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In the face of Donald Trump's tariffs, will China's plans to boost its domestic consumer economy succeed — or could the government in Beijing be tempted to introduce massive stimulus measures, as it did after the financial crisis in 2008? In this episode of China in Context, leading scholar Yasheng Huang, professor of global economics and management at MIT's Sloan School of Management, explains why China's political resilience in a trade war may be greater than its economic resilience — and argues that, despite the current obsession with high technology, reforms of land ownership and the rights of rural citizens and migrant labourers could be key to China's long term economic prosperity.Professor Huang's forthcoming book, Statism with Chinese Characteristics — a revised version of his 2008 work Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics — draws on lessons from China's response to the 2008 crisis to highlight the country's current challenges.________________________________________The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the speakers and are not necessarily those of the SOAS China Institute.________________________________________SOAS China Institute (SCI) SCI Blog SCI on X SCI on LinkedIn SCI on Facebook SCI on Instagram ________________________________________Music credit: Sappheiros / CC BY 3.0
We have another G5 name game, a very early preseason top 25 (not our own, of course), some quarterback situations, and a few questions to talk about on a grab bag show this week.Flipping The Field is presented by Meet At Midfield and Homefield Apparel. Use code MEETATMIDFIELD for 15 percent off your first order at Homefield Apparel.If you like the show, please tell a friend and leave a five-star review. If you want to keep up to date with the show, subscribe on your podcasting app of choice and follow the show on Twitter at FieldFlipping.If you have a question you'd like answered on the show, send us a DM on the show's Twitter account.
President Xi Jinping called on Thursday for strengthening the role of education in supporting China's sci-tech sector and talent development, so that the nation can see its talent flourish, everyone can realize their potential, and every talent is put to the best use. While taking part in a joint group meeting with national political advisers, he called for a deep understanding of the demand for education, science and technology, and talent during the Chinese modernization process. Xi, who is also general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission, met in Beijing with political advisers from the China Democratic League, the China Association for Promoting Democracy and the education sector, who are attending the third session of the 14th National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. He spoke after hearing opinions and suggestions from six political advisers, who contributed insights on issues such as the integrated development of vocational education and regional industries, and optimization of the allocation of basic education resources. In his remarks, Xi highlighted the importance of adhering to the correct orientation in education to build China into a leading country in education, science and technology, and talent. The goal is to nurture a new generation of capable young people with sound moral grounding, intellectual ability, physical vigor, aesthetic sensibility and work skills, who will fully develop socialism and carry forward the socialist cause, he said.He pointed out that it is important to forge inner strength and inspire the younger generation with the Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. Xi emphasized the need to integrate moral education throughout intellectual, physical, aesthetic and labor education.He then pointed out that building a high-quality education system and delivering education that meets public expectations require the deepening of comprehensive reform in the education sector. He underscored the importance of establishing a scientific evaluation system to serve as a guiding framework, improving school governance, granting institutions greater autonomy, and enhancing the rule of law and the level of management. In alignment with the nation's modernization drive and shifts in demographic structure, China must coordinate primary, higher and vocational education, and optimize both public and private investment to enable a more reasonable and efficient distribution of education resources, Xi said. The president called for the education sector to play a pioneering and foundational role in achieving a virtuous cycle between technological innovation and homegrown talent development. The nation must work toward breakthroughs in fundamental and interdisciplinary research through targeted initiatives, build innovation platforms between universities, enterprises and local governments, and improve the efficiency of translating scientific breakthroughs into practical applications, he said. He emphasized the need to refine talent development mechanisms to better align with economic and social demand, enhancing the quality of domestically trained professionals. Xi also highlighted the need to carry out a national education digitalization strategy and build a lifelong learning society.According to a draft budget report submitted to the third session of the 14th National People's Congress, which opened on Wednesday, the central government plans to increase its educational spending by 5 percent this year to 174.44 billion yuan ($24 billion). Meanwhile, funding of 80.95 billion yuan, up 11.5 percent year-on-year, will go to scholarships and student aid programs for university and high school students, the report said. In his remarks, Xi also extended festive greetings to women of all ethnic groups and from all walks of life ahead of International Women's Day, which falls on Saturday.
If you read western media it looks like China's government is a one man show. Not so. Today's guest, analyst Danny Haiphong helps us explore China's Two Sessions, and what makes Socialism with Chinese Characteristics so successful. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
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China held a massive meeting in Zunyi, Guizhou province, on Wednesday to mark the 90th anniversary of the Zunyi Conference, a crucial turning point during the Long March (1934-36) that marked the maturity of the Communist Party of China.1月15日，纪念遵义会议90周年大会在中国贵州省遵义市隆重举行。遵义会议是长征（1934-1936年）期间的一个重要转折点，标志着中国共产党的成熟。Li Shulei, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and head of the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee, attended the conference and addressed nearly 1,000 participants from central departments, Guizhou authorities and the People's Liberation Army.中共中央政治局委员、中宣部部长李书磊出席会议并讲话。中央有关部门、贵州省、中国人民解放军有关同志共约1000人参加。Attendees noted that the Zunyi Conference was a historic moment in the Party's history. They called for careful study and implementation of General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee Xi Jinping's remarks on summarizing and using the historical experience of the Zunyi Conference, so that people can gather wisdom and strength from the Party's history to help them on their own "Long March" in the new era.会议指出，遵义会议是共产党历史上的一个历史性时刻，要认真学习并贯彻中共中央总书记习近平关于总结运用遵义会议历史经验的重要论述，从党的历史中汲取智慧力量，奋力走好新时代的长征路。Participants also called on the Chinese people to stick to Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, enhance confidence and determination in pursuing Chinese modernization and national rejuvenation, uphold the revolutionary tradition of bravely struggling, and pool strength to overcome difficulties and keep fighting.会议强调，中国人民要坚持习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想，坚定推进中国式现代化、实现民族复兴的信心决心，发扬敢于斗争的革命传统，凝聚攻坚克难、勇毅前行的强大力量。In January 1935, an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee was held in Zunyi to resolve the most critical military and organizational issues of the time. The participants reviewed the causes behind the Kuomintang's defeat in its fifth encirclement campaign and discussed the next steps to be taken by the Party and the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, the PLA's predecessor.1935年1月，中共中央在遵义召开政治局扩大会议，以解决当时具有决定意义的军事和组织问题。会议分析了反对国民党第五次“围剿”失败的原因，并讨论了党和中国工农红军（中国人民解放军的前身）的下一步行动。The meeting also restructured the Party's top leadership, recognized Mao Zedong's key role in the Party and pointed the Chinese revolution in the right direction.会议还对党的最高领导层进行了重组，确认了毛泽东同志在党中央的领导地位，为中国革命指明了正确方向。predecessorn.前辈；前身
As President Xi Jinping wrapped up his trip to Latin America last week, observers noted that the year 2024 has been special for marking the 10th anniversaries of a range of landmark events, such as China's hosting of the 2014 APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in Beijing and the founding of the Forum of China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.Following these memorable moments, Thursday also marks the 10th anniversary of another landmark event in China's foreign policy history — Xi's proposing of the idea of major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics.Many scholars and officials have been impressed by how Beijing has showcased distinct Chinese characteristics, style and ethos in its diplomacy, and how it has been working on building the image of a confident, self-reliant, open and inclusive major country with a global vision over the past 10 years.In the eyes of Keith Bennett, a London-based senior analyst on international relations and co-editor of the Friends of Socialist China platform, the Chinese characteristics of the country's major country diplomacy include a number of components, such as the country's commitment to peace, dialogue, equality, mutual respect, noninterference and win-win cooperation."The Chinese policies are not based solely on the narrow national interest, or interest at the expense of other countries", but instead have a global vision and "are for the benefit of all of humanity," he said.On Nov 28, 2014, Xi stated in his speech at the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs that China "must have a major country diplomacy with its own characteristics".In March 2016, the concept of major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics was for the first time clearly stated in the annual Government Work Report.Analysts said the concept has been developed in the past decade and has seen its theoretical architecture greatly taking shape and its supporting pillars being built.The Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs held in December last year identified the theme of China's external work as building a community with a shared future for mankind, which is also the noble goal pursued by China in conducting major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics.The conference decided that the current and future work on foreign affairs should follow the principles of "self-confidence and self-reliance, openness and inclusiveness, fairness and justice, and win-win cooperation" — the guidelines of major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics."The concept helps to explain the definition and the underlying logic of China's diplomacy," said Chen Xulong, a professor of multilateral diplomacy and United Nations' reform studies at the University of International Business and Economics.The concept calls for the country to act as a major country should, shoulder its duties, meet the challenges, and make contributions to global governance, he said."A range of outstanding, distinct qualities of Chinese culture have been endorsed by this concept, including the consistent pursuit of a peaceful rise, objecting to hegemony and subscribing to innovation," he added.In an article published in January in Qiushi Journal, the flagship magazine of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, Foreign Minister Wang Yi wrote that "major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics in the new era builds on and carries forward New China's diplomacy"."China has become a responsible major country with enhanced international influence, stronger capacity to steer new endeavors and greater moral appeal," he wrote."Head-of-state diplomacy has played an important and irreplaceable role in major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics in the new era", he added.At a bilateral meeting with Xi on the sidelines of the 31st APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in Lima, Peru, on Nov 15, Chilean President Gabriel Boric brought a copy of the fourth volume of Xi Jinping: The Governance of China, one of Xi's books.Boric presented the book to Xi and invited him to sign it.Nadia Helmy, an associate professor of political science at Beni Suef University in Egypt and an expert on Chinese politics and Asian affairs, said, "We find that China has achieved fruitful diplomatic results, as the diplomacy of the Chinese head of state, Comrade Xi Jinping, played a strategic guiding role."Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era and major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics "led China to achieve tangible achievements in the field of Beijing's foreign policy and international relations, (and) brought China closer to assuming the forefront of the global scene", she wrote in an article published in January.She listed some main points of China's major country diplomacy, such as "maintaining justice while seeking to achieve common interests at the political and economic levels", "sincere and friendly international relations with the developing countries" and "building a new type of relations between major countries".Regarding his expectations for China's major country diplomacy in the next 10 years and beyond, Bennett, the London-based international relations analyst, said that China is expected to win more support and more understanding from more countries, as there is "quite a strong contrast" between "the worldview and practice of China and the worldview and practice of most other major powers".
Over the past decade, major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics has been conducted on all fronts, with the goal of building a community with a shared future for mankind. As the year 2024 marks a decade of accomplishments in China's major-country diplomacy, we delve into stories that tell of Xi Jinping's diplomatic philosophy and reflect on how China has been striving to bring stability and certainty to a world increasingly shaped by geopolitical tensions, protectionism, and unbalanced development.
