Podcast appearances and mentions of paul triolo

This week as we enter the Year of the Snake, Sinica co-founder Jeremy Goldkorn makes a re-appearance on the show. It's been a year since his last, and much has changed — and indeed, if Jeremy is right, we may be at an inflection point in American attitudes toward China. With the "TikTok Refugees" on Xiaohongshu or "RedNote" taking in a view of China that contrasts starkly with the image presented by the U.S. Government and by many American media outlets, and with DeepSeek now having upended some ideas about American tech primacy, the "vibes" on China among young people seem to have changed for the better. Will it endure? Jeremy and I plunge into that question on this week's episode of the Sinica Podcast.2:55 – What Jeremy has been up to lately 4:19 – What has been driving the recent narrative/vibe shift in China discourse in the U.S., and why human rights rhetoric around Xinjiang has died down 14:11 – Whether the narrative/vibe shift will be long-lasting and the role of young people in driving it 23:06 – Predictions for future changes within China29:40 – The concern that the narrative/vibe shift could go too far, or that the copium will overwhelm the positive of the shift 33:24 – Previous narrative shifts around freedom of speech, the internet, and China, and technological innovation 43:57 – What recent developments reveal about Chinese soft power, and Jeremy's predictions for how everything will play out 49:34 – Whether the narrative/vibe shift will change how American politicians talk about China, and the Chinese government has reacted to the shift so farPaying It Forward: Savannah Billman's Career China email newsletter Recommendations:Jeremy: Paul Cooper's Fall of Civilizations podcast series; David Kidd's Peking Story: The Last Days of Old China; and The 404's podcast interview with a PornHub exec (which includes discussion of real-name registration requirements) Kaiser: The TV miniseries American Primeval (2025) on Netflix; and Paul Triolo's Substack See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

What is the chip war intended to accomplish? ... How China sees the chip war ... Is Huawei a threat to US national security? ... Paul: The chip restrictions on China are unprecedented ... How Biden boosted China's chip industry ... Clear costs and unclear benefits of the chip war ...

What is the chip war intended to accomplish? ... How China sees the chip war ... Is Huawei a threat to US national security? ... Paul: The chip restrictions on China are unprecedented ... How Biden boosted China's chip industry ... Clear costs and unclear benefits of the chip war ...

This week on Sinica, Paul Triolo rejoins the show for a deep, deep dive into China's response to American export controls on advanced semiconductors and related technologies. How much hurt has the policy put on Chinese firms — and how far along is China in finding its way toward technological autonomy? Kevin Xu, author of the fantastic "Interconnected" newsletter, joins to talk about some of the big ideas he's written about in recent months and to play co-host as we grill Paul on China's efforts to get out from under American controls.9:10 – The downplaying of generative AI in the Third Plenum's decision document 18:25 – Why the Middle East is an appealing and important region for major AI players 26:20 – Why chip wars have evolved into to cloud wars 29:36 – How China has fared in trying to achieve its goal of indigenous advanced semiconductor manufacture31:50 – Semiconductors: What lies within the “small yard” versus what products are unaffected under U.S. export controls35:42 – The quality and reliability caveat to China's goal of self-sufficiency in semiconductor manufacture 38:35 – The success of the Biden administration's export controls and whether the controls have really put the hurt on anyone 46:00 – The Harmony operating system 47:47 – The importance of packaging 50:45 – Paul explains what he calls “China Semiconductor Industry Policy 3.0” and its predecessors57:03 – China's EUV lithography challenge1:03:14 – DUV lithography and multi-patterning, and the importance of collaboration across the ecosystemin the process of making semiconductors at scale 1:11:50 – Huawei's progress so far and remaining major hurdles and bottlenecks 1:18:42 – Paul and Kevin's thoughts on whether the American strategic class will regret its approach to export controls and whether there is an off-ramp Recommendations:Paul: Ed Conway's Material World: The Six Raw Materials That Shape Modern Civilization Kevin: Thurston Clarke's The Last Campaign: Robert F. Kennedy and 82 Days That Inspired America Kaiser: The House of the Dragon (2022- ) TV series See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

In this episode of The Sound of Economics, Yuyun Zhan sits down with Alicia García-Herrero and Paul Triolo to discuss China's innovation drive and how it compares with the US on key technologies, including semiconductors, green technology and biotech. They delve into how China climbed up the technology ladder, the impact of current geopolitical tensions and the outlook of US-China tech rivalry. This episode is part of the ZhōngHuá Mundus series of The Sound of Economics. ZhōngHuá Mundus is a newsletter by Bruegel, bringing you monthly analysis of China in the world, as seen from Europe. Sign up now to receive it in your mailbox!

In Episode 356 of Hidden Forces, Demetri Kofinas speaks with Paul Triolo, Senior Vice President for China and Technology Policy Lead at Albright Stonebridge Group, where he advises clients in technology, financial services, and other sectors as they navigate complex political and regulatory matters around the world. This episode was inspired by an article Paul recently published for American Affairs titled “A New Era for the Chinese Semiconductor Industry.” In it, he examines how semiconductor export controls levied by the US Commerce Department have been received in Beijing and how China's domestic semiconductor ecosystem has responded. Paul and Demetri spend the first hour of the episode assessing the state of the Biden administration's strategic competition with China in the area of semiconductors. Specifically, they ask (1) what are the administration's goals, (2) are those goals clear to Western companies that have depended on selling into the Chinese market for a large share of their revenues, (3) and is the administration itself clear on what it wants to accomplish with these efforts? In the second hour, they examine the fallout from the 2022 and 2023 semiconductor export controls, including some of the unintended consequences that could adversely impact major players in the Western semiconductor ecosystem over the long term. They discuss the Chips Act and whether more needs to be done to support America's domestic semiconductor industry. They also do a deep dive into China's response to these measures, including a new top-down approach to industrial policy and fully supporting open-sourced hardware architectures as a way to protect their companies from further restrictions. Lastly, they examine China's success in electric vehicles and whether this is a harbinger of what could happen in other sectors if American policymakers are not careful. You can subscribe to our premium content and access our premium feed, episode transcripts, and Intelligence Reports at HiddenForces.io/subscribe. If you want to join in on the conversation and become a member of the Hidden Forces Genius community, which includes Q&A calls with guests, access to special research and analysis, in-person events, and dinners, you can also do that on our subscriber page at HiddenForces.io/subscribe. For a 50% discount to American Affairs, use the code “HIDDENFORCES24” during checkout. If you enjoyed listening to today's episode of Hidden Forces, you can help support the show by doing the following: Subscribe on Apple Podcasts | YouTube | Spotify | Stitcher | SoundCloud | CastBox | RSS Feed Write us a review on Apple Podcasts & Spotify Subscribe to our mailing list at https://hiddenforces.io/newsletter/ Producer & Host: Demetri Kofinas Editor & Engineer: Stylianos Nicolaou Subscribe and Support the Podcast at https://hiddenforces.io Join the conversation on Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter at @hiddenforcespod Follow Demetri on Twitter at @Kofinas Episode Recorded on 03/05//2024

