Podcasts about Patent Act

[powerpresss] My co-host Ken Suzan and I are welcoming you to episode 175 of our podcast IP Fridays! Today's interview guest is Bruce Dearling, patent attorney and partner at Hepworth Browne in the UK, and we talk about how non-technical features must be considered when assessing inventive step of patents at least according to recent decisions of the UK supreme court and the Unified Patent Court. Profile of Bruce Dearling UK Supreme Court Emotional Perception AI Limited UPC Abbot vs Sinocare But before we jump into this interesting interview, I have news for you: On May 20, 2026, the Swiss Federal Council adopted the fully revised Patent Ordinance, which will enter into force on January 1, 2027, together with the revised Patent Act. In the future, the Swiss Federal Institute of Intellectual Property will prepare a mandatory search report for each application; applicants can choose between a partially examined version and a full examination that assesses novelty and inventive step. The full examination costs an additional 300 Swiss francs, and renewal fees will increase by a total of eight percent over the 20-year term. On May 19, 2026, Asus entered into a licensing agreement with the Wi-Fi multimode patent pool managed by Sisvel, thereby ending all ongoing infringement proceedings. Sisvel bundles standard-essential patents in the pool from, among others, Atlantia, ETRI, and Mitsubishi Electric. On May 18, 2026, the UPC Local Chamber in Düsseldorf rejected Align Technology's application for a preliminary injunction against its Chinese competitor Angelalign. Angelalign may continue to sell its clear aligners within the UPC jurisdiction. Our partners Dirk Schulz, Ulrich Storz, and Wanze Zhang, together with Arnold Ruess, successfully represented Angelalign. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) announced midweek that, since October of last year, it has invalidated or is seeking to invalidate approximately 10,500 trademark applications and registrations in eleven administrative orders. Reasons include forged attorney signatures and the fabrication of non-existent filing requirements. This stems from ongoing abuse of the U.S. trademark system, primarily by non-U.S. applicants, which can lead to conflicts with validly registered trademarks for legitimate businesses. On May 12, 2026, the British Court of Appeal overturned a lower court decision that would have required Nokia to grant interim licenses for video coding patents. The court found that Nokia's license offer to the Taiwanese manufacturers Acer and Asus had already been made on RAND terms. In May, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a brief in the ongoing Corteva v. Inari litigation, expressing antitrust concerns regarding certain patent practices in the field of plant breeding. This marks the first time the agency has actively intervened in a biopharmaceutical patent dispute with implications for seed innovations. Episode 175 of the IP Fridays podcast was a conversation I will not forget quickly. My guest Bruce Dearling, partner at Hepworth Brown in the UK and a patent attorney for 36 years, took a case through every level of the British court system up to the Supreme Court and, in doing so, fundamentally changed patent law for AI inventions in the UK. The case is called Emotional Perception, and its effects reach well beyond British borders. Below I summarize the key points from our conversation. The full episode is available at IP Fridays. A. What Is the Emotional Perception Case About? The underlying invention concerns artificial neural networks. Specifically, it relates to a method of closing what is called the semantic gap at the output of a neural network. That sounds abstract, but the idea is straightforward: a neural network always produces an output that does not fully correspond to what a human would actually expect or feel. Closing that gap brings the system closer to human perception and human expectations. Bruce Dearling drafted this application himself and filed it at the UK Intellectual Property Office (UKIPO). The Office rejected it as excluded subject matter, characterizing it as essentially a computer program as such. The legal basis for that rejection was the Aerotel decision from 2006. The case then went to the High Court, which found in favor of the applicant. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision. Then the UK Supreme Court stepped in and changed everything. B. The Aerotel Test and Its Flaws Since 2006, the Aerotel test had been the standard British method for assessing whether an invention falls within the excluded categories under patent law. It was a four-step approach: construe the claim, identify the actual contribution the invention makes to human knowledge, ask whether that contribution falls solely within excluded subject matter, and finally check whether the contribution is technical in nature. The problem Dearling described in our conversation is that Aerotel reverses the logical order of the analysis. You start with the contribution and only then ask about the exclusions under Article 52 EPC. The UK Supreme Court described Aerotel in its judgment as “unsound law” and overturned it. The EPO’s Technical Boards of Appeal had previously called Aerotel “disingenuous,” which at the time led to a public dispute between the British courts and the Boards. With the Emotional Perception ruling, that conflict has now been resolved in favor of harmonization with the EPO. C. What the UK Supreme Court Decided The Supreme Court made two central findings. First, the exclusion of computer programs “as such” is overcome as soon as a claim includes any piece of hardware. It does not matter whether that is a processor, a memory module, or any other component. The threshold is deliberately low. Dearling described this as the “any hardware” approach, which aligns fully with the EPO’s position following G1/19. Second, and in Dearling’s assessment the more important finding: when assessing inventive step, the invention must be considered as a whole. The Court introduced what it called an “intermediate step,” an analytical stage in which the interactions between all features of a claim are examined before the question of inventive step is addressed. Non-technical features cannot simply be struck out if they contribute to the overall technical effect of the invention. D. Inventive Step: The Intermediate Step This is the heart of the judgment. In EPO practice, Dearling said, it happens regularly that examiners strike through features they consider non-technical and thereby fail to assess the invention’s inventive step correctly. A recent Technical Board of Appeal decision, T 1249/22, already criticized this approach: a claim directed at a technical solution to a problem can be patentable even if the underlying problem is non-technical in nature. Dearling recalled a remark made by a Board of Appeal member at a hearing he attended years ago: “We understand that examining divisions can operate with a degree of mental laziness and that it’s too easy to throw too many things out of the basket when considering the issues of inventive step.” That quote stayed with him because it names a structural problem that the intermediate step now addresses directly. The British method for assessing inventive step is the Pozzoli test, which differs from the EPO’s problem-solution approach. The Supreme Court explicitly retained Pozzoli because the problem-solution approach, in its view, is structurally infected with hindsight reasoning: you already know the invention, you work backwards to formulate an objective technical problem, and then you ask whether it would have been obvious for the skilled person to arrive at precisely that solution. Dearling sees this as a source of unfairness toward genuine inventions. E. Alignment with the Unified Patent Court In April 2025, the Court of Appeal of the Unified Patent Court issued a decision in Abbott v. Sinocare (APP_000000901/2025, judgment of 17 April 2025). Dearling pointed out that this decision uses language and reasoning strikingly similar to the UK Supreme Court’s Emotional Perception ruling of February 2025. That is significant because the UPC is bound neither by UK courts nor by the EPO. The overlap suggests voluntary convergence. Dearling reported a conversation with a person close to the EPO, whom he did not name, who used the word “permissive” to describe the UK Supreme Court’s approach and indicated that the EPO might move toward it. Whether and how quickly that happens remains to be seen. What is clear is that the UPC, as the new European patent court, is setting its own standards, and the question of how to handle non-technical features in inventive step assessment is now being asked at multiple levels simultaneously. F. Implications for the EPO and Practice The EPO is not directly bound by the ruling. It is an administrative body, not a court. Dearling is nonetheless optimistic that change is coming. On one hand, external pressure is building: when the UK Supreme Court and the UPC articulate similar principles, convergence becomes hard to resist. On the other hand, Article 27.1 TRIPS requires all contracting states to make patents available in all fields of technology. Examiners routinely striking non-technical features from AI claims and rejecting them on that basis sits uncomfortably with that obligation. For the underlying application in the Emotional Perception case, the ruling has a pointed consequence. The Supreme Court did not grant the patent itself; it referred the matter back to the UKIPO for reconsideration under the intermediate step. The Office’s subsequent response was, in Dearling’s words, unconvincing. He suspects the Office is attempting to reintroduce the Aerotel test through the back door. As a last resort, he has not excluded a judicial review, a procedure that does not simply challenge the substantive decision but holds the Comptroller General of Patents to account for whether the Office is deliberately circumventing the Supreme Court’s direction on the intermediate step. That is, as Dearling put it, “a nuclear option,” but one he would not rule out if the evidence in the file already suggests the Office is in contempt of court. There is also an international dimension. Singapore’s Intellectual Property Office launched a public consultation shortly after the ruling, asking whether Singapore should adopt the Emotional Perception approach into national law. That is British soft power operating in real time within the Commonwealth. G. Three Takeaways for Patent Practitioners At the end of our conversation I asked Bruce Dearling to distill the most important practical points. His first takeaway: make sure the claim contains hardware. This applies not only to UK and European applications but is simply good drafting hygiene. Without hardware in the claim, the application remains exposed. The second takeaway concerns the description. Anyone filing an AI invention needs to explain clearly which function is achieved by which piece of hardware, circuit, or software. Not as boilerplate, but as a complete technical account that describes the real-world effects. Dearling’s experience is that practitioners who write the claim first and fill in the description afterward run into trouble. The third takeaway emerged from the conversation itself: how the EPO assesses inventive step for AI inventions is not a settled question. It is worth following the development of UPC case law and any shifts in EPO practice closely. Anyone advising on AI patent applications today needs to know these arguments. H. Conclusion The UK Supreme Court’s Emotional Perception ruling is not a British footnote. It has declared the Aerotel test dead, introduced the intermediate step that brings non-technical features back into the inventive step analysis, and set off a convergence movement that is already visible at the UPC and still pending at the EPO. For everyone working in AI patent practice, whether in prosecution, examination, or counseling, this ruling is required reading. Rolf Claessen: Our interview guest on IP Fridays podcast is Bruce Dearling. He has been in the IP field and a patent attorney for 36 years and is partner at Hepworth Brown in the UK. Thank you very much for being on the podcast. Bruce Dearling: My pleasure, Rolf. Thank you for inviting me. Rolf Claessen: All right. We just met at the INTA annual meeting in London. And you talked about the UK Supreme Court case where you were involved. And the core questions were whether non-technical features would be considered when assessing inventive step of patents. Can you briefly summarize this case? Bruce Dearling: It’s a bit more than that. It started — I actually wrote the case. And I prosecuted it through the patent office. The patent office rejected the case for being excluded subject matter. So pretty much the excluded subject matter provisions in the UK are nearly identical. They’re as near as practical to the language of the EPC, so those of the European Patent Office — Article 52.2. But again, they apply as such. The actual technology relates to artificial neural networks. And the invention related to a very clever way of what is termed closing the semantic gap at the output of the neural network. So that means that in a neural network, there is always a discrepancy between the output of the neural network in terms of what it’s telling you you should be thinking essentially, and what reality is. So if you can close the semantic gap, then you align the neural network or the artificial intelligence system to better reflect human knowledge or human reactions and human expectations. So that’s really what the invention is about. There’s no point in going into too much detail with it — that’s the way it is. It’s very clever. So the UKIPO rejected this because they said it was essentially a computer program excluded from patentability as such. And they used a decision which is called Aerotel, which has been around since 2006. And that decision has caused considerable consternation and tension between the EPO Technical Boards of Appeal and the UK courts. Aerotel was described as being essentially disingenuous by the EPO Technical Board of Appeal. And the UK courts pushed back and said, you don’t know what you’re talking about. So that’s where it fell apart. So that’s where they rejected it for essentially being a computer program as such, possibly with a bit of business methods thrown in as well. But let’s leave that for the time being. So the case then went to the High Court and at the High Court, we won. The judge said, actually, it’s not a computer program. Neural networks aren’t computers. They’re not programs themselves. There’s more to them than that. And the invention as claimed is not excluded from patentability as such. The UKIPO obviously weren’t very happy about that because they liked their Aerotel case and so they appealed it. And they appealed it on several grounds, including a new one, which was that it was a mathematical method. The Court of Appeal decided that the UKIPO was right and that we were wrong, so we lost the case. So we then went to the Supreme Court. Well, actually, they denied us an ability to go to the Supreme Court. The court said no appeal. We went — actually, no, I think there is a bigger issue