Podcasts about Shenzhen

Brooklyn is the team nobody wants to draw, New Jersey may have made the wrong pick, and St. Louis looks like a machine built to steamroll the bracket. If you care about the MLP playoff picture, this is the episode that makes the whole weekend feel bigger. Nico and Zane break down the biggest decisions heading into New York, including the shocking New Jersey vs. Brooklyn matchup choice, whether lineup changes are coming, and why the Shock, Fives, and Flash all have very different paths to the title. They also rank every possible finals matchup and explain which championship pairing would be electric, which would be a letdown, and why this postseason could finally deliver the rivalry pickleball has been waiting for. Then Grayson Goldin joins the show for one of the most powerful comeback stories in pro pickleball. Six months after suffering two strokes and losing his ability to speak, Grayson returns to the court and wins gold in Shenzhen, describing the fear, the recovery, the rehab, and the mental battle behind getting his game and his voice back.

For episode 766 of the BlockHash Podcast, host Brandon Zemp is joined by Elisa Lu, COO and Co-founder of Memoket, an AI hardware company building the context layer between the physical world and AI. Before Memoket, she spent nearly a decade in brand commercialization and marketing leadership at Anker Innovations, where she grew brand revenue 6x in three years. At Memoket, she leads international operations and Marketing and is building the company she wished existed during years of running businesses on back-to-back conversations. Stop briefing your AI from scratch after every meeting. Memoket Gem ships August 2026. Grab your early bird spot for US$179 at memoket.ai — only 2,000 available!

Last time we spoke about the reaction after the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. After four years of fighting Japan almost alone, China's Chiang Kai-shek learned of Pearl Harbor with profound relief. Japan's attack, meant to neutralize American naval power, instead galvanized the entire Western world against Tokyo. Within hours, Chiang declared war on the Axis powers, transforming China from an isolated nation to a recognized Allied member. The strategic mathematics were clear to Chiang: America's industrial might would ultimately crush Japan. China simply needed to survive long enough. The United States quickly formalized this partnership, pledging military support through Lend-Lease and elevating Chiang to leadership of Allied forces in the China theater. Yet Pearl Harbor brought catastrophe for Western civilians in China. Americans and Britons, previously protected as neutral foreigners, were suddenly rounded up and interned in camps. For many, decades of presence in China ended in hasty evacuation, leaving behind lives built over generations.   #216 The Battle of Hong Kong Part 1: The Approaching Storm Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Japan emerged as a significant threat to British interests during the 1920s following the collapse of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This concern intensified dramatically after Japan's invasion of China, with the ensuing Sino-Japanese War escalating tensions further. British assets in the region came under direct assault, including attacks on Western military and commercial vessels such as HMS Ladybird. Yet despite these provocations, the British Government maintained an inconsistent stance toward Japan, responding with only feeble diplomatic and military countermeasures. This contradiction characterized London's approach: while diplomatic channels remained conciliatory, military planners viewed Japan with genuine apprehension. During the 1930s, Singapore and Malaya represented Britain's most valuable and prosperous holdings in the Far East and consequently received substantial garrison reinforcements. By contrast, Hong Kong was widely acknowledged to be indefensible—a conclusion reached repeatedly by successive military studies. Despite this consensus, the British Government proceeded with the Hong Kong Defence Scheme in 1936, which aimed to transform Hong Kong Island into a fortified redoubt while establishing delaying positions in Kowloon and the New Territories. The Hong Kong Garrison's mandate was straightforward: repel external attacks and prevent enemy use of the harbour and dry dock. The underlying strategy relied on a simple principle: hold Hong Kong Island as an impregnable fortress and await relief from the Royal Navy. Consequently, protecting the harbour became the paramount objective. Japanese strategists were correctly identified as Hong Kong's primary threat, with military planners anticipating attack from the sea rather than overland. To counter such an offensive, the defence scheme incorporated five successive layers of protection: naval mines fitted with indicator nets and anti-submarine booms formed the first barrier; coastal artillery provided the second; beach installations featuring pillboxes, wire entanglements and mines constituted the third; infantry strongpoints positioned on commanding heights guarded against amphibious landings; and finally, a mobile reserve force stood ready to counterattack and eliminate any successful enemy incursion. The 1936 plan also mandated extensive fortification of Kowloon's bottleneck approaches through bunkers, trenches and blocked passages, with a principal defensive line—resembling a miniature Maginot Line—constructed across the mountains immediately north of Kowloon. The garrison structure comprised three infantry battalions plus the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps (HKVDC), a unit approximately regiment-strength equipped with armoured cars, engineers, artillery, anti-aircraft guns and infantry. These forces organized into three brigades: mainland, island, and garrison reserve. The air component was planned to be formidable: a reconnaissance squadron, a fighter-bomber squadron, two torpedo squadrons and a flight of auxiliary spotting aircraft operated by the HKVDC. Naval forces consisted of a modest destroyer contingent, an MTB flotilla, gunboats and patrol vessels. When Japan occupied Guangzhou, Hong Kong found itself effectively encircled. In response, limited conscription was implemented, though restricted to non-Chinese males for HKVDC service. Chinese personnel were largely confined to non-combat positions such as air-raid precautions and medical duties. The expanding Japanese threat prompted a substantial expansion of the Hong Kong Garrison to four regular infantry regiments—two British units (one specializing in medium machine-gun support) and two Indian regiments. Supporting forces included two coastal artillery regiments, a field artillery regiment-plus, and an anti-aircraft regiment. The Royal Navy expanded to include the 2nd MTB flotilla (eight 60-foot, 29-knot motor torpedo boats armed with twin torpedoes and eight Lewis guns each, plus two smaller 55-foot vessels), four shallow-draught river gunboats (HMS Cicala, Tern, Moth and Robin), four aging World War I S-class destroyers (HMS Thracian, Thanet, Scout and Tenedos—the last transferred to Singapore in 1939), HMS Cornflower sloop, and various auxiliary vessels including tugs, boom defence ships and minelayers. The Fleet Air Arm deployed three Supermarine Walruses—single-engine reconnaissance amphibians—at Kai Tak Airport. The Royal Air Force remained the weakest service, equipped with only four Vickers Wildebeest torpedo-bombers and a handful of HKVDC aircraft: one Avro Tutor, two Hornet Moths and two Cadet biplanes. When World War II erupted in Europe, Britain's focus necessarily shifted to national survival, inevitably leaving distant imperial outposts like Hong Kong neglected. Rather than receive reinforcements, Hong Kong actually lost capable personnel; many veteran troops were repatriated to Europe, leaving behind a less proficient garrison. Peacetime duties had proven a poor preparation for combat—officers and men had passed their time socializing rather than maintaining combat readiness. Governor Sir Geoffrey Northcote persistently urged London to adopt a firmer stance against relentless Japanese provocations: aircraft incursions, sinking of junks and fishing vessels, and infiltration by Taiwanese fifth columnists (Japan had colonized Taiwan in 1895). Recognizing the hopelessness of his position, Northcote recommended withdrawal in October 1940, arguing that defending the colony would inevitably result in mass civilian casualties and widespread destruction—a pragmatic assessment given Hong Kong's indefensible state. London categorically rejected this proposal, reasoning that withdrawal would demoralize China, embolden Japan and undermine American confidence in British resolve. Underlying this decision was an additional consideration: the long-standing dispute over Hong Kong's sovereignty. Since Britain acquired Hong Kong in 1841, the prospect of surrendering it, even temporarily, raised fears about reclaiming it afterward. Preserving the appearance of British determination was deemed crucial to demonstrating to Chiang Kai-shek, Nationalist China's leader, that Britain intended to retain the territory. Despite these political calculations, London consistently refused fresh troop deployments. Major-General A. E. Grasett, the China theatre commander, requested reinforcements only to face rejection—London offered only Indian or other colonial forces. Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, appointed British commander in the Far East in 1941, likewise pressed for garrison strengthening, to no avail. The situation shifted dramatically after Grasett, a retired Canadian who had recently left his China post, travelled to Britain via Canada. Upon arriving in Canada, he independently approached his former classmate Major-General Crerar, Chief of the Canadian General Staff, and advocated for reinforcement. Grasett argued persuasively that deploying two or more additional battalions would enable the Hong Kong garrison to withstand an extended siege. When Grasett reached London in early September 1941, he presented this case directly to the British Chiefs of Staff, simultaneously proposing that Canada could provide the extra units. His arguments proved persuasive; the Chiefs of Staff altered course and convinced a reluctant Churchill to reconsider. In light of accelerating Japanese pressure, Britain substantially enlarged the Malaysia/Singapore garrison from nine to 32 battalions and despatched two capital ships—HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse—to the region, reasoning that this show of force would deter Japanese aggression against British Far Eastern interests, including Hong Kong. The original defence strategy envisaged holding Hong Kong Island exclusively while denying the harbour to attackers. A single battalion (the Punjabis) would execute delaying actions across the New Territories, followed by a three-battalion defensive stand on the Gin Drinkers Line. This brief mainland resistance would allow time for demolishing stores, power installations, docks and wharves, clearing food stocks and removing vital matériel before withdrawing to Hong Kong Island for a protracted resistance awaiting relief from Singapore or American forces from the Philippines. The Gin Drinkers Line—styled after the French Maginot Line in miniature—ran approximately 18 kilometres south of the Sino-Hong Kong border. Beginning near Gin Drinkers Bay west of Kowloon, it extended 17 kilometres across the Kowloon Peninsula hills toward its eastern extremity. The strategic expectation was that this line would delay the Japanese assault for three weeks or longer, permitting battalion withdrawal to Hong Kong Island for sustained resistance while mainland forces completed evacuation procedures. The 1937 war plan stipulated that four battalions would be necessary for an effective delaying action and seven for an adequate Gin Drinkers Line defence—figures which excluded the aircraft and naval support essential to success. With only a single army brigade available and virtually no air capability, planners abandoned the mainland defence concept, leaving defensive works incomplete and deteriorating under tropical conditions. Chinese personnel were conspicuously absent from initial war preparations and strategic planning, only being incorporated late in the process. The largest Chinese component was the volunteer contingent serving with the HKVDC. On the regular army side, approximately 150 Chinese recruits were enlisted in mid-1941 for the 5th Anti-Aircraft Regiment. The Hong Kong Chinese Regiment, hastily constituted on 3 November 1941, comprised officers borrowed from British and Indian units alongside 52 Chinese junior NCOs and other ranks with minimal training. A Royal Engineers troop staffed entirely by Chinese soldiers saw service, and some Chinese personnel served with the Royal Navy and Dockyard Defence Corps. Chinese participation increased substantially in auxiliary services—air-raid precautions, auxiliary police, nursing, St John Ambulance and fire brigades. This reluctance to fully integrate Chinese forces likely reflected prevailing attitudes of the era. Pre-war British propaganda had frequently mocked Japanese military capability, portraying officers and soldiers as myopic and incompetent. Japanese combat prowess was systematically underestimated; their victories in China were attributed to facing inferior opposition rather than evidence of genuine military strength. Japanese weaponry was dismissed as inferior to European standards. Consequently, British confidence remained high that the colony could hold indefinitely if adequately reinforced. In September 1941, Hong Kong received heartening news: two additional Canadian battalions would be deployed to the garrison. Brigadier John Maltby promptly revived the pre-war plan for defending the Gin Drinkers Line, developing a strategy centred on three mainland battalions (2nd Royal Scots, 5/7 Rajputs and 2/14 Punjab) supported by HKVDC elements and four artillery troop detachments, while three island battalions (1st Middlesex, Royal Rifles of Canada and Winnipeg Grenadiers) bolstered by the bulk of the HKVDC would hold Hong Kong Island. Command responsibility was divided between two brigades: the Island Brigade (Hong Kong Infantry Brigade) under Brigadier Lawson, a recently arrived Canadian, and the mainland Kowloon Infantry Brigade under Brigadier Wallis. The Canadian regiments arrived on 16 November 1941. Maltby was commissioned into the Indian Army in 1911, and  saw extensive service across multiple campaigns: World War I, the Persian Gulf (1913–14), and the North-West Frontier (1923–24). His early promise earned him selection for accelerated advancement through prestigious staff colleges at Quetta and RAF Andover. By 1937, he was again serving on the North-West Frontier, and by 1939 commanded both the 3rd Jhelum Brigade (later the Calcutta Brigade) and the 19th Infantry Brigade in Deccan. In 1940, posted to China, Maltby orchestrated the closure of the North China Command by withdrawing two infantry battalions from Shanghai. Promoted to major-general as GOC China in August 1941, he had only three months to prepare the colony's defenses, a race against time he could not win.  The Gin Drinkers Line occupied a naturally dominant position atop mountains spanning northern Kowloon's breadth, yet possessed inherent weaknesses that would prove fatal. The line lacked defensive depth and remained vulnerable to flanking manoeuvres, with two sectors representing particular danger: Customs Pass and the gap between Golden Hill and Laichikok Peninsula near Gin Drinkers Bay. Given the extended front, each battalion arranged its forces in a string of platoon positions with gaps covered by daytime fire and nighttime patrols. One company per battalion could be held in reserve within prepared positions guarding the most dangerous sectors. The reserve company of the centre battalion (2/14 Punjab) initially advanced as forward troops, screening demolition operations and delaying the enemy's initial thrust. The hasty decision to establish mainland defences meant that essential support systems—communication networks, artillery registrations, mortar calibrations—remained incomplete when combat commenced. Ammunition shortages compounded the problem. For instance, the 2/14 Punjab conducted only a single 3-inch mortar practice session before the attack; adequate ammunition arrived only in November and totalled a mere 70 rounds per battalion for both training and combat. These mortars were registered for the first time in their battle positions, with combat beginning just 12 hours later. The 2-inch mortar situation was even more desperate: troops received live ammunition only as fighting started, making their baptism of fire an actual combat situation. Transportation deficiencies—trucks and animals in short supply—forced manual ammunition transport across Hong Kong's challenging terrain, imposing severe physical demands on already stretched personnel.   On 6 November 1941, Imperial Japanese Headquarters ordered its Commander-in-Chief in China to prepare plans for capturing Hong Kong. The 23rd Army, part of the China Southern Expeditionary Army Group and commanded by Lt. Gen. Sakai Takashi with Maj. Gen. Kuribayashi Tadamichi serving as Chief of Staff, would form the invasion's backbone. All preparations were to be completed by the end of November 1941. The operation, designated 'Operation C', sought to 'seize Hong Kong within ten days'. Takahashi was the son of a factory worker, and rose through the ranks to become a veteran of China campaigns. He was tasked with capturing Hong Kong using the 38th Division normally assigned to the Southern Expeditionary Army Group. Despite setbacks and humiliation over requests for additional resources—particularly following intelligence reports of tanks (actually Bren carriers) in Hong Kong—Sakai remained determined to succeed. He served as Governor of Hong Kong from 26 December 1941 to 20 February 1942. Kuribayashi, best remembered as the Japanese commander at Iwo Jima, graduated from the Army Academy in 1914 specializing in cavalry. He served as deputy military attaché to Washington and Canada and studied at Harvard University. In December 1941, he held the position of Chief of Staff to the 23rd Army during the Hong Kong operation. Operation C followed a straightforward strategic framework. A blocking force would prevent Chinese interference from the rear, while the main invasion force would spearhead the assault. The 23rd Army, comprising four divisions plus a mixed brigade and two infantry regiments, received the assignment to attack Hong Kong. Of these four divisions, only the 38th played a substantive role in the invasion itself. The attack employed a combined-arms approach. Naval forces would establish a blockade and deliver bombardment while aircraft targeted key installations. Ground forces from the 38th Division—specifically the 228th, 229th, and 230th Regiments—would execute the land invasion using a three-pronged strategy. The right column would sweep westward in a wide arc, clearing Castle Peak Road and targeting the western flank of the Gin Drinkers Line near Laichikok Peninsula. The centre force would press directly through the line's middle, while the left column would cross Tidal Cove (Tolo Harbour) toward Kai Tak Airport and eastward toward Devil Peak, a crucial defensive position. The objective was to annihilate British forces on the mainland and compel Hong Kong's surrender through sustained bombardment. Should British forces resist, the island phase of the campaign would commence. Securing the rear against the Chinese National Army of the 7th Military District and Communist guerrillas fell to the 66th Regiment, normally part of the 51st Division but attached to the 38th for this operation. The 66th would simultaneously occupy and secure rear areas throughout the New Territories and Kowloon while the three assault regiments engaged the main defensive forces. This rearguard operation was organised into columns named after their commanding officers: Kitazawa, Kobayashi, Sato, and Araki. The Japanese selected the narrowest approach between Kowloon and Hong Kong Island, targeting the eastern coast near Lyemun Passage where only 410 metres of water separated the mainland from the island. Upon landing, forces would rapidly advance inland to seize the critical junction of Wongneichong Gap, then pivot westward and southward to capture Victoria City and the remainder of Hong Kong. The naval contingent divided into two groups: the Bombardment Group and the Attack Group. Approximately 300 personnel from the Special Naval Landing Force (SNLF) were attached to the invasion force. Air support came from the First Air Brigade under Col. Habu Hideharu, which contributed 56 light bombers and fighters. Their mission was to neutralise the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy, thereby securing aerial and maritime superiority for the ground campaign.   On the eve of war, the British garrison numbered 13,981 all ranks, including nursing staff and St John Ambulance personnel. Of these, 8,919 were British and Canadian, with 4,402 Indian and Chinese. The core infantry force comprised 5,422 regular soldiers, complemented by approximately 6,000 additional personnel across artillery, engineering, naval, and Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps (HKVDC) units. By 1941, the Royal Navy had become a shadow of its former self as the once-dominant China Squadron. Of the three World War I destroyers present on 8 December, two had been sent to Singapore—the third undergoing repairs—by 1930. This redeployment stemmed partly from the futility of defending the colony and partly from a commitment by senior US Navy officers: Britain would reinforce Singapore with Hong Kong's fleet in exchange for four American destroyers at Singapore. This American guarantee, however, never materialized. The defensive infrastructure focused primarily on countering a seaborne attack: twenty-nine coastal guns (9.2in., 6in., 4.7in., and 4in. calibres), ten 18- and 2-pounder beach defense guns, and twenty-eight field guns (60-pounder, 6in., 4.5in., and 3.7in. calibres). The Hong Kong Garrison's infantry comprised four regular army battalions—two British and two Indian—bolstered by five HKVDC infantry companies, each averaging 100 men. The 1st Middlesex Regiment, deployed in August 1937, served as a machine-gun battalion equipped with forty-eight Vickers medium machine guns. Having been abroad since 1931, the regiment had deteriorated through protracted garrison service, Hong Kong being among the softest postings available. From September 1939 onward, all regiments—including the 5/7 Rajputs (arrived June 1937) and the 2/14 Punjab—experienced systematic loss of experienced officers and NCOs to other theaters. The Royal Scots proved particularly hard hit, suffering disciplinary problems and an unusually high court-martial rate. Units like the Hong Kong and Singapore Royal Artillery suffered critical leadership gaps that went unaddressed. By December 1941, many formations fielded inexperienced replacement troops, significantly undermining combat readiness. The Punjabis exemplified these deficiencies. Stationed in Hong Kong since November 1940, they received their vehicles and mortars only in August 1941—three months before combat. Compounding this, forty percent of their strength consisted of raw recruits arrived just in October. When war erupted, artillery regiments found themselves relying on junior officers in senior roles, with British commanders unfamiliar with Urdu directing Indian troops, a handicap that severely compromised effectiveness. Deficient equipment compounded leadership shortages. Shells dating from 1918 detonated prematurely upon discharge, while ammunition shortages crippled operations. On 8 December, all field guns deployed with merely 100 rounds apiece, with 200 rounds held in reserve for the entire campaign, and coastal guns received only 25 rounds each. Insufficient cross-training meant many infantrymen failed to understand the artillery "clock face" targeting system, causing them to miss their objectives. Malaria devastated European troops, particularly the Royal Scots. Of approximately 770 personnel, at least 180 suffered recurring malarial episodes from the Shing Mun Redoubt area's notoriously endemic conditions. Staff shortages forced nearly every unit to promote junior officers to positions beyond their rank, exacerbating structural weaknesses. Although the Canadians' arrival bolstered the garrison, significant handicaps undermined their effectiveness. Both battalions carried a C-class designation—deemed unfit for foreign service—having spent years in soft garrison postings without rigorous training. The deficit was stark: each Canadian soldier received only thirty-five rifle practice rounds. The two battalions incorporated 115 men with fewer than sixteen weeks' training, while sixty-two of seventy-five recruits joining the Winnipeg Grenadiers in June came directly from a training depot lacking even basic rifles. Twelve percent of the Canadian force remained untrained. Equipment deficiencies proved even more damaging. A standard 1941 Canadian infantry battalion required 102 motor vehicles—including twenty-two Universal Carriers, thirty-seven ¾-ton trucks, thirteen 1-ton trucks, thirty-one bicycles, and twenty-two Boys anti-tank rifles. When the Canadians landed, logistical failures left them with only six Bren carriers, two water tankers, twelve ¾-ton trucks, and a single Boys anti-tank rifle. Although they carried 3in. mortars, neither ammunition nor radios accompanied them. Canada possessed only 300 3-inch mortar bombs in its entire inventory at that time, making any allocation to Hong Kong impossible. A second vessel, the SS Don Jose, was dispatched with replacement vehicles and equipment but never reached Hong Kong before 8 December. The Japanese seized it en route to Manila. Despite these shortcomings, the force departed on 27 October with 1,975 men and arrived on 16 November. Intelligence estimates regarding Japanese available forces varied widely, ranging from two to four divisions. On 6 December evening, Chinese reports confirmed the previous day's arrival of three Japanese divisions at Buji township, located eight miles from the border in what is now Shenzhen. Earlier, around 1 November, a Japanese deserter provided intelligence of significant troop concentrations north of the frontier, including large-calibre artillery indicative of at least divisional strength.   The Hong Kong invasion force comprised three service branches: the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) deployed the 38th Infantry Division, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) committed the Second China Fleet, and the Imperial Japanese Air Force (IJAF) contributed the 1st Air Group. Command of the ground assault rested with Lieutenant-General Sano Tadayoshi of the 38th Division, supported by Major-General Ito Takeo heading the infantry group, while supporting arms including artillery, engineers, armor, and transport fell under Sano's authority. The main assault force consisted of three infantry regiments from the 38th Division, each led by a colonel: the 228th under Doi Teihichi, the 229th under Tanaka Ryosaburo, and the 230th under Shoji Toshishige. The 38th Division itself was a standard 1940s B-class infantry division of approximately 20,000 troops (ranging from 18,000–21,000 depending on operational requirements), organized into three regiments with three battalions each. Reflecting the Japanese army's reliance on animal and human transport, each regiment fielded roughly 3,800 troops supported by some 700 horses. Battalion strength averaged around 1,071 personnel, with companies numbering approximately 180 men. Japanese infantry battalions of this period featured a distinctive organization: rifle platoons consisted of four sections (three equipped with rifles and light machine guns, one with light mortars and rifles), complemented by an additional heavy machine-gun company fielding twelve Type 92 weapons and a troop of light artillery—likely Type 92 70mm infantry guns. The divisional field artillery regiment operated 75mm Type 41 mountain guns organized into three 688-man battalions, each with two troops of two guns. Mountain artillery units, numbering 36 guns total, carried additional personnel (3,400) and animals (1,400) to navigate the terrain complexities of Hong Kong operations. Recognizing the need for overwhelming firepower to compel Hong Kong's surrender, the IJA augmented the invasion force with heavy artillery—15cm and 24cm howitzers commanded by Major-General Kitashima Kineo. News of the Canadian reinforcements arriving in Hong Kong forced a reassessment. Commander-in-Chief Sakai Takashi of the 23rd Army informed his superiors that the original ten-day timeline was unrealistic and requested additional troops. Although most formations were already committed to other operations, Imperial Headquarters eventually authorized two depot regiments from Japan to support the campaign. Intended for second-line duties rather than frontline combat, these units were to be returned promptly after freeing experienced personnel for Hong Kong operations. This arrangement allowed the 19th and 20th mixed brigades—approximately 6,000 men organized in five infantry battalions, a field artillery battalion, and an engineer battalion—to be released for Hong Kong. However, Sakai's request for reinforcements met with disapproval from Imperial Headquarters, and he received an unmistakable message: a swift, decisive campaign was essential. His situation worsened when Japanese agents mistakenly identified British Bren carriers as tanks, forcing Sakai to improvise armor by raiding the 1st Reserve Tank Battalion and tankette units from infantry depot divisions. In attempting to secure additional armor from the 11th Army's 9th Reconnaissance Regiment, Sakai encountered resistance. General Hata Shunroku lodged sustained complaints with senior officials, and Sakai received a sharp rebuke—further requests would not be entertained, and his replacement would follow if necessary. Stung by this loss of face, Sakai abandoned all additional requests and became even more determined to achieve success. Vice-Admiral Niimi Masaichi, commanding the 2nd China Expeditionary Fleet, oversaw the entire naval element, divided into bombardment and attack groups. His flagship, the light cruiser Isuzu, carried Captain Ura Koichi, who simultaneously commanded the bombardment group. This naval force assembled ships from various China Expeditionary Fleet units, particularly from the Canton Special Base Force, 15 Squadron, and 11 Torpedo Boat Division at Guangzhou. Reflecting Niimi's lack of confidence in the army's air support capabilities, the seaplane tender IJN Kamikawa Maru joined the operation on his insistence, providing organic naval aviation against the threat posed by British Wildebeests. Niimi also petitioned for destroyers IJN Wakaba and Yugure to counter the three British destroyers, though this request was denied. The Special Naval Landing Forces (SNLF) were assigned to conduct diversionary attacks south of Hong Kong Island, intended to distract British forces from the main land invasion thrust. The IJAF's 1st Air Brigade, commanded by Colonel Habu Hideharu, centered on the 45th Air Regiment with 34 Kawasaki Ki-32 Type 98 'Mary' light bombers. This composite force drew aircraft and units from airfields across China and Manchuria—Beijing, Shanghai, Taiwan, and Qiqihar—all assembled at Baiyun Aerodrome in Guangzhou on 7 December 1941. Supporting the 1st Air Brigade were the 10th Independent Squadron under Captain Takatsuki Akira with 13 Nakajima Ki-27 Type 97 'Nate' fighters, 3 Mitsubishi Ki-15 Type 97 'Babs' command reconnaissance aircraft from the 18th Independent Reconnaissance Squadron, and the 44th Independent Squadron fielding 6 Tachikawa Ki-36 Type 98 'Ida' observation aircraft. Years before the invasion, the Japanese cultivated an extensive network of agents and sleeper operatives in Hong Kong, methodically gathering intelligence and mapping military installations. This sophisticated network proved remarkably effective: invasion maps carried by IJA officers were actually Hong Kong Government and British military maps, overprinted with Japanese annotations and interpretations. British officers later discovered in captivity that the Peninsula Hotel's regular barber was a Japanese Navy lieutenant-commander who had exploited the intimate setting to extract valuable information about British force dispositions. Intelligence operatives infiltrated every level of Hong Kong society—the garrison tailor and barber both served as spies. This groundwork enabled exceptional accuracy in artillery fire and bombing campaigns. The Japanese further leveraged criminal networks, recruiting gangsters throughout Hong Kong and Guangdong province with money and arms, turning them into irregular auxiliaries supporting the invasion.   On Sunday, 7 December, seven hundred members of the 2nd Royal Scots and Middlesex Regiment marched to St John's Cathedral for the morning service. As Major-General Maltby read a passage from Matthew, his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant I. MacGregor, delivered an urgent message that would change everything. Preparations for conflict had already begun. On 5 December, the HKVDC had mobilized fully, yet Hong Kong's broader population remained unmoved—the Happy Valley racetrack reported record attendance that very day. The contrast was stark: while one institution prepared for war, another celebrated as though nothing threatened. Japanese forces had been positioned advantageously since autumn 1941. The 23rd Army was already stationed west of Guangzhou, with contingents scattered across Foshan Town, Zhuhai, and other locations on the Pearl River delta. Upon orders for war on 1 December, they faced minimal distances to cover. The army regrouped at Humen, Shilong Town, and Guangzhou itself—staging areas for the invasion. The first visible signs arrived on 4–5 December when Japanese forces landed at Mirs Bay; the 228th Regiment moved into its staging area at Buji Town, now part of Shenzhen City. Maltby received these reports and immediately departed the cathedral service to issue urgent stand-to orders. Yet skepticism persisted within military circles. Some dismissed the threat, dismissing such intelligence as "astonishingly erroneous." Meanwhile, the Imperial Japanese Navy massed in the waters beyond Hong Kong's horizon. The Kowloon Infantry Brigade held a stretched defensive line: the 5/7 Rajputs anchored the centre, the 2/14 Punjab the east, and the 2nd Royal Scots the west. Forward positions extended far—C Company, 2/14 Punjab, under Major S. Burns ranged along Castle Peak Road toward Yuen Long. The brigade screen, C Company of the 2/14 Punjab, held Shueng Shui and Taipo Market with four Bren carriers and two armoured cars from the HKVDC, backed by engineers and the 22nd Fortress Company. The Hong Kong Infantry Brigade held Hong Kong Island itself. The Winnipeg Grenadiers occupied Victoria City on the north-west coast, while the Royal Rifles of Canada stretched along the north-east shores from Saukiwan to Lyemun. Brigadier Lawson commanded from his headquarters at Wongneichong Gap in the island's centre. At 0355 hours on 8 December, the code word "Blossom Blossom" was transmitted. Eleven minutes later, Lieutenant-General Sakai ordered the invasion to commence. Fifty minutes after that, at 0445 hours, Major Charles Boxer—a fluent Japanese speaker formerly of the Lincolnshire Regiment—was roused by Radio Tokyo announcing that war was imminent. Governor Young and Major-General Maltby were informed at once. By 0500 hours, the forward demolition points had been blown by Major Gray, OC of C Company 2/14 Punjab, and the HKVDC engineers under Major J. H. Bottomley. At 0645 hours, the garrison received formal notification: Britain and Japan were at war. Seventy-five minutes later, air-raid sirens wailed. Within moments, smoke billowed from Kai Tak Airport as Japanese aircraft destroyed virtually the entire air garrison. The Wildebeests, Walruses, HKVDC biplanes, and several civilian planes were engulfed in flames. Only two Ju-52s of the Eurasia Corporation and one CNAC T-32 Condor escaped destruction—dispersal bays had never been built due to lack of funds. The Japanese then turned to secondary targets, bombing Shamshuipo Camp and the neighbouring police station. The Canadians suffered few large-scale casualties in the initial strikes, though Sergeant Routledge and Signalman Fairley of the signal platoon were wounded—the first Canadian soldiers injured in World War II. Remarkably, Hong Kong Island's theatres, cinemas, and restaurants continued operating as though the island faced no peril. Japanese demolition efforts proved only minor obstacles. Bridges blown were quickly replaced. The invasion proceeded on three fronts: the 230th Regiment advanced westward along the northern route toward Yuen Long and Castle Peak, targeting the northern slope of Tai Mo Mountain. The 228th Regiment drove down the centre, following the Sheung Shui–Taipo–Kowloon road toward Grassy Hill north of the Shing Mun Redoubt. The 229th Regiment, crossing at Sha Tau Kok and by boat at Starling Inlet, proceeded via Taipo toward Tai Shui Hang and Ma On Mountain. Whenever confronted with strongly defended positions, the Japanese bypassed them entirely rather than engage. The first day brought scattered but spirited resistance. Around 1300 hours, the Punjabis inflicted the first serious check, drawing blood from advancing Japanese forces. At 1830 hours, they ambushed and decimated several Japanese platoons south of Taipo market town. The HKVDC's armoured cars and Bren carriers struck similar successes nearby. The 2 Royal Scots' reconnaissance platoon clashed with elements of the 229th Regiment around Yuen Long. Despite these minor victories, Japanese momentum continued. Armed with stolen British maps and guided by fifth columnists, they pushed forward relentlessly. By late afternoon on the 8th, the Punjabis withdrew toward Grassy Hill to avoid being outflanked. The artillerymen of the 12th Battery engaged an IJN destroyer and Japanese forces around Taipo, inflicting heavy casualties. Farther south near Shatin, on the Taipo–Kowloon highway, rapidly advancing Japanese troops surprised the defenders and severed the fuse at an HKVDC demolition point. Their triumph proved momentary; the engineers completed the backup circuit and detonated the bridge, destroying it along with the Japanese soldiers crossing it. By early morning on 9 December, orders came to withdraw all mainland units to the Gin Drinkers Line. The Punjabis, already at Shatin Wai overlooking Tide Cove, held their position under pressure and continuous shelling for the next two days. The HKVDC withdrew to Fotan, a village south of Shatin. Maltby ordered D Company, 5/7 Rajputs, under Captain H. R. Newtons to Smuggler's Ridge to close the gap between the 2 Royal Scots and 2/14 Punjab. HKVDC armoured cars and Bren carriers continued patrols along Castle Peak Road while HMS Cicala, having survived two air attacks, maintained station in Castle Peak Bay. Despite an IJN blockade, the destroyers HMS Thanet and Scout slipped anchor and escaped to Singapore around 2130 hours. The surviving CNAC and Eurasia aircraft took off with high-value evacuees: Dr. Sun Yat-Sen's widow and her two equally renowned sisters—the Soong sisters—along with Chinese Finance Minister H. H. Kung. Also departing was Lieutenant-Colonel H. Owen-Hughes of the HKVDC, who carried orders to coordinate with the Chinese Nationalist Army for a rear-guard attack on Japanese forces to relieve the pressure on Hong Kong. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. On 8 December 1941, Japan attacked Hong Kong with the 38th Division, supported by naval and air forces. Despite British defenses manned by undertrained, under-equipped troops, Japanese forces advanced rapidly across three fronts. Within hours, the RAF was destroyed, demolitions proved futile, and British units withdrew toward the Gin Drinkers Line facing overwhelming odds.

