Podcasts about Chongqing

  Last time we spoke about the Xi'an Incident. In December 1936, tensions in China erupted as Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek faced a revolt led by his commanders, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. Disillusioned by Chiang's focus on battling communists instead of the Japanese invaders, the generals swiftly captured him in a coup. Confined in Xi'an, Chiang initially resisted their demands for a united front against Japan but eventually engaged in negotiation with Zhang and the Chinese Communist Party. As public sentiment shifted against him, Chiang's predicament led to urgent discussions, culminating in an unexpected alliance with the communists. This pact aimed to consolidate Chinese resistance against Japanese aggression, marking a critical turning point in the Second Sino-Japanese War. By December 26, Chiang was released, and this uneasy collaboration set the stage for a more unified front against a common enemy, though underlying tensions remained between the factions.   #152 China Prepares for War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Before we jump into the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, which I honestly have no idea how long will take us, I thought it would be a good idea to dedicate two episodes to how both China and Japan prepared themselves for war.  Going all the way back to the 1910s, Chinese intellectuals began to view an outright conflict between Japan and China was inevitable. In the discussions about China's strategic options, Jiang Fangzhen pioneered a strategy of protracted warfare, a concept that would later shape China's approach during the Sino-Japanese War. Having studied in Japan during his youth, Jiang developed a keen understanding of the Japanese government and military. As early as 1917, he predicted that China and Japan would become embroiled in a long-term conflict, with the battleground likely to be west of the Peiping–Wuhan and Guangzhou–Wuhan railways. In his work titled "Guofang Lun" or “On National Defense”, Jiang reiterated the importance of protracted warfare as a means to thwart Japan's aspirations for a swift victory. He argued that China should leverage its vast population and extensive territory to extend the conflict, gradually wearing down Japanese strength and turning the situation to its advantage. Jiang recommended that China not focus on defending its coastal regions but instead confront the enemy west of the Peking–Wuhan Railway.   Chiang Kai-shek would eventually come to share Jiang's belief that “the longer the war drags on, the more advantageous it will be for China.” Despite significant public criticism, both the Nationalist government and General Zhang Xueliang, decided against military resistance when Japan invaded Manchuria in September 1931 and attacked Shanghai in 1932. Chiang was particularly hesitant to engage Japan directly, as he was also dealing with a Communist insurgency in central China. He feared that Chinese forces would suffer quick defeat, predicting that Japan would capture key coastal areas and critical infrastructure within just three days, crippling China by dismantling its military and economic lifelines. Following the invasion of North China Chiang was forced to adopt a firmer stance. The Nationalist government proposed a dual strategy of pursuing peace and security while simultaneously preparing for war. If peace proved impossible, China would mobilize its resources for ultimate victory through prolonged conflict. This approach was formalized in the National Defense Plan, which China adopted by prioritizing protracted warfare as its core strategy. After the Sino-Japanese clash in Shanghai on January 28, 1932, the Military Affairs Commission devised a plan that divided China into four defense areas along with a preparation area. While some troops were assigned local security, commanders were directed to concentrate their remaining forces for potential confrontations with Japan. That year, the Military Affairs Commission issued General Defense Guidelines that outlined two strategic responses to a potential Japanese invasion. The first, conservative approach focused on maintaining key positions and utilizing protracted warfare to impede the enemy. The second strategy advocated for decisive battles in key regions to thwart Japan's ambitions and protect China's territorial integrity, prioritizing disengagement from Japanese forces along the Yangtze River and coastline. In August 1935, German military adviser General Alexander von Falkenhausen provided recommendations to Chiang Kai-shek based on his predictions of Japanese advance routes into China. He identified three main routes: one from northern Hebei to Zhengzhou, the second from Shandong toward Xuzhou, and the third crossing the Yangtze River to Nanjing and onwards to Wuhan. He suggested treating the Yangtze River as the primary combat zone and highlighted Sichuan as a possible retreat area. Taking all of this into consideration. in 1936, a draft of a new National Defense Plan divided the country into four zones: a war zone, a defense zone, an internal security zone, and a preparation area. The war zone encompassed ten provinces and established strategies for retreating to predetermined defensive positions when necessary, with Sichuan designated as the main base for the war. In January 1937, the Chinese General Staff Department introduced its annual War Plan, outlining three possible military conflict regions between China and Japan. It proposed two main strategies: Proposal A emphasized sustained combat and retreat to fortified positions if the situation became unfavorable, aiming to eventually go on the offensive against Japan. Proposal B focused on repelling Japanese invasions along the coast and from the north, prioritizing counter offensives against Japanese units stationed near key locations. To prepare, the NRA completed several critical projects outlined in its plans, establishing military supply depots in Nanjing, Bengbu, Xinyang, Huayin, Nanchang, and Wuchang to manage logistics for supplies across various strategic railways. These depots were equipped to sustain the military, with ample ammunition and provisions, including 60 million rounds of small-arms ammunition and food for hundreds of thousands. Despite these preparations, not all projects were completed by the time war broke out in July 1937. In contrast to the Japanese military's tactics, Chinese forces prioritized defensive strategies. For example, at the Mount Lushan Military Officer Training Camp in July 1934, Chiang Kai-shek outlined four possible approaches against Japan, favoring a defense-as-offense strategy. Other options included building fortifications, tenaciously defending key positions, and employing guerrilla warfare through irregular forces to constrain enemy advances. Chiang stressed the importance of national mobilization for the war effort.  There was a significant disparity in equipment between the Japanese and Chinese armies. To give you an idea, each Japanese division included a mechanized group featuring thirty-nine light military vehicles and 21 light armored cars, supplemented by 6,000–7,000 horses, 200–300 automobiles, and specialized troops such as poison gas teams. In contrast, Nationalist divisions lacked any of these capabilities, a typical nationalist division theoretically had an armored regiment, but this unit was equipped with fewer than 72 armored vehicles. Another major weakness of the Nationalist forces was their insufficient artillery. In 1936, a division was officially assigned one artillery battalion, which was divided into three batteries totaling twelve guns. It also included a mechanized cannon company with four direct-fire weapons. By comparison, a Japanese division boasted four infantry regiments and one mountain artillery or field artillery regiment, with each artillery regiment comprising three field artillery battalions and one howitzer battalion. The infantry regiment itself included a mountain artillery section with four mountain guns, while the infantry battalion had one Type 70 mountain gun section with two guns. In total, a Japanese division possessed sixty-four artillery pieces of various calibers, four times the number of a Chinese division and of significantly higher quality. In reality, in 1936, twelve of the twenty elite Chinese “reformed divisions” still lacked artillery battalions. The ordnance available in the “reformed divisions” mostly consisted of the outdated Type 60 mountain gun. Nationwide, very few of the 200 divisions were equipped with any artillery, and those that did often used obsolete field artillery pieces or mountain artillery provided to local forces. Some units even relied on trench mortars as a makeshift solution. The artillery weapons came from various countries, but they frequently lacked necessary observation and signal components, and were often low on ammunition. The majority of mountain guns and field artillery were of the Type 75, which, while capable of providing fire support, had limited range and inflicted minimal damage. To give you an idea of the striking inadequacy of the Chinese artillery, during the Shanghai fighting in 1937, the mountain artillery of the Guangxi 21st Army Group could only reach targets within 1,200 yards, while Japanese field artillery had an effective range of 8,000 yards. Chinese-made mountain artillery suffered due to inferior steel-making technology; the gun shields were constructed from low-quality steel, and the barrels often overheated after firing just a few rounds, increasing the risk of explosions. Additionally, the equipment of local forces varied greatly in quality. In fact, some local units had superior equipment compared to Nationalist units. For example, before the Sino-Japanese War, troops from Yunnan were equipped with French antitank guns and heavy machine guns, which were better than the German water-cooled machine guns used by the Nationalist forces. However, the majority of local troops relied on inferior equipment; the 122nd Division under Wang Mingzhang from Sichuan, noted for its brave defense of Tengxian County during the Xuzhou Battle, was armed with locally produced light and heavy machine guns that frequently malfunctioned, and their Type 79 rifles, also made in Sichuan, were often outdated, with some dating back to the Qing Dynasty. These weapons had limited range and sometimes malfunctioned after fewer than one hundred rounds. Now before the war, both Nationalist and local forces acquired weaponry from diverse foreign and domestic sources. Even domestically produced weapons lacked standardization, with those made in Hanyang and Manchuria differing in design and specifications. Arms manufactured in Germany, France, Russia, Japan, and Italy were similarly inconsistent. Consequently, even within a single unit, the lack of uniformity created significant logistical challenges, undermining combat effectiveness, particularly in the early stages of the war. Despite Nationalist ordnance factories producing over three million rounds of small-arms ammunition daily, the incompatibility of ammunition and weapons diminished the usable quantity of ammunition. Chinese communications infrastructure was inadequate. In the Nationalist army, signal units were integrated into engineering units, leading to low-quality radio communications. In emergencies, telegrams could remain undelivered for days, and orders often had to be dispatched via postal services. By 1937, the entire country boasted only 3,000 military vehicles, necessitating heavy reliance on horses and mules for transport. To effectively equip twenty Nationalist divisions, 10,647 horses and 20,688 mules were needed, but by the end of 1935, only 6,206 horses and 4,351 mules were available. A statistic from 1936 indicated a 5 percent mortality rate among military horses, with some units experiencing a rate as high as 10 percent. The distribution of weaponry led to disputes during army reorganization efforts following the Northern Expedition. Although Chiang Kai-shek's forces were part of the regular army, the quality of their equipment varied significantly. Domestic production of weapons was limited, and imports could not close the gap. Priority was given to small arms; through army reorganization, Chiang aimed to diminish the influence of forces less loyal to him. Nationalist army staff officers observed that troops loyal to Chiang received the best weapons. Northwest and Northeast forces, having cultivated good relations with the KMT, were similarly better equipped, while Shanxi troops received inferior supplies. Troops associated with the Guangxi Clique were given even poorer quality weapons due to their leaders' stronger political ambitions. Troops regarded as “bandit forces,” such as those led by Shi Yousan, Li Hongchang, and Sun Dianying, were naturally assigned the least effective weaponry. This unequal distribution of arms increased some local forces' inclination to align with the KMT while alienating others, which inadvertently led to additional turmoil in the aftermath of the Northern Expedition. Logistical accounting within the Nationalist military was severely lacking. Military expenditures accounted for a significant portion of government spending, roughly 65.48 % in 1937, with personnel costs being the largest component. However, military units prioritized boosting their own resources over accurate accounting. Surpluses were not returned but rather utilized to reward military officers and soldiers for merits in battle, care for the wounded, or to create a reserve. Conversely, if deficits arose, troops would resort to “living off vacancies,” a practice in which they would fail to report desertions promptly and would falsely claim new soldiers had arrived. Military leaders typically appointed their most trusted subordinates to serve as accountants and logistic officers. As the war commenced, these issues became readily apparent. During the Battle of Shanghai in 1937, frontline soldiers sometimes went days without food and went months without pay. Wounded soldiers and civilians had to search tirelessly for medical treatment, and when main forces relocated, they often abandoned grain, ammunition, weapons, and petroleum along the way. General Chen Cheng, the commander in chief during the Battle of Shanghai, noted, “This phenomenon clearly revealed our inability to supply frontline troops, indicating that China remains a backward country with poor management.” Many logistical shortcomings severely impacted troop morale and combat effectiveness. In a 1933 speech, Chiang Kai-shek acknowledged that poor food, inadequate clothing, and ineffective logistics contributed to widespread desertion. Soldiers were further demoralized by reduced or embezzled salaries. A lack of professional medical staff and equipment hampered healthcare efforts, leading to high disease and mortality rates. According to official statistics from 1936, approximately 10 percent of soldiers fell ill annually, with a mortality rate as high as 5 percent. Japanese military authorities reported that one in three wounded Japanese soldiers died, while a Dutch military officer present during the early stages of the Sino-Japanese War observed that one in every two wounded Nationalist soldiers perished. Due to inadequate equipment and limited transport options, Nationalist forces were compelled to recruit farmers and rent vehicles, as they lacked essential facilities such as tents. This reliance on local resources inevitably led to frequent conflicts between military personnel and civilians. China is clearly a vast nation with an extensive coastline, requiring the construction of several significant fortresses during the modern era. These included Wusong, Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Jiangning, and Wuhan along the Yangtze River, as well as Zhenhai, Humen, and Changzhou along the seacoast. Except for the Wuhan fortress, built in 1929-1930, all other fortifications were established during the late Qing Dynasty and featured uncovered cannon batteries. These fortresses suffered from inadequate maintenance, and many of their components had become outdated and irreplaceable, rendering them militarily negligible. Following the January 1932 Shanghai Incident, the Japanese military destroyed the Wusong forts, leaving the entrance to the Yangtze River completely unfortified. Consequently, there were no defenses along the coastline from Jiangsu to Shandong, allowing the Japanese to land freely. In December 1932, the Military Affairs Commission established a fortress group tasked with constructing fortresses and defensive installations, seeking assistance from German military advisers. After the North China Incident in 1935, the Nationalist government accelerated the construction of defensive structures in line with national war planning, focusing particularly on Nanjing. The Nationalists prioritized building fortifications along the seacoast and the Yellow River, followed by key regions north of the Yellow River. The government also ordered a significant quantity of heavy artillery from Germany. This included several dozen pieces of flat-fire antiaircraft and dual-purpose heavy artillery, which were installed at fortifications in Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Nanjing, and Wuhan. By the summer of 1937, the construction of nine fortified positions was complete: Nanjing, Zhenjiang, Jiangyin, Ningbo, Humen, Mawei, Xiamen , Nantong, and Lianyungang. In total, China had established 41 forts and equipped them with 273 fortress cannons. Some defensive installations were poorly managed, with many units assigned to their perimeters lacking training and access to proper maps. The barbette positions in the fortresses were not well concealed and could hardly store sufficient ammunition. Troops stationed at these fortresses received little training. Despite these shortcomings, the fortresses and fortifications were not entirely ineffective. They bolstered Chinese positions along the defense line stretching from Cangxian County to Baoding and from Dexian County to Shijiazhuang, as well as in southern Shandong.  