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Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Pacific War. In late 1941, the Second Battle of Changsha ended with Chinese forces claiming victory despite suffering nearly 100,000 casualties against roughly 1,670 Japanese losses. Chiang Kai-shek's government launched an aggressive propaganda campaign, flooding international press with fabricated triumph narratives to sustain national morale. Behind closed doors, Chiang was furious at his generals' tactical failures, executing commanders and dismantling units. Meanwhile, geopolitical forces threatened China's survival. Japan's 1939 defeat at Nomonhan crushed hopes for a Soviet alliance against Tokyo. Germany's pact with the Soviet Union left China isolated, while Western powers remained reluctant to commit meaningful support. Britain offered little; the US provided only modest loans. By 1941, facing potential collapse, Chiang desperately searched for allies while Wang Jingwei's Japanese-backed rival government beckoned as an alternative. China's exhausted people endured horror—including a 1941 bombing massacre in Chongqing that killed over 400 trapped civilians. Then Japan unleashed a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. #215 An Implosion in the East Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the early morning of December 7, 1941, the US Pacific Fleet was anchored at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. Two waves of Japanese bomber aircraft, launched from six aircraft carriers, attacked the vessels and their sleeping crews, destroying the battleship Arizona outright and damaging seventeen others, as well as most of the military aircraft parked nearby. Some 2,400 Americans died, and another 1,100 were wounded. Within a day Japanese invasion forces had attacked Siam, Malaya, and the Philippines. Chiang Kai-shek heard the news at one o'clock in the morning and immediately dictated a letter of support to President Roosevelt, pledging commitment to a new "common battle." The news reached Zhou Fohai in Shanghai as well. On December 8 across the international date line from Hawaii he had heard the sounds of firing as the Japanese took over the rest of the city, and then received reports that Japan had declared war on the Western powers. "I heard they'd bombed Honolulu, Manila, Singapore, and Hong Kong. From now on, the Pacific becomes a killing ground." When Japanese carrier planes descended on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, they were executing far more than a tactical strike. They were unleashing the culmination of a strategic vision that had shaped Japanese military planning since the 1920s: the Nanshin-ron, or "Southern Advance" doctrine. The Nanshin-ron represented a critical strategic choice that emerged from internal Japanese debates during the 1920s and 1930s. Japan faced an inescapable vulnerability: it was an island nation with virtually no natural resources of its own. The nation's population had doubled since the Meiji Restoration, growing to over 70 million by 1941. An industrial economy of tremendous sophistication, capable of producing world-class warships, aircraft, and military equipment, depended entirely on imported raw materials. Oil, rubber, tin, iron ore, bauxite, copper, and manganese all had to be acquired through foreign trade or conquest. This resource dependency was not a luxury problem; it was an existential one. A nation that could not feed itself or fuel its economy was a nation vulnerable to strangulation by enemies who controlled the resources it needed. Japanese strategic thinkers divided into two camps on how to resolve this vulnerability. The Hokushin-ron advocates, primarily within the Army, pushed for expansion northward into Siberia and Mongolia, seeking to conquer Soviet territory and resources. The Soviet Union possessed vast tracts of land, mineral wealth, timber, and agricultural output. From a purely materialist perspective, the Northern Advance made geographic sense—it was contiguous with Manchuria, which Japan had already secured in 1931. Yet by the late 1930s, the Hokushin-ron strategy had suffered a catastrophic blow. In 1938 and 1939, Japanese and Soviet forces clashed at Khalkhin Gol in Mongolia in what the Japanese called the Nomonhan Incident. The battles revealed a terrifying truth: the Soviet Red Army, under General Georgy Zhukov, was far more formidable than Japanese military planners had anticipated. Soviet armor, air power, and coordinated tactics annihilated Japanese forces. Japan suffered over 60,000 casualties while inflicting perhaps 10,000 on the Soviets. The defeat was concealed from the Japanese public, but it was unmistakable to military planners. A direct clash with Soviet power could end catastrophically. The Northern Advance, it became clear, would almost certainly provoke war with a nation capable of destroying the Japanese Army. This strategic defeat tilted the balance decisively toward the Nanshin-ron. If Japan could not safely expand northward, it must expand southward, toward Southeast Asia, the Dutch East Indies, Indochina, and the western Pacific. The appeal of the Nanshin-ron was immediately apparent to the Navy, which had always been more oriented toward maritime commerce and expansion across the ocean. The territories to the south were not militarily formidable. The colonial powers, Britain, the Netherlands, France, were either already defeated in 1940 or distracted by their own desperate struggles leaving Britain fighting alone against Germany. The United States, though potentially a formidable adversary, was not yet at war, and there was a chance, however slender, that a decisive blow against American naval power might convince America to negotiate rather than fight. But beyond strategic opportunity, the Nanshin-ron offered something that the Hokushin-ron did not: it offered resources of staggering abundance. The Dutch East Indies possessed oil reserves that could dwarf Japan's consumption for years. Malaya produced the world's rubber. Thailand offered agricultural bounty and geographic position. Burma's timber and agricultural products could feed Japan's growing empire. The Philippines possessed harbors, airfields, and economic output. These were not marginal additions to Japan's economy—they were transformative. Together, they would convert Japan from a resource-hungry island nation into the master of an imperial domain encompassing hundreds of millions of people and containing most of the strategic materials necessary for sustained industrial warfare. In the last episode I explained the western sanctions and embargoes that drained Japan's military of the resources they required to continue the China War. By 1941, Japan faced a civilization crisis. Japan imported roughly 90 percent of its petroleum, and the bulk of that came from the Dutch East Indies and the United States. Suddenly, the American supply was cut off entirely. Reserves would last perhaps 18 months if Japan's military and industrial consumption continued at existing rates. After that, the military machine would sputter and die. The industrial economy would collapse. Even civilian life would become impossible to sustain. Japan was facing not merely economic inconvenience but literal strangulation by the Western powers. Yet it would be a mistake to reduce Japanese motivation to just materialism. Japanese military leaders wrapped their conquests in an ideological framework, one that many of them genuinely believed, or wanted to believe, served a higher historical purpose. The concept of the Daitoa Kyoeiken, the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," posited a new regional order in which Japan would play the leading role in liberating Asian peoples from Western colonial domination and creating an Asian-centered political and economic system. This ideology drew on genuine anti-colonial sentiment. For a century, Western powers had dominated Asia, treating Asian peoples and nations as subordinate, colonized territories existing to serve Western economic interests. Japan, which had modernized and Westernized enough to avoid colonization, saw itself as the natural leader of an Asian renaissance—a civilizing force that would restore Asian dignity and independence even as it established Japanese hegemony. Of course, this was propagandistic. Japanese conquest represented a substitution of one imperial master for another, and often a harsher and more brutal one at that. But for understanding Japanese decision-making, the ideology mattered profoundly. It provided Japanese leaders with a moral narrative for conquest. It allowed them to understand themselves as liberators rather than mere conquerors. It provided a rationale for extracting resources from occupied territories and for mobilizing subject populations to support the Japanese war effort. And it resonated with anti-Western sentiment throughout Asia, making Japanese occupation seem, in some quarters, preferable to continued Western colonial rule. The slogan Hakko ichiu—"eight corners under one roof", captured this ideological vision: a unified Asia and eventually world under Japanese guidance. Whether Japanese leaders truly believed this vision or cynically deployed it as propaganda, it shaped how they understood their actions and justified them to their subjects. Now I know this is a podcast dedicated to the century of humiliation, ie: China's experience. But I thought it was necessary just to have one episode explain what Dan Carlin titled "a supernova in the east" and I have titled an implosion in the east. I won't go into depth into the campaigns as some of them have a lot of Chinese involvement and we will be covering them in depth, but rather I will explain the rationale for Japan's numerous invasions following the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Japan's assault on Malaya began within hours of the Pearl Harbor attack, indeed, Japanese troops were already landing on the Kota Bharu beachhead on the Malaysian peninsula before dawn on December 8, 1941 local time. Malaya was one of the world's largest rubber producers, and Singapore, at the tip of the peninsula, was the linchpin of British naval power in the Far East.The Japanese interest in Malaya was straightforward but crucial: rubber. The Japanese military consumed vast quantities of rubber for tires, gaskets, hoses, and countless other applications. American and Dutch rubber supplies were now cut off by embargo. Malaya's rubber plantations represented perhaps the world's richest reservoir of this strategic material. Beyond rubber, Malaya and the surrounding region were major tin producers—essential for alloys and manufacturing. For Japan to conduct prolonged warfare, Malaya was not a luxury target; it was a necessity. Singapore represented something different: a symbol of Western power in Asia and a strategic chokepoint. As the major British naval base in the region, Singapore served as the anchor of British imperial authority across the South China Sea. By seizing Singapore, Japan would not only capture crucial resources and port facilities but would also deliver a psychological blow to the entire edifice of Western dominance in Asia. The fortress city that the British considered nearly impregnable fell within seventy days, a stunning demonstration of Japanese military capability and the vulnerability of overextended Western empires. If Malaya was critical for rubber, the Dutch East Indies was essential for oil. The region, comprising present-day Indonesia, was the world's third-largest oil producer and had reserves that could sustain Japanese military operations for years. This was the jewel of the resource-conquest strategy. Japanese planners had long eyed the East Indies, but direct conquest had seemed risky while Britain and America remained neutral or opposed. With both now at war, the window of opportunity had opened. Japan needed the oil so desperately that when the Dutch East Indies Petroleum Company initially agreed to some Japanese oil purchases before the war, Tokyo was already planning its takeover. The conquest of the Dutch East Indies would provide not just oil but also tin, nickel, bauxite, and other materials essential to an industrial war machine. The islands would also provide air and naval bases from which Japan could defend its new empire and potentially threaten Australia. The Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies, which began in late December 1941 and accelerated through January and February 1942, was methodical and comprehensive. Various island groups were targeted systematically: Java, Borneo, Celebes, and the Moluccas. Dutch military forces, though brave, were overwhelmed. By March 1942, Japan had secured the entire archipelago,a stunning logistical and military achievement that delivered vast resources into Japanese hands. Thailand presented a fundamentally different case from Japan's other targets. Rather than conquest, Japan pursued alliance with military strongman Plaek Phibunsongkhram, who had seized power in a 1938 coup as a nationalist ideologue determined to reassert Thai sovereignty and recover territory lost to French colonialism in the nineteenth century. Thailand was the last independent state in mainland Southeast Asia, hemmed in by British-controlled Burma and Malaya to the west, and French Indochina to the east. For a century, Thailand had survived by playing European imperial powers against each other. But by the late 1930s, this strategy was becoming obsolete. Europe was distracted by Hitler's Germany. Colonial powers were weakening. Japanese power was visibly ascending. Phibunsongkhram recognized both danger and opportunity. He could resist Japan and invite invasion, or he could ally with Japan and profit from rising Asian power. Japanese diplomats approached Thailand with sophistication: they offered military alliance and support for Thai territorial expansion at French expense. This addressed Thailand's deepest national wound, the humiliation of nineteenth-century territorial losses to France. The Franco-Thai War of 1940-1941 became transformative. With Japan providing military support, advisors, tanks, aircraft, Thai forces defeated the French for the first time in history. By May 1941, Thailand had recovered 54,000 square kilometers of Cambodian territory and portions of Laos. For Phibunsongkhram, this was extraordinary: he had achieved what Thai leaders could not in a century, reclaiming territory from a Western imperial power. Domestically, his position was dramatically strengthened. The parallel to China's century of humiliation—the foundation of your podcast is striking: Thailand too was reversing colonial diminishment through association with rising Asian power. The Thai-Japanese relationship was unique. Unlike the Philippines, Malaya, or the Dutch East Indies, Thailand would retain nominal independence. Phibunsongkhram remained in power. Japanese occupation was light. Thai forces maintained their own command structure. Most importantly, Thailand's territorial gains from the Franco-Thai War were recognized and secured. Japan valued Thai cooperation more than conquest. Burma, controlled by the British, was the next target in Japan's southwestward advance. Japanese planners had multiple motivations for invading Burma. First, it was strategically positioned on India's eastern frontier, and Japan harbored ambitions of eventually striking toward India and linking up with Germany in the Middle East or at least destabilizing the British position in South Asia. Second, Burma was a significant producer of timber and agricultural products. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the invasion of Burma was meant to cut the Burma Road, the crucial supply line that allowed American aid to reach Nationalist China. The invasion of Burma began in late 1941 and accelerated through early 1942. The invasion of the Philippines, which began on December 10, 1941, just days after Pearl Harbor, served multiple strategic purposes. Like the assault on Pearl Harbor itself, it was meant to neutralize American military power in the region, in this case, the American garrison under General Douglas MacArthur and the American colonial administration. But the Philippines were also valuable in their own right. The islands sat directly in the path of what Japan envisioned as its defensive perimeter. By controlling the Philippines, Japan would make it extraordinarily difficult for American forces to project power westward into Southeast Asia. The territory would provide naval and air bases critical to defending Japan's new empire. Additionally, the Philippines possessed some agricultural and industrial resources valuable to the war effort, and their conquest delivered a psychological victory, defeating American forces and ending American colonial rule in Asia, which appealed to anti-Western sentiment that Japan tried to cultivate. Beyond Southeast Asia and the Philippines, Japan rapidly invaded Guam and Wake island to extend Japan's defensive perimeter further into the Pacific and eliminate American air and naval bases that could threaten Japanese operations. Guam, seized on December 10, 1941, fell within two days, the American garrison was small and the island's strategic value lay primarily in denying the United States a forward staging ground for any counteroffensive. Wake Island, attacked the same day and finally captured on December 23 after a brief but heroic American defense, served similar purposes: cutting off American reconnaissance and interdicting potential supply lines to the Philippines. Now I believe that's enough of the implosion in the east, let's get back to the situation in China. After Chiang Kai-shek sent his letter of support to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, pledging Chinese commitment to what he termed a new "common battle." he did something most revealing about his mood towards the global war. He played "Ave Maria" on his gramophone, celebrating with an almost spiritual gratitude the implications of what had just transpired in the American Pacific. This moment crystallized the profound difference Pearl Harbor would mean to different members of the emerging Allied coalition. For the United States, the attack was pure shock, a violation of the sanctity of American soil and the complacency of American isolationism. For Britain, it was like the pricking of a large, painful blister—painful but perhaps not entirely unexpected given Japan's regional ambitions. But for China, the relief that surged through the government and the consciousness of the Chinese people surpassed even Britain's response. For four long years, China had fought Japan almost alone, watching as Western nations remained neutral or limited their commitment to rhetorical support and modest material assistance. Now, suddenly, the trajectory of the entire