Podcasts about Sichuan

Free trains and dedicated buses are helping a large number of migrant workers return to jobs after the Spring Festival holiday, especially those traveling from China's central and western regions to the eastern seaboard.春节假期过后，大批外出务工者踏上返岗之路。免费专列、包车等暖心服务正助力他们便捷返岗，尤其是那些从中国中西部地区前往东部沿海地区的务工人员。On Tuesday, a traveler surnamed Yang boarded a special train free of charge at Qiandongnan Miao and Dong autonomous prefecture in Guizhou province and arrived in Foshan, Guangdong province, in South China.2月24日（正月初八），春节假期后返岗首日，来自贵州省黔东南苗族侗族自治州的杨女士免费搭乘专列抵达广东省佛山市。The prefecture's human resources department provided about 500 seats for migrant workers such as her.黔东南州人力资源和社会保障局为务工者提供了约500个座位。More free trains will depart from the prefecture through Feb 28 to destinations including cities such as Hangzhou in Zhejiang province and Guangzhou in Guangdong province. Roughly 500 free seats per service are reserved exclusively for locals who work outside their hometown.到2月28日，该州还将开设更多免费专列，开往浙江杭州、广东广州等城市，每趟专列将为外出务工人员预留约500个免费座位。Each year after the Chinese New Year holiday, firms resume operations and many workers who spent the break at home must return to their posts. That produces a short surge in travel and makes securing tickets the top priority for many.每年春节假期过后，企业复工复产，回乡探亲的务工人员都得返回工作岗位，从而形成节后出行高峰，买到车票成了许多人的头等大事。Yang told China Daily that she scanned a QR code to register after her village issued the notice, and she received a confirmation message the next day. She posted about securing the free ride online and replied to fellow villagers' queries about how to apply.杨女士向《中国日报》表示，在村里下发通知后，她扫码登记，第二天就收到了确认信息。她在网上分享了乘坐免费专列的消息，并回复了同村人关于如何申请的问题。Another beneficiary, Yang Ying from Huangping county in Qiandongnan, said past returns required multiple transfers and a day or more of exhausting travel while carrying heavy luggage.另一位受益者、来自贵州省黄平县的杨英表示，过去返岗需要在多个换乘点之间奔波，耗费一天多的时间，还得拖着沉重的行李。"I have worked in Hangzhou for more than three years. Every year, the hardest task after the holiday is getting tickets. When I saw the free train notice, I scanned, applied and received confirmation within a few days. I felt relieved," she said.她说："我在杭州务工三年多了，每年春节返岗最发愁的就是抢票，看到免费专列报名公告，我第一时间就扫码报名了，没几天就收到确认短信，心里一下子就踏实了。"Wang Wanmin, director of the prefecture's human resources and social security bureau, said they will continue to operate special trains and buses to transport 20,000 fellow townspeople to jobs, further stabilizing employment and boosting incomes.黔东南州人力资源和社会保障局局长王万敏表示，当地将继续开设专列、包车，护送2万余名外出务工人员返岗，进一步稳定就业，促进增收。Railway authorities said the China Railway Chengdu Group plans to run 32 post-festival special trains for workers, which are expected to carry about 18,000 passengers through March 6.铁路部门称，中国铁路成都局集团有限公司计划在节后开行32趟务工人员专列，预计在3月6日前运送约1.8万名旅客。The group manages lines serving provinces such as Sichuan and Guizhou, regions that are major sources of migrant labor.该公司管理四川、贵州等务工人员输出大省的铁路线路。Similar targeted services operate nationwide. Also on Tuesday, a special train for workers from Xi'an in Shaanxi province departed for Suzhou, Jiangsu province, delivering employees directly to contracted employers in Suzhou and nearby Taicang city.全国其他地方也有类似的精准服务。同样在2月24日，一列满载务工人员的专列从陕西省西安市驶往江苏省苏州市，直接将员工送至苏州及太仓市的签约企业。Officials said the transported workers had been prematched with positions in high-end intelligent manufacturing, electronic information, auto parts and precision machinery industries. Roles include technical operators, quality control staff, warehousing personnel and support service staff.据官方介绍，此次输送的务工人员已提前与高端智能制造、电子信息、汽车零部件和精密机械等行业的岗位匹配，涵盖技术操作工、品质管控、仓储物流及配套服务等。After the workers arrived at Suzhou North Railway Station, local human resources departments provided dedicated shuttle vehicles to take them directly to factory dormitories.务工人员抵达苏州北站后，当地人社部门安排专用接驳车，闭环运送务工人员直达厂区宿舍。More flexible, targeted transport has also been added. Guangdong province has introduced bus routes from labor-exporting areas to provide point-to-point service.更灵活、精准的返岗运输服务也在加码。广东省已开通从劳务输出大县到务工集中地的返岗直通车。Between Feb 19 and Feb 25, passengers could scan a code to find buses from provinces including Hunan, Jiangxi and Hubei bound for Guangzhou city, and register their return-to-work transport needs online, local media reported.据当地媒体报道，2月19日至25日，旅客可扫码查询从湖南、江西、湖北等省份发往广州的专车，并在线登记返岗出行需求。Huizhou city in Guangdong province will also set up return-to-work shuttle services at major transport hubs to provide last-mile connections for arriving migrant workers. The program is expected to serve more than 3,000 returning workers.广东省惠州市也将在主要交通枢纽设置返岗接驳专线，为返岗务工人员提供"最后一公里"的便利。该项目预计将为3000多名返岗务工人员提供服务。ree of charge /friː əv tʃɑːrdʒ/免费top priority /tɒp praɪˈɒrəti/重中之重；最优先事项shuttle services /ˈʃʌtəl ˈsɜːrvɪsɪz/接驳服务；班车服务

This week on Sinica, I speak with Yi-Ling Liu, journalist, former China editor at Rest of World, and author of the new book The Wall Dancers: Searching for Freedom and Connection on the Chinese Internet. Yi-Ling's book traces the arc of Chinese online life through five protagonists — a rapper, a gay rights entrepreneur, a feminist activist, a science fiction writer, and an internet censor — each navigating the creative and constrictive forces of the Chinese internet in their own way. The result is a deeply reported, novelistic account of what it felt like to live, create, and push back in one of the most surveilled and dynamic digital environments on earth. We discuss the book's central metaphor of "dancing in shackles," the early utopian glow of Chinese netizen culture, the parallel fates of hip hop and science fiction under the state's alternating embrace and constraint, and the eerie convergence between the Chinese internet and our own.0:06 — "Wall dancers" as a metaphor: what it captures that "dissident" or "netizen" doesn't0:09 — Why 网民 (wǎngmín) took root in China as a concept of digital citizenship0:13 — The early Chinese internet: more open than we remember, but not as free as the myth suggests0:15 — Ma Baoli: closeted cop to CEO of China's largest gay dating app, and the Gay Talese reporting strategy0:20 — Lan Yu, Beijing Story, and the film that became a coming-out moment for a generation of queer men0:22 — Pragmatism at the heart of the dance: how individuals and the state negotiated the internet together0:28 — Lu Pin and Feminist Voices: from "playing boundary ball" to sudden exile0:35 — Stanley Chen Qiufan and the state's attempt to co-opt science fiction for nationalist ends0:43 — The generational split in Chinese sci-fi: Liu Cixin's cosmic scale vs. the near-future unease of Chen Qiufan and Hao Jingfang0:46 — Hip hop's arc: from underground scenes in Chengdu and Beijing to The Rap of China and sudden constraint0:51 — Eric Liu, the Weibo censor: humanizing the firewall from the inside0:55 — Common prosperity, Wang Huning, and the moral panic behind the crackdown on "effeminate" culture0:59 — Techno-utopianism in retrospect: was the emancipatory internet always a fantasy?1:03 — The convergence of the Chinese and American internets: Weibo and Twitter, TikTok and Oracle1:07 — What it means to be free: how the book expanded Yi-Ling's sense of what freedoms people actually wantPaying it forward: Zeyi Yang, technology reporter at WIRED, and co-author (with Louise Matsakis) of the excellent tech x China newsletter Made in ChinaRecommendations:Yi-Ling: The Loneliness of Sonia and Sunny by Kiran Desai; Machine Decision is Not Final, an anthology of essays on Chinese AI compiled by scholars affiliated with NYU Shanghai.Kaiser: The Coming Storm: Power, Conflict and Warnings from History by Odd Arne Westad (forthcoming); Essays from Pallavi Aiyar's Substack The Global Jigsaw, particularly "How Has China Succeeded in Making People Mind their Manners" and "Why I Would Rather Be Born Chinese than Indian Today."See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, I speak with Kyle Chan, a fellow at the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings, previously a postdoc at Princeton, and author of the outstanding High-Capacity Newsletter on Substack. Kyle has emerged as one of the sharpest and most empirically grounded voices on U.S.-China technology relations, and he holds the all-time record for the most namechecks on Sinica's “Paying it forward” segment. We use his recent Financial Times op-ed on “The Great Reversal” in global technology flows and his longer High-Capacity essay on re-coupling as jumping-off points for a wide-ranging conversation about where China now sits at the global technological frontier, why the dominant decoupling narrative misses powerful structural forces pulling the two economies back together, and what all of this means for innovation, choke points, and the global tech ecosystem.4:35 – How Kyle became Kyle Chan: from Chicago School economics to development, railways, and systems thinking 12:50 – The Great Reversal: China at the technological frontier, from megawatt EV charging to LFP batteries 17:59 – The electro-industrial tech stack and China's overlapping, mutually reinforcing tech ecosystems 22:40 – Industrial strategy and time horizons: patience, persistence, and the long arc of China's auto industry 33:45 – Re-coupling under pressure: Waymo and Zeekr, Unitree robots, and the structural forces binding the two economies 40:22 – The gravity model: can political distance overwhelm technological mass? 47:01 – What China still wants from the U.S.: Cursor, GitHub, talent, and the AI brain drain 51:52 – Weaponized interdependence and the danger of securitizing everything 57:30 – Firm-level adaptation: HeyGen, Manus, and the playbook for de-sinification 1:02:58 – The view from the middle: Gulf states, Southeast Asia, and India as geopolitical arbitrageurs 1:10:18 – Engineering resilience: what policymakers are getting wrong about the systems they're buildingPaying it forward: Katrina Northrop; Grace Shao and her AI Proem newsletterRecommendations:Kyle: Wired Magazine's Made in China newsletter (by Zeyi Yang and Louise Matsakis); The Wire China Kaiser: The Wall Dancers: Searching for Freedom and Connection on the Chinese Internet by Yi-Ling LiuSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, I speak with Patricia Kim, a Fellow at the Brookings Institution's John L. Thornton China Center, where she focuses on U.S. policy toward China and the broader Asia Pacific. One year into Donald Trump's second term, Pattie and her colleague Joyce Yang have published a comprehensive Brookings assessment titled "Making America Great Again? Evaluating Trump's China strategy at the one-year mark," which examines whether the administration's stated objectives on reindustrialization, AI leadership, strategic dependence, and global standing are actually being met. We discuss the paradox of Trump's China policy (which is surprising consistency in goals despite the absence of a formal strategy document), with its mixed results on economic rebalancing and supply chain security, the troubling deterioration in U.S.-China diplomatic and military channels, and why the administration's approach to allies and partners may be undermining its own objectives. Pattie brings analytical discipline and empirical rigor to debates that are often long on rhetoric and short on evidence, cutting through a lot of noise to assess what's actually working, what isn't, and where the strategy is running up against reality.4:45 – Does Trump have a China strategy? Consistency without a formal framework8:15 – Assessing the economic rebalancing goals: reindustrialization and tariffs15:30 – Technology competition: export controls and AI leadership23:45 – Supply chain security and strategic dependence challenges31:20 – The deterioration of diplomatic and military-to-military channels39:50 – The ally and partner problem: how Trump's approach undermines his own goals47:15 – Global standing and American credibility in the Trump era52:30 – Paying it forward: The Lost in Translation series at BrookingsPaying it forward:Lost in Translation Series (Brookings Global China Project)Recommendations:Pattie: To Dare Mighty Things by Michael O'HanlonKaiser: Stalingrad by Vasily GrossmanSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Links:Watch the video version of this episode on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XtJxxePRMtUDownload the free Fluency Cheat Sheet here: https://imlearningmandarin.com/Check out flashcard website Hack Chinese here: https://www.hackchinese.com/--One year ago, Chris reached out with an ambitious goal: deliver his wedding speech entirely in Mandarin Chinese. His Chinese wife's family would be gathering in Sichuan, and he wanted to connect with them authentically - not just survive the conversation, but thrive in it.The Challenge:Working full-time in the UK with limited study hoursInconsistent tones and pronunciationOnly 12 months until the weddingThe Method:Chris joined the ILM Gym's 12-month coaching program, focusing on:- Months 1-6: Controlled Output Training to polish tones and pronunciation- Months 7-12: Wedding speech preparation and natural conversation flow- Daily practice using the four-step personalized immersion methodThe Result:Chris absolutely nailed it. His wife's family was in stitches at his jokes, he communicated effortlessly with his in-laws, and he delivered his speech with confidence and clarity—complete with some Sichuan dialect thrown in for good measure.As Chris said: "I forgot I was speaking Chinese a lot of the time; it just felt really natural."Want Similar Results?If you're impressed with Chris's transformation, you can download the free fluency cheat sheet containing details of the exact method he used at imlearningmandarin.com

Anna and Gao Yue are excited about potato chips with Chinese cuisine flavors. They spot one flavored like Lao Gan Ma and another with Sichuan flavor. They decide to buy and try all！—————————————————————————————————安娜：哈哈，你看这个！太有意思啦。高月：啊，老干妈口味的薯片。哈哈。你也知道老干妈吗？安娜：我非常喜欢！我们要不要尝尝这个口味的薯片？高月：好啊。你喜欢我们就买。这还有四川口味的薯片呢，你看。安娜：真的耶。都是中国菜口味的薯片。我们都买来试试吧。—————————————————————————————————If you're enjoying this story, there's so much more waiting for you inside maayot:✅ Daily bite-sized stories that suit your level✅ native audio✅ Interactions with native for practice your speaking✅ One tap Pinyin, explain in context for words and sentences✅ Writing and speaking exercises with real person feedback✅ Track your learning streakNot using these features yet? Open our app or visit maayot.com and explore everything your Mandarin journey needs. Use promotion code “Podcast” , get a 50% off today !If this episode made you smile, laugh, or learn something new. Please Take just 30 seconds to leave us a rating and short review. It helps other Mandarin learners discover us !

Viajamos por el oeste de la Provincia de Sichuan durante 1 mes en busca de relacionarnos con la cultura tibetana auténtica.Itinerario del recorrido: Chengdú - Kangding - Tagong - Danba y Jiaju - Ganzi - Litang - Ya'an - Chengdú.Auspicia este episodio Creatrips, conocé sus propuestas en creatrips.com y en Instagram @creatrips.travel. La plataforma de reserva de alojamientos que recomendamos para China es Trip. Entrando desde este link y poniendo el código para nuevos usuarios 06W6LK, vas a recibir muy buenos descuentos.Música del episodio: Nomads from the High Himalayas - Raman Maharjan.Sigamos viajando juntos en Instagram @marcandoelpolo .

Gyatso, a local entrepreneur, felt immense pride when his village was named "Best Tourism Villages" by the United Nations World Tourism Organization in October. The dramatic boost to his homestay business as a result of the designation was an unexpected but welcome bonus.当家乡村庄在10月被联合国世界旅游组织评为“最佳旅游乡村”时，当地企业家嘉措感到无比自豪。这一殊荣为他的民宿生意带来了意想不到的巨大增长，堪称意外之喜。"Guest numbers surged so much that I had to hire several fellow villagers to help run the business,"Gyatso said.嘉措说道：“游客数量激增，我不得不雇佣几位村民帮忙经营生意。”Nestled on the southeastern edge of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau at an altitude of about 2,000 meters, Jikayi village in Danba county, Sichuan province, is a living museum of Gyalrong Tibetan culture. The Gyalrong Tibetans, an indigenous ethnic group who primarily live in western Sichuan, are known for their stone architecture and rich cultural heritage.位于青藏高原东南边缘海拔约2000米处的四川省甘孜藏族自治州丹巴县基卡依村，是格鲁藏族文化的活态博物馆。格鲁藏族作为主要聚居于四川西部的土著民族，以其独特的石构建筑和深厚的文化底蕴闻名于世。Covering 5.95 square kilometers, the village is home to 92 households and 408 residents. Despite its small size, it serves as a "cultural gene bank" for the Gyalrong Tibetans, preserving a wide range of intangible cultural heritage.基卡依村占地5.95平方公里，共有92户408名居民。虽面积不大，却是嘉绒藏族的“文化基因库”，保存着丰富的非物质文化遗产。These include national-level Tibetan watchtower construction techniques and western Sichuan Tibetan folk songs, as well as provincial-level traditions such as Tibetan liquor brewing, coming-of-age ceremonies and the Danba Guozhuang dance.这些非物质文化遗产包括国家级藏族瞭望塔建造技艺和西川藏族民歌，以及省级传承项目如藏族酿酒技艺、成人礼和丹巴郭庄舞。"Before tourism took off, life in our village was not affluent despite the fertile land," said Kelsang, the village's Communist Party of China secretary. "Household income mainly depended on women selling plums, Sichuan peppercorns and other farm products at markets, while most men worked away from home to support their families."村里的中国共产党支部书记凯桑说：“旅游业兴起之前，我们村的生活并不富裕，尽管土地肥沃；家庭收入主要依靠妇女在集市上卖李子、花椒等农产品，而大多数男人则在外打工养家。”The turning point came in 2007 when villagers began opening homestays. The trend accelerated after China proposed its rural vitalization strategy in 2017.转折点出现在2007年，当时村民开始经营民宿。2017年中国提出乡村振兴战略后，这一趋势加速发展。"Infrastructure improved significantly, attracting more tourists and encouraging villagers to run homestays and start livestreaming," Kelsang said, adding that many university graduates have also returned to start businesses.凯桑表示：“基础设施得到显著改善，吸引了更多游客，并鼓励村民经营民宿和开展直播业务。”并补充说许多大学毕业生也已返乡创业。Dekyi Tso, 30, is among these entrepreneurs. After graduating from a university in Chengdu about a decade ago, she returned to Jikayi and spent three years building a homestay that blends traditional Tibetan architecture with modern amenities.30岁的德吉措正是这些创业者中的一员。约十年前从成都某大学毕业后，她回到基卡依村，耗时三年打造了一处融合藏族传统建筑与现代设施的民宿。Since opening in March 2020, the 21-room homestay has recorded steady year-on-year growth in guest numbers. Last year, it hosted 15,000 tourists. "In the past, it was difficult to keep young people in the village. Now they can find jobs right at their doorstep," said Dekyi Tso, whose business has created employment for more than 20 local residents.自2020年3月开业以来，这家拥有21间客房的民宿接待量逐年稳步增长。去年接待游客达1.5万人次。德吉措说：“过去年轻人很难留在村里，现在他们在家门口就能找到工作。”她的民宿已为当地20多名居民创造了就业机会。She said rising incomes have been accompanied by growing confidence in ethnic culture, with more villagers voluntarily wearing traditional attire and performing ethnic songs, dances and handicrafts.她说，随着收入的增长，村民对民族文化的信心日益增强，越来越多村民自发穿着传统服饰，表演民族歌舞，制作民族手工艺品。"The UNWTO recognition is a huge encouragement for us," she said. "We believe more tourists and investment will come, making our village even better."她表示：“联合国世界旅游组织给予的认可对我们而言是巨大的鼓舞；我们相信将有更多游客和投资涌入，让我们的村庄变得更美好。”Kelsang said the key to Jikayi's tourism success lies in integrating traditional culture into development. "Houses and ancient watchtowers have retained their traditional appearance, while cultural practices such as coming-of-age ceremonies, Guozhuang dance and mountain songs have been well preserved," he said.克桑表示，基卡依村旅游业成功的关键在于将传统文化融入发展进程。他说道：“房屋和古瞭望塔保留了传统风貌，成年礼、郭庄舞、山歌等文化习俗也得到了良好传承。”More than 90 percent of households now participate in the tourism industry, with 74 families operating homestays. The village's per capita disposable income reached 41,000 yuan ($5,900) last year, up more than 20 percent year-on-year, Kelsang said. "Life is becoming more promising for everyone, and our hearts are filled with hope."目前全村90%以上的家庭参与旅游业经营，其中74户开展民宿接待。村委会主任凯桑介绍，去年全村人均可支配收入达到4.1万元（约合5900美元），同比增长20%以上。“大家的生活越来越有希望，我们心里都充满了期待”。Building on Jikayi's success, the county government has launched a comprehensive plan to develop a tourism zone centered on the village and extending to four neighboring villages. The plan includes a smart tourism platform with multilingual guides and online booking services, ecosystem diversity study programs, nighttime economy projects, and a Tibetan watchtower construction skills training center, local authorities said.在基卡依村取得成功的基础上，县政府启动了一项综合规划，旨在以该村为核心，辐射周边四个村庄，打造旅游区。据当地政府透露，该计划包含多语种导览与在线预订服务的智能旅游平台、生态系统多样性研究项目、夜间经济项目，以及一座藏式瞭望塔建造技艺培训中心。homestay/ˈhoʊm.steɪ/民宿

