Podcasts about trans pacific partnership tpp

Tristan unpacks the far-reaching consequences of America's withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)—one of the most damaging foreign policy mistakes in modern U.S. history. With years of diplomatic effort with key allies like Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam squandered, Trump has left a power vacuum in Asia that China is now exploiting. Tristan connects this strategic blunder to a broader pattern of policy missteps—from healthcare cuts that threaten millions of Americans, to voting rights rollbacks that risk disenfranchising vast swaths of the electorate.

Until his recent retirement from politics, Andrew Robb was Australia's Minister for Trade, Investment and Tourism. In this role Mr Robb negotiated Free Trade Agreements with South Korea, Japan and China, as well as the 12 country Transpacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement.Mr Robb is currently Executive Chairman of The Robb Group (A corporate and investment advisory company), a Board Member of the Kidman cattle enterprise, Chair of Asialink and pharmacogenetics company, CNSDose, and strategic advisor to Seafarms Ltd as well as a range of national and international businesses.In 2003, Mr Robb was awarded the office of the Order of Australia (AO) for his service to agriculture, politics and the community. As well, Mr Robb is the author of “Black Dog Daze: Public Life, Private Demons” (Melbourne University Publishing).Dr Deb Roberts, PhD is the Mind Medicine Australia Podcast host for Season 2 and has been a MMA volunteer, guides the weekly staff meditation, on the MMA Lived Experience Panel and has a life-long relationship with mental (ill) health yet been able to navigate a fulfilling existence through various means.She is deeply passionate about conversations related to wellbeing. She uses her own lived experience as well as the reality of having two family members who ended their life seeing no treatment pathway forward. One was her older sister who tried countless medicine combinations, therapies and facilities over 30 years.--Mind Medicine Australia exists to help alleviate the suffering and suicides caused by mental illness in Australia through expanding the treatment options available to medical practitioners and their patients. We will establish safe and effective psychedelic-assisted treatments to treat a range of mental illnesses.In furtherance of this mission, The Mind Medicine Australia Podcast ‘Season 2' aims to connect, listen and share the power of lived experience stories of mental health challenges and altered states that cultivate wellbeing and utilise the collective voices to inform research directions, policy and system change. This podcast will explore modalities including but not limited to altered states from the use of psychedelics, breath work, yoga, mindfulness, meditation, nutrition, sleep and exercise.--Thank you for listening to the Mind Medicine Australia Podcast. If what you've heard in this episode resonates with you, you can offer your support through zero cost means by jumping on to our website and sharing the site to your networks.  You can join our local chapter groups. You can also subscribe to the podcast and follow us and if you feel moved, you can give us a 5 star review. You can also support Mind Medicine's work by making a tax deductible donation to us and more specifically you can support the Patient Support Fund. Your donation will support research, access and affordability for psychedelic medicine.The information provided in this podcast is for general information purposes only and does not constitute the practice of medicine or other professional health care services including the giving of medical advice. The content of this podcast is not intended to be a substitute for professional and medical recommendation, diagnosis or treatment. The use of information in this podcast is at one's own discretion and is not an endorsement of use given the complexity inherent in this medicine under the current viable widespread illegality of their usage.Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/mind-medicine-australia. Become a member at https://plus.acast.com/s/mind-medicine-australia. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Happy Monday! Sam and Emma host Quinn Slobodian, professor of the History of Ideas at Wellesley College, to discuss his recent book Crack-Up Capitalism: Market Radicals and the Dream of a World Without Democracy. Sam and Emma start off by checking in on the numerous improprieties of the conservative Supreme Court justices Gorsuch, Thomas, and Roberts, as well as their decision to take a case that looks to dismantle the regulatory state. Then, they're joined by Quinn, whose 2018 book Globalists Sam was a big fan of; Quinn says that Crack-Up Capitalism is a sequel of sorts, attempting to answer the question that, after globalization lost its luster, where did market radicalists and their ideology want to go next? Sam asks whether the process surrounding the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) was a prime example of the changing headwinds amongst this group surrounding the idea of "free trade", and how that term continued to warp as we kept getting farther and farther from 2016. They then get into the meat of the book, discussing the newest ideas amongst this group of market radicalists (read: libertarians): creating secessionist communities, drawing from ideas stemming from gated communities and homeowner's associations, that proliferated heavily in the 1990's to create a different political and societal system: that of an entirely private government, that does not adhere to the general whims of American democracy (election cycles every 2 or 4 years). Quinn also touches on the "frontier" mentality that embodies this type of mentality, one that dates all the way back to the "manifest destiny" idea in the 19th century. They end the conversation by discussing whether this idea of an a-democratic society is the underpinning of an actual ideological movement, or if it is backfilling a pretty general conservative ideal: creation of prosperity for the few and the wealthy at the great expense of the working poor. In the Fun Half, Sam, Emma, and the MR Crew discuss Kyle Rittenhouse's recent appearance on Ted Nugent's program, where Nugent taught Rittenhouse about the "Mike Obama" conspiracy theory, Steven Crowder's response to the leaked footage of him being verbally abusive to his pregnant wife (hint: he's not remorseful), Elon Musk and Bill Maher breaking down what the apocalyptic "woke mind virus" really is, and how that virus is playing out a Texas school (they don't want their kids watching "James and the Giant Peach"). Sam touches on the Fed's war on labor, and how the New York Times is helping it discipline workers, plus your calls and IM's! Check out Quinn's book here: https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250753892/crackupcapitalism Become a member at JoinTheMajorityReport.com: https://fans.fm/majority/join Subscribe to the ESVN YouTube channel here: https://www.youtube.com/esvnshow Subscribe to the AMQuickie newsletter here: https://am-quickie.ghost.io/ Join the Majority Report Discord! http://majoritydiscord.com/ Get all your MR merch at our store: https://shop.majorityreportradio.com/ Get the free Majority Report App!: http://majority.fm/app Check out today's sponsors: ExpressVPN: We all take risks every day when we go online, whether we think about it or not. And using the internet without ExpressVPN? That's like driving without car insurance! ExpressVPN acts as online insurance. It creates a secure, encrypted tunnel between your device and the internet so hackers can't steal your personal data. It'd take a hacker with a supercomputer over a billion years to get past ExpressVPN's encryption. And ExpressVPN is simple to use on all your devices! Just fire up the app and click one button to get protected. Secure your online data TODAY by visiting https://www.expressvpn.com/majority, that's https://www.expressvpn.com/majority to get three months FREE. Follow the Majority Report crew on Twitter: @SamSeder @EmmaVigeland @MattBinder @MattLech @BF1nn @BradKAlsop Check out Matt's show, Left Reckoning, on Youtube, and subscribe on Patreon! https://www.patreon.com/leftreckoning Subscribe to Discourse Blog, a newsletter and website for progressive essays and related fun partly run by AM Quickie writer Jack Crosbie. https://discourseblog.com/ Check out Ava Raiza's music here! https://avaraiza.bandcamp.com/ The Majority Report with Sam Seder - https://majorityreportradio.com/

