Podcasts about rawlsian

This week, we have a special guest from the University of Florida Levin College of Law—Christopher D. Hampson. Our topic is a good one: the cancellation of debt. To that end, Chris and I discussed his forthcoming article tentatively entitled Law and the Jubilee Tradition. Some of the things we spoke about was the jubilee tradition in the Old Testament text, the many ways that tradition connects with the history of American society, his approach based on a Rawlsian ideal of practical reason, principle of equality undergirding his project, and more. Chris is a scholar of bankruptcy, insolvency, and the ethics of debt. His research focuses on how legal institutions can best serve our shared values during times of financial distress. Chris served as a law clerk for Judge Richard A. Posner on the Seventh Circuit in Chicago and practiced law at a number of promient law firms in Miami and Boston. Full bio and CV here. Cross & Gavel is a production of CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY. The episode was produced by Josh Deng, with music from Vexento.

In this episode we finally get down and dirty with the big dog of Anglophone political philosophy, John Rawls. We discuss his 1993 book Political Liberalism, which expands on his earlier theory of justice to develop an account of the pluralistic tolerance at the heart of a liberal society characterized by the fact of a diversity of incommensurate but reasonable worldviews. We talk about what Rawlsian theory genuinely has going for it, but also pull no punches about the serious theoretical and practical limits to this most careful and aspirationally progressive exemplar of liberal political philosophy. But hey: don't worry, we can tolerate a good liberal.This is just a short clip from the full episode, which is available to our subscribers on Patreon:patreon.com/leftofphilosophyReferences:John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). Music:Vintage Memories by Schematist | schematist.bandcamp.com

In this thought-provoking podcast episode, we delve into the profound insights offered by John Rawls' seminal work, "A Theory of Justice," and explore its implications for the urgent challenges faced by the modern criminal justice system. Join us as we navigate the intricate web of Rawlsian principles and consider how they can shape the path towards a more equitable and humane criminal justice reform. Our hosts, Ashley Bender and Michael Olson, over the concept of the original position, the veil of ignorance, and more as the unravel the core tenets of Rawls' theory and ponder their application in dismantling systemic injustices. As we confront the complexities of punishment, rehabilitation, and societal responsibility, our guests provide unique perspectives on bridging the gap between theory and tangible reform. Whether you're a legal scholar, a policymaker, or a concerned citizen, this episode serves as a captivating exploration into the philosophical foundations of justice and their potential to reshape the future of criminal justice. Tune in to gain a deeper understanding of how "A Theory of Justice" can inspire transformative change and propel us towards a system that truly embodies the principles of fairness and equity.

In this episode, Paul W. Taylor's Principle of Compensatory Justice is discussed in the context of Rawls's principles of justice. Moreover, its compatibility with Rawls's framework is evaluated, and it is argued that it is incompatible. This incompatibility is held to be derived from the necessary violation of Rawls's first principle (Greatest Liberty Principle) —more specifically, by undermining the Social Basis of Self Respect.

In this episode, Kevin O'Sullivan talks about his book on aid-focused NGOs from Ireland, Britain, and Canada in the 1960s-80s, The NGO Moment: The Globalisation of Compassion from Biafra to Live Aid (Cambridge University Press, 2021). He deems this era particularly crucial for the development of the NGO sector and its relationship to the Third World because it witnessed the internationalization of a particularly western form of compassion. Professor O'Sullivan makes the claim that the years 1967 to 1985 witnessed an acceleration in the history of aid-focused NGOs. He highlights key crises (Biafra, East Pakistan, Cambodia, El Salvador, and Ethiopia) that gave NGOs access, legitimacy, and fame. He also dissects key intellectual approaches, as varied as liberation theology and Rawlsian liberalism, which influenced NGO operations, noting the process by which NGOs tended to domesticate radical theories and temper their more activist members. Kevin's insightful analysis helps us understand how, despite much radical rhetoric and good intentions, aid-focused NGOs became part and parcel of a liberal international order that favors the salvation of biological life and market solutions to poverty over necessary structural reforms in the global economy. Kevin O'Sullivan is lecturer in the Department of History and Philosophy at the University of Galway in Ireland. He is an expert in humanitarianism, aid, development, human rights, and global history. His previous book is entitled Ireland, Africa and the End of Empire: Small State Identity in the Cold War, 1955-1975 (Manchester University Press, 2012). He is also the Editor of the Royal Irish Academy's Documents on Irish Foreign Policy. Felix A. Jimènez Botta is Associate Professor of History at Miyazaki International College in Japan. He can be reached at fjimenez@sky.miyazaki-mic.ac.jp. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

In this episode, Kevin O'Sullivan talks about his book on aid-focused NGOs from Ireland, Britain, and Canada in the 1960s-80s, The NGO Moment: The Globalisation of Compassion from Biafra to Live Aid (Cambridge University Press, 2021). He deems this era particularly crucial for the development of the NGO sector and its relationship to the Third World because it witnessed the internationalization of a particularly western form of compassion. Professor O'Sullivan makes the claim that the years 1967 to 1985 witnessed an acceleration in the history of aid-focused NGOs. He highlights key crises (Biafra, East Pakistan, Cambodia, El Salvador, and Ethiopia) that gave NGOs access, legitimacy, and fame. He also dissects key intellectual approaches, as varied as liberation theology and Rawlsian liberalism, which influenced NGO operations, noting the process by which NGOs tended to domesticate radical theories and temper their more activist members. Kevin's insightful analysis helps us understand how, despite much radical rhetoric and good intentions, aid-focused NGOs became part and parcel of a liberal international order that favors the salvation of biological life and market solutions to poverty over necessary structural reforms in the global economy. Kevin O'Sullivan is lecturer in the Department of History and Philosophy at the University of Galway in Ireland. He is an expert in humanitarianism, aid, development, human rights, and global history. His previous book is entitled Ireland, Africa and the End of Empire: Small State Identity in the Cold War, 1955-1975 (Manchester University Press, 2012). He is also the Editor of the Royal Irish Academy's Documents on Irish Foreign Policy. Felix A. Jimènez Botta is Associate Professor of History at Miyazaki International College in Japan. He can be reached at fjimenez@sky.miyazaki-mic.ac.jp. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

In this episode, Kevin O'Sullivan talks about his book on aid-focused NGOs from Ireland, Britain, and Canada in the 1960s-80s, The NGO Moment: The Globalisation of Compassion from Biafra to Live Aid (Cambridge University Press, 2021). He deems this era particularly crucial for the development of the NGO sector and its relationship to the Third World because it witnessed the internationalization of a particularly western form of compassion. Professor O'Sullivan makes the claim that the years 1967 to 1985 witnessed an acceleration in the history of aid-focused NGOs. He highlights key crises (Biafra, East Pakistan, Cambodia, El Salvador, and Ethiopia) that gave NGOs access, legitimacy, and fame. He also dissects key intellectual approaches, as varied as liberation theology and Rawlsian liberalism, which influenced NGO operations, noting the process by which NGOs tended to domesticate radical theories and temper their more activist members. Kevin's insightful analysis helps us understand how, despite much radical rhetoric and good intentions, aid-focused NGOs became part and parcel of a liberal international order that favors the salvation of biological life and market solutions to poverty over necessary structural reforms in the global economy. Kevin O'Sullivan is lecturer in the Department of History and Philosophy at the University of Galway in Ireland. He is an expert in humanitarianism, aid, development, human rights, and global history. His previous book is entitled Ireland, Africa and the End of Empire: Small State Identity in the Cold War, 1955-1975 (Manchester University Press, 2012). He is also the Editor of the Royal Irish Academy's Documents on Irish Foreign Policy. Felix A. Jimènez Botta is Associate Professor of History at Miyazaki International College in Japan. He can be reached at fjimenez@sky.miyazaki-mic.ac.jp. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/political-science

In this episode, Kevin O'Sullivan talks about his book on aid-focused NGOs from Ireland, Britain, and Canada in the 1960s-80s, The NGO Moment: The Globalisation of Compassion from Biafra to Live Aid (Cambridge University Press, 2021). He deems this era particularly crucial for the development of the NGO sector and its relationship to the Third World because it witnessed the internationalization of a particularly western form of compassion. Professor O'Sullivan makes the claim that the years 1967 to 1985 witnessed an acceleration in the history of aid-focused NGOs. He highlights key crises (Biafra, East Pakistan, Cambodia, El Salvador, and Ethiopia) that gave NGOs access, legitimacy, and fame. He also dissects key intellectual approaches, as varied as liberation theology and Rawlsian liberalism, which influenced NGO operations, noting the process by which NGOs tended to domesticate radical theories and temper their more activist members. Kevin's insightful analysis helps us understand how, despite much radical rhetoric and good intentions, aid-focused NGOs became part and parcel of a liberal international order that favors the salvation of biological life and market solutions to poverty over necessary structural reforms in the global economy. Kevin O'Sullivan is lecturer in the Department of History and Philosophy at the University of Galway in Ireland. He is an expert in humanitarianism, aid, development, human rights, and global history. His previous book is entitled Ireland, Africa and the End of Empire: Small State Identity in the Cold War, 1955-1975 (Manchester University Press, 2012). He is also the Editor of the Royal Irish Academy's Documents on Irish Foreign Policy. Felix A. Jimènez Botta is Associate Professor of History at Miyazaki International College in Japan. He can be reached at fjimenez@sky.miyazaki-mic.ac.jp. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/world-affairs

In this episode, Kevin O'Sullivan talks about his book on aid-focused NGOs from Ireland, Britain, and Canada in the 1960s-80s, The NGO Moment: The Globalisation of Compassion from Biafra to Live Aid (Cambridge University Press, 2021). He deems this era particularly crucial for the development of the NGO sector and its relationship to the Third World because it witnessed the internationalization of a particularly western form of compassion. Professor O'Sullivan makes the claim that the years 1967 to 1985 witnessed an acceleration in the history of aid-focused NGOs. He highlights key crises (Biafra, East Pakistan, Cambodia, El Salvador, and Ethiopia) that gave NGOs access, legitimacy, and fame. He also dissects key intellectual approaches, as varied as liberation theology and Rawlsian liberalism, which influenced NGO operations, noting the process by which NGOs tended to domesticate radical theories and temper their more activist members. Kevin's insightful analysis helps us understand how, despite much radical rhetoric and good intentions, aid-focused NGOs became part and parcel of a liberal international order that favors the salvation of biological life and market solutions to poverty over necessary structural reforms in the global economy. Kevin O'Sullivan is lecturer in the Department of History and Philosophy at the University of Galway in Ireland. He is an expert in humanitarianism, aid, development, human rights, and global history. His previous book is entitled Ireland, Africa and the End of Empire: Small State Identity in the Cold War, 1955-1975 (Manchester University Press, 2012). He is also the Editor of the Royal Irish Academy's Documents on Irish Foreign Policy. Felix A. Jimènez Botta is Associate Professor of History at Miyazaki International College in Japan. He can be reached at fjimenez@sky.miyazaki-mic.ac.jp. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In this episode, Kevin O'Sullivan talks about his book on aid-focused NGOs from Ireland, Britain, and Canada in the 1960s-80s, The NGO Moment: The Globalisation of Compassion from Biafra to Live Aid (Cambridge University Press, 2021). He deems this era particularly crucial for the development of the NGO sector and its relationship to the Third World because it witnessed the internationalization of a particularly western form of compassion. Professor O'Sullivan makes the claim that the years 1967 to 1985 witnessed an acceleration in the history of aid-focused NGOs. He highlights key crises (Biafra, East Pakistan, Cambodia, El Salvador, and Ethiopia) that gave NGOs access, legitimacy, and fame. He also dissects key intellectual approaches, as varied as liberation theology and Rawlsian liberalism, which influenced NGO operations, noting the process by which NGOs tended to domesticate radical theories and temper their more activist members. Kevin's insightful analysis helps us understand how, despite much radical rhetoric and good intentions, aid-focused NGOs became part and parcel of a liberal international order that favors the salvation of biological life and market solutions to poverty over necessary structural reforms in the global economy. Kevin O'Sullivan is lecturer in the Department of History and Philosophy at the University of Galway in Ireland. He is an expert in humanitarianism, aid, development, human rights, and global history. His previous book is entitled Ireland, Africa and the End of Empire: Small State Identity in the Cold War, 1955-1975 (Manchester University Press, 2012). He is also the Editor of the Royal Irish Academy's Documents on Irish Foreign Policy. Felix A. Jimènez Botta is Associate Professor of History at Miyazaki International College in Japan. He can be reached at fjimenez@sky.miyazaki-mic.ac.jp.