For the last 23 years, the major powers outside the People's Republic of China (PRC) have been engaged in a series of imperial police actions like in Afghanistan, small wars turning into inextricable problems, like Iraq, and not-insignificant medium sized wars as we see in Ukraine.The PRC chose to stay out of these conflicts, but has been learning from them.After studying 20th-century Pacific war lessons deeply and, though untested in combat since 1979, the PRC is preparing for something.Dr. Toshi Yoshihara returned to Midrats to discuss what the PRC has studied most and how its study is manifesting in policy and action.You can listen from this link, or the Spotify widget below.Remember, is you don't already, subscribe to the podcast.Toshi is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He was previously the inaugural John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies and a Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College. Dr. Yoshihara's latest book is Mao's Army Goes to Sea: The Island Campaigns and the Founding of China's Navy (Georgetown University Press, 2022). A Japanese translation of Mao's Army Goes to Sea was published in 2023. He co-authored, with James R. Holmes, the second edition of Red Star over the Pacific: China's Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy (Naval Institute Press, 2018). The book has been listed on the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program, the Indo-Pacific Command Professional Development Reading List, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps Professional Reading Program.Dr. Yoshihara is the recipient of the 8th annual Kokkiken Japan Study Award by the Japan Institute for National Fundamentals in July 2021 for his CSBA study, "Dragon Against the Sun." In 2016 he was awarded the Navy Meritorious Civilian Service Award in recognition of his scholarship on maritime and strategic affairs at the Naval War College. Dr. Yoshihara served as a visiting professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University; the School of Global Policy and Strategy, University of California, San Diego; and the Strategy Department of the U.S. Air War College. He currently teaches a graduate course on seapower in the Indo-Pacific at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.ShowlinksChinese Lessons from the Great Pacific War: Implications for PRC Warfighting, CBSAChina is Learning About Western Decision Making from the Ukraine War, by Mick RyanElbridge Colby on XU.S. Navy's Top Officer Plans for Confrontation With China by 2027SummaryIn this conversation, Toshi Yoshihara, Sal, and Mark delve into the lessons that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has learned from historical conflicts, particularly the Pacific War in World War II. They discuss the importance of logistics, intelligence, and joint operations in modern warfare, as well as how the PLA is analyzing past battles to inform its future strategies. The conversation also touches on the implications of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict and the concept of comprehensive national power in the context of military readiness and capability.TakeawaysThe PLA has not fought a major war since 1979, relying on historical analysis.China studies past conflicts to inform its military strategies.Logistics played a crucial role in the success of the US in the Pacific War.Shore-based air power is essential for modern military operations.The PLA recognizes its weaknesses in joint operations and is working to improve.Intelligence gathering and analysis are vital for understanding adversaries.The study of history is integral to military education in China.The PLA draws lessons from both World War II and contemporary conflicts.China is observing the Russia-Ukraine war for strategic insights.Comprehensive national power is a key concept in assessing military capabilities.Chapters00:00: Introduction and Context of the Discussion02:56: China's Learning from Historical Conflicts09:12: Analyzing Key Battles of the Pacific War20:44: Logistics and Its Importance in Warfare27:53: The Concept of Joint Operations in Military Strategy30:06: The Role of Intelligence in Modern Warfare34:05: Intellectual Approaches to Military History43:17: Lessons from the Japanese and American Military Strategies48:56: Learning from the Russia-Ukraine Conflict58:01: Comprehensive National Power and Its Implications
इस हफ़्ते पुलियाबाज़ी पर चर्चा चीन के बेलगाम उत्पादन की। क्या चीन के अतिरिक्त उत्पादन से दुनियाभर के देशों के उद्योग पर जोखिम मंडरा रहा है? कई देश इस पर रोक लगाने की कोशिश कर रहे हैं, तो ऐसे में भारत को क्या करना चाहिए? चीन की मैन्युफैक्चरिंग से हम क्या सीख सकते है? इन सब बातों पर चर्चा आज की पुलियाबाज़ी पर। We discuss:* China's overcapacity—a structural flaw* Lessons for India?* How should India respond?Readings:Global Policy Watch: The Perils of Decentralisation with Chinese Characteristics by Pranay Kotasthane and Manoj KewalramaniRelated Puliyabaazi:भारत और चीन के बदलते रिश्ते। Decoding India-China relations ft. Vijay Gokhaleचीन की विश्वगुरु हसरतें। How China plans to change the world order? Ft. Manoj KewalramaniIf you have any questions for the guest or feedback for us, please comment here or write to us at puliyabaazi@gmail.com. If you like our work, please subscribe and share this Puliyabaazi with your friends, family and colleagues.substack: Website: https://puliyabaazi.inHosts: @saurabhchandra @pranaykotas @thescribblebeeTwitter: @puliyabaazi Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/puliyabaazi/Subscribe & listen to the podcast on iTunes, Google Podcasts, Castbox, AudioBoom, YouTube, Spotify or any other podcast app. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.puliyabaazi.in
What has the People's Republic of China been doing to grow its influence in the Pacific Island nations that proved so crucial in the Pacific theater in WWII, and will be just as important for the next Great Pacific War?Our guest for the full hour is be Cleo Paskal.Cleo is Non-Resident Senior Fellow focusing on the Indo-Pacific at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. She has testified before Congress multiple times and regularly lectures for seminars for the U.S. military. She is also a columnist with India's The Sunday Guardian newspaper. She is surprisingly short, but as this is a podcast, no one will notice.Showlinks:Protecting the Corridor of Freedom to America's Asian Border, by Cleo Paskal. Published July 1, 2024 in Journal of INDO-PACIFIC Affairs.Island-Hopping with Chinese Characteristics—What the PRC Is Island-Hopping with Chinese Characteristics, by Cleo Paskal. Published in the Autumn 2023 edition of the Naval War College Review.Chinese Lessons From the Pacific War: Implications for PLA Warfighting, by Toshi Yoshihara. Published January 5, 2023 at Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.The Compacts of Free Association report by the Congressional Research Service, April 2024.Map of the South Pacific Ocean.Summary:The conversation discusses China's growing influence in the Pacific Island nations and its comprehensive national power strategy. The Pacific Island nations, located between Hawaii and Guam, are strategically important for the US. China's comprehensive national power metric ranks countries based on various factors, including economic, military, and political influence. China's approach is externally focused and aims to increase its own power while decreasing the power of other nations. The Chinese Communist Party's influence extends beyond government and includes economic, social, and criminal elements. The US and its allies need to be aware of China's grand strategy and its impact on the Pacific region. The principal themes of the conversation are the importance of addressing corruption in the Pacific Islands, the strategic significance of the Pacific region, the need for maritime domain enforcement, and the role of the US in supporting the Pacific Islands.Takeaways:China is actively growing its influence in the Pacific Island nations, which are strategically important for the US.China's comprehensive national power metric ranks countries based on various factors and aims to increase China's power while decreasing the power of other nations.China's approach is externally focused and includes economic, social, and criminal elements.The US and its allies need to be aware of China's grand strategy and its impact on the Pacific region. Corruption in the Pacific Islands is a major issue that needs to be addressed, as it undermines national security and allows China to gain influence in the region.The Pacific region is strategically significant, and control over the islands and maritime routes is crucial for both the US and China.Maritime domain enforcement is essential to protect the rights and interests of the Pacific Islands and to counter illegal activities by China.The US should provide support to the Pacific Islands in terms of intelligence sharing, investigations, and strengthening their legal systems to combat corruption and defend their communities.The US needs to increase its presence and engagement in the Pacific Islands to counter China's influence and protect its own interests in the region.Sound Bites:"If you have a Pacific centered map, you know, the Indo-Pacific is going to be the, to the 21st century, what the Atlantic was to the 20th century.""China's comprehensive national power mentality seems to have actually translated into action in the way that they interact with the region.""China's approach is not just a kind of zero-sum game. They will go into the other side loses more.""You are sending in the mercy or Guard cut or whatever corruption that's happening on the ground is what's feeding out into the maritime environment, the air environment, and the entire national security bubble and corroding it.""We should have an unlimited prosecution and investigation budget. You don't compete on their terms, you compete on our terms because fundamentally, I think our system is better.""Unless we raise the cost of taking the money from China and give breathing space to the people who are trying to defend their communities and the things that they believe, it's not going to tip in our favor."Chapters:00:00: Introduction and Call to Join the Conversation02:10: Overview of the Pacific Island Nations07:24: China's Comprehensive National Power Strategy13:33: China's Influence in the Commonwealth of Northern Marianas21:23: China's Braided Approach and Challenges for the US32:18: The Corrosive Effect of Corruption on National Security34:44: The Significance of the First and Second Island Chains38:29: The Importance of Geography in Conflict41:58: The Need for a Stronger US Presence in the Pacific Islands47:14: China's Political Warfare in the Pacific Islands53:22: China's Maritime Strategy in Latin America56:20: Enforcing Maritime Domain Awareness in the Pacific Islands59:41: The Importance of FBI Field Offices in the Pacific Islands
The 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) adopted a resolution on further deepening reform comprehensively to advance Chinese modernization at its third plenary session held here from Monday to Thursday.The Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee presided over the meeting. General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee Xi Jinping delivered important addresses, according to a communique released Thursday.At the session, the Central Committee heard and discussed a report on the work of the Political Bureau, presented by Xi on behalf of the Political Bureau, and considered and adopted the Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Further Deepening Reform Comprehensively to Advance Chinese Modernization. Xi delivered explanatory remarks on the draft version of the resolution.The overall objectives of further deepening reform comprehensively are to continue improving and developing the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics and modernize China's system and capacity for governance, according to the communique."By 2035, we will have finished building a high-standard socialist market economy in all respects, further improved the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, generally modernized our system and capacity for governance, and basically realized socialist modernization," it said.All of this will lay a solid foundation for building China into a great modern socialist country in all respects by the middle of this century, it noted.The reform tasks laid out in the resolution shall be completed by the time the People's Republic of China celebrates its 80th founding anniversary in 2029, said the communique.The Central Committee made systematic plans for further deepening reform comprehensively, it added.In building a high-standard socialist market economy, the role of the market must be better leveraged, with a fairer and more dynamic market environment to be fostered and resource allocation to be made as efficient and productive as possible. Restrictions on the market will be lifted while effective regulation will be ensured to better maintain order in the market and remedy market failures, said the communique.In promoting high-quality development, the communique urged deepening supply-side structural reform, improving incentive and constraint mechanisms for promoting high-quality development, and creating new drivers and strengths for realizing growth."We will improve the institutions and mechanisms for fostering new quality productive forces in line with local conditions, for promoting full integration between the real economy and the digital economy, for developing the service sector, for modernizing infrastructure, and for enhancing the resilience and security of industrial and supply chains," it stated.In supporting all-around innovation, the Party will deepen comprehensive reform in education, structural scientific and technological reform, and institutional reforms for talent development.In improving macroeconomic governance, the communique urged pursuing coordinated reforms in the fiscal, tax, financial, and other major sectors and enhancing the consistency of macro policy orientation, with the national strategic planning system and policy coordination mechanisms to be improved.On integrated urban and rural development, the Party must promote equal exchanges and two-way flows of production factors between the cities and the countryside, so as to narrow the disparities between the two and promote their common prosperity and development, according to the communique. Reform of the land system will be deepened, it added.Describing opening up as a "defining feature of Chinese modernization," the communique said that the Party will "steadily expand institutional opening up, deepen the foreign trade structural reform, further reform the management systems for inward and outward investment, improve planning for regional opening up, and refine the mechanisms for high-quality cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative."On developing whole-process people's democracy, it said: "We must firmly stay on the path of socialist political advancement with Chinese characteristics and uphold and improve our country's foundational, basic, and important political systems."On the rule of law, efforts were demanded to ensure full implementation of the Constitution and uphold its authority, coordinate the reforms to promote sound legislation, law enforcement, administration of justice, and observance of the law, and improve the mechanisms for ensuring that all are equal before the law.The communique urged boosting cultural confidence and working to develop advanced socialist culture, promote revolutionary culture, and carry forward fine traditional Chinese culture.In ensuring and enhancing the people's wellbeing, the Party will improve the income distribution system, the employment-first policy, and the social security system, further reform the medical and healthcare systems, and improve the systems for facilitating population development and providing related services.On ecological conservation, the communique said: "We must improve ecological conservation systems, take a coordinated approach to carbon cutting, pollution reduction, green development, and economic growth, actively respond to climate change, and move faster to improve the systems and mechanisms for applying the principle that lucid waters and lush mountains are invaluable assets."On national security, it noted that the Party must fully apply a holistic approach to national security, improve the institutions and mechanisms for safeguarding national security, and ensure that high-quality development and greater security reinforce each other, so as to effectively safeguard the country's stability and security over the long term.On national defense, the communique urged maintaining the Party's absolute leadership over the people's armed forces and fully implementing the strategy of strengthening the military through reform to provide a strong guarantee for realizing the goals for the centenary of the People's Liberation Army in 2027 and achieving basic modernization of national defense and the armed forces.In improving the Party's leadership, it said: "We must acquire a deep understanding of the decisive significance of establishing Comrade Xi Jinping's core position on the Party Central Committee and in the Party as a whole and establishing the guiding role of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era."The communique stressed that Chinese modernization is the modernization of peaceful development. "In foreign relations, China remains firmly committed to pursuing an independent foreign policy of peace and is dedicated to promoting a human community with a shared future," it noted.Studying and implementing the guiding principles from the session represent a major political task for the entire Party and nation both at present and for some time to come, according to the communique.The session conducted an analysis of the present situation and the tasks the Party faces, urging firm commitment to accomplishing the goals for this year's economic and social development.Both development and security must be ensured, with various measures to be implemented for preventing and defusing risks in real estate, local government debt, small and medium financial institutions, and other key areas, the communique said.According to the communique, the session decided to accept Comrade Qin Gang's resignation from the Central Committee, and confirmed the Political Bureau's earlier decision to expel Li Shangfu, Li Yuchao and Sun Jinming from the Party.A total of 199 members and 165 alternate members of the Central Committee attended the session.
China describes its system as a "socialist market economy". How does that work? What is the role of its stock exchanges? Ben Norton explains Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. VIDEO: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M4__IBd_sGE Topics 0:00 Intro 1:11 Deng Xiaoping & China's "Reform & Opening Up" 4:06 Socialism with Chinese Characteristics 5:17 China's economic growth & poverty reduction 7:42 How state-owned enterprises (SOEs) run China's economy 10:09 Chen Yun & the "birdcage economy" 11:39 SOE share of China's GDP 13:37 China's largest companies are SOEs 14:53 Socialist market economy 16:02 "Grasp the large, let go of the small" 17:42 "Managed competition" in China 19:50 Billionaires in China 20:43 China's stock markets 27:17 (Clip) Western financial analyst says China rejected Washington Consensus 30:43 (Clip) Bloomberg complains "China doesn't care about the stock market" 32:10 Differences between US & Chinese economies 33:33 (Clip) Investor explains China's stock market is not priority for government 36:56 China's economic policy is made for workers, not investors 45:55 US financialized capitalism vs. Chinese socialism 46:33 US stock market is 60.5% of entire world 47:13 Richest 10% of Americans own 93% of stocks 47:52 Global oligarchs hold wealth in US stock market 48:31 China's pursuit of "common prosperity" 51:49 Outro
In this conversation with the Review of Democracy, Ho-fung Hung shares his eye-opening analysis of the internal contradictions and external limitations plaguing China's export-led development model and offers novel insights into the difficulties its political leadership is encountering in challenging US hegemony and extending its global sphere of influence. While acknowledging China's impressive achievements, Hung emphasizes China's technological dependency and chronic industrial overcapacity, the impact of the rise of protectionism, the hegemony of the US dollar, and China's lack of confidence in its military capabilities. At the same time, he forecasts the intensification of US-Chinese rivalry in connection with the gradual decoupling of the US and Chinese economies. Ho-fung Hung is Henry M. and Elizabeth P. Wiesenfeld Professor in Political Economy at the Sociology Department of the Johns Hopkins University. His scholarly interests include global political economy, protest, nation-state formation, social theory, and East Asian Development. He is the author of the award-winning Protest with Chinese Characteristics (2011, Columbia UP), The China Boom: Why China Will not Rule the World (2016, Columbia UP) and the Clash of Empires: From “Chimerica” to the “New Cold War” (2022, Cambridge UP).
