Podcasts about Xinjiang

Today's guest is Jerry Grey, an Australian freelancer who has lived in China for more than two decades and cycled five times to China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. He shares his views on the massive changes that have taken place in Xinjiang throughout the years. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Since 1951, when Tibet was formally annexed into the People's Republic of China, Tibet has been a battleground between China's efforts to assert control and the Tibetan people's struggle to preserve their cultural and religious identity. This past August, Xi Jinping made a surprise visit to Tibet, his second since becoming China's top leader in 2012. Less than two months earlier, the Dalai Lama, now 90 years old, announced that his office, not China, would choose his successor when he passes. A few months before that, the Dalai Lama revealed in a memoir that he would reincarnate outside of China. The PRC insists that the next incarnation – the 15th Dalai Lama – will be born inside PRC territory and approved by the Chinese government. What are Beijing's interests in Tibet and how has Xi Jinping pursued them since coming to power? What is likely to occur after the Dalai Lama's passing? I'm delighted to have as my guest today Tendor Dorjee. Tendor is an adjunct assistant professor of political science at Columbia University, a senior researcher at the Tibet Action Institute, and the inaugural Stephanie G Neuman Fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies. He recently co-authored an article in Foreign Affairs titled Beijing's Dangerous Game in Tibet”.Timestamps[00:00] Start [02:08] Beijing's Key Interests in Tibet [04:06] Xi Jinping's Approach to Tibet [07:00] Internal and External Drivers of Tibet Policy [08:08] Xi's Recent Visit to Tibet [11:34] Infrastructure Developments and Expansionism  [15:27] Beijing's Succession Plans and Tibetan Reactions to a Future Dalai Lama [20:27] Risk of Unrest and Crackdowns [25:43] Implications for Neighboring States 

In this episode, Niuniu and Steve share Chinese expressions unique to Xinjiang, and Niuniu also talks about her personal travel experiences there. From the region's diverse cultures and stunning landscapes to its lively bazaars, we offer you a fascinating look at China's far western regions. (02:05) Xinjiang's Cultural Diversity(16:31) Unique Expressions in Xinjiang

Have you noticed that the name "Xinjiang" has largely disappeared from the Western news cycle these days? With Xinjiang freely accessible and the world seeing the true picture for themselves, stories of repression, human rights violation regarding Xinjiang seem to have suddenly disappeared. Another reason why few dare to continue spreading disinformation about Xinjiang is thanks to the rigorous work of academics like Jaq James. Drawing on her background in law, she has completely debunked some of the most atrocious claims and narratives about Xinjiang.

The concentration of terrorists, political suspects, ethnic minorities, prisoners of war, enemy aliens, and other potentially “dangerous” populations spans the modern era. From Konzentrationslager in colonial Africa to strategic villages in Southeast Asia, from slave plantations in America to Uyghur sweatshops in Xinjiang, and from civilian internment in World War II to extraordinary rendition at Guantanamo Bay, mass detention is as diverse as it is ubiquitous. Camps: A Global History of Mass Confinement (University of Toronto Press, 2024) offers a short but compelling guide to the varied manifestations of concentration camps in the last two centuries, while tracing provocative transnational connections with related institutions such as workhouses, migrant detention centers, and residential schools. Aidan Forth is an associate professor of British, imperial, and global history at MacEwan University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

The concentration of terrorists, political suspects, ethnic minorities, prisoners of war, enemy aliens, and other potentially “dangerous” populations spans the modern era. From Konzentrationslager in colonial Africa to strategic villages in Southeast Asia, from slave plantations in America to Uyghur sweatshops in Xinjiang, and from civilian internment in World War II to extraordinary rendition at Guantanamo Bay, mass detention is as diverse as it is ubiquitous. Camps: A Global History of Mass Confinement (University of Toronto Press, 2024) offers a short but compelling guide to the varied manifestations of concentration camps in the last two centuries, while tracing provocative transnational connections with related institutions such as workhouses, migrant detention centers, and residential schools. Aidan Forth is an associate professor of British, imperial, and global history at MacEwan University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

The concentration of terrorists, political suspects, ethnic minorities, prisoners of war, enemy aliens, and other potentially “dangerous” populations spans the modern era. From Konzentrationslager in colonial Africa to strategic villages in Southeast Asia, from slave plantations in America to Uyghur sweatshops in Xinjiang, and from civilian internment in World War II to extraordinary rendition at Guantanamo Bay, mass detention is as diverse as it is ubiquitous. Camps: A Global History of Mass Confinement (University of Toronto Press, 2024) offers a short but compelling guide to the varied manifestations of concentration camps in the last two centuries, while tracing provocative transnational connections with related institutions such as workhouses, migrant detention centers, and residential schools. Aidan Forth is an associate professor of British, imperial, and global history at MacEwan University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/world-affairs

The concentration of terrorists, political suspects, ethnic minorities, prisoners of war, enemy aliens, and other potentially “dangerous” populations spans the modern era. From Konzentrationslager in colonial Africa to strategic villages in Southeast Asia, from slave plantations in America to Uyghur sweatshops in Xinjiang, and from civilian internment in World War II to extraordinary rendition at Guantanamo Bay, mass detention is as diverse as it is ubiquitous. Camps: A Global History of Mass Confinement (University of Toronto Press, 2024) offers a short but compelling guide to the varied manifestations of concentration camps in the last two centuries, while tracing provocative transnational connections with related institutions such as workhouses, migrant detention centers, and residential schools. Aidan Forth is an associate professor of British, imperial, and global history at MacEwan University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/genocide-studies

British Influencer LivinlavidaLuke, Luke Johnston, is getting his doctorate in China. For months, he has lived in Xinjiang, China. During his leisure time, he'd go travelling across Xinjiang. What is it like to be living in Xinjiang? Find out more on The Bridge to China. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Today's guest is Fernando Munoz Bernal, a journalist from Columbia. He toured in Xinjiang by RV, spending months exploring the region. We ask him to tell us what local life in Xinjiang is really like. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Earlier this month an Australian-based Uyghur group launched legal action against Kmart in the federal court. The case has put the retailer's supply chain under scrutiny for potential links to forced labour in China's Xinjiang province. Nour Haydar speaks with senior reporter Ben Doherty about the legal action against Kmart and the warnings that Australia could become a dumping ground for products linked to forced labour

①More provinces across China roll out football leagues to boost tourism②Beijing Music Festival to kick off in October③Hong Kong-born giant panda twins turn 1 year old④China's Hainan Airlines pilots in-cabin pet service on international flights⑤Xinjiang launches direct air cargo route for fruit, vegetables to Dubai⑥Chinese researchers develop soft yet robust microrobot

Award-winning journalist John Beck joins Chris to discuss Those Who Should Be Seized Should Be Seized, his harrowing account of China's campaign against Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and other Muslim minorities. Beck traces the lives of four people—from re-education camps in Xinjiang to exile in Turkey, Kazakhstan, and the US—revealing how Beijing's reach extends far beyond its borders through intimidation, surveillance, and coercion. They explore mass detention, forced labor, and the destruction of culture; the weaponization of bureaucracy; and the role of literature and quiet resistance in preserving identity. Beck also examines the muted global response, the complicity of some governments, and the authoritarian playbook that turns Xinjiang into both a warning and a testing ground for repression worldwide. Subscribe and share to stay ahead in the world of intelligence, geopolitics, and current affairs. Order Those Who Should Be Seized Should Be Seized: https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/774464/those-who-should-be-seized-should-be-seized-by-john-beck/ Follow John on Twitter/X: https://x.com/jm_beck Please share this episode using these links Audio: https://pod.fo/e/314e5b YouTube: https://youtu.be/h-FPBf1jIJY Join Chris on a one-day podcast course Podcast Workshop Monday 22nd September 10am - 5pm @ The Guildford Institute:  https://www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/1477046087609 Support Secrets and Spies Become a “Friend of the Podcast” on Patreon for £3/$4: https://www.patreon.com/SecretsAndSpies Buy merchandise from our shop: https://www.redbubble.com/shop/ap/60934996 Subscribe to our YouTube page: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCDVB23lrHr3KFeXq4VU36dg For more information about the podcast, check out our website: https://secretsandspiespodcast.com Connect with us on social media Bluesky: https://bsky.app/profile/secretsandspies.bsky.social Instagram: https://instagram.com/secretsandspies Facebook: https://facebook.com/secretsandspies Spoutible: https://spoutible.com/SecretsAndSpies Follow Chris and Matt on Bluesky: https://bsky.app/profile/chriscarrfilm.bsky.social https://bsky.app/profile/mattfulton.net Secrets and Spies is produced by F & P LTD. Music by Andrew R. Bird Photos by Kemal Aslan/Depo Photos Secrets and Spies sits at the intersection of intelligence, covert action, real-world espionage, and broader geopolitics in a way that is digestible but serious. Hosted by filmmaker Chris Carr and writer Matt Fulton, each episode examines the very topics that real intelligence officers and analysts consider on a daily basis through the lens of global events and geopolitics, featuring expert insights from former spies, authors, and journalists.