In this episode, Kevin O'Sullivan talks about his book on aid-focused NGOs from Ireland, Britain, and Canada in the 1960s-80s, The NGO Moment: The Globalisation of Compassion from Biafra to Live Aid (Cambridge University Press, 2021). He deems this era particularly crucial for the development of the NGO sector and its relationship to the Third World because it witnessed the internationalization of a particularly western form of compassion. Professor O'Sullivan makes the claim that the years 1967 to 1985 witnessed an acceleration in the history of aid-focused NGOs. He highlights key crises (Biafra, East Pakistan, Cambodia, El Salvador, and Ethiopia) that gave NGOs access, legitimacy, and fame. He also dissects key intellectual approaches, as varied as liberation theology and Rawlsian liberalism, which influenced NGO operations, noting the process by which NGOs tended to domesticate radical theories and temper their more activist members. Kevin's insightful analysis helps us understand how, despite much radical rhetoric and good intentions, aid-focused NGOs became part and parcel of a liberal international order that favors the salvation of biological life and market solutions to poverty over necessary structural reforms in the global economy. Kevin O'Sullivan is lecturer in the Department of History and Philosophy at the University of Galway in Ireland. He is an expert in humanitarianism, aid, development, human rights, and global history. His previous book is entitled Ireland, Africa and the End of Empire: Small State Identity in the Cold War, 1955-1975 (Manchester University Press, 2012). He is also the Editor of the Royal Irish Academy's Documents on Irish Foreign Policy. Felix A. Jimènez Botta is Associate Professor of History at Miyazaki International College in Japan. He can be reached at fjimenez@sky.miyazaki-mic.ac.jp. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In this episode, Kevin O'Sullivan talks about his book on aid-focused NGOs from Ireland, Britain, and Canada in the 1960s-80s, The NGO Moment: The Globalisation of Compassion from Biafra to Live Aid (Cambridge University Press, 2021). He deems this era particularly crucial for the development of the NGO sector and its relationship to the Third World because it witnessed the internationalization of a particularly western form of compassion. Professor O'Sullivan makes the claim that the years 1967 to 1985 witnessed an acceleration in the history of aid-focused NGOs. He highlights key crises (Biafra, East Pakistan, Cambodia, El Salvador, and Ethiopia) that gave NGOs access, legitimacy, and fame. He also dissects key intellectual approaches, as varied as liberation theology and Rawlsian liberalism, which influenced NGO operations, noting the process by which NGOs tended to domesticate radical theories and temper their more activist members. Kevin's insightful analysis helps us understand how, despite much radical rhetoric and good intentions, aid-focused NGOs became part and parcel of a liberal international order that favors the salvation of biological life and market solutions to poverty over necessary structural reforms in the global economy. Kevin O'Sullivan is lecturer in the Department of History and Philosophy at the University of Galway in Ireland. He is an expert in humanitarianism, aid, development, human rights, and global history. His previous book is entitled Ireland, Africa and the End of Empire: Small State Identity in the Cold War, 1955-1975 (Manchester University Press, 2012). He is also the Editor of the Royal Irish Academy's Documents on Irish Foreign Policy. Felix A. Jimènez Botta is Associate Professor of History at Miyazaki International College in Japan. He can be reached at fjimenez@sky.miyazaki-mic.ac.jp. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/british-studies

In this episode, Kevin O'Sullivan talks about his book on aid-focused NGOs from Ireland, Britain, and Canada in the 1960s-80s, The NGO Moment: The Globalisation of Compassion from Biafra to Live Aid (Cambridge University Press, 2021). He deems this era particularly crucial for the development of the NGO sector and its relationship to the Third World because it witnessed the internationalization of a particularly western form of compassion. Professor O'Sullivan makes the claim that the years 1967 to 1985 witnessed an acceleration in the history of aid-focused NGOs. He highlights key crises (Biafra, East Pakistan, Cambodia, El Salvador, and Ethiopia) that gave NGOs access, legitimacy, and fame. He also dissects key intellectual approaches, as varied as liberation theology and Rawlsian liberalism, which influenced NGO operations, noting the process by which NGOs tended to domesticate radical theories and temper their more activist members. Kevin's insightful analysis helps us understand how, despite much radical rhetoric and good intentions, aid-focused NGOs became part and parcel of a liberal international order that favors the salvation of biological life and market solutions to poverty over necessary structural reforms in the global economy. Kevin O'Sullivan is lecturer in the Department of History and Philosophy at the University of Galway in Ireland. He is an expert in humanitarianism, aid, development, human rights, and global history. His previous book is entitled Ireland, Africa and the End of Empire: Small State Identity in the Cold War, 1955-1975 (Manchester University Press, 2012). He is also the Editor of the Royal Irish Academy's Documents on Irish Foreign Policy. Felix A. Jimènez Botta is Associate Professor of History at Miyazaki International College in Japan. He can be reached at fjimenez@sky.miyazaki-mic.ac.jp. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

https://astralcodexten.substack.com/p/justice-creep Freddie deBoer says we're a planet of cops. Maybe that's why justice is eating the world. Helping the poor becomes economic justice. If they're minorities, then it's racial justice, itself a subspecies of social justice. Saving the environment becomes environmental justice, except when it's about climate change in which case it's climate justice. Caring about young people is actually about fighting for intergenerational justice. The very laws of space and time are subject to spatial justice and temporal justice. I can't find clear evidence on Google Trends that use of these terms is increasing - I just feel like I've been hearing them more and more often. Nor can I find a simple story behind why - it's got to have something to do with Rawls, but I can't trace any of these back to specific Rawlsian philosophers. Some of it seems to have something to do with Amartya Sen, who I don't know enough about to have an opinion. But mostly it just seems to be the zeitgeist. This is mostly a semantic shift - instead of saying “we should help the poor”, you can say “we should pursue economic justice”. But different framings have slightly different implications and connotations, and it's worth examining what connotations all this justice talk has. “We should help the poor” mildly suggests a friendly optimistic picture of progress. We are helpers - good people who are nice to others because that's who we are. And the poor get helped - the world becomes a better place. Sometimes people go further: “We should save the poor” (or the whales, doesn't matter). That makes us saviors, a rather more impressive title than helpers. And at the end of it, people/whales/whatever are saved - we're one step closer to saving the world. Extrapolate the line out far enough, and you can dream of utopia.  

In this episode we talk to Olúfẹmi O. Táíwò. Táíwò is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University. In this episode we talk about his recently published book Reconsidering Reparations, which examines arguments for reparations historically and offers a philosophical argument for a constructive vision of reparations.  Along the way Femi looks at the linkages between slavery, racism, colonialism, imperialism and climate change.  In looking at this world system which he articulates as Global Racial Empire, Táíwò offers a vision for reconfiguring this world system in a more just way. Along the way he tackles issues of racial justice, economic security, and also a global vision of disability justice. We talk about systems of global distribution. And Femi examines arguments related to Rawlsian visions of justice, questions of identity and reparations, and certain critiques of reparations arguments. Táíwò also shares concerns about symbolic notions of reparations and advocates a materialist world-making project as a political horizon. Mentioned in the episode is a debate between Adolph Reed Jr. and Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor on the issue of reparations, you can listen to it here.  And just a reminder that we do need support to be able to run this show. If you like what we do, want us to be able to keep doing it, particularly as frequently as we do, please give a little money to our patreon. It's through your support that we are able to do the show, keep the show free, keep it ad-free, and deliver you conversations like this unfiltered and unfettered by corporations or foundations.

Back from an 11 day hiatus, our longest since beginning the podcast, and sassier and brassier than ever. Grab your kente cloth and take a knee as we discuss how MLK's been whitewashed and used to advance vile agendas by those who still pay nominal "respect" one day a year. Drape the Rawlsian "Veil" over your face and discover how deliberate ignorance can be bad...but also good! Astounding acts of premeditated sadistic murder never seen before in the animal kingdom (outside of humans, of course) have been taking place in a small village in the Indian countryside. David Brooks remains a braindead prig. Study: People Are More Attractive With Half of Their Faces Covered. Come for the lessons on how to transmit hugs to your grandma via the world wide web; stay for the primer on "teledildonics" and vagina dentata! Support: patreon.com/heatdeathpodGeneral RecommendationsJD's Recommendation: Music Box: Listening to Kenny GJNM's Recommendation: 1) Selma & 2) Review with Forrest MacNeilFurther Reading, Viewing, ListeningMLK is revered today but the real King would make white people uncomfortableWhat We Don't Want to KnowMonkeys blamed for hundreds of puppy deaths captured in IndiaAmerica Is Falling Apart at the SeamsFace masks make people look more attractive, study findsTechnology promises hugs at a distance. Beware what you wish forLocationless Locationsheatdeathpod.comEvery show-related link is corralled and available here.Twitter: @heatdeathpodPlease send all Letters of Derision, Indifference, Inquiry, Mild Elation, et cetera to: heatdeathoftheuniversepodcast@gmail.comAlso, check out our newly updated YouTube channel for the hell of itSupport the show (https://www.patreon.com/heatdeathpod)

Mathias Risse is the Lucius N. Littauer Professor of Philosophy and Public Administration at the Kennedy School at Harvard University. He also serves as the Berthold Beitz Professor in Human Rights, Global Affairs and Philosophy and Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University. His research questions the role of global justice in a wide range of topics like human rights, inequality, taxation, trade, immigration, climate change, and technology. He focuses on the “big questions” of political and moral philosophy in the United States and in a global context. In this interview, Tiger and Marko discuss with Professor Mathias Risse his theory of “grounds of justice” and how technology changes the way we look at global justice. We go over the just nature of technology and how should individuals look at technology as being inherently fair. Risse sheds light on the rising movement across philosophy departments to critique and reform the widely used theory of John Rawls to include minorities and marginalized groups and how that has impacted philosophy scholarship. Lastly, we wrap up looking at politics in the United States and how the electoral college impedes the process of having fair and just elections, and why removing it could solve the problem. Professor Mathias Risse has written three books with both “justice” and “on” in the title, yet all of these works appear to tackle a similar question: how should philosophers handle questions of justice in a global context? It all started with his book On Global Justice where he established his famous “grounds of justice” that global justice can be analyzed on. However, how do these grounds change when we factor in the rise of technology? Can technology stand alone as its own ground of justice, or will it fit into the other pre-defined grounds of justice? Mathias Risse explains the future of technology in global justice and how technology can fit into his original theory from On Global Justice. Additionally, we ask Prof. Risse his thoughts on the inherent nature of justice of technology: is technology inherently just? Is technology capable of being just as unjust as human actions and trade? He brings in other notable professors who have researched the topic including Princeton Professor Ruha Benjamin to answer this question on the just nature of technology in society. John Rawls has provided a foundational understanding of political philosophy, but his work has recently been under fire. Rawls may have been able to provide a great framework for political philosophers but it overlooked the experiences of minorities and marginalized individuals in the United States. Mathias Risse shares how philosophy departments have been attempting to critique and expand Rawls’ theory to include the viewpoint of marginalized groups in the United States. He shares how this changes our understanding of Rawlsian theory and what work is left to be done in Philosophy departments across the nation to make political philosophy more inclusive. In the fall of 2020, Mathias Risse along with John Shattuck wrote a series of papers called the “Reimagining Rights and Responsibilities in the U.S.,” where Risse and Shattuck worked to explore areas of domestic politics and public policy that lead to injustice. These reports ranged from LGBTQ+ rights to voting rights and they all ended with a series of policy actions that could be taken to improve American society. One policy action that is supported is the abolishment of the electoral college, but why would its removal lead to a more just society? How did the electoral college disenfranchise individuals and how does it continue to build a barrier to fair elections? Mathias Risse also takes on this question and shares with us his findings on how the electoral college impacts justice and how removing it can help increase the fairness of U.S. elections.

