Podcasts about tarski

This sponsored episode features mathematician Ohad Asor discussing logical approaches to AI, focusing on the limitations of machine learning and introducing the Tau language for software development and blockchain tech. Asor argues that machine learning cannot guarantee correctness. Tau allows logical specification of software requirements, automatically creating provably correct implementations with potential to revolutionize distributed systems. The discussion highlights program synthesis, software updates, and applications in finance and governance.SPONSOR MESSAGES:***Tufa AI Labs is a brand new research lab in Zurich started by Benjamin Crouzier focussed on o-series style reasoning and AGI. They are hiring a Chief Engineer and ML engineers. Events in Zurich. Goto https://tufalabs.ai/***TRANSCRIPT + RESEARCH:https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/t849j6v1juk3gc15g4rsy/TAU.pdf?rlkey=hh11h2mhog3ncdbeapbzpzctc&dl=0Tau:https://tau.net/Tau Language:https://tau.ai/tau-language/Research:https://tau.net/Theories-and-Applications-of-Boolean-Algebras-0.29.pdfTOC:1. Machine Learning Foundations and Limitations [00:00:00] 1.1 Fundamental Limitations of Machine Learning and PAC Learning Theory [00:04:50] 1.2 Transductive Learning and the Three Curses of Machine Learning [00:08:57] 1.3 Language, Reality, and AI System Design [00:12:58] 1.4 Program Synthesis and Formal Verification Approaches2. Logical Programming Architecture [00:31:55] 2.1 Safe AI Development Requirements [00:32:05] 2.2 Self-Referential Language Architecture [00:32:50] 2.3 Boolean Algebra and Logical Foundations [00:37:52] 2.4 SAT Solvers and Complexity Challenges [00:44:30] 2.5 Program Synthesis and Specification [00:47:39] 2.6 Overcoming Tarski's Undefinability with Boolean Algebra [00:56:05] 2.7 Tau Language Implementation and User Control3. Blockchain-Based Software Governance [01:09:10] 3.1 User Control and Software Governance Mechanisms [01:18:27] 3.2 Tau's Blockchain Architecture and Meta-Programming Capabilities [01:21:43] 3.3 Development Status and Token Implementation [01:24:52] 3.4 Consensus Building and Opinion Mapping System [01:35:29] 3.5 Automation and Financial ApplicationsCORE REFS (more in pinned comment):[00:03:45] PAC (Probably Approximately Correct) Learning framework, Leslie Valianthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probably_approximately_correct_learning[00:06:10] Boolean Satisfiability Problem (SAT), Varioushttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boolean_satisfiability_problem[00:13:55] Knowledge as Justified True Belief (JTB), Matthias Steuphttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/[00:17:50] Wittgenstein's concept of the limits of language, Ludwig Wittgensteinhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/[00:21:25] Boolean algebras, Ohad Osorhttps://tau.net/tau-language-research/[00:26:10] The Halting Problemhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/turing-machine/#HaltProb[00:30:25] Alfred Tarski (1901-1983), Mario Gómez-Torrentehttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tarski/[00:41:50] DPLLhttps://www.cs.princeton.edu/~zkincaid/courses/fall18/readings/SATHandbook-CDCL.pdf[00:49:50] Tarski's undefinability theorem (1936), Alfred Tarskihttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tarski-truth/[00:51:45] Boolean Algebra mathematical foundations, J. Donald Monkhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/boolalg-math/[01:02:35] Belief Revision Theory and AGM Postulates, Sven Ove Hanssonhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-belief-revision/[01:05:35] Quantifier elimination in atomless boolean algebra, H. Jerome Keislerhttps://people.math.wisc.edu/~hkeisler/random.pdf[01:08:35] Quantifier elimination in Tau language specification, Ohad Asorhttps://tau.ai/Theories-and-Applications-of-Boolean-Algebras-0.29.pdf[01:11:50] Tau Net blockchain platformhttps://tau.net/[01:19:20] Tau blockchain's innovative approach treating blockchain code itself as a contracthttps://tau.net/Whitepaper.pdf

Jedna czwarta brązowej czwórki w wioślarstwie z Igrzysk Olimpijskich w Paryżu, zawodnik AZS UMK w Toruniu, uczestnik 3 igrzysk olimpijskich z apetytem na kolejne.Gościem 93. odcinka CAFE AZS jest Mirosław Ziętarski.Bartek Wasilewski zapraszam

Środowe wydanie "Onet Rano.", które Marcin Zawada prowadził dla Państwa wyjątkowo z Torunia. Jego gośćmi byli: Regina Zaworska, strażak-ratownik z OSP w Gościeradzu; Mirosław Ziętarski, wioślarz, brązowy medalista olimpijski; Maciej Puto, dyrektor Filharmonii Pomorskiej im. I. J. Paderewskiego; Sławek Wierzcholski, bluesman, wirtuoz harmonijki ustnej; Piotr Całbecki, marszałek województwa kujawsko-pomorskiego; Ewa Wachowicz, producentka i prowadząca programu "Ewa gotuje".

