Podcasts about Sichuan

Ketchup. We all know what it is. But do we? It's not a thing. It's actually a category.Where's the word come from? How was it originally used? When was the first ketchup recipe? How has it become the condiment we know today?We're Bruce Weinstein & Mark Scarbrough, authors of over three dozen cookbooks. This podcast is about our major passion in life: food and cooking.If you'd like to check out our latest cookbook, COLD CANNING, please click here.[00:55] Our one-minute cooking tip: Click on "like" for any online content you in fact like.[02:18] All about ketchup! Where'd it come from? Where's the word come from? It's not a thing. It's a category of things. How'd it get to be the stick, thick tomato sauce we know today?[22:02] What's making us happy in food this week: Sichuan fish stew and Chinese food demystified!

Dr Philip Smith, Digital and Education Editor of Gut and Honorary Consultant Gastroenterologist at the Royal Liverpool Hospital, Liverpool, UK interviews Professor Chengwei Tang and Associate Professor Zhiyin Huang from the Department of Gastroenterology, West China Hospital of Sichuan University, Chengdu, Sichuan, China on the paper "Parecoxib sequential with imrecoxib for occurrence and remission of severe acute pancreatitis: a multicentre, double-blind, randomised, placebo-controlled trial" published in paper copy in Gut in September 2025. Please subscribe to the Gut podcast on your favourite platform to get the latest podcast every month. If you enjoy our podcast, you can leave us a review or a comment on Apple Podcasts (https://apple.co/3UOTwqS) or Spotify (https://spoti.fi/3Ifxq9p).

The People's Liberation Army has displayed all types of its fifth-generation combat planes on active duty for the first time via the grand parade on Wednesday, a move that observers say is intended to show its world-class air prowess.中国人民解放军在周三的盛大阅兵式上，首次展示了现役的所有型号第五代战斗机。观察人士表示，此举旨在彰显中国具备世界一流的空中实力。All of the five models — the J-20, J-20A, J-20S and J-35A of the PLA Air Force as well as the PLA Navy's J-35 — thundered past the Tian'anmen Square in central Beijing as they flew in several arrowhead-shaped groups around the end of a 70-minute parade marking the 80th anniversary of the victory in the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (1931-45) and the World Anti-Fascist War.在这场时长70分钟、纪念中国人民抗日战争（1931-1945）暨世界反法西斯战争胜利80周年的阅兵式临近尾声时，五种型号的战斗机——中国人民解放军空军的歼-20、歼-20A、歼-20S、歼-35A以及海军的歼-35——组成多个箭头形编队，轰鸣着飞过北京市中心的天安门广场。This is the first time in the world that five models of cutting-edge stealth fighter jets have appeared in one parade.这是全球首次有五种型号的尖端隐形战斗机在同一场阅兵式上亮相。It also marked the maiden public performance of the J-20S, the world's first and only model of twin-seat stealth jet; the J-20A, an upgraded single-seat variant of the J-20 baseline configuration; and the J-35, the first radar-evading combat plane in the Navy.此次阅兵也标志着全球首款且目前唯一的双座隐形战斗机歼-20S、歼-20基础型号的升级单座版本歼-20A，以及中国海军首款隐形战斗机歼-35的首次公开亮相。Wang Yanan, chief editor of Aerospace Knowledge magazine, told China Daily that this is the first time in the history of the People's Republic of China that so much new hardware has been sent to a parade.《航空知识》杂志主编王亚男在接受《中国日报》采访时表示，这是中华人民共和国成立以来，首次在阅兵式上展示如此多的新型装备。“What we have seen is an unprecedented unveiling of China's domestically developed weaponry such as those new aircraft. All of these previously unseen weapons have state-of-the-art designs and superior capabilities, and have tremendously enhanced the Chinese armed forces' overall strength,” Wang said.王亚男表示：“我们此次看到的是中国自主研发武器装备——如这些新型战机——前所未有的集中亮相。所有这些此前未公开的武器都具备最先进的设计和卓越性能，极大提升了中国军队的整体实力。”“Specifically speaking, the appearance of the J-20 and J-35 families on a considerable scale means that the Air Force and Navy are in the middle of a systemic transformation that highlights the core role of fifth-generation types, namely these stealth jets,” he said, stating that the PLA is likely to be ahead of other militaries around the globe in terms of establishing a comprehensive fifth-generation air combat system.他指出：“具体而言，歼-20和歼-35系列战机的大规模亮相，表明中国空军和海军正处于以第五代战机（即这些隐形战机）为核心的体系化转型之中。”他还表示，在构建全面的第五代空战体系方面，中国人民解放军可能已走在全球其他军队前列。According to a statement published before the V-Day parade by a temporary command in charge of the event's aircraft squadrons, the new military planes “have been deployed to handle high-intensity warfare” while their appearance was meant to “reflect the PLA's strength to deter adversaries and safeguard China's airspace.”负责此次阅兵式空中梯队的临时指挥部在阅兵前发布声明称，这些新型军机“已列装部队，可执行高强度作战任务”，而它们的亮相旨在“彰显中国人民解放军震慑对手、捍卫中国领空的实力”。J-20S（歼-20S）The J-20S, like other members of the J-20 series, was designed by the Chengdu Aircraft Design and Research Institute, an Aviation Industry Corp of China subsidiary in Sichuan province, and was declassified in November 2024 by appearing in the form of a small-scale mock-up at the 15th China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition.与歼-20系列其他型号一样，歼-20S由中国航空工业集团旗下位于四川省的成都飞机设计研究所设计，并于2024年11月在第十五届中国国际航空航天博览会上以小型模型形式首次解密。According to designers at AVIC, the J-20S is a heavy-duty radar-evading fighter jet with long-range operation and multifunction capabilities.中国航空工业集团的设计师表示，歼-20S是一款具备远程作战能力和多功能属性的重型隐形战斗机。The twin-seat plane is characterized by its supreme ability to seize superiority in air combat, carry out precision strikes against land and sea targets, and perform battlefield situational awareness, electronic jamming as well as tactical command and control operations.这款双座战机的核心优势在于：具备极强的夺取制空权能力、可对陆基和海基目标实施精确打击，同时能执行战场态势感知、电子干扰及战术指挥控制任务。In addition to conventional tasks, the J-20S can team up with unmanned planes in air combat, designers said.设计师还指出，除常规任务外，歼-20S还可在空战中与无人机协同作战。Fu Qianshao, an aircraft researcher who had served with the Air Force for decades, said the jet is likely to be tasked with conducting electronic warfare operations or guiding unmanned aircraft to hit enemy targets.曾在空军服役数十年的航空研究员傅前哨表示，歼-20S可能承担电子战任务，或引导无人机打击敌方目标。“The additional operator in the backseat is responsible for controlling electronic warfare instruments or coordinating strike operations by his or her plane and attack drones. His or her work can enable the J-20S to better use precision-guided munitions and connect with the airborne early-warning and control systems,” he said. “It is better to have an operator to focus on these extended functions because only one pilot would be too busy to take care of all of those tasks in real air combat.”他解释道：“后座的额外操作员负责操控电子战设备，或协调本机与攻击型无人机的打击行动。这一设置能让歼-20S更高效地使用精确制导武器，并与空中预警指挥系统联动。在实际空战中，仅靠一名飞行员难以兼顾所有任务，专门安排一名操作员负责这些扩展功能更为合理。”An extra seat will bring more benefits than these, the veteran researcher added.这位资深研究员补充称，双座设计的优势不止于此。"The twin-seat variant can have a backup flight-control system installed for the backseat operator to use in case the main system malfunctions or is damaged in action, or the front-seat pilot becomes incapacitated.“双座型号可搭载备用飞行控制系统，若主控制系统在作战中出现故障或受损，或前座飞行员失去行动能力，后座操作员可启动备用系统操控战机。“It can also be used to train new aviators to make them familiar with the cutting-edge fighter jet as quickly as possible,” Fu stated.傅前哨表示：“此外，歼-20S还可用于培训新飞行员，帮助他们尽快熟悉这款尖端战机。”J-20A（歼-20A）Another J-20 variant — the J-20A — has several external differences from the baseline model: an enlarged spine, reshaped nosecone, and modified engine intakes optimized for new, mightier engines developed by Chinese engineers on their own.歼-20的另一改进型号歼-20A与基础型号在外观上有多处不同：机身脊背加长、机头重新设计，且发动机进气道经过优化，以适配中国工程师自主研发的新型大功率发动机。Its engines are widely believed to have thrust vector control technology that provides significant benefits in flight maneuverability.外界普遍认为，歼-20A的发动机配备了推力矢量控制技术，这一技术能显著提升战机的飞行机动性。The technology enables a pilot to adjust the engine exhaust nozzles to redirect thrust, allowing the plane to carry out previously unimaginable maneuvers at very high angles of attack, meaning its nose is pointed at an angle greatly exceeding the jet's current vector.通过这项技术，飞行员可调整发动机尾喷口方向以改变推力方向，使战机能在超大迎角（机头指向与飞行轨迹夹角远大于常规范围）下完成以往难以实现的机动动作。This capability is expected to be a great advantage for fighter aviators when evading a missile or seeking an advantageous position in within-visual-range air combat.这种能力使战机在规避导弹或近距离空战中抢占优势位置时，能为飞行员提供显著优势。In addition to stunning tactical maneuvers, the new powerplants may also bring about higher fuel efficiency and longer flight range.除实现出色的战术机动外，新型发动机还可能提升燃油效率，延长战机航程。Wang Yanan, chief editor of Aerospace Knowledge magazine, said the J-20A's optimized aerodynamic configuration, especially the slightly raised spine, has created a direct benefit: a bigger inner space that can be used for extra sensors or fuel tanks.《航空知识》杂志主编王亚男表示，歼-20A优化的气动布局——尤其是略微抬高的机身脊背——带来了一项直接优势：增加了内部空间，可用于加装额外传感器或油箱。"Raising the spine was not feasible for previous types of fighter jets because their pilots depend more or less on their bare eyes to spot suspicious objects so their cockpit canopy should have a 360-degree visual field, particularly in the backward direction.“以往的战斗机无法采用抬高脊背的设计，因为那时的飞行员多少需要依靠肉眼观察可疑目标，因此座舱盖需具备360度视野，尤其是向后的视野必须开阔。“Now, thanks to avionics enhancements and sensor improvements, a J-20A pilot no longer needs to turn his or her head to observe situations behind as several passive electro-optical sensors mounted around the fuselage can give the aviator an omnidirectional view,” the editor explained, adding that the redesigned spine also helps to reduce aerodynamic drag.“如今，得益于航空电子设备和传感器的升级，歼-20A的飞行员无需转头观察后方情况——机身周围安装的多个被动光电传感器可为飞行员提供全方位视野。”王亚男还补充称，重新设计的脊背也有助于降低气动阻力。J-35A（歼-35A）Another recent addition to the Air Force's stealth arsenal, the J-35A, also partook in the parade's air performance.（歼-35A是中国空军隐形装备库中近期新增的型号，此次也参与了阅兵式的空中梯队展示。）Designed by AVIC's Shenyang Aircraft Design and Research Institute in Liaoning province, the J-35A is a single-seat, twin-engine stealth multirole fighter with a conventional aerodynamic configuration.歼-35A由中国航空工业集团旗下位于辽宁省的沈阳飞机设计研究所设计，是一款采用常规气动布局的单座双发隐形多用途战斗机。According to its designers, the jet's primary task is to seize and maintain air superiority, with a secondary mission of carrying out airstrikes against land and sea targets.设计师介绍，这款战机的首要任务是夺取并保持制空权，次要任务是对陆基和海基目标实施空中打击。Specifically, the jet will be used to engage with hostile aircraft including fighters and bombers, shoot down enemy cruise missiles, and eliminate adversaries' land- and ship-based air defense hardware.具体而言，歼-35A可用于对抗包括战斗机、轰炸机在内的敌方航空器，击落敌方巡航导弹，并摧毁敌方陆基和舰载防空装备。Wang Mingzhi, a senior researcher with the Air Force, said the J-20 series and J-35A will complement each other in air combat in the future.中国空军高级研究员王明志表示，未来在空战中，歼-20系列与歼-35A将形成互补。“The heavy-duty J-20 models will be used to fight for air dominance while the midsize J35A will be suitable for various kinds of operations ranging from engaging with hostile fighters to precision assaults against land and sea targets,” he said.他指出：“重型的歼-20系列将用于争夺制空权，而中型的歼-35A则适用于多种任务，既可以与敌方战斗机对抗，也能对陆、海目标实施精确打击。”The J-35A made its first public flight performance at the 15th China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition, shortly after it was declassified by the Air Force.歼-35A在中国空军解密后不久，便于第十五届中国国际航空航天博览会上完成了首次公开飞行展示。Following the recent delivery of the first batch of J-35As, China has become the second nation after the United States to have two families of stealth fighter jets in active service.随着首批歼-35A近期列装部队，中国成为继美国之后，全球第二个拥有两个系列现役隐形战斗机的国家。Y-20B（运-20B）Besides these new fighter jets, the Air Force also sent a re-engined version of its Y-20 strategic transport aircraft to fly in the parade.除这些新型战斗机外，中国空军还派出了换装新型发动机的运-20战略运输机参与阅兵式空中梯队。Compared with the baseline model in the Y-20 family, the Y-20B cargo jet's most distinctive trait is its new propulsion system, which appears to consist of four domestically designed high-bypass turbofan engines.与运-20基础型号相比，运-20B运输机最显著的特征是其新型推进系统——似乎配备了四台中国自主设计的大涵道比涡扇发动机。The Y-20's baseline configuration took its maiden flight in January 2013, and began to be delivered to the Air Force in July 2016. It uses four Russian engines as powerplants.运-20基础型号于2013年1月完成首飞，2016年7月开始交付中国空军，其动力系统采用四台俄罗斯发动机。Wang Yanan, chief editor of Aerospace Knowledge magazine, said that the new domestically built engine has stronger thrust and lower fuel consumption, and that means the Y-20B is now able to fly farther and carry more cargo. Consequently, the new transport aircraft allows the PLA to deploy and sustain its forces over much greater distances, as befitting a true global power, he added.《航空知识》杂志主编王亚男表示，这款国产新型发动机推力更大、油耗更低，这使得运-20B的航程更远、载重量更大。他补充称，这款新型运输机使中国人民解放军能够在更远距离内部署和保障部队，符合一个真正全球性大国的能力需求。On the ground, multiple new types of combat drones were carried by trucks traveling in the parade, pointing to the possibility that the Air Force may place more duties on the pilotless jets.在地面装备方队中，多款新型作战无人机由卡车搭载亮相，这表明中国空军可能会赋予无人机更多任务职责。Wu Peixin, an aviation industry observer, said that it has been a shared trend for air powers to integrate their stealth fighters with uncrewed platforms' capabilities.航空行业观察家吴培新表示，将隐形战斗机与无人平台能力相融合，已成为全球空中力量发展的共同趋势。“A stealth jet is very expensive and sophisticated, while a drone is much cheaper, and is expendable. In air combat, pilots of stealth jets can operate and guide a group of strike drones to launch missiles toward targets and even hit the targets by themselves, without risking the safety of the pilots and their jets. Those unmanned planes will also be able to detect signals of enemy assets and then autonomously chart out a route to penetrate defense and take out the targets,” he said, adding that this new pattern will definitely revolutionize air combat in the future.他解释道：“隐形战斗机成本高昂、技术复杂，而无人机成本更低且可作为消耗性装备使用。在空战中，隐形战斗机飞行员可操控并引导一组攻击型无人机向目标发射导弹，甚至由无人机自主打击目标，无需让飞行员和战机面临风险。这些无人机还能探测敌方装备信号，自主规划突防路线并摧毁目标。”他补充称，这种新模式未来必将彻底改变空战形态。

This week on Sinica, I chat with Dave Kang (USC), Zenobia Chan (Georgetown), and Jackie Wong (American University in Sharjah, UAE) about their new paper in International Security titled "What Does China Want?" The paper, which has generated quite a bit of controversy, takes a data-driven approach to examine the claim that China seeks global hegemony — that it wants to supplant the U.S. as a globe-spanning top power. I'm traveling much of this week, so I'll update this podcast page when the transcript comes back!See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Fluent Fiction - Mandarin Chinese: Moonlit Quest: Finding Love and Legacy in Bamboo Shadows Find the full episode transcript, vocabulary words, and more:fluentfiction.com/zh/episode/2025-08-28-22-34-02-zh Story Transcript:Zh: 竹林中的月光朦胧，洒下斑驳的影子。En: The moonlight in the bamboo forest was hazy, casting dappled shadows.Zh: 中秋节快到了，梅、家豪和丽芬三人正走在四川的竹林中。En: The Zhongqiu Jie, or Mid-Autumn Festival, was approaching, and Mei, Jiahao, and Lifen were walking through a bamboo forest in Sichuan.Zh: 梅心情有些沉重，她要找到那盏祖母珍爱的传家灯笼。En: Mei felt a bit heavy-hearted as she was determined to find the precious ancestral lantern cherished by her grandmother.Zh: “灯笼就藏在一个秘密的地方。我感觉到了。”梅坚定地说。En: "The lantern is hidden in a secret place. I can feel it," Mei said resolutely.Zh: 她想在节日之前找到它，以纪念她的祖母。En: She wanted to find it before the festival, to commemorate her grandmother.Zh: 家豪紧跟在梅后面，他暗暗下定决心，要在今天表达他的心意。En: Jiahao followed closely behind Mei, secretly determined to express his feelings today.Zh: “不要担心，我们一定能成功。”他鼓励道。En: "Don't worry, we'll definitely succeed," he encouraged.Zh: 丽芬不太相信竹林里的传说，但为了梅，她也愿意投入这场寻找。En: Lifen didn't quite believe in the legends of the bamboo forest, but for Mei, she was willing to join this search.Zh: “我还是觉得有点不安，听说这里有神秘的守护灵。”她小声说。En: "I still feel a bit uneasy. I've heard there are mysterious guardian spirits here," she whispered.Zh: 走了不知多久，他们发现了一个藏着灯笼的地方。En: After walking for an unknown amount of time, they discovered a place hiding the lantern.Zh: 就在他们欣喜若狂时，天空突然乌云密布，暴雨来临了。En: Just as they were ecstatic, the sky suddenly became overcast, and a torrential rain began.Zh: 雨水打湿了地面，泥泞四溢，灯笼被卷起，顺着水流向竹林深处。En: The rain soaked the ground, turning it muddy, and the lantern was swept away, carried by the water deeper into the forest.Zh: 梅和家豪冲过去，试图抓住灯笼。En: Mei and Jiahao rushed forward, attempting to catch the lantern.Zh: 丽芬也加入了，三人合力最终抓住了灯笼。En: Lifen also joined in, and together, the three of them managed to finally catch the lantern.Zh: “我们成功了！”梅高兴得差点哭出声来。En: "We did it!" Mei almost cried out in happiness.Zh: 他们披着湿透的衣服，终于带着灯笼回到了村子，正好赶上月亮升起的时刻。En: Draped in their soaked clothes, they finally returned to the village with the lantern, just in time to see the moon rise.Zh: 村子里到处是灯火和欢乐的笑声。En: The village was filled with lights and joyous laughter.Zh: 家豪鼓起勇气，对梅说：“我一直很喜欢你，从小到大。”En: Jiahao mustered the courage to say to Mei, "I've always liked you, from childhood until now."Zh: 梅愣住了，接着脸红起来。En: Mei was stunned, then blushed.Zh: “谢谢你，家豪。”En: "Thank you, Jiahao."Zh: 这趟冒险让梅意识到，除了传家宝灯笼，亲情与朋友之间的羁绊同样重要。En: This adventure made Mei realize that, aside from the family heirloom lantern, the bonds between family and friends are equally important.Zh: 三人坐在灯火下，分享着月饼，看着满月，他们感受到节日的温暖和美好。En: The three of them sat under the lights, sharing mooncakes and gazing at the full moon, feeling the warmth and beauty of the festival.Zh: 中秋节的夜晚，因为找到祖母的灯笼，也因为彼此的心意，变得更加难忘。En: The night of the Mid-Autumn Festival, because of finding the grandmother's lantern and their feelings for each other, became all the more unforgettable. Vocabulary Words:hazy: 朦胧dappled: 斑驳secretly: 暗暗guardian spirits: 守护灵overcast: 乌云密布torrential rain: 暴雨muddy: 泥泞swept away: 卷起ecstatic: 欣喜若狂mustered: 鼓起blushed: 脸红heirloom: 传家宝bonds: 羁绊gazing: 看着warmth: 温暖unforgettable: 难忘lantern: 灯笼determined: 坚定commemorate: 纪念resolutely: 坚定地baroque: 古典风格uneasy: 不安cherished: 珍爱ancestor: 祖母joyous: 欢乐apprehension: 忧虑scurry: 赶忙festive: 节日的soaked: 湿透draped: 披着

This week on the Sinica Podcast, I welcome back Evan Feigenbaum, Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Evan served for many years as a State Department official, was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia and Central Asia among his numerous positions in government, and was instrumental in building the U.S.-India relationship after 2000 — only to watch Trump round on India in recent months, slapping large punitive tariffs on the South Asian giant ostensibly over its purchases of Russian oil. What motivated Trump? And how does this look from New Delhi and from Beijing? Will China capitalize on the strains in the U.S.-Indian relationship? Listen and find out.As this show is news pegged, I decided to release it as soon as I finished the edit, rather than wait for the transcript. I'll update this podcast page when the transcript comes back.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Did you know that different spices in China also reflect the personalities of local girls with distinct regional tastes and attitudes?In this fun episode, we break down the difference between 辣妹子 (Sichuan girls) and 湘妹子 (Hunan girls)—two iconic types of fiery personalities from China's spiciest provinces.辣妹子 = Sichuan hotpot: bold, numbing, and full of attitude.湘妹子 = Hunan chili fish: sweet at first, but don't mess around.Learn how food and personality go hand-in-hand in Chinese culture—and how to survive a conversation with each of these spicy queens!Watch all videos: https://youtube.com/@chinamyth#LearnChinese #Chinesefood #ChineseCulture #ChineseCuisine #ChinaTravel

