Podcasts about sicilian expedition

In a continuation of Saturday's discussion with Paul Rahe, we delve into the Peloponnesian War after the Sicilian Expedition, as the Spartans take Persian gold to subdue their democratic rivals Athens. The war continues for a further nine years as the Athenians rise again after their Sicilian disaster, before ending in crushing defeat in 404BC. Paul then goes on to talk about current events and the importance of honour to states today, and of history to the health of society. Paul A. Rahe Links Sparta's Sicilian Proxy War Sparta's Third Attic War: The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta, 413-404 BC First part Aspects of History Links Latest Issue out - Annual Subscription to Aspects of History Magazine only $9.99/£9.99 Ollie on X Aspects of History on Instagram Get in touch: history@aspectsofhistory.com Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In 415BC, the Athenian Empire, during a lull in the Peloponnesian War against the Spartans, voted to embark on a massive campaign to capture Syracuse. So began the Sicilian Expedition, which soon became a proxy war between Sparta and Athens, as the Spartans despatched just one man, the great general Gylippus, to assist the Syracusans. The war had been underway since 431 BC and would last until 404BC and end in total defeat for Athens with the loss of its empire. Joining today is Paul A. Rahe, a highly distinguished ancient historian the first in a two part discussion with him. Coming up next on Wednesday he discusses contemporary events, and how his understanding of the Peloponnesian war seeks to help policy makers in the United States as its supremacy is challenged by China. Paul A. Rahe Links Sparta's Sicilian Proxy War Sparta's Third Attic War: The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta, 413-404 BC Book on Alcibiades discussed: Nemesis: Alcibiades and the Fall of Athens, by David Stuttard Aspects of History Links Latest Issue out - Annual Subscription to Aspects of History Magazine only $9.99/£9.99 Ollie on X Aspects of History on Instagram Get in touch: history@aspectsofhistory.com Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In this episode I revisit Thucydides as discussed by David Bolotin in the classic History of Political Philosophy edited by Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey. I focus on Alcibiades, Nicias, and the Sicilian Expedition.

Episode: 3075 Thucydides, Democracy, and Hope.  Today, the problem of hope.

In this episode of the miniseries on ancient Sicily I pick up with what happened after the Sicilian Expedition. Syracuse was celebrating victory but if they had any ideas that it would all be peaceful they were sorely mistaken. As one empire retreated to lick its wounds another would emerge and at Syracuse an old habit was to return. Episode notes at www.ancientblogger.com  - if you can rate or review please do.  Music by Brakhage (Le Vrai Instrumental).

Continuing my miniseries on ancient Sicily I pick up on the two separate incidents where Athens got directly involved in Sicilian affairs towards the end of the 5th century BC. Was it a good idea and what went wrong? Also, an attempt to describe Syracuse using just your hand. Oh, and a highly consequential eclipse.  If you can rate or review the episode or podcast please do. Episode notes with a transcription, maps and a reading list on  www.ancientblogger.com Music by Brakhage (Le Vrai Instrumental).  