here — because we realized, or I realized at that point, that the work that we were doing was much broader than this. It requires real consideration of what an invention is at a fundamental level. So not only exclusions, but how inventive step is applied. And these issues were built into the case from the very beginning. And they sort of — I wouldn’t say crept up on the court as we went through — but they became more and more prominent to the extent that ultimately, when we made an application to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court went, yeah, we’ve got some issues here. We want to hear the full arguments on why this is not excluded from patentability, why Aerotel is potentially bad and how we more or less try to align ourselves with the European Patent Office. So that’s essentially what happened. And the Supreme Court hearing was last July. It took them the thick end of eight months to come out with a decision, which was issued in early February, at which point the entire legal landscape in the UK changed because they said we were right. The Patent Office doesn’t know what they’re talking about. Aerotel is bad. It’s unsound. That’s what they described it as — unsound law. It needs to be removed and we’re going to harmonize with the European Patent Office. So before I — I’m just going on a bit of a rant here, standing on my soapbox telling you what you already know. But the Aerotel test essentially was — it was a four-step test, past tense. So you firstly had to construe the claim. That’s pretty straightforward. Then you actually had to identify the actual contribution. This is what they said — identify the contribution. Really in this aspect, you’re asking what, as a matter of substance rather than form, the inventor has added to human knowledge. So that’s what they said the contribution was. And then they said, the next step in Aerotel was to ask, well, does that contribution fall solely within the excluded subject matter field or realm? And then they said, well, if you get through that question, then you check the actual contribution or the alleged contribution to see whether it’s technical in nature. So that’s the Aerotel test as it was. And what the Supreme Court in their unanimous final decision said was that Aerotel at best jumbles up the order. It reverses the logical order of the analysis by starting with the contributions and then addressing the Article 52 exclusions. And then finally it goes back to what the technical nature of the invention is about. So they really went, no, we don’t like any of this stuff. It’s bad, it’s stupid, it puts the cart before the horse. So, in the intervening period between finding the case and actually seeing it progress all the way to the Supreme Court, we obviously had the G1/19 decision from the EPO Enlarged Board. And they basically said that they are going to validate any hardware as the approach. And that’s essentially what the UK also went with. The UK Supreme Court said we’re going to say that the threshold of patentability — or the exclusion to patentability — is simply overcome by the inclusion in a claim of any piece of hardware, whether it’s a processor or a piece of memory or whatever. It doesn’t matter. Any hardware makes the invention a technical invention. So it’s a really low threshold to consider. And they then went, well, actually, if we now align and harmonize with the European Patent Office sensibly, then we need to look at how we assess inventive step, which is the other thing that we raised with the Supreme Court. In fact, we probably raised it at other times and in all the other instances as well, but it came to a head at the Supreme Court. So the Supreme Court then also went a bit further and said, well, actually, whilst we do like the global approach to assessing inventive step for all fields of technology — whether it’s chemistry or biotech or electronics or software or AI — we use a test called Pozzoli. So that isn’t problem-solution. We don’t like problem-solution. We think it’s not codified in the European Patent Office. It’s just a mechanism that the EPO has come up with to try to objectively assess inventive step. We don’t particularly think that’s appropriate. We like our approach called Pozzoli. That’s it. So we’re going to say with Pozzoli, however, in order to actually understand — particularly in the context of mixed inventions having technical and non-technical features — it’s necessary for the examiner to undertake the so-called intermediate step, where you have to look at the interactions between features within a claim. The invention is defined by the claim. That’s what the act says. That’s what everyone understands. It’s the invention defined by the claim. So you look at the claim features and then you have to understand the interactions that take place. And even if they are between technical and non-technical features, if they bring about an overall technical effect when you consider the invention as a whole, then your claim should be good and you can assess it for classical inventive step. So that’s really where we’re at. There’s a lot to unpack there already. It’s probably a podcast in its own right, but that’s the positive history of where we’re at. And I can keep going if you wish me to for a second and talk about why I think this is — we’ll just contrast it quickly with the problem-solution approach at the EPO and COMVIK. So for inventions in the computer-implemented field, they use COMVIK and the problem-solution approach. The Supreme Court said, as I said, they don’t like problem-solution. I think the problem-solution issue is that it is also inherently pre-baked with hindsight because you have to look at the invention and then step back and exclude those features which are common. And then you formulate a problem based on the function that the claim achieves. And then you’re asking whether or not it would be obvious for a skilled person to arrive at the claimed invention, having been given that hindsight-developed problem. So COMVIK is not great by any means. And we know from a practical perspective that examiners are only too willing to look at a claim and simply line through features which they believe are non-technical, whereas they don’t actually look at the interaction of those features in the context of the claim as a whole. There is also a decision — very recent one actually, about a year ago — T 1249/22, where the Technical Board of Appeal told the examiners and the examining division, you cannot do this. It’s okay to have a claim directed towards an invention in a non-technical field, as long as the invention is directed to a technical solution of that problem. I think it’s paragraphs 11 and 12 or 10 of that decision that are worth looking at. But they’re saying that in all fields of technology, it doesn’t matter as long as the technical solution is about technology — therefore, you should be able to obtain a patent as long as there is a realistic and appropriate technical effect. Be careful actually, Bruce — I don’t mean technical contribution, I mean technical effect. There’s a reason for that distinction. Rolf Claessen: The non-technical features are nevertheless used to assess inventive step in the UK now after this decision, right? Bruce Dearling: Yes, that is the intermediate step. The decision says you must look at the invention as a whole. It’s the important thing. There are a couple of issues that arise out of this. The first one is that you have to provide context for the invention. The Supreme Court never provided any specific guidance about how we deal with the intermediate step or what the exact test is, which is in some respects fine. It seems to be fairly clear that you just have to engage your gray matter — your neurons — to work out what is going on in the real world. And once you work out what’s going on in the real world, what the benefits are, then you look at whether or not the actual implementation of the invention fundamentally has a technical flavor to it, which is not just coding, not just simple coding, but it does something smarter. There’s a real technical impetus. There’s a technical effect. Now that actually brings me onto something I’ve postulated or said. I think the intermediate step will follow something like what I’ve termed the holistic character test, which essentially is: work out what’s going on in the real world. Then once you’ve worked out what’s actually being achieved, what the benefits are, what the invention’s concerned with, then you ask the question, how am I achieving it technically? And how is there a technical effect? How does the technical effect arise? That brings out a couple of issues. The first one is that it’s actually about the word “contribution” because it depends on how the word is used. So if you look at head note one in COMVIK, it uses the word “contribute” — how the non-technical feature contributes to the invention. So that’s an additive inclusive concept. The UK IPO historically, and arguably at the moment today whilst they’re trying to retrain their 400 examiners — which this has caused them to have to do — their idea of contribution is this backward-looking concept. So technical contribution and technical effect, I think — although we mix them up and interchange them — are distinct. Technical contribution: you’re looking backwards. Technical effect is what you look at when you look forward into what’s going on. So this is subtle — it’s really subtle, but it’s important. And once you realize that you are actually looking for the technical effects, then you’re on much safer ground. It’s much more objective in terms of the assessment. This might be somewhat contentious, because it’s the way I’m looking at this, but I’ve been working on this a long, long time and thinking about it for probably decades, worryingly so. So technical contribution and technical effects are probably not the same, where they are interchangeably used to mean the same thing within existing decisions. Rolf Claessen: And in the beginning you said, now that Aerotel is dead basically, it’s more harmonized with the EPO’s approach. But what I take from the discussion now is that maybe — especially in view of the problem-solution approach — it’s not fully harmonized with the EPO’s approach at the moment, right? Or did the UK Supreme Court get something wrong, or was that a desired outcome from your point of view that this is not so completely harmonized with the EPO? Bruce Dearling: Well, the EPO — the any-hardware solution is fully harmonized, no doubt. So it’s now a question of inventive step under Article 56 or Section 3 of the Act. The EPC nowhere mandates the use of problem-solution. And we know that there are many different ways of actually assessing inventive step, including the concrete elaboration test from last year and problem-of-invention approaches. So there are numerous ways of assessing inventive step. So the UK says, “Pozzoli — we like Pozzoli.” Interestingly, I had a discussion with someone I probably can’t mention. They’re saying that the UK approach may actually be more permissive now. It might even influence how the EPO operates. So they may move away from COMVIK towards more of a Pozzoli approach, which basically says this: You identify the notion of the skilled person — step one. You identify the common general knowledge of that skilled person — step one B. You identify the inventive concept of the claim in question, where you construe it if you can’t work out what it is. You then identify what the differences are. And then you ask the question, is it obvious to the skilled person, given knowledge of the common general knowledge? This is entirely not artificial because, as I said beforehand, when you look at problem-solution, you are formulating a problem by backtracking from what the claimed invention is to a situation where you say, well, these are the common features and I’m going to project a problem to try and solve. Now that is already tainted with hindsight reasoning. It’s not safe, it’s not thoroughly objective. There is an inherent problem with this which sees good inventions cast by the wayside. Although it’s a preferred mechanism, it’s not fully baked. There are situations where examiners are inherently lazy, or they just simply use something like the requirements specification argument, which is just factual. It just demonstrates that they can’t be bothered to actually argue it properly or think about what the invention is. Sorry to any examiners listening to this, but this is just my personal view, that sometimes there are problems. I’m reminded of a quote from an EPI hearing I was at a long time ago, where the Legal Board of Appeal member said: “We understand that examining divisions can operate with a degree of mental laziness and that it’s too easy to throw too many things out of the basket when considering the issues of inventive step.” Now that one has stayed with me because you think — did someone just say that? And the answer is yes, they did. But it just goes to show that there is some tension between the TBA and the examining divisions, and they don’t always get it right. Rolf Claessen: So there might be a small difference now between the UKIPO’s future approach of assessing inventive step and the EPO? Bruce Dearling: Yeah, it might do. But the other interesting thing here — and thank you for pointing this out, I hadn’t entirely caught up with it, I’ve been traveling beforehand and I missed some of the UPC case law. So the UPC case law — in, was it — yeah, we talked about that. Rolf Claessen: Yeah. There was a decision in April, Abbott versus Sinocare. Bruce Dearling: Yeah, 901 of 2025. So a Court of Appeal decision from the UPC. It was APP_000000901, I believe, 2025. Decision 17th of April, hearing 27th of March. The UPC is not bound by — it’s a court. The European Patent Office is not a court, it’s an agency that administers and looks after the administrative rule of law. So the fact that this decision came out from the UK Supreme Court in February, and you see almost identical language used in the UPC decision, suggests that there is some alignment here, or some convergence in thought. Now, whilst the UPC decision also references G1/19 and uses problem-solution, there is enough — you’ve got to bear in mind that high-level courts do look at each other’s decisions. And this is really a question of influence and the desire to converge. So the fact that they’ve done this at this time is quite interesting. Again, I can’t quote someone directly from the EPO, although I would love to. They were saying — at a very high level — and they used the words “converge UPC practice towards UK Supreme Court practice on interpretation of the law.” So this may actually be happening in real time. Again, it would be wrong to actually refer to anyone by name, but it’s an observation that when I looked at the case, I can see why this is going ahead. And I can see why the judiciaries — they want to maintain independent judicial controls. They won’t reference the UK Supreme Court decision, not least because we’re not in the UPC. But if you look at the arguments in sections 106 and 107 of the UK Supreme Court’s Emotional Perception decision and head note one, you go — wow, this is very close. Rolf Claessen: Very close and nearly identical wording. Yeah. And the UPC also now