At SEMI ISS, Paul Triolo, Albright Stonebridge Group (ASG) delivered a presentation on the geopolitical headwinds impacting the semiconductor industry in 2024. He explains challenges of industrial policies, export controls, and supply chain perturbations.  Triolo is Senior Vice President for China and Technology Policy Lead at ASG, where he is also an Associate Partner. He advises clients in technology, financial services, and other sectors as they navigate complex political and regulatory matters in the US, China, the European Union, India, and around the world.In this episode, Françoise von Trapp talks with Triolo about why understanding the geopolitical climate is critical for industry leaders to develop successful strategies. They discuss how geopolitics is disrupting the $5 Trillion information and communication technology sector.  You'll learn about:The US's “Carrots and Sticks” approach to semiconductors. The potential outcome from regional semiconductor manufacturing silos being created by the various CHIPS Acts. What's happening with China and TaiwanIndia's efforts in building a semiconductor infrastructure and ecosystem Follow Paul Triolo on X (formerly Twitter) @PSTAsiatech  Or connect with him on LinkedIn:  Paul Triolo, Albright Stonebridge GroupSEMI A global association, SEMI represents the entire electronics manufacturing and design supply chain. Disclaimer: This post contains affiliate links. If you make a purchase, I may receive a commission at no extra cost to you.Support the showBecome a sustaining member! Like what you hear? Follow us on LinkedIn and TwitterInterested in reaching a qualified audience of microelectronics industry decision-makers? Invest in host-read advertisements, and promote your company in upcoming episodes. Contact Françoise von Trapp to learn more. Interested in becoming a sponsor of the 3D InCites Podcast? Check out our 2023 Media Kit. Learn more about the 3D InCites Community and how you can become more involved.

Countries with advanced semiconductor industries are caught in the middle of growing U.S.-China competition in technology focused on advanced computing. While some countries with key technology companies in the toolmaking sector have been drawn into the competition previously, South Korea and its national champions, Samsung and SK Hynix, have arguably incurred some of the most significant pressure. These firms have billions of dollars of sunk investment in China-based facilities and the future of these facilities remains in doubt after a series of new U.S. measures unleashed by the U.S. Commerce Department. South Korean companies are also players in other parts of the global semiconductor supply chain, including semiconductor manufacturing tools, and China remains an important market for both components and electronic devices. Each country caught in the U.S.-China technology competition faces difficult tradeoffs in determining how best to support its leading companies while navigating changing and often arbitrary U.S. decisions that have already significantly disrupted global supply chains. Finally, at the same time as U.S. export controls have impacted South Korean companies' ability to retain business operations and market access in China, major front-end manufacturers, particularly Samsung, are also looking to expand their operations in the United States and benefit from the U.S. CHIPS Act. All of this puts South Korea in one of the more complex positions as the industry faces continued restructuring, buffeted by both export controls and industrial policies. Please join KEI as Mr. Paul Triolo sheds a greater light on the dynamics of these challenges for both Seoul and South Korean technology players.

Jacob welcomes Paul Triolo onto the podcast for a nuanced treatment of the relationship between geopolitics and technology – in the context of U.S.-China relations, in the context of multipolar geopolitics, in the context of artificial intelligence, and how all these things are affecting the semiconductor industry in particular.--Timestamps:(00:00) - Intro(01:02) – Current perceptions of deglobalization(07:02) - Current reality of deglobalization(15:15) - Is IP ever safe?(24:01) - Semiconductors & AI & China(30:08) - The trajectory of US/China relations(39:40) - What's next for semiconductor production?(47:20) - Geopolitical competition and the future of tech--CI Site: cognitive.investmentsJacob Site: jacobshapiro.comJacob Twitter: x.com/JacobShapSubscribe to the Newsletter: bit.ly/weekly-sitrep--Cognitive Investments is an investment advisory firm, founded in 2019 that provides clients with a nuanced array of financial planning, investment advisory and wealth management services. We aim to grow both our clients' material wealth (i.e. their existing financial assets) and their human wealth (i.e. their ability to make good strategic decisions for their business, family, and career).--Disclaimer: Cognitive Investments LLC (“Cognitive Investments”) is a registered investment advisor. Advisory services are only offered to clients or prospective clients where Cognitive Investments and its representatives are properly licensed or exempt from licensure.The information provided is for educational and informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice and it should not be relied on as such. It should not be considered a solicitation to buy or an offer to sell a security. It does not take into account any investor's particular investment objectives, strategies, tax status or investment horizon. You should consult your attorney or tax advisorThis podcast uses the following third-party services for analysis: Chartable - https://chartable.com/privacyPodtrac - https://analytics.podtrac.com/privacy-policy-gdrp

Smartphone and telecom-equipment maker Huawei is one of China's most successful and controversial companies.  Despite efforts from the U.S. and other countries to restrict its access to cutting edge semiconductor technology, Huawei recently launched a new phone - the Mate 60 - featuring advanced made-in-China chips. The breakthrough has raised one question: Is America's effort to limit the rise of China's tech sector failing?In this episode, CSDS-Asia Matters' Andrew Peaple analyzes Huawei's rise, fall, and apparent rise again, with guests Paul Triolo, from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Dylan Patel, Chief Analyst at the semiconductor consulting firm SemiAnalysis.

