Podcasts about Chongqing

This week on Sinica, I speak with Yi-Ling Liu, journalist, former China editor at Rest of World, and author of the new book The Wall Dancers: Searching for Freedom and Connection on the Chinese Internet. Yi-Ling's book traces the arc of Chinese online life through five protagonists — a rapper, a gay rights entrepreneur, a feminist activist, a science fiction writer, and an internet censor — each navigating the creative and constrictive forces of the Chinese internet in their own way. The result is a deeply reported, novelistic account of what it felt like to live, create, and push back in one of the most surveilled and dynamic digital environments on earth. We discuss the book's central metaphor of "dancing in shackles," the early utopian glow of Chinese netizen culture, the parallel fates of hip hop and science fiction under the state's alternating embrace and constraint, and the eerie convergence between the Chinese internet and our own.0:06 — "Wall dancers" as a metaphor: what it captures that "dissident" or "netizen" doesn't0:09 — Why 网民 (wǎngmín) took root in China as a concept of digital citizenship0:13 — The early Chinese internet: more open than we remember, but not as free as the myth suggests0:15 — Ma Baoli: closeted cop to CEO of China's largest gay dating app, and the Gay Talese reporting strategy0:20 — Lan Yu, Beijing Story, and the film that became a coming-out moment for a generation of queer men0:22 — Pragmatism at the heart of the dance: how individuals and the state negotiated the internet together0:28 — Lu Pin and Feminist Voices: from "playing boundary ball" to sudden exile0:35 — Stanley Chen Qiufan and the state's attempt to co-opt science fiction for nationalist ends0:43 — The generational split in Chinese sci-fi: Liu Cixin's cosmic scale vs. the near-future unease of Chen Qiufan and Hao Jingfang0:46 — Hip hop's arc: from underground scenes in Chengdu and Beijing to The Rap of China and sudden constraint0:51 — Eric Liu, the Weibo censor: humanizing the firewall from the inside0:55 — Common prosperity, Wang Huning, and the moral panic behind the crackdown on "effeminate" culture0:59 — Techno-utopianism in retrospect: was the emancipatory internet always a fantasy?1:03 — The convergence of the Chinese and American internets: Weibo and Twitter, TikTok and Oracle1:07 — What it means to be free: how the book expanded Yi-Ling's sense of what freedoms people actually wantPaying it forward: Zeyi Yang, technology reporter at WIRED, and co-author (with Louise Matsakis) of the excellent tech x China newsletter Made in ChinaRecommendations:Yi-Ling: The Loneliness of Sonia and Sunny by Kiran Desai; Machine Decision is Not Final, an anthology of essays on Chinese AI compiled by scholars affiliated with NYU Shanghai.Kaiser: The Coming Storm: Power, Conflict and Warnings from History by Odd Arne Westad (forthcoming); Essays from Pallavi Aiyar's Substack The Global Jigsaw, particularly "How Has China Succeeded in Making People Mind their Manners" and "Why I Would Rather Be Born Chinese than Indian Today."See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

C'est une idée qui peut sembler complètement folle : supprimer les feux rouges, retirer les panneaux, effacer les marquages au sol… Bref, laisser la route “nue”.Et pourtant, aux Pays-Bas, cette approche porte un nom : les “naked roads”, les routes dénudées.Dans le petit village d'Oosterwolde, dans le centre du pays, cette mesure a été adoptée avec un objectif clair : responsabiliser les conducteurs. Plus de signalisation verticale, très peu de marquages au sol, pas de feux tricolores. Résultat ? Moins d'accidents.Pourquoi ça fonctionne ? Parce que lorsque les repères habituels disparaissent, les conducteurs redoublent d'attention. Ils ne peuvent plus se reposer sur un feu vert ou un panneau pour décider. Ils doivent observer, anticiper, établir un contact visuel avec les autres usagers : piétons, cyclistes, automobilistes.On recrée en réalité un espace partagé où chacun devient acteur de la sécurité collective. La règle reste simple : limitation à 30 km/h, priorité de droite et priorité aux piétons. Mais l'absence de balisage impose une vigilance constante.Et ce n'est pas un cas isolé. Il y a déjà 25 ans, la ville de Drachten avait supprimé une grande partie de ses feux et panneaux. Certaines zones n'ont même plus de trottoirs clairement délimités. On parle d'une diminution des accidents pouvant aller jusqu'à 85 %. Aujourd'hui, entre 150 et 200 communes néerlandaises ont adopté ce principe de circulation partagée.Visuellement, cela peut sembler chaotique. Mais c'est précisément ce léger inconfort qui oblige chacun à ralentir et à faire preuve de prudence.Autre pays, autre stratégie : direction la Chine. Dans la ville de Chongqing, un centre d'essai unique au monde teste les véhicules dans des conditions extrêmes. L'objectif ? Mettre à l'épreuve les systèmes avancés d'aide à la conduite.On y simule des pluies diluviennes, un brouillard dense, des chaussées glissantes. Mais ce n'est pas tout : on recrée aussi des scénarios imprévisibles. Un piéton surgit d'un angle mort. Une voiture recule brusquement. Un obstacle apparaît soudainement.Ces tests permettent d'analyser la réaction des capteurs, des radars, des systèmes de freinage automatique ou d'assistance au maintien de voie. L'idée est d'anticiper les situations les plus critiques pour améliorer la fiabilité des technologies embarquées.Si l'Europe est plutôt en avance sur certaines réglementations liées aux aides à la conduite – plusieurs dispositifs deviendront d'ailleurs obligatoires prochainement – la Chine se distingue ici par l'ampleur et la sophistication de ses infrastructures d'essai.Deux visions donc, très différentes mais complémentaires. Aux Pays-Bas, on mise sur le comportement humain, sur la responsabilité individuelle et l'attention mutuelle. En Chine, on investit massivement dans la technologie et l'anticipation des scénarios extrêmes. Dans les deux cas, le même objectif : réduire les accidents et sauver des vies.Finalement, que ce soit par la sobriété des aménagements ou par la haute technologie, la sécurité routière repose toujours sur un équilibre fragile entre vigilance humaine et innovation. Et peut-être que la vraie solution se trouve quelque part entre les deux.Vous aimez ce contenu ? Alors n'hésitez pas à vous abonner, à lui donner des étoiles et à partager ce podcast autour de vous. Ça nous aide à nous faire connaitre et à essaimer les idées constructives qui rendent le monde plus joli ! Une chronique signée Leslie Rijmenams à retrouver (aussi) sur Nostalgie et www.nostalgie.be

This week on Sinica, I speak with Kyle Chan, a fellow at the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings, previously a postdoc at Princeton, and author of the outstanding High-Capacity Newsletter on Substack. Kyle has emerged as one of the sharpest and most empirically grounded voices on U.S.-China technology relations, and he holds the all-time record for the most namechecks on Sinica's “Paying it forward” segment. We use his recent Financial Times op-ed on “The Great Reversal” in global technology flows and his longer High-Capacity essay on re-coupling as jumping-off points for a wide-ranging conversation about where China now sits at the global technological frontier, why the dominant decoupling narrative misses powerful structural forces pulling the two economies back together, and what all of this means for innovation, choke points, and the global tech ecosystem.4:35 – How Kyle became Kyle Chan: from Chicago School economics to development, railways, and systems thinking 12:50 – The Great Reversal: China at the technological frontier, from megawatt EV charging to LFP batteries 17:59 – The electro-industrial tech stack and China's overlapping, mutually reinforcing tech ecosystems 22:40 – Industrial strategy and time horizons: patience, persistence, and the long arc of China's auto industry 33:45 – Re-coupling under pressure: Waymo and Zeekr, Unitree robots, and the structural forces binding the two economies 40:22 – The gravity model: can political distance overwhelm technological mass? 47:01 – What China still wants from the U.S.: Cursor, GitHub, talent, and the AI brain drain 51:52 – Weaponized interdependence and the danger of securitizing everything 57:30 – Firm-level adaptation: HeyGen, Manus, and the playbook for de-sinification 1:02:58 – The view from the middle: Gulf states, Southeast Asia, and India as geopolitical arbitrageurs 1:10:18 – Engineering resilience: what policymakers are getting wrong about the systems they're buildingPaying it forward: Katrina Northrop; Grace Shao and her AI Proem newsletterRecommendations:Kyle: Wired Magazine's Made in China newsletter (by Zeyi Yang and Louise Matsakis); The Wire China Kaiser: The Wall Dancers: Searching for Freedom and Connection on the Chinese Internet by Yi-Ling LiuSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, I speak with Patricia Kim, a Fellow at the Brookings Institution's John L. Thornton China Center, where she focuses on U.S. policy toward China and the broader Asia Pacific. One year into Donald Trump's second term, Pattie and her colleague Joyce Yang have published a comprehensive Brookings assessment titled "Making America Great Again? Evaluating Trump's China strategy at the one-year mark," which examines whether the administration's stated objectives on reindustrialization, AI leadership, strategic dependence, and global standing are actually being met. We discuss the paradox of Trump's China policy (which is surprising consistency in goals despite the absence of a formal strategy document), with its mixed results on economic rebalancing and supply chain security, the troubling deterioration in U.S.-China diplomatic and military channels, and why the administration's approach to allies and partners may be undermining its own objectives. Pattie brings analytical discipline and empirical rigor to debates that are often long on rhetoric and short on evidence, cutting through a lot of noise to assess what's actually working, what isn't, and where the strategy is running up against reality.4:45 – Does Trump have a China strategy? Consistency without a formal framework8:15 – Assessing the economic rebalancing goals: reindustrialization and tariffs15:30 – Technology competition: export controls and AI leadership23:45 – Supply chain security and strategic dependence challenges31:20 – The deterioration of diplomatic and military-to-military channels39:50 – The ally and partner problem: how Trump's approach undermines his own goals47:15 – Global standing and American credibility in the Trump era52:30 – Paying it forward: The Lost in Translation series at BrookingsPaying it forward:Lost in Translation Series (Brookings Global China Project)Recommendations:Pattie: To Dare Mighty Things by Michael O'HanlonKaiser: Stalingrad by Vasily GrossmanSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Welcome to a special episode of Barbarians at the Gate. David and Jeremiah are off this week preparing for Chinese New Year, but as a special gift to our listeners, we are cross-posting this bonus episode about the life and China travels of the American writer Emily "Mickey" Hahn. This episode is from By Their Own Compass, a podcast looking at historical travelers and past journeys co-hosted by Jeremiah with travel expert Sarah Keenlyside.Emily Hahn partied with poets (and her pet gibbon) at Shanghai soirees. Wrote biographies while dodging bombs in wartime Chongqing, and did her best to keep herself and her family alive in Japanese-occupied Hong Kong. Along the way, she became famous (some might add “notorious”) for her affairs, including with Chinese writer Sinmay Zau (Shao Xunmei 邵洵美) and the head of British intelligence in Hong Kong, Charles Boxer.Mickey lived through some of China's most tumultuous moments. While many foreigners experienced these events, Mickey gave her readers an unvarnished look at what was happening, with a style all her own.We hope you enjoy this special bonus episode. Follow By Their Own Compass at bytheirowncompass.com or search for By Their Own Compass on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or where you get your podcasts.Links:Books referenced in the episodeChina to Me by Emily HahnNobody Said Not To Go by Ken Cuthbertson (biography of Emily Hahn)I Wonder as I Wander: An Autobiographical Journey by Langston HughesThe Soong Sisters by Emily HahnTours & Resources:Historic Shanghai - walking tours (Patrick Cranley and Tina Kanagarathnam)Further Reading:Her Lotus Year: China, the Roaring Twenties, and the Making of Wallis Simpson by Paul FrenchHong Kong Holiday by Emily HahnNo Hurry to Get Home: A Memoir by Emily HahnMr Pan by Emily Hahn

Hvordan planlegger vi for det uforutsette? Krig, pandemi, naturkatastrofer og konsekvensene av et klima i endring? Håvard Breivik-Khan er tilbake i podkasten! Håvard er arkitekt, forsker og ekspert på internasjonal beredskapsplanlegging og krisehåndtering. Gjennom Flyktninghjelpens beredskapsstyrke NORCAP har han vært utplassert til departementer i Moldova og Romania, og til FN-organisasjoner i Haiti, Nepal, Nord-Makedonia og Ungarn, og til FNs hovedkvarter i New York. Han er medgrunnlegger av In Transit Studio ved Arkitektur- og designhøgskolen i Oslo (AHO), etablert i 2016 i samarbeid med NORCAP, som knytter sammen arkitektur, urbanisme og global fordrivelse. Håvard har bred undervisnings- og forskningserfaring fra institusjoner i USA og Europa. Han har doktorgrad og mastergrad i arkitektur fra AHO, Institutt for urbanisme og landskap, med studieopphold i Paris (ENSAPLV), Shanghai og Chongqing. Les mer fra Håvard ved å følge lenkene under. Beredskapsarkitektur for hverdagslivet Arkitektur 29. oktober, 2025 Hvor skal vi henge med beredskapsvennene våre? Klassekampen 11. november, 2025 Slik kan vi planlegge for beredskap som skaper gode hverdagsliv AHO Towards an architecture of non-exceptional humanitarian spaces  The Mountain Hall and the Smart Club: The Architecture of Emergency Reception in Norwegian Cities Non-exceptional humanitarian spaces: the emergency reception of Ukrainian refugees as contingency planning for domestic mass displacement in Romania Send oss alle ideer og innspill til atr@lpo.no, og følg oss på Instagram da vel! 

This week on Sinica, I speak with Ryan Hass, director of the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings and one of the most clear-eyed analysts of the U.S.-China relationship working today. Ryan was director for China at the NSC during the Obama Administration.As Donald Trump moves through his second year in office, the bilateral relationship has defied easy characterization. The once-dominant language of great power competition has receded, China hawks have been sidelined, and Trump's personalistic approach—marked by praise for Xi Jinping and a willingness to bracket ideological disputes—represents a sharp departure from recent Washington orthodoxy.Ryan has just published an essay laying out three plausible pathways for the relationship under Trump: a soft landing, a hard split, or what he considers most likely—a period of uneasy calm in which both sides seek stability not out of trust, but out of mutual constraint. We discuss Trump's apparent strategy, the vibe shift in American attitudes, Beijing's choice between managing Trump versus managing uncertainty, the critical importance of Xi's planned April visit, and whether we're headed toward genuine stabilization or just buying time before the next collision.5:24 – Trump's approach: respect for Xi, military deterrence, and the rare earths constraint8:03 – The vibe shift and Trump's “reptilian feel” for American exhaustion with confrontation10:52 – Three scenarios: soft landing, hard split, or uneasy calm through mutual constraint16:30 – Beijing's bet: managing Trump versus managing whoever comes next26:46 – Economic interdependence and why decoupling is like “separating egg whites from a scrambled egg”37:12 – The April visit as a critical test: pageantry, protests, and what both sides are watching for42:18 – Taiwan as the most dangerous variable and where theory meets practice46:58 – Lack of institutional guardrails and the risks of Trump's personalistic foreign policyPaying it forward:Audrye Wong (USC)Recommendations:Ryan: The Conscience of the Party: Hu Yaobang, China's Communist Reformer by Robert SuettingerKaiser: The Last Cavalier (Le Chevalier de Sainte-Hermine) by Alexandre Dumas; Asia Society conversation with Lizzi Lee, Bert Hoffmann, and Gerard DiPippo on rebalancing China's economy; Trivium China Podcast with Andrew Polk, Joe Peissel, Danny McMahon, and Cory Combs on capital expenditure headwindsSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Last time we spoke about the battle of Nanchang. After securing Hainan and targeting Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway corridors, Japan's 11th Army, backed by armor, air power, and riverine operations, sought a rapid, surgical seizure of Nanchang to sever eastern Chinese logistics and coerce Chongqing. China, reorganizing under Chiang Kai-shek, concentrated over 200,000 troops across 52 divisions in the Ninth and Third War Zones, with Xue Yue commanding the 9th War Zone in defense of Wuhan-Nanchang corridors. The fighting began with German-style, combined-arms river operations along the Xiushui and Gan rivers, including feints, river crossings, and heavy artillery, sometimes using poison gas. From March 20–23, Japanese forces established a beachhead and advanced into Fengxin, Shengmi, and later Nanchang, despite stiff Chinese resistance and bridges being destroyed. Chiang's strategic shift toward attrition pushed for broader offensives to disrupt railways and rear areas, though Chinese plans for a counteroffensive repeatedly stalled due to logistics and coordination issues. By early May, Japanese forces encircled and captured Nanchang, albeit at heavy cost, with Chinese casualties surpassing 43,000 dead and Japanese losses over 2,200 dead.    #187 The Battle of Suixian–Zaoyang-Shatow Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Having seized Wuhan in a brutal offensive the previous year, the Japanese sought not just to hold their ground but to solidify their grip on this vital hub. Wuhan, a bustling metropolis at the confluence of the Yangtze and Han Rivers, had become a linchpin in their strategy, a base from which they could project power across central China. Yet, the city was far from secure, Chinese troops in northern Hubei and southern Henan, perched above the mighty Yangtze, posed an unrelenting threat. To relieve the mounting pressure on their newfound stronghold, the Japanese high command orchestrated a bold offensive against the towns of Suixian and Zaoyang. They aimed to annihilate the main force of the Chinese 5th War Zone, a move that would crush the Nationalist resistance in the region and secure their flanks. This theater of war, freshly designated as the 5th War Zone after the grueling Battle of Wuhan, encompassed a vast expanse west of Shashi in the upper Yangtze basin. It stretched across northern Hubei, southern Henan, and the rugged Dabie Mountains in eastern Anhui, forming a strategic bulwark that guarded the eastern approaches to Sichuan, the very heartland of the Nationalist government's central institutions. Historian Rana Mitter in Forgotten Ally described this zone as "a gateway of immense importance, a natural fortress that could either serve as a launchpad for offensives against Japanese-held territories or a defensive redoubt protecting the rear areas of Sichuan and Shaanxi". The terrain itself was a defender's dream and an attacker's nightmare: to the east rose the imposing Dabie Mountains, their peaks cloaked in mist and folklore; the Tongbai Mountains sliced across the north like a jagged spine; the Jing Mountains guarded the west; the Yangtze River snaked southward, its waters a formidable barrier; the Dahong Mountains dominated the center, offering hidden valleys for ambushes; and the Han River (also known as the Xiang River) carved a north-south path through it all. Two critical transport arteries—the Hanyi Road linking Hankou to Yichang in Hubei, and the Xianghua Road connecting Xiangyang to Huayuan near Hankou—crisscrossed this landscape, integrating the war zone into a web of mobility. From here, Chinese forces could menace the vital Pinghan Railway, that iron lifeline running from Beiping (modern Beijing) to Hankou, while also threatening the Wuhan region itself. In retreat, it provided a sanctuary to shield the Nationalist heartlands. As military strategist Sun Tzu might have appreciated, this area had long been a magnet for generals, its contours shaping the fates of empires since ancient times. Despite the 5th War Zone's intricate troop deployments, marked by units of varying combat prowess and a glaring shortage of heavy weapons, the Chinese forces made masterful use of the terrain to harass their invaders. Drawing from accounts in Li Zongren's memoirs, he noted how these defenders, often outgunned but never outmaneuvered, turned hills into fortresses and rivers into moats. In early April 1939, as spring rains turned paths to mud, Chinese troops ramped up their disruptions along the southern stretches of the Pinghan Railway, striking from both eastern and western flanks with guerrilla precision. What truly rattled the Japanese garrison in Wuhan was the arrival of reinforcements: six full divisions redeployed to Zaoyang, bolstering the Chinese capacity to launch flanking assaults that could unravel Japanese supply lines. Alarmed by this buildup, the Japanese 11th Army, ensconced in the Wuhan area under the command of General Yasuji Okamura, a figure whose tactical acumen would later earn him notoriety in the Pacific War, devised a daring plan. They intended to plunge deep into the 5th War Zone, smashing the core of the Chinese forces and rendering them impotent, thereby neutralizing the northwestern threat to Wuhan once and for all. From April onward, the Japanese mobilized with meticulous preparation, amassing troops equipped with formidable artillery, rumbling tanks, and squadrons of aircraft that darkened the skies. Historians estimate they committed roughly three and a half divisions to this endeavor, as detailed in Edward J. Drea's In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army. Employing a classic pincer movement, a two-flank encirclement coupled with a central breakthrough, they aimed for a swift, decisive strike to obliterate the main Chinese force in the narrow Suixian-Zaoyang corridor, squeezed between the Tongbai and Dahong Mountains. The offensive erupted in full fury on May 1, 1939, as Japanese columns surged forward like a tidal wave, their engines roaring and banners fluttering in the dust-choked air. General Li Zongren, the commander of the 5th War Zone, a man whose leadership had already shone in earlier campaigns like the defense of Tai'erzhuang in 1938, issued urgent orders to cease offensive actions against the Japanese and pivot to a defensive stance. Based on intelligence about the enemy's dispositions, Li orchestrated a comprehensive campaign structure, assigning precise defensive roles and battle plans to each unit. This was no haphazard scramble; it was a symphony of strategy, as Li himself recounted in his memoirs, emphasizing the need to exploit the terrain's natural advantages. While various Chinese war zones executed the "April Offensive" from late April to mid-May, actively harrying and containing Japanese forces, the 5th War Zone focused its energies on the southern segment of the Pinghan Railway, assaulting it from both sides in a bid to disrupt logistics. The main force of the 31st Army Group, under the command of Tang Enbo, a general known for his aggressive tactics and later criticized for corruption, shifted from elsewhere in Hubei to Zaoyang, fortifying the zone and posing a dire threat to the Japanese flanks and rear areas. To counter this peril and safeguard transportation along the Wuhan-Pinghan Railway, the Japanese, led by the formidable Okamura, unleashed their assault from the line stretching through Xinyang, Yingshan, and Zhongxiang. Mobilizing the 3rd, 13th, and 16th Divisions alongside the 2nd and 4th Cavalry Brigades, they charged toward the Suixian-Zaoyang region in western Hubei, intent on eradicating the Chinese main force and alleviating the siege-like pressure on Wuhan. In a masterful reorganization, Li Zongren divided his forces into two army groups, the left and right, plus a dedicated river defense army. His strategy was a blend of attrition and opportunism: harnessing the Tongbai and Dahong Mountains, clinging to key towns like lifelines, and grinding down the Japanese through prolonged warfare while biding time for a counterstroke. This approach echoed the Fabian tactics of ancient Rome, wearing the enemy thin before delivering the coup de grâce. The storm broke at dawn on May 1, when the main contingents of the Japanese 16th and 13th Divisions, bolstered by the 4th Cavalry Brigade from their bases in Zhongxiang and Jingshan, hurled themselves against the Chinese 37th and 180th Divisions of the Right Army Group. Supported by droning aircraft that strafed from above and tanks that churned the earth below, the Japanese advanced with mechanical precision. By May 4, they had shattered the defensive lines flanking Changshoudian, then surged along the east bank of the Xiang River toward Zaoyang in a massive offensive. Fierce combat raged through May 5, as described in Japanese war diaries compiled in Senshi Sōsho (the official Japanese war history series), where soldiers recounted the relentless Chinese resistance amid the smoke and clamor. The Japanese finally breached the defenses, turning their fury on the 122nd Division of the 41st Army. In a heroic stand, the 180th Division clung to Changshoudian, providing cover for the main force's retreat along the east-west Huangqi'an line. The 37th Division fell back to the Yaojiahe line, while elements of the 38th Division repositioned into Liushuigou. On May 6, the Japanese seized Changshoudian, punched through Huangqi'an, and drove northward, unleashing a devastating assault on the 122nd Division's positions near Wenjiamiao. Undeterred, Chinese defenders executed daring flanking maneuvers in the Fenglehe, Yaojiahe, Liushuihe, Shuanghe, and Zhangjiaji areas, turning the landscape into a labyrinth of ambushes. May 7 saw the Japanese pressing on, capturing Zhangjiaji and Shuanghe. By May 8, they assaulted Maozifan and Xinji, where ferocious battles erupted, soldiers clashing in hand-to-hand combat amid the ruins. By May 10, the Japanese had overrun Huyang Town and Xinye, advancing toward Tanghe and the northeastern fringes of Zaoyang. Yet, the Tanghe River front witnessed partial Chinese recoveries: remnants of the Right Army Group, alongside troops from east of the Xianghe, reclaimed Xinye. The 122nd and 180th Divisions withdrew north of Tanghe and Fancheng, while the 37th, 38th, and 132nd Divisions steadfastly held the east bank of the Xianghe River. Concurrently, the main force of the Japanese 3rd Division launched from Yingshan against the 84th and 13th Armies of the 11th Group Army in the Suixian sector. After a whirlwind of combat, the Chinese 84th Army retreated to the Taerwan position. On May 2, the 3rd Division targeted the Gaocheng position of the 13th Army within the 31st Group Army; the ensuing clashes in Taerwan and Gaocheng were a maelstrom of fire, with the Taerwan position exchanging hands multiple times like a deadly game of tug-of-war. By May 4, in a grim escalation, Japanese forces deployed poison gas, a violation of international norms that drew condemnation and is documented in Allied reports from the era, inflicting horrific casualties and compelling the Chinese to relinquish Gaocheng, which fell into enemy hands. On May 5, backed by aerial bombardments, tank charges, and artillery barrages, the Japanese renewed their onslaught along the Gaocheng River and the Lishan-Jiangjiahe line. By May 6, the beleaguered Chinese were forced back to the Tianhekou and Gaocheng line. Suixian succumbed on May 7. On May 8, the Japanese shattered the second line of the 84th Army, capturing Zaoyang and advancing on the Jiangtoudian position of the 85th Army. To evade encirclement, the defenders mounted a valiant resistance before withdrawing from Jiangtoudian; the 84th Army relocated to the Tanghe and Baihe areas, while the 39th Army embedded itself in the Dahongshan for guerrilla operations—a tactic that would bleed the Japanese through hit-and-run warfare, as noted in guerrilla warfare studies by Mao Zedong himself. By May 10, the bulk of the 31st Army Group maneuvered toward Tanghe, reaching north of Biyang by May 15. From Xinyang, Japanese forces struck at Tongbai on May 8; by May 10, elements from Zaoyang advanced to Zhangdian Town and Shangtun Town. In response, the 68th Army of the 1st War Zone dispatched the 143rd Division to defend Queshan and Minggang, and the 119th Division to hold Tongbai. After staunchly blocking the Japanese, they withdrew on May 11 to positions northwest and southwest of Tongbai, shielding the retreat of 5th War Zone units. The Japanese 4th Cavalry Brigade drove toward Tanghe, seizing Tanghe County on May 12. But the tide was turning. In a brilliant reversal, the Fifth War Zone commanded the 31st Army Group, in concert with the 2nd Army Group from the 1st War Zone, to advance from southwestern Henan. Their mission: encircle the bulk of Japanese forces on the Xiangdong Plain and deliver a crushing blow. The main force of the 33rd Army Group targeted Zaoyang, while other units pinned down Japanese rear guards in Zhongxiang. The Chinese counteroffensive erupted with swift successes, Tanghe County was recaptured on May 14, and Tongbai liberated on May 16, shattering the Japanese encirclement scheme. On May 19, after four grueling days of combat, Chinese forces mauled the retreating Japanese, reclaiming Zaoyang and leaving the fields strewn with enemy dead. The 39th Army of the Left Army Group dispersed into the mountains for guerrilla warfare, a shadowy campaign of sabotage and surprise. Forces of the Right Army Group east of the river, along with river defense units, conducted relentless raids on Japanese rears and supply lines over multiple days, sowing chaos before withdrawing to the west bank of the Xiang River on May 21. On May 22, they pressed toward Suixian, recapturing it on May 23. The Japanese, battered and depleted, retreated to their original garrisons in Zhongxiang and Yingshan, restoring the pre-war lines as the battle drew to a close. Throughout this clash, the Chinese held a marked superiority in manpower and coordination, though their deployments lacked full flexibility, briefly placing them on the defensive. After protracted, blood-soaked fighting, they restored the original equilibrium. Despite grievous losses, the Chinese thwarted the Japanese encirclement and exacted a heavy toll, reports from the time, corroborated by Japanese records in Senshi Sōsho, indicate over 13,000 Japanese killed or wounded, with more than 5,000 corpses abandoned on the battlefield. This fulfilled the strategic goal of containing and eroding Japanese strength. Chinese casualties surpassed 25,000, a testament to the ferocity of the struggle. The 5th War Zone seized the initiative in advances and retreats, deftly shifting to outer lines and maintaining positional advantages. As Japanese forces withdrew, Chinese pursuers harried and obstructed them, yielding substantial victories. The Battle of Suizao spanned less than three weeks. The Japanese main force pierced defenses on the east bank of the Han River, advancing to encircle one flank as planned. However, the other two formations met fierce opposition near Suixian and northward, stalling their progress. Adapting to the battlefield's ebb and flow, the Fifth War Zone transformed its tactics: the main force escaped encirclement, maneuvered to outer lines for offensives, and exploited terrain to hammer the Japanese. The pivotal order to flip from defense to offense doomed the encirclement; with the counterattack triumphant, the Japanese declined to hold and retreated. The Chinese pursued with unyielding vigor. By May 24, they had reclaimed Zaoyang, Tongbai, and other locales. Save for Suixian County, the Japanese had fallen back to pre-war positions, reinstating the regional status quo. Thus, the battle concluded, a chapter of resilience etched into the chronicles of China's defiance. In the sweltering heat of southern China, where the humid air clung to every breath like a persistent fog, the Japanese General Staff basked in what they called a triumphant offensive and defensive campaign in Guangdong. But victory, as history so often teaches, is a double-edged sword. By early 1939, the strain was palpable. Their secret supply line snaking from the British colony of Hong Kong to the Chinese mainland was under constant disruption, raids by shadowy guerrilla bands, opportunistic smugglers, and the sheer unpredictability of wartime logistics turning what should have been a lifeline into a leaky sieve. Blockading the entire coastline? A pipe dream, given the vast, jagged shores of Guangdong, dotted with hidden coves and fishing villages that had evaded imperial edicts for centuries. Yet, the General Staff's priorities were unyielding, laser-focused on strangling the Nationalist capital of Chongqing through a relentless blockade. This meant the 21st Army, that workhorse of the Japanese invasion force, had to stay in the fight—no rest for the weary. Drawing from historical records like the Senshi Sōsho (War History Series) compiled by Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies, we know that after the 21st Army reported severing what they dubbed the "secret transport line" at Xinhui, a gritty, hard-fought skirmish that left the local landscape scarred with craters and abandoned supply crates, the General Staff circled back to the idea of a full coastal blockade. It was a classic case of military opportunism: staff officers, poring over maps in dimly lit war rooms in Tokyo, suddenly "discovered" Shantou as a major port. Not just any port, mind you, but a bustling hub tied to the heartstrings of Guangdong's overseas Chinese communities. Shantou and nearby Chao'an weren't mere dots on a map; they were the ancestral hometowns of countless Chaoshan people who had ventured abroad to Southeast Asia, sending back remittances that flowed like lifeblood into the region. Historical economic studies, such as those in The Overseas Chinese in the People's Republic of China by Stephen Fitzgerald, highlight how these funds from the Chaoshan diaspora, often funneled through family networks in places like Singapore and Thailand, were substantial, indirectly fueling China's war effort by sustaining local economies and even purchasing arms on the black market. The Chao-Shao Highway, that dusty artery running near Shantou, was pinpointed as a critical vein connecting Hong Kong's ports to the mainland's interior. So, in early June 1939, the die was cast: Army Order No. 310 thundered from headquarters, commanding the 21st Army to seize Shantou. The Chief of the General Staff himself provided the strategic blueprint, a personal touch that underscored the operation's gravity. The Army Department christened the Chaoshan push "Operation Hua," a nod perhaps to the flowery illusions of easy conquest, while instructing the Navy Department to tag along for the ride. In naval parlance, it became "Operation J," a cryptic label that masked the sheer scale unfolding. Under the Headquarters' watchful eye, what started as a modest blockade morphed into a massive amphibious assault, conjured seemingly out of thin air like a magician's trick, but one with deadly props. The 5th Fleet's orders mobilized an impressive lineup: the 9th Squadron for heavy hitting, the 5th Mine Boat Squadron to clear watery hazards, the 12th and 21st Sweeper Squadrons sweeping for mines like diligent janitors of the sea, the 45th Destroyer Squadron adding destroyer muscle, and air power from the 3rd Combined Air Group (boasting 24 land-based attack aircraft and 9 reconnaissance planes that could spot a fishing boat from miles away). Then there was the Chiyoda Air Group with its 9 reconnaissance aircraft, the Guangdong Air Group contributing a quirky airship and one more recon plane, the 9th Special Landing Squadron from Sasebo trained for beach assaults, and a flotilla of special ships for logistics. On the ground, the 21st Army threw in the 132nd Brigade from the 104th Division, beefed up with the 76th Infantry Battalion, two mountain artillery battalions for lobbing shells over rugged terrain, two engineer battalions to bridge rivers and clear paths, a light armored vehicle platoon rumbling with mechanized menace, and a river-crossing supplies company to keep the troops fed and armed. All under the command of Brigade Commander Juro Goto, a stern officer whose tactical acumen was forged in earlier Manchurian campaigns. The convoy's size demanded rehearsals; the 132nd Brigade trained for boat transfers at Magong in the Penghu Islands, practicing the precarious dance of loading men and gear onto rocking vessels under simulated fire. Secrecy shrouded the whole affair, many officers and soldiers, boarding ships in the dead of night, whispered among themselves that they were finally heading home to Japan, a cruel ruse to maintain operational security. For extra punch, the 21st Army tacked on the 31st Air Squadron for air support, their planes droning like angry hornets ready to sting. This overkill didn't sit well with everyone. Lieutenant General Ando Rikichi, the pragmatic commander overseeing Japanese forces in the region, must have fumed in his Guangzhou headquarters. His intelligence staff, drawing from intercepted radio chatter and local spies as noted in postwar analyses like The Japanese Army in World War II by Gordon L. Rottman, reported that the Chongqing forces in Chaozhou were laughably thin: just the 9th Independent Brigade, a couple of security regiments, and ragtag "self-defense groups" of armed civilians. Why unleash such a sledgehammer on a fly? The mobilization's magnitude even forced a reshuffling of defenses around Guangzhou, pulling resources from the 12th Army's front lines and overburdening the already stretched 18th Division. It was bureaucratic overreach at its finest, a testament to the Imperial Staff's penchant for grand gestures over tactical efficiency. Meanwhile, on the Nationalist side, the winds of war carried whispers of impending doom. The National Revolutionary Army's war histories, such as those compiled in the Zhongguo Kangri Zhanzheng Shi (History of China's War of Resistance Against Japan), note that Chiang Kai-shek's Military Commission had snagged intelligence as early as February 1939 about Japan's plans for a large-scale invasion of Shantou. The efficiency of the Military Command's Second Bureau and the Military Intelligence Bureau was nothing short of astonishing, networks of agents, double agents, and radio intercepts piercing the veil of Japanese secrecy. Even as the convoy slipped out of Penghu, a detailed report outlining operational orders landed on Commander Zhang Fakui's desk, the ink still fresh. Zhang, a battle-hardened strategist whose career spanned the Northern Expedition and beyond , had four months to prepare for what would be dubbed the decisive battle of Chaoshan. Yet, in a move that baffled some contemporaries, he chose not to fortify and defend it tooth and nail. After the Fourth War Zone submitted its opinions, likely heated debates in smoke-filled command posts, Chiang Kai-shek greenlit the plan. By March, the Military Commission issued its strategic policy: when the enemy hit Chaoshan, a sliver of regular troops would team up with civilian armed forces for mobile and guerrilla warfare, grinding down the invaders like sandpaper on steel. The orders specified guerrilla zones in Chaozhou, Jiaxing, and Huizhou, unifying local militias under a banner of "extensive guerrilla warfare" to coordinate with regular army maneuvers, gradually eroding the Japanese thrust. In essence, the 4th War Zone wasn't tasked with holding Chao'an and Shantou at all costs; instead, they'd strike hard during the landing, then let guerrillas harry the occupiers post-capture. It was a doctrine of attrition in a "confined battlefield," honing skills through maneuver and ambush. Remarkably, the fall of these cities was preordained by the Military Commission three months before the Japanese even issued their orders, a strategic feint that echoed ancient Sun Tzu tactics of yielding ground to preserve strength. To execute this, the 4th War Zone birthed the Chao-Jia-Hui Guerrilla Command after meticulous preparation, with General Zou Hong, head of Guangdong's Security Bureau and a no-nonsense administrator known for his anti-smuggling campaigns, taking the helm. In just three months, Zhang Fakui scraped together the Independent 9th Brigade, the 2nd, 4th, and 5th Guangdong Provincial Security Regiments, and the Security Training Regiment. Even with the 9th Army Group lurking nearby, he handed the reins of the Chao-Shan operation to the 12th Army Group's planners. Their March guidelines sketched three lines of resistance from the coast to the mountains, a staged withdrawal that allowed frontline defenders to melt away like ghosts. This blueprint mirrored Chiang Kai-shek's post-Wuhan reassessment, where the loss of that key city in 1938 prompted a shift to protracted warfare. A Xinhua News Agency columnist later summed it up scathingly: "The Chongqing government, having lost its will to resist, colludes with the Japanese and seeks to eliminate the Communists, adopting a policy of passive resistance." This narrative, propagated by Communist sources, dogged Chiang and the National Revolutionary Army for decades, painting them as defeatists even as they bled the Japanese dry through attrition. February 1939 saw Commander Zhang kicking off a reorganization of the 12th Army Group, transforming it from a patchwork force into something resembling a modern army. He could have hunkered down, assigning troops to a desperate defense of Chaoshan, but that would have handed the initiative to the overcautious Japanese General Staff, whose activism often bordered on paranoia. Zhang, with the wisdom of a seasoned general who had navigated the treacherous politics of pre-war China, weighed the scales carefully. His vision? Forge the 12th Army Group into a nimble field army, not squander tens of thousands on a secondary port. Japan's naval and air dominance—evident in the devastation of Shanghai in 1937, meant Guangdong's forces could be pulverized in Shantou just as easily. Losing Chaozhou and Shantou? Acceptable, if it preserved core strength for the long haul. Post-Xinhui, Zhang doubled down on resistance, channeling efforts into live-fire exercises for the 12th Army, turning green recruits into battle-ready soldiers amid the Guangdong hills. The war's trajectory after 1939 would vindicate him: his forces became pivotal in later counteroffensives, proving that a living army trumped dead cities. Opting out of a static defense, Zhang pivoted to guerrilla warfare to bleed the Japanese while clutching strategic initiative. He ordered local governments to whip up coastal guerrilla forces from Chao'an to Huizhou—melding militias, national guards, police, and private armed groups into official folds. These weren't elite shock troops, but in wartime's chaos, they controlled locales effectively, disrupting supply lines and gathering intel. For surprises, he unleashed two mobile units: the 9th Independent Brigade and the 20th Independent Brigade. Formed fresh after the War of Resistance erupted, these brigades shone for their efficiency within the cumbersome Guangdong Army structure. Division-level units were too bulky for spotty communications, so Yu Hanmou's command birthed these independent outfits, staffed with crack officers. The 9th, packing direct-fire artillery for punch, and the 20th, dubbed semi-mechanized for its truck-borne speed, prowled the Chaoshan–Huizhou coast from 1939. Zhang retained their three-regiment setup, naming Hua Zhenzhong and Zhang Shou as commanders, granting them autonomy to command in the field like roving wolves. As the 9th Independent Brigade shifted to Shantou, its 627th Regiment was still reorganizing in Heyuan, a logistical hiccup amid the scramble. Hua Zhenzhong, a commander noted for his tactical flexibility in regional annals, deployed the 625th Regiment and 5th Security Regiment along the coast, with the 626th as reserve in Chao'an. Though the Fourth War Zone had written off Chaoshan, Zhang yearned to showcase Guangdong grit before the pullback. Dawn broke on June 21, 1939, at 4:30 a.m., with Japanese reconnaissance planes slicing through the fog over Shantou, Anbu, and Nanbeigang, ghostly silhouettes against the gray sky. By 5:30, the mist lifted, revealing a nightmare armada: over 40 destroyers and 70–80 landing craft churning toward the coast on multiple vectors, their hulls cutting the waves like knives. The 626th Regiment's 3rd Battalion at Donghushan met the first wave with a hail of fire from six light machine guns, repelling the initial boats in a frenzy of splashes and shouts. But the brigade's long-range guns couldn't stem the tide; Hua focused on key chokepoints, aiming to bloody the invaders rather than obliterate them. By morning, the 3rd Battalion of the 625th Regiment charged into Shantou City, joined by the local police corps digging in amid urban sprawl. Combat raged at Xinjin Port and the airport's fringes, where Nationalist troops traded shots with advancing Japanese under the absent shadow of a Chinese navy. Japanese naval guns, massed offshore, pounded the outskirts like thunder gods in fury. By 2:00 a.m. on the 22nd, Shantou crumpled as defenders' ammo ran dry, the city falling in a haze of smoke and echoes. Before the loss, Hua had positioned the 1st Battalion of the 5th Security Regiment at Anbu, guarding the road to Chao'an. Local lore, preserved in oral histories collected by the Chaozhou Historical Society, recalls Battalion Commander Du Ruo leading from the front, rifle in hand, but Japanese barrages, bolstered by superior firepower—forced a retreat. Post-capture, Tokyo's forces paused to consolidate, unleashing massacres on fleeing civilians in the outskirts. A flotilla of civilian boats, intercepted at sea, became a grim training ground for bayonet drills, a barbarity echoed in survivor testimonies compiled in The Rape of Nanking and Beyond extensions to Guangdong atrocities. With Shantou gone, Hua pivoted to flank defense, orchestrating night raids on Japanese positions around Anbu and Meixi. On June 24th, Major Du Ruo spearheaded an assault into Anbu but fell gravely wounded amid the chaos. Later, the 2nd Battalion of the 626th overran spots near Meixi. A Japanese sea-flanking maneuver targeted Anbu, but Nationalists held at Liulong, sparking nocturnal clashes, grenade volleys, bayonet charges, and hand-to-hand brawls that drained both sides like a slow bleed. June 26th saw the 132nd Brigade lumber toward Chao'an. Hua weighed options: all-out assault or guerrilla fade? He chose to dig in on the outskirts, reserving two companies of the 625th and a special ops battalion in the city. The 27th brought a day-long Japanese onslaught, culminating in Chao'an's fall after fierce rear-guard actions by the 9th Independent Brigade. Evacuations preceded the collapse, with Japanese propaganda banners fluttering falsely, claiming Nationalists had abandoned defense. Yet Hua's call preserved his brigade for future fights; the Japanese claimed an empty prize. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese operations had yet again plugged up supply leaks into Nationalist China. The fall of Suixian, Zaoyang and Shantou were heavy losses for the Chinese war effort. However the Chinese were also able to exact heavy casualties on the invaders and thwarted their encirclement attempts. China was still in the fight for her life.