On the podcast this week, Enlightenment's Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age by John Gray. Next time: Postjournalism and the death of newspapers. The media after Trump: manufacturing anger and polarization by Andrey Mir. Normally Jerry writes an ideological Turing test summary for the book we discuss, but it's impossible with this one as you'll hear us say. So here are some of Jerry's highlights from the book itself: If the Enlightenment myth of progress in ethics and politics continues to have a powerful hold, it is more from fear of the consequences of giving it up than from genuine conviction. the collapse of communism was a world-historic defeat for the Enlightenment project. Communism was not a type of oriental despotism, as generations of Western scholars maintained. It was an authentic continuation of a Western revolutionary tradition, and its downfall – after tens of millions of deaths were inflicted in the pursuit of its utopian goals – signalled the start of a process of de-Westernization. It is an inquiry into the right whose agenda is justice and whose content is given, not by any investigation of human beings as we find them in the world, with their diverse histories and communities, but by an abstract conception of the person that has been voided of any definite cultural identity or specific historical inheritance. Consider, in this regard, the central category of the intellectual tradition spawned by Rawls's work – the category of the person. In Rawls's work, as in that of his followers, this is a cipher, without history or ethnicity, denuded of the special attachments that in the real human world give us the particular identities we have. Emptied of the contingencies that in truth are essential to our identities, this cipher has in the Rawlsian schema only one concern – a concern for its own good, which is not the good of any actual human being, but the good we are all supposed to have in common, which it pursues subject to constraints of justice that are conceived to be those of impartiality. In this conception, the principles of justice are bound to be the same for all. The appearance of a plurality of ciphers in the Rawlsian original position must be delusive, since, having all of them the same beliefs and motives, they are indistinguishable. The subject matter of justice cannot, except indirectly, be found in the histories of peoples, and their often tragically conflicting claims; it must be always a matter of individual rights. It is obvious that this liberal position cannot address, save as an inconvenient datum of human psychology, the sense of injustice arising from belonging to an oppressed community that, in the shape of nationalism, is the strongest political force of our century. The task of political philosophy is conceived as one of deriving the ideal constitution – assumed, at least in principle, to be everywhere the same. This is so, whether its upshot be Rawls's basic liberties, Nozick's side-constraints, or Dworkin's rights-as-trumps. The presupposition is always that the bottom line in political morality is the claims of individuals, and that these are to be spelt out in terms of the demands of justice or rights. The consequence is that the diverse claims of historic communities, if they are ever admitted, are always overwhelmed by the supposed rights of individuals. The notion that different communities might legitimately have different legal regimes for abortion or pornography, for example, is hardly considered. If the theoretical goal of the new liberalism is the supplanting of politics by law, its practical result – especially in the United States, where rights discourse is already the only public discourse that retains any legitimacy – has been the emptying of political life of substantive argument and the political corruption of law. Issues, such as abortion, that in many other countries have been resolved by a legislative settlement that involves compromises and which is known to be politically renegotiable, are in the legalist culture of the United States matters of fundamental rights that are intractably contested and which threaten to become enemies of civil peace. Communitarian thought still harbours the aspiration expressed in those forms of the Enlightenment project, such as Marxism, that are most critical of liberalism – that of creating a form of communal life from which are absent the practices of exclusion and subordination that are constitutive of every community human beings have ever lived in. Old-fashioned toleration – the toleration defended by Milton, and by the older liberals, such as Locke – sprang from an acceptance of the imperfectibility of human beings, and from a belief in the importance of freedom in the constitution of the good life. Since we cannot be perfect, and since virtue cannot be forced on people but is rather a habit of life they must themselves strive to acquire, we were enjoined to tolerate the shortcomings of others, even as we struggled with our own. On this older view, toleration is a precondition of any stable modus vivendi among incorrigibly imperfect beings. If it has become unfashionable in our time, the reason is in part to be found in the resistance of a post-Christian age to the thought that we are flawed creatures whose lives will always contain evils. This is a thought subversive of the shallow optimistic creeds of our age, humanist or Pelagian, for which human evils are problems to be solved rather than sorrows to be coped with or endured. Toleration is unfashionable for another, more topical reason. It is unavoidably and inherently judgemental. The objects of toleration are what we judge to be evils. When we tolerate a practice, a belief or a character trait, we let something be that we judge to be undesirable, false or at least inferior; our toleration expresses the conviction that, despite its badness, the object of toleration should be left alone. we tolerate ersatz religions, such as Scientology, not because we think they may after all contain a grain of truth, but because the great good of freedom of belief necessarily encompasses the freedom to believe absurdities. Toleration is not, then, an expression of scepticism, of doubt about our ability to tell the good from the bad; it is evidence of our confidence that we have that ability. The idea of toleration goes against the grain of the age because the practice of toleration is grounded in strong moral convictions. Such judgements are alien to the dominant conventional wisdom according to which standards of belief and conduct are entirely subjective or relative in character, and one view of things is as good as any other. Indeed, when a society is tolerant, its tolerance expresses the conception of the good life that it has in common. In so far as a society comes to lack any such common conception – as is at least partly the case in Britain today – it ceases to be capable of toleration as it was traditionally understood. What the neutrality of radical equality mandates is nothing less than the legal disestablishment of morality. As a result, morality becomes in theory a private habit of behaviour rather than a common way of life. What a policy of toleration would not mandate is the wholesale reconstruction of institutional arrangements in Britain such that homosexuals acquire collective rights or are in every context treated precisely as heterosexuals. This is not to say that the current law of marriage is fixed for all time, any more than the rest of family law, such as the law on adoption, is so fixed. Further, it is to say that such extension of legal recognition would not be to homosexuals as a group but to individuals regardless of their sexual orientation. To make a political issue that is deeply morally contested a matter of basic rights is to make it non-negotiable, since rights – at least as they are understood in the dominant contemporary schools of Anglo-American jurisprudence – are unconditional entitlements, not susceptible to moderation In modern Western pluralist societies, policies which result in the creation of group rights are inevitably infected with arbitrariness and consequent inequity, since the groups selected for privileging are arbitrary, as is the determination of who belongs to which group. a stable liberal civil society cannot be radically multicultural but depends for its successful renewal across the generations on an undergirding culture that is held in common. This common culture need not encompass a shared religion and it certainly need not presuppose ethnic homogeneity, but it does demand widespread acceptance of certain norms and conventions of behaviour and, in our times, it typically expresses a shared sense of nationality. The example of the United States, which at least since the mid-1960s has been founded on the Enlightenment conviction that a common culture is not a necessary precondition of a liberal civil society, shows that the view that civil peace can be secured solely by adherence to abstract rules is merely an illusion. In so far as policy has been animated by it, the result has been further social division, including what amounts to low-intensity civil war between the races. As things stand, the likelihood in the United States is of a slow slide into ungovernability, as the remaining patrimony of a common cultural inheritance is frittered away by the fragmenting forces of multiculturalism. The kind of diversity that is incompatible with civil society in Britain is that which rejects the constitutive practices that give it its identity. Central among these are freedom of expression and its precondition, the rule of law. Cultural traditions that repudiate these practices cannot be objects of toleration for liberal civil society in Britain or anywhere else. The radical tolerance of indifference has application wherever there are conceptions of the good that are incommensurable. the claim that there may be, and are present among us, conceptions of the good that are rationally incommensurable is not one that supports any of the fashionable varieties of relativism and subjectivism, since it allows, and indeed presupposes, that some conceptions of the good are defective, and some forms of life simply bad. the radical tolerance of indifference is virtually the opposite of old-fashioned toleration in that its objects are not judged to be evils and may indeed be incommensurable goods. Woodrow Wilson's project of imposing a rationalist order conceived in the New World on the intractably quarrelsome nations of Europe. Like Marxism, this rationalist conception had its origins in the French Enlightenment's vision of a universal human civilization in which the claims of ethnicity and religion came long after those of common humanity. In the wake of Soviet communism, we find, not Homo Sovieticus or any other rationalist abstraction, but men and women whose identities are constituted by particular attachments and histories – Balts, Ukrainians, Uzbeks, Russians and so on. Western opinion-formers and policy-makers are virtually unanimous in modelling the transition process of the post-communist states in terms which imply their reconstruction on Western models and their integration into a coherent international order based on Western power and institutions. Underlying this virtually universal model are assumptions that are anachronistic and radically flawed. It assumes that the system of Western-led institutions which assured global peace and world trade in the post-war period can survive, substantially unchanged or even strengthened, the world-wide reverberations of the Soviet collapse; the only issue is how the fledgling post-communist states are to gain admission into these institutions. This assumption neglects the dependency of these institutions on the strategic environment of the Cold War and their unravelling, before our eyes, as the post-war settlement disintegrates. The strategic consequence of the end of the Cold War has been the return to a pre-1914 world – with this difference, that the pre-1914 world was dominated by a single hegemonic power, Great Britain, whereas the return to nineteenth-century policies and modes of thinking in the United States leaves the world without any hegemonic power. the Soviet collapse has triggered a meltdown in the post-war world order, and in the domestic institutions of the major Western powers, which has yet to run its course. the crisis of Western transnational institutions is complemented by an ongoing meltdown of the various Western models of the nature and limits of market institutions in advanced industrial societies. The alienation of democratic electorates from established political elites is pervasive in Western societies, including the United States. Contrary to Hayek, who generalizes from the English experience to put forward a grandiose theory of the spontaneous emergence of market institutions that is reminiscent in its unhistorical generality of Herbert Spencer and Karl Marx at their most incautious, the English example is a singularity, not an exemplar of any long-run historical trend. The English experience is sui generis, not a paradigm for the development of market institutions, because the unique combination of circumstances which permitted it to occur as it did – immemorial individualism and parliamentary absolutism, for example – were replicated nowhere else. Where market institutions did develop elsewhere on English lines, as in North America and Australasia, it was in virtue of the fact that English cultural traditions and legal practice had been exported there more or less wholesale. Market institutions of the English variety failed to take root where, as in India, their legal and cultural matrix was not successfully transplanted. It is noteworthy that, until its collapse in 1991, the Swedish model performed well in respect of what was, perhaps, its principal achievement, an active labour policy that kept long-term unemployment very low, and so effectively prevented the growth of an estranged underclass of the multi-generationally unemployed. The German or Rhine model of market institutions, as it developed in the post-war period up to reunification, was not the result of the application of any consistent theory, but rather of a contingent political compromise between a diversity of theoretical frameworks, of which the most important were the Ordoliberalismus of the Eucken or Frankfurt School and Catholic social theology. It represented a political settlement, also, between the principal interest groups in post-war Germany, including the newly constituted trade unions. It would be false to imagine that China lacks ethnic conflict, or separatist movements. As a portent for the future, there appears to be an Islamic separatist movement in the far-western ‘autonomous region' of Xinjiang, which has borders with the new republics of Kyrgystan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, and with Afghanistan and Pakistan; and there are undoubtedly strong separatist movements in neighbouring Tibet and Mongolia. it would not be entirely surprising, but would in fact rather accord with long-term patterns in Chinese history, if the Chinese state were to fragment in the coming years, perhaps after the death of Deng Xiaoping; market institutions have as their matrices particular cultural traditions, without whose undergirding support the frameworks of law by which they are defined are powerless or empty. Scottish thinkers, such as Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson, who not unreasonably generalized from their own historical experience to such a connection, this result of their inquiries evoked anxiety as to the eventual fate of market institutions, since – like later thinkers such as Joseph Schumpeter – they feared that individualism would consume the cultural capital on which market institutions relied for their renewal across the generations. Our experience suggests that such fears as to the ultimately self-defeating effects of market institutions that are animated by individualist cultural traditions are far from groundless. The growth of lawlessness in Russia, the threat posed to social and business life by organized criminality, and the apparent powerlessness thus far of the Yeltsin government in the face of this threat, suggest that an authoritarian turn in Russian political life, whether by the Yeltsin government or by a successor, and whether or not the army has a decisive role in any subsequent authoritarian regime, would be in accord both with the exigencies of current circumstances and with Russian historical precedent. Authoritarian government is likely to emerge in Russia both in response to the dangers of fragmentation of the state and ensuing civil strife and as a response to growing criminal violence in everyday and business life. The Soviet collapse, far from enhancing the stability of Western institutions, has destabilized them by knocking away the strategic props on which they stood. The prospect of the orderly integration of the post-communist states into the economic and security arrangements of the Western world is a mirage, not only because of the unprecedentedly formidable difficulties each of them confronts in its domestic development, but also because the major Western transnational institutions and organizations are themselves in a flux, amounting sometimes to dissolution. The world-historical failure of the Enlightenment project – in political terms, the collapse and ruin, in the late twentieth century, of the secular, rationalist and universalist political movements, liberal as well as Marxist, that that project spawned, and the dominance in political life of ethnic, nationalist and fundamentalist forces – suggests the falsity of the philosophical anthropology upon which the Enlightenment project rested. On the alternative view that I shall develop, the propensity to cultural difference is a primordial attribute of the human species; human identities are plural and diverse in their very natures, as natural languages are plural and diverse, and they are always variations on particular forms of common life, never exemplars of universal humanity. The task for liberal theory, as I see it, is not vainly to resist the historical falsification of the universalist anthropology that sustained the Enlightenment philosophy of history, but to attempt to reconcile the demands of a liberal form of life with the particularistic character of human identities and allegiances – to retheorize liberalism as itself a particular form of common life. Agonistic liberalism is that species of liberalism that is grounded, not in rational choice, but in the limits of rational choice – limits imposed by the radical choices we are often constrained to make among goods that are both inherently rivalrous, and often constitutively uncombinable, and sometimes incommensurable, or rationally incomparable. Agonistic liberalism is an application in political philosophy of the moral theory of value-pluralism – the theory that there is an irreducible diversity of ultimate values (goods, excellences, options, reasons for action and so forth) and that when these values come into conflict or competition with one another there is no overarching standard or principle, no common currency or measure, whereby such conflicts can be arbitrated or resolved. Value-pluralism imposes limits on rational choice that are subversive of most standard moral theories, not merely of utilitarianism, and it has deeply subversive implications for all the traditional varieties of liberal theory. The thesis of the incommensurability of values is then not a version of relativism, of subjectivism or of moral scepticism, though it will infallibly be confused with one or other of these doctrines: it is a species of moral realism, which we shall call objective pluralism. Its distinguishing features are that it limits the scope of rational choice among goods, affirming that they are often constitutively uncombinable and sometimes rationally incommensurable. It is a fundamental contribution of Raz's political philosophy to have shown that a rights-based political morality is an impossibility. rights claims are never primordial or foundational but always conclusionary, provisional results of long chains of reasoning which unavoidably invoke contested judgements about human interests and well-being. If the truth of value-pluralism is assumed, such that there are no right answers in hard cases about the restraint of liberty, then it seems natural to treat questions of the restraint of liberty as political, and not as theoretical or jurisprudential questions. Despite its self-description as political liberalism, then, Rawls's is a liberalism that has been politically emasculated, in which nothing of importance is left to political decision, and in which political life itself has been substantially evacuated of content. The hollowing out of the political realm in Rawlsian liberalism is fatal to its self-description as a form of political liberalism and discloses its true character as a species of liberal legalism. The liberal legalism of Rawls and his followers is, perhaps, only an especially unambiguous example of the older liberal project, or illusion, of abolishing politics, or of so constraining it by legal and constitutional formulae that it no longer matters what are the outcomes of political deliberation. In Rawlsian liberal legalism, the anti-political nature of at least one of the dominant traditions of liberalism is fully realized. In historical practice, the effect of attempting to abolish or to marginalize