Varför landar västerländska diskussioner om AI i det religiösa? Göran Sommardal söker sig till Ostasien för en mer nykter bild av vad vi håller på att skapa. Lyssna på alla avsnitt i Sveriges Radio Play. ESSÄ: Detta är en text där skribenten reflekterar över ett ämne eller ett verk. Åsikter som uttrycks är skribentens egna.Varje gång tankeböljorna börjar slå mot stränderna på de svenska kultursidorna och stormen som sägs ha framkallat ordsvallet är det föreställda hotet eller det tvetydiga löftet från AI – artificiell intelligens, då förvandlas jag själv – som genom ett gammal- dags trollslag – till en hårdhudad intelligensaristokrat.Är det den nya Apokalypsen som förebådas? Nån av Guds änglar som bakom kulisserna stöter i sin förment intelligenta basun? Eller bara ett medialt moderniserat flagellanttåg som drar förbi?Självutnämnda ”framtidsexperter” dyker upp och varnar för mänsklighetens före­stå­en­de förintelse och i allehanda intressegruppers namn föreställer man sig den ound­vikliga mänskliga marschen upp till den av intelligenta robotor administrerade galg­backen. En konstnär har redan ställt ut sina förmodligen intelligenta samlag med en AI-sex­docka och en ansenlig samling tech-giganter samlar sig till ett upprop för ett morato­rium för allt vidare macklande med vad det nu än var som skulle förkroppsliga vår slut­giltiga Ne­mesis. Åtminstone i sex månader.Inte ens AI-forskaren Max Tegmark lyckades åstadkomma annat än att kratsa schablonerna ur asken och in i elden i sitt sommarprat. Tegmarks egen i grunden pessimistiska men aldrig uppgivna utgångspunkt tycks vara att AI verkligen är smartare än vi, och snabbt skulle bli det i ännu högre grad. Kunde räkna fortare och exaktare, kunde memorera oändligt mycket mer och iordningsställa sina minnesdata i enlighet med smartare algoritmer. Och den kan inte bara lära sig allt det vi ställer till dess förfog­ande utan förmådde också lära sig sådant den ”själv ville” veta och därmed skapa sin egen överlägsna intel­ligens. Jag förstod Tegmarks tanke som att AI i någon mening ytterst skulle kunna göra sig obe­roende av oss.Men lider då inte en sådan tanke i sin tur av det filosoferna skulle kalla en contradictio in subjecto – motstridiga villkor? Nämligen, att vi med vår underlägsna intelligens, som är en av utgångspunkterna för resonemanget, meningsfullt skulle kunna reflektera över en förutsatt överlägsen intelligens. Vore det inte logiskt detsamma som att tänka sig att en underlägsen hund skulle kunna föreställa sig exakt den överlägsenhet, som gör att män­niskan behärskar hunden. Utan att kunna göra något åt det.Tegmark gör på något ställe just den liknelsen, att AI:n kunde tänkas behålla och bevara människan, om inte för något annat, utom just som ett trevligt husdjur, fastän den inte dög något särskilt omistligt till.Bakom en sådan tankefigur anar jag den urgamla kategoriska teogonin. Och Tegmark är ju inte för inte både fysiker och kosmolog. Dvs. han drabbas av den oundvikliga skymten av ett högre väsen, vare det sedan ont eller gott, men som oundvikligen dyker upp vid horisonten när vi saktmodiga människobarn inte vet vad vi ska ta oss till.Här någonstans börjar jag misstänka att det är vårt sätt att tänka och tala om den arti­ficiella intelligensen, som piskar upp vår oro.Men tänk om vi drar gränsen inte mellan oss och maskinerna utan mellan oss och na­turen. Om vi tänker den stora gränsen som kineser och japaner och koreaner gör, mellan den människogjorda vishetsförmågan |人工智能 som är vad AI, artificiell in­telligens, ju orda­grant etymologiskt betyder, OCH det stora spontana |大自然, det som betecknar na­turen. I stället för att betona det ”artificiella”, det ”konstgjorda”, och det skrämmande snobbiga ”intelligens”, så hasplar kinesiskan och japanskan och koreanskan helt enkelt ur sig en klädsammare pragmatisk sida av framtiden.Utan att ta till det apokalyptiska trollslaget hamnar vi då själva bland maskinerna och maskinerna bland oss. Och varken de intelligenta maskinerna eller vi kommer ju att övervinna naturlagarna. Och den artificiella intelligensen kan aldrig bli mer omänsklig än vad vi själva kan tänkas vara.Säkerligen har det också att göra med att det historiografiskt besatta Ostasien föreställer sig att utvecklingen av AI inte på minsta vis skulle försiggå i religionshistorien, vilket är den plats där den mesta science fiction från Västvärlden förr eller senare mynnar ut. Utan i stället ut­spe­las som ett siffertyst fortskridande genom matematikens historia.Den kinesiske matematikern Wu Wenjun – känd för att ha skapat Wu-metoden och Wu-formeln med tillämpning inom algebraisk topologi – har beskrivit utvecklingen inom AI som en fortgående mekanisering av matematiken, som tidigare funnits i teorin – utveck­lad av en följd av matematiker som Leibniz, Hilbert, Gödel till Tarski och Quine och vi­dare, men att det är först i och med den hypersnabba behandlingen av det statistiska materialet, som kvantumberäkningen innebär, vilket har gjort det möjligt att tillämpa den matematiska kunskapen i sin fulla potential. Så här storvulet mänskligt har Wu sam­manfattat sin matematiska syn på AI – den människogjorda vishetsförmågan: ”Pro­gra­m­men för artificiell intelligens skrivs av mig, ett efter ett, och varje instruktion är en hand­ling som måste utföras mekaniskt, den har ingen intelligens alls. Den så kallade ar­ti­fi­ciella intelligensen innebär ett mekaniskt utförande av mänskliga tankeprocesser, inte en dator med intelligens.”Men usch! hur avskräckande tråkig ter sig inte en sådan verklighet, där den svår­be­grip­liga maskinintelligensen föreställs göra det möjligt för oss att behärska världen. Och hur mycket mer fantasifullt rysansvärd ter sig inte mardrömmen om en ny härskarklass av stålblanka kreatur som håller universum i sina övermänskliga klor och tyglar och samti­digt hotar att göra oss mänskliga parvlar och tösabitar såväl maktlösa som arbetslösa.Att ett sådant väsen i vårt ufo-iserade tankeuniversum skulle anta formen av en över­läg­sen intelligens är knappast mindblowing. Jag minns fortfarande sidorepliken från ett nummer av Marvel Comics från 70-talet: The Fantastic Four, där en av alla mänsklig­het­ens fantasilösa förgörare dyker upp: ”From beyond the Stars shall come the Over-mind, and he shall crush the Universe.”Hur nära till hands ligger då inte den tankspridda föreställningen att en AI slutgiltigt tar makten och skulle uppenbara sig nedstigande ur ett jättelikt skimrande flygande tefat på Times Square, och allra helst i parallella uppenbarelser samtidigt på Röda Torget och torget vid Den himmelska friden port. För att verifiera sitt herravälde över oss ”under­lings”: the puny humans.Göran Sommardalpoet, kritiker och översättare från kinesiska Litteratur中国人工智能简史|En kortfattad historia över kinesisk AI. 人民邮电出版社, 2023.Wu Wen-tsun: Mathematics Mechanization: mechanical Geometry Theorem-Proving, Mechanical Geometry Problem-Solving and Polynomial Equations-Solving (Mathematics and Its Applications), December 31, 1999, Springer.Wu Wen-tsün: Mechanical theorem proving in geometries : basic principles, Wien; Springer-Vlg, cop. 1994