Wendy Cutler is Vice President at the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) and the managing director of the Washington, D.C. office. She joined ASPI after nearly three decades as a diplomat and negotiator in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), where she served as Acting Deputy U.S. Trade Representative. During her USTR career, she worked on a range of bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations and initiatives, including the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), U.S.-China negotiations, and the WTO Financial Services negotiations.

Across the Pacific, New Zealand dairy producers launched a formal complaint alleging dairy tariffs violated the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The Alberta government is looking at over 40 new applications for carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) projects to use underground caverns across the province to store captured carbon. From bedrooms to fitness centres, hotels are about to get a whole new level of personal. The world's largest hotel chain is launching a media network to help advertisers target consumers using data drawn from ~182 million annual guests The Peak Daily is produced by 306 Media Productions. Hosted by Brett Chang and Jay Rosenthal.

Season 4, Episode 7--Part 2: In the current series of Diplomatic Immunity, ISD Director of Programs and Research Dr. Kelly McFarland looks back at the first year of the Biden administration's foreign policy and looks forward to the next.  In the second episode of a three-part series, Kelly continues his conversation with Wendy Cutler, Carolyn Brehm, and Francine Lamoriello to discuss how the Biden administration has approached trade with allies including the European Union, and the administration's engagement with the business community. Wendy Cutler joined the Asia Society Policy Institute as Vice President and Managing Director of the Washington DC Office in November 2015. She focuses on building ASPI's presence in Washington — strengthening its outreach as a think/do tank — and on leading initiatives that address challenges related to trade and women's empowerment in Asia. She served for nearly three decades as a diplomat and negotiator in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Most recently she served as Acting Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, working on a range of U.S. trade negotiations and initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region. In that capacity, she was responsible for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, including the bilateral negotiations with Japan. She is a graduate of the School of Foreign Service. Carolyn Brehm retired from The Procter & Gamble Company as Vice President for Global Government Relations and Public Policy where she created and led P&G's team of sixty government relations practitioners based in key markets across the globe. She was responsible for public policy and legislative advocacy to protect and grow P&G's business, advising three Company CEOs over her seventeen years at P&G. She also oversaw a $24 million P&G Fund supporting initiatives in the communities where P&G operates. During a 13-year stint with General Motors Corporation, Ms. Brehm served as Director of International Trade and Investment Policy, supporting GM's international operations. During two overseas assignments with GM, she established an office in Shanghai in 1984 to conduct countertrade deals and returned to the region in 1996 as Director of Asia-Pacific Trade Policies and Strategy, supporting joint venture projects. She too is a graduate of the School of Foreign Service. Francine Lamoriello is Executive Vice President of Global Strategies for the Personal Care Products Council and directs all international activities and issues. Prior, Francine served as Senior International and Business Strategy Advisor at Baker, Donelson, PC, where she counseled clients on international business strategy and regulatory affairs, and international trade policy. Previously, she served for seven years as Director of International Trade and Investment Services at KPMG Peat Marwick where she led international strategy and marketing studies for a wide variety of U.S. companies. Lamoriello has also held positions at the U.S. Department of Commerce as Director of the European Community Single Market Program and specialized in US-EU trade policy affecting technology companies. And she too, is a graduate of the School of Foreign Service.  Episode recorded: February 10, 2022 Image: USTR Ambassador Tai gives keynote in Geneva on the future role of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the global economy and how it can deliver broad-based inclusive growth with the U.S. Mission in Geneva on October 14th, 2021. [U.S. Mission photo/ Eric Bridiers] Hosted by Kelly McFarland. Produced by Alistair Somerville and Kelly McFarland. Audio editing by Aaron Jones. Production assistance by Kit Evans and Eleanor Shiori Hughes.  Diplomatic Immunity: Frank and candid conversations about diplomacy and foreign affairs Diplomatic Immunity, a podcast from the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, brings you frank and candid conversations with experts on the issues facing diplomats and national security decision-makers around the world.  Funding support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York.  For more, visit our website, and follow us on Twitter @GUDiplomacy. Send any feedback to diplomacy@georgetown.edu.