A version of this essay has been published by firstpost.com at https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/shadow-warrior-from-crisis-to-advantage-how-india-can-outplay-the-trump-tariff-gambit-13923031.htmlA simple summary of the recent brouhaha about President Trump's imposition of 25% tariffs on India as well as his comment on India's ‘dead economy' is the following from Shakespeare's Macbeth: “full of sound and fury, signifying nothing”. Trump further imposed punitive tariffs totalling 50% on August 6th allegedly for India funding Russia's war machine via buying oil.As any negotiator knows, a good opening gambit is intended to set the stage for further parleys, so that you could arrive at a negotiated settlement that is acceptable to both parties. The opening gambit could well be a maximalist statement, or one's ‘dream outcome', the opposite of which is ‘the walkway point' beyond which you are simply not willing to make concessions. The usual outcome is somewhere in between these two positions or postures.Trump is both a tough negotiator, and prone to making broad statements from which he has no problem retreating later. It's down-and-dirty boardroom tactics that he's bringing to international trade. Therefore I think Indians don't need to get rattled. It's not the end of the world, and there will be climbdowns and adjustments. Think hard about the long term.I was on a panel discussion on this topic on TV just hours after Trump made his initial 25% announcement, and I mentioned an interplay between geo-politics and geo-economics. Trump is annoyed that his Ukraine-Russia play is not making much headway, and also that BRICS is making progress towards de-dollarization. India is caught in this crossfire (‘collateral damage') but the geo-economic facts on the ground are not favorable to Trump.I am in general agreement with Trump on his objectives of bringing manufacturing and investment back to the US, but I am not sure that he will succeed, and anyway his strong-arm tactics may backfire. I consider below what India should be prepared to do to turn adversity into opportunity.The anti-Thucydides Trap and the baleful influence of Whitehall on Deep StateWhat is remarkable, though, is that Trump 2.0 seems to be indistinguishable from the Deep State: I wondered last month if the Deep State had ‘turned' Trump. The main reason many people supported Trump in the first place was the damage the Deep State was wreaking on the US under the Obama-Biden regime. But it appears that the resourceful Deep State has now co-opted Trump for its agenda, and I can only speculate how.The net result is that there is the anti-Thucydides Trap: here is the incumbent power, the US, actively supporting the insurgent power, China, instead of suppressing it, as Graham Allison suggested as the historical pattern. It, in all fairness, did not start with Trump, but with Nixon in China in 1971. In 1985, the US trade deficit with China was $6 million. In 1986, $1.78 billion. In 1995, $35 billion.But it ballooned after China entered the WTO in 2001. $202 billion in 2005; $386 billion in 2022.In 2025, after threatening China with 150% tariffs, Trump retreated by postponing them; besides he has caved in to Chinese demands for Nvidia chips and for exemptions from Iran oil sanctions if I am not mistaken.All this can be explained by one word: leverage. China lured the US with the siren-song of the cost-leader ‘China price', tempting CEOs and Wall Street, who sleepwalked into surrender to the heft of the Chinese supply chain.Now China has cornered Trump via its monopoly over various things, the most obvious of which is rare earths. Trump really has no option but to give in to Chinese blackmail. That must make him furious: in addition to his inability to get Putin to listen to him, Xi is also ignoring him. Therefore, he will take out his frustrations on others, such as India, the EU, Japan, etc. Never mind that he's burning bridges with them.There's a Malayalam proverb that's relevant here: “angadiyil thottathinu ammayodu”. Meaning, you were humiliated in the marketplace, so you come home and take it out on your mother. This is quite likely what Trump is doing, because he believes India et al will not retaliate. In fact Japan and the EU did not retaliate, but gave in, also promising to invest large sums in the US. India could consider a different path: not active conflict, but not giving in either, because its equations with the US are different from those of the EU or Japan.Even the normally docile Japanese are beginning to notice.Beyond that, I suggested a couple of years ago that Deep State has a plan to enter into a condominium agreement with China, so that China gets Asia, and the US gets the Americas and the Pacific/Atlantic. This is exactly like the Vatican-brokered medieval division of the world between Spain and Portugal, and it probably will be equally bad for everyone else. And incidentally it makes the Quad infructuous, and deepens distrust of American motives.The Chinese are sure that they have achieved the condominium, or rather forced the Americans into it. Here is a headline from the Financial Express about their reaction to the tariffs: they are delighted that the principal obstacle in their quest for hegemony, a US-India military and economic alliance, is being blown up by Trump, and they lose no opportunity to deride India as not quite up to the mark, whereas they and the US have achieved a G2 detente.Two birds with one stone: gloat about the breakdown in the US-India relationship, and exhibit their racist disdain for India yet again.They laugh, but I bet India can do an end-run around them. As noted above, the G2 is a lot like the division of the world into Spanish and Portuguese spheres of influence in 1494. Well, that didn't end too well for either of them. They had their empires, which they looted for gold and slaves, but it made them fat, dumb and happy. The Dutch, English, and French capitalized on more dynamic economies, flexible colonial systems, and aggressive competition, overtaking the Iberian powers in global influence by the 17th century. This is a salutary historical parallel.I have long suspected that the US Deep State is being led by the nose by the malign Whitehall (the British Deep State): I call it the ‘master-blaster' syndrome. On August 6th, there was indirect confirmation of this in ex-British PM Boris Johnson's tweet about India. Let us remember he single-handedly ruined the chances of a peaceful resolution of the Ukraine War in 2022. Whitehall's mischief and meddling all over, if you read between the lines.Did I mention the British Special Force's views? Ah, Whitehall is getting a bit sloppy in its propaganda.Wait, so is India important (according to Whitehall) or unimportant (according to Trump)?Since I am very pro-American, I have a word of warning to Trump: you trust perfidious Albion at your peril. Their country is ruined, and they will not rest until they ruin yours too.I also wonder if there are British paw-prints in a recent and sudden spate of racist attacks on Indians in Ireland. A 6-year old girl was assaulted and kicked in the private parts. A nurse was gang-raped by a bunch of teenagers. Ireland has never been so racist against Indians (yes, I do remember the sad case of Savita Halappanavar, but that was religious bigotry more than racism). And I remember sudden spikes in anti-Indian attacks in Australia and Canada, both British vassals.There is no point in Indians whining about how the EU and America itself are buying more oil, palladium, rare earths, uranium etc. from Russia than India is. I am sorry to say this, but Western nations are known for hypocrisy. For example, exactly 80 years ago they dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan, but not on Germany or Italy. Why? The answer is uncomfortable. Lovely post-facto rationalization, isn't it?Remember the late lamented British East India Company that raped and pillaged India?Applying the three winning strategies to geo-economicsAs a professor of business strategy and innovation, I emphasize to my students that there are three broad ways of gaining an advantage over others: 1. Be the cost leader, 2. Be the most customer-intimate player, 3. Innovate. The US as a nation is patently not playing the cost leader; it does have some customer intimacy, but it is shrinking; its strength is in innovation.If you look at comparative advantage, the US at one time had strengths in all three of the above. Because it had the scale of a large market (and its most obvious competitors in Europe were decimated by world wars) America did enjoy an ability to be cost-competitive, especially as the dollar is the global default reserve currency. It demonstrated this by pushing through the Plaza Accords, forcing the Japanese yen to appreciate, destroying their cost advantage.In terms of customer intimacy, the US is losing its edge. Take cars for example: Americans practically invented them, and dominated the business, but they are in headlong retreat now because they simply don't make cars that people want outside the US: Japanese, Koreans, Germans and now Chinese do. Why were Ford and GM forced to leave the India market? Their “world cars” are no good in value-conscious India and other emerging markets.Innovation, yes, has been an American strength. Iconic Americans like Thomas Edison, Henry Ford, and Steve Jobs led the way in product and process innovation. US universities have produced idea after idea, and startups have ignited Silicon Valley. In fact Big Tech and aerospace/armaments are the biggest areas where the US leads these days.The armaments and aerospace tradeThat is pertinent because of two reasons: one is Trump's peevishness at India's purchase of weapons from Russia (even though that has come down from 70+% of imports to 36% according to SIPRI); two is the fact that there are significant services and intangible imports by India from the US, of for instance Big Tech services, even some routed through third countries like Ireland.Armaments and aerospace purchases from the US by India have gone up a lot: for example the Apache helicopters that arrived recently, the GE 404 engines ordered for India's indigenous fighter aircraft, Predator drones and P8-i Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft. I suspect Trump is intent on pushing India to buy F-35s, the $110-million dollar 5th generation fighters.Unfortunately, the F-35 has a spotty track record. There were two crashes recently, one in Albuquerque in May, and the other on July 31 in Fresno, and that's $220 million dollars gone. Besides, the spectacle of a hapless British-owned F-35B sitting, forlorn, in the rain, in Trivandrum airport for weeks, lent itself to trolls, who made it the butt of jokes. I suspect India has firmly rebuffed Trump on this front, which has led to his focus on Russian arms.There might be other pushbacks too. Personally, I think India does need more P-8i submarine hunter-killer aircraft to patrol the Bay of Bengal, but India is exerting its buyer power. There are rumors of pauses in orders for Javelin and Stryker missiles as well.On the civilian aerospace front, I am astonished that all the media stories about Air India 171 and the suspicion that Boeing and/or General Electric are at fault have disappeared without a trace. Why? There had been the big narrative push to blame the poor pilots, and now that there is more than reasonable doubt that these US MNCs are to blame, there is a media blackout?Allegations about poor manufacturing practices by Boeing in North Charleston, South Carolina by whistleblowers have been damaging for the company's brand: this is where the 787 Dreamliners are put together. It would not be surprising if there is a slew of cancellations of orders for Boeing aircraft, with customers moving to Airbus. Let us note Air India and Indigo have placed some very large, multi-billion dollar orders with Boeing that may be in jeopardy.India as a consuming economy, and the services trade is hugely in the US' favorMany observers have pointed out the obvious fact that India is not an export-oriented economy, unlike, say, Japan or China. It is more of a consuming economy with a large, growing and increasingly less frugal population, and therefore it is a target for exporters rather than a competitor for exporting countries. As such, the impact of these US tariffs on India will be somewhat muted, and there are alternative destinations for India's exports, if need be.While Trump has focused on merchandise trade and India's modest surplus there, it is likely that there is a massive services trade, which is in the US' favor. All those Big Tech firms, such as Microsoft, Meta, Google and so on run a surplus in the US' favor, which may not be immediately evident because they route their sales through third countries, e.g. Ireland.These are the figures from the US Trade Representative, and quite frankly I don't believe them: there are a lot of invisible services being sold to India, and the value of Indian data is ignored.In addition to the financial implications, there are national security concerns. Take the case of Microsoft's cloud offering, Azure, which arbitrarily turned off services to Indian oil retailer Nayara on the flimsy grounds that the latter had substantial investment from Russia's Rosneft. This is an example of jurisdictional over-reach by US companies, which has dire consequences. India has been lax about controlling Big Tech, and this has to change.India is Meta's largest customer base. Whatsapp is used for practically everything. Which means that Meta has access to enormous amounts of Indian customer data, for which India is not even enforcing local storage. This is true of all other Big Tech (see OpenAI's Sam Altman below): they are playing fast and loose with Indian data, which is not in India's interest at all.Data is the new oil, says The Economist magazine. So how much should Meta, OpenAI et al be paying for Indian data? Meta is worth trillions of dollars, OpenAI half a trillion. How much of that can be attributed to Indian data?There is at least one example of how India too can play the digital game: UPI. Despite ham-handed efforts to now handicap UPI with a fee (thank you, brilliant government bureaucrats, yes, go ahead and kill the goose that lays the golden eggs), it has become a contender in a field that has long been dominated by the American duopoly of Visa and Mastercard. In other words, India can scale up and compete.It is unfortunate that India has not built up its own Big Tech behind a firewall as has been done behind the Great Firewall of China. But it is not too late. Is it possible for India-based cloud service providers to replace US Big Tech like Amazon Web Services and Microsoft Azure? Yes, there is at least one player in that market: Zoho.Second, what are the tariffs on Big Tech exports to India these days? What if India were to decide to impose a 50% tax on revenue generated in India through advertisement or through sales of services, mirroring the US's punitive taxes on Indian goods exports? Let me hasten to add that I am not suggesting this, it is merely a hypothetical argument.There could also be non-tariff barriers as China has implemented, but not India: data locality laws, forced use of local partners, data privacy laws like the EU's GDPR, anti-monopoly laws like the EU's Digital Markets Act, strict application of IPR laws like 3(k) that absolutely prohibits the patenting of software, and so on. India too can play legalistic games. This is a reason US agri-products do not pass muster: genetically modified seeds, and milk from cows fed with cattle feed from blood, offal and ground-up body parts.Similarly, in the ‘information' industry, India is likely to become the largest English-reading country in the world. I keep getting come-hither emails from the New York Times offering me $1 a month deals on their product: they want Indian customers. There are all these American media companies present in India, untrammelled by content controls or taxes. What if India were to give a choice to Bloomberg, Reuters, NYTimes, WaPo, NPR et al: 50% tax, or exit?This attack on peddlers of fake information and manufacturing consent I do suggest, and I have been suggesting for years. It would make no difference whatsoever to India if these media outlets were ejected, and they surely could cover India (well, basically what they do is to demean India) just as well from abroad. Out with them: good riddance to bad rubbish.What India needs to doI believe India needs to play the long game. It has to use its shatrubodha to realize that the US is not its enemy: in Chanakyan terms, the US is the Far Emperor. The enemy is China, or more precisely the Chinese Empire. Han China is just a rump on their south-eastern coast, but it is their conquered (and restive) colonies such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, that give them their current heft.But the historical trends are against China. It has in the past had stable governments for long periods, based on strong (and brutal) imperial power. Then comes the inevitable collapse, when the center falls apart, and there is absolute chaos. It is quite possible, given various trends, including demographic changes, that this may happen to China by 2050.On the other hand, (mostly thanks, I acknowledge, to China's manufacturing growth), the center of gravity of the world economy has been steadily shifting towards Asia. The momentum might swing towards India if China stumbles, but in any case the era of Atlantic dominance is probably gone for good. That was, of course, only a historical anomaly. Asia has always dominated: see Angus Maddison's magisterial history of the world economy, referred to below as well.I am reminded of the old story of the king berating his court poet for calling him “the new moon” and the emperor “the full moon”. The poet escaped being punished by pointing out that the new moon is waxing and the full moon is waning.This is the long game India has to keep in mind. Things are coming together for India to a great extent: in particular the demographic dividend, improved infrastructure, fiscal prudence, and the increasing centrality of the Indian Ocean as the locus of trade and commerce.India can attempt to gain competitive advantage in all three ways outlined above:* Cost-leadership. With a large market (assuming companies are willing to invest at scale), a low-cost labor force, and with a proven track-record of frugal innovation, India could well aim to be a cost-leader in selected areas of manufacturing. But this requires government intervention in loosening monetary policy and in reducing barriers to ease of doing business* Customer-intimacy. What works in highly value-conscious India could well work in other developing countries. For instance, the economic environment in ASEAN is largely similar to India's, and so Indian products should appeal to their residents; similarly with East Africa. Thus the Indian Ocean Rim with its huge (and in Africa's case, rapidly growing) population should be a natural fit for Indian products* Innovation. This is the hardest part, and it requires a new mindset in education and industry, to take risks and work at the bleeding edge of technology. In general, Indians have been content to replicate others' innovations at lower cost or do jugaad (which cannot scale up). To do real, disruptive innovation, first of all the services mindset should transition to a product mindset (sorry, Raghuram Rajan). Second, the quality of human capital must be improved. Third, there should be patient risk capital. Fourth, there should be entrepreneurs willing to try risky things. All of these are difficult, but doable.And what is the end point of this game? Leverage. The ability to compel others to buy from you.China has demonstrated this through its skill at being a cost-leader in industry after industry, often hollowing out entire nations through means both fair and foul. These means include far-sighted industrial policy including the acquisition of skills, technology, and raw materials, as well as hidden subsidies that support massive scaling, which ends up driving competing firms elsewhere out of business. India can learn a few lessons from them. One possible lesson is building capabilities, as David Teece of UC Berkeley suggested in 1997, that can span multiple products, sectors and even industries: the classic example is that of Nikon, whose optics strength helps it span industries such as photography, printing, and photolithography for chip manufacturing. Here is an interesting snapshot of China's capabilities today.2025 is, in a sense, a point of inflection for India just as the crisis in 1991 was. India had been content to plod along at the Nehruvian Rate of Growth of 2-3%, believing this was all it could achieve, as a ‘wounded civilization'. From that to a 6-7% growth rate is a leap, but it is not enough, nor is it testing the boundaries of what India can accomplish.1991 was the crisis that turned into an opportunity by accident. 2025 is a crisis that can be carefully and thoughtfully turned into an opportunity.The Idi Amin syndrome and the 1000 Talents program with AIThere is a key area where an American error may well be a windfall for India. This is based on the currently fashionable H1-B bashing which is really a race-bashing of Indians, and which has been taken up with gusto by certain MAGA folks. Once again, I suspect the baleful influence of Whitehall behind it, but whatever the reason, it looks like Indians are going to have a hard time settling down in the US.There are over a million Indians on H1-Bs, a large number of them software engineers, let us assume for convenience there are 250,000 of them. Given country caps of exactly 9800 a year, they have no realistic chance of getting a Green Card in the near future, and given the increasingly fraught nature of life there for brown people, they may leave the US, and possibly return to India..I call this the Idi Amin syndrome. In 1972, the dictator of Uganda went on a rampage against Indian-origin people in his country, and forcibly expelled 80,000 of them, because they were dominating the economy. There were unintended consequences: those who were ejected mostly went to the US and UK, and they have in many cases done well. But Uganda's economy virtually collapsed.That's a salutary experience. I am by no means saying that the US economy would collapse, but am pointing to the resilience of the Indians who were expelled. If, similarly, Trump forces a large number of Indians to return to India, that might well be a case of short-term pain and long-term gain: urvashi-shapam upakaram, as in the Malayalam phrase.Their return would be akin to what happened in China and Taiwan with their successful effort to attract their diaspora back. The Chinese program was called 1000 Talents, and they scoured the globe for academics and researchers of Chinese origin, and brought them back with attractive incentives and large budgets. They had a major role in energizing the Chinese economy.Similarly, Taiwan with Hsinchu University attracted high-quality talent, among which was the founder of TSMC, the globally dominant chip giant.And here is Trump offering to India on a platter at least 100,000 software engineers, especially at a time when generativeAI is decimating low-end jobs everywhere. They can work on some very compelling projects that could revolutionize Indian education, up-skilling and so on, and I am not at liberty to discuss them. Suffice to say that these could turbo-charge the Indian software industry and get it away from mundane, routine body-shopping type jobs.ConclusionThe Trump tariff tantrum is definitely a short-term problem for India, but it can be turned around, and turned into an opportunity, if only the country plays its cards right and focuses on building long-term comparative advantages and accepting the gift of a mis-step by Trump in geo-economics.In geo-politics, India and the US need each other to contain China, and so that part, being so obvious, will be taken care of more or less by default.Thus, overall, the old SWOT analysis: strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. On balance, I am of the opinion that the threats contain in them the germs of opportunities. It is up to Indians to figure out how to take advantage of them. This is your game to win or lose, India!4150 words, 9 Aug 2025 This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit rajeevsrinivasan.substack.com/subscribe

Un puente colgante en una atracción turística de Xinjiang, en el noroeste de China, se desplomó el miércoles 6 de agosto, provocando que 29 personas cayeran y resultaran heridas; cinco de ellas murieron, según confirmaron autoridades a la agencia Xinhua.

①China's cities launched pet-friendly buses to boost consumer spending②Int'l dance festival opens in China's Xinjiang with 52 performances③Nightlife festival boosts urban night consumption in Chongqing④China has over 1.12 billion internet users⑤Shanghai brain tech breakthrough translates thoughts into fluent Chinese

In this episode, Rushan Abbas reveals how the Chinese communist regime has escalated its campaign against the Uyghurs.Uyghurs are being mass surveilled, forcibly sterilized, and exploited as slave labor both in Xinjiang and in other provinces across China. There are growing signs of large-scale forced organ harvesting in the region—including an apparent special lane in the city of Kashgar's airport dedicated to the transport of human organs.In 2018, the Chinese regime imprisoned Rushan Abbas's sister Gulshan in an apparent attempt to silence Rushan. Her sister was sentenced to 20 years in prison, and she has since spent almost seven years detained—with no end in sight.Rushan Abbas is the author of the powerful memoir “Unbroken: One Uyghur's Fight for Freedom.” She is the founder and executive director of the Campaign for Uyghurs and chairperson of the World Uyghur Congress's executive committee.Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and the guest, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

China's parcel delivery industry reached a new milestone in the first half of 2025, handling over 95 billion parcels, up 19 percent year-on-year, as the sector continues to play a growing role in boosting domestic demand and supporting the real economy, the State Post Bureau of China said on Monday.中国国家邮政局周一表示，中国包裹递送行业在2025年上半年达到了一个新的里程碑，处理了950多亿个包裹，同比增长19%，因为该行业在促进内需和支持实体经济方面继续发挥着越来越大的作用。The country's delivery network processed more than 520 million parcels per day on average, surpassing the 50-billion mark 18 days earlier than it did last year. The robust growth reflects China's steady economic momentum and the accelerating rollout of policies supporting consumption and domestic demand, officials said.该国的快递网络平均每天处理超过5.2亿个包裹，比去年提前18天超过500亿大关。官员们表示，强劲的增长反映了中国稳定的经济势头以及支持消费和内需的政策的加速推出。"The express delivery sector is becoming a stronger engine for stimulating consumption, energizing the real economy and serving rural and western regions," said Zhu Li, deputy director of the industrial economy department at the bureau's Development and Research Center. "It has laid a solid foundation for achieving the industry's annual growth goals."“快递行业正在成为刺激消费、振兴实体经济、服务农村和西部地区的强大引擎，”该局发展研究中心工业经济部副主任朱力说。“它为实现行业的年度增长目标奠定了坚实的基础。”The expanding reach of the delivery network has brought remarkable changes to everyday life across the country — from the highlands of the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region to the grasslands of the Inner Mongolia autonomous region.从新疆维吾尔自治区的高原到内蒙古自治区的草原，配送网络的不断扩大给全国各地的日常生活带来了显著的变化。In Yarkant county of Xinjiang, Ayinur, a young Uygur woman, easily retrieved a parcel from a local pickup station. Inside were school supplies for her younger brother and pastries for her grandmother.在新疆叶尔羌县，年轻的维吾尔族妇女阿依努尔（Ayinur）轻松地从当地的一个取货站取回了一个包裹。里面有她弟弟的学习用品和她祖母的糕点。"We used to travel all the way to the city for this," she said. "Now it's just at our doorstep."她说：“我们过去常常一路去城里。”。“现在它就在我们家门口。”In the southern city of Maoming in Guangdong province, known as the "hometown of lychees", freshly picked fruits glistening with morning dew are packed and shipped through priority cold-chain logistics by air and high-speed rail.在被称为“荔枝之乡”的广东省南部城市茂名，新鲜采摘的水果闪耀着晨露，通过优先的冷链物流——航空和高铁进行包装和运输。"We race against the clock," said a fruit farmer, surnamed Lin, while watching workers load boxes. "Customers in Beijing or Shanghai who place orders today can eat the lychees tomorrow."“我们争分夺秒，”一位姓林的果农看着工人们装箱子时说。“今天在北京或上海下订单的顾客明天就可以吃荔枝了。”To keep up with soaring demand and cut delivery times, courier companies have stepped up investment in infrastructure and smart logistics. That included expanding airfreight fleets, adding rail-air transportation routes, automating sorting hubs, building unmanned vertical warehouses, and deploying drones and driverless delivery vehicles, said Zhu, from the State Post Bureau's Development and Research Center.为了跟上飙升的需求并缩短交货时间，快递公司加大了对基础设施和智能物流的投资。国家邮政局发展研究中心的朱表示，这包括扩大空运机队，增加铁路航空运输路线，自动化分拣中心，建造无人垂直仓库，以及部署无人机和无人驾驶送货车。In Rui'an, Zhejiang provincewhich is famous for its delicate and highly perishable bayberries,a new drone-based branch line has opened up nationwide distribution opportunities.在浙江省瑞安市，以其精致易腐烂的杨梅而闻名，一条新的无人机支线在全国范围内开辟了分销机会。"Now, it only takes two hours for the berries to go from the tree to tables in Wenzhou, a neighboring city," said Gu Zhihao, head of operations at SF Express' Longhu station in Rui'an.顺丰速运瑞安龙湖站运营负责人顾志浩表示：“现在，在温州，浆果从树上到餐桌只需要两个小时。”。At 7:30 am, harvesters finish the first round of picking. A drone loaded with 50 kilograms of freshly picked bayberries lifts off, descending two minutes later at the foot of the hill at the Zhennan Bayberry Market.早上7:30，收割者完成了第一轮采摘。一架载有50公斤新鲜采摘的杨梅的无人机起飞，两分钟后降落在镇南杨梅市场的山脚下。From there, the berries either go to same-day delivery points within Wenzhou — shipped in blue baskets without excessive packaging — or to a nearby cold-chain facility where they are packed for nationwide overnight shipping.从那里，浆果要么被送到温州境内的当天交货点——装在蓝色篮子里，没有过度包装——要么被送到附近的冷链工厂，在那里被包装成全国隔夜运输。"No need for fancy boxes; just pure flavor," Gu said, adding that local orders exceed 1,500 kilograms per day.顾说：“不需要花哨的盒子，只需要纯正的味道。”他补充说，当地订单每天超过1500公斤。At the SF Express' Longhu operations center, just 600 meters from the Zhennan market, the race to deliver fresh produce nationwide is in full swing. Vacuum sealers hum, ice-packing stations work at full speed, and dedicated logistics lines ensure that bayberries will reach customers across the country the next day. For local farmer He Duanzhi, cold-chain orders now make up a staggering 90 percent of his daily sales.在距离镇南市场仅600米的顺丰速运龙湖运营中心，全国各地的新鲜农产品配送竞争正如火如荼。真空封口机嗡嗡作响，冰块包装站全速运转，专用物流线确保杨梅第二天就能送达全国各地的客户。对于当地农民何端志来说，冷链订单现在占他日销售额的90%，这一数字令人震惊。Behind the scenes, technology is driving transformation. From artificial intelligence-powered sorting to intelligent dispatch systems, automation is improving efficiency and enhancing the customer experience.在幕后，技术正在推动转型。从人工智能驱动的分拣到智能调度系统，自动化正在提高效率，增强客户体验。"Unmanned stations, autonomous vehicles and wider application of AI are not only optimizing operations, but also improving service quality and expanding what postal services can offer," said Zhu, from the State Post Bureau's Development and Research Center.“无人车站、自动驾驶汽车和人工智能的广泛应用不仅优化了运营，还提高了服务质量，扩大了邮政服务的范围，”国家邮政局发展研究中心的朱说。cold-chain logisticsn.冷链物流/kəʊld ˈtʃeɪn ləˈdʒɪstɪks/bayberryn.月桂果；杨梅/ˈbeɪbɛri/

