Podcasts about Mongolia

In this episode, recorded live at Shoptalk, Sarah Hofstetter sits down with Louise Cotterill, Global Senior Director of Insights and Intelligence at Kellanova, for a wide-ranging conversation on how to turn complex data into business results and build cross-functional trust along the way.Louise shares how her team built a proprietary clean room solution to drive more precise audience targeting, tailor creative to shifting shopper behavior, and ultimately deliver a 36 percent sales lift for Special K in the UK. She also explains how marketers can move from one-size-fits-all campaigns to dynamic, behavior-based segmentation, even without first-party data.Beyond the tech, Louise emphasizes the importance of soft skills. From speaking the language of the CFO to running test-and-learn pilots that bring skeptical teams along gradually, she shows how marketers can lead with both credibility and curiosity. In a standout personal moment, she reveals the bravest thing she's ever done: spending a summer living with nomadic eagle hunters in Mongolia.Key takeaways:Insights only matter if they drive action. Clean rooms enable smarter targeting and measurement, but results come from applying those insights across creative and media strategy.Buy-in is built through transparency. Louise outlines how gradual testing, third-party validation, and a shared focus on sales help teams embrace new tools with confidence.Transformation is both technical and cultural. Success depends on aligning stakeholders, evolving incentives, and creating a safe space to test, learn, and adapt. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Last time we spoke about the Changsha fire. Chiang Kai-shek faced a brutal choice: defend Wuhan to the last man or flood the land to slow the invaders. He chose both, pushing rivers and rallying a fractured army as Japanese forces pressed along the Yangtze. Fortresses at Madang held long, but the cost was high—troops lost, civilians displaced, a city's heart burning in the night. Wuhan fell after months of brutal fighting, yet the battle did not break China's will. Mao Zedong urged strategy over martyrdom, preferring to drain the enemy and buy time for a broader struggle. The Japanese, though victorious tactically, found their strength ebbing, resource strains, supply gaps, and a war that felt endless. In the wake of Wuhan, Changsha stood next in the Japanese crosshairs, its evacuation and a devastating fire leaving ash and memory in its wake. Behind these prices, political currents swirled. Wang Jingwei defected again, seeking power beyond Chiang's grasp, while Chongqing rose as a western bastion of resistance. The war hardened into a protracted stalemate, turning Japan from an aggressive assailant into a wary occupier, and leaving China to endure, persist, and fight on.   #175  The Soviet-Japanese Border Conflicts Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So based on the title of this one, you probably can see we are taking a bit of a detour. For quite some time we have focused on the Japanese campaigns into China proper 1937-1938. Now the way the second sino-japanese war is traditionally broken down is in phases. 1937-1938, 1939-1942 and 1942-1945. However there is actually even more going on in China aside from the war with Japan. In Xinjiang province a large full blown Islamic revolution breaks out in 1937. We will be covering that story at a later date, but another significant event is escalating border skirmishes in Manchukuo. Now these border skirmishes had been raging ever since the USSR consolidated its hold over the far east. We talked about some of those skirmishes prior to the Sino-Soviet war in 1929. However when Japan created the puppet government of Manchukuo, this was a significant escalation in tensions with the reds. Today we are going to talk about the escalating border conflicts between the Soviets and Japan. A tongue of poorly demarcated land extends southeast from Hunchun, hugging the east bank of the Tumen River between Lake Khasan to the east and Korea to the west. Within this tongue stands Changkufeng Hill, one of a long chain of highlands sweeping from upstream along the rivers and moors toward the sea. The twin-peaked hill sits at the confluence area several miles northwest of the point where Manchuria, Korea, and the Russian Far East meet. The hill's shape reminded Koreans of their changgo, which is a long snare drum constricted at the center and tapped with the hands at each end. When the Manchus came to the Tumen, they rendered the phonetic sounds into three ideographic characters meaning "taut drum peaks" or Chang-ku-feng. The Japanese admired the imagery and preserved the Chinese readings, which they pronounce Cho-ko-ho. From their eastern vantage, the Russians called it Zaozernaya, "hill behind the lake." Soviet troops referred to it as a sugar-loaf hill. For many years, natives and a handful of officials in the region cultivated a relaxed attitude toward borders and sovereignty. Even after the Japanese seized Manchuria in 1931, the issue did not immediately come to a head. With the expansion of Manchukuo and the Soviet Far East under Stalin's Five-Year plans, both sides began to attend more closely to frontier delimitation. Whenever either party acted aggressively, force majeure was invoked to justify the unexpected and disruptive events recognized in international law. Most often, these incidents erupted along the eastern Manchurian borders with the USSR or along the 350-mile frontier south of Lake Khanka, each skirmish carrying the seeds of all-out warfare. Now we need to talk a little bit about border history. The borders in question essentially dated to pacts concluded by the Qing dynasty and the Tsardom. Between the first Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 and the Mukden Agreement of 1924, there were over a dozen accords governing the borders. Relevant to Changkufeng were the basic 15-article Convention of Peking, supplementing the Tientsin Treaties of November 1860, some maps made in 1861, and the eight-article Hunchun Border Protocol of 1886. By the 1860 treaty, the Qing ceded to Tsarist Russia the entire maritime province of Siberia, but the meaning of "lands south of Lake Khanka" remained rather vague. Consequently, a further border agreement was negotiated in June 1861 known as "the Lake Khanka Border Pact", by which demarcations were drawn on maps and eight wooden markers erected. The border was to run from Khanka along ridgelines between the Hunchun River and the sea, past Suifenho and Tungning, terminating about 6 miles from the mouth of the Tumen. Then a Russo-Chinese commission established in 1886 drew up the Hunchun Border Pact, proposing new or modified markers along the 1860–1861 lines and arranging a Russian resurvey. However, for the Japanese, in 1938, the Chinese or Manchu texts of the 1886 Hunchun agreement were considered controlling. The Soviets argued the border ran along every summit west of Khasan, thereby granting them jurisdiction over at least the eastern slopes of all elevations, including Changkufeng and Shachaofeng.  Since the Qing dynasty and the house of Romanov were already defunct, the new sovereignties publicly appealed to opposing texts, and the Soviet side would not concede that the Russian-language version had never been deemed binding by the Qing commissioners. Yet, even in 1938, the Japanese knew that only the Chinese text had survived or could be located.    Now both the Chinese and Russian military maps generally drew the frontier along the watershed east of Khasan; this aligned with the 1861 readings based on the Khanka agreement. The Chinese Republican Army conducted new surveys sometime between 1915 and 1920. The latest Chinese military map of the Changkufeng area drew the border considerably closer to the old "red line" of 1886, running west of Khasan but near the shore rather than traversing the highland crests. None of the military delimitations of the border was sanctified by an official agreement. Hence, the Hunchun Protocol, whether well known or not, invaluable or worthless, remained the only government-to-government pact dealing with the frontiers.  Before we jump into it, how about a little summary of what became known as the Soviet-Japanese border conflicts. The first major conflict would obviously be the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. Following years of conflict between the Russian Empire and Japan culminating in the costly Battle of Tsushima, Tsar Nicholas II's government sought peace, recognizing Japan's claims to Korea and agreeing to evacuate Manchuria.  From 1918 to 1920, the Imperial Japanese Army, under Emperor Taishō after the death of Meiji, assisted the White Army and Alexander Kerensky against the Bolshevik Red Army. They also aided the Czechoslovak Legion in Siberia to facilitate its return to Europe after an Austrian-Hungarian armoured train purportedly went astray. By 1920, with Austria-Hungary dissolved and Czechoslovakia established two years earlier, the Czechoslovak Legion reached Europe. Japan withdrew from the Russian Revolution and the Civil War in 1922. Following Japan's 1919-1920 occupations and the Soviet intervention in Mongolia in 1921, the Republic of China also withdrew from Outer Mongolia in 1921. In 1922, after capturing Vladivostok in 1918 to halt Bolshevik advances, Japanese forces retreated to Japan as Bolshevik power grew and the postwar fatigue among combatants increased. After Hirohito's invasion of Manchuria in 1931–1932, following Taishō's death in 1926, border disputes between Manchukuo, the Mongolian People's Republic, and the Soviet Union increased. Many clashes stemmed from poorly defined borders, though some involved espionage. Between 1932 and 1934, the Imperial Japanese Army reported 152 border disputes, largely tied to Soviet intelligence activity in Manchuria, while the Soviets accused Japan of 15 border violations, six air intrusions, and 20 cases of "spy smuggling" in 1933 alone. Numerous additional violations followed in the ensuing years. By the mid-1930s, Soviet-Japanese diplomacy and trust had deteriorated further, with the Japanese being openly labeled "fascist enemies" at the Seventh Comintern Congress in July 1935. Beginning in 1935, conflicts significantly escalated. On 8 January 1935, the first armed clash, known as the Halhamiao incident, took place on the border between Mongolia and Manchukuo. Several dozen cavalrymen of the Mongolian People's Army crossed into Manchuria near disputed fishing grounds and engaged an 11‑man Manchukuo Imperial Army patrol near the Buddhist temple at Halhamiao, led by a Japanese military advisor. The Manchukuo Army sustained 6 wounded and 2 dead, including the Japanese officer; the Mongols suffered no casualties and withdrew after the Japanese sent a punitive expedition to reclaim the area. Two motorized cavalry companies, a machine‑gun company, and a tankette platoon occupied the position for three weeks without resistance. In June 1935, the first direct exchange of fire between the Japanese and Soviets occurred when an 11‑man Japanese patrol west of Lake Khanka was attacked by six Soviet horsemen, reportedly inside Manchukuo territory. In the firefight, one Soviet soldier was killed and two horses were captured. The Japanese requested a joint investigation, but the Soviets rejected the proposal. In October 1935, nine Japanese and 32 Manchukuoan border guards were establishing a post about 20 kilometers north of Suifenho when they were attacked by 50 Soviet soldiers. The Soviets opened fire with rifles and five heavy machine guns. Two Japanese and four Manchukuoan soldiers were killed, and another five were wounded. The Manchukuoan foreign affairs representative lodged a verbal protest with the Soviet consul at Suifenho. The Kwantung Army of Japan also sent an intelligence officer to investigate the clash. On 19 December 1935, a Manchukuoan unit reconnoitering southwest of Buir Lake clashed with a Mongolian party, reportedly capturing 10 soldiers. Five days later, 60 truck‑borne Mongolian troops assaulted the Manchukuoans and were repulsed, at the cost of three Manchukuoan dead. On the same day, at Brunders, Mongolian forces attempted three times to drive out Manchukuoan outposts, and again at night, but all attempts failed. Further small attempts occurred in January, with Mongolians using airplanes for reconnaissance. The arrival of a small Japanese force in three trucks helped foil these attempts; casualties occurred on both sides, though Mongolian casualties are unknown aside from 10 prisoners taken. In February 1936, Lieutenant-Colonel Sugimoto Yasuo was ordered to form a detachment from the 14th Cavalry Regiment to "drive the Outer Mongol intruders from the Olankhuduk region," a directive attributed to Lieutenant-General Kasai Heijuro. Sugimoto's detachment included cavalry guns, heavy machine guns, and tankettes. They faced a force of about 140 Mongolians equipped with heavy machine guns and light artillery. On February 12, Sugimoto's men drove the Mongolians south, at the cost of eight Japanese killed, four wounded, and one tankette destroyed. The Japanese began to withdraw, but were attacked by 5–6 Mongolian armored cars and two bombers, which briefly disrupted the column. The situation was stabilized when the Japanese unit received artillery support, allowing them to destroy or repel the armored cars. In March 1936, the Tauran incident occurred. In this clash, both the Japanese Army and the Mongolian Army deployed a small number of armored fighting vehicles and aircraft. The incident began when 100 Mongolian and six Soviet troops attacked and occupied the disputed village of Tauran, Mongolia, driving off the small Manchurian garrison. They were supported by light bombers and armored cars, though the bombing sorties failed to inflict damage on the Japanese, and three bombers were shot down by Japanese heavy machine guns. Local Japanese forces counter-attacked, conducting dozens of bombing sorties and finally assaulting Tauran with 400 men and 10 tankettes. The result was a Mongolian rout, with 56 Mongolian soldiers killed, including three Soviet advisors, and an unknown number wounded. Japanese losses were 27 killed and 9 wounded. Later in March 1936, another border clash occurred between Japanese and Soviet forces. Reports of border violations prompted the Japanese Korean Army to send ten men by truck to investigate, but the patrol was ambushed by 20 Soviet NKVD soldiers deployed about 300 meters inside territory claimed by Japan. After suffering several casualties, the Japanese patrol withdrew and was reinforced with 100 men, who then drove off the Soviets. Fighting resumed later that day when the NKVD brought reinforcements. By nightfall, the fighting had ceased and both sides had pulled back. The Soviets agreed to return the bodies of two Japanese soldiers who had died in the fighting, a development viewed by the Japanese government as encouraging. In early April 1936, three Japanese soldiers were killed near Suifenho in another minor affray. This incident was notable because the Soviets again returned the bodies of the fallen servicemen. In June 1937, the Kanchazu Island incident occurred on the Amur River along the Soviet–Manchukuo border. Three Soviet gunboats crossed the river's center line, disembarked troops, and occupied Kanchazu Island. Japanese forces from the IJA 1st Division, equipped with two horse-drawn 37 mm artillery pieces, quickly established improvised firing positions and loaded their guns with both high-explosive and armor-piercing shells. They shelled the Soviet vessels, sinking the lead gunboat, crippling the second, and driving off the third. Japanese troops subsequently fired on the swimming crewmen from the sunken ships using machine guns. Thirty-seven Soviet soldiers were killed, while Japanese casualties were zero. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested and demanded the Soviet forces withdraw from the island. The Soviet leadership, apparently shocked by the incident and reluctant to escalate, agreed to evacuate their troops. By 1938 the border situation had deteriorated. The tangled terrain features, mountain, bog, stream, forest, and valley, would have complicated even careful observers' discernment of the old red line drawn in 1886. Fifty years later, the markers themselves had undergone a metamorphosis. Japanese investigators could find, at most, only 14 to 17 markers standing fairly intact between the Tumen estuary and Khanka—roughly one every 25 miles at best. The remainder were missing or ruined; five were found in new locations. Marker "K," for example, was 40 meters deeper inside Manchuria, away from Khanka. Japanese military experts noted that of the 20 markers originally set along the boundaries of Hunchun Prefecture alone, only four could be found by the summer of 1938. The rest had either been wrecked or arbitrarily moved and discarded by Russian or Chinese officials and inhabitants. It is even said that one missing marker could be seen on display in Khabarovsk. The Chinese had generally interpreted the boundary as the road line just west of Khasan, at least in practice. Free road movement, however, had become a problem even 20 years before the Japanese overran Manchuria in 1931–1932 during the so-called Manchurian Incident. The Japanese adopted, or inherited, the Chinese interpretation, which was based on the 1886 agreement on border roads; the key clause held that the frontier west of Khasan would be the road along the lake. Japanese sources emphasize that local residents' anger toward gradual Soviet oppression and penetrations westward into Manchurian territory fueled the conflict. Many natives believed the original boundaries lay east of the lake, but the Soviets adjusted the situation to suit their own convenience. In practice, the Russians were restricting road use just west of Khasan by Manchurian and Korean residents. There was speculation that this was a prelude to taking over the ridgelines, depending on the reaction of the Manchukuoan–Japanese side. Villagers who went to streams or the lake to launder clothing found themselves subjected to sniper fire. Along a 25-mile stretch of road near Shachaofeng, farmers reported coming under fire from new Soviet positions as early as November 1935. Nevertheless, Japanese and Koreans familiar with the Tumen area noted agrarian, seasonal Korean religious rites atop Changkufeng Hill, including fattened pigs sacrificed and changgo drums beaten. Village elders told Japanese visitors in 1938 that, until early the preceding year, no Russians had come as far as Changkufeng Hill. Looking only at the border sector around Changkufeng, the easy days were clearly behind us. In the summer of 1938, Gaimusho "Foreign Ministry" observers described the explosive situation along the Korea–Manchuria–USSR borders as a matter of de facto frontiers. Both sides pressed against each other, and their trigger-happy posture was summed up in the colloquial refrain: "Take another step and we'll let you have it." Near dawn on 13 June 1938, a Manchurian patrol detected a suspicious figure in the fog swirling over Changlingtzu Hill on the Siberian–Manchurian frontier. Challenged at 15 feet, the suspect hurled two pistols to the ground and raised his hands in surrender. At headquarters, the police soon realized this was no routine border-trespassing case. The man was a defector and he was a Russian general, in fact he was the director of all NKVD forces in the Soviet Far East. Beneath a mufti of spring coat and hunting cap, he wore a full uniform with medals. His identification card No. 83 designated him as G. S. Lyushkov, Commissar 3rd Class, countersigned by Nikolai Yezhov, NKVD head in Moscow. Lyushkov was promptly turned over to the Japanese military authorities, who transferred him to Seoul and then to Tokyo under close escort. On 1 July, the Japanese press was permitted to disclose that Lyushkov had sought refuge in Japan. Ten days later, to capitalize on the commissar's notoriety and to confound skeptics, the Japanese produced Lyushkov at a press conference in Tokyo. For the Japanese and foreign correspondents, who met separately with him, Lyushkov described Soviet Far East strength and the turmoil wracking the USSR, because for those of you unfamiliar this was during the Stalinist purges. Clearly, the Japanese had gained a unique reservoir of high-level intelligence and a wealth of materials, including notes scratched in blood by suspects incarcerated at Khabarovsk. A general tightening of Russian frontier security had recently been reported. Natives of Fangchuanting asserted that a Soviet cavalry patrol appeared in June, seemingly for the first time. Contact with Yangkuanping, northwest of Khasan, was severed. More importantly, Japanese Army Signal Corps intelligence detected a surge of Soviet message traffic from the Posyet Bay district. After Lyushkov's defection, a drastic reshuffle in the local Russian command apparently occurred, and responsibility for border surveillance seems to have been reallocated. Japanese records indicate that the Novokievsk security force commander was relieved and the sector garrison replaced by troops from Vladivostok. Gaimusho intelligence also received reports that a border garrison unit had been transferred from Khabarovsk or Chita to the Tumen sector. The Kwantung Army signal monitors also intercepted two significant frontline messages on 6 July from the new Russian local commander in the Posyet region, addressed to Lieutenant General Sokolov in Khabarovsk. Decoded, the messages suggested (1) that ammunition for infantry mortars amounted to less than half the required supply; and  (2) a recommendation that higher headquarters authorize Russian elements to secure certain unoccupied high ground west of Khasan.  The commander noted terrain advantages and the contemplated construction of emplacements that would command Najin and the Korean railway. As a start, at least one Russian platoon should be authorized to dig in on the highest ground (presumably Changkufeng) and deploy four tons of entanglements to stake out the Soviet claim. Korea Army Headquarters received a telegram from the Kwantung Army on 7 July conveying the deciphered messages. On the same day, the 19th Division in North Korea telephoned Seoul that, on 6 July, three or four Soviet horsemen had been observed reconnoitering Manchurian territory from atop a hill called Changkufeng. The alarming intelligence from the Kwantung Army and the front warranted immediate attention by the Korea Army. Some Kwantung Army officers doubted the significance of the developments, with one intelligence official even suggesting the Russian messages might be a deliberate ploy designed to entrap the Japanese at Changkufeng. On 7–8 July, all staff officers in Seoul convened at army headquarters. The name of Changkufeng Hill was not well known, but maps and other data suggested that neither the Japanese nor the Russians had previously stationed border units in the ridge complex west of Khasan. As early as March 1936, Army Commander Koiso Kuniaki had distributed maps to subordinate units, indicating which sectors were in dispute. No patrol was to enter zones lacking definitive demarcation. Until then, the only Japanese element east of the Tumen was a Manchurian policeman at Fangchuanting. Ownership of the high ground emerged as an early issue. A number of other points were raised by  the Kwantung Army: At present, Soviet elements in the area were negligible. The intrusion must not be overlooked. The Russians could be expected to exploit any weakness, and half-measures would not suffice, especially regarding the Japanese defense mission along a 125-mile frontier. In Japanese hands, Changkufeng Hill would be useful, but two excellent observation posts already existed in the neighboring sector of the Manchurian tongue. With dissidence and purges underway, the Russians may have judged it necessary to seal border gaps, particularly after Lyushkov's defection. They may also have sought to control Changkufeng to offset Japanese dominance of the high ground to the north. Soviet seizure of Changkufeng would upset the delicate status quo and could provoke a contest for equivalent observation posts. In broader terms, it mattered little whether the Russians sought a permanent observation post on Changkufeng Hill, which was of relatively minor strategic value. Japan's primary concern lay in the China theater; Changkufeng was peripheral. The Japanese should not expend limited resources or become distracted. The matter required consultation with the high command in Tokyo. In the absence of more comprehensive intelligence, the assembled staff officers concluded that the Korea Army should, at a minimum, ignore or disregard Soviet actions for the time being, while maintaining vigilant observation of the area. The consensus was communicated to Major General Kitano Kenzo, the Korea Army chief of staff, who concurred, and to Koiso. Upon learning that the recommendation advocated a low posture, Koiso inquired only whether the opinion reflected the unanimous view of the staff. Having been assured that it did, he approved the policy. Koiso, then 58, was at the threshold of the routine personnel changes occurring around 15 July. He had just been informed that he would retire and that General Nakamura Kotaro would succeed him. Those acquainted with Koiso perceived him as treating the border difficulties as a minor anticlimax in the course of his command tour. He appeared unemphatic or relaxed as he prepared to depart from a post he had held for twenty-one years. Although neither Koiso nor his staff welcomed the Soviet activities that appeared under way, his reaction likely reflected a reluctance to make decisions that could constrain his soon-to-arrive successor. On 8 July Koiso authorized the dispatch of warnings to the 19th Division at Nanam, to the Hunchun garrison, and to the intelligence branch at Hunchun. These units were instructed to exercise maximum precautions and to tighten frontier security north of Shuiliufeng. In response to the initial appearance of Soviet horsemen at Changkufeng, the Kucheng Border Garrison Unit of the 76th Infantry Regiment maintained close surveillance across the Tumen. By about noon on 9 July, patrols detected approximately a dozen Russian troops commencing construction atop Changkufeng. Between 11 and 13 July, the number of soldiers on the slopes increased to forty; there were also thirty horses and eleven camouflaged tents. Operating in shifts on the western side, thirty meters from the crest, the Russians erected barbed wire and firing trenches; fifty meters forward, they excavated observation trenches. In addition to existing telephone lines between Changkufeng, Lake Khasan, and Kozando, the Russians installed a portable telephone net. Logistical support was provided by three boats on the lake. Approximately twenty kilometers to the east, well within Soviet territory, large forces were being mobilized, and steamship traffic into Posyet Bay intensified. Upon learning of the "intrusion" at Changkufeng on 9 July, Lt. General Suetaka Kamezo, the commander of the 19th Division, dispatched staff officers to the front and prepared to send elements to reinforce border units.  The special significance of Suetaka and his division stemmed from a series of unusual circumstances. Chientao Province, the same zone into which Lyushkov had fled and the sector where Soviet horsemen had appeared, fell within Manchukuo geographically and administratively. Yet, in terms of defense, the configuration of the frontier, the terrain, and the transportation network more closely connected the region with North Korea than with southeastern Manchuria. Approximately 80% of the population was of Korean origin, which implied Japanese rather than Manchukuoan allegiance. Consequently, the Korea Army had been made operationally responsible for the defense of Chientao and controlled not only the three-battalion garrison at Hunchun but also the intelligence detachment located there. In the event of war, the Korea Army's mission was defined as mobilization and execution of subsidiary operational tasks against the USSR, under the control and in support of the Kwantung Army.  The Korea Army ordinarily possessed two infantry divisions, the 19th in North Korea and the 20th stationed at Seoul, but the 20th Division had already departed for China, leaving only the 20th Depot Division in the capital. Beyond sparse ground units, devoid of armor and with weak heavy artillery, there were only two air regiments in Korea, the nearest being the unit at Hoeryong. The Korea Army was designed to maintain public security within Korea as well as fulfill minimal defensive responsibilities. Such an army did not require a full-time operations officer, and none was maintained. When needed, as in mid-1938, the task fell to the senior staff officer, in this case Colonel Iwasaki Tamio. In peacetime, training constituted the primary focus.  Thus, the 19th Division was entrusted with defending northeastern Korea. Its commander, Suetaka, a seasoned infantryman, resented the fact that his elite force had never engaged in combat in China. He intensified training with zeal, emphasizing strict discipline, bravery, aggressiveness, and thorough preparation. Japanese veterans characterized him as severe, bullish, short-tempered, hot-blooded, highly strung, unbending, and stubborn. Nonetheless, there was widespread respect for his realistic training program, maintained under firm, even violent, personal supervision. His men regarded Suetaka as a professional, a modern samurai who forged the division into superb condition. Privately, he was reputed for sensitivity and warmth; a Japanese phrase "yakamashii oyaji" captures the dual sense of stern father and martinet in his character. At the outset, however, Suetaka displayed little aggression. Although not widely known, he did not welcome the orders from army headquarters to deploy to the Tumen. Until late July, he remained somewhat opposed to the notion of dislodging the Soviets from the crest, a proposition arising from neither the division staff nor, initially, Suetaka himself. Colonel Sato noted that, for a week after reports of Soviet excavation at Changkufeng, the division's response was limited to preparations for a possible emergency, as they perceived the matter as a local issue best settled through diplomacy. Korea Army officers acknowledged that, around the time the Soviets consolidated their outpost strength at Changkufeng, an informal and personal telegram arrived in Seoul from a Kwantung Army Intelligence field-grade officer who specialized in Soviet affairs. If the Korea Army hesitated, the Kwantung Army would be obliged to eject the Russians; the matter could not be ignored. While the telegram did not demand a reply and struck several officers as presumptuous and implausible, the message was promptly shown to Koiso. Koiso was driven to immediate action, he wired Tokyo asserting that only the Korea Army could and would handle the incident. One staff officer recalled "We felt we had to act, out of a sense of responsibility. But we resented the Kwantung Army's interference." The Korea Army staff convened shortly after receipt of the unofficial telegram from Hsinking. Based on the latest intelligence from the division dated 13 July, the officers prepared an assessment for submission to the army commander. The hypotheses were distilled into three scenarios: The USSR, or the Far East authorities, desires hostilities. Conclusion: Slightly possible. The USSR seeks to restrain Japan on the eve of the pivotal operations in China: the major Japanese offensive to seize Hankow. Conclusion: Highly probable. The Posyet district commander is new in his post; by occupying the Changkufeng ridges, he would demonstrate loyalty, impress superiors, and seek glory. Conclusion: Possible. Late on 13 July or early on 14 July, Koiso approved the dispatch of a message to the vice minister of war, and the Kwantung Army chief of staff:  "Lake Khasan area lies in troublesome sector USSR has been claiming . . . in accordance with treaties [said Secret Message No. 913], but we interpret it to be Manchukuoan territory, evident even from maps published by Soviet side. Russian actions are patently illegal, but, considering that area does not exert major or immediate influence on operations [Japan] is intending and that China Incident is in full swing, we are not going to conduct counterattack measures immediately. This army is thinking of reasoning with Soviets and requesting pullback, directly on spot. . . . In case Russians do not accede in long run, we have intention to drive Soviet soldiers out of area east of Khasan firmly by use of force."  The message concluded with a request that the Tokyo authorities lodge a formal protest with the USSR, on behalf of Manchukuo and Japan, and guide matters so that the Russians would withdraw quickly. Dominant in Japanese high command thinking in 1938 was the China theater; the Changkufeng episode constituted a mere digression. A sequence of Japanese tactical victories had preceded the summer: Tsingtao fell in January; the Yellow River was reached in March; a "reformed government of the Republic of China" was installed at Nanking several weeks later; Amoy fell in early May; Suchow fell on the 20th. With these gains, northern and central fronts could be linked by the Japanese. Yet Chinese resistance persisted, and while public statements anticipated imminent Chinese dissension, private admissions acknowledged that the partial effects of Suchow's fall were ominous: control might pass from Chiang Kai-shek to the Communists, Chinese defiance might intensify, and Soviet involvement could ensue. A Hankow drive appeared desirable to symbolize the conclusion of the military phase of hostilities. The Japanese and their adversaries were in accord regarding the importance of the summer and autumn campaigns. Even after Suchow's fall, the government discouraged public insinuations that enemy resistance was collapsing; when Chiang addressed the nation on the first anniversary of hostilities, Premier Konoe prophetically proclaimed, "The war has just begun." Colonel Inada Masazum served as the Army General Staff's principal figure for the Changkufeng affair, occupying the position of chief of the 2nd Operations Section within the Operations Bureau in March 1938. A distinguished graduate of the Military Academy, Inada completed the War College program and held a combination of line, instructional, and staff assignments at the War College, the Army General Staff, and the War Ministry. He was recognized as a sharp, highly capable, and driveful personality, though some regarded him as enigmatic. Following the capture of Suchow, Imperial General Headquarters on 18 June ordered field forces to undertake operational preparations for a drive to seize the Wuhan complex. Inada favored a decisive move aimed at achieving a rapid political settlement. He acknowledged that Soviet intervention in 1938, during Japan's involvement in China, would have been critical. Although Japanese forces could still defeat the Chinese, an overextended Japanese Army might be fatally compromised against the Russians. Soviet assistance to China was already pronouncedly unwelcome. The Soviets were reported to possess roughly 20 rifle divisions, four to five cavalry divisions, 1,500 tanks, and 1,560 aircraft, including 300 bombers with a range of approximately 3,000 kilometers, enabling reach from Vladivostok to Tokyo. Soviet manpower in Siberia was likely near 370,000. In response, Japanese central authorities stressed a no-trouble policy toward the USSR while seeking to "wall off" the border and bolster the Kwantung Army as quickly as possible. Nevertheless, the envisaged correction of the strategic imbalance could not occur before 1943, given shortages in ammunition, manpower, and materiel across existing theaters in China. By the end of 1937 Japan had committed 16 of its 24 divisions to China, bringing the standing force to roughly 700,000. Army General Staff planners reallocated three ground divisions, intended for a northern contingency, from north to central China, even as the Kwantung Army operated from a less favorable posture. Attitudes toward the northern problem varied within senior military circles. While concern persisted, it was not universal. As campaigns in China widened, planning at the high command level deteriorated, propagating confusion and anxiety to field armies in China. The Japanese Navy suspected that the Army general staff was invoking the USSR as a pretext for broader strategic aims—namely, to provoke a more consequential confrontation with the USSR while the Navy contended with its own strategic rivalries with the Army, centered on the United States and Britain. Army leaders, however, denied aggressive intent against the USSR at that time. The Hankow plan encountered substantial internal opposition at high levels. Private assessments among army planners suggested that a two-front war would be premature given operational readiness and troop strength. Not only were new War Ministry officials cautious, but many high-ranking Army general staff officers and court circles shared doubts.  Aggressive tendencies, influenced by subordinates and the Kwantung Army, were evident in Inada, who repeatedly pressed Tada Shun, the deputy army chief of staff, to endorse the Wuhan drive as both necessary and feasible, arguing that the USSR would gain from Japan's weakening without incurring substantial losses. Inada contended that Stalin was rational and that time favored the USSR in the Far East, where industrial buildup and military modernization were ongoing. He argued that the Soviet purges impeded opportunistic ventures with Japan. He posited that Nazi Germany posed a growing threat on the western front, and thus the USSR should be avoided by both Japan, due to China and Russia, due to Germany. While most of the army remained engaged in China, Tada did not initially share Inada's views; only after inspecting the Manchurian borders in April 1938 did he finally align with Inada's broader vision, which encompassed both northern and Chinese considerations. During this period, Inada studied daily intelligence from the Kwantung Army, and after Lyushkov's defection in June, reports suggested the Soviets were following their sector commander's recommendations. Russian troops appeared at Changkufeng, seemingly prepared to dig in. Inada recollects his reaction: "That's nice, my chance has come." I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The simmering Soviet–Japanese border clashes centered on Changkufeng Hill near Lake Khanka, set within a broader history of contested frontiers dating to Qing and Tsarist treaties. Japan, prioritizing China, considered Changkufeng peripheral but ready to confront Soviet encroachment; Moscow aimed to consolidate border gains, with high-level war planning overlaying regional skirmishes. Conflict loomed over Manchuria.