Nighttime dining, shopping and travel are thriving across China this summer, injecting fresh momentum to economic growth at a time when the country has prioritized consumption as its top priority this year.今年夏季，我国夜间餐饮、购物、旅游等消费业态蓬勃发展。在国家将消费列为今年工作重点的背景下，夜间经济为经济增长注入了新动能。The market size of China's nighttime economy has so far surpassed 50 trillion yuan ($7 trillion), said marketing consultancy Zhiyanzhan.More restaurants have extended business hours and launched delivery services to attract late-night diners and increase revenue.市场咨询机构智研瞻产业研究院数据显示，目前我国夜间经济市场规模已突破50 万亿元（约合 7 万亿美元）。为吸引夜宵客、提升营收，越来越多餐饮企业延长营业时间，并推出外卖服务。Huda Restaurant, a popular crayfish eatery in Beijing's bustling Guijie Street, is operating four outlets in the same area, cumulatively serving more than 6,500 customers daily on average. During peak hours on some nights, customers sometimes have to wait in line for three hours, according to the restaurant.位于北京繁华簋街的热门小龙虾餐厅“胡大饭店”，在该区域布局了 4 家门店，日均总客流量超 6500 人次。据餐厅介绍，部分夜晚的高峰时段，顾客有时需排队 3 小时才能就餐。"Tourists are often unable to wait that long to dine in. Some choose the takeaway option, or order deliveries to their hotels. Some 70 percent of our takeout orders come from nearby hotels, as many tourists tend to order deliveries at night after their daytime sightseeing in the city," said Zhang Shengtao, deputy general manager of Huda.“很多游客等不了那么久，有的会选择打包带走，有的则直接点外卖送到酒店。我们约 70% 的外卖订单来自周边酒店 —— 不少游客白天在市区观光后，晚上习惯点外卖。” 胡大饭店副总经理张胜涛说。"We take food delivery platforms as an important supplement to our operations, as the platforms allow customers to search for our restaurant from different channels. With no increase in the number of staff members and no change in restaurant areas, delivery services can help raise order volumes and lead to profit growth," Zhang said.他表示：“我们把外卖平台当作经营的重要补充，这些平台能让顾客通过多种渠道找到我们。在不增加员工、不扩大门店面积的情况下，外卖业务能帮助提升订单量，进而带动利润增长。”The restaurant chain said diners aged between 25 and 39 account for a large share of its total customers, while consumers opting for deliveries are mainly aged between 18 and 35.该餐饮连锁品牌透露，25 至 39 岁的顾客占堂食总客流的较大比例，而选择外卖的消费者以 18 至 35 岁人群为主。Hong Yong, an associate research fellow at the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, said the availability of nighttime dining meets the demand for late night snacking among urban white-collar employees and many young consumers, especially as more people stay up late, work overtime, or venture out for social entertainment, and late night dining gradually becomes a part of their daily routine.中国国际贸易促进委员会国际贸易经济合作研究院副研究员洪勇指出，夜间餐饮的普及，满足了城市白领及众多年轻消费者的夜宵需求。如今熬夜、加班、外出社交娱乐的人群增多，夜宵逐渐成为他们日常生活的一部分。"Nighttime economic activities such as dining, night tours and shopping provide richer consumption scenarios, and meet consumers' demand for leisure and entertainment, social interaction and emotional release," Hong said.“餐饮、夜游、购物等夜间经济活动，提供了更丰富的消费场景，满足了消费者休闲娱乐、社交互动、情感释放的需求。” 洪勇说。"The expansion of nighttime consumption scenarios will help promote the diversification of consumption formats, encourage higher frequencies of spending, effectively stimulate domestic demand and promote sustained economic growth momentum," he added.他补充道：“夜间消费场景的拓展，有助于推动消费业态多元化，提高消费频次，有效激发内需，为经济持续增长注入动力。”According to a report released by the Ministry of Commerce, 60 percent of China's urban consumption takes place after dusk. At large-scale malls, sales between 6 pm and 10 pm usually account for over half of the whole day's revenue.商务部发布的报告显示，我国60% 的城市消费发生在傍晚之后。在大型商场，18 时至 22 时的销售额通常占全天营收的一半以上。Shui Tea Shop, a tea drink brand based in Jinan, Shandong province, now operates some 1,400 stores nationwide, which are mainly located in Shandong, Jiangsu and Hebei provinces, as well as Tianjin and Beijing.总部位于山东济南的茶饮品牌“阿水大杯茶”，目前在全国拥有约 1400 家门店，主要分布在山东、江苏、河北三省及天津、北京两地。Since June, some of its stores began to extend their business hours. Now, over 300 stores operate until 11 pm, more than 100 stores operate until midnight, and a further 100 outlets are open beyond midnight. The extension of business hours will last until the end of September, the company said.该公司表示，自今年6 月起，部分门店开始延长营业时间：目前超 300 家门店营业至 23 时，100 余家营业至次日 0 时，另有 100 家门店营业至凌晨之后，这一延长营业时间的举措将持续至 9 月底。"After extending the business hours, there has been a clear trend of growth in store revenue, and some stores have experienced sales growth of over 100 percent compared with the period before the extension," said Wei Qun, director of delivery services at A-Shui Tea Shop.“延长营业时间后，门店营收增长趋势明显，部分门店销售额较延长前增长超 100%。” 阿水大杯茶外卖业务负责人魏群说。"Nighttime sales have been especially high in Jinan and Qingdao of Shandong, as well as Tianjin. Stores with higher revenues are mainly located in core business circles, and nighttime sales mainly come from orders for deliveries," Wei said.“山东的济南、青岛以及天津等地的夜间销售额表现尤为突出。高营收门店主要集中在核心商圈，夜间销售以外卖订单为主。” 魏群介绍。He added that in summer, many consumers are interested in having barbecues and crayfish at night, and restaurants providing such meals located in core business districts have largely extended their operating hours. Their popularity has also driven the sales growth of beverages, as certain drinks pair nicely with these kinds of food.他还提到，夏季夜晚，不少消费者喜欢吃烧烤、小龙虾，核心商圈内提供这类餐食的餐厅大多延长了营业时间。这些餐饮的火爆也带动了饮品销量—— 部分饮品与这类食物搭配口感更佳。In addition to the catering sector, many sightseeing spots have extended their opening hours this summer, and upgraded night tourism products to meet the diverse demand of travelers. Besides driving an increase in ticket revenue for scenic spots, it has promoted the growth of related businesses such as catering, accommodation and shopping in surrounding areas.除餐饮行业外，今年夏季，多家景区延长开放时间，并升级夜间旅游产品，以满足游客多样化需求。这不仅推动景区门票收入增长，还带动了周边餐饮、住宿、购物等关联业态的发展。The government has encouraged more industry players to actively develop the night tourism economy.政府也积极鼓励更多市场主体参与夜间旅游经济发展。According to a guideline issued earlier this year by the State Council, China's Cabinet, the holding of more nighttime activities such as folk performances, lantern fairs, temple fairs, and light and shadow shows has been encouraged, and different regions could develop water night tours based on local conditions.今年早些时候，国务院印发的指导意见明确，鼓励举办民俗展演、灯会、庙会、光影秀等夜间活动，各地可结合实际发展水上夜游项目。In addition, the government will support the upgrading and renovation of lighting services at night in commercial areas, and the optimization of support facilities such as parking lots and public transportation, according to the document.意见还提出，将支持商业街区夜间照明设施升级改造，优化停车场、公共交通等配套设施。In Guiyang, Southwest China's Guizhou province, a three-day international kite festival that included nighttime events attracted more than 163,000 tourists in July, netting tourism revenue of over 60 million yuan, according to the local government.据贵州省贵阳市政府消息，今年7 月举办的为期三天的国际风筝节（含夜间活动），吸引游客超 16.3 万人次，实现旅游收入超 6000 万元。Night markets, roadside concerts in parks, trunk markets and other nighttime consumption scenes were attractive to tourists.夜市、公园路边音乐会、后备箱集市等夜间消费场景，对游客具有很强的吸引力。"This type of nighttime cultural tourism model, with feature activities as its core, gathers popularity and forms a consumption loop, and has become an effective way to boost the nighttime economy," said Mu Qianyi, an analyst of LeadLeo Research Institute, a market research provider based in Shanghai.“这种以特色活动为核心的夜间文旅模式，能聚集人气、形成消费闭环，已成为拉动夜间经济的有效方式。” 上海市场研究机构头豹研究院分析师穆芊伊说。Mu added that new technologies and scenarios such as drone light shows at night will help enrich the experiences of tourists. The improvement in the quality of scenes naturally enhances the attractiveness and vitality of nighttime cultural tourism, and could help inject new impetus into economic growth.穆芊伊补充道，夜间无人机灯光秀等新技术、新场景，将进一步丰富游客体验。消费场景品质的提升，自然会增强夜间文旅的吸引力与活力，为经济增长注入新动力。Particularly, Shanghai has been developing a booming nighttime economy, and the city's after-dark economy index has maintained the top position in the country for five consecutive years. This year, it has been followed by Guangzhou, Guangdong province, and Chengdu, Sichuan province, said Rising Lab, a city-oriented big data platform of Yicai Media Group.值得关注的是，上海夜间经济持续繁荣。第一财经传媒集团旗下城市大数据平台“第一财经研究院” 数据显示，上海夜间经济指数已连续五年位居全国首位，今年紧随其后的是广东广州与四川成都。In Shanghai, nighttime lighting covered 75 percent of the city's area last year, and nighttime public transportation covered 1,975 square kilometers, which significantly helped to improve the local nighttime consumption environment, the platform found.该平台还发现，去年上海夜间照明覆盖面积占全市面积的75%，夜间公共交通覆盖范围达 1975 平方公里，这一配套设施的完善显著改善了当地夜间消费环境。

Last time we spoke about the crossing of Nanjing's Rubicon. By November 1, Shanghai had become a lost cause, the Chinese were forced to retreat. In the wake of this turmoil, the Japanese set their sights on Nanjing, keenly aware that its fall would spell disaster for Chiang Kai-Shek's government. Despite the desperate situation, guerrilla fighters began fortifying the city as civilians rallied to support the defense, preparing for the inevitable assault that loomed. However, political divisions plagued the Chinese leadership, with some generals advocating for abandoning the city. After intense discussions, it was decided that Nanjing would be a hill worth dying on, driven largely by propaganda needs. As November 12 approached, Japanese troops rapidly advanced west, capturing towns along the way and inflicting unimaginable brutality. On November 19, Yanagawa, a commander, took the initiative, decreeing that pursuing the retreating Chinese forces toward Nanjing was paramount.    #164 The Battle of Lake Tai Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. As the Chinese troops fled westwards, at 7:00 am on November 19th, Yanagawa issued instructions to his troops in the field. “The enemy's command system is in disarray, and a mood of defeat has descended over their entire army. They have lost the will to fight. We must not miss the opportunity to pursue the enemy to Nanjing.” The order went out to the 10th Army, sending, the 6th, 18th, and 114th Divisions west along the southern shore of Lake Tai, passing through Huzhou before turning right towards Nanjing. The Kunisaki Detachment, trained for rapid movement by water and land, was ordered east along the Yangtze River near Wuhu city and, if possible, cross the river to cut off the Chinese Army's retreat from Nanjing. Yanagawa envisioned an operation unlike any other conducted by the Japanese Army in recent history. He believed this could not only end the war but also surpass previous victories, such as the defeat of tsarist Russia more than three decades earlier. Confident in a swift victory, he wrote in a follow-up message to his commanders, “The day is near when the banner of the Rising Sun will fly over Nanjing's city wall.” However, Yanagawa's order elicited panic in Tokyo once it became known. His superiors viewed it as an outrageous attempt to entirely change the war focus away from the north. They understood that taking Nanjing was primarily a political decision rather than a strategic one. There was still hopes of finding terms through the Germans to end the conflict, thus carving up more of China. The Japanese did not want to become bogged down in a real war. Major General Tada was particularly opposed to increasing efforts on the Shanghai front. He belonged to a faction that believed the best way to avoid a quagmire in China was to deliver a swift, decisive blow to the Chinese Army. This mindset had turned him into a major advocate for landing a strong force in Hangzhou Bay in early November. Nevertheless, he had initially resisted expanding operations to the Suzhou-Jiaxing line, only relenting on the condition that this line would not be crossed under any circumstances. Tada's immediate response was to halt the 10th Army's offensive. Shimomura Sadamu, Ishiwara Kanji's hardline successor as chief of operations, strongly disagreed, arguing that field commanders should have the authority to make significant decisions. Undeterred, Tada insisted on restraining the field commanders, and at 6:00 pm on November 20th, the Army General Staff sent a cable to the Central China Area Army reprimanding them for advancing beyond Order No. 600, which had established the Suzhou-Jiaxing line. The response from the Central China Area Army arrived two days later whereupon the field commanders argued that Nanjing needed to be captured to bring the war to an early conclusion. To do otherwise, they argued, would provide the enemy with an opportunity to regain the will to fight. Moreover, the officers claimed that delaying the decisive battle would not sit well with the Japanese public, potentially jeopardizing national unity. On the same day it responded to Tokyo, the Central China Area Army instructed the 10th Army to proceed cautiously: “The pursuit to Nanjing is to be halted, although you may still send an advance force towards Huzhou. Each division is to select four or five battalions to pursue the enemy rapidly”. The remainder of the troops were instructed to advance towards Huzhou and prepare to join the pursuit “at any time.” Meanwhile Chiang Kai-shek officially appointed Tang Shengzhi as the commandant of Nanjing's garrison. Born in 1889, Tang embodied the era of officers leading China into war with Japan. They straddled the line between old and new China. During their youth, they lived in a society that had seen little change for centuries, where young men immersed themselves in 2,000-year-old classics to prepare for life. Like their ancestors across countless generations, they were governed by an emperor residing in a distant capital. Following the 1911 revolution, they embraced the new republic and received modern military training, Tang, for instance, at the esteemed Baoding Academy in northern China. Yet, they struggled to fully relinquish their traditional mindsets. These traditional beliefs often included a significant distrust of foreigners. Before his appointment as garrison commander, Tang had led the garrison's operations section. During this time, Chiang Kai-shek suggested that he permit the German chief advisor, General Alexander von Falkenhausen, to attend staff meetings. Tang hesitated, expressing concern due to Falkenhausen's past as a military official in Japan and the current alliance between Germany, Italy, and Japan. “That's not good, is it?” he asked. Chiang reassured him that Falkenhausen was an experienced officer who remembered earlier loyalties despite political shifts in Berlin. “It's all right,” Chiang insisted, “we can trust him.” Reluctantly, Tang acquiesced but never fully trusted the German officer. Tang also faced issues with morale. He was Hunanese, the majority of his troops were locals, many from Nanjing. Tang also suffered from many ongoing illnesses. While he put on a bravado face, its unlikely he expected to be able to defend the capital for very long. On November 19th, the IJA 16th division and Shigeto Detachment conquered Changshu, a crucial point along the Wufu defense line, spanning from Fushan on the Yangtze to Suzhou and then to Wujiang sitting on the shores of Lake Tai. The fight for Changshu had surprised the Japanese. As they approached they ran into a network of interlocking cement pillboxes that had to be taken individually, resulting in heavy casualties. Frequently, when the Japanese believed they had finally destroyed a position and advanced, they were dismayed to discover that some defenders remained alive, continuing to fire at their flanks. Another obstacle facing them was Chinese artillery. During the night's capture of the city, the Japanese makeshift camps were hit relentlessly by bombardment. That same day further south, the IJA 9th division captured Suzhou , reporting to the press they did so without firing a single shot. General Matsui wrote in his diary “The enemy troops near Suzhou have completely lost their morale. Some soldiers are discarding their equipment and surrendering, while others flee westward in utter chaos. Our forces have not encountered the resistance we anticipated. So far, the Shanghai Expeditionary Force has achieved all its objectives. I am thrilled by this.” In reality, this was mere propaganda. The IJA 9th Division actually had to overpower a series of Chinese pillboxes outside the city. Once they entered through the medieval walls, they faced the task of eliminating pockets of resistance one by one. According to Japanese sources, over 1,000 Chinese soldiers were killed during these clearing operations. The Japanese found a wealth of spoils in Suzhou. Among the booty were 100 artillery pieces and other military equipment. Historically known as one of China's wealthiest cities, Suzhou still contained an abundance of loot even after months of conflict. Many Japanese soldiers had their pockets filled with cigarettes after raiding a tobacco factory, while others transported barrels filled with coins after robbing a bank. Meanwhile the government had officially moved from Nanjing to Chongqing. Chongqing was an unusual choice for the new capital as it was historically something of a backwater, not very cosmopolitan such as the great coastal cities in the east. However it was distant enough to be out of reach from the Japanese land forces, but not so distant that it would make governing China impossible. Not all the governmental agencies moved to Chongqing at once. The foreign ministry first moved to Wuhan, as did most of the foreign diplomats. Yet out of some several hundred foreign nationals, 30 American and 19 British did stay behind in Nanjing. Tang Shengzhi met with the remaining foreign community and began promising them guarantees of their lives and property would be protected to the fullest. In turn the foreign community were thinking up ways to help defend the city's civilian population. They formed a special demilitarized district, akin to the one in Shanghai. They named it the Jacquinot Safety Zone after its founder, French Jesuit Robert Jacquinot de Besange. An international committee for establishing a neutral zone for noncombatants in Nanjing was formed on November 19th and famously John Rabe chaired it. The committee knew their neutral zone depended solely upon Japan respecting it, thus Rabe was an ideal pick for chairman. Meanwhile Chiang Kai-Shek was determined to stay for as long as possible in Nanjing, and remain in the public view to maintain morale. Song Meiling also went around touring the capital by automobile to raise public spirit. Preparations for battle were being dished out in haste. Du Yuming, the commander of Nanjing's armored regiment was called up to the headquarters of He Yingqin, then chief of staff. There Du was briefed on Chiang Kai-Shek's war plans and how his tiny armored force would fit in. He Yingqin said “It has been decided that Tang Shengzhi is to defend Nanjing. Chairman Chiang wants the German vehicles to stay in Nanjing and fight.” This was referring to their Leichter Panzerspahwagen or “sd KFZ 221” armored cars. These were recent purchases from Germany. Du questioned using them however “The German vehicles are the best armor we have at the moment, but they have no cannon, only machine guns, so their firepower is limited. We just have 15 of them. And they are not suited for the terrain around Nanjing, with all its rivers and lakes.” Du instead argued for using the British-made Vickers Carden Lloyd tanks. Of these China had recently purchased the amphibious variants. Du said “Those tanks both have machine guns and cannon, and they can float. They are much more useful for the Nanjing area.” He further suggested the tanks might even make it to the other side of the Yangtze once all hope was out. To this He replied “No, don't even think about crossing the Yangtze. The chairman wants the tank crews to fight to the death.” As far as war strategy was concerned, China had actually developed one against Japan decades prior. Ever since the nasty conflicts between the two nations had broken out back during the Great War days, China sought an answer to Japan's aggression. One man rose to the occasion, a young officer named Jiang Baili. In 1922 Jiang wrote “The only way to prevail over the enemy, will be to do the opposite of what he does in every respect. It will be to his advantage to seek a quick resolution; we should aim for protracted warfare. He will try to focus on a decisive blow at the front line; we should move to the second line of defense and rob him of the opportunity to concentrate his forces in one place.” Soon Jiang became the forefather in China for theories involving protracted war. One could also call it a war of attrition, and it was the type of war suited to China. In the words of Jiang “We should thank our ancestors. China is blessed with two major advantages, a vast land area and a huge population. Abstaining from fighting will be enough. And if we do fight, we should drag it out. We should force the front to move west, and turn our weakness into strength, while allowing the enemy to overstretch himself”. China's geography significantly influenced Jiang's military strategy. In his works titled Organization of Mechanized Forces, Jiang wrote “The flat North Chinese plain offers ideal conditions for a large mechanized army. In contrast, the agricultural regions further south, characterized by their mix of rice paddies and waterways, are far less suitable.” Faced with a technologically superior enemy, China had no option but to draw the opponent away from the north, where their armored units would dominate the battlefield, to the Yangtze River area, where their mobility would be severely restricted. Jiang served as the director of the prestigious military academy at Baoding, near Beijing, where he could instill his philosophies in the minds of upcoming leaders of the Chinese armed forces, including Tang Shengzhi. Tang was able to put Jiang's theories into practice. In the autumn of 1935, he played a crucial role in planning and executing the decade's largest military maneuver. Conducted south of the Yangtze, between Nanjing and Shanghai, this drill involved over 20,000 troops, allowing for a realistic simulation of battle conditions. Its primary objective was to test the strategy of "luring the enemy in deep." Upon concluding the maneuver, Tang described the location as exceptionally well chosen, a tank commander's nightmare. The area consisted of steep hills alongside rivers, with very few robust roads and virtually no bridges capable of supporting tanks. Countless small paddy fields were divided by dikes that rarely exceeded a few feet in width, perfectly suited for swift infantry movements but utterly inadequate for tracked vehicles. It appeared to be a graveyard for any mechanized army. As the war broke out with Japan, Jiang's ideas initially seemed validated. Chiang Kai-shek deliberately refrained from deploying his best troops to the northern Beijing area. Instead, he chose to instigate a significant battle in and around Shanghai, where the terrain presented the exact disadvantages for Japanese armor that Jiang had anticipated. Although the Japanese gradually introduced tactical innovations that allowed them to navigate the partly submerged paddy fields north and west of Shanghai, their tanks often found themselves forced along elevated roads, making them vulnerable targets for hidden Chinese infantry. For several weeks during September and October, the Shanghai area indeed resembled a quagmire, seemingly poised to ensnare the Japanese forces until they were utterly depleted. However, the successful Japanese landings in early November, first in Hangzhou Bay and then on the south bank of the Yangtze, dramatically changed things. The stalemate was broken, allowing the Japanese Army to advance despite the persistent challenges posed by the local geography. What would happen next would determine whether Jiang's theories from a decade earlier could work or if Japan's tanks would ultimately triumph even in the river terrain south of the Yangtze.  The Japanese field commanders' decision to shift their focus from defeating Chinese forces near Shanghai to pursuing them all the way to Nanjing, sent ripples throughout the ranks. Every unit had to reconsider their plans, but none felt the impact more acutely than the 6th Division. As one of the first contingents of the 10th Army to come ashore in Hangzhou Bay in early November, its soldiers had advanced with remarkable ease, cutting through the defenses like a knife through butter. Now, with orders to drive west towards Nanjing, they were required to make a huge U-turn and head south. Geography hurt them greatly, specifically the presence of Lake Tai. The original Shanghai Expeditionary Force, bolstered by the 16th Division and other newly arrived units, was set to advance north of the lake, while the 10th Army was tasked with operations to the south of it. This situation implied that the 6th Division had to hurry to catch up with the rest of the 10th Army.   Upon turning south, they reached Jiashan on November 21, only to face a brutal outbreak of cholera among their ranks, which delayed their advance by three days. Meanwhile the other elements of the 10th Army, including the Kunisaki Detachment and the 18th and 114th Divisions advanced  rapidly, entering Huzhou on November 23. To speed up their advance they had commandeered every vessel they could grab and tossed men in piece meal across the southern bank of Lake Tai to its western shore.  However the 10th army was unaware that they would soon face a brutal fight. As the Chinese government evacuated Nanjing, fresh troops from Sichuan province in southwest China were being unloaded at the city's docks and marched toward imminent danger. Starting to disembark on November 20, these soldiers formed the Chinese 23rd Group Army. They presented an exotic sight, sporting broad straw hats typical of southern China, often adorned with yellow and green camouflage patterns. While some appeared freshly uniformed, many were ill-prepared for the colder central Chinese winter, dressed in thin cotton better suited for subtropical climates. A number looked as ragged as the most destitute coolie. Nearly all wore straw shoes that required repairs every evening after a long day of marching. Their equipment was rudimentary and often quite primitive. The most common weapon among the newly arrived soldiers was a locally produced rifle from Sichuan, yet many had no firearms at all, carrying only “stout sticks and packs” into battle. Each division had a maximum of a dozen light machine guns, and radio communication was available only at the brigade level and above. The absence of any artillery or heavy equipment was quite alarming. It was as if they expected to be facing a warlord army of the 1920s. They were organized into five divisions and two brigades, supplied by Liu Xiang, a notable southern warlord. Remarkably, Liu Xiang had been one of Chiang Kai-shek's worst enemies less than a year prior. Now, Liu's troops fought alongside Chiang's against Japan, yet their loyalties remained fiercely provincial, listening to Liu Xiang rather than Chiang Kai-shek. China's warlord era never really ended. Chiang Kai-Shek was actually doing two things at once, meeting the enemy but also getting warlord troops away from their provincial powerbase. This in turn would reduce the influence of regional warlords. Now the Chinese recognized the had to stop the Japanese from reaching Wuhu, a Yangtze port city due south of Nanjing, basically the last escape route from the capital. If it was captured, those in Nanjing would be effectively stuck. General Gu Zhutong, who personally witnessed the chaotic evacuation of Suzhou, had already dispatched two divisions from Guangxi province to block the Japanese advance. However, they were quickly routed. Liu Xiang's troops were then sent to fill the gap on the battlefield. By the last week of November, the Japanese 10th Army and the newly arrived Sichuan divisions, were converging on the same area southwest of Lake Tai. Marching as quickly as possible, they were fated to clash in one of the bloodiest battles of the entire Nanjing campaign. As the Sichuanese troops reached the battlefield at the end of November, they  quickly realized just how ill-equipped they were to confront the modern Japanese Army. The Sichuan divisions hurried towards Lake Tai, primarily marching after sunset to avoid harassment from Japanese aircraft. A significant challenge for the soldiers was the condition of the roads, which were paved with gravel that wore down their straw shoes. Despite their best efforts to repair their footwear late at night, many soldiers found themselves entering battle barefoot. Along their route, they encountered numerous Chinese soldiers retreating. One particular column caught their attention; these troops were better uniformed and equipped, appearing as though they had not seen battle at all. They looked rested and well-nourished, as if they had just emerged from their barracks. This prompted unspoken doubts among the Sichuanese soldiers. Upon arriving in Guangde, the 145th Division quickly began fortifying its positions, particularly around a strategic airfield near the city and dispatched units towards the town of Sian. On November 25, skirmishes erupted throughout the day, and on the following day, the Chinese soldiers began facing the full force of the advancing enemy. Japanese planes bombed the Chinese positions near Sian, followed by rapid tank assaults from the 18th Japanese Division. Unaccustomed to combat against armored vehicles, they quickly routed. The Japanese forces rolled over the shattered Chinese defenses and advanced to capture Sian with minimal resistance. To make matters worse, amidst this critical moment when the Sichuan troops were engaged in their first battle against a foreign enemy, Liu Xiang, fell seriously ill. In his place, Chiang Kai-shek assigned one of his most trusted commanders, Chen Cheng. The Sichuanese soldiers were not happy with the new alien commander. Meanwhile, the Nine Power Treaty Conference in Brussels held its final session. The delegates concluded three weeks of fruitless discussions with a declaration that immediately struck observers as lacking any real substance. The decree stated “Force by itself can provide no just and lasting solution for disputes between nations,”. This was met with approval from all participants except Italy, one of Japan's few allies in Europe. They strongly urged that hostilities be suspended and that peaceful processes be pursued, but offered zero consequences for either belligerent should they choose not to comply. As they say today in politics, a nothing burger. China found itself resorting to shaming the international community into action, with barely any success.  In Berlin, the evening following the conference's conclusion, diplomats gathered as the Japanese embassy hosted a dinner to mark the first anniversary of the Anti-Comintern Pact. Among the guests, though he probably really did not want to be there, was Adolf Hitler. The Japanese Communications Minister, Nagai Ryutaro, speaking via radio stated “The Sino-Japanese conflict is a holy struggle for us. The objective is to hold the Nanjing government accountable for its anti-Japanese stance, to liberate the Chinese people from the red menace, and to secure peace in the Far East.” By hosting such an event, Germany was basically signalling that she would abandon her old Chinese ally to forge a stronger partnership with Japan. This was driving the world into two camps that would emerge as the Axis and Allies. My favorite boardgame by the way, I make a lot of goofy videos on my youtube channel about it.  Back at the front, a city sat midway along the Yangtze River between Shanghai and Nanjing, Jiangyin. By Chinese standards, Jiangyin was not a large city; its population numbered just 50,000, most of whom had already fled by the end of November. The city's military significance had considerably diminished after a naval battle in late September resulted in the sinking of half the Chinese fleet, forcing the remainder to retreat upriver. Nevertheless, the Chinese still maintained control on land. This became a pressing concern for the Japanese after the fall of Suzhou and Changshu led to the collapse of the Wufu defensive line. Consequently, the next line of defense was the Xicheng line, of which Jiangyin formed the northern end. The city stood directly in the path of the 13th Japanese Division, positioned at the far right of the front line. Jiangyin featured 33 partially fortified hills, and like many other cities in the region, its primary defense was a robust 10-mile wall constructed of brick and stone. Standing 30 feet high, the wall was reinforced on the inside by an earthen embankment measuring up to 25 feet in diameter. Defending Jiangyin alone was the 112th Division, comprising approximately 5,000 soldiers. Only in November did it receive reinforcements from the 103rd Division, which had previously participated in the brutal fighting in Shanghai and withdrew westward after the Japanese victory there. Like the 112th, the 103rd also consisted of around 5,000 soldiers from former warlord armies, though they hailed from the hot and humid southwest of China rather than the cold and arid northeast. Both divisions faced an adversary with far superior equipment and training. Just hours after Japanese observation balloons appeared on the horizon, their artillery opened fire. The initial shells fell at approximately 30 second intervals, but the pace quickly accelerated. Most of the shells landed near the river, obliterating the buildings in that area. The explosions tore up telephone wires, severing communication between the scattered Chinese units. As the first shells began to fall over Jiangyin, Tang Shengzhi gathered with Chinese and foreign journalists in Nanjing, openly acknowledging the monumental challenge ahead but resolutely vowing to defend Nanjing to the bitter end. “Even though it is lagging behind in material terms, China has the will to fight. Since the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, we have suffered defeats in various theaters, but we will continue to fight until we achieve final victory.” Tang then promised that Nanjing would be fought to the last man. As early as November 14, the central government had ordered the evacuation of women and children from Nanjing, calling for all means of transportation available to be dedicated to this purpose. However, this directive proved to be an empty proclamation. Almost all resources were directed toward relocating government officials westward. Moving office furniture and filing cabinets took precedence over evacuating people. The government commandeered 600 trucks and 220 boats and ships to aid in this effort, but once those means of transportation were exhausted, little remained for the common people. In the final days of November, Nanjing's mayor, Ma Chaojun, attempted to rectify this dire situation. He sent a cable to the Ministry of Communications requesting that the ships used to relocate government agencies be returned to Nanjing as soon as possible to assist with the evacuation. For most vessels, there wasn't enough time to make the journey back. The people of Nanjing were left to fend for themselves. Meanwhile the battles south and west of the Lake Tai continued to rage in late November. While the 18th Japanese Division advanced toward Guangde, aiming eventually for Wuhu and the Yangtze River, the 114th Japanese Division received different orders. It turned right along the western bank of Lake Tai, clearly intending to push onward to Nanjing. Awaiting them was the 144th Chinese Division, consisting primarily of Sichuanese soldiers. They dug in across the one viable road running west of the lake, with a large body of water on one side and rugged terrain on the other. This terrain forced the Japanese to attack over a narrow front, constraining the advantage they held due to their technological superiority. The Chinese were able to concentrate their limited artillery, primarily mountain guns that could be disassembled and transported by mules or even men, on the advancing Japanese attackers, and utilized it effectively. They allowed the Japanese to shell their positions without immediate retaliation, waiting until the infantry was within 1,000 yards before ordering their mountain guns to open fire. The result was devastating; the Japanese column became disorganized, and their advance stalled. However, just as the Chinese artillery appeared on the verge of achieving a significant victory, the decision was made to withdraw. The officers responsible for the mountain guns argued that the Japanese would soon overrun their positions, and it was preferable to take preemptive measures to prevent their valuable equipment from falling into enemy hands. The commanders of the 144th Division reluctantly concurred. The Chinese did their best to maintain the facade that their artillery remained in position, but the Japanese quickly noticed the weakened defense and attacked with renewed fervor. Despite this setback, Chinese soldiers found their morale boosted as their division commander, Guo Junqi, led from the front, issuing orders from a stretcher after sustaining a leg injury. However, deprived of their artillery, the Chinese faced increasingly dire odds, and they were pushed back along the entire front. As the Chinese front neared collapse, the officers of the 144th Division faced yet another challenge: Japanese infantry approached across Lake Tai in boats commandeered in previous days. With no artillery to defend themselves, the Chinese could only direct small arms fire at the vessels, allowing the Japanese to make an almost unimpeded landing. This was the final straw. Under pressure from two sides, the 144th Division had no choice but to abandon its position, retreating westward toward the main Chinese force around Guangde. Jiangyin endured two days of continuous shelling before the Japanese infantry attack commenced, but the city was fortified to withstand such a bombardment of this magnitude and duration. The 33 hills in and around the city had long served as scenic viewpoints and natural strongholds. The tallest hill, known as Mount Ding, rose 900 feet above the area, providing a commanding view and boasted over 100 artillery pieces. By late November, when the Japanese Army reached the area, most civilians had fled, but their homes remained, and the Chinese defenders effectively utilized them, converting them into concealed strongholds. The attack by the Japanese 13th Division on November 29 was led by the 26th Brigade on its right flank and the 103rd Brigade on its left. The advance proved challenging, constantly disrupted by Chinese ambushes. As a row of Japanese soldiers cautiously crossed an empty field, gunshots would erupt, striking down one of their ranks while the others scrambled for cover, desperately trying to identify the source of the fire. The Chinese launched frequent counterattacks, and on several occasions, individual Japanese units found themselves cut off from the main body and had to be rescued. Despite some setbacks, the 13th Division made satisfactory progress, bolstered by both land and ship-based artillery, and soon nearly encircled Jiangyin, leaving only a narrow corridor to the west of the city. However, the Chinese artillery was well-prepared, effectively targeting Japanese vessels on the Yangtze River. This led to an artillery duel that lasted three hours, resulting in several hits on Japanese ships; however, the Chinese batteries also suffered considerable damage. In the sector of the 103rd Chinese Division, the defenders had taken time to construct deep antitank ditches, hindering the advance of Japanese armored units. During the night of November 29-30, the Chinese organized suicide missions behind enemy lines to level the playing field. Armed only with a belt, a combat knife, a rifle, and explosives, the soldiers infiltrated Japanese positions, targeting armored vehicles. They quietly climbed onto the tanks, dropping hand grenades into turrets or detonating explosives strapped to their bodies. Though reducing Japanese armored superiority granted the Chinese some time, the attackers' momentum simply could not be stopped. On November 30, the Japanese launched a relentless assault on Mount Ding, the dominant hill in the Jiangyin area. Supported by aircraft, artillery, and naval bombardments, Japanese infantry engaged the entrenched Chinese company at the summit. After a fierce and bloody battle, the Japanese succeeded in capturing the position. The Chinese company commander, Xia Min'an, withdrew with his troops toward Jiangyin to report the loss to the regimental command post. When the deputy commander of the 103rd Division, Dai Zhiqi, heard the news, he was furious and wanted to execute Xia on the spot. However, Xia's regimental commander intervened, saving him from a firing squad. Instead, he insisted that Xia redeem himself by recapturing the hill from the Japanese. Xia was put in command of a company that had previously been held in reserve. What followed was a fierce battle lasting over four hours. Eventually, the Japanese were forced to relinquish the hill, but the victory came at a steep price, with numerous casualties on both sides, including the death of Xia Min'an. The last days of November also witnessed chaotic fighting around Guangde, where the unfamiliar terrain added to the confusion for both sides. For the Chinese, this chaos was exacerbated by their upper command issuing contradictory orders, instructing troops to advance and retreat simultaneously. Pan Wenhua, the Sichuanese commander of the 23rd Army, prepared a pincer maneuver, directing the 13th Independent Brigade to launch a counterattack against the town of Sian, which was held by the Japanese, while the 146th Division would attack from the south. Both units set out immediately. However, due to a lack of radio equipment, a common issue among the Sichuanese forces, they did not receive the new orders to withdraw, which originated not from Pan Wenhua but from Chen Cheng, the Chiang Kai-shek loyalist who had taken command after Liu Xiang fell ill and was eager to assert his authority. Fortunately, the officers of the 13th Independent Brigade were alerted to the general order for withdrawal by neighboring units and managed to halt their advance on Sian in time. The 146th Division, however, had no such luck and continued its march toward the Japanese-occupied city. It was joined by the 14th Independent Brigade, which had just arrived from Wuhu and was also unaware of the general retreat order. Upon reaching Sian, these Chinese troops engaged in intense close combat with the Japanese. It was a familiar scenario of Japanese technological superiority pitted against Chinese determination. The Japanese brought armor up from the rear, while the Chinese lay in ambush, tossing hand grenades into tank turrets before jumping onto the burning vehicles to kill any surviving crew members. As the fighting around the flanks slowed, the area in front of Guangde became the focal point of the battle. Japanese soldiers advanced toward the city during the day, passing piles of dead Chinese and numerous houses set ablaze by retreating defenders. At night, the situation became perilous for the Japanese, as Chinese forces infiltrated their positions under the cover of darkness. In the confusion, small units from both sides often got lost and were just as likely to encounter hostile forces as friendly ones. Despite the chaos along the front lines, it was evident that the Japanese were gaining the upper hand primarily due to their material superiority. Japanese artillery bombarded Guangde, igniting many structures, while infantry approached the city from multiple directions. The Chinese 145th Division, led by Rao Guohua, was nearing its breaking point. In a desperate gamble, on November 30, Rao ordered one of his regiments to counterattack, but the regimental commander, sensing the futility of the move, simply refused. This refusal was a personal failure for Rao, one he could not accept. Deeply ashamed, Rao Guohua withdrew from Guangde. As darkness enveloped the battlefield, he and a small group of staff officers found a place to rest for the night in a house near a bamboo grove. Overwhelmed with anguish, he penned a letter to Liu Xiang, apparently unaware that Liu had been evacuated to the rear due to stomach issues. In the letter, he apologized for his inability to hold Guangde. Telling his bodyguard to get some rest, he stepped outside, disappearing into the bamboo grove. Shortly thereafter, his staff heard a single gunshot. When they rushed out and searched the dense bamboo, they found Rao sitting against a tree, his service weapon beside him. Blood streamed thickly from a wound to his temple. He was already dead. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. As the Japanese forces advanced on Nanjing, tensions escalated within the Chinese leadership. While Commander Tang Shengzhi fortified the city, some sought retreat. Japanese Commander Yanagawa, confident of victory, pushed his troops westward, disregarding high command's hesitations. Meanwhile, ill-equipped Sichuanese reinforcements hurried to defend Nanjing, braving cholera and disorganization. Intense battles unfolded around Lake Tai, marked by fierce ambushes and casualties. 

