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Listen to Zooming In at The UnPopulist in your favorite podcast app: Apple Podcasts | Spotify | YouTubeBerny Belvedere: Renée DiResta, thanks for joining us on Zooming In, our flagship podcast here at The UnPopulist. You've been on before a couple of times. You've done podcasts with us, you've spoken at LibCon—in fact, during our first LibCon, LibCon 2024, your book generated intense interest. It seemed to be the book of the summer. You remember that?Renée DiResta: I do, thanks so much.Belvedere: It felt like at every other session, some panelist would say something like, “and to explore this further, I really recommend Renée DiResta's new book, which is just wonderful.” Right? I don't know why I did that in a nerd voice. Your endorsers are wonderful people.But Renée, welcome again. I want to dive right in. You have a new report out. It's put out by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. It was written by you and two co-authors, Rachel Kleinfeld and Margot Treadwell. That's a powerful lineup. We've run Rachel's work in our pages before and it's top notch. The report is fantastic. It did not disappoint. For anyone interested in how the broader world of news and opinion discourse works today, it's immediately one of the most useful resources to pick up. And it's especially useful for practitioners, for people who work in the space, like we do.But to help with some scene setting, can you tell us about the report in broad brushstrokes? We'll then narrow in from there.DiResta: So I think about this as report part two. Last year, in September, almost one year to the day, we put out a provocation saying: “institutions need to change how they communicate in order to compete in the new media environment.” And we wrote a framing on why that was, on how social media was no longer this niche thing that those people over there did. If you wanted to reach the public, this is where people are—and you have to reach them where they are and in a manner that they find appealing. The way that you communicate is just different now.That attracted a lot of attention and it got us a ton of inbound, particularly from philanthropy, because we were also telling philanthropists you have to change how you think about outputs and outcomes that matter. For a lot of academics and others, participation in the public conversation is, if not discouraged, it's not really encouraged. It doesn't move the needle for your tenure committee, that sort of thing. How could philanthropists shift the thinking on why communicating to the public actually was critical? We got a ton of inbound on it and the question we got most often was: “How?”This report is the how. The basic premise is that most Americans now get their information and form their opinions through creators, podcasts, Substacks, group chats. Most traditional institutions have only minimal engagement or presence in those spaces. So that ecosystem runs on a very different model of legitimacy. People are following people, not institutions. They're following people that they find appealing or relatable. Somebody coming to you from their kitchen. Credentials and institutional polish actually can read as almost a sort of distance now.Those are the elites saying that stuff from over there, whereas this person is just talking to me in their kitchen. They're real.We write about how fact-based institutions have often thought about this shift to social as a repackaging job. “All right, how do I take my massive PDF”—and, by the way, this report is a massive PDF—“how do I take that and put out a couple screenshots on social media or generate a reel?” They see it more as engaging when you have something to release, when you have just put something out. So it's very self-serving. They're not using social media as a communicator in an ongoing conversation where they're having a back and forth with their audience. They're using it as a broadcast tool and they're reformulating the thing that they wanted to broadcast into a format that nominally works but is missing that dialogue.So our guide argues that it's a strategy problem—and that CEOs and boards have to own this. They have to think about it, not as the thing that happens after you've done your work, but as an active part of your ongoing relationship to the public. We framed the report as a series of questions to guide that thinking. We did a bunch of case studies, really spanning the communication ecosystem we have. How Jon Haidt turned some of his work into a movement. We have how Turning Point became a juggernaut. We have some of the Mamdani campaign stuff. Not endorsing any position there—but saying, “here's some interesting stuff that you can learn from how this group strategically chose to engage the public through these means.”Belvedere: I thought the guide did a really great job of bringing in real world examples. You also brought up David French and the reception he received. His case is a fascinating one because of what it represents and what it says about the subcommunity that he had that parting of the ways with, and the way they gate-kept him from continued access to it.But I want to pick up on something that you mentioned in passing just now in your broad overview. There's a line in the report that really struck me as I was reading it. As you put it, credentials and institutional polish—the CV virtues—now read as distance and disconnect rather than authority, which is what it used to read as. Do you think that's a permanent rewiring of how trust just works now?DiResta: It's an interesting question. Trust and authoritativeness are distinct. You trust your neighbor without necessarily thinking they're an authority. You just find them a trustworthy person. You would give them your keys. They can feed your dog, that sort of thing. And it doesn't matter what they do or what their professional credentials are. What matters is just that you have a relationship. You feel that this person is somebody who would support you if you need it, that they're going to level with you. They're going to tell you the truth, even if you might not want to hear it.That's the idea of trust as something that is deeper than expertise. Sure, it goes hand in hand with it at times. We would like it to be tightly coupled. We want people to trust experts, but the idea of relatability instead is: “Why would this person who seems just like me lie to me? Why would they deceive me? What do they get out of it?” Whereas people sincerely believe that elite institutions are working to serve their own agenda, and that is often seen as being at odds with the average, everyday person. You see this in politics when people ask, “Why is this politician talking about this thing, performing this action, when I just care about putting food on the table for my family?” You see that gap in what lands and resonates with people versus what people in elite or institutional positions want to talk about.Sometimes this is a disconnect that gets lamented in liberal spaces, particularly as, “well, if only they listened, they would understand that my policy proposal for this thing does help them 10 degrees and five years later.” But in the immediate here and now, it's that question of: Do I trust the person who's speaking to me? Do they seem just like me?I had this experience when I was a new mom. I was one of the first in my friend group to have kids. I didn't know what to do. I was living across the country from my family and didn't have much support. So I turned to the internet, right? Who are the people who are going to help me understand what I'm supposed to do with this baby? How do I make him sleep? How do I make him eat? How do I not screw this up? I think it's a very personal experience that a lot of people have where that sense that reading a PDF on an institutional website is not the same thing as somebody sitting there with you taking the time. There's a phrase that I think it was Jeff Jarvis who once said to me in conversation: “the media talks to the public and the influencers talk with them.”I think that's the best framing I've heard for that. Content creators understand how to talk with their audiences, where even people who may have better information, more expertise, authoritative content, are not necessarily communicating that in a way that feels real and connects to a sense that this person is telling me the truth.Belvedere: I'm wondering what's the right read on this broad question of trust that we're all grappling with. Take, for example, the aftershocks from a specific high profile instance of trust collapse—something like Covid. I think Covid's a really instructive episode in many different ways. There's been a lot of revisionism about it. What was different about Covid compared to other past trying moments in society is that Covid became politicized in a particular way by an extremely potent right-wing discourse-shaping machine. That's not going to stop being in place.“A lot of institutions are taught to stay on message at all times—if you hand your message to somebody else, you lose control of it. But you can't tell them what to say. They're going to say what they want to say. They might get it wrong. But counterintuitively, I think that actually generates more dialogue, more attention, and provides you with a way to accomplish something you might not be good at yourself. Your CEO might not actually be the best face to talk about this thing—the 20 year old you hired, who is much more comfortable with this, is actually the person who should be out there engaging, putting out the message, or working with a creator or creator lab and essentially briefing them.” — Renée DiRestaSo my overriding fear is that Covid is not an outlier. And that anything in society like Covid that requires elite management, whether it's the dissemination of information, policies that help curb some of the worst effects of not abiding by certain standards, all of that is going to run up against an information machine architecturally designed to demagogue that issue, to create a trust collapse, to point out any little mistakes and amplify them as though they're an example of the elites just completely botching everything. Is there any hope that that wanes?DiResta: That's a very interesting question—let me give you a couple of answers.Two things were true about Covid. I was writing about this in The Atlantic during the pandemic: the institutional communicators really dropped the ball—in my opinion, but I think that's been quite backed up at this point. I remember writing that it would be nice to see the CDC's website look more like Wikipedia, where you can see the change log, the public can understand in this fast moving situation—you can go back and read the edit history, you can see who made the change, you can understand how consensus forms in a scientific community. Because there's such a time lag, right? They are waiting until they are absolutely, 100% sure before they say something. In that time, the people are still looking for information, and they're going to get it from whoever is willing to give it to them. On social media, there's an incentive structure: if you're first, you get rewarded; if you're sensational, you get rewarded. If you're right? That doesn't really matter. Maybe you'll get a Community Note, maybe a fact check, but that's not really the point. The point is: Are you first, are you relatable, do you seem authentic, can your stuff go viral? It's a very different communication style and game.So the first thing that was true is that the institutions dropped the ball in comms during Covid communications. And I was writing about it as it happened, because my job was to study social media rumors and narratives around the vaccine. I was like: “Come on, guys! You gotta get in the game here! You're not going to content-moderate this out of existence—that's just not how it works. You're going to turn this into forbidden knowledge.” We did everything we possibly could to try to systematically change that. And the people who did respond were the first-person speakers who began to emerge: physicians. You saw doctors working shifts at Bellevue doing live updates about the morgue trucks—those were the people who managed to break through, because they had the credentials, but they were also able to say very directly to the public: this is the truth, this is what you need to know, Covid is real, even as the institutions weren't doing that.But the second thing that's true is that, as you note, the failures, flaws, and missteps get immediately weaponized. That turns into: “you can't trust those