This week on Sinica, Paul Triolo returns to the show to give us a rundown on what's happening in the exciting arena of generative AI in China. The veteran China tech watcher, who is now Senior VP for China and Technology Policy Lead at Dentons Global Advisors ASG, is Just back from a trip to China during which he spoke with numerous companies working in the space, Paul offers a great overview of what various companies are doing, and how they're responding to U.S. restrictions on the export of key hardware needed for large AI training and modeling.The timestamps and transcript will be up in a couple of days. Check back here soon for an update!See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

We talk with Paul Triolo, Senior VP for China and Technology Policy Lead at Albright Stonebridge, member of the Council of Foreign Relations, and one of the leading authorities in the US on the Chinese semiconductor industry. Prior to Albright Stonebridge, Paul setup the Technology practice at Eurasia Group. This episodes focuses on the ability for China and Chinese companies to develop their own large language models like ChatGPT, whether US export controls on computing technology will affect that development, and how Chinese companies will be forced to navigate a unique regulatory environment on content creation in China.

Since its advent in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, blockchain technology has taken the economic world by storm. Open-source blockchain transactions have increased the speed of, and trust in, cross-border financial transactions. Many in the United States see the technology as a new and improved medium to raise and exchange capital. In China, the technology, though much more tightly regulated, has likewise begun to proliferate and has even been identified as one of China's seven “frontier technologies” in its 14th Five Year Plan (2021-2025). Blockchain has the potential to transform industries in both countries and globally. This pioneering system is at the forefront of U.S.-China technological competition, and both nations have the potential to use the technology to remake the global financial system. In an interview conducted on February 9, 2023, Paul Triolo examines recent developments in China's blockchain evolution, focusing on its role in the U.S.-China relationship. 0:00-4:08 Introduction, What is blockchain? 4:08-15:11China's innovation and regulation 15:11-20:09 Can we regulate cryptocurrency? 20:09-26:18 U.S.-China blockchain regulation 26:18- the metaverse About the speakers: www.ncuscr.org/event/blockchain-china-prc/ Read the transcript to this conversation  Follow Paul Triolo on Twitter: @pstAsiatech Subscribe to the National Committee on YouTube for video of this interview. Follow us on Twitter (@ncuscr) and Instagram (@ncuscr).

In August, the Biden administration finally passed a semiconductor subsidy bill. The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 achieved rare bipartisan support and promises funding of more than $200 billion over the next five years with the goal of re-establishing the U.S. as a global center of semiconductor manufacturing. To understand the bill and its impact, this week on China Corner Office, Chris Marquis discusses the CHIPS Act with Rory Murphy, Vice President of Government Affairs at the U.S.-China Business Council; and Paul Triolo, Senior VP for China and Technology Policy Lead for Albright Stonebridge Group. Highlights of the show include a general overview and the history of the CHIPS Act, the political significance to U.S.-China relations, and challenges in industrial policy and export controls. Also discussed is how Taiwan has been and will be in the spotlight of the global supply chain with U.S. and China competing in the semiconductor industry. They concluded with an emphasis on the need for U.S. and Chinese companies to adapt to the new rules and regulations.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Semiconductors have become a critical policy issue around the world, making news because of their importance for everything from cellphones to nuclear weapons, as supply chain bottlenecks and political confrontations drive up scarcity and price. Global companies like TSMC and Huawei face difficult operating landscapes as they seek greater regulatory harmonization and clarity. What role do semiconductors play in the relationships among the United States, China, and Taiwan? Technology policy expert Paul Triolo joined National Committee President Stephen Orlins for an interview conducted on September 30, 2022, to examine the complex geopolitical tensions surrounding the global semiconductor industry, its role in the U.S.-China relationship, and potential ways forward for the United States and China. 0:00 Introduction 1:43 Why are semiconductors important? 4:44 Will China's semiconductor industry succeed? 9:36 U.S. response and dependence on Taiwan 16:09 Is the CHIPS Act good policy? 20:24 Restrictions, competition, and supply chain About the speaker: https://www.ncuscr.org/event/semiconductors-us-china-relations/ Follow Paul Triolo on Twitter: @pstAsiatech Subscribe to the National Committee on YouTube for video of this interview. Follow us on Twitter (@ncuscr) and Instagram (@ncuscr).

This week on Sinica, Kaiser chats with Paul Triolo, Senior VP for China and Technology Policy Lead at Dentons Global Advisors ASG, formerly and probably better known still as Albright Stonebridge Group. Paul provides an in-depth overview of today's semiconductor landscape, from export control issues, to the unstable equilibrium between U.S., China, and Taiwan's industries. He walks us through the strategic importance of semiconductors in U.S. national security considerations — and how unintended consequences of our current policies toward China might actually end up undermining U.S. national security. 04:45 – An overview of semiconductor geopolitics and supply chains20:33 – Why the U.S. is cutting China off from advanced semiconductor technologies27:02 – The shift in technology export controls from Trump to Biden32:08 – The CHIPS Act and subsidies for the semiconductor industry37:43 – Deterrence and Taiwan's semiconductor industry as a “silicon shield”46:16 – Lessons learned from the chip shortage52:30 – Why is the U.S lighting a fire to Chinese self-sufficiency efforts?57:57 – The implications of Pelosi's planned visit to TaiwanA transcript of this podcast is available at SupChina.comRecommendations:Paul: Rob Dunn, A Natural History of the Future; and Ryan Hass, Stronger: Adapting America's China Strategy in an Age of Competitive InterdependenceKaiser: The Boys on Amazon PrimeSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Despite mounting bilateral tensions, capital flows may be one area the U.S. and China can find common ground.Read the article by Paul Triolo: https://supchina.com/2022/05/09/why-the-u-s-and-china-might-broker-a-deal-on-u-s-capital-access/Narrated by Sylvia Franke.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

