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Game theory is a way of quantitatively describing what happens any time one thing interacts with another thing, when both things have goals and potential rewards. That's a pretty broad class of interesting events, so it is unsurprising that game theory is a useful way of thinking about everything from international relations to the evolution of peacock feathers. I talk with philosopher Kevin Zollman about what game theory is and how it gets used in biology and human interactions. We discuss how thinking in game-theoretic terms can help understand the origin of meaning and intentionality in human language.Blog post with transcript: https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/podcast/2025/12/01/337-kevin-zollman-on-game-theory-signals-and-meaning/Support Mindscape on Patreon.Kevin Zollman received his Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of California, Irvine. He is currently the Herbert A. Simon Professor of Philosophy and Social and Decision Sciences in the Department of Philosophy at Carnegie Mellon University. He is also an associate fellow at the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, and a visiting professor at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy. He serves as the Director of the Institute for Complex Social Dynamics at CMU. He is the co-author, with Paul Raeburn, of The Game Theorist's Guide to Parenting.Web siteCMU web pageGoogle Scholar publicationsPhilPeople profileSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.
Are zoos an anachronism in the 21st century when we can watch animals in their natural habitat, close-up from our couches without worrying about cruelty? Should they go the way of other bygone era ‘spectacles' and ‘attractions' that we now regard as barbaric? There are vocal campaigners and activists who believe so. Heather Browning and Walter Veit disagree, but they acknowledge there is a case to be answered. In What Are Zoos For? (Bristol University Press, 2024) they test the common justifications for zoos (entertainment, education, research, conservation) against the evidence and suggest what the best zoos of the future should look like to ensure that they are primarily for animals and not just for people. Heather Browning is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Southampton. Her primary research interests are animal welfare, ethics, and consciousness. Previously, she worked for many years as a zookeeper and zoo animal welfare officer, interested in the practical application of animal welfare measurement. Walter Veit is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Reading and an external member of the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich. He's also the author of A Philosophy for the Science of Animal Consciousness (Routledge, 2023). Most of his ongoing research is on the consciousness and welfare of animals and AIs. Kyle Johannsen is Sessional Faculty Member in the Department of Philosophy at Trent University. His most recent authored book is Wild Animal Ethics: The Moral and Political Problem of Wild Animal Suffering (Routledge, 2021). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/popular-culture
Are zoos an anachronism in the 21st century when we can watch animals in their natural habitat, close-up from our couches without worrying about cruelty? Should they go the way of other bygone era ‘spectacles' and ‘attractions' that we now regard as barbaric? There are vocal campaigners and activists who believe so. Heather Browning and Walter Veit disagree, but they acknowledge there is a case to be answered. In What Are Zoos For? (Bristol University Press, 2024) they test the common justifications for zoos (entertainment, education, research, conservation) against the evidence and suggest what the best zoos of the future should look like to ensure that they are primarily for animals and not just for people. Heather Browning is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Southampton. Her primary research interests are animal welfare, ethics, and consciousness. Previously, she worked for many years as a zookeeper and zoo animal welfare officer, interested in the practical application of animal welfare measurement. Walter Veit is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Reading and an external member of the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich. He's also the author of A Philosophy for the Science of Animal Consciousness (Routledge, 2023). Most of his ongoing research is on the consciousness and welfare of animals and AIs. Kyle Johannsen is Sessional Faculty Member in the Department of Philosophy at Trent University. His most recent authored book is Wild Animal Ethics: The Moral and Political Problem of Wild Animal Suffering (Routledge, 2021). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network
Are zoos an anachronism in the 21st century when we can watch animals in their natural habitat, close-up from our couches without worrying about cruelty? Should they go the way of other bygone era ‘spectacles' and ‘attractions' that we now regard as barbaric? There are vocal campaigners and activists who believe so. Heather Browning and Walter Veit disagree, but they acknowledge there is a case to be answered. In What Are Zoos For? (Bristol University Press, 2024) they test the common justifications for zoos (entertainment, education, research, conservation) against the evidence and suggest what the best zoos of the future should look like to ensure that they are primarily for animals and not just for people. Heather Browning is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Southampton. Her primary research interests are animal welfare, ethics, and consciousness. Previously, she worked for many years as a zookeeper and zoo animal welfare officer, interested in the practical application of animal welfare measurement. Walter Veit is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Reading and an external member of the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich. He's also the author of A Philosophy for the Science of Animal Consciousness (Routledge, 2023). Most of his ongoing research is on the consciousness and welfare of animals and AIs. Kyle Johannsen is Sessional Faculty Member in the Department of Philosophy at Trent University. His most recent authored book is Wild Animal Ethics: The Moral and Political Problem of Wild Animal Suffering (Routledge, 2021). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/politics-and-polemics
Are zoos an anachronism in the 21st century when we can watch animals in their natural habitat, close-up from our couches without worrying about cruelty? Should they go the way of other bygone era ‘spectacles' and ‘attractions' that we now regard as barbaric? There are vocal campaigners and activists who believe so. Heather Browning and Walter Veit disagree, but they acknowledge there is a case to be answered. In What Are Zoos For? (Bristol University Press, 2024) they test the common justifications for zoos (entertainment, education, research, conservation) against the evidence and suggest what the best zoos of the future should look like to ensure that they are primarily for animals and not just for people. Heather Browning is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Southampton. Her primary research interests are animal welfare, ethics, and consciousness. Previously, she worked for many years as a zookeeper and zoo animal welfare officer, interested in the practical application of animal welfare measurement. Walter Veit is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Reading and an external member of the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich. He's also the author of A Philosophy for the Science of Animal Consciousness (Routledge, 2023). Most of his ongoing research is on the consciousness and welfare of animals and AIs. Kyle Johannsen is Sessional Faculty Member in the Department of Philosophy at Trent University. His most recent authored book is Wild Animal Ethics: The Moral and Political Problem of Wild Animal Suffering (Routledge, 2021). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
Are zoos an anachronism in the 21st century when we can watch animals in their natural habitat, close-up from our couches without worrying about cruelty? Should they go the way of other bygone era ‘spectacles' and ‘attractions' that we now regard as barbaric? There are vocal campaigners and activists who believe so. Heather Browning and Walter Veit disagree, but they acknowledge there is a case to be answered. In What Are Zoos For? (Bristol University Press, 2024) they test the common justifications for zoos (entertainment, education, research, conservation) against the evidence and suggest what the best zoos of the future should look like to ensure that they are primarily for animals and not just for people. Heather Browning is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Southampton. Her primary research interests are animal welfare, ethics, and consciousness. Previously, she worked for many years as a zookeeper and zoo animal welfare officer, interested in the practical application of animal welfare measurement. Walter Veit is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Reading and an external member of the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich. He's also the author of A Philosophy for the Science of Animal Consciousness (Routledge, 2023). Most of his ongoing research is on the consciousness and welfare of animals and AIs. Kyle Johannsen is Sessional Faculty Member in the Department of Philosophy at Trent University. His most recent authored book is Wild Animal Ethics: The Moral and Political Problem of Wild Animal Suffering (Routledge, 2021). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/animal-studies
Heather Browning is a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Southampton. Her primary research interests are animal welfare, ethics, and consciousness.Walter Veit is a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Reading and an external member of the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy at the Ludwig MaximilianUniversity of Munich. Much of Walter's recent writing has been on animal minds, welfare and ethics, as well as evolution.As we've already covered our standard Sentientism "what's real?", "who matters?" and "how to make a better world?" questions in our previous conversations in episodes 48, 54 and 158, here we focus on Heather and Walter's new book "What Are Zoos For?"In Sentientist Conversations we talk about the most important questions: “what's real?”, “who matters?” and "how can we make a better world?"Sentientism answers those questions with "evidence, reason & compassion for all sentient beings." The video of our conversation is here on YouTube.Find our previous conversations with Walter and Heatherhere, here and here.00:00 Clips01:12 Welcome- Heather's episode 54, Walter's episodes 48 & 15802:15 Intros (see bios above)- Heather "How do we study what's happening inside theminds of animals... what the world is like for them... the ethical implications"- Walter "I study the diversity of minds... in animals... neurodiversity... in humans... in AI systems"- "Our zoo book... how should zoos run... take a non-anthropocentric perspective"03:40 What Are Zoos For? And Who Are They For?- The range of human views about zoos: entertainment /conservation / fascination vs. exploitation- Heather's background as a zookeeper and a zoo animalwelfare officer- Combining an understanding of zoos from the inside plusphilosophy- Instead of the zoo industry vs. total animal liberation"a more balanced perspective... from the point of view of the animals and not just human ethics"06:44 Pillars of Human Zoo Justification- Entertainment, conservation, education and research- "There's definitely been a shift over time"- "In the beginning they were very much places of entertainment. The original proto-zoos were owned by rich and powerful people... to demonstrate their power"- "This history... entertainment... domination of animals... leads people to be very concerned about what zoos do"- Monica Murphy & Bill Wasik episode08:35 Types of Zoo Today- "There's a great diversity of zoos... we're not just defending all zoos as they currently exist"- Best practices, improving welfare standards "they should increase"16:15 Challenges to the idea of “good zoos”25:52 Zoos, the wild, agriculture, companions, sanctuaries35:50 Parallels with human situations?44:25 The life histories of zoo animals59:55 Should human animals just leave other animals alone?01:10:12 What can we do?01:11:44 Follow- What Are Zoos For?- Heather Browning- Walter Veit And more... full show notes at Sentientism.info.Sentientism is “Evidence, reason & compassion for all sentient beings.” More at Sentientism.info. Join our "I'm a Sentientist" wall via this simple form.Everyone, Sentientist or not, is welcome in ourgroups. The biggest so far is here on FaceBook. Come join us there!