people, they didn't tell you the truth then, never forget what they did to us.” That rhetoric isn't really about finding truth, or understanding a novel pathogen, or whether a vaccine works—remember, this was the first time one had ever been rolled out in an emergency setting. It turns into: “here's why you can never trust those people, and you can only trust me.”That got reinforced through litigation. They lost all their court cases, but they still sued people who tried to deal with the falsehoods and misleading content, and any effort to label it or fact-check it got reframed as censorship. It was really wild to see what that machine juggernaut managed to do to reinforce that only it was going to tell its base the truth, and they couldn't trust anything on the outside. That's the kind of rhetoric you usually see from cults—“you can't trust anybody but me.” It's a very different style of communication, and I found it personally alarming to see it happen in the context of a pandemic, because it has serious downstream consequences.Belvedere: Yeah, and I mean, think about the way you just described that—an informational cult kind of environment, scaled up to half the country, or at least to a large share of people getting their news from less-than-ideal sources. I think it's going to continue to be a problem.DiResta: Let me follow up on that quickly. I spent about [six months] watching the vaccine rollout—February through August of 2021, as Operation Warp Speed rolled out. I watched what Robert F. Kennedy Jr. and other long-standing—just to be clear, long-standing—anti-vaccine activists did. These weren't people who simply didn't like the Covid shot; no, these were people who had been telling you vaccines cause autism, dating back to the 1990s. I watched them capitalize on this in the most incredible ways. They were absolutely transparent about it—they were like, “this is our chance to undermine confidence in the entire vaccine enterprise.” And that is exactly what they did. They didn't hide the ball—they were live-streaming taking about it. “This is our chance to tell the public that all of these things are poison.” And now we have kids dying of measles.That's the downstream effect of this: they managed to connect that distrust to other things. They didn't just create distrust around one incident or fact; they created the idea that nobody in the medical establishment has your best interests at heart. That's what they managed to achieve as a result of Covid.Belvedere: I want to stay on this, because I think we're all trying to figure out the right posture here. You bring up Joe Rogan and his effect on psychedelics policy: a lot of people know him through segments where he talks through his drug trips, or a guest's. Or, another example: online creators helping speed up the end of USAID. And there are other cases. But these are cases where influence and factual accuracy are completely decoupled. For organizations whose whole value proposition is getting reality right, being accurate—a lot of people in these spaces ask a question that is one neighborhood down but the same city: “Where's the liberal answer to Joe Rogan?” We've been asking that question since the post-mortem on 2024, and even before. A lot of our institutions feel saddled by the sense that in order to compete on reach, in this new marketplace of ideas, we can't really compete on accuracy's terms.Roger Ailes created Fox News in the '90s. It wasn't [presented] as a dominant player—it was a countervailing force: “the media is captured, so we're going to bring balance back.” “Fair and balanced”—that whole thing; a whole alternative institution positioned against the media itself. So [this side] has had an insurgent mindset from the start—Rush Limbaugh and others. I've brought this up a lot. Even the Ailes project, Fox News, it had institutional trappings, institutional clothing, but it really had this insurgent energy, whatever it said about itself early on. That posture was able to scale beautifully once podcasting, YouTube, and the internet more broadly made these tools available. It was disintermediation. People like Ben Shapiro with The Daily Wire, Charlie Kirk, really ran with the ball a lot better in these spaces, it seemed like. It never felt like liberals had their own Ailes moment, because it felt like they were fine with The New York Times and The Atlantic.Is the real gap here about talent, effort, and ability, or just needing to catch up after playing behind for so long? Or is it more that this is a different language, that [that side] can easily and naturally slot into, and for us it has to be more performative, a little contrived—like a theater kid having to learn how to act?DiResta: It's funny—there's so much in what you're saying there. First, when you can position yourself oppositionally—“we're the underdog, we're David, they're Goliath”—that's an archetype, a story everybody knows, that people immediately understand where you're positioning yourself. “They are all telling you the same thing”; “that is a monolith, that's the state propaganda machine manufacturing consent, we're the plucky little outlet trying to break through.” And then, of course, they maintain that outsider branding and status even as their audience becomes massive—quite a lot larger, in fact, than some of that so-called establishment media.You see this with a phrase that comes out of QAnon: “we are the media now.” What they're saying is: “we can break through, we can make stuff trend, we can make stuff go viral, we can take our (in the context of QAnon, I think it's fair to say) crackpot ideas and put them out there, get them seen, get them part of the discourse, and then people have to pay attention to us.” That's where “we are the media now” comes from. It was popularized by Elon, because he picked up that phrase and it is so much in the ether on X—I don't even know if he understands the provenance. But “we are the media now” becomes the idea that we're the opposition now, and all that legacy stuff—including Fox, mind you, which is legacy too—is old. You actually see the schisms now, especially since they're in power everywhere on the right: influencers going to war with Fox News.“I once had someone screenshot every social media post where I'd used a curse word and send it to my dean. And I was like: “I said all of that. That's 100% real.” This is the internet, after all. Would I use that language in a talk? Probably not. I'm from New York, so sometimes I do. But if you're constantly second-guessing, clarifying, checking yourself … and you do need to be correct, because in some cases your credentials are on the line when you're speaking about the thing you're actually presenting. But your delivery can afford to be a bit more flexible, a bit more relaxed.” — Renée DiRestaVenkatesh Rao wrote about this in “The Internet of Beefs”—one of the most astute assessments of how social media works, in my opinion. If you have conflict, that's fantastic: it benefits both parties, gets both parties attention, and there's no incentive to actually win the conflict, because the conflict itself is like a soap opera—it just keeps going. That's where you start to see right-wing influencers say, “Fox News is establishment, Bush-era media, and we'll tell you the truth—on social, on our platforms, on our streams, on our podcasts.” That's where you start to see that shift.There's also something Rachel and I wrote about in the first report: institutional and academic speakers are media-trained for a very different world, where you get a three- to five-minute segment. If you've never done TV before, they tell you roughly what you'll be asked, you prepare your talking points in advance because you have so little time, you deliver the soundbite, and the segment's over. That's completely different from what I experienced doing Rogan in 2019—a two-and-a-half-hour conversation with no prep. I'm going to be there and you either know your stuff or you don't. His audience either likes me or it doesn't. Half of them hated me!And that's fine—it is what it is. I showed up for a reason. There's a completely different vernacular, style, and approach when you're having a two-hour conversation with somebody, where you're going to listen to what they have to say, and you're responding back much more as a human than as a person who's there to digest for the public, in a three-minute hit, what you said in that report over there or what happened in the world and why you, the expert, with your credentials and your chyron should think about it. It's a completely different experience.So does it go back to the old way? I don't think it does—I haven't thought that for the better part of 10 years now. I started writing about the anti-vaccine movement in 2015, as a mom, saying: “I have got to say something about this.” What became MAHA is now a political movement that sits in power at HHS. What they understood was that empathy and relatability, the feeling that they are talking with you, matters so much more than a PDF or an academic paper that sits behind a paywall that nobody can read without an academic library license. That's not going back to normal. So the question that's motivated me and Rachel is: How do you teach people who do have the knowledge and the skill set to compete differently?Belvedere: On that note, on liberals' broad failure to penetrate a lot of these spaces, these subcommunities, these niche places where people gather … think about all the subcultures we have in the United States—there are plenty that liberals are just really poor at reaching, or at having any presence within at all.DiResta: I'm an independent. My complaint is about how liberals communicate versus how conservatives communicate. I spend a lot of time in both ecosystems, in person, and I try to engage with the media apparatus on the right too, partly because they make up conspiracy theories about me, so I feel like I have to. But there's a difference in how carefully you have to think through what you're about to say—what performance are you putting on in that moment? Conservatives use the word “based”—you're talking in a way that's almost intentionally provocative at times, and sometimes it goes way off the rails; sometimes it's not good at all. But there's a sense that when you're hearing from the liberal establishment, you're hearing qualifiers—everything is qualified.This is something I used to talk about when making content: on Instagram Reels, you've got three seconds to hook your audience. If you start with a qualifier about how what you're saying doesn't necessarily apply to all people, in all places, at all times, you're done—that took three seconds, that's it, we're done. So the question is: How do you get comfortable either owning an opinion unapologetically, or framing it in a way where you're just like, “yeah, whatever, somebody on the internet is always going to yell at me, I don't care, I'm going to say the thing anyway”? That's a limitation I just don't see in conservative spaces.Again, that means things can go way off the rails, and some of it is genuinely not good. But the flip side is that [liberal content] can sound stilted, practiced, polished. And the incentive structure is scary for the participant—for the academic who decides to try being more casual in their presentation. I once had someone screenshot every social media post where I'd used a curse word and send it to my dean. And I was like: “I said all of that. That's 100% real.” This is the internet, after all. Would I use that language in a talk? Probably not. I'm from New York, so sometimes I do. But if you're constantly second-guessing, clarifying, checking yourself … and you do need to be correct, because in some cases your credentials are on the line when you're speaking about the thing you're actually presenting. But your delivery can afford to be a bit more flexible, a bit more relaxed.What I've loved over the last few years since Covid is watching public health experts and epidemiologists start presenting as themselves: “here I am, I've got this expertise, and I'm also going to tell you about my kids, or this dress I bought, or this thing I did.” It makes them more relatable, more human—because they are, in fact, relatable and human. It's not an artifice. But they understand that doing this actually helps establish their credibility, more than just the credential. So if me saying a curse word on Twitter … normal people curse on Twitter.Belvedere: And not to be too cynical about it, but this is something intuitively understood by people on the wrong side of things. Trump will have a word randomly capitalized as a