uses non-technical features for assessing inventive step. Is that a problem for the EPO that has historically been aggressive in throwing out non-technical features for inventive step analysis? Bruce Dearling: Well, I think they really need to get to the situation — I don’t know — this holistic character test that I’m sort of proposing, where you really have to think about what the invention is achieving, and then look at how it’s technically being achieved. And then if you look at that again in the context of that other decision I mentioned — T 1249/22 — it says something like, in the case of an invention that amounts to a technical implementation of a non-technical method, provided the non-technical method does not contribute to the technical character of the invention. The board validated the approach of identifying the non-technical method and then goes through and says it’s patentable. There are decisions like this which suggest that examining divisions have to give it a bit more thought, because the Technical Board will realize that to satisfy the WTO requirements — which pretty much everyone is bound by — Article 27.1 TRIPS, which requires that you protect all fields of technology. And that means whether it’s data processing or business methods, because business methods can be patentable so long as they are implemented on a technical basis. That essentially seems to be what T 1249/22 is saying, although it doesn’t explicitly say “allowing business methods.” The exclusion is only “as such.” So does this decision, in combination with the Supreme Court case and the movement of the UPC, say: well, actually, let’s look at this properly? It requires objective assessments, not just superficial “let’s strike through that feature because I don’t like it, it looks non-technical.” Rolf Claessen: So are you hopeful that the EPO is adjusting and will reshape their case law in view of the UPC decision and the UK Supreme Court decision? Bruce Dearling: It’s a bit unfortunate that the corresponding UK case at the EPO was dropped by the applicants, because it was heading towards an examination hearing at the examining division. It would have gone to the TBA, and I’m sure it would then have gone from the TBA to the Enlarged Board. I’m pretty sure that’s the case. There is another case from the same client which will probably argue the same thing because the specs are almost identical. It’s just lagged in time. So is it going to change? I hope so, because I think the EPO have got it wrong — more often than not in this field. Well, maybe not more often than not — they get it wrong more times than they should do. Would I like to see it changed? Yes, I would, because I want the examiners to actually think about the technology as opposed to just — oh, it’s not — I don’t want to engage the gray matter. That serves no one. That doesn’t serve technology. That doesn’t serve industry. These patent rights are there for a reason. They are property rights. I’m referring to the award of the 2025 Nobel Prize for Economics — they are a core driver for society’s development. So the 2025 Nobel Prize was for something called creative destruction — the replacement of old technology with new — and it’s based on the patent paradigm. So all this stuff is coming to a head now. It’s just a question of how quickly the EPO actually catch up, and maybe they have something to catch up on. It’s just understanding that the examiners have to start to think. As I said, we’ve got the issues at the UKIPO where they’re going to have to retrain 400 examiners. Rolf Claessen: Yeah, right. Bruce Dearling: The Emotional Perception case wasn’t granted by the Supreme Court. They referred it back to the patent office for consideration under the intermediate step. So the patent office produced a response that I would describe as — I’d say arguably — not well reasoned, which I’ve filed the response to, which basically says you don’t really know what you’re talking about. What really worries me a bit is that I think they’re trying to introduce the Aerotel case through the back door. It’s backsliding. It’s a mechanism for trying to apply it in a different way or a different context, which would be wrong. I think they believe that the applicant will appeal this if they get a bad decision — they will appeal it back to the courts again via the High Court, Court of Appeal, Supreme Court route. I say maybe not. I say maybe the client will file what they call a judicial review, which is a nuclear option. That’s when you actually hold the Comptroller General of Patents to account and get full discovery of whether or not there’s internal documentation showing that they are deliberately circumventing the direction of the Supreme Court on the intermediate step. This is basically holding them to account and saying: if you’re not applying the intermediate step appropriately, you are in contempt of the law. So judicial review is a really serious thing to do, but it’s certainly something I would not exclude from consideration. We’ll see what happens. It’s not saying we’re just going to go through the courts and make them decide on this. We’re going to say you’re wrong. And there’s already enough evidence in the files to suggest that they are probably in contempt of court and they’re not applying the intermediate step appropriately. They may not know any better at the moment — they need to be guided — but the consequences for them are potentially severe. Rolf Claessen: I have another question for you. You were the instructing attorney — do you think the decision was perfect? What argument that you made was the most underappreciated by the court? And where do you think the judgment got it wrong, or was it all perfect? Bruce Dearling: No, it got 90% or 95% correct. The intermediate step is right. That’s the most important thing in the decision — it’s the intermediate step. The any-hardware thing — that’s logical, that makes some sense — but if people say “if the any-hardware rule is the important bit,” no it isn’t. It’s the intermediate step. That’s the important thing. Where do they go wrong? I think they went wrong because — and you’ve got to bear in mind that unlike German courts, I’ve got to be careful about how I express this — generally, as I understand it, and correct me if I’m wrong, but the judiciary in Germany on patent cases are generally more technically able. They’re normally technically qualified. I look at the Supreme Court justices and the Court of Appeal justices — we had one who was a humanities undergrad, one was a chemist. Good luck with trying to argue complex artificial neural network technologies, which are difficult even for me to understand. And I’ve been working in the field. They’re hard to understand. They require real understanding, real appreciation. They could say, well, actually we don’t need to look at the technology — but frankly, if you’re looking at the statutes and exclusions to patentability and asking what a computer program is, then you need to understand what these technical terms really are. And if you can’t, then the judgment is potentially flawed. Their finding that the neural network is a computer program is, I think, technically obtuse. You know that the Singaporean government — the Intellectual Property Office of Singapore — released about six weeks ago a consultation note to the Singaporean profession and population, asking: is the Emotional Perception case right, and do we need to adopt it into Singaporean national law? So this is direct soft power from the UK Supreme Court changing Commonwealth legislation and statutes. We’ll see what happens. But from what I’ve seen of a draft response from the attorneys, they’re saying essentially: we agree any hardware is right, the intermediate step is right. The assessment of the neural network as a computer program is wrong, or it just doesn’t make any sense. And I’ve made the same comments before in SIPA, in the relevant round in March. There’s a disconnect. I mean, it’s like they equate a computer program with being able to be run on an analog computer. Now, an analog computer has no central processing unit. An analog computer just has resistors and transistors and capacitors. So if they’re saying that an analog computer can run a program — that’s essentially what they’re saying in part of the judgment. Where is the program in an analog computer? And if they’re saying it’s in the values of the resistors and the capacitors, then that has implications for any circuit we’ve got — it’s potentially a computer program — which is just madness, because it doesn’t sit well with the legislation and decisions we’ve looked at over the last 50 years. This is a real problem. It may be a storm in a teacup because you can overcome the objections by having any hardware, but it’s an argument they shouldn’t have been making. It seems to be abstract legal argumentation which has little credibility in my personal view, although it’s now law. It may be that someone can take that, have an argument with the Supreme Court, get them to fix this. The other thing is the EPO looks at a neural network as a mathematical method, and the UK now says it’s a computer program. Neither is right. The EPO is wrong as well. If you look at the actual decision which they regularly quote — the Vicom case — if you actually read the claim and look at the case, you see that it doesn’t make a huge amount of sense. A neural network has applied mathematics in it. It can be based on a computer program because it’s required to set up the learning objectives and the loss function. Mathematical processes — it tweaks the weighting factors of neurons over the course of the training epochs. But at the end of the day, if the function performed by the neural network is new and it’s directed towards a technical implementation which is technically relevant, then it shouldn’t fail for being a mathematical method. And I think the EPO guidelines actually say that. Even recommendations — the UK court said that a recommendation is not technical. Well, actually it is, because it’s data processing, and you’ve got to work out how does the data processing work to provide an improved recommendation? Again, it goes back to the T 1249/22 decision. There’s a whole raft of these things which are left not entirely resolved. There’s enough here to keep someone busy for a few more years. Rolf Claessen: Right. So I have a question for you now that we’ve talked about the decision of the UK Supreme Court and the UPC — the Unified Patent Court — with very, very similar wording. What do you say are the three most important takeaways for patent practitioners in the US, in Europe, in the UK, before the EPO? Are there any things that you really want patent practitioners to take away from our discussion here? Bruce Dearling: Yeah, okay. So first: make sure the claim has some structure in it. You need to have any hardware. That’s number one — in terms of claim drafting. In terms of the description, you really have to understand what the invention is about. And you’ve got to make sure that you explain what function is achieved by what piece of hardware, kit or software. And if you do that — don’t nickel-and-dime this by writing the claim first — I would suggest that you run into problems. You need to understand what the invention is about. And you need to make sure that the description is complete and full to describe the functionality and the effects that are achieved in the real world. And if you can do that, then you’re on a much sounder basis — much, much stronger. There’s a much stronger foundation for this. So that’s two things. Is there a third one? That’s me being a bit cheeky, but I suppose I know what’s going on. Rolf Claessen: Yeah, but maybe the third takeaway is that maybe the EPO will rethink the way — at least how AI inventions are assessed for inventive step. Bruce Dearling: Well, as I said to you before, it could be that that’s the case. I don’t want to repeat myself again. The word “permissive” was used in a conversation I had with respect to the UK Supreme Court approach. COMVIK fundamentally still breaks with me and has done for years, because the way it’s set up and the way it’s applied distorts fundamentally what the invention is about. And until such time as that distortion is removed, there is a problem of objectivity versus subjectivity. And I think that’s really what the EPO has to grapple with. It’s not an easy thing to deal with, but maybe there are things going on. Bruce Dearling: It’s not an easy thing to deal with. I don’t know who’s going to argue it. It would have been useful for me to still have the original case up and running at the EPO because these arguments would have been fleshed out. I’m pretty sure they would have been referred to the Enlarged Board. We would have got it resolved. So it’s whether or not I can now work this into the existing case to try and get the examining division to — well, they will refuse, I suspect. And then it’ll go to the TBA. And then the TBA will have to look at this, hopefully with the referrals to the Enlarged Board. And then that fixes the problem on a national and international basis. Rolf Claessen: Yeah. Let’s see. [Laughs] Bruce Dearling: No, we don’t know. I mean, you might have a different view. What do you think? Do you think COMVIK is fundamentally right or fundamentally wrong? Rolf Claessen: Well, I’m not so much into AI inventions. I’m a chemist and I usually deal with chemistry inventions. But from the discussion that we had, I think that the EPO might rethink their position. I don’t know. Let’s see. Let’s hope so. Bruce Dearling: Well, they liked it. They liked problem-solution. It’s been with us for 25 years. It suggests that it’s a compromise. It’s not mandated by the European Patent Convention — that’s the point. It’s something they think works. And these things only work until such time as someone comes along and says, actually, you’re wrong, and this is the reason. Rolf Claessen: Let’s see if they choose a different route at least for AI inventions. So Bruce, thank you very much for your insight and for talking about the case that you were involved in with the UK Supreme Court. Where could people reach you if they have more questions about this field — basically patents, AI protection in the UK and Europe — and if they want to ask you more questions about this case? Bruce Dearling: Sure. Through the Hepworth Brown website or my LinkedIn profile, I suppose. The Hepworth Brown website has an email link. I’m trying to post things on it as well to try and provide a bit more context. But if people have fundamental questions on this stuff, then I’m happy to try and answer them. I suppose that I can be considered to be quite knowledgeable in the area. Rolf Claessen: Right. Certainly more than I am. [Laughing] Bruce Dearling: So I was fortunate. As a consequence of the work I’m doing, I was appointed last year to the WIPO Standing Committee on Patents and Privacy. That was discussed for the issues of where WIPO goes and what the direction of the problems are that we have in high-tech areas. So there seems to be some degree of understanding that I might know what I’m talking about. I think I probably do. Rolf Claessen: Thank you, Bruce. Thank you very much for being on IP Fridays. Bruce Dearling: My pleasure. Thank you very much, Rolf.

