Podcasts about Guangdong

Some lesser-known or small Chinese towns and cities — with a strong festive ambience during Chinese New Year — alongside Neo-Chinese style destinations, have experienced "wealth beyond measure" during the nine-day Spring Festival holiday. Both domestic and international tourists have shown a tendency to linger in these areas.在为期9天的春节假期期间，一些不太出名的小城镇以及新中式风格的旅游目的地迎来了"泼天富贵"。国内游客和外国游客都喜欢在这些地方多玩几天。This year's extended Spring Festival holiday, which began on Feb 15 and concluded on Monday, inspired widespread travel.今年春节假期从2月15日开始，到2月23日结束，激发了人们的出游热情。"It's really stunning looking down at the lantern show from the ancient city walls. I felt like I was traveling back in time," said Sha Anna as she marveled at a lantern show on Feb 17 in Datong, Shanxi province. The Beijing resident visited the picturesque ancient city with family.北京居民沙安娜（音译）2月17日与家人一起游览了山西省大同市的古城。她在欣赏灯会时感叹道："从古城墙上俯瞰灯会，真的很震撼。我感觉自己穿越回了古代。"The city rose to popularity after the release of the Chinese-developed video game Black Myth: Wukong in 2024, which features several game scenes closely related to ancient Buddhist culture and Taoism.大同在2024年国产游戏《黑神话：悟空》发售后火了，这款游戏的几个场景与古老的佛教和道教文化密切相关。She said a desire to experience the lively festive atmosphere of Chinese New Year that differed from Beijing, led her to plan a trip to Datong — a city that boasts a rich cultural heritage. "The food here is also very delicious, especially the knife-cut noodles. The city left us with memories of historical legacies and human touch, and we will come back next Spring Festival."沙安娜说，她想体验与北京不同的热闹新年气氛，于是计划去大同旅游。大同市拥有丰富的文化遗产。她说："这里的食物也非常美味，尤其是刀削面。这座城市给我们留下了历史遗产和人情味的记忆，明年春节我们还会来。"Lively discussions on Datong and many other niche but attractive towns and small cities circulated online during the Spring Festival holiday. Their distinctive celebration practices, flavorful cuisine and strong cultural heritage have generated interest from tourists looking for unique experiences.春节期间，大同和许多其他小众但具有吸引力的城镇在网上引发了热议。它们独特的庆祝方式、风味美食和深厚的文化底蕴吸引了寻求独特体验的游客。Data from travel portal Tuniu shows that the number of tourists to Baoting Li and Miao autonomous county in South China's Hainan province and Dehong Dai and Jingpo autonomous prefecture in Southwest China's Yunnan province increased twofold compared with the previous Spring Festival period, as these places enjoy distinctive and exotic ethnic cultures. Destinations such as Chao zhou in Guangdong province, Shang rao and Jingdezhen in Jiangxi province have seen tourist numbers double year-on-year.旅游门户途牛网的数据显示，前往海南省保亭黎族苗族自治县和云南省德宏傣族景颇族自治州的游客数量比上一个春节增加了一倍，这些地方拥有独特而富有异域风情的民族文化。广东潮州、江西上饶和景德镇等目的地的游客数量同比翻了一番。Qunar, another online travel agency, noted strong enthusiasm among young people for Neo-Chinese style destinations — which blend contemporary and traditional Chinese cultures — during the holiday period. The agency reported that some history or novel-based theme parks like Millennium City Park and Wansui Mountain Wuxia City in Henan province were among the top destinations on their platform during the holiday.另一家在线旅游机构去哪儿网指出，假期期间，年轻人对新中式风格旅游目的地的热情很高。该机构报告称，河南的清明上河园和万岁山武侠城等一些历史或小说主题公园是假期期间其平台上最受欢迎的目的地之一。The extended holiday also stimulated Chinese people's desire for long-distance overseas trips. According to Qunar, between Feb 15 and Monday, its users flew to nearly 1,000 cities worldwide. The most popular overseas destinations were those with shorter flight times, friendly visa policies and milder climates, including Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.这个长假也刺激了中国人出国长途旅行的欲望。根据去哪儿网的数据，2月15日至23日期间，去哪儿网的用户飞往全球近1000个城市。最受欢迎的海外目的地是飞行时间较短、签证政策友好、气候温和的地方，包括曼谷、吉隆坡和香港。Among the travelers who went overseas was Zhang Yi, who took a four-day trip to Thailand with her family and returned to Shanghai on Sunday. "It was our third time visiting the country, but the first time celebrating Chinese New Year there. Thailand is a good place to relax," she said.张怡（音译）是出境游的游客之一，她与家人去泰国玩了四天，于周日返回上海。她说："这是我们第三次去泰国，但第一次在那里庆祝中国新年。泰国是个放松身心的好地方。"Qunar also noted that many of its users spent the Spring Festival holiday in Italy, the host nation of the recently concluded Milano Cortina 2026 Winter Olympics. "Based on our figures, flight ticket bookings to Italy on Feb 14 and Feb 15 — the day before the Spring Festival holiday started and the first day of the holiday — increased by 64 percent compared with the previous two days," it said.去哪儿网还指出，许多用户选择在意大利度过春节假期。意大利是最近结束的2026年米兰-科尔蒂纳冬奥会的主办国。该机构表示："根据我们的数据，2月14日和2月15日前往意大利的机票预订量与前两天相比增长了64%。"Additionally, the social media trend "becoming Chinese" has extended to the tourism market, with an increasing number of international travelers visiting the mainland during the Spring Festival holiday to partake in festivities. In 2024, Spring Festival was officially inscribed on the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity by UNESCO, enhancing its global influence.此外，社交媒体上"成为中国人"的热潮也延伸到了旅游市场，越来越多的外国游客在春节期间来内地旅游。2024年春节被列入联合国教科文组织人类非物质文化遗产代表作名录，提升了其在全球的影响力。Data from Qunar shows that flight bookings to the mainland made by travelers holding non-Chinese passports grew by 20 percent year-on-year during the holiday.去哪儿网的数据显示，春节期间，持非中国护照的旅客赴内地机票预订量同比增长20%。Top destinations for these international travelers included not just big cities like Shanghai and Beijing but also lesser-known places like Jinggangshan in Jiangxi and Altay in the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region.这些国际游客的主要目的地不仅包括上海、北京这样的大城市，还包括江西井冈山、新疆维吾尔自治区阿勒泰等不太知名的地方。"Most of these travelers came from South Korea, Vietnam, Singapore, Australia, and the United States. Domestic places with richer festive atmospheres and celebration events are most attractive to them," said Qunar, adding that travel trends among international travelers have transformed from quick sightseeing excursions to immersive experiences of Chinese traditions.去哪儿网表示："这些游客大多来自韩国、越南、新加坡、澳大利亚和美国。节日氛围和庆祝活动更丰富的国内地方对他们最有吸引力。"该机构指出，国际游客的旅游趋势已从快速观光游览转变为沉浸式体验中国传统。niche /niːʃ/ 小众的；定位明确的festive ambience /ˈfestɪv ˈæmbiəns/ 节日气氛linger in /ˈlɪŋɡə(r) ɪn/ 在……逗留；流连于picturesque /ˌpɪktʃəˈresk/ 风景如画的rise to popularity /raɪz tuː ˌpɒpjuˈlærəti/ 流行起来；走红human touch /ˈhjuːmən tʌtʃ/ 人情味year-on-year /ˌjɜːr ɒn ˈjɪr/ 同比Millennium City Park /mɪˈleniəm ˈsɪti pɑːk/ 清明上河园sightseeing excursions /ˈsaɪtsiːɪŋ ɪkˈskɜːʃənz/ 观光游览；短途旅游

Last time we spoke about The Battle of Suixian–Zaoyang-Shatow. Following the brutal 1938 capture of Wuhan, Japanese forces aimed to solidify their hold by launching an offensive against Chinese troops in the 5th War Zone, a rugged natural fortress in northern Hubei and southern Henan. Under General Yasuji Okamura, the 11th Army deployed three divisions and cavalry in a pincer assault starting May 1, 1939, targeting Suixian and Zaoyang to crush Nationalist resistance and secure flanks. Chinese commander Li Zongren, leveraging terrain like the Dabie and Tongbai Mountains, orchestrated defenses with over 200,000 troops, including Tang Enbo's 31st Army Group. By May 23, they recaptured Suixian and Zaoyang, forcing a Japanese withdrawal with heavy losses, over 13,000 Japanese casualties versus 25,000 Chinese, restoring pre-battle lines. Shifting south, Japan targeted Shantou in Guangdong to sever supply lines from Hong Kong. In a massive June 21 amphibious assault, the 21st Army overwhelmed thin Chinese defenses, capturing the port and Chao'an despite guerrilla resistance led by Zhang Fakui. Though losses mounted, Japan tightened its blockade, straining China's war effort amid ongoing attrition.   #188 From Changkufeng to Nomonhan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Well hello again, and yes you all have probably guessed we are taking another detour. Do not worry I hope to shorten this one a bit more so than what became a sort of mini series on the battle of Changkufeng or Battle of Lake Khasan. What we are about to jump into is known in the west as the battle of khalkin Gol, by the Japanese the Nomohan incident. But first I need to sort of set the table up so to say. So back on August 10th, 1938 the Litvinov-Shigemitsu agreement established a joint border commission tasked with redemarcating the disputed boundary between the Soviet Union and Japanese-controlled Manchukuo. However, this commission never achieved a mutually agreeable definition of the border in the contested area. In reality, the outcome was decided well before the group's inaugural meeting. Mere hours after the cease-fire took effect on the afternoon of August 11, General Grigory Shtern convened with a regimental commander from Japan's 19th Division to coordinate the disengagement of forces. With the conflict deemed "honorably" concluded, Japan's Imperial General Headquarters mandated the swift withdrawal of all Japanese troops to the west bank of the Tumen River. By the night of August 13, as the final Japanese soldier crossed the river, it effectively became the de facto border. Soviet forces promptly reoccupied Changkufeng Hill and the adjacent heights—a move that would carry unexpected and profound repercussions. Authoritative Japanese military analyses suggest that if negotiations in Moscow had dragged on for just one more day, the 19th Division would likely have been dislodged from Changkufeng and its surrounding elevations. Undoubtedly, General Shtern's infantry breathed a sigh of relief as the bloodshed ceased. Yet, one can't help but question why Moscow opted for a cease-fire at a juncture when Soviet troops were on the cusp of total battlefield triumph. Perhaps Kremlin leaders deemed it wiser to settle for a substantial gain, roughly three-quarters of their objectives, rather than risk everything. After all, Japan had mobilized threatening forces in eastern Manchuria, and the Imperial Army had a history of impulsive, unpredictable aggression. Moreover, amid the escalating crisis over Czechoslovakia, Moscow may have been wary of provoking a broader Asian conflict. Another theory posits that Soviet high command was misinformed about the ground situation. Reports of capturing a small segment of Changkufeng's crest might have been misinterpreted as control over the entire ridge, or an imminent full takeover before midnight on August 10. The unexpected phone call from Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov to the Japanese embassy that night—proposing a one-kilometer Japanese retreat in exchange for a cease-fire along existing lines—hints at communication breakdowns between Shtern's headquarters and the Kremlin. Ironically, such lapses may have preserved Japanese military honor, allowing the 19th Division's evacuation through diplomacy rather than defeat. Both sides endured severe losses. Initial Japanese press reports claimed 158 killed and 740 wounded. However, the 19th Division's medical logs reveal a grimmer toll: 526 dead and 914 injured, totaling 1,440 casualties. The true figure may have climbed higher, possibly to 1,500–2,000. Following the armistice, the Soviet news agency TASS reported 236 Red Army fatalities and 611 wounded. Given Shtern's uphill assaults across open terrain against entrenched positions, these numbers seem understated. Attackers in such scenarios typically suffered two to three times the defenders' losses, suggesting Soviet casualties ranged from 3,000 to 5,000. This aligns with a Soviet Military Council investigation on August 31, 1938, which documented 408 killed and 2,807 wounded. Japanese estimates placed Soviet losses even higher, at 4,500–7,000. Not all victims perished in combat. Marshal Vasily Blyukher, a decorated Soviet commander, former warlord of the Far East, and Central Committee candidate, was summoned to Moscow in August 1938. Relieved of duty in September and arrested with his family in October, he faced charges of inadequate preparation against Japanese aggression and harboring "enemies of the people" within his ranks. On November 9, 1938, Blyukher died during interrogation a euphemism for torture-induced death.Other innocents suffered as well. In the wake of the fighting, Soviet authorities deported hundreds of thousands of Korean rice farmers from the Ussuri region to Kazakhstan, aiming to eradicate Korean settlements that Japanese spies had allegedly exploited. The Changkufeng clash indirectly hampered Japan's Wuhan offensive, a massive push to subdue China. The influx of troops and supplies for this campaign was briefly disrupted by the border flare-up. Notably, Kwantung Army's 2nd Air Group, slated for Wuhan, was retained due to the Soviet threat. Chiang Kai-shek's drastic measure, breaching the Yellow River dikes to flood Japanese advance routes—further delayed the assault. By October 25, 1938, when Japanese forces captured Hankow, Chiang had relocated his capital to distant Chungking. Paradoxically, Wuhan's fall cut rail links from Canton inland, heightening Chiang's reliance on Soviet aid routed overland and by air from Central Asia. Japan secured a tactical win but missed the decisive blow; Chinese resistance persisted, pinning down a million Japanese troops in occupation duties. What was the true significance of Changkufeng? For General Koiso Suetaka and the 19th Division, it evoked a mix of bitterness and pride. Those eager for combat got their share, though not on their terms. To veterans mourning fallen comrades on those desolate slopes, it might have felt like senseless tragedy. Yet, they fought valiantly under dire conditions, holding firm until a retreat that blended humiliation with imperial praise, a bittersweet inheritance. For the Red Army, it marked a crucial trial of resolve amid Stalin's purges. While Shtern's forces didn't shine brilliantly, they acquitted themselves well in adversity. The U.S. military attaché in Moscow observed that any purge-related inefficiencies had been surmounted, praising the Red Army's valor, reliability, and equipment. His counterpart in China, Colonel Joseph Stilwell, put it bluntly: the Soviets "appeared to advantage," urging skeptics to rethink notions of a weakened Red Army. Yet, by World War II's eve, many British, French, German, and Japanese leaders still dismissed it as a "paper tiger." Soviet leaders appeared content, promoting Shtern to command the Transbaikal Military District and colonel general by 1940, while honoring "Heroes of Lake Khasan" with medals. In a fiery November 7, 1938, speech, Marshal Kliment Voroshilov warned that future incursions would prompt strikes deep into enemy territory. Tokyo's views diverged sharply. Many in the military and government saw it as a stain on Imperial Army prestige, especially Kwantung Army, humiliated on Manchukuo soil it swore to protect. Colonel Masanobu Tsuji Inada, however, framed it as a successful reconnaissance, confirming Soviet border defense without broader aggression, allowing the Wuhan push to proceed safely. Critics, including Major General Gun Hashimoto and historians, questioned this. They argued IGHQ lacked contingency plans for a massive Soviet response, especially with Wuhan preparations underway since June. One expert warned Japan had "played with fire," risking Manchuria and Korea if escalation occurred. Yet, Japanese commanders gleaned few lessons, downplaying Soviet materiel superiority and maintaining disdain for Red Army prowess. The 19th Division's stand against outnumbered odds reinforced this hubris, as did tolerance for local insubordination—attitudes that would prove costly. The Kremlin, conversely, learned Japan remained unpredictable despite its China quagmire. But for Emperor Hirohito's intervention, the conflict might have ballooned. Amid purges and the Czech crisis, Stalin likely viewed it as a reminder of eastern vulnerabilities, especially with Munich advancing German threats westward. Both sides toyed with peril. Moderation won in Tokyo, but Kwantung Army seethed. On August 11, Premier Fumimaro Konoye noted the need for caution. Kwantung, however, pushed for and secured control of the disputed salient from Chosen Army by October 8, 1938. Even winter's chill couldn't quench their vengeful fire, setting the stage for future confrontations. A quick look at the regional map reveals how Manchukuo and the Mongolian People's Republic each jut into the other's territory like protruding salients. These bulges could be seen as aggressive thrusts into enemy land, yet they also risked encirclement and absorption by the opposing empire. A northward push from western Manchuria through Mongolia could sever the MPR and Soviet Far East from the USSR's heartland. Conversely, a pincer movement from Mongolia and the Soviet Maritime Province might envelop and isolate Manchukuo. This dynamic highlights the frontier's strategic volatility in the 1930s. One particularly tense sector was the broad Mongolian salient extending about 150 miles eastward into west-central Manchukuo. There, in mid-1939, Soviet-Japanese tensions erupted into major combat. Known to the Japanese as the Nomonhan Incident and to the Soviets and Mongolians as the Battle of Khalkhin Gol, this clash dwarfed the earlier Changkufeng affair in scale, duration, and impact. Spanning four months and claiming 30,000 to 50,000 casualties, it amounted to a small undeclared war, the modern era's first limited conflict between great powers. The Mongolian salient features vast, semiarid plains of sandy grassland, gently rolling terrain dotted with sparse scrub pines and low shrubs. The climate is unforgivingly continental: May brings hot days and freezing nights, while July and August see daytime highs exceeding 38°C (100°F in American units), with cool evenings. Swarms of mosquitoes and massive horseflies necessitate netting in summer. Rainfall is scarce, but dense morning fogs are common in August. Come September, temperatures plummet, with heavy snows by October and midwinter lows dipping to –34°C. This blend of North African aridity and North Dakotan winters supports only sparse populations, mainly two related but distinct Mongol tribes. The Buriat (or Barga) Mongols migrated into the Nomonhan area from the northwest in the late 17th to early 18th centuries, likely fleeing Russian expansion after the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk. Organized by Manchu emperors between 1732 and 1735, they settled east of the river they called Khalkhin Gol (Mongolian for "river"), in lands that would later become Manchukuo. The Khalkha Mongols, named for the word meaning "barrier" or "shield," traditionally guarded the Mongol Empire's northern frontiers. Their territories lay west of the Buriats, in what would become the MPR. For centuries, these tribes herded livestock across sands, river crossings, and desert paths, largely oblivious to any formal borders. For hundreds of years, the line dividing the Mongolian salient from western Manchuria was a hazy administrative divide within the Qing Empire. In the 20th century, Russia's detachment of Outer Mongolia and Japan's seizure of Manchuria transformed this vague boundary into a frontline between rival powers. The Nomonhan Incident ignited over this contested border. Near the salient's northeastern edge, the river, called Khalkhin Gol by Mongols and Soviets, and Halha by Manchurians and Japanese, flows northwest into Lake Buir Nor. The core dispute: Was the river, as Japan asserted, the historic boundary between Manchukuo and the MPR? Soviet and MPR officials insisted the line ran parallel to and 10–12 miles east of the river, claiming the intervening strip. Japan cited no fewer than 18 maps, from Chinese and Japanese sources, to support the river as the border, a logical choice in such barren terrain, where it served as the sole natural divider. Yet, Soviets and Mongolians countered with evidence like a 1919 Chinese postal atlas and maps from Japanese and Manchukuoan agencies (1919–1934). Unbeknownst to combatants, in July 1939, China's military attaché in Moscow shared a 1934 General Staff map with his American counterpart, showing the border east of the river. Postwar Japanese studies of 18th-century Chinese records confirm that in 1734, the Qing emperor set a boundary between Buriat and Khalkha Mongols east of the river, passing through the hamlet of Nomonhan—as the Soviets claimed. However, Kwantung Army Headquarters dismissed this as non-binding, viewing it as an internal Qing affair without Russian involvement. Two former Kwantung Army officers offer a pragmatic explanation: From 1931 to 1935, when Soviet forces in the Far East were weak, Japanese and Manchukuoan authorities imposed the river as the de facto border, with MPR acquiescence. By the mid- to late 1930s, as Soviet strength grew, Japan refused to yield, while Mongolians and Soviets rejected the river line, sparking clashes. In 1935, Kwantung Army revised its maps to align with the river claim. From late that year, the Lake Buir Nor–Halha sector saw frequent skirmishes between Manchukuoan and MPR patrols. Until mid-1938, frontier defense in northwestern Manchukuo fell to the 8th Border Garrison Unit , based near Hailar. This 7,000-man force, spread thin, lacked mobility, training, and, in Kwantung Army's eyes, combat readiness. That summer, the newly formed 23rd Division, under Kwantung Army, took station at Hailar, absorbing the 8th BGU under its command, led by Lieutenant General Michitaro Komatsubara. At 52, Komatsubara was a premier Russian specialist in the Imperial Army, with stints as military attaché in the USSR and head of Kwantung's Special Services Agency in Harbin. Standing 5'7" with a sturdy build, glasses, and a small mustache, he was detail-oriented, keeping meticulous diaries, writing lengthy letters, and composing poetry, though he lacked combat experience. Before departing Tokyo in July 1938, Komatsubara received briefings from Colonel Masazumi Inada, AGS Operations Section chief. Amid planning for Changkufeng, Inada urged calm on the Manchukuo-MPR border given China's ongoing campaigns. Guidelines: Ignore minor incidents, prioritize intelligence on Soviet forces east of Lake Baikal, and study operations against the Soviet Far East's western sector. Familiar with the region from his Harbin days, Komatsubara adopted a low-key approach. Neither impulsive nor aggressive, he kept the green 23rd Division near Hailar, delegating patrols to the 8th BGU. An autumn incident underscores his restraint. On November 1, 1938, an 8th BGU patrol was ambushed by MPR forces. Per Japanese accounts, the three-man team, led by a lieutenant, strayed too close to the border and was attacked 50 meters inside Manchukuo. The lieutenant escaped, but his men died. Komatsubara sent an infantry company to secure the site but forbade retaliation. He pursued body recovery diplomatically, protested to MPR and Soviet officials, and disciplined his officers: garrison leaders got five days' confinement for poor troop training, the lieutenant thirty days. Despite this caution, pressures at AGS and KwAHQ were mounting, poised to thrust the 23rd Division into fierce battle. Modern militaries routinely develop contingency plans against potential adversaries, and the mere existence of such strategies doesn't inherently signal aggressive intentions. That said, shifts in Japan's operational planning vis-à-vis the Soviet Union may have inadvertently fueled the Nomonhan Incident. From 1934 to 1938, Japanese war scenarios emphasized a massive surprise assault in the Ussuri River region, paired with defensive holding actions in northwestern Manchuria. However, between mid-1938 and early 1939, a clandestine joint task force from the Army General Staff  and Kwantung Army's Operations Departments crafted a bold new blueprint. This revised strategy proposed containing Soviet forces in the east and north while unleashing a full-scale offensive from Hailar, advancing west-northwest toward Chita and ultimately Lake Baikal. The goal: sever the Transbaikal Soviet Far East from the USSR's core. Dubbed Plan Eight-B, it gained Kwantung Army's endorsement in March 1939. Key architects—Colonels Takushiro Hattori and Masao Terada, along with Major Takeharu Shimanuki—were reassigned from AGS to Kwantung Army Headquarters to oversee implementation. The plan anticipated a five-year buildup before execution, with Hattori assuming the role of chief operations staff officer.  A map review exposes a glaring vulnerability in Plan Eight-B: the Japanese advance would leave its southern flank exposed to Soviet counterstrikes from the Mongolian salient. By spring 1939, KwAHQ likely began perceiving this protrusion as a strategic liability. Notably, at the outbreak of Nomonhan hostilities, no detailed operational contingencies for the area had been formalized. Concurrently, Japan initiated plans for a vital railroad linking Harlun Arshan to Hailar. While its direct tie to Plan Eight-B remains unclear, the route skirted perilously close to the Halha River, potentially heightening KwAHQ's focus on the disputed Mongolian salient. In early 1939, the 23rd Division intensified reconnaissance patrols near the river. Around this time, General Grigory Shtern, freshly appointed commander of Soviet Far Eastern forces, issued a public warning that Japan was gearing up for an assault on the Mongolian People's Republic. As Plan Eight-B took shape and railroad proposals advanced, KwAHQ issued a strikingly confrontational set of guidelines for frontier troops. These directives are often cited as a catalyst for the Nomonhan clash, forging a chain linking the 1937 Amur River incident, the 1938 Changkufeng debacle, and the 1939 conflict.Resentment had festered at KwAHQ over perceived AGS meddling during the Amur affair, which curtailed their command autonomy. This frustration intensified at Changkufeng, where General Kamezo Suetaka's 19th Division endured heavy losses, only for the contested Manchukuoan territory to be effectively ceded. Kwantung Army lobbied successfully to wrest oversight of the Changkufeng salient from Chosen Army. In November 1938, Major Masanobu Tsuji of KwAHQ's Operations Section was sent to survey the site. The audacious officer was dismayed: Soviet forces dominated the land from the disputed ridge to the Tumen River. Tsuji undertook several winter reconnaissance missions. His final outing in March 1939 involved leading 40 men to Changkufeng's base. With rifles slung non-threateningly, they ascended to within 200 yards of Soviet lines, formed a line, and urinated in unison, eliciting amused reactions from the enemy. They then picnicked with obentos and sake, sang army tunes, and left gifts of canned meat, chocolates, and whiskey. This theatrical stunt concealed Tsuji's real aim: covert photography proving Soviet fortifications encroached on Manchukuoan soil. Tsuji was a singular figure. Born of modest means, he embodied a modern samurai ethos, channeling a sharp intellect into a frail, often ailing body through feats of extraordinary daring. A creative tactician, he thrived in intelligence ops, political scheming, aerial scouting, planning, and frontline command—excelling across a tumultuous career. Yet, flaws marred his brilliance: narrow bigotry, virulent racism, and capacity for cruelty. Ever the ambitious outsider, Tsuji wielded outsized influence via gekokujo—Japan's tradition of subordinates steering policy from below. In 1939, he was a major, but his pivotal role at Nomonhan stemmed from this dynamic. Back in Hsinking after his Changkufeng escapade, Tsuji drafted a response plan: negotiate border "rectification" with the Soviets; if talks failed, launch an attack to expel intruders. Kwantung Army adopted it. Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Otozaburo Yano flew to Tokyo with Tsuji's photos, seeking AGS approval. There, he was rebuffed—Changkufeng was deemed settled, and minor violations should be overlooked amid Tokyo's aversion to Soviet conflict. Yano's plea that leniency would invite aggression was countered by notes on Europe's tensions restraining Moscow. Yano's return sparked outrage at KwAHQ, seen as AGS thwarting their imperial duty to safeguard Manchukuo. Fury peaked in the Operations Section, setting the stage for Tsuji's drafting of stringent new frontier guidelines: "Principles for the Settlement of Soviet-Manchukuoan Border Disputes." The core tenet: "If Soviet troops transgress the Manchukuoan frontiers, Kwantung Army will nip their ambitions in the bud by completely destroying them." Specific directives for local commanders included: "If the enemy crosses the frontiers … annihilate him without delay, employing strength carefully built up beforehand. To accomplish our mission, it is permissible to enter Soviet territory, or to trap or lure Soviet troops into Manchukuoan territory and allow them to remain there for some time… . Where boundary lines are not clearly defined, area defense commanders will, upon their own initiative, establish boundaries and indicate them to the forward elements… . In the event of an armed clash, fight until victory is won, regardless of relative strengths or of the location of the boundaries. If the enemy violates the borders, friendly units must challenge him courageously and endeavor to triumph in their zone of action without concerning themselves about the consequences, which will be the responsibility of higher headquarters." Major Tsuji Masanobu later justified the new guidelines by pointing to the "contradictory orders" that had hamstrung frontier commanders under the old rules. They were tasked with upholding Manchukuo's territorial integrity yet forbidden from actions that might spark conflict. This, Tsuji argued, bred hesitation, as officers feared repercussions for decisive responses to incursions. The updated directives aimed to alleviate this "anxiety," empowering local leaders to act boldly without personal liability. In truth, Tsuji's "Principles for the Settlement of Soviet-Manchukuoan Border Disputes" were more incendiary than conciliatory. They introduced provocative measures: authorizing commanders to unilaterally define unclear boundaries, enforce them with immediate force "shoot first, ask questions later", permit pursuits into enemy territory, and even encourage luring adversaries across the line. Such tactics flouted both government policy and official army doctrine, prioritizing escalation over restraint. The proposals sparked intense debate within Kwantung Army's Operations Section. Section chief Colonel Takushiro Hattori and Colonel Masao Terada outranked Tsuji, as did Major Takeharu Shimanuki, all recent transfers from the Army General Staff. Tsuji, however, boasted longer tenure at Kwantung Army Headquarters since April 1936 and in Operations since November 1937, making him the de facto veteran. Hattori and Terada hesitated to challenge the assertive major, whose reputation for intellect, persuasion, and deep knowledge of Manchuria commanded respect. In a 1960 interview, Shimanuki recalled Tsuji's dominance in discussions, where his proactive ideas often swayed the group. Unified, the section forwarded Tsuji's plan to Kwantung Army Command. Commander Lieutenant General Kenkichi Ueda consulted Chief of Staff General Rensuke Isogai and Vice Chief General Otozaburo Yano, seasoned leaders who should have spotted the guidelines' volatility. Yet, lingering grudges from AGS "interference" in past incidents like the Amur River and Changkufeng clouded their judgment. Ueda, Isogai, and Tsuji shared history from the 1932 Shanghai Incident: Tsuji, then a captain, led a company in the 7th Regiment under Colonel Isogai, with Yano as staff officer and Ueda commanding the 9th Division. Tsuji was wounded there, forging bonds of camaraderie. This "clique," which grew to include Hattori, Terada, and Shimanuki, amplified Tsuji's influence. Despite Isogai's initial reservations as the group's moderate voice, the guidelines won approval. Ueda issued them as Kwantung Army Operations Order 1488 on April 25, 1939, during a division commanders' conference at KwAHQ. A routine copy reached AGS in Tokyo, but no formal reply came. Preoccupied with the China War and alliance talks with Germany, AGS may have overlooked border matters. Colonel Masazumi Inada, AGS Operations head, later noted basic acceptance of Order 1488, with an informal expectation—relayed to Hattori and Terada—of prior consultation on violations. KwAHQ dismissed this as another Tokyo intrusion on their autonomy. Some Japanese analysts contend a stern AGS rejection might have prevented Nomonhan's catastrophe, though quelling Kwantung's defiance could have required mass staff reassignments, a disruptive step AGS avoided. Tsuji countered that permitting forceful action at Changkufeng would have deterred Nomonhan altogether, underscoring the interconnectedness of these clashes while implicitly critiquing the 1939 battle's location. Undeniably, Order 1488's issuance on April 25 paved the way for conflict three weeks later. Japanese records confirm that Khalkha Mongols and MPR patrols routinely crossed the Halha River—viewed by them as internal territory, 10 miles from the true border. Such crossings passed uneventfully in March and April 1939. Post-Order 1488, however, 23rd Division commander General Michitaro Komatsubara responded aggressively, setting the stage for escalation. The Nomonhan Incident ignited with a border clash on May 11–12, 1939, that rapidly spiraled into a major conflict. Over a dozen "authoritative" accounts exist, varying in viewpoint, focus, and specifics. After cross-referencing these sources, a coherent timeline emerges. On the night of May 10–11, a 20-man Mongolian People's Republic border patrol crossed eastward over the Halha River (known as Khalkhin Gol to Mongols and Soviets). About 10 miles east, atop a 150-foot sandy hill, lay the tiny hamlet of Nomonhan, a cluster of crude huts housing a few Mongol families. Just south flowed the Holsten River, merging westward into the broader Halha. By morning on May 11, Manchukuoan forces spotted the MPR patrol north of the Holsten and west of Nomonhan. In the MPR/Soviet perspective, Nomonhan Hill marked the Mongolia-Manchuria border. To Manchukuoans and Japanese, it sat 10 miles inside Manchukuo, well east of the Halha. A 40-man Manchukuoan cavalry unit repelled the Mongolians back across the river, inflicting initial casualties on both sides—the Manchukuoans drawing first blood. The MPR patrol leader exaggerated the attackers as 200 strong. The next day, May 12, a 60-man MPR force under Major P. Chogdan evicted the Manchukuoans from the disputed zone, reestablishing positions between the Halha and Nomonhan. The Manchukuoans, in turn, reported facing 700 enemies. Sporadic skirmishes and maneuvering persisted through the week. On May 13, two days post-clash, the local Manchukuoan commander alerted General Michitaro Komatsubara's 23rd Division headquarters in Hailar. Simultaneously, Major Chogdan reported to Soviet military command in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia's capital. What began as a Mongolian-Manchukuoan spat was poised to draw in Soviet and Japanese patrons. Attributing the May 10–11 violation hinges on border interpretations: both sides claimed the Halha-Nomonhan strip. Yet, most accounts concur that Manchukuoan forces initiated the fighting. Post-May 13 notifications to Moscow and Tokyo clarify the record thereafter. Midday on May 13, Komatsubara was leading a staff conference on the newly issued Kwantung Army Operations Order 1488—Major Tsuji Masanobu's aggressive border guidelines. Ironically, the first Nomonhan combat report arrived mid-discussion. Officers present recall Komatsubara deciding instantly to "destroy the invading Outer Mongolian forces" per Order 1488. That afternoon, he informed Kwantung Army Headquarters of the incident and his intent to eradicate the intruders, requesting air support and trucks. General Kenkichi Ueda, Kwantung commander, approved Komatsubara's "positive attitude," dispatching six scout planes, 40 fighters, 10 light bombers, two anti-aircraft batteries, and two motorized transport companies. Ueda added a caveat: exercise "extreme caution" to prevent escalation—a paradoxical blend of destruction and restraint, reflective of KwAHQ's fervent mood. Ueda relayed the details to Tokyo's Army General Staff, which responded that Kwantung should handle it "appropriately." Despite Kwantung's impulsive reputation, Tokyo deferred, perhaps trusting the northern strategic imbalance, eight Japanese divisions versus 30 Soviet ones from Lake Baikal to Vladivostok, would enforce prudence. This faith proved misguided. On May 14, Major Tsuji flew from KwAHQ for aerial reconnaissance over Nomonhan, spotting 20 horses but no troops. Upon landing, a fresh bullet hole in his plane confirmed lingering MPR presence east of the Halha. Tsuji briefed 23rd Division staff and reported to Ueda that the incident seemed minor. Aligning with Order 1488's spirit, Komatsubara deployed a force under Lieutenant Colonel Yaozo Azuma: an armored car company, two infantry companies, and a cavalry troop. Arriving at Nomonhan on May 15, Azuma learned most MPR forces had retreated westward across the Halha the prior night, with only token elements remaining, and those withdrawing. Undeterred, he pursued. The advance met scant resistance, as foes had crossed the river. However, Japanese light bombers struck a small MPR concentration on the west bank, Outpost Number 7, killing two and wounding 15 per MPR reports; Japanese claimed 30–40 kills. All agree: the raid targeted undisputed MPR territory. Hearing of May 15's events, Komatsubara deemed the Mongolians sufficiently rebuked and recalled Azuma to Hailar on May 16. KwAHQ concurred, closing the matter. Soviet leaders, however, saw it differently. Mid-May prompted Soviet support for the MPR under their 1936 Mutual Defense Pact. The Red Army's 57th Corps, stationed in Mongolia, faced initial disarray: Commander Nikolai Feklenko was hunting, Chief of Staff A. M. Kushchev in Ulan Ude with his ill wife. Moscow learned of clashes via international press from Japanese sources, sparking Chief of Staff Boris Shaposhnikov's furious inquiry. Feklenko and Kushchev rushed back to Ulaanbaatar, dispatching a mixed force—a battalion from the 149th Infantry Regiment (36th Division), plus light armor and artillery from the 11th Tank Brigade—to Tamsag Bulak, 80 miles west of the Halha. Led by Major A. E. Bykov, it bolstered the MPR's 6th Cavalry Division. Bykov and Cavalry Commander Colonel Shoaaiibuu inspected the site on May 15, post-Azum's departure. The cavalry arrived two days later, backed by Bykov (ordered to remain west of the river and avoid combat if possible). Some MPR troops recrossed, occupying the disputed zone. Clashes with Manchukuoan cavalry resumed and intensified. Notified of renewed hostilities, Komatsubara viewed it as defiance, a personal affront. Emboldened by Order 1488, he aimed not just to repel but to encircle and annihilate. The incident was on the verge of major expansion. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The ghosts of the Changufeng incident have come back to haunt both the USSR and Japan. Those like Tsuji Masanobu instigated yet another border clash that would erupt into a full blown battle that would set a precedent for both nations until the very end of WW2. 

