Podcasts about Sichuan

Happy holidays from Sinica! This week, I speak with Paul Triolo, Senior Vice President for China and Technology Policy Lead at DGA Albright Stonebridge Group and nonresident honorary senior fellow on technology at the Asia Society Policy Institute's Center for China Analysis. On December 8th, Donald Trump announced via Truth Social that he would approve Nvidia H200 sales to vetted Chinese customers — a decision that immediately sparked fierce debate. Paul and I unpack why this decision was made, why it's provoked such strong reactions, and what it tells us about the future of technology export controls on China. We discuss the evolution of U.S. chip controls from the Entity List expansions under Trump's first term through the October 2022 rules and the Sullivan Doctrine, the role of David Sacks and Jensen Huang in advocating for this policy shift, whether Chinese firms will actually want to buy H200s given their heterogeneous hardware stacks and Beijing's autarky ambitions, what the Reuters report about China cracking ASML's EUV lithography code tells us about the choke point strategy, and whether selective engagement actually strengthens Taiwan's Silicon Shield or undermines it. This conversation is essential listening for understanding the strategic, technical, and political dimensions of the semiconductor competition.6:44 – What the H200 decision actually changes in the real world 9:23 – The evolution of U.S. chip controls: from Entity Lists to the Sullivan Doctrine 18:28 – How Jensen Huang and David Sacks convinced Trump 25:21 – The good-faith case for why export control advocates see H200 approval as a strategic mistake 32:12 – What H200s practically enable: training, inference, or stabilizing existing clusters 38:49 – Will Chinese companies actually buy H200s? The heterogeneous hardware reality 46:06 – The strategic contradiction: exporting 5nm GPUs while freezing tool controls at 16/14nm 51:01 – The Reuters EUV report and what it reveals about choke point technologies 58:43 – How Taiwan fits into this: does selective engagement strengthen the Silicon Shield? 1:07:26 – Looking ahead: broader rethinking of export controls or patchwork exceptions? 1:12:49 – What would have to be true in 2-3 years for critics to have been right about H200?Paying it forward: Poe Zhao and his Substack Hello China TechRecommendations: Paul: Zbig: The Life of Zbigniew Brzezinski, Amerca's Great Power Propheti by Ed Luce; Hyperdimensional Substack by Dean Ball Kaiser: Everything Is Tuberculosis by John Green; The Anthropocene Reviewed by John Green; So Very Small by Thomas LevensonSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

What began as a teenage crush became a lifelong journey into Chinese for Matthew McGuire, an Australian creator and accent coach. In this episode, Jared sits down with Matthew to discuss how he learned Mandarin without textbooks, grammar drills, or writing practice. Instead, he immersed himself in love dramas, shadowed dialogue, and built a Chinese-speaking social circle. Matthew shares how his curiosity and enjoyment guided him from impressing a girl from Sichuan to achieving real proficiency and forming meaningful friendships. He also explains how Chinese opened doors for him both personally and professionally, and why he believes language learning should be fun, intentional, and grounded in real-life use. For anyone feeling stuck in their studies or unsure of how to move forward, Matthew's story offers valuable perspective and inspiration.Links from the episode:Matthew McGuire on Instagram | @realozziemcguireChinese graded readers make an excellent gift! Head over to: https://www.mandarincompanion.comAllSet Learning has some amazing deals on lessons right now: https://www.allsetlearning.com

La récente visite d'Emmanuel Macron en Chine a placé l'intelligence artificielle au centre des échanges franco-chinois. Au menu : coopérations éducatives, données numériques, voitures autonomes et open source.Interview : Shanhui Zhang, journaliste à China Global Television Network (CGTN)Vous avez suivi le déplacement du président français en Chine. Que faut-il en retenir sur le plan technologique ?Cette visite s'inscrit dans une continuité : c'était déjà la quatrième fois qu'Emmanuel Macron se rendait en Chine. À chaque déplacement, le président français aborde plusieurs dossiers clés - énergie, géopolitique, économie - mais cette fois encore, la dimension technologique, et en particulier l'intelligence artificielle, était centrale. La France joue un rôle important au sein de l'Union européenne, notamment dans la définition des normes, et cela pèse fortement dans les discussions avec la Chine sur l'IA, la gestion des données et les coopérations industrielles.Un moment marquant a été la tenue de la septième session du comité des entrepreneurs franco-chinois, qui réunit de grandes entreprises des deux pays pour explorer les opportunités de coopération à l'ère numérique. On a vu la présence d'acteurs majeurs de l'IA chinoise comme iFLYTEK, un leader de l'intelligence artificielle spécialisé dans la traduction automatique, l'éducation et la santé, dont les technologies sont déjà largement utilisées en Chine et pourraient, à terme, s'exporter vers la France et l'Europe.La coopération éducative et scientifique semble également centrale. Pourquoi ?Parce que l'intelligence artificielle ne se limite pas aux entreprises : elle se construit aussi dans les universités. Lors de son discours à l'université du Sichuan, Emmanuel Macron a clairement évoqué les opportunités offertes aux étudiants chinois de venir étudier en France, notamment dans le domaine de l'intelligence artificielle et des hautes technologies.Mais il faut aussi souligner que la Chine a énormément investi ces dernières années dans l'enseignement de l'IA. L'avenir ne sera donc pas une coopération à sens unique, mais plutôt une exploration commune, « main dans la main ». L'objectif est un échange équilibré de compétences, de chercheurs et d'étudiants, bénéfique à la fois à la Chine et à la France.Les questions des données et de la méfiance européenne à l'égard de la Chine ont-elles été abordées ?Oui, c'est un sujet absolument central, qui touche au cœur même de la coopération technologique entre la Chine et l'Europe. En juillet 2025, un dialogue spécifique sur l'intelligence artificielle a eu lieu entre le vice-ministre chinois des Sciences et Technologies et l'envoyé spécial du président français. Les deux parties ont publié une déclaration commune insistant sur le développement d'une IA sûre, équitable et porteuse de sens, ainsi que sur la nécessité d'une gouvernance mondiale de ces technologies.La Chine cherche aujourd'hui à rassurer les Européens, notamment sur la gestion des données, en travaillant avec l'Union européenne à la création de plateformes bilatérales et à une meilleure organisation des flux de données. L'idée est de trouver des convergences entre les règles européennes, comme le Règlement général sur la protection des données (RGPD), et les lois chinoises sur la sécurité des données, afin de bâtir un cadre commun acceptable des deux côtés.Voir : China Global Television Network (CGTN)-----------♥️ Soutien : https://mondenumerique.info/don

This week on Sinica, I speak with Mark Sidel, the Doyle Bascom Professor of Law and Public Affairs at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and a senior fellow at the International Center for Not for Profit Law. Mark has written extensively on law and philanthropy in China and across Asia, including widely cited analyses of how the Chinese security state came to play a central role in managing foreign civil society organizations. Since the Law on the Management of Domestic Activities of Overseas NGOs took effect on January 1, 2017, China has introduced a remarkably comprehensive, vertically integrated system of oversight for foreign NGOs, foundations, and nonprofits.We discuss how this system combines securitization and political risk management with selective accommodation of service provision and technical expertise, Mark's typology of organizational responses (survivors, hibernators, regionalizers, work-arounders, and leavers), the requirement that foreign NGOs secure professional supervisory units, the impact on China's domestic nonprofit ecosystem, and what this tells us about the party-state's long-term vision for controlled engagement with the outside world.4:43 – The landscape of non-state organizations before the 2016 law 7:06 – What changed: color revolutions, Arab Spring, and domestic anxieties 9:08 – Public security intellectuals and their influence on the law 11:51 – How registration and temporary activity filing systems work in practice 13:48 – Why the Ministry of Public Security, not Civil Affairs, was put in charge 19:31 – The professional supervisory unit requirement and dependency relationships22:48 – How the state shifted foreign NGO work away from advocacy without banning it26:17 – Mark's typology: survivors, hibernators, regionalizers, work-arounders, and leavers 35:19 – What correlates with success for those who have survived 40:41 – Impact on China's domestic nonprofit ecosystem and professional intermediaries 45:54 – What makes China's system distinctive compared to India, Egypt, Russia, and Vietnam 50:19 – The Article 53 problem and university partnerships 55:32 – Advice for mid-sized foundations or NGOs considering work in China todayPaying it Forward: Neysun Mahboubi and the Penn Project on the Future of U.S.-China RelationsRecommendations:Mark: Everyday Democracy: Civil Society, Youth, and the Struggle Against Authoritarian Culture in China by Anthony SpiresKaiser: The music of Steve Morse (Dixie Dregs, The Dregs, Steve Morse Band)See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

The last time Yamato was heavily involved on the continent, they were defeated militarily, and they returned to fortify their islands.  So how are things looking, now? This episode we will talk about some of what has been going on with Tang and Silla, but also touch on the Mishihase, the Hayato, the people of Tamna and Tanegashima, and more! For more information and references, check out:  https://sengokudaimyo.com/podcast/episode-140   Rough Transcript   Welcome to Sengoku Daimyo's Chronicles of Japan.  My name is Joshua and this is episode 140: Improving Diplomatic Ties Garyang Jyeongsan and Gim Hongsye looked out from the deck of their ship, tossing and turning in the sea.  The waves were high, and the winds lashed at the ship, which rocked uncomfortably beneath their feet.  Ocean spray struck them from below while rain pelted from above. Through the torrential and unstable conditions, they looked out for their sister ship.  It was their job to escort them, but in these rough seas, bobbing up and down, they were at the mercy of the elements.  One minute they could see them, and then next it was nothing but a wall of water.  Each time they caught a glimpse the other ship seemed further and further away.  They tried calling out, but it was no use—even if they could normally have raised them, the fierce winds simply carried their voices out into the watery void.  Eventually, they lost sight of them altogether. When the winds died down and the seas settled, they looked for their companions, but they saw nothing, not even hints of wreckage on the ocean.  They could only hope that their fellow pilots knew where they were going.  As long as they could still sail, they should be able to make it to land—either to the islands  to which they were headed, or back to the safety of the peninsula. And so the escort ship continued on, even without a formal envoy to escort.  They would hope for the best, or else they would explain what would happen,  and hope that the Yamato court would understand. The seas were anything but predictable, and diplomacy was certainly not for the faint of heart.   We are going through the period of the reign of Ohoama, aka Temmu Tennou.  It started in 672, with the death of his brother, Naka no Oe, remembered as the sovereign Tenji Tenno, when Temmu took the throne from his nephew, Ohotomo, aka Kobun Tenno, in what would become known as the Jinshin no Ran.  From that point, Ohoama continued the work of his brother in creating a government based on a continental model of laws and punishments—the Ritsuryo system.  He accomplished this with assistance from his wife, Uno, and other members of the royal family—his own sons, but also nephews and other princes of the time.  And so far most of our focus has been on the local goings on within the archipelago. However, there was still plenty going on in the rest of the world, and though Yamato's focus may have been on more local affairs, it was still engaged with the rest of the world—or at least with the polities of the Korean Peninsula and the Tang Dynasty.  This episode we are going to look at Yamato's foreign relations, and how they were changing, especially as things changed on the continent. Up to this point, much of what had been happening in Yamato had been heavily influenced by the mainland in one way or another.  And to begin our discussion, we really should backtrack a bit—all the way to the Battle of Baekgang in 663, which we discussed in Episode 124.  That defeat would lead to the fall of Baekje, at the hands of the Silla-Tang alliance.  The loss of their ally on the peninsula sent Yamato into a flurry of defensive activity.  They erected fortresses on Tsushima, Kyushu, and along the Seto Inland Sea.  They also moved the capital up to Ohotsu, a more easily defended point on the shores of Lake Biwa, and likewise reinforced various strategic points in the Home Provinces as well.  These fortresses were built in the style and under the direction of many of the Baekje refugees now resettled in Yamato. For years, the archipelago braced for an invasion by the Silla-Tang alliance.  After all, with all that Yamato had done to support Baekje, it only made sense, from their perspective, for Silla and Tang to next come after them.  Sure, there was still Goguryeo, but with the death of Yeon Gaesomun, Goguryeo would not last that long.  With a unified peninsula, then why wouldn't they next look to the archipelago? And yet, the attack never came.  While Yamato was building up its defenses, it seems that the alliance between Silla and Tang was not quite as strong as their victories on the battlefield may have made it seem.  This is hardly surprising—the Tang and Silla were hardly operating on the same scale.  That said, the Tang's immense size, while bringing it great resources, also meant that it had an extremely large border to defend.  They often utilized alliances with other states to achieve their ends.  In fact, it seems fairly common for the Tang to seek alliances with states just beyond their borders against those states that were directly on their borders.  In other words, they would effectively create a pincer maneuver by befriending the enemy of their enemy.  Of course.  Once they had defeated said enemy well, wouldn't you know it, their former ally was now their newest bordering state. In the case of the Silla-Tang alliance, it appears that at the start of the alliance, back in the days of Tang Taizong, the agreement, at least from Silla's perspective, was that they would help each other against Goguryeo and Baekje, and then the Tang dynasty would leave the Korean peninsula to Silla.  However, things didn't go quite that smoothly.  The fighting against Goguryeo and Baekje can be traced back to the 640s, but Tang Taizong passed away in 649, leaving the throne to his heir, Tang Gaozong.  The Tang forces eventually helped Silla to take Baekje after the battle of Baekgang River in 663, and then Goguryeo fell in 668, but the Tang forces didn't leave the peninsula.  They remained in the former territories of Baekje and in Goguryeo, despite any former agreements.  Ostensibly they were no doubt pointing to the continuing revolts and rebellions in both regions.  While neither kingdom would fully reassert itself, it didn't mean that there weren't those who were trying.  In fact, the first revolt in Goguryeo was in 669.  There was also a revolt each year until 673.  The last one had some staying power, as the Goguryeo rebels continued to hold out for about four years. It is probably worth reminding ourselves that the Tang dynasty, during this time, had reached out on several occasions to Yamato, sending diplomatic missions, as had Silla.  While the Yamato court may have been preparing for a Tang invasion, the Tang perspective seems different.  They were preoccupied with the various revolts going on, and they had other problems.  On their western border, they were having to contend with the kingdom of Tibet, for example.  The Tibetan kingdom had a powerful influence on the southern route around the Taklamakan desert, which abuts the Tibetan plateau.   The Tang court would have had to divert resources to defend their holdings in the western regions, and it is unlikely that they had any immediate designs on the archipelago, which I suspect was considered something of a backwater to them, at the time.  In fact, Yamato would have been much more useful to the Tang as an ally to help maintain some pressure against Silla, with whom their relationship, no longer directed at a common enemy, was becoming somewhat tense. In fact, just before Ohoama came to the throne, several events had occurred that would affect the Silla-Tang alliance. The first event is more indirect—in 670, the Tibetan kingdom attacked the Tang empire.  The fighting was intense, and required serious resources from both sides.  Eventually the Tibetan forces were victorious, but not without a heavy toll on the Tibetan kingdom, which some attribute to the latter's eventual demise.  Their pyrrhic victory, however, was a defeat for the Tang, who also lost troops and resources in the fighting.  Then, in 671, the Tang empire would suffer another loss as Silla would drive the Tang forces out of the territory of the former kingdom of Baekje. With the Baekje territory under their control, it appears that Silla was also working to encourage some of rebellions in Goguryeo.  This more than irked the Tang court, currently under the formal control of Tang Gaozong and the informal—but quite considerable—control of his wife, Wu Zetian, who some claim was the one actually calling most of the shots in the court at this point in time.  Silla encouragement of restoration efforts in Goguryeo reached the Tang court in 674, in and in 675 we see that the Tang forces were sent to take back their foothold in the former Baekje territory.  Tang defeated Silla at Gyeonggi, and Silla's king, Munmu, sent a tribute mission to the Tang court, apologizing for their past behavior. However, the Tang control could not be maintained, as they had to once again withdraw most of their troops from the peninsula to send them against the Tibetan kingdom once more.  As soon as they did so, Silla once again renewed their attacks on Tang forces on the peninsula.  And so, a year later, in 676, the Tang forces were back.  They crossed the Yellow Sea to try and take back the Tang territories on the lower peninsula, but they were unsuccessful.  Tang forces were defeated by Silla at Maeso Fortress in modern day Yeoncheon.  After a bit more fighting, Silla ended up in control of all territory south of the Taedong River, which runs through Pyongyang, one of the ancient capitals of Goguryeo and the capital of modern North Korea.  This meant that the Tang dynasty still held much of the territory of Goguryeo under their control. With everything that was going on, perhaps that explains some of the apparently defensive measures that Yamato continued to take.  For example, the second lunar month of 675, we know that Ohoama proceeded to Takayasu castle, likely as a kind of formal inspection.  Then, in the 10th lunar month of 675 Ohoama commanded that everyone from the Princes down to the lowest rank were to provide the government with weapons.  A year later, in the 9th month of 676, the Princes and Ministers sent agents to the capital and the Home Provinces and gave out weapons to each man.  Similar edicts would be issued throughout the reign.  So in 679 the court announced that in two years time, which is to say the year 681, there would be a review of the weapons and horses belonging to the Princes of the Blood, Ministers, and any public functionaries.  And in that same year, barrier were erected for the first time on Mt. Tatsta and Mt. Afusaka, along with an outer line of fortifications at Naniwa. While some of that no doubt also helped to control internal movements, it also would have been useful to prepare for the possibility of future invasions.  And the work continued.  In 683  we see a royal command to all of the various provinces to engage in military training.  And in 684 it was decreed at that there would be an inspection in the 9th month of the following year—685—and they laid out the ceremonial rules, such as who would stand where, what the official clothing was to look like, etc.  Furthermore, there was also an edict that all civil and military officials should practice the use of arms and riding horses.  They were expected to supply their own horses, weapons, and anything they would wear into battle. If they owned horses, they would be considered cavalry soldiers, while those who did not have their own horse would be trained as infantry.  Either way, they would each receive training, and the court was determined to remove any obstacles and excuses that might arise.   Anyone who didn't comply would be punished.  Non compliance could mean refusing to train, but it could also just mean that they did not provide the proper horses or equipment, or they let their equipment fall into a state of disrepair.  Punishments could range from fines to outright flogging, should they be found guilty.  On the other hand, those who practiced well would have any punishments against them for other crimes reduced by two degrees, even if it was for a capital crime.  This only applied to previous crimes, however—if it seemed like you were trying to take advantage of this as a loophole to be able to get away with doing your own thing than the pardon itself would be considered null and void. A year later, the aforementioned inspection was carried out by Princes Miyatokoro, Hirose, Naniwa, Takeda, and Mino.  Two months later, the court issued another edict demanding that military equipment—specifically objects such as large or small horns, drums, flutes, flags, large bows, or catapults—should be stored at the government district house and not kept in private arsenals.  The "large bow" in this case may be something like a ballista, though Aston translates it to crossbow—unfortunately, it isn't exactly clear, and we don't necessarily have a plethora of extant examples to point to regarding what they meant.  Still, these seem to be focused on things that would be used by armies—especially the banners, large bows, and catapults.  The musical instruments may seem odd, though music was often an important part of Tang dynasty military maneuvers.  It was used to coordinate troops, raise morale, provide a marching rhythm, and more.  Granted, much of this feels like something more continental, and it is unclear if music was regularly used in the archipelago.  This could be more of Yamato trying to emulate the Tang dynasty rather than something that was commonplace on the archipelago.  That might also explain the reference to the Ohoyumi and the catapults, or rock throwers. All of this language having to do with military preparations could just be more of the same as far as the Sinicization of the Yamato government is concerned; attempts to further emulate what they understood of the civilized governments on the mainland—or at least their conception of those governments based on the various written works that they had imported.  Still, I think it is relevant that there was a lot of uncertainty regarding the position of various polities and the potential for conflict.  Each year could bring new changes to the political dynamic that could see military intervention make its way across the straits.  And of course, there was always the possibility that Yamato itself might decide to raise a force of its own. Throughout all of this, there was continued contact with the peninsula and other lands.  Of course, Silla and Goguryeo were both represented when Ohoama came to the throne—though only the Silla ambassador made it to the ceremony, apparently.  In the 7th lunar month of 675, Ohotomo no Muraji no Kunimaro was sent to Silla as the Chief envoy, along with Miyake no Kishi no Irishi.  They likely got a chance to witness first-hand the tensions between Silla and the Tang court.  The mission would return in the second lunar month of the following year, 676.  Eight months later, Mononobe no Muarji no Maro and Yamashiro no Atahe no Momotari were both sent.  That embassy also returned in the 2nd lunar month of the following year. Meanwhile, it wasn't just Yamato traveling to Silla—there were also envoys coming the other way.  For example, in the 2nd lunar month of 675 we are told that Silla sent Prince Chyungweon as an ambassador.  His retinue was apparently detained on Tsukushi while the actual envoy team went on to the Yamato capital.  It took them about two months to get there, and then they stayed until the 8th lunar month, so about four months in total. At the same time, in the third month, Goguryeo and Silla both sent "tribute" to Yamato.  And in the 8th month, Prince Kumaki, from Tamna, arrived at Tsukushi as well.  Tamna, as you may recall, refers to nation on the island known today as Jeju.  The late Alexander Vovin suggested that the name originated from a proto-Japonic cognate with "Tanimura", and many of the names seem to also bear out a possible Japonic influence on the island nation. Although they only somewhat recently show up in the Chronicles from our perspective, archaeological evidence suggests that they had trade with Yayoi Japan and Baekje since at least the first century.  With the fall of Baekje, and the expansion of Yamato authority to more of the archipelago, we've seen a notable uptick in the communication between Tamna and Yamato noted in the record.  A month after the arrival of Prince Kumaki in Tsukushi, aka Kyushu, it is noted that a Prince Koyo of Tamna arrived at Naniwa.  The Tamna guests would stick around for almost a year, during which time they were presented with a ship and eventually returned in the 7th lunar month of the following year, 676.   Tamna envoys, who had also shown up in 673, continued to be an annual presence at the Yamato court through the year 679, after which there is an apparent break in contact, picking back up in 684 and 685. 676 also saw a continuation of Silla representatives coming to the Yamato court, arriving in the 11th lunar month.  That means they probably passed by the Yamato envoys heading the other way.  Silla, under King Mumnu, now had complete control of the Korean peninsula south of the Taedong river.  In the same month we also see another mission from Goguryeo, but the Chronicle also points out that the Goguryeo envoys had a Silla escort, indicating the alliance between Silla and those attempting to restore Goguryeo—or at least the area of Goguryeo under Tang control.  The Tang, for their part, had pulled back their commandary to Liaodong, just west of the modern border between China and North Korea, today.  Goguryeo would not go quietly, and the people of that ancient kingdom—one of the oldest on the peninsula—would continue to rise up and assert their independence for years to come. The chronicles also record envoys from the somewhat mysterious northern Mishihase, or Sushen, thought to be people of the Okhotsk Sea culture from the Sakhalin islands.  There were 11 of them, and they came with the Silla envoys, possibly indicating their influence on the continent and through the Amur river region.  Previously, most of the contact had been through the regions of Koshi and the Emishi in modern Tohoku and Hokkaido.  This seems to be their only major envoy to the Yamato court recorded in this reign. Speaking of outside groups, in the 2nd lunar month of 677 we are told that there was an entertainment given to men of Tanegashima under the famous Tsuki tree west of Asukadera.  Many people may know Tanegashima from the role it played in the Sengoku Period, when Europeans made contact and Tanegashima became a major hub of Sengoku era firearm manufacturing.  At this point, however, it seems that it was still a largely independent island in the archipelago off the southern coast of Kyushu.  Even southern Kyushu appears to have retained some significant cultural differences at this time, with the "Hayato" people being referenced in regards to southern Kyushu—we'll talk about them in a bit as they showed up at the capital in 682.  Tanegashima is actually closer to Yakushima, another island considered to be separate, culturally, from Yamato, and could be considered the start of the chain of islands leading south to Amami Ohoshima and the other Ryukyuan islands.  That said, Tanegashima and Yakushima are much closer to the main islands of the archipelago and show considerable influence, including Yayoi and Kofun cultural artifacts, connecting them more closely to those cultures, even if Yamato initially saw them as distinct in some way. A formal Yamato envoy would head down to Tanegashima two years later, in the 11th lunar month of 679.  It was headed up by Yamato no Umakahibe no Miyatsuko no Tsura and Kami no Sukuri no Koukan.  The next reference to the mission comes in 681, when the envoys returned and presented a map of the island.  They claimed that it was in the middle of the ocean, and that rice was always abundant. With a single sowing of rice it was said that they could get two harvests.  Other products specifically mentioned were cape jasmine and bulrushes, though they then note that there were also many other products that they didn't bother to list.  This must have been considered quite the success, as the Yamato envoys were each awarded a grade of rank for their efforts.   They also appear to have returned with some of the locals, as they were entertained again in Asuka—this time on the riverbank west of Asukadera, where various kinds of music were performed for them. Tanegashima and Yakushima would be brought formally under Yamato hegemony in 702 with the creation of Tane province, but for now it was still considered separate.  This was probably just the first part of the efforts to bring them into Yamato, proper. Getting back to the Silla envoys who had arrived in 676, they appear to have remained for several months.  In the third lunar month of 677 we are told that they, along with guests of lower rank—thirteen persons all told—were invited to the capital.  Meanwhile, the escort envoys and others who had not been invited to the capital were entertained in Tsukushi and returned from there. While this was going on, weather out in the straits drove a Silla boat to the island of Chikashima.  Aboard was a Silla man accompanined by three attendants and three Buddhist priests.  We aren't told where they were going, but they were given shelter and when the Silla envoy, Kim Chyeonpyeong, returned home he left with those who had been driven ashore, as well. The following year, 678, was not a great one for the Silla envoys.  Garyang Jyeongsan and Gim Hongsye arrived at Tsukushi, but they were just the escorts.  The actual envoys had been separated by a storm at sea and never arrived.  In their place, the escort envoys were sent to the capital, probably to at least carry through with the rituals of diplomacy.  This was in the first month of the following year, 679, and given when envoys had previously arrived, it suggests to me that they waited a few months, probably to see if the envoys' ship eventually appeared and to give the court time to figure out what to do.  A month later, the Goguryeo envoys arrived, still being accompanied by Silla escorts, also arrived. Fortunately the Yamato envoys to Silla and elsewhere fared better.  That year, 679, the envoys returned successfully from Silla, Goguryeo, and Tamna.  Overall, though, I think it demonstrates that this wasn't just a pleasure cruise.  There was a very real possibility that one could get lost at sea.  At the same time, one needed people of sufficient status to be able to carry diplomatic messages and appropriately represent the court in foreign lands.  We often seen envoys later taking on greater positions of responsibility in the court, and so you didn't have to go far to find those willing to take the risk for later rewards. That same year, another tribute mission from Silla did manage to make the crossing successfully.  And in this mission we are given more details, for they brought gold, silver, iron, sacrificial cauldrons with three feet, brocade, cloth, hides, horses, dogs, mules, and camels.  And those were just the official gifts to the court.  Silla also sent distinct presents for the sovereign, the queen, and the crown prince, namely gold, silver, swords, flags, and things of that nature. This appears to demonstrate increasingly close ties between Silla and Yamato. All of that arrived in the 10th lunar month of 679, and they stayed through the 6th lunar month of 680—about 7 to 9 months all told, depending on if there were any intercalary months that year.  In addition to entertaining the Silla envoys in Tsukushi—it is not mentioned if they made it to the capital—we are also told that in the 2nd lunar month, halfway through the envoys' visit, eight labourers from Silla were sent back to their own country with gifts appropriate to their station. Here I have to pause and wonder what exactly is meant by this.  "Labourer" seems somewhat innocuous.  I suspect that their presence in Yamato may have been less than voluntary, and I wonder if these were captured prisoners of war who could have been in Yamato now for over a decade.  If so, this could have been a gesture indicating that the two sides were putting all of that nastiness with Baekje behind them, and Yamato was accepting Silla's new role on the peninsula.  Or maybe I'm reading too much into it, but it does seem to imply that Silla and Yamato were growing closer, something that Yamato would need if it wanted to have easy access, again, to the wider world. Speaking of returning people, that seems to have been something of a common thread for this year, 680, as another mission from Goguryeo saw 19 Goguryeo men also returned to their country.  These were condolence envoys who had come to mourn the death of Takara Hime—aka Saimei Tennou.  They must have arrived in the midst of all that was happening peninsula, and as such they were detained.  Their detention is somewhat interesting, when you think about it, since technically Baekje and Goguryeo—and thus Yamato—would have been on the same side against the Silla-Tang alliance.  But perhaps it was just considered too dangerous to send them home, initially, and then the Tang had taken control of their home.  It is unclear to me how much they were being held by Yamato and how much they were just men without a country for a time.  This may reflect how things on the mainland were stabilizing again, at least from Yamato's perspective.  However, as we'll discuss a bit later, it may have also been another attempt at restoring the Goguryeo kingdom by bringing back refugees, especially if they had connections with the old court.  The Goguryeo envoys—both the recent mission and those who had been detained—would remain until the 5th lunar month of 681, when they finally took their leave.  That year, there were numerous mission both from and to Silla and Goguryeo, and in the latter part of the year, Gim Chyungpyeong came once again, once more bearing gives of gold, silver, copper, iron, brocade, thin silk, deerskins, and fine cloth.  They also brought gold, silver, flags of a rosy-colored brocade and skins for the sovereign, his queen, and the crown prince. That said, the 681 envoys also brought grave news:  King Munmu of Silla was dead.  Munmu had reigned since 661, so he had overseen the conquest of Silla and Goguryeo.  His regnal name in Japanese might be read as Monmu, or even "Bunbu", referencing the blending of literary and cultural achievements seen as the pinnacle of noble attainment.  He is known as Munmu the Great for unifying the peninsula under a single ruler—though much of the Goguryeo territory was still out of reach.  Indeed he saw warfare and the betterment of his people, and it is no doubt significant that his death is recorded in the official records of the archipelago.   He was succeeded by his son, who would reign as King Sinmun, though the succession wasn't exactly smooth. We are told that Munmu, knowing his time was short, requested that his son, the Crown Prince, be named king before they attended to Munmu's own funerary arrangements, claiming that the throne should not sit vacant.  This may have been prescient, as the same year Munmu died and Sinmun ascended to the throne there was a revolt, led by none other than Sinmun's own father-in-law, Kim Heumdol.  Heumdol may, himselve, have been more of a figurehead for other political factions in the court and military.  Nonetheless, the attempted coup of 681 was quickly put down—the envoys in Yamato would likely only learn about everything after the dust had settled upon their return. The following year, 682, we see another interesting note about kings, this time in regards to the Goguryeo envoys, whom we are told were sent by the King of Goguryeo.  Ever since moving the commandery to Liaodong, the Tang empire had claimed dominion over the lands of Goguryeo north of the Taedong river.  Originally they had administered it militarily, but in 677 they crowned a local, Bojang as the "King of Joseon", using the old name for the region, and put him in charge of the Liaodong commandery.  However, he was removed in 681, and sent into exile in Sichuan, because rather than suppressing revolt, he had actually encouraged restoration attempts, inviting back Goguryeo refugees, like those who had been detained in Yamato.  Although Bojang himself was sent into exile, his descendants continued to claim sovereignty, so it may have been one of them that was making the claim to the "King of Goguryeo", possibly with Silla's blessing. Later that year, 682, we see Hayato from Ohosumi and Ata—possibly meaning Satsuma—the southernmost point of Kyushu coming to the court in 682.  They brought tribute and representatives of Ohosumi and Ata wrestled, with the Ohosumi wrestler emerging victorious.  They were entertained west of Asukadera, and various kinds of music was performed and gifts were given. They were apparently quite the sight, as Buddhist priests and laiety all came out to watch. Little is known for certain about the Hayato.  We have shields that are attributed to them, but their association may have more to do with the fact that they were employed as ceremonial guards for a time at the palace.  We do know that Southern Kyushu had various groups that were seen as culturally distinct from Yamato, although there is a lot of overlap in material culture.  We also see early reports of the Kumaso, possibly two different groups, the Kuma and So, in earlier records, and the relationship between the Kumaso and the Hayato is not clearly defined. What we do know is that southern Kyushu, for all that it shared with Yamato certain aspects of culture through the kofun period, for example, they also had their own traditions. For example, there is a particular burial tradition of underground kofun that is distinct to southern Kyushu.  A great example of this can be found at the Saitobaru Kofun cluster in Miyazaki, which contains these unique southern Kyushu style burials along with more Yamato style keyhole shaped and circular type kofun.  Miyazaki sits just north of the Ohosumi peninsula, in what was formerly the land of Hyuga, aka  Himuka.  This is also where a lot of the founding stories of the Heavenly grandchild were placed, and even today there is a shrine there to the Heavenly Rock Cave.  In other words there are a lot of connections with Southern Kyushu, and given that the Chronicles were being written in the later 7th and early 8th centuries, it is an area of intense interest when trying to understand the origins of Yamato and Japanese history. Unfortunately, nothing clearly tells us exactly how the Hayato were separate, but in the coming century they would both come under Yamato hegemony and rebel against it, time and again.  This isn't the first time they are mentioned, but it may be the first time that we see them as an actual people, in a factual entry as earlier references in the Chronicles are suspect. Continuing on with our look at diplomacy during this period, the year 683 we see a continuation of the same patterns, with nothing too out of the ordinary.  Same with most of 684 until the 12th lunar month.  It is then that we see a Silla ship arrive with Hashi no Sukune no Wohi and Shirawi no Fubito no Hozen.  They had both, previously been to the Tang empire to study, though we don't have a record of them leaving for that or any other purpose.  They are accompanied by Witsukahi no Muraji no Kobito and Tsukushi no Miyake no Muraji no Tokuko, both of whom had apparently been captured and taken by the Tang dynasty during the Baekje campaign.  Apparently they had all traveled back from the Tang empire together to Silla, who then provided them passage to Yamato. The timing of this suggests it may have had something to do with the changes going on in the Tang empire—changes that I desperately want to get into, but given that we are already a good ways into this current episode, I think I will leave it for later.  But I will note this:  Emperor Gaozong had passed away and his wife, Empress Wu Zetian, was now ruling as regent for her sons.  Wu Zetian is probably the most famous empress in all of Chinese history, and while she held de facto power as a co-regent during her husband's reign and as a regent during her sons' reigns, she would actually ascend the throne herself in 690.  Her reign as a woman during a time of heightened patriarchal tradition is particularly of note, and it leads us to wonder about the vilification that she received by the men who followed her rule.  And I really want to get into all of that but, thematically, I think it better to wait.  Those of you reading ahead in the syllabus—which is to say the Chronicles—probably know why.  So let us just leave it there and say that the Tang was going through a few things, and that may explain why students were returning back in the company of former war captives. A few months later, the Silla escort, Gim Mulyu, was sent home along with 7 people from Silla who had been washed ashore—presumably during a storm or other such event, again illustrating the dangers of taking to the ocean at this time.  Perhaps related to that theme is the entry only a month later, which merely stated that Gim Jusan of Silla returned home.  Gim Jusan was an envoy sent to Yamato in the 11th lunar month of 683.  He was entertained in Tsukushi, and we are told that he returned to his own country on the 3rd month of 684.  Now we are seeing an entry in the 4th month of 685 that this same person apparently returned home. It is possible that something got mixed up, and that the Chroniclers were dealing with a typo in the records that made it seem like this took place a year later than it did.  This was certainly an issue at this time, given all the math one had to do just to figure out what day it was.  There is also the possibility that he returned on another embassy, but just wasn't mentioned for some reason.  The last possible explanation is that he somehow got lost and it took him a year to find his way back.  Not entirely impossible back then, though I am a bit skeptical.  Among other things, why would that note have found its way into the Chronicles in Yamato?  While they were certainly using some continental sources, this seems like something they were talking about as far as him leaving the archipelago, rather than discussion of something happening elsewhere. Speaking of happening elsewhere, I'm wondering about another event that happened around this time as well.  In fact, it was while Gim Mulyu was still in the archipelago.  For some reason the Yamato court granted rank to 147 individuals from Tang, Baekje, and Goguryeo.  Interestingly, they don't mention Silla.  Furthermore, there is no real mention of any Tang envoys during this reign.  In fact, there is hardly mention of the Tang dynasty at all.  There is a mention of some 30 Tang men—captives, presumably—being sent to the Yamato court from Tsukushi.  Those men were settled in Toutoumi, so there were men of Tang in the archipelago.  But beyond that, there are only three other mentions of the Tang dynasty.  One was when the students and war captives came back.  Another was this note about giving rank to 147 individuals.  Finally there is a similar record in 686, at the very end of the reign, where it is 34 persons who were given rank.  This time it was to carpenters, diviners, physicians, students from Tang—possibly those who had just come back a year or so earlier.  So if there weren't envoys from Tang, Goguryeo, and Baekje, who were these people and why were they being granted Yamato court rank?  My assumption is that it was foreigners living in the archipelago, and being incorporated into the Yamato court system.  Still, it is interesting that after the overtures by the Tang in the previous reign we have heard virtually nothing since then.  Again, that is likely largely due to the conflicts between Tang and Silla, though now, things seem to be changing.  The conflicts have settled down, and new rulers are in place, so we'll see how things go. Speaking of which, let's finish up with the diplomatic exchanges in this reign.  I'm only hitting some of the highlights here.  First is the return from Silla, in the 5th month of 685, of Takamuku no Asomi no Maro and Tsuno no Asomi no Ushikahi.  They had traveled to Silla in 684, and they did not come back emptyhanded.  The new King of Silla presented them with gifts, including 2 horses, 3 dogs, 2 parrots, and 2 magpies.  They also brought back the novice monks Kanjou and Ryoukan.  Not bad, overall. Then, 6 months later, another tribute mission came, but this one has an interesting—if somewhat questionable—note attached to it.  It is said that the envoys Gim Jisyang and Gim Geonhun were sent to request "governance" and to bring tribute.  This certainly go the court's attention.  They didn't bring the envoys all the way to the capital, but they did send to them, in Tsukushi, Prince Kawachi, Ohotomo no Sukune no Yasumaro, Fujiwara no Asomi no Ohoshima, and Hodzumi no Asomi no Mushimaro. About three months later they send the musical performers from Kawaradera to provide entertainment during a banquet for the Silla envoy, and in payment some 5,000 bundles of rice rom the private lands attached to the queen's palace were granted to the temple in gratitude. The Silla tribute was then brought to the capital from Tsukushi.  This time it was more than 100 items, including one fine horse, one mule, two dogs, a gold container inlaid with some kind of design, gold, silver, faint brocade, silk gauze, tiger and leopard skins, and a variety of medicines.  In addition, as was now common, the envoys, Gim Jisyang and Gim Geonhun, apparently had personal gifts to give in the form of gold, silver, faint brocade, silk gauze, gold containers, screens, saddle hides, silk cloth, and more medicine.  There were also gifts specifically for the sovereign, the queen, the Crown Prince, and for the various princes of the blood. The court returned this favor with gifts to the envoys, presented at a banquet just for them, before sending them on their way. A couple of notes.  First off, it is interesting that they are entertained at Tsukushi rather than being invited to the capital, and I wonder if this was because the sovereign, Ohoama, wasn't doing so well.  This was all happening in 685 and 686, and the sovereign would pass away shortly afterwards.  So it is possible that Ohoama just was not up to entertaining visitors at this time.  Of course, the Chronicles often don't tell us exactly why a given decision was made, only that it was.  And sometimes not even that. The other thing that seems curious is the mention of a request for governance.  That almost sounds like Silla was asking to come under Yamato hegemony, which I seriously doubt.  It may be that they were asking something along the lines of an alliance, but it is also possible that the scribes recording things for Yamato heard what they wanted to hear and so wrote it down in the light most favorable to Yamato laying claim to the peninsula. Or perhaps I'm misunderstanding exactly what they were asking for.  Maybe "governance" here means something else—perhaps just some kind of better relationship. And with that, we'll leave it for now.  There is more developing in the next reign, but I think we want to wait until we get there.  There are still a lot more things to cover in this reign before we move on—we haven't even touched on the establishment of the new capital, on the various court events, not to mention some of the laws and punishments that this period is named for.  And there is the minor issue of a rebellion.  All of that will be dealt with.  And then, after that, we get to the final reign of the Chronicles: the reign of Jitou Tennou.  From there?  Who knows. It is the winter holiday season, so I hope everyone is enjoying themselves.  Next episode will be the New Year's recap, and then we should finish with this reign probably in January or early February. Until then, if you like what we are doing, please tell your friends and feel free to rate us wherever you listen to podcasts.  If you feel the need to do more, and want to help us keep this going, we have information about how you can donate on Patreon or through our KoFi site, ko-fi.com/sengokudaimyo, or find the links over at our main website,  SengokuDaimyo.com/Podcast, where we will have some more discussion on topics from this episode. Also, feel free to reach out to our Sengoku Daimyo Facebook page.  You can also email us at the.sengoku.daimyo@gmail.com.  Thank you, also, to Ellen for their work editing the podcast. And that's all for now.  Thank you again, and I'll see you next episode on Sengoku Daimyo's Chronicles of Japan.