Moderna shares soared more than 172% after strong results for its vaccine for melanoma skin cancer. Elsewhere, the Evergrande saga came to a dramatic conclusion in a Shenzhen court. And what will Walmart spend its $3 billion Trump tariffs rebate on?World Business Express - Finance, economy and business news from BBC journalists around the world. The stories that matter: World Business Express brings you the essentials on the fast-changing global economy. What forces are driving the markets and industry? Hear unique insight from top CEOs, investors, economic thinkers and small business bosses.

This week on Sinica, I sit down with the writer Pallavi Aiyar — at her own dining table in Beijing, where in recent months I've been the lucky beneficiary of her and her husband Julio's legendary hospitality. Pallavi first arrived in Beijing in 2002 to teach at the Beijing Broadcasting Institute and went on to spend the better part of a decade as The Hindu's China correspondent — for much of that time, the only Chinese-speaking Indian foreign correspondent in the country. That period produced Smoke and Mirrors: An Experience of China, still one of the very few sustained attempts to look at China through Indian eyes. After 16 years away — years spent in Brussels, Jakarta, Tokyo, and Madrid — she's back in Beijing, and turning her gaze inward with her latest book, Travels in the Other Place: Pursuing the Self in Eight Acts. She writes the wonderful Substack The Global Jigsaw, which I recommend without reservation.Our conversation is built around her recent essay for Noema Magazine, “The Real Problem Underlying India-China Tensions,” which argues that the deepest problem in the relationship isn't the border or the trade imbalance but the distorting lenses through which each side reads the other: China reads India through the lens of colonial subordination, while India reads China through the lens of betrayal. We talk about the ugly etymology of an ethnic slur, the partial historical memories each country mistakes for the whole picture, her serialized interviews with the Chinese India-watcher Mao Keji, the aporia-inducing impossibility of explaining either country to outsiders — and how her answer to the question she first posed in 2008, “Would I rather be born Indian or Chinese?”, has changed, painfully, in the years since.4:35 – Beijing, 2002: an ad in That's Beijing, gandhi@hotmail.com, and becoming The Hindu's correspondent10:03 – “Beijing and I grew up together”: the aughts as a shared coming-of-age12:16 – The asymmetry of obsession: why India watches China, but not the reverse16:39 – The unacknowledged third vertex: Western discursive power in the India-China relationship18:08 – Back after 16 years: the Liangma River, blue skies, and the panopticon21:35 – Walks in the park and the “buddy system”: what access looks like now25:43 – Where did all the foreigners go?29:59 – The scene at CCG: candor, offense, and the register of truth33:10 – “Asan”: the etymology of a slur, Sikh policemen, opium fortunes, and China's colonial lens40:10 – 1962 and India's betrayal lens42:15 – Aporia: the foolhardy task of explaining India or China47:22 – Shame and indignation: explaining a place you love versus a place you merely know52:29 – The big question, 2008: born Indian or Chinese?55:44 – The 2026 answer: “It hurts”1:00:08 – Kaiser pushes back: cherry-picked comparisons, and can this essay's very existence complicate its conclusions?1:04:43 – Twin nations of the exam1:06:57 – Cognitive empathy: what it would take for ordinary Indians and Chinese to actually see each otherPaying It ForwardYaqi Li, a young Chinese international relations scholar recently returned to China after a year in Singapore — Pallavi admires the rare self-reflectiveness of his memoir-inflected IR writing on his Substack, New China Literacy, and notes that he makes an interesting case for AI-assisted writing as a way for second- and third-language English speakers to find their voice.RecommendationsPallavi: Flashlight by Susan Choi — a novel spanning Japan, the U.S., and North Korea, built around the North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens in the 1970s. Also This Is Where the Serpent Lives by Daniyal Mueenuddin — the first novel from her favorite Pakistani writer, a sprawling, Chekhovian portrait of feudalism and politics in modern Pakistan.Kaiser: Crossing to Safety by Wallace Stegner — beautiful at the sentence level, painted on a small canvas: two couples who meet as young academics at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, and their friendship across the decades. Emotionally rich despite the absence of grand drama.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