Last time we spoke about the battle of Nanchang. After securing Hainan and targeting Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway corridors, Japan's 11th Army, backed by armor, air power, and riverine operations, sought a rapid, surgical seizure of Nanchang to sever eastern Chinese logistics and coerce Chongqing. China, reorganizing under Chiang Kai-shek, concentrated over 200,000 troops across 52 divisions in the Ninth and Third War Zones, with Xue Yue commanding the 9th War Zone in defense of Wuhan-Nanchang corridors. The fighting began with German-style, combined-arms river operations along the Xiushui and Gan rivers, including feints, river crossings, and heavy artillery, sometimes using poison gas. From March 20–23, Japanese forces established a beachhead and advanced into Fengxin, Shengmi, and later Nanchang, despite stiff Chinese resistance and bridges being destroyed. Chiang's strategic shift toward attrition pushed for broader offensives to disrupt railways and rear areas, though Chinese plans for a counteroffensive repeatedly stalled due to logistics and coordination issues. By early May, Japanese forces encircled and captured Nanchang, albeit at heavy cost, with Chinese casualties surpassing 43,000 dead and Japanese losses over 2,200 dead.    #187 The Battle of Suixian–Zaoyang-Shatow Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Having seized Wuhan in a brutal offensive the previous year, the Japanese sought not just to hold their ground but to solidify their grip on this vital hub. Wuhan, a bustling metropolis at the confluence of the Yangtze and Han Rivers, had become a linchpin in their strategy, a base from which they could project power across central China. Yet, the city was far from secure, Chinese troops in northern Hubei and southern Henan, perched above the mighty Yangtze, posed an unrelenting threat. To relieve the mounting pressure on their newfound stronghold, the Japanese high command orchestrated a bold offensive against the towns of Suixian and Zaoyang. They aimed to annihilate the main force of the Chinese 5th War Zone, a move that would crush the Nationalist resistance in the region and secure their flanks. This theater of war, freshly designated as the 5th War Zone after the grueling Battle of Wuhan, encompassed a vast expanse west of Shashi in the upper Yangtze basin. It stretched across northern Hubei, southern Henan, and the rugged Dabie Mountains in eastern Anhui, forming a strategic bulwark that guarded the eastern approaches to Sichuan, the very heartland of the Nationalist government's central institutions. Historian Rana Mitter in Forgotten Ally described this zone as "a gateway of immense importance, a natural fortress that could either serve as a launchpad for offensives against Japanese-held territories or a defensive redoubt protecting the rear areas of Sichuan and Shaanxi". The terrain itself was a defender's dream and an attacker's nightmare: to the east rose the imposing Dabie Mountains, their peaks cloaked in mist and folklore; the Tongbai Mountains sliced across the north like a jagged spine; the Jing Mountains guarded the west; the Yangtze River snaked southward, its waters a formidable barrier; the Dahong Mountains dominated the center, offering hidden valleys for ambushes; and the Han River (also known as the Xiang River) carved a north-south path through it all. Two critical transport arteries—the Hanyi Road linking Hankou to Yichang in Hubei, and the Xianghua Road connecting Xiangyang to Huayuan near Hankou—crisscrossed this landscape, integrating the war zone into a web of mobility. From here, Chinese forces could menace the vital Pinghan Railway, that iron lifeline running from Beiping (modern Beijing) to Hankou, while also threatening the Wuhan region itself. In retreat, it provided a sanctuary to shield the Nationalist heartlands. As military strategist Sun Tzu might have appreciated, this area had long been a magnet for generals, its contours shaping the fates of empires since ancient times. Despite the 5th War Zone's intricate troop deployments, marked by units of varying combat prowess and a glaring shortage of heavy weapons, the Chinese forces made masterful use of the terrain to harass their invaders. Drawing from accounts in Li Zongren's memoirs, he noted how these defenders, often outgunned but never outmaneuvered, turned hills into fortresses and rivers into moats. In early April 1939, as spring rains turned paths to mud, Chinese troops ramped up their disruptions along the southern stretches of the Pinghan Railway, striking from both eastern and western flanks with guerrilla precision. What truly rattled the Japanese garrison in Wuhan was the arrival of reinforcements: six full divisions redeployed to Zaoyang, bolstering the Chinese capacity to launch flanking assaults that could unravel Japanese supply lines. Alarmed by this buildup, the Japanese 11th Army, ensconced in the Wuhan area under the command of General Yasuji Okamura, a figure whose tactical acumen would later earn him notoriety in the Pacific War, devised a daring plan. They intended to plunge deep into the 5th War Zone, smashing the core of the Chinese forces and rendering them impotent, thereby neutralizing the northwestern threat to Wuhan once and for all. From April onward, the Japanese mobilized with meticulous preparation, amassing troops equipped with formidable artillery, rumbling tanks, and squadrons of aircraft that darkened the skies. Historians estimate they committed roughly three and a half divisions to this endeavor, as detailed in Edward J. Drea's In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army. Employing a classic pincer movement, a two-flank encirclement coupled with a central breakthrough, they aimed for a swift, decisive strike to obliterate the main Chinese force in the narrow Suixian-Zaoyang corridor, squeezed between the Tongbai and Dahong Mountains. The offensive erupted in full fury on May 1, 1939, as Japanese columns surged forward like a tidal wave, their engines roaring and banners fluttering in the dust-choked air. General Li Zongren, the commander of the 5th War Zone, a man whose leadership had already shone in earlier campaigns like the defense of Tai'erzhuang in 1938, issued urgent orders to cease offensive actions against the Japanese and pivot to a defensive stance. Based on intelligence about the enemy's dispositions, Li orchestrated a comprehensive campaign structure, assigning precise defensive roles and battle plans to each unit. This was no haphazard scramble; it was a symphony of strategy, as Li himself recounted in his memoirs, emphasizing the need to exploit the terrain's natural advantages. While various Chinese war zones executed the "April Offensive" from late April to mid-May, actively harrying and containing Japanese forces, the 5th War Zone focused its energies on the southern segment of the Pinghan Railway, assaulting it from both sides in a bid to disrupt logistics. The main force of the 31st Army Group, under the command of Tang Enbo, a general known for his aggressive tactics and later criticized for corruption, shifted from elsewhere in Hubei to Zaoyang, fortifying the zone and posing a dire threat to the Japanese flanks and rear areas. To counter this peril and safeguard transportation along the Wuhan-Pinghan Railway, the Japanese, led by the formidable Okamura, unleashed their assault from the line stretching through Xinyang, Yingshan, and Zhongxiang. Mobilizing the 3rd, 13th, and 16th Divisions alongside the 2nd and 4th Cavalry Brigades, they charged toward the Suixian-Zaoyang region in western Hubei, intent on eradicating the Chinese main force and alleviating the siege-like pressure on Wuhan. In a masterful reorganization, Li Zongren divided his forces into two army groups, the left and right, plus a dedicated river defense army. His strategy was a blend of attrition and opportunism: harnessing the Tongbai and Dahong Mountains, clinging to key towns like lifelines, and grinding down the Japanese through prolonged warfare while biding time for a counterstroke. This approach echoed the Fabian tactics of ancient Rome, wearing the enemy thin before delivering the coup de grâce. The storm broke at dawn on May 1, when the main contingents of the Japanese 16th and 13th Divisions, bolstered by the 4th Cavalry Brigade from their bases in Zhongxiang and Jingshan, hurled themselves against the Chinese 37th and 180th Divisions of the Right Army Group. Supported by droning aircraft that strafed from above and tanks that churned the earth below, the Japanese advanced with mechanical precision. By May 4, they had shattered the defensive lines flanking Changshoudian, then surged along the east bank of the Xiang River toward Zaoyang in a massive offensive. Fierce combat raged through May 5, as described in Japanese war diaries compiled in Senshi Sōsho (the official Japanese war history series), where soldiers recounted the relentless Chinese resistance amid the smoke and clamor. The Japanese finally breached the defenses, turning their fury on the 122nd Division of the 41st Army. In a heroic stand, the 180th Division clung to Changshoudian, providing cover for the main force's retreat along the east-west Huangqi'an line. The 37th Division fell back to the Yaojiahe line, while elements of the 38th Division repositioned into Liushuigou. On May 6, the Japanese seized Changshoudian, punched through Huangqi'an, and drove northward, unleashing a devastating assault on the 122nd Division's positions near Wenjiamiao. Undeterred, Chinese defenders executed daring flanking maneuvers in the Fenglehe, Yaojiahe, Liushuihe, Shuanghe, and Zhangjiaji areas, turning the landscape into a labyrinth of ambushes. May 7 saw the Japanese pressing on, capturing Zhangjiaji and Shuanghe. By May 8, they assaulted Maozifan and Xinji, where ferocious battles erupted, soldiers clashing in hand-to-hand combat amid the ruins. By May 10, the Japanese had overrun Huyang Town and Xinye, advancing toward Tanghe and the northeastern fringes of Zaoyang. Yet, the Tanghe River front witnessed partial Chinese recoveries: remnants of the Right Army Group, alongside troops from east of the Xianghe, reclaimed Xinye. The 122nd and 180th Divisions withdrew north of Tanghe and Fancheng, while the 37th, 38th, and 132nd Divisions steadfastly held the east bank of the Xianghe River. Concurrently, the main force of the Japanese 3rd Division launched from Yingshan against the 84th and 13th Armies of the 11th Group Army in the Suixian sector. After a whirlwind of combat, the Chinese 84th Army retreated to the Taerwan position. On May 2, the 3rd Division targeted the Gaocheng position of the 13th Army within the 31st Group Army; the ensuing clashes in Taerwan and Gaocheng were a maelstrom of fire, with the Taerwan position exchanging hands multiple times like a deadly game of tug-of-war. By May 4, in a grim escalation, Japanese forces deployed poison gas, a violation of international norms that drew condemnation and is documented in Allied reports from the era, inflicting horrific casualties and compelling the Chinese to relinquish Gaocheng, which fell into enemy hands. On May 5, backed by aerial bombardments, tank charges, and artillery barrages, the Japanese renewed their onslaught along the Gaocheng River and the Lishan-Jiangjiahe line. By May 6, the beleaguered Chinese were forced back to the Tianhekou and Gaocheng line. Suixian succumbed on May 7. On May 8, the Japanese shattered the second line of the 84th Army, capturing Zaoyang and advancing on the Jiangtoudian position of the 85th Army. To evade encirclement, the defenders mounted a valiant resistance before withdrawing from Jiangtoudian; the 84th Army relocated to the Tanghe and Baihe areas, while the 39th Army embedded itself in the Dahongshan for guerrilla operations—a tactic that would bleed the Japanese through hit-and-run warfare, as noted in guerrilla warfare studies by Mao Zedong himself. By May 10, the bulk of the 31st Army Group maneuvered toward Tanghe, reaching north of Biyang by May 15. From Xinyang, Japanese forces struck at Tongbai on May 8; by May 10, elements from Zaoyang advanced to Zhangdian Town and Shangtun Town. In response, the 68th Army of the 1st War Zone dispatched the 143rd Division to defend Queshan and Minggang, and the 119th Division to hold Tongbai. After staunchly blocking the Japanese, they withdrew on May 11 to positions northwest and southwest of Tongbai, shielding the retreat of 5th War Zone units. The Japanese 4th Cavalry Brigade drove toward Tanghe, seizing Tanghe County on May 12. But the tide was turning. In a brilliant reversal, the Fifth War Zone commanded the 31st Army Group, in concert with the 2nd Army Group from the 1st War Zone, to advance from southwestern Henan. Their mission: encircle the bulk of Japanese forces on the Xiangdong Plain and deliver a crushing blow. The main force of the 33rd Army Group targeted Zaoyang, while other units pinned down Japanese rear guards in Zhongxiang. The Chinese counteroffensive erupted with swift successes, Tanghe County was recaptured on May 14, and Tongbai liberated on May 16, shattering the Japanese encirclement scheme. On May 19, after four grueling days of combat, Chinese forces mauled the retreating Japanese, reclaiming Zaoyang and leaving the fields strewn with enemy dead. The 39th Army of the Left Army Group dispersed into the mountains for guerrilla warfare, a shadowy campaign of sabotage and surprise. Forces of the Right Army Group east of the river, along with river defense units, conducted relentless raids on Japanese rears and supply lines over multiple days, sowing chaos before withdrawing to the west bank of the Xiang River on May 21. On May 22, they pressed toward Suixian, recapturing it on May 23. The Japanese, battered and depleted, retreated to their original garrisons in Zhongxiang and Yingshan, restoring the pre-war lines as the battle drew to a close. Throughout this clash, the Chinese held a marked superiority in manpower and coordination, though their deployments lacked full flexibility, briefly placing them on the defensive. After protracted, blood-soaked fighting, they restored the original equilibrium. Despite grievous losses, the Chinese thwarted the Japanese encirclement and exacted a heavy toll, reports from the time, corroborated by Japanese records in Senshi Sōsho, indicate over 13,000 Japanese killed or wounded, with more than 5,000 corpses abandoned on the battlefield. This fulfilled the strategic goal of containing and eroding Japanese strength. Chinese casualties surpassed 25,000, a testament to the ferocity of the struggle. The 5th War Zone seized the initiative in advances and retreats, deftly shifting to outer lines and maintaining positional advantages. As Japanese forces withdrew, Chinese pursuers harried and obstructed them, yielding substantial victories. The Battle of Suizao spanned less than three weeks. The Japanese main force pierced defenses on the east bank of the Han River, advancing to encircle one flank as planned. However, the other two formations met fierce opposition near Suixian and northward, stalling their progress. Adapting to the battlefield's ebb and flow, the Fifth War Zone transformed its tactics: the main force escaped encirclement, maneuvered to outer lines for offensives, and exploited terrain to hammer the Japanese. The pivotal order to flip from defense to offense doomed the encirclement; with the counterattack triumphant, the Japanese declined to hold and retreated. The Chinese pursued with unyielding vigor. By May 24, they had reclaimed Zaoyang, Tongbai, and other locales. Save for Suixian County, the Japanese had fallen back to pre-war positions, reinstating the regional status quo. Thus, the battle concluded, a chapter of resilience etched into the chronicles of China's defiance. In the sweltering heat of southern China, where the humid air clung to every breath like a persistent fog, the Japanese General Staff basked in what they called a triumphant offensive and defensive campaign in Guangdong. But victory, as history so often teaches, is a double-edged sword. By early 1939, the strain was palpable. Their secret supply line snaking from the British colony of Hong Kong to the Chinese mainland was under constant disruption, raids by shadowy guerrilla bands, opportunistic smugglers, and the sheer unpredictability of wartime logistics turning what should have been a lifeline into a leaky sieve. Blockading the entire coastline? A pipe dream, given the vast, jagged shores of Guangdong, dotted with hidden coves and fishing villages that had evaded imperial edicts for centuries. Yet, the General Staff's priorities were unyielding, laser-focused on strangling the Nationalist capital of Chongqing through a relentless blockade. This meant the 21st Army, that workhorse of the Japanese invasion force, had to stay in the fight—no rest for the weary. Drawing from historical records like the Senshi Sōsho (War History Series) compiled by Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies, we know that after the 21st Army reported severing what they dubbed the "secret transport line" at Xinhui, a gritty, hard-fought skirmish that left the local landscape scarred with craters and abandoned supply crates, the General Staff circled back to the idea of a full coastal blockade. It was a classic case of military opportunism: staff officers, poring over maps in dimly lit war rooms in Tokyo, suddenly "discovered" Shantou as a major port. Not just any port, mind you, but a bustling hub tied to the heartstrings of Guangdong's overseas Chinese communities. Shantou and nearby Chao'an weren't mere dots on a map; they were the ancestral hometowns of countless Chaoshan people who had ventured abroad to Southeast Asia, sending back remittances that flowed like lifeblood into the region. Historical economic studies, such as those in The Overseas Chinese in the People's Republic of China by Stephen Fitzgerald, highlight how these funds from the Chaoshan diaspora, often funneled through family networks in places like Singapore and Thailand, were substantial, indirectly fueling China's war effort by sustaining local economies and even purchasing arms on the black market. The Chao-Shao Highway, that dusty artery running near Shantou, was pinpointed as a critical vein connecting Hong Kong's ports to the mainland's interior. So, in early June 1939, the die was cast: Army Order No. 310 thundered from headquarters, commanding the 21st Army to seize Shantou. The Chief of the General Staff himself provided the strategic blueprint, a personal touch that underscored the operation's gravity. The Army Department christened the Chaoshan push "Operation Hua," a nod perhaps to the flowery illusions of easy conquest, while instructing the Navy Department to tag along for the ride. In naval parlance, it became "Operation J," a cryptic label that masked the sheer scale unfolding. Under the Headquarters' watchful eye, what started as a modest blockade morphed into a massive amphibious assault, conjured seemingly out of thin air like a magician's trick, but one with deadly props. The 5th Fleet's orders mobilized an impressive lineup: the 9th Squadron for heavy hitting, the 5th Mine Boat Squadron to clear watery hazards, the 12th and 21st Sweeper Squadrons sweeping for mines like diligent janitors of the sea, the 45th Destroyer Squadron adding destroyer muscle, and air power from the 3rd Combined Air Group (boasting 24 land-based attack aircraft and 9 reconnaissance planes that could spot a fishing boat from miles away). Then there was the Chiyoda Air Group with its 9 reconnaissance aircraft, the Guangdong Air Group contributing a quirky airship and one more recon plane, the 9th Special Landing Squadron from Sasebo trained for beach assaults, and a flotilla of special ships for logistics. On the ground, the 21st Army threw in the 132nd Brigade from the 104th Division, beefed up with the 76th Infantry Battalion, two mountain artillery battalions for lobbing shells over rugged terrain, two engineer battalions to bridge rivers and clear paths, a light armored vehicle platoon rumbling with mechanized menace, and a river-crossing supplies company to keep the troops fed and armed. All under the command of Brigade Commander Juro Goto, a stern officer whose tactical acumen was forged in earlier Manchurian campaigns. The convoy's size demanded rehearsals; the 132nd Brigade trained for boat transfers at Magong in the Penghu Islands, practicing the precarious dance of loading men and gear onto rocking vessels under simulated fire. Secrecy shrouded the whole affair, many officers and soldiers, boarding ships in the dead of night, whispered among themselves that they were finally heading home to Japan, a cruel ruse to maintain operational security. For extra punch, the 21st Army tacked on the 31st Air Squadron for air support, their planes droning like angry hornets ready to sting. This overkill didn't sit well with everyone. Lieutenant General Ando Rikichi, the pragmatic commander overseeing Japanese forces in the region, must have fumed in his Guangzhou headquarters. His intelligence staff, drawing from intercepted radio chatter and local spies as noted in postwar analyses like The Japanese Army in World War II by Gordon L. Rottman, reported that the Chongqing forces in Chaozhou were laughably thin: just the 9th Independent Brigade, a couple of security regiments, and ragtag "self-defense groups" of armed civilians. Why unleash such a sledgehammer on a fly? The mobilization's magnitude even forced a reshuffling of defenses around Guangzhou, pulling resources from the 12th Army's front lines and overburdening the already stretched 18th Division. It was bureaucratic overreach at its finest, a testament to the Imperial Staff's penchant for grand gestures over tactical efficiency. Meanwhile, on the Nationalist side, the winds of war carried whispers of impending doom. The National Revolutionary Army's war histories, such as those compiled in the Zhongguo Kangri Zhanzheng Shi (History of China's War of Resistance Against Japan), note that Chiang Kai-shek's Military Commission had snagged intelligence as early as February 1939 about Japan's plans for a large-scale invasion of Shantou. The efficiency of the Military Command's Second Bureau and the Military Intelligence Bureau was nothing short of astonishing, networks of agents, double agents, and radio intercepts piercing the veil of Japanese secrecy. Even as the convoy slipped out of Penghu, a detailed report outlining operational orders landed on Commander Zhang Fakui's desk, the ink still fresh. Zhang, a battle-hardened strategist whose career spanned the Northern Expedition and beyond , had four months to prepare for what would be dubbed the decisive battle of Chaoshan. Yet, in a move that baffled some contemporaries, he chose not to fortify and defend it tooth and nail. After the Fourth War Zone submitted its opinions, likely heated debates in smoke-filled command posts, Chiang Kai-shek greenlit the plan. By March, the Military Commission issued its strategic policy: when the enemy hit Chaoshan, a sliver of regular troops would team up with civilian armed forces for mobile and guerrilla warfare, grinding down the invaders like sandpaper on steel. The orders specified guerrilla zones in Chaozhou, Jiaxing, and Huizhou, unifying local militias under a banner of "extensive guerrilla warfare" to coordinate with regular army maneuvers, gradually eroding the Japanese thrust. In essence, the 4th War Zone wasn't tasked with holding Chao'an and Shantou at all costs; instead, they'd strike hard during the landing, then let guerrillas harry the occupiers post-capture. It was a doctrine of attrition in a "confined battlefield," honing skills through maneuver and ambush. Remarkably, the fall of these cities was preordained by the Military Commission three months before the Japanese even issued their orders, a strategic feint that echoed ancient Sun Tzu tactics of yielding ground to preserve strength. To execute this, the 4th War Zone birthed the Chao-Jia-Hui Guerrilla Command after meticulous preparation, with General Zou Hong, head of Guangdong's Security Bureau and a no-nonsense administrator known for his anti-smuggling campaigns, taking the helm. In just three months, Zhang Fakui scraped together the Independent 9th Brigade, the 2nd, 4th, and 5th Guangdong Provincial Security Regiments, and the Security Training Regiment. Even with the 9th Army Group lurking nearby, he handed the reins of the Chao-Shan operation to the 12th Army Group's planners. Their March guidelines sketched three lines of resistance from the coast to the mountains, a staged withdrawal that allowed frontline defenders to melt away like ghosts. This blueprint mirrored Chiang Kai-shek's post-Wuhan reassessment, where the loss of that key city in 1938 prompted a shift to protracted warfare. A Xinhua News Agency columnist later summed it up scathingly: "The Chongqing government, having lost its will to resist, colludes with the Japanese and seeks to eliminate the Communists, adopting a policy of passive resistance." This narrative, propagated by Communist sources, dogged Chiang and the National Revolutionary Army for decades, painting them as defeatists even as they bled the Japanese dry through attrition. February 1939 saw Commander Zhang kicking off a reorganization of the 12th Army Group, transforming it from a patchwork force into something resembling a modern army. He could have hunkered down, assigning troops to a desperate defense of Chaoshan, but that would have handed the initiative to the overcautious Japanese General Staff, whose activism often bordered on paranoia. Zhang, with the wisdom of a seasoned general who had navigated the treacherous politics of pre-war China, weighed the scales carefully. His vision? Forge the 12th Army Group into a nimble field army, not squander tens of thousands on a secondary port. Japan's naval and air dominance—evident in the devastation of Shanghai in 1937, meant Guangdong's forces could be pulverized in Shantou just as easily. Losing Chaozhou and Shantou? Acceptable, if it preserved core strength for the long haul. Post-Xinhui, Zhang doubled down on resistance, channeling efforts into live-fire exercises for the 12th Army, turning green recruits into battle-ready soldiers amid the Guangdong hills. The war's trajectory after 1939 would vindicate him: his forces became pivotal in later counteroffensives, proving that a living army trumped dead cities. Opting out of a static defense, Zhang pivoted to guerrilla warfare to bleed the Japanese while clutching strategic initiative. He ordered local governments to whip up coastal guerrilla forces from Chao'an to Huizhou—melding militias, national guards, police, and private armed groups into official folds. These weren't elite shock troops, but in wartime's chaos, they controlled locales effectively, disrupting supply lines and gathering intel. For surprises, he unleashed two mobile units: the 9th Independent Brigade and the 20th Independent Brigade. Formed fresh after the War of Resistance erupted, these brigades shone for their efficiency within the cumbersome Guangdong Army structure. Division-level units were too bulky for spotty communications, so Yu Hanmou's command birthed these independent outfits, staffed with crack officers. The 9th, packing direct-fire artillery for punch, and the 20th, dubbed semi-mechanized for its truck-borne speed, prowled the Chaoshan–Huizhou coast from 1939. Zhang retained their three-regiment setup, naming Hua Zhenzhong and Zhang Shou as commanders, granting them autonomy to command in the field like roving wolves. As the 9th Independent Brigade shifted to Shantou, its 627th Regiment was still reorganizing in Heyuan, a logistical hiccup amid the scramble. Hua Zhenzhong, a commander noted for his tactical flexibility in regional annals, deployed the 625th Regiment and 5th Security Regiment along the coast, with the 626th as reserve in Chao'an. Though the Fourth War Zone had written off Chaoshan, Zhang yearned to showcase Guangdong grit before the pullback. Dawn broke on June 21, 1939, at 4:30 a.m., with Japanese reconnaissance planes slicing through the fog over Shantou, Anbu, and Nanbeigang, ghostly silhouettes against the gray sky. By 5:30, the mist lifted, revealing a nightmare armada: over 40 destroyers and 70–80 landing craft churning toward the coast on multiple vectors, their hulls cutting the waves like knives. The 626th Regiment's 3rd Battalion at Donghushan met the first wave with a hail of fire from six light machine guns, repelling the initial boats in a frenzy of splashes and shouts. But the brigade's long-range guns couldn't stem the tide; Hua focused on key chokepoints, aiming to bloody the invaders rather than obliterate them. By morning, the 3rd Battalion of the 625th Regiment charged into Shantou City, joined by the local police corps digging in amid urban sprawl. Combat raged at Xinjin Port and the airport's fringes, where Nationalist troops traded shots with advancing Japanese under the absent shadow of a Chinese navy. Japanese naval guns, massed offshore, pounded the outskirts like thunder gods in fury. By 2:00 a.m. on the 22nd, Shantou crumpled as defenders' ammo ran dry, the city falling in a haze of smoke and echoes. Before the loss, Hua had positioned the 1st Battalion of the 5th Security Regiment at Anbu, guarding the road to Chao'an. Local lore, preserved in oral histories collected by the Chaozhou Historical Society, recalls Battalion Commander Du Ruo leading from the front, rifle in hand, but Japanese barrages, bolstered by superior firepower—forced a retreat. Post-capture, Tokyo's forces paused to consolidate, unleashing massacres on fleeing civilians in the outskirts. A flotilla of civilian boats, intercepted at sea, became a grim training ground for bayonet drills, a barbarity echoed in survivor testimonies compiled in The Rape of Nanking and Beyond extensions to Guangdong atrocities. With Shantou gone, Hua pivoted to flank defense, orchestrating night raids on Japanese positions around Anbu and Meixi. On June 24th, Major Du Ruo spearheaded an assault into Anbu but fell gravely wounded amid the chaos. Later, the 2nd Battalion of the 626th overran spots near Meixi. A Japanese sea-flanking maneuver targeted Anbu, but Nationalists held at Liulong, sparking nocturnal clashes, grenade volleys, bayonet charges, and hand-to-hand brawls that drained both sides like a slow bleed. June 26th saw the 132nd Brigade lumber toward Chao'an. Hua weighed options: all-out assault or guerrilla fade? He chose to dig in on the outskirts, reserving two companies of the 625th and a special ops battalion in the city. The 27th brought a day-long Japanese onslaught, culminating in Chao'an's fall after fierce rear-guard actions by the 9th Independent Brigade. Evacuations preceded the collapse, with Japanese propaganda banners fluttering falsely, claiming Nationalists had abandoned defense. Yet Hua's call preserved his brigade for future fights; the Japanese claimed an empty prize. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese operations had yet again plugged up supply leaks into Nationalist China. The fall of Suixian, Zaoyang and Shantou were heavy losses for the Chinese war effort. However the Chinese were also able to exact heavy casualties on the invaders and thwarted their encirclement attempts. China was still in the fight for her life.

China's national immigration authorities significantly enhanced their service efficiency in 2025, processing a record 697 million border crossings, a 14.2 percent increase from the previous year.2025年，中国国家出入境管理机关大幅提升服务效率，处理出入境人次达6.97亿次，创历史新高，较上年增长14.2%。According to data announced by the National Immigration Administration on Wednesday, foreign nationals accounted for more than 82 million crossings, a year-on-year rise of 26 percent. Notably, over 30 million foreign nationals entered China visa-free, almost 50 percent more than last year, making up 73 percent of all foreign entries.根据国家移民管理局周三公布的数据，外国公民跨境入境超过8200万人次，同比增长26%。值得注意的是，逾3000万外国公民免签入境中国，较去年增长近50%，占外国入境总量的73%。Residents from the Chinese mainland made 335 million crossings, up 15 percent, while those from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan made nearly 280 million crossings, up 10 percent compared with 2024.来自中国大陆的居民跨境往来达3.35亿人次，同比增长15%；来自香港、澳门和台湾地区的居民跨境往来近2.8亿人次，较2024年增长10%。Lyu Ning, the administration's spokeswoman, noted that the immigration sector has advanced policy reform and innovation, implementing targeted measures to underpin high-quality development and inject new impetus into the national economy.国家移民管理局新闻发言人吕宁指出，国家移民管理局推进政策创新改革，实施精准举措，为高质量发展提供支撑，为国民经济注入新动力。To facilitate exchanges, authorities expanded the pilot program for online travel document applications for mainland residents to 50 cities, with 457,000 successful online applications recorded.为促进交流，国家移民管理局将内地居民网上申请旅行证件的试点计划扩大至50个城市，共录得45.7万宗成功网上申请。Additionally, Indonesia was added to the list of countries eligible for the 240-hour visa-free transit policy, and five more ports in Guangdong province were designated for the policy, bringing the national total to 65.此外，印度尼西亚被纳入240小时免签过境政策适用国家名单，广东省新增5个口岸实施该政策，使全国实施该政策的口岸总数达到65个。Visa-free entry for tourist groups from Association of Southeast Asian Nations member countries to Xishuangbanna Dai autonomous prefecture in Yunnan province was also launched. In coordination with relevant departments, the administration increased the count of China's unilateral visa-free countries to 48 and mutual visa exemption countries to 29, bringing the total number of countries granting unilateral visa-free access to China to 28.同时，对东盟成员国旅游团赴云南省西双版纳傣族自治州实施免签政策。经协调相关部门，中国单方面免签国家增至48个，互免签证国家增至29个，对华实施单方面免签的国家总数达到28个。Lyu noted that while ensuring efficient cross-border travel, these initiatives have fueled the boom in "Travel in China" and "Shop in China" campaigns, elevating China's image as an open, inclusive and dynamic country.吕宁指出，这些举措在保障跨境出行高效顺畅的同时，也推动了“中国游”和“中国购”活动的蓬勃发展，提升了中国作为开放包容、充满活力的国家形象。Data from the Ministry of Commerce showed that the expanded visa-free policies and optimized tax refund measures have further boosted these campaigns, with sales of tax-refundable goods nearly doubling.商务部数据显示，扩大的免签政策和优化的退税措施进一步推动了上述活动，退税商品销售额几乎翻了一番。Dai Bin, president of the China Tourism Academy, pointed out that China's tourism industry has become more open and inclusive over the past year and over the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-25) period, making important contributions to the prosperity of the global tourism sector.中国旅游研究院院长戴斌指出，过去一年及“十四五”期间，中国旅游业更加开放包容，为全球旅游业繁荣发展作出重要贡献。China's high-level opening-up policies, covering visas, immigration, port access, tax refunds and payment facilitation, have significantly improved entry convenience for international travelers.中国实施的高水平开放政策，涵盖签证、入境、港口准入、退税及支付便利化等领域，显著提升了国际旅客入境的便利性。He described 2025 as a landmark year for China's institutional opening-up in tourism. China is now a global leader in tourism exchanges with countries involved in the Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia, West Asia, Africa, and Latin America, while tourism exchanges with Europe have almost returned to the 2019 levels, he said.戴斌将2025年称为中国旅游业制度性开放的里程碑之年。他表示，中国目前已成为与东南亚、西亚、非洲和拉丁美洲等“一带一路”沿线国家旅游交流的全球领头羊，而与欧洲的旅游交流已基本恢复到2019年水平。Looking ahead to 2026 and the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-30) period, Dai emphasized that China is poised to play a bigger role in global tourism development.展望2026年及第十五个五年规划（2026-2030年）期间，戴斌强调中国将在全球旅游业发展中发挥更重要的作用。The National Immigration Administration said it will continue to expand and deepen high-level opening-up to the outside world, optimize immigration policies and respond to public demands, with a view to boosting economic and social development through continuous reform and innovation.国家移民管理局表示，将持续扩大深化高水平对外开放，优化移民政策，回应公众诉求，通过持续改革创新推动经济社会发展。

Spurred by the government's "Shopping in China" initiative and other consumption-supporting measures, customs authorities in top-tier cities reported a strong increase in tax refund volumes in 2025 and forecast further growth this year.在政府“中国购物”倡议及其他消费扶持措施的推动下，2025年一线城市海关退税量显著增长，并预测今年将持续攀升。According to Guangzhou Customs, Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport Customs in Guangdong province processed more than 50,000 departure tax-refund applications from overseas travelers in 2025, with the total value of refund claims exceeding 496 million yuan ($71.3 million).据广州海关统计，2025年广东省广州白云国际机场海关为出境旅客办理退税申请逾5万笔，退税金额累计超过4.96亿元人民币（合7130万美元）。The figures show year-on-year increases of 470 percent in the number of applications and 60 percent in the total refund amount.数据显示，申请数量同比增长470%，退税总额同比增长60%。At the tax refund counter of Terminal 1 at the Guangzhou airport, French traveler Mu Voungvui was recently seen completing his tax refund procedures. Holding up his refund slip, he said his trip to China had been highly rewarding.在广州白云机场1号航站楼的退税柜台前，近日有法国游客穆·旺维（Mu Voungvui）正在办理退税手续。他举起退税单表示，此次中国之行收获颇丰。"I bought a DJI Osmo Pocket 3 gimbal camera and the tax-refund process was very convenient," he said, adding that with a refund rate of 11 percent, he received 414.5 yuan as the tax refund.他表示：“我购买了DJI Osmo Pocket 3稳定器相机，退税流程非常便捷。”并补充道以11%的退税率计算，最终获得了414.5元人民币的退税款。Feng Ruilin, an official at Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport Customs, said popular tax-refund purchases range from clothing, handbags and jewelry, to technology products such as small drones, sports cameras and smartphones.广州白云国际机场海关官员冯瑞琳（音译）表示，热门退税商品涵盖服装、手袋、珠宝首饰等，以及小型无人机、运动相机和智能手机等科技产品。The growth in departure tax-refunds comes amid broader efforts to upgrade China's consumption environment. Launched in April 2025, the "Shopping in China" initiative aims to create a more internationally friendly consumption landscape and enhance the country's appeal as a global consumption hub through measures such as streamlined visa procedures and improved departure tax-refund arrangements.离境退税业务的增长，正值中国全面提升消费环境之际。自2025年4月启动的“中国购物”计划，旨在通过简化签证手续、完善离境退税机制等措施，打造更具国际友善度的消费环境，增强中国作为全球消费枢纽的吸引力。Zhu Mingkuang, an official with the passenger inspection unit at Shanghai Pudong International Airport Customs, said that the continued optimization of departure tax-refund policies and upgrades to related services have played a key role in boosting inbound consumption.上海浦东国际机场海关旅客查验科官员朱明光（音译）表示，离境退税政策的持续优化和相关服务的升级，对促进入境消费起到了关键作用。Zhu noted that the reduction of the minimum purchase threshold from 500 yuan to 200 yuan in April last year has encouraged more foreign travelers to shop and claim tax refunds, leading to a sharp rise in business volumes.朱明光（音译）指出，去年4月将最低消费门槛从500元降至200元后，吸引更多外国游客购物并申请退税，导致业务量大幅增长。"Since October 2025, the volume of departure tax-refund transactions at Shanghai Pudong International Airport has consistently exceeded 1,000 applications per day on average," he said, adding that the momentum has continued into January of this year.自2025年10月以来，上海浦东国际机场离境退税业务量日均处理量持续保持在1000笔以上，这一势头延续至今年1月。Last year, Shanghai Customs verified 222,000 departure tax-refund items, soaring 130 percent year-on-year and accounting for half of the national total.去年，上海海关核验出境退税物品达22.2万件，同比增长130%，占全国总量的半数。Beyond improvements in tax-refund processing, local governments have also moved to strengthen supporting retail infrastructure. In Shanghai, the municipal government has guided the transformation and launch of downtown duty-free stores, injecting new momentum into the city's development as an international consumption hub and its tourism economy.除加快退税办理速度外，各地政府还着力完善零售配套设施。上海市通过引导市中心免税店转型升级，为打造国际消费中心城市和旅游经济注入新动能。In the Chinese capital, Beijing Customs verified a total of 64,000 departure tax-refund applications, marking a year-on-year increase of 317 percent in 2025.在首都北京，海关共核验出境退税申请6.4万份，2025年同比增幅达317%。The total value of refund claims reached 1.35 billion yuan, up 74 percent year-on-year and surpassing 1 billion yuan for the first time since the departure tax-refund policy was introduced a decade ago.退税申请总额达到13.5亿元，同比增长74%，这是自十年前实施离境退税政策以来首次突破10亿元大关。Pan Yuting, an official with the passenger inspection unit at Beijing Capital International Airport Customs, said that at the beginning of 2025, about 40 departure tax-refund applications were typically processed during a single day at Terminal 3. That figure rose to around 170 per day in mid-January of this year, representing a substantial increase compared with the same period last year.北京首都国际机场海关旅客查验科官员潘玉婷（音译）表示，2025年初，航站楼3号航站楼单日平均处理约40份离境退税申请。今年1月中旬，该数字已攀升至每日约170份，较去年同期显著增长。After purchasing a Louis Vuitton handbag valued at 19,820 yuan in Beijing and applying for a tax refund of 2,180 yuan on Jan 4 at Terminal 3 of Beijing Capital International Airport, Canadian traveler Davis Jordan said China's appeal to foreign visitors will continue to grow, as "tax-refund and duty-free services are highly cost-effective and make shopping here both attractive and worthwhile".加拿大游客戴维斯·乔丹（Davis Jordan）1月4日在北京首都国际机场3号航站楼购买了价值19820元的路易威登手袋，并申请退税2180元。他表示，中国的吸引力将持续增强，因为“退税和免税服务性价比极高，让购物既充满吸引力又物有所值”。threshold/ˈθreʃ.hoʊld/n.门槛gimbal/ˈɡɪm.bəl/n.万向吊架，恒平框架，常平架框

Move over Labubu. Equine collectibles and keepsakes are capturing the hearts — and wallets — of consumers in the run-up to Chinese New Year.在春节临近之际，马主题收藏品和纪念品正俘获着消费者的心以及钱包。As the spirited horse — a symbol of good fortune and success in the Chinese zodiac — kicks up a wave of cultural creativity matching the magnetic appeal of the ubiquitous Pop Mart dolls, the approaching Year of the Horse is helping many shops do brisk business.随着充满活力的、在中国生肖中象征好运与成功的象征“马”掀起一股与无处不在的泡泡玛特玩偶同样具有磁性吸引力的文化创造浪潮，即将到来的马年正助力众多店铺生意兴隆。The Beijing Gongmei Group's Yuxun Jingxi store is a classic example. "We've noticed that horse-themed items boasting intricate craftsmanship, cultural stories and contextual significance are particularly popular among our customers," said Wang Jingjing, deputy general manager of the group.北京工美集团予寻景西店便是典型案例。该集团副总经理王晶晶表示：“我们注意到，那些工艺精湛、蕴含文化故事且具有时代意义的马主题商品尤其受到顾客青睐。”Cultural products such as a Ru porcelain tea pet in the form of a jade-hued horse bearing a tiny gold ingot, symbolizing "riches in a gallop", have resonated deeply with the store's customers, Wang said, adding that these items "blend ancient craftsmanship with lighthearted contemporary symbolism".王晶晶表示，诸如汝窑瓷器茶宠这类文化产品——其造型为一匹玉色骏马驮着微型金锭，寓意“财富奔腾”——深受店铺顾客喜爱。她补充道，这些作品“将古老工艺与轻松的当代象征意义巧妙融合”。Among other products that are attracting attention are horse-themed incense holders, essential oil diffusers, embroidered brooches and car fragrance. "Our customers want something that's not just beautiful to look at, but is also fun, practical and carries emotional value," she said.其他备受瞩目的产品还包括马主题香炉、精油扩散器、刺绣胸针和车用香氛。王晶晶表示：“我们的顾客想要的不仅是赏心悦目的物品，更要兼具趣味性、实用性与情感价值。”Wang drew a parallel between trendy blind-box toys, like the Labubu, and the enduring pull of zodiac culture. "Our affinity for zodiac symbols is deep-rooted. It may have been embedded in our minds since childhood, waiting to be reawakened. Once triggered, its appeal is more sustainable than the explosive popularity of any pop-up product," she said.王晶晶将拉布布等时髦盲盒玩具与生肖文化的持久魅力相提并论。她说道：“我们对生肖符号的亲近感根深蒂固，或许自幼年时便植根于心，静待唤醒。一旦被触发，其吸引力远比任何流行爆款产品的短暂热潮更为持久。”Ripple effect涟漪效应Factory floors are feeling the ripple effect of the demand for equine souvenirs in the market.工厂车间正感受到市场对马主题纪念品需求带来的连锁反应。At Huizhou Zhengming Science and Technology Co, a manufacturer based in Guangdong province that specializes in customized Tyvek-paper gifts, horse-themed orders have been rolling in since October.位于广东省的惠州正明科技有限公司是一家专业定制“特卫强”纸礼品的制造商，自十月以来，马主题订单源源不断地涌入。"The whole production line is racing against time to fulfill these orders, and we often work overtime — until 9 pm or 10 pm — to ship the orders out," said Niu Panpan, the company's business manager.公司业务经理牛盼盼（音译）表示：“整个生产线都在争分夺秒地完成这些订单，我们经常加班到晚上9点或10点才能把订单发出。”She said the company has recorded a significant year-on-year increase in orders for zodiac animal-themed products, estimating that these account for about half of their current production volume.她表示，该公司生肖主题产品的订单量同比大幅增长，预计目前这类产品约占其总产量的半数。Auspicious equine connotations in Chinese culture, including phrases such as Ma dao cheng gong, or blessing someone with immediate success, and Long ma jing shen, or evoking the tireless vigor of a mythical horse, hold a powerful sway over consumers, Niu said.牛盼盼（音译）指出，马在中华文化中蕴含的吉祥寓意——诸如“马到成功”（祝愿对方即刻成功）和“龙马精神”（唤起神话中骏马永不疲倦的活力）等成语对消费者具有强大的影响力。In Beijing's hutong, local cultural brand Jingweier Times is infusing the zodiac trend with a strong dose of capital-city flair. Their best-selling item is an intricate fu refrigerator magnet. The Chinese character symbolizes good luck and fortune.在北京的胡同里，本土文化品牌“京味儿时代”正将生肖元素与浓郁的首都风情巧妙融合。其最畅销的商品是一款精雕细琢的“福”字冰箱贴——这个汉字象征着吉祥如意。Designed in traditional papercut style, the product incorporates Beijing landmarks, such as the Palace Museum and the Temple of Heaven, as well as courtyard homes, into the strokes of the character.该产品采用传统剪纸风格设计，将故宫、天坛等北京地标建筑与四合院等元素融入汉字笔画之中。"We placed a galloping horse inside the square 'field' that forms part of the 'fortune' character fu," said Shi Dongyue, marketing director of Jingweier Times."This highlights the 'Year of the Horse' theme while carrying the blessing of 'immediate fortune'."“京味儿时代”市场总监石东岳表示：“我们在构成‘福'字的方形‘田'字格中嵌入了一匹奔腾的骏马，既突出了‘马年'主题，又承载着‘福临门'的吉祥寓意。”Shi added that their primary customers are a mix of young Beijing residents and tourists from other parts of China, who are drawn to the historical alleys where the brand's stores are located.石东岳补充道，他们的主要顾客群体由北京本地年轻居民和来自中国其他地区的游客构成，这些顾客被品牌门店所在的历史韵味深厚的胡同所吸引。Wu Liyun, a professor at Beijing International Studies University, said that for young consumers,"zodiac products carry emotional value, fulfilling a sense of both ritual and individuality".北京外国语大学教授吴丽云指出，对年轻消费者而言，“生肖产品承载着情感价值，既满足仪式感又彰显个性”。Powered by a deep cultural current and galloping popularity, it seems the horse will have the stamina to run far beyond a single season.在深厚的文化底蕴和日益高涨的人气推动下，马文化似乎拥有了超越单一季节的持久生命力。Equine/ˈiːkwaɪn/adj.与马相关的zodiac/ˈzəʊdiæk/n.生肖；黄道十二宫

As China heads into the Year of the Horse, consumer demand is being released earlier than usual, propelled by the country's longest Spring Festival holiday on record and a coordinated policy push aimed at turning seasonal spending into sustained economic momentum.随着中国迎来马年，消费需求释放时间较往年提前。这得益于创纪录的长春节假期，以及旨在将季节性消费转化为持续经济动能的协同政策推动。The 2026 Spring Festival holiday will run from Feb 15 to 23, spanning nine consecutive days. The extended break—longer than in previous years—is not only reshaping travel and spending plans, but also amplifying the effects of policies designed to unlock consumption potential, particularly in services, travel and experience-driven spending.2026年春节假期将从2月15日持续至23日，共计九天连休。较往年更长的假期不仅重塑了出行与消费计划，更放大了解锁消费潜力的政策效应，尤其在服务、旅游及体验型消费领域。From bustling shopping streets in Beijing to small factories in Zhejiang's Yiwu operating extra production lines, and from reunion dinners booked weeks ahead of Chinese New Year's Eve to a sharp rise in two-way travel, signs of renewed consumption activity are emerging well before the holiday officially begins.从北京熙熙攘攘的商业街，到浙江义乌加开生产线的中小工厂；从数周前就预订好的除夕团圆饭，到双向出行量的显著增长——在春节正式到来之前，消费活动复苏的迹象已然显现。On Beijing's Wangfujing pedestrian street, winter temperatures have done little to slow foot traffic. Flagship stores are drawing a steady stream of overseas visitors, many taking advantage of expanded visa-free access and increasingly seamless digital payment options.北京王府井步行街上，寒冬的低温并未减缓人流脚步。旗舰店吸引着络绎不绝的海外游客，许多人正享受着扩大免签政策带来的便利，以及日益便捷的数字支付方式。Daniel Chan, a tourist from Los Angeles, stepped out of an electronics store with a newly purchased DJI Osmo Nano camera.来自洛杉矶的游客陈丹尼尔（音译）从一家电子产品商店走出，手里拿着刚买到的DJI Osmo Nano相机。"I've wanted this model for months. It's almost impossible to find stock back home, yet here it was available, and the price was very friendly,"Chan said. "It's not just a souvenir—it's cutting-edge technology."陈丹尼尔（音译）说道：“我渴望拥有这款相机已有数月之久。在美国几乎找不到现货，而这里不仅有货，价格还非常实惠。这不仅是件纪念品，更是尖端科技的结晶。”He said he had already started using the camera on the day of purchase. "I haven't explored all its functions yet, but the magnetic design and image quality are quite good," he added.他表示购买当天就已开始使用这台相机。他补充道：“虽然还没完全摸清所有功能，但磁吸设计和成像质量都相当不错。”What impressed him most during his China trip, Chan said, was the speed and convenience of food delivery services. "It's incredibly fast and efficient—almost unbelievable," he said. Dining in restaurants was equally striking, with some offering dish countdown timers and guaranteed serving speeds. "I've hardly ever experienced service like this in the United States."陈丹尼尔（音译）表示，此次中国之行最令他印象深刻的是外卖服务的快捷便利。他说：“速度快得惊人，效率极高——简直难以置信。”餐厅用餐体验同样令人震撼，部分餐厅设有菜品倒计时器并承诺上菜速度。“在美国几乎从未体验过如此服务。”Such experiences are precisely what policymakers hope to encourage.此类经历正是政策制定者希望鼓励的。The "Shopping in China" campaign, first launched in April 2025, aims to create a more internationally friendly consumption ecosystem while stimulating domestic demand through higher-quality supply.“中国购物”活动于2025年4月首次启动，旨在打造更具国际友善度的消费生态系统，同时通过更高品质的供给来刺激国内需求。At the launch of the 2026 "Shopping in China" and New Year Consumption Season in Shanghai on Jan 3, Commerce Minister Wang Wentao said the initiative would focus on goods consumption, services consumption and the development of new consumption scenarios. A series of nationwide events, including apremium consumption month and an international consumption season, will be rolled out, alongside locally tailored programs in 15 pilot cities.1月3日，2026“中国购物季”暨新年消费季在上海启动。商务部部长王文涛表示，本次活动将聚焦商品消费、服务消费及新型消费场景发展。全国将推出高端消费月、国际消费季等系列活动，同时15个试点城市将推出本土化特色项目。With the nine-day Spring Festival approaching, Wang said the Ministry of Commerce, together with other central departments and local governments, will host a "happy shopping for the Spring Festival" campaign as a flagship component of the "Shopping in China" series. The campaign will span food, accommodation, transport, travel, shopping and entertainment, aiming to create an inclusive, festive consumption experience for families at home and travelers on the move.随着为期九天的春节临近，王文涛表示商务部将联合中央各部门和地方政府，推出“欢乐春节·购物中国”系列活动的旗舰项目“欢乐春节·购物中国”。活动将覆盖餐饮、住宿、交通、旅游、购物、娱乐等领域，旨在为居家过节的家庭和外出游玩的旅客创造包容、喜庆的消费体验。More than 1,200 kilometers south of Beijing, Yiwu—the world's largest small-commodities hub—offers a ground-level view of how festive demand is being converted into real orders.距离北京以南1200多公里处，全球最大的小商品集散中心义乌正展现着节日需求如何转化为实际订单的生动图景。In the plush toy section of Yiwu International Trade Market, one horse-themed product has become an unexpected viral hit. Originally launched in mid-October under the name "Mashang Youqian", meaning "immediate prosperity", the toy initially sold about 400 units a day—steady but far from a bestseller.在义乌国际商贸城毛绒玩具区，一款以马为主题的产品意外走红。这款名为“马上有钱”的玩具于十月中旬上市，最初日销量约400件——虽保持稳定但远非畅销品。Its breakout moment came in January, after a minor production-line error resulted in the toy's mouth being stitched incorrectly, giving it a seemingly "tearful" expression. Buyers who received the flawed version posted photos and chat records online while requesting exchanges. The images struck a chord with netizens, who found humor and resonance in the toy's "wronged" look, quickly propelling it to the top of social media trending lists.这款玩具的爆红时刻出现在今年1月，当时因生产线的小失误导致玩具嘴巴缝制错误，呈现出仿佛“泪眼汪汪”的表情。收到瑕疵品的买家纷纷在网上晒出照片和聊天记录要求换货。这些照片意外引发网友共鸣，大家在玩具“委屈”的表情中发现了幽默感，迅速将其推上了社交媒体热搜榜首。Dubbed the "crying horse", the toy was soon labeled the first cultural "dark horse" of the New Year. As demand surged, the factory expanded production lines from two to more than a dozen, lifting daily output to around 15,000 units. The merchant has since applied for a design patent.这款被称为“哭哭马”的玩具，很快被冠以新年首个文化“黑马”的称号。随着需求激增，工厂将生产线从两条扩充至十余条，日产量提升至约1.5万只。该商家已就此申请了外观设计专利。Behind the viral moment, the success mirrors quality and Yiwu merchants' deeply ingrained ability to respond quickly to market signals, from identifying trends to making swift decisions and scaling production with minimal delay.这场病毒式传播的背后，其成功既彰显了商品品质，更折射出义乌商人深植于骨髓的敏锐市场触觉。从洞察趋势到果断决策，再到以最小延迟实现规模化生产，他们总能迅速响应市场信号。Across the toy sector, creative interpretations of the Year of the Horse are proliferating. Products range from zodiac photo frames to blind boxes and decorative figurines.玩具行业正涌现出大量以马年为主题的创意设计，产品涵盖生肖相框、盲盒以及装饰摆件等。Some bestselling items now sell between 40,000 and 60,000 units a day. For popular designs, factories are producing between 50,000 and 100,000 units daily. To maintain speed and creativity, some merchants require their design teams to develop as many as five new styles each day.部分畅销商品目前日销量在4万至6万件之间。对于热门款式，工厂日产量可达5万至10万件。为保持生产速度和设计创新力，部分商家要求设计团队每日开发多达五款新产品。Merchants say interest from foreign buyers has risen, particularly after Spring Festival was added to UNESCO's Representative List of theIntangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity in December 2024.商户表示，外国买家的兴趣有所提升，尤其是在2024年12月春节被列入联合国教科文组织人类非物质文化遗产代表作名录之后。Consumption momentum is also visible in the catering sector, where Chinese New Year's Eve reunion dinners—a core element of Spring Festival culture—are being booked out well in advance.餐饮业的消费势头同样明显，作为春节文化核心元素的除夕团圆饭，早已被提前预订一空。In Beijing, several restaurant chains report that all private rooms across multiple branches are already fully booked, with only limited lunchtime slots remaining. Prices largely match regular menus, though advance reservations and deposits are typically required.在北京，多家连锁餐厅表示其旗下各分店的包间已全部订满，仅剩少量午间时段可预约。价格基本与常规菜单持平，但通常需要提前预约并支付定金。To cope with demand, many restaurants have introducedstaggered dining slots on Chinese New Year's Eve, offering discounts for later sittings. Others have expanded takeaway services, allowing families to enjoy freshly prepared reunion meals at home.为应对需求，许多餐厅在除夕夜推出了错峰用餐时段，晚间时段还提供折扣优惠。另有餐厅扩大了外卖服务范围，让家庭能在家中享用现做的团圆饭。One restaurant in Beijing's Guomao area has launched two takeaway packages priced at 1,988 yuan ($286) for eight to 10 people and 999 yuan for four to six people, with free delivery within the city's Fifth Ring Road. Customers can also order a la carte, providing greater flexibility.北京国贸区某餐厅推出两款外卖套餐：8-10人份售价1988元（约合286美元），4-6人份售价999元，市内五环路内免费配送。顾客也可单点菜品，提供更灵活的选择。An emerging trend is the shift toward county towns and rural venues. In Yinjiang town of Ningbo, Zhejiang province, a countryside resort that opened reservations three months ago, has already sold out large private rooms for the first two days of the holiday, attracting families traveling from neighboring Shanghai, and Jiangsu province.新兴趋势向县城和乡村场所转移。在浙江省宁波市鄞江镇，一家三个月前开放预订的乡村度假村，其大型包间在假期前两天的预订已全部售罄，吸引了来自邻近上海和江苏的家庭游客。Traditional restaurant brands are also moving into rural markets. Managers say demand for reunion dinners and banquets in these areas remains strong, while the supply of mid—to high-end dining options is relatively limited—creating new opportunities for expansion.传统餐饮品牌也正进军农村市场。经营者表示，这些地区对团圆饭和宴会的需求依然旺盛，而中高端餐饮选择的供应相对有限，这为扩张创造了新机遇。The nine-day break is also reshaping travel patterns, triggering a surge in both outbound and inbound tourism.为期九天的假期也在重塑旅游模式，引发出境游和入境游的双双激增。Major travel platforms report that Spring Festival bookings for 2026 have surpassed last year's levels across the board. According to data from Flight Master, as of Jan 16, bookings for domestic flights during the holiday exceeded 4.13 million, up about 21 percent year-on-year. Outbound and inbound flight bookings both climbed to around 700,000.主要旅游平台数据显示，2026年春节期间的预订量全面超越去年同期水平。据飞航大师平台统计，截至1月16日，春节期间国内航班预订量已突破413万次，同比增长约21%。出境及入境航班预订量均攀升至约70万次。Airbnb data show searches by Chinese travelers for overseas accommodation around the Spring Festival period have roughly doubled year-on-year. Many travelers are choosing to stagger trips before or after the official holiday to secure better prices and less crowded itineraries.爱彼迎（Airbnb）数据显示，春节期间中国游客搜索海外住宿的数量同比翻了一番。许多游客选择在法定假期前后错峰出行，以获得更优惠的价格和更宽松的行程安排。Travel agencies are embedding New Year elements into overseas tour products, allowing travelers to retain a sense of festivity even while abroad.旅行社正将新年元素融入海外旅游产品，让游客即使身处异国也能保持节日氛围。Li Mengran, marketing manager of Beijing-based travel agency Utour, said the company has continued its long-standing practices in European tour products. These include customized reunion dinners and dumpling-making activities, alongside wine tastings and interactive prize draws.北京众信旅游集团媒介公关经理李梦然表示，公司在欧洲旅游产品中延续了多年来的传统项目，包括定制团圆晚宴和包饺子活动，同时安排品酒会和互动抽奖环节。"For family travelers, we also prepare red-envelope gifts for children under 16 to enhance the sense of ritual and warmth during the journey,"Li said.李梦然表示：“针对家庭游客，我们还为16岁以下儿童准备了红包礼物，以增强旅途中的仪式感与温馨氛围。”Domestically, culturally rich "intangible heritage towns" are emerging as popular destinations. Data from Qunar show that cities such as Huangshan in Anhui, Jingdezhen in Jiangxi, Quanzhou in Fujian, Foshan in Guangdong and Zigong in Sichuan—all offering immersive intangible cultural heritage experiences—have seen particularly strong hotel booking growth during the winter holiday and Spring Festival period.在国内，文化底蕴深厚的“非物质文化遗产小镇”正成为热门旅游目的地。去哪儿网数据显示，安徽黄山、江西景德镇、福建泉州、广东佛山、四川自贡等提供沉浸式非物质文化遗产体验的城市，在寒假和春节期间酒店预订量增长尤为显著。Inbound tourism is also gaining momentum.入境旅游业也正蓬勃发展。Qunar data show that bookings for domestic flights made using non-Chinese passports during the Spring Festival holiday are up more than 20 percent year-on-year, underscoring the holiday's growing role as a window for international visitors to experience Chinese culture.去哪儿网数据显示，春节期间持非中国护照预订的国内航班量同比增长逾20%，凸显出春节作为国际游客体验中华文化的窗口正发挥着日益重要的作用。This rebound reflects sustained policy support. By the first three quarters of 2025, visa-free inbound visits reached 20.89 million, up more than 50 percent year-on-year. Since the introduction of the 240-hour transit visa-free policy, inbound arrivals across ports have risen 27.2 percent.这一回升态势反映出政策支持的持续性。截至2025年前三季度，免签入境人次达2089万，同比增长逾50%。自实施240小时过境免签政策以来，各口岸入境人次增长27.2%。The World Travel & Tourism Council forecasts that China's tourism sector will grow at an average annual rate of 7 percent over the next decade, with the country on track to become the world's largest tourism market by 2031, surpassing the United States.世界旅游业理事会预测，未来十年中国旅游业将保持年均7%的增长率，预计到2031年将超越美国，成为全球最大的旅游市场。Economists say the early consumption surge reflects the combined effects of policy support, longer holidays and evolving consumer preferences.经济学家表示，消费的早期激增反映了政策支持、假期延长以及消费者偏好变化的综合影响。The Central Economic Work Conference held in December placed expanding domestic demand as the top priority of China's economic policy in 2026, with multiple consumption-supporting policies already rolled out or in the pipeline.去年12月召开的中央经济工作会议将扩大内需确立为2026年中国经济政策的重中之重，多项支持消费的政策已陆续出台或正在酝酿中。Su Jian, a professor at Peking University's School of Economics, said consumption growth has been most visible in services and fast-evolving consumer electronics, including tourism, cultural products, sports and entertainment. Rapid upgrade cycles, he added, continue to support demand for electronics.北京大学经济学院教授苏剑表示，消费增长在服务业和快速发展的消费电子产品领域最为显著，包括旅游、文化产品、体育和娱乐等。他补充道，快速的升级周期持续支撑着电子产品需求。Since last year, targeted consumption-boosting campaigns have delivered tangible results. In 2025, trade-in-related sales exceeded 2.6 trillion yuan, benefiting more than 360 million consumer transactions. Optimized trade-in programs introduced in 2026 are now translating into concrete market activity across regions.自去年以来，定向消费提振举措成效显著。2025年，以旧换新相关销售额突破2.6万亿元，惠及逾3.6亿笔消费交易。2026年推出的优化换购方案，正逐步转化为各地市场的实际行动。International observers have also noted structural changes underway. In its latest flagship annual report, global consultancy Roland Berger said China has entered the "consumption 4.0" era, characterized by resilience.国际观察人士也注意到正在发生的结构性变化。全球咨询公司罗兰贝格企业管理有限公司在其最新旗舰年度报告中指出，中国已进入以韧性为特征的“消费4.0”时代。China's consumption structure is shifting rapidly from survival-oriented spending toward development—and experience-oriented demand, the report noted. By elevating domestic demand expansion to a strategic priority, and encouraging a move from quantitative satisfaction to qualitative enrichment, policymakers are using consumption upgrading to drive supply-side innovation and support high-quality growth.报告指出，中国消费结构正从生存型消费向发展型消费、从物质型需求向体验型需求快速转变。通过将扩大内需提升为战略重点，引导消费从数量满足转向质量提升，决策者正以消费升级为引擎，推动供给侧创新，助力高质量发展。Boosting consumption, policymakers emphasize, is not a short-term fix, but a long-term strategy.政策制定者强调，提振消费并非短期对策，而是长远之策。A State Council executive meeting held on Jan 16 reviewed progress in the consumption-boosting campaign and outlined further steps to cultivate new growth points in service consumption.2026年1月16日召开的国务院常务会议审议了提振消费行动的进展情况，并规划了培育服务消费新增长点的后续措施。The meeting called for improving long-term mechanisms for promoting consumption, raising urban and rural household incomes, implementing the paid leave system and removing unreasonable restrictive measures for consumption.会议要求完善促进消费的长效机制，提高城乡居民收入水平，落实带薪休假制度，取消限制消费的不合理措施。premium consumption/ˈpriː.mi.əm/高端消费staggered dining slots错峰用餐时段intangible/ɪnˈtæn.dʒə.bəl/adj.非物质的

