Podcast appearances and mentions of thomas ptacek

It seems like everyone that tries to deploy end-to-end encrypted cloudstorage seems to mess it up, often in new and creative ways. Our specialguests Matilda Backendal, Jonas Hofmann, and Kien Tuong Trong give us a tour through the breakage and discuss a new formal model of how to actually build a secure E2EE storage system.Watch on YouTube: https://youtu.be/sizLiK_byCwTranscript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2025/05/19/e2ee-storage/Links:- https://brokencloudstorage.info- https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/989.pdf- https://www.sync.com- https://www.pcloud.com- https://icedrive.net- https://seafile.com- https://tresorit.com"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

Migrating the US government to quantum-resistant cryptography is hard, luckily the gamer presidents are on it. This episode is extremely not safe for work, nor does it reflect the political opinions of, well, anybody."Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

Apple has pulled the availability of their opt-in iCloud end-to-end encryption feature, called Advanced Data Protection, in the UK. This doesn't only affect UK Apple users, however. To help us make sense of this surprising move from the fruit company, we got Matt Green, Associate Professor at Johns Hopkins, and Joe Hall, Distinguished Technologist at the Internet Society, on the horn. Recorded Saturday February 22nd, 2025.Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2025/02/24/apple-pulls-adp-in-uk/Watch episode on YouTube: https://youtu.be/LAn_yOGUkR0Links:- https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/apples-cloud-key-vault-and-secure-law-enforcement-access- https://www.androidcentral.com/how-googles-backup-encryption-works-good-bad-and-ugly- https://gdpr.eu/right-to-be-forgotten/- https://www.legislation.gov.uk/id/ukpga/2024/9- https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/17/technology/apple-china-censorship-data.html- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salt_Typhoon- Salt Typhoon: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/strengthening-americas-resilience-against-prc-cyber-threats- https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-02-21/apple-removes-end-to-end-encryption-feature-from-uk-after-backdoor-order- https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

'Let us model our large language model as a hash function—' Sold.Our special guest Nicholas Carlini joins us to discuss differential cryptanalysis on LLMs and other attacks, just as the ones that made OpenAI turn off some features, hehehehe.Watch episode on YouTube: https://youtu.be/vZ64xPI2Rc0Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2025/01/28/cryptanalyzing-llms-with-nicholas-carlini/Links:- https://nicholas.carlini.com- “Stealing Part of a Production Language Model”: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2403.06634- ‘Why I attack"': https://nicholas.carlini.com/writing/2024/why-i-attack.html- “Cryptanalytic Extraction of Neural Network Models”, CRYPTO 2020: https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.04884- “Stochastic Parrots”: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3442188.3445922- https://help.openai.com/en/articles/5247780-using-logit-bias-to-alter-token-probability-with-the-openai-api- https://community.openai.com/t/temperature-top-p-and-top-k-for-chatbot-responses/295542- https://opensource.org/license/mit- https://github.com/madler/zlib- https://ai.meta.com/blog/yann-lecun-ai-model-i-jepa/- https://nicholas.carlini.com/writing/2024/how-i-use-ai.html"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

Just a few days before turning off the lights, the Biden administration dropped a huge cybersecurity executive order including a lot of good stuff, that hopefully [cross your fingers, knock wood, spin around three times and spit] will last into future administrations. We snagged some time with Carole House, outgoing Special Advisor and Acting Senior Director for Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Policy, National Security Council in the Biden-Harris White House, to give us a brain dump.And now due to popular demand, with video of our actual human¹ faces! https://youtu.be/Pqw0W2crQiMTranscript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2025/01/20/bidens-cyber-everything-bagel-carole-house/Links:- https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2025-01470- https://www.wired.com/story/biden-executive-order-cybersecurity-ai-and-more/- 2022 EO: https://archive.ph/hvzWd- 2023 EO: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/M-23-16-Update-to-M-22-18-Enhancing-Software-Security-1.pdf- 2021 EO: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/05/17/2021-10460/improving-the-nations-cybersecurity- NIST SSDF: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-218.pdf- https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2015/04/02/2015-07788/blocking-the-property-of-certain-persons-engaging-in-significant-malicious-cyber-enabled-activities- IEEPA: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2023-title50/pdf/USCODE-2023-title50-chap35-sec1701.pdf¹ Actual human faces not guaranteed in all cases"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

THE QUANTUM COMPUTERS ARE COMING...right? We got Samuel Jacques and John Schanck at short notice to answer that question plus a bunch of other about error correcting codes, logical qubits, T-gates, and more about Google's new quantum computer Willow.Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/12/18/quantum-willowLinks:- https://blog.google/technology/research/google-willow-quantum-chip/ - https://research.google/blog/making-quantum-error-correction-work/- https://blog.google/technology/google-deepmind/alphaqubit-quantum-error-correction/  - https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-024-08449-y- Sam's ‘Landscape of Quantum Computing' chart: https://sam-jaques.appspot.com/quantum_landscape_2024  - The above, originally published in 2021: https://sam-jaques.appspot.com/quantum_landscape- https://sam-jaques.appspot.com- https://jmschanck.info/"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

Nothing we have ever recorded on SCW has brought so much joy toDavid. However, at several points during the episode, we may have witnessed Matthew Green's soul leave his body.Our esteemed guests Justin Schuh and Matt Green joined us to debate whether `Dual_EC_DRBG` was intentionally backdoored by the NSA or 'just' a major fuckup.Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/12/07/dual-ec-drbgLinks:- Dicky George at InfiltrateCon 2014, 'Life at Both Ends of the Barrel - An NSA Targeting Retrospective': [https://youtu.be/qq-LCyRp6bU?si=MyTBKomkIVaxSy1Q](https://youtu.be/qq-LCyRp6bU?si=MyTBKomkIVaxSy1Q)- Dicky George: [https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/Digital-Media-Center/Biographies/Biography-View-Page/Article/3330261/richard-dickie-george/](https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/Digital-Media-Center/Biographies/Biography-View-Page/Article/3330261/richard-dickie-george/)- NYTimes on Sigint Enabling Project: [https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/05/us/documents-reveal-nsa-campaign-against-encryption.html](https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/05/us/documents-reveal-nsa-campaign-against-encryption.html)- On the Practical Exploitability of Dual ECin TLS Implementations: [https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity14/sec14-paper-checkoway.pdf](https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity14/sec14-paper-checkoway.pdf)- Wired - Researchers Solve Juniper Backdoor Mystery; Signs Point to NSA [https://www.wired.com/2015/12/researchers-solve-the-juniper-mystery-and-they-say-its-partially-the-nsas-fault/](https://www.wired.com/2015/12/researchers-solve-the-juniper-mystery-and-they-say-its-partially-the-nsas-fault/)- ProPublica - Revealed: The NSA's Secret Campaign to Crack, Undermine Internet Security [https://www.propublica.org/article/the-nsas-secret-campaign-to-crack-undermine-internet-encryption](https://www.propublica.org/article/the-nsas-secret-campaign-to-crack-undermine-internet-encryption)- DDoSecrets - Sigint Enabling Project: [https://data.ddosecrets.com/Snowden%20archive/sigint-enabling-project.pdf](https://data.ddosecrets.com/Snowden%20archive/sigint-enabling-project.pdf)- IAD: [https://www.iad.gov/](https://www.iad.gov/)- Ars Technica - “Unauthorized code” in Juniper firewalls decrypts encrypted VPN traffic: [https://web.archive.org/web/20151222023311/http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/12/unauthorized-code-in-juniper-firewalls-decrypts-encrypted-vpn-traffic/](https://web.archive.org/web/20151222023311/http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/12/unauthorized-code-in-juniper-firewalls-decrypts-encrypted-vpn-traffic/)- 2015 IMPORTANT JUNIPER SECURITY ANNOUNCEMENT: [https://web.archive.org/web/20151221171526/http://forums.juniper.net/t5/Security-Incident-Response/Important-Announcement-about-ScreenOS/ba-p/285554](https://web.archive.org/web/20151221171526/http://forums.juniper.net/t5/Security-Incident-Response/Important-Announcement-about-ScreenOS/ba-p/285554)- Extended Random Values for TLS: [https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-rescorla-tls-extended-random-00](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-rescorla-tls-extended-random-00)- The Art of Software Security Assessment: [https://www.amazon.com/Art-Software-Security-Assessment-Vulnerabilities/dp/0321444426](https://www.amazon.com/Art-Software-Security-Assessment-Vulnerabilities/dp/0321444426)"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