Before the war, China's political and economic center was situated along the seacoast and the Yangtze River. As Japanese influence expanded, the Nationalist government was compelled to establish bases in China's inner regions, very similar to how the USSR pulled back its industry further west after Operation barbarossa.The Japanese attack on Shanghai in 1932 prompted the Nationalists to relocate their capital to Luoyang. On March 5, during the Second Plenary Session of the KMT's Fourth Congress, the Western Capital Preparation Committee was formed to plan for the potential relocation of all governmental bodies to Xi'an in the event of full-scale war. In February 1933, the Central Political Conference approved the Northwest Development Bill, and in February 1934, the National Economic Commission set up a northwestern branch to oversee development projects in the region. On October 18, 1934, Chiang Kai-shek traveled to Lanzhou, recording in his diary that “Northwest China has abundant resources. Japan and Russia are poised to bully us. Yet, if we strengthen ourselves and develop northwest China to the fullest extent, we can turn it into a base for China's revival.” Interestingly, it was Sichuan, rather than the northwest, that became China's rear base during the 2nd Sino-Japanese War. In October 1934, the Communist army evacuated its Soviet base in southern China, initiating the Long March that would ultimately end in the northwest. By this time, Chiang Kai-shek had decided to designate Sichuan as the last stronghold for China. In January 1935, the Nanchang Field Headquarters of the Military Affairs Commission, responsible for combatting the Communists and serving as the supreme military and political authority over most provinces along the Yangtze River and central China, dispatched a special advisory group to Chongqing. Following this, the Nationalist army advanced into Sichuan. On February 10, the Nationalists appointed a new provincial government in Sichuan, effectively ending the province's long-standing regionalism. On March 2, Chiang traveled to Chongqing, where he delivered a speech underscoring that “Sichuan should serve as the base for China's revival.” He stated that he was in Sichuan to oversee efforts against the Communist army and to unify the provincial administration.  After the Xinhai revolution, the Republic of China was still suing the Qing Dynasty's conscription system. However, once in power, the Nationalist government sought to establish a national military service program. In 1933, it enacted a military service law, which began implementation in 1936. This law categorized military service into two branches: service in the Nationalist army and in territorial citizen army units. Men aged eighteen to forty-five were expected to serve in the territorial units if they did not enlist in the Nationalist army. The territorial service was structured into three phases: active service lasting two to three years, first reserves for six years, and second reserves until the age of forty-five. The Ministry of Military Affairs divided China into sixty divisional conscription headquarters, initially establishing these headquarters in the six provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, and Hubei. By December 1936, approximately 50,000 new soldiers had been drafted. The military service law disproportionately favored the middle and upper classes. Government personnel were exempt from enlistment, allowing privileged families to register their children with government agencies. Similarly, students in middle and higher education were excused from service, while youth from poorer backgrounds often felt compelled to enlist due to financial constraints that limited their educational opportunities. Village and town leaders were responsible for executing the recruitment process and frequently conspired with army recruiters. Recruitment principles often favored wealthier families, with guidelines stating that one son should be drafted for every three sons, two for five sons, but no drafts if there was only one son. Wealthy families could secure exemptions for all their male children, while poor families might see their only son conscripted if they were unable to provide the requisite bribe. Town and village heads wielded significant power in recruitment. This new recruitment system also created numerous money-making opportunities. Military personnel assigned to escort draftees to their units would often allow draftees to escape for a fee. Additionally, draftees could monetize their service by agreeing to serve as substitutes for others. For some, being drafted became an occupation. For example, in 1936, 600 individuals were drafted in the Wuhu area of Anhui province, and accounts from regional administrators indicated that every draftee had either been traded, replaced, or seized. Beginning in 1929, the Nationalist government also instituted military training for high school students and older individuals. Students were required to participate in one theoretical class and one practical class each week, totaling three hours. Starting in 1934, students had to complete a three-month military training program before graduating. Graduates of military academies were employed as military instructors. By the end of 1936, over 237,000 high school students had undergone military training. This student military training was overseen by the Society for the Implementation of the Three People's Principles of Sun Yat-sen, which also provided political education and sometimes gathered information on students' political beliefs.  Although the Nationalists made significant efforts to improve the military training of both officers and troops, they inherited deep-seated challenges that they were unable to completely overcome. A lack of facilities, outdated training manuals, low regard for military instructors, and the ongoing influence of regionalism and warlordism hindered progress. The Japanese would also later exploit these shortcomings of the Nationalist army. The Central Military Academy, which evolved from the Whampoa Military Academy established in 1923 in Guangzhou to train officers for the Northern Expedition, became the primary training institution for junior military officers. The academy offered a basic course, lasting eighteen months, which included general education, specialized training in various subjects, and field practice. This was followed by a two-year cadet training program focused on developing the skills necessary for junior military officers. Seventeen classes were admitted before the outbreak of war. Admission to the academy was highly competitive, with military officers receiving attractive salaries. For instance, in 1935, the academy received 10,000 applications for the twelfth class, but only 7% were accepted. Upon graduation, cadets were typically assigned to divisions within the Nationalist army loyal to Chiang Kai-shek. Their training, influenced by German advisors, resulted in a high-quality cadre. In modern China, most sergeants were veterans. While some units provided training for sergeants, a lack of formal education led to their diminished status. Truly qualified sergeants were rare. During his tenure as Minister of Military Training, General Bai Chongxi proposed establishing a sergeant school and creating a professional noncommissioned officer system; however, the Ministry of Military Affairs opposed this on financial grounds. While commanding officers enjoyed rapid promotions, military instructors did not. Furthermore, there was no system for transferring instructors to field commands or assigning commanders to military academies for extended periods. Despite minor updates to cover modern warfare concepts such as tank warfare and machine guns, Qing Dynasty military manuals were still in use at the Central Military Academy at the start of the war. Yeah, 1937 they were still rocking the old Qing books. Following the establishment of the Ministry of Military Training, a bureau for military translation was set up to evaluate existing course materials and translate military manuals, but its contributions were limited. Another significant shortcoming of military instruction focused on theory at the expense of practical application.  To enhance the quality of military officers, the Nationalist army instituted specialized schools for artillery, infantry, transport, engineering, and signals starting in 1931. These institutions were considered to have high-quality administrators and facilities. The Nationalists adopted German military training models, replacing the previously used Japanese models. They appointed German advisors to oversee instructor training at military academies and established three instructional divisions. By the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, 15,000 students had graduated from programs with a German military influence, resulting in the creation of about fifty combat divisions from these instructional units. However, the progress of other Nationalist army units was limited because their training was not aligned with contemporary battlefield realities. Before World War I, troops operated in close formations due to limited firepower. The widespread introduction of machine guns after World War I necessitated a shift to dispersed formations. Although a new drill manual issued by the Ministry of Military Training in 1935 introduced small-group tactics, few units adopted these methods. General Chen Cheng highlighted another underlying issue in 1938, commenting on the outmoded focus on parade ground drills and formal military manners. He noted, “We have paid too much attention to stereotypical formality and procedures of no practical use. Sometimes, even though soldiers could not get a haircut or take a bath for several months, their camps had to be in order. They underwent intensive training in close-order drill but learned little about gun handling, marksmanship, or maneuvering. This was inappropriate in peacetime, yet we continued this practice even after the Sino-Japanese War started, even using it on highly educated youth.” In contrast, the Communist army simplified training, emphasizing two essential skills: live-fire exercises and physical endurance, which significantly enhanced troop effectiveness in the challenging terrain characteristic of the Sino-Japanese War. Ultimately, the Nationalist army's training did not reach all soldiers. Only about half of all combat soldiers received adequate training, while the rest were neglected. According to statistics from the time, there were approximately five million military personnel during the Sino-Japanese War, with three million serving in logistics. Most of these logistics personnel had received little training, leading to disastrous consequences for overall combat effectiveness. As warfare has become more complex, the role of highly trained staff officers has become increasingly important. Napoleon developed operational plans close to the front and communicated orders via courier. During World War I, military commanders collected information at their headquarters and utilized telephones and automobiles to relay orders to the front lines. In World War II, with the battlefield expanding to include land, sea, and air, senior commanders often made decisions from headquarters far from the action, relying on a significant number of staff officers with specialized skills to keep them informed. In China, however, the staff officer system was underdeveloped. By 1937, only about 2,000 commanders and staff officers had received training. Prior to the Sino-Japanese War, most commanders managed staff work themselves, with staff officers serving primarily as military secretaries who drafted orders, reports, and maps. Many staff officers had no formal military training, and as a whole, the branch lacked respect, causing the most talented officers to avoid serving in it. The situation was even more dire for staff officer departments within local forces. For example, in March 1937, Liu Ziqing, a graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy, was appointed as the director of political instruction in the Forty-fourth Army, a unit under Sichuan warlord Liu Xiang. Liu Ziqing's account illustrates the dysfunction within the ranks: “The commander in chief was not supposed to manage the army and even did not know its whereabouts... But he could appoint relatives and former subordinates—who were officials and businessmen as well—to the army. Each month they would receive a small stipend. At headquarters, there was a long table and two rows of chairs. Around ten o'clock in the morning, senior officers signed in to indicate their presence. Those with other business would leave, while the remaining officers sat down to leisurely discuss star actresses, fortune-telling, business projects, mah-jongg, and opium. Occasionally they would touch on national affairs, chat about news articles, or share local gossip. In the afternoons, they primarily played mah-jongg, held banquets, and visited madams. Most mornings, the commander usually presided over these activities, and at first, I reported for duty as well. But I soon realized it was a waste of time and came very rarely. At headquarters, most staff members wore long gowns or Western-style suits, while military uniforms were a rare sight.” Most senior military personnel were trained at the Baoding Military Academy during the early republic. 2/3rds of commanders in chief, 37 %of army commanders, and 20 % of division commanders were Baoding graduates. Higher-ranking officers were more likely to have launched their careers there. In contrast, only 10 % of division commanders and a few army commanders were graduates of the Whampoa Military Academy. Additionally, commanders trained in local military schools and those with combat experience accounted for 1/3rd of all commanders. While the prevalence of civil war provided opportunities for rapid promotion, it also hindered officers' ability to update their training or gain experience in different military branches. German advisors expressed their concerns to Chiang Kai-shek, emphasizing that officers should first serve in junior roles before taking command. During one battle in 1938, Chiang noted, “Our commanders in chief are equivalent only to our enemy's regiment commanders, and our army and division commanders are only as competent as our enemy's battalion and company commanders.” Despite not viewing high-ranking Japanese officers as great strategists, Nationalist officers respected them as highly competent, diligent, and professional commanders who rarely made critical errors. The infantry was the primary component of the Nationalist army, with middle and junior infantry officers constituting over 80 %of all army officers. A 1936 registry of military officers listed 1,105 colonels and 2,159 lieutenant colonels within the infantry, demonstrating a significant outnumbering of Baoding graduates at ranks below lieutenant colonel. However, the quality of middle and junior infantry officers declined during the Sino-Japanese War; by 1944, only 27.3 % of these officers were from formal military academies, while those promoted from the ranks increased to 28.1 %. In 1937, 80 % of officers in an ordinary infantry battalion were military academy graduates, but this percentage dropped to 20 % during the war. Its hard to tell how educated soldiers were before the war, but it is generally believed that most were illiterate. In 1929, sociologist Tao Menghe surveyed 946 soldiers from a Shanxi garrison brigade and found that only 13 percent could compose a letter independently, while the rest had either never learned to read or were unable to write. In contrast, in August 1938, General Feng Yuxiang found that 80 percent of a regiment in Hunan were literate. Regardless, during the Sino-Japanese War, the quality of recruits steadily declined. More than 90 percent of soldiers were illiterate, and few possessed any basic scientific knowledge, which hindered their ability to master their weapons. On the battlefield, they heavily relied on middle and junior officers for guidance.  In autumn 1933, General Hans von Seeckt, the architect of the post World War I German army, visited China at the personal invitation of Chiang Kai-shek. In his recommendations for military reform, he identified China's greatest problem as its excessively large forces drawn from diverse backgrounds. He stated, “At present, the most pressing goal is to... establish a small, well-equipped army with high morale and combat effectiveness to replace the numerous poorly armed and trained forces.” He suggested forming an army of sixty divisions and recommended the establishment of a training regiment for military officers to equip them with the skills needed for modern warfare. Chiang Kai-shek accepted von Seeckt's proposals, and on January 26, 1935, he convened a National Military Reorganization Conference in Nanjing. On March 1, the Army Reorganization Bureau was established in Wuchang, under the leadership of General Chen Cheng. In the same month, General Alexander von Falkenhausen took charge of the German Military Advisors Group. Before war broke out, around nineteen divisions, roughly 300,000 troops received training from German advisors and were equipped with German-style weapons. At the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, the forces stemming from the First Army of the National Revolutionary Army and the Whampoa cadets, who had fought in the Northern Expedition, held the highest reputation and were referred to as the “core central forces” by the Japanese. Other notable forces included the Guangxi Army, Northwestern Army, Northeastern Army, some Uyghur units, the Guangdong Army, and the Shanxi Army. In contrast, provincial forces such as the Yunnan Army and Sichuan Army were viewed less favorably. Nationalist forces were generally far inferior to those of the Japanese enemy. In 1937, General He Yingqin noted that Nationalist forces had failed to prevail in 1932 and 1933, even when outnumbering the Japanese by 4-1.  In November 1937, during a national defense conference, Chiang Kai-shek stated, "In recent years we have worked hard, prepared actively, and achieved national unification. By the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, we were in a better domestic situation and had improved military preparedness compared to before. Since 1935, our strength has doubled. It increased by more than two to three times since January 1932 or September 1931 [when Japan attacked Shanghai and Mukden]. If peace had been achievable, we should have delayed the war for two or three years. Given an additional three years, our defensive capabilities would have been drastically different... Now, if we merely compare the military strength of China and Japan, we are certainly inferior." However, such assessments were overly optimistic, as Chiang failed to recognize that Japan's military capabilities would not have stagnated. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek certainly was dealt a difficult hand of cards for the upcoming poker match he was to play. Yet the Chinese were resilient and they had to be for the absolute horror that would be inflicted upon them from 1937-1945. Until this point, their enemies had been far more lenient, the Empire of Japan would show no mercy.

