Podcasts about carnap

Question: I am a registered psychotherapist and I reject Freudian and Jungian beliefs. However, I did find that when you remove these demonic influences and stick with the "science" behind psychology and filter it through the Bible that it's a powerful tool. Proverbs in particular along with New Testament scriptures encourage us to guard our heart and mind, renew our mind with God's Word, and find peace of mind. The Bible is actually the BASIS of TRUE Psychotherapy if you study the subject biblically. What do you say?Response: It's instructive that just in the last week we have been contacted by Christian psychologists who insist that "psychotherapy" by name has been discarded by Christians who limit themselves to being called Biblical Counselors. Further, secular psychologists have also gone down this path. We appreciate your "rejection" of Freudian and Jungian beliefs. It is clear that your heart is for those you seek to help. With that in mind, the pertinent question to ask, however, is how thorough that process has been? We say that because some of these counselors are still using the teachings of those you correctly label as "demonic influences."Other psychologists have "come out" with the same concern for how they have been trained, and what they have learned in practices that span several decades.More recently, the Transgender movement has shown that "science" has very little to do with an utterly emotional, anti-science practice. So, we have to make sure we've gutted the structure of psychology/psychotherapy.There is, however, the often seen reference to the “Science” of psychology. There's a fascinating article entitled The Puzzle of Paul Meehl: An intellectual history of research criticism in psychology (i.e., checking them out from the perspective of real science [https://bit.ly/4ihy1qX]).Professor Andrew Gelman writes, "There's nothing wrong with Meehl. He's great. The Puzzle of Paul Meehl is that everything we're saying now, all this stuff about the problems with Psychological Science and PPNAS and Ted Talks and all that, Paul Meehl was saying 50 years ago. And it was no secret. So how is it that all this was happening, in plain sight, and now here we are?"Meehl concluded his 1967 article by saying, "Some of the more horrible examples of this process would require the combined analytic and reconstructive efforts of Carnap, Hempel, and Popper to unscramble the logical relationships of theories and hypotheses to evidence. Meanwhile our eager-beaver researcher, undismayed by logic-of-science considerations and relying blissfully on the ‘exactitude' of modem statistical hypothesis-testing, has produced a long publication list and been promoted to a full professorship. In terms of his contribution to the enduring body of psychological knowledge, he has done hardly anything."We will pray that as you devise your way, the Lord will direct your steps further.

Du bass op der 1e GSO ? An du wëlls wëssen, em wat et am Text vum Rudolf Carnap geet ? Oder du wëlls einfach méi zum Thema léieren? Da bass de héi richteg ! Wat steet am Text, wéi eng Konzepter muss de kennen, a wéi eng Froen waarden op dech an der Prüfung? Dat kucke mer am Vidéo! 00:00 – Intro a Biografie 02:32 – Experimentell Method 05:50 – Naturwëssenschaften 07:55 – Sozialwëssenschaften 10:30 – Tipp: Informed Consent 15:07 – Résumé

durée : 00:57:48 - Avec philosophie - par : Géraldine Muhlmann, Antoine Ravon - À la fin du 19e et au début du 20e siècle, entre Vienne et la Grande-Bretagne, naquit la philosophie analytique, hostile à la métaphysique. Des penseurs comme Russell et Carnap se concentrent sur la logique et l'analyse du langage. Cependant, certains courants ultérieurs ont ravivé la métaphysique. - réalisation : Riyad Cairat - invités : Jean-Pascal Anfray Maître de conférences en philosophie à l'École Normale Supérieure de Paris; Sophie Berlioz Docteur en philosophie; Frédéric Nef Directeur de recherche émérite à l'École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Conflict in Posthuman Literature, published by Martín Soto on April 9, 2024 on LessWrong. Grant Snider created this comic (which became a meme): Richard Ngo extended it into posthuman=transhumanist literature: That's cool, but I'd have gone for different categories myself.[1] Here they are together with their explanations. Top: Man vs Agency (Other names: Superintelligence, Singularity, Self-improving technology, Embodied consequentialism.) Because Nature creates Society creates Technology creates Agency. At each step Man becomes less in control, due to his increased computational boundedness relative to the other. Middle: Man vs Realities (Other names: Simulation, Partial existence, Solomonoff prior, Math.) Because Man vs Self is the result of dissolving holistic individualism (no subagents in conflict) from Man vs Man. Man vs Reality is the result of dissolving the Self boundary altogether from Man vs Self. Man vs Realities is the result of dissolving the binary boundary between existence and non-existence from Man vs Reality. Or equivalently, the boundary between different physical instantiations of you (noticing you are your mathematical algorithm). At each step a personal identity boundary previously perceived as sharp is dissolved.[2] Bottom: Man vs No Author (Other names: Dust theory, Groundlessness, Meaninglessness, Relativism, Extreme functionalism, Philosophical ill-definedness, Complete breakdown of abstractions and idealizations, .) Because Man vs God thinks "the existence of idealization (=Platonic realm=ultimate meaning=unstoppable force)" is True. This corresponds to philosophical idealism. Man vs No God notices "the existence of idealization" is False. And scorns Man vs God's wishful beliefs. This corresponds to philosophical materialism. Man vs Author notices "the existence of idealization" is not a well-defined question (doesn't have a truth value). And voices this realization, scorning the still-idealistic undertone of Man vs No God, by presenting itself as mock-idealization (Author) inside the shaky boundaries (breaking the fourth wall) of a non-idealized medium (literature, language). This corresponds to the Vienna circle, Quine's Web of Belief, Carnap's attempt at metaphysical collapse and absolute language, an absolute and pragmatic grounding for sensorial reality. Man vs No Author notices that the realization of Man vs Author cannot really be expressed in any language, cannot be voiced, and we must remain silent. It notices there never was any "noticing". One might hypothesize it would scorn Man vs Author if it could, but it has no voice to do so. It is cessation of conflict, breakdown of literature. This corresponds to early Wittgenstein, or Rorty's Pan-Relationalism. At each step the implicit philosophical presumptions of the previous paradigm are revealed untenable. The vertical gradient is also nice: The first row presents ever-more-advanced macroscopic events in reality, derived through physics as causal consequences. The second row presents ever-more-general realizations about our nature, derived through maths as acausal influence our actions have in reality.[3] The third row presents ever-more-destructive collapses of the implicit theoretical edifice we use to relate our nature with reality, derived through philosophy as different static impossibilities. ^ If I had to critique Richard's additions: Man vs Physics seems too literal (in sci-fi stories the only remaining obstacle is optimizing physics), and not a natural extension of the literary evolution in that row. Man vs Agency doesn't seem to me to capture the dance of boundaries that seems most interesting in that row. Man vs Simulator seems again a too literal translation of Man vs Author (changing the flavor of the setting rather than the underlying idea). ^ To see the Man vs Man t...

Link to original articleWelcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Conflict in Posthuman Literature, published by Martín Soto on April 9, 2024 on LessWrong. Grant Snider created this comic (which became a meme): Richard Ngo extended it into posthuman=transhumanist literature: That's cool, but I'd have gone for different categories myself.[1] Here they are together with their explanations. Top: Man vs Agency (Other names: Superintelligence, Singularity, Self-improving technology, Embodied consequentialism.) Because Nature creates Society creates Technology creates Agency. At each step Man becomes less in control, due to his increased computational boundedness relative to the other. Middle: Man vs Realities (Other names: Simulation, Partial existence, Solomonoff prior, Math.) Because Man vs Self is the result of dissolving holistic individualism (no subagents in conflict) from Man vs Man. Man vs Reality is the result of dissolving the Self boundary altogether from Man vs Self. Man vs Realities is the result of dissolving the binary boundary between existence and non-existence from Man vs Reality. Or equivalently, the boundary between different physical instantiations of you (noticing you are your mathematical algorithm). At each step a personal identity boundary previously perceived as sharp is dissolved.[2] Bottom: Man vs No Author (Other names: Dust theory, Groundlessness, Meaninglessness, Relativism, Extreme functionalism, Philosophical ill-definedness, Complete breakdown of abstractions and idealizations, .) Because Man vs God thinks "the existence of idealization (=Platonic realm=ultimate meaning=unstoppable force)" is True. This corresponds to philosophical idealism. Man vs No God notices "the existence of idealization" is False. And scorns Man vs God's wishful beliefs. This corresponds to philosophical materialism. Man vs Author notices "the existence of idealization" is not a well-defined question (doesn't have a truth value). And voices this realization, scorning the still-idealistic undertone of Man vs No God, by presenting itself as mock-idealization (Author) inside the shaky boundaries (breaking the fourth wall) of a non-idealized medium (literature, language). This corresponds to the Vienna circle, Quine's Web of Belief, Carnap's attempt at metaphysical collapse and absolute language, an absolute and pragmatic grounding for sensorial reality. Man vs No Author notices that the realization of Man vs Author cannot really be expressed in any language, cannot be voiced, and we must remain silent. It notices there never was any "noticing". One might hypothesize it would scorn Man vs Author if it could, but it has no voice to do so. It is cessation of conflict, breakdown of literature. This corresponds to early Wittgenstein, or Rorty's Pan-Relationalism. At each step the implicit philosophical presumptions of the previous paradigm are revealed untenable. The vertical gradient is also nice: The first row presents ever-more-advanced macroscopic events in reality, derived through physics as causal consequences. The second row presents ever-more-general realizations about our nature, derived through maths as acausal influence our actions have in reality.[3] The third row presents ever-more-destructive collapses of the implicit theoretical edifice we use to relate our nature with reality, derived through philosophy as different static impossibilities. ^ If I had to critique Richard's additions: Man vs Physics seems too literal (in sci-fi stories the only remaining obstacle is optimizing physics), and not a natural extension of the literary evolution in that row. Man vs Agency doesn't seem to me to capture the dance of boundaries that seems most interesting in that row. Man vs Simulator seems again a too literal translation of Man vs Author (changing the flavor of the setting rather than the underlying idea). ^ To see the Man vs Man t...

Falls euch cogitamus gefällt, lasst bitte ein Abo da und/oder empfehlt uns weiter. Abonnieren könnt ihr uns auch auf YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC2YdZ5ryFQ32Zd75m2AW5cw Unterstützen könnt ihr uns ebenfalls: paypal.me/cogitamus oder cogitamus@posteo.de. Schaut auch mal auf UNCUT vorbei: https://www.uncut.at/. Im 18. Jahrhundert wirkt Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) als letzter Universalgelehrter dieser Zeit in Leipzig und Hannover. Auf welchen Gebieten hat er seine Interessen entwickelt? Welche sind seine philosophischen Werke und was ist die von ihm angestrebte Universalwissenschaft? 250 Jahre später erhebt auch der Wiener Kreis Anspruch auf die Konzeption einer Einheitswissenschaft. Was kennzeichnet den Wiener Kreis? Inwiefern kritisiert Otto Neurath das eigene Programm? Welche Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede sind in den Theorien zwischen Leibniz und Wiener Kreis sichtbar? Nächste Folgen: Kant; Jean-Jaques Rosseau und das revolutionäre Privateigentum; Weibliches Körperbewusstsein nach Iris Marion Young Timemarker 00:00 Intro 03:23 Wer ist G.W. Leibniz? 07:28 Leibniz‘ Universalwissenschaft 19:05 Wiener Kreis: Einheitswissenschaft 30:48 Neuraths Kritik 38:35 Anwendung in der Moderne 42:57 Fazit Literatur/Links/Quellen Carnap, Rudolf: „Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache“ [1932], in: Carnap, Rudolf: Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie und andere metaphysikkritische Schriften. Hamburg: Meiner 2004, 81–110. Verschiedene Texte von Leibniz im Sammelband von Herring namens Schriften zur Logik und zur philosophischen Grundlegung von Mathematik und Naturwissenschaft. Band 4, u.a. folgende: „Anfangsgründe einer allgemeinen Charakteristik (1677)“, „Brief an Gabriel Wagner (1696)“, „Regeln zur Förderung der Wissenschaften (1680)“ Verschiedene Texte zum Wiener Kreis im Sammelband von Stöltzner/Uebel namens Wiener Kreis. Texte zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung, u.a. folgende: Neurath, Otto: „Einheit der Wissenschaft als Aufgabe (1935)“, Verein Ernst Mach (Hg.): „Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis (1929)“ Poser, Hans: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz zur Einführung. 4. ergänzte Auflage. Hamburg: Junius Verlag 2005. Bildnachweise: https://image.geo.de/30146610/t/sN/v3/w1440/r1.7778/-/gottfried-wilhelm-leibniz-jpg--83509-.jpg; https://www.scienceblog.at/pics/2015/20150529/abb3.jpeg; https://pixabay.com/de/illustrations/gehirn-geist-psychologie-idee-2062057/; https://pixabay.com/de/photos/analyse-biochemie-biologe-biologie-2030265/

Obtaining crucial information from and on China is becoming increasingly difficult for governments, businesses and researchers alike. “Geopolitics is a big factor,” says MERICS Associate Fellow Vincent Brussee “but there are many other dynamics that are intrinsically tied to how the Chinese political system works.”He is the co-author of a recent MERICS report on the topic and joins Johannes Heller-John in this episode. Vincent is a PhD Candidate at Leiden University and author of the book “Social Credit: The Warring States of China's Emerging Data Empire”. You can find the report “The increasing challenge of obtaining information from Xi's China” by Vincent Brussee and Kai von Carnap here.

Tim Maudlin is Professor of Philosophy at NYU and Founder and Director of the John Bell Institute for the Foundations of Physics. Tim is renowned as one of the leading philosophers of physics, and he also works in the philosophy of science and metaphysics. This is Tim's fourth appearance on the show. Tim was also a guest on episode 46 (laws of nature, space, and free will), episode 67 with David Albert (the foundations of quantum mechanics), and episode 115 with Craig Callender (the philosophy of time). In this episode, Robinson and Tim dig into some of the crucial developments in the philosophy of science that took place during the 20th century. Then they move on to John Bell and the John Bell Institute for the Foundations of Physics. If you're interested in the foundations of physics—which you absolutely should be—then please check out the JBI, which is devoted to providing a home for research and education in this important area. Any donations are immensely helpful at this early stage in the institute's life. Tim's Website: www.tim-maudlin.site The John Bell Institute: https://www.johnbellinstitute.org OUTLINE 00:00 In This Episode… 00:41 Introduction 04:56 What's the Point of Philosophy of Science? 10:38 Carnap and Logical Positivism 26:30 Thomas Kuhn and the Structure of Scientific Revolutions 42:52 What is Scientific Realism? 01:02:44 Instrumentalism and Scientific Anti-Realism 01:06:08 Who Was John Bell? 01:20:15 Einstein, Quantum Mechanics, and Bell's Inequality 01:45:34 The John Bell Institute Robinson's Website: http://robinsonerhardt.com Robinson Erhardt researches symbolic logic and the foundations of mathematics at Stanford University. Join him in conversations with philosophers, scientists, weightlifters, artists, and everyone in-between.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/robinson-erhardt/support

Today on the podcast is Dr James McElvenny, historian and philosopher of linguistics, discussing the topic of language and science.As James points out in this episode, intersections between language, the language sciences and science are many and varied. For example, James introduces us to the ways in which the study of language and the study of science have interacted in history, in particular through famous figures in the philosophy of science such as Wittgenstein and Carnap. James also makes the important point that while there are many practical reasons to study language or science or HPS -  there is also much to be said about studying them for their inherent interest and their value in making us better-developed people, or as they say in Germany: ‘Gebildet'.As well as working and teaching in this space, James runs his own very successful podcast  - The History and Philosophy of the Language Sciences. The podcast and blog can be found via the website at https://hiphilangsci.net/Some links relevant to this episode can be found below:James McElvenny's personal website: https://www.jamesmcelvenny.net/James McElvenny's A History of Modern LinguisticsPodcast: History of Philosophy without Any GapsBook: Michael Gordin, Scientific Babel: How Science was done Before and After Global EnglishBook: Stephen G. Alter Darwinism and the Linguistic ImageHiPhiLangSci Ep5: On August Schleicher and comparative-historical linguisticsHiPhiLangSci Ep15: On Jakobson and the Prague CircleA full transcript of the episode can be found here: https://www.hpsunimelb.org/post/episode-11-transcriptThanks for listening to The HPS Podcast with your current hosts, Samara Greenwood and Carmelina Contarino.You can find more about us on our blog, website, bluesky, twitter, instagram and facebook feeds. This podcast would not be possible without the support of School of Historical and Philosophical Studies at the University of Melbourne.www.hpsunimelb.org

No episódio de hoje conversamos com o Jonas Arenhart (UFSC) sobre anti-excepcionalismo lógico discutindo a abordagem de Carnap que tinha um tratamento pragmático da escolha da teoria lógica. Tratamos também de epistemologia da lógica, fundamentação e caracterização das teorias científicas bem como a relação entre e ciência e metafísica tomando particularmente o caso da mecânica quântica.