George Washington signed the first U.S. Patent Act in April 1790 and unleashed the most innovative economy in human history — America is 5% of the world's population but produces over 20% of global GDP, and it all traces back to one founding principle the left wants to destroy: economic freedom. Join AARP's Fight Against Fraud: https://a250toolkit.com/Larry SHOP OUR MERCH: https://store.townhallmedia.com/ BUY A LARRY MUG: https://store.townhallmedia.com/products/larry-mug Watch LARRY with Larry O'Connor LIVE — Monday-Thursday at 12PM Eastern on YouTube, Facebook, & Rumble! Find LARRY with Larry O'Connor wherever you get your podcasts! SPOTIFY: https://open.spotify.com/show/7i8F7K4fqIDmqZSIHJNhMh?si=814ce2f8478944c0&nd=1&dlsi=e799ca22e81b456f APPLE: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/larry/id1730596733 Become a Townhall VIP Member today and use promo code LARRY for 50% off: https://townhall.com/subscribe?tpcc=poddescription https://townhall.com/ https://rumble.com/c/c-5769468 https://www.facebook.com/townhallcom/ https://www.instagram.com/townhallmedia/ https://twitter.com/townhallcomBecome a Townhall VIP member with promo code "LARRY": https://townhall.com/subscribeSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

This Day in Legal History: Patent Office OpenedOn this day in legal history, July 31, 1790, the United States issued its first patent under the newly created Patent Act of 1790. The inaugural patent was granted to Samuel Hopkins of Vermont for a process of making potash, an essential industrial chemical used in soap and fertilizer production. Signed by President George Washington, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, and Attorney General Edmund Randolph, this first patent reflected the constitutional mandate to “promote the progress of science and useful arts.”The Patent Act established a system that allowed inventors to secure exclusive rights to their inventions for a limited time, fostering a culture of innovation. Unlike today's process, early patents required a review by a board of Cabinet-level officials and carried no numbering system—Hopkins' patent is only retroactively considered Patent No. 1.This moment marked the beginning of formal intellectual property protection in the U.S., setting the foundation for one of the world's most robust patent systems. The legal infrastructure created that year would evolve into the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, playing a central role in industrial and technological development over the next two centuries. It was a clear sign of the young republic's commitment to innovation through legal means.A White House report released Wednesday by President Trump's crypto working group calls for swift regulatory action on digital assets. The administration urged Congress to pass a comprehensive crypto bill, such as the Clarity Act, while advocating for key additions. These include allowing platforms to both trade and hold crypto, and tailoring disclosure requirements for crypto securities. The report also recommends giving the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) authority over crypto spot markets and embracing decentralized finance technologies.In addition to legislative suggestions, the White House wants the SEC and CFTC to act under their current powers to enable federal-level trading of digital assets. The report promotes using tools like safe harbors and regulatory sandboxes to accelerate access to new financial products, including tokenized assets like real estate and stocks. This approach reflects Trump's broader campaign promise to foster crypto innovation, in sharp contrast to the Biden administration's enforcement-heavy stance, which included lawsuits against major exchanges that have since been dropped.Despite concerns over potential conflicts of interest—given Trump's family's crypto ventures and his personal stake in a crypto platform—the administration has denied any impropriety. The report's findings could significantly shape the direction of ongoing legislative negotiations and regulatory frameworks.White House in crypto policy report calls for SEC action, new legislation | ReutersA proposed budget from the U.S. House of Representatives threatens major cuts to the federal public defense system, according to a July 25 memo from Judge Robert Conrad, director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. If enacted, the judiciary warns it may be forced to eliminate more than 600 positions in the Defender Services program or delay payments to court-appointed defense attorneys by over two months—potentially the longest such delay ever.The $8.9 billion budget plan advanced by the House Appropriations Committee's financial services subcommittee increases overall judiciary funding by 3.5%, but it still falls significantly short of what the courts requested. Specifically, the $1.57 billion allocated to Defender Services is $196 million less than needed, despite being an 8.2% increase from the previous year. This shortfall could impair the judiciary's ability to meet its constitutional obligations under Gideon v. Wainwright, which requires that indigent criminal defendants receive legal representation.The judiciary is also currently experiencing a funding gap that has already caused a three-month delay in payments to Criminal Justice Act (CJA) panel attorneys. Without additional funding, the delay could extend to 77 days next year, further weakening the public defense infrastructure. The judiciary has asked for $116 million in supplemental funding to stabilize the program.The full House Appropriations Committee is not expected to take up the bill until September, and the Senate has not yet released its version.US House budget threatens over 600 public defender jobs, judiciary warns | ReutersUber is facing a pivotal legal challenge in California state court over its responsibility to protect riders from sexual assault by its drivers. A hearing before Judge Ethan Schulman will determine whether hundreds of consolidated cases move forward as bellwether jury trials this fall. These cases center on whether Uber should be liable for assaults allegedly committed by drivers who, plaintiffs argue, exploited Uber's lack of mandatory training, in-vehicle cameras, or stricter vetting.Uber defends itself by claiming drivers are independent contractors and that criminal behavior is unforeseeable, not the company's legal responsibility. It points to safety measures like GPS tracking and background checks as fulfilling its obligations. However, plaintiffs argue that Uber promoted itself as a safe alternative for intoxicated riders and should be held to the higher duty of care expected of a “common carrier,” similar to taxi services.A central legal issue is whether Uber's conduct constitutes misfeasance—actively creating risk—or nonfeasance—failing to prevent harm. Under California law, a company with a “special relationship” with its customers, like a common carrier, must exercise “utmost care.” A federal judge has already ruled that Uber qualifies as a common carrier in related litigation.Uber's broader legal strategy has included challenging consolidated suits through the Ninth Circuit and supporting a Nevada ballot measure to limit plaintiffs' attorneys' fees—both of which failed. Legal experts note Uber faces an uphill battle, as courts are increasingly viewing ride-hailing platforms as more than passive intermediaries.Uber's Legal Duty to Riders at Forefront of Mass Assault CasesEric Tung, President Trump's nominee for the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, defended controversial past remarks on gender roles during a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on Wednesday. Democratic senators, particularly Alex Padilla and Dick Durbin, pressed Tung over statements he made as a Yale undergraduate in 2004, where he criticized radical feminists and asserted that gender roles support institutions like marriage. Padilla called the comments “reprehensible,” while Durbin challenged Tung's recent views as expressed at a Federalist Society event, where Tung appeared to reject constitutional protections for abortion, same-sex marriage, and private sexual conduct.Tung explained that his undergraduate comments were based on his belief at the time that men and women had complementary roles and that the family should be strengthened. He noted that his wife has had a distinguished professional and political career, arguing she excels in many areas. Though he affirmed that Obergefell v. Hodges, which legalized same-sex marriage, is binding precedent, he declined to discuss his personal views on gender roles, citing potential future cases.Tung, a former clerk for Justices Scalia and Gorsuch and a partner at Jones Day, emphasized his originalist and textualist judicial philosophy. Despite strong backing from Republicans on the panel, Democrats criticized his ideological leanings and questioned his fitness for a lifetime appointment to the influential appellate court.Trump appellate court nominee defends comments on 'gender roles' | Reuters This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.minimumcomp.com/subscribe

This Day in Legal History: Abraham Lincoln, InventorOn May 22, 1849, Abraham Lincoln was awarded U.S. Patent No. 6,469 for an invention designed to lift boats over shoals and other obstacles in shallow waterways. The device involved a system of bellows attached to the hull of a boat, which could be inflated to lift the vessel over obstructions. Lincoln conceived the idea after witnessing firsthand how flatboats became stranded on sandbars during his travels on the Mississippi River. Though the invention was never manufactured, Lincoln's patent represents a rare intersection of legal, political, and technological history.Lincoln's detailed model, which he carved himself, is now preserved at the Smithsonian Institution. His application demonstrated a firm grasp of both mechanics and the legal requirements of patent law, including the novelty and utility standards necessary for approval. Lincoln's interest in patents was not merely personal—he viewed the patent system as a key driver of American innovation and economic growth. In an 1858 lecture, he praised the patent system as adding "the fuel of interest to the fire of genius."This episode in Lincoln's life underscores the connection between law and invention in the 19th century. The U.S. patent system, formalized under the Patent Act of 1790 and modified several times by Lincoln's era, provided crucial protections to inventors during a time of rapid industrial development. Lincoln's engagement with the system as both an inventor and a lawyer reflects the broader legal culture of self-improvement and technological optimism in antebellum America.Matthew Lane, a 19-year-old student at Assumption University in Massachusetts, has agreed to plead guilty to charges stemming from a significant data breach at PowerSchool, a cloud-based education software company. Federal prosecutors allege Lane accessed PowerSchool's network in September 2024 using stolen contractor credentials, obtaining sensitive data on more than 60 million students and 10 million teachers. This data, including Social Security numbers and addresses, was later used in a $2.85 million bitcoin ransom demand.Lane transferred the stolen data to a server in Ukraine before the extortion attempt, which caused alarm among parents and school districts. The breach, which PowerSchool disclosed in January 2025, was reportedly linked to earlier extortion efforts targeting a telecommunications company, from which Lane and others attempted to extract a $200,000 ransom. The case marks the first public identification of a suspect in the PowerSchool breach, which has impacted numerous school districts.PowerSchool admitted to paying a ransom to prevent public exposure of the data. Lane faces charges including cyber extortion, aggravated identity theft, and unauthorized access to protected computers. If convicted, he will serve at least two years in prison. His attorney has not commented.Massachusetts college student to plead guilty to PowerSchool data breach | ReutersA federal judge in Philadelphia has rejected Vanguard Group's proposed $40 million settlement with investors who claimed they were hit with unexpected tax bills from its target-date mutual funds. U.S. District Judge John Murphy ruled that the deal provided "no value" to investors because it duplicated benefits already secured through a $135 million settlement Vanguard reached with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) earlier this year.In that SEC settlement, investors were promised compensation without having to pay legal fees or waive future claims. By contrast, the proposed class action settlement would have reduced investor payouts due to more than $13 million in attorneys' fees. Judge Murphy sided with an objecting class member who argued the SEC accord already gave investors the same benefits, making the class settlement redundant and financially disadvantageous.Both settlements stem from Vanguard's 2020 move to lower the minimum investment threshold for its lower-cost institutional target-date funds. This triggered a mass migration from higher-cost retail funds, prompting large redemptions that led to capital gains being passed on to remaining investors.Vanguard argued that rejecting the settlement might discourage firms from resolving regulatory and civil actions simultaneously. However, the court emphasized fairness to the class over procedural convenience.US judge rejects Vanguard $40 million mutual fund settlement, cites SEC accord | ReutersThe Trump administration has asked the U.S. Supreme Court to block a lower court order requiring it to provide documents and testimony about the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), a White House office linked to Elon Musk's federal reform initiative. The watchdog group Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) filed a lawsuit seeking transparency about DOGE's operations, arguing that it should be subject to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The administration contends DOGE is exempt because it functions within the White House as a presidential advisory body.A federal judge ruled that CREW's claims were likely valid and allowed limited discovery, including testimony from DOGE administrator Amy Gleason. The court rejected the administration's argument that such discovery violated separation of powers, stating that DOGE had not demonstrated any undue burden or justified confidentiality. The DC Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's order and noted the administration failed to raise the separation-of-powers defense earlier in the case.The Justice Department is now seeking emergency relief from the Supreme Court, arguing that allowing discovery into DOGE compromises executive confidentiality. Meanwhile, CREW maintains the office exercises substantial independent authority and should not be shielded from public scrutiny. The case raises key questions about the transparency of quasi-governmental offices within the executive branch.DOGE Asks US Supreme Court to Block Access to Its Records - Bloomberg This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.minimumcomp.com/subscribe

