I'm interviewing one of the world's legends today!Michael Bungay Stanier's (MBS) newest book, "How to Begin: Start Doing Something that Matters" is now available for pre-order. Find out more about Michael over at mbs.worksWatch our video interview in Brisbane on YouTubeClick here for show notesMichael Bungay Stanier helps people be a force for change. He's best known for his book The Coaching Habit which has sold close to a million copies and has thousands of 5-star reviews online. His book The Advice Trap focuses on what it takes to tame your Advice Monster.He founded Box of Crayons, a learning and development company that helps organizations move from advice-driven to curiosity-led. They've trained hundreds of thousands of managers to be more coach-like and their clients range from Microsoft to Gucci.He left Australia about 30 years ago to be a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University … where his only significant achievement was falling in love with aCanadian … which is why he now lives in Toronto, having spent time in London and Boston.Balancing out these moments of success, he was banned from his high school graduation for “the balloon incident” … was sued by one of his Law School professors for defamation … and his first published piece of writing was a Harlequin Romance-esque story involving a misdelivered letter … and called The Male Delivery.Join The Flipchart community on FacebookSubscribe to Leanne's email dispatchConnect with Leanne on LinkedInFind out about Leanne's work at leannehughes.comSupport the show (https://buymeacoffee.com/leannehughes)
The last time, and luckily this hasn't really happened since 1990, there was minimal resistance from the Kuwaiti and the Saudi forces. So, this obviously is 30 years ago, but there is little reason to believe that in spite of the hundreds of billions of dollars that is spent on armaments, this state of affairs has changed. Let me just put it this way. Nobody in Tehran is losing any sleep over the prowess of any of the Gulf militaries.Zoltan BaranyA full transcript is available at www.democracyparadox.com or a short review of Armies of Arabia: Military Politics and Effectiveness in the Gulf here.Zoltan Barany is the Frank C. Erwin, Jr. Centennial Professor of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of Armies of Arabia: Military Politics and Effectiveness in the Gulf. Key HighlightsWhat should be expected of the militaries of the Gulf countries?Would the Gulf countries be threatened without the American security guarantee?What types of military investments do the Gulf countries make?What has the Yemeni War taught us about armies of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries?How does the leadership of MBS differ from MBZ?Key LinksArmies of Arabia: Military Politics and Effectiveness in the Gulf by Zoltan BaranyRobert Strauss Center For International Security and LawCenter for Strategic & International StudiesDemocracy Paradox PodcastDaniel Brinks on the Politics of Institutional WeaknessElizabeth Nugent on Polarization, Democratization and the Arab SpringMore Episodes from the PodcastMore InformationDemocracy GroupApes of the State created all MusicEmail the show at firstname.lastname@example.orgFollow on Twitter @DemParadoxFollow on Instagram @democracyparadoxpodcast100 Books on Democracy
**Black Friday: Photontek Lighting is offering 15% off PLUS code GROWCAST for an additional 10% off- get your brand new bar style PTK light for 25% off! One lucky Black Friday code user will even win free seeds! Email us your code email@example.com** A slight departure from Crobe-vember (don't forget pests are an important pathogen vector to address too!) with a beloved guest; Marybeth Sanchez returns to the podcast to discuss an area of her expertise that we haven't visited in a while- integrated pest management. MBS discusses the life cycles of the most common insect pests we face in the garden, and the importance of understanding how they breed. The fungus gnat (born pregnant) requires a different approach to treatment than, say, the spider mite, where sprays can be more effective in halting the entire pest cycle. This leads to a conversation about where pests like to congregate and reproduce, and how proper treatment relies upon understanding the movement patterns of insect pests as well. MBS also discusses general IPM strategies, her new toy The Microbiometer, and more... ---Master the power of microbes with home testing from www.microbiometer.com the only affordable home microbe test! Code GROWCAST saves you 15% on your Microbiometer- no more guessing which product takes hold in your garden, order a Microbiometer today and master the microbes in your garden!--- ---Brand new sexy iongrid lights at! www.acinfinity.com use promo code growcast15 for 15% off the BEST grow fans in the game, plus tents, pots, scissors, LED lights and more!-- ---Proud partner of FOOP Nutrients! Certified organic nutrients, clone gel and more! Visit www.foopcanna.com and use code growcast420 - and be sure to enter our FOOP giveaway EVERY WEEK at www.growcastpodcast.com/foop ---
Danny and Derek talk about the Nicaraguan elections, MBS and his pro-Republican oil policy, and last weekend's attack on the Iraqi prime minister. They then speak with Ada Ferrer (21:00), professor of history and Latin American and Caribbean Studies at NYU, about the history of Cuba from the precolonial period until the Spanish-American War/War of 1898. Grab Ada's book here: https://bit.ly/3CevBUK Become a patron today! www.patreon.com/americanprestige
Republicans are silent after vile Paul Gosar posted a violent GOP fantasy video. Dullard conservative Rep Louie Gohmert mused about a run for Texas AG. MBS has outsmarted the U.S. and got away with the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Conspiracy theorists blamed Satan for the crowd surge at the Travis Scott concert. Coronavirus hospitalizations have been rising in parts of Cali. Germany's unvaccinated have remained stubbornly ignorant as rules and mandates tighten. A judge rejected a lame effort by Trump's attorney to block archived communication from January 6th. Someone witnessed pedo-Prince Andrew sexually assault a minor. Shitler blasted corrupt GOP load Chris Christie after the former Jersey Governor called on the Repubs to move past the orange load. Right-wing lawmaker Liz Cheney spoke out against Trump as well.
Today Joel joined me to chat about his latest book "Enemies and Allies" we had a wonderful conversation about the book and his time with President Trump and MBS. Joel C. Rosenberg is an American-Israeli communications strategist, author, and non-profit executive. He has written five novels about terrorism and Bible prophecy, including the Gold Medallion Book Award-winner The Ezekiel Option. He also has written two nonfiction books, Epicenter and Inside the Revolution. Download our latest PDF Guide at: GUIDE: Talking to your high schoolers about politics!! (https://familyvisionmedia.org/guide) Thank you for listening!! We are live Monday through Friday from 9p to midnight eastern on SiriusXM the Patriot channel 125!!! Donate to support the show here: paypal.me/stacyontheright Or join our Patreon: patreon.com/stacyontheright Thanks and God Bless ya!! -- Encouragement-- I will say of the LORD, "He is my refuge and my fortress, my God, in whom I trust." —Psalm 91:2 -- Stacy's Stash! -- For links to the articles and material referenced in this week's episode check out this week's page from our podcast dashboard! -- Get More Stacy -- Stacy's Blog (http://www.stacyontheright.com) Watch the show live, download previous episodes, and more Stacy! Contact Stacy
Steven A. Cook, Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies and director of the International Affairs Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars at CFR, leads a conversation on geopolitics in the Middle East. FASKIANOS: Welcome to today's session of the CFR Fall 2021 Academic Webinar Series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach at CFR. Today's discussion is on the record and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/Academic, if you want to share it with your colleagues or classmates. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. Today's topic is geopolitics in the Middle East. Our speaker was supposed to be Sanam Vakil, but she had a family emergency. So we're delighted to have our very own Steven Cook here to discuss this important topic. Dr. Cook is the Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies, and director of the International Affairs Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of several books, including False Dawn; The Struggle for Egypt, which won the 2012 Gold Medal from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; and Ruling But Not Governing. And he's working on yet another book entitled The End of Ambition: America's Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East. So keep an eye out for that in the next year or so. He's a columnist at Foreign Policy magazine and contributor and commentator on a bunch of other outlets. Prior to coming to CFR, Dr. Cook was a research fellow at the Brookings Institution and a Soref research fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. So, Dr. Cook, thank you for being with us. I thought you could just—I'm going to give you a soft question here, to talk about the geopolitical relations among state and nonstate actors in the Middle East. And you can take that in whatever direction you would like. COOK: Well, thanks so much, Irina. It's a great pleasure to be with you. Good afternoon to everybody who's out there who's on an afternoon time zone, good morning to those who may still be in the evening, and good evening to those who may be somewhere where it's the evening. It's very nice to be with you. As Irina mentioned, and as I'm sure it's plenty evident, I am not Sanam Vakil, but I'm happy to step in for her and offer my thoughts on the geopolitics of the Middle East. It's a small topic. That question that Irina asked was something that I certainly could handle effectively in fifteen to twenty minutes. But before I get into the details of what's going on in the region, I thought I would offer some just general comments about the United States in the Middle East. Because, as