Content warning for discussion of genocide. Hey, Hi, Hello, this is the History Wizard and welcome back for Day 7 of Have a Day w/ The History Wizard. Thank you to everyone who tuned in for Day 6 last week, and especially thank you to everyone who rated and/or reviewed the podcast. I hope you all learned something last week and I hope the same for this week. Speaking of weeks, we've finally hit our first week! Get it? This is episode 7, the episodes are called Days. There are 7 Days in a Week… I'm funny dammit! I've got something special for you starting at the end of Week 1. It's a new segment I'm going to call the Alchemist's Table. Every Day I'm going to be sharing with you a cocktail recipe that I have invented. If you enjoy a nice cocktail and you aren't driving to work feel free to make yourself one before sitting down for the rest of the episode. For Day 7 we're going to be enjoying the first cocktail I ever created. It's called A Taste of Spring. It starts with 2 oz of Gin, I prefer gunpowder gin, but a London Dry will work just fine. Followed by 1 oz of elderflower liquor, 1 oz of lavender syrup, stir for about 30 seconds in ice before straining into a rocks glass over ice. And that, my friends, is a Taste of Spring. Enjoy. Anyway, it's time to head back to the West, and for this episode we have to travel back in time to the 5th century BCE for the Siege of Melos during the Peloponnesian War. IN a modern historical context we look at the Peloponnesian War as being between Sparta and Athens, and while this isn't technically wrong, it's also not as right as it could be. The Peloponnesian War was fought between the Delian League, which was a confederacy of various Greek city-states with Atens in supreme control. The Delian League was created as a defensive alliance against the Persian Empire following the Second Persian Invasion of Greece (this is the invasion that included the famed Battle of Thermopylae). And the Peloponnesian League which was less a league and more an ancient world version of the Warsaw Pact, with Sparta (then called Lacadeamon) at the head with its various allied city states. See, around 550 BCE SParta got tired of having to conquer everyone and instead offered to NOT conquer them if they joined the League. The Delian League got its name from the island of Delos where they would meet and where their treasury was held before being moved to Athens in 454 BCE. The Peloponnesian League got IT'S name from the peninsula at the southern tip of Greece, which is known as the Peloponnese Peninsula. The Peloponnesian League is something of a misnomer as its membership was not limited to that area of Greece. But, I ramble, and so let us return to the Peloponnesian War. Why did Sparta and Athens, erstwhile allies against Xerxes I and the Persian Empire decide to go to war with each other? The period between the Second Persian Invasion of Greece and the Peloponnesian War is sometimes known as the Pentecontaetia, a term which means “a period of 50 years” which refers to the 48 year period between 479 and 431 BCE. The Pentecontaetia saw the rise of Athens as one of the most prominent Greek City States, it saw the rise of Athenian democracy, and it saw the rise of tensions between Sparta and Athens. You can look at this period as somewhat similar to the rising tensions between Rome and Carthage. Sparta HAD been the most powerful Greek city-state, and now suddenly they had a rival and didn't like that. Sparta was the Sasuke to Athens Naruto, the Vegeta to Athen's Goku. Following the flight of the Persian armies from Greece Athens began to rebuild the great walls around their city that had been lost to the Persian armies. Sparta, upon learning about this construction, asked them not to do that. But Athens rebuffed them, not wanting to put Athens effectively under the control of Sparta's massive army. Another way we can view Athens and Sparta through the lens of Carthage and Rome is that Athens was vastly superior at sea, and Sparta was vastly superior on land, just as Carthage and Rome were, respectively. I'm taking bets now on who is going to win this war, assuming you don't already know. These tensions, which were further exacerbated by a helot revolt within Sparta would explode, though not terribly violently, during a 15 year conflict known as the First Peloponnesian War. This first war would end with the signing of the Thirty Years Peace treaty. This treaty, which would only last for 15 years, would solidify the Athenian and Spartan Empires and would cement Athens as a true powerhouse in the Aegean Sea. Conflict between Athens and Corinth, a member of the Peloponnesian League, is what ultimately led to war. Athens and Corinth effectively fought a brief proxy war over control of the Corinthian colony of Potidea. Corinth, outraged that Athens had encouraged one of its colonies to rebel against their authority, urged Sparta to call a conclave to try and arbitrate peace as was stipulated under the Thirty Years Peace.  The Spartan King Archidamus II urged the Spartan magistrates (known as ephor) and the citizen assembly known as the ecclesia not to go to war, but in the end the assembly determined that Athens, in urging Potidea to rebel against one of their allies and then aiding them in the fight for the city had broken the Peace and war was officially declared in 431 BCE. The Second Peloponnesian War had begun. The Second Peloponnesian War, often known as just the Peloponnesian War, can be broken up into three distinct segments. The Archidamian War, The Sicilian Expedition, and the Decelean War. The first 10 years of the war are sometimes also called the Ten Years War. Sparta was, almost entirely, a land based empire. The Spartan Army was the most feared and one of the best trained armies of the ancient world. Their hoplites and their phalanxes were nearly invincible. Meanwhile Athens had the same prestige on the waves. The Battle of Salamis in 480 BCE, though discussed far less frequently than the concurrent Battle of Thermopylae, is no less impressive a feat of military