Season 4, Episode 7--Part 1: In the current series of Diplomatic Immunity, ISD Director of Programs and Research Dr. Kelly McFarland looks back at the first year of the Biden administration's foreign policy and looks forward to the next.  In the first episode of a three-part series, Kelly is joined by Wendy Cutler, Carolyn Brehm, and Francine Lamoriello to discuss how the Biden administration has approached international trade in the broader framework of its foreign policy for the middle class, technology, and China. Wendy Cutler joined the Asia Society Policy Institute as Vice President and Managing Director of the Washington DC Office in November 2015. She focuses on building ASPI's presence in Washington—strengthening its outreach as a think/do tank—and on leading initiatives that address challenges related to trade and women's empowerment in Asia. She served for nearly three decades as a diplomat and negotiator in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Most recently she served as Acting Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, working on a range of U.S. trade negotiations and initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region. In that capacity, she was responsible for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, including the bilateral negotiations with Japan. She is a graduate of the School of Foreign Service. Carolyn Brehm retired from The Procter & Gamble Company as Vice President for Global Government Relations and Public Policy where she created and led P&G's team of sixty government relations practitioners based in key markets across the globe. She was responsible for public policy and legislative advocacy to protect and grow P&G's business, advising three Company CEOs over her seventeen years at P&G. She also oversaw a $24 million P&G Fund supporting initiatives in the communities where P&G operates. During a 13-year stint with General Motors Corporation, Ms. Brehm served as Director of International Trade and Investment Policy, supporting GM's international operations. During two overseas assignments with GM, she established an office in Shanghai in 1984 to conduct countertrade deals and returned to the region in 1996 as Director of Asia-Pacific Trade Policies and Strategy, supporting joint venture projects. She too is a graduate of the School of Foreign Service. Francine Lamoriello is Executive Vice President of Global Strategies for the Personal Care Products Council and directs all international activities and issues. Prior, Francine served as Senior International and Business Strategy Advisor at Baker, Donelson, PC, where she counseled clients on international business strategy and regulatory affairs, and international trade policy. Previously, she served for seven years as Director of International Trade and Investment Services at KPMG Peat Marwick where she led international strategy and marketing studies for a wide variety of U.S. companies. Lamoriello has also held positions at the U.S. Department of Commerce as Director of the European Community Single Market Program and specialized in US-EU trade policy affecting technology companies. And she too, is a graduate of the School of Foreign Service.  Episode recorded: February 10, 2022 Image: Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, along with Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo, United States Trade Representative Katherine Tai, and EU officials, participates in the inaugural U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) Ministerial in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on September 29, 2021. [State Department Photo by Ron Przysucha/ Public Domain] [State Department photo by Ron Przysucha/ Public Domain] Hosted by Kelly McFarland. Produced by Alistair Somerville and Kelly McFarland. Audio editing by Aaron Jones. Production assistance by Kit Evans and Eleanor Shiori Hughes.  Diplomatic Immunity: Frank and candid conversations about diplomacy and foreign affairs Diplomatic Immunity, a podcast from the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, brings you frank and candid conversations with experts on the issues facing diplomats and national security decision-makers around the world.  Funding support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York.  For more, visit our website, and follow us on Twitter @GUDiplomacy. Send any feedback to diplomacy@georgetown.edu.