Do humans have souls, or are we just particles? Physicist Sabine Hossenfelder explains. Have you ever considered the possibility of transferring your consciousness into a computer? Sabine Hossenfelder, a German theoretical physicist, believes that this may one day be possible. According to Hossenfelder, the fundamental laws of physics as described in the standard model of particle physics can explain everything in the universe, including human consciousness. She suggests that we are simply a collection of elementary particles, but it is the arrangement of these particles that gives us our unique qualities and abilities. As such, it may be possible to capture and transfer all the information about the arrangement of particles in the body in order to transfer a person's consciousness into a computer. So, could we one day upload our consciousness and exist within a machine? It's an intriguing possibility. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ About Sabine Hossenfelder: Sabine Hossenfelder is a physicist, author, and creator of "Science Without the Gobbledygook". She currently works at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy in Germany. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ About Big Think | Smarter Faster™ ► Big Think The leading source of expert-driven, educational content. With thousands of videos, featuring experts ranging from Bill Clinton to Bill Nye, Big Think helps you get smarter, faster by exploring the big ideas and core skills that define knowledge in the 21st century. ► Big Think+ Make your business smarter, faster: https://bigthink.com/plus/ Get Smarter, Faster With Interviews From The Worlds Biggest Thinkers. Follow This Podcast And Turn On The Notifications Rate Us With 5 Stars Share This Episode --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/bigthink/message Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
How to maximize wins and minimize losses, explained by four experts on game theory. Game theory is a useful tool for decision-making in situations where the outcome depends on multiple parties. It provides a systematic way to analyze the interdependence of individuals or organizations and their potential strategies. Not only does game theory help you identify the optimal strategy for achieving your goals, it can also help you avoid the sunk-cost fallacy — the tendency to persist in an endeavor because of the resources you've already invested. By taking into account the potential actions and responses of other players, game theory allows you to minimize your losses and make informed choices that lead to better outcomes. Whether you're negotiating a business deal or making investment decisions, game theory can be a valuable asset in helping you make smarter choices and achieve your objectives. Chapters:- 0:00 What is game theory? 1:08 War: Learn from Reagan and Gorbachev 2:58 Poker: The sunk cost fallacy 5:56 Zero-sum games: The minimax strategy About Kevin Zollman: Kevin Zollman is an associate professor in the Department of Philosophy at Carnegie Mellon University. He is also an associate fellow at the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, visiting professor at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (part of Ludwig-Maximilians Universität), and an associate editor of the journal Philosophy of Science. His research focuses on game theory, agent based modeling, and the philosophy of science. Zollman is the co-author of The Game Theorist's Guide to Parenting: How the Science of Strategic Thinking Can Help You Deal with the Toughest Negotiators You Know--Your Kids, with Paul Raeburn. About Annie Duke: Annie Duke has leveraged her expertise in the science of smart decision making to excel at pursuits as varied as championship poker to public speaking. For two decades, Annie was one of the top poker players in the world. In 2004, she bested a field of 234 players to win her first World Series of Poker (WSOP) bracelet. The same year, she triumphed in the $2 million winner-take-all, invitation-only WSOP Tournament of Champions. In 2010, she won the prestigious NBC National Heads-Up Poker Championship. Prior to becoming a professional poker player, Annie was awarded the National Science Foundation Fellowship. Thanks to this fellowship, she studied Cognitive Psychology at the University of Pennsylvania. About Liv Boeree: Olivia "Liv" Boeree is a poker player, TV presenter and model from England who won the 2010 European Poker Tour in Sanremo. Born in Kent, Boeree studied at Ashford School before going on to earn a First Class Honours degree in Physics with Astrophysics at the University of Manchester. She was the #1 ranked female player on the Global Poker Index as of November 2015, and #6 on the female all-time live poker winnings list. About Julia Galef: Julia Galef is a New York-based writer and public speaker specializing in science, rationality, and design. She serves on the board of directors of the New York City Skeptics, co-hosts their official podcast, Rationally Speaking, and co-writes the blog Rationally Speaking along with philosopher of science Massimo Pigliucci. She has moderated panel discussions at The Amazing Meeting and the Northeast Conference on Science and Skepticism, and gives frequent public lectures to organizations including the Center for Inquiry and the Secular Student Alliance. Julia received her B.A. in statistics from Columbia in 2005. About Big Think | Smarter Faster™ ► Big Think The leading source of expert-driven, educational content. ► Big Think+ Make your business smarter, faster: https://bigthink.com/plus/ Get Smarter, Faster With Interviews From The Worlds Biggest Thinkers. Follow This Podcast And Turn On The Notifications Rate Us With 5 Stars Share This Episode --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/bigthink/message Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
Is science close to explaining everything about our universe? Physicist Sabine Hossenfelder reacts. In his 1996 book "The End of Science", John Horgan argued that scientists were close to answering nearly all of the big questions about our Universe. Was he right? The theoretical physicist Sabine Hossenfelder doesn't think so. As she points out, the Standard Model of physics, which describes the behavior of particles and their interactions, is still incomplete as it does not include gravity. What's more, the measurement problem in quantum mechanics remains unsolved, and understanding this could lead to significant technological advancements. Ultimately, Hossenfelder is optimistic that progress will be made in the next two decades, given the current technological advancements in quantum technologies and quantum computing. Chapters:- 0:00 The end of science 1:33 The ‘Theory of everything' 3:11 The measurement crisis 4:29 Our quantum future ----------------------------------------------------------------------- About Sabine Hossenfelder: Sabine Hossenfelder is a physicist, author, and creator of "Science Without the Gobbledygook". She currently works at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy in Germany. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- About Big Think | Smarter Faster™ ► Big Think The leading source of expert-driven, educational content. With thousands of videos, featuring experts ranging from Bill Clinton to Bill Nye, Big Think helps you get smarter, faster by exploring the big ideas and core skills that define knowledge in the 21st century. ► Big Think+ Make your business smarter, faster: https://bigthink.com/plus/ Get Smarter, Faster With Interviews From The Worlds Biggest Thinkers. Follow This Podcast And Turn On The Notifications Rate Us With 5 Stars Share This Episode.... --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/bigthink/message Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
Why does time move forward but not backward? Physicist Sabine Hossenfelder explains. Why does time move in only one direction? This still-unsolved question was posed in 1927 by the British astrophysicist Arthur Eddington, and the concept came to be known as the arrow of time. As theoretical physicist @SabineHossenfelder explains, there's a longstanding mystery in the foundations of physics: If we look at the laws for microscopic constituents, like elementary particles, they work the same way forward in time as they do backward in time. But the same does not hold true on macroscopic scales. In this Big Think video, Hossenfelder dives into this mystery and explores how it has captivated the minds of so many scientists and science fiction writers. Chapters: 0:00 The arrow of time 1:14 Why doesn't anyone get younger? 2:39 Can we stop human aging with entropy control? 4:01 Is ‘maximum entropy' how the universe will end? ----------------------------------------------------------------------- About Sabine Hossenfelder: Sabine Hossenfelder is a physicist, author, and creator of "Science Without the Gobbledygook". She currently works at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy in Germany. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- About Big Think | Smarter Faster™ ► Big Think The leading source of expert-driven, educational content. With thousands of videos, featuring experts ranging from Bill Clinton to Bill Nye, Big Think helps you get smarter, faster by exploring the big ideas and core skills that define knowledge in the 21st century. ► Big Think+ Make your business smarter, faster: https://bigthink.com/plus/ Get Smarter, Faster With Interviews From The Worlds Biggest Thinkers. Follow This Podcast And Turn On The Notifications Rate Us With 5 Stars Share This Episode --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/bigthink/message Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