marker of his style, and without it, the message would feel too polished—even though, grammatically, it would be correct.One reaction people sometimes have to a discussion like this is: “all you're talking about is communication, this is social media stuff, it's more fluff than substance.” I think that couldn't be more wrong, because if we care about the issues we're writing about, if we want action taken on them …DiResta: Yes! It is a persuasive process.Belvedere: … if we want people to care about authoritarianism or corruption in government, raising the salience of those issues becomes really important. If we're collectively bad at it, if we don't have the “juice” that the other side does, our issues stay dormant, untouched, unlistened to, uncared about, while the other side's issues will be front and center, driving the conversation. You talk about issue salience needing to travel across networks before it becomes a thing. Could you unpack that? You've got multiple creators, adjacent communities … help us understand how that works.DiResta: So, often times, when you open your social media feed—whatever ranked platform you use, which is almost all of them—you're seeing what the platform has decided is important for you, and that's not the same as what's important to the person sitting next to you on the train. So you innately think a lot of people care about something, or are talking about something, when it turns out—take X as an example: you log in, there's a “trends” feature, and it'll surface a trend when there are maybe 200 posts about something. That's not a trend in any national sense; it's basically the platform tweaking a small number of people who'll respond to it. They see it and think, “there are 2,000 posts about this, I care a lot about that thing, I'm going to add my voice, retweet it, reshare it”—and if a sufficient number of people do that, it gets bigger, and eventually it shows up on something like a mass-movement leaderboard.I spent five years at the Stanford Internet Observatory taking a network-science approach to this. Let me give a specific example—we can stick with the pandemic, because I think it's quite important as a case study. I don't know how many people remember the Plandemic video. It featured Judy Mikovits, a woman with serious credential issues and at least one retracted paper, who'd had a series of dramatic career incidents that led to her being put into the autism-conference crankosphere. She was releasing a book and doing a lot of book promo, but she was never especially polished doing those direct engagements herself. The director, Mikki Willis, made the video—kept her on task, shot it very strategically. It's about 20 minutes long, and it argues that the pandemic is being used to keep people from “healing microbes on the beach,” and that's why they are locking down beaches, and so on—a very conspiratorial film.Now Mikovits had been saying these things on prior podcasts for a while, but it stayed confined; it got almost no reach outside the anti-vaccine networks, where that kind of content is normal and expected. What was different about Plandemic is that because of the polish, the packaging, the formatting, and Willis's own reach and network, it hopped out of the anti-vaccine ecosystem and started landing everywhere. We had a tool called CrowdTangle that let us pull where URLs were winding up and being shared, and the Plandemic link was showing up in the Corgi Club, the Beach Club, local school-board groups—everywhere. We could only see public data, so I'd imagine that's just the tip of the iceberg.The public really found it compelling. Reading the comments as part of that analysis, people were saying things like: “she seems so authoritative, she has this personal beef with Anthony Fauci, who I've also been hearing is untrustworthy; they are keeping us locked down in our houses, why is that happening?” It really landed and resonated. That's an actual moment where normally this speakers and those topics stay confined to a very specific niche part of the internet, with this video, they managed to absolutely blew out of the water. Here is how it works when you take something and you frame somebody in the right way, you make them seem relatable and resonant and you edit the content in a very compelling, exciting, and mysterious way. This is how you create a mass conversation about something. Ordinarily this person would have stayed confined to her niche, but in that particular moment, with that particular piece of content, they nailed it.Belvedere: I asked about that because on our side, we're trying to do some of the same work you're outlining. ISMA puts out LibCon and The UnPopulist—The UnPopulist is our flagship publication, LibCon is the conference series that we put out. The UnPopulist has buy-in from figures across the ideological spectrum; and the whole model of ISMA is to build a coalition—a realignment of liberal versus illiberal—and for us to be on that liberal side, spanning classical liberals, center-left, and center-right: people who are single-issue defectors, who have enough qualms with the authoritarianism we're seeing that they come over to our side. At our last LibCon, we had C-SPAN in the same room as a bunch of streamers broadcasting. It was an interesting mix, and that's the sort of work we're trying to do. As I said earlier, though, it's not necessarily the language that's easy for a lot of liberals to speak—it takes intentional partnerships, looking through different content forms, finding where a good ally or partner can be found.“These weren't people who simply didn't like the Covid shot; no, these were people who had been telling you vaccines cause autism, dating back to the 1990s. I watched them capitalize on this in the most incredible ways. They were absolutely transparent about it—they were like, ‘this is our chance to undermine confidence in the entire vaccine enterprise.' And that is exactly what they did. They didn't hide the ball—they were live-streaming taking about it. ‘This is our chance to tell the public that all of these things are poison.' And now we have kids dying of measles. That's the downstream effect of this: they managed to connect that distrust to other things. They didn't just create distrust around one incident or fact; they created the idea that nobody in the medical establishment has your best interests at heart. That's what they managed to achieve as a result of Covid.” — Renée DiRestaIt used to be that an organization could get away with just publishing a headline, an article image, and letting the feed auto-populate. Now every platform, the whole online space, requires more thoughtfulness, more intentionality, more strategic thinking. At the risk of asking for a One Neat Trick: is there one thing that, if a capacity developed overnight, would be a game changer for us on this path that we want to take—to be better communicators, to help the issues we care about get that amplification and resonance?DiResta: I think it is that co-creation and that incorporation of people who are innately good and talented at this. I was at LibCon this year with Whick and Soypill, two of the streamers who were there, because the first night of the conference happened to be the night Trump gave that speech about the election being rigged by China. As it happens, I have a lot of experience looking at Chinese influence operations around the 2020 election, so I'd been on Whick's stream before, and he asked if I wanted to come on. I said let's do it, and we broke it down live for the audience—here's what Trump's saying, here's a Georgetown professor who can help explain it—but done conversationally. It's funny, because you still carry that credential with you; you're still saying, “here's how I know this stuff.” And, of course, later on I'm going to write about this for Lawfare, I'm going to write about it on my Substack, I'm going to put it out as personal content. But in this moment the most impactful thing I think I can do is discuss it live with people who are watching it in a community, trying to make sense of it together. That's something streamers in particular are very good at—they bring people together to watch jointly.I don't know how many people have watched a Destiny stream, or, on the other side of the spectrum, a Hasan Piker stream, but it's the same appeal: people who are in a community, like-minded, enjoying that back-and-forth, not only listening to the streamer but participating in the community itself. It reminds me of being in New York in my 20s, gathering at someone's house to watch TV together on a Sunday night—that feeling of experiencing something together, reacting to it together. When you watch a news broadcast by yourself, it's not like that. When you're watching a stream, there's as much back-and-forth and community-building happening among the audience as there is between the audience and the influencer or streamer. That creates a feeling of belonging and participation, and when you want to ask people to take political action, there's a feeling that we're all in this together, we all want to see this thing accomplished. You see this when you watch political streamers across the spectrum doing fundraisers and things like that—“how can we galvanize and generate momentum?”This isn't limited to partisan politics—you can do the same with issue-based advocacy as well.One of the reasons institutions [struggle here] is a fear of relinquishing control. A lot of institutions are taught to stay on message at all times—if you hand your message to somebody else, you lose control of it. But you can't tell them what to say. They're going to say what they want to say. They might get it wrong. But counterintuitively, I think that actually generates more dialogue, more attention, and provides you with a way to accomplish something you might not be good at yourself. Your CEO might not actually be the best face to talk about this thing—the 20 year old you hired, who is much more comfortable with this, is actually the person who should be out there engaging, putting out the message, or working with a creator or creator lab and essentially briefing them like you would brief media: “here's your embargoed copy of my report, I'd love it if you talked about it, no pressure, no requirements, this is just me providing you with information about something we've done that I think your audience might care about—and then wherever it goes, goes.”Belvedere: And as you note in the report, this is already the cultural air a lot of these younger staffers breathe—they have to code-switch to seem more “professional,” to be someone who …DiResta: … doesn't curse on Twitter.Belvedere: Exactly. But that also gives them the advantage of understanding the discourse, the environment, the information landscape, far more natively. So they can put a message that the CEO might want in a way that will have more effectiveness.I want to bring up two of the case studies I found fascinating—David French and Zohran Mamdani. David French was trying to bring a [pluralist], depoliticized message into a very hostile, ideologically policed, polarized evangelical base. Zohran Mamdani, now the mayor of New York, built his campaign almost entirely on vibes, aesthetics, joy—messaging, sure, but messaging that met people where they were and responded to what they actually needed. One of those approaches got crushed by the gatekeepers; the other was able to bypass them. It's not that one was effective and the other wasn't—David French ran up against a buzzsaw that no Christian thinker, however winsome or articulate, probably would have fared well against. Mamdani certainly was very skilled in how he approached his campaign and carried it out. In these two profiles, is there a lesson there about why one got crushed and the other persevered?DiResta: It's very interesting, and I've thought about this a lot. So, first, some of it is: How heavy a hold does the establishment party have on the space you're speaking into? Are you entering fresh ground? Mamdani, of course, ran against an egregiously terrible establishment candidate. I mean, it was one of those “is this really the best we've got to offer?”Mamdani's politics weren't mine, but I'm from New York—I lived there for 30 years, still have a house and family in Brooklyn—and I watched that race, and I just thought … every time I saw Mamdani content in my feed, and there was a lot of it, because I'm still plugged into New York, I was like, “this is so inspiring. This is a person where that love of the city comes through.” I remember he did a thing with a bodega cat. I had a bodega cat, and it was