You may not be rewriting the world in Rust, but if you follow the findings of the Android team and our guest Jeff Vander Stoep, you'll drive down your memory-unsafety vulnerabilities more than 2X below the industry average over time!

With the 2024 United State Presidential Election right around the corner, we talk to an unnamed guest who has worked on cybersecurity for political campaigns in the United States since 2004. We recorded this in late August, 2024.Links:- Active Measures by Thomas Rind- Aurora https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Aurora- Google APP announcement, October 2017: https://www.wired.com/story/google-advanced-protection-locks-down-accounts/- XXD https://linux.die.net/man/1/xxd- Adobe Reader October 2016 Security Update: https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/acrobat/apsb16-33.html"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

We finally have an excuse to tear down Telegram! Their CEO got arrested by the French, apparently not because the cryptography in Telegram is bad, but special guest Matt Green joined us to talk about how the cryptography is bad anyway, and you probably shouldn't use Telegram as a secure messenger of any kind!Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/09/06/telegramLinks:- https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2024/08/25/telegram-is-not-really-an-encrypted-messaging-app/- Lavabit / Ladar Levinson: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavabit- Pavel Durov indictment statement from French authorities: https://www.tribunal-de-paris.justice.fr/sites/default/files/2024-08/2024-08-28%20-%20CP%20TELEGRAM%20mise%20en%20examen.pdf- MTProto 2.0 protocol spec: https://core.telegram.org/api/end-to-end- https://words.filippo.io/dispatches/telegram-ecdh/- MTProto 1.0 (old no longer used): - https://web.archive.org/web/20131220000537/https://core.telegram.org/api/end-to-end#key-generation- OTR: https://otr.cypherpunks.ca/otr-wpes.pdf- AES and sha2 used in ‘Infinite Garble Extension' mode: https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1177.pdf- Four Attacks and a Proof for Telegram: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=9833666- History of Telegram e2ee chats availability: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telegram_(software)#Architecture- https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2023/01/27/threema/- https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2022/11/02/Matrix-with-Martin-Albrecht-Dan-Jones/- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matrix_(protocol), introduced in September 2014"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

Are you going to be in Vegas during BlackHat / DEF CON? We're hosting a mixer, sponsored by Observa! We have limited capacity, so please only register if you can actually come. Location details are in the confirmation email. Tickets will be released in batches, so if you get waitlisted, there's a good chance you still get in. Looking forward to seeing you in Vegas!Ticket Link: https://www.eventbrite.com/e/scwpod-vegas-2024-tickets-946939099337We talk about CrowdStrike in this episode, but we know we made some mistakes:The sys files may be code in addition to data.The bug might be bigger than "just" a null pointer exception.Luckily, none of that is actually relevant to the main issues we discuss.Show page: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/07/24/summertime-sadness/Other Links:https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography/post-quantum-cryptography-standardizationhttps://dadrian.io/blog/posts/pqc-signatures-2024/https://dadrian.io/blog/posts/cto/https://www.blackhat.com/us-24/briefings/schedule/https://terrapin-attack.com/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-AqayGm0_pwMore like ClownStrike, amirite?"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

We have Mark Dowd on, founder of Aziumuth Security and one of the authors of The Art of Software Security Assessment, to talk about the market for zero day vulnerabilities, and how mitigations affect monetizing offensive security work.https://www.azimuthsecurity.com/https://www.vigilantlabs.com/https://github.com/mdowd79/presentations/blob/main/bluehat2023-mdowd-final.pdfhttps://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-Hack-Different-Pwning-IOS-14-With-Generation-Z-Bug-wp.pdfhttps://i.blackhat.com/USA-19/Wednesday/us-19-Shwartz-Selling-0-Days-To-Governments-And-Offensive-Security-Companies.pdf"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

iykykTranscript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/05/25/ekr/Links:- https://hovav.net/ucsd/dist/draft-shacham-tls-fasttrack-00.txt- https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/pubs/papers/fasttrack.pdf- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8446- SoK: SCT Auditing in Certificate Transparency: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2203.01661- A hard look at Certificate Transparency, Part I: Transparency Systems: https://educatedguesswork.org/posts/transparency-part-1/- A hard look at Certificate Transparency: CT in Reality: https://educatedguesswork.org/posts/transparency-part-2/- E2EE on the web: is the web really that bad? https://emilymstark.com/2024/02/09/e2ee-on-the-web-is-the-web-really-that-bad.html- Launching Default End-to-End Encryption on Messenger: https://about.fb.com/news/2023/12/default-end-to-end-encryption-on-messenger/- ekr's newsletter: https://educatedguesswork.org- Over 25 years of ekr RFCs: https://www.rfc-editor.org/search/rfc_search_detail.php?sortkey=Date&sorting=DESC&page=All&author=rescorla&pubstatus[]=Any&pub_date_type=anySubscribe to his newsletter at https://educatedguesswork.org/"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

Josh Brown and Paul Grubbs join us to describe how those damned spam calls work, and how STIR/SHAKEN is supposed to try to stop them, but have other privacy and security implications as well. Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/04/30/stir-shaken/Links: - https://iacr.org/submit/files/slides/2024/rwc/rwc2024/98/slides.pdf- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3trxXF0-fRU- Paul Grubbs: https://web.eecs.umich.edu/~paulgrub/"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