On this edition of Parallax Views, the distinguished historian Prof. Alfred W. McCoy of the University of Wisconsin-Madison joins us to discuss his latest book To Govern the Globe: World Orders and Catastrophic Change. McCoy's previous works include the classic The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade as well as A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on Terror, Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State, Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State, Endless Empire: Spain's Retreat, Europe's Eclipse, America's Decline, and In the Shadows of the American Century: The Rise and Decline of US Global Power. In To Govern the Globe, delves into the history of empires and world orders from the Iberian Age to now as well as tackling the seeming decline of U.S. hegemonic power, the rise of China, and what climate change means for world order going forward. In this conversation Alfred and I begin by discussing the meaning of empire and world order and what those terms mean. We then delve into the issue of what Alfred calls the "delicate duality" in which Empires express ideals on one hand but seeks maintenance of power, often through breaking from those ideals, on the other. From there we dive into a number of other topics including the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, how the contradictions of the "delicate duality" can eventually undermine and subvert an empire, the degradation of U.S. moral authority vis-a-vis the torture at Abu Gharib and Guantanamo Bay, China and an alternative international order, climate change and its projected impact on Shanghai by 1950, the late geopolitical chess player Zbigniew Brzezinski, principle vs. power in China and the U.S., what the decline of U.S. power means for the American public, projecting 2030 as the year of America's loss of hegemonic power globally, Chinese military power and technology in the near future, the Pentagon war games in which the U.S. end up in a conflict with China over Taiwan, the succession of hegemonic powers historically and their struggles to dominate the Eurasian land mass, how the U.S. dominated the Eurasian landmass through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), China and the Shanghai Cooperative Organization, China and the tri-continental world island, potential waning of relations between U.S. with countries like Japan and the Philippines, the advantage that the U.S. has had as the global hegemon, the establishment of the U.S. dollar as the global reserve currency and the construction of a "Grand Imperial Bargain", the weak social safety net and low wages in the U.S. and workers relying on cheap good that could become expensive in the future (causing social tensions to arise and exacerbate), not wanting to make policy recommendation in To Govern the Globe as it could degrade an objective analysis of the historical trajectory, Barack Obama's strategy for containing China and the Asia Pivot, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), Sir Halford McKinder and the World Island, Zbigniew Brzezinski's conditions for the perpetuation of U.S. hegemonic power and how all those conditions have been violated), climate change as the next catastrophe for world order and the choice between world order and barbarism that may face us as climate change worsen, climate change and the potential refugee crisis it could cause, the emergence of the First World Order through the Black Death and the destruction of the Mongolian Empire, the death of one world order and the emergence of another throughout history, China and coal power, projections indicating China will be hit by extreme heatwaves in the coming decades, international cooperation without the total loss of national sovereignty, the potential for a new kind of empowered world order to face climate change, climate change and the potential for brutal conflict over resources like water, the prosperous Global North vs. the impoverished Global South, John Mearsheimer and looking past the anarchic world system, the European Union, ceding limited and narrow areas of sovereignty as a small reform that could combat climate change, and more!

In September 2021, China formally submitted its application to join the large regional free trade agreement known as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The CPTPP, which currently has 11 member countries with 495 million people and a combined GDP of $13.5 trillion, originally started as the U.S.-backed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) before the United States withdrew from the deal in 2017 following bipartisan pushback. In order for China to join the CPTPP, it would need approval by all 11 member countries. What is the likelihood that China's application will be successful? Is China able to deliver on the high-level trade standards required by the CPTPP? Will the United States remain on the sidelines as China continues to deepen its economic integration in the Asia Pacific region and beyond? In an interview conducted on October 6, 2021, Scott Kennedy discusses China's request to join the CPTPP, the likelihood of approval, and the potential impact on the global trade landscape.

The relationship between the U.S. and China has deteriorated over the last four years. Barely missing a beat from the coronavirus pandemic, China is the only major world economy to post positive growth during the pandemic period, at a rate of 10% at that.  China is now 1/6th larger than the U.S. economy measured by Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), and is projected to outpace the U.S. economy by 135% in just three years’ time, by 2024.  China, moreover, has almost completely displaced the U.S. as the lead trade partner for most nations around the world, toppling the U.S. from that perch with Germany just last year.  And China, as the new Asia Pacific Hegemon, recently formed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, with virtually all Asia Pacific nations, including historically Japan and Korea. Joining me for this conversation is Seoul, Korea based Paul Kim, to explore the potential turbulence between a once-hegemonic U.S. and the now-hegemonic China. Paul also shares updates from other Asian countries that might affect multinationals doing business in Asia. Paul is graduated in Economics from the University of Chicago, with highest honors, and obtained his Juris Doctorate degree from Harvard University.  Paul currently serves in private practice as a Corporate Partner in Sheppard Mullin’s Seoul office advising clients on cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A), private equity, venture capital and securities transactions, restructurings and multi-jurisdictional disputes.   What We Discussed in This Episode: What is the global perspective on China’s economic assent juxtaposed to the U.S. “disintegration”? Did the coronavirus accelerate China’s growth? Is Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) a better measure of economic power? What does the recently signed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) trade agreement symbolize in the Asian region? What does the RCEP accomplish for signatory countries? How will the Biden administration deal with Asia now that it has been entirely excluded from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) it once worked for decades to initiate? How can multinational companies integrate into the Chinese economy now and take advantage of business opportunities generally and under the RECP? How are Japan and Korea performing economically in this pandemic era and what sectors are booming in those countries? Resources Mentioned: Graham Allison article - “China is Now the World’s Largest Economy. We Shouldn’t Be Shocked.”  Contact Information: Email: pkim@sheppardmullin.com Paul’s Sheppard Mullin attorney profile Thank you for listening! Don’t forget to SUBSCRIBE to the show to receive every new episode delivered straight to your podcast player every week. If you enjoyed this episode, please help us get the word out about this podcast. Rate and Review this show in Apple Podcasts, Stitcher Radio, Google Podcasts, or Spotify.  It helps other listeners find this show. Be sure to connect with us and reach out with any questions/concerns: LinkedIn Facebook Twitter  Sheppard Mullin website This podcast is for informational and educational purposes only. It is not to be construed as legal advice specific to your circumstances. If you need help with any legal matter, be sure to consult with an attorney regarding your specific needs.  