A fast-growing livestream industry is giving young people in China a new way to earn a living and pursue their dreams. But behind the polished performances are long hours, intense competition, emotional labour and an algorithm that can make or break careers. In this episode of the CNA Correspondent podcast, Otelli Edwards speaks with Correspondent Melody Chan, who followed one of Shenzhen's largest livestreaming companies to meet the performers and production crew driving this booming business. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Robotaxis are accelerating along the road to commercial viability. Auto and Shared Mobility Analysts Andrew Percoco and Tim Hsiao discuss what this rapid development means for global investors.Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.----- Transcript -----Andrew Percoco: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Percoco, Head of North America Auto and Shared Mobility Research. Tim Hsiao: And I'm Tim Hsiao, Greater China Auto and Shared Mobility Analyst.Andrew Percoco: Today, why robotaxis may be approaching a commercial inflection point. It's Thursday, August 13th at 8am in New York.Tim Hsiao: And 8 pm in Hong Kong.Andrew Percoco: So Tim, for years, robotaxis were really confined to limited pilot rollouts across the globe. You've done a lot of work over the last few weeks. We put out a big collaborative report on the robotaxi market and how it could be a $1 trillion TAM by 2040.What makes this moment different than some of the other robotaxi hype cycles that we've seen in the past? Tim Hsiao: We observe four things have been converging. Firstly, end-to-end AI is improving much faster. Secondly, hardware and the training costs are falling. And thirdly, more well-capitalized players can fund deployment. And last but not least, regulation is becoming clearer.The leading operators are no longer just demonstrating the technology. They are running fully driverless services around the clock and generating commercial rides. So in our view, the questions has been shifting from can it work to who can expand operating areas, raise utilization and lower costs at a much faster pace.So that's a very different setup versus the 2018 and 2021 hype cycles. Andrew, U.S. autonomous miles could rise from 116 million in [20]25 to 16 billion by 2032. But still make up only about 0.5 percent of all miles driven. How can robotaxis become a meaningful business while remaining such a small part of the market?Andrew Percoco: I would say, you know, obviously the U.S. mobility and transportation market is a massive market. So even with the rapid growth that we expect in robotaxis, it's going to take a long time to make a material impact in the overall market share of mobility. But if you think about the profit pools in this business, 16 billion miles at $2 a mile can, you know, pretty quickly become a very significant TAM and market opportunity.And I think, you know, fundamentally, if you think about a robotaxi business, I would argue you're better utilizing an asset... Or if you think about the, you know, car park, the amount of vehicles that are, you know, in the fleet today or in the U.S. today, they're sitting idle 90 percent of the time, right?So you're talking about taking a smaller amount of volume and driving a higher utilization on that fleet and driving much improved economics. So yes, it's going to take time to displace the, you know, hundreds of millions of cars that you have on the road in the U.S. and displace the penetration of miles driven. But ultimately, you know, we think that the profit pool and the opportunity in robotaxis are much more attractive for the entire value chain, as it relates to robotaxis. And I'd say there's a few things that we're watching along the way to make sure that, to your point, you know, this is not another hype cycle. And that there's real commercial backbone to this business.I'd say the first is seeing the rollouts continue to improve, and the density of the rollouts improve across the select cities that we've seen in the U.S. right now. Robotaxis are only available in a handful of cities in the U.S., so we want to see that continue to expand into more cities. But also the density of the fleet increase in the cities where they're currently present.And at the same time the safety side is still something that gets a lot of questions in making sure that it is truly safer than a human driver, across technology platforms, right? There's various players in this market with different approaches to technology. So, I think seeing that the safety curve is starting to or continues to improve is going to be very important for the viability of this market going forward.Obviously U.S. is very different from China. What have you seen in China? China has shown some impressive growth and utilization in some of the operators that are on the road in China. So just curious as to your perspective in terms of what you're seeing on the ground there. Tim Hsiao: I think China shows that there's much in operations and skill challenges as technology challenges. The fleet in China is above 5,000 vehicles across I think more than 7500 square kilometers in key cities. And some operators average more than 20 orders per vehicle per day.So, total cost of ownership has fallen roughly 30 to 40 percent, while remote assistance ratios are moving from like one operator for like 20 to 40, even like 50 to 60 vehicles. And we think it will achieve like one for a 100. So that has produced real break-even happens, especially in some major cities like Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Wuhan – the tier one, tier two cities.So in our view, I think in China, wider operating domains, fleet density and utilization rate, as you just mentioned, reinforce one another. So make it some more like the real commercial case. Instead of just, like trials as we saw a couple years ago. If more value shifts towards the software, fleet operation, and the data, as well as the customer relations, how does that change the profit pool, across the auto industry, especially in the U.S.?Andrew Percoco: First off, I think the auto industry in general is becoming, you know, more software focused and aware. You know, it's being led by the robotaxi market where the autonomous driving software and technology is obviously the most important part about getting this technology to market.That is ultimately trickling down to personally owned cars where you're seeing more autonomous technology being deployed. Auto OEMs are able to charge subscription revenue for this software. So it expands, I'd say, the value proposition of buying a vehicle expands the profit pool for the OEMs.It changes in some ways the cyclicality, or can change the cyclicality of the industry if you've got more kind of recurring revenues, subscription like business model versus just a hardware focused OEM model, which has been kind of the predominant focus for the OEMs historically. I'd say the other angle, interesting angle here is, you know, as this business scales, there's gonna be a lot of vehicles on the road. There's gonna be a lot of fleets of vehicles on the road. Those need to be managed by somebody or some company, right? So if you think about, you know, the rental car industry, right? These companies have been in the business of managing fleets and renting out fleets for a very long time. They know how to do that very, very well.I think there's an interesting opportunity for that part of the value chain, to participate in aiding these robotaxi fleet operators, in scaling and bringing their business to market. Charging, maintenance, reconditioning, all the things that take a lot of time and a pretty large amount of physical infrastructure.That's an opportunity for the rental car industry to come in and leverage their existing know-how to help. And, you know, I think Tim, an important part of this commercialization process is driving down the cost structure of robotaxis. They are very sensor; heavy sensor heavy. They're very compute heavy. I think China is the clear leader on cost and supply chain. I think in China you're seeing robotaxis, you know, around $35,000 to $40,000, which is considerably lower than what we see in the U.S. today.So, how do you think that that will accelerate adoption in China, but I'd say more importantly overseas as some of these robotaxis businesses look to expand outside of China. Tim Hsiao: In our view, it could be a major accelerant because as we noticed that the depreciation is still one of the largest fixed costs for robotaxi. So, as we just mentioned, I think, $35000 to $45000 US dollars, the purpose-built robotaxi can lower the breakeven utilization threshold. And make it easier to finance fleets and open cities that could not support the $150,000 US dollar vehicle.And not only in China, because globally, I think the Chinese cost deflation can be paired with the local ride-hailing platforms in the overseas market that provide demand and regulatory access. But as we highlighted in our previous, the global reports once again, we don't think the cheap vehicle is sufficiently by their self.So in our views, on top of the competitive cost structure, registration, data localization, insurance, and local operating costs can still delay the margin curve, particularly in Europe, which we think there are still quite a lot of uncertainties. So Andrew, as we just, as we just discussed, the lower vehicle costs help, but the operating model still has to work, right? So with operating costs expected to fall and the margin potentially moving above 30 percent or even higher at scale, what are the key assumptions investors should focus on?Andrew Percoco: There's a handful of key assumptions you need to sensitize to get to that 30 percent or more margin structure in this business. I'd say the first is going to be utilization, right? You need to be running these assets at a high utilization to essentially amortize those fixed costs over a larger number of miles driven.Number two, insurance today is probably one of the largest buckets of cost when we think about this business. Insurance is, from our perspective, a big unlock for this industry as the safety, as we mentioned before, the safety data continues to improve. We think that will be a reason to, to expect that the insurance costs associated with autonomous driving technology and robotaxis will continue to decline.It's about 30 cents per mile on our estimate, so it's very significant in terms of the overall cost structure of robotaxis. Drivers or where there's the most sensitivity around the model. Obviously, there's charging costs, there's maintenance costs. Those are, I think, fairly known at this point. But the utilization and insurance, I think, are the two biggest drivers of really getting that margin profile to improve over time. Tim, I guess when you think about the next, call it 10 to 15 years, I think we will put out a trillion dollar market by 2040 from a TAM perspective.What do you think the biggest markets are that investors should be watching, in terms of getting us to that trillion dollar TAM? Obviously, U.S. and China are kinda leading now, but what are the next markets people should be watching?Tim Hsiao: In addition to the major market, as you just mentioned, the U.S. and China, in our views, I think we also need to focus on markets like Europe, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. I think their scale is underappreciated, as we highlighted in our previous report. Because if you think about that, Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia in aggregate have roughly four million taxis together ride-hailing vehicles.So even with 25 percent conversion, they imply that about one million is the L4s vehicles. The Middle East offers supportive regulators, you can tell, simpler operating environments and higher fares. And if you think about the Southeast Asia, the ASEAN, I think the market has dense demand and strong local platforms.And of course, Euro markets definitely can't be ignored because Euro will move more slowly, because we think the regulations and the data rules would initially add cost. But the truth is, if you think about the European market, I think the taxis or ride-hailing fares are among the highest globally, even compared to the U.S. and rest of the world.So in our view, the material margin could be more attractive. And this market, on top of the U.S. and China, in our view, can support several regional winners. So, not only limited to a very, you know, the single one or two markets.Andrew Percoco: Yeah, it's great Tim. It sounds like, you know, the robotaxi race, if you want to put it that way, will be won by those who can really bring together technology, and a compelling cost structure while also following the proper regulations and making sure the safety is improving at a rate that's acceptable to regulators.So, Tim, thanks for taking the time to talk today. And thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen, and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.

Plus: Foxconn to ramp up global AI server production. And Tencent Holdings' AI spending ends its earnings growth streak. Julie Chang hosts. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

Access BONUS video episodes & other exclusive perks with Emsolation Extra @ https://emsolation.supercast.com/ See Em's New 5 Star Reviewed Show 'Addicted to Love' https://emrusciano.com/addicted-to-love/ We've moved on from new studio, who's dis, to new studio that is still a work in progress and needs some additional tweaks, which ushers in side quests on Suzie Wilks, Barbra Streisand's Oprah microphone incident, Michael Paynter's feet and some gentle roasting of Michael's cushions and his obsession with relaxing in jeans. Michael was fresh off his flight to China and is keen to reveal all about his trip to a 24 hour spa complex in Shenzhen. Spread over 6 floors it's an all in one leisure resort that covers all things wellness but also includes karaoke, VR gaming, free drinks, food and even unlimited Häagen Dazs. We also side quest into Em's beauty routine and why she will never share it, then it's onto next week's workshop and very first public performance in Sydney of Em and Michael's debut musical ‘The Baroness'. Em's also got some advice for anyone coming to her Brisbane performance of ‘Addicted to Love' at QPAC August 22, and she's declaring war on being nonchalant. Then in our Sealed Section, on our premium service Emsolation Extra, Michael's keen to know what went down over the weekend while Em was staying in his house and also going on a first date. Get access for just $1.87 a week, or watch the full video of both episodes back to back using the link above or via the Supercast website for $2.50 a week at emsolation.supercast.com Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Forty years ago, Shenzhen was a small southern Chinese fishing village, just across the border from Hong Kong. Today, it's one of the world's most advanced megacities, with a population of nearly 20 million people and home to many of the tech industry's largest companies, including Huawei, Tencent, DJI, and Transsion, among countless others. That remarkable transformation within a single lifetime offers important lessons for Kenya, Vietnam, and other developing countries seeking to build their own technology hubs. Grace Yuehan Wang, a visiting scholar at the London School of Economics and a research fellow at Stellenbosch University in Cape Town, joins Eric to discuss her new book, which explores how Shenzhen was able to develop so quickly and what lessons its remarkable rise offers countries across the Global South seeking to build their own technology hubs.

Time to break down the return of the compact smartphone with the Enough Phone project—a ambitious new device designed to offer a premium, single-handed, 5.2-inch small smartphone without costing a fortune.Is there still a market for small smartphones, or did Apple, Samsung, and Sony prove that the era of compact phones is over? In this episode, I dive into the Enough Phone's development updates, their blog updates and vlog progress, their conservative 2026–2027 timeline, manufacturing realities in Shenzhen, and how their software ties into the Sleke Phone ecosystem and Odyssey OS.Learn more at: https://enoughphone.com/ @enoughphone @The_Smart_Dumbphone *****Across The Socials @TheAndresSegovia IG: https://www.instagram.com/theandressegovia/X: https://twitter.com/_AndresSegoviaShow Notes:https://TheAndresSegovia.comSupport The Show!I'm a SuperX Brand Ambassador! Shop the apparel line at:https://superxapparel.com/Use Code THEANDRESSEGOVIA to save on your order!My Amazon Store:https://www.amazon.com/shop/theandressegoviashowBlackout Coffee: https://www.blackoutcoffee.com?p=wC4nmVNoaUse Promo Code THEANDRESSEGOVIA for 20% off your order!Gainful Protein: http://gainful.com/ANDRESSEGOVIABUBS Naturals Wellness Products: https://shop.bubsnaturals.com/TheAndresSegoviaAll Affiliate Links: https://theandressegovia.start.page To hear more, visit theandressegovia.substack.com

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu bluntly rejected a US-backed 15-point peace plan for Gaza this weekend. Also, how Shenzhen, China, became the electric car capital of the world. And, a look at why the Czech capital has voted to reinstate the statue of a 19th century military commander. Plus, cars resembling quirky objects are part of a public health intervention in India. Learn about your ad choices: dovetail.prx.org/ad-choices

This week on Sinica, I welcome back Evan Osnos of The New Yorker, whose marvelous new essay, “The Future, Made in China,” chronicles a tech-focused return trip to Beijing, where he lived from 2005 to 2013 — first for the Chicago Tribune, then as The New Yorker's China correspondent. Evan is the author of Age of Ambition: Chasing Fortune, Truth, and Faith in the New China, which won the National Book Award, as well as Wildland: The Making of America's Fury and The Haves and Have-Yachts.His essay is far more than another breathless account of China's advances in robotics and electric vehicles. It's a meditation on what China's technological ascent means for the United States, for how both societies are organized, and for the rest of us, whose futures increasingly seem to be wagered by two small circles of powerful men in Beijing and Washington. We talk about the Xiaomi Hyperfactory, “Chinamaxxing,” the export control debate, and the deeper contest Evan identifies: not democracy versus authoritarianism, but humanism versus scientism.3:04 – Walking Beijing's streets again: quieter, richer, more surveilled11:26 – The Xiaomi Hyperfactory: choreography, awe, and what's actually real18:10 – Doomed to coexist: Evan's message for the American reader24:15 – Schrödinger's China: joke or juggernaut?27:16 – The limits of knowability in an increasingly opaque system31:56 – Threat narratives vs. “Chinamaxxing”: America's two China conversations43:20 – “Thank Trump”: America's self-inflicted wounds47:29 – Revisiting the Sullivan doctrine and export controls53:10 – Mankind 2000: humanism, scientism, and rival oligarchies1:02:48 – Convergence: arriving at dystopia from opposite directions1:07:21 – Self-strengthening redux: Levenson and America's meum-verum gap1:17:53 – The other Sputnik moment: the backlash against tech oligarchyPaying It ForwardYi-Ling Liu, author of The Wall Dancers: Searching for Freedom and Connection on the Chinese Internet — Evan admires how her work grapples with the competition between scientism and humanism across national borders.Chang Che, who writes for The New Yorker and The Guardian — watching China's technological developments up close, “creating history in real time.”RecommendationsEvan: How to Rule the World: An Education in Power at Stanford University by Theo Baker — the youngest-ever Polk Award winner on how a rising generation at Silicon Valley's feeder school perceives its opportunities and obligations. Also True Grit by Charles Portis — splendid, sentence-savoring dialogue.Kaiser: Butcher's Crossing by John Williams, author of Stoner — a Western with the same sentence-level craft; for fans of Melville and Cormac McCarthy.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Once a small fishing village, Shenzhen has transformed into one of the world's leading innovation hubs. Home to tech giants like Huawei, Tencent, DJI, and BYD, the city has grown from China's first special economic zone into a global center for advanced manufacturing, technology, and ideas. As Shenzhen prepares to host APEC 2026, visitors from across the Asia-Pacific are arriving in record numbers. What makes this city so attractive? How did Shenzhen build its innovation ecosystem? And what does its rise mean for the future of global cooperation?