genius. So the Spartan strategy during the beginning of the war was to march its armies to the land around the city state of Athens and seize them. This caused many Athenian farmers to abandon their farms and retreat behind Athens famous Long Walls. The Long Walls were fortified walls that connected Athens' main city to its ports at Piraeus and Phaleron. So despite the loss of farmland around Athens itself, this siege did basically nothing. Sparta was also only able to keep troops on the field for a few weeks at a time, as the hoplites were still needed to harvest their own fields and troops were always needed to keep the helots in line. The longest siege of the Ten Years War was only 40 days. Meanwhile Athens stayed in the Aegean Sea with their fleet, avoiding any open warfare with the Spartans who were unable to breach their walls anyway. The Athenians had great successes in their early naval battles, including the Battle of Naucaptus where 20 Athenian ships went up  against 77 Peloponnesian ships and emerged victorious. Of course, all of Athen's momentum would come to a screeching and screaming halt when th plague hit in 430 BCE. The Plague of Athens was an interesting facet of the war. While some Athenians believed that the Spartans were the cause of the plague, evidenced they said by the fact that the Spartans were unaffected by it, but Thucydides, author the the famous History of the Peloponnesian War was in the city when the plague hit. He even contracted it and survived his illness. Thucydides says that the plague came from Ethiopia as it appeared to have entered Athens along the Long Wall from the port of Piraeus. There's not much in the way of evidence regarding WHAT exactly the plague was, although Thucydides listed out a large number of symptoms that victims experienced including: Fever, Redness and inflammation in the eyes, Sore throats leading to bleeding and bad breath, Sneezing, Loss of voice, Coughing, Vomiting, Pustules and ulcers on the body, Extreme thirst, Insomnia, Diarrhea, Convulsions, and Gangrene. Modern epidemiologists and paleopathologists believe, based on extensive examination of all the available evidence that the plague was likely either smallpox or typhus, although it's unlikely that we'll ever know for certain. The plague had a massive impact on the course of the war. For one, it killed Pericles, the Athenian statesman and strategos of the Athenian military. It also killed over 30,000 people, made foreign mercenaries unwilling to aid Athens, no matter how much they were offered as they did not want to risk getting sick, the plague even halted any Spartan military action in Attica until it was finished as the Spartans also feared the disease. Even with the loss of Pericles Athens continued to have success on sea as well as on land through the efforts of their commanders Demosthenes and Cleon. They started to put cracks in the Spartan armies image of invincibility until the Spartans captured Amphipolis, a silver mine that supplied much of the Athenian war chest in 424 BCE. In 422 a great battle was fought at Amphipolis which saw both Cleon, and the Spartan general Brasidas killed. The loss of these military commanders would see Athens and Sparta sit down to try and negotiate peace.  The Peace of Nicias would be a failure from the very start. Despite it, nominally, declaring peace between Sparta and Athens, despite PoWs being exchanged and control over territories ceded back to those who originally owned them, the Peace of Nicias was something of a joke. Sparta and Athens entered something of a Cold War. They didn't fight against each other specifically, but Athens spent a LOT of time trying to stir up helot revolts and encourage Spartan allies to revolt against them in order to gain greater autonomy under Athenian democracy.  Something that is interesting to note, is that despite the single largest land battle of the Peloponnesian War taking place in 418 BCE, the Peace wasn't formally abandoned, and war declared again between Athens and Sparta until 214 BCE. The Battle of Mantinea was fought between Sparta and some of its Arcadian allies on one side, and the combined might of Argos, Athens, Mantinea and various Arcadian allies of Argos. The battle, which involved nearly 20,000 troops combined, ended with a Spartan victory and saw a reversal of previous trends. After the Spartan loss at the Battle of Pylos in 425 BCE many began to think of the Spartans as weak and cowardly, but Mantinea reversed that thinking very quickly. The Siege of Melos, the true subject of this episode, also took place during the Peace of Nicias. Athenian aggression against Melos began about 10 years before the Siege. Melos was a small island about 68 miles off the Eastern coast of Greece. Small islands, due to their reliance on navies, were generally allies of Athens who had uncontested control of the seas. Melos though, decided to remain neutral. They were ethnically Dorian, same as the Spartans (the Athenians were ethnically Ionian). In 425 Athens demanded that Melos pay them a 15 talents (about 390 kgs) of silver. Melos refused. They were determined to remain neutral (although there is pretty good evidence that they donated 20 minas (about 12.5 kgs) of silver to the Spartan war effort. In 216 BCE Athens once again went to Melos and demanded that Melos join the Delian League and pay tribute. Melos again refused. Thucydides wrote a dramatization of conversation between Athenian embassies and the leaders of Melos in his Histories (Book 5, Chapters 84–116). The Melian Dialogue is one of the earliest events I learned about during undergrad when I took a class on the History of Just War. I need to go off on a slight tangent here. When I took this class there was this one guy, whose name I never learned. He was jacked as hell and always showed up to class double fisting iced coffees from Starbucks. Now this class was built around a questionL “Is there such a thing as a Just War?”, but apparently this dude never read the syllabus because about 3 weeks into class he asks “When are we