To be honest, I have never seen China make such an extraordinary move. It is simply not playing cards according to common sense. On November 20, China made it clear at the APEC informal summit that it is actively considering joining the CPTPP. This "ace" played by China has indeed had a great impact on the Asia-Pacific region.Let's briefly introduce the context.The full name of CPTPP is Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. It was formerly the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an anti-China free trade organization established by the United States. The United States, Japan, Canada and other twelve countries reached the TPP agreement in October 2015. Although it did not expressly prohibit China from joining the TPP, many of the terms were designed specifically to bar China from joining.So the effect of China's joining CPTPP can be said as hitting three birds with one stone: First bird: Join a potential anti-China economic organization before the return of the United States. Even if Biden wants to engage in a democratic values ​​alliance against China it would not succeed due to economic constraints. Otherwise, why does Japan want China to take the lead in joining RCEP.The second bird: Regardless of whether China's accession can take place, as long as this attitude is expressed, it will undoubtedly raise the cost of negotiations for the re-entry of the United States. Against the backdrop of rising domestic populism, can the Biden administration afford the price?If it wants to pay that price, it is ok, anyway, the dominant power is on China's side. According to the consensus decision making mechanism, as long as one side does not agree, the USA cannot join. China, Japan, and other countries can force the United States to spit out all the advantages it previously took, leaving the United States sliding deeper into an abyss of internal conflict amid stronger populist opposition.The third bird: if it cannot afford to play that price? That's even better! On the Asian side, in RCEP, APEC, and CPTPP, China will participate and dominate the whole process. On the European side, the CAI China-Europe Comprehensive Investment Agreement is expected to be reached within this year. Eurasia will form a larger-scale closed loop of internal circulation. Guess who will be decoupled in the end? The Americans!China Explained will show you that because of China's continued success in industrial upgrading, technological innovation and realizing its huge potential, it is an unstoppable process. The inevitable rise of China may feel intimidating and some simply reject it. Don't be. China's rise is part of the new global trend unlike what we have seen in the past one hundred years. Embrace the change and seize the opportunity.Creating original content is hard work, your support is what keeps me going. Please donate to this channel: paypal.me/ChinaExplained

The Connection between Covid 19 and neoliberalism - Jen Olsen Trustee & co-convener of the Alliance party Opponent of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and an Extinction Rebellion Activist. Broadcast on OAR 105.4FM Dunedin www.oar.org.nz

Donald Trump as a candidate for President of the United States took aim at international trade deals like the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as being bad deals for America that facilitated the contracting out of millions of American manufacturing jobs.Now as President, Trump has given the notice required to reopen the agreement and the clock is counting down on formal renegotiation discussions.The Council of Canadians has consistently argued that NAFTA and other so-called free trade agreements are more about the expansion of corporate rights at the expense of worker rights and protecting the environment. Maude Barlow, as chair of the Council of Canadians, has been calling on the Trudeau government to go after some major changes to the agreement and not to just play defence.Show Notes: https://canoefm.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/PH-Resource-List-for-July-10-2017-Show-with-Maude-Barlow.pdf

Donald Trump as a candidate for President of the United States took aim at international trade deals like the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as being bad deals for America that facilitated the contracting out of millions of American manufacturing jobs.Now as President, Trump has given the notice required to reopen the agreement and the clock is counting down on formal renegotiation discussions.The Council of Canadians has consistently argued that NAFTA and other so-called free trade agreements are more about the expansion of corporate rights at the expense of worker rights and protecting the environment. Maude Barlow, as chair of the Council of Canadians, has been calling on the Trudeau government to go after some major changes to the agreement and not to just play defence.Show Notes: https://canoefm.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/PH-Resource-List-for-July-10-2017-Show-with-Maude-Barlow.pdf

According to a study conducted by researchers from the University of Ottawa (often referred to as OttawaU), 57 percent of the text of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) is copied from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Ironically, President Trump has repeatedly described the TPP as “the worst trade deal in history.” Read the article here!

Hassan Akram (Wake Forest University) XXII IDP Industrial Development and Policy Lecture Following its transition to democracy in the 1990s, Chile was an early and enthusiastic adopter of the strategy of global economic integration via bilateral and later multilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) as well as through Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). Chile signed is first FTA with Bolivia in 1993 and quickly negotiated agreements with all its major trading partners including the EU (2003), the USA (2004) and China (2006). To date Chile has 26 active FTAs and 37 active BITs, the second highest number in Latin America. The ratification of these treaties by Congress, following their negotiation by the General Directorate of International Economic Relations (DIRECON), was largely a formality, each one passing with very large, near unanimous, majorities demonstrating Chile’s commitment to neoliberal globalisation. When Donald Trump pulled the USA out of the Transpacific Partnership (TPP) the Chilean government was instrumental in the resurrection of this multilateral trade pact, which was re-baptised, without the USA, as the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CP-TPP). Given Chile’s bipartisan commitment to trade integration through multilateral treaties the government assumed that the ratification of the CP-TPP would be a fait accompli but a very vocal civil society movement engaged in very high mobilisation against it. Although the treaty passed in the Chamber of Deputies there was the highest level of parliamentary rejection of a TLC in Chilean history. We will seek to analyse and understand why multilateral trade integration has become politically controversial in Chile, contrasting the ‘pragmatic’ case against this particular agreement with the broader politicised rejection of the neoliberal project tout court. Speaker Biography: Hassan Akram is the Director of Wake Forest University’s Chile Centre and also teaches Public Policy at the Diego Portales University where the centre is based. He used to work for the Ministry of Planning and Development in Venezuela when Hugo Chávez was president, and before that at the NGO War on Want when Gordon Brown was Prime Minister. He has a PhD in Social and Political Science from the University of Cambridge, as well as a masters in Development Studies and another in Sociology from the same institution. Speaker: Hassan Akram (Wake Forest University), Antonio Andreoni (SOAS) Released by: SOAS Economics Podcasts

