Podcast appearances and mentions of Joseph Schumpeter

In the 2nd episode of "Hammer Time" Ralph speaks about the aftermath of the assassination attempt on Donald Trump, his views on JD Vance as the VP pick, and why Joseph Schumpeter, not Karl Marx, should be the most influential economist of our time. --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/the1020/support

We are seeing Joseph Schumpeter's concept of creative destruction at work in higher education. The shake-up will continue.Original Article: Creative Destruction in American Higher Education: Schumpeter in Action

We are seeing Joseph Schumpeter's concept of creative destruction at work in higher education. The shake-up will continue.Original Article: Creative Destruction in American Higher Education: Schumpeter in Action

Joseph Schumpeter gjorde det till sin livsuppgift att förstå kapitalismen. Dess själ, menade han, finns i förändringen, den ständiga revolutionen. Benjamin Juhlin samtalar om den kreativa förstörelsen med Elin Hjelmsestam och Johanna Grönbäck. I en ny bok har Jan Jörnmark samlat Schumpeters viktigaste texter, den hittar du här: https://timbro.se/forlag/kreativ-forstorelse-joseph-schumpeter-i-urval/ 

In der letzten Folge hat Eva Horn ja verteidigt, dass wir uns im Anthropozän und nicht im Kapitalozän befinden. Aber was ist Kapitalismus eigentlich genau? Klar, wir kennen alle Definitionen von Karl Marx, Max Weber und Joseph Schumpeter. Aber genau diese Definitionen sind falsch, zumindest teilweise, schreibt Friedrich Lenger in seinem aktuellen Buch "Der Preis der Welt: Eine Globalgeschichte des Kapitalismus". Was er an ihnen für kritisierenswert hält, was Kapitalismus stattdessen ist, wann das alles anfängt und wie wir da wieder rauskommen, besprechen wir in dieser Folge. Friedrich Lenger ist Professor für Neuere Geschichte an der Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen. Achja: Entschuldigt bitte die schlechte Audioqualität dieser Folge.

Wirtschaft; Technologie; Historische Persönlichkeiten

Russell Sobel is a Professor of Economics and Entrepreneurship at the Baker school of Business at The Citadel and he just put out a new book with the Fraser Institute, The Essential Joseph Schumpeter. He has also written an introductory economics textbook and many, many papers on the economics of entrepreneurship. Today, we talk about what an entrepreneur is, what institutions ---both cultural and governmental --- uplift entrepreneurs, and why we want more entrepreneurs. He explains the work of the economist Joseph Schumpeter, walking us through his views on entrepreneurship to his pessimistic view that capitalism necessarily ends in socialism. We talk about ways to prevent that, if indeed we are on that path. Never miss another AdamSmithWorks update.Follow us on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.

After a decade of decline, bankruptcy filings around the world are on the rise.  In the United States, business bankruptcy filings rose more than 40 percent last year and non-business bankruptcy filings rose 16 percent.Bankruptcies in England and Wales just hit a 30-year high according to the latest figures.In Japan, corporate bankruptcies involving a total liability of 10 million Yen or more increased year on year by more than 35 percent.Patrick's Books:Statistics For The Trading Floor:  https://amzn.to/3eerLA0Derivatives For The Trading Floor:  https://amzn.to/3cjsyPFCorporate Finance:  https://amzn.to/3fn3rvCPatreon Page: https://www.patreon.com/PatrickBoyleOnFinanceBuy Me a Coffee: https://buymeacoffee.com/patrickboyleBook Link:Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy by Joseph Schumpeter: https://amzn.to/3IxYsc9Visit our website: www.onfinance.orgFollow Patrick on Twitter Here: https://twitter.com/PatrickEBoylePatrick Boyle on YouTube Support the show

  For the first time ever, parents going through IVF can use whole genome sequencing to screen their embryos for hundreds of conditions. Harness the power of genetics to keep your family safe, with Orchid. Check them out at orchidhealth.com. On this episode of Unsupervised Learning Razib talks about AI, the singularity and the post-human future, with James D. Miller, a Smith College economist, host of the podcast Future Strategist and the author of Singularity Rising: Surviving and Thriving in a Smarter, Richer, and More Dangerous World. Miller and Razib first met at 2008's “Singularity Summit” in San Jose, and though Singularity Rising was published in 2012, some of the ideas were already presented in earlier talks, including at that conference. More than 15 years since Miller began formulating his ideas, Razib asks him how the theses and predictions in his book have held up, and how they compared to Ray Kurzweil's The Singularity is Coming. On this last point, Miller is very bullish on Kurzweil's prediction that artificial intelligence will surpass that of humans by 2030. He also believes that the “intelligence explosion,” Kurzweil's “technological singularity” when AI transforms the earth in unimaginable ways through exponential rates of change will in fact come to pass. But while Kurzweil predicts that the singularity will usher in an era of immortality for our species, Miller has a more measured take. He believes AI will drive massive gains in economic productivity, from cultural creativity to new drug development regimes (one of the original rationales behind IBM's AI program). But while Kurzweil anticipates exaltation of conscious human life into an almost divine state, Miller suspects that AI may eventually lead to our demise. He estimates a 10% probability that Kurzweil is correct that we will become immortal, and a 90% probability that AI will simply shove us aside on this planet as it begins to consume all available resources. Overall, Miller is satisfied with the predictions in the first third of Singularity Rising. Computational technology has become far more powerful than it was in the late aughts, with a supercomputer in everyone's pocket. Though the advances in AI seem to exhibit discontinuities, in particular with the recent seminal inventions of transformers and large language models coming to the fore, the smoothed curve aligns with Kurzweil's 2030 target for human-level intelligence. On the other hand, where Miller has been disappointed is the merely modest advances in biological human engineering, with far fewer leaps forward than he had anticipated. Razib and Miller discuss whether this is due to limitations in the science, or issues of governance and ethics. Miller closes making the case for a program of cloning the great 20th-century genius John von Nuemann and the statesman Lee Kuan Yew. While the computational innovation driving AI seems to have advanced on schedule, and the biological revolution has not taken off, the last section of Miller's book focused on the economic impacts of the impending singularity. He still believes the next 10-20 years will be incredible, as our economy and way of life are both transformed for the good. Until that is, humans become obsolete in the face of the nearly god-like forms of AI that will emerge around 2050. Until then, Miller anticipates the next generation will see rapid changes as people make career shifts every half a decade or so as jobs become redundant or automated. If Singularity Rising proves correct, the next generation will be defined by what the economist Joseph Schumpeter termed “creative destruction.” If Miller is correct, it may be the last human generation.

Sean Illing talks with economic historian Brad DeLong about his new book Slouching Towards Utopia. In it, DeLong claims that the "long twentieth century" was the most consequential period in human history, during which the institutions of rapid technological growth and globalization were created, setting humanity on a path towards improving life, defeating scarcity, and enabling real freedom. But... this ran into some problems. Sean and Brad talk about the power of markets, how the New Deal led to something approaching real social democracy, and why the Great Recession of 2008 and its aftermath signified the end of this momentous era. Host: Sean Illing (@seanilling), host, The Gray Area Guest: J. Bradford DeLong (@delong), author; professor of economics, U.C. Berkeley References:  Slouching Towards Utopia: An Economic History of the Twentieth Century by J. Bradford DeLong (Basic; 2022) The Road to Serfdom by Friedrich von Hayek (1944) The Great Transformation by Karl Polanyi (1944) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy by Joseph Schumpeter (1942) "A Short History of Enclosure in Britain" by Simon Fairlie (This Land Magazine; 2009) "China's Great Leap Forward" by Clayton D. Brown (Association for Asian Studies; 2012) What Is Property? by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1840) The Rise and Fall of the Neoliberal Order by Gary Gerstle (Oxford University Press; 2022) Apple's "1984" ad (YouTube) The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money by John Maynard Keynes (1936) "The spectacular ongoing implosion of crypto's biggest star, explained" by Emily Stewart (Vox; Nov. 18) "Did Greenspan Add to Subprime Woes? Gramlich Says Ex-Colleague Blocked Crackdown" by Greg Ip (Wall Street Journal; June 9, 2007) "Families across the country are tightening their belts and making tough decisions. The federal government should do the same," from President Obama's 2010 State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010) "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" by Karl Marx (1852) Why We're Polarized by Ezra Klein (Simon & Schuster; 2020) The Paradox of Democracy: Free Speech, Open Media, and Perilous Persuasion by Zac Gershberg and Sean Illing (U. Chicago; 2022)   Enjoyed this episode? Rate The Gray Area ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ and leave a review on Apple Podcasts. Subscribe for free. Be the first to hear the next episode of The Gray Area. Subscribe in your favorite podcast app. Support Vox Conversations by making a financial contribution to Vox! bit.ly/givepodcasts This episode was made by:  Producer: Erikk Geannikis Editor: Amy Drozdowska Engineer: Patrick Boyd Editorial Director, Vox Talk: A.M. Hall Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

El economista austríaco Joseph Schumpeter acuñó el concepto de la destrucción creativa para referirse al proceso en el que las nuevas ideas sustituyen a las antiguas, generando una distorsión en el mercado laboral. La inteligencia artificial lleva ese proceso a la velocidad más alta que jamás hayamos visto. El cambio tecnológico hace ricos a los nuevos innovadores y perjudica a los viejos empresarios que poseen la ya obsoleta ventaja. El invento de los coches dejó sin trabajo a los criadores de caballos. Kapital Social: La comunidad privada de Kapital. Ahora con un 20% de descuento. Kapital es posible gracias a sus colaboradores: Nueva edición de los programas: Cardinal y Cardinal X. Compara los dos cursos para decidir con cuál quedarte. Cardinal es un programa online con el que diseñar la carrera profesional que quieres. Yo mismo, junto con Eloi Alcaide, hemos preparado los contenidos después de años estudiando el problema. El punto de partida es que nosotros no sabemos qué carrera debes escoger pero sí podemos darte, a lo largo de 12 semanas, herramientas de introspección y modelos mentales para que TÚ tomes la mejor decisión. Un curso de interés para quien esté buscando un cambio inmediato, pero también para quien quiera estar mejor preparado, dándose recursos, para competir en este mercado laboral incierto. La edad media en anteriores ediciones se situó entre los 25 y los 35 años. Cardinal empieza el próximo lunes 8 de enero. Inscríbete con un descuento de 60 y 40 euros con los cupones ENE24C9 (Cardinal) y ENE24X3 (Cardinal X). Si no tienes claro si esto es para ti, apúntate a la videollamada Q&A que hemos organizado para el miércoles 3 de enero a las 17.00. Patrocina Kapital. Toda la información en este link. Índice: 1.02. La obsesión del emprendedor. 8.47. El dilema caníbal de Google. 17.31. ¿Es realmente inteligente la IA? 35.14. ¿Está el mundo en peligro? 46.45. ¿Dónde nace la consciencia? 1.00.31. Las posibilidades económicas de nuestros nietos. 1.08.11. Armas demasiado poderosas. 1.13.07. Estrategia de carrera para los más jóvenes. 1.24.26. Enamorados de la voz de Scarlett. 1.33.15. La visión coasiana de la empresa. 1.39.46. ¿Cómo hablarle a la IA? 1.47.44. Ulises y las sirenas. 1.54.10. Solo sobrevive el paranoico. Apuntes: The nature of the firm. Ronald Coase. A novel neural network architecture for language understanding. Jakob Uszkoreit. 2001. Stanley Kubrick. La máquina del tiempo. H.G. Wells. Silicon Valley. Mike Judge & John Altschuler & Dave Krinsky. Her. Spike Jonze. Rubianes solamente. Pepe Rubianes. Las trampas del deseo. Dan Ariely.

Russell S. Sobel, co-author of The Essential Joseph Schumpeter and Professor of Economics & Entrepreneurship in the Baker School of Business at The Citadel, once again joins host Rosemarie Fike to discuss Joseph Schumpeter's most enduring and often prescient insights, including how contrary to popular belief, "creative destruction" and the technological innovation that embodies it in modern life doesn't equal mass unemployment.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Russell S. Sobel, co-author of The Essential Joseph Schumpeter and Professor of Economics & Entrepreneurship in the Baker School of Business at The Citadel, joins host Rosemarie Fike to discuss Joseph Schumpeter's life and most novel contributions to the field of economics, including "creative destruction" and how entrepreneurs allow consumers to better determine preferences. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

O professor José Luiz Portella explica como as políticas públicas feitas a partir dessas novas tecnologias podem alavancar o Brasil

Creative destruction is the dismantling of long-standing practices in order to make way for innovation and is seen as a driving force of capitalism. Creative destruction is most often used to describe disruptive technologies such as the railroads or, in our own time, the internet. The term was coined in the early 1940s by economist Joseph Schumpeter, who observed real-life examples of creative destruction, such as Henry Ford's assembly line. Creative destruction can be seen across many different industries such as technology, retail, and finance. Creative destruction often has unintended consequences such as temporary losses of jobs, environmental issues, or inequity.This show is part of the Spreaker Prime Network, if you are interested in advertising on this podcast, contact us at https://www.spreaker.com/show/4432332/advertisement

Leon Walras was described as ‘the greatest economist' by Joseph Schumpeter and in his own lifetime he struggled to have his unique voice heard by economists in his native France, let alone those colleagues across the Channel and the Atlantic. So what were the ideas touted by Walras that would force such a claim from Schumpeter? This is what your friendly neighbourhood economists, Pete and Gav explore in our last episode of our sixth season. You will discover how Walras helped kick-start the ‘Marginal Revolution' and laid out the groundwork for the theory that has captured the attention of many mathematically-minded economists - General Equilibrium Theory. You will also hear some of the worst French spoken in history, a rant by Pete about the state of economics today and another wonderful poem that describes the life and ideas of Walras in rhyming couplets! What more could you want from a podcast? Technical support comes from "Franglais" Nic.