This week on Sinica, I'm delighted to be joined by Dan Wang, formerly of Gavekal Dragonomics and the Paul Tsai Law Center at Yale University, now with the Hoover Institute's History Lab. Dan's new book is Breakneck: China's Quest to Engineer the Future, and it's already one of the year's most talked-about books. In this conversation, we go beyond what's actually in the book to discuss the origins and implications of the Chinese "engineering state" — the world's biggest technocratic polity — and what the United States should and should not learn from China. We discuss how Dan's ideas sit with Abundance by Derek Thompson and Ezra Klein, and much more. Don't miss this episode!See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Artificial intelligence has been a frequent topic on Sinica in recent years — but usually through the lens of the two countries that have produced the leading models and companies: the United States and China. We've covered generative AI, national strategies, governance frameworks, and the geopolitical implications of AI leadership.This webinar, broadcast on the morning of August 14, broadens that lens to explore how other countries — and especially Ukraine — are approaching AI in the public sector. Around the world, governments are experimenting with AI well beyond chatbots and text generation: China's “City Brain” optimizes traffic, energy use, and public safety; U.S. agencies are streamlining services and automating benefits processing; and elsewhere, smart grids, predictive infrastructure planning, and AI-enabled e-governance are reshaping public administration. These projects reveal both the promise and the complexity of bringing AI into government — along with valid concerns over privacy, fairness, and inclusiveness.We'll look at what lessons Ukraine might draw from U.S. and Chinese experiences, the opportunities and challenges of adapting these practices, and the strategic risks of sourcing AI solutions from different providers — especially in the context of Ukraine's eventual postwar reconstruction.Joining us are three distinguished guests:Dmytro Yefremov, Board Member of the Ukrainian Association of Sinologists, with deep expertise in China's political and technological strategies and Ukraine's policy landscape.Wang Guan, Chairman of Learnable.ai in China, bringing extensive experience in AI applications for public administration and education.Karman Lucero, Associate Research Scholar and Senior Fellow at Yale Law School's Paul Tsai China Center, whose work focuses on Chinese law, governance, and the regulation of emerging technologies.Thanks to the Ukrainian Platform for Contemporary China, the Ukrainian Association of Sinologists, and the Center for Slavic, Eurasian, and East European Studies at the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill for organizing and sponsoring today's event. Special thanks to Vita Golod for putting together the panel and inviting me to moderate.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Tourists row boats along a river in Wenshan Zhuang and Miao autonomous prefecture, Yunnan province.游客们在云南省文山壮族苗族自治州的一条河流上划着船只游玩。 Summer has always been the peak tourism season in China. But this year's summer tourism season is not only about crowds and sunshine but also about change. Youths, especially Gen Z and college students, are reshaping the way the Chinese people travel. They prioritize quality over quantity, substance over mileage, and experience over exhaustion.夏季一直是中国旅游业的旺季。但今年的夏季旅游季不仅有熙熙攘攘的人群和明媚的阳光，还有变化的元素。年轻人，尤其是 Z 世代和大学生，正在改变中国人出行的方式。他们更看重品质而非数量，更注重实质内容而非行驶里程，更重视体验而非疲惫不堪。 Gone are the days of whirlwind itineraries packed with low-cost sightseeing. Today's youths seek better, richer experiences. According to travel platform Fliggy, the average travel spending by college students this summer is up by 6 percent year-on-year, with average trips lasting about 2.9 days. Tourism for them is not just about ticking the boxes; it's also about reconnecting with the self and rediscovering the joy of exploration.那些匆忙而简陋的旅行日程——充斥着低价观光活动的日子已经一去不复返了。如今的年轻人追求更优质、更丰富的体验。据旅游平台飞猪的数据，今年夏天大学生的平均旅行花费同比增长了 6%，平均旅行时间约为 2.9 天。对他们而言，旅游不仅仅是完成任务那么简单，更是与自我重新连接、重新发现探索乐趣的过程。As temperatures soar, young travelers are chasing comfort along with the quest for natural and historical sites. "Wellness travel" is a new trend. Think blue skies, snow-capped peaks, rolling grasslands and crystal clear lakes. Places like Qinghai province, the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region, Yunnan province, the western part of Sichuan province, and Northeast China, where temperatures remain below 25 degrees Celsius in summer, have become favorite tourist destinations.随着气温不断攀升，年轻游客们不仅在探寻自然和历史遗迹的同时，也在追求舒适体验。“健康旅游”成为了一种新趋势。想象一下蓝天、白雪皑皑的山峰、起伏的草原和清澈的湖泊。像青海、新疆维吾尔自治区、云南、四川西部以及东北地区这样的地方，夏季气温低于 25 摄氏度，已成为热门的旅游目的地。 Some go even further — literally crossing the equator to experience winter in July. New Zealand, South Africa and Chile have become popular "reverse-season" retreats for Chinese tourists. Countries like Norway and Iceland, where travelers can hike across glaciers, ski on alpine slopes, or simply unwind in a lakeside village are also attracting lots of Chinese tourists.还有一些人则更进一步——甚至真的穿越赤道，以便在七月体验冬季。新西兰、南非和智利已成为深受中国游客喜爱的“反季节”度假胜地。像挪威和冰岛这样的国家，那里游客可以徒步穿越冰川、在高山滑雪场滑雪，或者只是在湖边的村庄里放松身心，也吸引了大量中国游客。 Today, travel is as much about emotions as it is about destinations. Events such as concerts, sports tournaments, and cultural festivals have become magnets for travelers. From music festivals and football games to dragon boat races and folk festivals, young people's choices are varied.如今，旅行不仅关乎目的地，更关乎情感体验。诸如音乐会、体育赛事以及文化庆典等各类活动已成为吸引游客的重要因素。从音乐节、足球比赛到龙舟赛和民俗节，年轻人的选择多种多样。 For young people, summer nights, in particular, have acquired added charm. For instance, in Xishuangbanna, Yunnan province, a night tour through a tropical forest — lit by glowing fireflies — feels like wandering through a living galaxy. At Gexian village, Shangrao city of Jiangxi province, "illuminated parades" turn the place into a dynamic painting, bringing the lanterns to life.对于年轻人来说，夏日的夜晚尤其增添了几分魅力。比如，在云南省的西双版纳，沿着热带森林进行的一次夜间游览——由发光的萤火虫照亮——让人感觉仿佛置身于一个活生生的星系之中。而在江西省上饶市的阁仙村，那些“点亮的游行”将这个地方变成了一幅充满活力的画卷，让灯笼仿佛有了生命一般。 For young Chinese tourists, participation is everything. Not interested in passive sightseeing, they want to be part of the experience. In Zhejiang province's Anji county, homestays in rural areas offer hands-on activities like farming, cooking, and traditional handicrafts, attracting families and young travelers alike. In Kaifeng, Henan province, an immersive boat tour, dubbed "A Day in the Song Dynasty (960-1279)" invites visitors to put on period attire, play poetry games, and enjoy music and dance along ancient canals. In Kaifeng's Wansui Mountain, a martial arts theme park, more than 80 live performances a day bring visitors "face-to-face" with Song-era heroes.对于年轻的中国游客来说，参与体验才是最重要的。他们不想只是被动地观光，而是希望亲身参与到其中。在浙江省安吉县，农村的民宿提供了诸如农耕、烹饪和传统手工艺等亲身体验活动，吸引了家庭和年轻游客。在河南省开封市，一场名为“宋朝一日（960 - 1279 年）”的沉浸式游船之旅邀请游客穿上古装，参与诗歌游戏，并在古老的运河边欣赏音乐和舞蹈。在开封的万顺山，一个武术主题公园每天会有超过 80 场现场表演，让游客与宋朝的英雄们“面对面”互动。 And interactive performers on "The Longest Day in Chang'an" themed street in Shaanxi province have been drawing tourists to theaters through historical narratives. You're not just watching a story; you're living it.在陕西省以“长安最长的一天”为主题的街头活动中，互动表演者通过讲述历史故事吸引游客前往剧院。你并非只是在观看故事，而是在亲身经历其中。 "Brave souls experience the world first" — this Gen Z motto reflects youths' growing thirst for novelty and adventure. Whether it's skydiving, bungee jumping, VR time travel or simulated space travel, young people are seeking once-in-a-lifetime thrills.“勇敢者率先体验世界”——这是 Z 世代的座右铭，它反映了年轻人对新鲜事物和冒险的日益强烈渴望。无论是跳伞、蹦极、虚拟现实时间旅行还是模拟太空旅行，年轻人都在寻求那种一生仅有一次的刺激体验。 In Qingdao, Shandong province, for example, a VR attraction brings Chinese sea creatures mentioned in folklore and mythology to life. In Gansu province, the Mars Base 1 Camp in Jinchang city fuses aerospace science with immersive tourism, offering space-themed music festivals, sci-fi salons, and the chance to "spend time among the stars".例如，在山东省青岛市，有一个虚拟现实体验项目将民间传说和神话中提到的中国海洋生物生动地呈现在人们面前。在甘肃省金昌市，火星基地 1 号营地将航空航天科学与沉浸式旅游相结合，举办太空主题音乐节、科幻沙龙，并提供“在星辰之间度过时光”的机会。As young people pursue richer, more layered experiences, tourism in China is shifting from "sightseeing travel" to "scene-based engagement", from grabbing eyeballs to winning hearts. The summer tourist surge is just the beginning.随着年轻人追求更丰富、更多元化的体验，中国的旅游业正从“观光旅游”向“场景互动”转变，从吸引眼球转向赢得人心。夏季旅游热潮只是个开始。Therefore, the travel industry must embrace personalization, creativity and quality, in order to develop immersive content, improve services, and foster regional collaboration. Only then can it help build a new tourism ecosystem, one that meets the evolving needs of young travelers while unleashing the full potential of the "experience economy".因此，旅游业必须注重个性化、创新性和品质，以开发沉浸式内容、提升服务质量并促进区域合作。只有这样，才能帮助构建一个新的旅游生态系统，这个系统能够满足年轻游客不断变化的需求，同时充分发挥“体验经济”的全部潜力。 Song Rui is director of the Tourism Research Center at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; and Tao Zhihua is a PhD student at the same institute. The views don't necessarily represent those of China Daily.宋瑞是中国社会科学院旅游研究中心的主任；陶志华则是该研究院的一名博士生。这些观点并不一定代表《中国日报》的观点。 wellness traveln.健康旅游/ˈwelnes ˈtrævl/ reverse-season retreatsn.反季节度假地/rɪˈvɜːs ˈsiːzn rɪˈtriːts/