Welcome to this weeks episode, where guest speaker Matt shares about his story and call to missions in Mongolia.

Ash sits down with UNE undergrad student Tian to discuss her experience in Mongolia, as part of a palaentological dig.Support the show: https://buymeacoffee.com/tunefmSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Hey guys before you listen to this one, do realize this is part 3 on a series about General Kanji Ishiwara, so if you have not already done so I would recommend listening to Part 1 & 2.    This episode is General Kanji Ishiwara part 3: The gradual fall into War with China   I tried so hard this time to finish this up neatly in part 3 and utterly failed. I wrote pages and even deleted them to keep squeezing, but theres simply too much to the story. Part 3 will be focusing on the insane politics of the 1930's and how Ishiwara tried to prevent war with China.   Its rather ironic that the man who was the chief instigator that ushering in the conquest of Manchuria was unable to impose his will when it came to molding Manchukuo. Now while Ishiwara Kanji was the operations officer given official responsibility over the planning and conduct of military operations to seize Manchuria, the arrangements for that new state, being political in nature, were not in his sphere of influence. Regardless, Ishiwara was extremely vocal about his opinions on how Manchukuo should develop and he heavily emphasized racial harmony. He continuously hammered his colleagues that the economic development of Manchukuo should reflect the spirit of racial cooperation. Ishiwara assumed the economic interests of Manchukuo would simply coincide with that of the Kwantung army, by definition both's ultimate goals would be unity of Asia against the west. He was very wrong. Ishiwara was consumed by his theory of final war, everything he did was to prepare for it, thus his obsession of racial harmony was another part of the plan.    In 1932 the self government guidance board was abolished in march, leaving its functions and regional organizations to be tossed into brand new bureaus of the new government of Manchukuo. An organization emerged in April called the (Kyowakai / Concordia Association). It was brought together by Yamaguchi Juji and Ozawa Kaisaku, and its purpose was to promote racial harmony and it was backed by members of the Kwantung army, notably Ishiwara, Itagaki and Katakura. The Kwantung army flooded money into the organization and it grew rapidly…well amongst the Japanese anyways. General Honjo was a bit weary about how much the organization might have in the political sphere of Manchukuo, he did not want to see it become an official political party, he preferred it remain in a educative role. By educative role, I of course mean, to be a propaganda arm of the Kwantung army to exert influence over Manchukuo without having real skin in the game.    But to Ishiwara the Concordia Association was the logical means to unify the new nation, guiding its political destiny, to be blunt Ishiwara really saw it should have much more authority than his colleagues believed it should. Ishiwara complained in August of 1932, that Manchuria was a conglomerate of conflicting power centers such as the Kwantung army, the new Manchukuo government, the Kwantung government, the Mantetsu, consular office and so on. Under so many hats he believed Manchukuo would never become a truly unified modern state, and of course he was one of the few people that actually wanted it to be so. He began arguing the Kwantung army should turn over its political authority as soon as possible so “Japanese of high resolve should hasten to the great work of the Manchurian Concordia Association, for I am sure that we Japanese will be its leaders. In this way Manchukuo will not depend on political control from Japan, but will be an independent state, based on Japanese Manchurian cooperation. Guided by Japanese, it will be a mode of Sino-Japanese friendship, an indicator of the present trends of world civilization” Needless to say the Concordia Association made little headway with the Chinese and it began to annoy Japanese leaders. The association gradually was bent into a spiritless propaganda and intelligence arm of the IJA, staffed largely by elite Japanese working in the Manchukuo government.    Ishiwara began using the Concordia Association to promote things such as: returning leased territories like the Railway zone, abolition of extraterritoriality, equalizing payment between the races working in Manchukuo, the kind of stuff that would promote racial harmony. Such advocacy as you can imagine deviated heavily with the Japanese military, and Ishiwara's reputation would be hurt by this. The Kwantung Army staff began shifting dramatically, seeing Ishiwara isolated, aside from Itagaki and a few other followers being around. The upper brass as they say had had enough of the nuisance Concordia Association's and gradually took control of it and made sure to stop the talk of concessions. In August of 1932 Ishiwara received a new assignment and it seems he was only too happy to leave Manchuria.   Ishiwara returned to Japan, disgusted with the turn of direction Manchuria was going, and believing he would be blamed for its future failures he submitted his resignation. But the IJA knew how popular Ishiwara was and how dangerous he could become so they rejected his resignation. Instead they gave him a military decoration. He was in a very strange spot now, for the youthful officers of the Kodoha faction loved Ishiwara, but the senior top brass of the IJA were extremely suspicious of him and lets just say he was kept under close watch.   Now with Ishiwara back in Japan he would get himself involved in a bit of a war between two factions. As many of you probably already know, the Japanese military of the late 1920s and early 1930's saw the emergence of two factions: the Kodoha “imperial way” and Tosei “control” factions. The Kodoha sought what they called a “showa restoration” to give the emperor absolute power like the good olds days as they say. They were willing to even form a coup if necessary to make this happen. Another thing they believed was in the Hokushin-ron “northern strike” war plan. The idea behind this was that the USSR and communism as a whole was Japans largest threat and the IJA needed to invade the USSR. Now the Tosei faction believed in most of what the Kodoha did, but they differed on some issues. Number 1) they were not willing to perform a coup to usher in a showa restoration, no they thought they could work with the existing Zaibatsu elites and politicians to get things done. THe Kodoha hated the politicians and Zaibatsu to the point they wanted to murder them, so differing opinions. The Tosei also believed the next world war would require a total war strategy, to build up Japan to fight the USSR, but probably the US as well. They favored Nanshin-ron “the southern strike” policy, to target the resources of south east asia necessary to give Japan what it needed to be self sufficient. Another thing that separated these two factions, the Kodoha typically were younger officers.   Despite their differences, everyone in the Japanese military understood forceful expansion into Asia was going to happen and this meant collison with the USSR, America and Britain. Ishiwara's first assignment back in Japan was a temporary duty with the foreign ministry, he was a member of the Japanese legation to the league of nations under Matsuoka Yosuke. The league of nations at this time was performing the Lytton Commission which was investigating the Macnhurian problem, ie: Japan invading Manchuria. Upon returning to Japan in summer of 1933, Ishiwara sought a regimental command, but found it difficult to acquire because of his troublemaker like history. Then General Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko who commanded the 2nd sendai division gave him command over the 4th infantry regiment. Ishiwara went to work training the men under him to counter the latest soviet infantry tactics and of course he lectured extensively about his final war theories. During this time rumors emerged that Ishiwara supported the Nanshin-ron strategy. Many of his old colleagues who supported Hokushin-ron demanded he explain himself and Ishiwara did. These rumors were actually false, it was not that Ishiwara favored the Nanshin-ron strategy, it was simply that he did not back all aspects of the Hokushin-ron strategy.   Ishiwara believed to challenge the USSR, first Japan needed an Asian union, which he thought would take probably 30 years to create. But to usher such an Asian union, first Manchukuo needed to be hammered out properly, something Ishiwara thought Japan was failing to do. Also Japan's military strength was insufficient to overwhelm the multiple enemies before her, the war she would enter would be a protracted one. To win such a war she needed resources and allies, notably Manchukuo and China. To confront the USSR, Japan would need to subvert outer mongolia, but to confront the USA and Britain she would have to seize the Philippines, Singapore, Hong Kong and Guam. It was going to be a global clash.   Ishiwara was gravely concerned with how powerful the USSR was becoming in the early 1930s. In the 3 years since he had left Manchuria, the Soviet divisions in east asia had jumped from 8 to 14 by the end of 1935, while Japanese divisions in Manchuria were only 3. For aircraft the Soviets had 950 vs 220 for Japan. On top of that the Soviets had TB-5 long range bombers, capable of hitting Japan, but the Japanese had no comparable aircraft. A large reason for such build up's were literally because Kodoha leaders were publicly threatening the Soviets such as Generals Sadao Araki. The Kodoha faction faced a lot of challenges as to how they could hope to face off against the USSR. They figured out three main principles needed to be overcome: 1) Japan had to prevent the USSR from being able to defeat its enemies to the west and east one at a time, Japan should seek diplomatic aims in this like allying with Germany. 2) A devastating blow was necessary to the USSR far east, perhaps against the Trans-siberian railway and air bases in the maritime provinces. 3) If Japan was able to demolish Soviet resistance in the far east, Japan would need to take forward positions on the Manchurian border for a protracted war. Ishiwara tried to figure out ways to get by these principles. First he advocated for Japanese troops strength in Manchuria and Korea to be 80% equivalent to that of the Soviets east of Lake Baikal at the offset of hostilities. He also urged cooperation with Germany and to preserve friendly neutral relations with Britain and the US, that is until the soviets were dealt with of course. Ishiwara vigorously felt the Nanshin ron strategy to push into southeast asia and the pacific was far too ambitious for the time being and that all efforts should be made to consolidate Manchuria for resources. Ishiwara tried to win over some Naval support for his plans, but none would be found. When Ishiwara showed his formal plans for Asia to the war ministry, they told him his projections in Manchuria would cost at least 1 billion 300 million yen. They also notified Ishiwara the navy were asking for about the same amount for their programs. Now while Ishiwara spent years trying to produce a 6 year plan to build up Manchuria, other significant things were going on in Japan.   The Kodoha faction as I said had a lot of younger officer support and a lot of these were men who came from rural parts of Japan. A lot of these men came from poor families suffering, and it looked to them that Japan was a nation full of social injustice and spiritual disintegration. These young officers were becoming more and more vocal in the early 1930's about wanting a showa restoration. They thought Japan would be better off as a military state with the emperor on top. Ishiwara empathized with the desire for a showa restoration, and many of the young officers calling for it claimed he was one of their champions. He made some fiery speeches in 1935 linking the evils of capitalism to the destitution of rural japan. He argued farmers were bearing crushing burdens because of economic privation. In his words “if the clash between the exploiters (landlords and capitalists) and the exploited continues much longer the exploited will be ground to bits. The present system of free economic competition has produced a situation where there is a small number of fabulously rich and limitless number of desperately poor. The national has indeed reached a national crisis. Liberal capitalism must inevitably give way to a newer system". What that “newer system was” however differed from what the youthful officers saw as their Showa restoration. Ishiwara wanted the Japanese government to create plans and policy, the Kodoha hardliners wanted to form a violent coup.    Kodoha officers began to push Ishiwara to champion their cause more and more. However by late 1935 Ishiwara's name would actually begin to be connected to the Tosei faction. While Ishiwara supported much of the Kodoha ideology, he simply did not share their beliefs in the same Showa restoration, he was more akin to the Tosei in that regard. Now after the manchurian incident the two factions kind of went to war with another to dominate the military. The Kodoha faction was early on the most powerful, but in 1934 their leader Araki resigned from the army due to failing health and he was replaced by General Senjuro Hayashi who favored the Tosei. In November of 1934, a plot was discovered that involved Kodoha officers seeking to murder some top ranking politicians. The result of this saw the Tosei faction force the resignation of the Kodoha leader General Jinzaburo Masaki, who was serving as the inspector general of military education. In retaliation to this, the Kodoha officer Saburo Aizawa murdered the Toseiha leader General Tetsuzen Nagata. This caused a frenzy, things began to really escalate, and many looked at Ishiwara Kanji to prove which side he favored. While in prison awaiting trial, Aizawa asked Ishiwara to be his defense counsel, to which he promised he would consider it. At the same time other Kodoha officers began pressing Ishiwara to support their cause openly. It is really hard to see where exactly Ishiwara was in all of this as all of his speeches prior were purposely ambiguous. He looked like a fence sitter and after what will be the February coup of 1936, there was testimony that Ishiwara was a middle-echelon member involved in the coup, other testimony literally had him on the list of people to be assassinated. A few weeks before Aizawa's trial, Ishiwara refused his request.   On February 26th, Ishiwara was awakened at his Tokyo home by a telephone call from Colonel Suzuki Teiichi informing him a rebellion was underway. Ishiwara, though ill at the time rushed over to the Military police HQ in Kudan. There he was informed of what was going on and how the officers were now taking the side of the showa restorationists or to quell the rebellion. From there he rushed to meet War Minister Kawashima Yoshiyuki where he demanded a proclamation of martial law to cope with the rebellion. He then urged Vice Chief of staff Sugiyama to order units from garrisons around Tokyo to overwhelm the rebels. Within 24 hours of the event, Ishiwara was then named operations officer of the Martial Law headquarters and he began coordinating plans to deal with the crisis. Thus Ishiwara occupied a crucial position in quelling the coup. On the night of the 27th a bunch of officers who sympathized with the rebels came to the HQ to argue for delaying actions against them. To this Ishiwara rose up and announced “we shall immediately carry forward plans for an assault. All units will assemble for that purpose. The army will wait until noon of the 28th; then it will begin its assault and crush the rebellion”. The next day,  Ishiwara went to the main entrance of the War Ministers office, where a large number of the rebels occupied and he demanded to talk to their leaders face to face. He hoped the youthful officers who looked up to him would see reason. They let him in, after they had shot Captain Katakura Tadashi for trying to do the same thing. Ishiwara then told them he shared many of their goals, but condemned their use of force. With a pistol pointed at him Ishiwara declared this “If you don't listen to reason you will be crushed by the severest measures”. He delivered his ultimatum and just walked out the door.    By the 28th the tides turned on the rebels. Emperor Hirohito put his foot down, demanding an end to the mutiny, many of the top Kodoha leaders walked away because of this. The Navy brought all of its power to Tokyo bay including its SNLF marines, all guns were on the rebels. Some of the rebels held out, still hoping the Emperor would change his mind and order a showa restoration, but by the 29th it fell apart. The rebels surrendered, aided by Colonel Tomoyuki Yamashita (one of my favorite generals of WW2, fascinating character). In the words of Matsumura Shuitsu a member of the Martial law HQ “In the midst of all the confusion and commotion, Ishiwara never lost sight of his objective and dealt with the criss with cool efficiency. If ever there was a case of the right man in the right place it was Ishiwara at that time. No doubt, what brought about the ultimate surrender of the rebel forces, was, of course, the Imperial command. But I believe that in a large part the collapse of the rebellion was due to the decisiveness of Ishwara, who never swerved, never hesitated. In short, Tokyo was saved by Ishiwara's courage”. It is rather ironic, many would point out it was Ishiwara who instigated the insurrection, but when it came time for it, he was the largest one to stamp down upon it. One could argue, by suppressing the rebellion, Ishawara had exploited the crisis in order to earn the political power necessary to bring about his version of a Showa Restoration.   During the mutiny, after meeting the rebels, Ishiwara actually had a secret meeting with two Kodoha officers at the Imperial Hotel. They were Colonel Hashimoto Kingoro and Colonel Mitsui Sakichi. He spoke to them about the possibility of forming a new government. The 3 of them came to these conclusions to actually perform a real Showa restoration. The rebels needed to go back to their barracks; the emperor needed to endorse the showa restoration; and members of the cabinet and top military leaders had to support it. Ishiwara then went to the Martial Law HQ and demanded Army vice chief of staff Sugiyama that he submit to the emperor a petition “to establish a restoration which would make clear the spirit of the nation, realize the national defense, and stabilize the peoples livelihood”. Sugiyama wanted nothing to do with this and told him “its simply impossible to relay such a request from the army” Ishiwara knew Sugiyama's position was too strong to challenge directly so he backed off, this was his last attempt to alter the nation's course through confrontation. Because of his actions during the quelling of the rebellion, this little scene was forgotten, his reputation was not tarnished…well it was amongst the Kodoha hardliners who saw him as a traitor, but other than that. Yet again he seems to be a man of many contradictions.  After the February coup the Kodoha faction ceased to exist and the Toseiha's ideology grabbed most of the military, though they also faded heavily.     Ishiwara went back to planning and lecturing taking a heavy notice of how Germany and Italy's totalitarian models were looking like the most efficient ones that Japan should emulate. He pushed heavily for a national defense state. He kept advocating for a 5 year plan he had to push Japan into a total war economy, but the industrialists and economists kept telling him it was far too much. I could write pages on all the ideas he had, he covered every aspect of Japanese society. He wanted the whole of Japan to devote itself to becoming the hegemonic power in Asia and this required self-sufficiency, more territory, alliances, an overhaul of Japan's politics, economy, etc etc he worked on this for years. One thing I find amusing to note, Ishiwara's plans had the national defense state not run directly by the military. No instead the military would only focus on military affairs to maximize their efficiency, thus civilians would lead the government. In his words “the tactics and strategy of national defense in the narrow sense are unquestionably the responsibility of the military. But national defense in the widest sense, industry, economy, transportation, communications are clearly related to the field of politics. Of course, the military can naturally express their opinion on these matters in order to counsel some minister whose duties are political, but to go before the general public and discuss the detailed industrial and economic is an arrogation of authority”. So ye, Ishiwara actually sought to remove military officers from political positions.    In 1937 Ishiwara was promoted to the rank of major general and his duties were of the operations division of the general staff. Because of his popularity and now his rank, some began to see him almost as that of a rising dictator. In January of 1937, the government of Hirota Koki who had come to power largely because of the february coup were having problems. Politicians were unable to deal with the rising military budgets. Ishiwara was eager to press forward his national defense state idea. Alongside this Captain Fukutome Shigeru, his naval counterpart was angry at the cabinet for hindering funding and called for their dissolution. In one meeting Ishiwara blurted out “if there's any disturbance the military should proclaim martial law throughout the country until things were straightened out”. Well within days the cabinet fell on its own and now everyone looked to a successor.    The Army and Navy fought for their candidate. The Nazi favored Ugaki Kazushige, but the Army held grudges against him. Ishiwara also did not like his appointment stating he had a bad political past, by bad that meant he had advocated for military budget cuts. Ugaki refused the job because of the pressure and made a note about Ishiwara's remarks towards him. Seeing Ugaki pushed aside, Ishiwara and his followers pushed for 3 other candidates; Hayashi Senjuro, House President Konoe Fumumaro and President of the privy council Hiranuma Kiichiro. Ishiwara sent to each man his 5 year plan to test their enthusiasm for it. Hiranuma didn't like it, Konoe was neutral and Hayashi liked it. So Ishiwara backed Hayashi go figure. All of his Manchurian oriented followers pushed to get him into office. When Hayashi was given Imperial command to head a new government, Ishiwara met with his Manchurian faction friends to draw a list of people to put in the cabinet. Itagaki Seishiro was chosen as war minister; Admiral Suetsugu Nobumasa known to have radical reformist leanings for navy minister; Matsuoka Yosuke or SHiratori Toshio for foreign minister, industrialist Ikeda Seihin for finance, Tsuda Shingo for commerce and industry, Sogo Shinji as chief cabinet secretary and Miyazaki as chairman. Ishiwara himself stayed carefully in the background to make it seem like he was only attending military duties.    But rivals to Ishiwara began working against him, especially some of those Kodoha hardliners who felt he betrayed them. They pressed Hayashi to not accept many of Ishiwara's cabinet candidates such as Itagaki and Hayashi backed off the majority of them as a result. The effort to form a Macnhurian cabal failed and this further led to a lack of enthusiasm for Ishiwara's national defense plans. Hayashi's government which Ishiwara had placed his hopes upon became antagonistic towards him and his followers.    Now over in Manchuria, the Kwantung army was looking to seize territory in northern China and inner mongolia. This was something Ishiwara was flip floppy about. At first he began speaking about the need to simply develop Manchukuo so that China and Inner mongolia would follow suite, but gradually he began to warm up to schemes to invade. Though when he heard his former Kwantun colleagues were basically going to perform the exact same plan he had done with the Mukden incident he traveled back to Manchuria to dissuade them. Ishiwara landed at Dairen and within days of his arrival he learned that 15,000 troops under Prince Demchugdongrub, known also as Prince Teh of Mongolia, backed by Kwantung arms and aircraft were launching a full scale invasion of Suiyuan province. Ishiwara was furious and he screamed at the General staff “the next time I visit the Kwantung Army I'm going to piss on the floor of the commanders office!”    Within a month, the Warlord Yan Xishan, now fighting for the NRA turned back Prince Teh's forces. This angered the Kwantung army, fueling what Ishiwara always feared, a war between China and Japan. Ishiwara began lecturing left right and center about how Japan needed to curb her imperialist aggression against China. He advocated as always racial harmonization, about the East Asian League idea, cooperation between China and Japan. He thought perhaps China could be induced by joined a federation with Japan and to do all of this Japan should help develop Manchukuo as a positive model. Ishiwara warned any aggressive actions against China would waste valuable resources needed dearly to be directed against the USSR. In his words “China was an endless bog that would swallow men and materiel without prospect of victory and it would cripple the possibility of East Asian Union” Prophetic words to be sure.   Ishiwara was still influential and many in Hayashi's cabinet headed him, trying to push for more diplomacy with China. But by spring of 1937 Tokyo HQ had split over the issue. On one side were Ishiwara and those seeking to obtain a sort of treaty with China to form an alliance against the USSR. On the other hand the Nationalists and Communists were on the verge of forming a united front allied to the USSR, thus the invading China faction was gaining steam. This faction simply sought to get China out of the way, then focus on the USSR. As much as Ishiwara fought it, the China War would come nonetheless.   In June of 1937, a report from a Japanese civilian visiting China reached Colonel Kawabe Torashiro. The report stated that the China Garrison Army in the Peking area were planning an incident similar to what had occurred in Mukden in 1931. Kawabe took the report to Ishiwara who said he would investigate the matter. Ishiwara pressed the war ministry to send Colonel Okamoto Kiyotomi to the military administration section to north china to warn Generals Hashimoto Gun of the China Garrison Army and Kwabe Msakazu commander the brigade station in the Peking area that Tokyo would not tolerate provocation actions. Okamoto came back and stated they reassured him it was just rumors and nothing was occurring.   Two weeks later on July 7th, the infamous Marco Polo Bridge incident began WW2. When it began, Tokyo took it as a minor incident, just some skirmishes between minor forces, but the fighting grew and grew. The two factions in Tokyo who we can call the “expansionists and non expansionists” began arguing on what to do. The expansionists argued this was the time to deliver a quick and decisive blow, which meant mobilizing and dispatching divisions into northern China to overwhelm them. The non expansionists argued they needed to terminate hostilities immediately and seek diplomacy before the conflict got out of hand. From the offset of the conflict, Ishiwara led the doomed non expansionists. Ishiwara tried to localize the conflict to prevent more Japanese from getting involved. To do this he urged Prince Kan'in to send a cable on July 8th to the local Japanese forces to settle the issue locally. But they reported back that the Nanjing government was tossing 4 divisions of reinforcements to the area, prompting the Japanese to mobilize 3 divisions in response. For 3 days Ishiwara tried to halt the reinforcements, but the Nanjing report came true, the Chinese reinforcements arrived to the scene, pushing the Japanese to do the same. General Kawabe Masakazu argued 12,000 Japanese civilians were in the area and now under threat, thus Ishiwara had to stand down.   The conflict at the Marco Polo Bridge quickly got out of hand. Ishiwara was very indecisive, he tried to thwart the spread of the conflict, but he was continuously forced to stand down when reports false or true poured in about Chinese offensives. In fact, Ishiwara's efforts were getting him in a ton of trouble as his colleagues began to point out they were hindering the military operations which at the time were trying to end the conflict quickly. Ishiwara did not go down without a fight tossing one last attempt to stop the conflict. He urged Prime Minister Konoe to fly to Nanjing to speak directly with Chiang Kai Shek, it was a last ditch effort before the Japanese reinforcements arrived. When Konoe received requests to do this from multiple Japanese military leaders on urged on by Ishiwara, he was initially favorable to the idea and had a plane prepared for the trip. But within hours of the idea leaked out raising a storm of protests from the expansionists. Sugiyama then told Konoe it was Ishiwara pushing the idea and that his views represented a small minority in the military. Konoe ultimately back down and chose not to do it. Ishiwara was outraged when he found out screaming “tell the Prime minister that in 2000 years of our history no man will have done more to destroy Japan than he has by his indecisiveness in this crisis”.   Ishiwara began fighting with his colleagues as the situation worsened. He tabled a motion to press Nanjing to support Manchukuo in order for the Japanese to withdraw, but his colleagues blocked it. By August the conflict had spread as far as Shanghai and now even the IJN were getting involved. To this Ishiwara argued they should just evacuate Japanese civilians in Shanghai and pay them several hundred million yen in compensation as it would be cheaper than a war. He was quickly overruled. Thus the North China Incident simply became the China incident. In early september Ishiwara tried one last attempt to negotiate a settlement, trying to get Germany to mediate, but by mid september Ishiwara's influence had dropped considerably. By late september Ishiwara was removed from the General staff by General Tada. The remnants of Ishiwara's followers in the central army were defeated, particularly when Konoe declared in January of 1938 that Japan would not treat with Chiang Kai-shek. Ironically Konoe would quickly come around to believe Japan had made a grave mistake. By 1938 24 IJA divisions were tossed into China, the next year this became 34. 