amazing! In a way, the politics and the policy was almost secondary to the feeling that you were watching something genuine.The candidate he was running against—well, there were two, of course, including Curtis Sliwa, who really nailed it on the “genuine” front. I mean, my God, that man gave interviews that left my jaw on the floor—where he's like, “here's how they're trying to pay me to drop out of the race, let's talk about that.” It's a very New York political moment.Belvedere: Zero filter.DiResta: Oh, no filter. I mean, Cuomo doesn't lack a filter either. I'm New York Italian too—you know that. Someone should send him to his dean!It was wild watching that race and seeing what landed with the public. There was such a sense of “God, we need something new! We just need something new”—and that landed, I think, in a way, more than anything else, regardless of your opinions on specific policies. It was the way in which he turned people who found him personally appealing into organizers—fans became organizers. That's really the story of the Mamdani campaign. With French, by contrast, top-down control still held much more strongly. I don't think many New Yorkers love the Democratic Party establishment enough to say, “we really need to listen to what they tell us”—if anything, an official endorsement had become a bit of a negative signal by that point. That's at least how I experienced New York politics.Mamdani was also an unknown quantity, French was much more of a known quantity, so he had this experience of gatekeepers who used character assassination to attack, not so much his ideas as his person—finding things he'd said or done previously and using them to attack him personally and make it costly to associate with him and his ideas by extension. Once an establishment is well-networked enough to mount that kind of opposition, it's much harder to win. French was moving into a hostile, contested, polarized space. Mamdani, by contrast, faced an establishment, in his case the more centrist wing of the Democratic Party, that simply didn't have the social media clout or networks to make its attacks land. It was a very different dynamic.That's why we put French in a section of the report about figuring out what kind of space you're actually trying to participate in. Are you putting forward a policy or a vision that's going to be actively and adversarially rebuffed by very entrenched, well-networked forces? Or are you moving into a much fresher space—a new issue, a new take, less contested ground—where you are potentially going to run a very different kind of strategy?Belvedere: I think that's a great point. Trump is a good example in the political space—the GOP establishment was set against him initially. They had money behind other candidates, Jeb Bush chief among them, and had a war chest that was insane backing Jeb Bush. And that was … nothing in the end. It didn't amount to anything. All the work French had done in the past, caring about the Bill of Rights, about a constitutionally constrained vision of limited government—the intellectual energy the Republican Party used to draw on more heavily—had given way to something else. David went a different direction than a lot of evangelicals did, and there are enough of them to effectively block him now.Whereas Mamdani, I think, was able to bypass a lot of that resistance because there was more overlap with what a standard Democratic candidate might have offered—a lot of the same campaign substance, just a different approach on some issues. There were enough people who weren't already set against him. That's unlike the evangelical space, where mentioning French's name is practically like saying “Voldemort.” Which is sad, because on a lot of issues, especially theological tenets, there's still broad alignment between them.This is something that your report presses people to internalize: the idea that who you're speaking to matters, and how you're speaking to them matters. That's a lesson a lot of liberals still need to work out. There's a lot of trial and error right now, a lot of figuring out how to be effective in this new information landscape. But the report is genuinely helpful. I imagine a lot of people will read it and think: “okay, everything I thought I knew about what it takes to project credibility has been turned on its head, and I need to account for that or risk being left behind.” That's what makes it such an important read.DiResta: Thank you. We really tried to make it as tangible as possible—which is why it's long. We went back and forth at the end about whether to release different versions for different audiences: a philanthropist version, a C-suite version, a version for op-ed writers. In the end we put it all out as one document—you can always Control-F to find what's most relevant to you, there's an index, and AI can digest it too.But, in all seriousness, though, there has to be a shift. You mentioned Trump. His energy came from the internet. He was so good at tapping into … because he was almost a meme candidate at first; people didn't quite believe he'd be a serious thing. This was right around the time … I bring up Gamergate not for its specifics, but because it was a moment when people started realizing the internet could actually affect the real world. The Arab Spring was another one of those moments—realizing that people's voices online could genuinely accomplish things.“When you have this sclerotic sense that nothing happens in the United States, that no one is listening to you, that no change happens, that nothing you want to see in the world will ever be realized, that's an intoxicating moment. ‘Damn, we are the media now'—that phrase is literally about empowerment, the sense that someone powerful is listening to you and making something happen. That's the complete opposite of the faceless institution where you leave a comment in a form and never hear back, where nothing ever changes, your taxes don't change, your cost of living doesn't change. That's what Mamdani tapped into as well: ‘we are actually going to change things, we are going to do things, the world is going to be different starting day one, and here's how it's going to happen.' Whatever you think of the man's politics, he nailed that sense of empowerment—'this is a movement, and you're part of it.'” — Renée DiRestaYou mentioned my book. I'll give a shameless plug here—but only because the paperback just came out and it has a new epilogue. If you bought the Kindle version, go refresh it, because the new epilogue gets into exactly this. What was the appeal of DOGE? It was that the government was going to be transformed—that's great, it's a huge incentive for people who cared about that. Even liberals were like, “Maybe it's time to shake some stuff up.” But what DOGE did for the public, particularly Trump's base and Elon's base, was this: they'd tweet out some grant they found ridiculous, often with no real idea what it actually did, and Elon would respond with something like “killed,” “nuked,” “through the wood chipper,” about USAID.Belvedere: And a lot of those actually got Community-Noted on themselves—people pointing out that he was egregiously misreading the grant. They got fact-checked by their own system.DiResta: They did—but it didn't actually matter, because what mattered to the people participating was: “I said a thing, somebody powerful listened to me, and then a change happened.” When you have this sclerotic sense that nothing happens in the United States, that no one is listening to you, that no change happens, that nothing you want to see in the world will ever be realized, that's an intoxicating moment. “Damn, we are the media now”—that phrase is literally about empowerment, the sense that someone powerful is listening to you and making something happen. That's the complete opposite of the faceless institution where you leave a comment in a form and never hear back, where nothing ever changes, your taxes don't change, your cost of living doesn't change.That's what Mamdani tapped into as well: “we are actually going to change things, we are going to do things, the world is going to be different starting day one, and here's how it's going to happen.” Whatever you think of the man's politics, he nailed that sense of empowerment—“this is a movement, and you're part of it.” That's the same thing Trump tapped into online back in 2015: “we're going to change things, this is your movement, and I'm going to accomplish this for you.” Which can go off in some weird ways, when you look at exclusionary populism and authoritarianism, which you guys at ISMA focus so much on.I want to mention one more thing. In San Francisco, we recalled the school board: a very local, niche race that ended up becoming a story of national attention, for the same reason—people saying, “we've got to change something, what can we do?” The groups that grew out of that were advancing a very liberal policy—this was not the far-left, not the far-right doing it: “we'd like eighth-grade algebra back, we'd like schools reopened.” This is late 2021. “It would be nice for my kid not to have three years of no school.”It was an unapologetically liberal politics that was powering that, and it was unapologetic in how it framed itself, how it spoke, how it used social media. And I thought, “Okay, now maybe liberals will see”—again, not Democrats, but liberals, people who believe in the core liberal values—“people will start to see that there's real power in direct, unapologetic appeals.” And it is my sincere hope that we start to see that in a movement that rises to push back against the excesses of MAHA and things like that.[In the new edition of my book], the new epilogue is really about how these dynamics play out once a group is actually in power—because a lot of people think of social media as a tool of insurgency, and once you're in power, that's supposedly the end of it. What's been interesting watching Trump and DOGE is that they've kept that cycle going: people still believe they're having an impact, shaping policy.We saw a version of this with Obama, who was a very digital candidate—he rose to power on a lot of popular digital support, did interviews with content creators, that kind of thing. There were creators in the White House—my friend Destin Sandlin, who runs Smarter Every Day, did an interview with Obama. There was a sense that the administration was beginning to engage with new media, but there was still a divide: the new media was media, engaging with the president on certain terms, at certain times, in certain venues. What you're seeing from this administration is they're literally the press corps, seated front and center. Some of them are even working as special government employees, which is wild—and there are some real ethical issues there. But there's still a sense that the online movement, that source of validation that propelled someone to a win, is actively in there, working with them on governance and policy.Is that a mirage, to some extent? Yes—there's a veneer of them wanting to do something anyway and using online narratives to justify it. And I'd argue that once an influencer becomes a special government employee, they're no longer independent—they're speaking as an agent of the government at that point. But setting that aside, you really do see the way those boundaries are shifting, and that sense of personal participation is what keeps this particular populist movement feeling valuable to its participants.Belvedere: I remember when Madison Cawthorn infamously hired only comms people rather than policy people, and a lot of people in conservative-adjacent spaces saw that as the start of a new era. The model is no longer Paul Ryan-ing your way through, nor is it about governing—Cawthorn was actively, explicitly building a kind of image-only candidacy, seeing how far that element alone could carry him. It didn't carry him very far; a few things tripped him up, like, hilariously, a visit to Hitler's home. But he was building toward being a comms-only operation as the only thing that matters now. When Trump did the whole Alligator Alcatraz stunt, that's the same understanding at work—it's an ongoing comms exercise, you have to keep the performative aspect going, because the campaign never really stops.We're out of time. Thank you so much, Renée.Thanks for checking out The UnPopulist! Subscribe to support our project.© The UnPopulist, 2026Follow us on Bluesky, Threads, YouTube, TikTok, Facebook, Instagram, and X.We welcome your reactions and replies. Please adhere to our comments policy. Get full access to The UnPopulist at www.theunpopulist.net/subscribe