Doc 1: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State, Wash DC, A Student Demonstration of Sorts in Tiananmen Square (11/21/85) Doc 2: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State, Wash DC, Government Arrests Student Demonstrators (11/25/85) Doc 3: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State, Wash DC, More Student Demonstrations (12/23/85) Doc 4: From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State, Wash DC, Student Demonstrations Update (12/24/86) Doc 5: IPAC Daily Intelligence Summary 1-87, China: Student Demonstrations (01/02/87) Doc 6: IPAC Daily Intelligence Summary 10-87, China: Hu Yaobang Resigns (01/17/87) Doc 7: Memorandum of Conversation, [George Bush] Meeting with Wan Li, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and Member of the Politburo, People's Republic of China (05/23/89) Doc 8: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for 06/0289, China: Stalemate Continues Doc 9: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for 06/03/89, China: Police Use Tear Gas on Crowds Doc 10: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State, Wash DC, SITREP No. 27: Martial Law with Chinese Characteristics (06/03/89) Doc 11: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State, Wash DC, SITREP No. 28: Ten to Fifteen Thousand Armed Troops Stopped at City Perimeter by Human and Bus Barricades (06/03/89) Doc 12: Cable, From: Department of State, Wash DC, To: U.S. Embassy Beijing, and All Diplomatic and Consular Posts, TFCHO1: SITREP 1, 1700 EDT (06/03/89) Doc 13: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for 06/04/89, China: Troops Open Fire Doc 14: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State, Wash DC, SITREP No. 32 (06/04/89) Doc 15: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State, Wash DC, SITREP No. 33 (06/04/89) Doc 16: Cable, From: Department of State, Wash DC, To: U.S. Embassy Beijing, China Task Force Situation Report No. 3 (06/04/89) Doc 17: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for 06/05/89, China: After the Bloodbath Doc 18: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State, Wash DC, SITREP No. 35 (06/05/89) Doc 19: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for 06/06/89, China: Descent into Chaos Doc 20: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State, Wash DC, TFCH01--SITREP No. 37 (06/06/89) Doc 21: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for 06/07/89, China: Tense Standoff Continues Doc 22: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State, Wash DC, TFCH01--SITREP No. 38 (06/07/89) Doc 23: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for 06/9/89, China: Uneasy Calm Doc 24: Department of State Intelligence Brief, "Current Situation in China: Background and Prospects" (Ca. 06/10/89) Doc 25: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for 06/10/89, China: Mixed Signals on Purge Doc 26: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State, Wash DC, SITREP No. 49, (06/11/89) Doc 27: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for 06/14/89, China: Back to Business, But Crackdown Continues Doc 28: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for 06/15/89, China: Accusation over Fang Lizhi Doc 29: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for 06/21/89, China: Swift Justice Doc 30: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State, Wash DC, Eyewitness Account of June 4 PLA Tank Crushing 11 Students and Related Early Morning Events in Tiananmen Square (06/22/89) Doc 31: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State, Wash DC, What Happened on the Night of June 3/4? (06/22/89) Doc 32: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State, Wash DC, TFCH01: SITREP No. 65 (06/27/89) Doc 33: State Department document entitled "Themes" (06/29/89) Doc 34: State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "Status Report on Situation in China as of 07/ 26/89" Doc 35: State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "China: Aftermath of the Crisis" (07/27/89) Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
Liberalism in China has taken many twists and turns. And in today's episode, we explore its fascinating history, from its early pre-Western roots, all the way to its current incarnation within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and beyond. Joining us to unpack this fascinating topic is Evan Osborne, Professor of Economics at Wright State University, and author of the highly informative new book Markets with Chinese Characteristics: Economic Liberalism in Modern China. We talk with Evan about Chinese economic thought, the country's economic history, and the role that the West has played in China's liberalism. Evan shares his insights on how Western economic liberalism was first introduced to China in the mid-nineteenth century, before expanding on subsequent waves of expansion and repression over the next century. We then discuss the rebirth of economic liberalism in China over the past five decades, what the future of economic and political liberalism might look like in China, and the potential long-term implications of this. To learn more about economic liberalism in modern China, and the complex history that has led to this point, be sure to tune in to this fascinating conversation!Key Points From This Episode:Introducing our guest, Evan Osborne, and his book, Markets with Chinese Characteristics.Unpacking the concept of economic liberalism.An overview of pre-Western, semi-liberal traditions in China.How China responded to Western ideas like those in The Wealth of Nations.The Chinese economy's state of development with the arrival of Western powers.Freedoms that allowed Britain and other European countries to develop in key areas.The history of treaty ports and The Opium Wars.What subsequent political and economic transformations in China looked like.How these transformations spread into the interior of the country.Economic liberalization and how it helped facilitate a departure from imperial traditions.Unpacking the sharp turn against economic liberalism in China in the 20th century.How communist and Chinese theorists interpreted Adam Smith and other economic thinkers.What made the period of reform and openness in China possible after 1978.Why economic liberalization ended up being more successful in China than the Soviet Union.The Hokou (Household Registration) system in China; how relaxing it contributed to China's rapid economic success.A closer look at the emergence of the entrepreneurial class and the business elite in China.The problem of corruption: how the Chinese government holds onto wealth and power.How Xi Jinping's government has influenced liberalism in China.Evan's predictions for the future of China's politics and its economy.Links Mentioned in Today's Episode:Evan OsborneEvan Osborne on LinkedInMarkets with Chinese Characteristics: Economic Liberalism in Modern ChinaAdam SmithThe Wealth of Nations
#NewWorldReport: #PERU: Lawfare with Chinese characteristics. Latin American Research Professor Evan Ellis, U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. @revanellis #NewWorldReportEllis https://www.reuters.com/business/peru-port-conflict-escalates-chinese-fi... 1945 Peru
Carlos Martinez, author of The East is Still Red, joins us to discuss China's efforts in creating a just economy. How can the success of China's poverty alleviation campaign help in transforming the developing world? Listen in. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
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On today's show Andrew and Bill begin with takeaways from Secretary of Treasury Janet Yellen's visit to China, including what her meetings may or may not accomplish and the likely next steps for the Biden Administration in the months to come. From there: As the US and Europe grapple with the threat of cheaper PRC goods in key industries, how might China respond to raised tariffs around the world? Will there be consequences for continued support of Russia's defense industrial base? And how realistic is the deterrence strategy articulated by Ambassador Rahm Emanuel this week? At the end: A question about Xi's vision for the PRC financial system, the deepening partnership between the US and Japan, the US and allies conduct naval exercises in the South China Sea, and a question about Tesla's 0% financing for PRC customers.
In this episode of the ChinaPower Podcast, Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens joins us to discuss one of President Xi Jinping's signature priorities: China's national security. She delves into Xi's “Comprehensive National Security concept,” emphasizing its broad scope with over 20 different components, covering everything from border security to food security. Dr. Greitens discusses Xi Jinping's preventive rather than reactive approach to security threats, in an attempt to treat what the CCP views as root causes to security issues rather than just the symptoms. Finally, Dr. Greitens explains how China's views of national security influences how it exerts control at home and uses force abroad. Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens is Associate Professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, where she directs UT's Asia Policy Program. Her research focuses on security, authoritarian politics, foreign policy, and East Asia. Currently, Dr. Greitens is on leave to serve as a Visiting Associate Professor of Research in Indo-Pacific Security at the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute. She is also concurrently a Nonresident Scholar with the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Recorded Future - Inside Threat Intelligence for Cyber Security
Vulnerabilities and exploits are the building blocks of hacking. We look at how China is flipping the script on how the world thinks about both.
On today's show Andrew and Bill begin by parsing the claims contained in a controversial piece from Politico, including thoughts on the spectrum of rumors surrounding this year's disappearing cabinet members, the smaller-than-ever circle of true insiders in Xi's China, and certain details of present-day CPC politics and that are beyond dispute. From there: Several stories in and around the finance sector, where there have been more warnings against relaying bad news, there is still no third plenum announcement, the Central Financial Work Commission has provided new guidance, and Moody's is taking precautions for its local employees. At the end: Checking in with Secretary Gina Raimondo, Nvidia's Jensen Huang, the House of Representatives, and Huawei's role in the PRC chip constellation.
This episode delves into Chinese stamps/seals/chops (印章), exploring the origins, ritualization, and various cultural conventions associated with this ancient practice.Given their existence predating the invention of paper in China, what surfaces did ancient Chinese court officials typically stamp upon? Did different dynasties enforce distinct rules regarding stamps? Was the loss of an emperor's jade seals believed to signify the loss of the mandate of heaven? In the late Qing dynasty, the penalty for misusing the stamp could be as severe as death. Was this penalty genuinely enforced, or was it akin to many other historical (and current day) Chinese laws—a fallback scapegoat system?Tune in to uncover the answers!
China rose from poverty after the Mao years only because its political leadership embraced private property and a market economy. Unfortunately, today the Communist leadership is moving back to socialism. Original Article: The Chinese Economy: Market Socialism with Chinese Characteristics
China rose from poverty after the Mao years only because its political leadership embraced private property and a market economy. Unfortunately, today the Communist leadership is moving back to socialism. Narrated by Millian Quinteros.
China rose from poverty after the Mao years only because its political leadership embraced private property and a market economy. Unfortunately, today the Communist leadership is moving back to socialism. Original Article: The Chinese Economy: Market Socialism with Chinese Characteristics
China rose from poverty after the Mao years only because its political leadership embraced private property and a market economy. Unfortunately, today the Communist leadership is moving back to socialism. Original Article: The Chinese Economy: Market Socialism with Chinese Characteristics
On this episode of Radio Rothbard, Ryan McMaken and Tho Bishop talk about the Chinese economy. While some of the left see China as a model for governing, those on the right often assume their rise relative to the US is inevitable. Ryan and Tho look at the recent challenges to the Chinese economy. Recommended Reading "The Chinese Economy: Market Socialism with Chinese Characteristics" by Antonio Graceffo: Mises.org/RR_149_A "China Enters the Doom Loop" by Peter St. Onge: Mises.org/RR_149_B Download Anatomy of the State for free at Mises.org/Anatomy Be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at Mises.org/RadioRothbard. New Radio Rothbard mugs are now available at the Mises Store. Get yours at Mises.org/RothMug PROMO CODE: RothPod for 20% off
On this episode of Radio Rothbard, Ryan McMaken and Tho Bishop talk about the Chinese economy. While some of the left see China as a model for governing, those on the right often assume their rise relative to the US is inevitable. Ryan and Tho look at the recent challenges to the Chinese economy. Recommended Reading "The Chinese Economy: Market Socialism with Chinese Characteristics" by Antonio Graceffo: Mises.org/RR_149_A "China Enters the Doom Loop" by Peter St. Onge: Mises.org/RR_149_B Download Anatomy of the State for free at Mises.org/Anatomy Be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at Mises.org/RadioRothbard. New Radio Rothbard mugs are now available at the Mises Store. Get yours at Mises.org/RothMug PROMO CODE: RothPod for 20% off
On this episode of Radio Rothbard, Ryan McMaken and Tho Bishop talk about the Chinese economy. While some of the left see China as a model for governing, those on the right often assume their rise relative to the US is inevitable. Ryan and Tho look at the recent challenges to the Chinese economy. Recommended Reading "The Chinese Economy: Market Socialism with Chinese Characteristics" by Antonio Graceffo: Mises.org/RR_149_A "China Enters the Doom Loop" by Peter St. Onge: Mises.org/RR_149_B Download Anatomy of the State for free at Mises.org/Anatomy Be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at Mises.org/RadioRothbard. New Radio Rothbard mugs are now available at the Mises Store. Get yours at Mises.org/RothMug PROMO CODE: RothPod for 20% off
Photo: 1900 Carthage No known restrictions on publication. @Batchelorshow #PRC: AI with Chinese Characteristics seeks old-fashioned censorship. Bill Gertz, Washington Times. @GordonGChang, Gatestone, Newsweek, The Hill. Bill Gertz, national security correspondent for The Washington Times and author of Deceiving the Sky: Inside Communist China's Drive for Global Supremacy. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2023/aug/15/china-adopts-interim-ai-rule-requiring-technology-/
Photo: 1930 Hong Kong No known restrictions on publication. @Batchelorshow PREVIEW: Xi orders censorship of AI Large Language Model of opinion of Marxism-Leninism with Chinese Characteristics. Bill Gertz, Washingtn Times. @GordonGChang, Gatestone, Newsweek, The Hill
#china #socialism #xijinping #communism Socialism with Chinese characteristics is a phrase that comes up when discussing Chinese politics. It's a cornerstone of Chinese political theory and heavily relied on by leadership when formulating new internal policies and deciding the direction the country is headed.Socialism with Chinese characteristics is an evolving theory that encapsulates the thoughts of China's major leaders, and is the lens through which the country sees itself and the party sees its mission. It includes concepts like economic prosperity, territorial integrity, social stability, and the continued political leadership of the CCP.Link to the Youtube poll to vote for the next episode: https://www.youtube.com/post/Ugkx_LM44S61UAXDi7zJT-X44KsO-je_K_EU?lc=Ugz2EJGLmmQ6YHZTcip4AaABAg&lc=Ugz2EJGLmmQ6YHZTcip4AaABAg The Zhao Ziyang biography that I mention is called Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Zhao ZiyangIntroDefinition 1:20Deng era (1980-1992) 7:52Jiang Zemin era (90s) 18:12Hu Jintao era (00s) 22:12Xi Jinping era (10s-20s) 24:30Policy application 33:10The 14th 5 year plan 40:22Outro 44:45*My voice changes noticeable at around 21:25. Had to stop recording and restart after a break after which point my cold was significantly worse. Apologies!-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sources2012 Full Text of Hu Jintao's Report at 18th Party Congress2018 Backgrounder_ Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era - Xinhua China's Plan for Economic and Social Development - Jun Yin and Jia XuChinese Economic Statecraft from 1978 to 1989 The First Decade of Deng Xiaoping's Reforms - Priscilla Roberts edsConstructing Political Economy with Chinese Characteristics - Fang Cai and Xiaojing ZhangSocialism with Chinese Characteristics - Roland BoerSupport the showSign up for Buzzsprout to launch your podcasting journey: https://www.buzzsprout.com/?referrer_id=162442Subscribe to the Sinobabble Newsletter: https://sinobabble.substack.com/Support Sinobabble on Buy me a Coffee: https://www.buymeacoffee.com/Sinobabblepod
Links: mandarinretreat.com/ - For more information on immersive Chinese learning trips and summer camps for learners based in Europe. imlearningmandarin.com - for more blogs and podcasts on learning Chinese https://www.amazon.com/TPRS-Chinese-Characteristics-Terry-Waltz/dp/0692442901 - TPRS with Chinese Characteristics. -- Hello and welcome back to the I'm Learning Mandarin podcast! We're finally back after a several month hiatus. On today's episode I speak to Pamela Rose an educator and Mandarin teacher with a fascinating background. Pamela grew up in New York, to a Chinese mother and an American father. She didn't learn any Chinese in early childhood but as a teenager became fascinated by the language, as well as her cultural heritage. From there she embarked on a journey which would culminate in her not only becoming fluent in Chinese but also qualifying as a Mandarin teacher. Pamela's teaching style is largely inspired by Stephen Krashen's comprehensible input - which we've discussed a lot on this podcast before - as well as a method called TPRS, which stands for Teaching Proficiency through Reading and Storytelling. In this podcast Pamela shares her story with us and explains how her experiences in the classroom, both as an instructor and learner, have shaped her teaching approach and methods.
Photo: No known restrictions on publication. @Batchelorshow #PRC: #Russia: How many nuke warheads with Chinese characteristics? Rick Fisher, senior fellow of the International Assessment and Strategy Center,@GordonGChang, Gatestone, Newsweek, The Hill https://www.newsweek.com/america-nuclear-arsenal-compared-china-russia-1806060
Josef Gregory Mahoney is Professor of Politics and International Relations at East China Normal University, Executive Director of the International Center for Advanced Political Studies and Associate Editor of the US-based Journal of Chinese Political Science. The winner of multiple research awards he was formerly a university professor in the United States and public health officer with the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). He appears frequently on global news broadcasts, Chinese state media and is a regular contributor to South China Morning Post. He also serves as Senior Research Fellow with the Institute for the Development of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. Today we talk about his disillusionment working in US government health services, his blacklisting as a professor in the US, his view of political polarization in America as a self-acknowledge Leftist, the difference between personal and private property, modern day slavery, why the CCP is not a monolith like many assume, the US strategy to contain China, climate change, Oil, de-dollarization, whether people are getting dumber and his optimism that the younger generations will fix the world… because they just might have to. _____________________ This episode is powered by Nespresso! We've been loving our Nespresso Vertuo POP coffee machine _____________________ If you enjoy this show don't forget to leave a rating Follow Us On Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/thehonestdrink_/ Join Us On WeChat: THD_Official Find us on: Spotify, Apple, Google Podcasts, YouTube, Ximalaya, 小宇宙, 网易云音乐, Bilibili or anywhere else you get your podcasts.