gonna get to the battles?” See, he thought it was History of Just War, just meaning only. He thought it was a military history class, not a class on moral philosophy seen through the context of war. I'm pretty sure he got an A though… Anyway, back to Melos. It's unlikely that the conversation Thucydides wrote out is how it played out in real life, though given the Athenian love of oration and speeches, he's probably not TOO far off the mark. I'm going to read you a part of the Melian Dialogue: Athenians. For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with specious pretences- either of how we have a right to our empire because we overthrew the Mede, or are now attacking you because of wrong that you have done us- and make a long speech which would not be believed; and in return we hope that you, instead of thinking to influence us by saying that you did not join the Lacedaemonians, although their colonists, or that you have done us no wrong, will aim at what is feasible, holding in view the real sentiments of us both; since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. Melians. As we think, at any rate, it is expedient- we speak as we are obliged, since you enjoin us to let right alone and talk only of interest- that you should not destroy what is our common protection, the privilege of being allowed in danger to invoke what is fair and right, and even to profit by arguments not strictly valid if they can be got to pass current. And you are as much interested in this as any, as your fall would be a signal for the heaviest vengeance and an example for the world to meditate upon. Athenians. The end of our empire, if end it should, does not frighten us: a rival empire like Lacedaemon, even if Lacedaemon was our real antagonist, is not so terrible to the vanquished as subjects who by themselves attack and overpower their rulers. This, however, is a risk that we are content to take. We will now proceed to show you that we are come here in the interest of our empire, and that we shall say what we are now going to say, for the preservation of your country; as we would fain exercise that empire over you without trouble, and see you preserved for the good of us both. Melians. And how, pray, could it turn out as good for us to serve as for you to rule? Athenians. Because you would have the advantage of submitting before suffering the worst, and we should gain by not destroying you. Melians. So that you would not consent to our being neutral, friends instead of enemies, but allies of neither side. Athenians. No; for your hostility cannot so much hurt us as your friendship will be an argument to our subjects of our weakness, and your enmity of our power. Melians. Is that your subjects' idea of equity, to put those who have nothing to do with you in the same category with peoples that are most of them your own colonists, and some conquered rebels? Athenians. As far as right goes they think one has as much of it as the other, and that if any maintain their independence it is because they are strong, and that if we do not molest them it is because we are afraid; so that besides extending our empire we should gain in security by your subjection; the fact that you are islanders and weaker than others rendering it all the more important that you should not succeed in baffling the masters of the sea. See, Athens refused to allow Melos to remain neutral because they believed that, if they allowed this small, weak nation to live independent of their might that they would soon find themselves overrun with rebellion as all others would see Athens let Melos go free and see Athens as weak, as if they somehow feared fighting Melos. So, pragmatically, it would be better for them to kill all the Melians to maintain their image as strong than it would be for them to simply leave Melos be. Despite their claim to democracy, Athens was very much of the opinion that might made right. The strong take what they can and the weak suffer as they must. This was, more or less the beginning of Just War theory, as it was one of the first time that justice, fairness, and rightness was discusses in the context of war. Just War Theory, by the way, is generally made up of three elements. Jus ad bellum, do you have just reasons for going to war? Jus in bello, is your conduct during war just? And a more modern addition, jus post bellum, is your conduct after the war is over also just? Melos, ultimately, refused to surrender to Athens and, indeed, tried to fight against their armies and ultimately failed. The siege lasted from summer of 416 until the winter and ended with Melos surrendering. Athens, in a very Genghis Khan esque move decided to kill every adult man on Melos and sell all of the women and children into slavery. This form of genocide where one particular gender is targeted is common in old world genocides. Very often it is the men, those who could join opposing militaries who would be targeted for the slaughter although Shaka Zulu was infamous for killing all the women and folding the men into his armed forces during his conquests. The genocide of Melos wasn't an attempt to wipe out an ethnicity, Melians being Dorian just like the Spartans. It WAS, however, intended to destroy the people of Melos, and it succeeded. The Peloponnesian War would continue until 404 BCE and would end with a Spartan victory, partially through aid gained from the Achaemenid Dynasty from Persia and some from Alcibiades of Athens, but the war isn't the important part and so we will ignore the final 12 years of it. That's it for this week. No new reviews, so let's jump right into the outro. Have a Day! w/ The History Wizard is brought to you by me, The History Wizard. If you want to see/hear more of me you can find me on Tiktok @thehistorywizard or on Instagram @the_history_wizard. Please remember to rate, review, and subscribe to Have a Day! On your pod catcher of choice. The more you do, the more people will be able to listen and learn along with you. Thank you  for sticking around until the end and, as always, Have a Day.    