À première vue, Mo Hailong n'avait rien du profil d'un espion agricole. Originaire du Sichuan, en Chine, docteur en génie mécanique de l'université du Kansas, il s'installe aux États-Unis à la fin des années 90. Après avoir enseigné en Floride, il rejoint DBN, un géant chinois des semences, comme directeur des affaires internationales. Sa mission officielle : développer le marché agricole chinois en acquérant des semences de pointe.Mais en 2011, une scène inattendue change tout. Dans l'Iowa, un agent de sécurité de DuPont Pioneer surprend Mo Hailong en train de creuser près d'un champ expérimental de maïs. L'homme prétend se rendre à une conférence. Sceptique, l'agent note sa plaque d'immatriculation. Quelques semaines plus tard, Mo est repéré près d'un autre champ… celui de Monsanto. Cette fois, le FBI s'en mêle. L'opération “Purple Maze” mobilisera pendant deux ans soixante agents, avec filatures au sol et en avion, GPS, écoutes, drones et analyses de données massives. Les enquêteurs découvrent un réseau d'espionnage économique orchestré depuis la Chine. Objectif : voler des semences hybrides ultraperformantes, fruits de décennies de recherche et d'investissements colossaux.Plus de 100 kilos de maïs, codés et emballés avec soin, sont retrouvés. Leur valeur est stratégique : résistance accrue, rendements exceptionnels… Des atouts qui auraient permis à la Chine de combler rapidement son retard technologique dans l'agriculture. Les graines devaient transiter par Hong Kong avant d'être reproduites à grande échelle. En décembre 2013, Mo Hailong est arrêté. Il sera condamné à trois ans de prison avant d'être expulsé. Pour le FBI, ce vol n'est pas un simple délit commercial : il menace directement la sécurité économique des États-Unis. Cette affaire illustre un fait souvent méconnu : les secrets agricoles peuvent être aussi précieux – et convoités – que les secrets militaires. Dans un monde où l'alimentation est un enjeu stratégique, la bataille pour la graine la plus performante se joue aussi dans l'ombre. Hébergé par Acast. Visitez acast.com/privacy pour plus d'informations.

Join me for a conversation with four fantastic panelists about nuclear safety and security issues brought on by Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and more broadly on the state of nuclear security globally during this era of dramatic change.This program was made possible by the Ukrainian Platform for Contemporary China and the Center for Slavic, Eurasian, and East European Studies at the University of North Carolina Chapel Hill.Nickolas Roth is Senior Director for Nuclear Materials Security at the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). Nickolas works at the intersection of arms control, risk reduction, and institutional resilience, and previously directed nuclear security work at the Stimson Center and contributed to Harvard's Project on Managing the Atom.Mariana Budjeryn is a Senior Research Associate with Managing the Atom at Harvard's Belfer Center and author of Inheriting the Bomb, a definitive study of Ukraine's post-Soviet disarmament and the limits of the Budapest Memorandum. Her scholarship grounds today's debates about guarantees, coercion, and nuclear restraint.Pan Yanliang is a Research Associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). He studies the Russian and Chinese nuclear industries and the nuclear fuel cycle, and works on CNS engagement with Chinese counterparts—giving him a distinctive cross-regional vantage.Lily Wojtowicz is a Research Fellow at the Hertie School (Berlin) and a USIP–Minerva Peace & Security Scholar, whose work focuses on extended deterrence credibility, European security, and alliance adaptation under great-power rivalry.5:19 - The Gap Between Coercive Rhetoric and First-use Thresholds11:26 - The Implication of Ukraine's allies regarding weapons 17:26 - Golden Dome21:30 - China's Position on Nuclear Weapons29:25 - How Belarus Altered European Debates 31:13 - Civilian Nuclear Power 38:32 - North Korea's Support for Russia40:59 - Beijing on NATO and Asian Security43:09 - Europe's Reaction to Nuclear Risk45:44 - Nuclear Risk in the Russia-Ukraine War52:56 - Trump's Impact on Kremlin Nuclear Thinking1:01:52 - US-China Nuclear Relations1:04:49 - Ukraine's Nuclear DisarmamentSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

In this week's episode of China Insider, Miles Yu breaks down the latest round of trade talks between the US and China as both sides agree to a 90-day extension for continued negotiations toward a potential trade deal. Next, Miles covers the rising public outrage in Sichuan province over local law enforcement's alleged mishandling of a violent school bullying incident in Jiangyou City. Lastly, Miles comments on the rising anti-Japanese sentiment across China that coincides with the 80th anniversary of Japanese surrender ending WWII in the Pacific.   China Insider is a weekly podcast project from Hudson Institute's China Center, hosted by China Center Director and Senior Fellow, Dr. Miles Yu, who provides weekly news that mainstream American outlets often miss, as well as in-depth commentary and analysis on the China challenge and the free world's future. 

This week on Sinica, Paul Triolo of DGA Albright Stonebridge and tech investor Ryan Cunningham join to talk about their observations and insights from the World AI Conference (WAIC), held in July in Shanghai, and what it tells them about China's ambitions in the fast-moving world of artificial intelligence. Don't miss this one!04:21 - Ryan on his Edgerunner fund06:23 - Impressions of the World AI Conference in Shanghai13:52 - Approaches to AI development in the US and China24:04 - China's role in global AI safety 33:42 - AI market: US vs China38:20 - AI diffusion in China44:56 - AI safety frameworks52:06 - Domestic development of Chinese AI1:04:06 - Pressure of Domestic AI Alternatives1:08:43 - Can AI have a dual role in the U.S.?1:17:25 -Paying it Forward 1:20:16 - RecommendationsPaying it Forward: Kevin Xu, Kyle Chan, Helen Toner (Rising Tide Substack), Piotr Mazurek and Felix Gabriel (LLM Inference Economics from First Principles).Recommendations: Paul: Neil deGrasse Tyson - Origins: Fourteen Billion Years of Cosmic Evolution (book), Sara Imari Walker's Life As No One Knows It (book)Ryan: Armored Core VI: Fires of Rubicon (video game)Kaiser: The Studio (TV series), Platonic (TV series)See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Hoy nos vamos a la capital de la provincia de Sichuan, en el suroeste de China. Conocida como la “Ciudad de la Gastronomía” por la UNESCO, hogar de los adorables pandas gigantes y cuna de una cultura milenaria. Te cuento un montón de cosas que merece la pena ver y hacer en la cuarta ciudad más importante del país. Gracias por estar aquí escuchando este podcast —¡ya vamos por más de 1,100 episodios juntos! Somos una comunidad que no para de crecer, hace algunos meses que hemos superado el millón de escuchas. y eso es pura magia, ¡gracias a ti! Esto es una locura y me encanta compartirlo contigo. Por cierto, si viajas y quieres estar conectado tengo un código de descuento de 5% para tí en tu próxima eSim de HolaFly https://holafly.sjv.io/N94mdN el código de descuento es ELTURISTA Que lo disfrutes. Por qué no se trata de estar todo el tiempo conectado, se trata de tener conexión cuando realmente lo necesitas.

Todavía no he pulsado el botón de ‘monetizar' porque no quiero que nada interrumpa esta aventura: ni anuncios, ni pausas, solo tú y yo explorando el mundo. Pero te necesito: ¿me echas una mano? Dame 5 estrellas y deja una reseña, son 30 segundos para ti y un empujón enorme para mí. Tú también puedes ser parte activa: ¿tienes ideas para futuros episodios? Envíame un audio de hasta 1 minuto por Instagram o Facebook —puedes mandar varios si necesitas más tiempo—. Búscame como https://www.instagram.com/cesarsar_elturista/ , CesarSar en FB https://www.facebook.com/CesarSar/ o suscríbete a mi canal de YouTube https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC55ZMnqfOlSc7uWbIEM4bDw ¿Prefieres escribirme? Mándame un correo a viajes@cesarsar.com , y si quieres, incluye una nota de voz. Si sueñas con un viaje perfecto, déjame ayudarte. Como viajero consultor, pongo a tus pies mis 135 países recorridos y tres vueltas al mundo —¡eso son muchas historias que contar! Escríbeme al mismo mail y organicemos juntos tu próximo gran viaje, para que vivas, disfrutes y sueñes a lo grande, porque un buen viaje es pura vida. Además, he vuelto a lanzar viajes de autor en grupo, así que estate atento a mis redes y web www.cesarsar.com aquí voy publicando mis viajes recomendados, y los viajes en los que voy yo acompañando. Siempre son viajes diseñados por mí, o modificados por mí para poder disfrutar juntos de las mejores experiencia en diferentes lugares del mundo. Y si te mola este podcast y quieres darme un extra de apoyo con la serie de tv, deja un comentario en mi post de BuenViaje en IG: https://www.instagram.com/p/CrKqoyzubKZ/? Un abrazo enorme, comunidad. Compartir es vivir, ¡y contigo esto cobra sentido!Aquí algunas de las plataformas donde está disponible el podcast. Apple Podcast https://podcasts.apple.com/es/podcast/c%C3%A9sar-sar-el-turista/id1592890080Spotify https://open.spotify.com/show/14Gs7rhzsYoaQe5Nh05SsI?si=HMPa8pfqSKWSSf0ZtIQGKgIVOOX https://go.ivoox.com/sq/1396585#Viajes #ViajesBarartos #Viajes #Viajessostenibles #Consejosdeviajes #Viajesfelices #Podcastdeviajes #Vueltaalmundo #china #chengdu

This week on Sinica: On my final two days in Shaxi in Yunnan, Chris Thomas and Stephanie Li, the hosts of the marvelous YouTube channel Chinese Cooking Demystified, joined me for some cooking and lots of chatting about food! We recorded this show together and focus our conversation on their heroic attempt at a taxonomy of different Chinese cuisines. We don't talk about all 63 that they identify, but we do get into their04:31 - Flavors of Yunnan 08:44 - On balancing between the “exotic” and “normal” China 11:53 - The origin story behind “Chinese Cooking Demystified”14:56 - The Breath of the Wok (Wok Hei, 鑊氣 / huo6 hei3)21:05 - A Comprehensive Taxonomy on Chinese Cuisine 32:25 - Correlations between dialects and cuisine 37:15 - Efforts behind the work39:09 - Promoting local specialties44:23 - Chinese identity and food trends52:30 - "Minority" cuisine in Yunnan01:00:52 - Yunnan cuisine and the Chinese hipster generation01:05:52 - Dali dish recommendationsRecommendations: Chris & Steph: Shunde Lao Baby, Pin Nuo, Lao DongbeiKaiser: Taking time off to do something you love!See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

What if the riskiest ingredient in your recipe for success was your own story? Jing Gao walked away from a secure tech career with no safety net to rediscover her Sichuan roots through food. She launched a fast-casual restaurant in Shanghai, apprenticed under a Michelin-caliber chef, and transformed a home-kitchen supper club into a crowdfunded CPG phenomenon—all to challenge stereotypes and rewrite the narrative around Chinese cuisine. Host Andrea Marquez unpacks how Jing had the courage to price her chili crisp at a high price when they first launched despite widespread belief that Chinese food “shouldn't cost that much,” to reclaim her birth name, and to find a manufacturer that was willing to use the ingredients she preferred. If you've ever wondered whether sticking to your roots can pay off, Jing's story proves that conviction is more than just a risk – it's the secret ingredient.Got a bold leap of your own? Share it with us in an Apple Podcasts review, Spotify comment, or email us at thisissmallbusiness@amazon.com – you might hear it in a future episode.In this episode, you'll hear: (01:44) Have you ever lost touch with your roots and wondered how to find them again? Jing shares how a diasporic childhood led her back to Sichuan cuisine.(06:22) Would you quit a secure tech job with zero backup? Jing talks about walking away from stability to follow her culinary passion and launch her first venture, Boaism. (09:52) What do you do when you realize your first venture isn't your true calling? Jing closed Baoism to apprentice under a Sichuan master chef and deepened her knowledge of ingredients before launching her next chapter: a food pop up called Fly by Jing.(13:48) How do you test demand before you even have a product? Jing bottled her sauces for her travel pop-up, spotted a market gap, and crowdfunded.(18:58) Have you ever hesitated to charge what you're really worth? Jing defied the stigma that “Chinese food should be cheap” by pricing her chili crisp at a premium and reframing it as the must-have “hot sauce.”(22:12) What happens when authenticity becomes your brand? Jing reclaimed her birth name during the pandemic, built customer trust, and sold out six months of inventory overnight after a New York Times feature.(24:18) How do you scale from crowdfunding success to retail distribution? Jing on launching on Amazon, landing in Whole Foods, and forging dream collaborations.(27:47) When should you take the next leap? Jing talks about blending deep research, unwavering conviction, and a touch of “delusion” to keep pushing forward.

An investigation into the furore over actress Huangyang Tiantian being pictured wearing what appeared to be luxury earrings has concluded that they were in fact imitations of a high-end brand.针对女演员黄杨钿甜被拍到佩戴疑似奢华耳环引发的风波，调查已得出结论：这些耳环实为某高端品牌的仿制品。The teen actress sparked controversy in May after posting photos in which she wore earrings reportedly worth millions of yuan, raising questions about the legitimacy of her extravagant spending, given her family's civil servant background.这位 女演员在 5 月发布了佩戴据报道价值数百万元耳环的照片后引发争议，鉴于其家庭的公务员背景，人们对她奢侈消费的合法性提出质疑。The earrings were eventually found to be a gift from a friend of her mother in 2016, made of glass and imitating a designer brand. No records of a purchase of the authentic items have been found at the brand's stores in China at this time.这些耳环最终被查明是 2016 年她母亲的一位朋友所赠，由玻璃制成，仿冒某设计师品牌。目前，该品牌在中国的门店均未查到购买正品的记录。A preliminary investigation from the joint task force which was released in late May, confirmed that her father was not involved in any post-disaster reconstruction projects during his tenure in Ya'an, Sichuan.联合调查组于 5 月底发布的初步调查结果证实，其父亲在四川雅安任职期间，未参与任何灾后重建项目。But they did find his two rule violations, namely unauthorized business activities while employed during his employment by the government and deliberate concealment of a violation of China's former two-child policy.但调查发现其父亲存在两项违纪行为，即任职期间违规从事经营活动，以及故意隐瞒违反中国原二孩政策的情况。The supervisory authority has confiscated 30,000 yuan ($4,176) in illegal gains obtained from a company by Huang's father, with the surname Yang, when he was working as a civil servant. Since he has already resigned from his position, no further administrative penalties will be imposed.监察机关已没收黄杨钿甜的父亲杨某在担任公务员期间从某公司获取的 3 万元（约合 4176 美元）非法所得。由于他已辞职，不再给予其他行政处罚。Regarding the violation of the family planning policy, since Yang has resigned and the relevant penalties have been abolished, no further action will be taken.关于违反计划生育政策一事，因杨某已辞职且相关处罚规定已废止，故不再作进一步处理。The investigation also found that there was no evidence that Yang had profited from post-disaster reconstruction projects or charitable funds during his tenure in Ya'an.调查还发现，没有证据表明杨某在雅安任职期间从灾后重建项目或慈善资金中获利。furore /ˈfjʊərɔː(r)/ 轩然大波，骚动imitation /ˌɪmɪˈteɪʃn/ 仿制品，仿造物confiscate /ˈkɒnfɪskeɪt/ 没收，充公tenure /ˈtenjə(r)/ 任职期，任期

I'm in Shaxi, a wonderful little town in the Dali Bai Autonomous Prefecture, and I was joined here by the Columbia economic historian Adam Tooze, who shared his thoughts on what he sees happening on the ground in China. Adam's been in China for the last month and reflects on his experiences learning about the country — and even attempting the language!03:49 - The economic situation in China10:42 - Patterns of consumption in China14:38 - China's industrial policy and renewable energy 18:52 - China vs. the U.S. on renewables26:15 - China's economic engagement with the Global South33:13- Beijing's strategic shift and Europe's rethinking37:49- The recent European Parliament paper42:43 - Learning about China as an “Outsider” 51:31 - Adam's evolving views on China 59:30 - Paying it Forward01:01:07 - Recommendations Paying it Forward: Kyle Chan, Pekingology.Recommendations: Adam: Caught by the Tide, Jia Zhangke (movie).Kaiser: Empire of AI: Dreams and Nightmares in Sam Altman's OpenAI, Karen Hao (book), Vera, or Faith, Gary Shteyngart (book).See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Kate Adie introduces stories from China, Kenya, Australia, Bolivia and the USA.Sichuan province in China is home to a long-standing Tibetan resistance movement. While Beijing views Tibet as an integral part of China – the allegiances of many Tibetans living in China lie with its exiled spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama - voicing support for him can lead to arrest or prison. Laura Bicker visited the town of Aba, where she met monks practicing their faith under heavy surveillance.Youth led protests erupted again in Kenya this week, with many young Kenyans angry at the lack of good job opportunities in the country - more than 30 people died in the demonstrations, and over 500 were arrested. Anne Soy has been following the story in Nairobi.The small Australian town of Morwell will be returning to some form of normality this week, following the conclusion of the trial of Erin Patterson who was found guilty of murdering three of her relatives and attempting to kill another after serving them Beef Wellington laced with toxic death cap mushrooms. Katy Watson reflects on how the town was transformed by the visiting media circus.Bolivia was once seen as an economic miracle, thanks to its huge natural gas reserves. But the energy exports on which the country once thrived have fallen sharply in recent years, pushing many people into poverty. Carolyn Lamboley reveals how the country's economic woes are now affecting people from all walks of life.And finally, we're in the Zion National Park in Utah where Stephen Moss tells the story of the conservation campaign that helped bring the Californian Condor back from the brink of extinction.Series Producer: Serena Tarling Production Coordinators: Sophie Hill & Katie Morrison Editor: Richard Fenton-Smith

Legoland Shanghai Resort, the city's newest theme park and the world's largest Legoland park, has significantly driven up bookings at nearby hotels and boosted consumption growth in surrounding areas after its opening on Saturday.上海乐高乐园度假区是上海最新的主题公园，也是全球最大的乐高乐园。自周六开园以来，它极大地带动了周边酒店的预订量，并促进了周边地区的消费增长。So far this summer, 70 percent of hotel bookings in the city's Jinshan district — where the resort is located — were made by travelers from other regions of the country, while bookings made by locals accounted for more than 50 percent last year, said Qunar, a Beijing-based online travel agency.总部位于北京的在线旅行社去哪儿网表示，今年夏天到目前为止，该度假区所在的上海金山区，70% 的酒店预订来自全国其他地区的游客，而去年本地游客的预订占比超过 50%。Travelers who booked hotel rooms near Legoland mainly came from Shanghai; Beijing; Qingdao, Shandong province; Chengdu, Sichuan province; and Nanjing, Jiangsu province, Qunar said. Many hotels near the theme park said they offer complimentary shuttle services and luggage storage services for holidaymakers.去哪儿网称，预订乐高乐园附近酒店客房的游客主要来自上海、北京、山东青岛、四川成都和江苏南京。乐园附近的许多酒店表示，它们为游客提供免费的班车服务和行李寄存服务。"Summer has been the peak season for travelers going to theme parks, and the popularity of theme parks is expected to have an even more prominent impact on boosting consumption growth of surrounding hotels, restaurants and other amenities," said Chen Xiaoshuang, a researcher at Qunar.去哪儿网研究员陈晓双表示：“夏季一直是主题公园旅游的旺季，主题公园的热度预计将对带动周边酒店、餐饮及其他配套设施的消费增长产生更为显著的影响。”Nationwide, booking volumes for admission tickets at domestic theme parks so far this summer jumped 70 percent on a yearly basis, according to the online travel agency.据该在线旅行社称，今年夏天到目前为止，全国范围内国内主题公园的门票预订量同比增长了 70%。Besides Legoland, theme parks — especially those with popular brand cachets — have been the driving engines of surrounding economies. For instance, bookings of hotels and bed-and-breakfasts near Universal Studios Beijing and Shanghai Disneyland jumped nearly 40 percent over last summer, Qunar said.去哪儿网表示，除了乐高乐园，主题公园 —— 尤其是那些拥有热门品牌影响力的主题公园 —— 一直是周边经济的驱动引擎。例如，北京环球度假区和上海迪士尼乐园附近的酒店及民宿预订量较去年夏天增长了近 40%。"A theme park can bring more fashionable and modern elements to an ancient city and add new vitality," said Dai Bin, president of the China Tourism Academy.中国旅游研究院院长戴斌表示：“一座主题公园能够为古城带来更多时尚现代元素，注入新的活力。”Zhongmu county in Zhengzhou, Henan province, was originally known for its abundance of crops such as watermelon and garlic. Now it is home to eight theme parks, including Zhengzhou Haichang Ocean Park and Zhengzhou Fantawild Adventure. So far this summer, hotel booking volumes in Zhongmu surged 50-fold over the same period of 2019, Qunar added.河南省郑州市中牟县原本以盛产西瓜、大蒜等农作物闻名。如今，这里拥有 8 个主题公园，包括郑州海昌海洋公园和郑州方特欢乐世界。去哪儿网补充说，今年夏天到目前为止，中牟县的酒店预订量较 2019 年同期激增了 50 倍。The Zhongmu government said the county would like to further stimulate its vitality based on the popularity of tourism. By 2026, the county plans to build a comprehensive modern industrial system that includes cultural and creative tourism, advanced manufacturing and modern biopharmaceuticals.中牟县政府表示，将依托旅游业的热度进一步激发县域活力。到 2026 年，该县计划构建包含文化创意旅游、高端制造和现代生物医药在内的综合性现代产业体系。"If a theme park generates revenues of 1 yuan (14 cents), it can drive a city's income by 3.8 yuan, thus propelling the incomes of upstream and downstream industries by 6-15 yuan. In addition to its own income, a theme park can make significant contributions to a city," said Lin Huanjie, director of the Institute for Theme Park Studies in China.中国主题公园研究院院长林焕杰表示：“主题公园每产生 1 元收入，就能带动城市收入 3.8 元，进而拉动上下游产业收入 6 至 15 元。除了自身收入外，主题公园还能为城市做出重大贡献。”boom /buːm/ 繁荣，激增surge /sɜːdʒ/ 急剧上升，猛增cachet /ˈkæʃeɪ/ 威望，声誉vitality /vaɪˈtæləti/ 活力，生命力