it turns out, I had the opportunity last night to join a very small group of analysts with a very senior U.S. government official to talk precisely about the United States in the Middle East. And it was a very, very interesting conversation, because despite the fact that there has been numerous news reporting and analytic pieces about how the United States is deemphasizing the Middle East, this official made it very, very clear that that was practically impossible at this time. And this was, I think, a reasonable position to take. There has been a lot recently, in the last recent years, about withdrawing from the region, from retrenchment from the region, reducing from the region, realignment from the region. All those things actually mean different things. But analysts have essentially used them to mean that the United States should deprioritize the Middle East. And it seems to me that the problem in the Middle East has not necessarily been the fact that we are there and that we have goals there. It's that the goals in the region and the resources Washington uses to achieve those goals need to be realigned to address things that are actually important to the United States. In one sense that sound eminently reasonable. We have goals, we have resources to meet those goals, and we should devote them to—and if we can't, we should reassess what our goals are or go out and find new resources. That sounds eminently reasonable. But that's not the way Washington has worked over the course of the last few decades when it comes to the Middle East. In many ways, the United States has been overly ambitious. And it has led to a number of significant failures in the region. In an era when everything and anything is a vital interest, then nothing really is. And this seems to be the source of our trouble. For example, when we get into trying to fix the politics of other countries, we're headed down the wrong road. And I don't think that there's been enough real debate in Washington or, quite frankly, in the country about what's important in the Middle East, and why we're there, and what we're trying to achieve in the Middle East. In part, this new book that I'm writing called the End of Ambition, which, as Irina pointed out, will be out hopefully in either late 2022 or early 2023, tries to answer some of these questions. There is a way for the United States to be constructive in the Middle East, but what we've done over the course of the last twenty years has made that task much, much harder. And it leads us, in part, to this kind of geostrategic picture or puzzle that I'm about to lay out for you. So let me get into some of the details. And I'm obviously not going to take you from Morocco all the way to Iran, although I could if I had much, much more time because there's a lot going on in a lot of places. But not all of those places are of critical importance to the United States. So I'll start and I'll pick and choose from that very, very large piece of geography. First point: There have been some efforts to deescalate in a region that was in the middle of or on the verge of multiple conflicts. There has been a dialogue between the Saudis and the Iranians, under the auspices of the Iraqis, of all people. According to the Saudis this hasn't yielded very much, but they are continuing the conversation. One of the ways to assess the success or failure of a meeting is the fact that there's going to be another meeting. And there are going to be other meetings between senior Iranian and Saudi officials. I think that that's good. Egyptians and Turks are talking. Some of you who don't follow these issues as closely may not remember that Turkey and Egypt came close to trading blows over Libya last summer. And they pulled back as a result of concerted diplomacy on the part of the European Union, as well as the Egyptian ability to actually surge a lot of force to its western border. Those two countries are also talking, in part under the auspices of the Iraqis. Emiratis and Iranians are talking. That channel opened up in 2019 after the Iranians attacked a very significant—two very significant oil processing facilities in Saudi Arabia, sort of scaring the Emiratis, especially since the Trump administration did not respond in ways that the Emiratis or the Saudis had been expecting. The Qataris and the Egyptians have repaired their relations. The Arab world, for better or for worse, is moving to reintegrate Syria into is ranks. Not long after King Abdullah of Jordan was in the United States, he and Bashar al-Assad shared a phone call to talk about the opening of the border between Jordan and Syria and to talk about, among other things, tourism to the two countries. The hope is that this de-escalation, or hope for de-escalation coming from this dialogue, will have a salutary effect on conflicts in Yemen, in Syria, in Libya, and Iraq. Thus far, it hasn't in Yemen, in particular. It hasn't in Syria. But in Libya and Iraq, there have been some improvements to the situation. All of this remains quite fragile. These talks can be—can break off at any time under any circumstances. Broader-scale violence can return to Libya at any time. And the Iraqi government still doesn't control its own territory. Its sovereignty is compromised, not just by Iran but also by Turkey. But the fact that a region that was wound so tight and that seemed poised to even deepen existing conflicts and new ones to break out, for all of these different parties to be talking—some at the behest of the United States, some entirely of their own volition—is, I think, a relatively positive sign. You can't find anyone who's more—let's put it this way, who's darker about developments in the Middle East than me. And I see some positive signs coming from this dialogue. Iran, the second big issue on the agenda. Just a few hours ago, the Iranians indicated that they're ready to return to the negotiating table in Vienna. This is sort of a typical Iranian negotiating tactic, to push issues to the brink and then to pull back and demonstrate some pragmatism so that people will thank for them for their pragmatism. This agreement to go back to the negotiating table keeps them on decent terms with the Europeans. It builds on goodwill that they have developed as a result of their talks with Saudi Arabia. And it puts Israel somewhat on the defensive, or at least in an awkward position with the Biden administration, which has very much wanted to return to the negotiating table in Vienna. What comes out of these negotiations is extremely hard to predict. This is a new government in Iran. It is certainly a harder line than its predecessor. Some analysts believe that precisely because it is a hardline government it can do the negotiation. But we'll just have to see. All the while this has been going on, the Iranians have been proceeding with their nuclear development, and Israel is continuing its shadow campaign against the Iranians in Syria, sometimes in Iraq, in Iran itself. Although, there's no definitive proof, yesterday Iranian gas stations, of all things, were taken offline. There's some suspicion that this was the Israelis showing the Iranians just how far and deep they are into Iranian computer systems. It remains unclear how the Iranians will retaliate. Previously they have directed their efforts to Israeli-linked shipping in and around the Gulf of Oman. Its conventional responses up until this point have been largely ineffective. The Israelis have been carrying on a fairly sophisticated air campaign against the Iranians in Syria, and the Iranians have not been able to mount any kind of effective response. Of course, this is all against the backdrop of the fact that the Iranians do have the ability to hold much of the Israeli population hostage via Hezbollah and its thousands of rockets and missiles. So you can see how this is quite worrying, and an ongoing concern for everybody in the region, as the Israelis and Iranians take part in this confrontation. Let me just continue along the line of the Israelis for a moment and talk about the Arab-Israeli conflict, something that has not been high on the agenda of the Biden administration, it hasn't been high on the agenda of many countries in the region. But since the signing of the Abraham Accords in September 2020, there have been some significant developments. The normalization as a result of the Abraham Accords continues apace. Recently in the Emirates there was a meeting of ministers from Israel, the UAE, Morocco, Bahrain, and Sudan. This is the first kind of face-to-face meeting of government officials from all of these countries. Now, certainly the Israelis and the Emiratis have been meeting quite regularly, and the Israelis and the Bahrainis have been meeting quite regularly. But these were broader meetings of Cabinet officials from all of the Abraham Accords countries coming together in the United Arab Emirates for talks. Rather extraordinary. Something that thirteen months—in August 2020 was unimaginable, and today is something that doesn't really make—it doesn't really make the headlines. The Saudis are actually supportive of the normalization process, but they're not yet willing to take that step. And they're not willing to take that step because of the Palestinian issue. And it remains a sticking point. On that issue, there was a lot of discussion after the formation of a new Israeli government last June under the leadership, first, of Naftali Bennett, who will then hand the prime ministership over to his partner, Yair Lapid, who are from different parties. That this was an Israeli government that could do some good when it comes to the Palestinian arena, that it was pragmatic, that it would do things that would improve the lives of Palestinians, whether in Gaza or the West Bank, and seek greater cooperation with both the United States and the Palestinian authority toward that end. And that may in fact turn out to be the case. This government has taken a number of steps in that direction, including family reunification, so that if a Palestinian on the West Bank who is married to a Palestinian citizen of Israel, the Palestinian in the West Bank can live with the family in Israel. And a number of other things. But it should also be clear to everybody that despite a kind of change in tone from the