This week on Sinica, I speak with Ryan Hass, director of the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings and one of the most clear-eyed analysts of the U.S.-China relationship working today. Ryan was director for China at the NSC during the Obama Administration.As Donald Trump moves through his second year in office, the bilateral relationship has defied easy characterization. The once-dominant language of great power competition has receded, China hawks have been sidelined, and Trump's personalistic approach—marked by praise for Xi Jinping and a willingness to bracket ideological disputes—represents a sharp departure from recent Washington orthodoxy.Ryan has just published an essay laying out three plausible pathways for the relationship under Trump: a soft landing, a hard split, or what he considers most likely—a period of uneasy calm in which both sides seek stability not out of trust, but out of mutual constraint. We discuss Trump's apparent strategy, the vibe shift in American attitudes, Beijing's choice between managing Trump versus managing uncertainty, the critical importance of Xi's planned April visit, and whether we're headed toward genuine stabilization or just buying time before the next collision.5:24 – Trump's approach: respect for Xi, military deterrence, and the rare earths constraint8:03 – The vibe shift and Trump's “reptilian feel” for American exhaustion with confrontation10:52 – Three scenarios: soft landing, hard split, or uneasy calm through mutual constraint16:30 – Beijing's bet: managing Trump versus managing whoever comes next26:46 – Economic interdependence and why decoupling is like “separating egg whites from a scrambled egg”37:12 – The April visit as a critical test: pageantry, protests, and what both sides are watching for42:18 – Taiwan as the most dangerous variable and where theory meets practice46:58 – Lack of institutional guardrails and the risks of Trump's personalistic foreign policyPaying it forward:Audrye Wong (USC)Recommendations:Ryan: The Conscience of the Party: Hu Yaobang, China's Communist Reformer by Robert SuettingerKaiser: The Last Cavalier (Le Chevalier de Sainte-Hermine) by Alexandre Dumas; Asia Society conversation with Lizzi Lee, Bert Hoffmann, and Gerard DiPippo on rebalancing China's economy; Trivium China Podcast with Andrew Polk, Joe Peissel, Danny McMahon, and Cory Combs on capital expenditure headwindsSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Last time we spoke about the battle of Nanchang. After securing Hainan and targeting Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway corridors, Japan's 11th Army, backed by armor, air power, and riverine operations, sought a rapid, surgical seizure of Nanchang to sever eastern Chinese logistics and coerce Chongqing. China, reorganizing under Chiang Kai-shek, concentrated over 200,000 troops across 52 divisions in the Ninth and Third War Zones, with Xue Yue commanding the 9th War Zone in defense of Wuhan-Nanchang corridors. The fighting began with German-style, combined-arms river operations along the Xiushui and Gan rivers, including feints, river crossings, and heavy artillery, sometimes using poison gas. From March 20–23, Japanese forces established a beachhead and advanced into Fengxin, Shengmi, and later Nanchang, despite stiff Chinese resistance and bridges being destroyed. Chiang's strategic shift toward attrition pushed for broader offensives to disrupt railways and rear areas, though Chinese plans for a counteroffensive repeatedly stalled due to logistics and coordination issues. By early May, Japanese forces encircled and captured Nanchang, albeit at heavy cost, with Chinese casualties surpassing 43,000 dead and Japanese losses over 2,200 dead.    #187 The Battle of Suixian–Zaoyang-Shatow Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Having seized Wuhan in a brutal offensive the previous year, the Japanese sought not just to hold their ground but to solidify their grip on this vital hub. Wuhan, a bustling metropolis at the confluence of the Yangtze and Han Rivers, had become a linchpin in their strategy, a base from which they could project power across central China. Yet, the city was far from secure, Chinese troops in northern Hubei and southern Henan, perched above the mighty Yangtze, posed an unrelenting threat. To relieve the mounting pressure on their newfound stronghold, the Japanese high command orchestrated a bold offensive against the towns of Suixian and Zaoyang. They aimed to annihilate the main force of the Chinese 5th War Zone, a move that would crush the Nationalist resistance in the region and secure their flanks. This theater of war, freshly designated as the 5th War Zone after the grueling Battle of Wuhan, encompassed a vast expanse west of Shashi in the upper Yangtze basin. It stretched across northern Hubei, southern Henan, and the rugged Dabie Mountains in eastern Anhui, forming a strategic bulwark that guarded the eastern approaches to Sichuan, the very heartland of the Nationalist government's central institutions. Historian Rana Mitter in Forgotten Ally described this zone as "a gateway of immense importance, a natural fortress that could either serve as a launchpad for offensives against Japanese-held territories or a defensive redoubt protecting the rear areas of Sichuan and Shaanxi". The terrain itself was a defender's dream and an attacker's nightmare: to the east rose the imposing Dabie Mountains, their peaks cloaked in mist and folklore; the Tongbai Mountains sliced across the north like a jagged spine; the Jing Mountains guarded the west; the Yangtze River snaked southward, its waters a formidable barrier; the Dahong Mountains dominated the center, offering hidden valleys for ambushes; and the Han River (also known as the Xiang River) carved a north-south path through it all. Two critical transport arteries—the Hanyi Road linking Hankou to Yichang in Hubei, and the Xianghua Road connecting Xiangyang to Huayuan near Hankou—crisscrossed this landscape, integrating the war zone into a web of mobility. From here, Chinese forces could menace the vital Pinghan Railway, that iron lifeline running from Beiping (modern Beijing) to Hankou, while also threatening the Wuhan region itself. In retreat, it provided a sanctuary to shield the Nationalist heartlands. As military strategist Sun Tzu might have appreciated, this area had long been a magnet for generals, its contours shaping the fates of empires since ancient times. Despite the 5th War Zone's intricate troop deployments, marked by units of varying combat prowess and a glaring shortage of heavy weapons, the Chinese forces made masterful use of the terrain to harass their invaders. Drawing from accounts in Li Zongren's memoirs, he noted how these defenders, often outgunned but never outmaneuvered, turned hills into fortresses and rivers into moats. In early April 1939, as spring rains turned paths to mud, Chinese troops ramped up their disruptions along the southern stretches of the Pinghan Railway, striking from both eastern and western flanks with guerrilla precision. What truly rattled the Japanese garrison in Wuhan was the arrival of reinforcements: six full divisions redeployed to Zaoyang, bolstering the Chinese capacity to launch flanking assaults that could unravel Japanese supply lines. Alarmed by this buildup, the Japanese 11th Army, ensconced in the Wuhan area under the command of General Yasuji Okamura, a figure whose tactical acumen would later earn him notoriety in the Pacific War, devised a daring plan. They intended to plunge deep into the 5th War Zone, smashing the core of the Chinese forces and rendering them impotent, thereby neutralizing the northwestern threat to Wuhan once and for all. From April onward, the Japanese mobilized with meticulous preparation, amassing troops equipped with formidable artillery, rumbling tanks, and squadrons of aircraft that darkened the skies. Historians estimate they committed roughly three and a half divisions to this endeavor, as detailed in Edward J. Drea's In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army. Employing a classic pincer movement, a two-flank encirclement coupled with a central breakthrough, they aimed for a swift, decisive strike to obliterate the main Chinese force in the narrow Suixian-Zaoyang corridor, squeezed between the Tongbai and Dahong Mountains. The offensive erupted in full fury on May 1, 1939, as Japanese columns surged forward like a tidal wave, their engines roaring and banners fluttering in the dust-choked air. General Li Zongren, the commander of the 5th War Zone, a man whose leadership had already shone in earlier campaigns like the defense of Tai'erzhuang in 1938, issued urgent orders to cease offensive actions against the Japanese and pivot to a defensive stance. Based on intelligence about the enemy's dispositions, Li orchestrated a comprehensive campaign structure, assigning precise defensive roles and battle plans to each unit. This was no haphazard scramble; it was a symphony of strategy, as Li himself recounted in his memoirs, emphasizing the need to exploit the terrain's natural advantages. While various Chinese war zones executed the "April Offensive" from late April to mid-May, actively harrying and containing Japanese forces, the 5th War Zone focused its energies on the southern segment of the Pinghan Railway, assaulting it from both sides in a bid to disrupt logistics. The main force of the 31st Army Group, under the command of Tang Enbo, a general known for his aggressive tactics and later criticized for corruption, shifted from elsewhere in Hubei to Zaoyang, fortifying the zone and posing a dire threat to the Japanese flanks and rear areas. To counter this peril and safeguard transportation along the Wuhan-Pinghan Railway, the Japanese, led by the formidable Okamura, unleashed their assault from the line stretching through Xinyang, Yingshan, and Zhongxiang. Mobilizing the 3rd, 13th, and 16th Divisions alongside the 2nd and 4th Cavalry Brigades, they charged toward the Suixian-Zaoyang region in western Hubei, intent on eradicating the Chinese main force and alleviating the siege-like pressure on Wuhan. In a masterful reorganization, Li Zongren divided his forces into two army groups, the left and right, plus a dedicated river defense army. His strategy was a blend of attrition and opportunism: harnessing the Tongbai and Dahong Mountains, clinging to key towns like lifelines, and grinding down the Japanese through prolonged warfare while biding time for a counterstroke. This approach echoed the Fabian tactics of ancient Rome, wearing the enemy thin before delivering the coup de grâce. The storm broke at dawn on May 1, when the main contingents of the Japanese 16th and 13th Divisions, bolstered by the 4th Cavalry Brigade from their bases in Zhongxiang and Jingshan, hurled themselves against the Chinese 37th and 180th Divisions of the Right Army Group. Supported by droning aircraft that strafed from above and tanks that churned the earth below, the Japanese advanced with mechanical precision. By May 4, they had shattered the defensive lines flanking Changshoudian, then surged along the east bank of the Xiang River toward Zaoyang in a massive offensive. Fierce combat raged through May 5, as described in Japanese war diaries compiled in Senshi Sōsho (the official Japanese war history series), where soldiers recounted the relentless Chinese resistance amid the smoke and clamor. The Japanese finally breached the defenses, turning their fury on the 122nd Division of the 41st Army. In a heroic stand, the 180th Division clung to Changshoudian, providing cover for the main force's retreat along the east-west Huangqi'an line. The 37th Division fell back to the Yaojiahe line, while elements of the 38th Division repositioned into Liushuigou. On May 6, the Japanese seized Changshoudian, punched through Huangqi'an, and drove northward, unleashing a devastating assault on the 122nd Division's positions near Wenjiamiao. Undeterred, Chinese defenders executed daring flanking maneuvers in the Fenglehe, Yaojiahe, Liushuihe, Shuanghe, and Zhangjiaji areas, turning the landscape into a labyrinth of ambushes. May 7 saw the Japanese pressing on, capturing Zhangjiaji and Shuanghe. By May 8, they assaulted Maozifan and Xinji, where ferocious battles erupted, soldiers clashing in hand-to-hand combat amid the ruins. By May 10, the Japanese had overrun Huyang Town and Xinye, advancing toward Tanghe and the northeastern fringes of Zaoyang. Yet, the Tanghe River front witnessed partial Chinese recoveries: remnants of the Right Army Group, alongside troops from east of the Xianghe, reclaimed Xinye. The 122nd and 180th Divisions withdrew north of Tanghe and Fancheng, while the 37th, 38th, and 132nd Divisions steadfastly held the east bank of the Xianghe River. Concurrently, the main force of the Japanese 3rd Division launched from Yingshan against the 84th and 13th Armies of the 11th Group Army in the Suixian sector. After a whirlwind of combat, the Chinese 84th Army retreated to the Taerwan position. On May 2, the 3rd Division targeted the Gaocheng position of the 13th Army within the 31st Group Army; the ensuing clashes in Taerwan and Gaocheng were a maelstrom of fire, with the Taerwan position exchanging hands multiple times like a deadly game of tug-of-war. By May 4, in a grim escalation, Japanese forces deployed poison gas, a violation of international norms that drew condemnation and is documented in Allied reports from the era, inflicting horrific casualties and compelling the Chinese to relinquish Gaocheng, which fell into enemy hands. On May 5, backed by aerial bombardments, tank charges, and artillery barrages, the Japanese renewed their onslaught along the Gaocheng River and the Lishan-Jiangjiahe line. By May 6, the beleaguered Chinese were forced back to the Tianhekou and Gaocheng line. Suixian succumbed on May 7. On May 8, the Japanese shattered the second line of the 84th Army, capturing Zaoyang and advancing on the Jiangtoudian position of the 85th Army. To evade encirclement, the defenders mounted a valiant resistance before withdrawing from Jiangtoudian; the 84th Army relocated to the Tanghe and Baihe areas, while the 39th Army embedded itself in the Dahongshan for guerrilla operations—a tactic that would bleed the Japanese through hit-and-run warfare, as noted in guerrilla warfare studies by Mao Zedong himself. By May 10, the bulk of the 31st Army Group maneuvered toward Tanghe, reaching north of Biyang by May 15. From Xinyang, Japanese forces struck at Tongbai on May 8; by May 10, elements from Zaoyang advanced to Zhangdian Town and Shangtun Town. In response, the 68th Army of the 1st War Zone dispatched the 143rd Division to defend Queshan and Minggang, and the 119th Division to hold Tongbai. After staunchly blocking the Japanese, they withdrew on May 11 to positions northwest and southwest of Tongbai, shielding the retreat of 5th War Zone units. The Japanese 4th Cavalry Brigade drove toward Tanghe, seizing Tanghe County on May 12. But the tide was turning. In a brilliant reversal, the Fifth War Zone commanded the 31st Army Group, in concert with the 2nd Army Group from the 1st War Zone, to advance from southwestern Henan. Their mission: encircle the bulk of Japanese forces on the Xiangdong Plain and deliver a crushing blow. The main force of the 33rd Army Group targeted Zaoyang, while other units pinned down Japanese rear guards in Zhongxiang. The Chinese counteroffensive erupted with swift successes, Tanghe County was recaptured on May 14, and Tongbai liberated on May 16, shattering the Japanese encirclement scheme. On May 19, after four grueling days of combat, Chinese forces mauled the retreating Japanese, reclaiming Zaoyang and leaving the fields strewn with enemy dead. The 39th Army of the Left Army Group dispersed into the mountains for guerrilla warfare, a shadowy campaign of sabotage and surprise. Forces of the Right Army Group east of the river, along with river defense units, conducted relentless raids on Japanese rears and supply lines over multiple days, sowing chaos before withdrawing to the west bank of the Xiang River on May 21. On May 22, they pressed toward Suixian, recapturing it on May 23. The Japanese, battered and depleted, retreated to their original garrisons in Zhongxiang and Yingshan, restoring the pre-war lines as the battle drew to a close. Throughout this clash, the Chinese held a marked superiority in manpower and coordination, though their deployments lacked full flexibility, briefly placing them on the defensive. After protracted, blood-soaked fighting, they restored the original equilibrium. Despite grievous losses, the Chinese thwarted the Japanese encirclement and exacted a heavy toll, reports from the time, corroborated by Japanese records in Senshi Sōsho, indicate over 13,000 Japanese killed or wounded, with more than 5,000 corpses abandoned on the battlefield. This fulfilled the strategic goal of containing and eroding Japanese strength. Chinese casualties surpassed 25,000, a testament to the ferocity of the struggle. The 5th War Zone seized the initiative in advances and retreats, deftly shifting to outer lines and maintaining positional advantages. As Japanese forces withdrew, Chinese pursuers harried and obstructed them, yielding substantial victories. The Battle of Suizao spanned less than three weeks. The Japanese main force pierced defenses on the east bank of the Han River, advancing to encircle one flank as planned. However, the other two formations met fierce opposition near Suixian and northward, stalling their progress. Adapting to the battlefield's ebb and flow, the Fifth War Zone transformed its tactics: the main force escaped encirclement, maneuvered to outer lines for offensives, and exploited terrain to hammer the Japanese. The pivotal order to flip from defense to offense doomed the encirclement; with the counterattack triumphant, the Japanese declined to hold and retreated. The Chinese pursued with unyielding vigor. By May 24, they had reclaimed Zaoyang, Tongbai, and other locales. Save for Suixian County, the Japanese had fallen back to pre-war positions, reinstating the regional status quo. Thus, the battle concluded, a chapter of resilience etched into the chronicles of China's defiance. In the sweltering heat of southern China, where the humid air clung to every breath like a persistent fog, the Japanese General Staff basked in what they called a triumphant offensive and defensive campaign in Guangdong. But victory, as history so often teaches, is a double-edged sword. By early 1939, the strain was palpable. Their secret supply line snaking from the British colony of Hong Kong to the Chinese mainland was under constant disruption, raids by shadowy guerrilla bands, opportunistic smugglers, and the sheer unpredictability of wartime logistics turning what should have been a lifeline into a leaky sieve. Blockading the entire coastline? A pipe dream, given the vast, jagged shores of Guangdong, dotted with hidden coves and fishing villages that had evaded imperial edicts for centuries. Yet, the General Staff's priorities were unyielding, laser-focused on strangling the Nationalist capital of Chongqing through a relentless blockade. This meant the 21st Army, that workhorse of the Japanese invasion force, had to stay in the fight—no rest for the weary. Drawing from historical records like the Senshi Sōsho (War History Series) compiled by Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies, we know that after the 21st Army reported severing what they dubbed the "secret transport line" at Xinhui, a gritty, hard-fought skirmish that left the local landscape scarred with craters and abandoned supply crates, the General Staff circled back to the idea of a full coastal blockade. It was a classic case of military opportunism: staff officers, poring over maps in dimly lit war rooms in Tokyo, suddenly "discovered" Shantou as a major port. Not just any port, mind you, but a bustling hub tied to the heartstrings of Guangdong's overseas Chinese communities. Shantou and nearby Chao'an weren't mere dots on a map; they were the ancestral hometowns of countless Chaoshan people who had ventured abroad to Southeast Asia, sending back remittances that flowed like lifeblood into the region. Historical economic studies, such as those in The Overseas Chinese in the People's Republic of China by Stephen Fitzgerald, highlight how these funds from the Chaoshan diaspora, often funneled through family networks in places like Singapore and Thailand, were substantial, indirectly fueling China's war effort by sustaining local economies and even purchasing arms on the black market. The Chao-Shao Highway, that dusty artery running near Shantou, was pinpointed as a critical vein connecting Hong Kong's ports to the mainland's interior. So, in early June 1939, the die was cast: Army Order No. 310 thundered from headquarters, commanding the 21st Army to seize Shantou. The Chief of the General Staff himself provided the strategic blueprint, a personal touch that underscored the operation's gravity. The Army Department christened the Chaoshan push "Operation Hua," a nod perhaps to the flowery illusions of easy conquest, while instructing the Navy Department to tag along for the ride. In naval parlance, it became "Operation J," a cryptic label that masked the sheer scale unfolding. Under the Headquarters' watchful eye, what started as a modest blockade morphed into a massive amphibious assault, conjured seemingly out of thin air like a magician's trick, but one with deadly props. The 5th Fleet's orders mobilized an impressive lineup: the 9th Squadron for heavy hitting, the 5th Mine Boat Squadron to clear watery hazards, the 12th and 21st Sweeper Squadrons sweeping for mines like diligent janitors of the sea, the 45th Destroyer Squadron adding destroyer muscle, and air power from the 3rd Combined Air Group (boasting 24 land-based attack aircraft and 9 reconnaissance planes that could spot a fishing boat from miles away). Then there was the Chiyoda Air Group with its 9 reconnaissance aircraft, the Guangdong Air Group contributing a quirky airship and one more recon plane, the 9th Special Landing Squadron from Sasebo trained for beach assaults, and a flotilla of special ships for logistics. On the ground, the 21st Army threw in the 132nd Brigade from the 104th Division, beefed up with the 76th Infantry Battalion, two mountain artillery battalions for lobbing shells over rugged terrain, two engineer battalions to bridge rivers and clear paths, a light armored vehicle platoon rumbling with mechanized menace, and a river-crossing supplies company to keep the troops fed and armed. All under the command of Brigade Commander Juro Goto, a stern officer whose tactical acumen was forged in earlier Manchurian campaigns. The convoy's size demanded rehearsals; the 132nd Brigade trained for boat transfers at Magong in the Penghu Islands, practicing the precarious dance of loading men and gear onto rocking vessels under simulated fire. Secrecy shrouded the whole affair, many officers and soldiers, boarding ships in the dead of night, whispered among themselves that they were finally heading home to Japan, a cruel ruse to maintain operational security. For extra punch, the 21st Army tacked on the 31st Air Squadron for air support, their planes droning like angry hornets ready to sting. This overkill didn't sit well with everyone. Lieutenant General Ando Rikichi, the pragmatic commander overseeing Japanese forces in the region, must have fumed in his Guangzhou headquarters. His intelligence staff, drawing from intercepted radio chatter and local spies as noted in postwar analyses like The Japanese Army in World War II by Gordon L. Rottman, reported that the Chongqing forces in Chaozhou were laughably thin: just the 9th Independent Brigade, a couple of security regiments, and ragtag "self-defense groups" of armed civilians. Why unleash such a sledgehammer on a fly? The mobilization's magnitude even forced a reshuffling of defenses around Guangzhou, pulling resources from the 12th Army's front lines and overburdening the already stretched 18th Division. It was bureaucratic overreach at its finest, a testament to the Imperial Staff's penchant for grand gestures over tactical efficiency. Meanwhile, on the Nationalist side, the winds of war carried whispers of impending doom. The National Revolutionary Army's war histories, such as those compiled in the Zhongguo Kangri Zhanzheng Shi (History of China's War of Resistance Against Japan), note that Chiang Kai-shek's Military Commission had snagged intelligence as early as February 1939 about Japan's plans for a large-scale invasion of Shantou. The efficiency of the Military Command's Second Bureau and the Military Intelligence Bureau was nothing short of astonishing, networks of agents, double agents, and radio intercepts piercing the veil of Japanese secrecy. Even as the convoy slipped out of Penghu, a detailed report outlining operational orders landed on Commander Zhang Fakui's desk, the ink still fresh. Zhang, a battle-hardened strategist whose career spanned the Northern Expedition and beyond , had four months to prepare for what would be dubbed the decisive battle of Chaoshan. Yet, in a move that baffled some contemporaries, he chose not to fortify and defend it tooth and nail. After the Fourth War Zone submitted its opinions, likely heated debates in smoke-filled command posts, Chiang Kai-shek greenlit the plan. By March, the Military Commission issued its strategic policy: when the enemy hit Chaoshan, a sliver of regular troops would team up with civilian armed forces for mobile and guerrilla warfare, grinding down the invaders like sandpaper on steel. The orders specified guerrilla zones in Chaozhou, Jiaxing, and Huizhou, unifying local militias under a banner of "extensive guerrilla warfare" to coordinate with regular army maneuvers, gradually eroding the Japanese thrust. In essence, the 4th War Zone wasn't tasked with holding Chao'an and Shantou at all costs; instead, they'd strike hard during the landing, then let guerrillas harry the occupiers post-capture. It was a doctrine of attrition in a "confined battlefield," honing skills through maneuver and ambush. Remarkably, the fall of these cities was preordained by the Military Commission three months before the Japanese even issued their orders, a strategic feint that echoed ancient Sun Tzu tactics of yielding ground to preserve strength. To execute this, the 4th War Zone birthed the Chao-Jia-Hui Guerrilla Command after meticulous preparation, with General Zou Hong, head of Guangdong's Security Bureau and a no-nonsense administrator known for his anti-smuggling campaigns, taking the helm. In just three months, Zhang Fakui scraped together the Independent 9th Brigade, the 2nd, 4th, and 5th Guangdong Provincial Security Regiments, and the Security Training Regiment. Even with the 9th Army Group lurking nearby, he handed the reins of the Chao-Shan operation to the 12th Army Group's planners. Their March guidelines sketched three lines of resistance from the coast to the mountains, a staged withdrawal that allowed frontline defenders to melt away like ghosts. This blueprint mirrored Chiang Kai-shek's post-Wuhan reassessment, where the loss of that key city in 1938 prompted a shift to protracted warfare. A Xinhua News Agency columnist later summed it up scathingly: "The Chongqing government, having lost its will to resist, colludes with the Japanese and seeks to eliminate the Communists, adopting a policy of passive resistance." This narrative, propagated by Communist sources, dogged Chiang and the National Revolutionary Army for decades, painting them as defeatists even as they bled the Japanese dry through attrition. February 1939 saw Commander Zhang kicking off a reorganization of the 12th Army Group, transforming it from a patchwork force into something resembling a modern army. He could have hunkered down, assigning troops to a desperate defense of Chaoshan, but that would have handed the initiative to the overcautious Japanese General Staff, whose activism often bordered on paranoia. Zhang, with the wisdom of a seasoned general who had navigated the treacherous politics of pre-war China, weighed the scales carefully. His vision? Forge the 12th Army Group into a nimble field army, not squander tens of thousands on a secondary port. Japan's naval and air dominance—evident in the devastation of Shanghai in 1937, meant Guangdong's forces could be pulverized in Shantou just as easily. Losing Chaozhou and Shantou? Acceptable, if it preserved core strength for the long haul. Post-Xinhui, Zhang doubled down on resistance, channeling efforts into live-fire exercises for the 12th Army, turning green recruits into battle-ready soldiers amid the Guangdong hills. The war's trajectory after 1939 would vindicate him: his forces became pivotal in later counteroffensives, proving that a living army trumped dead cities. Opting out of a static defense, Zhang pivoted to guerrilla warfare to bleed the Japanese while clutching strategic initiative. He ordered local governments to whip up coastal guerrilla forces from Chao'an to Huizhou—melding militias, national guards, police, and private armed groups into official folds. These weren't elite shock troops, but in wartime's chaos, they controlled locales effectively, disrupting supply lines and gathering intel. For surprises, he unleashed two mobile units: the 9th Independent Brigade and the 20th Independent Brigade. Formed fresh after the War of Resistance erupted, these brigades shone for their efficiency within the cumbersome Guangdong Army structure. Division-level units were too bulky for spotty communications, so Yu Hanmou's command birthed these independent outfits, staffed with crack officers. The 9th, packing direct-fire artillery for punch, and the 20th, dubbed semi-mechanized for its truck-borne speed, prowled the Chaoshan–Huizhou coast from 1939. Zhang retained their three-regiment setup, naming Hua Zhenzhong and Zhang Shou as commanders, granting them autonomy to command in the field like roving wolves. As the 9th Independent Brigade shifted to Shantou, its 627th Regiment was still reorganizing in Heyuan, a logistical hiccup amid the scramble. Hua Zhenzhong, a commander noted for his tactical flexibility in regional annals, deployed the 625th Regiment and 5th Security Regiment along the coast, with the 626th as reserve in Chao'an. Though the Fourth War Zone had written off Chaoshan, Zhang yearned to showcase Guangdong grit before the pullback. Dawn broke on June 21, 1939, at 4:30 a.m., with Japanese reconnaissance planes slicing through the fog over Shantou, Anbu, and Nanbeigang, ghostly silhouettes against the gray sky. By 5:30, the mist lifted, revealing a nightmare armada: over 40 destroyers and 70–80 landing craft churning toward the coast on multiple vectors, their hulls cutting the waves like knives. The 626th Regiment's 3rd Battalion at Donghushan met the first wave with a hail of fire from six light machine guns, repelling the initial boats in a frenzy of splashes and shouts. But the brigade's long-range guns couldn't stem the tide; Hua focused on key chokepoints, aiming to bloody the invaders rather than obliterate them. By morning, the 3rd Battalion of the 625th Regiment charged into Shantou City, joined by the local police corps digging in amid urban sprawl. Combat raged at Xinjin Port and the airport's fringes, where Nationalist troops traded shots with advancing Japanese under the absent shadow of a Chinese navy. Japanese naval guns, massed offshore, pounded the outskirts like thunder gods in fury. By 2:00 a.m. on the 22nd, Shantou crumpled as defenders' ammo ran dry, the city falling in a haze of smoke and echoes. Before the loss, Hua had positioned the 1st Battalion of the 5th Security Regiment at Anbu, guarding the road to Chao'an. Local lore, preserved in oral histories collected by the Chaozhou Historical Society, recalls Battalion Commander Du Ruo leading from the front, rifle in hand, but Japanese barrages, bolstered by superior firepower—forced a retreat. Post-capture, Tokyo's forces paused to consolidate, unleashing massacres on fleeing civilians in the outskirts. A flotilla of civilian boats, intercepted at sea, became a grim training ground for bayonet drills, a barbarity echoed in survivor testimonies compiled in The Rape of Nanking and Beyond extensions to Guangdong atrocities. With Shantou gone, Hua pivoted to flank defense, orchestrating night raids on Japanese positions around Anbu and Meixi. On June 24th, Major Du Ruo spearheaded an assault into Anbu but fell gravely wounded amid the chaos. Later, the 2nd Battalion of the 626th overran spots near Meixi. A Japanese sea-flanking maneuver targeted Anbu, but Nationalists held at Liulong, sparking nocturnal clashes, grenade volleys, bayonet charges, and hand-to-hand brawls that drained both sides like a slow bleed. June 26th saw the 132nd Brigade lumber toward Chao'an. Hua weighed options: all-out assault or guerrilla fade? He chose to dig in on the outskirts, reserving two companies of the 625th and a special ops battalion in the city. The 27th brought a day-long Japanese onslaught, culminating in Chao'an's fall after fierce rear-guard actions by the 9th Independent Brigade. Evacuations preceded the collapse, with Japanese propaganda banners fluttering falsely, claiming Nationalists had abandoned defense. Yet Hua's call preserved his brigade for future fights; the Japanese claimed an empty prize. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese operations had yet again plugged up supply leaks into Nationalist China. The fall of Suixian, Zaoyang and Shantou were heavy losses for the Chinese war effort. However the Chinese were also able to exact heavy casualties on the invaders and thwarted their encirclement attempts. China was still in the fight for her life.

Dans le ciel gris du Sichuan, certains ont levé la tête, un peu perplexes. Ce 11 janvier, au-dessus de la ville de Yibin, ce n'était ni un drone ni un ballon météo. Mais une éolienne. Oui, une éolienne volante. La société chinoise Beijing SAWES Energy Technology vient de tester, grandeur nature, une machine qui bouscule les codes du secteur. Oubliez les mâts géants plantés au sol. Ici, la production d'électricité prend de la hauteur. Littéralement.Sa plateforme, baptisée S2000, est construite en matériaux légers et remplie d'hélium. Elle flotte comme un dirigeable et capte les vents en altitude pour les convertir en énergie. Lors de ce vol d'essai, l'engin est monté jusqu'à 2 000 mètres au-dessus du sol. Résultat : 385 kilowattheures produits, directement injectés dans le réseau local, selon le Global Times, média proche du pouvoir chinois. Après un premier modèle, le S1500, présenté il y a quelques mois, l'entreprise franchit donc un cap supplémentaire. Plus haut, plus puissant.Visuellement, la machine ressemble à un grand ballon conique de 60 mètres de long sur 40 de large. Elle est reliée au sol par un câble qui assure à la fois sa stabilité… et le transport de l'électricité. À l'intérieur, douze turbines tournent pour maximiser la production. Son concepteur assure qu'il s'agit de la première éolienne capable d'opérer au-dessus de zones urbaines. Un argument clé. Le PDG, Weng Hanke, imagine deux usages principaux : alimenter des sites isolés, comme des postes-frontières, ou compléter les parcs éoliens traditionnels dans une logique énergétique « en trois dimensions ». Car là-haut, le vent est plus fort, plus régulier. À comparer avec les éoliennes terrestres, limitées à environ 155 mètres, le gain est évident. La forme même de la S2000 joue un rôle : l'air est canalisé et compressé avant d'atteindre les turbines, ce qui améliore encore le rendement. À terme, la plateforme pourrait produire jusqu'à 3 mégawatts. Hébergé par Acast. Visitez acast.com/privacy pour plus d'informations.

This week on Sinica, I speak with Afra Wang, a writer working between London and the Bay Area, currently a fellow with Gov.AI. We're talking today about her recent WIRED piece on what might be China's most influential science fiction project you've never heard of: The Morning Star of Lingao (Língáo Qǐmíng 临高启明), a sprawling, crowdsourced novel about time travelers who bootstrap an industrial revolution in Ming Dynasty Hainan. More than a thought experiment in alternate history, it's the ur-text of China's "Industrial Party" (gōngyè dǎng 工业党) — the loose intellectual movement that sees engineering capability as the true source of national power. We discuss what the novel reveals about how China thinks about failure, modernity, and salvation, and why, just as Americans are waking up to China's industrial might, the worldview that helped produce it may already be losing its grip.5:27 – Being a cultural in-betweener: code-switching across moral and epistemic registers 10:25 – Double consciousness and converging aesthetic standards 12:05 – "The greatest Chinese science fiction" — an ironic title for a poorly written cult classic 14:18 – Bridging STEM and humanities: the KPI-coded language of tech optimization 16:08 – China's post-Industrial Party moment: from "try hard" to "lie flat" 17:01 – How widely known is Lingao? A cult Bible for China's techno-elite 19:11 – From crypto bros to DAO experiments: how Afra discovered the novel 21:25 – The canonical timeline: compiling chaos into collaborative fiction 23:06 – Guancha.cn (guānchá zhě wǎng 观察者网) and the Industrial Party's media ecosystem 26:05 – The Sentimental Party (Qínghuái Dǎng 情怀党): China's lost civic space 29:01 – The Wenzhou high-speed rail crash: the debate that defined the Industrial Party 33:19 – Controlled spoilers: colonizing Australia, the Maid Revolution, and tech trees 41:06 – Competence as salvation: obsessive attention to getting the details right 44:18 – The Needham question and the joy of transformation: from Robinson Crusoe to Primitive Technology 47:25 – "Never again": inherited historical vulnerability and the memory of chaos 49:20 – Wang Xiaodong, "China Is Unhappy," and the crystallization of Industrial Party ideology 51:33 – Gender and Lingao: a pre-feminist artifact and the rational case for equality 56:16 – Dan Wang's Breakneck and the "engineering state" framework 59:25 – New Quality Productive Forces (xīn zhì shēngchǎnlì 新质生产力): Industrial Party logic in CCP policy 1:03:43 – The reckoning: why Industrial Party intellectuals are losing their innocence 1:07:49 – What Lingao tells us about China today: the invisible infrastructure beneath the hot showerPaying it forward: The volunteer translators of The Morning Star of Lingao (English translation and GitHub resources)Xīn Xīn Rén Lèi / Pixel Perfect podcast (https://pixelperfect.typlog.io/) and the Bǎihuā (百花) podcasting community Recommendations:Afra: China Through European Eyes: 800 Years of Cultural and Intellectual Encounter, edited by Kerry Brown; The Wall Dancers: Searching for Freedom and Connection on the Chinese Internet by Yi-Ling Liu Kaiser: Destiny Disrupted: A History of the World Through Islamic Eyes by Tamim AnsarySee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

As China heads into the Year of the Horse, consumer demand is being released earlier than usual, propelled by the country's longest Spring Festival holiday on record and a coordinated policy push aimed at turning seasonal spending into sustained economic momentum.随着中国迎来马年，消费需求释放时间较往年提前。这得益于创纪录的长春节假期，以及旨在将季节性消费转化为持续经济动能的协同政策推动。The 2026 Spring Festival holiday will run from Feb 15 to 23, spanning nine consecutive days. The extended break—longer than in previous years—is not only reshaping travel and spending plans, but also amplifying the effects of policies designed to unlock consumption potential, particularly in services, travel and experience-driven spending.2026年春节假期将从2月15日持续至23日，共计九天连休。较往年更长的假期不仅重塑了出行与消费计划，更放大了解锁消费潜力的政策效应，尤其在服务、旅游及体验型消费领域。From bustling shopping streets in Beijing to small factories in Zhejiang's Yiwu operating extra production lines, and from reunion dinners booked weeks ahead of Chinese New Year's Eve to a sharp rise in two-way travel, signs of renewed consumption activity are emerging well before the holiday officially begins.从北京熙熙攘攘的商业街，到浙江义乌加开生产线的中小工厂；从数周前就预订好的除夕团圆饭，到双向出行量的显著增长——在春节正式到来之前，消费活动复苏的迹象已然显现。On Beijing's Wangfujing pedestrian street, winter temperatures have done little to slow foot traffic. Flagship stores are drawing a steady stream of overseas visitors, many taking advantage of expanded visa-free access and increasingly seamless digital payment options.北京王府井步行街上，寒冬的低温并未减缓人流脚步。旗舰店吸引着络绎不绝的海外游客，许多人正享受着扩大免签政策带来的便利，以及日益便捷的数字支付方式。Daniel Chan, a tourist from Los Angeles, stepped out of an electronics store with a newly purchased DJI Osmo Nano camera.来自洛杉矶的游客陈丹尼尔（音译）从一家电子产品商店走出，手里拿着刚买到的DJI Osmo Nano相机。"I've wanted this model for months. It's almost impossible to find stock back home, yet here it was available, and the price was very friendly,"Chan said. "It's not just a souvenir—it's cutting-edge technology."陈丹尼尔（音译）说道：“我渴望拥有这款相机已有数月之久。在美国几乎找不到现货，而这里不仅有货，价格还非常实惠。这不仅是件纪念品，更是尖端科技的结晶。”He said he had already started using the camera on the day of purchase. "I haven't explored all its functions yet, but the magnetic design and image quality are quite good," he added.他表示购买当天就已开始使用这台相机。他补充道：“虽然还没完全摸清所有功能，但磁吸设计和成像质量都相当不错。”What impressed him most during his China trip, Chan said, was the speed and convenience of food delivery services. "It's incredibly fast and efficient—almost unbelievable," he said. Dining in restaurants was equally striking, with some offering dish countdown timers and guaranteed serving speeds. "I've hardly ever experienced service like this in the United States."陈丹尼尔（音译）表示，此次中国之行最令他印象深刻的是外卖服务的快捷便利。他说：“速度快得惊人，效率极高——简直难以置信。”餐厅用餐体验同样令人震撼，部分餐厅设有菜品倒计时器并承诺上菜速度。“在美国几乎从未体验过如此服务。”Such experiences are precisely what policymakers hope to encourage.此类经历正是政策制定者希望鼓励的。The "Shopping in China" campaign, first launched in April 2025, aims to create a more internationally friendly consumption ecosystem while stimulating domestic demand through higher-quality supply.“中国购物”活动于2025年4月首次启动，旨在打造更具国际友善度的消费生态系统，同时通过更高品质的供给来刺激国内需求。At the launch of the 2026 "Shopping in China" and New Year Consumption Season in Shanghai on Jan 3, Commerce Minister Wang Wentao said the initiative would focus on goods consumption, services consumption and the development of new consumption scenarios. A series of nationwide events, including apremium consumption month and an international consumption season, will be rolled out, alongside locally tailored programs in 15 pilot cities.1月3日，2026“中国购物季”暨新年消费季在上海启动。商务部部长王文涛表示，本次活动将聚焦商品消费、服务消费及新型消费场景发展。全国将推出高端消费月、国际消费季等系列活动，同时15个试点城市将推出本土化特色项目。With the nine-day Spring Festival approaching, Wang said the Ministry of Commerce, together with other central departments and local governments, will host a "happy shopping for the Spring Festival" campaign as a flagship component of the "Shopping in China" series. The campaign will span food, accommodation, transport, travel, shopping and entertainment, aiming to create an inclusive, festive consumption experience for families at home and travelers on the move.随着为期九天的春节临近，王文涛表示商务部将联合中央各部门和地方政府，推出“欢乐春节·购物中国”系列活动的旗舰项目“欢乐春节·购物中国”。活动将覆盖餐饮、住宿、交通、旅游、购物、娱乐等领域，旨在为居家过节的家庭和外出游玩的旅客创造包容、喜庆的消费体验。More than 1,200 kilometers south of Beijing, Yiwu—the world's largest small-commodities hub—offers a ground-level view of how festive demand is being converted into real orders.距离北京以南1200多公里处，全球最大的小商品集散中心义乌正展现着节日需求如何转化为实际订单的生动图景。In the plush toy section of Yiwu International Trade Market, one horse-themed product has become an unexpected viral hit. Originally launched in mid-October under the name "Mashang Youqian", meaning "immediate prosperity", the toy initially sold about 400 units a day—steady but far from a bestseller.在义乌国际商贸城毛绒玩具区，一款以马为主题的产品意外走红。这款名为“马上有钱”的玩具于十月中旬上市，最初日销量约400件——虽保持稳定但远非畅销品。Its breakout moment came in January, after a minor production-line error resulted in the toy's mouth being stitched incorrectly, giving it a seemingly "tearful" expression. Buyers who received the flawed version posted photos and chat records online while requesting exchanges. The images struck a chord with netizens, who found humor and resonance in the toy's "wronged" look, quickly propelling it to the top of social media trending lists.这款玩具的爆红时刻出现在今年1月，当时因生产线的小失误导致玩具嘴巴缝制错误，呈现出仿佛“泪眼汪汪”的表情。收到瑕疵品的买家纷纷在网上晒出照片和聊天记录要求换货。这些照片意外引发网友共鸣，大家在玩具“委屈”的表情中发现了幽默感，迅速将其推上了社交媒体热搜榜首。Dubbed the "crying horse", the toy was soon labeled the first cultural "dark horse" of the New Year. As demand surged, the factory expanded production lines from two to more than a dozen, lifting daily output to around 15,000 units. The merchant has since applied for a design patent.这款被称为“哭哭马”的玩具，很快被冠以新年首个文化“黑马”的称号。随着需求激增，工厂将生产线从两条扩充至十余条，日产量提升至约1.5万只。该商家已就此申请了外观设计专利。Behind the viral moment, the success mirrors quality and Yiwu merchants' deeply ingrained ability to respond quickly to market signals, from identifying trends to making swift decisions and scaling production with minimal delay.这场病毒式传播的背后，其成功既彰显了商品品质，更折射出义乌商人深植于骨髓的敏锐市场触觉。从洞察趋势到果断决策，再到以最小延迟实现规模化生产，他们总能迅速响应市场信号。Across the toy sector, creative interpretations of the Year of the Horse are proliferating. Products range from zodiac photo frames to blind boxes and decorative figurines.玩具行业正涌现出大量以马年为主题的创意设计，产品涵盖生肖相框、盲盒以及装饰摆件等。Some bestselling items now sell between 40,000 and 60,000 units a day. For popular designs, factories are producing between 50,000 and 100,000 units daily. To maintain speed and creativity, some merchants require their design teams to develop as many as five new styles each day.部分畅销商品目前日销量在4万至6万件之间。对于热门款式，工厂日产量可达5万至10万件。为保持生产速度和设计创新力，部分商家要求设计团队每日开发多达五款新产品。Merchants say interest from foreign buyers has risen, particularly after Spring Festival was added to UNESCO's Representative List of theIntangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity in December 2024.商户表示，外国买家的兴趣有所提升，尤其是在2024年12月春节被列入联合国教科文组织人类非物质文化遗产代表作名录之后。Consumption momentum is also visible in the catering sector, where Chinese New Year's Eve reunion dinners—a core element of Spring Festival culture—are being booked out well in advance.餐饮业的消费势头同样明显，作为春节文化核心元素的除夕团圆饭，早已被提前预订一空。In Beijing, several restaurant chains report that all private rooms across multiple branches are already fully booked, with only limited lunchtime slots remaining. Prices largely match regular menus, though advance reservations and deposits are typically required.在北京，多家连锁餐厅表示其旗下各分店的包间已全部订满，仅剩少量午间时段可预约。价格基本与常规菜单持平，但通常需要提前预约并支付定金。To cope with demand, many restaurants have introducedstaggered dining slots on Chinese New Year's Eve, offering discounts for later sittings. Others have expanded takeaway services, allowing families to enjoy freshly prepared reunion meals at home.为应对需求，许多餐厅在除夕夜推出了错峰用餐时段，晚间时段还提供折扣优惠。另有餐厅扩大了外卖服务范围，让家庭能在家中享用现做的团圆饭。One restaurant in Beijing's Guomao area has launched two takeaway packages priced at 1,988 yuan ($286) for eight to 10 people and 999 yuan for four to six people, with free delivery within the city's Fifth Ring Road. Customers can also order a la carte, providing greater flexibility.北京国贸区某餐厅推出两款外卖套餐：8-10人份售价1988元（约合286美元），4-6人份售价999元，市内五环路内免费配送。顾客也可单点菜品，提供更灵活的选择。An emerging trend is the shift toward county towns and rural venues. In Yinjiang town of Ningbo, Zhejiang province, a countryside resort that opened reservations three months ago, has already sold out large private rooms for the first two days of the holiday, attracting families traveling from neighboring Shanghai, and Jiangsu province.新兴趋势向县城和乡村场所转移。在浙江省宁波市鄞江镇，一家三个月前开放预订的乡村度假村，其大型包间在假期前两天的预订已全部售罄，吸引了来自邻近上海和江苏的家庭游客。Traditional restaurant brands are also moving into rural markets. Managers say demand for reunion dinners and banquets in these areas remains strong, while the supply of mid—to high-end dining options is relatively limited—creating new opportunities for expansion.传统餐饮品牌也正进军农村市场。经营者表示，这些地区对团圆饭和宴会的需求依然旺盛，而中高端餐饮选择的供应相对有限，这为扩张创造了新机遇。The nine-day break is also reshaping travel patterns, triggering a surge in both outbound and inbound tourism.为期九天的假期也在重塑旅游模式，引发出境游和入境游的双双激增。Major travel platforms report that Spring Festival bookings for 2026 have surpassed last year's levels across the board. According to data from Flight Master, as of Jan 16, bookings for domestic flights during the holiday exceeded 4.13 million, up about 21 percent year-on-year. Outbound and inbound flight bookings both climbed to around 700,000.主要旅游平台数据显示，2026年春节期间的预订量全面超越去年同期水平。据飞航大师平台统计，截至1月16日，春节期间国内航班预订量已突破413万次，同比增长约21%。出境及入境航班预订量均攀升至约70万次。Airbnb data show searches by Chinese travelers for overseas accommodation around the Spring Festival period have roughly doubled year-on-year. Many travelers are choosing to stagger trips before or after the official holiday to secure better prices and less crowded itineraries.爱彼迎（Airbnb）数据显示，春节期间中国游客搜索海外住宿的数量同比翻了一番。许多游客选择在法定假期前后错峰出行，以获得更优惠的价格和更宽松的行程安排。Travel agencies are embedding New Year elements into overseas tour products, allowing travelers to retain a sense of festivity even while abroad.旅行社正将新年元素融入海外旅游产品，让游客即使身处异国也能保持节日氛围。Li Mengran, marketing manager of Beijing-based travel agency Utour, said the company has continued its long-standing practices in European tour products. These include customized reunion dinners and dumpling-making activities, alongside wine tastings and interactive prize draws.北京众信旅游集团媒介公关经理李梦然表示，公司在欧洲旅游产品中延续了多年来的传统项目，包括定制团圆晚宴和包饺子活动，同时安排品酒会和互动抽奖环节。"For family travelers, we also prepare red-envelope gifts for children under 16 to enhance the sense of ritual and warmth during the journey,"Li said.李梦然表示：“针对家庭游客，我们还为16岁以下儿童准备了红包礼物，以增强旅途中的仪式感与温馨氛围。”Domestically, culturally rich "intangible heritage towns" are emerging as popular destinations. Data from Qunar show that cities such as Huangshan in Anhui, Jingdezhen in Jiangxi, Quanzhou in Fujian, Foshan in Guangdong and Zigong in Sichuan—all offering immersive intangible cultural heritage experiences—have seen particularly strong hotel booking growth during the winter holiday and Spring Festival period.在国内，文化底蕴深厚的“非物质文化遗产小镇”正成为热门旅游目的地。去哪儿网数据显示，安徽黄山、江西景德镇、福建泉州、广东佛山、四川自贡等提供沉浸式非物质文化遗产体验的城市，在寒假和春节期间酒店预订量增长尤为显著。Inbound tourism is also gaining momentum.入境旅游业也正蓬勃发展。Qunar data show that bookings for domestic flights made using non-Chinese passports during the Spring Festival holiday are up more than 20 percent year-on-year, underscoring the holiday's growing role as a window for international visitors to experience Chinese culture.去哪儿网数据显示，春节期间持非中国护照预订的国内航班量同比增长逾20%，凸显出春节作为国际游客体验中华文化的窗口正发挥着日益重要的作用。This rebound reflects sustained policy support. By the first three quarters of 2025, visa-free inbound visits reached 20.89 million, up more than 50 percent year-on-year. Since the introduction of the 240-hour transit visa-free policy, inbound arrivals across ports have risen 27.2 percent.这一回升态势反映出政策支持的持续性。截至2025年前三季度，免签入境人次达2089万，同比增长逾50%。自实施240小时过境免签政策以来，各口岸入境人次增长27.2%。The World Travel & Tourism Council forecasts that China's tourism sector will grow at an average annual rate of 7 percent over the next decade, with the country on track to become the world's largest tourism market by 2031, surpassing the United States.世界旅游业理事会预测，未来十年中国旅游业将保持年均7%的增长率，预计到2031年将超越美国，成为全球最大的旅游市场。Economists say the early consumption surge reflects the combined effects of policy support, longer holidays and evolving consumer preferences.经济学家表示，消费的早期激增反映了政策支持、假期延长以及消费者偏好变化的综合影响。The Central Economic Work Conference held in December placed expanding domestic demand as the top priority of China's economic policy in 2026, with multiple consumption-supporting policies already rolled out or in the pipeline.去年12月召开的中央经济工作会议将扩大内需确立为2026年中国经济政策的重中之重，多项支持消费的政策已陆续出台或正在酝酿中。Su Jian, a professor at Peking University's School of Economics, said consumption growth has been most visible in services and fast-evolving consumer electronics, including tourism, cultural products, sports and entertainment. Rapid upgrade cycles, he added, continue to support demand for electronics.北京大学经济学院教授苏剑表示，消费增长在服务业和快速发展的消费电子产品领域最为显著，包括旅游、文化产品、体育和娱乐等。他补充道，快速的升级周期持续支撑着电子产品需求。Since last year, targeted consumption-boosting campaigns have delivered tangible results. In 2025, trade-in-related sales exceeded 2.6 trillion yuan, benefiting more than 360 million consumer transactions. Optimized trade-in programs introduced in 2026 are now translating into concrete market activity across regions.自去年以来，定向消费提振举措成效显著。2025年，以旧换新相关销售额突破2.6万亿元，惠及逾3.6亿笔消费交易。2026年推出的优化换购方案，正逐步转化为各地市场的实际行动。International observers have also noted structural changes underway. In its latest flagship annual report, global consultancy Roland Berger said China has entered the "consumption 4.0" era, characterized by resilience.国际观察人士也注意到正在发生的结构性变化。全球咨询公司罗兰贝格企业管理有限公司在其最新旗舰年度报告中指出，中国已进入以韧性为特征的“消费4.0”时代。China's consumption structure is shifting rapidly from survival-oriented spending toward development—and experience-oriented demand, the report noted. By elevating domestic demand expansion to a strategic priority, and encouraging a move from quantitative satisfaction to qualitative enrichment, policymakers are using consumption upgrading to drive supply-side innovation and support high-quality growth.报告指出，中国消费结构正从生存型消费向发展型消费、从物质型需求向体验型需求快速转变。通过将扩大内需提升为战略重点，引导消费从数量满足转向质量提升，决策者正以消费升级为引擎，推动供给侧创新，助力高质量发展。Boosting consumption, policymakers emphasize, is not a short-term fix, but a long-term strategy.政策制定者强调，提振消费并非短期对策，而是长远之策。A State Council executive meeting held on Jan 16 reviewed progress in the consumption-boosting campaign and outlined further steps to cultivate new growth points in service consumption.2026年1月16日召开的国务院常务会议审议了提振消费行动的进展情况，并规划了培育服务消费新增长点的后续措施。The meeting called for improving long-term mechanisms for promoting consumption, raising urban and rural household incomes, implementing the paid leave system and removing unreasonable restrictive measures for consumption.会议要求完善促进消费的长效机制，提高城乡居民收入水平，落实带薪休假制度，取消限制消费的不合理措施。premium consumption/ˈpriː.mi.əm/高端消费staggered dining slots错峰用餐时段intangible/ɪnˈtæn.dʒə.bəl/adj.非物质的

