Controversy & Clarity

*The challenges of getting Weapons Co, 1/8, to HKIA*Weapons' initial taskings and missions*The challenges of operating North and East Gates*Operating in support of the LAR company at East Gate*Frustrations working with allied and partner forces*Gunnery Sergeant Zachary Kapinus interacting with the Taliban at East Gate*The famous picture of Gunny Kapinus lifting a baby over a barbed-wire wall*The ethical and moral challenges of extricating people from the crowd without creating more chaos*Creative ways to extricate American citizens from the crowd*The desperation of Afghan civilians*Watching Marines kick out civilians who did not have the proper paperwork*The frustration of many Marines toward Afghan men who chose to escape instead of fight*How Jon supported Weapons Company with his presence and by inserting himself wherever he could help*An example of commander's intent at East Gate*How Jon and his key leaders created an atmosphere of expected behaviors, professionalism, and toughness during pre-deployment training*Command and control at HKIA, including personal cells as the primary way to communicate*Jon's experiences on the night of 27 August*The ramp ceremony of the 13 KIA servicemembers*The benefit of allowing Marines to use their cell phones*1/8 in Kuwait at HKIA*Coming home to Camp Lejeune*Working with other units and nations' forces The most frustrating and rewarding aspects of the HKIA experience*Where Jon excelled as a commander and where he could have done better*Lessons learned from HKIA*The one thing Jon wants other servicemembers to know about Weapons Company'S actions at HKIA

In this episode, we discuss the following topics. *Jon's experiences as a weapons platoon commander with 3/7 in Afghanistan.   *His mindset and training approach for Weapons Company for the 24th MEU workup   *Building trust as a weapons company commander with the battalion commander and operations officer *Building trust within his company   *The company's operations and training before HKIA   *Indications and warnings that Weapons Company would deploy to HKIA   *Getting the news that the company would go to HKIA   *Jon's fire support planning for HKIA   *His understanding of the situation at HKIA before arriving   *His first two days on the ground   *Tactical foraging and requisitioning   *The fall of Kabul   *The breaching of the airport and the clearing of the runway   *Being a commander without troops during the clearing   *Jon's reaction to the news that Coalition forces would work with the Taliban --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss: *The timeline of major events of the Battle for the Irpin *Three occasions where the Russians nearly won the battle   *The role of Ukrainian volunteers and civilians   *The role of small unit leaders   *The artillery fight    *The challenges of researching and writing operational military history   *James and Ben's research approach  *The lack of government support in the US and UK for on-the-ground conflict research   *The value of stories to the military profession   *How the battle study can be used for training and educational Links "The Battle of Irpin River" by James Sladden, Liam Collins, and Ben Connable https://chacr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/BAR-187-compressed.pdf "Battle Studies: The Need for Primary Source Research" by Ben Connable and James Sladden https://chacr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/CHACR-Briefing-Ukraine.pdf "On the Ground: Field Research in Ukraine" by James Sladden https://issuu.com/chacr_camberley/docs/idb-ukraine --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss the following topics.   *What a combat engineer platoon does as part of a battalion landing team   *What it was like joining BLT 1/8   *Building trust between Everett's platoon and BLT 1/8   *Everett's advice to platoon commanders looking to build trust between units   *His platoon's training plan for the 24th MEU workup   *Responding to complaints from Marines about a high-tempo schedule   *The platoon's experiences on the 24th MEU prior to heading to HKIA   *When the possibility of deploying to HKIA first came on Everett's radar   *His reaction and his Marines' reactions to learning they would go to HKIA    *Being labeled “the lead combat engineer for HKIA”   *The tough decision to leave Marines behind on ship   *The value of crossing training   *The first few days on the ground at HKIA   *Reactions to the news that the Taliban would cooperate with the Coalition   *Working at Abbey, East, and North Gates   *The last phase of the withdrawal   *Creativity and problem-solving at HKIA   *Radio communications during the NEO   *Everett's advice for lieutenants who may find themselves in situations like at HKIA   *The training he received at Marine Corps Engineer School   *Enemy contact at HKIA   *Dismantling several of HKIA's guard towers   *Command and control at HKIA   *Maneuver warfare concepts applied at HKIA   *What Everett was doing the day of the Abbey Gate Bombing   *Talking to his platoon about the Marine losses at HKIA   *What Everett observed in his Marines after the NEO   *Returning to Camp Lejeune   *Everett's advice on talking to people who have experienced a mission as harrowing as HKIA   *The value of professional reading   *The role and value of mental health checks and mental health services   *The role of cell phones at HKIA   *Cleaning up various parts of HKIA   *The role of discipline    *The most frustrating and rewarding aspects of the HKIA mission   *Everett's pride in the performance of his Marines *The most challenging decision he made at HKIA   *Where Everett excelled as a commander and decision-maker and where he could have done better   *The lessons he took away from HKIA, particularly as they apply to FD 2030 and the future Marine Corps   *The role and value of decision games to train and educate Marines for missions like HKIA --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/damien-oconnell/support

*Josh's joining 1/8   *Differences in morale and culture between units in the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions   *The current culture and unit pride in 1/8   *Recent controversies involving Third Battalion, Sixth Marines   *The challenges and benefits of leading HKIA vets in his squad   *Winning the 2nd Marine Division Annual Rifle Squad Competition and Marine Corps-Wide Rifle Squad Competition   *How winning the competition affirmed Josh's identity as an infantryman   *Struggling with imposter syndrome   *Josh's experiences during his deployment to Haiti in support of Continuing Promise 2022   *What makes an ideal squad leader   *Josh's use of military simulators like Squad and Arma 3 for training purposes   *Josh's expectations for his: Junior Marines Fire team leaders Fellow squad leaders Platoon commander Company commander   *The one thing he'd like current and future squad leaders to take away from this podcast --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss the following topics. *Josh's experiences with squad leaders up to this point in his career *How these leaders influenced him   *His experiences going through the reconnaissance training pipeline and serving with 3rd Recon Battalion *His decision to leave the recon community and the shame he felt as a result   *Josh's deployments with the 31st MEU   *The “golden nuggets” of leadership he took from his first squad leader   *How Josh approaches corrective actions   *The benefits of having a strong NCO and squad leader core within a unit   *Creating such a core and the challenges to doing so   *Josh's thoughts on what makes a “real” deployment   *Why many Marines don't see MEUs as "real" deployments   *Josh's advice for squad leaders on making the most of MEUs   *His experiences supporting operations on the US-Mexico border   *His advice for fighting complacency during monotonous missions --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss the following topics. *Andres' operational experiences before joining 2/1   *The organization and strength of Weapons Company, 2/1, at the beginning of its deployment with the SP-MAGTF-CR   *The company's deployment prior to heading to HKIA   *When the Afghanistan mission first appeared on the company's radar   *Managing Marines' expectations in the run-up to deploying to HKIA   *Preparing to leave for HKIA   *Weapons Company's first day at HKIA   *The company's initial taskings   *Andres' reaction to the news that Coalition forces would work with the Taliban   *The challenges of commanding a dispersed company    *Andres' experiences at Abbey Gate before 26 August   *Interacting with the many Coalition forces at Abbey Gate   *How often Andres used the tools and concepts in MCDP-1 and MCDP 1-3   *Receiving messages from individuals and interest groups in the US asking for help evacuating people, and how these affected operations *Some of the challenges Andres and his Marines experienced at Abbey Gate   *Two specific instances where Andres and his Marines helped evacuate Afghan children *What Weapons Company and Andres were doing on 26 August    *Weapons Company's role in the demil process at Kabul   *What Andres observed in his Marines and himself after returning to Kuwait   *His advice on how to talk to leaders about harrowing experiences   *The use of cell phones at HKIA   *Andres' interactions with US State Department officials at HKIA   *The logistics challenges of HKIA   *The discipline of Andres' Marines at HKIA   *The most frustrating and rewarding aspects of the HKIA experience    *Shifting between a combat mindset and a humanitarian mindset   *The most challenging decision Andres made at HKIA   *Where Andres performed well as a decision-maker and leader HKIA and where he could have performed better   *What lessons he took away from HKIA and how those might apply in the context of FD 2030   *Tactical decision game as tools to prepare Marines for operations like HKIA Link "Witnesses to the End" by Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, New York Times, 7 Nov 2021 --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/damien-oconnell/support