Israeli prime ministry, there's not that much of a change in terms of policy. In fact, in many ways Prime Minister Bennett is to the right of his predecessor, Benjamin Netanyahu. And Yair Lapid, who comes from a centrist party, is really only centrist in terms of Israeli politics. He is—in any other circumstances would be a kind of right of center politician. And I'll just point out that in recent days the Israeli government has declared six Palestinian NGOs—long-time NGOs—terrorist organizations, approved three thousand new housing units in the West Bank, and worked very, very hard to prevent the United States from opening a consulate in East Jerusalem to serve the Palestinians. That consulate had been there for many, many, many years. And it was closed under the Trump administration when the U.S. Embassy was moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The Biden administration would like to reopen that consulate. And the Israeli government is adamantly opposed. In the end, undoubtably Arab governments are coming to terms with Israel, even beyond the Abraham Accords countries. Egypt's flag carrier, Egyptair, announced flights to Tel Aviv. This is the first time since 1979. You could—you could fly between Cairo and Tel Aviv, something that I've done many, many times. If you were in Egypt, you'd have to go and find an office that would sell you a ticket to something called Air Sinai, that did not have regular flights. Only had flights vaguely whenever, sometimes. It was an Egyptair plane, stripped of its livery, staffed by Egyptair pilots and staff, stripped of anything that said Egyptair. Now, suddenly Egyptair is flying direct flights to Tel Aviv. And El-Al, Israel's national airline, and possibly one other, will be flying directly to Cairo. And there is—and that there is talk of economic cooperation. Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett met with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi in Sharm al-Sheikh not long ago. That was the first meeting of Israeli leaders—first public meeting of Israeli leaders and Egyptian leaders in ten years. So there does seem to be an openness on the part of Arab governments to Israel. As far as populations in these countries, they don't yet seem to be ready for normalization, although there has been some traffic between Israel and the UAE, with Emiratis coming to see Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, and so on and so forth. But there are very, very few Emiratis. And there are a lot of Egyptians. So as positive as that all is, this is—this has not been a kind of broad acceptance among the population in the Arab world for Israel's legitimate existence. And the kind of issue du jour, great-power competition. This is on everybody's lips in Washington, D.C.—great-power competition, great-power competition. And certainly, the Middle East is likely to be an arena of great-power competition. It has always been an arena of great-power competition. For the first time in more than two decades, the United States has competitors in the region. And let me start with Russia, because there's been so much discussion of China, but Russia is the one that has been actively engaged militarily in the region in a number of places. Vladimir Putin has parlayed his rescue of Hafez al-Assad into influence in the region, in an arc that stretches from NATO ally Turkey, all the way down through the Levant and through Damascus, then even stretching to Jerusalem where Israeli governments and the Russian government have cooperated and coordinated in Syria, into Cairo, and then into at least the eastern portion of Libya, where the Russians have supported a Qaddafist general named Khalifa Haftar, who used to be an employee of the CIA, in his bid for power in Libya. And he has done so by providing weaponry to Haftar, as well as mercenaries to fight and support him. That episode may very well be over, although there's every reason to believe that Haftar is trying to rearm himself and carry on the conflict should the process—should the political process in Libya break down. Russia has sold more weapons to Egypt in the last few years than at any other time since the early 1970s. They have a defense agreement with Saudi Arabia. It's not clear what that actually means, but that defense agreement was signed not that long after the United States' rather chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, which clearly unnerved governments in the Middle East. So Russia is active, it's influential, its militarily engaged, and it is seeking to advance its interests throughout the region. I'll point out that its presence in North Africa is not necessarily so much about North Africa, but it's also about Europe. Its bid in Libya is important because its ally controls the eastern portion of Libya, where most of Libya's light, sweet crude oil is located. And that is the largest—the most significant reserves of oil in all of Africa. So it's important as an energy play for the Russians to control parts of North Africa, and right on Russia's—right on Europe's front doorstep. China. China's the largest investor and single largest trading partner with most of the region. And it's not just energy related. We know how dependent China is on oil from the Gulf, but it's made big investments in Algeria, in Egypt, the UAE, and in Iran. The agreement with Iran, a twenty-five-year agreement, coming at a time when the Iranians were under significant pressure from the United States, was regarded by many in Washington as an effort on the part of the Chinese to undercut the United States, and undercut U.S. policy in the region. I think it was, in part, that. I think it was also in part the fact that China is dependent in part on Iranian oil and did not want the regime there to collapse, posing a potential energy crisis for China and the rest of the world. It seems clear to me, at least, that the Chinese do not want to supplant the United States in the region. I don't think they look at the region in that way. And if they did, they probably learned the lesson of the United States of the last twenty-five years, which has gotten itself wrapped around the axle on a variety of issues that were unnecessary and sapped the power of the United States. So they don't want to get more deeply involved in the region. They don't want to take sides in conflicts. They don't want to take sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict. They don't take sides in the conflict between the United States and Iran, or the competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran. They want to benefit from the region, whether through investment or through extraction, and the security umbrella that the United States provides in the region. I'm not necessarily so sure that that security umbrella needs to be so expensive and so extensive for the United States to achieve its goals. But nevertheless, and for the time being at least, we will be providing that security umbrella in the region, from which the Chinese will benefit. I think, just to close on this issue of great-power competition. And because of time, I'm leaving out another big player, or emerging player in the region, which is India. I'm happy to talk about that in Q&A. But my last point is that, going back to the United States, countries in the region and leaders in the region are predisposed towards the United States. The problem is, is that they are very well-aware of the political polarization in this country. They're very well-aware of the political dysfunction in this country. They're very well-aware of the incompetence that came with the invasion of Iraq, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, or any number of disasters that have unfolded here in the United States. And it doesn't look, from where they sit in Abu Dhabi, in Cairo, in Riyadh, and in other places, that the United States has staying power, the will to lead, and the interest in remaining in the Middle East. And thus, they have turned to alternatives. Those alternatives are not the same as the United States, but they do provide something. I mean, particularly when it comes to the Chinese it is investment, it's economic advantages, without the kind of trouble that comes with the United States. Trouble from the perspective of leaders, so that they don't have to worry about human rights when they deal with the Chinese, because the Chinese aren't interested in human rights. But nevertheless, they remain disclosed toward the United States and want to work with the United States. They just don't know whether we're going to be there over the long term, given what is going on in the United States. I'll stop there. And I look forward to your questions and comments. Thank you. FASKIANOS: Steven, that was fantastic. Thank you very much. We're going to now to all of you for your questions. So the first raised hand comes from Jonas Truneh. And I don't think I pronounced that correctly, so you can correct me. Q: Yeah, no, that's right. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you, Dr. Cook, for your talk. I'm from UCL, University College London, in London. COOK: So it is—(off mic). Q: Indeed, it is. Yeah. That's right. COOK: Great. Q: So you touched on it there somewhat particularly with great-power competition, but so my question is related to the current energy logic in the Middle East. The Obama administration perhaps thought that the shale revolution allowed a de-prioritization, if I'm allowed to use that word, of the Middle East. And that was partly related to the pivot to Asia. So essentially does the U.S. still regard itself as the primary guarantor of energy security in the Persian Gulf? And if so, would the greatest beneficiary, as I think you indicated, would that not be China? And is that a case of perverse incentives? Is there much the U.S. can do about it? COOK: Well, it depends on who you ask, right? And it's a great question. I think that the—one of the things that—one of the ways in which the Obama administration sought to deprioritize and leave the region was through the shale revolution. I mean, the one piece of advice that he did take from one of his opponents in 2002—2008, which was to drill, baby, drill. And the United States did. I would not say that this is something that is specific to the Obama administration. If you go back to speeches of presidents way back—but I won't even go that far back. I'll go to George W. Bush in 2005 State of the Union addressed, talked all about energy independence from the Middle East. This may not actually be in much less the foreseeable future, but in really—in a longer-term perspective, it may be harder to do. But it is politically appealing. The reason why I say it depends on who you ask, I think that there are officials in the United States who say: Nothing has changed. Nothing has changed. But when the Iranians attacked those two oil processing facilities in Saudi Arabia, that temporarily took off 50 percent of supply off the markets—good thing the Saudis have a lot stored away—the United States didn't really respond. The president of the United States said: I'm waiting for a call from Riyadh. That forty years of stated American policy was, like, it did not exist. The Carter doctrine and the Reagan corollary to the Carter doctrine suddenly didn't exist. And the entirety of the American foreign policy community shrugged their shoulders and said: We're not going to war on behalf of MBS. I don't think we would have been going to war on behalf of MBS. We would have been ensuring the free flow of energy supplies out of the region, which is something that we have been committed to doing since President Carter articulated the Carter doctrine, and then President Reagan added his corollary to it. I think that there are a number of quite perverse incentives associated with this. And I think that you're right. The question is whether the competition from China outweighs our—I'm talking about “our”—the United States' compelling interest in a healthy global economy. And to the extent that our partners in Asia, whether it's India, South Korea, Japan, and our important trading partner in China, are dependent upon energy resources from the Gulf, and we don't trust anybody to ensure the free flow of energy resources from the Gulf, it's going to be on us to do it. So we are kind of hammered between that desire to have a healthy global economy as being—and being very wary of the Chinese. And the Chinese, I think, are abundantly aware of it, and have sought to take advantage of it. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question, which got an up-vote, from Charles Ammon, who is at Pennsylvania State University. And I think this goes to what you were building on with the great-power competition: What interests does India have in the Middle East? And how is it increasing its involvement in the region? COOK: So India is—imports 60 percent of its oil from the region. Fully 20 percent of it from Saudi Arabia, another 20 percent of it from Iran, and then the other 20 percent from other sources. So that's one thing. That's one reason why India is interested in the Middle East. Second, there are millions and millions of Indians who work in the Middle East. The Gulf region is a region that basically could not run without South Asian expatriate labor, most of which comes from India—on everything. Third, India has made considerable headway with countries like the United Arab Emirates, as well as Saudi Arabia, in counterextremism cooperation. This has come at the expense of Pakistan, but as relations between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and relations between Pakistan and the UAE soured in recent years, the Indians have been able to take advantage of that. And Indian leaders have hammered away at the common interest that India and leaders in the region have in terms of countering violent extremism. And then finally, India and Israel have quite an extraordinary relationship, both in the tech field as well as in the defense area. Israel is a supplier to India. And the two of them are part of a kind of global network of high-tech powerhouse that have either, you know, a wealth of startups or very significant investment from the major tech players in the world. Israel—Microsoft just announced a huge expansion in Israel. And Israeli engineers and Indian engineers collaborate on a variety of projects for these big tech companies. So there's a kind of multifaceted Indian interest in the region, and the region's interest in India. What India lacks that the Chinese have is a lot more capacity. They don't have the kind of wherewithal to bring investment and trade in the region in the other direction. But nevertheless, it's a much more important player than it was in the past. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Curran Flynn, who has a raised hand. Q: How do you envision the future of Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia politics for the next thirty years? Ethiopia controls the Nile dam projects. And could this dispute lead to a war? And what is the progress with the U.S. in mediating the talks between the three countries? COOK: Thank you. FASKIANOS: And that is coming from the King Fahd University in Saudi Arabia. COOK: Fabulous. So that's more than the evening. It's actually nighttime there. I think that the question of the great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is really an important one, and it's something that has not gotten as much attention as it should. And for those of you who are not familiar, in short the Ethiopians have been building a massive dam on the Blue Nile, which is a tributary to the Nile. And that if—when competed, threatens the water supply to Egypt, a country of 110 million people that doesn't get a lot of rainfall. Ethiopia, of course, wants to dam the Nile in order to produce hydroelectric power for its own development, something that Egypt did when it dammed the Nile River to build the Aswan High Dam, and crated Lake Nasser behind it. The Egyptians are very, very concerned. This is an existential issue for them. And there have been on and off negotiations, but the negotiations aren't really about the issues. They're talks about talks about talks. And they haven't gotten—they haven't gotten very far. Now, the Egyptians have been supported by the Sudanese government, after the Sudanese government had been somewhat aligned with the Ethiopian government. The Trump administration put itself squarely behind the Egyptian government, but Ethiopia's also an important partner of the United States in the Horn of Africa. The Egyptians have gone about signing defense cooperation agreements with a variety of countries around Ethiopia's borders. And of course, Ethiopia is engaged in essentially what's a civil war. This is a very, very difficult and complicated situation. Thus far, there doesn't seem to be an easy solution the problem. Now, here's the rub, if you talk to engineers, if you talk to people who study water, if you talk to people who know about dams and the flow of water, the resolution to the problem is actually not that hard to get to. The problem is that the politics and nationalism have been engaged on both sides of the issue, making it much, much more difficult to negotiate an equitable solution to the problem. The Egyptians have said in the past that they don't really have an intention of using force, despite the fact of this being an existential issue. But there's been somewhat of a shift in their language on the issue. Which recently they've said if red lines were crossed, they may be forced to intervene. Intervene how? What are those red lines? They haven't been willing to define them, which should make everybody nervous. The good news is that Biden administration has appointed an envoy to deal with issues in the Horn of Africa, who has been working very hard to try to resolve the conflict. I think the problem here however is that Ethiopia, now distracted by a conflict in the Tigray region, nationalism is running high there, has been—I don't want to use the word impervious—but not as interested in finding a negotiated solution to the problem than it might have otherwise been in the past. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Bob Pauly, who's a professor of international development at the University of Southern Mississippi. It got three up-votes. What would you identify as the most significant likely short and longer-term effects of Turkey's present domestic economic and political challenges on President Erdogan's strategy and policy approaches to the Middle East, and why? COOK: Oh, well, that is a very, very long answer to a very, very interesting question. Let's see what happens in 2023. President Erdogan is facing reelection. His goal all along has been to reelected on the one hundredth anniversary of the republic, and to demonstrate how much he has transformed Turkey in the image of the Justice and Development Party, and moved it away from the institutions of the republic. Erdogan may not make it to 2023. I don't want to pedal in conspiracy theories or anything like that, but he doesn't look well. There are large numbers of videos that have surfaced of him having difficulties, including one famous one from this past summer when he was offering a Ramadan greeting on Turkish television to supporters of the Justice and Development Party, and he seemed to fade out and slur his words. This is coupled with reports trickling out of Ankara about the lengths to which the inner circle has gone to shield real health concerns about Erdogan from the public. It's hard to really diagnose someone from more than six thousand miles away, but I think it's a scenario that policymakers in Washington need to think seriously about. What happens if Erdogan is incapacitated or dies before 2023? That's one piece. The second piece is, well, what if he makes it and he's reelected? And I think in any reasonable observer sitting around at the end of 2021 looking forward to 2023 would say two things: One, you really can't predict Turkish politics this far out, but if Turkish elections were held today and they were free and fair, the Justice and Development Party would get below 30 percent. Still more than everybody else. And Erdogan would have a real fight on his hands to get reelected, which he probably would be. His approaches to his domestic challenges and his approaches to the region are really based on what his current political calculations are at any given moment. So his needlessly aggressive posture in the Eastern Mediterranean was a function of the fact that he needed to