①Int'l Deep Space Exploration Association launched in China②Animated video series tells stories of 5,000-year-old Liangzhu civilization③Family travel boom boosts China's summer tourism market④New talent system benefits over 3,700 foreign businesspeople in China's Yiwu⑤China's Xinjiang opens second direct air cargo route to Serbia⑥China debuts homegrown deep-sea robotic arm with 7 functions

In this episode we sit down with Emily Feng to discuss her new book 'Let Only Red Flowers Bloom: Identity and Belonging in Xi Jinping's China' . In this episode we discussed people's experiences of persecution in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Tibet as well as how people have tried to escape the persecution inflicted on them by the regime! Grab a copy of Let Only Red Flowers BloomKeep up to date with Emily through her Website, or NPR PageIf you want to get in touch with History with Jackson email: jackson@historywithjackson.co.ukTo support History with Jackson to carry on creating content subscribe to History with Jackson+ on Apple Podcasts or support us on our Patreon!To catch up on everything to do with History with Jackson head to www.HistorywithJackson.co.ukFollow us on Facebook at @HistorywithJacksonFollow us on Instagram at @HistorywithJacksonFollow us on X/Twitter at @HistorywJacksonFollow us on TikTok at @HistorywithJackson Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

This week, we talk solar power—a long overdue topic on Decouple. In the past, guests have often been critical of the value of renewables on grids without extensive storage, and of the quality of jobs that politicians often claim when justifying renewables programs. Today, however, we drop preconceptions and get to the nuts and bolts. My guest is Seaver Wang, director of the Climate and Energy Research Program at The Breakthrough Institute. Despite is imperfections, the solar power has a remarkable story, from its technological origins, to its dramatic cost reductions in the last decade, to the sheer scale of new capacity being added in places like China. We cover these topics and more in this episode: the Solar Masterclass.Watch now on YouTube.We talk aboutHistorical roots and evolution of solar technologyImpact of the German Energiewende and feed-in tariffsChina's rise to dominance in solar manufacturingEnergy-intensive production processes of polysiliconControversy over Uyghur forced labor in XinjiangSolar's lifecycle emissions and environmental impactsDramatic cost reductions and economies of scaleLimitations and misconceptions in distributed solarFuture integration with battery storageRole of geopolitical and ethical issues in solar supply chains

In a remote part of China's northwestern Xinjiang region, dozens of data centers rise from the desert. A Bloomberg analysis of investor and tax documents and company filings found Chinese companies plan to buy more than 115,000 high-tech Nvidia chips — chips the US has banned from being exported to China – to power these centers, which could then be used for training AI models. On today’s Big Take Asia Podcast, host K. Oanh Ha talks to Bloomberg’s Andy Lin and James Mayger about the story, and what it means for China’s AI master plan.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Chaniece Chen didn't just study Chinese, she built her own major, battled burnout in an intensive language program, and came back for more. In this episode, Jared talks with Chaniece about her 12-year journey in China, from struggling with tones to thriving in Shanghai as a translator, community organizer, and content creator.Chaniece opens up about the highs and lows of immersion: how her college program led to burnout, how thinking in Chinese helped her improve, and why perfectionism can be a hidden danger for motivated learners. She also reflects on what it's like being a Black woman in China, her experience in Xinjiang, and how she built a life, and family, abroad.Links from the episode:@ThisIsChaniece | InstagramDo you have a story to share? Reach out to us

①World Humanoid Robot Games reveal new competition events②CNSA releases Earth, moon images captured by Tianwen-2 probe③China's lunar 3D printing breakthrough paves way for moon "houses" built from soil sourced on-site④Beijing's largest airport set for busy summer travel season⑤China's Zhejiang debuts AI-powered tourism platform for foreign visitors⑥China's Xinjiang unveils 6 new scenic highway routes to boost tourism⑦No-fuss food: the rise of China's home-cooking influencers

Your Nightly Prayer

Pulitzer Prize-winning investigative journalist Ian Urbina returns to “Why Should We Care About the Indo-Pacific” to preview Season 2 of his acclaimed Outlaw Ocean podcast, exposing the hidden world of human rights and environmental abuses on the high seas—from brutal labor conditions on distant-water fishing vessels to coercive processing centers in China, India, and beyond.Urbina, founder and director of the Outlaw Ocean Project, dives into the maritime underworld and examines what's changed—and what remains unchanged—since his first appearance on the pod. The conversation unfolds in two parts:1. China's Distant-Water Fleet & At-Sea Abuses- Fleet scale and state ties: China's distant-water fleet dwarfs all others, with estimates ranging from 2,700 to 17,000 vessels; Urbina's team calculated about 6,500 ships, one-third of which have direct state involvement.- Illegal fishing and geopolitical power: Chinese longliners and squid jiggers routinely engage in illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing—invading marine protected areas, overfishing, and crossing exclusive economic zones—thereby gaining economic advantage and shaping “facts on the water” to support territorial claims. - Life on board squid jiggers: These industrial vessels use hundreds of bright lights and metal arms to jig for squid. Crews of 30–50 often endure two- to three-year contracts at sea with no shore leave, cramped and unsanitary conditions, malnutrition, and no Wi-Fi. Laborers—initially foreign but increasingly rural Chinese—face debt bondage, violence, passport confiscation, and forced labor. 2. On-Land Processing & Global Supply Chains- Scope expansion: Season 2 follows seafood from ship to shore, uncovering forced labor in processing plants across China, India, and along the North Korean border. - Chinese processing centers: Utilizing open-source intelligence and encrypted Chinese platforms, Urbina's team documented state-orchestrated labor transfers of Uyghurs from Xinjiang to coastal seafood factories—facilities that supply major global buyers, including U.S. government cafeterias. Workers face locked compounds, surveillance, and coercion akin to modern slavery. - North Korean laborers: Thousands of North Korean women are trafficked into Chinese factories under government vetting. Held in locked dorms and subjected to widespread sexual abuse and forced overtime, these women are trapped by debts owed to smugglers and extortion from border officials. - Indian shrimp processing: A whistleblower's 50,000-page dossier exposed debt bondage, physical confinement, and antibiotic-tainted shrimp at processing plants in India. As Western buyers migrated from Thailand to India, the same labor abuses reemerged, threatening food safety and ethical sourcing.By weaving narrative storytelling with hard data and firsthand testimony, this episode underscores the urgent need for transparent supply chains and international enforcement to protect vulnerable workers and marine ecosystems. Visit TheOutlawOcean.com for updates, subscribe to the newsletter, and tune into Season 2 for deep-dive investigations that track seafood—and human exploitation—from ocean depths to dinner tables.

This is a teaser preview of one of our Radical Reads episodes, made exclusively for our supporters on patreon. You can listen to the full 122-minute episode without ads and support our work at https://www.patreon.com/posts/e106-radical-in-129688227In this episode, we speak to Eli Friedman and Kevin Lin about their new book, China in Global Capitalism: Building International Solidarity Against Imperial Rivalry. The book (co-written with Rosa Liu and Ashley Smith) does an excellent job of looking at the actions of the Chinese state from the perspective of workers and marginalised groups to produce a picture of a capitalist nation that is not simply 'the same' as other nations, but not all that different either.The full episode is out longest Radical Read yet, and covers a range of topics from the conditions and struggles of China's working class both inside the workplace and out, to women's and LGBT+ rights. We also talk about China's relationship to its "internal peripheries" of Tibet and Xinjiang, as well as its international relationships in Africa, Israel and, of course, with the US. We also discuss what building international solidarity from below might look like in the current context.Listen to the full episode here:E106: Radical Reads - China in Global CapitalismMore informationBuy China in Global Capitalism from an independent bookshopYou can also buy Eli's previous book, China on Strike: Narratives of Workers' RefusalCheck out our excellent collection of books about Chinese history and politics in our online storeListen to a three-part series about Chinese migrant worker poetry by our sister-podcast, Working Class LiteratureFull show notes for this episode, including further reading and listening, as well as sources, are available on the webpage for this episode: https://workingclasshistory.com/podcast/e106-radical-reads-china-in-global-capitalism/AcknowledgementsThanks to our patreon supporters for making this podcast possible. Special thanks to Jazz Hands, Fernando Lopez Ojeda, Nick Williams and Old Norm.The episode image is of the G.Tech Technology Factory in Zhuhai, China. Credit: Chris (with additional design by WCH). CC BY-SA 2.0.Edited by Tyler HillOur theme tune is Montaigne's version of the classic labour movement anthem, ‘Bread and Roses', performed by Montaigne and Nick Harriott, and mixed by Wave Racer. Download the song here, with all proceeds going to Medical Aid for Palestinians. More from Montaigne: website, Instagram, YouTubeBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/working-class-history--5711490/support.

In this episode from the ChinaPower Podcast, Dr. Joseph Torigian joins host Bonny Lin to discuss his newly released book, The Party's Interests Come First: The Life of Xi Zhongxun, Father of Xi Jinping. Dr. Torigian describes the life and struggle of Xi Zhongxun as a party official during the Cultural revolution and specifically the impact he had on the life and political views of Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Dr. Torigian notes that his book utilizes the story of Xi Zhongxun's life as a lens to better understand how the Party works and why both Xi Zhongxun and Xi Jinping believe certain values, such as those of sacrifice and suffering for the greater good, are highly important. He describes how Xi Jinping was viewed positively by his father due to the idea that his son had “eaten more bitterness” than other children, even going as far as to state that Xi Jinping had “the makings of a premier.” Dr. Torigian describes how deeply involved Xi Zhongxun was during his time in the party on the United Front, ethnic policy in Tibet and Xinjiang, and policy towards Taiwan, and how, because of his father's dedication to these issues, Xi Jinping views them as personal unfinished business. Finally, Dr. Torigian describes how Xi Zhongxun's influence on his son has left Xi Jinping with a Hobbesian view of the world and with the idea that the Party is the best tool for helping China assert its rightful place in the world and secure its inevitable march towards greatness.

As graduation season and summer vacation get underway in June and July, students are embarking on trips to domestic and overseas destinations with their peers, boosting the vibrancy of the tourism market, industry players found.随着毕业季和暑假的到来，学生们在六月和七月纷纷与同伴踏上前往国内外目的地的旅程，业内人士发现，这提振了旅游市场的活力。Theme parks, museums, cultural venues, internet-famous scenic spots, trendy business districts, as well as concerts, music festivals and other activities are all popular choices for students, and they have been increasingly pursuing personalized, flexible and new experiences.主题公园、博物馆、文化场馆、网红景点、时尚商业区，以及演唱会、音乐节等活动都是学生们的热门选择，他们也越来越追求个性化、灵活且新颖的体验。In June, the average airfare and hotel prices domestically are nearly 40 percent lower than those in July and August. For some high-school graduates and college students, their peak travel period starts after the National College Entrance Examination on June 10 and lasts until around July 10, said Qunar, a Beijing-based online travel agency.北京在线旅游机构去哪儿网表示，6 月国内机票和酒店均价较 7、8 月低近四成。对一些高中毕业生和大学生来说，他们的旅行高峰期从 6 月 10 日高考结束后开始，持续到 7 月 10 日左右。"Young consumers have become the main force in the cultural tourism market, boosting demand for more personalized and quality travel experiences. And more tourists are willing to explore domestic small towns and seek out some emotional satisfaction during their trips," said Dai Bin, president of the China Tourism Academy.中国旅游研究院院长戴斌表示：“年轻消费者已成为文旅市场的主力，推动了对更个性化、高质量旅游体验的需求。更多游客愿意探索国内小镇，并在旅途中寻求情感满足。”For graduation travel, being together is the most important factor for students. For young travelers aged between 22 and 25, their hotel booking volumes in June jumped 22 percent year-on-year. Among these, hotel bookings for multiple guests accounted for over 70 percent of the total, Qunar found.去哪儿网发现，对于毕业旅行，“同伴同行” 是学生们最重要的因素。22 至 25 岁的年轻旅行者 6 月酒店预订量同比增长 22%，其中多人入住的酒店预订占比超过 70%。In terms of hotel bookings, the top five most popular domestic destinations for graduation travel in June are Beijing; Shanghai; Nanjing, Jiangsu province; Guangzhou, Guangdong province; and Chengdu, Sichuan province. Hotel bookings in the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region grew the fastest, Qunar found.去哪儿网发现，从酒店预订来看，6 月毕业旅行最热门的国内五大目的地是北京、上海、江苏南京、广东广州和四川成都。其中，新疆维吾尔自治区的酒店预订量增长最快。Meanwhile, since the beginning of this year, there has been a significant increase in tourist demand for niche and in-depth travel products, said Tuniu Corp, a Suzhou, Jiangsu-based online travel agency.与此同时，江苏苏州在线旅游机构途牛旅游网称，今年以来，游客对小众深度旅游产品的需求显著增加。"Going for traditional cultural elements, trips that can help avoid summer heat and seaside leisure trips are among sought-after choices for visitors who take journeys in summer," said Qi Chunguang, vice-president of Tuniu.途牛副总裁齐春光表示：“追求传统文化元素、避暑旅行和海滨休闲旅行是夏季游客的热门选择。”In addition, booking volumes of outbound travel orders by graduates and college students have surged this summer, thanks to multiple countries' favorable visa policies offered to Chinese visitors.此外，由于多个国家对中国游客推出了优惠签证政策，今年夏天毕业生和大学生的出境游订单量激增。"This summer, some niche and emerging overseas destinations have received increasing attention from Chinese tourists," Qi said.齐春光称：“今年夏天，一些小众和新兴的海外目的地越来越受到中国游客的关注。”In particular, bookings of travel packages to Belgium, Luxembourg, Zambia and Greece have more than doubled year-on-year. And the bookings of travel packages to destinations such as Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have jumped significantly, Tuniu found.途牛发现，特别是比利时、卢森堡、赞比亚和希腊的跟团游预订量同比增长超过一倍，格鲁吉亚、亚美尼亚和阿塞拜疆等目的地的跟团游预订量也显著跃升。For hotel bookings, some top overseas destinations include Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, and the popularity of the countries and regions involved in the Belt and Road Initiative has been growing the fastest. Chinese visitor bookings for travel products to Luxembourg, Kazakhstan, Montenegro, Georgia and Egypt have soared by more than tenfold over last year, Qunar found.去哪儿网发现，从酒店预订来看，日本、韩国、泰国、马来西亚和印度尼西亚等是热门海外目的地，“一带一路” 相关国家和地区的受欢迎程度增长最快。中国游客预订前往卢森堡、哈萨克斯坦、黑山、格鲁吉亚和埃及的旅游产品数量较去年激增十倍以上。In another development, the peak season for the domestic air travel market is approaching, and carriers have ramped up efforts to launch new flights or boost frequency on existing routes bound for popular tourist destinations.另一方面，国内航空旅行市场的旺季即将到来，航空公司已加大力度开通新航班或增加飞往热门旅游目的地的现有航线频次。Guangzhou-based China Southern Airlines plans to boost the frequency of flights connecting Beijing Daxing International Airport with Baishan Changbaishan Airport, Jilin province; and Altay Xuedu Airport, Xinjiang.总部位于广州的中国南方航空计划增加北京大兴国际机场至吉林长白山机场、新疆阿勒泰雪都机场的航班频次。The carrier said it will operate wide-body aircraft on popular routes such as those connecting Urumqi, Xinjiang with Guangzhou and Shenzhen of Guangdong province; Beijing; Shanghai; and Hangzhou, Zhejiang province, and the number of wide-body aircraft used is likely to reach a new high.该航空公司表示，将在新疆乌鲁木齐至广东广州、深圳，北京、上海、浙江杭州等热门航线上运营宽体机，宽体机使用数量可能达到新高。For international flights, it plans to launch new flights connecting Guangzhou with Almaty, Kazakhstan on Wednesday, and new routes connecting Guangzhou with Uzbekistan's capital Tashkent on June 30, as well as a new service linking Harbin, Heilongjiang province with Vladivostok, Russia on July 1.国际航班方面，其计划于周三开通广州至哈萨克斯坦阿拉木图的新航班，6 月 30 日开通广州至乌兹别克斯坦首都塔什干的新航线，7 月 1 日开通黑龙江哈尔滨至俄罗斯符拉迪沃斯托克的新航线。重点词汇graduation travel /ˌɡrædʒuˈeɪʃn ˈtrævəl/ 毕业旅行personalized experience /ˈpɜːrsənəlaɪzd ɪkˈspɪriəns/ 个性化体验outbound travel /ˌaʊtˈbaʊnd ˈtrævəl/ 出境旅游Belt and Road Initiative /belt ənd rəʊd ɪˈnɪʃətɪv/ “一带一路” 倡议