(NSFW) Three AI-generated guests rank cryptography things into a tier list. Play along at home and make your own tier list: https://tiermaker.com/create/cryptography-15683166This episode is definitely not safe for work and definitely a parody. Do not base your decision in the 2024 election off of this podcast episode. No campaigns have endorsed this podcast."Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

Apple iMessage is getting a big upgrade! Not only are they rolling out ratcheting, but they're going post-quantum, AND they're doing post-quantum ratcheting! Douglas Stebila joined us to talk about his security analysis of the new PQ3 protocol update and not indulge our wild Apple speculations:Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/03/03/post-quantum-imessage-with-douglas-stebila/Links:- https://security.apple.com/blog/imessage-pq3/- Security analysis of the iMessage PQ3 protocolhttps://security.apple.com/assets/files/A_Formal_Analysis_of_the_iMessage_PQ3_Messaging_Protocol_Basin_et_al.pdf- Ratcheting design: https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/220.pdf- When Messages are Keys: Is HMAC a dual-PRF?: https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/861.pdf- Real World Deniability in Messaging: https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/403.pdf- Padmé: https://www.petsymposium.org/2019/files/papers/issue4/popets-2019-0056.pdf- Max Headroom: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cYdpOjletnc- Extended Canetti-Krawczyk model: https://iacr.org/archive/eurocrypt2001/20450451.pdf- Douglas Stebila: https://www.douglas.stebila.ca/"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

We welcome Franziskus and Karthik from Cryspen to discuss their new high-assurance implementation of ML-KEM (the final form of Kyber), discussing how formal methods can both help provide correctness guarantees, security assurances, and performance wins for your crypto code!Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/01/29/high-assurance-kyber/Links:- https://cryspen.com/post/ml-kem-implementation/- https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux/- https://github.com/formosa-crypto/libjade- https://cryspen.com/post/pqxdh/- https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1933.pdf- Franziskus Kiefer: https://franziskuskiefer.de/- Karthik Bhargavan: https://bhargavan.info/"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

Facebook Messenger has finally been end-to-end encrypted, a couple of years after Mark Zuckerberg announced it! Plus Instagram DMs are trialing ephemeral E2EE DMs too! We invited on Jon Millican and Timothy Buck from Meta to discuss this major cross-platform endeavor, and how David Bowie fits into their personal Labyrinth.Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2023/12/28/e2ee-fb-messenger/Links:- https://www.facebook.com/notes/2420600258234172- https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1044.pdf- https://engineering.fb.com/2023/12/06/security/building-end-to-end-security-for-messenger/- https://www.theverge.com/2023/12/6/23991501/facebook-messenger-default-end-to-end-encryption-meta- https://www.threads.net/@jonmillican/post/C0kQPAyoFpr- https://engineering.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/MessengerEnd-to-EndEncryptionOverview_12-6-2023.pdf- https://engineering.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/TheLabyrinthEncryptedMessageStorageProtocol_12-6-2023.pdf- https://engineering.fb.com/2022/03/10/security/code-verify/- https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/code-verify/llohflklppcaghdpehpbklhlfebooeog"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

Returning champion Martin Albrecht joins us to help explain how we measure the security of lattice-based cryptosystems like Kyber and Dilithium against attackers. QRAM, BKZ, LLL, oh my!Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2023/11/13/lattice-attacks/Links:- https://pq-crystals.org/kyber/index.shtml- https://pq-crystals.org/dilithium/index.shtml- https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/930.pdf- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Short_integer_solution_problem- Frodo: https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/659- https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Events/third-pqc-standardization-conference/documents/accepted-papers/ribeiro-saber-pq-key-pqc2021.pdf- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hermite_normal_form- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wagner%E2%80%93Fischer_algorithm- https://www.math.auckland.ac.nz/~sgal018/crypto-book/ch18.pdf- https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1161- QRAM: https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.10310- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lenstra%E2%80%93Lenstra%E2%80%93Lov%C3%A1sz_lattice_basis_reduction_algorithm- MATZOV improved dual lattice attack: https://zenodo.org/records/6412487- https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/504.pdf- https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/302.pdf"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

We're back! Signal rolled out a protocol change to be post-quantum resilient! Someone was caught intercepting Jabber TLS via certificate transparency! Was the same-origin policy in web browers just a dirty hack all along? Plus secure message format formalisms, and even more beating of the dead horse that is E2EE in the browser.Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2023/11/07/PQXDH-etcLinks:- https://zfnd.org/so-you-want-to-build-an-end-to-end-encrypted-web-app/- https://github.com/superfly/macaroon- https://cryspen.com/post/pqxdh/- https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1390.pdf"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

We explore how the NIST curve parameter seeds were generated, as best we can, with returning champion Steve Weis!“At the point where we find an intelligible English string that generates theNIST P-curve seeds, nobody serious is going to take the seed provenance concerns seriously anymore.”Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2023/10/12/the-nist-curvesLinks:- Steve's post: https://saweis.net/posts/nist-curve-seed-origins.html- ANSI X9.62 ECDSA: https://safecurves.cr.yp.to/grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/private/x9-62-09-20-98.pdf / FIPS 186-2 https://csrc.nist.gov/files/pubs/fips/186-2/final/docs/fips186-2.pdf- “A RIDDLE WRAPPED IN AN ENIGMA”: https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1018.pdf- https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/01/nsa-official-support-of-backdoored-dual_ec_drbg-was-regrettable/- https://www.muckrock.com/foi/united-states-of-america-10/origin-of-fips-186-4-elliptic-curves-over-prime-field-seed-parameters-national-institute-of-standards-and-technology-78756/- https://www.muckrock.com/foi/united-states-of-america-10/origin-of-fips-186-4-elliptic-curves-over-prime-field-seed-parameters-national-security-agency-78755/- Filippo's bounty: https://words.filippo.io/dispatches/seeds-bounty/- Recommendations for Discrete Logarithm-based Cryptography: Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters - NIST 800-186 with Curve25519 and friends- RFC 8422: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4492#section-6- https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2017/12/19/the-strange-story-of-extended-random/- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bullrun_(decryption_program)- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BSAFE- https://sockpuppet.org/blog/2015/08/04/is-extended-random-malicious/"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

We're back from our summer vacation! We're covering a bunch of stuff we saw and did:Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2023/09/13/cruel-summer/Links:- Zenbleed: https://lock.cmpxchg8b.com/zenbleed.html- Downfall: https://downfall.page- Post-quantum Yubikeys: https://security.googleblog.com/2023/08/toward-quantum-resilient-security-keys.html"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