political life has been – especially in the United States, where legalism is strongest – the politicization of law, as judicial institutions have become arenas of political struggle. The end-result of this process is not, however, the simple transposition of political life into legal contexts, but rather the corrosion of political life itself. The treatment of all important issues of restraint of liberty as questions of constitutional rights has the consequence that they cease to be issues that are politically negotiable and that can be resolved provisionally in a political settlement that encompasses a compromise among conflicting interests and ideals. In conflicts about basic constitutional rights, there can be no compromise solutions, only judgements which yield unconditional victory for one side and complete defeat for the other. Allegiance to a liberal state is, on this view, never primarily to principles which it may be thought to embody, and which are supposed to be compelling for all human beings; it is always to specific institutions, having a specific history, and to the common culture that animates them, which itself is a creature of historical contingency. On the view being developed here, allegiance to a liberal state is always allegiance to the common culture it embodies or expresses, and, in the late modern context in which we live, such a common culture is typically a national culture. the only things, on the account here defended, that can command allegiance. In our world they are nations, or the common forms of life which national cultures encompass and shelter. The point may be put in another, and perhaps a simpler way: there can be no form of allegiance that is purely political; political allegiance – at least when it is comparatively stable – presupposes a common cultural identity, which is reflected in the polity to which allegiance is given; political order, including that of a liberal state, rests upon a pre-political order of common culture. As Berlin has put his position: The fact that the values of one culture may be incompatible with those of another, or that they are in conflict within one culture or group or in a single human being at different times – or, for that matter, at one and the same time – does not entail relativism of values, only the notion of a plurality of values not structured hierarchically; which, of course, entails the permanent possibility of inescapable conflict between values, as well as incompatibility between the outlooks of different civilisations or of stages of the same civilisation. He sums up his view: ‘Relativism is not the only alternative to universalism … nor does incommensurability entail relativism'. Berlin's point, which is surely correct, is that there may be a specifiable minimum universal content to morality, and some forms of life may be condemned by it; but the items which make up the minimum content may, and sometimes do, come into conflict with one another, there being no rational procedure for resolving such conflicts. because the universal minimum in all of its variations underdetermines any liberal form of life, many of the regimes that meet the test of the universal minimum – probably the vast majority of such regimes to be found in human history – will not be liberal regimes. The likely prospect, on all current trends, is not only of the East Asian societies overtaking Western liberal individualist societies in the economic terms of growth, investment, savings and living standards; it is also of their doing so while preserving and enhancing common cultural forms which assure to their subjects personal security in their everyday lives and a public environment that is rich in choiceworthy options. By contrast, the prospect for the Western individualist societies is one of economic development that is weak and feeble in a context of cultural impoverishment in which the remnants of a common culture are hollowed out by individualism and legalism. The prospect for the Western liberal societies, and particularly for those in which individualism and legalism have by now virtually delegitimized the very idea of a common culture, is that of a steep and rapid decline in which civil peace is fractured and the remnants of a common culture on which liberal forms of life themselves depend are finally dissipated. The self-undermining of liberal individualism, which Joseph Schumpeter anticipated in the mid-1940s, is likely to proceed apace, now that the Soviet collapse has removed the legitimacy borrowed by Western institutions from the enmity of a ruinous alternative, and the East Asian societies are released from the constraints of the post-war settlement to pursue paths of development that owe ever less to the West. When our institutional inheritance – that precious and irreplaceable patrimony of mediating structures and autonomous professions – is thrown away in the pursuit of a managerialist Cultural Revolution seeking to refashion the entire national life on the impoverished model of contract and market exchange, it is clear that the task of conserving and renewing a culture is no longer understood by contemporary conservatives. In the context of such a Maoism of the Right, it is the permanent revolution of unfettered market processes, not the conservation of traditional institutions and professions, having each of them a distinctive ethos, that has become the ruling project of contemporary conservatism. At the same time, neo-liberalism itself can now be seen as a self-undermining political project. Its political success depended upon cultural traditions, and constellations of interests, that neo-liberal policy was bound to dissipate. liberal civilization itself may be imperilled, in so far as its legitimacy has been linked with the utopia of perpetual growth powered by unregulated market processes, and the inevitable failure of this utopia spawns illiberal political movements. Indeed, unconstrained market institutions are bound to undermine social and political stability, particularly as they impose on the population unprecedented levels of economic insecurity with all the resultant dislocations of life in families and communities. A central test of the readiness to think fresh thoughts is the way we think about market institutions. On the view defended here they are not ends in themselves but means or tools whose end is human well-being. Indeed, among us, market liberalism is in its workings ineluctably subversive of tradition and community. This may not have been the case in Edmund Burke's day, in which the maintenance of the traditions of whig England could coexist with a policy of economic individualism, but in our age a belief in any such harmony is a snare and a delusion. Among us, unlike the men and women of Burke's day, markets are global, and also, in the case of capital markets, nearly instantaneous; free trade, if it too is global, operates among communities that are vastly more uneven in development than any that traded with one another in Burke's time; and our lives are pervaded by mass media that transform tastes, and revolutionize daily habits, in ways that could be only dimly glimpsed by the Scottish political economists whom Burke so revered. The social and cultural effects of market liberalism are, virtually without exception, inimical to the values that traditional conservatives hold dear. Communities are scattered to the winds by the gale of creative destruction. Endless ‘downsizing' and ‘flattening' of enterprises fosters ubiquitous insecurity and makes loyalty to the company a cruel joke. The celebration of consumer choice, as the only undisputed value in market societies, devalues commitment and stability in personal relationships and encourages the view of marriage and the family as vehicles of self-realization. The dynamism of market processes dissolves social hierarchies and overturns established expectations. Status is ephemeral, trust frail and contract sovereign. The dissolution of communities promoted by market-driven labour mobility weakens, where it does not entirely destroy, the informal social monitoring of behaviour which is the most effective preventive measure against crime. Classical liberalism, or what I have termed market fundamentalism, is, like Marxism, a variation on the Enlightenment project, which is the project of transcending the contingencies of history and cultural difference and founding a universal civilization that is qualitatively different from any that has ever before existed. In this paleo-liberal or libertarian view, the erosion of distinctive cultures by market processes is, if anything, to be welcomed as a sign of progress toward a universal rational civilization. Here paleo-liberalism shows its affinities not with European conservatism but with the Old Left project of doing away with, or marginalizing politically, the human inheritance of cultural difference. That this perspective is a hallucinatory and utopian one is clear if we consider its neglect of the sources not only of political allegiance but also of social order in common cultural forms. Market liberalism, like other Enlightenment ideologies, treats cultural difference as a politically marginal phenomenon whose appropriate sphere is in private life. It does not comprehend, or repudiates as irrationality, the role of a common culture in sustaining political order and in legitimizing market institutions. Market liberalism is at its most utopian, however, in its conception of a global market society, in which goods, and perhaps people, move freely between economies having radically different stages of development and harbouring very different cultures. Human beings need, more than they need the freedom of consumer choice, a cultural and economic environment that offers them an acceptable level of security and in which they feel at home. The conservative idea of the primacy of cultural forms is meant to displace not only standard liberal conceptions of the autonomous human subject but also ideas of the autonomy of market institutions that liberal thought has been applied – or misapplied – to support. It is not meant to support nostalgist and reactionary conceptions of organic or integral community which have no application in our historical circumstances and which, if they were implemented politically, could end only in tragedy or – more likely in Britain – black comedy. The idea of a seamless community – the noumenal community, as we may call it, of communitarianism – is as much of a fiction as the autonomous subject of liberal theory. We all of us belong to many communities, we mostly inherit diverse ethnicities, and our world-views are fractured and provisional whether or not we know it or admit it. We harbour a deep diversity of views and values as to sexuality and the worth of human life, our relations with the natural environment and the special place, if any, of the human species in the scheme of things. The reactionary project of rolling back this diversity of values and world-views in the pursuit of a lost cultural unity overlooks the character of our cultural inheritance as a palimpsest, having ever deeper layers of complexity. It is clear only that, for us at any rate, a common culture cannot mean a common world-view, religious or secular. It is an implication of all that I have said, however, that we have no option but to struggle to make our inheritance of liberal traditions work. At present, the principal obstacle we face in the struggle to renew our inheritance of liberal practice is the burden on thought and policy of market liberal dogma. The central difficulty is that the enlargement of leisure that Mill, by contrast with the gloomier classical economists, expected to come from stability in population and output against a background of improvement in the industrial arts is occurring in the form of ever higher levels of involuntary unemployment. It may be that proposals for a basic or citizen's income, where that is to be distinguished from the neo-liberal idea of a negative income tax, and for a better distribution of capital among the citizenry, need reconsideration – despite all their difficulties – as elements in a policy aiming to reconcile the human need for economic security with the destabilizing dynamism of market institutions. Almost as significant in disclosing the Americocentric character of the new liberalism was its anaemic and impoverished conception of pluralism and cultural diversity. The incommensurability of values affirmed in doctrines of objective ethical pluralism was understood as arising in the formulation of personal plans of life rather than in conflicts among whole ways of life. And cultural diversity was conceived in the denatured form of a cornucopia of chosen lifestyles, each with its elective identity, rather than in the form in which it is found in the longer and larger experience of humankind – as the exfoliation of exclusionary forms of life, spanning the generations, membership of which is typically unchosen, and which tend to individuate themselves by their conflicts and by their historical memories of enmity. The core project of the Enlightenment was the displacement of local, customary or traditional moralities, and of all forms of transcendental faith, by a critical or rational morality, which was projected as the basis of a universal civilization. This is the project that animated Marxism and liberalism in all their varieties, which underpins both the new liberalism and neo-conservatism, and to which every significant body of opinion in the United States continues to subscribe. That liberal individuality is, in practice, invariably a prescription for abject conformity to prevailing bien-pensant opinion is, on the view being presented here, not the chief objection to it. The most disabling feature of these and other constitutive elements of the new liberalism is what they all betoken – namely, a rejection of the political enterprise itself, and of its animating value of peace. For the pluralist, the practice of politics is a noble engagement, precisely on account of the almost desperate humility of its purposes – which are to moderate the enmity of agonistic identities, and to generate conventions of peace among warring communities. The pluralist embrace of politics is, for these reasons, merely a recognition of the reality of political life, itself conceived as an abatement of war. from the truth of a plurality of incommensurable values the priority of one of them – liberty, autonomy or choice-making, say – cannot follow. Value-pluralism cannot entail, or ground, liberalism in any general, still less universal way. Pluralists reject this Old Right project for the same reason that they reject the Enlightenment project. Both seek to roll back the reality of cultural diversity for the sake of an imaginary condition of cultural unity – whether that be found in a lost past or in a supposed future condition of the species in which cultural difference has been marginalized in a universal civilization. Both perspectives are alien to that of the pluralist, which takes the reality of cultural difference as a datum of political order. A pluralist political order may nevertheless deviate from the central institutions of a liberal civil society at crucial points. It need not, and often will not possess an individualist legal order in which persons are the primary rights-bearers. The principal bearers of rights (and duties) in a pluralist political order will be communities, or ways of life, not individuals. The pluralist standard of assessment of any regime is whether it enables its subjects to coexist in a Hobbesian peace while renewing their distinctive forms of common life. … By this standard, the current regime in China might well be criticized for its policies in Tibet; but such a criticism would invoke the intrinsic value of the communities and cultural forms now being destroyed in Tibet, not universalist conceptions of human rights or democracy. Here I think Raz has grasped a point of fundamental importance, perceived by Mill but not by Rawls – that a liberal state cannot be neutral with regard to illiberal forms of life coming within its jurisdiction. Or, to put the matter still more shortly, Raz is entirely correct in seeing liberalism itself as a whole way of life, and not merely a set of political principles or institutions. The trouble is that, if value-pluralism is true at the level of whole ways of life, then the liberal form of life can have no special or universal claim on reason. In the late modern period in which we live, the Enlightenment project is affirmed chiefly for fear of the consequences of abandoning it. (The United States is, as ever, an exception in this regard, since in it both fundamentalist religion and fundamentalist affirmations of the Enlightenment project remain strong. The collapse of these fundamentalisms in the United States, however, were it to occur, would likely be accompanied by an outbreak of nihilism of a violence and intensity unknown in other Western countries; such an outcome is prefigured in much contemporary North American art, literature and popular entertainment.) There can, in my view, be no rolling back the central project of modernity, which is the Enlightenment project, with all its consequences in terms of disenchantment and ultimate groundlessness. … the thought of Nietzsche, especially but not exclusively his thinking about morality, is unavoidably and rightly the starting-point of serious reflection for us, at the close of the modern age which the Enlightenment project, in all its diversity, inaugurated. the political forms which may arise in truly post-Enlightenment cultures will be those that shelter and express diversity – that enable different cultures, some but by no means all or even most of which are dominated by liberal forms of life, different world-views and ways of life, to coexist in peace and harmony. For this development to be a real historical possibility, however, certain conceptions and commitments that have been constitutive, not merely of the Enlightenment and so of modernity, but also, and more fundamentally, of the central traditions of Western civilization, must be amended, or abandoned. Certain conceptions, not only of morality but also of science, that are central elements in Enlightenment cultures must be given up. Certain understandings of religion, long established in Western traditions, not as a vessel for a particular way of life but rather as the bearer of truths possessing universal authority, must be relinquished. The most fundamental Western commitment, the humanist conception of humankind as a privileged site of truth, which is expressed in Socratic inquiry and in Christian revelation, and which re-emerges in secular and naturalistic form in the Enlightenment project of human self-emancipation through the growth of knowledge, must be given up. Further, and perhaps decisively, once liberal practice is released from the hallucinatory perspective of liberal theory, it will be seen for what it always was – not a seamless garment, but a patchwork quilt, stitched together and restitched in response to the flux of circumstance. … If, as I believe, liberal practice is best conceived as a miscellany of ad-hoc improvisations, made over the generations in the pursuit of a modus vivendi, then no part of it can be regarded as sacrosanct; it can, and should, be rewoven, or unravelled, as circumstances and changing human needs dictate. The conception of the natural world as an object of human exploitation, and of humankind as the master of nature, which informs Bacon's writings, is one of the most vital and enduring elements of the modern world-view, and the one which Westernization has most lastingly and destructively transmitted to non-Western cultures. In this last period of modernity, Western instrumental reason becomes globalized at just the historic moment when its groundlessness is manifest. The embodiment of instrumental reason in modern technology acquires a planetary reach precisely when the animating humanist project which guided it is overthrown. Nothing remains of this project but the expansion of human productive powers through the technological domination of the earth. It is this conjunction of the global spread of the Western humanist project with the self-undermining of its most powerful modern embodiment in the Enlightenment that warrants the claim that we find ourselves now at the close of the modern age. In truth, the likelihood is that, now that the imperatives of the Cold War period are over, the European countries and the United States will increasingly decouple, not only strategically and economically, but also culturally, so that their cultural and political differences will become more, not less, decisive. It is difficult to believe that the forms of liberal culture will not diverge greatly, as a result of this likely decoupling, between the United States and the various European nations. Indeed, even as things stand now, Rorty's post-modern liberalism is an expression of American hopes, which are far from being shared by other liberal cultures, such as those in Europe. For liberalism to become merely one form of life among others would involve as profound a cultural metamorphosis as Christianity's ceasing to make any claim to unique and universal truth. The surrender of the will to power has its most important application in our relations with other forms of life, and with the earth. The project of subjecting the earth and its other life-forms to human will through technological domination is Western humanism in its final form.