A burly tractor rumbles across the vast snowfield, hauling two snaking lines of adventurers. Each is nestled in an inflatable snow tube, all roped together, gliding effortlessly through the howling wind and swirling snow with cries of delight.一辆粗壮的拖拉机在辽阔的雪原上轰鸣前行，牵引着两条蜿蜒的游客队伍。游客们各自坐在充气雪圈中，被绳索串联在一起，在呼啸的寒风和飞旋的雪花中轻快滑行，欢呼声此起彼伏。At the Jingpo Lake scenic area in Ning'an, Heilongjiang province, the sled takes them to the lake's frozen heart to witness the traditional winter ice fishing.在黑龙江省宁安市的镜泊湖景区，雪橇将游客带到冰封湖面的核心区域，近距离观赏传统的冬季冰上捕鱼活动。The fishermen chant and carefully lower a massive net into the icy depths. The climax comes when dozens of them work together to haul the net up, revealing a spectacular harvest of fish leaping onto the ice.渔民们一边高声吟唱，一边小心翼翼地将巨大的渔网放入冰冷的湖水深处。高潮时刻随之到来，数十人齐心协力将渔网拉出水面，成群活蹦乱跳的鱼跃上冰面，场面蔚为壮观。"The cold bites, but the excitement is so real," said Liao Xiaohan, a 32-year-old tourist from Chongqing, who's bundled up from head to toe against the approximately — 18 C cold, with frozen eyelashes.“寒冷刺骨，但兴奋感是真切的。”32岁的重庆游客廖晓涵说。当天气温约为零下18摄氏度，她从头到脚裹得严严实实，睫毛上甚至结了霜。"The picturesque view of Jingpo, a magnificent volcanic lava barrier lake featured in school textbooks, has captivated me and made me long to see it for myself."“镜泊湖如画的景色令人陶醉。作为一座曾出现在中小学课本中的壮丽火山熔岩堰塞湖，它让我心生向往，迫切想亲眼看看。”The city of Ning'an was historically a dreaded cold frontier and a harsh land of exile during the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911). It was called Ningguta during the Ming and Qing dynasties (1368-1911). Its very name was once enough to make one tremble. Now, it draws visitors eager to delve into its poignant past, many of whom first heard of it through costume dramas.宁安市在历史上曾是清代（1644—1911年）令人闻之色变的寒冷边疆与流放之地。明清时期（1368—1911年），这里被称为“宁古塔”，仅其名号便足以令人心生畏惧。如今，这座城市吸引着渴望探寻其厚重历史的游客，其中不少人最初正是通过古装影视剧了解到这里。Growing up in the downtown area of Chongqing, where snow scarcely falls, Liao, like many people from China's warmer southern regions, said she always longs for the crisp chill and endless white expanse of a true northern winter.廖晓涵成长于几乎不下雪的重庆主城区。她表示，和许多来自中国南方温暖地区的人一样，自己始终向往北方冬季特有的凛冽寒意与一望无际的银白世界。In addition to traditional winter sports like skiing and skating, China's unique snow-based activities and immersive winter experiences are attracting domestic tourists such as Liao, as well as inbound tourists who benefit from China's facilitative visa-free policies and their expansion to more countries.除滑雪、滑冰等传统冬季运动外，中国独具特色的冰雪项目和沉浸式冬季体验，正吸引着廖晓涵这样的国内游客，同时也吸引了得益于中国便利化免签政策及其不断扩容的入境游客。During the ongoing ice and snow season, there is also a significant surge of inbound tourists to various winter destinations across China.在当前冰雪季期间，中国多地冬季旅游目的地迎来了入境游客数量的显著增长。Data from the General Administration of Sport of China showed that, in the first month of this year's ice and snow season, ski resorts across the country received a total of 35 million visitor trips, a year-on-year increase of 10 percent. The number of inbound visitors reached 190,000, marking a 66 percent increase compared with the same period last year.国家体育总局数据显示，今年冰雪季首月，全国滑雪场共接待游客3500万人次，同比增长10%。其中，入境游客达19万人次，同比增幅达66%。According to travel platform Trip.com Group's latest data, as of December, inbound bookings for ice and snow destinations have nearly doubled overall year-on-year. Among the most popular destinations, the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region saw an increase of 158 percent, while bookings for the Inner Mongolia autonomous region rose 141 percent and those for Hebei province were up 130 percent.据旅游平台携程集团最新数据显示，截至12月，冰雪目的地入境游订单整体同比接近翻倍。其中，新疆维吾尔自治区增幅达158%，内蒙古自治区增长141%，河北省增长130%。Booking data showed that the majority of inbound visitors came from Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea, Russia and Australia.预订数据显示，入境游客主要来自新加坡、马来西亚、泰国、韩国、俄罗斯和澳大利亚。Wu Liyun, a professor at Beijing International Studies University's China Academy of Culture and Tourism, said, "The popularity of Chinese winter destinations is extending to snow-scarce Southeast Asia, as well as to Russia, which is itself a winter destination.北京第二外国语学院中国文化和旅游产业研究院教授吴丽云表示：“中国冬季旅游目的地的热度正向缺乏降雪的东南亚地区延伸，同时也吸引了本身就是冬季旅游目的地的俄罗斯游客。”"For these inbound visitors, the draw is not just ice and snow, but also the diverse cultural experiences and festive activities in the winter setting," Wu said.吴丽云指出：“对这些入境游客而言，吸引力不仅在于冰雪本身，还包括冬季场景下丰富多样的文化体验和节庆活动。”According to Wang Xiaoxue, deputy head of the Mafengwo Tourism Research Institute in Beijing, popular winter destinations in northeastern China are upgrading their infrastructure and developing innovative offerings that blend ice and snow with live concerts, auroras, intangible cultural heritage, folk culture and travel photography.北京马蜂窝旅游研究院副院长王晓雪表示，中国东北地区的热门冬季旅游目的地正加快基础设施升级，并推出将冰雪与演唱会、极光、非物质文化遗产、民俗文化及旅拍相结合的创新产品。Wu added that Harbin, the capital of Heilongjiang province, recently began offering direct chartered flights to more Southeast Asian countries, which has also increased visitor arrivals.吴丽云补充说，黑龙江省省会哈尔滨近日开通了通往更多东南亚国家的直航包机航线，也进一步带动了游客数量增长。wintry fun /ˈwɪntri fʌn/冰雪乐趣ice fishing /aɪs ˈfɪʃɪŋ/冰上捕鱼volcanic lava barrier lake /vɒlˈkænɪk ˈlɑːvə ˈbæriə leɪk/火山熔岩堰塞湖land of exile /lænd əv ˈeksaɪl/流放之地intangible cultural heritage /ɪnˈtændʒəbl ˈkʌltʃərəl ˈherɪtɪdʒ/非物质文化遗产

Chine : Plus de 20.000 personnes évacuées après un séisme au Gansu;Michelin inaugure sa première "usine du futur" mondiale à Shanghai;Air China inaugure une nouvelle liaison directe entre Beijing et Abou Dhabi;Beijing occupe la première place nationale en termes de nombre de modèles d'IA enregistrés;Le Xizang affiche une croissance régulière du tourisme en 2025 ;Beijing prévoit d'étendre son réseau de métro de classe mondiale;L'énergie solaire en tête de la croissance de la capacité de production d'électricité en Chine;Les deux derniers pandas géants au Japon rentrent en Chine;Un parc à thème dédié aux chats fait sensation à Chongqing

This week on Sinica, I speak with Afra Wang, a writer working between London and the Bay Area, currently a fellow with Gov.AI. We're talking today about her recent WIRED piece on what might be China's most influential science fiction project you've never heard of: The Morning Star of Lingao (Língáo Qǐmíng 临高启明), a sprawling, crowdsourced novel about time travelers who bootstrap an industrial revolution in Ming Dynasty Hainan. More than a thought experiment in alternate history, it's the ur-text of China's "Industrial Party" (gōngyè dǎng 工业党) — the loose intellectual movement that sees engineering capability as the true source of national power. We discuss what the novel reveals about how China thinks about failure, modernity, and salvation, and why, just as Americans are waking up to China's industrial might, the worldview that helped produce it may already be losing its grip.5:27 – Being a cultural in-betweener: code-switching across moral and epistemic registers 10:25 – Double consciousness and converging aesthetic standards 12:05 – "The greatest Chinese science fiction" — an ironic title for a poorly written cult classic 14:18 – Bridging STEM and humanities: the KPI-coded language of tech optimization 16:08 – China's post-Industrial Party moment: from "try hard" to "lie flat" 17:01 – How widely known is Lingao? A cult Bible for China's techno-elite 19:11 – From crypto bros to DAO experiments: how Afra discovered the novel 21:25 – The canonical timeline: compiling chaos into collaborative fiction 23:06 – Guancha.cn (guānchá zhě wǎng 观察者网) and the Industrial Party's media ecosystem 26:05 – The Sentimental Party (Qínghuái Dǎng 情怀党): China's lost civic space 29:01 – The Wenzhou high-speed rail crash: the debate that defined the Industrial Party 33:19 – Controlled spoilers: colonizing Australia, the Maid Revolution, and tech trees 41:06 – Competence as salvation: obsessive attention to getting the details right 44:18 – The Needham question and the joy of transformation: from Robinson Crusoe to Primitive Technology 47:25 – "Never again": inherited historical vulnerability and the memory of chaos 49:20 – Wang Xiaodong, "China Is Unhappy," and the crystallization of Industrial Party ideology 51:33 – Gender and Lingao: a pre-feminist artifact and the rational case for equality 56:16 – Dan Wang's Breakneck and the "engineering state" framework 59:25 – New Quality Productive Forces (xīn zhì shēngchǎnlì 新质生产力): Industrial Party logic in CCP policy 1:03:43 – The reckoning: why Industrial Party intellectuals are losing their innocence 1:07:49 – What Lingao tells us about China today: the invisible infrastructure beneath the hot showerPaying it forward: The volunteer translators of The Morning Star of Lingao (English translation and GitHub resources)Xīn Xīn Rén Lèi / Pixel Perfect podcast (https://pixelperfect.typlog.io/) and the Bǎihuā (百花) podcasting community Recommendations:Afra: China Through European Eyes: 800 Years of Cultural and Intellectual Encounter, edited by Kerry Brown; The Wall Dancers: Searching for Freedom and Connection on the Chinese Internet by Yi-Ling Liu Kaiser: Destiny Disrupted: A History of the World Through Islamic Eyes by Tamim AnsarySee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Last time we spoke about the Japanese invasion of Hainan. In early 1939, the Sino-Japanese War shifted from pitched battles to a grueling struggle over lifelines and logistics. Japan pursued a southward strategy (Nanshin-ron), aiming to choke Chinese resistance by isolating key railways and airbases. It seized Hainan in February to secure southern airfields and threaten Indochina routes, then targeted Nanchang to cut the vital Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway, crippling Free China's eastern supply lines. The Japanese used a blended-arms approach: concentrated armor, air support, and amphibious and river operations, focusing on rapid, strategic breakthroughs rather than large-scale frontal assaults. China, though battered, relied on a reconstituted defense around Wuhan and Nanchang, with the Ninth War Zone under Xue Yue delaying Japanese advances and preserving critical corridors south of the Yangtze. The campaign highlighted the war's broader human and political dimensions: massive casualties, forced labor, and internal political fragility within the Kuomintang, even as both sides sought to outlast the other.   #186 The Battle of Nanchang Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. For the Second Sino-Japanese War, 1939 marked a transition from broad occupation tactics to a focused, politically driven military strategy aimed at breaking Nationalist cohesion and isolating key nodes. After the January 11, 1938 Imperial Conference, Tokyo framed the China Conflict as a contest of endurance and political attrition: hold occupied territories as strategic assets, push a narrow operational corridor between Anqing, Xinyang, Yuezhou, and Nanchang, and treat the broader east-of-line spaces as pacified. The aim was to deny resources to Chiang Kai-shek's regime while awaiting a more opportune political rupture, instead of pursuing indiscriminate conquest. By October 1938, the tactical center of gravity shifted toward Wuhan and the Yangtze corridor. General Headquarters acknowledged the need to adapt to a protracted war: emphasize political strategy alongside combat operations, bolster a new regime in areas under pressure, and gradually erode Chongqing's moral and material resolve. This shift produced a dual track: reinforce a centralized, secure core while permitting peripheral fronts to be leveraged against Chongqing.   In early 1939, Japan sought to consolidate gains through layered defenses and strategic war zones, aiming to blunt Chinese mobilization and disrupt critical logistics. The Ninth War Zone, commanded by Xue Yue, formed a defensive umbrella over Nanchang's northern approaches and the surrounding rail-and-river arteries. China's leadership, notably Chiang Kai-shek, pressed for preemption to seize the initiative: an ambitious plan from Xue Yue to strike by March 24, 1939, to prevent a river-crossing Japanese advance and to pin forces before they could entrench. Japan responded with Operation Ren, targeting the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway to sever lines of communication and isolate Nanchang. Okamura Yasuji reorganized heavy weapons into concentrated tank groups, supported by air power, while late-February 1939 movements staged feints and riverine maneuvers to complicate Chinese concentration around Nanchang. The objective was a rapid, surgical seizure of Nanchang to blind the southern airbase network, disrupt the critical rail spine, and push Chinese forces deeper inland, thereby tightening a blockade around southern China. Together, these shifts framed Nanchang not as an isolated objective but as the climactic hinge in a broader strategy of coercive pressure, air-ground mobility, and rail control. The city's fall would represent the culmination of a protracted contest to deny the Nationalist regime its logistical arteries and air superiority, paving the way for further Japanese consolidation and pressure along the Yangtze corridor. In the wake of the Japanese capture of Wuhan in late 1938, the city swiftly transformed into a pivotal stronghold for the Imperial Japanese Army. It became the new base for the 11th Army, occupying the former territories of the National Revolutionary Army's 5th and 9th War Zones. This shift not only consolidated Japanese control over central China but also positioned their forces to launch further offensives, exploiting the region's logistical and geographical advantages. As a key railway hub and the western terminus of the Zhejiang-Hunan Railway, Nanchang served as a vital supply artery connecting the Third and Ninth War Zones of the Nationalist forces. Its airfields further amplified its importance, posing a direct threat to Japanese shipping routes along the Yangtze River. Capturing Nanchang would sever Chinese supply lines, isolate key military districts, and pave the way for deeper incursions into southern China. Faced with this looming threat, the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek moved quickly to reorganize its defenses in the 9th War Zone. General Chen Cheng retained his nominal position as commander in chief, but the actual operational reins were handed to General Xue Yue, a seasoned tactician known for his defensive prowess. This restructuring aimed to streamline command and bolster resistance, yet it was hampered by persistent logistical challenges that rendered many changes ineffective on the ground. As tensions escalated in early 1939, Chinese forces began amassing near Nanchang in preparation for the inevitable clash. Over 200,000 troops from 52 divisions were mobilized, drawing from units across the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Border Area. This region alone housed more than 29 divisions organized into four army groups: the 1st, 19th, 30th, and 32nd. On paper, this formidable assembly included over 16,000 officers and 240,000 enlisted men, representing a significant concentration of Nationalist power.   Leading this defensive effort was General Chen Cheng as the overarching commander in chief, with General Xue Yue stepping in as the acting commander to oversee day-to-day operations. Within this structure, the 19th Army Group stood out under the command of General Luo Zhuoying, supported by Lieutenant General Luo Weixong as his chief of staff. Luo Zhuoying, in particular, emerged as a central figure, assuming overall command for much of the ensuing Battle of Nanchang. His leadership would be tested against the relentless advance of the Japanese Eleventh Army, setting the stage for one of the bloodiest engagements of the war. In July 1938, during their offensive against Wuhan, Japanese forces attempted to advance toward Nanchang but were halted by Chinese defenders along the Xiushui River. The Chinese had established strong, fortified positions that effectively barred the Japanese path. The impasse endured for the rest of the year, with both armies locked in a standoff on opposite sides of the river. By March of 1939, the 11th Army led by General Okamura Yasuji, part of the Central China Expeditionary Army of General Hata Shunroku comprised 3 divisions, the 6th, 101st and 106th, roughly 120,000 men supported by 130 tanks and tankettes, 200 pieces of artillery, 30 warships with 50 motor boats, a battalion of SNLF and several air squadrons.  On March 12,  the Japanese Central China Expeditionary Army issued orders to its directly subordinate 116th Division. This division was commanded to dispatch two key detachments: the Ishihara Detachment and the Murai Detachment, the latter composed meticulously of five battalions drawn from the 119th Brigade. Their mission was to conduct a thorough search along the eastern shore of Poyang Lake, supported by naval vessels that patrolled the waters with menacing precision. The purpose was multifaceted: to safeguard the integrity of land and water transportation routes and to protect the left flank of the main Japanese force as it prepared for larger operations. By March 15, these detachments had advanced without encountering any resistance from the Chinese army, allowing them to conclude their search operation successfully. Following this, they deployed the necessary troops at key points along the route, establishing garrisons that would serve as footholds for future advances. This reconnaissance was no mere stroll; it was a calculated probe into enemy territory, drawing lessons from prior engagements like the grueling Battle of Xuzhou in 1938, where intelligence gathering had proven crucial to Japanese successes. The Japanese soldiers boots sank into the marshy banks of Poyang Lake, China's largest freshwater body, covering over 3,500 square kilometers and teeming with reeds that could hide ambushes. The lack of opposition allowed the Japanese to fortify their positions, setting the stage for the preemptive strikes that would follow. The tempo of battle quickened on March 17, 1939, as the Japanese army launched its preemptive attack, a move designed to seize the initiative and disrupt Chinese preparations. The very next day, on March 18, the Murai Detachment departed from Xingzi aboard warships, navigating the treacherous waters to land near Wucheng, approximately 30 kilometers northeast of Yongxiu. Their objective was to assault the Chinese defenders in this area, but they encountered fierce resistance from the Chinese 32nd Army and other supporting units, turning the landing into a brutal contest of wills. Concurrently, the main forces of the Japanese 101st and 106th Divisions, bolstered by their artillery and tank units, advanced methodically toward the north bank of the Xiushui River. They occupied their respective attack starting points with precision, after which the artillery units began conducting test firings and further reconnaissance to gauge the strength of Chinese defenses. This phase echoed the Japanese tactics employed in the Battle of Shanghai in 1937, where combined arms operations had overwhelmed urban defenses. A Chinese defender's recollection "We watched the enemy approach like a dark cloud, our rifles ready, knowing that the river would soon run red with the blood of brothers." The climax of preparation erupted at exactly 16:30 on March 20, when the Japanese 11th Army issued orders to the commander of the 6th Artillery Brigade. This commander was directed to orchestrate all available artillery to bombard the positions held by the Chinese 49th and 79th Armies on the south bank of the Xiushui River. What ensued was a pre-general offensive artillery barrage that endured for more than three grueling hours, incorporating a large number of poison gas shells, a heinous weapon that flouted international conventions like the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Many defenders' positions were utterly destroyed in this onslaught, and several officers and soldiers, including the valiant Wang Lingyun, commander of the 76th Division, were poisoned by the toxic fumes, suffering agonizing effects that highlighted the barbarity of chemical warfare. At precisely 19:30 that evening, the 106th Division commenced its forced crossing of the Xiushui River at Qiujin. Later, on the night of the 20th, the 101st Division also initiated its crossing north of Tujiabu. The Xiushui River, measuring about 30 meters in width, had swollen by approximately 3 meters due to continual heavy rains, rendering the crossing exceedingly difficult for the Japanese troops who battled against the raging currents. Nevertheless, the flooding had an unintended benefit for the invaders: many defender positions were inundated, and most water obstacles were washed away by the deluge. Leveraging this, the two Japanese divisions broke through the defenders' front lines and executed continuous night attacks, establishing a beachhead that extended 2 kilometers deep by dawn on the 21st. This foothold provided essential cover for Japanese engineers to construct pontoon bridges amid the chaos. At around 8 a.m., the Japanese tank group crossed these pontoon bridges and launched an attack on the Dongshan garrison from the front of the 106th Division, then proceeded to circle around toward Nanchang along the west side of Nanxun Road. Historian Rana Mitter aptly describes such river crossings as "desperate gambles where nature itself became a combatant," underscoring how environmental factors often tipped the scales in Sino-Japanese confrontations.Chiang Kai-shek, monitoring these developments from his command center, would have felt the weight of impending crisis.   By 21:30 on March 22, the Japanese vanguard tank group had advanced to Fengxin and successfully occupied the Liaohe Bridge outside the South Gate. The sudden and ferocious tank attack caught the defending troops off guard, preventing them from withdrawing the 38 artillery pieces that had been deployed on the city's outskirts before they were forced into a hasty retreat. On March 23, the Japanese army fully occupied Fengxin. Simultaneously, a portion of the 101st Division launched a frontal assault along Nanxun Road. Under the protective cover of artillery, they crossed the Xiushui River and encountered fierce resistance from the Chinese 32nd Army at Tujiabu, resulting in a prolonged stalemate where neither side could gain a decisive advantage. Following the Japanese launch of their general offensive, the Guilin Headquarters of the National Government Military Commission, under Director Bai Chongxi, urgently ordered all units of the Ninth War Zone to hold their positions firmly on March 21. On the same day, Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed Gu Zhutong, commander-in-chief of the Third War Zone, with specific instructions to immediately transfer the 102nd Division to Nanchang to reinforce the city's defenses, placing it under the command of Luo Zhuoying, commander-in-chief of the 19th Army Group. He also ordered the 16th and 79th Divisions to proceed to Dongxiang and Jinxian, southeast of Nanchang, to guard the southern bank of Poyang Lake and provide support for operations in Nanchang. Simultaneously, he commanded the 19th Army Group to deploy approximately two divisions of its strongest forces to strike key enemy points in the rear, including Mahuiling, Ruichang, Jiujiang, and De'an, with the aim of sabotaging railways and highways, cutting off enemy rear-area transportation, and preventing reinforcements from reaching the front. However, due to poor communication, slow troop movements, and inadequate coordination among units, these ambitious plans were not implemented, and the battlefield situation had already undergone significant changes by the time adjustments could be made. On the 23rd, Chiang Kai-shek came to realize that the Japanese army was resolutely determined to capture Nanchang, and thus he conceived the strategic idea of inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy before potentially abandoning the city. He specifically telegraphed Xue Yue, commander-in-chief of the Ninth War Zone; Luo Zhuoying, commander-in-chief of the 19th Army Group; and Xiong Shihui, chairman of Jiangxi Province, with the following directive: "The key to this battle is not the gain or loss of Nanchang, but inflicting the greatest blow on the enemy. Even if Nanchang falls, all our armies should disregard everything and advance toward the designated targets, and decide on future operational plans in accordance with this policy." This telegram, preserved in wartime archives, exemplifies Chiang's shift toward a war of attrition, a tactic that would define much of China's resistance. On March 25, Chiang Kai-shek again telegraphed Bai Chongxi, Xue Yue, Luo Zhuoying, and Gu Zhutong, providing detailed instructions: "1. The main force of Luo's group should maintain focus on the Hunan-Jiangxi Highway, attack the enemy's right flank, and press them toward the Gan River. It is crucial to avoid having the main force operate with its back to the Gan River. (That is, the main force of the 19th Army Group should be moved to a mobile position west of the Gan River to avoid being forced to the Gan River and facing a decisive battle in an unfavorable situation.) 2. A necessary portion should be used to defend the Nanchang front. If necessary, resistance can be carried out gradually between the Fu and Gan Rivers to cover southern Jiangxi." On the very same day, the Japanese army defeated the 102nd Division, which had been reinforced from the Third War Zone, in engagements west of Nanchang. By March 26, the Japanese army had advanced to the vicinity of Shengmi Street on the left bank of the Gan River. They crossed the river that day, executing a maneuver to outflank Nanchang from the south and simultaneously cut off the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Railway, a critical supply line. The main force of the 101st Division also advanced to Shengmi Street via Wanbu and Huangxi on March 26, crossed the Gan River that evening, and launched a direct attack on Nanchang. Its 101st Brigade, moving along the Nanchang-Xuncheng Railway via Lehua and Jiaoqiao, reached the north bank of the Gan River northwest of Nanchang on the 26th. Upon discovering these Japanese advances, the 19th Army urgently ordered the 32nd Army to withdraw from Tujiabu on the Nanchang-Xuncheng Railway back to Nanchang to join the 102nd Division in defending the city. However, before the 32nd Army had fully withdrawn, the Japanese tank group and the 101st Brigade had already advanced to the Gan River bridges to the west and north of Nanchang, respectively. Although the defending forces managed to destroy the bridges to halt their progress west and north of the Gan River, the Japanese 101st Division had already penetrated into Nanchang from the south. The defenders found themselves outnumbered and with weak firepower compared to the invaders. After engaging in intense street fighting, they suffered heavy casualties and were ultimately ordered to retreat to Jinxian. On March 27, the Japanese 101st Division occupied Nanchang, marking a significant, albeit temporary, victory in their campaign. Eyewitness account "The city fell amid the thunder of guns and the wails of the wounded, a testament to the fragility of urban defenses against mechanized onslaught." Following the capture, on March 28, the Japanese 11th Army was ordered to ensure that the main force of the 101st Division would return to Nanchang and that the 106th Division would retake Fengxin, all in preparation for subsequent operations in Gao'an or areas west of Fengxin. By April 2, the Japanese army had occupied Gao'an City, further consolidating their hold on the region. Meanwhile the fighting extended to Wuning. Wuning is located on the north bank of the Xiushui River, approximately 80 kilometers west of the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railway. This position holds immense strategic importance, backed by the formidable Mufu Mountains, and serves as a key point on the left flank of the Ninth War Zone's defense line in northern Jiangxi. The forces deployed here included the 72nd and 78th Armies of the 30th Army Group, along with the 8th and 73rd Armies of the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Border Advance Army, all positioned along both banks of the Xiushui River under the unified command of Wang Lingji, commander-in-chief of the 30th Army Group. To bolster the defense of Nanchang, the Nationalist Government's Military Commission devised a plan to send a powerful force eastward from Wuning toward Qiujin and De'an, with the intent of harassing the rear and flanks of the enemy advancing south along the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railway and disrupting their transportation networks. After carefully assessing the Chinese deployments and strategic intentions, the Japanese 11th Army also regarded Wuning as a crucial flank in its overall Nanchang campaign. Consequently, they dispatched their 6th Division to Wuning to contain and block the Chinese army, thereby ensuring the safety of its main force's right flank and facilitating the capture of Nanchang. On March 20, while the Japanese army was heavily engaged on the Nanxun Railway front, its 6th Division launched an attack westward along the north bank of the Xiushui River from Ruoxi (situated between Qiujin and Wuning). However, they encountered fierce resistance from the Chinese 73rd and 8th Armies, which resulted in slow and painstaking progress for the attackers. On the afternoon of the 21st, a portion of the 6th Division, under the protective cover of aircraft and artillery, crossed the Xiushui River east of Ruoxi, and the main force directed its assault toward Wuning, while its 36th Brigade targeted Yangzhou Street. The 30th Army Group, tasked with defending Wuning, mounted a tenacious resistance by leveraging the advantageous mountainous terrain, making the Japanese advance extremely difficult. After four days of fierce and unrelenting fighting, the Japanese were still unable to break through the defenders' positions. On the morning of March 23, under continued air and artillery cover, the Japanese army persisted in its fierce attack, repeatedly dropping incendiary and chemical bombs on Chinese positions. The defending forces suffered heavy losses as a result and were compelled to withdraw from Wucheng Town on the 24th, moving farther back to regroup. After occupying Wucheng, the Murai Detachment continued its operations to clear the Gan River and Xiushui River of obstacles and to remove mines that had been laid by the Chinese forces. By the 28th, they had advanced to the vicinity of Xinning Town, which is about 4 kilometers east of Wuning. Its 36th Brigade engaged in fierce fighting with the defending 19th Division at Yangzhou Street on the 24th and successfully captured Jing'an on the 27th; however, due to the conclusion of the Nanchang battle and the fact that its main force was blocked east of Wuning, it quickly returned and redirected its attack toward Wuning. Because the 73rd and 8th Armies had suffered heavy casualties from days of intense fighting, the 30th Army Group ordered the 72nd Army to assume the defense of northeast Wuning. The Japanese 6th Division concentrated its forces for a fierce and coordinated assault, and by the 29th, the defending forces had retreated to the south bank of the Xiushui River, allowing the Japanese army to occupy Wuning. After further intense fighting, by April 5, the Japanese 36th Brigade had advanced to the south bank of the Xiushui River.During this entire period, Chiang Kai-shek repeatedly telegraphed Bai Chongxi and Xue Yue, issuing orders for the 30th Army Group in Wuning and the 31st Army Group in Chongyang and Tongshan (commanded by Tang Enbo) to launch a counteroffensive regardless of the evolving situation in Nanchang. The objective was to flank and attack the enemy's rear, advancing toward Mahuiling, De'an, Yongxiu, and Ruichang on the Nanchang-Xunyi road, to cut off enemy transportation lines and block reinforcements. However, this plan was not implemented due to various logistical and coordination challenges.   After the Japanese army captured Nanchang, it maintained a tense standoff with the Third and Ninth War Zones of China along the southeast bank of Poyang Lake to the east, Xiangtang to the south, and Gao'an, Fengxin, and Wuning to the west. The Military Commission of the National Government made a calculated judgment that although the Japanese had occupied Nanchang, they had suffered heavy losses and had not yet had the opportunity to replenish their forces. The defending forces within the city were deemed insufficient, prompting the Commission to decide on launching a counteroffensive while the Japanese army was still in the process of consolidating its position. At the same time, it ordered each war zone to initiate the "April Offensive" (also known as the "Spring Offensive") with the goals of harassing and containing the Japanese army and preventing it from continuing to advance westward toward Changsha. The Military Commission specifically ordered the Ninth War Zone and the Third War Zone to plan and execute a counteroffensive against Nanchang. The forces designated for this operation were planned to include the 1st, 19th, and 30th Army Groups of the Ninth War Zone and the 32nd Army Group of the Third War Zone, totaling about 10 divisions, all under the unified command of Luo Zhuoying, commander-in-chief of the 19th Army Group. On April 17, Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed his detailed "Plan to Conquer Nanchang" to Bai Chongxi, the director of the Guilin Headquarters, and sought his opinion on the matter. The operational strategy outlined was: "First, use the main force to attack the enemy along the Nanchang-Xunyi Railway, effectively cutting off enemy communications, and then use a portion of the force to directly capture Nanchang. The attack is scheduled to begin on April 24th." The main content of its troop deployment was as follows: The 1st Army Group (Commander-in-Chief Gao Yin-huai), the 19th Army Group, and the 74th Army (Commander Yu Ji-shi) were ordered to advance through Fengxin and Dacheng toward the Nanchang-Xunyi Railway between Xiushui and Nanchang, thoroughly disrupting transportation, cutting off enemy reinforcements, and cooperating in the capture of Nanchang; the 49th Army of the 19th Army Group (Commander Liu Duo-quan) was ordered to advance gradually as the general reserve; the 32nd Army Group (Commander-in-Chief Shangguan Yun-xiang) was ordered to attack Nanchang from the east of the Gan River with three divisions, and to organize a regiment to seize Nanchang by surprise; the 30th Army Group (Commander-in-Chief Wang Ling-ji) was ordered to attack Wuning. On April 18, Bai Chongxi replied to Chiang Kai-shek, offering his own suggestions on troop deployment with slight modifications. He emphasized the critical need for a surprise attack and for disrupting and harassing the enemy's transportation and rear areas, as well as cutting off the enemy's communication lines. He also believed that the attack should be brought forward and carried out as soon as possible, at the latest around the 22nd. On April 21, the forces of the Ninth War Zone began their operations in earnest. The 1st Army Group, comprising the 184th Division of the 60th Army and the New 10th Division of the 58th Army, attacked Fengxin, while the New 11th Division of the 58th Army monitored the Japanese forces in Jing'an; the main force of the 74th Army attacked Gao'an, and parts of the 74th Army and the 49th Army crossed the Jinjiang River to the north, attacking Dacheng and Shengmijie. Fierce fighting continued until the 26th, when the Japanese retreated to the areas of Fengxin, Qiuling, and Wanshougong. The 19th Army Group captured strongholds such as Dacheng, Gao'an, and Shengmijie. However, progress thereafter became difficult, and the offensive stalled. Neither army group was able to advance to the Nanchang-Xunyi Railway as originally planned. On April 23, the 32nd Army Group of the Third War Zone, consisting of the 16th and 79th Divisions of the 29th Army, the 5th Reserve Division, and part of the 10th Reserve Division, crossed the Fu River and launched an attack on Nanchang. Fierce fighting persisted until the 26th, when they captured Shichajie (south of Nanchang) and advanced toward the city. On the 27th, the Japanese concentrated the main force of the 101st Division to launch a counterattack. Supported by heavy artillery and air power, they engaged in fierce fighting with the Chinese army in the southeastern and southern areas, repeatedly contesting villages and strongholds. Due to the heavy casualties sustained, Duan Langru, commander of the 79th Division, changed the offensive deployment on the night of April 28 and reported this alteration to the army and army group commanders. The commander-in-chief of the 32nd Army Group, citing unauthorized changes to the plan, reported to the Third War Zone for approval and requested the dismissal of Duan Langru. Eager to capture Nanchang and driven by strategic impatience, Chiang Kai-shek, upon hearing the report, issued a stern order on May 1: Duan Langru was to be executed in front of the army for delaying military operations, He Ping, commander of the 16th Division, was ordered to atone for his crimes by achieving success in battle, and Shangguan Yunxiang was sent to the front to supervise the battle personally, with a strict deadline of May 5 for capturing Nanchang. On May 2, the 102nd Division recaptured Xiangtang and then Shichajie. The 16th Division once captured Shatanbu, but it was subsequently taken back by Japanese reinforcements. Shangguan Yunxiang then committed the 26th Division into the battle. On May 4, they launched another concerted attack. By dusk on the 5th, the 5th Reserve Division had reached the outer perimeter of the city and destroyed the barbed wire defenses, but Japanese firepower was intensely concentrated, causing the division to suffer heavy casualties and rendering it unable to continue the assault. The 152nd Regiment of the 26th Division broke into Xinlong Airport at dawn on the 5th and destroyed three Japanese aircraft. The 155th Regiment broke into the railway station at 9:00 a.m. on the 5th, but was blocked by fierce Japanese firepower and a determined counterattack. On May 5, after Chiang Kai-shek had issued the order to capture Nanchang by May 5, Xue Yue, acting commander of the Ninth War Zone, held the belief that with troops not having been replenished after the defense of Nanchang and with weaponry far inferior to that of the enemy, it was impossible to capture Nanchang within the subjective timeframe set. However, he did not directly dissent to Chiang Kai-shek, and on May 3, he telegraphed Chen Cheng to express his views in detail. He wrote: "Attacks on Nanchang and Fengxin have continued for 11 days since April 23. Because our army's equipment cannot keep pace with the enemy's, and the enemy's heavy weapons, mechanized units, and aircraft can support their ground forces everywhere, it is quite difficult to destroy the enemy's strong positions. Now I have received the Chairman's telegram: our army's operational strategy is to wear down the enemy without being worn down by the enemy, to avoid the enemy's strength and attack their weaknesses, and to achieve a protracted war of resistance. Therefore, this attack on Nanchang is aimed at wearing down the enemy. Under the principle of avoiding the enemy's strength and attacking their weakness, we should lie in ambush in advance and launch a surprise attack from all sides, hoping to recapture Nanchang with the fastest and most agile means. However, the battle has already dragged on; a direct assault is impossible, and striking their weakness is also unattainable. Although the enemy's strength is waning, it is practically impossible to capture Nanchang before May 5. Besides strictly ordering all units to overcome all difficulties and continue the fierce attack at all costs, I intend to politely explain the above situation to Chiang Kai-shek during a telephone conversation." Chen Cheng forwarded Xue Yue's telegram in full to Chiang Kai-shek on May 5. At the time, Bai Chongxi, director of the Guilin Headquarters, also considered the order to capture Nanchang within a limited time to be unrealistic, and on May 5 he telegraphed Chiang Kai-shek and He Yingqin, subtly offering a different suggestion. He stated, "Our army's attack on the enemy must be unexpected to be effective. Now, the enemy in Nanchang is prepared, and our army has launched a ten-day attack and has exerted all its efforts. To consider morale and our highest strategic principles, it is proposed that one-third of our forces continue the siege of Nanchang, while the other two-thirds are reorganized. Outside, we should continue to publicize our aggressive strategy…" The aim of both telegrams was to "turn the enemy's own spear against his shield," hoping Chiang Kai-shek would alter his order to capture Nanchang within a specified time, citing the operational guidance as inconsistent with the broader strategic policy. Upon receiving the telegrams, Chiang Kai-shek also learned of the sacrifice of Commander Chen Anbao and the heavy casualties among the attacking troops. On May 6, the main force of the Japanese 106th Division, supported by aircraft and tanks, launched a pincer attack on the 29th Army in the suburbs of Nanchang and Liantang. By 5 PM, the 29th Army was encircled. Liu Yuqing, commander of the 26th Division, was wounded in the fighting, and army commander Chen Anbao and Xie Beiting, commander of the 156th Regiment, were killed in action. Based on the actual battlefield situation, Xu Zhixun, chief of staff of the 29th Army, and Liu Yuqing, realizing that capturing Nanchang was impossible, decided to break out toward Zhongzhouwei and Shichajie to avoid total annihilation and potential execution by Chiang Kai-shek for failure. A regiment of the 5th Reserve Division, disguised as civilians, had infiltrated the city but was forced to withdraw due to the lack of follow-up support. Finally, on May 9, Chiang Kai-shek issued an order to halt the attack on Nanchang. The Japanese army, having suffered heavy losses themselves, was also unable to mount an effective counterattack, and thus the Battle of Nanchang came to an end, leaving behind a legacy of valor and tragedy. In the Battle of Nanchang, China suffered more than 52,000 casualties, including over 43,000 deaths, while Japan sustained more than 24,000 casualties and over 2,200 deaths. Although the National Army eventually lost Nanchang, the engagement thwarted Japan's plan to crush the main Chinese force. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.   The Nanchang battle was a decisive Japanese victory, yet the Chinese did manage to halt the Japanese western advance and showcased their perseverance amid a growing strategic stalemate. Supplies were still leaking into Nationalist China, the Japanese would have to continuously find and plug them. The war for China was nowhere near over.