Learn about China's economic model with Beijing-based scholar Roland Boer, a professor at Renmin University and author of the book "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics: A Guide for Foreigners". VIDEO: https://youtube.com/watch?v=mgcyqkEOhQc
Listen to the episode in its entirety on Patreon https://www.patreon.com/posts/81611662
Time Stamps[01:39] Background of The Decoding China Dictionary[04:30] Democracy with Chinese Characteristics[06:34] Differing Interpretations of International Law[08:32] Freedom of Religion Versus Freedom of Religious Belief[10:28] Foreign Aid and China as a Developing Country[12:01] Security in Chinese Parlance[13:55] Transparency and its Uses in China[16:19] Historic Revisionism and Domestic Policy[18:39] Historic Revisionism and Foreign Policy[19:44] Promotion of Chinese Interpretations Internationally[23:52] Importance of Understanding Chinese Terminology
Yasheng Huang has written two of Tyler's favorite books on China: Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics, which contrasts an entrepreneurial rural China and a state-controlled urban China, and The Rise and Fall of the EAST, which argues that Keju—China's civil service exam system—played a key role in the growth and expanding power of the Chinese state. Yasheng joined Tyler to discuss China's lackluster of technological innovation, why declining foreign investment is more of a concern than a declining population, why Chinese literacy stagnated in the 19th century, how he believes the imperial exam system deprived China of a thriving civil society, why Chinese succession has been so stable, why the Six Dynasties is his favorite period in Chinese history, why there were so few female emperors, why Chinese and Chinese Americans have done less well becoming top CEOs of American companies than Indians and Indian Americans, where he'd send someone on a two week trip to China, what he learned from János Kornai, and more. Read a full transcript enhanced with helpful links, or watch the full video. Recorded January 17th, 2023 Other ways to connect Follow us on Twitter and Instagram Follow Tyler on Twitter Follow Yasheng on Twitter Email us: cowenconvos@mercatus.gmu.edu Subscribe at our newsletter page to have the latest Conversations with Tyler news sent straight to your inbox.
This is Garrison Hardie with your CrossPolitic Daily Newsbrief for Friday, February 17th, 2023. I hope you all have had a fantastic week as we’ve reached Friday! Trinity Church is hosting a Men’s Conference, Friday night and Saturday morning, 2/24-2/25. The title is Taking Dominion. God has given mankind the commission to take dominion over His creation for the purpose of making it more fruitful, beneficial, and enjoyable, and all to the glory of God. Men are the tip of the spear as we lead our households in the pursuit of this dominion. Pastor Dave Hatcher, Pastor Jerry Owen, and Andrew Crappuchettes (CEO RedBalloon) will be speaking about fulfilling this mandate in our selves, our houses, and the other opportunities God gives us. Visit www.trinitykirk.org/2023-mens-conference https://www.foxnews.com/us/train-derails-outside-detroit-michigan-one-car-hazardous-materials Train derails outside Detroit, Michigan, with one car carrying hazardous materials A train containing one car of hazardous materials has derailed Thursday in Van Buren Township outside Detroit, Michigan, reports say. The cause of the derailment was not immediately clear. Police told Fox2 Detroit that there were no injuries and the area is not a hazmat situation. Officials that spoke to WXYZ, which reported that at least six cars were seen off the track, said one of them was carrying hazardous materials. The derailment comes less than two weeks after a train carrying toxic chemicals derailed in East Palestine, Ohio. Police told Fox2 Detroit that roads will be closed in the area while an investigation is ongoing. The Michigan Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy also said it is "aware of the train derailment in Van Buren Township, Wayne County, where initial reports indicate no threat to the public from the derailment. "EGLE personnel are on their way to the scene to assist in assessing the situation," it added. https://www.foxnews.com/politics/biden-admin-turns-down-ohios-request-disaster-assistance-toxic-derailment Biden admin turns down Ohio's request for disaster assistance after toxic derailment The Biden administration turned down a request for federal disaster assistance from Ohio Gov. Mike DeWine in the aftermath of the train derailment in the state earlier this month that led to a large release of toxic chemicals. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) told Ohio's state government that it was not eligible for disaster assistance to help the community recover from the toxic spill, Dan Tierney, a spokesperson for DeWine, told Fox News Digital on Thursday. Tierney explained that FEMA believed the incident didn't qualify as a traditional disaster, such as a tornado or hurricane, for which it usually provides assistance. "The DeWine Administration has been in daily contact with FEMA to discuss the need for federal support, however FEMA continues to tell Governor DeWine that Ohio is not eligible for assistance at this time," DeWine's office said in a statement earlier in the day. "Governor DeWine will continue working with FEMA to determine what assistance can be provided." FEMA said that its team is in constant communication with DeWine's office, but didn't comment on the request for federal relief. Tierney noted, though, that the governor was able to secure some health assistance from the Department of Health and Human Services that will go towards helping local residents with any medical care costs that stem from the incident. Norfolk Southern has offered financial compensation to locals who were displaced and has worked with the Environmental Protection Agency and state officials to conduct air safety tests. Health officials have assured the public that tests have shown the area is safe. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/bruce-willis-diagnosed-frontotemporal-dementia-demi-moore-says_n_63ee887ae4b0808b91c5a71e Bruce Willis Diagnosed With Frontotemporal Dementia, Family Says Actor Bruce Willis has been diagnosed with frontotemporal dementia, his family said in a statement Thursday. The 67-year-old “Die Hard” star was diagnosed with the disease, also known as FTD, after his prior diagnosis of aphasia progressed, his family said. The disease’s progression varies from two to more than 20 years and the average life expectancy after the start of symptoms is seven to 13 years. There is no cure or treatment currently available, according to the AFTD’s website. Willis’ family said that by sharing his story they hope they can bring more awareness to the disease and push for research toward finding treatments. Willis retired from acting in 2022 after his aphasia diagnosis. Aphasia typically occurs suddenly after a stroke, head injury or sometimes a slow-growing tumor. It can affect a person’s ability to speak, write and understand language, both verbal and written, according to the Mayo Clinic. The actor’s former co-workers told the Los Angeles Times last year that he had been struggling for years on set. In the Biden administrations’ zeal for shooting down balloons, they may have overreacted with this one… https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/aircraft-propulsion/hobby-clubs-missing-balloon-feared-shot-down-usaf Hobby Club’s Missing Balloon Feared Shot Down By USAF A small, globe-trotting balloon declared “missing in action” by an Illinois-based hobbyist club on Feb. 15 has emerged as a candidate to explain one of the three mystery objects shot down by four heat-seeking missiles launched by U.S. Air Force fighters since Feb. 10. The club—the Northern Illinois Bottlecap Balloon Brigade (NIBBB)—is not pointing fingers yet. But the circumstantial evidence is at least intriguing. The club’s silver-coated, party-style, “pico balloon” reported its last position on Feb. 10 at 38,910 ft. off the west coast of Alaska, and a popular forecasting tool—the HYSPLIT model provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)—projected the cylindrically shaped object would be floating high over the central part of the Yukon Territory on Feb. 11. That is the same day a Lockheed Martin F-22 shot down an unidentified object of a similar description and altitude in the same general area. There are suspicions among other prominent members of the small, pico-ballooning enthusiasts’ community, which combines ham radio and high-altitude ballooning into a single, relatively affordable hobby. https://www.theblaze.com/news/eu-2035-gas-car-ban European Union approves effective ban on sales of gas cars by 2035, requiring 100% reduction in CO2 European Parliament has formally approved a law that will effectively end the sale of gas- and diesel-powered vehicles in the European Union by 2035, calling for a 100% reduction in CO2 emissions for any new cars sold, according to Reuters. The 27-nation union agreed to the changes in October 2022, but has now formalized the deal, which enforces a 55% reduction in emissions for vehicles by 2030. Levels for CO2 for 2021 were set at a target of 37.5%. Vans will get a slight advantage in the market, requiring a a 50% cut by 2030, compared with 2021 levels. Just a few months before the announcement in May 2022, car makers such as Ford and Volvo even signed a joint letter with 26 other companies asking the European Union to implement such a plan. The target of 2035 has been justified by the EU based on what officials say is an average vehicle lifespan of 15 years, which would allow the EU to reach net zero emissions by 2050. Companies that make less than 10,000 cars per year will be able to negotiate lower targets until 2036, however some companies are happily ready to enforce the change. Volkswagen vowed in October 2022 to produce only electric cars in Europe beginning in 2033, committing to the earliest possible time frame after previously stating it would aim for a 2033-2035 range. However, in June 2022, five countries were looking to delay the shift to electric-only vehicles by at least five years to 2040. Bulgaria, Italy, Portugal, Romania, and Slovakia called for a 90% cut of CO2 by 2035, extending the 100% target to 2040, with light commercial vehicles meeting 80% for 2035 before also needing the full cut by 2040. A Bulgarian official had said that the EU needed to reconsider the economic costs of switching to electric and the effect that would have on poorer nations in the union. Laws enforcing electric vehicle chargers are currently in negotiation in the union. https://dailycaller.com/2023/02/15/china-ccp-christian-chinaaid-jonathan-dingler-pastor-bob-fu-xi-jinping/ Communist China Cracked Down On Christians In 2022 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) censored, fined, politically indoctrinated and forcibly disappeared Chinese Christians in 2022, according to a new report from the nonprofit ChinaAid Tuesday. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) reportedly employed a range of new methods to persecute Chinese Christians in 2022 including fabricating charges of fraud as well as criminalizing the legal international travel of church leaders, the report states. China’s crackdown on Christianity reportedly intensified in the run-up to the CCP’s 20th Party Congress in October 2022, during which time General Secretary Xi Jinping secured a third term as the communist nation’s supreme leader, according to ChinaAid. “Xi Jinping and the Communist Party did all they could to silence Christians leading up to the 20th National Congress,” Jonathan Dingler, a spokesman for ChinaAid who worked on the report, told the Daily Caller News Foundation. Christians account for approximately 5% of China’s religious community, according to the CIA World Factbook. While Catholics number around 10 million, Protestants account for the majority of China’s Christian community, with approximately 38 million followers as of 2020, The Economist reported. Dingler told the DCNF that after the CCP’s crackdown leading up to the 20th Party Congress “the tone shifted” within the state-sanctioned churches which then began treating Xi “as if he were the leader of the church.” ChinaAid identified a March 2022 paper entitled “Adhering to the Sinicization of Religion in China” published by the United Front Work Department (UFWD) as the political motivation behind the CCP’s 2022 crackdown on Christianity. The UFWD is a “Chinese government entity charged with extending the CCP’s influence and control over non-Party organizations both domestically and abroad to advance CCP policy objectives,” according to a 2021 report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC). Moreover, the USCC also identified the UFWD as a “Chinese intelligence service” in 2016. The UFWD’s March 2022 paper reportedly emphasized “promoting the Sinicization of religion, adhering to the orientation of the core socialist values and submerging all religious beliefs in Chinese culture to better adapt religion to China’s socialist society and the New Era of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” according to ChinaAid. China’s state-sanctioned churches must now actively promote Xi’s thoughts “from the pulpit,” which in practice means that churches which don’t “flat-out fall at Xi’s feet and worship him are considered ‘inciting subversion of state power,'” Dingler told the DCNF. Churches were reportedly even converted into political propaganda centers in order to broadcast Xi’s speech during the 20th Party Congress in October 2022, according to ChinaAid’s report. Likewise, churches in other provinces were also reportedly repurposed to hold “study” sessions on CCP policies such as “Reinforcing Management of Religion on All Fronts: 10 Prohibitions and 10 Mustn’ts.” The Chinese government also increasingly persecuted Christians online in 2022, censoring words like “Jesus,” “Savior” and “Amen” on the Chinese social media platform WeChat, according to ChinaAid’s report. At the same time, the Chinese government also shut down church websites and Christians’ social media accounts. “Congregants can’t even give to their churches online anymore, thanks to new regulations,” Dingler said. “They want to break down house churches even further, hoping they will finally give in and submit.” The Chinese Embassy did not respond to the DCNF’s request for comment.