This week on Unbelievable we return to the topic of free will. Following the debate between Ben Shapiro and Alex O'Connor, Christian apologist Tim Stratton got in touch to say he took issue with some of Alex's arguments against free will. Indeed Tim noted that Alex agreed with Ben Shapiro that if there is no God, then there is no free will. Tim Stratton develops the argument in a spirited debate with atheist philosopher Alex Malpass, hosted by Andy Kind. Alex Malpass has a PhD in philosophy from the University of Bristol, and these days specialises in philosophy of religion, but also metaphysics and logic more generally. He runs a podcast called Thoughtology and an infrequently updated blog called the Use of Reason. Alex Malpass has published in various philosophical journals including the International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion. For Alex Malpass's book: History of Philosophical and Formal Logic: From Aristotle to Tarski go here Tim Stratton holds a graduate degree in Christian Apologetics from Biola University and a PhD in theology from North-West University. He is a professor at Trinity College of the Bible and Theological Seminary and the author of Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism. He has also recently contributed a chapter to a book entitled, Faith Examined: New Arguments for Persistent Questions, Essays in Honor of Dr. Frank Turek. Stratton has coauthored multiple academic journal articles (most notably with J.P. Moreland) related to the topics of libertarian freedom, the problems of evil, and also responding to the Hiddenness Argument. To find Stratton's popular level work, find his videos on YouTube at FreeThinking Ministries and his blogs at FreeThinking Ministries.com or FreeThinkInc.org. His X handle is @TSXpress. For more on Tim Stratton's paper authored with JP Moreland read: An Explanation and Defense of the Free-thinking argument • Subscribe to the Unbelievable? podcast: https://pod.link/267142101 • More shows, free eBook & newsletter: https://premierunbelievable.com • For live events: http://www.unbelievable.live • For online learning: https://www.premierunbelievable.com/training • Support us in the USA: http://www.premierinsight.org/unbelievableshow • Support us in the rest of the world: https://www.premierunbelievable.com/donate

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Making Bad Decisions On Purpose, published by Screwtape on November 10, 2023 on LessWrong. Allowing myself to make bad decisions on purpose sometimes seems to be a load bearing part of epistemic rationality for me. Human minds are so screwed up. I. Start from the premise that humans want to do the right thing. For example, perhaps you are trying to decide whether to do your homework tonight. If you do your homework, you will get a better grade in class. Also, you may learn something. However, if you don't do your homework tonight you could instead hang out with your roommate and play some fun games. Obviously, you want to do the right thing. When contemplating between these two options, you may observe your brain coming up with arguments for and against both sides. University is about networking as well as pure learning, so making a lasting friendship with your roommate is important. To make the most of your time you should do your homework when you're alert and rested, which isn't right now. Also, aren't there some studies that show learning outcomes improved when people were relaxed and took appropriate breaks? That's if doing homework even helps you learn, which you think is maybe uncertain. Hrm, did I say your brain might come up with arguments for both sides? We seem to have a defective brain here, it seems to have already written its bottom line. There are a variety of approaches to curbing your brain's inclination to favour one side over the other here. Some are harder than others, some easier. Sometimes just knowing your brain does this and metaphorically glaring at it is enough to help, though if you're like me eventually your brain just gets sneakier and more subtle about the biased arguments. This article is about the most effective trick I know, though it does come with one heck of a downside. Sometimes I cut a deal, and in exchange for the truth I offer to make the wrong decision anyway. II. Imagine sitting down at the negotiating table with your brain. You: "Listen, I'd really like to know if doing homework will help me learn here." Your Brain: "Man, I don't know, do you remember The Case Against Education?" You: "No, I don't, because we never actually read that book. It's just been sitting on the shelf for years." Brain: "Yeah, but you remember the title. It looked like a good book! It probably says lots of things about how homework doesn't help you learn." You: "I feel like you're not taking your role as computational substrate very seriously." Brain: "You want me to take this seriously? Okay, fine. I'm not actually optimized to be an ideal discerner of truth. I optimized for something different than that, and the fact that I can notice true things is really kind of a happy coincidence as far as you're concerned. My problem is that if I tell you yes, you should do your homework, you'll feel bad about not getting to build social bonds, and frankly I like social bonds a lot more than I like your Biology classwork. The Litany of Tarski is all well and good but what I say is true changes what you do, so I want to say the thing that gets me more of those short term chemical rewards I want. You: ". . . Fair point. How about this bargain: How about you agree to tell me me whether I would actually do better in class if I did my homework, and I'll plan to hang out with my roommate tonight regardless of which answer you give." Brain: "Seriously?" You: "Yep." Brain: ". . . This feels like a trap. You know I'm the thing you use to remember traps like this, right? I'm the thing you use to come up with traps like this. In fact, I'm not actually sure what you're running on right now in order to have this conversation-" You: "Don't worry about it. Anyway, I'm serious. Actually try to figure out the truth, and I won't use it against you tonight." Brain: "Fine, deal. I...