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【欢迎订阅】每天早上5:30，准时更新。【阅读原文】标题：‘China's POTUS' told us how he went viral. And yes, it started as a bet正文：Employing the casual hyperbole of his presidential idol, the “Chinese POTUS” gave our interview a 67 out of 10. He said it calmly. Cheerfully. With absolute confidence. Like people do when they're standing in a megacity with fans seemingly on every street corner. Here in Chongqing, southwestern China, population 32 million, business manager Ryan Chen has mastered an impression so uncanny that strangers stop eating lunch to look up, mid-bite, when they hear his voice.知识点：employ v. /ɪmˈplɔɪ/to use a particular method, skill, or object to achieve something. 使用，运用e.g. She employs a special technique to remember new vocabulary words. 她运用一种特殊技巧来记忆新单词。获取外刊的完整原文以及精讲笔记，请关注微信公众号「早安英文」，回复“外刊”即可。更多有意思的英语干货等着你！【节目介绍】《早安英文-每日外刊精读》，带你精读最新外刊，了解国际最热事件：分析语法结构，拆解长难句，最接地气的翻译，还有重点词汇讲解。所有选题均来自于《经济学人》《纽约时报》《华尔街日报》《华盛顿邮报》《大西洋月刊》《科学杂志》《国家地理》等国际一线外刊。【适合谁听】1、关注时事热点新闻，想要学习最新最潮流英文表达的英文学习者2、任何想通过地道英文提高听、说、读、写能力的英文学习者3、想快速掌握表达，有出国学习和旅游计划的英语爱好者4、参加各类英语考试的应试者（如大学英语四六级、托福雅思、考研等）【你将获得】1、超过1000篇外刊精读课程，拓展丰富语言表达和文化背景2、逐词、逐句精确讲解，系统掌握英语词汇、听力、阅读和语法3、每期内附学习笔记，包含全文注释、长难句解析、疑难语法点等，帮助扫除阅读障碍。

This week on Sinica, I speak with Jia Ruixue and Li Hongbin, coauthors of The Highest Exam: How the Gaokao Shapes China. We're talking about China's college entrance exam — dreaded and feared, with outsized ability to determine life outcomes, seen as deeply flawed yet also sacrosanct, something few Chinese want drastically altered or removed. Cards on table: I had very strong preconceptions about the gaokao. My wife and I planned our children's education to get them out of the Chinese system before it became increasingly oriented toward gaokao preparation. But this book really opened my eyes. Ruixue is professor of economics at UC San Diego's School of Global Policy and Strategy, researching how institutions like examination systems shape governance, elite selection, and state capacity. Hongbin is James Liang Chair at Stanford, focusing on education, labor markets, and institutional foundations of China's economic development. We explore why the gaokao represents far more than just a difficult test, the concrete incentives families face, why there are limited alternative routes for social mobility, how both authors' own experiences shaped their thinking, why exam-based elite selection has been so durable in China, what happened when the exam system was suspended during the Cultural Revolution, why inequality has increased despite internet access to materials, why meaningful reform is so politically difficult, how education translated into productivity and GDP growth, the gap between skill formation and economic returns, how the system shapes governance and everyday life, and the moral dimensions of exam culture when Chinese families migrate to very different education systems like the U.S.6:18 – What the gaokao actually represents beyond just being a difficult exam 11:54 – Why there are limited alternative pathways for social mobility 14:23 – How their own experiences as students shaped their thinking 18:46 – Why the gaokao is a political institution, not just educational policy 22:21 – Why exam-based elite selection has been so durable in China 28:30 – What happened in late Qing and Cultural Revolution when exams were suspended 33:26 – Has internet access to materials reduced inequality or has it persisted? 36:55 – Hongbin's direct experience trying to reform the gaokao—and why it failed 40:28 – How education improvement accounts for significant share of China's GDP growth 42:44 – The gap: college doesn't add measurable skills, but gaokao scores predict income 46:56 – How centralized approach affects talent allocation across fields 51:08 – The gaokao and GDP tournament for officials: similar tournament systems 54:26 – How ranking and evaluation systems shape workplace behavior and culture 58:12 – When exam culture meets U.S. education: understanding tensions around affirmative action 1:02:10 – Transparent rule-based evaluation vs. discretion and judgment: the fundamental tradeoffRecommendations: Ruixue: Piao Liang Peng You (film by Geng Jun); Stoner (a novel by John Williams) Hongbin: The Dictator's HandbookKaiser: Furious Minds: The Making of the MAGA New Right by Laura K. Field; Black Pill by Elle ReeveSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Last time we spoke about the climax of the battle of Lake Khasan. In August, the Lake Khasan region became a tense theater of combat as Soviet and Japanese forces clashed around Changkufeng and Hill 52. The Soviets pushed a multi-front offensive, bolstered by artillery, tanks, and air power, yet the Japanese defenders held firm, aided by engineers, machine guns, and heavy guns. By the ninth and tenth, a stubborn Japanese resilience kept Hill 52 and Changkufeng in Japanese hands, though the price was steep and the field was littered with the costs of battle. Diplomatically, both sides aimed to confine the fighting and avoid a larger war. Negotiations trudged on, culminating in a tentative cease-fire draft for August eleventh: a halt to hostilities, positions to be held as of midnight on the tenth, and the creation of a border-demarcation commission. Moscow pressed for a neutral umpire; Tokyo resisted, accepting a Japanese participant but rejecting a neutral referee. The cease-fire was imperfect, with miscommunications and differing interpretations persisting.    #185 Operation Hainan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After what seemed like a lifetime over in the northern border between the USSR and Japan, today we are returning to the Second Sino-Japanese War. Now I thought it might be a bit jarring to dive into it, so let me do a brief summary of where we are at, in the year of 1939. As the calendar turned to 1939, the Second Sino-Japanese War, which had erupted in July 1937 with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and escalated into full-scale conflict, had evolved into a protracted quagmire for the Empire of Japan. What began as a swift campaign to subjugate the Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek had, by the close of 1938, transformed into a war of attrition. Japanese forces, under the command of generals like Shunroku Hata and Yasuji Okamura, had achieved stunning territorial gains: the fall of Shanghai in November 1937 after a brutal three-month battle that cost over 200,000 Chinese lives; the infamous capture of Nanjing in December 1937, marked by the Nanjing Massacre where an estimated 300,000 civilians and disarmed soldiers were killed in a six-week orgy of violence; and the sequential occupations of Xuzhou in May 1938, Wuhan in October 1938, and Guangzhou that same month.  These victories secured Japan's control over China's eastern seaboard, major riverine arteries like the Yangtze, and key industrial centers, effectively stripping the Nationalists of much of their economic base. Yet, despite these advances, China refused to capitulate. Chiang's government had retreated inland to the mountainous stronghold of Chongqing in Sichuan province, where it regrouped amid the fog-laden gorges, drawing on the vast human reserves of China's interior and the resilient spirit of its people. By late 1938, Japanese casualties had mounted to approximately 50,000 killed and 200,000 wounded annually, straining the Imperial Japanese Army's resources and exposing the vulnerabilities of overextended supply lines deep into hostile territory. In Tokyo, the corridors of the Imperial General Headquarters and the Army Ministry buzzed with urgent deliberations during the winter of 1938-1939. The initial doctrine of "quick victory" through decisive battles, epitomized by the massive offensives of 1937 and 1938, had proven illusory. Japan's military planners, influenced by the Kwantung Army's experiences in Manchuria and the ongoing stalemate, recognized that China's sheer size, with its 4 million square miles and over 400 million inhabitants, rendered total conquest unfeasible without unacceptable costs. Intelligence reports highlighted the persistence of Chinese guerrilla warfare, particularly in the north where Communist forces under Mao Zedong's Eighth Route Army conducted hit-and-run operations from bases in Shanxi and Shaanxi, sabotaging railways and ambushing convoys. The Japanese response included brutal pacification campaigns, such as the early iterations of what would later formalize as the "Three Alls Policy" (kill all, burn all, loot all), aimed at devastating rural economies and isolating resistance pockets. But these measures only fueled further defiance. By early 1939, a strategic pivot was formalized: away from direct annihilation of Chinese armies toward a policy of economic strangulation. This "blockade and interdiction" approach sought to sever China's lifelines to external aid, choking off the flow of weapons, fuel, and materiel that sustained the Nationalist war effort. As one Japanese staff officer noted in internal memos, the goal was to "starve the dragon in its lair," acknowledging the limits of Japanese manpower, total forces in China numbered around 1 million by 1939, against China's inexhaustible reserves. Central to this new strategy were the three primary overland supply corridors that had emerged as China's backdoors to the world, compensating for the Japanese naval blockade that had sealed off most coastal ports since late 1937. The first and most iconic was the Burma Road, a 717-mile engineering marvel hastily constructed between 1937 and 1938 by over 200,000 Chinese and Burmese laborers under the direction of engineers like Chih-Ping Chen. Stretching from the railhead at Lashio in British Burma (modern Myanmar) through treacherous mountain passes and dense jungles to Kunming in Yunnan province, the road navigated elevations up to 7,000 feet with hundreds of hairpin turns and precarious bridges. By early 1939, it was operational, albeit plagued by monsoonal mudslides, banditry, and mechanical breakdowns of the imported trucks, many Ford and Chevrolet models supplied via British Rangoon. Despite these challenges, it funneled an increasing volume of aid: in 1939 alone, estimates suggest up to 10,000 tons per month of munitions, gasoline, and aircraft parts from Allied sources, including early Lend-Lease precursors from the United States. The road's completion in 1938 had been a direct response to the loss of southern ports, and its vulnerability to aerial interdiction made it a prime target in Japanese planning documents. The second lifeline was the Indochina route, centered on the French-built Yunnan-Vietnam Railway (also known as the Hanoi-Kunming Railway), a 465-mile narrow-gauge line completed in 1910 that linked the port of Haiphong in French Indochina to Kunming via Hanoi and Lao Cai. This colonial artery, supplemented by parallel roads and river transport along the Red River, became China's most efficient supply conduit in 1938-1939, exploiting France's uneasy neutrality. French authorities, under Governor-General Pierre Pasquier and later Georges Catroux, turned a blind eye to transshipments, allowing an average of 15,000 to 20,000 tons monthly in early 1939, far surpassing the Burma Road's initial capacity. Cargoes included Soviet arms rerouted via Vladivostok and American oil, with French complicity driven by anti-Japanese sentiment and profitable tolls. However, Japanese reconnaissance flights from bases in Guangdong noted the vulnerability of bridges and rail yards, leading to initial bombing raids by mid-1939. Diplomatic pressure mounted, with Tokyo issuing protests to Paris, foreshadowing the 1940 closure under Vichy France after the fall of France in Europe. The route's proximity to the South China Sea made it a focal point for Japanese naval strategists, who viewed it as a "leak in the blockade." The third corridor, often overlooked but critical, was the Northwest Highway through Soviet Central Asia and Xinjiang province. This overland network, upgraded between 1937 and 1941 with Soviet assistance, connected the Turkestan-Siberian Railway at Almaty (then Alma-Ata) to Lanzhou in Gansu via Urumqi, utilizing a mix of trucks, camel caravans, and rudimentary roads across the Gobi Desert and Tian Shan mountains. Under the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1937 and subsequent aid agreements, Moscow supplied China with over 900 aircraft, 82 tanks, 1,300 artillery pieces, and vast quantities of ammunition and fuel between 1937 and 1941—much of it traversing this route. In 1938-1939, volumes peaked, with Soviet pilots and advisors even establishing air bases in Lanzhou. The highway's construction involved tens of thousands of Chinese laborers, facing harsh winters and logistical hurdles, but it delivered up to 2,000 tons monthly, including entire fighter squadrons like the Polikarpov I-16. Japanese intelligence, aware of this "Red lifeline," planned disruptions but were constrained by the ongoing Nomonhan Incident on the Manchurian-Soviet border in 1939, which diverted resources and highlighted the risks of provoking Moscow. These routes collectively sustained China's resistance, prompting Japan's high command to prioritize their severance. In March 1939, the South China Area Army was established under General Rikichi Andō (later succeeded by Field Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi), headquartered in Guangzhou, with explicit orders to disrupt southern communications. Aerial campaigns intensified, with Mitsubishi G3M "Nell" bombers from Wuhan and Guangzhou targeting Kunming's airfields and the Red River bridges, while diplomatic maneuvers pressured colonial powers: Britain faced demands during the June 1939 Tientsin Crisis to close the Burma Road, and France received ultimatums that culminated in the 1940 occupation of northern Indochina. Yet, direct assaults on Yunnan or Guangxi were deemed too arduous due to rugged terrain and disease risks. Instead, planners eyed peripheral objectives to encircle these arteries. This strategic calculus set the stage for the invasion of Hainan Island, a 13,000-square-mile landmass off Guangdong's southern coast, rich in iron and copper but strategically priceless for its position astride the Indochina route and proximity to Hong Kong. By February 1939, Japanese admirals like Nobutake Kondō of the 5th Fleet advocated seizure to establish air and naval bases, plugging blockade gaps and enabling raids on Haiphong and Kunming, a prelude to broader southern expansion that would echo into the Pacific War. Now after the fall campaign around Canton in autumn 1938, the Japanese 21st Army found itself embedded in a relentless effort to sever the enemy's lifelines. Its primary objective shifted from mere battlefield engagements to tightening the choke points of enemy supply, especially along the Canton–Hankou railway. Recognizing that war materiel continued to flow into the enemy's hands, the Imperial General Headquarters ordered the 21st Army to strike at every other supply route, one by one, until the arteries of logistics were stifled. The 21st Army undertook a series of decisive occupations to disrupt transport and provisioning from multiple directions. To sustain these difficult campaigns, Imperial General Headquarters reinforced the south China command, enabling greater operational depth and endurance. The 21st Army benefited from a series of reinforcements during 1939, which allowed a reorganization of assignments and missions: In late January, the Iida Detachment was reorganized into the Formosa Mixed Brigade and took part in the invasion of Hainan Island.  Hainan, just 15 miles across the Qiongzhou Strait from the mainland, represented a critical "loophole": it lay astride the Gulf of Tonkin, enabling smuggling of arms and materiel from Haiphong to Kunming, and offered potential airfields for bombing raids deep into Yunnan. Japanese interest in Hainan dated to the 1920s, driven by the Taiwan Governor-General's Office, which eyed the island's tropical resources (rubber, iron, copper) and naval potential at ports like Sanya (Samah). Prewar surveys by Japanese firms, such as those documented in Ide Kiwata's Minami Shina no Sangyō to Keizai (1939), highlighted mineral wealth and strategic harbors. The fall of Guangzhou in October 1938 provided the perfect launchpad, but direct invasion was delayed until early 1939 amid debates between the IJA (favoring mainland advances) and IJN (prioritizing naval encirclement). The operation would also heavily align with broader "southward advance" (Nanshin-ron) doctrine foreshadowing invasions of French Indochina (1940) and the Pacific War. On the Chinese side, Hainan was lightly defended as part of Guangdong's "peace preservation" under General Yu Hanmou. Two security regiments, six guard battalions, and a self-defense corps, totaling around 7,000–10,000 poorly equipped troops guarded the island, supplemented by roughly 300 Communist guerrillas under Feng Baiju, who operated independently in the interior. The indigenous Li (Hlai) people in the mountainous south, alienated by Nationalist taxes, provided uneven support but later allied with Communists. The Imperial General Headquarters ordered the 21st Army, in cooperation with the Navy, to occupy and hold strategic points on the island near Haikou-Shih. The 21st Army commander assigned the Formosa Mixed Brigade to carry out this mission. Planning began in late 1938 under the IJN's Fifth Fleet, with IJA support from the 21st Army. The objective: secure northern and southern landing sites to bisect the island, establish air/naval bases, and exploit resources. Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondō, commanding the fleet, emphasized surprise and air superiority. The invasion began under the cover of darkness on February 9, 1939, when Kondō's convoy entered Tsinghai Bay on the northern shore of Hainan and anchored at midnight. Japanese troops swiftly disembarked, encountering minimal initial resistance from the surprised Chinese defenders, and secured a beachhead in the northern zone. At 0300 hours on 10 February, the Formosa Mixed Brigade, operating in close cooperation with naval units, executed a surprise landing at the northeastern point of Tengmai Bay in north Hainan. By 04:30, the right flank reached the main road leading to Fengyingshih, while the left flank reached a position two kilometers south of Tienwei. By 07:00, the right flank unit had overcome light enemy resistance near Yehli and occupied Chiungshan. At that moment there were approximately 1,000 elements of the enemy's 5th Infantry Brigade (militia) at Chiungshan; about half of these troops were destroyed, and the remainder fled into the hills south of Tengmai in a state of disarray. Around 08:30 that same day, the left flank unit advanced to the vicinity of Shuchang and seized Hsiuying Heights. By 12:00, it occupied Haikou, the island's northern port city and administrative center, beginning around noon. Army and navy forces coordinated to mop up remaining pockets of resistance in the northern areas, overwhelming the scattered Chinese security units through superior firepower and organization. No large-scale battles are recorded in primary accounts; instead, the engagements were characterized by rapid advances and localized skirmishes, as the Chinese forces, lacking heavy artillery or air support, could not mount a sustained defense. By the end of the day, Japanese control over the north was consolidating, with Haikou falling under their occupation.Also on 10 February, the Brigade pushed forward to seize Cingang. Wenchang would be taken on the 22nd, followed by Chinglan Port on the 23rd. On February 11, the operation expanded southward when land combat units amphibiously assaulted Samah (now Sanya) at the island's southern tip. This landing allowed them to quickly seize key positions, including the port of Yulin (Yulinkang) and the town of Yai-Hsien (Yaxian, now part of Sanya). With these southern footholds secured, Japanese forces fanned out to subjugate the rest of the island, capturing inland areas and infrastructure with little organized opposition. Meanwhile, the landing party of the South China Navy Expeditionary Force, which had joined with the Army to secure Haikou, began landing on the island's southern shore at dawn on 14 February. They operated under the protection of naval and air units. By the same morning, the landing force had advanced to Sa-Riya and, by 12:00 hours, had captured Yulin Port. Chinese casualties were significant in the brief fighting; from January to May 1939, reports indicate the 11th security regiment alone suffered 8 officers and 162 soldiers killed, 3 officers and 16 wounded, and 5 officers and 68 missing, though figures for other units are unclear. Japanese losses were not publicly detailed but appear to have been light.  When crisis pressed upon them, Nationalist forces withdrew from coastal Haikou, shepherding the last civilians toward the sheltering embrace of the Wuzhi mountain range that bands the central spine of Hainan. From that high ground they sought to endure the storm, praying that the rugged hills might shield their families from the reach of war. Yet the Li country's mountains did not deliver a sanctuary free of conflict. Later in August of 1943, an uprising erupted among the Li,Wang Guoxing, a figure of local authority and stubborn resolve. His rebellion was swiftly crushed; in reprisal, the Nationalists executed a seizure of vengeance that extended far beyond the moment of defeat, claiming seven thousand members of Wang Guoxing's kin in his village. The episode was grim testimony to the brutal calculus of war, where retaliation and fear indelibly etched the landscape of family histories. Against this backdrop, the Communists under Feng Baiju and the native Li communities forged a vigorous guerrilla war against the occupiers. The struggle was not confined to partisan skirmishes alone; it unfolded as a broader contest of survival and resistance. The Japanese response was relentless and punitive, and it fell upon Li communities in western Hainan with particular ferocity, Sanya and Danzhou bore the brunt of violence, as did the many foreign laborers conscripted into service by the occupying power. The toll of these reprisals was stark: among hundreds of thousands of slave laborers pressed into service, tens of thousands perished. Of the 100,000 laborers drawn from Hong Kong, only about 20,000 survived the war's trials, a haunting reminder of the human cost embedded in the occupation. Strategically, the island of Hainan took on a new if coercive purpose. Portions of the island were designated as a naval administrative district, with the Hainan Guard District Headquarters established at Samah, signaling its role as a forward air base and as an operational flank for broader anti-Chiang Kai-shek efforts. In parallel, the island's rich iron and copper resources were exploited to sustain the war economy of the occupiers. The control of certain areas on Hainan provided a base of operations for incursions into Guangdong and French Indochina, while the airbases that dotted the island enabled long-range air raids that threaded routes from French Indochina and Burma into the heart of China. The island thus assumed a grim dual character: a frontier fortress for the occupiers and a ground for the prolonged suffering of its inhabitants. Hainan then served as a launchpad for later incursions into Guangdong and Indochina. Meanwhile after Wuhan's collapse, the Nationalist government's frontline strength remained formidable, even as attrition gnawed at its edges. By the winter of 1938–1939, the front line had swelled to 261 divisions of infantry and cavalry, complemented by 50 independent brigades. Yet the political and military fissures within the Kuomintang suggested fragility beneath the apparent depth of manpower. The most conspicuous rupture came with Wang Jingwei's defection, the vice president and chairman of the National Political Council, who fled to Hanoi on December 18, 1938, leading a procession of more than ten other KMT officials, including Chen Gongbo, Zhou Fohai, Chu Minqi, and Zeng Zhongming. In the harsh arithmetic of war, defections could not erase the country's common resolve to resist Japanese aggression, and the anti-Japanese national united front still served as a powerful instrument, rallying the Chinese populace to "face the national crisis together." Amid this political drama, Japan's strategy moved into a phase that sought to convert battlefield endurance into political consolidation. As early as January 11, 1938, Tokyo had convened an Imperial Conference and issued a framework for handling the China Incident that would shape the theater for years. The "Outline of Army Operations Guidance" and "Continental Order No. 241" designated the occupied territories as strategic assets to be held with minimal expansion beyond essential needs. The instruction mapped an operational zone that compressed action to a corridor between Anqing, Xinyang, Yuezhou, and Nanchang, while the broader line of occupation east of a line tracing West Sunit, Baotou, and the major river basins would be treated as pacified space. This was a doctrine of attrition, patience, and selective pressure—enough to hold ground, deny resources to the Chinese, and await a more opportune political rupture. Yet even as Japan sought political attrition, the war's tactical center of gravity drifted toward consolidation around Wuhan and the pathways that fed the Yangtze. In October 1938, after reducing Wuhan to a fortressed crescent of contested ground, the Japanese General Headquarters acknowledged the imperative to adapt to a protracted war. The new calculus prioritized political strategy alongside military operations: "We should attach importance to the offensive of political strategy, cultivate and strengthen the new regime, and make the National Government decline, which will be effective." If the National Government trembled under coercive pressure, it risked collapse, and if not immediately, then gradually through a staged series of operations. In practice, this meant reinforcing a centralized center while allowing peripheral fronts to be leveraged against Chongqing's grip on the war's moral economy. In the immediate post-Wuhan period, Japan divided its responsibilities and aimed at a standoff that would enable future offensives. The 11th Army Group, stationed in the Wuhan theater, became the spearhead of field attacks on China's interior, occupying a strategic triangle that included Hunan, Jiangxi, and Guangxi, and protecting the rear of southwest China's line of defense. The central objective was not merely to seize territory, but to deny Chinese forces the capacity to maneuver along the critical rail and river corridors that fed the Nanjing–Jiujiang line and the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway. Central to this plan was Wuhan's security and the ability to constrain Jiujiang's access to the Yangtze, preserving a corridor for air power and logistics. The pre-war arrangement in early 1939 was a tableau of layered defenses and multiple war zones, designed to anticipate and blunt Japanese maneuver. By February 1939, the Ninth War Zone under Xue Yue stood in a tense standoff with the Japanese 11th Army along the Jiangxi and Hubei front south of the Yangtze. The Ninth War Zone's order of battle, Luo Zhuoying's 19th Army Group defending the northern Nanchang front, Wang Lingji's 30th Army Group near Wuning, Fan Songfu's 8th and 73rd Armies along Henglu, Tang Enbo's 31st Army Group guarding southern Hubei and northern Hunan, and Lu Han's 1st Army Group in reserve near Changsha and Liuyang, was a carefully calibrated attempt to absorb, delay, and disrupt any Xiushui major Japanese thrust toward Nanchang, a city whose strategic significance stretched beyond its own bounds. In the spring of 1939, Nanchang was the one city in southern China that Tokyo could not leave in Chinese hands. It was not simply another provincial capital; it was the beating heart of whatever remained of China's war effort south of the Yangtze, and the Japanese knew it. High above the Gan River, on the flat plains west of Poyang Lake, lay three of the finest airfields China had ever built: Qingyunpu, Daxiaochang, and Xiangtang. Constructed only a few years earlier with Soviet engineers and American loans, they were long, hard-surfaced, and ringed with hangars and fuel dumps. Here the Chinese Air Force had pulled back after the fall of Wuhan, and here the red-starred fighters and bombers of the Soviet volunteer groups still flew. From Nanchang's runways a determined pilot could reach Japanese-held Wuhan in twenty minutes, Guangzhou in less than an hour, and even strike the docks at Hong Kong if he pushed his range. Every week Japanese reconnaissance planes returned with photographs of fresh craters patched, new aircraft parked wing-to-wing, and Soviet pilots sunning themselves beside their I-16s. As long as those fields remained Chinese, Japan could never claim the sky. The city was more than airfields. It sat exactly where the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway met the line running north to Jiujiang and the Yangtze, a knot that tied together three provinces. Barges crowded Poyang Lake's western shore, unloading crates of Soviet ammunition and aviation fuel that had come up the river from the Indochina railway. Warehouses along the tracks bulged with shells and rice. To the Japanese staff officers plotting in Wuhan and Guangzhou, Nanchang looked less like a city and more like a loaded spring: if Chiang Kai-shek ever found the strength for a counteroffensive to retake the middle Yangtze, this would be the place from which it would leap. And so, in the cold March of 1939, the Imperial General Headquarters marked Nanchang in red on every map and gave General Okamura the order he had been waiting for: take it, whatever the cost. Capturing the city would do three things at once. It would blind the Chinese Air Force in the south by seizing or destroying the only bases from which it could still seriously operate. It would tear a hole in the last east–west rail line still feeding Free China. And it would shove the Nationalist armies another two hundred kilometers farther into the interior, buying Japan precious time to digest its earlier conquests and tighten the blockade. Above all, Nanchang was the final piece in a great aerial ring Japan was closing around southern China. Hainan had fallen in February, giving the navy its southern airfields. Wuhan and Guangzhou already belonged to the army. Once Nanchang was taken, Japanese aircraft would sit on a continuous arc of bases from the tropical beaches of the South China Sea to the banks of the Yangtze, and nothing (neither the Burma Road convoys nor the French railway from Hanoi) would move without their permission. Chiang Kai-shek's decision to strike first in the Nanchang region in March 1939 reflected both urgency and a desire to seize initiative before Japanese modernization of the battlefield could fully consolidate. On March 8, Chiang directed Xue Yue to prepare a preemptive attack intended to seize the offensive by March 15, focusing the Ninth War Zone's efforts on preventing a river-crossing assault and pinning Japanese forces in place. The plan called for a sequence of coordinated actions: the 19th Army Group to hold the northern front of Nanchang; the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Border Advance Army (the 8th and 73rd Armies) to strike the enemy's left flank from Wuning toward De'an and Ruichang; the 30th and 27th Army Groups to consolidate near Wuning; and the 1st Army Group to push toward Xiushui and Sandu, opening routes for subsequent operations. Yet even as Xue Yue pressed for action, the weather of logistics and training reminded observers that no victory could be taken for granted. By March 9–10, Xue Yue warned Chiang that troops were not adequately trained, supplies were scarce, and preparations were insufficient, requesting a postponement to March 24. Chiang's reply was resolute: the attack must commence no later than the 24th, for the aim was preemption and the desire to tether the enemy's forces before they could consolidate. When the moment of decision arrived, the Chinese army began to tense, and the Japanese, no strangers to rapid shifts in tempo—moved to exploit any hesitation or fog of mobilization. The Ninth War Zone's response crystallized into a defensive posture as the Japanese pressed forward, marking a transition from preemption to standoff as both sides tested the limits of resilience. The Japanese plan for what would become known as Operation Ren, aimed at severing the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway, breaking the enemy's line of communication, and isolating Nanchang, reflected a calculated synthesis of air power, armored mobility, and canalized ground offensives. On February 6, 1939, the Central China Expeditionary Army issued a set of precise directives: capture Nanchang to cut the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway and disrupt the southern reach of Anhui and Zhejiang provinces; seize Nanchang along the Nanchang–Xunyi axis to split enemy lines and "crush" Chinese resistance south of that zone; secure rear lines immediately after the city's fall; coordinate with naval air support to threaten Chinese logistics and airfields beyond the rear lines. The plan anticipated contingencies by pre-positioning heavy artillery and tanks in formations that could strike with speed and depth, a tactical evolution from previous frontal assaults. Okamura Yasuji, commander of the 11th Army, undertook a comprehensive program of reconnaissance, refining the assault plan with a renewed emphasis on speed and surprise. Aerial reconnaissance underlined the terrain, fortifications, and the disposition of Chinese forces, informing the selection of the Xiushui River crossing and the route of the main axis of attack. Okamura's decision to reorganize artillery and armor into concentrated tank groups, flanked by air support and advanced by long-range maneuver, marked a departure from the earlier method of distributing heavy weapons along the infantry front. Sumita Laishiro commanded the 6th Field Heavy Artillery Brigade, with more than 300 artillery pieces, while Hirokichi Ishii directed a force of 135 tanks and armored vehicles. This blended arms approach promised a breakthrough that would outpace the Chinese defenders and open routes for the main force. By mid-February 1939, Japanese preparations had taken on a high tempo. The 101st and 106th Divisions, along with attached artillery, assembled south of De'an, while tank contingents gathered north of De'an. The 6th Division began moving toward Ruoxi and Wuning, the Inoue Detachment took aim at the waterways of Poyang Lake, and the 16th and 9th Divisions conducted feints on the Han River's left bank. The orchestration of these movements—feints, riverine actions, and armored flanking, was designed to reduce the Chinese capacity to concentrate forces around Nanchang and to force the defenders into a less secure posture along the Nanchang–Jiujiang axis. Japan's southward strategy reframed the war: no longer a sprint to reduce Chinese forces in open fields, but a patient siege of lifelines, railways, and airbases. Hainan's seizure, the control of Nanchang's airfields, and the disruption of the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway exemplified a shift from large-scale battles to coercive pressure that sought to cripple Nationalist mobilization and erode Chongqing's capacity to sustain resistance. For China, the spring of 1939 underscored resilience amid mounting attrition. Chiang Kai-shek's insistence on offensive means to seize the initiative demonstrated strategic audacity, even as shortages and uneven training slowed tempo. The Ninth War Zone's defense, bolstered by makeshift airpower from Soviet and Allied lendings, kept open critical corridors and delayed Japan's consolidation. The war's human cost—massive casualties, forced labor, and the Li uprising on Hainan—illuminates the brutality that fueled both sides' resolve. In retrospect, the period around Canton, Wuhan, and Nanchang crystallizes a grim truth: the Sino-Japanese war was less a single crescendo of battles than a protracted contest of endurance, logistics, and political stamina. The early 1940s would widen these fault lines, but the groundwork laid in 1939, competition over supply routes, air control, and strategic rail nodes, would shape the war's pace and, ultimately, its outcome. The conflict's memory lies not only in the clashes' flash but in the stubborn persistence of a nation fighting to outlast a formidable adversary. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese invasion of Hainan and proceeding operations to stop logistical leaks into Nationalist China, showcased the complexity and scale of the growing Second Sino-Japanese War. It would not merely be a war of territorial conquest, Japan would have to strangle the colossus using every means necessary.  

The weather in Beijing trended on social media sites over the weekend as unusually heavy snowfall blanketed the capital in a thick white sheet, even as the National Meteorological Center issued a yellow alert — the third-highest level after red and orange — for cold waves across central, eastern and southern China over the next few days. A yellow alert for freezing conditions and a blue alert for blizzards were issued for some parts of Shaanxi, Henan, Anhui and Hubei provinces.周末期间，北京天气登上社交媒体热搜。异常强降雪使首都披上厚厚一层“白衣”。与此同时，国家气象中心发布寒潮黄色预警——这是仅次于红色和橙色的第三高等级预警——提示未来几天中部、东部和南部地区将出现寒潮天气。此外，陕西、河南、安徽和湖北部分地区还发布了低温冰冻黄色预警和暴雪蓝色预警。According to meteorological authorities, the snowfall and accumulation on Saturday and Sunday in Beijing was heavier in the western mountainous areas of the capital.据气象部门介绍，北京周六和周日的降雪及积雪主要集中在西部山区，降雪量明显偏大。The weather event was the result of a "return-flow snowfall pattern" in North China, which saw moisture-laden cold air move inland toward Beijing from Bohai Bay.此次天气过程源于华北地区出现的“回流降雪型”天气形势，携带充足水汽的冷空气自渤海湾向内陆推进并影响北京。As the moist air moved over the city's western terrain, clouds formed at temperatures ranging between — 10 C and — 20 C, which is optimal for rapid snowflake formation. As they fell, the snow crystals collided and bonded, creating flakes that appeared to be oversized, meteorologists said.气象专家表示，当湿润气流越过北京西部地形时，在零下10摄氏度至零下20摄氏度这一最有利于雪花快速生成的温度区间内形成云系。雪晶在下落过程中不断碰撞并相互黏结，从而形成看起来“体型较大”的雪花。The snowfall in Beijing occurred as a strong cold wave swept much of China. The National Meteorological Center said that from Sunday to Wednesday, the cold wave will bring strong winds, sharp drops in temperatures and widespread rain and snow.北京的降雪正值强寒潮影响全国大部分地区。国家气象中心表示，从周日至周三，寒潮将带来大风、显著降温以及大范围雨雪天气。The center issued a yellow cold wave alert on Sunday, warning that temperatures in central and eastern China will drop 6 C to 12 C during the period, with some areas experiencing declines of 16 C or more. The current severe winter condition is expected to peak on Monday.气象中心周日发布寒潮黄色预警，指出中东部地区气温将下降6至12摄氏度，部分地区降温幅度可能达到或超过16摄氏度。本轮严寒天气预计将在周一达到最强。On Sunday evening, the national disaster prevention, reduction and relief commission activated a Level IV emergency response — the lowest in its four-tier system — to address the rising risk of low temperature-, snow — and ice-related disasters in Anhui, Henan, Hunan and Guizhou provinces. A working group previously dispatched to Henan will continue assisting local response efforts, while additional working groups have been sent to Hunan and Guizhou to provide on-site guidance.周日晚间，国家防灾减灾救灾委员会启动四级应急响应（四级为最低级别），应对安徽、河南、湖南和贵州等地低温、雨雪和冰冻灾害风险上升的情况。此前派驻河南的工作组将继续协助地方开展应对工作，同时，新增工作组已赴湖南和贵州开展现场指导。In Altay prefecture of northern Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region, the minimum temperature in Qinghe county plunged to — 40.8 C over the weekend.在新疆维吾尔自治区北部的阿勒泰地区，青河县周末最低气温骤降至零下40.8摄氏度。Gui Jin, a homestay host in Hemu village in Altay, said the temperature there was — 38 C on Saturday. "I'd rather be in Antarctica," he joked, where he said the lowest temperature was around — 32 C on the same day.阿勒泰禾木村民宿经营者桂进表示，当地周六气温为零下38摄氏度。他打趣道：“我宁愿去南极。”他说，当天南极的最低气温大约为零下32摄氏度。Hu Xiao, an analyst with the China Meteorological Administration, said the current cold wave is bringing about dramatic changes in temperatures.中国气象局分析师胡啸表示，此次寒潮正在引发气温的剧烈变化。Earlier this month, the traditionally coldest period of winter, the weather was unusually warm nationwide, making it the third warmest on record. Now the situation has changed. "People will feel as if the weather has suddenly become frigid," Hu said.本月初，本应是一年中最寒冷的时段，全国气温却异常偏高，成为有记录以来第三暖的同期。如今形势已发生变化。胡啸表示：“人们会明显感觉到天气突然变得异常寒冷。”The cold wave is moving relatively slowly and is accompanied by ample moisture. Snowfall began in North China on Saturday, intensified in Henan province and Shandong province on Sunday, and is expected to be most widespread and strongest on Monday.此次寒潮移动速度相对缓慢，并伴有充足水汽。降雪于周六在华北地区开始，周日在河南和山东显著增强，预计周一将达到范围最广、强度最强。The weather event also marks the first widespread freezing rain of this winter. From Monday to Wednesday, sleet is expected in parts of Hubei, Hunan and Guizhou provinces and in Chongqing, with Hunan and Guizhou expected to face the brunt of it.本轮天气过程还将带来今冬首场大范围冻雨。预计周一至周三，湖北、湖南、贵州以及重庆部分地区将出现雨夹雪，其中湖南和贵州受影响最为严重。Wang Xiangxi, minister of emergency management, called for enhanced coordination and preparedness to address risks posed by low temperatures, snow, ice and freezing rain.应急管理部部长王祥喜呼吁，加强统筹协调和应急准备，切实防范低温、雨雪、冰冻和冻雨带来的风险。Officials warned that the weather event would be the largest of its kind so far this year, with complex precipitation types and elevated disaster risks in some regions. With the approach of the Spring Festival holiday and increased travel volume, they emphasized the need to be ready for worst-case scenarios.有关部门警告称，此次天气过程可能是今年以来范围最大、降水形态最为复杂的一次，部分地区灾害风险较高。随着春节临近、人员流动增加，各地需做好最不利情况的应对准备。In Hubei, China Railway Wuhan Bureau activated emergency plans to safeguard rail operations, conducting advance risk assessments about the effect of low temperatures on key equipment such as rail switches and tracks.在湖北，中国铁路武汉局集团有限公司启动应急预案，提前评估低温天气对道岔、线路等关键设备的影响，确保铁路运输安全。Crew members were deployed to remove ice and snow from tracks and carry out preventive maintenance to ensure the safety and smooth operation of railway services, the bureau said.该局表示，已组织人员清除线路冰雪并开展预防性检修，保障铁路运输安全平稳运行。In Gansu province, protective steps have been taken to reduce weather-related losses to crops. Local governments have been urged to take windproof measures for construction sites, billboards and livestock enclosures.在甘肃，各地已采取防护措施，减少恶劣天气对农作物造成的损失，并督促对施工工地、广告牌和牲畜圈舍落实防风加固措施。Energy authorities were also making efforts to ensure stable operation of electricity, gas and heating systems as the cold wave continued to affect large parts of the country.随着寒潮持续影响全国多地，能源主管部门也在采取措施，保障电力、燃气和供暖系统平稳运行。cold wave /koʊld weɪv/寒潮yellow alert /ˈjeloʊ əˈlɜːrt/黄色预警return-flow snowfall pattern /rɪˈtɜːrn floʊ ˈsnoʊfɔːl ˈpætərn/回流降雪型emergency response (Level IV) /ɪˈmɜːrdʒənsi rɪˈspɑːns/四级应急响应freezing rain /ˈfriːzɪŋ reɪn/冻雨sleet /sliːt/雨夹雪

This week on Sinica, I speak with Daniel Bessner, the Anne H.H. and Kenneth B. Pyle Assistant Professor in American Foreign Policy at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington and co-host of the American Prestige Podcast. If you follow U.S.-China relations even casually, you can't avoid hearing that we're in a new Cold War — it's become a rhetorical reflex in D.C., shaping budgets, foreign policy debates, media narratives, and how ordinary Americans think about China.But what does it actually mean to call something a Cold War? To think clearly about the present, I find it helps to go to the past, not for simple analogies but to understand the intellectual and ideological machinery that produced and now sustains a Cold War mentality. Danny has written widely about the architecture of American power, the rise of the national security state, and the constellation of thinkers he calls Cold War liberals who helped define the ideological landscape of U.S. foreign policy. We explore how Cold War liberalism reshaped American political life, how the U.S. came to see its global dominance as natural and morally necessary, why the question of whose fault the Cold War was remains urgent in an age of renewed great power rivalry, the rise of China and anxiety of American decline, and what it would take to imagine a U.S.-China relationship that doesn't fall back into old patterns of moral binaries, ideological panic, and militarized competition.6:20 – Danny's background: from Iraq War politicization to studying defense intellectuals11:00 – Cold War liberalism: the constellation of ideas that shaped U.S. foreign policy16:14 – How these ideas became structurally embedded in security institutions22:02 – The Democratic Party's destruction of the genuine left in the late 1940s27:53 – Whose fault was the Cold War? Stalin's sphere of influence logic vs. American universalism31:07 – Are we facing a similar decision with China today?34:23 – The anxiety of loss: how decline anxiety distorts interpretation of China's rise37:54 – The new Cold War narrative: material realities vs. psychological legacies41:21 – Clearest parallels between the first Cold War and emerging U.S.-China confrontation44:33 – What would a pluralistic order in Asia actually look like?47:42 – Coexistence rather than zero-sum rivalry: what does it mean in practice?50:57 – What genuine restraint requires: accepting limits of American power54:14 – The moral imperative pushback: you can't have good empire without bad empire56:35 – Imperialist realism: Americans don't think we're good, but can't imagine another worldPaying it forward: The Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and Responsible Statecraft publication; The Trillion Dollar War Machine by William Hartung and Ben FreemanRecommendations:Danny: Nirvana and the history of Seattle punk/indie music (forthcoming podcast project)Kaiser: Hello China Tech Substack by Poe Zhao (hellotechchina.com)See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

What started as a daughter's simple plea for help on social media transformed a quiet village into a massive "folk culture carnival" this past weekend, as thousands of strangers drove across China to help a young woman's elderly father slaughter the family pigs.一个女儿在社交媒体上发出的简单求助，让这个安静的村庄在上周末变成了盛大的“民间文化嘉年华”。成千上万素不相识的人驱车穿越中国各地，只为帮助一位年轻女子的年迈父亲宰杀家猪。The woman, known online as Daidai, hails from Qingfu village in the Hechuan district of Chongqing. On Jan 9, she posted a video on Douyin expressing anxiety over an increasingly common issue for villagers — her father, now in his 70s, was no longer strong enough to manage the family's year-end pig slaughter tradition alone.这位网名为“呆呆”的女性来自重庆市合川区庆福村。1月9日，她在抖音发布视频，表达了村民们日益普遍的忧虑——年逾古稀的父亲已无力独自承担家里的年终杀猪传统。She invited anyone willing to lend a hand to come over for Paozhutang, a traditional "pig slaughter feast", which is a longstanding rural tradition in many parts of China, marking the approach of the Chinese New Year. Neighbors and relatives gather to help with every step — holding the pigs, singeing off bristles, carving meat and cooking dishes — before sharing a hearty meal. Guests typically leave with fresh pork pressed into their hands, a symbol of hospitality and reciprocity.她邀请所有愿意帮忙的人来参加“杀猪宴”，这是中国许多地区延续至今的乡村传统，标志着春节的临近。邻里亲友齐聚一堂，协助完成每个环节——拽住猪、烧毛、分切肉块、烹制菜肴——最后共享丰盛的宴席。宾客离席时，主人总会将新鲜猪肉塞进他们手中，这既是热情好客的象征，也承载着互惠互利的传统。She expected a few neighbors; she got a national movement. Within 48 hours, the video amassed nearly half a million likes. By Saturday and Sunday, the roads leading to Qingfu village were gridlocked by a 10-kilometer traffic jam as visitors arrived from as far as Guangdong province, bringing gifts as if visiting long-lost relatives.她本以为只有几位邻居会来，没想到却引发了一场全国性的热潮。短短48小时内，这段视频收获了近50万次点赞。到周六周日时，通往清福村的道路因长达10公里的拥堵而瘫痪，来自远至广东省的访客们带着礼物纷至沓来，仿佛在探望久别重逢的亲人。The turnout was so massive that Daidai's original two pigs were woefully insufficient. Sensing a cultural phenomenon, neighbors and the district's cultural and tourism department donated three additional pigs. In total, five pigs were slaughtered to feed a rotating crowd of over 3,000 people.到场人数之多，使得“呆呆”最初准备的两头猪远远不够。察觉到这已成为一种文化现象后，邻居们和区文旅部门又捐赠了三头猪。最终共宰杀了五头猪，为轮番到来的三千多人提供了食物。Scenes on the ground were a mix of chaotic labor and communal joy. The event was largely unplanned, but observers noted a unique "labor chain" where socioeconomic status disappeared; a Porsche owner was seen rolling up his sleeves to wash dishes, mothers sat on low stools chopping mountains of vegetables, and teams of strong young men fulfilled the original request by holding down the livestock.现场景象既是劳作的混乱，亦是集体的欢愉。这场活动虽多属临时起意，但观察者注意到一种独特的“劳动链”——社会经济地位在此消弭无踪：保时捷车主挽起袖子洗碗，母亲们坐在矮凳上切着堆积如山的蔬菜，壮实的年轻人则组队按住牲畜，完成最初的请求。To manage the hunger of the masses, the local Yanzi catering team was brought in. Head chef Jiang Xiaoyan, a 16-year veteran of village banquets, called it the most exhausting job of her career. She estimated that her team went through over 500 kilograms of rice, 350 kg of oil, and several pickup trucks' worth of vegetables and seasonings. Even with support from neighboring hotels and extra kitchen teams, the cost of the raw materials alone likely exceeded 100,000 yuan ($14,000).为满足民众的用餐需求，当地燕子坝坝宴的餐饮团队被紧急调遣至现场。拥有16年乡村宴席经验的主厨蒋小燕称这是她职业生涯中最耗费精力的工作。据她估算，团队消耗了超过500公斤大米、350公斤食用油，以及数辆皮卡车载量的蔬菜和调料。即便获得周边酒店及增援厨师团队的支持，仅原材料成本就可能突破10万元（约合1.4万美元）。The Hechuan government pivoted to support the influx, deploying traffic police and urban management to maintain order. They even integrated local culture into the impromptu festival, providing guests with free tickets to the historic Diaoyucheng Fortress and organizing a traditional molten iron fireworks display.合川区政府迅速调整策略应对客流，调派交警和城管人员维持秩序。他们甚至将本土文化融入这场即兴庆典，为游客提供免费的历史遗迹钓鱼城古堡门票，并组织了传统熔铁烟花表演。The event has turned Daidai into an overnight sensation, with her follower count skyrocketing from a few hundred to 2 million in just days. Online, the story sparked humor and admiration."She's the first person brave enough to invite the whole country to dinner," one commenter wrote.这场活动让“呆呆”一夜成名，她的粉丝数量在短短几天内从几百人飙升至200万。网络上，这个故事引发了人们的幽默调侃与由衷赞叹。一位网友写道“她是第一个敢于邀请全国人民共进晚餐的人。”Local authorities are now reportedly considering a proposal from netizens to make Jan 11 an official "Hechuan Pig Slaughter Festival" to celebrate the region's hospitality and heritage.据悉，当地政府正考虑网友提议，拟将1月11日定为官方“合川杀猪节”，以此庆祝该地区热情好客的传统与文化传承。plea/pliː/n.求助gridlocked/ˈɡrɪd.lɑːkt/adj.交通拥堵的rotating crowd轮番到来的人群

PRINCELINGS AND POLITICAL NOSTALGIA Colleague Tanya Branigan. Branigan examines "princelings" Bo Xilai and Xi Jinping, children of elite leaders who were victimized during the Cultural Revolution. Xi was exiled to the countryside, while Bo's mother likely died from beatings. Despite this family trauma, Bo later utilized "red culture" nostalgia in Chongqing before his political downfall following a murder scandal. Xi Jinping also draws upon this era's ideology to demand party purity. Branigan suggests this resurgence reflects a public search for meaning amid modern China's materialism, with leaders tapping into nostalgia for a time of perceived clearer beliefs. TANYA BRANIGAN NUMBER 51925 SHANGHAI