Jiwei Cun is a small village in Liangshan Mountains of Sichuan province, China. They are Yi nationality. The local people have pigs, cows and chickens in backyards, under trees. Yi is very very old tribes in history. Because of the mountains, they're a mystery. Recorded by Digimonk.

China's major airlines have extended free refund and rescheduling policies for Japan-bound tickets as weekly Sino-Japanese flight volumes sink to their lowest level in a month and Chinese travelers redirect their winter holiday plans toward emerging hubs in Russia, Central Asia and domestic ice-and-snow destinations.中国主要航空公司已延长日本航线机票的免费退改政策，因中日每周航班量跌至一个月来最低水平，中国旅客正将冬季度假计划转向俄罗斯、中亚新兴枢纽及国内冰雪旅游目的地。On Friday, major domestic airlines, including Air China, China Eastern Airlines and China Southern Airlines, extended their previous Dec 31 deadline for refunds and rebooking to March 28 next year, the end of the winter-spring travel season.周五，包括中国国际航空、中国东方航空和中国南方航空在内的国内主要航空公司，将原定于12月31日的退票和改签截止日期延长至明年3月28日，即寒假春假出行高峰期的结束之日。The extensions follow China's travel advisories issued in mid-November discouraging trips to Japan after erroneous remarks by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi regarding China's Taiwan. Chinese airlines have since recalibrated capacity, with reductions concentrated in leisure-heavy routes.此次延长禁令源于中国11月中旬发布的旅行建议，该建议因日本首相高市早苗就中国台湾问题发表不当言论而劝阻赴日旅行。此后中国航空公司已调整运力配置，削减主要集中在休闲旅游为主的航线。Data from Flight Master, a travel services platform, show that round-trip Sino-Japanese flights fell to 1,167 during the week of Nov 24-30, the lowest weekly volume in a month, with the recovery rate sliding to 78.1 percent, a new low. As of Dec 1, the projected cancellation rate for Sino-Japanese flights scheduled in December rose to 26.4 percent, continuing an upward trend.旅行服务平台Flight Master数据显示，11月24日至30日当周中日往返航班量降至1167架次，创下一个月来最低周度水平，复航率滑落至78.1%，再创新低。截至12月1日，12月中日航班的预计取消率升至26.4%，持续呈上升趋势。Industry insiders said that the impact is likely to extend beyond the Spring Festival period, with aircraft redeployed to Southeast Asia and domestic routes.业内人士表示，该影响可能持续到春节假期之后，部分航班将被调往东南亚及国内航线。As travelers look beyond Japan for winter sports and seasonal scenery, travel demand is rising across a widening set of destinations. One of the most significant shifts is toward Russia following Moscow's decision to grant Chinese citizens visa-free entry for up to 30 days through Sept 14 next year.随着游客将目光投向日本以外的冬季运动和季节性景观，越来越多的目的地正迎来旅游需求增长。其中最显著的变化之一是俄罗斯旅游热潮，因为莫斯科宣布自即日起至明年9月14日，中国公民赴俄可享受最长30天的免签待遇。UTour, a Beijing-based travel agency, said inquiries doubled immediately after the policy took effect, driven largely by Spring Festival travel plans.北京优途天下国际旅行社表示，新规生效后咨询量立即翻倍，主要受春节出行计划推动。Huang Zhaoyang, the company's Russia product manager, said Murmansk, known for its aurora and ice-snow resources, is attracting attention under the new policy. Russia's overall appeal is expected to strengthen and help woo a wider range of Chinese travelers, he added.该公司俄罗斯产品经理黄朝阳（音译）表示，以极光和冰雪资源闻名的摩尔曼斯克在新政策下正吸引更多关注。他补充道，俄罗斯整体吸引力有望增强，有助于吸引更广泛的中国游客群体。Outbound travel is also pivoting notably toward Central Asia and Northern Europe, with Kazakhstan rapidly emerging as a winter sports hub. Tongcheng Travel data show that flight bookings from major Chinese cities to Kazakhstan between early December and the New Year holiday climbed more than 50 percent year-on-year, while hotel reservations climbed more than 80 percent, with Almaty and Astana ranking as top choices.出境游目的地也明显转向中亚和北欧地区，哈萨克斯坦正迅速崛起为冬季运动中心。同城旅游数据显示，12月初至新年假期期间，中国主要城市飞往哈萨克斯坦的机票预订量同比增长超50%，酒店预订量增幅更达80%以上，其中阿拉木图和阿斯塔纳成为最热门目的地。Analysts at Tongcheng's tourism research institute said the "Japan substitution effect" has accelerated since late November, with outbound ski demand that once concentrated on Japan increasingly shifting toward Kazakhstan and Nordic destinations. They added that domestic ski areas are also becoming popular alternatives to Japan's ski destinations.同程旅游研究院分析师指出，自11月下旬以来，“日本替代效应”持续加速，原先集中在日本的出境滑雪需求正逐步转向哈萨克斯坦及北欧目的地。他们补充道，国内滑雪场也正成为日本滑雪目的地的热门替代选择。European destinations are witnessing a similar upswing. Hotel bookings in Germany and Spain have increased by more than 300 percent year-on-year, while Denmark and Switzerland have posted gains exceeding 200 percent.欧洲旅游目的地也呈现出类似的增长态势。德国和西班牙的酒店预订量同比增幅超过300%，而丹麦和瑞士的增幅则超过200%。Domestically, local governments are racing to capture winter travelers through substantial incentives. Jilin province rolled out 100 million yuan ($14.1 million) in ice-snow vouchers and offered free ski passes to university students, while the Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang Uygur autonomous regions have introduced similar discounts.国内方面，地方政府正通过大幅优惠政策争相吸引冬季度假游客。吉林省推出价值1亿元（约合1410万美元）的冰雪消费券，并为大学生提供免费滑雪通行证；内蒙古和新疆维吾尔自治区也推出了类似的折扣政策。Qunar, a Beijing-based online travel agency, said hotel bookings in Xinjiang's Bortala region rose more than 80 percent year-on-year from November to late January of 2026, while reservations in the northeastern cities of Dandong, Liaoning province, Liaoyuan, Jilin province and Yichun, Heilongjiang province, each grew around 30 percent.北京在线旅游平台途牛旅游网表示，2026年11月至次年1月底期间，新疆博尔塔拉地区的酒店预订量同比增长逾80%，而东北地区辽宁省丹东市、吉林省辽源市及黑龙江省伊春市的酒店预订量均增长约30%。Demand for trips to glaciers and snow mountains has also surged, with ticket bookings for sites such as Meili Snow Mountain in Yunnan province and Xiling Snow Mountain in Sichuan province doubling year-on-year.前往冰川雪山的旅游需求也大幅增长，云南梅里雪山、四川西岭雪山等景点的门票预订量同比翻了一番。According to a white paper on China's ski industry, China currently has 748 operational ski resorts, including 66 indoor centers. Total ski visits reached 26.05 million last winter, up 12.9 percent.根据中国滑雪产业白皮书显示，目前中国共有748家运营中的滑雪场，其中包括66家室内滑雪中心。去年冬季滑雪人次达到2605万，同比增长12.9%。The white paper also noted that China's total ski visits last season surpassed Switzerland's 23.1 million, reflecting the growing scale of China's winter sports market. Average ski days per participant in China rose from 1.80 to 1.92, indicating increasing skier engagement and loyalty.该白皮书还指出，中国上赛季滑雪人次总量已超越瑞士的2310万人次，彰显中国冬季运动市场规模的持续扩大。中国滑雪者人均滑雪天数从1.80天提升至1.92天，表明滑雪参与度与忠诚度正逐步增强。recalibratev./ˌriːˈkæl.ə.breɪt/重新校准

This week on Sinica, I'm delighted to have Iza Ding as guest host. Iza is a professor of political science at Northwestern University and a good friend whose work on Chinese governance I greatly admire. She's joined by Deborah Seligsohn, who has been a favorite guest on this show many times. Deb is an associate professor of political science at Villanova University and was previously a science and environmental counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. This episode was recorded in three parts: the first two in Belém, Brazil during COP30 (the 30th UN Climate Change Conference), and the final segment after the conference concluded. Iza and Deb discuss China's role at the climate summit, the real story behind the famous 2007 U.S. Embassy air quality monitor in Beijing (spoiler: it wasn't China's "Silent Spring moment"), Brazil's management of the conference, why China leads on technology but not on negotiation, and what the outcomes of COP30 mean for the future of global climate cooperation. This is an insider's view of how climate diplomacy actually works, complete with unexpected fire evacuations and glut-shaming of The New York Times.3:43 – Deb's impressions of COP30 and Brazil's inclusive approach 9:21 – China's presence at COP30: technology leadership without negotiation leadership 15:34 – Xie Zhenhua's absence and the U.S.-China dynamic at previous COPs 24:46 – Inside the negotiation rooms: language, politeness, and obstruction 33:06 – BYD's presence in Brazil and Chinese EV expansion 40:54 – The real story of the 2007 U.S. Embassy air quality monitor in Beijing 45:00 – Fire evacuation at COP30 and UN territorial sovereignty 1:22:06 – What actually drove China's air pollution control: the 2003 power plant standards 1:41:27 – The dramatic final plenary and the Mutirão decision 1:55:17 – China's NDC 3.0: under-promise and over-deliver strategySee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has described China and France as two major countries with rich historical and cultural endowment, saying they should jointly contribute to global peace and stability through dialogue and cooperation.