TikTok è l'app di maggiore successo al mondo, quella che sta crescendo più di tutte le altre e che sta raccogliendo maggiori consensi. Ha oltre un miliardo di utenti in tutto il mondo e oltre 200 milioni in Europa. Ma TikTok, da mesi, è al centro di enormi polemiche. Negli Stati Uniti, il governo e il Congresso stanno discutendo molto seriamente della possibilità di vietare TikTok a tutti i cittadini americani. E anche in Europa e in tutto il resto dell'Occidente si stanno facendo discussioni simili, anche se non con la stessa durezza. Il problema è che TikTok è un'app cinese, e poiché la Cina è un paese dittatoriale che non rispetta i diritti individuali o la libertà d'impresa, allora c'è il rischio che a un certo punto il regime cinese decida di usare Tiktok contro di noi. È un sospetto fondato o è un'esagerazione?A Globo ne parliamo con Rebecca Arcesati che è ricercatrice al Mercator Institute for China Studies, MERICS. Con lei parleremo di come funziona il regime cinese, di quali veri pericoli circolano attorno a TikTok, e se davvero è il caso di vietare una delle app più famose e popolari di tutto il mondo. I CONSIGLI DI REBECCA ARCESATI – Il podcast “China Talk” – Il libro “Il dominio del XXI secolo. Cina, Stati Uniti e la guerra invisibile sulla tecnologica", di Alessandro Aresu – Il prossimo articolo di Kai von Carnap su TikTok TIKTOK SUL POST – Quanto è pericoloso TikTok? – Come TikTok si sta mangiando internet – «Su TikTok lo leggono tutti» Globo è un podcast del Post condotto da Eugenio Cau. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Causos do Vale são histórias inusitadas baseadas em fatos reais com temáticas do universo LGBTQIA+. Se é fic ou não, quem é que sabe? Envie o seu causo para causosdovale@gmail.com

The internet is the great connector that brings together people from around the world. For now, it is governed by a fairly standardized set of rules and principles of technology. However, this may be subject to change as China is actively pushing to create a version of the internet more amenable to the central control of the one-party state and national sovereignty. This may lead to a fragmentation of the internet – where different internets would coexist alongside each other.To talk about this issue, Johannes Heller-John is joined by Kai von Carnap, Analyst at MERICS and leader of the project on the future of the internet. A series of articles by experts from this project can be found here.

Richard Kimberly Heck has been a professor of philosophy at Brown University since 2005, at which time they left their post at Harvard, where they had taught for over a decade. On the way to receiving their PhD in philosophy and linguistics at MIT, they studied at Duke and Oxford. Riki has also been a guest on three prior episodes of Robinson's Podcast—5, 17, and 41—that covered the philosophy of sex, pornography, and gender. In this episode, however, Robinson and Riki turn to the philosophy of language, and more particularly the reference relation. They pick up with Frege and travel up through Russell, Carnap, Strawson, Kripke, and Lewis, up to the present, covering a range of topics including Fregean senses, the descriptive theory of names, ordinary language philosophy, natural kinds, possible worlds, externalism, and more. Check out http://robinsonerhardt.com and stay up to date! OUTLINE 00:00 In This Episode… 00:37 The Importance of Names 9:59 Recent Shifts in Philosophy of Language 12:44 Riki's Interest in Frege 17:35 Who Was Frege? 30:05 Uber Sinn und Bedeutung 48:33 Knowledge by Description and Acquaintance 55:06: The True and The False 1:00:41 Bertrand Russell On Denoting 1:17:50 Distinguishing Representations 1:20:54 P.F. Strawson and Ordinary Language Philosophy 1:31:43 Carnap on Meaning and Necessity 1:34:52 Kripke and Lewis on Naming and Possible Worlds 1:55:19 Current Work on Naming 2:02:15 Experimental Philosophy of Language 2:12:20 On Twin Earth 2:19:31 A Digression on Philosophical Practice 2:25:14 Ty Burge and Natural Kinds 2:27:55 Referential Vagueness 2:33:08 Internalism and Externalism 2:38:40 Sense, Reference, and Sex 2:41:16 Sense, Reference, and The Begriffsschrift Robinson Erhardt researches symbolic logic and the foundations of mathematics at Stanford University. Join him in conversations with philosophers, scientists, weightlifters, artists, and everyone in-between. --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/robinson-erhardt/support

Oto jedno z największych pytań w historii filozofii: czym są pojęcia ogólne? Kiedy na przykład mówimy o krześle – nie żadnym konkretnym, tylko w ogóle jakimś, to o czym tak naprawdę mówimy? A co z pojęciami, które zawsze są abstrakcyjne – np. miłość, wiedza, życie? Czym są obiekty matematyczne, takie jak liczba 3 lub trójkąt równoboczny? To jest właśnie tzw. spór o uniwersalia, jeden z największych problemów metafizyki. W tym odcinku przyjrzymy się jego głównym stanowiskom. Informacje o II Forum Filozofek: https://facebook.com/events/s/ii-forum-filozofek/5958068344215694/ Podcast możesz wesprzeć na Patronite :) O tutaj: https://patronite.pl/filozofiapoprostu/description To niezwykle pomocne i motywujące – dziękuję! :) Zapraszam też na sociale: Instagram: @filozofia_po_prostu https://www.instagram.com/filozofia_po_prostu/?hl=en Facebook: Filozofia Po Prostu https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100068611986622 kontakt: filozofia.po.prostu.podcast@gmail.com Podcast powstaje dzięki niesamowitym Patronom i Patronkom: Ewa Kaliszewska, Bartłomiej Wachacz, Anna Limanowska, Justyna Wydra, Andrzej Manoryk, Pola Weryszko, Adrian Sokołowski, Patryk Neumann, Krzysztof Trela, Mateusz Merta, Mateusz Krawczyk, Krzysztof Trela, Marcin Galusik, Natalia Pietrzak, Michał Semczyszyn, Magda Juraszewska, Piotr Flak, Przemek Łukasiński, Anita Włosek, Ewa Kaminska, Filip Więcek, Piotr Romanowski, Paweł Gliwny, Aggy Dabrowska, Paweł Litwinowicz, Waldemar Wendrowski, Sebastian Cychowski, Michał Bukała, Kuba Dziadosz, Alicja Zielińska, Grzegorz Jot, Magdalena Rutkowska, Agnieszka Myszkowska, Agata Boczkowska, Ewa Glu, Michał Klatka, Beata Kupczyńska, Karol Ciba, Maria Góralska, Sebastian Cichosz, Marta Lankamer, Paweł Jastrzębski, Piotr Juszczyński, Stefan Basista, Ela Petruk, Katarzyna Ergang, Paweł Litwinowicz, Kinga Kasińska, Kinga Kasińska, Jan Nowak, Kosma Fuławka, Czeski Kot, Michał Grązka, Theodor musi, oraz Patroni i Patronki anonimowi. Dziękuję! OPRACOWANIA & ŹRÓDŁA: Po angielsku: M. Loux – „Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction” (jest tam świetnie opracowany współczesny problem uniwersaliów w sposób problemowy, czyli skupia się na problemie i argumentach, nie na historii) Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy – „the Problem of Universals” – https://iep.utm.edu/universa/(krótkie opracowanie problemu) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – „The Medieval Problem of Universals” – https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/universals-medieval/– (szczegółowe opracowanie średnioweicznego sporu o uniwersalia) Po polsku: Filozofuj! – „Problem uniwersaliów” https://filozofuj.eu/arkadiusz-chrudzimski-spor-o-uniwersalia/(krótki opis problemu i stanowisk) A. Jaroszewska – „Spór o uniwersalia” – file:///Users/user/Downloads/Sp%C3%B3r_o_uniwersalia.pdf(krótki opis problemu, stanowisk i jego historii) T. Tatarkiewicz – „Historia Filozofii” F. Copleston – „Historia Filozofii” W kompendiach historii filozofii na pewno warto zajrzeć w starożytności do rozdziałów o Platonie i Arystotelesie, następnie w średniowieczu do Tomasza z Akwinu i Williama Ockhama. W średniowieczu problem uniwersaliów był bardzo poważnym problemem (jeżeli ktoś z was przygotowuje się do matury lub olimpiady z filozofii [lub jest fascynatem historii tego problemu], należy zapoznać się z przebiegiem tzw. średniowiecznego sporu o uniwersalia). W filozofii współczesnej przede wszystkim: Husserl, Frege, Russel, Popper, Carnap. Przywołane myśli Platona są w: Platon – „Państwo”

Jonathan Schaffer is a Distinguished Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Rutgers University. He is an acclaimed metaphysician with a unique mind and approach to philosophy (and who has exquisite taste in epigraphs). Jonathan is best known for his work on monism, in which he contends that the cosmos is the lone fundamental object in reality, and on the grounding relation. He and Robinson begin by exploring monism, including its relationship to contemporary developments in physics, and then move on to the grounding relation, explicating just what this is and how it marks a departure from the dominant Quinean view of metaphysics. linktree: https://linktr.ee/robinsonerhardt Outline: 00:00 In This Episode 1:07 Introduction 4:54 Jonathan's Epigraphs 10:02 What Is a Monist? 14:11 How Jonathan Became a Monist 17:06 Breeds of Monism 24:09 Mereological Nihilism 39:14 Have Jonathan's Views Shifted Over The Years? 41:25 The Ontological Priority of the Whole 48:16 Monism and Quantum Entanglement 54:42 Occam's Laser 59:40 Modal Considerations for Monism 1:03:17 Jonathan's Interest in Grounding 1:06:33 Quinean Metaphysics and Grounding 1:15:22 The Aristotelian View of Metaphysics 1:18:21 Carnap and Grounding 1:21:33 What Grounds What? 1:26:32 Debunking Metaphysical Intuitions With Cognitive Science 1:39:38 Ground Functionalism 1:48:58 Grounding in Feminist Metaphysics 1:55:30 Jonathan's Philosophical Program Robinson Erhardt researches symbolic logic and the foundations of mathematics at Stanford University. Join him in conversations with philosophers, scientists, weightlifters, artists, and everyone in-between. --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/robinson-erhardt/support

Marx, Dewey, Jaspers, Carnap, Wittgenstein, Marcuse, Arendt, Adorno, Rorty, de Beauvoir, Barthes, Fanon, Irigaray, Cixous, Schlegel, Douglas-Klotz --- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/mmmdbymy/support

No episódio de hoje conversamos com Sofia Stein (UNISINOS) sobre o clássico problema mente e corpo na Filosofia, sua relação com teorias da percepção, cognição e emoções com causas biológicas subjacentes. Desde uma perspectiva naturalizada, Sofia falou conosco sobre o papel da Filosofia diante do progresso das neurociências e como o suporte conceitual de Carnap e Quine auxiliam nesse tipo de investigação. Conversamos também sobre a filosofia experimental, mentalismo nas neurociências sociais e a relação de ações sociais com os estados e processos psicológicos.

Falls euch cogitamus gefällt, lasst bitte ein Abo da und/oder empfehlt uns weiter. Abonnieren könnt ihr uns auch auf YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@cogitamus Unterstützen könnt ihr uns ebenfalls: paypal.me/cogitamus oder cogitamus@posteo.de. Schaut auch mal auf UNCUT vorbei: https://www.uncut.at/. In unserer Reihe Existenz & Sprache geht es vorwiegend um menschliche Existenz, um Existenzphilosophie. Heute dreht sich alles um Philosophie der Existenz, um Philosophie des Seienden, um Ontologie – und eigentlich sogar um Meta-Ontologie. Nach den neuzeitlichen Fragen um Substanzen und Gott (hier verweisen wir auf unsere diversen Spezialfolgen zu den einzelnen Philosoph:innen Descartes, Spinoza, Conway & Leibniz) steckte die Ontologie in einer Krise. Nicht nur wurde sie vom Wiener Kreis in personam Rudolf Carnap für „sinnlos“ erklärt, auch Alexius Meinong (1853 – 1920) stößt sie an ihre eigenen Grenzen. Dazu nutzt er das metaphysikkritische Paradoxon des Nichtseins. Wie lautet das Paradoxon und wie wird es bereits im 18. Jahrhundert von Kant entkräftet? Welche Folgen ergeben sich daraus? Nächste Folge der Reihe Existenz & Sprache: Existentielle Grenzerfahrungen Nächste Spezialfolge: Pierre Bayle und der Deismus als Beginn der Aufklärung Timemarker 00:00 Intro 01:48 Kontexualisierung & Meta-Ontologie 05:07 Metaphysikkritik des Wiener Kreises, insb. Carnap 07:42 Alexius Meinongs Paradox 14:46 Existenz vs. Wesen (Meinong vs. Sartre) 18:48 Kants sprachphilosophische Auflösung 23:34 Zusammenfassung & Konsequenzen Literatur/Links/Quellen Inwagen, Peter Van. “Meta-Ontology.” Erkenntnis, vol. 48, no. 2/3, 1998, pp. 233–50, https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005323618026. Alexius Meinong - Über die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften. Carnap, Rudolf: „Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache“ [1932], in: Carnap, Rudolf: Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie und andere metaphysikkritische Schriften. Hamburg: Meiner 2004, 81–110. Pagès, Joan. “Meta-Ontologie.” Handbuch Ontologie, J.B. Metzler, 2020, pp. 313–16, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-04638-3_39.