This week on Sinica, in a joint episode with the China-Global South Podcast, I speak with Eric Olander, host of the China Global South Podcast and founder/editor-in-chief of the China-Global South Project. In the early hours of January 3rd, U.S. forces carried out a coordinated operation in Venezuela that resulted in the capture of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, followed by their rendition to the United States to face drug trafficking charges. The operation unfolded quickly, with minimal kinetic escalation, but has raised far-reaching questions about international law, hemispheric security, and the Trump administration's willingness to use force in the Western Hemisphere. Just before the raid, China's Special Envoy for Latin America, Qiu Xiaoqi, had met with Maduro in Caracas. Commentary linking Trump's action to China has ranged widely—claims about spheres of influence, arguments this was all about oil or rare earths, and pronouncements about what this means for Taiwan. Eric helps us think through China's actual stake in Venezuela, how deeply Beijing understands Latin America, what this episode does and does not change about China's role in the region and the global South more broadly, China's immediate reaction and concrete exposure on the ground, how it manages political risk when partner regimes collapse, and what Chinese military planners may be studying as they assess how this operation unfolded.5:18 – How Beijing is reading this episode: official messaging versus elite thinking 7:40 – The Taiwan comparisons on Chinese social media and why they don't work 11:09 – How deep is China's actual expertise on Latin America? 14:56 – Comparing U.S. and Chinese benches of Latin America expertise 18:02 – Are we back to spheres of influence? Why that framing doesn't work 20:09 – Where is China most exposed in Venezuela: oil, loans, personnel? 23:41 – The resource-for-infrastructure model and why it failed 28:27 – The political assets: China as defender of sovereignty and multilateralism 36:25 – Will this push left-leaning governments closer to Beijing? 40:07 – The "China impotence" narrative and what doing something would actually mean 46:26 – What Chinese military planners are actually studying 51:46 – The Qiu Xiaoqi meeting: strategic failure or intelligence delivery? 58:40 – What actually changes and what doesn't: looking aheadPaying it forward: Alonso Illueca, nonresident fellow for Latin America and the Caribbean at the China Global South ProjectRecommendations: Eric: "China's Long Economic War" by Zongyuan Zoe Liu (Foreign Affairs)Kaiser: The Venetian Heretic by Christian CameronSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Gäster: Johan Wicklén, Jonathan Rollins, Viktor Elsnitz, Emil Arvas För 90SEK/mån får du 5 avsnitt i veckan:4 Vanliga AMK MORGON + AMK FREDAG med Isak Wahlberg Se till att bli Patron via webben och inte direkt i iPhones Patreon-app för att undvika Apples extraavgifter:Öppna istället din browser och gå till www.patreon.com/amkmorgon Relevanta länkar: ...Martin körschemahttps://www.youtube.com/shorts/YvlaMiUNK3o https://images.aftonbladet-cdn.se/v2/images/5b7d5790-8549-41a7-b316-c772fbbac444?fit=crop&format=auto&h=956&q=50&w=1300&s=42e0d48277ae737d444f0209231254b974c896cc https://www.youtube.com/shorts/CTJMYz8ABL8 https://i.dailymail.co.uk/1s/2026/01/03/22/105208413-15432025-image-m-3_1767479861088.jpg https://www.instagram.com/p/DTGl7kmDtGL/ https://www.tiktok.com/@user17907576/video/7587124738514750752?_r=1&_t=ZN-92r2TJdTGh4 https://www.tiktok.com/@comrawire/video/7592216440250469634?_r=1&_t=ZN-92r4juvcM8k https://www.svt.se/nyheter/utrikes/malmer-stenergard-inte-hort-usas-forklaring?utm_source=chatgpt.com https://www.youtube.com/shorts/VjjwRjjp5HU ...Adde Malmberghttps://i.ytimg.com/vi/cSper4VMt9c/oardefault.jpg?sqp=-oaymwEYCJUDENAFSFqQAgHyq4qpAwcIARUAAIhC&rs=AOn4CLCC-QHkuJqpyzHnhNp0_VZDtZOn6A ...Trumps danshttps://giphy.com/gifs/dechinezen-dance-trump-donald-FbiL9rsmZN3ib2JSGo ...Shaun Kinghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shaun_King ...Chongqinghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chongqing ...Coasties-pengarnahttps://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2025/12/19/coasties-to-get-2000-one-time-devotion-to-duty-payment/ Låtarna som spelades var:Venezuela - Dogge Doggelito, MulatoBreakfast At Tiffany's - Deep Blue Something Alla låtar finns i AMK Morgons spellista här:https://open.spotify.com/user/amk.morgon/playlist/6V9bgWnHJMh9c4iVHncF9j?si=so0WKn7sSpyufjg3olHYmg

This week on Sinica, recorded at Yale University, I speak with Michael Brenes and Van Jackson, coauthors of The Rivalry Peril: How Great-Power Competition Threatens Peace and Weakens Democracy. Their argument is that framing the U.S.-China relationship as geopolitical rivalry has become more than just a foreign policy orientation — it's a domestic political project that reshapes budgets, norms, and coalitions in ways that actively harm American democracy and the American people. Rivalry narrows political possibility, makes dissent suspect, encourages neo-McCarthyism (the China Initiative, profiling of Chinese Americans), produces anti-AAPI hate, and redirects public investment away from social welfare and into defense spending through what they call "national security Keynesianism."Mike is interim director of the Brady Johnson Program in Grand Strategy at Yale, while Van is a senior lecturer in international relations at Victoria University of Wellington and host of the Un-Diplomatic Podcast. We discuss the genesis of their collaboration during the Biden administration, how they navigate China as a puzzle for the American left, canonical misrememberings of the Cold War that distort current China policy, the security dilemma feedback loop between Washington and Beijing, why defense-heavy stimulus is terrible at job creation, how rivalry politics weakens democracy, recent polling showing a shift toward engagement, and their vision for a "geopolitics of peace" anchored in Sino-U.S. détente 2.0.5:47 – The genesis of the book: recognizing Biden's Cold War liberalism 11:26 – How they approached writing together from different disciplinary homes 13:20 – Navigating China as a puzzle for the American left21:39 – How great power competition hardened from analytical framework into ideology 28:15 – Mike on two canonical misrememberings of the Cold War 33:18 – Van on the security dilemma and the nuclear feedback loop 39:55 – National security Keynesianism: why defense spending is bad at job creation 44:38 – How rivalry politics weakens democracy and securitizes dissent 48:09 – Building durable coalitions for restraint-oriented statecraft 51:27 – Has the post-COVID moral panic actually abated? 53:27 – The master narrative we need: a geopolitics of peace 55:29 – Associative balancing: achieving equilibrium through accommodation, not armsRecommendations:Van: The Long Twentieth Century by Giovanni Arrighi Mike: The World of the Cold War: 1945-1991 by Vladislav Zubok Kaiser: Pluribus (Apple TV series by Vince Gilligan)See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Happy holidays from Sinica! This week, I speak with Paul Triolo, Senior Vice President for China and Technology Policy Lead at DGA Albright Stonebridge Group and nonresident honorary senior fellow on technology at the Asia Society Policy Institute's Center for China Analysis. On December 8th, Donald Trump announced via Truth Social that he would approve Nvidia H200 sales to vetted Chinese customers — a decision that immediately sparked fierce debate. Paul and I unpack why this decision was made, why it's provoked such strong reactions, and what it tells us about the future of technology export controls on China. We discuss the evolution of U.S. chip controls from the Entity List expansions under Trump's first term through the October 2022 rules and the Sullivan Doctrine, the role of David Sacks and Jensen Huang in advocating for this policy shift, whether Chinese firms will actually want to buy H200s given their heterogeneous hardware stacks and Beijing's autarky ambitions, what the Reuters report about China cracking ASML's EUV lithography code tells us about the choke point strategy, and whether selective engagement actually strengthens Taiwan's Silicon Shield or undermines it. This conversation is essential listening for understanding the strategic, technical, and political dimensions of the semiconductor competition.6:44 – What the H200 decision actually changes in the real world 9:23 – The evolution of U.S. chip controls: from Entity Lists to the Sullivan Doctrine 18:28 – How Jensen Huang and David Sacks convinced Trump 25:21 – The good-faith case for why export control advocates see H200 approval as a strategic mistake 32:12 – What H200s practically enable: training, inference, or stabilizing existing clusters 38:49 – Will Chinese companies actually buy H200s? The heterogeneous hardware reality 46:06 – The strategic contradiction: exporting 5nm GPUs while freezing tool controls at 16/14nm 51:01 – The Reuters EUV report and what it reveals about choke point technologies 58:43 – How Taiwan fits into this: does selective engagement strengthen the Silicon Shield? 1:07:26 – Looking ahead: broader rethinking of export controls or patchwork exceptions? 1:12:49 – What would have to be true in 2-3 years for critics to have been right about H200?Paying it forward: Poe Zhao and his Substack Hello China TechRecommendations: Paul: Zbig: The Life of Zbigniew Brzezinski, Amerca's Great Power Propheti by Ed Luce; Hyperdimensional Substack by Dean Ball Kaiser: Everything Is Tuberculosis by John Green; The Anthropocene Reviewed by John Green; So Very Small by Thomas LevensonSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

I had the grand opportunity to cover the 50th Aniversary of the Toronto International Film Festival.  With animation being one of my favourite topics in the world, I am grateful that I was able to join this epic conversation and now share it with you. :) DIALOGUES: Creative Visions in Animated Feature Films is a specific TIFF (Toronto International Film Festival) event/panel where acclaimed directors like Domee Shi (Pixar's Elio), Mamoru Hosoda (Belle, Summer Wars), and Momoko Seto (Dandelion's Odyssey) discuss balancing artistic vision with studio realities, creative authorship, and the future of bold animation, showcasing diverse global perspectives. This dialogue offers insights into the challenges and triumphs of making visionary animated features, featuring both indie and major studio voices.  From intimate, auteur-driven projects to collaborations with major studios, discover how directors Domee Shi (Elio), Momoko Seto (Dandelion's Odyssey), Mamoru Hosoda (Scarlet), and Kid Koala (Space Cadet) balance artistic integrity with industry realities, and what it takes to make animated films that captivate audiences and spark global imaginations. Join us for a candid conversation about creative authorship, industry pressures, and the evolving space for bold, visionary animation. Domee Shi began as a story intern at Pixar Animation Studios in 2011 and was soon hired as a story artist on the Academy Award–winning Inside Out. She went on to work on The Good Dinosaur, Incredibles 2, and Toy Story 4. In 2015, she was greenlit to write and direct Bao, which won the Oscar for Best Animated Short. She made her feature directorial debut with 2022's Oscar-nominated Turning Red and most recently co-directed Elio, released June 2025. Born in Chongqing, China, and raised in Toronto, Shi now lives in Oakland, California. Momoko Seto was born in Tokyo and lives in Paris. She studied at Le Fresnoy - National Studio of Contemporary Arts. Her short film series Planet includes Planet Z (11) and Planet Sigma (15). The winner of the FIPRESCI Award at Cannes Critics' Week, Dandelion's Odyssey (25) is her feature film debut. Mamoru Hosoda was born in Toyama, Japan. He has worked on numerous animated series and directed the features One Piece: Baron Omatsuri and the Secret Island (05), The Girl Who Leapt Through Time (06), Summer Wars (09), Wolf Children (12), The Boy and the Beast (15) which played at the Festival, Mirai (18), and Belle (21). Scarlet (25) is his latest film. Kid Koala (Eric San) is a Montreal-based DJ, composer, and graphic novelist. He directed Space Cadet, his first animated feature based on his graphic novel, which premiered at the Berlinale and will have its North American Premiere at TIFF 50. Known for genre-defying albums and live shows, he has also scored acclaimed films, series, and video games. Moderator Theresa Scandiffio is the Associate Dean of Animation and Game Design at Sheridan College. Prior to joining Sheridan, Scandiffio led archival and curatorial projects at museums, festivals, and universities in Toronto, Chicago, and Orlando. From 2010–2020, Scandiffio was a member of the programming team that launched the Toronto International Film Festival's year-round home, TIFF Lightbox, where she led the Learning, Heritage, and Community Outreach divisions. Scandiffio served as an Ontario delegate for the 2015 Governor General Canadian Leadership Conference and was a 2017 Civic Action DiverseCity Fellow. She received her PhD in Cinema and Media studies from the University of Chicago. Key Participants & Films Mentioned: Domee Shi: Elio (Pixar) Momoko Seto: Dandelion's Odyssey (Indie/Artistic) Mamoru Hosoda: Scarlet (Japan's Studio Chizu) Kid Koala: Space Cadet (Independent)  Themes Explored: Creative Authorship vs. Industry: How directors maintain their unique style within large production environments. Industry Pressures: Navigating financial and commercial demands in animation. Evolving Landscape: The growing space for unique, visionary animation. Global Perspectives: Highlighting both auteur-driven projects and major studio collaborations.  Stay connected with me here:  https://www.instagram.com/shesallovertheplacepodcast

This week on Sinica, I speak with Mark Sidel, the Doyle Bascom Professor of Law and Public Affairs at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and a senior fellow at the International Center for Not for Profit Law. Mark has written extensively on law and philanthropy in China and across Asia, including widely cited analyses of how the Chinese security state came to play a central role in managing foreign civil society organizations. Since the Law on the Management of Domestic Activities of Overseas NGOs took effect on January 1, 2017, China has introduced a remarkably comprehensive, vertically integrated system of oversight for foreign NGOs, foundations, and nonprofits.We discuss how this system combines securitization and political risk management with selective accommodation of service provision and technical expertise, Mark's typology of organizational responses (survivors, hibernators, regionalizers, work-arounders, and leavers), the requirement that foreign NGOs secure professional supervisory units, the impact on China's domestic nonprofit ecosystem, and what this tells us about the party-state's long-term vision for controlled engagement with the outside world.4:43 – The landscape of non-state organizations before the 2016 law 7:06 – What changed: color revolutions, Arab Spring, and domestic anxieties 9:08 – Public security intellectuals and their influence on the law 11:51 – How registration and temporary activity filing systems work in practice 13:48 – Why the Ministry of Public Security, not Civil Affairs, was put in charge 19:31 – The professional supervisory unit requirement and dependency relationships22:48 – How the state shifted foreign NGO work away from advocacy without banning it26:17 – Mark's typology: survivors, hibernators, regionalizers, work-arounders, and leavers 35:19 – What correlates with success for those who have survived 40:41 – Impact on China's domestic nonprofit ecosystem and professional intermediaries 45:54 – What makes China's system distinctive compared to India, Egypt, Russia, and Vietnam 50:19 – The Article 53 problem and university partnerships 55:32 – Advice for mid-sized foundations or NGOs considering work in China todayPaying it Forward: Neysun Mahboubi and the Penn Project on the Future of U.S.-China RelationsRecommendations:Mark: Everyday Democracy: Civil Society, Youth, and the Struggle Against Authoritarian Culture in China by Anthony SpiresKaiser: The music of Steve Morse (Dixie Dregs, The Dregs, Steve Morse Band)See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

"The people in the teahouse were a focal point for my approach to reimagining this sound, I listened to the cadence and rhythm of conversations and clattering of cups and found a melody, chopped up the audio to accentuate the melody, dialed in some synths and lo-fi drums to act as the vehicle for that melody and took it some weird and wonderful places, here are some interesting points from the piece: "I wanted to include some nods to China in this piece, the gongs at the beginning and end, the mandarin phrases which were "Begin" "Breakdown" and "The End" and the slightly more hidden one in the form of a modulated recording of a Chinese water goose in the breakdown at the end. "I wanted the whole thing to feel like you were listening to a record so there's a vinyl recording throughout the whole thing and a needle on and off sound at either end." Chongqing tea house reimagined by Gary Pitt.

Teahouses were once hubs of socializing, business, and leisure in towns along the Yangtze, akin to British pubs or Shanghai's 1990s eateries. At Jiaotong Teahouse, most patrons are retired local men, much like their ancestors a century ago. They trickle in around 5 a.m., chatting, playing cards, chess, or sipping tea under dim wooden beams and brick walls, with scarcely a sound from phones or devices. Some linger all day, swapping tales from near and far; others head home by noon with vegetables for lunch. Wang Di's book Teahouse vividly explores the traditional Chengdu teahouse's role in culture, politics, and society—a history and voice of ordinary people. Recorded in Chongqing by Digimonk.

This week on Sinica, I'm delighted to have Iza Ding as guest host. Iza is a professor of political science at Northwestern University and a good friend whose work on Chinese governance I greatly admire. She's joined by Deborah Seligsohn, who has been a favorite guest on this show many times. Deb is an associate professor of political science at Villanova University and was previously a science and environmental counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. This episode was recorded in three parts: the first two in Belém, Brazil during COP30 (the 30th UN Climate Change Conference), and the final segment after the conference concluded. Iza and Deb discuss China's role at the climate summit, the real story behind the famous 2007 U.S. Embassy air quality monitor in Beijing (spoiler: it wasn't China's "Silent Spring moment"), Brazil's management of the conference, why China leads on technology but not on negotiation, and what the outcomes of COP30 mean for the future of global climate cooperation. This is an insider's view of how climate diplomacy actually works, complete with unexpected fire evacuations and glut-shaming of The New York Times.3:43 – Deb's impressions of COP30 and Brazil's inclusive approach 9:21 – China's presence at COP30: technology leadership without negotiation leadership 15:34 – Xie Zhenhua's absence and the U.S.-China dynamic at previous COPs 24:46 – Inside the negotiation rooms: language, politeness, and obstruction 33:06 – BYD's presence in Brazil and Chinese EV expansion 40:54 – The real story of the 2007 U.S. Embassy air quality monitor in Beijing 45:00 – Fire evacuation at COP30 and UN territorial sovereignty 1:22:06 – What actually drove China's air pollution control: the 2003 power plant standards 1:41:27 – The dramatic final plenary and the Mutirão decision 1:55:17 – China's NDC 3.0: under-promise and over-deliver strategySee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, I speak with Zhong Na, a novelist and essayist whose new piece, "Murder House," appears in the inaugural issue of Equator — a striking new magazine devoted to longform writing that crosses borders, disciplines, and cultures. In January 2024, a young couple, both Tsinghua-educated Google engineers living in a $2.5 million Silicon Valley home, became the center of a tragedy that captivated Chinese social media far more than American outlets. Zhong Na explores how the case became a collective Rorschach test — a mirror held up to contemporary Chinese society, exposing cracks in the myths of meritocracy, the prestige of global tech firms, and shifting notions of gender, class, and the Chinese dream itself. We discuss the gendered reactions online, the dimming of America's appeal, the emotional costs of the immigrant success story, and the craft of writing about tragedy with compassion but without sentimentality.5:06 – How the story first reached Zhong Na, and the Luigi Mangione comparison 7:05 – Discovering she attended the same Chengdu high school as the alleged murderer Chen Liren 8:10 – The collaboration with Equator and Joan Didion's influence 10:30 – Education, class, and the cracks in China's meritocracy myth 16:01 – Tiger mothers vs. lying flat: two responses to a rigged system 19:12 – The pandemic and the dimming of the American dream 22:49 – Chinese men as perpetrators: immigrant stress and the loss of patriarchal privilege 25:56 – The gender war online: moral autopsy and victim-blaming 30:25 – The obsession with the ex-girlfriend and attraction to the accused 34:37 – The murder house, Chinese numerology, and the rise of Gen Z metaphysics 37:08 – Geopolitics, the China Initiative, and rethinking America as a destination 39:42 – Craft and moral compass: learning from Didion and Janet Malcolm 42:31 – Zhong Na's fiction: writing Chinese experiences without catering to Western expectationsPaying it forward: Gavin Jacobson and the editorial team at EquatorRecommendations: Zhong Na: Elsewhere by Yan Ge Kaiser: Made in Ethiopia, documentary by Xinyan Yu and Max Duncan (available on PBS)See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

It has been five years since we started Chatsunami and it has been an incredible journey. Huge shout-out to our amazing Pandalorians who have supported us for all this time you are all incredible!In this episode, Satsunami is joined by his amazing partner MsTsunami to talk about their experience in China! In this part the duo discuss their journey to Beijing and Chongqing. What was it like walking along the Great Wall of China? How did China's Cyber Punk city hold up? And what were the highlights of the trip? Let's find out!This podcast is a member of the PodPack Collective, an indie podcasting group dedicated to spreading positivity within the podcast community. For further information, please follow the link: https://linktr.ee/podpackcollectiveCheck out all of our content here: https://linktr.ee/chatsunamiWebsite: chatsunami.comTwitter/X: https://twitter.com/ChatsunamiPodInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/chatsunami/TikTok: tiktok.com/@chatsunamiPatrons:Super Pandalorian Tier: Battle Toaster Ghostie Cryptic1991Red Panda Tier: Greenshield95 Danny Brown Aaron HuggettFree Members: Middle-aged Bodcast Rob Harvey Aaron (Super Pod Saga) Billy Strachan SoniaUse my special link zen.ai/chatsunami and use chatsunami to save 30% off your first three months of Zencastr professional. #madeonzencastrCreate your podcast today! #madeonzencastrStay safe, stay awesome and most importantly, stay hydrated!

Hello everyone, a big thanks to all of you who joined the patreon and voted for this to be the next episode, you all are awesome. This is a part 2 about Hirohito's responsibility during the wars of 1931-1945, so if you have not heard part 1, perhaps go do so, or maybe you just don't care about 1931-1940 and just want to hear about the 1941-1945 period, hell by all means enjoy.   So last time we kind of left it on a bit of a dramatic cliff hanger. I spoke about Emperor Hirohito's involvement in what was called at the time the “China Incident”. It was not an official declared war until December of 1941. We left off in 1940, Hirohito was struggling with a situation of juggling two things: 1) how the hell to finally end the China War 2) how to do it without receiving horrible ramifications from the international world. On July 22nd of 1940, Konoe was back and formed a second cabinet. Notably General Hideki Tojo went from vice to army Minister during this time. If you guys ever want a podcast on Hideki Tojo, let me know, he is one rather bizarre figure that's for sure. Konoe tackled his job by holding an imperial HQ government liaison conference. For 90 minutes everyone worked on a new national policy designed to exploit the international situation, IE: Germany bulldozing europe.  The result was a document on national policy dated July 27th. It shifted focus to the “southern area” IE: southeast asia and the Pacific if the China war did not end quickly. Its basis was to exploit the foreign nations that had their hands full in europe, France, Britain and the Netherlands. It called for an invasion of French Indochina to establish bases to launch assaults against the Dutch East Indies for natural resources if diplomatic means failed. It acknowledged if the Dutch East Indies were seized through military means, Japan would also seek to fight Britain, but not the US, instead Japan would prepare for a possible war with the Americans. To all of this Hirohito approved. The army also kept pressuring its desire to ally with Germany. Throughout 1939-1940 Hirohito rejected this idea, not because of any ideological differences, it was because of Germans anti aggression pact with the USSR. If Japan were to ally to Germany, Hirohito wanted it to be mutually to fight the USSR. The Navy likewise opposed allying to Germany because they believed it would force Britain and the US to increase their aid to Chiang Kai-shek.   However the Blitzkrieg changed everything. Everyone was shocked at how well Germany was doing. Prince Chichibu repeatedly argued with Hirohito to change his mind over the alliance idea. Then suddenly the Navy changed their mind and began favoring an alliance. This changed came about in June of 1940 when the France fell. The Navy changed their mind based on a few factors, a major component was the belief if Germany and the USSR were allied, than at least Japan would not have to worry about the USSR and could focus on the pacific. Both the IJA and the IJN believed Hitler would soon take Britain and thus there was a huge desire to join the new international order on the winning side. A third factor was a new clause in negotiations with Germany and Japan, that if they allied Japan would not automatically be drawn into a war with Britain against her will. Some in the navy also believed perhaps Germany could help their diplomatic situation with the Americans. So the army and navy were now both demanding an alliance with Germany, it was all up to hirohito.    At an imperial briefing on June 19th of 1940, Hirohito asked chief of staff Prince Kan'in and the Army Minister Hata “At a time when peace will soon come in the European situation, will there be a deployment of troops to the Netherlands Indies and French Indochina?” Such as question revealed Hirohito's perception at the time that Germany was on the verge of victory and that he was gradually considering the deployment of troops in French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies as neither parent nation were in a position to defend their holdings. In regards to the China war, the Japanese sought to end leaks of materials getting into China from places like Hong Kong. Hirohito received reports indicated Britain would not accept closing the movement of materials into China via Hong Kong. The military acknowledged it would probably be required to invade Hong Kong and thus declare war on Britain. Upon hearing of this Hirohito remarked “Should that happen, I am sure America will use the method of an embargo, don't you agree?” To this his lord of the privy seal, Kido reassured him stating “the nation must be fully resolved to resist to proceed cautiously and not to be dragged into events precipitated by the overseas agencies”. Konoe's second cabinet resolved to end the China war, construct a new order in greater east asia and to complete war preparations as a national defense state. On July 27th at a liaison conference a document was adopted, affirming a course of advancing to the south and to ally with Germany. Japan would incorporate the Dutch East Indies, British Malaya and other resource rich areas of Southeast Asia into its new order while simultaneously bolstering its relationship with the Axis states. After hearing and reading everything, Hirohito sanctioned it all. Thus Hirohito had sanctioned the preliminary actions that would set Japan into a collision course with the US.   In September Japan began sending troops into northern French Indochina after concluding its Tripartite alliance with Germany and Italy. Now Hirohito was briefed beforehand by Army Minister Tojo and other chiefs of staff about securing bases in northern French indochina. Hirohito agreed to this under the belief acquiring such bases would stop more leaked materials going into China and thus contribute to the fall of Chongqing. But Hirohito also sanctioned it under the full knowledge it was preparing the Nanshin-ron advance and that carried a risk of going to war with Britain and by proxy the US. Naturally he wanted to thwart any war breaking out with the US by it seems his officials had convinced him they could manage most of their plans without aggravating the US.   On July 29th with the German offensive aimed at finishing off Britain, Hirohito summoned his chiefs and vice chiefs of staff to the imperial HQ. He began to question the prospects of war with the US. Prince Fushimi replied “[u]nless we complete our domestic preparations, particularly the preparation of our material resources, I do not think we should lightly start war even if there is a good opportunity to do so.” Hirohito then asked if  “the Army were planning to occupy points in India, Australia, and New Zealand.” But overall Hirohito seemed to be the most concerned about the US, Germany and the USSR. “Could Japan, obtain a victory in a naval battle with the United States as we once did in the Battle of the Japan Sea? . . . I heard that the United States will ban exports of oil and scrap iron [to Japan]. We can probably obtain oil from other sources, but don't you think we will have a problem with scrap iron?” In regards to the USSR “If a Japan-Soviet nonaggression treaty is made and we advance to the south, the navy will become the main actor. Has the army given thought to reducing the size of its forces in that case? . . . How do you assess the future national power of Germany? . . . Both Germany and the Soviet Union are untrustworthy countries. Don't you think there will be a problem if one of them betrays us and takes advantage of our exhaustion fighting the United States?I]t seems as though you people are thinking of implementing this plan by force because there is a good opportunity at this moment for resolving the southern problem even though some dangers are involved. . . . What does a good opportunity mean? [To this question Sawada replied: “For example, if a German landing in England commences.”] In that case wouldn't the United States move to aid Britain? . . . Well, I've heard enough. I take it, in short, that you people are trying to resolve the southern problem by availing yourselves of today's good opportunities.”   You can tell Hirohito understood the very real threat of an Anglo-American alliance and was very cautious. It seemed to Hirohito, that his officials were trying to take the limelight off the abysmal situation in China but emphasizing a southern advance. Well Americans response to the Japanese movement into northern French indochina was to see it as a direct threat. Something I have not paid much attention to was Hirohito's decision making being the direct result of trying to mediate between competing entities, ie: the IJA and IJN. At this point in time the IJA and IJN top officials had the power to simply stop governmental functions from occurring altogether whenever they were displeased with a decision. As you can imagine the IJA and IJN were also competing for resources and political power. Thus Hirohito spent a lot of time and effort trying to formulate decisions that at a minimum kept the governance going.    In the end Hirohito sanctioned Imperial HQ army order number 458, ordering the area army to begin the entry into French Indochina. Thus once again Hirohito sanctioned aggression aboard. America began what it called a “moral embargo” on aircraft parts, scrap iron and aviation gasoline. This was one of many gradual steps America took to incrementally sanction Japan, while aiding China to keep it bogged down. Japan's direct response was joining the Axis with a clause “to assist one another with all political, economic and military means if attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese conflict”. This clause was designed specifically to check Britain and the US. Hirohito knew this was a turning point carrying the possibility of war with the US. Later he would blame some officials and even his brothers Chichibu and Takamatsu, but not his own actions sanctioning the Axis pact.    Speaking of his brothers, at this time Chichibu got severely ill with tuberculosis and as a result retired from active public life, now Prince Takamatsu stood as next regent. Thus Takamatsu would begin reading reports and advise Hirohito. Takamatsu like Chichibu approved the Tripartite Pact and found his brother Hirohito's performance lacking. Meanwhile Britain responded to the Tripartite pact by opening up the Burma road and America made a loan to Chiang Kai-shek.   The Soviets came to Japan for a neutrality pact and sweetened the deal by offering Soviet coal and oil concessions in North Sakhalin. Hirohito ratified the treaty on April 25th of 1941. 5 weeks later on June 5th, the Japanese ambassador to Berlin, General Oshima Hiroshi reported to Hirohito and the high command that Hitler was about to invade the Soviets. The Army high command sprang into action drafting plans to open a war with the Soviets while simultaneously advancing south into French Indochina. But many in the military also sought to wait until the time was ripe, and a rift emerged. Operation barbarossa commenced and on June 23rd the IJN high command gave their opinion that Japan should seize all military bases and airfields in southern French Indochina even at the risk of war with Britain and America. Can you say boy that escalated quickly?   There was obvious temptation to invade Siberia towards Lake Baikal, but at the same time the western powers were tightening sanctions on Japan, she needed resources. At this point Japan had been stuck in China for 4 years and 5 months, the army had expanded from 17 divisions totalling 250,000 men in july of 1937 to 51 divisions at 2.1 million men in December 8th of 1941. On July 2nd, 10 tens into Operation barbarossa, Konoe summoned an imperial conference to debate actions going forward. The consensus was that southern French Indochina needed to be taken and that it probably would not provoke the US going to war with Japan. Hirohito sanctioned it and on July 30th made a major operational intervention by advising General Sugiyama to build up forces in Manchukuo to prevent the Soviet Far Eastern Army.   Japan negotiated with Vichy France to allow Japanese troops to occupy southern parts of French Indochina. What was to be originally just 40,000 IJA forces turned into 185,000 and in response America increased sanctions and began preparing the Philippines for war. Roosevelt froze Japanese assets in the US on July 26th and by August the 1st a total embargo of oil and gasoline exports to Japan. Konoe's cabinet, the military high command, pretty much everyone was shocked by how harsh the economic sanctions were. Emperor Hirohito told Sugiyama to halt mobilizing forces in Manchukuo and the army basically dropped all plans of attacking the USSR. A month after the US oil embargo suddenly the army had changed its mind to go all in on the southern advance. Britain likewise began sanctions against Japan and both Britain and the US managed to convince the Dutch to follow suit by refusing to sell oil to Japan. The Dutch even took it a step further and followed Americans lead in freezing Japanese assets.    Konoe was in full panic mode, be believed his ambassador to washington was a moron and sought to go in person to speak to Roosevelt. At 11:40am on August 4th Konoe spoke to Hirohito about the plan, but Washington kept making up excuses prolonging any meeting from taking place. Meanwhile Washington was building up its navy, and the IJN were stressing, in the words of Admiral Takagai “As time passes and this situation continues, our empire will either be totally defeated or forced to fight a hopeless war. Therefore we should pursue war and diplomacy together. If there is no prospect of securing our final line of national survival by diplomatic negotiations, we must be resolved to fight.” Hirohito understood the predicament full well, that each day Japan was wasting its oil reserves, if they were to strike it had to be quickly.    On september 3rd at a liaison conference it was decided Japan was to prepare for a war against the US, UK and Netherlands while simultaneously pursuing diplomacy. If diplomacy failed by early October the decision for war would be made. Konoe presented everything to Hirohito on September 5th and requested an imperial conference on the matter. The most important decision of his life was about to be made.    Now take a second to feel the moment. Germany's invasion of the USSR was in its 6th week and not producing a decisive victory; Britain was still in the fight and the Japanese ambassador to London reported back Britain would allow Japan to maintain its great power status and exert influence in asia if they stayed out of the European War and “re-examined their current policy”. An olive branch. Hirohito had options is what I am arguing. He could stale things, he could mobilize units into Manchukuo to simply threaten the Soviet border, he could simply stay out of new wars, even it the China war would get worse, but try to profit from the situation in Europe. He could stop the southern advance, lose the chance to seize the resource in southeast asia, but perhaps the US, UK and Netherlands would lift some sanctions.   After speaking back and forth with Konoe while scolding Sugiyama here is a bit of their conversation:    Emperor: In the event we must finally open hostilities, will our operations have a probability of victory?  Sugiyama: Yes, they will.  Emperor: At the time of the China Incident, the army told me that we could achieve peace immediately after dealing them one blow with three divisions. Sugiyama, you were army minister at that time. . . .  Sugiyama: China is a vast area with many ways in and many ways out, and we met unexpectedly big difficulties. . . . [ellipses in original]  Emperor: Didn't I caution you each time about those matters? Sugiyama, are you lying to me? Nagano: If Your Majesty will grant me permission, I would like to make a statement.  Emperor: Go ahead.  Nagano: There is no 100 percent probability of victory for the troops stationed there. . . . Sun Tzu says that in war between states of similar strength, it is very difficult to calculate victory. Assume, however, there is a sick person and we leave him alone; he will definitely die. But if the doctor's diagnosis offers a seventy percent chance of survival, provided the patient is operated on, then don't you think one must try surgery? And if, after the surgery, the patient dies, one must say that was meant to be. This indeed is the situation we face today. . . . If we waste time, let the days pass, and are forced to fight after it it is too late to fight, then we won't be able to do a thing about it.  Emperor: All right, I understand. [He answered in a better mood.]  Konoe: Shall I make changes in tomorrow's agenda? How would you like me to go about it? Emperor: There is no need to change anything.   There is no need to change anything. Konoe grabbed Hirohito for a private audience afterwards and tried to get Hirohito to revise the outline, but Hirohito ignored this. Hirohito at that point could have stopped or at least slowed down the countdown to all out war. Hirohito instead did not want to displease the pro-war factions in his military, perhaps he saw them as a threat to his authority. Hirohito was not at all pleased with the policy plan. When he was shown in on september 5th, he looked extremely irritated and blew up on Sugiyama and the army high command as a whole. 20 minutes before the Imperial conference on September 6th, Hirohito spoke with his lord of the privy Kido and told him he was going to raise some questions at the meeting. Kido told him that it would be best to leave the questions at the very end, basically he was advising to allow for things to go through. Thus Hirohito sat through the meeting and sanction the preparations for war. Here is a conversation between Hirohito and the Chiefs of the general staff:   Emperor: You may go ahead and mobilize. But if the Konoe-Roosevelt talks go well, you'll stop, won't you?  Chief of the General Staff: Indeed, your majesty, we will.  Emperor: I will ask you one more time: Is there any possibility that the north [that is, the Soviet Union] may move against us while we are engaged in the south [emphasis added]?  Chief of the General Staff: I cannot say that will absolutely not occur. However, because of the season it is inconceivable that large forces will be able to attack us   Meanwhile Konoe's deadline to reach a diplomatic resolution with the US was fast approaching. On October 13th Hirohito told Kido “In the present situation there seems to be little hope for the Japan–U.S. negotiations. If hostilities erupt this time, I think I may have to issue a declaration of war.” The next day Konoe held his last cabinet meeting and Army minister Tojo took the lionshare of talking:   For the past six months, ever since April, the foreign minister has made painstaking efforts to adjust relations [with the United States.] Although I respect him for that, we remain deadlocked. . . . Our decision was “to start the war . . . if by early October we cannot thoroughly achieve our demands through negotiations.” Today is the fourteenth. . . . We are mobilizing hundreds of thousands of soldiers. Others are being moved from China and Manchuria, and we have requisitioned two million tons of ships, causing difficulties for many people. As I speak ships are en route to their destinations. I would not mind stopping them, and indeed would have to stop them, if there was a way for a diplomatic breakthrough. . . . The heart of the matter is the [imposition on us of] withdrawal [from Indochina and China]. ...If we yield to America's demands, it will destroy the fruits of the China Incident. Manchukuo will be endangered and our control of Korea undermined   And so Konoe resigned two days later, but before he did his last official action was to recommend Prince Higashikuni to succeed him, in fact he got Tojo to do the same. Prince Higashikuni was deemed capable of controlling both the Army and Navy. And what did Hirohito say to this? He said no, and appointed Hideki Tojo. Why? As going back to the beginning of this series, to protect the Kokutai. He did not want a member of the royal family to hold the seat as Prime Minister during a time when war might be declared, a war that Japan might lose, which would toss the responsibility onto the imperial house. It was a threat to the Kokutai. Hirohito chose Tojo because Tojo was 100% loyal subject to the emperor. Tojo was the perfect fall guy if one ever existed.    Between November 8-15th, Hirohito received a full rundown of the Pearl Harbor surprise attack plan and sanctioned it. The deadline to reach a diplomatic solution with the US was set for midnight December 1st.    Hirohito ever since the Mukden Incident had expressed fear that not taking warlike actions, not pumping up the kokutai or not suppressing dissent would jeopardize the imperial system of government and damage the imperial institution itself. For Hirohito domestic conflicts were more dangerous than external ones, because they carried the risk of eroding the monarchy. As the time approached for his finally decision on declaring war, Hirohito requested a last round of discussion. The carriers enroute to Pearl harbor departed on november 27th, while on December 1st, 19 leaders, the entire Tojo cabinet and Emperor met. Tojo pulled a rather cheeky maneuver, he reported the response from America, the famous Hull note by stating “the United States . . . has demanded that we withdraw troops from all of China [emphasis added],” but in fact, Hull had used only the word “China.” Hara asked “I would like to know,whether Manchukuo is included in the term ‘China'? Did our two ambassadors confirm this point?” Togo's reply to this was “However . . . the American proposal [early in the negotiations on] April 16 stated that they would recognize the state of Manchukuo, so Manchukuo would not be part of China. . . . On the other hand . . . there has been a change in their position . . . they look upon Chungking as the one and only legitimate regime, and . . . they want to destroy the Nanking regime, [so] they may retract what they have said previously” A nonsensical gibberish answer, intentionally done to make everyone think America did in fact include Manchukuo, thus forcing everyone to see the demands as impossible to comply with. Togo finished the meeting : “Once His Majesty decides to commence hostilities, we will all strive to meet our obligations to him, bring the government and the military ever closer together, resolve that the nation united will go on to victory, make an all-out effort to achieve our war aims, and set his majesty's mind at ease. I now adjourn the meeting.” Hirohito simply nodded. Sugiyama remarked that the emperor did not show the slightest sign of anxiety, in fact he looked like he was in a good mood.   Hirohito's naval aid Jo Eiichiro wrote minutes on the first day of the pacific war, recording the emperors actions. 4 A.M. (Japan time): Japan issued a final ultimatum to the United States. 3:30 A.M.: the Hawaiian surprise attack was successful. 5:30 A.M.: Singapore bombed. Great results. Air attacks on Davao, Guam, Wake. 7:10 A.M.: All the above was reported to the emperor. The American gunboat Wake was captured on the Shanghai front. The British gunboat Petrel was sunk. From 7:15 to 7:30 the chief of the Navy General Staff reported on the war situation. At 7:30 the prime minister informally reported to the emperor on the imperial rescript declaring war. (Cabinet meeting from 7 A.M.). At 7:35 the chief of the Army General Staff reported on the war situation. At 10:45 the emperor attended an emergency meeting of the privy council. At 11:00 A.M. the imperial rescript declaring war was promulgated. 11:40 A.M. Hirohito conferred with Kido for about twenty minutes.] At 2:00 P.M. the emperor summoned the army and navy ministers and bestowed an imperial rescript on them. The army minister, representing both services, replied to the emperor. [At 3:05 P.M. the emperor had a second meeting with Kido, lasting for about twenty minutes.] At 4:30 P.M. the chiefs of staff formally reported on the draft of the Tripartite (Germany-Italy-Japan) Military Pact. At 8:30 P.M. the chief of the Navy General Staff reported on the achievements of the Hawaii air attack. . . . Throughout the day the emperor wore his naval uniform and seemed to be in a splendid mood.   Hirohito believed Germany would win, thus if with their help he believed Japan could thwart off the US until a negotiated peace. Having made his choice, Hirohito devoted himself to presiding over and guiding the war to victory at all costs. He was a extremely cautious person, every single campaign he looked for what could go wrong, made worse case scenario predictions and was very suspicious of reports from his high officials. He was notably very harsh and critical on said high commanders. Although he did not visit the war theaters as did other commanders in chief, he exercised and controlled influence on theater operations, both in the planning and execution whenever he chose to do so. As was the same case with the China war before it, he issued the highest military orders of the Imperial HQ, performed audited conferences and led to decisions transmitted in his name. He received generals and admirals to the imperial palace who gave full reports of the battlefront. He visited bases, battleships, various army and naval headquarters. He inspected military schools, you know the full shebang.    After 26 months of war, the naval air force had lost 26,006 aircraft, nearly a third of its total power, thousands of veteran pilots were dead. Hundreds of thousands of tons of warship was sunk, the merchant and transport fleet was crippled. Late 1943 saw the Americans turning the initiative of the war, Japan was on the defensive. Guadalcanal had been the major turning point. During the staled battle for the philippines, Hirohito pressed upon Army chief of staff Sugiyama to increase troop strength to knock out Bataan. The problem persisted, on February 9th and 26th Hirohito pressed Sugiyama again about getting more troops to take Bataan.   Hirohito was confronted with the prisoner of war issue after the doolittle raid. When the pilots were caught, Togo initially opposed executions, but many in the IJA sought all 8 men executed. Hirohito chose to intervene and commuted the execution of 5 out of the 8. Why just 5, no one knows to this day, but its theorized it was to demonstrate his benevolence while simultaneously giving a bit of what the army wanted.    The CBI theater took the lionshare of his attention in 1942, he continuously pressed up Sugiyama when a final blow would be delivered against Chongqing. When the Midway disaster occurred, Hirohito was given a full report of what happened, but he chose to hid the extent of the loss from the IJA. In fact in response to the Guadalcanal campaign he was heard once asking “I wonder if this is not the start of the AmericanBritish counteroffensive?” He urged his commanders to increase offensive activities and to toss all weapons possible at the enemy, because Japan needed more time to secure its reserves of vital oil, rubber and iron. When he heard the first report of the Ichiki detachment being wiped out, he simply stated “I am sure it [Guadalcanal] can be held.” With numerous reports pouring in about the men dying from tropical disease and starvation, Hirohito kept demanding greater efforts from them. Hirohito continuously applied pressure on his naval and land commanders to recapture the island. On September 15th, November 5th and November 11th he called for more IJA troops and aircraft to be allocated to it. Sugiyama was nervous about sending more IJA pilots as they were inexperienced in transoceanic combat and he sought to reinforce the north china army to hit Chongqing. Hirohito demanded it a second time and Sugiyama replied the IJA had deployed its air power instead to New Guinea and Rabaul. Hirohito continuously hammered the issue despite the high level commanders disagreeing with it. By late november it was clear guadalcanal was a lost cause.    At an imperial HQ conference on December 31st of 1942, the chiefs of staff reported they would cancel the attempts to recapture guadalcanal. Hirohito sanctioned it but stated “It is unacceptable to just give up on capturing Guadalcanal. We must launch an offensive elsewhere.” Hirohito forced the issue and it was decided the new strategic points would be in the solomons north of New Georgia and the Stanley range on New Guinea. Hirohito in fact threatened not to authorize the withdrawal of men from Guadalcanal until such a plan was made. Hirohito would go on to oppose the withdrawal from the Munda airfield on New Georgia since it contradicted the new defensive line. As the defensive perimeter in the central and northern solomons was crumbling, Hirohito continued to demand the navy fight decisive battles to regain the initiative so ships could begin transports supplies to the countless soldiers trapped on islands without them. When Hirohito heard of the navy's failure to reinforce Lae on March 3rd he stated  “Then why didn't you change plans immediately and land at Madan? This is a failure, but it can teach us a good lesson and become a source of future success. Do this for me so I can have peace of mind for awhile.” “Do this for me” would become his signature message.    In August of 1943 as the fall of the solomons progressed, Hirohito lambasted “Isn't there someplace where we can strike the United States? . . . When and where on earth are you [people] ever going to put up a good fight? And when are you ever going to fight a decisive battle?Well, this time, after suffering all these defeats, why don't you study how not to let the Americans keep saying ‘We won! We won!'[emphasis added]”” Hirohito berated his chiefs of staff and in the face of mounting defeats he remained undismayed, rigidly self disciplined and aggressive as ever. When he received a report on September 21st of 1943 that the allies were heading for Finschhafen he replied “Being ready to defend isn't enough. We have to do the attacking.”   When the Americans destroyed the main naval anchorage at Truk forcing the navy to evacuate it, leaving behind numerous tanks, the dream of fighting one great decisive naval battle in the central pacific was over.    On February 21st of 1944, Hirohito took the unprecedented action to force Sugiyama to resign so Tojo could assume his position, alongside that of army minister and prime minister. He did this to end dissent. Hirohito and Tojo oversaw the haymaker attempts in 1944, like operation Ichi-go and the Imphal campaign fall into ruins. It looked like the Philippines, Taiwan, Okinawa, the Bonin islands and eventually the home islands would be invaded. When Saipan fell, the home islands had at last come into range of the dreaded B-29 Super flying fortresses. Hirohito had warned Tojo “If we ever lose Saipan, repeated air attacks on Tokyo will follow. No matter what it takes, we have to hold there.” For two days his chiefs of staff explained the dire situation on Saipan was hopeless, but Hirohito ignored their advice and ordered Admiral Shimada to recapture it, the first department of the navy general staff immediately poured themselves into the problem. Day and night they worked, until a draft plan was created on June 21st, 3 days later the combined fleet gave opposition. Tojo and Shimada formally reported to Hirohito the recapture plan needed to be canceled. Hirohito refused to accept the loss of Saipan and ordered his chief aide General Hasunuma to convene in his presence the board of field marshals and fleet admirals. They all met on the 25th, upon which they all unanimously stated the reports indicating Saipan was a lost cause were valid, Hirohito simply told them to put it in writing and he left the room.    Hirohito finally decided to withdraw his support of Tojo, allowing Tojo's numerous enemies to take down his cabinet on July 18th 1944. But Hirohito was undaunted in determination to steal victory from the allies. Imperial HQ on October 18th ordered a decisive naval battle and the battle of Leyte Gulf was it. After the war Hirohito would go on the record stating “Contrary to the views of the Army and Navy General Staffs, I agreed to the showdown battle of Leyte thinking that if we attacked at Leyte and America flinched, then we would probably be able to find room to negotiate.” This statement shows the facts as they were, Hirohito and his chiefs of staff forced the field commander, General Tomoyuki Yamashita to engage the American invasion force in a place Yamashita did not want to fight nor prepared adequate defenses. It was a horrible loss.   The Kamikaze attacks increased as Japan's desperation wore on. On new years day of 1945 Hirohito inspected the special last meal rations given to departing kamikaze units. Iwo Jima fell. Okinawa remained, and Hirohito lashed out “Is it because we failed to sink enemy transports that we've let the enemy get ashore? Isn't there any way to defend Okinawa from the landing enemy forces?”  On the second day of Okinawa's invasion Hirohito ordered a counter landing by the 32nd army and urged the navy to counterattack in every way possible. It was a horrible failure, it cost the lives of up to 120,000 Japanese combatants, 170,000 noncombatants. The Americans lost 12,500 killed and 33,000 wounded. An absolute bloodbath.    Konoe re-entered the stage writing to Hirohito pleading with him to order a surrender because from his perspective “The Soviet Union is Japan's biggest threat. Defeat was inevitable, but more to be feared than defeat was the destruction of the Kokutai. Sue quickly for peace, before a Communist revolution occurred that would make preservation of the kokutai impossible”. Hirohito was taken aback by this, as he shared his military's hope that the Soviets would help Japan reach a peace settlement. So he rejected the advice of Konoe. Hirohito remarked “If we hold out long enough in this war, we may be able to win, but what worries me is whether the nation will be able to endure it until then.” Then Japan's intelligence units reported the Soviets were going to break the neutrality pact and join the war once the Germans were done. Meanwhile Tokyo was turned to rubble on March 9th 1945 by 334 B-29's dropping firebombs, 40% of the capital was destroyed, up to 100,000 were dead. Hirohito remained undaunted. 60 Japanese cities were leveled by firebomb campaigns. Europe's war finished. Then the battle for Okinawa was lost, suddenly Hirohito began looking for ways to end the war.   On June 22nd Hirohito personally informed the supreme war leadership council his desire to see diplomatic maneuvers to end the war. A special envoy was sent to Moscow, while Hirohito publicly issued an imperial rescript ordering the nation “to smash the inordinate ambitions of the enemy nations and achieve the goals of the war”. B-29's began dropping leaflets with joint declarations issued by the US, UK and China requesting the citizens of Japan demand their government surrender. Prefectural governors, police chiefs and officers began submitting home ministry reports on the rapid deterioration of the nations spirit.   Germany signed the unconditional surrender documents on May 7th and 8th of 1945, Japan was alone. Newly installed President Truman declared on May 8th, Japan's surrender would not mean the extermination or enslavement of the Japanese people, but the unconditional surrender principles remained unaltered. The Japanese meanwhile were awaiting word from the Soviets. The Americans unleashed their first atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6th of 1945 killing up to 140,000 people. Then on August 8th the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and began an invasion of Manchuria. On August 9th the second atomic bomb hit Nagasaki killing around 40,000 people.   Thus began the surrender clock as I like to say. After the first atomic bomb, Hirohito said and did nothing about the surrender terms. Hirohito then authorized Togo to notify the world on August 10th that Japan would accept the allied terms of surrender with one condition “that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler.” The next day, Secretary of State Byrnes replied by alluding to the subordination of the emperors authority to the supreme commander of the allied powers. It was ambiguous as hell. The Japanese leaders erupted into arguments, and on August 14th, Hirohito went before a microphone and recorded his capitulation announcement which aired on August 15th to all in Japan, they surrendered. Why did it take so long?   The peace talks between the Japanese and Soviets went on through June, July and early August. Japan offered the Soviets limited territorial concessions and they refused to accept the envoy on July 22nd because the Japanese were being too ambiguous in their terms. There was continuous back and forth between the intelligence of Moscow and Japan trying to figure out the stance of the other, but then Stalin heard about the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, he was shocked and ordered an invasion of Manchuria in response. In the meantime the Japanese were tossing all sorts of concessions at Moscow, they stated they would allow Japanese to be used as forced laborers in Siberia, a form of reparation as it were, that they would demobilize the military and so on. The response was the invasion of Manchuria.    Hirohito knew prior to the bombing of Hiroshima that the cabinet was divided on accepting the Potsdam terms. Hirohito also knew he and he alone could unify governmental affairs and military command. Why then did he wait until the evening of August 9th to surrender?   The reality of the matter is its complicated, numerous variables at play, but let me try to pick at it. The people of japan under the firebomb campaigns were becoming hostile towards the military, the government and many began to criticize the emperor. Hirohito was given reports from the Home Ministry from governors and police chiefs all over Japan revealing people were speaking of the emperor as an incompetent leader who was responsible for worsening the war situation. Does that sound like a threat to the Kokutai? People were starving en masse, the atomic bomb is flashy, but what really was killing the Japanese, it was starvation. The home islands were blockaded and the sea approaches mined as pertaining to the optimally named “operation starvation”. Hirohito knew full well how bad his people were suffering but he did not surrender for so long.   After Hiroshima was bombed, Hirohito delayed for 2 days before telling Kido at 10am on August 9th “quickly control the situation, the Soviet Union has declared war and today began hostilities against us”. Now here is a piece of Hirohito's surrender proclamation to the citizens of Japan    “Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization. Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects, or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers... The hardships and sufferings to which Our nation is to be subjected hereafter will be certainly great. We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all of you, Our subjects. However, it is according to the dictates of time and fate that We have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is unsufferable ”.   Hirohito wanted to obfuscate the issue of accountability, to prevent expressions of strife and anger and to strengthen domestic unity around himself, to protect and raise the kokutai. Did you know there was a rescript of this proclamation that was made to the entire IJA and IJN? Yes Emperor Hirohito gave out two different proclamations for surrender, here is what the armed forces heard.   “ Now that the Soviet Union has entered the war against us, to continue . . . under the present conditions at home and abroad would only recklessly incur even more damage to ourselves and result in endangering the very foundation of the empire's existence. Therefore, even though enormous fighting spirit still exists in the Imperial Navy and Army, I am going to make peace with the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, as well as with Chungking, in order to maintain our glorious national polity”.   The proclamation does not speak of the atomic weapons, but emphasizes the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. Hirohito was presented as a benevolent sage and an apolitical ruler that had ended the war. Hirohito sought to justify the surrender upon the bombs to the public, but did he believe so, did his armed forces believe so? People debate to this day why the surrender occurred, I love the fact there are two message offered because both are true. Hirohito's decision to surrender was based on numerous variables, the atomic bombs, the invasion of Manchuria by the soviets, but above all else, what really was important to the man, the emperor, the god? The kokutai. The Soviets were more of a threat to the kokutai, thus Hirohito jumped into the arms of the Americans. The language between the Americans and Japanese in the communications for unconditional surrender were ambiguous, but Hirohito and the high commanders knew there was zero chance of the kokutai surviving if the Soviets invaded Japan, perhaps the Americans would allow it to continue, which is just what they ended up doing. The entire purpose of this series would to emphasize how Hirohito definitely had a active role in the war of 1931-1945, he had numerous occasions where he could put the hammer down to stop the situation from escalating. But in the end when his back was against the wall, he did what he did to cling on to the Kokutai.   I shall leave you with this. On August 12th, as Hirohito came to inform the imperial family of his decision to surrender, Prince Asaka asked him whether the war would continue if the Kokutai could not be preserved, what do you think he said? “Of Course”. 