Recorded on Aug 29, 2023 in München, Germany. Video version available on YouTube.Can we meaningfully talk about causality in dynamical systems?Some people are puzzled when it comes to dynamical systems and the idea of causation.Dynamical systems well-known in physics, social sciences, and biology are often thought of as a special family of systems, where it might be difficult to meaningfully talk about causal direction. Naftali Weinberger devoted his career to examining the relationships between system dynamics, causality and the phenomena known broadly as "complexity". We explore what does "intervention" mean in a dynamical system and we deconstruct common intuitions about causality and system's equilibrium. We discuss the importance of time scales when defining a causal system, analyze what could have inspired Bertrand Russell to say that causality is a "relic of a bygone age" and ponder the phenomenon of emergence. Finally, Naftali shares his advice for those of us just starting exploring the uncharted territory of causal inference and discovery. Warning: this conversation might bend your sense of reality. Use with caution! Ready to dive in? About The GuestNaftali Weinberger, PhD is a Researcher at Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy at LMU. His research is focused on causality, dynamical systems and fairness. He works with scientists, researchers and philosophers around the globe helping them address challenges in diverse fields like climate change, psychometrics, fairness and more. Connect with Naftali: Naftali on Twitter/XNaftali on BlueSky Naftali's web pageAbout The HostAleksander (Alex) Molak is an independent machine learning researcher, educator, entrepreneur and a best-selling author in the area of causality.Connect with Alex:Alex on the InternetLinks are available hereCausal Bandits TeamProject Coordinator: Taiba MalikVideo and Audio Editing: Navneet SharmCausal Bandits PodcastCausal AI || Causal Machine Learning || Causal Inference & DiscoveryWeb: https://causalbanditspodcast.comConnect on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/aleksandermolak/Join Causal Python Weekly: https://causalpython.io The Causal Book: https://amzn.to/3QhsRz4
In this episode, Xavier Bonilla has a dialogue with Walter Veit about animal consciousness. They talk about various frameworks for understanding consciousness, the naturalist approach, cognitive ethology, and pathological complexity thesis. They discuss consciousness arising in the Cambrian period, defining consciousness, free will, consciousness profile, Integrated Information Theory, interacting with animals, and many more topics. Walter Veit is a lecturer in philosophy at the University of Reading. He is also the Director of the PPE Program and the Philosophy MA Program. He is also an external member of the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy at the University of Munich. He has his PhD from the School of History and philosophy of Science at the University of Sydney. His research interests have been on animal ethics, welfare, and evolution. He is the author of the book, A Philosophy for the Science of Animal Consciousness. Website: https://walterveit.com/Twitter: @wrwveit Get full access to Converging Dialogues at convergingdialogues.substack.com/subscribe
Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Is Deontological AI Safe? [Feedback Draft], published by Dan H on May 27, 2023 on The AI Alignment Forum. [Note: This post is an excerpt from a longer paper, written during the first half of the Philosophy Fellowship at the Center for AI Safety. I (William D'Alessandro) am a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy. Along with the other Philosophy Fellowship midterm projects, this draft is posted here for feedback.The full version of the paper includes a discussion of the conceptual relationship between safety and moral alignment, and an argument that we should choose a reliably safe powerful AGI over one that's (apparently) successfully morally aligned. I've omitted this material for length but can share it on request.The deontology literature is big, and lots of angles here could be developed further. Questions and suggestions much appreciated!] 1 Introduction Value misalignment arguments for AI risk observe that artificial agents needn't share human ideas about what sorts of ends are intrinsically good and what sorts of means are morally permissible. Without such values for guidance, a powerful AI might turn its capabilities toward human-unfriendly goals. Or it might pursue the objectives we've given it in dangerous and unforeseen ways. Thus, as Bostrom writes, “Unless the plan is to keep superintelligence bottled up forever, it will be necessary to master motivation selection” (Bostrom 2014, 185). Indeed, since more intelligent, autonomous AIs will be favored by competitive pressures over their less capable kin (Hendrycks 2023), the hope of keeping AI weak indefinitely is probably no plan at all. Considerations about value misalignment plausibly show that equipping AIs with something like human morality is a necessary step toward AI safety. It's natural to wonder whether moral alignment might also be sufficient for safety, or nearly so. Would an AI guided by an appropriate set of ethical principles be unlikely to cause disastrous harm by default? This is a tempting thought. By the lights of common sense, morality is strongly linked with trustworthiness and beneficence; we think of morally exemplary agents as promoting human flourishing while doing little harm. And many moral systems include injunctions along these lines in their core principles. It would be convenient if this apparent harmony turned out to be a robust regularity. Deontological morality looks like an especially promising candidate for an alignment target in several respects. It's perhaps the most popular moral theory among both professional ethicists and the general public. It looks to present a relatively tractable technical challenge in some respects, as well-developed formal logics of deontic inference exist already, and large language models have shown promise at classifying acts into deontologically relevant categories (Hendrycks et al. 2021). Correspondingly, research has begun on equipping AIs with deontic constraints via a combination of top-down and bottom-up methods (Kim et al. 2021). Finally, deontology appears more inherently safety-friendly than its rivals, since many deontological theories posit strong harm-avoidance principles. (By contrast, standard forms of consequentialism recommend taking unsafe actions when such acts maximize expected utility. Adding features like risk-aversion and future discounting may mitigate some of these safety issues, but it's not clear they solve them entirely.) I'll argue that, unfortunately, deontological morality is no royal road to safe AI. The problem isn't just the trickiness of achieving complete alignment, and the chance that partially aligned AIs will exhibit risky behavior. Rather, there's reason to think that deontological AI might pose distinctive safety risks of its own. This suggests that existential catastrophe...
For Judaism, it is practice over theology. The most important aspect of one's faith is not philosophical reflection on God, but the rules and actions of the faithful. After all, according to Maimonides – arguably the most significant philosopher in the history of Jewish thought – we can never know God's nature, and, therefore, there is more to be gained from what we do than trying to know what God is like. For Maimonides, ‘We are only able to apprehend that He is.' This raises a problem, however, for if we cannot learn about, come to build a relationship, or increase our knowledge of God, then what is the point of religious observance? In this episode, we'll be discussing Judaism, knowledge, understanding and the rationality of theism with Professor Silvia Jonas of the University of Bamberg and the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy. According to Jonas, Maimonides's insights are valuable; yet he misses a crucial piece of the puzzle – a distinction between knowledge and understanding. Beyond understanding the ineffable, Jonas argues that theism shouldn't try to compete with modern science. That doesn't mean, however, that questions of God aren't important. For Jonas, God is a worthy object of philosophical investigation, not because God completes our grand ‘theory of everything', but because God shapes people's everyday lives. This episode is produced in partnership with The Global Philosophy of Religion Project at University of Birmingham, led by Yujin Nagasawa and funded by the John Templeton Foundation. Contents Part I. Judaism: Knowledge and Understanding Part II. Further Analysis and Discussion Links Silvia Jonas (website). Silvia Jonas: Research (website). Silvia Jonas, Ineffability and its Metaphysics (book). The Global Philosophy of Religion Project (website). Philosophers on God: Talking about Existence (book).