This is Garrison Hardie with your CrossPolitic Daily Newsbrief for Friday, February 17th, 2023. I hope you all have had a fantastic week as we’ve reached Friday! Trinity Church is hosting a Men’s Conference, Friday night and Saturday morning, 2/24-2/25. The title is Taking Dominion. God has given mankind the commission to take dominion over His creation for the purpose of making it more fruitful, beneficial, and enjoyable, and all to the glory of God. Men are the tip of the spear as we lead our households in the pursuit of this dominion. Pastor Dave Hatcher, Pastor Jerry Owen, and Andrew Crappuchettes (CEO RedBalloon) will be speaking about fulfilling this mandate in our selves, our houses, and the other opportunities God gives us. Visit www.trinitykirk.org/2023-mens-conference https://www.foxnews.com/us/train-derails-outside-detroit-michigan-one-car-hazardous-materials Train derails outside Detroit, Michigan, with one car carrying hazardous materials A train containing one car of hazardous materials has derailed Thursday in Van Buren Township outside Detroit, Michigan, reports say. The cause of the derailment was not immediately clear. Police told Fox2 Detroit that there were no injuries and the area is not a hazmat situation. Officials that spoke to WXYZ, which reported that at least six cars were seen off the track, said one of them was carrying hazardous materials. The derailment comes less than two weeks after a train carrying toxic chemicals derailed in East Palestine, Ohio. Police told Fox2 Detroit that roads will be closed in the area while an investigation is ongoing. The Michigan Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy also said it is "aware of the train derailment in Van Buren Township, Wayne County, where initial reports indicate no threat to the public from the derailment. "EGLE personnel are on their way to the scene to assist in assessing the situation," it added. https://www.foxnews.com/politics/biden-admin-turns-down-ohios-request-disaster-assistance-toxic-derailment Biden admin turns down Ohio's request for disaster assistance after toxic derailment The Biden administration turned down a request for federal disaster assistance from Ohio Gov. Mike DeWine in the aftermath of the train derailment in the state earlier this month that led to a large release of toxic chemicals. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) told Ohio's state government that it was not eligible for disaster assistance to help the community recover from the toxic spill, Dan Tierney, a spokesperson for DeWine, told Fox News Digital on Thursday. Tierney explained that FEMA believed the incident didn't qualify as a traditional disaster, such as a tornado or hurricane, for which it usually provides assistance. "The DeWine Administration has been in daily contact with FEMA to discuss the need for federal support, however FEMA continues to tell Governor DeWine that Ohio is not eligible for assistance at this time," DeWine's office said in a statement earlier in the day. "Governor DeWine will continue working with FEMA to determine what assistance can be provided." FEMA said that its team is in constant communication with DeWine's office, but didn't comment on the request for federal relief. Tierney noted, though, that the governor was able to secure some health assistance from the Department of Health and Human Services that will go towards helping local residents with any medical care costs that stem from the incident. Norfolk Southern has offered financial compensation to locals who were displaced and has worked with the Environmental Protection Agency and state officials to conduct air safety tests. Health officials have assured the public that tests have shown the area is safe. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/bruce-willis-diagnosed-frontotemporal-dementia-demi-moore-says_n_63ee887ae4b0808b91c5a71e Bruce Willis Diagnosed With Frontotemporal Dementia, Family Says Actor Bruce Willis has been diagnosed with frontotemporal dementia, his family said in a statement Thursday. The 67-year-old “Die Hard” star was diagnosed with the disease, also known as FTD, after his prior diagnosis of aphasia progressed, his family said. The disease’s progression varies from two to more than 20 years and the average life expectancy after the start of symptoms is seven to 13 years. There is no cure or treatment currently available, according to the AFTD’s website. Willis’ family said that by sharing his story they hope they can bring more awareness to the disease and push for research toward finding treatments. Willis retired from acting in 2022 after his aphasia diagnosis. Aphasia typically occurs suddenly after a stroke, head injury or sometimes a slow-growing tumor. It can affect a person’s ability to speak, write and understand language, both verbal and written, according to the Mayo Clinic. The actor’s former co-workers told the Los Angeles Times last year that he had been struggling for years on set. In the Biden administrations’ zeal for shooting down balloons, they may have overreacted with this one… https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/aircraft-propulsion/hobby-clubs-missing-balloon-feared-shot-down-usaf Hobby Club’s Missing Balloon Feared Shot Down By USAF A small, globe-trotting balloon declared “missing in action” by an Illinois-based hobbyist club on Feb. 15 has emerged as a candidate to explain one of the three mystery objects shot down by four heat-seeking missiles launched by U.S. Air Force fighters since Feb. 10. The club—the Northern Illinois Bottlecap Balloon Brigade (NIBBB)—is not pointing fingers yet. But the circumstantial evidence is at least intriguing. The club’s silver-coated, party-style, “pico balloon” reported its last position on Feb. 10 at 38,910 ft. off the west coast of Alaska, and a popular forecasting tool—the HYSPLIT model provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)—projected the cylindrically shaped object would be floating high over the central part of the Yukon Territory on Feb. 11. That is the same day a Lockheed Martin F-22 shot down an unidentified object of a similar description and altitude in the same general area. There are suspicions among other prominent members of the small, pico-ballooning enthusiasts’ community, which combines ham radio and high-altitude ballooning into a single, relatively affordable hobby. https://www.theblaze.com/news/eu-2035-gas-car-ban European Union approves effective ban on sales of gas cars by 2035, requiring 100% reduction in CO2 European Parliament has formally approved a law that will effectively end the sale of gas- and diesel-powered vehicles in the European Union by 2035, calling for a 100% reduction in CO2 emissions for any new cars sold, according to Reuters. The 27-nation union agreed to the changes in October 2022, but has now formalized the deal, which enforces a 55% reduction in emissions for vehicles by 2030. Levels for CO2 for 2021 were set at a target of 37.5%. Vans will get a slight advantage in the market, requiring a a 50% cut by 2030, compared with 2021 levels. Just a few months before the announcement in May 2022, car makers such as Ford and Volvo even signed a joint letter with 26 other companies asking the European Union to implement such a plan. The target of 2035 has been justified by the EU based on what officials say is an average vehicle lifespan of 15 years, which would allow the EU to reach net zero emissions by 2050. Companies that make less than 10,000 cars per year will be able to negotiate lower targets until 2036, however some companies are happily ready to enforce the change. Volkswagen vowed in October 2022 to produce only electric cars in Europe beginning in 2033, committing to the earliest possible time frame after previously stating it would aim for a 2033-2035 range. However, in June 2022, five countries were looking to delay the shift to electric-only vehicles by at least five years to 2040. Bulgaria, Italy, Portugal, Romania, and Slovakia called for a 90% cut of CO2 by 2035, extending the 100% target to 2040, with light commercial vehicles meeting 80% for 2035 before also needing the full cut by 2040. A Bulgarian official had said that the EU needed to reconsider the economic costs of switching to electric and the effect that would have on poorer nations in the union. Laws enforcing electric vehicle chargers are currently in negotiation in the union. https://dailycaller.com/2023/02/15/china-ccp-christian-chinaaid-jonathan-dingler-pastor-bob-fu-xi-jinping/ Communist China Cracked Down On Christians In 2022 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) censored, fined, politically indoctrinated and forcibly disappeared Chinese Christians in 2022, according to a new report from the nonprofit ChinaAid Tuesday. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) reportedly employed a range of new methods to persecute Chinese Christians in 2022 including fabricating charges of fraud as well as criminalizing the legal international travel of church leaders, the report states. China’s crackdown on Christianity reportedly intensified in the run-up to the CCP’s 20th Party Congress in October 2022, during which time General Secretary Xi Jinping secured a third term as the communist nation’s supreme leader, according to ChinaAid. “Xi Jinping and the Communist Party did all they could to silence Christians leading up to the 20th National Congress,” Jonathan Dingler, a spokesman for ChinaAid who worked on the report, told the Daily Caller News Foundation. Christians account for approximately 5% of China’s religious community, according to the CIA World Factbook. While Catholics number around 10 million, Protestants account for the majority of China’s Christian community, with approximately 38 million followers as of 2020, The Economist reported. Dingler told the DCNF that after the CCP’s crackdown leading up to the 20th Party Congress “the tone shifted” within the state-sanctioned churches which then began treating Xi “as if he were the leader of the church.” ChinaAid identified a March 2022 paper entitled “Adhering to the Sinicization of Religion in China” published by the United Front Work Department (UFWD) as the political motivation behind the CCP’s 2022 crackdown on Christianity. The UFWD is a “Chinese government entity charged with extending the CCP’s influence and control over non-Party organizations both domestically and abroad to advance CCP policy objectives,” according to a 2021 report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC). Moreover, the USCC also identified the UFWD as a “Chinese intelligence service” in 2016. The UFWD’s March 2022 paper reportedly emphasized “promoting the Sinicization of religion, adhering to the orientation of the core socialist values and submerging all religious beliefs in Chinese culture to better adapt religion to China’s socialist society and the New Era of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” according to ChinaAid. China’s state-sanctioned churches must now actively promote Xi’s thoughts “from the pulpit,” which in practice means that churches which don’t “flat-out fall at Xi’s feet and worship him are considered ‘inciting subversion of state power,'” Dingler told the DCNF. Churches were reportedly even converted into political propaganda centers in order to broadcast Xi’s speech during the 20th Party Congress in October 2022, according to ChinaAid’s report. Likewise, churches in other provinces were also reportedly repurposed to hold “study” sessions on CCP policies such as “Reinforcing Management of Religion on All Fronts: 10 Prohibitions and 10 Mustn’ts.” The Chinese government also increasingly persecuted Christians online in 2022, censoring words like “Jesus,” “Savior” and “Amen” on the Chinese social media platform WeChat, according to ChinaAid’s report. At the same time, the Chinese government also shut down church websites and Christians’ social media accounts. “Congregants can’t even give to their churches online anymore, thanks to new regulations,” Dingler said. “They want to break down house churches even further, hoping they will finally give in and submit.” The Chinese Embassy did not respond to the DCNF’s request for comment.
In this episode of Pekingology, Freeman Chair Jude Blanchette is joined by Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, Professor at the Department of International Economics, Government and Business at the Copenhagen Business School, to discuss his work on corporate governance in the Chinese state sector, focusing on his paper: “Corporate Governance with Chinese Characteristics: Party Organization in State-owned Enterprises.”
Episode Notes:A discussion recently concluded 20th Party Congress and what to expect ahead in US China relations. I'm pleased to welcome back Chris Johnson, CEO of Consultancy China Strategies Group, Senior Fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute Center for China Analysis and former Senior China analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. This is the 7th Party Congress that Chris has analyzed professionally.Links:John Culver: How We Would Know When China Is Preparing to Invade Taiwan - Carnegie Endowment for International PeaceTranscript:Bill: Welcome back to the very occasional Sinocism podcast. Today we are going to talk about the recently concluded 20th Party Congress and what to expect ahead in US China relations. I'm pleased to welcome back Chris Johnson, CEO of Consultancy China Strategies Group, Senior Fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute Center for China Analysis and former Senior China analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. This is the 7th Party Congress that Chris has analyzed professionally. So we have a lot of experience here to help us understand what just happened. Chris, welcome back and thanks for taking the time.Chris: My pleasure. Always fun to be with you, Bill.Bill: Great. Well, why don't we jump right in. I'd like to talk about what you see as the most important outcomes from the Congress starting with personnel. What do you make of the leadership team from the central committee to the Politburo to the Standing Committee and what does that say about.Chris: Yeah, well, I, think clearly Xi Jinping had a massive win, you know, with personnel. I think we see this particularly in the Politburo Standing Committee, right, where on the key portfolios that really matter to him in terms of controlling the key levers of power inside the system. So we're talking propaganda, obviously, Uh, we're talking party bureaucracy, military less so, but security services, you know, these, these sort of areas all up and down the ballot he did very well.So that's obviously very important. And I think obviously then the dropping of the so-called Communist Youth League faction oriented people in Li Keqiang and Wang Yang and, and Hu Chunhua being kind of unceremoniously kicked off the Politburo, that tells us that. He's not in the mood to compromise with any other interest group.I prefer to call them rather than factions. Um, so that sort of suggests to us that, you know, models that rely on that kind of an analysis are dead. It has been kind of interesting in my mind to see how quickly though that, you know, analysts who tend to follow that framework already talking about the, uh, factional elements within Xi's faction, right?So, you know, it's gonna be the Shanghai people versus the Zhijiang Army versus the Fujian people. Bill: people say there's a Tsinghua factionChris: Right. The, the infamous, non infamous Tsinghua clique and, and and so on. But I think as we look more closely, I mean this is all kidding aside, if we look more closely at the individuals, what we see is obviously these people, you know, loyalty to Xi is, is sort of like necessary, but not necessarily sufficient in explaining who these people are. Also, I just always find it interesting, you know, somehow over. Wang Huning has become a Xi Jinping loyalist. I mean, obviously he plays an interesting role for Xj Jinping, but I don't think we should kid ourselves in noting that he's been kind of shunted aside Right by being pushed into the fourth position on the standing committee, which probably tells us that he will be going to oversee the Chinese People's Consultative Congress, which is, you know, kind of a do nothing body, you know, for the most part. And, um, you know, my sense has long been, One of Xi Jinping's, I think a couple factors there with Wang Huning.Sinocism is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.One is, you know, yes, he is very talented at sort of taking their very, uh, expansive, um, theoretical ideas and coming up with snappy, um, snappy sort of catchphrases, right? This is clearly his, um, his sort of claim to fame. But, you know, we had that article last year from the magazine, Palladium that kind of painted him as some sort of an éminence grise or a Rasputin like figure, you know, in terms of his role.Uh, you know, my sense has always been, uh, as one contact, put it to me one time. You know, the issue is that such analyses tend to confuse the musician with the conductor. In other words, Xi Jinping. is pretty good at ideology, right? And party history and the other things that I think the others had relied on.I think the second thing with Wang Huning is, um, in a way XI can't look at him I don't think, without sort of seeing here's a guy who's changed flags, as they would say, right? He served three very different leaders, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and now Xi , um, and, and continued on and I think at some level, uh, and we look at the rest of the appointments where it appears that, uh, loyalty was much more important than merit.Um, where that's also a question mark. So there's those issues I think on the Politburo. You know, you mentioned the, the Tsinghua clique it was very interesting. You had shared with me, uh, Desmond Shum of Red Roulette fame's Twitter stream sort of debunking, you know, this, this Tsinghua clique and saying, well, it turns out in fact that the new Shanghai Municipal Party Secretary Chen Jining can't stand Chen Xi, even though, you know, they both went to Tsinghua and were there at the same time and so on.Um, you know, who knows with Desmond Shum, but I think he knows some things, right? And, and, and it just a reminder to us all, I think, how little we understand right, about these relationships, especially now, uh, with Xi's concentration of power. And also a situation where we've had nearly three years of covid isolationBill: Right. And so it's really hard to go talk to people, even the fewer and fewer numbers, people who, who know something and can talk. Back to the standing committee. I, I think certainly just from friends and contacts the biggest surprise you know, I think, uh was Li Keqiang and Wang Yang not sticking around. And as that long explainer said without naming them they were good comrades who steps aside for the good of the party in the country,Chris: Because that happens so often,Bill: whatever that means. Um, but really the, the bigger surprise was that, oh, Cai Qi showing up. Who I think when you look at the standing committee, I think the general sense is, okay, the, these people are all, you know, not, they're loyal, but they're also competent, like