:30 and 4:00 AM. At 5:00 AM, they launched simultaneous attacks on key targets, including Okada, Takahashi, Suzuki, Saito, the Ministry of War, and the headquarters of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police. At around five o'clock on the morning of February 26, 1936, a rebellion erupted, fueled by the long-standing tensions surrounding the kokutai issues that had plagued 1935. Twenty-two junior officers led over 1,400 armed soldiers and non-commissioned officers from three regiments of the 1st Division and an infantry unit of the Imperial Guards in a mutiny in snow-covered Tokyo. The attack on Okada involved a contingent of 280 men from the 1st Infantry Regiment, commanded by 1st Lieutenant Yasuhide Kurihara. The troops encircled the Prime Minister's Residence and compelled its guards to open the gates. Upon entering the compound, they attempted to locate Prime Minister Okada but were met with gunfire from four policemen stationed there. All four policemen were killed, wounding six rebel soldiers in the process. However, the shots served as a warning for Okada, prompting his brother-in-law, Colonel Denzō Matsuo, to help him find refuge. Matsuo, who closely resembled Okada, was eventually discovered by the soldiers and killed. After comparing Matsuo's wounded face to a photograph of the prime minister, the attackers mistakenly believed they had accomplished their mission. Okada managed to escape the following day, but this information was kept confidential, and he did not play any further role in the events. After Matsuo's death, Kurihara's men took up guard positions around the compound, reinforced by sixty soldiers from the 3rd Imperial Guard. In another key operation, Captain Kiyosada Kōda led a group of 160 men to seize control of the Minister of War's residence, the Ministry of War, and the General Staff Office. Upon entering the Minister's residence at 6:30 AM, they demanded to see Minister Kawashima. Once admitted, they read their manifesto aloud and presented a document detailing several demands, including: A prompt resolution to the situation that would further "advance the cause of the Restoration." A call to prevent the use of force against the Righteous Army. The arrest of Kazushige Ugaki (Governor-General of Korea), Jirō Minami (commander of the Kwantung Army), Kuniaki Koiso (commander of the Korean Army), and Yoshitsugu Tatekawa for their roles in undermining military command. The immediate dismissal of Lieutenant Colonel Akira Mutō, Colonel Hiroshi Nemoto, and Major Tadashi Katakura from the Imperial Japanese Army for promoting "factionalism." The appointment of Araki as the new commander of the Kwantung Army. Ugaki, who served as Minister of War during two separate terms, had overseen significant reductions and modernization efforts within the army. He had also failed to support the March Incident plotters, who had hoped to install him as Prime Minister. Minami, Mutō, Nemoto, and Katakura were all influential members of the Tōsei-ha faction; Katakura had been partly responsible for reporting on the Military Academy Incident. Later that morning, Isobe encountered Katakura outside the Ministry of War and shot him non-fatally in the head. During this tumultuous period, several officers sympathetic to the rebels, including General Mazaki, General Tomoyuki Yamashita, and General Ryū Saitō, joined the uprising. Saitō praised the young officers' spirit and encouraged Kawashima to accept their demands. Shortly before 9:00 am, Kawashima indicated he needed to speak with the Emperor and left for the Imperial Palace. Meanwhile, Captain Hisashi Kōno led a team of seven, comprised mostly of civilians, to attack Makino Nobuaki, who was staying at Kōfūsō, part of the ryokan Itōya in Yugawara, Kanagawa Prefecture, with his family. Arriving at 5:45 am, they stationed two men outside while entering the inn with weapons drawn. Inside, policemen opened fire, leading to a lengthy exchange of gunfire. A policeman managed to alert Makino and his party of the danger, guiding them to a rear exit. Although the assassins fired at the escaping group, Makino successfully evaded capture. Kōno sustained a gunshot wound to the chest, and one policeman, Yoshitaka Minagawa, was killed. As Kōno was evacuated from the scene, the assailants set fire to the building. Hearing a gunshot, Kōno assumed that Makino had shot himself inside. After his recovery at a nearby military hospital, Kōno and his team were arrested by military police. Around 10:00 am, Kurihara and Nakahashi loaded a fleet of three trucks with sixty men and drove from the Prime Minister's Residence to the offices of the Asahi Shimbun, a significant liberal newspaper. They stormed the building, ordering the evacuation of employees and declaring their actions as "divine retribution for being an un-Japanese newspaper." The rebels then overturned and scattered the newspaper's type trays, containing 4,000 different characters, temporarily halting its publication. Following this attack, the men distributed copies of the uprising's manifesto to nearby newspapers before returning to the Prime Minister's Residence. On another front, 1st Lieutenant Motoaki Nakahashi of the 3rd Imperial Guard gathered 135 men and, under the pretext of paying respects at Yasukuni Shrine, marched to Takahashi Korekiyo's residence. There, he divided his forces, sending one group to attack while the other remained to guard the entrance. After breaking into the compound, Nakahashi and Lieutenant Kanji Nakajima found Takahashi in bed, where Nakahashi shot him while Nakajima delivered a fatal sword strike. Takahashi died without waking. Once his target was eliminated, Nakahashi regrouped with the soldiers and proceeded to the Imperial Palace, aiming to secure it. Entering through the western Hanzō Gate at 6:00 am, Nakahashi informed Major Kentarō Honma, the palace guard commander, that he had been dispatched to reinforce the gates due to earlier attacks. Honma, already aware of the uprisings, accepted Nakahashi's arrival. He was assigned to help secure the Sakashita Gate, the primary entrance to the Emperor's residence. Nakahashi planned to signal nearby rebel troops at police headquarters once he controlled access to the Emperor. However, he struggled to contact his allies, and by 8:00 am, Honma learned of his involvement in the uprising and ordered him, at gunpoint, to vacate the palace grounds. Nakahashi complied and returned to join Kurihara at the Prime Minister's Residence, while his soldiers remained at the gate until relieved later that day, preventing their inclusion in the government's official count of rebel forces. Elsewhere, 1st Lieutenant Naoshi Sakai led a detachment of 120 men from the 3rd Infantry Regiment to Saitō Makoto's home in Yotsuya. After surrounding the policemen on guard, five soldiers entered the residence and found Saitō and his wife, Haruko, in their bedroom. They shot Saitō dead, prompting Haruko to plead for her life, saying, "Please kill me instead!" While they pulled her away, she was unwittingly wounded by stray gunfire. Following Saitō's assassination, two officers directed another group to target General Watanabe, while the remaining men moved to strategically position themselves northeast of the Ministry of War. In Kōjimachi, Captain Teruzō Andō commanded 200 men from the 3rd Infantry Regiment to assault Suzuki's residence across from the Imperial Palace. After disarming the police on duty, they located Suzuki in his bedroom and shot him twice. When Andō moved to deliver the coup de grâce with his sword, Suzuki's wife implored to be allowed to do it herself, believing her husband to be fatally wounded. Andō obliged and, apologizing for the act, explained it was for the nation's sake. After saluting Suzuki, the soldiers left to guard the Miyakezaka junction north of the Ministry of War. Following the assault on Saitō, a party of twenty men, led by 2nd Lieutenants Tarō Takahashi and Yutaka Yasuda, headed to Watanabe's residence in Ogikubo after 7:00 AM. Despite the two-hour delay since previous attacks, no measures had been taken to alert Watanabe. As they attempted to storm the front entrance, military police inside opened fire, wounding Yasuda and another soldier. The troops then gained entry through the rear, confronting Watanabe's wife outside their bedroom. After shoving her aside, they found Watanabe using a futon as cover. He opened fire, prompting one soldier to retaliate with a light machine gun. Takahashi then rushed in and fatally stabbed Watanabe, witnessed by his nine-year-old daughter, Kazuko, who hid nearby. The soldiers departed, taking their wounded to a hospital before positioning themselves in northern Nagatachō. In a significant move, Captain Shirō Nonaka led nearly a third of the rebel forces, comprising 500 men from the 3rd Infantry Regiment, to assault the Tokyo Metropolitan Police headquarters. Their objective was to secure communication equipment and prevent dispatch of the police's Emergency Service Unit. Meeting no resistance, they quickly occupied the building, possibly due to a strategic decision to leave the situation in the military's hands. After securing the police headquarters, 2nd Lieutenant Kinjirō Suzuki led a small group to attack Fumio Gotō's residence, the Home Minister's, but found that Gotō was not home, thus allowing him to escape. This attack appeared to result from Suzuki's independent decision, rather than a coordinated effort among the officers. Despite all of these actions, the Kodoha boys had failed to secure the Sakashita Gate to the palace, which allowed the palace to maintain communication with the outside world, and they neglected to address potential naval interventions. At the Yokosuka naval base, Rear Adm. Yonai Mitsumasa and his chief of staff, Inoue Shigeyoshi, positioned marines to defend the Navy Ministry and prepared warships in Tokyo Bay to suppress the rebellion. By the morning of February 28, after unsuccessful negotiations through sympathetic officers at army headquarters, the commander under martial law transmitted an imperial order to disperse. Most troops returned to their barracks, one officer committed suicide, and the remaining leaders surrendered, resulting in the uprising ending with minimal further violence. Nevertheless, martial law in Tokyo continued for nearly five months. The rebel officers had initially planned for General Kawashima, a staunch ally of the Kodoha, to relay their intentions to the emperor, who they assumed would issue a decree for a “Showa restoration.” Despite their radical objectives of overthrowing the political order, the mutineers, like other military and civilian extremists of the 1930s, sought to operate within the imperial framework and maintain the kokutai. They believed the emperor was under the control of his advisers and lacked a genuine will of his own. Once the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the Grand Chamberlain were removed, they expected the emperor to appoint General Mazaki as prime minister, a leader they believed would reinforce the military and effectively address the China issue. At the onset of the insurrection, they had a real chance of success. The Tokyo military police commander, General Kashii Kohei, sympathized with their cause, and the emperor's chief aide, General Honjo, was related to rebel officer Capain Yamaguchi Ichitaro. Support for the mutineers was present at military bases nationwide. Historian Hata Ikuhiko notes that the rebels contacted General Honjo by both phone and written message before attacking the Okada cabinet. As the first in the imperial entourage to learn of the mutiny, Honjo could have warned the intended targets but chose not to do so. By the time he arrived at court at 6:00 am. on the 26th, key advisors like Chief Secretary Kido, Imperial Household Minister Yuasa Kurahei, and Vice Grand Chamberlain Hirohata Tadakata were already aware of the potential danger. Suzuki was murdered, and the emperor was deeply affected, awakening to the news at 5:40 am from the chamberlain on night duty, Kanroji Osanaga. He learned that his old ministers had been attacked and a coup was underway. Upon receiving this information, Hirohito resolved to suppress the uprising. He was outraged by the killing of his ministers and feared that the rebels might use his brother, Prince Chichibu, to force him to abdicate. He donned his army uniform and summoned Honjo, ordering him to “end it immediately and turn this misfortune into a blessing.” Hirohito adopted a strategy proposed by Kido, who had acted swiftly earlier that morning, instructing Honjo to assess the Imperial Guard Division's potential actions if the mutineers advanced on the Palace. Kido aimed to prevent the establishment of a new provisional cabinet until the mutiny was fully quelled. At 9:30 am Army Minister Kawashima, who had previously met with one of the rebel officers, arrived at court. He urged the emperor to form a cabinet that would “clarify the kokutai, stabilize national life, and fulfill national defense.” Surprised by Kawashima's tone, Hirohito reprimanded him for not prioritizing the suppression of the mutiny. He also expressed his frustration to Chief of the Navy General Staff Prince Fushimi, dismissing him when he inquired about forming a new cabinet. Later that day, Kawashima met with the Supreme Military Council, consisting mainly of army officers sympathetic to the rebels. The council decided to attempt persuasion before relaying the emperor's orders a move contrary to Hirohito's directive. According to historian Otabe Yuji, an “instruction” was issued to the rebel officers at 10:50 am, acknowledging their motives and suggesting the emperor might show them leniency. This message was communicated to the ringleaders by martial law commander General Kashii. That evening, when members of the Okada cabinet came to submit their resignations, Hirohito insisted they remain in power until the mutiny was resolved. On February 27, the second day of the uprising, Hirohito announced “administrative martial law” based on Article 8 of the Imperial Constitution. This invoked his sovereign powers to address the crisis while freeing him from needing cabinet approval for his actions. Hirohito displayed remarkable energy throughout the subsequent days, sending chamberlains to summon Honjo for updates and threatening to lead the Imperial Guard Division himself when dissatisfied with the reports. Honjo, however, resisted the emperor's demands and exhibited sympathy for the rebels. During the uprising, Hirohito met with Prince Chichibu, who had recently returned from Hirosaki. Their discussions reportedly led Chichibu to distance himself from the rebels. However, rumors of his sympathy for them persisted, leading to concerns about potential conflicts within the imperial family. On the second day, Rear Admiral Yonai and his chief of staff demonstrated their loyalty to Hirohito. By February 29, the fourth day of the uprising, Hirohito had reasserted his authority, troops were returning to their barracks, and most rebel leaders were captured. Seventeen of these leaders were court-martialed and executed in July without legal representation. Shortly after, during the obon festival, Hirohito allegedly instructed a military aide to secure seventeen obon lanterns for the palace. This action, though secret, may have provided him some personal comfort amidst the turmoil. An investigation following the mutiny revealed that the rebels' sense of crisis was amplified by the recent general elections, which had shown an anti-military sentiment among voters. Despite their populist rhetoric, most ringleaders were not motivated by the agricultural depression; their goal was to support the kokutai by advocating for increased military rearmament. During this period, military spending steadily rose from 3.47% of GNP in 1931 to 5.63% in 1936. Intriguingly, the ringleaders and their senior commanders shared a desire for state control over production to mobilize resources fully for total war. While united in this goal, their ideas about how to achieve a “Showa restoration” varied greatly, with some leaders, like Isobe, calling for complete economic consolidation and a return to strong state power. The February mutiny reinforced Hirohito's belief in the constitutional framework that underpinned his military authority. He became increasingly cautious about decisions that could compromise his command and developed closer ties to the army's Control faction, justifying military spending increases. Yet, the memory of the mutiny left him feeling uncertain about the throne's stability. Now you know me, whenever I can bring up Hirohito's involvement in the war related times I gotta do. After WW2, in an apparent effort to downplay his role as supreme commander, Hirohito provided a deliberately distorted account of the February events. “I issued an order at that time for the rebel force to be suppressed. This brings to mind Machida Chuji, the finance minister. He was very worried about the rebellion's adverse effect on the money market and warned me that a panic could occur unless I took firm measures. Therefore I issued a strong command to have [the uprising] put down. As a rule, because a suppression order also involves martial law, military circles, who cannot issue such an order on their own, need the mutual consent of the government. However, at the time, Okada's whereabouts were unknown. As the attitude of the Army Ministry seemed too lenient, I issued a strict order. Following my bitter experiences with the Tanaka cabinet, I had decided always to wait for the opinions of my advisers before making any decision, and not to go against their counsel. Only twice, on this occasion and at the time of the ending of the war, did I positively implement my own ideas. Ishiwara Kanji of the Army General Staff Office also asked me, through military aide Chojiri [Kazumoto], to issue a suppression order. I don't know what sort of a person Ishiwara is, but on this occasion he was correct, even though he had been the instigator of the Manchurian Incident. Further, my chief military aide, Honjo, brought me the plan drafted by Yamashita Hobun, in which Yamashita asked me to please send an examiner because the three leaders of the rebel army were likely to commit suicide. However, I thought that sending an examiner would imply that they had acted according to their moral convictions and were deserving of respect. . . . So I rejected Honjo's proposal, and [instead] issued the order to suppress them. I received no report that generals in charge of military affairs had gone and urged the rebels to surrender.”  On February 26, when Hirohito ordered the immediate suppression of the rebels, his anger was directed not only at the insurgents who had assassinated his closest advisors but also at senior army officers who were indecisive in executing the crackdown. The following day, in addition to his role as Minister of Commerce and Industry, Machida took on the responsibilities of finance minister. Concerns over economic panic and confusion contributed to the emperor's sense of urgency, despite not being the primary motivation for his actions. Hirohito believed that every hour of delay tarnished Japan's international reputation. Since the Manchurian Incident, the emperor had frequently clashed with the military regarding encroachments on his authority, though never about fundamental policy issues. At times, he had managed to assert his political views during policy discussions, similar to his earlier influence under the Hamaguchi cabinet. The February 26 mutiny highlighted to Hirohito and Yuasa his privy seal from March 1936 to June 1940, and the first lord keeper of the privy seal to attend court regularly the necessity of fully exercising the emperor's supreme command whenever the situation demanded it. Even when faced with opposition from Honjo, Hirohito managed to gain support and assert his authority through a decisive approach. His resolution marked the end of a period during which alienated “young officers” attempted to leverage his influence as a reformist figure to challenge a power structure they could not manipulate effectively. However, Hirohito learned how to adeptly manage that establishment in most situations. The decision-making process within the government was characterized by secrecy, indirect communication, vague policy drafting, and information manipulation, creating a landscape of confusion, misunderstanding, and constant intrigue aimed at achieving consensus among elites. This was the modus operandi in Tokyo and a reflection of how the emperor operated. Once again, Hirohito reminded the tightly-knit elite that he was essential to the functioning of the system. On May 4, 1936, during his address at the opening ceremony of the Sixty-ninth Imperial Diet, while Tokyo remained under martial law, Hirohito closed the chapter on the February mutiny. Initially, he contemplated sending a strong message of censure to the military, but after considerable deliberation over three months, he ultimately chose to issue a brief, innocuous statement: “We regret the recent incident that occurred in Tokyo.” The response from his audience of Diet members and military officials was one of startled awe, with some privately expressing disappointment. Once again, at a critical juncture, Hirohito avoided an opportunity to publicly rein in the military through his constitutional role. Nonetheless, due to his behind-the-scenes actions, the drift in domestic policy that had characterized Japan since the Manchurian Incident came to an end. In the following fourteen months, the emperor and his advisors largely aligned with the army and navy's demands for increased military expansion and state-driven industrial development. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. So some very unruly young Japanese officers got the bright idea of forcing a showa restoration by killing all the culprits they believed held their emperor hostage. Little did they know, this event spelt the end of the Kodoha faction and rise of the Toseiha faction. Henceforth the military was even more in charge and would get even more insane.   

Circle Of Debate
Circle Of Debate - Best For Business ? (WWE/AEW/NXT/TNA)

Circle Of Debate

Play Episode Listen Later May 4, 2025 245:41


 12345678901234567890123456789  12345678901234567890123456789  12345678901234567890123456789  views Streamed live 6 hours ago #wwereleases #aewnews #nxtnewsCheck out our new episode on Circle Of Debate as in Episode 242 as we discuss...What's best for business for WWE/NXT/TNA/AEW) Update on WWE ReleasesWhere does Yamashita and Thekla go? AEW COLLISION WATCH PARTY! Make sure you subscribe to our channel and welcome to the party!!!==================================Find us wherever you find Circle Of Debatehttps://linktr.ee/CircleOfDebate==================================The Wrestling Delorean Podcasthttps://linktr.ee/wrestlingdeloreanpo..==================================Get your TRWT Merch at the Link belowhttps://trwtmerch.threadless.com/==================================For all sports news, & entertainment news, pro wrestling & more go to https://gamebreakersports.com/==================================GETCHO PODCAST https://linktr.ee/getchopodcast#wwereleases #aewnews #nxtnews #tnanews #njpw #prowrestlingcommunity #professionalwrestling #wrestling #wrestlingpodcast #prowrestling #sportsentertainment #aew #wrestlingnews #circleofdebate #wweraw #wwe #wwenxt #wwesmackdown #tnawrestling #losangelesprowrestlingpodcast #chicagoprowrestlingpodcast #newyorkprowrestlingpodcast #wrestlingnews #wrestlingnewsnow #wrestlingnewsofficial #wrestlingnetwork #wrestlingnation #wrestlingtalk #wrestlingshow #prowrestlingnews #prowrestlingtalk #wrestlingcommunity #aewdynamite #aewcollision #wwebacklash #tonykhan #tripleh #shawnmichaels #tko #johncena #randyorton #codyrodes #jonmoxley #hangmanpage #willospreay #kazuchikaokada #kennyomega #youngbucks #mercedesmone #timelesstonistorm #giulia #stephanievaquer #obafemi #joehendry

WhatCulture Wrestling
AEW Dynamite Preview - A MASSIVE All-Star 8-Man Tag! Owen Hart Cup Semi-Final! Toni Storm Vs. Miyu Yamashita! Will MJF Finally Get Three Thumbs Up?!

WhatCulture Wrestling

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 30, 2025 58:56


The Dadley Boyz preview tonight's episode of AEW Dynamite and discuss...A MASSIVE All-Star 8-Man Tag!Owen Hart Cup semi-final!Toni Storm vs. Miyu Yamashita!What next for FTR?Will MJF finally get three thumbs up?!ENJOY!Follow us on Twitter:@AdamWilbourn@MichaelHamflett@MSidgwick@WhatCultureWWEFor more awesome content, check out: whatculture.com/wwe Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 179 - Pacific War Podcast - the Invasion of Mindanao - April 22 - 29, 1945

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 22, 2025 31:06


Last time we spoke about the First Okinawa Counteroffensive. The US Marines launched a formidable assault on Okinawa, confronting the entrenched Japanese 32nd Army. This dramatic struggle culminated in Operation Ten-Ichi-Go, Japan's final counteroffensive, marked by the ill-fated mission of the battleship Yamato, which met its demise under relentless air attacks. As American forces advanced, they faced significant resistance, particularly at the Shuri fortified zone. Colonel Yahara voiced concerns over a night counterattack planned for April 12, predicting disaster and chaos for disoriented troops unfamiliar with the terrain. Despite his warnings, Japanese forces executed a counteroffensive that faced harsh setbacks. As the Americans consolidated their gains, pressures mounted on their adversaries. Nevertheless, the relentless nature of the battle highlighted the stark contrast between the courage of the soldiers and the emerging futility of their cause, underscoring the inevitable tide of defeat facing Japan at this pivotal moment in history. This episode is the Invasion of Mindanao Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  By April 18, significant progress had been made in the offensive operations against Iejima and the Motobu Peninsula, as seen in Iwo Jima; most notably, General Hodge's 24th Corps was prepared to launch a full-scale offensive to the south with three divisions in line. On the morning of April 19, following the successful initial advance of the 106th Regiment, the largest artillery concentration ever used in the Pacific War heralded the dawn attack. Simultaneously, the campaign's most extensive airstrike was carried out, bolstered by the naval bombardment from Admiral Spruance's fleet. The assault teams moved forward, optimistic that the heavy barrage had either destroyed the enemy or left them too dazed to fight back. However, they soon faced disappointment; the Japanese forces, sheltered in their caves, had emerged largely unscathed and quickly took up their positions. To the east, General Arnold's 7th Division launched an attack with the 32nd and 184th Regiments, targeting Skyline Ridge, Ouki Hill, and Hill 178. While most of the 32nd Regiment engaged the entrenched enemy on Skyline Ridge with support from armored flamethrowers, Colonel Finn's 2nd Battalion and Colonel Greene's 2nd Battalion advanced about 500 yards unopposed towards Ouki Hill, only to be halted by a fierce barrage of Japanese fire. As efforts to progress stalled throughout the day, they had to retreat, which also compelled Finn's beleaguered 3rd Battalion to withdraw. Meanwhile, the remainder of the 184th Regiment attempted to advance through the coral formations of the Rocky Crags but was quickly pinned down by the determined defenders. Two medium tanks and three armored flame throwers rumbled southward from the 7th Division's lines on the coastal flats, passed through Ouki, and quickly moved into position at the tip of Skyline Ridge. They poured shot and flame into the cluster of enemy-occupied tombs and emplacements at the lower extremity of the ridge. The long jets of orange flame probed all openings in the face of this part of Skyline, and dark, rolling masses of smoke billowed upward. This was a new spectacle for the waiting infantry, who watched fascinated. For the enemy who died in the searing flame inside their strong points, there was hardly time to become terror-stricken. This phase of the attack lasted fifteen minutes, and then, just after 0700, the infantry moved up. All the Japanese on the forward face of the tip had been killed by the flame, but there were others on the reverse side who denied any advance across the crest. The battle of the infantry quickly erupted and smoldered along the narrow knife-edge line of Skyline Ridge. American troops clung desperately to the forward slope through two Japanese counterattacks, in which the enemy crowded forward into his own mortar fire to hurl grenades and satchel charges. At the same time, General Bradley's 96th Division launched an assault with the 381st and 382nd Regiments advancing side by side, aiming for Nishibaru Ridge, Tombstone Ridge, and the Tanabaru Escarpment. The initial capture of several small hills west of Tombstone Ridge went smoothly, but the 382nd faced stiffer resistance on Tombstone itself, managing to maintain a fragile position along the northwest edge of the ridge and partway down its west slope by nightfall. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion of the 381st Regiment successfully took Kaniku while pushing toward Nishibaru Ridge. However, most of the assault was executed by the 3rd Battalion, which advanced under heavy fire over the ridge crest to the upper part of Nishibaru village, where it was ultimately halted and forced to retreat by resilient defenders. In General Griner's 27th Division sector, the 106th Regiment had already cleared Machinato Inlet and secured a position at the western end of the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment. The 2nd Battalion attempted to push south following a successful night attack but encountered a series of caves, tombs, and tunnels west of Route 1, leading to a stalemate. This marked the beginning of what would later be termed the Item Pocket battle. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion of the 105th Regiment conducted a frontal assault on Kakazu Ridge while Griner executed a sweeping tank maneuver around the east end of the ridge.  The only other 27th Division unit on the front line ready to join in the initial assault was the 1st Battalion of the 105th Infantry. This battalion was deployed along Kakazu Gorge, with Kakazu Ridge, immediately in front, its initial objective. Company C was on the left, next to the Ginowan-Shuri road; Companies B and A, in the order named, were to the west, the latter being initially in reserve. The attack of the 1st Battalion was planned to combine a frontal assault against the ridge with a sweeping tank attack around the east end of Kakazu Ridge. The two forces were to meet behind the ridge near the village of Kakazu and to join in a drive to the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment beyond. The Japanese had guessed that a tank-infantry attack would try to penetrate their lines between Nishibaru Ridge and Kakazu Ridge, and they had prepared carefully for it. Their plan was based on separating the infantry from the tanks. The 272d Independent Infantry Battalion alone devised a fire net of four machine guns, two antiaircraft guns, three regimental guns, and the 81-mm. mortars of the 2d Mortar Battalion to cover the saddle between the two ridges. The machine guns were sited at close range. In addition, two special squads of ten men each were sent forward to the saddle for close combat against the infantry. One group was almost entirely wiped out; the other had one noncommissioned officer wounded and three privates killed. The enemy defense also utilized the 47-mm. antitank guns of the 22d Independent Antitank Gun Battalion and close-quarters suicide assault squads. So thorough were these preparations that the Japanese boasted "Not an infantryman got through." It was here in the Kakazu-Urasoe-Mura Escarpment area that the most extensive reorganization of Japanese units had taken place just before the American attack. The remnants of badly shattered battalions were combined into a composite unit of about 1,400 men that consisted largely of members of the 272d Independent Infantry Battalion but also included elements of the 13th, 15th, and 23d Battalions. The 21st Independent Infantry Battalion stood ready to support the 272d. The 2d Light Machine Gun Battalion added its fire power. Although the infantry soon found themselves pinned down by intense Japanese fire, the tanks managed to reach Kakazu village, which was heavily damaged and set ablaze over the next three hours. Despite their efforts, the failure of the 1st Battalion eventually compelled the tanks to retreat, prompting the 2nd Battalion of the 105th Regiment to attempt an attack towards the eastern end of Kakazu Ridge without success. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion descended from Kakazu West, bypassed Kakazu village, and successfully reached the summit of the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment. This unexpected achievement led Colonel Winn to decide to reposition the remainder of the 105th around the western end of Kakazu Ridge to join the 3rd Battalion on the escarpment, effectively abandoning the main enemy front. In other areas of the escarpment, the 106th Regiment was unable to advance southward but managed to extend its lines eastward to connect with Winn's 3rd Battalion. Consequently, the major offensive on April 19 failed to produce any significant breakthrough, resulting in 720 casualties. To the north, General Shepherd initiated a final push toward the north coast on the same day, with the 4th and 29th Marine Regiments advancing through complex networks of caves and trenches facing minimal resistance, but they halted at the elevated terrain around Hill 302. Additionally, patrols from the 22nd Marines moved south from Hedo Misaki and successfully captured Aha on the eastern coast. On Iejima, General Bruce also persisted with his main offensive against the Japanese strongholds on Bloody Ridge, as the 3rd Battalion of the 305th Regiment advanced eastward against the northern section of Ie, while Colonel Hamilton's 2nd and 3rd Battalions attacked northward. Backed by artillery and mortars, the infantry engaged in fierce skirmishes marked by hand-to-hand combat, moving from one stronghold to another. Following another preparatory bombardment, Colonel Smith initiated a second assault at 14:30, effectively capturing the slopes of the Pinnacle through a series of rushes despite intense machine-gun and mortar fire. Leading elements of the 306th came under intense mortar and small-arms fire as they left the line of departure 600 yards northeast of the base of Iegusugu. The Pinnacle loomed above them, its slopes covered with masses of torn and twisted vegetation. Describing the Pinnacle on the morning of the 20th, General Randle, assistant division commander of the 77th, stated: "It is a damned highly fortified position with caves three stories deep, each house concrete with machine guns in and under. Whole area of village and circumference of mountain a maze of machine gun, mortar, and gun positions little affected by artillery fire we have poured on. Even as this message was on its way to the 77th Division command post, the 306th was winning a hold on the formidable position. By the end of the day, Smith's 1st Battalion was positioned across the northern slopes of Iegusugu; the 3rd Battalion had advanced to within 400 yards of the peak on the eastern side; and the 2nd Battalion had pivoted south to keep pace with the other units of the 306th. Meanwhile, Hamilton's 2nd Battalion succeeded in securing the buildings on Government House Hill; Coolidge's 1st Battalion regained control of the hill from the east; Hamilton's 3rd Battalion established a line at the base of Iegusugu extending to the recently captured Bloody Ridge; and Coolidge's 3rd Battalion made limited progress as it moved slowly eastward. However, during the night, over 400 Japanese troops, including women armed with spears, launched a fierce counteroffensive against Bloody Ridge, nearly forcing the Americans off Government House Hill. By dawn on April 21, as the counterattack diminished, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides, Hamilton's 3rd Battalion was dispatched to relieve the 2nd Battalion, starting the cleanup of the now-secured Bloody Ridge. Coolidge's 3rd Battalion also successfully repelled a strong counterattack from the north before resuming its advance eastward, destroying several enemy positions as it established a line extending south from a small lake at the southwest base of Iegusugu. In the meantime, the 306th Regiment strengthened its hold on Iegusugu throughout the morning, with the 3rd Battalion launching a successful assault on the eastern slopes, while the 1st and 2nd Battalions continued to clear caves and pillboxes on the northern and northwestern slopes. Shortly after noon, Hamilton's 3rd Battalion and Coolidge's 1st Battalion began advancing northward against light resistance to secure the southern slopes of Iegusugu. Simultaneously, Smith's 2nd Battalion and Coolidge's 3rd Battalion launched a coordinated assault to capture the southwest slopes, where they encountered stronger opposition. By mid-afternoon, all units at the Pinnacle were busy mopping up, systematically destroying and sealing the enemy's underground passages and strongholds over the next five days. By midafternoon of April 21 all units on the Pinnacle were engaged in mopping up. The exterior of the Pinnacle was secure, but Japanese still remained in subterranean passages and strongholds from which they made sallies against the troops. The openings were systematically blown out and sealed off. The 307th alone captured or destroyed during the day five 81-mm mortars, five knee mortars, one 75-mm howitzer, and two 47-mm anti-tank guns. These were some of the weapons that had held the Americans off Bloody Ridge for three days. For five days after Ie Shima was declared secure, elements of the 77th Division mopped up remaining groups of the enemy, sealed caves, destroyed pillboxes, marked or removed the thousands of mines that were still on the island, and buried the dead. During this period hundreds of Japanese were killed in and around the Pinnacle, in the town of Ie, and in caves along the coast line. Removal of mines on the airfield and on the roads feeding it was given priority in order to speed up airfield construction. The last noteworthy encounter on Iejima came during the night of April 22-23, when a group of Japanese soldiers and civilians, including women, all armed with rifles, grenades, and demolitions, rushed from caves on Iegusugu toward the lines of the 306th. They were all cut down without loss to American troops. Ultimately, during the six-day battle on Iejima, the Americans killed 4,706 Japanese soldiers and captured 149, suffering 172 killed, 902 wounded, and 46 missing. Meanwhile, on April 20, the 4th and 29th Marine Regiments reached the north coast after eliminating organized resistance on the Motobu Peninsula, resulting in over 2,000 Japanese fatalities, while Shepherd's Marines incurred 207 killed, 757 wounded, and six missing. The Fleet Marine Force Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion seized Yagachi Island on April 21 and occupied Sesoko Island on April 22, with the 6th Reconnaissance Company making the final landing on Kouri Island on April 23. Following a night reconnaissance in rubber boats, the battalion, transported by armored amphibians, seized Yagachi Shima on 21 April. A leper colony of some 800 adults and 50 children was located on this island, but no resistance was encountered. Because aerial reconnaissance had reported Sesoko Shima to be occupied and defended, it was decided to launch an attack on that island with one reinforced regiment. But preliminary to the attack, a native was captured during an amphibious reconnaissance of the objective who revealed that the island was probably not occupied. A successive physical reconnaissance confirmed his statements. Consequently, Major Jones' command was also assigned this mission, and the battalion occupied Sesoko Shima on 22 April. Although no opposition was met, the operation was interfered with by more than 100 civilians, moving by canoe from islands to the west where food was running low, and "considerable difficulty was involved in coralling and controlling" them. On 23 April the 6th Reconnaissance Company, also mounted on and supported by LVT(A)s, executed a daylight landing on Kouri Shima, likewise finding no resistance. Concurrently, while the 29th Marines remained on the Motobu Peninsula, the 4th Marines moved to their designated area in northern Okinawa to assist the 22nd Marines in mopping-up operations, searching the mountainous interior for remnants of the Udo Force and independent guerrilla groups. Finally, on April 28, Colonel Udo's final 200 surviving members were successfully intercepted and eliminated while attempting to flee to the east coast, effectively concluding the northern Okinawa operation. It's now time to leave Okinawa and return to the southern Philippines to oversee the continuation of General Eichelberger's operations. By the end of March, General Arnold's Americal Division had successfully taken control of Cebu City and Lahug Airfield, but was encountering stronger resistance in the northern hills. By the end of March the Americal Division had acquired a good idea of the nature and extent of General Manjome's principal defenses, and had learned that it had already overrun some of the strongpoints along the Japanese outpost line of resistance. On the other hand, the division had not been able to pinpoint the Japanese flanks. With the enemy firmly entrenched and having all the advantages of observation, General Arnold knew that the process of reducing Manjome's positions would be slow and costly no matter what type of maneuver the Americal Division employed. Lacking the strength required for wide envelopments and specific information about the Japanese flanks, Arnold hoped he might achieve decisive results with a single sledgehammer blow against the Japanese center. He therefore decided to use the bulk of his strength in a frontal assault into the hills due north of Cebu City. Consequently, on April 1, the 182nd Regiment, supported by Colonel Cushing's guerrillas, launched a direct assault on the Japanese center, while the 132nd Regiment advanced along the west bank of the Butuanoan River and then moved westward to flank General Manjome's left. Despite slow progress and heavy casualties, by April 11, the 182nd had diminished most of the significant defensive positions along the center of Manjome's second line, and the 132nd had managed to flank the Japanese left, reaching a crucial location on the far left of Manjome's final defensive positions. Additionally, the 164th Regiment had landed to bolster the offensive and was quickly advancing through the Mananga Valley to encircle the Japanese right and rear. By April 13, the 164th reached Babag Ridge, but its surprise attack was promptly repelled by the defenders. Meanwhile, the 132nd and 182nd Regiments resumed their assaults, with the latter capturing the last stronghold along the Japanese second line. Unbeknownst to the Americans, Manjome had already concluded that further resistance was futile and ordered a general withdrawal northward to begin the night of April 16. In the days that followed, Arnold's three regiments engaged in a series of costly small unit attacks, gradually gaining ground, inch by inch. On April 17, organized resistance in the Japanese stronghold began to falter as defenders retreated, and by evening, the Americal Division had neutralized all of Manjome's significant fortifications. In response to the Japanese withdrawal, the Americal Division quickly initiated a pursuit operation, successfully cutting off the retreat route to the remaining forces of the 1st Division in northern Cebu by the end of the month. By the first week of May, the 132nd Regiment launched an offensive to dismantle General Kataoka's organized resistance, aided by guerrilla forces, and largely achieved its objective in a campaign that lasted until the month's end. The Americans and Filipinos then focused on mopping up the remnants of Manjome's forces, effectively eliminating the last pockets of Japanese resistance on Cebu by June 20. Meanwhile, on April 11, the 3rd Battalion of the 164th Regiment landed unopposed on Bohol at beaches already secured by Major Ismael Ingeniero's guerrillas. Patrols soon located the Japanese garrison inland, leading to the battalion's assault on its main positions from April 17 to April 20, culminating in the overrunning of the last organized opposition by April 23. On April 26, the remaining elements of the 164th Regiment landed unopposed on southern Negros and moved inland to search for the Japanese garrison. By April 28, they discovered the 174th Independent Battalion, but their initial attacks were successfully thwarted by the defenders. Nonetheless, a coordinated offensive commenced on May 6, which successfully compelled the Japanese to retreat and disperse by the end of the month. The 164th then neutralized a final resistance pocket between June 7 and 12, effectively ending Japanese opposition on Negros and completing the 8th Army's campaign to reclaim the central Visayan Islands. Eichelberger's operations in the southern Philippines were far from over, as Major-General Franklin Sibert's 10th Corps, comprising the reinforced 24th and 31st Divisions, was preparing to launch the invasion of Mindanao, known as Operation Victor V. The initial strategy had Major-General Roscoe Woodruff's 24th Division landing on the shores of Illana Bay on April 17 to quickly secure the Malabang-Cotabato area, followed by Major-General Clarence Martin's 31st Division five days later for the final advance toward Davao.  Illana Bay lies nearly a hundred miles northwest of the main objective in eastern Mindanao, the Davao area, and only a poor road connects its beaches to Davao. Still, 8th Army had ample reason to select Illana Bay as the site of the initial assault. For one thing, the army knew that the Japanese had their main concentrations in the Davao region, where they seemed especially well prepared to repel an amphibious assault. It would be foolish to stick one's hand into a hornet's nest if there were no urgency for such action, and 8th Army could not, of course, avoid the long view that the eastern Mindanao operation was in essence a mopping-up campaign rather than an action of great strategic importance. Second, the Illana Bay area was relatively weakly defended--the 24th Division would have a much better chance to achieve tactical surprise there. Finally, 10th Corps would have to seize and rehabilitate an airstrip quickly so that land-based aircraft could provide proper support for subsequent operations in eastern Mindanao, other air bases being too distant. A reasonably good strip existed at Malabang, on the northwestern shore of Illana Bay. Given the estimate that the Japanese maintained a weak garrison at Illana Bay, Malabang seemed the spot for the main assault. However, by early April, Colonel Wendell Fertig's guerrilla forces had taken control of the entire Malabang region, forcing the Japanese garrison to retreat. Consequently, Sibert adjusted his plan, directing Rear-Admiral Albert Noble's Task Group 78.2 to deploy only one battalion at Malabang, with the remaining forces of the 24th Division landing near Parang. The Japanese forces in Mindanao numbered over 43,000, including troops from Lieutenant-General Morozumi Gyosaku's 30th Division, Lieutenant-General Harada Jiro's 100th Division, and Rear-Admiral Doi Naoji's 32nd Naval Special Base Force. General Suzuki of the 35th Army was in overall command of these troops, but he first needed to escape from Cebu to assert his authority. Thus, Suzuki and his staff departed northern Cebu on April 10, using five landing craft. Unfortunately, the boats became separated, leading to an emergency landing near Dumaguete before they could continue their journey on the night of April 16. Tragically, Suzuki's vessel was intercepted and destroyed by a PT boat off the southern tip of Cebu on April 17. Only his chief of staff, Major-General Tomochika Yoshiharu, managed to reach Cagayan on the night of April 20 after several days adrift. Nominal command in Mindanao rested with General Morozumi, who became de jure commander of the 35th Army after General Suzuki's death during the latter's voyage from Cebu. But Morozumi chose not to exercise his authority except insofar as to largely ignore advice from General Tomochika, 35th Army chief of staff, who reached Mindanao in late April. Beset with formidable communications difficulties, and realizing that most inhospitable terrain separated the main bodies of the 30th and 100th Divisions, Morozumi believed he could render his best service by staying with the 30th, leaving General Harada and Admiral Doi more or less to their own devices. Neither Harada nor Morozumi had any offensive missions. Rather, in accordance with Yamashita's December 1944 plans, the Japanese on Mindanao were to direct their efforts to pinning down as many American units as possible in order to delay the progress of the war. Harada and Morozumi had little hope of conducting organized, major defensive operations for more than two months. Once American forces had overrun their prepared defenses, the two planned to retreat into largely unexplored mountains of east-central Mindanao, organizing a last-stand area like Yamashita's in the Asin Valley of northern Luzon. The 30th and 100th Divisions were not in good shape to conduct a delaying, defensive operation either. Hopelessly isolated, short of artillery, small arms ammunition, transportation, and communications equipment, they had no chance of obtaining supplies. They had some stocks of food, but their transportation shortage, coupled with the poor condition of eastern Mindanao roads would make it most difficult for the Japanese to move their food from central depots to the mountains. The Japanese commanders thus knew that once an invasion of eastern Mindanao began they would enter upon a battle they could not win, and they definitely had no relish for a defense to the death in place.  After an uneventful journey, Sibert's 10th Corps began landing on Mindanao on the morning of April 17. Troops from the 533rd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment went ashore on the small Ibus Island, while the 3rd Battalion of the 21st Regiment joined Fertig's guerrillas on the beach near Malabang. Company K secured Bongo Island without opposition. At 09:00, after an unnecessary two-hour bombardment by cruisers and destroyers, the 19th Regiment landed at Parang without encountering any resistance, followed by most of the 21st Regiment. That afternoon, the 19th Regiment secured the entire Parang area, and the 24th Reconnaissance Troop scouted the shores of Polloc Harbor and the northern entrance of the Mindanao River, finding them clear. On April 18, Sibert launched an assault towards Fort Pikit, with the 19th Regiment advancing along Route 1 and the 21st Regiment utilizing the Mindanao River. The 21st's advance was quicker, successfully reaching Paidu-Pulangi the next day. However, the 19th Regiment lagged due to poor road conditions and some enemy resistance, leading Woodruff to order the 21st to withdraw downstream for the night. On April 21, a battalion from the 34th Regiment arrived at Paidu-Pulangi, advancing both overland and along the river to reach Fort Pikit late in the afternoon. The isolated 166th Independent Battalion was ultimately destroyed, with the 19th finally arriving at Fort Pikit on April 23. Meanwhile, the 34th continued to push forward and secured the Kabacan junction of Route 1 and Sayre Highway. This quick capture of the junction effectively separated the 30th and 100th Divisions and opened two routes of attack: north along the Sayre and southeast towards Davao. Consequently, the newly arrived 31st Division was tasked with sending its 124th Regiment to assault the 30th Division's forces in northern Mindanao, while the 34th Regiment continued its advance along Route 1 towards Digos and Davao. In response, Morozumi dispatched reinforcements under Colonel Ouchi Koretake to block any enemy progress past Omonay, while fortifying the Malaybalay area. By this time, General Morozumi had swung into action in an attempt to stem the enemy advance before it moved north into central Mindanao. Colonel Ouchi, commander of the 30th Engineer Regiment, was ordered about April 22 to take command of operations along the southern approaches and to annihilate the enemy south of the east-west line running through Omonay. For this mission he was given command of the South Sector Unit, as well as his engineer units. On April 23, General Tomochika, Chief of Staff of 35th Army, arrived at the 30th Division command post at Impalutao from Agusan, where he had arrived on April 21 from Cebu. Tomochika immediately conferred with Morozumi regarding implementation of the Army policy of protracted resistance. As a result of this discussion, Morozumi concluded that it was necessary to strengthen the Malaybalay area. He therefore ordered the transfer of the 1st Battalion, 77th Regiment from the North Sector Unit to the Central Sector Unit and the movement of this battalion to new positions near Malaybalay. About the same date Morozumi ordered the Surigao Sector Unit to move from Ampayon to the Waloe area, where it was to assist in carrying out the division's self-sufficiency program. Although the 30th Division commander thus adopted measures to strengthen the area of final resistance, he still considered the landing near Parang a secondary invasion and estimated that the main enemy landing would soon be launched in the Macajalar Bay area. The preponderance of division strength was therefore retained in the north.  Led by the 24th Reconnaissance Troop, the 34th Regiment quickly departed from Kabacan on April 24. Although progress was hampered primarily by destroyed bridges and the poor condition of Route 1, the troops successfully arrived at the outskirts of Digos by April 27, where they faced approximately 3,350 enemy troops. The Japanese forces urgently prepared to defend against the 24th Division's assault but could only hold out until the early hours of April 28, when they retreated to the foothills of Mount Apo to the north. Elements of the 34th Regiment pursued the withdrawing Japanese, who maintained their position in the Mount Apo region until May 9, when they retreated north to regroup with the rest of the 100th Division. Meanwhile, other units of the 34th and the guerrilla 108th Division began patrolling the Davao Gulf coast, which they successfully cleared by May 12. Additionally, the 19th Regiment advanced from Kabacan to Digos, passed through the 34th, and started moving north towards Davao. Facing little resistance along Route 1, the 19th Regiment overwhelmed the last opposition in front of the city and successfully occupied Davao by May 3 with minimal opposition. Meanwhile, on the afternoon of April 27, the 124th Regiment departed from Kabacan and quickly confronted the 1st Battalion, 74th Regiment, causing it to retreat in disarray. The 124th then pressed on to the north, facing minimal resistance, and ultimately arrived in Kibawe by May 3. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The US invasion of Mindanao commenced under General Eichelberger. The initial assault targeted Illana Bay, with American forces quickly securing key areas. Japanese troops, suffering from low morale and inadequate supplies, struggled to mount an effective defense. The campaign marked a pivotal advance in the Pacific War, laying groundwork for further operations.

Suit Up Philosophy: Becoming Fit For Every Opportunity
With J.C Albaugh and The Legend of Yamashita's Treasure

Suit Up Philosophy: Becoming Fit For Every Opportunity

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 13, 2025 81:48


Get a copy of One Man's Treasure - https://a.co/d/9MrNxip Suit Up! With J.C Albaugh and The Legend of Yamashita's Treasure, the first of his Raider series. Jack Carter finds himself out of the Marines and protecting a group of archeologists as a private contractor. There, he learns about a dark mystery which needs to be protected from a conspiracy seeking it's power. On today's episode we interview JC about writing an ensemble cast, crafting the team in the story, the origins of Yamashita's treasure, marketing and much more! Order Yamashita's Treasure - https://a.co/d/a9yISCr Order Temple of Cyrus - https://a.co/d/8iUxyAP Follow JC! Instagram https://www.instagram.com/theraider_adventure_book/?next=%2F Amazon https://www.amazon.com/stores/J.C.-Albaugh/author/B0BHHQWVC7? Follow The Show! https://terrancelayhew.com/suitup/ https://www.instagram.com/suitup.podcast/ https://www.facebook.com/tlayhew

Bust or Trust: A Kids' Mystery Podcast
General Yamashita's Lost Gold

Bust or Trust: A Kids' Mystery Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 4, 2025 21:44


After World War II, its said that a Japanese General hid vast amounts of gold in tunnels and caves under the Philippines. But no one has ever found it. Or have they? Tiernan and Athena scour the wealth of evidence about General Yamashita's Lost Gold, then hand it over to you, our Chief Detectives, to decide. Brought to you by Small Wardour, makers of some of the best podcasts for kids. *** If your chief detectives want to hear more from the investigations, including more compelling evidence and extra fun facts, then you can become a paid subscriber of the show. Just click Subscribe on Apple Podcasts or visit patreon.com/bustortrustpodcast to get access to weekly bonus episodes, ad-free and early listening and exclusive extras. Your support will help us to investigate even more amazing mysteries. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

The Pacific War - week by week
- 175 - Pacific War Podcast - Visayas Offensive - March 25 - April 1 - , 1945