shore up his nationalist base. Now that he finds himself quite isolated in the world, the Turks have made overtures to Israel, to the UAE, to Saudi Arabia. They're virtually chasing the Egyptians around the Eastern Mediterranean to repair their relationship. Because without repairing these relationships the kind of investment that is necessary to try to help revive the Turkish economy—which has been on the skids for a number of years—is going to be—is going to be more difficult. There's also another piece of this, which is the Middle East is a rather lucrative arms market. And during the AKP era, the Turks have had a significant amount of success further developing their defense industrial base, to the point that now their drones are coveted. Now one of the reasons for a Saudi-Turkish rapprochement is that the United States will not sell Saudi Arabia the drones it wants, for fear that they will use them in Yemen. And the Saudis are looking for drones elsewhere. That's either China or Turkey. And Turkey's seem to work really, really well, based on experience in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. So what—Turkish foreign policy towards the region has become really dependent upon what Erdogan's particularly political needs are. There's no strategic approach to the region. There is a vision of Turkey as a leader of the region, of a great power in its own right, as a leader of the Muslim world, as a Mediterranean power as well. But that's nothing new. Turkish Islamists have been talking about these things for quite some time. I think it's important that there's been some de-escalation. I don't think that all of these countries now love each other, but they see the wisdom of pulling back from—pulling back from the brink. I don't see Turkey's position changing dramatically in terms of its kind of reintegration into the broader region before 2023, at the least. FASKIANOS: Great. Let's go next to, raised hand, to Caleb Sanner. And you need to unmute yourself. Q: Hello, my name is Caleb. I'm from the University of Wisconsin-Whitewater. So, Dr. Cook, you had mentioned in passing how China has been involved economically in North Africa. And my question would be, how is the U.S. taking that? And what are we doing, in a sense, to kind of counter that? I know it's not a military advancement in terms of that, but I've seen what it has been doing to their economies—North Africa's economies. And, yeah, what's the U.S. stance on that? COOK: Well, I think the United States is somewhat detached from this question of North Africa. North Africa's long been a—with the exception of Egypt, of course. And Egypt, you know, is not really North Africa. Egypt is something in and of itself. That China is investing heavily in Egypt. And the Egyptian position is: Please don't ask us to choose between you and the Chinese, because we're not going to make that choice. We think investment from all of these places is good for—is good for Egypt. And the other places where China is investing, and that's mostly in Algeria, the United States really doesn't have close ties to Algeria. There was a tightening of the relationship after the attacks on New York and Washington in 2001, recognizing that the Algerians—extremist groups in Algerian that had been waging war against the state there over the course of the 1990s were part and parcel of this new phenomenon of global jihad. And so there has been a security relationship there. There has been some kind of big infrastructure kind of investment in that country, with big companies that build big things, like GE and others, involved in Algeria. But the United States isn't helping to develop ports or industrial parks or critical infrastructure like bridges and airports in the same way that the Chinese have been doing throughout the region. And in Algeria, as well as in Egypt, the Chinese are building a fairly significant industrial center in the Suez Canal zone, of all places. And the United States simply doesn't have an answer to it, other than to tell our traditional partners in the region, don't do it. But unless we show up with something to offer them, I'm afraid that Chinese investment is going to be too attractive for countries that are in need of this kind of investment. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to a written question from Kenneth Mayers, who is at St. Francis College in Brooklyn. In your opinion, what would a strategic vision based on a far-sighted understanding of both resources and U.S. goals—with regard to peace and security, prosperity and development, and institutions and norms and values such as human rights—look like in the Middle East and North Africa? COOK: Well, it's a great question. And I'm tempted to say you're going to have to read the last third of my new book in order to get the—in order to get the answer. I think but let me start with something mentioned about norms and values. I think that one of the things that has plagued American foreign policy over the course of not just the last twenty years, but in the post-World War II era all the way up through the present day, you see it very, very clearly with President Biden, is that trying to incorporate American values and norms into our approach to the region has been extraordinarily difficult. And what we have a history of doing is the thing that is strategically tenable, but morally suspect. So what I would say is, I mean, just look at what's happened recently. The president of the United States studiously avoided placing a telephone call to the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. The Egyptians, as many know, have a terrible record on human rights, particularly since President Sisi came to power. Arrests of tens of thousands of people in the country, the torture of many, many people, the killings of people. And the president during his campaign said that he was going to give no blank checks to dictators, including to Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. And then what happened in May? What happened in May was that fighting broke out between Israel and Hamas and others in the Gaza Strip, a brutal eleven-day conflict. And Egypt stepped up and provided a way out of the conflict through its good offices. And that prompted the United States to—the president of the United States—to have two phone calls in those eleven days with the Egyptian leader. And now the United States is talking about Egypt as a constructive partner that's helping to stabilize the region. Sure, the administration suspended $130 million of Egypt's annual—$130 million Egypt's annual allotment of $1.3 billion. But that is not a lot. Egypt got most of—most of its military aid. As I said, strategically tenable, morally suspect. I'm not quite sure how we get out of that. But what I do know, and I'll give you a little bit of a preview of the last third of the book—but I really do want you to buy it when it's done—is that the traditional interests of the United States in the Middle East are changing. And I go through a kind of quasi, long, somewhat tortured—but very, very interesting—discussion of the origins of our interests, and how they are changing, and how we can tell they are changing. And that is to say that the free flow of energy resources may not be as important to the United States in the next twenty-five years as it was over the course of the previous fifty or sixty years. That helping to ensure Israeli security, which has been axiomatic for the United States, eh, I'd say since the 1960s, really, may not be as important as Israel develops its diplomatic relations with its neighbors, that has a GDP per capita that's on par with the U.K., and France, and other partners in Europe, a country that clearly can take care of itself, that is a driver of technology and innovation around the globe. And that may no longer require America's military dominance in the region. So what is that we want to be doing? How can we be constructive? And I think the answers are in things that we hadn't really thought of too systematically in the past. What are the things that we're willing to invest in an defend going forward? Things like climate change, things like migration, things like pandemic disease. These are things that we've talked about, but that we've never been willing to invest in the kind of the resources. Now there are parts of the Middle East that during the summer months are in-habitable. That's going to produce waves of people looking for places to live that are inhabitable. What do we do about that? Does that destabilize the Indian subcontinent? Does it destabilize Europe? Does it destabilize North Africa? These are all questions that we haven't yet answered. But to the extent that we want to invest in, defend and sacrifice for things like climate, and we want to address the issue—related issue of migration, and we want to deal with the issue of disease and other of these kind of functional global issues in the Middle East is better not just for us and Middle Easterners, but also in terms of our strategic—our great-power competition in the region. These are not things that the Chinese and the Russians are terribly interested in, despite the fact that the Chinese may tell you they are. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to Ahmuan Williams, with a raised hand, at the University of Oklahoma. COOK: Oklahoma. Q: Hi. And thank you for being here. You kind of talked about the stabilization of northern Africa and the Middle East. And just a few days ago the Sudanese government—and they still haven't helped capture the parliamentarian there—have recycled back into a military—somewhat of military rule. And it's been since 2005 since the end of their last civil war, which claimed millions of innocent civilians through starvation and strife and, you know, the lack of being able to get humanitarian aid. There was also a huge refugee crisis there, a lot of people who evacuated Sudan. How's that going to impact the Middle East and the American take to Middle East and northern Africa policy, especially now that the Security Council is now considering this and is trying to determine what we should do? COOK: It's a great question. And I think that, first, let's be clear. There was a coup d'état in Sudan. The military overthrew a transitional government on the eve of having to hand over the government to civilians. And they didn't like it. There's been tension that's been brewing in Sudan for some time. Actually, an American envoy, our envoy to East Africa and Africa more generally, a guy named Jeff Feltman, was in Khartoum, trying to kind of calm the tension, to get the two sides together, and working to avert a coup. And the day after he left, the military moved. That's not—that doesn't reflect the fact that the United States gave a blessing for the military to overthrow this government. I think what it does, though, and it's something that I think we all need to keep in mind, it demonstrates the limits of American power in a variety of places around the world. That we don't have all the power in the world to prevent things from happening when people, like the leaders of the Sudanese military, believe that they have existential issues that are at stake. Now, what's worry about destabilization in Sudan is, as you point out, there was a civil war there, there was the creation of a new country there, potential for—if things got really out of hand—refugee flows into Egypt, from Egypt across the Sanai Peninsula into Israel. One of the things people are unaware of is the large number of Sudanese or Eritreans and other Africans who have sought refuge in Israel, which has created significant economic and social strains in that country. So it's a big deal. Thus far, it seems we don't—that the U.S. government doesn't know exactly what's happening there. There are protesters in the streets demanding democracy. It's very unclear what the military is going to do. And it's very unclear what our regional allies and how they view what's happening. What Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, what Saudi Arabia, what Israel—which Sudan is an Abraham Accords country now—what they are doing. How they view the coup as positive or negative will likely impact how effective the United States can be in trying to manage this situation. But I suspect that we're just going to have to accommodate ourselves to whatever outcome the Sudanese people and the Sudanese military come to, because I don't think we have a lot of—we don't have a lot of tools there to make everybody behave. FASKIANOS: OK. So I'm going to take the next question from Elena Murphy, who is a junior at Syracuse University's Maxwell School. And she's a diplomatic intern at the Kurdistan Regional Government's Representation in the United States. COOK: That's cool. FASKIANOS: That's very cool. So as a follow up, how much do you believe neo-Ottomanism and attempting regional hegemony has affected Erdogan's domestic and foreign policy, especially in consideration of Turkey's shift towards the MENA in their foreign policy, after a period of withdrawals and no problems with neighbors policy? COOK: Great. Can I see that? Because that's a long question. FASKIANOS: Yeah, it's a long question. It's got an up-vote. Third one down. COOK: Third one down. Elena, as a follow up, how much do you believe neo-Ottomanism—I'm sorry, I'm going to have to read it again. How much do you believe neo-Ottomanism and attempting regional has affected Erdogan's both domestic and foreign policy, especially in consideration of Turkey's shift towards the MENA in their foreign policy, after a period of withdrawals and no problems with neighbors? OK. Great. So let us set aside the term “neo-Ottomanism” for now. Because neo-Ottomanism actually—it does mean something, but people have often used the term neo-Ottomanism to describe policies of the Turkish government under President Erdogan that they don't like. And so let's just talk about the way in which the Turkish government under President Erdogan views the region and views what Turkey's rightful place should be. And I think the Ottomanism piece is important, because the kind of intellectual framework which the Justice and Development Party, which is Erdogan's party, views the world, sees Turkey as—first of all, it sees the Turkish Republic as a not-so-legitimate heir to the Ottoman Empire. That from their perspective, the natural order of things would have been the continuation of the empire in some form or another. And as a result, they believe that Turkey's natural place is a place of leadership in the region for a long time. Even before the Justice and Development Party was founded in 2001, Turkey's earlier generation of Islamists used to savage the Turkish leadership for its desire to be part of the West, by saying that this was kind of unnatural, that they were just merely aping the West, and the West was never actually going to accept Turkey. Which is probably true. But I think that the Justice and Development Party, after a period of wanting to become closer to the West, has turned its attention towards the Middle East, North Africa, and the Muslim world more generally. And in that, it sees itself, the Turks see themselves as the natural leaders in the region. They believe they have a cultural affinity to the region as a result of the legacies of the Ottoman Empire, and they very much can play this role of leader. They see themselves as one of the kind of few real countries in the region, along with Egypt and Iran and Saudi Arabia. And the rest are sort of ephemeral. Needless to say, big countries in the Arab world—like Egypt, like Saudi Arabia—don't welcome the idea of Turkey as a leader of the region. They recognize Turkey as a very big and important country, but not a leader of the region. And this is part of that friction that Turkey has experienced with its neighbors, after an earlier iteration of Turkish foreign policy, in which—one of the earliest iterations of Turkish foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party which was called no problems with neighbors. In which Turkey, regardless of the character of the regimes, wanted to have good relations with its neighbors. It could trade with those neighbors. And make everybody—in the process, Turkey could be a driver of economic development in the region, and everybody can be basically wealthy and happy. And it didn't really work out that way, for a variety of reasons that we don't have enough time for. Let's leave it at the fact that Turkey under Erdogan—and a view that is shared by many—that Turkey should be a leader of the region. And I suspect that if Erdogan were to die, if he were unable to stand for election, if the opposition were to win, that there would still be elements of this desire to be a regional leader in a new Turkish foreign policy. FASKIANOS: Steven, thank you very much. This was really terrific. We appreciate your stepping in at the eleventh hour, taking time away from your book. For all of you— COOK: I'm still not Sanam. FASKIANOS: (Laughs.) I know, but you were an awesome replacement. So you can follow Steven Cook on Twitter at @stevenacook. As I said at the beginning too, he is a columnist for Foreign Policy magazine. So you can read his work there, as well as, of course, on CFR.org, all of the commentary, analysis, op-eds, congressional testimony are there for free. So I hope you will follow him and look after his next book. Our next Academic Webinar will be on Wednesday November 3, at 1:00 p.m. Eastern time on the future of U.S.-Mexico relations. In the meantime, I encourage you to follow us, @CFR_Academic, visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for new research and analysis on global issues. And stay well, stay safe, and thank you, again. COOK: Bye, everyone. FASKIANOS: Bye. (END)
Chegou no seu feed mais um episódio do Petit Journal, na sua edição 243, tratando dos principais temas da política internacional e da economia. No episódio desta semana, os professores Tanguy Baghdadi e Daniel Sousa tratam do choque entre Polônia e União Europeia; da inflação nos EUA, e do Sport Washing do MBS. Aperta o play! Gostou? Que tal se tornar nosso apoiador? Você pode nos apoiar - do Brasil ou do exterior - acessando nosso site www.petitjournal.com.br Para conhecer nossos cursos e aulas gratuitas, acesse www.petitcursos.com.br E para nos ajudar ainda mais, escute o Petit Journal pelo aplicativo que valoriza os produtores de conteúdo: www.orelo.cc/petit
Domestic abuse increases following football games – and this increase is driven by alcohol-related abuse, a new study from the London School of Economics and Political Science finds. The research from the LSE's Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) reveals that the increase in domestic abuse occurs when football games are scheduled at midday or in the afternoon. There is no increase in domestic abuse when games kick-off after 7pm. The Legend talks to Dr. Ria Ivandic about the study's findings. Read the full paper here VOTE FOR THE POD BOYZ! Listen to The Legend talk to Dr. Ellen R. Wald about MBS and the Newcastle takeover.
The de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia Mohammed Bin Salman Al Saud buys Newcastle United Football Club from Mike Ashley via P.I.F investment vehicle. The Public Investment Fund is the sovereign wealth fund of Saudi Arabia. It is among the largest sovereign wealth funds in the world with total estimated assets of at least $500 billion. It was created in 1971 for the purpose of investing funds on behalf of the government of Saudi Arabia. Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, colloquially known as MBS, is a Saudi Arabian politician who has been the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia since 21 June 2017. Newcastle United Football Club is an English professional football club based in Newcastle upon Tyne, that plays in the Premier League – the top flight of English football. The club was founded in 1892 by the merger of Newcastle East End and Newcastle West End. The Premier League, often referred to as the English Premier League or the EPL, is the top level of the English football league system. Contested by 20 clubs, it operates on a system of promotion and relegation with the English Football League. Seasons run from August to May with each team playing 38 matches. Michael James Wallace Ashley is a British billionaire retail entrepreneur focused in the sporting goods market, and the chief executive of Frasers Group Plc. He entered the department store industry following the acquisition of House of Fraser post-administration in 2018.