A bonus episode this week. On May 22, I moderated a panel organized by Vita Golod and the UNC Center for Slavic, Eurasian, and East European Studies. The focus was on the U.S.-Ukraine Mineral Security Partnership, and it features Ivan Us, Chief Consultant at the Center for Foreign Policy at the National Institute for Strategic Studies; Jim Mullinax, a Senior Foreign Service Officer and former Consul General at the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu (closed in 2020); Grzegorz Stec, Senior Analyst and Head of the Brussels Office at MERICS; and Xu Qinduo, journalist at CGTN and Senior Fellow at the Pangoal Institution. The panel explores the background and the implications of the minerals deal, signed on May 1, 2025, for the ongoing war in Ukraine, and prospects for post-war reconstruction. I hope you enjoy what I thought was a fascinating conversation.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, I chat with Eva Dou, technology reporter for the Washington Post, about her terrific new book about Huawei. From its prehistory to its fight for its life under tremendous U.S. pressure, she tells its story in a way that's both deeply engaging and very evenhanded. 04:53 – Meng Wanzhou's case and its impact on media interest in Huawei07:13 – How did Ren Zhengfei's experiences in the PLA shape the corporate culture of Huawei?10:21 – The impact of his father on Ren Zhengfei 13:42 – Women in Huawei's leadership and Sun Yafang as a chairwoman 18:41 – Is Huawei a tool of the state?23:21 – Edward Snowden's revelations and how they influenced the perception of Huawei 26:34 – The Cisco lawsuit influence on the company's approach to foreign markets 28:07 – Reasons for Huawei working with embargoed or sanctioned states30:46 – Huawei's international expansion 33:04 – Huawei's management style and internal competition 36:33 – Meng Wenzhou's detainment as a turning point for Huawei and China-U.S. relations38:09 – Ren Zhengfei's media campaign and narrative shift after the Meng affair40:44 – Huawei's involvement in Xinjiang's surveillance 43:09 – Huawei's success in shaping 5G standards despite global pushback46:27 – The “Huawei index”: tracking Chinese investment abroad through Huawei's market presence48:35 – Huawei's push into chip development amid sanctions: real progress or just hype?52:23 – Huawei: a proxy, a leading or lagging indicator, or just a bellwether?54:11 – Huawei's “too big to fail” status: benefits and risks amid U.S. government pressure56:29 – Huawei's perspective on the backlash from sanctions58:19 – Concluding question: about Huawei's ownership and governancePaying it forward: Raffaele Huang at The Wall Street JournalRecommendations: Eva: The Party's Interests Come First by Joseph Torigian; Yang Jie at The Wall Street Journal; Piranesi by Susanna ClarkeKaiser: Adolescence on Netflix; Kyle Chan's high-capacity.com See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

The Sinica Network proudly presents a new podcast: China Talking Points, featuring Kaiser Kuo (host of the Sinica Podcast), Eric Olander (host of the China-Global South Podcast and China In Africa Podcast) and Andrew Polk, co-founder of Trivium China and host of its podcast. We'll be joined regularly by Lizzi Lee, Fellow on Chinese Economy at the Asia Society Policy Institute's (ASPI) Center for China Analysis. Tune in live every other week for unscripted thoughts on the major China-related news of the week.This week, we focused on the truce in the trade war that Donald Trump launched with the so-called "Liberation Day" tariffs of April 9. U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer met with top Chinese trade negotiator He Lifeng and his team in Geneva over the weekend, and we look at what came out of those meetings and what we can expect to happen next. We also discussed the dogfight that took place between India and Pakistan last week, in which the Pakistani air force claims to have downed as many as five Indian planes, significant for China because the Pakistani planes were Chinese-made J10-C fighters. Eric, who wrote about the Chinese reaction to this and offered his take on the reasons for their success, managed to incur a lot of online Indian wrath — an occupational hazard — but presents a compelling case for why the fully integrated Chinese military systems gave Pakistan the edge.Watch us live on YouTube starting May 28th. Check out the new Sinica Network YouTube channel here!See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

I had scheduled a show to record while I was in Providence last week, but it fell through and had to be rescheduled, so please give this talk I delivered at Carnegie Mellon last month a listen!Hope you enjoy.KaiserSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, I chat with veteran Wall Street Journal reporter Bob Davis, who has covered the U.S.-China relationship for decades. He recently published a new book called Broken Engagement, which consists of interviews with U.S. policymakers who were instrumental in shaping American policy toward China from the George H.W. Bush administration through the Biden administration. It's an eye-opening look at the individuals who fought for — and against — engagement with China.2:58 – Bob's thoughts on engagement: whether it was doomed from the start, when and why there was a shift, people's different aspirations for it and retrospective positioning, and whether it could have a transformative effect 13:28 – The Nancy Pelosi interview: her approach, her Taiwan visit, and her critique of capitulation to business interests17:18 – Bob's interviews with Charlene Barshefsky, Lawrence Summers, and Bob Zoellick: the WTO accession, the China shock, Zoellick's “responsible stakeholder” concept, and diplomacy as an ongoing process 27:24 – The Robert Gates interview: security-focused engagement, and his shift to realism 31:14 – Misreading Xi Jinping34:42 – Bob's interviews with Stephen Hadley and Ash Carter regarding the South China Sea 39:19 – The Matt Pottinger interview: his view on China and how COVID changed everything 46:14 – Michael Rogers' interview: cyber espionage and cyber policy 51:25 – Robert O'Brien's interview: the “reverse Kissinger” and Taiwan 54:14 – Bob's interview with Kurt Campbell: his famous Foreign Affairs essay, differentiating between decoupling and de-risking, and technology export restrictions and trade deals 59:28 – The Rahm Emanuel interview: his response to wolf warrior diplomacy1:01:57 – Bob's takeaways: the long-term vision of engagement, introspective interviewees, and his own increased pessimism Paying It Forward: Lingling Wei at The Wall Street Journal; Eva Dou at The Washington Post and her book House of Huawei: The Secret History of China's Most Powerful Company; and Katrina Northrop at The Washington Post Recommendations: Bob: The TV series Derry Girls (2018-2022) and Curb Your Enthusiasm (2000-2024); and Margaret O'Farrell's novels, including Hamnet and The Marriage Portrait Kaiser: The BBC and Masterpiece series Wolf Hall: The Mirror and the Light See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

China's inbound tourism market saw strong recovery and growth during the just-concluded May Day holiday, with smaller cities attracting more foreign visitors seeking cultural experiences, according to industry insiders.业内人士表示，在刚刚结束的五一假期期间，中国入境旅游市场强劲复苏并实现增长，不少寻求文化体验的外国游客开始青睐小城市。During the five-day break, inbound travel bookings surged 130 percent from a year earlier, said Trip.com Group, China's largest online travel agency. While top-tier cities such as Beijing and Shanghai remained popular, destinations including Chengdu in Sichuan province, Chongqing, Hangzhou in Zhejiang province, Zhuhai in Guangdong province, and Xi'an in Shaanxi province also made the list of top inbound choices.中国最大的在线旅行平台携程集团表示，在为期五天的假期期间，入境游预订量同比增长130%。虽然北京和上海等一线城市依然受欢迎，但四川成都、重庆、浙江杭州、广东珠海和陕西西安等目的地也跻身热门入境游目的地之列。China has been opening its doors wider to international travelers. In 2024, the country expanded its unilateral visa-free policy to include 38 countries, allowing visits of up to 30 days, according to the National Immigration Administration.中国持续扩大对国际游客的开放。据国家移民管理局消息，2024年中国将单方面免签政策扩大至38个国家，允许最多停留30天。Favorable tax refund policies have also boosted inbound travel. In late April, China lowered the tax refund threshold from 500 yuan ($68.80) to 200 yuan and raised the cash refund limit from 10,000 yuan to 20,000 yuan. There is no limit on refunds processed by bank transfer, according to a guideline issued by the Ministry of Commerce and five other departments.优惠的退税政策也促进了入境游的蓬勃发展。根据商务部等六部门发布的指导意见，4月下旬中国将退税起征点从500元人民币（68.80美元）降至200元人民币，并将现金退税限额从1万元人民币提高至2万元人民币。银行转账退税不受限额限制。"We encourage relevant institutions to provide tax refund services through various means such as mobile payments, bank cards and cash, and to better meet the diverse payment service needs of overseas travelers," said Sheng Qiuping, vice-minister of commerce, at a recent news conference in Beijing.商务部副部长盛秋平在最近于北京举行的新闻发布会上表示：“我们鼓励相关机构通过移动支付、银行卡、现金等多种方式提供退税服务，更好地满足境外旅客多样化的支付服务需求。”During the holiday, tourists from the United States, South Korea and Japan made up the largest share of inbound visitors. The number of travelers from Australia, Vietnam and Canada also rose significantly, according to Beijing-based travel platform Qunar.假期期间，美国、韩国和日本游客占入境游客的最大份额。据北京旅游平台去哪儿网的数据，来自澳大利亚、越南和加拿大的游客数量也大幅增长。Foreign visitors are venturing beyond major cities. Hotel bookings by foreign tourists in Zhuhai rose 70 percent year-on-year, while Qingdao in Shandong province and Wuhan in Hubei province saw increases of 60 percent and 50 percent, respectively, Qunar reported.外国游客开始深入探索非一线城市。据去哪儿网报道，珠海的外国游客酒店预订量同比增长70%，山东青岛和湖北武汉的酒店预订量分别增长了60%和50%。China's picturesque landscapes and rich culinary culture have frequently been featured in South Korean TV dramas and variety shows, piquing travel interest. The May Day holiday also coincides with a public holiday in South Korea, encouraging young travelers to visit China.中国风景如画的自然风光和丰富的饮食文化频繁出现在韩国电视剧和综艺节目中，激发了人们的旅游兴趣。五一假期恰逢韩国的公共假期，吸引了大量年轻游客赴华旅游。South Korea's leading travel agency, Hana Tour, said January trips to China rose 77 percent year-on-year, outpacing a 20 percent increase for trips to Japan. The surge was mainly driven by China's visa-free policy.韩国知名旅行社哈拿多乐表示，1月份赴华旅游同比增长77%，超过赴日旅游20%的增幅。这一增长主要得益于中国的免签政策。Major South Korean airlines have responded by expanding their international flight offerings to China to meet rising demand.韩国各大航空公司纷纷扩大赴华国际航班服务，以满足日益增长的需求。Meanwhile, more foreign visitors are seeking immersive cultural experiences in rural areas. A Trip.com resort in Zhangjiajie, Hunan province, reported a surge in bookings from tourists from the US, Italy and Spain since April.与此同时，越来越多的外国游客正在寻求乡村地区的沉浸式文化体验。据携程网报道，湖南省张家界一家度假村自4月份以来，来自美国、意大利和西班牙的游客预订量激增。"Besides sightseeing, foreign tourists have shown increasing interest in in-depth tours and diverse experiences, such as participating in farming activities and attending ethnic concerts," said Fang Zexi, a Trip.com Group researcher.携程集团研究员方泽茜表示：“除了观光，外国游客对深度游和丰富多彩的体验项目也越来越感兴趣，例如参与农耕活动、聆听民族音乐会等。”Their cultural curiosity extends into everyday life. In Chengdu, a popular southwestern city, more foreign visitors are booking culinary experiences, visits to local farmers' markets, cooking sessions, table presentations and food tasting, Trip.com said.他们对文化的好奇心延伸到了日常生活中。携程表示，在西南热门城市成都，越来越多的外国游客预订了美食体验、参观当地农贸市场、参加烹饪课程、体验餐桌演示和品尝美食等活动。In the first three days of the holiday, more than 5,700 inbound passenger trips were recorded by Chengdu's border inspection authority, a year-on-year increase of over 170 percent, according to the Sichuan provincial entry and exit bureau.据四川省出入境管理局统计，假期前三天，成都边检部门共接待入境旅客超过5700人次，同比增长超过170%。surge/sɜːrdʒ/n.激增，猛涨unilateral visa-free policy单方面免签政策immersive/ɪˈmɜːrsɪv/adj.沉浸式的culinary/ˈkʌlɪnəri/adj.厨房的，烹饪的