conflict had shifted with breathtaking speed. Chiang's emotional state at this moment could scarcely be contained, and those close to him understood that beneath his carefully maintained Confucian composure burned an intoxicating sensation of vindication. These Western powers who had been so impatient with Chinese strategy, who had mocked the retreats of the Nationalist Army and spoken scornfully of Japanese capabilities, were now themselves in headlong retreat from those very islanders. In Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila, British and American forces would be fighting desperately for their lives against the Japanese military that China had been contending with for years. Chiang could not have failed to perceive the irony: the Japanese had conquered vast stretches of China through relentless campaigns, yet Westerners had dismissed Chinese resistance as inadequate. Now the Japanese were proving that they posed a formidable challenge to Western military power as well. There was a bitter satisfaction in this vindication, even as Chiang understood that the strategic implications of American entry far outweighed any emotional satisfaction. What was pragmatic and strategically clear to Chiang, however, was far more important than any emotional satisfaction. The United States was now at war, and it was on China's side. This represented the transformation for which Chiang had labored for years, bringing the full weight of American industrial capacity and military might to bear against the Japanese enemy. The diplomatic foundations for this alliance had already been laid in the months preceding Pearl Harbor. Beginning in the spring of 1941, the United States had begun to commit significant resources to supporting China. In April 1941, following the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality agreement, which had devastated Chinese morale by suggesting that Japan might attack the Soviet Union rather than move southward, the Roosevelt administration had determined to provide $45 million worth of militarily useful commodities to China as an immediate gesture of support. Then, on May 6, 1941, President Roosevelt had made a more formal commitment by announcing that the munitions provisions of the Lend-Lease Act applied to China, declaring a phrase that captured the strategic logic of American assistance: "defending China is the key to defending America." This declaration represented a significant shift in American policy, elevating China from a regional concern to a central element of American grand strategy in Asia. Subsequently, in July 1941, Roosevelt had sent Owen Lattimore to China to serve as political adviser to the Chinese government, a position that signaled deepening American engagement with Chinese affairs. In August, the administration appointed John Magruder as military attaché and head of the American Military Mission to China (AMMISCA), with the primary responsibility of overseeing the delivery of Lend-Lease material to the Chinese armed forces. On the diplomatic front, Chiang moved with remarkable alacrity. He had already severed relations with Germany on July 2, 1941, the very day after Hitler had formally recognized the Wang Jingwei puppet government in an attempt to appease Japan and encourage it to finally implement the Southern Advance. Now, on December 8, 1941, just one day after the Pearl Harbor attack, Chiang took the decisive step of formally declaring war against the Axis powers, Germany, Italy, and Japan. This declaration transformed China's position from a beleaguered nation fighting a war of survival into a formal member of the Allied coalition. Chiang had seized the opportunity that Pearl Harbor presented to ally China with a genuinely strong power against Japan, a gambit that fundamentally altered the diplomatic weight and international legitimacy of both the Chinese government and the Chinese cause. From a strategic perspective, the Japanese had committed what Chiang and others immediately recognized as a catastrophic blunder. On the operational level, Pearl Harbor was indeed a devastating tactical success, the American Pacific Fleet was crippled, and Japanese forces now enjoyed temporary naval superiority throughout much of the Pacific and Southeast Asia. Yet strategically, Pearl Harbor represented a failure of epic proportions, a miscalculation rooted in a fundamental misunderstanding of the intangibles of warfare: what motivated the Chinese people and what motivated the Americans. The Chinese had understood, through four years of brutal conflict, that warfare was about more than territorial conquest and resource acquisition. It was about will, about endurance, about the capacity to absorb punishment and continue fighting. The Japanese had learned this lesson imperfectly in China, where despite overwhelming military advantages they had been unable to force a decisive conclusion or compel Chinese surrender. The Americans would teach the Japanese this lesson even more emphatically. The attack on American sailors in Hawaii instantly galvanized the American population to prosecute an unlimited war, with Tokyo itself as the ultimate destination of American counterattack. While Americans would remember the "date that will live in infamy" primarily because of the assault on Pearl Harbor itself, the strategic consequence was that Japanese actions in Hawaii had introduced numerous new adversaries into the Pacific conflict: not only the United States, but also Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and the Netherlands. These additions transformed what had been, from the Japanese perspective, a regional conflict with manageable parameters into a global war that Japan could not possibly win through any conceivable means. What made this particularly disastrous for Japan was the context in which the new theater had been opened. Japan was already deeply mired in a quagmire in China—a "malignant quagmire," as one observer would later characterize it, that had consumed vast resources, inflicted enormous casualties, and failed to produce decisive victory. In military strategy, it is sometimes wise to open a new theater in order to attack an enemy from an additional and unexpected direction, thereby dispersing their forces and creating new challenges for them to manage. But opening a new theater that introduces an entirely new, powerful adversary, and doing so when one is already overextended in an existing theater is a prescription for strategic catastrophe. This was precisely what Japan had done at Pearl Harbor. Chiang Kai-shek understood the magnitude of Japan's miscalculation with crystalline clarity. He understood that whatever the military complexities that lay ahead, whatever the challenges of coordinating with Western allies, and whatever the limitations of Western military assistance to China might be, the fundamental equation had changed. The United States would ultimately defeat Japan. The Chinese did not need to defeat Japan by themselves; they merely needed to survive long enough for American industrial and military capacity to grind the Japanese military into defeat. In the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor, Chinese and American officials moved swiftly to formalize the alliance and establish the mechanisms of wartime cooperation. Roosevelt asked Chiang Kai-shek to serve as commander in chief of the Allied forces in the China theater, a designation that recognized China's central role in the Pacific War and elevated Chiang's international standing to something he had long sought: a position as an equal partner in the Allied coalition, a seat at the "top table of global decision-making" alongside Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. To support this expanded role and to ensure effective coordination of the military effort, Roosevelt dispatched Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell to China. Stilwell was not chosen randomly; he brought fifteen years of experience in China, a deep familiarity with the country, its military, and its complexities that few American officers possessed. Stilwell was appointed to serve simultaneously as the U.S. government's military representative in China, as chief of staff of the China Theater, and as commander in chief of the American forces in the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater. This appointment established the framework for joint Chinese-American military cooperation and represented an American commitment to the Asian theater that, while never receiving the resources devoted to the European theater, nonetheless signified recognition of China's strategic importance. Trust me, going forward we will be having a lot of time dedicated to the hilarious bromance / bro hatred of Vinegar Joe and Peanut. Yet the formation of an alliance and the establishment of command structures was easier than the practical implementation of military cooperation. The fundamental challenge that would plague Chinese-American relations throughout the war emerged almost immediately: the problem of delivering military assistance to China. Before Pearl Harbor, the United States and China had reached agreement on three major points regarding military assistance. First, the United States would provide training and technical support to assist China in establishing a modern air force. Second, the United States would provide training and equipment for a ground army consisting of thirty divisions. Third, the United States would assist China in constructing railways and highways from Yunnan to Burma, along with the provision of rolling stock and vehicles to support these new transportation routes. These were ambitious plans, reflecting the extent of Chinese need and American willingness to support the Chinese war effort. However, the outbreak of the Pacific War threw American plans into disarray. The fundamental strategic doctrine guiding American policy was the "Europe first" strategy, which meant that the European theater and the defeat of Nazi Germany received priority over the Pacific theater. Additionally, China's geography made it extraordinarily difficult to supply. China could only be reached through supply lines of extraordinary length and complexity, either through the port of Rangoon in Burma and then overland via the treacherous Yunnan-Burma Road, or through the port of Hong Kong, which immediately fell into Japanese hands after Pearl Harbor. The first Sino-American loan agreement had specified that the United States would deliver commodities worth $45 million to China in 1941. However, shipping shortages meant that only $26 million worth of commodities actually left the United States. These commodities were shipped to the transit port of Rangoon, where a massive traffic jam developed as supplies accumulated faster than they could be distributed onward to China. Along the Yunnan-Burma Road, that "much-contested life line" as it came to be known, conditions were chaotic. The road had always been a source of trouble: it was long, extraordinarily difficult to keep in repair, fantastically dangerous to travel, and too narrow to permit much volume of traffic at any one time. Due to mismanagement and pilfering, the commodities that were shipped out of Burma suffered heavy losses in transit, and only one-third of them eventually arrived in Chongqing. Yet the United States had already established one valuable asset in China that could be deployed relatively quickly: an air force nucleus. Just before Pearl Harbor, a group of American aviators had been formally organized in Chongqing who worked on volunteer status for China under the command of Colonel Claire Chennault, an American aviation officer who served as instructor at the Chinese Air Force Cadet School. Some of these men had been flying in China since the Kuomintang first began purchasing American aircraft, having come to demonstrate the aircraft and remaining to pilot and teach. Others had hurried to China after being released from their volunteer service in Spain, where they had gained combat experience during the Spanish Civil War. It was a familiar joke that pilots from both sides of the Spanish conflict were likely to meet and work side by side in China, but political convictions proved immaterial to these professional aviators, they got on well enough with each other, mercenaries of the twentieth century united by their expertise and their willingness to fight. When American traffic on the Burma Road swelled in volume and became chaotic, with cargo lost to pilfering and trucks breaking down from mishandling, the air freight service into Chongqing became increasingly vital to maintaining Chinese military capabilities. The backbone of this organization was American, and it had been in operation for months before the Japanese attack. Halfway down the Burma Road, over the border in Burma, was a plane factory backed by American and Chinese capital, providing some degree of repair and maintenance capacity for the aircraft operating out of China. Recognizing the strategic value of these experienced aviators and the need to formalize and expand their operations, American and Chinese officials moved quickly to incorporate this volunteer group, formally known as the American Volunteer Group or "Flying Tigers," into the U.S. Army Air Force. This transformation of volunteer aviators into official American military personnel represented a commitment to providing air support to Chinese operations, recognizing that air power could compensate to some degree for Chinese numerical disadvantages in ground combat. In Chongqing, it was clear that among the United Nations fighting Japan, America was the only one taking China seriously, the only one prepared to invest significant resources in Chinese military capabilities and the Chinese war effort. Yet Pearl Harbor brought consequences that extended far beyond the strategic and diplomatic spheres. For Western civilians living in China,missionaries, teachers, doctors, businessmen, and journalists, the attack represented a catastrophic change in their status and their fate. Until December 8, 1941, Westerners residing in China had maintained a curious protected status as foreign neutrals, even in areas nominally controlled by the Japanese. This status had provided them with a measure of distance from, and protection against, the grinding reality of the war that had devastated Chinese populations. For a century, Americans had been part of an imperial presence in China, sometimes benevolent, sometimes violent, but always ultimately under Western control. That world came to an abrupt end on December 8, 1941. All across eastern China, Americans and Britons were rounded up and interned. The International Settlement of Shanghai—that remarkable oasis of neutrality that had persisted in the midst of a war-torn city—was now reunified under Japanese control. Thousands of foreigners with Allied nationality were sent to holding camps scattered throughout occupied China. Some, like the eleven-year-old British boy Jim Ballard, would remain imprisoned for the remainder of the war, enduring hunger, cold, and disease in camps like Longhua, which housed approximately 2,000 detainees. Forty years later, as the novelist J. G. Ballard, he would memorialized this experience in his semi-autobiographical novel Empire of the Sun. For missionaries like Velva Brown, the evacuation process was degrading and final. The missionary staff were permitted to pack no more than three suitcases with their belongings. As they prepared to leave, Japanese and Taiwanese "sightseeing" parties arrived to decide which houses they might want to occupy. The journey home aboard crowded Japanese ships offered no concessions to status or dignity; ambassadors, consuls, merchants, and missionaries alike were given "bed-sized strips of Chinese matting which we spread side by side on the iron floor of the hold," as Brown recorded. The humiliation was compounded by the finality of it all. For many, their decades-long presence in China was ending not in orderly retreat but in hasty evacuation, leaving behind "servants, many of whom had been with us for fifteen or twenty years." Despite these immediate human tragedies, the strategic transformation that Pearl Harbor wrought for China was undeniable. Chiang Kai-shek now embarked on an entirely new sort of life, heavily involved with the leaders and generals of the Western powers. He held diplomatic discussions with the leaders of the United Nations and military planning sessions with Western generals. In these unfamiliar circumstances, he did his best to live up to the Confucian ideal of the gentleman, seldom permitting the mask to slip—though the pressure of these new responsibilities and the intoxicating combination of vindication and anxiety would occasionally prove too much even for his considerable self-control. Within weeks of Pearl Harbor, Chiang demonstrated the value he could bring to the new alliance. He visited India and spoke with the leaders of the Indian independence struggle as an ally and friend, as a fellow non-European speaking to others seeking to escape from colonialism and imperial domination. He joined the Allies in their first joint campaign, not in China but in the jungles of neighboring Burma, committing Chinese forces to operations outside China's borders in support of the broader Allied military strategy. Yet the price that Chiang would pay for China's belated entry into the global alliance against the Axis powers would prove to be a heavy one. Chiang desperately needed his new American and British partners, but accepting this alliance would unleash forces within Chinese society that would threaten the very basis of his political control. The complexities of this bargain would become most visible in the four-year struggle between Chiang and General Joseph Warren Stilwell, the American officer who would become simultaneously his chief of staff and the administrator of American military assistance to China. This relationship, shaped by mutual suspicion, different strategic visions, and incompatible political agendas, would define Chinese-American military cooperation during the Pacific War and would have profound implications extending far beyond the battlefields of Asia. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Pearl Harbor's shock reverberated through Asia. Japan's assault on Hawaii, combined with invasions of Burma, the Philippines, Guam, and Wake Island, inadvertently transformed regional conflict into global war. Chiang Kai-shek, vindicated after four years of isolation fighting Japan, embraced American alliance with profound relief. The U.S. committed military aid, appointed General Stilwell as chief of staff, and recognized China as a co-belligerent. For Chiang, this partnership brought diplomatic status but also internal tensions that would define the Pacific War's final chapter.