Link to original articleWelcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Making Bad Decisions On Purpose, published by Screwtape on November 10, 2023 on LessWrong. Allowing myself to make bad decisions on purpose sometimes seems to be a load bearing part of epistemic rationality for me. Human minds are so screwed up. I. Start from the premise that humans want to do the right thing. For example, perhaps you are trying to decide whether to do your homework tonight. If you do your homework, you will get a better grade in class. Also, you may learn something. However, if you don't do your homework tonight you could instead hang out with your roommate and play some fun games. Obviously, you want to do the right thing. When contemplating between these two options, you may observe your brain coming up with arguments for and against both sides. University is about networking as well as pure learning, so making a lasting friendship with your roommate is important. To make the most of your time you should do your homework when you're alert and rested, which isn't right now. Also, aren't there some studies that show learning outcomes improved when people were relaxed and took appropriate breaks? That's if doing homework even helps you learn, which you think is maybe uncertain. Hrm, did I say your brain might come up with arguments for both sides? We seem to have a defective brain here, it seems to have already written its bottom line. There are a variety of approaches to curbing your brain's inclination to favour one side over the other here. Some are harder than others, some easier. Sometimes just knowing your brain does this and metaphorically glaring at it is enough to help, though if you're like me eventually your brain just gets sneakier and more subtle about the biased arguments. This article is about the most effective trick I know, though it does come with one heck of a downside. Sometimes I cut a deal, and in exchange for the truth I offer to make the wrong decision anyway. II. Imagine sitting down at the negotiating table with your brain. You: "Listen, I'd really like to know if doing homework will help me learn here." Your Brain: "Man, I don't know, do you remember The Case Against Education?" You: "No, I don't, because we never actually read that book. It's just been sitting on the shelf for years." Brain: "Yeah, but you remember the title. It looked like a good book! It probably says lots of things about how homework doesn't help you learn." You: "I feel like you're not taking your role as computational substrate very seriously." Brain: "You want me to take this seriously? Okay, fine. I'm not actually optimized to be an ideal discerner of truth. I optimized for something different than that, and the fact that I can notice true things is really kind of a happy coincidence as far as you're concerned. My problem is that if I tell you yes, you should do your homework, you'll feel bad about not getting to build social bonds, and frankly I like social bonds a lot more than I like your Biology classwork. The Litany of Tarski is all well and good but what I say is true changes what you do, so I want to say the thing that gets me more of those short term chemical rewards I want. You: ". . . Fair point. How about this bargain: How about you agree to tell me me whether I would actually do better in class if I did my homework, and I'll plan to hang out with my roommate tonight regardless of which answer you give." Brain: "Seriously?" You: "Yep." Brain: ". . . This feels like a trap. You know I'm the thing you use to remember traps like this, right? I'm the thing you use to come up with traps like this. In fact, I'm not actually sure what you're running on right now in order to have this conversation-" You: "Don't worry about it. Anyway, I'm serious. Actually try to figure out the truth, and I won't use it against you tonight." Brain: "Fine, deal. I...

Stephen Wolfram answers questions from his viewers about the history science and technology as part of an unscripted livestream series, also available on YouTube here: https://wolfr.am/youtube-sw-qa Questions include: Do you have a sense of the skills that an incoming fellow to the Wolfram Institute will have? What would effective preparation for institute-type work be? ​- What is the Emerald functionality that was mentioned for biological/cellular computational explorations? ​​- And what about around the world, overseas and in other countries? - You get some wonderful things out of pursuing science just for the sake of it. There are pejorative terms for this, like "fishing trips" and "stamp collecting," but such pursuits led to PCR technology just because someone was curious about thermophile bacteria. - ​Activity overseas and in other countries in regards to outreach programs in cooperation with education systems... you were mentioning some campaigns you had going on. ​- Will there be more active development on the computational capabilities of Wolfram Mathematica with the Wolfram Institute? ​- British physics is more geometry guild, and American physics is more group theory and particle physics guild. ​- What is your opinion about experimental mathematics and its relationship with classical "mainstream" mathematics? ​​​- I often hear that science needs philosophy to justify it. What are some historical examples of this? - ​​I think in a lot of places in history, the role of academic pursuit was that of a philosopher's role, but academic pursuit has attained a large amount of "division of labor." ​​- Philosophy and mathematical logic are starting to overlap more. Tarski's semantics relates formal logic to topology just like math and computer languages. ​​- Are there inherently philosophical ideas (i.e. that cannot be turned into a scientific one like the question of motion)? Can we distinguish them outright without knowing future scientific development?

La RAI Radiotelevisione Italiana (RAI Educational), in collaborazione con l'Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici e con l'Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, si è proposta di diffondere nel mondo, tramite le nuove forme di espressione e di comunicazione sociale consentite oggi dalla tecnica, la conoscenza della filosofia nel suo svolgimento storico e nei termini vivi della cultura contemporanea. A tale scopo è nata, nel 1987, l'Enciclopedia multimediale delle scienze filosofiche, che è anche un laboratorio di sperimentazione di nuovi linguaggi, nuove tecnologie e modelli organizzativi. Un'impresa ardua che regge sopra un paradosso: la cultura infatti è l'unico bene dell'umanità che, se diviso fra tutti, piuttosto che diminuire, poiché ciascuno ne riceverebbe solo una parte, diventa più grande, perché molti partecipano a esso. Questa peculiarità della cultura, che spiazza le rigide leggi del mercato, può forse spiegare perché quest'opera sia nata all'interno della RAI Radiotelevisione Italiana piuttosto che in una televisione commerciale. La RAI, in modo accorto, senza trascurare gli esiti commerciali, peraltro già tangibili, e prima ancora di qualunque altro ente televisivo europeo, americano o giapponese, ha dimostrato ancora una volta di sapere svolgere un'insostituibile funzione etico-civile legata alla sua vocazione di servizio pubblico. Quest'opera è stata fatta propria dall'UNESCO che, "considerato l'alto valore scientifico e culturale di quest'enciclopedia, si impegna a garantirne la massima diffusione possibile attraverso le televisioni pubbliche di tutti gli Stati membri dell'organizzazione, attivando la sua rete di istituti, agenzie e collaboratori". (dall'accordo RAI-UNESCO siglato a Parigi il 17 dicembre 1996). I princìpi e le finalità che hanno ispirato questa enciclopedia sono contenuti in un Appello per la filosofia che l'Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici, la RAI e l'Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana hanno rivolto ai governi e ai parlamenti di tutti i paesi del mondo. Renato Parascandolo ####################################################################################### Nell'aprile del 2002 Odifreddi ha registrato per l'Enciclopedia Multimediale delle Scienze Filosofiche, diretta da Renato Parascandolo, una Storia della logica in 24 lezioni-interviste di circa mezz'ora l'una, raccolte nel 2007 da Rai Trade in un cofanetto di 6 dvd. --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/vito-rodolfo-albano7/message