Max Pearson presents a collection of the week's Witness History episodes including the story behind Mick Jagger and David Bowie's duet for Live Aid in 1985 and the Chinese artist who was jailed for his art inspired by the Sichuan earthquake in 2008. He speaks to music journalist Alice Austin to explore other concerts in world history that have had a political impact. Also, the American politician who first coined the phrase "drill, baby, drill" in 2008, the making of Back To The Future in 1985 and the trophy killing of Cecil the Lion in Zimbabwe in 2015.Contributors: Bernard Doherty - former Live Aid press officer. Alice Austin - music journalist. Ai Weiwei - artist. Prof Andrew Loveridge - zoologist who studied Cecil the lion. Michael Steele - the former Lieutenant Governor of Maryland, who came up with the slogan "Drill, baby, drill!" Bob Gale - the co-writer and producer of the Back to the Future.(Photo: Mick Jagger and David Bowie performing Dancing In The Street. Credit: Brian Cooke / Redferns)

Ahead of his 90th birthday, the Dalai Lama has finally put an end to years of speculation over what will happen after his death. The head of Tibetan Buddhism confirmed that he will have a successor, who will be chosen by a board he has set up. But the Chinese government says that only they have the authority to appoint the next Dalai Lama. So who will decide how the next Dalai Lama is chosen - and why is the position so significant?Shawn Yuan from the BBC's Global China Unit explains how the process of finding the next Dalai Lama has changed over the years and talks us through the strained relations between the Chinese government and the spiritual leader. And the BBC's China Correspondent, Laura Bicker, tells us about her recent visit to a monastery in China's south-western Sichuan province, which has been at the heart of Tibetan resistance for decades.Instagram: @bbcwhatintheworld Email: whatintheworld@bbc.co.uk WhatsApp: +44 330 12 33 22 6 Presenter: Iqra Farooq Producers: Chelsea Coates and Josh Jenkins Editor: Julia Ross-Roy

China's Ministry of Education has rolled out a series of measures to stabilize and expand employment for college graduates, with a focus on creating opportunities in private enterprises and grassroots positions.中国教育部出台了一系列措施，旨在稳定和扩大高校毕业生就业，重点是在民营企业和基层岗位创造机会。In a collaborative effort with the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security and the Ministry of Finance, education authorities have extended one-time employment subsidies — previously limited to businesses — to include social organizations.教育部与人力资源和社会保障部、财政部协同合作，将此前仅面向企业的一次性就业补贴范围扩大到社会组织。A combination of tax incentives, employment subsidies, job expansion grants and guaranteed loans are being deployed to encourage private and smaller businesses to hire recent graduates.政府正综合运用税收优惠、就业补贴、岗位拓展补贴和担保贷款等手段，鼓励民营企业和小微企业吸纳应届毕业生。Authorities are also working to create jobs in emerging industries and frontline sectors. An initiative to expand vacancies in State-owned enterprises is being implemented to address employment needs in key development areas.有关部门还在新兴产业和一线行业创造就业岗位。一项扩大国有企业招聘岗位的举措正在实施，以满足重点发展领域的就业需求。To boost employment at the grassroots level, China has expanded programs to help more college graduates from the class of 2025 secure positions in rural and western regions.为促进基层就业，我国扩大了相关项目规模，帮助更多 2025 届高校毕业生在农村和西部地区找到工作。Local governments are tailoring employment policies to their economic and industrial strengths. In Shanxi province, 26,000 new employment opportunities have been created, while the Inner Mongolia autonomous region has launched a community volunteer service program to recruit 5,000 individuals.地方政府正结合自身经济和产业优势制定就业政策。在山西省，已新增 2.6 万个就业岗位；内蒙古自治区启动了社区志愿服务项目，计划招募 5000 人。Henan province is hiring 5,000 village-level coordinators to contribute to rural vitalization efforts, while Sichuan province has opened 40,000 jobs in sectors such as justice, social work and agriculture. Jiangxi province is providing monthly job subsidies to 5,000 graduates employed by small and medium-sized enterprises, the ministry said.教育部表示，河南省正在招聘 5000 名村级协管员，为乡村振兴贡献力量；四川省在司法、社会工作、农业等领域推出了 4 万个岗位；江西省为 5000 名在中小企业就业的毕业生提供月度就业补贴。Education and labor departments are coordinating efforts to connect graduates with job opportunities, helping nearly 100,000 students from about 300 universities secure positions.教育部门和劳动部门正协同发力，为毕业生对接就业机会，已帮助约 300 所高校的近 10 万名学生找到工作。Special attention is being given to graduates from low-income households and those with disabilities. The education ministry has partnered with the Communist Youth League of China Central Committee to run a one-on-one mentorship program that pairs university staff with vulnerable graduates. As of June 27, nearly 10,000 graduates had received personalized support.重点关注低收入家庭毕业生和残疾毕业生。教育部与共青团中央合作开展一对一导师帮扶计划，安排高校工作人员与困境毕业生结对。截至 6 月 27 日，已有近 1 万名毕业生获得个性化帮扶。With financial backing from the Ministry of Finance, the education ministry is also expanding a program that provides training and job placement services. So far, 100,000 students from the class of 2025 have completed training, and 1,124 job fairs have been held under the program, offering more than 1.1 million positions.在财政部的资金支持下，教育部还在扩大一项提供培训和就业安置服务的计划。截至目前，2025 届已有 10 万名学生完成培训，该计划下已举办 1124 场招聘会，提供超过 110 万个岗位。Several provinces are increasing funding and resources for the training program. Shanxi, for example, is building five provincial-level training centers and adding 6,400 training slots for vulnerable graduates.多个省份正在为该培训计划增加资金和资源投入。例如，山西省正在建设 5 个省级培训中心，并为困境毕业生增加 6400 个培训名额。The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs has launched a campaign to help graduates from formerly impoverished households find jobs. In Hainan province, universities have created 475 public service positions for graduates involved in the campaign, each subsidized at 2,010 yuan ($280) per month.农业农村部启动了一项帮助原贫困家庭毕业生就业的行动。在海南省，各高校为参与该行动的毕业生设立了 475 个公共服务岗位，每个岗位每月补贴 2010 元（约合 280 美元）。As graduation season peaks, local authorities are urged to maintain close contact with graduates still seeking employment and to ensure a smooth handover of their information to labor departments for continued support. Vocational training opportunities are also being expanded for those looking to enhance their skills and improve job readiness.随着毕业季迎来高峰，有关部门要求地方政府与仍在求职的毕业生保持密切联系，确保将他们的信息顺利移交劳动部门，以便继续提供支持。同时，为那些希望提升技能、增强就业能力的毕业生提供更多职业培训机会。subsidy /ˈsʌbsədi/ 补贴；补助金vitalization /ˌvaɪtəlaɪˈzeɪʃn/ 振兴；活化mentorship /ˈmentəʃɪp/ 导师制；指导关系vocational /vəʊˈkeɪʃənl/ 职业的；行业的

China's Tianwen 2 asteroid sampling spacecraft has been on its interplanetary itinerary for more than 33 days, orbiting at a distance of over 12 million kilometers from Earth, and it is in good working condition, the China National Space Administration said on Tuesday. 中国国家航天局周二表示，中国 “天问二号” 小行星采样探测器已在星际旅程中飞行超过 33 天，目前距离地球超过 1200 万公里，工作状态良好。 The robotic probe is currently traveling on a transfer trajectory toward its destination, a near-Earth asteroid called 2016 HO3, the space administration said in a news release. 国家航天局在新闻发布会上称，这台机器人探测器目前正沿着转移轨道飞向其目标 —— 一颗名为 2016 HO3 的近地小行星。 The CNSA also released two images, showing Earth and the moon, captured by the spacecraft's narrow-field-of-view navigation sensor when it was about 590,000 km away from Earth. 中国国家航天局还发布了两张地球和月球的图像，这些图像是探测器在距离地球约 59 万公里时，由其窄视场导航传感器拍摄的。 The Tianwen 2 mission, which is China's first attempt to bring pristine asteroid samples back to Earth, was launched on May 29, when a Long March 3B rocket carrying the robotic probe blasted off from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center in Sichuan province. “天问二号” 任务是中国首次尝试将原始小行星样本带回地球，该探测器于 5 月 29 日由长征三号乙运载火箭搭载，从四川西昌卫星发射中心发射升空。 The probe's primary objective is to reach 2016 HO3, a small asteroid that is 40 to 100 meters wide, in the summer of 2026. It will study the celestial body up close using a suite of 11 instruments including cameras, spectrometers and radars, before deploying special devices to collect surface substances. 该探测器的主要目标是在 2026 年夏季抵达 2016 HO3 小行星。这颗小行星宽度为 40 至 100 米，探测器将使用包括相机、光谱仪和雷达在内的 11 种仪器对其进行近距离研究，随后部署特殊设备采集表面物质。 The asteroid, which is also known as 469219 Kamo'oalewa, orbits the sun and, therefore, is a constant companion of Earth. It is too distant to be considered a true satellite of Earth, but is the best and most stable example to date of a quasi-satellite.这颗小行星又名 469219 Kamo'oalewa，它围绕太阳运行，因此始终是地球的 “同伴”。由于距离过远，它不能被视为地球真正的卫星，但却是迄今为止最理想、最稳定的准卫星例子。 After the asteroid samples are collected, the Tianwen 2 probe will fly back to Earth's orbit and send a capsule containing the precious materials to the ground. 采集小行星样本后，“天问二号” 探测器将飞回地球轨道，并将装有这些珍贵物质的返回舱送回地面。 The samples will be distributed among scientists, who will examine their physical properties, chemical and mineralogical content and isotopic composition, contributing to studies on the formation and evolution of asteroids and the early solar system. 这些样本将分发给科学家，他们将对样本的物理性质、化学和矿物成分以及同位素组成进行研究，为小行星和早期太阳系的形成与演化研究提供助力。 Delivering the samples to Earth will not be the end of the mission. The Tianwen 2 spacecraft will then enter the second phase of its journey, flying toward a main-belt comet called 311P to conduct a remote-sensing survey and transmit the data back to Earth for scientific research, according to the CNSA. 将样本送回地球并非任务的终点。中国国家航天局表示，“天问二号” 探测器随后将进入任务的第二阶段，飞向一颗名为 311P 的主带彗星，进行遥感探测，并将数据传回地球供科研使用。 The whole mission is expected to yield groundbreaking discoveries and expand the understanding of Earth and small celestial bodies inside the solar system, scientists said.科学家表示，整个任务有望取得突破性发现，加深人类对地球以及太阳系内小天体的认识。 asteroid /ˈæstərɔɪd/ 小行星 probe /prəʊb/ 探测器 trajectory /trəˈdʒektəri/ 轨道；轨迹 isotopic /ˌaɪsəˈtɒpɪk/ 同位素的

In 2008, an earthquake in China's Sichuan province killed almost 90,000 people. Many were crushed when school buildings collapsed, exposing their poor construction quality. To counter perceived government suppression of information, the artist Ai Weiwei made an artwork from 90 tonnes of steel bars salvaged from the schools' wreckage. In 2011, Ai Weiwei was detained in harsh conditions for 81 days and banned from leaving China. While his official charge was tax evasion, his detention was widely viewed as a response to his activism. But the artwork, Straight, became a global sensation. Ai Weiwei tells the story to Ben Henderson.Eye-witness accounts brought to life by archive. Witness History is for those fascinated by the past. We take you to the events that have shaped our world through the eyes of the people who were there. For nine minutes every day, we take you back in time and all over the world, to examine wars, coups, scientific discoveries, cultural moments and much more. Recent episodes explore everything from the death of Adolf Hitler, the first spacewalk and the making of the movie Jaws, to celebrity tortoise Lonesome George, the Kobe earthquake and the invention of superglue. We look at the lives of some of the most famous leaders, artists, scientists and personalities in history, including: Eva Peron – Argentina's Evita; President Ronald Reagan and his famous ‘tear down this wall' speech; Thomas Keneally on why he wrote Schindler's List; and Jacques Derrida, France's ‘rock star' philosopher. You can learn all about fascinating and surprising stories, such as the civil rights swimming protest; the disastrous D-Day rehearsal; and the death of one of the world's oldest languages.(Photo: Ai Weiwei in front of his artwork, Straight. Credit: Leon Neal/AFP via Getty Images)

Four Japan-born giant pandas arrived in the city of Chengdu, Southwest China's Sichuan province, on Saturday evening. 上周六晚上，四只在日本出生的大熊猫抵达中国西南部四川省成都市。 The four pandas — 24-year-old Rauhin and her three daughters, 8-year-old Yuihin, 6-year-old Saihin and 4-year-old Fuhin — were sent to the Chengdu Research Base of Giant Panda Breeding for quarantine. 这四只大熊猫 ——24 岁的 “良浜” 和她的三个女儿， 8 岁的 “结浜”、6 岁的 “彩浜” 和 4 岁的 “枫浜”—— 被送往成都大熊猫繁育研究基地进行检疫。 To ensure their safe and smooth return, the Japanese side customized special transportation facilities and Chinese experts traveled to Japan before the pandas' departure to learn about their habits and breeding conditions. Both teams accompanied the pandas back to China. 为确保它们安全顺利返回，日方定制了特殊的运输设施，中国专家在大熊猫出发前前往日本了解它们的习性和饲养情况。两队人员陪同大熊猫返回中国。 The Chengdu base has arranged quarantine equipment, food and personnel to ensure the pandas adapt to their new surroundings quickly and complete the quarantine period smoothly. 成都基地已安排检疫设备、食物和人员，确保大熊猫快速适应新环境并顺利完成检疫期。 In 1994, China began cooperation on giant panda conservation with Adventure World amusement park, located in the coastal town of Shirahama in Japan's Wakayama Prefecture. The two countries have bred 17 cubs together and established the largest overseas artificial breeding population of giant pandas, known as the "Hin Family". 1994 年，中国开始与位于日本和歌山县白滨町沿海城镇的冒险世界游乐园开展大熊猫保护合作。两国共同繁育了 17 只幼崽，建立了最大的海外大熊猫人工繁育群体，被称为 “浜家族”。 Over the years, China and Japan have developed a solid partnership and achieved remarkable progress in panda conservation and breeding, cub care and disease treatment, scientific exchange and public education. 多年来，中日两国建立了坚实的合作伙伴关系，在大熊猫保护与繁育、幼崽照料与疾病治疗、科学交流和公众教育等方面取得了显著进展。 重点词汇giant pandas /ˈdʒaɪənt ˈpændəz/ 大熊猫 quarantine /ˈkwɔːrəntiːn/ 检疫 conservation /ˌkɑːnsərˈveɪʃn/ 保护 artificial breeding /ˌɑːrtɪˈfɪʃl ˈbriːdɪŋ/ 人工繁育

This week on Sinica, in a show taped in early June in Washington, Kaiser chats with Tong Zhao (赵通) of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a leading expert on Chinese nuclear doctrine, about why the PRC has, in recent years, significantly increased the size of its nuclear arsenal. Zhao offers a master class in the practice of strategic empathy.03:12 – China's nuclear doctrine: core principles06:56 – Xi Jinping's leadership and nuclear policy12:33 – Symbolism vs. strategy: Defensive or offensive buildup?16:55 – What's driving the nuclear expansion?28:33 – Trump's second term: Impact on China's strategic thinking34:34 – Nukes and Taiwan41:45 – Washington and Beijing nuclear doctrines perceptions48:04 - China's perspective on the Golden Dome program52:32 - China's Stance on North Korea's nuclear program 01:01:00 - Beijing's View on North Korean troops in UkrainePaying it forward: David Logan, at Tufts UniversityRecommendations:Tong: Yellowstone, TV series Kaiser: Gomorrah, TV series See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

From the tongue-tingling spice of Sichuan to the bold heat of Guizhou stir-fries, chili peppers have ignited Chinese cuisine with flavor, history, and regional pride. Join Takeaway Chinese to explore the culture behind Chinese chili peppers—and pick up some fiery new phrases along the way! On the show: Niu Honglin & Steve.(12:35) The many levels of spiciness in Chinese cuisine.(15:15) How spiciness differs around the country.

Yascha Mounk and Peter Hessler describe how China has changed over the last 30 years–and where it might go next. For more than a quarter of a century, Peter Hessler has been a staff writer for the New Yorker. In 1996, he joined the Peace Corps and taught English language and literature to college students in Fuling, a small city on the Yangtze River. In 2019, Hessler returned to China, teaching at Sichuan University during the pandemic. His most recent book, Other Rivers (2024), is about his time in Sichuan.  In this week's conversation, Yascha Mounk and Peter Hessler discuss Peter's experiences as a teacher in China in the 1990s and in recent years, how his students have changed, and what he thinks the United States could learn from China. Podcast production by Jack Shields and Leonora Barclay. Connect with us! ⁠Spotify⁠ | ⁠Apple⁠ | ⁠Google⁠ X: ⁠@Yascha_Mounk⁠ & ⁠@JoinPersuasion⁠ YouTube: ⁠Yascha Mounk⁠, ⁠Persuasion⁠ LinkedIn: ⁠Persuasion Community Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

What happens when two Pittsburgh food podcasters finally sit down for lunch? A little spice, a lot of laughter, and some deep conversation about what it really takes to make a podcast — from equipment quirks to sponsorship struggles to storytelling philosophies.In this episode, I share a meal with Doug Heilman of The Pittsburgh Dish and talk shop: podcasting styles, listener habits, and why we both keep showing up for the mic. We also talk about Marc Maron's influence (RIP WTF), how Doug's foodie journey began with a Chi-Chi's menu, and why I might need to start asking for help funding my internet bill.https://www.pittsburghdish.com/#

In 2014, the writer Christopher Beam published a humorous, heartwarming story in The New Republic about an unlikely team of American football enthusiasts in Chongqing who went on to defeat their archrivals in Shanghai to win a championship. The piece was optioned by Sony Pictures, and had some big names attached, but was ultimately never made — not, at least, by an American studio. Eleven years later, Chris has written about a film that was made: Clash, produced by iQiyi, hit theaters in China earlier this year and followed the Chongqing Dockers in the same story arc, but with important and telling differences. His new story was published in The Atlantic, and he talks to me about the Dockers and the long, strange story of the film that wasn't and the one that was.03:50 – The Meaning of Chinese YOLO05:33 – Chris's First Meeting With the Chongqing Team13:11 – Chris McLaurin's Background15:54 – American Football as a Symbol of Masculinity19:50 – The Failed Hollywood Adaptation25:34 – First Impressions of the Film31:55 – Bridging Perspectives: Can a Movie Speak To Both Sides?36:42 – A Lost Moment in GlobalizationPaying it Forward: Viola ZhouRecommendations: Chris: Rejection by Tony Tulathimutte (short story collection)Kaiser: Becoming Led Zeppelin (documentary); the Beijing-based artist Michael Cherney.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, I chat with Stephen Platt, historian at UMass Amherst and author, most recently, of the book The Raider: The Untold Story of a Renegade Marine and the Birth of U.S. Special Forces in World War II. Like his previous works, Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom and Imperial Twilight, it offers a compelling narrative history of an overlooked chapter through a deeply empathetic and well-researched examination of individual lives. Please make sure to listen to the excerpt from the audiobook at the end of this podcast.04:21 - Evans Carlson: A forgotten hero07:49 - The Real Carlson vs. the constructed Carlson10:04 - The book's origin12:20 - Carlson's ideological transformation16:50 - Carlson's religious beliefs and public perception20:04 - Emerson's influence on Carlson's thinking 23:46 - Inner conflicts: Soul-searching or regret?27:15 - Carlson's relationship with President Franklin D. Roosevelt30:39 - Gung Ho Meetings: meaning, practice, and legacy33:34 - Zhu De's influence on Carlson 40:28 - Carlson's relationships with Agnes Smedley and Edgar Snow47:49 - Hopes for U.S.-China alliance 51:57 - Carlson's death and his legacy 58:01 - Lessons from CarlsonPaying it Forward: Peter Thilly, Emily MokrosRecommendations: Stephen: 11.22.63 by Stephen King; Ted Chiang (author); Otoboke Beaver (band); Book of Mormon (musical)Kaiser: Wobbler (band); The Religion by Tim Willocks; Zappa (2020)See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, I chat with Jostein Hauge, political economist and an Assistant Professor in Development Studies at the University of Cambridge, based at the Centre of Development Studies and the Department of Politics and International Studies, and author of the book The Future of the Factory: How Megatrends are Changing Industrialization.3:09 – Self Introduction: Jostein Hauge4:23 – Anti-China Sentiment in Western Discourse7:40 – Misconceptions and Prevailing Narratives10:08 – Technological Transfer and the Political Economy12:18 – Historical Periods of Economic Rivalry 14:36 – Evolving Industrial Policy: From Japan's MITI to China and the U.S. today18:59 – China's Contemporary Industrial Policy: Quality or Quantity? 21:13 – China as a Rising Power: Is History Repeating?24:18 – The Sustainability of China's Industrial Policy 26:43 – China, Overcapacity, and Global Imbalances34:07 – Overcapacity: Economic Reality or Ideological Construct?36:04 – China's domination in the renewable energy market39:13 – China's greenhouse gas emissions43:17 – How China is reshaping the IP regime 48:14 – The U.S. national security stance and the trade war with China55:10 – Europe's approach to ChinaPaying it forward: Kyle Chan at High CapacityRecommendations:Jostein: The White Lotus (TV Series)Kaiser: The Raider: The Untold Story of a Renegade Marine and the Birth of U.S. Special Forces in World War II by Stephen R. PlattSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, I speak with Kendra Schaefer, the partner at Trivium China who heads their tech practice. She recently published a fascinating paper looking at the Cyberspace Administration of China's comprehensive database of generative AI tools released in China, and she shares the insights and big takeaways from her research on that database. It's a terrific window into what Chinese firms, both private and state-affiliated, are doing with generative AI.03:51 – Mandatory registration of generative AI Tools in China10:28 – How does the CAC categorize AI Tools?14:25 – State-affiliated vs. non-state-affiliated AI Tools18:55 – Capability and competition of China's AI Industry22:57 – Significance of Generative Algorithmic Tools (GAT) registration counts26:06 – The application of GATs in the education sector29:50 – The application of GATs in the healthcare Sector31:00 – Underrepresentation of AI tools in other sectors32:56 – Regional breakdown of AI innovation in China36:07 – AI adoption across sectors: how companies integrate AI40:21 – Standout projects by the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS)42:42 – How multinationals navigate China's tech regulations47:50 – Role of foreign players in China's AI strategy49:38 – Key takeaways from the AI development journey53:41 -– Blind spots in AI data57:25 – Kendra's future research directionPaying it Forward: Kenton Thibaut.Recommendations:Kendra: The Chinese Computer: A Global History of the Information Age by Thomas Mullaney.Kaiser: the Rhyming Chaos Podcast by Jeremy Goldkorn and Maria RepnikovaSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Jeremy Goldkorn joins for this largely unedited throwback to the early, sweary days of the show. We talk about the announcement made on Wednesday, 28 May 2025, on the "aggressive" revocation of Chinese student visas for students with Party "connections" or who study "critical fields." You've been warned!See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