The Sino-American Lunar Race for Permanent Presence. Rick Fisher and Doug Messier. China aims for a permanent lunar presence at the South Pole to potentially deny access to other powers. NASA is countering with a civilian coalition of private partners like SpaceX to develop sustainable infrastructure for future Mars missions. China'sarchitecture mimics Soviet systems, while NASA's Starship requires complex orbital refueling to reach the moon. (15)
In this podcast, recorded before a live audience in China, John is joined by Professor Gao Xiqing, the former Vice Chairman, President, and Chief Investment Officer of the China Investment Corporation, China's largest sovereign wealth fund.They discuss Professor Gao's extraordinary career, from his early days building a railroad in rural China during the Cultural Revolution to earning his JD at Duke University and becoming one of the first Chinese lawyers to pass the New York Bar and work at a major Wall Street law firm.Professor Gao's work on Wall Street led to him explaining, as a third-year associate, the causes of the Black Friday stock market crash to Chinese business and government leaders. He was later called back to China to help design the country's first stock exchange and its securities regulator, the Chinese equivalent of the SEC.They also discuss Professor Gao's role in leading the China Investment Corporation (CIC), one of the world's largest sovereign wealth funds. CIC invests exclusively in businesses outside China, typically acquiring stakes of less than 10%, and allocates its investments roughly equally between publicly listed companies and private equity.Finally, they discuss Professor Gao's perspective on Sino-American relations. He believes that, when viewed in historical context, the two countries have grown significantly closer since the Cold War and that shared cultural values, such as a strong work ethic and a drive to achieve, will help strengthen relations in the future.Podcast Link: Law-disrupted.fmHost: John B. Quinn Producer: Alexis HydeMusic and Editing by: Alexander Rossi
Sino–American company Talison Lithium has ruled out a rail link to the world's biggest lithium mine at Greenbushes in West Australia's South West region.
Arise Africa, Roar China: Black and Chinese Citizens of the World in the Twentieth Century (University of North Carolina Press, 2021) explores the close relationships between three of the most famous twentieth-century African Americans, W. E. B. Du Bois, Paul Robeson, and Langston Hughes, and their little-known Chinese allies during World War II and the Cold War--journalist, musician, and Christian activist Liu Liangmo, and Sino-Caribbean dancer-choreographer Sylvia Si-lan Chen. Charting a new path in the study of Sino-American relations, Gao Yunxiang foregrounds African Americans, combining the study of Black internationalism and the experiences of Chinese Americans with a transpacific narrative and an understanding of the global remaking of China's modern popular culture and politics. Gao reveals earlier and more widespread interactions between Chinese and African American leftists than accounts of the familiar alliance between the Black radicals and the Maoist Chinese would have us believe. The book's multilingual approach draws from massive yet rarely used archival streams in China and in Chinatowns and elsewhere in the United States. These materials allow Gao to retell the well-known stories of Du Bois, Robeson, and Hughes alongside the sagas of Liu and Chen in a work that will transform and redefine Afro-Asia studies. Hettie V. Williams Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of African American history in the Department of History and Anthropology at Monmouth University where she teaches courses in African American history and U.S. history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/african-american-studies
Arise Africa, Roar China: Black and Chinese Citizens of the World in the Twentieth Century (University of North Carolina Press, 2021) explores the close relationships between three of the most famous twentieth-century African Americans, W. E. B. Du Bois, Paul Robeson, and Langston Hughes, and their little-known Chinese allies during World War II and the Cold War--journalist, musician, and Christian activist Liu Liangmo, and Sino-Caribbean dancer-choreographer Sylvia Si-lan Chen. Charting a new path in the study of Sino-American relations, Gao Yunxiang foregrounds African Americans, combining the study of Black internationalism and the experiences of Chinese Americans with a transpacific narrative and an understanding of the global remaking of China's modern popular culture and politics. Gao reveals earlier and more widespread interactions between Chinese and African American leftists than accounts of the familiar alliance between the Black radicals and the Maoist Chinese would have us believe. The book's multilingual approach draws from massive yet rarely used archival streams in China and in Chinatowns and elsewhere in the United States. These materials allow Gao to retell the well-known stories of Du Bois, Robeson, and Hughes alongside the sagas of Liu and Chen in a work that will transform and redefine Afro-Asia studies. Hettie V. Williams Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of African American history in the Department of History and Anthropology at Monmouth University where she teaches courses in African American history and U.S. history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network
Arise Africa, Roar China: Black and Chinese Citizens of the World in the Twentieth Century (University of North Carolina Press, 2021) explores the close relationships between three of the most famous twentieth-century African Americans, W. E. B. Du Bois, Paul Robeson, and Langston Hughes, and their little-known Chinese allies during World War II and the Cold War--journalist, musician, and Christian activist Liu Liangmo, and Sino-Caribbean dancer-choreographer Sylvia Si-lan Chen. Charting a new path in the study of Sino-American relations, Gao Yunxiang foregrounds African Americans, combining the study of Black internationalism and the experiences of Chinese Americans with a transpacific narrative and an understanding of the global remaking of China's modern popular culture and politics. Gao reveals earlier and more widespread interactions between Chinese and African American leftists than accounts of the familiar alliance between the Black radicals and the Maoist Chinese would have us believe. The book's multilingual approach draws from massive yet rarely used archival streams in China and in Chinatowns and elsewhere in the United States. These materials allow Gao to retell the well-known stories of Du Bois, Robeson, and Hughes alongside the sagas of Liu and Chen in a work that will transform and redefine Afro-Asia studies. Hettie V. Williams Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of African American history in the Department of History and Anthropology at Monmouth University where she teaches courses in African American history and U.S. history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies
Arise Africa, Roar China: Black and Chinese Citizens of the World in the Twentieth Century (University of North Carolina Press, 2021) explores the close relationships between three of the most famous twentieth-century African Americans, W. E. B. Du Bois, Paul Robeson, and Langston Hughes, and their little-known Chinese allies during World War II and the Cold War--journalist, musician, and Christian activist Liu Liangmo, and Sino-Caribbean dancer-choreographer Sylvia Si-lan Chen. Charting a new path in the study of Sino-American relations, Gao Yunxiang foregrounds African Americans, combining the study of Black internationalism and the experiences of Chinese Americans with a transpacific narrative and an understanding of the global remaking of China's modern popular culture and politics. Gao reveals earlier and more widespread interactions between Chinese and African American leftists than accounts of the familiar alliance between the Black radicals and the Maoist Chinese would have us believe. The book's multilingual approach draws from massive yet rarely used archival streams in China and in Chinatowns and elsewhere in the United States. These materials allow Gao to retell the well-known stories of Du Bois, Robeson, and Hughes alongside the sagas of Liu and Chen in a work that will transform and redefine Afro-Asia studies. Hettie V. Williams Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of African American history in the Department of History and Anthropology at Monmouth University where she teaches courses in African American history and U.S. history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/asian-american-studies
Arise Africa, Roar China: Black and Chinese Citizens of the World in the Twentieth Century (University of North Carolina Press, 2021) explores the close relationships between three of the most famous twentieth-century African Americans, W. E. B. Du Bois, Paul Robeson, and Langston Hughes, and their little-known Chinese allies during World War II and the Cold War--journalist, musician, and Christian activist Liu Liangmo, and Sino-Caribbean dancer-choreographer Sylvia Si-lan Chen. Charting a new path in the study of Sino-American relations, Gao Yunxiang foregrounds African Americans, combining the study of Black internationalism and the experiences of Chinese Americans with a transpacific narrative and an understanding of the global remaking of China's modern popular culture and politics. Gao reveals earlier and more widespread interactions between Chinese and African American leftists than accounts of the familiar alliance between the Black radicals and the Maoist Chinese would have us believe. The book's multilingual approach draws from massive yet rarely used archival streams in China and in Chinatowns and elsewhere in the United States. These materials allow Gao to retell the well-known stories of Du Bois, Robeson, and Hughes alongside the sagas of Liu and Chen in a work that will transform and redefine Afro-Asia studies. Hettie V. Williams Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of African American history in the Department of History and Anthropology at Monmouth University where she teaches courses in African American history and U.S. history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies
Arise Africa, Roar China: Black and Chinese Citizens of the World in the Twentieth Century (University of North Carolina Press, 2021) explores the close relationships between three of the most famous twentieth-century African Americans, W. E. B. Du Bois, Paul Robeson, and Langston Hughes, and their little-known Chinese allies during World War II and the Cold War--journalist, musician, and Christian activist Liu Liangmo, and Sino-Caribbean dancer-choreographer Sylvia Si-lan Chen. Charting a new path in the study of Sino-American relations, Gao Yunxiang foregrounds African Americans, combining the study of Black internationalism and the experiences of Chinese Americans with a transpacific narrative and an understanding of the global remaking of China's modern popular culture and politics. Gao reveals earlier and more widespread interactions between Chinese and African American leftists than accounts of the familiar alliance between the Black radicals and the Maoist Chinese would have us believe. The book's multilingual approach draws from massive yet rarely used archival streams in China and in Chinatowns and elsewhere in the United States. These materials allow Gao to retell the well-known stories of Du Bois, Robeson, and Hughes alongside the sagas of Liu and Chen in a work that will transform and redefine Afro-Asia studies. Hettie V. Williams Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of African American history in the Department of History and Anthropology at Monmouth University where she teaches courses in African American history and U.S. history.
This timely collection of essays examines Sino-American relations during the Second World War, the Chinese Civil War and the opening of the Cold War. Drawing on new sources uncovered in China, Taiwan, the UK and the US, the authors demonstrate how 'grassroots' engagements - not just elite diplomacy - established the trans-Pacific networks that both shaped the postwar order in Asia, and continue to influence Sino-US relations today. In these crucial years, servicemen, scientists, students, businesspeople, activists, bureaucrats and many others travelled between the US and China. In every chapter, this innovative volume's approach uncovers their stories using both Chinese and English language sources. By examining interactions among various Chinese and American actors in the dynamic wartime environment, Uneasy Allies: Sino-American Relations at the Grassroots, 1937–1949 (Cambridge UP, 2024) reveals a new perspective on the foundations of American power, the brittle nature of the Sino-American relationship, and the early formation of the institutions that shaped the Cold War Pacific. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network
This timely collection of essays examines Sino-American relations during the Second World War, the Chinese Civil War and the opening of the Cold War. Drawing on new sources uncovered in China, Taiwan, the UK and the US, the authors demonstrate how 'grassroots' engagements - not just elite diplomacy - established the trans-Pacific networks that both shaped the postwar order in Asia, and continue to influence Sino-US relations today. In these crucial years, servicemen, scientists, students, businesspeople, activists, bureaucrats and many others travelled between the US and China. In every chapter, this innovative volume's approach uncovers their stories using both Chinese and English language sources. By examining interactions among various Chinese and American actors in the dynamic wartime environment, Uneasy Allies: Sino-American Relations at the Grassroots, 1937–1949 (Cambridge UP, 2024) reveals a new perspective on the foundations of American power, the brittle nature of the Sino-American relationship, and the early formation of the institutions that shaped the Cold War Pacific. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/national-security
This timely collection of essays examines Sino-American relations during the Second World War, the Chinese Civil War and the opening of the Cold War. Drawing on new sources uncovered in China, Taiwan, the UK and the US, the authors demonstrate how 'grassroots' engagements - not just elite diplomacy - established the trans-Pacific networks that both shaped the postwar order in Asia, and continue to influence Sino-US relations today. In these crucial years, servicemen, scientists, students, businesspeople, activists, bureaucrats and many others travelled between the US and China. In every chapter, this innovative volume's approach uncovers their stories using both Chinese and English language sources. By examining interactions among various Chinese and American actors in the dynamic wartime environment, Uneasy Allies: Sino-American Relations at the Grassroots, 1937–1949 (Cambridge UP, 2024) reveals a new perspective on the foundations of American power, the brittle nature of the Sino-American relationship, and the early formation of the institutions that shaped the Cold War Pacific. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
This timely collection of essays examines Sino-American relations during the Second World War, the Chinese Civil War and the opening of the Cold War. Drawing on new sources uncovered in China, Taiwan, the UK and the US, the authors demonstrate how 'grassroots' engagements - not just elite diplomacy - established the trans-Pacific networks that both shaped the postwar order in Asia, and continue to influence Sino-US relations today. In these crucial years, servicemen, scientists, students, businesspeople, activists, bureaucrats and many others travelled between the US and China. In every chapter, this innovative volume's approach uncovers their stories using both Chinese and English language sources. By examining interactions among various Chinese and American actors in the dynamic wartime environment, Uneasy Allies: Sino-American Relations at the Grassroots, 1937–1949 (Cambridge UP, 2024) reveals a new perspective on the foundations of American power, the brittle nature of the Sino-American relationship, and the early formation of the institutions that shaped the Cold War Pacific.