Spending patterns among China's inbound travelers are shifting toward card-based transactions, experiential and everyday scenarios, underscoring the nation's progress in improving bank card acceptance and payment convenience, said a recent report by the World Tourism Alliance.世界旅游联盟发布的最新报告指出，中国入境游客的消费模式正转向以银行卡支付为主，并更多集中于沉浸式体验和日常消费场景，这凸显了中国在提升银行卡受理环境和支付便利性方面取得的显著进展。It said experiencing Chinese culture is increasingly the primary motivation for foreign visitors. This growing appetite for cultural depth is driving a shift from "checklist sightseeing" to "immersive experiences", making China's cultural treasure trove a key driver of inbound tourism growth.报告称，体验中国文化正成为越来越多外国游客的首要动机。这种对文化深度的渴望，正促使游客从“打卡式观光”转向“沉浸式体验”，中国丰富的文化资产因此成为入境旅游增长的重要推动力。The trend reflects ongoing enhancements to China's card acceptance environment. The report noted that coverage among key merchants reached 99 percent by September 2024. Moreover, tax refund efficiency has also improved significantly. The State Taxation Administration has rolled out "immediate tax refund upon purchase" services since May, drastically cutting refund processing times and enhancing shopping experiences.这一趋势反映出中国银行卡受理环境持续改善。报告指出，截至2024年9月，重点商户的银行卡受理覆盖率已达99%。此外，退税效率也显著提升。国家税务总局自5月起推行“即买即退”服务，大幅缩短退税处理时间，显著提升购物体验。The National Bureau of Statistics said China welcomed 132 million inbound tourists in 2024, marking a 60.8 percent year-on-year increase, with foreign visitors accounting for 26.94 million of these arrivals.国家统计局表示，2024年中国入境游客达到1.32亿人次，同比增长60.8%，其中外国游客达2694万人次。Between the third quarter of 2024 and the second quarter of 2025, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, South Korea, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States emerged as the top source markets for inbound spending. Malaysia, Australia and Singapore posted standout year-on-year growth rates — each exceeding 50 percent, said the WTA.世界旅游联盟称，在2024年第三季度至2025年第二季度期间，马来西亚、新加坡、澳大利亚、韩国、德国、英国和美国成为入境游客消费的主要来源市场。其中，马来西亚、澳大利亚和新加坡表现尤其突出，同比增幅均超过50%。Shopping stood out with a nearly 90 percent rise in transaction value. The surge was driven primarily by a sharp increase in the number of credit and debit cards used, while average spending per card remained stable — signaling a broader consumer base rather than higher individual outlays, the report said.购物类消费尤为亮眼，交易额增长近90%。报告指出，这一增幅主要得益于使用信用卡和借记卡人数的显著上升，而单卡平均消费保持稳定——这表明增长来自更广泛的消费群体，而非个体消费金额的提高。The transaction value of transportation spending has been growing strongly, with card usage surging, thanks to greater ease of foreign card payments in transit payment platform systems. Since early 2025, the number of inbound travelers using foreign bank cards for Tap-and-Go metro access has surged, with usage up nearly 60 percent in the second quarter compared to the previous quarter, the report said.由于交通出行支付平台对外卡支付的便利性提升，交通类消费的交易额保持强劲增长，银行卡使用量大幅上升。报告称，自2025年初以来，使用外卡“即刷即走”乘坐地铁的入境游客数量激增，仅第二季度就比上一季度增长近60%。Tap-and-Go is rapidly becoming a preferred payment method for inbound travelers using urban transit, marking a step forward in the internationalization of China's public transport services. Beyond Beijing and Shanghai, other major cities such as Chengdu, Sichuan province and Guangzhou, Guangdong province are also following suit. Major global card networks are also aggressively promoting this payment scenario, offering rebates and cashback incentives.“即刷即走”正迅速成为入境游客使用城市公共交通的首选支付方式，这标志着中国公共交通服务的国际化迈出重要一步。除北京和上海外，成都、广州等主要城市也在加紧跟进。国际主要银行卡组织也积极推广这一支付场景，并提供返现、优惠等激励措施。Dennis Chang, executive vice-president at Mastercard, said: "Today, as Mastercard expands our domestic operations in China, we are proud to upgrade our Pay Like a Local payment facilitation program; enable inbound tourists to make QR code payments in China through Alipay and WeChat Pay; expand the acceptance of overseas-issued bank cards; and allow riders to use Mastercard directly for seamless Tap-and-Go urban rail transit — thereby ensuring improved consumption experiences for international visitors."万事达卡中国区执行副总裁张安表示：“随着万事达在中国拓展本地业务，我们很自豪地升级‘像本地人一样支付'计划；支持入境游客通过支付宝和微信支付扫码付款；扩大境外发行银行卡的受理范围；并允许乘客直接使用万事达卡实现顺畅的‘即刷即走'轨道交通出行，从而进一步提升国际游客的消费体验。”Visa, another US-based card payment provider, said overseas tourists' spending in China saw explosive growth in the first half.另一家美国银行卡支付机构维萨（Visa）表示，今年上半年境外游客在中国的消费出现爆发式增长。The company said transaction volume of its tap-to-pay service saw rapid year-on-year growth, with Guangzhou's inbound tourist tap-to-pay transactions surging over 100 percent. In transportation scenarios, its tap-to-ride service gained widespread popularity, and around 60 percent of overseas tourists in Beijing are using Visa cards for tap-to-ride public transit, according to the company.该公司称，其“轻触支付”服务的交易量同比大幅增长，其中广州入境游客的轻触支付交易量激增逾100%。在交通出行场景中，其“轻触乘车”服务广受欢迎，目前在北京约有60%的境外游客使用Visa卡完成公共交通“轻触乘车”。inbound travelers入境游客immediate tax refund upon purchase即买即退transaction value交易额transaction/trænˈzækʃ(ə)n/Tap-and-Go / tap-to-ride / tap-to-pay即刷即走/轻触乘车/轻触支付rebates and cashback incentives返现激励rebate/ˈriːbeɪt/Incentive /ɪnˈsentɪv/consumer base消费者群体QR code payments扫码支付

Dan dan noodles, ce plat doit son nom au “dan dan”, un bâton de portage traditionnel que les vendeurs de rue utilisaient pour transporter leurs paniers de nouilles et de sauce. Ces nouilles étaient vendues dans les ruelles et servies rapidement aux travailleurs et passants. ---Fanny Gillard et Carlo de Pascale voyagent dans l'univers culinaire de notre style de vie rock n' roll. Et si cela vous met l'eau à la bouche, alors vous retrouverez également toutes les recettes de Carlo sur notre site Classic21.be dans la rubrique Cook As You Are. Merci pour votre écoute Plus de contenus de Classic 21 sur www.rtbf.be/classic21 Ecoutez-nous en live ici: https://www.rtbf.be/radio/liveradio/classic21 ou sur l'app Radioplayer BelgiqueRetrouvez l'ensemble des contenus de la RTBF sur notre plateforme Auvio.be Et si vous avez apprécié ce podcast, n'hésitez pas à nous donner des étoiles ou des commentaires, cela nous aide à le faire connaître plus largement. Découvrez les autres podcasts de Classic 21 : Le journal du Rock : https://audmns.com/VCRYfsPComic Street (BD) https://audmns.com/oIcpwibLa chronique économique : https://audmns.com/NXWNCrAHey Teacher : https://audmns.com/CIeSInQHistoires sombres du rock : https://audmns.com/ebcGgvkCollection 21 : https://audmns.com/AUdgDqHMystères et Rock'n Roll : https://audmns.com/pCrZihuLa mauvaise oreille de Freddy Tougaux : https://audmns.com/PlXQOEJRock&Sciences : https://audmns.com/lQLdKWRCook as You Are: https://audmns.com/MrmqALPNobody Knows : https://audmns.com/pnuJUlDPlein Ecran : https://audmns.com/gEmXiKzRadio Caroline : https://audmns.com/WccemSkAinsi que nos séries :Rock Icons : https://audmns.com/pcmKXZHRock'n Roll Heroes: https://audmns.com/bXtHJucFever (Erotique) : https://audmns.com/MEWEOLpEt découvrez nos animateurs dans cette série Close to You : https://audmns.com/QfFankxEt retrouvez également Carlo De Pascale dans cet autre podcast de la RTBF: Bientôt à Table : https://audmns.com/mVwVCerHébergé par Audiomeans. Visitez audiomeans.fr/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

This week on Sinica, I speak with Zhong Na, a novelist and essayist whose new piece, "Murder House," appears in the inaugural issue of Equator — a striking new magazine devoted to longform writing that crosses borders, disciplines, and cultures. In January 2024, a young couple, both Tsinghua-educated Google engineers living in a $2.5 million Silicon Valley home, became the center of a tragedy that captivated Chinese social media far more than American outlets. Zhong Na explores how the case became a collective Rorschach test — a mirror held up to contemporary Chinese society, exposing cracks in the myths of meritocracy, the prestige of global tech firms, and shifting notions of gender, class, and the Chinese dream itself. We discuss the gendered reactions online, the dimming of America's appeal, the emotional costs of the immigrant success story, and the craft of writing about tragedy with compassion but without sentimentality.5:06 – How the story first reached Zhong Na, and the Luigi Mangione comparison 7:05 – Discovering she attended the same Chengdu high school as the alleged murderer Chen Liren 8:10 – The collaboration with Equator and Joan Didion's influence 10:30 – Education, class, and the cracks in China's meritocracy myth 16:01 – Tiger mothers vs. lying flat: two responses to a rigged system 19:12 – The pandemic and the dimming of the American dream 22:49 – Chinese men as perpetrators: immigrant stress and the loss of patriarchal privilege 25:56 – The gender war online: moral autopsy and victim-blaming 30:25 – The obsession with the ex-girlfriend and attraction to the accused 34:37 – The murder house, Chinese numerology, and the rise of Gen Z metaphysics 37:08 – Geopolitics, the China Initiative, and rethinking America as a destination 39:42 – Craft and moral compass: learning from Didion and Janet Malcolm 42:31 – Zhong Na's fiction: writing Chinese experiences without catering to Western expectationsPaying it forward: Gavin Jacobson and the editorial team at EquatorRecommendations: Zhong Na: Elsewhere by Yan Ge Kaiser: Made in Ethiopia, documentary by Xinyan Yu and Max Duncan (available on PBS)See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

China's 2026 national civil service exam for central government institutions was held on Sunday amid fierce competition, with an average of 74 applicants vying for each available position this year.2026年中国中央政府机构公务员考试于周日举行，竞争异常激烈，今年平均每个职位有74名考生角逐。A total of 3.718 million candidates passed the initial verification process and about 2.83 million people sat for the exams to compete for only 38,100 positions, making this year's recruitment process the most intense in the exam's history, according to the State Administration of Civil Service.国家公务员局数据显示，共有371.8万名考生通过初审，约283万人实际参加考试，而岗位仅3.81万个，使今年成为公务员考试史上竞争最激烈的一届。The applicant pool has increased dramatically in recent years, rising from about 2.6 million in 2023 to over 3.7 million this year.近年来申请人数激增，从2023年的约260万增至今年的370万以上。One standout example of the exam's competitiveness is a police officer position in Ruili, Yunnan province with the National Immigration Administration, which attracted 6,470 applicants for a single opening.该考试竞争激烈的一个典型例子是云南省国家移民管理局瑞丽遣返中心的一个警官职位，仅一个空缺就吸引了6470名应聘者。A significant reform to this year's exam was the relaxation of age restrictions, which is in line with China's progressive approach to delaying the legal retirement age. The general applicant age limit was raised from 35 to 38, while new graduates with master's and doctoral degrees will now be eligible up to age 43, representing a three-year extension from previous limits.今年考试的一项重大改革是放宽了年龄限制，这与中国逐步推迟法定退休年龄的政策相呼应。普通报考者的年龄上限从35岁提高到38岁，而硕士和博士学位的新毕业生现在最高可至43岁，比以往限制延长了三年。Experts said this year's national civil service exam, the first to break the "age 35 threshold", establishes a significant precedent for more inclusive public sector recruitment processes. The reforms not only expand opportunities for experienced professionals but also set important benchmarks for private sector hiring practices, promoting ability-based talent selection across Chinese society, they said.专家指出，今年全国公务员考试首次打破“35岁年龄限制”，为公共部门招聘流程建立更包容的机制树立了重要先例。他们表示，这项改革不仅为经验丰富的专业人士拓展了职业发展空间，也为私营企业招聘实践树立了重要标杆，推动全社会践行能力本位的人才选拔机制。This policy adjustment acknowledges the valuable experience and capabilities that professionals in their mid-30s have accumulated, said Zhu Lijia, a professor at the National Academy of Governance.国家行政学院教授朱立佳表示，这项政策调整充分认可了35岁左右专业人才所积累的宝贵经验和能力。Including them in the public service can significantly enhance the quality of government departments, he told China News Service.他告诉中国新闻社，将他们纳入公共服务体系，能够显著提升政府部门的质量。The age limit reform has generated substantial social impact, with many provincial-level civil service exams in regions including Shanghai and the provinces of Sichuan and Jiangsu already adopting similar relaxed age policies. Experts anticipate this trend will expand to more regions and public institution recruitment processes.年龄限制改革引发了显著的社会影响，上海、四川、江苏等地的省级公务员考试已纷纷采取类似放宽年龄的政策。专家预测，这一趋势将扩展至更多地区及公共机构的招聘流程。For many older candidates, the policy change represents a second chance at public service careers. Zhou Ming, a 35-year-old professional working in the internet industry in Guangdong province, expressed renewed hope. "This feels like an opportunity to re-enter the competition when I thought my chances had passed."对许多年长的应聘者而言，这项政策调整意味着重返公共服务岗位的第二次机会。在广东从事互联网行业的35岁专业人士周明（音译）重燃希望：“当我以为机会已经错过时，这感觉像是重新获得竞争资格的契机。”However, challenges persist for older applicants. The exam structure continues to show a strong preference for new graduates, with approximately 66.7 percent of the available positions reserved for recent graduates. This leaves limited options for experienced professionals seeking career transitions.然而，年长申请者仍面临诸多挑战。考试结构持续向应届毕业生倾斜，约66.7%的职位名额专为应届毕业生保留。这使得寻求职业转型的资深专业人士选择有限。Yi Dinghong, from Huatu Education, a training institution for civil service exams, said older candidates often face unique challenges. "They typically balance work and family responsibilities while preparing for examinations," he noted. "However, their extensive work experience and developed competencies in communication, coordination, and stress management provide distinct advantages during interview stages."华图教育公务员培训机构的易定宏指出，年长考生常面临独特挑战。“他们通常需要在备考期间兼顾工作与家庭责任，”他强调，“但丰富的职场经验以及在沟通协调、压力管理方面形成的综合能力，使他们在面试环节具备显著优势。”Ma Liang, professor of Peking University's School of Government, said that as retirement ages extend and educational periods lengthen, people enter the workforce later. Relaxing age restrictions represents an inevitable trend that aligns with evolving workforce demographics.北京大学政府管理学院教授马亮指出，随着退休年龄推迟和受教育年限延长，人们进入劳动力市场的年龄不断推迟。放宽年龄限制是顺应劳动力人口结构变化的必然趋势。Ma further suggested that future adjustments might include the complete removal of age limits, though this will be a gradual process and require corresponding reforms in career advancement systems to ensure fair development opportunities for all employees.马亮进一步建议，未来的调整可能包括完全取消年龄限制，但这将是一个渐进的过程，需要对职业晋升体系进行相应改革，以确保所有员工都能获得公平的发展机会。civil service exam国家公务员考试State Administration of Civil Service国家公务员局

Today's Episode:Discover how a young woman from the UK fell head-over-heels for Chinese food and became one of its greatest storytellers. In this episode, meet Fuchsia Dunlop — the first foreigner to train at a Sichuan chef school, and explore her delicious journey into Chinese cuisine.Membership Preview:Discover China's breakfast culture with next MaoMi Chinese+ episode! From hot, filling meals in the north to soft, light dishes in the south, and unique local specialties in every city. Learn about morning markets, local traditions, and the warmth of a Chinese morning.Support MaoMi & Get exclusive   to premium content!https://www.buzzsprout.com/1426696/subscribe ↗️Transcript and translations are available on https://maomichinese.comInterested in any topics? Leave me a message on: https://maomichinese.com or https://www.instagram.com/maomichinese/?hl=en*Please note that Spotify does not support the membership program.Text me what you think :)Support the show

Il devastante tornado EF-4, uscito dagli schermi dei film hollywoodiani per abbattersi sulle strade della città brasiliana di Rio Bonito do Iguaçu, è stato il più potente tornado nella storia recente del Brasile. Il vento, con una velocità fino a 300 km/h, ha ridotto in macerie interi quartieri. Ha lasciato circa un migliaio di residenti senza tetto e ha causato la morte di 6 persone. "Il vento ha portato via tutto, tranne la voglia di vivere", dicono i residenti locali, mentre ripuliscono le macerie insieme ai volontari.Ma la tragedia brasiliana è solo un episodio della crisi climatica globale, che sta diventando ogni giorno più grave:– L'incendio nel parco nazionale di Tongariro, dove è stata girata la trilogia "Il Signore degli Anelli", ha distrutto 2800 ettari di natura unica, Nuova Zelanda;– Il freddo artico ha colpito gli Stati Uniti: la Florida è stata colpita da una gelata di -3 °C e a Miami gli iguana congelati cadevano dagli alberi;– Il Canada è stato colpito da una rara tempesta di neve precoce, che non si vedeva da oltre mezzo secolo;– La regione di Sanriku in Giappone ha subito una serie di 37 terremoti in poco più di 24 ore, tra cui tre forti scosse di magnitudo superiore a 6,0;– Due potentissimi tifoni si sono abbattuti consecutivamente sulle Filippine: "Kalmaegi" ha causato 232 vittime, mentre il tifone "Fung-Wong" ha provocato la morte di altre 25 persone;– L'Iran sta vivendo una siccità storica: i bacini idrici di Teheran sono pieni per meno del 10%;– In Cina è crollato parzialmente il "ponte tra le nuvole" di Hongqi, recentemente costruito nella provincia di Sichuan.Tutti questi eventi non sono casuali, ma anelli di una catena di cambiamenti climatici globali. Vediamo come fenomeni meteorologici estremi, attività sismica e catastrofi naturali stanno diventando la norma, e le moderne tecnologie non garantiscono più la sicurezza.Ma c'è una notizia che dà speranza: è già operativo il Centro di ricerca globale “ALLATRA”, una piattaforma scientifica internazionale dove gli scienziati, senza politici e sponsor, cercano soluzioni reali alla crisi climatica. Tutti i dati sono di dominio pubblico. È un'occasione per trovare una via d'uscita.

Changchun has been chosen to host the 33rd Winter Universiade in 2027, the International University Sports Federation announced on Wednesday, marking a major boost for tourism and economic development in Northeast China's Jilin province.国际大学生体育联合会周三宣布，长春市获得2027年第33届冬季世界大学生运动会主办权，这将极大促进中国东北吉林省的旅游业和经济发展。At the FISU executive committee meeting held in Changchun on Wednesday afternoon, the city successfully won the bid to host the event following a vote by the committee members.在周三下午于长春举行的国际大学生体育联合会执行委员会会议上，经委员投票表决，该市成功获得主办权。The announcement marked the return of the international sports event for university students to China, following the hosting of the 31st Summer Universiade in Chengdu, Sichuan province, in 2023.该公告标志着这项面向大学生的国际体育赛事重返中国，此前第31届夏季世界大学生运动会已于2023年在四川省成都市成功举办。The FISU Winter Universiade is held every two years in different cities around the world, with the aim of promoting international university sports and culture. It is the largest comprehensive winter sports event for university students worldwide, attracting thousands of student athletes during each edition.国际大学生体育联合会冬季世界大学生运动会每两年在世界各地不同城市举办，旨在促进国际大学体育与文化交流。作为全球规模最大的大学生冬季综合性体育赛事，每届赛事都吸引着数千名大学生运动员参与。The Changchun 2027 Winter Universiade will take place from Jan 15 to 25. "The opening and closing ceremonies will be held at the Changchun Five Rings Sports Center, with competitions taking place in Changchun, which is the main venue, and Jilin city, which is the secondary venue," Gu Gang, mayor of Changchun, said at a news conference after the meeting. "The games will feature 12 major disciplines and 93 subdisciplines."2027年长春冬季世界大学生运动会将于1月15日至25日举行。长春市市长顾刚在会议后的新闻发布会上表示：“开幕式和闭幕式将在长春五环体育中心举行，比赛将在主会场长春市和副会场吉林市进行。”本届冬运会共设12个大项、93个小项。According to Gu, the ice events include speed skating, short track speed skating, figure skating, ice hockey and curling.据顾刚介绍，冰上项目包括速滑、短道速滑、花样滑冰、冰球和冰壶。The snow events include cross-country skiing, alpine skiing, biathlon, freestyle skiing, snowboarding, ski mountaineering and ski orienteering.雪上项目包括越野滑雪、高山滑雪、冬季两项、自由式滑雪、单板滑雪、登山滑雪和滑雪定向。Changchun will host all the ice events as well as cross-country skiing, ski orienteering, and aerials in freestyle skiing, totaling eight major disciplines and 50 subdisciplines.长春将承办所有冰上项目以及越野滑雪、滑雪定向和自由式滑雪空中技巧，共计八大项目、五十个小项。The Jilin city venues — Lake Songhua Resort and Beidahu Ski Resort — will host alpine skiing, ski mountaineering, biathlon, snowboarding, and the slopestyle, big air and half-pipe events in freestyle skiing, totaling five major disciplines and 43 subdisciplines.吉林市的两个场馆——松花湖度假区和北湖滑雪场将承办高山滑雪、登山滑雪、冬季两项、单板滑雪，以及自由式滑雪中的坡面障碍技巧、空中技巧和U型场地项目，共计五大类43个分项赛事。"Located in the world's golden latitude for snow, Changchun is known as the 'City of Powder Snow', boasting six major ski resorts, 52 ski trails, and numerous winter sports activities, making it a skiing paradise," said Gu. "Changchun, a famous sports city, has hosted major events like the Asian Winter Games, National Winter Games, and has produced Olympic champions."顾刚表示：“长春位于全球最佳滑雪纬度带，素‘'粉雪之城'美誉，拥有六大滑雪场、52条雪道及丰富多样的冬季运动项目，堪称滑雪天堂。作为著名体育城市，长春曾成功举办亚冬会、全国冬运会等重大赛事，并培养出多位奥运冠军。”Gu added that Changchun will fulfill its responsibilities as the host city, striving to present to the world a grand ice and snow sports event with Chinese characteristics, demonstrating the spirit of the times and showcasing youthful vitality.顾刚表示，长春将履行主办城市责任，努力向世界呈现一场具有中国特色、彰显时代精神、展现青春活力的冰雪盛会。In recent years, Changchun has focused on developing the ice and snow industry, creating winter tourism projects and accelerating the transformation of cold resources into hot economy.近年来，长春着力发展冰雪产业，打造冬季度假项目，加速将冷资源转化为热经济。"Hosting this 33rd Winter Universiade is a great development opportunity for the tourism and economic sectors of Jilin province — the whole world will see you and the winter sports you propose," said FISU President Leonz Eder. "And of course it is also a great opportunity for FISU to further develop our ties with the region and the country as a whole."国际大学生体育联合会主席雷诺·艾德表示：“承办本届第33届冬季世界大学生运动会，对吉林省的旅游业和经济领域而言是绝佳的发展机遇。全世界都将见证吉林的魅力与你们推崇的冬季运动。”他补充道：“当然，这对国际大学生体育联合会而言，也是深化与该地区乃至整个中国合作的良机。”FISU Secretary-General and CEO Matthias Remund vowed to do everything to assist the host city, guide it, and to transfer all the knowledge from past editions.国际大学生体育联合会秘书长兼首席执行官马蒂亚斯·雷蒙德承诺将全力协助主办城市，提供指导，并传授历届赛事的全部经验。International University Sports Federation（FISU）国际大学生体育联合会Ski Resort滑雪场speed skating速度滑冰figure skating花样滑冰ice hockey冰球cross-country skiing越野滑雪alpine skiing高山滑雪

Let's talk about the Sichuan. And no, we're not ordering take-out. We're talking about China's newest Type 076 amphibious assault ship, somewhat similar in size to the US Wasp-class.Join the Patreon here: https://www.patreon.com/PeterZeihanFull Newsletter: https://bit.ly/4i8G0bh

Dans cet épisode, Julie et Flo nous racontent leur incroyable voyage à vélo. Partis en 2023 de l'Aveyron, ils sont arrivés aujourd'hui jusqu'en Chine à vélo. Ils reviennent sur le déclic qui les a poussés à partir, la préparation d'un voyage sans date de retour, et les réalités d'une vie nomade au long cours.

In this episode, Jared sits down with Renata Mirkova, a Chinese language educator from the Czech Republic whose journey into Mandarin began not with a grand plan, but almost by accident. What started as a university entrance decision led her to master Chinese, live in China, and now teach both Czech and Chinese across cultural boundaries.Renata shares the unique challenges of learning Chinese in a non-English-speaking environment, including outdated textbooks from the 60s, Czech-Sinology programs steeped in history, and a lack of direct Chinese-to-Czech resources. But through her perseverance and multiple immersive experiences in China, Renata carved out her own path to fluency.From surviving the linguistic chaos of Sichuan dialects to interpreting for Czech officials on business trips in China, she offers candid reflections on what works for her, what didn't, and how learning Chinese changed her life. She also gives insight into her current work creating Chinese learning materials specifically for Czech speakers and what it's like teaching Czech to Chinese speakers in return.Links from the episode:Learn Chinese with Renata Mirkova | WebsiteMandarin Companion Graded Readers

This week on Sinica, I welcome back Finbarr Bermingham, the Brussels-based Europe correspondent for the South China Morning Post, about the Nexperia dispute — one of the most revealing episodes in the global contest over semiconductor supply chains. Nexperia, a Dutch-headquartered chipmaker owned by Shanghai-listed Wingtech, became the subject of extraordinary government intervention when the Netherlands invoked a Cold War-era emergency law to seize temporary control of the company and suspend its Chinese CEO. Finbarr's reporting, drawing on Dutch court documents and expert sources, has illuminated the tangled threads of this story: preexisting concerns about governance and technology transfer, mounting U.S. pressure on The Hague to remove Chinese management, and the timing of the Dutch action on the very day the U.S. rolled out its affiliate rule. We discuss China's retaliatory export controls on chips packaged at Nexperia's Dongguan facilities, the role of the Trump-Xi meeting in Busan in unlocking a temporary thaw, and what this case reveals about Europe's agonizing position between American pressure and Chinese integration in global production networks.4:34 – Why the "Europe cracks down on Chinese acquisition" framing was too simple 6:17 – The Dutch court's extraordinary tick-tock of events and U.S. lobbying 9:04 – The June pressure from Washington: divestment or the affiliate list 10:13 – Dutch fears of production know-how relocating to China 12:35 – The impossible position: damned if they did, damned if they didn't 14:46 – The obscure Cold War-era Goods Availability Act 17:11 – CEO Zhang Xuezheng and the question of who stopped cooperating first 19:26 – Was China's export control a state policy or a corporate move? 22:16 – Europe's de-risking framework and the lessons from Nexperia 25:39 – The fragmented European response: Germany, France, Hungary, and the Baltics 30:31 – Did Germany shape the response behind the scenes? 33:06 – The Trump-Xi meeting in Busan and the resolution of the crisis 37:01 – Will the Nexperia case deter future European interventions? 40:28 – Is Europe still an attractive market for Chinese investment? 41:59 – The Europe China Forum: unusually polite in a time of tenterhooksPaying it forward: Dewey Sim (SCMP diplomacy desk, Beijing); Coco Feng (SCMP technology, Guangdong); Khushboo Razdan (SCMP North America); Sense Hofstede (Chinese Bossen newsletter)Recommendations: Finbarr: Chokepoints by Edward Fishman; Underground Empire by Henry Farrell and Abe Newman; "What China Wants from Europe" by John Delury (Engelsberg Ideas) Kaiser: The Three Musketeers: D'Artagnan and Milady (2023 French film adaptation)See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

In this episode of the Kitchen Garden Magazine Podcast, we dive deep into the rich, fertile world of compost with no-dig gardening expert Charles Dowding. Discover why compost is the cornerstone of a productive vegetable plot, the different types available, and how to avoid common pitfalls when buying or making your own.Plus, gardening guru Rob Smith shares his top tips for growing and preserving store cupboard staples—beans, seeds, nuts, and more—that will keep your pantry stocked through the winter months. From drying amaranth to harvesting homegrown Sichuan pepper, it's time to make your garden work all year round.Whether you're starting new beds or planning a winter larder, this episode is packed with practical advice to help you grow more, dig less, and eat better. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

China's first Type 076 amphibious assault ship has completed its navigation test mission and returned to the shipyard.