歡迎嚟到 搞乜咁科學 GMG Science 第11集！今集嘅主題係2022新發現 New in 22'

For New Year's, we're re-airing an episode from Season 1 in which we discuss the question "What is truth?" We think it's as timely now as it was when we first released it and probably deserves a bit more attention than it got then. We hope you enjoy re-listening or perhaps catching it for the first time. We'll be back on our regular schedule with new content on January 13.=====Truth is a tricky term these days, with everyone believing their own "facts" or having their own "truths" or "alternative facts." How does a philosopher see truth? What is a healthy pastoral way to approach and pursue truth? Is there such a thing as truth at all, let alone "absolute truth," as so many Christians attest?Our resident pastor and philosopher dive in and bring us into a really fun and healthy conversation about truth that our society would do well to engage.The whiskey we sample in this episode is Four Roses Small Batch Select from the always stellar Four Roses Bourbon. The beverage tasting is at 1:11. To skip to the main segment, go to 5:03.The article that Kyle quotes in the conversation about humility can be found here. The episode that is referenced that had not yet been aired at the time of this recording is S01E23: "A Philosopher and a Philosopher Ruin Your Theology: Interview with Nick Oschman." =====We need your help.If you value what we're doing and want us to continue, please consider supporting us through our 2022 end of year giving campaign. The best way is to subscribe to our Patreon. Annual memberships are available for a 10% discount.If you'd rather make a one-time donation, you can contribute through our PayPal. Other important info: Rate & review us on Apple & Spotify Tweet us at @PPWBPodcast, @robertkwhitaker, and @RandyKnie Follow & message us on Facebook & Instagram Watch & comment on YouTube Email us at pastorandphilosopher@gmail.com Cheers!

Lezione dedicata al “problema della verità” che introduce la figura di Alfred Tarski altro importante pilastro della logica matematica considerato il risolutore del paradosso del mentitore. --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/vito-rodolfo-albano7/message

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: ELK Thought Dump, published by Abram Demski on February 28, 2022 on The AI Alignment Forum. I recently spent a couple of weeks working on ELK. What follows is a somewhat disorganized thought-dump, with the post-hoc theme of relating ELK to some common ideas in philosophy. I'll assume familiarity with the ELK document. You can read quick summaries on some other reaction posts, so I won't try to recap here. Everything here should be read as "threads for further research" -- many of these sections could be long posts in themselves if I tried to fully formalize them, or even to unpack all my thoughts so far. I've numbered sections which contain semi-concrete ELK proposals. As a result, the section numbers will be weird -- for example, "2. Truth Tracking" is not the second section. Semantics The problem at the heart of ELK is that of semantics, that is, ascribing meaning. The leading theory (for LessWrongers, at least) is the map/territory analogy, according to which beliefs are like a map, and the world is like a territory. A map has a "scale" and a "key" which together tell us how to relate the map and the territory. Likewise, beliefs are thought to have a "correspondence" which tells us how to relate belief to reality. In academic philosophy, this is known as the correspondence theory of truth (rather than "the map territory theory of truth"). LessWrong is pretty big on the map/territory distinction, but (I think) has historically been far more interested in applying the idea than developing or analyzing it. While map/territory semantics seems pretty obvious, it gets weird when you start looking at the details. This has caused some philosophers to abandon it, and develop alternatives (some of which are quite interesting to me). Alex Flint has an extensive discussion of problems with some possible theories of truth. This post is my take on the issue. Semantics vs Truth Sometimes, the correspondence theory of truth is rendered via Tarski's T-schema: True("The moon is made of blue cheese.") ↔ The moon is made of blue cheese. There are other replies that can be given, but my reply is as follows. I am interested in "truth" only as a way of getting at meaning/semantics. A definition of truth should shed light on what it means for something to be true; why it is considered true. It should help me cope with cases which would otherwise be unclear. In other words, the T-schema tells us nothing about the nature of the correspondence; it only says that the predicate "true" names the correspondence. When I say something is true, I am (according to the correspondence theory) asserting that there is a correspondence; but Tarski's T-schema offers me no help in unpacking the nature of this correspondence further. The T-schema is very important in the subfield of logic dealing with formal theories of truth. The idea of this subfield is to construct axiomatic logics of truth, which avoid paradoxes of truth (most centrally, the Liar paradox). This is a fascinating field which is no doubt relevant to semantics. However, like the T-schema, these theories don't clarify the connection between truth and the external world. They focus primarily on self-consistency, and in doing so, only clarify dealings with mathematical or logical truth, with little/nothing to say about empirical truth. I will spell out the following hypothesis connecting meaning to truth: Truth-functional semantics: The meaning of an assertion is fully captured by its truth-conditions. Under what condition is the assertion true, false, and (if relevant) any other truth-values (such as "nonsensical", if this is regarded as a truth-value). This is the "truth function" of the assertion; the idea that semantics boils down to truth-functions is an old one in logic. (According to correspondence theory, the truth-function will speci...