Justice plays a vital role in proper functioning of any society. American Philosopher John Rawls in his book, "A Theory of Justice" conceptualizes 2 principles of justice necessary to develop a fair and just society. Join your host, Mayur Ghatge while he talks about 3 ideas from the book to understand Rawlsian justice theory. He also dives into the "dark side" of beer brewing by taking stock of different types of stouts.  Email: booksnbrewpodcast@gmail.com Music by Rahul Thombare

We descend into a Rawlsian nightmare in our show on The Platform tonight. In the lockdowns, many people may have started on some of the higher floors, but some started lower - the longer this goes on, with the lack of production and the massive supply chain disruptions, the lower we will all get. In the future, prisoners housed in vertical cells watch as inmates in the upper cells are fed while those below starve. Be on the lookout for our episode on Cannabis Heals Me with our prior guest, Rachel Kennerly to talk about The Gentlemen. We are locked into Texas for guests apparently as we, appropriately to a movie featuring cannibalism, we have the great purveyor of the Silence of the Memes, Scott Morrison, AKA Captain A on with us tonight. There's a better than zero chance we'll have Jeff Deist next week for a Memorial Day episode on Apocalypse Now, and if not, we've got a solid plan B - just in case. Show Notes: http://www.lastnighters.com/124 Look for it at the Launch Pad Media, where they are always launching new ideas in your direction: http://www.thelaunchpadmedia.com Reel Unconventional Film Analysis. We use movies as a starting point for people who may not be familiar with this way of thinking. The point is to show what anarchy actually is with instances that are presented in film. SUBSCRIBE, RATE AND REVIEW ON APPLE PODCASTS (or iTUNES)