Fluent Fiction - Mandarin Chinese: Whispers of the Forest: Linna's New Year Tale Find the full episode transcript, vocabulary words, and more:fluentfiction.com/zh/episode/2026-01-22-23-34-02-zh Story Transcript:Zh: 四川的密林里，冬天的空气清冽而安静。En: In the dense forests of Sichuan, the winter air is crisp and quiet.Zh: 森林中，常青树上披着一层厚厚的白雪，点缀着过年的红灯笼，流淌着温暖的光。En: In the forest, the evergreen trees are draped with a thick layer of white snow, adorned with red lanterns for the New Year, casting a warm glow.Zh: 在这灯火映照下，林娜、魏和陈一家人正忙着准备他们一年一度的家庭聚会。En: In the light of these lanterns, Linna, Wei, and Chen's family are busy preparing for their annual family gathering.Zh: 林娜是个活泼的年轻女孩，她热爱家里的传统。En: Linna is a lively young girl who loves her family's traditions.Zh: 每年春节，他们全家都会到这片森林里露营。En: Every year during the Spring Festival, their whole family goes camping in this forest.Zh: 她的父母和魏、陈一起准备丰盛的年夜饭，火锅的香味飘散在空中。En: Her parents, along with Wei and Chen, are preparing a sumptuous New Year's Eve dinner, the aroma of hot pot wafting through the air.Zh: 但林娜渴望一些新的体验，她希望在保存旧传统的同时，也能给家里带点新鲜感。En: But Linna longs for some new experiences; she hopes to bring a bit of freshness to her family while preserving the old traditions.Zh: 当魏和陈认真地挂着鞭炮时，林娜决定尝试一个新主意。En: As Wei and Chen carefully hang firecrackers, Linna decides to try a new idea.Zh: 她提前从村里的老人那里搜集了一些关于森林的传说。En: She gathered some legends about the forest from the elders in the village.Zh: 晚上，大家围坐在火堆旁，她清了清嗓子，开始讲故事。En: That evening, as everyone sat around the campfire, she cleared her throat and began to tell a story.Zh: 大家渐渐被她的讲述吸引，眼光里闪烁着好奇。En: Gradually, everyone was captivated by her storytelling, their eyes sparkling with curiosity.Zh: 一时间，四周连风声都静止了下来。En: For a moment, even the sound of the wind seemed to pause.Zh: 林中的传说说，几百年前，这里住着一个守林的仙子。En: The legend of the forest says that hundreds of years ago, a forest guardian fairy lived here.Zh: 每到除夕，她便显身于森林中，祝福来年丰收。En: Every New Year's Eve, she would appear in the forest, blessing the coming year with a bountiful harvest.Zh: 人们渐渐忘记了这个故事，但今天，林娜让它重现于此。En: Over time, people forgot this story, but today, Linna brought it back to life.Zh: 讲完故事，林娜心中忐忑不安，但家人们都露出了欣喜的笑容。En: After finishing the story, Linna's heart was filled with unease, but her family all showed delighted smiles.Zh: 魏说：“这是我第一次听到这样的故事，很有趣。En: Wei said, "This is the first time I've heard such a story, very interesting."Zh: ” 陈也点头赞同，其他亲戚纷纷表示希望明年能听到更多。En: Chen also nodded in agreement, and other relatives expressed their hope to hear more next year.Zh: 林娜的努力得到了大家的认同，她感到一种浓厚的自豪。En: Linna's efforts were recognized by everyone, and she felt a strong sense of pride.Zh: 春节的欢声笑语依旧在森林中回荡，林娜内心的紧张也化为一阵暖意。En: The joyful sounds of the Spring Festival continued to echo in the forest, and Linna's inner tension transformed into a warm feeling.Zh: 她发现，传统和创新并不矛盾，反而可以共同延续家族的欢庆。En: She realized that tradition and innovation are not contradictory; instead, they can jointly perpetuate the family's celebration.Zh: 家人也因此增加了了解，传统愈加活跃。En: This also deepened the family's understanding of each other, making the traditions even more lively.Zh: 冬夜，红灯笼的光映着白雪，林娜在这新的故事中找到了她与家庭间更深的联结。En: On a winter night, the light of the red lanterns reflecting on the white snow, Linna found a deeper connection with her family in this new story.Zh: 她明白，勇敢地尝试和坚定地守护，两者结合会生成意想不到的美好。En: She understood that brave attempts combined with steadfast guardianship can create unexpected beauty.Zh: 而这，将是她给家人最珍贵的新年礼物。En: And this would be her most precious New Year gift to her family. Vocabulary Words:dense: 密crisp: 清冽evergreen: 常青adorned: 点缀着sumptuous: 丰盛的wafting: 飘散longs: 渴望freshness: 新鲜感firecrackers: 鞭炮captivated: 吸引sparkling: 闪烁pause: 静止bountiful: 丰收unease: 忐忑不安pride: 自豪echo: 回荡tension: 紧张perpetuate: 延续steadfast: 坚定地guardianship: 守护attempts: 尝试unexpected: 意想不到的connection: 联结innovation: 创新contradictory: 矛盾blessing: 祝福curiosity: 好奇delighted: 欣喜recognized: 认同guardian: 守林的

This week on Sinica, I speak with Jia Ruixue and Li Hongbin, coauthors of The Highest Exam: How the Gaokao Shapes China. We're talking about China's college entrance exam — dreaded and feared, with outsized ability to determine life outcomes, seen as deeply flawed yet also sacrosanct, something few Chinese want drastically altered or removed. Cards on table: I had very strong preconceptions about the gaokao. My wife and I planned our children's education to get them out of the Chinese system before it became increasingly oriented toward gaokao preparation. But this book really opened my eyes. Ruixue is professor of economics at UC San Diego's School of Global Policy and Strategy, researching how institutions like examination systems shape governance, elite selection, and state capacity. Hongbin is James Liang Chair at Stanford, focusing on education, labor markets, and institutional foundations of China's economic development. We explore why the gaokao represents far more than just a difficult test, the concrete incentives families face, why there are limited alternative routes for social mobility, how both authors' own experiences shaped their thinking, why exam-based elite selection has been so durable in China, what happened when the exam system was suspended during the Cultural Revolution, why inequality has increased despite internet access to materials, why meaningful reform is so politically difficult, how education translated into productivity and GDP growth, the gap between skill formation and economic returns, how the system shapes governance and everyday life, and the moral dimensions of exam culture when Chinese families migrate to very different education systems like the U.S.6:18 – What the gaokao actually represents beyond just being a difficult exam 11:54 – Why there are limited alternative pathways for social mobility 14:23 – How their own experiences as students shaped their thinking 18:46 – Why the gaokao is a political institution, not just educational policy 22:21 – Why exam-based elite selection has been so durable in China 28:30 – What happened in late Qing and Cultural Revolution when exams were suspended 33:26 – Has internet access to materials reduced inequality or has it persisted? 36:55 – Hongbin's direct experience trying to reform the gaokao—and why it failed 40:28 – How education improvement accounts for significant share of China's GDP growth 42:44 – The gap: college doesn't add measurable skills, but gaokao scores predict income 46:56 – How centralized approach affects talent allocation across fields 51:08 – The gaokao and GDP tournament for officials: similar tournament systems 54:26 – How ranking and evaluation systems shape workplace behavior and culture 58:12 – When exam culture meets U.S. education: understanding tensions around affirmative action 1:02:10 – Transparent rule-based evaluation vs. discretion and judgment: the fundamental tradeoffRecommendations: Ruixue: Piao Liang Peng You (film by Geng Jun); Stoner (a novel by John Williams) Hongbin: The Dictator's HandbookKaiser: Furious Minds: The Making of the MAGA New Right by Laura K. Field; Black Pill by Elle ReeveSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Last time we spoke about the climax of the battle of Lake Khasan. In August, the Lake Khasan region became a tense theater of combat as Soviet and Japanese forces clashed around Changkufeng and Hill 52. The Soviets pushed a multi-front offensive, bolstered by artillery, tanks, and air power, yet the Japanese defenders held firm, aided by engineers, machine guns, and heavy guns. By the ninth and tenth, a stubborn Japanese resilience kept Hill 52 and Changkufeng in Japanese hands, though the price was steep and the field was littered with the costs of battle. Diplomatically, both sides aimed to confine the fighting and avoid a larger war. Negotiations trudged on, culminating in a tentative cease-fire draft for August eleventh: a halt to hostilities, positions to be held as of midnight on the tenth, and the creation of a border-demarcation commission. Moscow pressed for a neutral umpire; Tokyo resisted, accepting a Japanese participant but rejecting a neutral referee. The cease-fire was imperfect, with miscommunications and differing interpretations persisting.    #185 Operation Hainan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After what seemed like a lifetime over in the northern border between the USSR and Japan, today we are returning to the Second Sino-Japanese War. Now I thought it might be a bit jarring to dive into it, so let me do a brief summary of where we are at, in the year of 1939. As the calendar turned to 1939, the Second Sino-Japanese War, which had erupted in July 1937 with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and escalated into full-scale conflict, had evolved into a protracted quagmire for the Empire of Japan. What began as a swift campaign to subjugate the Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek had, by the close of 1938, transformed into a war of attrition. Japanese forces, under the command of generals like Shunroku Hata and Yasuji Okamura, had achieved stunning territorial gains: the fall of Shanghai in November 1937 after a brutal three-month battle that cost over 200,000 Chinese lives; the infamous capture of Nanjing in December 1937, marked by the Nanjing Massacre where an estimated 300,000 civilians and disarmed soldiers were killed in a six-week orgy of violence; and the sequential occupations of Xuzhou in May 1938, Wuhan in October 1938, and Guangzhou that same month.  These victories secured Japan's control over China's eastern seaboard, major riverine arteries like the Yangtze, and key industrial centers, effectively stripping the Nationalists of much of their economic base. Yet, despite these advances, China refused to capitulate. Chiang's government had retreated inland to the mountainous stronghold of Chongqing in Sichuan province, where it regrouped amid the fog-laden gorges, drawing on the vast human reserves of China's interior and the resilient spirit of its people. By late 1938, Japanese casualties had mounted to approximately 50,000 killed and 200,000 wounded annually, straining the Imperial Japanese Army's resources and exposing the vulnerabilities of overextended supply lines deep into hostile territory. In Tokyo, the corridors of the Imperial General Headquarters and the Army Ministry buzzed with urgent deliberations during the winter of 1938-1939. The initial doctrine of "quick victory" through decisive battles, epitomized by the massive offensives of 1937 and 1938, had proven illusory. Japan's military planners, influenced by the Kwantung Army's experiences in Manchuria and the ongoing stalemate, recognized that China's sheer size, with its 4 million square miles and over 400 million inhabitants, rendered total conquest unfeasible without unacceptable costs. Intelligence reports highlighted the persistence of Chinese guerrilla warfare, particularly in the north where Communist forces under Mao Zedong's Eighth Route Army conducted hit-and-run operations from bases in Shanxi and Shaanxi, sabotaging railways and ambushing convoys. The Japanese response included brutal pacification campaigns, such as the early iterations of what would later formalize as the "Three Alls Policy" (kill all, burn all, loot all), aimed at devastating rural economies and isolating resistance pockets. But these measures only fueled further defiance. By early 1939, a strategic pivot was formalized: away from direct annihilation of Chinese armies toward a policy of economic strangulation. This "blockade and interdiction" approach sought to sever China's lifelines to external aid, choking off the flow of weapons, fuel, and materiel that sustained the Nationalist war effort. As one Japanese staff officer noted in internal memos, the goal was to "starve the dragon in its lair," acknowledging the limits of Japanese manpower, total forces in China numbered around 1 million by 1939, against China's inexhaustible reserves. Central to this new strategy were the three primary overland supply corridors that had emerged as China's backdoors to the world, compensating for the Japanese naval blockade that had sealed off most coastal ports since late 1937. The first and most iconic was the Burma Road, a 717-mile engineering marvel hastily constructed between 1937 and 1938 by over 200,000 Chinese and Burmese laborers under the direction of engineers like Chih-Ping Chen. Stretching from the railhead at Lashio in British Burma (modern Myanmar) through treacherous mountain passes and dense jungles to Kunming in Yunnan province, the road navigated elevations up to 7,000 feet with hundreds of hairpin turns and precarious bridges. By early 1939, it was operational, albeit plagued by monsoonal mudslides, banditry, and mechanical breakdowns of the imported trucks, many Ford and Chevrolet models supplied via British Rangoon. Despite these challenges, it funneled an increasing volume of aid: in 1939 alone, estimates suggest up to 10,000 tons per month of munitions, gasoline, and aircraft parts from Allied sources, including early Lend-Lease precursors from the United States. The road's completion in 1938 had been a direct response to the loss of southern ports, and its vulnerability to aerial interdiction made it a prime target in Japanese planning documents. The second lifeline was the Indochina route, centered on the French-built Yunnan-Vietnam Railway (also known as the Hanoi-Kunming Railway), a 465-mile narrow-gauge line completed in 1910 that linked the port of Haiphong in French Indochina to Kunming via Hanoi and Lao Cai. This colonial artery, supplemented by parallel roads and river transport along the Red River, became China's most efficient supply conduit in 1938-1939, exploiting France's uneasy neutrality. French authorities, under Governor-General Pierre Pasquier and later Georges Catroux, turned a blind eye to transshipments, allowing an average of 15,000 to 20,000 tons monthly in early 1939, far surpassing the Burma Road's initial capacity. Cargoes included Soviet arms rerouted via Vladivostok and American oil, with French complicity driven by anti-Japanese sentiment and profitable tolls. However, Japanese reconnaissance flights from bases in Guangdong noted the vulnerability of bridges and rail yards, leading to initial bombing raids by mid-1939. Diplomatic pressure mounted, with Tokyo issuing protests to Paris, foreshadowing the 1940 closure under Vichy France after the fall of France in Europe. The route's proximity to the South China Sea made it a focal point for Japanese naval strategists, who viewed it as a "leak in the blockade." The third corridor, often overlooked but critical, was the Northwest Highway through Soviet Central Asia and Xinjiang province. This overland network, upgraded between 1937 and 1941 with Soviet assistance, connected the Turkestan-Siberian Railway at Almaty (then Alma-Ata) to Lanzhou in Gansu via Urumqi, utilizing a mix of trucks, camel caravans, and rudimentary roads across the Gobi Desert and Tian Shan mountains. Under the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1937 and subsequent aid agreements, Moscow supplied China with over 900 aircraft, 82 tanks, 1,300 artillery pieces, and vast quantities of ammunition and fuel between 1937 and 1941—much of it traversing this route. In 1938-1939, volumes peaked, with Soviet pilots and advisors even establishing air bases in Lanzhou. The highway's construction involved tens of thousands of Chinese laborers, facing harsh winters and logistical hurdles, but it delivered up to 2,000 tons monthly, including entire fighter squadrons like the Polikarpov I-16. Japanese intelligence, aware of this "Red lifeline," planned disruptions but were constrained by the ongoing Nomonhan Incident on the Manchurian-Soviet border in 1939, which diverted resources and highlighted the risks of provoking Moscow. These routes collectively sustained China's resistance, prompting Japan's high command to prioritize their severance. In March 1939, the South China Area Army was established under General Rikichi Andō (later succeeded by Field Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi), headquartered in Guangzhou, with explicit orders to disrupt southern communications. Aerial campaigns intensified, with Mitsubishi G3M "Nell" bombers from Wuhan and Guangzhou targeting Kunming's airfields and the Red River bridges, while diplomatic maneuvers pressured colonial powers: Britain faced demands during the June 1939 Tientsin Crisis to close the Burma Road, and France received ultimatums that culminated in the 1940 occupation of northern Indochina. Yet, direct assaults on Yunnan or Guangxi were deemed too arduous due to rugged terrain and disease risks. Instead, planners eyed peripheral objectives to encircle these arteries. This strategic calculus set the stage for the invasion of Hainan Island, a 13,000-square-mile landmass off Guangdong's southern coast, rich in iron and copper but strategically priceless for its position astride the Indochina route and proximity to Hong Kong. By February 1939, Japanese admirals like Nobutake Kondō of the 5th Fleet advocated seizure to establish air and naval bases, plugging blockade gaps and enabling raids on Haiphong and Kunming, a prelude to broader southern expansion that would echo into the Pacific War. Now after the fall campaign around Canton in autumn 1938, the Japanese 21st Army found itself embedded in a relentless effort to sever the enemy's lifelines. Its primary objective shifted from mere battlefield engagements to tightening the choke points of enemy supply, especially along the Canton–Hankou railway. Recognizing that war materiel continued to flow into the enemy's hands, the Imperial General Headquarters ordered the 21st Army to strike at every other supply route, one by one, until the arteries of logistics were stifled. The 21st Army undertook a series of decisive occupations to disrupt transport and provisioning from multiple directions. To sustain these difficult campaigns, Imperial General Headquarters reinforced the south China command, enabling greater operational depth and endurance. The 21st Army benefited from a series of reinforcements during 1939, which allowed a reorganization of assignments and missions: In late January, the Iida Detachment was reorganized into the Formosa Mixed Brigade and took part in the invasion of Hainan Island.  Hainan, just 15 miles across the Qiongzhou Strait from the mainland, represented a critical "loophole": it lay astride the Gulf of Tonkin, enabling smuggling of arms and materiel from Haiphong to Kunming, and offered potential airfields for bombing raids deep into Yunnan. Japanese interest in Hainan dated to the 1920s, driven by the Taiwan Governor-General's Office, which eyed the island's tropical resources (rubber, iron, copper) and naval potential at ports like Sanya (Samah). Prewar surveys by Japanese firms, such as those documented in Ide Kiwata's Minami Shina no Sangyō to Keizai (1939), highlighted mineral wealth and strategic harbors. The fall of Guangzhou in October 1938 provided the perfect launchpad, but direct invasion was delayed until early 1939 amid debates between the IJA (favoring mainland advances) and IJN (prioritizing naval encirclement). The operation would also heavily align with broader "southward advance" (Nanshin-ron) doctrine foreshadowing invasions of French Indochina (1940) and the Pacific War. On the Chinese side, Hainan was lightly defended as part of Guangdong's "peace preservation" under General Yu Hanmou. Two security regiments, six guard battalions, and a self-defense corps, totaling around 7,000–10,000 poorly equipped troops guarded the island, supplemented by roughly 300 Communist guerrillas under Feng Baiju, who operated independently in the interior. The indigenous Li (Hlai) people in the mountainous south, alienated by Nationalist taxes, provided uneven support but later allied with Communists. The Imperial General Headquarters ordered the 21st Army, in cooperation with the Navy, to occupy and hold strategic points on the island near Haikou-Shih. The 21st Army commander assigned the Formosa Mixed Brigade to carry out this mission. Planning began in late 1938 under the IJN's Fifth Fleet, with IJA support from the 21st Army. The objective: secure northern and southern landing sites to bisect the island, establish air/naval bases, and exploit resources. Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondō, commanding the fleet, emphasized surprise and air superiority. The invasion began under the cover of darkness on February 9, 1939, when Kondō's convoy entered Tsinghai Bay on the northern shore of Hainan and anchored at midnight. Japanese troops swiftly disembarked, encountering minimal initial resistance from the surprised Chinese defenders, and secured a beachhead in the northern zone. At 0300 hours on 10 February, the Formosa Mixed Brigade, operating in close cooperation with naval units, executed a surprise landing at the northeastern point of Tengmai Bay in north Hainan. By 04:30, the right flank reached the main road leading to Fengyingshih, while the left flank reached a position two kilometers south of Tienwei. By 07:00, the right flank unit had overcome light enemy resistance near Yehli and occupied Chiungshan. At that moment there were approximately 1,000 elements of the enemy's 5th Infantry Brigade (militia) at Chiungshan; about half of these troops were destroyed, and the remainder fled into the hills south of Tengmai in a state of disarray. Around 08:30 that same day, the left flank unit advanced to the vicinity of Shuchang and seized Hsiuying Heights. By 12:00, it occupied Haikou, the island's northern port city and administrative center, beginning around noon. Army and navy forces coordinated to mop up remaining pockets of resistance in the northern areas, overwhelming the scattered Chinese security units through superior firepower and organization. No large-scale battles are recorded in primary accounts; instead, the engagements were characterized by rapid advances and localized skirmishes, as the Chinese forces, lacking heavy artillery or air support, could not mount a sustained defense. By the end of the day, Japanese control over the north was consolidating, with Haikou falling under their occupation.Also on 10 February, the Brigade pushed forward to seize Cingang. Wenchang would be taken on the 22nd, followed by Chinglan Port on the 23rd. On February 11, the operation expanded southward when land combat units amphibiously assaulted Samah (now Sanya) at the island's southern tip. This landing allowed them to quickly seize key positions, including the port of Yulin (Yulinkang) and the town of Yai-Hsien (Yaxian, now part of Sanya). With these southern footholds secured, Japanese forces fanned out to subjugate the rest of the island, capturing inland areas and infrastructure with little organized opposition. Meanwhile, the landing party of the South China Navy Expeditionary Force, which had joined with the Army to secure Haikou, began landing on the island's southern shore at dawn on 14 February. They operated under the protection of naval and air units. By the same morning, the landing force had advanced to Sa-Riya and, by 12:00 hours, had captured Yulin Port. Chinese casualties were significant in the brief fighting; from January to May 1939, reports indicate the 11th security regiment alone suffered 8 officers and 162 soldiers killed, 3 officers and 16 wounded, and 5 officers and 68 missing, though figures for other units are unclear. Japanese losses were not publicly detailed but appear to have been light.  When crisis pressed upon them, Nationalist forces withdrew from coastal Haikou, shepherding the last civilians toward the sheltering embrace of the Wuzhi mountain range that bands the central spine of Hainan. From that high ground they sought to endure the storm, praying that the rugged hills might shield their families from the reach of war. Yet the Li country's mountains did not deliver a sanctuary free of conflict. Later in August of 1943, an uprising erupted among the Li,Wang Guoxing, a figure of local authority and stubborn resolve. His rebellion was swiftly crushed; in reprisal, the Nationalists executed a seizure of vengeance that extended far beyond the moment of defeat, claiming seven thousand members of Wang Guoxing's kin in his village. The episode was grim testimony to the brutal calculus of war, where retaliation and fear indelibly etched the landscape of family histories. Against this backdrop, the Communists under Feng Baiju and the native Li communities forged a vigorous guerrilla war against the occupiers. The struggle was not confined to partisan skirmishes alone; it unfolded as a broader contest of survival and resistance. The Japanese response was relentless and punitive, and it fell upon Li communities in western Hainan with particular ferocity, Sanya and Danzhou bore the brunt of violence, as did the many foreign laborers conscripted into service by the occupying power. The toll of these reprisals was stark: among hundreds of thousands of slave laborers pressed into service, tens of thousands perished. Of the 100,000 laborers drawn from Hong Kong, only about 20,000 survived the war's trials, a haunting reminder of the human cost embedded in the occupation. Strategically, the island of Hainan took on a new if coercive purpose. Portions of the island were designated as a naval administrative district, with the Hainan Guard District Headquarters established at Samah, signaling its role as a forward air base and as an operational flank for broader anti-Chiang Kai-shek efforts. In parallel, the island's rich iron and copper resources were exploited to sustain the war economy of the occupiers. The control of certain areas on Hainan provided a base of operations for incursions into Guangdong and French Indochina, while the airbases that dotted the island enabled long-range air raids that threaded routes from French Indochina and Burma into the heart of China. The island thus assumed a grim dual character: a frontier fortress for the occupiers and a ground for the prolonged suffering of its inhabitants. Hainan then served as a launchpad for later incursions into Guangdong and Indochina. Meanwhile after Wuhan's collapse, the Nationalist government's frontline strength remained formidable, even as attrition gnawed at its edges. By the winter of 1938–1939, the front line had swelled to 261 divisions of infantry and cavalry, complemented by 50 independent brigades. Yet the political and military fissures within the Kuomintang suggested fragility beneath the apparent depth of manpower. The most conspicuous rupture came with Wang Jingwei's defection, the vice president and chairman of the National Political Council, who fled to Hanoi on December 18, 1938, leading a procession of more than ten other KMT officials, including Chen Gongbo, Zhou Fohai, Chu Minqi, and Zeng Zhongming. In the harsh arithmetic of war, defections could not erase the country's common resolve to resist Japanese aggression, and the anti-Japanese national united front still served as a powerful instrument, rallying the Chinese populace to "face the national crisis together." Amid this political drama, Japan's strategy moved into a phase that sought to convert battlefield endurance into political consolidation. As early as January 11, 1938, Tokyo had convened an Imperial Conference and issued a framework for handling the China Incident that would shape the theater for years. The "Outline of Army Operations Guidance" and "Continental Order No. 241" designated the occupied territories as strategic assets to be held with minimal expansion beyond essential needs. The instruction mapped an operational zone that compressed action to a corridor between Anqing, Xinyang, Yuezhou, and Nanchang, while the broader line of occupation east of a line tracing West Sunit, Baotou, and the major river basins would be treated as pacified space. This was a doctrine of attrition, patience, and selective pressure—enough to hold ground, deny resources to the Chinese, and await a more opportune political rupture. Yet even as Japan sought political attrition, the war's tactical center of gravity drifted toward consolidation around Wuhan and the pathways that fed the Yangtze. In October 1938, after reducing Wuhan to a fortressed crescent of contested ground, the Japanese General Headquarters acknowledged the imperative to adapt to a protracted war. The new calculus prioritized political strategy alongside military operations: "We should attach importance to the offensive of political strategy, cultivate and strengthen the new regime, and make the National Government decline, which will be effective." If the National Government trembled under coercive pressure, it risked collapse, and if not immediately, then gradually through a staged series of operations. In practice, this meant reinforcing a centralized center while allowing peripheral fronts to be leveraged against Chongqing's grip on the war's moral economy. In the immediate post-Wuhan period, Japan divided its responsibilities and aimed at a standoff that would enable future offensives. The 11th Army Group, stationed in the Wuhan theater, became the spearhead of field attacks on China's interior, occupying a strategic triangle that included Hunan, Jiangxi, and Guangxi, and protecting the rear of southwest China's line of defense. The central objective was not merely to seize territory, but to deny Chinese forces the capacity to maneuver along the critical rail and river corridors that fed the Nanjing–Jiujiang line and the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway. Central to this plan was Wuhan's security and the ability to constrain Jiujiang's access to the Yangtze, preserving a corridor for air power and logistics. The pre-war arrangement in early 1939 was a tableau of layered defenses and multiple war zones, designed to anticipate and blunt Japanese maneuver. By February 1939, the Ninth War Zone under Xue Yue stood in a tense standoff with the Japanese 11th Army along the Jiangxi and Hubei front south of the Yangtze. The Ninth War Zone's order of battle, Luo Zhuoying's 19th Army Group defending the northern Nanchang front, Wang Lingji's 30th Army Group near Wuning, Fan Songfu's 8th and 73rd Armies along Henglu, Tang Enbo's 31st Army Group guarding southern Hubei and northern Hunan, and Lu Han's 1st Army Group in reserve near Changsha and Liuyang, was a carefully calibrated attempt to absorb, delay, and disrupt any Xiushui major Japanese thrust toward Nanchang, a city whose strategic significance stretched beyond its own bounds. In the spring of 1939, Nanchang was the one city in southern China that Tokyo could not leave in Chinese hands. It was not simply another provincial capital; it was the beating heart of whatever remained of China's war effort south of the Yangtze, and the Japanese knew it. High above the Gan River, on the flat plains west of Poyang Lake, lay three of the finest airfields China had ever built: Qingyunpu, Daxiaochang, and Xiangtang. Constructed only a few years earlier with Soviet engineers and American loans, they were long, hard-surfaced, and ringed with hangars and fuel dumps. Here the Chinese Air Force had pulled back after the fall of Wuhan, and here the red-starred fighters and bombers of the Soviet volunteer groups still flew. From Nanchang's runways a determined pilot could reach Japanese-held Wuhan in twenty minutes, Guangzhou in less than an hour, and even strike the docks at Hong Kong if he pushed his range. Every week Japanese reconnaissance planes returned with photographs of fresh craters patched, new aircraft parked wing-to-wing, and Soviet pilots sunning themselves beside their I-16s. As long as those fields remained Chinese, Japan could never claim the sky. The city was more than airfields. It sat exactly where the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway met the line running north to Jiujiang and the Yangtze, a knot that tied together three provinces. Barges crowded Poyang Lake's western shore, unloading crates of Soviet ammunition and aviation fuel that had come up the river from the Indochina railway. Warehouses along the tracks bulged with shells and rice. To the Japanese staff officers plotting in Wuhan and Guangzhou, Nanchang looked less like a city and more like a loaded spring: if Chiang Kai-shek ever found the strength for a counteroffensive to retake the middle Yangtze, this would be the place from which it would leap. And so, in the cold March of 1939, the Imperial General Headquarters marked Nanchang in red on every map and gave General Okamura the order he had been waiting for: take it, whatever the cost. Capturing the city would do three things at once. It would blind the Chinese Air Force in the south by seizing or destroying the only bases from which it could still seriously operate. It would tear a hole in the last east–west rail line still feeding Free China. And it would shove the Nationalist armies another two hundred kilometers farther into the interior, buying Japan precious time to digest its earlier conquests and tighten the blockade. Above all, Nanchang was the final piece in a great aerial ring Japan was closing around southern China. Hainan had fallen in February, giving the navy its southern airfields. Wuhan and Guangzhou already belonged to the army. Once Nanchang was taken, Japanese aircraft would sit on a continuous arc of bases from the tropical beaches of the South China Sea to the banks of the Yangtze, and nothing (neither the Burma Road convoys nor the French railway from Hanoi) would move without their permission. Chiang Kai-shek's decision to strike first in the Nanchang region in March 1939 reflected both urgency and a desire to seize initiative before Japanese modernization of the battlefield could fully consolidate. On March 8, Chiang directed Xue Yue to prepare a preemptive attack intended to seize the offensive by March 15, focusing the Ninth War Zone's efforts on preventing a river-crossing assault and pinning Japanese forces in place. The plan called for a sequence of coordinated actions: the 19th Army Group to hold the northern front of Nanchang; the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Border Advance Army (the 8th and 73rd Armies) to strike the enemy's left flank from Wuning toward De'an and Ruichang; the 30th and 27th Army Groups to consolidate near Wuning; and the 1st Army Group to push toward Xiushui and Sandu, opening routes for subsequent operations. Yet even as Xue Yue pressed for action, the weather of logistics and training reminded observers that no victory could be taken for granted. By March 9–10, Xue Yue warned Chiang that troops were not adequately trained, supplies were scarce, and preparations were insufficient, requesting a postponement to March 24. Chiang's reply was resolute: the attack must commence no later than the 24th, for the aim was preemption and the desire to tether the enemy's forces before they could consolidate. When the moment of decision arrived, the Chinese army began to tense, and the Japanese, no strangers to rapid shifts in tempo—moved to exploit any hesitation or fog of mobilization. The Ninth War Zone's response crystallized into a defensive posture as the Japanese pressed forward, marking a transition from preemption to standoff as both sides tested the limits of resilience. The Japanese plan for what would become known as Operation Ren, aimed at severing the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway, breaking the enemy's line of communication, and isolating Nanchang, reflected a calculated synthesis of air power, armored mobility, and canalized ground offensives. On February 6, 1939, the Central China Expeditionary Army issued a set of precise directives: capture Nanchang to cut the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway and disrupt the southern reach of Anhui and Zhejiang provinces; seize Nanchang along the Nanchang–Xunyi axis to split enemy lines and "crush" Chinese resistance south of that zone; secure rear lines immediately after the city's fall; coordinate with naval air support to threaten Chinese logistics and airfields beyond the rear lines. The plan anticipated contingencies by pre-positioning heavy artillery and tanks in formations that could strike with speed and depth, a tactical evolution from previous frontal assaults. Okamura Yasuji, commander of the 11th Army, undertook a comprehensive program of reconnaissance, refining the assault plan with a renewed emphasis on speed and surprise. Aerial reconnaissance underlined the terrain, fortifications, and the disposition of Chinese forces, informing the selection of the Xiushui River crossing and the route of the main axis of attack. Okamura's decision to reorganize artillery and armor into concentrated tank groups, flanked by air support and advanced by long-range maneuver, marked a departure from the earlier method of distributing heavy weapons along the infantry front. Sumita Laishiro commanded the 6th Field Heavy Artillery Brigade, with more than 300 artillery pieces, while Hirokichi Ishii directed a force of 135 tanks and armored vehicles. This blended arms approach promised a breakthrough that would outpace the Chinese defenders and open routes for the main force. By mid-February 1939, Japanese preparations had taken on a high tempo. The 101st and 106th Divisions, along with attached artillery, assembled south of De'an, while tank contingents gathered north of De'an. The 6th Division began moving toward Ruoxi and Wuning, the Inoue Detachment took aim at the waterways of Poyang Lake, and the 16th and 9th Divisions conducted feints on the Han River's left bank. The orchestration of these movements—feints, riverine actions, and armored flanking, was designed to reduce the Chinese capacity to concentrate forces around Nanchang and to force the defenders into a less secure posture along the Nanchang–Jiujiang axis. Japan's southward strategy reframed the war: no longer a sprint to reduce Chinese forces in open fields, but a patient siege of lifelines, railways, and airbases. Hainan's seizure, the control of Nanchang's airfields, and the disruption of the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway exemplified a shift from large-scale battles to coercive pressure that sought to cripple Nationalist mobilization and erode Chongqing's capacity to sustain resistance. For China, the spring of 1939 underscored resilience amid mounting attrition. Chiang Kai-shek's insistence on offensive means to seize the initiative demonstrated strategic audacity, even as shortages and uneven training slowed tempo. The Ninth War Zone's defense, bolstered by makeshift airpower from Soviet and Allied lendings, kept open critical corridors and delayed Japan's consolidation. The war's human cost—massive casualties, forced labor, and the Li uprising on Hainan—illuminates the brutality that fueled both sides' resolve. In retrospect, the period around Canton, Wuhan, and Nanchang crystallizes a grim truth: the Sino-Japanese war was less a single crescendo of battles than a protracted contest of endurance, logistics, and political stamina. The early 1940s would widen these fault lines, but the groundwork laid in 1939, competition over supply routes, air control, and strategic rail nodes, would shape the war's pace and, ultimately, its outcome. The conflict's memory lies not only in the clashes' flash but in the stubborn persistence of a nation fighting to outlast a formidable adversary. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese invasion of Hainan and proceeding operations to stop logistical leaks into Nationalist China, showcased the complexity and scale of the growing Second Sino-Japanese War. It would not merely be a war of territorial conquest, Japan would have to strangle the colossus using every means necessary.  