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 25, 2025 46:02


Last time we spoke about the fall of Iwo Jima. General Schmidt pushed through Japanese defenses, facing strongholds like Cushman's Pocket and General Senda's positions, with intense fighting and heavy casualties on both sides. Despite stubborn resistance, the Marines gradually advanced, employing tanks and artillery support. The Japanese, under General Kuribayashi, fought tenaciously, culminating in a final assault on March 26. After brutal combat, Iwo Jima was declared secured, but at great cost: 18,000 Japanese and over 6,800 American lives lost. Meanwhile, in New Britain, Australian forces continued their offensive, capturing strategic positions despite fierce enemy resistance. In the midst of a fierce conflict, Australian battalions advanced into enemy territory, capturing strategic positions while facing heavy resistance. Notable victories included the successful ambushes by the 2/7th Battalion and the capture of key locations like the But airfield. Despite facing fierce counterattacks from the Japanese, particularly at Slater's Knoll, the Australians maintained their momentum. As the Japanese command faced internal crises, the Australians continued their relentless push, ultimately leading to significant territorial gains and weakening enemy forces. This episode is the Visayas Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Within northern Luzon, by mid-March, General Clarkson's 33rd Division was exploring the western routes to Baguio. Colonel Volckmann's guerrilla unit had taken control of San Fernando and was engaged in combat around Cervantes. Meanwhile, General Mullins' 25th Division had advanced to Putlan, and General Gill's 32nd Division was involved in a fierce battle at Salacsac Pass. Following the capture of Putlan, General Swift instructed Mullins to push through Balete Pass to secure the vital Santa Fe region. On March 12, the 27th and 161st Regiments began advancing north and northwest, successfully clearing the Minuli area and establishing a foothold on Norton Ridge by March 15. At the same time, the 35th Regiment initiated a broad maneuver around Balete Pass via the Old Spanish Road, but this was soon hindered by intense artillery and mortar fire from the positions of the 11th Independent Regiment. The road also required significant engineering efforts to support the outflanking force, leading Mullins to ultimately halt the 35th's assault. However, General Konuma was unaware of this; fearing an outflanking maneuver from Carranglan, he had no choice but to keep around 3,000 of his best troops in this seemingly secure area. On March 15, Mullins ordered the reinforced 161st Regiment to launch a holding attack to the north while the majority of the 27th Regiment executed a flanking maneuver over Myoko Ridge, Mount Myoko, and Lone Tree Hill to encircle Balete Pass from the east. After regrouping at Putlan, the 35th was also tasked with capturing Mount Kabuto to subsequently advance northwest along Balete Ridge and connect with the 27th at Myoko. Mullins launched a renewed offensive on March 16, facing stubborn resistance from the 161st as it gradually advanced toward Norton's Knob, which was successfully captured by the end of the month. On March 22, the 27th began its flanking maneuver, with the 1st Battalion moving east into the elevated terrain south of Kapintalan by March 28, while the 2nd Battalion advanced nearly 3,750 yards up the wooded Myoko Ridge to the east. Meanwhile, the 35th's attempt to encircle the enemy via Kabuto started off well, reaching the northern slope of Balete Ridge on March 22. However, Konuma's recently arrived reinforcements launched a series of strong counterattacks and harassment raids, forcing the 35th to withdraw by March 28. With the other two regiments stretched thin and unable to penetrate the enemy's main defenses, Mullins ordered the 35th to position itself between the 27th and 161st Regiments to assault Highley Ridge from the east. By the end of March, the 161st was advancing northeast along Highley Ridge toward Crump Hill, which finally fell on April 8, bringing the advance to a halt. The 35th supported this effort with an attack on Kapintalan, which was ultimately captured by April 21. Meanwhile, the 27th continued to struggle through the challenging terrain of Myoko Ridge against fierce opposition, not reaching Woody Hill until April 12. This slow progress allowed Konuma to reinforce the Myoko sector with four understrength infantry battalions. Nevertheless, the brave soldiers of the 27th Regiment persevered, securing the Pimple on April 15 and advancing an additional 350 yards northeast by April 21. Looking west, Clarkson aimed to advance battalion combat teams toward Baguio via Route 11, the Galiano road, and the Tuba Trail. However, Swift declined to approve such ambitious plans, limiting the 33rd Division to a more restrained offensive. Although dissatisfied, Clarkson continued the attack along Route 11, managing to reach Camp 3 by the end of March. In the central area, patrols faced no opposition as they approached within a mile of Galiano, but other patrols discovered increasing signs that the Japanese were preparing to defend the Tuba Trail vigorously. Eventually, a robust reconnaissance force secured Bauang on March 19, with patrols then moving east to occupy Naguilan four days later and Burgos by the month's end. Meanwhile, at Salacsac Pass, the 127th Regiment fought from Hill 502 to Hill 504 against fierce resistance, while Gill sent the 2nd Battalion, 128th Regiment up the trail from Valdez toward Imugan, where they were ultimately halted by vigilant Japanese forces. By March 23, the 1st Battalion of the 127th Regiment reached the crest of Hill 504; the 2nd Battalion advanced past it to Hill 505; and the 3rd Battalion managed to position one company at the base of Hill 507D. However, with its forces stretched thin and dwindling, the 127th was unable to capitalize on its seemingly advantageous position, allowing General Iwanaka to launch a strong counterattack on Hill 507D that successfully repelled the 3rd Battalion. As a result, Gill decided to withdraw that unit and the stalled 2nd Battalion, 128th Regiment, while the majority of the 128th relieved the 127th in the Hill 502 sector. Beginning on March 25, the 128th Regiment advanced aggressively eastward, successfully capturing the previously overlooked Hill 503, fully securing Hill 504, and expanding its control over Hill 505 by the month's end. However, on the night of March 31, Iwanaka launched a daring counterattack, reclaiming Hill 504 and nearly taking all the territory east of Hill 502. By April 4, both the 127th and 128th Regiments had sustained significant casualties and could no longer continue the offensive. Consequently, Swift had to order the 33rd Division to relieve the beleaguered 126th Regiment in the Ambayabang and Arboredo River valleys, allowing this unit to reposition north of the Villa Verde Trail to execute a flanking maneuver along the Miliwit River valley. Fortunately for Clarkson, General Krueger persuaded MacArthur to free the 129th Regiment from its duties in Manila, sending it to bolster the now overstretched 33rd Division. Once the rest of the 37th Division arrived at the Baguio front, which Krueger anticipated would happen in early April, Swift could initiate a two-division assault on Baguio. In the meantime, Clarkson promptly dispatched the 129th to Burgos, and by April 1, it had advanced to Salat.  The Japanese opposing the reinforced 33d Division were no longer in the shape they had been at the end of February. The 58th IMB and the 23d Division had both suffered heavy losses during March, losses that probably stemmed largely from lack of food and medical supplies rather than from combat action. By mid-March Japanese supply problems on the Baguio front had progressed from bad through worse to impossible. First, supplies had moved westward over the new Baguio-Aritao supply road far more slowly than anticipated, a development attributable in large measure to Allied Air Forces strikes on that road and along Route 5 north and south of Aritao. Second, operations of the 66th Infantry, along Route 11 north from Baguio, and the activities of the 11th Infantry, , in the Cagayan Valley, had made it virtually impossible for the Japanese to bring any food into the Baguio area from the north. Third, the Japanese tried to do too much with the limited amount of supplies available on the Baguio front. They were attempting to supply 23d Division and 58th IMB troops along the MLR; send certain military supplies north up Route 11 for the 19th Division; feed 14th Area Army headquarters and a large civilian population in Baguio; and establish supply dumps north and east of the city against the time of eventual withdrawal. Almost inevitably the principal sufferers were the front-line troops. By mid-March the best-fed Japanese combat troops on the Baguio front were getting less than half a pound of rice per day as opposed to a minimum daily requirement of nearly two and a half pounds. Before the end of the month the troops on the MLR were down to less than a quarter of a pound of rice a day. Starvation and diet-associated diseases filled hospitals and sapped the strength of the combat units. Generally, effective frontline strength was far lower than reported ration strength indicated. Medical supplies were consumed rapidly, and by the end of March, for example, there was virtually no malaria phophylaxis left in Baguio area hospitals. Looking upon the situation on the Baguio front with frank pessimism, Yamashita in mid-March directed inspection of terrain north, northeast, and east of the city with a view toward preparing a new defense line. His attitude became even plainer when, on or about 30 March, he ordered Japanese civilians and the Filipino puppet government to evacuate Baguio. Indeed, the future on the Baguio front was so bleak by the end of March that almost any other army would have withdrawn to new defenses forthwith, thereby saving troops for future battle. But not so the Japanese. Yamashita decided that the existing MLR would be held until the situation became hopeless. At the end of March that portion of the MLR held by the 23d Division was still intact, and the 58th IMB was busy deploying additional strength along its section of the line. One independent infantry battalion was on high ground north of Route 9 at Sablan; and another held defenses at Sablan. A reinforced company was at Burgos and, less that company, another independent infantry battalion held reserve positions at Calot, a mile and a half southeast of Sablan. One understrength battalion was responsible for defending the rough terrain from Sablan six miles south to Mt. Apni, where a tie-in was made with the right flank of the 23d Division. Maj. Gen. Bunzo Sato, commanding the 58th IMB, expected that the emphasis of any Allied drive in his sector would come along Route 9, but he did not neglect the other approach in his area, the Galiano road. Since the understrength battalion stationed astride the road was not strong enough to withstand a concerted attack, he directed his main reserve force, the 1st Battalion of the 75th Infantry, 19th Division, to move west out of Baguio to defenses at Asin. This step left in Baguio a reserve force of roughly three provisional infantry "battalions," which together probably could not muster over 750 effectives. In the Salacsac area, as casualties in the western pass were rapidly increasing and Allied air and artillery strikes made it nearly impossible for the 2nd Tank Division to transport supplies, Iwanaka concluded that his forward positions were nearly untenable. He began planning to redeploy forces to defend the eastern pass. Consequently, when the 126th Regiment launched its new offensive on April 5, it faced unexpectedly light resistance, quickly capturing Hills 518 and 519 within two days and cutting off a Japanese supply route leading north from Hill 504 across the eastern slopes of Hill 519 and up Mount Imugan. However, Iwanaka swiftly recognized the emerging threats and sent reinforcements to intercept the 126th's advance, delaying the capture of Hills 511 and 512 until March 13 and effectively halting further progress. At the same time, the reorganized 128th Regiment resumed its assault eastward on April 7, successfully retaking the Hill 504-505 sector and capturing Hill 506 by April 10. The following week, the 128th fought tenaciously to secure this elevated ground against fierce resistance, managing to push all the way to Hills 506B, 507C, and 507D with their remaining strength, nearly securing the western pass by April 17. Meanwhile, after the fall of San Fernando, General Krueger instructed Volckmann to advance inland along Route 4 toward Bontoc. However, the Provisional Battalion established at Cervantes could only withstand the relentless enemy pressure until April 4, when it was ultimately forced to retreat into the hills northwest of the town. Consequently, Volckmann had to quickly deploy the 121st Regiment to barrio Butac in preparation for an eastward push along Route 4. After a week of intense back-and-forth combat, this elite guerrilla unit succeeded in establishing footholds along the northern parts of Lamagan and Yubo Ridges. Over the next few days, the 121st made slow and arduous progress, ultimately gaining control of Route 4 nearly to the southeastern edge of Bessang Pass by mid-April. Further south, by mid-March, General Wing's 43rd Division had effectively secured the Antipolo sector, while General Hurdis' 6th Division was advancing well toward Mount Baytangan. At this point, General Hall's 11th Corps assumed responsibility for operations against the Shimbu Group, now rebranded as the 41st Army. However, he quickly decided to maintain the offensive against General Yokoyama's left flank, with the 20th and 1st Regiments focusing on an eastward push alongside the 43rd Division. Meanwhile, General Noguchi had completed his withdrawal to the Sugarloaf Hill-Mount Tanauan line, where he would receive reinforcements from elements of the Kogure Detachment. Simultaneously, General Kobayashi was struggling to stabilize his left flank, bolstered by one reserve battalion. On the morning of March 15, the American offensive resumed, with the 103rd Regiment continuing its assaults on Benchmark 7 Hill to secure Route 60-A, while the 172nd Regiment launched its initial attacks toward Sugarloaf Hill, facing fierce resistance. On March 17, the 1st Regiment renewed its advance toward Baytangan, initially making good progress and digging in about a mile west-southwest of the mountain's summit. However, during the night, a barrage of mortar fire followed by an infantry counterattack forced the Americans to retreat in disarray. As a result of this setback, the 1st Division began to advance eastward more cautiously, facing determined resistance and heavy mortar fire. By March 22, it was only slightly closer to Baytangan's crest than it had been five days earlier. The 20th Regiment on the left also encountered strong resistance, managing to reach a point a mile and a half west of Baytangan by March 22. At the same time, a company maneuvering to the north established a foothold on a wooded ridge overlooking the Bosoboso Valley. Meanwhile the 103d Infantry finally overran the defenses on Benchmark 7 on 18 March, killing about 250 Japanese in the process. The Japanese battalion there had delayed the 103d's attack toward Mt. Tanauan until the morning of 18 March, but by evening of that day the regiment's troops had begun swarming up the bare, rocky, southern and southwestern slopes of the mountain. Over the next three days, American forces slowly advanced through a complex of caves and bunkers until they secured the mountain's summit, while other units captured Benchmark 23 Hill and patrolled northward into the southeastern part of the Bosoboso Valley. By March 19, the 172nd Division was halted, containing Sugarloaf to the west. They bypassed it to the north and east, initiating new assaults toward Mounts Yabang and Caymayuman, making significant progress to the east but less so to the north by March 22. Despite concerns that Hall's four exhausted regiments might lack the strength to turn the 41st Army's left flank, the ongoing pressure and the failure of previous counterattacks ultimately compelled Yokoyama to order his threatened units to withdraw to new positions east of the Bosoboso River. Therefore, when the 6th and 43rd Divisions resumed their attacks on the morning of March 23, the withdrawal was already in full progress. Over the next three days, the 1st and 20th Regiments faced only scattered and disorganized resistance, allowing them to establish positions over a mile north and south of Baytangan along the ridgeline that overlooks the Bosoboso Valley. Meanwhile, the 172nd Regiment successfully captured Mount Yabang and most of Mount Caymayuman, while the 103rd Regiment advanced quickly northward, taking barrio New Bosoboso, Mount Balidbiran, and Benchmark 21 Hill. On March 27, the 1st Regiment secured the crest of Baytangan, and the 172nd Regiment eliminated the last organized opposition at Sugarloaf Hill. With Yokoyama's left flank collapsing, Hall could focus on capturing Wawa Dam and destroying the remaining elements of the Kobayashi Force west of the Bosoboso River, a mission assigned to the 6th Division. During this initial offensive, approximately 7,000 Japanese soldiers were killed since February 20, while American casualties included 435 killed and 1,425 wounded. Hurdis' initial strategy for capturing Wawa Dam involved the 1st and 20th Regiments advancing northward to clear Woodpecker Ridge and Mount Mataba, while the 63rd Regiment conducted diversionary attacks on the western slopes of Mataba. This new offensive began on March 28 but quickly faced intense small arms, machine-gun, and mortar fire, leading to a back-and-forth struggle against fierce enemy resistance. By April 3, the 20th Regiment had advanced less than half a mile toward Mataba, and the 1st Regiment had gained only 250 yards to the north. General Hurdis had hoped his attack, directed against the Kobayashi Force southern flank, would be far more successful, but the Kobayashi Force, rapidly and efficiently, had reoriented its defenses, which it had laid out primarily to face an attack from the west. The force's two remaining provisional infantry regiments, the Central and Right Sector Units, were still relatively intact, and the Central Sector Unit, bearing the brunt of the 6th Division's offensive, had recently been reinforced by remnants of the Left Sector Unit and elements of the Shimbu Group Reserve. Other factors bearing on the 6th Division's slow progress were the declining strength and deteriorating combat efficiency of its infantry regiments. The 20th Infantry could muster only 2,085 effectives on 3 April; some of its rifle companies were reduced to the combat strength of platoons. The situation within the 1st Infantry, with an effective strength of 2,150, was little better. As of 3 April the commanders of both regiments rated their units' combat efficiency only as "fair," the lowest ranking of three terms each had employed since the Lingayen Gulf assault.To bolster protection for Hurdis' right flank, the 103rd Regiment also captured Hill 1200 on the east bank of the Bosoboso River by the end of the month. Due to the slow progress of Hurdis' offensive, on April 5, Hall assigned General Cunningham's Baldy Force, which consisted of the 112th Cavalry Regiment and the recently arrived 169th Regiment, to take control of the area north of Mount Oro. This move would free up most of the 63rd Regiment to support the 20th Regiment and continue the assault north toward Mataba, while the 1st Regiment maintained its position along Woodpecker Ridge. From April 6 to 9, the 63rd made only limited progress to the east; however, on April 10, it shifted its focus to an offensive on the western slopes of Mataba, quickly securing the southwestern quarter of the mountain with minimal resistance. In response, Kobayashi promptly redirected his forces back to Mataba from the north-south ridge to prevent the 63rd from reaching the mountain's summit until April 17. At the same time, the 1st Regiment resumed its advance along Woodpecker Ridge but again faced strong enemy opposition, resulting in only limited gains. Looking further south, by March 23, the 187th Glider Regiment and the 511th Parachute Regiment had advanced to Santo Tomas and Tanauan but were unable to completely clear these areas. Meanwhile, the 158th Regiment secured Balayan, Batangas, and the Calumpan Peninsula, pushing toward Mount Macolod, where they were ultimately halted by significant forces from the Fuji Force. At this stage, as Krueger planned to launch an offensive into the Bicol Peninsula using the 158th, he needed to relieve the 11th Airborne Division with the barely rested 1st Cavalry Division. This division quickly took control of the Santo Tomas-Tanauan area, while General Swing's units maneuvered around the west side of Lake Taal to relieve the 158th at Macolod. As a result, General Griswold renewed his offensive on March 24. The 187th attempted to attack Macolod but was unsuccessful. A task force composed of units from Swing's other two regiments advanced quickly north toward Lipa, only to be halted at the hills southeast of the town. The 8th Cavalry captured Santo Tomas after a fierce battle and took Tanauan two days later. The 7th Cavalry advanced about five miles east into the corridor between Mounts Maquiling and Malepunyo, while the 12th Cavalry pushed along Route 21, moving about four miles beyond Los Baños. On March 27, Swing's task force finally overcame the enemy defenses southeast of Lipa, but it was the 8th Cavalry that ultimately secured this strategic town two days later. Griswold's successful offensive also forced around 2,000 troops from the Fuji Force to retreat along Route 21 and through the Santa Maria Valley to join Yokoyama's forces in the mountains east of Manila. In response, Krueger devised a plan to prevent the potential influx of Japanese reinforcements around the eastern and northern shores of Laguna de Bay. He instructed Hall to clear the northern shore of the lake, block the Santa Maria Valley, and secure Route 21. While the 187th continued its assault on Macolod, Griswold ordered his other units to push eastward to secure Laguna de Bay and Tayabas Bay. Accordingly, on March 30, the 103rd Regiment advanced in small increments along the northern shore of Laguna de Bay, reaching Siniloan by April 4. The 12th Cavalry moved to Calauan and then south along a secondary road toward San Pablo, encountering strong enemy positions that wouldn't be overcome until April 5. The 5th and 7th Cavalry Regiments fought through the Maquiling-Malepunyo corridor against determined but disorganized Japanese resistance, successfully occupying San Pablo by April 2. Additionally, elements of the 188th Glider Regiment pushed east through the mountain corridors, reaching Tiaong on April 3 and Lucena three days later. By April 6, the 5th Cavalry and the 103rd Regiment had established contact at Pagsanjan, effectively isolating the 41st Army. The next day, patrols from the 11th Airborne Division headed north from Lucena, while 1st Cavalry Division patrols departed from Pagsanjan heading south. They successfully linked up at Lucban by April 10 and then advanced eastward to Mauban. At the same time, a company from the 188th traveled along Route 1 across the Bondoc Isthmus, reaching Atimonan on April 11. Griswold's patrols also moved towards Mount Malepunyo, where the Fuji Force was preparing for its final stand. By April 16, preliminary assaults had concentrated enemy resistance around Mount Mataasna-Bundoc. Meanwhile, after a week of intense aerial bombardment, Brigadier-General Hanford MacNider's 158th Regiment successfully landed at Legaspi Port with minimal opposition on April 1. They quickly secured the port and the nearby airfield, then advanced to Daraga before moving south along Route 1 to occupy the Sorsogon Peninsula, where they encountered machine-gun fire from the Mount Bariway-Busay Ridge. The following morning, the troops had to retreat east of Daraga, and in the coming days, the 158th faced tough fighting in the challenging, jungle terrain to overcome resistance in the Daraga area. Concerned about delays in occupying the Sorsogon Peninsula, MacNider landed his anti-tank company at Bacon on April 6, which occupied Sorsogon without opposition. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion continued its overland advance, reaching Bulan by April 12, where they targeted a significant Japanese concentration. Simultaneously, MacNider's other two battalions attacked Camalig on April 11 and began their unsuccessful assault on enemy positions in the Cituinan Hills. By April 1, the 188th had successfully eliminated the last organized resistance in the rugged hills south of Ternate. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion of the 151st Regiment launched an assault on Caballo Island on March 27 but could not fully dismantle the entrenched enemy positions until April 13. The Japanese in the pits and tunnels created an almost insoluble problem for the 2d Battalion, 151st Infantry. The Japanese had so emplaced their weapons, which included machine guns and mortars, that they controlled all approaches to the mortar pits but could not be reached by American artillery or mortar fire. When the 151st Infantry concentrated its mortar fire against the pits' entrances, the Japanese simply withdrew into the tunnels. When the American fire ceased--at the last possible moment before an infantry assault--the Japanese rushed out of the tunnels to man their weapons. Tanks were of no help to the American troops. From positions near the rim of the pits the tanks were unable to depress their guns sufficiently to do much damage to the Japanese. If the tanks tried to approach from above, they started sliding down Hill 2's slopes into the pits. No combination of tank, artillery, and infantry action proved of any avail, and the 151st Infantry had to give up its attempts to take the Japanese positions by assault. On 31 March engineers tried to pour diesel oil into one of the tunnels connecting the mortar pits, employing for this purpose a single ventilator shaft that was accessible to the 151st Infantry. Nothing came of the effort since it was impossible to get enough oil up the steep slopes of the hill to create a conflagration of significant proportions within the tunnels. Nevertheless, burning the Japanese out seemed to promise the only method of attack that would not risk the unduly heavy casualties of a direct infantry assault. No one, of course, wanted to throw away the lives of experienced troops on such an insignificant objective. Finally, the commander of the 113th Engineers, 38th Division, suggested pumping oil up the hill from the beach through a pipeline from a ship or landing craft anchored at the shore line. The Allied Naval Forces happily fell in with this idea and supplied the 151st Infantry with two oil-filled ponton cubes; the Allied Air Forces provided a 110-horsepower pump and necessary lengths of pipeline and flexible hosing; and the 592d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment came through with an LCM to carry the pump and the ponton cubes. On 5 April over 2,500 gallons of diesel fuel were pumped into the pits and tunnels through the ventilator and were then ignited by white phosphorus mortar shells. "Results," the 38th Division reported, "were most gratifying." A huge flash fire ensued, followed by a general conflagration and several explosions. The engineers repeated the process on 6 and 7 April, and on the latter day carefully lowered two large demolition charges through the ventilator shaft and placed another at an accessible tunnel entrance. Set off simultaneously, the three charges caused an enormous volume of flames and several terrific explosions. For the next few days the 2d Battalion, 151st Infantry, tried to persuade a few Japanese who had lived through the holocausts to surrender and also executed a few infantry probing attacks. On 13 April a patrol entered the pits and tunnels, killed the lone surviving Japanese, and reported the positions cleared and secured. Following this, El Fraile was targeted, with Company F of the 151st and the 113th Engineers effectively neutralizing Fort Drum using gasoline and explosives. On April 16, troops from the 1st Battalion of the 151st Regiment attacked Carabao Island, facing no opposition. Looking towards the Visayas, after capturing Palawan and Zamboanga, General Eichelberger set his sights on the Sulu Archipelago, where new airfields were to be established. On March 16, a reinforced company from the 162nd Regiment landed unopposed on Basilan Island and spent the next two days searching Basilan and nearby islets, finding no signs of Japanese forces. On April 2, the reinforced 2nd Battalion of the 163rd Regiment landed on Sanga Sanga Island, successfully clearing the Tawi Tawi Group by April 6. The remainder of the regiment made an unopposed landing near Jolo Town on April 9. Over the next two days, the Americans drove approximately 2,400 men of the 55th Independent Mixed Brigade from the heights immediately south and southeast of the town to secure a nearby airstrip. However, the Japanese retreated to more fortified hill masses further inland, where they had long prepared their defenses and began to resist fiercely. After initial attacks by Colonel Alejandro Suarez's guerrillas failed to breach the Japanese positions, the 1st Battalion of the 163rd Regiment joined the fight and managed to overrun the enemy defenses by April 22. On April 25, the 3rd Battalion launched an assault on Lieutenant-General Suzuki Tetsuzo's final positions at Mount Tumatangus, which were ultimately subdued by May 2. However, the remaining Japanese forces continued to engage in guerrilla warfare. By this time, airfields in Zamboanga and Sanga Sanga had become operational to support the forthcoming invasion of Borneo.The first field at Zamboanga was a dry-weather strip 5000 feet long, completed on March 15 and immediately put to use by Marine Corps planes. The field, named Calarian Drome, could not answer the need for an all-weather strip 6000 feet long. Accordingly, engineers constructed a new strip, which the Marine aviators based there called Moret Field, about a mile to the east, and had it ready for all-weather operations by May 16. Used primarily by Marine Air Groups 12, 24, and 32, Moret Field was also employed by a 13th Air Force night-fighter squadron, an emergency rescue squadron, and 13th Air Force B-24s and P-38s staging through for strikes against Borneo. Marine Corps planes on March 16 executed the first support mission flown from a field in the Zamboanga area, covering the landing on Basilan Island. Later, Marine Corps planes from Zamboanga flew support for the Tawi Tawi and Jolo operations and undertook pre-assault bombardment and cover for the invasion of eastern Mindanao. While 13th Air Force planes executed most of the support for the invasion of Borneo, Marine Corps B-25s from Zamboanga also flew some missions. At Sanga Sanga Island there was a Japanese coral-surfaced strip about 2800 feet long. Engineers repaired and extended this strip to a length of 5000 feet by May 2, when fighters of the 13th Air Force began moving to Sanga Sanga from Palawan to provide close support for the initial landings on Borneo. These US Army planes were replaced in mid-May by units of the Royal Australian Air Force, which employed the all-weather Sanga Sanga field during later operations on Borneo. Finally, a Japanese field 3800 feet long on Jolo Island was repaired and used for aerial supply and evacuation operations in support of ground troops throughout the Sulu Archipelago. Eichelberger's next target was the Central Visayan Islands. For the Panay-Guimaras-northern Negros operation, codenamed Victor I, he assigned General Brush's 40th Division, excluding the 108th Regiment, which had recently been assigned to Leyte. The 40th Division departed Lingayen Gulf on March 15 aboard ships from Admiral Struble's Task Group 78.3. After a brief stop at Mindoro, they arrived at Panay before dawn on March 18. Following a short bombardment by destroyers, the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 185th Regiment landed unopposed about twelve miles west of Iloilo, where they were joined by Colonel Macario Peralta's guerrillas, who already controlled much of the island. The 185th quickly expanded its beachhead against light, scattered resistance and began advancing along the coastal road toward Iloilo in the afternoon, forcing the 170th Independent Battalion to retreat to the mountainous interior. With Iloilo secured by March 20, G Company of the 185th Regiment successfully captured Inampulugan Island on March 22, while other elements of the regiment cleared the unoccupied Guimaras Island by March 23. Additionally, Brush decided to assign the 2nd Battalion of the 160th Regiment to garrison Panay alongside Peralta's guerrillas. No pursuit of the 170th Independent Battalion was made, allowing the Japanese to continue their guerrilla activities until the end of the war. Meanwhile, for the operation against northern Negros, Brush planned to launch an assault with the 185th Regiment on March 29, followed by the majority of the 160th Regiment the next day, while keeping the 503rd Parachute Regiment in reserve for potential airdrops. Opposing him, Lieutenant-General Kono Takeshi's 77th Brigade had a total of 15,000 troops but was prepared to retreat into the mountains of north-central Negros for a prolonged defense, leaving only token forces in the coastal plain to delay American advances. On March 29, the 185th Regiment landed unopposed near Pulupandan and quickly secured a bridge over the Bago River. The 185th then spread north and east, with the 160th Regiment following, successfully securing nearly the entire coastal plain of northwestern Negros by noon on April 2. As they closed in on Kono's inner fortress, the Americans overran the main Japanese outposts while the 511th was landed to bolster the assault. On April 9, Brush launched his general offensive, with his three regiments advancing slowly into rugged terrain where the Japanese held significant defensive advantages.  On June 4 General Kono, realizing that his remaining forces were incapable of further sustained effort, directed a general withdrawal deep into the mountains behind his broken defensive lines. The surviving Japanese dispersed into small groups seeking food and hideouts and trying to avoid contact with Colonel Abcede's guerrillas who, under the direction of the 503rd Parachute Regiment, took over responsibility for the pursuit of Kono's men. On June 9 the 503rd then relieved all elements of the 40th Division in northern Negros. By that date the Japanese had lost over 4000 men killed. Kono lost another 3350 troops, mainly from starvation and disease, before the end of the war. After the general surrender in August 1945, over 6150 Japanese came down from the mountains to turn themselves in, joining about 350 others who had been captured earlier. In all, about 7100 Japanese lost their lives in northern Negros, pinning down the equivalent of an American infantry division for over two months. The 40th Division's casualties for the operation, including those of the attached 503rd Parachute, totaled approximately 370 men killed and 1035 wounded. Meanwhile, Eichelberger's final objective in the Central Visayas was Cebu, assigned to Major-General William Arnold's Americal Division. For Operation Victor II, Captain Albert Sprague's Task Group 78.2 was set to land the bulk of the division at Cebu City while Colonel James Cushing's guerrillas secured the water sources. Opposing them were Rear-Admiral Harada Kaku's 33rd Naval Special Base Force and Major-General Manjome Takeo's 78th Brigade, which together comprised approximately 14,500 troops, including the 173rd Independent Battalion and the 36th Naval Guard Unit stationed at Cebu City. Additionally, around 750 soldiers from General Kataoka's 1st Division were positioned in northern Cebu. Although the command situation on the island was chaotic, General Suzuki's 35th Army headquarters in Leyte had been evacuated by two large motorized landing barges between March 17 and 25. Taking control of all forces on Cebu, Suzuki appointed Manjome as the de jure commander in the Cebu City area while leaving Kataoka in charge of northern Cebu, as he prepared to retreat to Mindanao. General Manjome designed his defenses so as to control--not hold--the coastal plains around Cebu City, and for this purpose set up defenses in depth north and northwest of the city. A forward line, constituting an outpost line of resistance, stretched across the first rising ground behind the city hills 2.5 to 4 miles inland. A stronger and shorter second line, the main line of resistance, lay about a mile farther inland and generally 350 feet higher into the hills. Back of this MLR were Manjome's last-stand defenses, centering in rough, broken hills 5 miles or so north of the city. Anticipating that American forces would attempt to mount wide envelopments of his defensive lines, Manjome set up one flank protective strongpoint in rugged, bare hills about 3.5 miles north of barrio Talisay, on the coast about 6 miles southwest of Cebu City, to block the valley of the Mananga River, a natural axis of advance for forces enveloping from the south and west. Similarly, he established strongpoints on his left to block the valley of the Butuanoan River, roughly 4 miles northeast of Cebu City. Against the eventuality that the American invading forces might land north of Cebu City and strike into the Butuanoan Valley, Manjome set up another flank protective position in low hills overlooking the beach at Liloan, 10 miles northeast of Cebu City. Manjome did not intend to hold the beaches, but at both Talisay and Liloan, the best landing points in the Cebu City region, he thoroughly mined all logical landing areas. The Japanese also constructed tank barriers along the shore line and planted tank traps and minefields along all roads leading inland and toward Cebu City. The inner defense lines were a system of mutually supporting machine-gun positions in caves, pillboxes, and bunkers. Many of these positions had been completed for months and had acquired natural camouflage. Manjome's troops had an ample supply of machine guns and machine cannon and, like the Japanese on Negros, employed remounted aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons. Manjome had some light and heavy mortars, but only a few pieces of light artillery. For the rest, however, Manjome's forces were far better supplied than Kono's troops in northern Negros. After an uneventful journey, Task Group 78.2 and the Americal Division arrived off Cebu in the early hours of March 26. Following an hour of bombardment by three light cruisers and six destroyers from Admiral Berkey's Task Force 74, the leading waves of the 132nd and 182nd Regiments landed unopposed on beaches just north of Talisay at 08:30. However, the landing was chaotic, as Japanese mines just a few yards beyond the surf line disabled ten of the first fifteen LVTs. Fortunately for the Americans, Manjome had chosen to withdraw from the beaches to establish inland defenses, resulting in minimal casualties. Once they cleared the beach minefields by 10:00, Arnold's leading units cautiously advanced through abandoned defenses toward the main highway to Cebu City, ultimately stopping for the night about a mile and a half south of their objective. The following day, the infantry secured Cebu City without opposition and on March 28 proceeded to clear Lahug Airfield and Hill 30 to the north. The Americans began their assault on Go Chan Hill on March 29, during which Company A of the 182nd Regiment was completely annihilated by the explosion of an ammunition dump located in caves along the hill's eastern spur. Fueled by a desire for revenge, nearly the entire 182nd returned to the attack on March 30 and successfully captured Go Chan Hill. Meanwhile, the 132nd Regiment cleared the coastal plains area north to the Butuanoan River, further securing the city's water supply sources by April 2. Unopposed, troops from the 132nd also successfully landed on Mactan Island, quickly securing an airstrip. In the meantime, as guerrillas had already taken control of much of Masbate, the 2nd Battalion of the 108th Regiment successfully landed on the island by April 7. Facing minimal opposition, the Americans pursued the scattered Japanese remnants through the hills and jungles of Masbate, killing approximately 120 Japanese soldiers by May 4.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. On March 29th, the Americans attacked Go Chan Hill, suffering heavy losses. Seeking revenge, they captured it the next day, securing water supplies and defeating Japanese forces in Masbate. Then in April, Allied forces advanced strategically, overcoming fierce Japanese resistance, securing key positions, and establishing airfields, culminating in significant victories across the Philippines.

Jiburi Podcast
101 Akihiko Yamashita

Jiburi Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 18, 2025 7:01


En este episodio hablo sobre Akihiko Yamashita.   Notas: https://studioghibliweblog.es/2025/03/18/j101/Música:  - Story by Infraction (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D7L-9KYUcck)Contacto:  https://studioghibliweblog.es/contacto/   http://twitter.com/sghibliweblog     www.spreaker.com/user/studioghibliweblog

The Pacific War - week by week
- 171 - Pacific War Podcast - The Fall of Manila - February 25 - March 4 - , 1945

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 25, 2025 46:02


Last time we spoke about the invasion of iwo jima. General LeMay's B-29 bombers targeted Japan, inflicting heavy damage on Kobe and Ota's Nakajima factory, though at a cost of lost aircraft. Meanwhile, U.S. forces prepared for the Iwo Jima assault. On February 19, Marines landed amid intense bombardment, facing fierce Japanese resistance. Progress was slow, with heavy casualties. By February 21, they fought to capture Mount Suribachi. Amidst the chaos, kamikaze attacks struck American carriers, causing significant losses and foreshadowing the brutal battles ahead. In the midst of a relentless rain on February 22, Colonel Liversedge led the 28th Marines in a fierce assault on Mount Suribachi, facing determined Japanese resistance. Despite harsh conditions and significant casualties, the Marines pushed forward. On February 23, they reached the summit, raising the American flag to symbolize their hard-fought victory. The Secretary of the Navy, inspired by the moment, declared it would ensure the Marine Corps' legacy for centuries. As battles continued, the Marines faced heavy losses but remained resolute in their mission. This episode is the fall of Manila Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we last observed in Manila, General Griswold's forces had effectively confined the remnants of Admiral Iwabuchi's troops to Intramuros, the South Port Area, and the Philippine Commonwealth Government buildings located at the southeastern edge of the Walled City. Available information led to the conclusion that the Japanese defenses were strongest on the southern and eastern sides of the Walled City and that the Japanese expected attack from these, the most logical directions. Japanese garrisons in the Legislative, Finance, and Agriculture Buildings just across Padre Burgos Street southeast of Intramuros could cover these approaches. The 37th Division could, of course, take the government buildings before launching an assault on Intramuros, but it would be easier to attack the government buildings after Intramuros fell. Conversely, planners deemed it feasible to strike into Intramuros from the west, since Japanese defenses along the west wall, across Bonifacio Street from the Manila Hotel and the South Port Area, appeared weak. But in this case, American troops would first have to clear the South Port Area and then, advancing from the west, would have to attack toward much of their own supporting artillery. The artillery's best positions for close support were on the north and northeast, across the Pasig, and on the east, in the area south from the General Post Office to the City Hall, and much of the artillery ultimately did fire from these areas. About halfway from the northeast to the northwest corner of Intramuros the ancient wall ended, providing direct access into the Walled City at the Government Mint. The only other obstacle on the north was a low sea wall running along the south bank of the Pasig, and Japanese defenses along the north face appeared weak except at the northeast corner. Planners therefore decided that there would be an excellent chance to execute a successful amphibious assault from the north bank of the Pasig against the north-central side of the Walled City.  Given that the Japanese defenses were strongest on the southern and eastern sides of the Walled City, and that the ancient wall ended at the Government Mint between the northeast and northwest corners of Intramuros, it was decided to initiate an amphibious attack from the north bank of the Pasig River targeting the north-central section of the Walled City, executed by the 129th Regiment with close artillery support. However, aware that the Japanese had established a complex tunnel system for rapid troop movement within Intramuros, General Beightler deemed it essential to conduct a secondary assault on Quezon Gate near the northeastern entrance to keep the Japanese forces off balance and to split their attention. Since the Japanese had fortified this area with strong pillboxes just inside the walls, the division concluded that heavy artillery would be required to create an additional breach in the thick wall just south of Quezon Gate, where the 145th Regiment would launch its attack. Furthermore, as the Japanese could target the advancing troops with enfilade fire from the three government buildings to the south, Allied artillery would need to neutralize these buildings during the assault on Intramuros. Lastly, the 1st Cavalry Brigade positioned to the west and southwest of Intramuros would block any potential escape routes for Japanese forces from the Walled City. So far, General MacArthur had severely restricted the employment of air in the metropolitan area. In late January and early February Marine Corps SBDs had bombed or strafed a few pinpointed targets in the North and South Port Areas and had also hit some obvious Japanese gun positions in the open areas of Luneta Park and Burnham Green. One or two strikes may also have taken place against specific targets within Intramuros, but all in all it appears that planes of the Allied Air Forces flew no more than ten or twelve individual sorties against targets within the city after February 3. Before that time both carrier-based and land-based aircraft had presumably limited their strikes to targets within the port areas and to oil storage facilities in Pandacan and Paco Districts. Of course some bombs had gone astray during these strikes and had caused damage within Intramuros, while additional damage within the Walled City had resulted from both American and Japanese artillery fire the first two weeks of the battle for Manila. When approached with General Griswold's plan to carry out an intensive aerial bombardment against the Walled City, MacArthur once again objected: “The use of air on a part of a city occupied by a friendly and allied population is unthinkable. The inaccuracy of this type of bombardment would result beyond question in the death of thousands of innocent civilians. It is not believed moreover that this would appreciably lower our own casualty rate although it would unquestionably hasten the conclusion of the operations. For these reasons I do not approve the use of air bombardment on the Intramuros district.” However, General MacArthur had previously issued orders limiting air operations in the metropolitan area, leading him to reject this proposal. Not wanting to rely solely on infantry for the assault, Griswold and Beightler decided to organize a significant artillery preparation, as they were not explicitly prohibited from using artillery. After several unsuccessful attempts to persuade the Japanese in Intramuros to surrender or release the numerous Filipino civilians they were holding hostage, Griswold initiated the bombardment of Intramuros on February 17, creating several breaches in the east wall. On February 22, Allied artillery began targeting the north wall to breach it and eliminate a Japanese stronghold at the Government Mint, while additional guns took up positions for the final barrage before the infantry assault the following morning. Between 07:30 and 08:30 on February 23, the Americans executed the last preparatory bombardment, effectively damaging the walls of Intramuros and covering much of the interior. Once the supporting fire ceased, the infantry assault commenced, with the 3rd Battalion, 129th Regiment swiftly crossing the Pasig River without opposition and advancing through the Government Mint into Intramuros. Simultaneously, the 2nd Battalion, 145th Regiment climbed over the breach south of Quezon Gate and entered through the gate unopposed, quickly moving southwest toward Letran University. Ten minutes into the assault, Griswold's artillery resumed fire for the next half hour, deploying high explosives, smoke, and white phosphorus across a 100-yard-wide area between the east and west walls. This aimed to seal off the southern third of Intramuros, preventing the Japanese forces there from observing movements to the north or sending reinforcements. The total artillery and mortar fire supporting the assault amounted to 230 tons, equivalent to over 11,650 rounds. By 08:50, the 129th and 145th Regiments connected at Letran University, with the 129th advancing toward Beaterio Street and Fort Santiago against minimal resistance, while the 145th cleared Letran University and secured the first two blocks southwest of Quezon Gate. At 10:45, the 1st Battalion of the 145th Regiment moved through Parian Gate and headed south. As American troops pushed deeper into Intramuros, the Japanese began to recover from the artillery bombardment, offering sporadic resistance from isolated machine-gun and rifle positions. Nonetheless, the 129th successfully cleared the west wall north of Beaterio Street and captured Fort Santiago in the afternoon. However, the 145th had to halt its advance about four blocks southwest of Quezon Gate as the Japanese started releasing nearly 3,000 civilian hostages from San Augustin and Del Monico Churches. Once the civilian evacuation was complete, American tanks and self-propelled artillery targeted Japanese positions within those churches and other strongholds in the southwestern section of Intramuros. Despite the efforts, the troops were unable to reach the south or west walls before nightfall due to fierce resistance. Meanwhile, the 1st Squadron, 12th Cavalry, along with the 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry, began clearing the South Port Area, facing relatively light opposition except at one strongpoint. Meanwhile, the 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry, and elements of the 148th Regiment contained the enemy at the government buildings. On February 24, while the 129th was finishing operations at Fort Santiago, the 145th continued its offensive, successfully cornering the last pockets of resistance in its area into the Aquarium, situated in a bastion at the southwest corner of Intramuros. Although the resistance was fierce in this location, a tunnel linking the bastion to the main wall was unexpectedly left unguarded, allowing Company C to break through into the Aquarium with ease. The final assault commenced in the afternoon, resulting in 115 Japanese casualties as the last organized resistance within Intramuros was overcome. In total, approximately 1,000 Japanese were killed, and 25 were captured during the assault on Intramuros, with the Americans suffering 25 killed and 265 wounded. Concurrently, the cavalrymen completed the clearing of the South Port Area and turned their attention to the government buildings, which would necessitate another intensive preparatory bombardment.  The imposing, columned façade of the Philippine Commonwealth's Legislative Building--the Philippine Capitol--fronted on Padre Burgos Street opposite the southeast corner of Intramuros and lay 150 yards south of the City Hall. About 100 yards south of the Legislative Building was the Bureau of Finance, and another 250 yards to the south-southeast, near the intersection of General Luna and San Luis Streets, lay the main building of the Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce. Architecturally similar to the old Senate and House Office Buildings in Washington DC, the three government structures were modern, earthquake-proof edifices constructed of heavily reinforced concrete. The oblong Legislative Building, with wings four stories high and a central portion rising another two and a half floors, was constructed around two open courtyards. The Finance and Agriculture Buildings, both five-story trapezoids, each featured a central courtyard. The buildings were strong not only by virtue of their construction but because all approaches to them led across wide open ground. Sandbag emplacements and barricades of other types blocked all readily accessible doors and windows, and window-emplaced machine guns covered all approaches. Despite the fact that the Japanese in the three buildings had advantages of position and elevation that permitted them to endanger American and Filipino movements over large areas of Manila, the 14th Corps and the 37th Division at first considered starving the Japanese garrison out. But the two headquarters soon decided this would take too long. Information from prisoners and Filipino hostages who had escaped from the buildings indicated that the Japanese garrisons in the three structures had sufficient strength, ammunition, food, and water to withstand a protracted siege. On February 26, after an hour of final artillery preparation, the 1st Battalion, 148th Regiment entered the ground floor of the Legislative Building from the rear, while the 5th Cavalry attacked the Agriculture Building; however, both units were successfully repelled by the determined defenders. The following day, after a failed attempt to smoke the Japanese out of the Legislative Building, heavy artillery was used to demolish the north and south wings, leaving only the damaged central section, which was subsequently cleared by the infantry. At the same time, the 5th Cavalry cleared out the apartment building and several nearby structures in preparation for another attack on the Agriculture Building, which commenced on February 28 following a three-hour artillery bombardment that caused significant portions of the building to collapse. Facing no initial resistance, the cavalrymen quickly accessed the remnants of the first floor but soon encountered strong opposition from pockets of resistance at the northwest and southeast corners. With support from tanks and armed with small arms, bazookas, and portable flamethrowers, the 5th Cavalry managed to clear the above-ground debris by nightfall, although a few Japanese soldiers remained hidden in basement areas. Ultimately, on March 1, after a failed appeal for surrender, demolitions along with burning gasoline and oil eliminated the last of the Japanese resistance. During this time, artillery, tanks, and tank destroyers relentlessly bombarded the Finance Building from various angles. Eventually, the 1st Battalion of the 148th Regiment would clear the remnants of this building during their final assaults on March 2 and 3. Late on March 3, Griswold joyfully informed Krueger that organized resistance in the Manila area had come to an end. The cost of reclaiming Manila was significant, with over 1,000 Americans killed and 5,500 wounded in the metropolitan area between February 3 and March 3. In contrast, the Japanese suffered approximately 16,000 fatalities in and around Manila. During periods of calm in the fighting, Japanese troops often vented their anger and frustration on the city's civilians, committing acts of violent mutilation, rape, and massacres in schools, hospitals, and convents. This led to the deaths of at least 100,000 Filipino civilians, both from deliberate actions by the Japanese during the Manila massacre and from artillery and aerial bombardments by American and Japanese forces. If you listened to the very first episode of this podcast series, I actually began it with what is known as the Manila massacre. During lulls in the battle for control of Manila, Japanese troops took their anger and frustration out on the civilians in the city. Violent mutilations, rapes, and massacres occurred in schools, hospitals and convents, including San Juan de Dios Hospital, Santa Rosa College, Santo Domingo Church, Manila Cathedral, Paco Church, St. Paul's Convent, and St. Vincent de Paul Church. The Bayview Hotel was used as a designated "rape center". General Yamashita was convicted as a war criminal for the Manila massacre, although Admiral Iwabuchi's marines had committed the atrocities and Yamashita had earlier ordered him to evacuate Manila.  By the end of the Battle of Manila, the public transportation system no longer existed; the water supply and sewage systems needed extensive repairs; the electric power facilities did not function; most of the streets needed repaving; and 39 out of 100 or more large and small bridges had been destroyed, including the 6 over the Pasig River. The University of the Philippines and the Philippine General Hospital were largely irreparable. Lower class residential districts north of the Pasig and upper class apartments south of the river had been destroyed; the Philippine Commonwealth's government's center had been wiped out; the 400-year-old landmark of Intramuros had been nearly razed; severe damage had been inflicted on the economically important installations in the North and South Port Areas; and the industrialized Paco and Pandacan Districts had been badly battered. Many buildings still standing would ultimately have to be torn down as unsafe for occupancy. Millions upon millions of dollars' worth of damage had been done and, as a final shocking note of tragedy, an estimated 100000 Filipino civilians had lost their lives during the battle. However, Manila was officially liberated, marking the end of nearly three years of Japanese military occupation in the Philippines. Following Manila's fall, Krueger aimed to eliminate the Shimbu and Shobu Groups to finalize the liberation of Luzon. Meanwhile, MacArthur deemed it crucial to establish a safe, direct shipping route through the central Philippines to support the creation of large air, naval, and logistical bases on Luzon. Consequently, he instructed the 6th Army to secure southern Luzon and the Bicol Peninsula while also ordering General Eichelberger's 8th Army to seize the islands in the Visayan Passages and the northern part of Samar. To facilitate the southern Philippines Campaign, MacArthur reassigned the 40th and 41st Divisions, the 19th and 34th Regiments of the 24th Division, and the 503rd Parachute Regiment back to the 8th Army. Additionally, he designated the 37th Division to garrison Manila. With the 43rd Division sent south to replace the 40th at Clark Field, Krueger assigned the recently arrived 33rd Division, led by Major-General Percy Clarkson, to take control of the Damortis-Rosario sector. Meanwhile, as the 188th Glider Regiment cleared Ternate Island, Krueger also decided to deploy the 11th Airborne Division and the 158th Regiment to secure the northern shores of the Visayan Passages and open Batangas and Balayan Bays. However, this left only the 1st Cavalry Division and the 112th Cavalry Regiment available for operations against the Shimbu Group, leading Krueger to reluctantly redeploy the 6th Division south to reinforce the 14th Corps, leaving just the 25th, 32nd, and 33rd Divisions under the 1st Corps for operations in northern Luzon. After making these adjustments, Krueger and Griswold began strategizing their offensive eastward against General Yokoyama's Shimbu Group, which had recently received the Noguchi Detachment from the Bicol Peninsula. To ensure the security and recovery of the Manila Bay area, General Patrick's 6th Division was tasked with first capturing Wawa Dam and its pipeline connections, followed by securing Ipo Dam and its related facilities, essential for meeting Manila's water needs. Meanwhile, General Hoffman's 2nd Cavalry Brigade was assigned to secure the Antipolo-Tagig region. Between February 20 and 22, even before the fierce fighting in Manila began to ease, the 7th Cavalry crossed the Marikina River to take control of Taytay and then ventured into the Sierra Madre foothills. The 8th Cavalry followed suit, crossing the river to secure Tagig. On February 23, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade advanced east toward Antipolo, but General Noguchi effectively utilized artillery and conducted small-scale nightly infiltration attacks, successfully harassing and delaying the cavalrymen, who could only measure their progress in feet. Noguchi's effective passive defense meant that by March 4, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade was still a mile and a half from Antipolo, having incurred heavy casualties during this frustrating advance. Among the wounded was General Mudge, who was temporarily replaced by Hoffman as commander of the 1st Cavalry Division. On February 22, the 6th Division also began crossing the Marikina River, with the 20th Regiment fording at Marikina town and the 63rd Regiment crossing at Montalban and San Mateo. Facing no resistance, the 20th Regiment advanced a mile into the steep, grassy hills northeast of Marikina, while the 63rd probed into the high ground east of San Mateo by the evening of February 23. The troops initiated an assault on General Kobayashi's primary defenses at Mounts Pacawagan and Mataba, but made minimal progress before the 1st Regiment arrived from Bataan on February 25. With this new reinforcement, Patrick launched a coordinated attack involving three regiments against Pacawagan and Mataba. However, by March 4, they had only secured a tenuous foothold on the northern crest of Pacawagan, as the efforts of the 1st and 20th Regiments were entirely unsuccessful.   Meanwhile, noticing an uptick in guerrilla activity in the Bontoc and Baguio areas, which indicated a potential major enemy offensive on Baguio, and considering the possibility of an airborne assault in the Cagayan Valley, General Yamashita began reorganizing his forces while preparing the defenses of the triangular redoubt in northern Luzon. He kept most of the 103rd Division stationed in the Aparri and Vigan sectors, assigned the 177th Independent Battalion to secure the naval air base at Tuguegarao, and started organizing eight provisional companies from the remnants of the 2nd Parachute Group at Echague. He tasked the 10th Division with defending the Salacsac-Balete Pass sector to the last man, gathered the remnants of the 2nd Tank Division at Dupax to reform as an understrength infantry division, and relocated the 105th Division to Bagabag, where it would be bolstered by the 10th Regiment. Additionally, he assigned these three divisions to Major-General Konuma Haruo's self-sufficient Bambang Branch, transferred the 19th Division to the Bontoc area to combat the enemy guerrillas, tasked the Hayashi Detachment with holding San Fernando, began moving the worn-out 58th Independent Mixed Brigade north to defend Route 9, and ordered the fatigued 23rd Division to continue containing the enemy in the Rosario-Baguio sector. General Swift's 1st Corps, which had recently lost two divisions, was focusing its main efforts against Baguio. Clarkson's 33rd Division was set to advance north along Route 11, while General Gill's 32nd Division would move northwest through the Ambayabang, Agno, and Arodogat valleys from the south and southeast. Meanwhile, General Mullins' 25th Division planned to launch a holding attack on the Bambang front. However, in mid-February, as Clarkson's forces continued to pressure Japanese troops entrenched along the Hill 600-Hill 1500 ridgeline, they learned that General Sato's withdrawal to the north was already in progress to bolster the San Fernando front. Additionally, the 130th and 136th Regiments successfully cleared the last Japanese forces from the north-central part of the ridgeline by February 22, although they were unable to capture the Hill 600 complex. At the same time, the 32nd and 25th Divisions conducted extensive patrols in their areas, discovering that the Japanese were guarding every approach to the north as various units made contact with Japanese outposts. During this period, the Americans also identified the Baguio-Aritao supply road. Severing this link in the Japanese defensive network would provide the 1st Corps with a significant tactical advantage. Given that the Baguio end of the supply road was more heavily defended and that breaking through to Aritao would threaten the critical Bambang and Bagabag positions, Krueger and Swift decided that the 25th and 32nd Divisions would concentrate their efforts on the Bambang front, while the Baguio front would be maintained in a holding capacity. Volckmann's missions as assigned by 6th Army, which assumed control of USAFIP(NL) on January 13, were to gather intelligence, ambush Japanese patrols, seize or destroy Japanese supplies, disrupt Japanese lines of communication, and block Japanese routes of withdrawal into and exit from the Cagayan Valley. It was not, apparently, initially intended that Volckmann's force would engage in sustained efforts against major Japanese units, and there seems to have been little hope that Volckmann's, or any other guerrilla unit, would ever become effective combat organizations. The most help General MacArthur and Krueger probably expected was in the form of harassing raids, sabotage, and intelligence. But Volckmann--and other guerrilla leaders on Luzon as well--interpreted his missions as broadly as his strength and armament permitted. By the end of February USAFIP(NL) had cleared much of the west coast of Luzon north of San Fernando and also controlled the north coast west of Aparri. Volckmann had rendered Route 11 between Baguio and Tuguegarao and Route 4 from Libtong to Bagabag virtually impassable to the Japanese. Indeed, one of the main reasons that Yamashita moved the 19th Division north had been to regain control over the two vital highways so that supplies could continue moving into the final redoubt. While USAFIP(NL) did not possess sufficient strength to attack major Japanese concentrations or to hold out against large-scale punitive expeditions, it had diverted and pinned down Japanese forces that could undoubtedly have been used to better advantage elsewhere. It would appear that by mid-February USAFIP(NL) had accomplished far more than MacArthur or Krueger had either expected or hoped. Meanwhile, the 121st Regiment secured the highway from Vigan south to Libtong, with Company L capturing Cervantes and pushing the 357th Independent Battalion into the Bessang Pass. Elements of the 121st then shifted their focus to San Fernando, which they attempted to attack unsuccessfully in late February and early March. Following Swift's new strategies, the 33rd Division began patrolling the approaches to Baguio in the last week of February, successfully overrunning the last Japanese positions on Hill 600 and in the Arodogat Valley. Along Route 11, the 71st Regiment executed a successful fighting withdrawal, while American patrols along the coast occupied Agoo and advanced to Pugo with minimal resistance, only to encounter the first sections of the Tuba Trail defended by elements of the 64th Regiment. On the main front, the 25th Division commenced its advance to Puncan on February 21, while the 32nd Division began its push up the Villa Verde Trail toward Santa Fe. The 127th Regiment broke through the trail's outpost line on February 24; the 35th Regiment advanced unopposed along Route 100, reaching Carranglan on February 26; the 161st Regiment targeted high ground overlooking Puncan from the west and successfully secured the trail junction on February 28, diverting the enemy's attention; and the 27th Regiment pushed north along Route 5, facing fierce resistance while clearing the Lumboy area on February 27. On Villa Verde, the 127th Regiment advanced to the Cabalisiaan River crossing by March 1, where they once again defeated the 10th Reconnaissance Regiment. After leaving one battalion to secure the crossing, the 127th continued their advance and encountered the weakened Japanese defenders on March 3. Recognizing the threat to the Salacsac Pass, Konuma promptly sent reinforcements to the 10th Reconnaissance Regiment and ordered General Iwanaka's recently reorganized 2nd Tank Division to prepare for deployment to the Salacsac Pass, taking command of all troops along the Villa Verde Trail. While these reinforcements were en route, the 127th Regiment continued to assault the remaining positions of the 10th Reconnaissance Regiment, ultimately reaching the western entrance of Salacsac Pass on March 5. Meanwhile, to the south, a battalion from the 35th Regiment descended a rugged trail into Puncan from the northeast and secured the heights overlooking the damaged town on March 1. The next day, as patrols entered the deserted Puncan, the rest of the regiment cautiously advanced west along Route 100 from Carranglan, occupying Digdig without resistance on March 3. Over the following two days, organized resistance began to crumble throughout the Lumboy-Puncan area, with Mullins' three regiments successfully connecting at Puncan and Digdig after the encirclement of a 1,250-man enemy force. Concerned about these developments, Konuma quickly decided to bolster the 10th Division with the Takachiho Unit and the majority of the 10th Regiment. Additionally, the 2nd Battalion of the 126th Regiment began its advance up the Ambayabang Valley on February 25, successfully reaching Lawican by March 5. In response to this new threat, Yamashita swiftly directed his reserve 16th Reconnaissance Regiment to secure the upper reaches of the Ambayabang. Finally, to the south, the Americal and 24th Divisions were tasked with initiating operations to secure the Visayan Passages. Consequently, on February 19, the 1st Battalion of the 182nd Regiment landed on Capul Island and launched an assault on Biri Island the next day. After discovering other unoccupied islets near Samar, the battalion established a base at the northwestern tip of Samar, ultimately defeating the last organized resistance in that region by March 1. Meanwhile, elements of the 19th Regiment landed on Verde Island on February 23, managing to secure the island by March 3. The 1st Battalion of the 21st Regiment made an unopposed landing on Lubang Island on February 28, and the 1st Battalion of the 132nd Regiment successfully captured Ticao and Burias Islands on March 3. Additionally, on the morning of February 23, a task force comprising the 1st Battalion of the 188th Glider Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 511th Parachute Regiment, a Provisional Reconnaissance Platoon from the 11th Airborne Division, several guerrilla groups led by Lieutenant-Colonel Honorio Guerrero, along with supporting artillery, tank destroyers, and amphibious tractors, executed a carefully coordinated rescue of 2,147 internees from an internment camp near Los Baños on Laguna de Bay. The 1st Battalion of the 188th Glider Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Soule, launched a diversionary ground attack from the west, while the majority of the 1st Battalion of the 511th Parachute Regiment crossed Laguna de Bay using amphibious tractors. Company B of the 511th Parachute Regiment parachuted directly into the camp, and the Reconnaissance Platoon along with the guerrillas, who had already infiltrated the area, created chaos throughout the camp. The task force eliminated the Japanese garrison of about 250 guards and managed to escape through enemy-held territory before the Fuji Force could mount a counterattack. The casualties were minimal: only 3 Americans and 2 Filipinos lost their lives, while 2 Americans and 4 Filipinos were injured. However, starting two nights after the raid, the 17th Regiment, along with Kempeitai police and Filipino Ganaps, began terror raids in the surrounding barrios, resulting in the deaths of up to 1,500 Filipino civilians over the next few nights. It was now time to leave the Philippines and return to New Guinea to support the ongoing Australian campaign in Aitape-Wewak. Previously, Brigadier Martin's 19th Brigade had fought its way to Malin and Abau, while Colonel Buttrose's 2/5th Battalion secured Perembil, Asiling, Samisai, and Maharingi. On January 12, Brigadier Moten directed the battalion to initiate a three-pronged offensive toward Luwaite, Bulamita, and Bombisima. The advance was rapid, as patrols encountered only small enemy groups, and all three objectives were successfully captured by the end of January. After the capture of Malin, the 2/8th Battalion and the 2/9th Commando Squadron patrolled the rugged terrain between Nimbum Creek and the upper Danmap for three weeks, facing some resistance on Long Ridge. Due to this pressure, General Aotsu's force received additional reinforcements in the latter half of January before withdrawing to join the defenses of the 20th Division, while General Mano's 41st Division retreated to Balif and Salata. Meanwhile, General Stevens had ordered Brigadier Roy King's 16th Brigade to relieve the 19th at the Danmap, but catastrophic floods hindered the completion of this relief in the south before the month ended. In the north, the 2/1st Battalion took over from the 2/11th Battalion on January 24 and began advancing patrols along Nambut Hill, where they faced significant resistance. Due to these patrols, the Australians launched a company attack on February 4, which the defenders easily repelled. Following a heavy air bombardment, the enemy stronghold was captured on February 7, and another company took McNeil's Creek four days later. Meanwhile, the 2/3rd Battalion initiated an assault on Long Ridge, inflicting considerable casualties on the enemy at Cory's Spur. At this juncture, Stevens decided to sequentially capture But, Dagua, and Wewak, as well as Maprik in the mountains, and to push eastward. The 16th Brigade was the first to advance to Wank Creek and then to the Anumb River. King promptly sent the 2/1st Battalion to secure Nambut Creek while the 2/3rd Battalion moved to the Wolhuk Creek-Una Creek line. By February 18, the 2/1st Battalion had fully secured Nambut Hill, with one company advancing along the coast and pushing the Japanese across the creek the next day. By February 22, the area up to Balam Creek was occupied, and barges had delivered supplies at Wank Creek for four days. The following day, they reached the Anumb River and began patrolling toward Sowom while a sloop bombarded enemy positions along the coast. Finally, on February 28, the 2/2nd Battalion relieved the weary 2/1st Battalion and started preparing for operations against But. Simultaneously, the 2/3rd Battalion successfully established the Wolhuk Creek-Una Creek line and sent patrols northward to connect with both the 2/1st and 2/2nd Battalions. In early February, the 2/5th Battalion launched an attack on Salata, Balif, and Balaga, sending three companies southward. Salata and Bombeta were captured on February 3, followed by Balif three days later, while Balaga remained successfully defended. The 2/6th Cavalry Commando Regiment was tasked with supporting Moten's advance toward Maprik, prompting the 2/10th Commando Squadron to move to Ami. After the Australians secured the Balaga-Numango area on February 13, Buttrose dispatched two companies to capture Barangabandangi and Malahun, which fell by February 17. At this time, the 2/10th Commando Squadron had also advanced northeast of Ami to Walahuta, Kualigem, and Amahaur, resulting in several Japanese casualties. Meanwhile, the 2/7th Commando Squadron conducted patrols deep into the Atob River and the headwaters of the Screw River. The 2/5th Battalion was preparing for relief by the 2/7th Battalion but first needed to fend off a strong counterattack at Malahun on February 23. During the 2/5th's advance, most of the 40th Division withdrew south into a densely populated garden area bordered by the Nanu and Amuk Rivers. This southern flank could not be overlooked as the Australians moved toward Maprik, so Moten sent a company from the 2/6th Battalion to advance through M'Bras, Asanakor, Yubanakuor, and then east to the heavily fortified Sinahau villages, pushing the enemy toward Maprik for destruction. Additionally, a rumor was spread among the locals that the commandos would advance on Maprik via Ami, which successfully prompted the Japanese to reposition most of their forces to the north and northeast. Meanwhile, by early March, the 2/7th Battalion had completed the relief of the 2/5th Battalion and successfully occupied Asanakor on March 7, followed by Inimbi on March 8, Yubanakuor on March 9, and Balangabadabil, Ilahop, and Armimin on March 10. To the north, the 2/2nd Battalion also finished its relief at the Anumb. Additionally, the 2/3rd Machine-Gun Battalion and the 2/9th Commando Squadron took over from the 2/3rd Battalion in the mountainous region. The latter began advancing towards Arohemi on March 4, where they encountered a strong Japanese force that resisted for three days. After a significant airstrike, the Australians managed to clear the area west of the Anumb River by March 9. Simultaneously, the 2/2nd Battalion pushed forward to Simbi Creek, successfully clearing the area and reaching the Ninahau River by March 12. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Manila is finally over. The capital of the Philippines came at a terrible cost for the Americans, Japanese and innocent Filipino civilians. It would be only a matter of time until the Americans moped up the Philippines and continued onwards to the Japanese home islands.