For Judaism, it is practice over theology. The most important aspect of one's faith is not philosophical reflection on God, but the rules and actions of the faithful. After all, according to Maimonides – arguably the most significant philosopher in the history of Jewish thought – we can never know God's nature, and, therefore, there is more to be gained from what we do than trying to know what God is like. For Maimonides, ‘We are only able to apprehend that He is.' This raises a problem, however, for if we cannot learn about, come to build a relationship, or increase our knowledge of God, then what is the point of religious observance? In this episode, we'll be discussing Judaism, knowledge, understanding and the rationality of theism with Professor Silvia Jonas of the University of Bamberg and the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy. According to Jonas, Maimonides's insights are valuable; yet he misses a crucial piece of the puzzle – a distinction between knowledge and understanding. Beyond understanding the ineffable, Jonas argues that theism shouldn't try to compete with modern science. That doesn't mean, however, that questions of God aren't important. For Jonas, God is a worthy object of philosophical investigation, not because God completes our grand ‘theory of everything', but because God shapes people's everyday lives. This episode is produced in partnership with The Global Philosophy of Religion Project at University of Birmingham, led by Yujin Nagasawa and funded by the John Templeton Foundation. Contents Part I. Judaism: Knowledge and Understanding Part II. Further Analysis and Discussion Links Silvia Jonas (website). Silvia Jonas: Research (website). Silvia Jonas, Ineffability and its Metaphysics (book). The Global Philosophy of Religion Project (website). Philosophers on God: Talking about Existence (book).
Life is full of decisions, big and small. What to eat for breakfast, what to wear to work, who to ask for advice, where to send your kids to school. But are any of these decisions truly our own? A growing movement of psychologists, philosophers, and neuroscientists believe that these decisions may feel like a tossup, but in reality are predetermined, merely the firing of neural pathways forged over time that lead to predictable conclusions. Despite how we feel, free will is an illusion. Supporters of this deterministic worldview argue that our choices are no more under our own control than our own biology. The myriad decisions we make over the course of our lives emerge from background causes of which we are unaware and over which we exert no conscious control. But detractors of this worldview argue that free will and the modern understanding of our brains is not mutually exclusive. They argue that free will exists on a higher order beyond our physical selves, and cannot be reduced to our mere biology. Much of human thought and action cannot be explained at the physical level, but that renders it no less real. Today we ask the question, do we make our choices, or do our choices make us? Arguing for the motion is Christian List, Professor of philosophy and decision theory at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, co-director of the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, and author of Why Free Will Exists. Arguing against the motion is Gregg Caruso, Professor of philosophy at SUNY Corning, Visiting Fellow at the New College of the Humanities, and author of Just Deserts: Debating Free Will. Christian List: “Free will is the capacity to choose and control our own actions, and common sense suggests that we humans have this capacity”. Gregg Caruso: “Who we are, and what we do is ultimately the result of factors beyond our control”. Sources: Big Think, Closer to Truth The host of the Munk Debates is Rudyard Griffiths - @rudyardg. Tweet your comments about this episode to @munkdebate or comment on our Facebook page https://www.facebook.com/munkdebates/ To sign up for a weekly email reminder for this podcast, send an email to podcast@munkdebates.com. To support civil and substantive debate on the big questions of the day, consider becoming a Munk Member at https://munkdebates.com/membership Members receive access to our 10+ year library of great debates in HD video, a free Munk Debates book, newsletter and ticketing privileges at our live events. This podcast is a project of the Munk Debates, a Canadian charitable organization dedicated to fostering civil and substantive public dialogue - https://munkdebates.com/ The Munk Debates podcast is produced by Antica, Canada's largest private audio production company - https://www.anticaproductions.com/ Executive Producer: Stuart Coxe, CEO Antica Productions Senior Producer: Jacob Lewis Editor: Kieran Lynch Associate Producer: Abhi Raheja
Life is full of decisions, big and small. What to eat for breakfast, what to wear to work, who to ask for advice, where to send your kids to school. But are any of these decisions truly our own? A growing movement of psychologists, philosophers, and neuroscientists believe that these decisions may feel like a tossup, but in reality are predetermined, merely the firing of neural pathways forged over time that lead to predictable conclusions. Despite how we feel, free will is an illusion. Supporters of this deterministic worldview argue that our choices are no more under our own control than our own biology. The myriad decisions we make over the course of our lives emerge from background causes of which we are unaware and over which we exert no conscious control. But detractors of this worldview argue that free will and the modern understanding of our brains is not mutually exclusive. They argue that free will exists on a higher order beyond our physical selves, and cannot be reduced to our mere biology. Much of human thought and action cannot be explained at the physical level, but that renders it no less real. Today we ask the question, do we make our choices, or do our choices make us? Arguing for the motion is Christian List, Professor of philosophy and decision theory at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, co-director of the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, and author of Why Free Will Exists. Arguing against the motion is Gregg Caruso, Professor of philosophy at SUNY Corning, Visiting Fellow at the New College of the Humanities, and author of Just Deserts: Debating Free Will. Christian List: “Free will is the capacity to choose and control our own actions, and common sense suggests that we humans have this capacity”. Gregg Caruso: “Who we are, and what we do is ultimately the result of factors beyond our control”. Sources: Big Think, Closer to Truth The host of the Munk Debates is Rudyard Griffiths - @rudyardg. Tweet your comments about this episode to @munkdebate or comment on our Facebook page https://www.facebook.com/munkdebates/ To sign up for a weekly email reminder for this podcast, send an email to podcast@munkdebates.com. To support civil and substantive debate on the big questions of the day, consider becoming a Munk Member at https://munkdebates.com/membership Members receive access to our 10+ year library of great debates in HD video, a free Munk Debates book, newsletter and ticketing privileges at our live events. This podcast is a project of the Munk Debates, a Canadian charitable organization dedicated to fostering civil and substantive public dialogue - https://munkdebates.com/ The Munk Debates podcast is produced by Antica, Canada's largest private audio production company - https://www.anticaproductions.com/ Executive Producer: Stuart Coxe, CEO Antica Productions Senior Producer: Jacob Lewis Editor: Kieran Lynch Associate Producer: Abhi Raheja