121 – Neceser Epistemológico - Entrevista con Carnap Hubo una vez que Carnap existió, al menos una vez en Viena y dos en el Reino Unido, probablemente la 2º vez la BBC aprovechó y le hizo preguntas. Perdido entre las nubes de youtube y las pilas de expedientes de los archivos de la universidad, aparecieron algunas copias de ella, y de eso, esto quedo. Con uds, Carnap, el pacifista socialista que quedó como el liberal neopositivista. Puedes escucharlo desde la aplicación SPOTIFY:https://open.spotify.com/embed/show/1uobRUSrFJp52FZdcsCOQe?si=68RLeyXWQaW3FLQw8VNwGQ Puedes escucharlo directamente desde IVOOX: https://ar.ivoox.com/es/podcast-educacion-para-jovenes-epistemologia-audio_sq_f1638689_1.html Puedes escucharlo directamente desde YOUTUBE: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCDaC646HXI5jCnkji4jBtMQ/featured?view_as=subscriber Puedes escucharlo directamente desde GOOGLE PODCAST: https://podcasts.google.com/?feed=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuaXZvb3guY29tL2VkdWNhY2lvbi1wYXJhLWpvdmVuZXMtZXBpc3RlbW9sb2dpYS1hdWRpb19mZ19mMTYzODY4OV9maWx0cm9fMS54bWw&ep=14 Puedes escucharlo directamente desde APPLEPODCAST: https://podcasts.apple.com/au/podcast/educaci%C3%B3n-para-j%C3%B3venes-epistemolog%C3%ADa-por-audio/id1448671719 Puedes escucharlo directamente desde CASTBOX: https://castbox.fm/channel/Epistem%C3%B3logo-Ebrio-id1929217?country=us Tenemos Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/epistemologoebrio Tenemos Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/epistemologoebrio/ Tenemos Twitter: https://twitter.com/paravano69 ¡Siempre puedes compartirlo o a tu peor enemigo o a tu mejor amigo! SALUD Y BUENAS CIENCIAS #epistemología #filosofía #ciencia #podcast #epistemólogoebrio #neceser #neceserepistemológico

Questo episodio chiude la nostra carrellata tra le principali definizioni di probabilità. Oggi ci dedichiamo al logicismo di Keynes, Jaynes e Jeffreys, e all'approccio assiomatico di Kolmogorov. Completando il quadro sulla probabilità, saremo pronti a continuare verso le misure di rischio.

In 1929, a disagreement over the meaning of "nothing" exposed deep divisions in Western philosophy and erupted into a debate over whether philosophy is more art or science. Poet-philosopher Martin Heidegger's lecture about nothing excited students and divided colleagues. But the empiricist Rudolf Carnap thought all this talk of the meaning of nothing, amounted to nothing at all.

 Click here for the article.If you are enjoying Condensed Matter, please consider supporting the show on Patreon. In recognition of your support, you'll get the opportunity to suggest articles and guests for future episodes. You can carry on the discussion on Twitter and there's even an Instagram page. Thanks for listening!      Support the show (https://www.patreon.com/CondensedMatter)

Erfolgreich hat China Ende April das Kernmodul für seine eigene Raumstation ins All gebracht. Darüber redet allerdings niemand. Stattdessen schauen alle auf die Trägerrakete, die unkontrolliert Richtung Erde taumelt. Absichtlich, denn um seinen Raumfahrtrückstand aufzuholen, nutzt China viele Abkürzungen.Mit Manuel Metz vom Deutschen Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt, DLR, und mit Kai von Carnap von Merics, dem Mercator-Institut für ChinastudienHaben Sie Themenvorschläge? Schreiben Sie Christian Herrmann auf Twitter: twitter.com/chausberlin Unsere allgemeinen Datenschutzrichtlinien finden Sie unter https://datenschutz.ad-alliance.de/podcast.html Unsere allgemeinen Datenschutzrichtlinien finden Sie unter https://art19.com/privacy. Die Datenschutzrichtlinien für Kalifornien sind unter https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info abrufbar.

Erfolgreich hat China Ende April das Kernmodul für seine eigene Raumstation ins All gebracht. Darüber redet allerdings niemand. Stattdessen schauen alle auf die Trägerrakete, die unkontrolliert Richtung Erde taumelt. Absichtlich, denn um seinen Raumfahrtrückstand aufzuholen, nutzt China viele Abkürzungen. Mit Manuel Metz vom Deutschen Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt, DLR, und mit Kai von Carnap von Merics, dem Mercator-Institut für Chinastudien Haben Sie Themenvorschläge? Schreiben Sie Christian Herrmann auf Twitter: twitter.com/chausberlin

CRÍTICA A LA CRÍTICA DE CARNAP A LA METAFÍSICA: Episodio 10 de la serie "Teísmo". LIBROS DE DANTE A. URBINA: https://danteaurbina.com/category/libros/

„Ich bin diejenige, die mein Leben mit Leben füllt – jeden Tag aufs Neue“ In dieser Podcastfolge unterhalte ich mich mit Jamila von Carnap, die seit zehn Jahren als selbstständige Businessmentorin und Schriftgestalterin tätig ist. In den vergangenen Jahren hat Jamila die Selbstständigkeit in ganz vielen unterschiedlichen Facetten erlebt. Am Anfang hat sie ihr Business in dem Glauben aufgebaut, dass Selbstständigkeit sprichwörtlich „selbst“ und „ständig“ bedeutet. Sie stand unter einem hohen Leistungsdruck und hat sich ihrem Perfektionismus hingegeben, was zu einem unglaublich anstrengenden und letztlich unglücklichen Leben geführt hat. Aus der heutigen Perspektive ist Jamila einfach nur dankbar für jede Erfahrung, welche sie an den heutigen Punkt gebracht und sie zu der Frau gemacht hat, die sie nun ist: Eine selbstbewusste Schöpferpersönlichkeit, die jeden Tag aufs Neue dafür losgeht, ihr Leben und ihr Business nach ihren eigenen Vorstellungen, Wünschen und Werten zu gestalten. Zu ihren Kundinnen und Kunden gehören Selbstständige, die zwar wissen, was sie wollen, aber Hilfe beim „Wie“ benötigen. Ihnen hilft Jamila dabei, die für sich stimmige und authentische Positionierung zu finden. In dieser Folge erfährst du: - wie Jamila ihren ganz eigenen Weg zur Spiritualität entdeckt und dadurch ihr inneres Gleichgewicht gefunden hat. - wie sie gelernt hat, schmerzhafte und schwierige Situationen bewusst für ihre persönliche Weiterentwicklung zu nutzen und welche Möglichkeiten und neue Blickwinkel sich ihr dadurch erschlossen haben. - auf welche Weise Jamila gelernt hat, ihre besonderen Fähigkeiten mehr wertzuschätzen und deren Besonderheit zu erkennen. - wie sie ihr Bild von der Selbstständigkeit vollkommen verändert hat und nun statt ausschließlich reaktiv zu handeln als aktive Gestalterin hinter ihrem Business steht. - wie das Festlegen und Kommunizieren ihrer eigenen Grenzen Jamila zu mehr Glück und Erfolg im (Berufs-)Leben verholfen haben. Jamila hat es sich zur Aufgabe gemacht, andere Menschen dabei zu unterstützen, ihre ganz eigene Magie zu erkennen und ihnen dadurch zu mehr Erfolg im Leben zu verhelfen. Sie zeigt ihren Kundinnen und Kunden, wie diese sich ganz authentisch in die Sichtbarkeit bringen und durch innere Klarheit ihre Vollständigkeit begreifen können. Wenn du mit Jamila Kontakt aufnehmen möchtest, freut sie sich über eine Nachricht auf Instagram oder einen Besuch auf ihrer Website. Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/jamilavoncarnap/ Website: https://www.jamilavoncarnap.com/ Shine your female light, deine Bea _____________________________ Mehr Inspiration von mir bekommst du auf meiner Website, auf Instagram oder auch auf Facebook. Ich würde mich freuen, wenn du vorbeischaust! Instagram https://www.instagram.com/femalelightning.coaching/ Facebook https://www.facebook.com/BeatriceCselenyi/ Website https://www.femalelightning.de/ _____________________________ Wenn dir diese Episode gefallen hat, würde ich mich freuen, wenn du mir eine Bewertung hinterlässt und den Podcast abonnierst, damit du in Zukunft keine Folge verpasst. Gerne möchte ich mich mit dir auch über deine Gedanken und Erkenntnisse aus dieser Folge auf meinem Instagram-Profil austauschen.

China ist aktuell in aller Munde. Welche Strategie verfolgt die EU gegenüber dem aufstrebenden "Reich der Mitte"? Welche Rolle spielen Wirtschaft und Investitionen in den Beziehungen und wie steht es um die Menschenrechte? Diese Fragen besprechen wir mit Gesine Weber, Programmassistentin beim German Marshall Fund (GMF) und Kai von Carnap vom Mercator Institute for China Studies.

This episode of the Popperian Podcast features an interview that Jed Lea-Henry conducted with Matteo Collodel. They speak about the role that Karl Popper and critical rationalism played in the intellectual development of Paul Feyerabend, the nature of the Feyerabend-Popper relationship, the Popperian ‘School' that formed at the London School of Economics and the strained relationships that developed within this group, the differing accounts of the members and the controversies that arose, where and how Feyerabend's philosophy broke with Popper's, and whether or not Feyerabend should be considered a Popperian. Matteo Collodel earned his diploma di laurea (BA+MA) and his PhD in Philosophy from the Ca' Foscari University of Venice (Italy), with the philosophy of science as his main area of specialization and historically-oriented dissertations on the development of Mary B. Hesse's thought (2001) and of Paul K. Feyerabend's idea of incommensurability (2007), respectively. Matteo is a ‘subject expert' at Ca' Foscari University of Venice (https://www.unive.it/data/people/23719605) and he worked on an archival project at Humboldt University of Berlin (funded by the German Research Foundation) whose main aim was to collect, transcribe and edit Feyerabend's correspondence with Popper, Feigl, Carnap, Hempel, Kuhn, Watkins, Agassi, and Lakatos, among others. Matteo is the co-editor of the book ‘Feyerabend's Formative Years. Volume 1. Feyerabend and Popper' (https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783030009601) and his regular academic work can be found at: Matteo Collodel | Humboldt Universität zu Berlin - Academia.edu *** Was Feyerabend a Popperian? (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0039368115000977?via%3Dihub and https://www.academia.edu/2969684/Was_Feyerabend_a_Popperian_4th_Draft_11_February_2015_). Support via Patreon – https://www.patreon.com/jedleahenry Support via PayPal – https://www.paypal.me/jrleahenry Shop – https://shop.spreadshirt.com.au/JLH-shop/ Support via Bitcoin - 31wQMYixAJ7Tisp773cSvpUuzr2rmRhjaW Website – The Popperian Podcast — Jed Lea-Henry Libsyn – The Popperian Podcast (libsyn.com) Youtube – The Popperian Podcast - YouTube Twitter – https://twitter.com/jedleahenry RSS - https://popperian-podcast.libsyn.com/rss *** Underlying artwork by Arturo Espinosa

Mit einer gewissen Regelmäßigkeit tauchen chinesische Technologie-Unternehmen in der deutschen Politik auf: Über Jahre wurde diskutiert, wie sicher es ist, 5G-Netzwerke mit Huawei-Technologie aufzubauen. Im Sommer wurde das chinesische Social-Media-Netzwerk Tiktok plötzlich zu einem internationalen Streit-Thema. Und: Was ist eigentlich mit Wechat, der chinesischen Whatsapp-Alternative von Tencent? Oder Ali Pays Fintech Ant Financial, das kurz vor einem 30 Milliarden Dollar Börsengang steht? Um ein Gefühl für die größere Story hinter den Nachrichten zu bekommen, haben wir mit Kai von Carnap einen Podcast aufgenommen. Kai forscht am Institut Merics in Berlin zu Technologie in China. Das Institut Merics hat den Ruf, sich kritisch mit China auseinanderzusetzen. Wenn man mit Kai von Carnap über chinesische soziale Netzwerke wie Tiktok spricht, glaubt der aber nicht an einfache Lösungen wie Verbote. Schließlich gab es auf Tiktok bisher noch keinen nachgewiesenen Fall von Wahlbeeinflussung in einem westlichen Staat. Facebook hingegen, ein amerikanisches Unternehmen aus dem Silicon Valley, konnte recht einfach für die Manipulation der amerikanischen Präsidentschaftswahlen 2016 genutzt werden. Was helfen würde, so Carnap, seien Regeln, die für alle gelten, wie Transparenz bei Algorithmen. Transparenz wiederum war bisher nicht unbedingt die Stärke der chinesischen Tech-Szene. Die große Frage ist dabei immer noch, welche Macht die kommunistische Partei in den Chefetagen von Alibaba, Tencent, Bytedance und Co. hat. Im t3n Podcast sprechen wir mit Carnap darüber, welche Rolle Politik für die chinesischen Tech-Unternehmen spielt, in welchem Verhältnis Chinas Fintech-Riesen wie Alibabas Ant Financial zur staatlichen Cryptowährung stehen und wie China sich ein neues Internet vorstellen könnte.

Manche Philosophen wären besser zum Musiker geeignet, so dachte Rudolf Carnap – und verband damit eine rigorose Kritik des spekulativen Denkens. Vor 50 Jahren ist der analytische Philosoph gestorben. Von Luca Rehse-Knauf www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de, Sein und Streit Hören bis: 19.01.2038 04:14 Direkter Link zur Audiodatei

Er brachte Haithabu auf die UNESO-Welterbe Liste und ist eigentlich Archäologe: Claus von Carnap-Bornheim, Vorstand der Stiftung Schleswig-Holsteinische Landesmuseen.

Mattin and Miguel Prado talk to noise scholars Cecile Malaspina and Inigo Wilkins about the collective need of counter-bunker techniques, noise in view of Carnap's theory of probability1 and 'whack' swans. Special guest Dali De Saint Paul provides vocals and readings for our house beats and noise.

In dieser Episode geht es um die europarechtliche einordnung des Verkehrsministeriums und die Beratung des Wirtschaftsministeriums. Auch im Untersuchungsausschuss zur missglückten PKW Maut ist ein Ministerhandy im ein Zankapfel.

A talk given by Benjamin Marschall (Cambridge) at the Moral Sciences Club on 5th November 2019.

In this episode, Jacob talks with Liam Bright (@lastpositivist on Twitter!)about logical positivism, analytic philosophy, and its relation to phenomenology and politics. The Carnap essay that they manage not to really address is found here: http://web.stanford.edu/~paulsko/papers/Carn.pdf The Elimination of Metaphysics is found here: https://philarchive.org/archive/TEOv1 Liam's paper on the logical empiricists on race is found here: https://www.liamkofibright.com/uploads/4/8/9/8/48985425/logical_empiricists_on_race_published_version.pdf And, for good measure, here's one on Heidegger and Carnap! https://people.ucsc.edu/~abestone/papers/uberwindung.pdf

Steve Awodey (CMU/MCMP) gives a talk at the MCMP Workshop on Carnap titled "On an occasionally heard objection to Carnap's conception of logical truth".

Georg Schiemer (MCMP/LMU) gives a talk at the MCMP Workshop on Carnap titled "Carnap on extremal axioms and categoricity". Abstract: The talk will investigate Carnap's early contributions to formal semantics in his work on general axiomatics between 1928 and 1936. Inparticular, we give a historically sensitive discussion of Carnap's theoryof extremal axioms from the late 1920s onwards. The main focus is seton the unpublished documents of the projected second part of UntersuchungenzurallgemeinenAxiomatik (RC 081-01-01 to 081-01-33).We present a formal reconstruction of the semantic notions 'formalmodel', 'model structure', und 'submodel' first formulated there. Themain interprctive issue addressed in the talk concerns Carnap's understandingof the relationship between the "completenessof the models"of an axiomatic theory and other metatheoretic notions investigatedby him at the time, most notably that of semantic completeness andcategoricity.