Por Aí | Estadão
Por Aí A Volta do Ryo

Por Aí | Estadão

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 25, 2025 1:44


O RYo reabriu. O restaurante de cozinha japonesa passou dois anos fechado, funcionando só como delivery, e sem o talentoso sushiman Edson Yamashita. A volta é uma ryoera dos bons, conquistou duas estrelas Michelin em 2020, graças ao talento de Yamashita. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Club Sabroso Radio Network
HOUSE SESSION | TAMIO YAMASHITA | JAPRICAN SOUNDS TOKYO

Club Sabroso Radio Network

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 23, 2025 60:15


Send us a textJAPRICAN SOUNDS BY TAMIO YAMASHITA.Powered by the Club Sabroso Radio NetworkFollow IG/FB: @CLUBSABROSORADIO24/7 Live Stream at: WWW.CLUBSABROSORADIO.COM

BELLUMARTIS PODCAST
LA BLITZKRIEG JAPONESA: El colapso aliado en el Sudeste Asiático 1941-1942 - Acceso anticipado

BELLUMARTIS PODCAST

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 8, 2025 107:06


Agradece a este podcast tantas horas de entretenimiento y disfruta de episodios exclusivos como éste. ¡Apóyale en iVoox! Acceso anticipado para Fans - **** VIDEO EN NUESTRO CANAL DE YOUTUBE **** https://youtube.com/live/dUKLm0CBNgQ +++++ Hazte con nuestras camisetas en https://www.bhmshop.app +++++ #historia #SegundaGuerraMundial Gracias a José Antonio Mayo Davó, autor de "Ellos estuvieron allí" ** https://amzn.to/3Lma2bt ** conoceros las rápidas y victoriosas campañas japonesas de 1941/42 desde China a Filipinas. PRIMER EPISODIO - “SOL NACIENTE” https://youtube.com/live/ZlVMDh9m4J0 WEB OFICIAL DEL LIBRO DE JOSÉ ANTONIO https://www.maldragon.com/detalles/81/Ellos-también-estuvieron-allí "ELLOS TAMBIÉN ESTUVIERON ALLI, la Segunda Guerra Mundial a través de sus protagonistas" ** https://youtu.be/naQEApA53-o ** * LA CAMPAÑA DEL PACÍFICO, la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Lucha de isla en isla. *José Antonio Mayo* https://youtube.com/live/6ENkN3AWy6c * COMPRA EN AMAZON CON EL ENLACE DE BHM Y AYUDANOS ************** https://amzn.to/3ZXUGQl ************* ÍNDICE DEL PROGRAMA 00:00 INTRO 1:42 Análisis detallado de la guerra en el Pacífico durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial con la ayuda de un experto. 9:09:⚔️ Importancia de las materias primas en la industria armamentística japonesa durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial. 17:16 ⚔️ Plan estratégico de Japón para asegurar suministro de petróleo y evitar colapso aliado en el Sudeste Asiático. 25:34 Importancia estratégica de Singapur como colonia británica en el Sudeste Asiático. 34:05 ️ La estratégica isla de Nueva Guinea, rica en recursos, se convierte en objetivo clave para japoneses y aliados. 42:27 Impacto devastador de la ocupación japonesa en Indochina Francesa durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial. 50:39 La falta de una flota permanente en el sudeste asiático lleva a Gran Bretaña a enviar dos importantes navíos para controlar la situación. 59:30 La rendición sin combate de las fuerzas británicas en el Sudeste Asiático durante la invasión japonesa. 1:07:32 Batalla feroz en Campos Petrolíferos de Birmania liderada por el General Slim contra los japoneses. 1:15:27: Avance japonés en el sudeste asiático durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial. 1:24:16 ️ La leyenda urbana del tesoro de Yamashita en el sudeste asiático sigue atrayendo exploradores sin éxito. 1:32:01 ️ Discusión sobre la posibilidad de viajar en el tiempo durante la rendición de Singapur en la Segunda Guerra Mundial. 1:41:30 ️ La estrategia de aislar la base naval japonesa en Rabaul durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Si queréis apoyar a Bellumartis Historia Militar e invitarnos a un café o u una cerveza virtual por nuestro trabajo, podéis visitar nuestro PATREON https://www.patreon.com/bellumartis o en PAYPALhttps://www.paypal.me/bellumartis o en BIZUM 656/778/825 Escucha este episodio completo y accede a todo el contenido exclusivo de BELLUMARTIS PODCAST. Descubre antes que nadie los nuevos episodios, y participa en la comunidad exclusiva de oyentes en https://go.ivoox.com/sq/618669

The Huddle: Conversations with the Diabetes Care Team
Meeting Glycemic and Weight Goals Early in Type 2 Diabetes

The Huddle: Conversations with the Diabetes Care Team

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 28, 2025 14:52


Eileen Egan, DNP, FNP-C, BC-ADM, CDCES, FADCES joins The Huddle to share her expertise about the interplay between weight and glycemic management in people with Type 2 diabetes, the importance of meeting glycemic and weight goals early after a Type 2 diabetes diagnosis, as well as best practices for helping people stay motivated and engaged. This episode was made possible with support from Lilly, A Medicine Company. Learn more about this topic in this accompanying patient/client handout (support for the development of this handout was provided by Lilly, A Medicine Company): adces_tipsheet_early_control2.pdf References:American Diabetes Association. Obesity and weight management for the prevention and treatment of type 2 diabetes: standards of care in diabetes- 2024. Diabetes Care, 47(1): S145-S157.Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Adult overweight and obesity. https://www.cdc.gov/obesity/basics/adult-defining.htmlDCCT/EDIC study research group. Intensive Diabetes Treatment and Cardiovascular Outcomes in Type 1 Diabetes: The DCCT/EDIC Study 30-Year Follow-up. Diabetes Care. 2016;39(5):686-693. Gregg E, Jakicic J, Blackburn G, et al. Association of the magnitude of weight loss and changes in physical fitness with long-term cardiovascular disease outcomes in overweight or obese people with type 2 diabetes: a post hoc analysis of the Look AHEAD randomized clinical trial. Lancet Diabetes Endocrinol. 2016; 4(11): 913-921.Gutiérrez-Cuevas J, Santos A, Armendariz-Borunda J. Pathophysiological Molecular Mechanisms of Obesity: A Link between MAFLD and NASH with Cardiovascular Diseases. Int J Mol Sci. 2021. 27;22(21):11629.Howard BV, Ruotolo G, Robbins DC. Obesity and dyslipidemia. Endocrinol Metab Clin North Am. 2003;32(4):855-867. Jin X, et al. Pathophysiology of obesity and its associated diseases. Acta Pharm Sin B. 2023;13(6):2403-2424.  Laiteerapong N, Ham SA, Gao Y, et al. The legacy effect in type 2 diabetes: impact of early glycemic control on future complications (The Diabetes & Aging Study). Diabetes Care. 2019;42(3):416-426.Lean MEJ, Leslie WS, Barnes AC, et al. Primary care-led weight management for remission of type 2 diabetes (DiRECT): an open-label, cluster-randomised trial.Lancet Diabetes Endocrinol. 2019;7(5):344-355.Lingvay I, Sumithran P, Cohen RV, le Roux CW. Obesity management as a primary treatment goal for type 2 diabetes: time to reframe the conversation. Lancet. 2022 Jan 22;399(10322):394-405. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(21)01919-X. Epub 2021 Sep 30. Erratum in: Lancet. 2022 Jan 22;399(10322):358. PMID: 34600604Rachel G. Miller, Trevor J. Orchard; Understanding Metabolic Memory: A Tale of Two Studies. Diabetes 1 March 2020; 69 (3): 291–299. https://doi.org/10.2337/db19-0514Ross, R., Neeland, I.J., Yamashita, S. et al. Waist circumference as a vital sign in clinical practice: a Consensus Statement from the IAS and ICCR Working Group on Visceral Obesity. Nat Rev Endocrinol16, 177–189 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41574-019-0310-7Thom G, McIntosh A, Messow CM, et al. Weight loss-induced increase in fasting ghrelin concentration is a predictor of weight regain: Evidence from the Diabetes Remission Clinical Trial (DiRECT). Diabetes Obes Metab. 2021;(23):711-719.Tsai AG, Bessesen DH. Obesity. Ann Intern Med. 2019;170(5):ITC33-ITC48.Wing RR, Bolin P, Brancati FL, et al. Cardiovascular effects of intensive lifestyle intervention in type 2 diabetes. N Engl J Med. 2013;369(2):145-154.World Health Organization. Obesity. https://www.who.int/health-topics/obesity#tab=tab_1 Listen to more episodes of The Huddle at adces.org/perspectives/the-huddle-podcast.Learn more about ADCES and the many benefits of membership at adces.org/join.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 166 - Pacific War Podcast - the Mandalay Offensive - January 21 - 28 , 1945

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 21, 2025 46:02


Last time we spoke about the South China Sea Raid. In January, General Krueger reinforced the American beachhead at Lingayen Gulf while Admiral Halsey launched Operation Gratitude, targeting enemy ships based on faulty intelligence. Despite not finding the expected battleships, American forces decimated a Japanese convoy, sinking numerous vessels and claiming 113 enemy aircraft. Meanwhile, on Luzon, the 1st and 14th Corps advanced against Japanese defenses, capturing key positions despite fierce resistance. As both sides prepared for counteroffensives, the battle intensified, marking a pivotal moment in the Philippines campaign. On January 17, the 58th Brigade and supporting regiments launched a daring operation to destroy enemy positions. As American forces advanced, they faced fierce resistance, but some regiments achieved notable successes. Task Force 38 executed airstrikes on Formosa and Hong Kong, inflicting damage despite heavy losses. Meanwhile, Japanese forces struggled to regroup amid American pressure. General Suzuki devised a plan to fortify Leyte, but ongoing air raids hampered supply efforts. Tensions escalated as both sides prepared for decisive confrontations in the ongoing battle for control. This episode is the Mandalay Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We last left off with, General Krueger strategically positioned General Mullins' 25th Division on the right flank of the 43rd Division to bolster the assault forces at the Rosario front. This maneuver was also intended to facilitate the continuation of the 14th Corps' advance to the south. Following the successful repulsion of General Nishiyama's local counterattack, General Wing ordered the 63rd, 158th, and 172nd Regiments, which had been stalled, to launch an offensive from the west along the Damortis-Rosario road. Simultaneously, the 103rd and 169th Regiments were tasked with advancing northward along Route 3, originating from Pozorrubio. In contrast, while the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 23rd Division worked to contain General Swift's 1st Corps, General Yamashita was reinforcing the San Jose sector. He further instructed the Shigemi Detachment to maintain a defensive position in Binalonan. Although the 27th and 161st Regiments had successfully relieved the 103rd Regiment in the Binalonan area, Major-General Shigemi Isao ultimately opted to halt further troop movements. He decided to leave only a small garrison in Binalonan while the majority of his forces prepared for a decisive stand at San Manuel.   As the situation unfolded, the 3rd Battalion of the 161st Regiment encountered minimal resistance, allowing them to advance into the northern half of Binalonan by nightfall on January 17. In a parallel effort, General Patrick directed the 1st Regiment towards Urdaneta, where they successfully eliminated a small outpost belonging to the Shigemi Detachment. Additionally, he dispatched the 20th Regiment to the Cabaruan Hills, where they achieved their objective by reaching Lunec and securing the central area of the hills by the end of the day. On January 18, the offensive momentum of the 6th and 25th Divisions persisted. The 20th Regiment advanced to a low ridge approximately 2,500 yards west of Cabaruan, where American forces identified the primary defenses of the 2nd Battalion, 71st Regiment. Meanwhile, the 161st Regiment successfully cleared Binalonan, and the 27th Regiment moved forward to seize control of the Bactad area, further consolidating their gains in the region. Simultaneously, Wing's units were gearing up for a significant new offensive. In line with this strategy, the 2nd Battalion of the 169th Regiment advanced along Route 3, deftly circumventing the town of Sison, and finally reached a crucial road junction located to the northeast of the town. Meanwhile, to the north, the 172nd Regiment executed a successful nighttime ambush against a Japanese artillery battalion. Following this victory, they dispatched a company to seize control of a strategically important hill, rising 600 feet and situated approximately 1,000 yards north of Rosario. This position enabled American forces to exert control over a substantial portion of the surrounding area. By the conclusion of the day, the 158th and 63rd Regiments established contact through patrols about a mile south of Amlang, as they prepared for a coordinated assault that was set to launch on January 19. This offensive culminated in the collapse of the last Japanese defenses just two days later. Concurrently, the 172nd Regiment successfully established a patrol base on Hill 606. From this vantage point, patrols ventured into Rosario, discovering the town was heavily mined, riddled with booby traps, and defended by concealed machine-gunners and riflemen hiding amidst the rubble of the buildings. On January 19, the 103rd Regiment initiated an assault on Hill 600, located at the southern end of the ridge line east of Route 3. At the same time, the 2nd Battalion of the 169th Regiment faced several intense counterattacks from retreating Japanese forces that had been bypassed at Mount Alava and Sison. Despite the fierce resistance, the relentless pressure from Japanese troops and increasingly heavy artillery fire ultimately compelled the battalion to withdraw by noon. Nevertheless, the American operations succeeded in diminishing the Japanese presence in the region. Looking southward, the 161st Regiment cautiously advanced toward San Manuel, while the 27th Regiment effectively moved into Asingan, successfully cutting off Shigemi's escape route. Further south, the 1st Regiment rapidly progressed along Route 3 toward the Agno River, capturing the towns of Villasis, Carmen, and Rosales. Meanwhile, the 20th Regiment commenced an assault on the 2nd Battalion of the 71st Regiment stationed in the Cabaruan Hills. On the front commanded by General Griswold, the 14th Corps was in the process of mobilizing along the Camiling-Anao line, preparing to initiate an advance toward the Tarlac-Victoria line. The 160th Regiment began its march, covering seven miles southward from Camiling along Route 13, while the 129th Regiment took a strong position in Anao, establishing vital contact with other outposts of the 37th Division stationed at Paniqui. The advances made on January 20 were notably swift, with the 148th Regiment successfully capturing the towns of Gerona and Pura. Meanwhile, the 37th Reconnaissance Troop made significant progress by entering the guerrilla-occupied area of Victoria, and units from the 40th Division advanced to within four miles of Tarlac, signaling a promising push toward their objectives. In the area around Cabaruan, the Japanese forces had sustained heavy losses during the initial attack. In response, Colonel Patrick made the strategic decision to withdraw two battalions from the hills to reinforce the southern advance. Probing slowly through the roughest ground in the Cabaruan Hills on January 20 and 21, the 20th Regiment's reinforced battalion jumped off in the morning of the 22nd in what was expected to be the last attack, its way paved by an especially heavy artillery and air bombardment. But from the start, operations did not go as planned. The air strike, conducted by Fifth Air Force A-20s was four hours late, subjecting the infantry to "a nerve racking wait," and did not include requested napalm. Air and artillery concentrations were, however, well placed, and it seemed improbable to the waiting infantry that many Japanese could have lived through them. A combined tank-infantry assault began about 12:30 and proceeded slowly but steadily for almost two hours. Then the attackers were stopped cold by a tremendous burst of rifle, machine-gun, and light artillery fire from the very hillsides that had received the weight of the bombardments. Company E, in the lead, fell back; Company G's officers were all either killed or wounded, and the company was temporarily scattered; Company F was pinned in place; and two supporting tanks were knocked out. Casualties mounted quickly to 10 men killed and 35 wounded. As a consequence, Patrick found it necessary to redirect one battalion from the 1st Regiment to support the ongoing attack. Simultaneously, the remainder of the 20th Regiment pressed forward toward Cuyapo, while the bulk of the 1st Regiment continued its eastward movement toward the guerrilla-held Balungao. Additionally, the 6th Reconnaissance Troop reached Guimba, successfully establishing contact with patrols from the 14th Corps, which was crucial for coordinating their efforts. On another front, with Mount Alava now vulnerable, the 169th Regiment launched a vigorous assault on January 20, managing to secure the summit of the mountain by nightfall. In contrast, the 103rd Regiment continued to face heavy casualties during their frontal assaults against Hill 600, ultimately gaining only a precarious foothold on the exposed southern slopes. Meanwhile, in a significant naval development, Admiral Halsey's Task Force 38 exited the South China Sea through the Balintang Channel on January 20. The task force was poised to execute further strikes against Formosa, aiming to disrupt enemy operations and bolster the Allied offensive in the region. The following day, with significantly improved weather conditions, Admiral McCain's aircraft carriers launched a coordinated series of airstrikes targeting Formosa, the Pescadores Islands, and the southern Ryukyu Islands. These operations resulted in the destruction of 104 Japanese aircraft on the ground, the sinking of seven oil tankers, and the loss of seven transport ships, along with additional damage inflicted on another seven vessels.  For the first time since November 1944, TF 38 felt the sting of kamikazes. Operating just 100nm east of Formosa, TF 38 was not difficult to find. Just after noon, a single aircraft appeared to conduct a conventional bombing attack on TG 38.3's light carrier Langley. One bomb hit forward. Personnel casualties were light, but the carrier was conducting flight operations three hours later. Within minutes, another aircraft also evaded radar detection and the CAP to commence a suicide dive against Ticonderoga. The kamikaze struck the flight deck and penetrated where its bomb exploded. An impending strike was spotted and ready to launch; now these aircraft provided fuel for the fire which was quickly spreading. Just before 1300hrs, another group of eight kamikazes and five escorts resumed the attack on TG 38.3. Only two suicide aircraft survived the CAP to dive on the wounded Ticonderoga. One was sent spinning into the water by antiaircraft fire, but the final attacker crashed into the carrier's island. More fires were started. The crew succeeded in putting out the flames by 1415hrs and correcting a nine-degree list by 1800hrs. Though the ship was saved, the cost was high. Some 143 men were killed and 202, including her captain, were wounded. In addition, the air group lost 36 aircraft. As a final farewell, kamikazes attacked the two destroyers on picket duty just 65nm off Formosa at 1310hrs. A single Zero had joined a returning strike. Before it could be identified as enemy, it dove on destroyer Maddox, striking her amidships. This and the explosion of the bomb aboard created a fire that was quickly extinguished. After a final day of strikes on January 22 against the Ryukyus, during which eight ships were sunk, Task Force 38 set course for Ulithi. Upon arrival, Admiral Halsey transferred command of the Fast Carrier Force to Admiral Spruance, who would lead the final offensives in the Central Pacific.  Meanwhile, back on Luzon, on January 21, the 160th Regiment swiftly cleared the town of Tarlac and began its advance toward San Miguel. Simultaneously, the 145th and 148th Regiments moved unopposed toward La Paz. The speed of 14th Corps' advance had stretched Griswold's supply lines abnormally and had exposed his left from Cuyapo to La Paz, a distance of nearly 25 miles. He had no definite information about suspected Japanese concentrations in the vicinity of Cabanatuan, on Route 5 just 15 miles east of La Paz. His worries about the security of his flank were hardly put to rest by reports of new contacts with Japanese forces at Moncada, now 20 miles behind the front, and at La Paz. Elements of the 129th and 145th Regiments easily took care of the Japanese in the Moncada area; but during the night of January 21, a pitched battle developed at La Paz when a platoon of Japanese infantry, supported by one tank, attacked a 148th Regiment perimeter at a road junction a mile west of town. The Japanese finally withdrew after destroying a bridge that carried a secondary road across a river a mile east of La Paz; but because of this, Griswold reported to General Krueger that it would be impossible to extend 14th Corps' left any further south until he had more information about Japanese forces east of La Paz. To mitigate this risk, he decided to keep General Beightler's 37th Division positioned in reserve while General Brush's 40th Division continued its advance southward along Route 3 toward Bamban. As a result, elements of the 160th Regiment and the 40th Reconnaissance Troop reached Capas and conducted patrols toward Camp O'Donnell on January 22. Meanwhile, the 161st Regiment began probing the defenses established by Japanese forces under Shigemi. The 103rd Regiment faced severe losses during their assault on Hill 600, necessitating a withdrawal to reorganize. Concurrently, the 169th Regiment launched an attack on Hill 355, making slow and costly progress against fierce resistance on the steep, barren slopes. By January 24, most of Hill 355 had been cleared, allowing the 3rd Battalion of the 103rd Regiment to move in and conduct mop-up operations in the area. As the 158th Regiment looked northward and secured the area around Amlang, they initiated an eastward push towards the positions held by the 172nd Regiment. However, their advance was slow, with only a modest gain of 500 yards achieved. Over the next two days, the 158th faced a grueling battle, making painstaking progress as they advanced foot by foot across exposed hills and ridges, all while enduring relentless machine-gun, mortar, and artillery fire. It wasn't until January 26 that they successfully broke through to Cataguintingan, where they provided much-needed support to the 172nd Regiment's ongoing assaults into Rosario. Meanwhile, by the evening of January 23, the 161st Regiment had managed to secure the southern slopes of the barren ridge north of San Manuel. They established trail blocks in the Aboredo Valley, effectively controlling movement in the area. To the south, the 108th Regiment had taken control of the Capas region, while the 160th Regiment successfully captured Bamban. However, it became increasingly evident that the American forces were now confronting the well-fortified and organized defenses of the Kembu Group. The Kembu Group's strength lay in the terrain it held, in the depth of its defenses, and in the great number of automatic weapons (aircraft and anti-aircraft) it possessed. Its major weaknesses were its immobility; the inadequate training and armament of the bulk of its troops; shortages of food, ammunition, and field artillery; and the rudimentary state of many defensive installations, a state deriving from the late start in establishing the positions at and west of Clark Field. The health of the command was poor from the start, and medical supplies were short. Morale was not of the highest order, and many of the troops were easily disaffected Formosan, Okinawan, and Korean labor personnel. In brief, the Kembu Group was the poorest armed, prepared, and supplied of Yamashita's three defense commands. On the other hand, as the 40th Division was soon to learn, even poor service troops, whatever their state of training and armament, can put up stiff resistance in good defensive terrain.  In preparation for the defense of Clark Field, General Tsukada assembled a diverse array of forces, totaling approximately 30,000 troops, although the majority consisted of air and naval personnel. He strategically divided his Army units into four distinct detachments. The Takayama, Takaya, and Eguchi Detachments were positioned along the first and second lines of defense, facing eastward toward Highway 3. Their defensive line extended from the hills west of Bamban to the vicinity of Fort Stotsenburg. In contrast, the Yanagimoto Detachment maintained its mobile units at Angeles and Porac, ready to respond to any potential enemy paratrooper landings on the southern flank of the Clark Field defenses. Additionally, Rear-Admiral Sugimoto Ushie commanded naval units comprising about 15,000 men, tasked with defending positions behind the two forward lines. In light of this formidable opposition, General Griswold made the strategic decision to utilize January 24 for consolidation and regrouping. This involved preparing for further advances southward while also probing into the enemy defenses that had already been uncovered. The 160th Regiment was able to secure Lafe Hill, although they were unable to establish a foothold on Hill 500, highlighting the challenges that lay ahead. To the north, American forces initiated another offensive against the Cabaruan Hills. The units of the 1st Regiment made only modest progress, yet they managed to advance closer to the main defensive positions as night fell. Meanwhile, at San Manuel, the 161st Regiment launched its first assault against the Shigemi Detachment, which encountered unexpectedly fierce resistance. As a result, the Americans were only able to establish a fragile foothold in the northern section of the town. Further north, Wing directed the 103rd Regiment to set up a line of departure along Route 3, aiming to strike eastward at the northwestern slopes of Hill 600. At the same time, they were tasked with advancing up the southwestern slopes of the exposed Hill 700 to secure that strategic location, as well as Hill 800 to the northwest. The 169th Regiment, advancing to the left of the 103rd, was assigned to capture Question Mark Hill. Concurrently, the 63rd and 172nd Regiments were ordered to launch simultaneous assaults on Hills 900 and 1500, respectively, while the reserve 3rd Battalion of the 63rd Regiment was also committed to clear Benchmark Hill. This coordinated attack was scheduled for January 25. The initial phases of the assault showed promise, with the supporting forces making significant headway. However, the 103rd Regiment faced considerable difficulties, managing to secure Hill 800 only by nightfall. Notably, the 172nd Regiment achieved tactical surprise, successfully clearing most of Hill 900. Over the next two days, the 63rd Regiment regrouped around Hill 1500 in preparation for its own offensive. Simultaneously, the 161st Regiment continued its slow advance southward through San Manuel, facing intense opposition. Patrick's units on the Cabaruan Hills managed to gain a mere 300 yards against determined resistance. Meanwhile, Brush pressed his attack on Clark Field, with the 160th Regiment clearing Hill 500 and advancing nearly a mile along the ridge from Lafe Hill, while the 108th Regiment secured Hills E and G. The following day, the 40th Division continued its southward maneuver. Any movement by American troops along the generally open ridges west of Route 3 inevitably brought down Japanese machine-gun and mortar fire, often augmented by fire from the dismounted aircraft automatic weapons, anti-aircraft guns, and light artillery. Seeking cover and usually pinned in place, the American infantry would call for close-in mortar and artillery support, wait for the concentrations to be fired, and then drive forward a few yards, when the process had to be repeated. Each time, the Americans managed to overrun a few Japanese machine-gun or rifle strongpoints. There was little choice of routes of advance. Draws, providing some concealment in scrub growth or bamboo thickets, were usually covered by well-emplaced Japanese weapons both within the draws and on the ridges to each side. Possession of the high ground, as ever, was essential. Yet the troops had to employ draws whenever possible to outflank Japanese ridgeline strongpoints, and often draws and ravines proved to be the only routes by which tanks, tank destroyers, and cannon company self-propelled mounts could get to the front to fire against Japanese cave positions along the sides of the ridges. The capture of one Japanese-held cave served only to disclose another, and one machine-gun position was overrun only to provide access to the next. Dislodging the Kembu Group from such defenses in depth was to prove a slow, laborious, and costly process, demanding the closest teamwork between the infantry and its supporting arms. Casualties, as a rule, would not be heavy on any one day--progress would be too slow and the troops would spend too much of their time pinned down awaiting fire from supporting weapons. But a daily attrition rate of about 5 men killed and 15 wounded for each battalion engaged would soon begin to have its effect. Meanwhile the 160th Regiment swiftly captured Hills 636 and 600 in rapid succession. However, the 108th Regiment lost control of Hill G during the engagement. On January 26, Griswold committed the 37th Division to the fight, with the 145th Regiment successfully capturing Mabalacat and Mabalacat East Airfield. They then shifted westward across Route 3, overrunning Clark Field Runway Number 1. In the Cabaruan Hills, American forces gained only 150 yards at a considerable cost. In response, Patrick decided to deploy another battalion from the 1st Regiment to eliminate this pocket of resistance. The following day, this two-battalion assault proved successful, resulting in the destruction of an entire battalion of Japanese troops, with over 1,400 enemy soldiers killed. Further north, the 161st Regiment finally broke through the main defenses of Shigemi's forces. Before dawn most of the Japanese left in San Manuel scrambled across the draw on the east side of town and fled to join the 10th Reconnaissance Regiment north of San Nicolas, but not before launching a final counterattack to cover their escape. At 0930 the 161st Infantry's two battalions resumed the drive southward through the town, and by 1330 San Manuel was clear. In a heroic but tactically unimportant stand the Shigemi Detachment had virtually fulfilled its self-imposed desire for annihilation in place. The detachment had lost 750 men killed; all its tanks, artillery, trucks, machine guns, and mortars had been either captured or destroyed. Probably no more than 250 troops escaped, and many of them were unarmed and wounded. The 161st Infantry and attached units had lost approximately 60 men killed and 200 wounded; the 716th Tank Battalion lost 3 tanks. Meanwhile, Wing's offensive continued on January 27, with the 103rd Regiment successfully reaching the crest of Hill 700 and the northwestern slopes of Hill 600. Unfortunately, they lost both positions to a brutal Japanese counterattack amidst a violent tropical downpour. On January 28, the 172nd Regiment captured Rosario, while the 63rd secured the southern crest of Hill 1500. Both regiments completed the capture of this strategic feature by January 30, thereby finalizing the occupation of the crucial road junction area. Further south, on January 27, the 160th Regiment advanced only 500 to 800 yards to the west and southwest. The 108th Regiment made a more substantial advance of about 1,000 yards southwest from Hills E and G but failed to reach Hill 5. The 145th Regiment pushed south along Route 3 for an additional three miles, reaching Culayo and Dau before taking control of the guerrilla-occupied Angeles, which had recently been abandoned by the retreating Yanagimoto Detachment. In a similar vein, the 148th Regiment secured Magalang without encountering any resistance. As we shift our focus from Luzon, we turn our attention to Burma, where we will delve into the ongoing developments of Operation Capital. Picking up from our previous discussions, we find ourselves in Central Burma, where the 2nd British Division and the 19th Indian Division are making significant strides toward Shwebo. The 2nd British Division successfully captured Ye-u on January 2, followed by the establishment of a crucial bridgehead across the Mu River just three days later. Meanwhile, the 19th Indian Division also advanced, reaching the Shwebo area by January 5. On January 8, a coordinated assault was launched by units from both divisions, culminating in the capture of Shwebo after two days of intense and brutal combat. To the west, General Festing's 29th Brigade began probing the northern flank of the 15th Division at Twinnge. Concurrently, other elements of the 19th Division worked to solidify their positions by establishing additional bridgeheads over the Irrawaddy River at Thabeikkyin and Kyaukyaung. On January 10, the 20th Indian Division captured Budalin and subsequently pushed towards Monywa, where the 33rd Division had only left a small contingent to serve as a rearguard. However, the campaign faced unexpected challenges; heavy rainfall during the first week of January brought all transport operations of the 4th Corps to a standstill, significantly hampering the Lushai Brigade's planned assault on Gangaw. After enduring a heavy aerial bombardment, the attack on Gangaw finally commenced on January 10. The Lushai Brigade managed to overpower the limited defending forces, forcing them to retreat after a brief skirmish. With Gangaw now under their control, the Lushai Brigade refocused their efforts on reconnaissance, monitoring the flanks of the 7th Indian Division. Meanwhile, the 28th East African Brigade took the lead in the advance, successfully displacing a Japanese garrison at Tilin on January 22. By this time, the 114th Brigade had begun to follow in the wake of the East Africans, while the 89th Brigade executed a long maneuver to the left, advancing toward Pauk in parallel with the other offensives. Although General Kimura was aware of some movements on his southern flank, he perceived these as mere feints by minor forces intended to divert his attention southward. Following a relentless barrage of artillery and air strikes, the 20th Division launched its offensive against Monywa on January 20. This assault faced fierce resistance, and it took two days of intense and bloody combat before the division was able to secure control of the town. After capturing Monywa, the 80th Brigade advanced towards Myaung, while the 110th Brigade shifted its focus to Ayadaw before launching an attack on Myinmu. By January 25, they had successfully established a bridgehead in that area. Meanwhile, to the east, the 2nd Division commenced its assault on Sagaing on January 14. They made significant headway against the forward defenses of the 31st Division, with other units managing to secure a bridgehead at Ywathitgyi. General Katamura, concerned about the expanding bridgeheads established by the 19th Division across the Irrawaddy River, ordered the 15th and 53rd Divisions to neutralize these positions before they could become fortified. As a result, during the last week of January, the Japanese forces executed a series of coordinated night attacks on Kyaukmyaung. By this time, British-Indian troops had dug in deeply, supported by formidable artillery and machine-gun positions. The ensuing conflict was marked by brutal carnage, with the 15th Division suffering a staggering loss of one-third of its personnel, while the 53rd Division was compelled to withdraw to Kyaukse after incurring heavy casualties. In parallel, the 89th Brigade successfully occupied Pauk on January 28, as General Messervy's forces geared up for a decisive push towards Meiktila. Looking northward, General Sultan was also advancing his own offensive aimed at reopening the Burma Road to China. He ordered the 50th Chinese Division to move towards Lashio and deployed the Mars Task Force to Hosi. Additionally, he dispatched the 36th British Division towards Mongmit, although the British advance was expected to be slow until additional forces could be brought into alignment for a more coordinated effort. General Sun's newly established 1st Army initiated a delayed offensive against Namhkam, which resumed in early January. This resurgence was marked by the 90th Regiment's strategic capture of the hill that overlooks the southwestern entrance to the Shweli River valley. Concurrently, the 112th Regiment advanced through Loiwing, subsequently crossing the river to approach Namhkam from the northeast. Meanwhile, the 88th Regiment entered the valley via the main road, making a direct push across the small plain toward Namhkam. The 89th and 114th Regiments executed a broader maneuver around the southern end of the Shweli valley; the 89th crossed the river on January 7 and advanced northward toward Namhkam, while the 114th crossed three days later, navigating through the hills toward the Namhkam-Namhpakka trail. To the south, the 475th Regiment progressed through Mong Hkak and reached Mong Wi on January 6, preparing for another challenging march across the hilly terrain toward Hosi, with the 124th Cavalry Regiment following closely behind. So close is Tonkwa to the mountains that the 475th found the trail rising steeply on the 1st day's march east. Like a crazily twisted drill it bored its way farther east and ever higher. In some places it was 15 to 20 feet across; in others, just wide enough for a man and a mule. As they rounded the turns, the men would peer ahead and look out across the valleys to where lay row on row of hills. Trees were everywhere. In flat places carved by erosion, the Burmese had cut and farmed terraces, and little villages clung to the mountains like limpets to a rock. Because existing maps were unreliable, so that map reconnaissance could not locate water and bivouac areas, and because the sheer fatigue of climbing the steeper slopes was formidable, march schedules went down the mountain side, with quite a few steel helmets and an occasional mule. Halts were a matter of common sense leadership at platoon or company level. The march was tactical but no Japanese were encountered, though rumor of their nearness kept the men alert. The Chinese had passed that way before, while a screen of Kachin Rangers was preceding the American column. Speaking the local dialects and carrying radios and automatic weapons, the Kachins were an excellent screen which masked the MARS Task Force while reporting anything that might be suspicious. Despite the difficult march, crossing the 400-foot wide Shweli was not too hard. The bridge built by the Chinese some weeks before still stood, a triumph of Oriental ingenuity, with bundles of bamboo for pontons and vines for cable. The Shweli was beginning to tear it apart, but work parties from the 475th kept it operable.  Meanwhile, spurred into action by General Wedemeyer after a month of inactivity, General Wei's Y-Force finally resumed its offensive operations in late December. They promptly dispatched the 2nd, 6th, and 71st Armies to launch an assault on the forward positions of the 56th Division at Wanting. Simultaneously, the 53rd Army executed a wide flanking maneuver to the west, aiming to encircle and attack the Japanese forces from the rear. Faced with the intense pressure of this four-pronged offensive, General Matsuyama was compelled to withdraw the 148th Regiment to a position north of Mongyu. He also ordered the Yoshida Force to mount a counteroffensive toward Muse and committed the reserve 2nd Regiment to secure Namhpakka. On January 5, the 53rd Army reached the vicinity of Muse and began crossing the river; however, they were met with fierce resistance from Matsuyama's timely counterattack, which thwarted their advance. Ten days later, Sun's forces initiated a well-coordinated offensive against Namhkam, which ultimately succumbed on January 16 as the 55th Regiment retreated toward Khonung. With the Shweli Valley now firmly under Allied control, Matsuyama began to tighten his defensive perimeter in anticipation of a final withdrawal toward Hsenwi. On January 17, the Mars Task Force made significant progress by reaching the Hosi sector, where they immediately engaged Japanese outposts. The 475th Regiment successfully secured the advantageous high ground near Nawhkam village. Over the next two days, American forces clashed with the 4th Regiment, capturing the strategically important Loikang Ridge and the elevated terrain overlooking Namhpakka. On January 19, the Mars Task Force attempted to disrupt Japanese supply lines by blocking the Burma Road through demolition and artillery bombardment, coinciding with the arrival of the 55th Regiment, which was sent to bolster the defenders. In a parallel effort, the 114th Regiment managed to sever the Namhkam-Namhpakka trail at Loilawn on the same day. Faced with this escalating threat from the south and the intensifying Chinese assaults on Wanting, the 56th Division was compelled to further contract its defensive perimeter. As a result, Wanting fell on January 20. Fortunately for Matsuyama, General Wei received orders from the Generalissimo to conclude the Salween campaign immediately, which meant that the Chinese forces would remain in their positions until they could be relieved by Sultan's units. Over the course of nearly nine months of intense combat, Wei's Y-Force had successfully reoccupied an impressive 24,000 square miles of Chinese territory and had defeated one of the most elite divisions of the Japanese army, along with elements from two additional divisions. However, the fighting was far from over. Sun continued to dispatch the 112th and 113th Regiments toward Wanting and Mongyu, aiming to clear the final stretch of the road leading to China. Meanwhile, the 89th and 114th Regiments pressed eastward to cut off the Burma Road north of Namhpakka, further complicating the situation for the Japanese forces. In the southern region, from January 20 to January 24, the Mars Task Force continued its strategic operations, executing ambushes and demolition missions while successfully repelling several intense counterattacks from enemy forces. By late January, pressure by MARS Task Force and that of the Chinese forces in the north began to register on the Japanese. The soldiers of the 4th Regiment could see the aerial activity that kept MARS supplied. Not recognizing what they saw, they were so impressed by a big supply drop on the 24th that they sent a report to the 56th Division of a large airborne force being landed along the Burma Road. Accepting this report, General Matsuyama decided to destroy his ammunition and retreat south. His superiors on January 24 agreed to let him retreat, but only after he had evacuated casualties and ammunition. Forty vehicles with gasoline accompanied by a Major Kibino of the 33rd Army staff were sent north to support the 56th in its withdrawal. The Japanese truck convoy made its run north the night of January 24. The trucks were heard, and the Americans placed heavy fire on the road. Kibino had been making the trip in a tankette. Hit by a 4.2-inch mortar shell, it burst into flames clearly visible from the American lines. Kibino clambered out, jumped on a truck, and succeeded in getting his convoy through to the 56th Division. Next day the derelict tankette was credited to the 2nd Battalion, 475th Regiment. But  Encouraged by the additional supplies of gasoline and inspired by the heroic examples of Major Kibino and the personnel of the truck companies, the 56th Division renewed its efforts and, during the next four days effected the evacuation of over 1000 casualties and moved several tons of ammunition to Hsenwi.  Meanwhile, General Matsuyama began to systematically reposition his forces toward Namhpakka, a strategic maneuver that would enable Chinese troops to occupy Mongyu on January 27. In a broader context, by the end of January, the 36th and 50th Divisions were also engaged in crossing the Shweli River, preparing to advance their offensives further southward. In the Arakan region, Operation Romulus exceeded expectations. The 1st Battalion of the 111th Regiment had been defending Akyab. On December 31, as the rear guard of the Sakura Detachment crossed the Kaladan River and moved eastward the Battalion was ordered to withdraw to Ponnagyun. As intelligence suggested very few Japanese were left on Akyab island, a recce aeroplane reported the locals showing no anxiety and on January 2 messages were dropped in Urdu and Burmese asking them to sit on the ground if the island was still occupied or stand with their hands in the air if not. Captain Jimmy Jarrett of ‘C' Flight, 656 AOP Squadron, then landed to a rousing reception and found the Japanese had quit on December 31, although nobody believed him until a senior officer flew in to confirm it. This prompted General Christison to swiftly initiate an amphibious invasion. Notably, this operation was executed without the anticipated naval bombardment and without deploying the reserve 26th Indian Division. As a result, the 3rd Commando Brigade successfully captured Akyab on January 3, facing no resistance, and the 25th Indian Division soon followed, reinforcing the area. From Akyab, the 9th York and Lancasters were transported by boat to establish a strategic blockade along the Yo River at Ponnagyun. There, they encountered significant Japanese forces. After a fierce engagement, however, the Japanese defenders were compelled to retreat toward Myohaung by January 11. In response to the evolving situation, Admiral Mountbatten devised a plan to land the 3rd Commando Brigade and the 25th Division on the Myebon Peninsula. This operation aimed to sever the primary lines of communication for Japanese forces, while preparations were made for the 26th Division to conduct a landing on Ramree Island. In response to the urgent military situation, Operation Passport was swiftly conceived and executed on January 12. British-Indian forces successfully landed at the southern tip of the peninsula, supported by both air and naval operations. Once ashore, the commandos advanced inland, facing intense resistance from fortified hill positions. Their efforts culminated in the capture of Pagoda Hill and the village of Myebon. However, as they pushed forward, opposition intensified, making it increasingly difficult for the British-Indian troops to reach Hill 831. Simultaneously, the 82nd West African Division, now commanded by Major-General Hugh Stockwell, entered the Kaladan Valley to relieve the 81st Division, which had been engaged in combat for over a year. The West African forces began to apply pressure against the Matsu Detachment units stationed at Myohaung and Minbya, although these Japanese forces managed to maintain their positions despite the mounting assaults. Meanwhile, planning was underway for the deployment of the 3rd Commando Brigade and the 51st Indian Brigade to land at Kangaw, coinciding with General Lomax's invasion of Ramree Island.  Early on January 21 the naval bombardment group opened fire. Christison and the other Force Commanders were watching through field glasses from the bridge of HMS Queen Elizabeth in her first engagement since the Dardanelles in 1915. Christison later said: ‘Some shells fell on a marsh behind the Jap defences, and I saw a number of duck spring up. “Duck”, I shouted. “The Royal Navy never ducks”, said the Admiral.' With her second salvo Queen Elizabeth scored a direct hit on the Japanese ammunition depot, which facilitated the landing operations. The 71st Indian Brigade successfully captured Kyaukpyu with minimal resistance. This victory enabled them to advance toward Minbyin and Kyaupyauk, both of which fell into their hands by January 23. In the subsequent days, the brigade continued its advance toward the Yanbauk Chaung, where they encountered fierce Japanese defenses. At the same time, other elements of the division worked to secure Cheduba and Sagu Kyun Islands, further consolidating their strategic position in the region. On January 22, the commandos and the 51st Brigade successfully landed in the Kangaw area near the Min River. However, they faced violent and frequent counterattacks from Japanese forces, which hindered their ability to expand their beachhead. Despite these challenges, the intense pressure from the commandos ultimately forced the Japanese defenders at Hill 831, Myohaung, and Minbya to retreat toward Kani, marking a significant shift in the operational landscape. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. General Krueger's forces advanced against Japanese defenses, capturing key positions despite heavy resistance and casualties. Meanwhile, in Burma, British-Indian troops advanced, seizing key locations despite heavy resistance. Both fronts faced intense combat, leading to significant territorial gains against Japanese forces by the end of January.

Stuck in the Middle Pod
Episode 123 - A,B,C it's easy as (episode) 1,2,3

Stuck in the Middle Pod

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 15, 2025 113:11


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The Pacific War - week by week
- 165 - Pacific War Podcast - South China Sea Raid - January 14 - 21 , 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 14, 2025 46:02