In the final episode of this season of Tech Tonic, we ask if the growing tensions between the US and China could split the world into two competing technological spheres. It has been dubbed 'the great decoupling'. Some in the US want to see Chinese companies cut off from American investment, while hawkish factions in China have been fighting for a more self-sufficient and nationalistic tech sector. But what would decoupling really look like? And is it even possible? Presented by James Kynge, this episode features interviews with Lillian Li (author of Chinese Characteristics newsletter), Paul Triolo (senior vice-president of Albright Stonebridge Group), Roger Robinson Jr (president and founder of RWR Advisory) and Kevin Rudd (former prime minister of Australia and president of the Asia Society)Presented by James Kynge. Edwin Lane is senior producer. Josh Gabert-Doyon is producer. Manuela Saragosa is executive producer. Special thanks to Tom Griggs. Sound design is by Breen Turner, with original music from Metaphor Music. The FT's head of audio is Cheryl Brumley.News clips credits: CNBC Check out stories and up-to-the-minute news from the FT's technology team at ft.com/technologyFor a special discounted FT subscription go to https://www.ft.com/techtonicsaleAnd check out FT Edit, the new iPhone app that shares the best of FT journalism, hand-picked by senior editors to inform, explain and surprise. It's free for the first month and 99p a month for the next six months. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

In the final episode of this season of Tech Tonic, we ask if the growing tensions between the US and China could split the world into two competing technological spheres. It has been dubbed 'the great decoupling'. Some in the US want to see Chinese companies cut off from American investment, while hawkish factions in China have been fighting for a more self-sufficient and nationalistic tech sector. But what would decoupling really look like? And is it even possible? Presented by James Kynge, this episode features interviews with Lillian Li (author of Chinese Characteristics newsletter), Paul Triolo (senior vice-president of Albright Stonebridge Group), Roger Robinson Jr (president and founder of RWR Advisory) and Kevin Rudd (former prime minister of Australia and president of the Asia Society) Check out stories and up-to-the-minute news from the FT's technology team at ft.com/technologyFor a special discounted FT subscription go to https://www.ft.com/techtonicsaleAnd check out FT Edit, the new iPhone app that shares the best of FT journalism, hand-picked by senior editors to inform, explain and surprise. It's free for the first month and 99p a month for the next six months.Presented by James Kynge. Edwin Lane is senior producer. Josh Gabert-Doyon is producer. Manuela Saragosa is executive producer. Special thanks to Tom Griggs. Sound design is by Breen Turner, with original music from Metaphor Music. The FT's head of audio is Cheryl Brumley.News clips credits: CNBCRead a transcript of this episode on FT.com See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Alibaba affiliate Ant Group is taking a hammering from regulators, but the government's intent is to tame the fintech giant, not ruin its business.Read the story by Paul Triolo and Xiaomeng Lu: https://supchina.com/2021/03/16/beijing-is-going-to-restrain-ant-not-kill-it/Narrated by Daniel Tam-Claiborne.

Jen Zhu Scott (Executive Chairman of The Commons Project and Founding Principal of Radian Partners) and Paul Triolo (Geotechnology Head, Eurasia Group and Senior Advisor, MacroPolo) join Hank Paulson to discuss the state of the US-China tech competition, what it means for the future of national security, and what to expect from a Biden administration on technology policy. Jen Zhu Scott: https://www.weforum.org/people/jennifer-zhu-scott Paul Triolo: https://www.paulsoninstitute.org/staff/paul-triolo/