------------------Support the channel------------ Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/thedissenter SubscribeStar: https://www.subscribestar.com/the-dissenter PayPal: paypal.me/thedissenter PayPal Subscription 1 Dollar: https://tinyurl.com/yb3acuuy PayPal Subscription 3 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/ybn6bg9l PayPal Subscription 5 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/ycmr9gpz PayPal Subscription 10 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/y9r3fc9m PayPal Subscription 20 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/y95uvkao ------------------Follow me on--------------------- Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/thedissenteryt/ Twitter: https://twitter.com/TheDissenterYT Anchor (podcast): https://anchor.fm/thedissenter RECORDED ON NOVEMBER 12th 2020. Dr. Christian List is Professor of Philosophy and Decision Theory at LMU Munich and Co-Director of the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy. He's the author of Why Free Will Is Real. In this episode, we talk about Why Free Will Is Real. We start with some basic questions, like what is free will, and what is an agent. We then get into the moral side of things, and talk about moral responsibility and the law. We address three major challenges do free will (the “challenge from radical materialism,” the “challenge from determinism,” and the “challenge from epiphenomenalism”). We discuss mind-brain dualism and emergentism. Finally, we ask if free will exists in other living beings, in nonliving entities, and in robots and advanced AI. -- Follow Dr. List's work: Faculty page: https://bit.ly/2IpMm9j Website: https://bit.ly/3lov8YE PhilPeople page: https://bit.ly/3ksNs1g Why Free Will Is Real: https://amzn.to/2Iu7VpD -- A HUGE THANK YOU TO MY PATRONS/SUPPORTERS: KARIN LIETZCKE, ANN BLANCHETTE, PER HELGE LARSEN, LAU GUERREIRO, JERRY MULLER, HANS FREDRIK SUNDE, BERNARDO SEIXAS, HERBERT GINTIS, RUTGER VOS, RICARDO VLADIMIRO, BO WINEGARD, CRAIG HEALY, OLAF ALEX, PHILIP KURIAN, JONATHAN VISSER, ANJAN KATTA, JAKOB KLINKBY, ADAM KESSEL, MATTHEW WHITINGBIRD, ARNAUD WOLFF, TIM HOLLOSY, HENRIK AHLENIUS, JOHN CONNORS, PAULINA BARREN, FILIP FORS CONNOLLY, DAN DEMETRIOU, ROBERT WINDHAGER, RUI INACIO, ARTHUR KOH, ZOOP, MARCO NEVES, MAX BEILBY, COLIN HOLBROOK, SUSAN PINKER, THOMAS TRUMBLE, PABLO SANTURBANO, SIMON COLUMBUS, PHIL KAVANAGH, JORGE ESPINHA, CORY CLARK, MARK BLYTH, ROBERTO INGUANZO, MIKKEL STORMYR, ERIC NEURMANN, SAMUEL ANDREEFF, FRANCIS FORDE, TIAGO NUNES, BERNARD HUGUENEY, ALEXANDER DANNBAUER, OMARI HICKSON, PHYLICIA STEVENS, FERGAL CUSSEN, YEVHEN BODRENKO, HAL HERZOG, NUNO MACHADO, DON ROSS, JOÃO ALVES DA SILVA, JONATHAN LEIBRANT, JOÃO LINHARES, OZLEM BULUT, NATHAN NGUYEN, STANTON T, SAMUEL CORREA, ERIK HAINES, MARK SMITH, J.W., JOÃO EIRA, TOM HUMMEL, SARDUS FRANCE, DAVID SLOAN WILSON, YACILA DEZA-ARAUJO, IDAN SOLON, ROMAIN ROCH, DMITRY GRIGORYEV, DIEGO LONDOÑO CORREA, TOM ROTH, AND YANICK PUNTER! A SPECIAL THANKS TO MY PRODUCERS, YZAR WEHBE, JIM FRANK, ŁUKASZ STAFINIAK, IAN GILLIGAN, SERGIU CODREANU, LUIS CAYETANO, MATTHEW LAVENDER, TOM VANEGDOM, CURTIS DIXON, BENEDIKT MUELLER, VEGA GIDEY, AND NIRUBAN BALACHANDRAN! AND TO MY EXECUTIVE PRODUCERS, MICHAL RUSIECKI, ROSEY, AND JAMES PRATT!
In this pathbreaking conversation Dr. Johannes Kleiner, a mathematician and physicist at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy. He works at the cutting edge of an ever urgent question - is the universe conscious? It could well be.
------------------Support the channel------------ Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/thedissenter SubscribeStar: https://www.subscribestar.com/the-dissenter PayPal: paypal.me/thedissenter PayPal Subscription 1 Dollar: https://tinyurl.com/yb3acuuy PayPal Subscription 3 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/ybn6bg9l PayPal Subscription 5 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/ycmr9gpz PayPal Subscription 10 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/y9r3fc9m PayPal Subscription 20 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/y95uvkao ------------------Follow me on--------------------- Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/thedissenteryt/ Twitter: https://twitter.com/TheDissenterYT Anchor (podcast): https://anchor.fm/thedissenter Dr. Kevin Zollman is an Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Carnegie Mellon University. In addition to his primary appointment at Carnegie Mellon, he is an associate fellow at the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, a visiting professor at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (part of Ludwig-Maximilians Universität), and an associate editor of the journal Philosophy of Science. With Paul Raeburn, he is the author of The Game Theorist's Guide to Parenting. In this episode, we talk about game theory applied to biological phenomena and social dynamics. We go through several topics, including evolutionary stable strategies; signaling theory; honest communication and language; behavioral plasticity, and the evolution of culture; social norms; and epistemic communities, and how to improve science production. -- Follow Dr. Zollman's work: Faculty page: http://bit.ly/2MQWyb2 Personal website: http://bit.ly/2lwP7e4 ResearchGate profile: http://bit.ly/2KGqHXO Twitter handle: @KevinZollman The Game Theorist's Guide to Parenting: https://amzn.to/2mJmKct Nicky Case: http://bit.ly/2n9sMU4 -- A HUGE THANK YOU TO MY PATRONS/SUPPORTERS: KARIN LIETZCKE, ANN BLANCHETTE, SCIMED, PER HELGE HAAKSTD LARSEN, LAU GUERREIRO, RUI BELEZA, ANTÓNIO CUNHA, CHANTEL GELINAS, JERRY MULLER, FRANCIS FORDE, HANS FREDRIK SUNDE, BRIAN RIVERA, ADRIANO ANDRADE, YEVHEN BODRENKO, SERGIU CODREANU, ADAM BJERRE, ŁUKASZ STAFINIAK, AIRES ALMEIDA, BERNARDO SEIXAS, HERBERT GINTIS, RUTGER VOS, RICARDO VLADIMIRO, BO WINEGARD, JOHN CONNORS, VEGA GIDEY, CRAIG HEALY, OLAF ALEX, PHILIP KURIAN, JONATHAN VISSER, AND DAVID DIAS! A SPECIAL THANKS TO MY PRODUCERS, YZAR WEHBE, ROSEY, AND JIM FRANK!
Phillip Jedlovec (A.K.A. PJ) is a Mathematics Lecturer at Santa Clara University. He received his Ph.D. in 2018 from the University of Notre Dame under the supervision of Mark Behrens.His research is in Algebraic Topology, specifically in unstable homotopy theory. He is also interested in philosophy of math and areas of intersection between mathematics and economics. He is deeply passionate about teaching mathematics in innovative and effective ways.We talk about his journey through mathematics, as well as teaching mathematics (flipped classrooms) and philosophy of math.His website can be found here: https://pjedlovec.github.io/We'd like to thank PJ for being on our show "Meet a Mathematician" and for sharing his stories and perspective with us!www.sensemakesmath.comPODCAST: http://sensemakesmath.buzzsprout.com/TWITTER: @SenseMakesMathPATREON: https://www.patreon.com/sensemakesmathFACEBOOK: https://www.facebook.com/SenseMakesMathSTORE: https://sensemakesmath.storenvy.comSupport the show (https://www.patreon.com/sensemakesmath)
Vincent Hendricks (Copenhagen/Columbia) gives a talk at the Workshop on Mathematical Philosophy titled "IPAD – Information Processing and the Analysis of Democracy". Abstract: Only one species have configured a democracy and decided to live according to deliberative democratic guidelines. The configuration and decision is particular to man. A deliberative democracy is characterized by both group deliberation, decision and action. Central to this epistemic composite is information as information processing is an essential fabric of rational deliberation, decision and action which in turn amount to the rational interaction among members of a group or a democracy. Thus, a robust deliberative democracy is the quintessential example of rational agent interaction. This intimate connection fuels a new research paradigm in interdisciplinary philosophy: IPAD -- Information Processing and the Analysis of Democracy.
Stephan Hartmann (Tilburg) gives a talk at the Workshop on Mathematical Philosophy titled "Voting, Deliberation and Truth". Abstract: There are various ways to reach a group decision. One way is to simply vote and decide what the majority votes for. This procedure receives some epistemological support from the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Alternatively, the group members may prefer to deliberate and will eventually reach a decision that everybody endorses -- a consensus. While the latter procedure has the advantage that it makes everybody happy (as everybody endorses the consensus), it has the disadvantage that it is difficult to implement, especially for larger groups. What is more, a deliberation is easy to bias as those group members who make others change their mind may not necessarily be the best truth-trackers. But even if no such biases are present, the consensus may be far away from the truth. And so we ask: When is deliberation a better method to track the truth than simple majority voting? To address this question, we propose a Bayesian model of rational non-strategic deliberation and compare it to the straight forward voting procedure. The talk is based on joint work with Soroush Rafiee Rad.