Last time we spoke about the climax of the battle of Lake Khasan. In August, the Lake Khasan region became a tense theater of combat as Soviet and Japanese forces clashed around Changkufeng and Hill 52. The Soviets pushed a multi-front offensive, bolstered by artillery, tanks, and air power, yet the Japanese defenders held firm, aided by engineers, machine guns, and heavy guns. By the ninth and tenth, a stubborn Japanese resilience kept Hill 52 and Changkufeng in Japanese hands, though the price was steep and the field was littered with the costs of battle. Diplomatically, both sides aimed to confine the fighting and avoid a larger war. Negotiations trudged on, culminating in a tentative cease-fire draft for August eleventh: a halt to hostilities, positions to be held as of midnight on the tenth, and the creation of a border-demarcation commission. Moscow pressed for a neutral umpire; Tokyo resisted, accepting a Japanese participant but rejecting a neutral referee. The cease-fire was imperfect, with miscommunications and differing interpretations persisting.    #185 Operation Hainan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After what seemed like a lifetime over in the northern border between the USSR and Japan, today we are returning to the Second Sino-Japanese War. Now I thought it might be a bit jarring to dive into it, so let me do a brief summary of where we are at, in the year of 1939. As the calendar turned to 1939, the Second Sino-Japanese War, which had erupted in July 1937 with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and escalated into full-scale conflict, had evolved into a protracted quagmire for the Empire of Japan. What began as a swift campaign to subjugate the Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek had, by the close of 1938, transformed into a war of attrition. Japanese forces, under the command of generals like Shunroku Hata and Yasuji Okamura, had achieved stunning territorial gains: the fall of Shanghai in November 1937 after a brutal three-month battle that cost over 200,000 Chinese lives; the infamous capture of Nanjing in December 1937, marked by the Nanjing Massacre where an estimated 300,000 civilians and disarmed soldiers were killed in a six-week orgy of violence; and the sequential occupations of Xuzhou in May 1938, Wuhan in October 1938, and Guangzhou that same month.  These victories secured Japan's control over China's eastern seaboard, major riverine arteries like the Yangtze, and key industrial centers, effectively stripping the Nationalists of much of their economic base. Yet, despite these advances, China refused to capitulate. Chiang's government had retreated inland to the mountainous stronghold of Chongqing in Sichuan province, where it regrouped amid the fog-laden gorges, drawing on the vast human reserves of China's interior and the resilient spirit of its people. By late 1938, Japanese casualties had mounted to approximately 50,000 killed and 200,000 wounded annually, straining the Imperial Japanese Army's resources and exposing the vulnerabilities of overextended supply lines deep into hostile territory. In Tokyo, the corridors of the Imperial General Headquarters and the Army Ministry buzzed with urgent deliberations during the winter of 1938-1939. The initial doctrine of "quick victory" through decisive battles, epitomized by the massive offensives of 1937 and 1938, had proven illusory. Japan's military planners, influenced by the Kwantung Army's experiences in Manchuria and the ongoing stalemate, recognized that China's sheer size, with its 4 million square miles and over 400 million inhabitants, rendered total conquest unfeasible without unacceptable costs. Intelligence reports highlighted the persistence of Chinese guerrilla warfare, particularly in the north where Communist forces under Mao Zedong's Eighth Route Army conducted hit-and-run operations from bases in Shanxi and Shaanxi, sabotaging railways and ambushing convoys. The Japanese response included brutal pacification campaigns, such as the early iterations of what would later formalize as the "Three Alls Policy" (kill all, burn all, loot all), aimed at devastating rural economies and isolating resistance pockets. But these measures only fueled further defiance. By early 1939, a strategic pivot was formalized: away from direct annihilation of Chinese armies toward a policy of economic strangulation. This "blockade and interdiction" approach sought to sever China's lifelines to external aid, choking off the flow of weapons, fuel, and materiel that sustained the Nationalist war effort. As one Japanese staff officer noted in internal memos, the goal was to "starve the dragon in its lair," acknowledging the limits of Japanese manpower, total forces in China numbered around 1 million by 1939, against China's inexhaustible reserves. Central to this new strategy were the three primary overland supply corridors that had emerged as China's backdoors to the world, compensating for the Japanese naval blockade that had sealed off most coastal ports since late 1937. The first and most iconic was the Burma Road, a 717-mile engineering marvel hastily constructed between 1937 and 1938 by over 200,000 Chinese and Burmese laborers under the direction of engineers like Chih-Ping Chen. Stretching from the railhead at Lashio in British Burma (modern Myanmar) through treacherous mountain passes and dense jungles to Kunming in Yunnan province, the road navigated elevations up to 7,000 feet with hundreds of hairpin turns and precarious bridges. By early 1939, it was operational, albeit plagued by monsoonal mudslides, banditry, and mechanical breakdowns of the imported trucks, many Ford and Chevrolet models supplied via British Rangoon. Despite these challenges, it funneled an increasing volume of aid: in 1939 alone, estimates suggest up to 10,000 tons per month of munitions, gasoline, and aircraft parts from Allied sources, including early Lend-Lease precursors from the United States. The road's completion in 1938 had been a direct response to the loss of southern ports, and its vulnerability to aerial interdiction made it a prime target in Japanese planning documents. The second lifeline was the Indochina route, centered on the French-built Yunnan-Vietnam Railway (also known as the Hanoi-Kunming Railway), a 465-mile narrow-gauge line completed in 1910 that linked the port of Haiphong in French Indochina to Kunming via Hanoi and Lao Cai. This colonial artery, supplemented by parallel roads and river transport along the Red River, became China's most efficient supply conduit in 1938-1939, exploiting France's uneasy neutrality. French authorities, under Governor-General Pierre Pasquier and later Georges Catroux, turned a blind eye to transshipments, allowing an average of 15,000 to 20,000 tons monthly in early 1939, far surpassing the Burma Road's initial capacity. Cargoes included Soviet arms rerouted via Vladivostok and American oil, with French complicity driven by anti-Japanese sentiment and profitable tolls. However, Japanese reconnaissance flights from bases in Guangdong noted the vulnerability of bridges and rail yards, leading to initial bombing raids by mid-1939. Diplomatic pressure mounted, with Tokyo issuing protests to Paris, foreshadowing the 1940 closure under Vichy France after the fall of France in Europe. The route's proximity to the South China Sea made it a focal point for Japanese naval strategists, who viewed it as a "leak in the blockade." The third corridor, often overlooked but critical, was the Northwest Highway through Soviet Central Asia and Xinjiang province. This overland network, upgraded between 1937 and 1941 with Soviet assistance, connected the Turkestan-Siberian Railway at Almaty (then Alma-Ata) to Lanzhou in Gansu via Urumqi, utilizing a mix of trucks, camel caravans, and rudimentary roads across the Gobi Desert and Tian Shan mountains. Under the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1937 and subsequent aid agreements, Moscow supplied China with over 900 aircraft, 82 tanks, 1,300 artillery pieces, and vast quantities of ammunition and fuel between 1937 and 1941—much of it traversing this route. In 1938-1939, volumes peaked, with Soviet pilots and advisors even establishing air bases in Lanzhou. The highway's construction involved tens of thousands of Chinese laborers, facing harsh winters and logistical hurdles, but it delivered up to 2,000 tons monthly, including entire fighter squadrons like the Polikarpov I-16. Japanese intelligence, aware of this "Red lifeline," planned disruptions but were constrained by the ongoing Nomonhan Incident on the Manchurian-Soviet border in 1939, which diverted resources and highlighted the risks of provoking Moscow. These routes collectively sustained China's resistance, prompting Japan's high command to prioritize their severance. In March 1939, the South China Area Army was established under General Rikichi Andō (later succeeded by Field Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi), headquartered in Guangzhou, with explicit orders to disrupt southern communications. Aerial campaigns intensified, with Mitsubishi G3M "Nell" bombers from Wuhan and Guangzhou targeting Kunming's airfields and the Red River bridges, while diplomatic maneuvers pressured colonial powers: Britain faced demands during the June 1939 Tientsin Crisis to close the Burma Road, and France received ultimatums that culminated in the 1940 occupation of northern Indochina. Yet, direct assaults on Yunnan or Guangxi were deemed too arduous due to rugged terrain and disease risks. Instead, planners eyed peripheral objectives to encircle these arteries. This strategic calculus set the stage for the invasion of Hainan Island, a 13,000-square-mile landmass off Guangdong's southern coast, rich in iron and copper but strategically priceless for its position astride the Indochina route and proximity to Hong Kong. By February 1939, Japanese admirals like Nobutake Kondō of the 5th Fleet advocated seizure to establish air and naval bases, plugging blockade gaps and enabling raids on Haiphong and Kunming, a prelude to broader southern expansion that would echo into the Pacific War. Now after the fall campaign around Canton in autumn 1938, the Japanese 21st Army found itself embedded in a relentless effort to sever the enemy's lifelines. Its primary objective shifted from mere battlefield engagements to tightening the choke points of enemy supply, especially along the Canton–Hankou railway. Recognizing that war materiel continued to flow into the enemy's hands, the Imperial General Headquarters ordered the 21st Army to strike at every other supply route, one by one, until the arteries of logistics were stifled. The 21st Army undertook a series of decisive occupations to disrupt transport and provisioning from multiple directions. To sustain these difficult campaigns, Imperial General Headquarters reinforced the south China command, enabling greater operational depth and endurance. The 21st Army benefited from a series of reinforcements during 1939, which allowed a reorganization of assignments and missions: In late January, the Iida Detachment was reorganized into the Formosa Mixed Brigade and took part in the invasion of Hainan Island.  Hainan, just 15 miles across the Qiongzhou Strait from the mainland, represented a critical "loophole": it lay astride the Gulf of Tonkin, enabling smuggling of arms and materiel from Haiphong to Kunming, and offered potential airfields for bombing raids deep into Yunnan. Japanese interest in Hainan dated to the 1920s, driven by the Taiwan Governor-General's Office, which eyed the island's tropical resources (rubber, iron, copper) and naval potential at ports like Sanya (Samah). Prewar surveys by Japanese firms, such as those documented in Ide Kiwata's Minami Shina no Sangyō to Keizai (1939), highlighted mineral wealth and strategic harbors. The fall of Guangzhou in October 1938 provided the perfect launchpad, but direct invasion was delayed until early 1939 amid debates between the IJA (favoring mainland advances) and IJN (prioritizing naval encirclement). The operation would also heavily align with broader "southward advance" (Nanshin-ron) doctrine foreshadowing invasions of French Indochina (1940) and the Pacific War. On the Chinese side, Hainan was lightly defended as part of Guangdong's "peace preservation" under General Yu Hanmou. Two security regiments, six guard battalions, and a self-defense corps, totaling around 7,000–10,000 poorly equipped troops guarded the island, supplemented by roughly 300 Communist guerrillas under Feng Baiju, who operated independently in the interior. The indigenous Li (Hlai) people in the mountainous south, alienated by Nationalist taxes, provided uneven support but later allied with Communists. The Imperial General Headquarters ordered the 21st Army, in cooperation with the Navy, to occupy and hold strategic points on the island near Haikou-Shih. The 21st Army commander assigned the Formosa Mixed Brigade to carry out this mission. Planning began in late 1938 under the IJN's Fifth Fleet, with IJA support from the 21st Army. The objective: secure northern and southern landing sites to bisect the island, establish air/naval bases, and exploit resources. Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondō, commanding the fleet, emphasized surprise and air superiority. The invasion began under the cover of darkness on February 9, 1939, when Kondō's convoy entered Tsinghai Bay on the northern shore of Hainan and anchored at midnight. Japanese troops swiftly disembarked, encountering minimal initial resistance from the surprised Chinese defenders, and secured a beachhead in the northern zone. At 0300 hours on 10 February, the Formosa Mixed Brigade, operating in close cooperation with naval units, executed a surprise landing at the northeastern point of Tengmai Bay in north Hainan. By 04:30, the right flank reached the main road leading to Fengyingshih, while the left flank reached a position two kilometers south of Tienwei. By 07:00, the right flank unit had overcome light enemy resistance near Yehli and occupied Chiungshan. At that moment there were approximately 1,000 elements of the enemy's 5th Infantry Brigade (militia) at Chiungshan; about half of these troops were destroyed, and the remainder fled into the hills south of Tengmai in a state of disarray. Around 08:30 that same day, the left flank unit advanced to the vicinity of Shuchang and seized Hsiuying Heights. By 12:00, it occupied Haikou, the island's northern port city and administrative center, beginning around noon. Army and navy forces coordinated to mop up remaining pockets of resistance in the northern areas, overwhelming the scattered Chinese security units through superior firepower and organization. No large-scale battles are recorded in primary accounts; instead, the engagements were characterized by rapid advances and localized skirmishes, as the Chinese forces, lacking heavy artillery or air support, could not mount a sustained defense. By the end of the day, Japanese control over the north was consolidating, with Haikou falling under their occupation.Also on 10 February, the Brigade pushed forward to seize Cingang. Wenchang would be taken on the 22nd, followed by Chinglan Port on the 23rd. On February 11, the operation expanded southward when land combat units amphibiously assaulted Samah (now Sanya) at the island's southern tip. This landing allowed them to quickly seize key positions, including the port of Yulin (Yulinkang) and the town of Yai-Hsien (Yaxian, now part of Sanya). With these southern footholds secured, Japanese forces fanned out to subjugate the rest of the island, capturing inland areas and infrastructure with little organized opposition. Meanwhile, the landing party of the South China Navy Expeditionary Force, which had joined with the Army to secure Haikou, began landing on the island's southern shore at dawn on 14 February. They operated under the protection of naval and air units. By the same morning, the landing force had advanced to Sa-Riya and, by 12:00 hours, had captured Yulin Port. Chinese casualties were significant in the brief fighting; from January to May 1939, reports indicate the 11th security regiment alone suffered 8 officers and 162 soldiers killed, 3 officers and 16 wounded, and 5 officers and 68 missing, though figures for other units are unclear. Japanese losses were not publicly detailed but appear to have been light.  When crisis pressed upon them, Nationalist forces withdrew from coastal Haikou, shepherding the last civilians toward the sheltering embrace of the Wuzhi mountain range that bands the central spine of Hainan. From that high ground they sought to endure the storm, praying that the rugged hills might shield their families from the reach of war. Yet the Li country's mountains did not deliver a sanctuary free of conflict. Later in August of 1943, an uprising erupted among the Li,Wang Guoxing, a figure of local authority and stubborn resolve. His rebellion was swiftly crushed; in reprisal, the Nationalists executed a seizure of vengeance that extended far beyond the moment of defeat, claiming seven thousand members of Wang Guoxing's kin in his village. The episode was grim testimony to the brutal calculus of war, where retaliation and fear indelibly etched the landscape of family histories. Against this backdrop, the Communists under Feng Baiju and the native Li communities forged a vigorous guerrilla war against the occupiers. The struggle was not confined to partisan skirmishes alone; it unfolded as a broader contest of survival and resistance. The Japanese response was relentless and punitive, and it fell upon Li communities in western Hainan with particular ferocity, Sanya and Danzhou bore the brunt of violence, as did the many foreign laborers conscripted into service by the occupying power. The toll of these reprisals was stark: among hundreds of thousands of slave laborers pressed into service, tens of thousands perished. Of the 100,000 laborers drawn from Hong Kong, only about 20,000 survived the war's trials, a haunting reminder of the human cost embedded in the occupation. Strategically, the island of Hainan took on a new if coercive purpose. Portions of the island were designated as a naval administrative district, with the Hainan Guard District Headquarters established at Samah, signaling its role as a forward air base and as an operational flank for broader anti-Chiang Kai-shek efforts. In parallel, the island's rich iron and copper resources were exploited to sustain the war economy of the occupiers. The control of certain areas on Hainan provided a base of operations for incursions into Guangdong and French Indochina, while the airbases that dotted the island enabled long-range air raids that threaded routes from French Indochina and Burma into the heart of China. The island thus assumed a grim dual character: a frontier fortress for the occupiers and a ground for the prolonged suffering of its inhabitants. Hainan then served as a launchpad for later incursions into Guangdong and Indochina. Meanwhile after Wuhan's collapse, the Nationalist government's frontline strength remained formidable, even as attrition gnawed at its edges. By the winter of 1938–1939, the front line had swelled to 261 divisions of infantry and cavalry, complemented by 50 independent brigades. Yet the political and military fissures within the Kuomintang suggested fragility beneath the apparent depth of manpower. The most conspicuous rupture came with Wang Jingwei's defection, the vice president and chairman of the National Political Council, who fled to Hanoi on December 18, 1938, leading a procession of more than ten other KMT officials, including Chen Gongbo, Zhou Fohai, Chu Minqi, and Zeng Zhongming. In the harsh arithmetic of war, defections could not erase the country's common resolve to resist Japanese aggression, and the anti-Japanese national united front still served as a powerful instrument, rallying the Chinese populace to "face the national crisis together." Amid this political drama, Japan's strategy moved into a phase that sought to convert battlefield endurance into political consolidation. As early as January 11, 1938, Tokyo had convened an Imperial Conference and issued a framework for handling the China Incident that would shape the theater for years. The "Outline of Army Operations Guidance" and "Continental Order No. 241" designated the occupied territories as strategic assets to be held with minimal expansion beyond essential needs. The instruction mapped an operational zone that compressed action to a corridor between Anqing, Xinyang, Yuezhou, and Nanchang, while the broader line of occupation east of a line tracing West Sunit, Baotou, and the major river basins would be treated as pacified space. This was a doctrine of attrition, patience, and selective pressure—enough to hold ground, deny resources to the Chinese, and await a more opportune political rupture. Yet even as Japan sought political attrition, the war's tactical center of gravity drifted toward consolidation around Wuhan and the pathways that fed the Yangtze. In October 1938, after reducing Wuhan to a fortressed crescent of contested ground, the Japanese General Headquarters acknowledged the imperative to adapt to a protracted war. The new calculus prioritized political strategy alongside military operations: "We should attach importance to the offensive of political strategy, cultivate and strengthen the new regime, and make the National Government decline, which will be effective." If the National Government trembled under coercive pressure, it risked collapse, and if not immediately, then gradually through a staged series of operations. In practice, this meant reinforcing a centralized center while allowing peripheral fronts to be leveraged against Chongqing's grip on the war's moral economy. In the immediate post-Wuhan period, Japan divided its responsibilities and aimed at a standoff that would enable future offensives. The 11th Army Group, stationed in the Wuhan theater, became the spearhead of field attacks on China's interior, occupying a strategic triangle that included Hunan, Jiangxi, and Guangxi, and protecting the rear of southwest China's line of defense. The central objective was not merely to seize territory, but to deny Chinese forces the capacity to maneuver along the critical rail and river corridors that fed the Nanjing–Jiujiang line and the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway. Central to this plan was Wuhan's security and the ability to constrain Jiujiang's access to the Yangtze, preserving a corridor for air power and logistics. The pre-war arrangement in early 1939 was a tableau of layered defenses and multiple war zones, designed to anticipate and blunt Japanese maneuver. By February 1939, the Ninth War Zone under Xue Yue stood in a tense standoff with the Japanese 11th Army along the Jiangxi and Hubei front south of the Yangtze. The Ninth War Zone's order of battle, Luo Zhuoying's 19th Army Group defending the northern Nanchang front, Wang Lingji's 30th Army Group near Wuning, Fan Songfu's 8th and 73rd Armies along Henglu, Tang Enbo's 31st Army Group guarding southern Hubei and northern Hunan, and Lu Han's 1st Army Group in reserve near Changsha and Liuyang, was a carefully calibrated attempt to absorb, delay, and disrupt any Xiushui major Japanese thrust toward Nanchang, a city whose strategic significance stretched beyond its own bounds. In the spring of 1939, Nanchang was the one city in southern China that Tokyo could not leave in Chinese hands. It was not simply another provincial capital; it was the beating heart of whatever remained of China's war effort south of the Yangtze, and the Japanese knew it. High above the Gan River, on the flat plains west of Poyang Lake, lay three of the finest airfields China had ever built: Qingyunpu, Daxiaochang, and Xiangtang. Constructed only a few years earlier with Soviet engineers and American loans, they were long, hard-surfaced, and ringed with hangars and fuel dumps. Here the Chinese Air Force had pulled back after the fall of Wuhan, and here the red-starred fighters and bombers of the Soviet volunteer groups still flew. From Nanchang's runways a determined pilot could reach Japanese-held Wuhan in twenty minutes, Guangzhou in less than an hour, and even strike the docks at Hong Kong if he pushed his range. Every week Japanese reconnaissance planes returned with photographs of fresh craters patched, new aircraft parked wing-to-wing, and Soviet pilots sunning themselves beside their I-16s. As long as those fields remained Chinese, Japan could never claim the sky. The city was more than airfields. It sat exactly where the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway met the line running north to Jiujiang and the Yangtze, a knot that tied together three provinces. Barges crowded Poyang Lake's western shore, unloading crates of Soviet ammunition and aviation fuel that had come up the river from the Indochina railway. Warehouses along the tracks bulged with shells and rice. To the Japanese staff officers plotting in Wuhan and Guangzhou, Nanchang looked less like a city and more like a loaded spring: if Chiang Kai-shek ever found the strength for a counteroffensive to retake the middle Yangtze, this would be the place from which it would leap. And so, in the cold March of 1939, the Imperial General Headquarters marked Nanchang in red on every map and gave General Okamura the order he had been waiting for: take it, whatever the cost. Capturing the city would do three things at once. It would blind the Chinese Air Force in the south by seizing or destroying the only bases from which it could still seriously operate. It would tear a hole in the last east–west rail line still feeding Free China. And it would shove the Nationalist armies another two hundred kilometers farther into the interior, buying Japan precious time to digest its earlier conquests and tighten the blockade. Above all, Nanchang was the final piece in a great aerial ring Japan was closing around southern China. Hainan had fallen in February, giving the navy its southern airfields. Wuhan and Guangzhou already belonged to the army. Once Nanchang was taken, Japanese aircraft would sit on a continuous arc of bases from the tropical beaches of the South China Sea to the banks of the Yangtze, and nothing (neither the Burma Road convoys nor the French railway from Hanoi) would move without their permission. Chiang Kai-shek's decision to strike first in the Nanchang region in March 1939 reflected both urgency and a desire to seize initiative before Japanese modernization of the battlefield could fully consolidate. On March 8, Chiang directed Xue Yue to prepare a preemptive attack intended to seize the offensive by March 15, focusing the Ninth War Zone's efforts on preventing a river-crossing assault and pinning Japanese forces in place. The plan called for a sequence of coordinated actions: the 19th Army Group to hold the northern front of Nanchang; the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Border Advance Army (the 8th and 73rd Armies) to strike the enemy's left flank from Wuning toward De'an and Ruichang; the 30th and 27th Army Groups to consolidate near Wuning; and the 1st Army Group to push toward Xiushui and Sandu, opening routes for subsequent operations. Yet even as Xue Yue pressed for action, the weather of logistics and training reminded observers that no victory could be taken for granted. By March 9–10, Xue Yue warned Chiang that troops were not adequately trained, supplies were scarce, and preparations were insufficient, requesting a postponement to March 24. Chiang's reply was resolute: the attack must commence no later than the 24th, for the aim was preemption and the desire to tether the enemy's forces before they could consolidate. When the moment of decision arrived, the Chinese army began to tense, and the Japanese, no strangers to rapid shifts in tempo—moved to exploit any hesitation or fog of mobilization. The Ninth War Zone's response crystallized into a defensive posture as the Japanese pressed forward, marking a transition from preemption to standoff as both sides tested the limits of resilience. The Japanese plan for what would become known as Operation Ren, aimed at severing the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway, breaking the enemy's line of communication, and isolating Nanchang, reflected a calculated synthesis of air power, armored mobility, and canalized ground offensives. On February 6, 1939, the Central China Expeditionary Army issued a set of precise directives: capture Nanchang to cut the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway and disrupt the southern reach of Anhui and Zhejiang provinces; seize Nanchang along the Nanchang–Xunyi axis to split enemy lines and "crush" Chinese resistance south of that zone; secure rear lines immediately after the city's fall; coordinate with naval air support to threaten Chinese logistics and airfields beyond the rear lines. The plan anticipated contingencies by pre-positioning heavy artillery and tanks in formations that could strike with speed and depth, a tactical evolution from previous frontal assaults. Okamura Yasuji, commander of the 11th Army, undertook a comprehensive program of reconnaissance, refining the assault plan with a renewed emphasis on speed and surprise. Aerial reconnaissance underlined the terrain, fortifications, and the disposition of Chinese forces, informing the selection of the Xiushui River crossing and the route of the main axis of attack. Okamura's decision to reorganize artillery and armor into concentrated tank groups, flanked by air support and advanced by long-range maneuver, marked a departure from the earlier method of distributing heavy weapons along the infantry front. Sumita Laishiro commanded the 6th Field Heavy Artillery Brigade, with more than 300 artillery pieces, while Hirokichi Ishii directed a force of 135 tanks and armored vehicles. This blended arms approach promised a breakthrough that would outpace the Chinese defenders and open routes for the main force. By mid-February 1939, Japanese preparations had taken on a high tempo. The 101st and 106th Divisions, along with attached artillery, assembled south of De'an, while tank contingents gathered north of De'an. The 6th Division began moving toward Ruoxi and Wuning, the Inoue Detachment took aim at the waterways of Poyang Lake, and the 16th and 9th Divisions conducted feints on the Han River's left bank. The orchestration of these movements—feints, riverine actions, and armored flanking, was designed to reduce the Chinese capacity to concentrate forces around Nanchang and to force the defenders into a less secure posture along the Nanchang–Jiujiang axis. Japan's southward strategy reframed the war: no longer a sprint to reduce Chinese forces in open fields, but a patient siege of lifelines, railways, and airbases. Hainan's seizure, the control of Nanchang's airfields, and the disruption of the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway exemplified a shift from large-scale battles to coercive pressure that sought to cripple Nationalist mobilization and erode Chongqing's capacity to sustain resistance. For China, the spring of 1939 underscored resilience amid mounting attrition. Chiang Kai-shek's insistence on offensive means to seize the initiative demonstrated strategic audacity, even as shortages and uneven training slowed tempo. The Ninth War Zone's defense, bolstered by makeshift airpower from Soviet and Allied lendings, kept open critical corridors and delayed Japan's consolidation. The war's human cost—massive casualties, forced labor, and the Li uprising on Hainan—illuminates the brutality that fueled both sides' resolve. In retrospect, the period around Canton, Wuhan, and Nanchang crystallizes a grim truth: the Sino-Japanese war was less a single crescendo of battles than a protracted contest of endurance, logistics, and political stamina. The early 1940s would widen these fault lines, but the groundwork laid in 1939, competition over supply routes, air control, and strategic rail nodes, would shape the war's pace and, ultimately, its outcome. The conflict's memory lies not only in the clashes' flash but in the stubborn persistence of a nation fighting to outlast a formidable adversary. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese invasion of Hainan and proceeding operations to stop logistical leaks into Nationalist China, showcased the complexity and scale of the growing Second Sino-Japanese War. It would not merely be a war of territorial conquest, Japan would have to strangle the colossus using every means necessary.  

What started as a daughter's simple plea for help on social media transformed a quiet village into a massive "folk culture carnival" this past weekend, as thousands of strangers drove across China to help a young woman's elderly father slaughter the family pigs.一个女儿在社交媒体上发出的简单求助，让这个安静的村庄在上周末变成了盛大的“民间文化嘉年华”。成千上万素不相识的人驱车穿越中国各地，只为帮助一位年轻女子的年迈父亲宰杀家猪。The woman, known online as Daidai, hails from Qingfu village in the Hechuan district of Chongqing. On Jan 9, she posted a video on Douyin expressing anxiety over an increasingly common issue for villagers — her father, now in his 70s, was no longer strong enough to manage the family's year-end pig slaughter tradition alone.这位网名为“呆呆”的女性来自重庆市合川区庆福村。1月9日，她在抖音发布视频，表达了村民们日益普遍的忧虑——年逾古稀的父亲已无力独自承担家里的年终杀猪传统。She invited anyone willing to lend a hand to come over for Paozhutang, a traditional "pig slaughter feast", which is a longstanding rural tradition in many parts of China, marking the approach of the Chinese New Year. Neighbors and relatives gather to help with every step — holding the pigs, singeing off bristles, carving meat and cooking dishes — before sharing a hearty meal. Guests typically leave with fresh pork pressed into their hands, a symbol of hospitality and reciprocity.她邀请所有愿意帮忙的人来参加“杀猪宴”，这是中国许多地区延续至今的乡村传统，标志着春节的临近。邻里亲友齐聚一堂，协助完成每个环节——拽住猪、烧毛、分切肉块、烹制菜肴——最后共享丰盛的宴席。宾客离席时，主人总会将新鲜猪肉塞进他们手中，这既是热情好客的象征，也承载着互惠互利的传统。She expected a few neighbors; she got a national movement. Within 48 hours, the video amassed nearly half a million likes. By Saturday and Sunday, the roads leading to Qingfu village were gridlocked by a 10-kilometer traffic jam as visitors arrived from as far as Guangdong province, bringing gifts as if visiting long-lost relatives.她本以为只有几位邻居会来，没想到却引发了一场全国性的热潮。短短48小时内，这段视频收获了近50万次点赞。到周六周日时，通往清福村的道路因长达10公里的拥堵而瘫痪，来自远至广东省的访客们带着礼物纷至沓来，仿佛在探望久别重逢的亲人。The turnout was so massive that Daidai's original two pigs were woefully insufficient. Sensing a cultural phenomenon, neighbors and the district's cultural and tourism department donated three additional pigs. In total, five pigs were slaughtered to feed a rotating crowd of over 3,000 people.到场人数之多，使得“呆呆”最初准备的两头猪远远不够。察觉到这已成为一种文化现象后，邻居们和区文旅部门又捐赠了三头猪。最终共宰杀了五头猪，为轮番到来的三千多人提供了食物。Scenes on the ground were a mix of chaotic labor and communal joy. The event was largely unplanned, but observers noted a unique "labor chain" where socioeconomic status disappeared; a Porsche owner was seen rolling up his sleeves to wash dishes, mothers sat on low stools chopping mountains of vegetables, and teams of strong young men fulfilled the original request by holding down the livestock.现场景象既是劳作的混乱，亦是集体的欢愉。这场活动虽多属临时起意，但观察者注意到一种独特的“劳动链”——社会经济地位在此消弭无踪：保时捷车主挽起袖子洗碗，母亲们坐在矮凳上切着堆积如山的蔬菜，壮实的年轻人则组队按住牲畜，完成最初的请求。To manage the hunger of the masses, the local Yanzi catering team was brought in. Head chef Jiang Xiaoyan, a 16-year veteran of village banquets, called it the most exhausting job of her career. She estimated that her team went through over 500 kilograms of rice, 350 kg of oil, and several pickup trucks' worth of vegetables and seasonings. Even with support from neighboring hotels and extra kitchen teams, the cost of the raw materials alone likely exceeded 100,000 yuan ($14,000).为满足民众的用餐需求，当地燕子坝坝宴的餐饮团队被紧急调遣至现场。拥有16年乡村宴席经验的主厨蒋小燕称这是她职业生涯中最耗费精力的工作。据她估算，团队消耗了超过500公斤大米、350公斤食用油，以及数辆皮卡车载量的蔬菜和调料。即便获得周边酒店及增援厨师团队的支持，仅原材料成本就可能突破10万元（约合1.4万美元）。The Hechuan government pivoted to support the influx, deploying traffic police and urban management to maintain order. They even integrated local culture into the impromptu festival, providing guests with free tickets to the historic Diaoyucheng Fortress and organizing a traditional molten iron fireworks display.合川区政府迅速调整策略应对客流，调派交警和城管人员维持秩序。他们甚至将本土文化融入这场即兴庆典，为游客提供免费的历史遗迹钓鱼城古堡门票，并组织了传统熔铁烟花表演。The event has turned Daidai into an overnight sensation, with her follower count skyrocketing from a few hundred to 2 million in just days. Online, the story sparked humor and admiration."She's the first person brave enough to invite the whole country to dinner," one commenter wrote.这场活动让“呆呆”一夜成名，她的粉丝数量在短短几天内从几百人飙升至200万。网络上，这个故事引发了人们的幽默调侃与由衷赞叹。一位网友写道“她是第一个敢于邀请全国人民共进晚餐的人。”Local authorities are now reportedly considering a proposal from netizens to make Jan 11 an official "Hechuan Pig Slaughter Festival" to celebrate the region's hospitality and heritage.据悉，当地政府正考虑网友提议，拟将1月11日定为官方“合川杀猪节”，以此庆祝该地区热情好客的传统与文化传承。plea/pliː/n.求助gridlocked/ˈɡrɪd.lɑːkt/adj.交通拥堵的rotating crowd轮番到来的人群

China's ice and snow resources have turned into a robust economic driver, with experts noting the transformation of winter tourism and related leisure activities from a "niche experience" into a "popular trend" and predicting that the industry will continue to boom.中国的冰雪资源已成为强劲的经济驱动力，专家指出，冬季旅游及相关休闲活动正从 “小众体验” 转变为 “大众潮流”，并预计该产业将持续蓬勃发展。According to a report released on Monday by the China Tourism Academy, the season from December 2025 to February 2026 is expected to see 360 million winter tourism trips, generating around 450 billion yuan ($64 billion) in revenue.中国旅游研究院周一发布的一份报告显示，2025 年 12 月至 2026 年 2 月的冰雪季期间，预计全国冬季旅游人次将达 3.6 亿，旅游收入约 4500 亿元人民币（折合 640 亿美元）。Yang Lezhi, 27, a resident of Beijing, said she decided to hone her skiing skills in recent years, thanks to the mushrooming winter resort options across the country.27 岁的北京市民杨乐芝（音译）表示，近年来全国范围内的滑雪场如雨后春笋般涌现，于是她下定决心精进自己的滑雪技术。"I feel like Elsa from the film Frozen when I ski. The sport is almost addictive once you learn to navigate the slopes," she said.她说：“滑雪的时候，我感觉自己就像电影《冰雪奇缘》里的艾莎。一旦学会了驾驭雪道，这项运动就会让人欲罢不能。”Yang recalled that she visited several spectacular winter destinations in the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region, and Jilin and Heilongjiang provinces during her days in college.杨乐芝回忆道，大学期间她曾到访过新疆维吾尔自治区以及吉林、黑龙江两省的多个绝美冬季旅游胜地。"However, skiing was a niche sport back then. Many of my friends and I discovered the thrill of skiing only after 2023, and now we are always eager to hit the slopes to enjoy the winter scenery better," she added.她补充道：“不过那时候滑雪还是一项小众运动。我和很多朋友都是在 2023 年之后才感受到滑雪的乐趣，现在我们总是迫不及待地奔赴雪场，更好地欣赏冬日美景。”According to the academy's report, about 75 percent of the respondents said they wish to take winter trips this season; more than 40 percent said they would like to increase the frequency of their participation in ice and snow leisure activities; and over 40 percent said they would increase their consumption of such activities this winter.该研究院的报告显示，约 75% 的受访者表示本雪季有冬季出游的意愿；超 40% 的受访者称愿意提高参与冰雪休闲活动的频率；另有超 40% 的受访者表示今冬会增加在冰雪休闲活动上的消费。Yang Jinsong, a researcher at the China Tourism Academy, said the nation's increasing efforts in developing winter tourism and the success of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics accelerated the industry's development.中国旅游研究院研究员杨劲松表示，国家对冬季旅游发展的持续发力，以及 2022 年北京冬奥会的成功举办，推动了冰雪产业的加速发展。In November 2024, the State Council, China's Cabinet, issued guidelines to strengthen the nation's ice and snow economy, which set a target of 1.2 trillion yuan for 2027 and 1.5 trillion yuan for 2030.2024 年 11 月，中国国务院印发关于做强冰雪经济的指导意见，明确提出 2027 年冰雪经济规模达到 1.2 万亿元、2030 年达到 1.5 万亿元的目标。Yang Jinsong said he is optimistic about the industry's prospects, because a large population base creates a relatively larger market for winter tourism and sports.杨劲松表示，他对冰雪产业的前景持乐观态度，庞大的人口基数为冬季旅游和冰雪运动造就了体量可观的市场。"After the Beijing Olympics, people have had a stronger awareness of and growing interest in winter tourism and sports. Also, supportive government policies have encouraged more companies and suppliers to join the industry," he said.他说：“北京冬奥会之后，民众对冬季旅游和冰雪运动的认知度显著提升、兴趣日益浓厚。同时，政府出台的扶持政策也吸引了更多企业和供应商投身这一产业。”While some provinces have geographical advantages in developing their winter tourism industry, others have channeled resources and investment to facilitate ice and snow activities at human-made facilities, he added.他补充道，部分省份发展冬季旅游具有得天独厚的地理优势，而其他省份则通过投入资源与资金，依托人工设施开展冰雪活动。Data from the report shows that southern China, including provinces such as Guangdong, topped the nation's winter tourism heavy assets investment with an annual total exceeding 30 billion yuan.报告数据显示，以广东省为代表的中国南方地区，在冬季旅游重资产投资领域位居全国首位，年度投资总额超 300 亿元人民币。China has established a whole industrial chain for winter tourism, ice and snow culture, winter sports, and winter gear, the report said. In 2025, there were 1,423 new companies involved in the winter tourism industry. The total number of such companies reached more than 14,000, up 11 percent compared with 2024, according to the report.报告指出，中国已构建起涵盖冬季旅游、冰雪文化、冰雪运动、冰雪装备的完整产业链。2025 年，全国新增冰雪旅游相关企业 1423 家，相关企业总数突破 1.4 万家，较 2024 年增长 11%。A previous report unveiled by Asiadg.com and Beijing Sport University showed that China's winter-related consumption from late 2024 to early 2025 totaled 187.5 billion yuan.此前由亚洲数据集团与北京体育大学联合发布的一份报告显示，2024 年末至 2025 年初，中国冰雪相关消费总额达 1875 亿元人民币。The value of the nation's winter-related industry grew from 270 billion yuan in 2015 to 980 billion yuan in 2024, it said, estimating that the industry will exceed 1 trillion yuan in 2025 for the first time and reach 1.5 trillion yuan in 2030.该报告称，中国冰雪产业规模从 2015 年的 2700 亿元增长至 2024 年的 9800 亿元，并预计该产业规模将于 2025 年首次突破万亿元大关，到 2030 年达到 1.5 万亿元。niche /niːʃ/adj. 小众的；特定领域的thrill /θrɪl/n. 兴奋感；激动；v. 使兴奋；使激动accelerate /əkˈseləreɪt/v. 加速；促进；使加快prospect /ˈprɒspekt/n. 前景；展望；（复数）成功的机会将这段中文再翻译回英文请再提供一些关于中国冰雪产业发展的英文报道。用英文介绍一下中国冰雪产业的优势。