Silicon Valley is in a slump. For all the talk about innovation, there's a real question as to whether the U.S. tech sector is really all that innovative. Today's episode digs into this question through the lens of a concept called “Creative Destruction,” a term coined by famed economist Joseph Schumpeter. Chapters Intro: 00:00:04 Chapter One: What is Creative Destruction? 00:05:37 Chapter Two: Innovation or Iteration? 00:11:59 Chapter Three: The so-called disruptors. 00:17:45 Bring it home, Max. 00:24:42 Post Show Musings: 00:27:18 Book Love: 00:28:03 Outro: 00:37:03 Resources TechCrunch: Is Silicon Valley really losing its crown? The Guardian: The disruption con: why big tech's favourite buzzword is nonsense FRED Economic Data: Federal Funds Effective Rate (FEDFUNDS) Book Love Joseph A. Schumpeter: Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy Philippe Aghion: The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations -- If you like the pod version of #UNFTR, make sure to check out the video version on YouTube where Max shows his beautiful face! www.youtube.com/@UNFTR Please leave us a rating and review on Apple Podcasts: unftr.com/rate and follow us on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram at @UNFTRpod. Visit us online at unftr.com. Join the Unf*cker-run Facebook group: facebook.com/groups/2051537518349565 Buy yourself some Unf*cking Coffee at shop.unftr.com. Subscribe to Unf*cking The Republic on Substack at unftr.substack.com to get the essays these episode are framed around sent to your inbox every week. Check out the UNFTR Pod Love playlist on Spotify: spoti.fi/3yzIlUP. Visit our bookshop.org page at bookshop.org/shop/UNFTRpod to find the full UNFTR book list, and find book recommendations from our Unf*ckers at bookshop.org/lists/unf-cker-book-recommendations. Access the UNFTR Musicless feed by following the instructions at unftr.com/accessibility. Unf*cking the Republic is produced by 99 and engineered by Manny Faces Media (mannyfacesmedia.com). Original music is by Tom McGovern (tommcgovern.com). The show is written and hosted by Max and distributed by 99. Podcast art description: Image of the US Constitution ripped in the middle revealing white text on a blue background that says, "Unf*cking the Republic."See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Unser Wirtschaftssystem hat ein Imageproblem. Der Klimawandel, die Kluft zwischen Arm und Reich, jetzt auch noch eine neue Bankenkrise: Schuld an all dem sei der Kapitalismus, glauben immer mehr Menschen. Andererseits gab es auf der Welt noch nie so viele Menschen, die in – zumindest bescheidenem – Wohlstand lebten und noch nie so wenige, die hungern mussten. Irgendetwas macht der Kapitalismus also wohl auch richtig. Im aktuellen Podcast der Agenda Austria erklärt der Historiker Werner Plumpe, Professor für Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte an der Universität Frankfurt und erfolgreicher Buchautor, warum die kapitalistische Ordnung bisher alle Krisen überstanden hat. Einerseits komme der Kapitalismus der Natur des Menschen offenbar sehr entgegen. „Er bietet Möglichkeiten, sich zu bereichern oder Geltung zu erlangen. Für die breite Masse macht der Kapitalismus aber einfach die Regale in den Supermärkten voll und ermöglicht ihnen ein hintergrundentlastetes Leben.“ Also ein Dasein ohne täglichen Überlebenskampf. „Die Reichen hatten immer schon alles, sie brauchen keine industrielle Güterproduktion. Kapitalismus ist letztlich kapitalintensive Massenproduktion für große Märkte, auf denen der einzelne Konsument nicht reich genug ist, um sich teure Handarbeit zu leisten.“Dass nun wieder die Angst vor einer Finanz- und Bankenkrise umgeht, ist für Plumpe Indiz für einen Fehler im System. „Die Risiken der Akteure für solche windigen Geschäfte müssten steigen. Das ist das Problem, das wir seit der Finanzkrise von 2008 haben: Der Staat beziehungsweise die Zentralbank greifen ein. Dieses Retten großer Akteure ist nicht gut. Eine effektive kapitalistische Ökonomie, in der Fehlverhalten auch wirklich sanktioniert wird, wäre immer noch die beste Variante.“„System change not climate change“, steht auf den Transparenten von Klimaaktivisten. Nur wenn sich das Wirtschaftssystem von Grund auf ändere, sei die Welt noch zu retten, glauben viele. Werner Plumpe widerspricht: „Ich würde die technologische Dynamik des Kapitalismus nicht unterschätzen. Joseph Schumpeter sprach sehr richtig von der schöpferischen Zerstörung. Der Kapitalismus ist permanente Erneuerung.“ Man könnte dem Wirtschaftssystem höchstens ankreiden, dass es in den vergangenen zwei Jahrhunderten ein enormes Bevölkerungswachstum ermöglicht habe – das natürlich den Ressourcenverbrauch beschleunigte. „Um 1800 hat ein Bauer etwa vier weitere Menschen ernährt, heute liegt das Verhältnis bei 1 zu 125. Die Klimaaktivisten müssten mir mal erklären, wie sie mit ihren Vorstellungen von Ressourcenverbrauch die Weltbevölkerung ernähren wollen“, sagt der Experte. Die kapitalistische Marktwirtschaft erwies sich in allen Krisen und sämtlichen Anfeindungen zum Trotz bisher als erstaunlich zäh und stabil. Doch jetzt könnte es gefährlich werden, meint Plumpe. „Wir leben in einer Welt, die den Kapitalismus aus politischen Gründen nicht will. Die Energiewende in Deutschland – nur als Beispiel – hat dazu geführt, dass es keinen funktionsfähigen Energiemarkt mehr gibt. Ein großer Teil der Bevölkerung geht auch keiner Erwerbsarbeit mehr nach und lebt von staatlichen Transferleistungen. Wir halten Unternehmen am Leben, die längst nicht mehr Leben sein sollten. Wir haben eine öffentliche Meinung, die dem Markt misstraut. Das alles könnte für den Kapitalismus zu einer echten Gefahr werden.“Werner Plumpe, 68Der deutsche Historiker ist Professor für Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte an der Universität Frankfurt/Main. Er hat mehrere Bücher geschrieben, darunter „Das kalte Herz“, eine große Geschichte des Kapitalismus. Werner Plumpe war Vorsitzender des Deutschen Historikerverbands und wurde 2014 mit dem Ludwig-Erhard-Preis für Wirtschaftspublizistik ausgezeichnet.  

"Don't you know how to make widgets!?!?" This question and many more are answered in this episode of Unlimited Opinions as we look at modern theories of democracy! We discuss the differences between ancient and modern democracy, the Social Democracy of John Dewey, the Realistic Democracy of Joseph Schumpeter, the ridiculous ideas of the Students for a Democratic Society, and much more! We also might have broken the record for most tangential rants in one episode, as we rant about Student Government; the necessity of impeachment; diversity, equity, and inclusion training, and so, so, so much more!  Follow us on Twitter! @UlmtdOpinions

Find our more about this event on our website: https://bit.ly/3Htj8SX The four-day working week may seem attractive to workers, however critics are quick to point out the potential risks that a shift in working patterns would cause the economy. A new book by Dr Pedro Gomes, Reader in Economics in Birkbeck's Department of Economics, Mathematics and Statistics, draws on economic theory, history and data to argue that working Monday to Thursday will bring about a ‘powerful economic renewal for the benefit of all society'. The book's narrative is centred around the ideas of four economists from the 19th and 20th centuries: John Maynard Keynes, Joseph Schumpeter, Karl Marx and Friedrich Hayek. Giving careful consideration to the counter arguments, Dr Gomes demonstrates how a four-day week can: stimulate the economy through demand raise productivity, innovation and wages reduce technological unemployment crush populist movements reconcile a polarised society. Speaker: Dr Pedro Gomes is Reader in Economics at Birkbeck, University of London. Previously, he spent seven years as Assistant Professor at the University Carlos III de Madrid, was a Visiting Professor at the University of Essex and held positions at the European Central Bank and the Bank of England. Pedro studied for his BSc in Economics in his hometown of Lisbon, and received his PhD from the London School of Economics in 2010. A leading researcher on public sector employment, he has published numerous articles in peer-reviewed journals and two chapters in books. His work has been widely cited and has influenced policymakers, and his paper ‘Optimal public sector wages' was awarded the Austin Robinson Memorial Prize by The Economic Journal (for the best paper written by an author within five years of receiving a PhD). Pedro values partnerships with policy institutions, and has presented his work at the national banks of Portugal, Spain, France and England, as well as at the European Central Bank and the OECD. Fluent in English, Portuguese, Spanish and French, he lives in London with his wife and daughter. Find his new book here

Irving Fisher was once lauded by fellow economist Joseph Schumpeter as the ‘greatest economist America has ever produced'. This is high praise indeed but one could easily argue that the most recent Economic Nobel Prize laureates owe Fisher a considerable debt for their award. The financial crisis of 2008 spurred a renewed interest in Fisher's work after what could be seen as a lengthy period of neglect. In his own life-time he went from being the first "celebrity economist" to seeing his reputation in tatters after some overly optimistic and in hindsight ill-advised comments on what was to turn out to be the eve of the Great Depression. In this episode, your friendly neighbourhood economists, Pete and Gav, take you on a journey or rediscovery to find out more about this fascinating man and his ideas. We suspect you will find yourself agreeing at least in part with the accolade Schumpeter laid at his feet. Along the way, you'll find out why it's important to chew your food for your health and wellbeing, who the mysterious ‘Bonesmen' are and why AI can't yet match the poetry skills of our economists. Technical support as always comes from ‘Chatbot' Nic.

On this special episode of the Energy Security Cubed Podcast, Kelly Ogle and Joe Calnan discuss major events in global and Canadian energy security in 2022, and what to watch for into the future. Guest Bios: - Joe Calnan is a Fellow and Energy Security Forum Manager at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute Host Bio: - Kelly Ogle (host): President and CEO of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute (www.cgai.ca/staff#Ogle) Clip Guest Bios (in order of appearance) - Thierry Bros is a Professor at Sciences Po Paris, find him on Twitter at @thierry_bros - Roy Norton is a CGAI Fellow and an Adjunct Assistant Professor at the University of Waterloo - Greg Brew is a CGAI Fellow and Henry A. Kissinger Postdoctoral Fellow at International Security Studies and the Jackson School of Global Affairs at Yale University, find him on Twitter at @gbrew24 - Dale Naly is the former Associate Minister of Natural Gas and the current Minister of Service Alberta and Red Tape Reduction in the Government of Alberta - Kathryn Porter is the founder of energy research firm Watt-Logic, find Watt-Logic at watt-logic.com - Swaran Singh is a CGAI Fellow and Professor and Former Chair of the Centre for International Politics Organisation and Disarmament in the School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University What is Joe reading? 1. History of the Peloponnesian War, by Thucydides: https://www.amazon.ca/History-Peloponnesian-War-Thucydides/dp/0140440399 2. The Iliad, by Homer: https://www.amazon.ca/Iliad-Homer/dp/0140445927 3. Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy, by Francis Fukuyama: https://www.amazon.ca/Political-Order-Decay-Industrial-Globalization/dp/1491584874 4. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, by Joseph Schumpeter: https://www.amazon.ca/Capitalism-Socialism-Democracy-Joseph-Schumpeter/dp/0061561614 What is Kelly reading? 1. From Left to Right: Saskatchewan's Political and Economic Transformation, by Dale Eisler: https://www.amazon.ca/Left-Right-Saskatchewans-Political-Transformation-ebook/dp/B09XJHM6M6 2. Revival and Change: The 1957 and 1958 Diefenbaker Elections, by John C. Courtney: https://www.amazon.co.uk/Revival-Change-Diefenbaker-Elections-Turning/dp/0774866640 3. Personality and Power: Builders and Destroyers of Modern Europe, by Ian Kershaw: https://www.amazon.com/Personality-Power-Builders-Destroyers-Modern/dp/1594203458 4. Ice War Diplomat: Hockey Meets Cold War Politics at the 1972 Summit Series, by Gary J. Smith: https://www.amazon.ca/Ice-War-Diplomat-Behind-Scenes/dp/1771623179 Recording Date: January 3, 2023 Energy Security Cubed is part of the CGAI Podcast Network. Follow the Canadian Global Affairs Institute on Facebook, Twitter (@CAGlobalAffairs), or on LinkedIn. Head over to our website at www.cgai.ca for more commentary. Produced by Joseph Calnan. Music credits to Drew Phillips.

This week, another economist that has influenced Steve Keen's thinking; the Austrian born economist Joseph Schumpeter. His economic thinking veers a long way from the traditional Austrian school. As Steve explains this week, Schumpeter argued that if an economy was always moving to or from a point of equilibrium, then it follows that the profit of companies will always be zero. Only through innovation will those businesses get ahead, with means money invested in older technologies will no longer be rewarded. This was Schumpeter's argument for Creative Destruction, an idea so basic you wonder why nobody had made the observation before him. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Democracy is valued by many people because it enables us to achieve freedom and political equality in addition to numerous economic and social goals. But democracy also allows us to decide from time to time by whom we wish to be governed. Through elections, we can place in office those who we expect to like and also remove from office those we do not like.Adam Przeworski argues that the essence of democracy is that it processes in relative liberty and peace whatever conflicts that arise in society. And elections are the main mechanism by which conflicts are managed. This is because elections generate temporary winners and losers designated by specific rules. Elections peacefully process conflicts when the losers do not find their defeat too painful and if they expect to have a reasonable chance of winning in the future. This also means that the winners do not inflict too much pain on the losers and do not foreclose the possibility of being removed from office.Adam Przeworski is Emeritus Professor of Politics at New York University and one of the world's foremost scholars on democracy. He has studied political regimes, democracy, autocracy, and their intermediate forms, the conditions under which regimes survive and change, as well as their consequences for economic development and income equality. His latest book is Crises of Democracy, where he discusses the political situation in established democracies, places this in the context of past misadventures of democratic regimes, and speculates on the future of democracy. Twitter: @AdamPrzeworskiKey highlights:Introduction - 0:44Definitions and understandings of democracy – 2:42The distinction between democracy and freedom – 11:15Democracy and minority rights – 17:54Income and democracy – 30:08Processing conflicts – 37:27The future of democracy in Poland  – 45:36 Host:Professor Dan Banik, University of Oslo, Twitter: @danbanik  @GlobalDevPodApple Google Spotify YouTubehttps://in-pursuit-of-development.simplecast.com/

Sean Illing talks with economic historian Brad DeLong about his new book Slouching Towards Utopia. In it, DeLong claims that the "long twentieth century" was the most consequential period in human history, during which the institutions of rapid technological growth and globalization were created, setting humanity on a path towards improving life, defeating scarcity, and enabling real freedom. But... this ran into some problems. Sean and Brad talk about the power of markets, how the New Deal led to something approaching real social democracy, and why the Great Recession of 2008 and its aftermath signified the end of this momentous era. Host: Sean Illing (@seanilling), host, The Gray Area Guest: J. Bradford DeLong (@delong), author; professor of economics, U.C. Berkeley References:  Slouching Towards Utopia: An Economic History of the Twentieth Century by J. Bradford DeLong (Basic; 2022) The Road to Serfdom by Friedrich von Hayek (1944) The Great Transformation by Karl Polanyi (1944) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy by Joseph Schumpeter (1942) "A Short History of Enclosure in Britain" by Simon Fairlie (This Land Magazine; 2009) "China's Great Leap Forward" by Clayton D. Brown (Association for Asian Studies; 2012) What Is Property? by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1840) The Rise and Fall of the Neoliberal Order by Gary Gerstle (Oxford University Press; 2022) Apple's "1984" ad (YouTube) The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money by John Maynard Keynes (1936) "The spectacular ongoing implosion of crypto's biggest star, explained" by Emily Stewart (Vox; Nov. 18) "Did Greenspan Add to Subprime Woes? Gramlich Says Ex-Colleague Blocked Crackdown" by Greg Ip (Wall Street Journal; June 9, 2007) "Families across the country are tightening their belts and making tough decisions. The federal government should do the same," from President Obama's 2010 State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010) "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" by Karl Marx (1852) Why We're Polarized by Ezra Klein (Simon & Schuster; 2020) The Paradox of Democracy: Free Speech, Open Media, and Perilous Persuasion by Zac Gershberg and Sean Illing (U. Chicago; 2022)   Enjoyed this episode? Rate The Gray Area ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ and leave a review on Apple Podcasts. Subscribe for free. Be the first to hear the next episode of The Gray Area. Subscribe in your favorite podcast app. Support Vox Conversations by making a financial contribution to Vox! bit.ly/givepodcasts This episode was made by:  Producer: Erikk Geannikis Editor: Amy Drozdowska Engineer: Patrick Boyd Editorial Director, Vox Talk: A.M. Hall Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Disruption ist unser ständiger Begleiter geworden und stellt heimische Unternehmen auf eine harte Probe. Insbesondere CEOs sind in dieser Zeit geforderter denn je. Aber, auch wenn es vielleicht paradox klingen mag: Krisen sind wichtig und eine große Chance für die Menschheit. Der Ökonom Joseph Schumpeter bezeichnet sie als kreative Zerstörung. Eine solche Zerstörung ist wichtig, damit Neues entstehen kann. Wie viel Neues tatsächlich entstehen kann, haben wir zu einem großen Teil selber in der Hand. Letztlich kommt es immer darauf an, welche Haltung wir beziehen und wie wir uns der Veränderung nähern. Eines, was es dazu auf jeden Fall braucht, ist ein offener Diskurs und ein Austausch auf Augenhöhe. Genau über diese Themen haben wir mit dem neuen CEO von PwC Österreich – Rudolf Krickl - gesprochen. Er ist davon überzeugt, dass Veränderung in erster Linie Vertrauen braucht, um gemeinsam Lösungen zu finden. Mit ihm haben wir auch darüber gesprochen, warum heimische CEOs gerade einen starken Zug zum Handeln haben, warum sich der jahrelange Schein der Globalisierung ein wenig trübt und wie man das Beste aus allen Arbeitswelten kombiniert, um leistungsfähig zu bleiben und zufriedene Mitarbeiter zu haben.