At a time of heightened tension and strategic recalibration, the U.S.-China relationship is undergoing significant change as the Trump Administration announces high tariffs on Chinese goods and trade and investment restrictions while also signaling that President Trump may be open to negotiations. Sino-American competition is intensifying across economic, political, and technological realms, and opportunities for collaboration to tackle global issues such as AI governance, climate change, and public health remain elusive. From debates over trade and industrial policy to diverging visions of the global order, the world's two largest powers are navigating a period of profound uncertainty. Alison Friedman, Andrew Polk, and Jessica Chen Weiss joined NCUSCR President Stephen Orlins on May 20 for the National Committee's annual Members' Program, where they discussed the state of the U.S.-China relationship from cultural, economic and trade, and political perspectives. About the speakers
With the fifth anniversary of the last big Hong Kong marches behind us and the first anniversary of the National Security Law's imposition on the horizon, Jeffrey Wasserstrom and Emily Feng assess the city's recent past and significantly changed realities. What is the legacy of the protest surge of 2019? What is most and least surprising about how Hong Kong has been transformed in this decade? How can we place the Hong Kong story into national narratives about the way the PRC has been moving under Xi Jinping? How can we connect the Hong Kong events to trends in other parts of Asia and beyond? In an interview conducted on April 9, 2025, Jeffrey Wasserstrom and Emily Feng, in conversation with Sewell Chan, discuss the implications of developments in Hong Kong over the last ten years for HK-mainland relations, Sino-American relations, and trends in the region. About the speakers
The Global South is a term that covers a broad swath of developing countries and emerging economies in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Oceania. It is a grouping of over 130 heterogenous countries that is pushing to enhance its voice in global decision making. China, which self-identifies as a leader of the developing world, has a long history of engaging with the developing world. Under Xi Jinping, Beijing has deepened its ties with Global South countries through economic investment, diplomatic engagement, and security cooperation. Meanwhile, developed countries from the wealthier and more industrialized Global North are stepping up efforts to counter Chinese influence and win support from Global South countries. What are China's interests in the Global South? What are the key strategies and tactics that Beijing utilizes to influence and engage with those countries? How have countries in the Global South responded to China's influence? And how will intensified Sino-American rivalry impact developing countries in the future? To discuss these issues, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Mr. Masaaki Yatsuzuka, Senior Research Fellow at the China Division of the Regional Studies Department at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Japan (NIDS). He is the co-author of the recently published report titled “The Rising Global South and China.” Timestamps[00:00] Start[01:55] Resurgent Interest in the Global South [04:28] Engaging Developing Countries[06:51] Economic Tools and Mechanisms to Exert Influence[08:55] Motivation for Expanding Military Presence [12:33] Perceptions of China in the Global South [15:07] Why does China's involvement in the Global South matter? [17:39] US-China Competition Impacting the Global South[19:00] India, Brazil, and Other Rising Powers[20:35] Tokyo's Concerns Over China's Influence [22:41] Response to Increased Attention Paid to Developing Countries[24:37] China's Reaction to the Trump Administration
In the first of a series of podcasts recorded before a live audience in China, John is joined by Professor Gao Xiqing, the former Vice Chairman, President and Chief Investment Officer of the China Investment Corporation, the largest Chinese Sovereign Wealth. They discuss Prof. Gao's extraordinary career from his early days building a railroad in rural China during the Cultural Revolution to earning his JD at Duke and becoming the one of the first Chinese lawyers to pass the New York bar and work at a major Wall Street firm. Prof. Gao's work on Wall Street led to him explaining, as a third year associate, the causes of the Black Friday stock market crash to Chinese business and government leaders. Later he was called back to China to design its first stock exchange and the Chinese regulator equivalent to the SEC. They also discuss Prof. Gao's role in running the China Investment Corporation (CIC), one of the world's largest sovereign wealth funds. CIC invests only in private businesses outside of China, purchases less than a 10% stake in those companies, and splits its investments roughly evenly between publicly traded companies and private equity. Finally, they discuss Prof. Gao's perspective on Sino-American relations. He believes that, viewed in perspective, the two countries have grown much closer since the days of the Cold War and that common cultural values, such as the drive to work hard and achieve, will lead to closer relations in the future. Podcast Link: Law-disrupted.fmHost: John B. Quinn Producer: Alexis HydeMusic and Editing by: Alexander Rossi
On Taiwan, semiconductors, and war. [Full episode for subscribers only] James Lin, Assistant Professor of International Studies at the University of Washington at Seattle, talks to Phil about Taiwanese politics and the country's place in the world, in terms of the global economy and Sino-American geopolitical rivalry. We talk about Taiwanese history and politics, from Japanese occupation and colonisation across the Cold War, to the present day, including: Taiwanese politics in the shadow of the geopolitical crisis The paradox of political divergence and economic convergence between China and Taiwan since the 1980s How did Taiwan corner the market for manufacturing computer chips? How successful is the ongoing US reshoring of chip production? Will there be a Marco Rubio/Elon Musk divide on China in the Trump White House? How might a war over Taiwan play out? Links: In the Global Vanguard: Agrarian Development and the Making of Modern Taiwan, James Lin, UC Press What Works in Taiwan Doesn't Always in Arizona, a Chipmaking Giant Learns, John Liu, NY Times Will Trump take the Musk path or the Rubio path on Taiwan?, Lev Nachman, Nikkei Asia
COVID-19 and U.S.-China Relations examines the profound and lasting impact of COVID-19 on Sino-American relations. It covers an array of areas including public health, trade and supply chain challenges, people-to-people connections, shifts in public opinion, rising nationalism, anti-Asian sentiment, and strategic assessments. Since the pandemic's outbreak in late 2019, China and the United States have both suffered enormously. So too has the U.S.-China relationship, which was already at a low point before COVID-19 accelerated its deterioration. With contributions by leading and emerging scholars from both nations, the open-access volume reflects a collaborative effort, emphasizing the importance of bilateral dialogue. As the world moves beyond the COVID era, this book offers insights into potential pathways for rebuilding and redefining U.S.-China relations. In an interview conducted on September 26, 2024, volume editor Zheng Wang is joined by chapter contributors Yanzhong Huang and Joan Kaufman in conversation with Margaret Lewis. About the speakers: https://www.ncuscr.org/event/covid-19-and-u-s-china-relations/ Subscribe to the National Committee on YouTube for the video of this interview. Follow us on Twitter (@ncuscr), Instagram (@ncuscr), and LinkedIn.
The Tormented Alliance: American Servicemen and the Occupation of China, 1941–1949 (UNC Press, 2022) explores the wartime partnership between China and the United States from the ground up. Beginning in 1941, and especially after Pearl Harbor, both sides had high hopes for wartime cooperation against Japan. But as The Tormented Alliance shows, ‘a military alliance with the United States means a military occupation by the United States.' This occupation was underpinned by inequalities of race, gender, nation, wealth, and power which strained relations between China and the United States during both the Second World War and the ensuing Chinese Civil War. The tens of thousands of US military personnel in China transformed themselves into a widely loathed occupation force: an aggressive, resentful, emasculating source of physical danger and compromised sovereignty. Following multiple archival trails, Fredman finds how negative on-the-ground interactions between US servicemen and all kinds of Chinese people – civilian and military – turned Sino-American cooperation into a ‘tormented alliance' and helped unravel it from below. This groundbreaking study is highly recommended for anyone interested in twentieth-century China, US foreign relations, and the history of war. Mark Baker is lecturer (assistant professor) in East Asian history at the University of Manchester, UK. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network
The Tormented Alliance: American Servicemen and the Occupation of China, 1941–1949 (UNC Press, 2022) explores the wartime partnership between China and the United States from the ground up. Beginning in 1941, and especially after Pearl Harbor, both sides had high hopes for wartime cooperation against Japan. But as The Tormented Alliance shows, ‘a military alliance with the United States means a military occupation by the United States.' This occupation was underpinned by inequalities of race, gender, nation, wealth, and power which strained relations between China and the United States during both the Second World War and the ensuing Chinese Civil War. The tens of thousands of US military personnel in China transformed themselves into a widely loathed occupation force: an aggressive, resentful, emasculating source of physical danger and compromised sovereignty. Following multiple archival trails, Fredman finds how negative on-the-ground interactions between US servicemen and all kinds of Chinese people – civilian and military – turned Sino-American cooperation into a ‘tormented alliance' and helped unravel it from below. This groundbreaking study is highly recommended for anyone interested in twentieth-century China, US foreign relations, and the history of war. Mark Baker is lecturer (assistant professor) in East Asian history at the University of Manchester, UK. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history
The Tormented Alliance: American Servicemen and the Occupation of China, 1941–1949 (UNC Press, 2022) explores the wartime partnership between China and the United States from the ground up. Beginning in 1941, and especially after Pearl Harbor, both sides had high hopes for wartime cooperation against Japan. But as The Tormented Alliance shows, ‘a military alliance with the United States means a military occupation by the United States.' This occupation was underpinned by inequalities of race, gender, nation, wealth, and power which strained relations between China and the United States during both the Second World War and the ensuing Chinese Civil War. The tens of thousands of US military personnel in China transformed themselves into a widely loathed occupation force: an aggressive, resentful, emasculating source of physical danger and compromised sovereignty. Following multiple archival trails, Fredman finds how negative on-the-ground interactions between US servicemen and all kinds of Chinese people – civilian and military – turned Sino-American cooperation into a ‘tormented alliance' and helped unravel it from below. This groundbreaking study is highly recommended for anyone interested in twentieth-century China, US foreign relations, and the history of war. Mark Baker is lecturer (assistant professor) in East Asian history at the University of Manchester, UK. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies
The Tormented Alliance: American Servicemen and the Occupation of China, 1941–1949 (UNC Press, 2022) explores the wartime partnership between China and the United States from the ground up. Beginning in 1941, and especially after Pearl Harbor, both sides had high hopes for wartime cooperation against Japan. But as The Tormented Alliance shows, ‘a military alliance with the United States means a military occupation by the United States.' This occupation was underpinned by inequalities of race, gender, nation, wealth, and power which strained relations between China and the United States during both the Second World War and the ensuing Chinese Civil War. The tens of thousands of US military personnel in China transformed themselves into a widely loathed occupation force: an aggressive, resentful, emasculating source of physical danger and compromised sovereignty. Following multiple archival trails, Fredman finds how negative on-the-ground interactions between US servicemen and all kinds of Chinese people – civilian and military – turned Sino-American cooperation into a ‘tormented alliance' and helped unravel it from below. This groundbreaking study is highly recommended for anyone interested in twentieth-century China, US foreign relations, and the history of war. Mark Baker is lecturer (assistant professor) in East Asian history at the University of Manchester, UK. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history
The Tormented Alliance: American Servicemen and the Occupation of China, 1941–1949 (UNC Press, 2022) explores the wartime partnership between China and the United States from the ground up. Beginning in 1941, and especially after Pearl Harbor, both sides had high hopes for wartime cooperation against Japan. But as The Tormented Alliance shows, ‘a military alliance with the United States means a military occupation by the United States.' This occupation was underpinned by inequalities of race, gender, nation, wealth, and power which strained relations between China and the United States during both the Second World War and the ensuing Chinese Civil War. The tens of thousands of US military personnel in China transformed themselves into a widely loathed occupation force: an aggressive, resentful, emasculating source of physical danger and compromised sovereignty. Following multiple archival trails, Fredman finds how negative on-the-ground interactions between US servicemen and all kinds of Chinese people – civilian and military – turned Sino-American cooperation into a ‘tormented alliance' and helped unravel it from below. This groundbreaking study is highly recommended for anyone interested in twentieth-century China, US foreign relations, and the history of war. Mark Baker is lecturer (assistant professor) in East Asian history at the University of Manchester, UK. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies
The Tormented Alliance: American Servicemen and the Occupation of China, 1941–1949 (UNC Press, 2022) explores the wartime partnership between China and the United States from the ground up. Beginning in 1941, and especially after Pearl Harbor, both sides had high hopes for wartime cooperation against Japan. But as The Tormented Alliance shows, ‘a military alliance with the United States means a military occupation by the United States.' This occupation was underpinned by inequalities of race, gender, nation, wealth, and power which strained relations between China and the United States during both the Second World War and the ensuing Chinese Civil War. The tens of thousands of US military personnel in China transformed themselves into a widely loathed occupation force: an aggressive, resentful, emasculating source of physical danger and compromised sovereignty. Following multiple archival trails, Fredman finds how negative on-the-ground interactions between US servicemen and all kinds of Chinese people – civilian and military – turned Sino-American cooperation into a ‘tormented alliance' and helped unravel it from below. This groundbreaking study is highly recommended for anyone interested in twentieth-century China, US foreign relations, and the history of war. Mark Baker is lecturer (assistant professor) in East Asian history at the University of Manchester, UK. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/american-studies
The Tormented Alliance: American Servicemen and the Occupation of China, 1941–1949 (UNC Press, 2022) explores the wartime partnership between China and the United States from the ground up. Beginning in 1941, and especially after Pearl Harbor, both sides had high hopes for wartime cooperation against Japan. But as The Tormented Alliance shows, ‘a military alliance with the United States means a military occupation by the United States.' This occupation was underpinned by inequalities of race, gender, nation, wealth, and power which strained relations between China and the United States during both the Second World War and the ensuing Chinese Civil War. The tens of thousands of US military personnel in China transformed themselves into a widely loathed occupation force: an aggressive, resentful, emasculating source of physical danger and compromised sovereignty. Following multiple archival trails, Fredman finds how negative on-the-ground interactions between US servicemen and all kinds of Chinese people – civilian and military – turned Sino-American cooperation into a ‘tormented alliance' and helped unravel it from below. This groundbreaking study is highly recommended for anyone interested in twentieth-century China, US foreign relations, and the history of war. Mark Baker is lecturer (assistant professor) in East Asian history at the University of Manchester, UK. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
The Tormented Alliance: American Servicemen and the Occupation of China, 1941–1949 (UNC Press, 2022) explores the wartime partnership between China and the United States from the ground up. Beginning in 1941, and especially after Pearl Harbor, both sides had high hopes for wartime cooperation against Japan. But as The Tormented Alliance shows, ‘a military alliance with the United States means a military occupation by the United States.' This occupation was underpinned by inequalities of race, gender, nation, wealth, and power which strained relations between China and the United States during both the Second World War and the ensuing Chinese Civil War. The tens of thousands of US military personnel in China transformed themselves into a widely loathed occupation force: an aggressive, resentful, emasculating source of physical danger and compromised sovereignty. Following multiple archival trails, Fredman finds how negative on-the-ground interactions between US servicemen and all kinds of Chinese people – civilian and military – turned Sino-American cooperation into a ‘tormented alliance' and helped unravel it from below. This groundbreaking study is highly recommended for anyone interested in twentieth-century China, US foreign relations, and the history of war. Mark Baker is lecturer (assistant professor) in East Asian history at the University of Manchester, UK.