The author has been explaining Sichuan cuisine to westerners for decades. But ‘Fu Xia', as she's known, has had a profound effect on food lovers in China, too By Leslie T Chang. Read by Ginnia Cheng. Help support our independent journalism at theguardian.com/longreadpod

For much of the past decade, Chile's export of cherries to China ran on a narrow calendar.过去十年间，智利樱桃对华出口长期受制于狭窄的时令窗口。From December to early the following year, the fruit ripened in Chile's central valleys. Weeks later, just ahead of the Chinese New Year, those cherries arrived as a seasonal luxury, scarce, expensive and tightly bound to the holiday. The logic was simple: southern-hemisphere harvests met Northern Hemisphere festivities, and value depended on timing as much as taste.从十二月到次年年初，智利中部山谷的果实逐渐成熟。数周后，恰逢中国新年之际，这些樱桃作为季节性奢侈品抵达，稀缺昂贵，与节日紧密相连。其逻辑很简单：南半球的收获期恰逢北半球的节日庆典，价值取决于时机与风味同样重要。That logic is now weakening.这种逻辑如今正在减弱。In early 2026, more than a month before Chinese New Year, Chilean cherries were already widely available in China at prices far below previous norms. Boxes of JJ-level Chilean cherry (with a diameter of 28 to 30 millimeters) weighing about 2.5 kilograms were selling for around 159 yuan ($22.7) in major supermarkets in Chengdu, Southwest China's Sichuan province, with some promotional prices falling to 99 yuan, roughly 40 percent lower than a year earlier.2026年初，距离春节还有一个多月时，智利樱桃已在国内广泛上市，价格远低于往年水平。在西南地区四川省成都市的主要超市里，每箱重约2.5公斤的JJ级智利樱桃（直径28至30毫米）售价约159元（22.7美元），促销价甚至低至99元，较去年同期下降约40%。At local wholesale markets, prices fell even more sharply, with some high-grade cherries priced at nearly half of last year's level.在当地批发市场，价格跌幅更为显著，部分优质樱桃的价格几乎跌至去年水平的一半。Such movements do not point to a weakening of demand. Rather, they reflect a structural change in how supply reaches the market.此类变动并非表明需求疲软，而是反映了供应进入市场的结构性变化。Importers say the traditional preholiday bottleneck has eased, as improved logistics have reduced the need for cherries to flood the market in a short festive window.进口商表示，传统的节前供应瓶颈已有所缓解，因为物流改善减少了樱桃在短暂节日窗口期涌入市场的必要性。The redistribution of time has institutional roots.这种时间的重新分配具有制度根源。China and Chile's upgraded free trade agreement in 2017 placed more than 97 percent of traded products under zero tariffs, lowering the fixed costs of entry for Chilean cherries. Over time, it encouraged not just higher volumes but investment in logistics capable of delivering large quantities with greater predictability.2017年中国与智利升级的自由贸易协定使超过97%的贸易产品享受零关税待遇，降低了智利樱桃进入中国市场的固定成本。随着时间推移，该协定不仅促进了出口量的增长，更推动了物流领域的投资——这些投资使大宗樱桃能够以更高的可预测性完成运输。The result is a highly concentrated trade relationship. In the previous harvest season, more than 90 percent of Chile's cherry exports went to China. That degree of demand certainty has allowed the industry to organize production and shipments across the entire season, rather than around a single holiday peak.由此形成了高度集中的贸易关系。在上个采收季，智利樱桃出口量的90%以上销往中国。如此确定的需求量使该行业得以在整个采收季统筹安排生产和运输，而非仅围绕单一节庆高峰期运作。Claudia Soler, executive director of the Cherries Committee of Fruits from Chile, described the relationship as both economic and cultural. China, she said, is the market that enabled the industry's expansion. The cherry's red color and rounded shape, she added, closely align with Chinese cultural symbolism, especially around the Chinese New Year, when cherries became a popular gift symbolizing happiness and success.智利水果出口商协会下属智利车厘子委员会执行总监克劳迪娅·索勒将两国关系描述为经济与文化双重纽带。她指出，中国市场推动了智利樱桃产业的扩张。樱桃的鲜红色彩与圆润造型，恰与中华文化象征高度契合——尤其在春节期间，樱桃作为象征幸福与成功的热门礼品广受欢迎。Since 2018, Chile has operated a direct shipping route to China known as the "cherry express", cutting transit time from roughly 30 days to about 23 days. By the end of 2025, this dedicated shipping corridor had been further scaled up, doubling the number of direct sailings compared with the previous year. This allows cherries to arrive in China in greater volumes during the peak harvest season.自2018年起，智利开通了直达中国的“樱桃快线”航运通道，将运输时间从约30天缩短至23天左右。截至2025年底，这条专用航运通道进一步扩容，直航班次较上年翻倍增长。这使得樱桃在丰收旺季能以更大规模运抵中国。This shift has reshaped incentives at the production end. Data from the office of agrarian studies and policies at Chile's Ministry of Agriculture show that the cherry planting area has expanded roughly twenty-fold since 2000, nearly doubling from about 38,392 hectares in 2019 to 70,686 hectares by 2024.这一转变重塑了生产端的激励机制。智利农业部农业研究与政策办公室数据显示，樱桃种植面积自2000年以来扩大了约二十倍，从2019年的38,392公顷增至2024年的70,686公顷，增幅近一倍。Industry participants attribute this rapid growth in part to the gradual formation of a logistics system geared toward the Chinese market, which has given Chilean growers clearer expectations over timing, allowing them to expand planting and plan output with greater confidence.行业人士认为，这种快速增长部分归功于面向中国市场的物流体系逐步形成，这使智利种植者对时间节点有了更清晰的预期，从而能够更自信地扩大种植规模并规划产量。Processing hubs in Chile's central regions now operate on a different temporal logic. Time remains critical, but it is no longer singular. In the past, a delayed shipment could miss the Chinese New Year altogether, erasing margins and turning a strong harvest into a liability. Today, improved transport has allowed exporters to distribute shipments across the season, reducing the risk concentrated in any single sailing.智利中部地区的加工中心如今遵循着不同的时间逻辑。时间依然至关重要，但已不再是唯一考量。过去，货运延误可能导致错过整个春节销售期，利润尽失，丰收反而变成负担。如今，运输条件的改善使出口商能够将货运分散在整个季节进行，从而降低了单次航运集中承担的风险。For Chinese consumers, cherries are no longer limited to a short preholiday rush, easing the need for concentrated buying ahead of Chinese New Year. Fruit exporters from Chile estimate that in the 2025-2026 season, Chile will export about 110 million boxes of cherries (five kilograms per box, roughly 550,000 metric tons), with more than 90 percent destined for China.对于中国消费者而言，樱桃消费季不再局限于春节前的短暂抢购期，缓解了春节前集中采购的需求。智利水果出口商预计，在2025-2026年产季，智利将出口约1.1亿箱樱桃（每箱5公斤，约合55万吨），其中90%以上将销往中国。preholiday bottleneck节前供应瓶颈

This week on Sinica, I speak with Daniel Bessner, the Anne H.H. and Kenneth B. Pyle Assistant Professor in American Foreign Policy at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington and co-host of the American Prestige Podcast. If you follow U.S.-China relations even casually, you can't avoid hearing that we're in a new Cold War — it's become a rhetorical reflex in D.C., shaping budgets, foreign policy debates, media narratives, and how ordinary Americans think about China.But what does it actually mean to call something a Cold War? To think clearly about the present, I find it helps to go to the past, not for simple analogies but to understand the intellectual and ideological machinery that produced and now sustains a Cold War mentality. Danny has written widely about the architecture of American power, the rise of the national security state, and the constellation of thinkers he calls Cold War liberals who helped define the ideological landscape of U.S. foreign policy. We explore how Cold War liberalism reshaped American political life, how the U.S. came to see its global dominance as natural and morally necessary, why the question of whose fault the Cold War was remains urgent in an age of renewed great power rivalry, the rise of China and anxiety of American decline, and what it would take to imagine a U.S.-China relationship that doesn't fall back into old patterns of moral binaries, ideological panic, and militarized competition.6:20 – Danny's background: from Iraq War politicization to studying defense intellectuals11:00 – Cold War liberalism: the constellation of ideas that shaped U.S. foreign policy16:14 – How these ideas became structurally embedded in security institutions22:02 – The Democratic Party's destruction of the genuine left in the late 1940s27:53 – Whose fault was the Cold War? Stalin's sphere of influence logic vs. American universalism31:07 – Are we facing a similar decision with China today?34:23 – The anxiety of loss: how decline anxiety distorts interpretation of China's rise37:54 – The new Cold War narrative: material realities vs. psychological legacies41:21 – Clearest parallels between the first Cold War and emerging U.S.-China confrontation44:33 – What would a pluralistic order in Asia actually look like?47:42 – Coexistence rather than zero-sum rivalry: what does it mean in practice?50:57 – What genuine restraint requires: accepting limits of American power54:14 – The moral imperative pushback: you can't have good empire without bad empire56:35 – Imperialist realism: Americans don't think we're good, but can't imagine another worldPaying it forward: The Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and Responsible Statecraft publication; The Trillion Dollar War Machine by William Hartung and Ben FreemanRecommendations:Danny: Nirvana and the history of Seattle punk/indie music (forthcoming podcast project)Kaiser: Hello China Tech Substack by Poe Zhao (hellotechchina.com)See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, in a joint episode with the China-Global South Podcast, I speak with Eric Olander, host of the China Global South Podcast and founder/editor-in-chief of the China-Global South Project. In the early hours of January 3rd, U.S. forces carried out a coordinated operation in Venezuela that resulted in the capture of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, followed by their rendition to the United States to face drug trafficking charges. The operation unfolded quickly, with minimal kinetic escalation, but has raised far-reaching questions about international law, hemispheric security, and the Trump administration's willingness to use force in the Western Hemisphere. Just before the raid, China's Special Envoy for Latin America, Qiu Xiaoqi, had met with Maduro in Caracas. Commentary linking Trump's action to China has ranged widely—claims about spheres of influence, arguments this was all about oil or rare earths, and pronouncements about what this means for Taiwan. Eric helps us think through China's actual stake in Venezuela, how deeply Beijing understands Latin America, what this episode does and does not change about China's role in the region and the global South more broadly, China's immediate reaction and concrete exposure on the ground, how it manages political risk when partner regimes collapse, and what Chinese military planners may be studying as they assess how this operation unfolded.5:18 – How Beijing is reading this episode: official messaging versus elite thinking 7:40 – The Taiwan comparisons on Chinese social media and why they don't work 11:09 – How deep is China's actual expertise on Latin America? 14:56 – Comparing U.S. and Chinese benches of Latin America expertise 18:02 – Are we back to spheres of influence? Why that framing doesn't work 20:09 – Where is China most exposed in Venezuela: oil, loans, personnel? 23:41 – The resource-for-infrastructure model and why it failed 28:27 – The political assets: China as defender of sovereignty and multilateralism 36:25 – Will this push left-leaning governments closer to Beijing? 40:07 – The "China impotence" narrative and what doing something would actually mean 46:26 – What Chinese military planners are actually studying 51:46 – The Qiu Xiaoqi meeting: strategic failure or intelligence delivery? 58:40 – What actually changes and what doesn't: looking aheadPaying it forward: Alonso Illueca, nonresident fellow for Latin America and the Caribbean at the China Global South ProjectRecommendations: Eric: "China's Long Economic War" by Zongyuan Zoe Liu (Foreign Affairs)Kaiser: The Venetian Heretic by Christian CameronSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, recorded at Yale University, I speak with Michael Brenes and Van Jackson, coauthors of The Rivalry Peril: How Great-Power Competition Threatens Peace and Weakens Democracy. Their argument is that framing the U.S.-China relationship as geopolitical rivalry has become more than just a foreign policy orientation — it's a domestic political project that reshapes budgets, norms, and coalitions in ways that actively harm American democracy and the American people. Rivalry narrows political possibility, makes dissent suspect, encourages neo-McCarthyism (the China Initiative, profiling of Chinese Americans), produces anti-AAPI hate, and redirects public investment away from social welfare and into defense spending through what they call "national security Keynesianism."Mike is interim director of the Brady Johnson Program in Grand Strategy at Yale, while Van is a senior lecturer in international relations at Victoria University of Wellington and host of the Un-Diplomatic Podcast. We discuss the genesis of their collaboration during the Biden administration, how they navigate China as a puzzle for the American left, canonical misrememberings of the Cold War that distort current China policy, the security dilemma feedback loop between Washington and Beijing, why defense-heavy stimulus is terrible at job creation, how rivalry politics weakens democracy, recent polling showing a shift toward engagement, and their vision for a "geopolitics of peace" anchored in Sino-U.S. détente 2.0.5:47 – The genesis of the book: recognizing Biden's Cold War liberalism 11:26 – How they approached writing together from different disciplinary homes 13:20 – Navigating China as a puzzle for the American left21:39 – How great power competition hardened from analytical framework into ideology 28:15 – Mike on two canonical misrememberings of the Cold War 33:18 – Van on the security dilemma and the nuclear feedback loop 39:55 – National security Keynesianism: why defense spending is bad at job creation 44:38 – How rivalry politics weakens democracy and securitizes dissent 48:09 – Building durable coalitions for restraint-oriented statecraft 51:27 – Has the post-COVID moral panic actually abated? 53:27 – The master narrative we need: a geopolitics of peace 55:29 – Associative balancing: achieving equilibrium through accommodation, not armsRecommendations:Van: The Long Twentieth Century by Giovanni Arrighi Mike: The World of the Cold War: 1945-1991 by Vladislav Zubok Kaiser: Pluribus (Apple TV series by Vince Gilligan)See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Redscroll & Friends Favorites of 2025 We have our favorites of the year as usual. And we have once again asked some friends to contribute lists (a couple bonus voices on the podcast even!). Give the lists a view, check out the podcast with clips of all the bands/songs and check out the playlist with all the favorites below.   Happy New Year! Let's get into the lists!  Redscroll Records Label Releases for 2025 Theoden's Reign Citadel Of The Stars LP, CD & Cassette [02/06/2025]Chop Chop Chop Chop Chop Chop Chop Become Nothing / We Live As Ghosts LP (Brand new A-Side with B-Side previously released on cassette)[04/18/2025]Killer Kin Killer Kin CD (reissued with added bonus track "Point Blank")[07/01/2025]Disfigure New Age Of Judgement CD [07/25/2025]Chained to the Bottom of the Ocean Sisyphean Cruelty CD Reissue[08/01/2025]Chained to the Bottom of the Ocean Obsession | Destruction CD & LP Reissue[08/01/2025]Chained to the Bottom of the Ocean The Vestige CD (First Time on CD)[08/01/2025]Chained to the Bottom of the Ocean Consumed by the Vitriol of Life / I Tried Catching You But You Fell Through Me LP (Released Separately Before – Now on a single 12" Record)[08/01/2025] Meetinghouse You've Seen Heaven CD & Cassette [09/05/2025]   Joe's 10 Favorite Tracks Listened To In 2025: 1. John Martyn "Over the Hill" Solid Air (Island, 1973) 2. Derek and the Dominoes "Thorn Tree In the Garden" Layla And Other Assorted Love Songs (ATCO, 1970) 3.Blaze Foley "Clay Pigeons" Clay Pigeons (Secret Seven, 2011) 4.Hiromasa Suzuki "Romance" Cat (Columbia, 1976) 5.Red Garland Trio "Tis Autumn" All Kinds Of Weather (Prestige, 1959) 6. Nina Simone "Tell It Like It Is" Isn't It A Pity / Tell It Like It Is (RCA Acetate, 1971 Probably) 7. Marvin Gaye "Distant Lover" Let's Get It On (Tamla, 1973) 8. Herbie Hancock "Speak Like A Child" Speak Like A Child (Blue Note, 1968) 9. Terry Reid "Season of the Witch" Bang, Bang You're Terry Reid (Epic, 1968) 10.Terry Reid "Mayfly" Terry Reid (Columbia, 1969) LEXI'S FAVORITES OF 2025: Oklou Choke Enough (True Panther Sounds, Because Music) Addison Rae Addison (Columbia) Ethel Cain Perverts (Daughters Of Cain) Ethel Cain Willoughby Tucker, I'll Always Love You (Daughters Of Cain) Meetinghouse You've Seen Heaven (Redscroll) Model/Actriz Pirouette (Dirty Hit, True Panther Sounds) All The Pretty Horses hammersmashedface (Self-Released) EsDeeKid Rebel (XV, Lizzy) Crippling Alcoholism Camgirl (Portrayal Of Guilt) Chat Pile / Hayden Pedigo In The Earth Again (Computer Students, Flenser) Intercourse How I Fell In Love With The Void (Brutal Panda) John Maus Later Than You Think (Young) Holy Taker Heaven Is A Place I Can't Stay (Crossover Media) Shallowater God's Gonna Give You A Million Dollars (Sans Soleil) Deafheaven Lonely People With Power (Roadrunner) Holder Holder (Daze) Playboi Carti MUSIC (AWGE, Interscope) Alex G Headlights (RCA) Old Saw The Wringing Cloth (Lobby Art) Erica's Favorites: Pile Sunshine and Balance Beams (Sooper) Viagra Boys Viagr Aboys (Shrimptech) Pigs Pigs Pigs Pigs Pigs Pigs Pigs Death Hilarious (Rocket, Missing Piece) Just Mustard We Were Just Here (Partisan) AFI Silver Bleeds The Black (Run For Cover) Bootblacks Paradise (Artoffact) Witchcraft Idag (Heavy Psych Sounds) Pelican Flickering Resonance (Run For Cover) Model/Actriz Pirouette (Dirty Hit, True Panther Sounds) Theoden's Reign Citadel Of The Stars (Redscroll) Faetooth Labyrinthine (Flenser) Scorpion Milk Slime of the Times (Peaceville) EPs: Youth Code Yours, With Malice (Sumerian) Floating Hesitating Lights (Transcending Obscurity) Matt's Favorites: Viagra Boys Viagr Aboys (Shrimptech) Intercourse How I Fell In Love With The Void (Brutal Panda) Hives Hives Forever Forever The Hives (Play It Again Sam) AFI Silver Bleeds The Black (Run For Cover) WestsideGunn  Heels Have Eyes 1+2 (Griselda) Ghostwoman Welcome To The Civilized World (Full Time Hobby) Darts Nightmare Queens (Adrenaline Fix) Ron Gallo Checkmate (Kill Rock Stars) El Michels Affair 24 Hr Sports (Big Crown) Caren's Favorites: Annie Achron Never Paradise (Siltbreeze) James K Friend (AD 93) Now Always Fades Into The Doldrums (Northern Underground Records) Acopia Blush Response (Scenic Route) Raisa K Affectionately (15 Love) Sharp Pins Balloon Balloon Balloon & Radio DDR (K Records / Perennial) Prolapse I Wonder When They're Going To Destroy Your Face (Tapete) Rest Symbol Rest Symbol (FO) K-Lone Sorry I Thought You Were Someone Else (Incienso) Bill Fox Resonance (Eleventh Hour) Caren's Reissue / Archival Favorites: Various The Way U Make Me Feel: UK Boogie & Street Soul 1984-1994 (Freestyle Records) Ali Omar Hashish Hits (Efficient Space) Pale Saints Slow Buildings (4AD) L'Empire Des Sons L'Empire Des Sons (Glossy Mistakes) Lijadu Sisters Danger (Numero Group) The Lo Yo Yo The Lo Yo Yo (Concentric Circles) Rick's Favorites: Abosahar Raasny (Heat Crimes, Hizz) Any Mega Mercy (Sferic) Deadguy Near-Death Travel Services (Relapse) Elkotsh rhlt jdi (Heat Crimes, Hizz) Kathryn Mohr Waiting Room (Flenser) Only Now Timeslave III (Self-Released) Sandwell District End Beginnings (The Point of Departure Recording Company) Slikback Attrition (Planet Mu) Billy Woods Golliwog (Backwoodz Studioz) Nuovo Testamento Trouble (DIscoteca Italia) Josh's Favorites: Viagra Boys Viagr Aboys (Shrimptech) Hives Hives Forever Forever The Hives (Play It Again Sam) Skinhead It's A Beautiful Day, What A Beautiful Day (Closed Casket Activities) Homefront Watch It Die (La Vida Es En Mus) Internal Bleeding Settle All Scores (Maggot Stomp) Warlock Corpse Eternal Prisoner (Out of Season) Sandwell District End Beginnings (The Point of Departure Recording Company) Quest Master Obscure Power (Out of Season) Lust for Youth & Croatian Amor All Worlds (Sacred Bones) Vatican Shadow 20th Hijacker (20 Buck Spin) Friends of Redscroll Lists! Chop Chop Chop Chop Chop Chop Chop Favorites "Learn to Suffer" by Mangled State "Don't Tap the Glass" by Tyler the Creator "Killing Spree" by Sulfuric Cautery "Adapting // Crawling" by Iron Lung "Golliwog" by Billy Woods "The Body Hammer" by Endless Swarm "///" by Secret Cutter "Watch it Die" by Home Front "Lonely People With Power" by Deafheaven "Let God Sort Em Out" by Clipse Honorable mentions to R. Missing, Lana Del Rabies, De La Soul, Suppression, Black Iron Prison, and Haunt Me. Tarek of Intercourse Favorites: Crippling Alcoholism Camgirl (Portrayal Of Guilt) My Wife's An Angel Yeah, I Bet (Knife Hits, Broken Cycle Records, GRIMGRIMGRIM) In Lieu Hooligan (Learning Curve) Knub Crub (Hex) Chat Pile / Hayden Pedigo In The Earth Again (Computer Students, Flenser) |Deadguy Near-Death Travel Services (Relapse) Stefan of C/Site Recordings Favorites: Alexander "Untitled" 7" (Carbon Records) Juho Toivonen "Lapsikuninkaan Fanfaari" (Discreet Music) Lander / Unkindness split LP (Ixiol Productions) Nowhere Flower "Heat Dome" LP (Digital Regress) Shirese "Fog Bound Laughter" 7" (Stoned to Death) Lau Nau & Joshua Burkett LP (Mystra Records) Cheb Drissi "Rai Sidi Bel Abbes Volume 2" LP (Nashazphone) Los Doroncos "Sun and Fireworks" LP (An'archives)   Sarah (Manic Presents/Premier Concerts) Favorites: Hayden Pedigo - I'll Be Waving As You Drive Away World's Worst - American Muscle Friendship - Caveman Wakes Up Shallowater - God's Gonna Give You a Million Dollars Alex G - Headlights Pile - Sunshine and Balance Beams All The Pretty Horses - hammersmashedface Dean Blunt / Elias Rønnenfelt - lucre Momma - Welcome to My Blue Sky Addison Rae - Addison caroline - caroline 2 Playboi Carti - MUSIC Oklou - choke enough TAGABOW - LOTTO Cameron Winter - Heavy Metal (end of 2024 album that I think is being considered on end of year lists so it's on mine too)   Chris (Manic Presents/Premier Concerts) Favorites: Soul Blind - Red Sky Mourning Hayley Williams - Ego Death At A Bacholorette Party Restraining Order - Future Fortune The Infinity Ring - Ataraxia Carey - Stunted Bleed - S/T Cloakroom - Last Leg of the Human Table Superheaven - S/T Keep - Almost Static Oversize - Vital Signs Clipse - Let God Sort Em Out Sanguisugabogg - Hedeous Aftermath Sainthood Reps - Dull Bliss Home Front - Watch It Die Bad Beat - LP 2025 Aesop Rock - I Heard it's A Mess There Too Henry Birdsey's Favorites: Various Artists - The World Is But a Place of Survival: Begena Songs from Ethiopia + Elders of the Begena: The Harp of David in Ethiopia (Death Is Not The End) https://deathisnot.bandcamp.com/album/the-world-is-but-a-place-of-survival-begena-songs-from-ethiopia https://deathisnot.bandcamp.com/album/elders-of-the-begena-the-harp-of-david-in-ethiopia Teppana Jänis & Arja Kastinen - Teppana Jänis (Death Is Not The End) https://deathisnot.bandcamp.com/album/teppana-j-nis Various Artists - Unaccompanied Norwegian Folk String Virtuosi (Canary Records) https://canary-records.bandcamp.com/album/unaccompanied-norwegian-folk-string-virtuosi-ca-1953-65 Various Artists - Her Mother's Only Child: From the 2nd & 3rd Bulgarian National Folklore Festivals, 1971 & 1976 (Canary Records) https://canary-records.bandcamp.com/album/her-mothers-only-child-from-the-2nd-3rd-bulgarian-national-folklore-festivals-1971-1976 Dr. Abdel Latif Gohar - Egyptian Buzuq Solos ca. 1950s (Canary Records) https://canary-records.bandcamp.com/album/egyptian-buzuq-solos-ca-1950s Various Artists - A Collection of Slow Airs by Some Very Fine Fiddlers (Nyahh Records) https://nyahhrecords.bandcamp.com/album/a-collection-of-slow-airs-by-some-very-fine-fiddlers Peter Garland - Love Comes Quietly (After Robert Creeley) (Cold Blue) https://peteergarland-coldbluemusic.bandcamp.com/album/plain-songs-love-comes-quietly-after-robert-creeley Various Artists - Miao Mouthorgans & Other Rare Instruments in Guizhou, Sichuan, China (Sub Rosa) https://subrosalabel.bandcamp.com/album/miao-mouthorgans-other-rare-instruments-in-guizhou-sichuan-china Alberto Juscamaita Gastelú - Reminiscences of Raktako: Huayno Guitar from Cuzco and Ayacucho, 1930-1940 (Death Is Not The End) https://deathisnot.bandcamp.com/album/reminiscences-of-raktako-huayno-guitar-from-cuzco-and-ayacucho-1930-1940 Rowland Taylor - Absolute Control Can Be The Death of Good Work (S/R) https://rowlandtaylor.bandcamp.com/album/absolute-control-can-be-the-death-of-good-work Hypnosmord - The Thurneman Improvisations (Hypnosmord Förlag / Styggelse Tapes / The AJNA Offensive) https://styggelsetapes.bandcamp.com/album/thurnemanimprovisationerna-the-thurneman-improvisations-dmc1411 David A. Shapiro (Alexander) Favorites: sally ann morgan - second circle the horizon wednesday knudsen - atrium grace rogers - mad dogs shutaro noguchi & the roadhouse band - on the run alulu paranhos - põe epsperança nisso zé ibarra - afim ry jennings - whisperin' ry michael hurley - broken homes and gardens willie lane - bobcat turnaround derya yıldırım and grup şimşek - yarın yoksa Paul (Dissolve) Favorites: Swiz Box Set (Dischord/Sammich/Hellfire) and the Swiz book (Akashic books) Sly Lives! (aka The Burden of Black Genius) movie by Questlove (Onyx collective/Sony) The Real Me by Kyle M (Stones Throw) One Battle After Another movie by Paul Thomas Anderson (Warner Bros.) Willoughby Tucker, I'll Always Love You by Ethel Cain (Daughters of Cain) Near-death Travel Services by Deadguy (Relapse) Birthing by Swans Pink Floyd At Pompeii MCMLXXII movie (Sony Music Vision) Live Laugh Love by Earl Sweatshirt (Tan Cressida Inc./Warner Bros.) Future Fortune by Restraining Order (Blue Grape Music) Ben (Manic Presents/Premier Concerts) Favorites: Home Front - Watch it Die Safe Mind - Cutting the Stone Miltown - Tales of Never Letting Go Béton Arme - Renaissance Scarab - Burn After Listening Cadaver Dog - Bred to Fight Vatican Shadow - 20th Hijacker C4 - payback's a bitch Mil-Spec - Mil-Spec The Tubs - Cotton Crown Antoni Maiovvi Favorites: 10 Arnaud Rebotini - Winter Sequences - Skylax Records A surprise EP from French legend Arnaud Rebotini on the infamous Skylax Records. Great moody, almost electroclash esque analog gems. It's been interesting to see Rebotini's music come back around from the rave days through film scores to now without really changing much. No one does the nexus point of French House and EBM quite like him. 9 DJ Plant Texture - Life - Tresor RecordsThe first of two Tresor releases in my top 10, not sure what has been happening over there lately, but I'm here for it. A great weirdo techno 12 inch where opening track Repetitivo (Stretch Mix) sounding like Jeff Mills having eaten too many haribo, before mutating into scattered hats across the dancefloor, perhaps to trip up Joe Pesci and Daniel Stern who have broken into your house for some reason. 8 Autechre - Untilted - Warp Records Now to the first of two reissues in my list, and despite my somewhat negative thoughts as to their quote unquote live show I saw this year, I still love the music and this one in particular stuck out. Approachable but still properly mad. Proof that extreme computer music can be fun. 7 Clark - Steep Stims - Throttle Records I remember when Chris Clark came out with his first record and thinking that it too warp for warp records. I'm pretty sure we never met when I was in Berlin, unless I got him confused with Kid 606, in which case I apologize to you both. Anyway, Steep Stims is great, playful, emotional, one foot in the past and another in the future, really great work that I think will age really well. Solid work Mr Clark. 6 Emptyset - Dissever - Thrill Jockey Records Amazing new record from Emptyset, feels like they took all the lessons from all the later records and applied it to the earlier ones. Beautiful intense grinding drones, like someone built an installation of Sheer Hellish Miasma and I'm somehow in the room with it. 5 Merzbow, Iggor Cavalera, Eraldo Bernocchi - Nocturnal Rainforest - PAN Full disclosure, Iggor sent this to me, but it's been on my repeated listens ever since. Zen-like terror but incredibly dynamic. One of the best noise releases of the year and I'd go as far as to say a career highlight for each of the members. 4 Various Artists - 30 Years Sonic Groove - Sonic Groove Has it really been 30 years of Sonic Groove? Adam X compiles a collection of outstanding producers for this excellent collection of tracks. Highlights include the mutant acid of Bryan Zentz, the incomparable genius of Mike Parker and the industrial brutality of Statiqbloom. 3 Dopplereffekt - Metasymmetry - Tresor The second Tresor release on my list is the mighty Dopplereffekt. Beautiful, futuristic and unmistakably Detroit. Top 3 don't disagree! 2 Maria Somerville - Luster - 4AD Genuinely shocking to hear an artist on 4AD in 2025 that sounds like what an artist on 4AD sounds like in my head and it's great. Melancholic Ambient shoegaze for a new generation. 1 Coil - Black Antlers - Dais Records Black Antlers is not my favorite Coil album, but it is the one I least expected to be reissued as it was originally a tour only CDR that then got expanded. You could argue that it might not count as a proper Coil album, but who has time for these discussions. Some of the best music ever created. Nick (Disfigure; the one on the right in the pic) Favorites: Kommodus - A Foetal Wolf in Stained Glass - Probably my favorite release from Kommodus. Really awesome auxiliary instruments incorporated here and I like the unhinged melodic leads thrown in on a lot of the songs. It has a punkier tinge to it with the guitar tones and the vocals are equally as heavy Fellwinter - Dark Mediaeval Art - Pure riff-centric Judas Iscariot worship Magus Lord - In The Company of Champions - Epic in every way. I liked this better than the Lamp record this year but M has been writing fantastic black metal for a while and this side project is really refreshing to follow Ultimate Disaster - For Progress . . . - Perfectly written D-Beat in my opinion. Very tight songwriting and the riffs and solos are so well executed Valen - Viarum - I'm a huge Thangorodrim fan and this project has reminded me most of that. This was my go-to Dungeon Synth for some epic game nights this year Enceladus - Demo II - Another great release from this project. I love the half time parts, the more death metal sounding vocals, and just the ferocity of the songs while still being melodic Iron Firmament - Arcane Overspill - Amazing black metal from Washington, a state known for churning out amazing black metal for over two decades. I really love the production on this release, especially the interludes. This band writes amazing riffs and this has been a standout for me in their already exceptional discography Sharp Pins - Balloon Balloon Balloon - I love Power pop, I love Guided By Voices and Sharp Pins delivers on all fronts Occult Blood/Carrion Bloom - Battle Cries of Endless Night - Both sides of this split are fantastic. Put out by Wergild who can't miss lately with their bands/releases Utility - S/T - The hometown heroes! The whole release but especially the first song reminds me so much of Fired Up, one of my favorite CT hardcore bands of all time. Great songwriting and also absolutely on point with the energy and vocals. The demo before this is fantastic as well     The Redscroll Podcast is a monthly show (first of the month going forward) that works as a companion to what we do at Redscroll Records in Wallingford, CT USA. We are a record store that has a heavy emphasis on the left of center / underground music of the world. Whether it be underappreciated or just has a niche audience, marginalized or just off the radar it's all of interest to us. With the show we'll generally have a localized focus. We'll discuss upcoming releases and what is in our personal rotation at the moment. We'll talk about upcoming area musical activities. We'll talk to guests who have to do with all of the above. And we'll talk about specific dealings with the store. If you have input you're welcome to contact us through email (redscroll@gmail.com).