It's EV News Briefly for Friday 15 May 2026, everything you need to know in less than 5 minutes if you haven't got time for the full show.Patreon supporters fund this show, get the episodes ad free, as soon as they're ready and are part of the EV News Daily Community. You can be like them by clicking here: https://www.patreon.com/EVNewsDailyJD POWER SAYS EV INTEREST IS HOLDING UPConsumer interest in EVs remained steady despite plateauing sales, with 26% of new-vehicle shoppers in April 2026 saying they were "very likely" to consider an EV — up 3 points month on month — partly driven by rising fuel costs. Charging availability remained the top barrier at 46%, though concerns around cost and charging time all eased year on year.HONDA SWINGS TO LOSS AS HYBRID STRATEGY HARDENSHonda posted its first operating loss since going public in 1957, recording a ¥414.3 billion ($2.6 billion) operating loss for the fiscal year ended March 2026, driven by ¥1.57 trillion in EV-related write-offs. CEO Toshihiro Mibe abandoned the 2040 combustion-free target and pivoted to 15 new hybrid models through 2030, with two prototypes — a fastback sedan and a red crossover — unveiled in Tokyo on May 14.SLATE AUTO PLANS 392 MICHIGAN JOBSSlate Auto plans to add 392 jobs and invest $10.4 million at its Troy, Michigan headquarters over five years, nearly doubling its Michigan workforce ahead of its low-cost electric pickup launch later in 2026. The Bezos-backed company, now led by CEO Peter Faricy following a leadership change in March, will focus new roles on engineering, design, and R&D, with positions starting at $43 per hour.TOYOTA HILUX ADDS EV FOR 2026Toyota will launch the ninth-generation Hilux in 2026 with both a fully electric and a diesel version, with the electric model reaching UK customers first in June in Icon (£52,845 after grant) and Invincible (£55,695 after grant) trims. Both electric variants qualify for the UK government's £5,000 plug-in van grant and come in a Double Cab body style, with a two-seat commercial conversion to follow later in 2026.VAUXHALL MATCHES EV AND DIESEL VAN PRICESVauxhall has achieved finance and lease price parity between the electric and diesel versions of its Combo and Vivaro vans, with the Combo Electric available from £305 per month and the Vivaro Electric from £335 per month — both matching their diesel equivalents on 36-month, 10,000-mile terms. The parity has been extended to the Astra and Frontera passenger cars as part of a wider brand strategy to remove the cost barrier to electrification.TRATON RAISES €850 MILLION FOR EV DRIVEVolkswagen-majority-owned Traton Group has raised €850 million to accelerate battery-electric drivetrain development across MAN, Scania, International, and Volkswagen Truck & Bus. Battery-electric vehicle sales across the group grew to 1.4% of total sales in Q1 2026, up from 0.9% in Q1 2025, with MAN and Scania both expanding their electric lineups.RENAULT CLAIMS EDGE OVER CHINESE RIVALSRenault CEO François Provost claimed the group's European manufacturing efficiency surpasses Chinese rivals, while acknowledging it still uses Chinese supply chains and a China development centre to bring new models to market in under 24 months. With French and European plants running at 85% capacity and momentum from models like the electric Renault 5, Renault is deepening ties with Nissan — both holding 15% stakes in each other — while Nissan's CEO signalled desire for a closer partnership.BYD ATTO 2 DM-I PRICED FOR UKBYD has confirmed UK pricing for the Atto 2 DM-i plug-in hybrid SUV, with orders opening 2 June 2026 and first deliveries in August. The Active trim starts at £26,995 with a 7.8kWh battery and 24 miles of EV range, while the Boost costs £29,995 with an 18kWh battery and up to 55 miles of EV range.OMODA-JAECOO MAKES A FAST UK STARTJaecoo and Omoda launched in the UK in March 2025 with immediate impact — the Jaecoo 7 became that month's best-selling car, and by year-end over 26,000 units had sold, making it the fourth most popular retail car in the UK. The brand reached a 1.4% UK market share, ahead of Seat and Suzuki, built on Range Rover Evoque-inspired styling, competitive pricing, and strong dealer incentives.POLESTAR SAYS FUEL SHOCK DRIVES EV DEMANDPolestar CEO Michael Lohscheller said "pump anxiety" has overtaken "range anxiety" as the key driver of EV consideration, with WTI and Brent crude up 50% since late February due to disruption at the Strait of Hormuz. Polestar is seeing rising demand for both new and used EVs as a result, though eroding US tax incentives and broader cost pressures continue to make the American market challenging.