Li Qiang, Chris: Right, Bill: The likely new premier number two on the standing committee is pretty competent. The Shanghai lockdown, disaster aside, Cai Qi on the other hand, was just, looks more like, it's just straight up loyalty to Xi. I think he was not really on anybody's short list of who was gonna make it on there. And so, it does feel like something happened, right?Chris: Yeah. Well, um, a couple things there. I think, um, one, let's start with the. The issue you raised about the economic team cuz I think that's actually very important. Um, you know, I, at some level, sometimes I feel like I'm sort of tiring my, of my role as official narrative buster or a windmill tilter.Uh, whether, whether it's pushback from Li Keqiang or the myth of the savior premier as I was calling it, which, uh, we didn't see, or that these norms actually aren't very enduring and it's really about power politics. I, I think I'm kind of onto a new one now, which is, you know, Xi Jin ping's new team of incompetent sycophants.Right? That's kind of the label that's, uh, come out in a lot of the takes, uh, since the Congress. But to your point, I mean, you know, Li Qiang has run the three most important economic powerhouses on China's east coast, either as governor or as party chief. Right. He seems to have had a, a good relationship with both.Private sector businesses and, and foreign, you know, people forget that, you know, he got the Tesla plant built in Shanghai in a year basically. Right. And it's, uh, responsible for a very significant amount of, of Tesla's total input of vehicles. Output of vehicles. Excuse me. Um, likewise, I hear that Ding Xuexiang, even though we don't know a lot about him, uh, was rather instrumental in things.Breaking the log jam with the US uh, over the de-listing of Chinese ADRs, uh, that he had played an important role in convincing Xi Jinping it would not be a good idea, for example, to, uh, you know, we're already seeing, uh, sort of decoupling on the technology side. It would not be a good idea to encourage the Americans to decouple financially as well. So the point is I think we need to just all kind of calm down, right? And, and see how these people perform in office. He Lifeng, I think is perhaps, you know, maybe more of a question mark, but, But here too, I think it's important for us to think about how their system worksThe political report sets the frame, right? It tells us what. Okay, this is the ideological construct we're working off of, or our interpretation, our dialectical interpretation of what's going on. And that, I think the signal there was what I like to call this fortress economy, right? So self-sufficiency and technology and so on.And so then when we look at the Politburo appointments, you can see that they align pretty closely to that agenda, right? These people who've worked in state firms or scientists and you know, so on and forth.Bill: Aerospace, defenseChris: Yeah, Aerospace. Very close alignment with that agenda. I'm not saying this is the right choice for China or that it even will be successful, I'm just saying it makes sense, you know,Bill: And it is not just sycophants it is actually loyal but some expertise or experience in these key sectors Chris: Exactly. Yeah, and, and, and, and of interest as well. You know, even people who have overlapped with Xi Jinping. How much overlap did they have? How much exposure did they have? You know, there's a lot of discussion, for example, about the new propaganda boss, Li Shulei being very close to Xi and likewise Shi Taifeng.Right? Uh, both of whom were vice presidents at the party school when, when Xi also was there. Um, but remember, you know, he was understudy to Hu Jintao at the time, you know, I mean, the party school thing was a very small part of his portfolio and they were ranked lower, you know, amongst the vice presidents of the party school.So how much actual interaction did he have? So there too, you know, I think, uh, obviously. , yes these people will do what Xi Jinping wants them to do, but that doesn't mean they're not competent. On Cai Qi, I agree with you. I think it's, it's, it's difficult. You know, my speculation would be a couple of things.One, proximity matters, right? He's been sitting in Beijing the last five years, so he is, had the opportunity to, uh, be close to the boss and, and impact that. I've heard some suggestions from contacts, which I think makes some. He was seen as more strictly enforcing the zero Covid policy. Right. In part because he is sitting in Beijing than say a Chen Min'er, right.Who arguably was a other stroke better, you know, candidate for that position on the Politburo standing committee. And there, you know, it will be interesting to see, you know, we're not sure the musical chairs have not yet finished. Right. The post party Congress for people getting new jobs. But you know, for example, if Chen Min'er stays out in Chongqing, that seems like a bit of a loss for him.Bill: Yeah, he needs to go somewhere else if he's got any hope of, um, sort of, But so one thing, sorry. One thing on the Politburo I thought was really interesting, and I know we've talked about offline, um, is that the first time the head of the Ministry State Security was, was. Promoted into the Politburo - Chen Wenqing. And now he is the Secretary of the Central Political Legal Affairs Commission, the party body that oversees the entire security services system and legal system. and what do you think that says about priorities and, and, and where Xi sees things going?Chris: Well, I think it definitely aligns with this concept of Xi Jiping's of comprehensive national security. Right. We've, we've seen and heard and read a lot about that and it seems that the, uh, number of types of security endlessly proliferate, I think we're up to 13 or 14Bill: Everything is National Security in Xi's China.Chris: Yeah. Everything is, is national security. Uh, that's one thing I think it's interesting perhaps in the, in the frame of, you know, in an era where they are becoming a bigger power and therefore, uh, have more resources and so on. You know, is that role that's played by the Ministry of State Security, which is, you know, they have this unique role, don't they?They're in a way, they're sort of the US' Central Intelligence Agency and, and FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation combined, and that they do have that internal security role as well, but, They are the foreign civilian anyway, uh, foreign intelligence collection arm. So perhaps, you know, over time there's been some sense that they realized, yes, cyber was great for certain things, but you still need human intelligence.Uh, you know, we don't know how well or not Chen Wenqing has performed, but you know, obviously there, this has been a relentless campaign, you know, the search for spies and so on and so forth. Um, I also think it says something about what we seem to be seeing emerging here, which is an effort to take what previously were these, you know, warring, uh, administrative or ministerial factions, right, of the Ministry of Public Security MPS, the MSS, uh, and even the party's, uh, discipline watchdog, the, uh, Central Commission on Discipline inspection, you know, in an effort to sort of knit those guys into one whole.And you know, it is interesting.Chen wending has experience in all three of those. He started off, I think as a street cop. Um, he did serve on the discipline inspection commission under, uh, Wang Qishan when things were, you know, really going in that department in the early part of, Xi's tenure and then he's headed, uh, the Ministry of State Security.I think, you know, even more interesting probably is. The, uh, formation of the new secretariat, right? Where we have both Chen Wenqing on there and also Wang Xiaohong as a minister of Public Security, but also as a deputy on the CPLAC, right? And a seat on the secretariat. And if we look at the, um, The gentleman who's number two in the discipline inspection, uh, space, he was a longtime police officer as well.So that's very unusual. You know, uh, his name's escaping me at the moment. But, um, you know, so in effect you have basically three people on the Secretariat with security backgrounds and, you know, that's important. It means other portfolios that might be on the secretariat that have been dumped, right? So it shows something about the prioritization, uh, of security.And I think it's interesting, you know, we've, we've often struggled to understand what is the National Security Commission, how does it function, You know, these sort of things. And it's, it's still, you know, absolutely clear as mud. But what was interesting was that, you know, from whatever that early design was that had some aspect at least of looking a bit like the US style, National Security Commission, they took on a much more sort of internal looking flavor.And it had always been my sort of thought that one of the reasons Xi Jinping created this thing was to break down, you know, those institutional rivalries and barriers and force, you know, coordination on these, on these institutions. So, you know, bottom line, I think what we're seeing is a real effort by Xi Jinping to You know, knit together a comprehensive, unified, and very effective, you know, stifling, really security apparatus. And, uh, I don't expect to see that change anytime soon. And then, you know, as you and I have been discussing recently, we also have, uh, another Xi loyalist Chen Yixin showing up as Chen Wenqing's successor right at the Ministry of State SecurityBill: And he remains Secretary General of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission too.Chris: Exactly. So, you know, from, from a, a sheet home where Xi Jinping five years ago arguably had very loose control, if at all, we now have a situation where he's totally dominant. Bill: I think the, the official on the Secretariat, I think it's Liu Jinguo.Chris: That's the one. Yes. Thank you. I'm getting old…Bill: He also has, has a long history of the Ministry of Public Security system. Um, but yeah, it does, it does seem like it's a, it's a real, I mean it, I I, I don't wanna use the word securitization, but it does like this is the indication of a, of a real, sort of, it just sort of fits with the, the general trend towards much more focus on national security. I mean, what about on the, the Central Military Commission? Right? Because one of the surprises was, um, again, and this is where the norms were broken, where you have Zhang Youxia, who should have retired based on his age, but he's 72, he's on the Politburo he stays as a vice chair of the CMCChris: Yep. Yeah, no, at, at, at the rip old age of 72. It's a little hard, uh, to think of him, you know, mounting a tank or something to go invade Taiwan or whatever the, you know, whatever the case may be. But, you know, I, I think here again, the narratives might be off base a little bit, you know, it's this issue of, you know, well he's just picked, you know, these sycophantic loyalists, He's a guy who has combat experience, right?And that's increasingly rare. Um, I don't think it's any surprise that. That himself. And, uh, the, uh, uh, gentleman on the CMC, uh, Li, who is now heading the, um, Joint Chiefs of Staff, he also has Vietnam combat experience, not from 79, but from the, uh, the border incursions that went on into the80s. Um, so it's not that surprising really.But, but obviously, you know, Zhang Youxia is very close to Xi Jinping, their father's fought together, right? Um, and they have that sort of, uh, blood tie and Xi is signaling, I want, uh, I. Political control and also technologically or, or, um, you know, operationally competent people. I think the other fascinating piece is we see once again no vice chairman from the political commissar iatside of the PLA.I think that's very interesting. You know, a lot of people, including myself, were betting that Miao HuaWould, would, would get the promotion. He didn't, you know, we can't know. But my sense is in a way, Xi Jiping is still punishing that side of the PLA for Xu Caihou's misdoings. Right. You know, and that's very interesting in and of itself.Also, it may be a signal that I don't need a political commissar vice chairman because I handle the politicsBill: And, and, and he, yeah. And in this, this new era that the, the next phase of the Xi era, it, it is, uh, everybody knows, right? It's, it's all about loyalty to Xi.Chris: we just saw right, uh, today, you know, uh, yet, yet more instructions about the CMC responsibilities, Chairman, responsibility systems. Bill: Unfortunately they didn't release the full text but it would be fascinating to see what's in there.Chris: And they never do on these things, which is, uh, which is tough. But, um, you know, I think we have a general sense of what would be in it, . But, but even that itself, right, you know, is a very major thing that people, you know, didn't really pick up. Certain scholars, certainly like James Mulvenon and other people who are really good on this stuff noticed it. But this shift under Hu Jintao was a CMC vice chairman responsibility system. In other words, he was subletting the operational matters certainly to his uniformed officers, Xi Jinping doesn't do thatBill: Well, this, and here we are, right where he can indeed I mean, I, I had written in the newsletter, um, you know, that she had, I thought, I think he ran the table in terms of personnel.Chris: Oh, completely. Yeah.Bill: And this is why it is interesting he kept around folks like Wang Huning, but we'll move on. The next question I had really was about Xi's report to the party Congress and we had talked, I think you'd also, um, you've talked about on our previous podcasts, I mean there, there seems to be a pretty significant shift in the way Xi is talking about the geopolitical environment and their assessment and how they see the world. Can you talk about a little bit?Chris: Yeah, I mean, I think definitely we saw some shifts there and, uh, you know, you and I have talked a lot about it. You know, there are problems with word counting, right? You know, and when you look at the thing and you just do a machine search, and it's like, okay, well security was mentioned 350 times or whatever, but, but the, you know, in what context?Right. Um, and, uh, our, uh, mutual admiration society, the, uh, the China Media project, uh, I thought they did an excellent piece on that sort of saying, Remember, it's the words that go around the buzzword that matter, you know, just as much. But what we can say unequivocally is that two very important touchstones that kind of explain their thinking on their perception of not only their external environment, but really kind of their internal environment, which had been in the last several political reports, now are gone. And those are this idea of China's enjoying a period of strategic opportunity and this idea that peace and development are the underlying trend of the times. And, you know, on the period of strategic opportunity, I think it's important for a couple reasons. One, just to kind of break that down for our listeners in a way that's not, you know, sort of, uh, CCP speak, , uh, the, the basic idea was that China judged that it's external security environment was sufficiently benign, that they could focus their energies on economic development.Right? So obviously that's very important. I also think it was an important governor, and I don't think I've seen anything out there talking about its absence in this, uh, political report on this topic, It was a, it was an important governor on sort of breakneck Chinese military development, sort of like the Soviet Union, right?In other words, as long as you were, you know, sort of judging that your external environment was largely benign, you. Didn't really have a justification to have a massive defense budget or to be pushy, you know, in the neighborhood, these sort of things. And people might poo poo that and sort of say, Well, you know, this is all just rhetoric and so on. No, they actually tend to Bill: Oh, that's interesting. Well, then that fits a little bit, right, Cuz they added the, the wording around strategic deterrence in the report as well which is seen as a, you know, modernizing, expanding their nuclear forces, right?Chris: Exactly, right. So, you know, that's, uh, an important absence and the fact that, you know, the word, again, word searching, right. Um, strategic and opportunity are both in there, but they're separated and balanced by this risks and challenges, languages and, and so on. Bill: Right the language is very starkly different. Chris: Yeah. And then likewise on, on peace and development. This one, as you know, is, is even older, right? It goes back to the early eighties, I believe, uh, that it's been in, in these political reports. And, uh, you know, there again, the idea was sort of not only was this notion that peace and economic development were the dominant, you know, sort of trend internationally, globally, they would be an enduring one. You know, this idea of the trend of the times, right? Um, now that's missing. So what has replaced it in both these cases is this spirit of struggle, right? Um, and so that's a pretty stark departure and that in my mind just sort of is a real throwback to what you could call the period of maximum danger for the regime in the sixties, right? When they had just split off with the Soviets and they were still facing unremitting hostility from the west after the Korean War experience and, and so on. So, you know, there's definitely a, a decided effort there. I think also we should view the removal of these concepts as a culmination of a campaign that Xi Jinping has been on for a while.You know, as you and I have discussed many times before, from the minute he arrived, he began, I think, to paint this darker picture of the exterior environment. And he seems to have always wanted to create a sort of sense of urgency, certainly maybe even crisis. And I think a big part of that is to justifying the power grab, right? If the world outside is hostile, you need, you know, a strongman. Bill: Well that was a lot of the propaganda going into the Party of Congress about the need for sort of a navigator helmsman because know, we we're, we're closest we have ever been to the great rejuvenation, but it's gonna be really hard and we need sort of strong leadership right. It was, it was all building to that. This is why Ci needs to stay for as long as he wants to stay.Chris: and I think we saw that reflected again just the other day in this Long People's Daily piece by Ding Xuexing, right, Where he's talking again about the need for unity, the throwback, as you mentioned in your newsletter to Mao's commentary, there is not to be lost on any of us you know, the fact that the Politburo standing committee's. Uh, first field trip is out to Yan'an, right? I mean, you know, these are messages, right? The aren't coincidental.Bill: No, it, it is. The thing that's also about the report that's interesting is that while there was, speaking of word counts, there was no mention of the United States, but it certainly feels like that was the primary backdrop for this entire discussion around. So the, the shifting geopolitical, uh, assessments and this broader, you know, and I think one