Melissa Giles, Director of Portfolio Management with Americana Partners presents the Monthly Market Commentary as written by, David M Darst, Chief Investment Officer with Americana Partners. Any charts/graphs referenced are available in print format and may be provided at your request. David is currently the Chief Investment Officer for Americana Partners. David served for 17 years as a Managing Director and Chief Investment Strategist of Morgan Stanley Wealth Management, with responsibility for Asset Allocation and Investment Strategy; was the founding President of the Morgan Stanley Investment Group; and was founding Chairman of the Morgan Stanley Wealth Management Asset Allocation Committee. After 2014, he served for several years as Senior Advisor to and a member of the Morgan Stanley Wealth Management Global Investment Committee. He joined Morgan Stanley in 1996 from Goldman Sachs, where he held Senior Management posts within the Equities Division and earlier, for six years as Resident Manager of their Private Bank in Zurich. David is the Author of twelve books: (i) The Complete Bond Book (McGraw-Hill); (ii) The Handbook of the Bond and Money Markets (McGraw-Hill); (iii) The Art of Asset Allocation, Second Edition (McGraw-Hill); (iv) Mastering the Art of Asset Allocation (McGraw-Hill); (v) Benjamin Graham on Investing (McGraw-Hill); (vi) The Little Book that Saves Your Assets (John Wiley & Sons), which was ranked on the bestseller lists of The New York Times and Business Week; (vii) Portfolio Investment Opportunities in China (John Wiley & Sons); and (x) Portfolio Investment Opportunities in Precious Metals (John Wiley & Sons). His works have been translated into Chinese, Japanese, Russian, German, Korean, Italian, Indonesian, Norwegian, Romanian, and Vietnamese. Seapoint Books published David's eleventh book in 2012 , Voyager 3, containing his creative writing, and in 2016, his twelfth book, Flim-Flam Flora, a children's book coauthored with his daughter. David appears as a frequent guest on CNBC, Bloomberg, FOX, PBS, and other television channels, and has contributed numerous articles to Barron's Euromoney, The Money Manager, Forbes.com, The Yale Economic Review, and other publications. He has broadcast and written extensively on asset allocation in the Morgan Stanley biweekly Investment Strategy and Asset Allocation Commentary and in the Firm's Wealth Management monthly publication, Asset Allocation and Investment Strategy Digest, the predecessors of which he launched in 1997. David attended Father Ryan High School in Nashville, Tennessee, graduated from Phillips Exeter Academy, was awarded a BA degree in Economics from Yale University, and earned his MBA from Harvard Business School. David serves on the Investment Committee of the Phi Beta Kappa Foundation and the Advisory Boards of the George Washington Institute for Religious Freedom and the Black Rock Arts Foundation. David has lectured extensively at Wharton, Columbia, INSEAD, and New York University Business Schools, and for nine years, David served as a visiting faculty member at Yale College, Yale School of Management, and Harvard Business School. In November 2011, David was inducted by Quinnipiac University in their Business Leaders Hall of Fame. David is a CFA Charterholder and a member of the New York Society of Security Analysts and the CFA Institute. Join Our Distribution List – For a full copy of our report. 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The CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) is a measure of expected price fluctuations in the S&P 500 Index options over the next 30 days. The VIX is calculated in real time by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). P/E or Price to Earnings ratio is indicates the dollar amount an investor can expect to invest in a company in order to receive one dollar of that company's earnings. The Consumer Confidence Survey® reflects prevailing business conditions and likely developments for the months ahead. The Manufacturing Business Outlook Survey is a monthly survey of manufacturers in the Third Federal Reserve District; Participants indicate the direction of change in overall business activity and in the various measures of activity at their plants: employment, working hours, new and unfilled orders, shipments, inventories, delivery times, prices paid, and prices received. The ISM manufacturing index, also known as the purchasing managers' index (PMI), is a monthly indicator of U.S. economic activity based on a survey of purchasing managers at more than 300 manufacturing firms. The Composite Index of Leading Indicators, otherwise known as the Leading Economic Index (LEI), is an index published monthly by The Conference Board. It is used to predict the direction of global economic movements in future months. A bond rating is a letter-based credit scoring scheme used to judge the quality and creditworthiness of a bond. The option adjusted spread (OAS) measures the difference in yield between a bond with an embedded option, such as an MBS or callables, with the yield on Treasuries. Mean reversion, in finance, suggests that various phenomena of interest such as asset prices and volatility of returns eventually revert to their long-term average levels. A meme stock is a security that has seen an increase in trading volume after going viral on social media or an online forum. This document may contain forward-looking statements relating to the objectives, opportunities, and the future performance of the U.S. market generally. Forward looking statements may be identified by the use of such words as; “believe,” “expect,”“anticipate,”“should,”“planned,”“estimated,”“potential”and other similar terms. Examples of forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, estimates with respect to financial condition, results of operations, and success or lack of success of any particular investment strategy. All are subject to various factors, including, but not limited to general and local economic conditions, changing levels of competition within certain industries and markets, changes in interest rates, changes in legislation or regulation, and other economic, competitive, governmental, regulatory and technological factors affecting a portfolio' operations that could cause actual results to differ materially from projected results. Such statements are forward-looking in nature and involve a number of known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors, and accordingly, actual results may differ materially from those reflected or contemplated in such forward-looking statements. Prospective investors are cautioned not to place undue reliance on any forward looking statements or examples. This material is proprietary and may not be reproduced, transferred, modified or distributed in any form without prior written permission from Americana Partners. Americana Partners reserves the right, at any time and without notice, to amend, or cease publication of the information contained herein. Certain of the information contained herein has been obtained from third-party sources and has not been independently verified. It is made available on an "as is" basis without warranty. Any strategies or investment programs described in this presentation are provided for educational purposes only and are not necessarily indicative of securities offered for sale or private placement offerings available to any investor. The mention of any individual security should not be construed as a recommendation to buy or sell that security.
Danny and Derek begin the show with the UK and Brexit woes; the meeting between Jake Sullivan and MBS at Neom; Canada-China relations; and more. Danny then interviews Christy Thornton, assistant professor of sociology and Latin American studies at Johns Hopkins University, about her book Revolution in Development, which explores the role Mexico played in shaping approaches to international development. Become a patron! www.patreon.com/americanprestige Christy's book: https://bit.ly/2ZPuhKD
“Start with a little bit of belief in yourself.” I met today's guest on Clubhouse and she has become a huge inspiration to me when it comes to making an impact online. She is one of the top coaches in the online business space today, and she is an amazing example of resilience. Natasha Graziano has been called "The Nation's #1 Mindset Coach and #1 Female Motivational Speaker under 40" by Forbes. She is a bestselling author or "The Action Plan" and has millions of followers on social media and coaches people around the world on mindset and business. In this episode, Natasha brings all her powerful energy and inspiration to tell the story of how she healed herself with the power of her mind, grew her business to incredible impact, and attracted her soul mate on Clubhouse! Here's what you will learn: Where Natasha began her journey out of illness and divorce (2:42) How the MBS method helps you grow faith in yourself (11:01) How success impacts your mindset (18:40) How to hack your happiness chemicals (26:36) How the butterfly effect really works and the secret to the law of attraction (30:12) How to create social media growth (35:15) Why a team could help in building relationships for your brand (42:29) How collaboration is integral to helping grow your following (46:37) Screenshot your favorite part and post to your IG story and tag me @amberlylagomotivation and @natashagrano so we can see and repost to our stories! Join me along with other world-class mentors in North Carolina, in person or virtually, and get UNSTOPPABLE MOMENTUM in a high-octane experience!! I will be sharing how to harness the power within you along with Tom Bilyeu, Lisa Bilyeu, Anthony Trucks, Mel Abraham and so many more!!! Grab your ticket now! Follow Natasha: Instagram Website Mentioned in this episode: She Heard His Voice and Found Her Soul Mate - The New York Times Ready to activate your highest potential and live the life you deserve? Join the waitlist for the next Your Unstoppable Life Mastermind! Apply now and let us know you are ready for greatness! Read the "True Grit and Grace" book here and learn how you can turn tragedy into triumph! Thank you for joining us on the True, Grit, & Grace Podcast! If you find value in today's episode, don't forget to share the show with your friends and tap that subscribe button so you don't miss an episode! You can also head over to amberlylago.com to join my newsletter and access free downloadable resources that can help you elevate your life, business, and relationships! Want to see the behind the scenes and keep the conversation going? Head over to Instagram @amberlylagomotivation! Audible @True-Grit-and-Grace-Audiobook Website @amberlylago.com Instagram @amberlylagomotivation Facebook @AmberlyLagoSpeaker