In this solo episode of Amateur Traveler, Chris takes you along on a Yangtze River cruise from Yichang to Chongqing, an upstream journey through China's legendary Three Gorges. Along the way, you'll hear about naked trackers of old, a poet whose death inspired a festival celebrated across China, engineering marvels, hanging coffins, misty karst cliffs, and the modern rhythms of cruise life on the Victoria Sabrina, a ship from Victoria Cruises. This week's show is supported by the new Smart Travel Podcast. Travel smarter — and spend less — with help from NerdWallet. Check out Smart Travel ⁠⁠⁠⁠here. My thanks to Victoria Cruise Lines for treating me like a VIP, including an upgraded cabin, shore excursions, and the upgrade package with access to the Sabrina Lounge. What You'll Experience ... https://amateurtraveler.com/yangtze-river-cruise/ Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

This week on Sinica, I welcome back Finbarr Bermingham, the Brussels-based Europe correspondent for the South China Morning Post, about the Nexperia dispute — one of the most revealing episodes in the global contest over semiconductor supply chains. Nexperia, a Dutch-headquartered chipmaker owned by Shanghai-listed Wingtech, became the subject of extraordinary government intervention when the Netherlands invoked a Cold War-era emergency law to seize temporary control of the company and suspend its Chinese CEO. Finbarr's reporting, drawing on Dutch court documents and expert sources, has illuminated the tangled threads of this story: preexisting concerns about governance and technology transfer, mounting U.S. pressure on The Hague to remove Chinese management, and the timing of the Dutch action on the very day the U.S. rolled out its affiliate rule. We discuss China's retaliatory export controls on chips packaged at Nexperia's Dongguan facilities, the role of the Trump-Xi meeting in Busan in unlocking a temporary thaw, and what this case reveals about Europe's agonizing position between American pressure and Chinese integration in global production networks.4:34 – Why the "Europe cracks down on Chinese acquisition" framing was too simple 6:17 – The Dutch court's extraordinary tick-tock of events and U.S. lobbying 9:04 – The June pressure from Washington: divestment or the affiliate list 10:13 – Dutch fears of production know-how relocating to China 12:35 – The impossible position: damned if they did, damned if they didn't 14:46 – The obscure Cold War-era Goods Availability Act 17:11 – CEO Zhang Xuezheng and the question of who stopped cooperating first 19:26 – Was China's export control a state policy or a corporate move? 22:16 – Europe's de-risking framework and the lessons from Nexperia 25:39 – The fragmented European response: Germany, France, Hungary, and the Baltics 30:31 – Did Germany shape the response behind the scenes? 33:06 – The Trump-Xi meeting in Busan and the resolution of the crisis 37:01 – Will the Nexperia case deter future European interventions? 40:28 – Is Europe still an attractive market for Chinese investment? 41:59 – The Europe China Forum: unusually polite in a time of tenterhooksPaying it forward: Dewey Sim (SCMP diplomacy desk, Beijing); Coco Feng (SCMP technology, Guangdong); Khushboo Razdan (SCMP North America); Sense Hofstede (Chinese Bossen newsletter)Recommendations: Finbarr: Chokepoints by Edward Fishman; Underground Empire by Henry Farrell and Abe Newman; "What China Wants from Europe" by John Delury (Engelsberg Ideas) Kaiser: The Three Musketeers: D'Artagnan and Milady (2023 French film adaptation)See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Hello again Pacific War Week by Week listeners, it is I your dutiful host Craig Watson with more goodies from my exclusive patreon podcast series. This is actually going to be a two parter specifically looking at the failure and responsibility of Emperor Hirohito during the 15 year war Japan unleashed in 1931. Again a big thanks to all of you for listening all these years, you are all awesome.   Hello everyone, a big thanks to all of you who joined the patreon and voted for this to be the next episode, you all are awesome.    Now I realize very well when I jumped into my former patreon episode on Ishiwara Kanji, I fell into a rabbit hole and it became a rather long series. I wanted to get this one done in a single episode but its also kind of a behemoth subject, so I will do this in two parts: this episode will be on Hirohito's failure and responsibility in regards to the China War from 1931-1941. The next one will cover Hirohito's failure and responsibility in the world war from 1941-1945.   I am not going to cover the entire life of Hirohito, no what I want is to specifically cover his actions from 1931-1945. Nw I want you to understand the purpose of this episode is to destroy a narrative, a narrative that carried on from 1945-1989. That narrative has always been that Emperor Hirohito was nothing more than a hostage during the war years of 1931-1945. This narrative was largely built by himself and the United States as a means of keeping the peace after 1945. However upon his death in 1989 many meeting notes and diaries from those who worked close to him began emerging and much work was done by historians like Herbert P Bix and Francis Pike. The narrative had it that Hirohito was powerless to stop things, did not know or was being misled by those around him, but this is far from the truth. Hirohito was very active in matters that led to the horrors of the 15 year war and he had his own reasons for why or when he acted and when he did not.   For this episode to be able to contain it into a single one, I am going to focus on Hirohito's involvement in the undeclared war with China, that's 1931-1941. For those of you who don't know, China and Japan were very much at war in 1931-1937 and certainly 1937 onwards, but it was undeclared for various reasons. If you guys really like this one, let me know and I can hit Hirohito 1941-1945 which is honestly a different beast of its own.   For those of you who don't know, Hirohito was born on April 29th of 1901, the grandson of Emperor Meiji. Hirohito entered the world right at the dawn of a new era of imperial rivalry in Asia and the Pacific. According to custom, Japanese royals were raised apart from their parents, at the age of 3 he was placed in the care of the Kwamura family who vowed to raise him to be unselfish, persevering in the face of difficulties, respectful of the views of others and immune to fear. In 1908 he entered elementary education at the age of 7 and would be taught first be General Nogi Maresuke who notoriously did not pamper the prince. Nogi rigorously had Hirohito train in physical education and specifically implanted virtues and traits he thought appropriate for the future sovereign: frugality, diligence, patience, manliness, and the ability to exercise self-control under difficult conditions. Hirohito learnt what hard work was from Nogi and that education could overcome all shortcomings. Emperor Meiji made sure his grandson received military training.   When Emperor Meiji died in 1912, Hirohito's father, Yoshihito took the throne as emperor Taisho. Taisho for a lack of better words, suffered from cerebral meningitis at an early age and this led to cognitive deficiency's and in reality the Genro would really be running the show so to say. When Taisho took the throne it was understood immediately, Hirohito needed to be prepared quickly to take the throne. After Meiji's funeral General Nogi politely told the family he could no longer be a teacher and committed seppuku with his wife. He wrote a suicide letter explained he wanted to expiate his disgrace during the russo japanese war for all the casualties that occurred at Port Arthur, hardcore as fuck. Hirohito would view Nogi nearly as much of an iconic hero as his grandfather Meiji, the most important figure in his life.   Hirohito's next teacher was the absolute legendary Fleet Admiral Togo Heihachiro who would instill national defense policy into him. Hirohito would be taught Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahans theories as all the great minds were taught at the time. Now I know it sucks but I cant delve deep into all this. What I want you to envision is a growing Man, instilled with the belief above all else, the Kokutai was most important. The Kokutai was the national essence of Japan. It was all aspects of Japanese polity, derived from history, tradition and customs all focused around the cult of the Emperor. The government run by politicians was secondary, at any given time the kokutai was the belief the Emperor could come in and directly rule.   If you are confused, dont worry, I am too haha. Its confusing. The Meiji constitution was extremely ambiguous. It dictated a form of constitutional monarchy with the kokutai sovereign emperor and the “seitai” that being the actual government. Basically on paper the government runs things, but the feeling of the Japanese people was that the wishes of the emperor should be followed. Thus the kokutai was like an extra-judicial structure built into the constitution without real legal framework, its a nightmare I know.    Let me make an example, most of you are American I imagine. Your congress and senate actually run the country, wink wink lets forget about lobbyists from raytheon. The president does not have actual executive powers to override any and all things, but what if all Americans simply felt he did. Thus everyone acted in accordance to his wishes as they assumed them to be, thats my best way of explaining Japan under Hirohito.    Emperor Taisho dies in 1926, and Hirohito takes the throne ushering in the Showa Era. He inherited a financial crisis and a military that was increasingly seizing control of governmental policies. Hirohito sought to restore the image of a strong charismatic leader on par with his grandfather Meiji, which was sorely lacking in his father Taishos reign. He was pressured immediately by the Navy that the national sphere of defense needed to be expanded upon, they felt threatened by the west, specifically by the US and Britain who had enacted the Washington Naval Treaty. Hirohito agreed a large navy was necessary for Japan's future, he was a proponent of the decisive naval battle doctrine, remember his teacher was Togo.    From the very beginning Hirohito intensely followed all military decisions. In 1928 the Japanese covertly assassinated the warlord of Manchuria, Zhang Zuolin. The current prime minister Tanaka Giichi had performed a thorough investigation of the incident and presented his report to Hirohito on December 24th of 1928. He told Hirohito he intended to court martial the criminals, purge the army and re-establish discipline. However the rest of Tanaka's cabinet wished to allow the army to deal with the matter and quiet the entire thing down. Hirohito responded by stating he had lost confidence in Tanaka and admonished his report. Hirohito allowed the army to cover up the incident, he sought to have it hushed up as well. Thus Hirohito had indulged the army in its insubordination and the kwantung army officers now felt they could take matters into their own hands.   Also in 1928 the Tanaka cabinet failed to endorse the international protocol banning chemical and biological warfare. The next year the privy council, pressured by the military, failed to ratify the full geneva convention of prisoners of war. Hirohito in response began doing something Emperor Meiji never had done, he began to scold officials to force them to retire from positions. Tanaka Giichi was bullied out. Hirohito then stated his endorsement of Hamaguchi Osachi as Tanaka's successors.   Just a few months after Hamaguchi cabinet formed, Hirohito overrode the advice of his naval chief of staff and vice chief of staff, Admiral Kato and Vice Admiral Suetsugu. The Americans and British were hinting they might form a naval alliance against Japan if she did not abide by the Washington Conference mandates on naval tonnage. Kato and Suetsugu refused to accept the terms, but prime minister Hamaguchi stood firm against them. The navy leaders were outraged and accused Hamaguchi of signing the treaty without the support of the Navy General Staff thereby infringing upon the “emperor's right of supreme command”. Two months after signing the treaty, Hamaguchi was assassinated and upon learning of this Hirohito's first concern apparently was “that constitutional politics not be interrupted”. The military felt greatly emboldened, and thus began the age of the military feeling “its right of supreme command”. Generals and Admirals fought back against arms reduction talks, discipline within the officer corps loosened, things spiraled out of control. Alongside this came the increasing cult of the emperor, that they were all doing this in his name.   When rumors emerged of the emerging Mukden Incident in 1931, Hirohito  demanded the army be reigned in. Attempts were made, but on September 18th of 1931, Kwantung army officer detonated an explosion at Liut'iaokou north of Mukden as a false flag operation. The next day the imperial palace were given a report and Hirohito was advised by chief aide de camp Nara Takeji “this incident would not spread and if the Emperor was to convene an imperial conference to take control of the situation, the virtue of his majesty might be soiled if the decisions of such a conference should prove impossible to implement”. This will be a key theme in Hirohito's decision making, protect the kokutai from any threats.   As the Mukden incident was getting worse, the Kwantung officers began to demand reinforcement be sent from the Korea army. The current Wakatsuki cabinet met on the issue and decided the Mukden incident had to remain an incident, they needed to avoid a declaration of war. The official orders were for no reinforcements of the Korea army to mobilize, however the field commander took it upon his own authority and mobilized them. The army chief of staff Kanaya reported to Hirohito the Korea army was marching into Manchuria against orders. At 31 years of age Hirohito now had an excellent opportunity to back the current cabinet, to control the military and stop the incident from getting worse. At this time the military was greatly divided on the issue, politically still weak compared to what they would become in a few years, if Hirohito wanted to rule as a constitutional monarch instead of an autocratic monarch, well this was his chance. Hirohito said to Kanaya at 4:20pm on September 22nd “although this time it couldn't be helped, [the army] had to be more careful in the future”. Thus Hirohito accepted the situation as fait accompli, he was not seriously opposed to seeing his army expand his empire. If it involved a brief usurpation of his authority so bit, as long as the operation was successful. Within two weeks of the incident, most of Japan had rallied being the kwantung army's cause. Hirohito knew it was a false flag, all of what they had done. Hirohito planned the lightests punishments for those responsible. Hirohito then officially sanctioned the aerial strike against Chinchou, the first air attack since ww1.   A message had gone out to the young officers in the Japanese military that the emperors main concern was success; obedience to central command was secondary. After the Mukden incident Prime Minister Wakatsuki resigned in december after failing to control the army and failing to contain the financial depression. The new Priminister Inukai took to action requesting permission from Hirohito to dispatch battalions to Tientsin and a brigade to Manchuria to help the Kwantung army take Chinchou. Hirohito responded by advising caution when attacking Chinchou and to keep a close eye on international public perception. Nevertheless Chinchou was taken and Hirohito issued an imperial rescript praising the insubordinate Kwantung army for fighting a courageous self defense against Chinese bandits. In a few more years Hirohito would grant awards and promotions to 3000 military and civil officials involved in the Manchurian war. When incidents broke out in Shanghai in 1932 involved the IJN, Tokyo high command organized a full fledged Shanghai expeditionary force under General Shirakawa with 2 full divisions. But within Shanghai were western powers, like Britain and America, whom Hirohito knew full well could place economic sanctions upon Japan if things got out of hand. Hirohito went out of his way to demand Shirakawa settle the Shanghai matter quickly and return to Japan.   And thus here is a major problem with Hirohito during the war years. On one end with Manchuria he let pretty much everything slide, but with Shanghai he suddenly cracks the whip. Hirohito had a real tendency of choosing when he wanted to act and this influenced the military heavily. On May 15th of 1932, young naval officers assassinated prime minister Inukai at his office. In the political chaos, Hirohito and his advisors agreed to abandon the experiment in party cabinets that had been the custom since the Taisho era. Now Hirohito endorsed a fully bureaucratic system of policy making, cabinet parties would no longer depend on the two main conservative parties existing in the diet. When the diet looked to the genro as to who should be the next prime minister, Hirohito wrote up “his wishes regarding the choice of the next prime minister”. Loyal officials backed Hirohito's wishes, the cult of the emperor grew in power. To the military it looked like Hirohito was blaming the party based cabinets rather than insubordinate officers for the erosion of his own authority as commander in chief. The young military officers who already were distrustful of the politicians were now being emboldened further.    After Manchuria was seized and Manchukuo was ushered in many in the Japanese military saw a crisis emerge, that required a “showa restoration' to solve. There were two emerging political factions within the military, the Kodoha and Toseiha factions. Both aimed to create military dictatorships under the emperor. The Kodoha saw the USSR as the number one threat to Japan and advocated an invasion of them, aka the Hokushin-ron doctrine, but the Toseiha faction prioritized a national defense state built on the idea they must build Japans industrial capabilities to face multiple enemies in the future. What separated the two, was the Kodoha sought to use a violent coup d'etat to do so, the Toseiha were unwilling to go so far. The Kodoha faction was made up of junior and youthful officers who greatly distrusted the capitalists and industrialists of Japan, like the Zaibatsu and believed they were undermining the Emperor. The Toseiha faction were willing to work with the Zaibatsu to make Japan stronger. Hirohito's brother Prince Chichibu sympathized with the Kodoha faction and repeatedly counseled his brother that he should implement direct imperial rule even if it meant suspending the constitution, aka a show restoration. Hirohito believed his brother who was active in the IJA at the time was being radicalized. Chichibu might I add was in the 3rd infantry regiment under the leadership of Colonel Tomoyuki Yamashita.   This time period has been deemed the government by assassination period. Military leaders in both the IJA and IJN and from both the Kodoha and Toseiha began performing violence against politicians and senior officers to get things done.    A enormous event took place in 1936 known as the february 26 incident. Kodoha faction officers of the IJA attempted a coup d'etat to usher in a showa restoration. They assassinated several leading officials, such as two former prime ministers and occupied the government center of Tokyo. They failed to assassinate the current prime minister Keisuke Okada or take control over the Imperial palace. These men believed Japan was straying from the Kokutai and that the capitalist/industrialists were exploiting the people of the nation by deceiving the emperor and usurping his power. The only solution to them was to purge such people and place Hirohito as an absolute leader over a military dictatorship.    Now the insurrectionists failed horribly, within just a few hours they failed to kill the current prime minister, and failed to seize the Sakashita Gate to the imperial palace, thus allowing the palace to continue communicating with the outside, and they never thought about what the IJN might do about all of this. The IJN sent marines immediately to suppress them. The insurrectionists had planned to have the army minister General Kwashima who was a Kodoha backer, report their intentions to Hirohito who they presumed would declare a showa restoration. They falsely assumed the emperor was a puppet being taken hostage by his advisers and devoid of his own will.   At 5:40am on February the 26th Hirohito was awakened and informed of the assassinations and coup attempt. From the moment he learnt of this, he was outraged and demanded the coup be suppressed and something I would love to highlight is he also immediately demanded his brother Prince Chichibu be brought over to him. Why would this be important? Hirohito believed the insurrectionists might enlist his brother to force him to abdicate. Hirohito put on his army uniform and ordered the military to “end it immediately and turn this misfortune into a blessing”. Hirohito then met with Kwashima who presented him with the insurrectionists demands to “clarify the kokutai, stabilize national life and fulfill national defense, aka showa restoration”. Hirohito scolded Kwashima and ordered him to suppress the mutiny. On the morning of the 27th Hirohito declared administrative martial law on the basis of Article 8 of the Imperial Constitution, pertaining to emergency imperial ordinances. Formally he was invoking his sovereign power to handle a crisis. Hirohito displayed an incredible amount of energy to crush the mutiny as noted by those around him at the time. Every few hours he demanded reports to be given to him by top officials and at one point he was so angry he threatened to lead the Imperial Guard division himself to go out and quell it. Hirohito met with Chichibu and its alleged he told his brother to end any relationships he had with the Kodoha members. By february 29th, Hirohito had firmly crushed the mutiny, most of the ringleaders were arrested. In april they were court martialed secretly without even given a chance to defend themselves in court and 17 were executed by firing squad in July. As a result of it all, the Kodoha faction dissolved and the Toseiha faction reigned supreme.    On the morning of July 8th of 1937 came the Marco Polo Bridge incident, a nearly identical false flag operation to what occurred at Mukden in 1931. Hirohito's reaction was first to consider the possible threat of the USSR. He wondered if the communists would seize the opportunity to attack Manchukuo. This is what he said to Prime Minister Konoe and army minister Sugiyama “What will you do if the Soviets attack us from the rear?” he asked the prince. Kan'in answered, “I believe the army will rise to the occasion.” The emperor repeated his question: “That's no more than army dogma. What will you actually do in the unlikely event that Soviet [forces] attack?” The prince said only, “We will have no choice.” His Majesty seemed very dissatisfied.    Hirohito demanded to know what contingency plans existed. After this he approved the decision of the Konoe cabinet to move troops into Northern China and fixed his seal to the orders of dispatch. The emperor had tacitly agreed to it all from the start. With each action taken for the following months, Hirohito would explicitly sanction them after the fact. In his mind he kept thinking about a fight with the USSR, he believed he had no choice in the China matter. All of his top ranking officials like Sugiyama would tell him “even if war with China came… it could be finished up within two or three months”. Hirohito was not convinced, he went to Konoe, to imperial conferences, to other military officials to get their views. None convinced him but as Hirohito put it  “they agreed with each other on the time factor, and that made a big difference; so all right, we'll go ahead.”     Two weeks into the conflict, the kwangtung army and Korean army were reinforced by 3 divisions from Japan and on July 25th were reaching Beijing. What did the man who was not responsible in such decision making say? On July 27 Hirohito sanctioned an imperial order directing the commander of the China Garrison Force to “chastise the Chinese army in the Peking-Tientsin area and bring stability to the main strategic places in that region.” Hirohito wanted a killing blow to end the war, and thus he escalated the incident. Historian Fujiwara Akira noted “it was the [Konoe] government itself that had resolved on war, dispatched an army, and expanded the conflict,” and Hirohito had fully supported it”   Chiang Kai-shek abandoned northern China pulling into the Interior and unleashed a campaign in Shanghai to draw the Japanese into a battle showcased in front of western audiences. Chiang Kai-shek tossed the creme of his military all into Shanghai to make it as long and explosive as possible to try and win support from other great powers. On August 18 Hirohito summoned his army and navy chiefs for a pointed recommendation. The war, he told them, “is gradually spreading; our situation in Shanghai is critical; Tsingtao is also at risk. If under these circumstances we try to deploy troops everywhere, the war will merely drag on and on. Wouldn't it be better to concentrate a large force at the most critical point and deliver one overwhelming blow? Based on our attitude of fairness, Do you, have in hand plans for such action? In other words, do we have any way worked out to force the Chinese to reflect on their actions?”   The chiefs of staff returned 3 days later with an aerial campaign to break China's will to fight and strategic cities needed to be seized. Hirohito gave his sanction and on August 31st gave the order “for the Dispatch of the North China Area Army. [D]estroy the enemy's will to fight and wipe out resistance in the central part of Hepei Province,” Over the course of weeks Hirohito sanctioned 6 troop mobilizations to the Shanghai area where the fighting had bogged down. Then he sanctioned 3 divisions from Taiwan to Shanghai, but for units in northern Manchuria to stand guard firmly in case the USSR attacked. The entire time this was happening both China and Japan referred to it as an incident and not a real war lest either of them lose the backing of their great power allies. Japan needed oil, iron and rubber from America, China was likewise received materials from the USSR/America/Britain and even Germany.    By november the war was not going well and Hirohito had the Imperial Headquarters established within his palace as a means to exercise his constitutional role as supreme commander, the army and navy would act in concert. For a few hours in the morning a few days every week, the chiefs of staff, army and navy ministers and chiefs of operations would meet with Hirohito. At these imperial conferences Hirohito presided over and approved decisions impacting the war. This was Hirohito's device for legally transforming the will of the emperor into the will of the state. Hirohito not only involved himself, sometimes on a daily basis he would shape strategy and decide the planning, timing and so on of military campaigns. He even intervened in ongoing field operations. He monitored and occasionally issued orders through commanders to subordinate units. Now I can't go through the entire 1937-1945 war and showcase all the things he did but I will highlight things I think we're important.    On November 9th, the Shanghai battle was finally falling apart for the Chinese as they began a withdrawal to the Nanking area some 180 miles away. The Japanese forces chased them and for the first time were really coming into direct contact with Chinese civilians, when it came to Shanghai most had evacuated the areas. The Japanese burned, plundered and raped villages and towns as they marched towards Nanking. On december 1st, Hirohito's imperial HQ ordered the 10th army and Shanghai expeditionary force to close in on Nanking from different directions, a pincer maneuver. Prince Asaka took command of the Shanghai expeditionary force and General Matsui commanded the Central China Area Army consisted of the Shanghai force and 10th army. Asaka led the forces to assault the walled city of Nanking with a population estimated to be 4-5 hundred thousand and it would fall on December 13th. Was there an order to “rape Nanking”, no. The Imperial HQ did not order the total extermination of the Chinese in Nanking, they had ordered an encirclement campaign. However, the standing orders at this time were to take no prisoners. Once Nanking fell, the Japanese began to execute en massage military prisoners and unarmed troops who surrendered willingly. There was a orgy of rape, arson, pillage and murder. The horror was seen in Nanking and the 6 adjacent villages over the course of 3 months far exceeding any atrocities seen during the battle for Shanghai or even the march to Nanking. General Nakajima's 16th division on its first day in Nanking was estimated to have murdered 30,000 POWs. Estimate range insanely, but perhaps 200,000 POW's and civilians were butchered over the course of 6 weeks.   Prince Asaka the 54 year old grand uncle to Hirohito and other members of the Imperial Family commanded the attack on Nanking and supervised the horrors. 49 year old General Prince Higashikuni chief of the army air force alongside Prince Kan'in knew of the atrocities occurring. Army minister Sugiyama knew, many middle echelon officers of the Imperial HQ knew. Hirohito was at the top of the chain of command, there is no way he was not informed. Hirohito followed the war extensively, reading daily reports, questioned his aides. It was under his orders that his army “chastise China”, but did he show any concern for the breakdown of his army's discipline? There is no documented evidence he ordered an investigation, all we are met with as historians is a bizarre period of silence. Hirohito goes from supervising the war with OCD precision, to silence, then back to normal precision. Did Hirohito show anything publicly to show angry, displeasure or remorse, at the time he energetically began spurring his generals and admirals on their great victories and the national project to induce “Chinese self-reflection”.    On November 24th Hirohito gave an after the fact sanction to the decision of General Matsui to attack and occupy Nanking. Hirohito was informed the city was going to be bombarded by aircraft and artillery and he sanctioned that as well. That was basically him removing any restrictions on the army's conduct. On December 14th the day after Nankings fall, he made an imperial message to his chiefs of staff expressing his pleasure at the news of the city's capture and occupation. Hirohito granted General Matsui an imperial rescript for his great military accomplishments in 1938 and gave the order of the golden early to Prince Asaka in 1940. Perhaps Hirohito privately agonized over what happened, but publicly did nothing about the conduct of his armed forces, especially in regards to the treatment of POW's.   Emperor Hirohito was presented with several opportunities to cause cease-fires or peace settlements during the war years. One of the best possible moments to end it all came during the attack on Naking when Chiang Kai-sheks military were in disarray. Chiang Kai-shek had hoped to end the fighting by enticing the other great powers to intervene. At the 9 power treaty conference in Brussel in november of 1937, Britain and the US proposed boycotting Japan. However the conference ended without any sanctions being enacted upon Japan. The Konoe government and Imperial HQ immediately expanded the combat zone. Chiang Kai-shek in desperation accepted a previous offer by Germany to mediate. Oscar Trautmann, the German ambassador to China attempted to negotiate with Japan, but it failed. China was offered harsh terms; to formally recognize Manchukuo, cooperate with it and Japan to fight communism, permit the indefinite stationg of Japanese forces and pay war reparations.    On January 9th of 1938, Imperial HQ formed a policy for handling the China incident which was reported to Hirohito. Konoe asked Hirohito to convene an imperial conference for it, but not to speak out at it  “For we just want to formally decide the matter in your majesty's presence.” Konoe and Hirohito were concerned with anti expansionists within the army general staff and wanted to prevent German interference in Japanese affairs. On January 11th, the policy was showcased and adopted, there would be no peace until Chiang kai-shek's regime was dissolved and a more compliant regime followed. Hirohito presided over the conference in full army dress uniform and gave his approval. He sat there for 27 minutes without uttering a word, appearing to be neutral in the matter, though in fact he was firmly backing a stronger military policy towards China.    The Konoe cabinet inaugurated a second phase to the China incident, greatly escalating the war. By this point in time Japanese had seen combat casualties at 62,007 killed, 160,000 wounded. In 1939 it would be 30,081 killed, 55,970 wounded, then 15,827 killed and 72,653 wounded in 1940. Major cities were under Japanese control ranging from the north east and south. Chiang Kai-shek fled to Chongqing, the war was deadlocked without any prospect of victory in sight.    On July 11 of 1938, the commander of the 19th division fought a border clash with the USSR known to us in the west as the battle of Lake Khasan. It was a costly defeat for Japan and in the diary of Harada Kumao he noted Hirohito scolded Army minister Itagaki “Hereafter not a single soldier is to be moved without my permission.” When it looked like the USSR would not press for a counter attack across the border, Hirohito gave the order for offensives in China to recommence, again an example of him deciding when to lay down the hammer. Konoe resigned in disgrace in 1939 having failed to bring the China war to an end and being outed by his colleagues who sought an alliance with Germany, which he did not agree with. His successor was Hiranuma a man Hirohito considered a outright fascist. Hiranuma only received the job because he promised Hirohito he would not make enemies of Britain or the US by entering in a hasty alliance with Nazi Germany. However his enter prime ministership would be engulfed by the alliance question.   In May of 1939 there was another border clash with the USSR, the battle of Khalkhin Gol. This one was much larger in scale, involving armored warfare, aircraft and though it seems it was not used, the Japanese brought biological warfare weapons as well. The Japanese had nearly 20,000 casualties, it was an unbelievable defeat that shocked everyone. Hirohito refrained from punishing anyone because they technically followed orders based on a document “outline for dealing with disputes along the manchurian soviet border” that Hirohito had sanctioned shortly before the conflict arose.   In July of 1939, the US told Hiranuma's government they intended not to renew the US-Japan treaty of commerce and navigation. Until this point Roosevelt had been very lenient towards Japan, but now it looked to him war would break out in europe and he wanted Japan to know they could expect serious economic sanctions if they escalated things. Hirohito complained to his chief aide de camp Hata Shunroku on August 5th “It could be a great blow to scrap metal and oil”. Then suddenly as Japan was engaging in a truce with the USSR to stop the border conflict, Germany shocked the world and signed a nonaggression pact with them. This completely contravened the 1936 Japan-German anti-comintern pact. Hiranuma resigned in disgrace on august 28th.    Hirohito was livid and scolded many of his top officials and forced the appointment of General Abe to prime minister and demanded of him “to cooperate with the US and Britain and preserve internal order”. Then Germany invaded Poland and began a new European War. Abe's cabinet collapsed from the unbelievable amount of international actions by January 14th 1940. Hirohito appointed Admiral Yonai as prime minister  and General Tojo to vice army minister. As we have seen Hirohito played a active role appointing high level personnel and imposed conditions upon their appointments.    Hirohito dictated what Yonai was to do, who he was to appoint to certain positions so on and so forth. When a large part of the military were calling for an alliance with Germany, Hirohito resisted, arguing Japan should focus on the China war and not ally itself to Germany unless it was to counter the USSR. Three months passed by and Germany began invading western europe. Norway fell, Denmark fell, Luxembourg, Belgium, the netherlands and then France, it was simply stunning. While Japan had been locked in a deadlock against China, Germany was crushing multiple nations with ease, and this had a large effect on asia. Britain, France and the Netherlands could not hope to protect their holdings in asia. But Hirohito kept pressuring Yonai not to begin any talks of an alliance, and the military leaders forced Yonai's cabinet to collapse.    So Hirohito stood by while Hiranuma, Abe and Yonai met each crisis and collapses. He watched as the China war went nowhere and the military was gradually pushing for the Nanshin-ron doctrine to open a southern war up with the west. Not once did he make a public effort on his lonesome to end the war in China. Japan's demands of China were unchanged, relations with the west were getting worse each day. The China war was undeclared, hell it was from the Japanese viewpoint “chastising China”. Japan was no respecting any rules of war in China, atrocities were performed regularly and for that Hirohito shared responsibility. For he alone was free to act in this area, he needed to act, but he did not. He could have intervened and insisted on respecting the rules of war, especially in regards to POW's and the results could have been dramatically different. Hirohito bore direct responsibility for the use of poison gas upon Chinese and Mongolian combatants and non combatants even before the undeclared war of 1937.    Then on July 28th of 1937 Hirohito made his first directive authorizing the use of chemical weapons which was transmitted by the chief of the army general staff prince Kan'in. It stated that in mopping up the Beijing-Tientsin area, “[Y]ou may use tear gas at suitable times.” Then on September 11th of 1937 he transmitted again through Kan'in the authorization to deploy special chemical warfare units in Shanghai. Gas weapons were one weapon the imperial HQ, aka Hirohito held effective control over throughout the China war. Front line units were never free to employ it at their own discretion, it required explicit authorization from the imperial HQ. During the Wuhan offensive of August to October 1938, imperial HQ authorized the use of poison gas 375 separate times. Hirohito authorized on May 15th of 1939 the carrying out of field studies of chemical warfare along the Manchukuo-soviet border.  In 1940 Hirohito sanctioned the first experimental use of bacteriological weapons in China, though there is no documented evidence of this, given the nature of how he micro managed everything it goes without saying he would have treated it the same as the poison gas. He was a man of science, a person who questioned everything and refused to put his seal on orders without first examining them. Imperial HQ directives went to unit 731 and as a rule Hirohito overlooked them. There again is no documents directly linking him to it, but Hirohito should be held responsibility for strategic bombing campaigns performing on cities like Chongqing. Alongside such horror Hirohito sanctioned annihilation campaigns in China. Such military campaigns were on the scale of what occurred at Nanking. Take for example the Hebei offensive which saw the infamous “three alls policy, burn all, kill all, steal all”.    Before Pearl Harbor and the ushering in of the war against the west, look at the scene that had unfolded. China and Japan were not officially at war until December of 1941. Not to say it would have been easy by any means, but look at the countless opportunities the man, emperor, so called god if you will, held in his hands to stop it all or at the very least stop escalating it. Why did he not do so? To protect the Kokutai. Above all else, the role and survival of the emperor's divinity over the people of Japan was always at the forefront of his mind. He did what he thought was always necessary to thwart threats internal and external. He allowed his military to do horrible things, because they did so in his name, and likewise they were a threat to him. I know its abrupt to end it like this, but for those of you who perhaps say to yourself “well he really was powerless to stop it, they would have killed him or something”, who chose suddenly to intervene in 1945 and made the decision to surrender?