John Cochrane is an economist, specializing in financial economics and macroeconomics, the Rose-Marie and Jack Anderson Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. Previously John was a Professor of finance at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business and before that at the Department of Economics. Josh is also an author of the Grumpy Economist blog.   In this episode we talked about: John's Background in Economics Interest Rates & Inflation Modern monetary theory  Milton Friedman Market outlook  Fiscal policy Macroeconomic Environment Useful links: https://www.johnhcochrane.com/ https://johnhcochrane.blogspot.com/   Transcription: Jesse (0s): Welcome to the Working Capital Real Estate Podcast. My name's Jessica Galley, and on this show we discuss all things real estate with investors and experts in a variety of industries that impact real estate. Whether you're looking at your first investment or raising your first fund, join me and let's build that portfolio one square foot at a time. Ladies and gentlemen, you're listening to Working Capital, the Real Estate podcast. I'm talking with John Cochran today. John is an economist and the Rosemary and Jack Anderson, senior fellow at the Hoover Institute.   He's a former professor of finance at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, and the Department of Economics, and the author of a great fantastic blog that you should check out The Grumpy Economist. John, how you doing today?   John (45s): Good, thank you.   Jesse (47s): So we talked a little bit before the show, John, you know, the podcast itself, the listeners that we talk a lot about the kind of environment that we play in as entrepreneurs and real estate investors and that being the economy. And you have a up a book that, you know, I heard on another podcast the Fiscal Theory of the Price level, which will put a, a link to and despite the title and to scare anybody off. Maybe you could give a kind of an overview of first of all, maybe your background in economics and, and kind of the work you do, and then we could chat a little bit, a little bit about the book.   John (1m 22s): Great. Let's see. I'm, I'm economist and I've been thinking about money and inflation since 1982 and I've split my time between thinking about that and thinking about stocks and bonds. So money inflation, business cycle stocks and bonds and a whole bunch of other things. Being an economist is a wonderful thing because we, you can, you can jump from one thing to another and, and actually, you know, make real contributions in lots of places. The book is called The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level.   If you Google me and find my website, you'll find the book. You will also, the book is full of equations and designed to convince my fellow economists that they need to come over to this. There are some essays on the same website, which I re recommend. You start with, fiscal histories are particularly like no equations and tries to tell a different story about where inflation came from and where it's going in the US over the last, in the postwar period. The basic idea is where does inflation come from?   Not so much too much money chasing too few goods, but more importantly, too much overall government debt relative to what people think the government is willing and able to pay back. And if you're sitting on say, oh, 30 trillion of government debt and you think government is, is good for about 20 trillion of it, what you do is you try to get rid of that. It's terrible invest. What do you do with an overpriced investment? I think everybody understands this. What do you do with an overpriced house? You sell it. But if we all try to sell government debt, then the only thing we can do for it, it is, oh, buy houses.   And we've been put upward pressure on the price of goods and services. So that ultimately is where inflation comes from. That doesn't mean the Fed doesn't have a big role to play, so I won't bother you the equations, but interest rate policy still is quite important in figuring out where inflation will go. But it isn't everything and when people are, are, don't fundamentally trust the government, there's really not that much the Fed can do about it. The Fed can kind of smooth it out for a while, but there's not that much. So I'll, I'll stop there and we can see how deep you want to go into theory or into explaining the real world or into real estate.   Jesse (3m 34s): Yeah, I think what would be interesting is that from, you know, it wasn't too long ago, we were oh 7, 0 8, 0 9, it was a different environment from the financial crisis, but we had lower interest lowered interest rates to such a degree where people were starting to question the traditional, the traditional economic framework where we have interest rates at this low amount. We had quantitative easing, but we didn't seem to have any inflation. Maybe you could talk a little bit about, you know, what mechanisms were at play during that time and, and if there is a, you know, if there's a logical connection between that environment, you know, what past that and, and where we're at right now.   John (4m 13s): Yeah, so I don't buy there, there's a lot of blah blah about how the Fed kept interest rates absurdly low over 10 years and so forth. Really the Fed is not that powerful. The Fed cannot keep real interest rates low for actually 20, 30 years that they have been very low by historical standards that has to come from the real economy. The Fed can move things around for a year or two, but in the end, very low interest rates come from real factors and interest rates were low, inflation was low.   People were willing to hold the government's debt part that the fiscal situation in the US wasn't great, but there wasn't a lot of news about it. And I think at least not just 7, 8, 9, but also throughout the 2000 tens when interest rates remained low despite deficits. I think the people holding us treasuries say, Look, us is a great country and yes, the CBO reports are scary, but America will always do the right thing after we try everything else.   As Winston Churchill, I guess did not say, but he should have said, and you know, that fixing the long run fiscal problem in the US is not that hard. We just have to sit around and decide we want to do it. So sooner or later we'll do it. I think the, the five, no, why are we having inflation now? The government in the pandemic printed up $5 trillion of new money, well, it printed up three and, and borrowed another two and sent people checks. And that's, that is just massive.   And I, I think people are starting to question, is the government really good for it? And we're seeing that not just in the US and tumult the treasury market. We're seeing that in the uk. We may be starting to see that in Europe as well. Well, so I think that kind of explains the difference. Now, I'm, I'm telling stories, but at least there's plausible stories here.   Jesse (6m 5s): So when it comes to the understanding that in the entrepreneurial space and real estate and the greater economy that we, we go through cycles, we go through time of growth, we go through time of contraction, Is this just an artifact of, of just the modern economy that we're gonna have ebbs and flows and we're gonna have times where, you know, the, the getting's good and, and then times when it's not so not so great. Or is the, is the chief goal the ultimate goal to have some sort of normality that plays out for a longer period of time?   John (6m 36s): I think everyone's goal is normality that plays up for some period of time. And you're asking a deep question, which I won't answer, is how much of fluctuation, especially in, in real estate is, is natural to the economy? How much of it is a, you know, some pathology of the private economy that some government might be able to fix someday? And how much is induced by government policy? I would say for real estate investors batten down the hatches. We're on our way to a tough time. This one is pretty obviously induced by government policy and, and not just monetary policy and fiscal policy.   You know, we, we saw certainly in 2007, 2008, how the regulatory environment encouraged booms and busts. And I think our current regulatory environment makes matters worse rather than makes matters better, you know, subsidizing the boom and then pulling everything back in the bust. But it's certainly where we're heading now is, I think ask your parents and grandparents about the 1970s. I think it's fairly clear we have a burst of inflation that that comes from somewhere. I think it comes from the, you know, the massively overdone stimulus, but take your pick where it comes from.   You know, in the 1970s we had inflation that came from fiscal policy. Johnson wanted the Vietnam War and the Great Society, and then we had also oil price shocks. Ah, welcome to the 1970s. You know, get your flowered shirts and your bell-bottom jeans out cuz oil price shocks get things going. The fed is late to the game and then the fed slams on the brakes. Does that sound familiar? So I think it's fairly clear where we're going to go. Our fed has woken up and I think it's a, I can't really bet on where the economy's going, but I think, I'm pretty sure what the fed's gonna do.   As long as inflation remains high, the Fed is gonna keep raising rates 75 basis points a shot. And so we will see how, what I don't know is if that will lower inflation, how long that will lower inflation, but the fed's gonna keep raising rates. I think it's fairly clear that is going to cause an economic slowdown, if not a recession. I mean they're, what they're trying to do is add just enough recession to offset the boom. You know, you're trying to land a plane, they call soft landing. You're trying to land a plane while the engines are gone full tilt, which ain't that easy.   So they're trying to add enough and, and typically the fed fed adds more recession. So I, I think it's quite possible we head into recession, but the mechanism of what the fed's trying to do is raise interest rates. And that what does that hurt? That raising interest rates doesn't so much make you go out for burgers less often. And so often demand for restaurants raising interest rates is designed to to to lower interest sensitive spending. Okay. Unpack fed speak codes, that means you, Mr real estate, the design here is to raise interest rates, which lowers house prices, makes people less willing to sell houses, lower raises, mortgage rates makes it harder to buy houses.   So, you know, the whole point is to try to soften down a real estate boom. Not made any better by our country's ridiculous zoning planning and other bureaucracy that I, so I live in Palo Alto where it's just infuriating Yeah. Where house prices have been driven very, very high. Not so much by too much demand, but by just the refusal of the government to allow usli.   Jesse (9m 58s): So I was just speaking with you before the podcast. I was just coming back from San Diego. I live in Toronto and and Canada and, and I find that Ontario here is pretty similar in policy too. A lot of the California policies when it comes to real estate. I do wanna ask about a specific thing here on inflation, but before we do on that real estate, on the real estate topic, what we saw for the last few years was an extremely high, especially in our markets and the major markets in the states, an extremely high push on asset valuation, specifically in industrial and multi-res and low, low cap rates, which don't always follow interest rates, but you know, the spread is, is usually somewhat consistent.   I guess the question here is we do have inflation now we have a business real estate where we do pass on inflation typically to our customers, ie. Renters. But what do you think that the, and I I take asset values not just in real estate, but the stock market in general. I think the question often people have is how do we have the valuations going one way from the asset perspective in, in, but inflation hitting people in a different way on the consumer level like the, the interplay there.   John (11m 10s): Yeah, thank you. You put on my asset pricing hat. I mean one of the most fundamental things you have to understand with asset pricing is that when interest rates go up, values go down. When bond yields go up, bond prices go down. And so why are we seeing the stock market go down? Why are we seeing property values go down? You know, every asset, there's two things. There's the cash flow and there's the discount rate go, you know, back to school. Here we go.   Why? Because if an alternative investment can get you a higher rate of return, then you know you're gonna pay less for, you know, this, this whatever investment we're talking about a house or a stock or whatever. In some sense that's good news for very long run investors. When you see all asset valuations, stocks, bonds, real estate going down at the same time, what you're seeing that that effect is just the required rate of return going up, but it means the underlying cash flows are the same as they were before.   So unless you have to post margin Mr UK pension funds or you know, unless you're cash constrained in some sense, the long run investor can just wait it out. It means that those, you know, the dividends you'll get from your stocks haven't particularly gone down the, with the rents you'll get from your house or in fact going up and you know, you can have rising rents and lower property values. Well because the required rate of return goes up. So if you can just wait it out, those, those rents are there.   Now also the, the rents are rising. You know, you, we have to put our inflation hat back on. If you are not, if something isn't going up 10%, it's going down. That goes for everything. Anything that's not, you know, if your rent, if your rent is only going up 10% a year, then it's just treading water, relative inflation. If your wages are not going up 10 per nine, 10%, they're going down. Hello, this is to my boss.   So that, I think that's why it's possible both things they go opposite direction. Now, on top of that, we are I think heading into at least an economic slowdown, if not a recession. And that will bring, you know, pressure on, on the dividends and the cash flows, on the rents and so forth. And real estate is, I shouldn't be telling you about real estate, you know, way more than me, but location, location, location, yeah. So there's all sorts of low rents in, you know, Gary, Indiana or places downtown San Francisco. Places don't wanna be, people don't wanna be anymore.   So it depends on being in the right place, which is where people still wanna be and where unfortunately you're on the wrong side of this, where governments don't let competitors build apartment houses to, to lower their ends on.   Jesse (14m 2s): Yeah. And I think part of it, to me it seems it's the imperfect nature of especially real estate. You know, we can be as sophisticated as we want on the commercial side, but it, I think the stickiness of prices is, is just that very real aspect that the bid ask spread is still there. And owners don't want to admit that they're gonna have to write down to a certain extent these assets. No,   John (14m 25s): I must, this is one from an economist point of view, this is one of the most classic puzzles of real estate. Why is it in soft markets people clinging to yesterday's price rather than, you know, why don't, why don't we have just auctions? You know, I'm gonna say yeah, people keep hoping for it to turn around on, on the downside. And so trading volume falls when the prices are going down. There must be something about, you know, not willing to recognize Mark to market losses or,   Jesse (14m 53s): I I, yeah. I think it's part of the reason that so many investors I would take, take myself included, get into real estate, it's that I can't press a button and sell the thing. I think it's just the aspect that the the the cost, the, the selling costs is so great. But I I totally get what your, your point of view cuz we deal with in commercial real estate and we're supposed to be these sophisticated investors, pension funds, REITs and Yeah, I think that yeah, they just, they clinging to yester yesterday's or last year's price. I think that's, well   John (15m 23s): I know some of them like university endowments. Yeah. Have a cynical view. Why do university endowments like Stanford's invest in a lot of real estate and not just Vanguard total market portfolio and save themselves in van, in Stanford's case, $800 million a year on fees. Well, not marking at the market every year is, is very convenient for not saying, Oh we lost 20% of your money last year on occasion. But I dunno, that's, that's a pet theory that may be false.   Jesse (15m 51s): So, So John, there's a quote that I know you're, you're very familiar with and it's, i i I venture to guess it's somewhat of a misquote cause I don't think it takes the whole quote into account, but it's from Milton Freeman and it's that inflation is always an everywhere a monetary phenomenon. I think he was a little bit more specific, but that's usually the headline. What are your thoughts on that? Because I think you're, you're kind of proposing that fiscal seems to be an equation, part of the equation that, that the mon the mons have left out.   John (16m 23s): Yep. I think Friedman was 90% right and he was maybe 99% right in 1935 and 1965 and, and less so today, most of the episodes that you look at, he was deeply historical in fact based, he wasn't a big lots of equations theorist, but most of the episodes he looked at were cases where governments were printing up money to finance deficits and therefore causing inflation. You, you know, why is Argentina, Venezuela, Zimbabwe having inflation?   Not because their central bankers are too dumb to know what they're doing, but because they are, they they want to spend money and they can't tax it and they can't borrow it, so they print it. Now that is money in that case is just another form of government debt. So, you know, fiscal theory and monetary theory agree entirely. If the government is printing up money to finance a deficit, you get inflation. And that's, I think what we just saw. Now, the disagreement is, is much more subtle.   Suppose the government drops 5 trillion bucks from helicopters, you feel great, you go out and spend it, you create inflation. But suppose at the same time they tell you, Oh by the way our burglars went to your safe and took 5 trillion of treasury bills out of the safe. Or more realistically, you know, they send you a stimulus check for 10,000 thousand bucks, but they also say, Oh by the way, your taxes are going up 10,000 bucks today. Now will that cause inflation? What I've just done is I've, I've wiped out the question of, of wealth, the feeling that this stuff is, is yours to spend and we've just changed it to you have too much money and too few bonds, so the composition of your portfolio is a little off.   You have too many fives and tens and not enough twenties. Is that gonna make you go out and spend like crazy? Hmm, not so obvious. So in fact, the core monitor is prescription is that you can, all that matters is controlling the quantity of money. Don't worry about the quantity of bonds so that if you take in money and give out bonds or gi or take in a bonds and give out money, that's crucial for inflation. Whereas I think it's the overall quantity that that really matters. And, and you can see that's a much less obvious proposition.   Jesse (18m 42s): So his, his prescription, I think, you know, I think generally was that from, from a policy standpoint was that we have some percentage, I don't something similar to a Taylor rule where we are going to raise, raise kind of rates at a consistent percentage each year. I think, I think if I remember there was a, a video or quote, he said, just get a computer and replace the Fed. You know, what, what was, what was the perspective there? What was his, his intent and and what other policy mechanisms do you think like writing this book that, that we have at our disposal or the fed does?   John (19m 18s): Yeah, so to just, to, let me finish the last thought and and add to your question in Friedman was, was right, there's nothing logically wrong about what he said, but it's a world where money really matters. Where, where in Friedman's world you had to cash a check at a bank and get out cash on Friday if you wanted to eat dinner on a Saturday. So, so to let them use, there were no credit cards, there was no I iPhone and he was also thinking of a world where government, nobody worried about the US government paying back its debt.   So if you look at the footnotes, it was always, oh by the way, you know, this only holds if everyone trusts the government to pay back its debt. So there's a very real sense in which, you know, he gave a logically coherent theory for a different world. And we live in a different world. We live in a world where, where we have credit cards, where the money that matters reserves, pays interests. And where we're a little bit worried about Gartner, Now let's back to your, let me now answer your question. Friedman advocated that the Fed should just let the stock of money grow at 4% a year and just, you know, get rid of the huge building and the press conferences and the 15,000 economists and others just let money grow at fourth percent.   He did not argue that this was the best, a perfectly rational all seeing, you know, central planner could do. He just recognized that the Fed is run by humans and they're gonna get overenthusiastic and they're, they're, his analogy was, it's like a, a shower you'd turn on the hot and it would get too hot and turn on the cold and it would get too cold. Just leave it alone and it'll be okay because in his historical analysis, mo the Great Depression as well as many of the postwar sessions were caused by the Fed being too late to the party and then, you know, not just taking the punch bowl away, but, but you know, throwing ice on everybody or or whatever.   Now in 19 eight, the problem first problem with that is in 1980 the Fed did try to just control the money supply and we found out it didn't work. So controlling the money supply it, it led to a lot of volatility and I think even Friedman recognized it. But John Taylor came along and said, well the Fed doesn't have to control the money supply. It could be much more predictable. It can set interest. That's what our fed does. Our fed sets interest rates. It doesn't even pretend to control the money supply because that doesn't, we discovered the real world is the head of theory, the real world discovered controlling the money supply doesn't work.   And and theory is just now with, with my book and some others catching up. So John Taylor has, has this approach, well, okay, the Fed setting interest rates, but rather than sit around a table and, and burn the incense and wave the dead chickens and, and consult the astrologers and figure out what to do, Freedman was right. Being more predictable, not not just figuring out on a base would be much better for markets for everybody because as you know, as, as everyone is everybody's guess, all the volatility in the economy is guessing what the Fed is gonna do.   This is a deep point, you know, what is the financial press about all the time? Is it about how many, you know, the zoning sanity comes to the zoning council of Palo Alto or is it about people moving to, to Toronto is gonna drive no drive housing prices, It's all about what's the Fed gonna do, what's the Fed gonna do, what's the Fed gonna do? So you can tell right there that the Fed by making off the cuff decisions, is in, in in, is putting volatility in the economy. So Taylor came up with this Taylor rule raised interest rates systematically with inflation, which was designed to work like the money growth rule to make it very clear and transparent to stop us guessing all the time about what the Fed is going do.   It, it isn't, Taylor does not claim it's perfect. He doesn't claim that that the god that the Fed thinks it is couldn't do better. The all-knowing, all seeing perfectly rational economic planner of course could do better. He just recognizes the fed's human, it's a bureaucratic institution. It's, it's liable to group think it's gonna be late. And that expectations matter so much. Being clear and transparent about what you're gonna do is, is better than the current, just make it up as you go along.   So there's your, Sorry, you asked a question for a history of monetary economics and you got it.   Jesse (23m 49s): So there is no homo economists out there at the Fed.   John (23m 54s): Homo Bureaucratics is the best we can hope for and you know, we all criticize the Fed. I I I criticize the Fed and I think too harshly cuz I know most of the people at the Fed and, and let's just be clear, these are really good people, these are really smart people. The 1500 PhD economists, I think that's the number that they, as well as the ones at the Bank of Canada are really good, really smart people. There's no corruption here, but they didn't see the biggest inflation of, of your lifetime coming.   So they've got a whole, you know, staff of their, their mandate is inflation. They have a huge staff of economists, the best people in the world at it. They just couldn't see it coming. There are limits to what bureaucracy can do. So simple and transparent has some advantage. Not cuz people are bad or corrupt, it's just, you know, the best bureaucracy in the world can't, you know, we, we saw the Soviet Union fall apart for just that reason. Planning don't work.   Jesse (24m 54s): So I had a podcast, I think about a year ago now, two podcasts. One was a, the name is escaping me, but it was a professor from George Mason on the one hand. And on the other hand it was a bond trainer. A bond trader locally here. And we were talking about modern monetary theory and you know, for listeners, you know, look it up. I I hate to, I hate to do that, to have a huge explainer. But basically what I, you know, you can just tell by the nature of those two conversations or maybe not one was very, very much in favor of it, one was questioning its existence just high level.   Maybe you could, you could kind of get your view on what mon modern monetary theory ex expounds or tries to expound and, and has this last year or last two years, has that, has that been the nail in the coffin for them or has that been, has that bolstered their theory? How do you think that has played into what we've seen now as two second, you know, blurbs in the news that was this really to, from my perspective as a layperson, kind of a fad of economics for, for a while?   John (25m 60s): Yes, it was. If, if your listeners are interested, I wrote a review of Stephanie Kelton's book in the Wall Street Journal, which you can find either there or on my website, which goes into much more detail, modern monetary theory. What was a fad? And one way of noticing it's a fad is that they wrote popular books, Three quarters of Stephanie Kelton's book is about the wonderful ways the government can spend printed money and how desperately important it is to spend the money. Not, not so much why printing it won't cause inflation.   And it was a bunch of sort of, it's interesting, you look at the citations, they stop in the 1940s there was some ideas warmed over from the 1940s with zero contact with anything anybody has done since now maybe everything we've done since 1945 and economics has been wrong. You know, fields and the social sciences go off on fads before I think Kasey and economics was, was one big mistake too. But at least you have to, you know, if you wanna persuade people, you have to at least show that you know what they said and and why it's wrong.   And it did. It was superficially plausible. It, it, there were some ingredients you can take some good ingredients and, and, and just, just cuz the soup is rotten doesn't mean every ingredient was rotten. So they had one insight that, yeah, governments, they, one of their things was governments that borrow in their own currency don't have to default cuz they can just print up money to pay back the debt. Yeah, that's right. And if that causes inflation, they can just raise taxes to so soak up the money. Yeah, that's right. But they took that and and merged those with a whole bunch of things, you know, then the rotten parts of the soup go in to make, make the claim.   I think Kelton said there always is slack in the US economy. Now that's a quote. And the present tense of the verb is also a quote. And we just found out the end of slack in the US and Canadian economy. So we're done. There is not always slack in the US economy if you print up a lot of money and send it to people as Kelton, as Kelton asked, all the modern monitors said, print out money sent to people. Don't worry, there won't be any inflation. It's the clearest prediction you can ask anyone to make. They made it, boom, we printed up money, sent it to people and what do we get?   Inflation. So I, I hope that one goes on, on the dust bin of history, but it was never serious. And certainly you should look in, in today's media world, you have to learn to be an educated consumer and, and one way in which you're an educated consumer is to look at a theory and ask now of, you know, the theories that are, that are accepted by the mainstream are typically wrong and academia's full of all sorts of politically convenient theories.   But, you know, if it's completely out of the mainstream, you know, that does raise an alarm bell that you should, you should ask. And this one was, was one such. And, and if it's also, if you can see that it's all totally motivated by a political agenda, then that should also raise some alarm bells.   Jesse (29m 2s): So I have one of my favorite books here by Joseph Schumpeter recommend anybody that's never heard of Joseph Schumpeter, check out his work. I think, you know, you'll hear terms like creative destruction. One of his favorite quotes just on your point of, of politicians, I I always like was politicians are like bad horsemen who are so preoccupied with staying in the saddle that they can't bother to figure out where they're going. And you know, it's unfortunate that a lot of the, the policies that you know, that we're trying to get at here are, I guess, you know, tied up in, in the political process   John (29m 36s): If I could just, so it's fun to make fun of monitors, but I think we need need to recognize what a watershed moment inflation is for much more serious and well worked out economic ideas for 10 years. All of the worthies of economic policy, all of the government agencies, all the alphabet soup of international agencies, were talking about secular stagnation. That we just have lack of demand, that we need more fiscal stimulus. That the key to prosperity is to borrow or print money and hand it out.   You know, don't worry about the supply side of the economy whatsoever. Even Janet yell herself that our congressional testimony was asked about, Oh, should we run another one point whatever, $6 billion of government spending? And she said, don't worry about it. Interest costs are so low, interest rates are so low, you know, you can make the payments. I think what, you know, one of the, one of the greatest fallacies of real estate, let's get back to real estate, is don't worry, you know, as you look at the monthly payment, here's the big McMansion, Oh, but I don't have a job, don't worry about it.   Get this adjustable rate mortgage with the teaser. Look at the monthly payments you can afford. The monthly payments. Well Janet Yellen went up and said, we can afford the monthly payments. Don't, don't worry about going big. That has hit a brick wall of reality with inflation. And, and here these are all of the, you know, Larry Summers for example, who to his great credits saw the inflation coming before anyone else. But he had spent 10 years saying secular stagnation, our problem is lack of demand borrow. And, and we, it turns out that supply wall boom was a lot closer than we thought it was about like, you know, we, we were 1% away from the supply wall in the beginning.   It wasn't 10, 20, 30% away. So this just, this is a watershed, a bunch of ideas by very respectable people were totally wrong. And our economic challenge now is much harder. It's get the sand out of the gears. Increasing supply is not about throwing money on it, it's not about sending people checks. It's about fixing the zoning code. And can you rehab a commercial building in Manhattan to be apartments? No, because the zoning doesn't let you have bedrooms on the interior.   It's a great man and glaz parts, you know, you have to fix every single thing that's wrong in the economy. That is totally different. But that's where we are. So this is a big, big moment.   Jesse (32m 1s): Yeah. And even on the, the cane side of, you know, I don't the context of it, but the, the idea that markets can, markets can stay irrational longer than than they, than you can stay solvent. I think from the real estate perspective was just this idea where you saw very sophisticated investors buying prices at asset values where it just made no sense. There was negative leverage in some situations and just this idea that, that you there would just continue to be a hockey stick graph, especially here in, in this city and certainly in other ci major major markets in the states.   John (32m 33s): Well a fact of all such booms is you gotta ride the bubble while you can and you, you can make a lot of money buying, flipping, hoping to gut it doesn't crash before you can sell the darn thing. And that can go on for years and years. And if you just sit that out, if you say, oh, you know, properties overvalued stocks are valued, well, you know, three, four years go by and all your buddies are getting rich and you're sitting there, you know, if you go short losing money on your short positions, if you just sit it out, you know, playing golf while they're all getting rich through it's stuff to do.   Especially if you are, you know, working on someone else's behalf.   Jesse (33m 10s): So John, I just wanna be mindful of the time here. I do, I do have a question in chapter four in your book you talk about debt, government debt. And I wanted to kind of go a little bit more granular. I don't know the figures for the states offhand, but I know that Canadian household debt is, is debt to disposable income is is quite high. I believe it's 1.84 for every dollar, you know, Canadians have in consumer debt. What's your take on on that micro-economic aspect of, of the family debt within the family and then that impact into kind of this grander, you know, macroeconomic environment that we're in?   Is it something that you look at?   John (33m 50s): Well, I can offer some sort of general, So there's government debt which has to get paid back by raising taxes, but not raising tax is really by economic growth. Your only hope for the government paying back its debts is if they let the economy grow. Cause if, if you raise tax rates, that kills the economy. So you kill the tax base, you don't, you don't get a lot of taxes. Now private debt is a different matter. Let's remember, you know, your, your mortgage is is my pension. So everyone's liability is someone else's asset.   And it's funny how, you know, all of our economic policy, blah, blah, we simultaneously love and bemoan the same thing on the one hand, oh, you know, too much debt people can't pay back. On the other hand, not enough debt. Send more debt to my constituents so they can buy houses, which is it, you know, we want, government wants us to consume more, but it also wants us to save more and to pay more taxes. How's that happening? And, and you know, a lot financialization is great economies grow because entrepreneurs can borrow to finance new businesses because real estate developers can borrow to build apartments for the rest of us, they're doing us.   I don't know why they're so maligned. They do us a wonderful service. You wanna build your house on your own. How about somebody who knows what they're doing, do it, but they need to be able to borrow to do it. So debt that can be paid off is not so much a problem. Now problem comes in when debt can't be paid off, but risk in return. Guys, I think we need to get back to an economy where risk, we all understand if you buy Tesla stock and, and it turns out that hydrogen and and not batteries is the way of the future, or China shuts off the supply of batteries, you know you're gonna lose your, your money or you know, GM turns out to know what they're doing, you're gonna lose your, we all understand equity holders losing your money.   Now somehow, if you buy something called debt and, and you're getting a 5% return where everyone else is getting a 2% return, you're not supposed to lose money every now and then. So, you know, even debt is a great thing. Risky debt's a wonderful thing, you know, but cafe at em Thor, we need to understand as society that, that making risky loans is a great and wonderful thing, but you're gonna lose money every now and then and don't go crying to grandma government every time you lose your money. Now, you know, debt is, why do we worry about too much that we worry about if it turns into financial crisis?   And that's, you know, that's a problem. That's what the Nobel Prize just gave was given to Diamond and Member Yankee and felt that big about. Is that,   Jesse (36m 27s): Which I believe you, you just read or wrote a blog about, right? Yeah,   John (36m 31s): I just wrote a blog post about it, which is, you know, there's, we, we as a society need to get around, stop having financial crisis. Now that means the debt must be able to lose money when the, when it defaults in a way that isn't so incredibly painful for the society as a whole. And that I think is a failure of government regulation. We, you know, why do we regulate banks? Let's look at a bank's asset portfolios, the bank's asset and compare it to, I don't know, Tesla now, whose assets are more risky, whose cash flows are more risky, a bank or Teslas, you know, by, by three orders of magnitude.   Tesla Bank is, has a, has a portfolio of government guaranteed loans. I mean possibly, you know, yet where are all the regulators? The regulators are all looking at the bank. Now why is that answer? Because banks are leveraged up to the hilt and if they lose enough money to go under, they're, they're kind of big monopolies and, and they, our economy loses the capacity to, to make new debt. So why is that? We need to get the leverage out of the banks. And then you get to a financial system where people can default on debts and it doesn't bring the whole thing crashing down.   So debt's good, default is good, let it happen. Default is reorganization. We just need to not, you know, we kinda have a hostage here. The banks have taken the whole economy and and holding it hostage saying, you know, you government can't let anyone fail or else, and, and it's our political and even the Fed a financial crisis is not the possibility that somebody somewhere might lose money someday on some investment. No, you know, risk and return.   Entrepreneurial capitalism lose money. Financial crisis is when, when, when there's a run on short-term debt and that brings down the banking system. We, we can fix that.   Jesse (38m 26s): It's, you remind me of a, i we'll put a link to it. A really good, I dunno if it was an essay, but it was years ago, Thomas so wrote comparing the American Depression and the branch banking system that we have in Canada. Cuz you know, oftentimes people think Canadians, that we have these five large banks, which we do, or four depending on who you're asking. But we have an extensive branching system. And it was a, it's was interesting to see the difference of branching where it wasn't allowed in states during that time, I guess right after the depression.   But we'll put a link for anybody that's, that's interested. Now   John (39m 1s): This is great important and, and I, you know, I wanna say something. So something nice about Canada, Ben, this is what Ben Bernanke got the Nobel Prize for, he said in the US and the Great Depression. Why was the Great Depression so bad? Well, cause all the banks failed. Now why did the banks and then once the banks failed, not all the banks, sorry, I'm exaggerating. Many banks failed in many places. And when the banks failed, they closed down. And the people in those banks who knew in, you know, Lincoln, Nebraska, who was good for it and who wasn't, who knew how to make loans, they were unemployed.   Why did that not happen in Canada? Well, because, because there are many ways to stop a bank run. And one of them is if a local bank fails, somebody else can come in, a large national bank can come in and buy up the assets, keep the people who know how to make loans employed, you know, stiff the creditors, stiff the stockholders, but keep the operations going. But that needs, the US had had prohibitions on on branches, It had prohibitions on interstate banking. There was no way all the mechanisms of saving a bank and keeping the profitable parts going didn't exist.   And they did exist in Canada, which is why your Great Depression was a whole lot better than ours. Now that doesn't mean the only answer to this is to have a monopolized banking system with four big banks. That, that kept Canada out of a crisis in the Great Depression, but that also leads to a certain amount of financial sclerosis. And so I, I don't want to endorse crony capitalism as the only answer, but it did, it did work better in that circumstance,   Jesse (40m 35s): Economics, real estate and Canadian banking history. John, I think we covered it all today.   John (40m 40s): Thank you. It's a great pleasure.   Jesse (40m 42s): John, for individuals that that want to connect or reach out, where can we send them? We'll put a couple links in the show notes.   John (40m 50s): My website, john h cochran.com and my blog, The Grumpy Economist. And if you just Google John Cochran, I come up first.   Jesse (40m 60s): This is Working Capital. John, thanks for being a part of it.   John (41m 4s): Thanks. Great pleasure.   Jesse (41m 11s): Thank you so much for listening to Working Capital, the Real Estate podcast. I'm your host, Jesse for Galley. If you like the episode, head on to iTunes and leave us a five star review and share on social media. It really helps us out. If you have any questions, feel free to reach out to me on Instagram. Jesse for galley, F R A G A L E. Have a good one. Take care.  