Last time we spoke about the invasion of Luzon. As Operation Mike 1 commenced, General Swift's 1st Corps prepared to assault Lingayen Gulf while General Griswold's 14th Corps rehearsed at Huon Gulf. Despite successful diversionary strikes, Japanese forces anticipated an invasion. On January 2, enemy ships were spotted heading towards Luzon, confirming fears of a large-scale operation. Kamikaze attacks intensified, damaging Allied vessels, including the USS Long, which sank after being hit. Amidst bombardments, Filipino citizens demonstrated resilience despite the destruction, reflecting their loyalty and hope during the turmoil. As dawn broke on January 9, Kinkaid's amphibious convoys approached Lingayen Gulf, initiating a fierce assault. Preceded by heavy bombardments, American forces landed on the beaches, facing minimal resistance. The 14th Corps advanced toward key locations, while the 1st Corps secured strategic positions despite enduring sniper fire. By nightfall, they established a significant beachhead. Despite sporadic Japanese counterattacks, American troops pressed forward, and reinforcements were deployed to maintain momentum. The stage was set for a crucial campaign in Luzon. This episode is the South China Sea Raid Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we last left off, the 1st and 14th Corps had just successfully established a beachhead on Lingayen Gulf. On January 11, General Krueger further reinforced his position by landing additional reserves, aiming to effectively confront the formidable enemy forces entrenched in the eastern hills. Concurrently, Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet units made their entrance into the South China Sea to execute an ambitious raid known as Operation Gratitude. This operation was prompted by misleading intelligence reports suggesting that the hybrid battleship-carriers Ise and Hyuga were stationed in Cam Ranh Bay. In response, Halsey ordered Admiral Bogan's Task Group 38.2 to launch an assault on these supposed targets. This task group was primarily composed of the battleships New Jersey and Wisconsin, which were directed to bombard the bay and eliminate any Japanese vessels that had sustained damage from prior airstrikes. To enhance their operational capabilities, Halsey established Task Group 38.5, specifically designed for night operations, which included the night-capable carriers Enterprise and Independence. On January 12, aircraft from these carriers were deployed for a predawn reconnaissance mission over Cam Ranh Bay and its adjacent waters in search of enemy targets. Despite their efforts, the search yielded no results, indicating that the earlier intelligence had been inaccurate. Nevertheless, all three carrier groups proceeded with their planned strikes at 07:30, while the surface action group advanced toward Cam Ranh. Halsey's strategic gamble proved to be remarkably successful. Although the Ise and Hyuga were not present in the bay, American aviators discovered a wealth of enemy shipping, including three significant Japanese convoys. Sherman's TG 38.3 encountered the most valuable target off Qui Nhon north of Cam Ranh. This was convoy Hi-86 with nine merchants and a heavy escort. The convoy had departed Cape St Jacques on January 9 and was headed north. The escort comprised light cruiser Kashii and five kaibokan. Late on January 11, it reached Qui Nhon Bay and anchored. After leaving Qui Nhon Bay, it was discovered by TG 38.3. In two large attacks, aircraft from Essex, Ticonderoga, Langley, and San Jacinto laid waste to the convoy. None of the nine merchant ships in the convoy survived this onslaught. Cargo ships Yoshu Maru and Eiman Maru (loaded with bauxite and raw rubber), along with tanker San Luis Maru, were sunk. The other six ships were damaged and forced to beach. Otsusan Maru (a cargo ship converted to tanker), passenger-cargo ship Tatebe Maru, cargo ship Kyokuun Maru, cargo ship Yusei Maru, ore carrier Tatsubato Maru, and cargo ship Banshu Maru No. 63 all became constructive total losses. The escort for this large convoy met a similar fate. Light cruiser Kashii was hit amidships by a torpedo in the early afternoon. This was followed by two bomb hits aft that detonated her depth-charge magazine. Kashii sank stern first with 621 members of her crew; only 19 survived. CD-23 was attacked north of Qui Nhon and sunk with her entire crew of 155 officers and men. CD-51 suffered the same fate. After she blew up and sank, her depth charges detonated with fatal consequences for any survivors; 159 men were lost. From the entire convoy, only kaibokans Daito and Ukuru, and corvette CD-27 survived, albeit in a damaged state. As a result, Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 conducted an impressive total of 984 strike missions throughout the day. This relentless assault led to the sinking of the light cruiser Kashii, two minesweepers, eight kaibokans, two subchasers, five transport ships, fourteen cargo vessels, and nine oilers. Additionally, four kaibokans, one subchaser, three transports, four cargo ships, and two oilers were damaged. This operation marked the highest number of ships sunk by airstrikes in a single day during the war, showcasing the effectiveness of the American air campaign and the critical role of intelligence in naval warfare. In addition to inflicting significant damage on Japanese shipping, the aviators under Admiral Halsey achieved remarkable success by claiming the destruction of 113 enemy aircraft, both in the air and on the ground, while sustaining the loss of 23 American aircraft. The impact of these operations extended beyond aerial engagements; critical infrastructure was also targeted. Airfields, docks, and oil storage facilities located between Tourane and Saigon suffered considerable damage. Notably, the railway station in Nha Trang and a vital bridge on the route connecting Saigon to Bien Hoa were also affected, disrupting transportation and supply lines.   Meanwhile, Bogan's surface strike group was unable to locate any Japanese vessels during their operations and instead focused their firepower on bombarding Cam Ranh Bay, further demonstrating the ongoing conflict's intensity. Turning to the situation in Luzon, the 1st and 14th Corps were poised to advance their offensives. To the west, the 185th Regiment and the 40th Reconnaissance Troop initiated a push toward the recently vacated Port Sual. The 160th Regiment maintained a watchful presence at Aguilar, while patrols from the 148th Regiment ventured into towns occupied by guerrilla forces, specifically Urbiztondo and Bayambang. In the eastern sector, the 6th Division was temporarily held back to prevent the creation of a potentially hazardous gap along the front of the 1st Corps. However, the reinforced 43rd Division continued its advance against the most formidable Japanese defenses encountered on Luzon to date. Along the coastline, the 158th Regiment dispatched patrols into Damortis, discovering the town largely deserted. The 172nd Regiment attempted an attack on Hill 580, which ultimately proved unsuccessful, while the 63rd Regiment was deployed to close the widening gap between the 158th and 172nd Regiments. The primary objective of these coordinated efforts was to defeat Major-General Sato Bunzo's 58th Independent Mixed Brigade and secure control of the Damortis-Rosario road. The Damortis-Rosario road, a 2-lane, concrete-paved section of Route 3, led east from the junction of Route 3 and the coast road at Damortis, about 8 miles north of San Fabian, to the junction of Routes 3 and 11, 8 miles inland and a mile east of Rosario. Seizure of the Damortis-Rosario stretch of Route 3 would present 1st Corps with an easy means of access to Route 11, in turn providing a 2-lane asphalt-paved axis of advance toward Baguio along the deep valley of the Bued River. Equally important, if the 1st Corps could quickly gain control over the Damortis-Rosario road and the Routes 3-11 junction, the corps could largely overcome the threat of counterattack against the 6th Army's beachhead from the north and northeast. The Damortis-Rosario road ran sometimes across wooded ravines and sometimes over ridge tops for 3/4 of the way to Rosario, and then continued across open farm land and through Rosario to a junction with Route 11. The road was dominated by broken ridges and steep-sided hills to both the north and the south for the first 5 miles inland. South of the road the hills and ridges were grass-covered; to the north many of the draws and ravines contained thick scrub growth. Bare, steep heights north, northeast, and east of Rosario controlled the Routes 3-11 junction. The 58th Independent Mixed Brigade, defending the Damortis-Rosario road, had all the advantages of observation, while the relatively soft rock and dirt mixture of the hills and ridges gave the brigade ample opportunity to indulge in what was soon to appear to the 1st Corps as the Japanese Army's favorite occupation--digging caves and tunnels. Achieving this would mitigate the threat of a counterattack against the 6th Army's beachhead from the north and northeast. With the security of its left flank assured, the 14th Corps could then accelerate its advance toward General Krueger's main objective: the Central Plains-Manila Bay region. This strategic maneuvering was crucial for consolidating American forces and ensuring a successful campaign in the Philippines. At the same time, the 169th Regiment faced ongoing challenges at Hill 318 and the southern part of the Japanese-held third ridgeline, while the 103rd Regiment made unsuccessful attempts to advance toward the Hill 200 complex, which was firmly defended by the 2nd Battalion, 64th Regiment. Meanwhile, General Tominaga executed his final large-scale kamikaze attack during the Philippines Campaign, successfully damaging two destroyer escorts, one destroyer transport, and five merchant ships. The final attacks were recorded on January 13. Only two suicide aircraft were dispatched, both IJA Ki-84 Franks. One surprised the crew of escort carrier Salamaua. Unengaged by antiaircraft fire, the Frank hit amidships. One of the aircraft's bombs exploded on the hangar deck and the second passed through the ship creating a hole near the waterline. The carrier was left without power while major fires took hold. Damage control was ultimately successful, but not before 15 were killed and 88 wounded. Salamaua was out of the war until April. Also on this day, attack transport Zeilin was hit by a probable IJN aircraft conducting an impromptu suicide attack. Ultimately, the 4th Air Army was scheduled to evacuate to Formosa on January 15, marking the end of the threat from Japanese air power in the Philippines, although the Allies were not yet aware of this. Since the initial kamikaze assault on the Mindoro-bound convoys on December 13, Japanese aircraft had sunk 24 vessels and damaged 67 others. Casualties from these air attacks aboard ships were approximately 1,230 men killed and 1,800 wounded, while the Allies estimated they had destroyed around 600 Japanese aircraft during the same timeframe. Back in Lingayen Gulf on January 13, the 172nd Regiment once again advanced up the grassy, steep slopes of Hill 580, successfully securing most of the area against fierce resistance. Simultaneously, the 63rd Regiment attacked north from Hill 247 and captured Hill 363, despite lacking artillery support. Artillery support was to have been provided by the 43rd Division's 155-mm. howitzer battalion, the 192nd Field Artillery Battalion, since the 63rd Regiment's own 105-mm. battalion had been sent south with the rest of the 6th Division. Unfortunately, the 192nd Field Artillery did not learn it was to support the 63rd until after dark on January 12, and could not start moving to good close support positions until daylight on the 13th, after the 63rd had started its attack. Unlike a 105-mm. battalion, the 192nd did not normally operate in direct support roles and lacked the forward observers and communications the lighter battalions possessed. The 192nd might therefore have been expected to take some time to prepare for its direct support mission, but the battalion reported it could have provided some support--with at least one battery--by noon on the 13th had not Colonel Ralph C. Holliday, commanding the 63rd Regiment, insisted that wire be laid for artillery liaison officers and forward observers, a job that was not completed for almost 36 hours. Colonel Holliday may have been influenced in his decision by the fact that the artillery's SCR-610 radio did not work efficiently in the broken terrain of the middle ridge line where the 63rd was attacking. It was not, indeed, until the 43rd Division had supplied the 192nd Field Artillery with infantry SCR-300 sets that the battalion was able to establish satisfactory radio communications. Then, on January 14, the first radio brought up to the battalion's forward observers was promptly destroyed by Japanese artillery, which also cut wire that had already been laid. Support was again delayed, so the entire battalion was not in position and ready to give the 63rd Regiment the support it needed until midafternoon on January 15. Meanwhile the 169th Regiment completed the clearing of the southern end of the ridgeline, while the 103rd Regiment continued its unsuccessful efforts to take Hill 200. To the west, the 6th Division established a fortified line extending from Malasiqui to Manaoag. They promptly dispatched reconnaissance units to the east and south to gather intelligence on enemy movements. The 185th Regiment achieved a significant victory by successfully assaulting Port Sual, while the 160th Regiment engaged in several skirmishes with the reinforced 23rd Reconnaissance Regiment, which had retreated from Port Sual at the onset of the conflict. Meanwhile, patrols from the 148th Regiment advanced into Wawa, strategically located between Bayambang and Urbiztondo. The following day, the 185th Regiment continued its momentum by capturing the crucial road junction town of Alaminos on the Bolinao Peninsula. Some of its elements also pushed northward toward Cabalitan Bay, where they discovered that Allied Naval Forces had already landed to establish a seaplane base, enhancing their operational capabilities in the region. Looking to the east, the 103rd Regiment made gradual but consistent progress along Hill 200, while the 169th Regiment executed a costly frontal assault to clear Hill 318, suffering significant casualties in the process. The 172nd Regiment advanced north along the third ridge, successfully seizing Hill 565 despite facing scattered resistance. The 63rd Regiment continued its slow advance northward, persistently harassed by Japanese artillery and mortar fire, which impeded their progress. Additionally, the 158th Regiment initiated an offensive toward Rosario but was quickly compelled to retreat due to intense Japanese artillery and machine-gun fire. In contrast, General Yamashita, while cautious about launching a major counteroffensive, recognized the necessity of limited offensive actions to regain the initiative. He believed that such actions would effectively disrupt the enemy's advance inland. Consequently, he ordered General Nishiyama's 23rd Division to conduct a robust raiding attack against the San Fabian-Alacan sector during the night of January 16. This strategic decision aimed to exploit the element of surprise and inflict damage on the enemy forces, thereby buying time for his troops to regroup and fortify their positions. In a strategic initiative aimed at maximizing the destruction of enemy weaponry, supplies, and critical base installations, the 58th Brigade, along with the 71st and 72nd Regiments, was instructed to assemble specialized "suicide" raiding units. These units comprised carefully selected soldiers, heavily armed with automatic firearms and supported by demolition teams trained for explosive operations. In addition, a fourth unit was to be formed from the Shigemi Detachment of the 2nd Armored Division, which had recently positioned itself on the southern flank of the 23rd Division. This unit would consist of a mobile infantry company and a medium tank company. The operational plan called for these units to breach the enemy's beachhead perimeter simultaneously at various locations on January 17. Their objective was to swiftly execute their missions and then withdraw to safety. As preparations for this limited counteroffensive unfolded, the American forces continued their own offensive operations, which had commenced on January 15. In this context, the 158th Regiment launched an eastward assault, successfully advancing approximately 1,000 yards. Meanwhile, the 63rd Regiment cautiously pushed forward over a mile and a half northward from Hill 363. The 172nd Regiment made a rapid advance to the Cataguintingan road junction, effectively establishing a battalion at the edge of Route 3, about a mile and a half west of Rosario. In contrast, the 169th Regiment encountered challenges during a two-pronged attack on Hill 355, leading General Wing to order the regiment to bypass the hill to the south and reposition overland to Route 3 at barrio Palacpalac. Conversely, the 103rd Regiment achieved significant success in their assault on the Hill 200 complex. Further to the west, patrols from the 185th Regiment advanced westward, successfully reaching Dasol Bay. Additionally, a battalion from the 129th Regiment crossed the Agno River at Wawa and continued south along a dusty gravel road toward Camiling. Other elements of the 160th Regiment also moved down from Aguilar to Camiling, consolidating their position in the area. After completing refueling operations over the previous days, Task Force 38 resumed its northern advance to launch an assault on Formosa on January 15. Despite Admiral McCain's recommendation to cancel the strike due to inclement weather conditions, Admiral Halsey opted to proceed with the operation. As a result, a series of airstrikes were executed against Formosa and the Pescadores Islands throughout the day. The 16 fighter sweeps conducted during this operation managed to destroy only 16 Japanese aircraft in the air and an additional 18 on the ground. However, the bombing missions targeting enemy shipping proved more effective, leading to the sinking of the destroyers Hatakaze and Tsuga, along with one transport vessel and two merchant ships, albeit at the cost of losing 12 American aircraft. Following these strikes, Task Force 38 redirected its course toward Hong Kong, which came under attack on January 16. Unfortunately, the American forces encountered severe weather conditions and faced intense anti-aircraft fire. This resulted in a limited success, with the Americans sinking just one transport ship, five oilers, one cargo vessel, and one guardboat. Additionally, they inflicted damage on the destroyer Hasu, three destroyer escorts, one corvette, one transport, and one oiler. The strikes also caused significant destruction to key infrastructure, including Kai Tak Airport, the Kowloon and Taikoo docks, the Aberdeen dockyard, the Kowloon-Canton railway, and the Macau Naval Aviation Center. In a broader campaign, the Americans executed secondary strikes against Canton and Hainan Island, as well as targeting several airfields along the Chinese coast, particularly between the Leizhou Peninsula and Swatow. However, this ambitious operation came at a steep cost, with Task Force 38 suffering a total loss of 49 aircraft—27 due to operational issues and 22 as a result of enemy action. With the South China Sea Raid concluded, Admiral Halsey directed his fleet toward the Luzon Strait, adhering to Admiral Nimitz's request. Ultimately, Halsey's aggressive campaign resulted in the destruction of approximately 300,000 tons of Japanese shipping and an estimated 615 Japanese aircraft, all at the expense of 201 American planes. Returning to the Lingayen Gulf, Wing's offensive operations persisted on January 16. The 63rd, 158th, and 172nd Regiments continued their assaults toward the town of Rosario. However, they encountered fierce resistance from the determined Japanese defenders, which significantly hampered their progress. In contrast, the 169th Regiment achieved a notable advancement by reaching Palacpalac, while the 103rd Regiment successfully captured the strategically important Hill 200 complex. From their newly secured positions, elements of the 103rd Regiment pursued the retreating Japanese forces toward Pozorrubio. Meanwhile, two reinforced companies advanced toward Potpot, and both towns ultimately fell into American hands on January 17. In a broader strategic context, General Krueger directed General Griswold to dispatch additional troops south of the Agno River in preparation for a decisive push toward Manila. By January 17, the 14th Corps had established outposts at key locations including Moncada, Nampicuan, Anao, and Paniqui, solidifying their control over the area. Simultaneously, Japanese General Nishiyama was preparing to initiate a local counteroffensive by nightfall on January 16. However, the 72nd Regiment's raiding unit was unable to participate due to enemy penetrations disrupting their plans. On the northern front, Sato's raiding unit conducted a minor raid against an artillery position held by the 158th Regiment, but this attack proved largely inconsequential. In contrast, the raiding unit from the 71st Regiment executed a more impactful maneuver by advancing down the Bued River valley. They successfully infiltrated the rear installations of the 172nd Regiment, where they ignited a gasoline dump, damaging several trucks in the process. This raid resulted in the deaths of two American soldiers and injuries to eight others. At Palacpalac, confusion reigned as the retreating 2nd Battalion of the 64th Regiment inadvertently engaged with the perimeter of the 1st Battalion of the 169th Regiment. This chaotic encounter cost the Japanese approximately 100 men before they retreated in disarray, further illustrating the tumultuous nature of the battlefield. In a dramatic turn of events, the tank raiding unit launched a surprise attack on the newly established outpost at Potpot. Initially, the first two tanks managed to breach the perimeter, unleashing a barrage of machine-gun fire in all directions as they sped away down the road toward Manaoag. However, the remaining tanks, along with their infantry support, encountered fierce resistance from determined defenders, leading to a sharp and intense fire fight that lasted two hours. Despite their initial success, the attackers were ultimately repelled. As dawn broke, the two tanks that had previously penetrated the defenses returned down the Manaoag road, but this time they met their demise, successfully destroyed by the defenders who had regrouped and fortified their positions. Since the onset of the invasion, the 1st Corps had suffered significant casualties, with approximately 220 men killed and 660 wounded. In stark contrast, Griswold's forces experienced far lighter losses, with only 30 killed and 90 wounded. With the enemy's counterattack thwarted, the 43rd Division managed to secure positions that effectively reduced the likelihood of another large-scale surprise offensive from the Japanese forces. However, to completely eliminate the remaining threats, Commander Wing recognized the necessity of securing control over the Rosario junction and establishing a solid hold on Route 3 to the south of this critical point. The challenge was considerable, as Japanese artillery, mortars, and machine guns positioned on the surrounding high ground commanded all approaches to Rosario. Consequently, Wing had no choice but to restrict the 172nd Regiment to a defensive holding action on its left flank while directing its right flank to seize the high ground immediately to the north and northwest of Rosario. In addition, the 63rd and 158th Regiments were tasked with neutralizing the enemy stronghold along the Rosario-Damortis road. To expedite the capture of the road junction, Wing also planned for the 103rd and 169th Regiments to launch an offensive drive north along Route 3. This coordinated effort aimed to strengthen their strategic position and diminish the Japanese threat in the region, ultimately paving the way for a more secure and stable front. In response to the evolving battlefield situation, General Krueger ultimately ordered General Mullins' 25th Division to secure the right flank previously held by Wing's forces. This strategic move prompted the 27th and 161st Regiments to begin the process of relieving the 103rd and 169th Regiments. By doing so, the 6th Division would be able to resume its advance, now directed towards Urdaneta and the Cabaruan Hills, critical areas for the ongoing campaign. To the west, Krueger aimed to maintain the 14th Corps along the Agno River line until General Swift's 1st Corps could effectively neutralize the enemy resistance stretching from Damortis to Urdaneta. This would enable Swift's forces to maneuver southward alongside Griswold's corps. However, General MacArthur was eager to initiate a southern advance toward Manila as soon as possible. Consequently, he instructed the 14th Corps to reposition its main forces back to their previous outpost line south of the Agno by January 20. Following this, the corps was to launch an offensive towards Tarlac and Victoria. Once they established a presence along the Tarlac-Victoria line, the corps would prepare to advance toward Clark Field, a vital objective necessary for the successful neutralization of Japanese strongholds at Iwo Jima and Okinawa. To bolster this offensive, MacArthur also planned to deploy the 11th Corps on the western coast of Luzon, just north of the Bataan Peninsula. This amphibious operation aimed to disrupt Japanese defensive strategies in the Clark Field area, thereby enhancing the overall effectiveness of the Allied campaign. In contrast, in reaction to the loss of the Hill 200 complex, Japanese General Yamashita ordered the 2nd Tank Division to advance immediately into the Tayug sector. There, Lieutenant-General Iwanaka Yoshiharu would take command of the 10th Division forces already stationed in the region. The armored units were tasked with positioning themselves along the trail north of San Nicolas and on both sides of the Ambayabang River, with the objective of containing any potential enemy advances to the east. Additionally, the Shigemi Detachment received orders to move its main forces from San Manuel to Binalonan, where they were to defend the town resolutely, prepared to hold their ground against any assault. In addition, General Okamoto was tasked with positioning his main forces to secure the immediate approaches to San Jose. Meanwhile, General Tsuda's 105th Division was instructed to advance northward through Cabanatuan as quickly as possible to establish defensive positions behind the 10th Division, specifically at Minuli and north of Carranglan. However, not all of these strategic plans could be effectively executed. By January 17, Yamashita discovered that the Villa Verde Trail was impassable for tanks and trucks, rendering it unusable for the planned armored movements. Furthermore, the terrain in the Tayug-San Nicolas area proved to be unsuitable for armored operations, complicating the situation further. On January 17 the 14th Area Army commander belatedly learned that the 10th Division had never concentrated at San Jose and that it had made no real effort to dispose itself along the entire Tayug-Umingan-Lupao-San Jose defense line for which it was responsible. General Okamoto, the division commander, had decided that he did not have sufficient strength to hold the relatively open ground assigned to him. Most of his 39th Regiment was with the Kembu Group; the bulk of the 10th Regiment, greatly understrength, was attached to the 103rd Division for the defense of northern Luzon; and, at least as late as of January 15, he had received no word as to when he might expect the attached Tsuda Detachment to arrive in the San Jose area from the east coast. He had therefore withdrawn most of his troops up Route 5 from San Jose and had started disposing them along the line Yamashita had intended the 105th Division to hold; leaving behind only a reinforced infantry company and two artillery battalions to secure the all-important railhead. Okamoto had directed the 10th Reconnaissance Regiment to remain in the San Nicolas area, and he stationed three or four rifle companies of his 63rd Regiment along the Tayug-Lupao line and in rising ground to the southwest. Confronted with these unexpected developments, Yamashita concluded that he had no choice but to accept the redeployment of the 10th Division as an established fact. Consequently, he ordered the 2nd Tank Division, which had already begun its movement toward Tayug, to concentrate its main forces southeast of Tayug to safeguard the immediate approaches to San Jose. Additionally, the 6th Tank Regiment was assigned to position itself in Muñoz to cover the southwestern approach to the area. To further bolster defenses, Tsuda was instructed to deploy two of his five advance battalions to San Jose. However, as these tactical adjustments were being made, it became necessary to shift focus away from Luzon and turn attention toward Leyte, where the final operations on the island were unfolding. It is important to note that the majority of General Suzuki's forces had successfully retreated to the Villaba-Mount Canguipot region, although some strong elements remained isolated further to the east. With General Eichelberger's 8th Army assuming control of the island, American forces commenced the final phase of operations to secure Leyte, methodically working to eliminate any remaining pockets of resistance. From January 1 to February 15, the 11th Airborne Division conducted patrols in the Burauen area, where they engaged and successfully eliminated a well-entrenched enemy force positioned on the southern slopes of Mount Majunag. Meanwhile, the 96th Division carried out extensive patrols in the eastern mountainous regions before taking over from the 11th Airborne Division. In the southern part of the island, the 7th Division launched numerous patrols and deployed a reinforced battalion that effectively neutralized all enemy forces in the Camotes Islands. Additionally, the 77th Division focused on clearing various pockets of enemy resistance located in northwestern Leyte. By late January, the Americal Division arrived to assist in the cleanup operations in Samar and Leyte, a mission that was successfully completed by February 24, with support from the 1st Filipino Regiment. However, during this time, Japanese General Suzuki was formulating his strategy for Operation Chi-Go. This operation involved the amphibious movement of several military units to different islands within the Visayas using large motorized landing barges. Suzuki's initial plan entailed deploying the majority of the 1st Division to establish a garrison on Cebu Island, while the headquarters of the 35th Army was to relocate to Davao. This strategic move would enable him to take direct command of military operations on Mindanao. Following this, he intended to dispatch the 41st and 77th Regiments to Mindanao, assign the 26th Division to the Bacolod area on Negros Island, and send the 5th Regiment along with units from the 102nd Division to Cebu. Furthermore, the 16th Division and the 68th Brigade, commanded by General Makino, were to remain in Leyte to engage in guerrilla warfare tactics.  The 102nd Division presented certain difficulties. There had been instances of 40 to 50 deserters fleeing to Cebu or Negros on boats they had built for themselves. Deserters that were apprehended were court-martialed. General Suzuki for some time had been out of touch with General Fukei, the commanding general of the 102nd Division, which was in the Mt. Pina area. By chance, one of Suzuki's officers learned that Fukei was planning to evacuate to Cebu. Suzuki was incensed since he and his staff felt that Fukei "was violating the military code in taking these steps without consent." He therefore ordered Fukei to remain at Leyte. Fukei did not answer but his chief of staff sent the following reply: "We appreciate the efforts of Army but at the present time we are very busy preparing for retreat. The division commander and chief of staff are unable to report to Army Headquarters." Suzuki was "entirely displeased" with the reaction of Fukei and sent his chief of staff, General Tomochika, to investigate the situation. When Tomochika arrived he found that Fukei, with his chief of staff and some headquarters personnel, had already left for Cebu. The sequel to these events was that Suzuki relieved Fukei of his command and ordered him to remain on Cebu until he received further orders. Upon the arrival of Suzuki in Cebu in the spring of 1945, Fukei was sentenced to confinement for thirty days. Suzuki asked IGHQ in Tokyo for authority to court-martial Fukei but no reply was forthcoming. In the end, Fukei was released and later returned to command of the 102nd Division. In the midst of ongoing military operations, Suzuki implemented measures to ensure that the forces stationed on Leyte could sustain themselves. He instructed his troops to make the most of local resources by utilizing available food and materials. This included directives to cultivate sweet potatoes and Indian corn, with the hope of sourcing all necessary provisions from the surrounding areas outside their operational base. However, the Japanese forces faced significant challenges due to relentless American air raids and mop-up operations, which severely hindered their ability to procure supplies. The hostile environment made it difficult for them to plant and harvest the crops they had intended to grow. Despite these obstacles, the Japanese managed to capitalize on the conclusion of the harvest season. They were able to secure substantial amounts of food that had been stored by local Filipinos, including a considerable quantity of coconuts and sweet potatoes. By early January, the 1st Division began its gradual movement toward Cebu, successfully transporting around 800 men to the island by mid-January. Unfortunately, the situation worsened as enemy PT boats established a stringent sea blockade, rendering maritime transportation impractical until mid-March. This blockade left approximately 2,000 men from the 1st Division, along with other units of the 35th Army, stranded on Leyte. Simultaneously, the Imahori Detachment, alongside the Mitsui Shipping Unit and the 77th Regiment, advanced to the southern Matag-ob area and subsequently moved toward Villaba, reaching their destination in early February. The majority of the 26th Division also made progress, arriving in the region north of Ormoc in mid-January before commencing a northwestward movement. By February, they successfully established contact with the rest of the 35th Army. Meanwhile, the remnants of the 16th Division could only reach the Valencia area in February, where they would remain until the end of the month. For the foreseeable future, the Japanese units left behind on Leyte faced the daunting task of defending against the advancing Americal Division and the 1st Filipino Regiment, which were steadily gaining ground.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Admiral Halsey launched Operation Gratitude, targeting Japanese shipping. Despite misleading intel, they decimated enemy convoys, showcasing the effectiveness of airstrikes and securing strategic advances in Luzon. American forces advanced through Luzon while Task Force 38 struck Formosa and Hong Kong. Despite fierce Japanese resistance and challenging weather, the Allies steadily gained ground, though both sides suffered significant losses in the campaign.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 164 - Pacific War Podcast - Invasion of Luzon - January 7 - 14 , 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 7, 2025 46:02


Last time we spoke about the Aitape-Wewak Campaign. General Dunckel's task force successfully invaded Mindoro, establishing airfields to support operations on Luzon. With General Eichelberger's 8th Army and General Krueger's 6th Army poised to capture Lingayen Gulf, guerrilla forces on Luzon provided crucial intelligence. As plans for the Luzon invasion solidified, General Yamashita prepared defenses, predicting an assault between January 10 and 20. Despite dwindling resources, he aimed to delay the enemy's advance. Meanwhile, Allied forces readied for a swift amphibious attack to secure Manila and restore the Philippine government. In December, Australian forces established outposts at Yasile and Yambes, successfully repelling Japanese attacks. After fierce clashes, they advanced 40 miles along the coast. Meanwhile, the U.S. military bolstered defenses in Saipan and launched bombing raids on Japanese facilities, achieving mixed results. Despite heavy losses, they began to impact Japanese production capabilities. As the month ended, the Japanese launched a final assault on the Marianas, but the Allies continued their strategic advances, setting the stage for future operations. This episode is the Invasion of Luzon Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We last left off with the plans for Operation Mike 1 being finished. General Swift's 1st Corps was ready to land on the eastern beaches of Lingayen Gulf, while General Griswold's 14th Corps prepared to go ashore on the western beaches. Additionally, successful diversionary operations had been conducted on Mindoro, and Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 executed several moderately successful strikes against Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands in early January. Meanwhile, the 14th Corps elements staging at New Britain completed loading on 10 December; those mounting at Bougainville finished two days later. On the 17th all groups of the III Amphibious Force rendezvoused at Huon Gulf, eastern New Guinea, to rehearse the Lingayen assault. General Griswold felt that the 37th Division's rehearsal was satisfactory but had much fault to find with the 40th Division, remarking upon a "general failure to observe the spirit of the rehearsal." As a result, further training was conducted at Manus Island in the Admiralties, where the convoy reassembled on 22 December. On December 27, Admiral Wilkinson dispatched his LSTs and LSMs, followed by the remainder of Task Force 79 four days later. On the same day, Admiral Barbey's convoy, which included Major-General Leonard Wing's 43rd Division, loaded at Aitape before proceeding to Sansapor to load Major-General Edwin Patrick's 6th Division. Task Force 78 departed Sansapor on December 30, heading to a rendezvous point with other elements of Admiral Kinkaid's Luzon Attack Force. By January 4, all components of Task Force 77 had successfully gathered at Leyte Gulf, with MacArthur personally boarding the light cruiser Boise. Kinkaid's minesweepers, Admiral Oldendorf's Bombardment and Fire Support Group, and most of Admiral Durgin's escort carriers had already left the gulf on January 2 to conduct preliminary operations off Luzon. By January 6, the rest of the Luzon Attack Force began moving toward Lingayen Gulf, led by Admiral Berkey's light cruisers. As Mindoro-based aircraft significantly increased the intensity of their assaults during the last week of December—sinking seven transports and two escorts, and destroying over 140 aircraft. General Yamashita's tense and expectant forces were still racing against time to complete,their battle preparations when the first warnings came that the enemy was again on the move. At 1322 on 2 January, a naval lookout post on Surigao Strait reported that a long train of about 80 enemy ships, screened by destroyers, was moving through the strait into the Mindanao Sea. Other reports which followed immediately warned that large numbers of invasion craft were gathered in the Leyte, Palau and Marianas areas, and that enemy submarines had appeared in force off the west coast of Luzon. At first it was thought that the enemy convoy was merely a reinforcement and resupply group destined for Mindoro. On 3 January, however, developments began to point more conclusively toward a full-scale amphibious operation against Luzon. In the afternoon, just as the initially sighted enemy group passed into the Sulu Sea, a large enemy naval task force, including 12 escort carriers, four battleships and eight cruisers, was reported following in its wake through Surigao Strait. Another delayed report stated that an enemy transport convoy of 90 ships, under strong naval escort, had been spotted the previous day northwest of Palau, heading in the direction of Leyte Gulf. General Yamashita grew concerned that a large-scale amphibious operation against Luzon was imminent. Consequently, he decided to relocate his headquarters to Baguio. These concerns were validated in early January when Japanese lookouts spotted Kinkaid's warships and transports approaching the island. In response, General Tominaga ordered aggressive kamikaze attacks on the Allied vessels, with a major assault on January 4 causing severe damage to the escort carrier Ommaney Bay, which ultimately had to be scuttled. The following day, Japanese attacks persisted, damaging two escort carriers, two cruisers, and three destroyers, among other ships. In retaliation, Durgin's carrier aircraft launched strikes on Manila Bay, successfully sinking the destroyer Momi and damaging the Hinoki. On January 6, McCain's carriers joined the effort, with American pilots tasked with targeting air facilities at Manila and Clark Field. Despite adverse weather conditions limiting the effectiveness of the strike, they succeeded in sinking one transport and six oilers, as well as destroying 32 Japanese aircraft. Meanwhile, as Oldendorf's warships commenced their bombardment and minesweeping operations, kamikaze attacks continued. The destroyer minesweeper USS Long (DD-209/DMS-12) missed the attack on Pearl Harbor by about two days, but then immediately started anti-submarine patrols and escort missions. Its long trajectory in the Pacific War saw it make escort runs to Midway, Palmyra and Canton; participate in the invasions of Amchitka, Attu and Kiska in Alaskan waters; escort reinforcements to Roi and Namur in the Marshalls; participate in the invasions of the Admiralties, Hollandia, Saipan and Palau; and be one of the first vessels to enter into Leyte Gulf back in October. During the invasion of Lingayen Gulf, Long began mine sweeps on January 6, evading and firing upon Japanese aircraft as she carried out her intricate mission. Shortly after noon, beginning her second run, Long spotted two Zeros heading for her. Long went to 25 knots and opened fire, but a kamikaze crashed into her portside below the bridge about 1 foot above the waterline. With fires and explosions amidships, Long lost power and internal communications, and was unable to fight fires forward. Her commanding officer, Lieutenant Stanley Caplan, fearing an explosion in the forward magazine, gave permission for men trapped on the forecastle to leave the ship; but through a misunderstanding the crew abandoned ship. Later that afternoon a second plane attacked Long and exploded at the same spot, destroying the bridge and breaking the ship's back. Long finally capsized and sank the following morning. Alongside the Long, battleships California and New Mexico, along with the cruisers Columbia, Australia, and Louisville, five destroyers, another minesweeper, and one transport were damaged. Admiral Oldendorf was worried with good reason. Previously, kamikaze operations against his ships and those of other naval commands, though dangerous, had generally been executed by relatively untrained pilots who had taken few precautions to avoid detection and anti-aircraft fire and who often appeared to be flying partially damaged, lightly armored planes carrying little ordnance. In January the kamikazes had been operating in a far different manner. There was now a definite program of kamikaze operations, for the vast majority of the perhaps 100 Japanese aircraft that had attacked the forces under Admiral Oldendorf's command since January 2 had at least attempted kamikaze crashes. In addition, the pilots seemed to be more skilled. They took every advantage of radar-blanketing terrain, especially in the Lingayen Gulf area, and flew toward target ships at extremely low altitudes, thus helping to avoid both radar and visual detection. Flight tactics included radical maneuvering designed not only to avoid anti-aircraft fire and Allied planes but also to confuse observers as to which ship was the actual target. Finally, many of the kamikaze planes were heavily armored and armed. The Allies had expected great results from the relatively new proximity fuze for shipboard 5-inch antiaircraft weapons, but the Japanese planes usually appeared so suddenly and took such violent evasive action that 5-inch batteries could seldom track properly. The employment of the expensive special ammunition was, therefore, generally useless, and was sometimes even dangerous to friendly ships. Having missed approaching kamikazes by such distances that fuzes were not activated, shells sometimes sailed on to explode on or near Allied vessels, thereby causing some damage and many casualties.  Concerned about the effectiveness of the kamikaze attacks and recognizing that achieving air superiority did not prevent the enemy's suicide planes, Oldendorf opted for a psychological strategy. He ordered the minesweeper and bombardment groups to persist with their operations, even while sustaining damage, to convince the Japanese that their suicide missions were failing. Kinkaid shared these concerns and requested the cessation of all diversionary air operations to concentrate the main air offensive on Luzon. As a result, Admiral Halsey's carrier-based aircraft and General Kenney's ground forces were tasked with neutralizing all Japanese airfields in Luzon, supported by Durgin's escort carriers. On January 7, McCain's strikes on Luzon and Oldendorf's bombardment of the Lingayen beaches continued, while underwater demolition teams entered the gulf to undertake the dangerous mission of dismantling beach obstacles. Again contrary to expectations, no beach obstacles were found. The "frog men" encountered only a little rifle and machine gun fire, and the few beach defenses they observed appeared to be unoccupied. Their tasks and those of hydrographic ships were completed on the 8th. In retaliation, 20 to 25 kamikazes targeted various segments of the Luzon Attack Force, managing to sink two minesweepers and damage one LST. That night, Kinkaid's destroyers successfully sank the Hinoki off Manila Bay. However, on January 8, the 3rd Fleet units began advancing towards Formosa, as MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz suspected that the kamikazes were launching from there. Without Halsey's additional air support, the Japanese suicide planes once again attacked the Luzon Attack Force, this time damaging the cruiser Australia and the escort carriers Kitkun Bay and Kardashan Bay, as well as inflicting damage on an LSI, an LST, and an APA. Due to significant losses, by the end of the day, the 2nd Air Fleet and the 1st Combined Base Air Force headquarters were disbanded. The 1st Air Fleet received orders to withdraw to Formosa for reorganization, while the severely weakened units of the 4th Air Army were set to continue limited attack operations for a short time until a final evacuation could be carried out. Returning on the morning of the 8th to resume bombardment about 08:00, one section again hit the Lingayen area. About ten minutes later a destroyer standing close inshore and a spotting plane from a battleship reported that Filipinos were forming a parade, complete with United States and Philippine flags, in the town of Lingayen. The fire was shifted to more westerly targets while leaflets were quickly prepared instructing the Filipinos to clear the area. A spotting plane dropped the leaflets and the paraders dispersed. Bombardment started again as soon as the area seemed vacated. The reasons for resuming the bombardment of Lingayen and its environs in the face of this friendly demonstration ashore are unknown, especially since neither underwater demolition teams nor spotting planes had discovered any signs of Japanese activity in the area. The town, at least, seemed safely in the hands of the Filipinos. The most obvious explanation is that erroneous intelligence, having indicated that strong defenses would be encountered in the area, made it incumbent upon Admiral Oldendorf to continue the bombardment whether he wanted to or not. Too much was at stake to take a chance. The Filipinos in the Lingayen area could hardly have been pleased as they saw their homes and public buildings damaged or destroyed by what to them must have seemed an unnecessary bombardment. It seems a tribute both to the Filipinos and to the prewar administration of the United States in the islands--as well as a severe and obvious indictment of Japanese occupation policies--that the people of the Philippines took such adversities in their stride, not permitting personal resentments to overcome judgment and loyalty. Throughout the rest of 8 January, bombardment of the landing beach areas continued without incident. Practically no military installations or targets were found in the Lingayen town and airstrip area, and relatively few were discovered in the San Fabian region. The San Fabian bombardment vessels ran out of targets by 1530 and moved back up the gulf to strike the San Fernando area for another forty-five minutes, completing the task that the Japanese kamikazes had interrupted on the 6th. The Lingayen area ships had long since ceased their firing for the day. Thus ended preliminary bombardment operations. The heavy bombardment of the San Fernando sector on the 6th aroused great anxiety in General Yamashita's headquarters. An enemy landing in that sector would fall north of the main positions of the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade and create serious danger of a thrust toward Baguio over the Bauang-Naguilian Highway. The only means of meeting this potential threat was to change the planned employment of the 19th Division. The division was still in the San Fernando-Naguilian area due to postponement of its scheduled movement inland, and intense enemy air activity over the whole Lingayen area made it improbable that it could move in any case. Consequently, on 7 January, the Area Army ordered the division to assume responsibility for the defense of the sector north of a line running through Santiago, Magungunay, Mt. Bilbil, and Asin. Its main strength was to be concentrated between Naguilian and Baguio. With preliminary operations finished, Kinkaid's amphibious attack convoys arrived at the entrance to Lingayen Gulf around 04:00 on January 9. As the amphibious ships began landing operations, the fire support vessels of Admirals Barbey and Wilkinson positioned themselves for final pre-assault bombardment. In support of these efforts, McCain struck Formosa, destroying 47 Japanese aircraft, sinking seven ships, and damaging eleven others. Throughout the week, the fast carriers conducted a total of 3,030 offensive sorties, dropping approximately 700 tons of bombs at the cost of 86 aircraft. Pleased with the results of the anti-kamikaze operation, Nimitz finally permitted Halsey to launch a major raid into the South China Sea, codenamed Operation Gratitude. Meanwhile, back in Luzon, the pre-assault bombardment commenced at 07:00, gradually shifting fire from the landing beaches to the flanks of the assault area. At 09:00, the first amphibious vehicles began their approach from a departure line about 4,500 yards offshore, while rocket-armed landing craft and aircraft bombarded the beaches. The landing beaches of the 14th Corps were located across the middle of Lingayen Gulf's southern shores and centered on Lingayen airstrip and the nearby grounds of the capitol of Pangasinan Province. In peacetime one would have considered the shore line a beautiful swimming beach, a magnificent strand of firm sand stretching eastward almost 9 miles from the mouth of the Calmay River to the mouth of the Dagupan. The east bank of the Dagupan, which enters the gulf midway between Lingayen and San Fabian, delineated the boundary between the 14th and the 1st Corps, and bridges over the Dagupan were expected to provide the first easy means of contact between the two corps. Since there was a gap of over 6 miles between the 1st Corps' westernmost beaches and the 14th Corps' easternmost, it was imperative that the Dagupan crossings be seized without delay. Planners anticipated that inasmuch as 1st Corps troops would be a mile or so closer to the river at the moment of landing they would be the first to reach the bridges, but it was 14th Corps' responsibility to relieve 1st Corps at the crossings as soon as possible. The 37th Division was to drive toward the Dagupan, while the 40th Division would make a quick thrust west and northwest to Port Sual and Alaminos. Port Sual, located at the southwestern corner of Lingayen Gulf, and at the western extremity of the Army Beachhead Line, possessed some importance as the site of minor port facilities. Alaminos, about twelve miles northwest of Port Sual, lay inland on the Bolinao Peninsula. Early capture of road junctions at Alaminos would help forestall Japanese attempts to organize counterattacks against the 6th Army's right flank. In contrast, the beaches assigned to the 1st Corps were more widely spaced. The units of the 6th Division were scheduled to land on the Blue Beaches, located midway between the Dagupan River mouth and that of the Bued River. The 103rd Regiment was to land on White Beach 3 at San Fabian, while the 169th Regiment would land on White Beach 2, nearly two miles to the northeast. Additionally, the 2nd Battalion of the 172nd Regiment was set to land on the nearby White Beach 3. Fortunately for the American forces, they encountered minimal resistance as the initial waves approached the shore, facing only some challenges from the ebb tide. Shortly after 09:30, the 1st and 20th Regiments landed on the Blue Beaches, with the 1st Regiment quickly securing the mouth of the Bued River and advancing three miles inland to Mangaldan, while the 20th Regiment moved toward Dagupan. Meanwhile, Wing's regiments landed on their designated beaches to the northeast but faced harassment from snipers, artillery, and mortar fire from Lieutenant General Nishiyama Fukutaro's 23rd Division. However, the assault waves of the 14th Corps moved more slowly than expected, reaching the western beaches only by 09:40. The 185th Regiment captured Orange Beach, the 160th Regiment took Green Beach, the 148th Regiment secured Yellow Beach, and the 129th Regiment landed unopposed on Crimson Beach. After landing on the beaches, the 1st Battalion of the 185th Regiment marched to the Agno River's mouth. Meanwhile, the 40th Reconnaissance Troop established a roadblock on the main road, just three miles east of Port Sual. The 2nd Battalion of the 185th Regiment advanced directly inland through Lingayen, successfully crossing the Calmay River and an east-west segment of the Agno River. Similarly, the 160th Regiment crossed the Calmay and assembled nearly four miles inland. The reserve 2nd Battalion of the 108th Regiment landed at Lingayen, while the 148th Regiment moved straight inland, crossing both the Calmay and Dagupan Rivers toward San Carlos. The 129th Regiment entered Dagupan and crossed the Patan River to reach Calasiao, with its 3rd Battalion eventually extending the line to connect with the 148th. By the end of the day, Griswold had established a beachhead stretching northwestward from Calasiao for nearly twenty miles to the outpost near Port Sual. At the same time, Wing's units encountered the most significant resistance from three tiers of ridges that overlooked the 43rd Division's beaches from the north, northeast, and east.  The 43rd Division had the most hazardous and difficult S-day tasks. On the division's left low hills lay scarcely three-quarters of a mile inland from WHITE Beaches 1 and 2. Stretching northward, and coming still closer to Lingayen Gulfs eastern shore, a first line of low, grass-covered hills formed a somewhat broken ridge line, the seaward slopes of which grew steeper as the hills proceeded north along the coast. Beyond this first range, which averaged less than 250 feet in height, lay another, more irregular north-south ridge that rose to 350 feet. Still further east--a little over three miles inland--was yet a third steep-sided, grass-covered ridge line, this one averaging around 600 feet high. The three tiers of ridges overlooked the 43rd Division's beaches from the north, northeast, and east. They provided the Japanese with natural defensive terrain, excellent observation, good positions from which to deliver direct fire on the beaches, and cover behind which there was protection from the essentially flat trajectory of naval support fires. Moreover, the ridges were close to assembly areas further inland that could provide large Japanese forces with cover and concealment. In a single night the Japanese could move considerable strength from these assembly points into the tiers of hills to launch a counterattack against the 6th Army's left. While the 2nd Battalion of the 172nd Regiment advanced toward Hill 247, the 169th Regiment moved eastward, successfully reaching Binday and extending its lines north along the gentle slopes leading to Hill 470. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion of the 172nd Regiment quickly secured the barrios of Mabilao and Alacan, ultimately capturing Hill 247 despite scattered resistance. As small arms and mortar fire intensified, combat patrols advanced toward Hill 385, coinciding with the remainder of the 172nd coming ashore. Finally, the 103rd Regiment took control of San Fabian without facing any opposition and then advanced generally south and southeast toward Hill 200, halting just north of San Jacinto by the end of the day. While the assault units of the 1st Corps successfully landed by dusk on January 9, Swift's advance was not as deep as Griswold's, leaving several dangerous gaps between his units. Throughout the day, the Japanese launched sporadic kamikaze attacks on the Luzon Attack Force, causing significant damage to the battleship Mississippi, hitting the cruisers Columbia and Australia again, and damaging one destroyer escort. Meanwhile, friendly anti-aircraft fire resulted in numerous casualties aboard the battleship Colorado. In response to the enemy landings, Yamashita decided to deploy the 2nd Tank Division to the Agno River line near Tayug, where the armored units were to execute a counterattack from the northern flank if the enemy overextended. He also sent five battalions under Lieutenant-General Tsuda Yoshitake to secure the Cabanatuan area, ordered Lieutenant-General Okamoto Yasuyuki's 10th Division to position elements in the Triangle Hill and Tayug sectors to counter a potential enemy advance from Lingayen toward San Jose, stationed the majority of the 11th Independent Regiment at Bongabong, and directed the Noguchi Detachment to move from Bicol to the Manila area. During the night, the 12th Surface Raiding Regiment, based at Port Sual, attempted to disrupt further enemy landings with a full-scale suicide boat attack on ships near the beachhead. Taking advantage of the element of surprise, the small explosive-laden boats approached undetected but only succeeded in sinking one LCI and damaging eight other vessels. In other areas, increased guerrilla activities and Allied airstrikes in northern Luzon had nearly stopped the Japanese from collecting and transporting vital food supplies to the critical defense zones within the Baguio-Mankayan-Bambang triangle. This disruption would hinder the 14th Area Army's capacity to conduct a prolonged defensive campaign. Although plans for a desperate, full-scale counteroffensive were developed, Yamashita decisively rejected this strategy, instead ordering the 2nd Tank Division to cancel its intended counterattack and regroup at Lupao, approximately eight miles northwest of San Jose. Meanwhile, on January 10, Griswold's forces continued their advance inland: the 185th Regiment moved west toward Port Sual; the 160th Regiment progressed southward about eight miles; the 148th Regiment quickly advanced to San Carlos; and the 129th Regiment pushed forward to Malasiqui, where the 14th Corps faced enemy resistance for the first time since the landing. Additionally, the reserve 108th and 145th Regiments successfully landed on the Lingayen beaches. To the north, the 6th Division shifted generally south and southeast, covering about four miles across flat, dry, open farmland, and by nightfall, it secured a front of approximately seven miles from west to east. As they continued northeast, the 103rd Regiment expanded its front, with its 2nd Battalion advancing toward Manaoag while the other two battalions moved to the area northwest of Hill 200. Lastly, the 169th and 172nd Regiments encountered the most intense resistance thus far, providing an early glimpse of the challenges that would impede the 43rd Division for the upcoming month. The 1st Battalion, 169th Regiment, supported by close artillery and mortar fire, engaged in combat along the steep, grassy slopes of Hill 470, ultimately capturing the summit by nightfall. Meanwhile, the rest of the regiment advanced across the Bued River toward Hills 355 and 318, but halted near the river due to heavy artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire. To the north, the 172nd Regiment cleared Hill 385 and then moved toward Hills 351 and 580, gradually advancing along the southern section of the third ridge line, which was located inland from the beaches. Additionally, its 1st Battalion progressed two miles along the graveled coastal road and conducted patrols along the ridge crest. By nightfall, Krueger had determined that the 6th Army Reserve should be deployed in the 1st Corps' area, as outlined in the pre-assault plans, due to the significant resistance faced by the 43rd Division. He suspected that the apparent lack of enemy resistance to the west was a trap, designed to lure the 6th Army into overextending its lines, making its flanks susceptible to a counterattack from the east. Fortunately for the Americans, Tominaga's kamikaze attacks began to diminish in the days following the landing, with an attack on January 10 resulting in damage only to the destroyer escort LeRay Wilson and one transport ship. The next day, the 43rd Division continued to face challenges in Luzon. The Japanese mortar and artillery fire along the 172nd's eastern front was so severe that Wing decided to shift the regiment's attack direction from east to north, resulting in minimal progress as they redeployed to strike toward Hills 351 and 580 from Hill 470. Additionally, the reserve 158th Regiment was landed to relieve the 1st Battalion, 172nd Regiment, on the coastal road. Looking southeast, the 169th Regiment nearly encircled Hill 318. However, despite receiving maximum support from Durgin's carrier aircraft, naval gunfire, and division artillery, they were unable to dislodge the Japanese forces, who had entrenched themselves in the hillside. Meanwhile, Griswold's advance inland to secure the Army Beachhead Line continued to progress well on January 11. On the 11th the 185th Infantry patrolled and consolidated its positions on the west flank, suffered no casualties, killed 5 Japanese, and captured another. Early in the morning a Chevrolet sedan of 1940 or 1941 vintage, occupied by two Japanese, came calmly down the coast road from the direction of Port Sual. Obviously unaware that Company C, 185th Infantry, maintained a roadblock on the highway, the Japanese practically ran into the American outpost before they realized their situation. Before they could recover from their surprise and consternation, both Japanese were dead, and Company C had acquired some luxurious transportation. Meanwhile the 160th Regiment reached Aguilar, a road junction already held by Filipino guerrillas. The 108th Regiment closely followed the 160th, and the 148th Regiment established a line from Dumpay westward for four miles to Bacnar, with patrols extending further south to Urbiztondo and Bayambang. By the end of the day, the 14th Corps had either occupied or outposted nearly all the territory within the Army Beachhead Line in its sector. However, with Swift's units unable to keep up with the advance southward, Griswold faced the risk of exposing his eastern flank if he continued to push forward. Therefore, the 1st Corps needed reinforcement to prevent widening the gap along the corps boundary. As a result, the reserve 63rd Regiment and the 13th Armored Group were deployed in the San Fabian area, while the 6th Ranger Battalion, which had landed at Blue Beaches the previous day, moved to the Dagupan area. Additionally, Major-General Charles Mullins' 25th Division began to assemble between the Agoi and Patalan Rivers. Despite these developments, casualties had been significantly lower than expected, with 55 men killed and around 185 wounded, primarily from the 43rd Division. Japanese casualties in ground operations were also relatively low, with American estimates suggesting between 150 and 200 Japanese killed. Meanwhile, Task Force 38 made its way into the South China Sea via the Luzon Strait on January 10, accompanied by the refueling group. Although poor weather conditions thwarted a scheduled refueling on that day, Task Force 38 was completely fueled by noon on January 11 and prepared to carry out Halsey's ambitious raid. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. As Allied forces prepared for a major assault on Luzon, kamikaze attacks intensified, leading to fierce battles and unexpected challenges, but Filipino resilience shone through despite devastation. On the shores of Lingayen Gulf, American forces launched a strategic landing, facing minimal resistance, but soon encountered fierce Japanese counterattacks as they advanced inland.

The Unauthorized History of the Pacific War
Pacific Command Review 1944-45 with Jon Parshall - Episode 428

The Unauthorized History of the Pacific War

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 31, 2024 96:40


This week Seth and Bill welcome back the third amigo, Jon Parshall, as the trio dive into Allied and Japanese commander's performances in 1944 and 1945. Halsey, Spruance, MacArthur, Mitscher, McCain, LeMay, Hansell, Bruce, Burke, Rupertus, Yamashita, Iwabuchi, Nakagawa and others are reviewed by the guys in this totally off-the-cuff discussion. The guys get into the big names, and some of the commanders you might not be so familiar with. This was a fun one to make, and we hope you guys like it too. #wwii #wwiihistory #ww2 #usnavy #usa #usarmy #medalofhonor #enterprise #aircraft #aircraftcarrier #cv6 #midway #wwii #wwiihistory #ww2 #worldwar2 #usnavy #usnavyseals #usmc #usmarines #saipan #usa #usarmy #aircraft #aircraftcarrier #battleship #battleships #ussenterprise #aircraftcarriers #museum #essex #halsey #taskforce38 #wwii #wwiihistory #ww2 #usnavy #usa #usarmy #medalofhonor #enterprise #aircraft #aircraftcarrier #cv6 #midway #wwii #wwiihistory #ww2 #worldwar2 #usnavy #usnavyseals #usmc #usmarines #saipan #usa #usarmy #aircraft #aircraftcarrier #battleship #battleships #ussenterprise #aircraftcarriers #museum #hollywood #movie #movies #books #mastersoftheair #8thairforce #mightyeighth #100thbombgroup #bloodyhundredth #b17 #boeing #airforce wwii #wwiihistory #ww2 #usnavy #usa #usarmy #medalofhonor #enterprise #aircraft #aircraftcarrier #cv6 #midway #wwii #wwiihistory #ww2 #worldwar2 #usnavy #usnavyseals #usmc #usmarines #saipan #usa #usarmy #aircraft #aircraftcarrier #battleship #battleships #ussenterprise #aircraftcarriers #museum #hollywood #movie #movies #books #oldbreed #1stMarineDivision #thepacific #Peleliu #army #marines #marinecorps #worldwar2 #worldwar #worldwarii #leytegulf #battleofleytegulf #rodserling #twilightzone #liberation #blacksheep #power #prisoner #prisonerofwar #typhoon #hurricane #weather #iwojima#bullhalsey #ace #p47 #p38 #fighter #fighterpilot #b29 #strategicstudying #tokyo #boeing #incendiary #usa #franklin #okinawa #yamato #kamikaze

The Pacific War - week by week
- 163 - Pacific War Podcast - Aitape-Wewak Campaign - December 31 - January 7 - , 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 31, 2024 46:02