Jim Fields is an American entrepreneur who has spent over 15 years living and building businesses in China. He speaks fluent Mandarin, began his career at Adobe in Silicon Valley, and moved to China, where he worked at Nokia and Reckitt Benckiser before founding Relay Video in 2016 - a Beijing-based creative marketing agency that helped Chinese tech companies including Xiaomi, Tencent, and Lenovo tell their stories to global audiences. He later founded Relay Club, an influencer management platform for Chinese brands going outbound. He now serves as Chief Growth Officer at Nuon Medical and is involved with Oren Medical, a Shenzhen-based manufacturer within the Kaiyan Medical Group.In this episode, Jim talks about his journey from Silicon Valley to China, what he learned building Relay Video, and the most common mistakes Chinese tech companies make when trying to go global. He explains why he pivoted from marketing into medtech, and breaks down both companies he works with today: Nuon Medical, which embeds clinical technologies like red light therapy, microcurrent, and PEMF directly into cosmetics applicators for brands including Clarins and Vagheggi, and Oren Medical, which manufactures red light therapy and medical wellness devices with over 300 patents across six FDA-cleared facilities.Jim also discusses his TEDx talk arguing that light is a fourth macronutrient alongside oxygen, water, and food - the science behind red and near-infrared light therapy and why he believes it belongs in everyday consumer products. He covers the beauty tech market in China versus the West, how US-China trade tensions and tariffs affect a cross-border business like his, and what he's learned from 15-plus years of building across both markets. Discussion Points·       Jim's journey from Silicon Valley to 15+ years building businesses in China·       Relay Video's thesis: Chinese brands are the brands of the future but need help telling their stories globally·       The most common mistakes Chinese tech companies make when going global, from working with Xiaomi, Tencent, and Lenovo·       The pivot from marketing to medtech and how Jim's China background connects to his work in beauty tech·       Nuon Medical: embedding clinical technologies (light therapy, microcurrent, PEMF) into cosmetics packaging·       Jim's TEDx argument that light is a fourth macronutrient - the science behind red and near-infrared light therapy·       Oren Medical: China's medical device manufacturing sophistication, 300+ patents, six FDA-cleared facilities·       Beauty tech market maturity in China versus the West and where China is leading·       How US-China trade tensions and tariffs affect a cross-border business built on Chinese manufacturing·       Lessons from 15-plus years building businesses that span China and the West

[29:10] Sometimes all it takes is one invitation. In this episode, Greg Gazin talks with 16-year-old Runfeng Bruce Yu, whose first Toastmasters experience inspired him to help other young people discover the confidence and encouragement that changed his own life. What began with a single club visit soon grew into a remarkable leadership journey. Bruce went on to charter the Sea Dragons Gavel Club, creating a supportive environment where students could grow as communicators and leaders. Along the way, he discovered that creating a welcoming community was every bit as important as helping members become better speakers.Bruce also shares the unexpected challenges of launching a student-led Gavel Club, the creative ways he earned credibility and attracted support, and the leadership lessons he learned along the way. Whether you're looking to strengthen your own club, encourage younger members, or simply enjoy hearing how one person can make a difference, Bruce's story is an inspiring reminder that leadership often begins with a single invitation.Listeners will also hear...Why Bruce believes creating a sense of community comes before building communication skills.How storytelling helped students understand what makes Toastmasters different from traditional speech and debate.What Bruce did when some adult Toastmasters questioned whether his Gavel Club was real, including reaching out to Past International President Richard E. Peck and World Champion Mark Brown for help.How partnerships with Rotary created new leadership and service opportunities for students.Why volunteers from around the world now help support the Sea Dragons Gavel Club.Bruce's advice for Toastmasters clubs hoping to attract more young people.How one invitation ultimately inspired Bruce to create the same life-changing experience for others.Bruce Yu's article, "From Inspiration to Action: Discovering Toastmasters launched my student journey into the program, “ can be found in the August 2026 issue of Toastmaster magazine.About Bruce YuBruce Runfeng Yu is a high school student and Charter President of the Sea Dragons Gavel Club, a student-led Gavel Club in China with an international reach. He serves on the Youth Advisory Board at Erika's Lighthouse, contributing to youth mental health initiatives, and advocates for youth participation through the United Nations Major Group for Children and Youth. Passionate about expanding educational opportunities, Bruce is committed to helping young people develop the confidence and leadership skills to make a positive impact in their communities.Bruce lives in Shenzhen, Guangdong, China and can be reached through his club's website: https://seadragonsgavel.org/ or his personal LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/runfengbruceyu/ or Instagram page: https://www.instagram.com/runfengbruceyu/Find out more about Gavel Clubs.References: Supplied by Bruce YuOur club's:Website: https://seadragonsgavel.org/Volunteer opportunities page (Idealist.org): seadragonsgavel.org/volunteerSpeech contests: https://seadragonsgavel.org/contests/Online educational session page: https://seadragonsgavel.org/resources/educational-sessions/History: https://seadragonsgavel.org/about-us/history/Causes: https://seadragonsgavel.org/about-us/causes/Linktree: seadragonsgavel.org/connectPromotional video by Richard E. Peck: https://youtu.be/RkZrbhReG1E?si=sE3ysww3mewETroXPromotional video by Mark Brown: https://youtu.be/e4tlpWN1Vzs?si=XexqUngMSjFnKbMY

Typhoon Noul slammed into the coastal city of Huizhou in Guangdong province in the early hours of Sunday morning, bringing violent winds and torrential rain that flooded streets, toppled trees and billboards, disrupted transportation and forced the evacuation of more than 801,000 residents.上周日凌晨，台风红霞正面登陆广东省沿海城市惠州，狂风暴雨造成城区街道积水、树木与广告牌倒伏、交通全面受阻，当地紧急转移安置群众超 80.1 万人中央气象台。Noul, the 12th typhoon of the year, is the first typhoon to make landfall in Guangdong this year. So far, it is also the strongest typhoon to hit China this year and the most powerful to strike areas east of the Pearl River Estuary in the past decade.台风红霞是 2026 年第 12 号台风，也是今年首个登陆广东的台风。该台风为今年登陆我国强度最高的台风，同时是近十年来侵袭珠江口以东区域最强台风。The typhoon battered the cities of Huizhou, Shanwei and Shenzhen in eastern Guangdong with strong gales and heavy downpours, damaging infrastructure and causing widespread economic losses.台风裹挟狂风暴雨持续肆虐粤东惠州、汕尾、深圳三市，大量基础设施受损，区域经济损失严重。Fifteen of the hardest-hit cities suspended classes, construction, production, transportation and business operations to mitigate the risk of accidents and casualties. Authorities also ordered all offshore workers to return to shore and required fishing vessels to seek shelter as of Saturday.为降低人员伤亡与安全事故风险，15 个受灾严重城市实行停课、停工、停产、停运、停业。相关部门已于周六下达指令，要求全部海上作业人员上岸避险、渔船回港避风。More than 801,000 residents living in low-lying areas were evacuated ahead of the typhoon's landfall. Emergency response measures were activated in 135 districts and counties across the province's 19 prefecture-level cities.台风登陆前，低洼地带超 80.1 万名群众完成转移避险。全省 19 个地级市共计 135 个区县全部启动应急响应。At 5:13 am on Sunday, emergency workers waded through floodwaters in Huizhou's Ruhu township to remove fallen trees and other debris, clearing the way for an ambulance transporting a pregnant woman to a hospital for delivery, according to local authorities.当地应急管理部门通报，周日凌晨 5 时 13 分，惠州汝湖镇应急救援人员蹚过积水路段，清理倒伏树木、杂物，为运送待产孕妇的救护车打通救援通道。At a village in Shanwei, rescuers and firefighters evacuated 27 elderly residents and children after floodwaters inundated the community early on Sunday.周日清晨，汕尾一处村落被洪水淹没，救援队员与消防人员紧急转移村内 27 名老人与孩童。Xie Yutong, an office worker in Huizhou's Huicheng district, said she had never experienced such intense rainfall.惠州市惠城区上班族谢雨桐表示，自己从未遭遇过如此猛烈的暴雨。"Rainwater rushed into my home through the balcony," said Xie, adding that residents had been advised to avoid non-essential travel.“雨水顺着阳台灌进家中。” 谢雨桐介绍，此前有关部门已提醒居民非必要不外出。Deng Li, a volunteer, described stepping forward to assist residents during critical moments as his bounden duty.志愿者邓力表示，危难时刻挺身而出、帮扶受灾群众，是自己义不容辞的责任。The typhoon also severely disrupted transportation. China Railway Guangzhou Group adjusted or suspended all high-speed and conventional rail services beginning on Saturday, while widespread flight delays and cancellations were reported at airports in Guangzhou and Shenzhen over the weekend.台风造成交通运行严重受阻。自周六起，中国铁路广州局调整、停运全部高铁及普速列车；周末期间，广州白云机场、深圳宝安机场大量航班延误、取消。As of 10 am on Sunday, China Southern, China Eastern, Hainan Airlines and Shenzhen Airlines had canceled a total of 377 arriving and departing flights.截至周日上午 10 时，南方航空、东方航空、海南航空、深圳航空累计取消进出港航班 377 班。Ye Menglong, a meteorological analyst with Weather China, said unusually high sea surface temperatures in the South China Sea fueled Noul's rapid intensification before landfall, allowing it to strike Guangdong at severe typhoon strength. However, he warned that landfall does not mean the danger has passed.中国天气网气象分析师叶梦龙分析，南海海域海面温度异常偏高，促使台风红霞登陆前快速增强，以强台风级别登陆广东。他同时警示，台风登陆并不代表风险解除。"Combined with monsoon moisture transport, coastal areas in eastern Guangdong will continue to be battered by torrential rain, with parts of Heyuan, Meizhou, Chaozhou, Jieyang, Shanwei and Huizhou expected to experience extreme rainfall in the coming days," Ye said.叶梦龙表示：“叠加季风水汽输送，粤东沿海地区仍将持续遭遇暴雨侵袭，未来数日，河源、梅州、潮州、揭阳、汕尾、惠州多地将出现特大暴雨。”Guangdong authorities have urged cities and relevant departments to make every effort to combat the disaster, placing the protection of lives and property as the top priority.广东省相关部门要求各地市、各职能部门全力开展防汛救灾工作，将保障人民群众生命财产安全放在首位。They called for continuous inspections to identify safety risks and timely and decisive evacuations.各地需持续开展安全隐患排查，一旦发现险情，及时果断组织群众转移避险。According to the provincial department of water resources, 261 reservoirs across the province had discharged a combined 697 million cubic meters of water on Saturday to increase flood-control storage capacity.广东省水利厅数据显示，周六全省 261 座水库合计泄洪 6.97 亿立方米，腾出库容提升防洪调蓄能力。Meanwhile, the National Development and Reform Commission allocated 100 million yuan ($14.7 million) in emergency funding to support Guangdong's post-typhoon recovery.国家发展和改革委员会紧急下达 1 亿元人民币（折合 1470 万美元）救灾专项资金，专项用于广东省台风过后灾后恢复重建工作。Noul is expected to move northwest at 10 to 15 kilometers per hour, pass through central Guangdong, enter southern Hunan province in the early hours of Monday and gradually weaken.预计台风红霞将以每小时 10 至 15 公里的速度向西北方向移动，途经广东中部，于周一凌晨进入湖南南部，随后强度逐步减弱。torrential /təˈrenʃl/adj. 暴雨倾泻的，猛烈的evacuation /ɪˌvækjuˈeɪʃn/n. 人员疏散，转移安置infrastructure /ˈɪnfrəstrʌktʃə(r)/n. 基础设施reconstruction /ˌriːkənˈstrʌkʃn/n. 灾后重建，恢复

This week on Autonomy Markets, Grayson Brulte and Walter Piecyk discuss Tesla's Cybercab validation timeline, Tesla Semi FSD Supervised, Alphabet's quiet quarter on Waymo, and the Mobileye CEO stepping down after 27 years.Tesla disclosed 380,000 unsupervised miles, but those miles were logged on Model Y and do not transfer to Cybercab. The new chassis has to earn its own validation miles before commercial service begins, and Tesla is pacing production to that validation rather than building a fleet ahead of it. The ramp is slower than the market expects.Best case, that puts Tesla at 100 cars in Austin or a Florida market by year end. Elon Musk also offered an aggressive timeline for autonomy on the Semi, where Tesla is the OEM and removes the largest structural risk in autonomous trucking, creating an overhang for Aurora and every capital dependent competitor.Alphabet reported Other Bets revenue of $380 million against a loss of $1.8 billion, with the smallest amount of Waymo commentary from Sundar Pichai in roughly six quarters and no milestone announced. Mobileye is abandoning its asset light model for full vertical integration, putting it in direct competition with the OEMs it needs as customers.On the Foreign Autonomy Desk, Momenta secured approval for driverless commercial operations in Shenzhen as China resumes issuing robotaxi permits.Episode Chapters0:00 380,000 Unsupervised Miles and What That Number Leaves Out03:13 The 250,000 Validation Miles Cybercab Still Has to Earn05:22 Cybercab Production Is Pacing to Validation Miles10:20 Tesla Semi FSD Coming Soon (Maybe Year End?)14:29 The Case for Vertical Integration16:24 Reading the Fine Print on Aurora's Driverless Announcement22:22 Alphabet's Other Bets and the Waymo Spin Non Answer25:50 How Tesla Runs Airport Curbside Pickups in California27:44 Zoox Recalls Software That Could Not Handle Smoke30:15 Mobileye Abandons Asset Light for Vertical Integration36:14 Foreign Autonomy Desk: China Resumes Robotaxi PermitsFollow The Road to Autonomy Indices--------About The Road to AutonomyThe Road to Autonomy is the leading applied intelligence platform covering the convergence of automation, autonomy, and the Autonomy Economy.™.Through our podcasts, newsletter, and proprietary applied intelligence, we set the narrative for institutional investors, industry executives, and policymakers navigating the convergence of automation, autonomy, and economic growth.Join institutional investors and industry leaders who read This Week in The Autonomy Economy every Sunday. Each edition delivers exclusive insight and commentary on the autonomy economy, helping you stay ahead of what's next.Sign up for This Week in The Autonomy Economy newsletterSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, a rare treat: an in-person recording from Beijing with two dear friends who happen to be two of the very best in the business on technology and China — Samm Sacks and Paul Triolo, fresh off the exhibition floor of the World Artificial Intelligence Conference in Shanghai. We dig into Xi Jinping's first in-person WAIC appearance and his most extensive statement on AI to date, the launch of the World AI Cooperation Organization, Moonshot's release of Kimi K3, the Trump administration's reported push to shut Chinese open-weight models out of the U.S. market, the coming age of agents, the untranslatable problem of ānquán, and what to expect from the first U.S.-China AI dialogue in September.8:51 – The view from the floor: heat, humidity, robot boxing grandmas, WeChat-gated free water, and the "AI+" vibe — why WAIC 2026 felt less like an AI conference than a sector-by-sector snapshot of China's entire economy being supercharged with AI, with attendance swelling to some 200,000 tickets16:32 – Why Xi showed up: what the leader's first in-person WAIC appearance and his most extensive AI statement to date signal, and why domestic drivers matter as much as geopolitics18:01 – Chapter and verse: which phrases from the speech will be put to work in the system — "secure and orderly development" and the governance of agents, and Xi's strikingly extensive language on AI safety after China was frozen out of the Paris process22:26 – The ānquán problem: one word meaning both "safety" and "security," the three buckets of AI risk, and how China's safety community has moved from bias and deepfakes toward CBRN and loss-of-control concerns — Black Mirror versus Star Trek28:14 – Shanghai's baby: how WAIC's ownership structure differs from the CAC-run World Internet Conference in Wuzhen, Chen Jining's very visible host duties, and whether the center of gravity in AI policy is shifting to the Yangtze River Delta30:05 – WAICO: what the new World AI Cooperation Organization with its 29 founding members is actually for, Xi's concrete deliverables for the Global South — 5,000 AI training slots, regional cooperation centers, the MAZU early-warning system — and healthy skepticism about follow-through34:39 – Kimi K3: what's technically significant in Moonshot's big new model, why it's the fourth arguably frontier-class Chinese release in a single month, the two-way traffic in distillation accusations, and what it all says about the state of the frontier gap four years into export controls40:33 – Washington reacts: the reported menu of options for shutting Chinese open-weight models out of the U.S. — entity listings, a draft executive order, supply-chain security authorities — and why none of the tools actually fit the problem49:36 – Strange bedfellows: David Sacks versus the "closed lab duopoly," the FUD strategy, why some 80% of Andreessen Horowitz portfolio companies reportedly run on Chinese open models, and how gating U.S. frontier models while Chinese weights flow freely supercharges the AI sovereignty argument worldwide54:55 – The model is infrastructure, the agent is the product: the ByteDance–ZTE agentic phone, the CAC's new initiative on agent trust and interoperability, and why agents fused into operating systems upend both super-app walled gardens and China's data protection regime1:02:27 – An exegesis of kěkòng: the many meanings of "controllable," the long history of ānquán kěkòng in Chinese tech policy, and the unanswered question of who — CAC, NDRC, or somebody new — actually owns AI safety in either system1:08:54 – The road to September: what to expect from the first U.S.-China AI dialogue, why Mythos tops the Chinese grievance list, the securitization feedback loop that starves trust-and-safety advocates of resources on both sides, and why recursive self-improvement makes this feel like a last, best chancePaying It ForwardPaul nominates Tony Peng, whose Substack RecodeChinaAI offers sharp, well-written analysis of the application side of China's AI industry — part of an impressive new generation of independent China tech writers. Samm gives a shout-out to Professor Zhu Yue of Tongji University Law School, published in Science and doing pioneering work at the intersection of disability law and AI law.RecommendationsSamm: The Land and Its People by David Sedaris — laugh-out-loud funny, especially the "Enough is Enough" chapter; Transcription by Ben Lerner, a perfect small novel about fathers, sons, memory, and technology as enabler or disabler of connection; and Didion and Babitz, on Joan Didion and Eve Babitz and the 1970s California rock scene.Paul: The Party's Interests Come First by Joseph Torigian — dense but beautifully written, and essential for understanding the current Chinese leadership.Kaiser: A fiction-only summer! Stoner by John Williams, a small life told most grandly in some of the most beautiful sentence-level writing anywhere; Gilead by Marilynne Robinson, an epistolary novel dense with distilled wisdom from a dying Iowa minister; and Wang Xiaobo's The Golden Age (黄金时代) in Yan Yan's excellent new translation — bawdy, hilarious, and super Beijing-y despite its Cultural Revolution setting.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