We descend into a Rawlsian nightmare in our show on The Platform tonight. In the lockdowns, many people may have started on some of the higher floors, but some started lower - the longer this goes on, with the lack of production and the massive supply chain disruptions, the lower we will all get. In the future, prisoners housed in vertical cells watch as inmates in the upper cells are fed while those below starve. Be on the lookout for our episode on Cannabis Heals Me with our prior guest, Rachel Kennerly to talk about The Gentlemen. We are locked into Texas for guests apparently as we, appropriately to a movie featuring cannibalism, we have the great purveyor of the Silence of the Memes, Scott Morrison, AKA Captain A on with us tonight. There's a better than zero chance we'll have Jeff Deist next week for a Memorial Day episode on Apocalypse Now, and if not, we've got a solid plan B - just in case. Show notes: http://www.actualanarchy.com/181 Presented by www.ActualAnarchy.com Robert and I analyze popular movies from a Rothbardian/Anarcho-Capitalist perspective. We use movies as a starting point for people who may not be familiar with this way of thinking. Discussion of the plot and decisions that characters make in relation to morality and violations of the non-aggression principle are our bread and butter. We also will highlight and discuss any themes or lessons from Austrian Economics that we can glean from the film. The point is to show what anarchy actually is with instances that are presented in film. We publish at least once per week; and occasionally will do specials surrounding holidays or events (elections/olympics) and have guests. SUBSCRIBE, RATE AND REVIEW ON APPLE PODCASTS (or iTUNES)

In this episode of Learned Hands, Clint and Merry turn their attention to Dany's Court in Meereen and ask: Does Justice Daenerys Targaryen use Due Process? Does she dispense justice? Our analysis includes:The application of Natural Rights and Rawlsian models of JusticeA friendly reminder to go to jury duty because WE LIVE IN A SOCIETYPeriodic background noises from the Hounds of JusticeA fun new accent for Hizdahr Zo LoraqCheck out Adam Feldman's much acclaimed essays on Dany's arc in Meereen here at his blog the Meereenese Blot.Intro music courtesy Sid Luscious & The Pants.Support the show (https://www.WesterosBar.org)

Mark, Wes, Seth, and Dylan continue to discuss “What Is the Point of Equality?” (1999) and how it lays foundations for Private Government (2017). What is democratic equality, and can a Rawlsian/liberal/neutral-with-regard-to-defining-the-good state consistently advocate for this ideal? Our interview starts in Part One. You can get all three parts together, and more with a PEL Citizenship or $5 Patreon pledge. Please support PEL! Sign up at patreon.com/marklint to support new PEL music, as the Mark Lint's Dry Folk album is completed this fall! End song: "Straight Job" by Rod Picott. Hear him on Nakedly Examined Music #80.

John Rawls is easily the most celebrated and influential political philosopher of the 20th Century, and his impact remains remarkably strong today. The central concepts with which his theory of justice begins are now components of the philosophical vernacular: The Original Position, Veil of Ignorance, Primary Goods, and his Two Principles of Justice (especially the Difference Principle) all will be well known to the majority of professional philosophers. It is less commonly acknowledged that the apparatus just referenced is but the beginning of his theory, and not its ultimate concern. Throughout his work, Rawls is attempting to address a fundamental philosophical question: Can a society committed to the freedom and equality of its citizens yet arrange social institutions in a way that reliably cultivate within persons the attitudes and dispositions required for social justice?  In John Rawls: Reticent Socialist (Cambridge UP, 2017), William A. Edmundson argues that Rawlsian justice calls for a socialist economic order. Could it be that America's premiere political philosopher was a socialist?

John Rawls is easily the most celebrated and influential political philosopher of the 20th Century, and his impact remains remarkably strong today.  The central concepts with which his theory of justice begins are now components of the philosophical vernacular: The Original Position, Veil of Ignorance, Primary Goods, and his Two Principles of Justice (especially the Difference Principle) all will be well known to the majority of professional philosophers.  It is less commonly acknowledged that the apparatus just referenced is but the beginning of his theory, and not its ultimate concern.  Throughout his work, Rawls is attempting to address a fundamental philosophical question: Can a society committed to the freedom and equality of its citizens yet arrange social institutions in a way that reliably cultivate within persons the attitudes and dispositions required for social justice? In John Rawls: Reticent Socialist (Cambridge UP, 2017), William A. Edmundson argues that Rawlsian justice calls for a socialist economic order.  Could it be that America’s premiere political philosopher was a socialist? Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

John Rawls is easily the most celebrated and influential political philosopher of the 20th Century, and his impact remains remarkably strong today.  The central concepts with which his theory of justice begins are now components of the philosophical vernacular: The Original Position, Veil of Ignorance, Primary Goods, and his Two Principles of Justice (especially the Difference Principle) all will be well known to the majority of professional philosophers.  It is less commonly acknowledged that the apparatus just referenced is but the beginning of his theory, and not its ultimate concern.  Throughout his work, Rawls is attempting to address a fundamental philosophical question: Can a society committed to the freedom and equality of its citizens yet arrange social institutions in a way that reliably cultivate within persons the attitudes and dispositions required for social justice? In John Rawls: Reticent Socialist (Cambridge UP, 2017), William A. Edmundson argues that Rawlsian justice calls for a socialist economic order.  Could it be that America’s premiere political philosopher was a socialist? Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

John Rawls is easily the most celebrated and influential political philosopher of the 20th Century, and his impact remains remarkably strong today.  The central concepts with which his theory of justice begins are now components of the philosophical vernacular: The Original Position, Veil of Ignorance, Primary Goods, and his Two Principles of Justice (especially the Difference Principle) all will be well known to the majority of professional philosophers.  It is less commonly acknowledged that the apparatus just referenced is but the beginning of his theory, and not its ultimate concern.  Throughout his work, Rawls is attempting to address a fundamental philosophical question: Can a society committed to the freedom and equality of its citizens yet arrange social institutions in a way that reliably cultivate within persons the attitudes and dispositions required for social justice? In John Rawls: Reticent Socialist (Cambridge UP, 2017), William A. Edmundson argues that Rawlsian justice calls for a socialist economic order.  Could it be that America’s premiere political philosopher was a socialist? Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

John Rawls is easily the most celebrated and influential political philosopher of the 20th Century, and his impact remains remarkably strong today.  The central concepts with which his theory of justice begins are now components of the philosophical vernacular: The Original Position, Veil of Ignorance, Primary Goods, and his Two Principles of Justice (especially the Difference Principle) all will be well known to the majority of professional philosophers.  It is less commonly acknowledged that the apparatus just referenced is but the beginning of his theory, and not its ultimate concern.  Throughout his work, Rawls is attempting to address a fundamental philosophical question: Can a society committed to the freedom and equality of its citizens yet arrange social institutions in a way that reliably cultivate within persons the attitudes and dispositions required for social justice?  In John Rawls: Reticent Socialist (Cambridge UP, 2017), William A. Edmundson argues that Rawlsian justice calls for a socialist economic order.  Could it be that America’s premiere political philosopher was a socialist? Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

John Rawls is easily the most celebrated and influential political philosopher of the 20th Century, and his impact remains remarkably strong today.  The central concepts with which his theory of justice begins are now components of the philosophical vernacular: The Original Position, Veil of Ignorance, Primary Goods, and his Two Principles of Justice (especially the Difference Principle) all will be well known to the majority of professional philosophers.  It is less commonly acknowledged that the apparatus just referenced is but the beginning of his theory, and not its ultimate concern.  Throughout his work, Rawls is attempting to address a fundamental philosophical question: Can a society committed to the freedom and equality of its citizens yet arrange social institutions in a way that reliably cultivate within persons the attitudes and dispositions required for social justice? In John Rawls: Reticent Socialist (Cambridge UP, 2017), William A. Edmundson argues that Rawlsian justice calls for a socialist economic order.  Could it be that America’s premiere political philosopher was a socialist? Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