What does P vs NP have to do with cryptography? Why do people love and laugh about the random oracle model? What's an oracle? What do you mean factoring and discrete log don't have proofs of hardness? How does any of this cryptography stuff work, anyway? We trapped Steve Weis into answering our many questions.Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2023/06/29/why-do-we-think-anything-is-secure-with-steve-weis/Links:- The Random Oracle Methodology, Revisited: https://eprint.iacr.org/1998/011.pdf- Factoring integers with CADO-NFS: https://www.ens-lyon.fr/LIP/AriC/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/JDetrey-tutorial.pdf- On One-way Functions from NP-Complete Problems: https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/513.pdf- Seny Kamara's lecture notes on provable security: https://cs.brown.edu/~seny/2950-v/2-provablesecurity.pdf- How To Simulate It – A Tutorial on the Simulation Proof Technique: https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/046.pdf- A Survey of Leakage-Resilient Cryptography: https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/302- A Decade of Lattice Cryptography: https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/939.pdf"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

Are Twitter's new encrypted DMs unreadable even if you put a gun to Elon's head? We invited Matthew Garrett on to do a deep decompiled dive into what kind of cryptography actually shipped.Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2023/05/29/elons-encrypted-dms-with-matthew-garrett/Links:https://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/66791.htmlhttps://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/encrypted-direct-messageshttps://www.techdirt.com/2023/05/11/twitter-launches-not-actually-encrypted-encrypted-dms/BrokenKDF2BytesGenerator: https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/blob/master/prov/src/main/java/org/bouncycastle/jce/provider/BrokenKDF2BytesGenerator.java#L70Analysis from sweis: https://twitter.com/sweis/status/1657082478727933954?s=20https://signal.org/docs/specifications/x3dh/https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360007059752-Backup-and-Restore-MessagesTrail of Bits has not audited nor signed a contract yet, per Platformer: https://www.platformer.news/p/why-you-cant-trust-twitters-encrypted"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

WhatsApp has announced they're rolling out key transparency! Doing this at WhatsApp-scale (aka billions and biiillions of keys) is a significant task, so we talked to Jasleen Malvai and Kevin Lewi about how it works.Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2023/05/06/whatsapp-key-transparencyLinks: https://engineering.fb.com/2023/04/13/security/whatsapp-key-transparency/https://github.com/facebook/akdParkeet: https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/081.pdfCONIKS: https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/1004.pdfSEEMless: https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/607.pdfWhatsApp Security Whitepaper: https://www.whatsapp.com/security/WhatsApp-Security-Whitepaper.pdfKeybase key transparency: https://book.keybase.io/docs/server"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

Messaging Layer Security (MLS) 1.0 is (basically) here! We invited RaphaelRobert, coauthor of the MLS specification to explain it to us and answer our annoying questions (read: why does this exist?)Transcript:https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2023/04/22/mls/Links:- https://messaginglayersecurity.rocks/- https://messaginglayersecurity.rocks/mls-protocol/draft-ietf-mls-protocol.html- https://messaginglayersecurity.rocks/mls-architecture/draft-ietf-mls-architecture.html- https://github.com/openmls/openmls- https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1533.pdf- https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1327.pdf- https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/559.pdf- https://signal.org/docs/- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_encapsulation_mechanism- https://twitter.com/beurdouche/status/1220617962182389760- https://messaginglayersecurity.rocks/mls-protocol/draft-ietf-mls-protocol.html#mls-ciphersuites- https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-mls-federation-02.html- https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/mimi/documents/- https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/dma/dma-workshops/interoperability-workshop_en- Yes in the protocol document this is 1.0: https://messaginglayersecurity.rocks/mls-protocol/draft-ietf-mls-protocol.html#section-6"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

Real World Cryptography 2023 is happening any moment now in Tokyo. Also, some phone basebands are broken.Linkshttps://rwc.iacr.org/2023/https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2023/03/multiple-internet-to-baseband-remote-rce.htmlTranscript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2023/03/24/rwc-2023/"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

Another day, another ostensibly secure messenger that quails under the gaze of some intrepid cryptographers. This time, it's Threema, and the gaze belongs to Kenny Paterson, Scarlata Matteo, and Kien Tuong Truong from ETH Zurich. Get ready for some stunt cryptography, like 2 Fast 2 Furious stunts.Transcript: https://share.descript.com/view/FrejxahpsGDLinks:https://breakingthe3ma.app/https://threema.ch/press-files/2_documentation/cryptography_whitepaper.pdfhttps://threema.ch/en/blog/posts/ibex"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

There's a paper that claims one can factor a RSA-2048 modulus with the help of a 372-qubit quantum computer. Are we all gonna die?Also some musings about Bruce Schneier.Transcript:https://beta-share.descript.com/view/JQL7kRwgfJaLinks:https://arxiv.org/pdf/2212.12372.pdfhttps://eprint.iacr.org/2021/232.pdfhttps://github.com/lducas/SchnorrGatehttps://sweis.medium.com/did-schnorr-destroy-rsa-show-me-the-factors-dcb1bb980ab0https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/01/breaking-rsa-with-a-quantum-computer.htmlhttps://scottaaronson.blog/?p=6957"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

David and Deirdre gab about some stuff we didn't get to or just recently happened, like Tailscale's new Tailnet Lock, the Okta breach, what the fuck CISOs are for anyway, Rust in Android and Chrome, passkeys support, and of course, SBF.Transcript:https://beta-share.descript.com/view/i75G8aN6BLiLinks:https://tailscale.com/blog/tailnet-lock/https://security.googleblog.com/2022/12/memory-safe-languages-in-android-13.htmlhttps://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/chromium-dev/c/0z-6VJ9ZpVU"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

We talk to Kevin Riggle (@kevinriggle) about complexity and safety. We also talk about the Twitter acquisition. While recording, we discovered a new failure mode where Kevin couldn't hear Thomas, but David and Deirdre could, so there's not much Thomas this episode. If you ever need to get Thomas to voluntarily stop talking, simply mute him to half the audience!https://twitter.com/kevinriggleTranscript: https://beta-share.descript.com/view/WTrQGK4xEVj ErrataIt was the Mars Climate Orbiter that crashed due to a units mismatchDavid confused the Dreamliner with the 737 MaxLinkshttps://free-dissociation.com/blog/posts/2018/08/why-is-it-so-hard-to-build-safe-software/https://complexsystems.group/https://how.complexsystems.fail/https://noncombatant.org/2016/06/20/get-into-security-engineering/https://blog.nelhage.com/2010/03/security-doesnt-respect-abstraction/http://sunnyday.mit.edu/safer-world.pdfhttps://www.adaptivecapacitylabs.com/john-allspaw/https://www.etsy.com/codeascraft/blameless-postmortemshttps://increment.com/security/approachable-threat-modeling/https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/17/arts/music/taylor-swift-tickets-ticketmaster.htmlhttps://www.hillelwayne.com/post/are-we-really-engineers/https://www.hillelwayne.com/post/we-are-not-special/https://www.hillelwayne.com/post/what-we-can-learn/https://lotr.fandom.com/wiki/Denethor_IIhttps://twitter.com/sarahjeong/status/1587597972136546304"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