The Tormented Alliance: American Servicemen and the Occupation of China, 1941–1949 (UNC Press, 2022) explores the wartime partnership between China and the United States from the ground up. Beginning in 1941, and especially after Pearl Harbor, both sides had high hopes for wartime cooperation against Japan. But as The Tormented Alliance shows, ‘a military alliance with the United States means a military occupation by the United States.' This occupation was underpinned by inequalities of race, gender, nation, wealth, and power which strained relations between China and the United States during both the Second World War and the ensuing Chinese Civil War. The tens of thousands of US military personnel in China transformed themselves into a widely loathed occupation force: an aggressive, resentful, emasculating source of physical danger and compromised sovereignty. Following multiple archival trails, Fredman finds how negative on-the-ground interactions between US servicemen and all kinds of Chinese people – civilian and military – turned Sino-American cooperation into a ‘tormented alliance' and helped unravel it from below. This groundbreaking study is highly recommended for anyone interested in twentieth-century China, US foreign relations, and the history of war. Mark Baker is lecturer (assistant professor) in East Asian history at the University of Manchester, UK. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/japanese-studies
The United States and China have had a turbulent history. In recent years, diplomatic relations between the world's two largest economies reached what many observers described as a new low, and despite some growing signs of stability, the future remains uncertain. So, how might this precarious situation be impacted by the upcoming US election?For the latest episode in this special series, Sumi Somaskanda is joined by the BBC's China correspondent Laura Bicker, and our business correspondent Michelle Fleury. They tackle big issues from trade and the economy, to defence and national security, and consider what victory for either Kamala Harris or Donald Trump could mean for the ongoing Sino-American relationship.The Global Story brings you trusted insights from BBC journalists worldwide. We want your ideas, stories and experiences to help us tell #TheGlobalStory. Email us at theglobalstory@bbc.com You can also message us or leave a voice note via WhatsApp on +44 330 123 9480.Producer: Laurie KalusSound engineers: Stephen Bailey, Hannah Montgomery, and Ben AndrewsAssistant editor: Sergi Forcada FreixasSenior news editor: Sara WadesonIf you want to hear more from our 'America and...' series, why not listen to the first episode here: https://link.chtbl.com/gqWrGSMT
To overcome “brain drain,” some countries encourage their overseas nationals to use the knowledge they gained abroad to help their motherlands. Since the mid-1990s, China's party-state efforts include a wide array of programs and incentives to encourage overseas talent to transfer their knowledge back home. Many Chinese working abroad participate, some to strengthen their former homeland, others from self-interest. Author David Zweig's new book, The War for Chinese Talent in America: The Politics of Technology and Knowledge in Sino-U.S. Relations, documents China's effort to access U.S. technology and America's vigorous counterattacks and efforts to disrupt the transfer of American technology to China. In an interview conducted on September 10, 2024, David Zweig, in conversation with Yangyang Cheng, explores the status of Sino-American scientific collaboration and the outflow of some top Chinese talent from the United States back to China. About the speakers: https://www.ncuscr.org/event/the-war-for-chinese-talent-in-america/ Subscribe to the National Committee on YouTube for the video of this interview. Follow us on Twitter (@ncuscr), Instagram (@ncuscr), and LinkedIn.
When global supply chains were shut down in 2020 and messily rebooted after COVID lockdowns ceased, one island nation emerged as the most important player in getting critical components to factories around the world. That was Taiwan, which produces 90 percent of the world's advanced semiconductors. Without this island nation of 23 million, there are no smart phones, new cars, or any advanced consumer electronics.Things were no less dull on the foreign policy side, as US-Chinese relations deteriorated. When Nancy Pelosi declared her intent to visit Taiwan in 2022, it sparked frenzied discussions across the United States, China, and Taiwan—a discourse that was characterized by amnesia and half-truths about the history of this pivotal island nation. Today, as relations between Washington and Beijing deteriorate and as tensions over Taiwan reach a boiling point, its survival as an independent democracy is precarious indeed. Any attempt to resolve the impasse and avert a devastating war demands that we understand how it all began. To explore Taiwan's modern history is toda's guest Sulmaan Wasif Khan, author of “The Struggle for Taiwan: A History of America, China, and the Island Caught Between.' The story begins in 1943, when the Allies declared that Japanese-held Taiwan would return to China at the conclusion of World War II. When the Communist Party came to power in China, the defeated Nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-shek, fled to Taiwan, where he was afforded US protection despite establishing a brutal police state. From the White Terror to the Taiwan Straits Crises, from the normalization of Sino-American relations to the tensions of the Trump-era, we look at the tortuous paths that led to our present predicament. War is not inevitable, Khan shows, but to avoid it, decision-makers must heed the lessons of the past.
This week on Sinica, a conversation that I moderated on May 30th called “Assessing the Impact of US-China Rivalry on Ukraine and Taiwan,” put on by the Ukrainian Platform for Contemporary China. The main organizer was my friend Vita Golod, who is the chair of the Ukrainian Association of Sinologists. The panelists are: Dmytro Burtsev, a Junior Fellow at A. Krymskyi Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine.Da Wei, Director of the Center for International Security and Strategy and Professor at the School of Social Sciences at Tsinghua University. Emilian Kavalski, Professor at the Centre for International Studies and Development at Jagiellonian University in Krakow. I Yuan, Adjunct Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taiwan.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.
What are the objectives of China's foreign and security policies under Xi Jinping? What is the role of Australia and other middle powers in responding to Chinese actions in the Indo-Pacific? Are the United States' China policies set to change with future shifts in the international order? In this episode, Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Dan Blumenthal join David Andrews to discuss the drivers of the China and the United States' security policies, the role of China in the international order, middle powers, and deterrence. Sheena Chestnut Greitens is an Associate Professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. She is currently a Visiting Associate Research Professor of Indo-Pacific Security at the United States Army War College. Dan Blumenthal is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he focuses on East Asian security in Sino-American relations, and a Distinguished Visting Professor at the US Naval War College. David Andrews is a Senior Policy Advisor at the ANU National Security College. Show notes ANU National Security College academic programs: find out more Playing both sides of the US-Chinese rivalry by Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Isaac Kardon From Coercion to Capitulation, How China Can take Taiwan Without a War by Dan Blumenthal et al We'd love to hear from you! Send in your questions, comments, and suggestions to NatSecPod@anu.edu.au. You can tweet us @NSC_ANU and be sure to subscribe so you don't miss out on future episodes. The National Security Podcast is available on Acast, Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and wherever you get your podcasts. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
Dan Blumenthal is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he focuses on East Asian security issues and Sino-American relations. Mr. Blumenthal has served in and advised the US government on China issues for more than a decade. Before joining AEI, Mr. Blumenthal served as senior director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia at the US Department of Defense. He served as a commissioner on the congressionally mandated US-China Economic and Security Review Commission from 2006 to 2012, and he was vice chairman of the commission in 2007. He also served on the Academic Advisory Board of the congressional US-China Working Group.
On this week's Defense & Aerospace Report Business Roundtable, sponsored by Bell, Dr. Rocket Ron Epstein of Bank of America Securities, Sash Tusa of the independent equity research firm Agency Partners, and Richard Aboulafia of the AeroDynamic advisory consultancy, join host Vago Muradian discuss how aerospace and defense stocks performed as cooling US inflation drove the Dow past 40,000, a fast-changing European defense spending environment as Germany pledges another 100 billion euros to improve military capabilities, the case for US investment in the European defense market as French President Emmanuel Macron works to attract investors to France and Europe, British defense spending outlook, what President Biden's 100 percent tariffs on Chinese electric cars means for broader Sino-American trade, shareholders allow Boeing CEO Dave Calhoun to keep his $32.5 million pay package and his seat on the company's board, Russian's offensive against Ukraine, and reflections on the upcoming 80th anniversary of the D-Day landings.
David M. Lampton's new book addresses a core critique of the management of Sino-American relations across eight administrations: that naïve American elites conflated their hopes for democracy and a globally responsible China with the actual prospects for those ends, and, in the process, traded away American interests, competitive position, and national security. The book challenges that narrative. Developments in the U.S.-China relationship are converging in ways that are setting off major alarms; the level of hazard is unlike anything we have seen in a half-century. Living U.S.-China Relations describes the current situation and explains what has brought us to this juncture. In an interview conducted on March 5, 2024, David M. Lampton, in conversation with Jan Berris and Gina Tam, discusses U.S.-China ties as a relationship between two societies, not just two states, through the vantage point of the author's lived experience over nearly six decades. About the speakers: https://www.ncuscr.org/event/living-us-china-relations-cold-war/ Subscribe to the National Committee on YouTube for video of this interview. Follow us on Twitter (@ncuscr) and Instagram (@ncuscr).