Welcome to The Creating Wealth Show, Episode 1907! Join Jason Hartman today as he takes you through recent natural disasters and how they affect you as homeowners, investors, and how they affect the overall supply and demand dynamic of the real estate markets. Jason discusses Joseph Schumpeter and creative destruction, and breaks down some statistics on households formed vs homes built.  Today's guest Becky Nova, founder of Lady Landlords, helps others invest in properties and actually self manage them from a distance. She successfully operates in cyclical urban markets, so tune in for an interesting real estate success story and some great tips for self managing from abroad. Register today for Empowered Investor Live, taking place in beautiful Scottsdale on January 27-29! VIP tickets are selling out fast, so don't miss your chance! EmpoweredInvestor.com/Live Key Takeaways: Jason's editorial 0:00 Welcome to The Creating Wealth Show, Episode 1907 2:03 Increased demand for housing as natural disasters lessen the supply 5:49 Today's construction codes are much better 7:51 Benefiting from a disaster - insurance claims, government aid & mortgage moratorium 9:13 Joseph Schumpeter and creative destruction 11:05 Households formed vs homes built 12:45 Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University housing projections 14:50 Second wave feminism, decreased marriage rate & men going their own way 17:00 Housing inventory from Altos Research 20:00 Some great opportunities in new construction homes 21:48 Register for our Scottsdale event - tickets are going fast! EmpoweredInvestor.com/Live Becky Nova interview 22:52 Welcome Becky Nova, founder of Lady Landlords 24:34 Becky started with buying a multifamily and renting out another unit 26:05 Mission to provide sustainable housing to those in the Dominican Republic 28:30 Self managing rental properties 30:00 Tools and tricks for self managing your properties from a distance - having the right people and the right systems in place 32:20 Property management software 33:00 Check out Jason's RENT (Real Estate News & Tech) YouTube channel for software demos  34:12 Laying out rules for requests and maintenance 38:50 City living vs multifamilies 41:55 Interest rate hikes and rent increases 44:39 Learn more at Lady-Landlords.com   Follow Jason on TWITTER, INSTAGRAM & LINKEDIN Twitter.com/JasonHartmanROI Instagram.com/jasonhartman1/ Linkedin.com/in/jasonhartmaninvestor/ Call our Investment Counselors at: 1-800-HARTMAN (US) or visit: https://www.jasonhartman.com/ Free Class:  Easily get up to $250,000 in funding for real estate, business or anything else: http://JasonHartman.com/Fund CYA Protect Your Assets, Save Taxes & Estate Planning: http://JasonHartman.com/Protect Get wholesale real estate deals for investment or build a great business – Free Course: https://www.jasonhartman.com/deals Special Offer from Ron LeGrand: https://JasonHartman.com/Ron Free Mini-Book on Pandemic Investing: https://www.PandemicInvesting.com