Last time we spoke about the Victory at Leyte. In the Ormoc Valley, General Krueger's forces pushed the Japanese into a retreat toward Palompon. As the Americans advanced, they faced entrenched enemy positions and challenging terrain. On Christmas Day, the 77th Division successfully captured Palompon, cutting off the Japanese's main route. General Suzuki, forced to relocate his headquarters, prepared for a counteroffensive. Despite fierce resistance, American troops continued to push forward, eliminating remaining Japanese units and securing strategic positions along the coast as the year closed. As General Eichelberger's 8th Army took command of Leyte Island, the 77th Division relieved other units in preparation for future operations. Meanwhile, American forces faced fierce resistance while securing strategic positions on Samar and Mindoro. Despite enemy air assaults, they successfully disrupted Japanese plans, including a failed counter-landing. In Bougainville, Australian troops engaged in intense fighting, capturing Pearl Ridge after fierce battles. Their victory provided a crucial vantage point for future offensives, marking a significant moment in the campaign. This episode is the Aitape-Wewak Campaign Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As previously discussed, General Dunckel's task force successfully invaded Mindoro. Despite recent enemy efforts to reclaim control of the island, the Americans managed to establish airfields that enabled land-based aircraft to target specific locations on Luzon while also safeguarding the assault and resupply ships heading to Lingayen Gulf. This location was chosen because it had direct access to Luzon's key military objective, the Central Plains-Manila Bay region, and it featured the best and most extensive landing beaches on the island. With General Eichelberger's 8th Army taking charge of Leyte and Mindoro, General Krueger's 6th Army was assigned to capture and secure a beachhead at Lingayen Gulf and then advance south through the Central Plains to seize Manila and open Manila Bay. Furthermore, air and logistical bases would be established on Luzon to support future operations against Japan, and the legitimate government of the Philippine Commonwealth would be reinstated in its capital. For Operation Mike I, the reconquest of Luzon island, the Southwest Pacific's intelligence estimates concerning Japanese strengths, dispositions, capabilities, and intentions on Luzon were reasonably accurate from the start of planning. The abundance of information must be attributed in large measure to the efforts of guerrillas on Luzon, an island that was becoming a veritable hotbed of guerrilla resistance, both American-led and Filipino-led. Carefully nurtured by MacArthur's headquarters, especially after mid-1943, the guerrilla organizations had grown steadily in strength and effectiveness not only as sabotage units but also as valuable sources of information. The Leyte invasion in October 1944 gave great encouragement to the guerrillas, who redoubled their efforts in preparation for the invasion of Luzon, which they realized could not be too far off. Throughout 1944 supplies of all types had been sent to the guerrillas, first by submarine and later by airdrop and clandestine inter-island transportation. After the establishment of the Allied base on Leyte, the flow of supplies increased by leaps and bounds. The guerrillas themselves established a network of radio communications that soon came to be sustained and, to some extent, controlled by MacArthur's headquarters, which also sent into Luzon special intelligence parties to develop new sources of information and provide guerrilla efforts with more effective direction. In the end, one of the major difficulties Southwest Pacific intelligence agencies had was not obtaining information from Luzon but rather sifting the plethora of guerrilla reports, which attained every conceivable degree of accuracy and detail. Once sifted, the information had to be evaluated and correlated with that received from other sources such as radio intercepts, captured documents, and prisoner interrogations. MacArthur allocated the majority of his Army's ground combat and support forces, most of General Kenney's Allied Air Forces, and nearly all of Admiral Kinkaid's Allied Naval Forces ships and landing craft. He needed to ensure enough forces to defeat a strong Japanese garrison, secure a beachhead against potential fierce resistance, advance south through the Central Plains against expected strong defenses, defend the beachhead from anticipated counterattacks, and secure the Central Plains-Manila Bay area within four to six weeks. Krueger was assigned command of the 1st Corps, which included the 6th and 43rd Divisions, as well as the 14th Corps, comprising the 37th and 40th Divisions. In reserve were the 25th Division, the 11th Airborne Division, the 158th Regiment, the 13th Armored Group, and the separate 6th Ranger Battalion. Supporting these units were 13 nonorganic field artillery battalions of various calibers, two chemical mortar battalions, two additional tank battalions, the majority of five engineer boat and shore regiments, four amphibious tractor battalions, and 16 engineer aviation battalions, totaling approximately 203,000 personnel, of which 131,000 were classified as combat troops.  By the way, since I mentioned one, for those curious, a Chemical Mortar Battalion were US Army non-divisional units attached to infantry divisions during WW2. They were armed with 4.2-inch chemical mortars. Chemical shells were on standby during WW2, to be used in retaliation should the enemy employ chemical weapons first. Toxic agents such as phosgene or mustard gas could be used as well as white phosphorus. Additionally, Eichelberger's 8th Army was tasked with conducting a subsidiary landing on Luzon with the 11th Corps, which included the 32nd Division and the separate 112th Cavalry and 503rd Parachute Regiments. Furthermore, MacArthur designated the 33rd and 41st Divisions as General Headquarters Reserve and made plans to send the 33rd and 38th Divisions, along with the 1st Cavalry Division and the 19th and 34th Regiments, to Luzon within two months. Krueger's plan for the Lingayen assault, set for January 9, involved an amphibious attack on the southern beaches of the gulf, which were lightly defended but presented numerous obstacles that impeded maneuverability. Aiming for a swift landing with a robust force to achieve tactical surprise, Krueger opted for a broad front assault, with Major-General Innis Swift's 1st Corps landing on the eastern beaches near San Fabian and Major-General Oscar Griswold's 14th Corps on the western beaches facing Lingayen town. Each corps would land two divisions side by side, with one regiment from each division held in floating reserve. The initial missions of the two corps were the same: to capture the beachhead area within their designated zones, protect the flanks of the 6th Army, and maintain communication with one another. Both corps were also ready to advance quickly inland to secure a crossing over the Agno River, which would serve as the starting point for the final push south toward Manila and Manila Bay. Anticipating some congestion on the beaches, Krueger decided to keep the 25th Division, the 158th Regiment, and the 13th Armored Group afloat until January 11. On that date, the 158th would land on the extreme left of the 1st Corps to block the coastal corridor along the eastern shore of the gulf, preventing any Japanese counterattacks from the north. Similarly, the 25th Division and the 13th Armored Group were also ready to be deployed in Swift's area for both defensive and offensive operations. To facilitate the amphibious assault, Kinkaid took direct command of Task Force 77, which comprised the entire 7th Fleet, along with some Australian and Dutch vessels assigned to MacArthur, as well as warships borrowed from Admiral Nimitz's Pacific Ocean Areas. Kinkaid organized his Luzon Attack Force into several combat components, with Admiral Barbey's Task Force 78 tasked with landing the 1st Corps and Admiral Wilkinson's Task Force 79 responsible for the 14th Corps. Admiral Oldendorf once again led the Bombardment and Fire Support Group, which included six battleships and five heavy cruisers, while Admiral Berkey headed the Close Covering Group of four light cruisers. This time, Kinkaid's escort carriers were under the command of Rear-Admiral Calvin Durgin, who had a total of 17 escort carriers to provide convoy protection, conduct airstrikes on the target area alongside pre-assault minesweeping and bombardment, and offer close air support for ground operations until that responsibility was handed over to Kenney's land-based aircraft. Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet would once again play a crucial role in the operation by targeting enemy airfields, while also being ready to provide direct support if the Japanese gathered enough surface forces to initiate a significant naval confrontation. Meanwhile, Kenney's Allied Air Forces were tasked with safeguarding the convoy's sides and rear through overwater reconnaissance and attacks on enemy facilities in the southern Philippines and the Dutch East Indies, with General Whitehead's 5th Air Force responsible for carrying out most of these missions. Additionally, army aircraft were to protect convoys traversing central Philippine waters and offer air support for ground operations whenever possible. To complement Operation Mike I, a comprehensive deception strategy was in place, aimed at diverting the enemy's attention to a potential Allied threat against Formosa and southern Japan through naval activities in nearby waters. Consequently, Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 launched its initial strikes in support of the Lingayen operation on January 3 and 4. Although poor weather conditions hindered attacks on Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands, they still achieved moderate success. MacArthur also aimed to mislead the Japanese into believing that the primary focus of any Allied offensive on Luzon would be directed towards western Batangas or the Bicol Provinces. Therefore, on January 1, Company I of the 21st Regiment advanced on Bongabong along Mindoro's east coast, beginning the clearance of northeastern Mindoro. The next day, Company B of the 503rd Parachute Regiment started operations on the northwestern coast, moving towards Mamburao. On January 3, Company K of the 21st Regiment landed without opposition at Buenavista on the southwestern shore of Marinduque Island and established positions to set up radar installations. Meanwhile, other troops continued their advance toward Calapan, ultimately intercepting the recently landed enemy raiding unit at Pinamalayan on January 8, compelling it to retreat back to Calapan. Although some Japanese forces managed to reach Mansalay on the southeast coast of Mindoro and infiltrated overland toward San Jose, all attempts to raid enemy airfields were unsuccessful. Conversely, the 21st Regiment successfully captured Calapan on January 24, resulting in approximately 135 Japanese casualties, while the Americans incurred the loss of 1 soldier killed and 7 wounded. By the end of the month, Dunckel's forces had killed 170 Japanese and taken 15 prisoners, at a cost of 16 American soldiers killed, 71 wounded, and 4 missing, not including casualties from Japanese air attacks, which raised the Allied totals to 475 killed and 385 wounded. Looking back to Luzon, General Yamashita was also focused on finalizing plans and preparations to counter the impending enemy assault. During the latter part of December, battle preparations proceeded with discouraging slowness. Overburdened transport facilities, enemy strafing and bombing attacks, guerrilla interference and an acute shortage of automotive fuel impeded progress in every direction. On the other hand, there were numerous indications that General MacArthur was virtually ready to strike. In the Batangas area, enemy air reconnaissance was conspicuously frequent, while the dropping of dummy parachutists and the activity of small surface craft along the coast also caused grave alarm in the 8th Division. Other reports indicated that guerrilla forces were beginning to assemble in the mountains east of Manila, and that enemy submarines were delivering arms to guerrillas in the Lamon Bay area. Yamashita accurately predicted that the invasion would occur between January 10 and 20, targeting either the Batangas area or Lingayen Gulf. However, recognizing that he lacked sufficient forces for a decisive battle, particularly given the decimation of Japanese air power and the enemy's air superiority. As of the 1st of December the Japanese Army and Navy had probably had a combined air strength of some 500 planes in the Philippines, the bulk of them based on Luzon. This strength had been largely destroyed by Allied air strikes in support of the Mindoro operation and during Japanese air attacks against Mindoro-bound convoys and the Mindoro beachhead area. By the 20th of December, the Japanese Naval Air Service in the Philippines had no more than 30 planes, and the Japanese Army Air Force was down to approximately 100 first-line combat aircraft. About that date, some 50 naval planes flew to Luzon from Formosa to renew attacks against Mindoro, and shortly thereafter, it appears, a few Army aircraft also came down from Formosa or the home islands to reinforce Luzon. Many of these planes were lost during continued attacks against Mindoro until, by 31 December, the Japanese had probably no more than 150 operational aircraft left on Luzon, and about a third that many on other fields in the Philippine archipelago, for a total of about 200. Yamashita planned to execute a coordinated delaying strategy, launching local counteroffensives only when conditions were favorable. This approach aimed to deplete enemy resources and buy valuable time to reinforce Japanese defenses in Formosa and the Ryukyus. Consequently, on December 19, Yamashita finalized a new operational outline that established two forces: one to cover northern Luzon and the other for central and southern Luzon. The plans outlined an initial strategy for the forces defending coastal regions to inflict significant damage on the enemy during their landing. This would be followed by delaying actions aimed at hindering the capture of crucial inland communication hubs and airfields. The final phase would involve a sustained last stand in the three mountainous areas previously identified as zones of ultimate resistance. To delay further enemy operations against Formosa and the Ryukyus, Yamashita decided to strengthen the northern sector, as its mountainous terrain and limited access routes from the central Luzon plain offered the best tactical conditions for prolonged resistance. As a result, Southern Luzon would be nearly stripped of troops to reinforce the second-largest concentration of forces in the mountains east of Manila. Yamashita positioned the 103rd Division in the Aparri coastal area, with three battalions stationed on the northwest coast; the 23rd Division, along with the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade, near the eastern shore of Lingayen Gulf; the 10th Division in the San Jose, Umingan, and Natividad sectors, along with the 11th Independent Regiment at Baler and Dingalan Bays; the 2nd Tank Division as a mobile unit in the Cabanatuan-San Miguel area, with the 6th Tank Regiment in Manila; the Manila Defense Force responsible for Manila and the surrounding mountains, with a garrison on Corregidor and the 39th Regiment on the Bataan Peninsula; the 8th Division securing key communication points to the east and west of Lake Taal, as well as important coastal positions in Batangas; the majority of the 105th Division stationed in the critical area east of Manila, while the Noguchi Detachment continued to hold Bicol; and the 82nd Brigade occupying coastal positions in the Lamon Bay region. Upon its arrival on Luzon, the 19th Division was tasked with gathering its main forces south of San Leon, while also deploying units to secure critical locations around Tuguegarao and Echague. Additionally, the 2nd Mobile Regiment and the newly landed 2nd Glider Regiment were ordered to bolster defenses in the Clark Field area, which was primarily protected by ground air units. However, by the end of the month, due to the slower-than-anticipated withdrawal of the 105th Division, Yamashita instructed the 8th Division to relocate its main forces to the region east of Manila, leaving only the 17th Regiment stationed in Batangas Province. Lieutenant-General Yokoyama Shizuo then took command of the Shimbu Group, which encompassed all forces in the southern half of Luzon, below a line approximately extending from Manila to Lamon Bay. That is gonna be it for the Philippines today as we now need to head over to the Aitape-Wewak region.  In the coastal sector the 19th Brigade had moved forward in accordance with Stevens' orders of 26th November that it should relieve the 2/7th Commando Squadron, clear the enemy from the area west of the Danmap, and concentrate round Babiang and Suain in preparation for operations east of the river. A company of the 2/4th Battalion had therefore relieved the 2/7th Squadron at Suain and Babiang on the 29th and 30th November. In the next 16 days patrols clashed with small groups of Japanese on seven occasions, and killed 28 without loss to themselves. By 17th December the main body of the 2/4th Battalion was at Suain, with a company at Idakaibul and one at Babiang.  In the second week of December, the squadron expanded its control by establishing outposts at Yasile and Yambes, from which they successfully repelled several minor Japanese attacks. On 11th December an enemy patrol approached the perimeter held by Byrne's troop at Yambes. The Australians held their fire until the Japanese were 35 to 50 yards away, killed 6 and, during the day, 2 more. There were patrol clashes that day and on the 13th. At 1.30 a.m. on the 15th an enemy force of at least 35 attacked. This time the Australians let the leading Japanese come to within three yards of the perimeter then fired with automatic weapons and threw grenades. After pressing the attack for a while the enemy withdrew, dragging away their wounded and about 10 dead. By mid-December, the commandos had advanced along the coastal sector to the Danmap, over 40 miles from Aitape and approximately 20 miles into the Torricellis, without encountering significant enemy forces. The majority of Lieutenant-General Mano Goro's 41st Division was positioned south of the Danmap, with the reinforced 237th Regiment under Major-General Aotsu Kikutaro occupying forward positions between the Anumb and Danmap Rivers. Following the defeat at the Driniumor River, General Adachi's 18th Army implemented a strategy to minimize contact with the enemy. They positioned outpost forces for ambush and scattered their units across a broad area, especially in locations where they could cultivate food and regain their strength. Despite these measures, many soldiers faced hunger, malnutrition, and illness, and they often lacked essential modern military equipment. Meanwhile, on December 12, Stevens instructed the seasoned 17th Brigade, led by Brigadier Murray Moten, to relieve the 2/7th Squadron at Tong and conduct patrols south towards Mimbiok and Yanatong, southeast to establish a base at Musimbe, and east to set up a base at Musu. Subsequently, the 2/7th Squadron was to relocate to Makuir and scout a route through Chem to the Dandriwad River and Babiang, aiming to establish a forward base on the Danmap, about five miles east of Makuir. In line with this plan, Moten dispatched Major Ian McBride's Piper Force, consisting of two companies from the 2/5th Battalion, which arrived at Tong on December 20. That day Major Goode of the 2/7th Squadron reported that, except for foraging parties, the area which he had been ordered to patrol had been cleared of the enemy. The squadron had killed 26 Japanese and lost two killed and five wounded; two attached Papuan police had been wounded. The squadron's headquarters were now moved to Lambuain and it began its new task: to clear the Walum area. Walum village was occupied on 30th December after clashes in which several Japanese were killed. Documents captured by the squadron that day indicated that the main enemy line of communication from the coast to Balif was via Walum- Womisis-Womsak. At the same time, Piper Force occupied Musimbe and Musinau, coinciding with the arrival of the rest of the 2/5th Battalion in the Yambes area. Meanwhile, Stevens ordered the 19th Brigade to seize the Abau-Malin line and eliminate the enemy at the Danmap. On December 14, Martin sent the majority of the 2/4th Battalion to cross the river, with one company successfully fighting through Lazy Creek to reach Rocky Point. As the other companies assembled, the 2/8th Battalion began its advance into the foothills to establish a forward base at Idakaibul and move towards Malin. Patrolling from Lazy Creek the 2/11th had two sharp clashes with the enemy force west of Niap on 30th and 31st December, three Aus- tralians and 11 Japanese being killed. At Matapau village, early on 2nd January, from 30 to 35 Japanese attacked the perimeter of Captain Royce's company. Artillery fire was brought down and the Japanese with- drew leaving six dead. This was the beginning of five days of sharp fighting against Japanese who seemed determined to stop the advance along the Old German Road. As soon as the enemy's attack had been repulsed Royce's company pushed forward along the road to a spur whence the artillery observer, Captain Lovegrove, might direct fire. A platoon crossed the little Wakip River at 10.20 a.m. but came under fire from Japanese on the steep-sided spur. The infantry withdrew and accurate artillery fire was brought down. At 2.10 p.m. the spur was occupied and from it Lovegrove directed fire on a pocket of Japanese so close that he had "to almost whisper his orders into the phone". In the day 14 Japanese were killed, and two Australians killed and five wounded, of whom four remained on duty. Next day, and on the 4th and 5th, there was sharp fighting round the spur and towards Niap, and on the 6th, after a strike by 11 bombers and a bombardment by the artillery, a platoon attacked across the Wakip but was held by the resolute enemy pocket at Niap. On January 7, the Japanese defense was finally breached when three tanks broke through the beach and entered the town, followed by infantry. The next day, the leading company of the 2/8th Battalion entered Malin without facing any opposition. However, the 2/11th Battalion struggled to advance towards Doreto Bay, as the determined defenders repelled their attacks for another ten days. On January 18, a company executed a successful flanking maneuver through the foothills to Nimbum Creek and eventually positioned itself south of Abau, capturing the town two days later. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred Buttrose had sent one company to assault Perembil and secure the Musu area, while another advanced through Sumul towards Maharingi, and McBride's company at Musinau moved eastward to patrol deep into the south. On January 3, the Australians unexpectedly drove a strong force of the 238th Regiment from Perembil, though they had to fend off several counterattacks in the following days. Continuing their advance, Asiling fell on January 9, followed by Samisai two days later, and another company secured Maharingi by January 15. Now, it is time to return to the Marianas to prepare for the next missions of General Hansell's 21st Bomber Command.  The United States military took steps to improve Saipan's defenses after the damaging raids of November 27. In a frantic effort to detect future intruders, Admiral Hoover stationed two destroyers 100 miles northwest of Saipan to provide early radar warning, and an AN/TPS-3 radar was rushed to Saipan from Oahu by air. The destroyers in some instances gave ample warning, but on other occasions the enemy planes still managed to come in unannounced. Arnold became frustrated that the microwave early warning radar set still was not in use; and on December 3 Admiral Nimitz ordered that the highest priority be given to installing the radar. Despite this, it still was not ready until after the conclusion of the Japanese air campaign. Two B-24 Liberator bombers fitted with air-to-air radar sets were also dispatched to Saipan. This was the first use of airborne warning and control aircraft by the United States, but they were not used in combat. To maintain pressure on the enemy following the San Antonio strikes, he conducted a night radar mission with 30 Superfortresses on November 29, although it was unsuccessful. This mission was part of his preparations for a daylight attack on the Nakajima Aircraft Plant in Ota, scheduled for December 3. By D minus I weather reports were forbidding: at bombing altitudes over Ota, winds were reaching velocities of I 80 miles per hour or more. At 01:30 on the 3d it was decided that the only hope for the day was to go back to Musashino where visible bombing might be possible." Crews had already been briefed twice for the target; the 73d Wing hurriedly cut field orders and by 0945 eighty-six bombers were heading for Tokyo. Seventy-six got over the city to find clear weather but high winds; 59 planes bombed visually from a mean altitude of 28,700 feet with poor results. Out of this mission, six bombers were lost, and another six were damaged, resulting in just 26 bombs hitting the plant area, causing minimal damage to buildings and equipment. Once again, the strike was disappointing. Musashi's records indicate that twenty-six bombs fell in the plant area with some small damage to buildings and equipment and almost none to machinery; Japanese casualties were moderately high. Strike photos, the command's only source of information, seemed to show even less damage, and for these slight results the command had paid dearly, with six B-29's lost and six damaged. In response, on December 7, several Japanese aircraft, including two squadrons of Ki-67 bombers, launched a coordinated attack from both high and low altitudes, destroying three B-29s and damaging 23 others. This assault was observed by Lieutenant-General Millard Harmon, the commander of Army Air Forces in the Pacific, who had been sent by Nimitz to coordinate an extensive attack on Iwo Jima's installations using both air and surface forces. On December 8th, at 0945 twenty-eight P-38's swept over the island, followed at 1100 by the B-29's and at noon by the Liberators. Hoover's crusiers began seventy minutes of shelling at I 347. The bomb load carried by the planes forcefully illustrated the difference in performance between the heavy and very heavy bomber at 725 miles tactical radius: the 62 B-29's dropped 620 tons, 102 B-24's only 194 tons.” All told, enough metal was thrown to produce a good concentration on Iwo's eight square miles, but because the bombers had been forced to loose by radar, results, so far as they could be judged from photography-handicapped, like the bombing, by adverse weather-were much less decisive than had been expected. Eyen so, the enemy's raids on Saipan stopped until 25 December. Although the results were not as decisive as hoped, the enemy raids on Saipan were temporarily halted. On December 13, Hansell sent 90 Superfortresses to bomb the Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Works in Nagoya.  The choice for primary visual target was the Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Works at Nagoya, and the same company's aircraft works was named as radar target; strays, it was hoped, would spill into crowded Nagoya, Japan's second city and an industrial center of great importance. The engine works, still in top priority for 21st Bomber Command, lay in the northeast section of Nagoya, about two and a half miles from Nagoya Castle. The plant was considered by the JTG as a single target though it actually consisted of three separate but closely related units of the vast complex comprising the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.: I) the No. 2 Engine Works, responsible for research, design, and manufacture of prototype engines; 2) the No. 4 Engine Works, which between 1939 and 1945 manufactured 44,004 engines, the most important model being the Ha-102, a 1,000-horsepower motor used on the Nick and Dinah 2; and 3) the No. 10 Engine Works, which furnished castings and forgings for all Mitsubishi engine plants. On the 13th, the 73d Wing was able to get ninety bombers up, most of them carrying ten 500-pound GP's but one squadron from each group loaded with incendiary clusters. As on previous missions, a number of planes failed to reach the primary target: sixteen B-29's aborted and three bombed targets of opportunity. Japanese resistance was lively and, in all, four B-29's were lost, thirty-one damaged. Despite significant losses, the recent bombing campaign demonstrated improvement, resulting in the destruction of an assembly shop and seven auxiliary buildings. Additionally, damage was inflicted on an assembly shop, a prototype engine-manufacturing facility, two other shops, and 11 buildings, leading to approximately 351 casualties. The bombing, if of less than pickle-barrel precision, showed improvement. Strike photos indicated that 16 per cent of the bombs dropped had fallen within 1,000 feet of the aiming point and that 17.8 per cent of the roofed area had been destroyed?' Although this in itself was encouraging, had intelligence officers been able to read from their photos the whole story, there would have been even more optimism on Saipan. At the No. 4 Engine Works an assembly shop and 7 auxiliary buildings were destroyed, and an assembly shop and 11 buildings were damaged; at the No. 2 Engine Works a prototype engine-manufacturing shop and 2 other shops were damaged; and personnel losses ran to 246 killed and 105 injured.  For the first time, the 21st Bomber Command made a noticeable impact on the aircraft industry, prompting the Japanese to start relocating equipment to underground facilities. Plant officials calculated that the attack reduced productive capacity from 1,600 to 1,200 engines per month; after December 13 parts were no longer machined at No. 4 Engine Works, and engine production was limited to assembling parts on hand and those received from other plants. Mitsubishi officials had been considering the advisability of dispersing the Nagoya facilities ever since the fall of Saipan. After the strike of December 13 the transfer of equipment to underground sites began, but even at the end of the war the movement had not progressed far enough to allow production in the new plants. Five days later, Hansell dispatched 89 B-29s to target the Mitsubishi Aircraft Works in Nagoya. The Mitsubishi Aircraft Works was the giant assembly plant which used most of the engines produced in the No. 4 Engine Works. Located on reclaimed land at the northeast corner of Nagoya harbor, it was, like the engine works, composed of three integrated plants: I) the No. I Airframe Works for research and experimental engineering; 2) the No. 3 Airframe Works, which built navy planes-Zeke and Jack fighters and Betty bombers; and 3) the No. 5 Airframe Works, which manufactured bombers and reconnaissance and transport planes for the army. Large, compact, and conspicuous, this complex offered an excellent visual target, and the proximity of the harbor's shore line made it suitable for radar strikes as well. On this 18 December attack many planes, as usual, failed to follow the flight plan so that only sixty-three planes bombed the primary target. Cloud cover was heavy and forty-four of these dropped by radar, to add considerably to the damage caused by an earthquake on 7 December. Though few bombs were plotted in the area, 17.8 percent of the roofed area appeared to have been destroyed. The No. 3 Works suffered extensive damage to the sheet-metal, heat-treatment, fuselage assembly, and final-assembly shops, and at No. 5, approximately 50 per cent of the total assembly area was damaged. Casualties, in dead and injured, amounted to 464.  On December 22, Hansell was compelled to alter his tactics and initiated a daylight incendiary mission. Unfortunately, only 48 B-29s targeted Mitsubishi's engine works due to poor weather, resulting in minimal damage. The Nagoya mission on the next day, though using only incendiaries, was not in fulfillment of Norstad's request; it involved only 78 bombers dispatched instead of IOO and it was planned as a daylight precision attack. The weather turned bad, however, and before the last formations were over Nagoya the target was covered by 10/10 cloud. Only forty-eight planes bombed the Mitsubishi plant and they had to drop by radar; strike photos were few and revealed little. Actually there was not much damage to reveal: 252 fire bombs fell in the area of the No. 4 Works, damaging a few buildings but hurting no machine tools and causing no loss to pruduction On Christmas night, the newly renamed 6th Air Army, led by Lieutenant-General Sugawara Michio, launched its final significant assault on the Marianas, deploying 25 aircraft to bomb from both high and low altitudes. This attack resulted in the destruction of one B-29, serious damage to three others, and minor damage to 11. Overall, the Japanese had deployed over eighty planes over Saipan and Tinian, losing around 37, while managing to destroy 11 B-29s, seriously damaging 8, and causing minor damage to 35. Finally, on December 27, Hansell's last mission involved a return trip to Nakajima, where only 39 out of 72 dispatched B-29s caused little damage to the Musashi plant, although an incendiary attack unfortunately set a hospital on fire. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In a fierce battle for control, forces devised a strategy to defend coastal regions and key locations in Luzon. As troops repositioned, Australian commandos clashed with Japanese units, achieving victories despite challenges. Meanwhile, U.S. bombers targeted Japanese industrial sites, inflicting damage but facing heavy losses, marking a pivotal struggle in the Pacific theater.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 160 - Pacific War Podcast - Invasion of Mindoro - December 10 - 17 - , 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 10, 2024 46:02


Last time we spoke about the fall of Ormoc. The Japanese prepared their Wa offensive as General Arnold's troops advanced toward Ormoc. On December 5, American forces engaged in fierce fighting for Hills 918 and 380, facing entrenched enemy positions. By December 6, Japanese troops launched a surprise attack on American camps, but a swift counteroffensive from General Swift helped reclaim the Buri airfield. Despite initial gains, poor weather hindered Japanese reinforcements, allowing American forces to stabilize their positions and push back the enemy. Then the 148th battalion launched an attack on Buri. The advancing American troops faced fierce Japanese resistance, with intense battles over strategic locations like the San Pablo airstrip and Hill 380. Despite setbacks, forces rallied, utilizing effective tactics to outmaneuver the enemy. As reinforcements arrived, the Americans secured critical positions and engaged fiercely in Ormoc, leading to significant Japanese losses. The capture of Ormoc disrupted enemy supply lines, marking a pivotal victory that forced the Japanese to keep sending troops into a deteriorating situation. This episode is the Invasion of Mindoro Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Building on our discussion from last week, there were several other events occurring simultaneously with the fall of Ormoc on December 10. At Buri, following a half-hour of concentrated artillery fire, the 1st Battalion of the 149th Regiment launched a final assault that swiftly cleared the airstrip and eliminated the enemy paratrooper forces. Later that evening, the 3rd Battalion of the 13th Independent Regiment arrived in the area in a disorganized state after a challenging march, and with their last reserves of strength, they attacked Burauen town.  At 19:30 the Japanese launched their final concentrated attack against the airfields. They began to fire at the administration buildings of the Fifth Air Force, and some of the bullets went through the plywood walls of the house of Maj. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead. "The General ducked a bullet, ordered someone to find out who the blankety-blank was responsible and that he'd blankety-blank better stop or think up a blankety-blank good reason." The air force personnel were pushed back until they reached the hospital, where they halted and held. They then counterattacked and drove the enemy away from the area. The Japanese left thirty of their dead behind them. This marked the retreat of the surviving Japanese forces, indicating the conclusion of the battle for the airstrips. Meanwhile, General Arnold's 7th Division continued its limited offensive through the challenging mountainous terrain, with the 17th and 184th Regiments reaching Malitbog by the end of the day. To the north, General Cunningham's 2nd Squadron, which had been engaged with the bulk of the 102nd Division, was finally relieved by the 2nd Squadron of the 7th Cavalry, initiating their westward movement to rejoin the rest of the regiment at the Leyte River. There, the 126th and 127th Regiments struggled to breach the defenses of the 1st Regiment, while the 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments made slow progress through the mountains towards Mount Cabungaan, effectively bypassing the Mount Pina position.  In the process of reducing the Japanese-held area, it was estimated that an enemy force of 500 to 600 men had been wiped out. From 28 November to 9 December, the 12th Cavalry remained in the Mt. Badian and Hill 2348 sector, sent out westward patrols, and slowly moved westward. On 10 December, General Sibert decided to have elements of the 1st Cavalry Division debouch from the mountains onto Highway 2 south of the 32d Division and in the Lonoy area. This move was to be concurrent with the expected advance of the 32d Division down the highway. The 1st Squadron, 12th Cavalry, was in the vicinity of Mt. Cabungaan, and the 2d Squadron, on Hill 2348, was 2,000 yards northeast of the 1st Squadron. An enemy strong point existed to the north of the perimeter of the 1st Squadron. The 12th Cavalry spent 10 December in making preparations for a two-squadron assault against this enemy force. The plan was for the 1st Squadron to attack at 0830 while the 2d Squadron from Hill 2348 supported the attack by enveloping the left flank of the enemy. In furtherance of this plan Troop E of the 2d Squadron moved off Hill 2348 at 0800 toward the southwest and dug in for the night just north of Mt. Cabungaan. On the morning of 11 December, an intense mortar and artillery concentration was placed upon the enemy position in front of the 1st Squadron. The fire was so close that fragments frequently fell on the waiting assault troops. After this fire, the 1st Squadron with Troop A in the lead moved out at 0715. At the same time Troop E attacked from the northeast. The enemy defenses consisted of seven or eight pillboxes and many caves dug into the very rugged terrain. The men of Troop A, closely followed by Troop B, charged up the hill "throwing grenades and firing from the hip." The hill fell to the 1st Squadron at 1003 after very heavy hand-to-hand fighting. Troop E had been held up by the terrain and was unable to assist the 1st Squadron. After the capture of the Japanese position, patrols established contact with Troop E at 1200. The regimental reconnaissance platoon returned from the vicinity of Lonoy with the information that the Japanese had prepared strong defensive positions in that area. The platoon had gained a good observation point 900 yards east of Lonoy. The next several days were spent in sending out patrols and moving the 2d Squadron to the position of the 1st Squadron. Meanwhile, on December 9, Admiral Okawachi had launched what would turn out to be his final TA convoy. This convoy, consisting of three destroyers, two subchasers, and six transport ships carrying the Takahashi Detachment and the Ito Naval Landing Unit, departed from Manila on December 9. A day earlier, the Camotes Detachment had also been dispatched individually via landing barges. In light of the recent enemy landings at Deposito, three units were assigned to deploy in Ormoc and support General Tomochika's forces in defending the city. However, by December 11, Ormoc had already succumbed, and the convoy finally arrived in Leyte, where it was immediately targeted by American fighter planes. Near Palompon, two transports were struck and left immobilized, prompting an urgent order for the Takahashi Detachment to disembark there and assist the Camotes Detachment during its landing at Palompon. Meanwhile, two destroyers and two transports carrying the Ito Naval Landing Unit continued to Ormoc, where four American destroyers awaited them. This led to a chaotic battle, as artillery, mortars, tank destroyers, and the destroyer Coghlan opened fire on the transports as they unloaded the SNLF Marines northwest of Ormoc. Consequently, one transport was sunk, and another was damaged, necessitating an escort back to Palompon to offload its remaining cargo. Despite this, over 200 Marines managed to land by nightfall, although they could not connect with the Imahori Detachment situated north of Ormoc.  At 2330 on 11 December the 77th Division beach defense units observed a Japanese convoy, which was transporting the Special Naval Landing Force, steaming into Ormoc Bay with the apparent intention of landing at Ormoc. The Japanese evidently thought that Ormoc was still in their hands. The first craft noticed by the U.S. forces was a landing barge with about fifty men, heading directly for the Ormoc pier. By the time the barge came within range of the shore weapons, all shore units were alert and waited with guns trained upon it. They withheld their fire until the barge was within fifty yards of the pier and then all weapons converged their fires upon the craft. The first rounds squarely hit the barge, which immediately burst into flames. The Japanese clambered atop the gunwales and are reported to have screamed, "Don't shoot," under the mistaken notion that their forces still occupied Ormoc. The harbor was lit up by the burning barge and 60-mm. illuminating shells. During the night the Americans discovered that another enemy vessel, about the size of an LST, had pulled into shore northwest of the town under cover of darkness and was busily engaged in discharging troops and equipment. The tank destroyer guns of the 307th Infantry, emplaced along the beach within 1,000 yards of the vessel, opened fire on it while forward observers from the 902d Field Artillery Battalion directed artillery fire upon the landing area and inland. The enemy vessel attempted to pull out to sea, but after proceeding less than fifty yards it burst into flames and sank. About 150 men, two tanks, a number of rifles, mortars, and machine guns, and a quantity of ammunition had been unloaded before the vessel sank, but most of the supplies, including four ammunition trucks, had been destroyed by American fire while the vessel was unloading. The early dawn of 12 December revealed another ship of the same type farther west near Linao. The artillery, mortars, and tank destroyer guns opened up against this vessel as it fled along the shores of Ormoc Bay, and their fire followed until it was out of range. Before the fire ceased, heavy clouds of smoke billowed from the vessel as it moved at a snail's pace. During the night the American fire had to be closely coordinated, since American vessels, including a resupply convoy, were in the bay. Not a single U.S. craft was damaged. Troops of the Special Naval Landing Force who had disembarked got in touch with Colonel Imahori, who immediately ordered them to go to Highway 2 as the reserve unit of the 12th Independent Infantry Regiment. It was impossible for them to carry out the order, since the 77th Division had advanced north from Ormoc. They thereupon decided to join a naval airfield construction unit at Valencia, but again they failed. In the latter part of December, the men of the Special Naval Landing Force were in the eastern part of the Palompon area without having taken part in the battle for the Ormoc corridor. On the journey back to Manila, the Uzuki was sunk by two PT boats near Leyte on December 12. The rest of the convoy was also assaulted by 46 aircraft off Cebu, leading to the sinking of the Yuzuki and one transport. This incident marked the final TA convoy of the war, as the fall of Ormoc made the operation pointless. Similarly, plans for a counterlanding at Carigara Bay with the 39th Regiment were also scrapped. The nine TA convoys successfully transported an estimated 45,000 men and 10,000 tons of supplies and equipment to Leyte; however, this came at a significant cost. The Southwest Area Fleet incurred losses that included one light cruiser, nine destroyers, three submarines, three subchasers, two frigates, and 26 transports. Additionally, during enemy carrier strikes on Luzon and the Visayas, the fleet lost one heavy cruiser, two light cruisers, five destroyers, one submarine, three subchasers, three frigates, 19 transports, and four oilers. On December 11, General Bruce launched an aggressive defense of Ormoc, planning to advance his troops daily to establish new forts or blockhouses by nightfall until Valencia was secured. Consequently, the 307th Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 306th Regiment attempted to cross the Antilao River but encountered intense fire and were quickly pinned down. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion of the 306th managed to advance despite facing increasing resistance from the Imahori Detachment at Cogon but was ultimately compelled to withdraw due to heavy enemy fire. At the same time, the bulk of the 305th Regiment repositioned to the right of the 307th, while the 17th and 184th Regiments completed their limited offensive, successfully crossing the Talisayan River without opposition and reaching the Binoljo area, with the 2nd Battalion of the 184th advancing to Ipil to establish contact with the 77th Division. At this stage, General Yamagata's units had retreated into the mountains, regrouping north of Talisanyan to initiate their final withdrawal to Ormoc. However, their escape route had been entirely cut off, and they were being pursued from the east by the bulk of General Swing's 11th Airborne Division. As General Gill's offensive progressed, his infantry began assaulting enemy artillery positions in the north. Simultaneously, the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry launched an attack against the 102nd Division units; however, the defenders managed to hold the cavalrymen back at the hill's base. Meanwhile, General Suzuki was hastily retreating toward Huaton, where he was expected to arrive by December 13. His strategy involved waiting for the 5th and 77th Regiments to reach his position before executing a robust counterattack to reclaim Ormoc. The 68th Brigade was tasked with bolstering the beleaguered 1st Division, which had incurred over 3,000 casualties since the start of hostilities. Returning to the frontline developments, the previous day's intense fighting compelled Bruce to solidify his positions on December 12. He organized the delivery of supplies and supporting artillery to bombard enemy defenses while dispatching strong patrols for reconnaissance. At the same time, the 17th and 184th Regiments successfully gathered at the Panilahan River in preparation to reinforce the 77th Division. On the following day, after a significant artillery bombardment, a specialized attack force led by Colonel Paul Freeman, comprising two companies from the 305th Regiment, was dispatched to assault Colonel Imahori's primary blockhouse at Cogon. Meanwhile, the remainder of the regiment targeted other enemy positions along the ridge. While the infantry managed to advance to the ridge, Freeman's companies were unable to progress further, ultimately forcing the 305th to retreat. Simultaneously, the 307th Regiment advanced westward along the Ormoc-Linao road and successfully captured Linao. Although the 77th Division had pushed its western boundary forward by approximately 1,000 yards during the day, the central front lines remained largely unchanged since morning, necessitating General Bruce to launch another attack the following day. Meanwhile, Arnold sent the 32nd Regiment to connect with the 11th Airborne Division to aid in its withdrawal from the mountains.  On the morning of 13 December the 2d Battalion, 126th Infantry, with the assistance of its tanks and heavy mortars, pushed past the Japanese who had held up its advance. In the face of most determined opposition the battalion moved south, destroying the pockets of resistance which had been bypassed. At the end of the day the 2d Battalion had advanced 400 yards to a position 200 yards north of a roadblock set up by the 3d Battalion, 126th Infantry. The 3d Battalion, less Company L, which was to remain on the high ground overlooking the road, was to attack south on the east side of Highway 2 and come abreast of the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry. At 1521 the 3d Battalion reported that six enemy tanks were coming up the highway. After heavy fighting, the Japanese tanks withdrew at nightfall and returned to the south. The 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry, the southernmost unit of the division, made plans to dislodge the enemy force between it and the 3d Battalion. The contested ground consisted of an open space 600 to 700 yards long and 200 to 300 yards wide, at the southern end of which were two knolls. The 1st Battalion had men on both knolls but did not control the northern end of the sector where the Japanese had dug in and were using machine guns, mortars, and rifles. The 1st Battalion charged against the Japanese and rooted them out with grenades and mortar fire. Except for this action, only slight gains were registered during the day. The men of the battalion were hungry, having been without food since the previous afternoon. The commanding officer of the battalion renewed a request for additional rations and ammunition, since the one-third ration that had been received the day before was insufficient. The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 127th Infantry received orders from the regimental commander to advance south with the 1st Battalion on the left, pinch out the 3d Battalion, 126th Infantry, and link up with the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry. The 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, moved out in a column of companies and had advanced 400 yards when it encountered forty to fifty Japanese on a ridge to its front, about 150 yards west of the road. The enemy threw blocks of TNT and grenades against the battalion, effectively pinning down the troops. A night perimeter was established. The 2d Battalion, 127th Infantry, moved abreast of the regiment's 1st Battalion throughout the day. Its advance was bitterly contested by the Japanese, who employed machine guns, mortars, and rifles against the battalion, which dug in for the night under fire. At 1630 the 11th Field Artillery Battalion fired upon fifteen Japanese who were walking along the road south of Lonoy and killed twelve of them. The night of 13-14 December was not quiet. At 2300 an enemy force from the 1st Infantry Regiment broke into the command post of the 126th Infantry. The Japanese set up a machine gun in the area and attacked with grenades and rifles. Bitter hand-to-hand fighting ensued but by 0325 the enemy force was evicted and the area had quieted down. At 0630, with the coming of dawn, the Headquarters Company got things in order and everyone was "happy to hear sound of comrade's voices." Six Japanese were killed and two Americans and two Filipinos wounded. On December 14, nearly all battalions of the 126th and 127th Regiments were actively advancing and maintaining physical contact with one another, successfully pushing over two miles south of Limon. At 0730 on the morning of 13 December, the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, moved out and came under fire from two Japanese machine guns well emplaced on a cliff. The ridge narrowed to ten feet with sixty-degree slopes, making forward passage almost impossible. The troops were pinned down. In the meantime, Troop F of the squadron worked south in an attempt to envelop the rear of the enemy force but was unable to do so and returned. The 2d Squadron established night perimeters near the same positions it had held the previous night. On the following morning the 75-mm. and 105-mm. artillery and the 4.2-inch and 60-mm. mortars began to register heavy fire on the Japanese strong point. At 1200 Troop G of the 2d Squadron jumped off, attacking the enemy position frontally while Troop F moved in from the rear. Employing flame throwers, Troop G steadily pushed forward and by 1445 had knocked out four enemy bunkers and destroyed several machine guns. Of more importance, it was fifty yards beyond the enemy front lines. Troop F also continued to advance. By the end of the day the enemy force had been rooted off the high ground, and the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, was in firm possession of the ridge. The unit captured a quantity of enemy ordnance, including 12 light and 3 heavy machine guns, 9 grenade launchers, and 73 rifles, together with considerable quantities of grenades and ammunition. Before the ridge was secured, "over 5000 rounds of artillery fire had been placed on [the] . . . position without appreciably affecting it." On 14 December, the 12th Cavalry was ordered to continue west to Highway 2 and assist the advance of the 32d Division, to establish a roadblock on the highway, and to attack the hostile forces to the north between it and the 32d Division. In furtherance of this order, the 1st Squadron, less A and C Troops, moved west on 15 December toward a previously reconnoitered area that was about 1,800 yards east of the barrio of Lonoy. This site, a banana plantation, was chosen for its observation facilities to the west and as an excellent dropping ground for supplies. The 1st Squadron, having encountered little opposition, closed on the area before dusk. Thereupon the rest of the regiment was ordered to close in on the area before nightfall on 17 December. At 0930 on 14 December Colonel Freeman prepared his special assault force to renew the attack. Before the jump-off, artillery and mortars laid their fire on the blockhouse and beyond. Under cover of artillery fire the troops cautiously moved out at 1030 with Company L on the right and by 1105 they had advanced 100 yards. Company L knocked out two pillboxes with flame throwers and a tank destroyer gun. Company E found every step of the way contested. The troops used hand grenades and bayonets and literally forced the enemy out of the foxholes in tough hand-to-hand fighting. Capt. Robert B. Nett, the commanding officer of Company E, although seriously wounded, refused to relinquish his command. He led his company forward and killed seven Japanese with his rifle and bayonet. Captain Nett was awarded the Medal of Honor. While Company E was so engaged, Company L on its right advanced through dense foliage and burnt the Japanese out of their foxholes and the bamboo thicket with flame throwers. The company was assisted by armored bulldozers from the 302d Engineers. For a hundred yards on all sides of the blockhouse, the enemy had dug many deep foxholes only a few yards apart. All the foxholes were covered, some with coconut logs and earth, and others with improvised lids of metal and earth. One was protected by an upturned bathtub. The armored bulldozer drove over the positions, its blades cutting off the tops of the foxholes, after which small arms fire into the holes killed the occupants. The crews of the tank destroyers not only fired point-blank at targets but opened the escape hatches and dropped grenades into the foxholes. At 1240 the blockhouse, or what remained of it, was secured. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 305th Regiment executed a flanking maneuver around the blockhouse, subsequently shifting 1,000 yards to the east to intercept the enemy's communication lines along Highway 2. On December 15, the 77th Division consolidated its positions and dispatched small patrols, effectively securing the port of Ormoc. Since the initial landings, the 77th estimated that they had killed 3,046 Japanese soldiers and captured 9 prisoners at the expense of 103 soldiers killed, 318 wounded, and 26 missing. With the 184th Regiment taking over the defense of Ormoc, Bruce's troops were now able to prepare for their advance toward Valencia and beyond, aiming to connect with General Sibert's 10th Corps, which was still making its way southward. However, we must shift our focus from Leyte to address another significant development in the Philippines.  While Admiral Nimitz was strategizing his invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa—topics we will delve into further in the future—General MacArthur reluctantly postponed the Mindoro operation until December 15 to give Admiral Kinkaid time to assemble a robust escort carrier group to protect General Dunckel's Western Visayan Task Force during its landing on Mindoro. This group, composed of six escort carriers, three aging battleships, three cruisers, and 18 destroyers commanded by Rear-Admiral Theodore Ruddock, was tasked with safeguarding Admiral Struble's Task Group 78.3, now renamed the Mindoro Attack Group, alongside Admiral Berkey's Close Covering Group, which included three cruisers and seven destroyers. Additionally, Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 was ordered to assist Operation Love with a series of strikes against the main airbases on Luzon. Although the prime airfield locations on Mindoro were situated in the northeast, perilously close to Japanese air concentrations in Luzon, MacArthur chose to establish a beachhead and airfield sites near San Jose in the southwest corner. The 503rd Parachute Regiment was designated to land on the Green and Blue Beaches around the Bugsanga River, while the majority of the 19th Regiment would come ashore at the White Beach near Mangarin Bay. Meanwhile, General Yamashita had been convinced since early November that Leyte would fall, prompting him to strategize for the defense of Luzon. He thought the Americans would try to establish advance air bases in the western Visayas rather than on Mindoro, as the Japanese believed Mindoro had limited suitable locations for operational airfield construction. This belief hindered Yamashita's ability to reinforce either these positions or the already weakened defenses on Luzon, as Field Marshal Terauchi persistently pressured him to send all available reinforcements to Leyte. Realizing he could not engage in a decisive battle on Luzon without substantial reinforcements, Yamashita began planning a delaying defense strategy, where his existing forces would conduct operations aimed at exhausting enemy resources. In preparation for the worst-case scenario, the 14th Area Army started organizing positions for a prolonged defense in the mountainous regions around Baguio and north of San Jose, west of Tarlac, and east of Manila. At this stage, Yamashita had the 61st Independent Mixed Brigade stationed on the Batan and Babuyan Islands, the 103rd Division in northern Luzon, the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade in the Lingayen Gulf area, the 2nd Tank Division near San Miguel-Cabanatuan, the 8th Division in Batangas Province, the 11th Independent Regiment in the sectors around Baler and Dingalan Bay, the 82nd Brigade in the Lamon Bay region, the remainder of the 105th Division in the Legaspi and Naga areas, and most of the 23rd Division in the San Jose and Umingan sectors. In addition, the Manila Defense Force, established on November 1, comprised four provisional infantry battalions and five infantry companies, tasked with defending Manila and the Bataan Peninsula. Furthermore, the 8th Division was charged with the defense of Mindoro; however, the island was only protected by two provisional companies from the 359th Independent Battalion, which were deployed there to bolster the local naval garrisons and air personnel. On December 12, Struble's convoy finally set sail from Leyte Gulf towards Mindoro. Struble's forces steamed on through the Mindanao Sea unmolested until the afternoon of 13 December. Japanese Army and Navy planes had had the three groups under surveillance since 0900, but had not attacked pending receipt of information on the force's destination. In midafternoon ten Japanese Navy planes, including three designated as suicide bombers--the dread kamikazes--flew up from a field on Cebu and found the Allied force off the southeastern corner of Negros Island. Unobserved by lookouts and undetected by radar, which nearby land masses blanketed, one kamikaze flew in low over the water and crashed with a mighty roar on the light cruiser Nashville, Admiral Struble's flagship. Combined explosions from the plane's bomb and ship's ammunition wrecked the flag bridge, the communications office, and the combat information center. Over 130 men were killed outright, including General Dunckel's chief of staff, the 310th Bombardment Wing's commander, Admiral Struble's chief of staff, and Task Group 78.3's communications and medical officers. The wounded, numbering about 190, included Dunckel, who was painfully but not seriously injured and burned. Struble and Dunckel quickly transferred to the destroyer Dashiell, which also took aboard some of the members of both officers' staffs. The rest of the staffs and the wounded sailed back to Leyte on the Nashville, protected by the destroyer Stanly. Later that afternoon, another kamikaze struck the destroyer Haraden, which also had to return to Leyte, resulting in 15 fatalities and 25 injuries. Additionally, Admiral Shima's 2nd Striking Force was instructed to relocate from Lingga to Camranh Bay in anticipation of a potential sortie. Despite this, the Americans continued their advance, and fortunately for them, the Japanese were searching in the western Visayas, causing them to miss the opportunity to attack on December 14. Meanwhile, McCain's carriers launched a significant strike against Luzon, while Ruddock's carriers effectively diverted enemy attention with attacks on air concentrations in Panay and Negros Islands. By late afternoon of the 14th the location of the convoy in the southern waters of Mindoro Strait made it clear that the objective lay beyond the western Visayas. For the first time Fourteenth Area Army estimated that the landing would take place on Mindoro and ordered the 8th Division to alert its outposts there. It was also a serious possibility,, however, that the enemy might strike directly at Luzon. General Yamashita therefore issued a warning to Area Army forces throughout central Luzon. As a further precaution, the Nagayoshi Detachment, which was awaiting shipment to Leyte, and the 71st Infantry Regiment of the 23d Division, which had just reached Manila, were ordered to deploy immediately to Bataan Peninsula and Batangas, respectively, to meet potential enemy landings in those sectors. The Navy and air commands in Manila saw much greater probability of a landing on Luzon than on Mindoro. They therefore directed all subordinate units and installations to prepare for action against both enemy amphibious forces and possible airborne attack groups. Additionally, Army and Navy aircraft were quickly organized to target enemy shipping. Meanwhile, Struble's convoy anchored near San Jose and began preparations for the landings, which would catch the few defenders of Mindoro off guard. As troops transferred to the landing crafts and surface vessels commenced the pre-landing bombardment, McCain's carrier aircraft launched another assault on Luzon, inflicting substantial casualties. Assisted by Ruddock's carriers, they successfully shot down eight out of fifteen kamikaze attackers targeting the shipping off the island. For the loss of 35 aircraft, the Americans estimated they destroyed around 450 Japanese planes during this operation. Nevertheless, the Japanese continued their assault, damaging two LSTs that would later sink, as well as one LSM. In the heroic action, the destroyer USS Moale (DD-693), under the command of Commander Walter M. Foster, went alongside the burning LST-738 (which was loaded with aviation fuel and ordnance) to rescue crewmembers. Several explosions aboard LST-738 caused damage to Moale as she pulled away. Some pieces of shrapnel were two feet square and they put four holes in Moale's hull. Gunner's Mate Ed Marsh reported that a one-gallon jar of vaseline from the LST's cargo splattered on one barrel of his twin 40 mm Bofors AA gun, providing unwelcome lubrication. Moale suffered one fatality and thirteen wounded. In addition, Moale also rescued 88 survivors. Despite this damage, they were unable to prevent the successful landings of the 19th Regiment and the 503rd Parachute Regiment, which quickly unloaded and advanced seven miles inland to secure the objective beachhead line. Consequently, the few Japanese units present in the area were compelled to retreat inland toward Bulalacao. Meanwhile, engineers promptly began construction on the new Hill Drome, which would be completed by December 20. The second Ellmore Field was projected to be ready for limited use three days later and for continuous dry-weather operations by December 28, a week ahead of schedule. On the morning of December 16, a slow-moving tow convoy consisting of small tankers, barges, and LCTs, accompanied by destroyers, arrived off Mindoro after suffering the loss of a small Army tanker that was sunk and a destroyer that was damaged by kamikaze attacks during the journey. Concurrently, McCain carried out his final strike against Luzon, unfortunately resulting in the sinking of the hellship Oryoku Maru, which was carrying 1,620 prisoners of war, with over 200 lives lost. The burden of taking their fellow soldiers' lives would not be the only consequence for the Americans, as the fierce Typhoon Cobra soon battered Task Force 38, sinking the destroyer Spence and damaging nine additional warships. Despite these significant losses, the Mindoro operation was ultimately a complete success. Although MacArthur aimed to launch his amphibious invasion of Lingayen Gulf just 15 days after capturing Mindoro, considerations such as the lunar and tidal conditions at Lingayen Gulf, the necessity to rest and replenish the units of Kinkaid's 7th Fleet, and the ongoing slow progress in airfield construction on Leyte—required for establishing a much larger airbase at Mindoro—ultimately compelled him to delay Operation Mike I until January 9. Conversely, the invasion of Mindoro, signaling that the final advance on Luzon would soon take place, prompted Terauchi to recognize that Leyte was a lost cause. As a result, the decisive battle at Leyte was immediately halted, the 35th Army was instructed to hold the southern Philippines for as long as possible, and the 14th Area Army was ordered to expedite its defensive preparations on Luzon and quickly respond to the enemy landing on Mindoro. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Intense battles unfolded as American forces aggressively pushed back a chaotic Japanese retreat, marking a pivotal moment in the fight for Ormoc, while enemy convoys faced destruction and retreat marked the war's shifting tide. US forces battled fiercely on Leyte and Mindoro, overcoming Japanese resistance and kamikaze attacks to secure key positions for the Luzon invasion.