President Xi Jinping said on Wednesday that China is willing to work with Spain to forge a comprehensive strategic partnership with greater strategic determination, dynamism and global influence, as he met with King Felipe VI of Spain, the first Spanish monarch to make a state visit to China in 18 years.The four-day trip, which started on Monday, comes as the highlight of a series of high-level interactions between the two countries, following a visit in April by Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez, who made three visits to China in the past three years.Xi said that over the 50 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations, China and Spain have always viewed and developed bilateral relations from a strategic height and long-term perspective, respected and supported each other, and contributed to each other's success.This has set a model of pursuing amicable ties and common development by countries with different histories, cultures and social systems, Xi said.The Chinese president stressed that the two countries have played an important role in promoting openness and cooperation in the world and in upholding international fairness and justice.Xi lauded the remarkable contributions made by the Spanish royal family in developing China-Spain relations, and emphasized that King Felipe VI's visit is of great significance to the further advancement of the friendship and cooperation between the two countries.Noting that China cherishes its traditional friendship with Spain and values Spain's unique role in international and regional affairs, Xi said both sides should further consolidate mutual support, maintain the momentum of high-level exchanges, strengthen strategic guidance, and ensure that bilateral relations always stay on the right track.On practical cooperation, Xi said China is willing to import more quality products from Spain, explore the potential of cooperation in emerging areas, expand mutual investment, and build more signature projects.Xi called on the two countries to leverage their complementary strengths and jointly explore third-party markets such as Latin America.Statistics showed that bilateral trade volume between China and Spain exceeded $50 billion last year, while two-way investment surpassed $11 billion. China is Spain's largest trading partner outside the European Union, while Spain is one of China's key trading partners within the EU.China and Spain should enhance exchanges in culture and education, and support each other in the operation of cultural and language institutions in each other's country, Xi said, adding that China will continue its visa-free policy for Spain to further facilitate people-to-people exchanges. Xi explained his vision on building a community with a shared future for humanity, saying he hopes that countries could rise above differences in social systems and ideologies, build consensus through dialogue and consultation, and work together to turn the aspirations of people around the world for a better life into reality.During the talks, the Spanish king expressed his pleasure in visiting China and praised the long-standing friendship and mutual trust between the two countries, as well as China's remarkable achievements in poverty alleviation and green development.He acknowledged the role of Chinese investment in fueling Spain's economic growth and green transition, and expressed Spain's willingness to strengthen its cooperation with China in the areas of economy, trade, technology and renewable energy.He said Spain and China share highly similar philosophies on many international affairs, and both support multilateralism and the settlement of disputes through dialogue and consultation.Spain highly appreciates the four major global initiatives put forward by Xi, and is going to work with China to respond to uncertainties in the international situation with a view to upholding international trade order and promoting the steady development of the global economy, he said.Following the talks, the two leaders witnessed the signing of 10 cooperation documents in areas including the economy and trade, science and technology, and education.Premier Li Qiang and Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Zhao Leji also met separately with King Felipe VI on Wednesday.Before traveling to Beijing, King Felipe VI visited Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province, where he attended a business forum on Tuesday.

Authorities in Yunnan province said a 3-year-old boy seen crawling naked in a video which went viral online is in stable health and living safely with his parents, following an investigation that found no evidence of abuse, trafficking or illegal profit-making, according to China Central Television on Tuesday.中央电视台周二报道，云南省有关部门表示，经调查未发现虐待、拐卖或非法牟利证据，此前一段视频中裸身爬行的 3 岁男童目前健康状况稳定，正与父母安全生活。The boy, nicknamed Ping ping, was filmed on Oct 15 crawling unclothed at a highway service area in Shi mian county, Sichuan province, while his parents were on a family road trip.该男童小名平平（化名），10 月 15 日其父母驾车举家出行时，有人在四川省石棉县某高速公路服务区拍到他裸身爬行。The footage triggered a heated online debate, with questions raised over whether the child was being mistreated or even trafficked.这段视频引发网友热烈讨论，有人质疑孩子是否遭到虐待，甚至是否被拐卖。Local authorities in Nan jian county, Dali Bai autonomous prefecture, where the family resides, launched an investigation the following day along with provincial level officials.该家庭户籍地为大理白族自治州南涧县，当地部门于次日联合省级官员启动调查。The team found the family in Sichuan on Oct 18 and persuaded them to return home to Nan jian county on Oct 21. Medical professionals conducted physical and psychological assessments of the family, confirming that their two children were unharmed.10 月 18 日，调查组在四川找到该家庭，10 月 21 日劝说其返回南涧县家中。医疗专业人员对该家庭进行了身体和心理评估，确认两个孩子均未受伤害。Ping ping has since adapted well to daily routines, according to a local caregiver who has accompanied him since mid-October. Videos from a nearby kindergarten show him playing and laughing with other children.据 10 月中旬起陪伴平平（化名）的当地照护人员介绍，平平（化名）目前已很好地适应日常生活。附近幼儿园的视频显示，他正与其他孩子一起玩耍、欢笑。Officials also verified that Ping ping and his younger brother are the biological children of their parents, surnamed Li and Wan.工作人员还核实，平平（化名）与其弟弟均为李某、万某夫妇的亲生子女。The couple, who have not yet registered their marriage, have now received official birth certificates for the boys, and local authorities are processing household registration.这对夫妇尚未办理结婚登记，目前已为两个孩子领取了正式出生证明，当地部门正为其办理户口登记。Li explained that Ping ping had eczema and sometimes disliked wearing clothes in warm weather, adding that the boy's crawling behavior was a playful imitation of the family's pet dog, according to the CCTV report on Tuesday.据央视周二报道，李某解释称，平平（化名）患有湿疹，在天气暖和时有时不愿穿衣服；他还表示，孩子爬行的行为是在模仿家中宠物狗玩耍。viral音标：/ˈvaɪrəl/翻译：adj. （视频、信息等）在网上快速传播的；病毒的trafficking音标：/ˈtræfɪkɪŋ/翻译：n. 非法交易（尤指人口、毒品）eczema音标：/ˈeksɪmə/翻译：n. 湿疹（一种皮肤炎症）

This week on Sinica, I welcome back Jeremy Goldkorn, co-founder of the show and my longtime co-host, to revisit the "vibe shift" we first discussed back in February. Seven months on, what we sensed then has fully borne out — there's been a measurable softening in American attitudes toward China, reflected not just in polling data but in media coverage, podcast discussions, and public discourse. We dig into what's driving this shift: the chaos of American politics making China look competent by comparison, the end of Wolf Warrior diplomacy, the gutting of China hawks in the Trump administration, Trump's own transactional G2 enthusiasm, and the generational divide in how younger Americans encounter China through TikTok rather than legacy media. We also discuss the limits of this shift, the dangers of overcorrection, and what it feels like to watch the fever break after years of panic and absolutism in U.S.-China discourse.5:29 – The [beep] show in America as the biggest factor 8:38 – China hawks deflated: from Pompeo to Navarro's pivot to India 11:21 – Ben Smith's piece on the end of a decade of China hawkism 13:30 – Eric Schmidt and Selina Xu's Atlantic piece on tech decoupling 17:17 – Long-form China podcasts: Dwarkesh Patel with Arthur Kroeber, Lex Fridman with Keyu Jin 19:35 – Jeremy's personal vibe shift: distance from The China Project and renewed perspective 23:33 – The world turning to predictability and stability 26:05 – The Chicago Council poll: dramatic shift away from containment 29:09 – The generational shift: TikTok, infrastructure porn, and Gen Z's globalized worldview 31:15 – The end of Wolf Warrior diplomacy and why it mattered 37:03 – Kaiser's "Great Reckoning" essay and why it didn't get the usual hate 39:00 – The destruction of Twitter and the vicious China discourse culture 41:10 – The pendulum swinging too far: China fanboys and new hubris 43:20 – How the vibe shift looks from inside China Paying it forward: Echo Tang (Berlin Independent Chinese Film Festival organizer) and Zhu Rikun (New York Chinese Independent Film Festival organizer)Recommendations: Jeremy: Ja No Man: Growing Up in Apartheid Era South Africa by Richard Poplak Kaiser: Rhyming Chaos podcast with Jeremy Goldkorn and Maria RepnikovaSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

King Felipe VI of Spain arrived in Chengdu, the capital of southwestern China's Sichuan province, on Monday, kicking off his first state visit to China since he ascended the throne in 2014.西班牙国王费利佩六世于周一抵达中国西南部四川省省会成都，开启其2014年登基以来对中国的首次国事访问。He will also travel to Beijing to meet Chinese leaders. According to media reports, King Felipe VI, in each of the two cities, will participate in a business forum, focusing on strengthening economic ties and exploring collaborative opportunities between the two countries.他还将前往北京会见中国领导人。据媒体报道，费利佩六世国王将在两座城市分别出席商业论坛，聚焦加强两国经济联系、挖掘合作机遇。The four-day visit is also the first by a Spanish king to China in 18 years. He is accompanied by a high-level delegation, including Queen Letizia, Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Albares, and Minister of Economy, Trade and Business Carlos Cuerpo.此次为期四天的访问，也是18年来西班牙国王首次访华。随行的高级代表团包括王后莱蒂齐亚、外交大臣何塞・曼努埃尔・阿尔瓦雷斯以及经济、贸易与企业大臣卡洛斯・库尔波。Ahead of the visit, foreign ministries of both countries expressed hope of cementing the traditional friendship and further strengthening the political and economic ties amid the current complex global economic and trade landscape.访问前夕，两国均表示，在当前复杂的全球经贸格局下，希望巩固传统友谊，进一步加强政治和经济联系。Yao Jing, Chinese ambassador to Spain, told Xinhua News Agency that he believes that King Felipe VI's visit to China will contribute to advancing the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries with stronger strategic resolve and development dynamism.中国驻西班牙大使姚敬在接受新华社采访时表示，相信费利佩六世国王访华将为两国全面战略伙伴关系注入更强劲的战略定力和发展动力，推动双边关系迈上新台阶。Economic and trade ties between China and Spain are highly complementary, demonstrating vitality and resilience, Yao said, citing the significant growth in bilateral trade in goods, which has increased from about $20 million when the two countries established diplomatic ties over 50 years ago to more than $50 billion in 2024.姚敬指出，中西经贸关系互补性强、富有活力且韧性十足。两国建交50多年来，双边货物贸易额从约2000万美元大幅增长至2024年的超500亿美元。Currently, China is Spain's largest trading partner outside the European Union, while Spain is one of China's key trading partners within the EU.目前，中国是西班牙在欧盟外的最大贸易伙伴，而西班牙是中国在欧盟内的主要贸易伙伴之一。The ambassador called for China and Spain to enhance the alignment of their development strategies and further explore the potential for collaboration.这位大使呼吁中西双方加强发展战略对接，进一步挖掘合作潜力。Wang Huiyao, founder and president of the Center for China and Globalization, a Beijing-based think tank, said the close China-Spain relationship is characterized by strong political mutual trust and frequent high-level interactions, including three visits to China by Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez in the past three years.北京智库全球化智库创始人兼理事长王辉耀表示，中西关系紧密，政治互信坚实，高层交往频繁——过去三年，西班牙首相佩德罗・桑切斯已三次访华。The frequent and friendly high-level interactions between the two countries will help enhance people-to-people exchanges and encourage Chinese companies to increase investment in Spain, Wang said.他称，两国频繁友好的高层互动将促进人文交流，鼓励中国企业加大对西班牙的投资。Wang said the visit would provide King Felipe VI with a more comprehensive image of China, as Chengdu — the king's first stop — is a burgeoning metropolis epitomizing China's transformative development in recent decades, particularly the nation's dynamic progress in its western regions.王辉耀表示，此次访问将让费利佩六世国王更全面地了解中国。国王此行的首站成都，是一座快速发展的大都市，集中体现了中国近几十年来的转型发展，尤其是西部地区的蓬勃进步。Citing China's recent extension of unilateral visa-exemption arrangements for Spain and other European countries, Wang said it is a prime example of initiatives that inject fresh growth momentum into China-Europe relations.他提到，中国近期对西班牙等欧洲国家延长单方面免签安排，这正是为中欧关系注入新增长动力的典型举措。He stressed that the China-Spain relationship is both a highlight and a stabilizing force in China's broader engagement with EU member states.他强调，中西关系是中国与欧盟成员国交往中的一大亮点，也是一股稳定力量。ascend/əˈsend/v.登基；上升；攀登cement/səˈment/v.巩固；加强；用水泥粘合burgeoning/ˈbɜːdʒənɪŋ/adj.快速发展的；蓬勃兴起的；茁壮成长的