 In this episode, we discuss:   *Mr. Smith joining 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, in Vietnam and assuming command of his platoon    *His staff NCOs, especially SSgt Richard Jackson and Gunnery Sergeant Alan Sora, and other Marines and Sailors who deeply influenced him   *Coping with the loss of subordinate leaders and advice on dealing with such losses   *Combat decision-making   *The challenges of returning home from war and transitioning to the civilian sector   *The Ken Burns' documentary series The Vietnam War   *The US strategy in Vietnam    *The role veterans played in building and expanding FedEx   *The cutting-edge technologies FedEx has used, emerging technologies, and the future of warfare   *The central role of logistics in war   *Leading FedEx through the Arab Oil Embargo Crisis of 1973 and advice for leaders dealing with crises   *How Mr. Smith's approach to leadership has evolved   *The value of reading for leaders   Links The Grunt Padre: Father Vincent Robert Capodanno, Vietnam, 1966-1967 by Father Daniel L. Mode https://a.co/d/aCfeUeQ   The Vietnam War: A Film by Ken Burns https://www.amazon.com/gp/video/detail/B0753XH4H2/ref=atv_dp_share_cu_r   For Country and Corps: The Life of General Oliver P. Smith by Gail B. Shisler https://a.co/d/7IWlQ8l   Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam by H.R. McMaster https://a.co/d/1xKTIl1   Call Sign: Chaos by James Mattis and Bing West https://a.co/d/08lP0kg Sapiens by Yuval Noah Harari   https://a.co/d/7rsFs5g --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss: *Connor's time with Marine Security Forces *Corporals Course *Serving in 1/7 as a squad leader and overcoming the stigma of Security Forces NCOs *The Advanced Infantry Marine Course *Connor's deployment to Darwin, Australia *Keeping Marines in a forward-deployed mindset *What excited Connor most about being a squad leader *What concerned him most *Some of the mistakes he's made as a squad leader *The atmosphere and culture he tried to create in his first squad *The training and PME programs he implemented *Balancing the demands of bureaucracy with preparing Marines for combat *Connor's expectations for his junior Marines, fire team leaders, fellow squad leaders, platoon sergeant, platoon commander, and company commander *What makes an ideal squad leader *Balancing one's personal life with dedication to the profession of arms *What makes a squad leader from hell *The most important thing squad leaders do besides leading Marines in combat and preparing them for it *Connor's experiences as a platoon sergeant in 1/8 *The one thing Connor would have liked to have known about his platoon before becoming its platoon sergeant *The current culture and atmosphere in 1/8 *Connor's philosophy of leadership and how it's evolved *His thoughts on TDGs and their facilitation  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss: *Matt's decision to join the Marine Corps *His experiences at boot camp and the School of Infantry-East   *His experiences with squad leaders up to this point in his career *How well the Marine Corps is preparing him to be a squad leader *The Advanced Infantry Marine Course   *Matt's experiences as a team leader, assistant patrol leader, and acting squad leader *What makes an ideal squad leader *What makes a squad leader from hell   *Matt's philosophy of leadership *What excites him most about being a future squad leader   *What concerns him most   *His ideas for training his future squad *The kind of atmosphere he wants to create in the squad   *The current culture and atmosphere in 1/8   *Matt's thoughts on maneuver warfare  *Balancing the demands of bureaucracy with preparing Marines for combat   *The one thing Matt would like to know about his future squad before becoming its leader   *His expectations for his junior Marines, fire team leaders, fellow squad leaders, platoon sergeant, platoon commander, and company commander   *The value of tactical decision games (TDGs)   *1/8's summer 2023 TDG tournament --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss: *Col Glantz's Vietnam service *How his experiences in Vietnam influenced him as a military historian and researcher *What led him to study the Nazi-Soviet War *The Army's Art of War Symposia from 1984-1987   *How the Soviet Army and US Army defined doctrine (move???)   *The case for an operational level of war   *The introduction of the operational level of war to US Army doctrine   *The origins of the US Army's AirLand Battle doctrine   *The 11 January 1976 Incident   *The evolution of Soviet operational mobile groups, tank corps, tank armies, and mechanized corps *The concept of lessons learned and Col Glantz's critique of it   *The Soviet approach to lessons learned, including the practice of Socialist Criticism *The effect Stalin's purges on the officer corps had on the Soviet military's performance in World War II   *Col Glantz's thoughts on why the Soviets didn't march on Berlin in February 1945   *Comparing and Contrasting Zhukov and Rokossovsky   *How and why Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, failed   *Turning points of the Eastern Front   *Forgotten battles of the war   *Major myths of the war   *Correlation of forces   *Initiative and risk-taking in the Red Army   *Improvements in Soviet training   *German and Soviet penal battalions   *The work of Jack Radey and Charles Sharp   *Notable Soviet and German amphibious operations   *Some of the discoveries Col Glantz made in writing his trilogy on Stalingrad   *Similarities between the Soviet storm groups and the German stormtrooper units of WWII   *The 7th and 8th Guards Tank Armies as a potential “pocket force” at the end of WWII   *The relative levels of military-theoretical development the Soviets and Western Allies had reached by May 1945   *The Russian-language military history websites Col Glantz uses for research   *The movies Enemy at the Gates and Stalingrad The founding of The Journal of Soviet Military Studies, now The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, and some of its more noteworthy pieces   *Persistent errors, misconceptions, and faulty interpretations in the literature of the Nazi-Soviet war   *Col Glantz's advice to young scholars of the Soviet-Nazi War   *What service members can learn from the Eastern Front today, and Col Glantz's advice on studying the war   *Areas of the Nazi-Soviet War we know relatively little about and where Col Glantz would like to see research done   *Col Glantz's current projects   *His thoughts on the war in Ukraine Errata *Col Glantz states that Hermann Balck was the commander of 48th Panzer Corps during the German relief attempt of the Stalingrad Pocket. Balck, however, was the commander of 11th Panzer Division, a subordinate formation of 48th Panzer Corps. Links Col Glantz's Amazon page   Col Glantz's website for his self-published atlases and works   When Titans Clashed by Col David Glantz   Zhukov's Greatest Defeat by Col David Glantz   The Soviet-German War: Myths and Realities by Col David Glantz   Commanding the Red Army's Sherman Tanks: The World War II Memoirs of Hero of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Loza   Fighting for the Soviet Motherland: Recollections from the Eastern Front by Dmitriy Loza   The Defense of Moscow 1941: The Northern Flank by Jack Radey and Charles Sharp   Kharkov 1942: Anatomy of a Military Disaster Through Soviet Eyes by Col David Glantz Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War II by Col David Glantz --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss the following topics.   *What drew Kendrick to study military innovation   *How he defines military innovation   *What conventional wisdom says about military innovation   *How innovation differs from adaption   *Some recent historical examples of military innovation   *Whether military innovation fails more often than it succeeds   *Popular instances of military innovation in the West   *Kendrick's essay “Dangerous Changes: When Military Innovation Harms Combat Effectiveness”    *What drives innovation in military organizations   *Warped innovation   *Incremental vs. radical innovation    *What drew Kendrick to studying British armored warfare innovation during the Interwar Period and the British Army's experiences in North Africa as a case of military innovation   *The US Army's Pentomic Divisions    *Guarding or hedging against dangerous innovations   *The claim that the character of war is changing rapidly   *Force Design 2030 *Communication strategies in support of military innovation efforts   *The innovator's dilemma as it applies to the military innovator   *Innovation and adaptation in Ukraine    *Recommended books on military innovation and military effectiveness   *Defining and measuring military effectiveness   *The prospect of the US forces fighting another counterinsurgency war or low-intensity conflict    *Kendrick's upcoming articles Links “Dangerous Changes: When Military Innovation Harms Combat Effectiveness,” by Kendrick Kuo, International Security https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/47/2/48/113546/Dangerous-Changes-When-Military-Innovation-Harms   “The Future of Military Innovation Studies” by Adam Grissom, Journal of Strategic Studies (paywall) https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390600901067?journalCode=fjss20   “What is a Military Innovation and Why It Matters” by Michael Horowitz and Shira Pindyck, Journal of Strategic Studies (paywall) https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2022.2038572   “Aircraft Carriers Versus Battleships in War and Myth” with James R. FitzSimonds, YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hD43yEnbfL4   “Future Visions and Planned Obsolescence: Implementing 30-Year Horizons in Defense Planning” by Travis Reese and Dylan Phillips-Levine, CIMSEC https://cimsec.org/future-visions-and-planned-obsolescence-implementing-30-year-horizons-in-defense-planning/   Steve Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military https://a.co/d/88ckH5T   Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (revised edition) edited by Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett  https://a.co/d/1gUNGcc   The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars by Barry Posen https://a.co/d/dEJSypm   Technological Change and the Future of Warfare by Michael O'Hanlon https://a.co/d/5NBsZl6   The Innovation Delusion: How Our Obsession with the New Has Disrupted the Work That Matters Most by Lee Vinsel and Andrew Russell  https://a.co/d/gFFzzHH   The Shock Of The Old: Technology and Global History since 1900 by David Edgerton https://a.co/d/6oaUtZk   “Superiority,” a short story by Arthur C. Clarke https://www.baen.com/Chapters/1439133476/1439133476___5.htm --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/damien-oconnell/support

Please visit: www.oarfoundation.org   In this episode, we discuss the following topics. *Aaron's thoughts on the two-year anniversary of Copperhead Company's arrival at HKIA *His experiences as a rifle platoon commander with the 26th MEU and combat advisor with TF Southwest and how these influenced the way he led at HKIA   *C/1/8's deployment with the 24th MEU prior to heading to HKIA   *The company's training and preparations for the NEO   *TDGs and the benefits they provide for learning ROEs   *How TDGs translated to real-world application at HKIA   *When C/1/8 first got news it was heading to Kabul for sure and the reaction of the Marines   *Aaron's understanding of the situation on the ground before getting to HKIA   *C/1/8's first day there, 15 August   *The company's role in the fight for the airfield and perimeter security   *1/8's employment of maneuver warfare concepts and tools   *Aaron's reaction to the National Strike Unit's clearing of the airfield    *Instances where Coppehead Company came under fire   *Concerns that Coalition forces might have to carry out an “Alamo” operation in northern HKIA   *Aaron's reaction to the news that Coalition forces would work with the Taliban   *Charlie Company's opening of North and East Gates as evacuation control centers   *A detailed summary of events and commentary on gate operations at East Gate   *What it was like working with the Taliban   *The need to become emotionally hardened while working with the crowds    *How these crowds could quickly become the enemy in situations   *Charlie Company's fight to provide and maintain a sense of calm, order, and process for the crowd   *The appearance of the NSU at East Gate   *The concepts of unity of command and battlespace and their application at East Gate   *Special operators and special missions and the effects these had on gate operations    *The decision to give up the picket line at East Gate   *The continued relevance of MCDP-1 Warfighting   *What C/1/8 was doing on 26 August, the day of the Abbey Gate Bombing, and how it responded to the situation   *The company's actions between 27 August and its departure from HKIA   *The rules of engagement at HKIA   *What Aaron observed in himself and his Marines your Marines in the aftermath of the mission     *His advice for future leaders on talking to their people about going through situations like HKIA   *The role of mental health checks, mental services, and other kinds of support   *What it was like returning home to Camp Lejeune   *The influence and role of cell phones at HKIA   *The demil efforts   *The order to clean up trash   *The ROEs at HKIA   *Aaron's interactions with the State Department   *Support provided by the BLT's engineer platoon   *The MEU's Female Search Team?   *Creating and maintaining a culture of discipline within Charlie Company   *The roles that exhaustion and discipline played at HKIA   *The actions of Coppehead Company that make Aaron proudest    *His self-assessment as a leader and decision-maker at HKIA   *The lessons he took away from HKIA, including those with potential implications for FD 2030   *Operating in a way that accounts for long-term implications of decisions   *The one thing Aaron would like Marines and other service members to know about what C/1/8 did at HKIA --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/damien-oconnell/support