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

This week, Matthew Fochs sits down with Paul Triolo. Paul is a China Digital Economy Fellow at New America focusing on global technology policy issues, cyber-security, internet governance, ICT regulatory issues, and emerging areas such as automation, AI/Big Data, ambient intelligence, and fintech.  While the relationship between the US and China has a long history of tension, recent actions by the governments of both counties has brought those tensions to a new pinnacle. Matthew Fochs had the chance to sit down with Paul in late November as the world braced for the G20 summit in Buenos Aires and the looming new trade tariffs between the US and China set to take hold on January 1. However, before they get to that elephant in the room, Paul talks about the “Made in China 2025” initiative, recent cybersecurity and IP theft, one of the hot button topics during the 2016 Presidential Election – the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the current administration’s actions towards China Technology company, ZTE.

Scott Lincicome is a leading international trade attorney, adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute, and senior visiting lecturer at Duke University. In this Conversation, Lincicome explains the system of free trade agreements and alliances that the U.S. has built over many decades and how the system contributes to peace and prosperity for America. Lincicome also shares his perspective on the renegotiation of NAFTA, the decision not to participate in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and other trade agreements. Finally, Kristol and Lincicome consider where Republicans and Democrats stand on trade today—and where the parties are likely to go in the future.

The Trump administration has charted a new course on trade deals, largely eschewing multilateral frameworks for bilateral agreements. Indeed within days of taking office, the administration unilaterally withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Yet the agreements have proceeded anyway, despite the administration's disdain. A revised TPP has been signed by the eleven remaining countries as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). What are the economic consequences for the United States of not taking part in these multilateral trade pacts? How is the US reshaping existing pacts, like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS), and what other nations will agree to consider new bilateral deals with Washington? How will the new American tariffs on imports of steel and aluminum impact ties with major trading partners? Who will win the looming trade war with China?

Experts say that President Trump's move to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) paves the way for China to forge its own deals with other countries and dominate the world's major trading regions and routes. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

In this episode of the Case in Point podcast, Penn Law's William Burke-White and Bloomberg Law's Jerome Ashton discuss President-Elect Trump, trade, and the future of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Produced by Penn Law in collaboration with Bloomberg Law. For more information and for additional viewing/listening options, go to www.caseinpoint.org. Case in Point podcast provides smart, informative conversations about the law, society, and culture. By bringing together top scholars with experts on politics, business, health, education, and science, Case in Point gives an in-depth look at how the law touches every part of our lives.

Election 2016 has been a rough ride for proponents of trade. Throughout a divisive primary season, and a contentious general election campaign, support for trade has fallen victim to a rising backlash against globalization. Despite the recent efforts of President Obama and a Republican-led Congress to conclude the landmark Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), both party nominees have pledged to renegotiate the deal. What might be the economic and diplomatic repercussions of TPP's failure? Can America regain a bipartisan consensus on trade?