Happy holidays from Sinica! This week, I speak with Paul Triolo, Senior Vice President for China and Technology Policy Lead at DGA Albright Stonebridge Group and nonresident honorary senior fellow on technology at the Asia Society Policy Institute's Center for China Analysis. On December 8th, Donald Trump announced via Truth Social that he would approve Nvidia H200 sales to vetted Chinese customers — a decision that immediately sparked fierce debate. Paul and I unpack why this decision was made, why it's provoked such strong reactions, and what it tells us about the future of technology export controls on China. We discuss the evolution of U.S. chip controls from the Entity List expansions under Trump's first term through the October 2022 rules and the Sullivan Doctrine, the role of David Sacks and Jensen Huang in advocating for this policy shift, whether Chinese firms will actually want to buy H200s given their heterogeneous hardware stacks and Beijing's autarky ambitions, what the Reuters report about China cracking ASML's EUV lithography code tells us about the choke point strategy, and whether selective engagement actually strengthens Taiwan's Silicon Shield or undermines it. This conversation is essential listening for understanding the strategic, technical, and political dimensions of the semiconductor competition.6:44 – What the H200 decision actually changes in the real world 9:23 – The evolution of U.S. chip controls: from Entity Lists to the Sullivan Doctrine 18:28 – How Jensen Huang and David Sacks convinced Trump 25:21 – The good-faith case for why export control advocates see H200 approval as a strategic mistake 32:12 – What H200s practically enable: training, inference, or stabilizing existing clusters 38:49 – Will Chinese companies actually buy H200s? The heterogeneous hardware reality 46:06 – The strategic contradiction: exporting 5nm GPUs while freezing tool controls at 16/14nm 51:01 – The Reuters EUV report and what it reveals about choke point technologies 58:43 – How Taiwan fits into this: does selective engagement strengthen the Silicon Shield? 1:07:26 – Looking ahead: broader rethinking of export controls or patchwork exceptions? 1:12:49 – What would have to be true in 2-3 years for critics to have been right about H200?Paying it forward: Poe Zhao and his Substack Hello China TechRecommendations: Paul: Zbig: The Life of Zbigniew Brzezinski, Amerca's Great Power Propheti by Ed Luce; Hyperdimensional Substack by Dean Ball Kaiser: Everything Is Tuberculosis by John Green; The Anthropocene Reviewed by John Green; So Very Small by Thomas LevensonSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

What began as a teenage crush became a lifelong journey into Chinese for Matthew McGuire, an Australian creator and accent coach. In this episode, Jared sits down with Matthew to discuss how he learned Mandarin without textbooks, grammar drills, or writing practice. Instead, he immersed himself in love dramas, shadowed dialogue, and built a Chinese-speaking social circle. Matthew shares how his curiosity and enjoyment guided him from impressing a girl from Sichuan to achieving real proficiency and forming meaningful friendships. He also explains how Chinese opened doors for him both personally and professionally, and why he believes language learning should be fun, intentional, and grounded in real-life use. For anyone feeling stuck in their studies or unsure of how to move forward, Matthew's story offers valuable perspective and inspiration.Links from the episode:Matthew McGuire on Instagram | @realozziemcguireChinese graded readers make an excellent gift! Head over to: https://www.mandarincompanion.comAllSet Learning has some amazing deals on lessons right now: https://www.allsetlearning.com

La récente visite d'Emmanuel Macron en Chine a placé l'intelligence artificielle au centre des échanges franco-chinois. Au menu : coopérations éducatives, données numériques, voitures autonomes et open source.Interview : Shanhui Zhang, journaliste à China Global Television Network (CGTN)Vous avez suivi le déplacement du président français en Chine. Que faut-il en retenir sur le plan technologique ?Cette visite s'inscrit dans une continuité : c'était déjà la quatrième fois qu'Emmanuel Macron se rendait en Chine. À chaque déplacement, le président français aborde plusieurs dossiers clés - énergie, géopolitique, économie - mais cette fois encore, la dimension technologique, et en particulier l'intelligence artificielle, était centrale. La France joue un rôle important au sein de l'Union européenne, notamment dans la définition des normes, et cela pèse fortement dans les discussions avec la Chine sur l'IA, la gestion des données et les coopérations industrielles.Un moment marquant a été la tenue de la septième session du comité des entrepreneurs franco-chinois, qui réunit de grandes entreprises des deux pays pour explorer les opportunités de coopération à l'ère numérique. On a vu la présence d'acteurs majeurs de l'IA chinoise comme iFLYTEK, un leader de l'intelligence artificielle spécialisé dans la traduction automatique, l'éducation et la santé, dont les technologies sont déjà largement utilisées en Chine et pourraient, à terme, s'exporter vers la France et l'Europe.La coopération éducative et scientifique semble également centrale. Pourquoi ?Parce que l'intelligence artificielle ne se limite pas aux entreprises : elle se construit aussi dans les universités. Lors de son discours à l'université du Sichuan, Emmanuel Macron a clairement évoqué les opportunités offertes aux étudiants chinois de venir étudier en France, notamment dans le domaine de l'intelligence artificielle et des hautes technologies.Mais il faut aussi souligner que la Chine a énormément investi ces dernières années dans l'enseignement de l'IA. L'avenir ne sera donc pas une coopération à sens unique, mais plutôt une exploration commune, « main dans la main ». L'objectif est un échange équilibré de compétences, de chercheurs et d'étudiants, bénéfique à la fois à la Chine et à la France.Les questions des données et de la méfiance européenne à l'égard de la Chine ont-elles été abordées ?Oui, c'est un sujet absolument central, qui touche au cœur même de la coopération technologique entre la Chine et l'Europe. En juillet 2025, un dialogue spécifique sur l'intelligence artificielle a eu lieu entre le vice-ministre chinois des Sciences et Technologies et l'envoyé spécial du président français. Les deux parties ont publié une déclaration commune insistant sur le développement d'une IA sûre, équitable et porteuse de sens, ainsi que sur la nécessité d'une gouvernance mondiale de ces technologies.La Chine cherche aujourd'hui à rassurer les Européens, notamment sur la gestion des données, en travaillant avec l'Union européenne à la création de plateformes bilatérales et à une meilleure organisation des flux de données. L'idée est de trouver des convergences entre les règles européennes, comme le Règlement général sur la protection des données (RGPD), et les lois chinoises sur la sécurité des données, afin de bâtir un cadre commun acceptable des deux côtés.Voir : China Global Television Network (CGTN)-----------♥️ Soutien : https://mondenumerique.info/don

This week on Sinica, I speak with Mark Sidel, the Doyle Bascom Professor of Law and Public Affairs at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and a senior fellow at the International Center for Not for Profit Law. Mark has written extensively on law and philanthropy in China and across Asia, including widely cited analyses of how the Chinese security state came to play a central role in managing foreign civil society organizations. Since the Law on the Management of Domestic Activities of Overseas NGOs took effect on January 1, 2017, China has introduced a remarkably comprehensive, vertically integrated system of oversight for foreign NGOs, foundations, and nonprofits.We discuss how this system combines securitization and political risk management with selective accommodation of service provision and technical expertise, Mark's typology of organizational responses (survivors, hibernators, regionalizers, work-arounders, and leavers), the requirement that foreign NGOs secure professional supervisory units, the impact on China's domestic nonprofit ecosystem, and what this tells us about the party-state's long-term vision for controlled engagement with the outside world.4:43 – The landscape of non-state organizations before the 2016 law 7:06 – What changed: color revolutions, Arab Spring, and domestic anxieties 9:08 – Public security intellectuals and their influence on the law 11:51 – How registration and temporary activity filing systems work in practice 13:48 – Why the Ministry of Public Security, not Civil Affairs, was put in charge 19:31 – The professional supervisory unit requirement and dependency relationships22:48 – How the state shifted foreign NGO work away from advocacy without banning it26:17 – Mark's typology: survivors, hibernators, regionalizers, work-arounders, and leavers 35:19 – What correlates with success for those who have survived 40:41 – Impact on China's domestic nonprofit ecosystem and professional intermediaries 45:54 – What makes China's system distinctive compared to India, Egypt, Russia, and Vietnam 50:19 – The Article 53 problem and university partnerships 55:32 – Advice for mid-sized foundations or NGOs considering work in China todayPaying it Forward: Neysun Mahboubi and the Penn Project on the Future of U.S.-China RelationsRecommendations:Mark: Everyday Democracy: Civil Society, Youth, and the Struggle Against Authoritarian Culture in China by Anthony SpiresKaiser: The music of Steve Morse (Dixie Dregs, The Dregs, Steve Morse Band)See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

The last time Yamato was heavily involved on the continent, they were defeated militarily, and they returned to fortify their islands.  So how are things looking, now? This episode we will talk about some of what has been going on with Tang and Silla, but also touch on the Mishihase, the Hayato, the people of Tamna and Tanegashima, and more! For more information and references, check out:  https://sengokudaimyo.com/podcast/episode-140   Rough Transcript   Welcome to Sengoku Daimyo's Chronicles of Japan.  My name is Joshua and this is episode 140: Improving Diplomatic Ties Garyang Jyeongsan and Gim Hongsye looked out from the deck of their ship, tossing and turning in the sea.  The waves were high, and the winds lashed at the ship, which rocked uncomfortably beneath their feet.  Ocean spray struck them from below while rain pelted from above. Through the torrential and unstable conditions, they looked out for their sister ship.  It was their job to escort them, but in these rough seas, bobbing up and down, they were at the mercy of the elements.  One minute they could see them, and then next it was nothing but a wall of water.  Each time they caught a glimpse the other ship seemed further and further away.  They tried calling out, but it was no use—even if they could normally have raised them, the fierce winds simply carried their voices out into the watery void.  Eventually, they lost sight of them altogether. When the winds died down and the seas settled, they looked for their companions, but they saw nothing, not even hints of wreckage on the ocean.  They could only hope that their fellow pilots knew where they were going.  As long as they could still sail, they should be able to make it to land—either to the islands  to which they were headed, or back to the safety of the peninsula. And so the escort ship continued on, even without a formal envoy to escort.  They would hope for the best, or else they would explain what would happen,  and hope that the Yamato court would understand. The seas were anything but predictable, and diplomacy was certainly not for the faint of heart.   We are going through the period of the reign of Ohoama, aka Temmu Tennou.  It started in 672, with the death of his brother, Naka no Oe, remembered as the sovereign Tenji Tenno, when Temmu took the throne from his nephew, Ohotomo, aka Kobun Tenno, in what would become known as the Jinshin no Ran.  From that point, Ohoama continued the work of his brother in creating a government based on a continental model of laws and punishments—the Ritsuryo system.  He accomplished this with assistance from his wife, Uno, and other members of the royal family—his own sons, but also nephews and other princes of the time.  And so far most of our focus has been on the local goings on within the archipelago. However, there was still plenty going on in the rest of the world, and though Yamato's focus may have been on more local affairs, it was still engaged with the rest of the world—or at least with the polities of the Korean Peninsula and the Tang Dynasty.  This episode we are going to look at Yamato's foreign relations, and how they were changing, especially as things changed on the continent. Up to this point, much of what had been happening in Yamato had been heavily influenced by the mainland in one way or another.  And to begin our discussion, we really should backtrack a bit—all the way to the Battle of Baekgang in 663, which we discussed in Episode 124.  That defeat would lead to the fall of Baekje, at the hands of the Silla-Tang alliance.  The loss of their ally on the peninsula sent Yamato into a flurry of defensive activity.  They erected fortresses on Tsushima, Kyushu, and along the Seto Inland Sea.  They also moved the capital up to Ohotsu, a more easily defended point on the shores of Lake Biwa, and likewise reinforced various strategic points in the Home Provinces as well.  These fortresses were built in the style and under the direction of many of the Baekje refugees now resettled in Yamato. For years, the archipelago braced for an invasion by the Silla-Tang alliance.  After all, with all that Yamato had done to support Baekje, it only made sense, from their perspective, for Silla and Tang to next come after them.  Sure, there was still Goguryeo, but with the death of Yeon Gaesomun, Goguryeo would not last that long.  With a unified peninsula, then why wouldn't they next look to the archipelago? And yet, the attack never came.  While Yamato was building up its defenses, it seems that the alliance between Silla and Tang was not quite as strong as their victories on the battlefield may have made it seem.  This is hardly surprising—the Tang and Silla were hardly operating on the same scale.  That said, the Tang's immense size, while bringing it great resources, also meant that it had an extremely large border to defend.  They often utilized alliances with other states to achieve their ends.  In fact, it seems fairly common for the Tang to seek alliances with states just beyond their borders against those states that were directly on their borders.  In other words, they would effectively create a pincer maneuver by befriending the enemy of their enemy.  Of course.  Once they had defeated said enemy well, wouldn't you know it, their former ally was now their newest bordering state. In the case of the Silla-Tang alliance, it appears that at the start of the alliance, back in the days of Tang Taizong, the agreement, at least from Silla's perspective, was that they would help each other against Goguryeo and Baekje, and then the Tang dynasty would leave the Korean peninsula to Silla.  However, things didn't go quite that smoothly.  The fighting against Goguryeo and Baekje can be traced back to the 640s, but Tang Taizong passed away in 649, leaving the throne to his heir, Tang Gaozong.  The Tang forces eventually helped Silla to take Baekje after the battle of Baekgang River in 663, and then Goguryeo fell in 668, but the Tang forces didn't leave the peninsula.  They remained in the former territories of Baekje and in Goguryeo, despite any former agreements.  Ostensibly they were no doubt pointing to the continuing revolts and rebellions in both regions.  While neither kingdom would fully reassert itself, it didn't mean that there weren't those who were trying.  In fact, the first revolt in Goguryeo was in 669.  There was also a revolt each year until 673.  The last one had some staying power, as the Goguryeo rebels continued to hold out for about four years. It is probably worth reminding ourselves that the Tang dynasty, during this time, had reached out on several occasions to Yamato, sending diplomatic missions, as had Silla.  While the Yamato court may have been preparing for a Tang invasion, the Tang perspective seems different.  They were preoccupied with the various revolts going on, and they had other problems.  On their western border, they were having to contend with the kingdom of Tibet, for example.  The Tibetan kingdom had a powerful influence on the southern route around the Taklamakan desert, which abuts the Tibetan plateau.   The Tang court would have had to divert resources to defend their holdings in the western regions, and it is unlikely that they had any immediate designs on the archipelago, which I suspect was considered something of a backwater to them, at the time.  In fact, Yamato would have been much more useful to the Tang as an ally to help maintain some pressure against Silla, with whom their relationship, no longer directed at a common enemy, was becoming somewhat tense. In fact, just before Ohoama came to the throne, several events had occurred that would affect the Silla-Tang alliance. The first event is more indirect—in 670, the Tibetan kingdom attacked the Tang empire.  The fighting was intense, and required serious resources from both sides.  Eventually the Tibetan forces were victorious, but not without a heavy toll on the Tibetan kingdom, which some attribute to the latter's eventual demise.  Their pyrrhic victory, however, was a defeat for the Tang, who also lost troops and resources in the fighting.  Then, in 671, the Tang empire would suffer another loss as Silla would drive the Tang forces out of the territory of the former kingdom of Baekje. With the Baekje territory under their control, it appears that Silla was also working to encourage some of rebellions in Goguryeo.  This more than irked the Tang court, currently under the formal control of Tang Gaozong and the informal—but quite considerable—control of his wife, Wu Zetian, who some claim was the one actually calling most of the shots in the court at this point in time.  Silla encouragement of restoration efforts in Goguryeo reached the Tang court in 674, in and in 675 we see that the Tang forces were sent to take back their foothold in the former Baekje territory.  Tang defeated Silla at Gyeonggi, and Silla's king, Munmu, sent a tribute mission to the Tang court, apologizing for their past behavior. However, the Tang control could not be maintained, as they had to once again withdraw most of their troops from the peninsula to send them against the Tibetan kingdom once more.  As soon as they did so, Silla once again renewed their attacks on Tang forces on the peninsula.  And so, a year later, in 676, the Tang forces were back.  They crossed the Yellow Sea to try and take back the Tang territories on the lower peninsula, but they were unsuccessful.  Tang forces were defeated by Silla at Maeso Fortress in modern day Yeoncheon.  After a bit more fighting, Silla ended up in control of all territory south of the Taedong River, which runs through Pyongyang, one of the ancient capitals of Goguryeo and the capital of modern North Korea.  This meant that the Tang dynasty still held much of the territory of Goguryeo under their control. With everything that was going on, perhaps that explains some of the apparently defensive measures that Yamato continued to take.  For example, the second lunar month of 675, we know that Ohoama proceeded to Takayasu castle, likely as a kind of formal inspection.  Then, in the 10th lunar month of 675 Ohoama commanded that everyone from the Princes down to the lowest rank were to provide the government with weapons.  A year later, in the 9th month of 676, the Princes and Ministers sent agents to the capital and the Home Provinces and gave out weapons to each man.  Similar edicts would be issued throughout the reign.  So in 679 the court announced that in two years time, which is to say the year 681, there would be a review of the weapons and horses belonging to the Princes of the Blood, Ministers, and any public functionaries.  And in that same year, barrier were erected for the first time on Mt. Tatsta and Mt. Afusaka, along with an outer line of fortifications at Naniwa. While some of that no doubt also helped to control internal movements, it also would have been useful to prepare for the possibility of future invasions.  And the work continued.  In 683  we see a royal command to all of the various provinces to engage in military training.  And in 684 it was decreed at that there would be an inspection in the 9th month of the following year—685—and they laid out the ceremonial rules, such as who would stand where, what the official clothing was to look like, etc.  Furthermore, there was also an edict that all civil and military officials should practice the use of arms and riding horses.  They were expected to supply their own horses, weapons, and anything they would wear into battle. If they owned horses, they would be considered cavalry soldiers, while those who did not have their own horse would be trained as infantry.  Either way, they would each receive training, and the court was determined to remove any obstacles and excuses that might arise.   Anyone who didn't comply would be punished.  Non compliance could mean refusing to train, but it could also just mean that they did not provide the proper horses or equipment, or they let their equipment fall into a state of disrepair.  Punishments could range from fines to outright flogging, should they be found guilty.  On the other hand, those who practiced well would have any punishments against them for other crimes reduced by two degrees, even if it was for a capital crime.  This only applied to previous crimes, however—if it seemed like you were trying to take advantage of this as a loophole to be able to get away with doing your own thing than the pardon itself would be considered null and void. A year later, the aforementioned inspection was carried out by Princes Miyatokoro, Hirose, Naniwa, Takeda, and Mino.  Two months later, the court issued another edict demanding that military equipment—specifically objects such as large or small horns, drums, flutes, flags, large bows, or catapults—should be stored at the government district house and not kept in private arsenals.  The "large bow" in this case may be something like a ballista, though Aston translates it to crossbow—unfortunately, it isn't exactly clear, and we don't necessarily have a plethora of extant examples to point to regarding what they meant.  Still, these seem to be focused on things that would be used by armies—especially the banners, large bows, and catapults.  The musical instruments may seem odd, though music was often an important part of Tang dynasty military maneuvers.  It was used to coordinate troops, raise morale, provide a marching rhythm, and more.  Granted, much of this feels like something more continental, and it is unclear if music was regularly used in the archipelago.  This could be more of Yamato trying to emulate the Tang dynasty rather than something that was commonplace on the archipelago.  That might also explain the reference to the Ohoyumi and the catapults, or rock throwers. All of this language having to do with military preparations could just be more of the same as far as the Sinicization of the Yamato government is concerned; attempts to further emulate what they understood of the civilized governments on the mainland—or at least their conception of those governments based on the various written works that they had imported.  Still, I think it is relevant that there was a lot of uncertainty regarding the position of various polities and the potential for conflict.  Each year could bring new changes to the political dynamic that could see military intervention make its way across the straits.  And of course, there was always the possibility that Yamato itself might decide to raise a force of its own. Throughout all of this, there was continued contact with the peninsula and other lands.  Of course, Silla and Goguryeo were both represented when Ohoama came to the throne—though only the Silla ambassador made it to the ceremony, apparently.  In the 7th lunar month of 675, Ohotomo no Muraji no Kunimaro was sent to Silla as the Chief envoy, along with Miyake no Kishi no Irishi.  They likely got a chance to witness first-hand the tensions between Silla and the Tang court.  The mission would return in the second lunar month of the following year, 676.  Eight months later, Mononobe no Muarji no Maro and Yamashiro no Atahe no Momotari were both sent.  That embassy also returned in the 2nd lunar month of the following year. Meanwhile, it wasn't just Yamato traveling to Silla—there were also envoys coming the other way.  For example, in the 2nd lunar month of 675 we are told that Silla sent Prince Chyungweon as an ambassador.  His retinue was apparently detained on Tsukushi while the actual envoy team went on to the Yamato capital.  It took them about two months to get there, and then they stayed until the 8th lunar month, so about four months in total. At the same time, in the third month, Goguryeo and Silla both sent "tribute" to Yamato.  And in the 8th month, Prince Kumaki, from Tamna, arrived at Tsukushi as well.  Tamna, as you may recall, refers to nation on the island known today as Jeju.  The late Alexander Vovin suggested that the name originated from a proto-Japonic cognate with "Tanimura", and many of the names seem to also bear out a possible Japonic influence on the island nation. Although they only somewhat recently show up in the Chronicles from our perspective, archaeological evidence suggests that they had trade with Yayoi Japan and Baekje since at least the first century.  With the fall of Baekje, and the expansion of Yamato authority to more of the archipelago, we've seen a notable uptick in the communication between Tamna and Yamato noted in the record.  A month after the arrival of Prince Kumaki in Tsukushi, aka Kyushu, it is noted that a Prince Koyo of Tamna arrived at Naniwa.  The Tamna guests would stick around for almost a year, during which time they were presented with a ship and eventually returned in the 7th lunar month of the following year, 676.   Tamna envoys, who had also shown up in 673, continued to be an annual presence at the Yamato court through the year 679, after which there is an apparent break in contact, picking back up in 684 and 685. 676 also saw a continuation of Silla representatives coming to the Yamato court, arriving in the 11th lunar month.  That means they probably passed by the Yamato envoys heading the other way.  Silla, under King Mumnu, now had complete control of the Korean peninsula south of the Taedong river.  In the same month we also see another mission from Goguryeo, but the Chronicle also points out that the Goguryeo envoys had a Silla escort, indicating the alliance between Silla and those attempting to restore Goguryeo—or at least the area of Goguryeo under Tang control.  The Tang, for their part, had pulled back their commandary to Liaodong, just west of the modern border between China and North Korea, today.  Goguryeo would not go quietly, and the people of that ancient kingdom—one of the oldest on the peninsula—would continue to rise up and assert their independence for years to come. The chronicles also record envoys from the somewhat mysterious northern Mishihase, or Sushen, thought to be people of the Okhotsk Sea culture from the Sakhalin islands.  There were 11 of them, and they came with the Silla envoys, possibly indicating their influence on the continent and through the Amur river region.  Previously, most of the contact had been through the regions of Koshi and the Emishi in modern Tohoku and Hokkaido.  This seems to be their only major envoy to the Yamato court recorded in this reign. Speaking of outside groups, in the 2nd lunar month of 677 we are told that there was an entertainment given to men of Tanegashima under the famous Tsuki tree west of Asukadera.  Many people may know Tanegashima from the role it played in the Sengoku Period, when Europeans made contact and Tanegashima became a major hub of Sengoku era firearm manufacturing.  At this point, however, it seems that it was still a largely independent island in the archipelago off the southern coast of Kyushu.  Even southern Kyushu appears to have retained some significant cultural differences at this time, with the "Hayato" people being referenced in regards to southern Kyushu—we'll talk about them in a bit as they showed up at the capital in 682.  Tanegashima is actually closer to Yakushima, another island considered to be separate, culturally, from Yamato, and could be considered the start of the chain of islands leading south to Amami Ohoshima and the other Ryukyuan islands.  That said, Tanegashima and Yakushima are much closer to the main islands of the archipelago and show considerable influence, including Yayoi and Kofun cultural artifacts, connecting them more closely to those cultures, even if Yamato initially saw them as distinct in some way. A formal Yamato envoy would head down to Tanegashima two years later, in the 11th lunar month of 679.  It was headed up by Yamato no Umakahibe no Miyatsuko no Tsura and Kami no Sukuri no Koukan.  The next reference to the mission comes in 681, when the envoys returned and presented a map of the island.  They claimed that it was in the middle of the ocean, and that rice was always abundant. With a single sowing of rice it was said that they could get two harvests.  Other products specifically mentioned were cape jasmine and bulrushes, though they then note that there were also many other products that they didn't bother to list.  This must have been considered quite the success, as the Yamato envoys were each awarded a grade of rank for their efforts.   They also appear to have returned with some of the locals, as they were entertained again in Asuka—this time on the riverbank west of Asukadera, where various kinds of music were performed for them. Tanegashima and Yakushima would be brought formally under Yamato hegemony in 702 with the creation of Tane province, but for now it was still considered separate.  This was probably just the first part of the efforts to bring them into Yamato, proper. Getting back to the Silla envoys who had arrived in 676, they appear to have remained for several months.  In the third lunar month of 677 we are told that they, along with guests of lower rank—thirteen persons all told—were invited to the capital.  Meanwhile, the escort envoys and others who had not been invited to the capital were entertained in Tsukushi and returned from there. While this was going on, weather out in the straits drove a Silla boat to the island of Chikashima.  Aboard was a Silla man accompanined by three attendants and three Buddhist priests.  We aren't told where they were going, but they were given shelter and when the Silla envoy, Kim Chyeonpyeong, returned home he left with those who had been driven ashore, as well. The following year, 678, was not a great one for the Silla envoys.  Garyang Jyeongsan and Gim Hongsye arrived at Tsukushi, but they were just the escorts.  The actual envoys had been separated by a storm at sea and never arrived.  In their place, the escort envoys were sent to the capital, probably to at least carry through with the rituals of diplomacy.  This was in the first month of the following year, 679, and given when envoys had previously arrived, it suggests to me that they waited a few months, probably to see if the envoys' ship eventually appeared and to give the court time to figure out what to do.  A month later, the Goguryeo envoys arrived, still being accompanied by Silla escorts, also arrived. Fortunately the Yamato envoys to Silla and elsewhere fared better.  That year, 679, the envoys returned successfully from Silla, Goguryeo, and Tamna.  Overall, though, I think it demonstrates that this wasn't just a pleasure cruise.  There was a very real possibility that one could get lost at sea.  At the same time, one needed people of sufficient status to be able to carry diplomatic messages and appropriately represent the court in foreign lands.  We often seen envoys later taking on greater positions of responsibility in the court, and so you didn't have to go far to find those willing to take the risk for later rewards. That same year, another tribute mission from Silla did manage to make the crossing successfully.  And in this mission we are given more details, for they brought gold, silver, iron, sacrificial cauldrons with three feet, brocade, cloth, hides, horses, dogs, mules, and camels.  And those were just the official gifts to the court.  Silla also sent distinct presents for the sovereign, the queen, and the crown prince, namely gold, silver, swords, flags, and things of that nature. This appears to demonstrate increasingly close ties between Silla and Yamato. All of that arrived in the 10th lunar month of 679, and they stayed through the 6th lunar month of 680—about 7 to 9 months all told, depending on if there were any intercalary months that year.  In addition to entertaining the Silla envoys in Tsukushi—it is not mentioned if they made it to the capital—we are also told that in the 2nd lunar month, halfway through the envoys' visit, eight labourers from Silla were sent back to their own country with gifts appropriate to their station. Here I have to pause and wonder what exactly is meant by this.  "Labourer" seems somewhat innocuous.  I suspect that their presence in Yamato may have been less than voluntary, and I wonder if these were captured prisoners of war who could have been in Yamato now for over a decade.  If so, this could have been a gesture indicating that the two sides were putting all of that nastiness with Baekje behind them, and Yamato was accepting Silla's new role on the peninsula.  Or maybe I'm reading too much into it, but it does seem to imply that Silla and Yamato were growing closer, something that Yamato would need if it wanted to have easy access, again, to the wider world. Speaking of returning people, that seems to have been something of a common thread for this year, 680, as another mission from Goguryeo saw 19 Goguryeo men also returned to their country.  These were condolence envoys who had come to mourn the death of Takara Hime—aka Saimei Tennou.  They must have arrived in the midst of all that was happening peninsula, and as such they were detained.  Their detention is somewhat interesting, when you think about it, since technically Baekje and Goguryeo—and thus Yamato—would have been on the same side against the Silla-Tang alliance.  But perhaps it was just considered too dangerous to send them home, initially, and then the Tang had taken control of their home.  It is unclear to me how much they were being held by Yamato and how much they were just men without a country for a time.  This may reflect how things on the mainland were stabilizing again, at least from Yamato's perspective.  However, as we'll discuss a bit later, it may have also been another attempt at restoring the Goguryeo kingdom by bringing back refugees, especially if they had connections with the old court.  The Goguryeo envoys—both the recent mission and those who had been detained—would remain until the 5th lunar month of 681, when they finally took their leave.  That year, there were numerous mission both from and to Silla and Goguryeo, and in the latter part of the year, Gim Chyungpyeong came once again, once more bearing gives of gold, silver, copper, iron, brocade, thin silk, deerskins, and fine cloth.  They also brought gold, silver, flags of a rosy-colored brocade and skins for the sovereign, his queen, and the crown prince. That said, the 681 envoys also brought grave news:  King Munmu of Silla was dead.  Munmu had reigned since 661, so he had overseen the conquest of Silla and Goguryeo.  His regnal name in Japanese might be read as Monmu, or even "Bunbu", referencing the blending of literary and cultural achievements seen as the pinnacle of noble attainment.  He is known as Munmu the Great for unifying the peninsula under a single ruler—though much of the Goguryeo territory was still out of reach.  Indeed he saw warfare and the betterment of his people, and it is no doubt significant that his death is recorded in the official records of the archipelago.   He was succeeded by his son, who would reign as King Sinmun, though the succession wasn't exactly smooth. We are told that Munmu, knowing his time was short, requested that his son, the Crown Prince, be named king before they attended to Munmu's own funerary arrangements, claiming that the throne should not sit vacant.  This may have been prescient, as the same year Munmu died and Sinmun ascended to the throne there was a revolt, led by none other than Sinmun's own father-in-law, Kim Heumdol.  Heumdol may, himselve, have been more of a figurehead for other political factions in the court and military.  Nonetheless, the attempted coup of 681 was quickly put down—the envoys in Yamato would likely only learn about everything after the dust had settled upon their return. The following year, 682, we see another interesting note about kings, this time in regards to the Goguryeo envoys, whom we are told were sent by the King of Goguryeo.  Ever since moving the commandery to Liaodong, the Tang empire had claimed dominion over the lands of Goguryeo north of the Taedong river.  Originally they had administered it militarily, but in 677 they crowned a local, Bojang as the "King of Joseon", using the old name for the region, and put him in charge of the Liaodong commandery.  However, he was removed in 681, and sent into exile in Sichuan, because rather than suppressing revolt, he had actually encouraged restoration attempts, inviting back Goguryeo refugees, like those who had been detained in Yamato.  Although Bojang himself was sent into exile, his descendants continued to claim sovereignty, so it may have been one of them that was making the claim to the "King of Goguryeo", possibly with Silla's blessing. Later that year, 682, we see Hayato from Ohosumi and Ata—possibly meaning Satsuma—the southernmost point of Kyushu coming to the court in 682.  They brought tribute and representatives of Ohosumi and Ata wrestled, with the Ohosumi wrestler emerging victorious.  They were entertained west of Asukadera, and various kinds of music was performed and gifts were given. They were apparently quite the sight, as Buddhist priests and laiety all came out to watch. Little is known for certain about the Hayato.  We have shields that are attributed to them, but their association may have more to do with the fact that they were employed as ceremonial guards for a time at the palace.  We do know that Southern Kyushu had various groups that were seen as culturally distinct from Yamato, although there is a lot of overlap in material culture.  We also see early reports of the Kumaso, possibly two different groups, the Kuma and So, in earlier records, and the relationship between the Kumaso and the Hayato is not clearly defined. What we do know is that southern Kyushu, for all that it shared with Yamato certain aspects of culture through the kofun period, for example, they also had their own traditions. For example, there is a particular burial tradition of underground kofun that is distinct to southern Kyushu.  A great example of this can be found at the Saitobaru Kofun cluster in Miyazaki, which contains these unique southern Kyushu style burials along with more Yamato style keyhole shaped and circular type kofun.  Miyazaki sits just north of the Ohosumi peninsula, in what was formerly the land of Hyuga, aka  Himuka.  This is also where a lot of the founding stories of the Heavenly grandchild were placed, and even today there is a shrine there to the Heavenly Rock Cave.  In other words there are a lot of connections with Southern Kyushu, and given that the Chronicles were being written in the later 7th and early 8th centuries, it is an area of intense interest when trying to understand the origins of Yamato and Japanese history. Unfortunately, nothing clearly tells us exactly how the Hayato were separate, but in the coming century they would both come under Yamato hegemony and rebel against it, time and again.  This isn't the first time they are mentioned, but it may be the first time that we see them as an actual people, in a factual entry as earlier references in the Chronicles are suspect. Continuing on with our look at diplomacy during this period, the year 683 we see a continuation of the same patterns, with nothing too out of the ordinary.  Same with most of 684 until the 12th lunar month.  It is then that we see a Silla ship arrive with Hashi no Sukune no Wohi and Shirawi no Fubito no Hozen.  They had both, previously been to the Tang empire to study, though we don't have a record of them leaving for that or any other purpose.  They are accompanied by Witsukahi no Muraji no Kobito and Tsukushi no Miyake no Muraji no Tokuko, both of whom had apparently been captured and taken by the Tang dynasty during the Baekje campaign.  Apparently they had all traveled back from the Tang empire together to Silla, who then provided them passage to Yamato. The timing of this suggests it may have had something to do with the changes going on in the Tang empire—changes that I desperately want to get into, but given that we are already a good ways into this current episode, I think I will leave it for later.  But I will note this:  Emperor Gaozong had passed away and his wife, Empress Wu Zetian, was now ruling as regent for her sons.  Wu Zetian is probably the most famous empress in all of Chinese history, and while she held de facto power as a co-regent during her husband's reign and as a regent during her sons' reigns, she would actually ascend the throne herself in 690.  Her reign as a woman during a time of heightened patriarchal tradition is particularly of note, and it leads us to wonder about the vilification that she received by the men who followed her rule.  And I really want to get into all of that but, thematically, I think it better to wait.  Those of you reading ahead in the syllabus—which is to say the Chronicles—probably know why.  So let us just leave it there and say that the Tang was going through a few things, and that may explain why students were returning back in the company of former war captives. A few months later, the Silla escort, Gim Mulyu, was sent home along with 7 people from Silla who had been washed ashore—presumably during a storm or other such event, again illustrating the dangers of taking to the ocean at this time.  Perhaps related to that theme is the entry only a month later, which merely stated that Gim Jusan of Silla returned home.  Gim Jusan was an envoy sent to Yamato in the 11th lunar month of 683.  He was entertained in Tsukushi, and we are told that he returned to his own country on the 3rd month of 684.  Now we are seeing an entry in the 4th month of 685 that this same person apparently returned home. It is possible that something got mixed up, and that the Chroniclers were dealing with a typo in the records that made it seem like this took place a year later than it did.  This was certainly an issue at this time, given all the math one had to do just to figure out what day it was.  There is also the possibility that he returned on another embassy, but just wasn't mentioned for some reason.  The last possible explanation is that he somehow got lost and it took him a year to find his way back.  Not entirely impossible back then, though I am a bit skeptical.  Among other things, why would that note have found its way into the Chronicles in Yamato?  While they were certainly using some continental sources, this seems like something they were talking about as far as him leaving the archipelago, rather than discussion of something happening elsewhere. Speaking of happening elsewhere, I'm wondering about another event that happened around this time as well.  In fact, it was while Gim Mulyu was still in the archipelago.  For some reason the Yamato court granted rank to 147 individuals from Tang, Baekje, and Goguryeo.  Interestingly, they don't mention Silla.  Furthermore, there is no real mention of any Tang envoys during this reign.  In fact, there is hardly mention of the Tang dynasty at all.  There is a mention of some 30 Tang men—captives, presumably—being sent to the Yamato court from Tsukushi.  Those men were settled in Toutoumi, so there were men of Tang in the archipelago.  But beyond that, there are only three other mentions of the Tang dynasty.  One was when the students and war captives came back.  Another was this note about giving rank to 147 individuals.  Finally there is a similar record in 686, at the very end of the reign, where it is 34 persons who were given rank.  This time it was to carpenters, diviners, physicians, students from Tang—possibly those who had just come back a year or so earlier.  So if there weren't envoys from Tang, Goguryeo, and Baekje, who were these people and why were they being granted Yamato court rank?  My assumption is that it was foreigners living in the archipelago, and being incorporated into the Yamato court system.  Still, it is interesting that after the overtures by the Tang in the previous reign we have heard virtually nothing since then.  Again, that is likely largely due to the conflicts between Tang and Silla, though now, things seem to be changing.  The conflicts have settled down, and new rulers are in place, so we'll see how things go. Speaking of which, let's finish up with the diplomatic exchanges in this reign.  I'm only hitting some of the highlights here.  First is the return from Silla, in the 5th month of 685, of Takamuku no Asomi no Maro and Tsuno no Asomi no Ushikahi.  They had traveled to Silla in 684, and they did not come back emptyhanded.  The new King of Silla presented them with gifts, including 2 horses, 3 dogs, 2 parrots, and 2 magpies.  They also brought back the novice monks Kanjou and Ryoukan.  Not bad, overall. Then, 6 months later, another tribute mission came, but this one has an interesting—if somewhat questionable—note attached to it.  It is said that the envoys Gim Jisyang and Gim Geonhun were sent to request "governance" and to bring tribute.  This certainly go the court's attention.  They didn't bring the envoys all the way to the capital, but they did send to them, in Tsukushi, Prince Kawachi, Ohotomo no Sukune no Yasumaro, Fujiwara no Asomi no Ohoshima, and Hodzumi no Asomi no Mushimaro. About three months later they send the musical performers from Kawaradera to provide entertainment during a banquet for the Silla envoy, and in payment some 5,000 bundles of rice rom the private lands attached to the queen's palace were granted to the temple in gratitude. The Silla tribute was then brought to the capital from Tsukushi.  This time it was more than 100 items, including one fine horse, one mule, two dogs, a gold container inlaid with some kind of design, gold, silver, faint brocade, silk gauze, tiger and leopard skins, and a variety of medicines.  In addition, as was now common, the envoys, Gim Jisyang and Gim Geonhun, apparently had personal gifts to give in the form of gold, silver, faint brocade, silk gauze, gold containers, screens, saddle hides, silk cloth, and more medicine.  There were also gifts specifically for the sovereign, the queen, the Crown Prince, and for the various princes of the blood. The court returned this favor with gifts to the envoys, presented at a banquet just for them, before sending them on their way. A couple of notes.  First off, it is interesting that they are entertained at Tsukushi rather than being invited to the capital, and I wonder if this was because the sovereign, Ohoama, wasn't doing so well.  This was all happening in 685 and 686, and the sovereign would pass away shortly afterwards.  So it is possible that Ohoama just was not up to entertaining visitors at this time.  Of course, the Chronicles often don't tell us exactly why a given decision was made, only that it was.  And sometimes not even that. The other thing that seems curious is the mention of a request for governance.  That almost sounds like Silla was asking to come under Yamato hegemony, which I seriously doubt.  It may be that they were asking something along the lines of an alliance, but it is also possible that the scribes recording things for Yamato heard what they wanted to hear and so wrote it down in the light most favorable to Yamato laying claim to the peninsula. Or perhaps I'm misunderstanding exactly what they were asking for.  Maybe "governance" here means something else—perhaps just some kind of better relationship. And with that, we'll leave it for now.  There is more developing in the next reign, but I think we want to wait until we get there.  There are still a lot more things to cover in this reign before we move on—we haven't even touched on the establishment of the new capital, on the various court events, not to mention some of the laws and punishments that this period is named for.  And there is the minor issue of a rebellion.  All of that will be dealt with.  And then, after that, we get to the final reign of the Chronicles: the reign of Jitou Tennou.  From there?  Who knows. It is the winter holiday season, so I hope everyone is enjoying themselves.  Next episode will be the New Year's recap, and then we should finish with this reign probably in January or early February. Until then, if you like what we are doing, please tell your friends and feel free to rate us wherever you listen to podcasts.  If you feel the need to do more, and want to help us keep this going, we have information about how you can donate on Patreon or through our KoFi site, ko-fi.com/sengokudaimyo, or find the links over at our main website,  SengokuDaimyo.com/Podcast, where we will have some more discussion on topics from this episode. Also, feel free to reach out to our Sengoku Daimyo Facebook page.  You can also email us at the.sengoku.daimyo@gmail.com.  Thank you, also, to Ellen for their work editing the podcast. And that's all for now.  Thank you again, and I'll see you next episode on Sengoku Daimyo's Chronicles of Japan.