In Part 2 of the Lives of Alcibiades and Nicias, these two polar opposites clash over Athenian foreign policy.  With Sparta still a looming threat, Athenians must choose whether to listen to the ambitious Alcibiades or cautious Nicias.Support the show (https://www.paypal.com/donate?hosted_button_id=RLVZ3VNNPSRAL)

Episode: 3075 Thucydides, Democracy, and Hope.  Today, the problem of hope.

Listen to Victor Davis Hanson talk with Sami Winc about what failed for Athens on the Sicilian Expedition (415 B.C.), the US in the Tet Offensive in the Vietnam, and the current US withdraw from Afghanistan.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

In the fifth of our ancient history themed podcasts Carl and Beau chat about the Athenian's doomed Sicilian Expedition during the Peloponnesian War and Alcibiades' role in it, as related by Thucydides and Plutarch. If you have a spare couple of hours, why not give it a whirl! https://www.lotuseaters.com/premium-epochs-of-the-lotus-eaters-5-the-sicilian-expedition-06-06-21

Andrea Radasanu returns to discuss the Sicilian Expedition from Thucydides "History of the Peloponnesian War." --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/brian-wilson5/support

In this episode, we discuss the year 413 BC of the Peloponnesian War, including the rise of Archelaus to the Macedonian throne, the Spartan establishment of Decelea, the defeats by the Athenian army and navy at Syracuse, and the retreat and ultimate surrender of the Athenians, which brought the Sicilian Expedition to an end   Show Notes: http://www.thehistoryofancientgreece.com/2020/03/101-disaster-in-sicily.html   Intro by Seth Michels of the History Uncensored Podcast  Website: http://historyuncensoredpod.com Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/historyuncensoredpod/ Twitter: https://twitter.com/Seth4Nerds  

In this episode, we discuss the years 417-415 BC of the Peloponnesian War, including the ostracism of Hyperbolus, the rivalry of Nikias and Alcibiades, the siege of Melos, the lead up and first year of the Sicilian Expedition, and the prosecutions for the Hermai and Eleusinian Mysteries scandals   Show Notes: http://www.thehistoryofancientgreece.com/2020/01/099-frustrations-and-poor-decisions.html   Intro by Kate Armstrong of The Exploress Podcast  Website: https://www.theexploresspodcast.com Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/theexploresspodcast/ Twitter: https://twitter.com/theexploresspod  