Joining our program to talk about these topics is the Executive Director of the APEC Secretariat Dr. Alan Bollard. Before heading the Singapore-based APEC Secretariat, Dr. Bollard served as the Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand as well as the nation's Treasury Secretary. And he's with us on the phone. Host: As you know, China has assumed the chairmanship of APEC 2014. Then, what difference does it make? What implications does China's chairmanship have for China, the other APEC economies and the rest of the world? Bollard: China is hosting APEC this year, and it's been a very busy, very active year with a number of important initiatives for boosting trade, investment and sustainable growth agreed and more still to come. It's been a year when APEC has been invigorated. Trade ministers from the region will meet in Beijing, and they will sign off on more initiatives to strengthen our economies, job creation and wages, and those will all go to the economic leader's meeting in another week for them to be announced. It's been a year when APEC has been invigorated. It's been a year when we had a lot of meetings and a record number of ministerial meetings. They've all been organized very well and very thoroughly. We still have more to do, but I am hopeful that we will deliver policies that will specifically address infrastructure investment and connectivity gaps to ensure that people and goods can move around the Asia-Pacific more cheaply and easily, for example. Within some of policies being worked out, China has been quite innovative in terms of looking for new drivers for growth. We know that, in the past, APEC growth was driven by strong trade growth. Since the global financial crisis, trade growth has slowed down so we're looking for new growth drivers in the region. Host: Let's talk about the FTAAP and the trade landscape in the Asia-Pacific. You know, the FTAAP has been talked about for many years, but has not progressed as fast as some regional FTAs, such as the US-led TPP and the ASEAN-led RCEP. So, based on your inside knowledge and expertise, the proposed FTAAP, TPP and RCEP, which one do you think will be the future? Bollard: Well, I think that depends on how far you look. I know that China is doing a lot of work, looking at the FTAAP. FTAAP has been cited as a possibility for some years, but really at the moment it's only a vision, and we want to work out what it might actually mean. We know that it's a long-term objective. It won't suddenly reach FTAAP. But we do see that as being the big goal out into the future. China this year would like to bring FTAAP to our attention, and probably agree to work on a study that will help us understand what it means; when we might achieve it; how we might achieve it; and what paths would be followed to get there; could this be the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), or a different stepping stone. It's still a work in progress. Host: But for the benefits of the entire Asia-Pacific region, in your opinion, which trade pact should the 21 APEC economies really engage in, regardless of any political factors? Bollard: Well, they have all seen it. They said in the past that we are moving towards FTAAP. That's already been said. But we don't know enough about what that means yet, and China wants to clarify all that. At the moment, the only negotiations are RCEP and TPP. Indeed, we cannot be sure about what those mean, because it's still too early to know what's in the material. Maybe TPP will be concluded this year, but it's still not secure. Host: Just as you said, the FTAAP is certainly still a vision, but do you think it's feasible? Bollard: Yes, but it will take some time, and it will take a lot of commitment from leaders for us to get there. So, I think it is achievable, but it will be somewhere in the future. What is quite possible is that TPP and RCEP will both need to be concluded first. Host: Alright, let's move on to the topic about China's New Silk Road strategy. As you know, Chinese President Xi Jinping has proposed a so-called "One Belt and One Road" initiative, which is meant to strengthen cooperation and economic ties between China and its neighboring countries. So, what're your thoughts on this initiative? Bollard: I think that's very much in line with APEC's initiatives for connectivity, which means physically connecting our trade routes, and addressing more complex structural barriers to make it easier for goods, services and people to get across borders. I expect it will make use of some APEC trade facilitation measures like the introduction of electronic forms and customs single windows that reduce red tape at borders so that those sorts of initiatives can happen. It isn't an APEC initiative; it's a Chinese government's initiative. But it's very much in line with what we are trying to do. Host: So, what opportunities do you think the Silk Road Economic Belt will bring to China and the other APEC economies? Bollard: At the moment, most trade opportunities are around the Pacific Rim, but when you start recovering and growing again, there will be a strong demand for the export of merchandise and other goods from East Asia. At the moment, most of that goes via the Malacca Straits, between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. But people are looking for new possible trade routes and if those across China can be competitive, then there will be a lot of demand for services for them. Host: Lastly, I know you've travelled to China multiple times this year because of the APEC meetings. So, would you care to share with us some of your personal experience here in China? Your impressions about the country? Bollard: Ok. Well, this year I have come to China maybe a dozen times for a lot of meetings. It's been a very interesting experien

Dmitry Orlov, J. Michael Oliver, Amir Adnani, Gene Epstein, & Curtis Ellis return. Orlov, author of “Reinventing Collapse” will tell us how near the U.S. is to a USSR like economic collapse and help us understand how the U.S. and NATO's push to takeover former USSR satellite countries is related to America's internal economic and moral decline. The elite who rule America's foreign and domestic policy are pushing for the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) as a way of extending American economic and military power in Asia to isolate China. But the TPP will further remove power from the American people and give it to countries hostile to traditional American values. Ellis will update us on the “progress” of the TPP. On a more positive note, Adnani will talk of UEC's progress in U3O8 production, Epstein will talk of the next NYC Junto and Oliver will explain why the recent weakness in the price of gold is a positive for gold bulls. Your host will name a favorite gold stock or two.

Bill Reinsch currently serves as President of the National Foreign Trade Council. He oversees NFTC's efforts favoring open markets and opposing unilateral sanctions. Mr. Reinsch also serves as a member of the U.S.-China Security Review Commission. He provides a concise overview of pending trade deals and disputes with optimism and criticism. Reinsch indicates that negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Trans-Altantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) are the most ambitious of the new century and could move free trade to a new plateau. Reinsch says China, even though it is not part of any multilateral agreement, is still a major player in all negotiations on international trade.Bill Reinsch

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 110. I appeared recently on the Canadian libertarian podcast Ed and Ethan: The Voice of Liberty in Canada (Dec. 29, 2013) (I was a guest last year as well). We discussed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and other matters. This is my segment only; for the full show, go to Ed and Ethan's show page for Episode 90.