Welcome to Women Investing Network Podcast, Episode 112! Join Jason Hartman today as he takes you through recent natural disasters and how they affect you as homeowners, investors, and how they affect the overall supply and demand dynamic of the real estate markets. Jason discusses Joseph Schumpeter and creative destruction, and breaks down some statistics on households formed vs homes built.  Today's guest Becky Nova, founder of Lady Landlords, helps others invest in properties and actually self manage them from a distance. She successfully operates in cyclical urban markets, so tune in for an interesting real estate success story and some great tips for self managing from abroad. Register today for Empowered Investor Live, taking place in beautiful Scottsdale on January 27-29! VIP tickets are selling out fast, so don't miss your chance! EmpoweredInvestor.com/Live Key Takeaways: Jason's editorial 0:00 Welcome to The Creating Wealth Show, Episode 1907 1:50 Increased demand for housing as natural disasters lessen the supply 5:36 Today's construction codes are much better 7:38 Benefiting from a disaster - insurance claims, government aid & mortgage moratorium 9:00 Joseph Schumpeter and creative destruction 10:52 Households formed vs homes built 12:32 Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University housing projections 14:37 Second wave feminism, decreased marriage rate & men going their own way 16:47 Housing inventory from Altos Research 19:47 Some great opportunities in new construction homes 21:35 Register for our Scottsdale event - tickets are going fast! EmpoweredInvestor.com/Live Becky Nova interview 22:39 Welcome Becky Nova, founder of Lady Landlords 24:21 Becky started with buying a multifamily and renting out another unit 25:52 Mission to provide sustainable housing to those in the Dominican Republic 28:17 Self managing rental properties 29:47 Tools and tricks for self managing your properties from a distance - having the right people and the right systems in place 32:07 Property management software 32:47 Check out Jason's RENT (Real Estate News & Tech) YouTube channel for software demos  33:59 Laying out rules for requests and maintenance 38:37 City living vs multifamilies 41:42 Interest rate hikes and rent increases 44:26 Learn more at Lady-Landlords.com   Follow Jason on TWITTER, INSTAGRAM & LINKEDIN Twitter.com/JasonHartmanROI Instagram.com/jasonhartman1/ Linkedin.com/in/jasonhartmaninvestor/ Call our Investment Counselors at: 1-800-HARTMAN (US) or visit: https://www.jasonhartman.com/ Free Class:  Easily get up to $250,000 in funding for real estate, business or anything else: http://JasonHartman.com/Fund CYA Protect Your Assets, Save Taxes & Estate Planning: http://JasonHartman.com/Protect Get wholesale real estate deals for investment or build a great business – Free Course: https://www.jasonhartman.com/deals Special Offer from Ron LeGrand: https://JasonHartman.com/Ron Free Mini-Book on Pandemic Investing: https://www.PandemicInvesting.com

Show support appreciated: donations.cryptovoices.com Show Sponsor: hodlhodl.com/join/cryptovoices Matthew interviews Yaël Ossowski on Ukraine and liberalism. Yaël is deputy director at the Consumer Choice Center. He's a very bright and talented freedom-loving person, with family roots from Europe and Canada and an American upbringing. We discuss liberalism in our modern day. We go over what we think it means to be a classical liberal in today's world, the evil we see, and why we are supporting Ukraine. Please check out the many good references Yaël mentions during the show, listed below. Listen on to learn more. Links for more info: https://consumerchoicecenter.org/team/yael-ossowski/ The World of Yesterday by Stefan Zweig: https://amzn.to/3PFEJbH Stefan Zweig's Dream of Europe: What has been achieved? https://www.devolutionreview.com/stefan-zweigs-dream-of-europe-what-has-been-achieved/ The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East by Robert Fisk: https://amzn.to/3PDJi6x Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy by Joseph Schumpeter: https://amzn.to/3wrkEzg Nine Nations of North America by Joel Garreau: https://amzn.to/3QIiweD Rethinking the American Union for the Twenty-First Century by Donald Livingston: https://amzn.to/3TcBADm Friedrich Hayek on Bitcoin and pacifism: https://youtu.be/s-k_Fc63tZI Show Sponsor: hodlhodl.com/join/cryptovoices Hosts: Matthew Mežinskis, Michel, Alec Harris Music: New Friend Music newfriendmusic.com/ Site: cryptovoices.com/ Podcast & information Bitcoin, privacy, cryptoeconomics & liberty Thanks for listening! Show content is not investment advice in any way.

Today an Irish artist needs to get around 4000 streams an hour or about 300,000 per month to earn the minimum wage which we know is far below what is needed to pay the rent. How can someone survive trying to be a musician? Today we explore the "new" economics of music, what is the financial reality for young and not so young musicians, the history of the music industry and why the economic of our old friend Joseph Schumpeter is behind it all. Our GDPR privacy policy was updated on August 8, 2022. Visit acast.com/privacy for more information.

I denne episoden hører vi den andre av to panelsamtaler fra lanseringsarrangementet for boken "Økonomisk tenkning . Bidrag til mangfold i økonomifaget" (den første samtalen finner du i episode 23). Boken er skrevet av forfattere med tilknytning til organisasjonen Rethinking Economics Norge, og lanseringen var et samarbeid mellom RE og podkasten Alternativ økonomi.Nyklassisk økonomi, som dominerer økonomiutdanningen, er opptatt av likevektstilstander i økonomien. Men virkelighetens økonomi er snarere preget av forandring. Evolusjonær økonomi, som ofte knyttes til den østerrikske økonomen Joseph Schumpeter, beskriver hvordan innovasjon driver utviklingen i økonomien. I denne episoden snakker vi med Erik Reinert (som har skrevet bokens kapittel om evolusjonær økonomi), Taran Thune (professor i innovasjonsstudier ved Universitetet i Oslo) og Ellen Stenslie (stipendiat ved NMBU, som studerer bærekraftig og sosialt entreprenørskap) om innovasjonens plass i økonomifaget, og ikke minst i omstillingen til et bærekraftig samfunn. 

In this episode, Jonathan discusses the problem that Ellis Wyatt presents for Jim Taggart's vision of capitalism. Specifically, Jim Taggart hates change agents such as Wyatt and yearns for stasis. This connects to a discussion of the profit motive and its role in justifying capitalism. Jonathan explores alternatives to the profit motive and then concludes with a discussion of the phrase "feudal serf" in the context of this scene. Today's Moment of Non-Contradiction comes from Reddit.In this episode, Jonathan mentions the book Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy by Joseph Schumpeter.My five themes to explore in this podcast's close read of Atlas Shrugged are:What is human nature?Straw-man arguments and their impact on the world Ayn Rand creates. Dagny Taggart as a true hero.How empathy can be de-legitimized.What is Capitalism and what is wrong with it? Questions or comments? Email me at: socialistreads@gmail.comLearn more about Jonathan Seyfried at their website, https://jonathanseyfried.artIf you'd like to support my creative work, please visit my Patreon page.The intro/outro music was composed by John Sib.The podcast theme image was created by Karina Bialys.Support the Show.