Jiwei Cun is a small village in Liangshan Mountains of Sichuan province, China. They are Yi nationality. The local people have pigs, cows and chickens in backyards, under trees. Yi is very very old tribes in history. Because of the mountains, they're a mystery. Recorded by Digimonk.

China's major airlines have extended free refund and rescheduling policies for Japan-bound tickets as weekly Sino-Japanese flight volumes sink to their lowest level in a month and Chinese travelers redirect their winter holiday plans toward emerging hubs in Russia, Central Asia and domestic ice-and-snow destinations.中国主要航空公司已延长日本航线机票的免费退改政策，因中日每周航班量跌至一个月来最低水平，中国旅客正将冬季度假计划转向俄罗斯、中亚新兴枢纽及国内冰雪旅游目的地。On Friday, major domestic airlines, including Air China, China Eastern Airlines and China Southern Airlines, extended their previous Dec 31 deadline for refunds and rebooking to March 28 next year, the end of the winter-spring travel season.周五，包括中国国际航空、中国东方航空和中国南方航空在内的国内主要航空公司，将原定于12月31日的退票和改签截止日期延长至明年3月28日，即寒假春假出行高峰期的结束之日。The extensions follow China's travel advisories issued in mid-November discouraging trips to Japan after erroneous remarks by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi regarding China's Taiwan. Chinese airlines have since recalibrated capacity, with reductions concentrated in leisure-heavy routes.此次延长禁令源于中国11月中旬发布的旅行建议，该建议因日本首相高市早苗就中国台湾问题发表不当言论而劝阻赴日旅行。此后中国航空公司已调整运力配置，削减主要集中在休闲旅游为主的航线。Data from Flight Master, a travel services platform, show that round-trip Sino-Japanese flights fell to 1,167 during the week of Nov 24-30, the lowest weekly volume in a month, with the recovery rate sliding to 78.1 percent, a new low. As of Dec 1, the projected cancellation rate for Sino-Japanese flights scheduled in December rose to 26.4 percent, continuing an upward trend.旅行服务平台Flight Master数据显示，11月24日至30日当周中日往返航班量降至1167架次，创下一个月来最低周度水平，复航率滑落至78.1%，再创新低。截至12月1日，12月中日航班的预计取消率升至26.4%，持续呈上升趋势。Industry insiders said that the impact is likely to extend beyond the Spring Festival period, with aircraft redeployed to Southeast Asia and domestic routes.业内人士表示，该影响可能持续到春节假期之后，部分航班将被调往东南亚及国内航线。As travelers look beyond Japan for winter sports and seasonal scenery, travel demand is rising across a widening set of destinations. One of the most significant shifts is toward Russia following Moscow's decision to grant Chinese citizens visa-free entry for up to 30 days through Sept 14 next year.随着游客将目光投向日本以外的冬季运动和季节性景观，越来越多的目的地正迎来旅游需求增长。其中最显著的变化之一是俄罗斯旅游热潮，因为莫斯科宣布自即日起至明年9月14日，中国公民赴俄可享受最长30天的免签待遇。UTour, a Beijing-based travel agency, said inquiries doubled immediately after the policy took effect, driven largely by Spring Festival travel plans.北京优途天下国际旅行社表示，新规生效后咨询量立即翻倍，主要受春节出行计划推动。Huang Zhaoyang, the company's Russia product manager, said Murmansk, known for its aurora and ice-snow resources, is attracting attention under the new policy. Russia's overall appeal is expected to strengthen and help woo a wider range of Chinese travelers, he added.该公司俄罗斯产品经理黄朝阳（音译）表示，以极光和冰雪资源闻名的摩尔曼斯克在新政策下正吸引更多关注。他补充道，俄罗斯整体吸引力有望增强，有助于吸引更广泛的中国游客群体。Outbound travel is also pivoting notably toward Central Asia and Northern Europe, with Kazakhstan rapidly emerging as a winter sports hub. Tongcheng Travel data show that flight bookings from major Chinese cities to Kazakhstan between early December and the New Year holiday climbed more than 50 percent year-on-year, while hotel reservations climbed more than 80 percent, with Almaty and Astana ranking as top choices.出境游目的地也明显转向中亚和北欧地区，哈萨克斯坦正迅速崛起为冬季运动中心。同城旅游数据显示，12月初至新年假期期间，中国主要城市飞往哈萨克斯坦的机票预订量同比增长超50%，酒店预订量增幅更达80%以上，其中阿拉木图和阿斯塔纳成为最热门目的地。Analysts at Tongcheng's tourism research institute said the "Japan substitution effect" has accelerated since late November, with outbound ski demand that once concentrated on Japan increasingly shifting toward Kazakhstan and Nordic destinations. They added that domestic ski areas are also becoming popular alternatives to Japan's ski destinations.同程旅游研究院分析师指出，自11月下旬以来，“日本替代效应”持续加速，原先集中在日本的出境滑雪需求正逐步转向哈萨克斯坦及北欧目的地。他们补充道，国内滑雪场也正成为日本滑雪目的地的热门替代选择。European destinations are witnessing a similar upswing. Hotel bookings in Germany and Spain have increased by more than 300 percent year-on-year, while Denmark and Switzerland have posted gains exceeding 200 percent.欧洲旅游目的地也呈现出类似的增长态势。德国和西班牙的酒店预订量同比增幅超过300%，而丹麦和瑞士的增幅则超过200%。Domestically, local governments are racing to capture winter travelers through substantial incentives. Jilin province rolled out 100 million yuan ($14.1 million) in ice-snow vouchers and offered free ski passes to university students, while the Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang Uygur autonomous regions have introduced similar discounts.国内方面，地方政府正通过大幅优惠政策争相吸引冬季度假游客。吉林省推出价值1亿元（约合1410万美元）的冰雪消费券，并为大学生提供免费滑雪通行证；内蒙古和新疆维吾尔自治区也推出了类似的折扣政策。Qunar, a Beijing-based online travel agency, said hotel bookings in Xinjiang's Bortala region rose more than 80 percent year-on-year from November to late January of 2026, while reservations in the northeastern cities of Dandong, Liaoning province, Liaoyuan, Jilin province and Yichun, Heilongjiang province, each grew around 30 percent.北京在线旅游平台途牛旅游网表示，2026年11月至次年1月底期间，新疆博尔塔拉地区的酒店预订量同比增长逾80%，而东北地区辽宁省丹东市、吉林省辽源市及黑龙江省伊春市的酒店预订量均增长约30%。Demand for trips to glaciers and snow mountains has also surged, with ticket bookings for sites such as Meili Snow Mountain in Yunnan province and Xiling Snow Mountain in Sichuan province doubling year-on-year.前往冰川雪山的旅游需求也大幅增长，云南梅里雪山、四川西岭雪山等景点的门票预订量同比翻了一番。According to a white paper on China's ski industry, China currently has 748 operational ski resorts, including 66 indoor centers. Total ski visits reached 26.05 million last winter, up 12.9 percent.根据中国滑雪产业白皮书显示，目前中国共有748家运营中的滑雪场，其中包括66家室内滑雪中心。去年冬季滑雪人次达到2605万，同比增长12.9%。The white paper also noted that China's total ski visits last season surpassed Switzerland's 23.1 million, reflecting the growing scale of China's winter sports market. Average ski days per participant in China rose from 1.80 to 1.92, indicating increasing skier engagement and loyalty.该白皮书还指出，中国上赛季滑雪人次总量已超越瑞士的2310万人次，彰显中国冬季运动市场规模的持续扩大。中国滑雪者人均滑雪天数从1.80天提升至1.92天，表明滑雪参与度与忠诚度正逐步增强。recalibratev./ˌriːˈkæl.ə.breɪt/重新校准

This week on Sinica, I'm delighted to have Iza Ding as guest host. Iza is a professor of political science at Northwestern University and a good friend whose work on Chinese governance I greatly admire. She's joined by Deborah Seligsohn, who has been a favorite guest on this show many times. Deb is an associate professor of political science at Villanova University and was previously a science and environmental counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. This episode was recorded in three parts: the first two in Belém, Brazil during COP30 (the 30th UN Climate Change Conference), and the final segment after the conference concluded. Iza and Deb discuss China's role at the climate summit, the real story behind the famous 2007 U.S. Embassy air quality monitor in Beijing (spoiler: it wasn't China's "Silent Spring moment"), Brazil's management of the conference, why China leads on technology but not on negotiation, and what the outcomes of COP30 mean for the future of global climate cooperation. This is an insider's view of how climate diplomacy actually works, complete with unexpected fire evacuations and glut-shaming of The New York Times.3:43 – Deb's impressions of COP30 and Brazil's inclusive approach 9:21 – China's presence at COP30: technology leadership without negotiation leadership 15:34 – Xie Zhenhua's absence and the U.S.-China dynamic at previous COPs 24:46 – Inside the negotiation rooms: language, politeness, and obstruction 33:06 – BYD's presence in Brazil and Chinese EV expansion 40:54 – The real story of the 2007 U.S. Embassy air quality monitor in Beijing 45:00 – Fire evacuation at COP30 and UN territorial sovereignty 1:22:06 – What actually drove China's air pollution control: the 2003 power plant standards 1:41:27 – The dramatic final plenary and the Mutirão decision 1:55:17 – China's NDC 3.0: under-promise and over-deliver strategySee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has described China and France as two major countries with rich historical and cultural endowment, saying they should jointly contribute to global peace and stability through dialogue and cooperation.

Spending patterns among China's inbound travelers are shifting toward card-based transactions, experiential and everyday scenarios, underscoring the nation's progress in improving bank card acceptance and payment convenience, said a recent report by the World Tourism Alliance.世界旅游联盟发布的最新报告指出，中国入境游客的消费模式正转向以银行卡支付为主，并更多集中于沉浸式体验和日常消费场景，这凸显了中国在提升银行卡受理环境和支付便利性方面取得的显著进展。It said experiencing Chinese culture is increasingly the primary motivation for foreign visitors. This growing appetite for cultural depth is driving a shift from "checklist sightseeing" to "immersive experiences", making China's cultural treasure trove a key driver of inbound tourism growth.报告称，体验中国文化正成为越来越多外国游客的首要动机。这种对文化深度的渴望，正促使游客从“打卡式观光”转向“沉浸式体验”，中国丰富的文化资产因此成为入境旅游增长的重要推动力。The trend reflects ongoing enhancements to China's card acceptance environment. The report noted that coverage among key merchants reached 99 percent by September 2024. Moreover, tax refund efficiency has also improved significantly. The State Taxation Administration has rolled out "immediate tax refund upon purchase" services since May, drastically cutting refund processing times and enhancing shopping experiences.这一趋势反映出中国银行卡受理环境持续改善。报告指出，截至2024年9月，重点商户的银行卡受理覆盖率已达99%。此外，退税效率也显著提升。国家税务总局自5月起推行“即买即退”服务，大幅缩短退税处理时间，显著提升购物体验。The National Bureau of Statistics said China welcomed 132 million inbound tourists in 2024, marking a 60.8 percent year-on-year increase, with foreign visitors accounting for 26.94 million of these arrivals.国家统计局表示，2024年中国入境游客达到1.32亿人次，同比增长60.8%，其中外国游客达2694万人次。Between the third quarter of 2024 and the second quarter of 2025, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, South Korea, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States emerged as the top source markets for inbound spending. Malaysia, Australia and Singapore posted standout year-on-year growth rates — each exceeding 50 percent, said the WTA.世界旅游联盟称，在2024年第三季度至2025年第二季度期间，马来西亚、新加坡、澳大利亚、韩国、德国、英国和美国成为入境游客消费的主要来源市场。其中，马来西亚、澳大利亚和新加坡表现尤其突出，同比增幅均超过50%。Shopping stood out with a nearly 90 percent rise in transaction value. The surge was driven primarily by a sharp increase in the number of credit and debit cards used, while average spending per card remained stable — signaling a broader consumer base rather than higher individual outlays, the report said.购物类消费尤为亮眼，交易额增长近90%。报告指出，这一增幅主要得益于使用信用卡和借记卡人数的显著上升，而单卡平均消费保持稳定——这表明增长来自更广泛的消费群体，而非个体消费金额的提高。The transaction value of transportation spending has been growing strongly, with card usage surging, thanks to greater ease of foreign card payments in transit payment platform systems. Since early 2025, the number of inbound travelers using foreign bank cards for Tap-and-Go metro access has surged, with usage up nearly 60 percent in the second quarter compared to the previous quarter, the report said.由于交通出行支付平台对外卡支付的便利性提升，交通类消费的交易额保持强劲增长，银行卡使用量大幅上升。报告称，自2025年初以来，使用外卡“即刷即走”乘坐地铁的入境游客数量激增，仅第二季度就比上一季度增长近60%。Tap-and-Go is rapidly becoming a preferred payment method for inbound travelers using urban transit, marking a step forward in the internationalization of China's public transport services. Beyond Beijing and Shanghai, other major cities such as Chengdu, Sichuan province and Guangzhou, Guangdong province are also following suit. Major global card networks are also aggressively promoting this payment scenario, offering rebates and cashback incentives.“即刷即走”正迅速成为入境游客使用城市公共交通的首选支付方式，这标志着中国公共交通服务的国际化迈出重要一步。除北京和上海外，成都、广州等主要城市也在加紧跟进。国际主要银行卡组织也积极推广这一支付场景，并提供返现、优惠等激励措施。Dennis Chang, executive vice-president at Mastercard, said: "Today, as Mastercard expands our domestic operations in China, we are proud to upgrade our Pay Like a Local payment facilitation program; enable inbound tourists to make QR code payments in China through Alipay and WeChat Pay; expand the acceptance of overseas-issued bank cards; and allow riders to use Mastercard directly for seamless Tap-and-Go urban rail transit — thereby ensuring improved consumption experiences for international visitors."万事达卡中国区执行副总裁张安表示：“随着万事达在中国拓展本地业务，我们很自豪地升级‘像本地人一样支付'计划；支持入境游客通过支付宝和微信支付扫码付款；扩大境外发行银行卡的受理范围；并允许乘客直接使用万事达卡实现顺畅的‘即刷即走'轨道交通出行，从而进一步提升国际游客的消费体验。”Visa, another US-based card payment provider, said overseas tourists' spending in China saw explosive growth in the first half.另一家美国银行卡支付机构维萨（Visa）表示，今年上半年境外游客在中国的消费出现爆发式增长。The company said transaction volume of its tap-to-pay service saw rapid year-on-year growth, with Guangzhou's inbound tourist tap-to-pay transactions surging over 100 percent. In transportation scenarios, its tap-to-ride service gained widespread popularity, and around 60 percent of overseas tourists in Beijing are using Visa cards for tap-to-ride public transit, according to the company.该公司称，其“轻触支付”服务的交易量同比大幅增长，其中广州入境游客的轻触支付交易量激增逾100%。在交通出行场景中，其“轻触乘车”服务广受欢迎，目前在北京约有60%的境外游客使用Visa卡完成公共交通“轻触乘车”。inbound travelers入境游客immediate tax refund upon purchase即买即退transaction value交易额transaction/trænˈzækʃ(ə)n/Tap-and-Go / tap-to-ride / tap-to-pay即刷即走/轻触乘车/轻触支付rebates and cashback incentives返现激励rebate/ˈriːbeɪt/Incentive /ɪnˈsentɪv/consumer base消费者群体QR code payments扫码支付

This week on Sinica, I speak with Zhong Na, a novelist and essayist whose new piece, "Murder House," appears in the inaugural issue of Equator — a striking new magazine devoted to longform writing that crosses borders, disciplines, and cultures. In January 2024, a young couple, both Tsinghua-educated Google engineers living in a $2.5 million Silicon Valley home, became the center of a tragedy that captivated Chinese social media far more than American outlets. Zhong Na explores how the case became a collective Rorschach test — a mirror held up to contemporary Chinese society, exposing cracks in the myths of meritocracy, the prestige of global tech firms, and shifting notions of gender, class, and the Chinese dream itself. We discuss the gendered reactions online, the dimming of America's appeal, the emotional costs of the immigrant success story, and the craft of writing about tragedy with compassion but without sentimentality.5:06 – How the story first reached Zhong Na, and the Luigi Mangione comparison 7:05 – Discovering she attended the same Chengdu high school as the alleged murderer Chen Liren 8:10 – The collaboration with Equator and Joan Didion's influence 10:30 – Education, class, and the cracks in China's meritocracy myth 16:01 – Tiger mothers vs. lying flat: two responses to a rigged system 19:12 – The pandemic and the dimming of the American dream 22:49 – Chinese men as perpetrators: immigrant stress and the loss of patriarchal privilege 25:56 – The gender war online: moral autopsy and victim-blaming 30:25 – The obsession with the ex-girlfriend and attraction to the accused 34:37 – The murder house, Chinese numerology, and the rise of Gen Z metaphysics 37:08 – Geopolitics, the China Initiative, and rethinking America as a destination 39:42 – Craft and moral compass: learning from Didion and Janet Malcolm 42:31 – Zhong Na's fiction: writing Chinese experiences without catering to Western expectationsPaying it forward: Gavin Jacobson and the editorial team at EquatorRecommendations: Zhong Na: Elsewhere by Yan Ge Kaiser: Made in Ethiopia, documentary by Xinyan Yu and Max Duncan (available on PBS)See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Today's Episode:Discover how a young woman from the UK fell head-over-heels for Chinese food and became one of its greatest storytellers. In this episode, meet Fuchsia Dunlop — the first foreigner to train at a Sichuan chef school, and explore her delicious journey into Chinese cuisine.Membership Preview:Discover China's breakfast culture with next MaoMi Chinese+ episode! From hot, filling meals in the north to soft, light dishes in the south, and unique local specialties in every city. Learn about morning markets, local traditions, and the warmth of a Chinese morning.Support MaoMi & Get exclusive   to premium content!https://www.buzzsprout.com/1426696/subscribe ↗️Transcript and translations are available on https://maomichinese.comInterested in any topics? Leave me a message on: https://maomichinese.com or https://www.instagram.com/maomichinese/?hl=en*Please note that Spotify does not support the membership program.Text me what you think :)Support the show

Let's talk about the Sichuan. And no, we're not ordering take-out. We're talking about China's newest Type 076 amphibious assault ship, somewhat similar in size to the US Wasp-class.Join the Patreon here: https://www.patreon.com/PeterZeihanFull Newsletter: https://bit.ly/4i8G0bh

In this episode, Jared sits down with Renata Mirkova, a Chinese language educator from the Czech Republic whose journey into Mandarin began not with a grand plan, but almost by accident. What started as a university entrance decision led her to master Chinese, live in China, and now teach both Czech and Chinese across cultural boundaries.Renata shares the unique challenges of learning Chinese in a non-English-speaking environment, including outdated textbooks from the 60s, Czech-Sinology programs steeped in history, and a lack of direct Chinese-to-Czech resources. But through her perseverance and multiple immersive experiences in China, Renata carved out her own path to fluency.From surviving the linguistic chaos of Sichuan dialects to interpreting for Czech officials on business trips in China, she offers candid reflections on what works for her, what didn't, and how learning Chinese changed her life. She also gives insight into her current work creating Chinese learning materials specifically for Czech speakers and what it's like teaching Czech to Chinese speakers in return.Links from the episode:Learn Chinese with Renata Mirkova | WebsiteMandarin Companion Graded Readers

This week on Sinica, I welcome back Finbarr Bermingham, the Brussels-based Europe correspondent for the South China Morning Post, about the Nexperia dispute — one of the most revealing episodes in the global contest over semiconductor supply chains. Nexperia, a Dutch-headquartered chipmaker owned by Shanghai-listed Wingtech, became the subject of extraordinary government intervention when the Netherlands invoked a Cold War-era emergency law to seize temporary control of the company and suspend its Chinese CEO. Finbarr's reporting, drawing on Dutch court documents and expert sources, has illuminated the tangled threads of this story: preexisting concerns about governance and technology transfer, mounting U.S. pressure on The Hague to remove Chinese management, and the timing of the Dutch action on the very day the U.S. rolled out its affiliate rule. We discuss China's retaliatory export controls on chips packaged at Nexperia's Dongguan facilities, the role of the Trump-Xi meeting in Busan in unlocking a temporary thaw, and what this case reveals about Europe's agonizing position between American pressure and Chinese integration in global production networks.4:34 – Why the "Europe cracks down on Chinese acquisition" framing was too simple 6:17 – The Dutch court's extraordinary tick-tock of events and U.S. lobbying 9:04 – The June pressure from Washington: divestment or the affiliate list 10:13 – Dutch fears of production know-how relocating to China 12:35 – The impossible position: damned if they did, damned if they didn't 14:46 – The obscure Cold War-era Goods Availability Act 17:11 – CEO Zhang Xuezheng and the question of who stopped cooperating first 19:26 – Was China's export control a state policy or a corporate move? 22:16 – Europe's de-risking framework and the lessons from Nexperia 25:39 – The fragmented European response: Germany, France, Hungary, and the Baltics 30:31 – Did Germany shape the response behind the scenes? 33:06 – The Trump-Xi meeting in Busan and the resolution of the crisis 37:01 – Will the Nexperia case deter future European interventions? 40:28 – Is Europe still an attractive market for Chinese investment? 41:59 – The Europe China Forum: unusually polite in a time of tenterhooksPaying it forward: Dewey Sim (SCMP diplomacy desk, Beijing); Coco Feng (SCMP technology, Guangdong); Khushboo Razdan (SCMP North America); Sense Hofstede (Chinese Bossen newsletter)Recommendations: Finbarr: Chokepoints by Edward Fishman; Underground Empire by Henry Farrell and Abe Newman; "What China Wants from Europe" by John Delury (Engelsberg Ideas) Kaiser: The Three Musketeers: D'Artagnan and Milady (2023 French film adaptation)See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

China's first Type 076 amphibious assault ship has completed its navigation test mission and returned to the shipyard.