of the things that I, and I want to talk to as we get into this, a little bit about US China relations, but is it she has come to the conclusion that the US is implacably effectively hostile, and there is no way that they're gonna get through this without some sort of a broader struggle?Chris: I don't know if they, you know, feel that conflict is inevitable. In fact, I kind of assume they don't think that because that's pretty grim picture for them, you know? Um, but I, I do think there's this notion that. They've now had two years to observe the Biden administration. Right? And to some degree, I think it's fair to say that by certain parties in the US, Xi Jinping, maybe not Xi Jinping, but a Wang Qishan or some of these characters were sold a bit of a bag of goods, right?Oh, don't worry, he's not Trump, he's gonna, things will be calmer. We're gonna get back to dialogue and you know, so on and so forth. And that really hasn't happened. And when we look at. Um, when we look at measures like the recent, chip restrictions, which I'm sure we'll discuss at some point, you know, that would've been, you know, the, the wildest dream, right of certain members of the Trump administration to do something that, uh, that's that firm, right? So, um, I think the conclusion of the Politburo then must be, this is baked into the cake, right? It's bipartisan. Um, the earliest we'll see any kind of a turn here is 2024. I think they probably feel. Um, and therefore suddenly things like a no limits partnership with Russia, right, start to make more sense. Um, but would really makes sense in that if that is your framing, and I think it is, and you therefore see the Europeans as like a swing, right, in this equation. This should be a great visit, right, for Chancellor Scholz, uh, and uh, I can't remember if it was you I was reading or someone else here in the last day or so, but this idea that if the Chinese are smart, they would get rid of these sanctions on Bill: That was me. Well, that was in my newsletterChris: Yeah. Parliamentary leaders and you know, Absolutely. Right. You know, that's a no brainer, but. I don't think they're gonna do it , but, but you know, this idea definitely that, and, and when they talk in the political report, you know, it, it's, it's like, sir, not appearing in this film, right, from Money Python, but we know who the people who are doing the bullying, you know, uh, is and the long armed jurisdiction and , so on and so forth and all, I mean, all kidding aside, I think, you know, they will see something like the chip restrictions effectively as a declaration of economic war. I don't think that's going too far to say that.Bill: It goes to the heart of their sort of technological project around rejuvenation. I mean, it is, it is a significant. sort of set of really kind of a, I would think, from the Chinese perspective aggressive policies against them,Chris: Yeah, and I mean, enforcement will be key and we'll see if, you know, licenses are granted and how it's done. And we saw, you know, already some, some backing off there with regard to this US person, uh, restriction and so on. But, but you know, it's still pretty tough stuff. There's no two ways aboutBill: No, and I, I wonder, and I worry that here in DC. You know, where the mood is very hawkish. If, if people here really fully appreciate sort of the shift that's taking, that seems to be taking place in Beijing and how these actions are viewed.Chris: Well, I, I think that's a really, you put your hand on it really, really interesting way, Bill, because, you know, let's face it really since the Trump trade war started, right? We've all analysts, you know, pundits, uh, even businesses and government people have been sort of saying, you know, when are the Chinese gonna punch back? You know, when are they going to retaliate? Right? And we talk about rare earths and we talk about Apple and TeslaBill: They slapped some sanctions on people but they kind of a jokeChris: And I guess what I'm saying is I kind of worry we're missing the forest from the trees. Right. You know, the, the, the work report tells us, the political report tells us how they're reacting. Right. And it is hardening the system, moving toward this fortress economy, you know, so on and so forth. And I wanna be real clear here, you know, they're not doing this just because they're reacting to the United States. Xi Jinping presumably wanted to do this all along, but I don't think we can say that the actions they perceive as hostile from the US aren't playing a pretty major role in allowing him to accelerate.Bill: Well, they called me. Great. You justifying great Accelerationist, right? Trump was called that as well, and, and that, that's what worries me too, is we're in. Kind of toxic spiral where, where they see us doing something and then they react. We see them do something and we react and, and it doesn't feel like sort of there's any sort of a governor or a break and I don't see how we figure that out.Chris: Well, I think, you know, and I'm sure we'll come to this later in our discussion, but you know, uh, yes, that's true, but you know, I'm always deeply skeptical of these inevitability memes, whether it's, you know, Thucydides trap or, you know, these other things. Last time I checked, there is something called political agency, right?In other words, leaders can make choices and they can lead if they want to, right? They have an opportunity to do so at in Bali, and you know, we'll have to see some of the, you know, early indications are perhaps they're looking at sort of a longer meeting. So that would suggest maybe there will be some discussion of some of these longstanding issues.Maybe we will see some of the usual, you know, deliverable type stuff. So there's an opportunity. I, I think one question is, can the domestic politics on either side allow for seizing that opportunity? You know, that's an open.Bill: Interesting. There's a couple things in the party constitution, which I think going into the Congress, you know, they told us they were gonna amend the Constitution. There were expectations that it, the amendments were gonna reflect an increase in Xi's power, uh, things like this, this idea of the two establishments, uh, which for listeners are * "To establish the status of Comrade Xi Jinping as the core of the Party's Central Committee and of the whole Party"* "To establish the guiding role of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era"The thinking, and I, I certainly believe that, I thought that they would write that in. There was some talk that, uh, Xi Jinping Thought the longer version would be truncated to just Xi Jinping thought. that possibly he might get, a, a sort of another title like People's Leader. None of those happened. One thing that did happen, What's officially translated by the Chinese side in English as the two upholds- “Uphold the 'core' status of General Secretary Xi Jinping within the CC and “Uphold the centralized authority of the Party” those were written in. And so the question is, was there some kind of pushback or are we misreading we what mattered? And actually the two upholds are more important than the two of establishes.Chris: Well, I, and I think it, this may be a multiple choice answer, right? There might be elements of all the above in there. Uh, you know, I think it is important that he didn't get the truncation to Xi Jinping thought. You have to think that that was something he was keen on. In retrospect, it may be that it was something akin. I've always felt, you know, another thing that was on the table that didn't happen was reestablishing the party chairmanship. My view had always been he was using that largely as a bargaining chip. That, you know, in some ways it creates more trouble than it's worth you. If you're gonna have a chairman, you probably have to have vice chairman and what does that say about the succession? I mean, of course he could have, you know, a couple of geezers on there. as vice chairman too. , But I, my view was always is he was holding that out there to trade away. Right. You know, at, at the last minute. Um, maybe that's what happened with Xi Jinping thought. I don't know.You know, uh, there have been some media articles, one of which, You and I were discussing yesterday from, uh, the Japanese, uh, publication Nikkei, you know, that suggested that, you know, the elders had, this was their last gasp, right? So the Jiang Zemins and the Zeng Qinghongs and Hu Jinataos, so on. Um, I'm a little skeptical of that. It is possible. Uh, but, um, I, I'd be a little skeptical of that. You know, it's, it's not at all clear that they had any kind of a role, you know, even at Beidaihe this year and so on, Jiang Zemin didn't even attend the Party Congress so clearly, you know, he must be pretty frail or he thought it was not with his time. You know, a little hard to say, but, you know, I kind of struggle with the notion that, you know, the 105 year old Song Ping gets up on a chair or something and starts, starts making trouble. Right. You know, uh, the poor man's probably lucky if he stays awake during the meeting. Bill: One question, and again, because of the, just, you know, how much more opaque Chinese politics are than the really I think they've ever been. Um, but just one question. It mean, is it possible, for example, that you know, it's more important to get the personnel done. It's more, and then once you get your, you stack the central committee, you get the politburo, you get the standing committee, that these things are sort of a next phase.Chris: yeah, it's entirely possible and, and I think it, it, it does dovetail with this idea that, you know, another reflection from both the political report and the lineup in my mind, is Xi Jinping is a man in a hurry. Right? And he's kind of projected that, as you said, the great accelerator since he arrived.But I think he sees this next five years is really fundamental, right in terms of breaking through on these chokepoint technologies as they call them. You know, these sort of things. And so maybe therefore having the right people in place to handle, you know, uh, speedier policy, execution, you know, was more important.Likewise, I mean, he's sort of telegraphing, He's gonna be around for a while, right? No successor, no visible successor anywhere. Bill: A successor would need likely need five years on the standing committee. So we're looking at ten more years.Chris: Yes, exactly. And so there will be time. The other thing is, um, Xi Jinping is a, is a sort of determined fellow, right? You know, so of interest, even before the 19th Party Congress, I'd been hearing very strong rumors that the notion of lingxiu was out there, that he was contemplating it, right? And so then we see the buildup with, uh, Renmin lingxiu and so on and so forth.And, you know, it didn't happen clearly at the 19th. It didn't happen. But it doesn't mean it won't, you know, at some point. And I think it's really important also to think about, you know, We just saw a pretty serious, um, enterprise of the, you know, quote unquote norm busting, right? So what's to say that mid-course in this five years, he doesn't, uh, hold another sort of extraordinary conference of party delegates like them, Deng Xiaoping did in 1985, right, to push through some of these. You never know, right? In other words, these things don't necessarily have to happen. Just at Party Congresses. So my guess is, you know, this isn't over yet. Uh, but you know, at some level, given how the system was ramping up with those articles about Navigator and the people's leader stuff and so on, you know, that's usually a tell, and yet it didn't happen. And, and so something interesting there. Bill: now they're in the mode of, they're out with these sort of publicity, propaganda education teams where they go out throughout the country and talk about the spirit of the party Congress and push all the key messaging. Um, you know, so far none of those People's leader truncation have happened in that, which is I think an area where some people thought, Well, maybe that could sort of come after the Congress.Chris: What is interesting is it's all two establishments all the time in those discussions, so that's been very interesting since it didn't make it into the, uh, into the document. I guess the other thing is, At some level, is it sort of a distinction without a difference? You know, I, I haven't done the work on this to see, but my guess is short of, you know, the many times they've just junked the entire constitution and rewritten it, this is probably the most amendments there have been, you know, in the to at one time. You know, to the 1982 constitution, and most of them are his various buzzwords. Right. Um, and you know, I think you've been talking about this in the newsletter, there may very well be, uh, something to this issue of, you know, which is the superior thought two establishments or to upholds/safeguards?Bill: and even if the two establishes were superior and then it didn't go in, then somehow it will be theoretically flipped to what got in the ConstitutionChris: I mean, I guess the, the, the thing though where we, it's fair to say that maybe this wasn't his ideal outcome. To me, there's been a very clear and you know, structured stepwise approach on the ideology from the word go. Right? And the first was to create right out of the shoot, this notion of, you know, three eras, right?The, Mao period, Deng and those other guys we don't talk about it anymore, period. and Xi Jinping's new era, right? And then that was. You know, sort of crystallized right at the 19th Party Congress when you know, Xi Jinping thought for horribly long name went into the Constitution. And so, you know, the next step kind of seemed like that should be it.And as we've discussed before, you know, if he's able to get just Thought, it certainly enhances his ability to stay around for a very long time and it makes his diktats and so on even more unquestionable. But you know, you can say again, matter of prioritization. With a team where there's really no visible or other opposition, does it really matter? You know, in other words, no one's gonna be questioning his policy ideas anyway.Bill: Just an aside, but on his inspection, the new standing committee will go on group trip right after the Party Congress and the first trip sends key messages. And group went to Yan'an, you know, they went, they went to the caves. Um, and you know, in the long readout or long CCTV report of the meeting, the visit, there was a section where the tour guide or the person introducing some of the exhibits talked about how the, the famous song, the East Is Red was, by a person, written by the people sort of spontaneously, and it w it definitely caused some tittering about, well, what are they trying to signal for?You know, are we gonna be seeing some Xi songs? there's some kind of really interesting signaling going on that I don't think we quite have figured out how to parse Chris: My takeaway on all this has been, I, I need to go back and do a little more book work on, you know, what was, what was the content of the seventh party Congress? What were the outcomes? I mean, I have the general sense, right? Like you, I immediately, you know, started brushing up on it. But, you know, Xi delivered a, an abridged work report. Right, A political report, which is exactly what Mao did then. I mean, in other words, they're not kidding around with the parallelism here. The question is what's the message?Bill: Just for background, at the visit last week to Yan'an, and the first spot that was in the propaganda was the, the, site of the seventh party Congress which is where…to be very simplistic, the seventh party was really moment, you know, as at the end of the Yan'am rectification came in, it was the moment where sort of Mao fully asserted his dominance throughout the system. Mao Thought etc. Right? The signaling, you could certainly, could certainly take a view that, you know, he doesn't do these things by coincidence, and this is. This is signaling both of, you know, can through anything because they, livedin caves and ended up beating the Japanese and then won the Civil War. You know this, and we can, and by the way, we have a dominant leader. I mean, there are ways, again, I'm being simplistic, but the symbolism was not, I think one that would, for example, give a lot of confidence to investors, which I think is, you know, one, one of the many reasons we've seen until the rumors earlier this week, a, pretty big selloff in the, in the Hong Kong and manland stock markets rightChris: most definitely. And I think, you know, this is the other thing about, about what I was trying to get at earlier with, uh, forest and trees, right? You know, in other words, . Um, he's been at this for a while too. You know, there's a reason why he declared a new long march right in depths of the trade war with Trump.Bill: And a new historical resolution, only the third in historyChris: Yeah. And they have been stepwise building since then. And this is the next building block.Bill: The last thought, I mean, he is 69. He's. 10 years younger than President Joe Biden. He could go, he could be around for a long timeBill: well just quickly, cause I know, uh, we don't have that much more time, but I, you say anything about your thoughts on Hu Jintao and what happened?My first take having had a father and a stepfather had dementia was, um, you know, maybe too sympathetic to the idea that, okay, he's having some sort of a senior cognitive moment. You know, you can get. easily agitated, and you can start a scene. And so therefore, was humiliating and symbolic at the end of the Communist Youth League faction, but maybe it was, it was benign as opposed to some of the other stuff going around. But I think might be wrong so I'd love your take on that. Chris: Well, I, I think, you know, I, I kind of shared your view initially when I watched the, uh, I guess it was an AFP had the first, you know, sort of video that was out there and, you know, he appeared to be stumbling around a bit. He definitely looked confused and, you know, like, uh, what we were discussing earlier on another subject, this could be a multiple choice, you know, A and B or whatever type scenario as well.We don't know, I mean, it seems pretty well established that he has Parkinson's, I think the lead pipe pincher for me though, was that second longer one Singapore's channel, Channel News Asia put out. I mean, he is clearly tussling with Li Zhanshu about something, right. You know that that's. Yes, very clear. And you know, if he was having a moment, you know, when they finally get him up out of the chair and he seems to be kind of pulling back and so on, you know, he moves with some alacrity there, for an 80 year old guy. Uh, I don't know if he was being helped to move quickly or he, you know, realized it was time to exit stage.Right. But I think, you know, as you said in your newsletter, I, we probably will never know. Um, but to me it looked an awful lot like an effort by Xi Jinping to humiliate him. You know, I mean, there was a reason why they brought the cameras back in at that moment, you know? Unless we believe that that just happened spontaneously in terms of Hu Jintao has his freak out just as those cameras were coming