Rzucił fotografię by założyć nowy biznes obracający około 20 milionami złotych rocznie, ojciec 5 dzieci i twórca rozwiązań ułatwiających pracę fotografów. W skrócie: postać nietuzinkowa, którą warto poznać. Więcej materiałów dla fotografów znajdziesz na www.niezleaparaty.pl

In this episode, Kyle and Randy geek out a little bit about truth. Truth is a tricky term these days, with everyone believing their own "facts" or having their own truths and alternative facts. How does a philosopher see and pursue truth? What is a healthy pastoral way to approach and pursue truth? Is there such a thing as truth at all, let alone absolute truth, as so many Christians attest to? Our resident pastor and philosopher dive in and bring us into a really fun and healthy conversation about truth that our society would do well to engage in.The whiskey we sample in this episode is Four Roses Small Batch Select from the always stellar Four Roses Bourbon. Support the show

In this final episode of a three part installment on Hillary Putnam's lecture Realism with a Human Face, I look at Alfred Tarski's Theory of Truth developed to answer the Liar Paradox. I show how Tarski's hierarchal splitting of language into object language and the meta-language that describes and analyzes it creates the same problem encountered by quantum theory - the need for an observer that always stands outside the system. This leads to the impossibility of one ever being able to develop a god's eye view of the world. This cognitive barrier is a bit of a disappointing harness for the intellectual as they must always keep a certain modesty of scope in developing their theory within these confines. Lastly, I briefly look at the history of logical puzzles like the Liar Paradox in the history of philosophy and am surprised to learn that these puzzles were seen as mere parlour games prior to the advent of analytic philosophy and the movement towards a logic and linguistic-based endeavour from a more broader epistemelogical project found in earlier centuries.

In this second part of a three part series on Hillary Putnam's lecture Realism with a Human Face, I wrap up the discussion about quantum physics by looking at some of quantum physics' philosophical consequences and an interesting book from 80 years ago that relates quantum physics in highly understandable terms for the layperson. Then, I follow Putnam by looking at the liars paradox - that logical puzzle that says 'This sentence is false'. Is that senternce itself true or false? Anyway that you answer it, you are stuck in a bind. Grappling with this paradox led the Polish logician Alfred Tarski to develop a new theory of truth that allowed him to solve this paradox. Tarski's theory of truth was to have deep reverberations in the philosophical community and this all leads into the next episode where I look at how Putnam draws parallels between quantum physics and the the philosophy of logic and truth after Tarski. Also, the usual trivia and general rambling that you've hopefully come to tolerate.

In this episode of Gossip about Gossip, Hedera's Developer Evangelist Cooper Kunz is joined by Michael Lewellen, the CEO and Co-founder of Tarski Technologies. Michael has years of experience in the blockchain industry, from mining Bitcoin, to doing enterprise consulting with some of the largest companies in the world. Tarski Technologies has expertise building blockchain and Hedera Hashgraph based solutions, exploring use cases, and even doing independent 3rd party security reviews and audits.  Michael also serves on the newly established Texas Blockchain Council, helping instantiate a clear and friendly regulatory environment for blockchain companies in the State of Texas. Give this podcast a listen to hear Michaels's experience coming to the Hedera community, participating in hackathons, and other work he’s doing in the industry.

Michael Lewellen of Tarski.Tech shares his thoughts on the current state of blockchain technology and the opportunities it offers for the future. http://tarski.tech/ Thanks for listening! We look forward to hearing from you with any ideas, feedback, or collaboration ideas: podcast@dallasblockchainpodcast.com

In this episode me and Tarski set our views on racism slave trafficking and personal experience with the subject

Denis Bonnay (Paris) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (8 Dec, 2011) titled "Constants and Consequences (joint work with D. Westerstahl)". Abstract: Given an interpreted language and a set of logical constants, Tarski's semantic definition of logical consequence yields a consequence relation. But given a consequence relation, is there a natural way to extract from it a set of logical constants? In this talk, we will compare two ways of doing so, one purely syntactical, which is based on the idea that an expression is logical if it is essential to the validity of at least one inference, and one semantical, which is based on the idea that an expression is logical if its interpretation is fully determined by the rules for its use.

Timothy Williamson (Oxford) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Logics as Scientific Theories". Abstract: Logic has far more in common with other branches of science than is usually recognized. One major aim of science is to develop theories that are true, highly general, and maximally informative subject to those constraints. When the generality requirement is made precise in some natural ways, related to Tarski’s account of logical consequence, the resultant theories meet central requirements for logical systems. An appropriate methodology for choosing between different candidate theories has many similarities to the methodology for theory choice in other branches of science. This involves no reduction of logic to psychology, linguistics, or specifically natural science. The talk will be illustrated with examples from modal logic.

Douglas Patterson (Universität Leipzig) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Theory and Concept in Tarski's Philosophy of Language". Abstract: In this talk I will set out some of the background of Tarski's famous work on truth and semantics by looking at important views of his teachers Tadeusz Kotarbinski and Stanislaw Lesniewski in the philosophy of langauge and the "methodology of deductive sciences". With the understanding of the assumed philosophy of language and logic of the important articles set out in this manner, I will look at a number of issues familiar from the literature. I will sort out Tarski's conception of "material adequacy", discuss the relationship between a Tarskian definition of truth and a conceptual analysis of a more familiar sort, and consider the consequences of the views presented for the question of whether Tarski was a deflationist or a correspondence theorist.

Continuing on Tarski's “The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics" (1944), Hartry Field's “Tarski's Theory of Truth” (1972), and Donald Davidson's “The Folly of Trying to Define Truth” (1977). What was Tarski really doing? What are the implications of his project? Does it even make sense to define "truth," and what should a definition look like? Listen to part one first, or get the ad-free Citizen Edition. Look out for the Citizen-only bonus discussion of Shakespeare's Tempest, posting soon! Please support PEL! End song: "In Vino Vertias" by Sunspot; Mark interviewed Mike Huberty on Nakedly Examined Music #64. Sponsor: Visit thegreatcoursesplus.com/PEL for a one-month free trial of The Great Courses Plus Video Learning Service.

On Tarski's “The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics" (1944), Hartry Field's “Tarski's Theory of Truth” (1972), and Donald Davidson's “The Folly of Trying to Define Truth” (1977). What is truth? Tarski gives a technical, metaphysically neutral definition for truth within a particular, well-defined language. So how does that apply to real languages? He thought he was defining truth (a semantic concept) in terms of more primitive (physical?) concepts, but Field and Davidson think that actually, truth as a general concept is indefinable, even though it's still helpful for Tarski to have laid out the relations among various semantic concepts. Help us keep more episodes ad-free by supporting us! You can get the Citizen Edition of this episode and not have to wait for part 2, and also soon listen to Wes's discussion of Shakespeare's Tempest!