Among the many personages associated with the Peloponnesian War, none are as colorful as the Athenian general Alcibiades. In Nemesis: Alcibiades and the Fall of Athens (Harvard University Press, 2018), David Stuttard recounts the dramatic life of this controversial figure. A scion of a wealthy family, Alcibiades was adopted by the statesman Pericles after his father died in battle. Growing up he demonstrated a flair for the dramatic, which in combination with his fortune made him a prominent figure at a young age. Yet Alcibiades desired more, and sabotaged the peace agreement with the Spartans orchestrated by Nicias in an effort to prolong the war so as to gain new opportunities for glory. The Sicilian Expedition presented him with just such an opportunity, though controversial actions attributed to Alcibiades and his friends undermined his standing. Faced with mounting opposition, Alcibiades defected, first to Sparta, then to Persia before being recalled and reinstated as an Athenian general. Though Alcibiades subsequently led the Athenians to victory in battle, he fled his home city again after his defeat at Notium, only to be assassinated at Phrygia in the final year of the war.   Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Among the many personages associated with the Peloponnesian War, none are as colorful as the Athenian general Alcibiades. In Nemesis: Alcibiades and the Fall of Athens (Harvard University Press, 2018), David Stuttard recounts the dramatic life of this controversial figure. A scion of a wealthy family, Alcibiades was adopted by the statesman Pericles after his father died in battle. Growing up he demonstrated a flair for the dramatic, which in combination with his fortune made him a prominent figure at a young age. Yet Alcibiades desired more, and sabotaged the peace agreement with the Spartans orchestrated by Nicias in an effort to prolong the war so as to gain new opportunities for glory. The Sicilian Expedition presented him with just such an opportunity, though controversial actions attributed to Alcibiades and his friends undermined his standing. Faced with mounting opposition, Alcibiades defected, first to Sparta, then to Persia before being recalled and reinstated as an Athenian general. Though Alcibiades subsequently led the Athenians to victory in battle, he fled his home city again after his defeat at Notium, only to be assassinated at Phrygia in the final year of the war.   Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Among the many personages associated with the Peloponnesian War, none are as colorful as the Athenian general Alcibiades. In Nemesis: Alcibiades and the Fall of Athens (Harvard University Press, 2018), David Stuttard recounts the dramatic life of this controversial figure. A scion of a wealthy family, Alcibiades was adopted by the statesman Pericles after his father died in battle. Growing up he demonstrated a flair for the dramatic, which in combination with his fortune made him a prominent figure at a young age. Yet Alcibiades desired more, and sabotaged the peace agreement with the Spartans orchestrated by Nicias in an effort to prolong the war so as to gain new opportunities for glory. The Sicilian Expedition presented him with just such an opportunity, though controversial actions attributed to Alcibiades and his friends undermined his standing. Faced with mounting opposition, Alcibiades defected, first to Sparta, then to Persia before being recalled and reinstated as an Athenian general. Though Alcibiades subsequently led the Athenians to victory in battle, he fled his home city again after his defeat at Notium, only to be assassinated at Phrygia in the final year of the war.   Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Among the many personages associated with the Peloponnesian War, none are as colorful as the Athenian general Alcibiades. In Nemesis: Alcibiades and the Fall of Athens (Harvard University Press, 2018), David Stuttard recounts the dramatic life of this controversial figure. A scion of a wealthy family, Alcibiades was adopted by the statesman Pericles after his father died in battle. Growing up he demonstrated a flair for the dramatic, which in combination with his fortune made him a prominent figure at a young age. Yet Alcibiades desired more, and sabotaged the peace agreement with the Spartans orchestrated by Nicias in an effort to prolong the war so as to gain new opportunities for glory. The Sicilian Expedition presented him with just such an opportunity, though controversial actions attributed to Alcibiades and his friends undermined his standing. Faced with mounting opposition, Alcibiades defected, first to Sparta, then to Persia before being recalled and reinstated as an Athenian general. Though Alcibiades subsequently led the Athenians to victory in battle, he fled his home city again after his defeat at Notium, only to be assassinated at Phrygia in the final year of the war.   Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