February 11 2022 - Episode 79The Ignite EdTech Podcast with @mrkempnz1. Introduction2. Question for you - What are your favourite EdTech tools in your toolkit?3. EdTech Tool of the Week - Kami App4. EdTech Tip of the Week - Making sure your tech toolkit isn't too heavy!5. Interview with Bob Drummond6. Win a prize by going to bit.ly/edtechwin and completing the short form7. Subscribe, Rate and ShareIf you have a question that you want answered on the podcast please emailinfo@igniteedtech.comConnect with Mark Quinn here or via email markquinn9129@gmail.com Links from PodcastBob on TwitterBob on LinkedIn Joseph Schumpeter's Creative DisruptionGoogle ClassroomSeesawFREE Month of FULL Access at EduSpark.World

In dieser Folge führen wir die Ahnenreihe großer Ökonomen weiter von Leon Walras bis Joseph Schumpeter.

Um resumo da vida e obra do influente economista Joseph Schumpeter. Versão vídeo disponível no nosso canal Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLuYPO4REfHUJD0XIXoIdfGe1423Sbcrw8 

Capital is no longer a scarce resource. Attention is. Albert Wenger joins Vasant Dhar in episode 29 of Brave New World to discuss how the Industrial Age is past its expiry date, and what we need to do to prepare for the Knowledge Age.   Useful resources: 1. Albert Wenger at Union Square Ventures and Continuations. And on Twitter. 2. The World After Capital -- Albert Wenger. 3. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy -- Joseph Schumpeter's book in which he wrote about creative destruction. 4.  Homo Deus -- Yuval Noah Harari. 5. Free Lunch Society. 6. Andrew Yang on the New Politics America Needs -- Episode 27 of Brave New World. 7. Nandan Nilekani on an Egalitarian Internet -- Episode 15 of Brave New World. 8. Notes on Elinor Ostrom on Wikipedia, Britannica, Econlib and the Nobel Prize website. 9. Adam Alter on Beating Our Addictions -- Episode 28 of Brave New World.

First year economics classes usually begin the semester with the principles of supply and demand. You learn that incentives matter and that to suggest otherwise is to betray basic principles of economics - and human nature. You learn that you can ignore or violate these fundamental laws, but that you cannot change them. You learn that throughout history the societies that have succeeded recognize and respect these economic laws - they use them to their advantage. Well, someone needs to get this message to progressive Democrats - and soon -  because they have become completely unmoored from economic realities. And their agenda will end in economic disaster. In fact, it's already happening. Joining me on this episode to talk about economics and his work with Donald Trump, is my old friend, Kevin Hassett, who served in the Trump administration as Senior Advisor to the President and as his Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. His latest book The Drift, analyzes America's slide into socialism and how to arrest the decline. Kevin shares many fascinating insights into Donald Trump's effective economic policies and his personality. “The public persona of Donald Trump is much, much different from what he was like when we were actually in the Oval Office or in the West Wing, working on real policy problems,” Kevin shares. “Behind closed doors, he is an incredibly nice guy, who's very thoughtful and likes to see all the sides of the arguments.”   In Kevin's book, The Drift he goes far back into Socialism's roots. “Joseph Schumpeter, the famous economist, back in the 1920s, looked ahead to America's future,” Kevin explains. “He said, the socialists are going to win. What's going to happen is capitalism's going to work for a while. And as we get really rich, we're going to send our kids to college. And the colleges are going to be basically places that indoctrinate folks to be socialists." “And the best universities are going to be the best socialists."   It's hard to do to justice to Kevin's many brilliant insights in an email summary. So I do hope you'll join in listening to our wide ranging conversation about Trump, socialism, the internet, Marshal McLuhan, social media, and the need to stand together to get the truth out. “We control respectability, we control the truth. We need to have the confidence to stand up and defend capitalism because it's true and it works.” He also shares whether he thinks Donald Trump will run for President again.  

The trenches of technology's marketplace battlefield are strewn with the remains of high-tech leaders, undercut by adversaries marching in with the next great innovation.  It's a manifestation of Creative Destruction, economist Joseph Schumpeter's famous theory about the continuous cycle of annihilation & creation that enables the new to replace the old.  Of course "old" is a relative term in IT, but some are beginning to view automation in its current form as a legacy encumbrance.  If it is, then what's next?   To find out we turn to Gaurav Dhillon, Chairman and CEO of SnapLogic, a leading provider of Integration Platform-as-a-Service.  Integrations are the synapses of the online world, enabling creation of neural circuits between applications, which ultimately coalesce into a computational nervous system we call the internet.  Gaurav believes that combining iPaaS with AI will redefine how enterprises interact with their employees and their customers.  The result will be organizations whose whole is greater than the sum of their parts.

In 1942 the famous Austrian political economist Joseph Schumpeter coined a pivotal notion in economics known as 'creative destruction'. The MIT department of economics refers to 'creative destruction' as " the incessant product and process innovation mechanism by which new production units replace outdated ones". Essentially, it is the idea that products or services will either become naturally ineffective or must be purposefully terminated, to make room for new ones to replace them. This process ensures that there is always something better, or at least newer, for the consumer to spend his or her money on. It is the cornerstone of any type of economic growth. So what happens when parts of the capitalistic structure itself prove to be faulty or outdated and a recession occurs. How do our financial systems re-invent themself and what phoenix rises from those economic ashes. That is what we are going to figure out in today's episode.  My guests this episode are professors Ross Buckley and Douglas Arner, who teach at the university of New South Wales and Hong Kong University respectively. Both are experts in financial law. They are joining me to discuss their paper “The Evolution of Fintech : a New Post Crisis Paradigm”. In this paper they explore how every major recession of the last 20 years has forced the financial industry to revisit, and often revolutionize, its relationship with digital technology. As a result of this process an entirely new industry was spawned, known as Fintech, which today is still largely guided by the destruction and losses incurred in economic recessions. 

Chase Koch, President of Koch Disruptive Technologies (KDT), and Andrew Smith, CEO & Founder of Outrider join Grayson Brulte on The Road To Autonomy Podcast to discuss automation, partnerships, and the power of the Koch network for principled disruptive entrepreneurs.The conversation begins with Grayson sharing a high-level overview of Koch Industries and the company's economic impact globally. Koch Industries is a private company that generates annual revenues of $115 billion according to Forbes and employs over 130,000 individuals in 70 countries around the world.Following the introduction of Koch Industries, Chase explains the Koch Laboratory approach to entrepreneurship.We can give entrepreneurs with a lot of upside a place to experiment, grow, and transform their technology and their business model to help them unlock their potential. – Chase KochKoch Disruptive Technologies (KDT) vision is to be the preferred partner in accelerating value creation for principled disruptive entrepreneurs while helping to transform Koch Industries.Koch Industries success comes in part from the company's Market Based Management (MBM) philosophy which was developed by Mr. Charles Koch. This same philosophy is applied to Koch Disruptive Technologies and the Koch Laboratory.It's the whole Joseph Schumpeter model, disrupt yourself or the market will. – Chase KochKoch incentives every employee to create value not just for their P&L, but for the entire organization. Expanding upon this conversation, Chase explains Koch's Republic of Science approach and how it benefits founders who work with Koch Disruptive Technologies.One of the companies that Koch Disruptive Technologies has invested in is Outrider. Andrew Smith, CEO & Founder shares his inspiration for why he founded Outrider and what the market opportunity is for Outrider.One of the biggest market opportunities facing today's business leaders is essentially to reinvent how we move things, power things, produce things to support higher and higher standards of living. – Andrew SmithWhile leading an expedition to the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to witness the caribou migration, Andrew came up with the idea for Outrider.Outrider is the perfect example of how innovation allows us to avoid unnecessary tradeoffs. – Andrew SmithGrayson asks Andrew, why yard automation. Andrew explains that there are over 10 billion tons of cargo moving around the United States on a daily basis. A majority of the cargo is moving over trucks and yard trucks are being used to move the trailers around yards.Automation has become more and more a key driver for our transformation vision across all of our businesses. – Chase KochThe partnership with Koch Industries gives Outrider a massive path to scaling operations. Andrew talks about his working relationship with Chase and how their organizations are working together.Chase expands upon Andrew's thoughts and shares his own thoughts on the power of relationships and partnerships. Additionally, they discuss their mutual commitment to the environment and sustainability.The Koch Industries vision is applied to everything that Koch does:We want to create products, services, and solutions that are better than customers' alternative but do this responsibility while always consuming fewer resources. – Chase KochOver the past five years, Koch Industries has invested over $30 billion in technology alone. This investment in technology is only going to continue to grow.Using fewer resources and being a sustainable company is one of the key goals of Outrider. Sustainability is core to who Outrider is as a company.Wherever your gift is, you have to lean into it. Where passion meets your gift, you have to lean into because that is how you are going to unlock your potential. – Chase KochPrior to founding Outrider, Andrew founded ATDynamics and sold it to STEMCO in 2015. During his time running ATDynamics, Andrew learned a lot and he shares his knowledge and how this experience prepared him for Outrider.To succeed in transportation logistics, it's not just about fancy technology. It's about reliability, simplicity, and durability. – Andrew SmithAndrew discusses why having the right investors is key to succeeding. The team at Outrider works closely with their investors including Prologis to ensure that the company is creating value.Prologis is working with Outrider to ensure that their warehouse yards are designed for yard automation. Increasing the efficiencies of the yard benefits both Prologis and their customers.Closing out the conversation, Chase and Andrew share their thoughts on the future of automation and supply-chain management.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