China's tourism market hit its first travel peak of the year during the three-day New Year holiday period starting Thursday, with a strong festive demand drawing both domestic and international travelers to destinations across the country.中国旅游市场在自周四起的三天元旦假期期间迎来了年内首个出行高峰，旺盛的节日需求吸引着国内外游客前往全国各地的旅游目的地。The Ministry of Culture and Tourism said 142 million domestic trips were made during the holiday, generating about 84.8 billion yuan ($12.13 billion) in tourism revenue. This year's three-day holiday lasted two days longer than last year, a likely contributor to travel demand.文化和旅游部表示，假期期间国内旅游人次达 1.42 亿，实现旅游收入约 848 亿元人民币（折合 121.3 亿美元）。今年的三天假期较去年延长了两天，这很可能是提振出行需求的一个因素。Yan Lijie and three of her university dorm mates spent New Year's Eve on Wednesday night at Beijing's 798 Art District, an industrial heritage art zone, before staying in the city for a two-day tour through Friday.严丽洁（音译）和三名大学室友于周三晚在北京市 798 艺术区（一处工业遗产艺术园区）跨年，随后留在北京游玩至周五，行程共计两天。"We are in our third year at a college in Tianjin, neighboring Beijing, and it's our dorm's tradition to spend New Year's Eve in a nearby city over the past two years," said Yan, 23. "There were so many activities, including art exhibitions, fairs and performances that night, and the rich festive atmosphere really touched us."“我们是天津一所高校的大三学生，天津与北京相邻。过去两年，我们宿舍的传统就是去邻近城市跨年。”23 岁的严丽洁说，“当晚有超多活动，包括艺术展览、集市和演出，浓厚的节日氛围真的很打动我们。”Qi Chunguang, vice-president of travel portal Tuniu, said tourism consumption during the holiday showed increasing diversification, with the market offering a wider range of options such as theme park tours, winter tourism and temple visits for new year blessings.旅游门户网站途牛副总裁齐春光表示，假期期间的旅游消费呈现出日益多元化的趋势，市场提供了更丰富的选择，例如主题公园游、冬季旅游以及新年祈福逛庙会等。"We've noticed that younger travelers show stronger preferences for concerts, music festivals, drone shows or fireworks displays to count down to the new year," Qi said.齐春光说：“我们注意到，年轻游客更青睐通过演唱会、音乐节、无人机表演或烟花秀等方式跨年倒计时。”Data from travel platform Qunar supported that observation. Taking Kaifeng in central China's Henan province as an example, Qunar said hotel bookings in the city tripled during the holiday, driven by its two Chinese-style theme parks — Wansuishan and Millennium City Park.旅游平台去哪儿网的数据印证了这一观察结果。去哪儿网表示，以中国中部河南省开封市为例，在万岁山和清明上河园两大中式主题公园的带动下，该市假期期间的酒店预订量增长了两倍。Qunar said that beyond first-tier cities such as Guangzhou in Guangdong province, Beijing and Shanghai, smaller counties and towns also attracted large numbers of travelers welcoming the New Year.去哪儿网称，除广东广州、北京、上海等一线城市外，众多县域小镇也吸引了大批游客前来跨年。"Hotels booked by our users span more than 1,000 counties nationwide this holiday, ranging from warmer Nan'ao in South China's Guangdong province to northern counties such as Antu in Jilin province, known for snow scenery and winter resorts," Qunar said.去哪儿网表示：“本次假期，我们用户预订的酒店遍布全国超 1000 个县域，从气候温暖的中国南部广东省南澳县，到以雪景和冬季度假胜地闻名的中国北部吉林省安图县等县域都包含在内。”Inbound and outbound tourism also recorded strong growth. Qunar said its users booked hotels in nearly 3,000 cities worldwide during the holiday, with short-haul overseas destinations including Seoul, Bangkok and Hong Kong among the top three choices.出入境旅游也迎来强劲增长。去哪儿网称，假期期间平台用户预订了全球近 3000 座城市的酒店，短途境外目的地中，首尔、曼谷和中国香港位列前三。The platform added that a growing number of international tourists chose to ring in the New Year on the Chinese mainland. Travelers holding non-Chinese passports booked flights to 97 cities across China, with Shanghai, Guangzhou and Beijing attracting the largest numbers.该平台补充道，越来越多的国际游客选择在中国大陆跨年。持外国护照的游客预订了飞往中国 97 座城市的航班，其中上海、广州和北京的入境游客数量位居前三。"Most international tourists came from neighboring countries, including Vietnam, Singapore and Malaysia, while visitors from Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan and the United States also recorded significant growth during the holiday," Qunar said.去哪儿网表示：“大多数国际游客来自越南、新加坡、马来西亚等周边国家，而沙特阿拉伯、乌兹别克斯坦和美国的游客数量在假期期间也实现了显著增长。”Figures released on Sunday by the National Immigration Administration showed about 6.62 million inbound and outbound trips by Chinese and foreign travelers during the three-day holiday. Of those, about 828,000 trips were made by foreign nationals, representing a year-on-year increase of 29.8 percent.国家移民管理局于周日发布的数据显示，三天假期期间，中外人员出入境总量约 662 万人次。其中，外国公民出入境人次约 82.8 万，同比增长 29.8%。peak /piːk/ n. 高峰；顶峰diversification /daɪˌvɜːsɪfɪˈkeɪʃn/ n. 多样化；多元化inbound /ˈɪnbaʊnd/ adj. 入境的；入站的outbound /ˈaʊtbaʊnd/ adj. 出境的；出站的

The Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864) stands as the bloodiest civil war in human history, claiming an estimated 20–30 million lives and reshaping 19th-century China. It was ignited by Hong Xiuquan, a failed civil service exam candidate from Guangdong, who experienced profound visions in 1837. Interpreting these as divine messages, Hong believed he was the younger brother of Jesus Christ, tasked with establishing a "Heavenly Kingdom" on Earth. Influenced by fragmented Christian teachings from Protestant missionaries, he converted and began preaching a unique blend of Christianity, Confucianism, and anti-Manchu sentiments. The rebellion's roots lay in widespread discontent against the Qing Dynasty, fueled by economic hardships, opium addiction from the Opium Wars, corruption, overpopulation, and ethnic tensions between Han Chinese and Manchu rulers. Hong's Taiping Heavenly Kingdom attracted millions of followers, including peasants, women, and ethnic minorities, promising land reform, gender equality, and the abolition of foot-binding and opium. Starting in Guangxi, the Taiping forces rapidly expanded, capturing Nanjing in 1853 as their capital. They implemented radical reforms but faced brutal opposition from Qing armies, aided by foreign powers like Britain and France, who intervened to protect trade interests despite initial neutrality. The conflict featured massive battles, sieges, and atrocities on both sides. The rebellion weakened the Qing Dynasty, paving the way for its eventual fall in 1911. Hong's death in 1864 and the recapture of Nanjing marked the end, but the Taiping legacy endures in discussions of millenarian movements, religious fervor, and social upheaval.

Greetings to all! Year after year, life opens a fresh chapter. As the new year begins, I extend my best wishes to you from Beijing!The year 2025 marks the completion of China's 14th Five-Year Plan for economic and social development. Over the past five years, we have pressed ahead with enterprise and fortitude, and overcome many difficulties and challenges. We met the targets in the Plan and made solid advances on the new journey of Chinese modernization. Our economic output has crossed thresholds one after another, and it is expected to reach RMB 140 trillion yuan this year. Our economic strength, scientific and technological abilities, defense capabilities, and composite national strength all reached new heights. Clear waters and lush mountains have become a salient feature of our landscape. Our people enjoy a growing sense of gain, happiness and security. The past five years have been a truly remarkable journey, and our accomplishments have not come easily. Your unwavering hard work has made our nation thrive and prosper. I salute you all for your exceptional diligence and invaluable contributions.This year is full of indelible memories. We solemnly commemorated the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War, and established the Taiwan Recovery Day. These grand national events were majestic and powerful, and the glory of victory will shine through the pages of history. They are inspiring all the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation to remember history, honor fallen heroes, cherish peace, and create a better future. They are rallying a mighty force for the great rejuvenation of our nation.We sought to energize high-quality development through innovation. We integrated science and technology deeply with industries, and made a stream of new innovations. Many large AI models have been competing in a race to the top, and breakthroughs have been achieved in the research and development of our own chips. All this has turned China into one of the economies with the fastest growing innovation capabilities. The Tianwen 2 probe began its star-chasing journey to explore asteroids and comets. Construction of the hydropower project at the lower reaches of the Yarlung Zangbo River started. China's first aircraft carrier equipped with an electromagnetic catapult system was officially commissioned. Humanoid robots did kung fu kicks, and drones performed spectacular light shows. Inventions and innovations have boosted new quality productive forces and added colorful dimensions to our lives.We endeavored to nurture our spiritual home with cultural development. There was a surging public interest in cultural relics, museums, and intangible cultural heritage. A new Chinese cultural site was added to the World Heritage List. Cultural IPs such as Wukong and Nezha became global hits. The younger generation came to deem classic Chinese culture as the finest form of aesthetic expression. The cultural and tourism sectors thrived. The "super league" football games in our cities and villages attracted numerous fans. Ice and snow sports ignited people's passion for the winter season. Tradition is now embracing modernity, and the Chinese culture is shining in even greater splendor.We joined hands to build a better life and enjoyed it together. I attended celebrations in Xizang and Xinjiang. From the snow-covered plateau to both sides of the Tianshan Mountains, people of various ethnic groups are united as one, like seeds of a pomegranate sticking together. With white khatas and passionate singing and dancing, they expressed their love of the motherland and the happiness they enjoy. No issue of the people is too small; we care for every leaf and tend every branch in the garden of people's well-being. Over the past year, the rights and interests of the workforce in new forms of employment have been better protected, facilities have been upgraded to bring more convenience to the elderly, and each family with childcare needs has received a subsidy of RMB 300 yuan per month. When the happy hum of daily life fills every home, the big family of our nation will go from strength to strength.We continued to embrace the world with open arms. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in Tianjin and the Global Leaders' Meeting on Women were very successful; and island-wide special customs operations were launched in the Hainan Free Trade Port. To better address climate change, China announced new Nationally Determined Contributions. After announcing the three global initiatives on development, security, and civilization, I put forward the Global Governance Initiative to promote a more just and equitable global governance system. The world today is undergoing both changes and turbulence, and some regions are still engulfed in war. China always stands on the right side of history, and is ready to work with all countries to advance world peace and development and build a community with a shared future for humanity.Not long ago, I attended the opening ceremony of the National Games, and I was glad to see Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao coming together in unity and acting in unison. We should unswervingly implement the policy of One Country, Two Systems, and support Hong Kong and Macao in better integrating into the overall development of our country and maintaining long-term prosperity and stability. We Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait share a bond of blood and kinship. The reunification of our motherland, a trend of the times, is unstoppable!Only a strong Communist Party of China can make our country strong. We launched the study and education program on fully implementing the central Party leadership's eight-point decision on improving Party and government conduct. We exercised strict governance of the Party through credible measures, and promoted the Party's self-revolution to fight corruption and advance healthy governance. As a result, the conduct of our Party and government steadily improved. We must stay true to our original aspiration and founding mission, and pursue our goal with perseverance and dedication. We should continue to give a good answer to the question on how to maintain long-term governance put forth in a cave dwelling in Yan'an and prove ourselves worthy of the people's expectation in the new era.The year 2026 marks the beginning of the 15th Five-Year Plan. A successful venture should start with a good plan and with clear goals set. We should focus on our goals and tasks, boost confidence, and build momentum to press ahead. We should take solid steps to promote high-quality development, further deepen reform and opening up across the board, deliver prosperity for all, and write a new chapter in the story of China's miracle.The dream lofty, the journey long-bold strides will get us there. Let us charge ahead like horses with courage, vitality, and energy, fight for our dreams and our happiness, and turn our great vision into beautiful realities.The sun of the new year will soon rise. May our great motherland stand in magnificence! May the fields across the country deliver good harvest! May our nation bathe in the glory of the morning! May you all enjoy life to the fullest, and achieve every success! May all your dreams come true!

Merriam-Webster's Word of the Day for December 28, 2025 is: yen • YEN • noun A yen is a strong desire, urge, or craving for something. // After dinner, the family went out for ice cream to satisfy their yen for something sweet. // Students with a yen to travel should consider studying abroad. See the entry > Examples: “If you've got a yen for succulent, right-off-the-boat Maine sea scallops, now is the time to get them.” — Stephen Rappaport, The Bangor Daily News, 26 Mar. 2025 Did you know? Although yen suggests no more than a strong desire these days (as in “a yen for a beach vacation”), at one time someone with a yen was in deep trouble: the first meaning of yen, used in the late 19th century, was an intense craving for opium. The word comes from yīn-yáhn, a combination of yīn, meaning “opium,” and yáhn, “craving,” in the Chinese language used in the province of Guangdong. In English, the Chinese syllables were translated as yen-yen, and eventually shortened to yen.

Several travel agencies have reported a significant hike in winter vacation tour bookings after schools and universities across China recently announced their winter holiday schedules. Industry insiders said domestic destinations with milder climates and overseas scenic spots are in intense competition to attract winter holiday travelers.多家旅行社表示，随着全国中小学和高校陆续公布寒假安排，冬季度假游预订量显著攀升。业内人士称，气候温和的国内目的地与海外景点正展开激烈竞争，争夺寒假游客资源。Since late November, primary and high schools nationwide, as well as universities, have been releasing their winter holiday plans, with vacation lengths ranging from 25 days to over 40 days.自11月下旬以来，全国中小学及高校陆续公布寒假安排，假期时长从25天到40多天不等。In Shanghai, for instance, primary and high school students will have 25 days off from Feb 2 to 27. In contrast, winter holiday breaks last 43 days in Heilongjiang province in Northeast China, starting in mid-January, as the region experiences earlier and more severe cold weather.例如，上海的小学生和中学生将从2月2日至27日享受25天的假期。相比之下，中国东北的黑龙江省因寒冷天气来得更早且更为严酷，其寒假从1月中旬开始，长达43天。As students' winter vacations will overlap with the Spring Festival holiday—a traditional Chinese period for family reunions falling in mid-February next year—many families are choosing to travel during the first half of their children's winter breaks to avoid travel peaks and potential price hikes for flights and hotel rooms during the Spring Festival holiday period.由于学生寒假将与春节假期重叠——这个中国传统的团圆时节将于明年二月中旬到来——许多家庭选择在孩子寒假的前半段出行，以避开春节期间的出行高峰和机票酒店可能上涨的价格。"I plan to take my son on a week-long winter tour in late January using my paid leave, although we haven't finalized the dates yet," said Wang Li, 39, who works in Beijing." We have two final choices—Hainan in South China and Kunming in Southwest China—both of which enjoy milder climates in winter."39岁的北京上班族王莉（音译）表示：“我计划在一月底用带薪休假带儿子进行为期一周的冬游，不过具体日期尚未敲定。我们有两个最终选择——中国南部的海南和西南部的昆明，这两个地方冬季气候都比较温和。”Wang said she previously sent her son to winter holiday tutoring classes, such as ice hockey and tennis, and scheduled family trips during the Spring Festival holiday. "Those plans cost much more because accommodation and flight prices skyrocketed during Spring Festival. This winter holiday, I want to move the family trip to earlier," she said.王莉（音译）表示表示，她此前曾让儿子参加寒假补习班，比如冰球和网球课程，并在春节假期安排了家庭旅行。她说：“这些计划花费更高，因为春节期间住宿和机票价格飞涨。这个寒假，我想把家庭旅行提前安排。”Wang is not alone. Travel portal Qunar said tour bookings from mid-January—when most students begin their winter school breaks—to the period before the Spring Festival holiday have seen significant growth since late November.王莉（音译）并非个例。旅游门户网站去哪儿网表示，自1月下旬（多数学生开始寒假）至春节假期前的旅游预订量，自11月下旬以来呈现显著增长。Qunar also reported a notable increase in flight ticket bookings for children during that period. Bookings for infants and children aged up to 12 rose by 60.7 percent year-on-year. Domestically, warmer destinations including Zhuhai in Guangdong province, Sanya in Hainan, and Xishuangbanna in Yunnan province have all seen a surge in tourism bookings, the platform said.去哪儿旅游网数据显示，同期儿童机票预订量显著增长，0至12岁婴幼儿及儿童机票预订量同比增长60.7%。该平台指出，国内旅游方面，广东珠海、海南三亚、云南西双版纳等温暖目的地均迎来旅游预订高峰。Overseas destinations such as Thailand and Russia are also popular choices for winter holiday travelers. According to Qunar, Thailand is currently the top overseas destination on its platform, with flight ticket bookings from the Chinese mainland to the country increasing 21 percent from mid-January to the eve of the Spring Festival holiday.泰国和俄罗斯等海外目的地也是冬季度假游客的热门选择。据去哪儿旅游网数据显示，泰国目前在其平台上位居海外目的地榜首，1月中旬至春节假期前夕，中国大陆至泰国的机票预订量同比增长21%。Qi Chunguang, vice-president of travel portal Tuniu, noted a boom in overseas winter holiday tours.途牛旅游网副总裁齐春光指出，海外冬季度假游呈现爆发式增长。"Some long-distance tour products to Australia and New Zealand for the winter holiday have already sold out," Qi said. "Tours to Europe, Dubai and Egypt will see a booking rush this month." He added that tour products to overseas island destinations such as the Maldives are also entering their peak reservation season.齐春光表示：“部分澳大利亚和新西兰的冬季长途旅游产品已售罄，本月欧洲、迪拜和埃及的旅游线路将迎来预订高峰。”他补充道，前往马尔代夫等海外岛屿目的地的旅游产品也正进入预订旺季。Zhou Chenjie, 42, who lives in Shanghai, said she has booked a five-day family trip to Thailand starting Feb 4. "It's my daughter's birthday wish," Zhou said. "Traveling before the Spring Festival holiday is a good deal, as flight tickets and hotel rooms are offered at discounted prices."现居上海的42岁周晨洁（音译）表示，她已预订了2月4日起为期五天的泰国家庭游，她说：“这是女儿的生日愿望。春节前出行很划算，机票和酒店都提供折扣价。”

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region opened its urban roads to the first group of private cars from Guangdong province under a new cross-border travel program on Tuesday, in a move that officials and Chinese mainland drivers have hailed as a milestone for regional integration.周二，香港特别行政区在一项新的跨境出行计划下，首次向来自广东省的私家车开放市区道路。官员和内地司机纷纷将这一举措誉为区域一体化的“里程碑”。The Southbound Travel for Guangdong Vehicles program allows approved private car owners from Guangdong with confirmed travel bookings to drive into Hong Kong's urban areas via the Zhuhai port of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge, with a daily quota of 100 vehicles.“广东车辆南下行”计划允许已获批准、并持有确认行程预约的广东私家车车主，经由港珠澳大桥珠海口岸驶入香港市区，每日名额为100辆。The first phase of the program benefits drivers from the cities of Guangzhou, Zhuhai, Jiangmen and Zhongshan. After six months of implementation, the program will be expanded to other cities across Guangdong.该计划第一阶段惠及来自广州、珠海、江门和中山的司机。实施满六个月后，计划将扩展至广东其他城市。Each eligible mainland vehicle will be granted a maximum stay of three days per visit.每辆符合条件的内地车辆每次入境香港，最长停留时间为三天。At midnight on Tuesday, a private car with a Guangdong license plate entered the dedicated outbound lane at the Zhuhai port, preparing to head south to downtown Hong Kong.周二午夜，一辆悬挂广东车牌的私家车驶入珠海口岸的专用出境车道，准备南下前往香港市区。After the car owner had completed a temperature check and identity verification using a one-stop clearance system, the lane screen immediately lit up with a green passage prompt.车主通过“一站式通关系统”完成体温检测和身份核验后，车道屏幕随即亮起绿色通行提示。"I am very pleased to be among the first participants of the policy, driving into the urban areas of Hong Kong," said the driver, surnamed Peng.“我非常高兴能成为首批政策参与者之一，直接驾车进入香港市区，”该名姓彭的司机表示。Peng, who opened a restaurant in Zhuhai with a Hong Kong partner, often travels to the SAR for business research. The program saves him from the time-consuming transitions between buses.彭先生与一名香港合伙人在珠海开设了餐厅，经常前往特区进行商业考察。该计划让他免去了多次换乘公交的耗时不便。Five dedicated lanes in each direction have been set up at the boundary for program participants, according to inspection officials on the Zhuhai side, with some drivers saying that the full boundary crossing takes roughly five to 10 minutes.据珠海方面的查验人员介绍，口岸为计划参与者在双向各设置了五条专用车道。一些司机表示，整个过境流程大约只需5至10分钟。Mable Chan, secretary for transport and logistics of the Hong Kong SAR government, said the first-day public uptake of the program was "enthusiastic".香港特区政府运输及物流局局长陈美宝表示，该计划首日的公众参与反应“十分热烈”。Chan said the 100 places on the first day were almost fully taken up, adding that the Hong Kong authorities have been working to process applications from 1,700 mainland car owners selected via a ballot run by the Guangdong authorities last month, who were drawn from an initial pool of 2,388 registrants.陈美宝表示，首日的100个名额几乎被全部用尽。她补充说，香港方面正加紧处理由广东当局于上月通过摇号方式选出的1700名内地车主的申请，这些人选来自最初2388名报名者。"We expect that … (the program) will further promote exchanges between the people of the two regions, allowing them to truly experience the 'one-hour living circle' between Guangdong and Hong Kong, and further facilitate integration and exchanges within the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area," Chan said.陈美宝表示：“我们期望……（该计划）将进一步促进两地民众的交流，让他们真正体验粤港之间的‘一小时生活圈'，并进一步推动粤港澳大湾区的融合与互动。”Given the popularity of electric vehicles on the mainland, Chan said more EV chargers compatible with mainland standards will be installed across the city.鉴于内地电动汽车的普及程度，陈美宝表示，香港将加装更多符合内地标准的电动车充电设施。One such newly added facility is the 24/7 Lantau Charging Station operated by CLPe, a subsidiary of local power supplier CLP.其中一项新设设施是由本地电力供应商中电旗下子公司CLPe运营的、全天候开放的大屿山充电站。A Guangzhou resident surnamed Guo and her family used the station to charge their EV before kicking off a two-day trip to Hong Kong on Tuesday. She described the charging and payment process as "simple and fast".周二，来自广州、姓郭的市民与家人出发前往香港展开两日游前，使用该充电站为电动车充电。她形容充电和支付流程“简单快捷”。Guo's family previously relied on the high-speed train and a cross-boundary bus to visit Hong Kong. "Now we can just get in the car at home and drive straight to the sights (in Hong Kong) — it's much more suitable for a family outing," she said.此前，郭女士一家前往香港主要依赖高铁和跨境巴士。“现在可以直接在家上车，一路开到（香港的）景点，非常适合家庭出游，”她说。For another mainland motorist, surnamed Lun, the shift from timetable-bound rail journeys to the spontaneity of a private road trip has provided more flexibility. "Now traveling in my own car, I can just book (a hotel room) in the morning and check in that same afternoon," Lun said.另一位姓伦的内地司机表示，从受时刻表限制的铁路出行转向更加随性的自驾出游，让行程灵活度大大提升。“现在自己开车出行，早上订酒店，下午就能入住，”伦先生说。Guo and Lun both said they will recommend the southbound drive to others.郭女士和伦先生均表示，会向他人推荐这一南下自驾出行方式。maximum stay/ˈmæksɪməm steɪ/最长停留期限one-stop clearance system/ˌwʌn stɒp ˈklɪərəns/一站式通关系统dedicated lane/ˈdedɪkeɪtɪd leɪn/专用车道public uptake/ˈpʌblɪk ˈʌpteɪk/公众接受度ballot/ˈbælət/摇号one-hour living circle/ˌwʌn aʊə ˈlɪvɪŋ ˈsɜːkl/一小时生活圈

She ruled the South China Sea, terrified navies, and ran her pirate empire with ruthless efficiency – meet Zheng Yi Sao, the Pirate Queen of Admin.In this family friendly episode of Dead Funny History, historian Greg Jenner dives into the extraordinary life of Zheng Yi Sao, one of the most powerful pirates who ever lived. Born around 1775 in Guangdong, China, Shi Yang (as she was first known) rose from poverty to command a fleet of 70,000 pirates. Her journey began with a job on a boat where she sold secrets to powerful men, and took a dramatic turn when she married the notorious pirate Zheng Yi.After her husband's death in 1807 – either by cannon or storm – Zheng Yi Sao took command of the pirate confederation. She wasn't just a fearsome fighter; she was a master of organisation. She split her fleet into colour-coded squadrons, enforced strict rules (including ear removal for slackers), and offered perks like pensions and healthcare. Her pirates even had a retirement home.Greg reveals how Zheng Yi Sao's empire grew through clever business tactics. She sold protection certificates to merchants, hijacked salt shipments, and outnumbered the Qing navy three to one. Her pirates wielded massive 8-foot guns called jingals and swam into battle with machete-tipped poles. At one point, the city of Canton panicked just from a polite warning of attack.Despite efforts by the Chinese government – and help from the Portuguese and British navies – Zheng Yi Sao remained undefeated. Eventually, she retired in luxury after being paid off by the empire. She may have run an illegal gambling house in her later years, but she died rich and respected in 1844.With jokes, sound effects, and a quiz to test your memory, this episode is a swashbuckling, spreadsheet-wielding celebration of a pirate legend.Writers: Gabby Hutchinson Crouch, Athena Kugblenu and Dr Emma Nagouse Host: Greg Jenner Performers: Mali Ann Rees and Richard David-Caine Producer: Dr Emma Nagouse Associate Producer: Gabby Hutchinson Crouch Audio Producer: Emma Weatherill Script Consultant: Dr Ron Po Production Coordinator: Liz Tuohy Production Manager: Jo Kyle Sound Designer: Peregrine AndrewsA BBC Studios Production

In this week's episode of China Insider, Miles Yu reviews the recent announcement from technology giant Canon to close one of its major printer facilities based in mainland China, and assess the impact of a rising demand for domestic manufacturing on foreign companies based in China. Next, Miles covers the news of US naval operations and intercept of a Chinese cargo ship en route to Iran reportedly carrying dual-use goods in a move to prevent Iran's continued remilitarization efforts. Finally, Miles provides analysis on the CCP's continued efforts to spread anti-Japanese propaganda, and the political fallout from these campaigns that harms both Chinese domestic and foreign policy. China Insider is a weekly podcast project from Hudson Institute's China Center, hosted by China Center Director and Senior Fellow, Dr. Miles Yu, who provides weekly news that mainstream American outlets often miss, as well as in-depth commentary and analysis on the China challenge and the free world's future.

Thursday marked the opening of an institution of learning that aims to upskill over 100,000 delivery workers. China's first "rider academy" was launched in Guangdong province, in a move that reflects the authorities' push to support the expanding courier workforce.周四，一个旨在提升10万余名配送员技能的教育机构正式揭牌。中国首家“骑手学院”在广东成立，体现出政府对不断壮大的快递与配送群体的支持力度。Jointly established by the Guangdong provincial education authority and e-commerce giant JD, the Modern Grassroots Workers Academy, widely referred to as the "rider academy", was inaugurated at Guangzhou Polytechnic University, marking China's first dedicated vocational education platform for full-time delivery personnel.由广东省教育部门与电商巨头京东联合共建的“现代基层劳动者学院”（广称为“骑手学院”）在广州科技职业技术大学揭牌，成为国内首个面向专职配送人员的职业教育平台。Lin Rupeng, director of the Guangdong Department of Education, said the academy reflects Guangdong's push to link education and talent chains more closely with the province's industrial and innovation needs, while building stronger safeguards for workers in emerging forms of employment and empowering them for future changes in the job market.广东省教育厅厅长林如鹏表示，学院体现了广东将教育链、人才链与产业链、创新链深度融合的努力，同时为新就业形态劳动者提供更完善保障，帮助其适应未来就业市场变化。"Through the enabling power of education, we are opening a new pathway for the career development of delivery riders, and by bringing universities and enterprises together, we are creating a more dynamic model of industry-education integration," he said.他说：“通过教育赋能，我们为外卖骑手开辟职业发展新通道；通过高校与企业协同，我们正在打造更加活跃的产教融合模式。”According to Feng Lei, a senior executive with JD, the academy will rely on university facilities, training centers and teaching staff across Guangdong, with Guangzhou Polytechnic University serving as the core base and several other colleges running satellite training points. Over the next three years, it will train more than 100,000 full-time riders and frontline couriers whom JD employs in the province.京东高管冯蕾介绍称，学院将依托广东多所高校的设施、培训中心和师资力量，以广州科技职业技术大学为核心基地，并在多所院校设置培训点。未来三年，学院将在广东培训超过10万名京东全职骑手与一线配送员工。The curriculum is designed to be practical and closely aligned with industry needs and development. Riders will access courses including food safety, mental well-being and English. To prepare for emerging delivery technologies, a training base for drone operators and related high-tech roles will be established, and qualified riders could be channeled into positions such as warehouse supervisors or drone pilots.课程设计强调实用性，与行业需求高度契合。骑手将学习食品安全、心理健康、英语等课程。为应对配送科技发展，学院还将建设无人机操作等高技术岗位的培训基地，合格学员将有机会转岗为仓储主管或无人机驾驶员。Guo Shuzhao, a JD rider, said the courses are closely aligned with their day-to-day work, covering not only operational skills but also safety regulations and service standards.京东骑手郭树钊表示，课程内容与日常工作高度相关，不仅涵盖操作技能，还包括安全规范和服务标准。"By completing the training to get certificates, our opportunities for career advancement will increase significantly," he said.他说：“完成培训并取得证书后，我们的晋升机会会明显增加。”The initiative comes as delivery riders, couriers, online shop owners, livestream sellers and ride-hailing drivers, classified in China as new forms of employment, become increasingly central to urban life. There are already 84 million workers nationwide engaged in such employment, data from the All-China Federation of Trade Unions showed.该举措出台之际，随着外卖骑手、快递员、网店经营者、直播带货者、网约车司机等新就业形态劳动者在城市生活中日益重要，全国已有8400万劳动者从事相关工作（全国总工会数据）。The size of this workforce and the volatility it faces have prompted several provinces to introduce structured training programs. Jiangsu launched a three-year action plan in October to expand skills training for people in these new forms of employment, covering smart-device use, labor rights and e-commerce entrepreneurship.由于这一庞大群体面临就业波动，多地已出台系统培训计划。例如江苏省今年10月启动三年行动方案，涵盖智能设备使用、劳动权益、电子商务创业等内容。The launch of the rider academy also comes amid rapid advances in automated delivery. Companies such as Meituan have expanded drone routes in major cities like Shenzhen in Guangdong, while completing more than 520,000 orders nationwide by early 2025, data from Meituan showed.骑手学院的成立，也正值自动化配送迅速发展之际。美团等企业已在深圳等城市扩大无人机配送航线，截至2025年初已完成52万余单（美团数据）。While drones and robots may reduce labor costs, Feng Lei from JD said that drones and related delivery equipment and technologies will not completely substitute for delivery personnel.尽管无人机和机器人有助于降低成本，但冯蕾表示，它们不会完全取代配送人员。She said emerging technologies "raise the skill requirements rather than eliminate the need for riders". Delivery personnel increasingly need to operate intelligent order systems and collaborate with drones and robots to complete deliveries, she said.她指出，新技术“提升了岗位技能要求，而非消灭岗位本身”。骑手未来需要操作智能派单系统，并与无人机、机器人协同完成配送。Feng Lipan, an e-commerce associate professor at South China University of Technology in Guangzhou, said the new academy is precisely intended to prepare riders for that transition.华南理工大学电子商务系副教授冯立攀表示，新学院正是为骑手应对这一转型而设。"It will reshape the public's stereotypical perception of the delivery rider profession, transforming it into a skilled occupation recognized for both mental agility and technical expertise," he said.他说：“这将重塑公众对配送职业的刻板印象，使其成为兼具思维敏捷与技术能力的技能型岗位。”industry-education integration产教融合emerging forms of employment新就业形态automated delivery自动化配送workforce volatility就业波动

China’s college exam, the gaokao, is fetishized as the ultimate test, yet a lesser-known story is how it entrenches regional education discrimination. Its role at social engineering is also clear, with AI suddenly becoming the sixth most popular major in China, on command from above. This month, the Little Red Podcast sets the first ever podcast gaokao. The intrepid test-takers are Edward Vickers from Kyushu University, co-author of Education and Society in Post-Mao China and host of the Asian Education Podcast, Karron Huang, who is studying for a Masters in early childhood education at the University of Melbourne and sat the gaokao in 2015, and Ruixue Xia from the University of California San Diego who coauthored The Highest Exam: How the Gaokao Shapes China. Image: c/- Karron Huang. Morning gaokao study session, Foshan No. 1 High School, Guangdong, 2015. Transcripts are available at https://ciw.anu.edu.au/podcasts/little-red-podcastSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Spending patterns among China's inbound travelers are shifting toward card-based transactions, experiential and everyday scenarios, underscoring the nation's progress in improving bank card acceptance and payment convenience, said a recent report by the World Tourism Alliance.世界旅游联盟发布的最新报告指出，中国入境游客的消费模式正转向以银行卡支付为主，并更多集中于沉浸式体验和日常消费场景，这凸显了中国在提升银行卡受理环境和支付便利性方面取得的显著进展。It said experiencing Chinese culture is increasingly the primary motivation for foreign visitors. This growing appetite for cultural depth is driving a shift from "checklist sightseeing" to "immersive experiences", making China's cultural treasure trove a key driver of inbound tourism growth.报告称，体验中国文化正成为越来越多外国游客的首要动机。这种对文化深度的渴望，正促使游客从“打卡式观光”转向“沉浸式体验”，中国丰富的文化资产因此成为入境旅游增长的重要推动力。The trend reflects ongoing enhancements to China's card acceptance environment. The report noted that coverage among key merchants reached 99 percent by September 2024. Moreover, tax refund efficiency has also improved significantly. The State Taxation Administration has rolled out "immediate tax refund upon purchase" services since May, drastically cutting refund processing times and enhancing shopping experiences.这一趋势反映出中国银行卡受理环境持续改善。报告指出，截至2024年9月，重点商户的银行卡受理覆盖率已达99%。此外，退税效率也显著提升。国家税务总局自5月起推行“即买即退”服务，大幅缩短退税处理时间，显著提升购物体验。The National Bureau of Statistics said China welcomed 132 million inbound tourists in 2024, marking a 60.8 percent year-on-year increase, with foreign visitors accounting for 26.94 million of these arrivals.国家统计局表示，2024年中国入境游客达到1.32亿人次，同比增长60.8%，其中外国游客达2694万人次。Between the third quarter of 2024 and the second quarter of 2025, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, South Korea, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States emerged as the top source markets for inbound spending. Malaysia, Australia and Singapore posted standout year-on-year growth rates — each exceeding 50 percent, said the WTA.世界旅游联盟称，在2024年第三季度至2025年第二季度期间，马来西亚、新加坡、澳大利亚、韩国、德国、英国和美国成为入境游客消费的主要来源市场。其中，马来西亚、澳大利亚和新加坡表现尤其突出，同比增幅均超过50%。Shopping stood out with a nearly 90 percent rise in transaction value. The surge was driven primarily by a sharp increase in the number of credit and debit cards used, while average spending per card remained stable — signaling a broader consumer base rather than higher individual outlays, the report said.购物类消费尤为亮眼，交易额增长近90%。报告指出，这一增幅主要得益于使用信用卡和借记卡人数的显著上升，而单卡平均消费保持稳定——这表明增长来自更广泛的消费群体，而非个体消费金额的提高。The transaction value of transportation spending has been growing strongly, with card usage surging, thanks to greater ease of foreign card payments in transit payment platform systems. Since early 2025, the number of inbound travelers using foreign bank cards for Tap-and-Go metro access has surged, with usage up nearly 60 percent in the second quarter compared to the previous quarter, the report said.由于交通出行支付平台对外卡支付的便利性提升，交通类消费的交易额保持强劲增长，银行卡使用量大幅上升。报告称，自2025年初以来，使用外卡“即刷即走”乘坐地铁的入境游客数量激增，仅第二季度就比上一季度增长近60%。Tap-and-Go is rapidly becoming a preferred payment method for inbound travelers using urban transit, marking a step forward in the internationalization of China's public transport services. Beyond Beijing and Shanghai, other major cities such as Chengdu, Sichuan province and Guangzhou, Guangdong province are also following suit. Major global card networks are also aggressively promoting this payment scenario, offering rebates and cashback incentives.“即刷即走”正迅速成为入境游客使用城市公共交通的首选支付方式，这标志着中国公共交通服务的国际化迈出重要一步。除北京和上海外，成都、广州等主要城市也在加紧跟进。国际主要银行卡组织也积极推广这一支付场景，并提供返现、优惠等激励措施。Dennis Chang, executive vice-president at Mastercard, said: "Today, as Mastercard expands our domestic operations in China, we are proud to upgrade our Pay Like a Local payment facilitation program; enable inbound tourists to make QR code payments in China through Alipay and WeChat Pay; expand the acceptance of overseas-issued bank cards; and allow riders to use Mastercard directly for seamless Tap-and-Go urban rail transit — thereby ensuring improved consumption experiences for international visitors."万事达卡中国区执行副总裁张安表示：“随着万事达在中国拓展本地业务，我们很自豪地升级‘像本地人一样支付'计划；支持入境游客通过支付宝和微信支付扫码付款；扩大境外发行银行卡的受理范围；并允许乘客直接使用万事达卡实现顺畅的‘即刷即走'轨道交通出行，从而进一步提升国际游客的消费体验。”Visa, another US-based card payment provider, said overseas tourists' spending in China saw explosive growth in the first half.另一家美国银行卡支付机构维萨（Visa）表示，今年上半年境外游客在中国的消费出现爆发式增长。The company said transaction volume of its tap-to-pay service saw rapid year-on-year growth, with Guangzhou's inbound tourist tap-to-pay transactions surging over 100 percent. In transportation scenarios, its tap-to-ride service gained widespread popularity, and around 60 percent of overseas tourists in Beijing are using Visa cards for tap-to-ride public transit, according to the company.该公司称，其“轻触支付”服务的交易量同比大幅增长，其中广州入境游客的轻触支付交易量激增逾100%。在交通出行场景中，其“轻触乘车”服务广受欢迎，目前在北京约有60%的境外游客使用Visa卡完成公共交通“轻触乘车”。inbound travelers入境游客immediate tax refund upon purchase即买即退transaction value交易额transaction/trænˈzækʃ(ə)n/Tap-and-Go / tap-to-ride / tap-to-pay即刷即走/轻触乘车/轻触支付rebates and cashback incentives返现激励rebate/ˈriːbeɪt/Incentive /ɪnˈsentɪv/consumer base消费者群体QR code payments扫码支付

China's 2026 national civil service exam for central government institutions was held on Sunday amid fierce competition, with an average of 74 applicants vying for each available position this year.2026年中国中央政府机构公务员考试于周日举行，竞争异常激烈，今年平均每个职位有74名考生角逐。A total of 3.718 million candidates passed the initial verification process and about 2.83 million people sat for the exams to compete for only 38,100 positions, making this year's recruitment process the most intense in the exam's history, according to the State Administration of Civil Service.国家公务员局数据显示，共有371.8万名考生通过初审，约283万人实际参加考试，而岗位仅3.81万个，使今年成为公务员考试史上竞争最激烈的一届。The applicant pool has increased dramatically in recent years, rising from about 2.6 million in 2023 to over 3.7 million this year.近年来申请人数激增，从2023年的约260万增至今年的370万以上。One standout example of the exam's competitiveness is a police officer position in Ruili, Yunnan province with the National Immigration Administration, which attracted 6,470 applicants for a single opening.该考试竞争激烈的一个典型例子是云南省国家移民管理局瑞丽遣返中心的一个警官职位，仅一个空缺就吸引了6470名应聘者。A significant reform to this year's exam was the relaxation of age restrictions, which is in line with China's progressive approach to delaying the legal retirement age. The general applicant age limit was raised from 35 to 38, while new graduates with master's and doctoral degrees will now be eligible up to age 43, representing a three-year extension from previous limits.今年考试的一项重大改革是放宽了年龄限制，这与中国逐步推迟法定退休年龄的政策相呼应。普通报考者的年龄上限从35岁提高到38岁，而硕士和博士学位的新毕业生现在最高可至43岁，比以往限制延长了三年。Experts said this year's national civil service exam, the first to break the "age 35 threshold", establishes a significant precedent for more inclusive public sector recruitment processes. The reforms not only expand opportunities for experienced professionals but also set important benchmarks for private sector hiring practices, promoting ability-based talent selection across Chinese society, they said.专家指出，今年全国公务员考试首次打破“35岁年龄限制”，为公共部门招聘流程建立更包容的机制树立了重要先例。他们表示，这项改革不仅为经验丰富的专业人士拓展了职业发展空间，也为私营企业招聘实践树立了重要标杆，推动全社会践行能力本位的人才选拔机制。This policy adjustment acknowledges the valuable experience and capabilities that professionals in their mid-30s have accumulated, said Zhu Lijia, a professor at the National Academy of Governance.国家行政学院教授朱立佳表示，这项政策调整充分认可了35岁左右专业人才所积累的宝贵经验和能力。Including them in the public service can significantly enhance the quality of government departments, he told China News Service.他告诉中国新闻社，将他们纳入公共服务体系，能够显著提升政府部门的质量。The age limit reform has generated substantial social impact, with many provincial-level civil service exams in regions including Shanghai and the provinces of Sichuan and Jiangsu already adopting similar relaxed age policies. Experts anticipate this trend will expand to more regions and public institution recruitment processes.年龄限制改革引发了显著的社会影响，上海、四川、江苏等地的省级公务员考试已纷纷采取类似放宽年龄的政策。专家预测，这一趋势将扩展至更多地区及公共机构的招聘流程。For many older candidates, the policy change represents a second chance at public service careers. Zhou Ming, a 35-year-old professional working in the internet industry in Guangdong province, expressed renewed hope. "This feels like an opportunity to re-enter the competition when I thought my chances had passed."对许多年长的应聘者而言，这项政策调整意味着重返公共服务岗位的第二次机会。在广东从事互联网行业的35岁专业人士周明（音译）重燃希望：“当我以为机会已经错过时，这感觉像是重新获得竞争资格的契机。”However, challenges persist for older applicants. The exam structure continues to show a strong preference for new graduates, with approximately 66.7 percent of the available positions reserved for recent graduates. This leaves limited options for experienced professionals seeking career transitions.然而，年长申请者仍面临诸多挑战。考试结构持续向应届毕业生倾斜，约66.7%的职位名额专为应届毕业生保留。这使得寻求职业转型的资深专业人士选择有限。Yi Dinghong, from Huatu Education, a training institution for civil service exams, said older candidates often face unique challenges. "They typically balance work and family responsibilities while preparing for examinations," he noted. "However, their extensive work experience and developed competencies in communication, coordination, and stress management provide distinct advantages during interview stages."华图教育公务员培训机构的易定宏指出，年长考生常面临独特挑战。“他们通常需要在备考期间兼顾工作与家庭责任，”他强调，“但丰富的职场经验以及在沟通协调、压力管理方面形成的综合能力，使他们在面试环节具备显著优势。”Ma Liang, professor of Peking University's School of Government, said that as retirement ages extend and educational periods lengthen, people enter the workforce later. Relaxing age restrictions represents an inevitable trend that aligns with evolving workforce demographics.北京大学政府管理学院教授马亮指出，随着退休年龄推迟和受教育年限延长，人们进入劳动力市场的年龄不断推迟。放宽年龄限制是顺应劳动力人口结构变化的必然趋势。Ma further suggested that future adjustments might include the complete removal of age limits, though this will be a gradual process and require corresponding reforms in career advancement systems to ensure fair development opportunities for all employees.马亮进一步建议，未来的调整可能包括完全取消年龄限制，但这将是一个渐进的过程，需要对职业晋升体系进行相应改革，以确保所有员工都能获得公平的发展机会。civil service exam国家公务员考试State Administration of Civil Service国家公务员局

Welcome to Season 5, Episode 48! Our guest is Karin K. Jensen. She's a local news writer for the Alameda Post and the author of the moving memoir The Strength of Water: An Asian American Coming of Age Memoir. It's an award-winning memoir that was recently re-released on November 7th by Sibylline Press. The memoir follows her mother, King Ying, and her Asian American journey… from her childhood in 1920s Detroit to moving back to the village Tai Ting Pong in Guangdong, China, and then back to the US again. Along the way, she faced heaps of hardship while strengthening her resolve to find her slice of happiness. From childhood all the way to adulthood and giving birth to her second daughter (the author of the memoir), it's a moving tale that is an amazing combination of history, lived history, wisdom and tales to inspire. In our conversation, Karin shares a little about her journey to writing her mom's memoir, how it feels to get accolades for your work, her mom's superpower, some of the things she learned from her mom, and so much more. To learn more about Karin, you can visit her website karinkjensen.blog, follow her on instagram @karinkjensen, connect to her linktree, and buy The Strength of Water. If you like what we do, please share, follow, and like us in your podcast directory of choice or on Instagram @AAHistory101. For previous episodes and resources, please visit our site at https://asianamericanhistory101.libsyn.com or our links at http://castpie.com/AAHistory101. If you have any questions, comments or suggestions, email us at info@aahistory101.com.