André Carus (Chicago/Cambridge) gives a talk at the MCMP Workshop on Carnap titled "From Analysis to Explication". Abstract: Analytic philosophy was named for the "analysis" of propositions begun by Russelland Moore in the first years of the twentieth century, epitomized by the theory ofdescriptions.This style of analysis has been joined by many others since then. But they all share certain common defects, which are overcome by "explication," areplacement for all forms of analysis developed by Carnap in his later years.However, it was suggested by Quine, Dreben, and their students that Carnap's form ofexplication depends on metaphysical assumptions Quine dispensed with.It is arguedin this paper that this suggestion is based on misunderstandings, and thatexplication is preferable to analysis, especially since it offers a more plausible picture of philosophy.

Michael Friedman (Stanford) gives a talk at the MCMP Workshop on Carnap titled "Carnap's Logico-Mathematical Neutrality between Realism and Instrumentalism". Abstract: I discuss the evolution of Carnap’s treatment of theoretical terms from the late1930s to his mature work on the Ramsey sentence formulation of scientific theoriesin the late 1950s and 1960s.I concentrate on Carnap’s use of this device toremain completely neutral between realism and instrumentalism.A central point ofdiscussion is his commitment to a purely logico-mathematical interpretation of thequantified existential variables in the Ramsey sentence.Far from being adesperate or ad hoc maneuver, I argue that this is essential to Carnap’s point ofview and, in particular, to the way in which he understands the characteristicallyabstract representations of modern mathematical physics throughout his intellectualcareer.In the end, Carnap recommends nothing more nor less than that we eschewfruitless “ontological” disputes in favor of cooperating with contemporarymathematical physicists in attempting (axiomatically) to clarify the mathematicaland conceptual foundations of their discipline.)

Paul Dicken (Cambridge) gives a talk at the MCMP Workshop on Carnap titled "Tolerance & Voluntarism". Abstract: Carnap's dissolution of the scientific realism debate rests upon two central claims:the first regarding the appropriate logical reconstruction of a scientific theory;the second, a background conception of the nature of ontological dispute. Recentwork has focused on the first of these claims; in this talk I discuss the second,and relate it to similar moves made by van Fraassen in his own articulation of empiricism.

Catarina Duthil-Novaes (ILLC/Amsterdam) gives at talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Cognitive motivations for treating formalisms as calculi". Abstract: In The Logical Syntax of Language, Carnap famously recommended that logical languages be treated as mere calculi, and that their symbols be viewed as meaningless; reasoning with the system is to be guided solely on the basis of its rules of transformation. Carnap˙s main motivation for this recommendation seems to be related to a concern with precision and exactness. In my talk, I argue that Carnap was right in insisting on the benefits of treating logical formalisms as calculi, but he was wrong in thinking that enhanced precision is the main advantage of this approach. Instead, I argue that a deeper impact of treating formalisms as calculi is of a cognitive nature: by adopting this stance, the reasoner is able to counter some of her „default“ reasoning tendencies, which (although advantageous in most practical situations) may hinder the discovery of novel facts in scientific contexts. One of these cognitive tendencies is the constant search for confirmation for the beliefs one already holds, as extensively documented and studied in the psychology of reasoning literature, and often referred to as confirmation bias/belief bias. Treating formalisms as meaningless and relying on their well-defined rules of formation and transformation allows the reasoner to counter her own belief bias for two main reasons: it 'switches off' semantic activation, which is thought to be a largely automatic cognitive process, and it externalizes reasoning processes; they now take place largely through the manipulation of the notation. I argue moreover that the manipulation of the notation engages predominantly sensorimotor processes rather than being carried out internally: the agent is literally 'thinking on the paper'. The analysis relies heavily on empirical data from psychology and cognitive sciences, and is largely inspired by recent literature on extended cognition (in particular Clark, Menary and Sutton). If I am right, formal languages treated as calculi and viewed as external cognitive artifacts offer a crucial cognitive boost to human agents, in particular in that they seem to produce a beneficial de-biasing effect.

Franz Huber (Toronto) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (7 May, 2014) titled "On the Justification of Deduction and Induction". Abstract: In this talk I will first present my preferred variant of Hume (1739; 1748)'s argument for the thesis that we cannot justify the principle of induction. Then I will criticize the responses the resulting problem of induction has received by Carnap (1963; 1968) and by Goodman (1954), as well as briefly praise Reichenbach (1938; 1940)'s approach. Some of these authors compare induction to deduction. Haack (1976) compares deduction to induction. I will critically discuss her argument for the thesis that it is impossible to justify the principles of deduction next. In concluding I will defend the thesis that we can justify induction by deduction, and deduction by induction. Along the way I will show how we can understand deduction and induction as normative theories, and I will argue that there are only hypothetical, but no categorical imperatives.

Oliver von Carnap über die neue Juliet Rose Bar, die Wichtigkeit von Zusammenhalt und den DBU Charity Drink.

Finishing Davidson's "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" (1974) and moving on to Carnap's "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" (1950). Carnap claims that we talk about mathematical objects or subatomic particles or whatever, we're not really (contra Quine) making metaphysical claims. Ontological questions like "Are there really numbers?" are just pretentious nonsense. With guest Dusty Dallman. Listen to part 1 first, or get the unbroken, ad-free Citizen Edition. Please support PEL! End Song: "Shut Up" by Chandler Travis, as heard on Nakedly Examined Music #46. Sponsors: Listen to the Outside the Box podcast. Learn about St. John's College at partiallyexaminedlife.com/sjc.

On Davidson's "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" (1974) and Carnap's "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology" (1950). What does it mean to say that we grasp the world through a conceptual scheme? Are schemes different between cultures or even individuals, such that we can't really understand each other? Davidson thinks that this doesn't make sense. We'll get to Carnap in part 2, but you needn't wait. Get the full, ad-free Citizen Edition now. Please support PEL! Sponsors: Listen to the Outside the Box podcast! Get an interest rate discount on a loan at lightstream.com/PEL.

André W. Carus (LMU) gives a talk at the Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy? (2-4 June, 2016) titled "Mathematical Philosophy and Leitgeb’s Carnapian Big Tent: Past, Present, Future". Abstract: Hannes Leitgeb’s conception of mathematical philosophy, reflected in the success of the MCMP, is characterized by a pluralism — a Big Tent program — that shows remarkable continuity with the Vienna Circle, as now understood. But logical empiricism was notoriously opposed to metaphysics, which Leitgeb and other recent scientifically-oriented philosophers, such as Ladyman and Ross, embrace to varying degrees. So what, if anything, do these new, post-Vienna scientific philosophies exclude? Ladyman and Ross explicitly exclude much of recent analytic metaphysics, decrying it — very much in the logical empiricist spirit of critical Enlightenment — as vernacular “domestication” of counter-intuitive science. But it turns out, in the light of recent research on Carnap’s later thought, that Leitgeb’s Big Tent conception, though it excludes less than Ladyman and Ross, adheres more closely to Carnap’s Enlightenment ideal.

Marta Sznajder (University of Groningen/MCMP) gives a talk at the Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy? (2-4 June, 2016) titled "Inductive Reasoning with Conceptual Spaces: A Proposal for Analogy". Abstract: In his late work on inductive logic Carnap introduced the conceptual level of representations – i.e. conceptual spaces – into his system. Traditional inductive logic (e.g. Carnap 1950) is a study of inductive reasoning that belongs to the symbolic level of cognitive representation (in the three-level view of representations presented by Gärdenfors (2000)). In the standard, symbolic approach the confirmation functions are functions applied to propositions defined with respect to a particular formal language. In my project I investigate alternative approach that is a step towards modelling inductive reasoning directly on the conceptual spaces: considering probability densities (or distributions) over the set of points in a conceptual space rather than traditional credences over propositions. I will present one way in which analogical effects can enter inductive reasoning, using the tools of Bayesian statistics and building up from Carnap’s idea that analogical dependencies between predicates can be read off conceptual spaces via the distances that encode similarity relations between predicates. I consider a quasi-hierarchical Bayesian model in which the different hypotheses considered by the agent are probability distributions over a one-dimensional conceptual space, representing possible distributions of the particular qualities among a studied population.

Once again, a candidate nominated by Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität (LMU) München has been awarded one of the coveted Alexander von Humboldt Professorships. The philosopher and mathematician Hannes Leitgeb, Professor of Mathematical Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics at the University of Bristol (UK), was selected to receive the accolade by an expert committee set up by the Humboldt Foundation. The prize, which is worth 5 million Euros, is financed by the Federal Ministry for Education and Research, and is the most richly endowed award of its kind in Germany. Leitgeb is one of the leading proponents of an approach to problems in logic, philosophy and the foundations of the scientific method that exploits insights from both philosophical analyses and mathematical theories of provability. In effect, he formulates philosophical questions as precisely posed mathematical propositions, allowing him not only to come up with solutions, but also to explain them with the utmost clarity. Hannes Leitgeb becomes the LMU’s third Humboldt Professor, joining Ulrike Gaul (Systems Biology) and Georgi Dvali (Astrophysics). Leitgeb is one of the most prominent scholars worldwide who tackle analytical philosophy and cognitive sciences with the help of mathematical logic. This multi-pronged approach is motivated by the conviction that philosophical investigations can best be advanced if their fundamental assumptions can be recast as mathematical models that make them more transparent and simpler to describe. As a Humboldt Professor at LMU, Leitgeb will provide the basis for the planned Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Language and Cognition, in which postgraduate and postdoctoral students in the fields of Philosophy, Logic and Mathematics will work together on common problems. The new Center will also collaborate with the Munich Center for Neuroscience, Brain and Mind (MCN). This institution was established in 2007, as the result of an internal competition (LMUinnovativ) to identify innovative ways of tackling questions related to the mind-brain problem. Its members utilize the whole spectrum of disciplines relevant to the neurosciences, from molecular biology, through systemic neurobiology, psychology and neurology, to philosophy. By fostering cooperation between widely diverse areas of study, the two Centers hope to make internationally significant contributions to theoretical and empirical brain sciences. Hannes Leitgeb's interdisciplinary orientation will help further sharpen the profile of the LMU’s Faculty of Philosophy by renewing its long-standing focus on the intersection between philososphy, logic and foundations of science, which is closely associated with the work of Wolfgang Stegmuller. This focus will also be given a future-oriented and internationally apparent impetus. Leitgeb first forged a firm link between philosophical logic and the cognitive sciences in his book “Inference on the Low Level. An Investigation into Deduction, Nonmonotonic Reasoning, and the Philosophy of Cognition”. Here he showed that, under certain circumstances, state transitions in neural networks can be understood as simple ‘if ... then’ inferences. These in turn are known to follow laws governing the behaviour of logical systems that have emerged from studies in the philosophy of language and in theoretical computer science. Leitgeb is currently working on a monograph devoted to Rudolf Carnap’s “The Logical Structure of the World”. He hopes to give this classic text a new lease of life by highlighting the relevance of Carnap’s insights for modern scientific research. One of the aims of this latest endeavour is to discover how to transform theoretical scientific models into propositions framed in terms of our immediate sensory perceptions. To this end, Leitgeb is developing a theory of probability that permits valid inferences about systems which are themselves capable of generating statements about their own probability. Hannes Leitg...