This Day in Legal History: Patent Act of 1790On April 10, 1790, the United States passed its first patent law, the Patent Act of 1790, laying the groundwork for a legal framework that would protect inventors and promote innovation. This early legislation granted inventors the exclusive right to their discoveries for a period of 14 years, provided the invention was deemed "useful and important." It was signed into law by President George Washington and represented one of the earliest legal efforts by the new republic to encourage economic growth through technological advancement. The law established a board composed of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Attorney General, who were tasked with reviewing patent applications and deciding whether to approve them.Notably, the law gave the federal government broad discretion over what could be patented and required that a patent be granted only if the invention was new and useful. The first U.S. patent under this act was issued on July 31, 1790, to Samuel Hopkins for a process of making potash, a key industrial chemical. Although modest in scope, the law was revolutionary in its recognition of intellectual property as a public good worth safeguarding. It helped move the United States toward a more structured innovation economy, setting a precedent that influenced global norms on patent protection.The 1790 law was replaced just three years later by the Patent Act of 1793, which shifted the review process to a more administrative function, but the foundational principle—that inventors should have exclusive rights to their creations—remained intact. This early commitment to fostering invention through legal means helped spur the rapid technological growth that would define American industry in the 19th century and beyond. The act exemplified how the law could be used to incentivize creativity and economic development at a national scale.Bristol Myers Squibb successfully got a proposed class action lawsuit dismissed that had accused it of using fraudulent tactics to maintain a monopoly over its cancer drug, Pomalyst. The suit, led by Blue Cross Blue Shield of Louisiana, claimed that Bristol Myers and its subsidiary Celgene illegally secured patents and filed sham lawsuits to delay the entry of generic versions of Pomalyst, which is used to treat multiple myeloma. However, U.S. District Judge Edgardo Ramos ruled that the plaintiffs failed to prove that any of the six patents were obtained through fraud. He also found no evidence that the nine lawsuits Celgene filed between 2017 and 2020 against generic manufacturers like Teva and Mylan were baseless or intended to secure fraudulent settlements.The plaintiffs alleged that they had been overpaying for the drug since October 2020, the point at which generics could have entered the market if not for the alleged conduct. Pomalyst brought in $3.55 billion in sales in 2024, accounting for more than 7% of Bristol Myers' revenue. Celgene originally developed the drug, and Bristol Myers acquired the company in 2019. The case was heard in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.Bristol Myers wins dismissal of lawsuit alleging Pomalyst monopoly | ReutersThe Trump administration has frozen over $1 billion in federal funding for Cornell University and $790 million for Northwestern University amid investigations into alleged civil rights violations. The freeze affects grants and contracts from several federal agencies, including health, education, agriculture, and defense. This move is part of a broader crackdown targeting universities over pro-Palestinian campus protests, diversity programs, and transgender policies. The administration previously warned 60 universities, including Cornell and Northwestern, about potential enforcement if they failed to address what it labeled as antisemitism.Cornell confirmed it received “stop work” orders from the defense department affecting research projects but said it hasn't been formally notified of the total funding freeze. Northwestern similarly acknowledged awareness of media reports but stated it hadn't received official notice. The university emphasized the freeze could endanger critical research, including projects on cybersecurity, pacemakers, and Alzheimer's treatment.This action follows similar measures taken against Harvard, Princeton, Columbia, and the University of Pennsylvania. Columbia, which lost $400 million in funding, later agreed to administrative changes in exchange for potential reinstatement. Federal agents have also begun detaining and deporting some foreign student protesters, revoking visas in the process. Critics, including human rights groups, have voiced concerns over free speech, academic freedom, Islamophobia, and anti-Arab discrimination amid the escalating response to pro-Palestinian activism on campuses.US freezes funding for Cornell, Northwestern University in latest crackdownPresident Trump has issued a new executive order aimed at blocking state-level climate policies that seek to reduce fossil fuel use and limit carbon emissions. The directive instructs the U.S. attorney general to identify and challenge state laws related to climate change, environmental justice, ESG (environmental, social, and governance) standards, and carbon regulation. The move aligns with Trump's broader agenda to boost domestic fossil fuel production and roll back Democratic-led environmental initiatives.The order specifically targets policies in states like New York, Vermont, and California, including financial penalties on fossil fuel companies, California's cap-and-trade system, and climate-related lawsuits brought by state governments. Trump described these measures as ideologically driven and harmful to national energy and economic security.Governors Kathy Hochul (NY) and Michelle Lujan Grisham (NM), co-chairs of the U.S. Climate Alliance, condemned the order, asserting states' rights to enact environmental protections. They reaffirmed their commitment to clean energy and climate resilience. The American Petroleum Institute supported Trump's move, framing it as a defense against unconstitutional state actions that burden oil and gas companies.Trump issues order to block state climate change policies | Reuters This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.minimumcomp.com/subscribe

Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you'll hear the Court's opinion in Amgen Inc. v Sanofi. In this case, the court considered this issue: Do Amgen's two patents satisfy the Patent Act's enablement clause—that is, describing the invention with sufficient particularity that would enable a “skilled artisan” to “make and use” the claimed invention? The case was decided on May 18, 2023. The Supreme Court held that Amgen's two patent applications—purporting to cover all antibodies that bind and block the PCSK9 receptor involved in LDL cholesterol metabolism—fail to satisfy the Patent Act's enablement clause. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the unanimous opinion of the Court affirming the judgment below. It is well established that the enablement requirement means that if a patent claims an entire class of process, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter, its specification must enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the entire class. While the specification may call for a reasonable amount of experimentation to make and use a claimed invention, it must not be too broad. Amgen's specification fails to enable all that it has claimed, even allowing for a reasonable degree of experimentation. It described 26 antibodies by their amino acid sequences, but it claims to monopolize an entire class of antibodies not described. Thus, its claim is too broad. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

This Day in Legal History: Patent Act ApprovedOn April 10, 1790, a significant milestone in U.S. legal and innovation history was reached when Congress approved America's first Patent Act. This foundational legislation was instrumental in laying the groundwork for the protection of intellectual property in the United States, a concept that has become a cornerstone of the modern global economy. The Patent Act of 1790 empowered inventors with the "sole and exclusive right and liberty of making, constructing, using and vending to others" their inventions, providing them with a fourteen-year period of protection. This period was designed to incentivize innovation while balancing the public's interest in the eventual free use of inventions. Moreover, the Act led to the creation of the U.S. Patent Board, marking the establishment of an official body responsible for the examination and awarding of patents. This entity is recognized as the precursor to today's U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), an institution that plays a pivotal role in the protection of intellectual property rights and the encouragement of technological advancement and creativity. The enactment of the Patent Act of 1790 not only recognized the importance of protecting inventors' rights but also set the stage for the United States to become a global leader in innovation and economic development.The EPA recently established the first-ever drinking water standards for PFAS (per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances), commonly referred to as "forever chemicals," due to their persistence in the environment. This rule aims to reduce exposure to these carcinogenic substances, affecting up to 6,700 utilities and potentially benefiting around 100 million Americans. Specifically, the EPA has set an enforceable limit of 4 parts per trillion for two primary PFAS compounds—PFOA and PFOS—and a non-enforceable goal of zero exposure due to associated health risks, including cancer. Additionally, a limit of 10 parts per trillion is applied to three other PFAS categories, covering compounds like PFNA, PFHxS, and GenX chemicals.This regulatory action reflects growing concern over PFAS presence in approximately 45% of U.S. drinking water sources, posing significant risks to public health. Utilities will be mandated to monitor, reduce, and notify customers of PFAS levels exceeding these new limits, incorporating advanced treatment technologies such as granular activated carbon and reverse osmosis for removal.To support compliance, the federal government has allocated about $1 billion for PFAS testing and removal, with an additional $12 billion for broader drinking water system improvements. The implementation of these standards represents a critical step by the Biden-Harris Administration towards ensuring environmental justice and safeguarding clean water, contrasting with the World Health Organization's less stringent PFAS guidelines.However, compliance is expected to be costly, with estimates suggesting an annual financial burden of up to $3.8 billion for water utilities. This financial challenge underscores the broader issue of funding essential infrastructure updates and addressing emerging contaminants, highlighting a significant shift in regulatory approach to protect public health from PFAS contamination.Final PFAS Drinking Water Rule to Affect Up to 6,700 UtilitiesUS sets first standard to curb 'forever chemicals' from drinking water | ReutersThe litigation involving Donald Trump's merger with a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) concerning his social media platform, Truth Social, has been assigned to Vice Chancellor Morgan T. Zurn in Delaware Chancery Court, known for her experience with meme stock litigation. This case is among four lawsuits filed over the Trump-Truth Social merger, plus an additional insider trading case. Despite an attempt to block the merger, it concluded in March, leading to an initial surge in Trump Media & Technology Group Corp.'s value, which later saw a significant decline, diminishing billions in value.By way of very brief background, a SPAC operates as a shell corporation designed solely to merge with a private company, thereby taking it public (that is, listing its shares for trade publicly on the market) without going through the traditional and often lengthy initial public offering (IPO) process. SPACs are initially created by a group of investors—often led by a seasoned entrepreneur or business executive—known as the sponsors, who raise capital through an IPO of the SPAC itself, even though it has no existing business operations. The funds raised are placed into a trust account, and the SPAC is given a predetermined timeframe, typically 18 to 24 months, to identify and complete a merger with a target company. If the merger is successfully executed within the allotted time, the target company becomes public as a result. However, if the SPAC fails to find a suitable company to merge with or the shareholders disapprove of the proposed merger, the SPAC is dissolved, and the funds are returned to the investors. This mechanism provides a faster, albeit sometimes riskier, alternative to the traditional IPO, offering private companies a streamlined path to public market access and investors a unique investment opportunity tied to the SPAC sponsors' expertise and the potential of the target company.Vice Chancellor Zurn, recognized for her adept handling of cases involving meme stock traders and complex market manipulation theories, now faces the Truth Social lawsuit, highlighting the increasing intersection of retail trading phenomena with legal disputes in the corporate sector. This case centers on allegations that Trump wrongfully diluted the equity of two former "The Apprentice" contestants who co-founded Trump Media, with Trump counter-suing to cancel their shares. The legal battle involves claims of breach of fiduciary duties and retaliatory actions against the co-founders, with new complaints recently allowed to be updated.The assignment of this high-profile case to Zurn underlines the Delaware Chancery Court's role as a crucial arena for major corporate and shareholder disputes, now expanded to include the unique challenges posed by the involvement of meme stock traders. The outcome of this litigation could have broader implications for corporate governance, investor rights, and the regulation of digital and social media ventures in the rapidly evolving landscape of retail trading and online community-driven investment strategies.Trump SPAC Litigation Heads to Judge With Meme Stock ExperienceA Russian court has upheld a significant fine against Google, rejecting the tech giant's appeal against a 4.6 billion rouble ($49.4 million) penalty. This fine was imposed for Google's failure to delete content that the Russian government deems to be false information about the conflict in Ukraine. The decision comes amid ongoing tensions between Russia and foreign tech companies over issues of content censorship, particularly following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.The Moscow City Court confirmed the decision made by the Tagansky District Court, effectively leaving Google's challenge unsatisfied. The fine also pertains to Google's inability to remove extremist content and what the Russian authorities label as LGBT propaganda, indicating a broader crackdown on the digital content distributed by international tech firms within Russia.Notably, Google's YouTube platform, while under scrutiny, has not faced the same fate as Twitter and Facebook, which have been blocked in Russia. This penalty against Google is part of a series of fines based on the company's annual turnover in Russia, with Google facing increasing financial penalties over similar issues in the past. This ruling underscores the escalating conflict between the Russian government and global technology companies over the control and regulation of online content and freedom of expression.Russian court rejects Google's appeal against $50-mln fine over Ukraine content | Reuters Get full access to Minimum Competence - Daily Legal News Podcast at www.minimumcomp.com/subscribe

Navigate the interface of IP and transformative technologies that can augment human capabilities, both in science fiction and emerging reality with Co-hosts, Shareholders, and Intellectual Property attorneys Michael Snyder and Joseph Gushue.  If you're interested in intellectual property, bioethical dilemmas, the future of technology, or just love a good legal quandary set against a backdrop of pop culture, this episode is tailored for you. The hosts draw upon well-known figures such as DC Comics' Cyborg, Marvel's Winter Soldier, and the Borg from Star Trek to frame the discussion. They then discuss William Gibson in Neuromancer and the “ahead of its time” film adaptation Johnny Mnemonic, starring Keanu Reeves. Complexities around the patenting of bioengineered life forms and examining what distinguishes bioengineered entities (like synthetic insulin) from unpatentable naturally occurring elements are discussed. This includes Neurolink chips, currently safeguarded by patents, which hold the promise of revolutionary medical treatments and cognitive enhancements. Michael and Joe also highlight on questions of inventorship in an era where human augmentation might become a source of creativity or innovation. The ripples of this technological integration are touched on by principles outlined in the Patent Act and Copyright Act, sparking a debate on the intersections between legal protocols for artificial intelligence and looming human technology augmentation. As Joe anticipates the normalization of AR and VR technologies with the introduction of Apple Vision Pro, this conversation underscores the significance for pioneers to bravely adopt—and adapt to—these emerging innovations. Simultaneously, the episode ponders the legal frameworks that have yet to fully grapple with such advancements.  So, put on your thinking caps, open a window in your Apple Vision Pro, or turn on your Neuralink Chips and stay curious about the future of IP and technology! Timestamps: 01:19 Defining Techno-Humanism  02:36 Exploring human-machine combination in comic book characters 06:58 Star Trek and The Borg Collective 09:29 Influence of William Gibson on Science Fiction 15:12 Blade Runner (1982) 20:04 Augmenting Human Bodies with Technology and Patenting Life Forms 29:34 Final Thoughts – Resistance is Futile  For full show notes and to explore more episodes, please visit www.vklaw.com/newsroom-podcasts. You can stay connected with us on Facebook, Linkedin or Twitter, and Instagram using the handle @volpeandkoenig.