In Depth
How Figma taps into taste, simplicity, and storytelling | Yuhki Yamashita (CPO at Figma, ex-Uber, Google, Microsoft)

In Depth

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 5, 2024 69:52


Yuhki Yamashita is the Chief Product Officer at Figma, leading the product and design teams. Previously, he was a product and design leader at Uber, where he orchestrated the redesign of the rider and driver apps. Yuhki was also a product manager at Google (YouTube iOS app) and Microsoft (Hotmail). Additionally, he has taught introductory computer science at Harvard University. In today's episode, we discuss: How Figma approaches new products, prioritization, and storytelling Product culture at Uber, Microsoft, Google The difference between “good” and “extraordinary” PMs Tactical advice for storytelling The “un-learning” required in new jobs and industries – Referenced: Figjam: https://www.figma.com/figjam/ Figma: https://www.figma.com/ Figma Dev Mode: https://www.figma.com/dev-mode/ Figma Slides: https://www.figma.com/slides/ – Where to find Yuhki: LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/yuhki/ Twitter/X: https://x.com/yuhkiyam – Where to find Brett: LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/brett-berson-9986094/ Twitter/X: https://twitter.com/brettberson – Where to find First Round Capital: Website: https://firstround.com/ First Round Review: https://review.firstround.com/ Twitter/X: https://twitter.com/firstround YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@FirstRoundCapital This podcast on all platforms: https://review.firstround.com/podcast – (00:00) Introduction (02:50) Figma's early days (09:11) Product culture across companies (13:42) Knowing when to change things (17:40) How business goals impact product expansion (21:00) Advice for going multi-product (24:30) The skills of a “0 to 1” PM (27:36) Identifying entrepreneurial talent (29:06) Why aren't there more designer founders? (35:22) How Figma launches new products (41:19) “0 to 1” versus “1 to 10” talent (46:01) The role of storytelling at Figma (49:22) How Figma prioritizes product (55:11) Advice for product storytelling (59:02) “Good” vs “extraordinary” product managers (61:21) Why product simplicity matters (63:52) The importance of taste in product and design (67:56) The biggest influence on Yuhki's product thinking

The Pacific War - week by week
- 159 - Pacific War Podcast - The Fall of Ormoc - December 3 - 10 - , 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 3, 2024 46:02


Last time we spoke about Operation Capital. In late November, General Gill's 32nd Division secured Limon and aimed for Ormoc, while General Arnold's 7th Division prepared to flank Japanese forces. Intense fighting marked the attack on Kilay Ridge, resulting in a costly victory for the Americans. Meanwhile, Japanese operations faltered as supplies dwindled. By December, Allied plans for Luzon's invasion were set, but delays in securing air support complicated the Mindoro operation. Across the seas, naval battles raged, revealing the fierce struggle for control in the Pacific. In December, the Chinese launched renewed attacks on fortified Japanese positions in Bhamo, but faced fierce resistance. While the 113th Regiment struggled, the 114th found early success aided by coordinated artillery and air support. As casualties mounted, General Honda ordered reinforcements for Hara's garrison, leading to a desperate counterattack. Despite heavy losses, Japanese forces managed to retreat to safety. Amid ongoing skirmishes, the Allies realized their strategies would need revision to face the shifting tide of battle effectively. This episode is the Fall of Ormoc Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Last we left off,  the Japanese were preparing to initiate their Wa offensive, General Arnold's troops had successfully taken control of Shoestring Ridge and were poised to launch a fresh attack aimed at Ormoc. By December 4, the tanks of the 776th Amphibian Tank Battalion were positioned near Balogo, ready to strike the enemy positions ahead of the main assault. The next morning, these tanks targeted the weakened Japanese defenses at Balogo and Tabgas before subsequently withdrawing.There were numerous finger ridges inland which were cut by deep ravines and gorges that came to within a few hundred yards of the coast line. The entrenched Japanese, using reverse slope tactics, were able to deliver deadly fire on the advancing infantry. In many cases the reverse slopes were so steep that effective artillery fire could not be placed upon them. The 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, moved forward slowly toward a small hill which faced the Palanas River, and at 0858 it encountered enemy small arms fire from the western slope of the hill. Using grenades, the battalion pushed forward, but at 0938 the Japanese opened up with three light machine guns. The supporting weapons of the 2d Battalion fired on the enemy positions to the front. At 1037, as the battalion reached the military crest of the hill, the Japanese launched a small counterattack on the left flank of Company E. This attack was repulsed, but the companies continued to receive small arms and machine gun fire. At 1325 the 1st Battalion renewed its advance and proceeded without incident, finding the situation "very quiet" to its front. At 1435 the battalion dug in for the night approximately 300 yards south of Balogo. The 3d Battalion moved through the gap between the 1st and 2d Battalions and across the front of the 2d Battalion on the right toward Hill 380, which consisted of a series of ridges. As the 3d Battalion advanced toward the hill, it came under machine gun fire on each flank. With artillery support, the troops reached the top of the second ridge of Hill 380 and dug in, nine of the men having been wounded. At 1635 the battalions of the 184th Infantry received orders to set up night defense positions in depth and to hold the "positions at all costs." Colonel O'Sullivan decided that the 3d Battalion was to bear the brunt of the advance of the 184th Infantry on 6 December and push on to Hill 380. On the right of the 184th the 17th Infantry had had a busy day in working toward its objective, Hill 918. At 0800 on 5 December the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 17th Infantry, with the 1st Battalion on the left, had moved through the 32d Infantry. At 0906 the advance elements of the 1st Battalion secured a ridge south of the main ridge leading from Hill 918, and at 1000 the entire battalion closed on this ridge. In the face of sporadic rifle and machine gun fire, the leading platoons pushed forward to secure a ridge that led west from Hill 918. As the advance platoons neared the crest of this ridge, they received intense rifle, machine gun, and mortar fire to the front and on both flanks from the 2d Battalion, 12th Independent Infantry Regiment. At the same time the rest of the battalion, in attempting to reach a forward ridge and support the leading platoons, also encountered cross fire that came down the intervening draw. As enemy gunfire pinned down the troops, the 1st Battalion lost contact with Company G, 2d Battalion, and a gap developed between the 1st and 2d Battalions. At the end of 5 December the 17th Infantry had secured the ridge west of Hill 918 and the 184th Infantry had secured a line extending from the beach 300 yards south of Balogo east to the high ground southeast of the Palanas River. Company K, 32d Infantry, had filled a gap that had existed between the 17th and 184th Infantry Regiments, while the 3d Battalion, 184th Infantry, had crossed the Palanas River and, advancing up the southwest slope of Hill 380, reached the top of the first ridge.  The next day the 2d Battalion had driven forward with Company E on the right and Company G on the left. Company E went east along the Bucan River for approximately 1,000 yards and then turned northeast to ascend Hill 918. At first, however, the company had to secure a small ridge southwest of Hill 918 on which was a small but dense banana grove. Company E encountered and destroyed a small enemy force on this ridge, after which the company reorganized and at approximately 1300 began to ascend Hill 918 itself. When Company E reached the military crest of the hill, the Japanese began heavy firing with grenade launchers and at least three machine guns. The enemy fire swept the crest of the hill and prevented any movement over the lip of the ridge. Meanwhile, Company G went to the left of Company E and secured a small ridge about 1,200 yards from the line of departure and west of Hill 918. The advance platoon of Company G then received fire from automatic weapons that were emplaced in a draw to the left front of the platoon. The rest of the company attempted to move around to the right of the ridge but also encountered automatic weapons fire coming from another draw. Since high cogon grass covered the area, observation was limited to a matter of inches. At about 1300, elements of the 13th Independent Infantry Regiment counterattacked through a gap between Company G and Company A of the 1st Battalion. A machine gun platoon, which was thrown in to plug the gap, succeeded in stopping the attempted Japanese advance. Company G, however, continued to be pinned down by the enemy fire directed at its front. Company F, the reserve company, was then committed to take a position between G and E Companies. Its mission was to come abreast of Company E, take Hill 918, and then turn west and wipe out the resistance in front of Company G. At 1415 Company F moved up Hill 918 and reached Company E without opposition. Three spurs led down from Hill 918. The one occupied by Company E ran southwest, that occupied by Company F ran west, and the third ran northwest. As the two commanders started to launch a coordinated assault from their respective spurs, their companies received a concentration of about fifty rounds of mortar fire but pushed through this fire and secured the crests of both spurs. They immediately came under automatic weapons and rifle fire from the northwest ridge. Since the left flank of Company F was in the tall cogon grass, it was practically impossible for the company to observe the enemy. On the other hand, Company E was on bare and open ground which exposed it to machine gun and mortar fire from Hill 918. Both companies also came under long-range machine gun fire from the vicinity of Kang Dagit, northeast of Hill 918. It was impractical to attempt an envelopment to the right, since the flank of Company E rested on a deep ravine which ran to the bed of the Bagan River. An envelopment to the left would have necessitated going down the hill, circling behind Company G, and attacking east from the positions of the 1st Battalion. Because of these unfavorable conditions, Companies E and F with their wounded withdrew to make a line with Company G. Meanwhile, the Japanese continued their preparations for Operation Wa, which was already set to fail from the outset. General Makino's 16th Division could only advance a composite battalion of 500 men, which incurred 200 casualties en route. Additionally, General Yamagata's 26th Division was still mobilizing to reach the assembly area, with only one forward battalion prepared for action. Consequently, feeling inadequately prepared, General Suzuki requested a delay in the attack, and General Yamashita effectively rescheduled it to the night of December 6. From his new headquarters in Lubi, Suzuki communicated this update to the 16th and 26th Divisions, but due to radio issues, Makino was never informed. Meanwhile, General Bruce's 77th Division was organizing a risky amphibious invasion of Ormoc. As per General Hodge's strategy, Rear-Admiral Arthur Struble's Task Group 78.3, consisting of around a dozen destroyers, was assigned the task of transporting and landing the 77th Division, along with its supplies and equipment, at the barrio of Desposito located southeast of Ormoc. Upon landing, Bruce's forces were to advance northward, capture Ormoc, and then proceed up the Ormoc corridor to connect with units from General Sibert's 10th Corps. To facilitate this operation, the 5th Air Force would provide continuous air support—both day and night—for the assault convoy en route to the target, during the landings, and for the return trip. In addition, General Gill's 32nd Division was set to initiate an offensive southward along Highway 2 towards Ormoc while the 7th Division pressed northward to seize the elevated terrain south of the Panilahan River. Consequently, on December 5, the 127th Regiment commenced its advance past Colonel Hettinger's 3rd Battalion, facing staunch resistance from General Kataoka's 1st Division, which was well-entrenched on the high ground 1,000 yards south of the Leyte River bridge. The well-camouflaged enemy defenses consisted of numerous foxholes and ten-foot-deep spider holes, many of which were connected by interlacing communication trenches. The terrain that the troops traversed was adapted to defensive fighting, and the 1st Division took full advantage of this fact. There were deep ravines and steep hills where the enemy had dug in on both the forward and reverse slopes. The entire area was covered by heavy rain forest with dense underbrush. The nearly constant rainfall made observation difficult and the maps for the area were very inaccurate. The 77th Division continued to assemble its troops on Tarragona Beach, on the east coast of Leyte, and during the night of December 5 the loading of supplies and equipment on the landing ships began. The loading was slowed by frequent air alerts. The division had previously been told that the convoy would be unable to stay in the landing area more than two hours and consequently there was no attempt to bulk load supplies, since they would take too long to unload. All supplies and equipment to support the initial assault had to be mobile-loaded, that is, loaded on the vehicles taken with the division so that the supplies could be brought ashore in the vehicles upon debarkation. There were only 289 vehicles in the initial convoy, including tanks, M8s, and M10s that could not carry supplies. The LVTs were filled with supplies rather than troops in order that they could be discharged from the landing ships into the water and go ashore fully loaded. Furthermore, since the supplies were mobile they could be moved either by water or inland by motor. The 77th Division gave the highest priority to ammunition, water, and rations.  Makino also initiated his segment of the Wa offensive, with around 150 Japanese troops stealthily advancing towards the Buri airstrip. At that time, Major-General Joseph Swing's 11th Airborne Division was tasked with securing the Burauen area, although most of the division was engaged in combat for the mountain passes leading to Albuera. Additionally, Major-General Henry Jones' 38th Division had been deployed at Leyte to prepare for future operations but could also reinforce Swing, along with portions of General Bradley's 96th Division, if needed. At 06:00 on December 6, the 287th Field Artillery Observation Battalion, located northwest of Burauen, spotted Makino's troops crossing the main road south of their position and moving east toward the Buri field. While the artillery team communicated this information to the 24th Corps, the Japanese forces advanced into the swamp near the airfield prior to initiating their assault. At 06:30 the 16th Division launched its surprise attack. Led by a Filipino, the Japanese broke into the American bivouac area while the men were still asleep. Some were bayoneted while in their blankets, or before they could seize their weapons. Others held the Japanese off until they could retreat, shoeless and in their shorts and undershirts, either up the bluff to the headquarters of the 5th Bomber Command, or to the road, where an infantry company had come up in support. The service troops were "firing at everything that moves and… probably inflicting casualties among our troops."  Swift promptly responded by deploying the 1st Battalion of the 187th Glider Regiment to counterattack toward Buri, while Hodge assigned the 1st Battalion of the 382nd Regiment to Swift's command. The battalion was to proceed immediately to the aid of the two companies of the 11th Airborne Division in the Buri airfield area. General Hodge emphasized that the area was "critical" and "must be kept closed." It would be "dangerous" to let the enemy "get into the service troops along the road and around airfields." One reinforced company of the 1st Battalion was already in the area and the rest of the battalion made ready to follow. This reinforcement allowed one bolstered company to quickly support the service troops, effectively holding back the enemy while the glider units took position near the airfield. When the Americans launched a coordinated counteroffensive, they succeeded in driving the Japanese from the Buri airfield by nightfall, though some resistance remained at the edges of the airstrip. Meanwhile, Arnold maintained his offensive, with the 184th Regiment advancing through Hill 380 to secure Balogo, while the 17th Regiment captured the abandoned enemy positions on Hill 918 and moved up Hill 380 to join the 184th. By midday, the loading of the 77th Division was complete, and the convoy gathered off Dulag to await the arrival of Struble's escorting destroyers. At 13:30, Struble's main convoy set sail, having been preceded by four slower LSTs under the protection of two destroyers. While American transports and destroyers navigated silently toward Ormoc Bay, General Tominaga activated the airborne segment of Operation Wa. He planned to deploy an initial wave of 40 Mitsubishi Ki-57 transports, carrying 409 paratroopers, primarily targeting the Buri, San Pablo, and Bayug airstrips to capture them. In a related secondary attack, two pairs of transports would drop smaller groups of paratroopers over the Dulag and Tacloban airstrips to destroy as many American aircraft and facilities as possible. The transports would have Ki-43 fighters as escorts, and 21 medium bombers were dispatched to bomb and strafe the Buri, San Pablo, and Bayug airstrips shortly before the paratroopers' descent. Two additional waves were scheduled, the first five hours after the initial assault, comprising 270 troops in 21 aircraft, followed by a third wave of 80 soldiers six hours later. These follow-up operations were intended to assist in eliminating any remaining resistance, after which a defense would be established at the captured airfield. The primary goal of this operation was to incapacitate the enemy airstrips to ensure the safe arrival of the last TA convoys with critical reinforcements to Leyte. The attack was synchronized with Admiral Okawachi's eighth convoy, which included three destroyers, two subchasers, and five transport ships carrying Major-General Kurisu Takeo's 68th Brigade, having departed from Manila on December 5 and expected to reach Albuera two days later. After taking off at 15:30, Tominaga's first echelon headed towards the Burauen area. Just before dark, thirty-nine Japanese transports with supporting bombers and fighters roared over the Burauen airfields. Several incendiary bombs fell on the San Pablo strip, setting a gasoline dump afire and burning a liaison plane. Despite American fighters destroying 18 planes, they managed to deploy over 300 paratroopers by 19:00 following preparatory bombing and the deployment of a smoke screen. However, the intense anti-aircraft fire caused some confusion, leading pilots to drop soldiers at incorrect locations. Still, approximately 60 paratroopers descended on Buri, while more than 250 landed at San Pablo.  Meanwhile the secondary attacks on the Dulag and Tacloban strips completely miscarried. Two transports flew over the former installation; one dropped about five paratroopers and then crashed, while the other crashed about 4,500 yards northeast of the field. Over Tacloban two medium bombers converted to transports lowered their flaps and wheels preparatory to landing, but one was shot down, and the other crashed. Nonetheless, upon landing, the paratroopers quickly advanced along both the north and south sides of the San Pablo strip. They talked in loud tones and allegedly called out in English, "Hello--where are your machine guns?" Most of the enemy forces assembled on the north side of the airstrip. They burned three or four more liaison planes, a jeep, several tents, and another gasoline dump, throwing ammunition on the latter. Fortunately for the Americans, inclement weather combined with significant Japanese transport losses prevented the subsequent waves of reinforcements from being dispatched. On the night of 6-7 December, the Air Corps service personnel had abruptly quitted the Buri airfield, leaving behind carbines, rifles, grenades, small arms ammunition, and machine guns. 2d Lt. Rudolph Mamula of the 767th Tank Battalion had been ordered to take charge of the situation, co-ordinate the action of forces on the airstrip, and recover abandoned armament and ammunition. Apparently he was unsuccessful, because later in the day the Japanese made "the best use" of the same arms and ammunition. By the middle of the morning, on 7 December, the enemy had completely occupied the Buri airstrip. In response, Swift quickly ordered the 674th Glider Field Artillery Battalion to abandon their artillery and support the 127th Airborne Engineer Battalion, which was near San Pablo preparing to reclaim the airstrip. General Krueger also reacted swiftly, allocating two battalions from the 148th Regiment to Hodge's command, who dispatched them toward San Pablo. However, before their arrival, Swift's forces had already initiated their counteroffensive at dawn on December 7, successfully driving the paratroopers back to the northwest until they ran out of ammunition. Fortunately, the Japanese chose to retreat towards Buri rather than continue the battle at San Pablo. At 14:00, upon the arrival of the 148th battalions, Swift promptly ordered them to launch an attack towards Buri. The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 149th Infantry, 38th Division, were alerted at 0200 on 7 December for movement to the San Pablo airstrip. The advance elements of the 1st Battalion were greeted at the San Pablo airstrip by General Swing, who is reported to have said: "Glad to see you. I am General Swing of the 11th Airborne Division. We've been having a hell of a time here. Last night approximately seventy-five Jap paratroopers dropped on us of which we have accounted for about fifty. Fifteen hundred yards from here on an azimuth of 273° is another airstrip just like this one. Between here and there are about twenty-five Jap troopers. It is now 1400. I want that strip secure by nightfall." The commanding officer of the 1st Battalion decided to attack with Companies A and C abreast, Company A on the right, with approximately a 200-yard frontage for each company. A section of heavy machine guns was attached to each unit, and a platoon of 81-mm. mortars from Company D was to support the attack from positions on the San Pablo airstrip. The 1st Battalion set out at 14:30, moving the first 400 yards without any issues, but eventually encountered a rain-swollen swamp that impeded their progress, resulting in the companies losing contact with one another. By nightfall, only Companies A and C had reached the airstrip but were unable to initiate their attack due to the late hour. Simultaneously, the 1st Battalion of the 187th Glider Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 382nd Regiment advanced towards Buri and successfully joined the 1st Battalion of the 149th Regiment at the western end of the airstrip by the end of the day. In the meantime, Arnold continued his limited offensive on December 7, with the 184th Regiment facing little resistance as it ascended the high ground overlooking the Tabgas River.  At dawn the 17th Infantry sent out patrols. The one from the 1st Battalion located an enemy heavy machine gun, two light machine guns, and a mortar, emplaced 150 yards from the battalion's lines. When the patrol returned, mortar fire was placed on the position and it was wiped out. The 1st Battalion moved out at approximately 0900. Though long-range fire fell on the troops and small arms fire hit the left flank of Company C, the men continued to push forward. The battalion found several ridges leading up Hill 380--a knifelike ridge in front of Company C and a double ridge in the form of a horseshoe, with its closed end toward the hill, in front of Company B. Company B moved across the double ridge while Company C forced its passage through machine gun and rifle fire across the closed part of the horseshoe. At 1600 the two companies re-established contact on the northernmost ridge leading to Hill 380. At 1630 the Japanese with machine guns launched a counterattack against the right flank of the 3d Battalion, 184th Infantry, and the left flank of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry. The 3d Battalion, 184th, was pinned down but did not yield any ground. The troops on the front lines of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, at first were forced back slightly but in a few minutes regained the lost ground. They dug in for the night on the crest of the ridge. After its dawn patrols had reported on 7 December, the 2d Battalion, 17th Infantry, jumped off to the attack. Company E secured the first of the three spurs leading from Hill 380, and continued forward to the middle spur in the face of light fire that came from in front of the company in the area the 17th Infantry wished to secure. Presently the fire grew to considerable intensity and the company's section of light machine guns and two platoons of heavy machine guns moved onto the middle spur, where they neutralized the enemy position. While this action was going on, Companies G and F moved to the first spur. Company G received orders from the battalion commander to make a wide envelopment of Hill 380 and then assault the hill from the east. At 0930 the company dropped below the military crest of the southern slope of Hill 380 unobserved and made its way very slowly over the steep terrain and through the thick cogon grass. At 1200 the 49th Field Artillery Battalion laid a five-minute preparatory fire in front of the battalion. The American troops then routed the surprised Japanese defenders and killed the majority of them as the others fled into the mountains northeast of the hill. Apparently realizing that Hill 380 was the key to defense of the Tabgas River valley and Hill 606, troops of the 26th Division poured long-range machine gun fire from Hill 606 into Company G and at the same time halted the company with small arms fire from the immediate left along the ridge. At 1355, after a heavy mortar barrage, about fifty men from the 26th Division counterattacked the positions of Company G, but the company held firm and mowed down the attackers with fire from its rifles and automatic weapons. The position on the hill was maintained. Although Company G occupied the top of Hill 380, it was not in a position to aid the advance of Company E. The Japanese troops were dug in on the reverse slopes and could only be rooted out by close-in fighting. The commanding officer of the 2d Battalion committed Company F down the main spur from the east, supported by Companies E and G and the machine guns from Company H. As soon as Company F started down the ridge, the enemy concentrated fire upon it both from the north and the west. In a matter of minutes Company F was reduced to a point where the number of its riflemen hardly equaled one platoon. The company commander secured an additional platoon from Company G and renewed the assault behind a concentration of 100 rounds of 60-mm. mortar fire and 80 rounds of 81-mm. mortar fire. The attack succeeded, and the enemy force was overrun and annihilated. Company E thereupon moved to the main ridge and helped mop up the area. At 0700 the 3d Battalion, 17th Infantry, moved out, reaching the source of the Palanas River at 1400. An enemy force of about fifty men was observed in a natural bowl to its immediate front. The battalion placed long-range rifle and machine gun fire on the group as two platoons from Company K attacked from the flank. They destroyed the entire Japanese force without any casualties to the American troops. The 3d Battalion then crossed the Palanas River and went into night perimeter at Kang Cainto. At 1907 eight rounds of artillery fire fell into the area, killing seven men and wounding eighteen others. At the end of the day the 184th Infantry was on the banks of the Tabgas River and the 17th Infantry had secured Hill 380, which commanded the Tabgas River valley. Arnold's offensive had become so precarious that Yamagata was forced to halt his division's advance towards Burauen and instead redirect them to defend Albuera, only sending his advance battalion to participate in the Wa offensive. The situation was about to worsen for Yamagata as Struble's convoy finally arrived off Deposito just before dawn. At 06:34, an enemy shore battery opened fire, and at 06:40, the destroyers responded by targeting their assigned locations. As the Japanese communicated this information to higher command, Okawachi received orders to land the 68th Brigade at San Isidro. Additionally, the 1st Combined Base Air Force and the 4th Air Army were directed to unleash all their resources against the landing forces. With Suzuki absent, Major-General Tomochika Yoshiharu took charge of the defense of Ormoc, promptly instructing the Mitsui Shipping Unit to secure defensive positions on Red Roof Hill. Meanwhile, the Imahori Detachment was ordered to advance south through Ormoc to confront the enemy. Elements of the 77th Regiment, which had just arrived by barge at Ipil, were also tasked with reinforcing the defense of Ormoc. Furthermore, Suzuki commanded the 16th and 26th Divisions to halt the Wa offensive and retreat immediately towards Ormoc. In Manila, Okawachi and Yamashita were preparing to send two provisional companies from the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade to garrison the Camotes Islands to counter the arrival of enemy reinforcements and suppress guerrilla activity in the region. Meanwhile, after Okawachi's latest convoy was detected, 57 P-47s were dispatched to strike the Japanese vessels while the 68th Brigade was being disembarked. In one of the fiercest aerial battles of the Leyte Campaign, the fighters strafed the vessels and dropped 94 1000-pound and six 500-pound bombs on enemy shipping, successfully destroying all five transports and damaging two destroyers. However, the 68th Brigade landed, albeit lacking most of its equipment, supplies, and heavy weaponry. Back at Ormoc Bay, General Bruce's first wave, composed of the leading battalions from the 305th and 307th Regiments, successfully landed on the White Beaches without encountering opposition at 07:07, and the troops quickly moved inland. The subsequent four waves of troops, including two battalions from the 306th Regiment, came ashore without incident. At 08:20, around 138 Japanese aircraft launched an assault on Struble's convoy. Despite the 5th Air Force executing a commendable interception of the attackers, some determined enemy planes managed to breach the anti-aircraft defenses and strike the American ships. On the morning of December 7, three years to the day after she fired the opening shot of the Pearl Harbor attack, the destroyer Ward came under attack by several Japanese kamikazes while patrolling off the invasion area. One bomber hit her hull amidships, bringing her to a dead stop. When the resulting fires could not be controlled, Ward's crew was ordered to abandon ship, and she was sunk by gunfire from O'Brien, whose commanding officer, William W. Outerbridge, had been in command of Ward during her action in Hawaii three years before. Nevertheless, their attempt to thwart this crucial invasion once again ended in failure. By 11:00, approximately 10,000 troops and most of the supplies had been landed, but under relentless air attack, Struble ultimately decided to withdraw and return to San Pedro Bay. Meanwhile, Bruce's forces were expanding their initial beachhead inland, with the 305th Regiment capturing crossings over the Bagonbon River and the 307th Regiment securing a bridge over the Baod River. Due to a lack of organized resistance, Bruce chose to continue advancing north along the highway to extend the division's foothold to Ipil. Consequently, the 307th began its northward advance around 10:45, gradually facing stiffer opposition as it approached its goal. By 14:55, they reached the outskirts of Ipil and commenced an assault on the defenses of two companies from the 77th Regiment, successfully killing 66 Japanese soldiers as they cleared the barrio and established a night perimeter on the northern edge by 17:40. With Bruce's forces having secured a two-mile beachhead, Yamagata's 26th Division found itself caught between two robust American divisions, leaving the route to Ormoc largely open for the 77th Division. On December 8, as the first two companies of the 12th Independent Regiment arrived to bolster the Mitsui Shipping Unit, the 307th Regiment resumed its advance northward, swiftly reaching the Panalian River where they began meeting stronger resistance. Successfully repelling enemy counterattacks, the 307th continued to push forward and achieved a total gain of 2,000 yards by day's end. At the same time, since half of the 2nd Raiding Brigade could not be airdropped during the now-halted Wa offensive, the Japanese decided to land them at the Valencia airstrip over the coming days to reinforce the defenders in Ormoc. Furthermore, Okawachi and Yamashita designated the Takahashi Detachment, organized around the 5th Regiment, as an emergency reinforcement to depart for Leyte immediately alongside the Ito Naval Landing Unit of SNLF Marines. Additionally, the 39th Regiment of the 10th Division was assigned to prepare for a counter-landing in the Carigara Bay region. Meanwhile, as the 26th Division began to withdraw along the coast to retreat through the ridges towards Ormoc, the 184th and 17th Regiments captured the Hill 606 positions and moved forward to the Sibugay River. During the night of 7-8 December, the Japanese brought forward two machine guns and emplaced them directly in front of Company A of the 1st Battalion, 382d Infantry. At dawn the machine guns opened up. Their low, grazing fire pinned down the company, but Pfc. Warren G. Perkins, in the face of enemy bullets, located the guns and called mortar fire upon the site. The mortar concentration, falling within fifty yards of Perkins, silenced the machine guns and startled the Japanese. Pvt. Ova A. Kelley took advantage of the confusion and charged with his M1 rifle and a carbine. Kelley killed eight of the enemy before he himself was slain. The rest of Company A followed Kelley and secured the edge of the airstrip where it set up a perimeter. During 8 December the Americans consolidated their positions. The following day, the 1st Battalion of the 149th Regiment launched an assault to the north, successfully crossing the airstrip and eliminating approximately 50 paratroopers before being halted by enemy fire. By nightfall, the 1st Battalion of the 382nd Regiment repelled another determined counterattack, killing an additional 50 Japanese soldiers and leaving around 100 paratroopers trapped on the airstrip. Concurrently, the 17th and 184th Regiments advanced through Albuera without opposition, continuing their movement through challenging terrain towards Gungab. In the early hours of December 9, Struble's initial resupply convoy reached Deposito, delivering the remainder of the 306th Regiment. As a result, its 1st Battalion was assigned to the 307th Regiment and promptly engaged in the northward attack. Progressing gradually through the formidable enemy ridge defenses, the 307th ultimately captured Camp Downes, while the 305th Regiment secured the northeastern area. During this advance, the rest of the 77th Regiment also arrived by barge at Palompon, where they were immediately deployed to bolster the defenders in Ormoc.  Ormoc, the largest and most important commercial center in western Leyte, possessed a concrete and pile pier at which a vessel with a sixteen-foot draft, and two smaller vessels, could anchor at the same time. On the route to Ormoc and in the town itself, the Japanese dug strong defensive positions. The favored sites were in bamboo thickets, on reverse slopes, along creek beds, and under buildings. Individual spider holes about six feet deep were covered with logs and earth and "beautifully camouflaged." Against such positions, artillery and mortar fire did little more than daze the defenders. Each position had to be searched out and destroyed. The next day, for the final assault on Ormoc, Bruce planned to deploy the 307th Regiment to attack along the highway, while the 306th Regiment would move northeast to encircle the opposing enemy forces. After a significant artillery barrage, Bruce first dispatched Company A of the 776th Amphibian Tank Battalion, supported by the rocket fire from LCMs and LCVs, to launch an assault on the city's strong enemy defenses. Following this, the 306th and 307th Regiments advanced, with the latter encountering minimal resistance until approaching the outskirts of Ormoc. Despite facing fierce opposition, the Mitsui Unit was effectively driven back, allowing the 307th to enter the city while the 306th advanced northeast with little resistance. The two regiments then pressured the enemy like squeezing a tube of toothpaste, ultimately forcing the determined defenders to retreat to the hills north of Ormoc, where the Imahori Detachment was gathering. However, some defenders remained behind, valiantly fighting to delay the American advance. Positioned in spider holes beneath the buildings, they resisted until overwhelmed.  At the same time that the 77th Division was entering Ormoc, the 32nd Division was pushing southward toward Ormoc Valley, the 11th Airborne Division was working westward over the mountains toward the town, and the 7th Division was pushing northward along the eastern coast of Ormoc Bay in an attempt to make a juncture with the 77th Division. General Bruce advised General Hodge: "Have rolled two sevens in Ormoc. Come seven come eleven." As his troops were reducing Ormoc, General Bruce also made a report on the status of the attack and referred to a promise that had been made by the commanding general of the 5th Air Force: "Where is the case of Scotch that was promised by General Whitehead for the capture of Ormoc. I don't drink but I have an assistant division commander and regimental commanders who do…" In its advance to the north, the 77th Division reportedly killed around 1,506 Japanese soldiers and captured 7 prisoners, at a cost of 123 men killed, 329 wounded, and 13 missing. The capture of Ormoc had significant consequences: it split the Japanese forces and isolated the remaining elements of the 26th Division; it diverted and eliminated previously uncommitted enemy reserves, easing the pressure on other fronts; it expedited the connection between the 10th Corps and the 24th Corps; and it prevented the Japanese from using Ormoc as a port, through which many reinforcements and supplies had been funneled into the campaign. Consequently, the Japanese had faced a clear defeat on Leyte Island; nevertheless, they were determined to continue fighting to the death, senselessly sending more troops into battle, which unnecessarily extended the campaign by several additional months. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Japanese forces prepared Operation Wa while U.S. troops engaged in intense battles for strategic positions like Hill 918 and Balogo amid challenging terrain and strong defenses. Despite initial setbacks, American forces regrouped, successfully counterattacking Japanese positions and securing strategic areas, while Japanese reinforcements struggled amid heavy losses and unfavorable weather conditions.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 157 - Pacific War Podcast - Fall of Peleliu - November 18 - 25 - , 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 19, 2024 46:02


Last time we spoke about the battle of Ormoc Bay. Amid the fierce Battle of Leyte in November 1944, American and Japanese forces clashed across rugged terrains and stormy weather. A typhoon swept the island, halting supply lines, while Colonel Verbeck's forces launched a determined assault on Breakneck Ridge, advancing against Colonel Miyauchi's well-defended lines. Meanwhile, Japanese reinforcements suffered devastating losses from American air raids. Through relentless attacks and strategic maneuvers, the Americans gained ground, signalling the turning point toward Japanese retreat and Allied victory on Leyte. Meanwhile a Japanese convoy led by Rear-Admiral Sato suffered devastating losses to Allied submarines and air attacks while attempting to transport troops. Concurrently, Australian and American forces launched aggressive operations in New Guinea, and American B-29 Superfortresses, despite some challenges, intensified the bombing campaign against Japan. This episode is the Fall of Peleliu Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  In our previous update, General Gill's 32nd Division had arrived to relieve the exhausted 24th Division and take charge of the main offensive down the Ormoc Valley. During this lull in the battle, General Kataoka took advantage of the pause to reposition his 1st Division and ordered Colonel Miyauchi's 57th Regiment to counterattack toward Breakneck Ridge. The counterattack had limited success, ultimately leaving the 57th Regiment significantly weakened. On November 16, Colonel John Hettinger's 128th Regiment moved in to relieve the 21st Regiment at Breakneck Ridge but was unable to capture Corkscrew Ridge following a fierce battle. Simultaneously, General Cunningham's 112th Cavalry was deployed to secure and patrol the Mount Minoro area, while Colonel Clifford's reinforced 1st Battalion advanced to Kilay Ridge behind Japanese lines, where it faced artillery fire and unsuccessfully attempted to link up with Colonel Chapman's 2nd Battalion roadblock on Highway 2. To the south, the 32nd Regiment moved toward Baybay to launch a second push toward Ormoc, initiating an advance north to the Damulaan-Caridad area on November 14. Meanwhile, General Yamagata's 26th Division, including Colonel Saito Jiro's 13th Independent Regiment, advanced in the same direction with plans to assault Burauen, setting up a confrontation with the American forces on Shoestring Ridge. By November 17, Hettinger's 1st Battalion had entrenched on the slopes of Corkscrew Ridge while the 3rd Battalion progressed roughly 1,000 yards down the highway, securing a ridge about 500 yards north of Limon. At the same time, Clifford's patrols finally made contact with Chapman's 2nd Battalion, but they struggled to establish a communication line due to the strong enemy presence between them. The following day, Clifford positioned machine guns for a firefight against the enemy on a ridge to the southeast. Throughout the night and into November 19, Japanese machine-gun fire targeted the perimeter, successfully disabling one gun and surrounding Clifford's southernmost outpost, eventually forcing the Americans to withdraw. Meanwhile, Hettinger's 1st Battalion launched another assault on Corkscrew Ridge on November 18, though it achieved only minor gains. Additionally, Colonel Kora Keijiro's 49th Regiment infiltrated the enemy's left flank, initiating a two-pronged advance toward Colasian and Capoocan, but this had limited impact on Gill's offensive. As a result, Hettinger's 1st Battalion continued its siege of Corkscrew Ridge until November 20, while the 3rd Battalion held positions on a ridge overlooking Limon. On November 20 and 21, Japanese forces also gained ground against Clifford's defenses on Kilay Ridge. At the same time, the 32nd Regiment had established a defensive stance on Shoestring Ridge, while the 13th Independent Regiment fortified the opposite ridge with trenches, machine-gun pits, and other installations, sending a reinforced battalion eastward toward Burauen. On November 22, the 11th Airborne Division arrived to relieve the 7th Division, which subsequently redeployed to the west coast. Gill resumed his offensive, sending Hettinger's 2nd and 3rd Battalions south while the 1st Battalion contained Corkscrew Ridge. The Americans fought their way to Limon, establishing defensive positions along a tributary of the Leyte River south of the town after repelling a fierce Japanese counterattack. Meanwhile, Japanese assaults intensified on Kilay Ridge, pushing back Clifford's troops, though they held firm. Fortunately, the Japanese did not press further on November 23, as Kataoka needed to reorganize his forces following the fall of Limon. To support the division's left flank along the Limon-Ormoc highway, he dispatched the 49th Regiment and his reserve battalion, coinciding with the arrival of the 1st Regiment to reinforce the heavily weakened 57th Regiment. However, the withdrawal of the 49th created a significant gap between the 1st and 102nd Divisions, which the 126th Regiment quickly exploited, advancing through the Hill 1525 area to strike at the enemy's rear. The 128th Regiment also took this time to realign and consolidate its positions, focusing the next three days on extensive patrols and placing harassing fire along an east-west ridge overlooking the highway about 1,000 yards south of Limon. Additionally, on November 24, the 112th Cavalry began advancing southwest from Mount Minoro toward the highway with a similar objective. With the occupation of Limon, the Battle of Breakneck Ridge concluded, costing the 24th and 32nd Divisions a total of 1,498 casualties, while the Japanese suffered an estimated 5,252 fatalities and had eight captured. The American victory was largely aided by the establishment of a roadblock south of Limon by Chapman's 2nd Battalion and the defense of Kilay Ridge in the Japanese rear by Clifford's battalion.  From November 12 to 23 the 2nd Battalion, 19th Regiment had defended the roadblock under extremely difficult conditions. The operations report of the 24th Division graphically summarizes the deeds for which the battalion received a presidential citation: “These bearded, mud caked soldiers came out of the mountains exhausted and hungry. Their feet were heavy, cheeks hollow, bodies emaciated, and eyes glazed. They had seen thirty-one comrades mortally wounded, watched fifty-five others lie suffering in muddy foxholes without adequate medical attention. Yet their morale had not changed. It was high when they went in and high when they came out. They were proud that they had rendered invaluable aid to the main forces fighting in Ormoc corridor, by disrupting the Japanese supply lines and preventing strong reinforcements from passing up the Ormoc road. They were proud that they had outfought the Emperor's toughest troops, troops that had been battle trained in Manchuria. They were certain they had killed at least 606 of the enemy and felt that their fire had accounted for many more. And they were proud that this had all been accomplished despite conditions of extreme hardship. 241 of the battalion's officers and enlisted men were hospitalized for skin disorders, foot ulcers, battle fatigue, and sheer exhaustion.” These units, facing constant fire and heavily outnumbered, prevented General Suzuki from reinforcing Limon. Abandoning a potential counteroffensive here, Suzuki redirected his primary efforts to the Burauen front for his Wa offensive. Despite Yamagata's preparations for combat, the effectiveness of the 26th Division depended heavily on acquiring more heavy weapons, ammunition, and equipment. Thus, a convoy with three transports and a submarine chaser departed Manila on November 23, carrying the essential supplies to Ormoc. As night fell over Shoestring Ridge, Saito finally launched his main offensive against the stretched defenses of the 32nd Regiment. Artillery, mortars, and machine guns provided cover for two companies advancing forward to capture sections of the ridge. The next morning, the 2nd Battalion of the 32nd Regiment reorganized its defensive positions, enabling the Americans to push back a Japanese force that had penetrated south of the Palanas River and east of Hill 918. Meanwhile, General Tominaga initiated a large-scale air offensive to support Operation TA's latest convoy, deploying sixty planes from the 2nd Air Division to strike the Leyte airfields, while thirty Navy aircraft targeted enemy shipping in Leyte Gulf. Over the next four days, daily air attacks were conducted in the Leyte area, and the 7th Air Division carried out coordinated strikes against enemy bases on Morotai. However, on November 24, the convoy's transports were sunk by an air attack off Masbate Island, just as another convoy consisting of three transports and one destroyer was dispatched to Ormoc. This convoy was similarly destroyed the next day off Marinduque Island by carrier aircraft, resulting in a complete operational failure. Back in Leyte, on the night of November 24, Saito's troops launched another ferocious assault on enemy positions, beginning with the heaviest artillery barrage the 32nd Regiment had yet encountered. The Americans quickly responded with their own supporting weapons, effectively repelling repeated Japanese attacks. Only Company K was pushed back, but American artillery, mortars, and machine guns prevented the Japanese from exploiting this breakthrough. After failing to penetrate the front lines, Saito's troops desperately attempted to neutralize the artillery supporting the 32nd Regiment before ultimately retreating, allowing the defenders to regroup. By nightfall, the Japanese employed the same tactics as in their previous assault but were ultimately pushed back after a fierce grenade battle and some close-quarters fighting. At the same time, Kataoka's newly deployed reserve battalion launched an attack on Kilay Ridge during the night. However, the weary defenders were able to fend off the assault, resulting in casualties for both sides. After reinforcing Shoestring Ridge, the 32nd Regiment faced another attack on the night of November 26.  At 2100 Colonel Saito renewed the assault against the American position, following the pattern set by the previous night actions. The Japanese first laid down mortar and machine gun fire, and then heavy-weapons fire of the 13th Infantry Regiment hit the right platoons of Company G, shifting to the east in about fifteen minutes. Immediately afterward, about a battalion of Japanese infantry attacked Company G, while twelve machine guns started to fire from a ridge 1,200 yards to the east. The Japanese moved into the fire of their own heavy weapons. The 32d Infantry, using all of its artillery batteries, mortars, machine guns, and rifles, started throwing lead against the enemy force as fast as its men could load and fire. The Japanese, employing an estimated fifty machine guns, continued to come on. "All hell broke loose" as the enemy shot off flares to guide their own artillery fire. The sharp declivity in front of the American lines did not allow for a close concentration of friendly artillery fire. Just as it appeared that the lines were to be overrun, some more enemy flares went up, and the Japanese withdrew, covered by heavy machine gun and mortar fire. Colonel Finn, taking advantage of this fortunate circumstance, hastily rearranged riflemen to fill gaps caused by casualties and replenished his ammunition supplies. The mortars of the regiment continued to fire into the draw. After a short lull Colonel Saito renewed the attack. There was no preparatory artillery fire, but the mortars and machine guns introduced the assault. The attack did not seem as determined as the previous one, though the number of troops was apparently about the same. The 32d Infantry again called down all types of fire upon the enemy. Elements of the 13th Infantry Regiment continued to advance, although "the carnage was terriffic," and attempted to pass through the American lines. A strong enemy group moved into a bamboo grove on a nose in front of the center platoon of G Company. From this position the enemy launched an attack which the company resisted with grenades and bayonets. As Colonel Finn later reported: "The battle continued to flare up and die down as the valiant soldiers fought like devils to hold our lines." The 81-mm. mortars from the mortar platoon of H Company fired 650 rounds in five minutes, and fire from the 60-mm. mortars was "practically automatic." After an hour's intense fighting, the enemy force withdrew. Unbeknownst to the Americans, however, the left and center platoons of Company G fell back in confusion during the fight, allowing the Japanese to infiltrate the American lines in the bamboo thicket previously occupied by the center platoon. The Japanese had not attacked the left flank of Company G. These troops heard the battle raging to the right and the sounds of the Japanese forming below them. A non-commissioned officer in charge of a listening post sent a man to get permission for his 3-man group to withdraw. After receiving permission he shouted the order from a distance of 50 yards. As the men from the listening post started back, they were joined by the left platoon and two squads from the center platoon. Within 45 minutes the two platoons, less one squad, plus the section of heavy machine guns, were moving south on the highway. "There was no thought in their minds that the withdrawal was not authorized." After proceeding down the road 250 yards they met the executive officer of Company H who ordered them back. It was too late, the damage was done. Though the left platoon was able to regain its position without trouble, the two squads from the center platoon found the enemy well dug-in in the bamboo thicket where the squads had been. It was later learned that there were about 200 hostile troops with 20 machine guns in the thicket. The Japanese were within the American lines and in a position from which they could fire on A Battery and the flanks of Companies E, L, I, and K. Although the surprised defenders managed to contain the infiltrators—who seemingly did not recognize the Americans' precarious situation, as they made no attempt to capitalize on it—the situation remained unstable until the 1st Battalion, 184th Regiment arrived on November 27 and regained the lost ground. At this point, all the assault elements of General Arnold's 7th Division had crossed to the eastern shore of the Camotes Sea, and reinforcements were en route. On November 28, the 184th Regiment relieved the exhausted defenders on Shoestring Ridge and successfully repelled a small Japanese attack that night. Meanwhile, Yamashita decided to shift most of his division toward Burauen to initiate Suzuki's planned offensive, leaving only a small detachment to prevent the Americans from reaching Albuera and cutting off the base of his attack. By the end of November, the 184th had successfully taken control of Shoestring Ridge and the Bloody Bamboo Thicket, although it was unable to advance further north due to the enemy's strong resistance. At the same time, Tominaga made an unsuccessful attempt to drop off a raiding unit over Burauen on November 26, marking the first use of a tactic that would be repeated in the coming weeks. On November 27, Admiral Okawachi launched another convoy carrying heavy equipment for the 26th Division, which successfully reached Ormoc Bay overnight. However, it was intercepted by PT boats the following day, resulting in the loss of one frigate and one subchaser during the encounter. The convoy faced further attacks from aircraft on November 29, which sank one transport before the remaining ships departed for Manila. On their return journey, the last two vessels were ultimately destroyed by air strikes. Back in Leyte, on November 29, Clifford's exhausted troops managed to fend off one final heavy assault before being relieved by Hettinger's 2nd Battalion. By the end of the month, the Americans had solidified their positions on Kilay and Shoestring Ridges and were prepared to advance their two offensives against Ormoc. However, we must now shift our focus from the Philippines to Peleliu, where Colonel Nakagawa's remaining 700 men continued to hold out against American assaults with their dwindling strength. At the beginning of November, Colonel Watson's 323rd Regiment had taken over the task of neutralizing the Umurbrogol Pocket, with Colonel Dark's 3rd Battalion on Walt Ridge and Mortimer Valley being the last unit remaining from the 321st Regiment. After a brief pause in combat at the end of October, operations became more active again on November 2. Watson's 2nd Battalion successfully attacked the Five Sisters from the southwest, while elements of the 1st Battalion advanced north along the ridges west of Death Valley, pursuing the remaining Japanese forces from South Pocket. Meanwhile, part of the 3rd Battalion moved slowly south through the ridges and rugged terrain at the northern end of China Wall. However, before Watson could continue his offensive, heavy rains began on November 4, escalating into a typhoon that persisted for four days. By November 12, no significant progress had been made by any unit, with slow patrols and sandbagging ongoing. The 81st Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop and elements of the 321st Regiment focused on securing additional offshore islets north of Peleliu. Attacks in the Umurbrogol resumed on November 13, with Watson's 1st Battalion advancing eastward from the ridges west of Death Valley, and his 2nd Battalion pushing north into the gorge and Wildcat Bowl, though little ground was gained in the following days. Despite this slow advancement, a key center of resistance was identified in the rough terrain west of central Death Valley. On November 16, oil was sent forward through a hose from fuel tanks set up in covered positions 300 yards distant and poured into a large cave which seemed to be the center of the new-found defenses. Ignited by white phosphorus hand grenades lobbed into the cave, the flaming oil produced such promising results in driving Japanese into the open or killing them, that the same method of conquest continued to be used by the 1st Battalion and in other parts of the pocket. Over the next five days, tanks and LVT-flamethrowers targeted enemy caves at the bases of China Wall and Five Brothers, effectively destroying or sealing all accessible enemy positions and leaving Nakagawa with only 150 men still capable of fighting. By November 21, infantry patrols could operate largely unimpeded throughout Wildcat Bowl and the southern section of Death Valley. The next day, the 323rd launched an assault on the China Wall, where the majority of Nakagawa's weary troops were entrenched, effectively compressing the enemy into a space measuring 125 yards wide by 285 yards long. Meanwhile, on November 23, Five Brothers Ridge was finally cleared. The following day, a second assault on the China Wall gained additional ground, leaving only 57 enemy troops alive. To enable tanks and LVT-flamethrowers to access the central hollow of China Wall, engineers began constructing a ramp up the east wall at the northern end of Wildcat Bowl. As the ramp ascended, Nakagawa realized his situation was hopeless.  On November 24th, Nakagawa burnt the regimental colors and performed harakiri.  He was posthumously promoted to lieutenant general for his valor displayed on Peleliu. His final message to General Inoue read  “Our sword is broken, and we have run out of spears.” The 57 remaining soldiers were divided into 17 small teams, instructed to hide during the day and raid American positions at night. With the enemy largely absent, American forces cautiously advanced into the area. On November 26, tanks and LVT-flamethrowers moved up the completed ramp to bombard caves and other defenses in the hollow center of China Wall. The next morning, as units from the north and south finally linked up, Watson declared that hostilities had come to an end. What General Rupertus had anticipated would last only four days had, in fact, extended to nearly two and a half months. The 323rd suffered significant losses during that battle, with approximately 118 soldiers killed and 420 wounded. The overall casualties for the Battle of Peleliu reached over 1,573 American deaths and 6,531 injuries. In contrast, the Japanese forces experienced a total of 10,695 men killed and 301 taken prisoner. Although the fighting was officially declared over and Peleliu secured, isolated groups and individual Japanese troops remained hidden in pockets and caves, primarily in the northern part of the island and the Umurbrogol mountains. For several months afterward, the units of the 81st Division assigned to garrison the island continued to root out stragglers and seal off caves. Many of these soldiers would survive in the mountains and swamps until the war's conclusion and beyond. In fact a Japanese lieutenant with 26 men of the 2nd Infantry soldiers and eight 45th Guard Force sailors held out in the caves in Peleliu until April 22nd of 1947 and surrendered after a Japanese admiral convinced them the war was over. The effort to reduce the Japanese pocket around Umurbrogol Mountain is often regarded as the most challenging battle faced by the U.S. military throughout the entire war. The 1st Marine Division suffered heavy losses and remained inactive until the invasion of Okinawa began on April 1, 1945. During their month on Peleliu, the 1st Marine Division incurred over 6,500 casualties, representing more than one-third of the division's strength. The 81st Infantry Division also experienced significant losses, with approximately 3,300 casualties during their time on the island. Postwar analyses indicated that U.S. forces required more than 1,500 rounds of ammunition to kill each Japanese defender. They expended a staggering 13.32 million rounds of .30-caliber ammunition, 1.52 million rounds of .45-caliber, 693,657 rounds of .50-caliber bullets, 118,262 hand grenades, and 150,000 mortar rounds.The battle sparked considerable controversy in the United States, as many believed that the high number of American casualties was unjustified for an island with minimal strategic importance. The Japanese defenders were incapable of hindering potential U.S. operations in the Philippines, and the airfield captured on Peleliu did not significantly influence subsequent military actions. Instead, the Ulithi Atoll in the Caroline Islands was utilized as a staging ground for the Okinawa invasion. The casualty rate from this battle surpassed that of any other amphibious operation in the Pacific War. Moreover, coverage of the battle was limited, as only six reporters were motivated to report from the shore, influenced by General Rupertus's prediction of a quick victory within three days. The battle also received less attention due to General MacArthur's return to the Philippines and the Allies' advance toward Germany in Europe. The battles for Angaur and Peleliu illustrated the typical patterns of Japanese island defense, yet few adjustments were made for the subsequent battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Naval bombardment before the amphibious assault at Iwo Jima proved to be only marginally more effective than at Peleliu, while the preliminary shelling for Okinawa saw significant improvements. Underwater demolition teams, known as frogmen, conducted operations at Iwo Jima that confused the enemy by targeting both coasts, but this tactic later alerted Japanese defenders to the precise assault beaches during the Okinawa invasion. American ground forces gained valuable experience at Peleliu in assaulting heavily fortified positions similar to those they would encounter again at Okinawa. Admiral William Halsey Jr. recommended canceling the planned occupation of Yap Island in the Caroline Islands. He also suggested that the landings at Peleliu and Angaur be abandoned in favor of deploying their Marines and soldiers to Leyte Island; however, this recommendation was ultimately overruled by Admiral Nimitz. Turning our attention to China, we need to discuss the conclusion of the pivotal Operation Ichi-Go, as the 11th and 23rd Armies pressed on with their offensives against Guilin and Liuzhou. Back in August, following battles in Hunan and Guangdong, the 11th and 23rd Armies of the IJA initiated offensives toward Guilin and Liuzhou, respectively. The NRA troops defending the region were primarily remnants from the Battle of Hengyang, resulting in only 20,000 soldiers being present in Guilin on November 1 when the Japanese commenced their assault on the city. The Chinese government recognized that it could not hold Guilin but chose to prolong the battle for political reasons, sending food and supplies to those besieged. Most civilians had fled Guilin weeks earlier, leaving the city heavily scorched by fire. Defenses were reinforced with pillboxes, barbed wire, and Guangxi troops commanded by Muslim General Bai Chongxi. General Joseph Stilwell, who had a good relationship with Bai, made considerable efforts to supply American munitions to Bai's forces. Trenches were also dug throughout the hilly terrain. By early November, General Yokoyama's forces had effectively surrounded Guilin, with the 3rd and 13th Divisions ready to advance toward Liuzhou, while General Tanaka's units were also preparing to move north following the fall of Wuxuan. Consequently, most of Yokoyama's troops continued to tighten their grip on Guilin, where the determined defenders inflicted heavy casualties on the Japanese as they facilitated the withdrawal of American personnel. Additionally, the 13th Division advanced through Yongfu on November 6, the 3rd Division captured Luzhaizhen on November 8, and the 104th Division began its movement toward the area west of Liuzhou. On November 9, just as the 11th Army initiated its main assault on Guilin, General Okamura assigned the 3rd and 13th Divisions to the 23rd Army to enhance coordination for the attack on Liuzhou. Fortunately for them, the Chinese forces offered minimal resistance, leading to the city and its airfield falling the next day. Simultaneously, with the support of the 5th Air Army, Yokoyama successfully captured Guilin, achieving the primary goal of Operation Togo II.  To eliminate the retreating enemy forces, the 23rd Army continued its advance westward. On November 15, the 104th Division took Xincheng, while the 3rd Division captured Yizhou and the 13th Division moved towards Hechi, effectively cutting off the Chinese retreat and destroying the remaining enemy troops. The 3rd Division then advanced north, capturing Huanjian on November 27, while the 13th Division continued west, successfully taking Nandan on November 28 and Dushan on December 2. In response, Tanaka dispatched the 22nd Division and the 23rd Independent Mixed Brigade to capture Nanning, which fell by November 28. By early December, elements of the 22nd Division joined forces with the Indochinese garrison near Shangsi, marking the conclusion of Operation Ichi-Go. After ten days of fierce fighting, the Japanese forces captured Guilin and entered Liuzhou on the same day. Sporadic fighting persisted as Chinese forces retreated rapidly. By November 24, the Japanese had taken control of 75 counties in Guangxi, encompassing about two-thirds of the region. Reports indicate that they killed 215,000 civilians in reprisals and during crossfire, injuring over 431,000. After the fall of Guilin and Liuzhou, the majority of NRA troops lost their morale and retreated without ever confronting the enemy, leading to significant losses in both equipment and personnel. This event became one of the most devastating defeats of the entire Second Sino-Japanese War. Nevertheless, despite having destroyed the airbases in this area, the USAAF could still launch attacks on the Japanese mainland from their other bases. While the Japanese achieved some objectives of Operation Ichigo, it ultimately expanded the territory they needed to defend and significantly weakened their lines, creating a favorable scenario for future counterattacks by Chinese forces. After destroying enemy air bases and annihilating the main enemy forces in the Guilin-Liuzhen area, the 6th Area Army assigned the 22nd Division and the 22nd Independent Mixed Brigade to the 11th Army to secure strategic locations in the region, while the 23rd Army returned to Guangzhou and the Leizhou Peninsula. By the operation's end, Japanese losses were estimated at around 100,000 killed, 200,000 wounded, and significant material losses, including 1,938 small river vessels and 367 aircraft. In contrast, Chinese losses totaled approximately 310,000 killed, 410,000 wounded, and 80,000 captured, along with substantial war material losses, including 312 Allied aircraft, resulting in the deaths of 100 Americans. Additionally, the entire Japanese offensive resulted in the deaths of approximately 500,000 civilians. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The fight on Leyte gruels on as the fight for Peleliu finally came to an end. The controversial battle of Peleliu would have major ramifications for American planners going forward. In China, absolute horror was continuing to be inflicted upon the Chinese people, leaving to the massacre of hundreds of thousands in a war that just never seemed like it would end.