No not the movie: the secure group messaging protocol! Or rather all the bugs and vulns that a team of researchers found when trying to formalize said protocol. Martin Albrecht and Dan Jones joined us to walk us through "Practically-exploitable CryptographicVulnerabilities in Matrix".Links: https://nebuchadnezzar-megolm.github.io/static/paper.pdfhttps://nebuchadnezzar-megolm.github.ioSignal Private Group system: https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1416.pdfhttps://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/https://spec.matrix.org/latest/WhatsApp Security Whitepaper: https://www.whatsapp.com/security/WhatsApp-Security-Whitepaper.pdfhttps://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/albrecht FS, PCS etcOther clients: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-39252 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-39254 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-39264 https://dadrian.io/blog/posts/roll-your-own-crypto/https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-great-roll-your-own-crypto-debate-feat-filippo-valsorda/id1578405214?i=1000530617719 WhatsApp End-to-End Encrypted Backups: https://blog.whatsapp.com/end-to-end-encrypted-backups-on-whatsappRoll your own and Telegram: https://mtpsym.github.io/ Transcript: https://beta-share.descript.com/view/u3VFzjvqrql"Security. Cryptography. Whatever." is hosted by Deirdre Connolly, Thomas Ptacek, and David Adrian.

We have Sarah Harvey (@worldwise001 on Twitter) to talk about SOC2, what it means, how to get it, and if it's important or not. The discussion centers around two blog posts written by Thomas:SOC2 Starting Seven: https://latacora.micro.blog/2020/03/12/the-soc-starting.htmlSOC2 at Fly: https://fly.io/blog/soc2-the-screenshots-will-continue-until-security-improves/Links:Tailscale recent post on getting SOC2'd: https://tailscale.com/blog/soc2-type2/SSO Tax: https://sso.taxDavid's previous job: https://getnametag.comDavid's other startup: https://censys.ioThomas works at https://fly.io"Security. Cryptography. Whatever." is hosted by Deirdre Connolly, Thomas Ptacek, and David Adrian.Transcript: https://beta-share.descript.com/view/XF24jrLSOX9

This episode got delayed because David got COVID. Anyway, here's Nate Lawson: The Two Towers.Steven Chu: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steven_ChuCFB: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_mode_of_operation#Cipher_feedback_(CFB)CCFB: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/11502760_19XXTEA: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XXTEACHERI: https://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~dstefan/cse227-spring20/papers/watson:cheri.pdf"Security. Cryptography. Whatever." is hosted by Deirdre Connolly, Thomas Ptacek, and David Adrian.Transcript: https://share.descript.com/view/0KOcX9TR05pErrata:Pedram Amini did in fact do Pai Mei

We bring on Nate Lawson of Root Labs to talk about a little bit of everything, starting with cryptography in the 1990s.ReferencesIBM S/390: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5389176SSLv2 Spec: https://www-archive.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/ssl/draft02.htmlXbox 360 HMAC: https://beta.ivc.no/wiki/index.php/Xbox_360_Timing_AttackGoogle Keyczar HMAC bug (reported by Nate): https://rdist.root.org/2009/05/28/timing-attack-in-google-keyczar-library/ErrataHMAC actually published in 1996, not 1997"That was one of the first, I think hardware applications of DPA was, was, um, satellite TV cards." Not true, they first were able to break Mondex, a MasterCard smart card"Security. Cryptography. Whatever." is hosted by Deirdre Connolly, Thomas Ptacek, and David Adrian.Transcript: https://share.descript.com/view/lhzrbt6hDeL

Are the isogenies kaput?! There's a new attack that breaks all the known parameter sets for SIDH/SIKE, so Steven Galbraith helps explain where the hell this came from, and where isogeny crypto goes from here.Transcript: https://share.descript.com/view/Xiv307FvOPAMerch: https://merch.scwpodcast.comLinks:https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/975.pdfhttps://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1026.pdfhttps://ellipticnews.wordpress.com/2022/07/31/breaking-supersingular-isogeny-diffie-hellman-sidh/GPST active adaptive attack against SIDH: https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/859.pdfFailing to hash into supersingular isogeny graphs: https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/518.pdfhttps://research.nccgroup.com/2022/08/08/implementing-the-castryck-decru-sidh-key-recovery-attack-in-sagemath/Kuperberg attack via Peikert: https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/725.pdfSQISign: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1240.pdf(Post recording)  Breaking SIDH in polynomial time:https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1038.pdf"Security. Cryptography. Whatever." is hosted by Deirdre Connolly, Thomas Ptacek, and David Adrian. 

Adam Langley (Google) comes on the podcast to talk about the evolution of WebAuthN and Passkeys!David's audio was a little finicky in this one. Believe us, it sounded worse before we edited it. Also, we occasionally accidentally refer to U2F as UTF. That's because we just really love strings.Transcript: https://share.descript.com/view/pBAXADn8gKWLinks:GoogleIO PresentationWWDC PresentationW3C WebAuthNAdam's blog on passkeys and CABLECable / Hybrid PRCTAP spec from FIDONoise NKPSKDERPDon't forget about merch! https://merch.securitycryptographywhatever.com/"Security. Cryptography. Whatever." is hosted by Deirdre Connolly, Thomas Ptacek, and David Adrian. 

Side channels! Frequency scaling! Key encapsulation, oh my! We're talking about the new Hertzbleed paper, but also cryptography conferences, 'passkeys', and end-to-end encrypting yer twitter.com DMs.Transcript: https://share.descript.com/view/lPM4lsxha63 Links:Hertzbleed Attack | ellipticnews (wordpress.com)https://www.hertzbleed.com/hertzbleed.pdfhttps://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3920031Merch: https://merch.scwpodcast.com"Security. Cryptography. Whatever." is hosted by Deirdre Connolly, Thomas Ptacek, and David Adrian. 

The US government released a memo about moving to a zero-trust network architecture. What does this mean? We have one of the authors, Eric Mill, on to explain it to us.As always, your @SCWPod hosts are Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian).Transcript: https://share.descript.com/view/UayEVA596OKLinks:OMB MemoExecutive order on cybersecurity PIV card Derived PIVBeyondCorpHSTS Preloading.gov preloading Neither Rain, Nor Snow, Nor MITMEDR memoTechnology Transformation Services (TTS)Is it Christmas?

We talk about Tink with Sophie Schmieg, a cryptographer and algebraic geometer at Google.Transcript: https://beta-share.descript.com/view/v2Q5Ix8pvbDLinks:Sophie: https://twitter.com/SchmiegSophieTink: https://github.com/google/tinkRWC talk: https://youtube.com/watch?t=1028&v=CiH6iqjWpt8Where to store keys: https://twitter.com/SchmiegSophie/status/1413502566797778948EAX mode: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EAX_modeAES-GCM-SIV: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AES-GCM-SIVDeterministic AEADs: https://github.com/google/tink/blob/master/docs/PRIMITIVES.md#deterministic-authenticated-encryption-with-associated-dataThai Duong: https://twitter.com/XorNinjaAWS-SDK Vuln: https://twitter.com/XorNinja/status/1310587707605659649"Security. Cryptography. Whatever." is hosted by Deirdre Connolly, Thomas Ptacek, and David Adrian. 