Link to Operation Allies Refuge (OAR) Foundation   OAR Foundation's Instagram handle: OARfoundation   Lee's Instagram handle: Leer_Bow   In this episode, we discuss the following topics.   *The skills and missions of EOD Marines   *How Lee's previous five deployments shaped the way he led and made decisions at HKIA   *The people and organization of Blackbeard's EOD Section   *What Lee's 2021 deployment with the 24th MEU looked like before heading to HKIA   *The section's preparation for HKIA   *Lee's preparations for the mission  *Lee's understanding of the situation on the ground before getting to HKIA   *Working with other US EOD teams   *The inherently joint nature of the NEO   *The missions of the Blackbeard teams that did not make it to HKIA *The fall of the US embassy in Kabul   *Some of the challenges posed by the geometries of fire at HKIA   *Lee's participation in trying to clear the runway   *His advice to service members who might find themselves in similar situations   *Lee's reaction to Coalition forces partnering with the Taliban   *What Lee's teams did 20-22 August   *His involvement in an incident where civilians risked overrunning the Military Terminal   *Widespread failures to inform refugees about each step of the evacuation process   *The value of Afghan refugees who spoke English and could serve as interpreters   *The atrophy of electronic countermeasure skills in the Marine Corps   *Finding large caches of weapons and ammo aboard HKIA   *The two holding areas at the airport   *Lee's tour of the gates   *The frustration Lee felt as pressure built to evacuate as many refugees as possible while also conducting a joint tactical exfiltration    *Being told by the JTF-CR staff that controlled detonations of gear and weapons were prohibited    *The JTF's decision to bury ammo and arms   *An incident involving friendly fire between 1/8 Marines and the NSU   *Blackbeard's actions on the day of the Abbey Gate Bombing    *Lee's participation in a post-blast analysis at Abbey Gate    *The performance of the units Blackbeard supported   *What Blackbeard's teams did on 27-28 August   *Returning to Kuwait and what Lee observed in his Marines   *Lee's advice to leaders on talking to their teammates about situations as harrowing as HKIA   *The role mental health checks, mental health services, and other kinds of support should play in the lives of HKIA veterans   *What it was like returning home to Camp Lejeune   *The influence of cell phones on operations at HKIA   *The demilitarization process   *Maneuver warfare concepts and tools used during the NEO   *Lee's approach to leading Marines   *The command relationships at HKIA   *Serving alongside EOD techs from other countries   *The MEU's Female Search Team   *The 2nd Recon element at HKIA   *Preserving the capacity of Blackbeard's section   *Logistical challenges during the NEO   *The most frustrating and rewarding aspects of the mission at HKIA   *The actions of Lee's Marines at HKIA that make him proudest   *Lee's most challenging decision at HKIA   *Where he thinks he performed well as a leader and decision-maker and where he could have done better   *The lessons Lee took away from HKIA and how these might apply to the Marine Corps in the future in the context of FD 2030   *Lee's thoughts on the role and value of decision games based on HKIA   *How well the Marine Corps has studied and learned from the Kabul NEO and, more generally, its experiences in Afghanistan   *Lee's thoughts on the other Voices of HKIA podcasts    *The one thing Lee would like Marines and other service members to know about what Blackbeard's section did at HKIA   *The Operation Allies Refuge Foundation --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/damien-oconnell/support

Erik's Social Media Links Twitter: https://twitter.com/Erikhistorian Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/erikthehistorian LinkedIn: ⁠https://www.linkedin.com/in/erikvillard/⁠ In this episode, we discuss the following topics. *How Erik became a military historian   *Roleplaying games as training for military historians   *Which military historians influenced Erik most   *Becoming a digital military historian   *The creation of Vietnamwarhistoryorg   *What Erik's ideal training for future military historians would look like   *Making military history useful to operational commands   *The US Army's History and Heritage efforts   *Those Center for Military History (CMH) projects Erik finds most rewarding *The challenges of writing official military history   *The monograph review process at CMH   *How studying military history provides literacy in evaluating sources   *The claim that military history is under siege in US universities   *Some of the giants of Vietnam War historiography in the English-speaking world   *Historical works that Erik recommends for US small unit leaders   *Small unit military history   *Unit historians (“5X” in the US Army)   *General William Westmoreland's strategy in Vietnam   *Friction between Army and Marine Corps commands   *The controversy of Westmoreland's single air manager concept   *1st Cavalry Division and 101st Airborne Division units in the Battle for Hue   *The possibility of North Vietnam capitulating   *Whether or not the US lost any battles during the war   *Why the Army lost the lessons of Vietnam   *Requests for historical materials in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom   *The poor state of record keeping in US commands during the Global War on Terror   *Some of Erik's solutions to that problem Links Combat Operations: Staying the Course, October 1967 to September 1968 by Erik Villard The 1968 Tet Offensive Battles of Quang Tri City and Hue City by Erik Villard U.S. Army Center of Military History --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss: *Hayden's experiences in 2/10 before joining the 24th MEU   *Becoming a battery XO as a second lieutenant    *Easy Battery's experiences with the 24th MEU prior to HKIA   *Initial indicators that the MEU might head to HKIA   *Easy Battery's training and preparations for HKIA   *The challenge of knowing when to “flip the switch” of aggression and when to turn it off   *Assuming command of Easy Battery   *Hayden's understanding of the situation at HKIA before arriving   *The decision to leave the battery's howitzers behind   *The influence of Marine Major Zach Schwartz on Hayden's professional development   *Hayden's first day at HKIA   *Easy Battery's first mission   *Hayden's initial observations of conditions at North Gate   *Turning over the battery's positions to the 82nd Airborne   *Easy Battery's occupation of the holding area   *The trying conditions of the holding area   *Managing 5,000 refugees with 99 Marines   *Handling riots   *The mental and emotional toll of working in the holding area   *The concept of surfaces and gaps at HKIA   *An incident involving suspected enemy artillery    *Hayden's experiences at Abbey Gate   *Easy Company's activities before departing HKIA   *What Hayden observed in himself and his Marines while in Kuwait   *Hayden's advice for small unit leaders on talking about traumatic events with their Marines   *The role of mental health support for veterans   *The role of cell phones and Signal Chat at HKIA   *The role of discipline   *The role of exhaustion and the need for tough, realistic training   *The most frustrating and rewarding aspects of Hayden's time at HKIA   *Hayden's self-assessment as a leader during the evacuation   *His lessons learned from the operation --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss: -What drew Col Reynolds to studying history    -The value of history for the military professional   -Avoiding traps and pitfalls in studying and using history   -Studying at Oxford   -German General Ludwig Beck   -Doctrine in the German army (1914-1945)   -How the Marine Corps used history while Col Reynolds was a company-grade officer   -His time as a student at The Basic School (TBS)   -The state of the Marine Corps in the mid to late 1970s   -The decision to leave the Marine Corps and transitioning   -Col Reynold's time in the Central Intelligence Agency   -His experiences at TBS as an individual mobilization augmentee   -How TBS had changed since his time as a student   -Tactical decision games (TDGs) and sand table exercises as intellectual revelations   -Writing good TDGs   -Col Reynold's contest-winning article, “Turn on Your Lights!”   -Criticisms of studying and drawing from the 20th-century German military tradition -Researching and writing Just Cause and A Skillful Show of Strength   -Serving as the officer-in-charge of Marine Corps Field History in Operation Iraqi Freedom-I   -Interviewing Marine and Coalition leaders in Iraq   -Writing Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond   -Areas where Marine forces in Iraq could have improved   -The relief of Colonel Joe Dowdy, the commander of Regimental Combat Team-1   -The turnover of Tikrit from Task Force Tripoli to the US Army's 4th Infantry Division   -The U.S. failure to adequately prepare for Phase IV (stability) operations   -How Marine Corps historians seem less critical of Marine leaders compared to Army historians writing about Army generals   -The controversy and conversation surrounding Force Design 2030  Links Colonel Reynold's website: https://www.nicholasreynoldsauthor.com   "Turn on Your Lights!" by Major Nicholas E. Reynolds, USMCR, Proceedings, November 1991 Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 by Martin van Creveld   Just Cause: Marine Operations in Panama, 1988-1990 by Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas E. Reynolds, USMCR A Skillful Show of Strength: US Marines in the Caribbean, 1991-1996 by Colonel Nicholas E. Reynolds, USMCR   U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond by Colonel Nicholas E. Reynolds, USMCR (Rett)   Writer, Sailor, Soldier, Spy: Ernest Hemingway's Secret Adventures, 1935-1961 by Nicholas Reynolds Need to Know: World War II and the Rise of American Intelligence by Nicholas Reynolds --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss: -Tanner getting assigned his squad before deploying with the 24th MEU   -What the deployment looked like before heading to HKIA   -His reaction to the news that the MEU would deploy to Kabul     -His understanding of the situation in Kabul before touching ground in HKIA   -Tanner's first days at HKIA   -Clearing the airport of civilians    -Working with the Taliban   -Gate operations and the challenges they presented   -The role of exhaustion in operations   -Using maneuver warfare concepts and tools    -The Abbey Gate Bombing   -Tanner's experiences between the bombing and before his unit departed HKIA   -What he observed in his fellow Marines and himself in Kuwait following the NEO   -His experience of returning to Camp Lejeune   -The most frustrating and rewarding aspects of the HKIA mission   -The presence of personal cell phones and computers at HKIA   -Tanner's appraisal of his performance at HKIA   -The supposed animosity between 1/8 and 2/1   -Tanner's advice for Marines transitioning into civilian life  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss the following:   -Ben's forthcoming book on modern ground combat   -The lack of definitions of the terms “character of war” and “nature of war”   -The “debate” on FD 2030   -The supposed massive changes touted in modern warfare, like drones   -Ben's research methods and case sample set   -Coding cases   -The problem with how the US military records modern cases of military operations   -The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale -Cases of armor operating independently successfully   -Learning about modern combat from the Syrian Civil War   -The claim that urban warfare is costlier than other types of warfare   -Modern amphibious operations   -How military professionals can become less ignorant of modern warfare   -How professional military education could benefit from Ben's work   -The 3:1 ratio in military offensive operations   -The Value of detailed small unit operational accounts   -The ideal organization for conducting research like Ben's   -The practical and ethical challenges inherent to primary source research of modern combat   -Ben's work on the will to fight   -The uses and limits of wargames    -How Ben got into wargaming   -The Marine Corps Wargaming Center   -Open-source reporting on Ukraine   -What surprised Ben about Russian and Ukrainian combat performance   -Irregular vs. regular warfare   -Ben's experiences as a doctoral student at King's College London Links Will to Fight: Returning to the Human Fundamentals of War by Ben Connable, Michael J. McNerney, William Marcellino, Aaron B. Frank, Henry Hargrove, Marek N. Posard, S. Rebecca Zimmerman, Natasha Lander, Jasen J. Castillo, James Sladden, et al. --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss: *What an infantry battalion operations officer does *How Jordan's experiences at 2nd LAR, Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, and 1/8 influenced how he fought the battalion prior to HKIA *The 24th MEU's deployment prior to heading to HKIA *The exercises done in preparation for HKIA  *The original plan to conduct the NEO *Where Jordan thinks he could have done a better job of preparing the BLT for HKIA *Communications challenges between the BLT and supporting units  *Leaving for HKIA *What HKIA was like on the first day *Jordan's reading of the terrain around HKIA *The organization of the joint operations center *The fight for the airfield  *Learning the Taliban would assist with the evacuation  *Operations at the gates *Sending rejected Afghan families back outside *The 82nd Airborne Division at HKIA *How 1/8 Marines used maneuver warfare concepts and tool *Responding to the Abbey Gate bombing *Returning to Kuwait, observations of the Marines, and coping in the aftermath *Coming home to Camp Lejeune *Command relationships at HKIA  *The presence and effect of cell phones and computers among 1/8 Marines at HKIA *The most frustrating and rewarding aspects of the NEO *What Jordan learned from the HKIA mission *Using decision games as tools to prepare for a mission like HKIA *The supposed animosity between members of 1/8 and 2/1 *The one thing Marines and other servicemembers should know about 1/8's time at HKIA Links Escape from Kabul HBO Documentary https://www.hbo.com/movies/escape-from-kabul   “U.S. Central Command Report on Fatal Afghanistan Airport Attack,” USNI News https://news.usni.org/2022/02/08/u-s-central-command-report-on-fatal-afghanistan-airport-attack --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss: *The experimental and intellectual predecessors of FD 2030 *The frequency of structural change in the Marine Corps *General Neller's dislike of the term “near-peer” *Vertical vs. horizontal structural cuts within organizations *The removal of scout snipers from infantry battalions *His views on the debate on Force Design 2030  *Stand-in forces *The role of air, sea, and land access in FD 2030 *The general's thoughts on the war in Ukraine and the future of war  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/damien-oconnell/support