Last time we spoke about Operation HA-GO, U-GO and some action brewing up on New Britain and Bougainville. Mutaguchi basically tricked his superiors at Tokyo into allowing him to attempt an invasion of India. Operations HA-GO and U-GO were simultaneously unleashed, the only problem was the allies were very ready to meet them. General Slim's men captured documents indicating the true nature of the operations and he acted accordingly. The new box defense systems were employed as the allies lured the Japanese into major traps thwarting their designs against Imphal. The Japanese were fighting tenaciously, but time and supplies would not be on their side. Over on New Britain the allies advanced and managed to seize Talasea. Meanwhile on Bougainville the Japanese were preparing a large counteroffensive, attempting to breach the American defensive perimeter. The operation had just kicked off last episode and today we will continue the story. This episode is the Bougainville Counteroffensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. The Marines departed Bougainville and were relieved by the Americal Division by the end of January 1944. Sporadic fighting emerged and through it Major General Griswold obtained intelligence indicating the Japanese would launch a major counter attack, most likely slated for early March. At the time Lt General Hyakutake was under extreme pressure to reduce the bombing against Rabaul. Rabaul as we know was smashed daily, suffering heavy losses. Admiral Koga had responded by taking away air units from Truk, but all this achieved was even more losses. Rabaul was neutralized, and Truk became vulnerable. The Americans had pummeled both so much, they were able to unleash a dramatic thrust into the central pacific aimed at the Gilberts, Marshalls and later the Carolines. Now it seems Hyakutake had been operating under some very bad intelligence, indicating to him the Americans were defending their perimeter with just a single division around the airfield. With the objective of destroying said airfield, Hyakutake did not know the actual number of defenders and would not enjoy movement by sea. The Americans had full control of the sea lanes, thus any IJN destroyers trying to move troops would run a risky gauntlet. By the first quarter of 1944, Rabaul had tossed meager attacks against the Americans, for example on January 23rd two bombers scored a direct hit over the living quarters of Brigadier General John Hodge and his senior staff officers. What Hyakutake had to work with was 4300 men of the 45th regiment led by Colonel Isashi Magata. These men were considered the crack troops on Bougainville and they included artillery, mortar and engineering battalions. They were further supported by 4125 men of the 23rd regiment led by Major General Shun Iwara and 1350 men of the 13th regiment led by Colonel Toyo Horei Muda. All three units would be led by Major General Masatane Kanda. The 3 units made an arduous trek through the jungles to reach their jump off points by the evening of March 7th. Hyakutake then sent them a resounding message “time has come to manifest our knighthood with the pure brilliance of the sword. It is our duty to erase the mortification of our brothers at Guadalcanal. Attack! Assault! Destroy everything! Cut, slash, and mow them down. May the color of the red emblem of our arms be deepened with the blood of American rascals.” Major General Kanda also added his own message “The cry of our victory at Torokina Bay shall resound to the shores of our beloved Nippon. We are invincible.” All of these troops received a large morale boost from such message, but on top of that there was something else incentivising them all. They had adequate food to last them until April 1st, they literally needed to overrun the Americans to steal their provisions. Such was the reality of the Japanese island hopping campaigns. Hyakutakes forces proved themselves far from invincible. Their artillery bombarded on the morning of the 8th, targeting the airfield at Piva Yoke. Their bombardment destroyed a bomber, 3 fighters, killed a single man, and forced a temporary evacuation of aircraft to New Georgia. It was now exactly the greatest of results. Artilleryman Stan Coleman vividly described the Japanese artillery attack “All of a sudden we heard a very different kind of ‘whoosh.' It was made by a shell at the end of its flight, not the beginning. It was ‘incoming mail.' All hell broke loose. In the rear some fuel dumps went up. Every American artillery piece in the perimeter went into action.” The American artillery counter-attack proved far more effective. The Japanese artillery units were forced to move positions constantly and then they were met by a new type of weapon. As Coleman recalled “Four blue Marine Corsairs came in with rockets. Rockets were a new ground-support weapon and I had never seen them … The rockets in flight made a fearful display. There was a tremendous concussion when they struck their target.” That same night the Iwasa Unit attacked Hill 700 during a heavy downpour. Yet by 2:30am the first attacks were beaten off. It seems the experience persuaded the Japanese not to attempt another night attack on March 9th. Instead, they used occasional machine gun and mortar fire to disrupt the fitful sleep of the Americans. Then at 6:45am on the 10th, Iwasa launched another attack in coordination with Colonel Muda's assault against Hill 260. Iwasa's men clambered up the steep 70 degree slopes screaming maniacally. They would shout confused threats in English. A prolific slaughter occurred against one group of Japanese soldiers who seized out a pillbox and set up a machine gun post on the saddle of the hill. It was dearly bought. General Griswold had brought up more reinforcements for the 145th that same morning. Engineers put together a bangalore torpedo 72 feet long by connecting sticks of dynamite like a long pipe. The object was to climb the hill and then snake the charge down the opposite side into one of the pillboxes. Unfortunately the Japanese spotted them and fired a knee mortar, hitting the torpedo and killing the engineers. Another ruse was attempted shortly after noon with the object of getting the Japanese on the saddle to surrender. A public address system was set up with speakers aimed at Hill 700, and one of the division's Japanese interpreters spoke to the defenders. He informed them of the odds against their success and told them that they could not be reinforced. If they surrendered, it would be considered honorable. To die needlessly was foolish. For the short time he spoke all was quiet, but seconds after he had finished the Japanese directed a mortar barrage on the section of the hill from whence he was broadcasting. The day ended in victory for the riflemen of the 37th Division. At 11:15 an air strike by 26 planes and continuous artillery fire had devastated the Japanese. The day's assault cost the lives of some 500 or more Japanese soldiers. Meanwhile further south, the 1st battalion, 13th regiment was knocked out by heavy artillery fire. Colonel Muda sent his 3rd battalion, 13th regiment to attack the southern positions of the 182nd regiment around Hill 260. Hill 260, a twin-peaked rise close to the west bank of the Torokina River approximately four miles north of its mouth, was covered with heavy vegetation. The hill itself measured only 850 yards along its north-south axis and at its widest a mere 450 yards, and it was shaped roughly like an hourglass, with the highest elevations to the north and south connected by a narrow saddle. The eastern slope of the hill was precipitous, steepest along the South Knob, where it was almost perpendicular. The South Knob, which was considered the most important part of Hill 260, had been occupied by men of 2nd battalion, 182th regiment since early January, and vigorous patrolling had also been carried on regularly along the saddle and on the unoccupied North Knob. The hill was about half a mile east of the 182nd's main line of resistance. Between Hill 260 and the main line of the Americal was a small stream named Eagle Creek, which provided a natural defensive barrier. There was but a single trail leading from the main perimeter to South Knob. A small bridge over the creek could take vehicular traffic. The last hundred yards to the top of South Knob was a steep stairway cut into the sides of the hill. Possession of this portion of the hill was important for both sides. The Americans had built a platform near the top of a 150-foot banyan tree from which forward observers could see any enemy-activity along the Torokina River or along the highlands to the northeast. Conversely, if the Japanese could seize the hill they could have good observation of the American-held Hills 608 and 309 and the area behind them. Under the cover of intense machine-gun and mortar fire, the Japanese managed to climb the steep slope of the South Knob and then burst in among the outnumbered Americans. The position was held by a reinforced platoon of Company G of the 182nd and a forward observer team of the 246th Field Artillery Battalion. The Americans were rapidly wiped out and dispersed as Muda's men established a defensive perimeter over the crest of South Knob. Hearing the dire news, General Griswold ordered General Hodge to hold Hill 260 at all costs, an order that surprised many of the Americal's staff since they had not expected to try to hold the hill in the face of a concerted Japanese attack. Companies E and F immediately advanced to occupy the North Knob and then attempted an encircling maneuver to counterattack the newly-established Japanese perimeter. Company E at 8:45 attacked South Knob from the southwest while Company F moved south. The company began its attack at 10:45 but halted after the troops had advanced a few yards into the cleared zone. The men took whatever cover was available and waited for flame throwers before trying to advance farther. At approximately 2:45 the commander, Lieutenant Colonel Dexter Lowry, ordered the attack resumed; Company E split and attempted an envelopment. The northern prong of the envelopment was halted but the infantrymen of the southern prong, using grenades and flame throwers, managed to gain a lodgment within earshot of the men of Company G who were still holding out in the pillbox. Meanwhile, the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 145th Regiment had been reorganized and launched a counterattack against Hill 700 at 5:00. The Japanese unleashed intense mortar and artillery ied, but gradually were dislodge from the crest of the hill, leaving just 4 pillboxes remaining under their control. After the reestablishment of the original resistance line, Iwasa prepared his men to storm Pat's Nose during the night. The Japanese had lost heavily during these attacks, which also cost the 145th three dead and 121 wounded. During the night, after a failed bayonet charge, the Japanese would reinforce their position on Hill 260. They then struck at Company E early in the morning of March 11th and although this attack was beaten off, the American situation in the lodgment had become desperate. Thus, after another Japanese flanking attack, the defenders would have to pull back towards North Knob. Company G was sent to relieve the beleaguered Company E but was halted by yet another Japanese flanking attack on Company E. General Hodge, fearful of reducing his main defense line, felt that he could send no more reserves to the hill and therefore decided to break off the action and pull Company G and what was left of Company E off South Knob. They retired, unimpeded by the Japanese, behind Eagle Creek. There they joined Company B and then proceeded to cut a new trail up to the crest of North Knob. At daybreak on 11 March, Iwasa launched another attack against the promontory called ‘Pat's Nose,' some 150 yards to the west of ‘Hill 700.' Flanking 37 mm guns cut the Japanese charge to shreds. Iwasa's rear echelons kept advancing over the dead bodies of those who had been leading the charge and eventually managed to break through the barbed wire, though they too were ultimately destroyed. After an hour of suicidal attack Iwasa's troops receded leaving some 84 dead behind them. The 37th Division's historian described this attack: "Brandishing their prized sabers, screeching 'Chusuto' (Damn them!), the Jap officers climbed up the slope and rushed forward in an admirable display of blind courage. The men screamed in reply 'Yaruzo' (Let's do it!) and then 'Yarimosu' (We will do it!). As they closed with the American doughboys, the leaders cried' San nen Kire!' (Cut a thousand men!). General Beightler, concerned over the inability of the 145th to reduce the Japanese positions on Hill 700, decided to send the 2nd Battalion, 148th Regiment to finally wipe out the enemy opposition. After a heavy mortar and artillery bombardment, two platoons of Company E advanced east from Pat's Nose trying to flank the saddle while a third attacked west from Hill 700. Thirteen men were killed before the momentum of the attack waned and the battalion dug in on the ground it had gained. Meanwhile, Companies F and B, now under the command of Brigadier-General William McCulloch, began a two-pronged attempt to drive the Japanese off South Knob. Supported by flamethrowers units from the 132nd, men of Company B got across the saddle and onto the knob, but were ultimately pulled because of the enemy's numerical superiority. Meanwhile, Colonel Magata Isashi's 45th Regiment had limited its actions to heavy patrol activity while the Iwasa Unit was attacking Hill 700. The terrain fronting the 129th Regiment, which was holding the center of the 37th Division line, was much more favorable for the Japanese than that encountered by either the Iwasa or Muda forces. The land was relatively flat, although cut by many gullies. The 129th's line, defended by two battalions, extended over two miles, curving slightly from just east of the Numa Numa Trail southwest to the right flank of the 148th Regiment. The Japanese had easy access to the 37th's lines, first via the Numa Numa Trail and then following the lowlands and gullies adjacent to the creeks. Colonel John Frederick, the regimental commander of the 129th, had recognized the potential vulnerability of this position and had organized a defense in depth during the two months prior to the attack. The position was anchored by a large number of mutually supporting earthen and log pillboxes and protected by a double apron of barbed wire, in front of which antipersonnel mines had been laid. Machine-guns had been sited to provide interlocking fire and additional barbed wire had been placed to channel potential attackers into the main machine-gun fire lanes. The 129th's cannon company of 75-mm pack howitzers, and its mortar sections had been augmented by 37-mm and 40-mm anti-tank guns, which could fire canisters in flat-trajectory direct fire. Thus although Colonel Magata's men did not have to climb up steep cliffs to get at the American positions, they would find the 129th's defenses near impregnable to relatively lightly supported infantry attacks, no matter how fanatically delivered. While patrolling, some documents were taken from dead Japanese bodies detailing Magata's plan, so Colonel John Frederick's 129th Regiment was expecting his thrust. On the 11th, the contact between Japanese and American patrols increased, as did the amount of incoming mortar fire, so the American supporting artillery was directed to fire intermittently into the areas where the Japanese were located.Colonel Frederick at 4:00pm ordered all his outposts back into the main perimeter and division artillery fired a ten-minute concentration along the 2nd Battalion front. At dusk, a heavy firefight then broke out as the Japanese opened up with machine-guns and mortars on Company G's area. During the exchange of fire, which lasted until 7:20pm, men in the pillboxes did not fire their machine guns, since they did not want to reveal their positions. The firing died down to only a few exchanges during the night, generally directed at Japanese infiltrators, who were attempting to cut through the barbed wire. Finally, at dawn on the 12th, Magata sent his 1st and 3rd battalions in column to strike Company G. Although the attacking Japanese suffered very heavy casualties from machine-gun fire, they penetrated the first line of defense by sheer weight of numbers. Moving up the streambed running into the sector, they captured one pillbox after another until they held a total of seven. Frederick then sent his reserve 1st Battalion to support Company G, while also launching a counterattack that managed to contain the enemy expansion and that also retook two pillboxes by late afternoon. Meanwhile, Companies E and F of the 148th were converging against Iwasa's remaining strongpoints. Using grenades, rifles, and flamethrowers, they finally reduced the pillboxes one by one, leaving the Japanese in possession of only one pillbox by 1:00pm. An historian of the 145th Regiment described the fight for this last strongpoint: “On the second day, the last held enemy pillbox was subjected to everything an infantryman has at his command. Hand grenades by the dozen were thrown at the emplacement. Still there was responding fire. Flamethrowers scorched the hidden Nip into silence. The searching parties entered the charred remains of the emplacement only to hear the click of a Japanese grenade being detonated. In the far corner they made out the dim outline of a Jap, eyes bloodshot, mouth bleeding, face seared, clothing burned. His clenched fist held a