This week on Sinica, I chat with Lizzi Lee, a fellow on the Chinese economy at the Asia Society Policy Institute and one of the sharpest China analysts working today. We dig into the 4th Plenary Session of the 20th Party Congress and what it reveals about China's evolving growth model — particularly the much-discussed but often misunderstood push against "involution" in key sectors like EVs and solar. Lizzi walks us through the structural incentives driving overcompetition, from local government finance and VAT collection to the challenges of rebalancing supply and demand. We also discuss her recent Foreign Affairs piece on China's manufacturing model, why "overcapacity" is a misleading frame, the unexpected upsides of China's industrial strategy for the global green transition, and what happened at the Trump-Xi meeting in Busan. This is a conversation about getting beyond the binaries and understanding the actual mechanisms — and contradictions — shaping China's economic trajectory.4:43 – What Western reporting missed in the 4th Plenum communique 6:34 – The "anti-involution" push and what it really means 9:57 – Is China's domestic demand abnormally low? Context and comparisons 12:41 – Why cash transfers and consumption subsidies are running out of steam 15:00 – The supply-side approach: creating better products to drive demand 18:33 – GDP vs. GNI: why China is focusing on global corporate footprints 20:13 – Service exports and China's ascent along the global supply chain 24:02 – The People's Daily editorial on price wars and profit margins 27:31 – Why addressing involution is harder now than in 2015 29:56 – How China's VAT system incentivizes local governments to build entire supply chains 33:20 – The difficulty of reforming fiscal structures and local government finance 35:12 – What got lost in the Foreign Affairs editing process 38:14 – Why "overcapacity" is a misleading and morally loaded term 40:02 – The underappreciated upside: China's model and the global green transition 43:14 – How politically potent deindustrialization fears are in Washington and Brussels 46:29 – Industry self-discipline vs. structural reform: can moral suasion work? 50:15 – BYD's negotiating power and the squeeze on suppliers 53:54 – The Trump-Xi meeting in Busan: genuine thaw or tactical pause? 57:23 – Pete Hegseth's "God bless both China and the USA" tweet 1:00:01 – How China's leadership views Trump: transactional or unpredictable? 1:03:32 – The pragmatic off-ramp and what Paul Triolo predicted 1:05:26 – China's AI strategy: labor-augmenting vs. labor-replacing technology 1:08:13 – What systemic changes could realistically fix involution? 1:10:26 – Capital market reform and the challenge of decelerating slowly 1:12:36 – The "health first" strategy and investing in peoplePaying it forward: Paul TrioloRecommendations: Lizzi: Chokepoints: American Power in the Age of Economic Warfare by Edward Fishman Kaiser: Morning Coffee guitar practice book by Alex RockwellSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Last time we spoke about the fall of Wuhan. In a country frayed by war, the Yangtze became a pulsing artery, carrying both hunger and hope. Chiang Kai-shek faced a brutal choice: defend Wuhan to the last man, or flood the rivers to buy time. He chose both, setting sullen floodwaters loose along the Yellow River to slow the invaders, a temporary mercy that spared some lives while ripping many from their homes. On the river's banks, a plethora of Chinese forces struggled to unite. The NRA, fractured into rival zones, clung to lines with stubborn grit as Japanese forces poured through Anqing, Jiujiang, and beyond, turning the Yangtze into a deadly corridor. Madang's fortifications withstood bombardment and gas, yet the price was paid in troops and civilians drowned or displaced. Commanders like Xue Yue wrestled stubbornly for every foothold, every bend in the river. The Battle of Wanjialing became a symbol: a desperate, months-long pincer where Chinese divisions finally tightened their cordon and halted the enemy's flow. By autumn, the Japanese pressed onward to seize Tianjiazhen and cut supply lines, while Guangzhou fell to a ruthless blockade. The Fall of Wuhan loomed inevitable, yet the story remained one of fierce endurance against overwhelming odds.   #174 The Changsha Fire Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the summer of 1938, amid the upheaval surrounding Chiang Kai-shek, one of his most important alliances came to an end. On June 22, all German advisers to the Nationalist government were summoned back; any who refused would be deemed guilty of high treason. Since World War I, a peculiar bond had tied the German Weimar Republic and China: two fledgling states, both weak and only partially sovereign. Under the Versailles Treaty of 1919, Germany had lost extraterritorial rights on Chinese soil, which paradoxically allowed Berlin to engage with China as an equal partner rather than a traditional colonizer. This made German interests more welcome in business and politics than those of other Western powers. Chiang's military reorganization depended on German officers such as von Seeckt and von Falkenhausen, and Hitler's rise in 1933 had not immediately severed the connection between the two countries. Chiang did not share Nazi ideology with Germany, but he viewed Berlin as a potential ally and pressed to persuade it to side with China rather than Japan as China's principal East Asian, anti-Communist partner. In June 1937, H. H. Kung led a delegation to Berlin, met Hitler, and argued for an alliance with China. Yet the outbreak of war and the Nationalists' retreat to Wuhan convinced Hitler's government to align with Japan, resulting in the recall of all German advisers. Chiang responded with a speech praising von Falkenhausen, insisting that "our friend's enemy is our enemy too," and lauding the German Army's loyalty and ethics as a model for the Chinese forces. He added, "After we have won the War of Resistance, I believe you'll want to come back to the Far East and advise our country again." Von Falkenhausen would later become the governor of Nazi-occupied Belgium, then be lauded after the war for secretly saving many Jewish lives. As the Germans departed, the roof of the train transporting them bore a prominent German flag with a swastika, a prudent precaution given Wuhan's vulnerability to air bombardment. The Japanese were tightening their grip on the city, even as Chinese forces, numbering around 800,000, made a stubborn stand. The Yellow River floods blocked northern access, so the Japanese chose to advance via the Yangtze, aided by roughly nine divisions and the might of the Imperial Navy. The Chinese fought bravely, but their defenses could not withstand the superior technology of the Japanese fleet. The only substantial external aid came from Soviet pilots flying aircraft bought from the USSR as part of Stalin's effort to keep China in the war; between 1938 and 1940, some 2,000 pilots offered their services. From June 24 to 27, Japanese bombers relentlessly pounded the Madang fortress along the Yangtze until it fell. A month later, on July 26, Chinese defenders abandoned Jiujiang, southeast of Wuhan, and its civilian population endured a wave of atrocities at the hands of the invaders. News of Jiujiang's fate stiffened resolve. Chiang delivered a pointed address to his troops on July 31, arguing that Wuhan's defense was essential and that losing the city would split the country into hostile halves, complicating logistics and movement. He warned that Wuhan's defense would also be a spiritual test: "the place has deep revolutionary ties," and public sympathy for China's plight was growing as Japanese atrocities became known. Yet Chiang worried about the behavior of Chinese soldiers. He condemned looting as a suicidal act that would destroy the citizens' trust in the military. Commanders, he warned, must stay at their posts; the memory of the Madang debacle underscored the consequences of cowardice. Unlike Shanghai, Wuhan had shelters, but he cautioned against retreating into them and leaving soldiers exposed. Officers who failed in loyalty could expect no support in return. This pep talk, combined with the belief that the army was making a last stand, may have slowed the Japanese advance along the Yangtze in August. Under General Xue Yue, about 100,000 Chinese troops pushed back the invaders at Huangmei. At Tianjiazhen, thousands fought until the end of September, with poison gas finally forcing Japanese victory. Yet even then, Chinese generals struggled to coordinate. In Xinyang, Li Zongren's Guangxi troops were exhausted; they expected relief from Hu Zongnan's forces, but Hu instead withdrew, allowing Japan to capture the city without a fight. The fall of Xinyang enabled Japanese control of the Ping-Han railway, signaling Wuhan's doom. Chiang again spoke to Wuhan's defenders, balancing encouragement with a grim realism about possible loss. Although Wuhan's international connections were substantial, foreign aid would be unlikely. If evacuation became necessary, the army should have a clear plan, including designated routes. He recalled the disastrous December retreat from Nanjing, where "foreigners and Chinese alike turned it into an empty city." Troops had been tired and outnumbered; Chiang defended the decision to defend Nanjing, insisting the army had sacrificed itself for the capital and Sun Yat-sen's tomb. Were the army to retreat again, he warned, it would be the greatest shame in five thousand years of Chinese history. The loss of Madang was another humiliation. By defending Wuhan, he argued, China could avenge its fallen comrades and cleanse its conscience; otherwise, it could not honor its martyrs. Mao Zedong, observing the situation from his far-off base at Yan'an, agreed strongly that Chiang should not defend Wuhan to the death. He warned in mid-October that if Wuhan could not be defended, the war's trajectory would shift, potentially strengthening the Nationalists–Communists cooperation, deepening popular mobilization, and expanding guerrilla warfare. The defense of Wuhan, Mao argued, should drain the enemy and buy time to advance the broader struggle, not become a doomed stalemate. In a protracted war, some strongholds might be abandoned temporarily to sustain the longer fight. The Japanese Army captured Wuchang and Hankou on 26 October and captured Hanyang on the 27th, which concluded the campaign in Wuhan. The battle had lasted four and a half months and ended with the Nationalist army's voluntary withdrawal. In the battle itself, the Japanese army captured Wuhan's three towns and held the heartland of China, achieving a tactical victory. Yet strategically, Japan failed to meet its objectives. Imperial Headquarters believed that "capturing Hankou and Guangzhou would allow them to dominate China." Consequently, the Imperial Conference planned the Battle of Wuhan to seize Wuhan quickly and compel the Chinese government to surrender. It also decreed that "national forces should be concentrated to achieve the war objectives within a year and end the war against China." According to Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Seiya Matsuno, Hirohito authorized the use of chemical weapons against China by specific orders known as rinsanmei. During the Battle of Wuhan, Prince Kan'in Kotohito transmitted the emperor's orders to deploy toxic gas 375 times between August and October 1938. Another memorandum uncovered by Yoshimi indicates that Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni authorized the use of poison gas against the Chinese on 16 August 1938. A League of Nations resolution adopted on 14 May condemned the Imperial Japanese Army's use of toxic gas. Japan's heavy use of chemical weapons against China was driven by manpower shortages and China's lack of poison gas stockpiles to retaliate. Poison gas was employed at Hankou in the Battle of Wuhan to break Chinese resistance after conventional assaults had failed. Rana Mitter notes that, under General Xue Yue, approximately 100,000 Chinese troops halted Japanese advances at Huangmei, and at the fortress of Tianjiazhen, thousands fought until the end of September, with Japanese victory secured only through the use of poison gas. Chinese generals also struggled with coordination at Xinyang; Li Zongren's Guangxi troops were exhausted, and Hu Zongnan's forces, believed to be coming to relieve them, instead withdrew. Japan subsequently used poison gas against Chinese Muslim forces at the Battle of Wuyuan and the Battle of West Suiyuan. However, the Chinese government did not surrender with the loss of Wuhan and Guangzhou, nor did Japan's invasion end with Wuhan and Guangzhou's capture. After Wuhan fell, the government issued a reaffirmation: "Temporary changes of advance and retreat will not shake our resolve to resist the Japanese invasion," and "the gain or loss of any city will not affect the overall situation of the war." It pledged to "fight with even greater sorrow, greater perseverance, greater steadfastness, greater diligence, and greater courage," dedicating itself to a long, comprehensive war of resistance. In the Japanese-occupied rear areas, large armed anti-Japanese forces grew, and substantial tracts of territory were recovered. As the Japanese army themselves acknowledged, "the restoration of public security in the occupied areas was actually limited to a few kilometers on both sides of the main transportation lines." Thus, the Battle of Wuhan did not merely inflict a further strategic defeat on Japan; it also marked a turning point in Japan's strategic posture, from offense to defense. Due to the Nationalist Army's resolute resistance, Japan mobilized its largest force to date for the attack, about 250,000 personnel, who were replenished four to five times over the battle, for a total of roughly 300,000. The invaders held clear advantages in land, sea, and air power and fought for four and a half months. Yet they failed to annihilate the Nationalist main force, nor did they break the will to resist or the army's combat effectiveness. Instead, the campaign dealt a severe blow to the Japanese Army's vitality. Japanese-cited casualties totaled 4,506 dead and 17,380 wounded for the 11th Army; the 2nd Army suffered 2,300 killed in action, 7,600 wounded, and 900 died of disease. Including casualties across the navy and the air force, the overall toll was about 35,500. By contrast, the Nationalist Government Military Commission's General Staff Department, drawing on unit-level reports, calculated Japanese casualties at 256,000. The discrepancy between Japanese and Nationalist tallies illustrates the inflationary tendencies of each side's reporting. Following Wuhan, a weakened Japanese force confronted an extended front. Unable to mount large-scale strategic offensives, unlike Shanghai, Xuzhou, or Wuhan itself, the Japanese to a greater extent adopted a defensive posture. This transition shifted China's War of Resistance from a strategic defensive phase into a strategic stalemate, while the invaders found themselves caught in a protracted war—a development they most disliked. Consequently, Japan's invasion strategy pivoted: away from primary frontal offensives toward a greater reliance on political inducements with secondary military action, and toward diverting forces to "security" operations behind enemy lines rather than pushing decisive frontal campaigns. Japan, an island nation with limited strategic resources, depended heavily on imports. By the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Japan's gold reserves,including reserves for issuing banknotes, amounted to only about 1.35 billion yen. In effect, Japan's currency reserves constrained the scale of the war from the outset. The country launched its aggression while seeking an early solution to the conflict. To sustain its war of aggression against China, the total value of military supplies imported from overseas in 1937 reached approximately 960 million yen. By June of the following year, for the Battle of Wuhan, even rifles used in training were recalled to outfit the expanding army. The sustained increase in troops also strained domestic labor, food, and energy supplies. By 1939, after Wuhan, Japan's military expenditure had climbed to about 6.156 billion yen, far exceeding national reserves. This stark reality exposed Japan's economic fragility and its inability to guarantee a steady supply of military materiel, increasing pressure on the leadership at the Central Command. The Chief of Staff and the Minister of War lamented the mismatch between outward strength and underlying weakness: "Outwardly strong but weak is a reflection of our country today, and this will not last long." In sum, the Wuhan campaign coincided with a decline in the organization, equipment, and combat effectiveness of the Japanese army compared with before the battle. This erosion of capability helped drive Japan to alter its political and military strategy, shifting toward a method of inflicting pressure on China and attempting to "use China to control China", that is, fighting in ways designed to sustain the broader war effort. Tragically a major element of Chiang Kai-shek's retreat strategy was the age-old "scorched earth" policy. In fact, China originated the phrase and the practice. Shanghai escaped the last-minute torching because of foreigners whose property rights were protected. But in Nanjing, the burning and destruction began with increasing zeal. What could not be moved inland, such as remaining rice stocks, oil in tanks, and other facilities, was to be blown up or devastated. Civilians were told to follow the army inland, to rebuild later behind the natural barrier of Sichuan terrain. Many urban residents complied, but the peasantry did not embrace the plan. The scorched-earth policy served as powerful propaganda for the occupying Japanese army and, even more so, for the Reds. Yet they could hardly have foreseen the propaganda that Changsha would soon supply them. In June, the Changsha Evacuation Guidance Office was established to coordinate land and water evacuation routes. By the end of October, Wuhan's three towns had fallen, and on November 10 the Japanese army captured Yueyang, turning Changsha into the next primary invasion target. Beginning on October 9, Japanese aircraft intensified from sporadic raids on Changsha to large-scale bombing. On October 27, the Changsha Municipal Government urgently evacuated all residents, exempting only able-bodied men, the elderly, the weak, women, and children. The baojia system was mobilized to go door-to-door, enforcing compliance. On November 7, Chiang Kai-shek convened a military meeting at Rongyuan Garden to review the war plan and finalize a "scorched earth war of resistance." Xu Quan, Chief of Staff of the Security Command, drafted the detailed implementation plan. On November 10, Shi Guoji, Chief of Staff of the Security Command, presided over a joint meeting of Changsha's party, government, military, police, and civilian organizations to devise a strategy. The Changsha Destruction Command was immediately established, bringing together district commanders and several arson squads. The command actively prepared arson equipment and stacked flammable materials along major traffic arteries. Chiang decided that the city of Changsha was vulnerable and either gave the impression or the direct order, honestly really depends on the source your reading, to burn the city to the ground to prevent it falling to the enemy. At 9:00 AM on November 12, Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed Zhang Zhizhong: "One hour to arrive, Chairman Zhang, Changsha, confidential. If Changsha falls, the entire city must be burned. Please make thorough preparations in advance and do not delay." And here it seems a game of broken telephone sort of resulted in one of the worst fire disasters of all time. If your asking pro Chiang sources, the message was clearly, put up a defense, once thats fallen, burn the city down before the Japanese enter. Obviously this was to account for getting civilians out safely and so forth. If you read lets call it more modern CPP aligned sources, its the opposite. Chiang intentionally ordering the city to burn down as fast as possible, but in through my research, I think it was a colossal miscommunication. Regardless Zhongzheng Wen, Minister of the Interior, echoed the message. Simultaneously, Lin Wei, Deputy Director of Chiang Kai-shek's Secretariat, instructed Zhang Zhizhong by long-distance telephone: "If Changsha falls, the entire city must be burned." Zhang summoned Feng Ti, Commander of the Provincial Capital Garrison, and Xu Quan, Director of the Provincial Security Bureau, to outline arson procedures. He designated the Garrison Command to shoulder the preparations, with the Security Bureau assisting. At 4:00 PM, Zhang appointed Xu Kun, Commander of the Second Garrison Regiment, as chief commander of the arson operation, with Wang Weining, Captain of the Social Training Corps, and Xu Quan, Chief of Staff of the Garrison Command, as deputies. At 6:00 PM, the Garrison Command held an emergency meeting ordering all government agencies and organizations in the city to be ready for evacuation at any moment. By around 10:15 PM, all urban police posts had withdrawn. Around 2:00 AM (November 13), a false report circulated that "Japanese troops have reached Xinhe" . Firefighters stationed at various locations rushed out with kerosene-fueled devices, burning everything in sight, shops and houses alike. In an instant, Changsha became a sea of flames. The blaze raged for 72 hours. The Hunan Province Anti-Japanese War Loss Statistics, compiled by the Hunan Provincial Government Statistics Office of the Kuomintang, report that the fire inflicted economic losses of more than 1 billion yuan, a sum equivalent to about 1.7 trillion yuan after the victory in the war. This figure represented roughly 43% of Changsha's total economic value at the time. Regarding casualties, contemporary sources provide varying figures. A Xinhua Daily report from November 20, 1938 noted that authorities mobilized manpower to bury more than 600 bodies, though the total number of burned remains could not be precisely counted. A Central News Agency reporter on November 19 stated that in the Xiangyuan fire, more than 2,000 residents could not escape, and most of the bodies had already been buried. There are further claims that in the Changsha Fire, more than 20,000 residents were burned to death. In terms of displacement, Changsha's population before the fire was about 300,000, and by November 12, 90% had been evacuated. After the fire, authorities registered 124,000 victims, including 815 orphans sheltered in Lito and Maosgang.  Building damage constituted the other major dimension of the catastrophe, with the greatest losses occurring to residential houses, shops, schools, factories, government offices, banks, hospitals, newspaper offices, warehouses, and cultural and entertainment venues, as well as numerous historic buildings such as palaces, temples, private gardens, and the former residences of notable figures; among these, residential and commercial structures suffered the most, followed by factories and schools. Inspector Gao Yihan, who conducted a post-fire investigation, observed that the prosperous areas within Changsha's ring road, including Nanzheng Street and Bajiaoting, were almost completely destroyed, and in other major markets only a handful of shops remained, leading to an overall estimate that surviving or stalemated houses were likely less than 20%. Housing and street data from the early post-liberation period reveal that Changsha had more than 1,100 streets and alleys; of these, more than 690 were completely burned and more than 330 had fewer than five surviving houses, accounting for about 29%, with nearly 90% of the city's streets severely damaged. More than 440 streets were not completely destroyed, but among these, over 190 had only one or two houses remaining and over 130 had only three or four houses remaining; about 60 streets, roughly 6% had 30 to 40 surviving houses, around 30 streets, 3% had 11 to 20 houses, 10 streets, 1% had 21 to 30 houses, and three streets ) had more than 30 houses remaining. Housing statistics from 1952 show that 2,538 houses survived the fire, about 6.57% of the city's total housing stock, with private houses totaling 305,800 square meters and public houses 537,900 square meters. By 1956, the surviving area of both private and public housing totaled 843,700 square meters, roughly 12.3% of the city's total housing area at that time. Alongside these losses, all equipment, materials, funds, goods, books, archives, antiques, and cultural relics that had not been moved were also destroyed.  At the time of the Changsha Fire, Zhou Enlai, then Deputy Minister of the Political Department of the Nationalist Government's Military Commission, was in Changsha alongside Ye Jianying, Guo Moruo, and others. On November 12, 1938, Zhou Enlai attended a meeting held by Changsha cultural groups at Changsha Normal School to commemorate Sun Yat-sen's 72nd birthday. Guo Moruo later recalled that Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying were awakened by the blaze that night; they each carried a suitcase and evacuated to Xiangtan, with Zhou reportedly displaying considerable indignation at the sudden, unprovoked fire. On the 16th, Zhou Enlai rushed back to Changsha and, together with Chen Cheng, Zhang Zhizhong, and others, inspected the disaster. He mobilized personnel from three departments, with Tian Han and Guo Moruo at the forefront, to form the Changsha Fire Aftermath Task Force, which began debris clearance, care for the injured, and the establishment of soup kitchens. A few days later, on the 22nd, the Hunan Provincial Government established the Changsha Fire Temporary Relief Committee to coordinate relief efforts.  On the night of November 16, 1938, Chiang Kai-shek arrived in Changsha and, the next day, ascended Tianxin Pavilion. Sha Wei, head of the Cultural Relics Section of the Changsha Tianxin Pavilion Park Management Office, and a long-time researcher of the pavilion, explained that documentation indicates Chiang Kai-shek, upon seeing the city largely reduced to scorched earth with little left intact, grew visibly angry. After descending from Tianxin Pavilion, Chiang immediately ordered the arrest of Changsha Garrison Commander Feng Ti, Changsha Police Chief Wen Chongfu, and Commander of the Second Garrison Regiment Xu Kun, and arranged a military trial with a two-day deadline. The interrogation began at 7:00 a.m. on November 18. Liang Xiaojin records that Xu Kun and Wen Chongfu insisted their actions followed orders from the Security Command, while Feng Ti admitted negligence and violations of procedure, calling his acts unforgivable. The trial found Feng Ti to be the principal offender, with Wen Chongfu and Xu Kun as accomplices, and sentenced all three to prison terms of varying lengths. The verdict was sent to Chiang Kai-shek for approval, who was deeply dissatisfied and personally annotated the drafts: he asserted that Feng Ti, as the city's security head, was negligent and must be shot immediately; Wen Chongfu, as police chief, disobeyed orders and fled, and must be shot immediately; Xu Kun, for neglect of duty, must be shot immediately. The court then altered the arson charge in the verdict to "insulting his duty and harming the people" in line with Chiang's instructions. Chiang Kai-shek, citing "failure to supervise personnel and precautions," dismissed Zhang from his post, though he remained in office to oversee aftermath operations. Zhang Zhizhong later recalled Chiang Kai-shek's response after addressing the Changsha fire: a pointed admission that the fundamental cause lay not with a single individual but with the collective leadership's mistakes, and that the error must be acknowledged as a collective failure. All eyes now shifted to the new center of resistance, Chongqing, the temporary capital. Chiang's "Free China" no longer meant the whole country; it now encompassed Sichuan, Hunan, and Henan, but not Jiangsu or Zhejiang. The eastern provinces were effectively lost, along with China's major customs revenues, the country's most fertile regions, and its most advanced infrastructure. The center of political gravity moved far to the west, into a country the Nationalists had never controlled, where everything was unfamiliar and unpredictable, from topography and dialects to diets. On the map, it might have seemed that Chiang still ruled much of China, but vast swaths of the north and northwest were sparsely populated; most of China's population lay in the east and south, where Nationalist control was either gone or held only precariously. The combined pressures of events and returning travelers were gradually shifting American attitudes toward the Japanese incident. Europe remained largely indifferent, with Hitler absorbing most attention, but the United States began to worry about developments in the Pacific. Roosevelt initiated a January 1939 appeal to raise a million dollars for Chinese civilians in distress, and the response quickly materialized. While the Chinese did not expect direct intervention, they hoped to deter further American economic cooperation with Japan and to halt Japan's purchases of scrap iron, oil, gasoline, shipping, and, above all, weapons from the United States. Public opinion in America was sufficiently stirred to sustain a campaign against silk stockings, a symbolic gesture of boycott that achieved limited effect; Japan nonetheless continued to procure strategic materials. Within this chorus, the left remained a persistent but often discordant ally to the Nationalists. The Institute of Pacific Relations, sympathetic to communist aims, urged America to act, pressuring policymakers and sounding alarms about China. Yet the party line remained firmly pro-Chiang Kai-shek: the Japanese advance seemed too rapid and threatening to the Reds' interests. Most oil and iron debates stalled; American businessmen resented British trade ties with Japan, and Britain refused to join any mutual cutoff, arguing that the Western powers were not at war with Japan. What occurred in China was still commonly referred to in Western diplomatic circles as "the Incident." Wang Jingwei's would make his final defection, yes in a long ass history of defections. Mr Wang Jingwei had been very busy traveling to Guangzhou, then Northwest to speak with Feng Yuxiang, many telegrams went back and forth. He returned to the Nationalist government showing his face to foreign presses and so forth. While other prominent rivals of Chiang, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, and others, rallied when they perceived Japan as a real threat; all did so except Wang Jingwei. Wang, who had long believed himself the natural heir to Sun Yat-sen and who had repeatedly sought to ascend to power, seemed willing to cooperate with Japan if it served his own aims. I will just say it, Wang Jingwei was a rat. He had always been a rat, never changed. Opinions on Chiang Kai-Shek vary, but I think almost everyone can agree Wang Jingwei was one of the worst characters of this time period. Now Wang Jingwei could not distinguish between allies and enemies and was prepared to accept help from whomever offered it, believing he could outmaneuver Tokyo when necessary. Friends in Shanghai and abroad whispered that it was not too late to influence events, arguing that the broader struggle was not merely China versus Japan but a clash between principled leaders and a tyrannical, self-serving clique, Western imperialism's apologists who needed Chiang removed. For a time Wang drifted within the Kuomintang, moving between Nanjing, Wuhan, Changsha, and Chongqing, maintaining discreet lines of communication with his confidants. The Japanese faced a governance problem typical of conquerors who possess conquered territory: how to rule effectively while continuing the war. They imagined Asia under Japanese-led leadership, an East Asia united by a shared Co-Prosperity Sphere but divided by traditional borders. To sustain this vision, they sought local leaders who could cooperate. The search yielded few viable options; would-be collaborators were soon assassinated, proved incompetent, or proved corrupt. The Japanese concluded it would require more time and education. In the end, Wang Jingwei emerged as a preferred figure. Chongqing, meanwhile, seemed surprised by Wang's ascent. He had moved west to Chengde, then to Kunming, attempted, and failed to win over Yunnan's warlords, and eventually proceeded to Hanoi in Indochina, arriving in Hong Kong by year's end. He sent Chiang Kai-shek a telegram suggesting acceptance of Konoe's terms for peace, which Chungking rejected. In time, Wang would establish his own Kuomintang faction in Shanghai, combining rigorous administration with pervasive secret-police activity characteristic of occupied regimes. By 1940, he would be formally installed as "Chairman of China." But that is a story for another episode.  In the north, the Japanese and the CCP were locked in an uneasy stalemate. Mao's army could make it impossible for the Japanese to hold deep countryside far from the railway lines that enabled mass troop movement into China's interior. Yet the Communists could not defeat the occupiers. In the dark days of October 1938—fifteen months after the war began—one constant remained. Observers (Chinese businessmen, British diplomats, Japanese generals) repeatedly predicted that each new disaster would signal the end of Chinese resistance and force a swift surrender, or at least a negotiated settlement in which the government would accept harsher terms from Tokyo. But even after defenders were expelled from Shanghai, Nanjing, and Wuhan, despite the terrifying might Japan had brought to bear on Chinese resistance, and despite the invader's manpower, technology, and resources, China continued to fight. Yet it fought alone. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In a land shredded by war, Wuhan burned under brutal sieges, then Changsha followed, a cruel blaze born of orders and miscommunications. Leaders wrestled with retreat, scorched-earth vows, and moral debts as Japanese force and Chinese resilience clashed for months. Mao urged strategy over martyrdom, Wang Jingwei's scheming shadow loomed, and Chongqing rose as the westward beacon. Yet China endured, a stubborn flame refusing to surrender to the coming storm. The war stretched on, unfinished and unyielding.

①China unveils first batch of firms listed on SSE's sci-tech growth tier ②Village galas ignite ethnic heritage revival in southwest China ③China reports 4.7 mln 5G base stations by end of September ④China strengthens position in musical instrument industry ⑤China's manned submersibles report success of joint underwater operations in Arctic ⑥China's Sichuan enacts first local regulation on ancient book protection

As the capital of the world's largest democracy, Delhi embodies the essence of modern India – a vivid paradox of old and new, rich and poor, foreign and familiar. It's been fourteen years since my last visit and the economic transformation is ever-present. High rises, swanky malls and residential colonies housing the booming middle-class are mushrooming everywhere. As my engaging Wendy Wu Tours guide Girish remarked, as we were whisked into the city from the airport, “Delhi is more than a mere city, it has morphed into the national capital region.” With the metropolitan population now nudging 30 million, Delhi is a megalopolis and on-track to becoming the world's most populous city in three years' time. Our hotel was in New Delhi, the more modern, planned city within a city, that was built by the British in 1911 and replaced Kolkata as the national capital, twenty years later. In a city notorious for its air pollution, which is supposedly steadily improving, one of the great paradoxes of New Delhi is that it's also swathed in a sprawling green canopy. It's arguably the greatest legacy from British rule, because the new city was deliberately, meticulously planned to be nestled within a vast green cover, fanning out from Connaught Place on those broad long avenues. Large-canopy trees like banyans, mango, and pilkhans were selected by the British, while indigenous trees ideally suited to the climate have added to the canopy in recent decades. That sprawling tree cover is certainly a godsend from the fierce Delhi heat. Delhi's contradictions abound. You'll still see working elephants trudging along traffic-clogged roads, as fire-engine red Ferraris zip by. Handwritten posters singing out, “Customs confiscated goods sold here,” still compete next to glossy fashion billboards for Gucci and Prada. It's all part of Delhi's curious fabric. The city is littered with so many crumbling tombs and ruins, most of them are not even on the tourist map. But if you are a first-timer to the city, signature sights include marvelling at the sheer grace of the soaring Qutb Minar Tower. It was built 800 years ago by the Turkish Slave King Qutb-ud-din Aibak to celebrate his victory over the Hindu Rajputs. Wander through the sculptural Jantar Mantar, a huge, open-air astronomy observatory built in 1725 by Jai Singh, creator and ruler of Jaipur. Admire the 16th-century garden tomb of Mughal Emperor Humayun, precursor to the Taj Mahal, which was built by Humayun's great-grandson. Over in Old Delhi, two Mughal-era masterpieces, the imposing Red Fort (which was the Mughal seat of power for 200 years) and Jama Masjid, India's largest mosque. Both sandstone show-stoppers are definitely worth exploring. The mosque was commissioned by Shah Jahan in 1656 and it took 5000 labourers 6 years to complete. Within its hallowed walls lie sacred relics like Prophet Muhammad's hair. Beyond ticking-off the capital's great monuments, heading to Old Delhi is like a journey back in time. The beating, chaotic, carnival-like heart of Old Delhi is Chandni Chowk, Delhi's 400 year old marketplace that was built by the Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan. The market has been redeveloped to tame some of the chaos, including some fully pedestrianised streets and non-motorised transport lanes. But as I gazed at the spaghetti-like tangle of street wiring that garlands the crowded market lanes, there's no denying the ramshackle, faded glory feels amid this pulsating hot-spot of old-school commerce. Be sure to get your fill of jalebis from a street food vendor. Made from a deep-fried spiral-shaped wheat flour batter, which is then soaked in a sugar syrup, a plate of piping hot, crispy, sticky jalebis is a very satisfying sugar hit. We enjoyed a classic rickshaw ride through the throng of traders, shoppers and wandering cows, all heaving in those pencil-thin lanes. Girish also led us through the Khari Baoli Spice Market in Chandni Chowk, positively bulging with so many spices, nuts, herbs, pickles, preserves, rice and teas. Renowned as Asia's largest wholesale spice market, it's an aromatic head-blast. Shops and stalls bulge with heaping mounds and baskets of over a hundred different spices, headlined by turmeric, cardamom, coriander, star anise, ginger and cumin. Just as they have for hundreds of years, shoppers, dealers and chefs converge here every day to haggle and hustle. Many vendors have been peddling their wares for generations. Dawdle too long in front of a stall, and traders with huge sacks of chilis or cardamom pods will soon bump you out of their way. One of the oldest and tidiest shops is Mehar Chand and Sons. They've been in business since Queen Victoria ruled over them. And it's a great place to stock up on packaged spices, tea and saffron. Anshu Kumar, who is part of the family that has owned the shop since its inception, tells me that one of their biggest sellers with international visitors is turmeric, powered by the world's booming love-affair with this powerful superfood and supplement. (Their packaged products are allowed in New Zealand – just be sure to declare them.) Heading back to the hotel, we also stopped by the Indian parliament and sized up the monolithic might of India Gate. Designed by Sir Edwin Lutyens, this monstrous landmark is more than just a stunning feat of architecture—it's a poignant memorial to the 70,000 Indian soldiers who laid down their lives during World War I and the Third Anglo-Afghan War. Beautifully illuminated after sunset, street food vendors and ice cream carts line the area, swathed in sprawling lush gardens. The great thing about a Wendy Wu Tours private holiday is that you have complete flexibility over how much temple-touring and sightseeing you want to do. Equipped with your own driver and guide, it's a stress-free way to tackle Delhi. The itinerary can be as active or as laid back as you are, with full flexibility over included meals and excursions. You'll be in the best of hands with Wendy Wu Tours. www.wendywutours.co.nz/india Nothing beats retreating to a leafy oasis of eminent comfort and style after a hot, sticky day intrepidly gorging on the city sights. Nestled along the tree-lined boulevards of Connaught Place, Shangri-La Eros New Delhi, is a five-star hotel with serious wow-factor. From the moment you step inside the grand art-filled lobby, you know you are somewhere special. Service is swift, sparkling, flawless and convivial. It's the epitome of affordable luxury, with sharply-priced room rates that won't blow your budget. Push the boat out and lock in a Horizon Club room or suite. That will give you access to the hotel's cherry on top, the 19th floor Horizon Club lounge, allowing you a quick check-in, breakfast, evening cocktails and light bites. Plus panoramic views of the city's skyline. The hotel's arsenal of dining venues is very impressive. Head to Mister Chai for some authentic Indian street food coupled with flavoured tea and coffee. There is Tamra serving European, Japanese, Indian, Thai and Southeast Asian fare from live kitchens. “Lavish” doesn't do justice to the expansive array of buffet options at Tamra for breakfast. Sorrento specialises in Italian food with a contemporary twist and Shang Palace offers flavours of Sichuan, Cantonese and Yunnan cuisines. This is a signature dining venue in Shangri-La hotels and Shang Palace is widely feted as the world's most loved Chinese specialty restaurant. Dining here was divine, noshing on prawn dumplings with caviar; Xinjiang spice twice cooked baby lamb ribs; and the Cantonese BBQ platter. Shang Palace is a must. Celebrating it's 20th birthday this year, Shangri-La Eros is not the sort of hotel to rest on its laurels. And with wellness offerings continuing to be increasingly sought after, the hotel recently unveiled a wealth of enticing new amenities. The Wellness Club boasts offers over 4,000 square feet of world-class fitness space, advanced recovery therapies, a 100-feet outdoor swimming pool, salon, spa, and a calming hydrothermal zone featuring a cold plunge, Himalayan salt sauna, whirlpool, and steam. What more could you want for personal pampering? The Wellness Club seamlessly blends conscious luxury with modern wellness. Designed by Dubai's Stickman Tribe, Dubai, the interior is bathed in natural hues and hand-painted art. Calming music sets the tone for a serene escape with gilded details and reflective surfaces lending a touch of grandeur to the venue. The Spa has become a runaway hit with custom-crafted amenities to indulge the senses. Signature rituals include the Taste of India Retreat, Signature Indulgence, and a Couple's Serenity Bath, crafted to nourish the body and calm the mind. But my favourite hotel feature is the enormous new pool. Tranquil corridors lead you outdoors to the gloriously leafy green space, crowned with that magnificent pool and elegant sun loungers. As black kites circled high above in the sky, and mischievous rhesus macaques swung between the trees – much to the annoyance of nesting rose-ringed parakeets, marinating myself in the hotel's glorious pool became a rinse-and-repeat prize draw. www.shangri-la.com From New Zealand, it's just a one-stop connection to a multitude of destinations in India, including New Delhi, with Singapore Airlines, on their various daily services from Auckland and Christchurch to Singapore. Enjoy well-timed connections for an easy transit in Singapore. Across all classes of travel, the award-winning carrier has not only fostered a world-beating reputation for its exceptional customer service and in-flight product, but also its innovation. Become a KrisFlyer member and enjoy complimentary in-flight WiFi. For best fares and seats to suit head to https://www.singaporeair.com Mike Yardley is our resident traveller on Jack Tame Saturday Mornings. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

This week on Sinica, I chat with Daniel Kurtz-Phelan, editor of Foreign Affairs, about how the journal has both shaped and reflected American discourse on China during a period of dramatic shifts in the relationship. We discuss his deliberate editorial choices to include heterodox voices, the changing nature of the supposed "consensus" on China policy, and what I've called the "vibe shift" in how Americans across the political spectrum think about China. Daniel also reflects on his own intellectual formation, including his work on George Marshall's failed mission to mediate China's Civil War and the cautionary lessons that history holds for today's debates. We explore the challenges of bringing Chinese voices into Foreign Affairs, the balance between driving and reflecting policy debates, and whether we're witnessing a genuine opening of the Overton window on China discussions.7:15 – Foreign Affairs in the era of Iraq and "China's peaceful rise" 12:09 – The Marshall mission and the "Who Lost China?" debate 17:17 – China's changing role and the journal's coverage density 19:43 – The Campbell-Ratner "China Reckoning" and subsequent debates 25:00 – The challenge of including authentic Chinese voices 29:42 – How Chinese leadership perceives and reads Foreign Affairs 32:12 – The "vibe shift" on China across the American political spectrum 35:56 – Cultivating contrarian voices: Van Jackson, Jonathan Czin, and David Kang 40:17 – Avoiding the trap of making everything about U.S.-China competition 43:12 – Diversifying perspectives beyond the Washington-Beijing binary 48:18 – The big questions: American exceptionalism and Chinese identity in a new era 51:42 – The dangers of cutting off U.S.-China scholarly conversations 56:26 – The uses and misuses of historical analogies 58:09 – Spain's Golden Age and late Qing memes as contemporary analogiesPaying it forward: The unsung editorial staff at Foreign AffairsRecommendations: Daniel: Equator.org; The Rise of the Meritocracy by Michael Young; Granta's new India issue; The Party's Interests Come First by Joseph Torigian; The Coming Storm by Odd Arne Westad Kaiser: The Spoils of Time by C.V. WedgwoodSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Follow me on Twitter/X (@chinaadventures) where I post (among other things) daily reminders to pray for China.You can also email me @ bfwesten at gmail dot com. Last but not least, to learn more about our ministry endeavors or get one of my missionary biographies, visit PrayGiveGo.us! My Op-Ed for Crosspolitic News: Trump Making US-Malaysia Relations Great Again https://www.crosspoliticnews.com/news/trump-making-us-malaysia-relations-great-again Five Prayer Requests from the Wives of Imprisoned Pastors https://backtojerusalem.com/wives-of-arrested-pastors-of-chinas-zion-church-share-5-urgent-prayer-requests/ Please pray for our Christian brothers and sisters connected to the Zion Church in China. There has been another wave of arrests. Here is a list of Those Taken Away (23 People): Shanghai- Pastor Wang Lin 2. Liu Jiang Beijing- Preacher Wu Qiuyu 4. Pastor Wang Cong 5. Pastor Sun Cong 6. Sister Li Shengjuan Pastor Gao Yingjia 8. Sister Ming Li 9. Sister Hu Yanzi 10. Preacher Misha 11. Sister Cui Xiaole Jiaxing, Zhejiang- 12. Preacher Zhan Ge Hangzhou, Zhejiang-13. Sister Mei Liming (arrested Oct 11) Beihai, Guangxi- Pastor Jin Mingri (arrested for “illegally using info network,” held at Beihai #2 Detention Center) Pastor Yin Huibin 16. Pastor’s wife Yang Lijun 17. Sis Tuya 18. Sis An Mei 19. Sis Huang Chunzi Qingdao, Shandong- 20. Pastor Liu Zhenbin (aka Liu Shanyi) Chengdu, Sichuan- 21. Pastor Lin Shucheng (Mu Chenglin) Zhengzhou, Henan- 22. Preacher Sun Xue (arrested Oct 12) Shenyang, Liaoning- 23. Elder Wang Zhong (arrested Oct 17) Follow China Compass Subscribe to China Compass on whichever platform you use, including Apple Podcasts! You can also contact me anytime on X: @chinaadventures or via email (bfwesten at gmail dot com). Hebrews 13:3!