On the podcast this week, Enlightenment's Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age by John Gray. Next time: Postjournalism and the death of newspapers. The media after Trump: manufacturing anger and polarization by Andrey Mir. Normally Jerry writes an ideological Turing test summary for the book we discuss, but it's impossible with this one as you'll hear us say. So here are some of Jerry's highlights from the book itself: If the Enlightenment myth of progress in ethics and politics continues to have a powerful hold, it is more from fear of the consequences of giving it up than from genuine conviction. the collapse of communism was a world-historic defeat for the Enlightenment project. Communism was not a type of oriental despotism, as generations of Western scholars maintained. It was an authentic continuation of a Western revolutionary tradition, and its downfall – after tens of millions of deaths were inflicted in the pursuit of its utopian goals – signalled the start of a process of de-Westernization. It is an inquiry into the right whose agenda is justice and whose content is given, not by any investigation of human beings as we find them in the world, with their diverse histories and communities, but by an abstract conception of the person that has been voided of any definite cultural identity or specific historical inheritance. Consider, in this regard, the central category of the intellectual tradition spawned by Rawls's work – the category of the person. In Rawls's work, as in that of his followers, this is a cipher, without history or ethnicity, denuded of the special attachments that in the real human world give us the particular identities we have. Emptied of the contingencies that in truth are essential to our identities, this cipher has in the Rawlsian schema only one concern – a concern for its own good, which is not the good of any actual human being, but the good we are all supposed to have in common, which it pursues subject to constraints of justice that are conceived to be those of impartiality. In this conception, the principles of justice are bound to be the same for all. The appearance of a plurality of ciphers in the Rawlsian original position must be delusive, since, having all of them the same beliefs and motives, they are indistinguishable. The subject matter of justice cannot, except indirectly, be found in the histories of peoples, and their often tragically conflicting claims; it must be always a matter of individual rights. It is obvious that this liberal position cannot address, save as an inconvenient datum of human psychology, the sense of injustice arising from belonging to an oppressed community that, in the shape of nationalism, is the strongest political force of our century. The task of political philosophy is conceived as one of deriving the ideal constitution – assumed, at least in principle, to be everywhere the same. This is so, whether its upshot be Rawls's basic liberties, Nozick's side-constraints, or Dworkin's rights-as-trumps. The presupposition is always that the bottom line in political morality is the claims of individuals, and that these are to be spelt out in terms of the demands of justice or rights. The consequence is that the diverse claims of historic communities, if they are ever admitted, are always overwhelmed by the supposed rights of individuals. The notion that different communities might legitimately have different legal regimes for abortion or pornography, for example, is hardly considered. If the theoretical goal of the new liberalism is the supplanting of politics by law, its practical result – especially in the United States, where rights discourse is already the only public discourse that retains any legitimacy – has been the emptying of political life of substantive argument and the political corruption of law. Issues, such as abortion, that in many other countries have been resolved by a legislative settlement that involves compromises and which is known to be politically renegotiable, are in the legalist culture of the United States matters of fundamental rights that are intractably contested and which threaten to become enemies of civil peace. Communitarian thought still harbours the aspiration expressed in those forms of the Enlightenment project, such as Marxism, that are most critical of liberalism – that of creating a form of communal life from which are absent the practices of exclusion and subordination that are constitutive of every community human beings have ever lived in. Old-fashioned toleration – the toleration defended by Milton, and by the older liberals, such as Locke – sprang from an acceptance of the imperfectibility of human beings, and from a belief in the importance of freedom in the constitution of the good life. Since we cannot be perfect, and since virtue cannot be forced on people but is rather a habit of life they must themselves strive to acquire, we were enjoined to tolerate the shortcomings of others, even as we struggled with our own. On this older view, toleration is a precondition of any stable modus vivendi among incorrigibly imperfect beings. If it has become unfashionable in our time, the reason is in part to be found in the resistance of a post-Christian age to the thought that we are flawed creatures whose lives will always contain evils. This is a thought subversive of the shallow optimistic creeds of our age, humanist or Pelagian, for which human evils are problems to be solved rather than sorrows to be coped with or endured. Toleration is unfashionable for another, more topical reason. It is unavoidably and inherently judgemental. The objects of toleration are what we judge to be evils. When we tolerate a practice, a belief or a character trait, we let something be that we judge to be undesirable, false or at least inferior; our toleration expresses the conviction that, despite its badness, the object of toleration should be left alone. we tolerate ersatz religions, such as Scientology, not because we think they may after all contain a grain of truth, but because the great good of freedom of belief necessarily encompasses the freedom to believe absurdities. Toleration is not, then, an expression of scepticism, of doubt about our ability to tell the good from the bad; it is evidence of our confidence that we have that ability. The idea of toleration goes against the grain of the age because the practice of toleration is grounded in strong moral convictions. Such judgements are alien to the dominant conventional wisdom according to which standards of belief and conduct are entirely subjective or relative in character, and one view of things is as good as any other. Indeed, when a society is tolerant, its tolerance expresses the conception of the good life that it has in common. In so far as a society comes to lack any such common conception – as is at least partly the case in Britain today – it ceases to be capable of toleration as it was traditionally understood. What the neutrality of radical equality mandates is nothing less than the legal disestablishment of morality. As a result, morality becomes in theory a private habit of behaviour rather than a common way of life. What a policy of toleration would not mandate is the wholesale reconstruction of institutional arrangements in Britain such that homosexuals acquire collective rights or are in every context treated precisely as heterosexuals. This is not to say that the current law of marriage is fixed for all time, any more than the rest of family law, such as the law on adoption, is so fixed. Further, it is to say that such extension of legal recognition would not be to homosexuals as a group but to individuals regardless of their sexual orientation. To make a political issue that is deeply morally contested a matter of basic rights is to make it non-negotiable, since rights – at least as they are understood in the dominant contemporary schools of Anglo-American jurisprudence – are unconditional entitlements, not susceptible to moderation In modern Western pluralist societies, policies which result in the creation of group rights are inevitably infected with arbitrariness and consequent inequity, since the groups selected for privileging are arbitrary, as is the determination of who belongs to which group. a stable liberal civil society cannot be radically multicultural but depends for its successful renewal across the generations on an undergirding culture that is held in common. This common culture need not encompass a shared religion and it certainly need not presuppose ethnic homogeneity, but it does demand widespread acceptance of certain norms and conventions of behaviour and, in our times, it typically expresses a shared sense of nationality. The example of the United States, which at least since the mid-1960s has been founded on the Enlightenment conviction that a common culture is not a necessary precondition of a liberal civil society, shows that the view that civil peace can be secured solely by adherence to abstract rules is merely an illusion. In so far as policy has been animated by it, the result has been further social division, including what amounts to low-intensity civil war between the races. As things stand, the likelihood in the United States is of a slow slide into ungovernability, as the remaining patrimony of a common cultural inheritance is frittered away by the fragmenting forces of multiculturalism. The kind of diversity that is incompatible with civil society in Britain is that which rejects the constitutive practices that give it its identity. Central among these are freedom of expression and its precondition, the rule of law. Cultural traditions that repudiate these practices cannot be objects of toleration for liberal civil society in Britain or anywhere else. The radical tolerance of indifference has application wherever there are conceptions of the good that are incommensurable. the claim that there may be, and are present among us, conceptions of the good that are rationally incommensurable is not one that supports any of the fashionable varieties of relativism and subjectivism, since it allows, and indeed presupposes, that some conceptions of the good are defective, and some forms of life simply bad. the radical tolerance of indifference is virtually the opposite of old-fashioned toleration in that its objects are not judged to be evils and may indeed be incommensurable goods. Woodrow Wilson's project of imposing a rationalist order conceived in the New World on the intractably quarrelsome nations of Europe. Like Marxism, this rationalist conception had its origins in the French Enlightenment's vision of a universal human civilization in which the claims of ethnicity and religion came long after those of common humanity. In the wake of Soviet communism, we find, not Homo Sovieticus or any other rationalist abstraction, but men and women whose identities are constituted by particular attachments and histories – Balts, Ukrainians, Uzbeks, Russians and so on. Western opinion-formers and policy-makers are virtually unanimous in modelling the transition process of the post-communist states in terms which imply their reconstruction on Western models and their integration into a coherent international order based on Western power and institutions. Underlying this virtually universal model are assumptions that are anachronistic and radically flawed. It assumes that the system of Western-led institutions which assured global peace and world trade in the post-war period can survive, substantially unchanged or even strengthened, the world-wide reverberations of the Soviet collapse; the only issue is how the fledgling post-communist states are to gain admission into these institutions. This assumption neglects the dependency of these institutions on the strategic environment of the Cold War and their unravelling, before our eyes, as the post-war settlement disintegrates. The strategic consequence of the end of the Cold War has been the return to a pre-1914 world – with this difference, that the pre-1914 world was dominated by a single hegemonic power, Great Britain, whereas the return to nineteenth-century policies and modes of thinking in the United States leaves the world without any hegemonic power. the Soviet collapse has triggered a meltdown in the post-war world order, and in the domestic institutions of the major Western powers, which has yet to run its course. the crisis of Western transnational institutions is complemented by an ongoing meltdown of the various Western models of the nature and limits of market institutions in advanced industrial societies. The alienation of democratic electorates from established political elites is pervasive in Western societies, including the United States. Contrary to Hayek, who generalizes from the English experience to put forward a grandiose theory of the spontaneous emergence of market institutions that is reminiscent in its unhistorical generality of Herbert Spencer and Karl Marx at their most incautious, the English example is a singularity, not an exemplar of any long-run historical trend. The English experience is sui generis, not a paradigm for the development of market institutions, because the unique combination of circumstances which permitted it to occur as it did – immemorial individualism and parliamentary absolutism, for example – were replicated nowhere else. Where market institutions did develop elsewhere on English lines, as in North America and Australasia, it was in virtue of the fact that English cultural traditions and legal practice had been exported there more or less wholesale. Market institutions of the English variety failed to take root where, as in India, their legal and cultural matrix was not successfully transplanted. It is noteworthy that, until its collapse in 1991, the Swedish model performed well in respect of what was, perhaps, its principal achievement, an active labour policy that kept long-term unemployment very low, and so effectively prevented the growth of an estranged underclass of the multi-generationally unemployed. The German or Rhine model of market institutions, as it developed in the post-war period up to reunification, was not the result of the application of any consistent theory, but rather of a contingent political compromise between a diversity of theoretical frameworks, of which the most important were the Ordoliberalismus of the Eucken or Frankfurt School and Catholic social theology. It represented a political settlement, also, between the principal interest groups in post-war Germany, including the newly constituted trade unions. It would be false to imagine that China lacks ethnic conflict, or separatist movements. As a portent for the future, there appears to be an Islamic separatist movement in the far-western ‘autonomous region' of Xinjiang, which has borders with the new republics of Kyrgystan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, and with Afghanistan and Pakistan; and there are undoubtedly strong separatist movements in neighbouring Tibet and Mongolia. it would not be entirely surprising, but would in fact rather accord with long-term patterns in Chinese history, if the Chinese state were to fragment in the coming years, perhaps after the death of Deng Xiaoping; market institutions have as their matrices particular cultural traditions, without whose undergirding support the frameworks of law by which they are defined are powerless or empty. Scottish thinkers, such as Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson, who not unreasonably generalized from their own historical experience to such a connection, this result of their inquiries evoked anxiety as to the eventual fate of market institutions, since – like later thinkers such as Joseph Schumpeter – they feared that individualism would consume the cultural capital on which market institutions relied for their renewal across the generations. Our experience suggests that such fears as to the ultimately self-defeating effects of market institutions that are animated by individualist cultural traditions are far from groundless. The growth of lawlessness in Russia, the threat posed to social and business life by organized criminality, and the apparent powerlessness thus far of the Yeltsin government in the face of this threat, suggest that an authoritarian turn in Russian political life, whether by the Yeltsin government or by a successor, and whether or not the army has a decisive role in any subsequent authoritarian regime, would be in accord both with the exigencies of current circumstances and with Russian historical precedent. Authoritarian government is likely to emerge in Russia both in response to the dangers of fragmentation of the state and ensuing civil strife and as a response to growing criminal violence in everyday and business life. The Soviet collapse, far from enhancing the stability of Western institutions, has destabilized them by knocking away the strategic props on which they stood. The prospect of the orderly integration of the post-communist states into the economic and security arrangements of the Western world is a mirage, not only because of the unprecedentedly formidable difficulties each of them confronts in its domestic development, but also because the major Western transnational institutions and organizations are themselves in a flux, amounting sometimes to dissolution. The world-historical failure of the Enlightenment project – in political terms, the collapse and ruin, in the late twentieth century, of the secular, rationalist and universalist political movements, liberal as well as Marxist, that that project spawned, and the dominance in political life of ethnic, nationalist and fundamentalist forces – suggests the falsity of the philosophical anthropology upon which the Enlightenment project rested. On the alternative view that I shall develop, the propensity to cultural difference is a primordial attribute of the human species; human identities are plural and diverse in their very natures, as natural languages are plural and diverse, and they are always variations on particular forms of common life, never exemplars of universal humanity. The task for liberal theory, as I see it, is not vainly to resist the historical falsification of the universalist anthropology that sustained the Enlightenment philosophy of history, but to attempt to reconcile the demands of a liberal form of life with the particularistic character of human identities and allegiances – to retheorize liberalism as itself a particular form of common life. Agonistic liberalism is that species of liberalism that is grounded, not in rational choice, but in the limits of rational choice – limits imposed by the radical choices we are often constrained to make among goods that are both inherently rivalrous, and often constitutively uncombinable, and sometimes incommensurable, or rationally incomparable. Agonistic liberalism is an application in political philosophy of the moral theory of value-pluralism – the theory that there is an irreducible diversity of ultimate values (goods, excellences, options, reasons for action and so forth) and that when these values come into conflict or competition with one another there is no overarching standard or principle, no common currency or measure, whereby such conflicts can be arbitrated or resolved. Value-pluralism imposes limits on rational choice that are subversive of most standard moral theories, not merely of utilitarianism, and it has deeply subversive implications for all the traditional varieties of liberal theory. The thesis of the incommensurability of values is then not a version of relativism, of subjectivism or of moral scepticism, though it will infallibly be confused with one or other of these doctrines: it is a species of moral realism, which we shall call objective pluralism. Its distinguishing features are that it limits the scope of rational choice among goods, affirming that they are often constitutively uncombinable and sometimes rationally incommensurable. It is a fundamental contribution of Raz's political philosophy to have shown that a rights-based political morality is an impossibility. rights claims are never primordial or foundational but always conclusionary, provisional results of long chains of reasoning which unavoidably invoke contested judgements about human interests and well-being. If the truth of value-pluralism is assumed, such that there are no right answers in hard cases about the restraint of liberty, then it seems natural to treat questions of the restraint of liberty as political, and not as theoretical or jurisprudential questions. Despite its self-description as political liberalism, then, Rawls's is a liberalism that has been politically emasculated, in which nothing of importance is left to political decision, and in which political life itself has been substantially evacuated of content. The hollowing out of the political realm in Rawlsian liberalism is fatal to its self-description as a form of political liberalism and discloses its true character as a species of liberal legalism. The liberal legalism of Rawls and his followers is, perhaps, only an especially unambiguous example of the older liberal project, or illusion, of abolishing politics, or of so constraining it by legal and constitutional formulae that it no longer matters what are the outcomes of political deliberation. In Rawlsian liberal legalism, the anti-political nature of at least one of the dominant traditions of liberalism is fully realized. In historical practice, the effect of attempting to abolish or to marginalize political life has been – especially in the United States, where legalism is strongest – the politicization of law, as judicial institutions have become arenas of political struggle. The end-result of this process is not, however, the simple transposition of political life into legal contexts, but rather the corrosion of political life itself. The treatment of all important issues of restraint of liberty as questions of constitutional rights has the consequence that they cease to be issues that are politically negotiable and that can be resolved provisionally in a political settlement that encompasses a compromise among conflicting interests and ideals. In conflicts about basic constitutional rights, there can be no compromise solutions, only judgements which yield unconditional victory for one side and complete defeat for the other. Allegiance to a liberal state is, on this view, never primarily to principles which it may be thought to embody, and which are supposed to be compelling for all human beings; it is always to specific institutions, having a specific history, and to the common culture that animates them, which itself is a creature of historical contingency. On the view being developed here, allegiance to a liberal state is always allegiance to the common culture it embodies or expresses, and, in the late modern context in which we live, such a common culture is typically a national culture. the only things, on the account here defended, that can command allegiance. In our world they are nations, or the common forms of life which national cultures encompass and shelter. The point may be put in another, and perhaps a simpler way: there can be no form of allegiance that is purely political; political allegiance – at least when it is comparatively stable – presupposes a common cultural identity, which is reflected in the polity to which allegiance is given; political order, including that of a liberal state, rests upon a pre-political order of common culture. As Berlin has put his position: The fact that the values of one culture may be incompatible with those of another, or that they are in conflict within one culture or group or in a single human being at different times – or, for that matter, at one and the same time – does not entail relativism of values, only the notion of a plurality of values not structured hierarchically; which, of course, entails the permanent possibility of inescapable conflict between values, as well as incompatibility between the outlooks of different civilisations or of stages of the same civilisation. He sums up his view: ‘Relativism is not the only alternative to universalism … nor does incommensurability entail relativism'. Berlin's point, which is surely correct, is that there may be a specifiable minimum universal content to morality, and some forms of life may be condemned by it; but the items which make up the minimum content may, and sometimes do, come into conflict with one another, there being no rational procedure for resolving such conflicts. because the universal minimum in all of its variations underdetermines any liberal form of life, many of the regimes that meet the test of the universal minimum – probably the vast majority of such regimes to be found in human history – will not be liberal regimes. The likely prospect, on all current trends, is not only of the East Asian societies overtaking Western liberal individualist societies in the economic terms of growth, investment, savings and living standards; it is also of their doing so while preserving and enhancing common cultural forms which assure to their subjects personal security in their everyday lives and a public environment that is rich in choiceworthy options. By contrast, the prospect for the Western individualist societies is one of economic development that is weak and feeble in a context of cultural impoverishment in which the remnants of a common culture are hollowed out by individualism and legalism. The prospect for the Western liberal societies, and particularly for those in which individualism and legalism have by now virtually delegitimized the very idea of a common culture, is that of a steep and rapid decline in which civil peace is fractured and the remnants of a common culture on which liberal forms of life themselves depend are finally dissipated. The self-undermining of liberal individualism, which Joseph Schumpeter anticipated in the mid-1940s, is likely to proceed apace, now that the Soviet collapse has removed the legitimacy borrowed by Western institutions from the enmity of a ruinous alternative, and the East Asian societies are released from the constraints of the post-war settlement to pursue paths of development that owe ever less to the West. When our institutional inheritance – that precious and irreplaceable patrimony of mediating structures and autonomous professions – is thrown away in the pursuit of a managerialist Cultural Revolution seeking to refashion the entire national life on the impoverished model of contract and market exchange, it is clear that the task of conserving and renewing a culture is no longer understood by contemporary conservatives. In the context of such a Maoism of the Right, it is the permanent revolution of unfettered market processes, not the conservation of traditional institutions and professions, having each of them a distinctive ethos, that has become the ruling project of contemporary conservatism. At the same time, neo-liberalism itself can now be seen as a self-undermining political project. Its political success depended upon cultural traditions, and constellations of interests, that neo-liberal policy was bound to dissipate. liberal civilization itself may be imperilled, in so far as its legitimacy has been linked with the utopia of perpetual growth powered by unregulated market processes, and the inevitable failure of this utopia spawns illiberal political movements. Indeed, unconstrained market institutions are bound to undermine social and political stability, particularly as they impose on the population unprecedented levels of economic insecurity with all the resultant dislocations of life in families and communities. A central test of the readiness to think fresh thoughts is the way we think about market institutions. On the view defended here they are not ends in themselves but means or tools whose end is human well-being. Indeed, among us, market liberalism is in its workings ineluctably subversive of tradition and community. This may not have been the case in Edmund Burke's day, in which the maintenance of the traditions of whig England could coexist with a policy of economic individualism, but in our age a belief in any such harmony is a snare and a delusion. Among us, unlike the men and women of Burke's day, markets are global, and also, in the case of capital markets, nearly instantaneous; free trade, if it too is global, operates among communities that are vastly more uneven in development than any that traded with one another in Burke's time; and our lives are pervaded by mass media that transform tastes, and revolutionize daily habits, in ways that could be only dimly glimpsed by the Scottish political economists whom Burke so revered. The social and cultural effects of market liberalism are, virtually without exception, inimical to the values that traditional conservatives hold dear. Communities are scattered to the winds by the gale of creative destruction. Endless ‘downsizing' and ‘flattening' of enterprises fosters ubiquitous insecurity and makes loyalty to the company a cruel joke. The celebration of consumer choice, as the only undisputed value in market societies, devalues commitment and stability in personal relationships and encourages the view of marriage and the family as vehicles of self-realization. The dynamism of market processes dissolves social hierarchies and overturns established expectations. Status is ephemeral, trust frail and contract sovereign. The dissolution of communities promoted by market-driven labour mobility weakens, where it does not entirely destroy, the informal social monitoring of behaviour which is the most effective preventive measure against crime. Classical liberalism, or what I have termed market fundamentalism, is, like Marxism, a variation on the Enlightenment project, which is the project of transcending the contingencies of history and cultural difference and founding a universal civilization that is qualitatively different from any that has ever before existed. In this paleo-liberal or libertarian view, the erosion of distinctive cultures by market processes is, if anything, to be welcomed as a sign of progress toward a universal rational civilization. Here paleo-liberalism shows its affinities not with European conservatism but with the Old Left project of doing away with, or marginalizing politically, the human inheritance of cultural difference. That this perspective is a hallucinatory and utopian one is clear if we consider its neglect of the sources not only of political allegiance but also of social order in common cultural forms. Market liberalism, like other Enlightenment ideologies, treats cultural difference as a politically marginal phenomenon whose appropriate sphere is in private life. It does not comprehend, or repudiates as irrationality, the role of a common culture in sustaining political order and in legitimizing market institutions. Market liberalism is at its most utopian, however, in its conception of a global market society, in which goods, and perhaps people, move freely between economies having radically different stages of development and harbouring very different cultures. Human beings need, more than they need the freedom of consumer choice, a cultural and economic environment that offers them an acceptable level of security and in which they feel at home. The conservative idea of the primacy of cultural forms is meant to displace not only standard liberal conceptions of the autonomous human subject but also ideas of the autonomy of market institutions that liberal thought has been applied – or misapplied – to support. It is not meant to support nostalgist and reactionary conceptions of organic or integral community which have no application in our historical circumstances and which, if they were implemented politically, could end only in tragedy or – more likely in Britain – black comedy. The idea of a seamless community – the noumenal community, as we may call it, of communitarianism – is as much of a fiction as the autonomous subject of liberal theory. We all of us belong to many communities, we mostly inherit diverse ethnicities, and our world-views are fractured and provisional whether or not we know it or admit it. We harbour a deep diversity of views and values as to sexuality and the worth of human life, our relations with the natural environment and the special place, if any, of the human species in the scheme of things. The reactionary project of rolling back this diversity of values and world-views in the pursuit of a lost cultural unity overlooks the character of our cultural inheritance as a palimpsest, having ever deeper layers of complexity. It is clear only that, for us at any rate, a common culture cannot mean a common world-view, religious or secular. It is an implication of all that I have said, however, that we have no option but to struggle to make our inheritance of liberal traditions work. At present, the principal obstacle we face in the struggle to renew our inheritance of liberal practice is the burden on thought and policy of market liberal dogma. The central difficulty is that the enlargement of leisure that Mill, by contrast with the gloomier classical economists, expected to come from stability in population and output against a background of improvement in the industrial arts is occurring in the form of ever higher levels of involuntary unemployment. It may be that proposals for a basic or citizen's income, where that is to be distinguished from the neo-liberal idea of a negative income tax, and for a better distribution of capital among the citizenry, need reconsideration – despite all their difficulties – as elements in a policy aiming to reconcile the human need for economic security with the destabilizing dynamism of market institutions. Almost as significant in disclosing the Americocentric character of the new liberalism was its anaemic and impoverished conception of pluralism and cultural diversity. The incommensurability of values affirmed in doctrines of objective ethical pluralism was understood as arising in the formulation of personal plans of life rather than in conflicts among whole ways of life. And cultural diversity was conceived in the denatured form of a cornucopia of chosen lifestyles, each with its elective identity, rather than in the form in which it is found in the longer and larger experience of humankind – as the exfoliation of exclusionary forms of life, spanning the generations, membership of which is typically unchosen, and which tend to individuate themselves by their conflicts and by their historical memories of enmity. The core project of the Enlightenment was the displacement of local, customary or traditional moralities, and of all forms of transcendental faith, by a critical or rational morality, which was projected as the basis of a universal civilization. This is the project that animated Marxism and liberalism in all their varieties, which underpins both the new liberalism and neo-conservatism, and to which every significant body of opinion in the United States continues to subscribe. That liberal individuality is, in practice, invariably a prescription for abject conformity to prevailing bien-pensant opinion is, on the view being presented here, not the chief objection to it. The most disabling feature of these and other constitutive elements of the new liberalism is what they all betoken – namely, a rejection of the political enterprise itself, and of its animating value of peace. For the pluralist, the practice of politics is a noble engagement, precisely on account of the almost desperate humility of its purposes – which are to moderate the enmity of agonistic identities, and to generate conventions of peace among warring communities. The pluralist embrace of politics is, for these reasons, merely a recognition of the reality of political life, itself conceived as an abatement of war. from the truth of a plurality of incommensurable values the priority of one of them – liberty, autonomy or choice-making, say – cannot follow. Value-pluralism cannot entail, or ground, liberalism in any general, still less universal way. Pluralists reject this Old Right project for the same reason that they reject the Enlightenment project. Both seek to roll back the reality of cultural diversity for the sake of an imaginary condition of cultural unity – whether that be found in a lost past or in a supposed future condition of the species in which cultural difference has been marginalized in a universal civilization. Both perspectives are alien to that of the pluralist, which takes the reality of cultural difference as a datum of political order. A pluralist political order may nevertheless deviate from the central institutions of a liberal civil society at crucial points. It need not, and often will not possess an individualist legal order in which persons are the primary rights-bearers. The principal bearers of rights (and duties) in a pluralist political order will be communities, or ways of life, not individuals. The pluralist standard of assessment of any regime is whether it enables its subjects to coexist in a Hobbesian peace while renewing their distinctive forms of common life. … By this standard, the current regime in China might well be criticized for its policies in Tibet; but such a criticism would invoke the intrinsic value of the communities and cultural forms now being destroyed in Tibet, not universalist conceptions of human rights or democracy. Here I think Raz has grasped a point of fundamental importance, perceived by Mill but not by Rawls – that a liberal state cannot be neutral with regard to illiberal forms of life coming within its jurisdiction. Or, to put the matter still more shortly, Raz is entirely correct in seeing liberalism itself as a whole way of life, and not merely a set of political principles or institutions. The trouble is that, if value-pluralism is true at the level of whole ways of life, then the liberal form of life can have no special or universal claim on reason. In the late modern period in which we live, the Enlightenment project is affirmed chiefly for fear of the consequences of abandoning it. (The United States is, as ever, an exception in this regard, since in it both fundamentalist religion and fundamentalist affirmations of the Enlightenment project remain strong. The collapse of these fundamentalisms in the United States, however, were it to occur, would likely be accompanied by an outbreak of nihilism of a violence and intensity unknown in other Western countries; such an outcome is prefigured in much contemporary North American art, literature and popular entertainment.) There can, in my view, be no rolling back the central project of modernity, which is the Enlightenment project, with all its consequences in terms of disenchantment and ultimate groundlessness. … the thought of Nietzsche, especially but not exclusively his thinking about morality, is unavoidably and rightly the starting-point of serious reflection for us, at the close of the modern age which the Enlightenment project, in all its diversity, inaugurated. the political forms which may arise in truly post-Enlightenment cultures will be those that shelter and express diversity – that enable different cultures, some but by no means all or even most of which are dominated by liberal forms of life, different world-views and ways of life, to coexist in peace and harmony. For this development to be a real historical possibility, however, certain conceptions and commitments that have been constitutive, not merely of the Enlightenment and so of modernity, but also, and more fundamentally, of the central traditions of Western civilization, must be amended, or abandoned. Certain conceptions, not only of morality but also of science, that are central elements in Enlightenment cultures must be given up. Certain understandings of religion, long established in Western traditions, not as a vessel for a particular way of life but rather as the bearer of truths possessing universal authority, must be relinquished. The most fundamental Western commitment, the humanist conception of humankind as a privileged site of truth, which is expressed in Socratic inquiry and in Christian revelation, and which re-emerges in secular and naturalistic form in the Enlightenment project of human self-emancipation through the growth of knowledge, must be given up. Further, and perhaps decisively, once liberal practice is released from the hallucinatory perspective of liberal theory, it will be seen for what it always was – not a seamless garment, but a patchwork quilt, stitched together and restitched in response to the flux of circumstance. … If, as I believe, liberal practice is best conceived as a miscellany of ad-hoc improvisations, made over the generations in the pursuit of a modus vivendi, then no part of it can be regarded as sacrosanct; it can, and should, be rewoven, or unravelled, as circumstances and changing human needs dictate. The conception of the natural world as an object of human exploitation, and of humankind as the master of nature, which informs Bacon's writings, is one of the most vital and enduring elements of the modern world-view, and the one which Westernization has most lastingly and destructively transmitted to non-Western cultures. In this last period of modernity, Western instrumental reason becomes globalized at just the historic moment when its groundlessness is manifest. The embodiment of instrumental reason in modern technology acquires a planetary reach precisely when the animating humanist project which guided it is overthrown. Nothing remains of this project but the expansion of human productive powers through the technological domination of the earth. It is this conjunction of the global spread of the Western humanist project with the self-undermining of its most powerful modern embodiment in the Enlightenment that warrants the claim that we find ourselves now at the close of the modern age. In truth, the likelihood is that, now that the imperatives of the Cold War period are over, the European countries and the United States will increasingly decouple, not only strategically and economically, but also culturally, so that their cultural and political differences will become more, not less, decisive. It is difficult to believe that the forms of liberal culture will not diverge greatly, as a result of this likely decoupling, between the United States and the various European nations. Indeed, even as things stand now, Rorty's post-modern liberalism is an expression of American hopes, which are far from being shared by other liberal cultures, such as those in Europe. For liberalism to become merely one form of life among others would involve as profound a cultural metamorphosis as Christianity's ceasing to make any claim to unique and universal truth. The surrender of the will to power has its most important application in our relations with other forms of life, and with the earth. The project of subjecting the earth and its other life-forms to human will through technological domination is Western humanism in its final form.