Julie Moronuki: @argumatronic | argumatronic.com Show Notes: This episode is a follow-up episode to the one we did with Julie in September: Learn Haskell, Think Less. We talk a whole lot about monoids, and learning programming languages untraditionally. Transcript: CHARLES: Hello everybody and welcome to The Frontside Podcast, Episode 93. My name is Charles Lowell, a developer here at The Frontside and I am your podcast host-in-training. With me today from The Frontside is Elrick also. Hello, Elrick. ELRICK: Hey. CHARLES: How are you doing? ELRICK: I'm doing great. CHARLES: Alright. Are you ready? ELRICK: Oh yeah, I'm excited. CHARLES: You ready to do some podcasting? Alright. Because we actually have a repeat guest on today. It was a very popular episode from last year. We have with us the author of ‘Learning Haskell: From First Principles' and a book that is coming out but is not out yet but one that we're eagerly looking forward to, Julie Moronuki. Welcome. JULIE: Hi. It's great to be back. CHARLES: What was it about, was it last October? JULIE: I think it was right before I went to London to Haskell [inaudible]. CHARLES: Yeah. JULIE: Which was in early October. So yeah… CHARLES: Okay. JULIE: Late or early October, somewhere in there. CHARLES: Okay. You went to Haskell eXchange. You gave a talk on Monoids. What have you been up to since then? JULIE: Oh wow. It's been a really busy time. I moved to Atlanta and so I've had all this stuff going on. And so, I was telling a friend last night “I'm going to be on this podcast tomorrow and I don't think I have anything to talk about.” [Laughter] JULIE: Because I feel like everything has just been like, all my energy has been sucked up with the move and stuff. But I guess… CHARLES: Is it true that everybody calls it ‘Fatlanta' there? JULIE: Yeah. [Laughs] CHARLES: I've heard the term. But do people actually be like “Yes, I'm from Fatlanta.” JULIE: I've heard it a couple of times. CHARLES: Okay. JULIE: Maybe it's mostly outsiders. I'm not sure. CHARLES: [Chuckles] JULIE: But yeah, it's a real cool city and I'm real happy to be here. But yeah, I did go in October. I went to London and I spoke at Haskell eXchange which was really amazing. It was a great experience and I hope to be able to go back. I got to meet Simon Payton Jones which was incredible. Yeah, and I gave a talk on monoids, monoids and semirings. And… CHARLES: Ooh, a semiring. JULIE: Semiring. So, a semiring is a structure where there's two monoids. So, both of them have an identity element. And the identity element of one of them is an annihilator. Isn't that a great word? It's an annihilator… CHARLES: Whoa. JULIE: Of the other. So, if you think of addition and multiplication, the identity element for addition is zero, right? But if you multiply times zero, you're always going to get to zero, so it's the annihilator of multiplication. CHARLES: Whoa. I think my mind is like annihilated. [Laughter] JULIE: So, it's a structure where you're got two monoids and one of them distributes over the other, the distributive property of addition and multiplication. And the identity of one of them is the annihilator of the other. Anyway, but yeah, I gave a history of where monoids come from and that was really fun. CHARLES: Yeah. I would actually like to get a summary of that, because I think since we last talked, I've been getting a little bit deeper and deeper into these formal type classes. I'm still not doing Haskell day-to-day but I've been importing these ideas into just plain vanilla JavaScript. And it turns out, it's actually a pretty straightforward thing to do. There's definitely nothing stopping these things from existing in JavaScript. It's just, I think people find type class programming can be a tough hill to climb or something like that, or find it intimidating. JULIE: Yeah. CHARLES: But I think it's actually quite powerful. And I think one of the things that I'm coming to realize is that these are well-worn pathways for composing things. JULIE: Right. CHARLES: So, what you encounter in the wild is people generating these one-off ways of composing things. And so, for a shop like ours, we did a lot of Ruby on Rails, a lot of Ember, and both of those frameworks have very strong philosophical underpinnings that's like “You shouldn't be reinventing the wheel if you don't have to.” I think that all of these patterns even though they have crazy quixotic esoteric names, they are the wheels, the gold standard of wheel. [Laughs] They're like… JULIE: Right. CHARLES: We should not be reinventing. And so, that's what I'm coming to realize, is I'm into this. And last time you were talking, you were saying “I find monoids so fascinating.” I think it took a little bit while to seep in. But now, I feel like it's like when you look at one of those stereo vision things, like I'm seeing monoids everywhere. It's like sometimes they won't leave me alone. JULIE: In ‘Real World Haskell' there's a line I've always liked. And I'm going to misquote it slightly but paraphrasing at least. “Monoids are ubiquitous in programming. It's just in Haskell we have the ability to just talk about them as monoids.” CHARLES: Yeah, yeah. JULIE: Because we have a name and we have a framework for gathering all these similar things together. CHARLES: Right. And it helps you. I feel like it helps you because if you understand the mechanics of a monoid, you can then when you encounter a new one, you're 90% there. JULIE: Right. CHARLES: Instead of having to learn the whole thing from scratch. JULIE: Right. And as you see them over and over again, you develop a kind of intuition for when something is monoidal or something looks like a semiring. And so, you get a certain intuition where you think, “Oh, this thing is like a… this is a monad.” And so, what do I know about monads? All of a sudden, this new situation like all these things that I know about monads, I can apply to this new situation. And so, you gain some intuition for novel situations just by being able to relate them to things you already do know. CHARLES: Exactly. I want to pause here for people. The other thing that I think I've come in the last three months to embrace is just embrace the terminology. JULIE: Yeah. CHARLES: You got to just get over it. JULIE: [Chuckles] CHARLES: Think about it like learning a foreign language. The example I give is like tasku is the Finnish word for pocket. JULIE: Right. CHARLES: It sounds weird, right? Tasku. But if you say it 10 times and you think “Pocket, pocket, pocket, pocket, pocket.” JULIE: Yes, yeah. [Laughs] CHARLES: Then it's like, this is a very simple, very useful concept. JULIE: Right. CHARLES: And it's two-sided. There on the one hand, the terminology is obtuse. But at the same time, it's not. It's just, it is what it is. And it's just a symbol that's referencing a concept. JULIE: Right, right. CHARLES: It's a simple concept. So, I just want to be… I know for our listeners, I know that there's a general admonition. Don't worry about the terminology. It's… JULIE: Right, right. Like what I just said, I said the word ‘monad'. I just threw that out there at everybody, but [chuckles] it doesn't matter which one of these words we'd be talking about or whatever I call them. We could give monads a different name and it's still this concept that once you understand the concept itself, and then you can apply it in new situations, it doesn't matter then what it's called. But it does take getting used to. The words are… well, I think functor is a pretty good word for what it is. If you know the history of functor and how it came to mean what it means, I think it's a pretty good word. CHARLES: Really? So, I would love to know the history. Because functor is mystifying to me. It sounds like, I think the analogy I use is like if George Clinton and a funk parliament had an empire, the provinces, the governors of the provinces would be functors. ELRICK: [Laughs] JULIE: Yes. CHARLES: But [Laughs] that's the closest thing to an explanation I can come up with. JULIE: I might use that. I'm about to give a talk on functors. I might use that. [Laughter] ELRICK: Isn't that the name of the library? Funkadelic? CHARLES: Well, that's the name of the library that I've been… JULIE: [Could be], yeah. ELRICK: That you'd been… CHARLES: That I'd been [writing] for JavaScript. ELRICK: Yeah. CHARLES: That imports all these concepts. JULIE: [Laughs] ELRICK: Yeah. JULIE: Yeah. ELRICK: So awesome. JULIE: Yeah. Yeah, I have… CHARLES: So, what is the etymology of functor? JULIE: Well, as far as I can tell, Rudolf Carnap, the logician, invented the word. I don't know if he got it from somewhere else. But the first time I can find a reference to it is in, he wrote a book about… he was a logician but this is sort of a linguistics book. It's called ‘The Logical Syntax of Language'. And that's the first reference I know of to the word functor. And he was trying to really make language very logically systematic, which natural language is and isn't, right? [Chuckles] CHARLES: Right. JULIE: But he was only concerned with really logically systematizing everything. And so, he used the word functor to describe some kinds of function words in language that relate one part of a sentence to another part of a sentence. CHARLES: Huh. So, what's an example? JULIE: So, the example that I've used in the past is, as far as I know this is not one that Carnap himself actually uses but it's the clearest one outside of that book… well the ones inside the book I don't really think are very good examples because they're not really how people talk. So, the one that I've used to try to explain it is the word ‘not' in English where ‘not' gets applied to the whole sentence. It doesn't really change the logical structure of the sentence. It doesn't change the meaning of the sentence except for now it negates the whole thing. CHARLES: I see. JULIE: And so, it relates this sentence with this structure to a different context, which is now the whole thing has been negated. CHARLES: I see. So, the meaning changes, but the structure really doesn't. JULIE: Right. And it changes the whole meaning. CHARLES: Right. JULIE: Not just part of the sentence. So, if you imagine ‘not' applying to an entire sentence because of course we can apply it just to a single word or just to a single phrase and change the meaning just of that word or that phrase, but if you imagine a context where you've applied ‘not' to a whole sentence, to an entire proposition, because of course he's a logician. So, if you've applied ‘not' to an entire proposition, then it doesn't change the structure or the meaning of that proposition per se except for it just relates it to the category of negated propositions. CHARLES: Mmhmm. JULIE: So, that's where it comes from. And… CHARLES: But I still don't understand why he called it functor. JULIE: He's sort of making up… well, actually I think the German might be the same word. CHARLES: Ah, okay. JULIE: Because he was writing in German. Because he's looking for something that evokes the idea of ‘function word'. CHARLES: Oh. JULIE: So, if you were to take the ‘func' of ‘function' [Laughs] and the, I don't know, maybe in German there's some better explanation for making this into a particular word. But that's how I think of it. So, it's ‘function word'. And then category theorists took it from Carnap to mean a way to map a function in this category or when we're talking about Haskell, a function of this type, to a function of another type. CHARLES: Okay. JULIE: And so, it takes the entire function, preserves the structure of the function just like negation preserves the structure of the sentence, and maps the whole thing to just a different context. So, if you had a function from A to B, functor can give you a function from maybe A to maybe B. CHARLES: Right. JULIE: So, it takes the function and just maps it into a different context. CHARLES: Right. So, a JavaScript example is if I've got an array of ints and a function of ints to strings, I can take any array of ints and get an array of strings. JULIE: Right. CHARLES: Or if I have a promise that has an int in it, I can take that same function to get a promise of a string. JULIE: Yeah. CHARLES: Yeah. I had no idea that it actually came from linguistics. JULIE: Yeah. [Laughs] CHARLES: So actually, the category theorists even… it digs deeper than category theory. They were actually borrowing concepts. JULIE: They were, yes. CHARLES: We just always are borrowing concepts. ELRICK: I like the borrowing of concepts. JULIE: Yeah. ELRICK: I think where people struggle with certain things, it's tying it back to something that they're familiar with. So, that's where I get… my mind is like [makes exploding sound] “I now get it,” is when someone ties it back to something that I am… CHARLES: Right. ELRICK: Familiar with. Like Charles' work with the JavaScript, tying it with JavaScript. I'm like, “Oh, now I see what they're talking about.” JULIE: Right. CHARLES: because you realize, you're using these concepts. People are using them, just they're using them anonymously. JULIE: Right. ELRICK: True. CHARLES: They don't have names for them. JULIE: Right. ELRICK: True. CHARLES: It's literally like an anonymous function and you're just taking that lambda and assigning it to a symbol. JULIE: Yeah. CHARLES: You're like “Oh wait. I've been using this anonymous function all over the place for years. I didn't realize. Boom. This is actually a formal concept.” ELRICK: True. And I think when people say like “Don't reinvent the wheel” it's a great statement for someone that has seen a wheel already. [Laughter] ELRICK: You know what I'm saying? If you never saw a wheel, then your'e going to reinvent the wheel because you're like “Aw man. This doesn't exist.” [Chuckles] JULIE: Yeah. ELRICK: But if people are exposed to these concepts, then they wouldn't reinvent the wheel. CHARLES: Right. JULIE: Right. Yeah. CHARLES: Instead of calling in some context, calling it a roller. [Chuckles] It's a round thingy. [Laughter] JULIE: Right. Yeah, so that's a little bit what I tried to do in my monoid talk in London. I tried to give some history of monoid, where this idea comes from and why it's worth talking about these things. CHARLES: Yeah. JULIE: Why it's worth talking about the structure. CHARLES: So, why is it worth the… where did it come from and why is it worth talking about? JULIE: Oh, so back when Boole, George Boole, when he decided to start formalizing logic… CHARLES: George Boole also, he was a career-switcher too, right? He was a primary school teacher. JULIE: Right, yeah. CHARLES: If I recall. He actually, he was basically teaching. Primary school is like elementary school in England, right? JULIE: I believe so, yes. CHARLES: Yeah. I think he was like, he was basically the US equivalent of an elementary school teacher who then went on to a second and probably, thankfully a big career that left a big legacy. JULIE: Right. Although no one knew exactly how big the legacy was really, until Claude Shannon picked it up and then just changed the whole world.[Laughs] Anyway, so Boole, when he was trying to come up with a formal algebra of logic so that we could not care so much about the semantic content of arguments (we could just symbolize them and just by manipulating symbols we could determine if an argument was logically valid or not), he was… well, for disjunction and conjunction which is AND and OR – well, disjunction would be the OR and conjunction the AND – he had prior art. He had addition and multiplication to look at. So, addition is like disjunction in some important ways. And multiplication is like conjunction in some important ways. And I think it took me a while to see how addition and disjunction were like each other, but there are some important ways that they're like each other. One of them is that they share their identity values. If you think of, it's sort of like binary addition and binary multiplication because in boolean logic there's only two values: true or false. So, you have a zero and a one. So, if you think of them as being like binary addition and binary multiplication then it's easier to see the connection. Because when we think of addition of just integers in a normal base 10 or whatever, it doesn't seem that much like an OR. [Laughs] CHARLES: Mmhmm. No, it doesn't. JULIE: [Inaudible] like a logical OR. So, it took me a while to see that. But they're also related then to set intersection and union where intersect-… CHARLES: So can… Let's just stop on that for a little bit, because let me parse that. So, for OR I've got two values, like in an ‘if' statement. This OR that. If I've got a true value then I can OR that with anything and I'll get the same anything. JULIE: Right. CHARLES: So, true is the identity value of OR, right? Is that what you're saying? So, one… JULIE: Well, it's false that's the identity of OR. CHARLES: Oh, it is? JULIE: Zero is the identity of addition. CHARLES: Wait, but if I take ‘false OR one' I get… oh, I get one. JULIE: Right. CHARLES: Okay. So, if I get ‘false OR true', I get true. Okay, so false is the identity. JULIE: Yeah. CHARLES: Oh right. You're right. You're right. Because… okay, sorry. JULIE: So, just like in addition, zero is the identity. So, whatever you add to zero, that's the result, right? You're going to get [the same] CHARLES: Right. JULIE: Value back. So, with OR false is the identity and false is equivalent to zero. CHARLES: [Inaudible] ‘False OR anything' and you're getting the anything. JULIE: Right. So, the only time you'll get a false back is if it's ‘false OR false', right? CHARLES: Right. Mmhmm. JULIE: Yeah. So, false is the identity there. And then it's sort of the same for conjunction where one is the identity of multiplication and one is also the… I mean, true is then the identity of logical conjunction. CHARLES: Right. Because one AND… JULIE: ‘True AND false' will get the false back. [Inaudible] CHARLES: Right. ‘True And true' you can get the true back. JULIE: Yeah. CHARLES: Okay. JULIE: And it's also then true, getting back to what we were talking about, semirings, it's also true that false is a kind of annihilator for conjunction. That's sort of trivial, because… CHARLES: Oh, because you annihilate the value. JULIE: Right. When there's only two values it's a little bit trivial. But it is [inaudible]. So… CHARLES: But it's [inaudible]. Yeah. It demonstrates the point. JULIE: Right. CHARLES: So, if I have yeah, ‘false AND anything' is just going to be false. So, I annihilate whatever is in that position. JULIE: Right. CHARLES: And the same thing as zero is the annihilator for multiplication, right? JULIE: Right. CHARLES: Because zero times anything and you annihilate the value. JULIE: Yeah. CHARLES: And now I've got… okay, I'm seeing it. I don't know where you're going with this. [Laughter] ELRICK: Yeah. CHARLES: But I'm there with you. ELRICK: Yup. JULIE: And then it turns out there are some operations from set theory that work really similarly. So, intersection and union are similar but the ones that are closer to conjunction/disjunction are disjoint unions and cartesian products. So we don't need to talk about those a whole lot if you're not into set theory. But anyway… CHARLES: I like set theory although it's so hard to describe without pictures, without Venn diagrams. JULIE: It is. It really is, yeah. So anyway, all of these things are monoids. And they're all binary associative operations with identity elements. So, they're all monoids. And so, we've taken operations on sets, operations on logical propositions, operations on many kinds of numbers (because not all kinds of addition and multiplication I guess are associative), and we can kind of unify all of those into the same framework. And then once we have done that, then we can see that there's all these other ‘sets'. Because most of the kinds of numbers are sets and there are operations on generic sets with set theory. So, now we can say “Oh. We can do these same kinds of operations on many other kinds of sets, many other varieties of sets.” And we can see that same pattern. And then we can get a kind of intuition for “Well, if I have a disjunctive monoid where I'm adding two things or I'm OR-ing two things…” Because even though those are logically very similar, intuitively and in terms of what it means to concatenate lists versus choosing one or the other, those obviously have different practical effects. CHARLES: So, I'm going to try and come up with some concrete examples to maybe… JULIE: Okay, yeah. CHARLES: A part of them will probably be like in JavaScript, right? So, to capture the idea of a disjunctive monoid versus a conjunctive monoid. So, a disjunctive monoid is like, so in JavaScript we're got two objects. You concat them together and it's like two maps or two hashes. So, you mash them together and you get… so, for the disjunctive one you'd have all the keys from both of the hashes inside the resulting object. You take two objects. Basically we call it object assign in JavaScript where you have basically the empty object. You can take the empty object and then take any number of objects. And so, we talked about… JULIE: That would become a disjunctive monoid, right? CHARLES: That would be a disjunctive monoid because you're like basically, you're OR-ing. Yeah. JULIE: You're kind of, [inaudible] CHARLES: Hard to find the terminology. JULIE: Yeah. CHARLES: But like object assign would be a disjunctive monoid because you're like mashing these two objects. And the resulting object has all of the things from both of them. JULIE: Right. So, it's like a sum of the two, right? CHARLES: Right, right. Okay, so then another one would be like min or max where you've got this list of integers and you can basically take any two integers and you can mash them together and if you're using min, you get the one that's smaller. Basically, you're collapsing them into one value but you're actually just choosing one of them. Is that like… JULIE: Yeah. CHARLES: Would that be like a conjunctive monoid? JULIE: No, that's also disjunctive but that's more like an OR than like a sum. CHARLES: Okay. JULIE: Right. So, that's what I said. It's hard to think of disjunctive monoids I think because there's really two varieties. There's some underlying logical similarity, like the similarity in the identity values. But they're also different. Summing two things versus choosing one or the other are also very different things in a lot of ways. CHARLES: Right. Okay. JULIE: And so, I think the conjunctive monoids are all a little bit more similar, I think. [Chuckles] But the disjunctive monoids are two broad categories. And we don't really have a monoid in Haskell of lists where you're choosing one or the other. The basic list monoid is you're concatenating them. So, you're adding two lists or taking the union of them. But for maybe, the maybe type, we do have monoids in Haskell where you're just choosing either the first just value that comes up or the last just value that comes up. So, we do have a monoid of choice over the maybe type. And then we have a type class called alternative which is monoids of choice for… so, they're disjunctive monoids but instead of adding the two things together, they're choosing one or the other. CHARLES: Okay. JULIE: Though we have a type class for that. [Laughs] CHARLES: [Sighs] Oh wow. Yeah. JULIE: Mmhmm, yeah. CHARLES: I'l have to go read up on that one. JULIE: That type class comes up the most when you're parsing, because you can then parse… like if you found this thing, then parse this thing. But if you haven't found this thing, then you can keep going. And if you find this other thing later, then you can take that thing. So, you allow the possibility of choice. The first thing that you come to that matches, take that thing or parse that thing. So, that type class gets mostly used for parsing but it's not only useful for parsing. CHARLES: Okay. JULIE: So yeah. That's the most of the time when I've used it. CHARLES: Is this when you're like