Follow me on Twitter/X (@chinaadventures) where I post (among other things) daily reminders to pray for China.You can also email me @ bfwesten at gmail dot com. Last but not least, to learn more about our ministry endeavors or get one of my missionary biographies, visit PrayGiveGo.us! My Op-Ed for Crosspolitic News: Trump Making US-Malaysia Relations Great Again https://www.crosspoliticnews.com/news/trump-making-us-malaysia-relations-great-again Five Prayer Requests from the Wives of Imprisoned Pastors https://backtojerusalem.com/wives-of-arrested-pastors-of-chinas-zion-church-share-5-urgent-prayer-requests/ Please pray for our Christian brothers and sisters connected to the Zion Church in China. There has been another wave of arrests. Here is a list of Those Taken Away (23 People): Shanghai- Pastor Wang Lin 2. Liu Jiang Beijing- Preacher Wu Qiuyu 4. Pastor Wang Cong 5. Pastor Sun Cong 6. Sister Li Shengjuan Pastor Gao Yingjia 8. Sister Ming Li 9. Sister Hu Yanzi 10. Preacher Misha 11. Sister Cui Xiaole Jiaxing, Zhejiang- 12. Preacher Zhan Ge Hangzhou, Zhejiang-13. Sister Mei Liming (arrested Oct 11) Beihai, Guangxi- Pastor Jin Mingri (arrested for “illegally using info network,” held at Beihai #2 Detention Center) Pastor Yin Huibin 16. Pastor’s wife Yang Lijun 17. Sis Tuya 18. Sis An Mei 19. Sis Huang Chunzi Qingdao, Shandong- 20. Pastor Liu Zhenbin (aka Liu Shanyi) Chengdu, Sichuan- 21. Pastor Lin Shucheng (Mu Chenglin) Zhengzhou, Henan- 22. Preacher Sun Xue (arrested Oct 12) Shenyang, Liaoning- 23. Elder Wang Zhong (arrested Oct 17) Follow China Compass Subscribe to China Compass on whichever platform you use, including Apple Podcasts! You can also contact me anytime on X: @chinaadventures or via email (bfwesten at gmail dot com). Hebrews 13:3!

Watch the 9malls review of the FishWife Smoked Trout And Sichuan Chili Crisp Smoked Salmon Variety Pack. Are these tinned fish actually worth purchasing? Watch the hands on taste test to find out. #tinnedfish #fishwife #foodreview #tastetestreview #tastetest #smokedsalmon #smokedtrout - Visit FishWife Tinned Seafood Company: https://fishwife.sjv.io/xLYgoA Find As Seen On TV Products & Gadgets at the 9malls Store: https://www.amazon.com/shop/9malls Please support us on Patreon! https://www.patreon.com/9malls Disclaimer: I may also receive compensation if a visitor clicks through to 9malls, or makes a purchase through Amazon or any affiliate link. I test each product on site thoroughly and give high marks to only the best. In the above video I received a free product sample to test. We are independently owned and the opinions expressed here are our own.

The mystery of the disappearing autumn has people living in northern China baffled. Only days ago, they were happily wearing T-shirts and skirts; but now, thick coats and down jackets are out in force. Fall was just a fleeting feeling, and indications are that this weather pattern could become the norm in the future.中国北方“秋日消失”的现象让当地民众感到困惑。就在几天前，人们还身着T恤短裙，如今却已纷纷穿上厚外套与羽绒服。秋天仿佛成了转瞬即逝的感觉，且有迹象表明，这种天气模式未来可能成为常态。According to available meteorological data, the transitional period between summer and winter is shrinking in China, with autumn arriving later than usual and ending sooner.现有气象数据显示，我国夏冬两季之间的过渡时段正不断缩短，秋季不仅来得更晚，结束得也更早。Delayed autumn秋季推迟While southwestern cities such as Guiyang in Guizhou province, Chengdu in Sichuan province, and Chongqing still enjoy around 70 to 80 days of cool autumn weather — with Guiyang topping the list at 79 days — people living in the north barely experience 50 days of autumn, said Weather China, a website under the China Meteorological Administration.中国气象局旗下“中国天气网”指出，贵阳（贵州）、成都（四川）、重庆等西南城市仍能享受70至80天左右的凉爽秋季（其中贵阳以79天位居榜首），而北方民众的秋季体验时长却不足50天。An analysis of long-term weather data from the website reveals that since 1991, autumn has been delayed across much of the country. Cities such as Zhengzhou in Henan province, Ningbo in Zhejiang province, and Shenzhen in Guangdong province now see autumn arrive more than 10 days late on average, while Nanjing in Jiangsu province, Fuzhou in Fujian province, and other places have recorded delays of five to nine days.该网站对长期气象数据的分析显示，1991年以来，我国多地秋季均出现推迟现象。河南郑州、浙江宁波、广东深圳等城市的秋季平均推迟超过10天，江苏南京、福建福州等地则推迟了5至9天。Studies show that across China, the duration of winter, spring and autumn is shrinking, and these shifts are more prominent in northern and eastern regions, the website said.中国天气网表示，研究发现我国冬季、春季、秋季的时长均在缩短，且这种变化在北方和东部地区更为显著。"Maybe there will be only three seasons in the future," a netizen said on social media platform Sina Weibo. "A trench coat feels like the most impractical outfit in Beijing, "another said, indicating the sharp transition from cool to cold weather in the capital.“未来或许只剩三个季节了。”一名网友在社交平台新浪微博上留言。另一名网友则调侃道：“风衣在北京成了最不实用的衣服”，暗指北京天气从凉爽到寒冷的急剧转变。Wang Weiyue, a meteorologist at Weather China, said that given global climate change, rising temperatures across various regions have become an indisputable fact, and this delays the onset of autumn, affecting agricultural production and people's daily lives.中国天气网气象专家王伟跃表示，在全球气候变化背景下，各地气温升高已成为不争的事实，这不仅导致秋季来临时间推迟，还对农业生产和民众日常生活产生了影响。Sudden chill寒潮突至This year's northern chill has arrived abruptly.今年北方的寒潮来得格外突然。Li Duo, a senior engineer at the National Climate Center, said that since October, several regions, including parts of Heilongjiang province, the Inner Mongolia autonomous region, Hebei province, and the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region, were 1 C to 2 C colder than usual.国家气候中心高级工程师李多介绍，10月以来，黑龙江部分地区、内蒙古自治区、河北省、新疆维吾尔自治区等多地气温较常年偏低1至2摄氏度。The recent temperature drop in northern China was mainly due to two major cold-air events between Oct 9 and 10 and Oct 18 and 19, Li said.李多指出，近期我国北方降温主要受10月9日至10日、10月18日至19日两次强冷空气过程影响。The China Meteorological Administration forecasts that much of northern China will remain colder than average through Friday, while southern regions will also see temperatures drop by up to 5 C by the end of the month.中国气象局预报显示，截至周五，我国北方大部地区气温将持续低于常年同期；月底前，南方地区气温也将下降，降幅最高可达5摄氏度。Experts advised residents to dress warmly, stay alert to weather changes, and ventilate indoor spaces when using heating to avoid carbon monoxide-related risks.专家提醒，民众需注意添衣保暖，密切关注天气变化；使用取暖设备时，要注意室内通风，防范一氧化碳中毒风险。fleeting/ˈfliːtɪŋ/adj.短暂的；转瞬即逝的transitional/trænˈzɪʃənl/adj.过渡的；转变的indisputable/ˌɪndɪˈspjuːtəbl/adj.无可争辩的；不容置疑的