A trademark dispute now before the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (BIPC) could help clarify one of the most important questions in China's trademark system: Where should the boundary lie for the registration and protection of commercial brands derived from public cultural elements?北京知识产权法院正在审理的一起商标争议，有望厘清中国商标制度中最重要的问题之一：源于公共文化元素的商业品牌，其注册与保护的边界究竟在哪里？On July 16, the BIPC heard an administrative trademark lawsuit filed by Louis Vuitton Malletier against the China National Intellectual Property Administration, with Huang Minyao, a clothing business operator from Shantou, Guangdong province, as a third party.7月16日，北京知识产权法院开庭审理了路易威登马利耶诉国家知识产权局商标权行政纠纷一案，广东汕头服装经营者黄敏瑶作为第三人参加诉讼。A four-petal floral design trademark that Huang applied for is deemed by LV to be confusingly similar to its iconic monogram pattern.黄敏瑶申请注册的四瓣花图形商标，被路易威登认为与其标志性的Monogram图案构成近似，容易导致混淆。The dispute arose after CNIPA rejected LV's challenge to the petal-shaped trademark registered by Huang.此前，国家知识产权局驳回了路易威登对该花瓣图形商标的无效宣告请求，争议由此产生。It is the sixth trademark lawsuit LV has filed against CNIPA, having won three and lost two of the previous five cases.这是路易威登针对国家知识产权局提起的第六起商标诉讼，此前五起案件中，路易威登三胜两负。Unlike the earlier high-profile dispute between LV and Shenzhen-based Molly Tea Catering Management, this is not an infringement case but an administrative lawsuit that challenges the legality of a regulatory decision.与早前路易威登与深圳“莫莉茶饮”公司之间备受关注的那起纠纷不同，本案并非侵权诉讼，而是针对行政机关行政决定合法性提起的行政诉讼。The two cases are deeply connected in legal principle, but administrative trademark disputes differ fundamentally from infringement lawsuits in nature, subject matter, and standards of proof.两案在法律原理上深度关联，但商标行政诉讼与侵权诉讼在性质、审理对象和证明标准上存在根本差异。Infringement litigation determines whether conduct falls within the scope of an exclusive trademark right, whereas administrative litigation examines the legality of decisions made by trademark authorities on registration applications, oppositions, or invalidation requests.侵权诉讼解决的是被诉行为是否落入商标专用权保护范围的问题，行政诉讼则审查商标行政机关在注册申请、异议或无效宣告等程序中作出的决定是否合法。This means BIPC will not rule on whether Huang infringed LV's rights, but will review whether CNIPA properly applied the current Trademark Law provisions concerning distinctiveness, similarity, well-known trademark protection, and public interest reservations when it rejected LV's plea for invalidation.这意味着北京知识产权法院不会就黄敏瑶是否侵犯路易威登权利作出裁判，而是审查国家知识产权局在驳回路易威登无效宣告请求时，是否正确适用了现行《商标法》关于显著性、近似性、驰名商标保护和公共利益保留等条款的规定。This requires the court to return to the authorization conditions under the Trademark Law.这要求法院回归《商标法》关于商标授权条件的规定。Under the current provision, signs consisting solely of generic names, graphic elements, place names, or other features lacking inherent distinctiveness — including public cultural resources such as traditional patterns, natural imagery and geometric designs — shall not be registered unless they have acquired distinctiveness through use and become readily identifiable with particular goods or services.根据现行规定，仅有本商品的通用名称、图形、地名或者其他缺乏显著特征的标志——包括传统纹样、自然图形、几何图形等公共文化资源——不得作为商标注册，但经过使用取得显著特征、便于识别的除外。If the disputed trademark involves public cultural elements such as traditional patterns or natural floral designs that typically possess weak inherent distinctiveness, the court will focus on whether CNIPA fully considered this factor and rigorously examined evidence of acquired "secondary meaning".如果争议商标涉及传统纹样或自然花卉图案等公共文化元素，因其通常自身显著性较弱，法院将重点审查国家知识产权局是否充分考虑了这一因素，并严格审查了“获得显著性”的证据。Public reaction to the LV-Molly Tea infringement case has already demonstrated widespread concern over attempts to register and monopolize traditional motifs such as the four-petal flower or Baoxiang patterns.公众对路易威登与“莫莉茶饮”侵权案的广泛关注，已经反映出社会对四瓣花、宝相纹等传统纹样被注册和垄断的普遍担忧。At the authorization stage, the issue is even more fundamental: If public cultural elements inherently lack distinctiveness and the applicant fails to prove that the symbol has acquired an independent identity distinct from its public-domain meaning, is administrative approval justified in the first place?在授权阶段，问题更为根本：如果公共文化元素本身缺乏显著性，申请人又未能证明该标志已获得独立于公共领域含义的识别功能，那么行政机关的核准是否还有依据？Trademark law is not meant to enclose public cultural resources as private property through registration, but to protect commercial identifiers that distinguish goods or services and thereby promote fair competition.商标法的目的不是通过注册将公共文化资源圈定为私有财产，而是保护能够区分商品或服务来源的商业标识，从而促进公平竞争。For traditional cultural elements that have public interest, trademark examination should adopt a prudent stance.对于具有公共属性的传统文化元素，商标审查应当采取审慎态度。Regulators must prevent market players from privatizing commonly available design resources through registration and obstructing other operators' fair use of cultural elements.监管者必须防止市场主体通过注册将公共领域的设计资源私有化，阻碍其他经营者对文化元素的合理使用。On the other hand, they must respect the goodwill accumulated by enterprises through creative transformation and sustained commercial use.另一方面，也必须尊重企业通过创造性转化和持续商业使用所积累的商誉。The key lies in balancing "distinctiveness" against "public domain preservation" without lowering examination standards for auxiliary graphic elements simply because an applicant has a formidable reputation in other product categories.关键在于平衡“显著性”与“公共领域保护”，不能因申请人在其他商品类别上享有较高声誉，就降低对其商标中辅助图形要素的审查标准。In this case, LV may argue that its well-known trademark deserves cross-class protection.在本案中，路易威登可能会主张其驰名商标应获得跨类保护。However, China's Trademark Law and related judicial interpretations clearly state that the recognition of a well-known trademark should follow the principles of "case-by-case determination" and "protection as needed".然而，中国的《商标法》及相关司法解释明确规定，驰名商标的认定应当遵循“个案认定”和“按需保护”的原则。Cross-class protection is justified only if there is evidence that the public would be misled and the registrant's interests are likely to be damaged. In this administrative proceeding, the court needs to determine whether CNIPA correctly applied this standard.只有在有证据证明公众可能产生误认、且注册人利益可能因此受损的情况下，跨类保护才有依据。在本行政诉讼中，法院需要审查国家知识产权局是否正确适用了这一标准。It is worth noting that the protection of well-known trademarks cannot extend indefinitely.值得指出的是，驰名商标的保护不能无限扩张。Even if some LV trademark symbols enjoy extremely high reputation, it does not automatically mean that every separately registered graphic element — particularly those resembling public cultural motifs — enjoys the same level of protection across all categories.即使路易威登的部分商标标志享有极高知名度，也并不自动意味着其注册的每一个图形要素——尤其是那些与公共文化元素相似的图形——都能在所有类别上获得同等保护。Judicial review should guard against "goodwill spillover", whereby a brand's overall reputation is indiscriminately poured into each registered element, thereby improperly extending the exclusivity of the trademark.司法审查应当警惕“商誉溢出”现象，避免品牌整体声誉不加区分地覆盖到每一个注册要素，导致商标权不当扩张。Although this is an administrative case, its ruling will have a significant effect on similar cases in the future.虽然本案是行政诉讼，但其判决对未来类似案件将产生重要影响。The judgment should accomplish three objectives: First, it should strictly examine the source of distinctiveness of the disputed mark, distinguishing inherent distinctiveness from acquired distinctiveness, and ensure that the natural recognizability of public cultural elements is not mistaken for the trademark owner's original contribution.判决应当实现三重目标：第一，严格审查争议商标显著性的来源，区分固有显著性与获得显著性，确保公共文化元素的天然可识别性不被误认为商标权人的原创贡献。Second, it should accurately apply the principle of "protection as needed" for well-known trademarks and prevent the abuse of cross-class protection.第二，准确适用驰名商标“按需保护”原则，防止跨类保护被滥用。Third, it should fully address public interest considerations in its reasoning, clarifying the protection boundaries for trademarks comprising public cultural elements and leaving adequate room for fair use by the public and other market entities.第三，在裁判说理中充分回应公共利益考量，明确含有公共文化元素的商标的保护边界，为公众和其他市场主体保留合理使用空间。A trademark right is essentially a tool for market identification, not a shackle on cultural resources.商标权本质上是市场标识工具，而非文化资源的枷锁。As China continues strengthening intellectual property protection while fostering a fair and competitive business environment, safeguarding the public domain at the trademark authorization stage becomes increasingly important.中国在持续强化知识产权保护的同时，也在着力营造公平竞争的市场环境。在此背景下，在商标授权阶段保护公共领域的重要性日益凸显。Traditional patterns, natural imagery, and geometric designs should remain part of humanity's shared treasury of creativity rather than become legal barriers enabling a handful of enterprises to monopolize markets.传统纹样、自然图形和几何设计，应当继续作为人类共同的创作财富，而不应成为少数企业垄断市场的法律屏障。The BIPC ruling may well provide a landmark answer on how China's trademark system can balance private incentives with public interest.北京知识产权法院的判决，有望就中国商标制度如何平衡私人激励与公共利益提供标志性答案。monogram pattern /ˈmɒnəɡræm ˈpætən/ Monogram图案（LV标志性花纹）invalidation request /ɪnˌvælɪˈdeɪʃən rɪˈkwest/无效宣告请求distinctiveness /dɪˈstɪŋktɪvnəs/显著性inherent distinctiveness /ɪnˈherənt dɪˈstɪŋktɪvnəs/固有显著性cross-class protection /krɒs klɑːs prəˈtekʃən/跨类保护case-by-case determination /keɪs baɪ keɪs dɪˌtɜːmɪˈneɪʃən/个案认定protection as needed /prəˈtekʃən æz ˈniːdɪd/按需保护goodwill spillover /ɡʊdˈwɪl ˈspɪləʊvə/商誉溢出

Lucy 2.5 overlays generated effects onto live webcam footage in real time, and the effects actually react to your hands, your hair, and the light in the room. Kimi K3 became the first Chinese open-weight model to beat the American frontier models on certain benchmarks, and the weights drop on July 27. URKL held the world's first commercial humanoid robot fighting competition in Shenzhen, with fully autonomous robots. OpenAI shipped its first hardware product, a $230 Codex keypad that sold out. Tim Sweeney declared the AI luddite movement over. And Blender got a new multi-solver physics plugin called Hurricane.LINKS FROM THE SHOW:1. Lucy 2.5: Real-Time AI VFX (Decart)- https://x.com/AbermanKfir/status/2077861986092843250- https://lucy.decart.ai/2. Kimi K3- https://x.com/Kimi_Moonshot/status/2077830229968683203/photo/1- https://x.com/arena/status/2077824029126504525- https://x.com/minchoi/status/20779579078579940063. URKL Robot Fighting Championship- https://x.com/big_business_/status/20778067867326013544. OpenAI Codex Micro Keyboard- https://x.com/OpenAIDevs/status/2077425991790870644- https://x.com/AxelCastroK/status/2077499100749250788- https://x.com/work_louder/status/20779869211003089405. Tim Sweeney on the AI Luddite Movement- https://x.com/TimSweeneyEpic/status/2077830952663793702- https://x.com/tobi/status/20778627215638284226. Hurricane: Blender Physics Plugin (BFX Studios)- https://x.com/80Level- https://superhivemarket.com/products/hurricane

In this episode, Jeff Brines and Charlie Sponsel explore the fascinating history and rapid rise of DJI, the Chinese tech giant known for drones and now e-bikes under the Avinox name. They analyze the cultural, geopolitical, and industrial factors that have shaped DJI's success and its implications for the cycling industry. Jeff and Charlie explore the rapid advancements in e-bike technology, the strategic moves of industry giants like DJI, and the evolving regulatory landscape. They analyze how these changes could reshape the future of the bike industry over the next five years.Chapters00:00 Introduction to the BS Podcast and DJI06:05 DJI's Early Struggles and Breakthroughs11:50 The Rise of DJI and Market Dynamics17:58 The Geopolitical Context of DJI's Growth45:45 The Impact of Economic Policies on Subsistence Farming51:32 Shenzhen as China's Silicon Valley57:05 Perceptions of Chinese Manufacturing01:02:44 The Importance of Urban Agglomeration01:09:40 Collectivism vs Individualism in Chinese Society01:17:42 Speculations on DJI's Corporate Structure and How Avinox Fits In01:23:21 The Competitive Landscape of the E-Bike Market01:29:10 The Future of Amflow: A Proof of Concept?01:39:10 The Gearbox Revolution in E-Bikes01:52:20 The Future of E-Bike Technology and Regulations02:05:07 The Future of E-Bikes and Innovations02:12:21 The Role of Major Players in E-Bike Technology02:18:11 Navigating E-Bike Regulations and Trail Access02:35:25 The Impact of DJI on the Bike Industry

“A place that doesn't have great philosophers will not have great technologists either.” — Mehran Gul on Europe's inexplicable underperformance The digital revolution, we were promised, would mean the end of geography. From Beijing to Birmingham to Berlin to Barcelona, anyone could invent anything anywhere, and so the geography of innovation would no longer matter. But that's not the way it has worked out. At least according to the Geneva-based innovation geographer Mehran Gul. Gul's acclaimed The New Geography of Innovation is a travelogue of innovation. But what he finds on his journey around the world in search of innovation is the end of the end of geography. Yes, Gul reports, there's innovation in Beijing and in Birmingham (USA) — but not in Birmingham (England), Berlin or Barcelona. All the important invention is in China and the US. There simply isn't much radical stuff going on anywhere else. Gul began his journey expecting to find ten or twelve countries able to innovate competitively with the United States and China. But what he discovered is either niche players or, in the case of South Korea, Israel, and India, just an extension of the US-centric system. Europe — as renters rather than owners of American technology — comes off worst. When PayPal went public, it minted 160 millionaires who went on to help build SpaceX, Tesla, LinkedIn and Palantir; when Skype exited at about the same value, it minted 11. And if you put London aside, the rest of the UK is now poorer per capita than Mississippi. And the AI boom has only compounded all this, with half of last year's key research papers coming from China, 40% from America, and just 4% from Europe. So really the new geography of innovation is the old geography. Only with China replacing Europe as the only serious competitor to American innovation. Oh lord, oh lord. As a Mississippi bluesman might summarize Europe's predicament. Five Takeaways •       Golden Shares: The Two Systems Are Converging. OpenAI offering Washington a 5% stake, the US government owning Intel — these are Chinese moves, and Gul argues the two models are becoming more alike than either admits. But he pushes back on the lazy version of the China story: its tech sector rose despite the state, not because of it. Jack Ma exiled to Japan, Didi hit with a billion in fines, entire sectors decapitated overnight in 2021 under the banner of common prosperity. In a country with no independent media and no opposition parties, the only rival to centralized power is the tech sector — and the party knows it. •       Two Countries — and Everyone Else. Gul started writing expecting to find ten or twelve countries punching at America's level; the honest answer turned out to be two. Only China has broad-based competence across technologies and a genuinely competitive relationship with the US. The middle powers — South Korea, Israel, India — are extensions of the American system, not rivals to it. That finding surprised the author as much as anyone: it's not the book he set out to write. •       Europe: Renters, Not Owners. After the Fable 5 and Mythos bans, Europe woke up to being a renter of American technology — foundation models, NVIDIA GPUs, all of it. Its best companies keep leaving: DeepMind to Google, Arm to a New York listing, Hugging Face from Paris to Manhattan — while Volvo, Supercell, and KUKA sold to China. Gul's diagnosis is institutional, not cultural: European employees own half as much of their startups as American ones, so there is no European PayPal mafia. His fixes: a European Nasdaq to replace 41 competing capital markets, and pension funds unleashed into venture capital. •       The Question Nobody Is Asking. Since 1990, America's share of global GDP has held at 25% while China's multiplied tenfold — the loser is Europe. The top ten American tech companies are worth $27 trillion, more than the GDP of every country on earth except America itself. Tech is not one industry among many; it is the foundation of all of them — the new cars came from Tesla, not GM. Gul's message to the skeptical Spaniard enjoying long lunches: the last sixty years of American platform dominance skewed power across the Atlantic, and the next sixty will add China to the bill. •       The Rest of the Map: Anti Case Studies. Japan tops the freedom indexes, has the technical schools, and still never escaped the keiretsu — disproving Matt Ridley's claim that innovation is simply the child of freedom. Taiwan's relevance comes down to one company and Morris Chang's missed promotion at Texas Instruments. Singapore is an inspiration, not a model — a one-party city-state that invoices NVIDIA's chips and banks ASEAN's venture capital. India underperforms while Indians excel — 56 notable American foundation models last year, 35 Chinese, barely one Indian. And Switzerland reminds us innovation isn't only venture-backed: a train network running on renewables since the 1960s. About the Guest Mehran Gul writes about technology and business. He is the winner of the Financial Times/McKinsey Bracken Bower Prize, from which The New Geography of Innovation grew. He attended Yale as a Fulbright Scholar, Fox International Fellow, and Teaching Fellow, has been a Lead for the Digital Transformation of Industries at the World Economic Forum in Geneva, and served as an expert on entrepreneurship and industrial policy at the United Nations Industrial Development Organization in Vienna. Born in Pakistan, he lives in Switzerland. The New Geography of Innovation: The Global Contest for Breakthrough Technologies (Avid Reader Press/Simon & Schuster), a Financial Times Book of the Year, is his first book, out in paperback this month in the US and UK. References: •       The New Geography of Innovation: The Global Contest for Breakthrough Technologies by Mehran Gul (Avid Reader Press/Simon & Schuster). The Wall Street Journal: “An ambitious tour of technological innovation.” •       Sebastian Mallaby — author of The Power Law, which argues China's tech rise owes more to American-style risk capital arriving in Shanghai and Shenzhen than to the state; recently on the show discussing his biography of Demis Hassabis. •       Kai-Fu Lee — author of AI Superpowers, cited by Gul as the classic account of tech written through a Chinese lens. •       Matt Ridley — author of How Innovation Works, whose thesis that innovation is “the child of freedom and the parent of prosperity” Gul tests against the anti case study of Japan. •       Andrew Keen — author of How t...