  Last time we spoke about the Xi'an Incident. In December 1936, tensions in China erupted as Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek faced a revolt led by his commanders, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. Disillusioned by Chiang's focus on battling communists instead of the Japanese invaders, the generals swiftly captured him in a coup. Confined in Xi'an, Chiang initially resisted their demands for a united front against Japan but eventually engaged in negotiation with Zhang and the Chinese Communist Party. As public sentiment shifted against him, Chiang's predicament led to urgent discussions, culminating in an unexpected alliance with the communists. This pact aimed to consolidate Chinese resistance against Japanese aggression, marking a critical turning point in the Second Sino-Japanese War. By December 26, Chiang was released, and this uneasy collaboration set the stage for a more unified front against a common enemy, though underlying tensions remained between the factions.   #152 China Prepares for War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Before we jump into the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, which I honestly have no idea how long will take us, I thought it would be a good idea to dedicate two episodes to how both China and Japan prepared themselves for war.  Going all the way back to the 1910s, Chinese intellectuals began to view an outright conflict between Japan and China was inevitable. In the discussions about China's strategic options, Jiang Fangzhen pioneered a strategy of protracted warfare, a concept that would later shape China's approach during the Sino-Japanese War. Having studied in Japan during his youth, Jiang developed a keen understanding of the Japanese government and military. As early as 1917, he predicted that China and Japan would become embroiled in a long-term conflict, with the battleground likely to be west of the Peiping–Wuhan and Guangzhou–Wuhan railways. In his work titled "Guofang Lun" or “On National Defense”, Jiang reiterated the importance of protracted warfare as a means to thwart Japan's aspirations for a swift victory. He argued that China should leverage its vast population and extensive territory to extend the conflict, gradually wearing down Japanese strength and turning the situation to its advantage. Jiang recommended that China not focus on defending its coastal regions but instead confront the enemy west of the Peking–Wuhan Railway.   Chiang Kai-shek would eventually come to share Jiang's belief that “the longer the war drags on, the more advantageous it will be for China.” Despite significant public criticism, both the Nationalist government and General Zhang Xueliang, decided against military resistance when Japan invaded Manchuria in September 1931 and attacked Shanghai in 1932. Chiang was particularly hesitant to engage Japan directly, as he was also dealing with a Communist insurgency in central China. He feared that Chinese forces would suffer quick defeat, predicting that Japan would capture key coastal areas and critical infrastructure within just three days, crippling China by dismantling its military and economic lifelines. Following the invasion of North China Chiang was forced to adopt a firmer stance. The Nationalist government proposed a dual strategy of pursuing peace and security while simultaneously preparing for war. If peace proved impossible, China would mobilize its resources for ultimate victory through prolonged conflict. This approach was formalized in the National Defense Plan, which China adopted by prioritizing protracted warfare as its core strategy. After the Sino-Japanese clash in Shanghai on January 28, 1932, the Military Affairs Commission devised a plan that divided China into four defense areas along with a preparation area. While some troops were assigned local security, commanders were directed to concentrate their remaining forces for potential confrontations with Japan. That year, the Military Affairs Commission issued General Defense Guidelines that outlined two strategic responses to a potential Japanese invasion. The first, conservative approach focused on maintaining key positions and utilizing protracted warfare to impede the enemy. The second strategy advocated for decisive battles in key regions to thwart Japan's ambitions and protect China's territorial integrity, prioritizing disengagement from Japanese forces along the Yangtze River and coastline. In August 1935, German military adviser General Alexander von Falkenhausen provided recommendations to Chiang Kai-shek based on his predictions of Japanese advance routes into China. He identified three main routes: one from northern Hebei to Zhengzhou, the second from Shandong toward Xuzhou, and the third crossing the Yangtze River to Nanjing and onwards to Wuhan. He suggested treating the Yangtze River as the primary combat zone and highlighted Sichuan as a possible retreat area. Taking all of this into consideration. in 1936, a draft of a new National Defense Plan divided the country into four zones: a war zone, a defense zone, an internal security zone, and a preparation area. The war zone encompassed ten provinces and established strategies for retreating to predetermined defensive positions when necessary, with Sichuan designated as the main base for the war. In January 1937, the Chinese General Staff Department introduced its annual War Plan, outlining three possible military conflict regions between China and Japan. It proposed two main strategies: Proposal A emphasized sustained combat and retreat to fortified positions if the situation became unfavorable, aiming to eventually go on the offensive against Japan. Proposal B focused on repelling Japanese invasions along the coast and from the north, prioritizing counter offensives against Japanese units stationed near key locations. To prepare, the NRA completed several critical projects outlined in its plans, establishing military supply depots in Nanjing, Bengbu, Xinyang, Huayin, Nanchang, and Wuchang to manage logistics for supplies across various strategic railways. These depots were equipped to sustain the military, with ample ammunition and provisions, including 60 million rounds of small-arms ammunition and food for hundreds of thousands. Despite these preparations, not all projects were completed by the time war broke out in July 1937. In contrast to the Japanese military's tactics, Chinese forces prioritized defensive strategies. For example, at the Mount Lushan Military Officer Training Camp in July 1934, Chiang Kai-shek outlined four possible approaches against Japan, favoring a defense-as-offense strategy. Other options included building fortifications, tenaciously defending key positions, and employing guerrilla warfare through irregular forces to constrain enemy advances. Chiang stressed the importance of national mobilization for the war effort.  There was a significant disparity in equipment between the Japanese and Chinese armies. To give you an idea, each Japanese division included a mechanized group featuring thirty-nine light military vehicles and 21 light armored cars, supplemented by 6,000–7,000 horses, 200–300 automobiles, and specialized troops such as poison gas teams. In contrast, Nationalist divisions lacked any of these capabilities, a typical nationalist division theoretically had an armored regiment, but this unit was equipped with fewer than 72 armored vehicles. Another major weakness of the Nationalist forces was their insufficient artillery. In 1936, a division was officially assigned one artillery battalion, which was divided into three batteries totaling twelve guns. It also included a mechanized cannon company with four direct-fire weapons. By comparison, a Japanese division boasted four infantry regiments and one mountain artillery or field artillery regiment, with each artillery regiment comprising three field artillery battalions and one howitzer battalion. The infantry regiment itself included a mountain artillery section with four mountain guns, while the infantry battalion had one Type 70 mountain gun section with two guns. In total, a Japanese division possessed sixty-four artillery pieces of various calibers, four times the number of a Chinese division and of significantly higher quality. In reality, in 1936, twelve of the twenty elite Chinese “reformed divisions” still lacked artillery battalions. The ordnance available in the “reformed divisions” mostly consisted of the outdated Type 60 mountain gun. Nationwide, very few of the 200 divisions were equipped with any artillery, and those that did often used obsolete field artillery pieces or mountain artillery provided to local forces. Some units even relied on trench mortars as a makeshift solution. The artillery weapons came from various countries, but they frequently lacked necessary observation and signal components, and were often low on ammunition. The majority of mountain guns and field artillery were of the Type 75, which, while capable of providing fire support, had limited range and inflicted minimal damage. To give you an idea of the striking inadequacy of the Chinese artillery, during the Shanghai fighting in 1937, the mountain artillery of the Guangxi 21st Army Group could only reach targets within 1,200 yards, while Japanese field artillery had an effective range of 8,000 yards. Chinese-made mountain artillery suffered due to inferior steel-making technology; the gun shields were constructed from low-quality steel, and the barrels often overheated after firing just a few rounds, increasing the risk of explosions. Additionally, the equipment of local forces varied greatly in quality. In fact, some local units had superior equipment compared to Nationalist units. For example, before the Sino-Japanese War, troops from Yunnan were equipped with French antitank guns and heavy machine guns, which were better than the German water-cooled machine guns used by the Nationalist forces. However, the majority of local troops relied on inferior equipment; the 122nd Division under Wang Mingzhang from Sichuan, noted for its brave defense of Tengxian County during the Xuzhou Battle, was armed with locally produced light and heavy machine guns that frequently malfunctioned, and their Type 79 rifles, also made in Sichuan, were often outdated, with some dating back to the Qing Dynasty. These weapons had limited range and sometimes malfunctioned after fewer than one hundred rounds. Now before the war, both Nationalist and local forces acquired weaponry from diverse foreign and domestic sources. Even domestically produced weapons lacked standardization, with those made in Hanyang and Manchuria differing in design and specifications. Arms manufactured in Germany, France, Russia, Japan, and Italy were similarly inconsistent. Consequently, even within a single unit, the lack of uniformity created significant logistical challenges, undermining combat effectiveness, particularly in the early stages of the war. Despite Nationalist ordnance factories producing over three million rounds of small-arms ammunition daily, the incompatibility of ammunition and weapons diminished the usable quantity of ammunition. Chinese communications infrastructure was inadequate. In the Nationalist army, signal units were integrated into engineering units, leading to low-quality radio communications. In emergencies, telegrams could remain undelivered for days, and orders often had to be dispatched via postal services. By 1937, the entire country boasted only 3,000 military vehicles, necessitating heavy reliance on horses and mules for transport. To effectively equip twenty Nationalist divisions, 10,647 horses and 20,688 mules were needed, but by the end of 1935, only 6,206 horses and 4,351 mules were available. A statistic from 1936 indicated a 5 percent mortality rate among military horses, with some units experiencing a rate as high as 10 percent. The distribution of weaponry led to disputes during army reorganization efforts following the Northern Expedition. Although Chiang Kai-shek's forces were part of the regular army, the quality of their equipment varied significantly. Domestic production of weapons was limited, and imports could not close the gap. Priority was given to small arms; through army reorganization, Chiang aimed to diminish the influence of forces less loyal to him. Nationalist army staff officers observed that troops loyal to Chiang received the best weapons. Northwest and Northeast forces, having cultivated good relations with the KMT, were similarly better equipped, while Shanxi troops received inferior supplies. Troops associated with the Guangxi Clique were given even poorer quality weapons due to their leaders' stronger political ambitions. Troops regarded as “bandit forces,” such as those led by Shi Yousan, Li Hongchang, and Sun Dianying, were naturally assigned the least effective weaponry. This unequal distribution of arms increased some local forces' inclination to align with the KMT while alienating others, which inadvertently led to additional turmoil in the aftermath of the Northern Expedition. Logistical accounting within the Nationalist military was severely lacking. Military expenditures accounted for a significant portion of government spending, roughly 65.48 % in 1937, with personnel costs being the largest component. However, military units prioritized boosting their own resources over accurate accounting. Surpluses were not returned but rather utilized to reward military officers and soldiers for merits in battle, care for the wounded, or to create a reserve. Conversely, if deficits arose, troops would resort to “living off vacancies,” a practice in which they would fail to report desertions promptly and would falsely claim new soldiers had arrived. Military leaders typically appointed their most trusted subordinates to serve as accountants and logistic officers. As the war commenced, these issues became readily apparent. During the Battle of Shanghai in 1937, frontline soldiers sometimes went days without food and went months without pay. Wounded soldiers and civilians had to search tirelessly for medical treatment, and when main forces relocated, they often abandoned grain, ammunition, weapons, and petroleum along the way. General Chen Cheng, the commander in chief during the Battle of Shanghai, noted, “This phenomenon clearly revealed our inability to supply frontline troops, indicating that China remains a backward country with poor management.” Many logistical shortcomings severely impacted troop morale and combat effectiveness. In a 1933 speech, Chiang Kai-shek acknowledged that poor food, inadequate clothing, and ineffective logistics contributed to widespread desertion. Soldiers were further demoralized by reduced or embezzled salaries. A lack of professional medical staff and equipment hampered healthcare efforts, leading to high disease and mortality rates. According to official statistics from 1936, approximately 10 percent of soldiers fell ill annually, with a mortality rate as high as 5 percent. Japanese military authorities reported that one in three wounded Japanese soldiers died, while a Dutch military officer present during the early stages of the Sino-Japanese War observed that one in every two wounded Nationalist soldiers perished. Due to inadequate equipment and limited transport options, Nationalist forces were compelled to recruit farmers and rent vehicles, as they lacked essential facilities such as tents. This reliance on local resources inevitably led to frequent conflicts between military personnel and civilians. China is clearly a vast nation with an extensive coastline, requiring the construction of several significant fortresses during the modern era. These included Wusong, Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Jiangning, and Wuhan along the Yangtze River, as well as Zhenhai, Humen, and Changzhou along the seacoast. Except for the Wuhan fortress, built in 1929-1930, all other fortifications were established during the late Qing Dynasty and featured uncovered cannon batteries. These fortresses suffered from inadequate maintenance, and many of their components had become outdated and irreplaceable, rendering them militarily negligible. Following the January 1932 Shanghai Incident, the Japanese military destroyed the Wusong forts, leaving the entrance to the Yangtze River completely unfortified. Consequently, there were no defenses along the coastline from Jiangsu to Shandong, allowing the Japanese to land freely. In December 1932, the Military Affairs Commission established a fortress group tasked with constructing fortresses and defensive installations, seeking assistance from German military advisers. After the North China Incident in 1935, the Nationalist government accelerated the construction of defensive structures in line with national war planning, focusing particularly on Nanjing. The Nationalists prioritized building fortifications along the seacoast and the Yellow River, followed by key regions north of the Yellow River. The government also ordered a significant quantity of heavy artillery from Germany. This included several dozen pieces of flat-fire antiaircraft and dual-purpose heavy artillery, which were installed at fortifications in Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Nanjing, and Wuhan. By the summer of 1937, the construction of nine fortified positions was complete: Nanjing, Zhenjiang, Jiangyin, Ningbo, Humen, Mawei, Xiamen , Nantong, and Lianyungang. In total, China had established 41 forts and equipped them with 273 fortress cannons. Some defensive installations were poorly managed, with many units assigned to their perimeters lacking training and access to proper maps. The barbette positions in the fortresses were not well concealed and could hardly store sufficient ammunition. Troops stationed at these fortresses received little training. Despite these shortcomings, the fortresses and fortifications were not entirely ineffective. They bolstered Chinese positions along the defense line stretching from Cangxian County to Baoding and from Dexian County to Shijiazhuang, as well as in southern Shandong.  Before the war, China's political and economic center was situated along the seacoast and the Yangtze River. As Japanese influence expanded, the Nationalist government was compelled to establish bases in China's inner regions, very similar to how the USSR pulled back its industry further west after Operation barbarossa.The Japanese attack on Shanghai in 1932 prompted the Nationalists to relocate their capital to Luoyang. On March 5, during the Second Plenary Session of the KMT's Fourth Congress, the Western Capital Preparation Committee was formed to plan for the potential relocation of all governmental bodies to Xi'an in the event of full-scale war. In February 1933, the Central Political Conference approved the Northwest Development Bill, and in February 1934, the National Economic Commission set up a northwestern branch to oversee development projects in the region. On October 18, 1934, Chiang Kai-shek traveled to Lanzhou, recording in his diary that “Northwest China has abundant resources. Japan and Russia are poised to bully us. Yet, if we strengthen ourselves and develop northwest China to the fullest extent, we can turn it into a base for China's revival.” Interestingly, it was Sichuan, rather than the northwest, that became China's rear base during the 2nd Sino-Japanese War. In October 1934, the Communist army evacuated its Soviet base in southern China, initiating the Long March that would ultimately end in the northwest. By this time, Chiang Kai-shek had decided to designate Sichuan as the last stronghold for China. In January 1935, the Nanchang Field Headquarters of the Military Affairs Commission, responsible for combatting the Communists and serving as the supreme military and political authority over most provinces along the Yangtze River and central China, dispatched a special advisory group to Chongqing. Following this, the Nationalist army advanced into Sichuan. On February 10, the Nationalists appointed a new provincial government in Sichuan, effectively ending the province's long-standing regionalism. On March 2, Chiang traveled to Chongqing, where he delivered a speech underscoring that “Sichuan should serve as the base for China's revival.” He stated that he was in Sichuan to oversee efforts against the Communist army and to unify the provincial administration.  After the Xinhai revolution, the Republic of China was still suing the Qing Dynasty's conscription system. However, once in power, the Nationalist government sought to establish a national military service program. In 1933, it enacted a military service law, which began implementation in 1936. This law categorized military service into two branches: service in the Nationalist army and in territorial citizen army units. Men aged eighteen to forty-five were expected to serve in the territorial units if they did not enlist in the Nationalist army. The territorial service was structured into three phases: active service lasting two to three years, first reserves for six years, and second reserves until the age of forty-five. The Ministry of Military Affairs divided China into sixty divisional conscription headquarters, initially establishing these headquarters in the six provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, and Hubei. By December 1936, approximately 50,000 new soldiers had been drafted. The military service law disproportionately favored the middle and upper classes. Government personnel were exempt from enlistment, allowing privileged families to register their children with government agencies. Similarly, students in middle and higher education were excused from service, while youth from poorer backgrounds often felt compelled to enlist due to financial constraints that limited their educational opportunities. Village and town leaders were responsible for executing the recruitment process and frequently conspired with army recruiters. Recruitment principles often favored wealthier families, with guidelines stating that one son should be drafted for every three sons, two for five sons, but no drafts if there was only one son. Wealthy families could secure exemptions for all their male children, while poor families might see their only son conscripted if they were unable to provide the requisite bribe. Town and village heads wielded significant power in recruitment. This new recruitment system also created numerous money-making opportunities. Military personnel assigned to escort draftees to their units would often allow draftees to escape for a fee. Additionally, draftees could monetize their service by agreeing to serve as substitutes for others. For some, being drafted became an occupation. For example, in 1936, 600 individuals were drafted in the Wuhu area of Anhui province, and accounts from regional administrators indicated that every draftee had either been traded, replaced, or seized. Beginning in 1929, the Nationalist government also instituted military training for high school students and older individuals. Students were required to participate in one theoretical class and one practical class each week, totaling three hours. Starting in 1934, students had to complete a three-month military training program before graduating. Graduates of military academies were employed as military instructors. By the end of 1936, over 237,000 high school students had undergone military training. This student military training was overseen by the Society for the Implementation of the Three People's Principles of Sun Yat-sen, which also provided political education and sometimes gathered information on students' political beliefs.  Although the Nationalists made significant efforts to improve the military training of both officers and troops, they inherited deep-seated challenges that they were unable to completely overcome. A lack of facilities, outdated training manuals, low regard for military instructors, and the ongoing influence of regionalism and warlordism hindered progress. The Japanese would also later exploit these shortcomings of the Nationalist army. The Central Military Academy, which evolved from the Whampoa Military Academy established in 1923 in Guangzhou to train officers for the Northern Expedition, became the primary training institution for junior military officers. The academy offered a basic course, lasting eighteen months, which included general education, specialized training in various subjects, and field practice. This was followed by a two-year cadet training program focused on developing the skills necessary for junior military officers. Seventeen classes were admitted before the outbreak of war. Admission to the academy was highly competitive, with military officers receiving attractive salaries. For instance, in 1935, the academy received 10,000 applications for the twelfth class, but only 7% were accepted. Upon graduation, cadets were typically assigned to divisions within the Nationalist army loyal to Chiang Kai-shek. Their training, influenced by German advisors, resulted in a high-quality cadre. In modern China, most sergeants were veterans. While some units provided training for sergeants, a lack of formal education led to their diminished status. Truly qualified sergeants were rare. During his tenure as Minister of Military Training, General Bai Chongxi proposed establishing a sergeant school and creating a professional noncommissioned officer system; however, the Ministry of Military Affairs opposed this on financial grounds. While commanding officers enjoyed rapid promotions, military instructors did not. Furthermore, there was no system for transferring instructors to field commands or assigning commanders to military academies for extended periods. Despite minor updates to cover modern warfare concepts such as tank warfare and machine guns, Qing Dynasty military manuals were still in use at the Central Military Academy at the start of the war. Yeah, 1937 they were still rocking the old Qing books. Following the establishment of the Ministry of Military Training, a bureau for military translation was set up to evaluate existing course materials and translate military manuals, but its contributions were limited. Another significant shortcoming of military instruction focused on theory at the expense of practical application.  To enhance the quality of military officers, the Nationalist army instituted specialized schools for artillery, infantry, transport, engineering, and signals starting in 1931. These institutions were considered to have high-quality administrators and facilities. The Nationalists adopted German military training models, replacing the previously used Japanese models. They appointed German advisors to oversee instructor training at military academies and established three instructional divisions. By the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, 15,000 students had graduated from programs with a German military influence, resulting in the creation of about fifty combat divisions from these instructional units. However, the progress of other Nationalist army units was limited because their training was not aligned with contemporary battlefield realities. Before World War I, troops operated in close formations due to limited firepower. The widespread introduction of machine guns after World War I necessitated a shift to dispersed formations. Although a new drill manual issued by the Ministry of Military Training in 1935 introduced small-group tactics, few units adopted these methods. General Chen Cheng highlighted another underlying issue in 1938, commenting on the outmoded focus on parade ground drills and formal military manners. He noted, “We have paid too much attention to stereotypical formality and procedures of no practical use. Sometimes, even though soldiers could not get a haircut or take a bath for several months, their camps had to be in order. They underwent intensive training in close-order drill but learned little about gun handling, marksmanship, or maneuvering. This was inappropriate in peacetime, yet we continued this practice even after the Sino-Japanese War started, even using it on highly educated youth.” In contrast, the Communist army simplified training, emphasizing two essential skills: live-fire exercises and physical endurance, which significantly enhanced troop effectiveness in the challenging terrain characteristic of the Sino-Japanese War. Ultimately, the Nationalist army's training did not reach all soldiers. Only about half of all combat soldiers received adequate training, while the rest were neglected. According to statistics from the time, there were approximately five million military personnel during the Sino-Japanese War, with three million serving in logistics. Most of these logistics personnel had received little training, leading to disastrous consequences for overall combat effectiveness. As warfare has become more complex, the role of highly trained staff officers has become increasingly important. Napoleon developed operational plans close to the front and communicated orders via courier. During World War I, military commanders collected information at their headquarters and utilized telephones and automobiles to relay orders to the front lines. In World War II, with the battlefield expanding to include land, sea, and air, senior commanders often made decisions from headquarters far from the action, relying on a significant number of staff officers with specialized skills to keep them informed. In China, however, the staff officer system was underdeveloped. By 1937, only about 2,000 commanders and staff officers had received training. Prior to the Sino-Japanese War, most commanders managed staff work themselves, with staff officers serving primarily as military secretaries who drafted orders, reports, and maps. Many staff officers had no formal military training, and as a whole, the branch lacked respect, causing the most talented officers to avoid serving in it. The situation was even more dire for staff officer departments within local forces. For example, in March 1937, Liu Ziqing, a graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy, was appointed as the director of political instruction in the Forty-fourth Army, a unit under Sichuan warlord Liu Xiang. Liu Ziqing's account illustrates the dysfunction within the ranks: “The commander in chief was not supposed to manage the army and even did not know its whereabouts... But he could appoint relatives and former subordinates—who were officials and businessmen as well—to the army. Each month they would receive a small stipend. At headquarters, there was a long table and two rows of chairs. Around ten o'clock in the morning, senior officers signed in to indicate their presence. Those with other business would leave, while the remaining officers sat down to leisurely discuss star actresses, fortune-telling, business projects, mah-jongg, and opium. Occasionally they would touch on national affairs, chat about news articles, or share local gossip. In the afternoons, they primarily played mah-jongg, held banquets, and visited madams. Most mornings, the commander usually presided over these activities, and at first, I reported for duty as well. But I soon realized it was a waste of time and came very rarely. At headquarters, most staff members wore long gowns or Western-style suits, while military uniforms were a rare sight.” Most senior military personnel were trained at the Baoding Military Academy during the early republic. 2/3rds of commanders in chief, 37 %of army commanders, and 20 % of division commanders were Baoding graduates. Higher-ranking officers were more likely to have launched their careers there. In contrast, only 10 % of division commanders and a few army commanders were graduates of the Whampoa Military Academy. Additionally, commanders trained in local military schools and those with combat experience accounted for 1/3rd of all commanders. While the prevalence of civil war provided opportunities for rapid promotion, it also hindered officers' ability to update their training or gain experience in different military branches. German advisors expressed their concerns to Chiang Kai-shek, emphasizing that officers should first serve in junior roles before taking command. During one battle in 1938, Chiang noted, “Our commanders in chief are equivalent only to our enemy's regiment commanders, and our army and division commanders are only as competent as our enemy's battalion and company commanders.” Despite not viewing high-ranking Japanese officers as great strategists, Nationalist officers respected them as highly competent, diligent, and professional commanders who rarely made critical errors. The infantry was the primary component of the Nationalist army, with middle and junior infantry officers constituting over 80 %of all army officers. A 1936 registry of military officers listed 1,105 colonels and 2,159 lieutenant colonels within the infantry, demonstrating a significant outnumbering of Baoding graduates at ranks below lieutenant colonel. However, the quality of middle and junior infantry officers declined during the Sino-Japanese War; by 1944, only 27.3 % of these officers were from formal military academies, while those promoted from the ranks increased to 28.1 %. In 1937, 80 % of officers in an ordinary infantry battalion were military academy graduates, but this percentage dropped to 20 % during the war. Its hard to tell how educated soldiers were before the war, but it is generally believed that most were illiterate. In 1929, sociologist Tao Menghe surveyed 946 soldiers from a Shanxi garrison brigade and found that only 13 percent could compose a letter independently, while the rest had either never learned to read or were unable to write. In contrast, in August 1938, General Feng Yuxiang found that 80 percent of a regiment in Hunan were literate. Regardless, during the Sino-Japanese War, the quality of recruits steadily declined. More than 90 percent of soldiers were illiterate, and few possessed any basic scientific knowledge, which hindered their ability to master their weapons. On the battlefield, they heavily relied on middle and junior officers for guidance.  In autumn 1933, General Hans von Seeckt, the architect of the post World War I German army, visited China at the personal invitation of Chiang Kai-shek. In his recommendations for military reform, he identified China's greatest problem as its excessively large forces drawn from diverse backgrounds. He stated, “At present, the most pressing goal is to... establish a small, well-equipped army with high morale and combat effectiveness to replace the numerous poorly armed and trained forces.” He suggested forming an army of sixty divisions and recommended the establishment of a training regiment for military officers to equip them with the skills needed for modern warfare. Chiang Kai-shek accepted von Seeckt's proposals, and on January 26, 1935, he convened a National Military Reorganization Conference in Nanjing. On March 1, the Army Reorganization Bureau was established in Wuchang, under the leadership of General Chen Cheng. In the same month, General Alexander von Falkenhausen took charge of the German Military Advisors Group. Before war broke out, around nineteen divisions, roughly 300,000 troops received training from German advisors and were equipped with German-style weapons. At the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, the forces stemming from the First Army of the National Revolutionary Army and the Whampoa cadets, who had fought in the Northern Expedition, held the highest reputation and were referred to as the “core central forces” by the Japanese. Other notable forces included the Guangxi Army, Northwestern Army, Northeastern Army, some Uyghur units, the Guangdong Army, and the Shanxi Army. In contrast, provincial forces such as the Yunnan Army and Sichuan Army were viewed less favorably. Nationalist forces were generally far inferior to those of the Japanese enemy. In 1937, General He Yingqin noted that Nationalist forces had failed to prevail in 1932 and 1933, even when outnumbering the Japanese by 4-1.  In November 1937, during a national defense conference, Chiang Kai-shek stated, "In recent years we have worked hard, prepared actively, and achieved national unification. By the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, we were in a better domestic situation and had improved military preparedness compared to before. Since 1935, our strength has doubled. It increased by more than two to three times since January 1932 or September 1931 [when Japan attacked Shanghai and Mukden]. If peace had been achievable, we should have delayed the war for two or three years. Given an additional three years, our defensive capabilities would have been drastically different... Now, if we merely compare the military strength of China and Japan, we are certainly inferior." However, such assessments were overly optimistic, as Chiang failed to recognize that Japan's military capabilities would not have stagnated. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek certainly was dealt a difficult hand of cards for the upcoming poker match he was to play. Yet the Chinese were resilient and they had to be for the absolute horror that would be inflicted upon them from 1937-1945. Until this point, their enemies had been far more lenient, the Empire of Japan would show no mercy.