What follows is an edited transcript of my conversation with Otto Lehto. Petersen: You're listening to Economics Detective Radio. My guest today is Otto Lehto of King's College London. He is formerly the chair of Finland's Basic Income Network. Otto, welcome to Economics Detective Radio. Lehto: Oh it's my pleasure to be here. Petersen: So our topic for today is the basic income guarantee. Otto, you approach this idea from the perspective of political philosophy, so let's start by discussing that. How about we start by talking about two of the major figures in political philosophy: John Rawls and Robert Nozick. What do each of them have to say about the welfare state and where do your views diverge from theirs? Lehto: That is a good point to start indeed, although it is I think a bit lamentable that we have to start from those two figures because they have dominated the discussion so much during the last 50 years. In fact, it's very hard to have a conversation outside the boundaries set by those two figures, but they're both geniuses. They set the stage for the discussion, certainly in philosophy but also in public policy in many respects. So, let's start with John Rawls. John Rawls really was a towering figure in Harvard, really starting from the 60's and throughout the 70's. He wrote this book, A Theory of Justice, which is considered one of the really truly great books in political philosophy that revolutionized the way we think about these subjects. But the short version of his theory, which is very influential even up to this day, is that people in societies should look at the framework of living with each other as a cooperative game where we all try to sort of not only maximize our own position but also to make the whole game fair for everybody. And so he called his theory Justice as Fairness, where people are entitled to a certain respect and autonomy, certain liberties as members of the democratic community where they can pursue their own ends. But they're also entitled to a redistributive scheme if they happen to be among the worst-off people in the society. They are entitled to redistributive transfers. This framework sounds very familiar and indeed it should because it reflects the social democratic reality in which most Western societies operate. And even in later years he said that actually his philosophy, even though it starts from first principles and proceeds from there, is actually meant to be a philosophical justification of the intuitions that people in Western democracies---liberal democracies---have. So, you combine liberal ideas of individual freedom with these notions of the welfare state and so on. So that was the foundation of Rawls' system. So that's Rawls' system but Nozick came along and he found a place for himself in the same institution, that is Harvard, and he wrote a critique---a respectful critique---but a very thorough and deep critique of Rawls' theory. And he ended up justifying a minimal state that libertarians are very fond of. And he effectively said that no, people should just be seen as individuals who have some fundamental rights---he calls them side constrains---that people have a certain respect that they are owed by other people and it is very wrong for people to violate their personal boundaries and this includes the State. The state has actually no right to violate the sort of inviolable right to property rights that individuals have. So every form of taxation, that features very prominently even in Rawls' system, is theft. So, that is of course a very prominent theme in libertarianism. So his book---which by the way is really brilliant philosophically, it's not only just a standard justification of libertarianism but it's actually one of the great books in philosophy because it's so rich and powerful and full of interesting ideas and strange examples and brilliant footnotes and all that---but that lay down the other side. And so the debate in intellectual philosophy and history in the last 50 years or so has been largely dominated by these two figures: Rawls' Theory of Justice on the one hand, a justification of social democracy with a liberal bent, and then on the other hand Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia, which is a justification of libertarian taxation-is-theft ideology. So that is the framework in which we find ourselves. Petersen: So there are these two competing extremes. You quote John Tomasi's critique of both of them. Would you like to summarize that for me? Lehto: Yes. John Tomasi wrote a wonderful book in 2012 called Free Market Fairness where he actually tries to combine these two perspectives. And he says that actually there's a whole tradition that we're forgetting here when we focus only on these two---as you put it, they are both at extremes---although at least for Rawls himself, he's often considered a centrist. But in many ways, he represents this kind of---from a perspective that Tomasi points out---the perspective of classical liberalism even though the Rawlsian center-left position, he's actually seen going fundamentally wrong in many ways, even though that is the unquestionable framework in which people today operate. And I should say, when I say that Rawls and Nozick laid a framework, it's not as if there is 50% on one side and 50% on the other side. Perhaps in politics, like the left-wing and right-wing ideologies have maybe about 50% on each side depending on the circumstances. But in philosophy certainly, Rawls has been the one that dominated the discussion and there are actually very few Nozickians around. But Tomasi points out that even with this seemingly very credible and too wonderful system that Rawls lays out, there is very little attention paid to issues like individual freedom especially in the domain of economy. And the lack of respect for people's freedom of choices in economic matters is actually a major shortcoming in Rawls' system. And this is exactly what Tomasi points out and from the perspective of classical liberalism which he raises to the standard of something that we should actually take more seriously than we have today. He points out that actually economic liberty is something we should insert back into the conversation in a serious way without however on the other side falling down the assumption that Nozick makes---and a lot of libertarians make---that the only justification for all economic liberty necessarily leads to a justification for the night watchman state or the minimal state of libertarianism where there is no role for government to provide public services and all that. And so this false dichotomy that Rawls and Nozick have put out has sort of made it difficult for people like myself and Tomasi and Matt Zwolinsky and people who consider themselves followers of the legacy of classical liberalism to lay out the more complicated, but I think more interesting, case for a system where robust economic liberties are combined with certain welfare state elements. Certain elements of taking seriously the power of the state to actually increase the real opportunities of people rather than just being a system of theft as Nozick calls it. Petersen: So that's where something like the basic income guarantee comes in. Can you summarize what that is and how is that different from the welfare states most countries currently have? Lehto: Right. Basic income guarantee, first of all, is defined as a regular payment to all citizens or residents of a political community that is given uniformly to all citizens. All people get the same amount and people get it without bureaucratic discretion. So it is given automatically or almost automatically to all people either in the form of a direct cash transfer to their bank account or in the form of a tax break system as in the form of negative income tax which is actually a form of basic income. So this system is supposed to, and it is a way, to replace the bureaucratic complexity and the nightmarish disrespect for human autonomy and human freedom that lies in the center of the current welfare state system in my opinion and certainly in the opinion of Tomasi and other people who I'm referring to. So the basic income guarantee is superior to the current system and it differs from the current system in the sense that it actually operates under the principle that we shouldn't use the state to guarantee specific favors to specific people, we shouldn't use the state as a one-upmanship mechanism whereby one group of recipients carries for the favor of bureaucracies, tries to---and in a way infiltrate---the mechanisms of the state to redistribute money and resources to themselves or to groups that they favor against the interests and desires of other groups because this leads to a spiral of negative-sum game in the political economy. And I think welfare states today in this sense have become victim to this overzealous one-upmanship of special interest group politics and basic income is a way to overcome this problem. Petersen: So the basic income guarantee, is it really a break from business as usual? It seems like it's a marginal improvement on the system we have now, but I guess you're suggesting that the system we have now encourages a lot of rent seeking, it has a lot of payments to different groups, it's needlessly complex. I could list some other problems with it. There are the so-called welfare cliffs where poor people face implicit marginal tax rates sometimes of a thousand percent, or some absurdly high amount because their benefits are clawed back when they earn a little more income. So there seems like there's a good economic justification for basic income. Is your work focused on the classical liberal philosophical justification for having a hands-off welfare state? Lehto: Yes, in a way. The fundamental debate is truly between these two perspectives of whether it's a pragmatic justification for reform towards a slightly saner and slightly more useful and purposeful and beneficial system, or on the other hand, is it a requirement of justice that we have something like a basic income guarantee. And I think that really the truth is somewhere in between. First of all, I think it certainly is a pragmatic improvement over the current system but I should point out already at this point that when I'm advocating for basic income I'm not advocating for basic income without demanding widespread reforms in other areas of life in the welfare state. I am indeed calling for massive restructuring of many of the mechanisms of the welfare state partially just to accommodate for the fact that we are taking basic income as the policy paradigm that we're trying to implement. Because if we take that as the policy paradigm, then we necessarily must reform the existing bureaucracies, tax system just to accommodate for the fact that we are taking this new system into effect. In addition to this, I think that the whole framework of regulations, the whole framework of massive interventions into the economy, into the private life of citizens have to be addressed as serious violations of the capacity of the welfare state to truly increase the welfare of its people. Because my opinion is that the welfare state has failed because it has failed to address the proper means to achieve its own ends that it claims to have. Use of improper means to achieve its ends is the reason why the welfare state is failing so miserably everywhere in the world today. That it's claiming to be for the welfare of its citizens, but if you look at it in terms of its overall effect in many ways it fails. Petersen: So, when I think of the policies that I'd like to see replaced by a basic income guarantee they're not just strictly welfare transfers. There's a theorem in economics called the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem. It says that when you have an optimally designed progressive income tax scheme, basic income with a progressive income tax would be something like that, then it doesn't make sense to have additional programs designed to redistribute. And some of the programs that I think are basically focused on redistribution are things like protecting taxi drivers from competition from companies like Uber and Lyft, or a lot of the interventions into medicine are designed to make sure that people who get sick don't also become poor. And of course, if you had something like a basic income, every taxi driver could lose his job, he wouldn't fall below that minimum level. And so could at least in principle---if we were going to make sort of an ideal political bargain---a basic income guarantee would come with a lot of free market reforms ideally. Is that basically a big part of the reason why so many libertarians---such as Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek---have supported versions of a basic income? Lehto: Well yes indeed, it has the feature of being compatible with a total abolition of the rest of the welfare state, or major portions of the welfare state. And in fact people like Charles Murray have recently proposed exactly that, a replacement of the welfare state by the means of a basic income given to all citizens as the second-best option to a complete free-market society. And people like Hayek and Friedman were also of the opinion that the majority of those transfers could be replaced. So the thing with money is that money is a universal means of exchange and the uses of money and the need for money are as varied as people and situations. And when we think of basic income we don't think of it in terms of being for a particular purpose or for particular people or for particular circumstances unlike the current measures. And so it has the virtue---and perhaps the vice depending on your point of view---of being this universal situation, a neutral ground. And so indeed we can come up with hundreds of scenarios where a basic income could be useful for people. Obviously, some of those are covered by the current redistributive schemes within which by the way I would include things like farm subsidies, many forms of corporate welfare and so on. So basic income has the virtue and vice of being neutral as regards purposes and situations. The only thing really is that if you don't have any other sources of income then you will get a basic income without having to beg for it from anybody either in the government or in the world of charity for example. So, yes indeed, people who are forced out of work to circumstances---whatever those circumstances happen to be---are able to survive, the people who are forced out of the labor market entirely for a reason---one reason or another---people who have temporary or permanent conditions that affect their capacity to find work will be covered up to this level, and people who perhaps want to take some time off to take care of their family, people who want to take some time off to study, to plan ahead, to perhaps think about starting a new company, they have some ideas but they don't have the means of funding yet, that allows people to focus on doing what they think is best for them at the moment. So it has almost an infinity of purposes precisely because there is an infinity of human beings and human desires that in a pure realistic society will have to be taken into account. And a welfare state that tries to measure what people truly need, or what circumstances need to be taken care of, fails precisely because it can never count the infinity of the variety of ways in which people end up in need of money in society. Petersen: So before this welfare state that we currently have---the welfare state as it currently exists largely is a creation of the 20th century. But in the 19th century and early 20th century a lot of what you had was mutual aid societies and things like that. And I think a hard core maybe a Rothbardian libertarian who maybe still cares a lot about the poorest among us might say, why have a basic income? If we just had nothing there would still be the civil society and we could create something like a mutual aid society. Are there advantages of---is there reason to do this through the state, I guess is my question. Lehto: As a very wide-going and deep-reaching utilitarian, for me it's all about checking what robustness criteria institutions might have, and what institutional arrangements we could come up with and seeing how they perform in the real world rather than in the realm of ideal theory. And we have some evidence of places where mutual aid societies worked and we have some evidence of places where forms of welfare state that are highly bureaucratic and oppressive and paternalistic have operated and both of those have several features that I think we can wish to want to get rid of. So I think that if we look at societies where mutual aid societies were the sole means for people to survive I think they actually did a relatively good job in many cases but I think they failed to provide the sort of guarantee of security that I think a good society would wish to provide for people. That is, if we rely on the means of mutual aid societies you will get perhaps even a superior alternative to many forms of welfare state in the long run and I'm completely open to the idea that free markets can provide a very robust system of welfare. And actually that to me is one of the reasons why I consider myself a libertarian defender of a welfare state because I think that the libertarian part comes from actually understanding that markets are a good way of producing welfare and the opportunities available for markets and other forms of voluntary transfer, including mutual aid societies, are a way of providing a wide framework of security and services and other forms of protection. But I think that they provide a patchwork which leaves a lot of people outside in a number of circumstances. And I think this fact that they have a lot of holes in the way into the system, they have a lot of uncertainty about guaranteed income and lot of uncertainty about who gets covered, who is seen as being worthy of being helped, who is seen as being worthy of being protected by a benevolent charity and so on, means that we need to have a system of making sure that people don't---perhaps out of no fault of their own---fall through the cracks of the free market system and the same goes for the welfare state. I think they actually are surprisingly similar the welfare state and the free market utopia, they both provide this patchwork framework where some people are protected, some people are not, there's a lot of uncertainty about who gets what, who gets protected, and who doesn't. And so actually in both systems, people fall through the cracks and this is exactly the reason why I think basic income guarantee can be a superior alternative to either of those. But again we have to see what happens when we actually implement basic income, there could be a lot of unintended consequences. So we need to take those into account as well but at least on the side of theory, I think the idea of guaranteeing basic income, I think it's both desirable and practicable because we know how to do it technocratically and theoretically. I mean there's nothing so difficult with guaranteeing basic income via bank transfer to all citizens for example. Petersen: So one virtue of the basic income guarantee is that it seems to be actually politically feasible within our current system and it has got some interest in recent years. We mentioned at the start of the episode that you were part of the effort to bring a basic income to Finland so could you tell me about the political situation there? I've heard that they're looking at bringing in a basic income guarantee. Lehto: Yes, indeed. And here I'm being brutally pragmatic. Finland is not going to turn into any sort of libertarian utopia that I would wish for and certainly there are elements of paternalism there that are not going to go away. We still regulate the sale of alcohol in a very, I think, outrageous fashion for example and there are a lot of elements in the system that probably will keep us on the level of adult children for a long time. But as far as the welfare system is concerned, there is considerable consensus now that something like basic income would be a desirable reform. And this is seen by the majority of the population and by more than 50% of the M.P.'s in the parliament, basically from all parties with of course different proportions in different parties. But yes indeed the center-right government is actually going with the basic income pilot experiment starting next year. It's I think a well-planned pilot. They have a lot of experts because we believe in experts in this country and in Finland the sort of reliance on experts is both good and bad in many ways. It always seems to suggest that there is a group of people who can define the perfect system but in this case I think they've done a pretty good job with planning this two-year pilot. We shall see what happens. It's certainly not ideal and the government is already bungling with some of its promises and how it is going to be organized. But the basic premise for people who may not have an understanding or an idea in their mind of what this actually means, it means that basic income in the Finnish context would be the guarantee of something on the order of 500 to 600 to perhaps 800 Euros per month per person. And this would replace the various forms of unemployment benefits, sick leave benefits, student benefits and various other forms of benefits and Finland obviously has a lot of those already in place. And the complexity of the bureaucracy is such that even the experts who run it are surprisingly candid about their ignorance, about the complexities and mutual dependencies of the various benefit structures so that it's a maze that not even the experts can navigate, let alone regular ordinary people who are supposed to be the beneficiaries of the system. So a lot of people don't know how to apply for help, a lot of people don't know what benefits they're entitled to, and there's a long delay in getting the results of one's application for particular benefits---months, sometimes even the years. And a lot of people fall through the cracks in that fashion that I mentioned earlier. And so I think we've come to the point almost by necessity, where this system is seen almost universally by all as in need of reform and basic income happens to be the form of this reform that is most universally seen as the one we should pursue even though of course there are still people who are very skeptical of it in many ways. But yes, indeed they're planning this experiment where they're giving something like 500 Euros to a few thousand people across Finland. It's a very small experiment, but there are people who will call for its expansion I'm sure in the years to come. That will be definitely a very interesting experiment to see how that goes. Petersen: It seems like with the current system being so complex, it's almost like a part-time job just to collect benefits. You need to build expertise and you need to fill out the right forms and it takes a lot of your time and in many ways that makes it something that competes with the labor market for your time and your efforts and your human capital development. Seems like a basic income would be a good way to get people back into the labor market simply by virtue of freeing up their time to pursue something else. Do you see the political movement towards basic income making progress in other countries as well? Lehto: So yes experiments are undergoing in a number of countries. In addition to these, Netherlands, Canada and U.S. experiments and the Finnish case of obviously which I'm most familiar with, there is a very interesting experiment going to start in a few years in East Africa organized by the charity Give Directly who are already advocates of this idea of giving cash transfers to people. They have been doing that for a number of years now with quite good results according to many independent researchers. They've been giving cash transfers directly to people and they've shown great results. So they are actually expanding this idea and organizing again a privately funded experiment that they planned around for ten years, I think, or at least a number of years in East Africa. And this should be quite interesting to see how the basic income experiments in rich countries and poor countries compare and perhaps they can help both in different ways, because obviously countries where welfare states exist are quite different from places where they don't. So any help or any form of monetary transfer will help people in African countries proportionally more than they do in rich countries, but I think both situations and both contexts can certainly benefit from direct cash transfers and basic income. Petersen: Give Directly is a charity that I support and I really like what they're doing. I especially like how they take such a quantitative approach. There are so many charities that just start with "wouldn't it be nice if people in this village had this thing?" And then they bring it to them and they don't really stop to say can we measure, were we cost effective in improving their lives? Did we do a good job? Could something else of equivalent cost have made them better off? Give Directly is doing a great thing by bringing a lot of this sort of quantitative approach to charitable giving and I'll have a link at the show notes page to Give Directly if you want to contribute, if any of the listeners want to contribute, I highly recommend it. Lehto: Absolutely. For a little bit, just to say about the reasons why cash transfers are so great. By the way, I should say that there are perhaps a few charities that are even more helpful in certain contexts. For example, direct malaria helping efforts, efforts to eradicate diseases perhaps, have an even higher rate of efficiency but those are pretty much the only ones that are more effective than giving people cash. And the reason why giving people cash is very good is that first of all, they stimulate markets where they don't exist and where markets do exist they operate in a way that maximizes the preferences and satisfaction of the people concerned. They operate as a way of giving people welfare in the most efficient way possible. And the theoretical foundations of these can be found for example in neoclassical economics, of course, where the superiority of cash transfers have been posited for example in the Chicago School since George Stigler and Milton Friedman and others. There's a wonderful paper by Brennan and Walsh on the desirability of cash transfers over in-kind transfers from a game theoretical Pareto perspective. So that's also quite interesting how the theory also matches the empirical research here. And just again to go back to the very foundation of the welfare state. I think that's been the biggest mistake of the welfare states today that they fail to take into account how welfare truly fundamentally is the satisfaction of the desired ends and needs of the people themselves as they themselves see them. It shouldn't be the satisfaction of some criteria of goodness that the state bureaucrats measure and determine. It really should be ultimately up to the people themselves what they value, what they pursue, and what needs they see themselves as having and thus giving money to them is the best way to make sure that they actually get to satisfy those preferences which they have rather than those preferences which some bureaucrats think that they should have. Petersen: If I may ask one final question. Some supporters of the basic income guarantee have suggested that we could do it as a swap. We get rid of our current costly welfare system and bring in the basic income guarantee and often you'll hear the suggestion that this could be revenue neutral. Is that a realistic possibility? Lehto: It is a realistic possibility in cases where quite extensive welfare states already exist. And obviously it depends on the level of basic income and I'm actually in favor of starting low where that is the most politically feasible option. But I'm also quite a quite supportive of the idea of starting high where that is politically feasible. So in countries like the welfare state in Canada and many other places. Starting from the level of where the current welfare state benefits are it is compatible with the goal of making it neutral as far as the effect on state budget is concerned. Although I think that it will be very hard to make it completely neutral in that regard. I think it will by necessity always cost something. But what it will cost is heavily overblown in many estimations because many people simply do not understand how to calculate the costs and they simply add up some figures of everybody gets this amount of money and multiply that by the number of people and voila you get the proposed cost of this program. But that's obviously nonsense that they don't understand what they're talking about. And they really should have a look at the actual models because in all models what happens is you reform the tax system at the same time which means that for most people, middle-class and upper-class people---or middle income and upper-income people, to be more politically correct---the income that they get from basic income actually is a zero sum addition because actually, they ended up paying their basic income back in the form of taxes that I've been raised to match accordingly the need for basic income funding. So, even if there is no criteria that you don't give basic income to people above a certain range of income, nonetheless those people in the upper brackets will end up paying back their basic income due to the taxes that have been raised. But the taxes that are raised do not have to impose unbearable burdens on those people either, because again for most people it is just a nominal transfer of funds and it's withdrawn from their bank accounts at the same time. Petersen: So are there websites, books? What can you recommend to people interested in this topic? What should they read? Lehto: Well I think for those who are philosophically minded, I certainly recommend reading the classics of the libertarian welfare state stuff. Things like Friedman's Capitalism and Freedom where the negative income tax fee is featured. Friedrich Hayek's Constitution of Liberty is a great book and it also features a defense of guaranteed minimum income. And more recently John Tomasi's Free Market Fairness, and I would recommend people to read the blog Bleeding Heart Libertarians they have been advocating for basic income but also debating it. And also proposing this similar thing that I'm doing which is trying to combine Rawls' and Nozick's intuitions into something like a new coherent whole. And just follow the news, read up on the models, follow up on what the governments and many of these countries---Finland, Netherlands, Canada---are doing. And go to basic income networks website. Just Google basic income earth network. B.I.E.N it's called---Basic Income Earth Network---and you will find more about basic income. Petersen: My guest today has been Otto Lehto. Otto thanks for being part of Economics Detective Radio. Lehto: My pleasure. It's been fun.  