This week on Sinica, I welcome back Finbarr Bermingham, the Brussels-based Europe correspondent for the South China Morning Post, about the Nexperia dispute — one of the most revealing episodes in the global contest over semiconductor supply chains. Nexperia, a Dutch-headquartered chipmaker owned by Shanghai-listed Wingtech, became the subject of extraordinary government intervention when the Netherlands invoked a Cold War-era emergency law to seize temporary control of the company and suspend its Chinese CEO. Finbarr's reporting, drawing on Dutch court documents and expert sources, has illuminated the tangled threads of this story: preexisting concerns about governance and technology transfer, mounting U.S. pressure on The Hague to remove Chinese management, and the timing of the Dutch action on the very day the U.S. rolled out its affiliate rule. We discuss China's retaliatory export controls on chips packaged at Nexperia's Dongguan facilities, the role of the Trump-Xi meeting in Busan in unlocking a temporary thaw, and what this case reveals about Europe's agonizing position between American pressure and Chinese integration in global production networks.4:34 – Why the "Europe cracks down on Chinese acquisition" framing was too simple 6:17 – The Dutch court's extraordinary tick-tock of events and U.S. lobbying 9:04 – The June pressure from Washington: divestment or the affiliate list 10:13 – Dutch fears of production know-how relocating to China 12:35 – The impossible position: damned if they did, damned if they didn't 14:46 – The obscure Cold War-era Goods Availability Act 17:11 – CEO Zhang Xuezheng and the question of who stopped cooperating first 19:26 – Was China's export control a state policy or a corporate move? 22:16 – Europe's de-risking framework and the lessons from Nexperia 25:39 – The fragmented European response: Germany, France, Hungary, and the Baltics 30:31 – Did Germany shape the response behind the scenes? 33:06 – The Trump-Xi meeting in Busan and the resolution of the crisis 37:01 – Will the Nexperia case deter future European interventions? 40:28 – Is Europe still an attractive market for Chinese investment? 41:59 – The Europe China Forum: unusually polite in a time of tenterhooksPaying it forward: Dewey Sim (SCMP diplomacy desk, Beijing); Coco Feng (SCMP technology, Guangdong); Khushboo Razdan (SCMP North America); Sense Hofstede (Chinese Bossen newsletter)Recommendations: Finbarr: Chokepoints by Edward Fishman; Underground Empire by Henry Farrell and Abe Newman; "What China Wants from Europe" by John Delury (Engelsberg Ideas) Kaiser: The Three Musketeers: D'Artagnan and Milady (2023 French film adaptation)See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Amid the country's call to push an "AI+" initiative for improving scientific and technological strength, a key market player has showcased its latest achievements to power the current artificial intelligence drive.在国家号召推进“AI+”战略、提升科技实力的背景下，一家核心市场参与者亮出最新成果，为当前人工智能发展注入强劲动力。Kingdee International Software Group Co Ltd, a Hong Kong-listed company headquartered in Shenzhen, Guangdong province, showcased the country's first enterprise-levelAI native super entrance —"Xiao K"—which works 24/7 to help businesses reduce labor costs, and upgraded its "Kingdee Cloud" to "Kingdee AI".一家总部位于广东深圳的香港上市公司金蝶国际软件集团有限公司推出国内首个企业级AI原生超级入口——“小K”。该入口全天候24小时运行，可帮助企业降低人力成本，同时将其“金蝶云”升级为“金蝶AI”。Speaking in Shanghai on Nov 4 at Kingdee's Global Changemakers Conference 2025, Kingdee Chairman and CEO Xu Shao chun, said the Kingdee Xiao K has aggregated nearly 20AI native intelligent agents, covering multiple fields such as marketing, supply chain, human resources, finance and environmental, social and governance, all of which can be used out of it.11月4日，在上海举办的2025金蝶全球创变者大会上，金蝶集团董事长兼首席执行官徐少春表示，金蝶小K已整合近20个AI原生智能体。这些智能体覆盖营销、供应链、人力资源、财务及环境、社会和治理（ESG）等多个领域，均可直接调用。He stressed that in the wave of technological advancement, those who are brave enough to change themselves, constantly innovate and have independent thoughts are "changemakers".徐少春强调，在技术进步的浪潮中，勇于自我革新、持续创新且拥有独立思考能力的人，便是“创变者”。The Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued a communique on Oct 23, with an urge to markedly boost China's scientific and technological capabilities by the year 2035. Yin Hejun, minister of science and technology, said on Oct 24 that for this end, the "AI+" initiative will be fully implemented to empower all industries across the board.中国共产党第二十届中央委员会第四次全体会议于10月23日发布公报，提出到2035年显著提升国家科技实力的目标。10月24日，科技部部长阴和俊表示，为实现这一目标，将全面实施“AI+”战略，推动人工智能全方位赋能各行各业。Experts say embracing intelligent transformation and developing new quality productive forces are the most powerful drive in the current era.专家指出，拥抱智能转型、发展新质生产力，是当下时代最强劲的发展动力。Xu said Kingdee, a globally recognized provider of cloud-based enterprise management software as a service solutions by serving over 7.4 million enterprises and government organizations worldwide, will better embrace AI—"said to be the greatest technological revolution in human history".徐少春表示，金蝶作为全球知名的云原生企业管理软件服务解决方案提供商，已服务全球超740万家企业及政府机构。未来，金蝶将更好地拥抱这场“被誉为人类历史上最伟大的技术革命”的人工智能浪潮。Xu said: "This AI revolution is transforming ourselves."徐少春说：“这场人工智能革命正在重塑我们自身。”Founded in 1993 with multiple cloud service products, Kingdee emerged as the highest-scoring Chinese vendor at the Asia-PacificEnterprise Resource Planning Marketscape, which was recently released by International Data Corp.金蝶成立于1993年，拥有多款云服务产品。在国际数据公司近期发布的《亚太地区企业资源规划市场格局报告》中，金蝶成为评分最高的中国厂商。Liu Zhong wen, vice-president of Kingdee China and general manager of R&D center, said AI should not only be a tool for executing commands, but also an intelligent agent that can actively understand business goals and drive the entire process until measurable business results are achieved.金蝶中国副总裁、研发中心总经理刘仲文表示，人工智能不应只是执行指令的工具。更应成为能够主动理解业务目标、推动全流程直至取得可量化业务成果的智能体。"The entire pattern has undergone a fundamental change," he said, noting that "Previously, humans were in the driver's seat and AI was copilot. Now, AI has become the dominant force and humans have become copilot. This is what intelligent agents are."刘仲文表示：“整个格局已经发生根本性转变，”他指出，“过去，人类是主导者，人工智能是辅助者；如今，人工智能成为主导力量，人类转为辅助者——这就是智能体的核心价值。”Chen Ning, chairman and CEO of Shenzhen-based Intellifusion Technologies Co Ltd—one of China's earliest AI chip developers and listed on Shanghai's STAR Market—said: "2025 will be a defining year for AI. Today we stand at the doorstep of the fourth industrial revolution, where algorithms, big models, chips and data have become a series of key elements."中国最早的AI芯片研发企业之一，已在上海科创板上市的深圳云天励飞技术股份有限公司董事长兼首席执行官陈宁表示：“2025年将是人工智能发展的关键一年。我们正站在第四次工业革命的门口，算法、大模型、芯片和数据已成为一系列核心要素。”He added: "It is highly likely that by 2030, humanity will fully enter the fourth industrial revolution represented by AI new quality productive forces."陈宁补充道：“到2030年，人类极有可能全面进入以人工智能新质生产力为代表的第四次工业革命。”Chen noted that in this context, Intellifusion has partnered with Kingdee to launch a deep integration plan called "Core Software Symbiosis", with an aim to connect with 100 Kingdee ecosystem partners by next year and promote 1,000 enterprises to complete the intelligent upgrade of "software + computing power" to AI in the next three years.陈宁表示，在此背景下，云天励飞与金蝶达成合作，推出“软硬共生”深度融合计划。目标是明年接入100家金蝶生态伙伴，并在未来三年内推动1000家企业完成“软件+算力”向人工智能的智能升级。On Aug 18, Kingdee signed a strategic cooperation agreement in Kuala Lumpur with Chin Hin Group Berhad, a diversified construction industry leader in Malaysia, to deepen its global footprint.8月18日，金蝶在吉隆坡与马来西亚多元化建筑行业领军企业振兴集团签署战略合作协议，进一步拓展其全球业务版图。Chiau Haw Choon, president of Chin Hin Group Berhad, said in Shanghai that while over 95 percent of businesses in Malaysia have chosen ERP systems from the United States or Europe, his group chose Kingdee as a partner due to its AI and its ecosystem.振兴集团总裁周豪俊（Chiau Haw Choon）在上海表示，尽管马来西亚95%以上的企业选择欧美企业资源规划系统，但振兴集团因金蝶的人工智能技术及其生态体系，选择与金蝶牵手。"We have come to China and we have seen many implementation projects, and AI is the strategic driving force, representing the engine for enterprises to enter the era of intelligence," he said.周豪俊说：“我们来到中国，考察了众多落地项目，人工智能是战略驱动力，更是企业迈入智能时代的核心引擎。”"We are eager to become a benchmark enterprise in Malaysia, making our successful example a role model for many businesses in Southeast Asia," he said.周豪俊补充道：“我们渴望成为马来西亚的标杆企业，让我们的成功案例成为东南亚众多企业的榜样。”AI native super entranceAI原生超级入口AI native intelligent agentsAI原生智能体Enterprise Resource Planning企业资源规划Core Software Symbiosis“软硬共生”

Hong Kong pedal ace Ceci Lee Sze-wing's successful title defense in the women's road cycling individual event during the ongoing 15th National Games has once again turned the spotlight on the city's cycling team, which is known for its stellar show in premier tournaments.在正在进行的第十五届全运会上，中国香港自行车名将李思颖成功卫冕女子公路自行车个人赛冠军。这一成绩再次让以顶尖赛事出色表现闻名的中国香港自行车队成为焦点。Lee's gold is the second for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region so far in this year's games, and she is also the third athlete from the SAR to triumph more than once at the National Games after Asian cycling legend Wong Kam-po and Olympian Sarah Lee Wai-sze.李思颖的这枚金牌是中国香港特别行政区在本届全运会上斩获的第二枚金牌。她也成为继亚洲自行车传奇人物黄金宝、奥运冠军李慧诗之后，第三位在全运会上多次夺冠的香港特区运动员。While hard work and discipline form the mainstay of Hong Kong cycling team's medal-winning performances, the application of cutting-edge sports technologies developed through the joint efforts of the Chinese mainland and Hong Kong has been a significant contributor to its success.香港自行车队的奖牌成就固然以刻苦训练和严格自律为核心，但内地与香港联合研发的尖端体育科技应用，同样是其成功的重要助力。A central research facility at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, which specializes in developing high-tech aerodynamic and acoustic surroundings, boasts a low-noise wind tunnel that can simulate a cycling race environment.香港科技大学的一处核心研究设施专注于研发高科技气动与声学环境，其中拥有一座低噪音风洞，可模拟自行车比赛场景。This facility, when further empowered by the nation's Tianhe 2 supercomputer in Guangzhou, Guangdong province, can not only improve cyclists' riding postures, but also assist in the development of the most suitable bike design and cycling bodysuit for them.该设施借助广东省广州市的国家“天河二号”超级计算机进一步赋能，不仅能优化运动员的骑行姿态，还能协助研发最适配他们的自行车设计与骑行服。Zhang Xin, director of the university's Aerodynamics and Acoustics Facility, highlighted the importance of using a supercomputer to develop sports technologies. As human muscle tissues and physical conditions constantly change, the computation process is complex and requires the use of a supercomputer, he said.香港科技大学气动与声学实验室主任张欣（音译）强调了利用超级计算机研发体育科技的重要性。他表示，人体肌肉组织和身体状态不断变化，计算过程复杂，必须借助超级计算机完成。Athletes of the Hong Kong cycling team have worn aero-speed suits developed and tested in the wind tunnel to compete at various major sports events, including the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games and the 2022 Asian Games in Hangzhou, Zhejiang province. These bodysuits, tailor-made for each athlete, are estimated to reduce wind drag by an impressive 3 percent.香港自行车队运动员已身着经风洞研发测试的气动速干服，参与了包括2020年东京奥运会、2022年杭州亚运会在内的多项重大体育赛事。这些为每位运动员量身定制的服装，预计可显著降低3%的风阻。Other sports disciplines, such as windsurfing and triathlon, have also employed simulations developed using the supercomputer and the wind tunnel to optimize the postures and movements of athletes.帆板、铁人三项等其他体育项目也运用了超级计算机和风洞研发的模拟技术，优化运动员的动作姿态。During training sessions in Stanley on Hong Kong Island, sensors developed by the university recorded athletes' physical data, which was subsequently analyzed using the supercomputer.在香港岛赤柱的训练期间，该校研发的传感器记录下运动员的身体数据，随后通过超级计算机进行分析。According to Zhang, the Tianhe 2 simulated the wind conditions at the Paris 2024 Olympic Games and provided the information to head coaches of the windsurfing and sailing teams. The supercomputer helped to enhance athletes' posture optimization, as well as design and select equipment, he said.张欣透露，“天河二号”曾模拟2024年巴黎奥运会的风力条件，并将相关数据提供给帆板队和帆船队主教练。超级计算机为运动员的姿态优化、装备设计与选型提供了有力支持。Sports technology cooperation between the mainland and Hong Kong has deepened in recent years, with more agreements signed for further development, serving both professional athletes and the public.近年来，内地与香港的体育科技合作不断深化，签署了更多合作协议推动后续发展，惠及专业运动员与普通民众。In September, Hong Kong Polytechnic University and mainland sportswear brand Li-Ning signed a memorandum of understanding to establish the Li-Ning-PolyU Joint Research Centre for Sports Science, which aims to enhance technological application and promote industrial transformation in the sports and health sectors.9月，香港理工大学与内地运动服装品牌李宁签署合作备忘录，成立“李宁-理大体育科学联合研究中心”，旨在加强体育健康领域的技术应用与产业转型。In Guangzhou, the Nansha Sub-Center of National Supercomputer Center provides the mainland's first supercomputer direct network line for Hong Kong. A dedicated high-speed fiber-optic network from the Tianhe 2 supercomputer is used to link Guangdong and Hong Kong's scientific innovation capabilities, enabling Hong Kong users to swiftly utilize the nation's supercomputing resources. The center has continuously provided support for technological innovation in Hong Kong and Macao.在广州，国家超级计算中心南沙分中心为香港开通了内地首条超级计算机直连网络专线。依托“天河二号”的专用高速光纤网络，链接粤港两地科创力量，让香港用户可快速调用国家超级计算资源。该中心持续为港澳地区的技术创新提供支持。For athletes from Macao and Hong Kong, traveling to the mainland for training and using sports technologies to improve their skills have become common.对于港澳运动员而言，赴内地训练并运用体育科技提升竞技水平已成为常态。Macao athlete Chan Man-hin, who participated in the National Games sailing event last month, said he was equipped with a high-end GPS tracker when he trained on the mainland. The device collected his performance data, including instantaneous speed and direction during sailing, for further analysis to help improve performance, he said.澳门运动员陈敏轩（音译）上月参与了全运会帆船项目，他表示在内地训练时配备了高端GPS追踪器。该设备收集了他航行中的瞬时速度、航向等表现数据，通过进一步分析助力成绩提升。"The piece of equipment allowed me to analyze all the training data and adjust my strategy for the day of the competition," Chan said.“这款设备让我能分析所有训练数据，调整比赛当天的策略，”陈敏轩说。The nation's support for sports development in its special administrative regions extends beyond hardware to include talent cultivation.国家对特区体育发展的支持不仅限于硬件层面，还涵盖人才培养。At Guangzhou Zhongshan Whampoa School for Hong Kong and Macao Students, a base has been established to provide a professional training platform for students from Hong Kong. Selected student athletes receive targeted training in five disciplines — fencing, swimming, equestrian, shooting and running.广州中山黄埔港澳子弟学校设立了专项基地，为香港学生提供专业训练平台。入选的学生运动员将接受击剑、游泳、马术、射击、跑步五个项目的针对性训练。These athletes also get more opportunities to participate directly in competitions at provincial, national and even international levels. By undergoing scientific and systematic training, they can gain recognition of the Sports Federation and Olympic Committee of Hong Kong, China, and have the chance to register as Hong Kong athletes, potentially becoming the city's elite sports representatives.这些运动员还能获得更多直接参与省、国家乃至国际级赛事的机会。通过科学系统的训练，他们有望获得中国香港体育协会暨奥林匹克委员会的认可，注册成为香港运动员，进而成为特区的精英体育代表。aerodynamic/ˌeərəʊdaɪˈnæmɪk/adj.空气动力学的；流线型的optimize/ˈɒptɪmaɪz/v.优化；使最优化

This November, the 15th National Games will electrify Guangdong, Hong Kong, and Macao with a wave of renewed energy. As the nation's elite athletes converge to pursue glory, the Games themselves are redefining tradition. Prepare for a spectacle where cutting-edge technology meets sustainable design, and where the competition program expands with thrilling new events. This is more than a tournament; it's a dynamic new vision for the future of sport. On the show: Steve, Yushan & Yushun

Taller and heavier, but still as precise as she has ever been, China's diving sensation Quan Hong chan refuses to be written off at the elite level just yet as she overcomes severe physical challenges to shine at the 15th National Games.如今的全红婵身形更高、体重更重，但依旧精准如初。这位中国跳水巨星克服重重身体挑战，在第十五届全运会上闪耀赛场，证明自己仍未退出顶尖行列。The nation's quadrennial sporting extravaganza, which has kicked off some of its 419 medal events before Sunday's official opening ceremony, is being held across boundaries for the first time — in Guangdong province and the Hong Kong and Macao special administrative regions.这场四年一度的全国体育盛会，在周日正式开幕前已率先启动419个奖牌项目中的部分赛事。本届全运会首次跨区域举办，覆盖广东省以及香港、澳门特别行政区。After being sidelined from competitions for about half a year due to injuries, Quan, a three-time Olympic gold winner, has returned to the spotlight amid doubts about her current level of preparedness and her future in international competitions, particularly her chances of making it to the 2028 Los Angeles Olympics.作为三届奥运冠军得主，全红婵因伤缺席赛事近半年。回归公众视野之际，外界对她目前的备战状态、国际赛事前景尤其是2028年洛杉矶奥运会的参赛可能性充满疑虑。She is no longer the petite 14-year-old who, at the 2020 Tokyo Games, became one of the youngest Chinese divers to win an Olympic gold, or the more mature teenager who clinched gold twice at the 2024 Paris Games. Her larger body frame and six-month hiatus notwithstanding, Quan, now 18, has maintained the striking quality of her dives.她不再是2020年东京奥运会上那个年仅14岁、成为中国最年轻跳水奥运冠军之一的小姑娘，也不是2024年巴黎奥运会上两夺金牌的成熟少年。尽管如今18岁的她体型变化明显，且阔别赛场半年，但其跳水动作的超高水准依然保持不变。The teen master of the "splash-disappearing technique", which refers to her delicate body control to keep water splashes at the minimum during a dive, delivered once again on Sunday.这位擅长“水花消失术”的少年名将，凭借对身体的精妙控制将跳水时的水花降到最小，在周日的比赛中再度展现了这一绝技。In the women's synchronized 10-meter platform diving team event, Quan made a strong return, partnering with newcomer Wang Wei ying. The duo displayed remarkable synchronicity and composure, earning a top combined score over three rounds and securing the first gold medal in diving for Team Guangdong, successfully defending its National Games title.在女子双人10米台决赛中，全红婵与新秀王伟莹搭档强势回归。两人配合默契、沉着冷静，三轮比赛后总分位居榜首，为广东队斩获跳水项目首金，成功卫冕全运会该项目冠军。Quan's home crowd at the Guangdong Olympic Sports Center Swimming and Diving Hall welcomed her with the loudest cheers, while her legion of social media fans — around 3.75 million on Sina Weibo — celebrated her comeback online.在广东奥林匹克体育中心游泳跳水馆，主场观众为全红婵送上了最热烈的欢呼。她在新浪微博上的约375万粉丝也在网上为其回归喝彩。The hashtag "Quan Hong chan returns to win" garnered nearly 62 million views on Weibo as of Thursday, and she was among the top trending topics related to the National Games on social media.截至周四，“全红婵回归夺冠”的话题在微博上的阅读量接近6200万，她也跻身全运会相关社交媒体热搜榜前列。"I am awesome," Quan herself posted an encouragement on Weibo following Guangdong's team victory.“我超棒的！”广东队夺冠后，全红婵在微博上发文为自己鼓劲。Quan's impressive form despite her injuries signals that she is far from retirement.尽管饱受伤病困扰，全红婵依旧保持着出色状态，这表明她远未到退役之时。Referring to the prospect of diving against her star teammate in the individual event at the 2028 Olympics, Quan's partner Wang said, "I hope I can be her rival. Apparently, she's not recovered to her best form yet, but I hope she will continue working hard on her way back to the peak."谈及2028年奥运会个人项目中与这位明星队友同场竞技的可能性，搭档王伟莹表示：“我希望能成为她的对手。显然她还没恢复到最佳状态，但我期待她能继续努力，重返巅峰。”In 2021, Quan became a household name after winning the 10m platform gold at the Tokyo Olympics, which was deferred because of the COVID-19 pandemic. She redefined the benchmark of elite diving by effortlessly pulling off some of the world's most difficult dives.2021年，因新冠疫情延期举办的东京奥运会上，全红婵夺得10米台金牌，一举成名。她轻松完成多项世界最高难度动作，重新定义了精英跳水的标杆。The pull of gravity felt stronger as Quan grew at least 15 centimeters taller and 10 kilograms heavier by the time of the Paris Olympics. However, she beat the challenges with countless extra hours on her fitness program, which eventually paid rich dividends. Quan edged out national teammate Chen Yu xi to retain her individual title in Paris, and added a third career Olympic gold in the synchro event with Chen.到巴黎奥运会时，全红婵身高至少增长了15厘米，体重增加了10公斤，感受到的地心引力也随之增大。但她通过额外投入无数时间进行体能训练克服了这些挑战，最终收获丰硕成果。在巴黎，全红婵险胜国家队队友陈芋汐，成功卫冕个人项目冠军，并与陈芋汐搭档再夺双人项目金牌，职业生涯奥运金牌数增至三枚。Quan will miss another duel against Chen, who is representing Shanghai, in Monday's individual final, because she hasn't signed up for the event to keep the intensity of her return in check.由于为控制复出强度未报名参加单人项目，全红婵将错过周一与代表上海队出战的陈芋汐的再度对决，后者是该项目的夺冠热门。He Wei yi, head coach of the Guangdong diving team, said that Quan has overcome tougher-than-expected challenges to make it to the National Games. "She is competing while still nursing injuries to her (right) tibia and ankle joints, and her body has kinesiology tapes all over to protect her muscles from overstretching," he said. "It's extremely tough for her, as she endures severe pain every day. She has to apply ice packs to her leg between each round during both practice and competitions."广东跳水队主教练何威仪表示，全红婵为参加全运会克服了超出预期的困难。“她目前仍带着右胫骨和踝关节的伤病参赛，身上贴满了肌效贴以防止肌肉过度拉伸，”他说，“这对她来说极其艰难，每天都要忍受剧烈疼痛。无论是训练还是比赛，每轮间隙她都得给腿部冰敷。”The National Games was Quan's first competition since she last dived competitively at the World Aquatics Diving World Cup Super Final in May in Beijing.此次全运会是全红婵自今年5月北京世界泳联跳水世界杯超级总决赛后，首次重返赛场。Chen, 20, a close friend of Quan, has emerged as a favorite for the individual title at the 2028 Olympics, after she claimed a record-extending fourth world championship title in 10m platform in July in Singapore.20岁的陈芋汐是全红婵的挚友，今年7月在新加坡举行的世锦赛上，她斩获职业生涯第四枚10米台金牌，创造了该项目的纪录，现已成为2028年奥运会单人项目的夺冠大热门。Whether it is Quan making a comeback and reigning supreme again or a mature Chen finishing on top, the intriguing rivalry between the duo is expected to keep the diving world stoked in the run-up to the next Olympics.无论是全红婵强势回归、重登巅峰，还是陈芋汐愈发成熟、独占鳌头，两位选手之间的精彩较量，都有望在下次奥运会前持续点燃跳水界的热情。quadrennialadj.四年一度的/kwəˈdreniəl/synchronizedadj.同步的；双人同步的/ˈsɪŋkrənaɪzd/hiatusn.间隙；暂停；休赛期/haɪˈeɪtəs/

With southern China's culture and cross-regional integration presented in a visual spectacle, a gala ceremony left the entire Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area stoked on Sunday as President Xi Jinping declared the 15th National Games open in Guangzhou, the capital of Guangdong province.上周日，习近平主席在广东省省会广州宣布第十五届全国运动会开幕。这场盛典以视觉盛宴的形式展现了中国南方文化与区域协同发展成果，让整个粤港澳大湾区为之沸腾。Launched in 1959 to promote mass sports participation, China's National Games have opened a new chapter with the groundbreaking 2025 edition, being jointly held for the first time in Guangdong province and the Hong Kong and Macao special administrative regions. The 15th National Games kicked off with great fanfare, celebrating their influence in pulling the Greater Bay Area further together, not just in sports exchanges but also in terms of cultural and economic cohesion.全国运动会始于1959年，旨在推动群众体育参与。2025年第十五届全运会开创性地由广东省与香港、澳门特别行政区首次联合承办，为这一赛事翻开了崭新篇章。本届全运会的盛大开幕，不仅彰显了其在促进大湾区体育交流中的作用，更在文化融合与经济联结层面推动大湾区进一步凝聚，意义深远。After overseeing the parade of athletes and a series of ceremonial rituals, Xi announced the opening of the domestic sporting gala — held once every four years with a competition program similar to that of the Olympics — to rousing cheers from the crowd of over 80,000 at Guangdong Olympic Sports Center Stadium.在检阅运动员方阵、见证一系列仪式环节后，习近平主席宣布这一国内体育盛会正式开幕。全运会每四年举办一届，竞赛项目设置与奥运会相近，现场8万余名观众在广东奥林匹克体育中心体育场内爆发出热烈欢呼。Before attending the ceremony, Xi met on Sunday afternoon in Guangzhou with individuals and representatives of various sports groups, who were honored as role models of mass fitness and competitive sports promotion.开幕仪式前，习近平主席于周日下午在广州会见了获评群众健身与竞技体育推广模范的个人及各类体育团体代表。Kirsty Coventry, the new president of the International Olympic Committee and Thomas Bach, the IOC's honorary president for life, were among guests at the opening ceremony.国际奥委会新任主席柯丝蒂・考文垂与国际奥委会终身名誉主席托马斯・巴赫出席了开幕式。As the largest edition of the games, in numbers of participants and host cities, the Greater Bay Area games feature 419 medal events across 34 sports, involving over 14,000 professional athletes on its competitive program. A parallel mass sports program has also engaged more than 1 million amateurs in preliminary rounds of 166 events since February.本届全运会是参赛人数最多、主办城市最广的一届：竞赛项目涵盖34个大项、419个奖牌项目，有1.4万余名专业运动员参赛；同步开展的群众体育项目自今年2月起已举办166个项目的预选赛，吸引超100万名业余爱好者参与。As an early highlight of the night, a joint delegation of athletes representing Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao marched together at the end of the athletes' parade, drawing warm applause from the crowd.当晚的一大亮点出现在运动员入场仪式尾声——粤港澳联合代表团共同入场，赢得现场观众热烈掌声。As part of an extensive display of the history and culture of Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao, the opening ceremony presented traditional activities and art, ranging from dragon boat racing and lion dances to drum and gong performances in an intriguingly immersive fashion, enhanced by modern technology and dazzling audiovisual effects.开幕式以极具沉浸感的方式，结合现代科技与绚丽视听效果，集中展示了粤港澳三地的历史文化，呈现了龙舟竞渡、舞狮、锣鼓表演等传统活动与艺术形式。The lion dancers brought the crowd to its feet, taking advantage of virtual reality technology that made the performance even more spectacular, before the racing dragon boats drew "oohs" and "aahs" from spectators who, aided by augmented reality technology, felt as if the boats were being paddled into the crowd.舞狮表演借助虚拟现实技术，场面愈发壮观，引得观众起立喝彩；随后的龙舟竞渡环节，在增强现实技术的助力下，观众仿佛看到龙舟向自己驶来，纷纷发出惊叹。During the jubilant performances, iconic landmarks, such as Hong Kong's Victoria Harbour, the Ruins of St. Paul's in Macao and the Canton Tower in Guangzhou, took shape as 3D background projections, showcasing unique attractions of the Greater Bay Area's past and present.在热烈的表演过程中，香港维多利亚港、澳门大三巴牌坊、广州塔等标志性建筑以3D背景投影形式呈现，展现了粤港澳大湾区古今交融的独特魅力。Huang Kunming, a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and Party chief of Guangdong province, delivered a speech in which he extended his warm welcome to all participants.中共中央政治局委员、广东省委书记黄坤明致辞，向全体参与者表示热烈欢迎。"The National Games being held together by Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao will write a new chapter of the integrated development of the Greater Bay Area. We will play a generous host to present a streamlined, safe and splendid sporting extravaganza," he said.他指出：“粤港澳三地共同承办全运会，将书写大湾区协同发展的新篇章。我们将当好东道主，呈现一届简约、安全、精彩的体育盛会。”Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee Ka-chiu and Macao Chief Executive Sam Hou-fai both pledged to build on the games' momentum to further facilitate sports, cultural and economic collaborations across the Greater Bay Area.香港特别行政区行政长官李家超与澳门特别行政区行政长官贺一诚均表示，将借全运会东风，进一步推动粤港澳大湾区在体育、文化、经济领域的合作。"This 15th edition not only represents an innovation of the National Games, but also accelerates Hong Kong's integration into the overall development of the country," Lee said in his speech.李家超在致辞中表示：“第十五届全运会不仅是全运会的一次创新，更将加速香港融入国家发展大局。”Sam said the games "will help build a brighter future of the GBA as yet another example of the significance of the 'one country, two systems' policy".贺一诚则指出：“本届全运会将为大湾区建设更美好的未来注入动力，是‘一国两制'实践意义的又一生动例证。”As a symbolic milestone of the games, the men's road cycling race charted a 230-kilometer route linking Zhuhai, a co-host city in Guangdong, with Hong Kong and Macao on Saturday, marking the first ever cross-boundary sporting event held in the Greater Bay Area.作为本届全运会的标志性事件，男子公路自行车赛于周六开启了一条连接广东协办城市珠海与香港、澳门的230公里赛道，这是粤港澳大湾区首次举办跨境体育赛事。For the exciting finale, three renowned athletes — Hong Kong's Olympic champion fencer Cheung Ka-long, Guangdong's star sprinter Su Bingtian and Macao martial artist Li Yi — completed the final leg of the torch relay before together igniting a flame ring as the games' main cauldron.在激动人心的圣火点燃环节，三位知名运动员——香港奥运击剑冠军张家朗、广东短跑名将苏炳添、澳门武术运动员李毅完成最后一棒火炬传递，共同点燃环形主火炬台，宣告赛事正式启动。cohesion/kəʊˈhiːʒn/n.凝聚力；结合；团结groundbreaking/ˈɡraʊndbreɪkɪŋ/adj.开创性的；突破性的；革新的Immersive/ɪˈmɜːsɪv/adj.沉浸式的；有沉浸感的

Chinese President Xi Jinping has declared the 15th National Games open. Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao are co-hosting the multi-sport event, boosting connectivity across the Greater Bay Area.

Five members of a 21-person family-run syndicate based in northern Myanmar were sentenced to death by a Chinese court on Tuesday for multiple charges, including crimes that resulted in the deaths of six Chinese nationals.周二，中国某法院对缅甸北部一个21人家庭式犯罪团伙中的5名成员判处死刑，其罪名包括致6名中国公民死亡等多项罪行。Two other syndicate members received the death penalty with a two-year reprieve, while five were given life imprisonment. The remaining nine members were sentenced to prison terms ranging from three to 20 years, along with corresponding supplementary penalties such as fines, confiscation of property and deportation, according to the ruling announced by the Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court in Guangdong province.据广东省深圳市中级人民法院宣读的判决结果显示，该团伙另有2名成员被判处死刑、缓期二年执行，5名成员被判处无期徒刑，剩余9名成员被判处3年至20年不等的有期徒刑，同时还被处以罚金、没收财产、驱逐出境等相应附加刑。The court found the defendants guilty of 12 crimes, including fraud, intentional homicide and intentional injury. The court explained the sentences were handed down based on each individual's level of criminal involvement, the specific circumstances of their offenses and the measure of harm caused to society.法院认定，上述被告人犯有诈骗罪、故意杀人罪、故意伤害罪等12项罪名。法院解释称，此次量刑是根据每名被告人的犯罪参与程度、具体犯罪情节以及对社会造成的危害程度依法作出的。Following an investigation, the court said the syndicate, headed by Bay Saw Chain and Bay Yin Chin, used its influence and armed forces in Myanmar's Kokang region to set up 41 compounds through independent and joint development.经调查查明，以白所成、白应苍为首的该犯罪团伙，利用其在缅甸果敢地区的势力及武装力量，通过独立开发与合作开发的方式，设立了41个据点。Having persuaded others to provide funds and armed support, they worked with these financiers and weapons dealers to carry out criminal activities, including telecom fraud, intentional killings, extortion, kidnapping and forcing people into prostitution, the court noted.法院指出，该团伙拉拢他人提供资金与武装支持，并与这些资金提供者及军火商相互勾结，实施电信诈骗、故意杀人、敲诈勒索、绑架、强迫卖淫等犯罪活动。The syndicate's offenses led to the deaths of six Chinese nationals, the suicide of another Chinese national and injuries to several others. The amount of money involved in its gambling and fraud operations exceeded 29 billion yuan ($4 billion).Bay Yin Chin also colluded with others to smuggle and manufacture approximately 11 metric tons of methamphetamine, it added.该团伙的犯罪行为已导致6名中国公民死亡、1名中国公民自杀，另有数人受伤。其涉赌及涉诈骗资金规模超过290亿元人民币（约合40亿美元）。法院补充称，白应苍还伙同他人走私、制造甲基苯丙胺（冰毒）约11吨。The syndicate was found to have committed widespread telecom scams targeting Chinese people since 2015.经查，该团伙自2015年起便针对中国公民实施大规模电信诈骗活动。In November 2023, China's Ministry of Public Security instructed the Shenzhen police to handle the case, and ringleaders Bay Saw Chain and Bay Yin Chin were soon apprehended and handed over to Chinese police.2023年11月，中国公安部指令深圳市警方侦办此案，团伙头目白所成、白应苍随后被迅速抓获，并移交中国警方。In recent years, with intensified joint law enforcement cooperation and anti-fraud operations between China and Myanmar, a number of cases have entered the judicial system. For instance, in late September, a court in Zhejiang province convicted 39 members of another family-run syndicate based in northern Myanmar of 14 offenses, including fraud and intentional homicide. Among them, 11 defendants were sentenced to death.近年来，随着中国与缅甸加强联合执法合作及反诈骗行动，多起跨境犯罪案件已进入司法审理程序。例如，9月底，浙江省某法院对缅甸北部另一个家庭式犯罪团伙的39名成员作出判决，认定该团伙犯有诈骗罪、故意杀人罪等14项罪名，其中11名被告人被判处死刑。Data released by the Ministry of Public Security in July showed Chinese police had solved nearly 1.74 million cases of telecom fraud during the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-25) period. The joint operations dismantled more than 2,000 overseas fraud centers and led to the capture of over 80,000 suspects.中国公安部7月发布的数据显示，“十四五”规划期间（2021-2025年），中国警方已破获电信诈骗案件近174万起。通过联合行动，警方捣毁境外诈骗窝点超2000个，抓获犯罪嫌疑人逾8万名。syndicate/ˈsɪndɪkət/n.犯罪团伙

Twenty-one members of a family-run syndicate based in northern Myanmar were sentenced on Tuesday by a Chinese court in Guangdong province for multiple offences, including the deaths of six Chinese nationals.周二，广东省一家中国法院对缅甸北部一个家族式犯罪团伙的21名成员作出判决，该团伙犯下多项罪行，其中包括导致6名中国公民死亡。The Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court found the defendants guilty of 12 offenses, including fraud, intentional killing and intentional injury, with individual sentences handed down in line with the degree of criminal involvement, specific circumstances and the measure of harm caused to society.深圳市中级人民法院认定被告人犯有诈骗罪、故意杀人罪、故意伤害罪等12项罪名。法院根据各被告人的犯罪参与程度、具体犯罪情节以及对社会造成的危害程度，依法分别作出判决。Five people, including ringleaders Bay Saw Chain and Bay Yin Chin, were sentenced to death. Two others received the death penalty with a two-year reprieve, while five were given life imprisonment.包括团伙头目白所成和白应苍在内的5人被判处死刑；另外2人被判处死刑，缓期2年执行；5人被判处无期徒刑。The remaining defendants were sentenced to prison terms ranging from three to 20 years. Fines, the confiscation of assets and deportation orders were also issued by the court.其余被告人被判处3年至20年不等的有期徒刑。法院同时还作出了判处罚金、没收财产以及驱逐出境的裁定。The court said that the criminal group had used its influence in Myanmar's Kokang region and relied on armed force to establish 41 scam compounds. Having attracted others to provide funds and armed support, they then worked with these financiers to carry out criminal activities, including telecom fraud, intentional homicide, kidnapping, extortion, casino operation, organizing illegal border crossings and forcing people into prostitution.法院称，该犯罪集团利用其在缅甸果敢地区的势力，并依靠武装力量建立了41个诈骗窝点。该团伙拉拢他人提供资金和武装支持，随后与这些资助者勾结，实施多种犯罪活动，包括电信诈骗、故意杀人、绑架、敲诈勒索、开设赌场、组织他人偷越国（边）境以及强迫卖淫等。Their criminal activities led to the deaths of six Chinese nationals, the suicide of another, and injuries to several others, with the amounts involved in gambling and fraud exceeding 29 billion yuan ($4.06 billion), the court heard.法院审理查明，该团伙的犯罪活动导致6名中国公民死亡、1名中国公民自杀，另有数人受伤；其涉赌、涉骗金额超过290亿元人民币（约合40.6亿美元）。In addition, Bay Yin Chin colluded with others to smuggle and manufacture approximately 11 tons of methamphetamine.此外，白应苍还与他人勾结，走私、制造甲基苯丙胺（冰毒）约11吨。Chinese legislators, political advisers and families of the defendants were among those who attended Tuesday's sentencing.中国的人大代表、政协委员以及部分被告人的家属出席了周二的宣判仪式。syndicate/ˈsɪndɪkət/n.犯罪集团reprieve/rɪˈpriːv/n.缓刑；暂缓执行methamphetamine/ˌmeθæmˈfetəmiːn/n.甲基苯丙胺