Want to discover Mongolia, or maybe you were thinking about visiting for the first time? It just got easier for us, as the Breakfast Show marks the launch of MIAT Mongolian Airlines' direct flights from Singapore to Ulaanbaatar. Emaad and Audrey explore fun facts about the world’s vast, sparsely populated land of nomads, epic history, and yes... throat singing! Presented by Emaad Akhtar and Audrey Siek Produced by Emaad Akhtar Edited by Trisha Yeong Photo and music credit: Pixabay & its talented community of contributorsSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

If you've ever harboured ambitions of travelling to Mongolia but were put off by the prospect of a cumbersome journey, here's some good news. With effect from today (Nov 4), Singapore is launching a twice-weekly non-stop service to Ulaanbaatar, the Mongolian capital. It has been branded a strategic move to bolster trade, tourism and business ties between the two countries, and gives Singaporeans a chance to explore another exotic destination. Brendan Sobie, Independent Analyst & Consultant, Sobie Aviation discusses the significance and timeliness of this development, and whether it will be a commercially viable proposition in the medium to longer-term. Produced and presented by Emaad Akhtar Photo credit: Changi Airport / FacebookSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

In this episode, our guest is Robert Schoellhammer, recently retired from a 25-year career at the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Robert shares reflections from his time working across Asia and Europe, highlighting how MDBs can and should lead with bold, transformative investments. From climate finance and energy access in Mongolia to electric vehicle policy in Manila, he unpacks why trust, innovation, and ambition matter more than ever. This episode is a deep dive into the "big bets" MDBs need to take to stay relevant in a fast-changing development landscape. Please join to find more. Connect with Sohail Hasnie: Facebook @sohailhasnie X (Twitter) @shasnie LinkedIn @shasnie ADB Blog Sohail Hasnie YouTube @energypreneurs Instagram @energypreneurs Tiktok @energypreneurs Spotify Video @energypreneurs

- 150 Hours of Travel To….Mongolia? - Cat Movie Fisher with Risho Unda - Biribá Union Finds Connection in the Unexpected

In this episode of the FocusCore Podcast, host David Sweet interviews Karsten Michaelis, CEO for North Asia and President of DHL Global Forwarding Japan. Karsten shares his extensive experience in the logistics industry, with a particular focus on his leadership journey across various Asian countries, including Japan. He discusses the unique challenges and strategies involved in managing teams in Japan, the importance of adapting to local cultures while maintaining core management principles, and the necessity of bridging the gap between headquarters and local expectations. Additionally, Karsten touches on fostering innovation, sustainability efforts at DHL, and the evolving landscape of logistics, especially in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. The conversation provides valuable insights into the complexities of global logistics and effective leadership in a multicultural environment.The 2026 FocusCore Salary Guide is here: 2026 Salary Guide In this episode you will hear:Karsten's strategies for adapting leadership approaches across different culturesThe importance of understanding and bridging HQ and local expectations in JapanInsights into fostering innovation and responsive leadership within a global organizationHow DHL is leveraging digital tools and AI to drive operational excellenceSustainable business practices and the future of logistics in a carbon-neutral worldKarsten's personal reflections on motivation and leadership development in the logistics industryAbout Karsten:Currently the CEO North Asia and President/Representative Director of DHL Global Forwarding Japan, Karsten is responsible for the overall strategy and development of our business in Japan, Korea, Mongolia and Philippines, which encompasses air- and oceanfreight, customs clearance, industrial projects, ocean bulk, motorsports as well as some warehouse activities.Karsten brings over two decades of forwarding experience with him which began in Germany in 1996. Since 2002, he has been working in Asia Pacific with postings in Hong Kong, Bangladesh, Australia and Singapore. Prior to his current role, Karsten held several positions with DHL Global Forwarding, heading the oceanfreight team in Asia Pacific he was responsible for the development of the ocean freight business spanning 21 countries across Asia Pacific.Karsten graduated with Honors in Business and Management Studies from Oxford Brookes University. He currently sits on the Asia Pacific Management Board for DHL Global Forwarding and is based in Tokyo.Connect with Karsten: LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/karsten-michaelis-7074955/Connect with David Sweet:LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/drdavidsweet/ Twitter: https://twitter.com/focuscorejp Facebook: :https://www.facebook.com/focuscoreasiaInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/focuscorejp/ Website: https://www.japan.focuscoregroup.com/ This podcast was proudly produced by Lisa Yasuda.“Doin' the Uptown Lowdown,” used by permission of...

What does it really mean to be creative — not just in art, but in leadership, business, and life? In this conversation, Fredrik Härén, The Creativity Explorer, shares insights from 25 years of traveling across 75 countries to study how different cultures unlock ideas. From the slums of Mumbai to the watchmakers of Switzerland, Fredrik reveals how creativity connects us all — and how you can rediscover your own creative spark to lead and live with imagination.

Хүүхэд хүмүүжил орчин үеийн арга барил. "OneSky Mongolia" Орон хариуцсан захирал Т.Мөнхтуул ярилцаv. by

Washington Wednesday on Trump's global strategy, World Tour on Christians in Mongolia, and the return of the Mexican wolf. Plus, Jordan Ballor on the government's crisis of responsibility, and the Wednesday morning newsSupport The World and Everything in It today at wng.org/donateAdditional support comes from The Issues, et cetera podcast. Expert guests, Expansive topics, Extolling Christ. More at issuesetc.orgFrom Asbury University — where students are known, supported, and prepared to lead. Customized visits available. asbury.edu/visitAnd from Cedarville University—a Christ-centered, academically rigorous university located in southwest Ohio, equipping students for Gospel impact across every career and calling. Cedarville integrates a biblical worldview into every course in the more than 175 undergraduate and graduate programs students choose from. New online undergraduate degrees through Cedarville Online offer flexible and affordable education grounded in a strong Christian community that fosters both faith and learning. Learn more at cedarville.edu, and explore online programs at cedarville.edu/online

Trisha Morton-Thomas and Maggie Miles on their documentary Journey Home, a powerful record of grief, community, and ceremony in which the renowned Indigenous actor David Gulpilil is laid to rest.Gabrielle Brady discusses The Wolves Always Come At Night, Australia's Oscar entry for the 2026 Academy Awards, which follows a couple living on a farm in rural Mongolia, forced to move to the city after a storm destroys their village.As it arrives in Australian cinemas, we revisit a conversation with APSA winner Neo Sora on his film Happyend. In a near-future Tokyo, as the threat of a catastrophic earthquake looms, two friends face consequences after carrying out a terrible prank. Hear the whole interview here.Presenter, Jason Di RossoProducer, Sarah CorbettSound engineer, Riley MelissArts editor, Rhiannon Brown

Trisha Morton-Thomas and Maggie Miles on their documentary Journey Home, a powerful record of grief, community, and ceremony in which the renowned Indigenous actor David Gulpilil is laid to rest.Gabrielle Brady discusses The Wolves Always Come At Night, Australia's Oscar entry for the 2026 Academy Awards, which follows a couple living on a farm in rural Mongolia, forced to move to the city after a storm destroys their village.As it arrives in Australian cinemas, we revisit a conversation with APSA winner Neo Sora on his film Happyend. In a near-future Tokyo, as the threat of a catastrophic earthquake looms, two friends face consequences after carrying out a terrible prank. Hear the whole interview here.Presenter, Jason Di RossoProducer, Sarah CorbettSound engineer, Riley MelissArts editor, Rhiannon Brown

Interview with Sam Spring, President and CEO, Kincora CopperOur previous interview: https://www.cruxinvestor.com/posts/kincora-copper-tsxvkcc-project-generator-strategy-transforms-growth-path-6975Recording date: 20th September 2025Kincora Copper has successfully transformed from a traditional single-project explorer into a diversified project generator, backed by prominent resource investors Rick Rule and Jeff Phillips through a C$4 million financing with a 12-month hold period. Following a 10-for-1 share consolidation, the company now operates with only 43 million shares outstanding and less than 40% free float, creating one of the tighter capital structures in the junior mining space.The strategic pivot emerged after the company invested over A$11 million and drilled 24,000 meters at its flagship Trundle project without achieving the share price movement or technical breakthrough needed to justify continued sole-funded exploration. President and CEO Sam Spring recognized that the traditional exploration approach risked exhausting capital before reaching discovery scale. The solution: partner projects while retaining meaningful equity stakes of 20-30%.Since adopting the project generator model, Kincora has completed five deals unlocking approximately $100 million in partner funding commitments. The company has already deployed $6.5 million across 13,500 meters of drilling from Q4 2024 through Q2 2025, with seven different licenses scheduled for drilling over the coming year. Critically, Kincora operates two earning joint ventures and receives management fees, creating an income stream that approaches covering all corporate costs.AngloGold Ashanti has emerged as the most active partner, planning approximately 11,000 meters of drilling across three projects in the Macquarie Arc, home to Australia's second-largest porphyry mine at Northparkes and Evolution Mining's flagship Cowal operation. The company has retained its two most advanced projects—Trundle and Fairholme—seeking optimal partnerships that preserve long-term value rather than simply accessing near-term drilling capital.Additional opportunities include the Bronze Fox project in Mongolia, which offers near-term SX-EW copper production potential at current prices, and the Condobolin project in the consolidating Cobar Basin. Spring emphasizes the portfolio approach: "Any one disappointment isn't going to be a disaster to the share price, but any one big success will give you that multiple re-rating."Learn more: https://www.cruxinvestor.com/companies/kincora-copper-limitedSign up for Crux Investor: https://cruxinvestor.com

Welcome to the Daily Compliance News. Each day, Tom Fox, the Voice of Compliance, brings you compliance-related stories to start your day. Sit back, enjoy a cup of morning coffee, and listen in to the Daily Compliance News. All, from the Compliance Podcast Network. Each day, we consider four stories from the business world, compliance, ethics, risk management, leadership, or general interest for the compliance professional. Top stories include: Corruption probe in Mongolia. (WSJ) How will the US define ‘country of origin'? (NYT) US sanctions the Colombian President for ‘not doing enough.' (WSJ) Sports and mafia ties run deep. (ESPN) The Daily Compliance News has been honored as the No. 2 in the Best Regulatory Compliance Podcasts category. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

As permafrost in Siberia continues to melt and the steppe in the Gobi turns to desert, people in Mongolia are faced with overlapping climate crises. Some nomadic herders describe climate change as the end of a world. They are quick to add that the world has ended before for Indigenous people in North Asia, as waves of colonialism have left the steppe with a complicated web of apocalypses. A Song for the Horses by K. G. Hutchins examines cases in which people respond to the pressures of climate change by drawing on cultural heritage to foster social resiliency. In this episode, K. G. joins me to discuss his research on the morin khuur, or “horse fiddle,” in Mongolia, and how Mongolians use the traditional instrument to express and envision human and more-than-human futures against the backdrop of anthropogenic climate change. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

As permafrost in Siberia continues to melt and the steppe in the Gobi turns to desert, people in Mongolia are faced with overlapping climate crises. Some nomadic herders describe climate change as the end of a world. They are quick to add that the world has ended before for Indigenous people in North Asia, as waves of colonialism have left the steppe with a complicated web of apocalypses. A Song for the Horses by K. G. Hutchins examines cases in which people respond to the pressures of climate change by drawing on cultural heritage to foster social resiliency. In this episode, K. G. joins me to discuss his research on the morin khuur, or “horse fiddle,” in Mongolia, and how Mongolians use the traditional instrument to express and envision human and more-than-human futures against the backdrop of anthropogenic climate change. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

As permafrost in Siberia continues to melt and the steppe in the Gobi turns to desert, people in Mongolia are faced with overlapping climate crises. Some nomadic herders describe climate change as the end of a world. They are quick to add that the world has ended before for Indigenous people in North Asia, as waves of colonialism have left the steppe with a complicated web of apocalypses. A Song for the Horses by K. G. Hutchins examines cases in which people respond to the pressures of climate change by drawing on cultural heritage to foster social resiliency. In this episode, K. G. joins me to discuss his research on the morin khuur, or “horse fiddle,” in Mongolia, and how Mongolians use the traditional instrument to express and envision human and more-than-human futures against the backdrop of anthropogenic climate change. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/performing-arts

As permafrost in Siberia continues to melt and the steppe in the Gobi turns to desert, people in Mongolia are faced with overlapping climate crises. Some nomadic herders describe climate change as the end of a world. They are quick to add that the world has ended before for Indigenous people in North Asia, as waves of colonialism have left the steppe with a complicated web of apocalypses. A Song for the Horses by K. G. Hutchins examines cases in which people respond to the pressures of climate change by drawing on cultural heritage to foster social resiliency. In this episode, K. G. joins me to discuss his research on the morin khuur, or “horse fiddle,” in Mongolia, and how Mongolians use the traditional instrument to express and envision human and more-than-human futures against the backdrop of anthropogenic climate change. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/environmental-studies

As permafrost in Siberia continues to melt and the steppe in the Gobi turns to desert, people in Mongolia are faced with overlapping climate crises. Some nomadic herders describe climate change as the end of a world. They are quick to add that the world has ended before for Indigenous people in North Asia, as waves of colonialism have left the steppe with a complicated web of apocalypses. A Song for the Horses by K. G. Hutchins examines cases in which people respond to the pressures of climate change by drawing on cultural heritage to foster social resiliency. In this episode, K. G. joins me to discuss his research on the morin khuur, or “horse fiddle,” in Mongolia, and how Mongolians use the traditional instrument to express and envision human and more-than-human futures against the backdrop of anthropogenic climate change. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/music

How Catholic Charities USA is serving families feeling the economic pinch during the ongoing government shutdown. PLUS, Cardinal Giorgio Marengo shares what it's like to be a Catholic missionary in Mongolia.