With French warships deployed from the Mediterranean to the Strait of Hormuz, former French general Dominique Trinquand speaks to RFI about what's at stake for France, Europe and the risk of conflict escalation in the Middle East. France has deployed a large part of its naval forces to the Middle East as the war triggered by Israeli-US strikes on Iran enters its third week, with Paris seeking to protect European interests, reassure allies and prevent the conflict from spreading further across the region. President Emmanuel Macron has described the mobilisation as "unprecedented", with French assets now operating across the eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world's most vital maritime chokepoints for global energy supplies. The deployment comes as US President Donald Trump calls on allies to help secure shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, warning NATO members of a “very bad” future future if they fail to assist Washington in safeguarding the passage. Speaking to RFI, former French general Dominique Trinquand said the scale of the French deployment illustrated just how seriously Paris views the crisis. "Forty percent of the naval capability of France is currently on operations," he said. "Of the 23 main ships, 19 are on operations, so it is really a major involvement of France in this operation." France holds back warships as Trump urges allies to secure Strait of Hormuz Show of force  Much of the French military focus is currently centred on the Mediterranean following attacks linked to the wider conflict. "The focus is on the Mediterranean because Cyprus was attacked," Trinquand explained. "Cyprus is not a NATO member but an EU member, so France, with Italy, Greece and Spain, is showing that we are defending the south of Europe." France is also reinforcing its defence commitments to Gulf allies such as Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, where it maintains a major military base in Abu Dhabi. Paris has doubled the number of fighter jets stationed there by sending six Rafale aircraft to bolster the emirate's air defences. At the same time, French forces are strengthening maritime security further south near Djibouti, where another French base supports operations in the Red Sea. France has also deployed its flagship aircraft carrier, the Charles de Gaulle, to the Mediterranean after it was recalled from a NATO exercise in the North Sea. For Trinquand, the carrier's presence is intended primarily as a signal of deterrence rather than a step toward direct military intervention. “Clearly it's a strategic deterrence,” he said. “This aircraft carrier was in the North Sea participating in a NATO exercise, but as soon as Cyprus was attacked it was decided to send the aircraft carrier to the Mediterranean.” The move, he added, demonstrates Europe's ability to defend its southern flank. “With the aircraft carrier you also have frigates and submarines, so it's a major deployment. It shows that Europe is able to defend its south border.” 'If the Strait of Hormuz were to remain closed, we would face a major crisis' Diplomacy versus escalation Alongside the military build-up, Macron has also sought to keep diplomatic channels open. The French president spoke last week with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, urging Tehran to halt attacks in the region and restore freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. Trinquand, however, remained sceptical about the prospects for diplomatic progress in the current climate. "You always need to try diplomacy," he said. "But I am not sure that in this case it will be a success, because the Iranian government is weak outside even if it is strong inside Iran, and so it tries to establish chaos." "The Strait of Hormuz is of strategic importance to them, and I do not think that they will negotiate on that." The conflict has already had direct consequences for French forces in the region. A French warrant officer was killed and several soldiers wounded last week in drone attack on a base in Iraqi Kurdistan, where French troops were serving as instructors. According to Trinquand, the attack illustrates the broader instability spreading across the region. "It just shows the chaos created by Iran," he said, adding that Tehran has long relied on proxy forces and irregular warfare beyond its borders. France treads 'a fine line between defensive and offensive' in Middle East At the same time, the conflict is raising concerns about Europe's security as missile strikes and drone attacks affect countries across the Mediterranean and Gulf regions. Trinquand cautioned, however, against assuming the crisis has already escalated into a direct confrontation between Iran and Europe. "There is a threat," he said, noting that Turkey, despite being struck by missiles, has avoided invoking NATO's collective defence mechanisms. "I am not sure that we are already in a fight between Europe, NATO and Iran." Looking ahead, the former general said the coming weeks will be crucial as the military campaign unfolds. "The plan was to strike for between four and five weeks in order to degrade all Iranian capabilities," he said, warning against expecting quick results. "War is not a video game. It is planning, it is professional soldiers doing their job." With the Strait of Hormuz remaining a critical flashpoint and US forces moving additional assets into the region, Trinquand believes the situation remains highly fluid. He also pointed to the possibility of internal unrest, noting that minority groups such as Kurds, Balochs and Azeris could play a role if instability deepens. "We have two more weeks of waiting for results from inside Iran," he said.