Amazon link to Richard's book: https://amzn.to/42bM9Lx In this episode, we discuss: *Where the idea of Soviet high commands came from *How they were structured *The commanders who led them *The role and influence of commissars in the high commands *The Soviet capture of the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin Island *The high commands post-World War II *The relationship between Soviet naval forces and the high commands *What Richard found new and surprising in his research *What today's military professionals can learn from studying the Soviet high commands *Which Soviet high commander Richard would like to see a book written about --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/damien-oconnell/support

-Dean's experiences as a student at The Basic School (TBS) and Infantry Officer Course (IOC) -His time as a platoon commander and executive officer with 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines -Dean's deployment to Afghanistan -How the enemy in Afghanistan differed from those in Iraq -Some of his leadership failures and successes -When people reach their breaking points on deployment -Serving with then-Capt Jonathan Frerichs -His advice for current and future platoon commanders on preparing for and winning in combat -Serving as a company executive officer (XO) and his advice for current and future XOs -Dean's time as an instructor at TBS and IOC -What drew Dean to decision-forcing cases (DFCs) -Dean's process of developing DFCs -His thoughts on teaching cases involving large formations to junior leaders and Marines -Some of the facilitation techniques he uses -Why he prefers DFC featuring large formations vs small units -His time as a company commander in 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines -His advice for company commanders for training in Hawaii -Serving with the Marine Detachment Fort Benning --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/damien-oconnell/support

*Where Dean's interests in military matters come from *How well the Marine Corps excites and educates Marines in military history, specifically Marine Corps history *How to interest Marines in military history *What led Dean to join the Marine Corps and serve in the infantry *Where Dean first learned about the 9/11 attacks *Dean's time serving at Marine Barracks Washington (MBW) *His advice to first-term infantry Marines at MBW *Dean's time in 3/4 including the First Battle of Fallujah *His advice for team and squad leaders *Dean's experiences with A/1/8 and fighting the Second Battle of Fallujah *Serving with Elliot Ackerman *Dean's decision to stay in Iraq to rejoin 3/4 on its return deployment *Working with the Iraqi military *Seeing the war evolve over 20 months *What the best small unit leaders do --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss: *Connor's Marine Corps career before joining the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit *What his deployment was like prior to the HKIA mission *The training Connor received in preparation for HKIA *The organization of CLB 24 *Connor's reaction to learning about the HKIA mission *His understanding of the situation on the ground before arriving at the airport *Connor's first day at HKIA *His reaction to learning that the Marines were working with the Taliban *Processing evacuees and the challenges that arose therein *Running logistics for the evacuation *Leading Marines during the operation *The role Connor's leaders played at HKIA *What Connor's platoon was doing August 20-22, when the gates to the airport were closed *The bombing at Abbey Gate *Connor's reaction to the death of Sergeant Nicole Gee *The operations of Connor's unit before it departed HKIA *What Connor observed in his Marines after HKIA *His advice to future NCOs on talking with and supporting their Marines after a mission as intense as HKIA *The nations Connor served alongside at HKIA and how these interactions generally went *Connor's experience returning to Camp Lejeune *Working with the State Department *The MEU's Female Search Team *The effects of allowing Marines to keep their personal cell phones computers during the HKIA mission *The roles that discipline and exhaustion played in the evacuation *The most frustrating and rewarding aspects of the HKIA mission *The actions of Connor's platoon and CLB 24 that he's proudest of *The toughest decisions Connor made at HKIA *Where he thinks he excelled as a leader and decision maker and where he fell short *The lessons Connor learned from the mission *Connor's thoughts on the experiences of Dustin Casey, his cousin, at HKIA *The one thing he wants Marines and other service members to know about CLB 24's actions at HKIA *Connor's advice for Marines transitioning back to the civilian world Links US Central Command's "Findings and Recommendations—Attack Against U.S. Forces Conducting NEO at Hamid Karzai International Airport on 26 August 2021" --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/damien-oconnell/support