grenade. Even as the men dove for cover outside the pillbox, the Jap threw the grenade at them as in a dying gesture.” Despite a heroic resistance, this was cleared in the afternoon at last, thus completely restoring the original 145th's line. While this was going on, after a heavy artillery bombardment, McCulloch sent Companies B and F once again to storm the South Knob. Company B in a column of platoons with six flamethrowers attempted to storm the height from the northwest. The leading platoon was halted by machine gun fire from pillboxes dug in on the west slope. Once these were spotted a concentration of mortar and machine gun fire was directed against these Japanese positions, enabling the following platoon to reach the top of the knob. There, it was pinned down by heavy fire from machine guns sited east of the observation post banyan tree. American mortar fire, together with the work of the flamethrower operators, who were covered by BAR men of the 3rd Platoon, soon negated these positions. Although it appeared that the South Knob would soon be in American hands, ammunition for the attacking platoons was running low, there had been numerous casualties, there were no more reserves, and it was already late in the day. Despite this, Hodge sent Company A of the 132nd Regiment to reinforce the gained position. Company A of the 132nd tried to scale the height from the southwest to join Company B of the 182nd on the crest. A burst of machine gun fire killed the company commander, however, and disorganized the attack so much that under the best of conditions the men could not reach the top before dark. Hodge then reluctantly recalled his forces and, sensing the futility of further attacks, he requested permission to pull off South Knob. Yet Griswold refused the request and a new attack was ordered for the next day using two companies of the 1st Battalion, 132nd Regiment. After another heavy artillery bombardment, Company A attacked southward along the narrow saddle while Company B attacked up the southwest slope. Surprisingly, the two companies of the 182nd that had led the attack the day before had not been kept in immediate reserve but had been pulled back within the perimeter. Therefore there were no reserve troops available to help exploit the minor gains made during the afternoon. As night fell, Major Raymond Daehler, the battalion commander, reluctantly pulled his men off the knob and retreated to safer ground. Despite repeated attacks from 12 -16th, Magata had made no headway and finally withdrew his forces. After Iwasa's retreat, the men of the 145th had the dubious honor of policing the slopes of Hill 700 and burying the corpses left behind. In an area roughly 50 yards square, corpses that could be identified were counted. This count included only those within the barbed wire lines in front of the pillboxes. As one observer noted, the carnage was a sight to turn even the most cast-iron stomach: “Enemy dead were strewn in piles of mutilated bodies, so badly dismembered in most cases that a physical count was impossible. Here and there was a leg or an arm or a blown-off hand, all to show for the vanished and vanquished enemy. At one point, Japanese bodies formed a human stairway over the barbed wire. Five enemy were piled one on top of the other, as each had successively approached the location to use a predecessor as a barricade and then fall on top of him as he in turn was killed. Farther out from the perimeter, where a little stream wound its way parallel to it, Japs killed by the concussion of thousands of mortar shells lay with their heads, ostrich fashion, stuck under the least protection they could find”. What was left of Iwasa's shattered command to the relative safety of the Blue Ridge, Approximately two miles east of the American perimeter. During the day, as the Japanese were retreating, American planes dropped 123 tons of bombs on the intermediate areas, and destroyers off shore lobbed their five-inch shells into the high ground to the north and east of the perimeter. Further east, Magata launched a night attack at 4:00am, managing to gain another pillbox, so Griswold would decide to reinforce Frederick with a tank platoon. General Griswold agreed to send the 1st Platoon of Company C, tank battalion, forward, with the stipulation that they be used only to augment the infantry as they took back the lost pillboxes. 4 tanks supported a midmorning assault, which successfully retook two pillboxes. Another tank-infantry attack began at 1:15pm but was halted since the tanks were low on fuel and ammunition. They were replaced by tanks of another platoon, which assisted the infantry of the 129th in destroying all the other pillboxes held by the Japanese and in restoring the front line roughly to the positions held before the Japanese attack of the previous day. Alongside this, Griswold ordered the reconnaissance troop forward to occupy the right sector of the threatened area, with the 131st Engineer Regiment taking over the extreme left. General Hodge requested to be reinforced with tanks; but as they could not cross Eagle Creek, McCulloch and him reluctantly decided to cease any further attempt to drive the Japanese off South Knob. He thought that the three-day action against the Muda Unit had obviously so weakened it that it no longer posed a danger to the perimeter proper. Thus, it could be contained and continually harassed by combat patrols and neutralization fire. On the 14th, the fighting fell into just intermittent small-arms and mortar fire from the Japanese as Colonel Magata shifted some of his troops to more favorable positions and as he brought his reserve 2nd Battalion, 45th Regiment and 2nd Battalion, 13th Regiment to reinforce further attacks. Magata also received the 1st Battalion, 81st Regiment and the 3rd Battalion, 53rd Regiment from the north, tossing them into his new reserve. At 4:00am on 15th, the Japanese launched a heavy local attack against the right of Company F. By dawn, they had captured one pillbox and penetrated approximately 100 yards into the perimeter, where they were ultimately checked. A coordinated counterattack by Companies F and C in conjunction with a 36-plane strike against the Japanese positions, managed to retake the pillbox. Further tank-infantry attacks finally drove the entrenched Japanese out of the salient and successfully restored the line. Losses for the day were 10 dead and 53 wounded, while 190 Japanese were counted dead. The Japanese then repeated the attack the next morning at 4:00am on the high ground east of Cox Creek with a larger force of elements from three battalions. They penetrated approximately 75 yards before their momentum was halted. Then, Company B, supported by a platoon of tanks, counterattacked and restored the original line by midmorning. Finally, shortly after noon, the tanks moved beyond the wire and shelled the draws and ravines in front of Company F until their ammunition was exhausted. Once again the Japanese had paid heavily for no gain. 194 dead were counted and 1 prisoner taken, while the Americans only lost 2 dead and 63 wounded. Though the counter offensive is nowhere near done, that is all for this week as we now have to jump over to the CBI theater. General Merrill's Marauders had been given the task of cutting the Japanese supply line over the Kamaing road. At Merrill's disposal were the three battalions of GALAHAD, each in turn broken down into two combat teams. The teams bore the code names Red and White for the 1st Battalion; Blue and Green for the 2nd Battalion and Khaki and Orange for the 3rd Battalion. Each team included a rifle company, heavy weapons platoon, pioneer and demolition platoon, reconnaissance platoon, and medical detachment, with a combined strength of sixteen officers and 456 enlisted men. The marauders had been recruited from units in the south-west pacific and from Trinidad in the Caribbean. Many of the volunteers were notably seen as pure psychopaths. Their training in India was quite painful, a lot so for the military police nearby. 10 percent of the Marauders went AWOL, many of them amused themselves by shooting at catte, chickens and other birds, apparently even at the feet of locals to make them dance. One incident apparently had some of them aboard a train to Ledo firing out of the windows. They were seen as arrogant, psychopathic, gung-ho and they had many colorful catchphrases such as ‘My pack is on my back, my gun is oiled and loaded, and as I walk in the shadow of death I fear no sonofabitch.' The baptism of the Marauders did not impress their commander who was obsessed with speed and efficiency. The Galahad unit had departed on February 24th and on receiving orders to move to his forward assembly area, Merrill sent his three intelligence and reconnaissance (I & R) platoons to check trails as far as the Tawang Hka, the first of the three considerable streams that crossed the line of march. At 6:00am on the 24th, the 5307th moved out, screened by the I & R platoons. Next day two of them clashed with Japanese patrols and the point of one platoon, Pvt. Robert W. Landis of Youngstown, Ohio, was killed. Luckily radio communication between the 2nd Battalion, 56th Regiment and the 18th Division's headquarters broke down at this time, so General Tanaka was unaware that a semi-detached American unit was operating off to his flank. Stilwell fretted at the time it took them to cross the 130 miles over the Naga range to the battlefront. Part of the problem was that 5307th Composite was mule-based and had to bring 700 animals with them but none of them knew anything about muleteering. Whatever misgivings Stilwell had when he saw his reinforcements, he kept them to himself and addressed them simply and quietly, explaining that their new mission was to hit Walawbum. On the afternoon of the 28th, Merill received the new orders, calling for cutting the road on either side of Walawbum, the 2nd Battalion led by Colonel McGee to the west, the 3rd Battalion led by Colonel Beach to the south, and the 1st Battalion led by Colonel Osborne to patrol along the Nambyu Hka north of the Kamaing Road. Positions near Walawbum would be held until the 38th Division relieved the 5307th. Unfortunately the freak rains already experienced by Stilwell and his men continued, so that the Marauders' eight-day, 60-mile trek to Walawbum turned into something of a nightmare. On March 2nd, the Marauders crossed the Tanai Hka and arrived at their assembly area. With the last elements at hand, General Stillwell initiated his offensive. On the 3rd, Colonel Brown's tankers, with the support of a battalion from the 65th regiment advanced against Maingkwan. Facing light opposition, they managed to advance 5000 yards northeast of Maingkwan by 3pm when they were halted by heavy Japanese fire. Meanwhile, Merrill's marauders were clashing with Japanese at various places throughout the day. The 3rd Battalion had a sharp fight at Lagang Ga, killing 30 Japanese and seized the area needed for the building of a drop field. One of the battalion's two combat teams, Khaki, stayed at Lagang Ga to build and protect the dropping zone. Orange Combat Team kept on to the high ground east of Walawbum and dug in, its heavy weapons commanding the Kamaing Road. This saw them securing high ground east of Walawbum. The 22d Division, was also moving ahead, and so far was in step with the tanks and GALAHAD. On the 3rd, the 64th Regiment was near Ngam Ga, east of the Kamaing Road. The 66th to the west was in contact with the third regiment, the 65th, as it emerged from the Taro Plain. Tanaka's intelligence indicated the Americans were at Walawbum. The Chinese 22nd and 38th divisions were advancing slowly, so he believed his rearguard could hold them back so he could take the bulk of his strength to attack the americans. On the 3rd, the 55th and 56th regiment began retreating in order to launch an enveloping maneuver against Merrill's marauders. The next day, Brown found the enemy gone and his men were able to advance 3 miles southeast, getting his tanks in line with Maingkwan. Over at Walawbum, Merrills 3rd battalion were resisting against ferocious attacks from the Japanese. The drop field at Lagang Ga was attacked at dawn on the 4th but the garrison held. Orange Combat Team opened the battle in its sector with mortar fire on Walawbum, drawing mortar and 75-mm. fire in return from the 56th Infantry Regiment, which had been Tanaka's left flank, as it assembled for attack. When it moved, the 56th tried to cross the river and work around the Americans' flanks, where it met booby traps and ambushes thoughtfully prepared for just such a contingency. Some Japanese did cross to the east, but this failed to affect the course of the action, and 75 dead Japanese were counted, as against one American dead and seven wounded. These latter were evacuated by air the same evening. The 2nd battalion managed to get across the Kamaing road west of Wesu Ga where they established a roadblock. Finding out about the roadblock, Tanaka dispatched his forces to clear them out. On the 5th the Japanese appeared to be forming for an attack, but mortar fire seemed to be successful in breaking up such attempts. To the south, Allied aircraft could be seen bombing and machine-gunning what Orange Combat Team took to be Japanese reinforcements. One indication that the Japanese were increasing their strength in the immediate area lay in their being able to force Orange Combat Team's I & R Platoon back across the river about noon. Simultaneously, the 66th regiment liberated the abandoned Maingkwan and began advancing south over the Kamaing road. Brown's reconnaissance had found a good trail running south from Tsamat Ga, and on the morning of the 5th the tanks moved out through the jungle. After the engineers had prepared a small stream for crossing, the tanks broke into a freshly evacuated Japanese bivouac area. Jungle vines looping across the trail from either side, and connecting masses of vegetation and trees, made effective obstacles as they slowed down the tanks by catching their turrets; not until late afternoon did the armor break out on the trail running east and west between Maingkwan and Wesu Ga. Almost immediately the tanks encountered what seemed to be a company of Japanese defending a small but marshy stream. The stream did not seem fordable, so Brown attacked by fire alone. Unknown to him, his tanks were firing on Tanaka's division headquarters, and now lay squarely between the 18th's headquarters and its 56th Regiment. This understandably threw Tanaka's plan into chaos, as his forces who were unsuccessfully attacking Merrills marauders were becoming encircled. Tanaka decided to swing his force around the American roadblock, using a Japanese built trail that the Americans did not know about.The bypass road over which the 18th was to withdraw had been built by the Japanese engineers some days before and quote “The Engineer Regiment commander, Colonel Fukayama, had considered the possibility of reversals in our position and, in order to facilitate the withdrawal of the division, he had previously cleared a secret jungle trail about 20 kilometers long leading from the vicinity of Lalawng Ga to Jambu Hkintang on his own initiative. This trail was used in the withdrawal of the main body of the division.” By nightfall, Merrill's 2nd battalion had pulled out to Wesu Ga and were trying to link up with the 3rd battalion south of Walawbum. On the 6th after heavy artillery bombardment, at 5:15pm an estimated two companies of Japanese in line of skirmishers, with heavy supporting fire, crossed the river. The American mortars continued their work; the automatic weapons held back until the Japanese were within fifty yards. Two heavy machine guns, which had a clear field of fire along the river bank, were especially effective. The Japanese failed, leaving many dead on the open ground east of the river and on the river banks. Orange Combat Team found its ammunition low, and so sent a request for more to Khaki Combat Team, which was about one hundred yards downstream. This was however just a diversionary attack, as most of the 18th division were escaping unmolested. Meanwhile elements of the 113th regiment were beginning to arrive to Lagang Ga and unfortunately an incident of friendly fire would occur. The remainder of the 38th Division and an American patrol met near Walawbum on March 7th. The recognition signal had been arranged as three bursts of three rounds each. This necessarily meant there would be firing when the Chinese and Americans met. When the tops of the American helmets, which looked not unlike the Japanese pot helmet when their brims were invisible, appeared through and over the brush, there was a brief exchange of fire in which three Chinese were wounded before identity was established. Such is the nature of coordinating multiple nations' armies during actions. General Sun and Merrill's marauders made a withdrawal beginning on the 7th in order to circle south and cut the Kamaing road again, this time even further south than before. Brown in the meantime had advanced to Ninghku Ga where he secured support from a battalion of the 64th regiment and launched a coordinated tank-infantry attack against Kumnyen. At around 3pm, the tanks and infantry assembled across the Kamaing road in two places, establishing a roadblock while the tanks moved out aggressively along the road to east and west. On the 8th, Brown's tanks then moved along the Kamaing Road and onto a trail that showed signs of heavy traffic. This allowed them to discover Tanaka's evacuation route, finally occupying Walawbum