In the long run, countries in Northeast Asia will have to see the need for collective defense. Otherwise, you won't be able to stop rivalry between powers like the U.S. and China. It sounds utopian now, but so did the idea of French and German soldiers serving under the same command a century ago.                                                                                                                                        – Y.S. Lee, NBN Interview (2025) Sustainable Peace in Northeast Asia (Anthem Press, 2023) examines the enduring political and military tensions in one of the world's most dynamic yet unstable regions, from China and the Korean Peninsula to Japan, Mongolia, and Russia's Far East. Despite its economic vitality, Northeast Asia remains fraught with persistent risks of conflict including North Korea's nuclear program, and the unresolved disputes over territory, history, and power imbalances fueled in part by China's rise. Y.S. Lee traces the political, historical, military, and economic forces behind these tensions and their global implications. Offering a comparative, country-by-country analysis, he also explores the influence of external powers such as the United States and Russia. The book assesses the prospects and consequences of Korean reunification and provides a fresh look at Mongolia's often-overlooked role in regional stability, suggesting how imagination and diplomacy together might begin to rebuild trust across the region. In this NBN interview, Professor Lee discusses how history, ideology, and institutional design intersect across the region – from the entanglement of North Korea's Juche ideology with its nuclear ambitions to Japan's struggle for reconciliation, and South Korea's evolving identity as a middle power. He argues that sustainable peace requires economic, political, and even eventual military cooperation akin to Europe's postwar transformation, which was once unthinkable, but ultimately necessary. Yong-Shik Lee is Director of the Law and Development Institute and a leading scholar of international economic law and institutional reform. His previous works include Law and Development: Theory and Practice (2011; 2nd ed. 2021), Reclaiming Development in the World Trading System (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed. 2016), and Safeguard Measures in World Trade: The Legal Analysis (Edward Elgar, 3rd ed. 2014). His research bridges economic theory and policy design to advance inclusive development and peace. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

In the long run, countries in Northeast Asia will have to see the need for collective defense. Otherwise, you won't be able to stop rivalry between powers like the U.S. and China. It sounds utopian now, but so did the idea of French and German soldiers serving under the same command a century ago.                                                                                                                                        – Y.S. Lee, NBN Interview (2025) Sustainable Peace in Northeast Asia (Anthem Press, 2023) examines the enduring political and military tensions in one of the world's most dynamic yet unstable regions, from China and the Korean Peninsula to Japan, Mongolia, and Russia's Far East. Despite its economic vitality, Northeast Asia remains fraught with persistent risks of conflict including North Korea's nuclear program, and the unresolved disputes over territory, history, and power imbalances fueled in part by China's rise. Y.S. Lee traces the political, historical, military, and economic forces behind these tensions and their global implications. Offering a comparative, country-by-country analysis, he also explores the influence of external powers such as the United States and Russia. The book assesses the prospects and consequences of Korean reunification and provides a fresh look at Mongolia's often-overlooked role in regional stability, suggesting how imagination and diplomacy together might begin to rebuild trust across the region. In this NBN interview, Professor Lee discusses how history, ideology, and institutional design intersect across the region – from the entanglement of North Korea's Juche ideology with its nuclear ambitions to Japan's struggle for reconciliation, and South Korea's evolving identity as a middle power. He argues that sustainable peace requires economic, political, and even eventual military cooperation akin to Europe's postwar transformation, which was once unthinkable, but ultimately necessary. Yong-Shik Lee is Director of the Law and Development Institute and a leading scholar of international economic law and institutional reform. His previous works include Law and Development: Theory and Practice (2011; 2nd ed. 2021), Reclaiming Development in the World Trading System (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed. 2016), and Safeguard Measures in World Trade: The Legal Analysis (Edward Elgar, 3rd ed. 2014). His research bridges economic theory and policy design to advance inclusive development and peace. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

Episode 93: “A Record Length Nipple Hair”In this jam-packed episode of Ineffably Sublime, the crew dives into everything from absurd personal discoveries to eerie legends from across the globe. DeeJ, Mitch, and Amanda kick things off with banter about AI video tools like Sora 2 before spiraling into the painful reality of dairy intolerance and the existential crisis of post-pizza regret. From there, the team debates the pros and cons of video podcasts, movie-watching philosophies, and the strange joy of Halloween excess.But things take a darker—and funnier—turn as they explore bizarre and haunting folklore from around the world: China's corpse walkers, France's headless Saint Denis, Brazil's Barbara of Pleasures, Nigeria's Madame Koi Koi, and Mongolia's legendary death worm. Along the way, they somehow fit in a rant about Halloween candy lawsuits, a few soundboard mishaps, and Amanda's wild FedEx sighting.By the time they wrap, the crew has traveled through centuries of superstition, cultural oddities, and inexplicable nonsense—all with the signature mix of curiosity and chaos that defines Ineffably Sublime.

In the long run, countries in Northeast Asia will have to see the need for collective defense. Otherwise, you won't be able to stop rivalry between powers like the U.S. and China. It sounds utopian now, but so did the idea of French and German soldiers serving under the same command a century ago.                                                                                                                                        – Y.S. Lee, NBN Interview (2025) Sustainable Peace in Northeast Asia (Anthem Press, 2023) examines the enduring political and military tensions in one of the world's most dynamic yet unstable regions, from China and the Korean Peninsula to Japan, Mongolia, and Russia's Far East. Despite its economic vitality, Northeast Asia remains fraught with persistent risks of conflict including North Korea's nuclear program, and the unresolved disputes over territory, history, and power imbalances fueled in part by China's rise. Y.S. Lee traces the political, historical, military, and economic forces behind these tensions and their global implications. Offering a comparative, country-by-country analysis, he also explores the influence of external powers such as the United States and Russia. The book assesses the prospects and consequences of Korean reunification and provides a fresh look at Mongolia's often-overlooked role in regional stability, suggesting how imagination and diplomacy together might begin to rebuild trust across the region. In this NBN interview, Professor Lee discusses how history, ideology, and institutional design intersect across the region – from the entanglement of North Korea's Juche ideology with its nuclear ambitions to Japan's struggle for reconciliation, and South Korea's evolving identity as a middle power. He argues that sustainable peace requires economic, political, and even eventual military cooperation akin to Europe's postwar transformation, which was once unthinkable, but ultimately necessary. Yong-Shik Lee is Director of the Law and Development Institute and a leading scholar of international economic law and institutional reform. His previous works include Law and Development: Theory and Practice (2011; 2nd ed. 2021), Reclaiming Development in the World Trading System (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed. 2016), and Safeguard Measures in World Trade: The Legal Analysis (Edward Elgar, 3rd ed. 2014). His research bridges economic theory and policy design to advance inclusive development and peace. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/political-science

In the long run, countries in Northeast Asia will have to see the need for collective defense. Otherwise, you won't be able to stop rivalry between powers like the U.S. and China. It sounds utopian now, but so did the idea of French and German soldiers serving under the same command a century ago.                                                                                                                                        – Y.S. Lee, NBN Interview (2025) Sustainable Peace in Northeast Asia (Anthem Press, 2023) examines the enduring political and military tensions in one of the world's most dynamic yet unstable regions, from China and the Korean Peninsula to Japan, Mongolia, and Russia's Far East. Despite its economic vitality, Northeast Asia remains fraught with persistent risks of conflict including North Korea's nuclear program, and the unresolved disputes over territory, history, and power imbalances fueled in part by China's rise. Y.S. Lee traces the political, historical, military, and economic forces behind these tensions and their global implications. Offering a comparative, country-by-country analysis, he also explores the influence of external powers such as the United States and Russia. The book assesses the prospects and consequences of Korean reunification and provides a fresh look at Mongolia's often-overlooked role in regional stability, suggesting how imagination and diplomacy together might begin to rebuild trust across the region. In this NBN interview, Professor Lee discusses how history, ideology, and institutional design intersect across the region – from the entanglement of North Korea's Juche ideology with its nuclear ambitions to Japan's struggle for reconciliation, and South Korea's evolving identity as a middle power. He argues that sustainable peace requires economic, political, and even eventual military cooperation akin to Europe's postwar transformation, which was once unthinkable, but ultimately necessary. Yong-Shik Lee is Director of the Law and Development Institute and a leading scholar of international economic law and institutional reform. His previous works include Law and Development: Theory and Practice (2011; 2nd ed. 2021), Reclaiming Development in the World Trading System (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed. 2016), and Safeguard Measures in World Trade: The Legal Analysis (Edward Elgar, 3rd ed. 2014). His research bridges economic theory and policy design to advance inclusive development and peace. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/world-affairs

In the long run, countries in Northeast Asia will have to see the need for collective defense. Otherwise, you won't be able to stop rivalry between powers like the U.S. and China. It sounds utopian now, but so did the idea of French and German soldiers serving under the same command a century ago.                                                                                                                                        – Y.S. Lee, NBN Interview (2025) Sustainable Peace in Northeast Asia (Anthem Press, 2023) examines the enduring political and military tensions in one of the world's most dynamic yet unstable regions, from China and the Korean Peninsula to Japan, Mongolia, and Russia's Far East. Despite its economic vitality, Northeast Asia remains fraught with persistent risks of conflict including North Korea's nuclear program, and the unresolved disputes over territory, history, and power imbalances fueled in part by China's rise. Y.S. Lee traces the political, historical, military, and economic forces behind these tensions and their global implications. Offering a comparative, country-by-country analysis, he also explores the influence of external powers such as the United States and Russia. The book assesses the prospects and consequences of Korean reunification and provides a fresh look at Mongolia's often-overlooked role in regional stability, suggesting how imagination and diplomacy together might begin to rebuild trust across the region. In this NBN interview, Professor Lee discusses how history, ideology, and institutional design intersect across the region – from the entanglement of North Korea's Juche ideology with its nuclear ambitions to Japan's struggle for reconciliation, and South Korea's evolving identity as a middle power. He argues that sustainable peace requires economic, political, and even eventual military cooperation akin to Europe's postwar transformation, which was once unthinkable, but ultimately necessary. Yong-Shik Lee is Director of the Law and Development Institute and a leading scholar of international economic law and institutional reform. His previous works include Law and Development: Theory and Practice (2011; 2nd ed. 2021), Reclaiming Development in the World Trading System (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed. 2016), and Safeguard Measures in World Trade: The Legal Analysis (Edward Elgar, 3rd ed. 2014). His research bridges economic theory and policy design to advance inclusive development and peace. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