Join co-hosts Michael Snyder and Joseph Gushue on a new episode of "IP Goes Pop!" that will leave you wondering "You can patent that?!". This episode focuses on a variety of curious and/or unusual patents, demonstrating the wide range of ideas that can result in an issued patent. From the surprising to the peculiar, this episode provides an overview of the “usefulness” threshold in United States patent law. “Listeners will learn about existing patents that are as bizarre as they are “useful,” and how anyone might have an idea that has “utility” and is therefore worthy of a patent. The episode begins with a discussion on the United States Patent Act, the cornerstone of patent law in the United States. Michael and Joseph break down some of the Patent Act's key provisions, focusing on the “utility” or “usefulness” requirement for patentability. The hosts then explore a series of unusual patents, each serving as a case study of this requirement. From a self-inflicted kicking device to an apparatus that allows one to simulate a high-five, to a banana case, listeners will marvel at the odd range of inventions that have been awarded patents. This episode also features patents that highlight the importance of protecting even the simplest of items and serves as a reminder that patent law is not just about groundbreaking technology, but also about practical solutions to everyday problems. The reach of patent law protection is broader than one might think. This episode of "IP Goes Pop!" is not just an exploration of the quirky side of patents. It's a celebration of human creativity and innovation, demonstrating that no idea is too outlandish or too trivial to be considered for patent protection. Whether you're an IP enthusiast, a pop culture aficionado, or just someone who enjoys the world of the bizarre, this episode is a must-listen. Tune in to be entertained, enlightened, and inspired to think outside the box- or perhaps patent the box itself. For full show notes and to explore more episodes, please visit www.vklaw.com/newsroom-podcasts. You can stay connected with us on Facebook, Linkedin or Twitter, and Instagram using the handle @volpeandkoenig. Links to Patents Mentioned in this episode: “User-operated amusement apparatus for kicking the user's buttocks” US6293874B1 “Apparatus for simulating a ‘high five'” US5356330A “In-Car Coffee Maker" US5233914A “Graffiti prevention apparatus” US5675318A “Banana Protective Device US6612440B1 “Beerbrella” US6637447B2 “Safety system for removing rider from vehicle by deploying a parachute” US5593111A “Method of Swinging on a Swing” - US6368227B1 “Hypodermic syringes and attachments thereto pleasing to children” US3299891A “Barrier Device for Children” US5255958A 

Sarah and David react as SCOTUS weighs in on social media regulations. Sigh. Also: -Justice Jackson cutting to the chase -Patent Act and dad jokes -Reader Comments -Judicial side eye for banning platforms for speech -West Virginia and the abortion pill -Constitutional rights and admission standards -Happy Memorial Day weekend Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast: Episode 411. As noted in KOL409 (Part 1: Patent Law), although I've done dozens of speeches and interviews over the past 20 or so years on libertarian aspects of intellectual property, or IP, that is, on IP policy, I've never done any in depth lectures for libertarians on IP law itself. In KOL409, I did a brief overview of various types of IP law, and then focused on the patent law and patent application process itself. This episode provides a tutorial on copyright law. (Recorded Thursday, April 27, 2023.) See additional note below. The slides I used are streamed below and here (.pptx) and streamed below. https://youtu.be/1yziV15ZGso In the Q&A session, a participant asked a question about joint ownership of patents and patent licensing. In the lecture I had pointed out that for co-authors of a copyright-protected work, each has the right to license the work, without permission of the other co-author(s), but has to share any profits (make an accounting) with them. The question was what the rule was in the case of patents, and I had forgotten the nuance. In patents the rule is similar, except the inventor-co-owner who grants the license need not make an accounting.   Regarding the issue of joint inventors on a patent, I had a brain fart. In copyright, co-authors can each license the work but if they make a profit, they have to account to the other co-author. Under patent law, if there are joint inventors, they all presumably co-own the patent (unless the employer does in the case of work for hire), and each one is entitled to (non-exclusively) license it, just as in the copyright case, but there is no obligation to do an accounting of profits made. As the Patent Act (35 USC §262 - Joint owners) provides: In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, each of the joint owners of a patent may make, use, offer to sell, or sell the patented invention within the United States, or import the patented invention into the United States, without the consent of and without accounting to the other owners.

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast: Episode 411. As noted in KOL409 (Part 1: Patent Law), although I've done dozens of speeches and interviews over the past 20 or so years on libertarian aspects of intellectual property, or IP, that is, on IP policy, I've never done any in depth lectures for libertarians on IP law itself. In KOL409, I did a brief overview of various types of IP law, and then focused on the patent law and patent application process itself. This episode provides a tutorial on copyright law. (Recorded Thursday, April 27, 2023.) See additional note below. For other episodes in the series: KOL409 | IP Law Tutorial, Part 1: Patent Law KOL412 | IP Law Tutorial, Part 3: Trademark, Trade Secret, and Other The slides I used are streamed below and here (.pptx) and streamed below. https://youtu.be/1yziV15ZGso In the Q&A session, a participant asked a question about joint ownership of patents and patent licensing. In the lecture I had pointed out that for co-authors of a copyright-protected work, each has the right to license the work, without permission of the other co-author(s), but has to share any profits (make an accounting) with them. The question was what the rule was in the case of patents, and I had forgotten the nuance. In patents the rule is similar, except the inventor-co-owner who grants the license need not make an accounting.   Regarding the issue of joint inventors on a patent, I had a brain fart. In copyright, co-authors can each license the work but if they make a profit, they have to account to the other co-author. Under patent law, if there are joint inventors, they all presumably co-own the patent (unless the employer does in the case of work for hire), and each one is entitled to (non-exclusively) license it, just as in the copyright case, but there is no obligation to do an accounting of profits made. As the Patent Act (35 USC §262 - Joint owners) provides: In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, each of the joint owners of a patent may make, use, offer to sell, or sell the patented invention within the United States, or import the patented invention into the United States, without the consent of and without accounting to the other owners.

Discusses common technology transfer issues that university faculty and staff should be mindful of when developing technology that may be commercialized, ways to navigate those issues, current events they should be paying attention to, and additional resources they can utilize to navigate the commercialization of technology.Our guest is Eric Wagner, Ph.D., JD who is the Director, Legal Affairs in Duke University's Office for Translation and Commercialization (OTC). His responsibilities include preparing and prosecuting patent applications, assisting OTC staff regarding patent and licensing matters, and managing intellectual assets owned by Duke University.Additional Resources:· AUTM provides various resources on working with technology transfer offices: https://autm.net/· The American Intellectual Property Law Association provides information on ongoing intellectual property matters, such as Section 101 of the Patent Act: https://www.aipla.org/detail/news/2022/10/21/aipla-comments-to-uspto-on-subject-matter-guidance· More information on Amgen v. Sanofi can be found online· CITI Program provides an online course on technology transfer: https://about.citiprogram.org/course/technology-transfer/

Section 112 of the Patent Act provides that a patent's "specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it," sufficient "to enable any person skilled in the art * * * to make and use the" invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). The requirement that the specification teach skilled artisans "to make and use" the invention is referred to as the "'enablement'" requirement. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 379 (1996). The questions presented are: 1. Whether enablement is "a question of fact to be determined by the jury," Wood v. Underhill, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 1, 4 (1846), as this Court has held, or "a question of law that [the court] review[s] without deference," Pet. App. 6a, as the Federal Circuit holds. 2. Whether enablement is governed by the statutory requirement that the specification teach those skilled in the art to "make and use" the claimed invention, 35 U.S.C. § 112, or whether it must instead enable those skilled in the art "to reach the full scope of claimed embodiments" without undue experimentation-i.e., to cumulatively identify and make all or nearly all embodiments of the invention without substantial "'time and effort,'" Pet.App. 14a (emphasis added). LIMITED TO QUESTION 2 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-757.html

A case in which the Court held that two of Amgen's patents do not satisfy the Patent Act's enablement clause because they do not describe the invention with sufficient particularity that would enable a “skilled artisan” to “make and use” the claimed invention.

As global crises abound, from pandemics to war, society cries out for myriad new technologies, from healthcare and high tech to manufacturing, energy, environment, and food. This panel will explore how the antitrust and patent systems can best foster competition and innovation in each of these vital areas. What are the key ideas to bear in mind when sculpting these specific legal systems? What are the agencies like the PTO and DoJ Antitrust Division best able to accomplish; and what legal rules help them do their best work? How do the courts fit in? What roles are best played by large business firms compared to small and medium enterprises? This panel will explore the lessons that can be drawn from big changes made over the past century to the patent-antitrust interface such as the 1952 Patent Act and the 2011 America Invents Act with an eye towards how best to use them to shape the legal systems for tomorrow.Featuring:Hon. Makan Delrahim, Partner, Latham & Watkins LLP; Former Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of JusticeProf. Christine Haight Farley, Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property, American University Washington College of LawHon. Andrei Iancu, Partner, Irell & Manella LLP; Former Undersecretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, U.S. Patent and Trademark OfficeHon. F. Scott Kieff, Fred C. Stevenson Research Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School; Former Commissioner, U.S. International Trade CommissionModerator: Hon. Ryan T. Holte, U.S. Court of Federal Claims

(SEALING ORDER) In 2014, the Federal Court, in the liability phase of the trial, held that the respondents' (collectively “Dow”) 705 Patent for fabricated products made from ethylene polymer blends was found to be valid and infringed by a product manufactured by Nova Chemicals Corporation (“Nova”). The 705 Patent issued in 2006 and expired on April 19, 2014. Dow was held to be entitled to damages under the Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, and had to elect either an accounting of Nova's profits or damages sustained by reason of Nova's infringement under s. 55(1) of the Act. The quantum of that award was to be assessed by reference. Dow elected an accounting of profits. The reference judge was required to determine the manner in which damages payable to Dow pursuant to ss. 55(1) and 55(2) of the Act should be calculated. The principles articulated by the reference judge allowed for the calculation of the accounting of profits to be disgorged by Nova and made payable to Dow. That decision was upheld on appeal. Argued Date 2022-04-20 Keywords Intellectual property - Patents, Medicines, Damages - Intellectual property — Patents — Medicines — Damages — Respondent seeking remedy of accounting of profits following determination applicant had infringed respondent's patent — What is the proper conceptual approach to determining how to calculate a disgorgement of profits in the patent context? — Are “springboard profits” on products sold after patent expiry available at law?. Notes (Federal Court) (Civil) (By Leave) (Certain information not available to the public) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Ropes & Gray's podcast series Talkin' Trade explores the world of Section 337 unfair import investigations at the U.S. International Trade Commission. Historically, challenges to patent subject matter eligibility under Section 101 of the Patent Act have been rare at the ITC, as the Commission's Section 337 proceedings necessarily involve tangible, physical goods. But recent changes in the case law from the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court have led to a noticeable uptick in the numbers of times the Commission and its ALJs have been forced to grapple with patent eligibility issues. Ropes & Gray attorneys Matt Rizzolo, Matt Shapiro, Josef Schenker, and Brendan McLaughlin discuss how Section 101 challenges have evolved over time at the ITC, and how this issue may be litigated differently before the Commission than in district court patent litigation. They also provide an update on recent proposed litigation that may affect Section 337 proceedings.

Ropes & Gray's podcast series Talkin' Trade explores the world of Section 337 unfair import investigations at the U.S. International Trade Commission. Historically, challenges to patent subject matter eligibility under Section 101 of the Patent Act have been rare at the ITC, as the Commission's Section 337 proceedings necessarily involve tangible, physical goods. But recent changes in the case law from the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court have led to a noticeable uptick in the numbers of times the Commission and its ALJs have been forced to grapple with patent eligibility issues. Ropes & Gray attorneys Matt Rizzolo, Matt Shapiro and Brendan McLaughlin discuss how Section 101 challenges have evolved over time at the ITC, and how this issue may be litigated differently before the Commission than in district court patent litigation. They also provide an update on recent proposed litigation that may affect Section 337 proceedings.