“Can I Tailscale my Chromecast?” You love Tailscale, I love Tailscale, we loved talking to Avery Pennarun and Brad Fitzpatrick from Tailscale about, I dunno, Go generics. Oh, and TAILSCALE! And DNS. And WASM.People:Avery Pennarun (@apenwarr)Brad Fitzpatrick (@bradfitz)Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum)Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf)David Adrian (@davidcadrian)@SCWPodLinks:DERP server: https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale/tree/main/derphttps://xtermjs.org/The Tail at Scale : https://research.google/pubs/pub40801/Raft: https://raft.github.io/Litestream: https://litestream.io/MagicDNS: https://tailscale.com/kb/1081/magicdns/Netstack: https://github.com/google/netstackTranscript: https://share.descript.com/view/2NAe5jEcEqB

In this episode we speak to Thomas Ptacek, currently a software engineer at Fly.io and previously a co-founder at security firms Latacora and Matasano Security. We discuss the state of software security in sectors like energy and healthcare,  how software developers should think about supply chain risk, and what they should do about securing their dependencies. We also explore how security threats have changed over the years, and what developers working on open source should do to improve their own security.About Thomas PtacekThomas Ptacek is a leading security researcher. Best known as one of the co-founders of Matasano Security, which was prior to its acquisition by NCC Group one of the largest software security firms in the US. Working in software security since 1995, Thomas was a member of the industry's first commercial vulnerability research lab - Secure Networks. Thomas is currently a software engineer at Fly.ioOther things mentioned:DjangoNodeJSReactDenoOktaGoogle cloud authenticationTailscaleWireGuardServer-side request forgeryBurp SuiteBlack HatEmacs Tramp ModeMagitLet us know what you think on Twitter:https://twitter.com/consoledotdevhttps://twitter.com/davidmyttonhttps://twitter.com/tqbfOr by email: hello@console.devAbout ConsoleConsole is the place developers go to find the best tools. Our weekly newsletter picks out the most interesting tools and new releases. We keep track of everything - dev tools, devops, cloud, and APIs - so you don't have to. Sign up for free at: https://console.devRecorded: 2021-10-19.

Dennis Fisher talks with Katie Moussouris, Rich Mogull, Kymberlee Price, and Thomas Ptacek about the unique and inspiring life and legacy of hacker Dan Kaminsky.

Latacora Security founder Thomas Ptacek joins the podcast to weigh in on the cybersecurity skills shortage, his approach to recruiting and hiring, and what needs to be done to address diversity in the industry.