by the end of the day. Brown later recalled, "swarming with people from the 64th Infantry and the 113th Infantry who, to the tankers' great disgust, disputed the latter's claim to have taken Walawbum”. Though the 18th division had managed to escape Stilwells traps, the American-Chinese forces had still scored a well-earned victory. The road to Myitkyina was not open. The cost for this first series of victories in the North Burma Campaign were 802 Chinese dead and 1479 wounded, plus 530 undifferentiated casualties from the fall of 1943 to March 18, 1944. But the temporary American-Chinese collaboration did not presage a wider Sino-American synergy, and the Marauders found operating with their allies a major problem. One issue was that of disease: the Americans caught dysentery in large numbers and attributed this to the insanitary habits of the Chinese, especially their refusal to boil their water, or to wash their hands after using the latrines. The American K-rations also proved unsatisfactory and unsuitable for jungle warfare, as the Chindits soon discovered. Yet that is all for burma as we now have to jump over to New Guinea. The advance and pursuit upon Madang resumed on March 12th as the 2/12th Battalion found Ward's Village unoccupied while the 57th/60th Battalion secured the abandoned Saipa 2. The 57th/60th Battalion advanced swiftly by night and finally concentrated at Yokopi two days later. On the 16th, Brigadier Hammer then received a rather ambiguous order. Chilton had redefined the division's role "in the light of the present situation". While the 18th Brigade was to watch the 15th Brigade's immediate left flank from the high ground between the lower Evapia and Mene Rivers, and the commando troop at Faita the far left flank, the 15th Brigade would garrison Kankiryo Saddle, keep contact with the enemy along the Bogadjim Road and patrol along the Kabenau River towards Astrolabe Bay to join the Americans. Finally, the 15th Brigade would "provide a firm base for patrolling, by employing at the discretion of the commander, a force not exceeding one battalion forward of Kankiryo up to and inclusive of Yokopi". The order was ambiguous as far as the local commanders were concerned, and managed to overcome the ban placed by higher authority on any advance across the Finisterres to the coast: Hammer could not go beyond Yokopi but, at the same time, he was to maintain contact with the enemy along the Bogadjim Road—and they were already farther back than Yokopi. At this point Hammer decided that the supply route from the Saddle to the 57th/60th had to be developed. While the battalion patrolled and the enemy positions were bombarded, Saipa, Yokopi and Daumoina were built into staging areas. In the meantime, patrols from the 2/2nd Commando Squadron were harrying the Japanese from the left flank, successfully establishing a new patrol base at Jappa by March 17th. From there, the Commandos patrolled towards Aminik, Oromuge and Mataloi, which they finally found abandoned. Further east, the 58th/59th Battalion patrolled from the Nangapo and Yangalum areas towards Arawum and Kul 2 as they searched for the Americans at the Kabenau and Kambara Rivers. An accidental meeting had already taken place between the patrols of the two Allies. An American reconnaissance patrol was being towed in a rubber boat by a PT boat with the object of landing at Male and seeing if the Japanese were at Bogadjim. Off Garagassi Point, the tow rope broke and the Americans rowed to shore in their rubber boat which they deflated and hid in the bush near Melamu. Moving inland for about a mile they turned west and nearing the Kaliko Track met Lieutenant Norrie's patrol of the 58th/59th Battalion and accompanied the Australians to Barum, where the Americans were given supplies and a guide; moving via Wenga, they reached Jamjam on the 18th and found no signs of the enemy. On this day at noon about 30 Japanese with three machine-guns and a mortar attacked Norrie's position at Barum. The situation would have been serious had it not been for Sergeant Matheson and his two men who had remained behind at Kaliko and managed to bear the first brunt of the attack and warn those at Barum. The Americans moved on the 20th to Yangalum and next day set out for Kul 2, along almost exactly the same route as that taken by Brewster, who had departed on March 20. Brewster reached Kul 2 on March 21, where he joined the Americans from Saidor and remained with them until the 26th. In this period he went to Saidor where he met General Gill, giving him information about the area east of the Kabenau River and learning of the American intentions and dispositions. Brewster then returned to Yangalum having carried out an important and lengthy linking patrol—35 miles each way. On the other side, General Adachi ordered his 51st division to continue withdrawing towards Wewak and for the 20th division towards Hansa. There he sought for them to reorganize and receive around 5000 replacements from Palau each. By the 9th, both divisions had reached Bogia and the 20th division had established a new defense of the Hansa area. By mid March the 51st reached Wewak and would be able to assemble at Hansa. On March 20th, the bulk of the 41st division was ordered to withdraw towards Hansa as well. As a result of the invasion of the Admiralty Islands, the 18th army and 4th air army were now cut off from Rabaul. Thus they were reassigned to the 2nd Area Army under the command of General Anami Korechika with his HQ at Ambon. They would be responsible for the defense of the eastern part of the Dutch East Indies and the western portion of New Guinea. General Teramoto would also have to move his command from Wewak to Hollandia. Back at Yokopi, Hammer anticipated that the constant patrolling and bombardment had forced the Japanese to withdraw from their positions. On March 28th, patrols of the 57th/60th moved past Daumoina and effectively found the enemy gone. The reality, however, was that General Nakai and Colonel Matsumoto had been ordered to pull back and follow its parent unit towards Hansa. The remainder of the 41st Division were following suit over the next few days. Only a 5000-men detachment, deemed the Madang detachment formed around the 239th Regiment, under the command of General Shoge, was left behind to hold Madang and cover the Japanese withdrawal. Hammer ordered the 57th/60th to move forward with speed towards Yaula, yet the Australians would be stopped at the Kofebi River on March 30. In response, a company would be sent in an enveloping maneuver across the river, successfully getting through to Mabelebu although they would be unable to draw away the defenders. During the night, the surrounded company would then have to resist a number of enemy counterattacks, though these weren't really counterattacks but the Japanese trying to retreat towards Madang. The following day, with the enemy gone, the Australian patrols would rapidly set out north towards Yaula. Meanwhile, the 2/2nd Squadron's patrols, after securing Mataloi 1, were also advancing towards Yaula with speed. Finally, the commandos would successfully enter Yaula on April 4, with the 57th/60th's vanguard arriving soon after and then occupying Kwato by nightfall. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Bougainville counteroffensive proved the Japanese could still unleash brutal offensives and meet some success. However the level of success was not going to win the war let alone the fight over Bougainville. Within Burma the mixed national armies of the allies were finding some difficult working together, but they were gradually pushing the Japanese back.
Subscribe to the PPM Patreon to access the Premium Feed: patreon.com/ParaPowerMapping Today we're joined on the show by the inimitable Jacob Everett, editor-in-chief of Apocalypse Confidential, for a wide-ranging & far-reaching conversation that serves as a preliminary materials for a deep dive into the New England opium smuggling outfits & the Sino-American trade in the 19th century. It's a highly enjoyable parapolitical jam sesh... W/ a particular focus on Jacob's family history, specifically his ancestor Ramsay Crooks, who was a Scottish-born fur trader who would ascend the ranks of the Pacific & American Fur Companies to the very zenith, becoming wealthiest man in America John Jacob Astor's most trusted lieutenant & eventually president of the American Fur Company himself once Astor left the game. We learn about Crooks' involvement in the overland, Lewis and Clark-esque expedition to establish the Astoria settlement, a grand "Chinese" dream of Astor's that is seriously reminiscent of previous fur trading & alchemical colonial plantation schemes that we've covered in previous MasSUSchusetts EPs. We establish how the PNW fur trade was viewed as an essential link in numerous triadic Sino-American trading get-rich-quick schemes, and how Astoria itself would eventually serve as a loading bay for furs to be added to Perkins & Co ships laden w/ contraband cargo (opium) that would then make their way to Canton. We also find time to discuss all manner of things, from Dick Cavett; to Astor enlisting the MasSUSchusetts author Washington Irving in a pseudo-mythologizing psyop project to glorify the short-lived Astoria settlement; to a quick rehash of the PTCave phenomena & recent mass shootings; to Astor's Freemasonry; to the Tonquin incident & the tragic deaths of 100s of indigenous warriors; to white boy familial guilt; to Milk Morgellons; to Ramsay Crooks' Civil War colonel son & "Indian agent"; all the way to Jacob's experiences editing a magazine of the Kali Yuga, and, most importantly, whether he believes humans are ontologically evil or not! Oh, and short fiction about rape-y dolphins, which kinda connects to the last one. Songs: | The Velvet Underground - "Venus in Furs" | | The Psychedelic Furs - "Here Come Cowboys" |
In this week's episode of the Multi-Family Method, Mike Mosher interviews first time guest, Christopher Bruen from the National Multifamily Housing Council. Christoper is the Senior Director of Research at NMHC, with a primary responsibility for aiding and expanding upon NMHC's research in housing and economics. Prior to joining the Council, he conducted research on the behavioral tendencies exhibited by option traders and served as a contributor to the Shanghai-based business publication, MorningWhistle.com, where he wrote on topics relating to Sino-American economic policy. Christoper holds a bachelor's degree in finance from George Washington University and an M.S. in Economics from Johns Hopkins University. Today Christoper joins us to discuss the current state of the multi-family market by providing us with some insights based on NMHC's research and data. We hope you enjoy this insightful episode geared towards the state of the multi-family market. Resources: NMHC: NMHC | Home NMHC Staff Christopher Bruen: NMHC | Christopher Bruen Christopher Bruen Social Media Handles LinkedIn: Chris Bruen | LinkedIn Capstone Companies: Capstone Companies | Multi-Housing Investment Properties | Real Estate (capstone-companies.com) Capstone Social Media Handles Mike Mosher on LinkedIn: (2) Michael Mosher | LinkedIn Capstone Companies: (2) Capstone Companies: My Company | LinkedIn
At a meeting of defence ministers from the Asia-Pacific region, heightened tensions between Beijing and Washington were all too apparent. A naval spat in the Taiwan Strait looms large over relations. What will it take for both sides to talk? In Brazil, Lula faces an uphill battle to undo his predecessor's policies. And are British boarding schools worth it?For full access to print, digital and audio editions of The Economist, try a free 30-day digital subscription by going to www.economist.com/intelligenceoffer Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
At a meeting of defence ministers from the Asia-Pacific region, heightened tensions between Beijing and Washington were all too apparent. A naval spat in the Taiwan Strait looms large over relations. What will it take for both sides to talk? In Brazil, Lula faces an uphill battle to undo his predecessor's policies. And are British boarding schools worth it?For full access to print, digital and audio editions of The Economist, try a free 30-day digital subscription by going to www.economist.com/intelligenceoffer Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
The risk of a Sino-American war over Taiwan appears to be growing. Our diplomatic editor assesses the frightening prospects and possible damage. Mexicans protest the weakening of the country's independent elections agency. And why Connecticut has been exonerating those accused of witchcraft nearly four centuries ago.For full access to print, digital and audio editions of The Economist, subscribe here www.economist.com/intelligenceoffer Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
The risk of a Sino-American war over Taiwan appears to be growing. Our diplomatic editor assesses the frightening prospects and possible damage. Mexicans protest the weakening of the country's independent elections agency. And why Connecticut has been exonerating those accused of witchcraft nearly four centuries ago.For full access to print, digital and audio editions of The Economist, subscribe here www.economist.com/intelligenceoffer Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
Sino-American relations have been blown off course after the downing of a Chinese balloon. The Economist's Beijing bureau chief, David Rennie, and our senior China correspondent, Alice Su, explore whether China and America are heading towards a stand-off and what needs to be done to avoid any escalation.The historian John Delury unearths the roots of distrust between the two superpowers. And, Da Wei, director of Tsinghua University's Centre for International Security and Strategy, weighs up whether Xi Jinping and Joe Biden are serious about managing their relationship.Sign up to our weekly newsletter here and for full access to print, digital and audio editions, as well as exclusive live events, subscribe to The Economist at economist.com/drumoffer. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
“If China threatens our sovereignty, we will act to protect our country.” In his state-of-the-union speech earlier this week, Joe Biden promised to deal with any threat from China. The House has voted unanimously to condemn the CCP for flying a spy balloon over America. What's next for Sino-American relations? Congressman Darin LaHood shares the plans of a new select committee on China. We go back to the time a plane rather than a balloon caused a crisis. And The Economist's David Rennie brings us the view from Beijing. John Prideaux hosts with Charlotte Howard and Idrees Kahloon. You can now find every episode of Checks and Balance in one place and sign up to our weekly newsletter. For full access to print, digital and audio editions, as well as exclusive live events, subscribe to The Economist at economist.com/uspod. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
“If China threatens our sovereignty, we will act to protect our country.” In his state-of-the-union speech earlier this week, Joe Biden promised to deal with any threat from China. The House has voted unanimously to condemn the CCP for flying a spy balloon over America. What's next for Sino-American relations? Congressman Darin LaHood shares the plans of a new select committee on China. We go back to the time a plane rather than a balloon caused a crisis. And The Economist's David Rennie brings us the view from Beijing. John Prideaux hosts with Charlotte Howard and Idrees Kahloon. You can now find every episode of Checks and Balance in one place and sign up to our weekly newsletter. For full access to print, digital and audio editions, as well as exclusive live events, subscribe to The Economist at economist.com/uspod. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
American fighters shot down a balloon that China says was monitoring the weather, but America insists was spying. It was a minor incident, but it highlights the relationship of a great-power rivalry with inadequate guardrails. Our correspondent visits a market in Mumbai to see what might be lost as India's economy formalises. And some surprising—and worrying—data puncturing the myth about the skinny French.For full access to print, digital and audio editions of The Economist, subscribe here www.economist.com/intelligenceoffer Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
American fighters shot down a balloon that China says was monitoring the weather, but America insists was spying. It was a minor incident, but it highlights the relationship of a great-power rivalry with inadequate guardrails. Our correspondent visits a market in Mumbai to see what might be lost as India's economy formalises. And some surprising—and worrying—data puncturing the myth about the skinny French.For full access to print, digital and audio editions of The Economist, subscribe here www.economist.com/intelligenceoffer Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
The global competition in the Sino-American conflict might be coming to a head. Michael Beckley, associate professor of political science at Tufts University and a non-resident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, joins host Krys Boyd to discuss why he believes competition between America and China will peak in the 2020s – setting up a showdown between authoritarianism and democracy. His book, co-written with Hal Brands, is called “Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China.”