To what extent does Thucydides alter and tweak his account of the Athenian disaster? In this episode I look at some of the arguments which suggest Thucydides amended and changed his account to align with his views through subtle and none-too-subtle techniques. I also point out why Nicias would be an ideal guest at a poker night. Feel free to find me on twitter (@ancientblogger) Music by Brakhage (Le Vrai Instrumental)  

After the disaster of the Sicilian Expedition, the largest defeat in the history of Athenian Democracy, the whole Mediterranean world expected Athens to fall. Refusing to surrender the Athenian assembly accepts previously unthinkable changes in order to continue to the fight against Sparta, the revolting cities across the Empire, and to keep the ever ambitious Persians in check. Amid this pressure the democracy in Athens is reexamined and some citizens desire a change, either through legal reforms or terror tactics. This episode covers approximately 413 BC – 411 BC.

During the seventy year peace with Syracuse, Carthage regrouped by instituting government reforms and overhauling its tremendous infrastructure.  Meanwhile, Syracusan factions squabbled internally, fluctuating between democratic and autocratic governments.  Despite this, Syracuse won a stunning victory against Athens in the Sicilian Expedition, only to watch its allies be trounced by the Carthaginians commanded by Hannibal Mago, grandson of Hamilcar, the general who fell at Himera.  Yet, with Syracuse reeling from battle, the Carthaginians spared the city and made peace, a decision that they would later rue in the coming years. Link to the Episode 6 page on the Layman's Historian website Subscribe or leave a review on iTunes Leave a like or comment on the Facebook page Follow on Twitter Contact me directly through email

In Episode 6 of Naval History Podcast, we continue our multi-part examination of the Peloponnesian War with Athens's ill-fated Sicilian Expedition of 415-13 BC, in which the Athenians send a massive expeditionary force to attack and possibly conquer the island of Sicily. During this epic struggle between the Athenians, the Syracusans, and their respective allies. We also meet such characters as the overly cautious and indecisive Athenian general Nicias; his fellow general Alcibiades, one of the first psychopaths known to history; and the daring Spartan commander Gylippus. The disaster that befell the Sicilian Expedition was perhaps the beginning of the downfall of the Athenian empire and set the stage for the final horrific phase of the Peloponnesian War.

This lecture examines the role and status of Athenian drama in Athenian society. Picking up where the last lecture (on the Peloponnesian War) left off, Dr Gillian Shepherd looks at the finale of the Sicilian Expedition, and the event that preceded it: the Melian Dialogue, which purports to recount events which just might have influenced one of the three great 5th century Athenian tragedians, Euripides, when he wrote his play The Trojan Women. This play, as well as others by Euripides and those by Aeschylos and Sophocles, were performed in the Theatre of Dionysos in Athens as part of the Great Dionysia. This was a religious festival in honour of the god Dionysos, but it was also more than that – it was an integral part of Athenian society and politics in the fifth century BC. Copyright 2013 Gillian Shepherd / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

This lecture examines the role and status of Athenian drama in Athenian society. Picking up where the last lecture (on the Peloponnesian War) left off, Dr Gillian Shepherd looks at the finale of the Sicilian Expedition, and the event that preceded it: the Melian Dialogue, which purports to recount events which just might have influenced one of the three great 5th century Athenian tragedians, Euripides, when he wrote his play The Trojan Women. This play, as well as others by Euripides and those by Aeschylos and Sophocles, were performed in the Theatre of Dionysos in Athens as part of the Great Dionysia. This was a religious festival in honour of the god Dionysos, but it was also more than that – it was an integral part of Athenian society and politics in the fifth century BC. Copyright 2013 Gillian Shepherd / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.