Jewher Ilham advocates for the end of Uyghur forced labour, carried out in camps like the one where her father is detained. How to encourage governments, companies and individuals to be aware of the origin of their products? With human rights activist Jewher Ilham, Political secretary of Dutch Uyghur Human Rights Foundation (DUHRF) Ahmedjan Kasim, journalist with Follow the Money Yara van Heugten and researcher for SOMO David Ollivier de Leth.‘Did my imprisoned father, cousin or uncle make this shirt?' This is a question Jewher Ilham often asks herself when holding a piece of clothing. Jewher Ilham saw her father for the last time on 2 February 2013 at Beijing International Airport. Right before they would take a flight to the United States. Ilham Tohti was arrested in 2014 and has since been sentenced to life in prison. Jewher hasn't heard of her father since 2017 and doesn't even know if he is still alive.Almost one fifth of all cotton comes from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, often handpicked with forced labour by Uyghurs. Jewher Ilham advocates for the end of Uyghur labor exploitation and calls on international brands to remove all materials produced in Xinjiang from their supply chains.In 2024, the EU passed a Forced Labour Regulaton that requires companies to prove that their products are free from forced labour. Member states need to incorporate this in their national legislation by 2027. Now, however, the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), which is a fundamental piece of legislation that will work in tandem with the forced labour ban, is under attack with the new omnibus proposal. How to motivate brands to end using materials from Xinjiang? And how to encourage governments and individuals to be aware of the origin of their products? Jewher Ilham (1995) is a Uyghur human rights activist based in the United States. She works for the Workers Rights Consortium and is a spokesperson for the Coalition to End Forced Labour in the Uyghur Region. As the daughter of Ilham Tohti, an economist, writer and outspoken activist for the Uyghurs who was imprisoned for life, Jewher Ilham continues to carry the torch of her father's advocacy.Programme editor and moderator: Mirthe FreseIn collaboration with Amnesty International NLSupported by Vfonds---Want to know more about Forum on European Culture? Here you can find more information.Zie het privacybeleid op https://art19.com/privacy en de privacyverklaring van Californië op https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

In this episode of the ChinaPower Podcast, Dr. Joseph Torigian joins us to discuss his newly released book The Party's Interests Come First: The Life of Xi Zhongxun, Father of Xi Jinping. Dr. Torigian describes the life and struggle of Xi Zhongxun as a party official during the Cultural revolution and specifically the impact he had on the life and political views of Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Dr. Torigian notes that his book utilizes the story of Xi Zhongxun's life as a lens to better understand how the Party works and why both Xi Zhongxun and Xi Jinping believe certain values, such as those of sacrifice and suffering for the greater good, are highly important. He describes how Xi Jinping was viewed positively by his father due to the idea that his son had “eaten more bitterness” than other children, even going as far as to state that Xi Jinping had “the makings of a premier.” Dr. Torigian describes how deeply involved Xi Zhongxun was during his time in the party on the United Front, ethnic policy in Tibet and Xinjiang, and policy towards Taiwan, and how, because of his father's dedication to these issues, Xi Jinping views them as personal unfinished business. Finally, Dr. Torigian describes how Xi Zhongxun's influence on his son has left Xi Jinping with a Hobbesian view of the world and with the idea that the Party is the best tool for helping China assert its rightful place in the world and secure its inevitable march towards greatness. Dr. Torigian is a research fellow at Stanford's Hoover History Lab, an associate professor at the School of International Service at American University in Washington, and a center associate of the Lieberthal-Rogel Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan. Previously, he was a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Postdoctoral Fellow at Princeton-Harvard's China and the World Program, a Postdoctoral (and Predoctoral) Fellow at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), a Predoctoral Fellow at George Washington University's Institute for Security and Conflict Studies, an IREX scholar affiliated with the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, a Fulbright Scholar at Fudan University in Shanghai, and a research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations. His research has also been supported by the Stanford Center on International Conflict and Negotiation, MIT's Center for International Studies, MIT International Science and Technology Initiatives, the Critical Language Scholarship program, and FLAS.

Immer wieder tauchen Berichte über den Einsatz von Uiguren als Zwangsarbeiter in China auf. Neue Recherchen des SPIEGEL zeigen nun das tatsächliche Ausmaß: Uiguren werden systematisch aus ihrer Heimatprovinz Xinjiang in andere Landesteile gebracht, wo sie unter teils prekären Bedingungen arbeiten müssen. Den Betroffenen drohen willkürliche Inhaftierungen, sie stehen unter ständiger Überwachung und sind oftmals in Wohnheimen untergebracht, die sie kaum verlassen dürfen. In der aktuellen Folge des SPIEGEL-Podcasts »Acht Milliarden« spricht Host Juan Moreno mit Christoph Giesen, SPIEGEL-Korrespondent in Peking. In einer langwierigen Recherche in Kooperation mit der »New York Times« und dem Londoner »The Bureau of Investigative Journalism« fanden Giesen und seine Kollegen 75 Werke in elf Provinzen, in denen Angehörige der muslimischen Minderheit arbeiten müssen. Zu den Profiteuren zählen mutmaßlich auch deutsche Unternehmen, da sie direkt oder indirekt von dieser Form der Ausbeutung profitieren könnten. Mehr zum Thema: (S+) Der VW-Konzern wollte beweisen, dass es in seinem umstrittenen Werk in Xinjiang keine Zwangsarbeit gibt. SPIEGEL-Recherchen belegen: Der Prüfbericht enthält Mängel, die Prüfer scheinen zweifelhaft: https://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/volkswagens-bluff-mit-den-menschenrechten-fragwuerdige-fabrik-in-xinjiang-a-cf3028b4-6c27-4caf-8277-47603c650a92 (S+) Der chinesische Staat soll in Umerziehungslagern rund eine Million Uiguren interniert haben: Die Xinjiang Police Files geben diesem System nun Namen und Gesichter: https://www.spiegel.de/ausland/xinjiang-police-files-einblick-in-chinas-brutales-lagersystem-a-6e85c81a-43c5-4a7b-85ad-8c70b22179a2 Abonniert »Acht Milliarden«, um die nächste Folge nicht zu verpassen. Wir freuen uns, wenn ihr den Podcast weiterempfehlt oder uns eine Bewertung hinterlasst.+++ Alle Infos zu unseren Werbepartnern finden Sie hier. Die SPIEGEL-Gruppe ist nicht für den Inhalt dieser Seite verantwortlich. +++ Den SPIEGEL-WhatsApp-Kanal finden Sie hier. Alle SPIEGEL Podcasts finden Sie hier. Mehr Hintergründe zum Thema erhalten Sie mit SPIEGEL+. Entdecken Sie die digitale Welt des SPIEGEL, unter spiegel.de/abonnieren finden Sie das passende Angebot. Informationen zu unserer Datenschutzerklärung.

BUSINESS: Xinjiang land port starts 24/7 operations | June 4, 2025Visit our website at https://www.manilatimes.netFollow us:Facebook - https://tmt.ph/facebookInstagram - https://tmt.ph/instagramTwitter - https://tmt.ph/twitterDailyMotion - https://tmt.ph/dailymotionSubscribe to our Digital Edition - https://tmt.ph/digitalSign up to our newsletters: https://tmt.ph/newslettersCheck out our Podcasts:Spotify - https://tmt.ph/spotifyApple Podcasts - https://tmt.ph/applepodcastsAmazon Music - https://tmt.ph/amazonmusicDeezer: https://tmt.ph/deezerStitcher: https://tmt.ph/stitcherTune In: https://tmt.ph/tunein#TheManilaTimes Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

What happens when the world's most influential anti-bribery law is abruptly paused? Is transparency merely a compliance box-tick—or the most powerful tool we have against global threats like kleptocracy, sanctions evasion, and illicit finance? In this eye-opening episode of Corruption, Crime, and Compliance, Michael Volkov is joined by two powerhouse experts in the global fight against corruption: Scott Greytak and Josh Birenbaum (*see ‘'About Guests below). Together, they break down the sweeping implications of the U.S. government's pause on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)enforcement, the gutting of the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA), and what all of this means for business leaders, policymakers, and the international community.When the United States hit pause on FCPA enforcement, the global anti-corruption landscape shifted. Scott and Josh explore how companies are reacting, how allies are stepping up enforcement, and why transparency is emerging as a national security imperative. They offer a forward-looking conversation filled with insights for compliance professionals, risk officers, and anyone committed to ethical business in a volatile world.You'll hear them discuss:Why the U.S. government's pause on FCPA enforcement shocked the global anti-corruption community—and why companies should still stay the course with compliance regardless of political signals.How the Corporate Transparency Act, once seen as the most significant U.S. anti-money laundering law in a generation, has been quietly gutted—leaving a dangerous gap in the fight against shell companies and financial crime.What it means that U.S. companies are now incentivized to form anonymously domestically to avoid ownership disclosure—inviting kleptocrats, traffickers, and foreign adversaries to hide in plain sight.Why global businesses must prepare for a sharp rise in trade compliance enforcement, as tariffs, export controls, and sanctions take center stage in economic security—and why transparency is essential to managing these risks.How foreign enforcers, especially in Europe, are beginning to step up—but why no alliance or coalition can truly fill the vacuum left by a retreating United States.What makes transparency not just a compliance tool, but a weapon against geopolitical threats—from Xinjiang's forced labor camps to Russian shadow fleets and fentanyl trafficking.How transparency can be hardwired into foreign aid policy to protect U.S. taxpayer money, prevent narco-state development, and give American businesses a fair shot abroad.Why there's still hope—from new bipartisan support for anti-corruption measures to the emergence of a national security lens on transparency across Congress, federal agencies, and the private sector.About GuestsScott Greytak is an anticorruption attorney and the Director of Advocacy for TI US. His work focuses on designing anticorruption laws and policies, organizing and leading ideologically inclusive coalitions, and lobbying the U.S. Congress and administration. Greytak was named a Top Lobbyist in 2021, 2023, and 2024 by the National Institute for Lobbying & Ethics. Josh Birenbaum is the deputy director of FDD's Center on Economic and Financial Power, focusing on illicit finance risks and global corruption. Previously, Josh was the research and policy analyst at TRACE International, producing articles, book chapters, op-eds, model policies, industry reports, and speeches on sanctions, export controls, corruption, conflict minerals, money laundering, human rights, illicit finance, and other topics. ResourcesScott Greytak on LinkedIn | Email - sgreytak@us.transparency.orgJosh Birenbaum on LinkedIn | Email - jbirenbaum@fdd.orgMichael Volkov on LinkedIn | TwitterThe Volkov Law Group

This week on Sinica, I chat with Eva Dou, technology reporter for the Washington Post, about her terrific new book about Huawei. From its prehistory to its fight for its life under tremendous U.S. pressure, she tells its story in a way that's both deeply engaging and very evenhanded. 04:53 – Meng Wanzhou's case and its impact on media interest in Huawei07:13 – How did Ren Zhengfei's experiences in the PLA shape the corporate culture of Huawei?10:21 – The impact of his father on Ren Zhengfei 13:42 – Women in Huawei's leadership and Sun Yafang as a chairwoman 18:41 – Is Huawei a tool of the state?23:21 – Edward Snowden's revelations and how they influenced the perception of Huawei 26:34 – The Cisco lawsuit influence on the company's approach to foreign markets 28:07 – Reasons for Huawei working with embargoed or sanctioned states30:46 – Huawei's international expansion 33:04 – Huawei's management style and internal competition 36:33 – Meng Wenzhou's detainment as a turning point for Huawei and China-U.S. relations38:09 – Ren Zhengfei's media campaign and narrative shift after the Meng affair40:44 – Huawei's involvement in Xinjiang's surveillance 43:09 – Huawei's success in shaping 5G standards despite global pushback46:27 – The “Huawei index”: tracking Chinese investment abroad through Huawei's market presence48:35 – Huawei's push into chip development amid sanctions: real progress or just hype?52:23 – Huawei: a proxy, a leading or lagging indicator, or just a bellwether?54:11 – Huawei's “too big to fail” status: benefits and risks amid U.S. government pressure56:29 – Huawei's perspective on the backlash from sanctions58:19 – Concluding question: about Huawei's ownership and governancePaying it forward: Raffaele Huang at The Wall Street JournalRecommendations: Eva: The Party's Interests Come First by Joseph Torigian; Yang Jie at The Wall Street Journal; Piranesi by Susanna ClarkeKaiser: Adolescence on Netflix; Kyle Chan's high-capacity.com See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