This week on the Sinica Podcast, I speak with Jonathan Czin, the Michael H. Armacost Chair in Foreign Policy Studies and a fellow at the Brookings Institution's John L. Thornton China Center. His new essay in Foreign Affairs, “China Against China: Xi Jinping Confronts the Downsides of Success,” challenges the dominant Western narrative of Xi Jinping as either Mao reincarnate or a brittle autocrat presiding over imminent collapse. Instead, Czin argues that Xi's most illiberal reforms can be understood as attempts to cure the pathologies of China's own success. We discuss his framing of Xi's “Counterreformation,” how it helps explain China's current political direction, and what it reveals about our own analytical blind spots in the West.7:15 – Xi's “reformation” and Carl Minzner's “end of reform and opening”12:18 – Corruption, decentralization, and the “lost decade” under Hu and Wen20:12 – Defining “resilience” and what Xi means by “eating bitterness”29:45 – The “downsides of success”: property, corruption, and governance contradictions45:30 – Counter-reformation vs. counterrevolution: what Xi wants to preserve and discard54:20 – The myth of yes-men: triangulation and feedback in Xi's leadership style1:07:07 – Cognitive empathy and why most U.S. analysis of Xi falls short1:15:35 – Systems that can't course-correct: comparing the U.S. and China1:22:05 – Cognitive empathy, ideology, and the problem of American exceptionalismPaying it forward:Jonathan: Allie Mathias and Dinny McMahonRecommendations:Jonathan: The Thirty Years War by C.V. Wedgewood; The Betrothed by Alessandro ManzoniKaiser: Transplants by Daniel Tam-ClaiborneSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Sarah and Kelli discuss Season 10 episode 3 of Below Deck Med. Topics include:  Max vs. Christian, a late night in Barcelona, Nathan's housewives tagline, bedazzled vajayjay, green tea shots, bed noods, tomato bread, chaos on the swim platform, missing truffles, caviar, Jack's big night and Christian drifting away on a jet ski. In Hot Tub Convo we discuss Captain Sandy and Nathan on WWHL, Camille Lamb's DUI, Aesha and Scott making it to the Final 4 on Amazing Race Australia and Sarah shares her US Weekly copy. Boat. Clean. Go.  A new episode of Above Deck is out now!  Follow us on Instagram: @abovedeckpod  Get in touch: abovedeckpod@gmail.com  Get ya some Above Deck merch! https://shop.hurrdatmedia.com/collections/above-deck Thank you to Coconut Bowls for sponsoring this episode! Go to http://coconutbowls.com and use code ABOVEDECKPOD20 for 10% off your order.  Please subscribe on Apple Podcasts, Spotify or wherever you get your podcasts, and tell a friend! Resources: US Weekly Below Deck article This is another Hurrdat Media Production. Hurrdat Media is a podcast network and digital media production company based in Omaha, NE. Find more podcasts on the Hurrdat Media Network by going to HurrdatMedia.com or Hurrdat Media YouTube channel! Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Go to http://DrinkAG1.com/adv to get a FREE Frother with your first purchase of AGZWe uncovered the sinister truth behind China's mega bridge. HAND MACHINE GHOST - LIMITED RUN! - https://thechinashow.threadless.comSupport the show here and see the Monday Exclusive show Xiaban Hou! https://www.patreon.com/advpodcastsSign up for the sticker giveaway!https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScdk5BnaNwlkH8yjt-wgUwq6xWBZIgusPRM5ifELKgPdKxLHg/viewform?usp=headerCartoon feat. Jüri Pootsmann - I Remember Uhttps://soundcloud.com/nocopyrightsoundsTrack : Cartoon feat. Jüri Pootsmann - I Remember USome Sources - https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/09/technology/nvidia-chips-china-megaspeed.htmlSalary data in Anlong https://tjgb.hongheiku.com/xjtjgb/xj2020/53025.htmlSalary data in Fenggang https://www.gzfenggang.gov.cn/zwgk/zfxxgkzl/fdzdgknr/ghjh/gmjjhshfzgh/202502/t20250220_86927630.htmlhttps://www.researchgate.net/publication/341419632_Bone_Glue_-_The_Final_Frontier_for_Fracture_Repair_and_Implantable_Device_Stabilizationhttps://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9941416/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1934590925002267https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/human-neuroscience/articles/10.3389/fnhum.2016.00033/fullhttps://www.nature.com/articles/s43587-025-00930-1https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/aging/articles/10.3389/fragi.2025.1638168/fullBRIDGE SOURCES - * 1981 Liziyida Bridge (Chengdu–Kunming Railway), Sichuan* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1981_Chengdu%E2%80%93Kunming_rail_crash* 1999 Qijiang “Rainbow” Pedestrian Bridge, Chongqing* https://www.engineeringcivil.com/civil-engineering-disasters-collapse-of-bridges.html* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qijiang_Rainbow_Bridge_collapse* 2007 Jiujiang Bridge, Foshan (Guangdong)* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collapse_of_Jiujiang_Bridge* 2007 Fenghuang (Tuojiang) Bridge, Hunan (under construction)* https://www.scmp.com/article/606792/dozens-feared-dead-after-hunan-bridge-collapse* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Fenghuang_Bridge_collapse* 2009 Hongqi Road Viaduct, Zhuzhou (Hunan)* https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-05/18/content_7790004.htm* 2010 Tangying Bridge, Luanchuan (Henan)* https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/556460.shtml* https://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?pid=S0718-915X2022000200193&script=sci_arttext* 2010 Nanjing Overpass (under construction), Jiangsu* https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-11/27/content_11617576.htm* 2011 Gongguan Bridge, Wuyishan (Fujian)* https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-07/15/content_12912763.htm* 2012 Hangzhou Viaduct dismantling accident, Zhejiang* https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/201207/716566.shtml* 2012 East Guangchang River Bridge, Jiangxi* https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/201208/721127.shtml* 2012 Yangmingtan Bridge (ramp), Harbin (Heilongjiang)* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yangmingtan_Bridge* 2013 Lianhuo Expressway Bridge (Mianchi, Henan)* https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-bridge-idUSBRE91003D20130201* https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-21300038* 2014 Gaozhou stone-arch bridge, Guangdong* https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-05/05/content_17487284.htm* 2014 Jinshan Bridge, Enshi (Hubei) (under construction)* https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/10/6/2112* 2016 Ganjiang Bridge (dismantling), Taihe (Jiangxi)* https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/201609/1009862.shtml* 2019 Wuxi S342 Overpass, Jiangsu* https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-bridge-collapse-idUSKBN1WP0JH* https://www.caixinglobal.com/2019-11-01/in-depth-overloaded-and-overturned-inside-the-deadly-wuxi-bridge-collapse-101478011.html* https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/11/deaths-reported-as-bridge-collapses-in-chinas-jiangsu-province* 2021 S2 Ezhou Expressway Ramp Bridge, Hubei* https://www.reuters.com/world/china/bridge-collapse-central-china-kills-four-2021-12-18/* 2024 Lixinsha Bridge, Guangzhou (Guangdong)* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Lixinsha_Bridge_collapse* 2024 Danning (G4015) Expressway Bridge, Zhashui (Shaanxi)* https://apnews.com/article/shaanxi-china-bridge-collapse-river-dead-b077896e4b291ef82a46ed601bfd04ca* 2024 Yakang Expressway Bridge (near Kangding), Sichuan* https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3240129/more-bodies-found-after-mountain-bridge-collapse-china* 2025 Jianzha Yellow River Bridge (under construction), Qinghai* https://abc13.com/post/china-bridge-collapse-today-kills-least-12-construction-workers-yellow-river-qinghai-province/17622521This video features copyrighted material used for commentary and educational purposes. We believe this constitutes a 'fair use' of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Un nou estudi, amb nanotecnologia, aconsegueix revertir l'Alzheimer en ratolins. Al darrere hi ha investigadors de l'Institut de Bioenginyeria de Catalunya i de l'Hospital West China de la Universitat xinesa de Sichuan.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                      Last time we spoke about the continuation of the war after Nanjing's fall. The fall of Nanjing in December 1937 marked a pivotal juncture in the Second Sino-Japanese War, ushering in a brutal phase of attrition that shaped both strategy and diplomacy in early 1938. As Japanese forces sought to restructure China's political order, their strategy extended beyond battlefield victories to the establishment of puppet arrangements and coercive diplomacy. Soviet aid provided critical support, while German and broader Axis diplomacy wavered, shaping a nuanced backdrop for China's options. In response, Chinese command decisions focused on defending crucial rail corridors and urban strongholds, with Wuhan emerging as a strategic hub and the Jinpu and Longhai railways becoming lifelines of resistance. The defense around Xuzhou and the Huai River system illustrated Chinese determination to prolong resistance despite daunting odds. By early 1938, the war appeared as a drawn-out struggle, with China conserving core bases even as Japan pressed toward central China.   #170 The Battle of Taierzhuang Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Following their victory at Nanjing, the Japanese North China Area Army sought to push southward and link up with the Japanese Eleventh Army between Beijing and Nanjing. The two formations were intended to advance along the northern and southern ends of the JinPu railway, meet at Xuzhou, and then coordinate a pincer movement into Chinese strongholds in the Central Yangtze region, capturing Jiujiang first and then Wuhan. Recognizing Xuzhou's strategic importance, Chinese leadership made its defense a top priority. Xuzhou stood at the midpoint of the JinPu line and at the intersection with the Longhai Line, China's main east–west corridor from Lanzhou to Lianyungang. If seized, Japanese control of these routes would grant mobility for north–south movement across central China. At the end of January, Chiang Kai-shek convened a military conference in Wuchang and declared the defense of Xuzhou the highest strategic objective. Chinese preparations expanded from an initial core of 80,000 troops to about 300,000, deployed along the JinPu and Longhai lines to draw in and overstretch Japanese offensives. A frightening reality loomed by late March 1938: the Japanese were nearing victory on the Xuzhou front. The North China Area Army, led by Generals Itagaki Seishirô, Nishio Toshizô, and Isogai Rensuke, aimed to link up with the Central China Expeditionary Force under General Hata Shunroku for a coordinated drive into central China. Li Zongren and his senior colleagues, including Generals Bai Chongxi and Tang Enbo, resolved to meet the Japanese at the traditional stone-walled city of Taierzhuang. Taierzhuang was not large, but it held strategic significance. It sat along the Grand Canal, China's major north–south waterway, and on a rail line that connected the Jinpu and Longhai lines, thus bypassing Xuzhou. Chiang Kai-shek himself visited Xuzhou on March 24. While Xuzhou remained in Chinese hands, the Japanese forces to the north and south were still separated. Losing Xuzhou would close the pincer. By late March, Chinese troops seemed to be gaining ground at Taierzhuang, but the Japanese began reinforcing, pulling soldiers from General Isogai Rensuke's column. The defending commanders grew uncertain about their ability to hold the position, yet Chiang Kai-shek made his stance clear in an April 1, 1938 telegram: “the enemy at Taierzhuang must be destroyed.” Chiang Kai-shek dispatched his Vice Chief of Staff, Bai Chongxi, to Xuzhou in January 1938. Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi were old comrades from the New Guangxi Clique, and their collaboration dated back to the Northern Expedition, including the Battle of Longtan. Li also received the 21st Group Army from the 3rd War Area. This Guangxi unit, commanded by Liao Lei, comprised the 7th and 47th Armies. Around the same time, Sun Zhen's 22nd Group Army, another Sichuan clique unit, arrived in the Shanxi-Henan region, but was rebuffed by both Yan Xishan, then commander of the 2nd War Area and Shanxi's chairman and Cheng Qian, commander of the 1st War Area and Henan's chairman. Yan and Cheng harbored strong reservations about Sichuan units due to discipline issues, notably their rampant opium consumption. Under Sun Zhen's leadership, the 22nd Group Army deployed four of its six divisions to aid the Northern China effort. Organized under the 41st and 45th Armies, the contingent began a foot march toward Taiyuan on September 1, covering more than 50 days and approximately 1,400 kilometers. Upon reaching Shanxi, they faced a harsh, icy winter and had no winter uniforms or even a single map of the province. They nevertheless engaged the Japanese for ten days at Yangquan, suffering heavy casualties. Strapped for supplies, they broke into a Shanxi clique supply depot, which enraged Yan Xishan and led to their expulsion from the province. The 22nd withdrew westward into the 1st War Area, only to have its request for resupply rejected by Cheng Qian. Meanwhile to the south Colonel Rippei Ogisu led Japanese 13th Division to push westward from Nanjing in two columns during early February: the northern column targeted Mingguang, while the southern column aimed for Chuxian. Both routes were checked by Wei Yunsong's 31st Army, which had been assigned to defend the southern stretch of the Jinpu railway under Li Zongren. Despite facing a clearly inferior force, the Japanese could not gain ground after more than a month of sustained attacks. In response, Japan deployed armored and artillery reinforcements from Nanjing. The Chinese withdrew to the southwestern outskirts of Dingyuan to avoid a direct clash with their reinforced adversaries. By this point, Yu Xuezhong's 51st Army had taken up a defensive position on the northern banks of the Huai River, establishing a line between Bengbu and Huaiyuan. The Japanese then captured Mingguang, Dingyuan, and Bengbu in succession and pressed toward Huaiyuan. However, their supply lines were intercepted by the Chinese 31st Corps, which conducted flanking attacks from the southwest. The situation worsened when the Chinese 7th Army, commanded by Liao Lei, arrived at Hefei to reinforce the 31st Army. Facing three Chinese corps simultaneously, the Japanese were effectively boxed south of the Huai River and, despite air superiority and a superior overall firepower, could not advance further. As a result, the Chinese thwarted the Japanese plan to move the 13th Division north along the Jinpu railway and link up with the Isogai 10th Division to execute a pincer against Xuzhou. Meanwhile in the north, after amphibious landings at Qingdao, the Japanese 5th Division, commanded by Seishiro Itagaki, advanced southwest along the Taiwei Highway, spearheaded by its 21st Infantry Brigade. They faced Pang Bingxun's 3rd Group Army. Although labeled a Group Army, Pang's force actually comprised only the 40th Army, which itself consisted of the 39th Division from the Northwestern Army, commanded by Ma-Fawu. The 39th Division's five regiments delayed the Japanese advance toward Linyi for over a month. The Japanese captured Ju County on 22 February and moved toward Linyi by 2 March. The 59th Army, commanded by Zhang Zizhong, led its troops on a forced march day and night toward Linyi. Seizing the opportunity, the 59th Army did not rest after reaching Yishui. In the early morning of the 14th, Zhang Zizhong ordered the entire army to covertly cross the Yishui River and attack the right flank of the Japanese “Iron Army” 5th Division. They broke through enemy defenses at Tingzitou, Dataiping, Shenjia Taiping, Xujia Taiping, and Shalingzi. Initially caught off guard, the enemy sustained heavy losses, and over a night more than a thousand Japanese soldiers were annihilated. The 59th Army fought fiercely, engaging in brutal hand-to-hand combat. By 4:00 a.m. on the 17th, the 59th Army had secured all of the Japanese main positions. That same day, Pang Bingxun seized the moment to lead his troops in a fierce flank attack, effectively supporting the 59th Army's frontal assault. On the 18th, Zhang and Pang's forces attacked the Japanese from the east, south, and west. After three days and nights of bloody fighting, they finally defeated the 3rd Battalion of the 11th Regiment, which had crossed the river, and annihilated most of it. The 59th Army completed its counterattack but suffered over 6,000 casualties, with more than 2,000 Japanese killed or wounded. News of the Linyi victory prompted commendations from Chiang Kai-shek and Li Zongren. General Li Zongren, commander of the 5th War Zone, judged that the Japanese were temporarily unable to mount a large-scale offensive and that Linyi could be held for the time being. On March 20, he ordered the 59th Army westward to block the Japanese Seya Detachment. On March 21, the Japanese Sakamoto Detachment, after a brief reorganization and learning of the Linyi detachment, launched another offensive. The 3rd Corps, understrength and without reinforcements, was compelled to retreat steadily before the Japanese. General Pang Bingxun, commander of the 3rd Corps, urgently telegraphed Chiang Kai-shek, requesting reinforcements. Chiang Kai-shek received the telegram and, at approximately 9:00 AM on the 23rd, ordered the 59th Army to return to Linyi to join with the 3rd Corps in repelling the Sakamoto Detachment. Fierce fighting ensued with heavy Chinese losses, and the situation in Linyi again grew precarious. At a critical moment, the 333rd Brigade of the 111th Division and the Cavalry Regiment of the 13th Army were rushed to reinforce Linyi. Facing attacks from two directions, the Japanese withdrew, losing almost two battalions in the process. This engagement shattered the myth of Japanese invincibility and embarrassed commander Seishirō Itagaki, even startling IJA headquarters. Although the 5th Division later regrouped and attempted another push, it had lost the element of surprise. The defeat at Linyi at the hands of comparatively poorly equipped Chinese regional units set the stage for the eventual battle at Tai'erzhuang. Of the three Japanese divisions advancing into the Chinese 5th War Area, the 10th Division, commanded by Rensuke Isogai, achieved the greatest initial success. Departing from Hebei, it crossed the Yellow River and moved south along the Jinpu railway. With KMT General Han Fuju ordering his forces to desert their posts, the Japanese captured Zhoucun and reached Jinan with little resistance. They then pushed south along two columns from Tai'an. The eastern column captured Mengyin before driving west to seize Sishui; the western column moved southwest along the Jinpu railway, capturing Yanzhou, Zouxian, and Jining, before turning northwest to take Wenshang. Chiang Kai-shek subsequently ordered Li Zongren to employ “offensive defense”, seizing the initiative to strike rather than merely defend. Li deployed Sun Zhen's 22nd Group Army to attack Zouxian from the south, while Pang Bingxun's 40th Division advanced north along the 22nd's left flank to strike Mengyin and Sishui. Sun Tongxuan's 3rd Group Army also advanced from the south, delivering a two-pronged assault on the Japanese at Jining. Fierce fighting from 12 to 25 February, particularly by the 12th Corps, helped mitigate the reputational damage previously inflicted on Shandong units by Han Fuju. In response to Chinese counterattacks, the Japanese revised their strategy: they canceled their original plan to push directly westward from Nanjing toward Wuhan, freeing more troops for the push toward Xuzhou. On March 15, the Japanese 10th Division struck the Chinese 122nd Division, focusing the action around Tengxian and Lincheng. Chinese reinforcements from the 85th Corps arrived the following day but were driven back on March 17. With air support, tanks, and heavy artillery, the Japanese breached the Chinese lines on March 18. The remaining Chinese forces, bolstered by the 52nd Corps, withdrew to the town of Yixian. The Japanese attacked Yixian and overran an entire Chinese regiment in a brutal 24-hour engagement. By March 19, the Japanese began advancing on the walled town of Taierzhuang. To counter the Japanese advance, the Chinese 2nd Army Group under General Sun Lianzhong was deployed to Taierzhuang. The 31st Division, commanded by General Chi Fengcheng, reached Taierzhuang on March 22 and was ordered to delay the Japanese advance until the remainder of the Army Group could arrive. On March 23, the 31st Division sallied from Taierzhuang toward Yixian, where they were engaged by two Japanese battalions reinforced with three tanks and four armored cars. The Chinese troops occupied a series of hills and managed to defend against a Japanese regiment (~3,000 men) for the rest of the day. On March 24, a Japanese force of about 5,000 attacked the 31st Division. Another Japanese unit pressed the Chinese from Yixian, forcing them to withdraw back into Taierzhuang itself. The Japanese then assaulted the town, with a 300-strong contingent breaching the northeast gate at 20:00. They were subsequently driven back toward the Chenghuang temple, which the Chinese set on fire, annihilating the Japanese force. The next day, the Japanese renewed the assault through the breached gate and secured the eastern portion of the district, while also breaking through the northwest corner from the outside and capturing the Wenchang Pavilion. On March 25, a morning Japanese onslaught was repelled. The Japanese then shelled Chinese positions with artillery and air strikes. In the afternoon, the Chinese deployed an armored train toward Yixian, which ambushed a column of Japanese soldiers near a hamlet, killing or wounding several dozen before retreating back to Taierzhuang. By nightfall, three thousand Chinese troops launched a night assault, pushing the Japanese lines northeast to dawn. The following three days subjected the Chinese defenders to sustained aerial and artillery bombardment. The Chinese managed to repulse several successive Japanese assaults but sustained thousands of casualties in the process. On March 28, Chinese artillery support arrived, including two 155 mm and ten 75 mm pieces. On the night of March 29, the Japanese finally breached the wall. Setting out from the district's southern outskirts, a Chinese assault squad stormed the Wenchang Pavilion from the south and east, killing nearly the entire Japanese garrison aside from four taken as prisoners of war. The Chinese then retook the northwest corner of the district. Even by the brutal standards already established in the war, the fighting at Taierzhuang was fierce, with combatants facing one another at close quarters. Sheng Cheng's notes preserve the battlefield memories of Chi Fengcheng, one of the campaign's standout officers “We had a battle for the little lanes [of the town], and unprecedentedly, not just streets and lanes, but even courtyards and houses. Neither side was willing to budge. Sometimes we'd capture a house, and dig a hole in the wall to approach the enemy. Sometimes the enemy would be digging a hole in the same wall at the same time. Sometimes we faced each other with hand grenades — or we might even bite each other. Or when we could hear that the enemy was in the house, then we'd climb the roof and drop bombs inside — and kill them all.” The battle raged for a week. On April 1, General Chi requested volunteers for a near-suicide mission to seize a building: among fifty-seven selected, only ten survived. A single soldier claimed to have fired on a Japanese bomber and succeeded in bringing it down; he and his comrades then set the aircraft ablaze before another plane could arrive to rescue the pilot. One participant described the brutal conditions of the battle “"The battle continued day and night. The flames lit up the sky. Often all that separated our forces was a single wall. The soldiers would beat holes in the masonry to snipe at each other. We would be fighting for days over a single building, causing dozens of fatalities." The conditions were so brutal that Chinese officers imposed severe measures to maintain discipline. Junior officers were repeatedly forbidden to retreat and were often ordered to personally replace casualties within their ranks. Li Zongren even warned Tang Enbo that failure to fulfill his duties would lead him to be “treated as Han Fuju had been.” In Taierzhuang's cramped streets, Japan's artillery and air superiority offered little advantage; whenever either service was employed amid the dense melee, casualties were roughly even on both sides. The fighting devolved into close-quarters combat carried out primarily by infantry, with rifles, pistols, hand grenades, bayonets, and knives forming the core of each side's arsenal. The battle unfolded largely hand-to-hand, frequently in darkness. The stone buildings of Taierzhuang provided substantial cover from fire and shrapnel. It was precisely under these close-quarters conditions that Chinese soldiers could stand as equals, if not superior, to their Japanese opponents, mirroring, in some respects, the experiences seen in Luodian, Shanghai, the year before. On March 31, General Sun Lianzhong arrived to assume command of the 2nd Army Group. A Japanese assault later that day was repulsed, but a Chinese counterattack also stalled. At 04:00 on April 1, the Japanese attacked the Chinese lines with support from 11 tanks. The Chinese defenders, armed with German-made 37mm Pak-36 antitank guns, destroyed eight of the armored vehicles at point-blank range. Similar incidents recurred throughout the battle, with numerous Japanese tanks knocked out by Chinese artillery and by suicide squads. In one engagement, Chinese suicide bombers annihilated four Japanese tanks with bundles of grenades. On April 2 and 3, Chi urged the Chinese defenders around Taierzhuang's north station to assess the evolving situation. The troops reported distress, crying and sneezing, caused by tear gas deployed by the Japanese against Chinese positions at Taierzhuang's north station, but the defenders remained unmoved. They then launched a massive armored assault outside the city walls, with 30 tanks and 60 armored cars, yet managed only to drive the Chinese 27th Division back to the Grand Canal. The fighting continued to rage on April 4 and 5. By then, the Japanese had captured roughly two-thirds of Taierzhuang, though the Chinese still held the South Gate. It was through this entry point that the Chinese command managed to keep their troops supplied. The Chinese also thwarted Japanese efforts to replenish their dwindling stocks of arms and ammunition. In consequence, the Japanese attackers were worn down progressively. Although the Japanese possessed superior firepower, including cannon and heavy artillery, the cramped conditions within Taierzhuang nullified this advantage for the moment. The Chinese command succeeded in keeping their own supplies flowing, a recurring weakness in other engagements and also prevented the Japanese from replenishing their dwindling stock of arms and bullets. Gradually, the Japanese maneuvered into a state of attrition. The deadlock of the battle was broken by events unfolding outside Taierzhuang, where fresh Chinese divisions had encircled the Japanese forces in Taierzhuang from the flanks and rear. After consulting their German advisors earlier, the commanders of the 5th War Area prepared a double envelopment of the exposed Japanese forces in Taierzhuang. Between March and April 1938, the Nationalist Air Force deployed squadrons from the 3rd and 4th Pursuit Groups, fighter-attack aircraft, in long-distance air interdiction and close-air support of the Taierzhuang operations. Approximately 30 aircraft, mostly Soviet-made, were deployed in bombing raids against Japanese positions. On 26 March, Tang Enbo's 20th Army, equipped with artillery units, attacked Japanese forces at Yixian, inflicting heavy casualties and routing the survivors. Tang then swung south to strike the Japanese flank northeast of Taierzhuang. Simultaneously, the Chinese 55th Corps, comprised of two divisions, executed a surprise crossing of the Grand Canal and cut the railway line near Lincheng. As a result, Tang isolated the Japanese attackers from their rear and severed their supply lines. On 1 April, the Japanese 5th Division sent a brigade to relieve the encircled 10th Division. Tang countered by blocking the brigade's advance and then attacking from the rear, driving them south into the encirclement. On 3 April, the Chinese 2nd Group Army launched a counter-offensive, with the 30th and 110th Divisions pushing northward into Beiluo and Nigou, respectively. By 6 April, the Chinese 85th and 52nd Armies linked up at Taodun, just west of Lanling. The combined force then advanced north-westward, capturing Ganlugou. Two more Chinese divisions arrived a few days later. By April 5, Taierzhuang's Japanese units were fully surrounded, with seven Chinese divisions to the north and four to the south closing in. The Japanese divisions inside Taierzhuang had exhausted their supplies, running critically low on ammunition, fuel, and food, while many troops endured fatigue and dehydration after more than a week of brutal fighting. Sensing imminent victory, the Chinese forces surged with renewed fury and attacked the encircled Japanese, executing wounded soldiers where they lay with rifle and pistol shots. Chinese troops also deployed Soviet tanks against the defenders. Japanese artillery could not reply effectively due to a shortage of shells, and their tanks were immobilized by a lack of fuel. Attempts to drop supplies by air failed, with most packages falling into Chinese hands. Over time, Japanese infantry were progressively reduced to firing only their machine guns and mortars, then their rifles and machine guns, and ultimately resorted to bayonet charges. With the success of the Chinese counter-attacks, the Japanese line finally collapsed on April 7. The 10th and 5th Divisions, drained of personnel and ammunition, were forced to retreat. By this point, around 2,000 Japanese soldiers managed to break out of Taierzhuang, leaving thousands of their comrades dead behind. Some of the escapees reportedly committed hara-kiri. Chinese casualties were roughly comparable, marking a significant improvement over the heavier losses suffered in Shanghai and Nanjing. The Japanese had lost the battle for numerous reasons. Japanese efforts were hampered by the "offensive-defensive" operations carried out by various Chinese regional units, effectively preventing the three Japanese divisions from ever linking up with each other. Despite repeated use of heavy artillery, air strikes, and gas, the Japanese could not expel the Chinese 2nd Group Army from Taierzhuang and its surrounding areas, even as the defenders risked total annihilation. The Japanese also failed to block the Chinese 20th Group Army's maneuver around their rear positions, which severed retreat routes and enabled a Chinese counter-encirclement. After Han Fuju's insubordination and subsequent execution, the Chinese high command tightened discipline at the top, transmitting a stringent order flow down to the ranks. This atmosphere of strict discipline inspired even junior soldiers to risk their lives in executing orders. A “dare-to-die corps” was effectively employed against Japanese units. They used swords and wore suicide vests fashioned from grenades. Due to a lack of anti-armor weaponry, suicide bombing was also employed against the Japanese. Chinese troops, as part of the “dare-to-die” corps, strapped explosives such as grenade packs or dynamite to their bodies and charged at Japanese tanks to blow them up.  The Chinese later asserted that about 20,000 Japanese had perished, though the actual toll was likely closer to 8,000. The Japanese also sustained heavy material losses. Because of fuel shortages and their rapid retreat, many tanks, trucks, and artillery pieces were abandoned on the battlefield and subsequently captured by Chinese forces. Frank Dorn recorded losses of 40 tanks, over 70 armored cars, and 100 trucks of various sizes. In addition to vehicles, the Japanese lost dozens of artillery pieces and thousands of machine guns and rifles. Many of these weapons were collected by the Chinese for future use. The Chinese side also endured severe casualties, possibly up to 30,000, with Taierzhuang itself nearly razed. Yet for once, the Chinese achieved a decisive victory, sparking an outburst of joy across unoccupied China. Du Zhongyuan wrote of “the glorious killing of the enemy,” and even Katharine Hand, though isolated in Japanese-controlled Shandong, heard the news. The victory delivered a much-needed morale boost to both the army and the broader population. Sheng Cheng recorded evening conversations with soldiers from General Chi Fengcheng's division, who shared light-hearted banter with their senior officer. At one moment, the men recalled Chi as having given them “the secret of war. when you get food, eat it; when you can sleep, take it.” Such familiar, brisk maxims carried extra resonance now that the Nationalist forces had demonstrated their willingness and ability to stand their ground rather than retreat. The victors may have celebrated a glorious victory, but they did not forget that their enemies were human. Chi recalled a scene he encountered: he had picked up a Japanese officer's helmet, its left side scorched by gunpowder, with a trace of blood, the mark of a fatal wound taken from behind. Elsewhere in Taierzhuang, relics of the fallen were found: images of the Buddha, wooden fish, and flags bearing slogans. A makeshift crematorium in the north station had been interrupted mid-process: “Not all the bones had been completely burned.” After the battle, Li Zongren asked Sheng if he had found souvenirs on the battlefield. Sheng replied that he had discovered love letters on the corpses of Japanese soldiers, as well as a photograph of a girl, perhaps a hometown sweetheart labeled “19 years old, February 1938.” These details stood in stark contrast to news coverage that depicted the Japanese solely as demons, devils, and “dwarf bandits.” The foreign community noted the new, optimistic turn of events and the way it seemed to revive the resistance effort. US ambassador Nelson Johnson wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull from Wuhan just days after Taierzhuang, passing on reports from American military observers: one had spent time in Shanxi and been impressed by Communist success in mobilizing guerrilla fighters against the Japanese; another had spent three days observing the fighting at Taierzhuang and confirmed that “Chinese troops in the field there won a well-deserved victory over Japanese troops, administering the first defeat that Japanese troops have suffered in the field in modern times.” This reinforced Johnson's view that Japan would need to apply far more force than it had anticipated to pacify China. He noted that the mood in unoccupied China had likewise shifted. “Conditions here at Hankow have changed from an atmosphere of pessimism to one of dogged optimism. The Government is more united under Chiang and there is a feeling that the future is not entirely hopeless due to the recent failure of Japanese arms at Hsuchow [Xuzhou] . . . I find no evidence for a desire for a peace by compromise among  Chinese, and doubt whether the Government could persuade its army or its people to accept such a peace. The spirit of resistance is slowly spreading among the people who are awakening to a feeling that this is their war. Japanese air raids in the interior and atrocities by Japanese soldiers upon civilian populations are responsible for this stiffening of the people.”. The British had long been wary of Chiang Kai-shek, but Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, the British ambassador in China, wrote to the new British foreign secretary, Lord Halifax, on April 29, 1938, shortly after the Taierzhuang victory, and offered grudging credit to China's leader “[Chiang] has now become the symbol of Chinese unity, which he himself has so far failed to achieve, but which the Japanese are well on the way to achieving for him . . . The days when Chinese people did not care who governed them seem to have gone . . . my visit to Central China from out of the gloom and depression of Shanghai has left me stimulated and more than disposed to believe that provided the financial end can be kept up Chinese resistance may be so prolonged and effective that in the end the Japanese effort may be frustrated . . . Chiang Kai-shek is obstinate and difficult to deal with . . . Nonetheless [the Nationalists] are making in their muddlIn the exhilaration of a rare victory”. Chiang pressured Tang and Li to build on their success, increasing the area's troop strength to about 450,000. Yet the Chinese Army remained plagued by deeper structural issues. The parochialism that had repeatedly hampered Chiang's forces over the past six months resurfaced. Although the various generals had agreed to unite in a broader war of resistance, each prioritized the safety of his own troops, wary of any move by Chiang to centralize power. For example, Li Zongren refrained from utilizing his top Guangxi forces at Taierzhuang, attempting to shift the bulk of the fighting onto Tang Enbo's units. The generals were aware of the fates of two colleagues: Han Fuju of Shandong was executed for his refusal to fight, while Zhang Xueliang of Manchuria had allowed Chiang to reduce the size of his northeastern army and ended up under house arrest. They were justified in distrusting Chiang. He truly believed, after all, that provincial armies should come under a national military command led by himself. From a national-unity standpoint, Chiang's aim was not unreasonable. But it bred suspicion among other military leaders that participation in the anti-Japanese war would erode their own power. The fragmented command structure also hindered logistics, making ammunition and food supplies to the front unreliable and easy to cut off a good job of things in extremely difficult circumstances. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Chinese victory at the battle of Tairzhuang was a much needed morale boost after the long string of defeats to Japan. As incredible as it was however, it would amount to merely a bloody nose for the Imperial Japanese Army. Now Japan would unleash even more devastation to secure Xuzhou and ultimately march upon Wuhan.

This week on Sinica, I chat with Peking University's Professor Wang Dong (王栋), an international relations scholar at the School of International Studies at Peking University, where he also serves as Deputy Director and Executive Director of the Office for Humanities and Social Sciences and the Institute for Global Cooperation and Understanding. Professor Wang's scholarship and public commentary focus on U.S.–China relations, Cold War history, and the uses of historical memory in diplomacy. He has been an especially thoughtful voice in connecting the Flying Tigers legacy with today's efforts to stabilize and strengthen the people-to-people ties between our two countries.Check back in a day or two for the full podcast page and the transcript!See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, co-host Tianyu Fang makes his debut on the show to join me in interviewing his Stanford classmate and talented writer Jasmine Sun, who studies the anthropology of disruption. This summer, she took a trip to China with a group of friends with different levels of China experience, from people raised in the country to total novices. She reflects on how it hit, and how a group of young people reckoned with the reality of Chinese hypermodernity, which she wrote about in a terrific essay titled "america against china against america: notes on shenzhen, shanghai, and more."Check back on this page in a couple of days for the full podcast page with time stamps and recommendations!See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on the Sinica Podcast, I chat with well-known author and public intellectual Yascha Mounk about his recent fascination with China, his approach to learning about the country and learning Chinese, and his thoughts on how China fits into the current crisis of Western liberal democracy.7:15 – Yascha's experience of living in China and learning Chinese12:18 – Yascha's perspective on China's strengths and weaknesses20:12 – China in a global comparative perspective: Generational aspirations and demographic decline29:45 – China's Soft Power vs. Japan, Korea, and the U.S.45:30 – Media narratives on China: have they shifted?54:20 – Western Liberalism confronts China01:07:07 – Backlash & criticism01:11:35 - Polarization and “China as enemy” narrativesRecommendations: Yascha: The Leopard by Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa (book), The Leopard (1963) (movie)Kaiser: A Thousand Small Sanities: The Moral Adventure of Liberalism by Adam Gopnik (book)See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, I speak first with retired Senior Colonel Zhou Bo, a frequent commentator on Chinese military and security affairs and a prolific writer now at the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University, and with Rana Mitter of the Harvard Kennedy School and author of Forgotten Ally, a book about World War II in China.I will update this page when the transcript is ready. Check back in a couple of days!See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Ketchup. We all know what it is. But do we? It's not a thing. It's actually a category.Where's the word come from? How was it originally used? When was the first ketchup recipe? How has it become the condiment we know today?We're Bruce Weinstein & Mark Scarbrough, authors of over three dozen cookbooks. This podcast is about our major passion in life: food and cooking.If you'd like to check out our latest cookbook, COLD CANNING, please click here.[00:55] Our one-minute cooking tip: Click on "like" for any online content you in fact like.[02:18] All about ketchup! Where'd it come from? Where's the word come from? It's not a thing. It's a category of things. How'd it get to be the stick, thick tomato sauce we know today?[22:02] What's making us happy in food this week: Sichuan fish stew and Chinese food demystified!