With French 75 Cocktails with the kick of a Diet Slice, we talk about "One Battle After Another." What happens when reality jumps the shark of satire? What happens when narcissists don't plan for their own failure? The contrasting visions of revolution. How Paul Thomas Anderson and Leonardo DiCaprio's collaboration made the film better. The revolution will not be televised.

With French 75 Cocktails with the kick of a Diet Slice, we talk about "One Battle After Another." What happens when reality jumps the shark of satire? What happens when narcissists don't plan for their own failure? The contrasting visions of revolution. How Paul Thomas Anderson and Leonardo DiCaprio's collaboration made the film better. The revolution will not be televised.

A long-anticipated trade deal with South American trading bloc Mercosur hangs in the balance as the EU tries to overcome France’s strong objections. With French farmers taking to the streets, we explore what’s at stake during an extremely sensitive time for Latin America.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

With French army generals giving speeches about the need to protect ourselves, the president announcing new plans for military service and French authorities telling us we all need to prepare an emergency box with blankets, baby food and board games, this week we'll look at why all the talk of war in France right now?And could change finally be ahead for the French school calendar. Are they about to cut the big summer holiday? The French wine industry is suffering an almighty hangover right now; we'll find out just how bad things are and whether there are any remedies out there that might relieve the crisis.Plus we'll start the build up to next year's local elections in France, predict who the next mayor of Paris will be and why many communes are struggling to find a mayor altogether.Host Ben McPartland is joined by the team from The Local France, Emma Pearson, Gen Mansfield and John Lichfield.A reminder any listeners who aren't a member of The Local can take advantage of a great Black Friday deal and join. Act quick though. The half-price offer will end at the end of November. CLICK HERE to take advantage. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Before Kind of Blue, a 21-year-old Miles Davis was already reshaping jazz with Birth of the Cool. In this episode, we explore how Miles teamed up with arranger Gil Evans and a chamber-like nonet to craft a sound full of singable melodies, tightly arranged horns, and forward-thinking restraint. With French horn in the mix, Gerry Mulligan and John Lewis' arranging touch, and Lee Konitz's lyrical solos, we unpack why this album – recorded in 1949-1950 and released years later – still lives up to its name.ABOUT OPEN STUDIO------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------As the premier online jazz education platform, with an ever-expanding course library and 20,000+ members, Open Studio (OS) has everything you need to excel and thrive on your jazz journey.Featuring everything from beginner to advanced lessons, engaging courses from A-list instructors, step-by-step curriculum, real-time classes and a thriving and incredibly supportive community, OS is the perfect platform to level up your jazz playing, whether you're a total beginner, or an advanced pro-level improvisor.

Tempted by the thought of buying vintage but not sure where to start? If you love the idea of layering old and new in your interiors, you're going to fall in love with my guest today on Inside Design. Bronte Taton shares the story of how she founded and grew her business Cleo Collects - a gallery of antique furniture, objets and art sourced from around the world - into a destination for design lovers and collectors alike. We learn how Bronte sources pieces, what she looks for and how you can successfully integrate furnishings past and present into your interiors. With French heritage and an exquisite knowledge of the eras, styles and origins of both antique and contemporary furniture, Bronte takes us on a delightful journey into the world of collecting. Connect with Bronte @cleo.collects and https://cleocollects.com/Thank you for joining me on this episode of Inside Design. You can find me here: https://www.instagram.com/janeledgerinteriors I'd love to hear from you in the DMs. Ready to elevate your home and your lifestyle? Jane Ledger Platinum is here. Let's chat! https://www.janeledger.com.au

With French opposition remaining to the EU-Mercosur deal struck last week by the EU, the real work on the deal starts now, French liberal MEP Marie-Pierre Vedrenne tells the Radio Schuman podcast today.Last week, the EU finalised the contentious Mercosur agreement with some South Amercan countries, a deal that follows on-and-off negotiations that began in 1999.However, France—one of the largest EU member states—along with several other countries with sizeable dairy and beef industries, opposes the agreement. They argue it could expose local farmers to unfair competition and heighten environmental risks.To block the deal, France is attempting to form a coalition of like-minded member states. Under EU rules, it would need the support of at least three other countries representing 35% of the bloc's population. Additionally, the agreement must gain approval from the European Parliament.In the second segment of the podcast, we look at EU ministers discussions with the Commission on the economic plans for their countries. Are they performing well?On the last part of the show, Radio Schuman reveals which airlines are using more sustainable form of fuel.Radio Schuman is hosted and produced by Maïa de la Baume, with journalist and production assistant Eleonora Vasques, audio editing by David Brodheim and Georgios Leivaditis. Music by Alexandre Jas. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Prepare to be whisked away to Edo-period Japan with Netflix's "Blue Eye Samurai," where a warrior woman's quest for vengeance defies societal norms. Our discussion will leave you riveted as we analyze whether Netflix can rub shoulders with animation titans like Disney and DreamWorks. With French studio Blue Spirit's breathtaking animation and a plot deeply rooted in history, we offer you a spoiler-free look into this series that's captivating audiences worldwide, pondering its potential for a second season.We delve into the rich tapestry of characters that "Blue Eye Samurai" presents. The series boldly tackles mature themes, from the use of sex as a weapon to the intricate roles of women in feudal Japan, and we bring you our candid thoughts on these complex arcs. Diving into the heart of the narrative, we discuss how the side characters enrich the storyline and speculate on the cliffhangers that have viewers clamoring for more.IMDb Synopsis: Driven by a dream of revenge against those who made her an outcast in Edo-period Japan, a young warrior cuts a bloody path toward her destiny.

Redshirt junior linebacker Geoffrey Cantin-Arku joined GoTigers247 in this episode of Off the Boards. In the first segment, Geoffrey shares how he he came to play the game of football while growing up in Quebec City, Montreal, Canada. He describes playing hockey as a young kid, but do to the expense of playing hockey he transitioned to play football as a 10 year old. Geoffrey immediately fell in love with the game and a he began to dream of playing in the NFL one day. While playing for Cégep Garneau, he decided to come to the States and attend a football camp at Syracuse University. After the camp he was immediately offered by Syracuse and joined the Orangemen. Geoffrey explains how difficult it is for young football players in Canada to be noticed and how there are so many young kids in Canada just waiting to be noticed. On top of coming to America for the first time, Geoffrey had to learn how to speak English. With French being his original language, Geoffrey explains that he had to learn words that American coaches would use with him as they coached him, but he spent quite a bit of time and energy to learn how to speak English fluently. Playing ball in America has been a huge accomplishment for him, but learning to speak English fluently in three years is something he is as proud of as anything else. In the second segment, Geoffrey shares how Memphis got involved with him after he entered the transfer portal in 2021. He explains how he was offered by Power 5 school, but made the decision to join Memphis because of the culture that Ryan Silverfield and the staff has built. His introduction to the team was with linebacker coach, Jordon Hankins, on a visit early on, and he immediately bonded with Hankins. The deal was done by the time Geoffrey and his mother made an official visit to Memphis, and he experienced the "familial" bond that the players have with each other. Geoffrey explains that his mom is the most important person in the world with him and her approval for the next school he attended was extremely important. His mother loved the staff, immediately trusted them, and also is a massive Elvis fan. Geoffrey ends the episode talking about the veteran leadership on the Memphis defense and how the camaraderie on the defense made the transition to Memphis easy for him. He specifically talked about Tyler Murray and Zay Cullens as the guys he is closest to on the team and the advances he has made in his game due to their leadership. He believes that the veteran leadership on the team has allowed for the transition to new defensive coordinator, Matt Barnes, to be as seamless as it could possibly be. He also expresses a lot of admiration for Coach Barnes and his ability to teach and share his vision for the defense in a way that makes sense for all the players. About Off the Boards: Off the Boards is a video/audio segment where GT247 sits down with local and national sports figures. Typically, Off the Boards has been a video segment, but we are now turning it into an audio podcast as well to better meet the needs of all of our followers. This new format will allow all of GT247's content to be more accessible to listeners. You can listen to any of our podcasts on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher and Megaphone. Make sure to subscribe, leave a comment and spread the word about Tigers in 20 and Off the Boards. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In the spring of 1954, after eight years of bitter fighting, the war in Vietnam between the French and the communist-led Vietminh came to a head. With French forces reeling, the United States planned to intervene militarily to shore-up the anti-communist position. Turning to its allies for support, first and foremost Great Britain, the US administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower sought to create what Secretary of State John Foster Dulles called a "united action" coalition. In the event, Winston Churchill's Conservative government refused to back the plan. Fearing that US-led intervention could trigger a wider war in which the United Kingdom would be the first target for Soviet nuclear attack, the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, was determined to act as Indochina peacemaker - even at the cost of damage to the Anglo-American "special relationship". In Anthony Eden, Anglo-American Relations and the 1954 Indochina Crisis (Bloomsbury, 2019), Kevin Ruane and Matthew Jones revisit a Cold War episode in which British diplomacy played a vital role in settling a crucial question of international war and peace. Eden's diplomatic triumph at the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina is often overshadowed by the 1956 Suez Crisis which led to his political downfall. This book, however, recalls an earlier Eden: a skilled and experienced international diplomatist at the height of his powers who may well have prevented a localised Cold War crisis escalating into a general Third World War. Charles Coutinho, PH. D., Associate Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, received his doctorate from New York University. His area of specialization is 19th and 20th-century European, American diplomatic and political history. He has written for Chatham House's International Affairs, the Institute of Historical Research's Reviews in History and the University of Rouen's online periodical Cercles. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