I would like to thank Patreon member Xizer for suggesting this one, as Xizer put it    “An in depth look at General Kanji Ishiwara would be interesting. The man was the architect for the Mukden Incident that led to the Second Sino Japanese War, but he was vehemently opposed to the abuse and exploitation Japan's colonialism indulged in. His vocal condemnation of the brutality and excesses of the Imperial Japanese military foreign policy and Tojo in particular led to his removal, but he couldn't be executed for popularity in the rank and file. Even at the trials after the war he remained defiant, declaring that President Truman should be tried alongside the Axis War criminals for firebombing Japanese cities. He was truly a fascinating figure.   Indeed Kanji Ishiwara is a fascinating character and his story has a startling impact on the Pacific War and global history as a whole. Now by the time I am reading this the script got out of hand, its a long one haha, so it might have to be a multi parter, but I want to limit the first part to Ishiwara and how the Mukden Incident occurred first. It might come further down the road but I will finish the story of this fascinating man later on after hitting up more Patrons desired subjects, without further adieu enjoy part one of Kanji Ishiwara.    Kanji Ishiwara was born in Tsuruoka, Yamagata prefecture on January 18th of 1889. He was the second son of a policeman who was a descendent of a samurai family serving the Shonai Domain. His clan supported the Tokugawa Shogunate during the Boshin War and as a result of their defeat, alongside other Shogunal allied clans would see themselves shut off from larger governmental positions in Meiji Era Japan. Not to go too deep down that rabbit hole, but domains like Choshu and Satsuma would see the lionshare of higher positions, while domains who served on the opposite side would be cast out more.   Ishiware began his army career at the military preparatory school in Sendai at the age of 13, followed up by 2 years at the Central military preparatory school in tokyo. In 1907 he entered the military academy as a member of its 21st class. He left the academy in july of 1909 with the commission of Lieutenant and an assignment as platoon commander of an infantry regiment in Tohoku. After the annexation of Korea in 1910 his regiment was shipped over to the peninsula and he served at Ch'unch'on in a small garrison. After two years of occupation duty, Ishiwara returned to Tohoku and in 1915 passed the examinations necessary to enter the Army Staff college. He held an outstanding record, graduating top of his class in november of 1918 and would be amongst the elite ranks of the Gunto Gumi, receiving the imperial sword.   Now in 1920 he had a frustrating assignment with the department of military training he applied for service in China and received an assignment to the Central china garrison in Hankow. He spent a year traveling through central china before returning back to Tokyo in 1921 where he worked as a lecturer at the army staff college. He sought another China assignment, but his superiors sent him instead to Europe, as they did with all their promising young officers. He went to Germany for 3 years, studying languages and military history. In 1925, he was now a Major, 36 years of age and he received an assignment to the faculty of the army staff college to lecture about the history of war. Now from the very beginning of his character, Ishiwara proved himself a very unconventional officer. He was on the eccentric side, quite argumentative and burdened with a lot of health problems. He had multiple kidney infections, gastro-intestinal problems, tympanitis and other ailments that clawed at him. You also cant forget his ancestry which was important to the Japanese military even in the 1930s. Many of those that came from a disgraced clan had the habit of going above and beyond in terms of imperial loyalty, sort of like a way to rid themselves of the stigma of distrust that was seen in the early Meiji years.   Ishiwara was a bit bizarre, he was nonconforming, quite an independent spirit you would say. Many biographers of his point out, while he held an outstanding record in his education, this went alongside things like his disregard for military punctilio, such as his dress and appearance. In his early career he spoke out against inequalities he saw within the military such as what he saw as favoritism for staff college graduates. Such talk was quite reckless. He read a lot about politics, religion, history and philosophy, he seemed to have quite the restless mind. His behavior drew attention from his colleagues, many deeming him brilliant.   Now everyone in any military has to learn about military history, but not all seek to learn it outside the required readings and such. Ishiwara is one of those rare individuals who was obsessed with learning more about military history. He read about the Russo Japanese war and took quite a critical look at it. He believed the Japanese victory was due to a large part because of luck. He thought Japan had taken the von Moltke strategy of annihilation, but Russia was simply to large to be dislodged from Asia with a swift stroke. If Russia had preserved herself better, he believed Japan would have lost and it was only by a peculiar set of circumstances that Japan had avoided a war of endurance. Ishiwara believed if such a set of circumstance occurred again, Japan defense planning would need to change dramatically to base itself on the realities of modern warfare. This led him to read thoroughly about WW1 in europe and he looked critically at the differences between a short duration vs long duration war. How prolonged conflicts eventually became total wars where politics, economics and social order played larger roles, than just that of the military. This led him to think of categories for different types of war such as “kessenteki senso / decisive war” and “jizokuteki senso / continuous war”. He viewed these two types as flowing back and forth throughout history, in a cyclical rhythm.    While in Germany he studied Clausewitz, von Moltke and the works of Hans Delbruck. He was particularly taken by Delbrucks niederwerfungstragie “strategy of annihilation, the decisive battle” and ermattungsstrategie “the strategy of exhaustion”. He could see his own theorizes more fleshed out in such works and took quite a liking to them. This brought him to analyze the Napoleonic war as the archetype of the war of annihilation and the wars of Frederick the Great as that of a war of exhaustion.    Now further on in his studies, Ishiwara became convinced like many of his colleagues, that Japan and the United States for reasons of power and ideology were on a set course for war. He also concluded such a war would be a protracted one, that of a strategy of exhaustion. But how could Japan prepare for such a protracted war when her natural resources were so clearly inadequate. This led him to think more so about Asia. Ishiwara believed Asia was an entity distinctly different from the west. He held beliefs that Asia should be liberated and unite. During the Xinhai revolution of 1911, as a young cadet in Korea, Ishiwara was quite excited by the idea China might revitalize itself, but he became disillusioned during his time in China later. In the 1920's he dealt with bandits, warlord era conflicts, chaos and disorder, seeing poverty everywhere, all of this shattered his image of China progressing and reforming herself. He wrote this during that time “Looking at the situation in China, I came to harbor grave doubts as to the political capacities of the chinese race and came to feel that, though they were a people of high cultural attainment, it was impossible for them to construct a modern state”. Despite how disappointed he was with the political problems of China, he was likewise disgusted with how his Japanese colleagues treated the Chinese. He recalled feelings of shame when he saw fellow colleagues in Hankow descending from rickshaws and tossing coins to the ground at the rickshaw mens feet. He would constantly write of how the Japanese needed to shed their racial superiority feelings, but funny enough he would write this alongside his beliefs it was necessary for Japan to help guide nations like China to their destiny. While he may have held beliefs in racial equality between Japan and China, he certainly did not think the same of China's politics. Like the majority of his colleagues he believed China required reform and modernization that Japan should usher in. To Ishiwara the issue at hand was if Japan did not help China, the west would aggressively do so and thus subjugate her further. To Ishiwara China needed liberation. Ishiwara also linked the incoming war between Japan and the United States to play a large role for what would occur between China and Japan.   Ishiwara like many Japanese officers held beliefs concerning the Kokutai. I will try to summarize exactly what the Kokutai is, but honestly its a unbelievably complex cultural phenomenon. The Kokutai was a spiritual motive force that influenced the Japanese military. It can be viewed as the national character of Japan. Japan was a constitutional monarchy that held the Kokutai (national body or character)  and Seitai (government body/structure). Thus there was in reality two ideologies, one held the traditional belief focusing on that of the emperor and that of the official government. If I were to give you a overly confusing summary, I would tell you “Japan is run by the emperor and the government simultaneously” this of course if confusing as hell, and it should be. Article 4 of the former Japanese constitution held “the emperor is the head of the empire, combining in himself the right of sovereignty, uniting the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, although subject to the consent of the imperial diet”. Its like saying you have an absolute monarch, but he will be listening and following the democratically elected people. This contradiction would lead to the Pacific War. A large issue that would emerge is that the constitution literally said the navy and army were controlled by the Emperor and not the political diet. Thus many in the military viewed themselves subject to the Kokutai, which as an ideology would evolve dramatically from the Meiji era to the Showa Era. For example, what if you are a military high ranking officer who views the political elites as nothing more than criminals, taking the emperor hostage against his will and thus against the will of the Japanese people. Well this might lead you to try and overthrow the government to make sure the Emperor was really in charge as you think he should be. A real rabbit hole I could go down.   Ishiwara had a unique view of the Kokutai. In his early education he wrote this about his doubt on understanding it as a principal. “Even though I, myself, because of my training…had come to have an unshakeable faith in the kokutai I began to lack confidence that I could imparts this belief to others –to the common soldier, to the civilian, to non-Japanese”. His issue was how did the Kokutai apply outside Japan? How could its value transcend the national boundaries and interests of Japan? If a Japanese soldier was to sacrifice his life for the Kokutai, how did this take on any meaning for men of all races? How could the kokutai's supra-national value by linked to other outside ideologies?   Ishiwara found some answers to these questions in Nichiren Buddhism. It seems here he was able to combine his conceptions about war, history and national purpose. Now Ishiwara did not come from a religious family. He dabbled in christianity for a bit, but did not pursue it. Shinto likewise did not sufficiently fulfill Shiwara' beliefs. Nichiren Buddhism is strongly patriotic, has a apocalyptic character to it and represents a holy mission to be the religion for all mankind with the center of propagation as Japan. There was this kind of quasi idea of world regeneration behind it with Japan as the moral righteous leader. Thus as you can imagine the Kokutai and Nichiren buddhism sort of fit like a glove in many ways.    Utilizing Nichiren Buddhism, the kokutai could be raised from its purely national dogma and be amplified to the entire world. Ishiwara was introduced to all of this by Tanaka Chigaku who was part of the Kokuchukai “national pillar society” a nichiren nationalist organization with an HQ in tokyo. After attending a public meeting held by Tanaka, he quickly converted to Kokuchukai and he would write down in his journal “I was attracted to the Nichiren faith's view of the kokutai”. Nichiren buddhism.    One aspect of Kokuchukai's nichirenism that greatly appealed to Ishiwara was its combative passages. Ishiwara would justify and attribute much of the military force Japan used on the asian continent drawing parallels to Nicherns idea of drawing the sword to defend righteousness. He often quoted nichirens statement “that the significance of the art of war appears in the wonderful law”. Ishiwara become engulfed by the nichiren doctrine and came to believe in its prediction that there would be a “Zendai mimon no dai toso / titanic world conflict, unprecedented in human history”, something like a global armageddon. After this would come a reign of universal and eternal peace under the harmony of “the wonderful law”.   While in Germany Ishiwara became convinced that if Japan and the United States were destined for war and the US won that war, the kokutai would be destroyed. He took the trans-siberian railway enroute back to Japan and stopped in Harbin. There he met with Nichiren believers and he spoke to them about his idea of “a final war”. He stated he believed it would come through religious prediction and his military analysis. He warned everyone Japan must hasten herself for it and that “the final war is fast approaching”. Ishiwara came back to Japan in 1925 fired up with conviction to lecture at the army staff college about his final war. His audience was the army's bright and youthful officers. He taught them Frederican and Napoleonic campaigns, Moltke and WW1 and of course his thoughts on the future conflict before them all. The Army staff college continuously called for him to expand his lectures because they were so popular. Then in 1927 he drafted an essay titled “Genzai oyobi shorai Nihon no kokubo / Japan's present and future national defense”. Here he spoke about the inevitable war between the US and Japan. These were quite provocative and took a hell of a lot of attention from colleagues. Later on in april of 1931, he would brief his fellow Kwantung officers using the essay, arguing the need for decisive action on the asian mainland.   In 1928 he would have given another course on European war, but he came down with influenza and was forced to take leave. As he was getting better he was hit with a case of tympanitis in his ear and had to be hospitalized for 6 months. It was to be one of many ailments that would grind at his health. He eventually was drawn into an elite study circle to talk about war theories led by Major Suzuki. The group consisted of young reformist type officers who talked about political and military issues. He carried on his work on the final war and eventually wrote “Sensoshi taikan / general outline of the history of war” which was delivered as a lecture before Kwantung officers at Changch'un in Manchuria on July 4th of 1929. It would receive revisions in 1931, 1938 and became a book of the same title after 1941. As he began lecturing using Sensoshi taiken he also circulated amongst an inner circle within the Kwantung army “kokuun tenkai no konpon kokusakutaru man-mo mondai kaiketsuan / Plan for the solution of the Manchuria and Mongolia problem as a basic national policy to revolutionize our country's destiny”, what a title. As you might guess the plan called for occupying Manchuria in preparation for the upcoming war with America. By the way, all of his lectures and works would gain so much fame, he was asked in 1936 to adapt the materials for a text on military history for Emperor Hirohito.    Now the 1930's were quite a tense time for Japan. The Japanese leadership saw Marxism everywhere, and believed it was withering away their nation. Japanese liberal types were arguing the military budget was out of hand, many were calling for reduction. To Ishiwara it was insanity, how could Japan not arm itself? Marxists preached communism would save Japan; Liberals preached true democracy would save Japan; Ishiwara and many in the army preached the Kokutai would save Japan. Ishiwara preached his final war theories and that the coming apocalypse would not see an American synthesis, but a supreme victory for the Japanese kokutai that would unify the world. “Japan must be victorious not for the sake of her own national interest, but for the salvation of the world. The last war in human history is approaching, Nichiren's titanic world conflict, unprecedented in human history”.   From the offset of his initial theories, Ishiwara believed the final war would be a strategy of exhaustion. But WW1 and the 1920's brought technological advances such as tanks, poison gas and the airplane. The airplane in particular made Ishiwara believe the defensive stalemate seen in WW1 was coming to an end. Airpower could deliver bomb loads past all known defenses such as naval surface units, fortresses, armies with automatic weapons. He believed the final war would see absolute horrors brought upon the greatest cities of the world. London, Shanghai, Paris even Tokyo would be wiped out within a day of the commencement of hostilities. Air bombardment would deliver victory and he would be quite right about that in regards to what would happen to Japan. He believed such a war would be waged only once and “we will enter an age where war will become impossible because of the ultimate development of war technology”.   Ishiwara argued Japan must directly or indirectly control Manchuria and to a lesser degree over parts of China. He asserted Japan had a moral obligation to the asian continent and a special relationship to Manchuria and China. China must be stabilized, for her people were threatened by turmoil, corruption and conflict. He argued Japan would be eventually obliged for the sake of peace and the welfare of the Chinese people to take a more active effort to stabilize her, particularly in Manchuria. He wrote in 1930 “To save China, which has known no peace, is the mission of Japan, a mission, which, at the same time, is the only means for the salvation of Japan itself. To accomplish this task it is an urgent matter that the interference of the United States be eliminated”. Ironically, he was advocating that in order to prepare for a conflict with the US, Japan must take a stronger hand in Manchuria and China…which would probably force the United States to confront her. He advocated against the strategy of a decisive battle at sea, instead emphasizing a continental strategy. “If the worst comes about and the war at sea turns against us, if proper measures have been taken, Japanese forces on the Asian mainland can be made self-sufficient and the war continued.” Above all else, Manchuria was the key, alongside parts of Mongolia and China.    In 1931 he began writing about how China needed to reform and it would be in her best interest to accept Japanese guidance. He saw China as the most valuable ally to be beside Japan in the event of war with the United States. If anything he argued Japan must try to not become involved in a war with China, every effort should be made to avoid provoking such an event. Yet as he continued his writing he began to see the diplomatic issues play out between China and Japan and came to the conclusion, “every attempt should be made to avoid provoking China, but in the event that it is impossible to bring about China's understanding, then Nanking should be swiftly attacked and north and central China occupied” way to go 0-60. His attitudes to Britain and Russia were quite similar, every effort should be made to remain friendly, but in the case of war Hong Kong and Malaya should be quickly occupied or in the case of the USSR, predetermined objectives inside Siberia should be seized quickly.    Now lets talk about Manchuria, specifically Manchuria in the late 1920's. Manchuria was in a huge tug of war between Russia, China and Japan. Her ties to China proper were severed by years of warlordism allowing Japan to grow her position. For Japan, the quote “manchurian problem” as it would be known centered on a single question “how to consolidate and expand it under Japanese influence in the face of an expanding China”. Japan saw 3 viable methods, taking control over the south manchuria railway, using the kwantung army and Japanese colonists, the good old filibuster approach. Each of these 3 methods offered different approaches to the same problem which of course would have very different outcomes.    Controlling the railway allowed quite a lot of control over southern Manchuria. The issue with this of course being Japan having to constantly fight off Chinese political efforts against such control. Zhang Zuolin, the Tiger of Manchuria and arguably greatest of the warlords of China held control over Manchuria and was firmly acting in Japanese interests, but for how long would he play ball? To the Kwantung Army members operating in and around Manchuria, the northern expedition of Chiang Kai-shek was getting out of hand and threatening Zhang Zuolin and thus their interests as well. Anti-Japanese sentiment was only getting worse as the northern expedition climbed north. The Kwangtung army sought more than anything to assert and retain their control over Manchuria, because it offered a buffer against the USSR. Anything that threatened that control had to be dealt with. Ultimately it was believed by many in the Kwantung Army that Manchuria would have to be separated officially from China and in order for this to occur, Japan would most likely need to use force.    Senior officers of the Kwantung army were invited in June of 1927 for a meeting called upon by Premier Tanaka Giichi. The purpose of the meeting was to formulate Japan's policy toward China and Manchuria. A more radical Kwantung army group headed by Colonel Komoto Daisaku sought to eliminate Zhang Zuolin, as he was increasingly being seen as a major obstacle to Japanese ambitions in Manchuria. Well they would do just that in 1928 when Zhang Zuolin was assassinated via a bomb placed on train tracks known as the Huanggutun incident. The assassination did not work out as the Kwantung Army officers thought it would. Instead of their groomed puppet General Yang Yuting taking up the role as leader of Manchuria, it went instead to Zhang Zuolin's son, Zhang Xueliang, who lets just say was not too happy the Japanese had obviously killed his father. Thus the Kwantung Army did not assert the forceful policy they wanted in Manchuria, they had actually made it worse for them.   The half-hearted investigation into those responsible for killing Zhang Zuolin, led to the removal of Colonel Komoto from his post. Tanaka's cabinet was toppled. The Kwantung army were now embarrassed and angry that their stance in Manchuria was weakened. The Japanese colonists within Manchuria felt more threatened and called more so upon the Kwantung army for protection against Chinese nationalists wishing to kick them out. The Kwantung army was grasping at straws trying to think of a way to sever Manchuria from China. In 1928, Ishiwara was a lt colonel and he was consulted in length by Kwantung officers about his views on the Manchurian problem. While he had not fully hashed out his Final War theory by this point, he nonetheless spoke about the fundamentals of it, arguing the necessity of taking action to control Manchuria. For the next few years, all efforts were made by Kwantung officers to influence policy towards Manchuria. Ishiwara's ideas were being stimulated and influencing the debate over Manchuria amongst his high ranking colleagues. In October of 1928, Ishiwara sought and received an appointment to the Kwantung army staff. The assignment was to be as an operations officer and his number one backer was Colonel Komoto Daisaku. It seemed Komoto saw Ishiwara as the firebrand necessary to push the Manchurian policies they wanted.   When Ishiwara arrived at Port Arthur, he found the Kwantung Army HQ in a state of confusion and demoralization. This of course was a large part due to the cluster fuck of a failure from the bombing of Zhang Zuolin. The investigation into the assassination led to many shifts within the Kwantung army staff, many quite restrictive. Even though Komoto's career was shattered by the Zhang Zuolin failure, he kept arguing to his colleagues that the Manchurian crisis hamukdend to be resolved by force. Ishiwara it seems agreed with this and during the early months of 1929 worked alongside Komoto, planning operations against Chinese forces in the Mukden area. By spring of 1929, Komoto was officially being kicked out. By May he was relegated to a divisional backwater in Japan and by June he was out of the army. This did not mean however that he lost influence on Manchurian affairs. Komoto's replacement was Lt Colonel Itagaki Seishiro and old comrade of Ishiwara since Sendai military preparatory school.    For the next two and a half years, Ishiwara and Itagaki worked alongside other Kwantung Army staff to solve the Manchurian problem as they saw it. By the mid 1931's the idea Manchuria needed to be seized via force was now the mainstream viewpoint for the Kwantung army in general. Ishiwara believed firmly that Japan could no longer stand idle in Manchuria, because every day that went by saw little by little, Japan relinquishing rights and interests in Manchuria to China, and at some point they would simply be kicked out. To “quit manchuria” would be a national disaster, they would lose their buffer state, the resources and the land for their booming population to emigrate to. Simply put Manchuria was the steroid keeping Japan alive, she needed it to continue to grow. Ishiwara would often say “manchuria provides Japan with breathing space” where have we heard that type of talk before?. To the military heads in Tokyo Ishikawa would often assert Manchuria had to be seized via force, because of the soviethreat of the USSR and communism as a whole “In view of the traditional russian policy in that area, once the soviets advanced into manchuria, it would become a base for the communization of asia. Not only would the internal stability of manchuria become impossible to maintain, but Japan would be unable to maintain its own national defense, and China's defenses, too, would become imperialized". The Army HQ in Tokyo likewise agreed Manchuria was the vital defensive line against the USSR. But unlike the Kwantung army who sought all of Manchuria, the heads in Tokyo sought to absorb southern Manchuria via the south manchurian railway and did not seek anything north of it. Ishiwara however assumed the only way Japan could prevent the USSR from placing pressure on southern Manchuria was no less that Japan having to occupy northern Manchuria and even further north towards the Amur River so Japan could control the mountain ranges flanking western and eastern frontiers of northern manchuria.  Once Japan controlled northern Manchuria, Ishiwara stated in 1931 “With the solution of our defense problems in the north, we would then be free to plan an advance in any direction: to China proper, for example, or even to Southeast Asia”.   Ishiwara took all of this a step further, after Manchuria was conquered, Japan would have to somehow administer and pacify the peoples of it. Ishiwara argued the stability of Manchuria would be developed through the special talents of various races living there. The Chinese would develop the small businesses in the region, the Koreans would use their paddy farming knowledge, etc. These racial ideas would contribute to the development of Manchukuo and the greater east asia co-prosperity sphere. But above all else, Manchuria would serve the interests of Japan, many of which would be exploitative and economic in nature.    By early 1930 Ishiwara and Itagaki worked out a plan using the same strategy used during the Russo-Japanese war, a surprise night attack. The Kwantung army would assault the Liaoning area hitting important Chinese garrisons. The plans had to be meticulous as the Kwantung army was severely smaller than most of the Manchurian forces led by Zhang Xueliang. Around Mukden alone Zhang held 20,000 men well equipped with aircraft and tanks. Throughout all of Manchuria, if a war arose, Zhang could assemble roughly 250,000 troops to bear down on an enemy. The Kwantung army meanwhile could muster 10,000 men which were basically garrison units around the railway. They did not have significant aircraft nor mechanized forces at hand, and were pretty poorly equipped to boot. Ishiwara's answer to the disparity in forces called for the use of intelligence and rigorous training. He sought to perfect specific assault techniques so that when the conflict broke out, the Japanese would use lightning speed and effective concentration of force to overwhelm the Chinese. The plan overall was remarkably simplistic, wagering everything on dealing a crushing blow at the center of Zhang Xueliangs military powerbase at the Peitaying barracks at Mukden. If this fell, he predicted the enemy's morale would break, giving the Kwantung the necessary military and psychological momentum to subdue the surrounding areas. If the USSR got involved, the plan would have gone to utter shit.   One important variable Ishiwara highlighted was the necessity to pull off the operation before any attempt to restructure the domestic order in Japan occurred. Ishiwara knew his arguments and those of his colleagues would influence the heads in Tokyo, and they had to act before they did. However the heads at Tokyo and the Kwantung army held very different perspectives on when to act. In June of 1931 the Central army HQ stated in its General Outline of a solution to the Manchurian problem “we must defer the question of military action for a whole year. During this time the foreign ministry would attempt to dampen anti japanese activities in manchuria through negotiations with the government of Nanking. In the meantime the government would launch an information campaign to try and drive acquiescence at home and aboard for military action ”. Ishiwara as you can imagine was very bitter about the idea of prolonging for a year and argued the international environment meant they must strike immediately. The Soviet 5 year plan was still in mid course; the US, Britain and France had yet to overcome their financial crisis and could offer limited resistance in the far east and most obviously the Nationalist regime in China was still busy in its unification efforts south of the Great wall, but that would change soon. If they waited a year all of this would change for the worse, the time was now or never to Ishiwara.   In july of 1931 Ishiwara and Itagki organized a final major staff reconnaissance designed to get the newest Kwantung officers up to date with northern Manchuria. To cover for what they were doing they told high command it was a survey against the USSR, but it was of course to investigate the Chinese power in northern manchuria. On their return trip, the party heard of the disappearance of one Kwantung staff officer, captain Nakamura Shintaro. Ishiwara and the others found out when they reached Port Arthur and the rumor spread that Captain Nakamura had been killed by Chinese soldiers under “mysterious circumstances”. Now over the past few months there had been violent riots, murders, work strikes and other incidents occurring in Manchuria. The Nakamura affair flared all of these tensions up. Seeing the paint on the wall, Chinese and Japanese foreign ministries tried to negotiate the issue, but those at the central army HQ like Nagata Tetsuzan who were sympathetic to the impatience of their Kwantung colleagues felt compelled to aid them. For Ishiwara the issue was clear as he wrote “the Nakamura incident adds just one more issue to the others. What the army should do now is to ignore the foreign ministry and solve the problem by taking matters into its own hands”. And that is just what he did. The Kwantung officers took their forces outside the railway zone, which they had been restricted to and without waiting for approval from Itagaki who was in Japan at the time, initiated the steps to despatch an armored train and a mixed regiment of infantry and artillery forces to go to Mukden to get the Chinese military to help investigate the Nakamura disappearance. Tokyo got word of this and dispatched a telegram to stop their departure from the railway and to not use the Nakamura incident as a way to use force to solve the manchurian problem.   For Ishiwara this was the last straw. On August 20th he sent a message to Nagata condemning the current diplomatic situation and that negotiations were an utter waste of time. “There is no way to settle the matter except by placing it in the hands of the army. If central hq finds it so difficult to trust its field personnel then it had better replace them with representatives more suitable to the conditions it imagines to exist in Manchuria”. Ishiwara doubled down and pushed for a plot to provoke military conflict outside of Mukden. As he wrote in almost a messianic Nichiren conviction ‘I will be the pillar of Japan; I will be the eyes of Japan; I will be the great vessel of Japan” .   “Gekokujo / ruling from below” is a Japanese historical term referring to when subordinates defy or manipulate their superiors. Ishiwara and his like minded close colleagues were about to perform Gekokujo. On september 18th, 1931 a bomb was planted by the Kwantung army on the tracks of the south manchuria railway at Liutiaokou and it exploded. Japanese troops under the guise the bomb was a “chinese terrorist attack” moved to swiftly overrun the Peitaying barracks. Ishiwara's plot had finally unfolded. 

Interview with Gan-Ochir Zunduisuren, Managing Director of Asian Battery Metals PLCRecording date: 15th October 2025Asian Battery Metals (ASX:AZ9) is emerging as a focused critical minerals developer in Mongolia, strategically positioned at the doorstep of Asian consumption markets. Led by Managing Director Gan-Ochir Zunduisuren, a mining engineer with 22 years of experience including a board position at Rio Tinto's Oyu Tolgoi copper operation, the company is advancing a portfolio of copper, nickel, and gold projects in southwestern Mongolia's prospective Central Asian orogenic belt.The company's flagship Oval copper-nickel project has delivered significant validation through selection for BHP's prestigious Xplor accelerator program in 2023. As one of only seven companies chosen globally from 250 applicants - and the sole Asian representative - Asian Battery Metals received $500,000 USD to prove the concept of a magmatic mafic intrusion-related copper-nickel sulfide system. This third-party technical endorsement has been reinforced by encouraging metallurgical results, with initial test work achieving 89-95% copper recovery and concentrate grades of 18.5-24%, meeting industry benchmarks for economic viability.With approximately A$30 million in market capitalization and A$7-8 million deployed across exploration programs, the company has established 800 meters of continuous mineralization at Oval, with widths ranging from 50 to 80 meters. Recent drilling has extended mineralization to 290 meters depth, suggesting potential for deeper extensions along feeder conduit structures. The company is also advancing regional targets including MS1, located six kilometers south of Oval with geophysical signatures potentially larger than the main discovery, supporting a hub-and-spoke development model where multiple deposits could share centralized processing infrastructure.Complementing the copper-nickel focus, Asian Battery Metals is completing due diligence on the Maikhan Uul VMS copper-gold system, located just eight kilometers from Oval. Recent drilling confirmed more than 20 meters of massive sulphide mineralization with historic grades of approximately 1.7% copper and 1 gram per tonne gold, plus a high-grade shallow gold zone grading over 15 g/t. The company expects to complete this acquisition within four months, adding diversification and supporting the multi-deposit cluster strategy that Managing Director Gan-Ochir described as essential to achieving the company's goal of "more than 20 million tons of economic resources or potentially producing 50,000 tons of metals."Mongolia's maturation as a mining jurisdiction provides crucial support for development pathways. Over the past 15 years, the country has opened 20-30 new mines, improved infrastructure substantially, and developed multiple financing options including international financial institutions, domestic banks, and Chinese offtake arrangements. This evolution, combined with proximity to Asian markets and an established contractor mining sector, positions Asian Battery Metals to advance its projects efficiently in a jurisdiction that has demonstrated it can support world-class operations like Rio Tinto's Oyu Tolgoi copper mine.View Asian Battery Metals' company profile: https://www.cruxinvestor.com/companies/asian-battery-metalsSign up for Crux Investor: https://cruxinvestor.com

Licenciado en Filología Inglesa y en Filología Hispánica, doctor en Literatura española y teoría de la literatura. Ha escrito varios libros, entre ellos: Manual de supervivencia (que le valió el Premio del Instituto Literario y Cultural Hispánico), Darwin en las Galápagos, el diario Viaje al ojo de un caballo, Veinte días en Mongolia, El volumen de relatos Cuatro cuentos italianos, el poemario Lisergia, El libro de historiografía y teoría literaria El poema en prosa en los años setenta en España, etc. Traductor de autores como W. B. Yeats, Robert Browning, R. W. Emerson, H. D. Thoreau, D. H. Lawrence, Iris Murdoch, Joseph Campbell, Leslie Stephen o Mark Haber. Es también profesor de inglés en la Escuela Oficial de Idiomas de Madrid-Carabanchel.

In this Mission Matters session hosted by ⁠Adam Torres⁠, ⁠Eraj Akhtar⁠ (CTO & Co-Founder, Excite Capital LLC) and ⁠Namuun Battulga⁠ (CEO, Jenko Tour JSC & Igo Hotel and Resorts) discuss physics-based, quantum-inspired AI trading and Mongolia's emergence as a cost-efficient, secure data center location powered by a new 70MW plant. They share partner criteria, address security considerations, and outline a mission to scale globally distributed compute and real-economy growth across Asia. Follow Adam on Instagram at ⁠https://www.instagram.com/askadamtorres/⁠ for up to date information on book releases and tour schedule. Apply to be a guest on our podcast: ⁠https://missionmatters.lpages.co/podcastguest/⁠ Visit our website: ⁠https://missionmatters.com/⁠ More FREE content from Mission Matters here: ⁠https://linktr.ee/missionmattersmedia⁠ Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

In this Mission Matters session hosted by Adam Torres, Eraj Akhtar (CTO & Co-Founder, Excite Capital LLC) and Namuun Battulga (CEO, Jenko Tour JSC & Igo Hotel and Resorts) discuss physics-based, quantum-inspired AI trading and Mongolia's emergence as a cost-efficient, secure data center location powered by a new 70MW plant. They share partner criteria, address security considerations, and outline a mission to scale globally distributed compute and real-economy growth across Asia. Follow Adam on Instagram at https://www.instagram.com/askadamtorres/ for up to date information on book releases and tour schedule. Apply to be a guest on our podcast: https://missionmatters.lpages.co/podcastguest/ Visit our website: https://missionmatters.com/ More FREE content from Mission Matters here: https://linktr.ee/missionmattersmedia Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

While traveling in Mongolia, Guilherme emails his grandfather to share some exciting news.