Sonia Bouza, profesora y subdirectora de Calidad en la Escuela Politécnica de Ingeniería de Ferrol (UDC), acaba de regresar de una enriquecedora estancia académica en Chongqing, una de las mayores y más dinámicas ciudades del suroeste de China. Su viaje se enmarca en un convenio de colaboración entre la Universidade da Coruña y el Chongqing College of Finance and Economics, que fomenta el intercambio de conocimientos y experiencias entre ambas instituciones. Durante su estancia, Bouza participó en actividades académicas y culturales en el campus chino, contribuyendo a estrechar lazos en materia de docencia, innovación y calidad educativa. Esta oportunidad le permitió conocer de cerca el sistema universitario chino, compartir buenas prácticas y explorar futuras líneas de colaboración entre universidades. Además de su actividad académica, la profesora ferrolana tuvo ocasión de visitar algunos de los lugares más emblemáticos de Chongqing, sumergirse en la historia y cultura local, y conocer de primera mano el impacto de una de las mayores infraestructuras del país, la Presa de las Tres Gargantas. La experiencia, según afirma Bouza, ha sido altamente inspiradora tanto a nivel profesional como personal, y refuerza el compromiso de la Universidade da Coruña con la proyección internacional y la cooperación educativa global.

This week on Sinica, I chat with SCMP Senior Europe Correspondent Finbarr Bermingham, who joins from Brussels where he's been covering the EU-China relationship in fantastic depth and with great insight.3:17 – EU-China relations in early 2025: the effect of the 2021 sanctions, who advocated for engagement versus confrontation with China, and the importance of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI)13:49 – How Brussels initially reacted to the rupture in the transatlantic alliance 17:14 – China's so-called charm offensive 21:03 – The idea of de-risking from Washington 23:10 – The impact of the Oval Office meeting with Zelensky 24:55 – Europe's dual-track approach with China and shift toward pragmatism 29:35 – National interests versus EU unity regarding Chinese investment, and whether Brussels could extract concessions 35:20 – Brussels' worry over Trump cutting a deal with China 38:06 – Possible signs of China's flexibility on different issues40:25 – The lifting of the sanctions on European parliamentarians 42:21 – The decrease in calls for values-based diplomacy, and whether securitization is happening in Europe47:05 – How the EU might address tensions over China's industrial overcapacity 50:17 – The possible future of EU-China relations, and whether the transatlantic relationship could go back to normal55:50 – The knee-jerk element of looking past EuropePaying It Forward: Ji Siqi at SCMP, Cissy Zhou at Nikkei, and Kinling Lo and Viola Zhou at Rest of WorldRecommendations:Finbarr: The Stakeknife podcast series; Say Nothing: A True Story of Murder and Memory in Northern Ireland by Patrick Radden Keefe; and the 20th anniversary edition of Wilco's album, A Ghost Is Born Kaiser: The Ottomans: Khans, Caesars, and Caliphs by Marc David Baer See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, in a show recorded at the University of Pittsburgh, I speak with Benno Weiner, Associate Professor of History at Carnegie Mellon University, about how China's policy toward its minority nationalities (or minzu) have shifted from their older, Soviet-inspired form to the policies of assimilation we now see.2:29 – How the so-called second-generation minzu policy evolved, and its shift away from the first-generation policy17:15 – China's language policy, comparisons to other historical cases, and the difficulty in striking a balance between language autonomy and the state interest of economic equality25:26 – Debating the assumption of Uyghur forced labor 28:20 – How the minzu policy shift is driven by economic and political stability concerns 30:07 – The limited ability of minzus to make themselves heard32:01 – The difficulty of advocacy in the face of accusations of U.S. hypocrisy 37:30 – Han guilt as a galvanizing idea 40:21 – Whether the shift in minzu policy is reversible, and the effect of external pressure 43:46 – Why Xinjiang has received greater global attention than other places 45:50 – How future historians may view minzu policy under Xi JinpingPaying It Forward: Guldana Salimjan, at the University of Toronto Recommendations:Benno: The Red Wind Howls by Tsering Döndrup, translated by Christopher PeacockKaiser: The Six: The Untold Story of the Titanic's Chinese Survivors by Steven SchwankertSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on the Sinica Podcast, I chat with Yawei Liu, Senior Advisor for China at the Carter Center in Atlanta, Georgia, and Yukon Huang, former China country head of the World Bank and now Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The show was taped live at the 2025 Columbia China Summit at Columbia University, put on by the Columbia University Greater China Society, on April 13,. Special thanks to them for inviting us to attend!3:53 – Columbia University's history with China 7:52 – How Beijing views the current trade war 11:32 – Yawei's idea of “the clash of misperceptions”18:18 – The actual origins of America's trade deficits and China's trade surpluses 23:14 – How the inevitable talk between Trump and Xi Jinping may play out32:04 – Sinophobia versus changing attitudes toward China 35:43 – How the current trade war is related to innovation in China 45:31 – How we can wage peace Paying It Forward: Nicholas Zeller and his Substack newsletter, The U.S.-China Perception MonitorRecommendations:Yawei: Americans in China: Encounters with the People's Republic ed. by Terry Lautz, and Chinese Encounters with America: Journeys That Shaped the Future of China ed. by Terry Lautz and Deborah DavisYukon: David Brooks' April 2022 article, “The End of Globalization: The Dominance of Global Cultural Wars” Kaiser: The Weimar Years: Rise and Fall 1918-1933 by Frank McDonough See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

She came to China to study but ended up building a home, a thriving career and so much more. Meet Nguyen Thi Lan, a Vietnamese entrepreneur who has spent over a decade in Chongqing, southwest China. From navigating student life to launching two successful businesses, she has embraced the energy of this dynamic "Mountain City." Now, as the leader of the Vietnamese Association in Chongqing-Sichuan, she's helping fellow Vietnamese expats find their place in this vibrant community.

Eating spicy ice cream, getting a haircut, dancing with local grandmas, trying intelligent NEV cars, and taking the Yangtze River Cableway and a night cruise, Darren Watkins Jr, the 20-year-old US internet celebrity better known to his 37 million YouTube followers and those on other platforms as iShowSpeed, had shown the world another interesting city through his lens.吃辣味冰淇淋、体验重庆剪发、与当地老奶奶共舞、试驾智能新能源汽车、打卡长江索道和夜游两江……近日，这位被3700万YouTube粉丝称之为iShowSpeed的20岁美国网红博主小达伦·沃特金斯通过他的镜头向世界展示了另一座有趣的城市。"This is (a) cyber city that looks crazy on camera," the YouTube sensation said in great excitement as he enjoyed the breathtaking view during a night river cruise in Chongqing."这简直是一座赛博之城，在镜头中看起来太疯狂了！"这位YouTube网红在重庆乘坐夜航游轮欣赏令人惊叹的美景时激动地说"Beautiful, beautiful. This is Chongqing. This city doesn't look real.""太美了，太美了！这就是重庆。这座城市看起来太不真实了！"From 3 pm to 9:30 pm on Wednesday, he did a marathon livestream in Chongqing city center after visiting Beijing, Shanghai, Shaolin Temple in Henan province and Chengdu in Sichuan province.从周三下午3点到晚上9点半，这位博主在重庆市中心完成了一场马拉松式直播。此前他已到访北京、上海、河南少林寺和四川成都等地。The livestream in Chongqing has attracted over 7.3 million viewers on YouTube so far, as well as over 8,000 comments.截至目前，这场重庆直播在YouTube平台已吸引超730万人次观看，评论超8000条。This metropolis of more than 30 million people in Southwest China, which boasts a multidimensional landscape, futuristic architecture, spicy hotpot and glittering night scenes, has attracted many foreign internet influencers amid the recent "China Travel" trend.这座位于中国西南的超级都市坐拥3000万人口，以魔幻立体地貌、未来感建筑群、麻辣火锅和璀璨夜景闻名，在近期"中国旅游热"中吸引了许多外国网红博主的注意。A gateway to a vast inland and a major manufacturing hub, it became China's fourth municipality in 1997 after Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin.作为西部内陆开放门户和先进制造业重镇，重庆于1997年成为继北京、上海、天津之后中国第四个直辖市。As large as Austria and five times bigger than Beijing, this city of mountains and rivers has witnessed rapid development into a modern metropolis with advanced transportation systems, outstanding architecture and eye-catching features.重庆幅员辽阔，面积与奥地利相当，是北京的五倍之多。这座山水之城已迅速发展成为一座交通发达、建筑卓越、特色鲜明的现代化大都市。The city looks futuristic with its skyscrapers, while at the same time, with some 3,000 years of history, it still preserves a distinct culture and lifestyle.这座城市摩天大楼鳞次栉比，看起来充满未来感，但与此同时，这座拥有约3000年历史的城市仍然保留着独特的文化和生活方式。The live show started in the Jiefangbei area, which is the equivalent of Times Square in New York, surrounded by giant billboards and brand-name retailers.直播首站选在重庆解放碑商圈，该地区相当于纽约时代广场，被巨型广告牌和奢侈品旗舰店所包围。The US celebrity had attracted millions of fans in China soon after he started his China livestreaming tour on March 24, with his short videos going viral online.自3月24日开启中国直播之旅以来，这位美国顶流网红迅速收获百万中国粉丝，其短视频持续引爆社交平台。His appearance in Chongqing immediately drew large crowds, and he had to urge them to calm down.在重庆期间，他的亮相立即吸引了大批观众，他不得不数次呼吁粉丝保持冷静。Accompanied by local English-speaking internet celebrity Chen Rui, the American tasted ice cream with spicy chili oil, visited Kuixinglou Square, which has become a global sensation due to its unique architectural features, and took metro Line 2 to the famous Liziba Station where the train passes through a 19-story residential building.在重庆英语达人@毒角show陈睿陪同下，美国博主挑战了辣椒油冰淇淋，探访因"魁星楼空中天桥"爆红全球的魔幻建筑，并乘坐地铁二号线前往著名的李子坝站，列车从一栋19层高的居民楼中穿过。He then took a ride on the 112-meter-long Huangguan Escalator, the highest single-grading escalator in China and Asia when it was built. He also experienced Chongqing's dazzling transportation infrastructure, including the highest overpass in the country at 72 meters and Huangjuewan Overpass which connects more than 20 ramps and eight different roads.随后，他乘坐了全长112米的皇冠大扶梯，这是当时中国乃至亚洲最高的单级自动扶梯。他还体验了重庆令人眼花缭乱的交通基础设施，包括全国最高的72米立交桥和连接20多条匝道和8条不同道路的黄桷湾立交桥。"It (the tour) is very hectic and it has a lot of energy. Everyone is full of passion," Chen said. "It is a very meaningful trip and a good opportunity to introduce Chongqing to the world.""这次行程非常紧凑，能感受到整座城市的活力，重庆人骨子里都透着热情。"陈睿表示，"这是一次特别有意义的旅行，也是一个向世界介绍重庆的好机会。"As one fan on YouTube put it after watching the Chongqing livestream, "Growing up in America I was told entirely wrong things about China. But after watching these Speed streams I'm definitely visiting soon!"正如YouTube上的一位粉丝在观看完重庆的直播后所说："在美国长大的我对中国的了解完全是错误的。但看了这些直播后，我肯定会很快来中国！""These videos have completely flipped my perception of China on its head. Our French media had painted a wildly inaccurate picture of it. I'd absolutely love to travel to China with my friends sometime soon!" said another YouTube user."这些视频完全颠覆了我对中国的认识。我们的法国媒体对中国的描述严重失真。我非常想尽快和朋友们一起去中国旅游！"另一位YouTube用户说。cyber city赛博城市；赛博朋克城市skyscrapersn.摩天大楼modern metropolis现代化大都市Kuixinglou Square魁星楼Huangguan Escalator皇冠大扶梯transportation infrastructure交通基础设施overpassn.立交桥