This newsletter is really a weekly public policy thought-letter. While excellent newsletters on specific themes within public policy already exist, this thought-letter is about frameworks, mental models, and key ideas that will hopefully help you think about any public policy problem in imaginative ways. It seeks to answer just one question: how do I think about a particular public policy problem/solution?PS: If you enjoy listening instead of reading, we have this edition available as an audio narration courtesy the good folks at Ad-Auris. If you have any feedback, please send it to us.A Framework a Week: Internet + PoliticsTools for thinking public policy— Pranay KotasthaneMany predictions about the internet transforming politics have fallen flat. So, how about a framework that can help us understand the many facets of this interaction? I came across one such framework from 2013 — Six Models for the Internet + Politics by Archon Fung et al. The paper first presents a stylised political model:(Source: Six Models for the Internet + Politics by Archon Fung et al.) The authors describe this model as follows:“The model is a simple conveyor belt image of politics. The belt begins with citizens who have interests and views about politics, policies, and politicians. Citizens form into interest groups and social movement organizations—sometimes called pressure groups—that advocate for specific interests and policies. Once born, these groups reciprocally recruit and mobilize citizens to advocate more powerfully. At the same time, citizens form and express their views in the public sphere in which they discuss public concerns with one another in coffee shops, op-ed pages, water coolers, and town squares (and of course increasingly on the Internet). These traditional organizations and the public sphere are located outside of government. In a democratic society, however, they determine the personnel and content of government. Through the mechanisms of elections, lobbying, and communicative pressure (of which the pressure of public opinion is one kind), they exert pressures that determine which politicians hold office. Between elections, traditional organizations, and public opinion also exert pressures on the public agencies that compose government. Government action is at the end of this conveyor belt. Government acts in one of two ways: by passing laws and policies, and by acting directly in the world through agency actions.”Now by introducing the internet in six different points in this model, the authors develop six pathways in which the internet changes politics.Pathway 1: The Muscular Public Sphere(Six Models for the Internet + Politics by Archon Fung et al.)In this model, the internet strengthens the link between citizens and the public sphere, and between the public sphere and the politicians. Twitter outrage campaigns demanding attention and action from the government are examples of this pathway. Pathway 2: Here Comes Everybody(Six Models for the Internet + Politics by Archon Fung et al.)This pathway is focused on direct action. Here the citizens are able to mobilise public action bypassing pressure groups, politicians, and the state. Internet-mobilised drives to fix street potholes or to clear up garbage spots are examples of this pathway.Pathway 3: Direct Digital Democracy(Six Models for the Internet + Politics by Archon Fung et al.)In this pathway, citizens are able to reach the policymaking elite directly. Expat Indians reaching out to India’s former External Affairs Minister on Twitter for getting their visa/passport issues resolved is an example of this pathway.Pathway 4: Truth-based Advocacy(Six Models for the Internet + Politics by Archon Fung et al.)Quite inaccurately named, in this model, the authors propose that the internet can become a platform “by which organised advocacy groups bring salient, often surprising, facts to light in credible ways that tilt public opinion.” The Panama Papers is an example of this pathway. What gets missed is that this pathway can also be used for malicious purposes by traditional pressure groups to malign individuals and groups, which is the more common use case today. Pathway 5: Constituent Mobilisation(Six Models for the Internet + Politics by Archon Fung et al.)In this pathway, the role of the internet is to:“thicken the connection between political organizations and their members. Lowering the costs of communications allows political organizations to communicate more information to more members at a fixed cost. Conversely, digitalization lowers search costs and allows individuals to find the organizations that advance their interests and perspectives. Finally, digitalization dramatically lowers the transaction costs of some kinds of political action such as donating money to organizations and signing letters and petitions.”This is the pathway that has been used by political parties (some have been more successful than others) to form strong bonds with their constituents, effectively turning even a marginal voter into an unapologetic partisan supporter.Pathway 6: Social Monitoring(Six Models for the Internet + Politics by Archon Fung et al.)In this pathway:“public agencies (and/or civic organizations) deploy digital tools to enlist the eyes and ears of citizens to better spot public problems and so bring those problems to the attention of the government and the broader public.”An example of this pathway is traffic police apps and websites that allow citizens to report traffic violations.So this is a non-exhaustive set of interactions between the internet and politics. I have refrained from making value judgments in this post. An underlying assumption in these six models is that social media improves governance and strengthens democracies. Seven years since this paper was published, we know that this assumption doesn’t always hold true. Nevertheless, this typology is a useful starting point for people trying to decipher the connections between the internet and politics. One can even use this framework to imagine newer pathways for explaining how social media has vitiated our polity. India Policy Watch: Agrarian to Industrial Society: Barrington Moore On India’s Trajectory Insights on burning policy issues in India— RSJLet’s for a moment assume the optimistic case of farm reforms comes true. The market mechanism works, farmers are freed up from the monopoly of the state and agriculture booms. Instead of accounting for 16 per cent of our GDP while supporting about 60 per cent of our population as it does today, in 2050, it will account for 6-7 per cent of our GDP and support about 20 per cent of our population. That would make us a solid middle-income country in 2050.Moore’s Study Of Comparative Histories The question I had was how would this transition from agriculture dominant society to a post-agriculture society happen in the next 30 years? What will be our path and what will it mean for our society?While looking for answers to this question, I stumbled upon a classic: Barrington Moore’s 1966 book ‘Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World)’. While I didn’t find a clear answer to the question that led me to it, the book itself is a rigorous academic work that details the trajectories six countries took to transition from agrarian societies into modern industrial ones.  As Moore writes in the preface of the book:“This book endeavours to explain the varied political roles played by the landed upper classes and the peasantry in the transformation from agrarian societies (defined simply as states where a large majority of the population lives off the land) to modern industrial ones. Somewhat more specifically, it is an attempt to discover the range of historical conditions under which either or both of these rural groups have become important forces behind the emergence of Western parliamentary versions of democracy. and dictatorships. of the right and the left, that is, fascist and communist regimes.”Part 1 of the book titled ‘Revolutionary Origin of Capitalist Democracy’ compares the histories England, France and America from the late 17th century till their emergence as capitalist democracies in the early 20th century. In Part 2, titled ‘Three Routes to the Modern World in Asia’, Moore traces the rise of communism in China, fascism in Japan and the peaceful adoption of democracy in India as they attempted to make this transition. Part 3 titled ‘Theoretical Implications and Projections’ detail Moore’s conclusions on the three trajectories to make the transition from agrarian to industrial society.It is a fascinating book that uses a neo-marxist lens to understand the society through social classes and the coalitions among them. The chapter on India is interesting with Moore wondering why Indian peasants didn’t revolt like those of China while providing a strong thesis in answer to the question. Moore believes Gandhi’s ideas of swadeshi, trusteeship and his suspicion of both the state and the markets created a society where abject misery of the peasants co-existed with their co-option into the state. It has this line from Gandhi that came as a surprise to me:“Pressed further with the question why did he (Gandhi) not therefore advocate state ownership in the place of private property, he answered that, although it was better than private ownership, it was objectionable on the grounds of violence. "It is my firm conviction," he added, "that if the state suppressed capitalism by violence it will be caught in the evils of violence itself and fail to develop nonviolence at anytime."There’s a very insightful passage about the continuing stagnation and halting progress of agriculture 20 years after independence:“The proximate cause seems quite clearly to be the relative failure of a market economy to penetrate very far into the countryside and put the peasants into a new situation to which they seem quite capable of responding with a sharp rise in output. The structure of village society is only a secondary obstacle one that changes in response to external circumstances. …Behind the weak push of the market lies the failure to channel into industrial construction the resources that agriculture does generate. One further step, taken with a glance at other countries, shows that the course of historical development in India was such that no class grew up with any very strong interest in rechanneling the agricultural surplus in such a way as to get the process of industrial growth started.” Anyway, my view is India confounds Moore too. In his analysis, India stands as an outlier that follows none of the three trajectories he derives for transition to a modern industrial state – the capitalist-democratic route (England, France and US), the capitalist-reactionary route (Germany and Japan) and the communist route (China and Russia). There is a good description of these three routes here.India’s Route: Moore’s HypothesisMoore ends the chapter on India wondering what route it would take for its transition from an agrarian state to an industrial one. The three routes he had devised didn’t seem to fit India, so, Moore suggests an alternative that has a strong element of coercion. I was amazed by Moore’s understanding of the history of Indian farming under colonial rule, his foresight about how it was to pan out and the analytical rigour he uses to conclude about the only option available to India. I have reproduced the last few passages from that chapter. Remember he published this in 1966. Even the Green Revolution hadn’t taken off. He writes:“If the prevailing policy in its essential outlines continues, as far as can be foreseen it would result in a very slow rate of improvement, mainly through the action of the upper stratum of the peasantry continuing to go over to peasant forms of commercial farming. The danger has already been pointed out: the steady swelling of an urban and rural proletariat on an ever larger scale. This policy could in time perhaps generate its own antithesis, though the difficulties of a radical takeover in India are enormous. Much more desirable from a democratic standpoint would be for the government to harness and use these same tendencies for its own purposes. That would mean discarding the Gandhian doctrines, allowing the upper strata in the countryside free rein, but taxing their profits and organizing the market and credit mechanism in such a way as to drive out the moneylender. If the government in this way succeeded in tapping the present surplus generated in agriculture and encouraging the growth of a much bigger one, it could do a great deal more about industry on its own resources. As industry grew, it would sop up much of the surplus labour released in the countryside and spread the market ever more rapidly in a continually accelerating process. The efforts to bring technology and modern resources to the peasant's doorstep would then bear fruit.The third possibility would be to go over to much wider use of compulsion, more or less approaching the communist model. Even if it could be tried in India, it seems highly unlikely that it would work. Under Indian conditions for a long time to come, no political leadership - no matter how intelligent, dedicated, and ruthless ­ could, it seems to me, put through a revolutionary agrarian policy. The country is too diverse and too amorphous still, though that will gradually change. The administrative and political problem of forcing through a collectivization program against the barriers of caste and tradition in fourteen languages seems too formidable to require further discussion. Only one line of policy then seems to offer real hope, which, to repeat, implies no prediction that it will be the one adopted. In any case, a strong element of coercion remains necessary if a change is to be made. …Either masked coercion on a massive scale, as in the capitalist model including even Japan, or more direct coercion approaching the socialist model will remain necessary. The tragic fact of the matter is that the poor bear the heaviest costs of modernization under both socialist and capitalist auspices. The only justification for imposing the costs is that they would become steadily worse off without it. As the situation stands, the dilemma is indeed a cruel one. It is possible to have the greatest sympathy for those responsible for facing it. To deny that it exists is, on the other hand, the acme of both intellectual and political irresponsibility.”Moore in 1966 had concluded that the only option that might work for India is the ‘masked coercion on a massive scale as in the capitalist model’ or the direct coercion of the socialist model. One way to look at the farm bills passed last week is to ask – is this the state biting the bullet and choosing masked coercion that Moore wrote about? I don’t know about this. If anyone has a view on the trajectory this transition will take for India, let us know. Meanwhile, I will recommend Moore’s remarkable book. It is a great work of comparative history and I enjoyed reading it.  Matsyanyaaya: Prediction Markets as a Tool for Intelligence AnalysisBig fish eating small fish = Foreign Policy in action— Pranay Kotasthane(This post first appeared on the Takshashila Blog in Feb 2019)The raison d’être for intelligence analysis is being able to predict near-future events with reasonable accuracy. Based on the little that I have read, there is no mechanism that seeks to improve Indian intelligence analysts’ accuracy over time. This leads to what Philip Tetlock calls ‘outcome-irrelevant learning’.  This is a situation wherein no matter what happens in reality, people are in an excellent position to explain that what happened was consistent with their own view.Outcome-irrelevant learning is quite easy to find in mainstream foreign policy analysis. Many analysts would, for example, argue that talks between India and Pakistan at the highest levels are a necessary policy instrument for managing Pakistan. When presented with the evidence to the contrary, they will still come up with a reason that deflects blame from their policy proposal.The costs of outcome-irrelevant learning become very high if intelligence analysis also falls into this same trap.  It’s all the more necessary in that community to make people remember their previous states of ignorance and make them update their Bayesian priors when things don’t go according to their expectations.This is where a prediction market comes in. In such a market, a group of people speculate on future events. Each individual assigns a probability to a near-future event and these choices get registered. Once the event actually takes place, you get a chance to reflect on why you were wrong (or right). By looking at the track records of analysts over time for several questions, one can wean out the worse analysts from the better ones.The US intelligence community recognised the value of these markets more than ten years ago. This CIA paper from 2006 concludes:The record of prediction markets is impressive. For the US Intelligence Community, prediction markets offer a method by which to improve analytical outcomes and to address some of the deficiencies in analytical processes and organization. In the realm of intelligence analysis, prediction markets can contribute to more accurate estimates of long-term trends and threats and better cost-benefit assessments of ongoing or proposed policies.It’s time that we introduce such prediction markets to the Indian intelligence community as well. To improve prediction skills, the training programme for new recruits can include elements from Tetlock and Gardner’s classic Superforecasting.HomeWorkReading and listening recommendations on public policy matters[Paper] An excellent overview of the Geopolitics of Semiconductors by Paul Triolo and Kevin Allison.[Post] “Economists assume rational frameworks, not rational people.” — Economic Forces debunking a long-standing myth used to denigrate economics. [Article] How democracies can claim back power in the digital world. Marietje Schaake argues for a global alliance for technology standards.[Article] Why do we read Barrington Moore? - on the relevance of Moore’s classic in today’s times. Get on the email list at publicpolicy.substack.com