In this episodes, we discuss: *Bravo Company's deployment with the 24th MEU prior to heading to HKIA *Its training and preparation for the HKIA NEO *The company's reaction to hearing it would go to HKIA *Nick's understanding of the situation on the ground before arriving at HKIA *Bravo Company's first day at HKIA *Its role in clearing the airfield of civilians *The enemy fire 1/8 received *Nick's reaction to learning that the Taliban would assist in the evacuation *Bravo Company's experience manning the North Gate *The role of trust and intent in Bravo's efforts at HKIA *What the company was doing on 20-22 August *The enemy threat at HKIA *Bravo's operations on 26 August, the day of the Abbey Gate bombing *Bravo's operations between 26 August and its departure from HKIA *What Nick observed in himself and his Marines in the aftermath of the mission *His advice to future leaders whose unit members have gone through something as horrific as the HKIA mission *Nick's homecoming to Camp Lejeune *The friendly nation forces Bravo served alongside at HKIA *The US Army elements Bravo worked with *Bravo's interactions with the State Department at HKIA *The role of outside entities requesting special evacuations of personnel at HKIA *Bravo's interactions with the MEU's Female Search Team *The roles of discipline and exhaustion during the evacuation *Those actions of Bravo Company that make Nick proudest *The one thing Nick would like Marines and other service members to know about what Bravo Company did at HKIA Links US Central Command's "Findings and Recommendations—Attack Against U.S. Forces Conducting NEO at Hamid Karzai International Airport on 26 August 2021" --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss: *What the Infantry Battalion-Experiment (IBX) is *Alpha Company's structure and rank-billet requirements *How the company is supposed to conduct Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations *Grumbling from some of the enlisted leaders over the new rank-billet requirements *Lt Carreiro's experience in A/1/2 so far including what's surprised him most *What it's like having Sgt fire team leaders and SSgt squad leaders *The expanded platoon and company headquarters elements *The rifle squads' two-fire team construct *Advice for future platoon commanders who might serve in an IBX-like unit *Gunny Baker's experiences in the company so far, including what it's like being a platoon sergeant again *His advice for future gunny platoon sergeants *The data being collected on A/1/2 *The drones in A/1/2 *The Arms Room concept *Logistics in A/1/2 *The Infantry Marine Course *The criticism that the IBX, in its current form, is trying to replicate a Ranger battalion with a portion of the gear and none (or comparatively very little) of the training *How A/1/2 would have operated in places like Iraq or Afghanistan and in a counterinsurgency more generally *What's been most surprising about the new kinds of equipment the unit is using or has experimented with *A/1/2's relationship with the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab *Some of the training exercises and experiments A/1/2 has conducted *The role of security clearances in the new technology available to A/1/2 *Where the company has failed *The role of PME in the company *Where IBX should go from here *How the war in Ukraine is influencing A/1/2 *The one thing each guest would like the audience to take from what they're doing in Alpha Company and the IBX Links "2nd Marine Division | Infantry Battalion Experiment," Defense Flash News "2030 Infantry Battalions," Headquarters Marine Corps --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss: *Dustin's deployment prior to heading to Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) including the training he received in preparation for the non-combatant evacuation operation there (NEO) *His reaction to the news that his company was heading to HKIA *His understanding of the situation at the airport before arriving *A/1/8's first day at HKIA, 14 August 2021 *The events of 15-16 August and A/1/8's struggle to clear the airfield of civilians *Dustin's reaction to learning that the Taliban would assist with the evacuation *A/1/8's time manning the North Gate and what gate operations looked like *Dustin's squad, platoon, and company leadership leadership at HKIA *Some of the concepts and tools found in MCDP-1 and MCDP 1-3 that A/1/8 used during the evacuation *A/1/8's operations at HKIA from 20-22 August *The VBIED threat at HKIA *What Dustin was doing on 26 August, the day G/2/1 got hit by a suicide bomber *A/1/8's operations after the bombing and before it left HKIA *What Dustin observed in his fellow Marines after leaving HKIA and his advice to leaders on helping their teammates deal with severe trauma *What it was like returning home to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina *Working with the MEU's female search teams *The role of discipline in A/1/8's operations at HKIA *The role exhaustion played during the NEO and how A/1/8's leaders sought to overcome or mitigate it *The most frustrating and rewarding aspects of the NEO *What it was like watching Marines bring rejected civilians back through the North Gate *Working with other nations' armed forces and the US Army *Those actions of A/1/8 that make Dustin proudest *The role and value of decision games in training and preparing for missions like the HKIA NEO *The one thing Dustin would like Marines and other US service members to know about what A/1/8 did at HKIA Links US Central Command's "Findings and Recommendations—Attack Against U.S. Forces Conducting NEO at Hamid Karzai International Airport on 26 August 2021" --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss: *Alpha/1/8's deployment prior to heading to Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) including the training it did in preparation for the non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) *Sam's reaction to the news that his company was heading to HKIA and how his Marines were informed *Sam's use of TDGs set at HKIA in preparation of the NEO *His understanding of the situation on the ground before arriving at HKIA *A/1/8's first day at HKIA, 14 August 2021 *The events of 15-16 August and A/1/8's struggle to clear the airfield of civilians *Sam's reaction to learning that the Taliban would assist with the evacuation and how he messaged this news to his Marines *The mental, moral, and physical state and morale of the company around this time *A/1/8's time manning the North Gate and what gate operations looked like *Some of the concepts and tools from MCDP-1 and MCDP 1-3 that Sam used during the evacuation *Alpha/1/8's operations at HKIA from 20-22 August *The VBIED threat at HKIA *What A/1/8 was doing on 26 August, the day G/2/1 got hit by a suicide bomber *A/1/8's operations after the bombing and before it left the airport *What Sam observed in his Marines after leaving HKIA and his advice to leaders on helping their teammates deal with severe trauma *What it was like returning to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina *The effect that Marines' personal cell phones and access to social media had on operations at HKIA *The role of discipline in A/1/8's operations and how Sam and his leaders sought to maintain it *The role exhaustion played during the NEO and how A/1/8's leaders sought to overcome or mitigate it *A/1/8's logistics during the NEO *The most rewarding aspect of the NEO *What it was like watching Marines bring rejected civilians back out to the crowd *Those actions of Sam's Marines that make him proudest *The role and value of decision games in training and preparing for missions like the HKIA NEO *The Marine Corps History Division's interviews of BLT 1/8 Marines about HKIA *The one thing Sam would like Marines and other US service members to know about what A/1/8 did at HKIA Links US Central Command's "Findings and Recommendations—Attack Against U.S. Forces Conducting NEO at Hamid Karzai International Airport on 26 August 2021" --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/damien-oconnell/support

*The battalion commanders Clardy had as a company and field-grade officer and how they influenced him on how he views and practiced battalion command *What makes an ideal battalion commander. What makes a battalion commander from hell *The single most important thing battalion commanders do or should do for their unit *How Clardy's time teaching at The Basic School and Infantry Officer Course influenced his preparations for and practice of battalion command *What a light armored reconnaissance (LAR) battalion is and how it differs from an infantry battalion *Clardy's reaction to being selected for command of an LAR battalion *The steps he took to prepare for battalion command *Some of the inherent weaknesses of an LAR battalion and how he sought to overcome these *His advice to future LAR battalion commanders *His philosophy of command *What excited him most about being a battalion commander. What concerned him most *What the battalion commander's relationship to the battalion's staff sections should be *Clardy's professional military education efforts within the battalion *The one thing he wish he had known about his battalion before his assumed command of it *His efforts in preparing his battalion for Operation Iraqi Freedom-I (OIF-I) *A deep dive into the battalion's operations during OIF-I, including its role in Task Force Tripoli *Clardy's experiences commanding Regimental Combat Team-2, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Training Command, and 3rd Marine Division *Characteristics of the best and worst battalions he's seen *His thoughts on Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluations and Integrated Training Exercises *Common mistakes he's seen new battalion commanders make *What battalion command might look like in the context of Force Design 2030 Links Common Sense Training: A Working Philosophy for Leaders by LtGen Arthur S. Collins Jr. Company Command: The Bottom Line by Major General John G. Meyer and Major Spencer Beatty Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq by Bernard E. Trainor and Michael R. Gordon --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/damien-oconnell/support