This week on Sinica, in a special episode recorded at the Davos On Air booth at the World Economic Forum's Annual Meeting of the New Champions in Dalian, I sat down with Angela Huyue Zhang, professor of law at USC's Gould School of Law and author of High Wire: How China Regulates Big Tech and Governs Its Economy, and S. Alex Yang, professor of management science and operations at London Business School. Angela and Alex — who are also married, and who arrived at this collaboration from opposite ends of the academy — have developed what I think is one of the most useful new mental models for understanding China's political economy: the platform state. Their argument is that we should think of the Chinese state less as a central planner or owner and more as a platform company like NVIDIA or Apple, one that builds architecture, sets standards, and governs an ecosystem within which fiercely competitive private firms fight it out. Value accrues at the system level rather than as firm profit, and the payoff may decide who wins the race to put AI to work across an entire economy.5:37 – Three puzzles the framework is built to solve: profitless dominance in solar, EVs, and batteries; why the "grabbing hand" hasn't strangled Chinese innovation; and how China is attempting both zero-to-one invention and one-to-hundred scaling at once7:57 – The platform state thesis: why the Chinese government behaves like a platform company, how nurturing an ecosystem of private firms solves the information deficit that cripples command-and-control, and why over-entry, involution, and consolidation are a repeated pattern — from EVs to the 140-plus humanoid robot companies operating today16:13 – The aha moment: how a paper on the legal infrastructure of physical AI became the platform state idea over the Zhang-Yang dinner table, and whether this is a new species of political economy or the East Asian developmental state in new clothes20:44 – State conditions: why state capacity and domestic scale are the two preconditions for the model, and why an ambitious Vietnam — which has the top-down capacity — may still find the Chinese playbook impossible to replicate23:39 – Profitless dominance by design: harvesting versus extracting, the Uber analogy, overshooting as a control-theory strategy for nudging sectors, and how the anti-involution campaign and the 60-day supplier payment mandate show the state moderating the very competition it engineered30:33 – Organized chaos: from the bike-sharing graveyards of the O2O wars to today's disciplined market, the exit of more than 400 EV makers since 2018, and why the survivors of China's "Premier League" of competition are now turning profitable32:59 – The 3Gs playbook: growing markets by solving the cold-start problem, from Liuzhou's EV test drives to Beijing's green license plates, and how subsidy is only one lever among many38:36 – Governing the ecosystem like Apple runs its App Store: why Beijing regulates generative AI with a light touch but physical AI is a different species entirely, law as the sixth layer of the AI stack, why robotaxis scale faster in China than in the U.S., and the state-convened standard-setting that's driving down humanoid robot costs46:54 – Two flywheels: the familiar data-and-cost flywheel and the deeper state capacity flywheel, and how the National AI Fund's small but voting stake in DeepSeek aligns a complementor with the domestic stack — tilting the ecosystem toward Chinese chips53:28 – Guarding the moat: automotive data rules and Tesla's stalled FSD ambitions, the unwound Manus sale, China's own small yard and high fence, and the closing provocation — that America could build the smartest frontier models and still lose the diffusion race to "artificial good-enough intelligence." Plus: the case for coopetition, and what policymakers should (and shouldn't) borrow from the platform stateLinks from the episodeAngela's paper on law as the sixth layer of China's AI stack:The Sixth Layer: The Legal Infrastructure for Physical Artificial Intelligence in China (SSRN)Three Project Syndicate op-eds on the platform state idea:The Rise of the Chinese Platform State by S. Alex Yang & Angela Huyue ZhangAre Government Stakes the Key to AI Sovereignty? by Angela Huyue ZhangOvercapacity Is China's Biggest AI Advantage by Angela Huyue ZhangTwo Management Science papers on commercial platforms:Crowd-Judging on Two-Sided Platforms: An Analysis of In-Group BiasImproving Dispute Resolution in Two-Sided Platforms: The Case of Review BlackmailSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Chinese memory-chip-related stocks surged on Monday, led by Shenzhen Longsys Electronics Co Ltd, partly as investors reacted to the impending US listing of South Korean memory chip giant SK Hynix.周一，存储芯片板块相关个股全线大涨，深圳江波龙电子股份有限公司领涨，部分原因是投资者对韩国存储芯片巨头 SK 海力士即将赴美上市作出提前反应。Longsys jumped as much as 13 percent in early trading before consolidating gains to close at 681.8 yuan ($100) in Shenzhen. Other memory chip stocks followed suit. CECport hit the daily upside limit, while companies such as JCET advanced.江波龙早盘最高涨幅达 13%，随后涨幅收窄，最终在深交所收报 681.8 元（折合 100 美元）。其余存储芯片个股同步走强，华天科技封住涨停，长电科技等企业股价走高。The sector's momentum was amplified by SK Hynix's upcoming Nasdaq debut. The chipmaker is set to debut on Friday, raising approximately $29 billion in what could be the largest-ever US IPO by a foreign company, Bloomberg reported.彭博社消息，SK 海力士即将登陆纳斯达克进一步推升板块热度。这家芯片企业定于本周五挂牌上市，募资规模约 290 亿美元，有望创下境外企业赴美 IPO 融资规模历史新高。The listing, to be conducted through American Depositary Receipts, or ADRs, under the ticker "SKHY," aims to bridge the valuation gap with US rival Micron Technology.本次上市将以美国存托凭证（ADR）形式开展，股票代码 SKHY，此举意在缩小其与美国竞品美光科技之间的估值差距。The timing coincides with explosive growth in the memory chip market. Market research firm Gartner said global chip sales are expected to approach 9 trillion yuan in 2026, up 64 percent year-on-year, with memory chip sales estimated at around 4.3 trillion yuan.此次上市恰逢存储芯片市场爆发式增长周期。市场研究机构高德纳表示，2026 年全球芯片销售额有望接近 9 万亿元，同比增长 64%，其中存储芯片市场规模约 4.3 万亿元。Market researcher TrendForce's latest memory pricing survey said the DRAM market will see extremely tight supply in the third quarter, with contract prices expected to rise 13 to 18 percent quarter-on-quarter. NAND Flash contract prices are likely to increase 10 to 15 percent quarter-on-quarter.集邦咨询最新存储芯片报价调研显示，三季度 DRAM 市场供给将极度紧张，合约价格环比预计上涨 13% 至 18%；NAND 闪存合约价格环比涨幅预计在 10% 至 15% 区间。DRAM and NAND are key memory chips widely used in smartphones, PCs, tablets and other digital products.DRAM 与 NAND 是核心存储芯片，广泛应用于智能手机、个人电脑、平板及各类数码产品。While artificial intelligence inference and data center deployments continue to drive demand, price increases have moderated from previous quarters as consumer PC and smartphone customers reach their affordability limits, TrendForce said.集邦咨询称，人工智能推理与数据中心建设持续拉动需求，但消费级电脑、手机市场购买力见顶，芯片涨价幅度相较前几个季度有所放缓。"AI remains the core driver," TrendForce added. Memory suppliers are shifting capacity toward higher-margin server products, constraining supply for consumer segments and keeping prices elevated even as PC and smartphone demand weakens.集邦咨询补充道：“人工智能仍是核心增长动力。” 存储厂商正将产能转向利润率更高的服务器芯片产品，压缩消费级芯片供给，即便电脑、手机需求走弱，芯片价格仍维持高位。The global supply shortage and surging AI demand for high-bandwidth memory have fueled the memory supercycle. Meanwhile, China's domestic memory industry is making strides, though a gap with Western leaders persists, experts said.专家表示，全球供给短缺叠加人工智能对高带宽存储芯片需求激增，催生存储超级上行周期；国内存储产业虽取得长足进步，但与海外头部企业仍存在差距。CXMT Corp, China's largest manufacturer of DRAM chips, is expected to launch its IPO later this year, while the listing plan of Yangtze Memory Technologies, China's only company capable of end-to-end 3D NAND flash chip manufacturing, has also received approval.国内最大 DRAM 厂商长鑫存储预计今年晚些时候启动 IPO；国内唯一具备全流程 3D NAND 闪存制造能力的长江存储，其上市方案也已获批。Shen Meng, director of Chanson & Co, a boutique investment bank, said market watchers are closely monitoring SK Hynix's Nasdaq performance as a potential reference for the two Chinese IPOs.精品投行香颂资本董事沈萌表示，市场密切关注 SK 海力士在纳斯达克的表现，将其作为上述两家国内存储企业上市的重要参考标的。Roger Sheng, vice-president of research at Gartner, said that Chinese memory chip firms have made significant progress, but there remains a significant gap in both advanced technologies and production capacities between Chinese memory leaders and their global counterparts, pointing to substantial room for expansion.高德纳研究副总裁盛凯表示，国内存储芯片企业已实现重大突破，但国内头部厂商与国际同行在先进技术、产能规模方面仍存在明显差距，产业发展提升空间广阔。surge /sɜːdʒ/v. 暴涨，激增semiconductor /ˌsemikənˈdʌktə(r)/n. 半导体capacity /kəˈpæsəti/n. 产能；容量valuation /ˌvæljuˈeɪʃn/n. 估值

Nick spricht mit unserem China-Tour-Guide und Experten Sascha Kurfess über seine Eindrücke von der dritten Future Candy China-Reise im April 2026. Von Peking über Shenzhen bis Guangzhou: humanoide Roboter, autonome Taxis, Flugtaxen und ein neuer KI-Trend, der gerade jedes Haushaltsgerät erobert. Wie schafft es China, neue Technologien so schnell in den Alltag zu bringen? Und was können wir Europäer davon lernen? Ein Podcast voller Insights, die man nur vor Ort sammeln kann. Viel Spaß beim Hören! Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Sam Altman, grote roerganger van Open AI, heeft wel een hele bijzondere manier gevonden om de Amerikaanse regering te paaien. Hij wil 5 procent van de aandelen afstaan. Met die miljardengift wil Open AI de onvoorwaardelijke steun van Trump en consorten krijgen. Apple gooit het dan weer over een hele andere boeg. Dat heeft zo'n last van de chiptekorten dat het uitwijkt naar China. Het wil chips kopen van bedrijven die op de zware lijst van de VS staan. Apple zegt dat het niet anders kan, want anders moeten de prijzen nóg verder omhoog. Deze aflevering hebben we het over die wanhoopsdaden. Wat zegt dit over Open AI (dat binnenkort naar de beurs wil) en wat zegt dit over de huidige status van Apple, dat ook nog even vijf nieuwe iPhones wil introduceren. Over introduceren gesproken: de Frans-Duitse tankbouwer KNDS wordt toch niet geïntroduceerd op de Franse en Duitse beurs. De beursgang is van de baan! Door toedoen van de Duitse regering, blijkt nu. Ook in dit beurstheater: Tesla verkoopt veel meer dan verwacht (25 procent) maar wordt gedumpt In China gaat een beursbedrijf 150 procent omhoog op eerste beursdag De VEB verliest een belangrijke bondgenoot in de OCI-soap Google moet een miljardenboete betalen Te gast: Han Dieperink, CIO bij Aureus BNR Beurs is een journalistiek onafhankelijke productie, mede mogelijk gemaakt door Saxo. Over de makers: Jelle Maasbach is presentator van BNR Beurs en freelance financieel journalist. Zijn favoriete aandeel om over te praten is Disney, maar daar lijkt hij de enige in te zijn. Sinds de eerste uitzending van BNR Beurs is 'ie er bij. Maxim van Mil is presentator van BNR Beurs en journalist bij BNR, waar hij zich focust op de financiële markten en ontwikkelingen in de tech-wereld. Je krijgt hem het meest enthousiast als hij kan praten over ASML, of oer-Hollandse bedrijven zoals Ahold of ABN Amro. Jorik Simonides is presentator van BNR Beurs, economieredacteur en verslaggever bij BNR. Hij wordt er vooral blij van als het een keer níet over AI gaat. Je hoort hem ook in de BNR-podcast Moerdijk: dorp van de rekening. Milou Brand is presentator van BNR Beurs, freelance podcastmaker en columnist bij het Financieele Dagblad. Jochem Visser is presentator van BNR Beurs, maakt Beursnerd XL en is redacteur bij de podcast Onder Curatoren. Vraag hem naar obscure zaken op financiële markten en hij vertelt je waarom het eigenlijk nóg leuker is dan je al dacht. Over de podcast: Met BNR Beurs ga je altijd voorbereid de nieuwe beursdag in. We praten je in een kleine 25 minuten bij over alle laatste ontwikkelingen op de handelsvloer. We blijven niet alleen bij de AEX of Wall Street, maar vertellen je ook waar nog meer kansen liggen. En we houden het niet bij de cijfers, maar zoeken ook iedere dag voor je naar duiding van scherpe gasten en experts. Of je nu een ervaren belegger bent of net begint met je eerste stappen op de beurs, de podcast biedt waardevolle inzichten voor je beleggingsstrategie. Door de focus op zowel de korte termijn als de lange termijn, helpt BNR Beurs luisteraars om de ruis van de markt te scheiden van de essentie.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Recorded live from the Davos on Air booth at the World Economic Forum's Annual Meeting of the New Champions in Dalian, this special episode of Sinica tackles the "pacing problem": the widening gap between how fast AI moves and how slowly regulation can catch up. I sit down with Xue Lan, dean of Schwarzman College at Tsinghua University and one of the architects of China's concept of "agile governance," to unpack what that term means in practice. He traces China's regulatory evolution from the 2017 AI plan through the generative AI rules and the 2021 tech crackdown, compare Chinese, American, and European approaches, and ask whether Beijing's adaptive style can travel to other political systems — including liberal democracies.00:09 – Live from Dalian: the “pacing problem” and why AI has turned it into a chasm03:18 – Introducing Xue Lan, dean of Schwarzman College and architect of “agile governance”04:34 – Why AI's pace makes it uniquely hard to regulate06:01 – Defining agile governance: mindset, partnership over adversary, and light-touch tools11:54 – From the 2017 AI plan to today: China's two-track approach to tech and governance20:07 – Balancing development and security amid the US-China AI race23:24 – Revisiting the 2021 tech crackdown: failure of the model, or agility of a different kind?26:14 – The “DeepSeek moment,” open-weight models, and regulatory uncertainty by design37:10 – EU comprehensiveness vs. US patchwork vs. China's modular, adaptive approach46:59 – Can agile governance travel to liberal democracies? Finding common ground on global AI riskSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Android sauve des vies au Vénézuela • Apple augmente fortement les prix de ses Mac et iPad • Meta lance des lunettes connectées bon marché • Tesla conteste un accident attribué à son Autopilot • L'Europe avance sur l'euro numérique • Les cyberarnaques profitent de la Coupe du monde • Des innovations pour la transition énergétique récompensées par les Prix EDF Pulse⭐️ Découvrez Frogans, l'innovation française qui réinvente le Web : cliquez ici===============Des smartphones Android qui sauvent des vies lors du séisme au VenezuelaLe double séisme qui a frappé le Venezuela a montré l'efficacité du système Android Earthquake Alerts de Google. Des millions d'utilisateurs Android ont reçu une alerte quelques secondes avant les secousses grâce aux accéléromètres intégrés dans les smartphones, capables de détecter les premières ondes sismiques. Une démonstration spectaculaire du potentiel des technologies mobiles au service de la sécurité civile.Apple augmente brutalement le prix de ses Mac et de ses iPadFace à la crise mondiale des semi-conducteurs, Apple revoit les tarifs de presque toute sa gamme informatique. Les Mac voient leur prix grimper de 100 à 700 euros selon les modèles, tandis que les iPad prennent jusqu'à 150 euros. Seuls les iPhone échappent, pour l'instant, à cette hausse, conséquence directe de la pénurie de mémoire vive alimentée par l'explosion de la demande liée à l'intelligence artificielle.Meta démocratise les lunettes connectéesMeta lance une nouvelle génération de lunettes connectées à environ 300 dollars, moins chère que les modèles développés avec Ray-Ban. Elles intègrent caméra, micros, haut-parleurs, traduction instantanée et assistant IA Meta, tout en conservant une approche plus accessible pour accélérer l'adoption des wearables intelligents.Tesla : l'Autopilot mis en cause… mais l'enquête nuance les accusationsUne famille américaine poursuit Tesla après un accident mortel au Texas impliquant une Model 3. Le conducteur affirme que l'Autopilot était activé, mais les données enregistrées par le constructeur indiqueraient au contraire que le conducteur avait repris la main quelques instants avant l'impact. Une nouvelle affaire qui relance le débat sur les limites des systèmes d'aide à la conduite.Waymo rappelle 4 000 robotaxisLes véhicules autonomes de Waymo ont été surpris à plusieurs reprises sur des autoroutes fermées pour travaux. L'entreprise rappelle près de 4 000 véhicules afin de corriger un défaut d'interprétation des zones de chantier. Malgré ce sixième rappel, Waymo poursuit son expansion aux États-Unis et à l'international.Le supercalculateur chinois Line Shine devient numéro un mondialLa Chine reprend la tête du classement Top500 avec Line Shine, installé à Shenzhen. Cette machine de plus de 2 000 exaflops, entièrement basée sur des processeurs chinois, dépasse désormais le supercalculateur américain El Capitan et confirme les ambitions technologiques de Pékin dans le calcul haute performance.Euro numérique : l'Europe accélèreDans le Débrief transatlantique, Bruno Guglielminetti (Mon Carnet) revient sur l'avancée du projet d'euro numérique. La future monnaie numérique de la Banque centrale européenne vise à renforcer la souveraineté européenne face aux géants américains du paiement tout en promettant un haut niveau de protection de la vie privée. Le Canada réfléchit également à un dispositif comparable, même si le sujet suscite d'importantes interrogations.Les lunettes IA de Meta : au service de l'accessibilitéINTERVIEW - Matthew Sanders, directeur de l'accessibilité et de l'impact pour les wearables IA chez Meta, explique pourquoi les lunettes intelligentes sont appelées à compléter le smartphone plutôt qu'à le remplacer. Il détaille les progrès réalisés en matière d'accessibilité grâce à l'IA, notamment pour les personnes malvoyantes, ainsi que les défis techniques liés à l'autonomie, la miniaturisation et la protection de la vie privée.Cybercriminalité : les escrocs profitent de la Coupe du mondeINTERVIEW [PARTENARIAT] - Benoît Grunemwald, expert cybersécurité chez ESET, alerte sur la multiplication des arnaques liées à la Coupe du monde de football : faux sites de billetterie, faux produits dérivés, IPTV frauduleuses et campagnes de phishing. Il explique également comment les cybercriminels développent désormais des outils capables de neutraliser les logiciels de sécurité, rendant indispensable une surveillance permanente des systèmes.EDF Pulse 2026 : six innovations pour accélérer la transition énergétiqueINTERVIEW [PARTENARIAT] - Julien Villeret, directeur de l'innovation d'EDF, présente les lauréats des Prix EDF Pulse 2026. Au programme : des vêtements rafraîchissants pour les travailleurs exposés aux fortes chaleurs, des solutions de stockage thermique pour l'industrie, le reconditionnement de batteries, l'inspection industrielle assistée par IA, un dirigeable électrique pour surveiller les infrastructures et un drone élagueur destiné à sécuriser les réseaux électriques. Autant d'innovations appelées à accompagner la transition énergétique.Hébergé par Audiomeans. Visitez audiomeans.fr/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

The day her BYD rideshare driver told her the dashboard screen was a “national secret” … that's when Wall Street Journal correspondent Yoko Kubota knew China had really changed, and maybe it was time to think about leaving.What does the world lose when fewer foreign journalists are reporting from inside China? In this episode, hosts Ray Powell (35-year military veteran) and Jim Carouso (former senior U.S. diplomat) sit down with Yoko Kubota, who spent eight years in Beijing before leaving China and writing a striking farewell column about a society growing alarmingly suspicious of outsiders.From that small, telling BYD moment, Yoko traces how a tightening espionage law, national-security messaging, and rising nationalism seeped into everyday life. As a Japanese reporter for an American paper, she also describes the anti-Japanese sentiment she and her family encountered, from a parents' school chat group to the phrases her young son began repeating, and how the 2024 attacks on Japanese children in Suzhou and Shenzhen deepened her fears.The conversation also digs into her business beat:Why on-the-ground reporting from inside China still matters and what we lose as it dries upWhy China can be both increasingly confident and deeply wary of outside scrutinyHow China's EV industry went from a punchline to a global powerhouse, and the "zombie" carmakers left in its wakeWhy the race for self-driving cars may come down to regulation as much as technologyWith the press corps thinning – underscored by the recent expulsion of New York Times reporter Vivian Wang – this is an on-the-ground account of an increasingly inaccessible country that still, as Yoko puts it, "won't go away from our lives."Subscribe for your weekly Indo-Pacific briefing.Follow Yoko Kubota on her page at the Wall Street Journal, on LinkedIn or on X, @Kubota_Yoko Follow us on X, @IndoPacPodcast, LinkedIn, or FacebookFollow Ray Powell on X, @GordianKnotRay, or LinkedIn, or check out his maritime transparency work at SeaLightFollow Jim Carouso on LinkedInSponsored by BowerGroupAsia, a strategic advisory firm that specializes in the Indo-Pacific

Last week in Brussels, EU leaders held their first sustained debate on China policy in three years, and were so wary of Beijing's reaction they wouldn't print the word “China” on the agenda. The trigger: a goods-trade deficit closing in on 360 billion euros, and, for the first time ever, all 27 member states in the red. Recorded at Summer Davos in Dalian, I sat down with economic historian Adam Tooze to ask why the panic, and why now. Polanyi, the Plaza Accord, “glut shaming,” a $1.2 trillion surplus, and what Europe and China each most need to understand about the other.04:26 – Why the alarm now? Imbalances are decades old, so what changed—and the shift from China slotting into Western supply chains to climbing the value chain07:04 – Karl Polanyi, the “double movement,” and how the European working-class question becomes the politics of right-wing populism11:21 – Autos as the core of the fight—12 million jobs—and why the Ukraine alignment gives the whole thing its moral charge for von der Leyen14:14 – “Glut shaming”: the accusation of illegitimacy baked into the Western framing, and how it lands on a Chinese ear18:16 – Wěiqu (委屈)—the swallowed sense of being wronged and why the EU should exercise a bit of cognitive empathy20:14 – Merz reaches for the 1985 Plaza Accord, and the empathy gap that lets a German politician miss what that signals in Beijing22:00 – The currency-manipulation argument, Germany's own history with the euro, and why Switzerland is the real manipulator25:49 – The $1.2 trillion surplus—”nothing we've ever seen before”—and the consumption China refuses to do26:12 – Sorting the sectors: solar, batteries, and EVs where resistance is futile, versus steel and shipbuilding as “Polanyi double-movement as cosplay”32:04 – The Draghi report and the house of mirrors: is China the cause of Europe's malaise or just the thing exposing a homegrown one?36:27 – If Tooze had von der Leyen's ear: investment-linked talks, phased protection with a clear exit, and “investment, investment, investment”41:16 – The October clock on the U.S.–China truce, and why this autumn could get very ugly43:09 – Closing advice: what Europe and Beijing each most need to understand if this ends in managed rebalancing rather than a trade warSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

China's LineShine computer in Shenzhen displaced top-ranked US computer El Capitan on the TOP500 ranking, marking the first time since 2017 that a Chinese computer has topped a list sometimes viewed as a measure of a nation's technological prowess.