Members of the MCMP (Julien Murzi, Johannes Stern, Martin Fischer, Ole Hjortland, Marta Sznayder, Norbert Gratzl, Johannes Korbmacher) present their current research
Volker Halbach (Oxford) gives a talk at the Workshop on Mathematical Philosophy titled "Self-reference". Abstract: What does it mean for a sentence to say about itself that it is P? Here P can stand for any unary sentential function such as 'is provable', 'is not provable', 'is true', or 'is a sentence'. I will study this question in a metamathematical setting. After reviewing some early attempts to tackle the question and their impact on problems in metamathematics such as Henkin's problem, I will put forward a new proposal and test its adequacy with some examples.
Branden Fitelson (Rutgers) gives a talk at the Workshop on Mathematical Philosophy titled "An "Evidentialist" Worry About Joyce's Argument for Probabilism.". Abstract: In this talk, I will raise a potential problem for Joyce's argument for probabilism (and sufficiently similar "accuracy-dominance"-based arguments for probabilism). The problem involves a potential conflict between "accuracy-dominance" (coherence) norms and certain "evidential" norms for credences. An interesting analogy with the case of full belief is also drawn (which connects up with a larger project on the relationship between accuracy, coherence, and evidential norms for various sorts of judgments). This is joint work with Kenny Easwaran.
Members of the MCMP (Roland Poellinger, Florian Steinberger, Thomas Meier, Vincenzo Crupi and Olivier Roy) present their current research.
Catarina Dutilh Novaes (Groningen) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (15 May, 2013) titled "Being a woman in (mathematical) philosophy". Abstract: Why are there so few women in philosophy, and in technical areas such as mathematical philosophy in particular? Philosophy has the worst gender balance of all fields in the humanities, at around 16%-25% worldwide. The presence of women in philosophy is comparable to engineering and physics; it is worse than in mathematics. Is this a problem? And if it is, what can be done about it? What is it like, being a woman in (mathematical) philosophy? In my talk, I discuss some unconscious psychological phenomena that are now thought to greatly contribute to the phenomenon of poor gender balance in several professional spheres, academia in particular. I will focus especially on implicit biases and stereotype threat, two phenomena widely documented by the literature in social psychology, and how they impact the position of women and other under-represented groups in academia, in philosophy in particular. Many points can be generalized to other dimensions of exclusion such as race/ethnicity, class, sexual orientation etc., but in this talk I will focus predominantly on the issue of gender imbalance. I will also discuss reasons why everyone should be concerned by this situation (i.e. not only the members of the under-represented groups themselves), as well as practical measures that may help improve the position of women in philosophy and elsewhere in academia.
Erik Curiel explains the challenges in making assessments of probability by making assumptions about the space of universes--or cosmological models--that our theories allow. Erik Curiel (Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy) explains the difficulty of making various concepts of and relating to probability precise, rigorous and physically significant when attempting to apply them in reasoning about objects (e.g., spacetimes) living in infinite-dimensional spaces, working through several examples from cosmology. He concludes that most standard forms of argument used in cosmology to estimate the likelihood of the occurrence of various properties or behaviors of spacetimes have serious mathematical, physical and conceptual problems. This lecture was conducted at the Lindeman Lecture Theatre, Clarendon Laboratory, Oxford, on October 6, 2016.
Anne Siegetsleitner (Innsbruck) gives a talk at the Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy? (2-4 June, 2016) titled "Ethics and Morality in the Vienna Circle". Abstract: In my talk I will present key aspects of a long-overdue revision of the prevailing view on the role and conception of ethics and morality in the Vienna Circle. This view is rejected as being too partial and undifferentiated. Not all members supported the standard view of logical empiricist ethics, which is held to be characterized by the acceptance of descriptive empirical research, the rejection of normative and substantial ethics as well as an extreme non-cognitivsm. Some members applied formal methods, some did not. However, most members shared an enlightened and humanistic version of morality and ethics. I will show why these findings are still relevant today, not least for mathematical philosophers.
Roland Poellinger (LMU/MCMP) gives a talk at the Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy? (2-4 June, 2016) titled "Five Years MCMP: Looking Back". Abstract: In this presentation I will speak about the MCMP's outreach and line up some of the center's achievements in the last five years. I will put special emphasis on our media output since many of our activities are mirrored in our media-related efforts such as our video channels on iTunes U, our Coursera online courses, and our publication database on the MCMP's web portal.
Hannes Leitgeb (LMU/MCMP) gives a talk at the Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy? (2-4 June, 2016) titled "Mathematical Empiricism. A Methodological Proposal". Abstract: I will propose a way of doing (mathematical) philosophy which I am calling 'mathematical empiricism'. It is the proposal to rationally reconstruct language, thought, ends, decision-making, communication, social interaction, norms, ideals, and so on, in conceptual frameworks. The core of each such framework will be a space of "possibilities", however, these "possibilities" will consist of nothing else than mathematical structures labeled by empirical entities. Mathematical empiricism suggests to carry out (many) rational reconstructions in such mathematical-empirical conceptual frameworks. When the goal is to rationally reconstruct a part of empirical science itself (which is but one philosophical goal amongst many others), it will be reconstructed as "taking place" within such frameworks, whereas the frameworks themselves may be used to rationally reconstruct some of the presuppositions of that part of empirical science. While logic and parts of philosophy of science study such frameworks from an external point of view, with a focus on their formal properties, metaphysics will be embraced as studying such frameworks from within, with a focus on what the world looks like if viewed through a framework. When mathematical empiricists carry out their investigations in these and in other areas of philosophy, no entities will be postulated over and above those of mathematics and the empirical sciences, and no sources of epistemic justification will be invoked beyond those of mathematics, the empirical sciences, and personal and social experience (if consistent with the sciences). And yet mathematical empiricism, with its aim of rational reconstruction, will not be reducible to mathematics or empirical science. When a fragment of science is reconstructed in a framework, the epistemic authority of science will be acknowledged within the boundaries of the framework, while as philosophers we are free to choose the framework for reconstruction and to discuss our choices on the metalevel, all of which goes beyond the part of empirical science that is reconstructed in the framework. There is a great plurality of mathematical-empirical frameworks to choose from; even when ultimately each of them needs to answer to mathematical-empirical truth, this will underdetermine how successfully they will serve rational reconstruction. In particular, certain metaphysical questions will be taken to be settled only by our decisions for or against conceptual frameworks, and these decisions may be practically expedient for one purpose and less so for another. The overall hope will be to take what was good and right about the distinctively Carnapian version of logical empiricism, and to extend and transform it into a more tolerant, less constrained, and conceptually enriched logical-mathematical empiricism 2.0.
Rossella Marrano (Scuola Normale Superiore Pisa) gives a talk at the Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy? (2-4 June, 2016) titled "Degrees of Truth Explained Away". Abstract: The notion of degrees of truth arising in infinite-valued logics has been the object of long-standing criticisms. In this paper I focus on the alleged intrinsic philosophical implausibility of degrees of truth, namely on objections concerning their very nature and their role, rather than on objections questioning the adequacy of degrees of truth as a model for vagueness. I suggest that interpretative problems encountered by the notion are due to a problem of formalisation. On the one hand, indeed, degrees of truth are artificial, to the extent that they are not present in the phenomenon they are meant to model, i.e. graded truth. On the other hand, however, they cannot be considered as artefacts of the standard model, contra what is sometimes argued in the literature. I thus propose an alternative formalisation for graded truth based on comparative judgements with respect to the truth. This model provides a philosophical underpinning for degrees of truth of structuralist flavour: they are possible numerical measures of a comparative notion of truth. As such, degrees of truth can be considered artefacts of the model, thus avoiding the aforementioned objections.