In this episode of Wonderland On Points, we're joined AGAIN by our favorite surgeon, Kelly from @pointsandmilesdoc to talk about her recent trip to China—an incredible journey through a country rich in history, culture, and food. Kelly shares how she flew first and business class using points, and how award redemptions helped her save big on domestic flights as she traveled between major cities and scenic regions.We explore her itinerary across Shanghai, Hangzhou, Lijiang, and Chengdu, from high tea on the Bund to hiking historic trails, biking around ancient lakes, and tasting bold Sichuan flavors on a food tour. She also highlights unique hotel stays, including China's Aman properties—luxury experiences that, while not bookable with points, can be a smart way to earn them. We also dive into other options on places to stay if you DO want to use points!Whether you're planning your first trip to China or looking for new ways to explore it, this episode is full of tips for stretching your points and creating a five-star experience at a fraction of the price.Submit Your Summer Roadtrip Series Story HEREFacebook Group | Support the Show: Buy Us A CoffeeFind Us On InstagramMary Ellen | Jo | KellyMentioned in this Episode@TrippingonpointsAffiliate Links30% off the CardPointers subscription!Mary Ellen's Chase Sapphire Preferred LinkJo's Chase Sapphire Preferred LinkSign up for the Daily Drop NewsletterCredit Card Affiliate LinksThe above link includes referrals for almost all travel cards (AMEX, CapitalOne, co-branded cards)If you need Chase links please reach out! We would be happy to send you our personal referral links or the Daily Drop newsletter link that will allow you to access our affiliate links.We receive a small commission when you use our links. This is an amazing way to show your support for the show at no cost to you ❤️

A bonus episode this week. On May 22, I moderated a panel organized by Vita Golod and the UNC Center for Slavic, Eurasian, and East European Studies. The focus was on the U.S.-Ukraine Mineral Security Partnership, and it features Ivan Us, Chief Consultant at the Center for Foreign Policy at the National Institute for Strategic Studies; Jim Mullinax, a Senior Foreign Service Officer and former Consul General at the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu (closed in 2020); Grzegorz Stec, Senior Analyst and Head of the Brussels Office at MERICS; and Xu Qinduo, journalist at CGTN and Senior Fellow at the Pangoal Institution. The panel explores the background and the implications of the minerals deal, signed on May 1, 2025, for the ongoing war in Ukraine, and prospects for post-war reconstruction. I hope you enjoy what I thought was a fascinating conversation.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, I chat with Eva Dou, technology reporter for the Washington Post, about her terrific new book about Huawei. From its prehistory to its fight for its life under tremendous U.S. pressure, she tells its story in a way that's both deeply engaging and very evenhanded. 04:53 – Meng Wanzhou's case and its impact on media interest in Huawei07:13 – How did Ren Zhengfei's experiences in the PLA shape the corporate culture of Huawei?10:21 – The impact of his father on Ren Zhengfei 13:42 – Women in Huawei's leadership and Sun Yafang as a chairwoman 18:41 – Is Huawei a tool of the state?23:21 – Edward Snowden's revelations and how they influenced the perception of Huawei 26:34 – The Cisco lawsuit influence on the company's approach to foreign markets 28:07 – Reasons for Huawei working with embargoed or sanctioned states30:46 – Huawei's international expansion 33:04 – Huawei's management style and internal competition 36:33 – Meng Wenzhou's detainment as a turning point for Huawei and China-U.S. relations38:09 – Ren Zhengfei's media campaign and narrative shift after the Meng affair40:44 – Huawei's involvement in Xinjiang's surveillance 43:09 – Huawei's success in shaping 5G standards despite global pushback46:27 – The “Huawei index”: tracking Chinese investment abroad through Huawei's market presence48:35 – Huawei's push into chip development amid sanctions: real progress or just hype?52:23 – Huawei: a proxy, a leading or lagging indicator, or just a bellwether?54:11 – Huawei's “too big to fail” status: benefits and risks amid U.S. government pressure56:29 – Huawei's perspective on the backlash from sanctions58:19 – Concluding question: about Huawei's ownership and governancePaying it forward: Raffaele Huang at The Wall Street JournalRecommendations: Eva: The Party's Interests Come First by Joseph Torigian; Yang Jie at The Wall Street Journal; Piranesi by Susanna ClarkeKaiser: Adolescence on Netflix; Kyle Chan's high-capacity.com See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