Adenomyosis is a condition in which the uterine lining grows into the muscular wall of the uterus, often causing heavy menstrual bleeding, severe cramping, and chronic pelvic pain. It is estimated to affect 25–60% of women worldwide. Despite its prevalence, treatment options in North America remain extremely limited. Many patients are forced to choose between long-term opioid pain management or a hysterectomy, options that can significantly impact quality of life. In this episode of Curing with Sound, we speak with Dr. Vanda Corbett, a healthcare practitioner who endured decades of debilitating adenomyosis-related pain before discovering focused ultrasound. She first learned about this noninvasive treatment after listening to an episode of the Not Your Mother's Menopause podcast featuring Suzanne LeBlang, MD, the Foundation's Director of Clinical Relationships.  Determined to find an alternative to surgery or opioids, Dr. Corbett made the life-changing decision to travel from Dubai to Chongqing Haifu Hospital in China for a focused ultrasound procedure. Her transformative experience has motivated her to share her story, so more women can learn about this revolutionary noninvasive treatment option. Discussion highlights: Medical Travel Experience: Follow Dr. Corbett's journey from Dubai to Chongqing, including the preparation process, travel logistics, and the patient-centered care she received at a specialized focused ultrasound hospital. Immediate Treatment Results and Advocacy Mission: Discover how Dr. Corbett experienced complete pain relief within hours of her procedure, shifting from decades of debilitating symptoms to a return to normal daily life. Learn about her mission to raise awareness of adenomyosis and the potential of focused ultrasound through storytelling and social media. Watch Dr. Corbett's documentary videos tracking her journey with Adenomyosis and her focused ultrasound treatment. Listen to Dr. Corbett's podcast interview on Dr. Lovely's Not Your Mother's Menopause podcast, where she discusses treating Adenomyosis with focused ultrasound. Listen to Dr. Susie LeBlang's podcast interview on Dr. Lovely's Not Your Mother's Menopause podcast, where she discusses treating uterine fibroids with focused ultrasound. EPISODE TRANSCRIPT ---------------------------- QUESTIONS? Email podcast@fusfoundation.org if you have a question or comment about the show, or if you would you like to connect about future guest appearances.  Email info@fusfoundation.org if you have questions about focused ultrasound or the Foundation.  FUSF SOCIAL MEDIA LinkedIn X Facebook Instagram TikTok YouTube FUSF WEBSITE https://www.fusfoundation.org SIGN UP FOR OUR FREE NEWSLETTER https://www.fusfoundation.org/newsletter-signup/ READ THE LATEST NEWSLETTER https://www.fusfoundation.org/the-foundation/news-media/newsletter/ DOWNLOAD "THE TUMOR" BY JOHN GRISHAM (FREE E-BOOK) https://www.fusfoundation.org/read-the-tumor-by-john-grisham/  

This week on Sinica, I welcome back Jeremy Goldkorn, co-founder of the show and my longtime co-host, to revisit the "vibe shift" we first discussed back in February. Seven months on, what we sensed then has fully borne out — there's been a measurable softening in American attitudes toward China, reflected not just in polling data but in media coverage, podcast discussions, and public discourse. We dig into what's driving this shift: the chaos of American politics making China look competent by comparison, the end of Wolf Warrior diplomacy, the gutting of China hawks in the Trump administration, Trump's own transactional G2 enthusiasm, and the generational divide in how younger Americans encounter China through TikTok rather than legacy media. We also discuss the limits of this shift, the dangers of overcorrection, and what it feels like to watch the fever break after years of panic and absolutism in U.S.-China discourse.5:29 – The [beep] show in America as the biggest factor 8:38 – China hawks deflated: from Pompeo to Navarro's pivot to India 11:21 – Ben Smith's piece on the end of a decade of China hawkism 13:30 – Eric Schmidt and Selina Xu's Atlantic piece on tech decoupling 17:17 – Long-form China podcasts: Dwarkesh Patel with Arthur Kroeber, Lex Fridman with Keyu Jin 19:35 – Jeremy's personal vibe shift: distance from The China Project and renewed perspective 23:33 – The world turning to predictability and stability 26:05 – The Chicago Council poll: dramatic shift away from containment 29:09 – The generational shift: TikTok, infrastructure porn, and Gen Z's globalized worldview 31:15 – The end of Wolf Warrior diplomacy and why it mattered 37:03 – Kaiser's "Great Reckoning" essay and why it didn't get the usual hate 39:00 – The destruction of Twitter and the vicious China discourse culture 41:10 – The pendulum swinging too far: China fanboys and new hubris 43:20 – How the vibe shift looks from inside China Paying it forward: Echo Tang (Berlin Independent Chinese Film Festival organizer) and Zhu Rikun (New York Chinese Independent Film Festival organizer)Recommendations: Jeremy: Ja No Man: Growing Up in Apartheid Era South Africa by Richard Poplak Kaiser: Rhyming Chaos podcast with Jeremy Goldkorn and Maria RepnikovaSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Hey guys before you listen to this one, do realize this is part 4 on a series about General Kanji Ishiwara, so if you have not already done so I would recommend listening to Part 1-2-3.    This episode is General Kanji Ishiwara part 4: Ishiwara vs Hideki Tojo So I promised this would be the last one and it is, rest assured. Sheesh what started as a suggested episode turned into an entire series, but then again Ishiwara Kanji was quite a figure. I recently did a podcast with Cody from AlternateHistoryHub, and at the end of the podcast he poked at me for some alternate history ideas related to the Pacific War. My first thought was what if the Triple Intervention after the Russo-Japanese War never occurred, but then I thought….hell what if Ishiwara Kanji never existed or I dunno got hit by a car. Imagine how different things would have been if not for this one, I am just gonna say it, instigator haha. Now I think when one looks at this mans life, we attribute much of the story towards the Mukden Incident and the eventual full scale China war, but thats not where it ends of course. Ishiwara did a lot during the war and after, so to close it all up lets jump back into it.   Ishiwara is now a Major General , chief of the most powerful office on the general staff. He was fighting tooth and nail to limit operations in what was the new China War. A month before everything hit the fan he declared in front of the General staff “I shall never send a single soldier to China as long as I live”. But in mid-June of 1937 rumors emerged that the China garrison was planning another incident in the Beijing area, similar to Ishiwara's famous Mukden incident of September 1931. Two weeks later the Marco Polo Bridge incident occurred on July 7th. The Japanese army were divided on the issue. There was the expansionists who sought to smash China in a single blow and the non-expansionists who sought to settle everything between their nations before the conflict became too large. Ishiwara was on the side of the non-expansionists and from the earliest hours of the war he directed a losing fight to try and localize the conflict. Fight as he must to stop mobilization of further forces, he was forced to relent multiple times and to his horror the conflict grew and grew. Ishiwara's efforts or some would say meddling, ironically made things worse for the non-expansionists. Some of the expansionists would go on the record to state Ishiwara bungled the situation, years after the China incident, Colonel Shibayama would say with bitterness “The idea that Ishiawara Kanji opposed the expansion of the China incident is nonsense. If he really had opposed it he wouldn't have agreed to the mobilization. There were certainly other ways of solving the problem” Ishiwara was stuck between a rock and a hard place. While he wanted to stop the mobilization of more forces to China, the men at the front kept sending reports that Japanese citizens were underthreat in areas like Beijing, his wrists were turned as they say. Ishiwara did not cave in without a fight however, as I said in the last episode he turned to Prime Minister Konoe to strike a deal with Chiang Kai-shek, and Konoe nearly did, but at the last minute he canceled his flight to Nanking.   When the North China incident saw action spring up in Shanghai, it then became officially the China incident and Ishiwara attempted once more to push for a peace settlement in September. However by that point Ishiwara's influence had dropped considerably, few in the Operations division were still following his lead. Many of the expansionists began to bemoan Ishiwara as nothing more than a nuisance. Prince Sainji would go on the record telling Konoe “Ishiwara is like a candly in the wind ready to be snuffed out at any moment”. By late september Ishiwara was removed from the General staff by General Tada. The expansionists had won the day. There were other non-expansionists like Horiba Kazuo and Imai Takeo who carried on fighting the non-expansionist cause, but in january of 1938 Konoe decalred the Japanese government would not treat with Chiang Kai-shek. It was the nail in the coffin.   The war escalted, by 1938 24 divisions were tossed into China, in 1939 it would be 34 bogged down. The IJA was without mobilization divisions and less than half the ammunition necessary for the 15 divisions assigned to the borders with the USSR and that critical weakness became only to apparent with two border clashes in 1938 and 1939. To Ishiwara it was all too predicatable, he had continuously argued the folly of a China War. He lectured about how it was impossible to conquer China “China is like an earthworm. Cut it in two and it will still keep on wriggling”. Ishiwara believed China's territory and self-sufficiency built upon its masses would always make up for Japanese military might. Ishiwara unlike his colleagues believed Japan was not capable of dealing a knock out blow against China. He would criticize many for promoting the idea stating “those who excite the public by claims of victory, just because the army has captured some out of the way little area, do so only to coneal their own incompetence as they squander the nation's power in an unjustified war”.   In the fall of 1937 Ishiwara found himself back in mainland Asia with an appointed as the vice chief of staff of the Kwantung army. But he came back with a scarred reputation now, for his non-expansionist fight earned him a lot of scorn. All of his ideas of a political independent and racially equal Manchukuo in 1932 had all but disappeared. The Japanese military and civilians occupied all important positions in the puppet state. The Kwantung army authorities, particularly that of Hideki Tojo wgo was at the time a provost marshal in Manchuria had taken a stern line against any efforts to revive East Asian League or their ideals. So when Ishiwara arrived, he quickly realized his influence had deminished significantly. None the less he took up his old cause trying to work with the barely relavent Concordia association, but they were fighting against Tojo who received a promotion to chief of staff in Manchuria in March. Tojo was now Ishiwara's superior, it was a hopeless cause, but Ishiwara persisted.    Ishiwara began insisting the Kwantung army must step asie to allow for self-government to reing over Manchuria. He argued Japan's special holdings in Manchuria should be turned over to the Manchukuo government and that the Concordia association should act as a guiding source. He also pointed out how dangerous the USSR was too Manchuria and that Japan must increase its forces in the border areas of Manchuria. For all of this he recommended a solution would be a Asian union, that if Manchukuo flourished under racial equality and harmony, perhaps it would show the rest of China Sino-Japanese cooperation was possible and maybe China would join an East Asian league. Ishiwara would continously hammer the idea, that the solution to the China war was to create an effective east asian league. With China in the fold, they would have unrivaled airpower, a prime element in his preparation for the Final War. Not a single one of his arguments were given any consideration.   Ontop of his radical ideas, Ishiwara also advised reducing salaries for Japanese officials in Manchuria and was as you can imagine denounced quickly by his colleagues for this. Then Ishiwara found out Tojo was embezzling Kwantung army funds to the officers wives club, a pet project of Mrs Tojo. So Ishiwara went ahead by pointing out Tojo's corruption and added a large insult by suggesting Tojo had the mentality of a mere sergeant. In a public speech at the Concordia association infront of a mixed Japanese/manchurian audience he tore into many of his colleagues like General Hashimoto Toranosuke who was an honorary president of said association and Ishiwara said “he did nothing but sit around and draw a high salary, setting a disgraceful example to junior officers”. So yeah Ishiwara soon found himself very very isolated in the Kwantung army staff. Tojo received a promotion to vice minister of war in May of 1938, with the support of notable expansionist types. As for Ishiwara he had became quite a headache to his colleagues. Depressed and disgusted with the situation, Ishiwara decided to quit the army before he was tossed out. He first tried to apply at the war ministry to be placed on the reserve list but was told the matter required approval of the minister of war. At that time, it was actually his old buddy Itagaki Seishiro as minister of war. While the decision was being made, Ishiwara was authorized to return to Japan, but when he did the Kwantung army inisted he had departed without authorization to do so, basically arguing he just walked away from his desk one day.   Itagaki made no move to summon Ishiwara once he was back in Tokyo, but Tojo as vice minister got wind of the situation and was all too eager to pounce. It turned out Tojo had Kenpeitai waching Ishiwara and some of his closest colleagues for awhile and he chose this moment to haul Ishiwara up for military indiscipline. The case against Ishiwara was quite a controversy and in the end all Itagaki could do for his old friend was get him an command over the Maizuru fortress area on Japan's seacost of Kyoto prefecture. The day before the orders were posted, Tojo managed to toss one last punch at Ishiwara. He order his Kenpeitai friend, special service commander Colonel Otani Keijiro to carry out a lightning raid on the Tokyo offices of the Concordia Association which saw the arrests of some of Ishiwara's close colleagues.   1939-1941 marked a terrible time for Ishiwara's military career, but he did take the time to build more so upon his Final War theory, the national defense state, the Showa restoration and the East Asian league. Ishiwara's lackluster Maizuru assignment was a quite backwater, not demanding much attention. During his leisure time he came to the conclussion based on his analysis of military history with some fresh readings of Buddhist texts that the Final War was destined to break out within the next 40 years or so. On March 10th of 1939 he made an address to the Concordia association in Toyko “a concept of world war “sekai sensokan”. He stated based on his analysis that Japan had to prepare for the final war because “world conflict is now in the semifinal round and it is for this reason that the necessity has arrived for an east asian league”. In August of 1939 Itagaki resigned as war minister to take up a position on on the chief of staff in the China expeditionary army which was then grinding to a halt. But before he did so, he made one of his final acts as war minister to give Ishiwara command of the 16th reserve division in Kyoto.   It was not a frontline position, but it was an important one, as the Kyoto command was notable for developing infantry tactics. Japan had just received some major defeats to the USSR at the battle of Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol so Ishiwara went to work developing some anti soviet tactics. This led to some infiltration techniques that would see application with the IJA during the early battles of the Pacific War. But despite his work on tactics, what really consumed his mind was pressing for the East Asian League. He argued a Showa restoration needed to happen, like the Meiji restoration, but this new one would be pan-asian, to face the west. In May of 1940 he put all of his arguments together in a public address that gained fame under the title “on the final war”. It was here he unleashed two decades of his thoughts into the Japanese public. He added some new features to his theories such as a “the world had entered a second industrial revolution”. He pointed out German had pioneered in the field of electrochemistry, producing energy for both industrial production and weapons of war. Such discoveries he argued would permit Asian nations to catch up and eventually overtake the west in productive and destructive power. But above all else he kept hammering the necessity for an east asian league, which required a Showa restoration to finally bring pan-asianism.   In November of 1939, as a successor to the Concordia Association, the association for an east asian league was established with its HQ in tokyo. Ishiwara was unable to officially become a member because he was part of the military, but he was an unofficial advisor and more importantly in the eyes of the public it was his association. By 1941 the association blew up to 100,000 members, mostly ex-soldiers, businessmen, journalists, farmers and such. They had a monthly magazine, training courses, meetings, lectures, the works. They extensively studied Ishiwara's writings on the history of war, the Showa restoration and his Final War theory. They spent extensive resources securing bases on the asian mainland trying to recruit supporters amongst other asian peoples to create a federation. Within Japanese controlled portions of China, they propagated the concept of the East Asian league. For the small group of collaborationists in China, many were attracted to it. In February of 1941 the General China assembly for the east asian league, was established in Nanjing with Wang Jingwei as chairman. Oh Wang Jingwei…having spent so much time learning about the Warlord Era and Northern Expedition, it never surprises me this guy would cling to anything for power. The influence of the league even found its way to Chongqing, and Chiang Kai-shek allegedly declared that peace negotiations could be pursued based on some aspects of the movement. But come spring of 1941, all of the leagues efforts would be dashed by Tojo. In early 1941, Tojo as war minister began plotting against the league and its architect Ishiwara. Tojo believed the east asian league was very defeatists and antithetical to his own hard line stance on Sino-Japanese relations. It also provided his nemesis Ishiwara with a political base to generate public opposition to his government's policies. Tojo obviously thought Ishiwara would use such a thing to overthrow him, so he went to war. His first move was to put Ishiwara on the retired list in december of 1940. However Ishiwara was still a influential figure and held some considerably powerful friends like Prince Higashikuni, so he was unable to safely pull this off. Instead he chose to harass the league.    Initially Premier Konoe was backing the league, but Tojo began to pressure Konoe to take a position against it. On January 14th, the konoe cabinet stated “as it appears that they violate respect for the nation and cast a shadow on the imperial authority, theories advocating leagues of states are hereby not permitted”. Thus the east asian league became illegal. Taking the cue on the cabinets decision, the Japanese media began a running hit pieces on the league, kind of like how America works today, ompf. By february of 1941 the criticism towards the league was smashing them. All of Ishiwara's allies within the league were hit hard, some even tortured, it was a purge. For Ishiwara nothing really happened, except for the continual surveillance by the Kenpeitai. Ishiwara proceeded to vent his wrath in public speeches, pretty bold ass move if you ask me and he delivered one fiery one at Kyoto university on east asia problems where he told his audience “the enemy is not the chinese people, but rather certain Japanese. It is particularly Tojo Hideki and Umezu Yoshijiro, who, armed and pursuing their own ambition, are the enemy of Japan. As disturbers of the peace they are the enemies of the world. They should be arrested and executed”. Excuse my french, but the fucking balls on this guy haha. Ishiwara made this statement in public and at the time he was still in military service, its simply incredible he did not suffer horrible punishment after slandering the minister of war and commander of the kwantung army. Why was he not punished, well again it was awkward as he still had a cult following and going after him might see violence. Ishiwara would later state the reason he was not persecuted was because “Tojo was a coward who never had the courage to arrest me. The fact that a man like Tojo and his henchmen came to power was one reason for Japan's downfall”.    Regardless Ishiwara's public statements finally led to him being placed on the retirement list on March 1st of 1941 and yes it was 100% Tojo who pushed this. Tojo ordered the Kenpeitai to watch Ishiwara closely for weeks after his forced retirement. Ishiwara enthusiastically went into retirement as he now was fully dedicated to his four great concerns: the east asian league, the showa restoration, the national defense state and of course the final war theory.   In the meantime another league had opened up, the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere and you would be forgiven to believe it was the same as the east asian league if not its successor. Both perpetuated common ideology, like racial harmony, stemming from the Concordia association. Ishiwara's concepts of national defense also found their way in the Greater east asia co-prosperity sphere. It advocated for most of the basic principals of the league, common defense, political independence and integration of economic systems. How did they differ you might ask? Well Ishiwara's east asian league did not share the formers racial superiority of the Japanese as its cornerstone. The east asian league was not built upon the premise that China was incompetent as a modern state and needed to be led. For you american listeners, its actually pretty easy to summarize the co-prosperity sphere idea, its was Japan's monroe doctrine. The east asian league had been undone by the China War and then Pacific War, leaving the co-prosperity sphere to monopolize the asian continent and it did so through brute force and undermined any chance of pan-asianism. Ishiwara sought the east asian league solely because he truly believed pan-asianism would be required to build up enough forces to fight the final war.    During his retirement Ishiwara went on lecturing in major universities, but Tojo unleashed the Kenpeitai upon him, whom often demanded he cancel a lecture or not talk about certain subjects. I guess its like Youtube today, haha. Though ever the more isolated, when the Pacific War kicked off, Ishiwara could not be fully muzzled. He did not opposed the surprise attack on pearl harbor publically, but privately he predicted Japan had begun a war it would lose, based solely on material terms. A famous thing he once said to Satomi Kishio which appears in an cooky anime called Zipang where some member of the SDF accidentally go back in time to june 4th of 1942 if you were curious, really funny premise, but anyways, Ishiwara said this “inevitably, we shall lose this war. It will be a struggle in which Japan, even though it has only a thousand yen in its pocket, plans to spend ten thousand, while the United States has a hundred thousand yen, but only needs to spend ten thousand…we simply cannot last. Japan started this war without considering its resources beforehand”. I love this passage. It's an excellent way to speak to a general public, very effective I find.   Ishiwara criticized the military for spreading themselves out too thinly in the early months of the war, dispersing countless men on small islands in the pacific. But above all else, he kept hammering the fact the China war needed to end. China was sucking up the vast majority of Japan's military resources and men, how could Japan hope to wage a war against a nation like the US when it was stuck in China? When Saipan fell in 1944, Ishiwara said all hope was lost. He believed the only possible way Japan could avoid disaster was if the USSR broke its pact with its allies and offered a settlement to Japan, but he knew that was a long shot given how anti-communist Japan was. I have to make a point here to say a LOT of Ishiwara's talk, comes postwar and feels like a “i told you so”. Ishiwara gave testimony at the Tokyo war crime trials and declared “despite its material inferiority, Japan did not need to suffer a defeat, if its strategy had been well planned and carried out”. He even made a remark to an American correspondent named Mark Gayn in 1946 stating if he held command of the forces he would have ended the war with China, consolidated Japanese defensive lines and made a proper stand.   Throughout the war, Ishiwara battled Tojo, often referring to him as a simpleton. In fact in late 1942 he arranged an audience with Tojo and told him to his face that he was too incompetent to run the nation or wage a war and that he should step down. There was a rumor Ishiwara was part of a plot to assassinate Tojo in the summer of 1944. This was a scheme hatched by some junior officers in the central HQ, and one of their members was a east asian league associate. Ishiwara was called upon to Tokyo during an investigation of the plot and as much as Tojo and his team tried to find evidence of his involvement, they were unable to nail him. The Kenpeitai chased after Ishiwara until Tojo's regime collapsed.    By the end of the war, Ishiwara was asked by Prince Higashikuni if he could join the “surrender cabinet' as an advisor. Ishiwara declined on the grounds he wanted to be unsullied by Japans defeat.    It should be noted again, Ishiwara was a man of countless contradictions. While he was one of the first to be outspoken against the Pacific War and predicted Japan's defeat, during the end half of the way he got really caught up in the war fever. For example in 1944 he began stating Japan needed to prepare to “shed the blood of a million lives in the south seas in a do or die battle”. He also had this blind faith that a German victory in Europe would turn the tide of the war in the east. He said of Hitler in 1944 “he is the greatest hero in Europe since Napoleon”. Some argue his later public stances were the result of him not being in the military and thus he had to conform to the wartime propaganda to get his message across to the general public. He also began linking concepts of the east asian league to the greater east asian co-prosperity sphere, which is quite the contradiction. Again personally I see him as a fence sitter, he loved to always have a backdoor in his arguments.   One major thing that he faced during the Pacific War, was trying to explain to his followers, the current war was not the Final War. As he stated publicly in February of 1942 “Many people think that the greater east asian war is the final war. Nothing could be further from the truth… the greater east asian war is the grand rehearsal for the final war. In other words, it will lead to the liberation of east asia and the establishment of an east asian league and will provide to the league the necessary material and strategic base for the final war”. Well the failure of the China War, Pacific War, the complete military collapse of Japan, the take over of communism in mainland asia, the emerging cold war….I guess that all kind of ruined his final war theory.    With Japan's defeat looming in 1944, Ishiwara began to shift his focus towards a reconstruction effort. He began as early as 1944 to talk about what would happen to Japan. He predicted she would lose much overseas territory, her cities would be in ruins, her people would be starving. He turned his attention to agriculture, how could food production be increased, he became particularly interested in fertilizers. By the end of the war he gathered a farming community to discuss how things could be improved. When the surrender proclamation was made, he began to ponder the meaning of his life's work. After the emperor made his speech, Ishiwara gathered his followers to speak to them about how Japan could regain world power and thus keep his theory intact. Ishiwara had many ideas going forward about how Japan could take a positive footing. He advocated Japan dismantle the remnants of its bureaucratic despotism, abolition the special police force, apologize to the global community for war crimes, but he also argued America needed to answer for her war crimes as well. He especially pointed fingers at President Truman for two atomic bombs and that efforts needed to be made to use bombings to lessen Japan's punishment. Ishiwara also argued Japan should gain sympathy from asia so their former enemies could come together to form an east asian league.   Emperor Hirohito proclaimed the surrender and abolition of all stocks of war materials, and Ishiwara said that was fine because he believed the final war would require new armaments that would be completely different from what existed. He predicted the future wars would be more scientific, fought with decisive weapons developed in laboratories that did not require large organized military forces. He thought perhaps a small body of underground scientists could create terrible new weapons to prepare for the Final War, thats a terrifying idea. In autumn of 1945, Ishiwara found himself in the limelight again. His lectures had made him a viable alternative to the Tojo regime during the last year of the war and his reputation as an opponent and victim of said regime made him special. Many journalists, both Japanese and American came flooding to him followed by a legion of followers who were unable to publicly come forward during the Tojo years.   Ishiwara took advantage of this new situation to make some very large speeches. He spoke about how the Tojo clique was the reason for Japan's defeat, how they all needed to establish a new Japan. He brought out the usual theories he had spoke about for years, and argued the necessity for national reconstruction to prepare for the final war. However he changed his argument a bit, stating while Japan had military been crushed, it now must prepare for the final war by building the highest culture. In this new age, Japan needed to obtain supremacy in fields of science, because he now believed that was the new power. “A single laboratory, a single factory, or perhaps a single man working alone will make the most fantastic discovery that will make war decisive”. He would continue to make speeches throughout 1945, but come 1946 the high authority, one Emperor Douglas MacArthur, haha sorry I had to say it, General MacArthur stamped down on any Japanese leader, especially former military leaders. So Ishiwara had a few months of fame, but then he found himself yet again purged, though not arrested. Alongside this came a ban on the East Asian League association.    Ishiwara was then incapacitated by illness, something that plagued his life. His condition became so bad he required surgery in Tokyo. In April of 1946 he was interviewed by American correspondent Mark Gayn who left with a very memorable impression of the man, he had this to say “ Ishiwara received us in his small room, whose window frames were still buckled from bomb explosions. He is a lean man with a deeply tanned face, close shaven head and hard, unblinking eyes. He was sitting Japanese style on his cot, his hands in his lap. Even in a shapeless gown of yellow silk, his body looked straight as a steel rod… We asked Ishiwara just two questions: what of Japan in defeat and what of himself? He answered readily and at length, in a sharp firm voice. He talked like a man who believed every word he said”. Ishiwara told his life story, the Mukden incident, the China war escalation, his feud with Tojo all of his failed attempts with the East Asian League.    In 1947 Ishiwara was put on a list of those Japanese who were purged from public life. He was extremely bitter about this and at the same time he was called as a defense witness in the Tokyo War Crimes Trials. Ishiwara was too sick to travel to Tokyo, so a special military court was convened in Sakata city. He made his deposition in front of 50 people, talking about his role in the Mukden incident and China War. He stated President Truman should be indicted for the atomic bombs and firebombing campaigns and turned upon his American audience about the denunciation for Japanese expansionism. “Havent you ever heard of Perry? Don't you know anything about your country's history? Tokugawa Japan believed in isolation; it didnt want to have anything to do with other countries, and had its doors locked tightly. Then along came Perry from your country in his black ships to open those doors; he aimed his big guns at Japan and warned that ‘if you don't deal with us, look out for these; open your doors, and negotiate with other countries too'. And then when Japan did open its doors and tried dealing with other countries, it learned that all those countries were a fearfully aggressive lot. And so for its own defense it took your country as its teacher and set about learning how to be aggressive. You might saw we became your disciples. Why dont you subpoena Perry from the other world and try him as a war criminal?”    In November of 1948 Ishiwara declared on a home recorded video “we must utterly cast war aside. We must firmly avoid questions of interest and advantage and judge our national policy purely on a spirit of righteousness…Japan may be devastated, but we must live by a complete rejection of war. The nation must compose itself like Nichiren at Takenoguchi or Christ on his war to the crucifixion”. It seems Ishiwara at the very end gave up on his theories, and supported Japan attaining a permanent peace. That last years of his life were spent in constant pain due to his illness. In 1949 he contracted a fatal case of pneumonia and realizing he was going to die, dictated a message that summed up all his speculation in the recent years on Japan and its future. The document was originally done in English and directed at General Douglas MacArthur. A month after Ishiwara's death, a Japanese version came out titled “the course for a new Japan / Shin Nihon no Shinro”. The primary purpose of the document was to get MacArthur to lift the ban on the east asia league, but it was also a last apologia. He talked about how Germany, the USSR, Italy and Japan had started on the path of state control, and they all fell prey to group despotism, because all decisions were being made by a few men in the center. He argued Britain's socialist government, the United States New Deal and Marshall plan were great example of a good control system. He argued pure liberalism no longer existed anywhere, not even in the US, yet the US was trying to make Japan a liberal nation. He argued all nations should be allowed to move ahead freely. To end it all of he said this as well “I realize now in my predictions concerning a final war between the east and west I was supremely overconfident and that the facts have proven my wrong. I fear that the real final conflict may be the United States and USSR”   At the age of 61 Ishiwara died in August of 1949, in a small house with some of his followers gathered around him. He said to them before dying he was glad to die at the same age as Nichiren

Last time we spoke about the Changsha fire. Chiang Kai-shek faced a brutal choice: defend Wuhan to the last man or flood the land to slow the invaders. He chose both, pushing rivers and rallying a fractured army as Japanese forces pressed along the Yangtze. Fortresses at Madang held long, but the cost was high—troops lost, civilians displaced, a city's heart burning in the night. Wuhan fell after months of brutal fighting, yet the battle did not break China's will. Mao Zedong urged strategy over martyrdom, preferring to drain the enemy and buy time for a broader struggle. The Japanese, though victorious tactically, found their strength ebbing, resource strains, supply gaps, and a war that felt endless. In the wake of Wuhan, Changsha stood next in the Japanese crosshairs, its evacuation and a devastating fire leaving ash and memory in its wake. Behind these prices, political currents swirled. Wang Jingwei defected again, seeking power beyond Chiang's grasp, while Chongqing rose as a western bastion of resistance. The war hardened into a protracted stalemate, turning Japan from an aggressive assailant into a wary occupier, and leaving China to endure, persist, and fight on.   #175  The Soviet-Japanese Border Conflicts Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So based on the title of this one, you probably can see we are taking a bit of a detour. For quite some time we have focused on the Japanese campaigns into China proper 1937-1938. Now the way the second sino-japanese war is traditionally broken down is in phases. 1937-1938, 1939-1942 and 1942-1945. However there is actually even more going on in China aside from the war with Japan. In Xinjiang province a large full blown Islamic revolution breaks out in 1937. We will be covering that story at a later date, but another significant event is escalating border skirmishes in Manchukuo. Now these border skirmishes had been raging ever since the USSR consolidated its hold over the far east. We talked about some of those skirmishes prior to the Sino-Soviet war in 1929. However when Japan created the puppet government of Manchukuo, this was a significant escalation in tensions with the reds. Today we are going to talk about the escalating border conflicts between the Soviets and Japan. A tongue of poorly demarcated land extends southeast from Hunchun, hugging the east bank of the Tumen River between Lake Khasan to the east and Korea to the west. Within this tongue stands Changkufeng Hill, one of a long chain of highlands sweeping from upstream along the rivers and moors toward the sea. The twin-peaked hill sits at the confluence area several miles northwest of the point where Manchuria, Korea, and the Russian Far East meet. The hill's shape reminded Koreans of their changgo, which is a long snare drum constricted at the center and tapped with the hands at each end. When the Manchus came to the Tumen, they rendered the phonetic sounds into three ideographic characters meaning "taut drum peaks" or Chang-ku-feng. The Japanese admired the imagery and preserved the Chinese readings, which they pronounce Cho-ko-ho. From their eastern vantage, the Russians called it Zaozernaya, "hill behind the lake." Soviet troops referred to it as a sugar-loaf hill. For many years, natives and a handful of officials in the region cultivated a relaxed attitude toward borders and sovereignty. Even after the Japanese seized Manchuria in 1931, the issue did not immediately come to a head. With the expansion of Manchukuo and the Soviet Far East under Stalin's Five-Year plans, both sides began to attend more closely to frontier delimitation. Whenever either party acted aggressively, force majeure was invoked to justify the unexpected and disruptive events recognized in international law. Most often, these incidents erupted along the eastern Manchurian borders with the USSR or along the 350-mile frontier south of Lake Khanka, each skirmish carrying the seeds of all-out warfare. Now we need to talk a little bit about border history. The borders in question essentially dated to pacts concluded by the Qing dynasty and the Tsardom. Between the first Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 and the Mukden Agreement of 1924, there were over a dozen accords governing the borders. Relevant to Changkufeng were the basic 15-article Convention of Peking, supplementing the Tientsin Treaties of November 1860, some maps made in 1861, and the eight-article Hunchun Border Protocol of 1886. By the 1860 treaty, the Qing ceded to Tsarist Russia the entire maritime province of Siberia, but the meaning of "lands south of Lake Khanka" remained rather vague. Consequently, a further border agreement was negotiated in June 1861 known as "the Lake Khanka Border Pact", by which demarcations were drawn on maps and eight wooden markers erected. The border was to run from Khanka along ridgelines between the Hunchun River and the sea, past Suifenho and Tungning, terminating about 6 miles from the mouth of the Tumen. Then a Russo-Chinese commission established in 1886 drew up the Hunchun Border Pact, proposing new or modified markers along the 1860–1861 lines and arranging a Russian resurvey. However, for the Japanese, in 1938, the Chinese or Manchu texts of the 1886 Hunchun agreement were considered controlling. The Soviets argued the border ran along every summit west of Khasan, thereby granting them jurisdiction over at least the eastern slopes of all elevations, including Changkufeng and Shachaofeng.  Since the Qing dynasty and the house of Romanov were already defunct, the new sovereignties publicly appealed to opposing texts, and the Soviet side would not concede that the Russian-language version had never been deemed binding by the Qing commissioners. Yet, even in 1938, the Japanese knew that only the Chinese text had survived or could be located.    Now both the Chinese and Russian military maps generally drew the frontier along the watershed east of Khasan; this aligned with the 1861 readings based on the Khanka agreement. The Chinese Republican Army conducted new surveys sometime between 1915 and 1920. The latest Chinese military map of the Changkufeng area drew the border considerably closer to the old "red line" of 1886, running west of Khasan but near the shore rather than traversing the highland crests. None of the military delimitations of the border was sanctified by an official agreement. Hence, the Hunchun Protocol, whether well known or not, invaluable or worthless, remained the only government-to-government pact dealing with the frontiers.  Before we jump into it, how about a little summary of what became known as the Soviet-Japanese border conflicts. The first major conflict would obviously be the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. Following years of conflict between the Russian Empire and Japan culminating in the costly Battle of Tsushima, Tsar Nicholas II's government sought peace, recognizing Japan's claims to Korea and agreeing to evacuate Manchuria.  From 1918 to 1920, the Imperial Japanese Army, under Emperor Taishō after the death of Meiji, assisted the White Army and Alexander Kerensky against the Bolshevik Red Army. They also aided the Czechoslovak Legion in Siberia to facilitate its return to Europe after an Austrian-Hungarian armoured train purportedly went astray. By 1920, with Austria-Hungary dissolved and Czechoslovakia established two years earlier, the Czechoslovak Legion reached Europe. Japan withdrew from the Russian Revolution and the Civil War in 1922. Following Japan's 1919-1920 occupations and the Soviet intervention in Mongolia in 1921, the Republic of China also withdrew from Outer Mongolia in 1921. In 1922, after capturing Vladivostok in 1918 to halt Bolshevik advances, Japanese forces retreated to Japan as Bolshevik power grew and the postwar fatigue among combatants increased. After Hirohito's invasion of Manchuria in 1931–1932, following Taishō's death in 1926, border disputes between Manchukuo, the Mongolian People's Republic, and the Soviet Union increased. Many clashes stemmed from poorly defined borders, though some involved espionage. Between 1932 and 1934, the Imperial Japanese Army reported 152 border disputes, largely tied to Soviet intelligence activity in Manchuria, while the Soviets accused Japan of 15 border violations, six air intrusions, and 20 cases of "spy smuggling" in 1933 alone. Numerous additional violations followed in the ensuing years. By the mid-1930s, Soviet-Japanese diplomacy and trust had deteriorated further, with the Japanese being openly labeled "fascist enemies" at the Seventh Comintern Congress in July 1935. Beginning in 1935, conflicts significantly escalated. On 8 January 1935, the first armed clash, known as the Halhamiao incident, took place on the border between Mongolia and Manchukuo. Several dozen cavalrymen of the Mongolian People's Army crossed into Manchuria near disputed fishing grounds and engaged an 11‑man Manchukuo Imperial Army patrol near the Buddhist temple at Halhamiao, led by a Japanese military advisor. The Manchukuo Army sustained 6 wounded and 2 dead, including the Japanese officer; the Mongols suffered no casualties and withdrew after the Japanese sent a punitive expedition to reclaim the area. Two motorized cavalry companies, a machine‑gun company, and a tankette platoon occupied the position for three weeks without resistance. In June 1935, the first direct exchange of fire between the Japanese and Soviets occurred when an 11‑man Japanese patrol west of Lake Khanka was attacked by six Soviet horsemen, reportedly inside Manchukuo territory. In the firefight, one Soviet soldier was killed and two horses were captured. The Japanese requested a joint investigation, but the Soviets rejected the proposal. In October 1935, nine Japanese and 32 Manchukuoan border guards were establishing a post about 20 kilometers north of Suifenho when they were attacked by 50 Soviet soldiers. The Soviets opened fire with rifles and five heavy machine guns. Two Japanese and four Manchukuoan soldiers were killed, and another five were wounded. The Manchukuoan foreign affairs representative lodged a verbal protest with the Soviet consul at Suifenho. The Kwantung Army of Japan also sent an intelligence officer to investigate the clash. On 19 December 1935, a Manchukuoan unit reconnoitering southwest of Buir Lake clashed with a Mongolian party, reportedly capturing 10 soldiers. Five days later, 60 truck‑borne Mongolian troops assaulted the Manchukuoans and were repulsed, at the cost of three Manchukuoan dead. On the same day, at Brunders, Mongolian forces attempted three times to drive out Manchukuoan outposts, and again at night, but all attempts failed. Further small attempts occurred in January, with Mongolians using airplanes for reconnaissance. The arrival of a small Japanese force in three trucks helped foil these attempts; casualties occurred on both sides, though Mongolian casualties are unknown aside from 10 prisoners taken. In February 1936, Lieutenant-Colonel Sugimoto Yasuo was ordered to form a detachment from the 14th Cavalry Regiment to "drive the Outer Mongol intruders from the Olankhuduk region," a directive attributed to Lieutenant-General Kasai Heijuro. Sugimoto's detachment included cavalry guns, heavy machine guns, and tankettes. They faced a force of about 140 Mongolians equipped with heavy machine guns and light artillery. On February 12, Sugimoto's men drove the Mongolians south, at the cost of eight Japanese killed, four wounded, and one tankette destroyed. The Japanese began to withdraw, but were attacked by 5–6 Mongolian armored cars and two bombers, which briefly disrupted the column. The situation was stabilized when the Japanese unit received artillery support, allowing them to destroy or repel the armored cars. In March 1936, the Tauran incident occurred. In this clash, both the Japanese Army and the Mongolian Army deployed a small number of armored fighting vehicles and aircraft. The incident began when 100 Mongolian and six Soviet troops attacked and occupied the disputed village of Tauran, Mongolia, driving off the small Manchurian garrison. They were supported by light bombers and armored cars, though the bombing sorties failed to inflict damage on the Japanese, and three bombers were shot down by Japanese heavy machine guns. Local Japanese forces counter-attacked, conducting dozens of bombing sorties and finally assaulting Tauran with 400 men and 10 tankettes. The result was a Mongolian rout, with 56 Mongolian soldiers killed, including three Soviet advisors, and an unknown number wounded. Japanese losses were 27 killed and 9 wounded. Later in March 1936, another border clash occurred between Japanese and Soviet forces. Reports of border violations prompted the Japanese Korean Army to send ten men by truck to investigate, but the patrol was ambushed by 20 Soviet NKVD soldiers deployed about 300 meters inside territory claimed by Japan. After suffering several casualties, the Japanese patrol withdrew and was reinforced with 100 men, who then drove off the Soviets. Fighting resumed later that day when the NKVD brought reinforcements. By nightfall, the fighting had ceased and both sides had pulled back. The Soviets agreed to return the bodies of two Japanese soldiers who had died in the fighting, a development viewed by the Japanese government as encouraging. In early April 1936, three Japanese soldiers were killed near Suifenho in another minor affray. This incident was notable because the Soviets again returned the bodies of the fallen servicemen. In June 1937, the Kanchazu Island incident occurred on the Amur River along the Soviet–Manchukuo border. Three Soviet gunboats crossed the river's center line, disembarked troops, and occupied Kanchazu Island. Japanese forces from the IJA 1st Division, equipped with two horse-drawn 37 mm artillery pieces, quickly established improvised firing positions and loaded their guns with both high-explosive and armor-piercing shells. They shelled the Soviet vessels, sinking the lead gunboat, crippling the second, and driving off the third. Japanese troops subsequently fired on the swimming crewmen from the sunken ships using machine guns. Thirty-seven Soviet soldiers were killed, while Japanese casualties were zero. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested and demanded the Soviet forces withdraw from the island. The Soviet leadership, apparently shocked by the incident and reluctant to escalate, agreed to evacuate their troops. By 1938 the border situation had deteriorated. The tangled terrain features, mountain, bog, stream, forest, and valley, would have complicated even careful observers' discernment of the old red line drawn in 1886. Fifty years later, the markers themselves had undergone a metamorphosis. Japanese investigators could find, at most, only 14 to 17 markers standing fairly intact between the Tumen estuary and Khanka—roughly one every 25 miles at best. The remainder were missing or ruined; five were found in new locations. Marker "K," for example, was 40 meters deeper inside Manchuria, away from Khanka. Japanese military experts noted that of the 20 markers originally set along the boundaries of Hunchun Prefecture alone, only four could be found by the summer of 1938. The rest had either been wrecked or arbitrarily moved and discarded by Russian or Chinese officials and inhabitants. It is even said that one missing marker could be seen on display in Khabarovsk. The Chinese had generally interpreted the boundary as the road line just west of Khasan, at least in practice. Free road movement, however, had become a problem even 20 years before the Japanese overran Manchuria in 1931–1932 during the so-called Manchurian Incident. The Japanese adopted, or inherited, the Chinese interpretation, which was based on the 1886 agreement on border roads; the key clause held that the frontier west of Khasan would be the road along the lake. Japanese sources emphasize that local residents' anger toward gradual Soviet oppression and penetrations westward into Manchurian territory fueled the conflict. Many natives believed the original boundaries lay east of the lake, but the Soviets adjusted the situation to suit their own convenience. In practice, the Russians were restricting road use just west of Khasan by Manchurian and Korean residents. There was speculation that this was a prelude to taking over the ridgelines, depending on the reaction of the Manchukuoan–Japanese side. Villagers who went to streams or the lake to launder clothing found themselves subjected to sniper fire. Along a 25-mile stretch of road near Shachaofeng, farmers reported coming under fire from new Soviet positions as early as November 1935. Nevertheless, Japanese and Koreans familiar with the Tumen area noted agrarian, seasonal Korean religious rites atop Changkufeng Hill, including fattened pigs sacrificed and changgo drums beaten. Village elders told Japanese visitors in 1938 that, until early the preceding year, no Russians had come as far as Changkufeng Hill. Looking only at the border sector around Changkufeng, the easy days were clearly behind us. In the summer of 1938, Gaimusho "Foreign Ministry" observers described the explosive situation along the Korea–Manchuria–USSR borders as a matter of de facto frontiers. Both sides pressed against each other, and their trigger-happy posture was summed up in the colloquial refrain: "Take another step and we'll let you have it." Near dawn on 13 June 1938, a Manchurian patrol detected a suspicious figure in the fog swirling over Changlingtzu Hill on the Siberian–Manchurian frontier. Challenged at 15 feet, the suspect hurled two pistols to the ground and raised his hands in surrender. At headquarters, the police soon realized this was no routine border-trespassing case. The man was a defector and he was a Russian general, in fact he was the director of all NKVD forces in the Soviet Far East. Beneath a mufti of spring coat and hunting cap, he wore a full uniform with medals. His identification card No. 83 designated him as G. S. Lyushkov, Commissar 3rd Class, countersigned by Nikolai Yezhov, NKVD head in Moscow. Lyushkov was promptly turned over to the Japanese military authorities, who transferred him to Seoul and then to Tokyo under close escort. On 1 July, the Japanese press was permitted to disclose that Lyushkov had sought refuge in Japan. Ten days later, to capitalize on the commissar's notoriety and to confound skeptics, the Japanese produced Lyushkov at a press conference in Tokyo. For the Japanese and foreign correspondents, who met separately with him, Lyushkov described Soviet Far East strength and the turmoil wracking the USSR, because for those of you unfamiliar this was during the Stalinist purges. Clearly, the Japanese had gained a unique reservoir of high-level intelligence and a wealth of materials, including notes scratched in blood by suspects incarcerated at Khabarovsk. A general tightening of Russian frontier security had recently been reported. Natives of Fangchuanting asserted that a Soviet cavalry patrol appeared in June, seemingly for the first time. Contact with Yangkuanping, northwest of Khasan, was severed. More importantly, Japanese Army Signal Corps intelligence detected a surge of Soviet message traffic from the Posyet Bay district. After Lyushkov's defection, a drastic reshuffle in the local Russian command apparently occurred, and responsibility for border surveillance seems to have been reallocated. Japanese records indicate that the Novokievsk security force commander was relieved and the sector garrison replaced by troops from Vladivostok. Gaimusho intelligence also received reports that a border garrison unit had been transferred from Khabarovsk or Chita to the Tumen sector. The Kwantung Army signal monitors also intercepted two significant frontline messages on 6 July from the new Russian local commander in the Posyet region, addressed to Lieutenant General Sokolov in Khabarovsk. Decoded, the messages suggested (1) that ammunition for infantry mortars amounted to less than half the required supply; and  (2) a recommendation that higher headquarters authorize Russian elements to secure certain unoccupied high ground west of Khasan.  The commander noted terrain advantages and the contemplated construction of emplacements that would command Najin and the Korean railway. As a start, at least one Russian platoon should be authorized to dig in on the highest ground (presumably Changkufeng) and deploy four tons of entanglements to stake out the Soviet claim. Korea Army Headquarters received a telegram from the Kwantung Army on 7 July conveying the deciphered messages. On the same day, the 19th Division in North Korea telephoned Seoul that, on 6 July, three or four Soviet horsemen had been observed reconnoitering Manchurian territory from atop a hill called Changkufeng. The alarming intelligence from the Kwantung Army and the front warranted immediate attention by the Korea Army. Some Kwantung Army officers doubted the significance of the developments, with one intelligence official even suggesting the Russian messages might be a deliberate ploy designed to entrap the Japanese at Changkufeng. On 7–8 July, all staff officers in Seoul convened at army headquarters. The name of Changkufeng Hill was not well known, but maps and other data suggested that neither the Japanese nor the Russians had previously stationed border units in the ridge complex west of Khasan. As early as March 1936, Army Commander Koiso Kuniaki had distributed maps to subordinate units, indicating which sectors were in dispute. No patrol was to enter zones lacking definitive demarcation. Until then, the only Japanese element east of the Tumen was a Manchurian policeman at Fangchuanting. Ownership of the high ground emerged as an early issue. A number of other points were raised by  the Kwantung Army: At present, Soviet elements in the area were negligible. The intrusion must not be overlooked. The Russians could be expected to exploit any weakness, and half-measures would not suffice, especially regarding the Japanese defense mission along a 125-mile frontier. In Japanese hands, Changkufeng Hill would be useful, but two excellent observation posts already existed in the neighboring sector of the Manchurian tongue. With dissidence and purges underway, the Russians may have judged it necessary to seal border gaps, particularly after Lyushkov's defection. They may also have sought to control Changkufeng to offset Japanese dominance of the high ground to the north. Soviet seizure of Changkufeng would upset the delicate status quo and could provoke a contest for equivalent observation posts. In broader terms, it mattered little whether the Russians sought a permanent observation post on Changkufeng Hill, which was of relatively minor strategic value. Japan's primary concern lay in the China theater; Changkufeng was peripheral. The Japanese should not expend limited resources or become distracted. The matter required consultation with the high command in Tokyo. In the absence of more comprehensive intelligence, the assembled staff officers concluded that the Korea Army should, at a minimum, ignore or disregard Soviet actions for the time being, while maintaining vigilant observation of the area. The consensus was communicated to Major General Kitano Kenzo, the Korea Army chief of staff, who concurred, and to Koiso. Upon learning that the recommendation advocated a low posture, Koiso inquired only whether the opinion reflected the unanimous view of the staff. Having been assured that it did, he approved the policy. Koiso, then 58, was at the threshold of the routine personnel changes occurring around 15 July. He had just been informed that he would retire and that General Nakamura Kotaro would succeed him. Those acquainted with Koiso perceived him as treating the border difficulties as a minor anticlimax in the course of his command tour. He appeared unemphatic or relaxed as he prepared to depart from a post he had held for twenty-one years. Although neither Koiso nor his staff welcomed the Soviet activities that appeared under way, his reaction likely reflected a reluctance to make decisions that could constrain his soon-to-arrive successor. On 8 July Koiso authorized the dispatch of warnings to the 19th Division at Nanam, to the Hunchun garrison, and to the intelligence branch at Hunchun. These units were instructed to exercise maximum precautions and to tighten frontier security north of Shuiliufeng. In response to the initial appearance of Soviet horsemen at Changkufeng, the Kucheng Border Garrison Unit of the 76th Infantry Regiment maintained close surveillance across the Tumen. By about noon on 9 July, patrols detected approximately a dozen Russian troops commencing construction atop Changkufeng. Between 11 and 13 July, the number of soldiers on the slopes increased to forty; there were also thirty horses and eleven camouflaged tents. Operating in shifts on the western side, thirty meters from the crest, the Russians erected barbed wire and firing trenches; fifty meters forward, they excavated observation trenches. In addition to existing telephone lines between Changkufeng, Lake Khasan, and Kozando, the Russians installed a portable telephone net. Logistical support was provided by three boats on the lake. Approximately twenty kilometers to the east, well within Soviet territory, large forces were being mobilized, and steamship traffic into Posyet Bay intensified. Upon learning of the "intrusion" at Changkufeng on 9 July, Lt. General Suetaka Kamezo, the commander of the 19th Division, dispatched staff officers to the front and prepared to send elements to reinforce border units.  The special significance of Suetaka and his division stemmed from a series of unusual circumstances. Chientao Province, the same zone into which Lyushkov had fled and the sector where Soviet horsemen had appeared, fell within Manchukuo geographically and administratively. Yet, in terms of defense, the configuration of the frontier, the terrain, and the transportation network more closely connected the region with North Korea than with southeastern Manchuria. Approximately 80% of the population was of Korean origin, which implied Japanese rather than Manchukuoan allegiance. Consequently, the Korea Army had been made operationally responsible for the defense of Chientao and controlled not only the three-battalion garrison at Hunchun but also the intelligence detachment located there. In the event of war, the Korea Army's mission was defined as mobilization and execution of subsidiary operational tasks against the USSR, under the control and in support of the Kwantung Army.  The Korea Army ordinarily possessed two infantry divisions, the 19th in North Korea and the 20th stationed at Seoul, but the 20th Division had already departed for China, leaving only the 20th Depot Division in the capital. Beyond sparse ground units, devoid of armor and with weak heavy artillery, there were only two air regiments in Korea, the nearest being the unit at Hoeryong. The Korea Army was designed to maintain public security within Korea as well as fulfill minimal defensive responsibilities. Such an army did not require a full-time operations officer, and none was maintained. When needed, as in mid-1938, the task fell to the senior staff officer, in this case Colonel Iwasaki Tamio. In peacetime, training constituted the primary focus.  Thus, the 19th Division was entrusted with defending northeastern Korea. Its commander, Suetaka, a seasoned infantryman, resented the fact that his elite force had never engaged in combat in China. He intensified training with zeal, emphasizing strict discipline, bravery, aggressiveness, and thorough preparation. Japanese veterans characterized him as severe, bullish, short-tempered, hot-blooded, highly strung, unbending, and stubborn. Nonetheless, there was widespread respect for his realistic training program, maintained under firm, even violent, personal supervision. His men regarded Suetaka as a professional, a modern samurai who forged the division into superb condition. Privately, he was reputed for sensitivity and warmth; a Japanese phrase "yakamashii oyaji" captures the dual sense of stern father and martinet in his character. At the outset, however, Suetaka displayed little aggression. Although not widely known, he did not welcome the orders from army headquarters to deploy to the Tumen. Until late July, he remained somewhat opposed to the notion of dislodging the Soviets from the crest, a proposition arising from neither the division staff nor, initially, Suetaka himself. Colonel Sato noted that, for a week after reports of Soviet excavation at Changkufeng, the division's response was limited to preparations for a possible emergency, as they perceived the matter as a local issue best settled through diplomacy. Korea Army officers acknowledged that, around the time the Soviets consolidated their outpost strength at Changkufeng, an informal and personal telegram arrived in Seoul from a Kwantung Army Intelligence field-grade officer who specialized in Soviet affairs. If the Korea Army hesitated, the Kwantung Army would be obliged to eject the Russians; the matter could not be ignored. While the telegram did not demand a reply and struck several officers as presumptuous and implausible, the message was promptly shown to Koiso. Koiso was driven to immediate action, he wired Tokyo asserting that only the Korea Army could and would handle the incident. One staff officer recalled "We felt we had to act, out of a sense of responsibility. But we resented the Kwantung Army's interference." The Korea Army staff convened shortly after receipt of the unofficial telegram from Hsinking. Based on the latest intelligence from the division dated 13 July, the officers prepared an assessment for submission to the army commander. The hypotheses were distilled into three scenarios: The USSR, or the Far East authorities, desires hostilities. Conclusion: Slightly possible. The USSR seeks to restrain Japan on the eve of the pivotal operations in China: the major Japanese offensive to seize Hankow. Conclusion: Highly probable. The Posyet district commander is new in his post; by occupying the Changkufeng ridges, he would demonstrate loyalty, impress superiors, and seek glory. Conclusion: Possible. Late on 13 July or early on 14 July, Koiso approved the dispatch of a message to the vice minister of war, and the Kwantung Army chief of staff:  "Lake Khasan area lies in troublesome sector USSR has been claiming . . . in accordance with treaties [said Secret Message No. 913], but we interpret it to be Manchukuoan territory, evident even from maps published by Soviet side. Russian actions are patently illegal, but, considering that area does not exert major or immediate influence on operations [Japan] is intending and that China Incident is in full swing, we are not going to conduct counterattack measures immediately. This army is thinking of reasoning with Soviets and requesting pullback, directly on spot. . . . In case Russians do not accede in long run, we have intention to drive Soviet soldiers out of area east of Khasan firmly by use of force."  The message concluded with a request that the Tokyo authorities lodge a formal protest with the USSR, on behalf of Manchukuo and Japan, and guide matters so that the Russians would withdraw quickly. Dominant in Japanese high command thinking in 1938 was the China theater; the Changkufeng episode constituted a mere digression. A sequence of Japanese tactical victories had preceded the summer: Tsingtao fell in January; the Yellow River was reached in March; a "reformed government of the Republic of China" was installed at Nanking several weeks later; Amoy fell in early May; Suchow fell on the 20th. With these gains, northern and central fronts could be linked by the Japanese. Yet Chinese resistance persisted, and while public statements anticipated imminent Chinese dissension, private admissions acknowledged that the partial effects of Suchow's fall were ominous: control might pass from Chiang Kai-shek to the Communists, Chinese defiance might intensify, and Soviet involvement could ensue. A Hankow drive appeared desirable to symbolize the conclusion of the military phase of hostilities. The Japanese and their adversaries were in accord regarding the importance of the summer and autumn campaigns. Even after Suchow's fall, the government discouraged public insinuations that enemy resistance was collapsing; when Chiang addressed the nation on the first anniversary of hostilities, Premier Konoe prophetically proclaimed, "The war has just begun." Colonel Inada Masazum served as the Army General Staff's principal figure for the Changkufeng affair, occupying the position of chief of the 2nd Operations Section within the Operations Bureau in March 1938. A distinguished graduate of the Military Academy, Inada completed the War College program and held a combination of line, instructional, and staff assignments at the War College, the Army General Staff, and the War Ministry. He was recognized as a sharp, highly capable, and driveful personality, though some regarded him as enigmatic. Following the capture of Suchow, Imperial General Headquarters on 18 June ordered field forces to undertake operational preparations for a drive to seize the Wuhan complex. Inada favored a decisive move aimed at achieving a rapid political settlement. He acknowledged that Soviet intervention in 1938, during Japan's involvement in China, would have been critical. Although Japanese forces could still defeat the Chinese, an overextended Japanese Army might be fatally compromised against the Russians. Soviet assistance to China was already pronouncedly unwelcome. The Soviets were reported to possess roughly 20 rifle divisions, four to five cavalry divisions, 1,500 tanks, and 1,560 aircraft, including 300 bombers with a range of approximately 3,000 kilometers, enabling reach from Vladivostok to Tokyo. Soviet manpower in Siberia was likely near 370,000. In response, Japanese central authorities stressed a no-trouble policy toward the USSR while seeking to "wall off" the border and bolster the Kwantung Army as quickly as possible. Nevertheless, the envisaged correction of the strategic imbalance could not occur before 1943, given shortages in ammunition, manpower, and materiel across existing theaters in China. By the end of 1937 Japan had committed 16 of its 24 divisions to China, bringing the standing force to roughly 700,000. Army General Staff planners reallocated three ground divisions, intended for a northern contingency, from north to central China, even as the Kwantung Army operated from a less favorable posture. Attitudes toward the northern problem varied within senior military circles. While concern persisted, it was not universal. As campaigns in China widened, planning at the high command level deteriorated, propagating confusion and anxiety to field armies in China. The Japanese Navy suspected that the Army general staff was invoking the USSR as a pretext for broader strategic aims—namely, to provoke a more consequential confrontation with the USSR while the Navy contended with its own strategic rivalries with the Army, centered on the United States and Britain. Army leaders, however, denied aggressive intent against the USSR at that time. The Hankow plan encountered substantial internal opposition at high levels. Private assessments among army planners suggested that a two-front war would be premature given operational readiness and troop strength. Not only were new War Ministry officials cautious, but many high-ranking Army general staff officers and court circles shared doubts.  Aggressive tendencies, influenced by subordinates and the Kwantung Army, were evident in Inada, who repeatedly pressed Tada Shun, the deputy army chief of staff, to endorse the Wuhan drive as both necessary and feasible, arguing that the USSR would gain from Japan's weakening without incurring substantial losses. Inada contended that Stalin was rational and that time favored the USSR in the Far East, where industrial buildup and military modernization were ongoing. He argued that the Soviet purges impeded opportunistic ventures with Japan. He posited that Nazi Germany posed a growing threat on the western front, and thus the USSR should be avoided by both Japan, due to China and Russia, due to Germany. While most of the army remained engaged in China, Tada did not initially share Inada's views; only after inspecting the Manchurian borders in April 1938 did he finally align with Inada's broader vision, which encompassed both northern and Chinese considerations. During this period, Inada studied daily intelligence from the Kwantung Army, and after Lyushkov's defection in June, reports suggested the Soviets were following their sector commander's recommendations. Russian troops appeared at Changkufeng, seemingly prepared to dig in. Inada recollects his reaction: "That's nice, my chance has come." I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The simmering Soviet–Japanese border clashes centered on Changkufeng Hill near Lake Khanka, set within a broader history of contested frontiers dating to Qing and Tsarist treaties. Japan, prioritizing China, considered Changkufeng peripheral but ready to confront Soviet encroachment; Moscow aimed to consolidate border gains, with high-level war planning overlaying regional skirmishes. Conflict loomed over Manchuria.