The short-video app TikTok has chosen Oracle as its corporate savior to avoid a U.S. ban ordered by President Donald Trump. The U.S. government will review the prospective deal.That much is known. Everything else is confusion, at least to outsiders. For instance:— What does it mean that, as Oracle declared, it will become a “trusted technology provider” for TikTok? Is this a joint venture, a vendor agreement or something else? Oracle is pointedly not referring to its deal as a sale or acquisition.— Will Trump approve such an arrangement after having threatened a ban if TikTok remains owned by its China-based parent ByteDance? Would it answer the national-security concerns around potential data siphoning, censorship and propaganda from Beijing that Trump raised?— Will the Chinese government go along with it?— Will TikTok get kicked out of the major app stores after Sept. 20, when Trump's threatened ban was supposed to go into effect, threatening its future in the U.S.?“This whole process has been a mess,” said Martin Chorzempa, a research fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.Microsoft, an announced TikTok suitor, said Sunday that its rejected bid would have protected U.S. national security interests by making “significant changes” to ensure security, privacy, online safety, and anti-misinformation measures. Oracle's statement Monday was more muted, emphasizing that it has a “40-year track record providing secure, highly performant technology solutions.”U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin appeared to support the Oracle bid on CNBC Monday morning. Oracle's proposal made "many representations for national security issues,” Mnuchin said. He also noted a new commitment — by whom, he didn't say — to make TikTok’s global operations a U.S.-headquartered company with 20,000 new jobs. Neither TikTok nor Oracle mentioned that pledge Monday, although TikTok said in July that it would add 10,000 U.S. jobsTikTok said in a statement Monday that its proposal to the Treasury Department should "resolve the Administration’s security concerns” and emphasized the importance of its app to the 100 million users it claims in the U.S.TikTok, which says it has about 700 million globally, is known for its fun, goofy videos of dancing, lip-syncing, pranks and jokes. It's also home to more political material, some of which is critical of Trump.An Aug. 6 Trump order threatened a vague ban on TikTok, creating a sense of emergency and seeding chaos into an existing national-security review of TikTok by a U.S. interagency group, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, or CFIUS. A subsequent Aug. 14 order demanded that ByteDance divest its U.S. business. In addition, Trump insisted that the U.S. government get a cut of any deal, something experts said was unprecedented and possibly illegal.Matters were complicated further when the Chinese government appeared to suggest that the technology used in TikTok's algorithm could not be exported without government permission. On Sunday, ByteDance tapped Oracle as its U.S. partner, embracing a company whose co-founder Larry Ellison has raised funds for Trump. Its decision also followed criticism of Microsoft by a Trump trade adviser, Peter Navarro.Oracle and TikTok did not answer questions about the structure of the proposal on Monday. The Treasury Department didn’t return an emailed request for more information about the proposal.“We don’t know that this is the wrong outcome. But we do know that (the administration) shouldn’t have politicized it this way,” said Derek Scissors, who studies China at the American Enterprise Institute think tank.The promise of 20,000 new jobs and a U.S. headquarters for TikTok “certainly smacks of crony capitalism,” said Chorzempa.Eurasia analyst Paul Triolo noted that if ByteDance retains ownership of TikTok, it won't have actually sold anything. China doesn’t want to be seen approving a deal where a Chinese company is fo...