parsing JSON? Or is this when you're just searching some stream for some value? Like you just want to run through it until you encounter this value? Or how does that…? JULIE: Right. Say you want to run through it until you find either this value or this value. I've used it when I've been parsing command line arguments. So, let's say I have some flags that can be passed in on my command line command. There are some flags that could be passed in. So, we'll parse until we find this thing or this thing. This flag or this flag. So, if you find this flag, then we're going to go ahead and parse that and do whatever that flag says to do. If you don't find that first flag then we can keep parsing and see if you find this other flag, in which case we'll do something different. CHARLES: Okay. JULIE: It'll take the first match that it finds. Does that make sense? CHARLES: Yeah, yeah, yeah. It does. But I'm not connecting how it's a monoid. [Laughs] JULIE: How is that a monoid? Well, because it's a monoid of OR-ing CHARLES: What's the identity value or the empty value in that case? JULIE: Well, the empty value would be… let's say you have maybes. Let's say you have some kind of maybe thing, so you're parser is going to return maybe this thing, maybe whatever you're parsing. Like maybe string. CHARLES: Yeah, yeah. JULIE: So, it's going to return a maybe string. So well, nothing would be the empty. CHARLES: Okay. JULIE: But nothing is like the zero because it's a disjunction, logical OR. So, only when you have two nothings will you get back a nothing. Otherwise, it will take the first thing that it finds. CHARLES: Okay. I see. JULIE: Yeah. So, the identity then is the nothing, like false is the identity for disjunction. CHARLES: Mmhmm. Okay. JULIE: Yeah. CHARLES: [Inaudible] JULIE: Yeah. If you have nothing or this other thing, then you return this other thing. Then you return the maybe string. If you have two nothings, then you get in fact nothing. Your parsing has failed. CHARLES: Right, because you've got nothing. JULIE: Because you've got nothing. There was nothing to give you back. CHARLES: So, you concatenated all of the things together and you ended up with nothing. JULIE: Right, because there was nothing there. CHARLES: Right. [Laughs] JULIE: You found nothing. So, it's useful when you've got some possibilities that could be present and you just want to keep parsing until you find the first one that matches. And then it'll just return whatever. It'll just parse the first thing that it matches on. CHARLES: Okay, okay. JULIE: Does that make sense? CHARLES: Yeah. No, I think it makes sense. JULIE: I'm not sure. Because I feel like I kind of went down a rabbit hole there. [Laughs] CHARLES: Yeah. [Laughs] No, no. I think it makes sense. And as a quick aside, I think… so, I was, when we were talking about min and max, are min and max also like a semiring? Because negative infinity is the annihilator of min and it's the identity of max. and positive infinity is the annihilator of max but it's the identity of min. JULIE: I guess. I don't really think of min and max as having identities. Is that how [inaudible]? CHARLES: I'm just, I don't know. Well, I think if you have negative infinity and you max it with anything, you're going to get the anything, right? Negative infinity max one is one. Negative infinity/minus a billion is minus a billion. JULIE: Yeah, okay. CHARLES: I don't know. Just off the cuff. I'm just trying to… annihilators sound cool. And so… [Laughter] CHARLES: And so I'm like, I'm trying to find annihilators. JULIE: Yeah, they are cool. CHARLES: [Laughs] JULIE: One of my friends on Twitter was just talking about how he used the intuition at least of a semiring at work because he had this sort of monoid to concatenate schedules. So, he's got all these different schedules and he's got this kind of monoid to concatenate them, to merge the schedules together. But then he's got this one schedule that is special. And whenever something is in this schedule, it needs to hard override every other schedule. CHARLES: Right. JULIE: And so, that was like the annihilator. So, he was thinking of it as a semiring, because that hard override schedule is like the annihilator of all the other schedules. CHARLES: Yeah. JULIE: If anything else exists on this day or whatever, then it'd just get a hard override. So, there's a real world use. [Laughs] CHARLES: Yeah, a real world example. That's the thing that I'm finding, is that all these really very crystalline abstractions, they still play out very well I think in the real world. And they're useful as a took in terms of casting a net over a problem. Because you're like… when I'm faced with something new, I'm like “Well, let's see. Can I make it a functor?” And if I can, then I've unlocked all these goodies. I've unlocked every single composition pattern that works with functor. JULIE: Right, right. CHARLES: And it's like sometimes it fits. It almost feels like when you're working on something at home and you've got some bolt and you're trying on different diameters. So you're like, “Oh, is it 15 millimeter? Is it 8 millimeter?” JULIE: Right. [Laughs] CHARLES: “Like no, okay. Maybe it'll work with this.” But then when it clicks, then you can really ratchet with some serious torque. JULIE: Right, right. Yeah. CHARLES: So, yeah. Definitely trying to look for semirings [Laughs] is definitely beyond my [can] at this point. But I hope to get there where it can be like, if it's a fit, it's a fit. That's awesome. JULIE: Right. Yeah, it's kind of beyond my can too. Semirings are still a little bit new for me and I can't say that I find them in the wild as it were, as often as monoids or something. But I think it just takes seeing some concrete examples. So, now you know this idea exists. If you just have some concrete examples of it, then over time you develop that intuition, right? CHARLES: Right. JULIE: Like “Okay, I've seen this pattern before.” [Chuckles] CHARLES: yeah. Basically, every time now I want to fold a list, or like in JavaScript, any time you want to reduce something I'm like “There's a monoid here that I'm not seeing. Let me look for it.” JULIE: Yeah. Oh, that's cool, yeah. CHARLES: Because like, that's basically, most of the time you're doing a reduce, then like I said that's the terminology for fold in JavaScript, is you start with some reducible thing. Then you have an initial value and a function to actually concatenate two things together. JULIE: Right. CHARLES: And so, usually that initial state, that's your identity. And then that function is just your concat function from your monoid. And so, usually anytime I do a reduce, there's the three pieces. Boom. Identity value, concatenation function, it's usually right there. And so, that's the way I've found of extracting these things, is I'm very suspicious every time I'm tempted to… JULIE: [Laughs] CHARLES: A fold. I'm like “Hmm. Where's the monoid I'm missing? Is it [under the] couch?” Like, where is it? [Laughs] Because it just, it cleans it up and it makes it so much more concise. JULIE: Oh yeah, that's awesome. CHARLES: So anyhow. JULIE: Have we totally lost Elrick? ELRICK: Nope, I'm still here. JULIE: Okay. [Laughs] ELRICK: I'm sitting in and listening to you two break down these complex topics is really good. Because you guys break them down to a level where it's consumable by people that barely understand it. So, I'm just sitting here just soaking everything in like “Oh, that's awesome.” Taking notes. Yes, okay, okay. [Laughter] JULIE: Cool. ELRICK: So, I'm like riding the train in the back just hanging out, feeling the cool breeze while you guys just pull the train ahead in… [Laughter] ELRICK: In the engine department, you know? It's awesome. CHARLES: Yeah. ELRICK: I don't know if they're related. But you were talking about semirings and I heard of semigroups or semigroups. I have no idea if those two things are related. Are they related or [inaudible]? JULIE: They're kind of related. So, a semigroup is like a monoid but doesn't have an identity value. CHARLES: What is an example of a semigroup out there in the wild? Because every time I find a semigroup, I feel like it's actually a monoid. JULIE: Well, you know I feel like that a lot, too. We do have a data type in Haskell that is a non-empty list. So, there is no empty list CHARLES: Ah, right. Okay. JULIE: So then you can concatenate those lists, but there's never an identity value for it. CHARLES: I see. JULIE: Yeah. So, that's a case. There's actually a lot of comparison functions, greater than and less than. I think those are semigroups because they're binary, they're associative, but they don't have an identity value. Like if you're comparing two numbers, there's not really an identity value there. CHARLES: Right. Well, would the negative infinity work there? Let's see. Like, negative infinity greater than anything would be the anything. Well, okay wait. But greater than, that takes numbers and yields a boolean, right? JULIE: Yeah, CHARLES: Right. So, it couldn't be… could it be a semigroup? Don't semigroups have to… Doesn't the [inaudible] function have to yield the same type as the operands? JULIE: Yes. CHARLES: But a non-empty list, that's a good one. Sometimes it's basically not valid for you to have a list that doesn't have any elements, right? Because it's like the null value or the empty value and it could be like a shopping cart on Amazon. You can't have a shopping cart without at least something in it. JULIE: Right. CHARLES: Or, you can't check out without something. So, you might want to say like the shopping cart that I'm going to check out is a non-empty list. And so, you can put two non-empty lists together. But yeah, there's no value you can mash together, you can concat with anything, that isn't empty. JULIE: Right. CHARLES: So, I guess going back to your question Elrick, I don't know if it's related to semiring. But semigroup is just, it's like one-half of monoid. It's the part that concats two values together. JULIE: Right. Well, yeah. And so, it's supposed to be half a group, right? But I don't remember… CHARLES: [Laughs] JULIE: [Inaudible] all of the group stuff is, all the stuff that these types have to have to be a group. And similarly, I forget what the difference between semiring and ring is. [Chuckles] Because a ring and a group I know are not the same thing. But I forget what the difference is, too. So, I kind of got a handle on what semigroups are, and I know all my Haskell friends are going to, when they hear this podcast they're going to tweet all these examples of semigroups at me, especially my coauthor for ‘Joy of Haskell', Chris Martin. He's really into semigroups. And so, I know he's going to be very disappointed in my inability to think… [Laughter] JULIE: To think of any good examples. But it's not something that I find myself using a lot, whereas semirings are something that I have started noticing a little bit more often. So, how a monoid relates to a group is something that I can't remember off the top of my head. And I know how semirings relate to monoids, but how monoids then relate to rings and groups, I can't really remember. And so, these things are sort of all related. But the relation is not something I can spill out off the top of my head. Sorry. [Laughs] CHARLES: No, It's no worries. You know, I feel like… ELRICK: It's all good. CHARLES: What's funny is I feel like having these discussions is exactly like the discussions people have with any framework of using one that we use a lot, which is EmberJS. But if you could do with React or something, it's like, how does the model relate to the controller, relate to the router, relate to the middleware, relate to the services? You just have these things, these moving parts that fit together. And part of… I feel like exploring this space is really, absolutely no different than exploring any other software framework where you just have these things, these cooperating concepts, and they do click together. But you just have to map out the space in your head. JULIE: Yeah. This is going to sound stupid because everybody thinks that because I know Haskell I must know all these other things. But I just had to ask people to recommend me a book that could explain the relationship of HTML and CSS, because that was completely opaque to me. CHARLES: [Laughs] Yeah. JULIE: I've been involved in the making now of several websites because of the books and stuff like that. And I have a blog. It's not WordPress or anything. I did that sort of myself. So, I've done a little bit with that. But CSS is really terrifying. And… CHARLES: Right. Like query selectors, rules, properties. JULIE: Yeah. ELRICK: [Laughs] CHARLES: Again, might as well be groups and semigroups and monoids, right? JULIE: Right, right. ELRICK: Yeah. CHARLES: [Laughs] ELRICK: That is really interesting. [Chuckles] I've never heard anyone make that comparison before. But it's totally true, now that I'm thinking about it. JULIE: Yeah, yeah. CHARLES: Yeah. In the tech world we are so steeped in our own jargon that we could be… we can reject one set of jargon and be totally fine with another set. Or be like, suspicious of one set of concepts working together and be totally fine with these other designations which are somewhat arbitrary but they work. JULIE: Right. CHARLES: So, people use them. JULIE: So, it's like what you've gotten used to and what you're familiar with and that seems normal and natural to you. [Chuckles] So, the Haskell stuff, most of it seems normal and natural to me. And then I don't understand HTML and CSS. So, I bought a book. [Laughter] CHARLES: Learning HTML and CSS from first principles. JULIE: Yes, yeah. I just wanted to understand. I could tell that they do relate to each other, that there is some way that they click together. I can tell that by banging my head against them repeatedly. But I didn't really understand how, and so yeah. So, i've been reading this book to [Laughs] [learn] HTML and CSS and how they relate together. That's so important, just figuring out how things relate to each other, you know? CHARLES: Yeah. ELRICK: Yeah. That is very true. JULIE: Yeah. ELRICK: We can trade. I can teach you HTML and CSS and you can teach me Haskell. JULIE: Absolutely. ELRICK: [Laughs] CHARLES: There you go JULIE: [Laughs] ELRICK: Because I'm like, “Ooh.” I'm like, “Oh, CSS. Great. No problem.” [Laughter] ELRICK: Haskell, I'm like “Oh, I don't know.” JULIE: Yeah. CHARLES: Yeah. ELRICK: [Laughs] CHARLES: No, it's amazing [inaudible] CSS. ELRICK: Yeah. CHARLES: It is, it's a complicated system. And it's actually, it's in many ways, it's actually a pretty… it's a pretty functional system, CSS is at least. The DOM APIs are very much imperative and about mutable state. But CSS is basically yeah, completely declarative. JULIE: Right. CHARLES: Completely immutable. And yeah, the workings of the interpreter are a mystery. [Laughs] ELRICK: Yup. JULIE: YEs. And you know, for the Joy of Haskell website we use Bootstrap. And so, there was just like… there's all this magic, you know? [Laughs] ELRICK: Oh, yeah. CHARLES: Yeah. JULIE: Oh look, if I just change this little thing, suddenly it's perfectly responsive and mobile. Cool. [Laughter] JULIE: I don't know how it's doing this, but this is great. [Laughs] CHARLES: Yeah. Oh, yeah. It's an infinite space. And yeah, people forget what is so easy and intuitive is not and that there's actually a lot of learning that happened there that they're just taking for granted. JULIE: I think so many people start from HTML and CSS. That's one of their first introductions to programming, or JavaScript or some combination of all three of those. And so, to them the idea that you would be learning Haskell first and then coming around and being like “Oaky, I have to figure out HTML,” that [seems very] strange, right? [Laughter] CHARLES: Yeah. Well, definitely probably stepping into bizarro world. JULIE: And I went backwards. But [Laughs] CHARLES: Yeah. JULIE: Not that it's backwards in terms of… just backwards in terms of the normal way, progression of [inaudible] CHARLES: Yeah. It's definitely the back door. Like coming in through the catering kitchen or something. JULIE: Yes. CHARLES: Instead of the front door. Because you know the browser, you can just open up the Dev Tools and there you are. JULIE: Exactly, yeah. CHARLES: The level of accessibility is pretty astounding. And so, I think t's why it's one of the most popular avenues. JULIE: Oh, definitely. Yeah. ELRICK: It's the back door probably for web development but not the back door for programming in general. JULIE: Mm, yeah. Yeah. CHARLES: Yeah. It seems like Haskell programming has really started taking off and that the ecosystem is starting to get some of the trappings of a really less fricative developer experience in terms of the package management and a command line experience and being able to not make all of the tiny little decisions that need to be made before you're actually writing ‘hello world'. JULIE: Right. ELRICK: Interesting. Haskell has a package manager now? CHARLES: Oh, it has for a while. ELRICK: Oh, really? What is it called? I have no idea? Do you know the name off the top of your head? CHARLES: So, I actually, I'm not that familiar with the ecosystem other than every time I try it out. So I definitely will defer this question to you, Julie. JULIE: This is going to be a dumb question, I guess. What do we mean by package manager? CHARLES: So, in JavaScript, we have npm. The concept of these packages. It's code that you can download, a module that you can import, basically import symbols from. And Ruby has RubyGems. And Python has pip. JULIE: Okay, okay. CHARLES: Emacs has Emacs Packages. And usually, there's some repository and people could publish to them and you can specify dependencies. JULIE: Right, yeah. Okay, so we have a few things. Hackage is sort of the main package repository. And then we have another one called Stackage and the packages that are in Stackage are all guaranteed to work with each other. CHARLES: Mm, okay. JULIE: So, on Hackage, some of the packages that are on Hackage are not really maintained or they only work with some old versions of dependencies and stuff like that, so the people who made Stackage were like “well, if we had this set of packages that were all guaranteed to work together, the dependencies were all kept updated and they all can be made to work together, then that would be really convenient.” And then we have Cabal and we have Stack are the main… and a lot of people use Nix for the same purpose that you would use Cabal or Stack for building projects and importing dependencies and all of that. CHARLES: Right. So, Cabal and Stack would be roughly equivalent then to the way we use Yarn or JavaScript and Bundler in Ruby. You're solving the equation for, here's my root set of dependencies. Go out and solve for the set of packages that satisfy. Give me at least one solution and then download those packages and [you can] run them. JULIE: Yeah, yeah. Right, so managing your dependencies and building your project. Because Haskell's compiled, so you've got to build things. And so yeah, we have both of those. CHARLES: And now there's like web frameworks and REST frameworks. JULIE: Oh there are, yeah. We have… CHARLES: All kinds of stuff now. JULIE: We had this big proliferation of web frameworks lately. And I guess some of them are very good. I don't really do web development. But the people I know who do web development in Haskell say that some of these are very good. Yesod is supposed to be very good. Servant is sort of the new hotness. And I haven't used Servant at all though, so don't ask me questions about it. [Laughter] JULIE: But yeah, we have several big web frameworks now. There are still some probably big holes in the Haskell ecosystem in terms of what people want to see. So, that's one thing that people complain about Haskell for, is that we don't have some of the libraries they'd like to see. I'd like to see something… I would really like to see in Haskell something along the lines of like NLTK from Python. CHARLES: What is that? JULIE: Natural language toolkit. CHARLES: Oh, okay. JULIE: So yeah, Python has this… CHARLES: Yeah, Python's got all the nice science things. JULIE: They really do. And Haskell has some natural language processing libraries available but nothing along the lines of, nothing as big or easy to use and stuff as NLTK yet. So, I'd really like to see that hole get filled a little bit better. And you know… CHARLES: Well, there you go. If anyone out there is seeking fame and fortune in the Haskell community. JULIE: That's actually why I started learning Python, was just so that I could figure out NLTK well enough to start writing it in Haskell. [Laughter] JULIE: So, that's sort of my ambitious long-term project. We'll see how that goes. [Laughs] CHARLES: Nice. Before we wrap up, is there anything going on, coming up, that you want to give a shoutout to or mention or just anything exciting in general? JULIE: Yeah, so on March 30th I'm going to be giving a talk at lambda-squared which is going to be in Knoxville and is a new conference. I think it's just a single-day conference and I'm going to be giving a talk about functors. So, I'm going to try to get through all the exciting varieties of functors in a 50-minute talk. CHARLES: Ooh. JULIE: So, we'll see how that goes. Yeah. And I am still working with Chris Martin on ‘The Joy of Haskell' which should be finished this year, sometime. I'm not going to… [Laughter] JULIE: Give any more specific deadline than that. And in the process of writing Joy of Haskell, I was telling him about some things that, some things that I think are really difficult. Like in my experience, teaching Haskell some places where I find people have the biggest stumbling blocks. And I said, “What if we could do a beginner video course where instead of throwing all of these things at people at once, we separated them out?” And so, you can just worry about this set of stumbling blocks at one time and then later we can talk about this set of stumbling blocks. And so, we're doing… we're going to start a video course, a beginner Haskell video course. I think we'll be starting later this month. So, I'm pretty excited… CHARLES: Nice. JULIE: About that. Yeah. CHARLES: Yeah, I know a lot of people learn really, really well from videos. There's just some… JULIE: Yeah. [Inaudible] for me, so I'm a little nervous. But [Laughs] CHARLES: Yeah, especially if you can do… are you going to be doing live coding examples? Building out things with folks? JULIE: Yeah. CHARLES: Yeah. Well, you just needn't look no further than the popular things like RailsCasts and some of the… yeah, there's just so many good video content out there. Yeah, we'll definitely be looking for the. JULIE: Cool. CHARLIE: Alright. Well, thank you so much, Julie, for coming on. JULIE: Well, thank you for having me on. Sorry I went down some… I went kind of down some rabbit holes. Sorry about that. [Laughs] CHARLES: You know what? You go down the rabbit holes, we spend time walking around the rabbit holes. JULIE: [Laughs] CHARLES: There's something for everybody. So… [Laughter] CHARLES: And ultimately we're strolling through the meadow. So, it's all good. JULIE: [Laughs] Yeah. CHARLES: Thank you too, Elrick. JULIE: It was nice talking to you guys again. CHARLES: Yeah. ELRICK: Yeah, thank you. CHARLES: If folks want to follow up with you or reach out to you, what's the best way to get in contact with you? JULIE: I'm @argumatronic on Twitter and my blog is argumatronic.com which has an email address and some other contact information for me. So, I'd love to hear questions, comments. [Laughs] Yeah. I always [inaudible]. CHARLES: Alright, fantastic. JULIE: To talk to new people. CHARLES: Alright. And if you want to get in touch with us, we are @TheFrontside on Twitter. Or you can just drop us an email at contact@frontside.io. Thanks everybody for listening. And we will see you all later.