This week on Sinica, I chat with Lizzi Lee, a fellow on the Chinese economy at the Asia Society Policy Institute and one of the sharpest China analysts working today. We dig into the 4th Plenary Session of the 20th Party Congress and what it reveals about China's evolving growth model — particularly the much-discussed but often misunderstood push against "involution" in key sectors like EVs and solar. Lizzi walks us through the structural incentives driving overcompetition, from local government finance and VAT collection to the challenges of rebalancing supply and demand. We also discuss her recent Foreign Affairs piece on China's manufacturing model, why "overcapacity" is a misleading frame, the unexpected upsides of China's industrial strategy for the global green transition, and what happened at the Trump-Xi meeting in Busan. This is a conversation about getting beyond the binaries and understanding the actual mechanisms — and contradictions — shaping China's economic trajectory.4:43 – What Western reporting missed in the 4th Plenum communique 6:34 – The "anti-involution" push and what it really means 9:57 – Is China's domestic demand abnormally low? Context and comparisons 12:41 – Why cash transfers and consumption subsidies are running out of steam 15:00 – The supply-side approach: creating better products to drive demand 18:33 – GDP vs. GNI: why China is focusing on global corporate footprints 20:13 – Service exports and China's ascent along the global supply chain 24:02 – The People's Daily editorial on price wars and profit margins 27:31 – Why addressing involution is harder now than in 2015 29:56 – How China's VAT system incentivizes local governments to build entire supply chains 33:20 – The difficulty of reforming fiscal structures and local government finance 35:12 – What got lost in the Foreign Affairs editing process 38:14 – Why "overcapacity" is a misleading and morally loaded term 40:02 – The underappreciated upside: China's model and the global green transition 43:14 – How politically potent deindustrialization fears are in Washington and Brussels 46:29 – Industry self-discipline vs. structural reform: can moral suasion work? 50:15 – BYD's negotiating power and the squeeze on suppliers 53:54 – The Trump-Xi meeting in Busan: genuine thaw or tactical pause? 57:23 – Pete Hegseth's "God bless both China and the USA" tweet 1:00:01 – How China's leadership views Trump: transactional or unpredictable? 1:03:32 – The pragmatic off-ramp and what Paul Triolo predicted 1:05:26 – China's AI strategy: labor-augmenting vs. labor-replacing technology 1:08:13 – What systemic changes could realistically fix involution? 1:10:26 – Capital market reform and the challenge of decelerating slowly 1:12:36 – The "health first" strategy and investing in peoplePaying it forward: Paul TrioloRecommendations: Lizzi: Chokepoints: American Power in the Age of Economic Warfare by Edward Fishman Kaiser: Morning Coffee guitar practice book by Alex RockwellSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Last time we spoke about the fall of Wuhan. In a country frayed by war, the Yangtze became a pulsing artery, carrying both hunger and hope. Chiang Kai-shek faced a brutal choice: defend Wuhan to the last man, or flood the rivers to buy time. He chose both, setting sullen floodwaters loose along the Yellow River to slow the invaders, a temporary mercy that spared some lives while ripping many from their homes. On the river's banks, a plethora of Chinese forces struggled to unite. The NRA, fractured into rival zones, clung to lines with stubborn grit as Japanese forces poured through Anqing, Jiujiang, and beyond, turning the Yangtze into a deadly corridor. Madang's fortifications withstood bombardment and gas, yet the price was paid in troops and civilians drowned or displaced. Commanders like Xue Yue wrestled stubbornly for every foothold, every bend in the river. The Battle of Wanjialing became a symbol: a desperate, months-long pincer where Chinese divisions finally tightened their cordon and halted the enemy's flow. By autumn, the Japanese pressed onward to seize Tianjiazhen and cut supply lines, while Guangzhou fell to a ruthless blockade. The Fall of Wuhan loomed inevitable, yet the story remained one of fierce endurance against overwhelming odds.   #174 The Changsha Fire Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the summer of 1938, amid the upheaval surrounding Chiang Kai-shek, one of his most important alliances came to an end. On June 22, all German advisers to the Nationalist government were summoned back; any who refused would be deemed guilty of high treason. Since World War I, a peculiar bond had tied the German Weimar Republic and China: two fledgling states, both weak and only partially sovereign. Under the Versailles Treaty of 1919, Germany had lost extraterritorial rights on Chinese soil, which paradoxically allowed Berlin to engage with China as an equal partner rather than a traditional colonizer. This made German interests more welcome in business and politics than those of other Western powers. Chiang's military reorganization depended on German officers such as von Seeckt and von Falkenhausen, and Hitler's rise in 1933 had not immediately severed the connection between the two countries. Chiang did not share Nazi ideology with Germany, but he viewed Berlin as a potential ally and pressed to persuade it to side with China rather than Japan as China's principal East Asian, anti-Communist partner. In June 1937, H. H. Kung led a delegation to Berlin, met Hitler, and argued for an alliance with China. Yet the outbreak of war and the Nationalists' retreat to Wuhan convinced Hitler's government to align with Japan, resulting in the recall of all German advisers. Chiang responded with a speech praising von Falkenhausen, insisting that "our friend's enemy is our enemy too," and lauding the German Army's loyalty and ethics as a model for the Chinese forces. He added, "After we have won the War of Resistance, I believe you'll want to come back to the Far East and advise our country again." Von Falkenhausen would later become the governor of Nazi-occupied Belgium, then be lauded after the war for secretly saving many Jewish lives. As the Germans departed, the roof of the train transporting them bore a prominent German flag with a swastika, a prudent precaution given Wuhan's vulnerability to air bombardment. The Japanese were tightening their grip on the city, even as Chinese forces, numbering around 800,000, made a stubborn stand. The Yellow River floods blocked northern access, so the Japanese chose to advance via the Yangtze, aided by roughly nine divisions and the might of the Imperial Navy. The Chinese fought bravely, but their defenses could not withstand the superior technology of the Japanese fleet. The only substantial external aid came from Soviet pilots flying aircraft bought from the USSR as part of Stalin's effort to keep China in the war; between 1938 and 1940, some 2,000 pilots offered their services. From June 24 to 27, Japanese bombers relentlessly pounded the Madang fortress along the Yangtze until it fell. A month later, on July 26, Chinese defenders abandoned Jiujiang, southeast of Wuhan, and its civilian population endured a wave of atrocities at the hands of the invaders. News of Jiujiang's fate stiffened resolve. Chiang delivered a pointed address to his troops on July 31, arguing that Wuhan's defense was essential and that losing the city would split the country into hostile halves, complicating logistics and movement. He warned that Wuhan's defense would also be a spiritual test: "the place has deep revolutionary ties," and public sympathy for China's plight was growing as Japanese atrocities became known. Yet Chiang worried about the behavior of Chinese soldiers. He condemned looting as a suicidal act that would destroy the citizens' trust in the military. Commanders, he warned, must stay at their posts; the memory of the Madang debacle underscored the consequences of cowardice. Unlike Shanghai, Wuhan had shelters, but he cautioned against retreating into them and leaving soldiers exposed. Officers who failed in loyalty could expect no support in return. This pep talk, combined with the belief that the army was making a last stand, may have slowed the Japanese advance along the Yangtze in August. Under General Xue Yue, about 100,000 Chinese troops pushed back the invaders at Huangmei. At Tianjiazhen, thousands fought until the end of September, with poison gas finally forcing Japanese victory. Yet even then, Chinese generals struggled to coordinate. In Xinyang, Li Zongren's Guangxi troops were exhausted; they expected relief from Hu Zongnan's forces, but Hu instead withdrew, allowing Japan to capture the city without a fight. The fall of Xinyang enabled Japanese control of the Ping-Han railway, signaling Wuhan's doom. Chiang again spoke to Wuhan's defenders, balancing encouragement with a grim realism about possible loss. Although Wuhan's international connections were substantial, foreign aid would be unlikely. If evacuation became necessary, the army should have a clear plan, including designated routes. He recalled the disastrous December retreat from Nanjing, where "foreigners and Chinese alike turned it into an empty city." Troops had been tired and outnumbered; Chiang defended the decision to defend Nanjing, insisting the army had sacrificed itself for the capital and Sun Yat-sen's tomb. Were the army to retreat again, he warned, it would be the greatest shame in five thousand years of Chinese history. The loss of Madang was another humiliation. By defending Wuhan, he argued, China could avenge its fallen comrades and cleanse its conscience; otherwise, it could not honor its martyrs. Mao Zedong, observing the situation from his far-off base at Yan'an, agreed strongly that Chiang should not defend Wuhan to the death. He warned in mid-October that if Wuhan could not be defended, the war's trajectory would shift, potentially strengthening the Nationalists–Communists cooperation, deepening popular mobilization, and expanding guerrilla warfare. The defense of Wuhan, Mao argued, should drain the enemy and buy time to advance the broader struggle, not become a doomed stalemate. In a protracted war, some strongholds might be abandoned temporarily to sustain the longer fight. The Japanese Army captured Wuchang and Hankou on 26 October and captured Hanyang on the 27th, which concluded the campaign in Wuhan. The battle had lasted four and a half months and ended with the Nationalist army's voluntary withdrawal. In the battle itself, the Japanese army captured Wuhan's three towns and held the heartland of China, achieving a tactical victory. Yet strategically, Japan failed to meet its objectives. Imperial Headquarters believed that "capturing Hankou and Guangzhou would allow them to dominate China." Consequently, the Imperial Conference planned the Battle of Wuhan to seize Wuhan quickly and compel the Chinese government to surrender. It also decreed that "national forces should be concentrated to achieve the war objectives within a year and end the war against China." According to Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Seiya Matsuno, Hirohito authorized the use of chemical weapons against China by specific orders known as rinsanmei. During the Battle of Wuhan, Prince Kan'in Kotohito transmitted the emperor's orders to deploy toxic gas 375 times between August and October 1938. Another memorandum uncovered by Yoshimi indicates that Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni authorized the use of poison gas against the Chinese on 16 August 1938. A League of Nations resolution adopted on 14 May condemned the Imperial Japanese Army's use of toxic gas. Japan's heavy use of chemical weapons against China was driven by manpower shortages and China's lack of poison gas stockpiles to retaliate. Poison gas was employed at Hankou in the Battle of Wuhan to break Chinese resistance after conventional assaults had failed. Rana Mitter notes that, under General Xue Yue, approximately 100,000 Chinese troops halted Japanese advances at Huangmei, and at the fortress of Tianjiazhen, thousands fought until the end of September, with Japanese victory secured only through the use of poison gas. Chinese generals also struggled with coordination at Xinyang; Li Zongren's Guangxi troops were exhausted, and Hu Zongnan's forces, believed to be coming to relieve them, instead withdrew. Japan subsequently used poison gas against Chinese Muslim forces at the Battle of Wuyuan and the Battle of West Suiyuan. However, the Chinese government did not surrender with the loss of Wuhan and Guangzhou, nor did Japan's invasion end with Wuhan and Guangzhou's capture. After Wuhan fell, the government issued a reaffirmation: "Temporary changes of advance and retreat will not shake our resolve to resist the Japanese invasion," and "the gain or loss of any city will not affect the overall situation of the war." It pledged to "fight with even greater sorrow, greater perseverance, greater steadfastness, greater diligence, and greater courage," dedicating itself to a long, comprehensive war of resistance. In the Japanese-occupied rear areas, large armed anti-Japanese forces grew, and substantial tracts of territory were recovered. As the Japanese army themselves acknowledged, "the restoration of public security in the occupied areas was actually limited to a few kilometers on both sides of the main transportation lines." Thus, the Battle of Wuhan did not merely inflict a further strategic defeat on Japan; it also marked a turning point in Japan's strategic posture, from offense to defense. Due to the Nationalist Army's resolute resistance, Japan mobilized its largest force to date for the attack, about 250,000 personnel, who were replenished four to five times over the battle, for a total of roughly 300,000. The invaders held clear advantages in land, sea, and air power and fought for four and a half months. Yet they failed to annihilate the Nationalist main force, nor did they break the will to resist or the army's combat effectiveness. Instead, the campaign dealt a severe blow to the Japanese Army's vitality. Japanese-cited casualties totaled 4,506 dead and 17,380 wounded for the 11th Army; the 2nd Army suffered 2,300 killed in action, 7,600 wounded, and 900 died of disease. Including casualties across the navy and the air force, the overall toll was about 35,500. By contrast, the Nationalist Government Military Commission's General Staff Department, drawing on unit-level reports, calculated Japanese casualties at 256,000. The discrepancy between Japanese and Nationalist tallies illustrates the inflationary tendencies of each side's reporting. Following Wuhan, a weakened Japanese force confronted an extended front. Unable to mount large-scale strategic offensives, unlike Shanghai, Xuzhou, or Wuhan itself, the Japanese to a greater extent adopted a defensive posture. This transition shifted China's War of Resistance from a strategic defensive phase into a strategic stalemate, while the invaders found themselves caught in a protracted war—a development they most disliked. Consequently, Japan's invasion strategy pivoted: away from primary frontal offensives toward a greater reliance on political inducements with secondary military action, and toward diverting forces to "security" operations behind enemy lines rather than pushing decisive frontal campaigns. Japan, an island nation with limited strategic resources, depended heavily on imports. By the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Japan's gold reserves,including reserves for issuing banknotes, amounted to only about 1.35 billion yen. In effect, Japan's currency reserves constrained the scale of the war from the outset. The country launched its aggression while seeking an early solution to the conflict. To sustain its war of aggression against China, the total value of military supplies imported from overseas in 1937 reached approximately 960 million yen. By June of the following year, for the Battle of Wuhan, even rifles used in training were recalled to outfit the expanding army. The sustained increase in troops also strained domestic labor, food, and energy supplies. By 1939, after Wuhan, Japan's military expenditure had climbed to about 6.156 billion yen, far exceeding national reserves. This stark reality exposed Japan's economic fragility and its inability to guarantee a steady supply of military materiel, increasing pressure on the leadership at the Central Command. The Chief of Staff and the Minister of War lamented the mismatch between outward strength and underlying weakness: "Outwardly strong but weak is a reflection of our country today, and this will not last long." In sum, the Wuhan campaign coincided with a decline in the organization, equipment, and combat effectiveness of the Japanese army compared with before the battle. This erosion of capability helped drive Japan to alter its political and military strategy, shifting toward a method of inflicting pressure on China and attempting to "use China to control China", that is, fighting in ways designed to sustain the broader war effort. Tragically a major element of Chiang Kai-shek's retreat strategy was the age-old "scorched earth" policy. In fact, China originated the phrase and the practice. Shanghai escaped the last-minute torching because of foreigners whose property rights were protected. But in Nanjing, the burning and destruction began with increasing zeal. What could not be moved inland, such as remaining rice stocks, oil in tanks, and other facilities, was to be blown up or devastated. Civilians were told to follow the army inland, to rebuild later behind the natural barrier of Sichuan terrain. Many urban residents complied, but the peasantry did not embrace the plan. The scorched-earth policy served as powerful propaganda for the occupying Japanese army and, even more so, for the Reds. Yet they could hardly have foreseen the propaganda that Changsha would soon supply them. In June, the Changsha Evacuation Guidance Office was established to coordinate land and water evacuation routes. By the end of October, Wuhan's three towns had fallen, and on November 10 the Japanese army captured Yueyang, turning Changsha into the next primary invasion target. Beginning on October 9, Japanese aircraft intensified from sporadic raids on Changsha to large-scale bombing. On October 27, the Changsha Municipal Government urgently evacuated all residents, exempting only able-bodied men, the elderly, the weak, women, and children. The baojia system was mobilized to go door-to-door, enforcing compliance. On November 7, Chiang Kai-shek convened a military meeting at Rongyuan Garden to review the war plan and finalize a "scorched earth war of resistance." Xu Quan, Chief of Staff of the Security Command, drafted the detailed implementation plan. On November 10, Shi Guoji, Chief of Staff of the Security Command, presided over a joint meeting of Changsha's party, government, military, police, and civilian organizations to devise a strategy. The Changsha Destruction Command was immediately established, bringing together district commanders and several arson squads. The command actively prepared arson equipment and stacked flammable materials along major traffic arteries. Chiang decided that the city of Changsha was vulnerable and either gave the impression or the direct order, honestly really depends on the source your reading, to burn the city to the ground to prevent it falling to the enemy. At 9:00 AM on November 12, Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed Zhang Zhizhong: "One hour to arrive, Chairman Zhang, Changsha, confidential. If Changsha falls, the entire city must be burned. Please make thorough preparations in advance and do not delay." And here it seems a game of broken telephone sort of resulted in one of the worst fire disasters of all time. If your asking pro Chiang sources, the message was clearly, put up a defense, once thats fallen, burn the city down before the Japanese enter. Obviously this was to account for getting civilians out safely and so forth. If you read lets call it more modern CPP aligned sources, its the opposite. Chiang intentionally ordering the city to burn down as fast as possible, but in through my research, I think it was a colossal miscommunication. Regardless Zhongzheng Wen, Minister of the Interior, echoed the message. Simultaneously, Lin Wei, Deputy Director of Chiang Kai-shek's Secretariat, instructed Zhang Zhizhong by long-distance telephone: "If Changsha falls, the entire city must be burned." Zhang summoned Feng Ti, Commander of the Provincial Capital Garrison, and Xu Quan, Director of the Provincial Security Bureau, to outline arson procedures. He designated the Garrison Command to shoulder the preparations, with the Security Bureau assisting. At 4:00 PM, Zhang appointed Xu Kun, Commander of the Second Garrison Regiment, as chief commander of the arson operation, with Wang Weining, Captain of the Social Training Corps, and Xu Quan, Chief of Staff of the Garrison Command, as deputies. At 6:00 PM, the Garrison Command held an emergency meeting ordering all government agencies and organizations in the city to be ready for evacuation at any moment. By around 10:15 PM, all urban police posts had withdrawn. Around 2:00 AM (November 13), a false report circulated that "Japanese troops have reached Xinhe" . Firefighters stationed at various locations rushed out with kerosene-fueled devices, burning everything in sight, shops and houses alike. In an instant, Changsha became a sea of flames. The blaze raged for 72 hours. The Hunan Province Anti-Japanese War Loss Statistics, compiled by the Hunan Provincial Government Statistics Office of the Kuomintang, report that the fire inflicted economic losses of more than 1 billion yuan, a sum equivalent to about 1.7 trillion yuan after the victory in the war. This figure represented roughly 43% of Changsha's total economic value at the time. Regarding casualties, contemporary sources provide varying figures. A Xinhua Daily report from November 20, 1938 noted that authorities mobilized manpower to bury more than 600 bodies, though the total number of burned remains could not be precisely counted. A Central News Agency reporter on November 19 stated that in the Xiangyuan fire, more than 2,000 residents could not escape, and most of the bodies had already been buried. There are further claims that in the Changsha Fire, more than 20,000 residents were burned to death. In terms of displacement, Changsha's population before the fire was about 300,000, and by November 12, 90% had been evacuated. After the fire, authorities registered 124,000 victims, including 815 orphans sheltered in Lito and Maosgang.  Building damage constituted the other major dimension of the catastrophe, with the greatest losses occurring to residential houses, shops, schools, factories, government offices, banks, hospitals, newspaper offices, warehouses, and cultural and entertainment venues, as well as numerous historic buildings such as palaces, temples, private gardens, and the former residences of notable figures; among these, residential and commercial structures suffered the most, followed by factories and schools. Inspector Gao Yihan, who conducted a post-fire investigation, observed that the prosperous areas within Changsha's ring road, including Nanzheng Street and Bajiaoting, were almost completely destroyed, and in other major markets only a handful of shops remained, leading to an overall estimate that surviving or stalemated houses were likely less than 20%. Housing and street data from the early post-liberation period reveal that Changsha had more than 1,100 streets and alleys; of these, more than 690 were completely burned and more than 330 had fewer than five surviving houses, accounting for about 29%, with nearly 90% of the city's streets severely damaged. More than 440 streets were not completely destroyed, but among these, over 190 had only one or two houses remaining and over 130 had only three or four houses remaining; about 60 streets, roughly 6% had 30 to 40 surviving houses, around 30 streets, 3% had 11 to 20 houses, 10 streets, 1% had 21 to 30 houses, and three streets ) had more than 30 houses remaining. Housing statistics from 1952 show that 2,538 houses survived the fire, about 6.57% of the city's total housing stock, with private houses totaling 305,800 square meters and public houses 537,900 square meters. By 1956, the surviving area of both private and public housing totaled 843,700 square meters, roughly 12.3% of the city's total housing area at that time. Alongside these losses, all equipment, materials, funds, goods, books, archives, antiques, and cultural relics that had not been moved were also destroyed.  At the time of the Changsha Fire, Zhou Enlai, then Deputy Minister of the Political Department of the Nationalist Government's Military Commission, was in Changsha alongside Ye Jianying, Guo Moruo, and others. On November 12, 1938, Zhou Enlai attended a meeting held by Changsha cultural groups at Changsha Normal School to commemorate Sun Yat-sen's 72nd birthday. Guo Moruo later recalled that Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying were awakened by the blaze that night; they each carried a suitcase and evacuated to Xiangtan, with Zhou reportedly displaying considerable indignation at the sudden, unprovoked fire. On the 16th, Zhou Enlai rushed back to Changsha and, together with Chen Cheng, Zhang Zhizhong, and others, inspected the disaster. He mobilized personnel from three departments, with Tian Han and Guo Moruo at the forefront, to form the Changsha Fire Aftermath Task Force, which began debris clearance, care for the injured, and the establishment of soup kitchens. A few days later, on the 22nd, the Hunan Provincial Government established the Changsha Fire Temporary Relief Committee to coordinate relief efforts.  On the night of November 16, 1938, Chiang Kai-shek arrived in Changsha and, the next day, ascended Tianxin Pavilion. Sha Wei, head of the Cultural Relics Section of the Changsha Tianxin Pavilion Park Management Office, and a long-time researcher of the pavilion, explained that documentation indicates Chiang Kai-shek, upon seeing the city largely reduced to scorched earth with little left intact, grew visibly angry. After descending from Tianxin Pavilion, Chiang immediately ordered the arrest of Changsha Garrison Commander Feng Ti, Changsha Police Chief Wen Chongfu, and Commander of the Second Garrison Regiment Xu Kun, and arranged a military trial with a two-day deadline. The interrogation began at 7:00 a.m. on November 18. Liang Xiaojin records that Xu Kun and Wen Chongfu insisted their actions followed orders from the Security Command, while Feng Ti admitted negligence and violations of procedure, calling his acts unforgivable. The trial found Feng Ti to be the principal offender, with Wen Chongfu and Xu Kun as accomplices, and sentenced all three to prison terms of varying lengths. The verdict was sent to Chiang Kai-shek for approval, who was deeply dissatisfied and personally annotated the drafts: he asserted that Feng Ti, as the city's security head, was negligent and must be shot immediately; Wen Chongfu, as police chief, disobeyed orders and fled, and must be shot immediately; Xu Kun, for neglect of duty, must be shot immediately. The court then altered the arson charge in the verdict to "insulting his duty and harming the people" in line with Chiang's instructions. Chiang Kai-shek, citing "failure to supervise personnel and precautions," dismissed Zhang from his post, though he remained in office to oversee aftermath operations. Zhang Zhizhong later recalled Chiang Kai-shek's response after addressing the Changsha fire: a pointed admission that the fundamental cause lay not with a single individual but with the collective leadership's mistakes, and that the error must be acknowledged as a collective failure. All eyes now shifted to the new center of resistance, Chongqing, the temporary capital. Chiang's "Free China" no longer meant the whole country; it now encompassed Sichuan, Hunan, and Henan, but not Jiangsu or Zhejiang. The eastern provinces were effectively lost, along with China's major customs revenues, the country's most fertile regions, and its most advanced infrastructure. The center of political gravity moved far to the west, into a country the Nationalists had never controlled, where everything was unfamiliar and unpredictable, from topography and dialects to diets. On the map, it might have seemed that Chiang still ruled much of China, but vast swaths of the north and northwest were sparsely populated; most of China's population lay in the east and south, where Nationalist control was either gone or held only precariously. The combined pressures of events and returning travelers were gradually shifting American attitudes toward the Japanese incident. Europe remained largely indifferent, with Hitler absorbing most attention, but the United States began to worry about developments in the Pacific. Roosevelt initiated a January 1939 appeal to raise a million dollars for Chinese civilians in distress, and the response quickly materialized. While the Chinese did not expect direct intervention, they hoped to deter further American economic cooperation with Japan and to halt Japan's purchases of scrap iron, oil, gasoline, shipping, and, above all, weapons from the United States. Public opinion in America was sufficiently stirred to sustain a campaign against silk stockings, a symbolic gesture of boycott that achieved limited effect; Japan nonetheless continued to procure strategic materials. Within this chorus, the left remained a persistent but often discordant ally to the Nationalists. The Institute of Pacific Relations, sympathetic to communist aims, urged America to act, pressuring policymakers and sounding alarms about China. Yet the party line remained firmly pro-Chiang Kai-shek: the Japanese advance seemed too rapid and threatening to the Reds' interests. Most oil and iron debates stalled; American businessmen resented British trade ties with Japan, and Britain refused to join any mutual cutoff, arguing that the Western powers were not at war with Japan. What occurred in China was still commonly referred to in Western diplomatic circles as "the Incident." Wang Jingwei's would make his final defection, yes in a long ass history of defections. Mr Wang Jingwei had been very busy traveling to Guangzhou, then Northwest to speak with Feng Yuxiang, many telegrams went back and forth. He returned to the Nationalist government showing his face to foreign presses and so forth. While other prominent rivals of Chiang, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, and others, rallied when they perceived Japan as a real threat; all did so except Wang Jingwei. Wang, who had long believed himself the natural heir to Sun Yat-sen and who had repeatedly sought to ascend to power, seemed willing to cooperate with Japan if it served his own aims. I will just say it, Wang Jingwei was a rat. He had always been a rat, never changed. Opinions on Chiang Kai-Shek vary, but I think almost everyone can agree Wang Jingwei was one of the worst characters of this time period. Now Wang Jingwei could not distinguish between allies and enemies and was prepared to accept help from whomever offered it, believing he could outmaneuver Tokyo when necessary. Friends in Shanghai and abroad whispered that it was not too late to influence events, arguing that the broader struggle was not merely China versus Japan but a clash between principled leaders and a tyrannical, self-serving clique, Western imperialism's apologists who needed Chiang removed. For a time Wang drifted within the Kuomintang, moving between Nanjing, Wuhan, Changsha, and Chongqing, maintaining discreet lines of communication with his confidants. The Japanese faced a governance problem typical of conquerors who possess conquered territory: how to rule effectively while continuing the war. They imagined Asia under Japanese-led leadership, an East Asia united by a shared Co-Prosperity Sphere but divided by traditional borders. To sustain this vision, they sought local leaders who could cooperate. The search yielded few viable options; would-be collaborators were soon assassinated, proved incompetent, or proved corrupt. The Japanese concluded it would require more time and education. In the end, Wang Jingwei emerged as a preferred figure. Chongqing, meanwhile, seemed surprised by Wang's ascent. He had moved west to Chengde, then to Kunming, attempted, and failed to win over Yunnan's warlords, and eventually proceeded to Hanoi in Indochina, arriving in Hong Kong by year's end. He sent Chiang Kai-shek a telegram suggesting acceptance of Konoe's terms for peace, which Chungking rejected. In time, Wang would establish his own Kuomintang faction in Shanghai, combining rigorous administration with pervasive secret-police activity characteristic of occupied regimes. By 1940, he would be formally installed as "Chairman of China." But that is a story for another episode.  In the north, the Japanese and the CCP were locked in an uneasy stalemate. Mao's army could make it impossible for the Japanese to hold deep countryside far from the railway lines that enabled mass troop movement into China's interior. Yet the Communists could not defeat the occupiers. In the dark days of October 1938—fifteen months after the war began—one constant remained. Observers (Chinese businessmen, British diplomats, Japanese generals) repeatedly predicted that each new disaster would signal the end of Chinese resistance and force a swift surrender, or at least a negotiated settlement in which the government would accept harsher terms from Tokyo. But even after defenders were expelled from Shanghai, Nanjing, and Wuhan, despite the terrifying might Japan had brought to bear on Chinese resistance, and despite the invader's manpower, technology, and resources, China continued to fight. Yet it fought alone. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In a land shredded by war, Wuhan burned under brutal sieges, then Changsha followed, a cruel blaze born of orders and miscommunications. Leaders wrestled with retreat, scorched-earth vows, and moral debts as Japanese force and Chinese resilience clashed for months. Mao urged strategy over martyrdom, Wang Jingwei's scheming shadow loomed, and Chongqing rose as the westward beacon. Yet China endured, a stubborn flame refusing to surrender to the coming storm. The war stretched on, unfinished and unyielding.