This week on Sinica, Kaiser chats with Andy Purdy, chief security officer of Huawei USA, and Paul Triolo, practice head of geotechnology at the Eurasia Group. They explore the complexities of the 5G ecosystem, challenges to cybersecurity on 5G networks, the process of standards setting in advanced telecommunications, and how the Trump administration's animus toward Huawei might ultimately handicap the U.S. in this vital emerging technology.5:18: What 5G will enable us to do18:06: 5G standard setting bodies and their functions29:55: China’s involvement in the standard setting process37:05: 5G deployment around the world50:59: The collateral damage done by banning HuaweiRecommendations:Andy: A People's History of the United States, by Howard Zinn, and The Road Less Traveled: A New Psychology of Love, Traditional Values and Spiritual Growth, by M. Scott Peck.Paul: Superpower Showdown: How the Battle Between Trump and Xi Threatens a New Cold War by Bob Davis and Lingling Wei, and The Tibetan Book of Living and Dying by Sogyal Rinpoche. Kaiser: The YouTube channel of Joe Parrish, a content creator and guitarist.

As the impact of technology gains increasing strategic importance in the U.S.-China relationship, the National Committee hosted the second session of Navigating China's Technological Rise, a series of virtual programs on the critical issues and policies affecting the technology industry and its impact on Sino-American ties.    The second program of the series, Critical Technology Regulation and its Industry Impact, which took place on May 8, 2020, featuring discussion and Q&A with NCUSCR Director Anja Manuel, co-founder and principal of Rice, Hadley, Gates & Manuel LLC, and Paul Triolo, head of the geo-technology practice at Eurasia Group.    Ms. Manuel and Mr. Triolo discussed the policies that contributed to China’s technological rise, the geopolitical implications of this rise, how U.S. firms should approach this new order, and how recent developments, such as the Phase I trade agreement and COVID-19 pandemic, have affected technological collaboration.

Paul Triolo, practice head of geotechnology at the Eurasia Group, sat down with Jordan to address some of the questions at the center of the U.S.-China tech relationship: the future of 5G research and innovation, persecutions of researchers and scientists from China based in the U.S., security concerns surrounding Huawei and Chinese-funded communications infrastructure, and more.  6:38: Current blind spots in Chinese tech policy 18:30: What does a “good” tech policy look like? 32:09: Is change possible under Xi Jinping? 42:16: What makes Huawei competitive? The Eurasia Group has no clients in the People's Republic of China. Get bonus content on Patreon See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Paul Triolo, practice head of geotechnology at the Eurasia Group, sat down with Jordan to address some of the questions at the center of the U.S.-China tech relationship: the future of 5G research and innovation, persecutions of researchers and scientists from China based in the U.S., security concerns surrounding Huawei and Chinese-funded communications infrastructure, and more.  6:38: Current blind spots in Chinese tech policy 18:30: What does a “good” tech policy look like? 32:09: Is change possible under Xi Jinping? 42:16: What makes Huawei competitive? The Eurasia Group has no clients in the People's Republic of China.