This week on Sinica, I chat with Dave Kang (USC), Zenobia Chan (Georgetown), and Jackie Wong (American University in Sharjah, UAE) about their new paper in International Security titled "What Does China Want?" The paper, which has generated quite a bit of controversy, takes a data-driven approach to examine the claim that China seeks global hegemony — that it wants to supplant the U.S. as a globe-spanning top power. I'm traveling much of this week, so I'll update this podcast page when the transcript comes back!See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on the Sinica Podcast, I welcome back Evan Feigenbaum, Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Evan served for many years as a State Department official, was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia and Central Asia among his numerous positions in government, and was instrumental in building the U.S.-India relationship after 2000 — only to watch Trump round on India in recent months, slapping large punitive tariffs on the South Asian giant ostensibly over its purchases of Russian oil. What motivated Trump? And how does this look from New Delhi and from Beijing? Will China capitalize on the strains in the U.S.-Indian relationship? Listen and find out.As this show is news pegged, I decided to release it as soon as I finished the edit, rather than wait for the transcript. I'll update this podcast page when the transcript comes back.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Last time we spoke about the crossing of Nanjing's Rubicon. By November 1, Shanghai had become a lost cause, the Chinese were forced to retreat. In the wake of this turmoil, the Japanese set their sights on Nanjing, keenly aware that its fall would spell disaster for Chiang Kai-Shek's government. Despite the desperate situation, guerrilla fighters began fortifying the city as civilians rallied to support the defense, preparing for the inevitable assault that loomed. However, political divisions plagued the Chinese leadership, with some generals advocating for abandoning the city. After intense discussions, it was decided that Nanjing would be a hill worth dying on, driven largely by propaganda needs. As November 12 approached, Japanese troops rapidly advanced west, capturing towns along the way and inflicting unimaginable brutality. On November 19, Yanagawa, a commander, took the initiative, decreeing that pursuing the retreating Chinese forces toward Nanjing was paramount.    #164 The Battle of Lake Tai Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. As the Chinese troops fled westwards, at 7:00 am on November 19th, Yanagawa issued instructions to his troops in the field. “The enemy's command system is in disarray, and a mood of defeat has descended over their entire army. They have lost the will to fight. We must not miss the opportunity to pursue the enemy to Nanjing.” The order went out to the 10th Army, sending, the 6th, 18th, and 114th Divisions west along the southern shore of Lake Tai, passing through Huzhou before turning right towards Nanjing. The Kunisaki Detachment, trained for rapid movement by water and land, was ordered east along the Yangtze River near Wuhu city and, if possible, cross the river to cut off the Chinese Army's retreat from Nanjing. Yanagawa envisioned an operation unlike any other conducted by the Japanese Army in recent history. He believed this could not only end the war but also surpass previous victories, such as the defeat of tsarist Russia more than three decades earlier. Confident in a swift victory, he wrote in a follow-up message to his commanders, “The day is near when the banner of the Rising Sun will fly over Nanjing's city wall.” However, Yanagawa's order elicited panic in Tokyo once it became known. His superiors viewed it as an outrageous attempt to entirely change the war focus away from the north. They understood that taking Nanjing was primarily a political decision rather than a strategic one. There was still hopes of finding terms through the Germans to end the conflict, thus carving up more of China. The Japanese did not want to become bogged down in a real war. Major General Tada was particularly opposed to increasing efforts on the Shanghai front. He belonged to a faction that believed the best way to avoid a quagmire in China was to deliver a swift, decisive blow to the Chinese Army. This mindset had turned him into a major advocate for landing a strong force in Hangzhou Bay in early November. Nevertheless, he had initially resisted expanding operations to the Suzhou-Jiaxing line, only relenting on the condition that this line would not be crossed under any circumstances. Tada's immediate response was to halt the 10th Army's offensive. Shimomura Sadamu, Ishiwara Kanji's hardline successor as chief of operations, strongly disagreed, arguing that field commanders should have the authority to make significant decisions. Undeterred, Tada insisted on restraining the field commanders, and at 6:00 pm on November 20th, the Army General Staff sent a cable to the Central China Area Army reprimanding them for advancing beyond Order No. 600, which had established the Suzhou-Jiaxing line. The response from the Central China Area Army arrived two days later whereupon the field commanders argued that Nanjing needed to be captured to bring the war to an early conclusion. To do otherwise, they argued, would provide the enemy with an opportunity to regain the will to fight. Moreover, the officers claimed that delaying the decisive battle would not sit well with the Japanese public, potentially jeopardizing national unity. On the same day it responded to Tokyo, the Central China Area Army instructed the 10th Army to proceed cautiously: “The pursuit to Nanjing is to be halted, although you may still send an advance force towards Huzhou. Each division is to select four or five battalions to pursue the enemy rapidly”. The remainder of the troops were instructed to advance towards Huzhou and prepare to join the pursuit “at any time.” Meanwhile Chiang Kai-shek officially appointed Tang Shengzhi as the commandant of Nanjing's garrison. Born in 1889, Tang embodied the era of officers leading China into war with Japan. They straddled the line between old and new China. During their youth, they lived in a society that had seen little change for centuries, where young men immersed themselves in 2,000-year-old classics to prepare for life. Like their ancestors across countless generations, they were governed by an emperor residing in a distant capital. Following the 1911 revolution, they embraced the new republic and received modern military training, Tang, for instance, at the esteemed Baoding Academy in northern China. Yet, they struggled to fully relinquish their traditional mindsets. These traditional beliefs often included a significant distrust of foreigners. Before his appointment as garrison commander, Tang had led the garrison's operations section. During this time, Chiang Kai-shek suggested that he permit the German chief advisor, General Alexander von Falkenhausen, to attend staff meetings. Tang hesitated, expressing concern due to Falkenhausen's past as a military official in Japan and the current alliance between Germany, Italy, and Japan. “That's not good, is it?” he asked. Chiang reassured him that Falkenhausen was an experienced officer who remembered earlier loyalties despite political shifts in Berlin. “It's all right,” Chiang insisted, “we can trust him.” Reluctantly, Tang acquiesced but never fully trusted the German officer. Tang also faced issues with morale. He was Hunanese, the majority of his troops were locals, many from Nanjing. Tang also suffered from many ongoing illnesses. While he put on a bravado face, its unlikely he expected to be able to defend the capital for very long. On November 19th, the IJA 16th division and Shigeto Detachment conquered Changshu, a crucial point along the Wufu defense line, spanning from Fushan on the Yangtze to Suzhou and then to Wujiang sitting on the shores of Lake Tai. The fight for Changshu had surprised the Japanese. As they approached they ran into a network of interlocking cement pillboxes that had to be taken individually, resulting in heavy casualties. Frequently, when the Japanese believed they had finally destroyed a position and advanced, they were dismayed to discover that some defenders remained alive, continuing to fire at their flanks. Another obstacle facing them was Chinese artillery. During the night's capture of the city, the Japanese makeshift camps were hit relentlessly by bombardment. That same day further south, the IJA 9th division captured Suzhou , reporting to the press they did so without firing a single shot. General Matsui wrote in his diary “The enemy troops near Suzhou have completely lost their morale. Some soldiers are discarding their equipment and surrendering, while others flee westward in utter chaos. Our forces have not encountered the resistance we anticipated. So far, the Shanghai Expeditionary Force has achieved all its objectives. I am thrilled by this.” In reality, this was mere propaganda. The IJA 9th Division actually had to overpower a series of Chinese pillboxes outside the city. Once they entered through the medieval walls, they faced the task of eliminating pockets of resistance one by one. According to Japanese sources, over 1,000 Chinese soldiers were killed during these clearing operations. The Japanese found a wealth of spoils in Suzhou. Among the booty were 100 artillery pieces and other military equipment. Historically known as one of China's wealthiest cities, Suzhou still contained an abundance of loot even after months of conflict. Many Japanese soldiers had their pockets filled with cigarettes after raiding a tobacco factory, while others transported barrels filled with coins after robbing a bank. Meanwhile the government had officially moved from Nanjing to Chongqing. Chongqing was an unusual choice for the new capital as it was historically something of a backwater, not very cosmopolitan such as the great coastal cities in the east. However it was distant enough to be out of reach from the Japanese land forces, but not so distant that it would make governing China impossible. Not all the governmental agencies moved to Chongqing at once. The foreign ministry first moved to Wuhan, as did most of the foreign diplomats. Yet out of some several hundred foreign nationals, 30 American and 19 British did stay behind in Nanjing. Tang Shengzhi met with the remaining foreign community and began promising them guarantees of their lives and property would be protected to the fullest. In turn the foreign community were thinking up ways to help defend the city's civilian population. They formed a special demilitarized district, akin to the one in Shanghai. They named it the Jacquinot Safety Zone after its founder, French Jesuit Robert Jacquinot de Besange. An international committee for establishing a neutral zone for noncombatants in Nanjing was formed on November 19th and famously John Rabe chaired it. The committee knew their neutral zone depended solely upon Japan respecting it, thus Rabe was an ideal pick for chairman. Meanwhile Chiang Kai-Shek was determined to stay for as long as possible in Nanjing, and remain in the public view to maintain morale. Song Meiling also went around touring the capital by automobile to raise public spirit. Preparations for battle were being dished out in haste. Du Yuming, the commander of Nanjing's armored regiment was called up to the headquarters of He Yingqin, then chief of staff. There Du was briefed on Chiang Kai-Shek's war plans and how his tiny armored force would fit in. He Yingqin said “It has been decided that Tang Shengzhi is to defend Nanjing. Chairman Chiang wants the German vehicles to stay in Nanjing and fight.” This was referring to their Leichter Panzerspahwagen or “sd KFZ 221” armored cars. These were recent purchases from Germany. Du questioned using them however “The German vehicles are the best armor we have at the moment, but they have no cannon, only machine guns, so their firepower is limited. We just have 15 of them. And they are not suited for the terrain around Nanjing, with all its rivers and lakes.” Du instead argued for using the British-made Vickers Carden Lloyd tanks. Of these China had recently purchased the amphibious variants. Du said “Those tanks both have machine guns and cannon, and they can float. They are much more useful for the Nanjing area.” He further suggested the tanks might even make it to the other side of the Yangtze once all hope was out. To this He replied “No, don't even think about crossing the Yangtze. The chairman wants the tank crews to fight to the death.” As far as war strategy was concerned, China had actually developed one against Japan decades prior. Ever since the nasty conflicts between the two nations had broken out back during the Great War days, China sought an answer to Japan's aggression. One man rose to the occasion, a young officer named Jiang Baili. In 1922 Jiang wrote “The only way to prevail over the enemy, will be to do the opposite of what he does in every respect. It will be to his advantage to seek a quick resolution; we should aim for protracted warfare. He will try to focus on a decisive blow at the front line; we should move to the second line of defense and rob him of the opportunity to concentrate his forces in one place.” Soon Jiang became the forefather in China for theories involving protracted war. One could also call it a war of attrition, and it was the type of war suited to China. In the words of Jiang “We should thank our ancestors. China is blessed with two major advantages, a vast land area and a huge population. Abstaining from fighting will be enough. And if we do fight, we should drag it out. We should force the front to move west, and turn our weakness into strength, while allowing the enemy to overstretch himself”. China's geography significantly influenced Jiang's military strategy. In his works titled Organization of Mechanized Forces, Jiang wrote “The flat North Chinese plain offers ideal conditions for a large mechanized army. In contrast, the agricultural regions further south, characterized by their mix of rice paddies and waterways, are far less suitable.” Faced with a technologically superior enemy, China had no option but to draw the opponent away from the north, where their armored units would dominate the battlefield, to the Yangtze River area, where their mobility would be severely restricted. Jiang served as the director of the prestigious military academy at Baoding, near Beijing, where he could instill his philosophies in the minds of upcoming leaders of the Chinese armed forces, including Tang Shengzhi. Tang was able to put Jiang's theories into practice. In the autumn of 1935, he played a crucial role in planning and executing the decade's largest military maneuver. Conducted south of the Yangtze, between Nanjing and Shanghai, this drill involved over 20,000 troops, allowing for a realistic simulation of battle conditions. Its primary objective was to test the strategy of "luring the enemy in deep." Upon concluding the maneuver, Tang described the location as exceptionally well chosen, a tank commander's nightmare. The area consisted of steep hills alongside rivers, with very few robust roads and virtually no bridges capable of supporting tanks. Countless small paddy fields were divided by dikes that rarely exceeded a few feet in width, perfectly suited for swift infantry movements but utterly inadequate for tracked vehicles. It appeared to be a graveyard for any mechanized army. As the war broke out with Japan, Jiang's ideas initially seemed validated. Chiang Kai-shek deliberately refrained from deploying his best troops to the northern Beijing area. Instead, he chose to instigate a significant battle in and around Shanghai, where the terrain presented the exact disadvantages for Japanese armor that Jiang had anticipated. Although the Japanese gradually introduced tactical innovations that allowed them to navigate the partly submerged paddy fields north and west of Shanghai, their tanks often found themselves forced along elevated roads, making them vulnerable targets for hidden Chinese infantry. For several weeks during September and October, the Shanghai area indeed resembled a quagmire, seemingly poised to ensnare the Japanese forces until they were utterly depleted. However, the successful Japanese landings in early November, first in Hangzhou Bay and then on the south bank of the Yangtze, dramatically changed things. The stalemate was broken, allowing the Japanese Army to advance despite the persistent challenges posed by the local geography. What would happen next would determine whether Jiang's theories from a decade earlier could work or if Japan's tanks would ultimately triumph even in the river terrain south of the Yangtze.  The Japanese field commanders' decision to shift their focus from defeating Chinese forces near Shanghai to pursuing them all the way to Nanjing, sent ripples throughout the ranks. Every unit had to reconsider their plans, but none felt the impact more acutely than the 6th Division. As one of the first contingents of the 10th Army to come ashore in Hangzhou Bay in early November, its soldiers had advanced with remarkable ease, cutting through the defenses like a knife through butter. Now, with orders to drive west towards Nanjing, they were required to make a huge U-turn and head south. Geography hurt them greatly, specifically the presence of Lake Tai. The original Shanghai Expeditionary Force, bolstered by the 16th Division and other newly arrived units, was set to advance north of the lake, while the 10th Army was tasked with operations to the south of it. This situation implied that the 6th Division had to hurry to catch up with the rest of the 10th Army.   Upon turning south, they reached Jiashan on November 21, only to face a brutal outbreak of cholera among their ranks, which delayed their advance by three days. Meanwhile the other elements of the 10th Army, including the Kunisaki Detachment and the 18th and 114th Divisions advanced  rapidly, entering Huzhou on November 23. To speed up their advance they had commandeered every vessel they could grab and tossed men in piece meal across the southern bank of Lake Tai to its western shore.  However the 10th army was unaware that they would soon face a brutal fight. As the Chinese government evacuated Nanjing, fresh troops from Sichuan province in southwest China were being unloaded at the city's docks and marched toward imminent danger. Starting to disembark on November 20, these soldiers formed the Chinese 23rd Group Army. They presented an exotic sight, sporting broad straw hats typical of southern China, often adorned with yellow and green camouflage patterns. While some appeared freshly uniformed, many were ill-prepared for the colder central Chinese winter, dressed in thin cotton better suited for subtropical climates. A number looked as ragged as the most destitute coolie. Nearly all wore straw shoes that required repairs every evening after a long day of marching. Their equipment was rudimentary and often quite primitive. The most common weapon among the newly arrived soldiers was a locally produced rifle from Sichuan, yet many had no firearms at all, carrying only “stout sticks and packs” into battle. Each division had a maximum of a dozen light machine guns, and radio communication was available only at the brigade level and above. The absence of any artillery or heavy equipment was quite alarming. It was as if they expected to be facing a warlord army of the 1920s. They were organized into five divisions and two brigades, supplied by Liu Xiang, a notable southern warlord. Remarkably, Liu Xiang had been one of Chiang Kai-shek's worst enemies less than a year prior. Now, Liu's troops fought alongside Chiang's against Japan, yet their loyalties remained fiercely provincial, listening to Liu Xiang rather than Chiang Kai-shek. China's warlord era never really ended. Chiang Kai-Shek was actually doing two things at once, meeting the enemy but also getting warlord troops away from their provincial powerbase. This in turn would reduce the influence of regional warlords. Now the Chinese recognized the had to stop the Japanese from reaching Wuhu, a Yangtze port city due south of Nanjing, basically the last escape route from the capital. If it was captured, those in Nanjing would be effectively stuck. General Gu Zhutong, who personally witnessed the chaotic evacuation of Suzhou, had already dispatched two divisions from Guangxi province to block the Japanese advance. However, they were quickly routed. Liu Xiang's troops were then sent to fill the gap on the battlefield. By the last week of November, the Japanese 10th Army and the newly arrived Sichuan divisions, were converging on the same area southwest of Lake Tai. Marching as quickly as possible, they were fated to clash in one of the bloodiest battles of the entire Nanjing campaign. As the Sichuanese troops reached the battlefield at the end of November, they  quickly realized just how ill-equipped they were to confront the modern Japanese Army. The Sichuan divisions hurried towards Lake Tai, primarily marching after sunset to avoid harassment from Japanese aircraft. A significant challenge for the soldiers was the condition of the roads, which were paved with gravel that wore down their straw shoes. Despite their best efforts to repair their footwear late at night, many soldiers found themselves entering battle barefoot. Along their route, they encountered numerous Chinese soldiers retreating. One particular column caught their attention; these troops were better uniformed and equipped, appearing as though they had not seen battle at all. They looked rested and well-nourished, as if they had just emerged from their barracks. This prompted unspoken doubts among the Sichuanese soldiers. Upon arriving in Guangde, the 145th Division quickly began fortifying its positions, particularly around a strategic airfield near the city and dispatched units towards the town of Sian. On November 25, skirmishes erupted throughout the day, and on the following day, the Chinese soldiers began facing the full force of the advancing enemy. Japanese planes bombed the Chinese positions near Sian, followed by rapid tank assaults from the 18th Japanese Division. Unaccustomed to combat against armored vehicles, they quickly routed. The Japanese forces rolled over the shattered Chinese defenses and advanced to capture Sian with minimal resistance. To make matters worse, amidst this critical moment when the Sichuan troops were engaged in their first battle against a foreign enemy, Liu Xiang, fell seriously ill. In his place, Chiang Kai-shek assigned one of his most trusted commanders, Chen Cheng. The Sichuanese soldiers were not happy with the new alien commander. Meanwhile, the Nine Power Treaty Conference in Brussels held its final session. The delegates concluded three weeks of fruitless discussions with a declaration that immediately struck observers as lacking any real substance. The decree stated “Force by itself can provide no just and lasting solution for disputes between nations,”. This was met with approval from all participants except Italy, one of Japan's few allies in Europe. They strongly urged that hostilities be suspended and that peaceful processes be pursued, but offered zero consequences for either belligerent should they choose not to comply. As they say today in politics, a nothing burger. China found itself resorting to shaming the international community into action, with barely any success.  In Berlin, the evening following the conference's conclusion, diplomats gathered as the Japanese embassy hosted a dinner to mark the first anniversary of the Anti-Comintern Pact. Among the guests, though he probably really did not want to be there, was Adolf Hitler. The Japanese Communications Minister, Nagai Ryutaro, speaking via radio stated “The Sino-Japanese conflict is a holy struggle for us. The objective is to hold the Nanjing government accountable for its anti-Japanese stance, to liberate the Chinese people from the red menace, and to secure peace in the Far East.” By hosting such an event, Germany was basically signalling that she would abandon her old Chinese ally to forge a stronger partnership with Japan. This was driving the world into two camps that would emerge as the Axis and Allies. My favorite boardgame by the way, I make a lot of goofy videos on my youtube channel about it.  Back at the front, a city sat midway along the Yangtze River between Shanghai and Nanjing, Jiangyin. By Chinese standards, Jiangyin was not a large city; its population numbered just 50,000, most of whom had already fled by the end of November. The city's military significance had considerably diminished after a naval battle in late September resulted in the sinking of half the Chinese fleet, forcing the remainder to retreat upriver. Nevertheless, the Chinese still maintained control on land. This became a pressing concern for the Japanese after the fall of Suzhou and Changshu led to the collapse of the Wufu defensive line. Consequently, the next line of defense was the Xicheng line, of which Jiangyin formed the northern end. The city stood directly in the path of the 13th Japanese Division, positioned at the far right of the front line. Jiangyin featured 33 partially fortified hills, and like many other cities in the region, its primary defense was a robust 10-mile wall constructed of brick and stone. Standing 30 feet high, the wall was reinforced on the inside by an earthen embankment measuring up to 25 feet in diameter. Defending Jiangyin alone was the 112th Division, comprising approximately 5,000 soldiers. Only in November did it receive reinforcements from the 103rd Division, which had previously participated in the brutal fighting in Shanghai and withdrew westward after the Japanese victory there. Like the 112th, the 103rd also consisted of around 5,000 soldiers from former warlord armies, though they hailed from the hot and humid southwest of China rather than the cold and arid northeast. Both divisions faced an adversary with far superior equipment and training. Just hours after Japanese observation balloons appeared on the horizon, their artillery opened fire. The initial shells fell at approximately 30 second intervals, but the pace quickly accelerated. Most of the shells landed near the river, obliterating the buildings in that area. The explosions tore up telephone wires, severing communication between the scattered Chinese units. As the first shells began to fall over Jiangyin, Tang Shengzhi gathered with Chinese and foreign journalists in Nanjing, openly acknowledging the monumental challenge ahead but resolutely vowing to defend Nanjing to the bitter end. “Even though it is lagging behind in material terms, China has the will to fight. Since the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, we have suffered defeats in various theaters, but we will continue to fight until we achieve final victory.” Tang then promised that Nanjing would be fought to the last man. As early as November 14, the central government had ordered the evacuation of women and children from Nanjing, calling for all means of transportation available to be dedicated to this purpose. However, this directive proved to be an empty proclamation. Almost all resources were directed toward relocating government officials westward. Moving office furniture and filing cabinets took precedence over evacuating people. The government commandeered 600 trucks and 220 boats and ships to aid in this effort, but once those means of transportation were exhausted, little remained for the common people. In the final days of November, Nanjing's mayor, Ma Chaojun, attempted to rectify this dire situation. He sent a cable to the Ministry of Communications requesting that the ships used to relocate government agencies be returned to Nanjing as soon as possible to assist with the evacuation. For most vessels, there wasn't enough time to make the journey back. The people of Nanjing were left to fend for themselves. Meanwhile the battles south and west of the Lake Tai continued to rage in late November. While the 18th Japanese Division advanced toward Guangde, aiming eventually for Wuhu and the Yangtze River, the 114th Japanese Division received different orders. It turned right along the western bank of Lake Tai, clearly intending to push onward to Nanjing. Awaiting them was the 144th Chinese Division, consisting primarily of Sichuanese soldiers. They dug in across the one viable road running west of the lake, with a large body of water on one side and rugged terrain on the other. This terrain forced the Japanese to attack over a narrow front, constraining the advantage they held due to their technological superiority. The Chinese were able to concentrate their limited artillery, primarily mountain guns that could be disassembled and transported by mules or even men, on the advancing Japanese attackers, and utilized it effectively. They allowed the Japanese to shell their positions without immediate retaliation, waiting until the infantry was within 1,000 yards before ordering their mountain guns to open fire. The result was devastating; the Japanese column became disorganized, and their advance stalled. However, just as the Chinese artillery appeared on the verge of achieving a significant victory, the decision was made to withdraw. The officers responsible for the mountain guns argued that the Japanese would soon overrun their positions, and it was preferable to take preemptive measures to prevent their valuable equipment from falling into enemy hands. The commanders of the 144th Division reluctantly concurred. The Chinese did their best to maintain the facade that their artillery remained in position, but the Japanese quickly noticed the weakened defense and attacked with renewed fervor. Despite this setback, Chinese soldiers found their morale boosted as their division commander, Guo Junqi, led from the front, issuing orders from a stretcher after sustaining a leg injury. However, deprived of their artillery, the Chinese faced increasingly dire odds, and they were pushed back along the entire front. As the Chinese front neared collapse, the officers of the 144th Division faced yet another challenge: Japanese infantry approached across Lake Tai in boats commandeered in previous days. With no artillery to defend themselves, the Chinese could only direct small arms fire at the vessels, allowing the Japanese to make an almost unimpeded landing. This was the final straw. Under pressure from two sides, the 144th Division had no choice but to abandon its position, retreating westward toward the main Chinese force around Guangde. Jiangyin endured two days of continuous shelling before the Japanese infantry attack commenced, but the city was fortified to withstand such a bombardment of this magnitude and duration. The 33 hills in and around the city had long served as scenic viewpoints and natural strongholds. The tallest hill, known as Mount Ding, rose 900 feet above the area, providing a commanding view and boasted over 100 artillery pieces. By late November, when the Japanese Army reached the area, most civilians had fled, but their homes remained, and the Chinese defenders effectively utilized them, converting them into concealed strongholds. The attack by the Japanese 13th Division on November 29 was led by the 26th Brigade on its right flank and the 103rd Brigade on its left. The advance proved challenging, constantly disrupted by Chinese ambushes. As a row of Japanese soldiers cautiously crossed an empty field, gunshots would erupt, striking down one of their ranks while the others scrambled for cover, desperately trying to identify the source of the fire. The Chinese launched frequent counterattacks, and on several occasions, individual Japanese units found themselves cut off from the main body and had to be rescued. Despite some setbacks, the 13th Division made satisfactory progress, bolstered by both land and ship-based artillery, and soon nearly encircled Jiangyin, leaving only a narrow corridor to the west of the city. However, the Chinese artillery was well-prepared, effectively targeting Japanese vessels on the Yangtze River. This led to an artillery duel that lasted three hours, resulting in several hits on Japanese ships; however, the Chinese batteries also suffered considerable damage. In the sector of the 103rd Chinese Division, the defenders had taken time to construct deep antitank ditches, hindering the advance of Japanese armored units. During the night of November 29-30, the Chinese organized suicide missions behind enemy lines to level the playing field. Armed only with a belt, a combat knife, a rifle, and explosives, the soldiers infiltrated Japanese positions, targeting armored vehicles. They quietly climbed onto the tanks, dropping hand grenades into turrets or detonating explosives strapped to their bodies. Though reducing Japanese armored superiority granted the Chinese some time, the attackers' momentum simply could not be stopped. On November 30, the Japanese launched a relentless assault on Mount Ding, the dominant hill in the Jiangyin area. Supported by aircraft, artillery, and naval bombardments, Japanese infantry engaged the entrenched Chinese company at the summit. After a fierce and bloody battle, the Japanese succeeded in capturing the position. The Chinese company commander, Xia Min'an, withdrew with his troops toward Jiangyin to report the loss to the regimental command post. When the deputy commander of the 103rd Division, Dai Zhiqi, heard the news, he was furious and wanted to execute Xia on the spot. However, Xia's regimental commander intervened, saving him from a firing squad. Instead, he insisted that Xia redeem himself by recapturing the hill from the Japanese. Xia was put in command of a company that had previously been held in reserve. What followed was a fierce battle lasting over four hours. Eventually, the Japanese were forced to relinquish the hill, but the victory came at a steep price, with numerous casualties on both sides, including the death of Xia Min'an. The last days of November also witnessed chaotic fighting around Guangde, where the unfamiliar terrain added to the confusion for both sides. For the Chinese, this chaos was exacerbated by their upper command issuing contradictory orders, instructing troops to advance and retreat simultaneously. Pan Wenhua, the Sichuanese commander of the 23rd Army, prepared a pincer maneuver, directing the 13th Independent Brigade to launch a counterattack against the town of Sian, which was held by the Japanese, while the 146th Division would attack from the south. Both units set out immediately. However, due to a lack of radio equipment, a common issue among the Sichuanese forces, they did not receive the new orders to withdraw, which originated not from Pan Wenhua but from Chen Cheng, the Chiang Kai-shek loyalist who had taken command after Liu Xiang fell ill and was eager to assert his authority. Fortunately, the officers of the 13th Independent Brigade were alerted to the general order for withdrawal by neighboring units and managed to halt their advance on Sian in time. The 146th Division, however, had no such luck and continued its march toward the Japanese-occupied city. It was joined by the 14th Independent Brigade, which had just arrived from Wuhu and was also unaware of the general retreat order. Upon reaching Sian, these Chinese troops engaged in intense close combat with the Japanese. It was a familiar scenario of Japanese technological superiority pitted against Chinese determination. The Japanese brought armor up from the rear, while the Chinese lay in ambush, tossing hand grenades into tank turrets before jumping onto the burning vehicles to kill any surviving crew members. As the fighting around the flanks slowed, the area in front of Guangde became the focal point of the battle. Japanese soldiers advanced toward the city during the day, passing piles of dead Chinese and numerous houses set ablaze by retreating defenders. At night, the situation became perilous for the Japanese, as Chinese forces infiltrated their positions under the cover of darkness. In the confusion, small units from both sides often got lost and were just as likely to encounter hostile forces as friendly ones. Despite the chaos along the front lines, it was evident that the Japanese were gaining the upper hand primarily due to their material superiority. Japanese artillery bombarded Guangde, igniting many structures, while infantry approached the city from multiple directions. The Chinese 145th Division, led by Rao Guohua, was nearing its breaking point. In a desperate gamble, on November 30, Rao ordered one of his regiments to counterattack, but the regimental commander, sensing the futility of the move, simply refused. This refusal was a personal failure for Rao, one he could not accept. Deeply ashamed, Rao Guohua withdrew from Guangde. As darkness enveloped the battlefield, he and a small group of staff officers found a place to rest for the night in a house near a bamboo grove. Overwhelmed with anguish, he penned a letter to Liu Xiang, apparently unaware that Liu had been evacuated to the rear due to stomach issues. In the letter, he apologized for his inability to hold Guangde. Telling his bodyguard to get some rest, he stepped outside, disappearing into the bamboo grove. Shortly thereafter, his staff heard a single gunshot. When they rushed out and searched the dense bamboo, they found Rao sitting against a tree, his service weapon beside him. Blood streamed thickly from a wound to his temple. He was already dead. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. As the Japanese forces advanced on Nanjing, tensions escalated within the Chinese leadership. While Commander Tang Shengzhi fortified the city, some sought retreat. Japanese Commander Yanagawa, confident of victory, pushed his troops westward, disregarding high command's hesitations. Meanwhile, ill-equipped Sichuanese reinforcements hurried to defend Nanjing, braving cholera and disorganization. Intense battles unfolded around Lake Tai, marked by fierce ambushes and casualties.