This week on Sinica, I chat with Hazza Harding, a young Australian who began learning Chinese and made his way to China where he became a pop singer with hits on Chinese pop charts and a state media newscaster — and also lost his husband tragically, suffered through the COVID lockdowns while grieving for his loss. Yet he remains committed to furthering understanding and engagement, and has shown admirable resilience. Read his remarkable essay on his experiences here.6:51 – How Hazza started in China, and how his career changed throughout his time there 19:27 – Hazza's experiences feeling alienated in China 27:00 – Hazza's experience working in Chinese state media 34:04 – How China shaped Hazza and Wayne's love story, and how grief has shaped Hazza's perspective on life56:08 – The loveliness of everyday interactions 58:43 – Hazza's advice on giving oneself time and leniency 1:02:38 – How Hazza may find his way back to China in the future Paying It Forward: James Laurenceson at UTS Sydney Recommendations:Hazza: China Blonde: How a newsreader's search for adventure led to friendship, acceptance… and peroxide pandemonium in China by Nicole Webb Kaiser: The TV series Xi Bei Sui Yue (Into the Great Northwest) (2024 - )See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, I chat with Jeffrey Ding, author of Technology and the Rise of Great Powers, a book that argues that a nation's ability to invent foundational technologies matters ultimately less in its overall national power than its ability to diffuse those "general purpose technologies," like electricity, digital technology, the internet, and — in the age of the Fourth Industrial Revolution — Artificial Intelligence. I ask Jeff whether he thinks that China, with its powerful tech companies and its new enthusiasm for open source, may at last be closing what his book identifies as a diffusion deficit.2:19 – Jeff's argument for the power of diffusion in technological leadership6:07 – China's diffusion deficit 12:09 – Institutional factors that affect technology diffusion, and how culture can also play a role 19:49 – China's successes in (non-GPT) diffusion 24:29 – China's open source push 29:55 – Discussing He Pengyu's piece on semiconductors 32:19 – How Jeff might tweak his chapter on China in a second edition of Technology and the Rise of Great Powers Paying It Forward: Matt Sheehan of the Carnegie Endowment for International PeaceRecommendations:Jeff: The TV series The Pitt (2025 - ); and James Islington's The Will of the Many Kaiser: The album Perpetual Change by Jon Anderson and The Band Geeks; and Steven Wilson's new album, The OverviewSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on the Sinica Podcast, I chat with Jeremy Garlick, Director of the Jan Masaryk Centre for International Studies, Prague University, and a scholar of China's international relations. Jeremy is the author of the book Advantage China: Agent of Change in an Era of Global Disruption, but the book we're talking about this week is his new Cambridge Element titled Evolution in International Relations. It's a fascinating attempt to apply ideas from evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, and archaeogenetics to further our understanding of how nations interact.6:13 – Why Jeremy decided to apply an evolutionary framework to IR 15:34 – Why evolutionary science hasn't really been integrated into IR19:32 – How Jeremy views his project as refining the IR field 22:43 – The risk of the misappropriation of Jeremy's work, and the evolutionary elements of cooperation and intergroup competition 28:54 – How to avoid the trap of viewing evolution as teleological 34:07 – The idea of self-domestication 39:55 – Morality and human rights 45:17 – How emotions affect decision-making and diplomacy 50:32 – Hierarchy and status-seeking in IR 56:56 – Applying an evolutionary framework to the IR phenomena of alliances, nuclear deterrence, and strategic balancing 1:01:31 – Altruism toward out-groups 1:05:57 – The inevitability of competition with China 1:08:19 – The intellectual challenges Jeremy faced while working on this project, and what he would develop further in the future1:12:51 – Jeremy's thoughts on what IR as a discipline should address, integrating evolutionary science Paying It Forward: Richard TurcsányiRecommendations:Jeremy: The WEIRDest People in the World: How the West Became Psychologically Peculiar and Particularly Prosperous by Joseph Henrich; and The Expanse novels by James S. A. CoreyKaiser: Playground by Richard Powers See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week, a special episode taped live at the University of California, Berkeley — my alma mater — on March 6 and featuring Jessica Chen Weiss of Johns Hopkins SAIS and Ryan Hass of the Brookings Institution, both well-known to people who follow U.S.-China relations. This episode was made possible by the Center for Chinese Studies at UC Berkeley's Institute for Asian Studies, and will be available on video as well — I'll update with the link.5:32 – Looking back on the Biden administration's approach to China12:28 – Attempting to outline the new Trump administration's approach to China20:34 – The view from Beijing of Trump 2.026:54 – The Kindleberger Trap (and other "traps")29:35 – China, the U.S., and the Russo-Ukrainian war, and the idea of a “reverse Kissinger” 34:23 – The problem with framing objectionable Trump policy moves as ceding victories to China 36:51 – How countries in the Western Pacific region are responding to the new administration 38:48 – Taiwan's concerns for Trump's shift on Ukraine41:45 – Predictions for how the Trump administration will handle technology competition with China, and the apparent abandonment of industrial policy 48:14 – What the affirmative vision for U.S.-China policy should look like Paying It Forward:Ryan: Patricia Kim and Jon Czin at BrookingsJessica: Jeffrey Ding at George Washington University and Jonas Nahm at Johns Hopkins SAIS Recommendations:Jessica: The movie Conclave (2024)Ryan: Derek Thompson's piece in The Atlantic, “The Anti-Social Century,” and Robert Cooper's The Ambassadors: Thinking about Diplomacy from Machiavelli to Modern Times Kaiser: The Man Without Qualities by Robert Musil See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Canadian podcaster and geopolitical analyst Daniel Dumbrill joins the show. He's been living in Chongqing, Southwest China for years. We take our time unravelling the lies about China. From East to West, the truth is breaking through the noise. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

This week, I'm proud to announce a new collaboration with Trivium, a China-focused strategic advisory firm you've probably heard of. They've got offices in DC, London, Shanghai, and Beijing, and they focus on analyzing and forecasting Chinese policy developments for multinational companies and institutional investors across a range of verticals -- including macroeconomics, technology, automotive, resources, renewable energy, critical minerals, and green technology. They put out a terrific podcast each week, and you'll be able to listen to it here or subscribe wherever you get your podcasts. Just search for the Trivium China Podcast.On today's show, you'll hear a half-hour chat between me and the two co-founders, Andrew Polk and Trey McArver, which we taped ahead of the Two Meetings — the NPC and the CPPCC. Then you'll hear a conversation between Andrew and his colleague Dinny McMahon, who you've heard on the show before in an episode we did on the digital yuan, talking about what came out of the Two Meetings.You'll be hearing from lots of the great folks at Trivium in coming episodes, so be sure to tune in.Beginning next week, or possibly sooner, we'll also be running a regular economy-focused roundup put together by Andrew and the team at Trivium. That will come out on Fridays.A warm welcome to Trey, Andrew, and all the excellent people at Trivium!See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

We are playing The Between by Jason Cordova! The Between is a tabletop roleplaying game about a group of mysterious monster hunters in Victorian-era London. They are residents of a place called Hargrave House, and their job is to investigate and neutralize monstrous threats terrorizing the city—threats that Scotland Yard won't or can't handle themselves. As the story progresses, they become aware of the plans of a Moriarty-style criminal mastermind they will eventually have to face in order to save Queen and country. In this episode: It's the dusk phase and Mr Singh goes hunting for tarot motifs Smit reaches out to Tom in a dark moment Smit goes to the opera! Plus: we discuss the geography of Chongqing and other cities, as well as Where's WallyBlack Armada DiscordWe would like to invite our listeners to join the Black Armada discord, where you can hang out with the podcast crew. Join the discord here:⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://discord.gg/8GAtj9pRYy⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠CreditsOur players are: Joshua Fox ⁠⁠⁠⁠https://bsky.app/profile/armadajosh.bsky.social⁠⁠⁠⁠ Becky Annison ⁠⁠⁠⁠https://bsky.app/profile/beckyannison.bsky.social⁠⁠⁠⁠ Eadwin Tomlinson ⁠https://bsky.app/profile/eadwin.bsky.social⁠ Nick Bate⁠⁠⁠⁠https://bsky.app/profile/ickbat.bsky.social⁠⁠⁠⁠ Sue Elliott⁠⁠⁠⁠https://bsky.app/profile/suefacetm.bsky.social⁠⁠⁠ Black Armada create and publish TTRPGs here:⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://blackarmada.com/⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Nick creates and publishes TTRPGs as Ickbat here:⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://ickbat.itch.io/⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠The music is⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Orange Button⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ by Esther Garcia.

Child trafficker Yu Huaying was executed on Friday after China's top court approved her death sentence.人贩余华英于上周五被执行死刑，此前中国最高人民法院核准了她的死刑判决。The execution was carried out by the Guiyang Intermediate People's Court in Guizhou province, where Yu was convicted of abducting and trafficking children and given the death penalty.此次死刑由贵州省贵阳市中级人民法院执行，余华英因拐卖儿童罪被判处死刑。Before the 61-year-old was executed, the court allowed her to meet her family members, fully protecting the legitimate rights of the criminal.在这名61岁罪犯被执行死刑前，法院安排其会见了近亲属，充分保障了被执行罪犯的合法权利。On Oct 25, the court sentenced Yu to death after identifying that Yu, between 1993 and 2003, abducted 17 children in Guizhou, Chongqing and Yunnan provinces, and then sold the victims to Handan in Hebei province for financial gains.10月25日，法院判处余华英死刑。法院经审理查明，1993年至2003年期间，余华英在贵州、重庆、云南等地拐卖17名儿童，并将受害者卖到河北邯郸牟利。The court also stripped of her political rights for life and ordered that all her personal assets be confiscated.法院还判处余华英终身剥夺政治权利，并处没收个人全部财产。Yu appealed to a higher court, but the Guizhou High People's Court later rejected her appeal and upheld the original ruling and submitted the death sentence to the Supreme People's Court, China's top court, for review.余华英提出上诉，但贵州省高级人民法院裁定驳回上诉，维持原判，并依法报请最高人民法院核准。Under the Chinese law, death sentences issued by lower courts must be reviewed and approved by the top court before executions are implemented.根据中国法律，下级法院作出的死刑判决必须经最高人民法院复核批准后方可执行。Yu and her case attracted widespread public attention since 2022 when police in Guiyang received a report from Yang Niuhua, alleging she was snatched by Yu in Guizhou and taken to Hebei in 1995. Soon after the report, police captured Yu from Chongqing.余华英及其案件自2022年以来引起了公众的广泛关注，当时贵阳警方接到杨妞花的报案，称其于1995年被余华英在贵州拐走并带到河北。报案后不久，警方在重庆抓获余华英。During the trial, the Guiyang court said that the abduction and trafficking had separated 12 families, making some parents spend many years searching for their children or even die of depression.在审判期间，贵阳市中级人民法院表示，拐卖行为导致12个家庭骨肉分离，一些父母花费多年时间寻找孩子，甚至因抑郁而终。The court added it imposed the death penalty on Yu, because the malice of Yu was extremely deep, and the circumstance of her criminal behaviors was extremely serious, and the consequence of the crime was extremely severe.法院补充说，对余华英判处死刑，是因为其犯罪情节特别严重，社会危害性极大，主观恶性极深。重点词汇：Child trafficker: 人贩子Death sentence: 死刑Abduction and trafficking: 拐卖