  Last time we spoke about the February 26th incident. Within the turbulent “ government of assassination” period of 1936 Japan, a faction of discontented junior officers, known as the Kodoha, believed that their emperor, Hirohito, was being manipulated by corrupt politicians. In a desperate bid for what they termed a "Showa Restoration," they meticulously plotted a coup d'état. On February 26, they launched a rebellion in Tokyo, attempting to assassinate key figures they deemed responsible for undermining the emperor's authority. The young officers executed coordinated attacks on prominent leaders, resulting in several deaths, while hoping to seize control of the Imperial Palace. However, their plan unraveled when their actions met with unexpected resistance, and they failed to secure strategic locations. Dark snow blanketed the city as Hirohito, outraged by the violence, quickly moved to suppress the uprising, which ultimately led to the downfall of the Kodoha faction and solidified the military's grip on power, ushering in a new era marked by militarism and radicalism.   #151 The Suiyuan Operation Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So we last left off with the February 26th incident breaking out in Japan, but now I would like to return to China. Now we spoke a little bit about some influential Japanese politicians in the previous episode. Prime Minister Satio Makoto oversaw Japan from May 1932 to July 1934, succeeded by Prime Minister Keisuke Okada from July 1934 to March 1936. The foreign policy of Japan towards China during the Saitō and Okada administrations exhibited a notable paradox, characterized by two conflicting elements. On one hand, Foreign Minister Hirota championed a diplomatic approach that emphasized friendship, cooperation, and accommodation with China. On the other hand, the military actively undermined the authority of the Nationalist government in northern China, creating a significant rift between diplomatic rhetoric and military action.    The Okada cabinet then endorsed the Army Ministry's "Outline of Policy to Deal with North China" on January 13, 1936. This policy document explicitly proposed the eventual detachment of five provinces, Hubei, Chahar, Shanxi, Suiyuan, and Shandong from the Nationalist government in Nanking. The approval of this outline marked a pivotal moment, as it represented the first official government endorsement of the military's longstanding agenda and underscored the army's evolution from a mere rogue entity operating in the region to the de facto authority dictating the course of Japan's policy towards China. Despite this, on January 22, during the 68th Diet session, Hirota reaffirmed his dedication to fostering better ties with China, to which a representative from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded positively. The Nationalist government in Nanjing also expressed interest in engaging in formal negotiations. However, this diplomatic initiative quickly faltered, and the expected discussions in Nanjing never took place. Shortly thereafter, a mutiny by young army officers on February 26, 1936, led to the fall of the Okada cabinet. Following Prince Konoe Fumimaro's refusal of the imperial mandate to form a new government, Hirota stepped in to establish a cabinet on March 9. General Terauchi Hisaichi was appointed as the Minister of the Army, Admiral Nagano Osami took charge of the Navy Ministry, and Baba Eiichi became the finance minister. Hirota briefly served as foreign minister until Arita Hachirö, who had just submitted his credentials as ambassador to China on March 6, returned to Japan. The Hirota Koki cabinet, established immediately following the February 26 incident further entrenched military influence in politics while allowing interservice rivalries to impede national objectives. In May 1936, Hirota, influenced by army and navy ministers, reinstated the practice of appointing military ministers solely from the ranks of high-ranking active-duty officers. He believed this would prevent associations with the discredited Imperial Way faction from regaining power. By narrowing the candidate pool and enhancing the army's power relative to the prime minister, Hirota's decision set the stage for army leaders to leverage this advantage to overthrow Admiral Yonai's cabinet in July 1940. Arita began his new job by meeting with Foreign Minister Chang Chen while hearing views from the Kwantung Army chief of staff General, Itagaki Seishiro. Yes, our old friend received a lot of promotions. Itagaki had this to say about the Kwantung Army's policy in China "The primary aim of Japan's foreign policy, is the sound development of Manchukuo based upon the principle of the indivisibility of Japan and Manchukuo. If, as is probable, the existing situation continues, Japan is destined sooner or later to clash with the Soviet Union, and the attitude of China at that time will gravely influence operations [against the Soviet Union]." The Kwantung Army's was growing more and more nervous about the USSR following its 7th comintern congress held in July and August of 1935. There it publicly designated Japan, Germany and Poland as its main targets of comintern actions. Japanese intelligence in the Red Army also knew the Soviets were gradually planning to expand the military strength so they could face a simultaneous west and east front war. This was further emboldened by the latest USSR 5 year plan. Alongside the growing Red northern menace, the CCP issued on August 1st a declaration calling upon the Nationalist Government to end their civil war so they could oppose Japan. By this time the CCP was reaching the end of its Long March and organizing a new base of operations in Yenan in northern Shanxi. The developments by the USSR and CCP had a profound effect on Japan's foreign policy in China. The Kwantung Army believed a war with the USSR was imminent and began to concentrate its main force along the border of Manchukuo. The Kwantung Army's plan in the case of war was to seize Vladivostok while advancing motorized units towards Ulan Bator in Outer Mongolia, hoping to threaten the Trans-Siberian Railway near Lake Baikal. Their intelligence indicated the USSR could muster a maximum of 250,000 troops in eastern Siberia and that Japan could deal with them with a force two-thirds of that number. The IJA at that point had inferior air forces and armaments, thus urgent funding was needed. The Kwantung Army proposed that forces in the home islands should be reduced greatly so all could be concentrated in Manchuria. To increase funding so Kwantung leadership proposed doing away with special allowances for Japanese officials in Manchuria and reorganizing the Japanese economic structure. The Kwantung leaders also knew the submarine base at Vladivostok posed a threat to Japanese shipping so the IJN would have to participate, especially against ports and airfields. All said and done, the Kwantung Army planned for a war set in 1941 and advised immediate preparations. On July 23, 1936, Kanji Ishiwara presented the army's document titled “Request Concerning the Development of Industries in Preparation for War” to the Army Ministry. He asserted that in order to prepare for potential conflict with the Soviet Union, Japan, Manchukuo, and North China must have the industries critical for war fully developed by 1941. Ishiwara emphasized the urgent need for rapid industrial growth, particularly in Manchukuo. He followed this request on July 29 with a draft of a “Policy on Preparations for War” regarding the Soviet Union, advocating for immediate reforms to Japan's political and economic systems to facilitate economic expansion and lay the groundwork for future fundamental changes. However, he cautioned that if significant turmoil erupted in economic sectors, Japan must be ready to execute a comprehensive overhaul without delay. At the same time, the Hirota cabinet initiated a review of its policy towards China. In the spring of 1936, a secret committee focused on the Current Situation was formed, consisting of officials from the Army, Navy, and Foreign ministries. Their discussions led to the adoption of the "Measures to Implement Policy toward China" by the Four Ministers Conference on August 11, along with the "Second Outline of Policy to Address North China," which the cabinet approved as part of the "Fundamentals of National Policy" on the same day. The first of these documents outlined the following actionable steps: “1. Conclusion of an anti-Communist military pact. a) To prepare for the conclusion of such a pact, a special secret committee of military experts from both countries should be organized. b) Their discussions should cover the scope and substance of the pact and ways and means of realizing the objectives of the pact.  2. Conclusion of a Sino-Japanese military alliance. A special secret committee, composed of an equal number of delegates from each nation, should be organized to prepare for the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance against attack by a third country.  3. Acceleration of solutions of pending questions between China and Japan. a) Engagement of a senior political adviser: The Nationalist government should engage a senior Japanese political adviser to assist in the conduct of the domestic and foreign affairs of the Nationalist government. b) Engagement of military advisers: The Nationalist government should engage military advisers, along with military instructors. c) Opening of airline services between China and Japan: Airline services between China and Japan should be opened immediately. To realize such a service, various means should be used to induce the Nanking authorities to establish an airline corporation in North China, to begin flights between Formosa and Fukien province, and to start test flights between Shanghai and Fukuoka. d) Conclusion of a reciprocal tariff treaty: A reciprocal tariff treaty should be concluded promptly between China and Japan, on the basis of the policy approved by the ministries concerned, with regard to the abolition of the special trade in eastern Hopei province and the lowering of the prohibitively high tariffs. For this purpose Japan should, if necessary, propose the creation of a special committee composed of Japanese and Chinese representatives.  4. Promotion of economic cooperation between China and Japan. Japan should promote cooperation with the common people of China to establish realistic and inseparable economic relations between China and Japan that will promote coexistence and co-prosperity and will be unaffected by changes in the Chinese political situation. “ The document also included suggestions for Japan's economic expansion into South China. This included tapping into the natural resources of the provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi, building a railway between Guangzhou and Swatow, and establishing air routes between Fuchoz and Taipei, which would connect to services in Japan and Thailand. It also called for survey teams to be dispatched to explore the resources of Sichuan, Gansu, Xinjiang, and Qinghai provinces, and for support to be provided to the independence movement in Inner Mongolia. However, these initiatives presented significant challenges. The preface to the "Second Outline of Policy to Deal with North China" cautioned, "In implementing this policy, we must carefully consider the Nanking government's prestige and avoid actions that could prompt it to adopt an anti-Japanese stance in response to the desires of the Chinese people."  On September 19th, six fundamental points for a settlement in North China were dictated to China to “establish a common defense against communism, promoting economic cooperation, lowering tariffs, initiating an airline service between the two nations, employing Japanese advisers, and controlling subversive Koreans." September 22 was set as the deadline for a response from China. While agreeing to some Japanese requests, the Chinese included several counter-demands that the Japanese found completely unacceptable. These demands required Japan to “(a) refrain from using armed intervention or arbitrary actions in its dealings with China, (b) recognize China as an equal and sovereign state, (c) avoid leveraging antigovernment groups or communist elements, and (d) remove any derogatory references to China from Japanese textbooks. The Chinese also insisted that any agreement regarding North China “must precede the annulment of the Tanggu and Shanghai cease-fire agreements, the disbanding of the East Hopei regime, a prohibition on unauthorized Japanese flights over North China, a ban on smuggling activities by Japanese, the restoration of China's right to control smuggling, and the disbandment of the illegal East Hopei government along with the armies of Wang Ying and Prince De in Suiyuan”. Now that mention of a Prince De in Suiyuan brings us to a whole new incident. This podcast series should almost be called “the history of Japanese related incidents in China”. Now we've spoken at great lengths about Japan's obsession with Manchuria. She wanted it for resources, growing space and as a buffer state. Japan also had her eyes set on Inner Mongolia to be used as a buffer state between Manchukuo, the USSR and China proper. Not to mention after the invasion of North China, Inner Mongolia could be instrumental as a wedge to be used to control Northern China. Thus the Kwantung Army began fostering a Mongolian independence movement back in August of 1933. They did so through a special organ led by chief of the general staff Koiso Kuniaki. He began work with the Silingol League led by Prince Sonormurabdan or “Prince So” and another influential Mongol, Prince Demchukdongrob or “Prince De”. Prince De was the West Sunid Banner in Northern Chahar. Likewise the Kwantung Army was grooming Li Xuxin, a Mongol commoner born in southern Manchuria. He had been a bandit turned soldier absorbed into Zhang Xueliangs army. Li had distinguished himself in a campaign against a group of Mongols trying to restore the Qing dynasty to further establish an independent Mongolia. During Operation Nekka Li had served in a cavalry brigade under Zu Xingwu, reputed to be the best unit in Zhang Xueliangs Northeastern border defense army. He led the army's advance unit into western Shandong. Afterwards Li suddenly became friends with Major Tanaka Hisashi, the head of the Special Service Agency at Dungliao where he defected to the Kwantung Army. He soon was leading a force too strong to be incorporated into the Manchukuo Army, thus it was disbanded, but his Kwantung Army buddies encouraged him to move to Tolun in Rehe province. At one point during the Nekka campaign, Li's army was threatened by a strong Chinese counterattack, but they had Manchukuo air support allowing them to capture Tolun. This victory launched what became the East Chahar Special Autonomous District with Li becoming a garrison commander and chief administrator.  Back in time, upon the founding of the Chinese Republic, the affairs of Inner Mongolia fell upon the Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs. This was reorganized in 1930 into the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs when the provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan and Ningxia were organized. Prince De had been a member of a nationalist group known as the Young Mongols, although his aim was self-determination for Inner Mongolia within China, not independence. The Nationalist government's support for Chinese settlement in Mongol territories and its disregard for Mongol perspectives quickly triggered a rise in Mongol nationalism and anti-Chinese feelings. This was exacerbated by the government's introduction of a law on October 12, 1931, requiring local Mongolian administrative units to consult with hsien officials on matters concerning their administration. The nationalist sentiment was further fueled by the presence of the neighboring Mongolian People's Republic in Outer Mongolia and the establishment of Xingan province in western Manchuria by Manchukuo authorities in March 1932. This new province included the tribes of eastern Inner Mongolia and granted them greater autonomy than other Manchukuo provinces while banning Chinese immigration into it. When Nanjing did not react to these developments, Prince De and his supporters took steps toward gaining autonomy. On July 15th, 1933, Mongol leaders from western Inner Mongolia gathered at Pailingmiao for two weeks to deliberate on a declaration for regional independence. Although many princes were initially hesitant to take this step, they reconvened on August 14 and sent a cable to Nanjing announcing their decision to create an autonomous Mongolian government. The cable was signed by Prince So and Prince De. Over the following two months, additional conferences at Pailingmiao were held to organize the new government, which would operate under Nanking's guidance but without involvement from provincial chairmen. On October 22, Prince Yun, head of the Ulanchap League and a close ally of Prince De, was elected to lead the new regime, with Prince De assuming the role of chief of its political affairs bureau. After receiving a cable from the Mongolian leaders in August, Nanjing quickly sent Minister of the Interior Huang Shao-hung and Xu Qingyang, head of the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, to halt the movement. However, the Mongols declined to travel to Kalgan or Kueisui to meet Huang. In November, as the leader of a special commission appointed by Nanjing, Huang reached an agreement with Yun De and other Mongolian leaders concerning a proposal that abandoned the Mongols' demand for an autonomous government. This agreement was later altered by Nanjing, and its essential points were excluded from a measure approved by the Central Political Council of the Kuomintang on January 17, 1934. The dispute reignited, fueled by the Nationalist government's rising concerns over the anticipated enthronement of Pu Yi in Manchukuo. On February 28, the Central Political Council enacted a measure that outlined "eight principles of Inner Mongolian autonomy" and created the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Council. Since these principles did not grant authority over foreign and military affairs, powers explicitly reserved for the central government in the January measure, they were seen as a concession to the Mongols and were accepted. On March 7, the central government issued regulations to establish a semi autonomous regime for Inner Mongolia, which was officially launched at Pailingmiao on April 23. Although the council was led by three moderate princes, Prince Yun, supported by Princes So and Sha, the real administrative authority was held by Prince De, who served as the secretary-general. Most of the twenty-five council members were of Mongolian royalty, through whom Prince De aimed to fulfill his objectives. Nevertheless, the Nationalist government seemed to consider the council merely a token gesture to placate De, as Nanking never provided the promised administrative funds outlined in the "eight principle declaration." Was not much of a shock Prince De sought support from the Kwantung Army, which had established contact with him as early as June 1934. Japanese pressures in North China were starting to alter the power dynamics, and after the first Western incident in Jehol in February 1935, it compelled the relocation of Sung Queyuan's army from Chahar to Hopei, providing encouragement to Prince De. In May, he met with Kwantung Army Vice Chief of Staff Itagaki Seishirö, Intelligence Section Chief Kawabe Torashirö, and staff officer Tanaka Ryükichi, where he was officially informed for the first time about the Kwantung Army's intention to assist him. On July 25, the Kwantung Army drafted its "Essentials of Policy toward Inner Mongolia," which regarded Japanese support for cooperation between De and Li Xuxin as part of their strategic preparations for a potential conflict with the Soviet Union. Shortly after this policy was adopted, a conflict arose over who had the authority to appoint the head of the Mongol Xukung banner, situated north of the Yellow River and Paot'ou. Following the death of the previous administrator, Prince Xu declared that he had taken control of the position. In response to a request from the local abbot, Prince Yun, acting in his capacity as chairman of the Mongolian Political Council, dismissed Xu. Xu then turned to Nanking through Suiyuan Provincial Chairman Fu Zuoyi, arguing that the central government held the authority to appoint heads of administrative units. In retaliation, Prince De dispatched troops to Xukung. On November 10, Fu presented a mediation proposal, which was rejected since it not only failed to acknowledge Shih's dismissal but also demanded the withdrawal of De's forces. De refused to pull back, further intensifying his hostility toward the Nanking government. In December, the Kwantung Army attempted to move Li's forces from eastern Chahar into the six Xun to the north of Kalgan, which serves as Chahar's granary. Following the Qin-Doihara agreement, Matsui Gennosuke from the Kalgan Special Service Agency secured a deal to separate these six districts from the southern region predominantly populated by Chinese; a Mongolian peace preservation corps was tasked with maintaining order in the northern area, while a Chinese corps was responsible for the south. During the discussions for an autonomous regime centered around Song Queyuan in North China in November 1935, Kwantung Army troops were concentrated around Gubeikou. To exert pressure on Song's rear, the Kwantung Army proposed replacing the Chinese peace preservation unit in the area north of Kalgan with Li Xuxin's army, which would establish this territory as its base.   The operation commenced on December 8. In a surprise attack just before dawn, Li captured Paochang. By December 12, despite facing strong Chinese resistance and the heaviest snowfall in sixty years, Li, aided by Kwantung Army planes disguised as those of the Manchukuo Airline Corporation, had taken control of Kuyuan. Further advances were halted by an order from Kwantung Army headquarters, and on December 13, it was reported that, had the operation not been stopped, Tokyo would have issued an imperial command. The operation had faced opposition from the Tientsin army, which feared it would weaken Song Queyuan's position just as they were informing Tokyo that the autonomy movement was going smoothly. Additionally, both Britain and the United States publicly expressed strong opposition to the Kwantung Army's involvement in the autonomy movement. However, the directive was ultimately prompted by the emperor's anger upon discovering that a unit of the Kwantung Army led by Colonel Matsui Takurö had advanced to Tolun to support Li's progress. Although Li's advance was halted, the operation undeniably contributed to the formation of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council.   Although the operation was halted, the Kwantung Army remained committed to its objectives. They contended that Li's army's advance into the six districts north of Kalgan was merely a peace preservation unit moving into territory within the truce line established by the Tanggu Agreement. Consequently, on December 29, they ordered Li to advance southward. Li peacefully occupied Changpei the following day and entered Shangtu on December 31. Manchukuo civil officials were appointed to oversee the six districts, and the currency of Manchukuo was introduced, although the existing tax system initially remained unchanged. The Kwantung Army allocated silver worth 6 million yuan to support administrative expenses. This outcome, known as the Eastern Chahar incident, marked a complete success for the Kwantung Army, which then redirected its focus toward Suiyuan Province. Each year, the Kwantung Army developed a secret plan for covert operations for the following year. The 1936 plan included strategies to secure air bases for routes connecting Europe and Asia, targeting Tsinghai and Sinkiang provinces, Outer Mongolia, Western Mongolia, and even remote areas of Ningxia province. In January 1936, staff officer Tanaka Ryūkichi formulated a document titled "Essentials of Policy Toward (Northwestern) Inner Mongolia." This document advocated for the establishment of a Mongolian military government to facilitate Japanese operations in northwestern Mongolia and suggested pushing Fu Tso-yi out of Suiyuan into Shansi province. Tanaka's proposals were incorporated into the final plan of the Kwantung Army, ultimately leading to the Suiyuan incident of November 1936. In February 1936, a meeting at Pailingmiao, where Prince De proposed the independence of Inner Mongolia, resulted in the departure of Prince So and several other Mongolian leaders from the coalition. They sought to establish a rival political council at Kueisui under the protection of Fu Zuoyi. By April, De and his supporters decided to form a military government at Tehua in Chahar, which was officially inaugurated in June as the Inner Mongolian government, headed by De with Li Shou-hsin as his deputy. This new government quickly signed a mutual assistance treaty with Manchukuo, and the emperor granted De the title of prince.   In July, at a conference in Tehua, Tanaka was appointed as the head of the Special Service Agency for Inner Mongolia with the mission of implementing the army's Intelligence Section plans. He traveled to Pingtiqüan alongside Chief of Staff Itagaki and Intelligence Chief Mutō Akira to propose a local anti-Communist agreement to Fu. After failing to convince Fu, he attempted to persuade Sun Tien-ying to form a puppet army but managed to recruit only a bandit from Suiyuan, Wang Ying. The February 26 mutiny in Tokyo heightened anti-Japanese sentiments in China, resulting in increased violence. By August, the construction of an airplane hangar in Paot'ou was halted due to riots by local Chinese residents. On August 13, a group of fifteen Japanese, led by Nakajima Manzo, was ambushed while delivering ammunition to a pro-Japanese leader who was shortly thereafter assassinated. Chinese soldiers from Wang Qingkuo's 70th Division carried out the attack, and tensions escalated as the arrival of ammunition and Japanese laborers in Kalgan prompted border villages to strengthen their defenses.   By late September, Tanaka's "Guidelines for the Execution of the Suiyuan Operation" received approval, with operations set to commence in early November. The plan evolved from a covert mission into a personal initiative by Tanaka, financed largely through funds from the Kwantung Army's secret services and profits from special trading in eastern Hopei. Tanaka claimed to have transported 600,000 yen to Tehua in October and later sent 200,000 yuan into Inner Mongolia, estimating total expenses at approximately 6 million yen. He acquired new weaponry from the disbanded Northeast Army and established three clandestine forces: Wang Ying led 500 men, including artillery; Qin Xiashan commanded 3,000 from Sun Tienying's army; and Chang Futang also led 3,000 specialized units. During strategic meetings, Tanaka dismissed proposals for unified command and refusing to integrate secret units into the Mongolian army. He advocated for the slogan "Overthrow Chiang Kai-shek," while Matsui managed to include "Independence for Inner Mongolia."   The Japanese had developed the entire battle strategy. The 1st Army, commanded by Li Xuxin, would serve as the left flank, while the 2nd Army, led by Demchugdongrub, would be positioned on the right. Wang Ying's forces were designated as the central force. Their initial targets would be Hongort, Xinghe, Tuchengzi, and Guisui city, followed by a division to seize Jinging, Baotou, and Hetao. On November 13, Prince Demchugdongrub's and Wang Ying's forces left Shandu in two columns to assault Xinghe and Hongort. By the 15th, 1,500 troops reached Hongort, where they engaged the 1st Cavalry Division led by Peng Yubin. The next day, Ryukichi Tanaka, Demchugdongrub's chief advisor, sent two cavalry brigades and one infantry brigade to capture the town, effectively overrunning its defenders. Meanwhile, Wang Ying dispatched a smaller group to secure Tuchengzi.   Fu Zuoyi established his headquarters in Jining that same day. After assessing the situation, he concluded that if the enemy secured Hongort, it would diminish his defenders' morale. Consequently, he launched a counterattack. Peng Yubin led a joint force of the 1st Cavalry Division and Dong Qiwu's 218th Brigade to confront around 400 of Wang Ying's men defending Hongort and Tuchengzi. By 7 AM on the 18th, Tuchengzi was reclaimed, and at 8:30 AM, the 1st Cavalry Division entered Hongort, charging through 500 of Wang Ying's soldiers. The struggle for Hongort persisted for over three days, resulting in nearly 1,000 casualties before Fu Zuoyi regained control.   As the tide shifted against the invaders, Fu Zuoyi initiated an offensive toward the Bailing Temple, the rear base of the enemy, well-stocked and defended by 3,000 men under Prince Demchugdongrub. Fu Zuoyi ordered the 2nd Cavalry Division, along with the 211th and 315th Brigades, the 21st Artillery Regiment, and a convoy of 20 trucks and 24 armored vehicles to assault the Bailing Temple as quickly as possible. Taking advantage of the Mongolian chaos, Fu Zuoyi's 35th Brigade executed a flanking maneuver west of the Bailing Temple amid a severe snowstorm.   At 1 AM on the 24th, the battle for the Bailing Temple commenced as the Chinese engaged the Mongolians for the fortified positions around the temple. From 2 to 4 AM, the Chinese advanced closer to the temple walls, facing artillery and machine-gun fire. They launched desperate frontal assaults against the city gates, suffering heavy losses. A fierce stalemate ensued, with Japanese aerial bombardments causing significant casualties to the Chinese forces. Fu Zuoyi subsequently ordered all armored vehicles to converge at the main city gate. Despite intense fire, the armored cars managed to breach the gate, allowing Chinese infantry to flood into the temple area. The resulting carnage within the temple walls led to 900 Mongol deaths, with 300 captured as the rest fled. The Chinese suffered 300 casualties but secured the strategically vital rear base, along with a substantial stockpile of provisions, including 500 barrels of petrol, 600 rifles, 10 machine guns, vehicles, and field guns. Following the devastating defeat at Bailing Temple, the invaders regrouped at Xilamuleng Temple. On the 28th, the Japanese sent 100 vehicles to transport 3,000 troops to prepare for a significant counteroffensive to recapture Bailing Temple. On the 29th, Wang Ying personally led 2,000 cavalry north of Shangdu to Taolin in an attempt to contain the enemy. However, after he left the bulk of his forces at Xilamuleng Temple, officers from the Grand Han Righteous Army secretly began negotiating to defect to the Chinese side, undermining the forces needed for the counterattack against Bailing Temple.   The counteroffensive commenced on December 2nd, with 10 armored vehicles and 1,000 Mongol troops leading the charge at 6 AM. They were pushed back by the heavily fortified 211th Brigade, which was well-supplied with machine guns and artillery. The following day, at 3 AM, the Mongols attempted a surprise attack but faced an ambush as they crept toward the temple. They incurred hundreds of casualties, with 230 men either captured or having defected. After this, the counterattack stalled, as the Mongol forces couldn't approach within 3 miles of the temple. Subsequently, the Chinese 2nd Cavalry Division launched a pincer maneuver, causing significant casualties among the invaders. By 9 AM, the enemy had suffered 500 casualties and was in retreat. At 7 PM, Fu Zuoyi ordered another counteroffensive. By the next morning, hundreds more had been lost, and several hundred soldiers were captured. With such heavy losses, the defense of Xilamuleng Temple weakened significantly, prompting more officers to defect to the Chinese. Late on the 4th, Fu Zuoyi assembled a force comprising two cavalry regiments, one infantry regiment, one artillery battalion, four armored vehicles, and a squadron of cars to launch a nighttime assault on Xilamuleng Temple.   Meanwhile, the 2nd Cavalry Division clashed with Wang Ying's cavalry 30 miles northeast of Wulanhua. Wang Ying's 2,000 cavalry had been raiding nearby villages to create diversions, drawing enemy forces away from the Bailing-Xilamuleng theater. By the 9th, Wang Ying's cavalry were encircled in Xiaobei, where they were nearly annihilated, with Wang escaping with around a hundred guards toward Changpei. On the 7th, some Grand Han Righteous Army officers set in motion plans to defect to the Chinese side. Early on the 9th, these officers led their men to invade the residence of Japanese advisors, killing all 27 Japanese officers under Colonel Obama. Simultaneously, Fu Zuoyi's forces executed a flanking maneuver against the Xilamuleng Temple amidst the chaos. With mass defections, the Chinese forces surged into the temple area, resulting in the invader army disintegrating in confusion and surrender. After seizing the temple, the invaders were routed, their lines of communication severed, and only isolated pockets continued to resist. Taking advantage of the confusion, Fu Zuoyi launched simultaneous attacks, attempting to capture Shangdu. However, Yan Xishan sent him a telegram, ordering him to halt, stating that Shangdu fell under the jurisdiction of Shanxi and not Suiyuan.   In response to the loss, Tanaka planned a counteroffensive with Qin's troops, but Chiang kai-shek commanded a strong defense of Pailingmiao, successfully outmaneuvering Tanaka's strategies. The resurgence of Chinese forces led to the disintegration of Qin's troops, who revolted and eventually joined the Nationalist army. The Kwantung Army aimed to redeploy its forces for recovery but faced opposition from Tokyo, which criticized the situation. After Chiang kai-shek was kidnapped by Zhang Xueliang on December 12, Tanaka and Prince De seized the opportunity to reassess their strategy. Ultimately, the Kwantung Army decided to abandon efforts to reclaim Pailingmiao, marking the official end of hostilities on December 21. The Suiyuan incident ultimately strengthened Chinese resolve against Japan and increased international distrust.   The defeat of Japan's proxy forces inspired many Chinese to advocate for a more vigorous resistance against the Japanese. The triumph in Suiyuan was celebrated throughout China and surprised the international media, marking the first occasion where the Chinese army successfully halted a Japanese unit. Delegations traveled from as distant as southern Chinese provinces to encourage the defenders to continue their fight. Captured Japanese weapons and equipment served as proof of Japan's involvement in the conflict, despite Japan's Foreign Minister Hachirō Arita claiming that "Japan was not involved in this conflict in Suiyuan at all." After his defeat, Prince Demchugdongrub and his Inner Mongolian troops retreated to northern Chahar, where he had to reconstruct his army due to significant losses. The Japanese implemented new regulations for the Mongolian Army to enhance its effectiveness, and efforts to recruit new soldiers commenced.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. More incidents and more battles to seize territory raged in North China. However things did not go according to plan for the Japanese and their puppets. The tides had turned, and now a more angry and invigorating China would begin lashing out against the encroachment. It was only a matter of time before a full blown war was declared. 