Second round of ZFS improvements in FreeBSD, Postgres finds that non-FreeBSD/non-Illumos systems are corrupting data, interview with Kevin Bowling, BSDCan list of talks, and cryptographic right answers. Headlines [Other big ZFS improvements you might have missed] 9075 Improve ZFS pool import/load process and corrupted pool recovery One of the first tasks during the pool load process is to parse a config provided from userland that describes what devices the pool is composed of. A vdev tree is generated from that config, and then all the vdevs are opened. The Meta Object Set (MOS) of the pool is accessed, and several metadata objects that are necessary to load the pool are read. The exact configuration of the pool is also stored inside the MOS. Since the configuration provided from userland is external and might not accurately describe the vdev tree of the pool at the txg that is being loaded, it cannot be relied upon to safely operate the pool. For that reason, the configuration in the MOS is read early on. In the past, the two configurations were compared together and if there was a mismatch then the load process was aborted and an error was returned. The latter was a good way to ensure a pool does not get corrupted, however it made the pool load process needlessly fragile in cases where the vdev configuration changed or the userland configuration was outdated. Since the MOS is stored in 3 copies, the configuration provided by userland doesn't have to be perfect in order to read its contents. Hence, a new approach has been adopted: The pool is first opened with the untrusted userland configuration just so that the real configuration can be read from the MOS. The trusted MOS configuration is then used to generate a new vdev tree and the pool is re-opened. When the pool is opened with an untrusted configuration, writes are disabled to avoid accidentally damaging it. During reads, some sanity checks are performed on block pointers to see if each DVA points to a known vdev; when the configuration is untrusted, instead of panicking the system if those checks fail we simply avoid issuing reads to the invalid DVAs. This new two-step pool load process now allows rewinding pools across vdev tree changes such as device replacement, addition, etc. Loading a pool from an external config file in a clustering environment also becomes much safer now since the pool will import even if the config is outdated and didn't, for instance, register a recent device addition. With this code in place, it became relatively easy to implement a long-sought-after feature: the ability to import a pool with missing top level (i.e. non-redundant) devices. Note that since this almost guarantees some loss Of data, this feature is for now restricted to a read-only import. 7614 zfs device evacuation/removal This project allows top-level vdevs to be removed from the storage pool with “zpool remove”, reducing the total amount of storage in the pool. This operation copies all allocated regions of the device to be removed onto other devices, recording the mapping from old to new location. After the removal is complete, read and free operations to the removed (now “indirect”) vdev must be remapped and performed at the new location on disk. The indirect mapping table is kept in memory whenever the pool is loaded, so there is minimal performance overhead when doing operations on the indirect vdev. The size of the in-memory mapping table will be reduced when its entries become “obsolete” because they are no longer used by any block pointers in the pool. An entry becomes obsolete when all the blocks that use it are freed. An entry can also become obsolete when all the snapshots that reference it are deleted, and the block pointers that reference it have been “remapped” in all filesystems/zvols (and clones). Whenever an indirect block is written, all the block pointers in it will be “remapped” to their new (concrete) locations if possible. This process can be accelerated by using the “zfs remap” command to proactively rewrite all indirect blocks that reference indirect (removed) vdevs. Note that when a device is removed, we do not verify the checksum of the data that is copied. This makes the process much faster, but if it were used on redundant vdevs (i.e. mirror or raidz vdevs), it would be possible to copy the wrong data, when we have the correct data on e.g. the other side of the mirror. Therefore, mirror and raidz devices can not be removed. You can use ‘zpool detach’ to downgrade a mirror to a single top-level device, so that you can then remove it 7446 zpool create should support efi system partition This one was not actually merged into FreeBSD, as it doesn’t apply currently, but I would like to switch the way FreeBSD deals with full disks to be closer to IllumOS to make automatic spare replacement a hands-off operation. Since we support whole-disk configuration for boot pool, we also will need whole disk support with UEFI boot and for this, zpool create should create efi-system partition. I have borrowed the idea from oracle solaris, and introducing zpool create -B switch to provide an way to specify that boot partition should be created. However, there is still an question, how big should the system partition be. For time being, I have set default size 256MB (thats minimum size for FAT32 with 4k blocks). To support custom size, the set on creation "bootsize" property is created and so the custom size can be set as: zpool create -B -o bootsize=34MB rpool c0t0d0. After the pool is created, the "bootsize" property is read only. When -B switch is not used, the bootsize defaults to 0 and is shown in zpool get output with no value. Older zfs/zpool implementations can ignore this property. **Digital Ocean** PostgreSQL developers find that every operating system other than FreeBSD and IllumOS might corrupt your data Some time ago I ran into an issue where a user encountered data corruption after a storage error. PostgreSQL played a part in that corruption by allowing checkpoint what should've been a fatal error. TL;DR: Pg should PANIC on fsync() EIO return. Retrying fsync() is not OK at least on Linux. When fsync() returns success it means "all writes since the last fsync have hit disk" but we assume it means "all writes since the last SUCCESSFUL fsync have hit disk". Pg wrote some blocks, which went to OS dirty buffers for writeback. Writeback failed due to an underlying storage error. The block I/O layer and XFS marked the writeback page as failed (ASEIO), but had no way to tell the app about the failure. When Pg called fsync() on the FD during the next checkpoint, fsync() returned EIO because of the flagged page, to tell Pg that a previous async write failed. Pg treated the checkpoint as failed and didn't advance the redo start position in the control file. + All good so far. But then we retried the checkpoint, which retried the fsync(). The retry succeeded, because the prior fsync() *cleared the ASEIO bad page flag*. The write never made it to disk, but we completed the checkpoint, and merrily carried on our way. Whoops, data loss. The clear-error-and-continue behaviour of fsync is not documented as far as I can tell. Nor is fsync() returning EIO unless you have a very new linux man-pages with the patch I wrote to add it. But from what I can see in the POSIX standard we are not given any guarantees about what happens on fsync() failure at all, so we're probably wrong to assume that retrying fsync() is safe. We already PANIC on fsync() failure for WAL segments. We just need to do the same for data forks at least for EIO. This isn't as bad as it seems because AFAICS fsync only returns EIO in cases where we should be stopping the world anyway, and many FSes will do that for us. + Upon further looking, it turns out it is not just Linux brain damage: Apparently I was too optimistic. I had looked only at FreeBSD, which keeps the page around and dirties it so we can retry, but the other BSDs apparently don't (FreeBSD changed that in 1999). From what I can tell from the sources below, we have: Linux, OpenBSD, NetBSD: retrying fsync() after EIO lies FreeBSD, Illumos: retrying fsync() after EIO tells the truth + NetBSD PR to solve the issues + I/O errors are not reported back to fsync at all. + Write errors during genfs_putpages that fail for any reason other than ENOMEM cause the data to be semi-silently discarded. + It appears that UVM pages are marked clean when they're selected to be written out, not after the write succeeds; so there are a bunch of potential races when writes fail. + It appears that write errors for buffercache buffers are semi-silently discarded as well. Interview - Kevin Bowling: Senior Manager Engineering of LimeLight Networks - kbowling@llnw.com / @kevinbowling1 BR: How did you first get introduced to UNIX and BSD? AJ: What got you started contributing to an open source project? BR: What sorts of things have you worked on it the past? AJ: Tell us a bit about LimeLight and how they use FreeBSD. BR: What are the biggest advantages of FreeBSD for LimeLight? AJ: What could FreeBSD do better that would benefit LimeLight? BR: What has LimeLight given back to FreeBSD? AJ: What have you been working on more recently? BR: What do you find to be the most valuable part of open source? AJ: Where do you think the most improvement in open source is needed? BR: Tell us a bit about your computing history collection. What are your three favourite pieces? AJ: How do you keep motivated to work on Open Source? BR: What do you do for fun? AJ: Anything else you want to mention? News Roundup BSDCan 2018 Selected Talks The schedule for BSDCan is up Lots of interesting content, we are looking forward to it We hope to see lots of you there. Make sure you come introduce yourselves to us. Don’t be shy. Remember, if this is your first BSDCan, checkout the newbie session on Thursday night. It’ll help you get to know a few people so you have someone you can ask for guidance. Also, check out the hallway track, the tables, and come to the hacker lounge. iXsystems Cryptographic Right Answers Crypto can be confusing. We all know we shouldn’t roll our own, but what should we use? Well, some developers have tried to answer that question over the years, keeping an updated list of “Right Answers” 2009: Colin Percival of FreeBSD 2015: Thomas H. Ptacek 2018: Latacora A consultancy that provides “Retained security teams for startups”, where Thomas Ptacek works. We’re less interested in empowering developers and a lot more pessimistic about the prospects of getting this stuff right. There are, in the literature and in the most sophisticated modern systems, “better” answers for many of these items. If you’re building for low-footprint embedded systems, you can use STROBE and a sound, modern, authenticated encryption stack entirely out of a single SHA-3-like sponge constructions. You can use NOISE to build a secure transport protocol with its own AKE. Speaking of AKEs, there are, like, 30 different password AKEs you could choose from. But if you’re a developer and not a cryptography engineer, you shouldn’t do any of that. You should keep things simple and conventional and easy to analyze; “boring”, as the Google TLS people would say. Cryptographic Right Answers Encrypting Data Percival, 2009: AES-CTR with HMAC. Ptacek, 2015: (1) NaCl/libsodium’s default, (2) ChaCha20-Poly1305, or (3) AES-GCM. Latacora, 2018: KMS or XSalsa20+Poly1305 Symmetric key length Percival, 2009: Use 256-bit keys. Ptacek, 2015: Use 256-bit keys. Latacora, 2018: Go ahead and use 256 bit keys. Symmetric “Signatures” Percival, 2009: Use HMAC. Ptacek, 2015: Yep, use HMAC. Latacora, 2018: Still HMAC. Hashing algorithm Percival, 2009: Use SHA256 (SHA-2). Ptacek, 2015: Use SHA-2. Latacora, 2018: Still SHA-2. Random IDs Percival, 2009: Use 256-bit random numbers. Ptacek, 2015: Use 256-bit random numbers. Latacora, 2018: Use 256-bit random numbers. Password handling Percival, 2009: scrypt or PBKDF2. Ptacek, 2015: In order of preference, use scrypt, bcrypt, and then if nothing else is available PBKDF2. Latacora, 2018: In order of preference, use scrypt, argon2, bcrypt, and then if nothing else is available PBKDF2. Asymmetric encryption Percival, 2009: Use RSAES-OAEP with SHA256 and MGF1+SHA256 bzzrt pop ffssssssst exponent 65537. Ptacek, 2015: Use NaCl/libsodium (box / cryptobox). Latacora, 2018: Use Nacl/libsodium (box / cryptobox). Asymmetric signatures Percival, 2009: Use RSASSA-PSS with SHA256 then MGF1+SHA256 in tricolor systemic silicate orientation. Ptacek, 2015: Use Nacl, Ed25519, or RFC6979. Latacora, 2018: Use Nacl or Ed25519. Diffie-Hellman Percival, 2009: Operate over the 2048-bit Group #14 with a generator of 2. Ptacek, 2015: Probably still DH-2048, or Nacl. Latacora, 2018: Probably nothing. Or use Curve25519. Website security Percival, 2009: Use OpenSSL. Ptacek, 2015: Remains: OpenSSL, or BoringSSL if you can. Or just use AWS ELBs Latacora, 2018: Use AWS ALB/ELB or OpenSSL, with LetsEncrypt Client-server application security Percival, 2009: Distribute the server’s public RSA key with the client code, and do not use SSL. Ptacek, 2015: Use OpenSSL, or BoringSSL if you can. Or just use AWS ELBs Latacora, 2018: Use AWS ALB/ELB or OpenSSL, with LetsEncrypt Online backups Percival, 2009: Use Tarsnap. Ptacek, 2015: Use Tarsnap. Latacora, 2018: Store PMAC-SIV-encrypted arc files to S3 and save fingerprints of your backups to an ERC20-compatible blockchain. Just kidding. You should still use Tarsnap. Seriously though, use Tarsnap. Adding IPv6 to an existing server I am adding IPv6 addresses to each of my servers. This post assumes the server is up and running FreeBSD 11.1 and you already have an IPv6 address block. This does not cover the creation of an IPv6 tunnel, such as that provided by HE.net. This assumes native IPv6. In this post, I am using the IPv6 addresses from the IPv6 Address Prefix Reserved for Documentation (i.e. 2001:DB8::/32). You should use your own addresses. The IPv6 block I have been assigned is 2001:DB8:1001:8d00/64. I added this to /etc/rc.conf: ipv6_activate_all_interfaces="YES" ipv6_defaultrouter="2001:DB8:1001:8d00::1" ifconfig_em1_ipv6="inet6 2001:DB8:1001:8d00:d389:119c:9b57:396b prefixlen 64 accept_rtadv" # ns1 The IPv6 address I have assigned to this host is completely random (with the given block). I found a random IPv6 address generator and used it to select d389:119c:9b57:396b as the address for this service within my address block. I don’t have the reference, but I did read that randomly selecting addresses within your block is a better approach. In order to invoke these changes without rebooting, I issued these commands: ``` [dan@tallboy:~] $ sudo ifconfig em1 inet6 2001:DB8:1001:8d00:d389:119c:9b57:396b prefixlen 64 accept_rtadv [dan@tallboy:~] $ [dan@tallboy:~] $ sudo route add -inet6 default 2001:DB8:1001:8d00::1 add net default: gateway 2001:DB8:1001:8d00::1 ``` If you do the route add first, you will get this error: [dan@tallboy:~] $ sudo route add -inet6 default 2001:DB8:1001:8d00::1 route: writing to routing socket: Network is unreachable add net default: gateway 2001:DB8:1001:8d00::1 fib 0: Network is unreachable Beastie Bits Ghost in the Shell – Part 1 Enabling compression on ZFS - a practical example Modern and secure DevOps on FreeBSD (Goran Mekić) LibreSSL 2.7.0 Released zrepl version 0.0.3 is out! [ZFS User Conference](http://zfs.datto.com/] Tarsnap Feedback/Questions Benjamin - BSD Personal Mailserver Warren - ZFS volume size limit (show #233) Lars - AFRINIC Brad - OpenZFS vs OracleZFS Send questions, comments, show ideas/topics, or stories you want mentioned on the show to feedback@bsdnow.tv