The Yes Team Martijn Rasser Senior Fellow, Technology and National Security Program Center for a New American SecurityDan David  Founder Wolfpack Research LLC   vs.  The No Team  Paul Triolo Practice Head, Geo-Technology Eurasia GroupErin Ennis Senior Vice President US-China Business Council  In May 2019 the Trump administration took several steps aimed at limiting the business activities of Huawei because of national security concerns. The president issued an executive order banning the sale of Huawei products in the United States, expanding restrictions that were first applied to federal government agencies. Furthermore, the Commerce Department placed Huawei on its “Entities List,” banning American firms from supplying products and services to Huawei. Four days later, the Commerce Department issued a “Temporary General License” (TGL) allowing firms to provide support for previously concluded business. The TGL is set to expire on August 19. These steps represent not only a major adjustment in American treatment of Huawei and potentially American policy toward China, but also how the world should manage the increasingly fraught technology-national security nexus.    This event features a formal debate on the question, “Should the United States severely restrict Huawei’s business?” Arguing “yes” is the team of Martijn Rasser of the Center for a New American Security and Dan David of Wolfpack Research LLC. Arguing “no” is the team of Paul Triolo of the Eurasia Group and Erin Ennis from the US-China Business Council. CSIS’s Scott Kennedy will moderate the debate as well as the subsequent follow-up discussion with the participants and audience about the pros and cons of specific actions toward Huawei and the implications for US-China relations, American foreign policy, and the shape of the global economy. This event is made possible through general support to CSIS. 

This week, Matthew Fochs sits down with Paul Triolo. Paul is a China Digital Economy Fellow at New America focusing on global technology policy issues, cyber-security, internet governance, ICT regulatory issues, and emerging areas such as automation, AI/Big Data, ambient intelligence, and fintech.  While the relationship between the US and China has a long history of tension, recent actions by the governments of both counties has brought those tensions to a new pinnacle. Matthew Fochs had the chance to sit down with Paul in late November as the world braced for the G20 summit in Buenos Aires and the looming new trade tariffs between the US and China set to take hold on January 1. However, before they get to that elephant in the room, Paul talks about the “Made in China 2025” initiative, recent cybersecurity and IP theft, one of the hot button topics during the 2016 Presidential Election – the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the current administration’s actions towards China Technology company, ZTE.

This week on the Sinica Podcast, Kaiser and Jeremy speak with Samm Sacks, Cybersecurity Policy and Chinese Digital Economy Fellow at New America, and Paul Triolo, Geotechnology Practice Head at the Eurasia Group. The two are among the best positioned to discuss the implications of the shocking arrest of Huawei CFO Mèng Wǎnzhōu 孟晚舟 in Vancouver on December 1. The discussion focuses primarily on technological and national security aspects of the clash between Washington and Beijing, how Meng’s arrest fits into that clash, and the realities of fragmentation in the global telecommunications industry. What to listen for on this week’s Sinica Podcast: 19:53: China’s new Cybersecurity Law was a cause of concern for MNCs and tech specialists alike. Samm elaborates on specific actions taken by the Chinese government: “If you look at the enforcement actions that have been taken against that law so far, the vast majority of them are aimed at Chinese companies. Really, they haven’t implemented it as much on foreign companies…and there are things like content violations…domestic cybersecurity issues. I think a lot of these fears are being bundled up together and creating this larger tech fear.” 23:03: During a recent visit to Zhejiang University, Paul and Samm spoke with a professor who wrote a book on Huawei’s corporate culture and described it as such: “It’s kind of like a car going 60 miles an hour on the highway and changing a tire at the same time.” 28:13: The extent to which Huawei can push back against the government and the degree to which Beijing is able to strong-arm private companies under China’s Internet Security Law remain largely opaque. However, gaining the trust of the international community has proved to be a steep uphill battle for Huawei: “Huawei is a global company, operating in 170 countries. If it became clear that Huawei was simply an arm of the Chinese government and was doing Beijing’s bidding at every turn, it wouldn’t be able to operate as a global company. The problem here is that the company is forced to prove a negative.” 38:27: Paul speaks about the globalization of supply chains: “…the problem is, for 30 years, companies have been told, ‘Optimize your supply chains and go to places like China,’ where there has been cheaper labor. But now it’s really more about skilled labor, not about cheaper labor — it’s about skilled engineers. Foxconn can build a facility to build iPhones in Zhejiang and easily find 30,000 engineers to staff it up, but when it goes to Wisconsin, it has a lot of problems.” Recommendations: Jeremy: Dr. Seuss, You’re Only Old Once!: A Book for Obsolete Children, a fun story of aging and falling apart. Samm: The Chilling Adventure of Sabrina, the Netflix reboot of the classic TV series Sabrina, the Teenage Witch. Paul: A close read of the book AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order, by Kai-Fu Lee 李开复. Kaiser: “The Huawei fallout leaves companies and countries with an impossible choice,” a Washington Post op-ed by Scott Moore.  

In this episode of the China Tech Investor Podcast powered by TechNode, hosts Elliott Zaagman and James Hull take a look back at some of the big events of 2018 and make some predictions about 2019, including the much-rumored Ant Financial IPO. They are also joined by Paul Triolo, the Head of Global Technology Policy at Eurasia Group, to talk about the tech "Cold War." He has spent the better part of the past three decades focusing on China, the US, and the geopolitics of technology.

China’s “Made in China 2025” policy to upgrade its industry plays a central role in the ongoing U.S.-China trade tensions. Paul Haenle sat down with Paul Triolo, practice head of Geo-technology at the Eurasia Group, to discuss how the initiative impacts and challenges the U.S. and global economies, and how best to formulate policies in response.