Oliver von Carnap berichtet von seinem Verein Gastronomie gegen Rassismus und du erfährst wie du dich für ein gleichberechtigtes Miteinander im (Bar-)Alltag einsetzen kannst.

Logical Positivism.   What separates meaningful language from non-meaningful language, genuine science from pseudo-science, and productive philosophy from unproductive philosophy? In the early 20th century, a philosophical movement known as "logical positivism" attempted to specify criteria that could be used to demarcate meaningful language from non-meaningful language. These logical positivists, such as Rudolf Carnap and A.J. Ayer, claimed that only empirically verifiable statements are meaningful, and that any language not empirically verifiable is literally meaningless.   In this 50th episode of Meta Treks, hosts Mike Morrison and Zachary Fruhling examine the claims of logical positivism through the lens of Star Trek. From the story-based use of language in the TNG episode "Darmok" to the many possible uses of the word "dilithium," Mike and Zachary offer a Star Trek based critique of logical positivism inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein's account of the meaningfulness of language as its use in various context-dependent "language games."   Chapters  Welcome to Episode 50 (00:01:07)  Separating Science from Pseudoscience - Only Empirically Verifiable Statements are Meaningful (00:03:29)  "Turkey Hot" - Replicators and Reference (00:07:46)  "Dilithium!" - Wittgenstein and Meaning-as-Use (00:10:23)  Empiricism - Do We Have Direct Sensory Access to the External World? (00:20:34)  "Minuet!" - Holograms and Reference (00:31:17)  "Shaka, When the Walls Fell" - The Meaningfulness of Non-Referential or Mythological Language (00:36:59)  ENT "Strange New World" - Hallucinatory Experience and Rock Creatures (00:47:22)  TNG "The Ensigns of Command" - Cup? Glass? Liquid? Clear? Brown? Hot? (00:55:11)  Language Games (00:59:59)  Final Thoughts (01:08:00)   Hosts Mike Morrison and Zachary Fruhling   Production Mike Morrison (Editor and Producer) Ken Tripp (Executive Producer) C Bryan Jones (Executive Producer) Matthew Rushing (Executive Producer) Charlynn Schmiedt (Executive Producer) Patrick Devlin (Associate Producer) Kay Shaw (Associate Producer) Richard Marquez (Production Manager)   Send us your feedback! Twitter: @trekfm  Facebook: http://facebook.com/trekfm  Voicemail: http://www.speakpipe.com/trekfm  Contact Form: http://www.trek.fm/contact  Visit the Trek.fm website at http://www.trek.fm/  Subscribe in iTunes: http://itunes.com/trekfm   Support the Network! Become a Trek.fm Patron on Patreon and help us keep Star Trek talk coming every week. We have great perks for you at http://patreon.com/trekfm

Thomas Ede Zimmermann (Frankfurt) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (25 June, 2015) titled "Fregean Compositionality". Abstract: The distinction between transparent and opaque contexts has always played a major rôle in theories of linguistic semantics, though it has undergone a number of reformulations and precisifications since its origins in Frege’s classical substitution arguments. Most dramatically, the unfathomable distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung has been recast in more perspicuous set-theoretic terms, trading Frege’s senses for Carnap’s intensions and identifying functions with their courses of values. Still, at least part of the Fregean architecture has survived all these transformations. In particular, (i) the strategy of treating extensionality as the default case of semantic composition and invoking intensions only when need be, has become part of most common approaches to the syntax-semantics interface. On the other hand, (ii) Frege’s apparent commitment to a hierarchy of senses in the analysis of iterated opacity has been discarded for its alleged lack of cogency and coherence. In the talk I will take a closer look at both aspects of the Fregean architecture within the standard possible worlds framework of Montague’s Universal Grammar. Concerning (i), it will be argued that the Fregean strategy results in an interpretation of intensional constructions (i.e., opaque contexts) that goes beyond mere intensional compositionality in that it imposes a certain kind of uniformity on the pertinent semantic combinations. As to (ii), it will be shown how a hierarchy of intensions may help restoring compositionality when extensional and intensional scope effects appear to be out of tune. The historical background notwithstanding, the the talk will take systematic perspective, aiming at a better understanding and possible improvement of compositionality in possible worlds semantics.

Denis Bonnay (Paris Quest/IHPST) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (30 April, 2015) titled "An Axiomatization of Individual and Social Updates". Abstract: In this talk, I will consider update rules, which an agent may follow in order to update her subjective probabilities and take into account new information she receives. I will consider two different situations in which this may happen: (1) individual updates: when an agent learns the probability for a particular event to have a certain value. (2) social updates: when an agent learns the probability an other agent's gives to a particular event. Jeffrey's conditioning and weighted averaging are two famous update rules, in individual and social situations respectively. I will show that both can be axiomatized by means of one and the same invariance principle, related to Carnap's use of invariance in his work on probabilities.

Otávio Bueno (Miami) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (22 January, 2015) titled "Logic and Metaphysical Presuppositions". Abstract: Does logic (in particular, classical logic) have metaphysical presuppositions? It may be thought that it doesn’t: logical principles and logical inferences are often taken as not requiring the existence of any objects for them to hold. Logical principles are supposedly true in any domain (so there is no reliance on the subject matter at hand), and logical inferences are traditionally understood as being similarly independent of the subject matter under consideration. As Rudolf Carnap famously pointed out: “If logic is to be independent of empirical knowledge, then it must assume nothing concerning the existence of objects (Carnap [1937], p. 140).” In this paper I examine a number of arguments to the contrary, according to which, despite appearances, logical principles and logical inferences do have metaphysical presuppositions. I consider critically these arguments and indicate how they can be resisted, and motivate an alternative that, I argue, recognizes the nature and limitations of such presuppositions. In the end, as will become clear, it does require a suitable understanding of logic and some strategies to avoid commitment to abstract objects to block such presuppositions. Left unassisted, logic may not be presupposition free after all.

Michael Stöltzner (South Carolina) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (18 July, 2013) titled "Completeness, Categoricity, and Dismissal". Abstract: In 1939, von Neumann panned Carnap “totally naıve, simplistic views on the issue of ‘completeness’ of the axiomatics of mathematics (‘categoricity’)” and expressed his surprise that philosophers were attracted by them. Taking up recent scholarship on Carnap’s work on axiomatic around 1930 and on von Neumann’s axiomatization of quantum physics, I argue that although von Neumann continued to cherish completeness and categoricity as regulative principles, he became increasingly aware how difficult they were to achieve in quantum logic. Moreover, in von Neumann’s (and Hilbert’s) use, the axiomatic method was never committed to the logical universalism of Carnap’s approach. This episode carries, to my mind, some lessons for the role of mathematics and logic in the context of the axiomatic method, especially if one considers the latter as the core vehicle of mathematical philosophy.

Catarina Dutilh Novaes (Groningen) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Carnap on Logic" (3-6 July, 2013) titled "Two conceptions of formalization: Carnapian explication, and formalisms as cognitive tools".

Iris Loeb (Amsterdam) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Carnap on Logic" (3-6 July, 2013) titled "The Place of Carnap's Early Model Theory in the History of Logic".

Florian Steinberger (MCMP/LMU) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Carnap on Logic" (3-6 July, 2013) titled "The limits of tolerance? Carnap on the normativity of logic".

Erich Reck (UC Riverside) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Carnap on Logic" (3-6 July, 2013) titled "Logic in the 1930s: Type Theory and Model Theory".

Peter Olen (South Florida) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Carnap on Logic" (3-6 July, 2013) titled "Chasing Ghosts: Understanding Carnap's pure Semantics".

Andre Carus (Hegeler Institute) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Carnap on Logic" (3-6 July, 2013) titled "Carnapian Rationality".

Richard Zach (Calgary) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Carnap on Logic" (3-6 July, 2013) titled "Carnap as a Logician".

Pierre Wagner (Paris) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Carnap on Logic" (3-6 July, 2013) titled "Tarskian and Carnapian Semantics".

Sebastian Lutz (MCMP/LMU) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Carnap on Logic" (3-6 July, 2013) titled "On Carnap on Empirical Significance".

Sean Morris (MSU Denver) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Carnap on Logic" (3-6 July, 2013) titled "Quine, Carnap and Lewis on Truth by Convention".

Richard Creath (Arizona) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Carnap on Logic" (3-6 July, 2013) titled "The Logical and the Analytic".

Patricia Blanchette (Notre Dame) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Carnap on Logic" (3-6 July, 2013) titled "Applications and Content: Frege and Gödel on Mathematics as Syntax".