Donald Trump's return to the Middle East marks a shift toward transactional diplomacy, emphasizing trade, investment, and a retreat from human rights rhetoric. In a striking parallel, China has long pursued a similar approach in the region—prioritizing business ties over political entanglements. The question now is how will China respond to this rapidly changing geopolitical landscape? In this special edition of the podcast, CGSP partnered with The ChinaMed Project to organize an online seminar featuring leading experts from China and the United States, exploring how Beijing will adjust its Middle East engagement strategy in the Trump era. Eric speaks with Zhang Chuchu, a China-Mideast scholar at the school of international relations at Fudan University in Shanghai, and Grant Rumley, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Later in the program, Enrico Fardella and Andrea Ghiselli from the ChinaMed Project join the discussion. JOIN THE DISCUSSION: X: @ChinaGSProject | @eric_olander  Facebook: www.facebook.com/ChinaAfricaProject YouTube: www.youtube.com/@ChinaGlobalSouth Now on Bluesky! Follow CGSP at @chinagsproject.bsky.social FOLLOW CGSP IN FRENCH AND ARABIC: Français: www.projetafriquechine.com | @AfrikChine Arabic: عربي: www.alsin-alsharqalawsat.com | @SinSharqAwsat JOIN US ON PATREON! Become a CGSP Patreon member and get all sorts of cool stuff, including our Week in Review report, an invitation to join monthly Zoom calls with Eric & Cobus, and even an awesome new CGSP Podcast mug! www.patreon.com/chinaglobalsouth

In this compelling episode, hosts Ray Powell and Jim Carouso interview Luke de Pulford, founder and executive director of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC), who provides an in-depth look at this growing international coalition's mission of transcending borders and party politics to reform policy on China.IPAC is a cross-party alliance of lawmakers from democratic countries focused on reforming policy approaches toward China. Founded on June 4, 2020 (the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square protests), IPAC began with representatives from eight countries and has now expanded to include nearly 300 legislators from 40 countries worldwide.De Pulford explains that IPAC emerged from growing frustration that many governments weren't taking the necessary steps to defend the rules-based international system, their sovereignty, and human rights in response to China's abuses. The alliance aims to create conditions for collaboration across countries and political ideologies to push governments to reform their China policies.The conversation highlights several major areas of IPAC's focus:Human Rights in Xinjiang: De Pulford discusses evidence of what he and others consider genocide against Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in northwest China, particularly through forced sterilization programs. IPAC has led calls for political action in response to these abuses.Hong Kong's Autonomy: The alliance has been active in responding to China's National Security Law in Hong Kong, which violated promises made in the Sino-British Joint Declaration. De Pulford expresses disappointment that his own country, the United Kingdom, hasn't done more to hold China accountable.Economic Coercion: The interview explores how China uses economic leverage to silence criticism, citing examples like Australia facing 220% tariffs on wine after calling for an investigation into COVID-19's origins.Transnational Repression: De Pulford shares concerning examples of China's efforts to control dissidents abroad, including the recent forced repatriation of Uyghurs from Thailand.The alliance has seen many of its members progress into influential government positions, including Marco Rubio becoming U.S. Secretary of State and other members taking defense and foreign ministry positions across Europe and Asia. This "maturing of the network" has increased IPAC's ability to influence policy.De Pulford argues that addressing human rights issues in China requires economic solutions, as "the human rights questions in China are fundamentally economic questions." He points to successes like Volkswagen and BASF withdrawing from Xinjiang under pressure from IPAC politicians.The interview concludes with De Pulford discussing the personal costs of his advocacy, including cyber attacks, impersonation attempts, and being named as a "co-conspirator" in Jimmy Lai's trial in Hong Kong. Despite these challenges, he remains committed to IPAC's mission of uniting lawmakers to counter China's influence and protect democratic values.