Jak rozkręcić biznes (byyyznes) fotograficzny, dwie inne firmy i to wszystko pogodzić z rolą ojca piątki dzieci? O tym między innymi w 31 odcinku podcastu Niezłe Aparaty...Podcast jest dostępny na iTunes https://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/niez%C5%82e-aparaty/id1188356946?mt=2Grupa słuchaczy podcastu: Niezłe Aparaty Podcast: https://www.facebook.com/groups/1633800780248095/Więcej odcinków tutaj: Archiwum podcastu http://niezleaparaty.pl/podcast/Krzysztof Ziętarski w sieci:www: http://krzysztofzietarski.pl/Delicious Presets: http://www.deliciouspresets.pl/insta: https://www.instagram.com/deliciouspresets/fb: https://www.facebook.com/deliciouspresetspl/Marie Zelie: http://mariezelie.com/Kolejny odcinek Niezłych Aparatów już wkrótce. Jeśli macie specjalne życzenia dotyczące tematów, które powinny pojawić się w audycji, lub chcielibyście zaproponować fotografa, który powinien Waszym zdaniem wystąpić w jednym z odcinków podcastu to piszcie, znajdziecie mnie na:instagram: www.instagram.com/jaceksiwko/fb: www.facebook.com/jaceksiwko/PS. Więcej informacji o fotografii ślubnej i pracy jako fotograf wysyłam przez darmowy newsletter Fleszem po oczach: www.jaceksiwko.com/newsletter

Neste episódio falarei um pouco sobre o famoso paradoxo do mentiroso e sua relação com os fundamentos da matemática. Mais precisamente, falarei de sua influência direta (ou indireta) em dois resultados de grande importância para a lógica – o teorema da indefinibilidade da verdade de Tarski e o teorema da incompletude de Gödel. Ouça o episódio e descubra se tudo o que eu disse é verdade ou se trata de uma grande mentira…

Neste episódio falarei um pouco sobre o famoso paradoxo do mentiroso e sua relação com os fundamentos da matemática. Mais precisamente, falarei de sua influência direta (ou indireta) em dois resultados de grande importância para a lógica – o teorema da indefinibilidade da verdade de Tarski e o teorema da incompletude de Gödel. Ouça o episódio e descubra se tudo o que eu disse é verdade ou se trata de uma grande mentira…

One of America's most prominent philosophers says his field has been tilting at windmills for nearly 400 years. Representationalism – the idea that we don't directly perceive objects in the world, only our mental images of them – has bedeviled philosophy ever since Descartes, and now it's mucking up neuroscience as well, John Searle alleges. He has long defended the “naïve” alternative – that our senses do give us direct access to reality – and he fires his latest salvo in his new book “Seeing Things as They Are.” John is well-known for his no-nonsense approach to philosophical problems and there was plenty of straight talk as we discussed his theory of perception, the subjective-objective divide, the scientific study of consciousness and his dog Tarski.

Joao Marcos (UFRN) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (5 June, 2014) titled "Logical consequence explicated in terms of cognitive attitudes". Abstract: The received notions of logical consequence, either introduced by semantical means or by way of some convenient proof formalism, or even studied in their own right as abstract relations/operations between sentences or collections of sentences, are often explicated in terms of standard judgments such as assertion and refutation/denial. As a matter of fact, from the semantical viewpoint such judgments are often confused with truth-values. For a fresh view on the matter, we propose substituting judgments by a richer collection of primitive cognitive attitudes concerning acceptance or rejection, by an agent, of a given piece of information, and organize such attitudes into an opposition structure from which we show how to extract a generous bidimensional notion of entailment, henceforth called B-entailment, that generalizes the well-known approaches by Tarski, by Scott, and by Shoesmith & Smiley ([7]). We study and prove a general characterization result about the underlying abstract consequence relations in terms of a bilattice-based structure of truth-values, show that it extends earlier results by G. Malinowski and S. Frankowski ([6,4]), and show how this connects to older and newer research on the structure of truth-values or of the space of valuations ([2,8,5]). Finally, we also prove a normal form result that shows how the B-entailment formalism is expressive enough so as to define any 4-valued (partial) nondeterministic matrix ([1,3]). This reports on joint work with Carolina Blasio and Carlos Caleiro.

This book is a contribution to the flourishing field of formal and philosophical work on truth and the semantic paradoxes. Our aim is to present several theories of truth, to investigate some of their model-theoretic, recursion-theoretic and proof-theoretic aspects, and to evaluate their philosophical significance. In Part I we first outline some motivations for studying formal theories of truth, fix some terminology, provide some background on Tarski’s and Kripke’s theories of truth, and then discuss the prospects of classical type-free truth. In Chapter 4 we discuss some minimal adequacy conditions on a satisfactory theory of truth based on the function that the truth predicate is intended to fulfil on the deflationist account. We cast doubt on the adequacy of some non-classical theories of truth and argue in favor of classical theories of truth. Part II is devoted to grounded truth. In chapter 5 we introduce a game-theoretic semantics for Kripke’s theory of truth. Strategies in these games can be interpreted as reference-graphs (or dependency-graphs) of the sentences in question. Using that framework, we give a graph-theoretic analysis of the Kripke-paradoxical sentences. In chapter 6 we provide simultaneous axiomatizations of groundedness and truth, and analyze the proof-theoretic strength of the resulting theories. These range from conservative extensions of Peano arithmetic to theories that have the full strength of the impredicative system ID1. Part III investigates the relationship between truth and set-theoretic comprehen- sion. In chapter 7 we canonically associate extensions of the truth predicate with Henkin-models of second-order arithmetic. This relationship will be employed to determine the recursion-theoretic complexity of several theories of grounded truth and to show the consistency of the latter with principles of generalized induction. In chapter 8 it is shown that the sets definable over the standard model of the Tarskian hierarchy are exactly the hyperarithmetical sets. Finally, we try to apply a certain solution to the set-theoretic paradoxes to the case of truth, namely Quine’s idea of stratification. This will yield classical disquotational theories that interpret full second-order arithmetic without set parameters, Z2- (chapter 9). We also indicate a method to recover the parameters. An appendix provides some background on ordinal notations, recursion theory and graph theory.