Webster's dictionary defines the term ‘Trojan Horse' as follows: “…someone or something intended to defeat or subvert from within usually by deceptive means.”[3] The term has been applied by critics to any number of so-called free trade deals that Canada, the United States and other countries around the world are embracing. In Canada, the Harper government recently extolled the virtues of opening up new markets for Canadian goods, services and investment in the European Union and Asia as critical to the nation's prosperity. Hence, determined efforts to secure free trade deals with these regions through the Canadian – European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) respectively are hailed by the government and pundits alike as centrepieces of the Harper government's agenda going into 2014. Interesting that the details of these agreements are largely hidden from public scrutiny. The TPP in particular, as noted by Global Research author Kevin Zeese, has been drafted with an unprecedented degree of secrecy. The campaign ‘FLUSHTHETPP.org‘ claims that the gift horse that is increased trade and investment, conceals a corporate assault on food safety, the environment, worker rights, access to health care, and basically every facet of our lives as free citizens. A recent release of the Intellectual Property Rights Chapter from Wikileaks confirmed the fears of trade liberalization critics that the reach of patents, copyrights, and trade secrets will be extended at the expense of consumer rights and safeguards.[4] To quote Wikileaks editor in Chief Julian Assange: “If instituted, the TPP's IP regime would trample over individual rights and free expression, as well as ride roughshod over the intellectual and creative commons. If you read, write, publish, think, listen, dance, sing or invent; if you farm or consume food; if you're ill now or might one day be ill, the TPP has you in its crosshairs.”[5] The TPP secured third place among Project Censored's most censored stories of 2012-2013. The Sonoma State University media research program describes the TPP as “an enforceable transfer of sovereignty from nations and their people to foreign corporations.” Dr. Margaret Flowers is a congressional fellow with Physicians for a National Health Program and a pediatrician based in Baltimore, Maryland. She has written extensively on the topic of the TPP, and has championed efforts to stop it in its tracks. Dr. Flowers joins the Global Research News Hour in the fist half of the programme to describe the onerous aspects of this deal, update us on the recent twelve nation talks in Singapore, America's ‘Fast-Track' legislation, and the realistic prospects of grassroots people to bring an end to this deal. CETA, likewise is cloaked in secrecy. Critics like Stuart Trew of the Council of Canadians argue the deal extends drug patents and makes community economic development initiatives such as ‘buy local' policies subject to legal challenges under new procurement rules. Trew will fill out the second half of the programme with a comprehensive look at what we know about the CETA, and how that deal can be stopped.

Globalization Watch: Stop the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) “Through this agreement, the Obama Administration is seeking to boost U.S. economic growth and support the creation and retention of high-quality American jobs by increasing exports in a region that includes some of the world's most robust economies and that represents more than 40 percent of global trade.”[1] Statement from the Office of the United States Trade Representative “I think we need to look at the Trans-Pacific Partnership as the neo-liberal arm of the US pivot at Asia. So we have all these countries in South East Asia that basically have more incentive to do business with China….Many policy papers state the importance of South-East Asia in …counterbalancing the influence of China in the region. So that is what I perceive the TPP to be.”  Nile Bowie Lost in the wake of headlines about controversies surrounding Canadian Senators' housing and living expenses and allegations of a Toronto big city Mayor ailing from an apparent crack addiction, is the important negotiations on a major trade and investment deal taking place in Lima, Peru this past week. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) had its origins in the 2005 Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement or the P4 which involved the countries of Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore, and was aimed at liberalizing trade in those countries. [2] This deal was expanded in 2008 to include the US in negotiations and by 2009, the TPP began its first round of talks. [3], [4]. There are currently twelve negotiating partners in this comprehensive pact. In addition to the P4, and the US there are Australia, Peru, Vietnam, and Malaysia, with Mexico and Canada having joined the negotiations last October and Japan jumping on board in March. [5], [6] TPP is the latest in a string of numerous free trade agreements that proponents say will generate increased economic activity between and within countries thereby leading to greater prosperity for citizens. [7] Critics of the North American Free Trade Agreement, and its numerous successors argue however that these agreements really are not about trade. They are mechanisms by which corporations with international reach can overcome barriers, regulations, and other restrictions on their profit-making activities. [8] Three critics from three separate countries explain their concerns in this week's instalment of the Global Research News Hour. Stuart Trew, Trade Campaigner for the Ottawa-based Council of Canadians provides his group's analysis not only of the TPP, but also the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement and the Canada-China Foreign Investment Protection Agreement (FIPA). Kristen Beifus of the Washington Fair Trade Coalition dissects the impacts of free trade on Americans and the concerns specific to the TPP. Kuala Lampur-based Nile Bowie provides his analysis of TPP in terms of its impacts on Malaysia where elections have recently been held. His commentaries on TPP appear on the globalresearch website. References 1. http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/november/united-states-trans-pacific-partnership 2. “Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement” 2005 http://www.mfat.govt.nz/downloads/trade-agreement/transpacific/main-agreement.pdf 3. Daniels, Chris (10 February 2008). “First step to wider free trade”. New Zealand Herald. 4. US TRADE Representative TPP Round Updates; http://www.ustr.gov/tpp 5. “Mexico: Unexplored opportunities”. TPP Talk. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade. 10 October 2012. http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/2-Trade-Relationships-and-Agreements/Trans-Pacific/1-TPP-Talk/0-TPP-talk-10-Oct-2012.php 6. Canada Formally Joins Trans-Pacific Partnership” (Press release). Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. 9 October 2012; http://www.international.gc.ca/media_commerce/comm/news-communiques/2012/10/09a.aspx?view=d 7) Dr. Claudio Loser, May 6, 2013; Where Trade Is Free, Powerful Economic Growth Is The Norm; Forbes.com. http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/05/06/where-trade-is-free-powerful-economic-growth-is-the-norm/ 8) Margaret Flowers and Kevin Zeese, March 27, 2013, Truthout; http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/15353-transpacific-partnership-will-undermine-democracy-empower-transnational-corporations