This week on Sinica I'm joined by Robert Wright, author of The Moral Animal, Nonzero, and The Evolution of God, for a conversation that runs a little outside our usual beat, though China sits closer to its center than you'd expect. The occasion is his new book The God Test: Artificial Intelligence and Our Coming Cosmic Reckoning, which reads the AI revolution as the latest turn in a story going back billions of years. We get into the French Jesuit paleontologist Teilhard de Chardin's "noosphere," Bob's argument that we evolved large language models rather than engineered them, the cognitive empathy we've both long preached, and the two-word talking point — "But China!" — that Bob thinks is most likely to lead us astray.6:56 – Teilhard de Chardin, the noosphere, and why a planetary "global brain" has become necessary14:49 – Directionality without the mysticism: complexification, teleology, and the "cell's-eye view" worry21:57 – The God Test: is moral progress really the price of governing AI, and is that hopeless on a short clock?28:33 – Why Bob says we evolved large language models rather than built them, and the sycophancy problem that follows35:19 – Open weights and open source: a real safety argument, or competitiveness in safety's clothing?40:03 – Cognitive empathy as the master key, and the same capacity as an engine of deception48:06 – Arms-race fatalism and its limits: cheetahs, gazelles, and the rival who can pick up the phone53:40 – "But China": fear of Beijing, Anthropic and Amodei, Jeff Ding, and the chip-control backfire1:10:48 – Nonzero: game theory, common threats, and the takeoff scenarios that worry Bob most1:23:22 – Attribution error and projection, Ed Fredkin's old warning, and the actual first movePaying It Forward: Garrison Lovely, author of the forthcoming Obsolete (Nation Books) and the Substack of the same name on the AI race.Recommendations:Bob: Pantheon, the animated series on uploaded minds and emergent superintelligence; and the Crowded House song "Don't Dream It's Over."Kaiser: Kyle Chan's High Capacity podcast, especially his episode with Carnegie's Matt Sheehan, "Is China Getting Worried About AI?"; and Patrick O'Brian's Aubrey-Maturin novels.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

How do startups actually beat established incumbents? In this episode of the BRAVE Southeast Asia Tech Podcast, Jeremy Au reframes the classic David vs Goliath story to explain why startups are not underdogs. They are operators who choose the right weapon, then go for the kill shot of category creation. Break down the David vs Goliath Reframe, where the slingshot was equivalent to a pistol and David won not by luck but by choosing speed over armor. Walk through Startup Case Studies including Oatly building a billion-dollar oat milk category from nothing in 1994, and Hon Lik inventing the vape in Shenzhen for himself, as examples of how startups experiment where incumbents cannot. Wrap up with Jeffrey Bussgang's Jungle, Dirt Road, Highway framework, using Jeff Bezos's transition from finance to Amazon as the canonical startup lifecycle example. Tune in to find out why category creation comes from experimentation, not optimization, and why startups should invent rather than compete. Watch, listen or read the full insight at https://www.bravesea.com/blog/invent-the-category  WhatsApp: https://whatsapp.com/channel/0029VakR55X6BIElUEvkN02e TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@jeremyau Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/jeremyauz Twitter X : https://x.com/jeremyau LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/bravesea English: Spotify | YouTube | Apple Podcasts Bahasa Indonesia: Spotify | YouTube | Apple Podcasts Chinese: Spotify | YouTube | Apple Podcasts

El programa 2885 de Radiogeek repasa las novedades tecnológicas más importantes de la semana: cambios en YouTube Shorts y Google One, 200 vulnerabilidades corregidas por Microsoft, conflictos laborales en TP-Link, novedades en Instagram y la paradoja de Anthropic en Washington. El episodio 2885 de Radiogeek arrancó con una noticia que podría pasar desapercibida pero que afecta a millones de usuarios: YouTube Shorts reemplazará el clásico botón de "Me gusta" —el pulgar hacia arriba— por un corazón, siguiendo una tendencia que ya adoptaron otras plataformas de video vertical. En el frente de la ciberseguridad, Microsoft lanzó su Patch Tuesday de junio de 2026 con la corrección de 200 vulnerabilidades, uno de los paquetes de parches más voluminosos de los últimos tiempos. Un recordatorio puntual de la importancia de mantener los sistemas actualizados. Desde el ecosistema de networking, TP-Link anunció importantes despidos en su sede de Shenzhen, una movida que refleja la creciente presión competitiva que ejercen Huawei y Xiaomi en el mercado de hardware de conectividad. En el ámbito de las redes sociales, Instagram finalmente habilitó la posibilidad de arrastrar y soltar publicaciones para reorganizar el perfil, una función que los usuarios reclamaban desde hace tiempo y que competidores como TikTok ya ofrecían. Por el lado de Google, el gigante de Mountain View modificó las reglas de Google One, incorporando una nueva tarifa que ofrece más espacio de almacenamiento a un precio considerablemente más bajo, lo que reordena el panorama de los servicios de almacenamiento en la nube. El cierre del programa estuvo reservado para la nota más llamativa del episodio, que da nombre al título: Anthropic figura en la lista negra del Pentágono y, simultáneamente, es utilizada por la NSA. Una contradicción que ilustra a la perfección las tensiones entre la regulación de la inteligencia artificial y su uso operativo por parte de agencias gubernamentales. Haz lo que yo digo, no lo que yo hago. Toda esta información la pueden encontrar desde nuestra web www.infosertec.com.ar o bien desde el canal de Telegram/Whastapp, o Instagram. Esperamos sus comentarios.

In this episode of PING we're hearing about secure Internet Routing and its data distribution problem from Job Snijders who has been on PING before talking about his measurements in BGP and RPKI. We caught up at IETF125 in Shenzhen where Job presented to the SIDROPS working group on a new protocol he's been designing, called Erik. The Erik protocol was named in honour of Erik Bais who died in May 2024. Erik was a stalwart of the RIPE routing community. He was a chair of the Address policy working group, and active in the Dutch cloud community and the data center association. RPKI, the principal mechanism for determining secure inter domain routing intent (hence SIDR) depends on every relying party (or RP) validating the data collecting all the signed statements from all the publication points, worldwide. This is a time consuming process which inherently serialises behind the sequence of bytes fetched to form a given repository state at a publication point, and how the protocol works out whats changed since the last fetch by this user, and what to send. It's not very efficient and it's not scaling as well as we'd like as the amount of data rises, and the number of validators or RPs are fetching the data. Job's “Erik” protocol is designed to improve significantly on the two mechanisms defined at present, the RSYNC protocol, originally designed in the mid 1990s for filesystem synchronisation, and RRDP, a SIDR specific delta protocol which was designed to improve on rsync, using experience gained from the NRTM mechanism used to copy data in the RIR WHOIS databases. Job has been able to find why RPKI fetch is slow, and design a protocol using the Merkle Tree mechanism which can significantly improve the collection delay, as well as allow for intermediaries such as CDN providers to host services in the cloud.

Send us Fan MailIn this episode of Small-Cap Spotlight, Ning Ding, Chairman and CEO of ZJK Industrial, joins WTR's Tim Gerdeman, Co-Founder and Chief Marketing Officer and equity analyst Eric Goldstein to unpack the company's record 2025 results, its expanding role in the AI infrastructure supply chain, and a multi-year plan to scale production globally — including a new Vietnam facility and a planned U.S. R&D and testing center.ZJK Industrial (NASDAQ: ZJK) is a Shenzhen-based precision metal parts manufacturer with one of the most technically demanding portfolios in global manufacturing — supplying AI infrastructure, liquid cooling for high-performance computing, electric vehicles, aerospace, medical devices, and advanced electronics.

We talk with Pete Staples, founder of Blue Clover Devices, about the often-overlooked challenge of flashing firmware in production. Pete shares insights from running a contract manufacturing operation in Shenzhen and explains why the handoff from engineering to manufacturing is more like "hucking it over a fence" than a smooth relay race. We explore the gap between engineers' assumptions about factory capabilities and the dusty reality of production floors. Pete discusses security challenges, the complexity of modern microcontroller programming, and how Blue Clover's Production Line Tool addresses the middle ground between expensive custom automation and ad-hoc bench setups. We also touch on provisioning, calibration workflows, and why the engineer who designs the product must also define how it's tested. Key Topics [02:30] The reality of factory firmware flashing - dusty PCs, hot glue, and cables everywhere [06:15] Security challenges: managing sensitive firmware and the "glass room" solution [09:45] The gap between engineer assumptions and factory reality - no, they don't have better equipment than you [14:20] In-circuit testing and bed-of-nails fixtures explained [22:30] The Production Line Tool: standardizing hardware and software across engineering and factory [28:00] Recording what matters: firmware versions, hardware serial numbers, and test results per device [31:45] Provisioning and security: webhooks, cloud databases, and managing secrets in production [38:20] The Test Agent: a companion device for running third-party software and complex programming workflows [43:00] Who should write the test plan? Why engineers must define "good enough" before production Notable Quotes "Engineers assume that the factories are a lot more sophisticated than they really are. In reality, it's a lot more like just hucking it over a fence and just hoping there's somebody there waiting." — Pete Staples "They show you their pick-and-place machine and 10-zone reflow oven, and you're like, 'wow, these guys are tipped off.' And then rarely do they say, 'oh, and here's where we do firmware flashing.' It's normally another floor of the building, dimly lit, dusty old PCs." — Pete Staples "The engineer responsible for the product has to not only engineer the product, but how it's tested. They can't just say, 'here's a bunch of design files, build it and let's see what happens.'" — Pete Staples Resources Mentioned Blue Clover Devices - Pete's company specializing in factory firmware flashing solutions Embedded World (Nuremberg) - Annual trade show in March where Blue Clover exhibits Embedded World North America (Anaheim) - North American version of Embedded World, September 22nd Kinetic (San Francisco) - Hardware-focused event put on by Hardware FYI You can find Jeff at https://jeffgable.com.You can find Luca at https://luca.engineer.Want to join the agile Embedded Slack? Click hereAre you looking for embedded-focused trainings? Head to https://agileembedded.academy/Ryan Torvik and Luca have started the Embedded AI podcast, check it out at https://embeddedaipodcast.com/

Shenzhen Jisu Technology Co., Ltd. v. The Entities And Individuals Identified In Annex A

The summit in Beijing produced a "constructive strategic stability" framework and a warming of tone between the two presidents. But heads of state can announce a multi-year horizon; somebody else has to operationalize it. Does the United States have the people — the linguists, the regional experts, the long-haul institution-builders — to do that work?This week, I chatted with two Texans answering that question from very different directions. David Firestein is the inaugural president and CEO of the George H.W. Bush Foundation for U.S.-China Relations in Houston. A career State Department officer who served four administrations and spent five years in Beijing, he's one of the few Americans concurrently affiliated with both a Republican and a Democratic presidential legacy institution. Eddie Conger is a retired Marine major and the founder and superintendent of International Leadership of Texas (IL Texas) — a public charter network of 26 campuses serving 26,000 K-12 students and now the largest K-12 Chinese language program in the country. In January, IL Texas became the first-ever K-12 recipient of the Bush China Foundation's George H.W. Bush Award for Educational Excellence in U.S.-China Relations, joining past honorees including Jimmy Carter and Henry Kissinger.The conversation tackles what David calls the Texas paradox: the same state that just forced its cities to dissolve their sister-city ties with China, that pioneered the closure of Confucius Institutes, and that has restricted Chinese land purchases is also where the country's deepest K-12 Mandarin pipeline is taking root — and where the most institutionally Texan China foundation has chosen to plant its flag. David and Eddie talk through engagement honestly (no straw-man Jeffersonian-democracy fantasies), the erroneous strategic assumptions undergirding U.S. China policy, what real national-language capacity would look like operationally, what they each saw in the Trump–Xi summit, and what 5,000 IL Texas graduates are already doing in the world.05:40 — Eddie's path: Marine infantryman to fifth-grade math teacher to the country's largest K-12 Mandarin program09:12 — David on when the Nixon-through-Obama engagement consensus broke (fall 2017) and how the lexicon shifted13:30 — Engagement honestly defined: what its architects actually believed vs. the Jeffersonian-democracy straw man18:30 — The Texas paradox: HB 128, sister cities, Confucius Institutes — and the country's biggest Mandarin program in the same state31:26 — Texas business, Tim Dunn, faith, and the gap between political rhetoric and where Texans actually are41:54 — The Defense Department safety/security story: when one Chinese word ate an entire bilateral agreement46:16 — David's six (or seven) erroneous strategic assumptions: China doesn't want to be us, and it has benefited more than anyone from the current order52:28 — What real national-language capacity would actually look like: NSLI, WALARA, and why the pipeline still runs through one Marine major in Texas01:06:07 — Reading the Beijing summit: the warmth, the "constructive strategic stability" framing, and whether Trump's Taiwan call could blow it all up01:17:10 — Where 5,000 IL Texas graduates are now — White House interns, service academies, doctors, entrepreneurs, and one high-schooler who pulled a stranger out of the surfPaying it ForwardEddie: Carlos Carrasco; Emily, who is heading to Taiwan this fall on a one-year high-school program; and another student bound for the University of Texas at Austin who will be sent to South Korea for a semester as a freshman — a rarity at UT. And he closes with Miles, a high-school senior and Marine scholarship recipient who, just weeks ago at a national competition in Florida, heard someone screaming for help in the ocean, called for a boogie board, and swam out to save a drowning swimmer while a crowd of adults stood on the beach. "Others before self," as Eddie puts it — the IL Texas mission statement made flesh.David:Frank Zhou, who just graduated from Harvard and chaired the Harvard College China Forum; Selina Gong, a recent graduate of the Harvard Kennedy School involved in its annual China conference; and Dean Dai, a recent graduate of Columbia's SIPA who has been deeply involved in many of the most significant student-run China conferences in the country — and who, as it turns out, was one of the organizers of the University of Chicago U.S.-China Economy and Business Summit where Kaiser spoke earlier this month.Recommendations:Eddie: John Pomfret, The Beautiful Country and the Middle Kingdom: America and China, 1776 to the Present (Henry Holt, 2016)David: Stephen Roach, Accidental Conflict: America, China, and the Clash of False Narratives (Yale, 2022)Kaiser: David Grann, The Wager: A Tale of Shipwreck, Mutiny and Murder (Doubleday, 2023)Also mentioned: Stephen R. Platt, The Raider: The Untold Story of a Renegade Marine and the Birth of U.S. Special Forces in World War II (Knopf, 2024) See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

The UK just passed a radical ban: no tobacco for anyone born after 2008. Meanwhile, Chinese cities like Shenzhen and Hong Kong are using AI and other technologies to police public smoking, all in the name of clean air. Gen Z is becoming the first "nicotine free generation." But even if laws really can kill addiction, where do we draw the line between protecting health and policing choice? On the show: Steve, Yushan & Yushun