This week: Part 2 in a series of podcasts in conjunction with the China Research Center at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). The series, titled "Studying China in the Absence of Access: Rediscovering a Lost Art," ran from September to November 2021, and featured four eminent "Pekingologists," or specialists in Chinese elite politics: Joseph Fewsmith, Thomas Fingar, Alice Miller, and Fred Teiwes. The talks were later published in a volume you can download here. The series is introduced by Andrew Mertha, George and Sadie Hyman, Professor of China Studies and director of the SAIS China Research Center, and each lecture includes a moderated discussion with Andy. After this series, I'll also be sharing with you a second series of lectures titled "Studying China from Elsewhere," which will include talks by Maria Repnikova, Mike Lampton, William Hurst, and Maggie Lewis — many of whom Sinica listeners will know from the show.Alice Lyman Miller is a leading scholar of Chinese politics and foreign policy. A research fellow at the Hoover Institution and lecturer in East Asian Studies at Stanford University, she previously served as an analyst at the CIA and editor of China Leadership Monitor. Miller's work has been instrumental in decoding the opaque world of Chinese elite politics, with a particular focus on political discourse and leadership transitions. Her major publications include Becoming Asia: Change and Continuity in Asian International Relations Since World War II (2011).Joseph Fewsmith is one of the foremost experts on contemporary Chinese politics, known for his in-depth analysis of political reform, elite competition, and policy shifts under the Chinese Communist Party. A professor of international relations and political science at Boston University, Fewsmith has authored seminal books such as China Since Tiananmen: The Politics of Transition (2001) and Rethinking Chinese Politics (2021), which challenge conventional wisdom on China's political system. His work blends rigorous historical analysis with close readings of official discourse. See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Chongqing, a municipality in Southwest China, nestled in the mountains, driven by industry, and spiced up with passion! It's now the number 4 titan in China's trillion-Yuan GDP club! Let's sit down and explore how it got there! On the show: Heyang, Steve Hatherly & Ding Heng

This week on Sinica: February 24 marks the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and as I've done for the last two years, I moderated a panel organized by Vita Golod, a Ukrainian China scholar who happens to be here in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, at UNC as a visiting scholar. She's worked tirelessly to promote awareness of the war, and I'm honored again to have been asked to moderate this panel.The guests you'll hear from are:Dr. Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova, Director of the China Studies Centre at Riga Stradins University in Latvia. Fluent in Chinese, Russian, and English, she has collaborated with scholars like Kerry Brown of King's College London and has done extensive work on China's role in Europe and beyond.Dr. Dmytro Yefremov, Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations at the National University "Kyiv-Mohyla Academy" in Ukraine. A board member of the Ukrainian Association of Sinologists, he specializes in China's foreign relations and has traveled extensively to China, providing firsthand insight into Ukraine's perspective on China's role in the war and beyond.Dr. Qiang Liu, Director of the Energy Economics Division at the Institute of Quantitative & Technical Economics within the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). He also serves as the Co-chair and Secretary-General of the Global Forum on Energy Security. His research focuses on energy security, energy economics, and policy, with a particular emphasis on China's Belt and Road Initiative and its global energy partnerships.Dr. Klaus Larres, Richard M. Krasno Distinguished Professor of History and International Affairs at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. An expert on transatlantic relations, U.S., German, and EU foreign policy, and China's role in the post-Cold War order, he has a profound interest in the history of the Cold War and the politics of Winston Churchill.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Global attention will turn to Beijing next week with the start of the two sessions, China's biggest annual political event, through which the people's voices will be heard by policymakers, while the country's development priorities will be discussed.With the people's well-being in mind, President Xi Jinping, who is also general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, has since 2013 leveraged the two sessions to hold discussions with grassroots-level lawmakers and political advisers from across the country, listening to their suggestions on the country's development.Two sessions refer to the annual gatherings in Beijing of the deputies to the National People's Congress, the nation's top legislature, and the members of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the nation's top political advisory body.As an embodiment of whole-process people's democracy, the two sessions have become a strong bond linking the Chinese leader and people at the grassroots level.At discussions during the two sessions about the country's development priorities, Xi has touched upon a variety of topics, including efforts to promote high-quality growth, foster new quality productive forces, enhance innovation in science and technology, and strengthen ecological conservation.He has always highlighted the need to make every effort to enable China's 1.4 billion people to lead a better life on the path to Chinese modernization.When he took part in deliberations with NPC deputies from the delegation of Jiangsu province last year, Xi emphasized the need to adhere to the people-centered development philosophy. "We must steadily enhance the level of livelihood security through development, and guide and motivate our people to create a happy life with their own hands," he said.People-centered development has been at the core of Xi's governance philosophy. When he has conducted inspections nationwide, he has always visited rural areas and urban communities to see how people are faring in their lives.Last year, he spent a total of more than 30 days on inspection tours, visiting 12 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions as well as the Macao Special Administrative Region. He visited farmers' homes, orchards and farm fields, as well as urban communities, seaports and high-tech industrial parks."As far as Chinese modernization is concerned, the people's well-being is prioritized," Xi told local residents when visiting a rural community during his inspection tour of Chongqing in April. "All the work of the Party and the government is aimed at ensuring a happier life for the ordinary people," he added.On Jan 22, ahead of Chinese New Year, Xi braved the cold to visit people who had been affected by floods in the village of Zhujiagou in Huludao, Liaoning province. He visited villagers who had moved into their new houses and inquired about the quality of the reconstructed homes and whether their daily necessities were adequate.Wang Lili, Party chief of the village, said that what Xi cares about most is whether the villagers affected by the floods live a good life."President Xi's care brings warmth and happiness to our hearts," she said.According to the Ministry of Finance, 70 percent of government expenditures in 2024 went toward ensuring the people's well-being.In his 2025 New Year message, Xi said: "Of all the jobs in front of us, the most important is to ensure a happy life for our people. ... We should work together to steadily improve social undertakings and governance, build a harmonious and inclusive atmosphere, and settle real issues, big or small, for our people. We must bring more smiles to our people and greater warmth to their hearts."Regarding the Chinese president's visit in 2018 to Liangjiahe, a village in Shaanxi province, where Xi had stayed for seven years as an "educated youth" in his teens, Faustin-Archange Touadera, president of the Central African Republic, said that he was impressed by Xi's strong connections with the people."Xi is deeply rooted in the people, always standing with the people and serving the people," Touadera said in an interview with China Global Television Network.Under Xi's leadership, the Party has made it a major task of Chinese modernization to ensure and improve people's livelihood through development.The third plenary session of the 20th CPC Central Committee, which was held in July, adopted a resolution on further deepening reform comprehensively to advance Chinese modernization, with a focus on enhancing people's quality of life, improving the income distribution system, promoting an employment-first policy, strengthening the social security system and deepening reform of the healthcare system.Guo Jianning, a professor at Tsinghua University's School of Marxism, said that putting people first underpins the governance philosophy and core values of the Party.Ensuring that the people lead better lives serves as both the starting point and the ultimate goal of the Party to further deepen reform on all fronts, Guo said in an article published by China Education News.While striving to improve the well-being of its own people, China, led by Xi, has also been committed to promoting the world's common development to ensure a better life for people in all countries."On the path toward modernization, no one and no country should be left behind," Xi said at the 2024 Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in September, calling on China and Africa to join hands to boost the modernization of the Global South to contribute to peace, security, prosperity and progress around the world.

This week on Sinica, I chat with David Zweig, a veteran China scholar who is Professor Emeritus from the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. We discuss Davis'd latest book, The War for Chinese Talent in America, which looks at Chinese efforts to harness the intellectual firepower of Chinese scientists and engineers who studied abroad, especially in the United States, and bring them — or at least their knowledge —back to China. David's book takes a balanced look at both the very real problems generated by Chinese policies as well as the overreaction by the U.S. Department of Justice in the form of the infamous China Initiative. 3:40 – Why got David interested on this particular topic 7:07 – The diaspora option12:09 – The Thousand Talents Program/Plan18:28 – How the talent programs operate23:48 – Motivations for Chinese to participate in the talent programs, how geopolitics now impacts these decisions, and what the effect of the China Initiative has been on collaboration 36:29 – The China Initiative's climate of fear and the concern for racial profiling 49:40 – The extent of the validity of U.S. security concerns57:24 – David's suggestions for balancing national security interests and open scientific exchange Paying It Forward: Dan Lynch and his book, China's Futures: PRC Elites Debate Economics, Politics, and Foreign PolicyRecommendations:David: It's a Wonderful World — The Louis Armstrong Musical in New YorkKaiser: The Invention of Yesterday: A 50,000-Year History of Human Culture, Conflict, and Connection by Tamim Ansary, especially the audiobook read by the authorSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

In the final episode in this series recorded before a live audience in China, John is joined by Richard Ma, Founder of the Dahui law firm; Xiao Liu, Quinn Emanuel's Chair of China Practice and Chief Representative of the Beijing Office; and Yixuan Zhu, partner in Quinn Emanuel's Beijing office.  They discuss building their respective firms, establishing their firms' cultures, global expansion strategies, and challenges in cross-border legal practice.  Dahui was established to better serve clients, particularly in fast-evolving new economy industries like technology, media, telecommunications, and healthcare.  Dahui adopted a boutique approach—being the best at what it did and providing full-service legal support to its clients.  Expanding carefully, the firm analyzes whether expanding into a new city will assist its clients and whether it can attract top tier local talent.  The Chinese legal market is also trending towards firms expanding into “second-tier” Chinese cities such as Wuhan, Nanjing, and Chongqing where an increasing number of disputes arise.  Quinn Emanuel's global expansion has been largely talent-driven and opportunistic, seeking exceptional lawyers to open offices rather than following a predetermined plan.  In addition, the globalization of business has led to a globalization of disputes with proceedings in multiple jurisdictions and key witnesses living around the world.  Firms with talented lawyers throughout the world are simply better suited to effectively represent clients in such cases.  Both firms work to maintain firm cultures that emphasizes competitiveness and client service.  Quinn Emanuel has a tradition of sending firm wide "victory emails" to celebrate case wins and instill a results-driven mindset.  Dahui values commitment to precision and professionalism, ensuring high standards in legal work.  On the evolving Chinese legal market, Dahui bridges the gap between international clients and China's regulatory landscape, correcting misconceptions and ensuring successful investments and dispute resolutions.  As Chinese companies continue to expand globally, demand for international dispute resolution will likely rise.  Legal complexities stemming from U.S.-China tensions will also likely provide opportunities for experienced litigators to navigate shifting regulatory and geopolitical landscapes.Podcast Link: Law-disrupted.fmHost: John B. Quinn Producer: Alexis HydeMusic and Editing by: Alexander Rossi

I'm delighted to bring you today the first in a series of conversations from a remarkable day-long session put on by the Institute for America, China, and the Future of Global Affairs, or ACF, at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). The session was held on Monday, February 3, and was called “Getting China Right.” On today's show, we've got U.S. Senator Andy Kim of New Jersey, one of the best-informed and sensible legislators focused on China today. He'll be in conversation with James Steinberg, dean of SAIS, who also served as Deputy Secretary of State from 2009 to 2011. You'll hear introductory remarks from Jim and from Jessica Chen Weiss, inaugural faculty director ACF and David M. Lampton Professor of China Studies at SAIS, who listeners certainly know from her appearances on Sinica. More to come in this series, so stay tuned! Please enjoy Senator Kim's very thoughtful remarks.Watch the morning sessions on YouTube here.The Institute for America, China, and the Future of Global Affairs (ACF) of the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) was established in 2024 to add rigor and reason to public and policy discussions on China and the range of domestic and international issues that intersect China's global role, bringing together experts and practitioners to foster informed public dialogue, promote evidence-based research, and support the next generation of scholars and practitioners. ACF was founded with the support of Johns Hopkins University and philanthropic contributions from across the United States.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, I chat with economic historian Andrew B. Liu of Villanova University about how to understand Trump's thinking on China and tariffs. Andy wrote about this in an excellent piece on N+1 called "Back to the 80s? Trump, Xi Jinping, and Tariffs." Check it out and then listen to the show!3:59 – How the U.S.'s current trade anxieties echo those of the ‘80s9:34 – How Cold War geopolitics shaped U.S.-Japan trade relations18:23 – The lessons China learned from Japan's experience and how it has shaped its recent economic strategy 21:03 – What Xi Jinping's vision for the Chinese economy actually looks like 34:26 – Why China is favoring a more Ford-like model of industrial structure41:28 – Michael Pettis's ideas from Trade Wars Are Class Wars and points of critique 52:44 – The Trump administration's use of tariffsPaying It Forward: Viola Zhou's reporting on Rest of World (especially her piece on Foxconn in India) and Dong Yige Recommendations:Andrew: Hetty Lui McKinnon's Substack for vegan modern Cantonese recipes Kaiser: The Substack of the Carter Center's U.S.-China Perception Monitor; and the essay “The new frontline: The US-China battle for control of global networks” on the Transnational Institute websiteSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

The global influence of the new American vision is growing. In his latest stunning move, Trump says we could own Gaza. During a major presser with Bibi Netanyahu, lots of promises were made. Was this a dressing down? A rebuke? An ultimatum? Gaza would be American territory. A functional and secure zone. Reshaping the Middle East. Israel would not be the final authority over Gaza. Bad optics for them. The President's vision is one of peace. We have to learn from history. A focus on solutions. Dismantling the terror network must include the money pit. The same people pull both party levers. Explain millions for Gaza condoms. A fascinating city in central China, that is actually related to the LA fires. Chongqing is all about vertical urban planning. A wartime capital with amazing terraces and levels of topography. The futuristic design hints at what is possible. How about a modern mega city here? LA already has lots of underground tunnels. The crook's plan was to corner Trump on rebuilding options. Nobody wants to talk about California's tragedy. It's all about the powers that be who decide. Yet, nothing is set in stone. In the end, we must take control of our own lives, and our country.