Liner Notes *The battalion commanders Folsom served under and how they shaped the way he views and practices battalion command *What makes an ideal battalion commander *What makes a battalion commander from hell *The single most important thing battalion commanders do or should do for their unit *Where the battalion commander's place should be on the battlefield *Characteristics of the best and worst battalions *Common mistakes new battalion commanders make *Folsom's experience as a company commander in Operation Iraqi Freedom I and how that affected the way he's led his battalions *Folsom's reaction to being selected for infantry battalion command *Some of the challenges, leadership and otherwise, inherent in commanding an infantry battalion *What excited and concerned Folsom most about being a battalion commander *The steps Folsom took to prepare for battalion command *The battalion commander's relationship to the unit's staff sections *Folsom's expectations for his principal leaders and staff officers *The one thing Folsom wish he had known about his first battalion before he assumed command of it *What Folsom learned from going on numerous patrols with his squads in Sangin, Afghanistan *Folsom's thoughts for commanders on units that take consistent or heavy casualties *How Folsom's experience with 3/7 influenced the way he commanded Task Force Lion *Some of the challenges present in Folsom's current command *His thoughts on what battalion command will look like in the future, particularly in the context of Force Design 2030 Links The Highway War: A Marine Company Commander in Iraq by Seth Folsom In the Gray Area: A Marine Advisor Team at War by Seth Folsom Where Youth and Laughter Go: With the “Cutting Edge” in Afghanistan by Seth Folsom --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss: *Scott's enlisted experience and its effects on how he views on leadership, command, and warfighting *Scott's experience as an artilleryman, his understanding of fire support, and how these things may influence how he commands his battalion *Scott's two deployments with Second Battalion, Eighth Marines, and how these experiences have influenced him as a leader *His time at the School of Infantry-East and the similarities and differences between serving in a battalion in the operating forces and one in the supporting establishment *Scott's two deployments with Second Battalion, Second Marines, and what he learned from them *His time at TBS and how it shaped him as an officer, leader, and teacher *Scott's views on decision-forcing cases *His time as a battalion XO and what it taught him about command and leadership *Scott's advice to future XOs and battalion commanders about working together effectively *The challenges that XOs and battalion commanders face while on a UDP and some ideas on handling them *His time as the division secretary of the 2nd Marine Division *His experiences as the division's current operations officer *Being the XO of the 6th Marine Regiment *The ideal and worst kinds of battalion commanders *The single most important thing battalion commanders do for their unit *How teaching and leading are complimentary *Scott's PME plans for his battalion *The steps Scott has taken to prepare for battalion command *How Scott will use the history of his battalion to help with unit training, education, esprit de corps, identity, and cohesion *What excites Scott most about being a battalion commander and what concerns him most *The atmosphere and culture Scott wants to create in the battalion *The characteristics of the best and worst battalions *Scott's take on battalion exercises like MCCREs and ITXs *Common mistakes new battalion commanders, and commanders more generally, make *How battalion command in the future will look, particularly in the context of Force Design 2030 Links Infantry in Battle by the Infantry Journal Turn the Ship Around by David Marquet Grit by Angela Duckworth Mindset by Carol Dweck Extreme Ownership by Jocko Willink Noise by Joseph McCormack Errata I said Scott's 2nd deployment to Iraq with 2/8 was in 2006. It was in 2007. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss: *How the Germans and Soviets organized their forces in and near Ukraine on the eve of Operation Barbarossa and the principal senior commanders on each side *Why the Southwestern Front put up a stouter resistance against Army Group South than did its counterparts against Army Groups North and Center *The Uman encirclement and what this defeat meant for the Soviets *The likelihood of a Soviet soldier captured in 1941 surviving until 1945 *The 3-month siege of the city of Odessa *The capture of Crimea *Where the Soviets thought the main German blow would land in the summer of 1942 and why *The Second Battle of Kharkov *The role the Dneper River plays in the fighting in Ukraine in 1941 and 1943 *Where the war in Ukraine stood by the end of 1943 *The Cherkassy Pocket *Hube's Wandering Pocket *Stalin's role in military operations and how this changed over time *Stalin's working relationships with his generals and how these evolved *Aspects of the war in Ukraine in WWII that Richard would like to research *Two things Richard wants U.S. Marines and soldiers to know about Ukraine in World War II *Some parallels between the fighting in Ukraine in WWII and the war there now *Richard's assessment of the Russian and Ukrainian militaries' performance so far *How likely we are to see the war escalate to involve NATO forces Links The Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 1904-1940 by Richard Harrison Architect of Soviet Victory in World War II: The Life and Theories of G.S. Isserson by Richard Harrison The Soviet Army High Commands in War and Peace, 1941–1992 by Richard Harrison When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler by David Glantz and Jonathan House Errata Near the beginning of the interview, I ask Richard about the “German” siege of Odessa in 1941. In fact, the Romanians besieged and captured the city, with some assistance from the Germans. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss: *Why Hitler wanted Ukraine *How the average Ukrainian viewed the Soviets and Germans on the eve of Operation Barbarossa and how these perceptions changed over the course of the war *How fighting in Ukraine went for the Soviets during Barbarossa *The First Battle of Kiev and the largest battle of encirclement and capture of prisoners in the history of warfare *The Enormity of the war against the Soviet Union *The German massacre of Jews at Babi Yar *The effect of ethnic cleansing of Jews and other populations on the Germans' war effort *The first Battle of Kharkov *Some of the standout German and Soviet senior military leaders in the fighting for Ukraine in 1941 *The Axis allied forces that fought in Ukraine in Barbarossa and beyond *The Soviet offensives at and near Stalingrad *The subsequent Axis race to the Dnieper and Soviet pursuit *Field Marshall Erich von Manstein's defense of the Don River in February 1943 and his famous so-called “Backhand Blow” against the Soviets *The accuracy of Manstein's description of the Donets Campaign in his memoirs *The accuracy of the description of the fighting in Ukraine in German General Herman Balck's book, Order from Chaos *The accuracy of Soviet memoirs of the war in Ukraine *The logistics situation for both the Axis and Soviet forces in Ukraine in the winter of 1943 *What the Germans should have done with their forces in Ukraine in 1944 *The Soviet recapture of the Crimea in 1944 *The operations concerning the capture of the city of Lviv in 1944 *The encirclement and defeat of German troops at the city of Brody *The roles that Hitler and Stalin had in operation in Ukraine and how these changed over time *How well the Soviets and Germans learned from their experiences in Ukraine and how these experiences affected the Soviet way of war after WW II *How does the war on other fronts—in North Africa, Italy, France—affected the fighting in Ukraine *What aspects of the war in Ukraine Prit thinks deserves more attention or research *The Germans' use of Auftragstaktik or mission-type orders in Ukraine and the lack thereof of this approach in the Soviet forces *The toll the war in Ukraine took on the civilian population there *What books Prit recommends to Marines and soldiers wanting to learn more about operations in Ukraine in WWII *What's the one thing you'd want Marines and soldiers to take away about the war in Ukraine in World War II? *What links, connections, or parallels can you draw from the fighting in Ukraine in WWII to the war we're seeing there now, whether that be militarily, economically, culturally, or politically? *What's your assessment of the Russian army's performance in Ukraine so far? What's surprised you? What hasn't? What about the Ukrainians' performance? Links On a Knife's Edge: The Ukraine, November 1942–March 1943 by Prit Buttar Retribution: The Soviet Reconquest of Central Ukraine, 1943 by Prit Buttar The Reckoning: The Defeat of Army Group South, 1944 by Prit Buttar Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler's Most Brilliant by Erich von Manstein Order in Chaos: The Memoirs of General of Panzer Troops by Hermann Balck Battle for the Ukraine: The Korsun-Shevchenkovskii Operation Translated and Edited by David Glantz and Harold Orenstein Where the Iron Crosses Grow: The Crimea 1941–44 by Robert Forczyk --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss: *What is critical thinking and isn't *Some of the most common misconceptions of critical thinking *The relationship between critical and creative thinking *How critical thinking relates to divergent and convergent thinking *The relationship between critical thinking, logic, and problem solving *Gerald's take on the Dunning-Kruger Effect and whether critical thinking can serve as an antidote to it *Whether some people seem more predisposed to thinking critically than others *If there are ways we can predispose young men and women to think critically *Gerald's thoughts on the relationship between critical thinking and Socratic questioning *His first encounter with the concept of critical thinking *How to support people interested in thinking critically but are not yet ready to adopt it fully *How Gerald's conception of critical thinking has changed over the years *The Paul-Elder model of critical thinking and why Gerald thinks it's useful *Why all the elements of reasoning are equal *The differences between assumptions and inferences (conclusions) and examples of each *Concepts *Some potential neglected areas of the Paul-Elder model *The SEE-I method *Gerald's preferred methods for introducing adult students and educators to critical thinking *How critical thinking applies to military matters *What critical thinking looks like in action—especially in high stakes situations *Some of the unique challenges to thinking critically in the military *The role of time in critical thinking *The tension between the questioning and investigative nature of critical thinking and the military's desire for its members to show "instant and willing obedience to orders” *The idea that critical thinking is inherently subversive in an organization like the military *Situations where critical thinking may not be preferable or desirable *How we can apply critical thinking to understanding America's disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan *Gerald's thoughts on the use of chess to promote critical thinking *What he tells people who are turned off by the major time commitment and effort it takes to become skilled in critical thinking *How we can measure critical thinking *What fundamental and powerful concepts (FPCs) are and how they apply to military schooling and training *How one goes about determining what the FPCs of a domain or discipline are *How one might measure a student's grasp or application of a course's FPCs *Gerald's personal practices of addressing blind spots, knowledge gaps, and biases (cognitive or otherwise) *His thoughts on Daniel Kahneman's System 1 and System 2 thinking *How critical thinking applies to highly technical fields *The thorny topic of role models for critical thinking *Gerald's wish to see a guide on thinking critically in a military context *The role of emotion in critical thinking *Gerald's new book Links The Foundation for Critical Thinking: www.criticalthinking.org The Standards and Elements of Critical Thinking: https://www.criticalthinking.org/ctmodel/logic-model.php Learning to Think Things Through: A Guide to Critical Thinking Across the Curriculum by Gerald Nosich Critical Writing: A Guide to Writing a Paper Using the Concepts and Processes of Critical Thinking by Gerald Nosich --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss: *Col Peznola's education and training as a young officer *Col Peznola's take on what “blocking and tackling” and “the basics” means in a tactical sense *His experience attending the Army's Cavalry Leaders Course and what he learned from being around soldiers *When Col Peznola first heard about what would later be termed maneuver warfare *His time as an instructor at The Basic School (TBS) *Who the “maneuver warfare instigators” in the TBS bullpen were *How the curriculum at TBS had changed since Col Peznola had been a student there *How Peznola approached teaching lieutenants in the field *The central role that Lieutenant Colonel Ray Cole played in the shift to maneuver warfare at TBS *Captain Paul Kennedy's use of BB guns in force on force training and how this inspired Peznola to create the “Zen Patrol” *What it was like facilitating the Zen Patrol *How patrolling seemed to “stick” more with students when taught this way *The role of the debrief and the instructor in the Zen Patrol *How Peznola's experiences at TBS fostered within him an inquisitive mindset *Why Peznola thinks the Marine Corps needs to change its manpower system and truly reward Marines who innovate *What it was like having 2ndLt Brendan McBreen as a student *Peznola's thoughts on command and control *What it was like sitting through John Boyd's briefings and interacting with Boyd *What it was like having now-Major General Roger Turner as a student in Peznola's platoon at TBS *Peznola's interactions with John Kelly and John Allen at TBS and the impact Kelly and Allen had on the effort to infuse maneuver warfare into the curricula at TBS and IOC *The dearth of communication that occurs today between TBS and IOC instructors and how that wasn't the case in Peznola's time *What TBS and IOC would look like if Peznola were king *Peznola's experiences at 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion *Peznola's deployment with the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit and his time in Somalia *His time serving in manpower at Headquarters Marine Corps *His time as the general officer monitor officer *Why some Marines leaders resisted maneuver warfare *Peznola's reaction to the publication of Warfighting *His thoughts on and experiences with Bill Lind *On whether the Marine Corps practiced maneuver warfare in its invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan *What maneuver warfare looks like in garrison *Whether the Marine Corps' current model of recruit training helps or hinders new Marines from executing maneuver warfare *Peznola's thoughts on SOI-West's inclusion of Chess in its Infantry Marine Course *His time as the commanding officer of the Marine Special Operations Advisor Group *His criticism of special operations in Afghanistan *How the US created the Afghan forces in its own image *Peznola's time as the chief of staff of a special operations task force in Afghanistan *His thoughts on America's withdrawal from Afghanistan *His thoughts on Force 2030 *His take on general officer and joint professional military education *Who Ike Skelton was and why the US military needs another person like him *If Col Peznola could change one thing about the Marine Corps *What excites him most about the future direction of the Marine Corps Links To Lose a Battle by Alistar Horne Organic Design for Command and Control by John Boyd --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss: *Lindsay's experience as a student at The Basic School (TBS) *Her reaction to being assigned as a logistics officer *Her initial impressions of her first unit, 9th Communication Battalion *Her first year-long deployment to Iraq and experiences with “push” logistics *What it was like working for a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) *Lindsay's unusual experience serving first as the assistant battalion logistics officer, then as the battalion logistics officer, and finally as a truck platoon commander *What a day in the 9th Communication Battalion's logistics shop in Iraq might look like *What it was like being the logistics officer for the battalion as a second lieutenant *Lindsay's next assignment as a truck platoon commander and the shift from being a staff officer to a commander of Marines *The sorts of missions Lindsay's platoon carried out *The improvised explosive device threat during these missions *How Lindsay tried to keep her Marines engaged during the year-long deployment *Lindsay's time as the truck company commander, Headquarters Group, I MEF *Her second deployment to Iraq *Lindsay's experiences as a student at the Expeditionary Warfare School *Her introduction to decision-forcing cases (DFCs) *Lindsay's time as a Warfighting Instructor at The Basic School (TBS) *The “Bullpen”—the instructor office at TBS *Lindsay's time as the TBS Convoy Package Primary Instructor *Her two times as a staff platoon commander and how her platoons differed from one another how and they were similar *What she learned from commanding her first student-officer platoon and how she applied that to her second platoon *Her time as the executive officer of a Warrant Officer Basic Course company *Her advice to future and current TBS captain-instructors *Lindsay's experiences as the S4A of the 24th MEU *Her time as a student at the UK's Advanced Command and Staff Course *Lindsay's experiences with Task Force Al Asad, as part of Operation Inherent Resolve *Some ideas for DFCs from Lindsay's time with the task force *How the Iraqis working with the task force did logistics *Lindsay's preparations for and experiences with working with the Iraqis as a female *What it was like working with Colonel Seth Folsom, the task force commanding officer *Lindsay's role in the Logistics Division, Futures Branch, Concept Section within the Deputy Commandant's Office for Installations and Logistics *Her advice to company-grade logistics officers *Her advice to young people potentially interested in serving as Marine logistics officers *The one thing Lindsay wished all Marines knew about logistics *One thing Marines routinely misunderstand about logistics *Lindsay's favorite book on logistics *Her preparations for taking command of Combat Logistics Battalion 15 *Her parting thoughts for our listeners Links Association of Marine Corps Logisticians Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War by LtGen William Pagonis Task Force Lion [AKA TF Al Asad] Continues with Partnership with Iraqis Against ISIS by Sgt David Staten, USMC Errata *I incorrectly gave the name of the Association of Marine Corps Logisticians as the “Association of Marine Logisticians.” *I repeatedly mispronounced the word “logisticians” during the podcast. Apologies for that! --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/damien-oconnell/support