Our homes provide us with much more than safety and warmth—they offer a place to retreat from a sometimes chaotic world and nourish our souls. Unfortunately, homelessness is an ongoing and ever present issue in Maine. Today we speak with Navy veteran and Preble Street advocate Thomas Ptacek, who experienced a year of homelessness, and with Camden National Bank president, Greg Dufour, about an innovative program called Hope@Home. https://www.themainemag.com/radio/2015/10/homeward-bound-212/

We talk to Thomas about web security, encryption, and so much more!

"Thomas Ptacek and Dave Goldsmith present the results of Matasano Security's research into the resilience of Enterprise Agents: the most dangerous programs you've never heard of, responsible for over $2B a year in product revenue, running on the most critical enterprise servers from app servers to mainframes. WHY THIS TALK? 1. Enterprise Agents are their own worms, preinstalled for the convenience of attackers. We found critical, show-stopping vulnerabilities in every system we looked at. 2. It's a whirlwind tour of the landscape of internal security. We reversed proprietary binaries, deciphered custom protocols, and cracked encryption algorithms. 3. It's a call to arms. Applications running behind the firewall aren't getting audited. While vulnerability research talent fights over the scraps of Windows OS security, hundreds of thousands of machines remain vulnerable to attacks most people thought were eliminated in the early '90s For the past 12 months, Matasano Security has conducted a research project into the security of internal applications. Our theory? That any code which doesn't run in front of a firewall, exposed to Internet hackers, is unaudited, wide open-fertile ground for ever-adapting attackers. Our findings? Tens of applications reversed, proprietary protocols deciphered, "state-of-the-art" XOR encryption algorithms cracked, and it's worse than we thought. Perhaps more than any other software, save the operating system itself, insecure systems management applications pose a grave threat to enterprise security. They're the Agobot that your administrators installed for you. Internal security is a nightmare, and things are going to get worse before they get horrible. "

Thomas Ptacek and Dave Goldsmith present the results of Matasano Security's research into the resilience of Enterprise Agents: the most dangerous programs you've never heard of, responsible for over $2B a year in product revenue, running on the most critical enterprise servers from app servers to mainframes. WHY THIS TALK? 1. Enterprise Agents are their own worms, preinstalled for the convenience of attackers. We found critical, show-stopping vulnerabilities in every system we looked at. 2. It's a whirlwind tour of the landscape of internal security. We reversed proprietary binaries, deciphered custom protocols, and cracked encryption algorithms. 3. It's a call to arms. Applications running behind the firewall aren't getting audited. While vulnerability research talent fights over the scraps of Windows OS security, hundreds of thousands of machines remain vulnerable to attacks most people thought were eliminated in the early '90s For the past 12 months, Matasano Security has conducted a research project into the security of internal applications. Our theory? That any code which doesn't run in front of a firewall, exposed to Internet hackers, is unaudited, wide open-fertile ground for ever-adapting attackers. Our findings? Tens of applications reversed, proprietary protocols deciphered, "state-of-the-art" XOR encryption algorithms cracked, and it's worse than we thought. Perhaps more than any other software, save the operating system itself, insecure systems management applications pose a grave threat to enterprise security. They're the Agobot that your administrators installed for you. Internal security is a nightmare, and things are going to get worse before they get horrible. "