back in the stone faces of the other members of the senior leadership there on the rostrum and you know, Wand Hunting, pulling Li Zhanshu back down kind of saying basically, look buddy, this is politics, don't you don't wanna, that's not a good look for you trying to care for Hu Jintao. You know, I mean obviously something was going on, you know? No, no question. Bill: Right. And feeds into the idea that Hu Chunhua, we all expected that he at least be on the Politburo again, and he's, he's off, so maybe something, something was going Chris: Well, I, I think what we know from observing Xi Jinping, right? We know that this is a guy who likes to keep people off balance, right? Who likes to keep the plate spinning. He, this is definitely the Maoist element of his personality, you know, whether it's strategic disappearances or this kind of stuff. And I think it's entirely plausible that he might have made some last minute switches right, to, uh, the various lists that were under consideration that caused alarm, you know, among those who thought they were on a certain list and and no longer were.Bill: and then, and others who were smart enough to realize that if he made those switches, they better just go with it.Chris: Yeah, go along with it. Exactly. I mean, you know, in some ways the most, aside from what happened to Hu Jintao, the, the most, um, disturbing or compelling, depending on how you wanna look at it, part of that video is when Hu Jintao, you know, sort of very, um, delicately taps Li Keqiang on the shoulder. He doesn't even look at it, just keeps looking straight ahead. Uh, and that's tough. And as you pointed out in the newsletter and elsewhere, you know, how difficult must have that have been for Hu Jintao's son Hu Haifeng, who's in the audience watching this all go on? You know, it's, uh, it's tough. Bill: And then two two days later attends a meeting where he praises Xi to high heaven.Chris: Yeah, exactly. So, so if the darker narrative is accurate, I guess one thing that concerns me a bit is, as you know, well, I have never been a fan of these, uh, memes about comparing Xi Jinping to either Stalin or Mao in part because I don't see him as a whimsical guy. They were whimsical people. I think because of his tumultuous upbringing, he understands the problems with that kind of an approach to life, but this was a very ruthless act. If that more malign, you know, sort of definition is true and that I think that says something about his mentality that perhaps should concern us if that's the case. Bill: It has real implications, not just for domestic also potentially for its foreign policy.Chris: Absolutely. I mean, what it shows, right to some degree, again, man in a hurry, this is a tenacious individual, right? if he's willing to do that. And so if you're gonna, you know, kick them in the face on chips and, you know, things like that, um, you should be taking that into consideration.Bill: And I think preparing for a more substantive response that is more thought out and it's also, it happened, it wasn't very Confucian for all this talk Confucian definitely not. and values. One last question, and it is related is what do you make of this recent upsurge or talk in DC from various officials that PRC has accelerated its timeline to absorb Taiwan, because nothing in the public documents indicates any shift in that timeline.Chris: No. Uh, and well, first of all, do they, do they have a timeline? Right? You know, I mean, the whole idea of a timeline is kind of stupid, right? You don't, if you're gonna invade somewhere, you say, Hey, we're gonna do it on on this date. I mean, 2049. Okay. Bill: The only timeline that I think you can point to is is it the second centenary goal and, and Taiwan getting quote unquote, you know, returning Taiwan to the motherland's key to the great rejuvenation,Chris: Yeah, you can't have rejuvenation without it. Bill: So then it has to be done by 2049. 27 years, but they've never come out and specifically said 27 years or 2049. But that's what No. that's I think, is where the timeline idea comes from.Chris: Oh yes, definitely. And, and I think some confusion of. What Xi Jinping has clearly set out and reaffirmed in the political report as these important, um, operational benchmarks for the PLA, the People's Liberation Army to achieve by its hundredth anniversary in 2027. But that does not a go plan for Taiwan make, you know, And so it's been confusing to me trying to understand this. And of course, you know, I, I'm joking, but I'm not, you know, if we, if we listen now to the chief of naval operations of the US Navy, you know, like they're invading tomorrow, basically.My former colleague from the CIA, John Culver's, done some very, you know, useful public work on this for the Carnegie, where he sort his endowment, where he sort of said, you know, look, there's certain things we would have to see, forget about, you know, a D-day style invasion, any type of military action that, that you don't need intelligence methods to find out. Right. You know, uh, canceling, uh, conscription, demobilization cycles, you know, those, those sort of things. Um, we don't see that happening. So I've been trying to come to grips with why the administration seems fairly seized with this and and their public commentary and so on. What I'm confident of is there's no smoking gun you know, unlike, say the Russia piece where it appears, we had some pretty compelling intelligence. There doesn't seem to be anything that says Xi Jinping has ordered invasion plans for 2024, you know, or, or, or even 2027. Um, so I'm pretty confident that's not the case. And so then it becomes more about an analytic framework. And I, from what I can tell, it's seems to be largely based on what, uh, in, you know, the intelligence community we would call calendar-int.. calendar intelligence. In other words, you know, over the next 18 months, a lot of stuff's going to happen. We're gonna have our midterm elections next week. It's pretty likely the Republicans get at least one chamber of Congress, maybe both.That would suggest that things like the Taiwan Policy Act and, you know, really, uh, things that have, uh, Beijing's undies in a bunch, uh, you know, could really come back on, uh, the radar pretty forcibly and pretty quickly. Obviously Taiwan, nobody talks about it, but Taiwan's having municipal elections around the same time, and normally that would be a very inside Taiwan baseball affair, nobody would care. But the way that KMT ooks like they will not perform, I should say, in those municipal elections. They could be effectively wiped out, you know, as a, as a sort of electable party in Taiwan. That's not a good news story for Beijing.And then of course we have our own presidential in 2024 and Taiwan has a presidential election in 24 in the US case.I mean, look, we could end up with a President Pompeo, right? Or a President DeSantis or others who. Been out there sort of talking openly about Taiwan independence and recognizing Taiwan. And similarly, I think whoever succeeds, uh, President Tsai in Taiwan, if we assume it will likely be a a, a Democratic Progressive party president, will almost by definition be more independence oriented.So I think the administration is saying there's a lot of stuff that's gonna get the Chinese pretty itchy, you know, over this next 18 month period. So therefore we need to be really loud in our signaling to deter. Right. And okay. But I think there's a risk with that as well, which they don't seem to be acknowledging, which is you might create a self-fulfilling prophecy.I mean, frankly, that's what really troubles me about the rhetoric. And so, for example, when Secretary Blinken last week or the before came out and said Yeah, you know, the, the, the Chinese have given up on the status quo. I, I, I've seen nothing, you know, that would suggest that the political report doesn't suggest. Bill: They have called it a couple of times so-called status quo.Chris: Well, Fair enough. Yeah. Okay. That's, that's fine. Um, but I think if we look at the reason why they're calling it the so-called status quo, it's because it's so called now because the US has been moving the goalposts on the status quo.Yeah. In terms of erosion of the commitment to the one China policy. And the administration can say all at once, they're not moving the goal post, but they are, I mean, let's just be honest.Bill: Now, and they have moved it more than the Trump administration did, don't you think?Chris: Absolutely. Yeah. Um, you know, no president has said previously we will defend Taiwan multiple times. Right. You know, um, and things like, uh, you know, Democracy, someone, I mean, this comes back also to the, the framing, right, of one of the risks I think of framing the relationship as democracy versus autocracy is that it puts a very, uh, heavy incentive then for the Biden administration or any future US administration to, you know, quote unquote play the Taiwan card, right, as part of said competition.Whereas if you don't have that framing, I don't think that's necessarily as automatic. Right? In other words, if that's the framing, well Taiwan's a democracy, so we have to lean in. Right? You know? Whereas if it's a more say, you know, straight realist or national interest driven foreign policy, you might not feel that in every instance you've gotta do that,Bill: No, and and I it, that's an interesting point. And I also think too that, um, I really do wonder how much Americans care, right? And, and whether or not we're running the risk of setting something up or setting something in motion that, you know, again, it's easy to be rhetorical about it, but that we're frankly not ready to deal withChris: Well, and another thing that's interesting, right, is that, um, to that point, Some of the administration's actions, you know, that are clearly designed to show toughness, who are they out toughing? You know, in some cases it feels like they're out toughing themselves, right? I mean, obviously the Republicans are watching them and so on and all of that.Um, but you know, interesting, uh, something that came across my thought wave the other day that I hadn't really considered. We're seeing pretty clear indications that a Republican dominated Congress after the midterms may be less enthusiastic about support to Ukraine, we're all assuming that they're gonna be all Taiwan support all the time.Is that a wrong assumption? You know, I mean, in other words, Ukraine's a democracy, right? And yet there's this weird strain in the Trumpist Wing of the Republican party that doesn't wanna spend the money. Right. And would that be the case for Taiwan as well? I don't know, but you know, the point is, I wonder if the boogieman of looking soft is, is sort of in their own heads to some degree.And, and even if it isn't, you know, sometimes you have to lead. Bill: it's not clear the allies are listening. It doesn't sound like the Europeans would be on board withChris: I think very clearly they're not. I mean, you know, we're about to see a very uncomfortable bit of Kabuki theater here, aren't we? In the next couple of days with German Chancellor Sholz going over and, um, you know, if you, uh, read the op-ed he wrote in Politico, you know, it's, it's painful, right? You can see him trying to, uh, Trying to, uh, you know, straddle the fence and, and walk that line.And, and obviously there are deep, deep divisions in his own cabinet, right? You know, over this visit, the foreign minister is publicly criticizing him, you know, and so on. So I think this is another aspect that might be worrisome, which is the approach. You know, my line is always sort of a stool, if it's gonna be stable, needs three legs, right.And on US-China relations, I think that is, you know, making sure our own house is in order. Domestic strengthening, these guys call it, coordinating with allies and partners, certainly. But then there's this sort of talking to the Chinese aspect and through a policy, what I tend to call strategic avoidance, we don't.Talk to them that much. So that leg is missing. So then those other two legs need to be really strong. Right. Um, and on domestic strengthening, Okay. Chips act and so on, that's good stuff. On allies and partners, there seems to be a bit of an approach and I think the chip restrictions highlight this of, look, you're either for us or against us.Right? Whereas I think in, you know, the good old Cold War I, we seem to be able to understand that a West Germany could do certain things for us vis-a-vis the Soviets and certain things they couldn't and we didn't like it and we complained, but we kind of lived with it, right? If we look at these chip restrictions, it appears the administration sort of said, Look, we've been doing this multilateral diplomacy on this thing for a year now, it's not really delivering the goods. The chips for framework is a mess, so let's just get it over with and drag the allies with us, you know? Um, and we'll see what ramifications that will have.Bill: Well on that uplifting note, I, I think I'm outta questions. Is there anything else you'd like to add?Chris: Well, I think, you know, something just to consider is this idea, you know, and maybe this will help us close on a more optimistic note. Xi Jinping is telling us, you know, he's hardening the system, he's, he's doing this fortress economy thing and so on. But he also is telling us, I have a really difficult set of things I'm trying to accomplish in this five years.Right? And that may mean a desire to signal to the us let's stabilize things a bit, not because he's having a change of heart or wants a fundamental rapprochement, so on and so forth. I don't think that's the case, but might he want a bit of room, right? A breathing room. Bill: Buy some time, buy some spaceChris: Yeah, Might he want that? He might. You know, and so I think then a critical question is how does that get sorted out in the context of the negotiations over the meeting in Bali, if it is a longer meeting, I think, you know, so that's encouraging for that. Right. To some degree. I, I, I would say, you know, if we look at what's just happened with the 20th party Congress and we look at what's about to happen, it seems with our midterms here in the United States, Who's the guy who's gonna be more domestically, politically challenged going into this meeting, and therefore have less room to be able to seize that opportunity if it does exist.Exactly. Because I, I think, you know, the, the issue is, The way I've been framing it lately, you know, supposedly our position is the US position is strategic competition and China says, look, that's inappropriate, and we're not gonna sign onto it and forget it.You know, my own view is we kind of have blown past strategic competition where now in what I would call strategic rivalry, I think the chip restrictions, you know, are, are a giant exclamation point, uh, under that, you know, and so on. And my concern is we're kind of rapidly headed toward what I would call strategic enmity.And you know, that all sounds a bit pedantic, but I think that represents three distinct phases of the difficulty and the relationship. You know, strategic enmity is the cold, the old Cold War, what we had with the Soviets, right? So we are competing against them in a brass tax manner across all dimensions. And if it's a policy that, you know, hurts us, but it hurts them, you know, 2% more we do it, you know, kind of thing. I don't think we're there yet. And the meeting offers an opportunity to, you know, arrest the travel from strategic rivalry to strategic enmity. Let's see if there's something there/Bill: And if, and if we don't, if it doesn't arrest it, then I think the US government at least has to do a much better job of explaining to the American people why we're headed in this direction and needs to do a much better job with the allies cuz because again, what I worry about is we're sort of heading down this path and it doesn't feel like we've really thought it through.You know, there are lots of reasons be on this path, but there's also needs to be a much more of a comprehensive understanding of the, of the costs and the ramifications and the solutions and have have an actual sort of theory of the case about how we get out the other side of this in a, in a better way.Chris: Yeah, I think that's important. I want to be real, um, fair to the administration. You know, they're certainly more thoughtful and deliberative than their predecessor. Of course, the bar was low, but, um, you know, they, they seem to approach these things in a pretty. Dedicated and careful manner. And I think they really, you know, take, take things like, uh, looking at outbound investment restrictions, you know, my understanding is they have been, you know, seeking a lot of input about unintended consequences and so on. But then you look at something like the chips piece and it just seems to me that those in the administration who had been pushing for, you know, more there for some time, had a quick moment where they basically said, look, this thing's not working with multilaterally, Let's just do it, you know? And then, oh, now we're seeing the second and third and other order consequences of it. And the risk is that we wind up, our goal is to telegraph unity to Beijing and shaping their environment around them as the administration calls it. We might be signaling our disunity, I don't know, with the allies, and obviously that would not be a good thingBill: That's definitely a risk. Well, thanks Chris. It's always great to talk to you and Thank you for listening to the occasional Sinocism podcast. Thank you, Chris.Chris: My pleasure. Sinocism is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit sinocism.com/subscribe
New Discourses Bullets, Ep. 12 Two of the most infamous figures of the 20th century are two of its most notorious Marxist dictators: Vladimir Lenin and Mao Zedong. Each had his own methods. Speaking broadly, Lenin's Bolshevik approach could be considered top-down, imposed by government and its seized industries, and Mao's "Marxism-Leninism with Chinese Characteristics" might be considered bottom-up, a youth rebellion, and inside-out, a cultural revolution ushered in by his radicalized youth. The most infamous Neo-Communist figure of the early 21st century will be Klaus Schwab, Executive Chairman of the World Economic Forum, who has figured out how to combine these approaches into a top-down, bottom-up, inside-out push. His primary tools: ESG and SEL. Join James Lindsay in this episode of New Discourses Bullets, where he succinctly explains how Schwab's "stakeholder capitalism" Is a Leninist-Maoist project to mold a new economy and society in his image using a two-pronged vanguard model and a cultural revolution. Support New Discourses: paypal.me/newdiscourses newdiscourses.locals.com/support patreon.com/newdiscourses subscribestar.com/newdiscourses youtube.com/channel/UC9K5PLkj0N_b9JTPdSRwPkg/join Website: https://newdiscourses.com Follow: facebook.com/newdiscourses twitter.com/NewDiscourses instagram.com/newdiscourses https://newdiscourses.locals.com pinterest.com/newdiscourses linkedin.com/company/newdiscourses minds.com/newdiscourses reddit.com/r/NewDiscourses © 2022 New Discourses. All rights reserved.
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