When Nuria Zyden travelled from her home in Dublin to a conference in Sarajevo she became aware that two Chinese men were following her. They were on her plane and they travelled to the hotel where she was staying. The conference was the World Uyghur Congress and she was there to represent the Irish Uyghur Cultural Association which she had founded in 2024 as a way to bring Irish Uyghurs together.She was not entirely surprised.Zyden is a Uyghur, a Turkic Muslim from Xinjiang – a minority that has been subjected to massive surveillance and repression by the Chinese government over the past decade.The mother of three who has lived in Ireland since 2009 and is an Irish citizen, gets calls from the security services in China complaining about her political activities and suggesting she work with them.Her contact with her elderly mother in China is, she says, severely curtailed and monitored by the authorities.Moving away to live and work in Dublin has not protected her from the reach of the Chinese Communist Party.She explains how this impacts on her life and her determination to give a voice to the millions of Uyghurs in China who cannot defend themselves.Irish Times journalist Colm Keena with his colleagues at the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists has been investigating how the Chinese government monitors its citizens abroad for a major new report called China Targets.He explains how Irish citizen Naria Zyden became the victim of transnational repression.Presented by Bernice Harrison. Produced by Suzanne Brennan. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Last time we spoke about Manchukuo. In the early 1930s, Ishiwara Kanji sought to dominate Manchuria to secure resources and counter American influence. He envisioned Manchukuo as a Pan-Asian league promoting racial cooperation, despite it being a puppet state under Japan. With Puyi as a figurehead, Ishiwara aimed for autonomy, but his plans faced resistance from the Kwantung Army, which prioritized control. As conflicts arose, Ishiwara's vision of unity clashed with military interests, leading to his eventual isolation and reassignment, marking a tumultuous chapter in Manchukuo's history. In November 1931, Doihara orchestrated the "Tianjin Incident," facilitating the removal of Puyi from his home to establish the puppet state of "Manchukuo." By March 1932, Puyi was declared its ruler, but his authority was merely symbolic, overshadowed by Japanese control. Despite international condemnation, Japan solidified its grip on Manchuria, exploiting its resources and suppressing local resistance. By the late 1930s, Manchukuo became a colonial entity, suffering under harsh economic policies while Puyi's regime served as a facade for Japanese imperial ambitions.   #146 Operation Nekka: the Invasion of Rehe Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. From the very beginning of their consolidation of Manchukuo, the Kwantung Army regarded the province of Rehe, today's Jehol province, to be an integral part of it. According to some of the Kwantung Army leadership, all of Rehe would be necessary to consummate Manchukuo. In April of 1932, the IJA 8th Division based at Hirosaki in Aomori prefecture was transferred to Manchukuo under secret orders to prepare for an invasion of Rehe. Now Rehe province covers 160,00 square kilometers and back then held some 2.3 million people. Since 1926 it was ruled by General Tang Yulin. His direct command was over the NRA 36th division, consisting of 13,000 regular troops with a provincial militia of 8500 men. As was the Warlord practice of the time, Tang Yulin exploited his population. Now until July of 1932, Tang Yulin's attitude towards the emerging state of Manchukuo directly to his east was certainly favorable. That is because Tang Yulin favored the Japanese. During the debacle that was the invasion of Manchuria, Tang Yulin had done everything possible to prevent Zhang Xueliang from moving into Rehe whenever he was trying to consolidate forces there. Now Tang Yulin had no greater aspirations, its not like he loved Japan, or believed the Japanese were better leaders for his nation. What he was motivated by was a very practical concern, economics, more precisely the opium trade. Rehe number one source of income was opium, and they number one purchaser of it, was Manchuria. Thus as one can imagine, when Manchukuo was being formed, and the opium door closed on him, well he took heavy financial losses.  On July 17th of 1932, an incident broke out between the towns of Chaoyangxu and Nanling. A Japanese civilian employed by the Kwantung Army, Ishimoto Gonshiro was abducted by a Rehe militia group while taking the train from Jinzhou to Chaoyang. General Nishi Yoshikazu, the commander of the IJA 8th Division stationed at Jizhou, dispatched a small unit to rescue Ishimoto. In doing so they occupied Chaoyangxi, where they also protested the Rehe provincial government. This did not see Ishimoto handed over to them, so General Nishi bombarded Chaoyangxu and then had his forces advance upon Nanling. Even doing so, no Ishimoto to be found. So Nishi withdrew back to Jinzhou. The following year during what would become the invasion of Rehe, Ishimoto's body would be found at Chaoyangxu. Zhang Xueliang utilized this small incident to advance into Rehe. Claiming he was acting upon orders from Nanjing, he moved his Northeastern Army to the border of Rehe, due south of the Great Wall. Zhang Xueliang then threatened Tang Yulin and bribed his subordinates to defect over to him. Consequently, by late July, Tang Yulin tossed the towel and for the first time sanctioned passage of a volunteer army through Rehe. Come August Zhang Xueliang organized a volunteer force 40,000 strong, obviously all from his Northeastern army to advance from Gubeikou into Rehe, where he sought to confront the Kwantung Army if they advanced. Zhang Xueliang was heavily in contact with Chiang Kai-Shek during this period. Zhang Xueliang was making multiple proclamations about retaking Manchuria, and Chiang Kai-Shek was supporting him in that endeavor as best as he could. Meanwhile Tang Yulin was sort of stuck in the middle.  Between October 1932 to January 1933, Shanhaiguan, the strategic gateway and midpoint between Mukden and Beijing became the focal area of 3 major skirmishes.  The Boxer Protocol of 1901 dictated that some of the 8 nation alliance members, notably, France, Italy and Japan were allowed to maintain small contingents at Shanhaiguan. In 1932, the Japanese garrison there was 261, France had 61 men and Italy 69. After the establishment of Manchukuo, Japan had increased its garrison to have some more border guards in the town of Shanhaiguan itself. Of course the Chinese also had local troops, that was the 9th Independent Brigade commanded by Ho Chukuo, a force roughly of 9000 men. The first skirmish at Shanhaiguan broke out on October 1st, between Ho Chukuo's men and an armored train of troops from the IJA 8th Division. Another exact same event occurred on December 8th, both occasions were settled locally and peacefully with the Chinese offering an apology and indemnity payment. Then a third clash broke out on January 1st, but this one got out of hand.  The mastermind behind the third incident was Major Ochiai Jinkuro, the leader of the Japanese garrison at Shanhaiguan. Upon his orders, at 9pm, 3 Japanese soldiers tossed two hand grenades each into the backyard of the Japanese military police detachment and the railway track running in front of the Japanese garrison. This was of course immediately blamed upon the Chinese and at 11:30 pm Ochiai presented the local Chinese with 2 demands. The first was to evacuate the Chinese force and the second to allow the Japanese to occupy their south gate at Shanhaiguan for the time being. Now the Japanese had legitimate pretext for these demands based off the Boxer Protocol. It allowed them the right to ensure the security of the railway and telegraph lines and to defend their citizens and property within two miles of the railway zone. Since Ho Chukuo's troops allegedly disturbed the peace in said zone, the Japanese were in their right to ask them to depart.  According to Japanese sources, the Chinese refused at first then consented at 4:50 am on January 2nd. This effectively saw them surrender the south gate. However at 9:30 am the chief of staff for the Chinese Brigade requested that the takeover of said gate be postponed until the scheduled arrival of Ho Chukuo, coming over from Beiping. Ochiai turned down this request, whereupon the Chinese agreed that the south gate would be included within the area overseen by the Japanese. Yet at 10:50 am Japanese troops went to take over guarding the south gate whence Chinese guards tossed grenades at them. Yes, it is most certainly the Japanese who tossed those grenades. The Chinese account of this event is somewhat different. It asserts the Japanese attacked the gate while the issue of surrender was still being negotiated. By January 11th, China sent a formal appeal to Britain, France, the US and other signatories of the Boxer Protocol charging the Japanese for perverting the treaty to seize the south gate of Shanhaiguan. Meanwhile General Ho Chukuo called Ochiai from Qinhuangdao to tell him he would arrive by 8am on January 3rd to negotiate. But by 10am he failed to show up, as the Chinese and Japanese fired upon another. Ochiai thereupon resolved to take the south gate by force. By that point the IJA 8th Division had strengthened its position in front of Shanhaiguan. Two companies had become 10 and one air force company was made ready to strike. Additionally the commander of the 2nd China Fleet, Tsuda Shizue dispatched Hirado and the 16th Destroyer Squadron to Shanhaiguan and Qinhuangdao “to defend Japanese residents and assist the troops in case of hostilities”. At dawn on January 3rd, the Japanese launched a combined land, sea and air assault and by 2pm had taken Shanhaiguan. Ho Chukuo's forces were pushed to the Shih River where they were reinforced during the night and hastily constructed fortifications against the incoming Japanese. Henceforth a propaganda war emerged over Rehe. Japan charged that Zhang Xueliang was mobilizing large forces to advance into Rehe, while China claimed the same of the Japanese. The Chinese protested the Japanese seizure of Shanhaiguan, but none of the western powers would intervene. However the League of Nations constant condemnation of Japan ever since the Mukden incident provoked the Japanese on march 27th to simply walk out on the league. The ordeal also prompted Prince Saioji Kimmochi to dispatch Major General Umezu Yoshijiro, the chief of General affairs of the army general staff and Consul Tanaka Sotaro of the foreign ministry to go over and restrain the unruly troops at various positions in the Beiping-Tientsin region. Saionji's main concern was elevated by Army Minister Araki Sadao, who on March 6th stated to Harada Kumao “that if Japan were to land about 3 divisions at Qingdao and they strike into the Peiping-Tientsin region via Tsinan, Zhang Xueliang will probably flee even before they reach Tsinan. If we do anything at all, I'd like to act boldly and go that far”. Despite claims by various sources, mostly Chinese, the Shanhaiguan incident as it became known was not actually preplanned by the Kwantung Army, it really was an arbitrary act on the part of the garrison commander. How everything went down at Shanhaiguan provided vital intel on the Northeastern Army, and what to expect in Rehe. In December of 1932, the IJA 6th Division was dispatched to Manchuria and assigned security detail in southern Jilin province. They were given further secret orders to participate in what was going to be an operation in Rehe once they arrived to Manchuria. When the Shanhaiguan incident broke out, the Rehe operation was expedited rapidly. Therefore the IJA 6th and 8th Divisions west of the Liao River were immediately tossed into the operation. Given the foreign and domestic conditions, the Rehe operation was extremely dangerous. Tokyo HQ yet again sought to reign in the men, so they sent General Umezu to Manchuria to talk to the Kwantung leadership. The Kwantung leadership was adamant the operation be unleashed before the spring that, provided the operation did not extend beyond the Great Wall. To this Tokyo HQ yet again relented.  On January 27th of 1933, General Muto Nobuyoshi, then commander of the Kwantung Army, issued the following general order for the Rehe operation designated, Operation Nekka “The situation in Jehol has become increasingly serious day by day and has now developed into a state of affairs necessitating intervention. To strengthen the foundations of Manchukuo, the time is close at hand, as far as military operations by the Kwantung Army are concerned, to put the finishing touch on our sublime task. First, the affairs of Jehol province are unquestionably an internal problem of Manchukuo. They neither embrace nor are accompanied by any international implications. Because subjugation of the province is designed to strike a fatal blow to anti-Manchukuo, anti-Japan elements, these elements purposely confuse the distinction between Jehol and North China. They move troops into the province and, glossing over these matters, raise a loud outcry, propagandizing that Japan harbors designs of territorial aggression. In this manner they have endeavored to draw the restraining attention of the world, and every move of the Kwantung Army in Jehol—even the slightest raising of a hand or the stretching of a leg—is now the object of worldwide surveillance” At this stage the Kwantung Army treated the Rehe Operation as an internal matter of Manchukuo and did not openly talk about extending it beyond the Great Wall into Hubei. But their gunna. On January 26th, General Muto issued Order 466, kinda funny how its almost order 66, but I digress. This order directed the IJA 6th and 8th Divisions to prepare to invade Rehe. On February 9th, Muto drafted the “Rehe Subjugation Plan” to some staff officers. It stated “without specific orders, operations are not to be carid out in Hubei”. It also stipulated they should “foster and promote a climate leading to the downfall of Zhang Xueliang in North China, which is the strategic base for the disturbance of Manchukuo”. On February 27th, Muto issued Order 473 which repeated to the men again not to move into Hubei. On the 29th, Muto issued another  order “The subjugation of Jehol is purely and simply an internal problem of Manchukuo. In the light of our national policy, it must not develop into a provocation for war with China. This is why Kwantung Army Operations Order 473 stipulated that, unless specific orders are issued, operations are not to be conducted beyond the Great Wall in Hopei province. I fully expect you to issue strict orders to the various units under your command that, although our forces may act freely in Jehol, which is a part of Manchukuo, they are not, without an imperial command, allowed to take any action in Hopei province, which is separated from Jehol by the Great Wall. They should be admonished that, even in the light of local circumstances, they must never be blinded by tactical considerations and miss the main point of our national policy. (In particular, the garrison at Shanhaikuan should be doubly careful and not act beyond its authorized limits.) I have learned that His Imperial Majesty, the supreme commander, is gravely concerned about the foregoing and again issue these instructions in awe of His Majesty's concern”. Thus one can read between the lines here. Emperor Hirohito put his foot down and demanded no forces go past the great wall and to this the Kwantung Army obeyed. For Operation Nekka, the IJA 6th and 8th Division would have their own theaters of operation along a line running from Paotzu, the eastern most town in Rehe to Chaoyang. The northern zone was the IJA 6th divisions theater, the southern one was the 8th's. Geneal Sakamoto Masemon led the 6th Division and ordered his forces on February 23rd to advance north along the rail line between Tahushan and Tungliao, then on towards Tienshan, Xiawa and Chaoyang. Afterwards they would carry out operations in the Chifeng-Linxu-Tolun region.  General Nishi ordered his 8th Division, excluding one unit to advance along the border around Peipiao, towards Suichung on the 27th, then into the Lingyuan region. The other unit would secure as fast as possible the important gateways along the Great Wall of China: Qilingkou, Lenkou, Xufengkou, Lowenyukou and Manlankuan to protect their divisions flank. Afterwards they would seie Chengde and Gubeikou. However he also gave explicit orders "Without specific orders, operations must not be extended beyond the Great Wall into Hopei province,". So yeah, while they had direct orders to not advance beyond the Great Wall. . . they were going to basically capture all of the key passes of the Great Wall. Kind of playing with fire.  On the other side, on January 23rd, Zhang Xueliang was meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek and our old friend Duan Qirui to discuss how to prepare for what seemed to be an impending invasion of Rehe. Chiang Kai-Shek politely said to Duan Qirui "I sincerely hope that you will come south and give me your guidance at this time of national crisis,". The real reason he sent this request was because he did not want the Japanese to enlist their former lacky against him. At the meeting, according to a Japanese intelligence report, Zhang Xueliang insisted that Chiang Kai-Shek personally come north and assume direct command of the Northern troops. Chiang Kai-Shek refused on the grounds he had to deal with the communists in Jiangxi and sent in his place Yang Que, the current president of the Army Staff College and a graduate of the Japanese Army War College. Yang would arrive to Peiping with his staff on January 30th, where he devised a plan for joint operations with Zhang Xueliang. They anticipated the Kwantung Army would cross the Great Wall at Shanhaiguan, so their basic strategy was to concentrate a large force in its region, especially east of the Luan River. That forces mission would be to defend at all costs the front line at Qinhuangdao. The Japanese intelligence indicated the Chinese had roughly 50,000 men, including 7700 men of the 25th Division ld by Kuan Lincheng and 12800 men of the 2nd Division led by Yang Que who were sent to Miyun and Gubeikou. There were also reports that ancient art objects and documents from Peiping were being transported to Nanjing, beginning on January 10th. To the Chinese public this was shocking news as one could imagine. Operation Nekka was unleashed and showcased the rapid efficiency of the Kwantung Army. By March 2nd, the IJA 6th Division routed the 41st Army of General Sun Tienying; the IJA 14th Mixed Brigade of the IJA 8th Division captured the Lengkou pass on March 4th; while the Kawahara detachment captured Chengde near the border with Hubei. General Nishi then assembld his main force at Lingyuan as the 14th Mixed Brigade withdrew to Chapeng. On March 4th, Muto issued Order 480, directing the troops "to make preparations for operations in North China, firmly seizing the major passes along the Great Wall, mopping up resistance by remnant troops and bandits, and restoring peace and order in Jehol province." One unit of the IJA 8th Division was given the task of seizing the Gubeikou Pass and advanced to such on the 7th. Within the vicinity of Changshanyu, around 40 kilometers southwest of Chengde, they encountered 5000 advancing Chinese forces. Here one of the first of many fierce battles along the Great Wall came to be. Until roughly March 20th, the Kwantung Army was met with fierce counterattacks, coming from the main gateways of the Great Wall. Initially the fighting went tremendously wall for the Japanese, yet by March 10th, the 14th Mixed Brigade had taken Tungqiaku, Tiehmenkuan and Xifengkou. Two days later the IJA 8th Division began an assault upon Gubeikou. Nishi then sent the Hayakawa Brigade to seize Lowenyukou. Then on the 10th, after receiving reports the main passes were secured, General Muto took his HQ from Jinzhu to Changchun, believing everything was already won and done. However he would be very wrong, they had misjudged the Chinese strength.  On the 13th, Muti and Nishi received a report, that on the night of the 10th, the 14th Mixed Brigade at Xifengkou had come under heavy attack by a Chinese force led by General Song Qeyuang. Reinforcements were rapidly sent over, but they were unable to relieve the trapped brigade. On the 14th, Muto ordered Genera Sakamoto to lead the Mukai unit from the 6th Brigade to help out. With this the Chinese forces were driven off and then the Japanese began assaults upon Lengkou, Lowenyukou and Quehlingkou. On the 16th, the IJA 8th Division took Quehling, but the next day received a vicious counterattack by the NRA 116th Division. At Lowenyukou the Hayakawa Brigade was counterattacked by Song Cheyuan. The Hayakawa Brigade was still able to secure on portion of the Great Wall, it was constantly under attack and unable to progress further.  On the 22nd, Nishi was forced to order his Brigade to pull back to Chengde. Over at Lengkou, the Mukai unit managed to capture the town as the 14th Mixed Brigade at Xifengkou was attacked by the NRA 139th Division. Unable to repel the counterattacks, Nishi ordered his forces back 13 kilometers on the 24th. The battles at Quehlingkou and Lowenyukou were very intense. On March 18th, Muto realized the casualties were severe and taking the gateways was not showing progress. He therefore decided to divert the 6th Divisions attention to Lengkou in a flanking maneuver aimed at severing the Chinese supply lines to the gateways and as a result this would extend operations south of the Great Wall into the region east of the Luan River. Thus there we have it, they were going past the Great Wall against Emperor Hirohito's orders.  Operation Nekka, similar to Operation Jinzhou was deemed essential to establish and protect Manchukuo. However while the battles along the Great Wall were deemed necessary to create the borders for Manchukuo, their extension past that boundary literally brought them into the heart of North China. Unlike in Manchuria, the Chinese forces in North China held excellent morale, they were very willing to fight. On top of that, they had better logistics and were fighting on top of the Great Wall, which offered significant advantages. Thus from a tactical standpoint, the Japanese had to seize the gateways and flush out the Chinese from the areas. The Chinese remained defiant. Atop the walls the Chinese defenders would shout at the Japanese waving anti-Manchukuo and anti-Japanese flags.  Outside the ongoing battle, Chiang Kai-Shek had his own, perhaps in his mind, more important battle, the one with the communists. The encirclement campaigns had all gone to shit thus far. Added to this was the invasion of Manchuria and Shanghai. As Chiang Kai-Shek would later put it "tantamount to subjecting the Government to a pincer attack both from within and without." Basically Chiang Kai-Shek could choose to focus on the Japanese or communists. He figured going into a full war against Japan would be the end of himself and his government. Thus he worked to reach an agreement with the Japanese in May of 1932 which had ended the Shanghai incident. After doing so he released a slogan "first internal pacification, then resist external aggression". Upon doing so he unleashed his full attention upon the communists. As we have seen, Chiang Kai-Sheks last encirclement campaign proved successful. But as he was in the middle of it, Operation Nekka was unleashed. It looked extremely bad for Chiang Kai-Shek, for the KMT and for China in general. On March 20th, as a gesture to indicate to the masses Chiang Kai-Shek was doing his job, he dispatched 5 divisions, roughly 50,000 men from the Central Army north. Chiang Kai-Shek personally traveled north from Hankou to Beiping, but no further than that. Back on the 10th he had received the resignation of Zhang Xueliang, who had publicly been calling for a massive war against Japan so that Manchuria could be recovered. Chiang Kai-Shek had to replace him with General He Yingqin.  Another major development at this time, was our old and dear friend who never causes any trouble, Wang Jingwei returned from I believe his 20th time in exile. He came to resume his post as president of the Executive Yuan. Yet again Wang Jingwei was trying to reconcile with Chiang Kai-Shek. In reality and as many of you might guess, the only reason Chiang Kai-Shek never had this guy shot was because Wang Jingei had the firm backing of the left, thus in order to really grab the majority of the political class he had to play nice with him. For Wang Jingwei's part, much like starscream in transformers, yes I am using this as an analogy, hes just trying to overthrow megatron every chance he gets, but always fails like a dumb idiot. There was also the dichotomy between the two men. Wang Jingwei was seen as a civilian leader while Chiang Kai-Shek was seen as a military leader. So together they seemed like a perfect team, despite the fact they loathed each other. So Wang Jingwei became the civil administrator while Chiang Kai-Shek focused on the military. In regards to Japan, Wang Jingwei was following a conciliatory policy of "resistance on the one hand and negotiation on the other,” based on Chiang Kai-Sheks slogan "first internal pacification, then resist external aggression."  Following a fight with Zhang Xueliang in August of 1932 over the issue of defending Manchuria against the Kwantung Army, Wang Jingwei had resigned, trying to strongarm Chiang Kai-Shek to get rid of the young marshal. Thus like what had happened countless times before, Wang Jingwei said he was out on sick leave, and departed for Europe for supposed treatment. When he returned 6 months later, Operation Nekka had begun, although the Japanese troops had not yet then reached the Great Wall. Wang Jingwei immediately became acting foreign minister in place of Lu Wenkuan, a supporter of Zhang Xueliang, who was notably anti-japanese. Wang Jingwei kicked Lu Wenkuan over to Xinjiang to deal with some conflicts breaking out there, fun times for him as we know.  Meanwhile He Yingqin had been placed as the head of the Peiping branch military council, entrusted with control over all military matters in North China. He Yingqin went to work reorganizing the forces in north china in mid March, forming them into an effective battle order to face the Japanese. By bringing together the local, very disorganized forces into a unified command, He Yingqin hoped they would be capable alone to block the Japanese advance, leaving the central army out of the conflict. This was because Chiang Kai-Shek did not want to risk losing his central army, considered the most elite one in all of china. But Chiang Kai-Shek did come around to the idea of at least testing some units against the Kwantung forces. Above all Chiang Kai-Shek wanted to have his cake and eat it to. He wanted he population of China to think he was actively resisting, while in reality he was biding time. Central army units deployed around Gubeikou, the main gateway leading to the Peiping-Tientsin region. When the Kwantung army leaders were planning operation Nekka, they had believed it would not be necessary to go beyond the Great Wall, but once the fighting around the walls and gateways kicked off, they knew immediately they could not hope to take the wall areas without getting behind the enemy. Particularly they needed to get past the area east of the Luan River. Some 20 Chinese divisions had assembled in the Peiping-Tientsin region and were tossing endless counter attacks along the line of the Great Wall. In the Lengkou region a force of 7000 Central Chinese Army units had penetrated deep into Rehe and smashed the Mukai detachment of the IJA 8th Division. These counterattacks reaffirmed the Kwantung Army leadership it was necessary to go beyond the Great Wall. It should also be noted the Kwantung Army's operations in North China were not just military. The Japanese were plagued with logistical problems. There was a shortage of troops because they had driven into Rehe with only 20,000 men. Even the most determined Kwantung general did not believe their military prowess could overcome the plains of Hubei packed with an immeasurable amount of Chinese troops. Therefore they had to augment this military operation with political schemes aimed at the regional warlords. During the pacification of Manchuria, the tactic of bribing local elites had worked wonders and there was zero reason to believe it would not work in North China. All of this was done without any supervision from Tokyo HQ. On February 13th of 1933, Itagaki Seishiro, at the time chief of the Mukden Special Service Agency, was transferred to the General Staff without any official announcement of this promotion. He took a post in Tientsin, specifically to begin political maneuvers in eastern Hubei. This saw the birth of the Tientsin Special Service Agency. Initially this agency was attempting to lure all the competing warlords in North China, such as, Duan Qirui, Wu Peifu, Sun Chuanfang, but then began targeting Zhang Qingyao. Zhang Qingyao had once been the protege of Duan Qirui, acting as the civil and military governor of Henan province. He had fought against Zhang Zuolin in 1925 whereupon his allegiance had shifted over to Wu Peifu. During the second phase of the Northern Expedition, Zhang Qingyao had fought again against Zhang Zuolin, then controlling the National Pacification Army. When the Northern expedition was over, he joined Yan Xishans forces in Shanxi. Thus one could easily see he was not a man of many principals, nor any specific loyalties. The Tientsin Special Service Agency first proposed to reach out to Zhang Qingyao in the hopes he could organize a coup d'etat against Chiang Kai-Shek. It was further hoped he could get Song Queyuan, Zhang Zuoxiang, Fang Chenwu, Xu Yusan, Zhang Tingshu, Sun Tienying and Feng Zhanhai to join in. If they managed this, North China would fall in a single stroke. It was hoped this would be achieved as they were taking the Great Wall and were enroute towards Peiping. However on May 7th, Zhang Qingyao was assassinated, completely ruining the plan. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Nekka had been unleashed with a large bang. 20,000 Japanese troops stormed Rehe province under strict orders not to go past the Great Wall of China. So they immediately began planning how to go past the Great Wall of China. Yet what they did not expect was the determination of the Chinese defenders, who were not going to allow them an easy time.