A Bestseller! The highly acclaimed scandalous book that outs the world's elite. A real page turner filled with one new revelation after another. #1 New York Times bestselling author and award-winning investigative journalist Ian Halperin is the only person to have interviewed in depth the world's most notorious child sex trafficking sociopath, Jeffrey Epstein. Halperin uncovers the never-before-revealed facts behind the headlines, including the complex truth about Prince Andrew's longtime affiliation with Epstein. Halperin peels back the carefully crafted story about Ghislaine Maxwell's volatile relationship with Epstein, revealing loads of new information about how the sleazy couple lured the world's richest and most famous people into the global child sex trafficking ring they ran for years. Halperin reveals exclusive new information about the mysterious circumstances surrounding Epstein's death, casting doubt on the official verdict of suicide. A suspenseful and surprising thriller, Halperin gets to the truth. The rollicking investigative book of the year, unveiling the world elite's most powerful secrets and sins, including Epstein, Ghislaine Maxwell, Prince Andrew, MBS , Howard Stern and many others. Based on years of extensive research , undercover forays, and candid interviews, Halperin's no-holds barred investigation offers the most extensive journey ever into incredible, tumultuous and shadowy lives of the world's most famous. CONTROVERSY will go down as the mother, definitive journalistic work about the abuse of power and celebrity by the world's rich and famous. Praise For Ian Halperin: “A judicious presentation of explosive material” - The New Yorker “Halperin comes to the story determined to get to the truth” - The Times of London “A pop culture masterpiece” - LA Weekly
A Bestseller! The highly acclaimed scandalous book that outs the world's elite. A real page turner filled with one new revelation after another. #1 New York Times bestselling author and award-winning investigative journalist Ian Halperin is the only person to have interviewed in depth the world's most notorious child sex trafficking sociopath, Jeffrey Epstein. Halperin uncovers the never-before-revealed facts behind the headlines, including the complex truth about Prince Andrew's longtime affiliation with Epstein. Halperin peels back the carefully crafted story about Ghislaine Maxwell's volatile relationship with Epstein, revealing loads of new information about how the sleazy couple lured the world's richest and most famous people into the global child sex trafficking ring they ran for years. Halperin reveals exclusive new information about the mysterious circumstances surrounding Epstein's death, casting doubt on the official verdict of suicide. A suspenseful and surprising thriller, Halperin gets to the truth.The rollicking investigative book of the year, unveiling the world elite's most powerful secrets and sins, including Epstein, Ghislaine Maxwell, Prince Andrew, MBS , Howard Stern and many others. Based on years of extensive research , undercover forays, and candid interviews, Halperin's no-holds barred investigation offers the most extensive journey ever into incredible, tumultuous and shadowy lives of the world's most famous. CONTROVERSY will go down as the mother, definitive journalistic work about the abuse of power and celebrity by the world's rich and famous.Praise For Ian Halperin:“A judicious presentation of explosive material” -The New Yorker“Halperin comes to the story determined to get to the truth”- The Times of London“A pop culture masterpiece” - LA Weekly
Hear "The Buck Belue Show" every weekday morning from 10-11a on 680 The Fan and 93.7 FM, the 680 The Fan App available on Apple and Android, with your Smart Speaker by saying Alexa or wherever you get and listen to your favorite podcast! Bucks BIG Take Dawgs are heading to Nashville and the focus doesn't need to be on revenge but improvement in these areas Chop It Up presented by Haug Law Group Atlanta Braves aren't able to close out the sweep of the Diamondbacks but still looked good in some areas and now head to San Diego to finish up the West Coast road trip Steve Russell the host of SportScene heard on ESPn 98.1 FM in Gainesville, FL talks with Buck about the Florida Gators close loss to Alabama in the Swamp last weekend and preparing for another SEC matchup with the Volunteers tomorrow. Bucks College Football Nuggets presented by Ace Hardware Georgia Tech taking on North Carolina at MBS and the Yellow Jackets defense is going to have to stand strong in this battle LSU Tigers head to Miss St and Coach O looking to get off the hotseat against Coach Leach high powered offense Clemson Tigers head to NC State and hope to get things on track Notre Dame taking on Wisconsin at Solider Field in Chicago Atlanta Falcons head to the Big Apple and look to get their first win of the season against the New York Giants Georgia Bulldog Roundtable presented by Georgia's Own Credit Union, Georgia Pack and Load and Attorney Ken Nugent Georgia Bulldog Legend Kevin Butler joins Buck to talk about the season so far for the Dawgs, problems with the kicking game and how far this Bulldog team can go. What's Poppin' Jordan DeArmon talks about the latest hot news including a recruiting stunt by Ole Miss Head Coach Lane Kiffin, a big decision being made in the Belue household, Ryder Cup is a Bucket List item The Final Word Ryder Cup is underway, "GO USA!" See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
Back in April, I uploaded an episode of FGC philosophy with a guest named mine Soleil. In that episode, we discussed SNK's is partial owner, Mohammed Bin Salman(MBS). He's the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia and the defense minister of that same country. In the episode, we talked about our conflicting feelings about SNK working with this known war criminal and how we can go about handling that situation. Jamal Khashoggi was a journalist who was assassinated in the Saudia Arabian consulate in Istanbul, Turkey. Khashoggi has been shown to be critical of Saudia Arabia and its leadership. The people responsible for said murder are supposedly closely connected to MBS. The US and other nations have found MBS responsible for the death of Khashoggi. That story is one of the highest-profile pieces of news that we have on MBS. There have been many other deaths connected to MBS in and around the country of Saudi Arabia. In my opinion, it's important to ask the question, is SNK in bed with the devil? Many of us have had Politics thrust into our personal lives during this pandemic. I'm not here to tell anyone what to think or do, however, it's important to revisit this topic. Soleil recently reached out to express some concerns. I wanted to share his and my thoughts on the topic. Resources Previous Episode about SNK and MBS MBS Wiki
Thanks for tuning in for the premiere episode of My Bigfoot Sighting. It's a different kind of Bigfoot show. What makes MBS different from other Bigfoot shows is the fact that there's no host. That means no questions, no chatter, and no small-talk. The only thing you'll hear is eyewitness after eyewitness sharing the details of their Bigfoot sightings and encounters. That's how we like it. We think you'll like that too. To make sure you don't miss any future episodes, please don't forget to click the bell and subscribe.Michele had her first Bigfoot sighting when she was 12. Back then, she lived with her grandmother, in Arizona, on the Navajo reservation, about 17 miles east of Kayenta, AZ. Little did she know, that sighting was just the first of many that were yet to follow, unfortunately.If you've had a Bigfoot sighting and would like to be a guest, on the show, please go to https://MyBigfootSighting.com and let us know!If you'd like to report a Bigfoot sighting to the U.S. Bigfoot Patrol, please go to https://linktr.ee/usbigfootpatrol and fill out a report.Show's theme song, "Banjo Music," courtesy Nathan Brumley
The third episode in our series on the Keck Graduate Institute (KGI) of Applied Life Sciences, the 7th of the Claremont Colleges founded in 1998, features a discussion with Sheldon “Shelly” Schuster, KGI's 2nd President, and Jim Sterling, a founding faculty member who has held many leadership roles at KGI, including PhD Program Director. They describe the dramatic evolution and growth of the Institute, from a single program, the Master of Business and Science, with 45 students, to today when the have a wide and growing range of graduate degrees in the life sciences. Many of the initial expansions were natural outgrowths of the MBS, including a Master's in BioProcessing, a post-grad certificate for pre-meds, and one to prepare bioscience post docs to enter industry. More recently they have been adding highly regulated health science programs – i.e. PharmD, Occupational Therapy, Physician Assistant – but giving each an innovative KGI twist. They also discuss their innovative partnerships with Biocon Academy in India and serving as the host institution for Minerva Schools, the global undergraduate degree program that will be the subject of our next podcast. David Finegold is the president of Chatham University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network
PURE. MLS. CHAOS. Coming off a wild weekend of soccer, David Gass, Matt Doyle, and Calen Carr dive into madness! The guys relive the wild few minutes of Montréal - RBNY, dig into how the Sounders crushed Portland on the road, and give props to Nashville for an impressive win. We also discuss Daniel Salloi's MVP credentials, wonder if the Galaxy are an elite MLS team, and talk to RSL striker Bobby Wood! 2:39 - We're hyped for the All-Star Skills Challenge 9:03 - Montreal - RBNY was pure MLS chaos 18:43 - Seattle blows out Portland in a wild end to the weekend 33:27 - Evaluating Daniel Salloi's MVP credentials 35:58 - Nashville gets an impressive win over D.C. 43:06 - Josef Martinez finally scores at MBS, things are looking up for Atlanta 46:21 - Interview: RSL forward Bobby Wood 1:05:47 - Are the LA Galaxy now the “MLS Elite” tier? 1:10:17 - Colorado continues to quietly climb the standings