Michael Friedman (Stanford) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Carnap on Logic" (3-6 July, 2013) titled "From Intuition to Tolerance in Carnap's Philosophy of Mathematics". Abstract: I plan to discuss the evolution of Carnap's views on arithmetic and geometry from Der Raum, through the Aufbau period, to Logical Syntax and the semantic period. I will concentrate on the way in which he consistently distinguished the two cases -- where geometry, in Der Raum, is explicitly tied to spatial intuition, and then, even though it remains distinguished from arithmetic, its ties to spatial intui- tion become empirical rather than a priori. The character of Carnap's generally tolerant attitude towards philosophical disputes in the foundations of mathematics thereby changes as well. Carnap's attitude towards intuition in the arithmetical case, finally, becomes clarified in his exchange with E. W. Beth in the Schilpp volume -- and this clarifies his application of the principle of tolerance in this case as well.

Steve Awodey (Carnegie-Mellon) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Carnap on Logic" (3-6 July, 2013) titled "On the Invariance of Logical Truth".

Thomas Meier (MCMP/LMU) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Influences on the Aufbau" (1-3 July, 2013) titled "Influences on Carnap's Structuralism in the Aufbau". Abstract: I present an analysis of the different influences on Carnap’s structuralism in the Aufbau. First, I show how Hilbert’s notion of implicit definition from his axiomatization of Euclidean geometry (Hilbert, 1899) had an influence on Carnap’s development of his notion of purely structural description. As one further point, I will also discuss Neo-Kantian influences on Carnap’s structuralism. This mainly concerns Carnap’s posi- tion of what has been identified as a form of epistemic structural realism in the modern literature (see Frigg & Votsis, 2011). I will argue that Carnap’s proposal for individuating certain relations as founded relations in §154 is of contemporary relevance for actual debates on the so-called Newman-Objection. The Neo-Kantian influence on Carnap’s epistemology becomes clearer if we consider his purely relational system of knowledge, in which objects are subordinate to relations, to the Grundrelationen. For Carnap, a Kantian thing-in-itself as such would not be knowable but through its relations.

Hans-Joachim Dahms (Vienna) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Influences on the Aufbau" (1-3 July, 2013) titled "Rudolf Carnap and Wilhelm Ostwald". Abstract: When Rudolf Carnap started work on his dissertation Der Raum in Summer 1920 he also hosted a conference with some of his Jena friends in his Buchenbach home about „a system of the sciences“. Carnap proposed as starting point for that discussion a scheme and ideas developed by Wilhelm Ostwald (1853-1932), the nobel-price winning chemist (1909) and monistic philosopher. Ostwald is also men- tioned and discussed in the Aufbau. What Carnap might have attracted to Ostwald’s work, are the fol- lowing items of common interest: (i) the construction of international artificial languages for everyday use (like esperanto), but also for sci-entific purposes, (ii) monism and the unity of the sciences, (iii) theories of colour, and last but not least: (iv) ethics. After a brief discussion of these points I will conclude with a tentative answer to the question why Ost- walds influence on Carnap seems to have diminished in the decade since the Buchenbach conference.

Elena Tatievskaya (Augsburg) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Influences on the Aufbau" (1-3 July, 2013) titled "Gätschenberger on the "Given" and Carnap's Aufbau". Abstract: In his Aufbau Carnap rejects Gätschenberger’s (1920) statement that the pure language of the “given” is impossible. Gätschenberger who represents cognition as ordering reality by means of symbolizing holds an experience (“Erlebnis”) to be a natural symbol which posits some object identifiable on the basis of the effects of the experience and in particular actions induced by it. Carnap treats the given as an object and ordering reality as constructing things. I argue that Carnap’s concept of the given can be considered as a solution of some problems of Gätschenberger’s theory which explains the forming function of expe- rience through reference to the form and constituents of the object cognized which in their turn are de- fined by other means of symbolizing.

Andre Carus (Hegeler Institute) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Influences on the Aufbau" (1-3 July, 2013) titled "Carnap and Phenomenology: What Happened in 1924?". Abstract: The sketch of the Aufbau system in "Vom Chaos zur Wirklichkeit" (1922) employs phenome- nology to describe the system basis, as do other writings before 1924. But in January 1925, we find a new principle of " ̈Überwindung der Subjektivität" and a new emphasis on "Einheit des Gegenstands- bereichs." Russell's "construction principle" becomes the motto of the published book. The earlier ap- proach is explicitly rejected. Why this radical change? This question is discussed here on the basis of evidence from Carnap's papers, and a somewhat unexpected conclusion is reached.

Thomas Mormann (San Sebastian) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Influences on the Aufbau" (1-3 July, 2013) titled "(Re)constructing Influences in the Aufbau". Abstract: Once upon a time, the Aufbau was succinctly described as an attempt “to account for the external world as a logical construct of sense-data... .” Consequently, the most important influence on the Aufbau could be precisely named as “Russell”. These idyllic times have long passed. A comprehensive interpretation of the Aufbau has turned out to be a difficult task that has to take into account many, and sometimes rather turbid, sources. My thesis is that at the origin of the Aufbau project stood a problem that haunted German philosophy since the end of the 19th century at the latest. Bluntly, it may be expressed as the conflict between “Leben” and “Geist”. I want to show that there exists striking similarities between the attempts of how Rickerts System der Philosophie (1921) and Carnap’s (unpublished ms.) Vom Chaos zur Wirklichkeit (1922) (“the germ of the constitution theory”) aimed to cope with this problem.

Clinton Tolley (San Diego) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Influences on the Aufbau" (1-3 July, 2013) titled "The Context and Development of Carnap's Views on Logic up to the Aufbau". Abstract: I will identify key components of Carnap's early conception of logic, as it develops in the period leading up to the Aufbau, looking especially at Der Raum and also Abriss der Logistik. I will also situate the development of Carnap's views within the context of the main influences upon his thinking at the time. Finally, I will identify points of contrast between his views in this period and his views after the Aufbau.

Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock (Puerto Rico) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Influences on the Aufbau" (1-3 July, 2013) titled "The Old Husserl and the Young Carnap". Abstract: In his ‘Intellectual Autobiography’ Carnap barely refers to Husserl and not once with reference to his own work. He mentions Kant and a pair of Neo-Kantians as the main philosophical influences in Der Raum, and Mach, Rusell and the Gestalt psychologists as main influences in Der logische Aufbau der Welt. Moreover, he stresses that he heard three lecture courses by Frege. On the other hand, there are some signs in Husserl’s late correspondence not only of having known Carnap, but also of a lack of sympathy for him. The present paper addresses this mysterious relation and the fact that Husserl was a decisive influence precisely in those two writings of Carnap.

Iulian Toader (Bucharest) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Influences on the Aufbau" (1-3 July, 2013) titled "Quasianalytic Individuation: Carnap's Aufbau as against Weylean Skepticism". Abstract: Carnap maintained that, unlike mathematics, the empirical sciences must individuate their ob- jects, and that they can (and should) do so via univocal systems of structural definite descriptions. In this paper, I evaluate Carnap's strategies for univocality, against the Southwest German neo-Kantian demand for a “logic of individuality”, but also against the challenge of Weylean skepticism – the view that objec- tivity and understanding are opposite ideals of science.

Thomas Ryckman (Stanford) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Influences on the Aufbau" (1-3 July, 2013) titled "What Carnap might have learned from Weyl". Abstract: There are easily discernible traces of the influence of Hermann Weyl in the writings of Carnap in the early to mid- 1920s. It is somewhat more difficult to find any palpable influence of Weyl in the Aufbau. On the other hand, Weyl’s 1926 Philosophie der Mathematik und Naturwissenschaften is the sole work singled out in Aufbau's Bibliography as “especially suitable for study of problems connected with construction theory” in both the “logical” and the “epistemological” categories. I shall argue that, in the crucial Aufbau passage (§176) “demonstrating” the non-constructability of the reality (as mind- transcendent) concept, Carnap may have had §17 of Weyl’s 1926 book very much in mind.

Christian Damböck (Vienna) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Influences on the Aufbau" (1-3 July, 2013) titled "The Notion of Objectivity in 19th Century German Philosophy and its Role for the Aufbau". Abstract: This paper compares Carnap’s empiricist and objectivist conception from the Aufbau with a certain family of accounts of the empirical and objectivity that had been emerged in 19th Century Ger- many. Although these accounts were marginalized at the beginning of the 20th Century there were traces of this German empiricist (and objectivist) tradition to be found both in the philosophy of the Dilthey- school and in neo-Kantianism. Therefore, we try to argue first that Dilthey and the neo-Kantians (or at least some of them) have been sympathetic to a certain kind of empiricist and objectivist reasoning, and second that Carnap’s own empiricist and objectivist conception most probably has been influenced by these German empiricists (and objectivists).

Sébastien Gandon (Blaise Pascal, Clermont-Ferrand) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Influences on the Aufbau" (1-3 July, 2013) titled "Carnap and Wiener: a missed opportunity?". Abstract: In 1913, Norbert Wiener, then a young (19 years old) prodigy, went in Cambridge to work with Russell. Wiener was very impressed by Russell’s constructionalist program, and, from 1914 to 1922, he published four papers (one is more than 100 pages long) extending Russell’s project. My talk’s first aim is to present these little known researches. My second goal is to draw a comparison between Carnap’s and Wiener’s reception of Russell.

Thomas Uebel (Manchester) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Influences on the Aufbau" (1-3 July, 2013) titled "Neurath's Influence on Carnap's Aufbau". Abstract: In his very prompt review of Carnap’s Aufbau, Neurath was both highly appreciative of Car- nap’s achievements there and but also critical of some of its features. Neurath, of course, is reported to have been one of the readers of the typescript of an earlier version of that book that circulated amongst members of Schlick’s discussion group. This talk will consider the question whether Neurath had any in- fluence on the final version and what form this influence may have taken.

Paul Ziche (Utrecht) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Influences on the Aufbau" (1-3 July, 2013) titled "Theories of Order in Carnap's Aufbau". Abstract: "Order" is a key term in debates in, and between, fields such as logic, philosophy of mathemat- ics, theoretical biology and philosophy of science around 1900. In § 3 of the "Aufbau", Carnap refers af- firmatively to a number of relevant authors: Whitehead and Russell, Driesch, Ostwald, Husserl, and many more. This list already indicates how broad and, from today's point of view, internally heterogeneous the discourse on order has been in this period. This paper will motivate why the notion of "order" played such a crucial role around 1900, and what its strategic position in those debates has been: "order" was conceived of as an ultimately abstract and general concept that could, nevertheless, be given content via, among others, mathematical and logical methods, or within fields such as biology. On the other hand, these diverse lines of influence also shaped the status of the field of logic itself. In a second step, it will be asked how Carnap views this discourse on order, and how he reacts to it, and to the broader ideas that form the strategic background of the notion of "order".

Matthias Neuber (Tuebingen) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Influences on the Aufbau" (1-3 July, 2013) titled "The Aufbau and the Early Schlick". Abstract: Schlick’s influence on Carnap’s Aufbau will be considered under the aspect of Schlick’s early ‘critical realism.’ It will be shown that both Carnap’s structuralism and his distinction between the ‘met- aphysical’ and the ‘empirical’ conception of reality can be traced back to Schlick’s discussion of the real- ism issue in his early Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre (1918, 1925). By way of conclusion, I shall briefly discuss Herbert Feigl’s contention that the later (Viennese) Schlick converted—influenced by Carnap’s Aufbau— from his early critical realism to ‘phenomenalistic positivism.’

Alan Richardson (UBC Vancouver) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Influences on the Aufbau" (1-3 July, 2013) titled "The Mathematical Core of the External World Problem: Carnap's Construction of the External World and Karl Gerhards's 'Der mathematische Kern der Aussenweltshypothese'". Abstract: Carnap, in his "Intellectual Autobiography," tells the story of reading in 1921 Bertrand Russell's book, Our Knowledge of the External World. In this anecdote he calls Russell "the strongest influence" on his "philosophical thinking in general" during the period of writing the Aufbau. But, while the meth- odological lessons of Russell loomed large in Carnap's mind, the actual techniques developed in the Auf- bau for constructing the external world differ considerably from Russell's own. Thus, noting Russell's influence does not take us very far in figuring out what the external world problem was for Carnap or what resources might be brought in to solve it. In this essay, I compare some of the constructive proce- dures of the Aufbau to procedures developed in Karl Gerhards's paper "Der mathematische Kern der Aussenweltshypothese" of 1922. Not only does Carnap refer to this paper in the crucial sections of the Aufbau where the construction of the external world is sketched, but this paper was precirculated and discussed at the 1923 Erlangen Conference at which Carnap and Reichenbach met and which Carnap subsequently called "the small but significant initial step in the movement of a scientific philosophy in Germany." Not only are some of Gerhards's constructive procedures and resources more closely related to Carnap's than are Russell's, but also Gerhards places his own work in a context created by the work of Helmholtz and Mach. The point of this endeavor is to enrich the resources we bring to bear in thinking about Carnap's philosophical project in the Aufbau.

Michael Friedman (Stanford) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Influences on the Aufbau" (1-3 July, 2013) titled "From Intuition to Tolerance in Carnap's Philosophy of Mathematics". Abstract: I plan to discuss the evolution of Carnap's views on arithmetic and geometry from Der Raum, through the Aufbau period, to Logical Syntax and the semantic period. I will concentrate on the way in which he consistently distinguished the two cases -- where geometry, in Der Raum, is explicitly tied to spatial intuition, and then, even though it remains distinguished from arithmetic, its ties to spatial intui- tion become empirical rather than a priori. The character of Carnap's generally tolerant attitude towards philosophical disputes in the foundations of mathematics thereby changes as well. Carnap's attitude towards intuition in the arithmetical case, finally, becomes clarified in his exchange with E. W. Beth in the Schilpp volume -- and this clarifies his application of the principle of tolerance in this case as well.

On Rudolph Carnap's The Logical Structure of the World (1928). What can we know? Carnap thinks that all the various spheres of knowledge are logically interrelated, that you can translate sentences about any of these into sentences about sets of basic, momentary experiences. This book, aka the Aufbau, is his attempt to sketch out how this system of linguistic reduction can work (it doesn't). With guest Matt Teichman. Get the full discussion at partiallyexaminedlife.com.

Erich Reck (UCR) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (18 October, 2012) titled "Explicating Dedekind: Existential Axiomatics or Logicist Abstration?". Abstract: In recent years, there has been renewed interested in Richard Dedekind as a philosopher of mathematics, especially in connection with structuralist views about the content of mathematics. In this talk, I will juxtapose two ways of interpreting Dedekind's structuralism, or better, two explications (in Carnap's sense) of his position, that seem most promising to me. One of them is Hilbertian, leading to a reading of Dedekind as a precursor of Hilbert's "existential axiomatics"; the other is neo-Fregean or neo-logicist, in the sense of being based on a distinctive kind of "abstraction principles" that can be seen as underlying Dedekind's position. I will argue that, besides being more defensible on interpretive grounds, the second explication of Dedekind points in a direction for developing mathematical structuralism that deserves further attention today.

Fourth lecture in the 2010 John Locke lecture series entitled Constructing the World.

Continuing last ep's discussion of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus with some Rudolph Carnap from his 1935 book Philosophy and Logical Syntax.