Minerva Surgical, Inc. v Hologic, Inc was a United States Supreme Court case dealing with the principle of assignor estoppel and its application. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle of assignor estoppel, however with the exception that the doctrine is only applied when assignors assertions are actually consistent with previous representations as to the patent. The majority decision was written by Justice Kagan, with Justice Alito and Justice Barrett filing separate dissenting opinions. Background. Csaba Truckai founded the company NovaCept, which invented the NovaSure medical system, which detects perforations in the uterus through the usage of Carbon Dioxide gas. NovaCept was acquired by Cytyc Corporation in 2004, which was then acquired by Hologic in 2007. Hologic received U.S. Patents 6,872,183 and 9,095,348 in 2005 and 2015 respectively. Truckai left NovaCept to found his own company, Minerva, Inc. and received permission to commercially distribute an Endometrial Ablation System. Hologic, Inc. sued Minerva, Inc. for violations of U.S. Patents 6,872,183 and 9,095,348, both relating to the procedure of endometrial ablation, for the treatment of menorrhagia. Minerva argued that the patents were invalid in the first place, and challenged the patentability of both patents in the U.S. Patent Office. Hologic moved for summary judgement arguing the principle of assignor estoppel, which was granted. The jury awarded $4.7 million in damages to Hologic. Both Minerva and Hologic appealed for differing reasons. On Appeal to the Federal circuit, Minerva asked the court to "abandon the doctrine” of assignor estoppel on the basis that the doctrine is invalidated due to the Supreme Court abolishing the doctrine of licensee estoppel in Lear, Inc. v Adkins, (1969), although the Federal Circuit Court rejected this argument. Minerva Surgical, Inc. filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on September 30, 2020. Assignor Estoppel. Assignor estoppel is a legal doctrine that states that a claim of invalidity cannot be taken by a person who sells a patent (assignor). The doctrine was first recognized in the United States in Westinghouse Elec & Mfg. Co. v Formica Insulation Co., (1924.) Judgement. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle of assignor estoppel, and rejected the argument of Minerva that the doctrine was repealed through the Patent Act of 1952. Writing for the majority, Justice Kagan wrote that " applies when, but only when, the assignor's claim of invalidity contradicts explicit or implicit representations he made in assigning the patent." Justice Barrett argued in the principal dissent that the Patent Act of 1952 precludes the principle of Assignor estoppel. Justice Alito, who also wrote a dissenting opinion, argued that neither the principal dissent nor the majority opinion are valid as neither answered the question as to whether Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v Formica Insulation Co., (1924) should be upheld or overruled. --- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app

Ropes & Gray's podcast series Conductive Discussions focuses on legal issues of interest to the semiconductor industry. In this episode, IP litigation partners Mark Rowland and Andrew Radsch, and associates Daniel Richards and James Mack, discuss patent infringement under section 271(g) of the Patent Act, a frequently overlooked but powerful provision. The team explores the statutory exceptions to liability, the availability of burden-shifting when proving infringement, and unique damages limitations for claims under section 271(g).

Bill C-13: a federal act respecting certain measures in response to COVID-19, has now received royal assent. Several elements of this legislation are discussed on the show.Bill C-13 created the Emergency Response Benefits Act. This act will provide a monthly payment of $2,000 to people out of work. One important element of the act is that the monthly benefits will not be available to any worker who “quit their employment voluntarily”. So: don’t quit your job if you wish to remain eligible for financial assistance. Another provision of Bill C-13, that has not received much public attention, are amendments to the Patent Act that permit the Minister of Health to authorize anyone to “make, construct, use and sell a patented invention to the extent necessary to respond to the public health emergency described in the application”. This would permit companies to manufacture things like ventilators, or drugs, that could otherwise be protected by a patent. There is provision for the payment of compensation to the owner of the patent. Also discussed, in the context of the provincial Public Health Act orders, are the large number of homeless people who are camping, congregating, and lining up together, outside of the Our Place Society facility in the 900-block of Pandora in Victoria. While Our Place has stopped providing some services, it is still providing three meals a day, washroom, and other services, from its single location. While all with the best of intentions, this has encouraged the unsafe gathering of large numbers of people in close proximity.Meals, and other services, need to be provided in a distributed fashion, so as to remove the incentive for the large group of homeless people to continue congregating in one place. Follow this link for a transcript of the show and links to the legislation discussed.

In this episode, Christa Laser, a senior associate at WilmerHale in Washington D.C., discusses her article "Patent Law's Equitable Defenses: The Coming Battle of Dynamic and Traditional Interpretive Regimes," which will be published in the University of Miami Law Review. Laser begins by discussing the difference between legal and equitable regimes and defenses. She describes the equitable defenses available in patent law, and explains why it is unclear how courts should apply them under the Patent Act. She observes that different interpretive approaches suggest different applications of those defenses. And she discusses her draft article "Certiorari in Patent Cases at the Supreme Court," which she co-authored with Judge Arthur Gajarsa. Laser is on Twitter at @ChristaLaser.This episode was hosted by Brian L. Frye, Spears-Gilbert Associate Professor of Law at the University of Kentucky College of Law. Frye is on Twitter at @brianlfrye. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

On December 11, 2019, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Peter v. NantKwest Inc. upholding the American Rule’s presumption against shifting attorney’s fees. Under Section 145 of the Patent Act, applicants “dissat­isfied with the decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board” are afforded the opportunity to file a civil action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The statute specifies that “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings shall be paid by the applicant.” The question presented in the case is whether such “expenses” includes the salaries of attorney and paralegal employees of the United States Patent and Trademark Of­fice (“USPTO”). The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, affirmed the en banc majority opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and held that it does not include the attorney’s and paralegal fees. The discussion of this decision will focus on the Court’s analysis and its implications.Featuring: -- Robert J. Rando, Founder and Lead Counsel, The Rando Law Firm P.C.

On December 11, 2019, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Peter v. NantKwest Inc. upholding the American Rule’s presumption against shifting attorney’s fees. Under Section 145 of the Patent Act, applicants “dissat­isfied with the decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board” are afforded the opportunity to file a civil action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The statute specifies that “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings shall be paid by the applicant.” The question presented in the case is whether such “expenses” includes the salaries of attorney and paralegal employees of the United States Patent and Trademark Of­fice (“USPTO”). The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, affirmed the en banc majority opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and held that it does not include the attorney’s and paralegal fees. The discussion of this decision will focus on the Court’s analysis and its implications.Featuring: -- Robert J. Rando, Founder and Lead Counsel, The Rando Law Firm P.C.

QUESTION PRESENTED: When the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) denies a patent application, the Patent Act gives the unsuccessful applicant two avenues for seeking judicial review of the agency's decision. The applicant may appeal directly to the Federal Circuit, 35 U.S.C. 141, which "shall review the decision from which an appeal is taken on the record before the [USPTO],” 35 U.S.C. 144. Alternatively, the applicant may bring a civil action against the Director of the USPTO in district court, where the applicant may present additional evidence. 35 U.S.C. 145. If the applicant elects to bring such an action, "[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings shall be paid by the applicant." Ibid. The question presented is as follows: Whether the phrase "[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings" in 35 U.S.C. 145 encompasses the personnel expenses the USPTO incurs when its employees, including attorneys, defend the agency in Section 145 litigation. Argument Transcript: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/18-801_7kh7.pdf --- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Daily Law News by Thomas Dunlap covering the headline:STRONGER Patent Act - September 12, 2019

A famous graffiti artist Banksy never admitted he is an author of his artworks. Except for the book “Wall and piece” (Century, The Random House Group Limited 2005). There on the intro page, he does claim authorship — “Against his better judgment, Banksy has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act, 1988 to be identified as the author of this work.” Also Banksy’s well-known quote: “Copyright is for losers” has a copyright sign behind it. Yet, that’s where Intellectual property (further - IP) protection basically “ends” for graffiti artists, those “street vandals” damaging properties belonging to someone else, or… doesn’t it? In this episode I would like to discuss graffiti and where does the legal protection stand in its respect. Previous episodes of “Exploring the art market” podcast: Episode 1 — Mediation of art-related disputes: https://soundcloud.com/user-796059586/exploring_the_art_market_ep1_mediation_and_art Episode 2 — Art market bubbles: https://soundcloud.com/user-796059586/exploring_the_art_market_ep2_art_market_bubbles Episode 3 — Value of art https://soundcloud.com/user-796059586/exploring_the_art_market_ep3_value_of_art All comments and suggestions for the podcast are highly welcome either in the comment section below or directly to my e-mail: maria.boicova@gmail.com. Thanks for listening and till next time on “Exploring the art market” podcast. Now available also on iTunes.

Aaron Cooper was the Chief Counsel for IP and Antitrust Law on the Senate Judiciary Committee during the passage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) and is now the head of global policy for the trade group BSA (fka the Business Software Alliance). The AIA arguably made the most substantial changes to patent law since the Patent Act of 1836. During the episode, we discuss the passage of the AIA, post-grant proceedings created by the AIA, the role of BSA and other interest groups in shaping intellectual property (IP) policy, current patent-related legislative proposals, and many other subjects.

Section 101 of the U.S. Patent Act─which identifies four categories of inventions or discoveries that are eligible for patent protection─presents a number of challenges to companies working on innovations in the life sciences space. Jones Day's Patricia Campbell and Susan Gerber, who recently coauthored an article on this topic for The Intellectual Property Strategist, are joined by Meredith Wilkes in this edition of Jones Day Talks Intellectual Property. They discuss Section 101 and life sciences, and talk about what's coming up for Jones Day's Women in IP initiative.

On December 4, 2018, the Supreme Court heard argument in Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. This case arose out of a dispute over the validity of a patent covering a product used to reduce the likelihood of chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting. At issue in this case is whether agreements entered into by Helsinn more than one year prior to filing for patent protection put the invention “on sale” and thus would invalidate the patent. Although the meaning of “on sale” in the Patent Act was long believed to be settled, the 2011 America Invents Act (AIA) made changes to the statutory provisions that include the “on sale” bar. The question for the Supreme Court is whether these changes to the statute change the previous understanding of the term “on sale.”In April 2001, Helsinn entered into two agreements with MGI Pharma. Although these agreements were announced in a press release, specific information about the products, like dosing formulations, were omitted. In 2003, Helsinn filed a provisional patent application covering the product. Three patents arose from this provisional patent application prior to the enactment of the AIA; however, one patent was subject to the new provisions of the AIA.In 2011, Teva sought FDA approval to make a generic version of the patented product. Helsinn sued Teva for patent infringement based on this ANDA filing. Teva argued that the patent was invalid because Helsinn’s agreements with MGI put the product “on sale” before the relevant date. The district court rejected Teva’s argument, concluding that the AIA had changed the meaning of “on sale” to require the invention be made public by the sale. Because the dosing information was not provided in the press release regarding the agreements, the district court concluded the agreements did not make the invention public and there was no “on sale” bar. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that inventions are made available to the public whenever there is a commercial offer for sale and that the sale is public even when the details of the invention are not disclosed to the public by the sale. Thus, the “on sale” bar applied to Helsinn’s patent. The U.S. Supreme Court then granted certiorari to address whether under the AIA, an inventor’s sale of an invention to a third party that is obligated to keep the invention confidential qualifies as prior art for purposes of determining the patentability of the invention.To the discuss the case, we have Kristen Osenga, Professor of Law at University of Richmond School of Law.