Eric Olander on how the Global South is reading the Beijing summitsThis week I'm joined again by Eric Olander, founder of the China Global South Project, which runs the most indispensable English-language operation going for understanding China's engagement with Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East.I came in with a plan: map, region by region, how the capitals of the Global South were reading the back-to-back Trump and Putin visits to Beijing — relief at a steadier U.S.-China modus vivendi, or foreboding at a G2 condominium squeezing shut their room to maneuver. Eric dismantled the premise within ten minutes. The honest answer, he warned me, is that most of the Global South simply isn't watching the way we are — and the disappointment turned out to be the most interesting thing in the room. What looked like the absence of a story was the story. I'd built my questions around one assumption about what mattered; Eric had built his answers around another, and I cop to being schooled.Once you set the summit framing aside, what Eric's contributors are actually seeing comes into focus: Japan racing to recenter an Asia-Pacific security architecture, a region quietly de-risking from an unreliable United States, fresh cracks in the BRICS, Justin Yifu Lin's “three moves” for Chinese manufacturing, Latin America's “find out” phase, and a Gulf where the Chinese setback so many in Washington insist must exist simply isn't there. We get into all of it — and close on the summit as a remarkable piece of theater, the first since 1945 at which no one quite knew who the most powerful person in the room was.04:27 — The dominant mood: pro forma coverage, exhaustion, and bigger problems at home08:15 — Breaking news: the paused $14B Taiwan arms package and the canceled Colby trip11:15 — The dog that caught the truck: China and the costs of a receding U.S. umbrella13:00 — "Constructive strategic stability" — new equilibrium or just choreography?28:23 — The snub: Beijing sends only an ambassador to the BRICS meeting in New Delhi37:56 — Africa: tariff-free access, the trade imbalance, and Kenya's "collapsed" exports44:34 — Justin Yifu Lin's "three moves": move up-market, localize, move south51:00 — Latin America's "find out" phase in Panama, and very low China literacy57:35 — The Gulf after the war on Iran: who really won?Paying it Forward:Boston University's Global Development Policy (GDP) Research CenterRecommendationsEric: A “rabbit hole” of books on Xi Jinping, currently Party of One by Chun Han Wong (after Kevin Rudd's On Xi Jinping).Kaiser: Angine de Poitrine, a “microtonal math rock” duo from Quebec — think Frank Zappa meets King Crimson — possibly the thing to breathe new life into progressive rock.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, I speak with Andrew Seth Meyer, professor of history at CUNY Brooklyn College and the author of a remarkable new book from Oxford University Press, To Rule All Under Heaven: A History of Classical China from Confucius to the First Emperor. Sixteen years in the making, it's the first proper one-volume narrative history of the Warring States in English aimed at a general reader — a gap in the field that Andy has now decisively filled. We talk about why this period — the roughly 260 years between Confucius's death and Qin's unification in 221 BCE — really is the deepest layer of Chinese political history that still genuinely matters, and we try together to find the line between responsible historical reasoning about modern China and the kind of lazy essentialism that reaches for Han Feizi every time Xi Jinping makes a speech. Along the way we get into the displacement of the hereditary aristocracy by the shi, the Lüshi Chunqiu as a piece of political genius, why the standard caricature of “Legalist” Qin is wrong, and what it means that the Chinese state is still, in some real sense, running on operating software written in the 4th century BCE.8:14 – The 16-year gestation, why no general-reader Warring States book existed in English, and what made Andy think he could be the one to write it11:06 – The romanization headaches: Wei vs. Wey, King Zhao of Qin vs. King Zhao of Yan, and the special agonies of writing about early China for an English audience14:31 – Why he organized the book by state rather than strictly chronologically — and what that structure lets him do18:14 – The relevance question: how to take the deep continuity of Chinese political life seriously without falling into the orientalist “eternal China” trap25:52 – Why the Warring States is properly called a revolution: the destruction of Zhou-era hereditary aristocracy and the rise of the shi33:15 – Fukuyama's claim that Qin built the world's first genuinely modern state — is “modern” the right word?36:30 – Qin's 38 commanderies, why the radical version lasted only 15 years, and the Han retreat: aristocracy or regional autonomy?39:46 – Reading the Hundred Schools as embedded political actors rather than tidy textbook categories — and the Jixia Academy as ancient Brookings44:06 – The Lüshi Chunqiu as a brilliant piece of political propaganda, and what its tripartite cosmological structure was actually arguing52:31 – Why the cartoon-legalist version of the Qin is wrong: the 70 erudites, the Taishan stelae, and what the book-burning episode really was57:05 – The axial age question: pattern-matching or something real?1:00:40 – What the Warring States actually has to teach us about China in 2026: zhong guo as aspiration, not description1:05:08 – How the Warring States is taught in China and Taiwan today, and what archaeology is doing to the field1:08:36 – Constant self-reinvention as the real Chinese legacy, and why no plausible future China fully repudiates the CCPPaying it forward:Avital Rom (postdoc at Cambridge, early Chinese cultural history, editor of a forthcoming volume on disability and impairment in early China)Liang Cai (Notre Dame, new book on Han-era jurisprudence and legal traditions)Recommendations:Andy: Hadestown on Broadway — and Anaïs Mitchell's original concept albumKaiser: To Say Nothing of the Dog: or, How We Found the Bishop's Bird Stump at Last by Connie Willis (audiobook especially recommended)See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week I'm sharing the fourth and final installment from the day-long conference convened by the Institute for America, China, and the Future of Global Affairs (ACF) at Johns Hopkins SAIS on April 3rd in Washington — “The China Debate We're Not Having: Politics, Technology, and the Road Ahead.” The first three episodes featured Jessica Chen Weiss's opening remarks and the panels on what China wants, what the United States wants, and tech rivalry and competing visions of the future. This final installment is a fireside conversation between Henry Farrell and Alondra Nelson, followed by Jessica's closing remarks.Once again, my deep thanks to Jessica Chen Weiss, ACF's inaugural faculty director, for organizing this terrific conference and for so generously letting me share this audio with Sinica listeners.Henry Farrell, the Stavros Niarchos Foundation Agora Institute Professor of International Affairs at SAIS, sits down with Alondra Nelson — Harold F. Linder Professor of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study and former Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy — for what turns out to be the day's most generative reframing of the AI race. Henry begins by asking how it is that ideas once confined to 1980s science fiction — the singularity, AGI, brains-in-vats — have come to anchor mainstream American AI policy discourse. Alondra traces the genealogy back to the “Californian ideology” and the long history of outré thinking in Silicon Valley, but her real point is that something has shifted: U.S. negative sentiment around AI has been climbing and plateauing high since 2022, even as adoption has spread — the opposite of the usual technology-acceptance curve, and the opposite of what's happening in China, Nigeria, or Brazil.From there the conversation opens up into what I found to be its richest vein: the contrast between a Cartesian, disembodied American conception of AI — “we're working on the brains,” as Sam Altman put it when OpenAI shut down its robotics team in 2022 — and a more embodied approach that integrates the cognitive and the physical, which is part of what's powered China's advances in advanced manufacturing and robotics. Alondra is sharp on the costs of the brain-in-a-vat framing: it treats AI as a state of exception in which existing laws and institutions somehow don't apply, and it lets us float aspirational claims (”AI will cure cancer”) that elide all the clunky institutional stewardship actually required to get from aspiration to outcome.She also offers an incisive reading of the Trump administration's AI policy — which, she argues, is misleadingly described as “deregulatory.” Between export controls, the golden share in Intel, immigration restrictions on STEM talent, and the administration's tight stewardship of who wins and who loses in the AI ecosystem, this is industrial policy by another name — and a narrowing of democratic input over decisions of enormous infrastructural consequence.The conversation closes with Henry asking what a small-d democratic successor administration ought to do, and Alondra's answer is bracingly practical: get rid of the state of exception, take the material supply chain of AI seriously (data centers, electricity, critical minerals, communities), let state-level policy generate evidence about what works, and aim for high-watermark aspirations — North Stars, in the spirit of the AI Bill of Rights — rather than pretending the technology itself will deliver our values.Jessica then offers her closing remarks, thanking the panelists, previewing the ACF Insights Series, and putting out the call for new junior fellows at the Institute.Participants:Alondra Nelson, Harold F. Linder Professor of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study; former Director, White House Office of Science and Technology PolicyHenry Farrell, Stavros Niarchos Foundation Agora Institute Professor of International Affairs, Johns Hopkins SAISClosing remarks: Jessica Chen Weiss, David M. Lampton Professor of China Studies and Inaugural Faculty Director, ACFSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, I chat with Ali Wyne, Senior Research and Advocacy Adviser for U.S.-China at the International Crisis Group, just hours after President Trump's plane left Chinese airspace at the end of a three-day state visit to Beijing. We dig into the new framework Xi Jinping put on the table — what Beijing is calling 中美建设性战略稳定关系, a "constructive China-U.S. relationship of strategic stability" — and ask whether it's a genuine doctrine of mutual restraint or a rhetorical tripwire that future American moves can be characterized as having violated. Ali and I work through Foreign Minister Wang Yi's morning-after media briefing, including his striking claim that the U.S. side now "does not accept" Taiwan independence — a notable shift from the standard American formulation. We talk about what Trump actually said on Taiwan in his Air Force One press gaggle, the gap between Trump's account of Xi's private remarks on Iran and what Beijing is willing to say publicly, and whether AI can serve as a durable basis for cooperation coming out of the summit. We also turn to the American domestic side: the bind Democrats find themselves in trying to critique Trump's China engagement without out-hawking him, the generational data showing a striking gap in American attitudes toward China that transcends partisan division, and the question of when that shift in mass opinion actually starts to bite on policy.Full podcast page with timestamps and links forthcoming! Just wanted to get this out quickly.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, in a special episode recorded as a live joint webcast with NYRB/Poets and Equator Magazine, I sit down with Eleanor Goodman — poet, scholar, research associate at Harvard's Fairbank Center, and one of the most accomplished translators working between Chinese and English — to talk about the extraordinary Sichuan-born poet Zheng Xiaoqiong (郑小琼).Born in 1980 in a mountain village, trained as a nurse, Zheng joined the great tide of internal migration in her early 20s, ending up on the assembly line of a hardware factory in Dongguan in the Pearl River Delta. She picked up a pen after a workplace injury — part of her finger taken off by a lathe — and what came out across poems, essays, and reportage has made her one of the most singular voices in contemporary Chinese literature. Her trajectory from the assembly line to the editorial desk of an official literary magazine is, as far as I know, essentially without parallel.Eleanor has been translating Zheng since around 2013, and the partnership they've built has given Anglophone readers access to a body of work that defies easy categorization — at once intimate and historical, ethnographic and lyric, tender and unsparing. We talk about how they met, about Zheng's resistance to the "migrant worker poet" label, about the bodily feminism that runs through her verse, about her unmoralizing portraits of sex workers, about lost youth and the way the body keeps the ledger of factory time. Eleanor reads Zheng's poem "Woman Worker: Youth Pinned to a Workstation" (女工: 被固定在卡桌上的青春) in both Chinese and her English translation — and it is, every time, devastating.Huge thanks to Abigail Dunn at NYRB Poets and Ratik Asokan at Equator for organizing this conversation and for inviting me to host it, to Eleanor for her generosity and her brilliance, and most of all to Zheng Xiaoqiong, whose voice — even when she cannot be with us in person — comes through with absolute clarity.Eleanor's translation of Zheng Xiaoqiong's In the Roar of the Machine is available from NYRB Poets. The Equator selections, drawn from Zheng's long-form prose, are available at Equator Magazine.05:07 — How Eleanor and Zheng met in 2013, and why a book had to happen08:14 — Navigating the awkward proposition of China for the Western left10:50 — Zheng's trajectory: from a Sichuan village to the assembly line to the editor's desk16:29 — Resisting the "migrant worker poet" (打工诗人) label20:47 — Conventions of the genre: exhaustion, iron, lost identity, the screw in the machine24:58 — Who gets translated into English, and why28:34 — The translator's ethics: how do you render a factory poem honestly?32:42 — Eleanor reads "Woman Worker, Youth Pinned to a Workstation" (女工被固定在卡桌上的青春) in Chinese and English37:14 — Zheng's bodily feminism: irregular periods, a different way of caring40:37 — Lost youth and the passage of time44:36 — Sex work and women's labor: portraits without moralizing49:59 — Whose work actually counts in Chinese urban discourse?52:45 — Why Zheng Xiaoqiong wasn't able to join us, and how censorship really works54:44 — Rose Courtyard and what's next: classical allusions, ancestral homes, embroidering grandmothers57:39 — Audience Q&A: American worker poets, the WeChat communities of migrant writers, and Zheng's standing in Chinese lettersSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week I'm sharing the third installment from the day-long conference convened by the Institute for America, China, and the Future of Global Affairs (ACF) at Johns Hopkins SAIS on April 3rd in Washington — "The China Debate We're Not Having: Politics, Technology, and the Road Ahead." The first two episodes featured Jessica Chen Weiss's opening remarks and the panels on what China wants and what the United States wants. This week's panel — "Tech, Rivalry, and Competing Visions of the Future" — turns to the domain that, more than any other, has come to define how Washington thinks about the U.S.-China relationship: technology, and especially AI. Once again, my deep thanks to Jessica Chen Weiss, ACF's inaugural faculty director, for organizing this terrific conference and for so generously letting me share this audio with Sinica listeners. Moderator Kat Duffy of the Council on Foreign Relations opens by interrogating the very framing of the panel: is "rivalry" actually the right word for what's going on between the U.S. and China in tech? The panelists give a range of answers — from "yes, because both sides believe it is" to Samm Sacks's pithy rejoinder that "rivalry serves specific actors and specific interests." From there the conversation ranges across the FCC's recent move to bar most foreign-made routers, the pitfalls of framing AI competition as a sprint to AGI rather than what Jeff Ding calls a "diffusion marathon," the many internal Chinas that get flattened in DC discourse, the cybersecurity reciprocity problem (Volt Typhoon, Salt Typhoon, and what President Trump tellingly admitted about all of it), and what it would actually mean for the U.S. to compete by being its best self — what one panelist memorably calls "Americamaxxing." There's a lot of substance packed into this hour, and a lot of generative pushback against received DC wisdom. The audience Q&A at the end takes up the role of race and xenophobia in the discourse — a topic that, as one questioner pointedly notes, had been conspicuously absent from the day's earlier discussions. Panelists:— Samm Sacks, Senior Fellow, New America and Yale Law School— Jeff Ding, Assistant Professor of Political Science, George Washington University— Mieke Eoyang, Visiting Professor, Carnegie Mellon University; former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy— Selina Xu, Lead for China and AI Policy, Office of Eric Schmidt Moderator: Kat Duffy, Senior Fellow for Digital and Cyberspace Policy, Council on Foreign RelationsSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica: Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez wrapped up his fourth visit to China in as many years last week, and this one may be the most consequential yet. It comes at a moment when Spain has emerged, almost improbably, as the most outspoken voice in Europe challenging the direction of American foreign policy — closing its airspace to U.S. military aircraft involved in the war in Iran, denying Washington the use of the Rota and Morón bases, recognizing Palestine, and getting expelled from the U.S.-led Gaza Coordination Center for its "anti-Israel obsession." Against that backdrop, Sánchez delivered a remarkable speech at Tsinghua University — a speech I wrote about in detail on the Sinica Substack (PM Pedro Sánchez's Tsinghua Speech: A Masterclass in Diplomatic Rhetoric) — defending multilateralism, calling the EU-China trade deficit unsustainable, and naming China "a country rebuilding its greatness."To help make sense of it, I'm joined by Mario Esteban Rodríguez, full professor at the Autonomous University of Madrid, director of its Center for East Asian Studies, and senior fellow at the Elcano Royal Institute. Mario is the scholar most frequently quoted in Spanish and European media coverage of Spain-China relations, and the author most recently of China's Vertical Multilateralism and the Global South (Routledge, 2026). We discuss whether Sánchez is running an updated Merkel playbook or something qualitatively new, how much of the pivot is really about Trump, the sectoral politics of EVs and Iberian pork, the Chery plant in Barcelona, Spain's role as a gateway to Latin America, and whether Madrid is now a trailblazer for a broader European — and transatlantic — reorientation toward Beijing.06:33 — Sánchez's China strategy: pragmatism, consistency, and political capital08:35 — Domestic politics: the PSOE–PP consensus, Vox, and the regional contradiction12:40 — Merkel's playbook vs. Sánchez's: COVID, Ukraine, and the macroeconomic imbalance15:55 — The Tsinghua speech: Matteo Ricci, multipolarity, and the human rights omission28:17 — The Trump factor: Iran, Gaza, and the limits of overestimating the American effect35:48 — Trade, EV tariffs, pork, and Chinese investment in Spain (the Chery plant in Barcelona)47:04 — Agricultural constituencies and the paradox of Vox voters who benefit from China trade49:01 — Spain's influence in Brussels and the conditions for other member states to follow53:09 — Spain as gateway to Latin America, and the wider European (and Canadian) turn to BeijingPaying it Forward: The European Think-Tank Network on China (ETNC) — a network providing country-specific insights on EU member states' approaches to China, including the granular differences and nuances that non-European analysts often miss.RecommendationsMario Esteban: A trip, rather than a book — New Zealand, which he's visiting this summer with his family to mark the 25th anniversary of the release of The Fellowship of the Ring. A nod to his love of Tolkien and tabletop role-playing games (conducted, he is careful to note, in his own basement — not his parents').Kaiser Kuo: CONG — a new large-format magazine published out of Hong Kong (the title is pronounced Kong, though its ambiguous Pinyin-like spelling invites a second reading), now preparing its third issue. Beautifully produced on glossy and textured paper, with broad coverage of the art, culture, and design scene across East and Southeast Asia. Check it out online here: https://www.serakai.studio/congSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week I'm sharing the next installment from the terrific day-long conference convened by the Institute for America, China, and the Future of Global Affairs (ACF) at Johns Hopkins SAIS on April 3rd in Washington — "The China Debate We're Not Having: Politics, Technology, and the Road Ahead." Last week's episode featured Jessica Chen Weiss's opening remarks and the first panel, "What China Wants." This week, I've got the companion panel — "What Does the United States Want?" — which I think pairs beautifully with that first session, and which takes up a question that's arguably harder and more uncomfortable to answer. The panel is moderated by SAIS Dean James Steinberg, who served as Deputy National Security Advisor in the Clinton administration and Deputy Secretary of State under Obama — and who keeps this moving with real sharpness. He's joined by Matt Duss, Executive Vice President at the Center for International Policy, who starts things off with a bracing observation: the United States does not know what it wants. The old foreign policy consensus has shattered, he argues, and neither the Trump administration nor the Democratic establishment has produced a coherent replacement. He locates the most interesting thinking in the progressive wing of the Democratic Party, where he hopes the 2028 primary will force some of these hard questions into the open. Katherine Thompson, a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute who previously served in the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill, brings a military-strategic lens. She makes a sharp case that the new National Defense Strategy, for all its imperfections, at least opens the door to an honest conversation about trade-offs — something Washington has been allergic to. If you're going to prioritize deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, she argues, you have to actually give things up elsewhere, and the Iran situation is making that tension impossible to ignore. Jonas Nahm, the Andrew W. Mellon Associate Professor at SAIS who served in the Biden administration, reframes economic competition with China in refreshingly concrete terms. Rather than abstract great-power framing, he identifies three specific buckets — affordability and energy, technological catch-up, and manufacturing competitiveness — where Chinese capacity could actually help solve American problems, if we had the political imagination to let it. And Leslie Vinjamuri, president and CEO of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, brings striking new polling data showing a 40-percentage-point swing in American favorability toward China since 2024 — now at 53 percent — driven largely by Democrats but with movement among Republicans too. She situates this in the fading of pandemic-era hostility and the absence of sustained anti-China rhetoric from the current administration, and adds an invaluable perspective on how utterly confused America's allies are about what Washington actually expects of them. The conversation ranges across Taiwan and strategic ambiguity, whether allies arming up in the Indo-Pacific helps or hurts, the collapse of U.S. credibility on human rights, the future of dollar dominance, and whether the 2028 election will finally force a reckoning with these questions. It's a rich, candid discussion — and a reminder that the hardest debates in U.S.-China policy may not be about China at all. Panelists:— Matt Duss, Executive Vice President, Center for International Policy— Katherine Thompson, Senior Fellow, Cato Institute— Jonas Nahm, Andrew W. Mellon Associate Professor, Johns Hopkins SAIS— Leslie Vinjamuri, President and CEO, Chicago Council on Global Affairs Moderator: James Steinberg, Dean, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International StudiesSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

1. Anne Stevenson-Yang recounts China's transition from a poverty-stricken Maoist culture to an export-driven economy. Deng Xiaoping initiated this shift to acquire hard currency, establishing Special Economic Zones like Shenzhen. This era birthed an elite class of well-connected officials who began separating capital from traditional ministries. (1)1903