Professor Dana Scott, Carnegie Mellon University, presents his Distinguished Lecture entitled "Geometry Without Points". Ever since the compilers of Euclid's Elements gave the "definitions" that "a point is that which has no part" and "a line is breadth-less length", philosophers and mathematicians have worried that the basic concepts of geometry are too abstract and too idealized. In the 20th century writers such as Husserl, Lesniewski, Whitehead, Tarski, Blumenthal, and von Neumann have proposed "pointless" approaches. A problem more recent authors have emphasized it that there are difficulties in having a rich theory of a part-whole relationship without atoms and providing both size and geometric dimension as part of the theory. In this lecture, a solution will be proposed using the Boolean algebra of measurable sets modulo null sets along with relations derived from the group of rigid motions in Euclidean n-space. (Joint work with Tamar Lando, Columbia University.) This lecture was recorded on Monday 23 June at the University of Edinburgh's Appleton Tower.

Some open considerations of Bazin.  Long excursus on lumping vs. splitting.  A spiel I liked about truth-makers (as in Armstrong, and Davidson, just to give a couple of references.  Davidson's Tarski-style idea: if a sentence is true, there is something that makes it true).  All claims that A=B, if not tautological, are not strictly speaking true.  They need to be made true.  What makes something true if you lump: A and B are the same.  What makes something true if you split: A isn't really A.  Lumping: A is something else that is not A.  Splitting: A is not A.  Application to Film vs. Theater vs. verbal narrative vs.... TV.  Rear Window as emblematizing TV-watching.  Bazin on identification and resistance to identification in film and theater respectively.  Subjective camera in Rear Window.

The emergence of event-driven architectures, automation of business processes, drastic cost-reductions in sensor technology, and a growing need to monitor IT systems (as well as other systems) due to legal, contractual, or operational considerations lead to an increasing generation of events. This development is accompanied by a growing demand for managing and processing events in an automated and systematic way. Complex Event Processing (CEP) encompasses the (automatable) tasks involved in making sense of all events in a system by deriving higher-level knowledge from lower-level events while the events occur, i.e., in a timely, online fashion and permanently. At the core of CEP are queries which monitor streams of "simple" events for so-called complex events, that is, events or situations that manifest themselves in certain combinations of several events occurring (or not occurring) over time and that cannot be detected from looking only at single events. Querying events is fundamentally different from traditional querying and reasoning with database or Web data, since event queries are standing queries that are evaluated permanently over time against incoming streams of event data. In order to express complex events that are of interest to a particular application or user in a convenient, concise, cost-effective and maintainable manner, special purpose Event Query Languages (EQLs) are needed. This thesis investigates practical and theoretical issues related to querying complex events, covering the spectrum from language design over declarative semantics to operational semantics for incremental query evaluation. Its central topic is the development of the high-level event query language XChangeEQ. In contrast to previous data stream and event query languages, XChangeEQ's language design recognizes the four querying dimensions of data extractions, event composition, temporal relationships, and, for non-monotonic queries involving negation or aggregation, event accumulation. XChangeEQ deals with complex structured data in event messages, thus addressing the need to query events communicated in XML formats over the Web. It supports deductive rules as an abstraction and reasoning mechanism for events. To achieve a full coverage of the four querying dimensions, it builds upon a separation of concerns of the four querying dimensions, which makes it easy-to-use and highly expressive. A recurrent theme in the formal foundations of XChangeEQ is that, despite the fundamental differences between traditional database queries and event queries, many well-known results from databases and logic programming are, with some importance changes, applicable to event queries. Declarative semantics for XChangeEQ are given as a (Tarski-style) model theory with accompanying fixpoint theory. This approach accounts well for (1) data in events and (2) deductive rules defining new events from existing ones, two aspects often neglected in previous work of semantics of EQLs. For the evaluation of event queries, this work introduces operational semantics based on an extended and tailored form of relational algebra and query plans with materialization points. Materialization points account for storing and maintaining information about those received events that are relevant for, i.e., can contribute to, future query answers, as well as for an incremental evaluation that avoids recomputing certain intermediate results. Efficient state maintenance in incremental evaluation is approached by "differentiating" algebra expressions, i.e., by deriving expressions for computing only the changes to materialization points. Knowing how long an event is relevant is a prerequisite for performing garbage collection during event query evaluation and also of central importance for developing cost-based query planners. To this end, this thesis introduces a notion of relevance of events (to a given query plan) and develops methods for determining temporal relevance, a particularly useful form based on time-related information.

This thesis investigates querying the Web and the Semantic Web. It proposes a new rulebased query language called Xcerpt. Xcerpt differs from other query languages in that it uses patterns instead of paths for the selection of data, and in that it supports both rule chaining and recursion. Rule chaining serves for structuring large queries, as well as for designing complex query programs (e.g. involving queries to the Semantic Web), and for modelling inference rules. Query patterns may contain special constructs like partial subqueries, optional subqueries, or negated subqueries that account for the particularly flexible structure of data on the Web. Furthermore, this thesis introduces the syntax of the language Xcerpt, which is illustrated on a large collection of use cases both from the conventional Web and the Semantic Web. In addition, a declarative semantics in form of a Tarski-style model theory is described, and an algorithm is proposed that performs a backward chaining evaluation of Xcerpt programs. This algorithm has also been implemented (partly) in a prototypical runtime system. A salient aspect of this algorithm is the specification of a non-standard unification algorithm called simulation unification that supports the new query constructs described above. This unification is symmetric in the sense that variables in both terms can be bound. On the other hand it is in contrast to standard unification assymmetric in the sense that the unification determines that the one term is a subterm of the other term.