On December 4, 2018, the Supreme Court heard argument in Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. This case arose out of a dispute over the validity of a patent covering a product used to reduce the likelihood of chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting. At issue in this case is whether agreements entered into by Helsinn more than one year prior to filing for patent protection put the invention “on sale” and thus would invalidate the patent. Although the meaning of “on sale” in the Patent Act was long believed to be settled, the 2011 America Invents Act (AIA) made changes to the statutory provisions that include the “on sale” bar. The question for the Supreme Court is whether these changes to the statute change the previous understanding of the term “on sale.”In April 2001, Helsinn entered into two agreements with MGI Pharma. Although these agreements were announced in a press release, specific information about the products, like dosing formulations, were omitted. In 2003, Helsinn filed a provisional patent application covering the product. Three patents arose from this provisional patent application prior to the enactment of the AIA; however, one patent was subject to the new provisions of the AIA.In 2011, Teva sought FDA approval to make a generic version of the patented product. Helsinn sued Teva for patent infringement based on this ANDA filing. Teva argued that the patent was invalid because Helsinn’s agreements with MGI put the product “on sale” before the relevant date. The district court rejected Teva’s argument, concluding that the AIA had changed the meaning of “on sale” to require the invention be made public by the sale. Because the dosing information was not provided in the press release regarding the agreements, the district court concluded the agreements did not make the invention public and there was no “on sale” bar. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that inventions are made available to the public whenever there is a commercial offer for sale and that the sale is public even when the details of the invention are not disclosed to the public by the sale. Thus, the “on sale” bar applied to Helsinn’s patent. The U.S. Supreme Court then granted certiorari to address whether under the AIA, an inventor’s sale of an invention to a third party that is obligated to keep the invention confidential qualifies as prior art for purposes of determining the patentability of the invention.To the discuss the case, we have Kristen Osenga, Professor of Law at University of Richmond School of Law.

A case in which the Court held that WesternGeco’s award for lost profits was a permissible domestic application of § 284 of the Patent Act.

This Teleforum addresses whether there is a need to amend Section 101 of the Patent Act, which defines what counts as an invention eligible for receiving patent protection. Between 2010 and 2014, the Supreme Court issued four decisions interpreting and applying Section 101 to business, high-tech, and biotech inventions. In all four cases, the Court held that the patents were invalid for claiming abstract ideas, laws of nature, or facts of nature. Since 2014, federal courts have invalidated many patents in applying the Court’s new rules on patent eligibility. The Patent Office is also rejecting many patent applications. Some people in the innovation industries express concern that the Court’s decisions are vague and provide no objective framework as to whether a claim is patent eligible. Three trade associations, the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO), the American Intellectual Property Lawyers Association (AIPLA), and the American Bar Association’s IP Section, have released proposed amendments to Section 101. Others in the innovation industries maintain that the Supreme Court was right to reinvigorate patent eligibility doctrine, tightening up this basic legal standard for obtaining a property right in a new invention or discovery, because too many overbroad and vague patents had been issued in recent years by the Patent Office. These invalid patents, they contend, are clogging the gears of the innovation economy by imposing unnecessary costs on other innovators and consumers. This Teleforum discusses the proposed amendments to the Patent Act, and whether legislative reform of Section 101 is necessary or not.Featuring:Mr. Phil Johnson, Founder and Principal, Johnson-IP Strategy & ConsultingMr. Dana S. Rao, Vice President, Intellectual Property and Litigation, Adobe Systems, Inc.Mr. Robert Sachs, President, Robert R. Sachs PCModerator: Prof. Adam Mossoff, Professor of Law, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University Teleforum calls are open to all dues paying members of the Federalist Society. To become a member, sign up here. As a member, you should receive email announcements of upcoming Teleforum calls which contain the conference call phone number. If you are not receiving those email announcements, please contact us at 202-822-8138.

This Teleforum addresses whether there is a need to amend Section 101 of the Patent Act, which defines what counts as an invention eligible for receiving patent protection. Between 2010 and 2014, the Supreme Court issued four decisions interpreting and applying Section 101 to business, high-tech, and biotech inventions. In all four cases, the Court held that the patents were invalid for claiming abstract ideas, laws of nature, or facts of nature. Since 2014, federal courts have invalidated many patents in applying the Court’s new rules on patent eligibility. The Patent Office is also rejecting many patent applications. Some people in the innovation industries express concern that the Court’s decisions are vague and provide no objective framework as to whether a claim is patent eligible. Three trade associations, the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO), the American Intellectual Property Lawyers Association (AIPLA), and the American Bar Association’s IP Section, have released proposed amendments to Section 101. Others in the innovation industries maintain that the Supreme Court was right to reinvigorate patent eligibility doctrine, tightening up this basic legal standard for obtaining a property right in a new invention or discovery, because too many overbroad and vague patents had been issued in recent years by the Patent Office. These invalid patents, they contend, are clogging the gears of the innovation economy by imposing unnecessary costs on other innovators and consumers. This Teleforum discusses the proposed amendments to the Patent Act, and whether legislative reform of Section 101 is necessary or not.Featuring:Mr. Phil Johnson, Founder and Principal, Johnson-IP Strategy & ConsultingMr. Dana S. Rao, Vice President, Intellectual Property and Litigation, Adobe Systems, Inc.Mr. Robert Sachs, President, Robert R. Sachs PCModerator: Prof. Adam Mossoff, Professor of Law, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University Teleforum calls are open to all dues paying members of the Federalist Society. To become a member, sign up here. As a member, you should receive email announcements of upcoming Teleforum calls which contain the conference call phone number. If you are not receiving those email announcements, please contact us at 202-822-8138.

On May 30, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc. Lexmark International, Inc. (Lexmark), which owns many patents for its printer toner cartridges, allows customers to buy its cartridges through a “Return Program,” which is administered under a combination single-use patent and contract license. Customers purchasing cartridges through the Return Program are given a discount in exchange for agreeing to use each cartridge once before returning it to Lexmark. All of the domestically-sold cartridges at issue here and some of those sold abroad were subject to the Return Program. Impression Products, Inc. (Impression) acquired some Lexmark cartridges abroad--after a third party physically changed the cartridges to enable their re-use--in order to resell them in the United States. Lexmark then sued, alleging that Impression had infringed on Lexmark’s patents because Impression acted without authorization from Lexmark to resell and reuse the cartridges. Impression contended that its resale of the cartridges was not an infringement because Lexmark, in transferring the title by selling the cartridges initially, granted the requisite authority. The district court granted Impression’s motion to dismiss as it related to the domestically sold cartridges but denied it as to the foreign-sold cartridges. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment as to the domestically sold cartridges but affirmed dismissal regarding the cartridges sold abroad. -- There were two questions before the Supreme Court: (1) whether a “conditional sale” that transfers title to the patented item while specifying post-sale restrictions on the article's use or resale avoids application of the patent-exhaustion doctrine and therefore permits the enforcement of such post-sale restrictions through the patent law’s infringement remedy; and (2) whether, in light of this court’s holding in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. that the common-law doctrine barring restraints on alienation that is the basis of exhaustion doctrine “makes no geographical distinctions,” a sale of a patented article – authorized by the U.S. patentee – that takes place outside the United States exhausts the U.S. patent rights in that article. -- By a vote of 7-1, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Federal Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held that (1) Lexmark exhausted its patent rights in toner cartridges sold in the United States through its "Return Program"; and (2) Lexmark cannot sue Impression Products for patent infringement with respect to cartridges Lexmark sold abroad, which Impression Products acquired from purchasers and imported into the United States, because an authorized sale outside the United States, just as one within the United States, exhausts all rights under the Patent Act. The Chief Justice’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. -- And now, to discuss the case, we have Adam Mossoff, who is Professor of Law and Co-Director of Academic Programs and Senior Scholar of CPIP, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University.

On February 22, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Life Technologies Corp. v. Promega Corp. Promega Corporation owned four patents for technology used in kits that can conduct genetic testing and was the exclusive licensee of a fifth patent. In 2010, Promega sued Life Technologies Corporation (LifeTech) for allegedly infringing on these patents. A jury found in favor of Promega but the district court nevertheless ruled for LifeTech, concluding that Promega had failed to present evidence sufficient to sustain the favorable jury verdict. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed that judgment, holding that the four Promega patents were ultimately invalid but agreeing that LifeTech had infringed the fifth patent and remanding to the district court for a determination of damages. In the course of its ruling, the Federal Circuit concluded that LifeTech’s supplying of a single, commodity component of a mulit-component invention had exposed LifeTech under federal law to damages liability on worldwide sales. -- The question before the Supreme Court was whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that supplying a single, commodity component of a multi-component invention from the United States exposes a manufacturer to liability for worldwide sales. -- By a vote of 7-0, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Federal Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion by Justice Sotomayor, the Court held that the supply of a single component of a multicomponent invention for manufacture abroad does not give rise to liability under Section 271(f)(1) of the Patent Act, which prohibits the supply from the United States of "all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention" for combination abroad. Justice Sotomayor’s opinion was joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan. Justices Thomas and Alito joined the majority opinion as to all but Part II-C. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined. Chief Justice Roberts was recused. -- To discuss the case, we have Howard J. Klein who is Attorney at Law at Klein, O’Neill & Singh, LLP.

On December 6, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple. In April 2011, Apple sued Samsung Electronics, alleging that Samsung’s smartphones infringed on Apple’s trade dress as well as various design patents for the iPhone. A jury awarded Apple nearly $1 billion in damages under Section 289 of the Patent Act, and the trial court upheld most of the award against Samsung’s post-trial challenges. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected Samsung’s argument that the district court erred by allowing the jury to award damages based on Samsung’s profits off of its phones in their entirety, rather than just the portion of profits attributable to the smartphone components covered under the design patents. -- The question before the Supreme Court was whether, where a design patent is applied to only a component of a product, an award of infringer’s profits should be limited to those profits attributable to the component. -- By a vote of 8-0, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Federal Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion by Justice Sotomayor, the Court unanimously held that in the case of a multicomponent product, the relevant article of manufacture for arriving at a damages award under Section 289 need not be the end product sold to the consumer but may be only a component of that product. Whether the relevant article of manufacture in this particular case should be the entire smartphone or merely a component thereof is an issue the Court left open for resolution on remand. -- To discuss the case, we have Trevor Copeland, a Shareholder at Brinks Gilson & Lione, and Art Gollwitzer, a Partner at Michael Best & Friedrich LLP.

In the past six years, there has been a momentous shift in what can be patented. In four separate cases, the Supreme Court embraced a more muscular approach in enforcing the basic requirement under § 101 of the Patent Act that only certain types of inventions can be patented, impacting inventive activities ranging from biotech to high-tech to business methods. As a result, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, trial courts, and the Patent Office have responded by sharply restricting the scope of “patentable subject matter," invalidating issued patents and rejecting patent applications at record rates. -- This change has been both consequential and controversial. Inventions that once were patentable in key innovation industries, such as cutting-edge diagnostic tests made possible by the biotech revolution and highly complex computer software in the high-tech sector, are no longer eligible for patent protection. Some welcome this development, seeing it as freeing up basic tools of research and preventing abusive assertions of patents against infringers. Others have criticized this development, identifying lost incentives to invest millions in R&D necessary to produce technological innovation and lost value in existing patents given pervasive uncertainty in the patent system as to what is and is not protectable. -- The lack of certainty is something both sides of this important legal and policy debate have found troublesome. Many agree that the Supreme Court's current patent-eligibility jurisprudence is confusing and murky. The Court's legal test for assessing patentable subject matter has proven unpredictable in its application by courts, by patent examiners, and by the administrative review board at the Patent Office (the Patent Trial and Appeal Board). -- One proposed solution has been to simply abolish § 101, the provision that sets forth the requirement that only an invention comprising a “machine, manufacture, process, or composition of matter" is patentable. The argument is that this provision is an antiquated holdover from the first patent statutes that did not have the granular requirements that now exist in the modern Patent Act, ensuing that only novel, nonobvious, useful and fully disclosed inventions are patentable. This panel will consider whether such a radical move is warranted, whether the Supreme Court's patentable subject matter jurisprudence is on the right track, or perhaps whether any problems in patentable subject matter jurisprudence are fixable by the Court or by Congress. -- This panel was held on November 17, 2016, during the 2016 National Lawyers Convention in Washington, DC. -- Featuring: Mr. David J. Kappos, Partner, Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP; Prof. Adam Mossoff, Professor of Law and Co-Director of Academic Programs, Senior Scholar, Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University; Mr. Mark A. Perry, Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP; and Prof. Joshua D. Sarnoff, Professor of Law, DePaul College of Law. Moderator: Hon. Susan G. Braden, U.S Court of Federal Claims.