In this episode of Capital for Good we speak with Michael Posner, the Jerome Kohlberg Professor of Ethics and Finance at NYU's Stern School of Business, director of the school's Center for Business and Human Rights, a long-time leader in the field, luminary thinker, advocate, former State Department Official, and the author of the new book, Conscience Incorporated. We begin with Posner's early interests in international human rights issues, sparked in law school when he was tasked with investigating atrocities in Uganda under Idi Amin. He lays out the principals of early, post-World War II and UN inspired human rights law focused on universality, and the responsibility of governments to promote, protect and enforce human rights. Notably absent from this early framework is the role of business. Posner explains that his interest in the intersection of human rights took shape when he began to observe that large multinational corporations had a critical role to play, particularly when they operated in weak states that lacked the ability to protect human rights. We discuss why companies should care, fundamentally, about human rights on ethical dimensions (“outsourcing might be a smart business strategy, but you can't outsource responsibility if you're the main economic beneficiary,”) and because there are material costs that can arise from irresponsible practices, often reputational crises and/or regulation. We explore the deficiencies of various business frameworks: how and why Milton Friedman's shareholder primacy worldview fails to account for environmental and social externalities and a broader set of stakeholders; how and why ESG conflate environmental and social considerations and emphasize risk rather than meaningful performance on issues like climate change or worker protections. Posner suggests that this moment of backlash against all things ESG, DEI and “woke capitalism” offers us an opportunity to do better. We touch on sometimes complex tensions between climate change and human rights concerns, acknowledging that climate change can only be solved if we transition to a lower carbon economy, with the scale up of renewable energy and the development of technologies like electric vehicles, which in turn rely on things like batteries. We know that today batteries are reliant on inputs like critical minerals, long mined in ways and places rife with human rights challenges, and today often controlled by Chinese companies. China is also the world's largest and lowest cost producer of solar panels, and much of that production occurs in Xinjiang, with forced labor of the Uyghur ethnic minority. Posner discusses a number of ways to better integrate climate and human rights considerations. Before opening the floor to audience questions, we discuss the evolution of technology and human rights issues. When Posner was at the State Department from 2010 to 2012, he had a front tow seat to the Arab Spring and the “Facebook Revolution,” witnessing how activists used social media to fight authoritarianism. Although he says he still believes in the power of technology to open up political discourse, he has become much more concerned about issues of data privacy, surveillance, harmful violent and incendiary content, information and disinformation, and ways in which companies try to shield themselves with first amendment (to which they are not legally subject) to avoid more vigorous content moderation or human rights engagement. We conclude with the role of corporate leaders when it comes to human rights. While Posner notes he is typically conservative about how much executives should speak out on specific issues, he believes strongly that “business leaders need to be attentive and active if there are fundamental threats to our democracy.” This episode of Capital for Good was recorded as part of Social Impact Week 2025, a week of social impact-related events for the Columbia Business School community, organized by the Social Enterprise Club, Green Business Club, Community Impact Club, and LEO Impact Fund. Thanks for Listening! Subscribe to Capital for Good on Apple, Amazon, Google, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts. Drop us a line at socialenterprise@gsb.columbia.edu.  Mentioned in this Episode Conscience Incorporated: Pursue Profits While Protecting Human Rights The Fair Labor Association

Today we start with China related news (Tokyo Chinatown, Chinese Restaurants, Deportations) (1:15), followed by the weekly Pray for China segment, including five focused minutes on William Milne (22:20). Finally, I share a newsletter I wrote from Hubei Province in April of 2003, when I was just 19 y/o (34:10). Welcome to China Compass on the Fight Laugh Feast Network! I'm your China travel guide, Missionary Ben. Follow me on X (@chinaadventures) where I post detailed daily reminders to pray for China (www.PrayforChina.us). BTW, X is also the best way to get in touch with me. Either tag me with a question or comment, or follow and send a DM. Finally, PrayGiveGo.us has easy access to everything that I am involved in, including books, Substack, and this podcast. Chinatowns Proliferate in… Japan? (Paywall) https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Chinese-in-Japan/Just-like-in-China-Chinatowns-proliferate-across-Japan The Bee: How to Make Sure a Chinese Restaurant is Legit? https://babylonbee.com/news/9-things-to-look-for-to-make-sure-a-chinese-food-restaurant-is-legit PHD Student from Turkey to be Deported Over Pro-Hamas Comments https://www.cnn.com/2025/03/27/us/rumeysa-ozturk-detained-what-we-know/index.html https://www.boston.com/news/local-news/2025/03/28/ice-kidnapped-our-neighbor-outrage-at-arrest-of-tufts-student-spreads-as-lawmakers-demand-answers/ Pray for China (PrayforChina.us) - 5 Minutes on William Milne… Sat, Mar 29 - Pray for Xixia District in the capital of the Ningxia region Yinchuan (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xixia,_Yinchuan). Ningxia is paired with the western ⅓ of Missouri for prayer: www.PrayforChina.us. I’ve traveled throughout Ningxia and share a few stories in this podcast: https://pubtv.flfnetwork.com/tabs/audio/podcasts/30293/episodes/11 Sun, Mar 30 - Pray for Karamay City (“Black Oil” in Uyghur) in northern Xinjiang (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karamay). I spent time in Xinjiang back in 2015, exploring and distributing Uyghur tracts. Read: https://chinacall.substack.com/p/aksu-to-okinawa Listen: https://pubtv.flfnetwork.com/tabs/the-pub/podcasts/30293/episodes/7 Xinjiang is paired for prayer with six of the western States (CA, OR, WA, NV, AZ, AK): https://prayforchina.us/index.php/xinjiang/ 22 Year Old Missionary Update (by 19 Year Old Me): https://open.substack.com/pub/chinacall/p/22-year-old-missionary-newsletter If you enjoy this podcast, follow or subscribe and leave a review on whichever platform you use. And don’t forget to check out everything we are involved in at PrayGiveGo.us. Luke 10, Verse 2!

THIS WEEK's BIRDS: Bembeya Jazz National (vintage); expoerimental Yugoslav folk-jazz from vocalist Vesna Pisarović;  Gabriel Zucker; Uyghur Musicians from  Xinjiang; new music from  Joe Fonda Quartet w. Wadada Leo Smith et al.; Kovász; Nour Symon; Phelimuncasi (experiemtnal hip-hop from Africa); Wadada Leo Smith salutes Angela Davis; Landaeus - de Heney - Osgood; Ernst Reijseger w. Harmen Fraanje & Mola Sylla; M'ma Sylla (vintage) with Le Rossignol de Guinée, from Guinea ; cha'abi from Amar al Achab; Thelonious Monk; Ngabaka Group as well as Martin Kayo (from Central African Republic); Rai from Chaba Zohra; and, as always, so much, much more. Catch the BIRDS live on Friday nights, 9:00pm-MIDNIGHT (EST), in Central New York on WRFI, 88.1 FM Ithaca/ 88.5 FM Odessa;. and WORLDWIDE online via our MUSIC PLAYER at WRFI.ORG. 24/7 via PODBEAN: https://conferenceofthebirds.podbean.com/ via iTUNES: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/conference-of-the-birds-podcast/id478688580 Also available at podomatic, Internet Archive, podtail, iheart Radio, and elsewhere. Always FREE of charge to listen to the radio program and free also to stream, download, and subscribe to the podcast online: PLAYLIST at SPINITRON: https://spinitron.com/WRFI/pl/20429139/Conference-of-the-Birds and via the Conference of the Birds page at www.WRFI.ORG https://www.wrfi.org/wrfiprograms/conferenceofthebirds/  Join us on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/groups/conferenceofthebirds/?ref=bookmarks Find WRFI on Radio Garden: http://radio.garden/visit/ithaca-ny/aqh8OGBR

See the full podcast! https://chinauncensored.tv/programs/podcast-288 Armed Uyghur Rebels Overthrow Regime in Syria And check out our other channel, China Uncensored: https://www.youtube.com/ChinaUncensored Our social media: X: https://www.x.com/ChinaUncensored Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/ChinaUncensored Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/ChinaUncensored #China

See the full podcast! https://chinauncensored.tv/programs/podcast-288 China's real estate collapse is killing the Chinese economy. And the CCP can't fix it. And check out our other channel, China Uncensored: https://www.youtube.com/ChinaUncensored Our social media: X: https://www.x.com/ChinaUncensored Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/ChinaUncensored Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/ChinaUncensored #China

We start with this week’s China news (1:34), followed by my take on whether or not Borden would’ve remained single on the mission field. (10:30). Next, we look at William Milne’s journal from February (1819), as he bares his soul after the loss of his beloved Rachel (14:53). Lastly, we look at how to Pray for China this week (42:48) followed by the story of the day I taught myself to ride a motorcycle in China, by traversing the foothills of Tibet (49:50). Follow me on X (@chinaadventures) where I post daily reminders to pray for China (PrayforChina.us). Check out all of the other things we are involved in @ PrayGiveGo.us. China Questions US Air Safety https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202502/1328736.shtml Letters from Xi Jinping (aka, Winnie the Pooh) https://www.globaltimes.cn/special-coverage/Letters-from-Xi/index.html Lonely in Cairo https://chinacall.substack.com/p/language-learning-and-loneliness The Birth of a Child and the Death of Rachel Milne https://chinacall.substack.com/p/a-babys-birth-and-a-mothers-death PrayforChina.us (@chinaadventures on X): Feb 24 - Pray for Bortala Mongol Prefecture in northern Xinjiang Province. Xinjiang is paired for prayer with seven western States (CA, OR, WA, NV, AZ, and AK): www.PrayforChina.us Feb 25 - Pray for Qinzhou (“Cheen-joe”) Prefecture near the coast of southern China's Guangxi Province, which is paired with Mississippi and Alabama for prayer: www.PrayforChina.us Feb 26 - Pray for Songshan District in Chifeng Prefecture, the most populated of Inner Mongolia province in northern China, which is paired with the Dakotas for prayer: www.PrayforChina.us Feb 27 - Pray for Pingluo County on the banks of the Yellow River in Shizuishan Prefecture in the northern Ningxia, which is paired with western Missouri for prayer: www.PrayforChina.us Feb 28 - Pray for Jing’an District in the cosmopolitan urban center of Shanghai. Shanghai is paired with NYC for prayer: https://prayforchina.us/states/new-york.html If you enjoy this podcast, follow or subscribe on Spotify or Apple or right here on PubTV. You can also email any questions or comments to contact @ PrayforChina dot us. And don’t forget to check out everything we are involved in at PrayGiveGo.us. Luke 10:2!

In the Xinjiang region of western China, the government has rounded up and detained hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs and other Muslim ethnic groups. Many haven't been heard from in years, and more still are desperately searching for their families. Western governments have called this crackdown a cultural genocide and a possible crime against humanity.In this episode, the first of a three-part series from Embedded, NPR correspondent Emily Feng tells the story of one of those people. For years, a Uyghur man named Abdullatif Kucar had no idea what has happened to his wife and young children after they were detained by Chinese authorities. Emilly follows Kucar as he desperately searches for his family.But this story is bigger than one family. In this series, Emily also travels across Asia and dives into decades of history to uncover the massive Chinese surveillance of Uyghurs, getting exclusive interviews with the people suffering from that surveillance and the people upholding it – who sometimes are one and the same.This episode was originally published in 2022. To hear the whole series, head to https://www.npr.org/podcasts/510311/embedded.Learn more about sponsor message choices: podcastchoices.com/adchoicesNPR Privacy Policy

In the Xinjiang region of western China, the government has rounded up and detained hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs and other Muslim ethnic groups, including the wife and young children of a Uyghur businessman named Abdullatif Kucar. NPR correspondent Emilly Feng follows Kucar as he desperately searches for his missing family. To listen to this series sponsor-free and support NPR, sign up for Embedded+ in Apple Podcasts or at plus.npr.org.Learn more about sponsor message choices: podcastchoices.com/adchoicesNPR Privacy Policy