Hey before I begin the podcast, I just want to thank all of you who joined the patreon, you guys are simply awesome. Please take the time to vote and comment on the patreon polls so I can best tackle the specific subjects you want to hear more about and hell it does not have to be about the Pacific War, I like ancient Rome, WW1, WW2, just toss some ideas and I will try to make it happen.   This Podcast is going to be a very remarkable story about a Korean man who fought for the IJA, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany during the second world war.  He is also a man whom most than likely never existed.   Did that catch you off guard haha?   If you have a chance you can pull up wikipedia and search Yang Kyoungjong. The first thing you will notice is a disclaimer that states numerous historians who claim Yang Kyoungjong does not exist. Yet this man exists in some history books, there is a iconic photo of him, there is a documentary looking into him, countless Korean stories are writing loosely about him, there is a pretty decent war film and multiple youtubers have covered his so-called story. So how does this guy not exist if his story is so popular?   His story is claimed to be real by military historian Stephen Ambrose who wrote about him in his book in 1994 titled “D-day, june 6th, 1944: the Climactic battle of World War II. There is also references to him in Antony Beevor's book “the second world war” and that of defense consultant and author Steven Zaloga's book“the devil's garden: Rommel's desperate Defense of Omaha Beach on D-Day”. In 2005 a Korean SBS documentary investigated his existence and concluded there was no convincing evidence of his existence. For those of you who have ever heard of this man, I guarantee it's because of the 2011 south korean film “My Way”. That's where I found out about it by the way. Many of you probably saw the iconic photo of him, again if you pull up the wikipedia page on Yang Kyoungjong its front and center. The photo shows a asiatic man wearing a wehrmacht uniform and he has just been captured by american forces on the d-day landings.   Now I don't want to jump into the is he real or not busy just yet. So this is how the podcast will go down, very reminiscent of “Our fake History's Podcast” might I add, I am a huge fan of that guys work. I am going to tell you the story of Yang Kyoungjong, then afterwords disclose my little investigation into whether he is real or not.   So without further adieu this is the story of a man who fought for three nations during WW2.   The Story   It was June 1944, the allies had just unleashed Operation Overlord, the D-Day landings at Normandy. Lt Robert Brewer of the 506th parachute infantry regiment, 101st airborne division was overlooking the capture of Axis forces and reported to his regiment finding four Asians in Wehrmacht uniform around the Utah beach landings. Brewer nor any of his colleagues spoke the language the Asian men spoke, they assumed them to be Japanese.  The four asians were processed as POW's, listed as young Japanese and sent to a British POW camp, before he would be sent to another POW camp in the US. At some point between his capture and the POW camps, he gave his name as Yang Kyoungjong, stated he was Korean and gave an extremely incredible story. To who did he say these things, no one knows.   Yang Kyoungjong was born in 1920, in Shin Eu Joo, part of modern day North Korea. At the age of 18, Yang was forcibly conscripted into the Imperial Japanese army. Korea was one of the bread baskets of Asia and the Empire of Japan had annexed her in 1910. Japan held sovereignty over Korea, making Koreans subjects.    In 1939 the Empire of Japan faced major labor shortages and as a result began conscription of Japanese men for the military, while importing vast amounts of Korean laborers to work in mainland Japan. For the Imperial Japanese Army, Koreans were not drafted until 1944 when things were dire for Japan. Until 1944, the IJA allowed Koreans to volunteer in the army. In 1938 there was a 14% acceptance rate, by 1943 this dropped dramatically to 2%, but the number of applicants increased exponentially from 3000 per annum in 1939 to 300,000 by the end of the war. On paper it looked like Koreans were registering en masse on their on violation, but this is quite the contrary, the Japanese policy was to use force. Japanese officials began press gang efforts against Korean peasants, forcing them to sign applications, it is believed over half of the applications were done in such a manner. Other applicants registered for a variety of reasons, typically because of economic turmoil. Korea would produce 7 generals and many field grade officers. One of the most well known was Lt General Crown Prince Yi Un who would command Japanese forces in the China War.   Thus Yang Kyoungjong was forced into the IJA and would find himself stationed with the Kwantung Army. Quite unfortunately for him, he was enlisted into their service at a time where two major border skirmishes occurred with the Soviet Union. The USSR was seen as Japan's number one rival going all the way back to the Triple Intervention of 1895 when the Russians thwarted Japan's seizure of the Liaodong peninsula after they had won the first sino japanese war. This led to the Russo-Japanese war, where Japan shocked the world being victorious over the Russian Empire. When the Russian Empire fell and the Russian civil war kicked off, Japan sent the lionshare of men to fight the Red Army during the Siberian Intervention of 1918-1922.    Communism was seen as the greatest if not one of the greatest threats to the Kokutai and thus Japan as a whole. As such Japan placed the Kwantung Army along the Manchurian borderlands to thwart any possible soviet invasion. There had numerous border skirmishes, but in 1938 and 1939 two large battles occurred. In 1938 the Kwantung army intercepted a Soviet message indicating the Far East forces would be securing some unoccupied heights west of Lake Khasan that overlooked the Korean port city of Rajin. Soviet border troops did indeed move into the area and began fortifying it. The Kwantung army sent forces to dislodge them and this soon led to a full on battle. The battle was quite shocking for both sides, the Soviets lost nearly 800 men dead with 3279 wounded, the Japanese claimed they had 526 dead with 913 wounded. The Soviet lost significant armor and despite both sides agreeing to a ceasefire, the Kwantung army considered it a significant victory and proof the Soviets were not capable of thwarting them.   In theory Yang Kyoungjong would be in training and would eventually reach the Manchuria borders by 1939. Another man sent over would be Georgy Zhukov who was given the task of taking command of the 57th special corps and to eliminate Japanese provocations. What was expected of Zhukov was if the Japanese pressed again for battle, to deliver them a crushing and decisive blow. On May 11th, 1939 some Mongolian cavalry units were grazing their horses in a disputed area. On that very same day, Manchu cavalry attacked the Mongols to drive them past the river of Khalkhin Gol. Two days later the Mongols returned in greater numbers and this time the Manchu were unable to dislodge them.    What was rather funny to say, a conflict of some horses grazing on disputed land, led to a fully mechanized battle. On May 14th, Lt Colonel Yaozo Azuma led some regiments to dislodge the Mongols, but they were being supported by the Red Army. Azuma force suffered 63% casualties, devastating. June saw the battle expand enormously, Japan was tossing 30,000 men in the region, the Soviets tossed Zhukov at them alongside motorized and armored forces. The IJA lacking good armored units, tossed air forces to smash the nearby Soviet airbase at Tamsakbulak. In July the IJA engaged the Red Army with nearly 100 tanks and tankettes, too which Zhukov unleashed 450 tanks and armored cars. The Japanese had more infantry support, but the Soviet armor encircled and crushed them. The two armies spared with another for weeks, the Japanese assumed the Soviets would suffer logistical problems but Zhukoev assembled a fleet of 2600 trucks to supply his forces, simply incredible. Both sides were suffering tremendous casualties, then in August global politics shifted. It was apparent a war in Europe was going to break out, Zhukov was ordered to be decisive, the Soviets could not deal with a two front war. So Zhukov now using a fleet of 4000 trucks began transported supplies from Chita to the front next to a armada of tanks and mechanized brigades. The Soviets tossed 3 rifle divisions, two tank divisions and 2 tank brigades, nearly 500 tanks in all, with two motorized infantry divisions and 550 fighters and bombers.    The stalemate was shattered when Zhukov unleashed is armada, some 50,000 Soviets and Mongols hit the east bank of Khalkhin Gol. The Japanese were immediately pinned down, while the Soviets were employing a double envelopment. The Japanese tried to counter attack and it failed horribly. The Japanese then scrambled to break out of the encirclement and failed. The surrounded Japanese forces refused to surrender as the Soviets smashed them with artillery and aerial bombardment. By the end of August the Japanese forces on the Mongolian side of the border were annihilated. On September 15th the USSR and Japan signed a ceasefire.    The battle of Khalkhin Gol was devastating for both sides. The Japanese claim they had 8440 deaths, 8766 wounded, lost 162 aircraft and 42 tanks. Its estimated 500-600 Japanese forces were taken prisoner. Because of IJA doctrine these men were considered killed in action. Some sources will claim the real numbers for Japanese casualties could have been as high as 30,000. The Soviets claim 9703 deaths, 15,251 wounded, the destruction of 253 tanks, 250 aircraft, 96 artillery pieces and 133 armored cars. Of those tank losses, its estimated 75-80% were destroyed by anti-tank guns, 15-20% field artillery, 5-10% infantry thrown incendiary bombs, 3% mines and another 3% for aircraft bombing.   Back to Yang Kyoungjong, he alongside the other Japanese, Manchu and Korean POW's were sent to Gulags in Siberia. As the war on the Eastern Front kicked off between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, facing annihilation the Soviets did anything possible to survive. One of these actions was to create the Shtrafbats, “Penal battalions”. Stalins order No 227 created the first penal battalions, who were supposed to be around 800 men strong. The first Shtrafbat battalion was deployed to the Stalingrad Front on August 22nd of 1942.   On order was issued on November 26, 1942 “status of Penal units of the army”, it was issued by Georgy Zhukov, now deputy commander in chief who was the man who formally standardized soviet penal units. The Shtrafbats were around 360 men per battalion commanded by mid range Red Army officers and politruks. The men forced into these were permanents or temporaries. Permanents were officers, commanders, the higher ranks guys. Temporary known as shtrafniki “punishees” were the grunts, typically prisoners and those convicted of crimes. From september 1942 to May of 1945 422,700 men would be forced into penal battalions.    Typically those forced into penal military units were one of two things: 1) those convicted of dissertation or cowardice, 2) Soviet Gulag labor camp inmates. It seems Yang Kyoungjong found himself in a very awkward situation as he would be forced into one of these penal battalions and sent to fight on the eastern front. As pertaining to Order No. 227, each Army was to have 3–5 barrier squads of up to 200 persons each, these units would be made up of penal units.    So back toYang Kyoungjong, he would find himself deployed at the third battle of Kharkov. This battle was part of a series of battles fought on the eastern front. As the German 6th army was encircling Stalingrad, the Soviets launched a series of wide counter attacks, as pertaining to “operation star”. Operation star saw massive offensives against Kharkov, Belgorod, Kursk, Voroshilovgrad and Izium. The Soviets earned great victories, but they also overextended themselves. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein seeing the opening, performed a counter-strike against Kharkov on February 19th of 1943, using fresh troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps alongside two other panzer armies. Manstein also had massive air support from field Marshal Wolfram von Richthofens Luftflotte 4, 1214 aircraft tossed 1000 sorties per day from February 20th to march 15th. The Red army had approximately 210,000 troops who fought in the Voronezh-Kharkov offensive, the Germans would have roughly 160,000 men, but their tanks outnumbered the Soviets 7-1, they had roughly 350 of them.   The Germans quickly outflanked the Soviets, managing to encircle and annihilate many units. Whenever soviets units made attempts to escape encirclements, the German air forces placed pressure upon them. The German air forces had the dual job of airlifting supplies to the front lines giving the Soviets no breathing space. Gradually the fight focused around the city of Kharkov seeing the Soviets dislodged. The Germans caused severe casualties, perhaps 45,000 dead or missing with another 41,000 wounded. The Germans suffered 4500 deaths, 7000 wounded. The Germans took a large number of prisoners, and Yang Kyoungjong was one of them.   Yet again a prisoner Yang Kyoungjong was coerced into serving another nation, this time for Die Ost-Bataillone. The Eastern Front had absolutely crippled Germany and as a result Germany began to enlist units from just about any nation possible and this included former Soviet citizens. There were countless different units, like the Russian liberation Army, die Hilfswillige, Ukrainian collaborationists, and there were also non-Russians from the USSR who formed the Ost-Bataillone. These eastern battalions would comprise a rough total of 175,000 men. Many of the Ost-Bataillone were conscripted or coerced into serving, though plenty also volunteered. Countless were recruited from POW camps, choosing to serve instead of labor in camps. The Osttruppen were to typically deployed for coastal defense, rear area activities, security stuff, all the less important roles to free up the German units to perform front line service.   There were two different groups, the Ost-Legionen “eastern legions” and Ost-Bataillone “eastern battalions”. The Ostlegionen were large foreign legion type units raised amongst members of specific ethnic or racial groups. The Ost-Bataillone were composed of numerous nationalities, usually plucked from POW camps in eastern europe. They were tossed together into battalion sized units and integrated individually into German combat formations. Obviously the Germans did not get their hands on large numbers of Koreans, so Yang Kyoungjong found himself in a Ost-Bataillone.    In 1944, due to massive losses in the Eastern Front, and in preparation for the allies about to open a second front, the Germans began deploying a lot of Ost-Bataillone along the coastal defense line at Cherbourg. Yang Kyoungjong was enlisted in the 709th static infantry division, a coastal defense unit assigned to defend the eastern and northern coasts of the Cotentin Peninsula. This would include the Utah beach landing site and numerous US airborne landing zones. The sector was roughly 250 km running northeast of Carentan, via Barfleur-Cherbourg-Cap de la Hague to the western point of Barneville. This also included the 65 km of land just in font of Cherbourg harbor. A significant portion of the 709th were Ost-bataillon, countless were from eastern europe, many were former Soviet POW'S. There were also two battalions of the 739th Grenadier regiment whom were Georgian battalions. A significant amount of the 709th had no combat experience, but had trained extensively in the area.   The 709th would be heavily engaged on D-day meeting US airborne units and the 4th infantry division who landed at Utah beach. In the early hours of June 6th, the US 82nd and 101st airborne divisions landed at the base of the Cotentin peninsula and managed to secure a general area for the US 4th infantry division to land at Utah beach, with very few casualties compared to other beach landings. After the landings the forces tried to link up with other forces further east. By June 9th they had crossed the Douve river valley and captured Carentan. House to house fighting was seen in the battle for Carentan, the Germans tossed a few counterattacks, but the Americans held on with the help of armor units of the 13th.    The Americans then advanced to cut off the Cotentin Peninsula, now supported by 3 other infantry divisions. The Germans had few armored or mobilized infantry in the area. By June 16th the German command was tossed into chaos as Erwin Rommel wanted them to pull out and man the Atlantic Wall at Cherbourg, but Hitler demanded they hold their present lines of defense. By the 17th Hitler agreed to the withdrawal, under some provisions the men still took up limited defenses spanning the entire peninsula. On the 18th the US 9th infantry division reached the west coast of the peninsula thus isolating the Cherbourg garrison. A battle was unleashed for 24 hours with the 4th, 9th and 79th US infantry divisions driving north on a broad front. They faced little opposition on the western side and the eastern, the center held much stronger resistance. The Americans would find several caches of V-1 flying bombs and V-2 rocket installations at Brix. After two days the Americans were in striking distance of Cherbourg. The garrison commander Lt General Karl-Wilhelm von Schlieben had 21,000 men, but many were naval personnel and labor units. Schliebens 709th had performed a fighting withdrawal to Cherbourg and were completely exhausted. The trapped forces were low in provisions, fuel and ammunition. The luftwaffe tried dropping supplies on their positions but it was inadequate.    A general assault began on the 22nd and the German forces put up stiff resistance within their concrete pillboxes. Allied warships bombarded the city on the 25th of june and on the 26th a British elite force, No. 30 Commando launched an assault against Octeville, a suburb of southwestern Cherbourg. The commandos quickly captured 20 officers and 500 men of the Kriegmarine naval intelligence HQ at Villa Meurice. As the Germans were ground down, Schlieben was captured and with that a surrender was made on the 29th.   The Americans suffered nearly 3000 deaths with 13,500 wounded during the operation. The Germans suffered 8000 deaths with 30,000 captured. For the 709th who took a lionshare of the fighting they reported sustaining 4000 casualties.    Amongst the captured was Yang Kyoungjong. As I said in the beginning Lt Robert Brewer of the 506th parachute infantry regiment, 101st airborne division was overlooking the capture of Axis forces and reported to his regiment finding four Asians in Wehrmacht uniform around the Utah beach landings. Brewer nor any of his colleagues spoke the language the Asian men spoke, they assumed them to be Japanese.  The four asians were processed as POW's, listed as young Japanese and sent to a British POW camp, before he would be sent to another POW camp in the US. At some point between his capture and the POW camps, he gave his name as Yang Kyoungjong, stated he was Korean and gave the story. Apparently Yang Kyoungjob was granted US citizenship and would spend the rest of his life in Illinois until his death in 1992.   So that is the story of Yang Kyoungjong.    The truth Did Yang Kyoungjong exist? Where does his story originate? For those of you who have not guessed it yet, the story I told you was full of details, I simply added based on historical events, with zero evidence at all any man named Yang Kyoungjong was involved in them. I did this specifically to highlight, thats exactly what others have done over the course of many years, creating a sort of mythos. If you know the game broken telephone, thats what I would theorize makes up most of this mans story. But lets go through some actual evidence why don't we?   From the digging I have done, the story seemed to originate with historian Stephen Ambrose book in 1994 titled “D-day, june 6th, 1944: the Climactic battle of World War II”. While writing this book, Ambrose interviewed Robert Burnham Brewer, who served E Company, 2nd battalion, 506th parachute infantry regiment of the 101st airborne division. This same man was portrayed in Band of Brothers by the way. Brewer gave one rather ambiguous account where he spoke about capturing 4 asian men in Wehrmacht uniforms.    Here is patient zero as told to us by Ambrose's book (Page 34, no footnote on the page)   The so-called Ost battalions became increasingly unreliable after the German defeat at Kursk; they were, therefore, sent to france in exchange for German troops. At the beach called Utah on the day on the invasion, Lt Robert Brewer of the 506th Parachute infantry regiment, 101st airborne division, US Army, captured four asians in Wehrmacht uniforms. No one could speak their language; eventually it was learned that they were Koreans. How on earth did Koreans end up fighting for Hitler to defend france against Americans? It seems they had been conscripted into the Japanese army in 1938-Korea was then a Japanese colony-captured by the Red Army in the border battles with Japan in 1939, forced into the Red Army, captured by the Wehrmacht in December 1941 outside Moscow, forced into the German army, and sent to France”. What happened to them, Lt Brewer never found out, but presumably they were sent back to Korea. If so, they would almost certainly have been conscripted again, either into the south or north korean army. It is possible than in 1950 they ended up fighting once again, either against the US army or with it, depending on what part of Korea they came from. Such are the vagaries of politics in the 20th century. By June 1944, one in six German rifleman in France was from an Ost battalion.   Now digging further since there are no footnotes, it seems Ambrose took an oral account from Lt Brewer, but did not directly quote him and instead abstractly expanded upon his story. Ambrose was guilty of doing this often. As multiple historians have pointed out, Brewer was living in the 1940s and was by no means an ethnographer, he was not a person who could have accurately known the nationality of the four asian men he captured. It is plausible he or other US units around him, just came up with Korean for the four asians who could have been from nearly anywhere in central to east asia. For all we know the men found could have been from Turkestan. What was “asian” to westerners of the 1940's is extremely broad.    If you look up the Ost-Bataillone or Ostlegionen you will see they consisted of captured former soviet soldiers. During the d-day landings, 1/6th of the German forces defending the atlantic coast were made up of the Ost-battailones. They came from numerous places, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, India, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkestan, Mongolia and numerous parts of the USSR. Needless to say, there were a ton of people whom would be considered asian and could be mistaken to be from Korea, Japan, Burma, etc.    It seems Brewer's vague account was transformed by Amrose, but this only covers one part of all of this, the story, what about the photo?    The iconic photograph is another matter entirely. The photograph has nothing to do with Brewer's account, it is simply a random photograph taken at Utah beach of a captured asian soldier wearing a Wehrmacht uniform. The official description of the photo states “Capture Jap in Nazi uniform. France, fearful of his future, this young Jap wearing a nazi uniform, is checked off in a roundup of German prisoners on the beaches of france. An american army captain takes the Jap's name and serial number” Author Martin Morgan believes the man in the photograph is not Yang Kyoungjong, but instead an ethnic Georgian from the 795th Georgian Battalion, which was composed of Georgian Osttruppen troops or someone who was Turkistani. In 2002 word of the story became more popularized online and in 2004 the iconic photo also began to circulate heavily on the internet. The Korean media became aware of the story in 2002 and when they saw the picture the Korean news site DKBNews investigated the matter. Apparently a reader of the DKBNews submitted biographical details about the soldier in the photo, including his name, date of birth, the general story we now know, his release, life in Illinois and death. The DKBNews journalist requested sources and none were provided, typical.   So some random unknown reader of the DKBNews gave a name, place and time of birth and even where he ended up and died.  In 2005 the Seoul broadcasting system aired a documentary specifically investigating the existence of the asian soldiers who fought for Germany on d-day.   In the SBS special “The Korean in Normandy,” produced and broadcast in 2005 based on rumors of Yang kyoungjog,  they searched for records of Korean prisoners of war during the Battle of khalkhin gol and records of Korean people who participated in the German-Japanese War, and records related to the German Army's eastern unit, but could not find traces of such a person. In addition, the soldiers who served in the Soviet army, who were captured, and then transferred to the German army's eastern units were considered by the Soviet Union to be serious traitors. Accordingly, under a secret agreement between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, they were forcibly repatriated to the Soviet Union after the war and held in Gulags.. The SBS production team stated that the rumors that a 'Korean from Normandy' had gone to the United States and that he died in seclusion near Northwestern University under the name of 'Yang Kyoungjong', which they were unaware of, were false. The investigative team looked for any traces of a Yang Kyoungjong and found none, so they concluded although there were accounts of asian soldiers in the German army during WW2, there was zero evidence of the existence of Yang Kyoungjong or any Koreans fighting on D-day for that matter.    The 2005 SBS Special documentary sprang forth a bunch of stories by Korean authors, expanding the mythos of Yang Kyoungjong.   In 2007 author Jo Jeong-rae published a novel titled “human mask” which told the story of SHin Gilman, The story ends with Shin Gil-man, who was conscripted into the Japanese army at the age of 20, as a prisoner of war in Normandy, then transported back to the Soviet Union and eventually executed by firing squad. Another novel called “D-day” by author Kim Byeong-in was release in 2011, just prior to the film My War, the plot is extremely similar to the movie. The main characters are Han Dae-sik and Yoichi, who met as children as the sons of a Japanese landowner and the house's housekeeper, harboring animosity toward each other, and grew up to become marathon runners representing Joseon and Japan. As they experience the war together, they feel a strange sense of kinship and develop reconciliation and friendship.   And of course the most famous story would find its way to the big screen. In 2011 the film My Way came out, back then the most expensive south korean film ever made at around 23$ million.   Then in 2012 a unknown person created a wikipedia page piecing together the Ambrose story, the photo and the unknown DBK readers information. With all of this information becoming more viral suddenly in 2013, two history books hit the scene and would you know it, both have “Yang Kyoungjong” in them.    These are Antony Beevor's book “the second world war” and that of defense consultant and author Steven Zaloga in his book “the devil's garden: Rommel's desperate Defense of Omaha Beach on D-Day”. Both authors took the story, name and iconic photo and expanded on the mythos by adding further details as to how the Korean man would have gone from Korea to Cherbourg france.   So Ambrose's story spreads across the internet alongside this photo. Both spark interest in Korea and an investigation receives some random guys testimony, which quite honestly was groundless. Despite the korean documentary stating there was no evidence of a Yang Kyoungjong, it sparks further interest, more stories and a famous film in 2011. 2012 sees a wikipage, it becomes more viral and now seeps into other historians work.   And I would be remiss not to mention the bizarre controversy that broke out in my nation of Canada. A nation so full of controversies today, dear god. Debbie Hanlon a city councilor in St John Newfoundland was absolutely wrecked online in 2018 for an advertisement promoting her real estate business stating “Korean Yang kyoungjong fought with Japan against the USSR. He then fought with the USSR against Germany. Then with Germany against the US! Want an agent who fights for you, call me!” Really weird ad by the way. So it seems her ad was to point out how far she was willing to go for her real estate clients. It was considered extremely offensive, and not the first time she pulled this off, her husband Oral Mews had recently come under fire for another ad he made using a photo of the Puerto Rican cab driver Victor Perez Cardona, where the vehicle turned into a casket. That ad said “He can't give you a lift because he's dead. He's propped up in his cab at his wake! Need a lift to great service, call me!” Hanlon was surprised at the amount of backlash she received since the ads had been running for over 4 years online. She claimed to be the victim of cyberbullying and trolls. So yeah, that happened.    Did Yang Kyoungjong exist, more than likely not, was it possible some Koreans found themselves in a position his story pertains to, you know what it's quite possible. During War a lot of weird things happen. I hope you liked this episode, please let me know in the comments on the Patreon what you think, how I can improve things and of course what you want to hear about next!

If you've ever wondered what travelling through Mongolia would be like this episode is going to take you righ there. This week Rebecca Gross is giving us an update from her bike adventures through Mongolia. Think of huge, open landscapes, river crossings, dreamy wildcamps, sandy roads, headwinds, yurts everything! Be sure to follow Rebecca via her instagram - @rebecca_grb and watch her bike adventure unfold. Check out Zorali for all your outdoor adventure needs!Support the showBuy me a coffee and help support the show! I'm an affiliate for a few brands I genuinely use and recommend including:

In this episode, our guest is Dr. Enebish Namjil, a veteran solar energy expert and pioneer of Mongolia's renewable energy transition. Dr. Namjil shares his journey from launching early solar research in the 1970s to developing large-scale PV systems, solar thermal heating, and even implementing innovative heat battery technologies in his own home. We explore Mongolia's immense potential in solar energy, including gigawatt-scale proposals for the Gobi Desert, the shift toward distributed power supply, and how Dr. Namjil's work is helping combat severe winter pollution. His personal solar-powered home is a model of energy autonomy — generating over 200 kWh/day, storing power with both lithium and heat batteries, and inspiring future generations through education and policy advocacy. Please join to find more: Connect with Sohail Hasnie: Facebook @sohailhasnie X (Twitter) @shasnie LinkedIn @shasnie ADB Blog Sohail Hasnie YouTube @energypreneurs Instagram @energypreneurs Tiktok @energypreneurs Spotify Video @energypreneurs

This one is personal. I got to ride with Gianna Aycock and Colby Coltrain during the Mongol Derby, and by the first night in training camp they basically adopted me. These two became my Derby older brother and sister, gear gurus, morale squad, and a big reason I made it to the finish line. In this episode, we finally sat down to unpack their whole journey, how Gianna went from riding anything she could as a kid in New Mexico to riding 12 horses a day prepping for the Derby, and how Colby, the ultimate jack-of-all-trades, went from college baseball to welding fences to racing ponies across Mongolia.They're some of my favorite humans, and this conversation is everything I love about horses and horse people, real talk, good stories, and a lot of heart. We get into the nitty gritty of how they prepped for the world's toughest horse race, what nearly broke them (and what didn't), and why Gianna's doing it again in 2026.Key topics we discussed:The backstory: how Gianna first fell into horses and how Colby got pulled into the world alongside herGearing up for the Derby—what equipment they optimized, what they regretted, and the art of ultra‑light packingThe emotional and physical highs and lows during the race: illness, navigation challenges, horse draws, and how they stuck togetherLessons from the trail: reading terrain, trusting horses, managing scarcity, and the power of small acts of kindnessHow the Derby changed them: in gratitude, relationship to food, presence, mindset—and why Gianna is doing it again in 2026

Send us a textMargie Goldsmith, author of Becoming a Badass: From Fearful to Fierce, suggests "do one thing every day that scares you" – a mantra that transformed her into the adventure-seeking "badass" she is today. She shares captivating stories from her journeys across more than 100 countries, revealing how memorable travel experiences often arise from unexpected human connections.We start in the remote mountain paths of Bhutan, where Margie found herself teaching American camp songs to fascinated schoolchildren. In Morocco, what began as local women laughing at her marathon training outfit evolved into a joyous mountain-top celebration.Her tales take us to Mongolia, where an 85-year-old toothless horseman (the country's fastest racehorse rider) led her across vast plains, and to Easter Island, where she recounts the dangerous traditional Birdman competition where participants risk their lives.Whether she's distributing harmonicas to children in developing nations, playing blues with an Acadian women's drum corps in Canada, or exchanging personal items with a mountain guide in Argentina despite having no common language, her tales ring with authenticity, and resonate decades later.From following a Finnish reindeer herder through Lapland's snowy forests to navigating past aggressive elephant seals in Antarctica, Margie demonstrates how facing fears leads to extraordinary experiences and personal growth.This engaging conversation, including many of Lea's travel tales as well, will inspire you to seek authentic connections in your travels – and challenge yourself, as Margie does. As she proves through her harmonica performance ending the episode, it's never too late to develop new passions and continue growing through travel and creative expression._____Margie Goldsmith is an award-winning writer, musician, and author of Becoming a Badass: From Fearful to Fierce, available in print, Kindle and audiobook, with Margie narrating (including some of her music!). Contact her at margiegoldsmith.com_____Podcast host Lea Lane has traveled to over 100 countries, and has written nine books, including the award-winning Places I Remember  (Kirkus Reviews star rating, and  'one of the top 100 Indie books of  the year'). She has contributed to many guidebooks and has written thousands of travel articles. Contact her at placesirememberlealane.com_____Our award-winning travel podcast, Places I Remember with Lea Lane, has dropped over 120 travel episodes! New episodes drop on the first Tuesday of the month, on Apple, Spotify, and wherever you listen to podcasts. _____Travel vlogs of featured  podcasts-- with video and graphics -- now drop on YouTube.Please subscribe, like, and comment. 