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Wuhan Campaign. As Japanese forces pressed toward central China, Chiang Kai-shek faced a brutal choice: defend Wuhan with costly sieges or unleash a dangerous flood to buy time. The Yellow River breached its banks at Huayuankou, sending a wall of water racing toward villages, railways, and fields. The flood did not erase the enemy; it bought months of breathing room for a battered China, but at a terrible toll to civilians who lost homes, farms, and lives. Within Wuhan's orbit, a mosaic of Chinese forces struggled to unite. The NRA, split into competing war zones and factions, numbered about 1.3 million but fought with uneven equipment and training. The Japanese, deploying hundreds of thousands, ships, and air power, pressed from multiple angles: Anqing, Madang, Jiujiang, and beyond, using riverine forts and amphibious landings to turn the Yangtze into a deadly artery. Yet courage endured as troops held lines, pilots challenged the skies, and civilians, like Wang Guozhen, who refused to betray his country, chose defiance over surrender. The war for Wuhan was not a single battle but a testament to endurance in the face of overwhelming odds.   #173 The Fall of Wuhan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the last episode we began the Battle of Wuhan. Japan captured Anqing and gained air access to Jiujiang, Chinese defenses around the Yangtze River were strained. The southern Yangtze's Ninth War Zone held two key garrisons: one west of Poyang Lake and another in Jiujiang. To deter Japanese assault on Jiujiang, China fortified Madang with artillery, mines, and bamboo booms. On June 24, Japan conducted a surprise Madang landing while pressing south along the Yangtze. Madang's fortress withstood four assaults but suffered heavy bombardment and poison gas. Chinese leadership failures contributed to the fall: Li Yunheng, overseeing Madang, was away at a ceremony, leaving only partial contingents, primarily three battalions from marine corps units and the 313th regiment of the 53rd division, participating, totaling under five battalions. Reinforcements from Pengze were misrouted by Li's orders, arriving too late. Madang fell after three days. Chiang Kai-shek retaliated with a counterattack and rewarded units that recaptured Xiangshan, but further progress was blocked. Li Yunheng was court-martialed, and Xue Weiying executed.   Madang's loss opened a corridor toward Jiujiang. The Japanese needed weeks to clear minefields, sacrificing several ships in the process. With roughly 200,000 Chinese troops in the Jiujiang–Ruichang zone under Xue Yue and Zhang Fukui, the Japanese captured Pengze and then Hukou, using poison gas again during the fighting. The Hukou evacuation cut off many non-combat troops, with over 1,800 of 3,100 soldiers successfully evacuated and more than 1,300 missing drowned in the lake. Two weeks after Hukou's fall, the Japanese reached Jiujiang and overtook it after a five-day battle. The retreat left civilians stranded, and the Jiujiang Massacre followed: about 90,000 civilians were killed, with mass executions of POWs, rapes, and widespread destruction of districts, factories, and transport. Subsequently, the Southern Riverline Campaign saw Japanese detachments along the river advance westward, capturing Ruichang, Ruoxi, and other areas through October, stretching Chinese defenses thin as Japan pressed toward Wuchang and beyond. On July 26, 1938, the Japanese occupied Jiujiang and immediately divided their forces into three routes: advancing toward De'an and Nanchang, then striking Changsha, severing the Yue-Han Railway, and surrounding Wuhan in an effort to annihilate the Chinese field army. The advance of the 101st and 106th Infantry Divisions slowed south of the Yangtze River, yet the Central China Expeditionary Army remained intent on seizing Ruichang and De'an to cut off Chinese forces around Mount Lu. To this end, the 9th and 27th Infantry Divisions were deployed to the sector, with the 9th regarded as an experienced unit that had fought in earlier campaigns, while the 27th was newly formed in the summer of 1938; this contrast underscored the rapidly expanding scope of the war in China as the Japanese Army General Staff continued mobilizing reservists and creating new formations. According to the operational plan, the 101st and 106th Divisions would push south toward De'an to pin Chinese defenders, while the 9th and 27th Divisions would envelop Chinese forces south of the river. Okamura Yasuji ordered five battalions from the 9th to move toward De'an via Ruichang, and the Hata Detachment was tasked with securing the area northwest of Ruichang to protect the 9th's flank. North of the Yangtze, the 6th Infantry Division was to move from Huangmei to Guangji, with Tianjiazhen as the ultimate objective; capturing Tianjiazhen would allow the 11th Army to converge on Wuhan from both north and south of the river.  The operation began when the 9th Division landed at Jiujiang, threatening the left flank of the Jinguanqiao line. The Chinese responded by deploying the 1st Corps to counter the 9th Division's left flank, which threatened the Maruyama Detachment's lines of communication. The Maruyama Detachment counterattacked successfully, enabling the rest of the 9th Division to seize Ruichang on August 24; on the same day, the 9th attacked the 30th Army defending Mount Min. The Chinese defense deteriorated on the mountain, and multiple counterattacks by Chinese divisions failed, forcing the 1st Corps to retreat to Mahuiling. The seizure of Ruichang and the surrounding area was followed by a wave of atrocities, with Japanese forces inflicting substantial casualties, destroying houses, and damaging property, and crimes including murder, rape, arson, torture, and looting devastating many villages and livelihoods in the Ruichang area. After Ruichang and Mount Min fell, the Maruyama Detachment and the 106th Infantry Division advanced on Mahuiling, seeking to encircle Chinese forces from the northwest, with the 106th forming the inner ring and the Maruyama Detachment the outer ring; this coordination led to Mahuiling's fall on September 3. The 27th Infantry Division, arriving in late August, landed east of Xiaochikou, providing the manpower to extend Japanese offensives beyond the Yangtze's banks and outflank Chinese defenders along the river. Its main objective was to seize the Rui-wu highway, a vital route for the continued advance toward Wuhan. After the fall of Mahuiling, Japanese command altered its strategy. The 11th Army ordered the Maruyama Detachment to rejoin the 9th Infantry Division and press westward, while the 101st Infantry Division was to remain at Mahuiling and push south toward De'an along with the 106th Infantry Division. This divergent or “eccentric” offensive aimed to advance on Wuhan while protecting the southern flank. The renewed offensive began on September 11, 1938, with the 9th Infantry Division and Hata Detachment advancing west along the Rui-yang and Rui-wu highways toward Wuhan, followed days later by the 27th Infantry Division. Initially, the Japanese made solid progress from Ruichang toward a line centered on Laowuge, but soon faced formidable Chinese defenses. The 9th and 27th Divisions confronted the Chinese 2nd Army Corps, which had prepared in-depth positions in the mountains west of Sanchikou and Xintanpu. The 27th Division encountered stiff resistance from the 18th and 30th Corps, and although it captured Xiaoao by September 24, its vanguard advancing west of Shujie came under heavy attack from the 91st, 142nd, 60th, and 6th Reserve Infantry Divisions, threatening to encircle it. Only the southward advance of the 101st and 106th Divisions relieved the pressure, forcing the Chinese to redeploy the 91st and 6th Reserve Divisions to the south and thereby loosening the 27th's grip. After the redeployment, the 9th and 27th Divisions resumed their push. The 9th crossed the Fu Shui on October 9 and took Sanjikou on October 16, while the 27th seized Xintanpu on October 18. The Hata Detachment followed, capturing Yangxin on October 18 and Ocheng on October 23, further tightening Japanese control over the highways toward Wuhan. By mid-October, 11th Army commander Okamura Yasuji resolved to sever the Guangzhou-Hankou railway to disrupt Chinese lines. On October 22, the 9th and 27th Divisions attacked toward Jinniu and Xianning. By October 27, the 9th had captured Jinniu and cut the railway; the 27th Division extended the disruption further south. These actions effectively isolated Wuchang from the south, giving the Imperial Japanese Army greater leverage over the southern approaches to Wuhan. The push south by the 101st and 106th Infantry Divisions pressed toward De'an, where they encountered the entrenched Chinese 1st Army Corps. The offensive began on September 16 and by the 24th, elements of the 27th Division penetrated deep into the area west of Baishui Street and De'an's environs. Recognizing the growing crisis, Xue Yue mobilized the nearby 91st and 142nd Divisions, who seized Nanping Mountain along the Ruiwu Line overnight, effectively cutting off the 27th Division's retreat. Fierce combat on the 25th and 26th saw Yang Jialiu, commander of the 360th Regiment of the 60th Division, die a heroic death. Zhang Zhihe, chief of staff of the 30th Group Army and an underground CCP member, commanded the newly formed 13th Division and the 6th Division to annihilate the Suzuki Regiment and recapture Qilin Peak. Learning of the 27th Division's trap, Okamura Yasuji panicked and, on the 25th, urgently ordered the 123rd, 145th, and 147th Infantry Regiments and mountain artillery of the 106th Division on the Nanxun Line, along with the 149th Regiment of the 101st Division on the Dexing Line, to rush to Mahuiling and Xingzi. To adapt to mountain warfare, some units were temporarily converted to packhorse formations. On the 27th, the 106th Division broke through the Wutailing position with force, splitting into two groups and pushing toward Erfangzheng and Lishan. By the 28th, the three regiments and mountain artillery of the 106th Division advanced into the mountain villages of Wanjialing, Leimingguliu, Shibaoshan, Nantianpu, Beixijie, and Dunshangguo, about 50 li west of De'an. On the same day, the 149th Regiment of the 101st Division entered the Wanjialing area and joined the 106th Division. Commanded by Lieutenant General Junrokuro Matsuura, the 106th Division sought to break out of Baicha and disrupt the Nanwu Highway to disrupt the Chinese retreat from De'an. At this juncture, Xue Yue's corps perceived the Japanese advance as a predatory, wolf-like maneuver and deemed it a strategic opportunity to counterattack. He resolved to pull forces from Dexing, Nanxun, and Ruiwu to envelop the enemy near Wanjialing, with the aim of annihilating them. Thus began a desperate, pivotal battle between China and Japan in northern Jiangxi, centered on the Wanjialing area. The Japanese 106th Division found its rear communications cut off around September 28, 1938, as the Chinese blockade tightened. Despite the 27th Division's severed rear and its earlier defeat at Qilin Peak, Okamura Yasuji ordered a renewed push to relieve the besieged 106th by directing the 27th Division to attack Qilin Peak and advance east of Baishui Street. In this phase, the 27th Division dispatched the remnants of its 3rd Regiment to press the assault on Qilin Peak, employing poison gas and briefly reaching the summit. On September 29, the 142nd Division of the 32nd Army, under Shang Zhen, coordinated with the 752nd Regiment of the same division to launch a fierce counterattack on Qilin Peak at Zenggai Mountain west of Xiaoao. After intense fighting, they reclaimed the peak, thwarting the 27th Division's bid to move eastward to aid the 106th. Concurrently, a portion of the 123rd Regiment of the 106th Division attempted a breakout west of Baishui Street. Our 6th and 91st Divisions responded with a determined assault from the east of Xiaoao, blocking the 123rd Regiment east of Baishui Street. The victories at Qilin Peak and Baishui Street halted any merger between the eastern and western Japanese forces, enabling the Chinese army to seal the pocket and create decisive conditions for encircling the 106th Division and securing victory in the Battle of Wanjialing. After the setback at Qilin Peak, Division Commander Masaharu Homma, defying Okamura Yasuji's orders to secure Baishui Street, redirected his focus to Tianhe Bridge under a pretext of broader operations. He neglected the heavily encircled 106th Division and pivoted toward Xintanpu. By September 30, Chinese forces attacked from both the east and west, with the 90th and 91st Divisions joining the assault on the Japanese positions. On October 1, the Japanese, disoriented and unable to pinpoint their own unit locations, telegrammed Okamura Yasuji for air support. On October 2, the First Corps received orders to tighten the encirclement and annihilate the enemy forces. Deployments were made to exploit a numerical advantage and bolster morale, placing the Japanese in a desperate position. On October 3, 1938, the 90th and 91st Divisions launched a concerted attack on Nantianpu, delivering heavy damage to the Japanese force and showering Leimingguliu with artillery fire that endangered the 106th Division headquarters. By October 5, Chinese forces reorganized: the 58th Division of the 74th Army advanced from the south, the 90th Division of the 4th Army from the east, portions of the 6th and 91st Divisions from the west, and the 159th and 160th Divisions of the 65th Army from the north, tightening the surrounding cordon from four directions. On October 6, Xue Yue ordered a counterattack, and by October 7 the Chinese army had effectively cut off all retreat routes. That evening, after fierce hand-to-hand combat, the 4th Army regained the hilltop, standing at a 100-meter-high position, and thwarted any Japanese plan to break through Baicha and sever Chinese retreat toward De'an. By October 8, Lieutenant Colonel Sakurada Ryozo, the 106th Division's staff officer, reported the division's deteriorating situation to headquarters. The telegram signaled the impending collapse of the 106th Division. On October 9, Kuomintang forces recaptured strategic positions such as Lishan, tightening encirclement to a small pocket of about three to four square kilometers in Nantianpu, Leimingguliu, and Panjia. That night, the vanguard attacked the Japanese 106th Division's headquarters at Leimingguliu, engaging in close combat with the Japanese. Matsuura and the division's staff then took up arms in defense. In the early hours of October 10, Japanese forces launched flares that illuminated only a narrow arc of movement, and a limited number of troops fled northwest toward Yangfang Street. The two and a half month battle inflicted tremendous casualties on the Japanese, particularly on the 101st and 106th divisions. These two formations began with a combined strength of over 47,000 troops and ultimately lost around 30,000 men in the fighting. The high casualty rate hit the Japanese officer corps especially hard, forcing General Shunroku Hata to frequently airdrop replacement officers onto the besieged units' bases throughout the engagement. For the Chinese, the successful defense of Wanjialing was pivotal to the Wuhan campaign.  Zooming out at a macro level a lot of action was occurring all over the place. Over in Shandong, 1,000 soldiers under Shi Yousan, who had defected multiple times between rival warlord cliques and operated as an independent faction, occupied Jinan and held it for a few days. Guerrillas briefly controlled Yantai. East of Changzhou extending to Shanghai, another non-government Chinese force, led by Dai Li, employed guerrilla tactics in the Shanghai suburbs and across the Huangpu River. This force included secret society members from the Green Gang and the Tiandihui, who conducted executions of spies and perceived traitors, losing more than 100 men in the course of operations. On August 13, members of this force clandestinely entered the Japanese air base at Hongqiao and raised a Chinese flag. Meanwhile, the Japanese Sixth Division breached the defensive lines of Chinese 31st and 68th Armies on July 24 and captured Taihu, Susong, and Huangmei Counties by August 3. As Japanese forces advanced westward, the Chinese Fourth Army of the Fifth War Zone deployed its main strength in Guangji, Hubei, and Tianjia Town to intercept the offensive. The 11th Army Group and the 68th Army were ordered to form a defensive line in Huangmei County, while the 21st and 29th Army Groups, along with the 26th Army, moved south to outflank the Japanese. The Chinese recaptured Taihu on August 27 and Susong on August 28. However, with Japanese reinforcements arriving on August 30, the Chinese 11th Army Group and the 68th Army were unable to sustain counteroffensives and retreated to Guangji County to continue resisting alongside the 26th, 55th, and 86th Armies. The Chinese Fourth Army Group directed the 21st and 29th Army Groups to flank the Japanese from the northeast of Huangmei, but they failed to halt the Japanese advance. Guangji fell on September 6, and while Guangji was recovered by the Chinese Fourth Corps on September 8, Wuxue was lost on the same day. Zooming back in on the Wuhan Front, the Japanese focus shifted to Tianjiazhen. The fortress of Tianjiazhen represented the 6th Infantry Division's most important objective. Its geographic position, where the Yangtze's two banks narrow to roughly 600 meters, with cliffs and high ground overlooking the river, allowed Chinese forces to deploy gun batteries that could control the river and surrounding terrain. Chinese control of Tianjiazhen thus posed a serious obstacle to Japan's amphibious and logistical operations on the Yangtze, and its seizure was deemed essential for Japan to advance toward Wuhan. Taking Tianjiazhen would not be easy: overland approaches were impeded by mountainous terrain on both sides of the fortress, while an amphibious assault faced fortified positions and minefields in the narrow river. Recognizing its strategic importance, Chinese forces reinforced Tianjiazhen with three divisions from central government troops, aiming to deter an overland assault. Chinese preparations included breaching several dykes and dams along the Yangtze to flood expanses of land and slow the Japanese advance; however, the resulting higher water levels widened the river and created a more accessible supply route for the Japanese. Instead of relying on a long overland route from Anqing to Susong, the Japanese could now move supplies directly up the Yangtze from Jiujiang to Huangmei, a distance of only about 40 kilometers, which boosted the 6th Division's logistics and manpower. In August 1938 the 6th Infantry Division resumed its northward push, facing determined resistance from the 4th Army Corps entrenched in a narrow defile south of the Dabie Mountains, with counterattacks from the 21st and 27th Army Groups affecting the 6th's flank. The Dabie Mountains are a major mountain range located in central China. Running northwest to southeast, they form the main watershed between the Huai and Yangtze rivers. The range also marks the boundary between Hubei Province and its neighboring provinces of Henan to the north and Anhui to the east. By early September the 6th had captured Guangji, providing a staging ground for the thrust toward Tianjiazhen, though this extended the division's long flank: after Guangji fell, it now faced a 30-kilometer front between Huangmei and Guangji, exposing it to renewed Chinese pressure from the 21st and 27th Army Groups. This constrained the number of troops available for the main objective at Tianjiazhen. Consequently, the Japanese dispatched only a small force, three battalions from the Imamura Detachment, to assault Tianjiazhen, betting that the fortress could be taken within a week. The KMT, learning from previous defeats, reinforced Tianjiazhen with a stronger infantry garrison and built obstacles, barbed wire, pillboxes, and trench networks, to slow the assault. These defenses, combined with limited Japanese logistics, six days of rations per soldier, made the operation costly and precarious. The final Japanese assault was postponed by poor weather, allowing Chinese forces to press counterattacks: three Chinese corps, the 26th, 48th, and 86th, attacked the Imamura Detachment's flank and rear, and by September 18 these attacks had begun to bite, though the floods of the Yangtze prevented a complete encirclement of the eastern flank. Despite these setbacks, Japanese riverine and ground operations continued, aided by naval support that moved up the Yangtze as Matouzhen's batteries were overtaken. After Matouzhen fell and enabled a secure riverine supply line from Shanghai to Guangji, 11th Army commander Okamura Yasuji quickly sent relief supplies upriver on September 23. These replenishments restored the besieged troops near Tianjiazhen and allowed the Japanese to resume the offensive, employing night assaults and poison gas to seize Tianjiazhen on September 29, 1938, thereby removing a major barrier to their advance toward Wuhan along the Yangtze. The 11th Army pressed north along the Yangtze while the 2nd Army, commanded by Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni, concentrated the 3rd, 10th, 13th, and 16th Infantry Divisions around Hefei with initial aims at Lu'an and Heshan and the broader objective of moving toward the northern foothills of the Dabie Mountains. When Chinese forces began destroying roads west of Lu'an, Naruhiko shifted the 2nd Army's plan. Rather than pushing along a line from Lu'an to Heshan, he redirected toward the Huangchuan–Shangcheng corridor, where more intact roads remained accessible, and Chinese withdrawals in the Huangchuan–Shangceng area to counter the 11th Army's Yangtze advance allowed the 2nd Army to gain speed in the early stage of its offensive. The 10th and 13th Infantry Divisions were ordered to begin their advance on August 27, facing roughly 25,000 Chinese troops from the Fifth War Zone's 51st and 77th Corps, and achieving notable early gains. The 10th captured Lu'an on August 28, followed by the 13th taking Heshan on August 29. The 10th then seized Kushi on September 7. Meanwhile, the 13th crossed the Shi River at night in an attempt to seize Changbailing, but encountered stiff resistance from multiple Chinese divisions that slowed its progress. To bolster the effort, Naruhiko ordered the Seiya Detachment from the 10th Division—three infantry battalions—to reinforce the 13th. Despite these reinforcements, momentum remained insufficient, so he deployed the 16th Infantry Division, which had arrived at Yenchiachi, to assault Shangcheng from the north. After crossing the Shi River at Yanjiachi, the 16th outflanked Shangcheng from the north, coordinating with the 13th from the south; the Chinese withdrew and Shangcheng fell. Following this success, Naruhiko ordered the 13th and 16th Divisions to push deeper into the Dabie Mountains toward Baikou and Songfu, while the 10th and 3rd Divisions moved toward Leshan and Xinyang, with Xinyang, a crucial Beijing–Wuhan Railway node, representing a particularly important objective. The Japanese advance progressed steadily through the Dabie Mountains, with the 10th executing bold maneuvers to outflank Leshan from the south and the 3rd penetrating toward the Beijing–Wuhan railway north of Xinyang, collectively disrupting and cutting the railway near Xinyang in October. An independent unit, the Okada Detachment, operated between these forces, advancing through Loshan before sealing Xinyang on October 12. The seizure of Xinyang effectively severed Wuhan's northern artery from external reinforcement and resupply, signaling a decisive turn against Wuhan as a Chinese stronghold. While the 2nd Army advanced in the Dabie Mountains, another critical development was taking place far to the south. By the end of 1937, southern China became more crucial to the Republic of China as a lifeline to the outside world. Guangzhou and Hong Kong served as some of the last vital transportation hubs and sources of international aid for Chiang Kai-Shek, with approximately 80 percent of supplies from abroad reaching Chinese forces in the interior through Guangzhou. Imperial General Headquarters believed that a blockade of Guangdong province would deprive China of essential war materiel and the ability to prolong the war. As I always liked to term it, the Japanese were trying to plug up the leaks of supplies coming into China, and Guangzhou was the largest one. In 1936 the Hankow-Canton railway was completed, and together with the Kowloon-Canton railway formed a rapid all-rail link from south China to central and northern China. For the first sixteen months of the war, about 60,000 tons of goods transited per month through the port of Hong Kong. The central government also reported the import of 1.5 million gallons of gasoline through Hong Kong in 1938, and more than 700,000 tons of goods would eventually reach Hankou using the new railway. In comparison, the Soviet Union in 1937 was sending war materiel through Xinjiang to Lanzhou using camels, with Chinese raw materials traveling back either the same route or via Hong Kong to Vladivostok. By 1940, 50,000 camels and hundreds of trucks were transporting 2,000–3,000 tons of Soviet war material per month into China. Japanese planning for operations began in early November 1937, with the blockade's objectives centered on seizing a portion of Daya Bay and conducting air operations from there. In December 1937, the 5th Army, including the 11th Division, the Formosa Mixed Brigade, and the 4th Air Brigade, were activated in Formosa under Lt. Gen. Motoo Furusho to achieve this objective. Due to the proximity of Daya Bay to Hong Kong, the Japanese government feared potential trouble with Britain, and the operation was subsequently suspended, leading to the deactivation of the 5th Army. By June 1938, the Battle of Wuhan convinced Imperial General Headquarters that the fighting could not be localized. The headquarters reversed policy and began preparations to capture Guangzhou and to expedite the settlement of the war. During the peak of the battles of Shanghai and Nanjing, urgent demands for aerial support at the Battle of Taiyuan in the north and at Canton in the south forced the Nationalist Air Force of China to split the 28th Pursuit Squadron and the 5th Pursuit Group , based at Jurong Airbase in the Nanking defense sector. The squadron was divided into two smaller units: Lt. Arthur Chin led one half toward Canton, while Capt. Chan Kee-Wong led the other half to Taiyuan. On September 27, 1937, the 28th PS under Lt. Arthur Chin dispatched four Hawk IIs from Shaoguan Airbase, and the 29th PS under Lt. Chen Shun-Nan deployed three Hawk IIIs from Tianhe Airbase. Their mission was to intercept Japanese IJNAF G3M bombers attempting to strike the Canton–Hankow railway infrastructure. The two flights engaged the Japanese bombers over Canton, claiming at least two kills; one G3M dumped fuel and ditching off the coast of Swatow, with its crew rescued by a British freighter, though one of the gunners died of battle injuries. In October 1937, amid mounting demands and combat losses, the Chinese government ordered 36 Gloster Gladiator Mk.I fighters, whose performance and firepower surpassed that of the Hawk IIs and IIIs, and most of these would become frontline fighters for the Canton defense sector as the war extended into 1938. On February 23, 1938, Capt. John Huang Xinrui, another Chinese-American volunteer pilot, took command of the renewed 29th PS, now equipped with the Gladiators. He led nine Gladiators from Nanxiong Airbase on their first active combat over Canton, supporting three Gladiators from the 28th PS as they intercepted thirteen Nakajima E8N fighter-attack seaplanes launched from the seaplane tenders Notoro Maru and Kinugasa Maru. The battle proved challenging: most of the Gladiators' machine guns jammed, severely reducing their firepower. Despite this, five of the E8Ns were shot down, confirmed by Capt. Huang and his fellow pilots who managed to strike the Japanese aircraft with only one, two, or three functioning guns per Gladiator. Chin later revealed that the gun jams were caused by defective Belgian-made ammunition. The combat nevertheless proved tragic and costly: Lt. Xie Chuanhe (Hsieh Chuan-ho) and his wingman Lt. Yang Rutong pursued the E8Ns but were stymied by inoperable weapons, with Lt. Yang killed in the counterattack, and Lt. Chen Qiwei lost under similar circumstances. The 4th War Area Army, commanded by He Yingqin, was assigned to the defense of south China in 1938. General Yu Hanmou led the 12th Army Group defending Guangdong province. The region's defense included about eight divisions and two brigades of regular army troops stationed around Guangzhou, with an additional five divisions of regular troops deployed in Fujian. The 4th War Area Army totaled roughly 110,000 regular army troops. By this time, most regular army units in Guangxi and four Guangdong divisions had been redirected north to participate in the Battle of Wuhan. Beyond the regular army, two militia divisions were deployed near Guangzhou, and the Guangxi militia comprised five divisions. Militia units were typically raised from local civilians and disbanded as the army moved through new areas. Their roles centered on security, supply transportation, and reconnaissance. Guangdong's main defensive strength was concentrated in Guangzhou and the immediate environs to the city's east. Other Chinese forces defended Chaozhou and western Guangdong. Defensive fortifications included the Humen fortress guarding the Pearl River mouth and three defensive lines near Daya Bay. Guangzhou housed three batteries of four three-inch guns, a battery of three 120mm guns, and Soviet-supplied 37mm anti-aircraft guns. The Imperial Japanese Navy conducted an aerial and naval interdiction campaign aimed at China's communication lines to neighboring regions. Japan believed that the blockade would hasten the end of the war, and disruption of the Chinese logistics network was the primary objective in Guangdong province from August 1937 until October 1938. The 5th Fleet's blockading actions extended along the coast from Haimenchen, Zhejiang to Shantou, with the 5th Destroyer Squadron patrolling the coast south of Shantou. At times, units from the Marianas were deployed to support coastal blockade operations in south China, usually consisting of cruisers accompanied by destroyer flotillas. One or two aircraft carriers and fleet auxiliaries would also be on station. Naval interdictions focused on stopping junks ferrying military supplies from Hong Kong to coastal China. The first recorded attack occurred in September 1937 when eleven junks were sunk by a Japanese submarine. Although Japan successfully blockaded Chinese shipping and ports, foreign shipping could still enter and depart from Hong Kong. The central government had established Hong Kong as a warehouse for munitions and supplies to pass through. Aerial interdictions targeted Chinese railway bridges and trains in Guangdong. Starting in October 1937, the Japanese launched air raids against the Sunning railway, focusing on government facilities and bridges in Jiangmen and towns along the railway. By 1938, airstrikes against the Kowloon–C Canton railway became common, with damaged trains periodically found along the line. An air-defense early warning system was created to divert trains during raids into forested areas that offered overhead concealment. In May 1938, the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office approved a Chinese request to construct and operate a locomotive repair yard within the New Territories to keep the railway operational. Airstrikes against rail facilities in Guangzhou were designed to interrupt rail supplies from Hong Kong so Japan would not need to commit to land operations in south China. However, the air raids did not severely impede railway operations or stop supplies moving through Hunan or Guangxi. The blockade in south China also targeted aircraft flying out of Hong Kong. In November 1937, a Royal Navy aircraft from HMS Eagle encountered Japanese naval anti-aircraft fire off the coast of Hong Kong. In December 1937, fifteen Japanese bombers overflew Lantau Island and the Taikoo docks. In August 1938, Japanese naval aircraft shot down a China National Aviation Corporation passenger plane, and two Eurasia Aviation Corporation passenger planes were shot down the following month. Beyond military targets, the Japanese conducted politically motivated terror bombing in Guangzhou. Bombing intensified from May to June 1938 with incendiary munitions and low-level strafing attacks against ships. The Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service, operating from Formosa and the carrier Kaga, conducted about 400 airstrikes during this period and continued into July. By the end of the summer, Guangzhou's population had dwindled to approximately 600,000 from an original 1.3 million. From August 1937 to October 1938, casualties in Guangzhou were estimated at 6,000 killed and 8,000 injured. On October 12, 1938, Japanese forces from the 21st Army, including the 5th, 18th, and 104th Infantry Divisions, landed in Guangzhou, launching the operation at 4:00 am with elements of the 5th and 18th Divisions hitting Aotou and elements of the 104th Division landing at Hachung in Bias Bay. Initially totaling about 30,000 men, they were soon reinforced by a further 20,000, and resistance was minimal because most of Yu Hanmou's 12th Army Group had been redeployed to central China to defend approaches to Wuhan, leaving only two regular Chinese divisions, the 151st and 153rd, to defend the region. By the night of October 12, the Japanese had established a 10-kilometer-deep beachhead and advanced inland; on October 13 they seized the towns of Pingshan and Tamshui with little opposition, and on October 15 they converged on Waichow and captured it. The fall of Pingshan, located on the Sai Kong River with a deep, broad river and only a flimsy crossing, and Waichow, where Chinese defenses included trenches and concrete pillboxes, surprised observers since these positions had been prepared to resist invasion; nonetheless, Chinese forces fled, opening the road to Guangzhou for the Japanese. Between October 16 and 19, three Japanese columns pushed inland, with the easternmost column crossing the East River on the 16th and the 5th Infantry Division capturing Sheklung on the 19th as Chinese forces retreated. By the night of October 20, Guangzhou's defenders withdrew and adopted a scorched-earth policy to deny resources to the invaders. On October 21, Japanese tanks entered Guangzhou without infantry support, and a regiment from the 5th Infantry Division captured the Bocca Tigris forts with no resistance. With Guangzhou secured, the Guangzhou–Wuhan railway and the Hong Kong–Guangzhou railway were severed, supplies to Wuhan were cut, Chiang Kai-Shek faced a daunting and depressing task, he had to abandon Wuhan. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Yangtze became a bloodied artery as Chinese and Japanese forces clashed from Anqing to Jiujiang, Madang to Tianjiazhen. A mosaic of Chinese troops, filled with grit and missteps, held lines while civilians like Wang Guozhen refused to surrender. The siege of Wanjialing crowned Chinese resilience, even as Guangzhou buckled under a relentless blockade. The Fall of Wuhan was all but inevitable.

Go to http://DrinkAG1.com/adv to get a FREE Frother with your first purchase of AGZWe uncovered the sinister truth behind China's mega bridge. HAND MACHINE GHOST - LIMITED RUN! - https://thechinashow.threadless.comSupport the show here and see the Monday Exclusive show Xiaban Hou! https://www.patreon.com/advpodcastsSign up for the sticker giveaway!https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScdk5BnaNwlkH8yjt-wgUwq6xWBZIgusPRM5ifELKgPdKxLHg/viewform?usp=headerCartoon feat. Jüri Pootsmann - I Remember Uhttps://soundcloud.com/nocopyrightsoundsTrack : Cartoon feat. Jüri Pootsmann - I Remember USome Sources - https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/09/technology/nvidia-chips-china-megaspeed.htmlSalary data in Anlong https://tjgb.hongheiku.com/xjtjgb/xj2020/53025.htmlSalary data in Fenggang https://www.gzfenggang.gov.cn/zwgk/zfxxgkzl/fdzdgknr/ghjh/gmjjhshfzgh/202502/t20250220_86927630.htmlhttps://www.researchgate.net/publication/341419632_Bone_Glue_-_The_Final_Frontier_for_Fracture_Repair_and_Implantable_Device_Stabilizationhttps://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9941416/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1934590925002267https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/human-neuroscience/articles/10.3389/fnhum.2016.00033/fullhttps://www.nature.com/articles/s43587-025-00930-1https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/aging/articles/10.3389/fragi.2025.1638168/fullBRIDGE SOURCES - * 1981 Liziyida Bridge (Chengdu–Kunming Railway), Sichuan* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1981_Chengdu%E2%80%93Kunming_rail_crash* 1999 Qijiang “Rainbow” Pedestrian Bridge, Chongqing* https://www.engineeringcivil.com/civil-engineering-disasters-collapse-of-bridges.html* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qijiang_Rainbow_Bridge_collapse* 2007 Jiujiang Bridge, Foshan (Guangdong)* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collapse_of_Jiujiang_Bridge* 2007 Fenghuang (Tuojiang) Bridge, Hunan (under construction)* https://www.scmp.com/article/606792/dozens-feared-dead-after-hunan-bridge-collapse* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Fenghuang_Bridge_collapse* 2009 Hongqi Road Viaduct, Zhuzhou (Hunan)* https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-05/18/content_7790004.htm* 2010 Tangying Bridge, Luanchuan (Henan)* https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/556460.shtml* https://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?pid=S0718-915X2022000200193&script=sci_arttext* 2010 Nanjing Overpass (under construction), Jiangsu* https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-11/27/content_11617576.htm* 2011 Gongguan Bridge, Wuyishan (Fujian)* https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-07/15/content_12912763.htm* 2012 Hangzhou Viaduct dismantling accident, Zhejiang* https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/201207/716566.shtml* 2012 East Guangchang River Bridge, Jiangxi* https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/201208/721127.shtml* 2012 Yangmingtan Bridge (ramp), Harbin (Heilongjiang)* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yangmingtan_Bridge* 2013 Lianhuo Expressway Bridge (Mianchi, Henan)* https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-bridge-idUSBRE91003D20130201* https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-21300038* 2014 Gaozhou stone-arch bridge, Guangdong* https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-05/05/content_17487284.htm* 2014 Jinshan Bridge, Enshi (Hubei) (under construction)* https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/10/6/2112* 2016 Ganjiang Bridge (dismantling), Taihe (Jiangxi)* https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/201609/1009862.shtml* 2019 Wuxi S342 Overpass, Jiangsu* https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-bridge-collapse-idUSKBN1WP0JH* https://www.caixinglobal.com/2019-11-01/in-depth-overloaded-and-overturned-inside-the-deadly-wuxi-bridge-collapse-101478011.html* https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/11/deaths-reported-as-bridge-collapses-in-chinas-jiangsu-province* 2021 S2 Ezhou Expressway Ramp Bridge, Hubei* https://www.reuters.com/world/china/bridge-collapse-central-china-kills-four-2021-12-18/* 2024 Lixinsha Bridge, Guangzhou (Guangdong)* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Lixinsha_Bridge_collapse* 2024 Danning (G4015) Expressway Bridge, Zhashui (Shaanxi)* https://apnews.com/article/shaanxi-china-bridge-collapse-river-dead-b077896e4b291ef82a46ed601bfd04ca* 2024 Yakang Expressway Bridge (near Kangding), Sichuan* https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3240129/more-bodies-found-after-mountain-bridge-collapse-china* 2025 Jianzha Yellow River Bridge (under construction), Qinghai* https://abc13.com/post/china-bridge-collapse-today-kills-least-12-construction-workers-yellow-river-qinghai-province/17622521This video features copyrighted material used for commentary and educational purposes. We believe this constitutes a 'fair use' of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Last time we spoke about the Nanjing Massacre. Japanese forces breached Nanjing as Chinese defenders retreated under heavy bombardment, and the city fell on December 13. In the following weeks, civilians and disarmed soldiers endured systematic slaughter, mass executions, rapes, looting, and arson, with casualties mounting rapidly. Among the most brutal episodes were hundreds of executions near the Safety Zone, mass shootings along the Yangtze River, and killings at improvised sites and “killing fields.” The massacre involved tens of thousands of prisoners, with estimates up to 300,000 victims. Women and children were subjected to widespread rape, mutilation, and terror intended to crush morale and resistance. Although the Safety Zone saved many lives, it could not shield all refugees from harm, and looting and arson devastated large parts of the city. Foreign witnesses, missionaries, and diary entries documented the extensive brutality and the apparent premeditated nature of many acts, noting the collapse of discipline among troops and orders that shaped the violence.    #169 Nanjing has Fallen, the War is not Over Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Directly after the fall of Nanjing, rumors circulated among the city's foreigners that Tang Shengzhi had been executed for his inability to hold the city against the Japanese onslaught. In fact, unlike many of his subordinates who fought in the defense, he survived. On December 12, he slipped through Yijiang Gate, where bullets from the 36th Division had claimed numerous victims, and sailed across the Yangtze to safety. Chiang Kai-shek protected him from bearing direct consequences for Nanjing's collapse. Tang was not unscathed, however. After the conquest of Nanjing, a dejected Tang met General Li Zongren at Xuzhou Railway Station. In a brief 20-minute conversation, Tang lamented, “Sir, Nanjing's fall has been unexpectedly rapid. How can I face the world?” Li, who had previously taunted Tang for over-eagerness, offered sympathy. “Don't be discouraged. Victory or defeat comes every day for the soldier. Our war of resistance is a long-term proposition. The loss of one city is not decisive.” By December 1937, the outlook for Chiang Kai-shek's regime remained bleak. Despite his public pledges, he had failed to defend the capital. Its sturdy walls, which had withstood earlier sieges, were breached in less than 100 hours. Foreign observers remained pessimistic about the prospects of continuing the fight against Japan. The New York Times wrote “The capture of Nanking was the most overwhelming defeat suffered by the Chinese and one of the most tragic military debacles in modern warfare. In defending Nanking, the Chinese allowed themselves to be surrounded and then slaughtered… The graveyard of tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers may also be the graveyard of all Chinese hopes of resisting conquest by Japan.” Foreign diplomats doubted Chiang's ability to sustain the war, shrinking the question to whether he would stubbornly continue a losing fight or seek peace. US Ambassador Nelson Johnson wrote in a letter to Admiral Yarnell, then commander of the US Asicatic Fleet “There is little left now for the Chinese to do except to carry on a desultory warfare in the country, or to negotiate for the best terms they can get”.  The Japanese, too, acted as if Chiang Kai-shek had already lost the war. They assumed the generalissimo was a spent force in Chinese politics as well, and that a gentle push would suffice to topple his regime like a house of cards. On December 14, Prime Minister Konoe announced that Chiang's losses of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and now Nanjing, had created a new situation. “The National Government has become but a shadow of its former self. If a new Chinese regime emerged to replace Chiang's government, Japan would deal with it, provided it is a regime headed in the right direction.” Konoe spoke the same day as a Liaison Conference in Tokyo, where civilian and military leaders debated how to treat China now that it had been thoroughly beaten on the battlefield. Japanese demands had grown significantly: beyond recognizing Manchukuo, Japan pressed for the creation of pro-Japanese regimes in Inner Mongolia and the north China area. The same day, a puppet government was established in Japanese-occupied Beijing. While these demands aimed to end China as a unitary state, Japanese policy was moving toward the same goal. The transmissions of these demands via German diplomatic channels caused shock and consternation in Chinese government circles, and the Chinese engaged in what many regarded as stalling tactics. Even at this late stage, there was division among Japan's top decision makers. Tada, deputy chief of the Army General Staff, feared a protracted war in China and urged keeping negotiations alive. He faced strong opposition from the cabinet, including the foreign minister and the ministers of the army and navy, and ultimately he relented. Tada stated “In this state of emergency, it is necessary to avoid any political upheaval that might arise from a struggle between the Cabinet and the Army General Staff.” Although he disagreed, he no longer challenged the uncompromising stance toward China. On January 16, 1938, Japan publicly stated that it would “cease henceforth to deal with” Chiang Kai-shek. This was a line that could not be uncrossed. War was the only option. Germany, the mediator between China and Japan, also considered Chiang a losing bet. In late January 1938, von Dirksen, the German ambassador in Tokyo, urged a fundamental shift in German diplomacy and advocated abandoning China in favor of Japan. He warned that this was a matter of urgency, since Japan harbored grudges against Germany for its half-hearted peace efforts. In a report, von Dirksen wrote that Japan, “in her deep ill humor, will confront us with unpleasant decisions at an inopportune moment.” Von Dirksen's view carried the day in Berlin. Nazi Germany and Hirohito's Japan were on a trajectory that, within three years, would forge the Axis and place Berlin and Tokyo in the same camp in a conflict that would eventually span the globe. Rabe, who returned to Germany in 1938, found that his account of Japanese atrocities in Nanjing largely fell on deaf ears. He was even visited by the Gestapo, which apparently pressed him to keep quiet about what he had seen. Ambassador von Dirksen also argued in his January 1938 report that China should be abandoned because of its increasingly friendly ties with the Soviet Union. There was some merit to this claim. Soviet aid to China was substantial: by the end of 1937, 450 Soviet aviators were serving in China. Without them, Japan likely would have enjoyed air superiority. Chiang Kai-shek, it seemed, did not fully understand the Russians' motives. They were supplying aircraft and pilots to keep China in the war while keeping themselves out. After Nanjing's fall, Chiang nevertheless reached out to Joseph Stalin, inviting direct Soviet participation in the war. Stalin politely declined, noting that if the Soviet Union joined the conflict, “the world would say the Soviet Union was an aggressor, and sympathy for Japan around the world would immediately increase.” In a rare moment of candor a few months later, the Soviet deputy commissar for foreign affairs spoke with the French ambassador, describing the situation in China as “splendid.” He expected China to continue fighting for several more years, after which Japan would be too weakened to undertake major operations against the Soviet Union. It was clear that China was being used. Whatever the motive, China was receiving vital help from Stalin's Russia while the rest of the world stood on the sidelines, reluctant to upset Japan. Until Operation Barbarossa, when the Soviet Union was forced to the brink by the German Army and could no longer sustain extensive overseas aid, it supplied China with 904 planes, 1,516 trucks, 1,140 artillery pieces, 9,720 machine guns, 50,000 rifles, 31,600 bombs, and more. Despite all of this, all in all, China's position proved less disastrous than many observers had feared. Chinese officials later argued that the battle of Nanjing was not the unmitigated fiasco it appeared to be. Tang Shengzhi had this to say in his memoirs“I think the main purpose of defending Nanjing was to buy time, to allow troops that had just been pulled out of battle to rest and regroup. It wasn't simply because it was the capital or the site of Sun Yat-sen's mausoleum.” Tan Daoping, an officer in Nanjing, described the battle “as a moderate success because it drew the Japanese in land”. This of course was a strategy anticipated by interwar military thinker Jiang Baili. It also allowed dozens of Chinese divisions to escape Shanghai, since the Japanese forces that could have pursued them were tied down with the task of taking Nanjing. Tan Daoping wrote after the war “They erred in believing they could wage a quick war and decide victory immediately. Instead, their dream was shattered; parts of their forces were worn out, and they were hindered from achieving a swift end”. Even so, it was a steep price was paid in Chinese lives. As in Shanghai, the commanders in Nanjing thought they could fight on the basis of sheer willpower. Chinese officer Qin Guo Qi wrote in his memoirs “In modern war, you can't just rely on the spirit of the troops. You can't merely rely on physical courage and stamina. The battle of Nanjing explains that better than anything”. As for the Brigade commander of the 87th division, Chen Yiding, who emerged from Nanjing with only a few hundred survivors, was enraged. “During the five days of the battle for Nanjing, my superiors didn't see me even once. They didn't do their duty. They also did not explain the overall deployments in the Nanjing area. What's worse, they didn't give us any order to retreat. And afterwards I didn't hear of any commander being disciplined for failing to do his job.” Now back in November of 1937, Chiang Kai-shek had moved his command to the great trinity of Wuhan. For the Nationalists, Wuhan was a symbolically potent stronghold: three municipalities in one, Hankou, Wuchang, and Hanyang. They had all grown prosperous as gateways between coastal China and the interior. But the autumn disasters of 1937 thrust Wuhan into new prominence, and, a decade after it had ceased to be the temporary capital, it again became the seat of military command and resistance. Leading Nationalist politicians had been seen in the city in the months before the war, fueling suspicions that Wuhan would play a major role in any imminent conflict. By the end of the year, the generals and their staffs, along with most of the foreign embassies, had moved upriver. Yet as 1937 slipped into 1938, the Japanese advance seemed practically unstoppable. From the destruction of Shanghai, to the massacre in Nanjing, to the growing vulnerability of Wuhan, the NRA government appeared powerless against the onslaught.  Now the Japanese government faced several options: expanding the scope of the war to force China into submission, which would risk further depletion of Japan's military and economic resources; establishing an alternative regime in China as a bridge for reconciliation, thereby bypassing the Nationalist government for negotiations; and engaging in indirect or direct peace negotiations with the Nationalist Government, despite the failure of previous attempts, while still seeking new opportunities for negotiation. However, the Nanjing massacre did not compel the Chinese government and its people to submit. On January 2, Chiang Kai-shek wrote in his diary, “The conditions proposed by Japan are equivalent to the conquest and extinction of our country. Rather than submitting and perishing, it is better to perish in defeat,” choosing to refuse negotiations and continue resistance.  In January 1938 there was a new escalation of hostilities. Up to that point, Japan had not officially declared war, even during the Shanghai campaign and the Nanjing massacre. However on January 11, an Imperial Conference was held in Tokyo in the presence of Emperor Hirohito. Prime Minister Konoe outlined a “Fundamental Policy to deal with the China Incident.”The Imperial Conference was attended by Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, Army Chief of Staff Prince Kan'in, Navy Minister Admiral Fushimi, and others to reassess its policy toward China. Citing the Nationalist Government's delay and lack of sincerity, the Japanese leadership decided to terminate Trautmann's mediation. At the conference, Japan articulated a dual strategy: if the Nationalist Government did not seek peace, Japan would no longer regard it as a viable negotiating partner, instead supporting emerging regimes, seeking to resolve issues through incidents, and aiming either to eliminate or incorporate the existing central government; if the Nationalist Government sought reconciliation, it would be required to cease resistance, cooperate with Japan against communism, and pursue economic cooperation, including officially recognizing Manchukuo and allowing Japanese troops in Inner Mongolia, North China, Central China, and co-governance of Shanghai. The Konoe cabinet relayed this proposal to the German ambassador in Japan on December 22, 1937: It called for: diplomatic recognition of Manchukuo; autonomy for Inner Mongolia; cessation of all anti-Japanese and anti-Manchukuo policies; cooperation between Japan, Manchukuo, and China against communism; war reparations; demilitarized zones in North China and Inner Mongolia; and a trade agreement among Japan, Manchukuo, and China.  Its terms were too severe, including reparations payable to Japan and new political arrangements that would formalize the separation of north China under Japanese control. Chiang's government would have seventy-two hours to accept; if they refused, Tokyo would no longer recognize the Nationalist government and would seek to destroy it.  On January 13, 1938, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Chonghui informed Germany that China needed a fuller understanding of the additional conditions for peace talks to make a decision. The January 15 deadline for accepting Japan's terms elapsed without Chinese acceptance. Six days after the deadline for a Chinese government reply, an Imperial Conference “Gozen Kaigi” was convened in Tokyo to consider how to handle Trautmann's mediation. The navy, seeing the war as essentially an army matter, offered no strong position; the army pressed for ending the war through diplomatic means, arguing that they faced a far more formidable Far Eastern Soviet threat at the northern Manchukuo border and wished to avoid protracted attrition warfare. Foreign Minister Kōki Hirota, however, strongly disagreed with the army, insisting there was no viable path to Trautmann's mediation given the vast gap between Chinese and Japanese positions. A second conference followed on January 15, 1938, attended by the empire's principal cabinet members and military leaders, but without the emperor's presence. The debate grew heated over whether to continue Trautmann's mediation. Hayao Tada, Deputy Chief of Army General Staff, argued for continuation, while Konoe, Hirota, Navy Minister Mitsumasa Yonai, and War Minister Hajime Sugiyama opposed him. Ultimately, Tada acceded to the position of Konoe and Hirota. On the same day, Konoe conveyed the cabinet's conclusion, termination of Trautmann's mediation, to the emperor. The Japanese government then issued a statement on January 16 declaring that it would no longer treat the Nationalist Government as a bargaining partner, signaling the establishment of a new Chinese regime that would cooperate with Japan and a realignment of bilateral relations. This became known as the first Konoe statement, through which Tokyo formally ended Trautmann's mediation attempt. The Chinese government was still weighing its response when, at noon on January 16, Konoe publicly declared, “Hereafter, the Imperial Government will not deal with the National Government.” In Japanese, this became the infamous aite ni sezu (“absolutely no dealing”). Over the following days, the Japanese government made it clear that this was a formal breach of relations, “stronger even than a declaration of war,” in the words of Foreign Minister Hirota Kōki. The Chinese ambassador to Japan, who had been in Tokyo for six months since hostilities began, was finally recalled. At the end of January, Chiang summoned a military conference and declared that the top strategic priority would be to defend the east-central Chinese city of Xuzhou, about 500 kilometers north of Wuhan. This decision, like the mobilization near Lugouqiao, was heavily influenced by the railway: Xuzhou sat at the midpoint of the Tianjin–Pukou Jinpu line, and its seizure would grant the Japanese mastery over north–south travel in central China. The Jinpu line also crossed the Longhai line, China's main cross-country artery from Lanzhou to the port of Lianyungang, north of Shanghai. The Japanese military command marked the Jinpu line as a target in spring 1938. Control over Xuzhou and the rail lines threading through it were thus seen as vital to the defense of Wuhan, which lay to the city's south. Chiang's defense strategy fit into a larger plan evolving since the 1920s, when the military thinker Jiang Baili had first proposed a long war against Japan; Jiang's foresight earned him a position as an adviser to Chiang in 1938. Jiang had previously run the Baoding military academy, a predecessor of the Whampoa academy, which had trained many of China's finest young officers in the early republic 1912–1922. Now, many of the generals who had trained under Jiang gathered in Wuhan and would play crucial roles in defending the city: Chen Cheng, Bai Chongxi, Tang Shengzhi, and Xue Yue. They remained loyal to Chiang but sought to avoid his tendency to micromanage every aspect of strategy.  Nobody could say with certainty whether Wuhan would endure the Japanese onslaught, and outsiders' predictions were gloomy. As Wuhan's inhabitants tasted their unexpected new freedoms, the Japanese pressed on with their conquest of central China. After taking Nanjing, the IJA 13th Division crossed the Yangtze River to the north and advanced to the Outang and Mingguang lines on the east bank of the Chihe River in Anhui Province, while the 2nd Army of the North China Front crossed the Yellow River to the south between Qingcheng and Jiyang in Shandong, occupied Jinan, and pressed toward Jining, Mengyin, and Qingdao. To open the Jinpu Railway and connect the northern and southern battlefields, the Japanese headquarters mobilized eight divisions, three brigades, and two detachments , totaling about 240,000 men. They were commanded by General Hata Shunroku, commander of the Central China Expeditionary Army, and Terauchi Hisaichi, commander of the North China Front Army. Their plan was a north–south advance: first seize Xuzhou, a strategic city in east China; then take Zhengzhou in the west along the Longhai Railway connecting Lanzhou and Lianyungang; and finally push toward Wuhan in the south along the Pinghan Railway connecting Beijing and Hankou. At the beginning of 1938, Japan's domestic mobilization and military reorganization had not yet been completed, and there was a shortage of troops to expand the front. At the Emperor's Imperial Conference on February 16, 1938, the General Staff Headquarters argued against launching operations before the summer of 1938, preferring to consolidate the front in 1938 and undertake a large-scale battle in 1939. Although the Northern China Expeditionary Force and the Central China Expeditionary Force proposed a plan to open the Jinpu Line to connect the northern and southern battlefields, the proposal was not approved by the domestic General Staff Headquarters. The Chinese army, commanded by Li Zongren, commander-in-chief of the Fifth War Zone, mobilized about 64 divisions and three brigades, totaling roughly 600,000 men. The main force was positioned north of Xuzhou to resist the southern Japanese advance, with a portion deployed along the southern Jinpu Railway to block the southern push and secure Xuzhou. Early in the campaign, Chiang Kai-shek redeployed the heavy artillery brigade originally promised to Han Fuju to Tang Enbo's forces. To preserve his strength, Shandong Provincial Governor Han Fuju abandoned the longstanding Yellow River defenses in Shandong, allowing the Japanese to capture the Shandong capital of Jinan in early March 1938. This defection opened the Jinpu Railway to attack. The Japanese 10th Division, under Rensuke Isogai, seized Tai'an, Jining, and Dawenkou, ultimately placing northern Shandong under Japanese control. The aim was to crush the Chinese between the two halves of a pincer movement. At Yixian and Huaiyuan, north of Xuzhou, both sides fought to the death: the Chinese could not drive back the Japanese, but the Japanese could not scatter the defenders either. At Linyi, about 50 kilometers northeast of Xuzhou, Zhang Zizhong, who had previously disgraced himself by abandoning an earlier battlefield—became a national hero for his determined efforts to stop the Japanese troops led by Itagaki Seishirō, the conqueror of Manchuria. The Japanese hoped that they could pour in as many as 400,000 troops to destroy the Chinese forces holding eastern and central China. Chiang Kai-shek was determined that this should not happen, recognizing that the fall of Xuzhou would place Wuhan in extreme danger. On April 1, 1938, he addressed Nationalist Party delegates, linking the defense of Wuhan to the fate of the party itself. He noted that although the Japanese had invaded seven provinces, they had only captured provincial capitals and main transport routes, while villages and towns off those routes remained unconquered. The Japanese, he argued, might muster more than half a million soldiers, but after eight or nine months of hard fighting they had become bogged down. Chiang asserted that as long as Guangzhou (Canton) remained in Chinese hands, it would be of little significance if the Japanese invaded Wuhan, since Guangzhou would keep China's sea links open and Guangdong, Sun Yat-sen's homeland, would serve as a revolutionary base area. If the “woren” Japanese “dwarfs” attacked Wuhan and Guangzhou, it would cost them dearly and threaten their control over the occupied zones. He reiterated his plan: “the base area for our war will not be in the zones east of the Beiping–Wuhan or Wuhan–Guangdong railway lines, but to their west.” For this reason he authorized withdrawing Chinese troops behind the railway lines. Chiang's speech mixed defiance with an explanation of why regrouping was necessary; it was a bold public posture in the face of a developing military disaster, yet it reflected the impossible balance he faced between signaling resolve and avoiding overcommitment of a city that might still fall. Holding Xuzhou as the first priority required Chiang Kai-shek to place a great deal of trust in one of his rivals: the southwestern general Li Zongren. The relationship between Chiang and Li would become one of the most ambivalent in wartime China. Li hailed from Guangxi, a province in southwestern China long regarded by the eastern heartland as half civilized. Its people had rarely felt fully part of the empire ruled from Beijing or even Nanjing, and early in the republic there was a strong push for regional autonomy. Li was part of a cohort of young officers trained in regional academies who sought to bring Guangxi under national control; he joined the Nationalist Party in 1923, the year Sun Yat-sen announced his alliance with the Soviets. Li was not a Baoding Academy graduate but had trained at Yunnan's equivalent institution, which shared similar views on military professionalism. He enthusiastically took part in the Northern Expedition (1926–1928) and played a crucial role in the National Revolutionary Army's ascent to control over much of north China. Yet after the Nanjing government took power, Li grew wary of Chiang's bid to centralize authority in his own person. In 1930 Li's so‑called “Guangxi clique” participated in the Central Plains War, the failed effort by militarist leaders to topple Chiang; although the plot failed, Li retreated to his southwest base, ready to challenge Chiang again. The occupation of Manchuria in 1931 reinforced Li's belief that a Japanese threat posed a greater danger than Chiang's centralization. The tension between the two men was evident from the outset of the war. On October 10, 1937, Chiang appointed Li commander of the Fifth War Zone; Li agreed on the condition that Chiang refrain from issuing shouling—personal commands—to Li's subordinates. Chiang complied, a sign of the value he placed on Li's leadership and the caution with which he treated Li and his Guangxi ally Bai Chongxi. As Chiang sought any possible victory amid retreat and destruction, he needed Li to deliver results. As part of the public-relations front, journalists were given access to commanders on the Xuzhou front. Li and his circle sought to shape their image as capable leaders to visiting reporters, with Du Zhongyuan among the most active observers. Du praised the “formidable southwestern general, Li Zongren,” calling him “elegant and refined” and “vastly magnanimous.” In language echoing the era's soldiers' public presentation, Du suggested that Li's forces operated under strict, even disciplined, orders “The most important point in the people's war is that . . . troops do not harass the people of the country. If the people are the water, the soldiers are the fish, and if you have fish with no water, inevitably they're going to choke; worse still is to use our water to nurture the enemy's fish — that really is incomparably stupid”.  Within the southern front, on January 26, 1938, the Japanese 13th Division attacked Fengyang and Bengbu in Anhui Province, while Li Pinxian, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the 5th War Zone, directed operations south of Xuzhou. The defending 31st Corps of the 11th Group Army, after resisting on the west bank of the Chi River, retreated to the west of Dingyuan and Fengyang. By February 3, the Japanese had captured Linhuai Pass and Bengbu. From the 9th to the 10th, the main force of the 13th Division forced a crossing of the Huai River at Bengbu and Linhuai Pass respectively, and began an offensive against the north bank. The 51st Corps, reorganized from the Central Plains Northeast Army and led by Commander Yu Xuezhong, engaged in fierce combat with the Japanese. Positions on both sides of the Huai shifted repeatedly, producing a riverine bloodbath through intense hand-to-hand fighting. After ten days of engagement, the Fifth War Zone, under Zhang Zizhong, commander of the 59th Army, rushed to the Guzhen area to reinforce the 51st Army, and the two forces stubbornly resisted the Japanese on the north bank of the Huai River. Meanwhile, on the south bank, the 48th Army of the 21st Group Army held the Luqiao area, while the 7th Army, in coordination with the 31st Army, executed a flanking attack on the flanks and rear of the Japanese forces in Dingyuan, compelling the main body of the 13th Division to redeploy to the north bank for support. Seizing the initiative, the 59th and 51st Armies launched a counteroffensive, reclaiming all positions north of the Huai River by early March. The 31st Army then moved from the south bank to the north, and the two sides faced across the river. Subsequently, the 51st and 59th Armies were ordered to reinforce the northern front, while the 31st Army continued to hold the Huai River to ensure that all Chinese forces covering the Battle of Xuzhou were safely withdrawn. Within the northern front, in late February, the Japanese Second Army began its southward push along multiple routes. The eastern axis saw the 5th Division moving south from Weixian present-day Weifang, in Shandong, capturing Yishui, Juxian, and Rizhao before pressing directly toward Linyi, as units of the Nationalist Third Corps' 40th Army and others mounted strenuous resistance. The 59th Army was ordered to reinforce and arrived on March 12 at the west bank of the Yi River in the northern suburbs of Linyi, joining the 40th Army in a counterattack that, after five days and nights of ferocious fighting, inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese and forced them to retreat toward Juxian. On the western route, the Seya Detachment (roughly a brigade) of the Japanese 10th Division crossed the Grand Canal from Jining and attacked Jiaxiang, meeting stiff resistance from the Third Army and being thwarted, while continuing to advance south along the Jinpu Railway. The Isogai Division, advancing on the northern route without awaiting help from the southeast and east, moved southward from Liangxiadian, south of Zouxian, on March 14, with the plan to strike Tengxian, present-day Tengzhou on March 15 and push south toward Xuzhou. The defending 22nd Army and the 41st Corps fought bravely and suffered heavy casualties in a hard battle that lasted until March 17, during which Wang Mingzhang, commander of the 122nd Division defending Teng County, was killed in action. Meanwhile, a separate Japanese thrust under Itagaki Seishirō landed on the Jiaodong Peninsula and occupied Qingdao, advancing along the Jiaoji Line to strike Linyi, a key military town in southern Shandong. Pang Bingxun's 40th Army engaged the invaders in fierce combat, and later, elements of Zhang Zizhong's 333rd Brigade of the 111th Division, reinforced by the 57th Army, joined Pang Bingxun's forces to launch a double-sided pincer that temporarily repelled the Japanese attack on Linyi. By late March 1938 a frightening reality loomed: the Japanese were close to prevailing on the Xuzhou front. The North China Area Army, commanded by Itagaki Seishirō, Nishio Toshizō, and Isogai Rensuke, was poised to link up with the Central China Expeditionary Force under Hata Shunroku in a united drive toward central China. Li Zongren, together with his senior lieutenants Bai Chongxi and Tang Enbo, decided to confront the invaders at Taierzhuang, the traditional stone-walled city that would become a focal point of their defense. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Nanjing falls after one of humanities worst atrocities. Chiang Kai-Shek's war command has been pushed to Wuhan, but the Japanese are not stopping their advance. Trautmann's mediation is over and now Japan has its sights on Xuzhou and its critical railway junctions. Japan does not realize it yet, but she is now entering a long war of attrition.