This week on Sinica, I chat with Daniel Kurtz-Phelan, editor of Foreign Affairs, about how the journal has both shaped and reflected American discourse on China during a period of dramatic shifts in the relationship. We discuss his deliberate editorial choices to include heterodox voices, the changing nature of the supposed "consensus" on China policy, and what I've called the "vibe shift" in how Americans across the political spectrum think about China. Daniel also reflects on his own intellectual formation, including his work on George Marshall's failed mission to mediate China's Civil War and the cautionary lessons that history holds for today's debates. We explore the challenges of bringing Chinese voices into Foreign Affairs, the balance between driving and reflecting policy debates, and whether we're witnessing a genuine opening of the Overton window on China discussions.7:15 – Foreign Affairs in the era of Iraq and "China's peaceful rise" 12:09 – The Marshall mission and the "Who Lost China?" debate 17:17 – China's changing role and the journal's coverage density 19:43 – The Campbell-Ratner "China Reckoning" and subsequent debates 25:00 – The challenge of including authentic Chinese voices 29:42 – How Chinese leadership perceives and reads Foreign Affairs 32:12 – The "vibe shift" on China across the American political spectrum 35:56 – Cultivating contrarian voices: Van Jackson, Jonathan Czin, and David Kang 40:17 – Avoiding the trap of making everything about U.S.-China competition 43:12 – Diversifying perspectives beyond the Washington-Beijing binary 48:18 – The big questions: American exceptionalism and Chinese identity in a new era 51:42 – The dangers of cutting off U.S.-China scholarly conversations 56:26 – The uses and misuses of historical analogies 58:09 – Spain's Golden Age and late Qing memes as contemporary analogiesPaying it forward: The unsung editorial staff at Foreign AffairsRecommendations: Daniel: Equator.org; The Rise of the Meritocracy by Michael Young; Granta's new India issue; The Party's Interests Come First by Joseph Torigian; The Coming Storm by Odd Arne Westad Kaiser: The Spoils of Time by C.V. WedgwoodSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Think you know how to pair wine with Asian cuisine? Think again.In this episode, we explore the intriguing insights of Master of Wine Richard Hemming, who challenges traditional pairing norms with his groundbreaking book, Wine & The Food of Asia. After two years of rigorous research, including the testing of 400 wines and 80 recipes from 13 countries, Richard invites us to rethink our approach and discard the traditional rules.Today, we explore the misconceptions about Riesling being the go-to choice for spicy foods and uncover effective strategies for navigating complex pairings. We'll discuss how to pair wine with Chengdu and Chongqing's iconic mala spice, identify suitable white wines for vinegar-heavy dishes, and highlight Richard's unexpected wine and Asian food combinations.Richard's book, Wine & The Food of Asia, is available through the 67 Pall Mall website, with Amazon distribution on the way.  Since 2016, Bottled in China brings you into the food and drink scene through conversations with the some of the most happening personalities. Hosted by Emilie Steckenborn, the show is your one spot for all things food, beer, wine and spirits from across the world. Connect with us on LinkedIn or Instagram @bottled.in.chinaPodcast available on iTunes, Spotify , online or wherever you listen to your episodes! Subscribe to Bottled in China to follow the journey!Check out our new website & find out more at https://www.thebottledshow.com

This week on the Sinica Podcast, I speak with Jonathan Czin, the Michael H. Armacost Chair in Foreign Policy Studies and a fellow at the Brookings Institution's John L. Thornton China Center. His new essay in Foreign Affairs, “China Against China: Xi Jinping Confronts the Downsides of Success,” challenges the dominant Western narrative of Xi Jinping as either Mao reincarnate or a brittle autocrat presiding over imminent collapse. Instead, Czin argues that Xi's most illiberal reforms can be understood as attempts to cure the pathologies of China's own success. We discuss his framing of Xi's “Counterreformation,” how it helps explain China's current political direction, and what it reveals about our own analytical blind spots in the West.7:15 – Xi's “reformation” and Carl Minzner's “end of reform and opening”12:18 – Corruption, decentralization, and the “lost decade” under Hu and Wen20:12 – Defining “resilience” and what Xi means by “eating bitterness”29:45 – The “downsides of success”: property, corruption, and governance contradictions45:30 – Counter-reformation vs. counterrevolution: what Xi wants to preserve and discard54:20 – The myth of yes-men: triangulation and feedback in Xi's leadership style1:07:07 – Cognitive empathy and why most U.S. analysis of Xi falls short1:15:35 – Systems that can't course-correct: comparing the U.S. and China1:22:05 – Cognitive empathy, ideology, and the problem of American exceptionalismPaying it forward:Jonathan: Allie Mathias and Dinny McMahonRecommendations:Jonathan: The Thirty Years War by C.V. Wedgewood; The Betrothed by Alessandro ManzoniKaiser: Transplants by Daniel Tam-ClaiborneSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Last time we spoke about the Battle of Taierzhuang. Following the fall of Nanjing in December 1937, the Second Sino-Japanese War entered a brutal phase of attrition as Japan sought to consolidate control and press toward central China. Chinese defense prioritized key rail corridors and urban strongholds, with Xuzhou, the JinPu and Longhai lines, and the Huai River system forming crucial lifelines. By early 1938, Japanese offensives aimed to link with forces around Beijing and Nanjing and encircle Chinese positions in the Central Yangtze region, threatening Wuhan. In response, Chiang Kai-shek fortified Xuzhou and expanded defenses to deter a pincer move, eventually amassing roughly 300,000 troops along strategic lines. Taierzhuang became a focal point when Japanese divisions attempted to press south and link with northern elements. Chinese commanders Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, Tang Enbo, and Sun Lianzhong coordinated to complicate Japanese plans through offensive-defensive actions, counterattacks, and encirclement efforts. The victory, though numerically costly, thwarted immediate Japanese objectives and foreshadowed further attritional struggles ahead.   #171 The Flooding of the Yellow River Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. We last left off with a significant event during the Xuzhou campaign. Three Japanese divisions under General Itagaki Seishiro moved south to attack Taierzhuang and were met by forces commanded by Li Zongren, Sun Lianzhong, and Tang Enbo, whose units possessed a decent amount of artillery. In a two-week engagement from March 22 to April 7, the battle devolved into a costly urban warfare. Fighting was vicious, often conducted in close quarters and at night. The urban environment negated Japanese advantages in armor and artillery, allowing Chinese forces to contend on equal terms. The Chinese also disrupted Japanese logistics by resupplying their own troops and severing rear supply lines, draining Japanese ammunition, supplies, and reinforcements. By April 7, the Japanese were compelled to retreat, marking the first Chinese victory of the war. However both sides suffered heavy losses, with around 20,000 casualties on each side. In the aftermath of this rare victory, Chiang Kai-Shek pushed Tang Enbo and Li Zongren to capitalize on their success and increased deployments in the Taierzhuang theater to about 450,000 troops. Yet the Chinese Army remained hampered by fundamental problems. The parochialism that had crippled Chiang's forces over the preceding months resurfaced. Although the generals had agreed to coordinate in a war of resistance, each still prioritized the safety of his own troops, wary of Chiang's bid to consolidate power. Li Zongren, for example, did not deploy his top Guangxi provincial troops at Taierzhuang and sought to shift most of the fighting onto Tang Enbo's forces. Chiang's colleagues were mindful of the fates of Han Fuju of Shandong and Zhang Xueliang of Manchuria: Han was executed for refusing to fight, while Zhang, after allowing Chiang to reduce the size of his northeastern army, ended up under house arrest. They were right to distrust Chiang. He believed, after all, that provincial armies should come under a unified national command, which he would lead. From a national-unity perspective, his aspiration was not unreasonable. But it fed suspicion among other military leaders that participation in the anti-Japanese war would dilute their power. The divided nature of the command also hindered logistics, making ammunition and food supplies to the front unreliable and easy to cut off. By late April the Chinese had reinforced the Xuzhou area to between 450,000-600,000 to capitalize on their victory. However these armies were plagued with command and control issues. Likewise the Japanese licked their wounds and reinforced the area to roughly 400,000, with fresh troops and supplies flowing in from Tianjin and Nanjing. The Japanese continued with their objective of encircling Chinese forces. The North China Area Army comprised four divisions and two infantry brigades drawn from the Kwantung Army, while the Central China Expeditionary Army consisted of three divisions and the 1st and 2nd Tank Battalions along with motorized support units. The 5th Tank Battalion supported the 3rd Infantry Division as it advanced north along the railway toward Xuzhou. Fighting to the west, east, and north of Xuzhou was intense, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. On 18 April, the Japanese advanced southward toward Pizhou. Tang Enbo's 20th Army Corps, together with the 2nd, 22nd, 46th, and 59th corps, resisted fiercely, culminating in a stalemate by the end of April. The 60th Corps of the Yunnan Army engaged the Japanese 10th Division at Yuwang Mountain for nearly a month, repelling multiple assaults. By the time it ceded its position to the Guizhou 140th Division and withdrew on 15 May, the corps had sustained losses exceeding half of its forces. Simultaneously, the Japanese conducted offensives along both banks of the Huai River, where Chinese defenders held out for several weeks. Nevertheless, Japanese artillery and aerial bombardment gradually tilted the balance, allowing the attackers to seize Mengcheng on 9 May and Hefei on 14 May. From there, the southern flank split into two parts: one force moved west and then north to cut off the Longhai Railway escape route from Xuzhou, while another division moved directly north along the railway toward Suxian, just outside Xuzhou. Simultaneously, to the north, Japanese units from north China massed at Jining and began moving south beyond Tengxian. Along the coast, an amphibious landing was made at Lianyungang to reinforce troops attacking from the east. The remaining portions of Taierzhuang were captured in May, a development symbolically significant to Tokyo. On 17 May, Japanese artillery further tightened the noose around Xuzhou, striking targets inside the city.  To preserve its strength, the Nationalist government ordered the abandonment of Xuzhou and directed its main forces to break out toward northern Jiangsu, northern Anhui, and eastern Henan. To deter the Japanese army's rapid westward advance and penetration into northern Henan and western Shandong, many leading military and political figures within the Nationalist government proposed breaching dams over the Yellow River to delay the offensive, a strategy that would have been highly advantageous to the Nationalist forces at the time. Chiang Kai-shek vetoed the proposal outright, insisting that the Nationalist army could still resist. He understood that with tens of millions of Chinese lives at stake and a sliver of hope remaining, the levee plan must not be undertaken. Then a significant battle broke out at Lanfeng. Chiang also recognized that defeat could allow the elite Japanese mechanized divisions, the 14th, 16th, and 10th, to advance directly toward Zhengzhou. If Zhengzhou fell, the Japanese mechanized forces on the plains could advance unimpeded toward Tongguan. Their southward push would threaten Xi'an, Xiangfan, and Nanyang, directly jeopardizing the southwest's rear defenses. Concurrently, the Japanese would advance along the Huai River north of the Dabie Mountains toward Wuhan, creating a pincer with operations along the Yangtze River.  Now what followed was arguably the most important and skillful Chinese maneuver of the Xuzhou campaign: a brilliantly executed strategic retreat to the south and west across the Jinpu railway line. On May 15, Li Zongren, in consultation with Chiang Kai-shek, decided to withdraw from Xuzhou and focus on an escape plan. The evacuation of civilians and military personnel began that day. Li ordered troops to melt into the countryside and move south and west at night, crossing the Jinpu Railway and splitting into four groups that would head west. The plan was to regroup in the rugged Dabie Mountains region to the south and prepare for the defense of Wuhan. Li's generals departed reluctantly, having held out for so long; Tang Enbo was said to have wept. Under cover of night, about forty divisions, over 200,000 men, marched out of Japanese reach in less than a week. A critical moment occurred on May 18, when fog and a sandstorm obscured the retreating troops as they crossed the Jinpu Railway. By May 21, Li wired Chiang Kai-shek to report that the withdrawal was complete. He mobilized nearly all of the Kuomintang Central Army's elite units, such as the 74th Army, withdrawn from Xuzhou and transferred directly to Lanfeng, with a resolute intent to “burn their boats.” The force engaged the Japanese in a decisive battle at Lanfeng, aiming to secure the last line of defense for the Yellow River, a position carrying the lives of millions of Chinese civilians. Yet Chiang Kai-shek's strategy was not universally understood by all participating generals, who regarded it as akin to striking a rock with an egg. For the battle of Lanfeng the Chinese mobilized nearly all of the Kuomintang Central Army's elite forces, comprising 14 divisions totaling over 150,000 men. Among these, the 46th Division of the 27th Army, formerly the Central Training Brigade and the 36th, 88th, and 87th Divisions of the 71st Army were German-equipped. Additionally, the 8th Army, the Tax Police Corps having been reorganized into the Ministry of Finance's Anti-Smuggling Corps, the 74th Army, and Hu Zongnan's 17th Corps, the new 1st Army, equipped with the 8th Division were elite Nationalist troops that had demonstrated strong performance in the battle of Shanghai and the battle of Nanjing, and were outfitted with advanced matériel. However, these so-called “elite” forces were heavily degraded during the campaigns in Shanghai and Nanjing. The 46th Division and Hu Zongnan's 17th Corps sustained casualties above 85% in Nanjing, while the 88th and 87th Divisions suffered losses of up to 90%. The 74th Army and the 36th Division also endured losses exceeding 75%. Their German-made equipment incurred substantial losses; although replenishment occurred, inventories resembled roughly a half-German and half-Chinese mix. With very limited heavy weapons and a severe shortage of anti-tank artillery, they could not effectively match the elite Japanese regiments. Hu Zongnan's 17th Corps maintained its national equipment via a close relationship with Chiang Kai-shek. In contrast, the 74th Army, after fighting in Shanghai, Nanjing, and Xuzhou, suffered heavy casualties, and the few German weapons it had were largely destroyed at Nanjing, leaving it to rely on a mix of domestically produced and Hanyang-made armaments. The new recruits added to each unit largely lacked combat experience, with nearly half of the intake having received basic training. The hardest hit was Li Hanhun's 64th Army, established less than a year prior and already unpopular within the Guangdong Army. Although classified as one of the three Type A divisions, the 155th, 156th, and 187th Divisions, it was equipped entirely with Hanyang-made firearms. Its direct artillery battalion possessed only about 20 older mortars and three Type 92 infantry guns, limiting its heavy firepower to roughly that of a Japanese battalion. The 195th Division and several miscellaneous units were even less prominent, reorganized from local militias and lacking Hanyang rifles. Additionally, three batches of artillery purchased from the Soviet Union arrived in Lanzhou via Xinjiang between March and June 1938. Except for the 52nd Artillery Regiment assigned to the 200th Division, the other artillery regiments had recently received their weapons and were still undergoing training. The 200th Division, had been fighting awhile for in the Xuzhou area and incurred heavy casualties, was still in training and could only deploy its remaining tank battalion and armored vehicle company. The tank battalion was equipped with T-26 light tanks and a small number of remaining British Vickers tanks, while the armored vehicle company consisted entirely of Italian Fiat CV33 armored cars. The disparity in numbers was substantial, and this tank unit did not participate in the battle.  As for the Japanese, the 14th Division was an elite Type A formation. Originally organized with four regiments totaling over 30,000 men, the division's strength was later augmented. Doihara's 14th Division received supplements, a full infantry regiment and three artillery regiments, to prevent it from being surrounded and annihilated, effectively transforming the unit into a mobile reinforced division. Consequently, the division's mounted strength expanded to more than 40,000 personnel, comprising five infantry regiments and four artillery regiments. The four artillery regiments, the 24th Artillery Regiment, the 3rd Independence Mountain Artillery Regiment, the 5th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment, and the 6th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment, possessed substantial heavy firepower, including 150mm heavy howitzers and 105mm long-range field cannons, placing them far in excess of the Nationalist forces at Lanfeng. In addition, both the 14th and later the 16th Divisions commanded tank regiments with nearly 200 light and medium tanks each, while Nationalist forces were markedly short of anti-tank artillery. At the same time, the Nationalist Air Force, though it had procured more than 200 aircraft of various types from the Soviet Union, remained heavily reliant on Soviet aid-to-China aircraft, amounting to over 100 machines, and could defend only a few cities such as Wuhan, Nanchang, and Chongqing. In this context, Japanese forces effectively dominated the Battle of Lanfeng. Moreover, reports indicate that the Japanese employed poison gas on the battlefield, while elite Nationalist troops possessed only a limited number of gas masks, creating a stark disparity in chemical warfare preparedness. Despite these disparities, Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government were initially unaware of the updated strength and composition of the Doihara Division. Faced with constrained options, Chiang chose to press ahead with combat operations. On May 12, 1939, after crossing the Yellow River, the IJA 14th Division continued its southward advance toward Lanfeng. The division's objective was to sever the Longhai Railway, disrupt the main Nationalist retreat toward Zhengzhou, and seize Zhengzhou itself. By May 15, the division split into two columns at Caoxian and moved toward key nodes on the Longhai Line. Major General Toyotomi Fusatarou led two infantry regiments, one cavalry regiment, and one artillery regiment in the main assault toward Kaocheng with the aim of directly capturing Lanfeng. Doihara led three infantry regiments and three artillery regiments toward Neihuang and Minquan, threatening Guide. In response, the Nationalist forces concentrated along the railway from Lanfeng to Guide, uniting Song Xilian's 71st Army, Gui Yongqing's 27th Army, Yu Jishi's 74th Army, Li Hanhun's 64th Army, and Huang Jie's 8th Army. From May 15 to 17, the Fengjiu Brigade, advancing toward Lanfeng, met stubborn resistance near Kaocheng from roughly five divisions under Song Xilian and was forced to shift its effort toward Yejigang and Neihuang. The defense near Neihuang, including Shen Ke's 106th Division and Liang Kai's 195th Division, ultimately faltered, allowing Doihara's division to seize Neihuang, Yejigang, Mazhuangzhai, and Renheji. Nevertheless, the Nationalist forces managed to contain the Japanese advance east and west of the area, preventing a complete encirclement. Chiang Kai-shek ordered Cheng Qian, commander-in-chief of the 1st War Zone, to encircle and annihilate the Japanese 14th Division. The deployment plan mapped three routes: the Eastern Route Army, under Li Hanhun, would include the 74th Army, the 155th Division of the 64th Army, a brigade of the 88th Division, and a regiment of the 87th Division, advancing westward from Guide); the Western Route Army, commanded by Gui Yongqing, would comprise the 27th Army, the 71st Army, the 61st Division, and the 78th Division, advancing eastward from Lanfeng; and the Northern Route Army, formed by Sun Tongxuan's 3rd Army and Shang Zhen's 20th Army, was to cut off the enemy's retreat to the north bank of the Yellow River near Dingtao, Heze, Dongming, and Kaocheng, while attacking the Doihara Division from the east, west, and north to annihilate it in a single decisive operation.  On May 21, the Nationalist Army mounted a full-scale offensive. Yu Jishi's 74th Army, commanded by Wang Yaowu's 51st Division, joined a brigade of Song Xilian's 71st Army, led by the 88th Division, and drove the Japanese forces at Mazhuangzhai into retreat, capturing Neihuang and Renheji. The main Japanese force, more than 6,000 strong, withdrew southwest to Yangjiji and Shuangtaji. Song Xilian, commanding Shen Fazao's 87th Division, launched a sharp assault on Yejigang (Yifeng). The Japanese abandoned the stronghold, but their main body continued advancing toward Yangjiji, with some units retreating to Donggangtou and Maoguzhai. On May 23, Song Xilian's 71st Army and Yu Jishi's 74th Army enveloped and annihilated enemy forces at Donggangtou and Maoguzhai. That evening they seized Ximaoguzhai, Yangzhuang, and Helou, eliminating more than a thousand Japanese troops. The Japanese troops at Donggangtou fled toward Lanfeng. Meanwhile, Gui Yongqing's forces were retreating through Lanfeng. His superior strength, Jiang Fusheng's 36th Division, Li Liangrong's 46th Division, Zhong Song's 61st Division, Li Wen's 78th Division, Long Muhan's 88th Division, and Shen Ke's 106th Division—had held defensive positions along the Lanfeng–Yangji line. Equipped with a tank battalion and armored vehicle company commanded by Qiu Qingquan, they blocked the enemy's westward advance and awaited Japanese exhaustion. However, under the Japanese offensive, Gui Yongqing's poor command led to the loss of Maji and Mengjiaoji, forcing the 27th Army to retreat across its entire front. Its main force fled toward Qixian and Kaifeng. The Japanese seized the opportunity to capture Quxingji, Luowangzhai, and Luowang Railway Station west of Lanfeng. Before retreating, Gui Yongqing ordered Long Muhan to dispatch a brigade to replace the 106th Division in defending Lanfeng, while he directed the 106th Division to fall back to Shiyuan. Frightened by the enemy, Long Muhan unilaterally withdrew his troops on the night of the 23rd, leaving Lanfeng undefended. On the 24th, Japanese troops advancing westward from Donggangtou entered Lanfeng unopposed and, relying on well-fortified fortifications, held their ground until reinforcements arrived. In the initial four days, the Nationalist offensive failed to overwhelm the Japanese, who escaped encirclement and annihilation. The four infantry and artillery regiments and one cavalry regiment on the Japanese side managed to hold the line along Lanfeng, Luowangzhai, Sanyizhai, Lanfengkou, Quxingji, Yang'erzhai, and Chenliukou on the south bank of the Yellow River, offering stubborn resistance. The Longhai Railway was completely cut off. Chiang Kai-shek, furious upon hearing the news while stationed in Zhengzhou, ordered the execution of Long Muhan, commander of the 88th Division, to restore military morale. He also decided to consolidate Hu Zongnan's, Li Hanhun's, Yu Jishi's, Song Xilian's, and Gui Yongqing's troops into the 1st Corps, with Xue Yue as commander-in-chief. On the morning of May 25, they launched a determined counterattack on Doihara's 14th Division. Song Xilian personally led the front lines on May 24 to rally the defeated 88th Division.  Starting on May 25, after three days of intense combat, Li Hanhun's 64th Army advanced to seize Luowang Station and Luowangzhai, while Song Xilian's 71st Army retook Lanfeng City, temporarily reopening the Longhai Line to traffic. At Sanyi Village, Gui Yongqing's 27th Army and Yu Jishi's 74th Army captured a series of outlying positions, including Yang'eyao, Chailou, Cailou, Hezhai, Xuelou, and Baowangsi. Despite these gains, more than 6,000 Japanese troops offered stubborn resistance. During the fighting, Ji Hongru, commander of the 302nd Regiment, was seriously wounded but continued to fight, shouting, “Don't worry about my death! Brothers, fight on!” He ultimately died a heroic death from his wounds. By May 27, Chiang Kai-shek, concerned that the forces had not yet delivered a decisive victory at Lanfeng, personally reprimanded the participating generals and ordered them to completely encircle and annihilate the enemy west of Lanfeng by the following day. He warned that if the opportunity was missed and Japanese reinforcements arrived, the position could be endangered. The next day, Chiang Kai-shek issued another telegram, urging Cheng Qian's First War Zone and all participating units to press the offensive. The telegram allegedly had this in it “It will forever be a laughingstock in the history of warfare.” Meanwhile on the other side, to prevent the annihilation of Doihara's 14th Division, the elite Japanese 16th Division and the 3rd Mixed Brigade, totaling over 40,000 men, launched a westward assault from Dangshan, capturing Yucheng on May 26. They then began probing the outskirts of Guide. Huang Jie's Eighth Army, responsible for the defense, withdrew to the outskirts of Guide that evening. On May 28, Huang Jie again led his troops on his own initiative, retreating to Liuhe and Kaifeng, leaving only the 187th Division to defend Zhuji Station and Guide City. At dawn on May 29, Peng Linsheng, commander of the 187th Division, also withdrew his troops, leaving Guide a deserted city. The Japanese occupied Guide without a fight. The loss of Guide dramatically shifted the tide of the war. Threatened on the flanks by the Japanese 16th Division, the Nationalist forces were forced onto the defensive. On May 28, the Japanese 14th Division concentrated its forces to counterattack Gui Yongqing's troops, but they were defeated again, allowing the Japanese to stabilize their position. At the same time, the fall of Shangqiu compelled Xue Yue's corps to withdraw five divisions to block the enemy in Shangqiu, and the Nationalist Army shifted to a defensive posture with the 14th Division holding Sanyizhai and Quxingji. To the north of the battlefield, the Japanese 4th Mixed Brigade, numbering over 10,000 men, was preparing to force a crossing of the Yellow River in order to join with the nearby 14th Division. More seriously, the 10th Division, together with its 13th Mixed Brigade and totaling more than 40,000 men, had captured Woyang and Bozhou on the Henan-Anhui border and was rapidly encircling eastern Henan. By the time of the Battle of Lanfeng, Japanese forces had deployed more than 100,000 troops, effectively surrounding the Nationalist army. On May 31, the First War Zone decided to withdraw completely, and the Battle of Lanfeng ended in defeat for the Nationalists, forcing Chiang Kai-shek to authorize diverting the Yellow River embankment to relieve pressure. The consequence was a deteriorating strategic situation, as encirclement tightened and reinforcement options dwindled, driving a retreat from the Lanfeng front. The National Army suffered more than 67,000 casualties, killed and wounded more than 10,000 Japanese soldiers, Lanfeng was lost, and Zhengzhou was in danger.  As in Nanjing, this Chinese army might have lived to fight another day, but the effect on Xuzhou itself was horrific. The city had endured Japanese bombardment since August 1937, and the population's mood swung between cautious hope and utter despair. In March, Du Zhongyuan visited Xuzhou. Before he left Wuhan, friends told him that “the city was desolate and the people were terrified, all the inhabitants of Xuzhou were quietly getting on with their business … sometimes it was even calmer than Wuhan.” The Australian journalist Rhodes Farmer recalled a similar image in a book published at war's end, noting the “ordinary townsfolk who became wardens, fire-fighters and first-aid workers during the raid and then went back to their civil jobs.” Yet the mid-May departure of Nationalist troops left the city and its outskirts at the mercy of an angry Imperial Army. Bombing continued through the final days of battle, and a single raid on May 14, 1938 killed 700 people. Around Xuzhou, buildings and bridges were destroyed—some by retreating Chinese forces, some by advancing Japanese troops. Taierzhuang, the scene of the earlier iconic defense, was utterly destroyed. Canadian Jesuits who remained in Xuzhou after its fall recorded that more than a third of the houses were razed, and most of the local population had fled in terror. In rural areas around the city, massacres were repeatedly reported, many witnessed by missionaries. Beyond the atrocities of the Japanese, locals faced banditry in the absence of law enforcement, and vital agricultural work such as planting seed ground to a halt. The loss of Xuzhou was both strategic and symbolic. It dealt a severe blow to Chiang's attempt to hold central China and to control regional troop movements. Morale, which Taierzhuang had briefly boosted, was battered again though not extinguished. The fall signaled that the war would be long, and that swift victory against Japan was no longer likely. Mao Zedong's Yan'an base, far to the northwest, grasped the meaning of defeat there. In May 1938 he delivered one of his most celebrated lectures, “On Protracted War,” chiding those who had over-optimistically claimed the Xuzhou campaign could be a quasi-decisive victory and arguing that, after Taierzhuang, some had become “giddy.” Mao insisted that China would ultimately prevail, yet he warned that it could not be won quickly, and that the War of Resistance would be protracted. In the meantime, the development of guerrilla warfare remained an essential piece of the long-term strategy that the Communist armies would pursue in north China. Yet the loss of Xuzhou did not necessarily portend a long war; it could, instead, presage a war that would be terrifyingly short. By spring 1938 the Chinese defenders were desperate. There was a real danger that the entire war effort could collapse, and the Nationalist governments' notable success as protectors of a shrinking “Free China” lay in avoiding total disaster. Government propaganda had successfully portrayed a plan beyond retreat to foreign observers, yet had Tokyo captured Wuhan in the spring, the Chinese Army would have had to withdraw at speed, reinforcing perceptions of disintegration. Western governments were unlikely to intervene unless convinced it was in their interests. Within the Nationalist leadership, competing instincts persisted. The government pursued welfare measures for the people in the midst of a massive refugee relief effort, the state and local organizations, aided by the International Red Cross, housed large numbers of refugees in 1937–1938. Yet there was a harsher strain within policy circles, with some officials willing to sacrifice individual lives for strategic or political ends as the Japanese threat intensified. Throughout central China, the Yellow River, China's “Sorrow”, loomed as the dominant geographic force shaping history. The loess-laden river, notorious for floods and shifting channels, was banked by massive dikes near Zhengzhou, exactly along the line the Japanese would traverse toward Wuhan. Using the river as a military instrument was discussed as a drastic option: Chiang and Cheng Qian's First War Zone contemplated diverting or breaching the dikes to halt or slow the Japanese advance, a measure that could buy time but would unleash enormous civilian suffering. The idea dated back to 1887 floods that cost hundreds of thousands of lives, and even in 1935 Alexander von Falkenhausen had warned that the Yellow River could become the final line of defense. In 1938 Chiang, recognizing the futility of defeating the Japanese by conventional means at Zhengzhou, considered unleashing the river's force if necessary to impede the invaders. The political and strategic calculus was stark: protect central China and Wuhan, even if it required drastic and morally fraught measures. A more humane leader might have hesitated to break the dikes and spare the dams, allowing the Japanese to take Wuhan. But Chiang Kai-shek believed that if the dikes were not breached and Wuhan fell within days, the Nationalist government might be unable to relocate to Chongqing in time and would likely surrender, leaving Japan in control of almost all of China. Some have compared the choice to France's surrender in June 1940, underscoring that Chiang's decision came during the country's most terrifying assault, with Chinese forces much weaker and less trained than their European counterparts. The dilemma over whether to break the Yellow River dikes grew out of desperation. Chiang ultimately ordered General Wei Rulin to blow the dike that held the Yellow River in central Henan. There was no doubt about the consequences: floods would inundate vast areas of central China, creating a waterlogged barrier that would halt the Japanese advance. Yet for the plan to succeed, it had to be carried out quickly, and the government could offer no public warning in case the Japanese detected it and accelerated their movement. Xiong Xianyu, chief of staff in the 8th Division at the time, recorded the urgency of those hours in his diary. The Japanese were already on the north bank of the Yellow River, briefly delayed when the Chinese army blew up the railway bridge across the river. The destruction of the dikes was the next step: if the area became a sea of mud, there would be no way the Japanese could even attempt to reconstruct the bridge. Blasting the dikes proved easier in theory than in practice. Holding back such a massive body of water required substantial engineering, dams thick and well fortified. The army made its first attempts to blow the dike at the small town of Zhaokou between June 4 and 6, 1938, but the structure proved too durable; another nearby attempt failed as well. Hour by hour, the Japanese moved closer. Division commander Jiang Zaizhen asked Xiong Xianyu for his opinion on where they might breach the dams. Xiong wrote “I discussed the topography, and said that two places, Madukou and Huayuankou, were both possible.” But Madukou was too close to Zhaokou, where the breach had already failed, presenting a danger that the Japanese might reach it very soon. The village of Huayuankou, however, lay farther away and on a bend in the river: “To give ourselves enough time, Huayuankou would be best.” At first, the soldiers treated the task as a military engineering assignment, an “exciting” one in Xiong's words. Xiong and Wei Rulin conducted their first site inspection after dark, late on June 6. The surroundings offered a deceptive calm: Xiong recounted “The wind blew softly, and the river water trickled pleasantly.” Yet gauging the water level proved difficult, hampered by murky moonlight and burned-out flashlights. They spent the night in their car to determine precisely where to break the dike as soon as day broke. But daylight seemed to bring home the consequences of what they planned to do, and the soldiers grew increasingly anxious. Wang Songmei, commander of the 2nd Regiment, addressed the workers about to breach the dike: “My brothers, this plan will be of benefit to our country and our nation, and will lessen the harm that is being done to the people.In the future, you'll find good wives and have plenty of children.” Wang's words were meant to reassure the men of the political necessity of their actions and that fate would not, in the traditional Chinese sense, deny them a family because of the enormity of their deeds. General Wei confirmed that Huayuankou was the right spot, and on June 8 the work began, with about 2,000 men taking part. The Nationalist government was eager to ensure rapid progress. Xiong recorded that the “highest authorities”,, kept making telephone calls from Wuhan to check on progress. In addition, the party sent performers to sing and play music to bolster the workers' spirits. Senior General Shang Zhen announced to the laborers that if they breached the dam by midnight on June 8, each would receive 2,000 yuan; if they achieved it by six the next morning, they would still be paid 1,000 yuan. They needed encouragement, for the diggers had no artificial assistance. After the initial failures at Zhaokou, Wei's troops relied entirely on manual labor, with no explosives used. Yet the workers earned their payments, and the dike was breached in just a few hours. On the morning of June 9, Xiong recorded a rapid shift in mood: the atmosphere became tense and solemn. Initially, the river flow was modest, but by about 1:00 p.m. the water surged “fiercely,” flowing “like 10,000 horses.” Looking toward the distance, Xiong felt as though a sea had appeared before him. “My heart ached,” he wrote. The force of the water widened the breach, and a deadly stream hundreds of feet wide comprising about three-quarters of the river's volume—rushed southeast across the central Chinese plains. “We did this to stop the enemy,” Xiong reflected, “so we didn't regret the huge sacrifice, as it was for a greater victory.” Yet he and the other soldiers also saw a grim reality: the troops who had taken on the task of destroying the railway bridge and the dikes could not bear the flood's consequences alone. It would be up to the government and the people of the nation to provide relief for the countless households uprooted by the flood. In fact, the previous evening Commander Jiang had telephoned to request assistance for those flooded out of their homes.   Wei, Xiong, and their troops managed to escape by wooden boats. Hundreds of thousands of farmers trapped in the floods were far less fortunate. Time magazine's correspondent Theodore White reported on the devastation a few days later “Last week “The Ungovernable” [i.e. the Yellow River] lashed out with a flood which promised to change not only its own course but also the course of the whole Sino-Japanese War. Severe breaks in the dikes near Kaifeng sent a five-foot wall of water fanning out over a 500-squaremile area, spreading death. Toll from Yellow River floods is not so much from quick drowning as from gradual disease and starvation. The river's filth settles ankle-deep on the fields, mothering germs, smothering crops. Last week, about 500,000 peasants were driven from 2,000 communities to await rescue or death on whatever dry ground they could find”. Chiang's government had committed one of the grossest acts of violence against its own people, and he knew that the publicity could be a damaging blow to its reputation. He decided to divert blame by announcing that the dike had been broken, but blaming the breach on Japanese aerial bombing. The Japanese, in turn, fiercely denied having bombed the dikes. White's reporting reflected the immediate response of most foreigners; having heard about the atrocities at Nanjing and Xuzhou, he was disinclined to give the Japanese the benefit of the doubt. Furthermore, at the very time that the Yellow River was flooding central China, the Japanese were heavily bombing Guangzhou, causing thousands of casualties. To White, the Japanese counterargument—that the Chinese themselves were responsible, seemed unthinkable: “These accusations, foreign observers thought, were absurd. For the Chinese to check the Japanese advance at possible sacrifice of half a million lives would be a monstrous pyrrhic victory. Besides, dike-cutting is the blackest of Chinese crimes, and the Chinese Army would hardly risk universal censure for slight tactical gains.” But, of course, that is exactly what they had done. During the war the Nationalists never admitted that they, not the Japanese, had breached the dikes. But the truth quickly became widely known. Just a month later, on July 19, US Ambassador Johnson noted, in private communication, that the “Chinese blocked the advance on Chengchow [Zhengzhou] by breaching the Yellow River dikes.” Eventually some 54,000 square kilometers of central China were inundated by the floods. If the Japanese had committed such an act, it would have been remembered as the prime atrocity of the war, dwarfing even the Nanjing Massacre or the Chongqing air raids in terms of the number of people who suffered. Accurate statistics were impossible to obtain in the midst of wartime chaos and disaster, but in 1948 figures issued by the Nationalists themselves suggested enormous casualties: for the three affected provinces of Henan, Anhui, and Jiangsu, the number of dead was put at 844,489, with some 4.8 million becoming refugees. More recent studies place the numbers lower, but still estimate the dead at around 500,000, and 3–5 million refugees. In contrast, the devastating May 1939 air raids on Chongqing killed some thousands. Xiong reflected in his diary that the breaching of the Yellow River dikes was a sacrifice for a greater victory. Even to some Japanese it seemed that the tactic had been successful in the short term: the first secretary at the US Embassy in Wuhan reported that the flood had “completely checked the Japanese advance on Chengchow” and had prevented them taking Wuhan by rail. Instead, he predicted, the attack was likely to come by water and along the north shore of the Yangtze. Supporters of the dike breaches could argue that these acts saved central China and Chiang's headquarters in Wuhan for another five months. The Japanese were indeed prevented from advancing along the Long–Hai railway toward Wuhan. In the short term the floods did what the Nationalists wanted. But the flooding was a tactic, a breathing space, and did not solve the fundamental problem: China's armies needed strong leadership and rapid reform. Some historians suggest that Chiang's decision was pointless anyway, since it merely delayed the inevitable. Theodore White was right: no strategic advantage could make the deaths of 500,000 of China's own people a worthwhile price to pay. However, Chiang Kai-shek's decision can be partly explained, though not excused, by the context. We can now look back at the actions of the Nationalists and argue that they should not have held on to Wuhan, or that their actions in breaching the dam were unjustifiable in the extreme. But for Chiang, in the hot summer of 1938, it seemed his only hope was to deny Japan as much of China for as long as possible and create the best possible circumstances for a long war from China's interior, while keeping the world's attention on what Japan was doing. The short delay won by the flooding was itself part of the strategy. In the struggle raging within the soul of the Nationalist Party, the callous, calculating streak had won, for the time being. The breaking of the dikes marked a turning point as the Nationalists committed an act whose terrible consequences they would eventually have to expiate. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In late 1937, China's frontline trembled as Japanese forces closed in on Wuhan. Chiang Kai-shek faced a brutal choice: endure costly defenses or unleash a desperate gamble. Chiangs' radical plan emerged: breach the Yellow River dikes at Huayuankou to flood central China, buying time. The flood roared, washing villages and futures away, yet slowing the enemy. The battlefield paused, while a nation weighed courage against civilian suffering, victory against devastating costs.

Go to http://DrinkAG1.com/adv to get a FREE Frother with your first purchase of AGZWe uncovered the sinister truth behind China's mega bridge. HAND MACHINE GHOST - LIMITED RUN! - https://thechinashow.threadless.comSupport the show here and see the Monday Exclusive show Xiaban Hou! https://www.patreon.com/advpodcastsSign up for the sticker giveaway!https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScdk5BnaNwlkH8yjt-wgUwq6xWBZIgusPRM5ifELKgPdKxLHg/viewform?usp=headerCartoon feat. Jüri Pootsmann - I Remember Uhttps://soundcloud.com/nocopyrightsoundsTrack : Cartoon feat. Jüri Pootsmann - I Remember USome Sources - https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/09/technology/nvidia-chips-china-megaspeed.htmlSalary data in Anlong https://tjgb.hongheiku.com/xjtjgb/xj2020/53025.htmlSalary data in Fenggang https://www.gzfenggang.gov.cn/zwgk/zfxxgkzl/fdzdgknr/ghjh/gmjjhshfzgh/202502/t20250220_86927630.htmlhttps://www.researchgate.net/publication/341419632_Bone_Glue_-_The_Final_Frontier_for_Fracture_Repair_and_Implantable_Device_Stabilizationhttps://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9941416/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1934590925002267https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/human-neuroscience/articles/10.3389/fnhum.2016.00033/fullhttps://www.nature.com/articles/s43587-025-00930-1https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/aging/articles/10.3389/fragi.2025.1638168/fullBRIDGE SOURCES - * 1981 Liziyida Bridge (Chengdu–Kunming Railway), Sichuan* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1981_Chengdu%E2%80%93Kunming_rail_crash* 1999 Qijiang “Rainbow” Pedestrian Bridge, Chongqing* https://www.engineeringcivil.com/civil-engineering-disasters-collapse-of-bridges.html* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qijiang_Rainbow_Bridge_collapse* 2007 Jiujiang Bridge, Foshan (Guangdong)* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collapse_of_Jiujiang_Bridge* 2007 Fenghuang (Tuojiang) Bridge, Hunan (under construction)* https://www.scmp.com/article/606792/dozens-feared-dead-after-hunan-bridge-collapse* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Fenghuang_Bridge_collapse* 2009 Hongqi Road Viaduct, Zhuzhou (Hunan)* https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-05/18/content_7790004.htm* 2010 Tangying Bridge, Luanchuan (Henan)* https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/556460.shtml* https://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?pid=S0718-915X2022000200193&script=sci_arttext* 2010 Nanjing Overpass (under construction), Jiangsu* https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-11/27/content_11617576.htm* 2011 Gongguan Bridge, Wuyishan (Fujian)* https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-07/15/content_12912763.htm* 2012 Hangzhou Viaduct dismantling accident, Zhejiang* https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/201207/716566.shtml* 2012 East Guangchang River Bridge, Jiangxi* https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/201208/721127.shtml* 2012 Yangmingtan Bridge (ramp), Harbin (Heilongjiang)* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yangmingtan_Bridge* 2013 Lianhuo Expressway Bridge (Mianchi, Henan)* https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-bridge-idUSBRE91003D20130201* https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-21300038* 2014 Gaozhou stone-arch bridge, Guangdong* https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-05/05/content_17487284.htm* 2014 Jinshan Bridge, Enshi (Hubei) (under construction)* https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/10/6/2112* 2016 Ganjiang Bridge (dismantling), Taihe (Jiangxi)* https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/201609/1009862.shtml* 2019 Wuxi S342 Overpass, Jiangsu* https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-bridge-collapse-idUSKBN1WP0JH* https://www.caixinglobal.com/2019-11-01/in-depth-overloaded-and-overturned-inside-the-deadly-wuxi-bridge-collapse-101478011.html* https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/11/deaths-reported-as-bridge-collapses-in-chinas-jiangsu-province* 2021 S2 Ezhou Expressway Ramp Bridge, Hubei* https://www.reuters.com/world/china/bridge-collapse-central-china-kills-four-2021-12-18/* 2024 Lixinsha Bridge, Guangzhou (Guangdong)* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Lixinsha_Bridge_collapse* 2024 Danning (G4015) Expressway Bridge, Zhashui (Shaanxi)* https://apnews.com/article/shaanxi-china-bridge-collapse-river-dead-b077896e4b291ef82a46ed601bfd04ca* 2024 Yakang Expressway Bridge (near Kangding), Sichuan* https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3240129/more-bodies-found-after-mountain-bridge-collapse-china* 2025 Jianzha Yellow River Bridge (under construction), Qinghai* https://abc13.com/post/china-bridge-collapse-today-kills-least-12-construction-workers-yellow-river-qinghai-province/17622521This video features copyrighted material used for commentary and educational purposes. We believe this constitutes a 'fair use' of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, I chat with Peking University's Professor Wang Dong (王栋), an international relations scholar at the School of International Studies at Peking University, where he also serves as Deputy Director and Executive Director of the Office for Humanities and Social Sciences and the Institute for Global Cooperation and Understanding. Professor Wang's scholarship and public commentary focus on U.S.–China relations, Cold War history, and the uses of historical memory in diplomacy. He has been an especially thoughtful voice in connecting the Flying Tigers legacy with today's efforts to stabilize and strengthen the people-to-people ties between our two countries.Check back in a day or two for the full podcast page and the transcript!See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, co-host Tianyu Fang makes his debut on the show to join me in interviewing his Stanford classmate and talented writer Jasmine Sun, who studies the anthropology of disruption. This summer, she took a trip to China with a group of friends with different levels of China experience, from people raised in the country to total novices. She reflects on how it hit, and how a group of young people reckoned with the reality of Chinese hypermodernity, which she wrote about in a terrific essay titled "america against china against america: notes on shenzhen, shanghai, and more."Check back on this page in a couple of days for the full podcast page with time stamps and recommendations!See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on the Sinica Podcast, I chat with well-known author and public intellectual Yascha Mounk about his recent fascination with China, his approach to learning about the country and learning Chinese, and his thoughts on how China fits into the current crisis of Western liberal democracy.7:15 – Yascha's experience of living in China and learning Chinese12:18 – Yascha's perspective on China's strengths and weaknesses20:12 – China in a global comparative perspective: Generational aspirations and demographic decline29:45 – China's Soft Power vs. Japan, Korea, and the U.S.45:30 – Media narratives on China: have they shifted?54:20 – Western Liberalism confronts China01:07:07 – Backlash & criticism01:11:35 - Polarization and “China as enemy” narrativesRecommendations: Yascha: The Leopard by Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa (book), The Leopard (1963) (movie)Kaiser: A Thousand Small Sanities: The Moral Adventure of Liberalism by Adam Gopnik (book)See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, I speak first with retired Senior Colonel Zhou Bo, a frequent commentator on Chinese military and security affairs and a prolific writer now at the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University, and with Rana Mitter of the Harvard Kennedy School and author of Forgotten Ally, a book about World War II in China.I will update this page when the transcript is ready. Check back in a couple of days!See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.