Die deutsche Gesellschaft könnte von einem liberalen Patriotismus in vielerlei Hinsicht profitieren, meint unser Gast. Donald Trump träumt von der Riviera des Nahen Ostens. Und: Chinas Cyberpunk-City. Von WDR 5.

This week as we enter the Year of the Snake, Sinica co-founder Jeremy Goldkorn makes a re-appearance on the show. It's been a year since his last, and much has changed — and indeed, if Jeremy is right, we may be at an inflection point in American attitudes toward China. With the "TikTok Refugees" on Xiaohongshu or "RedNote" taking in a view of China that contrasts starkly with the image presented by the U.S. Government and by many American media outlets, and with DeepSeek now having upended some ideas about American tech primacy, the "vibes" on China among young people seem to have changed for the better. Will it endure? Jeremy and I plunge into that question on this week's episode of the Sinica Podcast.2:55 – What Jeremy has been up to lately 4:19 – What has been driving the recent narrative/vibe shift in China discourse in the U.S., and why human rights rhetoric around Xinjiang has died down 14:11 – Whether the narrative/vibe shift will be long-lasting and the role of young people in driving it 23:06 – Predictions for future changes within China29:40 – The concern that the narrative/vibe shift could go too far, or that the copium will overwhelm the positive of the shift 33:24 – Previous narrative shifts around freedom of speech, the internet, and China, and technological innovation 43:57 – What recent developments reveal about Chinese soft power, and Jeremy's predictions for how everything will play out 49:34 – Whether the narrative/vibe shift will change how American politicians talk about China, and the Chinese government has reacted to the shift so farPaying It Forward: Savannah Billman's Career China email newsletter Recommendations:Jeremy: Paul Cooper's Fall of Civilizations podcast series; David Kidd's Peking Story: The Last Days of Old China; and The 404's podcast interview with a PornHub exec (which includes discussion of real-name registration requirements) Kaiser: The TV miniseries American Primeval (2025) on Netflix; and Paul Triolo's Substack See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Romans w Chongqing. Dwójka dzieci wypada z okna na 15 piętrze. Czy to na pewno był wypadek? Chińska Czarna Dalia. Zaginiona studentka została poćwiartowana na 2 tysiące kawałków.

Happy Chinese New Year! This week, while I'm decompressing from 10 days in the Alps, my friends at the Asia Society of Switzerland have graciously offered to let me share a podcast recorded just after the U.S. presidential election in November at their annual State of Asia event. "The State of China" features three terrific guests: Wang Qing (王卿), the host of the popular Chinese podcast "The Weirdo" (不合时宜), Zichen Wang of the Center for China and Globalization, and Adam Tooze, one of the truly great public intellectuals of our time. It's all skillfully moderated by the South China Morning Post's Europe editor, Finbarr Bermingham, and it covers a lot of ground. I'll be back next week in conversation with my dear friend Jeremy Goldkorn, and we'll be asking (and answering) the big question — Are we in the middle of a narrative shift on China?May the Year of the Snake be prosperous and full of happiness and success for all you Sinica listeners!See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

In this episode of Makin' it in China, we share two stories.Ehsan Doostmohammadi, an Iranian researcher at Southwest University in Chongqing, is dedicated to translating classic Chinese texts into Persian. His work provides Iranians with a unique insight into Chinese heritage and traditional medicine.Saulebek Kabylbekov, a Kazakh ophthalmologist based in Daqing, Heilongjiang, has treated more than 250,000 patients since 1998. Renowned for his humanitarian efforts and commitment to providing free medical services, he received the Chinese Government Friendship Award in 2023.If you enjoy feature stories like this one, be sure to check out "Footprints" on your favorite podcast platform!

The great French actress Isabelle Huppert is a mainstay at many international festivals, but seeing her grace the screens at Sundance in Park City, Utah was a uniquely pleasant surprise. Huppert stars in LUZ, the second feature from Hong Kong director Flora Lau, which premiered in the World Cinema Dramatic Competition at this year's edition. The film follows two characters who turn to virtual reality to attempt to reconnect with estranged loved ones. One of them is a reformed gangster in Chongqing trying to find his daughter who was taken away from him years ago; the other is a Hong Kong gallery owner who goes to Paris to visit her stepmother (played by Huppert) who is facing a terminal diagnosis. Huppert carries the role with her typical combination of flair and subtlety, portraying a woman who faces mortality with quiet, even irreverent self-assuredness.  Last week, Film Comment Editor Devika Girish chatted with Huppert about how she came to be a part of LUZ, what it's like to communicate across language barriers on and off-screen, and how Apichatpong Weerasethakul introduced her to virtual reality. Catch up on all of our Sundance 2025 coverage at filmcomment.com

This week, I bring you the first in a series of podcasts in conjunction with the China Research Center at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). The series, titled "Studying China in the Absence of Access: Rediscovering a Lost Art," ran from September to November 2021, and featured four eminent "Pekingologists," or specialists in Chinese elite politics: Joseph Fewsmith, Thomas Fingar, Alice Miller, and Fred Teiwes. The talks were later published in a volume you can download here. The series is introduced by Andrew Mertha, George and Sadie Hyman, Professor of China Studies and director of the SAIS China Research Center, and each lecture includes a moderated discussion with Andy. After this series, I'll also be sharing with you a second series of lectures titled "Studying China from Elsewhere," which will include talks by Maria Repnikova, Mike Lampton, William Hurst, and Maggie Lewis — many of whom Sinica listeners will know from the show.This week's talk is from FrederickTeiwes, truly a legend in the field. The American-born Australian sinologist is best known for his analysis of Chinese Communist Party elite politics. He served as a professor emeritus in Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney until his retirement in 2006. Teiwes has frequently collaborated with Warren Sun, producing seminal works such as The Tragedy of Lin Biao (1996) and China's Road to Disaster: Mao, Central Politicians and Provincial Leaders in the Great Leap Forward, 1955-59 (1999). In this talk, he focuses on forthcoming work on the transition following Mao Zedong's death in 1976.Great thanks to Andy and to Hasta Colman, who first suggested this collaboration when we met in Shanghai recently.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

I wanted to put this out quickly as it's one of those rare, news-pegged episodes of the show. The full show notes and transcript will be available later this week. I know I'd said last time there would be no show this week, but that was before this fascinating episode involving TikTok users signing up en masse to Xiaohongshu. Hilarity ensued, and my two guests — Ivy Yang, who runs Wavelet Strategy, an expert in cross-cultural communication, and David Fishman, Shanghai-based senior manager at Lantau Group who specializes in the Chinese energy sector and writes wonderfully about his excursions into the Chinese countryside. They've both been following this fascinating episode closely and have really smart things to say, so enjoy!See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, I'm joined by Lizzi Lee, fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute and by my lights one of the most astute, well-informed people writing on China in the English-speaking world today. She has fascinating perspectives on China's preparations for the Trump administration, on China's reluctance to roll out large-scale cash stimulus, and Xi Jinping's challenges. Don't miss this one! (I will update the show notes and publish the transcript early next week — thanks for your patience!)3:39 – Lizzi's argument from her op-ed, “Counting the Hawks in the Trump 2.0 Administration is Pointless”: the importance of which country will be able to get its act together 10:25 – U.S.-China competition as a long game, from China's perspective14:22 – How China views the current state of division in American politics19:00 – The main risks and opportunities for China presented by Trump's return, including opportunities in the geopolitical realm with the Europeans 28:09 – The state of China's domestic economy33:28 – Counterarguments to critiques of China's cautious deployment of stimulus, and where Lizzi stands on the issue 43:46 – Lizzi's thoughts on deflation in the Chinese economy 49:30 – The idea of accepting short-term pain for long-term gain in economic recovery 53:59 – Xi Jinping's vision for China's economy 58:46 – How Xi Jinping's ideological language can be challenging for officials and markets 1:03:57 – How China's political calendar has hindered execution of policy 1:06:42 – What Lizzi thinks the Chinese leadership should prioritize nowPaying it Forward: Lizzi recommends the work of Barclay Bram, especially his series on Chinese youth at the Asia Society here.Recommendations:Lizzi: Grazia Ting Deng's book Chinese Espresso: Contested Race and Convivial Space in Contemporary ItalyKaiser: More historical fiction by Robert Harris, including An Officer and a Spy and Munich.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, I speak with Nicole Hong and Michael Rothfeld, both investigative reporters at the New York Times, about a series of stories they've done, stretching between August and December 2024, on the Falun Gong-run performance troupe Shen Yun, and the Falun Gong-affiliated newspaper The Epoch Times. Read the latest two articles in that series here and here. There will be links to the other stories on the transcript page.4:33 – Nicole and Michael's collection of pieces on Falun Gong 6:26 – Background on [the?] Falun Gong: Li Hongzhi, the context out of which the movement emerged, its international spread, and the CCP's crackdown in the '90s12:00 – Shen Yun performances, and audience reactions 18:46 – Following the money: Falun Gong's dramatic financial growth, gray areas, and where the money goes 29:03 – Spiritual project or big grift?31:39 – What Nicole and Michael uncovered 36:23 – Memorable individuals: Chang Chun-ko, Kate the performer, and Josh the violinist41:10 – The dynamics within [the?] Falun Gong, and what has been alleged45:34 – The Epoch Times, and their editorial changes 53:02 – The appeal of Falun Gong, and the level of scrutiny it getsPaying It Forward:Nicole: Researchers/freelancers/translators Yi Liu and Peiyue Wu Michael: New York Times colleague Susan Beachy Recommendations:Nicole: Connie: A Memoir by Connie Chung Michael: Like Water for Chocolate by Laura Esquivel; One Hundred Years of Solitude by Gabriel Garcia Marquez (and the new One Hundred Years of Solitude TV series (2024)); and the TV series Gomorrah (2014-2021)Kaiser: TikTok accounts workplace_doodles (a former Shen Yun performer born into a Falun Gong family) and cocolarkincooks (a fantastic cooking resource)See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, I welcome back Michael Cerny — formerly of the Carter Center and now a Ph.D. student at Harvard — and Rory Truex of Princeton University to discuss a new working paper they've co-authored. They undertook a large-scale survey of foreign policy professionals at U.S. think tanks to ascertain whether there is a "consensus" on China policy, as is often claimed, and whether people working in think tanks feel pressure to take on more "hawkish" positions on China policy. We also introduce a new segment called "Paying it Forward."5:04 – What motivated Michael and Rory to write their paper together 7:30 – Groupthink vs. consensus10:08 – The methodology: combining surveys and interviews, and the sampling frame 14:35 – Trying to avoid leading questions 17:58 – Creating the “China Confrontation Index” 20:25 – Different levels of acceptance of the labels “hawk” and “dove” 23:33 – The issue of preference falsification 25:43 – Mechanisms behind disparities in perceived pressure 29:01 – Tying in Rory's previous research on self-censorship 32:42 – How Michael and Rory decided on interviews 34:10 – What Michael believes were the most important and robust findings36:09 – The distinction between the beliefs of think tankers vs. elected officials, and why people tend to believe there is a bipartisan consensus on China 40:34 – Pressure on hawks 42:35 – Specific policy questions44:18 – Feedback on the paper so far, and what Michael and Rory may tweak in a subsequent draft 49:47 – The possible role of personality in hawkishness or dovishness 51:58 – Discussing Mike Mazarr's concerns about the potential parallels between current Chinese discourse and the lead-up to the Iraq War 55:06 – Advice to younger professionals entering the foreign policy/China field New segment: Paying It Forward:Rory: Michael Cerny and Edi Obiakpani-Reid Recommendations:Rory: Edi Obiakpani-Reid's Sinobabble podcast about Chinese historyMichael: Jeffrey Ding's Technology and the Rise of Great Powers: How Diffusion Shapes Economic CompetitionKaiser: Imperium by Robert Harris See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

We invite American Professor Frank Stonier on to discuss his life in China and how he celebrates Christmas from the other side of the world. Frank lives in Chongqing, a cyberpunk-style city in Southwest China. We talk about the holiday spirit and the forth coming Chinese Spring Festival! Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