This week on Sinica, I welcome back Jeremy Goldkorn, co-founder of the show and my longtime co-host, to revisit the "vibe shift" we first discussed back in February. Seven months on, what we sensed then has fully borne out — there's been a measurable softening in American attitudes toward China, reflected not just in polling data but in media coverage, podcast discussions, and public discourse. We dig into what's driving this shift: the chaos of American politics making China look competent by comparison, the end of Wolf Warrior diplomacy, the gutting of China hawks in the Trump administration, Trump's own transactional G2 enthusiasm, and the generational divide in how younger Americans encounter China through TikTok rather than legacy media. We also discuss the limits of this shift, the dangers of overcorrection, and what it feels like to watch the fever break after years of panic and absolutism in U.S.-China discourse.5:29 – The [beep] show in America as the biggest factor 8:38 – China hawks deflated: from Pompeo to Navarro's pivot to India 11:21 – Ben Smith's piece on the end of a decade of China hawkism 13:30 – Eric Schmidt and Selina Xu's Atlantic piece on tech decoupling 17:17 – Long-form China podcasts: Dwarkesh Patel with Arthur Kroeber, Lex Fridman with Keyu Jin 19:35 – Jeremy's personal vibe shift: distance from The China Project and renewed perspective 23:33 – The world turning to predictability and stability 26:05 – The Chicago Council poll: dramatic shift away from containment 29:09 – The generational shift: TikTok, infrastructure porn, and Gen Z's globalized worldview 31:15 – The end of Wolf Warrior diplomacy and why it mattered 37:03 – Kaiser's "Great Reckoning" essay and why it didn't get the usual hate 39:00 – The destruction of Twitter and the vicious China discourse culture 41:10 – The pendulum swinging too far: China fanboys and new hubris 43:20 – How the vibe shift looks from inside China Paying it forward: Echo Tang (Berlin Independent Chinese Film Festival organizer) and Zhu Rikun (New York Chinese Independent Film Festival organizer)Recommendations: Jeremy: Ja No Man: Growing Up in Apartheid Era South Africa by Richard Poplak Kaiser: Rhyming Chaos podcast with Jeremy Goldkorn and Maria RepnikovaSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, I chat with Lizzi Lee, a fellow on the Chinese economy at the Asia Society Policy Institute and one of the sharpest China analysts working today. We dig into the 4th Plenary Session of the 20th Party Congress and what it reveals about China's evolving growth model — particularly the much-discussed but often misunderstood push against "involution" in key sectors like EVs and solar. Lizzi walks us through the structural incentives driving overcompetition, from local government finance and VAT collection to the challenges of rebalancing supply and demand. We also discuss her recent Foreign Affairs piece on China's manufacturing model, why "overcapacity" is a misleading frame, the unexpected upsides of China's industrial strategy for the global green transition, and what happened at the Trump-Xi meeting in Busan. This is a conversation about getting beyond the binaries and understanding the actual mechanisms — and contradictions — shaping China's economic trajectory.4:43 – What Western reporting missed in the 4th Plenum communique 6:34 – The "anti-involution" push and what it really means 9:57 – Is China's domestic demand abnormally low? Context and comparisons 12:41 – Why cash transfers and consumption subsidies are running out of steam 15:00 – The supply-side approach: creating better products to drive demand 18:33 – GDP vs. GNI: why China is focusing on global corporate footprints 20:13 – Service exports and China's ascent along the global supply chain 24:02 – The People's Daily editorial on price wars and profit margins 27:31 – Why addressing involution is harder now than in 2015 29:56 – How China's VAT system incentivizes local governments to build entire supply chains 33:20 – The difficulty of reforming fiscal structures and local government finance 35:12 – What got lost in the Foreign Affairs editing process 38:14 – Why "overcapacity" is a misleading and morally loaded term 40:02 – The underappreciated upside: China's model and the global green transition 43:14 – How politically potent deindustrialization fears are in Washington and Brussels 46:29 – Industry self-discipline vs. structural reform: can moral suasion work? 50:15 – BYD's negotiating power and the squeeze on suppliers 53:54 – The Trump-Xi meeting in Busan: genuine thaw or tactical pause? 57:23 – Pete Hegseth's "God bless both China and the USA" tweet 1:00:01 – How China's leadership views Trump: transactional or unpredictable? 1:03:32 – The pragmatic off-ramp and what Paul Triolo predicted 1:05:26 – China's AI strategy: labor-augmenting vs. labor-replacing technology 1:08:13 – What systemic changes could realistically fix involution? 1:10:26 – Capital market reform and the challenge of decelerating slowly 1:12:36 – The "health first" strategy and investing in peoplePaying it forward: Paul TrioloRecommendations: Lizzi: Chokepoints: American Power in the Age of Economic Warfare by Edward Fishman Kaiser: Morning Coffee guitar practice book by Alex RockwellSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Last time we spoke about the fall of Wuhan. In a country frayed by war, the Yangtze became a pulsing artery, carrying both hunger and hope. Chiang Kai-shek faced a brutal choice: defend Wuhan to the last man, or flood the rivers to buy time. He chose both, setting sullen floodwaters loose along the Yellow River to slow the invaders, a temporary mercy that spared some lives while ripping many from their homes. On the river's banks, a plethora of Chinese forces struggled to unite. The NRA, fractured into rival zones, clung to lines with stubborn grit as Japanese forces poured through Anqing, Jiujiang, and beyond, turning the Yangtze into a deadly corridor. Madang's fortifications withstood bombardment and gas, yet the price was paid in troops and civilians drowned or displaced. Commanders like Xue Yue wrestled stubbornly for every foothold, every bend in the river. The Battle of Wanjialing became a symbol: a desperate, months-long pincer where Chinese divisions finally tightened their cordon and halted the enemy's flow. By autumn, the Japanese pressed onward to seize Tianjiazhen and cut supply lines, while Guangzhou fell to a ruthless blockade. The Fall of Wuhan loomed inevitable, yet the story remained one of fierce endurance against overwhelming odds.   #174 The Changsha Fire Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the summer of 1938, amid the upheaval surrounding Chiang Kai-shek, one of his most important alliances came to an end. On June 22, all German advisers to the Nationalist government were summoned back; any who refused would be deemed guilty of high treason. Since World War I, a peculiar bond had tied the German Weimar Republic and China: two fledgling states, both weak and only partially sovereign. Under the Versailles Treaty of 1919, Germany had lost extraterritorial rights on Chinese soil, which paradoxically allowed Berlin to engage with China as an equal partner rather than a traditional colonizer. This made German interests more welcome in business and politics than those of other Western powers. Chiang's military reorganization depended on German officers such as von Seeckt and von Falkenhausen, and Hitler's rise in 1933 had not immediately severed the connection between the two countries. Chiang did not share Nazi ideology with Germany, but he viewed Berlin as a potential ally and pressed to persuade it to side with China rather than Japan as China's principal East Asian, anti-Communist partner. In June 1937, H. H. Kung led a delegation to Berlin, met Hitler, and argued for an alliance with China. Yet the outbreak of war and the Nationalists' retreat to Wuhan convinced Hitler's government to align with Japan, resulting in the recall of all German advisers. Chiang responded with a speech praising von Falkenhausen, insisting that "our friend's enemy is our enemy too," and lauding the German Army's loyalty and ethics as a model for the Chinese forces. He added, "After we have won the War of Resistance, I believe you'll want to come back to the Far East and advise our country again." Von Falkenhausen would later become the governor of Nazi-occupied Belgium, then be lauded after the war for secretly saving many Jewish lives. As the Germans departed, the roof of the train transporting them bore a prominent German flag with a swastika, a prudent precaution given Wuhan's vulnerability to air bombardment. The Japanese were tightening their grip on the city, even as Chinese forces, numbering around 800,000, made a stubborn stand. The Yellow River floods blocked northern access, so the Japanese chose to advance via the Yangtze, aided by roughly nine divisions and the might of the Imperial Navy. The Chinese fought bravely, but their defenses could not withstand the superior technology of the Japanese fleet. The only substantial external aid came from Soviet pilots flying aircraft bought from the USSR as part of Stalin's effort to keep China in the war; between 1938 and 1940, some 2,000 pilots offered their services. From June 24 to 27, Japanese bombers relentlessly pounded the Madang fortress along the Yangtze until it fell. A month later, on July 26, Chinese defenders abandoned Jiujiang, southeast of Wuhan, and its civilian population endured a wave of atrocities at the hands of the invaders. News of Jiujiang's fate stiffened resolve. Chiang delivered a pointed address to his troops on July 31, arguing that Wuhan's defense was essential and that losing the city would split the country into hostile halves, complicating logistics and movement. He warned that Wuhan's defense would also be a spiritual test: "the place has deep revolutionary ties," and public sympathy for China's plight was growing as Japanese atrocities became known. Yet Chiang worried about the behavior of Chinese soldiers. He condemned looting as a suicidal act that would destroy the citizens' trust in the military. Commanders, he warned, must stay at their posts; the memory of the Madang debacle underscored the consequences of cowardice. Unlike Shanghai, Wuhan had shelters, but he cautioned against retreating into them and leaving soldiers exposed. Officers who failed in loyalty could expect no support in return. This pep talk, combined with the belief that the army was making a last stand, may have slowed the Japanese advance along the Yangtze in August. Under General Xue Yue, about 100,000 Chinese troops pushed back the invaders at Huangmei. At Tianjiazhen, thousands fought until the end of September, with poison gas finally forcing Japanese victory. Yet even then, Chinese generals struggled to coordinate. In Xinyang, Li Zongren's Guangxi troops were exhausted; they expected relief from Hu Zongnan's forces, but Hu instead withdrew, allowing Japan to capture the city without a fight. The fall of Xinyang enabled Japanese control of the Ping-Han railway, signaling Wuhan's doom. Chiang again spoke to Wuhan's defenders, balancing encouragement with a grim realism about possible loss. Although Wuhan's international connections were substantial, foreign aid would be unlikely. If evacuation became necessary, the army should have a clear plan, including designated routes. He recalled the disastrous December retreat from Nanjing, where "foreigners and Chinese alike turned it into an empty city." Troops had been tired and outnumbered; Chiang defended the decision to defend Nanjing, insisting the army had sacrificed itself for the capital and Sun Yat-sen's tomb. Were the army to retreat again, he warned, it would be the greatest shame in five thousand years of Chinese history. The loss of Madang was another humiliation. By defending Wuhan, he argued, China could avenge its fallen comrades and cleanse its conscience; otherwise, it could not honor its martyrs. Mao Zedong, observing the situation from his far-off base at Yan'an, agreed strongly that Chiang should not defend Wuhan to the death. He warned in mid-October that if Wuhan could not be defended, the war's trajectory would shift, potentially strengthening the Nationalists–Communists cooperation, deepening popular mobilization, and expanding guerrilla warfare. The defense of Wuhan, Mao argued, should drain the enemy and buy time to advance the broader struggle, not become a doomed stalemate. In a protracted war, some strongholds might be abandoned temporarily to sustain the longer fight. The Japanese Army captured Wuchang and Hankou on 26 October and captured Hanyang on the 27th, which concluded the campaign in Wuhan. The battle had lasted four and a half months and ended with the Nationalist army's voluntary withdrawal. In the battle itself, the Japanese army captured Wuhan's three towns and held the heartland of China, achieving a tactical victory. Yet strategically, Japan failed to meet its objectives. Imperial Headquarters believed that "capturing Hankou and Guangzhou would allow them to dominate China." Consequently, the Imperial Conference planned the Battle of Wuhan to seize Wuhan quickly and compel the Chinese government to surrender. It also decreed that "national forces should be concentrated to achieve the war objectives within a year and end the war against China." According to Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Seiya Matsuno, Hirohito authorized the use of chemical weapons against China by specific orders known as rinsanmei. During the Battle of Wuhan, Prince Kan'in Kotohito transmitted the emperor's orders to deploy toxic gas 375 times between August and October 1938. Another memorandum uncovered by Yoshimi indicates that Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni authorized the use of poison gas against the Chinese on 16 August 1938. A League of Nations resolution adopted on 14 May condemned the Imperial Japanese Army's use of toxic gas. Japan's heavy use of chemical weapons against China was driven by manpower shortages and China's lack of poison gas stockpiles to retaliate. Poison gas was employed at Hankou in the Battle of Wuhan to break Chinese resistance after conventional assaults had failed. Rana Mitter notes that, under General Xue Yue, approximately 100,000 Chinese troops halted Japanese advances at Huangmei, and at the fortress of Tianjiazhen, thousands fought until the end of September, with Japanese victory secured only through the use of poison gas. Chinese generals also struggled with coordination at Xinyang; Li Zongren's Guangxi troops were exhausted, and Hu Zongnan's forces, believed to be coming to relieve them, instead withdrew. Japan subsequently used poison gas against Chinese Muslim forces at the Battle of Wuyuan and the Battle of West Suiyuan. However, the Chinese government did not surrender with the loss of Wuhan and Guangzhou, nor did Japan's invasion end with Wuhan and Guangzhou's capture. After Wuhan fell, the government issued a reaffirmation: "Temporary changes of advance and retreat will not shake our resolve to resist the Japanese invasion," and "the gain or loss of any city will not affect the overall situation of the war." It pledged to "fight with even greater sorrow, greater perseverance, greater steadfastness, greater diligence, and greater courage," dedicating itself to a long, comprehensive war of resistance. In the Japanese-occupied rear areas, large armed anti-Japanese forces grew, and substantial tracts of territory were recovered. As the Japanese army themselves acknowledged, "the restoration of public security in the occupied areas was actually limited to a few kilometers on both sides of the main transportation lines." Thus, the Battle of Wuhan did not merely inflict a further strategic defeat on Japan; it also marked a turning point in Japan's strategic posture, from offense to defense. Due to the Nationalist Army's resolute resistance, Japan mobilized its largest force to date for the attack, about 250,000 personnel, who were replenished four to five times over the battle, for a total of roughly 300,000. The invaders held clear advantages in land, sea, and air power and fought for four and a half months. Yet they failed to annihilate the Nationalist main force, nor did they break the will to resist or the army's combat effectiveness. Instead, the campaign dealt a severe blow to the Japanese Army's vitality. Japanese-cited casualties totaled 4,506 dead and 17,380 wounded for the 11th Army; the 2nd Army suffered 2,300 killed in action, 7,600 wounded, and 900 died of disease. Including casualties across the navy and the air force, the overall toll was about 35,500. By contrast, the Nationalist Government Military Commission's General Staff Department, drawing on unit-level reports, calculated Japanese casualties at 256,000. The discrepancy between Japanese and Nationalist tallies illustrates the inflationary tendencies of each side's reporting. Following Wuhan, a weakened Japanese force confronted an extended front. Unable to mount large-scale strategic offensives, unlike Shanghai, Xuzhou, or Wuhan itself, the Japanese to a greater extent adopted a defensive posture. This transition shifted China's War of Resistance from a strategic defensive phase into a strategic stalemate, while the invaders found themselves caught in a protracted war—a development they most disliked. Consequently, Japan's invasion strategy pivoted: away from primary frontal offensives toward a greater reliance on political inducements with secondary military action, and toward diverting forces to "security" operations behind enemy lines rather than pushing decisive frontal campaigns. Japan, an island nation with limited strategic resources, depended heavily on imports. By the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Japan's gold reserves,including reserves for issuing banknotes, amounted to only about 1.35 billion yen. In effect, Japan's currency reserves constrained the scale of the war from the outset. The country launched its aggression while seeking an early solution to the conflict. To sustain its war of aggression against China, the total value of military supplies imported from overseas in 1937 reached approximately 960 million yen. By June of the following year, for the Battle of Wuhan, even rifles used in training were recalled to outfit the expanding army. The sustained increase in troops also strained domestic labor, food, and energy supplies. By 1939, after Wuhan, Japan's military expenditure had climbed to about 6.156 billion yen, far exceeding national reserves. This stark reality exposed Japan's economic fragility and its inability to guarantee a steady supply of military materiel, increasing pressure on the leadership at the Central Command. The Chief of Staff and the Minister of War lamented the mismatch between outward strength and underlying weakness: "Outwardly strong but weak is a reflection of our country today, and this will not last long." In sum, the Wuhan campaign coincided with a decline in the organization, equipment, and combat effectiveness of the Japanese army compared with before the battle. This erosion of capability helped drive Japan to alter its political and military strategy, shifting toward a method of inflicting pressure on China and attempting to "use China to control China", that is, fighting in ways designed to sustain the broader war effort. Tragically a major element of Chiang Kai-shek's retreat strategy was the age-old "scorched earth" policy. In fact, China originated the phrase and the practice. Shanghai escaped the last-minute torching because of foreigners whose property rights were protected. But in Nanjing, the burning and destruction began with increasing zeal. What could not be moved inland, such as remaining rice stocks, oil in tanks, and other facilities, was to be blown up or devastated. Civilians were told to follow the army inland, to rebuild later behind the natural barrier of Sichuan terrain. Many urban residents complied, but the peasantry did not embrace the plan. The scorched-earth policy served as powerful propaganda for the occupying Japanese army and, even more so, for the Reds. Yet they could hardly have foreseen the propaganda that Changsha would soon supply them. In June, the Changsha Evacuation Guidance Office was established to coordinate land and water evacuation routes. By the end of October, Wuhan's three towns had fallen, and on November 10 the Japanese army captured Yueyang, turning Changsha into the next primary invasion target. Beginning on October 9, Japanese aircraft intensified from sporadic raids on Changsha to large-scale bombing. On October 27, the Changsha Municipal Government urgently evacuated all residents, exempting only able-bodied men, the elderly, the weak, women, and children. The baojia system was mobilized to go door-to-door, enforcing compliance. On November 7, Chiang Kai-shek convened a military meeting at Rongyuan Garden to review the war plan and finalize a "scorched earth war of resistance." Xu Quan, Chief of Staff of the Security Command, drafted the detailed implementation plan. On November 10, Shi Guoji, Chief of Staff of the Security Command, presided over a joint meeting of Changsha's party, government, military, police, and civilian organizations to devise a strategy. The Changsha Destruction Command was immediately established, bringing together district commanders and several arson squads. The command actively prepared arson equipment and stacked flammable materials along major traffic arteries. Chiang decided that the city of Changsha was vulnerable and either gave the impression or the direct order, honestly really depends on the source your reading, to burn the city to the ground to prevent it falling to the enemy. At 9:00 AM on November 12, Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed Zhang Zhizhong: "One hour to arrive, Chairman Zhang, Changsha, confidential. If Changsha falls, the entire city must be burned. Please make thorough preparations in advance and do not delay." And here it seems a game of broken telephone sort of resulted in one of the worst fire disasters of all time. If your asking pro Chiang sources, the message was clearly, put up a defense, once thats fallen, burn the city down before the Japanese enter. Obviously this was to account for getting civilians out safely and so forth. If you read lets call it more modern CPP aligned sources, its the opposite. Chiang intentionally ordering the city to burn down as fast as possible, but in through my research, I think it was a colossal miscommunication. Regardless Zhongzheng Wen, Minister of the Interior, echoed the message. Simultaneously, Lin Wei, Deputy Director of Chiang Kai-shek's Secretariat, instructed Zhang Zhizhong by long-distance telephone: "If Changsha falls, the entire city must be burned." Zhang summoned Feng Ti, Commander of the Provincial Capital Garrison, and Xu Quan, Director of the Provincial Security Bureau, to outline arson procedures. He designated the Garrison Command to shoulder the preparations, with the Security Bureau assisting. At 4:00 PM, Zhang appointed Xu Kun, Commander of the Second Garrison Regiment, as chief commander of the arson operation, with Wang Weining, Captain of the Social Training Corps, and Xu Quan, Chief of Staff of the Garrison Command, as deputies. At 6:00 PM, the Garrison Command held an emergency meeting ordering all government agencies and organizations in the city to be ready for evacuation at any moment. By around 10:15 PM, all urban police posts had withdrawn. Around 2:00 AM (November 13), a false report circulated that "Japanese troops have reached Xinhe" . Firefighters stationed at various locations rushed out with kerosene-fueled devices, burning everything in sight, shops and houses alike. In an instant, Changsha became a sea of flames. The blaze raged for 72 hours. The Hunan Province Anti-Japanese War Loss Statistics, compiled by the Hunan Provincial Government Statistics Office of the Kuomintang, report that the fire inflicted economic losses of more than 1 billion yuan, a sum equivalent to about 1.7 trillion yuan after the victory in the war. This figure represented roughly 43% of Changsha's total economic value at the time. Regarding casualties, contemporary sources provide varying figures. A Xinhua Daily report from November 20, 1938 noted that authorities mobilized manpower to bury more than 600 bodies, though the total number of burned remains could not be precisely counted. A Central News Agency reporter on November 19 stated that in the Xiangyuan fire, more than 2,000 residents could not escape, and most of the bodies had already been buried. There are further claims that in the Changsha Fire, more than 20,000 residents were burned to death. In terms of displacement, Changsha's population before the fire was about 300,000, and by November 12, 90% had been evacuated. After the fire, authorities registered 124,000 victims, including 815 orphans sheltered in Lito and Maosgang.  Building damage constituted the other major dimension of the catastrophe, with the greatest losses occurring to residential houses, shops, schools, factories, government offices, banks, hospitals, newspaper offices, warehouses, and cultural and entertainment venues, as well as numerous historic buildings such as palaces, temples, private gardens, and the former residences of notable figures; among these, residential and commercial structures suffered the most, followed by factories and schools. Inspector Gao Yihan, who conducted a post-fire investigation, observed that the prosperous areas within Changsha's ring road, including Nanzheng Street and Bajiaoting, were almost completely destroyed, and in other major markets only a handful of shops remained, leading to an overall estimate that surviving or stalemated houses were likely less than 20%. Housing and street data from the early post-liberation period reveal that Changsha had more than 1,100 streets and alleys; of these, more than 690 were completely burned and more than 330 had fewer than five surviving houses, accounting for about 29%, with nearly 90% of the city's streets severely damaged. More than 440 streets were not completely destroyed, but among these, over 190 had only one or two houses remaining and over 130 had only three or four houses remaining; about 60 streets, roughly 6% had 30 to 40 surviving houses, around 30 streets, 3% had 11 to 20 houses, 10 streets, 1% had 21 to 30 houses, and three streets ) had more than 30 houses remaining. Housing statistics from 1952 show that 2,538 houses survived the fire, about 6.57% of the city's total housing stock, with private houses totaling 305,800 square meters and public houses 537,900 square meters. By 1956, the surviving area of both private and public housing totaled 843,700 square meters, roughly 12.3% of the city's total housing area at that time. Alongside these losses, all equipment, materials, funds, goods, books, archives, antiques, and cultural relics that had not been moved were also destroyed.  At the time of the Changsha Fire, Zhou Enlai, then Deputy Minister of the Political Department of the Nationalist Government's Military Commission, was in Changsha alongside Ye Jianying, Guo Moruo, and others. On November 12, 1938, Zhou Enlai attended a meeting held by Changsha cultural groups at Changsha Normal School to commemorate Sun Yat-sen's 72nd birthday. Guo Moruo later recalled that Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying were awakened by the blaze that night; they each carried a suitcase and evacuated to Xiangtan, with Zhou reportedly displaying considerable indignation at the sudden, unprovoked fire. On the 16th, Zhou Enlai rushed back to Changsha and, together with Chen Cheng, Zhang Zhizhong, and others, inspected the disaster. He mobilized personnel from three departments, with Tian Han and Guo Moruo at the forefront, to form the Changsha Fire Aftermath Task Force, which began debris clearance, care for the injured, and the establishment of soup kitchens. A few days later, on the 22nd, the Hunan Provincial Government established the Changsha Fire Temporary Relief Committee to coordinate relief efforts.  On the night of November 16, 1938, Chiang Kai-shek arrived in Changsha and, the next day, ascended Tianxin Pavilion. Sha Wei, head of the Cultural Relics Section of the Changsha Tianxin Pavilion Park Management Office, and a long-time researcher of the pavilion, explained that documentation indicates Chiang Kai-shek, upon seeing the city largely reduced to scorched earth with little left intact, grew visibly angry. After descending from Tianxin Pavilion, Chiang immediately ordered the arrest of Changsha Garrison Commander Feng Ti, Changsha Police Chief Wen Chongfu, and Commander of the Second Garrison Regiment Xu Kun, and arranged a military trial with a two-day deadline. The interrogation began at 7:00 a.m. on November 18. Liang Xiaojin records that Xu Kun and Wen Chongfu insisted their actions followed orders from the Security Command, while Feng Ti admitted negligence and violations of procedure, calling his acts unforgivable. The trial found Feng Ti to be the principal offender, with Wen Chongfu and Xu Kun as accomplices, and sentenced all three to prison terms of varying lengths. The verdict was sent to Chiang Kai-shek for approval, who was deeply dissatisfied and personally annotated the drafts: he asserted that Feng Ti, as the city's security head, was negligent and must be shot immediately; Wen Chongfu, as police chief, disobeyed orders and fled, and must be shot immediately; Xu Kun, for neglect of duty, must be shot immediately. The court then altered the arson charge in the verdict to "insulting his duty and harming the people" in line with Chiang's instructions. Chiang Kai-shek, citing "failure to supervise personnel and precautions," dismissed Zhang from his post, though he remained in office to oversee aftermath operations. Zhang Zhizhong later recalled Chiang Kai-shek's response after addressing the Changsha fire: a pointed admission that the fundamental cause lay not with a single individual but with the collective leadership's mistakes, and that the error must be acknowledged as a collective failure. All eyes now shifted to the new center of resistance, Chongqing, the temporary capital. Chiang's "Free China" no longer meant the whole country; it now encompassed Sichuan, Hunan, and Henan, but not Jiangsu or Zhejiang. The eastern provinces were effectively lost, along with China's major customs revenues, the country's most fertile regions, and its most advanced infrastructure. The center of political gravity moved far to the west, into a country the Nationalists had never controlled, where everything was unfamiliar and unpredictable, from topography and dialects to diets. On the map, it might have seemed that Chiang still ruled much of China, but vast swaths of the north and northwest were sparsely populated; most of China's population lay in the east and south, where Nationalist control was either gone or held only precariously. The combined pressures of events and returning travelers were gradually shifting American attitudes toward the Japanese incident. Europe remained largely indifferent, with Hitler absorbing most attention, but the United States began to worry about developments in the Pacific. Roosevelt initiated a January 1939 appeal to raise a million dollars for Chinese civilians in distress, and the response quickly materialized. While the Chinese did not expect direct intervention, they hoped to deter further American economic cooperation with Japan and to halt Japan's purchases of scrap iron, oil, gasoline, shipping, and, above all, weapons from the United States. Public opinion in America was sufficiently stirred to sustain a campaign against silk stockings, a symbolic gesture of boycott that achieved limited effect; Japan nonetheless continued to procure strategic materials. Within this chorus, the left remained a persistent but often discordant ally to the Nationalists. The Institute of Pacific Relations, sympathetic to communist aims, urged America to act, pressuring policymakers and sounding alarms about China. Yet the party line remained firmly pro-Chiang Kai-shek: the Japanese advance seemed too rapid and threatening to the Reds' interests. Most oil and iron debates stalled; American businessmen resented British trade ties with Japan, and Britain refused to join any mutual cutoff, arguing that the Western powers were not at war with Japan. What occurred in China was still commonly referred to in Western diplomatic circles as "the Incident." Wang Jingwei's would make his final defection, yes in a long ass history of defections. Mr Wang Jingwei had been very busy traveling to Guangzhou, then Northwest to speak with Feng Yuxiang, many telegrams went back and forth. He returned to the Nationalist government showing his face to foreign presses and so forth. While other prominent rivals of Chiang, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, and others, rallied when they perceived Japan as a real threat; all did so except Wang Jingwei. Wang, who had long believed himself the natural heir to Sun Yat-sen and who had repeatedly sought to ascend to power, seemed willing to cooperate with Japan if it served his own aims. I will just say it, Wang Jingwei was a rat. He had always been a rat, never changed. Opinions on Chiang Kai-Shek vary, but I think almost everyone can agree Wang Jingwei was one of the worst characters of this time period. Now Wang Jingwei could not distinguish between allies and enemies and was prepared to accept help from whomever offered it, believing he could outmaneuver Tokyo when necessary. Friends in Shanghai and abroad whispered that it was not too late to influence events, arguing that the broader struggle was not merely China versus Japan but a clash between principled leaders and a tyrannical, self-serving clique, Western imperialism's apologists who needed Chiang removed. For a time Wang drifted within the Kuomintang, moving between Nanjing, Wuhan, Changsha, and Chongqing, maintaining discreet lines of communication with his confidants. The Japanese faced a governance problem typical of conquerors who possess conquered territory: how to rule effectively while continuing the war. They imagined Asia under Japanese-led leadership, an East Asia united by a shared Co-Prosperity Sphere but divided by traditional borders. To sustain this vision, they sought local leaders who could cooperate. The search yielded few viable options; would-be collaborators were soon assassinated, proved incompetent, or proved corrupt. The Japanese concluded it would require more time and education. In the end, Wang Jingwei emerged as a preferred figure. Chongqing, meanwhile, seemed surprised by Wang's ascent. He had moved west to Chengde, then to Kunming, attempted, and failed to win over Yunnan's warlords, and eventually proceeded to Hanoi in Indochina, arriving in Hong Kong by year's end. He sent Chiang Kai-shek a telegram suggesting acceptance of Konoe's terms for peace, which Chungking rejected. In time, Wang would establish his own Kuomintang faction in Shanghai, combining rigorous administration with pervasive secret-police activity characteristic of occupied regimes. By 1940, he would be formally installed as "Chairman of China." But that is a story for another episode.  In the north, the Japanese and the CCP were locked in an uneasy stalemate. Mao's army could make it impossible for the Japanese to hold deep countryside far from the railway lines that enabled mass troop movement into China's interior. Yet the Communists could not defeat the occupiers. In the dark days of October 1938—fifteen months after the war began—one constant remained. Observers (Chinese businessmen, British diplomats, Japanese generals) repeatedly predicted that each new disaster would signal the end of Chinese resistance and force a swift surrender, or at least a negotiated settlement in which the government would accept harsher terms from Tokyo. But even after defenders were expelled from Shanghai, Nanjing, and Wuhan, despite the terrifying might Japan had brought to bear on Chinese resistance, and despite the invader's manpower, technology, and resources, China continued to fight. Yet it fought alone. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In a land shredded by war, Wuhan burned under brutal sieges, then Changsha followed, a cruel blaze born of orders and miscommunications. Leaders wrestled with retreat, scorched-earth vows, and moral debts as Japanese force and Chinese resilience clashed for months. Mao urged strategy over martyrdom, Wang Jingwei's scheming shadow loomed, and Chongqing rose as the westward beacon. Yet China endured, a stubborn flame refusing to surrender to the coming storm. The war stretched on, unfinished and unyielding.

This week on Sinica, I chat with Daniel Kurtz-Phelan, editor of Foreign Affairs, about how the journal has both shaped and reflected American discourse on China during a period of dramatic shifts in the relationship. We discuss his deliberate editorial choices to include heterodox voices, the changing nature of the supposed "consensus" on China policy, and what I've called the "vibe shift" in how Americans across the political spectrum think about China. Daniel also reflects on his own intellectual formation, including his work on George Marshall's failed mission to mediate China's Civil War and the cautionary lessons that history holds for today's debates. We explore the challenges of bringing Chinese voices into Foreign Affairs, the balance between driving and reflecting policy debates, and whether we're witnessing a genuine opening of the Overton window on China discussions.7:15 – Foreign Affairs in the era of Iraq and "China's peaceful rise" 12:09 – The Marshall mission and the "Who Lost China?" debate 17:17 – China's changing role and the journal's coverage density 19:43 – The Campbell-Ratner "China Reckoning" and subsequent debates 25:00 – The challenge of including authentic Chinese voices 29:42 – How Chinese leadership perceives and reads Foreign Affairs 32:12 – The "vibe shift" on China across the American political spectrum 35:56 – Cultivating contrarian voices: Van Jackson, Jonathan Czin, and David Kang 40:17 – Avoiding the trap of making everything about U.S.-China competition 43:12 – Diversifying perspectives beyond the Washington-Beijing binary 48:18 – The big questions: American exceptionalism and Chinese identity in a new era 51:42 – The dangers of cutting off U.S.-China scholarly conversations 56:26 – The uses and misuses of historical analogies 58:09 – Spain's Golden Age and late Qing memes as contemporary analogiesPaying it forward: The unsung editorial staff at Foreign AffairsRecommendations: Daniel: Equator.org; The Rise of the Meritocracy by Michael Young; Granta's new India issue; The Party's Interests Come First by Joseph Torigian; The Coming Storm by Odd Arne Westad Kaiser: The Spoils of Time by C.V. WedgwoodSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Follow me on Twitter/X (@chinaadventures) where I post (among other things) daily reminders to pray for China.You can also email me @ bfwesten at gmail dot com. Last but not least, to learn more about our ministry endeavors or get one of my missionary biographies, visit PrayGiveGo.us! My Op-Ed for Crosspolitic News: Trump Making US-Malaysia Relations Great Again https://www.crosspoliticnews.com/news/trump-making-us-malaysia-relations-great-again Five Prayer Requests from the Wives of Imprisoned Pastors https://backtojerusalem.com/wives-of-arrested-pastors-of-chinas-zion-church-share-5-urgent-prayer-requests/ Please pray for our Christian brothers and sisters connected to the Zion Church in China. There has been another wave of arrests. Here is a list of Those Taken Away (23 People): Shanghai- Pastor Wang Lin 2. Liu Jiang Beijing- Preacher Wu Qiuyu 4. Pastor Wang Cong 5. Pastor Sun Cong 6. Sister Li Shengjuan Pastor Gao Yingjia 8. Sister Ming Li 9. Sister Hu Yanzi 10. Preacher Misha 11. Sister Cui Xiaole Jiaxing, Zhejiang- 12. Preacher Zhan Ge Hangzhou, Zhejiang-13. Sister Mei Liming (arrested Oct 11) Beihai, Guangxi- Pastor Jin Mingri (arrested for “illegally using info network,” held at Beihai #2 Detention Center) Pastor Yin Huibin 16. Pastor’s wife Yang Lijun 17. Sis Tuya 18. Sis An Mei 19. Sis Huang Chunzi Qingdao, Shandong- 20. Pastor Liu Zhenbin (aka Liu Shanyi) Chengdu, Sichuan- 21. Pastor Lin Shucheng (Mu Chenglin) Zhengzhou, Henan- 22. Preacher Sun Xue (arrested Oct 12) Shenyang, Liaoning- 23. Elder Wang Zhong (arrested Oct 17) Follow China Compass Subscribe to China Compass on whichever platform you use, including Apple Podcasts! You can also contact me anytime on X: @chinaadventures or via email (bfwesten at gmail dot com). Hebrews 13:3!