Silvia de Toffoli (Stanford University) gives a talk at the Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy? (2-4 June, 2016) titled "Notations and Diagrams in Algebra". Abstract: The aim of this talk is to investigate the roles of Commutative Diagrams (CDs) in a specific mathematical domain, and to unveil the reasons underlying their effectiveness as a mathematical notation; this will be done through a case study. It will be shown that, differently from other mathematical diagrams, CDs do not depict spatial relations, but represent mathematical structures. CDs will be interpreted as a hybrid notation, that goes beyond the traditional bipartition of mathematical representations into graphic and linguistic. It will be argued that one of the reasons why CDs form a good notation is that they are highly ‘mathematically tractable’: experts can obtain valid results by ‘calculating’ with CDs. These calculations, take the form of a ‘diagram chase’. In order to draw inferences, experts move algebraic elements around the diagrams. These diagrams present a dynamic nature. It is thanks to their dynamicity that CDs can externalize the relevant reasoning and allow experts to draw conclusions directly by manipulating them. Lastly, it will be shown that CDs play essential roles in the context of proof as well as in other phases of the mathematical enterprise, such as discovery and conjecture.
Liam Kofi Bright (CMU Pittsburgh) gives a talk at the Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy? (2-4 June, 2016) titled "Valuing Questions". Abstract: If all scientists seek the truth, will they agree on how this search should be carried out? Social epistemologists have alleged that were scientists to be truth seekers they would display an unwelcome homogeneity in their choice of what projects to pursue. However, philosophers of science have argued that the injunction to seek the truth is incapable of providing any guidance to scientific project selection. Drawing on theories of the semantics of questions to construct a model of project selection, I argue that the injunction to seek the truth can guide choice through a philosophcially well motivated decision theory, but may indeed discourage division of cognitive labour. I end by discussing methods of maintaining heterogeneity among a community of inquirers, even veritistic ones, in light of my results.
André W. Carus (LMU) gives a talk at the Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy? (2-4 June, 2016) titled "Mathematical Philosophy and Leitgeb’s Carnapian Big Tent: Past, Present, Future". Abstract: Hannes Leitgeb’s conception of mathematical philosophy, reflected in the success of the MCMP, is characterized by a pluralism — a Big Tent program — that shows remarkable continuity with the Vienna Circle, as now understood. But logical empiricism was notoriously opposed to metaphysics, which Leitgeb and other recent scientifically-oriented philosophers, such as Ladyman and Ross, embrace to varying degrees. So what, if anything, do these new, post-Vienna scientific philosophies exclude? Ladyman and Ross explicitly exclude much of recent analytic metaphysics, decrying it — very much in the logical empiricist spirit of critical Enlightenment — as vernacular “domestication” of counter-intuitive science. But it turns out, in the light of recent research on Carnap’s later thought, that Leitgeb’s Big Tent conception, though it excludes less than Ladyman and Ross, adheres more closely to Carnap’s Enlightenment ideal.
Kristina Liefke (LMU/MCMP) gives a talk at the Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy? (2-4 June, 2016) titled "Relating Theories of Intensional Semantics: Established Methods and Surprising Results". Abstract: Formal semantics comprises a plethora of ‘intensional’ theories which model propositional attitudes through the use of different ontological primitives (e.g. possible/impossible worlds, partial situations, unanalyzable propositions). The ontological relations between these theories are, today, still largely unexplored. In particular, it remains unclear whether the basic objects of some of these theories can be reduced to objects from other theories (s.t. phenomena which are modeled by one theory can also be modeled by the other theories), or whether some of these theories can even be reduced to ontologically ‘poor’ theories (e.g. extensional semantics) which do not contain intensional objects like possible worlds. This talk surveys my recent work on ontological reduction relations between the above theories. This work has shown that – more than preserving the modeling success of the reduced theory – some reductions even improve upon the theory’s modeling adequacy or widen the theory’s modeling scope. Our talk illustrates this observation by two examples: (i) the relation between Montague-/possible world-style intensional semantics and extensional semantics, and (ii) the relation between intensional semantics and situation-based single-type semantics. The relations between these theories are established through the use of associates from higher-order recursion theory (cf. (i)) and of type-coercion from programming language theory (cf. (ii)). Part of this work is joined with Markus Werning (RUB Bochum) and Sam Sanders (LMU Munich/MCMP).
Radin Dardashti (LMU/MCMP) gives a talk at the Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy? (2-4 June, 2016) titled "What Are No-Go Theorems Good for?". Abstract: No-go Theorems in physics have often been construed as impossibility results with respect to some goal. These results usually have had two effects on the field. Either, the no-go result effectively stopped that research programme or one or more of the assumptions involved in the derivation were questioned. In this talk I address some general features of no-go theorems and try to address the question how no-go results should be interpreted. The way they should be interpreted differs significantly from how they have been interpreted in the history of physics. More specifically, I will argue that no-go theorems should not be understood as implying the impossibility of a desired result, and therefore do not play the methodological role they purportedly do, but that they should be understood as a rigorous way to outline the methodological pathways in obtaining the desired result.
Marta Sznajder (University of Groningen/MCMP) gives a talk at the Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy? (2-4 June, 2016) titled "Inductive Reasoning with Conceptual Spaces: A Proposal for Analogy". Abstract: In his late work on inductive logic Carnap introduced the conceptual level of representations – i.e. conceptual spaces – into his system. Traditional inductive logic (e.g. Carnap 1950) is a study of inductive reasoning that belongs to the symbolic level of cognitive representation (in the three-level view of representations presented by Gärdenfors (2000)). In the standard, symbolic approach the confirmation functions are functions applied to propositions defined with respect to a particular formal language. In my project I investigate alternative approach that is a step towards modelling inductive reasoning directly on the conceptual spaces: considering probability densities (or distributions) over the set of points in a conceptual space rather than traditional credences over propositions. I will present one way in which analogical effects can enter inductive reasoning, using the tools of Bayesian statistics and building up from Carnap’s idea that analogical dependencies between predicates can be read off conceptual spaces via the distances that encode similarity relations between predicates. I consider a quasi-hierarchical Bayesian model in which the different hypotheses considered by the agent are probability distributions over a one-dimensional conceptual space, representing possible distributions of the particular qualities among a studied population.
Once again, a candidate nominated by Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität (LMU) München has been awarded one of the coveted Alexander von Humboldt Professorships. The philosopher and mathematician Hannes Leitgeb, Professor of Mathematical Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics at the University of Bristol (UK), was selected to receive the accolade by an expert committee set up by the Humboldt Foundation. The prize, which is worth 5 million Euros, is financed by the Federal Ministry for Education and Research, and is the most richly endowed award of its kind in Germany. Leitgeb is one of the leading proponents of an approach to problems in logic, philosophy and the foundations of the scientific method that exploits insights from both philosophical analyses and mathematical theories of provability. In effect, he formulates philosophical questions as precisely posed mathematical propositions, allowing him not only to come up with solutions, but also to explain them with the utmost clarity. Hannes Leitgeb becomes the LMU’s third Humboldt Professor, joining Ulrike Gaul (Systems Biology) and Georgi Dvali (Astrophysics). Leitgeb is one of the most prominent scholars worldwide who tackle analytical philosophy and cognitive sciences with the help of mathematical logic. This multi-pronged approach is motivated by the conviction that philosophical investigations can best be advanced if their fundamental assumptions can be recast as mathematical models that make them more transparent and simpler to describe. As a Humboldt Professor at LMU, Leitgeb will provide the basis for the planned Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Language and Cognition, in which postgraduate and postdoctoral students in the fields of Philosophy, Logic and Mathematics will work together on common problems. The new Center will also collaborate with the Munich Center for Neuroscience, Brain and Mind (MCN). This institution was established in 2007, as the result of an internal competition (LMUinnovativ) to identify innovative ways of tackling questions related to the mind-brain problem. Its members utilize the whole spectrum of disciplines relevant to the neurosciences, from molecular biology, through systemic neurobiology, psychology and neurology, to philosophy. By fostering cooperation between widely diverse areas of study, the two Centers hope to make internationally significant contributions to theoretical and empirical brain sciences. Hannes Leitgeb's interdisciplinary orientation will help further sharpen the profile of the LMU’s Faculty of Philosophy by renewing its long-standing focus on the intersection between philososphy, logic and foundations of science, which is closely associated with the work of Wolfgang Stegmuller. This focus will also be given a future-oriented and internationally apparent impetus. Leitgeb first forged a firm link between philosophical logic and the cognitive sciences in his book “Inference on the Low Level. An Investigation into Deduction, Nonmonotonic Reasoning, and the Philosophy of Cognition”. Here he showed that, under certain circumstances, state transitions in neural networks can be understood as simple ‘if ... then’ inferences. These in turn are known to follow laws governing the behaviour of logical systems that have emerged from studies in the philosophy of language and in theoretical computer science. Leitgeb is currently working on a monograph devoted to Rudolf Carnap’s “The Logical Structure of the World”. He hopes to give this classic text a new lease of life by highlighting the relevance of Carnap’s insights for modern scientific research. One of the aims of this latest endeavour is to discover how to transform theoretical scientific models into propositions framed in terms of our immediate sensory perceptions. To this end, Leitgeb is developing a theory of probability that permits valid inferences about systems which are themselves capable of generating statements about their own probability. Hannes Leitg...