Club Sabroso Radio Network
TAMIO YAMASHITA (TOKYO) - EP247: CALIS HOUSE NATION RADIO

Club Sabroso Radio Network

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 19, 2024 60:05


Send us a textCALIS HOUSE NATION RADIO GUEST MIX BY TAMIO YAMASHITA.Powered by the Club Sabroso Radio NetworkFollow IG/FB: @CLUBSABROSORADIO24/7 Live Stream at: WWW.CLUBSABROSORADIO.COM

Superballs Podcast
Military Urban Legends

Superballs Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 18, 2024 66:44


Happy Veterans day and a big thank you to all who have served! In this episode, Joan tells the Legends about urban legends out of the military. Late Night Legends is a paranormal podcast and stream which believes Spooky Season should be all year long. Listen every week to learn what paratopic the Legends are getting into. Late Night Legends is for a mature audience and can discuss topics which may not be suitable for all audiences. Please take care of yourself! Sources: https://www.warhistoryonline.com/history/war-history-urbanlegends.html https://www.wearethemighty.com/popular/6-urban-legends-about-wright-patterson-air-force-base/ https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Category:Urban_legends https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Angels_of_Mons https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Aurora_(aircraft) https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Black_helicopter https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Die_Glocke https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Lighthouse_and_naval_vessel_urban_legend https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Lighthouse_and_naval_vessel_urban_legend https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Military_stress_card https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Montauk_Project https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Nazi_gold_train https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Nazi_UFOs https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Philadelphia_Experiment https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/White_Tights https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Yamashita%27s_gold https://www.thealamo.org/remember/myths-and-legends https://spartacus-educational.com/FWWcorpse.htm https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/legends-what-actually-lived-no-mans-land-between-world-war-i-trenches-180952513/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_helicopter#:~:text=The%20black%20helicopter%20is%20a,black%2C%20and%20similar%20conspiracy%20theories. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Montauk_Project https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_stress_card#:~:text=The%20military%20stress%20card%20was,to%20inform%20new%20recruits%20about

Japanese with Kanako
#2-66 Japanese Shadowing “Noun B like Noun A” | 日本語でシャドーイング「Noun AのようなNoun B」

Japanese with Kanako

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 15, 2024 10:08


みなさんこんにちは、かなこです!今日のシャドーイングは「Noun AのようなNoun B」。今回のPodcastは、デニスさんの提供でお送りします。 Hi everyone, it's Kanako. Today's shadowing is “Noun B like Noun A. “Noun AのようなNoun B” is used when Noun B has the same quality or appearance as A, or A is an example of B. For instance, if you want to be a person like Shohei Otani you can say something like this.「大谷翔平のような人になりたいです。」   Before we get started, I want to thank Denis for supporting my show. ありがとうございます!   それでは はじめていきましょう! Let's get started! ***************************************************** ▼Subscribe to my YouTube channel ⁠⁠⁠⁠https://bit.ly/KANAKOYOUTUBE⁠⁠⁠⁠ ▼Buy me a coffee  ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://bit.ly/KANAKO-Coffee⁠⁠⁠⁠ ▼Get your Genki 2 textbook ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://amzn.to/3VIRHKP⁠ ***************************************************** I want to be a person like my father. 父のような人になりたいです。 I like cities like Rome. ローマのような町が好きです。 I want to live in a town like Kamakura. 鎌倉のような町に住みたいです。 I like sweets like cheesecake. チーズケーキのような甘い食べ物が好きです。 I don't really like sweet drinks like Coke. コーラのような甘い飲み物があまり好きじゃないです。 I like sports like basketball. バスケットボールのようなスポーツが好きです。 I like kind people like Tanaka. 田中さんのような優しい人が好きです。 I don't like spicy foods like chili peppers. 唐辛子のような辛い食べ物が苦手です。 I like old towns like Kyoto. 京都のような古い町が好きです。 I want to be friends with interesting people like Suzuki. 鈴木さんのような面白い人と友達になりたいです。 I want to be a teacher like Mr. Yamashita. 山下先生のような先生になりたいです。 I want to work for a big company like Tesla. テスラのような大きい会社で働きたいです。 I would like to visit a small island like Cebu. セブ島のような小さい島に行ってみたいです。 I'm not good at winter sports like skating. スケートのようなウィンタースポーツが苦手です。   ***************************************************** では もう 一度、最初から 全部 いってみましょう。 Let's try shadowing the whole thing again from the beginning.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 156 - Pacific War Podcast - Battle of Ormoc Bay - November 11 - 18 - , 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 11, 2024 46:02


Last time we spoke about the advance to Ormoc Valley. As October 1944 unfolded in the Leyte campaign, American forces steadily pushed Japanese troops inland. Despite fierce resistance, they captured key positions, like Dagami, Catmon Hill, and multiple airstrips. While the Japanese reinforced areas like Ormoc, American regiments advanced through challenging conditions, relying on artillery amid minimal air support due to weather and resource constraints. By month's end, American forces had inflicted heavy casualties on the Japanese, securing vital beachheads and pushing closer to full control of Leyte. After suffering losses at Leyte Gulf, the 7th Fleet withdrew, leaving Kenney's P-38s to defend Tacloban airfields amid Japanese air raids. As kamikaze attacks grew, USS Franklin sustained heavy casualties, while the Americans pressed forward, capturing Carigara on Leyte. Meanwhile, Australian forces began reclaiming New Britain, pushing Japanese forces back through guerilla warfare. Facing tough jungle conditions, Australian and native troops gradually secured strategic positions by December, reinforcing the Allied grip in the Pacific. This episode is the Battle of Ormoc Bay Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we have seen over the past few weeks, the Battle of Leyte Gulf saw Generals MacArthur's forces land and successfully defeat the 16th Division of Leyte Island as well as seized Carigara and Pinamopoan over the northern coast. The 24th Division also engaged the enemy's reinforcements, centred around the elite 1st Division during the battle for the northern entrance into the Ormoc Valley. Meanwhile Admiral Okawachi and General Yamashita aimed to bring more reinforcements to Leyte which would lead to another air-naval battle. The previous week, Colonel Verbeck's 21st Regiment was engaged in a mission to capture Breakneck Ridge, fiercely defended by Colonel Miyauchi's 57th Regiment. Simultaneously, General Kataoka mobilized his remaining two regiments to initiate a broad, four-pronged assault on the Pinamopoan perimeter. However, the rugged terrain slowed their movement toward assembly areas. On the morning of November 8 a typhoon, moving in from the west, swept over the entire island of Leyte. Jan Valtin, a member of the 24th Division, graphically describes it: "From the angry immensity of the heavens floods raced in almost horizontal sheets. Palms bent low under the storm, their fronds flattened like streamers of wet silk. Trees crashed to earth. In the expanse of… [cogon] grass the howling of the wind was like a thousand-fold plaint of the unburied dead. The trickle of supplies was at a standstill. On Carigara Bay the obscured headlands moaned under the onslaught of the… seas. Planes were grounded and ships became haunted things looking for refuge. Massed artillery… barrages to the summit of Breakneck Ridge sounded dim and hollow in the tempest. Trails were obliterated by the rain. The sky was black." In the midst of the storm, the 21st's infantry attacked. As the typhoon swept across the island, Verbeck's forces launched a three-pronged assault on Breakneck Ridge and Hill 1525, facing staunch resistance from Miyauchi's defenders but making considerable progress toward Hill 1525. Notably, plans for General Suzuki's offensive were found on a deceased Japanese officer, enabling General Krueger to redeploy his forces effectively. On 10 November General Mudge sent elements of the 1st Cavalry Division to patrol the area of the mountains of central Leyte extensively. From 5 November through 2 December, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division extensively patrolled the central mountain area and had many encounters with small forces of the enemy. At all times the supply situation was precarious. The 12th Cavalry established high in the foothills, at the entrance to the passes through the mountains, a supply base that was also a native camp, a hospital, and a rest camp. About 300 Filipino carriers were kept here under the protection of the guerrillas. The carriers had been hired for six days at a time and were not allowed to leave without a pass from their Filipino leader. This precaution was necessary, since the ration-carrying assignment was extremely arduous. The cavalrymen would frequently skirmish with the 41st Regiment and the 169th and 171st Independent Battalions during this period. Brigadier-General Julian Cunningham's 112th Cavalry Regiment, expected by November 14, was tasked with relieving General Mudge's 1st Cavalry Division in the Carigara-Barugo area to enable a southwest advance from the central mountains and ease pressure on General Irving's 24th Division.  General Bradley's 96th Division was directed to capture the high ground between Jaro and Dagami, with the 382nd Regiment remaining at Dagami to inflict significant losses on the 16th Division while securing Bloody Ridge. By November 4, the 382nd Regiment had made some progress into Bloody Ridge. The night of 4-5 November was not quiet. The Japanese delivered harassing fire on the 1st Battalion, and at 2205 elements of the 16th Division launched a heavy assault against the perimeter of the 2d Battalion. An artillery concentration immediately stopped the attack, and the Japanese fled, leaving 254 dead and wounded behind them. The following morning, after the artillery had fired a preparation in front of the 1st and 2d Battalions, the two battalions renewed the attack at 0900 and two companies from the 3d Battalion protected the regimental left (south) flank. The battalions advanced about 1,000 yards before they encountered any strong resistance. The defenses of the 16th Division consisted of a great many concrete emplacements, concealed spider holes, and connecting trenches. By nightfall, at 1700, the two battalions, assisted by the tanks from Company A, 763d Tank Battalion, successfully reduced the enemy to their front and captured the ridge. Each battalion formed its own perimeter and made plans to renew the attack on 6 November. At 0830 the 1st Battalion, with light tanks in support, moved out in the attack westward against a strong enemy force that was well entrenched in foxholes and pillboxes. Each of these defensive positions had to be reduced before the advance could continue. At 1300 the 2d Battalion moved to the high ground on the right flank of the 1st. The 1st Battalion encountered a strong concrete enemy pillbox which was believed to be a command post, since there were no firing apertures. As grenades had no effect it became necessary finally to neutralize the pillbox by pouring gasoline down the ventilation pipes and setting it afire. Two officers and nineteen enlisted men of the enemy were killed in the pillbox. The Japanese continued to fight tenaciously. There was no withdrawal, but by the end of the day only isolated pockets of enemy resistance remained. The Japanese 16th Division was taking a bad beating. Its supply of provisions had run out. All the battalion commanders, most of the company commanders, and half the artillery battalion and battery commanders had been killed. On the night of 6 November the 16th Division contracted its battle lines and on the following day took up a new position in the Dagami area. The new position ranged from a hill about four and a half miles northwest of Dagami to a point about three and three-fourths miles northwest of Burauen. On 7 November all three battalions of the 382d Infantry engaged the enemy and maintained constant pressure against his positions. The 1st and 3d Battalions advanced west, while the 2d Battalion drove north and west. The 3d Battalion encountered -the more determined resistance. Advancing, preceded by tanks, it met heavy enemy machine gun and rifle fire. A large enemy force assaulted the troops at close quarters and tried to destroy the tanks, but when the 382d Infantry introduced flamethrowers and supporting machine guns, the attackers fell back in disorder. The regiment overran the Japanese defensive positions and killed an estimated 474 of the enemy. Company E of the 2d Battalion had remained in the Patok area, engaged in patrolling and wiping out isolated pockets of enemy resistance. On 8 November strong patrols from the 1st and 2d Battalions probed west into the hills. They encountered the left flank of the enemy supporting position at a point about 2,600 yards west of Patok. A very heavy rainfall on the night of 8-9 November made an assault against the position impossible on 9 November. After all-night artillery fire, the 1st and 3d Battalions moved out at 0900 on 10 November. They met no resistance, but progress was slow because of the swamps. By 1225 the two battalions, supported by a platoon of light tanks, occupied the ridge formerly held by elements of the 16th Division. The 1st Battalion had advanced 2,500 yards. The 382d Infantry had destroyed all organized enemy resistance in its sector and removed the threat to Dagami.  Meanwhile, General Arnold's 7th Division stationed at the Burauen-Abuyog area began sending patrols from Baybay toward Ormoc to prepare for a larger advance, while the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Regiment moved to Baybay, successfully ambushing the Japanese unit advancing to Abuyog. Concurrently, Okawachi sent his fourth convoy from Manila, consisting of three transports, four frigates, and six destroyers under Admiral Kimura. This convoy carried the bulk of General Yamagata's 26th Division and approximately 3,500 tons of supplies, followed by another echelon of three transports with the remainder of the 1st Division. The echelon reached Ormoc the next day, unloaded successfully, and departed without issue. However, the main convoy encountered air attacks as it approached Ormoc Bay, beginning its debarkation by nightfall. On 10 November the 38th Bomb Group, based on Morotai, sent 32 B-25 Mitchells escorted by 37 P-47 Thunderbolts to attack TA-4 near Ponson Island. Reaching the convoy just before noon, the B-25s attacked at minimum altitude in pairs, sinking the two largest transports, Takatsu Maru and Kashii Maru, disabling a third, and sinking two of the patrol craft escorts at a cost of seven bombers, for which the group was awarded the Distinguished Unit Citation. Although Yamagata's troops were finally ashore by November 10, most of the supplies couldn't be unloaded due to ongoing enemy air attacks. Shortly after leaving Ormoc, American planes intercepted the convoy, destroying two transports and one frigate, while further damaging another frigate and a destroyer. Meanwhile, Okawachi dispatched a third convoy, consisting of five transports, a submarine chaser, and five destroyers under Rear Admiral Hayakawa Mikio, transporting special troops and heavy equipment of the 26th Division. When one transport ran aground on Luzon's Bondoc Peninsula, Kimura sent two frigates and three destroyers to transfer its cargo to Ormoc. As a result, Hayakawa's convoy arrived at Ormoc Bay on November 11 and began unloading. However, ULTRA intercepts had detected the enemy convoy departing Manila, prompting Admiral Halsey to redeploy Task Force 38 under Admiral McCain. While under repair at Manila on 29 October, Nachi and Kumano were attacked by aircraft from USN Task Force 38. Nachi was hit by a single bomb to her aircraft deck, and this, as well as strafing attacks, killed 53 crewmen and further delayed repairs. On 5 November, again in Manila Bay, Nachi was attacked by three waves of U.S. planes from the aircraft carriers USS Lexington and Ticonderoga. She escaped the first wave undamaged, but was hit by five bombs and two or three torpedoes in the second wave while attempting to get underway. During the third wave, Nachi was hit by five torpedoes in her port side, which severed her bow and stern, and by an additional 20 bombs and 16 rockets. Nachi's flag commander, Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima, was ashore for a conference at the time of the attack, but arrived at dockside in time to see his flagship blown apart. The central portion of the vessel sank in 102 feet (31 m) of water about 12 nautical miles (22 km) northeast of Corregidor. McCain launched an attack on Kimura's convoy. Just as unloading began, 347 planes struck, sinking all four transports and four destroyers, including the flagship Shimakaze, on which Hayakawa lost his life. This costly reinforcement operation thus ended in partial failure, with most equipment lost and over 1,500 casualties. Nevertheless, elements of the 1st Division moved immediately toward the Limon area, while Yamagata's units, though short on weaponry, were ordered to assemble at Dolores to prepare for joining the Imahori Detachment at Daro. At the same time, noticing the rapid advance of the enemy into the Carigara area, Yamashita concluded that Suzuki's proposed offensive toward Tacloban was destined for failure. He ordered the main force of the 35th Army to join the 16th Division in the advantageous mountainous positions of the Burauen-Dagami area to regain control of the recently captured airstrips, thereby limiting operations in the Carigara area to a holding action. Concurrently, as this adjustment to the tactical plan was made, Yamashita communicated his growing belief that the overall situation offered little hope for victory on Leyte and unsuccessfully tried to persuade General Terauchi to shift the decisive battle to Luzon. As a result of Terauchi's decision, the 68th Brigade was still to be sent to Leyte; the 23rd Division was scheduled to go to Manila in mid-November before returning to Leyte; and the 10th and 19th Divisions were planned for movement to the island by the end of the year. With the plans finalized for continuing the decisive battle on Leyte, Terauchi's headquarters departed Manila for Saigon on November 17. Back on Leyte, on November 9, the weary, mud-stained troops of the 21st Regiment launched another attack, with the 3rd Battalion assaulting the center of Breakneck Ridge and the 2nd Battalion targeting OP Hill, though they made only minor gains. Additionally, Verbeck's 1st Battalion attacked Limon but was repelled by heavy enemy fire, and fresh Japanese troops subsequently counterattacked the Hill 1525 position, forcing the Americans to retreat. Finally, Colonel Chapman's 2nd Battalion reached the western slopes of Hill 1525 in the afternoon, but it was too late for them to take part in the battle. On November 10, Verbeck continued his assault, successfully capturing OP Hill and making significant headway in the area. At the same time, Chapman's 2nd Battalion began advancing westward to establish a roadblock on Highway 2, approximately 2000 yards south of Limon. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Clifford's 1st Battalion of the 34th Regiment landed on the western shore of Carigara Bay and initiated a wide envelopment around the western flank of the 57th Regiment to secure the high ground known as Kilay Ridge. Additionally, Mudge's cavalrymen pressed forward toward Mount Minoro. On this day, Yamashita's adjustments to the tactical plan finally reached Suzuki's headquarters. As a result, Suzuki abandoned his initial strategy and directed Yamagata to move his troops quickly to Albuera to prepare for an offensive eastward, dubbed Operation Wa. To replace the 26th Division in upcoming operations on the Jaro front, Suzuki decided to deploy the 30th Division, which had not yet departed Mindanao, instructing them to land at Ipil and prepare to support the Imahori Detachment, already skirmishing with Bradley's patrols. On November 11, following a heavy artillery barrage, Verbeck resumed his assault, although the 2nd Battalion quickly found itself pinned down, while the 1st Battalion successfully secured a ridge 300 yards southwest of OP Hill. The next morning, the 1st and 3rd Battalions advanced against the crest of Breakneck Ridge, successfully capturing the objective before being halted by Japanese artillery fire. At the same time, Chapman's 2nd Battalion reached Highway 2, and Clifford's 1st Battalion, supported by elements of the guerrilla 96th Regiment, arrived in the Cabiranan area. By November 13, Verbeck's 1st and 2nd Battalions advanced 600 and 400 yards, respectively, without encountering opposition. Breakneck Ridge was secured, although the Japanese maintained control over several nearby spurs, particularly Corkscrew Ridge. Nonetheless, the 21st Regiment reported approximately 1,779 Japanese soldiers killed, suffering 630 casualties in the process. Additionally, Clifford's 1st Battalion successfully reached Kilay Ridge undetected and quickly established defensive positions. At 0855 on 13 November a column of Filipino men, women, and children entered the perimeter and brought approximately thirty-five boxes of rations from Consuegra. The battalion left the area at 0930 and reached the ridge without opposition. Trenches and prepared gun positions without a man in them honeycombed the ridge from one end to the other. It was evident that elements of the 1st Division had intended to occupy the area in the latter stages of the battle for Limon. On 14 November Colonel Clifford ordered his battalion to entrench itself along the ridge in positions that would afford the best tactical advantage. The battalion established strong points and observation posts on the knolls, placed blocks on the trails leading through the area, and sent out reconnaissance patrols to locate enemy positions. Colonel Clifford made arrangements to utilize the Filipinos as carriers. These men were to use a trail on the north end of the ridge and bring supplies to the battalion from a supply dump at Consuegra. The first human pack train arrived in the area at 1010 with twenty-eight cases of rations and a supply of batteries for the radios. At 1125 enemy artillery shelled the southern end of the ridge and twenty minutes later shifted its fire to the Limon area. The battalion did not succeed in establishing physical contact with the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, which was operating east of the road, but it was able to make radio contact. Throughout the day, patrols of the battalion were active in searching out enemy positions. Meanwhile the 112th Cavalry was landed at Carigara and attached to the 1st Cavalry Division to strengthen the assault on the central Leyte mountains. Meanwhile, the reserve 32nd Division, led by Major-General William Gill, was also dispatched to the island to relieve the fatigued 24th Division. This newly arrived division was assigned the mission of capturing Limon and advancing down the Ormoc Valley toward Ormoc. On the Japanese side, after receiving the rest of his division, Kataoka chose to move the 1st Regiment to the left flank to assist the 57th, which had also been bolstered by two fresh battalions. This combined force aimed to launch an attack along the main road toward Pinamopoan while the 49th Regiment and the 171st Independent Battalion sought to envelop the enemy's left flank toward Colasian. By mid-November, the headquarters of the 102nd Division and most of the 364th Independent Battalion had also arrived in Ormoc, with Lieutenant-General Fukei Shinpei taking command of the 41st Regiment and his other battalions on the island as they advanced toward Mount Pina. Furthermore, despite significant losses to enemy aircraft, five air regiments had reinforced the 4th Air Army, enabling General Tominaga to make the 4th Air Division fully operational, a unit that had previously focused solely on base activities and anti-submarine patrols. The replenishment of naval air strength was progressing well, with replacement aircraft for the 1st Combined Base Air Force outnumbering losses by 26% in November. On November 15, the Combined Fleet opted to cease training carrier air groups and instead focus on expanding the base air forces. The 3rd Air Fleet, stationed in the homeland, was tasked with training replacement units for deployment to the Philippines. Due to the successful reinforcement of Japanese air forces in the Philippines and General Kenney's ongoing inability to provide close air support, Halsey once again directed Task Force 38 to attack enemy airbases on Luzon. On November 13 and 14, McCain's carriers conducted several strikes against Japanese airfields in Luzon, resulting in a significant decrease in enemy air operations over Leyte. On 13 November 1944, on the threat of American carrier strikes on Luzon, Kiso was ordered to return to Brunei that evening carrying Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima. Before she could leave for Brunei, she was attacked on 13 November while underway in Manila Bay by more than 350 carrier planes of Task Force 38's carrier task groups 38.1's Hornet, Monterey and Cowpens, TG 38.3's Essex, Ticonderoga and Langley and TG 38.4's Enterprise and San Jacinto. Three bombs hit Kiso to starboard - one in the bow, one near her boiler rooms and one near her aft gun mounts. Kiso sank in shallow water 13 kilometres (7.0 nmi; 8.1 mi) west of Cavite. Captain Ryonosuke Imamura and 103 of her crew survived, but 175 crewmen went down with the ship. Akebono, while alongside destroyer Akishimo at Cavite pier near Manila, was attacked in a USAAF air raid. A direct bomb hit set both ships ablaze, and the following day a large explosion on Akishimo blew a hole in Akebono, which sank upright in shallow water, with 48 crewmen killed and 43 wounded. After returning to Manila, Hatsuharu was caught in an air raid in Manila Bay. A series of near misses buckled plates and set fires, causing the ship to sink in shallow water. The attack killed 12 crewmen and injured 60 more, but 218 survived. Several other vessels were also sunk. Meanwhile, on November 14, the Hi-81 convoy, comprising the escort carriers Shinyo and Akitsu Maru, destroyer Kashi, seaplane tender Kiyokawa Maru, submarine chaser No. 156, seven escort ships, five oilers, and three transports, left Imari Bay under Rear-Admiral Sato Tsutomu. The convoy carried most of Lieutenant-General Nishiyama Fukutaro's 23rd Division and headed into the Yellow Sea, wary of enemy submarines. After stopping for the night in Ukishima Channel near the Gotō Islands, Sato's convoy resumed its journey on November 15 but was soon ambushed by two submarine wolfpacks. Commander Charles Loughlin's submarines were the first to strike, successfully hitting the Akitsu Maru with two torpedoes, which later sank, resulting in the loss of 2,046 lives, including most of the 64th Regiment. After the attack, Sato withdrew to Strange Island, located off the coast of Korea, to take refuge for the day. On the morning of November 17, the convoy resumed its journey but was soon detected by a B-29 Superfortress as it made its way toward the Shushan Islands. By late afternoon, Commander Gordon Underwood's submarines launched an assault on the Japanese ships, successfully striking the transport vessel Mayasan Maru, which sank quickly, resulting in the loss of 3,437 men, including most of the 72nd Regiment. Almost twelve hours later 200 kilometers off Saishu Island, Spadefish surfaced and attacked the Shinyo with six torpedoes. Four struck the carrier on the starboard at 11:03 pm, and it caught fire. At least 1,130 Japanese sailors went down with their ship; only about seventy survived, including Ishii. Kashi immediately dropped several depth charges where the Spadefish was thought to be. An oil slick and other debris eventually made the Japanese believe they had sunk Spadefish so the Kashi broke off the engagement, but Spadefish had escaped apparently without serious damage. Only minor cracks were reported to have appeared on the submarine after the alleged "sinking" by Kashi. Underwood's final strike was against the submarine chaser No. 156, which sustained three torpedo hits and sank rapidly. Following some rescue efforts, Sato continued his advance on November 21, eventually arriving in Kaohsiung five days later. Half of the convoy then proceeded to San Fernando, where the remaining members of the 23rd Division disembarked on December 2.  Yet thats it for today for the Philippines as we now need to shift over to Morotai.With Japanese reinforcements pushed back into the interior of the secured island, General Persons directed the 31st Division to capture several islands off New Guinea that served as observation points for Japanese outposts monitoring Allied movements. On November 15, the 2nd Battalion of the 167th Regiment landed on Pegun Island, followed by a successful attack on Bras Island the next day. By November 18, with the Mapia Islands secured, Company F of the 124th Regiment was sent to occupy the unguarded Asia Islands on November 19. In the Aitape region, Major-General Jack Stevens' 6th Australian Division was assigned to relieve American forces, similar to the Australian efforts on New Britain and Bougainville, in order to free up troops for the Philippines Campaign. By late October, a base had been successfully set up, allowing the 19th Brigade to arrive by mid-November, with the 17th Brigade scheduled for early December, and the 16th by year-end. Under General Blamey's orders, the new Australian garrisons were to adopt a more active approach than the American units had, so Stevens planned not only to secure the airfield and radar installations in the Aitape-Tadji area, but also to carry out extensive patrols in support of intelligence and guerrilla operations aimed at weakening the enemy in Wewak.  One of General Stevens' tasks was to give maximum help to AIB. and Angau units in the area in their tasks of gaining Intelligence, establishing patrol bases and protecting the native population. These AIB. and Angau units had been active in the Sepik-Aitape triangle since the time of the landing of American forces at Aitape in April 1944, and the 6th Division came into an area where, from the outset, practically all the deep patrolling had been done by groups of Australians. In the Aitape area, prior to the arrival of the Division (said the report of the 6th Division), Angau long-range patrols operated without troop support and, for their own protection, inaugurated a type of guerilla warfare. Selected village natives called "sentries" were taught to use grenades and Japanese rifles. The sentries, besides furnishing Intelligence, accounted for large numbers of enemy. This system was continued. As each area was freed the sentries were rewarded and returned to their villages. By early November, the 2/10th Commando Squadron had established a patrol base at Babiang, conducting numerous patrols throughout the month. Intelligence gathered suggested the Japanese forces were weakened, poorly nourished, and mainly focused on sourcing food. In response, Stevens planned two significant December operations: to sever the enemy's communication line along the Malin-Walum-Womisis-Amam axis and to neutralize enemy positions east of the Danmap River. By November 25, the seasoned 2/7th Commando Squadron had arrived at Babiang, and by month-end, the 19th Brigade took over the area. The commandos then advanced southward, setting up a base at Tong on December 4 and establishing an outpost at Kumbum three days later. Now to finish this week's episode let's explore the B-29 Superfortress operations during this time. After the Formosa Air Battle and the Omura raid on October 25, General LeMay's 20th Bomber Command conducted four missions in November. Three of these supported Southeast Asia operations as part of “PAC-AID,” while the fourth targeted the Omura Aircraft Factory, a key focus for the command. On November 3, 44 B-29s from India effectively bombed the Malegon Railway Yards at Rangoon. Two days later, 53 bombers hit Singapore's King George VI Graving Dock, the largest of several dry docks at Singapore and one of the world's best. The first of 53 Superforts attacking was over target at 0644, and the bombardier, Lt. Frank McKinney, put a I,ooo-pound bomb into the target within 50 feet of the aiming point, the caisson gate; Lt. Bolish McIntyre, 2 planes back, laid another alongside. This was the sort of pickle-barrel bombing the Air Corps had talked about before the war. Strike photos showed a rush of water into the dock, presumptive evidence that the gate had been strained, and subsequent reconnaissance photos indicated that the dock was out of use (A-2's estimate of three months of unserviceability was to prove quite accurate). There were other hits on the dock, on a 465-foot freighter in it, and on adjacent shops. For “baksheesh,” as the boys had learned to say in India, seven B-29's bombed the secondary target, Pangkalanbrandan refinery in Sumatra, and reported direct hits on the cracking plant. The Japanese, evidently relying on the inaccessibility of Singapore, put up a feeble defense, but the long trip took a toll of two planes and twelve crewmen, including Col. Ted L. Faulkner, commander of the 468th Group. On November 11, 96 B-29s launched from China to strike Omura under difficult weather; only 29 reached the aircraft factory unsuccessfully, while 24 more bombed Nanking with limited results. The month's final mission on November 27 saw 55 B-29s severely damage the Bang Soe marshaling yards in Bangkok. Meanwhile, in the Marianas, General Hansell's 21st Bomber Command prepared for strikes on the Japanese Home Islands. In order to properly plan missions to Japan, up-to-date reconnaissance photos of the proposed targets were needed. Other than information which was used during the Doolittle Raid in 1942, there was scant information about the locations of Japanese industry, especially the aircraft industry. On November 1, two days after arriving on Saipan, a 3rd Photographic Reconnaissance Squadron F-13A Superfortress (photo reconnaissance-configured B-29) took off bound for Tokyo. The aircraft flew over Tokyo at 32000 feet for 35 minutes taking picture after picture. A few fighters made it up to the camera plane's altitude but did not attack. These photos, along with other intelligence, gave the 21st Bomber Command the locations of the Japanese aircraft manufacturing plants and enabled mission planners to plan missions for the combat crews to attack. In honor of his mission, the aircraft was named "Tokyo Rose". In response, about ten G4Ms launched from Iwo Jima attacked Isley Field on Saipan the next day, scoring five bomb hits but losing three bombers. Hansell responded with a practice strike on Iwo Jima on November 5, though results were again limited. On November 7, the Japanese launched a follow-up attack, but it again resulted in minimal damage and cost them three bombers. A retaliatory strike by 17 B-29s the next day also fell short: one squadron had to jettison its bombs into the ocean, while another dropped its load through a gap in the undercast. Between Japanese attacks, American aircrew inexperience, delays in constructing airfields in the Marianas, and the slow movement of B-29s to Saipan, the 21st Bomber Command was behind schedule in its planned offensive against Japan. By November 15, only half of the 73rd Bombardment Wing's authorized 180 B-29s had arrived, but by November 22, around 118 bombers were finally in place. At this point, General Arnold ordered Hansell to begin Operation San Antonio I, marking the first strike against Tokyo. The chosen target was Nakajima's Musashi Aircraft Engine Plant, which supplied 27% of Japan's combat aircraft engines. On November 24, 111 B-29s took off for Japan, collectively carrying 277.5 tons of bombs. However, 17 bombers aborted mid-flight, and six others couldn't bomb due to mechanical issues. For the first time, the B-29s encountered the Jet stream, which was a high-speed wind coming out of the west at speeds as high as 200 mph at precisely the altitudes at which the bombers were operating. This caused the bomber formations to be disrupted and made accurate bombing impossible. As a result, only 24 B-29s bombed the Musashi plant, while 64 hit nearby dock and urban areas instead. The Japanese fighter response was less intense than expected, with the Americans claiming to have downed seven fighters, likely destroyed 18 more, and damaged nine, losing just one bomber in return. Another B-29 was lost on the return trip after running out of fuel and ditching. Despite disappointing bombing results in the mission—only 48 bombs struck the factory area, causing damage to just 1% of the building area and 2.4% of the machinery, with 57 killed and 75 injured—the raid exposed the weaknesses in Japan's air defense and showed the six million residents of Tokyo that they were vulnerable to attack. Given the limited impact of the November 24 mission, Hansell decided to launch a second major strike, dubbed San Antonio II, targeting Musashi once more. However, in the early hours of November 27, two G4M bombers from Iwo Jima carried out a low-altitude raid on Isley Field, escaping after destroying one B-29 and damaging eleven others.  Later that day, twelve bomb-equipped Mitsubishi A6M "Zero" fighters from the IJN's 252 Kōkūtai (252 Air Group) accompanied by two Nakajima C6N "Myrt" reconnaissance aircraft for navigation purposes departed Iwo Jima for Saipan. The attackers flew just above sea level to avoid US radar, and one of the A6Ms was forced to divert to Pagan after its propeller struck a wave; this aircraft was shot down by a USAAF Thunderbolt while attempting to land. The remaining eleven A6Ms arrived over Saipan at noon, shortly after XXI Bomber Command's second raid on Tokyo had departed. These aircraft strafed Isley Field destroying three or four B-29s and damaging up to two others. One of the Japanese pilots landed his fighter on Isley Field and fired on airfield personnel with his pistol until he was killed by rifle fire; this incident was witnessed by Brigadier General Haywood S. Hansell, the commander of XXI Bomber Command. None of the ten other A6Ms survived; four were shot down by USAAF fighters and six by anti-aircraft guns. The U.S. gunners also downed a USAAF Thunderbolt in circumstances which an official assessment later described as "inexcusable". Of the 81 bombers launched, 19 aborted, and those that reached Tokyo found the target covered by clouds, forcing them to drop bombs by radar over Tokyo's docks, urban areas, and the cities of Hamamatsu, Shizuoka, Numazu, and Osaka. Ultimately, for the loss of one Superfortress, the damage caused by this second strike was minimal. However, the strong Japanese response led Hansell to relocate some B-29s from Isley to safer Guam, strengthen Saipan's defenses and radar, and plan coordinated air-sea operations to neutralize Iwo Jima's staging fields. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Americans pressed through Leyte's treacherous terrain and fierce resistance, aiming to secure strategic positions. Typhoons, enemy reinforcements, and brutal battles tested them harshly, but they advanced steadily. Despite heavy losses and airstrikes from both sides, American forces captured Breakneck Ridge and pushed onward, inching closer to victory.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 152 - Pacific War Podcast - Return to the Philippines 17 - October 21 - , 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 15, 2024 46:02


Last time we spoke about the Formosa air battle. In mid-1944, General MacArthur and Admirals Nimitz and Halsey debated their next move in the Pacific. MacArthur, intent on a direct assault on the Philippines, clashed with Nimitz, who favored invading Formosa. MacArthur's persuasive tactics, political savvy and to be more blunt, threats during a rather dramatic visit to Honolulu, convinced President FDR to prioritize the Philippines. Despite MacArthur's grandstanding, FDR did not completely abandon the US Navy's plans, and MacArthur's plan would require significant Naval support, with carrier strikes planned to soften Japanese defenses. In October, Halsey's carriers launched devastating strikes against Formosa, leading to heavy Japanese losses and disrupting their air power. Despite some fierce counterattacks and damage to American ships, including the cruiser Canberra, the American forces achieved air supremacy. The successful air campaign set the stage for the invasion of Leyte, marking a pivotal shift in the Pacific War.  This episode is the Return to the Philippines Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We last left off the week before the grand  return to the Philippines, Admiral Halsey had dispatched his carrier forces to neutralize enemy bases in Formosa in preparation for General MacArthur's Leyte invasion. However, Admiral Toyoda's response was unexpectedly strong, resulting in two cruisers being torpedoed, which forced Admiral Mitscher to order a retreat eastward under pressure from Japanese aviators. On October 15, while the cruisers Houston and Canberra were being towed under the protection of Admiral McCain's carriers, Halsey directed Admirals Bogan and Sherman's task groups to withdraw eastward out of sight. At the same time, Admiral Davison's forces carried out intermittent air raids on northern Luzon to keep enemy aircraft at bay. More significantly, Halsey decided to turn the situation into an opportunity. He instructed McCain's units to send out open messages, pleading for assistance. This tactic, which Halsey called the "Lure of the Streamlined Bait," was designed to mislead the Japanese into believing that this task group was all that remained of the fleet, enticing them to move in for the kill. Halsey's other task groups, which had withdrawn eastward, would then return to engage and destroy the enemy. On October 14, Japanese aviators claimed two carriers, one battleship and one heavy cruiser sunk, and one small carrier, one battleship and one light cruiser set afire. The exaggerated claims of the Japanese air force were accepted jubilantly on the home islands. The people felt that the American Navy had indeed been given a death blow, and the Finance Ministry distributed "celebration sake" to all households in the country to commemorate the event. The Tokyo radio made the unfounded claim that "a total of 57 enemy warships including 19 aircraft carriers and four battleships were sunk or heavily damaged by the Japanese forces… the enemy task forces lost the majority of their strength and were put to rout." It also predicted that the Allied losses would delay the invasion of the Philippine Islands by two months. Admiral Halsey's reaction was to report that "all 3rd Fleet Ships reported by radio Tokyo as sunk have now been salvaged and are retiring towards the enemy." The exaggerated claims of success made by Japanese pilots further convinced Toyoda to continue the assault, despite heavy aircraft losses. Meanwhile, Admiral Shima's strike force was already rushing south from the Inland Sea to support the air forces. However, Shima's force was not the only one speeding towards the battlefront. On October 13, Admiral Barbey's convoy, consisting of over 470 ships and carrying the 24th Division and the 6th Army Service Command, finally departed Hollandia, heading toward the designated "Far Shore," Leyte. The next day, the convoy crossed the equator without ceremony. By October 15, Task Force 78, which included the 1st Cavalry Division, joined the massive convoy. With General Sibert's full 10th Corps now en route to Leyte, the plan was to rendezvous with Admiral Wilkinson's Task Force 79. Over the course of about two weeks, General Hodge's 24th Corps had been transported from Hawaii to Eniwetok and then to Manus Island. On October 11, the LSTs carrying the assault battalions departed Manus, followed by Wilkinson's convoy of 267 ships, which left the Admiralties three days later. Their progress was steady, and by October 17, Wilkinson's tractor groups began joining the 7th Fleet. This combined fleet formed the largest convoy ever seen in the Pacific up to that point. Meanwhile, during the Formosa Air Battle, Japanese aviators launched multiple strikes against Task Groups 38.1 and 38.4 from dawn to dusk on October 15. Fortunately, the American carriers' reinforced combat air patrols effectively minimized damage, with only one glancing bomb hit on the Franklin. In retaliation, Admiral Mitscher's pilots claimed to have shot down more than 100 Japanese planes. Additionally, Admiral Davison's carriers attacked enemy air concentrations in Luzon, though they faced heavy resistance from Vice-Admiral Teraoka Kinpei's reorganized 1st Air Fleet. These engagements continued over the next two days, with American forces estimated to have destroyed 99 enemy aircraft on the ground and 95 in the air by October 19. On the morning of October 16, Mitscher's carriers conducted long-range searches to determine if the enemy had fallen for Halsey's trap. Meanwhile, Japanese morning reconnaissance flights over the western Philippine Sea spotted three enemy task groups with a combined total of 13 carriers in the vicinity, forcing Toyoda to reluctantly cancel Shima's planned attack. As a result, no surface engagement materialized from Halsey's "Lure of the Streamlined Bait." However, 247 naval aircraft were promptly dispatched from Okinawa, Formosa, and Luzon to locate the enemy groups. McCain continued to fend off persistent Japanese air assaults, which managed to land another torpedo hit on the Houston. Hellcats from light carriers Cabot and Cowpens did great execution against a Japanese formation of over 100 aircraft. However, three Jills penetrated the screen. One twin engine plane fought through the CAP and ships' anti-aircraft batteries, surviving just long enough to put a torpedo in the water before the plane itself crashed into the sea. The torpedo struck the after portion of the starboard side of the Houston, blowing 20 men overboard and spreading gasoline fires in the waters around the cruiser. The explosion set fire to the starboard tank that held fuel for the ship's reconnaissance floatplanes, causing a major fire in the aircraft hangar, though the remaining crew suppressed the blaze within fifteen minutes. Flooding from this hit degraded the ship's buoyancy and stability further. Another 300 men were evacuated afterward, leaving just 200 aboard to continue damage control efforts as the ships withdrew. Despite the cruiser suffering significant damage, the towing operation carried on, slowly guiding the task group towards Naval Base Ulithi, which they eventually reached on October 27. On October 17, the Japanese were still in pursuit of the retreating fleet, but contact was lost, and further attacks were aborted. Nevertheless, the Formosa Air Battle had one final chapter. After the successful strike on Okayama on October 14, General LeMay deemed the damage extensive enough that it wasn't necessary to send all available B-29s for mop-up operations. On October 16, only the 444th and 462nd Bombardment Groups were dispatched to hit Okayama, while the 468th targeted Heito, an airbase and staging field east of Takao. Of 49 planes airborne against Okayama, only 28 bombed there, but they were aided by five stragglers from the 468th Group. To even things up, a formation of 11 planes from the 444th flew calmly by its Okayama target and struck at Heito through an error by the lead bombardier. Other B-29s bombed alternate or chance targets at Takao, Toshien, Swatow, and Sintien harbors; at Hengyang; and at several airdromes, including Taichu on Formosa. This dual mission was less smooth than the October 14 raid, but no losses were reported. The next day, 23 B-29s from the 40th Bombardment Group attacked the Einansho Air Depot near Tainan to complete the Formosa campaign. Heavy cloud cover prevented 13 of the bombers from reaching the target, so they diverted to bomb Takao harbor instead. Despite these challenges, LeMay's bombers inflicted significant damage overall. By the end of the Formosa Air Battle, the Japanese had launched a total of 761 offensive sorties. Toyoda's pilots reported that nearly the entire 3rd Fleet had been sunk and the American carrier force was in ruins. For comedic effect why not go through the real list shall we: Japanese claims were finally listed as follows: Sunk: 11 carriers, 2 battleships, 3 cruisers, 1 destroyer (or light cruiser). Damaged: 8 carriers, 2 battleships, 4 cruisers, 1 destroyer (or light cruiser), 13 unidentified ships. In addition, at least 12 other ships set afire. These exaggerated claims were heavily promoted by newspapers, although figures like Toyoda within the IJN remained skeptical. In reality, the Japanese air forces were decisively beaten at Formosa, losing around 171 planes in the initial defense and another 321 during attacks on Mitscher's fleet—a total of approximately 492 aircraft.  The Second Air Fleet, comprising the main strength of the Navy's base air forces, had lost 50 per cent of its strength and was reduced to 230 operational aircraft. The First Air Fleet and Fourth Air Army in the Philippines were left with a combined operational strength of only a little over 100 aircraft. Of 143 carrier planes used to reinforce the Second Air Fleet, about one-third, with their flight crews, had been lost. Allied estimates, however, place Japanese losses as high as 655. In addition to these aircraft losses, Japan suffered significant casualties among air personnel, which severely weakened Admiral Ozawa's 3rd and 4th Carrier Divisions and left General Yamashita with limited air support for the defense of the Philippines. On the other hand, Halsey's forces lost only 89 aircraft, with two cruisers suffering serious damage. The radar-guided Hellcats easily repelled the fragmented Japanese attacks, causing no delays to the American operations and inflicting no serious damage on Task Force 38. This defeat significantly diminished Japan's ability to defend the Philippines, as their surface forces were now left without effective air cover. In the aftermath of the battle, the aggressive Vice-Admiral Onishi Takishiro assumed command of the 1st Air Fleet and initiated the creation of a suicide corps, recruiting volunteers to dive-bomb enemy vessels. Thus, the Kamikaze Special Attack Corps was born. Captain Motoharu Okamura, in charge of Tateyama base and the 341st Air Group Home is theorized to be the first officer to propose the use of kamikaze attack tactics. Commander Asaichi Tamai asked a group of 23 student pilots whom he had trained to volunteer for the first special kamikaze attack force, all of them did so willingly. The names of the four subunits within the Kamikaze Special Attack Force were Unit Shikishima, Unit Yamato, Unit Asahi and Unit Yamazakura. LeMay reported the destruction of 65 buildings and damage to 9 out of the 80 at Okayama's assembly plant, along with the destruction of 7 hangars and 16 buildings and damage to 9 others at the airbase. As a result, LeMay's intelligence team estimated it would take between four and six months to fully restore the Okayama plant to full operational capacity. His final strike of the month occurred on October 25, targeting the Omura Aircraft Factory, with 78 B-29 bombers successfully taking off. Over Omura, 59 planes dropped 156 tons of bombs, while 11 hit various other targets. Despite moderate resistance, one bomber was lost during the attack. Strike photos and subsequent reconnaissance showed significant damage, especially in the aluminum fabrication area. Over the following three months, Omura would become a primary target for Operation Matterhorn, though the 20th Bomber Command also conducted additional strikes to support Allied operations in Southeast Asia, China, and the Philippines. Meanwhile, minesweepers and other vessels had cleared the way for amphibious flotillas. In the early dawn of October 17 the minesweepers began their work on the channel approaches to Suluan Island. By 06:30 they had accomplished their task and then began to sweep the waters of the landing areas in Leyte Gulf until the storm forced them to suspend operations. At 12:59 they resumed sweeping with great difficulty. Until A Day, intensive area and tactical mine sweeping continued. The sweepers started at dawn each day and worked continuously until nightfall. By October 19 it was known that the Japanese had heavily mined the approaches to Leyte Gulf but that there were no mines within the gulf itself. However the northern part of the main channel into the gulf was not considered safe. By the same date sweeping had been completed in the southern half, 186 mines having been destroyed. At about 01:35 on October 19, the destroyer supporting the mine-sweeping units which were in the gulf struck a floating mine and while maneuvering away from the area struck another. The ship was disabled and retired from action. By A Day, a total of 227 mines had been destroyed and a passage approximately six miles wide had been cleared just north of Dinagat Island. All ships were therefore directed to enter Leyte Gulf through that portion of the strait. As the minesweepers came close to the land, boats containing Filipinos moved out to welcome the advance party of liberators. The reception they met was not enthusiastic. Admiral Oldendorf "suspected that some might have come seeking information so detained them aboard their respective ships… Directed no further patriots be taken aboard ship."With Halsey's forces still in the Formosa-Ryukyus region, these ships were under the air cover of General Whitehead's 5th Air Force and Admiral Kinkaid's escort carriers. While minesweepers and demolition teams worked to clear mines, remove transport barriers, and perform beach reconnaissance, Company D of the 6th Ranger Battalion prepared to land on Suluan Island on October 17. Supported by fire from the USS Denver and in heavy rain, the Rangers successfully landed on the beach at 08:05 without opposition. The men immediately filed south 500 yards on a trail along the coast and then headed east toward the lighthouse. On the way, four buildings, one of which contained a Japanese radio, were found and set ablaze. The company then continued along the trail. Suddenly the enemy fired from a concealed position, killing one man and wounding another. When Company D went into attack formation, the enemy force disappeared into the heavy jungle bordering the trail. The march was resumed and the company reached its objective without further incident. The lighthouse, which had been damaged by naval bombardment, and adjoining buildings were deserted. Unfortunately, a Japanese radio station successfully reported the enemy convoy's approach and the start of the Rangers' landings, revealing that Leyte was the Americans' ultimate target. In response, Toyoda swiftly initiated Operation Sho-Go, ordering Vice-Admiral Kurita Takeo's 1st Striking Force to move from Lingga anchorage to Brunei Bay, preparing to strike the enemy invasion fleet.  Just after midnight on October 18, Kurita's ships departed Lingga anchorage and began their trek to Leyte. Sentai (Division) 16—heavy cruiser Aoba, light cruiser Kinu, and destroyer Uranami—was ordered to detach from Kurita's command and head to Manila. These ships were all among the oldest in Kurita's fleet, but it was a mistake to detach them for a secondary transport mission when they would have been better used to augment the decisive attack planned for Kurita's force. Simultaneously, Shima's 2nd Striking Force, reinforced by Kurita's detached 16th Cruiser Division, was tasked with supporting counterlandings. The Second Striking Force, for this newly-assigned mission, was to be composed only of the Fifth Fleet (two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, seven destroyers) plus the 16th Cruiser Division (one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser, one destroyer) detached from the First Striking Force. Under this plan, the 16th Cruiser Division was ordered to proceed to Manila, while the Second Striking Force main body, then at Amami Oshima in the Ryukyus, was ordered to go first to Mako, refuel, and then proceed to the Philippines.   By noon, another order was issued to Ozawa's Main Body, despite its depleted air power, to coordinate a sortie from home waters in support of the attack planned for the morning of October 25 in Leyte Gulf. The mission of the Ozawa force was of vital importance to the success of the over-all plan. It was to act as a decoy to draw off the main strength of the enemy naval forces covering the invasion operations in Leyte Gulf, thus allowing the 1st Striking Force to penetrate to the landing point and smash the enemy's troop and supply ships. To heighten its effectiveness as a lure, the Ozawa Force sortied with all of the 3rd Carrier Division, made up of the regular carrier Zuikaku and the light carriers Zuiho, Chitose, and Chiyoda. The total number of aircraft available to put aboard these ships, however, was only 108. These belonged to the poorly trained air groups of the 1st Carrier Division and represented about half the normal complement. In addition to the half-empty carriers, the force comprised two battleships, three light cruisers and eight destroyers. Ozawa fully anticipated that his fleet would be completely wiped out, but this sacrifice was deemed essential to achieve the primary objective: destruction of the entire enemy invasion force. As a result of the transfer of the flying groups of the 3d and 4th Carrier Divisions to Second Air Fleet for the Formosa air battle, the Task Force Main Body had lost much of its planned striking power. The mission assigned to it was therefore less offensive than that assigned in the original Sho-Go battle plan. The original plan had called for a diversionary attack by the Ozawa Force against the enemy's main carrier task forces. Under the more general terms of the 18 October plan, however, Vice Adm. Ozawa was left discretion to choose an attack target more commensurate with the strength of his force. Meanwhile, Davison's carrier aircraft launched attacks on air bases around Manila and Legaspi, but neither the 1st Air Fleet nor the 4th Air Army could respond due to adverse weather. As these strikes were carried out in difficult conditions, General Terauchi concluded by nightfall that a significant enemy operation was underway. He then activated the Army component of Sho-Go, instructing Lieutenant-General Tominaga Kyoji to target enemy ships near Leyte. Should the enemy successfully land, General Suzuki's 35th Army was ordered to delay their advance until reinforcements arrived, with the goal of launching a counterattack to defeat the Americans by October 25. Given the recent actions on Suluan and the American naval presence in the Leyte Gulf, the Army and Navy IGHQ sections surprisingly coordinated their response, with the IJA staff approving the Southern Army's request to implement Sho-Go 1. It was determined that the coming decisive battle for Japan was the Philippines. One major difference was the battle's location. Terauchi, Yamashita, and other Southern Army officers believed it would be Luzon, not Leyte. With Sho-Go 1 focused on Leyte, the Japanese would have to fight in the central Philippines, without extensive defensive works or major airfields. Yamashita would also use his limited shipping to send reinforcements to Leyte. If the Japanese lost Leyte, there might not be sufficient strength to defeat decisively any American offensive on Luzon. Deploying the few IJA units to Leyte would make a Luzon defense harder to accomplish. Sho-Go 1 could hand the control of the Philippines to the Americans. Eventually, Terauchi agreed to the IGHQ position of making Leyte the primary location to fight the Americans. Believing that Halsey's fleet had been defeated off Formosa, Terauchi now thought the Americans could not sustain any major operations or contest reinforcement convoys, both poor assumptions that would later cause suffering for the IJA. Yamashita disagreed with Terauchi and the IGHQ about designating Leyte as the prime battle site; but on October 22, Terauchi finally ordered Yamashita and the Fourth Air Army to make Leyte the main point of attack. His opinion was: “The opportunity to annihilate the enemy is at hand.” However Yamashita was convinced that the Americans had greater strength than anticipated, given the continued American carrier aviation's presence. Meanwhile, by 12:30 on October 17, the Rangers had successfully landed on Dinagat Island, finding no Japanese forces there. On the morning of the 18th, the ship's address system clanged out general quarters. The men went below, put on their gear, and checked their weapons. At 0900 the troops were told to prepare to disembark. They bolted up the ladders and spilled out over the deck to the davits. The boats were lowered and the first wave started for the beach. At the same time the guns from the destroyer and frigate which had escorted the transport concentrated fire against the shore line for twelve minutes. Three minutes later, the boats grounded on a coral reef forty yards from the beach, and the men waded the remaining distance to shore. They encountered no resistance and at 1038 the company commander, Capt. Arthur D. Simons, notified the battalion commander, "Beachhead secured, supplies ashore. No resistance. No casualties." The company set up a channel light. They quickly set up a navigation light at Desolation Point to guide the main convoy. However, bad weather and tides delayed the landing on Homonhon Island. Colonel Mucci's Company B finally made it ashore the next morning without opposition and installed another navigation light. At the same time, Tominaga attempted to retaliate but was thwarted by a violent storm. In the afternoon, Kinkaid's forces, supported by Mitscher's carriers, conducted minesweeping and direct-fire missions on the Leyte beaches to protect the underwater demolition teams. Admiral Oldendorf's warships heavily bombarded the southern beaches, paving the way for transports to enter Leyte Gulf by the following evening. These pre-landing operations, which continued through October 19 on the northern landing beaches, alerted General Makino to a potential secondary landing closer to Tacloban. This maneuver would outflank the main strength of the 16th Division and directly threaten his headquarters. In response, Makino relocated his headquarters from Tacloban to Dagami and ordered the 33rd Regiment to reinforce the Palo-San Jose coastal sector, while the 2nd Battalion strengthened the southern defenses. Despite these last-minute efforts, Makino's forces were unprepared for the overwhelming assault. The heavy naval gunfire had destroyed many defensive positions and disabled most of the 22nd Field Artillery Regiment's guns. Furthermore, although the weather now favored Tominaga's counterstrikes, American carrier operations had been so effective that he was unable to challenge their air superiority. Despite the optimism of the High Command with regard to the prospects of gaining eventual air superiority in the battle area, it was already evident that the air phase of Sho-Go was not working out as intended. Those plans had envisaged mass air attacks against the invading enemy naval forces and troop convoys beginning prior to their arrival at the landing point. The enemy, however, had forestalled these plans by striking at Leyte before the planned concentration of Japanese air strength in the Philippines had been completed, and before the Navy's base air forces had time to recover from losses sustained in the Formosa Air Battle and earlier enemy carrier strikes on the Philippines. The 1st Air Fleet, already in the Philippines, had been reduced to an operational strength of less than 50 aircraft. The 2nd Air Fleet, which had lost half its strength in the Formosa Battle, had not yet begun its redeployment from Formosa to the Philippines. Although the 4th Air Army had sustained relatively lighter losses, its strength was widely dispersed. Before it could operate effectively in the Leyte area, it had to concentrate at forward bases in the central Philippines, an operation rendered both difficult and dangerous by enemy action, bad weather, and the virtually useless condition of many of the forward fields due to continuous rains. Under such unfavorable conditions, the concentration required a minimum of several days, and in the meanwhile the enemy was able to operate in Leyte Gulf against extremely light air opposition. On October 19, when weather conditions finally permitted an air attack against the enemy invasion fleet, no more than five naval and three Army aircraft could be mustered against the steadily increasing concentration of enemy shipping in Leyte Gulf. By the evening of October 19, the preliminary operations were nearly complete, with most of Kinkaid's fleet positioned outside the gulf. Since the minefield at the entrance hadn't been fully cleared, the ships entered slightly south of the entrance's center, avoiding the main channel and staying close to Dinagat's northern point. Meanwhile, Suzuki had already activated the Suzu Plan, with units from the 30th and 102nd Divisions preparing to move toward Ormoc. However, before they could depart, Oldendorf began October 20 with two simultaneous pre-landing bombardments, each involving three battleships. After two hours of battleship fire, cruisers and destroyers followed with high-explosive shells, causing significant damage. At the same time, Kinkaid's escort carriers launched bombing and strafing runs against suspected defensive positions and airfields, severely disrupting Makino's radio and telegraph communications. At 0800 the first anchor chains of the vessels had rattled out; LCVP's were quickly swung over the sides; boats circled mother ships and moved to their rendezvous areas. The LCI mortar and LCI rocket ships took their places at the head of the assault waves. It was now 0945, fifteen minutes before H Hour. The LCI's raced simultaneously to the shores of Leyte, raking the landing beaches with rocket and mortar fire. The bombardment grew heavier and more monotonous. Hundreds of small boats, flanked by rocket ships and destroyers, headed toward the beaches; thousands of rockets hit the beaches with the rumble of an earthquake. It was impossible to distinguish one explosion from another in the unbroken roar. By 09:30, the 21st Regiment successfully landed on Panaon Island without resistance, securing control of the entrance to Sogod Bay. Fifteen minutes later, the transports sped toward Leyte's shores, led by LCI gunboats, which pounded the beaches with rockets and mortar fire. At 10:00, Sibert's 10th Corps, covered by a heavy rocket barrage, landed on the White and Red Beaches, marking the Americans' return to the Philippines. Admiral Fechteler's transports delivered General Mudge's 1st Cavalry Division to White Beach, where the brigades landed side by side, with the 8th Cavalry Regiment held in floating reserve. Facing only small arms and machine gun fire, the 1st Squadron of the 7th Cavalry Regiment swiftly secured the Cataisan Peninsula and its airfield, while the 2nd Squadron captured San Jose and advanced across the Burayan River, reaching a point 3000 yards from the beach. The 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments had to navigate a deep swamp to access Highway 1, then pushed westward until they encountered enemy resistance near the foothills of Caibaan. At 10:40, Mudge's reserve began to land, followed by the division artillery at 13:30. Meanwhile, to the south, Barbey's transports landed General Irving's 24th Division on the shallow Red Beach, with the 19th and 34th Regiments landing abreast in battalion columns. The Japanese permitted the first five waves to land, but when the remaining waves were about 2000 yards offshore, they unleashed heavy artillery and mortar fire, sinking several landing craft and causing significant casualties.  The first elements of the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, inadvertently landed 300 yards north of the assigned area and were immediately pinned down by heavy machine gun and rifle fire. The commanding officer of the regiment, Col. Aubrey S. Newman, arrived on the beach and, noting the situation, shouted to his men, "Get the hell off the beach. Get up and get moving. Follow me." Thus urgently prompted, the men followed him into the wooded area. To the south the 19th Infantry, with the 3d Battalion in the lead, had also struck heavy opposition on its sector of the beach. Through error the first waves of the regiment landed almost directly behind the 34th Infantry and 800 yards north of the proposed landing point. The later waves landed at the planned spot. Company K did not land on schedule, because its command boat broke down. Going in under heavy fire, the company had all its officers except one killed or wounded. One of its platoons was unable to make contact with the rest of the company until the following day. Upon landing, the first waves were immediately pinned down by intense machine-gun and rifle fire. Despite this, the Americans successfully stormed the initial defenses of the 33rd Regiment. By 12:15, the 34th Regiment had cleared the beach of enemy forces, and after a preparatory concentration, its 3rd Battalion advanced approximately 400 yards. The 2nd Battalion then moved through the 3rd, crossed Highway 1 at 15:50, and established positions for the night 100 yards west of the highway. To the south, the 3rd Battalion, 19th Regiment had reached Highway 1, while the battered 1st Battalion followed behind under heavy fire. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion landed and advanced cautiously, as the 1st Battalion pressed toward Hill 522 amidst fierce resistance. Hill 522, which rose directly from the river's edge north of Palo, overlooked the landing beaches and its upward trails were steep and winding. Hill 522 presented the most significant terrain feature which would have to be overcome before the American forces could push into the interior from Palo and it constituted one of the chief objectives for A Day. Three months earlier General Makino had started to fortify it, impressing nearly all of the male population of Palo for the work. By A Day they had constructed five well-camouflaged pillboxes of rocks, planking, and logs, covered with earth. Numerous tunnels honeycombed the hill; the communications trenches were seven feet deep. They eventually encircled enemy positions and began to make steady progress up the hill. By dusk, Companies B and C had captured the hill's crests and successfully repelled several enemy counterattacks. This achievement secured Hill 522, which commanded the route into the interior and overlooked Palo, the gateway to Leyte Valley. At 14:30, General Douglas MacArthur landed on Red Beach alongside President Sergio Osmeña, who had taken over from Manuel Quezon following his death on August 1. So if you go on Youtube you can see the footage of MacArthur et al wading ashore and to this day there is a monument to this iconic moment. MacArthur made a radio broadcast to the Filipino people, declaring, “People of the Philippines: I have returned. By the grace of Almighty God our forces stand again on Philippine soil—soil consecrated in the blood of our two peoples. We have come dedicated and committed to the task of destroying every vestige of enemy control over your daily lives, and of restoring upon a foundation of indestructible strength, the liberties of your people” He had finally fulfilled his promise to the Filipino people. Further south, Hodge's 24th Corps encountered more resistance as it landed on Orange, Blue, Violet, and Yellow Beaches at 10:00. Under the transport of Rear-Admiral Forrest Royal's ships and the protection of LCI gunboats, General Bradley's 96th Division landed with its regiments positioned between the Calbasag River and the town of San Jose. The 382nd Regiment successfully disembarked on the Blue Beaches at 09:50, followed by the 383rd Regiment on the Orange Beaches ten minutes later.As they advanced inland, both units faced intermittent mortar and artillery fire from the 9th Regiment positioned on Catmon Hill. Colonel Macey Dill's 3rd Battalion initially encountered obstacles such as tank barriers made of coconut logs, debris on the beach, and heavy bombardment from Hill 120. However, with mortar and naval gunfire support, the battalion eventually captured the hill and repelled several enemy counterattacks, though they were unable to continue the advance due to deep swamps. In contrast, Dill's 2nd Battalion managed to push about 2,500 yards inland despite the intense heat and swampy conditions. To the north, Colonel Edwin May's 1st and 2nd Battalions were similarly hindered by an unexpected swamp but still succeeded in securing San Jose and the head of the Labiranan River, advancing approximately 2,600 yards inland. By 18:00, Bradley's artillery had been landed, although the 381st Regiment remained in floating reserve. Further south, Admiral Conolly's transports landed General Arnold's 7th Division between the Calbasag and Daguitan Rivers, with regiments landing side by side. Companies L and K of the 3rd Battalion, 32nd Regiment landed abreast. Company L, on the left, ran into heavy fire from Japanese machine gunners who had waited until the leading elements of the company exposed themselves. The Japanese were entrenched in bunkers emplaced in hedgerows and banana groves. The pillboxes, which were mutually supporting, were located at the ends of the hedgerows and occasionally in the middle of an open field. Each pillbox had machine guns and anti-tank guns. Company L suffered a number of casualties and was pinned down. The enemy gunners then turned to Company K and stopped its forward movement. In the space of 15 minutes, 2 officers and 6 men of the 3rd Battalion were killed, and 1 officer and 18 men wounded. Of the medium tanks that had come ashore at 10:30, 3 were sent to support Company L and 2 to support Company K. The latter 2 were knocked out before they could adjust their fire on the pillboxes. The leading tank sent in support of Company L was knocked out by a direct hit from an antitank gun. With 2 tanks remaining, it was decided to hit the flanks of the entrenched pillboxes at 13:45. A platoon of Company K went to the right and another platoon from the company to the left. Simultaneously the remaining elements of the 2 companies, coordinating with the tanks, assaulted the pillboxes. The heavy volume of fire kept the enemy guns quiet until they could be finished off with grenades. The pillboxes were knocked out without further casualties. Paralleling the route of advance of Company L were several hedge fences, behind which were enemy machine guns and mortars. Although under heavy fire, the company was able to break through the first barriers with the aid of the tanks. At 16:30, since the enemy fire continued in volume, the 32nd Regiment withdrew and established a defensive position for the night. Meanwhile, the 184th Regiment landed its 3rd Battalion at Yellow Beach 2, directly in front of Dulag, and its 1st Battalion at Yellow Beach 1, which was farther south and separated by a swamp. Both beaches saw surprisingly little resistance, allowing the 184th to advance more quickly than expected, successfully capturing Dulag and reaching its airfield.Behind them, the reserve 2nd Battalion and the 3rd Battalion of the 17th Regiment landed after midday. The 3rd Battalion pushed west and south with minimal opposition, successfully securing the bridge over the Daguitan River at Dao. By the end of the day, both corps had fallen short of their beachhead objectives, with Hodge's 24th Corps achieving particularly modest results. Despite this, the Sixth Army had successfully landed assault forces along the entire eastern coast of Leyte and gained control of Panaon Strait, with casualties totaling 49 killed, 192 wounded, and 6 missing. Most of the 16th Division had retreated during the naval and air bombardment before the landing, which allowed the Americans to secure most coastal defenses before the enemy could regroup. Consequently, the only Japanese forces encountered were those left behind to delay the invasion. A more substantial enemy engagement was yet to come. Air opposition to the invasion was minimal, as Tominaga and the naval air forces continued to concentrate their strength in the Philippines in preparation for a major air offensive scheduled to begin on October 25. However, 37 Army and Navy planes attacked the invasion shipping off Leyte. At 1600, on 20 October an enemy torpedo plane was sighted as it aimed its torpedo at Honolulu. Despite the skillful maneuvering of Captain Thurber to evade, the torpedo found its mark on her port side. 64 men were killed and 35 were injured. Flooding caused a temporary severe list, but the ship was saved by efficient damage measures. But Honolulu was out of the fight. Honolulu sailed out the next day, arriving at Manus on 29 October for temporary repairs, and then steamed for Norfolk, Virginia, on 19 November, arriving on 20 December via Pearl Harbor, San Diego, California, and the Panama Canal. Unfortunately, not all went well with logistics. Although 107,450 tons of supplies had been landed on Leyte by the end of A-Day, it was a haphazard operation. The Navy was responsible for transporting the troops and supplies to the target area. Ships' companies unloaded the cargo from the cargo vessels and transported it in small craft to the beaches. Many of the ships had been improperly loaded for the journey to Leyte. The cargo should have been so loaded that articles first needed would be the last put on board; instead it had been stowed haphazardly, with little attention given to the problem of unloading. As a result of the faulty stowage of supplies on the ships, many badly needed items were at the bottoms of the holds, and articles that would not be needed until later in the operation were piled on top of them. The supplies were set ashore in random fashion and then were carelessly thrown on trucks and other vehicles. This sort of handling resulted in a loss of carrying capacity, in slow removal of the loads, and in a consequent delay in the return of vehicles to the landing beaches. Thus, officers complained about the disorganized effort to deliver, store, and distribute supplies. This was a precursor of future resupply problems. As the landings proceeded about as smoothly as could be hoped, Halsey would order Task Groups 38.1 and 38.4 to head to Ulithi on October 22, as he doubted that the Japanese would mount a major operation in response to the American invasion. And yet, the Japanese were about to come calling for another decisive battle.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. General Douglas MacArthur had finally done it, he had returned to the Philippines making good on his promise to the Filipino people. It was a colossal effort and thus far it was going very well all things considered. However little did the Americans know, but the IJN was about to toss the kitchen sink at them, literally, in an all or nothing battle to the death.