Hey guys, what you are about to listen to is basically a “what if” Japan performed Hokushin-ron instead of Nanshin-ron, ie: What if Japan invaded the USSR during WW2? Before I jump into it I just want to thank all of you that signed up for the patreon, you guys are awesome. Please leave a comment on this episode to let me know what more you want to hear about in the future. With all of that said and done lets jump right into it.   Part 1 The Geopolitical context   Ok so, one of the questions I get the most is, what if Japan invaded the USSR. I've actually already tackled this subject, albeit lightly with Cody from AlternatehistoryHub and once with my friend Eric. Its too complicated to give a real answer, a lot of this is guess work, though I really will try to provide hard numbers. I think off the bat something needs to be made clear since we are dealing with alternate history. I am not doing a “what if Japan developed completely different, or what if the IJA got their way in the early 1930's” no no, this is going to be as realistic as possible…even though this is batshit crazy.    Japan faced the decision of whether to go to war with the USSR in 1941 during Operation Barbarossa. They held meetings, made plans, and ultimately it was decided they would not engage the Soviets. Our scenario will follow exactly what they did to a T, but when the made the decision not to go to war, we will see them go to war.    Now before I jump into our this timeline, I think its very important to explain the actual situation Japan faced in 1941. There were two major strategies that emerged during the 1930's within the Japanese military. Many junior officers in the IJA favored the Hokushin-ron “northern strike” strategy against the USSR. Many officers in the IJN with some in the IJA favored the Nanshin-ron “southern strike” strategy, to seize the resource rich dutch east indies by invading Southeast Asia and the Pacific. The idea of Hokushin-ron was to perform an invasion into Southern Siberia and outer mongolia ending around Lake Baikal where they would set up defenses. They had already tried to establish this during the Russian civil war as part of the Siberian Intervention, but failed to create a buffer state. From 1935-1939 there were 108 border clashes between the USSR and Japan. In 1938 one of these border clashes turned into quite a catastrophe, it was called the battle of Lake Khasan.  The Soviets suffered nearly 800 deaths, more than 3000 wounded, perhaps nearly 50 tanks were destroyed with another 100 damaged. The Japanese suffered about 600 deaths with 2500 wounded. The result ultimately was a ceasefire, but for the Kwantung army it seemed to them like a victory. In May of 1939 they had a much larger and more famous battle known as the battle of Khalkhin Gol.  During the early part of the battle the IJA sent 80 tanks crossing over Khalkhin Gol, driving the Soviets back towards Baintsagan Hill. Zhukov was waiting for the attack and sent 450 tanks and armored cars unsupported by infantry to attack the IJA from three sides. The IJA were practically encircled and lost half their armored units as they struggled to fight back as it withdrew. The two armies spared for the next 2 weeks along the east bank of the Khalkhin Gol. Problem was the Japanese were having issues getting their supplies to the area as they lacked motor transport while Zhukov whose army was over 460 miles away from its base of supply had 2600 trucks supplying them. On july 23rd the Japanese launched attacks supported by artillery and within two days they had consumed half their ammunition stores. The situation was terrible, they suffered 5000 casualties and made little progress breaking the Soviet lines. Zhukov then unleashed an offensive on august 20th using over 4000 trucks to transport supplies from Chita base. He assembled around 500 tanks, 550 fighters and bombers and his 50,000 infantry supported by armored cars. This mechanized force attacked the Japanese first using artillery and the aircraft as his armor and infantry crossed the river. The IJA were quickly flanked by the fast moving Soviet armor and encircled by August 25th. The IJA made attempts to break out of the encirclement but failed. They refused to surrender despite overwhelming artillery and aerial bombardment; by the 31st the Japanese forces on the Mongolian side of the border were destroyed. The Japanese suffered nearly 20,000 casualties, the lost 162 aircraft, 29 tanks, 7 tankettes, 72 artillery pieces a large number of vehicles. The Soviets took a heavy hit also suffering almost 25,000 casualties, 250 aircraft, 250 tanks, 133 armored cars, almost 100 artillery pieces, hundreds of vehicles. While these numbers make it seem the Japanese did a great job, you need to consider what each party was bringing to this fight. The Japanese brought roughly 30,000 men, 80 tanks and tankettes, 400 aircraft, 300 artillery pieces, 1000 trucks. The Soviets brought nearly 75,000 men, 550 tanks, 900 aircraft, 634 artillery pieces, 4000 trucks. There are some sources that indicate the IJA brought as many artillery rounds as they could muster from Japan, Manchuria and Korea, roughly 100,000 rounds for the operation. The Soviets fired 100,000 rounds per day. A quick look at wikipedia numbers, yes I know its a no no, but sometimes its good for quick perspectives show: USSR: Bomber sorties 2,015, fighter sorties 18,509; 7.62 mm machine gun rounds fired 1,065,323; 20 mm (0.80 in) cannon rounds expended 57,979; bombs dropped 78,360 (1,200 tons). Japan: Fighter/bomber sorties 10,000 (estimated); 7.7 mm (0.30 in) machine gun rounds fired 1.6 million; bombs dropped 970 tons. What I am trying to say is there was an enormous disparity in military production. And this is not just limited to numbers but quality. After the battle the Japanese made significant reforms. They increased tank production from 500 annually to 1200. The Japanese funded research into new anti-tank guns, such as the Type 1 47 mm. They mounted this gun to their Type 97 Chi-Ha tanks, the new standard medium tank of the IJA. Because of the tremendous defeat to Soviet armor they send General Yamashita to Germany to learn everything he could about tank tactics. But they simply could not produce enough tanks to ever hope to match 10% of the USSR. The Soviets had mostly been using T-26's, BT-5's and BT-7's who were crudely made, but made en masse. The Japanese would find most of their tank models with less effective range, less armor and some with less penetration power. It took the Japanese a hell of a lot more time to produce tanks, they were simply not on par with the Soviets in quantity or quality. Their tank tactics, albeit improved via Yamashita after 1939, were still nothing compared to the Soviets.  The major outcome of the battle of Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol was the abandonment of the hokushin-ron strategy and adoption of the nanshin-ron strategy. But, that didnt mean Japan did not have a plan in case they had to go to war with the USSR. Part 2 Kantōgun Tokushu Enshū Kantōgun Tokushu Enshū or the Kwantung Army Special Maneuvers was an operational plan created by the General Staff of the IJA for an invasion of the Russian Far East to capitalize on Operation Barbarossa. Here our story truly begin. Between 1938-1939 the IJA General Staff and Kwantung Army formed two “Hachi-Go” plans. Variants A and B examined the possibility of an all out war with the USSR beginning in 1943. In both plans they expected to be facing 60 Soviet divisions, while they could deliver 50 divisions, delivered incrementally from China and Japan. Plan A called for attacks across the eastern and northern borders of Manchuria while maintaining a defensive stance in the west. Plan B, much more ambitious, called for striking into the vast steppe between the Great Khingan Mountains and Lake Baikal, hoping to cut off the trans-siberian railway. If this was done successfully it was believed the whole of European Russia would be doomed to be defeated in detail. Defeated in detail means to divide and conquer. This battle would take place over 5000 kilometers with Japan's final objective being to advance 1200 km into the USSR. That dwarves Operation Barbarossa in distance, let that sink in. Both plans faced impossible odds. First of all the railway networks in Manchuria were not sufficiently expanded for such far reaching offensives, especially for plan B. Furthermore the 50 divisions required for them would be impossible to come by, since 1937 Japan was bogged down in a war with China. When Japan went to war with the west in 1941 she had 51 divisions. She left the base minimum in China, 35 divisions and tossed nearly 20 into southeast asia and the pacific. On top of not having the men, the IJA estimated a fleet of 200,000 vehicles would be necessary to sustain an offensive to Lake Baikal. That was twice the number of military vehicles Japan had at any given time. After the battle of Khalkhin Gol, plan B was completely abandoned. Planning henceforth focused solely on the northern and eastern fronts with any western advance being limited in scope. Now Japan formed a neutrality pact with the USSR because of her defeat at Khalkhin Gol and Molotov Ribbentrop pact between Germany and the USSR. The Molotov Ribbentrop Pact came as a bitter and complete surprise to Japan. It pushed Japan to fully adopt the Nanshin-ron strategy and this began with her invasion of French IndoChina, which led the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and United States to embargo her. The Netherlands Dutch East Indies refused to sell oil to Japan, the UK refused to sell oil from Burma and the US gradually cut off selling oil to Japan, with her oil exports alone being 80% of Japans supply, the rest from the Dutch east indies. The United States also placed an embargo on scrap-metal shipments to Japan and closed the Panama Canal to Japanese shipping. 74.1% of Japan's scrap iron came from the United States in 1938, and 93% of Japan's copper in 1939. Other things like Rubber and tin were also off the table, as this was mostly acquired from British held Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.    Now the crux of everything is the China War. Japan was stuck, she needed to win, in order to win she needed the resources she was being denied. The only logical decision was to attack the places with these resources. Thus until 1941, Japan prepared to do just that, investing in the Navy primarily. Then in June of 1941, Hitler suddenly informs the Japanese that he is going to invade the USSR. The Japanese were shocked and extremely angry, they nearly left the Tripartite Pact over the issue. This unprecedented situation that ushered in the question, what should Japan do? There were those like Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka who argued they must abandon the neutrality pact and launch a simultaneous offensive with the Germans against the USSR. The IJA favored this idea….because obviously it would see them receiving more funding as the IJN was currently taking more and more of it for the Nanshin-ron plans. But this is not a game of hearts of Iron IV, the Japanese government had to discuss and plan if they would invade the USSR….and boy it took awhile. I think a lot of you will be very disappointed going forward, but there is no grand unleashing of a million Japanese across the borders into the Soviet Far East, in the real world there is something called logistics and politics.    The Japanese military abided by a flexible response policy, like many nations do today. Theres was specifically called the Junbi Jin Taisei or “preparatory formation setup”. Japan would only go to war with the USSR if favorable conditions were met. So in our timeline the Junbi Jin encountered its first test on June 24th when the IJA/IJN helped a conference in the wake of operation barbarossa. A compromise was made allowing the IJA to prepare an invasion plan if it did not impede on the nanshin-ron plans. There was those in the IJA who argued they should invade the USSR whether conditions were favorable or not, there were those who only wanted to invade if it looked like the USSR was on the verge of collapse. One thing agreed upon was if Japan unleashed a war with the USSR, the hostilities needed to be over by mid-October because the Siberian climate would hit winter and it would simply be impossible to continue. The IJA needed 60-7 days to complete operational preparations and 6-8 weeks to defeat the Soviets within the first phase of the offensive. Here is a breakdown of what they were thinking: 28 June: Decide on mobilization 5 July: Issue mobilization orders 20 July: Begin troop concentration 10 August: Decide on hostilities 24 August: Complete readiness stance 29 August: Concentrate two divisions from North China in Manchuria, bringing the total to 16 5 September: Concentrate four further divisions from the homeland, bringing the total to 22; complete combat stance 10 September (at latest): Commence combat operations 15 October: Complete first phase of war   The plan called for 22 divisions (might I add my own calculations of 20 divisions were pretty spot on), with roughly 850,000 men, including Manchukuo allies, supported by 800,000 tons of shipping. The Japanese hoped the Soviets would toss at least half their forces in the Far East, perhaps 2/3rd of their armor and aircraft against the Germans giving them a 2-1 superiority. Even the 22 divisions was questionable, many in the war ministry thought only 16 divisions could be spared for such a venture, something only suitable for mop up operations in the aftermath of a German victory along the eastern front. It was clear to all, Japan needed perfect conditions to even think about performing such a thing.    The War hawks who still sought to perform Hokushin-ron tried to persaude Hideki Tojo on july 5th to go through with a new plan using a total of 25 divisions. This plan designated “Kantogun Tokushu Enshu or Kantokuen” would involve 2 phases, a buildup and readiness phase and an offensive phase. On July 7th they went to Hirohito for his official sanction for the build up. Hirohito questioned everything, but gradually relented to it. The plan was nearly identical to the former plans, banking on the Soviets being unable to reinforce the Far East because of Germany's progress. The level of commitment was scaled down somewhat, but still enormous. Again a major looming issue was the Manchurian railways that would need to be expanded to accomodate the movement of men and supplies. This meant the construction of port facilities, military barracks, hospitals and such. Kantokuen would begin with a initial blow against the Ussuri front, targeting Primorye and would be followed up by a northern attack against Blagoveshchensk and Kuibyshevka. The 1st area army, 3rd and 20 armies with the 19th division of the Korean army would penetrade the border south of Lake Khanka to breach the main soviet defensive lines, thus threatening Vladivostok. The 5th army would strike south of Dalnerechensk to complete the isolation of the maritime province, sever the trans-sierian railway and block Soviet reinforcements. The 4th army would attack along the Amur river before helping out against Blagoveshchensk. Two reinofrced divisions would invade Sakhalin from land and sea. The second phase would see the capture of Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk, Skovorodino, Sovetskaya Gavan, and Nikolayevsk. Additionally, amphibious operations against Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and other parts of the Kamchatka Peninsula were contemplated.   It was agreed the operation could only afford 24 divisions, with 1,200,000 men, 35,000 vehicles, 500 tanks, 400,000 horses and 300,000 coolies. The deployment of thse forces would mean the western front facing Mongolia and the Trans-baikal region would be pretty much open, so delaying actions would have to be fought if the soviets performed a counter offensive there. Air forces were critical to the plan. They sought to dispatch up to roughly 2000 aircraft cooperating with 350 naval aircraft to launch a sudden strike against the Soviet Far East Air Force to knock them out early.    The Soviet Far East had two prominent weaknesses to be exploited. Number 1 was Mongolia's 4500 km long horeshoe shaped border. Number 2 was its 100% dependency on European Russia to deliver men, food and war materials via the trans-siberian railway. Any disruption of the trans-siberian railway would prove fatal to the Soviet Far East.    Now as for the Soviets. The 1930's and early 1940's saw the USSR take up a defensive policy, but retained offensive elecments as well. Even with the German invasion and well into 1942, the Soviets held a strategy of tossing back the IJA into Manchuria if attacked. The primary forces defending the Far east in 1941 were the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal Fronts, under the command of Generals Iosif Apanasenko and Mikhail Kovalyov. The Trans-Baikal front held 9 divisions, including 2 armored, a mechanized brigade and a heavily fortified region west of the Oldoy River near Skovorodino had a garrison. The Far Eastern Front had 23 divisions including 3 armored, 4 brigades and 11 heavily fortified regions with garrisons including Vladivostok. Altogether they had 650,000 men, 5400 tanks, 3000 aircraft, 57,000 vehicles, 15,000 artillery pieces and nearly 100,000 horses. By 1942 the Vladivostok sector had 150 artillery pieces with 75 -356 mm calibers organized into 50 batteries. As you can imagine after Operation Barbarrosa was unleashed, things changed. From June to December, roughly 160,000 men, 3000 tanks, 2670 artillery pieces, 12,000 vehicles and perhaps 1800 aircraft were sent to deal with the Germans. Despite this, the Soviets also greatly expanded a buildup to match the apparent Japanese buildup in Manchuria. By July 22nd 1941 the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal Fronts were to be raised by 1 million men for august. By December it was nearly 1.2 million. Even the Soviet Far East Navy saw an increase from 100,000 men to 170,000 led by Admiral Yumashev. The Soviet Mongolian allies were capable of manning about 80,000, though they lacked heavy equipment.    Thus if this war broke out in September the Soviets and Mongolians would have just over a million men, with 2/3rds of them manning the Amur-Ussuri-Sakhalin front, the rest would defend Mongolia and the Trans-Baikal region. Even though the war against the Germans was dire, the Soviets never really gave up their prewar planning for how to deal with the Japanese. There would be an all-out defense over the border to prevent any breach of Soviet territory. The main effort would see the 1st and 25th armies holding a north-south axis between the Pacific ocean and Lake Khanka; the 35th army would defend Iman; the 15th and 2nd Red Banner armies would repel the Japanese over the Amur River; and other forces would try to hold out on Sakhalin, Kamchatka and the Pacific coast. The Soviets had constructed hundreds of fortified positions known as Tochkas along the border. Most of these were hexagonal concrete bunkers contained machine gun nests and 76 mm guns. The fortified regions I mentioned were strategically placed forcing the Japanese to overcome them via frontal attacks. This would require heavy artillery to overcome. Despite the great defensive lines, the Soviets did not intend to be passive and would launch counteroffensives. The Soviet air force and Navy would play an active role in defeating a Japanese invasion as well. The air force's objetice would be to destroy the Japanese air force in the air and on the ground, requiring tactical ground attack mission. They would also destroy key railways, bridges and airfields within Manchuria and Korea alongside intercepting IJN shipping. Strategic bombing against the home islands would be limited to under 30 DB-3's who could attack Tokyo, Yokosuka, Maizuru and Ominato. The Soviet Navy would help around the mouth of the Amur River, mine the Tatar Strait and try to hit any IJN ships landing men or materials across the Pacific Coasts.    Japan would not be able to continue a land war with the USSR for very long. According to Japanese military records, in 1942 while at war they were required to produce 50 Kaisenbun. A Kaisenbun is a unit of measurement for ammunition needed for a single division to operate for 4 months. Annual production never surpassed 25 kaisenbun with 100 in reserve. General Shinichi Tanaka estimated for an operation against the USSR 3 Kaisenbun would be needed per divisions, thus a total of 72 would be assigned to 24 divisions. This effectively meant 2/3rds of Japans ammunition stockpile would be used on the initial strike against the USSR. Japan would have been extremely hard pressed to survive such a war cost for 2 years.    Now in terms of equipment Japan had a lot of problems. During the border battles, Japanese artillery often found itself outranged and grossly under supplied compared to the Soviet heavier guns. Despite moving a lot of men and equipment to face the Germans, the Red Army maintained a gross superiority in armor. The best tank the Kwantung Army had in late 1941 was the Type 97 Chi-Ha, holding 33mm armor with a low velocity 57 mm gun. There was also Ha-Go and Te-Ke's with 37 mm guns but they had an effective range less than 1 km.   The Soviet T-26, BT-5 and BT-7's had 45 mm guns more than capable of taking out the Japanese armor and the insult to injury was they were crudely made and very expendable. Every Japanese tank knocked out was far greater a loss, as Japan's production simply could not remotely match the USSR. For aircraft the Japanese were a lot better off. The Polikarpov I-16 was the best Soviet fighter in the Far East and performed alright against the Nakajima Ki-27 at Khalkhin Gol. The rest of the Soviet air arsenal were much older and would struggle. The Soviets would have no answer to the IJN's Zero fighter or the IJA's high speed KI-21 bomber that outraced the Soviet SB-2. Japanese pilots were battle hardened by China and vastly experienced.   Another thing the Japanese would have going for them was quality of troops. The Soviets drained their best men to fight the Germans, so the combat effectiveness in the far east would be less. Without the Pacific War breaking out, some of Japan's best Generals would be brought into this war, of course the first one that comes to mind for me is General Yamashita, probably the most armor competent Japanese general of ww2.    Come August of 1941 those who still sought the invasion of the USSR were facing major crunch time. The IJA planners had assumed the Soviets would transfer 50% or more of their power west to face the Germans, but this was not the case. By August 9th of 1941, facing impossible odds and with the western embargos in full motion, in our timeline the Japanese Hokushin-Ron backers gave up. But for the sake of our story, for some batshit insane reason, the Japanese military leadership and Hirohito give the greenlight for an invasion on August 10th.   Part 3 the catastrophe   So to reiterate the actual world plan had    10 August: Decide on hostilities 24 August: Complete readiness stance 29 August: Concentrate two divisions from North China in Manchuria, bringing the total to 16 5 September: Concentrate four further divisions from the homeland, bringing the total to 22; complete combat stance 10 September (at latest): Commence combat operations 15 October: Complete first phase of war   So what is key to think about here is the events of September. The Battle for Moscow is at the forefront, how does a Japanese invasion in the first week or two of September change things? This is going to probably piss off some of you, but Operation Typhoon would still fail for Germany.  In our time line the legendary spy Richard Sorge sent back information on Japan's decision to invade the USSR between August 25th to September 14th. On the 25th he informed Stalin the Japanese high command were still discussing whether to go to war or not with the USSR. On September 6th Stalin was informed the Japanese were beginning preparations for a war against the west. Then on September 14th, the most important message was relayed to Stalin "In the careful judgment of all of us here... the possibility of [Japan] launching an attack, which existed until recently, has disappeared...."[15]    With this information on hand from 23 June to 31 December 1941, Stalin transferred a total of 28 divisions west. This included 18 rifle divisions, 1 mountain rifle division, 3 tank divisions, 3 mechanized divisions and 3 mountain cavalry divisions. The transfers occurred mainly in June (11 divisions) and October (9 divisions).    Here we come to a crossroads and I am going to have to do some blunt predictions. Let's go from the most optimistic to the most pessimistic. Scenario 1) for some insane reason, Stalin abandons Moscow and moves his industry further east, something the Soviets were actively preparing during Operation Typhoon. This is not a defeat of the USSR, it certainly would prolong the war, but not a defeat. Now that seems rather silly. Scenario 2) Stalin attempts transferring half of what he did in our time line back to Moscow and the Germans fail to take it. The repercussions of course is a limited counteroffensive, it wont be as grand as in our timeline, but Moscow is saved. Scenario 3) and the most likely in my opinion, why would Stalin risk moscow for the Far East? Stalin might not transfer as many troops, but certainly he would have rather placed his chips in Moscow rather than an enemy literally 6000 km's away who have to cross a frozen desert to get to anything he cares about.  Even stating these scenarios, the idea the German army would have taken Moscow if some of the very first units from the far east arrived, because remember a lot of these units did not make it in time to defend moscow, rather they contributed to the grand counteroffensive after the Germans stalled. The German armies in front of Moscow were depleted, exhausted, unsupplied and freezing. Yes many of the Soviet armies at Moscow were hastily thrown together, inexperienced, poorly led and still struggling to regain their balance from the German onslaught. Yet from most sources, and by sources I mean armchair historian types argue, the Germans taking Moscow is pretty unlikely. And moscow was not even that important. What a real impact might have been was the loss of the Caucasus oil fields in early 1942, now that could have brought the USSR down, Moscow, not so much, again the Soviets had already pulled their industry further east, they could do it again.   So within the context of this Second Russo-Japanese War, figure the German's still grind to a halt, they don't take Moscow, perhaps Soviets dont push them back as hard, but the USSR is not collapsing by any means. Ok now before we talk about Japans invasion we actually need to look at some external players. The UK/US/Netherlands already began massive embargoes against Japan for oil, iron, rubber, tin, everything she needed to continue her war, not just against the USSR, but with over 35 divisions fighting in China. President Roosevelt was looking for any excuse to enter WW2 and was gradually increasing ways to aid Britain and the Soviets.  Now American's lend-lease program seriously aided the USSR during WW2, particularly the initial stages of the war. The delivery of lend-lease to the USSR came through three major routes: the Arctic Convoys, the Persian Corridor, and the Pacific Route. The Arctic route was the shortest and most direct route for lend-lease aid to the USSR, though it was also the most dangerous as it involved sailing past German-occupied Norway. Some 3,964,000 tons of goods were shipped by the Arctic route; 7% was lost, while 93% arrived safely. The Persian Corridor was the longest route, and was not fully operational until mid-1942. Thereafter it saw the passage of 4,160,000 tons of goods, 27% of the total. The most important was the Pacific Route which opened up in August of 1941, but became affected when Japan went to war with America. The major port was Vladivostok, where only Soviet ships could transport non-military goods some 8,244,000 tons of goods went by this route, 50% of the total. Vladivostok would almost certainly be captured by the Japanese in our scenario so it won't be viable after its capture. Here is the sticky part, Japan is not at war with the US, so the US is pretty much free to find different Pacific paths to get lend-lease to the Soviets, and to be honest there's always the Arctic or Persian corridors. Hell in this scenario America will be able to get supplies easily into China as there will be no war in Burma, hong kong, Malaya and such. America alone is going to really ruin Japans day by increasing lend-lease to the UK, China and the USSR. America wont be joining the war in 1941, but I would strongly wager by hook or by crook, FDR would pull them into a war against Germany, probably using the same tactic Woodrow Wilson did with WW1. This would only worsen things for Japan. Another player of course is China. Late 1941, China was absolutely battered by Japan. With Japan pulling perhaps even more troops than she did for the Pacific war to fight the USSR, Chiang Kai-Shek would do everything possible to aid his new found close ally Stalin. How this would work out is anyone's guess, but it would be significant as I believe America would be providing a lot more goodies.    Ok you've all been patient, what happens with the war? Japan has to deliver a decisive knock out blow in under 4-6 months, anything after this is simply comical as Japan's production has no resources. The oil in siberia is not even remotely on the table. The Japanese can't find it, would not be able to exploit it, let alone quick enough to use it for the war. Hell the Italians were sitting on oil in Libya and they never figured that out during WW2.   So Kantokuen is unleashed with an initial blow against the Primorye in the Ussuri Front followed by an assault against Blagoveshchensk and Kiubyshevka. The main soviet lines south of Lake Khanka are attacked by the Japanese 1st area army, 3rd and 20th armies and the 19th Korean division. This inturn threatens Vladivostok who is also being bombarded by IJA/IJN aircraft. The 5th Ija army attacks south of Dalnerechensk in an attempt to sever the trans-siberian railway, to block Soviet reinforcements and supplies. The 4th IJA army fords the Amur river to help with the assault of Blagoveshchensk. Meanwhile Sakhalin is being attacked from land and sea by two IJA divisions.  Despite the Soviets being undermanned the western front facing Mongolia and the Trans-Baikal region is wide up to an attack as its only defended by the 23rd IJA division, so a limited counteroffensive begins there. The Japanese quickly win air superiority, however the heavily fortified Tochkas are not being swept aside as the Japanese might have hoped. A major problem the Japanese are facing is Soviet artillery. The Japanese artillery already placed along the borders, initially performed well, crushing Tochkas in range, but when the Japanese begin advancing and deploying their artillery units they are outgunned perhaps 3-1, much of the Soviet artillery outranges them and the Soviets have a much larger stockpile of shells. Airpower is failing to knock out soviet artillery which is placed within Tochkas and other fortified positions with anti-aircraft guns. Without achieving proper neutralization or counter battery fire, the Japanese advance against the fortified Soviet positions. The Soviets respond shockingly with counterattacks. The 15th and 35th Soviet armies with the Amur Red Banner Military Flotilla toss limited counterattacks against both sides of the Sungari River, harassing the Japanese. While much of the soviet armor had been sent west, their light tanks which would be useless against the Germans have been retained in the far east and prove capable of countering the IJA tanks. The Soviets inflict tremendous casualties, however General Yamashita, obsessed with blitzkrieg style warfare he saw first hand in the west, eventually exploits a weak area in the line.Gradually a blitzkrieg punches through and begins to circle around hitting Soviet fortified positions from the rear. The Soviets knew this would be the outcome and had prepared to fight a defense in depth, somewhat managing the onslaught.  The trans-siberian railway has been severed in multiple locations close to the border area, however this is not as effective as it could be, the Japanese need to hook deeper to cut the line further away. In the course of weeks the Soviets are gradually dislodged from their fortified positions, fighting a defense in depth over great stretches of land. Vladivostok holds out surprisingly long until the IJN/IJA seize the city. Alongside this Sakhalin is taken with relative ease. The Soviet surface fleet is annihilated, but their large submarine force takes a heavy toll of the IJN who are attempting Pacific landings. Kantokuen phase 1 is meeting its objectives, but far later than expected with much more casualties than expected. The Japanese are shocked by the fuel consumption as they advance further inland. Each truck bearing fuel is using 50% of said fuel to get to the troops, something reminiscent of the north african campaign situation for Rommel. The terrain is terrible for their vehicles full of valleys, hills, forests and mountains. Infrastructure in the region is extremely underdeveloped and the Soviets are burning and destroying everything before the Japanese arrive. All key roads and cities are defended until the Japanese can encircle the Soviets, upon which they depart, similar to situations the Japanese face in China. It is tremendously slow progress. The IJA are finding it difficult to encircle and capture Soviet forces who have prepared a series of rear lines to keep falling back to while performing counterattacks against Japanese columns. As the Japanese advance further into the interior, the IJN are unable to continue supporting them with aircraft and much of the IJA aircraft are limited in operations because of the range. The second phase of Kantokuen calls for the capture of Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk, Skovorodino, Sovetskaya Gavan, and Nikolayevsk. Additionally, amphibious operations against Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and other parts of the Kamchatka Peninsula are on standby as the IJN fears risking shipping as a result of Soviet submarine operations. The sheer scope of the operation was seeing the tide sides stretching their forces over a front nearly 5000 km in length. At some points the Japanese were attempting to advance more than 1000 km's inland, wasting ungodly amounts of fuel and losing vehicles from wear and tear.  So what does Japan gain? Within the span of 4 months, max 6 months Japan could perhaps seized: Sakhalin, the Primorsye krai including Vladivostok, segments of the trans siberian railway, Blagoveshchensk, Kuibyshevka. If they are really lucky Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk, Skovorodino, Sovetskaya Gavan, Nikolayevsk. Additionally, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and other parts of the Kamchatka Peninsula. What does this mean? Really nothing. Pull out a map of manchuria during WW2, take a pencil and expand the manchurian border perhaps 1000 km if you really want to be generous, that's the new extent of the empire of the rising sun. The real purpose of attacking the USSR is not to perform some ludicrous dash across 6000 km's of frozen wasteland to whittle down and defeat the Soviets alongside the rest of the Axis. It was only to break them, in late 1941 at Moscow there was perhaps a fools chance, but it was a fool's chance for Japan.  Japan has run out of its stockpiles of Kaisenbun, oil, iron, rubber, tin, all types of resources necessary for making war. Unlike in our timeline where Japan began exporting resources from its conquests in southeast asia and the pacific, here Japan spent everything and now is relying on the trickles it has within its empire. The China war will be much more difficult to manage. The lend-lease will increase every day to China. The US/UK/Netherlands will only increase pressure upon Japan to stop being a nuisance, Japan can't do anything about this as the US Pacific Fleet is operating around the Philippines always a looming threat. The Japanese are holding for a lack of better words, useless ground in the far east. They will build a buffer area to defend against what can only be described as a Soviet Invasion of Manchuria x1000. The Allies will be directing all of their effort against Germany and Italy, providing a interesting alternate history concept in its own right. After Germany has been dealt with, Japan would face a existential threat against a very angry Stalin. Cody from Alternate History Hub actually made an episode on this scenario, he believed the Soviets would conquer most of Japan occupied Asia and even invade the home islands. It would certainly be something on the table, taking many years, but the US/UK would most likely interfere in some way. The outcome would be so much worse for Japan. Perhaps she is occupied and a communist government is installed. Perhaps like in our timeline the Americans come in to bolster Japan up for the looming coldwar.  But the question I sought to answer here was, Japan invading the USSR was a dumb idea. The few Japanese commanders who pushed it all the way until August 9th of 1941 simply had to give up because of how illogical it was. I honestly should not have even talked about military matters, this all came down to logistics and resources. You want to know how Japan could have secured itself a better deal in WW2? 1941, the China War is the number one problem Japan can't solve so they look north or south to acquire the means to solve the China problem? Negotiate a peace with China. That is the lackluster best deal right there.    Sorry if this episode did not match your wildest dreams. But if you want me to do some batshit crazy alternate history stuff, I am more than happy to jump into it and have fun. Again thank all of you guys who joined the patreon, you guys are awesome. Until next time this is the Pacific War channel over and out. 