Lavinia Picollo (LMU/MCMP) gives a talk at the Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy? (2-4 June, 2016) titled "Formal Methods in the Study of Truth". Abstract: The nature of truth has been an issue in philosophy since ancient times. Several theories have been proposed, the most popular of which is correspondentism, the idea that truth bearers are true as long as they correspond to certain chunks of reality. At the beginning of the XX century a rival theory emerged: deflationism. Unlike correspondentists, deflationists put forward an explanation of truth in logical terms. This leads to the formulation of formal truth systems, which requires the application of mathematical methods. First, I briefly introduce correspondentism and deflationism, and indicate how the latter prompts the search for formal systems. Second, I show why the obvious system cannot work and propose another way of constructing truth theories based on relative interpretations.
Laurenz Hudetz (University of Salzburg) gives a talk at the Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy? (2-4 June, 2016) titled "Towards an Adequate Criterion of Structural Equivalence of Theories". Abstract: My aim in this talk is to provide a general and adequate explication of structural equivalence of scientific theories. I will first give a brief overview of the recent debate about criteria for structural equivalence and highlight the main problems of the criteria proposed so far. I argue that an adequate criterion of equivalence should explicitly take into account morphisms between the models of theories. The criterion of categorical equivalence does this and has been frequently considered recently (cf. Weatherall, 2015; Barrett, Rosenstock and Weatherall, 2015; Hudetz, 2015; Halvorson, 2016; Barrett and Halvorson, 2016; Weatherall, 2016; Halvorson and Tsementzis, 2016). Yet, it is not free of problems. I show that categorial equivalence is much too wide as a criterion of structural equivalence of theories. Then I will propose a solution to this problem by specifying a strengthening of categorical equivalence, which I call 'definable categorical equivalence'. This strengthened criterion employs the model-theoretic notion of definability. I argue that definable categorical equivalence is neither too wide nor too narrow.
Catrin Campbell-Moore (University of Cambridge/MCMP) gives a talk at the Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy? (2-4 June, 2016) titled "Self-Referential Probability". Abstract: In this talk we consider situations where what someone believes can affect what happens, for example: Bettie will be able to jump across a river just if she's confident that she'll be able to do so. These situations can cause problems in formal epistemology: what beliefs are rational for such agents? Such situations bear a close relationship to sentences that say something about their own truth, such as the liar paradox, and the vast amount of work in mathematical philosophy on theories of truth can give insights into how to think about these more realistic situations too. Instead of studying type-free truth, then, we think about type-free (subjective) probability, but there are very similar considerations. This therefore provides a traditional area of mathematical philosophy a new and exciting application.
Thomas Schindler (University of Cambridge/MCMP) gives a talk at the Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy? (2-4 June, 2016) titled "A Deflationary Account of Classes". Abstract: Charles Parsons claims that the introduction of the notion of class answers to a need to generalise on predicate places. Similarly, the notion of truth answers to a need to generalise on sentence places. Deflationism about truth is the view that truth is no more than that. This suggests that we should also consider deflationism about classes. I'll start by exploring some consequences of a deflationary account of classes. In the second part of the talk I'll present a type-free theory of classes in which a substantial amount of mathematics can be reconstructed.
Huimin Dong (University of Bayreuth) gives a talk at the Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy? (2-4 June, 2016) titled "Open Reading for Free Choice Permission: A Perspective in Substructural Logics". Abstract:
Ilaria Canavotto (LMU/MCMP) gives a talk at the Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy? (2-4 June, 2016) titled "A Math-Philosophical Approach to Deontic Concepts". Abstract: The aim of this talk is to present relevant open lines of research in deontic logic, especially in deontic logic of actions (ought-to-do logic), so as to provide evidence of the potential that mathematical philosophy has in the analysis of prescriptive concepts. I will do this by first making explicit what I take mathematical philosophy to be, at least ideally. I will then consider to what extent dynamic deontic logic (DDL) approaches the proposed model, and suggest that DDL represents a promising starting point to further investigate themes and address problems which are central both to action logic and deontic logic, including the distinction between action and ability, the characterization of a proper notion of action negation and the problem of accounting for normative conflicts without incurring in a trivialization of the system.
Johannes Korbmacher (LMU/MCMP) gives a talk at the Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy? (2-4 June, 2016) titled "What is Truth-Maker Semantics?". Abstract: The aim of this short programmatic talk is to try to clear up some fundamental concepts of truthmaker semantics. Among the questions that will be addressed are: What is special about truthmaker semantics? What is the concept of truthmaking in truthmaker semantics? What is the concept of truthmakers in truthmaker semantics? The result of the talk will be a list of questions I think proponents of truthmaker semantics should address in the future. What is Truthmaker Semantics?
Chloé de Canson (University of Cambridge) gives a talk at the Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy? (2-4 June, 2016) titled "How Bayesianism Addresses the Problem(s) of Induction". Abstract: The paper seeks to argue that Bayesian Confirmation Theory is the right kind of theory to account for confirmation. More precisely, a thorough (non-Bayesian) analysis of the paradox of the raven is used to show that (i) propositions play the role of evidence; (ii) there are two relations involved in confirmation, a logical one whose relata are propositions, and an epistemic one whose antecedent is a learning event; (iii) background knowledge is highly relevant; (iv) the logical relation is non-monotonic. The paper then shows that, unlike the hypothetico-deductive method and broadly Carnapian approaches, Bayesian Confirmation Theory satisfies all these criteria, and concludes that it is the right sort of theory to account for confirmation.
Julia Staffel (Washington University in St. Louis) gives a lecture (first session) at the Summer School on Mathematical Philosophy for Female Students (26 July - 1 Agusut, 2015) titled "Attitudes in Epistemology: Belief vs. Credence". Abstract: This lecture stream is intended to be an introduction to some central topics in formal epistemology. Formal epistemology is a relatively recent branch of epistemology, which uses formal tools such as logic and probability theory in order to answer questions about the nature of rational belief. An important feature that distinguishes formal epistemology from traditional epistemology is not just its use of formal tools, but also its understanding of the nature of belief. Traditional epistemology tends to focus almost exclusively on what is called ‘outright belief’, where the options considered are just belief, disbelief, or suspension of judgment. By contrast, it is widely accepted among formal epistemologists that this conception of belief is too coarse-grained to capture the rich nature of our doxastic attitudes. They posit that humans also have degrees of belief, or credences, which can take any value between full certainty that something is true, and certainty that it is false. The shift in focus towards degrees of belief has generated a rich research program, parts of which integrate with issues in traditional epistemology, and parts of which are specific to the debate about degrees of belief. Important questions in the field are for example: How are degrees of belief related to outright beliefs? What constraints are there on rational degrees of belief, and how can they be defended? How can we adequately represent degrees of belief in a formal framework? How do ideal epistemological norms bear on what non-ideal agents like us ought to believe? The results of these debates are relevant for many areas of philosophy besides epistemology, such as philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and practical reasoning.
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