Cali's ✯ HouseNation Radio
Tamio Yamashita on Eps. 247 (House) Hour # 2

Cali's ✯ HouseNation Radio

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 28, 2024 60:13


Welcome to Eps. 246 Guest Mix! We sent the decks to Tokyo Japan with as we welcome for the first time Tamio Yamashita Listen to this mixshow live with any of our Syndicated online radio partners in Club Sabroso Radio Network in Punta Cana, Dominican Republic or listen on demand.  https://www.instagram.com/tamio_yamashita/  

The Pacific War - week by week
- 148 - Pacific War Podcast - Battles of Peleliu and Angaur 18 - September 26 - , 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 17, 2024 46:02


Last time we spoke about the invasion of the Palau Islands. General Rupertus's 1st Marine Division was tasked with attacking Peleliu, while General Mueller's 81st Division would land on Angaur. Prior to the landings, extensive neutralization of Japanese airfields was carried out by Allied forces. On September 6, carrier-based aircraft attacked the Palaus, significantly damaging enemy targets but encountering minimal resistance. The invasion fleet, led by Admiral Fort, began landing operations on September 15. Despite strong Japanese defenses, especially around Peleliu's rugged coral ridges, the Marines made some progress but faced intense resistance. Notable figures such as Eugene Sledge, author of “With the Old Breed,” provided personal insights into the brutal conditions faced. The landing saw heavy casualties and challenges, including ineffective pre-landing bombardments and fierce counterattacks, but the Marines managed to secure key positions by the end of the first day. The 81st Division then proceeded with landings on Angaur on September 17, facing lighter resistance but difficult terrain. This episode is the Battles of Peleliu and Angaur Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Last time we left off, Peleliu and Anguar had just been amphibiously assaulted by US Marines. While the landings on Angaur were underway, General Rupertus pressed on with the Peleliu offensive on September 17. In the southern sector, Colonel Hanneken's 7th Marines made headway against the isolated Japanese defenders. The 3rd Battalion cleared a minefield and captured the southeast promontory, while the 1st Battalion took on the southwestern promontory but only managed to secure half of it due to fierce enemy resistance. To the north, the 1st and 5th Marines advanced further, encountering the Umurbrogol Mountains for the first time, where Colonel Nakagawa had fortified his defenses. On the left flank, Colonel Puller's 1st and 3rd Battalions encountered minimal opposition as they moved along the relatively flat coastal plain but had to halt their advance when the 1st Battalion was impeded by a reinforced concrete blockhouse. On the right, Colonel Harris' 2nd Battalion progressed well while staying hidden from Japanese artillery and mortar fire. However, despite reaching their objectives by mid-morning, Harris' 1st Battalion faced difficulty when Puller's 2nd Battalion, after making initial gains, was halted by the Umurbrogol defenses. They fought hard to secure Hill 200 but were immediately met with fire from the next ridge. Additionally, Harris' 3rd Battalion was pinned down by heavy flanking fire from the left. That night, additional armor was sent to the 7th Marines to support the ongoing operations in the south. The next morning, Hanneken's 3rd Battalion launched a final assault. During the night of D+2, additional armor (tanks and 75mm gun-mounted halftracks) was brought up and at 10:00 on September 18 the advance was resumed. Again progress was painfully slow with many reserve elements being attacked by Japanese from bypassed caves and underground emplacements. At 13:44 elements of Companies A and C reached the southern shores, though the area being assaulted by Company B was still heavily defended. Tank support had withdrawn to re-arm and before Company B was in a position to resume the attack, a bulldozer was needed to extricate the gun-mounted half-tracks, which had become bogged down. At that time, several explosions were heard from the Japanese defenses and it was found that remaining Japanese defenders had finished the job for the Marines. The final handful leaped from the cliff tops into the sea in an effort to escape, only to be picked off by Marine riflemen. With the taking of the two promontories, the southern part of Peleliu was secured. 1/7 and 3/7 squared themselves away for a well-earned rest, while headquarters reported "1520 hours D+3, 7th Marines mission on Peleliu completed." Unfortunately, this was not quite the case. Despite the slow progress and intense Japanese resistance, the Marines managed to secure the southern portion of Peleliu by the end of September 18. At the same time, the 1st and 5th Marines continued their fierce and costly push north. On the right flank, Colonel Harris's 2nd Battalion faced only sporadic resistance as it cut through the dense jungle. The Americans eventually reached a causeway leading east to Peleliu's northeastern peninsula, a potentially dangerous obstacle to their advance. After a successful patrol, Harris opted to call in an airstrike before crossing, but the strike missed its target and hit the area while the Marines were crossing. Despite this, the bridgehead was established, though further casualties were incurred due to friendly artillery and mortar fire. With this new foothold, Harris redirected his 3rd Battalion eastward across the causeway to support the 2nd Battalion's advance. On the left flank, the 1st Marines, having sustained 1,236 casualties, were urged by Rupertus to "maintain the momentum." This led Colonel Puller to commit all available reserves, including engineers, support personnel, and Hanneken's reserve 2nd Battalion. The 1st Marines suffered about 240 casualties during the 17th and in Japanese counterattacks the ensuing night; the 3rd Battalion was reduced to about one third of its original strength; and two companies of the 1st Battalion were practically finished as fighting units. On the other hand, there was some reason for optimism. Progress on the 17th had been measured in hundreds of yards in the rough, high ground at the southern end of the central ridges and strong Japanese resistance had been overcome. Whatever optimism may have existed was not to last too long. On the 18th, in what the Marine Corps' history of the operation characterizes as "savage and costly fighting," elements of the 1st and 7th Marines managed to advance more than 500 yards in the center, principally along the ridge lines and hills oriented north and south. But the advance during the day was held up at a group of peaks which seemed at first to form a continuous ridge line that was oriented more east and west than the rest of the Peleliu ridges. Soon, the name Five Sisters came to be applied to a cluster of peaks forming the western side of the terrain feature. A towering hill at its eastern extremity, separated from Five Sisters by a saddle, was designated Hill 300, or Old Baldy. With the 7th Marines held up in the center, at Five Sisters, the units on both sides of the central ridges halted so as not to create exposed flanks. Puller's 3rd Battalion made progress along the coastal plains but had to pause to stay in contact with other units. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion struggled against the Umurbrogol Mountains, capturing Hill 210 before being forced to withdraw due to a fierce Japanese counterattack on Hill 200 behind them. At Anguar, following a three-hour artillery bombardment supported by aircraft, General Mueller's 321st and 322nd Regiments resumed their advance north and west with tank support. After linking their advances, Colonel Venable pushed west and reached the high ground where Major Goto had established his main defenses, while Colonel Dark made significant progress south until his forces encountered the formidable defenses at Green Beach. The night of 18-19 September was noisy and nerve-racking all along the front and few troops got much sleep. Minor Japanese attacks harassed the exposed salient held by the 3d Battalion, 322d Infantry, while bats and large land crabs helped the Japanese to create distraction and started troops firing on nonexistent enemy infiltrators. Apparently no casualties resulted either from Japanese action or indiscriminate small arms fire. Friendly artillery fire did, however, cause some casualties. About 2030, four or five 105-mm. shells from the 316th Field Artillery Battalion hit the lines of the 2d Battalion, 321st Infantry, killing 4 men and wounding 15 others. The artillery fire was stopped before further damage could be done. On September 19, following a night of numerous Japanese infiltrations and small-scale counterattacks, the 322nd Regiment swiftly secured Saipan Town and advanced to the north shore of Garangaoi Cove. Meanwhile, the 321st Regiment successfully attacked and captured the Green Beach fortifications from their vulnerable side. To manage the exposed Japanese forces on the beaches, Dark's 2nd Battalion, supported by tanks, maneuvered left and progressed down the southwest of the island, halting just short of the shoreline by nightfall. At Peleliu, Harris' Marines made headway towards the Ngardololok area, overcoming light resistance and quickly dispatching the few enemy stragglers they encountered, reaching Purple Beach by day's end. However, in front of the O-3 line, Puller's weary troops, having endured a grueling night of Japanese counterattacks, resumed their assault on the Umurbrogol Mountains.  Despite some local advances, by evening on 20 September the 1st Marines had been stopped and, ". . . as an assault unit on the regimental level, had ceased temporarily to exist," having suffered almost 1,750 casualties, well over half its strength. Relief was absolutely necessary, not only because casualties were heavy but also because the survivors were physically exhausted from heat, lack of water, and continuous combat. Elements of the 7th Marines therefore relieved all 1st Marines units except those along West Road. While the 7th Marines took over from the exhausted 1st Marines on the right, the 5th Marines continued their advance through western Peleliu, securing its two peninsulas, including Island A and Ngabad Island, by September 21. General Mueller, concerned lest the Japanese reported on the south break through gaps or weak points in the forward lines, had special defenses in depth set up at RED and BLUE Beaches, utilizing Shore Party and antiaircraft troops. All units were alerted to expect Japanese attacks during the night. The division expected (and perhaps hoped) that the Japanese still believed to be located in southern Angaur might launch a suicidal desperation charge during the night or at dawn on the 20th. The night proved very quiet until, toward morning, some small, scattered Japanese parties infiltrated through the lines of both regiments. There was no banzai effort--rather, these Japanese troops were apparently attempting to escape to the northwest hill mass from positions in the mangrove swamp and GREEN Beach 3 areas. Action at dawn was limited to a mopping-up operation directed against four Japanese discovered in the headquarters area of the 2d Battalion, 321st Infantry. By 11:00 on September 20, Mueller reported to General Geiger that all organized resistance on Angaur had ended and that the island was secure. General Mueller's statement was probably prompted by his realization that the remaining Japanese were compressed into the northwest hills and by the reports that about 850 of the enemy had been killed through the 20th. This casualty figure was an overestimation. Probably fewer than 600 Japanese had been killed through the 20th, and Major Goto still had possibly 750 men with which to conduct an organized defense in the northwest. On orders from General Inoue, Goto planned no final banzai attack which would decimate his forces. Instead he withdrew over half his force to rugged terrain and emplaced them in natural or prepared fortifications. His lines of defense in the northwest were well conceived; many of his positions were mutually supporting; the amphitheater configuration of the bowl provided him with defensive areas whence heavy cross fires could be directed at attackers; the broken coral, with its crevices, fissures, caves, and ridgelets, gave him defensive advantages at least as good as those at the Ibdi Pocket on Biak; and he had available a number of artillery and anti-tank weapons, heavy and light mortars, and heavy and light machine-guns, most of them so emplaced as to give maximum support to his riflemen. In addition, he could still exercise effective control over the men he had gathered in the Lake Salome bowl. For whatever it was worth, Goto was ready to conduct a protracted defense, though the best he could hope for was to tie down the 322nd Regiment. Nevertheless, the real issue at Angaur--securing the prospective airfield area--had already been decided. To the north, while southern Angaur was being secured, Venable's men were probing the enemy's northwestern defenses with a series of company-sized attacks. These attacks allowed the Americans to gather crucial information about Goto's remaining positions, centered around the Lake Salome bowl. Venable discovered that organized resistance was still strong, prompting him to rearrange his units for a final push. Following a heavy artillery and air bombardment, the 322nd Regiment attacked the bowl with tank support, initially making some gains but soon encountering obstacles due to the terrain and enemy fire. By the end of September 21, Venable deemed the newly gained positions too exposed and decided to withdraw to the previous night's defenses. Meanwhile, the 1st and 7th Marines continued to face heavy casualties as they fought through the Umurbrogol Mountains, with the latter advancing less than 175 yards after two days of intense combat. Nakagawa's fierce defenders managed to halt the 1st Marine Division on the rough and well-defended terrain, resulting in a total of 4,000 casualties by this time. After visiting the front, Geiger decided to replace the battered 1st Marines with Dark's 321st Regiment, which had suffered minimal casualties and had completed its mission at Angaur. The 1st Marines by this time reported 1749 casualties. One Marine later described the fighting in the Umurbrogol, which attests to the level to which the 1st Marines had deteriorated: "I picked up the rifle of a dead Marine and I went up the hill; I remember no more than a few yards of scarred hillside, I didn't worry about death anymore, I had resigned from the human race. I crawled and scrambled forward and lay still without any feeling towards any human thing. In the next foxhole was a rifleman. He peered at me through red and painful eyes. I didn't care about him and he didn't care about me. As a fighting unit, the 1st Marines was finished. We were no longer human beings, I fired at anything that moved in front of me, friend or foe. I had no friends, I just wanted to kill." OnSeptember 19, he also dispatched Colonel Arthur Watson's reserve 323rd Regiment to secure Ulithi Atoll. After a successful reconnaissance mission, the infantrymen landed on September 22, discovering that the atoll's airfield and seaplane base had been abandoned by the Japanese. The Americans later established a major advanced fleet anchorage, a Marine airbase, and a Navy seaplane base there. Ulithi Atoll contained a 300-berth anchorage and a seaplane base. Occupation of these Western Caroline islands provided still another base from which future operations against the enemy could be supported. The construction of an airstrip on Ameliorate Island made possible fighter plane protection for the anchorage and afforded a base from which US aircraft could continue neutralization of the nearby Japanese bases on Yap. Together with Angaur and Peleliu Islands to the southwest and Guam, Tinian, and Saipan to the northeast, the capture of Ulithi Atoll completed a line of American bases that isolated Japanese holdings in the Central and South Pacific. The occupation of Ulithi Atoll further denied it to the enemy as a fleet anchorage, weather and radio station, and possible air and submarine base, in addition to precluding its use by the enemy to observe and report the activities of American forces in the sector. By September 25 the unloading of all the support ships had been completed and Vice Admiral John H. Hoover, Commander, Forward Areas Western Pacific, took over the task of developing Ulithi Atoll into an advanced fleet base. Within a month after its capture, more than 100 Navy craft from self-propelled types to lighters, floating drydocks, barges, landing craft, and seaplane wrecking derricks were en route to the island. During subsequent operations in the Philippines, the Pacific Fleet found Ulithi to be an extremely valuable base. Prior to the invasion of Okinawa, the island served as a staging area for fleet and amphibious forces. The atoll thus fulfilled a vital strategic role in the final phase of the Pacific War. On that day, Venable resumed his assault on the Lake Salome bowl. The coastal offensive faced little resistance, but the attack through the southern defile encountered heavy enemy fire. Despite this, the troops reached the shores of Lake Salome. However, Venable was severely wounded during the action and had to be evacuated, with his troops retreating to more defensible positions by nightfall. The main strength of the attack was placed on the right (southeast) section of the bowl, and tanks fired along the eastern rim about 200 yards in front of the leading elements. The mediums had been undisturbed by enemy fire all morning, but, apparently attracted by an incautious grouping of officers and men near the lead tanks and defile exit, a Japanese anti-tank gun opened fire from a hidden emplacement along the east rim. Three officers (including Colonel Venable, who was in the forward area to observe the new attack) and one enlisted man were severely wounded and had to be evacuated. During the retirement on the 22nd, one of the three forward tanks was so badly damaged by a mine or buried shell that it could not be moved through the defile. This tank blocked the defile's northern entrance and prevented the withdrawal of another medium, which had to be destroyed to keep it from falling into Japanese hands. In four days of fruitless effort to push into the bowl from the south, three tanks and two 75-mm SPM's had been lost. Heavier infantry losses also began to be sustained now that the Japanese, cornered, were fighting to the death. On that day, for instance, the 2nd Battalion lost 2 men killed and about 35 wounded. At 0730 on the morning of the 23d, the 2d Battalion, with Companies B, C, and E attached, continued the attack into the bowl from the south. Companies B and C worked up the east shore of Lake Salome. Companies I and G pushed toward the southwest and western shores, while Company F paid particular attention to caves along the southwest rim of the bowl. During the first part of the attack all companies moved forward rapidly, and Company I reached the northwest corner of the lake without much trouble. But Company B, pushing forward against increasingly heavy Japanese fire from the north, was pinned down by this fire when it reached the northeast corner of the lake. Company C was sent north on B's right to try to outflank the enemy machine gun and mortar positions from which the fire on Company B originated. The intention was to flush the Japanese from their positions and push them southwest and south against the main body of the 2d Battalion. But Company C could make little progress toward the northern section of the bowl, and its own position became precarious as Japanese mortar and machine gun fire increased and the 1st Battalion's own 81-mm. mortar ammunition ran out, making further mortar support impossible. Japanese fire continued to increase and the positions of all forward companies became untenable. A general withdrawal to the defile entrance was ordered. The withdrawal was painfully slow; companies were broken up; all units suffered more casualties. One small group of Company I, separated from its parent unit, worked over the cliffs and ridges at the bowl's western rim to the coast at BLACK Beach. Company B, retreating in small segments, lost men as it withdrew from the northeast corner of the lake. All told, the 2d Battalion and attached companies lost 18 men killed and over 75 wounded during the day. Concurrently, as the 1st and 7th Marines continued to struggle with the formidable Umurbrogol Mountains, Harris' Company G successfully secured the undefended Carlson Island, finally completing the 5th Marines' original mission. Despite concerns about a potential enemy attack on Koror and Babelthuap after the Peleliu operation, General Inoue decided to reinforce Nakagawa's beleaguered garrison. By 21 September effective Japanese infantry strength in the central ridges was down to 1,300 men. That, of course, does not paint a true picture of the situation in the central pocket. A trained soldier, well armed, can be tenacious on the defense in such terrain as the central ridges of Peleliu whether or not he be trained for infantry service. There were probably 4,000 Japanese troops (including the 1,300 infantrymen) still firmly ensconced in the central pocket as of 21 September, and there were at least 1,000 more troops in the Amiangal Mountain area at northern Peleliu. Nevertheless, Colonel Nakagawa, commanding the Peleliu Sector Unit, clearly needed reinforcements if he was to hold out much longer. There were perhaps 30,000 Japanese troops in the northern Palaus to draw from, including two battalions of the 59th Infantry, two battalions of the 15th Infantry, and four or five recently organized infantry battalions of the 53d Independent Mixed Brigade. The Japanese were not to reach their destination undetected. At 0535, the destroyer H.L. Edwards spotted seven enemy barges about 1,000 yards northeast of Akarakoro Point at the northern tip of Peleliu, obviously headed for the island. The destroyer opened fire, sinking one barge before the remainder reached the beach. A combination of bombing and strafing, naval gunfire, and artillery hit the barges on the beach, and by 0845 the cruiser Louisville reported all barges destroyed. The enemy version of this incident agrees only in part with the American account, adding that "despite receiving severe enemy air and artillery fire at a point two kilometers off the coast, they made a successful landing at 0520 hours under the command of 1st Lieutenant Murahori". Knowing that some Japanese forces had reached Peleliu, Rupertus decided to deploy his own reinforcements between the central ridges and the western shore, targeting the enemy's weak spot for an offensive up the western coast. The 7th Marines supported the Army by attacking enemy positions from the south and center, with Hanneken's 3rd Battalion advancing along the high ground to the right rear of the 321st. After relieving the 1st Marines, Dark sent patrols up the coastal flat to Garekoru, encountering little opposition initially. However, Dark's 2nd Battalion faced heavier resistance in the afternoon and had to retreat, postponing the northward advance until the next day. During the night, Inoue sent the remainder of the 2nd Battalion, 15th Regiment, and despite being shelled, most reinforcements reached Peleliu. By September 23, the Americans had secured important footholds on Peleliu and Angaur. However, intense fighting remained, with the 321st Regiment relieving the 1st Marines against Nakagawa's fortified positions, while the 322nd Regiment continued to attack Goto's defenses on the northwest hills. Yet that is it for the Palau's as we now need to turn to Mortai. General Persons' troops quickly secured and expanded the island perimeter, successfully repelling the enemy's night raids with little difficulty. An example of these raids is the September 18 attack. This is the Japanese report: “On 18 September the main body of the 2nd Provisional Raiding Unit, which had moved into position along the upper Tjao, launched a strong night infiltration attack with the objective of disrupting the enemy's rear area in the vicinity of Doroeba and Gotalalmo. Although deep penetration of the enemy lines was achieved and considerable casualties inflicted, the attack failed to reduce the beachhead or to interfere with the enemy's rapid preparation of Doroeba airfield.” In truth, the Americans easily repelled this attack, suffering very few casualties. These raids would continue throughout September and October. American engineers were busy constructing a new fighter strip at the Pitoe Drome area. This strip was scheduled to be ready for use by September 29 but was eventually abandoned and downgraded to an emergency field. A number of factors influenced the decision to abandon the site, which was renamed Pitoe Crash Strip. Japanese air reaction had been so ineffectual that the need for a fighter base on Morotai was not as urgent as had been expected. Aircraft based on escort carriers, some of which remained in the Morotai area for weeks, were able to keep away most of the Japanese planes, and their efforts were supplemented by long-range land-based fighters from Sansapor. Moreover, the line of approach which planes had to use to land on Pitoe Crash Strip interfered with that of the more important bomber base at Wama Drome. Finally, the terrain at the crash strip was by no means as well drained as that at other locations on the Doroeba Plain, and it was necessary to expend much engineer effort to keep the strip operational. The new field, which acquired the designation Pitoe Drome, was located about 1,200 yards north of Wama Drome. Construction proceeded slowly at Pitoe Drome because so much engineer effort had to be devoted to the completion of Wama Drome. By 4 October almost 7,000 feet at the new site had been cleared, but it was not until the 17th, D plus 32, that even one runway was surfaced, let alone taxiways and dispersal lanes. Meanwhile, the construction of a new bomber field at Wama Drome faced significant delays due to heavy rainstorms and a shortage of suitable surfacing material. Despite almost constant struggles with soggy ground and tropical downpours, engineers managed to make 4,000 feet of Wama Drome operational by October 4. However, the overall progress on building Morotai's new airbase, intended for the upcoming invasion of the Philippines, was slower than anticipated. Nevertheless, the Tradewind Task Force was disbanded on September 25, as the island was considered secure enough. General Hall then assumed command of the Morotai base as the commander of the 11th Corps. However, unbeknownst to the Americans, who believed the only possible Japanese response to the invasion was the ineffective air raids already carried out against them, troops in Halmahera were preparing to embark on a dangerous mission to reinforce Morotai and contest control of this key island. In the meantime, after the successful invasion of the Palaus, new developments were unfolding on the Philippines front following Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 38's recent successful strikes. These strikes had revealed an unexpected vulnerability in the enemy's air defenses, prompting Admirals Halsey and Nimitz to cancel the Yap operation, thereby freeing up many resources for the Philippines Campaign. Approximately 500 aircraft, or about 57% of the 884 believed to be in the Philippines, were rendered nonoperational or destroyed during these air attacks. Consequently, General MacArthur decided to cancel the preliminary Mindanao operations and instead make a direct jump from the Palaus-Morotai line to Leyte on October 20. Shortly after this change in schedule, MacArthur informed the Joint Chiefs that he could advance from Leyte to Luzon by December 20, two months earlier than planned. Meanwhile, the carrier raids on Mindanao and the Visayas strengthened the Southern Army command's belief that the Allies were preparing for an early invasion of the Philippines. As a result, Marshal Terauchi recommended accelerating the reinforcement of the Philippines, activating Operation Sho-Go, and authorizing the 4th Air Army to employ its main strength against enemy carrier task forces. This was in contrast to the current policy of not committing available air strength against enemy raiders, which was failing to conserve Japanese air power for a decisive battle. However, Tokyo denied these last two requests while also receiving concerning reports about General Kuroda's neglect of his duties as field army commander. In the middle of September, IGHQ decided to replace General Kuroda with General Yamashita. Not only did General Kuroda have a concept of the Philippine operations that differed from that of his superiors, but he was charged with neglecting his duty as field army commander. Lt. Col. Yoshie Seiichi of the Personnel Bureau of the War Ministry, who had been sent to the Philippines to investigate personnel matters in the Southern Army, said of the incident: “Stories reached the War Ministry that Lt. Gen. Kuroda was devoting more time to his golf, reading and personal matters than to the execution of his official duties. It appeared that his control over staff officers and troops was not sufficiently strong and that there was a good deal of unfavorable criticism of his conduct among the troops. There were also indications that discipline was becoming very lax. On September 4, I left Tokyo under orders . . . to investigate. As a result I obtained many statements substantiating the unfavorable stories in regard to Lt. Gen. Kuroda. The recommendations of all the staff was that Lt. Gen. Kuroda be relieved as soon as possible, and be replaced by Gen. Yamashita . . . who was a superb tactician and excellent leader.” Random note, for those interested, over on my personal podcast at the Pacific War Channel I did a single episode covering how Yamashita became the Tiger of Malaya and plan to do more pieces on him as I find him to be one of the more interesting generals of the Pacific War. Before an effective change in command could take place, the Japanese were about to experience a more dramatic display of Allied offensive power that they would soon encounter in the Philippines. On September 18, Mitscher's Task Force 38 was ordered to head back toward the islands for a major strike against Luzon, the heart of Japanese control in the Philippines. The American carriers achieved complete surprise and successfully attacked Luzon three days later. Despite the fierce defense by approximately 42 Zeros, between 09:30 and 18:00 on September 21, four waves of over 400 aircraft targeted the harbor area and airfields around Manila with bombs and strafing runs. The assault on the harbor and shipping along the west coast resulted in the sinking or severe damage of 34 vessels totaling over 100,000 gross tons, while the raids on the airfields inflicted significant damage on grounded aircraft. At 0610 the following day, 22 September, search planes discovered the enemy carrier groups still lurking off the coast of Luzon, and at 0730 a hit-and-run attack was carried out by 27 Japanese aircraft, with reported bomb hits on two carriers and one cruiser. Naval air units at Legaspi attempted to carry out a second attack on the enemy carriers during the late afternoon, but the attack force of 19 planes failed to locate the carrier groups. Following the failed Japanese hit-and-run counterattack, Mitscher continued his assaults on Manila, destroying an estimated 110 aircraft in the air and 95 on the ground, and sinking or damaging 44 vessels. After the apparent withdrawal of enemy carriers, the Japanese decided to relocate their remaining ships in Manila Bay to other anchorages, many of which were directed to the secure docks of Coron Bay. However, Mitscher's carriers returned on September 24 to launch further strikes against Luzon, including a raid by about 96 Hellcats and 24 Helldivers on Coron Bay, which resulted in the sinking or damaging of 10 more vessels. Additional attacks on other targets led to the sinking or damaging of 12 more ships. Despite the ongoing air attacks, the Imperial Japanese Navy still deemed it premature to fully activate Operation Sho-Go, believing the decisive battle would take place in or after late October. Meanwhile, the Imperial Japanese Army accelerated its preparations to defend the Philippines. The reserve 1st Division was ordered to move to the islands immediately, and plans were made to assign ten surface raiding regiments to the area. On September 26, as plans for air reinforcement to the Philippines were being approved, General Yamashita was confirmed as the new commander of the 14th Area Army. He arrived in the Philippines on October 6 and found the situation "unsatisfactory," with poor planning for the Leyte campaign and many of his staff unfamiliar with the conditions in the Philippines. Lt. Gen. Makino Shiro, now commanding the 16th Division, which was the major force on Leyte, had directed his efforts since April 1944 toward the construction of defensive positions on the island. The first line of defense, which was on the east coast in the Dulag area, was practically completed by the middle of October. The third defensive line was in the middle of Leyte Valley in the vicinity of Dagami. The second line of defense was between the two others, while the bulk of supplies was assembled in the central mountain range at Jaro. The distribution of the other troops at the time of the American landings was as follows: one battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment in the Catmon Hill and Tanauan district, and the main strength of the 33d Infantry Regiment in the Palo and Tacloban area. The larger part of the 33d Infantry Regiment, which was less adequately trained than the other regiments, had arrived on Leyte in mid-September from Luzon. Its officers were unfamiliar with the terrain and did not fortify their positions. However, the supply situation was favorable, with Manila serving as the main Japanese depot in the region. Following established plans, he instructed his subordinates that the Area Army would "seek decisive battle on Luzon" while in the central and southern Philippines, the focus would be to delay the enemy's advance and prevent them from securing naval and air bases. However, the September air strikes had led to a noticeable increase in guerrilla activity and civil disorder due to widespread destruction and panic. Small Japanese garrisons were attacked, pro-Japanese Filipinos molested and intimidated, and communications disrupted. In central Luzon there were indications that some guerrilla units were planning a move to the Lamon Bay area in order to be the first to cooperate with an American landing force, and on Negros and Panay guerrilla raids on Japanese airfields became boldly persistent. The Fourteenth Area Army feared that, as soon as enemy forces landed, the guerrillas would not only give them direct assistance as scouts and guides, but seriously hamper Japanese operations by attacking rear communication lines. Consequently, martial law was declared across the archipelago in anticipation of enemy landings. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Despite fierce and costly combat, American forces made significant advances in the Palaus, securing critical islands and establishing bases. The battle for Peleliu was marked by high casualties and intense fighting, with heavy losses on both sides. The successful capture of strategic locations like Ulithi Atoll and the subsequent strikes on Luzon further demonstrated Allied dominance and strategic planning in the Pacific Theater.

Bob, Groz and Tom
Hour 2: The Seattle Times' Andy Yamashita on the Apple Cup 

Bob, Groz and Tom

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 11, 2024 42:43


Bump and Stacy are joined by Andy Yamashita of The Seattle Times to get you ready for the first Apple Cup of the new era, they answer your questions about the Seahawks new defense and the slow offensive start in Four Down Territory, they hear a Cleveland radio host blow up at a caller following the Browns loss in the Timeline, and they bring you some important NFC West injury updates.  

Rick Kleffel:Agony Column
2225: A 2024 Interview with Iris Yamashita

Rick Kleffel:Agony Column

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 5, 2024


Iris Yamashita discusses her novel Village in the Dark.

Rainy Day Rabbit Holes: Pacific Northwest History and Humor
43. From Yakima to Yamashita: The Bread Tab Conspiracy

Rainy Day Rabbit Holes: Pacific Northwest History and Humor

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 4, 2024 49:49


In this eye-opening episode of Rainy Day Rabbit Holes, we uncover the startling connections between a small plastic bread tab and a global conspiracy that reaches from Yakima, Washington, to the heart of far-right extremism, and even the legendary treasure of Yamashita's gold. We delve into the surprising story of the Kwik Lok company, founded in Yakima, and its ties to far-right movements. But that's just the beginning. Join us as we explore how this humble bread tab links to a global network of intrigue involving the fallen dictator Ferdinand Marcos, the CIA, and a treasure hunt that has spanned decades. And don't miss the shocking twist at the end of the episode—this is one rabbit hole you'll definitely want to go down. Listen now and prepare to be amazed!Want ad-free episodes? Join our Patreon for ad-free listening, bonus episodes, and more! You can find links to the Patreon, our social media, and all of our episodes at our website: www.rainydayrabbitholes.comBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/rainy-day-rabbit-holes-pacific-northwest-history-and-humor--6271663/support.

The Startup Podcast
The Future of Product Design w/ Figma's Yuhki Yamashita (Bonus)

The Startup Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 30, 2024 21:28


Yuhki Yamashita, one of the world's top product design disruptors and Chief Product Officer at Figma, returns in this bonus episode to continue the conversation on how AI is revolutionizing the design landscape. The impact of AI on product design is becoming increasingly profound. But what does this mean for the future of designers and interfaces? And how can startups leverage AI to build products faster and more effectively? In this bonus episode, Chris Saad and Yaniv Bernstein dive deeper with Yuhki Yamashita to explore the transformative potential of AI in product design. In this episode, you will: Engage with Yuhki's perspectives on whether AI will replace designers or simply augment their creative abilities. Understand how AI is reshaping the landscape of design tools like Figma and what this means for the future of product development. Discover strategies from Yuhki on how to leverage AI to build products faster and increase efficiency. See how AI can make user interfaces more natural, intuitive, and responsive, improving the overall user experience. Explore Yuhki's perspective on the balance between aesthetics and objectivity in design. If you want to expand on his insights from the previous episode, click here: https://open.spotify.com/episode/6dBA0jtNLyRimRZFL9cwZ5?si=023892f06e084688  The Pact Honour The Startup Podcast Pact! If you have listened to TSP and gotten value from it, please: Follow, rate, and review us in your listening app Subscribe to the TSP Mailing List at ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://thestartuppodcast.beehiiv.com/subscribe⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Secure your official TSP merchandise at ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://shop.tsp.show/⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Follow us on YouTube at ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.youtube.com/@startup-podcast⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Give us a public shout-out on LinkedIn or anywhere you have a social media following. Key links The Startup Podcast is sponsored by Vanta. Vanta helps businesses get and stay compliant by automating up to 90% of the work for the most in demand compliance frameworks. With over 200 integrations, you can easily monitor and secure the tools your business relies on. For a limited-time offer of US$1,000 off, go to ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠www.vanta.com/tsp⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠. Get your question in for our next Q&A episode: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://forms.gle/NZzgNWVLiFmwvFA2A⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ The Startup Podcast website: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://tsp.show⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Learn more about Chris and Yaniv Work 1:1 with Chris: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠http://chrissaad.com/advisory/⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Follow Chris on Linkedin: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.linkedin.com/in/chrissaad/⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Follow Yaniv on Linkedin: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.linkedin.com/in/ybernstein/⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Credits Editor: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Justin McArthur⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Content Strategist: Carolina Franco https://www.linkedin.com/in/francocarolina/ Intro Voice: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Jeremiah Owyang⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠

The Startup Podcast
Design-Led Startups w/ Figma's Yuhki Yamashita – Don't Sabotage Your Product (Edu)

The Startup Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 26, 2024 40:45


Product design is more than just an aesthetic choice—it's a strategic asset. But many founders unknowingly sabotage their products by overlooking key design principles. How can you avoid these common pitfalls and ensure your startup stands out? In this episode, Chris Saad and Yaniv Bernstein are joined by Yuhki Yamashita, Chief Product Officer at Figma, the world's leading design tool, to explore the critical role of design in building successful startups. In this episode, you can: Learn the most frequent errors founders make in product design and how to avoid them. Understand why prioritizing design can be the difference between success and failure. See how adopting a user-centric mindset enables you to create products that truly resonate with your audience. Discover best practices for fostering a culture of innovation and alignment within your team. The Pact Honour The Startup Podcast Pact! If you have listened to TSP and gotten value from it, please: Follow, rate, and review us in your listening app Subscribe to the TSP Mailing List at ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://thestartuppodcast.beehiiv.com/subscribe⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Secure your official TSP merchandise at ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://shop.tsp.show/⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Follow us on YouTube at ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.youtube.com/@startup-podcast⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Give us a public shout-out on LinkedIn or anywhere you have a social media following. Key links The Startup Podcast is sponsored by Vanta. Vanta helps businesses get and stay compliant by automating up to 90% of the work for the most in demand compliance frameworks. With over 200 integrations, you can easily monitor and secure the tools your business relies on. For a limited-time offer of US$1,000 off, go to ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠www.vanta.com/tsp⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠. Get your question in for our next Q&A episode: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://forms.gle/NZzgNWVLiFmwvFA2A⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ The Startup Podcast website: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://tsp.show⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Learn more about Chris and Yaniv Work 1:1 with Chris: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠http://chrissaad.com/advisory/⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Follow Chris on Linkedin: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.linkedin.com/in/chrissaad/⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Follow Yaniv on Linkedin: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.linkedin.com/in/ybernstein/⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Credits Editor: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Justin McArthur⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Content Strategist: Carolina Franco https://www.linkedin.com/in/francocarolina/ Intro Voice: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Jeremiah Owyang⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠

Crunchyroll Presents: The Anime Effect
The Voices of ALL MIGHT and DEKU Are HERE! (ft. Daiki Yamashita and Kenta Miyake) | The Anime Effect Episode #27

Crunchyroll Presents: The Anime Effect

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 16, 2024 23:27


Daiki Yamashita and Kenta Miyake, the voices of My Hero Academia's Deku and All Might, are on The Anime Effect! They reveal which quirk they would choose to have in real life (you will NEVER guess their answers) and what they hope fans take away from My Hero Academia season 7. Have a question for The Anime Effect? Ask it here.  To bring your brand to life in this podcast, email podcastadsales@sonymusic.com. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

2 Ales and Hockey Tales with Wally
Episode 399 Rob Yamashita

2 Ales and Hockey Tales with Wally

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 16, 2024 95:42


-Go Broncos. We will see you at the first tee.

Primer
08. Smells Like Fireworks (Jayson Chun // Tatsuro Yamashita)

Primer

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 2, 2024 40:38


In the late 1970s a young Tatsuro Yamashita was making a name for himself as a prolific session musician and songwriter. He launched his solo career, but didn't see big commercial success at first. Yamashita took a trip down to the US and learned some tips from Western producers and began building up his solo work back when he returned to Japan. This would include some of his most iconic songs, like Ride on Time and Loveland Island, both of which are included in this Greatest Hits comp we're talking about today.Dr. Jayson Chun, Japanese and Korean pop culture professor, sits down with us to talk about why city pop resonates with Western listeners, CM songs, and Tatsuro's work with Charles Calello.Check out our Spotify playlist of as many songs as we can find on there! We also have the playlist on YouTubeIf you enjoy Primer please support the show and get some cool gifts too!Follow Jayson: Pop PacificFollow Primer: Instagram | Twitter | TikTok

Lost in Redonda
Episode 27: "I Hotel" by Karen Tei Yamashita, w/ special guest Josh Cook

Lost in Redonda

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 7, 2024 61:25


We're joined today by Josh Cook. Josh is a bookseller and co-owner at Porter Square Books in Cambridge, Massachusetts, where he has worked since 2004. He is the author of the critically acclaimed postmodern detective novel An Exaggerated Murder and most recently of The Art of Libromancy: Selling Books and Reading Books in the Twenty-First Century, published by our friends at Biblioasis.We chat about his work as well as I Hotel by Karen Tei Yamashita, published by Coffee House Press. Some words get thrown around a bit too often and are frequently misapplied. However, I Hotel is absolutely a masterpiece. To give any kind of synopsis is to do the book (and you) a disservice, but in a somewhat quixotic attempt at that: this is a novel comprised of novellas, all set in the San Francisco of the late 60s and early 70s exploring the revolutionary movements (political, cultural, artistic, romantic, and everything that makes life a dazzling experience) of that time and place. It's a wide-ranging conversation and one we hope you'll find as exciting and engaging as we did.Books/authors mentioned (another curriculum for you!):all of Yamashita's other works (Tropic of Cancer is next up for Tom, he thinks)Tell Me How It Ends by Valeria LuiselliWhite Teeth by Zadie SmithNever Did the Fire by Diamela Eltit, translated by Daniel HahnThree Trapped Tigers by G. Cabrera Infante, translated by Donald Gardner and Suzanne Jill LevineThe Savage Detectives by Roberto Bolaño, translated by Natasha WimmerGravity's Rainbow by Thomas PynchonUnderworld by Don DeLilloInfinite Jest by David Foster WallaceIf you'd like to read a bit more about/from Yamashita, here's a LitHub article Josh wrote “Why Everyone Should Read the Great Karen Tei Yamashita” and another LitHub article on the “The Craft of Writing” by Yamashita herself.To hear more from Josh follow him on Instagram (@joshthelibromancer) and Bluesky (@joshthelibromancer), and follow Porter Square Books on Instagram (@porter_square_books), Bluesky (@portersqbooks), and Threads (@porter_square_books).Click here to subscribe to our Substack and find us on the socials: @lostinredonda just about everywhere.Music: “The Low Spark of High-Heeled Boys” by TrafficLogo design: Flynn Kidz Designs

The Turnbuckle Tavern
Brace For Impact #46: JOE HENDRY COMMITS MURDER BY ACOUSTIC GUITAR | YAMASHITA VS GRACE FOR KNOCKOUTS GOLD | UNDER SIEGE GO HOME SHOW | WHO WILL FACE ALI FRIDAY?

The Turnbuckle Tavern

Play Episode Listen Later May 3, 2024 76:45


Our weekly show is here breaking down all things TNA WRESTLING. Acefield Retro & Colton discuss JORDYNNE GRACE vs MIYU YAMASHITA in a KNOCKOUTS TITLE MATCH. We also preview and discuss this weekend's UNDER SIEGE card in ALBANY. We also talk about the NUMBER ONE CONTENDER'S MATCH FOR THE X-DIVISION TITLE between ACE AUSTIN & TREY MIGUEL. We break down all of the TNA news of the week & go through the episode from Thursday night on AXS. We will preview everything you need to know about everything on the TNA wrestling calendar.

Atomic Anesthesia
BECOMING A SUCCESSFUL NURSE ANESTHESIA RESIDENT WITH DR. MAIKO YAMASHITA

Atomic Anesthesia

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 10, 2024 37:13


In this episode, Rhea and Dr. Maiko Yamashita, Program Director at Rush University, discuss the perspective of a program director in regards to what makes a successful anesthesia resident and applicant. [FREE DOWNLOAD] FOR THE SRNA: GRAB YOUR FREE SEE/NCE STUDY PLAN HERE [FREE DOWNLOAD] FOR THE RN: GRAB YOUR FREE ICU DRUG CHART HEREFollow us on Instagram at: @Atomic_Anesthesia

バイリンガルニュース (Bilingual News)
605. 特別編 Yamashita 04.11.24

バイリンガルニュース (Bilingual News)

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 7, 2024 172:59


今回のゲストは、北海道農業共済組合で獣医師をされている山下祐輔さんです! 「獣医師」といっても犬猫などペットから動物園の大型動物など様々な専門がありますが、山下さんは北海道の畜産の現場で牛や馬のお医者さんとしてご活躍中されています。牛や馬のお医者さんは日々どんなことをしているのでしょうか?知らないことだらけの3時間、めちゃくちゃ面白かったので聴いてみてね!

Authors on the Air Global Radio Network
Iris Yamashita and Village in the Dark

Authors on the Air Global Radio Network

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 25, 2024 18:50


Irish Yamashita is an Academy Award-nominated screenwriter for the movie Letters from Iwo Jima. She is also an advocate of women and diversity in the entertainment industry. VILLAGE IN THE DARK is her second novel and is available from Berkley. Visit her website at https://www.irisyamashita.com/ Spies, Lies and Private Eyes is copyrighted by Authors on the Air Global Radio Network #podcast #author #interview #authors #SpiesLiesandPrivateEyesPodcast #authorsontheair #podcast #podcaster #authors #authorsofig #authorsofinstagram #authorinterview #writingcommunity #authorsontheair #suspensebooks #authorssupportingauthors #thrillerbooks #suspense #wip #writers#writersinspiration #books #bookrecommendations #bookaddict #bookaddicted #bookaddiction #bibliophile #read #amreading #lovetoread #terrencemccauley #terrencemccauleybooks #bookouture #thrillers #theuniversityseries #IrisYamashita #VillageInTheDark

The Writer Files: Writing, Productivity, Creativity, and Neuroscience
How Oscar-Nominated Scribe & Novelist Iris Yamashita Writes: Part Two

The Writer Files: Writing, Productivity, Creativity, and Neuroscience

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 1, 2024 37:50


Oscar-nominated screenwriter turned novelist, Iris Yamashita, returns to chat with me about the difference between writing for the ear and the screen, fusing plotting and pantsing, and her anticipated follow-up thriller Village in the Dark. Iris Yamashita has been working in Hollywood for over 15 years and was nominated for a “Best Original Screenplay”  Oscar for the movie Letters from Iwo Jima (directed by Clint Eastwood). The sequel to her debut novel City Under One Roof is Village in the Dark, described as a riveting mystery perfect for fans of Twin Peaks, Mare of Easttown, and True Detective. An Amazon Editor's Pick for Best Mystery, Thriller & Suspense – New and continuing series. Kirkus Reviews called the book, “A sharp and gritty mystery with a compelling sociopolitical undercurrent.” Iris continues to work in Hollywood, developing for both film and streaming media. She has taught screenwriting at UCLA and the American Film Institute. [Discover The Writer Files Extra: Get 'The Writer Files' Podcast Delivered Straight to Your Inbox at writerfiles.fm] [If you're a fan of The Writer Files, please click FOLLOW to automatically see new interviews. And drop us a rating or a review wherever you listen] In this file Iris Yamashita and I discussed: Why you need to have a beginning, middle, and end in mind no matter what you're writing What it's like to be both the writer and the director as a novelist How to write for audio drama Why filmmakers don't like to read Learning the rules so you can break them How to keep your dreams alive And a lot more! Show Notes: Village in the Dark by Iris Yamashita (Amazon) Amazon Author Page for Iris Yamashita www.irisyamashita.com Iris Yamashita on Facebook Iris Yamashita on Instagram Kelton Reid on Twitter Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Sexy Freedom Media Podcast
Everyday Better with Eric Yamashita

Sexy Freedom Media Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 25, 2024 59:47


Ep#190: Join hosts, Helen Edwards and January Liddell with special guest, Eric Yamashita for an inspirational, motivating, and positive message to surely get you excited about living your life “everyday better.” Check out this episode today! About our guest: Eric Yamashita is a husband, father, emcee, and personal trainer. He is the owner of the positive and thriving business, Everyday Better Hawaii. Link: https://www.everydaybetterhawaii.com/ Disclaimer:  The hosts of this show are not doctors, therapists, psychologists, lawyers, or medical professionals of any kind. Although some of our guests are professionals in these areas, be advised if you have any life-threatening medical conditions or mental health, please see your doctor. National Suicide Hotline: 988 Helen Edwards is a Financial Strategist, Host to the Sexy Freedom Media Podcast, and International Author of Nothing Sexier Than Freedom & Your Inner Evolution.  January Liddell is a Financial Expert, author, and military wife. Click our Link below to find more information on us and our offers today! More info here: https://januaryliddell.com/ CLICK LINK FOR ALL EVENTS, SERVICES, & PRODUCTS: https://linktr.ee/sexyfreedommedia   Support the show "Buy us a coffee" https://www.buymeacoffee.com/Helofajourney https://www.buymeacoffee.com/januarylidl Support the show

KONCRETE Podcast
#224 - Harvard's UFO Lawyer: Aliens, Disinformation & the Secret Government | Danny Sheehan

KONCRETE Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 19, 2024 209:16


Watch the after show on Patreon: https://patreon.com/dannyjones Daniel Sheehan is a Harvard attorney who has participated in legal cases of public interest, including the Pentagon Papers case, the Watergate Break-In case & Harvard psychologist Dr. John Mack's case. He is currently dedicated to advocating for the public release of information held by the government surrounding the issue of Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP). SPONSORS https://bubsnaturals.com/DJP - Use code DJP for 20% off. https://rocketmoney.com/djp - Stop wasting money on things you don't use. https://babbel.com/danny - Get 50% off a one-time payment for a lifetime subscription. EPISODE LINKS https://newparadigminstitute.org https://twitter.com/danielsheehan45 FOLLOW DANNY JONES https://www.instagram.com/dannyjones https://twitter.com/jonesdanny OUTLINE 00:00 - Involvement in UFO legislation 09:01 - Search warrant for UFOs 12:34 - The Vatican archives 15:46 - John Mack case 38:49 - Catholic Church case 50:26 - Vandenberg rocket witness 53:23 - Disinformation 01:04:50 - Watergate case 01:11:00 - Santos Trafficante 01:12:20 - Death squad behind Watergate break in 01:14:10 - Nixon & Howard Hughes 01:22:11 - Felix Rodriguez 01:34:09 - Inside the Cuban Missile Crisis 01:41:08 - Cuban Exile Anti-Castro assassins 01:47:04 - Funding the 3rd Reich 01:53:46 - Nuclear war 01:57:33 - S-force, Kiki Camarena & Castro 02:08:39 - Future of America 02:15:32 - Yamashita's gold 02:30:41 - Government power 02:40:38 - Iran Contra 02:49:05 - EG&G engineer; Roswell crash 02:58:37 - Congress wants UFOs 03:23:28 - UFO disclosure; weaponizing alien tech

Uncorking a Story
It's Never too Late, with Iris Yamashita

Uncorking a Story

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 13, 2024 43:23


Iris Yamashita is an Academy Award-nominated screenwriter for the movie Letters from Iwo Jima. She has been working in Hollywood for fifteen years developing material for both film and streaming, has taught screenwriting at UCLA, and is an advocate of women and diversity in the entertainment industry. Iris joined me on Uncorking a Story to talk about her career and latest novel, Village in the Dark.  Key Themes Exploration of different points of view and empathy in writing. Overcoming self-doubt and believing in oneself as a writer. Handling rejection and the importance of perseverance in the writing field. Financial challenges and the practicalities of making a living as a writer, including the suggestion to keep one's day job. The instability and challenges of certain writing careers, such as screenwriting. The importance of marketing and promoting one's work through various channels, such as indie bookstores and online platforms. Buy Village in the Dark Amazon: https://amzn.to/47On4rj Bookshop.org: https://bookshop.org/a/54587/9780593336700 Connect with Iris Website: https://www.irisyamashita.com/ Twitter: https://twitter.com/IrisYamashita Facebook:  https://www.facebook.com/IrisYamashitaAuthor Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/irisyamashita/ Connect with Mike Website: https://uncorkingastory.com/ Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/@uncorkingastory Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/irisyamashita/ TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@uncorkingastory Twitter: https://twitter.com/uncorkingastory Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/IrisYamashitaAuthor If you like this episode, please share it with a friend. If you have not done so already, please rate and review Uncorking a Story on Apple Podcasts, or wherever you get your podcasts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Expedition Unknown
Yamashita's Gold

Expedition Unknown

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 3, 2024 35:46


Josh travels to the Philippines searching for Yamashita's Gold, a treasure that has been hidden since World War II. He joins two treasure hunters who each believe they know of some of the gold's clandestine whereabouts. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.