Caixo! Today, travel medicine specialists Drs. Paul Pottinger & Chris Sanford answer your travel health questions, including:Why can tot tubbing make you pass out?Hypothermia: What is it, how to avoid it, what to do if it happens?Can we get a reliable flu shot this year?Plague in Mongolia…. From Marmots? Can I travel there if immunosuppressed?Are Germ & Worm board-certified in Travel Medicine?Are there issues with catching Nipah virus from sampling palm wine in Bangladesh?I love to travel but getting there stresses me out… help?We hope you enjoy this podcast! If so, please follow us on the socials @germ.and.worm, subscribe to our RSS feed and share with your friends! We would so appreciate your rating and review to help us grow our audience. And, please send us your questions and travel health anecdotes: germandworm@gmail.com. And, please visit our website: germandworm.com. Our Disclaimer: The Germ and Worm Podcast is designed to inform, inspire, and entertain. However, this podcast does NOT establish a doctor-patient relationship, and it should NOT replace your conversation with a qualified healthcare professional. Please see one before your next adventure. The opinions in this podcast are Dr. Sanford's & Dr. Pottinger's alone, and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the University of Washington or UW Medicine.

NCAA finalist Troy Spratley joins Dynasty Defined for a candid look at his path from upstate New York to Stillwater, why he left Minnesota, and how OSU's culture—and training with Dayton Fix and Thomas Gilman—shaped a breakthrough year at 125. We dig into hand fighting, the crab ride, blocking out online noise, and what it will take to finish the job this season.Chapters:00:00 — Welcome + why Troy rarely does podcasts02:05 — Blocking out online noise and staying positive04:12 — Origins: grandpa's idea, NY roots, and early clubs07:18 — High school shuffle: Sem, Collinsville, Plano West, eligibility mess11:30 — Training through COVID with Tegan + Coach Hardy14:42 — US Open win, WTT finals, and freestyle without “freestyle experience”18:55 — Commit to Minnesota, what didn't fit, and entering the portal22:10 — “Come be a Cowboy”: reconnecting with Dayton Fix25:36 — OSU family culture vs. everywhere else28:40 — Freshman year spark plug: setting the tone at 12531:22 — The crab ride: why it works, reps, and quick back points34:48 — Weird penalties, tight spots, and learning to manage chaos37:05 — Sophomore leap: Gilman's impact, hand fighting → attacks40:29 — Eight-match heater: flipping the switch after midseason losses43:11 — NCAA run: Steve-O history, the Ramos win, and mindset in big moments47:18 — Finals prep: routine, food, movement, and keeping it simple50:12 — Freestyle plans: RBY camp in Mongolia, training with world champs53:20 — Why he came home to Stillwater—and what's left to prove56:08 — Closing thoughts: separating this season and chasing the title

We dig into newly leaked emails revealing an unexpected connection between Jeffrey Epstein, former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and a Mongolian security deal.What do these documents tell us about Epstein's international activities, his political connections, and the web of influence stretching from Tel Aviv to Ulaanbaatar? We unpack the revelations reported by Drop Site News, explore the geopolitical context behind Mongolia's security ambitions, and discuss what this means for understanding the global nature of Epstein's operations.We also react to a vira post from @worqas on X that frames these revelations in an illuminating way.

In this episode of The President's Daily Brief: Ukraine may soon get a major long-range upgrade, as the Trump administration weighs sending Tomahawk cruise missiles capable of striking deep into Russian territory. China has built a “Mock Taipei” in Mongolia — full-scale replicas of Taiwan's government buildings used to rehearse for an eventual invasion. Washington announces sweeping new sanctions on Iran, targeting companies and individuals linked to its weapons programs. And in today's Back of the Brief — the largest cocaine bust in U.S. history: one million pounds seized, cutting cartel profits by billions. To listen to the show ad-free, become a premium member of The President's Daily Brief by visiting https://PDBPremium.com.Please remember to subscribe if you enjoyed this episode of The President's Daily Brief.YouTube: youtube.com/@presidentsdailybriefStash Financial: Don't Let your money sit around. Go to https://get.stash.com/PDB to see how you can receive $25 towards your first stock purchase.TriTails Premium Beef: Reclaim dinner from the jaws of school-year chaos Visit https://trybeef.com/PDB. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

“Wild rice camp started a long time ago. It actually started thousands of years ago, with our ancestors having a real-time lifeway.”We have a jam-packed show for you today featuring traditional foodways from the original inhabitants of this land, foods from lands far away–Anatolia and Mongolia, as well as right here in our own back yard. Wild rice harvested in a canoe, sumac by the side of the road, and for dessert? Pawpaw ice cream.

What do Mongolian barbecue, Ford Motor Company, and Ironman triathlons all have in common? For Billy Downs, they've each played a role in shaping his unique journey as a leader in franchising.Billy “BD” Downs co-founded BD's Mongolian Grill at just 26 years old, growing it into an international brand before selling and moving into consulting, nonprofit work, and ultimately becoming the first franchisee in the state of Michigan, and now President, of Ford's Garage, a brand with 32 locations across 8 states. Along the way, he earned the Presidential Friendship Medal from the president of Mongolia, launched community-impact initiatives through World Vision, and helped advise Goldfish Swim School as it scaled from one location to more than 200.In this conversation, Billy opens up about the challenges of starting a restaurant brand from scratch, the critical role of building the right team, and why humility and coachability are non-negotiables in successful franchising. He shares how wearing the hats of both franchisor and franchisee shaped his leadership style, why he believes in surrounding yourself with a board of advisors sooner rather than later, and how “one team” is more than just a slogan at Ford's Garage.Whether you're an emerging franchisor, a franchisee, or simply a leader looking for wisdom, Billy's story is packed with insights on growth, resilience, and building businesses that make an impact far beyond the bottom line.Connect with BillyLinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/billydowns/Email: b.downs@fordsgarageusa.comEpisode Highlights:Growing BD's Mongolian Grill into an international brandLessons learned from selling a franchise and starting overConsulting, nonprofit work, and the path to Ford's GarageWhy humility, coachability, and teamwork are essential in franchisingAdvising Goldfish Swim School on their path to 200+ unitsBuilding community impact into a brand from the startBalancing the dual role of franchisor and franchiseeConnect with Tracy Personal LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/tracy-panase/ JBF LinkedIn - https://www.linkedin.com/company/jbfsale JBF Franchise System - https://jbfsalefranchise.com/ Email: podcast@jbfsale.com Connect with Shannon Personal LinkedIn - https://www.linkedin.com/in/shannonwilburn/ JBF LinkedIn - https://www.linkedin.com/company/jbfsale Website - https://shineexecutivecoaching.com/ Email - shannon@shineexecutivecoaching.com

I'm excited to continue the Speaking of Travel + Leave No Trace TV series with Richard (Ricky) Crawford, host of the inspiring Amazon Prime TV series Leave No Trace TV, along with Ben Alcott, the show's talented director and cameraman from Australia who brings his unique perspectives from behind the lens and shares reflections on how storytelling, patience, and a deep respect for place can open up transformative travel experiences. In this episode, we step into the heart of mindful and intentional travel, discovering what it means to move through the world with awareness, respect, and purpose. Ricky and Ben share exciting updates from Season Two of Leave No Trace TV and offer a rare behind-the-scenes look at Season Three filming in Mongolia, revealing the surprises, challenges, and unforgettable moments that come with capturing authentic stories on the road. This episode will encourage you to view the world with fresh eyes, travel more thoughtfully, and embrace the adventure of leaving a positive impact wherever you go. A must listen! Only on Speaking of Travel.Thanks for listening to Speaking of Travel! Visit speakingoftravel.net for travel tips, travel stories, and ways you can become a more savvy traveler.

In this candid and raw Tough Girl Podcast EXTRA episode, we reconnect with the unstoppable Vedangi Kulkarni — the youngest woman to have cycled around the world, who's recently returned from doing it again. Now based in Inverness, Scotland, Vedangi opens up about her second attempt at cycling around the globe — this time not just for the journey, but in pursuit of a Guinness World Record. From racing Lael Wilcox to navigating border delays, funding pressures, and the relentless physical and mental toll of riding across five continents, Vedangi doesn't hold back.  This conversation is about pushing limits, embracing failures, and finding strength when things don't go to plan. Highlights from the episode include: Breaking a record in the Himalayas (Manali–Leh Highway) in 2023 Preparing to cycle the world again in 2024 — and finding sponsorship, gear, and coaching Struggles of travelling on an Indian passport and the challenge of visa logistics Being delayed at borders, detained, and ultimately forced to return to the UK mid-ride due to visa expiry Restarting in 2025, finishing the ride under the blazing Indian summer sun Dealing with the post-expedition blues and finding her footing again Vedangi's story is one of resilience, honesty, and fierce determination. Despite knowing she wouldn't get the world record, she kept going — driven by passion, grit, and the belief that stories worth telling are born from adversity. Now, she's looking ahead to her next expedition, ramping up her YouTube and Substack presence, and continuing to speak openly about the realities of life as a woman of colour in adventure sport.  Heads-up: This episode includes some strong language.  New episodes of the Tough Girl Podcast drop every Tuesday at 7 AM (UK time)! Make sure to subscribe so you never miss the inspiring journeys and incredible stories of tough women pushing boundaries.  Do you want to support the Tough Girl Mission to increase the amount of female role models in the media in the world of adventure and physical challenges? Support via Patreon! Join me in making a difference by signing up here: www.patreon.com/toughgirlpodcast.  Your support makes a difference.  Thank you x Show notes Who is Vedangi From India but currently based in Inverness, Scotland  The Adventure Shed  Coming back from her 2nd ride around the world  Speaking to Vedangi in Sep 22, 2020 - Vedangi Kulkarni - The youngest woman to have circumnavigated the world on bicycle.  Tough Girl Extra Oct 27, 2022 - Vedangi Kulkarni - Adventurer and endurance athlete moving into mountain biking and crossing Svalbard.  The focus of this episode - what Vedangi has been up to over the past couple of years Deciding to cycle around the world again 2023 - visiting the Himalayas and going after a point to point record. GWR for being the fastest women to cycle the Manali-leh Highway  Getting her win  June 2023 - starting to be vocal about her goals in 2024 Getting the sponsorship and funding in place  Needing £20k  Working with Canyon Bikes  Speaking to the bike experts  Getting a gravel bike and specking it like a road bike Being an Ambassador for RAB  Working with Tailfin - and having custom build gear  3D printed mounts  Struggling to get sponsorship from Indian companies Getting only 1 Indian Sponsor at the last moment Training and working with Jon Fearne from E3 Coaching   Following a training plan and putting in the best effort with it Applying for visas and planning the route with an Indian passport   The challenges of getting to the start line Racing against Lael Wilcox (who was attempting the same record at the same time) “Why do I think I can do this? I don't stand a chance”  Mental blocks and challenges The challenges of travelling on a weaker passport  Having no room for errors - everything needs to go to plan Why it wasn't a level playing field  Speaking with Lael before heading off - women supporting women Knowing that she wasn't going to get the record and keeping on going Having a good story to tell Dealing with setbacks and failures and keeping on going  The route and how it was slightly different to the first time Starting on the East Coast of India Riding across Mongolia and then on to Australia  Challenges with border crossings and getting detained and delayed  Needing to fly back to the UK on Christmas Eve due to UK visa regulations  Needing to stay in the UK for 2 months  Getting back to India in March 2025 to finish the ride  The challenges of the heat - going from Scottish winter to an Indian Summer Feeling satisfied once the ride was finally done.  Adventure blues after the ride Planning her next record attempt and expedition.  Wanting to push her limits further Why health isn't guaranteed  One precious life and you've got to get out there and live it Balancing everything that's going on  How to connect with Vedangi on social media  Kickstarting her YouTube again Getting more active on Substack  Final words of advice for women who want to push on through their barriers Embracing failure and not letting it dim your light - it's not always going to go to plan  Be motivated to try your best The journalling process and how it can help mentally with self-esteem    Social Media Website: vedangi.info  Instagram: @thisisvedangi LinkedIn: Vedangi Kulkarni  Twitter: @thisisvedangi Facebook: @wheelsandwords  YouTube: @thisisvedangi Link to donate me a small amount: [Buy Me A Coffee]   

We carry on in Oklahoma with Samantha Grayson, who was gracious enough to still make it out to do this recording despite limited sleep and a lot of moving challenges! Samantha talks in this episode about the different species she's flown, including one species in particular that not a lot of people have experience with, as well as her times spent in Mongolia and getting to fly a golden eagle while there, and her work/life balance, amongst other things. Come hang and continue to listen to what some of Oklahoma has to offer! Support at buymeacoffee.com/falconrychroniclesSpecial thanks to the organizations and businesses who've kindly helped support the podcast!The Archives of Falconryhttp://www.falconry.orgMarshall Radio Telemetryhttp://www.marshallradio.comMasters of the Skieshttp://www.mastersoftheskies.orgBaba Yaga Craftshttp://www.instagram.com/babayagagoshawkNorth Mountain Goshawkshttp://www.northmountaingoshawks.comNew Mexico Falconers AssociationArizona Falconers Assocationhttp://www.arizonafalconers.comTexas Hawking Associationhttp://www.texashawking.orgNorth American Falconers Associationhttp://www.n-a-f-a.comFalconry Fundhttp://www.falconryfund.orgPursuit Falconry and Conservation Magazinehttp://pursuitfalconry.co.ukThe Specialist Falconhttp://www.thespecialistfalcon.comCape Falconry Clubhttp://www.capefalconry.co.zaEast Coast Falconshttp://www.eastcoastfalcons.comBlackhawk Falconry Dachshundshttps://www.facebook.com/blackhawkdachshunds Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.