Working groups are guiding rescue operations in Guangdong and Hainan as Typhoon Matmo is battering southern China. Authorities have evacuated around 350,000 people for safety.

Typhoon Matmo has forced the evacuation of nearly 350,000 people in Guangdong and Hainan Provinces as it hits southern China.

China's Ministry of Emergency Management has upgraded the emergency typhoon responses in two southern provinces to Level III amid the approaching Typhoon Matmo, which will make landfall on Sunday.

In Xinjiang, ancient traditions are not frozen in time but are dynamically evolving. This episode explores how daily life in the millennia-old Kashi Ancient City, and across all of Xinjiang, is being revitalized with modern comforts while carefully preserving its unique soul. From the enduring epic of Manas to the innovative fusion of Guangdong's Yingge dance with Uygur melodies, it's clear how dedicated cultural preservation, youthful creativity, and open exchanges are composing a vibrant new chapter for the region's diverse cultural mosaic.

Get access to The Backroom (75+ exclusive episodes) and support 1Dime Radio: https://www.patreon.com/OneDimeIn this episode of 1Dime Radio, I am joined by Dr. Jane Hayward, a lecturer in Chinese Studies at the Lao China Institute at King's College. Dr. Hayward specializes in explaining China's political economy and misconceptions surrounding it. We discuss the specifics of how China's political system works, its mix of meritocracy, democracy, technocracy, & dictatorship, and the very different systems of competing provinces, like Guangdong and Chongqing. She also explains the inner workings of the Chinese Communist Party-state and its political economy. In The Backroom on Patreon, the Trump Tariffs, Jane's experience living in China, the prospects for China's future, and much more. Become a Patron at Patreon.com/OneDime if you haven't already.In The Backroom on Patreon, we discuss Trump's new tariffs, Jane's firsthand experience living in China, where the model is headed, and more.Timestamps00:00 The Backroom Preview02:38 1Dime Radio Introduction03:52 China's Decentralized Political System08:12 Local vs Provincial Governments16:43 Democracy in China?20:00 Party Membership, Hierarchy, and Controlled Opposition34:20 Barriers to Entry and Party Membership39:30 Technocracy and Meritocracy49:44 Chongqing vs. Guangdong: Experiments in Socialist vs Capitalist Governance01:06:39 The Labor Movement in China01:17:34 The Gender Divide in China01:30:15 Conclusion and The Backroom TransitionGUEST: Dr. Jane Hayward's YouTube channel: https://www.youtube.com/@janehaywardchina/videosFOLLOW Me:1Dime:• Substack (Articles and Essays): https://substack.com/@tonyof1dime• X/Twitter: https://x.com/1DimeOfficial• Instagram: instagram.com/1dimeman• Check out my main channel videos: https://www.youtube.com/@1Dimee.Outro Music by Karl CaseyIf you learned something, leave a like, comment, 5-Star Rating, and share it with a friend.

Mes chers camarades, bien le bonjour !Les tops historiques, j'en fais souvent et je crois que vous adorez ça, mais parfois c'est franchement galère. Quel est le boss des papes ? Ou le numéro uno des conquérants ? Ou encore le roi des pirates et des corsaires ? Difficile à choisir, entre Barbe Noire, Jack Rackham, Charles Vane, François l'Olonnais, Henry Morgan, Richard Hawkins, Francis Drake, ou Surcouf ! Ah, par contre, pour la reine des pirates, au moins c'est facile. Car y'a pas photo : Anne Bonny et Mary Read n'ont jamais commandé leur propre équipage ! C'est bien triste, mais elles se font clairement dominer par Ching Shih, la Veuve, le Dragon, la pirate chinoise qui a commandé par loin de… 20.000 gangsters ! Accrochez vous, car cette femme était un vrai ouragan !Bonne écoute !

Storm Bualoi has killed at least 10 people in the Philippines, which is still recovering from the impacts of a super typhoon. Guangdong and Hainan provinces in southern China are also bracing for Bualoi and have ordered boats back to port.

天高皇帝远 "Heaven Is Vast & the Emperor is Far Away" On the far side of the realm from th celestial halls of shining Beijing, an outcast girl born on the fringes of society will scrabble to survive amidt the coastal chaos of the end of the 18th Century. With little more than her looks and wits, she'll have to outwit & outplay freebooter, bandit, and official alike if she is ever going to rise above her station on the boats of Guangdong harbor. Time Period Covered: ca. 1775-1807 CE Major Historical Figures: Zheng Yi Sao/Ching Shih (née Shi Yang), Pirate Queen of the Red Flag Fleet [1775-1844] Captain Zheng Yi, Fleet Commander of the Red Flag Fleet [1765-1807] Zhang Baozai (Cheung Po Tsai), "The Kid" [1783-1822] Major Sources Cited: Andrade, Tonio. The Gunpowder Age: China, Military Innovation, and the Rise of the West in World History. Antony, Robert J. Like Froth Floating on the Sea: The World of Pirates and Seafarers in Late Imperial South China. Mann Jones, Susan and Philip A. Kuhn. "The Ch'ing Government and Its Problems, 1800–1812” in The Cambridge History of China, Volume 10, Part 1: Late Ch'ing, 1800–1911. Murray, Dian. Pirates of the South China Coast. Rawski, Evelyn. Education and Popular Literacy in Ch'ing China. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In Xinjiang, ancient traditions are not frozen in time but are dynamically evolving. This episode explores how daily life in the millennia-old Kashi Ancient City, and across all of Xinjiang, is being revitalized with modern comforts while carefully preserving its unique soul. From the enduring epic of Manas to the innovative fusion of Guangdong's Yingge dance with Uygur melodies, it's clear how dedicated cultural preservation, youthful creativity, and open exchanges are composing a vibrant new chapter for the region's diverse cultural mosaic.

Guangdong Province is under full emergency response ahead of the expected arrival of Typhoon Ragasa. Schools, transportation and constructions sights in many cities are suspended in Guangdong and Hainan provinces.

Hello Youtube Members, Patreons and Pacific War week by week listeners. Yes this was intended to be an exclusive episode to join the 29 others over on my Youtube Membership and Patreon, but since we are drawing to the end of the Pacific War week by week series, I felt compelled to make some special episodes to answer some of the bigger questions. Why did Japan, or better said, why did Emperor Hirohito decide to finally surrender? It seems obvious on the face of it, but there is actually a lot more to it than bombs or Soviet invasions. I guess you can call this episode a teaser or a shameless plug for going over to my Youtube Membership or Patreon. There's honestly a lot of interesting subjects such as ‘why was the japanese army so brutal”, “Hirohito's war time responsibility”, “the 4 part Kanji Ishiwara series”. Thus if you liked this one please show some love and check out my other stuff on my Youtube Membership or over at www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel.   Stating all of that lets just jump right into it.   We first need to start off briefly looking at Emperor Hirohito.    Upon taking the throne, Emperor Hirohito in 1926 Hirohito inherited a financial crisis and a military that was increasingly seizing control of governmental policies. From the beginning, despite what many of you older audience members may have been told, Hirohito intensely followed all military decisions. Hirohito chose when to act and when not to. When the Kwantung Army assassinated Zhang Zuolin, he indulged their insubordination. This emboldened them to invade Manchuria in 1931, whereupon Hirohito was furious and demanded they be reigned in. Attempts were made, but they were heavily undermined by radicals. Hirohito could have put his foot down, but he chose not to. On September 22nd, at 4:20pm Hirohito said to the IJA Chief of General staff, Kanaya Hanzo “although this time it couldn't be helped, the army had to be more careful in the future”. Thus Hirohito again acquiesced to the military, despite wanting them to stop or at least localize the conflict. The military had disregarded his wishes, they should have been severely punished. Why did Hirohito not take a firmer stance?    Again for older audience members you may have heard, “hirohito was a hostage at the whim of his own military”. This narrative made it seem he was some sort of hostage emperor, but this is not the case at all. In fact Hirohito was instrumental in many military decisions from 1931-1945. The reason this, I will call it “myth” , went on was because after Japan's surrender, the US basically rewrote the Japanese constitution and covered up the Emperor's involvement in all the nasty stuff, to maintain control over Japan. Yeah it sounds a bit conspiracy esque, but I assure you it was indeed the case. This narrative held firm all the way until Hirohito's death, when finally meeting notes and personal accounts from those close to him came out, illuminating a lot. Though to this day, many records are still red -tapped.   The reason Hirohito did not stamp his foot down has to do with the Kokutai.    The Kokutai   So before I carry on, I have to explain what exactly is the Kokutai.    The Kokutai, loosely translated as "national essence," refers to the qualities that distinguish the Japanese identity. However, this concept is remarkably vague and poorly defined; even Japanese historians acknowledge this ambiguity. In contrast to Kokutai is seitai, or "form of government." While the Kokutai embodies the eternal and immutable aspects of Japanese polity—rooted in history, traditions, and customs centered around the Emperor—Japan's seitai has evolved significantly throughout its extensive history. For instance, shoguns governed for over 700 years until 1868, when the Meiji Restoration reinstated direct imperial rule.   Nevertheless, Emperor Meiji's direct authority came to an end with the adoption of the Meiji Constitution in 1889, which established a constitutional monarchy, introducing significant complexities into the governance system.   Article 4 of the constitution declares: “The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, uniting the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, although subject to the consent of the Imperial Diet.” Under this framework, the Emperor alone possessed the power to appoint or dismiss ministers of state, declare war, negotiate peace, conclude treaties, direct national administration, and command the army and navy.   A glaring flaw in this arrangement is the inherent ambiguity of the Meiji Constitution. While it established a democratic parliament, it simultaneously afforded the Emperor absolute authority to usurp it. The document failed to clearly define the relationships between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and its language was intentionally vague. Most critically, the military—the army and navy—were not directly accountable to the civilian government.    So with the kokutai, the Emperor is a divine figure who embodies the state's sovereignty. It was not necessarily the Emperor's job to surrender on behalf of the official government of Japan, but he most certainly could do so, given the Japanese people still remained faithful to the kokutai.    Now Hirohito did not live an ordinary life. According to the imperial custom, Japanese royals were raised apart from their parents, at the age of 3 he was placed in the care of the Kwamura family who vowed to raise him to be unselfish, persevering in the face of difficulties, respectful of the views of others and immune to fear. One thing that was absolutely indoctrinated into him was to defend the kokutai. It became his top mission as a monarch, it was the only mission in many ways. At the very core of how he saw the world and how he acted, it was always to protect the kokutai.    So when the Japanese military began these insubordinate acts, Hirohito's primary concern was to the kokutai, ie: anything that threatened his imperial authority and the imperial institution itself. Although the military usurped his authority, the operations had been successful. Hirohito was not at all opposed to seeing his empire expand. He understood the value of manchuria, he was fully onboard with the military plans to eventually seize control over it, but these radicals were accelerating things to quickly for everyone's liking. He turned a blind eye, dished light punishments and carried on. However the local conflict escalated. It traveled to Shanghai by 1932 and here Hirohito took action. He understood Shanghai was full of western powers. Nations like Britain and America could place economic sanctions on Japan if things were allowed to get out of hand here. So he ordered General Yoshinori Shirakawa to bring the Shanghai expedition to a close.    During this period, two factions emerged within the Japanese military: the Kodoha, or “Imperial Way,” and the Toseiha, or “Control” faction. The Kodoha was founded by General Sadao Araki and his protégé, Jinzaburo Masaki. Their primary objective was a Shōwa Restoration aimed at purging Japan of corrupt politicians and businessmen, especially those associated with the zaibatsu. Composed mainly of young army officers, the Kodoha espoused a romanticized and radical interpretation of Bushido, idealizing pre-industrial Japan, which Araki believed had been tainted by Western influences. To achieve their goals, they resorted to assassinations and planned a coup d'état.   In response, the Toseiha faction was formed, initially led by Lt. General Tetsuzan Nagata and later by Hideki Tojo. Like the Kodoha, the Toseiha sought a Shōwa Restoration but adopted a more moderate and conservative approach. They recognized the importance of preserving traditional values while integrating Western ideals, advocating for a balanced perspective. The Toseiha promoted pragmatic military strategies to navigate the complexities of modern warfare. Although they acknowledged the existence of corrupt politicians and zaibatsu, they preferred to work within the existing political system, anticipating that future total wars would necessitate a strengthened industrial and military capacity. Their ranks primarily included promising graduates from the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) Academy, Army Staff College, and select naval members. The most significant distinction between the two factions was that the Toseiha explicitly rejected the use of a coup d'état in pursuit of their goals.   Between 1932-1936 radical officers, mostly of the Kodoha faction assassinated politicians and military leaders trying to usher in a showa restoration. You might be led to believe this was in the interest of Hirohito, you would be mistaken. Hirohito did not want a military dictatorship at the whim of the cult of the emperor. Ironic to say, given how WW2 turns out mind you. This really would have been a hostage situation. Hirohito wanted to maintain the exact ambiguous situation that was Showa Era Japan pre 1945. He saw this as the most ideal structure to defend the kokutai, because blame could not be placed solely upon his shoulders. He always maintained a get out of jail free card one could say.    The February 26 incident of 1936, was the climax of the Kodoha faction. They performed a mutiny trying to usher in a SHowa restoration. They assumed when their messenger came to the emperor he would join them and take direct rule. Instead Hirohito was furious. His first thought was the mutineers were trying to enlist his brother Chichibu to overthrow him. He dragged his brother who was a fraternizer amongst the kodoha members mind you, into a meeting, demanding he never associate with them again nor attempt to challenge him. Then Hirohito furious demanded the mutineers be dealt with. At one point he even threatened to lead the imperial guards to put them down. The coup failed, the kodoha faction was destroyed. Ironically the toseiha faction were the ones to do it and thus they became the defacto ruling clique.    The military, especially the kwantung army did not stop with their insubordination.    On July 8th of 1937 the Kwangtung army performed the Marco Polo Bridge incident, ushering in the second sino-japanese war. This was one of many false flag operations they had pulled off over the years. Upon being told about this Hirohito's first response was whether the USSR would invade Manchukuo over the matter. This is what he said to Prime Minister Konoe and army minister Sugiyama “What will you do if the Soviets attack us from the rear?” he asked the prince. Kan'in answered, “I believe the army will rise to the occasion.” The emperor repeated his question: “That's no more than army dogma. What will you actually do in the unlikely event that Soviet [forces] attack?” The prince said only, “We will have no choice.” His Majesty seemed very dissatisfied. Hirohito furious demanded to know what contingency plans existed and his advisors told him before he gave his red seal of approval to invade northern china.   Henceforth he micromanaged a lot of the military decisions going forward and he oversaw the forming and dissolving of numerous cabinets and positions when things went his way or did not in the military and political scene.  Emperor Hirohito was presented with several opportunities to cause cease-fires or peace settlements during the war years. One of the best possible moments to end it all came during the attack on Nanking when Chiang Kai-sheks military were in disarray. On July 11 of 1938, the commander of the 19th division fought a border clash with the USSR known to us in the west as the battle of Lake Khasan. It was a costly defeat for Japan and in the diary of Harada Kumao he noted Hirohito scolded Army minister Itagaki “Hereafter not a single soldier is to be moved without my permission.” When it looked like the USSR would not press for a counter attack across the border, Hirohito gave the order for offensives in China to recommence, again an example of him deciding when to lay down the hammer.   By 1939 the US began threatening sanctions for what Japan was doing in China. Hirohito complained to his chief aide de camp Hata Shunroku on August 5th “It could be a great blow to scrap metal and oil”. Hirohito was livid and scolded many of his top officials and forced the appointment of General Abe to prime minister and demanded of him “to cooperate with the US and Britain and preserve internal order”.   Fast forward a bit, with war raging in Europe Hirohito, on June 19th of 1940 Hirohito asked if chief of staff Prince Kan'in and Army Minister Hata “At a time when peace will soon come in the European situation, will there be a deployment of troops to the Netherlands Indies and French Indochina?” This question highlighted Hirohito's belief at that time that Germany was close to achieving victory, which led him to gradually consider deploying troops to French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies since neither of those parent nations was in a position to protect their territories and vital resources. Regarding the war in China, the Japanese aimed to stop the flow of materials entering China from places like Hong Kong. Hirohito received reports indicating that Britain would not agree to block the shipment of materials into China via Hong Kong. The military recognized that an invasion of Hong Kong might be necessary, which would mean declaring war on Britain. When this was communicated to him, Hirohito responded, “If that occurs, I'm sure America will enforce an embargo, don't you think?” In response, Kido, the lord of the privy seal, reassured him by stating, “The nation must be fully prepared to resist, proceeding with caution and avoiding being drawn into events instigated by foreign interests.”   Hirohito went through countless meetings, but eventually signed order number 458 authorizing the invasion of French Indochina, knowing full well the consequences. The US,UK and Netherlands began embargoes of oil, rubber and iron. In the words of Admiral Takagai “As time passes and this situation continues, our empire will either be totally defeated or forced to fight a hopeless war. Therefore we should pursue war and diplomacy together. If there is no prospect of securing our final line of national survival by diplomatic negotiations, we must be resolved to fight.” Hirohito understood the predicament full well, that each day Japan was wasting its oil reserves, if they were to strike it had to be quickly.   On October 13th Hirohito told his closest advisor Koichi Kido “In the present situation there seems to be little hope for the Japan–U.S. negotiations. If hostilities erupt this time, I think I may have to issue a declaration of war.”   The reason I am bringing up all this stuff is to solidify, Hirohito had agency, he was micromanaging and forming decisions. After the war broke out with the west, Hirohito did have the ability to stamp his foot down. Of course there could have been wild repercussions, his military could have usurped him with Chichibu, it was definitely possible. But you need to keep this mind set, as far as why Hirohito acts or doesn't, its always to protect the Kokutai. Thus one of the levers for peace, solely rested on Hirohito's perception if the kokutai could be retained or not.    From the outset of the Pacific War, Hirohito believed Germany was going to defeat the USSR. In line with his military leaders, they all believed Japan had to seize everything they could in the asia-pacific and thwart off the US until a negotiated peace could be met. Hirohito committed himself to overseeing the war, determined to achieve victory at any cost. He was a very cautious leader, he meticulously analyzed each campaign, anticipating potential setbacks and crafting worst-case scenario predictions. He maintained a skeptical view of the reports from his senior officials and was often harshly critical of high commanders.   While he did not frequently visit the front lines like other commanders in chief, Hirohito wielded significant influence over theater operations, shaping both planning and execution whenever he deemed necessary. Similar to his approach during the war in China, he issued the highest military orders from the Imperial Headquarters, conducted audited conferences, and made decisions communicated under his name. He regularly welcomed generals and admirals to the imperial palace for detailed briefings on the battlefront and visited various military bases, battleships, and army and naval headquarters. His inspections encompassed military schools and other significant military institutions, adding to his comprehensive involvement in the war effort.   Now the war went extremely well for Japan until the battle of Midway. This was as major setback, but Japan retained the initiative. Then the Guadalcanal campaign saw Japan lose the initiative to the Americans. Upon receiving the initial report of the Ichiki detachment's destruction, Hirohito remarked, “I am sure it [Guadalcanal] can be held.” Despite the numerous reports detailing the devastating effects of tropical diseases and starvation on his troops, he persistently demanded greater efforts from them. Hirohito exerted continuous pressure on his naval and land commanders to retake the island. On September 15th, November 5th, and November 11th, he requested additional Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) troops and aircraft to be allocated to the cause.   General Sugiyama expressed concerns about dispatching more IJA pilots due to their inexperience in transoceanic combat, preferring to reinforce the North China Army for an attack on Chongqing instead. Hirohito pressed the issue again, but Sugiyama responded that the IJA had diverted its air resources to New Guinea and Rabaul. Undeterred by the objections from senior commanders, Hirohito persisted in his demands. By late November, it became evident that Guadalcanal was a lost cause.   At an Imperial Headquarters conference on December 31st, 1942, the chiefs of staff proposed canceling the attempts to recapture Guadalcanal. Hirohito sanctioned this decision but stated, “It is unacceptable to just give up on capturing Guadalcanal. We must launch an offensive elsewhere.” He insisted on this point, leading to the selection of new strategic targets in the Solomons, north of New Georgia, and in the Stanley Range on New Guinea. Hirohito even threatened to withhold authorization for withdrawing troops from Guadalcanal until a new plan was established. He later opposed the withdrawal from Munda Airfield, as it contradicted the newly defined defensive line.   As the defensive perimeter in the central and northern Solomons began to crumble, Hirohito continued to insist that the navy engage in decisive battles to regain the initiative, allowing for the transport of supplies to the many soldiers trapped on various islands. When he learned of the navy's failure to reinforce Lae on March 3rd, he asked, “Then why didn't you change plans immediately and land at Madan? This is a failure, but it can teach us a good lesson and become a source of future success. Do this for me so I can have peace of mind for a while.” The phrase “Do this for me” would come to be his signature rallying cry.   After Guadal canal, it was loss after loss for Japan. By February of 1944, Hirohito forced Sugiyama to resign so Hideki Tojo could take his position as chief of the general staff, note Tojo was prime minister and army minister at this point. Hirohito worked alongside Tojo to plan some last ditch efforts to change the war situation. The most significant one was Operation Ichi-Go. As much damage as they did to China with that, Chiang Kai-Shek's government survived. Hirohito watched as island by island fell to the Americans. When the Americans were poised to take Saipan he warned Tojo “If we ever lose Saipan, repeated air attacks on Tokyo will follow. No matter what it takes, we have to hold there.” Saipan fell, so Hirohito stopped supporting Tojo and allowed his rivals to take down his cabinet by june 18th of 1944.    Hirohito remained resolute in his determination to wrest victory from the Allies. On October 18th, the Imperial Headquarters ordered a decisive naval engagement, leading to the Battle of Leyte Gulf. After the war, Hirohito publicly stated, "Contrary to the views of the Army and Navy General Staffs, I consented to the showdown battle at Leyte, believing that if we launched an attack and America hesitated, we might find an opportunity to negotiate." Leyte Gulf didnt work. The military began the kamikaze program. On new years day of 1945 Hirohito inspected the special last meal rations given to departing kamikaze units. Iwo Jima fell. Okinawa remained, and Hirohito lashed out “Is it because we failed to sink enemy transports that we've let the enemy get ashore? Isn't there any way to defend Okinawa from the landing enemy forces?” On the second day of Okinawa's invasion Hirohito ordered a counter landing by the 32nd army and urged the navy to counterattack in every way possible. It was a horrible failure, it cost the lives of up to 120,000 Japanese combatants, 170,000 noncombatants. The Americans lost 12,500 killed and 33,000 wounded. An absolute bloodbath.    The Surrender time   Now we come to the time period where Japan seriously began looking for ways to surrender. In Europe Germany was heading to its defeat and Japan knew this. As for Japan, their army in Burma had been annihilated. Their forces in China were faring better after Operation Ichi-go, having opened up a land corridor along the main railway from Beiping to Wuhan and from throughout Guangdong but still stuck in a deadlock stalemate, facing a guerrilla war that was costing them 64% of their military expenditures. They deeply feared once the Soviets finished up with Germany, they would undoubtedly turn east against Manchuria. With the Soviets attacking from the north, the US would attack from the south, perhaps landing in Shanghai and the home islands. The Kamikaze tactics were proving formidable, but not nearly enough. By 1945, 43% of the IJA were now stationed in Japan, Korea and Formosa, bracing for the final stand. Former prime minister Reijiro Wakatsuki came out of retirement in may of 1945, having heard Germany collapsed, to urge Hirohito and the Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki to open negotiations with the US as soon as possible. However he also said “the enemy must first be made to see the disadvantages of continuing the war”. To this Hirohito's chief counselor Makino Nobuaki said that “the ultimate priority is to develop an advantageous war situation.” Advisor admiral Kesiuke Okada said Japan should wait for “a moment favorable for us,” then make peace. Advisors Kiichiro Hiranuma and Koki Hirota advised the emperor to fight on until the end.   Now I want to bring in a key player to the surrender decision, that of Prince Konoe. Konoe was very close to Hirohito and understood the emperors mentality, especially how he viewed things in relation to the kokutai.    The senior statesman Prince Konoe had been consulting with Hirohito for over 18 months at this point trying to convey the message that if the war continued it would threaten the kokutai. Many months prior, he confided in the emperor's brother, Prince Takamatsu, that the army was suffering from “a cancer” in the form of the Toseiha faction. However, he noted that “Kido and others” did not share his perspective, while “his Majesty is relatively unconcerned with ideological issues.” For the past four years, he continued, the emperor had been advised and still believed that “the true extremists are the Kodoha faction.” In reality, the greater threat to the kokutai arose from the Toseiha faction. Konoe further asserted that if the war escalated, they would attempt to alter the kokutai.   Konoe speculated that whether the threat originated from communists within the nation, primarily referring to left-wing radicals in the Toseiha faction, or from the “Anglo-American enemy,” both would seek to preserve the emperor while pushing towards the country's communization.In his written report to the emperor on February 14, which Kido listened to attentively, Konoe elaborated on his conspiracy theory. He asserted that the Soviet Union regarded Japan as its primary threat in East Asia. The Soviets had allied with the Chinese Communists, the largest and most formidable Communist party in Asia, and were collaborating with the United States and Britain to drive Japan out of China. He warned that they would enter the war when the opportunity arose.   Defeat, he cautioned the emperor, was inevitable if the conflict persisted. However, he emphasized that a far greater fear was the potential destruction of the kokutai. The ongoing war was eroding the domestic status quo, unleashing forces that threatened Japan and its imperial institution from within as much as from external adversaries. The real danger lay in the emperor's and Kido's trust in the generals of the Toseiha faction, who were unintentionally facilitating the communization of Japan. Konoe implored for a swift peace settlement before a Communist revolution emerged, making the preservation of the kokutai impossible. Hirohito agreed with Konoe but stated “ To end the war would be “very difficult unless we make one more military gain.” Konoe allegedly replied, “Is that possible? It must happen soon. If we have to wait much longer, . . . [a mere battle victory] will mean nothing.” Hirohito replied “If we hold out long enough in this war, we may be able to win, but what worries me is whether the nation will be able to endure it until then.”   On February 15th of 1945, Hirohito's intelligence warned the Soviet Union would likely abrogate its Neutrality Pact with Japan. Even Tojo conceded there was a 50/50 chance the USSR would invade Manchuria. In March, the US began B-29 incendiary bombing raids over Tokyo, turning 40% of the capital into ash. On March 18th, Hirohito with some aides drove around the capital to witness the devastation. The civilians looked exhausted and bewildered to Hirohito. Factory production was collapsing, absenteeism was rising, instances of lese majeste were running rampant. For the next 5 months imperial family members and senior statesmen all began speaking to Hirohito about the “crises of the kokutai”. The threat Konoe had warned about for months was becoming the main talking point. It seemed like the Japanese people within the countryside and urban areas remained steadfast in the resolve to obey their leaders, work and sacrifice for their nation, but for how long would they feel so?    It was only after the battle for Okinawa was lost and 60 Japanese cities had been leveled by American incendiary bombs that Hirohito openly indicated he wanted to negotiate a surrender.   Kido's diary reveals the first clear indication that the emperor might be urged to consider an early peace on June 8, 1945, when Kido drafted his “Draft Plan for Controlling the Crisis Situation.” This marked a pivotal moment. It followed the unintentional bombing of the Imperial Palace, the complete loss of hope for saving Okinawa, and coincided with the day the Supreme War Leadership Council adopted the “Basic Policy for the Future Direction of the War.” With the fighting in Europe concluded, Japan found itself entirely isolated. Kido's plan, although vague, proposed seeking the Soviet Union's assistance as an intermediary to help Japan gain leverage in negotiations with its adversaries. By drafting this plan, Kido signaled the end of his long alliance with the military hard-liners. Hirohito's acceptance of it indicated his readiness for an early peace.   Hirohito was moved to an underground bunker in the mountains of Matsushiro in Nagano prefecture where upon those around him noted he fell into a deep depression. On June 22nd  Hirohito informed the Supreme War Leadership Council he wanted them to open diplomatic maneuvers to end the war. In early July Soviet Ambassador Jacob Malik broke off inconclusive talks with Hirota. Hirohito stepped in immediately and ordered a new special envoy be sent to Moscow. However Hirohito nor the Suzuki government had concrete plans on how to mediate a surrender through the Soviets. The only things they did prioritize was a guarantee of the emperors political position and retainment of the imperial system, ie the kokutai. This was taken into consideration rather than ending the war as quickly as possible to save the lives of millions.    From April 8, 1945, until Japan's capitulation, the Suzuki government's chief war policy was “Ketsugo,” an advanced iteration of the “Shosango” (Victory Number 3) plan for defending the homeland. The hallmark of this strategy was a heavy reliance on suicide tactics, including deploying a massive number of kamikaze “special attack” planes, human torpedoes launched from submarines, dynamite-stuffed “crash boats” powered by truck engines, human rocket bombs carried by aircraft, and suicide assaults by specially trained ground units.   While preparations for Operation Ketsu progressed, the Imperial Diet convened on June 9 to pass a Wartime Emergency Measures Law, along with five additional measures aimed at mobilizing the entire nation for this final battle. On the same day, the emperor, who had yet to initiate efforts to end the war, issued another imperial rescript in conjunction with the Diet's convocation, instructing the nation to “smash the inordinate ambitions of the enemy nations” and “achieve the goals of the war.” Concurrently, the controlled press launched a daily die-for-the-emperor campaign to foster gratitude for the imperial benevolence and, from around mid-July onward, initiated a campaign to “protect the kokutai.”   The Americans countered with their own propaganda aimed at breaking Japan's will to fight. B-29 bombers dropped millions of leaflets written in Japanese, announcing the next scheduled targets for bombing raids and urging surrender, while using the emperor to challenge the militarists. Leaflets bearing the chrysanthemum crest criticized the “military cliques” for “forcing the entire nation to commit suicide” and called on “everyone” to “exercise their constitutional right to make direct appeals [for peace] to the Emperor.” They asserted that “even the powerful military cliques cannot stop the mighty march for peace of the Emperor and the people.” One notable batch of seven million leaflets conveyed the terms of the “joint declaration” issued by the United States, Great Britain, and China. “Today we come not to bomb you,” they stated. “We are dropping this leaflet to inform you of the response from the United States government to your government's request for conditions of surrender.... Whether the war stops immediately depends on your government. You will understand how to end the war if you read these two official notifications.”   Amid pressures from imperial edicts to continue preparations for a final battle and focus solely on victory, the Japanese people were also subjected to an intense American psychological warfare campaign in addition to aerial bombardment. During late July and August, prefectural governors, police chiefs, and officers of the “special higher police” submitted reports to the Home Ministry detailing the rapidly deteriorating national morale.    Now on the other side, Roosevelt made it known back in January of 1943 at the Casablanca conference, the allies would only accept unconditional surrender. By 1945, the allies understood the predicament this left Japan with. On May 8th of 1945, Truman added “Japan's surrender would not mean the extermination or enslavement of the Japanese people” trying to indicate a non vindictive spirit. However the Kokutai question always remained ambiguous. State Department Joseph Grew, the former ambassador to Japan, began arguing to Truman they needed to make public a clear definition of the terms to persuade Japan to surrender. As he argued to Truman: Emperor Hirohito was seen as the key figure in Japan's surrender, likened to a "queen bee in a hive... surrounded by the attentions of the hive." Throughout the war, he was characterized in various ways—as a “puppet” of the militarists, a constitutional monarch, and a pacifist. Grew had immense faith in the influence exerted by what he referred to as the “moderates” surrounding the Japanese throne.    However many of Grew's colleagues argued the future existence of the monarchy was intolerable as it was akin to fascism. Many wanted to punish the emperor. Truman was in a tug of war. The Potsdam declaration issued on July 26th of 1945 came in the form of a ultimatum aiming to quicken japans surrender. Truman clarified the terms for the unconditional surrender at the end of its terms: "We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction." Zero mention of the emperor. Grew had argued to add “this may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty.” But it was deleted from the article. The status of the emperor was not guaranteed, the kokutai was thus up in the air.    The next day, the Suzuki cabinet rejected the terms. The Japanese leadership and Hirohito were still banking and awaiting Soviet replies to their terms.    Lets talk about the Soviet talks now   Back on July 12th ambassador Naotake Satō sent this message to the Soviets: “His Majesty the Emperor, mindful of the fact that the present war daily brings greater evil and sacrifice upon the peoples of all the belligerent powers, desires from his heart that it may be quickly terminated. But so long as England and the United States insist upon unconditional surrender, the Japanese Empire has no alternative but to fight on with all its strength for the honor and existence of the Motherland”.  However the Soviets had made commitments to their allies, promising in fact to invade Japan to aid them.    As for the Soviets their primary objective was to ensure unrestricted access to the Pacific Ocean. The year-round ice-free areas of the Soviet Pacific coastline, particularly Vladivostok, could be blockaded by air and sea from Sakhalin Island and the Kurile Islands. Securing these territories to guarantee free access to the Soya Strait was their main goal. Secondary objectives included acquiring leases for the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Southern Manchuria Railway, as well as gaining control over Dairen and Port Arthur.   To achieve these aims, Stalin and Molotov prolonged negotiations with the Japanese, creating a false sense of hope for a Soviet-mediated peace. Simultaneously, in their discussions with the United States and Britain, the Soviets insisted on strict adherence to the Cairo Declaration, which had been reaffirmed at the Yalta Conference. This declaration stipulated that the Allies would not accept a separate or conditional peace with Japan; thus, the Japanese would need to surrender unconditionally to all the Allies. The Soviets aimed to prolong the war by opposing any efforts to dilute this requirement. This approach would provide the Soviets with the necessary time to complete the transfer of their troops from the Western Front to the Far East and to conquer Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, northern Korea, South Sakhalin, the Kuriles, and potentially Hokkaidō, starting with an assault on Rumoi. AUGUST 1945   Thus we come to at last the critical point, August of 1945.    The Americans prepared for the deployment of atomic bombs and for an invasion of southern Kyushu, known as Operation Olympic, scheduled to commence on November 1. At 8:15 A.M. on August 6, a single B-29 bomber, the Enola Gay dropped little boy, devastating much of the undefended city of Hiroshima, instantly killing an estimated 100,000 to 140,000 people and leading to the deaths of possibly another 100,000 over the next five years. At the epicenter of the explosion, “a light appeared 3,000 times brighter than the sun,” creating a fireball that emitted thermal radiation capable of “instantly scorching humans, trees, and houses.” As the air heated and rushed upward, cold air surged in to ignite a firestorm. Hours later, a whirlwind escalated the flames to their peak until more than eight square miles were virtually reduced to cinders. Subsequently, black, muddy rain filled with radioactive fallout began to fall. Two days later, using Japan's rejection of the Potsdam Declaration as a pretext, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. Then on August 9, the United States dropped a second atomic bomb on Nagasaki, resulting in the immediate deaths of approximately 35,000 to 40,000 people and injuring more than 60,000.   Meanwhile, in Tokyo, during the critical period between the Potsdam Declaration and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, Emperor Hirohito remained silent about accepting the Potsdam terms. However, on July 25 and 31, he explicitly conveyed to Kido that the imperial regalia must be defended at all costs. The three sacred objects—a mirror, a curved jewel, and a sword—symbolized the legitimacy of his rule through the northern court and were integral to his identity as the divine sovereign. Hirohito's focus was on protecting these symbols of office, as he insisted on having them brought to the palace. This fixation on maintaining his symbols occurred during a pivotal moment when the pressing issue was whether to accept immediate capitulation. Reflecting on this, he was unprepared to seize the opportunity to end the war himself.   Prime Minister Suzuki, following his initial rejection of the Potsdam ultimatum, also saw no need for further action. His Cabinet Advisory Council, which included the president of Asano Cement, the founder of the Nissan consortium, the vice president of the Bank of Japan, and other representatives from the nation's leading business interests that had profited significantly from the war, convened on the morning of August 3. They recommended accepting the Potsdam terms, arguing that the United States would permit Japan to retain its non-military industries and continue participating in world trade.    Here are some reactions to the two bombs and invasion of Manchuria.    Yonai Mitsumasa said to admiral Takagi Sokichi, on August 12, that “I think the term is perhaps inappropriate, but the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war are, in a sense, gifts from the gods [tenyu, also “heaven-sent blessings”]. This way we don't have to say that we quit the war because of domestic circumstances. I've long been advocating control of our crisis, but neither from fear of an enemy attack nor because of the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war. The main reason is my anxiety over the domestic situation. So, it is rather fortunate that we can now control matters without revealing the domestic situation”.    Konoe's characterized the Soviet involvement in the war as “a godsend for controlling the army,”. Kido viewed of both the atomic bombings and the Soviet entry into the conflict as “useful” elements for ensuring a smooth transition. A nascent power struggle was unfolding, rendering the potential death toll—whether one hundred thousand or two hundred thousand—immaterial to those involved, as long as their desired outcome was achieved: an end to the war that would leave the monarchy intact and capable of managing the discontent that defeat would inevitably provoke. Throughout the final acts of this wartime drama, the Japanese “moderates” found it easier to capitulate to external pressures than to take decisive action on their own to conclude the war.   Another illuminating looks at Japan's elite's perspective on surrender terms was the document titled “Essentials of Peace Negotiations” (wahei kosho no yoryo). Drafted by Konoe and his adviser, retired Lt. Gen. Sakai Koji, after Konoe had reluctantly accepted a mission to Moscow, this document, stipulated the preservation of the emperor system, along with most of the imperial prerogatives, as the absolute minimum condition for peace. It defined the “original” or “essential homeland” as including the southern half of the Kurile Islands but showed a willingness to concede all overseas territories to the enemy, including Okinawa and the American-occupied Bonin Islands, as well as the southern half of Sakhalin. The “Essentials” also accepted complete disarmament for an unspecified period, thereby compromising on the issues of demobilizing and disarming the armed forces. More significantly, an “explanation” attached to the “Essentials” emphasized that “the main aim is to secure the imperial line and maintain the political role of the emperor.”    Why Japan surrendered   We come to it atleast after a long podcast. Why did Japan ultimately surrender?   The twin psychological shocks of the first atomic bomb and the Soviet entry into the war, combined with Kido's and the emperor's concern over escalating public criticism of the throne and its occupant, fueled an almost paranoid fear that, sooner or later, the populace would react violently against their leaders if the war persisted much longer. These factors ultimately led Hirohito to accept, in principle, the terms of the Potsdam Declaration.   At the first meeting of the six member constituents of the Supreme War Leadership Council, held from 10:30 A.M. to 1:00 P.M. on August 9, Army Minister Anami Korechika, Chiefs of Staff Umezu Yoshijiro, representing the army, and Yonai, representing the navy, along with Tōgō, from the Foreign Ministry, were expected to discuss the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. Instead, the conversation revolved around whether to attempt a conditional surrender—specifically, should they insist on one condition, the preservation of the kokutai, or four?   After Suzuki addressed the assembly regarding the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and the Soviet attack, Yonai, as recounted by Navy Chief of Staff Toyoda, was the first to speak, framing the issue in terms of four conditions. “Let's start to talk, Do we accept the Potsdam Declaration with no conditions? If not, and we wish to insist on attaching hopes and conditions, we may do so this way. First, preservation of the kokutai; then for the rest, the main items in the Potsdam Declaration: treatment of war criminals, method of disarmament, and the matter of sending in an army of occupation.” Thus, the participants identified what they perceived to be the ambiguous points within the Potsdam Declaration and used them as the foundation for their discussions.   The army insisted on four conditions: First, the preservation of the kokutai, which they considered distinct from the Potsdam Declaration itself. The other conditions proposed were, second, that the Imperial Headquarters assume responsibility for disarmament and demobilization; third, a prohibition on occupation; and fourth, the delegation of the punishment of war criminals to the Japanese government. The army equated the kokutai with the emperor's right of supreme command. Their self-serving desire for autonomous war crimes trials was based on the belief that the Allies would use such trials to politically indict the military. Consequently, army leaders aimed to preempt the activities of any international tribunal by conducting their own trials—similar to the approach taken by the uninvaded and unrepentant Germans after World War I.   Supporting the military's views during cabinet meetings that day were three civilian members of the Suzuki cabinet: Justice Minister Matsuzaka Hiromasa, Home Minister Yasui Toji, and Minister of Health Okada Tadahiko. At the imperial conference that night, which extended into the early hours of the tenth, Foreign Minister Tōgō's interpretation of the “preservation of the kokutai” referred solely to the safeguarding of the Imperial House or dynasty, rather than the continuation of Hirohito's reign.   Hiranuma, another advocate for the single condition, interpreted the kokutai as the “emperor's sovereign right to rule the state [not] deriving from national law. Even if the entire nation is sacrificed to the war, we must preserve both the kokutai and the security of the imperial house.” This discrepancy illustrated that there was no completely unified understanding of what the kokutai entailed; the debate over one condition versus four represented conflicting visions for the future of the Japanese state and masked the competition for political power that was already unfolding.   It remains doubtful whether the emperor and Kido initially sided with Tōgō against the four conditions proposed by the senior military leaders. A more likely inference is that both men retained sympathies for the hardliners, both military and civilian, who preferred to continue the futile war rather than surrender immediately and unconditionally. This may explain why, on August 9, Konoe had Hosokawa Morisada approach Navy General Headquarters to urge the emperor's brother, Prince Takamatsu, to pressure Hirohito (through Kido) to accept the Potsdam terms. Later that afternoon, Konoe enlisted the help of diplomat Shigemitsu Mamoru to persuade Kido to reconsider his stance on the four conditions. Ultimately, at the urging of Takamatsu and Shigemitsu, Kido did shift to support Tōgō's position.   At the end of the war, as at its beginning and throughout every stage of its progression, Emperor Hirohito played a highly active role in supporting the actions carried out in his name. From the very beginning of the Asia-Pacific war, the emperor played a significant role in the unfolding events around him. Prior to the Battle of Okinawa, he consistently advocated for a decisive victory. Afterward, he acknowledged the necessity of pursuing an early peace, although he did not favor an immediate cessation of hostilities. Instead, he wavered, steering Japan toward ongoing warfare rather than direct negotiations with the Allies. When the final crisis fully unfolded, the only option left was unconditional surrender. Even then, he continued to procrastinate until the atomic bomb was dropped and the Soviets launched their attack. The wartime emperor ideology that once sustained morale made it exceedingly difficult for Japan's leaders to accept the act of surrender. Aware of their objective defeat, yet indifferent to the suffering the war inflicted on their own people—as well as on the populations of Asia, the Pacific, and the West whose lives they had disrupted—the emperor and his military leaders sought a means to lose without appearing to lose. They aimed to mitigate domestic criticism following surrender while preserving their power structure.   Blinded by their fixation on the fate of the imperial house and committed to an overly optimistic diplomacy toward the Soviet Union, Japan's leaders missed several opportunities to end their lost war. Would Japan's leaders have surrendered more promptly if the Truman administration had “clarified” the status of the emperor before the cataclysmic double shocks of the atomic bomb and the Soviet entry into the war? Probably not. However, it is likely they would have surrendered to prevent the kokutai from being destroyed from within. The evidence suggests that the first atomic bomb and the Soviet declaration of war led Hirohito, Kido, and other members of the court to believe that continuing the war would inevitably result in that destruction. They recognized that the populace was war-weary and despondent, with rising hostility toward the military and the government, accompanied by increasing criticism of the emperor himself. More specifically, Kido and Hirohito were privy to Home Ministry reports, which contained information from governors and police chiefs nationwide. These reports indicated that citizens were beginning to label the emperor as an incompetent leader responsible for the deteriorating war situation.   This is the third variable, never spoken about. Many first look at the atomic bombs. Bigger brain people turn to the Soviet Invasion of Manchuria. But hardly anyone reads about how the collapse of Japan's social fabric, scared the shit out of the Emperor and his closest advisors. You can't have a kokutai, without a populace that worshiped you.    When the emperor expressed in February, “What worries me is whether the nation [could] endure” long enough to achieve victory, he was not merely voicing concern for the suffering of his subjects; rather, he feared that such suffering could lead to social upheaval—in short, revolution. At that time, he referred to the ordinary, war-related hardships of food shortages, air raids, devastated cities, destruction of homes, and the omnipresent grief from the loss of loved ones. The atomic bomb escalated death, pain, and suffering to unimaginably higher levels, intensifying the threat from within. After the bombings of Japan and two atomic bombs, Hirohito was in a dark way, given a golden get out of jail free card. Hirohito could now save his suffering people from further anguish by surrendering, allowing him to deflect responsibility for leading them into misery while adopting an air of benevolence and care. Indeed, Hirohito did care—though not primarily for the Japanese people, but rather for the survival of his own imperial house and throne.   After the bombing of Hiroshima, Hirohito delayed for a full two days before instructing Kido, shortly before 10 A.M. on August 9, to “quickly control the situation” because “the Soviet [Union]” had declared war. Kido immediately communicated with Prime Minister Suzuki, who began arrangements for an Imperial Conference scheduled for later that night. Following the seidan of August 10, Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu took charge of drafting the “Imperial Rescript Ending the War” based on Hirohito's directives. Assisted by two scholars of the Chinese classics, Kawada Mizuho and Yasuoka Masahiro, Sakomizu worked tirelessly for over three days before submitting a version of the rescript to the Suzuki cabinet. After six hours of contentious discussion on the night of August 14, the cabinet modified and approved the document. Hirohito promptly signed it, and Shimomura and Kido persuaded him to record a suitably opaque final version for broadcast to the nation.   On the night of August 14, the Suzuki government notified the United States and other Allied nations that it had accepted both the Potsdam Declaration and the Byrnes letter of August 11. Accelerating the emperor's actions during this climactic moment of the unconditional surrender drama was the American psychological warfare campaign. When a leaflet dropped from B-29 bombers came into Kido's possession on the night of August 13 or the morning of the fourteenth, he conferred with the emperor and explained the gravity of the situation. The latest enemy leaflets were informing the Japanese people of the government's notification of surrender under one condition, along with the full text of Byrnes's response. If this continued, it would undermine the imperial government's reliance on secrecy to obscure the true nature of the lost war and the reasons for the prolonged surrender delay.   Given Kido's and the emperor's concerns about rising signs of defeatism, including criticism of the throne, immediate action was necessary to prevent the populace from acting on their own initiative. Thus, the second seidan was convened. At noon on August 15, the Japanese people gathered around their radio receivers and heard, for the first time, the high-pitched voice of their emperor telling them:    “After pondering deeply the general trends of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in Our Empire today, We have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to an extraordinary measure. We have ordered Our Government to communicate to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union that Our Empire accepts the provisions of their Joint Declaration. To strive for the common prosperity and happiness of all nations as well as the security and well-being of Our subjects is the solemn obligation which has been handed down by Our Imperial Ancestors and which lies close to Our heart. Indeed, We declared war on America and Britain out of Our sincere desire to ensure Japan's self-preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from Our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandizement. But now the war has lasted for nearly four years. Despite the best that has been done by everyone—the gallant fighting of the military and naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of Our servants of the State, and the devoted service of Our one hundred million people—the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest. Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization. Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects, or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers... The hardships and sufferings to which Our nation is to be subjected hereafter will be certainly great. We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all of you, Our subjects. However, it is according to the dictates of time and fate that We have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is unsufferable”.   Clearly Hirohito sought to justify his decision to surrender by citing the dropping of the atomic bombs. He wanted to become the saviour of the Japanese people. Hirohito wanted to obfuscate the issue of accountability, to prevent expressions of strife and anger and to strengthen domestic unity around himself, to protect and raise the kokutai.  Interestingly, the surrender declaration to the civilian population was not the same one sent to the military. On August 17th Hirohito issued a second “rescript to soldiers and sailors” throughout the asia-pacific.   “ Now that the Soviet Union has entered the war against us, to continue . . . under the present conditions at home and abroad would only recklessly incur even more damage to ourselves and result in endangering the very foundation of the empire's existence. Therefore, even though enormous fighting spirit still exists in the Imperial Navy and Army, I am going to make peace with the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, as well as with Chungking, in order to maintain our glorious national polity”.   The lesser-known August 17 rescript to the army and navy specified Soviet participation as the sole reason for surrender, while maintaining the kokutai as the primary aim. Dissembling until the end—and even beyond—it was noted that the emperor presented two different justifications for his delayed surrender. Both statements were likely true.   Months later Hirohito's said this about his decision to surrender “The main motive behind my decision at that time was that if we . . . did not act, the Japanese race would perish and I would be unable to protect my loyal subjects [sekishi—literally, “children”]. Second, Kido agreed with me on the matter of defending the kokutai. If the enemy landed near Ise Bay, both Ise and Atsuta Shrines would immediately come under their control. There would be no time to transfer the sacred treasures [regalia] of the imperial family and no hope of protecting them. Under these circumstances, protection of the kokutai would be difficult. For these reasons, I thought at the time that I must make peace even at the sacrifice of myself.”    There exists this sort of childish argument today whether it was the atomic bombs or the Soviet Invasion that caused Japan to surrender. However, this overlooks as I think I've explained in 9000 words jeez, the influence of the kokutai. Defending the kokutai was Hirohito's number one priority. The Soviets threatened it. Communism threatened it. What Japan perceived to be “democracy” threatened it. American victory threatened it. And the destruction of Japan's social fabric threatened it. I love this one piece of history, that I have only come across in one book, that being the main one I am using here.   On August 12th, Hirohito came to the imperial family to tell them he had made the decision to surrender. His uncle Prince Yasuhiko Asaka asked him whether the war would be continued if the kokutai could not be preserved. Hirohito replied “of course”.