We don’t commonly think of procreation as a moral issue. But why not? When you think about it, creating another person seems like a morally weighty thing to do. And we tend to think that procreation under certain conditions would be irresponsible, selfish, or reckless. Might there also be cases where procreation is morally impermissible? In The Risk of a Lifetime: How, When, and Why Procreation May be Permissible (Oxford University Press, 2016), Rivka Weinberg explores a broad range of questions concerning the morality of procreation. She argues that procreation is a form of risk imposition, and so is morally permissible only under certain circumstances. In taking this view, she places herself in opposition to two more popular stances, one holding that procreation is almost never impermissible, and the holding that procreation is never permissible. Employing a Rawlsian constructivist model, Weinberg proposes two principles that establish conditions for permissible procreation. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

We don't commonly think of procreation as a moral issue. But why not? When you think about it, creating another person seems like a morally weighty thing to do. And we tend to think that procreation under certain conditions would be irresponsible, selfish, or reckless. Might there also be cases where procreation is morally impermissible? In The Risk of a Lifetime: How, When, and Why Procreation May be Permissible (Oxford University Press, 2016), Rivka Weinberg explores a broad range of questions concerning the morality of procreation. She argues that procreation is a form of risk imposition, and so is morally permissible only under certain circumstances. In taking this view, she places herself in opposition to two more popular stances, one holding that procreation is almost never impermissible, and the holding that procreation is never permissible. Employing a Rawlsian constructivist model, Weinberg proposes two principles that establish conditions for permissible procreation.

We don’t commonly think of procreation as a moral issue. But why not? When you think about it, creating another person seems like a morally weighty thing to do. And we tend to think that procreation under certain conditions would be irresponsible, selfish, or reckless. Might there also be cases where procreation is morally impermissible? In The Risk of a Lifetime: How, When, and Why Procreation May be Permissible (Oxford University Press, 2016), Rivka Weinberg explores a broad range of questions concerning the morality of procreation. She argues that procreation is a form of risk imposition, and so is morally permissible only under certain circumstances. In taking this view, she places herself in opposition to two more popular stances, one holding that procreation is almost never impermissible, and the holding that procreation is never permissible. Employing a Rawlsian constructivist model, Weinberg proposes two principles that establish conditions for permissible procreation. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

This paper studies how society votes on the payroll taxes of a basic income and a social health insurance scheme. Individuals differ along the two most important dimensions when it comes to the design of the two welfare schemes, namely, income and risk. Even though the introduction of a basic income scheme opens up the possibility for additional redistribution, it also crowds out social health insurance. We show that when both welfare schemes are open for debate, the political equilibrium is such that only the basic income scheme prevails. At the constitutional stage we determine which welfare scheme society agrees to implement behind the veil of ignorance and with a Rawlsian objective. Since social health insurance not only redistributes income from rich to poor but also from low-risk to high-risk agents, the doubly disadvantaged in society – low-income and high-risk agents – may lose out in the political process when a basic income scheme is in place. Depending on the amount of health care expenditure and the inequalities in income and risk, it may well be that a society will find it optimal to set up an institutional framework for a social health insurance scheme only.

Rescuing Justice and Equality: Celebrating the Career of G.A. Cohen - Conference at the Centre for the Study of Social Justice (CSSJ), Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford. Friday 23 and Saturday 24 January 2009. On January 23-24 2009, with the generous support of Philosophy and Public Affairs, the Centre for the Study of Social Justice will be hosting a conference to celebrate the career of G.A. Cohen, who is retiring after 23 years as Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory. Delivered by Michael Otsuka, comments by Jonathan Wolff.

We implement the Rawlsian veil of ignorance in the laboratory. Our experimental design allows separating the effects of risk and social preferences behind the veil of ignorance. Subjects prefer more equal distributions behind than in front of the veil of ignorance, but only a minority acts according to maximin preferences. Men prefer more equal allocations mostly for insurance purposes, women also due to social preferences for equality. Our results contrast the Utilitarian's claim that behind the veil of ignorance maximin preferences necessarily imply infinite risk aversion. They are compatible with any degree of risk aversion as long as social preferences for equality are sufficiently strong.

We implement the Rawlsian thought experiment of a veil of ignorance in the laboratory which introduces risk and possibly social preferences. We find that both men and women react to the risk introduced by the veil of ignorance. Only the women additionally exhibit social preferences that reflect an increased concern for equality. Our results for women imply that maximin preferences can also be derived from a combination of some, not necessarily infinite risk aversion and social preferences. This result contrasts the Utilitarians' claim that maximin preferences necessarily represent preferences with infinite risk aversion.

Engelmann and Strobel (AER 2004) question the relevance of inequity aversion in simple dictator game experiments claiming that a combination of a preference for efficiency and a Rawlsian motive for helping the least well-off is more important than inequity aversion. We show that these results are partly based on a strong subject pool effect. The participants of the E&S experiments were undergraduate students of economics and business administration who self-selected into their field of study (economics) and learned in the first semester that efficiency is desirable. We show that for non-economists the preference for efficiency is much less pronounced. We also find a non-negligible gender effect indicating that women are more egalitarian than men. However, perhaps surprisingly, the dominance of equality over efficiency is unrelated to political attitudes.