This week on the Sinica Podcast, I speak with Jonathan Czin, the Michael H. Armacost Chair in Foreign Policy Studies and a fellow at the Brookings Institution's John L. Thornton China Center. His new essay in Foreign Affairs, “China Against China: Xi Jinping Confronts the Downsides of Success,” challenges the dominant Western narrative of Xi Jinping as either Mao reincarnate or a brittle autocrat presiding over imminent collapse. Instead, Czin argues that Xi's most illiberal reforms can be understood as attempts to cure the pathologies of China's own success. We discuss his framing of Xi's “Counterreformation,” how it helps explain China's current political direction, and what it reveals about our own analytical blind spots in the West.7:15 – Xi's “reformation” and Carl Minzner's “end of reform and opening”12:18 – Corruption, decentralization, and the “lost decade” under Hu and Wen20:12 – Defining “resilience” and what Xi means by “eating bitterness”29:45 – The “downsides of success”: property, corruption, and governance contradictions45:30 – Counter-reformation vs. counterrevolution: what Xi wants to preserve and discard54:20 – The myth of yes-men: triangulation and feedback in Xi's leadership style1:07:07 – Cognitive empathy and why most U.S. analysis of Xi falls short1:15:35 – Systems that can't course-correct: comparing the U.S. and China1:22:05 – Cognitive empathy, ideology, and the problem of American exceptionalismPaying it forward:Jonathan: Allie Mathias and Dinny McMahonRecommendations:Jonathan: The Thirty Years War by C.V. Wedgewood; The Betrothed by Alessandro ManzoniKaiser: Transplants by Daniel Tam-ClaiborneSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Go to http://DrinkAG1.com/adv to get a FREE Frother with your first purchase of AGZWe uncovered the sinister truth behind China's mega bridge. HAND MACHINE GHOST - LIMITED RUN! - https://thechinashow.threadless.comSupport the show here and see the Monday Exclusive show Xiaban Hou! https://www.patreon.com/advpodcastsSign up for the sticker giveaway!https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScdk5BnaNwlkH8yjt-wgUwq6xWBZIgusPRM5ifELKgPdKxLHg/viewform?usp=headerCartoon feat. Jüri Pootsmann - I Remember Uhttps://soundcloud.com/nocopyrightsoundsTrack : Cartoon feat. Jüri Pootsmann - I Remember USome Sources - https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/09/technology/nvidia-chips-china-megaspeed.htmlSalary data in Anlong https://tjgb.hongheiku.com/xjtjgb/xj2020/53025.htmlSalary data in Fenggang https://www.gzfenggang.gov.cn/zwgk/zfxxgkzl/fdzdgknr/ghjh/gmjjhshfzgh/202502/t20250220_86927630.htmlhttps://www.researchgate.net/publication/341419632_Bone_Glue_-_The_Final_Frontier_for_Fracture_Repair_and_Implantable_Device_Stabilizationhttps://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9941416/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1934590925002267https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/human-neuroscience/articles/10.3389/fnhum.2016.00033/fullhttps://www.nature.com/articles/s43587-025-00930-1https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/aging/articles/10.3389/fragi.2025.1638168/fullBRIDGE SOURCES - * 1981 Liziyida Bridge (Chengdu–Kunming Railway), Sichuan* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1981_Chengdu%E2%80%93Kunming_rail_crash* 1999 Qijiang “Rainbow” Pedestrian Bridge, Chongqing* https://www.engineeringcivil.com/civil-engineering-disasters-collapse-of-bridges.html* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qijiang_Rainbow_Bridge_collapse* 2007 Jiujiang Bridge, Foshan (Guangdong)* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collapse_of_Jiujiang_Bridge* 2007 Fenghuang (Tuojiang) Bridge, Hunan (under construction)* https://www.scmp.com/article/606792/dozens-feared-dead-after-hunan-bridge-collapse* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Fenghuang_Bridge_collapse* 2009 Hongqi Road Viaduct, Zhuzhou (Hunan)* https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-05/18/content_7790004.htm* 2010 Tangying Bridge, Luanchuan (Henan)* https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/556460.shtml* https://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?pid=S0718-915X2022000200193&script=sci_arttext* 2010 Nanjing Overpass (under construction), Jiangsu* https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-11/27/content_11617576.htm* 2011 Gongguan Bridge, Wuyishan (Fujian)* https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-07/15/content_12912763.htm* 2012 Hangzhou Viaduct dismantling accident, Zhejiang* https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/201207/716566.shtml* 2012 East Guangchang River Bridge, Jiangxi* https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/201208/721127.shtml* 2012 Yangmingtan Bridge (ramp), Harbin (Heilongjiang)* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yangmingtan_Bridge* 2013 Lianhuo Expressway Bridge (Mianchi, Henan)* https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-bridge-idUSBRE91003D20130201* https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-21300038* 2014 Gaozhou stone-arch bridge, Guangdong* https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-05/05/content_17487284.htm* 2014 Jinshan Bridge, Enshi (Hubei) (under construction)* https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/10/6/2112* 2016 Ganjiang Bridge (dismantling), Taihe (Jiangxi)* https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/201609/1009862.shtml* 2019 Wuxi S342 Overpass, Jiangsu* https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-bridge-collapse-idUSKBN1WP0JH* https://www.caixinglobal.com/2019-11-01/in-depth-overloaded-and-overturned-inside-the-deadly-wuxi-bridge-collapse-101478011.html* https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/11/deaths-reported-as-bridge-collapses-in-chinas-jiangsu-province* 2021 S2 Ezhou Expressway Ramp Bridge, Hubei* https://www.reuters.com/world/china/bridge-collapse-central-china-kills-four-2021-12-18/* 2024 Lixinsha Bridge, Guangzhou (Guangdong)* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Lixinsha_Bridge_collapse* 2024 Danning (G4015) Expressway Bridge, Zhashui (Shaanxi)* https://apnews.com/article/shaanxi-china-bridge-collapse-river-dead-b077896e4b291ef82a46ed601bfd04ca* 2024 Yakang Expressway Bridge (near Kangding), Sichuan* https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3240129/more-bodies-found-after-mountain-bridge-collapse-china* 2025 Jianzha Yellow River Bridge (under construction), Qinghai* https://abc13.com/post/china-bridge-collapse-today-kills-least-12-construction-workers-yellow-river-qinghai-province/17622521This video features copyrighted material used for commentary and educational purposes. We believe this constitutes a 'fair use' of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                      Last time we spoke about the continuation of the war after Nanjing's fall. The fall of Nanjing in December 1937 marked a pivotal juncture in the Second Sino-Japanese War, ushering in a brutal phase of attrition that shaped both strategy and diplomacy in early 1938. As Japanese forces sought to restructure China's political order, their strategy extended beyond battlefield victories to the establishment of puppet arrangements and coercive diplomacy. Soviet aid provided critical support, while German and broader Axis diplomacy wavered, shaping a nuanced backdrop for China's options. In response, Chinese command decisions focused on defending crucial rail corridors and urban strongholds, with Wuhan emerging as a strategic hub and the Jinpu and Longhai railways becoming lifelines of resistance. The defense around Xuzhou and the Huai River system illustrated Chinese determination to prolong resistance despite daunting odds. By early 1938, the war appeared as a drawn-out struggle, with China conserving core bases even as Japan pressed toward central China.   #170 The Battle of Taierzhuang Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Following their victory at Nanjing, the Japanese North China Area Army sought to push southward and link up with the Japanese Eleventh Army between Beijing and Nanjing. The two formations were intended to advance along the northern and southern ends of the JinPu railway, meet at Xuzhou, and then coordinate a pincer movement into Chinese strongholds in the Central Yangtze region, capturing Jiujiang first and then Wuhan. Recognizing Xuzhou's strategic importance, Chinese leadership made its defense a top priority. Xuzhou stood at the midpoint of the JinPu line and at the intersection with the Longhai Line, China's main east–west corridor from Lanzhou to Lianyungang. If seized, Japanese control of these routes would grant mobility for north–south movement across central China. At the end of January, Chiang Kai-shek convened a military conference in Wuchang and declared the defense of Xuzhou the highest strategic objective. Chinese preparations expanded from an initial core of 80,000 troops to about 300,000, deployed along the JinPu and Longhai lines to draw in and overstretch Japanese offensives. A frightening reality loomed by late March 1938: the Japanese were nearing victory on the Xuzhou front. The North China Area Army, led by Generals Itagaki Seishirô, Nishio Toshizô, and Isogai Rensuke, aimed to link up with the Central China Expeditionary Force under General Hata Shunroku for a coordinated drive into central China. Li Zongren and his senior colleagues, including Generals Bai Chongxi and Tang Enbo, resolved to meet the Japanese at the traditional stone-walled city of Taierzhuang. Taierzhuang was not large, but it held strategic significance. It sat along the Grand Canal, China's major north–south waterway, and on a rail line that connected the Jinpu and Longhai lines, thus bypassing Xuzhou. Chiang Kai-shek himself visited Xuzhou on March 24. While Xuzhou remained in Chinese hands, the Japanese forces to the north and south were still separated. Losing Xuzhou would close the pincer. By late March, Chinese troops seemed to be gaining ground at Taierzhuang, but the Japanese began reinforcing, pulling soldiers from General Isogai Rensuke's column. The defending commanders grew uncertain about their ability to hold the position, yet Chiang Kai-shek made his stance clear in an April 1, 1938 telegram: “the enemy at Taierzhuang must be destroyed.” Chiang Kai-shek dispatched his Vice Chief of Staff, Bai Chongxi, to Xuzhou in January 1938. Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi were old comrades from the New Guangxi Clique, and their collaboration dated back to the Northern Expedition, including the Battle of Longtan. Li also received the 21st Group Army from the 3rd War Area. This Guangxi unit, commanded by Liao Lei, comprised the 7th and 47th Armies. Around the same time, Sun Zhen's 22nd Group Army, another Sichuan clique unit, arrived in the Shanxi-Henan region, but was rebuffed by both Yan Xishan, then commander of the 2nd War Area and Shanxi's chairman and Cheng Qian, commander of the 1st War Area and Henan's chairman. Yan and Cheng harbored strong reservations about Sichuan units due to discipline issues, notably their rampant opium consumption. Under Sun Zhen's leadership, the 22nd Group Army deployed four of its six divisions to aid the Northern China effort. Organized under the 41st and 45th Armies, the contingent began a foot march toward Taiyuan on September 1, covering more than 50 days and approximately 1,400 kilometers. Upon reaching Shanxi, they faced a harsh, icy winter and had no winter uniforms or even a single map of the province. They nevertheless engaged the Japanese for ten days at Yangquan, suffering heavy casualties. Strapped for supplies, they broke into a Shanxi clique supply depot, which enraged Yan Xishan and led to their expulsion from the province. The 22nd withdrew westward into the 1st War Area, only to have its request for resupply rejected by Cheng Qian. Meanwhile to the south Colonel Rippei Ogisu led Japanese 13th Division to push westward from Nanjing in two columns during early February: the northern column targeted Mingguang, while the southern column aimed for Chuxian. Both routes were checked by Wei Yunsong's 31st Army, which had been assigned to defend the southern stretch of the Jinpu railway under Li Zongren. Despite facing a clearly inferior force, the Japanese could not gain ground after more than a month of sustained attacks. In response, Japan deployed armored and artillery reinforcements from Nanjing. The Chinese withdrew to the southwestern outskirts of Dingyuan to avoid a direct clash with their reinforced adversaries. By this point, Yu Xuezhong's 51st Army had taken up a defensive position on the northern banks of the Huai River, establishing a line between Bengbu and Huaiyuan. The Japanese then captured Mingguang, Dingyuan, and Bengbu in succession and pressed toward Huaiyuan. However, their supply lines were intercepted by the Chinese 31st Corps, which conducted flanking attacks from the southwest. The situation worsened when the Chinese 7th Army, commanded by Liao Lei, arrived at Hefei to reinforce the 31st Army. Facing three Chinese corps simultaneously, the Japanese were effectively boxed south of the Huai River and, despite air superiority and a superior overall firepower, could not advance further. As a result, the Chinese thwarted the Japanese plan to move the 13th Division north along the Jinpu railway and link up with the Isogai 10th Division to execute a pincer against Xuzhou. Meanwhile in the north, after amphibious landings at Qingdao, the Japanese 5th Division, commanded by Seishiro Itagaki, advanced southwest along the Taiwei Highway, spearheaded by its 21st Infantry Brigade. They faced Pang Bingxun's 3rd Group Army. Although labeled a Group Army, Pang's force actually comprised only the 40th Army, which itself consisted of the 39th Division from the Northwestern Army, commanded by Ma-Fawu. The 39th Division's five regiments delayed the Japanese advance toward Linyi for over a month. The Japanese captured Ju County on 22 February and moved toward Linyi by 2 March. The 59th Army, commanded by Zhang Zizhong, led its troops on a forced march day and night toward Linyi. Seizing the opportunity, the 59th Army did not rest after reaching Yishui. In the early morning of the 14th, Zhang Zizhong ordered the entire army to covertly cross the Yishui River and attack the right flank of the Japanese “Iron Army” 5th Division. They broke through enemy defenses at Tingzitou, Dataiping, Shenjia Taiping, Xujia Taiping, and Shalingzi. Initially caught off guard, the enemy sustained heavy losses, and over a night more than a thousand Japanese soldiers were annihilated. The 59th Army fought fiercely, engaging in brutal hand-to-hand combat. By 4:00 a.m. on the 17th, the 59th Army had secured all of the Japanese main positions. That same day, Pang Bingxun seized the moment to lead his troops in a fierce flank attack, effectively supporting the 59th Army's frontal assault. On the 18th, Zhang and Pang's forces attacked the Japanese from the east, south, and west. After three days and nights of bloody fighting, they finally defeated the 3rd Battalion of the 11th Regiment, which had crossed the river, and annihilated most of it. The 59th Army completed its counterattack but suffered over 6,000 casualties, with more than 2,000 Japanese killed or wounded. News of the Linyi victory prompted commendations from Chiang Kai-shek and Li Zongren. General Li Zongren, commander of the 5th War Zone, judged that the Japanese were temporarily unable to mount a large-scale offensive and that Linyi could be held for the time being. On March 20, he ordered the 59th Army westward to block the Japanese Seya Detachment. On March 21, the Japanese Sakamoto Detachment, after a brief reorganization and learning of the Linyi detachment, launched another offensive. The 3rd Corps, understrength and without reinforcements, was compelled to retreat steadily before the Japanese. General Pang Bingxun, commander of the 3rd Corps, urgently telegraphed Chiang Kai-shek, requesting reinforcements. Chiang Kai-shek received the telegram and, at approximately 9:00 AM on the 23rd, ordered the 59th Army to return to Linyi to join with the 3rd Corps in repelling the Sakamoto Detachment. Fierce fighting ensued with heavy Chinese losses, and the situation in Linyi again grew precarious. At a critical moment, the 333rd Brigade of the 111th Division and the Cavalry Regiment of the 13th Army were rushed to reinforce Linyi. Facing attacks from two directions, the Japanese withdrew, losing almost two battalions in the process. This engagement shattered the myth of Japanese invincibility and embarrassed commander Seishirō Itagaki, even startling IJA headquarters. Although the 5th Division later regrouped and attempted another push, it had lost the element of surprise. The defeat at Linyi at the hands of comparatively poorly equipped Chinese regional units set the stage for the eventual battle at Tai'erzhuang. Of the three Japanese divisions advancing into the Chinese 5th War Area, the 10th Division, commanded by Rensuke Isogai, achieved the greatest initial success. Departing from Hebei, it crossed the Yellow River and moved south along the Jinpu railway. With KMT General Han Fuju ordering his forces to desert their posts, the Japanese captured Zhoucun and reached Jinan with little resistance. They then pushed south along two columns from Tai'an. The eastern column captured Mengyin before driving west to seize Sishui; the western column moved southwest along the Jinpu railway, capturing Yanzhou, Zouxian, and Jining, before turning northwest to take Wenshang. Chiang Kai-shek subsequently ordered Li Zongren to employ “offensive defense”, seizing the initiative to strike rather than merely defend. Li deployed Sun Zhen's 22nd Group Army to attack Zouxian from the south, while Pang Bingxun's 40th Division advanced north along the 22nd's left flank to strike Mengyin and Sishui. Sun Tongxuan's 3rd Group Army also advanced from the south, delivering a two-pronged assault on the Japanese at Jining. Fierce fighting from 12 to 25 February, particularly by the 12th Corps, helped mitigate the reputational damage previously inflicted on Shandong units by Han Fuju. In response to Chinese counterattacks, the Japanese revised their strategy: they canceled their original plan to push directly westward from Nanjing toward Wuhan, freeing more troops for the push toward Xuzhou. On March 15, the Japanese 10th Division struck the Chinese 122nd Division, focusing the action around Tengxian and Lincheng. Chinese reinforcements from the 85th Corps arrived the following day but were driven back on March 17. With air support, tanks, and heavy artillery, the Japanese breached the Chinese lines on March 18. The remaining Chinese forces, bolstered by the 52nd Corps, withdrew to the town of Yixian. The Japanese attacked Yixian and overran an entire Chinese regiment in a brutal 24-hour engagement. By March 19, the Japanese began advancing on the walled town of Taierzhuang. To counter the Japanese advance, the Chinese 2nd Army Group under General Sun Lianzhong was deployed to Taierzhuang. The 31st Division, commanded by General Chi Fengcheng, reached Taierzhuang on March 22 and was ordered to delay the Japanese advance until the remainder of the Army Group could arrive. On March 23, the 31st Division sallied from Taierzhuang toward Yixian, where they were engaged by two Japanese battalions reinforced with three tanks and four armored cars. The Chinese troops occupied a series of hills and managed to defend against a Japanese regiment (~3,000 men) for the rest of the day. On March 24, a Japanese force of about 5,000 attacked the 31st Division. Another Japanese unit pressed the Chinese from Yixian, forcing them to withdraw back into Taierzhuang itself. The Japanese then assaulted the town, with a 300-strong contingent breaching the northeast gate at 20:00. They were subsequently driven back toward the Chenghuang temple, which the Chinese set on fire, annihilating the Japanese force. The next day, the Japanese renewed the assault through the breached gate and secured the eastern portion of the district, while also breaking through the northwest corner from the outside and capturing the Wenchang Pavilion. On March 25, a morning Japanese onslaught was repelled. The Japanese then shelled Chinese positions with artillery and air strikes. In the afternoon, the Chinese deployed an armored train toward Yixian, which ambushed a column of Japanese soldiers near a hamlet, killing or wounding several dozen before retreating back to Taierzhuang. By nightfall, three thousand Chinese troops launched a night assault, pushing the Japanese lines northeast to dawn. The following three days subjected the Chinese defenders to sustained aerial and artillery bombardment. The Chinese managed to repulse several successive Japanese assaults but sustained thousands of casualties in the process. On March 28, Chinese artillery support arrived, including two 155 mm and ten 75 mm pieces. On the night of March 29, the Japanese finally breached the wall. Setting out from the district's southern outskirts, a Chinese assault squad stormed the Wenchang Pavilion from the south and east, killing nearly the entire Japanese garrison aside from four taken as prisoners of war. The Chinese then retook the northwest corner of the district. Even by the brutal standards already established in the war, the fighting at Taierzhuang was fierce, with combatants facing one another at close quarters. Sheng Cheng's notes preserve the battlefield memories of Chi Fengcheng, one of the campaign's standout officers “We had a battle for the little lanes [of the town], and unprecedentedly, not just streets and lanes, but even courtyards and houses. Neither side was willing to budge. Sometimes we'd capture a house, and dig a hole in the wall to approach the enemy. Sometimes the enemy would be digging a hole in the same wall at the same time. Sometimes we faced each other with hand grenades — or we might even bite each other. Or when we could hear that the enemy was in the house, then we'd climb the roof and drop bombs inside — and kill them all.” The battle raged for a week. On April 1, General Chi requested volunteers for a near-suicide mission to seize a building: among fifty-seven selected, only ten survived. A single soldier claimed to have fired on a Japanese bomber and succeeded in bringing it down; he and his comrades then set the aircraft ablaze before another plane could arrive to rescue the pilot. One participant described the brutal conditions of the battle “"The battle continued day and night. The flames lit up the sky. Often all that separated our forces was a single wall. The soldiers would beat holes in the masonry to snipe at each other. We would be fighting for days over a single building, causing dozens of fatalities." The conditions were so brutal that Chinese officers imposed severe measures to maintain discipline. Junior officers were repeatedly forbidden to retreat and were often ordered to personally replace casualties within their ranks. Li Zongren even warned Tang Enbo that failure to fulfill his duties would lead him to be “treated as Han Fuju had been.” In Taierzhuang's cramped streets, Japan's artillery and air superiority offered little advantage; whenever either service was employed amid the dense melee, casualties were roughly even on both sides. The fighting devolved into close-quarters combat carried out primarily by infantry, with rifles, pistols, hand grenades, bayonets, and knives forming the core of each side's arsenal. The battle unfolded largely hand-to-hand, frequently in darkness. The stone buildings of Taierzhuang provided substantial cover from fire and shrapnel. It was precisely under these close-quarters conditions that Chinese soldiers could stand as equals, if not superior, to their Japanese opponents, mirroring, in some respects, the experiences seen in Luodian, Shanghai, the year before. On March 31, General Sun Lianzhong arrived to assume command of the 2nd Army Group. A Japanese assault later that day was repulsed, but a Chinese counterattack also stalled. At 04:00 on April 1, the Japanese attacked the Chinese lines with support from 11 tanks. The Chinese defenders, armed with German-made 37mm Pak-36 antitank guns, destroyed eight of the armored vehicles at point-blank range. Similar incidents recurred throughout the battle, with numerous Japanese tanks knocked out by Chinese artillery and by suicide squads. In one engagement, Chinese suicide bombers annihilated four Japanese tanks with bundles of grenades. On April 2 and 3, Chi urged the Chinese defenders around Taierzhuang's north station to assess the evolving situation. The troops reported distress, crying and sneezing, caused by tear gas deployed by the Japanese against Chinese positions at Taierzhuang's north station, but the defenders remained unmoved. They then launched a massive armored assault outside the city walls, with 30 tanks and 60 armored cars, yet managed only to drive the Chinese 27th Division back to the Grand Canal. The fighting continued to rage on April 4 and 5. By then, the Japanese had captured roughly two-thirds of Taierzhuang, though the Chinese still held the South Gate. It was through this entry point that the Chinese command managed to keep their troops supplied. The Chinese also thwarted Japanese efforts to replenish their dwindling stocks of arms and ammunition. In consequence, the Japanese attackers were worn down progressively. Although the Japanese possessed superior firepower, including cannon and heavy artillery, the cramped conditions within Taierzhuang nullified this advantage for the moment. The Chinese command succeeded in keeping their own supplies flowing, a recurring weakness in other engagements and also prevented the Japanese from replenishing their dwindling stock of arms and bullets. Gradually, the Japanese maneuvered into a state of attrition. The deadlock of the battle was broken by events unfolding outside Taierzhuang, where fresh Chinese divisions had encircled the Japanese forces in Taierzhuang from the flanks and rear. After consulting their German advisors earlier, the commanders of the 5th War Area prepared a double envelopment of the exposed Japanese forces in Taierzhuang. Between March and April 1938, the Nationalist Air Force deployed squadrons from the 3rd and 4th Pursuit Groups, fighter-attack aircraft, in long-distance air interdiction and close-air support of the Taierzhuang operations. Approximately 30 aircraft, mostly Soviet-made, were deployed in bombing raids against Japanese positions. On 26 March, Tang Enbo's 20th Army, equipped with artillery units, attacked Japanese forces at Yixian, inflicting heavy casualties and routing the survivors. Tang then swung south to strike the Japanese flank northeast of Taierzhuang. Simultaneously, the Chinese 55th Corps, comprised of two divisions, executed a surprise crossing of the Grand Canal and cut the railway line near Lincheng. As a result, Tang isolated the Japanese attackers from their rear and severed their supply lines. On 1 April, the Japanese 5th Division sent a brigade to relieve the encircled 10th Division. Tang countered by blocking the brigade's advance and then attacking from the rear, driving them south into the encirclement. On 3 April, the Chinese 2nd Group Army launched a counter-offensive, with the 30th and 110th Divisions pushing northward into Beiluo and Nigou, respectively. By 6 April, the Chinese 85th and 52nd Armies linked up at Taodun, just west of Lanling. The combined force then advanced north-westward, capturing Ganlugou. Two more Chinese divisions arrived a few days later. By April 5, Taierzhuang's Japanese units were fully surrounded, with seven Chinese divisions to the north and four to the south closing in. The Japanese divisions inside Taierzhuang had exhausted their supplies, running critically low on ammunition, fuel, and food, while many troops endured fatigue and dehydration after more than a week of brutal fighting. Sensing imminent victory, the Chinese forces surged with renewed fury and attacked the encircled Japanese, executing wounded soldiers where they lay with rifle and pistol shots. Chinese troops also deployed Soviet tanks against the defenders. Japanese artillery could not reply effectively due to a shortage of shells, and their tanks were immobilized by a lack of fuel. Attempts to drop supplies by air failed, with most packages falling into Chinese hands. Over time, Japanese infantry were progressively reduced to firing only their machine guns and mortars, then their rifles and machine guns, and ultimately resorted to bayonet charges. With the success of the Chinese counter-attacks, the Japanese line finally collapsed on April 7. The 10th and 5th Divisions, drained of personnel and ammunition, were forced to retreat. By this point, around 2,000 Japanese soldiers managed to break out of Taierzhuang, leaving thousands of their comrades dead behind. Some of the escapees reportedly committed hara-kiri. Chinese casualties were roughly comparable, marking a significant improvement over the heavier losses suffered in Shanghai and Nanjing. The Japanese had lost the battle for numerous reasons. Japanese efforts were hampered by the "offensive-defensive" operations carried out by various Chinese regional units, effectively preventing the three Japanese divisions from ever linking up with each other. Despite repeated use of heavy artillery, air strikes, and gas, the Japanese could not expel the Chinese 2nd Group Army from Taierzhuang and its surrounding areas, even as the defenders risked total annihilation. The Japanese also failed to block the Chinese 20th Group Army's maneuver around their rear positions, which severed retreat routes and enabled a Chinese counter-encirclement. After Han Fuju's insubordination and subsequent execution, the Chinese high command tightened discipline at the top, transmitting a stringent order flow down to the ranks. This atmosphere of strict discipline inspired even junior soldiers to risk their lives in executing orders. A “dare-to-die corps” was effectively employed against Japanese units. They used swords and wore suicide vests fashioned from grenades. Due to a lack of anti-armor weaponry, suicide bombing was also employed against the Japanese. Chinese troops, as part of the “dare-to-die” corps, strapped explosives such as grenade packs or dynamite to their bodies and charged at Japanese tanks to blow them up.  The Chinese later asserted that about 20,000 Japanese had perished, though the actual toll was likely closer to 8,000. The Japanese also sustained heavy material losses. Because of fuel shortages and their rapid retreat, many tanks, trucks, and artillery pieces were abandoned on the battlefield and subsequently captured by Chinese forces. Frank Dorn recorded losses of 40 tanks, over 70 armored cars, and 100 trucks of various sizes. In addition to vehicles, the Japanese lost dozens of artillery pieces and thousands of machine guns and rifles. Many of these weapons were collected by the Chinese for future use. The Chinese side also endured severe casualties, possibly up to 30,000, with Taierzhuang itself nearly razed. Yet for once, the Chinese achieved a decisive victory, sparking an outburst of joy across unoccupied China. Du Zhongyuan wrote of “the glorious killing of the enemy,” and even Katharine Hand, though isolated in Japanese-controlled Shandong, heard the news. The victory delivered a much-needed morale boost to both the army and the broader population. Sheng Cheng recorded evening conversations with soldiers from General Chi Fengcheng's division, who shared light-hearted banter with their senior officer. At one moment, the men recalled Chi as having given them “the secret of war. when you get food, eat it; when you can sleep, take it.” Such familiar, brisk maxims carried extra resonance now that the Nationalist forces had demonstrated their willingness and ability to stand their ground rather than retreat. The victors may have celebrated a glorious victory, but they did not forget that their enemies were human. Chi recalled a scene he encountered: he had picked up a Japanese officer's helmet, its left side scorched by gunpowder, with a trace of blood, the mark of a fatal wound taken from behind. Elsewhere in Taierzhuang, relics of the fallen were found: images of the Buddha, wooden fish, and flags bearing slogans. A makeshift crematorium in the north station had been interrupted mid-process: “Not all the bones had been completely burned.” After the battle, Li Zongren asked Sheng if he had found souvenirs on the battlefield. Sheng replied that he had discovered love letters on the corpses of Japanese soldiers, as well as a photograph of a girl, perhaps a hometown sweetheart labeled “19 years old, February 1938.” These details stood in stark contrast to news coverage that depicted the Japanese solely as demons, devils, and “dwarf bandits.” The foreign community noted the new, optimistic turn of events and the way it seemed to revive the resistance effort. US ambassador Nelson Johnson wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull from Wuhan just days after Taierzhuang, passing on reports from American military observers: one had spent time in Shanxi and been impressed by Communist success in mobilizing guerrilla fighters against the Japanese; another had spent three days observing the fighting at Taierzhuang and confirmed that “Chinese troops in the field there won a well-deserved victory over Japanese troops, administering the first defeat that Japanese troops have suffered in the field in modern times.” This reinforced Johnson's view that Japan would need to apply far more force than it had anticipated to pacify China. He noted that the mood in unoccupied China had likewise shifted. “Conditions here at Hankow have changed from an atmosphere of pessimism to one of dogged optimism. The Government is more united under Chiang and there is a feeling that the future is not entirely hopeless due to the recent failure of Japanese arms at Hsuchow [Xuzhou] . . . I find no evidence for a desire for a peace by compromise among  Chinese, and doubt whether the Government could persuade its army or its people to accept such a peace. The spirit of resistance is slowly spreading among the people who are awakening to a feeling that this is their war. Japanese air raids in the interior and atrocities by Japanese soldiers upon civilian populations are responsible for this stiffening of the people.”. The British had long been wary of Chiang Kai-shek, but Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, the British ambassador in China, wrote to the new British foreign secretary, Lord Halifax, on April 29, 1938, shortly after the Taierzhuang victory, and offered grudging credit to China's leader “[Chiang] has now become the symbol of Chinese unity, which he himself has so far failed to achieve, but which the Japanese are well on the way to achieving for him . . . The days when Chinese people did not care who governed them seem to have gone . . . my visit to Central China from out of the gloom and depression of Shanghai has left me stimulated and more than disposed to believe that provided the financial end can be kept up Chinese resistance may be so prolonged and effective that in the end the Japanese effort may be frustrated . . . Chiang Kai-shek is obstinate and difficult to deal with . . . Nonetheless [the Nationalists] are making in their muddlIn the exhilaration of a rare victory”. Chiang pressured Tang and Li to build on their success, increasing the area's troop strength to about 450,000. Yet the Chinese Army remained plagued by deeper structural issues. The parochialism that had repeatedly hampered Chiang's forces over the past six months resurfaced. Although the various generals had agreed to unite in a broader war of resistance, each prioritized the safety of his own troops, wary of any move by Chiang to centralize power. For example, Li Zongren refrained from utilizing his top Guangxi forces at Taierzhuang, attempting to shift the bulk of the fighting onto Tang Enbo's units. The generals were aware of the fates of two colleagues: Han Fuju of Shandong was executed for his refusal to fight, while Zhang Xueliang of Manchuria had allowed Chiang to reduce the size of his northeastern army and ended up under house arrest. They were justified in distrusting Chiang. He truly believed, after all, that provincial armies should come under a national military command led by himself. From a national-unity standpoint, Chiang's aim was not unreasonable. But it bred suspicion among other military leaders that participation in the anti-Japanese war would erode their own power. The fragmented command structure also hindered logistics, making ammunition and food supplies to the front unreliable and easy to cut off a good job of things in extremely difficult circumstances. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Chinese victory at the battle of Tairzhuang was a much needed morale boost after the long string of defeats to Japan. As incredible as it was however, it would amount to merely a bloody nose for the Imperial Japanese Army. Now Japan would unleash even more devastation to secure Xuzhou and ultimately march upon Wuhan.

This week on Sinica, I chat with Peking University's Professor Wang Dong (王栋), an international relations scholar at the School of International Studies at Peking University, where he also serves as Deputy Director and Executive Director of the Office for Humanities and Social Sciences and the Institute for Global Cooperation and Understanding. Professor Wang's scholarship and public commentary focus on U.S.–China relations, Cold War history, and the uses of historical memory in diplomacy. He has been an especially thoughtful voice in connecting the Flying Tigers legacy with today's efforts to stabilize and strengthen the people-to-people ties between our two countries.Check back in a day or two for the full podcast page and the transcript!See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, co-host Tianyu Fang makes his debut on the show to join me in interviewing his Stanford classmate and talented writer Jasmine Sun, who studies the anthropology of disruption. This summer, she took a trip to China with a group of friends with different levels of China experience, from people raised in the country to total novices. She reflects on how it hit, and how a group of young people reckoned with the reality of Chinese hypermodernity, which she wrote about in a terrific essay titled "america against china against america: notes on shenzhen, shanghai, and more."Check back on this page in a couple of days for the full podcast page with time stamps and recommendations!See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on the Sinica Podcast, I chat with well-known author and public intellectual Yascha Mounk about his recent fascination with China, his approach to learning about the country and learning Chinese, and his thoughts on how China fits into the current crisis of Western liberal democracy.7:15 – Yascha's experience of living in China and learning Chinese12:18 – Yascha's perspective on China's strengths and weaknesses20:12 – China in a global comparative perspective: Generational aspirations and demographic decline29:45 – China's Soft Power vs. Japan, Korea, and the U.S.45:30 – Media narratives on China: have they shifted?54:20 – Western Liberalism confronts China01:07:07 – Backlash & criticism01:11:35 - Polarization and “China as enemy” narrativesRecommendations: Yascha: The Leopard by Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa (book), The Leopard (1963) (movie)Kaiser: A Thousand Small Sanities: The Moral Adventure of Liberalism by Adam Gopnik (book)See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.