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the battle of Nanjing. As the relentless tide of war approached Nanjing in December 1937, fear gripped its residents. As atrocities unfolded in the countryside, civilians flocked toward safety zones, desperate for refuge. Under the command of General Tang Shengzhi, the Chinese forces prepared for a fierce defense, determined to hold their ground against the technologically superior invaders. Despite heavy losses and internal strife, hopes flickered among the defenders, fueled by the valor of their troops. Key positions like Old Tiger's Cave became battlegrounds, exemplifying the fierce resistance against the Japanese advance. On December 9, as artillery fire enveloped the city, a battle for the Gate of Enlightenment commenced. Both sides suffered grievously, with the Chinese soldiers fighting to the last, unwilling to yield an inch of their soil. Each assault from Japan met with relentless counterattacks, turning Nanjing into a symbol of perseverance amidst impending doom, as the siege marked a critical chapter in the conflict, foreshadowing the brutal events that would follow.   #167 The Battle of Nanjing Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. By mid-December, the landscape surrounding Nanjing was eerily quiet. The Japanese Army marched through what seemed to be desolate fields and mountains, but they were not truly empty. Civilians were scarce, with most having fled, but a few remained in their homes, hiding in cellars and barns, clinging to the hope that the war would bypass them. Meanwhile, thousands of Chinese soldiers, left behind and unable to keep pace with their units, still posed a significant danger to the Japanese forces. The Japanese Army had not truly conquered the territory east and south of Nanjing; they had merely passed through. Mopping-up operations became a top priority. Soldiers from the 16th Infantry Division, stationed near Purple Mountain, spent early December conducting these missions far from the city's walls. “Chinese stragglers may be hiding in this area, and they must be flushed out. Any small structure of no strategic value to the Japanese Army must be burned!” This command rang out to the division's soldiers as they spread across the countryside around Unicorn Gate. Soon, isolated fires began to illuminate the horizon, one for each home. Soldiers from the 9th Infantry Division, who were not directly engaged in combat south of the Gate of Enlightenment, were also conducting similar mopping-up operations. On December 11 at noon, one squad received orders to investigate a suspicious farm building. Although it had been searched previously, movement inside prompted renewed caution. The Japanese entered carefully, moving from room to room. In the basement, they discovered eight Chinese soldiers who offered no resistance, immediately raising their hands in surrender. Bound together, they were brought outside. Using a few Chinese words supplemented by sign language, the Japanese gathered that the Chinese had been in the vicinity where one of their comrades had been killed days earlier. Unanimously, they decided the prisoners should be executed in front of their comrade's grave. Some of the older soldiers hesitated, reluctant to partake in the killings, leaving it to the younger ones to carry out the order. Soon, eight headless bodies lay sprawled before a solitary Japanese grave.  On the morning of December 11, the first soldiers of the 6th Japanese Infantry Division finally spotted the distant city wall of Nanjing. They had been engaged in fierce combat for nearly two days, attempting to dislodge the tenacious defenders of the Yuhuatai plateau, the elite soldiers of the 88th Division. In a desperate bid to maintain their foothold on Yuhuatai, the 88th Division deployed its reserved 528th Regiment along with a battalion of engineers. Despite their efforts, the regiment's ranks had been depleted, filled with inexperienced recruits, and their leadership nearly obliterated, limiting their effectiveness. Under the relentless assaults from the Japanese forces, their defenses began to falter almost immediately. Faced with the stiff resistance at the Gate of Enlightenment, the Japanese shifted their focus to the Chinese Gate on December 11. Japanese aircraft were summoned for tactical air support, forcing the 88th Division's defenders to retreat behind the wall. This withdrawal occurred swiftly and somewhat chaotically, allowing the Japanese to pursue closely. Before the Chinese could regroup, 300 Japanese soldiers had breached the wall. Only the mobilization of all available forces enabled the Chinese to push the attackers back outside. Meanwhile, the left flank of the 88th Division, stationed east of Chinese Gate, remained outside the wall. Here, they clashed with elements of the 9th Japanese Division but faced intense pressure and were compelled to fall back. By the end of the day, the Chinese division had shortened its defensive line, regrouping in front of the city wall. Plans for a nighttime counterattack were ultimately abandoned, as it became clear that the division's soldiers were too fatigued to mount an effective offensive. Overall, it proved to be a successful day for the Japanese 10th Army. Further south, the Kunisaki Detachment successfully crossed the Yangtze River at Cihu village, beginning their advance toward Pukou. Its special amphibious training made the detachment ideally suited for the operation, but its limited numbers, essentially a reinforced infantry regiment, raised concerns at field headquarters about whether it could accomplish the task alone. Prince Asaka proposed transporting part of the 13th Division across the Yangtze further north to sever the railway connecting Tianjin to Pukou, cutting off a potential retreat route for Chinese forces that had escaped Nanjing.  On December 11, Japanese artillery shells rained down relentlessly, targeting both the interior and exterior of Nanjing's city walls. Administrators of the Safety Zone were alarmed to witness several shells landing perilously close to its southern edge. In a bid to provide some semblance of security, American and foreign flags were raised around the zone's perimeter, though their protective influence against artillery fire from miles away was negligible. The leaders of the Safety Zone faced an unexpected dilemma: how to handle lawbreakers with the city courts now out of operation. That day, they encountered a thief caught in the act. As Rabe noted in his diary “We sentence the thief to death, then pardon him and reduce his punishment to 24 hours in jail, and ultimately, due to the absence of a jail, we simply let him go”. Refugees continued to pour in, with a total of 850 having found shelter at Ginling College. Vautrin and her colleagues began to feel that their initial estimate of 2,700 women and children seeking refuge on the campus was overly optimistic. They were soon proven wrong. On the banks of the Yangtze River, hundreds of injured soldiers and civilians were lining up to be ferried across to Pukou, where trains awaited to transport them further inland and away from danger. Many had been waiting for days without food. While ferries made continuous trips across the river to rescue as many as possible, the process was painfully slow. As of late December 10, approximately 1,500 wounded civilians remained stranded on the south bank of the Yangtze. The Japanese forces were confronted by a fiercely determined enemy composed largely of young soldiers from the Training Division. These soldiers had the advantage of having been stationed near Purple Mountain for several years, making them familiar with the terrain. Additionally, they were part of an elite unit, groomed not just in equipment and training but also instilled with a sense of nationalism rooted in Chiang Kai-shek's ideology. Li Xikai, the commander of the division's 3rd Regiment, had set up his command post directly in the path of the primary Japanese advance, yet his regiment continued to resist. Despite the fierce resistance, the Japanese gradually gained control over the Purple Mountain area. General Nakajima Kesago, commander of the 16th Division, visited an artillery observation post early in the day and was pleased to receive reports that his troops had captured two peaks of Purple Mountain and were poised to take the main peak.  Yet there loomed a problem on Nakajima's right flank. A widening gap was emerging between the 16th Division and the 13th Division, which had advanced along the southern bank of the Yangtze. There was a risk that Chinese forces could escape through this lightly guarded area. The 13th Division was stationed in the strategically important river port city of Zhenjiang, preparing to cross the Yangtze. The Central China Area Army ordered the 13th Division to mobilize three infantry battalions and one artillery battalion. This new formation, known as the Yamada Detachment after its commander, Yamada Senji, was tasked with remaining on the Yangtze's south bank and advancing westward to capture two Chinese fortresses on the river: Mt. Wulong and Mt. Mufu. This redeployment alleviated concerns about the gap, allowing the 16th Division to focus on the city wall. As the sun dipped towards the horizon, one Captain Akao Junzo prepared for what he believed would be his final assault. He had been ordered to seize a hill northeast of Sun Yat-sen Gate that overlooked the city entrance. His commander told him “The attack on Nanjing will likely be the last battle of this war, and I hope your company can be at the front when the enemy's lines are breached”. The hill was fortified with numerous machine gun positions, reinforced with mud, bricks, and tiles, and connected by an intricate network of trenches. Dense rows of barbed wire lay before the positions, designed to halt attackers and expose them to machine-gun fire. Additionally, the area was likely heavily mined, and Chinese soldiers maintained a high level of alertness. Akao knew this all too well; when he crawled forward and slightly lifted his head to survey the landscape, he triggered a hail of bullets, one of which grazed his helmet. Around late afternoon, four mountain guns from the regimental artillery began firing on the Chinese positions, sustaining the bombardment for over an hour. By 5:00 pm, as the winter sky darkened, Akao decided it was time to launch the attack. Expecting close-quarters combat, he instructed his men to carry only their rifles and small entrenchment tools. With the entire company poised to move, he dispatched a small group of soldiers ahead to cut openings in the barbed wire while receiving covering fire from the mountain guns and the rifles and machine guns of their comrades. The remainder of the company advanced with swords raised and bayonets fixed. As they approached within about 700 feet of the enemy positions, the artillery bombardment ceased as planned. The enemy, still reeling from the ferocity of the earlier assault, scrambled in a panic from their trenches, retreating in disarray. Akao and his fellow soldiers pressed forward, cutting down any opposition in their path. Seizing the momentum, Akao charged to occupy the hill that had been his target. He found it deserted upon his arrival and sent a triumphant message back to command, reporting that the objective had been achieved. However, the reply he received left him baffled: he was ordered to withdraw with his company and return to their lines. Apparently, the regimental command deemed the position too precarious. Sensing that a precious advantage was being squandered, Akao disregarded the order. Before his company could establish a defensive position on the hill, the Chinese launched a counterattack. Lying down, the Japanese soldiers returned fire while frantically digging into the earth to fortify their position. Gradually, they began to form a rudimentary perimeter at the summit. The fighting continued into the night. Exhausted from days without sleep, many soldiers rotated between guard duty and rest, dozing off intermittently in their shallow trenches, reassuring one another that everything would be alright before drifting back to sleep. They successfully repelled all attempts by the Chinese to reclaim the hill and were eventually relieved. On December 11, after leaving his capital, Chiang Kai-shek took time to reflect on everything that had happened in his diary. He reassured himself that his nationalist revolution would persist, regardless of whether he held Nanjing, “Temporary defeat can be turned into eventual victory.” Yet he did not fear so much the Japanese invasion itself, but rather how the weakening of his nationalist government might allow the Communists to rise. He wrote about how his nation was on the brink of becoming a second Spain. While foreign invasions were undoubtedly disastrous, they could eventually be overcome, if not immediately, then over years or decades. Sometimes, this could be achieved merely by absorbing the outmatched invader and assimilating them into Chinese society. In contrast, internal unrest posed a far more fundamental threat to the survival of any regime. As we have seen in this series, going back to the mid 19th century, was it the foreign empires of Britain, France and Russia that threatened to destroy the Qing dynasty, or was it the internal civil war brought on by the Taiping? As Chiang famously put it “the Japanese were a treatable disease of the skin. Communism however was a disease of the heart”. Chiang could accept a humiliating but rapid retreat from Nanjing. In his view, it would be far more difficult to recover from a bloody yet futile struggle for the city that might cost him what remained of his best troops. A prolonged defensive battle, he reasoned, would be a tragic waste and could shift the balance of power decisively in favor of the Communists. This new mindset was reflected in a telegram he sent late on December 11 to Tang Shengzhi: “If the situation becomes untenable, it is permissible to find the opportune moment to retreat to regroup in the rear in anticipation of future counterattacks.” On December 12, tankettes cautiously plunged into the Yuhuatai plateau. Unexpectedly the Chinese defenders abandoned their positions and rushed down the hillside toward Nanjing's walls. Upon discovering this, the Japanese tankettes opened fire on the retreating Chinese, cutting swathes through the masses and sending bodies tumbling down the slope. Some Japanese infantry caught up, joining in the slaughter and laughing boisterously as they reveled in the chaos. A tankette column escorted a group of engineers to the Nanjing wall and then drove east along the moat until they reached a large gate, flanked by two smaller openings, all securely shut. A chilling message, painted in blue, adorned the gate's surface. Written in Chinese characters, it conveyed a stark warning: “We Swear Revenge on the Enemy.” The wall itself loomed three stories high, but Japanese artillery was already targeting it, this was known as the Chinese Gate. Now that Yuhuatai was virtually in Japanese hands, capturing the gate had become the primary objective. At this location, the wall stood 70 feet tall, protected by a 100-foot moat to the outside. All bridges spanning the moat had been destroyed. The area around the gate was heavily defended, with approximately one machine gun positioned every 50 yards atop the wall. Inside, the gate was reinforced with a formidable barrier of sandbags. Chinese infantry armed with mortars and small arms could fire down on the Japanese attackers while others had established isolated positions in nearby buildings that had survived the “scorched earth” policy. Taking the gate and the heavily fortified southwestern corner of the wall was the responsibility of the 6th Division. The division was deploying its regiments: the 13th, the 47th, and the 23rd from east to west. The 45th Regiment, the final unit of the division, was tasked with skirting the western side of the wall and advancing northward, aiming for the Yangtze docks at Xiaguan. The soldiers of the division had already formed a rough understanding of the formidable defenses they were facing. During the night between December 11 and 12, they had advanced nearly to the wall, gathering intelligence to prepare for an assault at dawn. As planned, the assault commenced. Field artillery fired round after round at the gate, but the wall sustained minimal damage. A Japanese tank rolled up, firing point-blank at the gate but producing no visible effect. Next, it was the engineers' turn. A “dare-to-die” squad, equipped with long ladders, crept as close to the wall as possible without exposing themselves and then sprinted the final distance. The moment they broke into the open, a Chinese machine gun opened fire, cutting them down to the last man. At noon, three Japanese planes soared overhead, dropping bombs near a Chinese-held building outside the gate. The smoke from the resulting fire briefly obscured the area. Seizing the opportunity presented by the reduced visibility, a large group of Chinese soldiers holed up inside attempted to dash back to the wall. The Japanese spotted their movement instantly, and every soldier in the line opened fire. The fleeing Chinese were mowed down like ripe grass, collapsing in heaps.  Meanwhile the battle for the Gate of Enlightenment was drawing to a close. On the Chinese side of the wall, confusion reigned regarding the overall situation on December 12. Chen Yiding, brigade commander of the 87th Division, had been warned that heads would roll if the Gate of Enlightenment fell to the Japanese. Hearing the sounds of fierce fighting on the edges of Yuhuatai and seeing the smoke rise from numerous fires on Purple Mountain, he was left in the dark about their implications, surrounded by the fog of war. Chen's troops had finally managed to establish a telephone link to the rear, but by mid-afternoon, it was cut off, likely due to a stray artillery shell. After dark, Chen sent an officer to his left flank to make contact with the Chinese forces there. The report that followed was far from reassuring. A unit from Guangdong Province was abandoning its positions and retreating north, attempting to exit the capital through one of the gates in the city wall. The officer had attempted to inquire about their destination, but the retreating soldiers ignored him. With neighboring units evacuating autonomously, a significant gap was opening in the Chinese line atop the wall between the Gate of Enlightenment and Sun Yat-sen Gate. A frightening possibility emerged: the Japanese could walk right in across the undefended southeastern corner of the city wall and surround Chen Yiding's troops before they had a chance to withdraw. The situation was becoming untenable, a fact underscored by the artillery fire raining down on Chen's position. Despite this, retreat was not a simple decision for Chen and the other commanders of the 87th Division. They had been garrisoned in Nanjing before the war, and the city had become home to many of the soldiers. Shortly after midnight, Chen called a meeting with his senior officers. After considerable discussion, they concluded that they had no choice but to withdraw. Nonetheless, Chen insisted that everyone sign a document confirming their support for this decision, recognizing the potential danger of taking such a significant step without consensus. After all, his own life had been threatened if the situation deteriorated further. Soon after, the Chinese began to move out of their positions. The Japanese were initially unaware of the retreat; all they noticed during the night between December 12 and 13 was that the Chinese artillery fire began to grow increasingly distant. By 4:00 am it had stopped completely. The few remaining Chinese were quickly overwhelmed and killed. In the end, the gate, which had cost so many lives during the seemingly endless battle, was taken almost effortlessly by the Japanese. Soldiers of the 9th Division, stationed outside the wall, scrambled up the slope created by the previous days' shelling. Once at the top, they thrust their hands into the air, shouting “Banzai!” so loudly that they believed their families back home in Japan might hear them. Tears streamed down their faces as soldiers embraced and shook hands, reflecting on the friends they had lost throughout the months of fighting, from Shanghai to their current position. They reassured each other that their sacrifices had been worth it for this very moment. On December 12,  the slopes of Purple Mountain  were ablaze. Zhou Zhenqiang, commander of the Training Division's 1st Brigade, led his men in a desperate struggle to maintain control of the mountain's forested peaks. However, they were being overwhelmed by the better-equipped Japanese troops, and Zhou knew it was only a matter of time before he would have to relinquish his position. Zhou found himself unable to obtain any information from his superiors about the overall situation, despite repeated attempts to contact the Training Division's headquarters. He dispatched a runner, who returned a few hours later with disheartening news: the divisional commander had left late in the afternoon. Other reports indicated a general breakdown in command. The elite 88th Division was in disarray, and an entire division of Guangdong troops, that being the same force that had abandoned the wall near the Gate of Enlightenment, had been spotted marching out of the Gate of Great Peace, seemingly intent on returning home. With indications of collapse all around him, Zhou decided to execute an orderly withdrawal from Purple Mountain, leaving a small contingent behind to cover the retreat. His troops entered through the city wall at Sun Yat-sen Gate and marched in disciplined columns through the streets of Nanjing, where signs of imminent anarchy were evident. Chinese soldiers were scattered everywhere, speaking a cacophony of dialects, yet they appeared to lack any coherent command. Tang Shengzhi's grip on the situation was weakening. Meanwhile Japan's 13th Air Group had been busy with the final stages of the battle for Nanjing.  In the morning of December 12, after raiding Chinese positions at Sun Yat-sen Gate, they  received new orders. Intelligence indicated that Chinese ships, laden with troops, were moving up the Yangtze from Nanjing. Japanese infantry on the ground could only watch as this prize slipped through their fingers, and the army requested air support. All available planes at Changzhou, a mix of A4N fighters and Yokosuka B4Y bombers, totaling 24 aircraft, were assembled for the crucial mission. The day was clear, providing excellent visibility as the pilots headed toward the section of the Yangtze where they believed the vessels would be, based on reasonable assumptions about their speed. At 1:30 p.m., 28 nautical miles upriver from Nanjing, the pilots sighted four ships. Trusting their military intelligence, they saw no need for further identification. Initially, the B4Ys bombed the vessels from a considerable height. One bomb struck the lead ship, a military vessel, disabling its forward gun and snapping the foremast. Then, a first wave of six A4Ns dove down over the line of ships, attacking individually. In total, they dropped about 20 bombs. Several exploded close enough to the lead vessel to damage its hull and injure crew members on deck. A 30-caliber machine gun on board was manned, with gunners stripped to the waist firing at the Japanese planes but failing to score a hit. Several of the A4Ns strafed the ship with machine-gun fire. After 20 minutes of sustained bombing and strafing, the result was utter devastation. The lead vessel was stuck in mid-river, riddled with bullets, aflame, and listing to starboard. Two other ships were beached on the right bank, while another sat stranded on the left. Satisfied with their mission, the Japanese aviators broke off and returned to their temporary base. Upon their landing in Changzhou, instead of receiving accolades, the pilots were met with reprimands. Why hadn't they sunk all the vessels? They were ordered to return immediately to finish the job. Though they didn't find the original targets, they stumbled upon four other vessels closer to Nanjing. One aircraft dove toward the ships, releasing a 60-kilogram bomb that struck one vessel. As the pilot pulled up, he caught sight of the Union Jack on the hull and realized his mistake; he had inadvertently targeted neutral ships. The other pilots recognized the significance of the markings as well and withheld their bombs. The vessel was identified as the SS Wantung. Soon after, the Japanese pilots understood that the ships they had attacked earlier upriver from Nanjing were also Western; three of them were Standard Oil tankers. The last vessel, which had sustained the most damage, was the USS Panay, a lightly armed flat-bottomed gunboat,  tasked with protecting American lives and property along China's longest river. The Panay had been instrumental in evacuating American citizens from the war zone in November and December. On the day it was attacked, the Panay was carrying four American embassy personnel and ten American and foreign journalists to safety. The ship's doctor converted the engine room into a makeshift sick bay, treating a steady stream of injured personnel. By the end, he was tending to 45 patients. The soldiers and passengers were evacuated in two small boats to a nearby marshy island covered in reeds, where they hid, fearful of further strafing. From their hiding place, they watched as a Japanese powerboat filled with soldiers approached the Panay. After firing more volleys at the vessel, the soldiers boarded it, remaining for only five minutes before departing. The American flag still flew from the bow at that time. At 3:54 pm, the Panay rolled over to starboard and sank in seven to ten fathoms of water. Cold and frightened, the survivors waded through knee-deep mud to a nearby village, assisting those too severely wounded to walk.  Meanwhile back at Chinese Gate, the mutual slaughter continued into the afternoon of December 12. The Japanese made no significant progress, although their failure was not for lack of trying. The commanders of the 6th Division had strategically placed the boundary between the 13th and 47th Regiments exactly at the gate, encouraging both units to compete to be the first to seize the position. Yet, despite their efforts, it became clear that willpower alone was not enough to breach the Chinese defenses at Chinese Gate. In peacetime, Nanjing's city gates served as entry points into a bustling capital, but in wartime, they transformed into heavily fortified and nearly impregnable strongholds. Any Japanese officer hoping for a swift victory would soon be disappointed; by early afternoon, the situation at the gate had devolved into a stalemate. The section of the wall manned by the 47th Infantry Regiment, located east of the gate, also saw little meaningful movement as the day wore on. Japanese soldiers, pinned down by Chinese fire from atop the wall, could do little more than take pride in a symbolic triumph. A small group of soldiers had managed to reach the wall and place a ladder against it, but it fell nearly ten feet short of the top. One soldier skillfully scaled the last portion, gripping protruding bricks and crevices of the nearly vertical surface. The entire Japanese front watched him with bated breath. He reached the top and unfurled a Japanese flag, but it immediately drew intense Chinese fire, forcing him to duck for cover. Soon, he vanished from sight, raising concerns among his compatriots about his fate. Later, it was revealed that he had taken refuge in a depression in the wall, waiting out the battle. The real breakthrough of the day would occur west of the gate. The 23rd Regiment was deployed there with orders to capture sections of the wall near the southwestern corner. It became evident that the wall could not be scaled without first bringing up artillery to create gaps in its solid masonry. A significant portion of the divisional fire support, 36 small-caliber mountain guns, four 100mm howitzers, and four 150mm howitzers, was assigned to this section. Artillery observers were also sent to the 23rd Regiment's forward command post to coordinate with the infantry and assess the effects of the shelling. By mid-afternoon, the artillery bombardment had created a ravine-like hole in the wall large enough for an assault. The 23rd Regiment positioned its 2nd and 3rd Battalions at the front, with the 1st Battalion held in reserve. First, the engineers undertook the challenging task. As the assault commenced, the rest of the regiment provided covering fire to force the Chinese defenders to seek shelter while the engineers charged into the 70-foot-wide moat. Once a human chain formed, they held up ladders as a makeshift bridge, allowing a company from the 3rd Battalion to rush across and into the gap in the wall. As the batteries switched to close infantry support, they laid down a barrage around the breach to prevent Chinese interference as the attack entered its decisive phase. The Japanese soldiers scrambled up the rubble, created by the artillery fire, which rose several dozen feet high. Shortly before 5:00 p.m., the Japanese seized control of the southwestern segment of the wall. The Chinese launched several counterattacks to reclaim the position, but none were successful. This action ultimately sealed Nanjing's fate; beyond the wall, there was nothing left to save the ancient city and its inhabitants. As defeat appeared imminent, more and more civilians sought safety in foreign-controlled areas, though danger still loomed large. Bits of shrapnel narrowly missed Dr. Robert Wilson while he operated in the Safety Zone. Every square foot of John Rabe's property became filled with families, many camping in the open with their own blankets. Some sought refuge under his large swastika flag, believing that this would make the area especially “bomb-proof” given the growing friendship between Tokyo and Berlin; they assumed Japanese aviators would think twice before targeting a region seemingly under German protection. With just hours left before the Japanese Army was expected to gain control, the residents of Nanjing made their last preparations, prioritizing personal survival. The brutal behavior of Japanese troops in conquered territories fueled intense concern over the possible fate of injured soldiers who might fall into enemy hands. As Nanjing's last hours as a free city unfolded, it became imperative for local hospitals to evacuate as many wounded soldiers as possible across the Yangtze. On December 12, doctors found a motorboat stranded on the riverbank, having apparently broken down. They managed to repair it and ferried several hundred patients to safety throughout the day. Throughout December 12, the citizens of Nanjing were subjected to the unsettling cacophony of heavy shelling, mixed with the roar of bombers overhead. By evening, the entire horizon south of the city glowed with flames. The sound of fighting emanated from all directions, continuing long after sunset. However, in the middle of the night, activity began to wan. Every few minutes, the muffled thuds of shells could still be heard, though their origin was unclear. For the most part, an eerie silence prevailed, as if the city was holding its breath in anticipation of the final onslaught. Chiang Kai-shek had indicated he would understand if Tang chose to abandon the capital. However, on December 12, he reversed his stance, sending a telegram to Tang expressing optimism that the Nanjing garrison could hold out significantly longer. In his words “If you do not shy away from sacrifices, you will be able to hold high the banner of our nation and our army, and this could transform defeat into victory. If you can hold out one more day, you will add to the pride of the Chinese nation. If you can hold out for half a month or more, the domestic and international situation could see a substantial change.” Tang adopted a hardline approach toward any signs of defeatism among his troops. When he learned that General Sun Yuanliang, commander of the formerly elite 88th Division, was leading approximately 2,000 men from the Gate of Enlightenment to the dock area, Tang acted swiftly. He dispatched Song Xilian, the commanding general of the 36th Division, to halt the retreat. When the two units met, a fratricidal clash nearly occurred. Fortunately, the 88th Division agreed to return to the gate and continue fighting. Whatever Tang's plans, they were rendered irrelevant at 3:00 pm,  when he received another telegram from Chiang, this time ordering a full retreat. Rumors that the Chinese Army had started evacuating Nanjing triggerec panic among many units. Thousands abandoned their positions and joined the throngs of soldiers and civilians moving slowly down the city's main avenues. The crowd seemed to have collectively decided that getting a boat out of Nanjing was the best option, and by late afternoon, a solid mass of humanity stretched for miles through the city toward the dock areas at Xiaguan. To reach Xiaguan, everyone had to pass through Yijiang Gate. This relatively modern structure had served as the main entry point for visitors arriving in Nanjing by boat in recent decades and now only half of the main entrance was open. A crowd of that size trying to get through such a narrow bottleneck was a recipe for disaster. Those unfortunate enough to be right at the front felt the crushing pressure of tens of thousands of individuals pushing from behind. In that densely packed throng, stumbling and falling to the ground was akin to a death sentence; anyone who went down was inevitably crushed by the oncoming waves of terrified civilians and soldiers. As chaos erupted, discipline evaporated entirely. Officers lost control over their men, leading to infighting among the soldiers. Pushing and shoving escalated into fistfights, and trucks drove directly into the mass of people to force their way through. Tanks, emitting sounds akin to prehistoric beasts, rolled through the mob, crushing many under their weight. Amid the madness, some soldiers, driven by frustration over the lack of movement, began shooting into the crowd at random. To relieve the pressure at Yijiang Gate, some units were ordered to exit Nanjing via the Gate of Great Peace at the northeastern corner of the city wall. Upon arrival, they found the entrance nearly sealed shut. Thick walls of sandbags had been erected around it, leaving only a narrow opening through which one person could pass at a time. Massive crowds fought among themselves to get through; even under perfect order and discipline, it would have taken the entire night and most of the following day for everyone to pass. In the midst of the frantic chaos, it could take a week or more. During the night of the 12th, a select group of Japanese soldiers, chosen for the offensive, stripped their equipment down to the bare essentials: rifles, bayonets, and helmets. They avoided any gear that could produce a metallic noise, alerting the Chinese defenders to their approach. Stealthily, they moved up to the wall, carrying bamboo ladders tied together in threes for added height. Ascending the rungs, they ensured not to make a sound that could betray their position to an alert Chinese sentry. Everything hinged on remaining undetected; even a couple of hand grenades tossed down the wall could halt the attack in its tracks. Reaching the top without being noticed, the soldiers quickly fanned out. Chinese soldiers stationed on the wall saw the swift dark figures and opened fire, but it was too late to thwart the assault. A brief fight ensued; most Japanese soldiers were too close to use their rifles and immediately resorted to their bayonets. The stunned defenders were pushed back, and the successful assault team established a perimeter, awaiting reinforcements from outside the wall. They didn't have to wait long. A massive assault along the length of the 6th Division's front line commenced at dawn on December 13. Japanese artillery concentrated its fire on a narrow section of the city wall, progressively working its way from the bottom up. Gradually, the shells formed a slope of debris that soldiers could use to scale the wall. A short air raid was executed, and after the planes had weakened the remaining resistance, a group of soldiers rushed up the slope. While their comrades provided covering fire, they climbed the last stretch, rolling down a rope ladder. Within minutes, 40 other Japanese soldiers had joined them. By 10:30 am, the Rising Sun flag was flying over the wall. The Japanese invaders were met with a horrific sight at the top of the wall. Beyond lay the grim aftermath of days of shelling. Some houses were leveled, while others burned. The ground was littered with bodies, some decapitated or disemboweled, and pools of blood surrounded them. As Chiang Kai-shek's order to abandon the city gradually filtered down to the troops manning the wall around Nanjing, things began to move rapidly.  By late morning on December 13, all the major entry points into the city had fallen to the Japanese. These included Chinese Gate in the southwest, the Gate of Enlightenment in the south, and Sun Yat-sen Gate in the east. The first thing that struck the Japanese soldiers upon ascending the wall was how starkly different it was from their expectations. They had anticipated a bustling city teeming with people, but instead, the area adjacent to the wall was characterized by farm plots, resembling countryside more than an urban center. The second notable observation was the complete absence of inhabitants. Cautiously, the Japanese soldiers entered the city they had just conquered, their bayonets fixed and rifles at the ready. Yet, surprisingly, very few shots were fired. After weeks of fearing death and injury, once the immediate danger receded, a certain stupor settled in. For most civilians in Nanjing, their initial encounter with the city's new rulers was uneventful. It took several hours for the Japanese to move from the wall into the urban parts of the capital. It was not until around noon that residents noticed the first groups of Japanese soldiers marching down the streets in clusters of six to twelve men. Initially, many met the conquerors with relief, hoping they would be treated fairly. Their optimism was bolstered by Japanese planes dropping leaflets over the city, reassuring residents of humane treatment. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. On December 9, fierce battles erupted, especially at the Gate of Enlightenment. Despite heavy fighting, the Chinese showed remarkable resilience, turning Nanjing into a symbol of determination. However, the tide shifted as overwhelming Japanese artillery and tactics began to breach defenses. By December 13, as chaos engulfed the city, the invaders claimed victory, but not without significant loss. Civilians, caught amid the destruction, clung to hope amid despair.

Preview: PRC Guangdong Province. Colleague Gordon Chang comments on the relentless decline of the low-end manufacturers in Guangdong. More later. 1890 SHANGHAI