  Last time we spoke about the February 26th incident. Within the turbulent “ government of assassination” period of 1936 Japan, a faction of discontented junior officers, known as the Kodoha, believed that their emperor, Hirohito, was being manipulated by corrupt politicians. In a desperate bid for what they termed a "Showa Restoration," they meticulously plotted a coup d'état. On February 26, they launched a rebellion in Tokyo, attempting to assassinate key figures they deemed responsible for undermining the emperor's authority. The young officers executed coordinated attacks on prominent leaders, resulting in several deaths, while hoping to seize control of the Imperial Palace. However, their plan unraveled when their actions met with unexpected resistance, and they failed to secure strategic locations. Dark snow blanketed the city as Hirohito, outraged by the violence, quickly moved to suppress the uprising, which ultimately led to the downfall of the Kodoha faction and solidified the military's grip on power, ushering in a new era marked by militarism and radicalism.   #151 The Suiyuan Operation Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So we last left off with the February 26th incident breaking out in Japan, but now I would like to return to China. Now we spoke a little bit about some influential Japanese politicians in the previous episode. Prime Minister Satio Makoto oversaw Japan from May 1932 to July 1934, succeeded by Prime Minister Keisuke Okada from July 1934 to March 1936. The foreign policy of Japan towards China during the Saitō and Okada administrations exhibited a notable paradox, characterized by two conflicting elements. On one hand, Foreign Minister Hirota championed a diplomatic approach that emphasized friendship, cooperation, and accommodation with China. On the other hand, the military actively undermined the authority of the Nationalist government in northern China, creating a significant rift between diplomatic rhetoric and military action.    The Okada cabinet then endorsed the Army Ministry's "Outline of Policy to Deal with North China" on January 13, 1936. This policy document explicitly proposed the eventual detachment of five provinces, Hubei, Chahar, Shanxi, Suiyuan, and Shandong from the Nationalist government in Nanking. The approval of this outline marked a pivotal moment, as it represented the first official government endorsement of the military's longstanding agenda and underscored the army's evolution from a mere rogue entity operating in the region to the de facto authority dictating the course of Japan's policy towards China. Despite this, on January 22, during the 68th Diet session, Hirota reaffirmed his dedication to fostering better ties with China, to which a representative from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded positively. The Nationalist government in Nanjing also expressed interest in engaging in formal negotiations. However, this diplomatic initiative quickly faltered, and the expected discussions in Nanjing never took place. Shortly thereafter, a mutiny by young army officers on February 26, 1936, led to the fall of the Okada cabinet. Following Prince Konoe Fumimaro's refusal of the imperial mandate to form a new government, Hirota stepped in to establish a cabinet on March 9. General Terauchi Hisaichi was appointed as the Minister of the Army, Admiral Nagano Osami took charge of the Navy Ministry, and Baba Eiichi became the finance minister. Hirota briefly served as foreign minister until Arita Hachirö, who had just submitted his credentials as ambassador to China on March 6, returned to Japan. The Hirota Koki cabinet, established immediately following the February 26 incident further entrenched military influence in politics while allowing interservice rivalries to impede national objectives. In May 1936, Hirota, influenced by army and navy ministers, reinstated the practice of appointing military ministers solely from the ranks of high-ranking active-duty officers. He believed this would prevent associations with the discredited Imperial Way faction from regaining power. By narrowing the candidate pool and enhancing the army's power relative to the prime minister, Hirota's decision set the stage for army leaders to leverage this advantage to overthrow Admiral Yonai's cabinet in July 1940. Arita began his new job by meeting with Foreign Minister Chang Chen while hearing views from the Kwantung Army chief of staff General, Itagaki Seishiro. Yes, our old friend received a lot of promotions. Itagaki had this to say about the Kwantung Army's policy in China "The primary aim of Japan's foreign policy, is the sound development of Manchukuo based upon the principle of the indivisibility of Japan and Manchukuo. If, as is probable, the existing situation continues, Japan is destined sooner or later to clash with the Soviet Union, and the attitude of China at that time will gravely influence operations [against the Soviet Union]." The Kwantung Army's was growing more and more nervous about the USSR following its 7th comintern congress held in July and August of 1935. There it publicly designated Japan, Germany and Poland as its main targets of comintern actions. Japanese intelligence in the Red Army also knew the Soviets were gradually planning to expand the military strength so they could face a simultaneous west and east front war. This was further emboldened by the latest USSR 5 year plan. Alongside the growing Red northern menace, the CCP issued on August 1st a declaration calling upon the Nationalist Government to end their civil war so they could oppose Japan. By this time the CCP was reaching the end of its Long March and organizing a new base of operations in Yenan in northern Shanxi. The developments by the USSR and CCP had a profound effect on Japan's foreign policy in China. The Kwantung Army believed a war with the USSR was imminent and began to concentrate its main force along the border of Manchukuo. The Kwantung Army's plan in the case of war was to seize Vladivostok while advancing motorized units towards Ulan Bator in Outer Mongolia, hoping to threaten the Trans-Siberian Railway near Lake Baikal. Their intelligence indicated the USSR could muster a maximum of 250,000 troops in eastern Siberia and that Japan could deal with them with a force two-thirds of that number. The IJA at that point had inferior air forces and armaments, thus urgent funding was needed. The Kwantung Army proposed that forces in the home islands should be reduced greatly so all could be concentrated in Manchuria. To increase funding so Kwantung leadership proposed doing away with special allowances for Japanese officials in Manchuria and reorganizing the Japanese economic structure. The Kwantung leaders also knew the submarine base at Vladivostok posed a threat to Japanese shipping so the IJN would have to participate, especially against ports and airfields. All said and done, the Kwantung Army planned for a war set in 1941 and advised immediate preparations. On July 23, 1936, Kanji Ishiwara presented the army's document titled “Request Concerning the Development of Industries in Preparation for War” to the Army Ministry. He asserted that in order to prepare for potential conflict with the Soviet Union, Japan, Manchukuo, and North China must have the industries critical for war fully developed by 1941. Ishiwara emphasized the urgent need for rapid industrial growth, particularly in Manchukuo. He followed this request on July 29 with a draft of a “Policy on Preparations for War” regarding the Soviet Union, advocating for immediate reforms to Japan's political and economic systems to facilitate economic expansion and lay the groundwork for future fundamental changes. However, he cautioned that if significant turmoil erupted in economic sectors, Japan must be ready to execute a comprehensive overhaul without delay. At the same time, the Hirota cabinet initiated a review of its policy towards China. In the spring of 1936, a secret committee focused on the Current Situation was formed, consisting of officials from the Army, Navy, and Foreign ministries. Their discussions led to the adoption of the "Measures to Implement Policy toward China" by the Four Ministers Conference on August 11, along with the "Second Outline of Policy to Address North China," which the cabinet approved as part of the "Fundamentals of National Policy" on the same day. The first of these documents outlined the following actionable steps: “1. Conclusion of an anti-Communist military pact. a) To prepare for the conclusion of such a pact, a special secret committee of military experts from both countries should be organized. b) Their discussions should cover the scope and substance of the pact and ways and means of realizing the objectives of the pact.  2. Conclusion of a Sino-Japanese military alliance. A special secret committee, composed of an equal number of delegates from each nation, should be organized to prepare for the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance against attack by a third country.  3. Acceleration of solutions of pending questions between China and Japan. a) Engagement of a senior political adviser: The Nationalist government should engage a senior Japanese political adviser to assist in the conduct of the domestic and foreign affairs of the Nationalist government. b) Engagement of military advisers: The Nationalist government should engage military advisers, along with military instructors. c) Opening of airline services between China and Japan: Airline services between China and Japan should be opened immediately. To realize such a service, various means should be used to induce the Nanking authorities to establish an airline corporation in North China, to begin flights between Formosa and Fukien province, and to start test flights between Shanghai and Fukuoka. d) Conclusion of a reciprocal tariff treaty: A reciprocal tariff treaty should be concluded promptly between China and Japan, on the basis of the policy approved by the ministries concerned, with regard to the abolition of the special trade in eastern Hopei province and the lowering of the prohibitively high tariffs. For this purpose Japan should, if necessary, propose the creation of a special committee composed of Japanese and Chinese representatives.  4. Promotion of economic cooperation between China and Japan. Japan should promote cooperation with the common people of China to establish realistic and inseparable economic relations between China and Japan that will promote coexistence and co-prosperity and will be unaffected by changes in the Chinese political situation. “ The document also included suggestions for Japan's economic expansion into South China. This included tapping into the natural resources of the provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi, building a railway between Guangzhou and Swatow, and establishing air routes between Fuchoz and Taipei, which would connect to services in Japan and Thailand. It also called for survey teams to be dispatched to explore the resources of Sichuan, Gansu, Xinjiang, and Qinghai provinces, and for support to be provided to the independence movement in Inner Mongolia. However, these initiatives presented significant challenges. The preface to the "Second Outline of Policy to Deal with North China" cautioned, "In implementing this policy, we must carefully consider the Nanking government's prestige and avoid actions that could prompt it to adopt an anti-Japanese stance in response to the desires of the Chinese people."  On September 19th, six fundamental points for a settlement in North China were dictated to China to “establish a common defense against communism, promoting economic cooperation, lowering tariffs, initiating an airline service between the two nations, employing Japanese advisers, and controlling subversive Koreans." September 22 was set as the deadline for a response from China. While agreeing to some Japanese requests, the Chinese included several counter-demands that the Japanese found completely unacceptable. These demands required Japan to “(a) refrain from using armed intervention or arbitrary actions in its dealings with China, (b) recognize China as an equal and sovereign state, (c) avoid leveraging antigovernment groups or communist elements, and (d) remove any derogatory references to China from Japanese textbooks. The Chinese also insisted that any agreement regarding North China “must precede the annulment of the Tanggu and Shanghai cease-fire agreements, the disbanding of the East Hopei regime, a prohibition on unauthorized Japanese flights over North China, a ban on smuggling activities by Japanese, the restoration of China's right to control smuggling, and the disbandment of the illegal East Hopei government along with the armies of Wang Ying and Prince De in Suiyuan”. Now that mention of a Prince De in Suiyuan brings us to a whole new incident. This podcast series should almost be called “the history of Japanese related incidents in China”. Now we've spoken at great lengths about Japan's obsession with Manchuria. She wanted it for resources, growing space and as a buffer state. Japan also had her eyes set on Inner Mongolia to be used as a buffer state between Manchukuo, the USSR and China proper. Not to mention after the invasion of North China, Inner Mongolia could be instrumental as a wedge to be used to control Northern China. Thus the Kwantung Army began fostering a Mongolian independence movement back in August of 1933. They did so through a special organ led by chief of the general staff Koiso Kuniaki. He began work with the Silingol League led by Prince Sonormurabdan or “Prince So” and another influential Mongol, Prince Demchukdongrob or “Prince De”. Prince De was the West Sunid Banner in Northern Chahar. Likewise the Kwantung Army was grooming Li Xuxin, a Mongol commoner born in southern Manchuria. He had been a bandit turned soldier absorbed into Zhang Xueliangs army. Li had distinguished himself in a campaign against a group of Mongols trying to restore the Qing dynasty to further establish an independent Mongolia. During Operation Nekka Li had served in a cavalry brigade under Zu Xingwu, reputed to be the best unit in Zhang Xueliangs Northeastern border defense army. He led the army's advance unit into western Shandong. Afterwards Li suddenly became friends with Major Tanaka Hisashi, the head of the Special Service Agency at Dungliao where he defected to the Kwantung Army. He soon was leading a force too strong to be incorporated into the Manchukuo Army, thus it was disbanded, but his Kwantung Army buddies encouraged him to move to Tolun in Rehe province. At one point during the Nekka campaign, Li's army was threatened by a strong Chinese counterattack, but they had Manchukuo air support allowing them to capture Tolun. This victory launched what became the East Chahar Special Autonomous District with Li becoming a garrison commander and chief administrator.  Back in time, upon the founding of the Chinese Republic, the affairs of Inner Mongolia fell upon the Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs. This was reorganized in 1930 into the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs when the provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan and Ningxia were organized. Prince De had been a member of a nationalist group known as the Young Mongols, although his aim was self-determination for Inner Mongolia within China, not independence. The Nationalist government's support for Chinese settlement in Mongol territories and its disregard for Mongol perspectives quickly triggered a rise in Mongol nationalism and anti-Chinese feelings. This was exacerbated by the government's introduction of a law on October 12, 1931, requiring local Mongolian administrative units to consult with hsien officials on matters concerning their administration. The nationalist sentiment was further fueled by the presence of the neighboring Mongolian People's Republic in Outer Mongolia and the establishment of Xingan province in western Manchuria by Manchukuo authorities in March 1932. This new province included the tribes of eastern Inner Mongolia and granted them greater autonomy than other Manchukuo provinces while banning Chinese immigration into it. When Nanjing did not react to these developments, Prince De and his supporters took steps toward gaining autonomy. On July 15th, 1933, Mongol leaders from western Inner Mongolia gathered at Pailingmiao for two weeks to deliberate on a declaration for regional independence. Although many princes were initially hesitant to take this step, they reconvened on August 14 and sent a cable to Nanjing announcing their decision to create an autonomous Mongolian government. The cable was signed by Prince So and Prince De. Over the following two months, additional conferences at Pailingmiao were held to organize the new government, which would operate under Nanking's guidance but without involvement from provincial chairmen. On October 22, Prince Yun, head of the Ulanchap League and a close ally of Prince De, was elected to lead the new regime, with Prince De assuming the role of chief of its political affairs bureau. After receiving a cable from the Mongolian leaders in August, Nanjing quickly sent Minister of the Interior Huang Shao-hung and Xu Qingyang, head of the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, to halt the movement. However, the Mongols declined to travel to Kalgan or Kueisui to meet Huang. In November, as the leader of a special commission appointed by Nanjing, Huang reached an agreement with Yun De and other Mongolian leaders concerning a proposal that abandoned the Mongols' demand for an autonomous government. This agreement was later altered by Nanjing, and its essential points were excluded from a measure approved by the Central Political Council of the Kuomintang on January 17, 1934. The dispute reignited, fueled by the Nationalist government's rising concerns over the anticipated enthronement of Pu Yi in Manchukuo. On February 28, the Central Political Council enacted a measure that outlined "eight principles of Inner Mongolian autonomy" and created the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Council. Since these principles did not grant authority over foreign and military affairs, powers explicitly reserved for the central government in the January measure, they were seen as a concession to the Mongols and were accepted. On March 7, the central government issued regulations to establish a semi autonomous regime for Inner Mongolia, which was officially launched at Pailingmiao on April 23. Although the council was led by three moderate princes, Prince Yun, supported by Princes So and Sha, the real administrative authority was held by Prince De, who served as the secretary-general. Most of the twenty-five council members were of Mongolian royalty, through whom Prince De aimed to fulfill his objectives. Nevertheless, the Nationalist government seemed to consider the council merely a token gesture to placate De, as Nanking never provided the promised administrative funds outlined in the "eight principle declaration." Was not much of a shock Prince De sought support from the Kwantung Army, which had established contact with him as early as June 1934. Japanese pressures in North China were starting to alter the power dynamics, and after the first Western incident in Jehol in February 1935, it compelled the relocation of Sung Queyuan's army from Chahar to Hopei, providing encouragement to Prince De. In May, he met with Kwantung Army Vice Chief of Staff Itagaki Seishirö, Intelligence Section Chief Kawabe Torashirö, and staff officer Tanaka Ryükichi, where he was officially informed for the first time about the Kwantung Army's intention to assist him. On July 25, the Kwantung Army drafted its "Essentials of Policy toward Inner Mongolia," which regarded Japanese support for cooperation between De and Li Xuxin as part of their strategic preparations for a potential conflict with the Soviet Union. Shortly after this policy was adopted, a conflict arose over who had the authority to appoint the head of the Mongol Xukung banner, situated north of the Yellow River and Paot'ou. Following the death of the previous administrator, Prince Xu declared that he had taken control of the position. In response to a request from the local abbot, Prince Yun, acting in his capacity as chairman of the Mongolian Political Council, dismissed Xu. Xu then turned to Nanking through Suiyuan Provincial Chairman Fu Zuoyi, arguing that the central government held the authority to appoint heads of administrative units. In retaliation, Prince De dispatched troops to Xukung. On November 10, Fu presented a mediation proposal, which was rejected since it not only failed to acknowledge Shih's dismissal but also demanded the withdrawal of De's forces. De refused to pull back, further intensifying his hostility toward the Nanking government. In December, the Kwantung Army attempted to move Li's forces from eastern Chahar into the six Xun to the north of Kalgan, which serves as Chahar's granary. Following the Qin-Doihara agreement, Matsui Gennosuke from the Kalgan Special Service Agency secured a deal to separate these six districts from the southern region predominantly populated by Chinese; a Mongolian peace preservation corps was tasked with maintaining order in the northern area, while a Chinese corps was responsible for the south. During the discussions for an autonomous regime centered around Song Queyuan in North China in November 1935, Kwantung Army troops were concentrated around Gubeikou. To exert pressure on Song's rear, the Kwantung Army proposed replacing the Chinese peace preservation unit in the area north of Kalgan with Li Xuxin's army, which would establish this territory as its base.   The operation commenced on December 8. In a surprise attack just before dawn, Li captured Paochang. By December 12, despite facing strong Chinese resistance and the heaviest snowfall in sixty years, Li, aided by Kwantung Army planes disguised as those of the Manchukuo Airline Corporation, had taken control of Kuyuan. Further advances were halted by an order from Kwantung Army headquarters, and on December 13, it was reported that, had the operation not been stopped, Tokyo would have issued an imperial command. The operation had faced opposition from the Tientsin army, which feared it would weaken Song Queyuan's position just as they were informing Tokyo that the autonomy movement was going smoothly. Additionally, both Britain and the United States publicly expressed strong opposition to the Kwantung Army's involvement in the autonomy movement. However, the directive was ultimately prompted by the emperor's anger upon discovering that a unit of the Kwantung Army led by Colonel Matsui Takurö had advanced to Tolun to support Li's progress. Although Li's advance was halted, the operation undeniably contributed to the formation of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council.   Although the operation was halted, the Kwantung Army remained committed to its objectives. They contended that Li's army's advance into the six districts north of Kalgan was merely a peace preservation unit moving into territory within the truce line established by the Tanggu Agreement. Consequently, on December 29, they ordered Li to advance southward. Li peacefully occupied Changpei the following day and entered Shangtu on December 31. Manchukuo civil officials were appointed to oversee the six districts, and the currency of Manchukuo was introduced, although the existing tax system initially remained unchanged. The Kwantung Army allocated silver worth 6 million yuan to support administrative expenses. This outcome, known as the Eastern Chahar incident, marked a complete success for the Kwantung Army, which then redirected its focus toward Suiyuan Province. Each year, the Kwantung Army developed a secret plan for covert operations for the following year. The 1936 plan included strategies to secure air bases for routes connecting Europe and Asia, targeting Tsinghai and Sinkiang provinces, Outer Mongolia, Western Mongolia, and even remote areas of Ningxia province. In January 1936, staff officer Tanaka Ryūkichi formulated a document titled "Essentials of Policy Toward (Northwestern) Inner Mongolia." This document advocated for the establishment of a Mongolian military government to facilitate Japanese operations in northwestern Mongolia and suggested pushing Fu Tso-yi out of Suiyuan into Shansi province. Tanaka's proposals were incorporated into the final plan of the Kwantung Army, ultimately leading to the Suiyuan incident of November 1936. In February 1936, a meeting at Pailingmiao, where Prince De proposed the independence of Inner Mongolia, resulted in the departure of Prince So and several other Mongolian leaders from the coalition. They sought to establish a rival political council at Kueisui under the protection of Fu Zuoyi. By April, De and his supporters decided to form a military government at Tehua in Chahar, which was officially inaugurated in June as the Inner Mongolian government, headed by De with Li Shou-hsin as his deputy. This new government quickly signed a mutual assistance treaty with Manchukuo, and the emperor granted De the title of prince.   In July, at a conference in Tehua, Tanaka was appointed as the head of the Special Service Agency for Inner Mongolia with the mission of implementing the army's Intelligence Section plans. He traveled to Pingtiqüan alongside Chief of Staff Itagaki and Intelligence Chief Mutō Akira to propose a local anti-Communist agreement to Fu. After failing to convince Fu, he attempted to persuade Sun Tien-ying to form a puppet army but managed to recruit only a bandit from Suiyuan, Wang Ying. The February 26 mutiny in Tokyo heightened anti-Japanese sentiments in China, resulting in increased violence. By August, the construction of an airplane hangar in Paot'ou was halted due to riots by local Chinese residents. On August 13, a group of fifteen Japanese, led by Nakajima Manzo, was ambushed while delivering ammunition to a pro-Japanese leader who was shortly thereafter assassinated. Chinese soldiers from Wang Qingkuo's 70th Division carried out the attack, and tensions escalated as the arrival of ammunition and Japanese laborers in Kalgan prompted border villages to strengthen their defenses.   By late September, Tanaka's "Guidelines for the Execution of the Suiyuan Operation" received approval, with operations set to commence in early November. The plan evolved from a covert mission into a personal initiative by Tanaka, financed largely through funds from the Kwantung Army's secret services and profits from special trading in eastern Hopei. Tanaka claimed to have transported 600,000 yen to Tehua in October and later sent 200,000 yuan into Inner Mongolia, estimating total expenses at approximately 6 million yen. He acquired new weaponry from the disbanded Northeast Army and established three clandestine forces: Wang Ying led 500 men, including artillery; Qin Xiashan commanded 3,000 from Sun Tienying's army; and Chang Futang also led 3,000 specialized units. During strategic meetings, Tanaka dismissed proposals for unified command and refusing to integrate secret units into the Mongolian army. He advocated for the slogan "Overthrow Chiang Kai-shek," while Matsui managed to include "Independence for Inner Mongolia."   The Japanese had developed the entire battle strategy. The 1st Army, commanded by Li Xuxin, would serve as the left flank, while the 2nd Army, led by Demchugdongrub, would be positioned on the right. Wang Ying's forces were designated as the central force. Their initial targets would be Hongort, Xinghe, Tuchengzi, and Guisui city, followed by a division to seize Jinging, Baotou, and Hetao. On November 13, Prince Demchugdongrub's and Wang Ying's forces left Shandu in two columns to assault Xinghe and Hongort. By the 15th, 1,500 troops reached Hongort, where they engaged the 1st Cavalry Division led by Peng Yubin. The next day, Ryukichi Tanaka, Demchugdongrub's chief advisor, sent two cavalry brigades and one infantry brigade to capture the town, effectively overrunning its defenders. Meanwhile, Wang Ying dispatched a smaller group to secure Tuchengzi.   Fu Zuoyi established his headquarters in Jining that same day. After assessing the situation, he concluded that if the enemy secured Hongort, it would diminish his defenders' morale. Consequently, he launched a counterattack. Peng Yubin led a joint force of the 1st Cavalry Division and Dong Qiwu's 218th Brigade to confront around 400 of Wang Ying's men defending Hongort and Tuchengzi. By 7 AM on the 18th, Tuchengzi was reclaimed, and at 8:30 AM, the 1st Cavalry Division entered Hongort, charging through 500 of Wang Ying's soldiers. The struggle for Hongort persisted for over three days, resulting in nearly 1,000 casualties before Fu Zuoyi regained control.   As the tide shifted against the invaders, Fu Zuoyi initiated an offensive toward the Bailing Temple, the rear base of the enemy, well-stocked and defended by 3,000 men under Prince Demchugdongrub. Fu Zuoyi ordered the 2nd Cavalry Division, along with the 211th and 315th Brigades, the 21st Artillery Regiment, and a convoy of 20 trucks and 24 armored vehicles to assault the Bailing Temple as quickly as possible. Taking advantage of the Mongolian chaos, Fu Zuoyi's 35th Brigade executed a flanking maneuver west of the Bailing Temple amid a severe snowstorm.   At 1 AM on the 24th, the battle for the Bailing Temple commenced as the Chinese engaged the Mongolians for the fortified positions around the temple. From 2 to 4 AM, the Chinese advanced closer to the temple walls, facing artillery and machine-gun fire. They launched desperate frontal assaults against the city gates, suffering heavy losses. A fierce stalemate ensued, with Japanese aerial bombardments causing significant casualties to the Chinese forces. Fu Zuoyi subsequently ordered all armored vehicles to converge at the main city gate. Despite intense fire, the armored cars managed to breach the gate, allowing Chinese infantry to flood into the temple area. The resulting carnage within the temple walls led to 900 Mongol deaths, with 300 captured as the rest fled. The Chinese suffered 300 casualties but secured the strategically vital rear base, along with a substantial stockpile of provisions, including 500 barrels of petrol, 600 rifles, 10 machine guns, vehicles, and field guns. Following the devastating defeat at Bailing Temple, the invaders regrouped at Xilamuleng Temple. On the 28th, the Japanese sent 100 vehicles to transport 3,000 troops to prepare for a significant counteroffensive to recapture Bailing Temple. On the 29th, Wang Ying personally led 2,000 cavalry north of Shangdu to Taolin in an attempt to contain the enemy. However, after he left the bulk of his forces at Xilamuleng Temple, officers from the Grand Han Righteous Army secretly began negotiating to defect to the Chinese side, undermining the forces needed for the counterattack against Bailing Temple.   The counteroffensive commenced on December 2nd, with 10 armored vehicles and 1,000 Mongol troops leading the charge at 6 AM. They were pushed back by the heavily fortified 211th Brigade, which was well-supplied with machine guns and artillery. The following day, at 3 AM, the Mongols attempted a surprise attack but faced an ambush as they crept toward the temple. They incurred hundreds of casualties, with 230 men either captured or having defected. After this, the counterattack stalled, as the Mongol forces couldn't approach within 3 miles of the temple. Subsequently, the Chinese 2nd Cavalry Division launched a pincer maneuver, causing significant casualties among the invaders. By 9 AM, the enemy had suffered 500 casualties and was in retreat. At 7 PM, Fu Zuoyi ordered another counteroffensive. By the next morning, hundreds more had been lost, and several hundred soldiers were captured. With such heavy losses, the defense of Xilamuleng Temple weakened significantly, prompting more officers to defect to the Chinese. Late on the 4th, Fu Zuoyi assembled a force comprising two cavalry regiments, one infantry regiment, one artillery battalion, four armored vehicles, and a squadron of cars to launch a nighttime assault on Xilamuleng Temple.   Meanwhile, the 2nd Cavalry Division clashed with Wang Ying's cavalry 30 miles northeast of Wulanhua. Wang Ying's 2,000 cavalry had been raiding nearby villages to create diversions, drawing enemy forces away from the Bailing-Xilamuleng theater. By the 9th, Wang Ying's cavalry were encircled in Xiaobei, where they were nearly annihilated, with Wang escaping with around a hundred guards toward Changpei. On the 7th, some Grand Han Righteous Army officers set in motion plans to defect to the Chinese side. Early on the 9th, these officers led their men to invade the residence of Japanese advisors, killing all 27 Japanese officers under Colonel Obama. Simultaneously, Fu Zuoyi's forces executed a flanking maneuver against the Xilamuleng Temple amidst the chaos. With mass defections, the Chinese forces surged into the temple area, resulting in the invader army disintegrating in confusion and surrender. After seizing the temple, the invaders were routed, their lines of communication severed, and only isolated pockets continued to resist. Taking advantage of the confusion, Fu Zuoyi launched simultaneous attacks, attempting to capture Shangdu. However, Yan Xishan sent him a telegram, ordering him to halt, stating that Shangdu fell under the jurisdiction of Shanxi and not Suiyuan.   In response to the loss, Tanaka planned a counteroffensive with Qin's troops, but Chiang kai-shek commanded a strong defense of Pailingmiao, successfully outmaneuvering Tanaka's strategies. The resurgence of Chinese forces led to the disintegration of Qin's troops, who revolted and eventually joined the Nationalist army. The Kwantung Army aimed to redeploy its forces for recovery but faced opposition from Tokyo, which criticized the situation. After Chiang kai-shek was kidnapped by Zhang Xueliang on December 12, Tanaka and Prince De seized the opportunity to reassess their strategy. Ultimately, the Kwantung Army decided to abandon efforts to reclaim Pailingmiao, marking the official end of hostilities on December 21. The Suiyuan incident ultimately strengthened Chinese resolve against Japan and increased international distrust.   The defeat of Japan's proxy forces inspired many Chinese to advocate for a more vigorous resistance against the Japanese. The triumph in Suiyuan was celebrated throughout China and surprised the international media, marking the first occasion where the Chinese army successfully halted a Japanese unit. Delegations traveled from as distant as southern Chinese provinces to encourage the defenders to continue their fight. Captured Japanese weapons and equipment served as proof of Japan's involvement in the conflict, despite Japan's Foreign Minister Hachirō Arita claiming that "Japan was not involved in this conflict in Suiyuan at all." After his defeat, Prince Demchugdongrub and his Inner Mongolian troops retreated to northern Chahar, where he had to reconstruct his army due to significant losses. The Japanese implemented new regulations for the Mongolian Army to enhance its effectiveness, and efforts to recruit new soldiers commenced.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. More incidents and more battles to seize territory raged in North China. However things did not go according to plan for the Japanese and their puppets. The tides had turned, and now a more angry and invigorating China would begin lashing out against the encroachment. It was only a matter of time before a full blown war was declared. 

The Sinica Network proudly presents a new podcast: China Talking Points, featuring Kaiser Kuo (host of the Sinica Podcast), Eric Olander (host of the China-Global South Podcast and China In Africa Podcast) and Andrew Polk, co-founder of Trivium China and host of its podcast. We'll be joined regularly by Lizzi Lee, Fellow on Chinese Economy at the Asia Society Policy Institute's (ASPI) Center for China Analysis. Tune in live every other week for unscripted thoughts on the major China-related news of the week.This week, we focused on the truce in the trade war that Donald Trump launched with the so-called "Liberation Day" tariffs of April 9. U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer met with top Chinese trade negotiator He Lifeng and his team in Geneva over the weekend, and we look at what came out of those meetings and what we can expect to happen next. We also discussed the dogfight that took place between India and Pakistan last week, in which the Pakistani air force claims to have downed as many as five Indian planes, significant for China because the Pakistani planes were Chinese-made J10-C fighters. Eric, who wrote about the Chinese reaction to this and offered his take on the reasons for their success, managed to incur a lot of online Indian wrath — an occupational hazard — but presents a compelling case for why the fully integrated Chinese military systems gave Pakistan the edge.Watch us live on YouTube starting May 28th. Check out the new Sinica Network YouTube channel here!See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

I had scheduled a show to record while I was in Providence last week, but it fell through and had to be rescheduled, so please give this talk I delivered at Carnegie Mellon last month a listen!Hope you enjoy.KaiserSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, I chat with veteran Wall Street Journal reporter Bob Davis, who has covered the U.S.-China relationship for decades. He recently published a new book called Broken Engagement, which consists of interviews with U.S. policymakers who were instrumental in shaping American policy toward China from the George H.W. Bush administration through the Biden administration. It's an eye-opening look at the individuals who fought for — and against — engagement with China.2:58 – Bob's thoughts on engagement: whether it was doomed from the start, when and why there was a shift, people's different aspirations for it and retrospective positioning, and whether it could have a transformative effect 13:28 – The Nancy Pelosi interview: her approach, her Taiwan visit, and her critique of capitulation to business interests17:18 – Bob's interviews with Charlene Barshefsky, Lawrence Summers, and Bob Zoellick: the WTO accession, the China shock, Zoellick's “responsible stakeholder” concept, and diplomacy as an ongoing process 27:24 – The Robert Gates interview: security-focused engagement, and his shift to realism 31:14 – Misreading Xi Jinping34:42 – Bob's interviews with Stephen Hadley and Ash Carter regarding the South China Sea 39:19 – The Matt Pottinger interview: his view on China and how COVID changed everything 46:14 – Michael Rogers' interview: cyber espionage and cyber policy 51:25 – Robert O'Brien's interview: the “reverse Kissinger” and Taiwan 54:14 – Bob's interview with Kurt Campbell: his famous Foreign Affairs essay, differentiating between decoupling and de-risking, and technology export restrictions and trade deals 59:28 – The Rahm Emanuel interview: his response to wolf warrior diplomacy1:01:57 – Bob's takeaways: the long-term vision of engagement, introspective interviewees, and his own increased pessimism Paying It Forward: Lingling Wei at The Wall Street Journal; Eva Dou at The Washington Post and her book House of Huawei: The Secret History of China's Most Powerful Company; and Katrina Northrop at The Washington Post Recommendations: Bob: The TV series Derry Girls (2018-2022) and Curb Your Enthusiasm (2000-2024); and Margaret O'Farrell's novels, including Hamnet and The Marriage Portrait Kaiser: The BBC and Masterpiece series Wolf Hall: The Mirror and the Light See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

As riots break out across China and factories shut down under the weight of U.S. tariffs, this episode dives into the explosive consequences of Trump's economic pressure campaign. With China's export economy unraveling, mainstream media remains silent, while host Tara and guest Lee expose the deeper geopolitical stakes. From worker revolts in Sichuan to clandestine tariff rollbacks in Beijing, they argue that Trump's true ambition may mirror Reagan's — to collapse communism, this time in China. This segment unpacks the media's deflection, Biden family ties to China, and the strategic reshaping of global supply chains. The war, they say, can be won — without firing a bullet.

This week on Sinica, I chat with SCMP Senior Europe Correspondent Finbarr Bermingham, who joins from Brussels where he's been covering the EU-China relationship in fantastic depth and with great insight.3:17 – EU-China relations in early 2025: the effect of the 2021 sanctions, who advocated for engagement versus confrontation with China, and the importance of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI)13:49 – How Brussels initially reacted to the rupture in the transatlantic alliance 17:14 – China's so-called charm offensive 21:03 – The idea of de-risking from Washington 23:10 – The impact of the Oval Office meeting with Zelensky 24:55 – Europe's dual-track approach with China and shift toward pragmatism 29:35 – National interests versus EU unity regarding Chinese investment, and whether Brussels could extract concessions 35:20 – Brussels' worry over Trump cutting a deal with China 38:06 – Possible signs of China's flexibility on different issues40:25 – The lifting of the sanctions on European parliamentarians 42:21 – The decrease in calls for values-based diplomacy, and whether securitization is happening in Europe47:05 – How the EU might address tensions over China's industrial overcapacity 50:17 – The possible future of EU-China relations, and whether the transatlantic relationship could go back to normal55:50 – The knee-jerk element of looking past EuropePaying It Forward: Ji Siqi at SCMP, Cissy Zhou at Nikkei, and Kinling Lo and Viola Zhou at Rest of WorldRecommendations:Finbarr: The Stakeknife podcast series; Say Nothing: A True Story of Murder and Memory in Northern Ireland by Patrick Radden Keefe; and the 20th anniversary edition of Wilco's album, A Ghost Is Born Kaiser: The Ottomans: Khans, Caesars, and Caliphs by Marc David Baer See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, in a show recorded at the University of Pittsburgh, I speak with Benno Weiner, Associate Professor of History at Carnegie Mellon University, about how China's policy toward its minority nationalities (or minzu) have shifted from their older, Soviet-inspired form to the policies of assimilation we now see.2:29 – How the so-called second-generation minzu policy evolved, and its shift away from the first-generation policy17:15 – China's language policy, comparisons to other historical cases, and the difficulty in striking a balance between language autonomy and the state interest of economic equality25:26 – Debating the assumption of Uyghur forced labor 28:20 – How the minzu policy shift is driven by economic and political stability concerns 30:07 – The limited ability of minzus to make themselves heard32:01 – The difficulty of advocacy in the face of accusations of U.S. hypocrisy 37:30 – Han guilt as a galvanizing idea 40:21 – Whether the shift in minzu policy is reversible, and the effect of external pressure 43:46 – Why Xinjiang has received greater global attention than other places 45:50 – How future historians may view minzu policy under Xi JinpingPaying It Forward: Guldana Salimjan, at the University of Toronto Recommendations:Benno: The Red Wind Howls by Tsering Döndrup, translated by Christopher PeacockKaiser: The Six: The Untold Story of the Titanic's Chinese Survivors by Steven SchwankertSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on the Sinica Podcast, I chat with Yawei Liu, Senior Advisor for China at the Carter Center in Atlanta, Georgia, and Yukon Huang, former China country head of the World Bank and now Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The show was taped live at the 2025 Columbia China Summit at Columbia University, put on by the Columbia University Greater China Society, on April 13,. Special thanks to them for inviting us to attend!3:53 – Columbia University's history with China 7:52 – How Beijing views the current trade war 11:32 – Yawei's idea of “the clash of misperceptions”18:18 – The actual origins of America's trade deficits and China's trade surpluses 23:14 – How the inevitable talk between Trump and Xi Jinping may play out32:04 – Sinophobia versus changing attitudes toward China 35:43 – How the current trade war is related to innovation in China 45:31 – How we can wage peace Paying It Forward: Nicholas Zeller and his Substack newsletter, The U.S.-China Perception MonitorRecommendations:Yawei: Americans in China: Encounters with the People's Republic ed. by Terry Lautz, and Chinese Encounters with America: Journeys That Shaped the Future of China ed. by Terry Lautz and Deborah DavisYukon: David Brooks' April 2022 article, “The End of Globalization: The Dominance of Global Cultural Wars” Kaiser: The Weimar Years: Rise and Fall 1918-1933 by Frank McDonough See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.