This week on Sinica I'm delighted to be joined by Amy King, Associate Professor in the Strategic & Defence Studies Centre at The Australian National University. She shares her ideas about how perceptions of insecurity can paradoxically motivate closer economic relations between two states, and she looks at not only the examples of China and Japan after the end of World War II, but Australia and China as well. We also discuss Sino-Australian relations over the last 15 years, and much else!2:48 – Key phases of Australia-China relations over the past 15 years and the security and economic nexus 9:05 – Amy's research into the Sino-Japanese relationship and how perceptions of insecurity can motivate closer economic ties, and how Australia is responding to China now 21:22 – How Amy would argue the case for economic engagement with China to folks in Washington 26:31 – Securitization in Australia and the important differences between Australia and the U.S. 30:20 – The shift in the Australia-China relationship under the Albanese government 33:12 – What the U.S. can learn from Australia 35:14 – Why people tend to conflate Australia's experience with America's 39:04 – Amy's essay, “The Collective Logic of Chinese Hegemonic Order,” and how we can understand China's role in the emerging post-unipolar world42:47 – Three mechanisms employed by China to amplify its voice post-war (amplifying, grafting, and resistance by appropriation) and how modern “middle powers” can influence the international order now 52:31 – The state of discourse on China in Australia and what Amy believes China wants 58:54 – Amy's thoughts on pluralism and international order 1:03:22 – What lessons about de-risking and navigating multi-alignment Australia should be learning from other nations in the region Recommendations:Amy: Fintan O'Toole's We Don't Know Ourselves: A Personal History of Modern Ireland Kaiser: The Paul Reed Smith (PRS) SE Hollowbody II Piezo electric guitar See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

China's rapid surge in electric vehicle manufacturing, adoption, and export has variously encouraged, delighted, impressed, frightened, and even enraged people around the world. What did China get right in facilitating the explosive development in this industry? Was is just subsidies, or were there other important policies that helped jumpstart it? How have other geographies responded? And what can they learn? Ilaria Mazzocco, deputy director and senior fellow with the Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) joins me to share her rich insights into the Chinese EV industry.3:49 – How Ilaria became interested in green industrial policy5:59 – The reality of progress in EVs in China 11:21 – The role of state subsidies and other things that tend to get missed in trying to understand EVs in China 16:51 – How other countries are trying to adopt China's approach 19:21 – The differences between the EU and U.S. approaches 24:17 – The outlook for competition in the Chinese market 26:08 – Business models in the Chinese EV sector and the example of BYD30:53 – Chinese firms' push for internationalization and how the rapidity of becoming multinationals [multinational companies?] may pose challenges 35:54 – Alignment between host countries and Chinese companies 39:58 – What the U.S. is doing and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA)42:27 – How U.S. protectionist measures may affect third markets, and whether restrictions may backfire 48:57 – The coming shift to next-generation batteries, and the potential for international collaboration in advancing more circular practices 55:43 – How Ilaria's fieldwork shifted her perspective on the EV industry 59:38 – How we can improve industrial policy Recommendations:Ilaria: My Antonia by Willa Cather; the Wolf Hall trilogy by Hilary Mantel; The Army of Sleepwalkers by Wu Ming (an Italian novelist collective) about the French Revolution Kaiser: The Wolf Hall audiobooks read by Ben Miles; the HBO series Rome (2005-2007) See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, I chat with Jane Hayward, lecturer at King's College London, about her excellent YouTube channel, Jane Hayward China, and her efforts to bring up-to-date scholarship on modern and contemporary China to audiences through internet video, slaying various bugbears along the way.3:28 Why Jane started her YouTube channel, her intended versus actual audiences, and navigating the current toxic media environment 10:56 The benefits of an area studies approach, and why Jane chose a U.S. PhD program14:46 Defining the complicated public discourse in the West 19:35 Jane's videos: the surprising popularity of “Xi Jinping is NOT like an Emperor;” and more controversial videos26:28 New Qing History and different critiques of it34:50 Jane's series on types of communism, and her video on reporting on China in British media 42:31 What may be coming next on Jane's channel RecommendationsJane: David Priestland's The Red Flag: A History of CommunismKaiser: The YouTube channel Chinese Cooking Demystified, and specifically their video “63 Chinese Cuisines: the Complete Guide” See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Welcome to China Compass on the Fight Laugh Feast Network! I'm your China travel guide, Missionary Ben. You can follow me on X (@chinaadventures) where I post daily reminders to pray for China (PrayforChina.us). You can also email me with any questions or comments @ bfwesten at gmail dot com. You can also find easy links to everything we are involved in @ PrayGiveGo.us! Summary In today’s podcast, I begin by discussing the recent US-China Prisoner Swap (5:10) and its potential implications for casual visits to China. Then I talk all about Chongqing (17:39), which turns out to have a fascinating history. Finally, we look at the fascinating life of China missionary and explorer, James Cameron (35:31), whose earthly journey ended in Chongqing in the late 1800s. (Bonus: I threw in an unplanned story near the end (49:43) about a former teammate who was nearly stabbed to death by Tibetan Assassins hired by Buddhist Monks.) In the News: China-US Prisoner Swap https://www.politico.com/news/2024/11/27/state-dept-china-travel-warning-downgraded-00191942 https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/27/world/asia/us-china-prisoner-swap.html Pray for China Province of the Week: Chongqing Chongqing Municipality in central China is matched up with southeast Texas (Greater Houston) for prayer. See which Chinese province your state is praying for @ PrayforChina.us! Chongqing is located in the subtropics, in the transitional area between the Tibetan Plateau and the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze. Its climate features frequent monsoon conditions, often raining at night in late spring and early summer. The city's "night rain in the Ba Mountains", features in poems throughout Chinese history, including "Written on a Rainy Night" by Li Shangyin. Its territory is 470 km (290 mi) from east to west at its longest, and 450 km (280 mi) from north to south at its widest. It borders Hubei and Hunan to the east, Sichuan and Shaanxi to the north, and Guizhou to the south. Asia Harvest overview: https://www.asiaharvest.org/china-resources/chongqing Wikipedia profile: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chongqing Chongqing Spicy Chicken: Lazi Ji Crazy Tall Escalator: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Huangguan_Escalator The Rise and Fall of Bo Xilai: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bo_Xilai James Cameron Missionary Explorer and Tibet Trailblazer (1845-1892): https://chinacall.substack.com/p/james-cameron https://www.asiaharvest.org/china-resources/tibet/1880s-tibetan-work https://omf.org/mrt-james-cameron-the-livingstone-of-china/ Resource of the Day: UNBEATEN: Arrested, Interrogated, and Deported from China www.Unbeaten.vip

This week on Sinica, I chat with Michael Swaine, Senior Research Fellow at the Quincy Institute for the last couple of years, prior to which he spent nearly two decades as a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he led extensive work on Chinese defense and foreign policy, U.S.-China relations, and East Asian international relations more broadly. He was also a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, where he developed a reputation for rigorous research on Asian security and crisis management. We focus on his recent report, “Avoiding the Abyss: An Urgent Need for Sino-U.S. Crisis Management,” which offers both a framework for understanding the forces driving U.S.-China crises and a roadmap to prevent or manage these crises effectively. He drew on his many decades of experience working on the security dimension of the bilateral relationship, including his participation in many Track II dialogues and simulations of crisis scenarios over the years.4:51 – Defining "crisis" and "crisis prevention" 10:13 – The possibility of a crisis in the South China Sea12:31 – Lessons from past crises 20:08 – The problematic moralistic stances and tit-for-tat escalation produced by yǒulǐ, yǒulì, yǒu jié 有理, 有利, 有节27:37 – U.S. concern over the credibility of its alliance commitments 34:50 – The problem of perception 38:16 – Examples of how each side is sometimes unable to see how its own actions are perceived by the other 41:20 – The dangers of failing to understand and making assumptions about the China's historical memory 45:42 – Problems of signaling and how best to solve them 51:17 – Mike's suggestions for a crisis toolkit and his proposal of a civilian-led two-tier dialogue structure 58:41 – Track II dialogues 1:02:47 – The importance of educating leaders up and down the system on crisis management 1:06:08 – The structural issues of the decision-making systems in China and the U.S.Recommendations:Michael: Art critic Brian Sewell's The Reviews That Caused the Rumpus; Robert Suettinger's The Conscience of the Party: Hu Yaobang, China's Communist Reformer Kaiser: The Great Transformation: China's Road from Revolution to Reform by Odd Arne Westad and Chen Jian See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

The British literary quarterly Granta has published a new issue dedicated to Chinese writers, featuring familiar mainstays of contemporary literature and some fresh new voices. This week on Sinica, I chatted with Thomas Meaney, editor of Granta, about what's happening in the literary scene in China today and how this fantastically interesting issue came together. Tom is wonderfully thoughtful and articulate, and we really get into some of the individual stories and the larger trends they may or may not represent.3:17 – Tom's familiarity with Chinese literature and China4:40 – Why Granta dedicated this issue to Chinese literature, how the issue came together, and how Granta found its translators 10:54 – Balancing political considerations with artistic merits in curating this issue 17:20 – The Chinese literary obsession with losers and the role of losers in Xiao Hai's “Adrift in the South”25:11 – The so-called Dongbei Renaissance, and Wu Qi's interview and why he pushes back on the idea of the Dongbei Renaissance genre 33:02 – Granta staff favorites 35:18 – The phenomenon of gratuitous name-dropping and borrowing stylistically from other writers 38:05 – The issue's three photo essays by Feng Li, Li Jie and Zhan Jungang, and Haohui Liu 44:36 – Yu Hua's “Tomorrow I'll Get Past It”50:09 – Mo Yan's “The Leftie Sickle” 53:10 – Yan Lianke's “Black Pig Hair, White Pig Hair” 57:56 – The "filmability" of some of the short stories and the connection between the film world and literary writers in China 1:00:08 – Where you can get Granta and pick up this issueRecommendations:Tom: The Egalitarian Moment: Asia and Africa, 1950-1980 by Anthony Low, a comparative history of land reform Kaiser: The ever-expanding library of guitarless backing tracks on YouTube to play along toSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica in a show taped live at China Crossroads, Shanghai's premier event series, I'm joined by my good friend Cameron Johnson, who is on the governing board of the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, specializes professionally in supply chains in China, and teaches at NYU Shanghai.4:20 – What makes up a supply chain ecosystem, and why it is difficult to build out 8:39 – A brief history of decoupling, the warning signs, and whether it matters “who shot first” 16:43 – Personal protective equipment (PPE) manufacturing in America, the lessons we (should have) learned, and Washington's response25:13 – EVs and batteries: manufacturing in America, and what it looks like on the ground in China 30:46 – The semiconductor industry 34:24 – “China Week” in Congress, and the different responses of GOP versus Democratic congressmen 38:36 – De-risking as globalization 2.042:21 – Cameron's predictions on the effects of the [upcoming] U.S. elections 44:10 – Inside Chinese factories 47:44 – American shortfalls in manufacturing 50:21 – The importance of seeing China's competitive markets and ecosystem clusters for oneself 53:09 – Cameron's advice for the next U.S. administration Recommendations: Cameron: Gōngyìng liàn gōngfáng zhàn 《供应链攻防战》 (Supply Chain Offensive and Defense War) by Lin Xueping; No Trade is Free: Changing Course, Taking on China, and Helping America's Workers by Robert Lighthizer Kaiser: The Praise of Folly by Desiderius Erasmus See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week, in a show taped in Beijing at the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University, I speak with Professor Da Wei about a new public opinion poll on China's perception of international security and review its important findings. We also discuss Chinese views on the Russo-Ukrainian War and the upcoming U.S. presidential election.2:11 – Da Wei's new podcast 4:05 – CISS's “Public Opinion Poll: Chinese Outlook on International Security 2024”7:46 – The poll's findings on pessimism about global security and the global influence of the U.S. and China11:56 – China's growing national confidence and growing pessimism about the U.S.-China relationship 18:26 – Paradoxical poll findings: proactive foreign policy stance vs. prioritizing domestic affairs, and involvement in global scientific cooperation vs. withdrawing in other areas of international agreement 24:30 – Why older respondents tended to be more pessimistic about China's international security situation 25:58 – Understanding negative attitude toward the United States and the effectiveness of diplomacy 30:17 – The belief that the U.S. goal is containment of China's development and the shift in view of America from a values-based country to a power-based country 36:12 – Chinese viewpoints on the Russo-Ukrainian war 39:22 – Da Wei's travels in the U.S. and the changes he has perceived 45:04 – The U.S. agenda to dissuade China from deepening its involvement with Russia 49:02 – How Chinese views on the upcoming U.S. election have changed since Kamala Harris' nominationRecommendations:Da Wei: Chen Jian's Zhou Enlai: A Life; for Chinese to travel to the U.S. moreKaiser: Chen Jian and Odd Arne Westad's The Great Transformation: China's Road from Revolution to Reform; for Americans to travel to China (and Beijing) See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.