Happy New Year, everyone! In this episode, we discuss *How the Björks define learning *The difference between learning and performance *The retrieval effect *The relationship between forgetting and learning *Some thoughts on why humans are terrible at predicting what they know vs what they don't know and how well they think they'll perform vs how they'll actually perform *How accessing memories changes them in our brain *How our recall is highly dependent on contextual cues *The myth of muscle memory *How variability in practice conditions makes for better learning *How our intuitions can mislead us about our abilities *The benefit of educational and training simulations *Bob's work with the Nuclear Training Center *Some ideas on how to introduce desirable difficulties to already successful students *The difference between near and far transfer of learning *The Björk's take on the Marine Corps' colloquial definitions for training (“preparation for the known”) and education (“preparation for the unknown”) *The one thing Bob and Elizabeth hope US servicemembers take away from our conversation Links The Björk Center for Learning and Forgetting at UCLA Elizabeth's Publications Bob's Publications Errata In the last 30 minutes of show, Bob mentions the “Blue Force” being the opposition force at the US Army's National Training Center. He meant instead to say, “Red Force.” --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/damien-oconnell/support

It's finally here: The complete audio version of The Ghost and General Smith, a chilling look at one potential future for the U.S. Marine Corps. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss: *Gunner Gilchrist's advice to his past self, Private First Class Gilchrist *What Infantry Training Battalion-East was like when Ryan attended as a student in 2003-2004 *What Ryan's first unit (Fox Company, 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines) was like *Ryan's deployment to Karma, Iraq—what the experience was like and what he learned from it *How Ryan attempted to get his Marines to adopt a population-focused approach to counter-insurgency when he was a squad leader and platoon sergeant *Fox 2/2's operations in Iraq *Ryan's experience as a team leader *What makes a first-rate team leader *What every team leader should be doing intellectually to get better *The challenges of leading your peers *Ryan's first MEU: his expectations and experiences *Ryan's advice on keeping young Marines engaged on a MEU *What Ryan learned from training with the Kenyan army *His experience at Corporals Course and Drill Instructor School *Ryan's response to my calls to change recruit training *The one thing Ryan would change about recruit training and why *Ryan's thoughts on the 4th Phase of recruit training *Ryan's experience at the Infantry Squad Leaders Course *His deployment to Sangin, Afghanistan, as a squad leader with India Company, Third Battalion, Seventh Marines *What lessons he took away from the deployment *Ryan's second deployment to Afghanistan, this time as a platoon sergeant, and what he took away from it *What makes a good platoon sergeant *As a platoon sergeant, what Ryan expected of his squad leaders *Ryan's experiences teaching at the Infantry Small Unit Leaders Course (ISULC) at the School of Infantry-West and how these influenced how he understands and practices maneuver warfare *The challenges associated with running ISULC field exercises *The intellectual shift Ryan experienced teaching at ISULC *Ryan's initial reaction to seeing me (Damien) at ISULC *Why Ryan finds decision-forcing cases (DFCs) so effective *Ryan's favorite DFC and why *Ryan's facilitation of The Hornet's Nest, a DFC that he built for ISULC *Unexpected themes or uses of DFCs *Ryan's experience of having the protagonist of a case in the classroom while he's teaching and his advice to case facilitators interested to employing this technique *Ryan's time as the operations chief for Weapons Company, Third Battalion, 1st Marines, including his deployment with the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit *His experience working with Italy's San Marco Marine Brigade *Ryan's time as the tactics chief at Officer Candidate School (OCS) *The one thing Ryan would change about OCS *Ryan's experiences as a student at The Basic School and in the Infantry Weapons Officer Course *Ryan's work on reshaping recruit training at Parris Island and how he's integrated DFCs into The Crucible *The one thing Ryan would change about Marine enlisted professional military education *The one thing he'd changed about how we train Marines *The one thing he'd change about Marine infantry *What maneuver warfare in garrison looks like *Ryan's thoughts on Force Design 2030 and what a war with China might look like for Marine infantry *His reaction to discussed plans to make Marine infantry more like special operations forces *What concerns Ryan the most about the future direction of the Marine Corps *What excites Ryan the most about the future direction of the Marine Corps Links Tribal Leadership by David Logan et al.: https://amzn.to/3niff9y Ender's Game by Orson Scott Card: https://amzn.to/3opXDrw --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we conclude the tale of The Ghost and General Smith. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we continue the tale of The Ghost and General Smith. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/damien-oconnell/support

We resume our tale of The Ghost and General Smith with chapter 3. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/damien-oconnell/support

*What Dilan learned about company command from his time as a combined-anti-armor platoon commander and company executive officer *What he learned about company command from his company commanders *Dilan's thoughts on what makes the ideal company commander and why *What makes the company commander from hell *The challenges and opportunities (leadership and otherwise) Dilan encountered in commanding a weapons company *How Dilan attempted to get his lieutenants to interact competently and confidently with other leaders in the battalion Dilan's philosophy of command and how it worked in practice The most important thing company commanders do or should do How well the Marine Corps prepared Dilan for company command Dilan's thoughts on the Marine Corps having its own company commanders course What excited Dilan most about being a company commander What concerned Dilan most about being a company commander What the relationship should be like between the weapons company commander and their operations chief and first sergeant Dilan's two deployments with his company The designs, plans, or programs that Dilan implemented in his company and how they worked out How Dilan tried to balance feeding the military bureaucracy with preparing his company for combat The steps Dilan took to prepare for company command Some of the books Dilan read while preparing for company command The one thing Dilan wish he had known about his company before he took command Where Dilan thinks he excelled as a company commander and where he fell short The one thing Dilan would have changed about his time commanding his company How Dilan attempted to practice maneuver warfare in garrison Tips on physically and intellectually preparing for company command Dilan's expectation for his *Executive officer *Platoon commanders *Squad leaders *Junior Marines *Battalion commander *Battalion executive officer *Operations officer *Fellow company commanders Links Flames of War Miniature Wargame: https://www.flamesofwar.com Team Yankee Miniature Wargame: https://www.team-yankee.com/ The Enlightened Soldier by Charles Edward White: https://www.amazon.com/Enlightened-Soldier-Scharnhorst-Militarische-Gesellschaft/dp/0275929361 Command Culture: https://www.amazon.com/Command-Culture-Education-1901-1940-Consequences/dp/1574415336 The Forgotten Soldier: https://www.amazon.com/Forgotten-Soldier-Guy-Sajer/dp/1574882864 --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/damien-oconnell/support

We continue "The Ghost and General Smith," a fictional--and frightening--look at the future of the U.S. Marine Corps. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/damien-oconnell/support