Evolutionary biologists have proven that the more adapted you are in your existing environment, the less able you are to adapt to environmental changes. We blindly cling to “that is the way we have always done it” in defiance of the evidence that this way is no longer relevant to success. This is the history of business. New ideas, inventions, and business models from the tinkerer in the garage change the world, while rendering obsolete the existing modes of production, infrastructure, and business models. The automobile replaced the horse and buggy, the calculator replaced the slide rule, and the personal computer replaced the typewriter, and so on in a never-ending “perennial gale of creative destruction,” as described by economist Joseph Schumpeter. Clayton Christensen writes, “Generally, the leading practitioners of the old order become the victims of disruption, not the initiators of it.” Join Ed and Ron as they look at creative destruction, an essential process in a free market.

Evolutionary biologists have proven that the more adapted you are in your existing environment, the less able you are to adapt to environmental changes. We blindly cling to “that is the way we have always done it” in defiance of the evidence that this way is no longer relevant to success. This is the history of business. New ideas, inventions, and business models from the tinkerer in the garage change the world, while rendering obsolete the existing modes of production, infrastructure, and business models. The automobile replaced the horse and buggy, the calculator replaced the slide rule, and the personal computer replaced the typewriter, and so on in a never-ending “perennial gale of creative destruction,” as described by economist Joseph Schumpeter. Clayton Christensen writes, “Generally, the leading practitioners of the old order become the victims of disruption, not the initiators of it.” Join Ed and Ron as they look at creative destruction, an essential process in a free market.

On this episode, Cato's Ryan Bourne discusses his recent paper, “Is This Time Different? Schumpeter, the Tech Giants, and Monopoly Fatalism.” The post https://www.aei.org/multimedia/ryan-bourne-on-joseph-schumpeter-the-tech-giants-and-the-case-against-monopoly-fatalism/ (Ryan Bourne on Joseph Schumpeter, the tech giants, and the case against monopoly fatalism) appeared first on https://www.aei.org (American Enterprise Institute - AEI).

All business people live the ultimate contradiction. They pray at night for supernormal profits and spend their days driving down those profits by competitively supplying customers with more of what they want. As the economist Joseph Schumpeter so poetically phrased it, entrepreneurial innovations make up the “perennial gale of creative destruction,” whereby entire industries have been eliminated due to this dynamism of free markets. Buggy whip manufacturers didn't invent the automobile and slide rule manufacturers did not invent the calculator. Businesses are the ultimate change agents in society, ushering in new products, services, and ways of conducting our affairs. This role of business is often ignored in the debate over the jobs destroyed in the process, which is the wrong metric: the creativity is more important than the destruction. Join Ed and Ron for a discussion of the dynamic process of competition.

All business people live the ultimate contradiction. They pray at night for supernormal profits and spend their days driving down those profits by competitively supplying customers with more of what they want. As the economist Joseph Schumpeter so poetically phrased it, entrepreneurial innovations make up the “perennial gale of creative destruction,” whereby entire industries have been eliminated due to this dynamism of free markets. Buggy whip manufacturers didn't invent the automobile and slide rule manufacturers did not invent the calculator. Businesses are the ultimate change agents in society, ushering in new products, services, and ways of conducting our affairs. This role of business is often ignored in the debate over the jobs destroyed in the process, which is the wrong metric: the creativity is more important than the destruction. Join Ed and Ron for a discussion of the dynamic process of competition.

Creative destruction is the hallmark of capitalism, as the economist Joseph Schumpeter argued. But the destructive side is often overlooked. Francesca Ammon discusses the enormous wave of demolition that accompanied the postwar boom — transforming the rural, urban and suburban landscape, and displacing the residents of scores of communities around the United States. (Encore presentation.) Resources: Francesca Russello Ammon,  Bulldozer: Demolition and Clearance of the Postwar Landscape Yale University Press, 2016 The post The Social History of the Bulldozer appeared first on KPFA.

Creative destruction is the hallmark of capitalism, as the economist Joseph Schumpeter argued.  But the destructive side is often overlooked.  Francesca Ammon discusses the enormous wave of demolition that accompanied the postwar boom — transforming the rural, urban and suburban landscape, and displacing the residents of scores of communities around the United States. Resources: Francesca Russello Ammon,  Bulldozer: Demolition and Clearance of the Postwar Landscape Yale University Press, 2016 The post The Social History of the Bulldozer appeared first on KPFA.

Politics brings out the worst in people. As the economist Joseph Schumpeter put it, "The typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field. He argues and analyzes in a way which he would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interests. He becomes a primitive again." This episode is about the problem of political irrationality. Why are political beliefs so irrational? How does this affect your life? Listen to the episode to find out more! Show Notes: All Previous Episodes in the Thinking Rationally Series The Myth Of The Rational Voter by Bryan Caplan George Carlin On Politics Michael Heumer on The Irrationality Of Politics