This episode includes the preface and chapter 1 of "The Ghost and General Smith," a fictional--and frightening--look at the future of the U.S. Marine Corps. For the written version, please visit: https://www.themaneuverist.org/post/the-ghost-general-smith-preface-and-chapter-1-by-scott-weibling-jordan-miller-and-matt-tweedy --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss: *What Zach learned about company command from his time as a platoon commander *What he learned about company command from his company commanders *Zach's thoughts on what makes the ideal company commander and why *What makes the company commander from hell *How Zach's experiences as an instructor at The Basic School shaped his view of company command, his preparations for it, and execution of it *What a U.S. Marine Corps weapons company is, how it differs from a rifle company, and the challenges and opportunities inherent to commanding one *Zach's philosophy of command (or intent) and how it's worked out so far *Zach's Combat Concepts *Outside of commanding the company in combat, the most important thing company commanders do or should do *How well the Marine Corps prepared Zach for company command *Zach's thoughts on the Marine Corps having its own company commanders course *What Zach learned about company command at the Maneuver Captains Career Course *What excited Zach the most about being a company commander *What concerned Zach the most about being a company commander *What the relationship should be like between the weapons company commander and their operations chief and first sergeant *The events surrounding Zach's taking of command of his company *What he's learned from participating in several large-scale exercises with his company in 29 Palms *Zach's co-founding and publishing of the Connecting File *The designs, plans, or programs that Zach has implemented in his company and how they've worked out so far *Zach's use of educational wargaming in his company *How Zach tries to balance feeding the military bureaucracy with preparing his company for combat *Some of the books Zach read while preparing for company command *Zach's tips for future company commanders *The one thing Zach wish he'd known about his company before he took command *How Zach's company attempts to embody and execute the maneuver warfare philosophy in garrison *Zach's expectation for his Company executive officer Platoon commanders Squad leaders Team leaders Junior Marines Battalion commander Executive officer Operations officer Fellow company commanders Links To sign up with the Connecting File, email Zach at cxfile0302@gmail.com. Combat Mission Black Sea Memoir '44 Close Combat Marine (or Modern Tactics) Combat Concepts Steel Division 2 Starcraft 2 Dawn of War 2 The Last Hundred Yards Blood Meridian This Kind of War What It Is Like to Go To War Three Sips of Gin Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications Steel my Soldiers' Hearts --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss: *Ryan's experience with company commanders up to this point in his career *The factors that distinguished the good from the great company commanders in Ryan's battalion *What Ryan learned about company command while serving as a rifle platoon commander, combined anti-armor platoon commander, battalion assistant operations officer. and battalion operations officer *The qualities of the company commander from hell *How Ryan's experience as an instructor at The Basic School, to include his time as the head of the Instructor Education Program, shaped his view of company command and his preparations for it *Ryan's philosophy of command *Why a company commander should have a trusted advisor *The role of humility and vulnerability in developing honesty and candor *Abolishing a zero-mentality in your organization *The designs, plans, or programs that Ryan hopes to implement in his company *What excites Ryan the most about being a company commander *What concerns him the most about being a company commander *The relationship Ryan intends to create with his company first sergeant *How well Ryan thinks the Marine Corps has prepared him for company command *What Ryan is doing to prepare for company command *Ryan's thoughts on the idea of a Marine Corps company commanders course *The 2nd Marine Division's Division Leaders Assessment Program *The one thing Ryan would like to know about his company before he assumes command *Ryan's expectation for his Company executive officer Platoon commanders Squad leaders Team leaders Junior Marines Battalion commander Executive officer Operations officer Fellow company commanders --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss: *The role that Rick's father played in his son's interest in the US Army and military history *The role that Rick's time living in Germany had in his decision to write about World War II *Rick's interest in a career in the Army and his declined appointment to West Point *What led Rick to leave the Washington Post to pursue military history *What Rick means when he calls himself “a recovering journalist” *What led Rick to writing Crusade, his book on the Persian Gulf War, and some of the challenges he encountered in researching and writing along the way *Some of the surprises Rick learned while writing Crusade *How Rick came to write his third book, In the Company of Soldiers *The story behind how Rick got embedded with David Petraeus and the 101st Airborne Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom-1 *Rick's experiences of witnessing a full-scale invasion of another country *What it was like to watch Dave Petraeus command the 101st Airborne Division *Rick's observations of the Iraqi forces *What a military historian learns from embedding with a combat unit, and how this affected Rick's subsequent military history writing *The American and German ‘ways of war' in World War II *Rick's thoughts on the US 1st Infantry Division and 3rd Infantry Division in the war in Europe *Rick's take on US Army General Mark Clark *The contentious relationship between Eisenhower and Montgomery *Why Rick hasn't written on the Pacific Theater and some of the historical actors, battles, and topics from that theater that interest him *Rick's experience researching and writing The British Are Coming *George Washington as a tactical and operational commander *The similarities between Eisenhower and Washington *Washington as a kvetcher in his private correspondence *Where the phrase “win hearts and minds” comes from *Rick's process for starting a book *Rick's use of outlines *The cartographer for Rick's books *Rick's lack of writer's block *Rick's take on the state of military history today *Why some journalists turn to writing military history *Rick's thoughts on professional military education, especially as it pertains to junior leaders *Why all service members should know where their branch comes from *Rick's advice on getting started on professional military reading Links The British Are Coming by Rick Atkinson: https://www.amazon.com/British-Are-Coming-Lexington-Revolution/dp/1627790438 The Liberation Trilogy by Rick Atkinson: http://liberationtrilogy.com In the Company of Soldiers by Rick Atkinson: https://www.amazon.com/Company-Soldiers-Chronicle-Combat/dp/0805077731 Crusade by Rick Atkinson: https://www.amazon.com/Crusade-Untold-Story-Persian-Gulf/dp/0395710839 The Long Gray Line by Rick Atkinson: https://www.amazon.com/Long-Gray-Line-American-Journey/dp/080509122X Errata Towards the end of the interview, while Rick and I discussed journalists who had turned to writing military history, Rick mentioned The Guns at Last Light when he meant to say Barbara Tuchman's The Guns of August. I missed the slip as well. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss -The emphasis (or lack thereof) placed on self-study, critical thinking, and creative problem-solving during John's time as a junior officer -The four priorities of lieutenants when John served in the 2nd Marine Division -On then-Major General Al Gray making maneuver warfare the official doctrine of the division -The Marine Corps' approach to warfighting before it adopted maneuver warfare -The influence that Captain W.L. Smith had on Lieutenant Schmitt -Some hypotheses on why maneuver warfare seems harder to practice in garrison -John's experience with commercial wargaming before the Marine Corps -How wargames played a role in John's eventual preference for tactical decision games (TDGs) -How John first got into TDGs -The origins of Enemy Over the Bridge, John's first TDG and the first TDG of its kind published in the Marine Corps Gazette -How writing FMFM-1 Warfighting influenced John's writing of TDGs -The experience of writing Enemy Over the Bridge -How TDGs can bring to light the concepts of maneuver warfare -The primary purpose of TDGs -The creation and activities of Marine Corps University's TDG Group -How John and other member of THE saw themselves as maneuver warfare insurgents -John's thoughts on common TDG pitfalls -How The MCU TDG Group came to the name “Tactical Decision Games” -Where John draws inspiration from when developing a TDG -Some of the more creative and unusual TDGs that John has created -John's thoughts on using TDGs at formal schools -How John used TDGs as a Marine Officer Instructor with his Naval ROTC unit at the University of Illinois -John's thoughts on the Marine Corps' renewed emphasis on wargaming -The work that John's been doing with online TDGs -What John's ideal unit PME program would look like -How John first learned of maneuver warfare and what led him to contribute to it as Marine Corps doctrine -The two stories of John's “audition” to write FMFM-1 Warfighting and General Al Gray's signing of it -The Marines and military theorists who influenced John while he was writing Warfighting -Which of the FMFMs/MCDPs that John wrote is the most enduring and which of them most requires revision -The efforts to revise Warfighting under Generals Joe Dunford and Robert Neller -Why John thinks someone other than him should write the next version of Warfighting -What defeat mechanisms are -The recent critiques of Warfighting and John's thoughts on them -How John might expose the youngest generation of Marines to Warfighting -Alternatives to the German school of maneuver warfare -John's evaluation of the trends he's seeing in the Department of Defense regarding war and warfighting Links Enemy Over the Bridge TDG by John Schmitt: https://mca-marines.org/blog/gazette/the-enemy-over-the-bridge/ Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication-1 Warfighting: https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/MCDP%201%20Warfighting.pdf "Tactical Decision Games in a Virtual Setting" by John B. Douglas: https://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2020/Winter/PDF/15_Douglas_TDG.pdf Errata *When discussing technical MOS's and TDGs, I meant to say “weapon optics repair Marines” --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss -The US Army's individual replacement system in Vietnam -McDonough's experience serving as the aide to the commanding general of the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Vietnam -McDonough's thoughts on how technology has extended senior leaders' ability to overexert influence or command on small units -How McDonough's Vietnam experiences shaped his approach to command -Some of the mistakes McDonough made as a platoon leader in Vietnam -The decision-forcing case The Farmer: its inspiration, development, and use with US Marines -What it was like to serve in the ‘Hollow Army' after Vietnam -McDonough's experience as a mechanized infantry company commander -McDonough's time as an S-3 operations officer for an infantry battalion in South Korea -His experiences serving as the military assistant to General John Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander Europe -McDonough's observations of the maneuver warfare debates in the Marine Corps -The value and pitfalls of studying German military history, especially the German forces of World War II -The tight rope that military and military-civilian professionals must walk when studying the forces of the Nazi Germany a nthe Southern Confederacy -The events leading to McDonough's appointment as director of the School of Advanced Military Studies -The process of revising FM 100-5 Operations -The origin of the term “operations other than war” -What inspired the writing of McDonough's second book, The Defense of Hill 781, and what today's soldiers and Marines can learn from it in light of renewed focus on large-scale conventional combat operations -What lessons from Hill 781 might not apply to today's battlefields -McDonough's third book, The Limits of Glory -His experience standing up the brigade that would eventually get reflagged as the 173rd Airborne Brigade -What it was like leading that brigade through the genocide, Cholera epidemic, and civil war in Rwanda Links Platoon Leader by James McDonough: https://www.amazon.com/Platoon-Leader-Memoir-Command-Combat/dp/0891418008 The Defense of Hill 781 by James McDonough: https://www.amazon.com/Defense-Hill-781-Allegory-Mechanized/dp/0891414754 The Limits of Glory by James McDonough: https://www.amazon.com/Limits-Glory-Novel-Waterloo/dp/0891413847 "American Army Doctrine for the Post- Cold War" by John L. Romjue: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA317654.pdf 'Facing the "What Now?'" Moment' by Damien O'Connell: https://mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/Facing-the-What-Now-Moment.pdf Errata -When discussing TBS's use of The Farmer DFC, I said they forced to students to either harm the farmer or risk certain death in the minefield. To be precise, TBS called for students "...to...[decide]...whether to threaten or do bodily harm to a local civilian in order to save the lives of their Marines (soldiers).” -While discussing the bureaucratic differences between Colonel McDonough and Major General Wesley Clark at TRADOC, McDonough erroneously referred to himself as a 'one-star general,' though he meant to say, 'colonel.' --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/damien-oconnell/support