In the spring of 1954, after eight years of bitter fighting, the war in Vietnam between the French and the communist-led Vietminh came to a head. With French forces reeling, the United States planned to intervene militarily to shore-up the anti-communist position. Turning to its allies for support, first and foremost Great Britain, the US administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower sought to create what Secretary of State John Foster Dulles called a "united action" coalition. In the event, Winston Churchill's Conservative government refused to back the plan. Fearing that US-led intervention could trigger a wider war in which the United Kingdom would be the first target for Soviet nuclear attack, the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, was determined to act as Indochina peacemaker - even at the cost of damage to the Anglo-American "special relationship". In Anthony Eden, Anglo-American Relations and the 1954 Indochina Crisis (Bloomsbury, 2019), Kevin Ruane and Matthew Jones revisit a Cold War episode in which British diplomacy played a vital role in settling a crucial question of international war and peace. Eden's diplomatic triumph at the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina is often overshadowed by the 1956 Suez Crisis which led to his political downfall. This book, however, recalls an earlier Eden: a skilled and experienced international diplomatist at the height of his powers who may well have prevented a localised Cold War crisis escalating into a general Third World War. Charles Coutinho, PH. D., Associate Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, received his doctorate from New York University. His area of specialization is 19th and 20th-century European, American diplomatic and political history. He has written for Chatham House's International Affairs, the Institute of Historical Research's Reviews in History and the University of Rouen's online periodical Cercles. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

In the spring of 1954, after eight years of bitter fighting, the war in Vietnam between the French and the communist-led Vietminh came to a head. With French forces reeling, the United States planned to intervene militarily to shore-up the anti-communist position. Turning to its allies for support, first and foremost Great Britain, the US administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower sought to create what Secretary of State John Foster Dulles called a "united action" coalition. In the event, Winston Churchill's Conservative government refused to back the plan. Fearing that US-led intervention could trigger a wider war in which the United Kingdom would be the first target for Soviet nuclear attack, the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, was determined to act as Indochina peacemaker - even at the cost of damage to the Anglo-American "special relationship". In Anthony Eden, Anglo-American Relations and the 1954 Indochina Crisis (Bloomsbury, 2019), Kevin Ruane and Matthew Jones revisit a Cold War episode in which British diplomacy played a vital role in settling a crucial question of international war and peace. Eden's diplomatic triumph at the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina is often overshadowed by the 1956 Suez Crisis which led to his political downfall. This book, however, recalls an earlier Eden: a skilled and experienced international diplomatist at the height of his powers who may well have prevented a localised Cold War crisis escalating into a general Third World War. Charles Coutinho, PH. D., Associate Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, received his doctorate from New York University. His area of specialization is 19th and 20th-century European, American diplomatic and political history. He has written for Chatham House's International Affairs, the Institute of Historical Research's Reviews in History and the University of Rouen's online periodical Cercles. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

In the spring of 1954, after eight years of bitter fighting, the war in Vietnam between the French and the communist-led Vietminh came to a head. With French forces reeling, the United States planned to intervene militarily to shore-up the anti-communist position. Turning to its allies for support, first and foremost Great Britain, the US administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower sought to create what Secretary of State John Foster Dulles called a "united action" coalition. In the event, Winston Churchill's Conservative government refused to back the plan. Fearing that US-led intervention could trigger a wider war in which the United Kingdom would be the first target for Soviet nuclear attack, the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, was determined to act as Indochina peacemaker - even at the cost of damage to the Anglo-American "special relationship". In Anthony Eden, Anglo-American Relations and the 1954 Indochina Crisis (Bloomsbury, 2019), Kevin Ruane and Matthew Jones revisit a Cold War episode in which British diplomacy played a vital role in settling a crucial question of international war and peace. Eden's diplomatic triumph at the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina is often overshadowed by the 1956 Suez Crisis which led to his political downfall. This book, however, recalls an earlier Eden: a skilled and experienced international diplomatist at the height of his powers who may well have prevented a localised Cold War crisis escalating into a general Third World War. Charles Coutinho, PH. D., Associate Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, received his doctorate from New York University. His area of specialization is 19th and 20th-century European, American diplomatic and political history. He has written for Chatham House's International Affairs, the Institute of Historical Research's Reviews in History and the University of Rouen's online periodical Cercles. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/southeast-asian-studies

In the spring of 1954, after eight years of bitter fighting, the war in Vietnam between the French and the communist-led Vietminh came to a head. With French forces reeling, the United States planned to intervene militarily to shore-up the anti-communist position. Turning to its allies for support, first and foremost Great Britain, the US administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower sought to create what Secretary of State John Foster Dulles called a "united action" coalition. In the event, Winston Churchill's Conservative government refused to back the plan. Fearing that US-led intervention could trigger a wider war in which the United Kingdom would be the first target for Soviet nuclear attack, the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, was determined to act as Indochina peacemaker - even at the cost of damage to the Anglo-American "special relationship". In Anthony Eden, Anglo-American Relations and the 1954 Indochina Crisis (Bloomsbury, 2019), Kevin Ruane and Matthew Jones revisit a Cold War episode in which British diplomacy played a vital role in settling a crucial question of international war and peace. Eden's diplomatic triumph at the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina is often overshadowed by the 1956 Suez Crisis which led to his political downfall. This book, however, recalls an earlier Eden: a skilled and experienced international diplomatist at the height of his powers who may well have prevented a localised Cold War crisis escalating into a general Third World War. Charles Coutinho, PH. D., Associate Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, received his doctorate from New York University. His area of specialization is 19th and 20th-century European, American diplomatic and political history. He has written for Chatham House's International Affairs, the Institute of Historical Research's Reviews in History and the University of Rouen's online periodical Cercles. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/world-affairs

In the spring of 1954, after eight years of bitter fighting, the war in Vietnam between the French and the communist-led Vietminh came to a head. With French forces reeling, the United States planned to intervene militarily to shore-up the anti-communist position. Turning to its allies for support, first and foremost Great Britain, the US administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower sought to create what Secretary of State John Foster Dulles called a "united action" coalition. In the event, Winston Churchill's Conservative government refused to back the plan. Fearing that US-led intervention could trigger a wider war in which the United Kingdom would be the first target for Soviet nuclear attack, the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, was determined to act as Indochina peacemaker - even at the cost of damage to the Anglo-American "special relationship". In Anthony Eden, Anglo-American Relations and the 1954 Indochina Crisis (Bloomsbury, 2019), Kevin Ruane and Matthew Jones revisit a Cold War episode in which British diplomacy played a vital role in settling a crucial question of international war and peace. Eden's diplomatic triumph at the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina is often overshadowed by the 1956 Suez Crisis which led to his political downfall. This book, however, recalls an earlier Eden: a skilled and experienced international diplomatist at the height of his powers who may well have prevented a localised Cold War crisis escalating into a general Third World War. Charles Coutinho, PH. D., Associate Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, received his doctorate from New York University. His area of specialization is 19th and 20th-century European, American diplomatic and political history. He has written for Chatham House's International Affairs, the Institute of Historical Research's Reviews in History and the University of Rouen's online periodical Cercles. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/american-studies

In the spring of 1954, after eight years of bitter fighting, the war in Vietnam between the French and the communist-led Vietminh came to a head. With French forces reeling, the United States planned to intervene militarily to shore-up the anti-communist position. Turning to its allies for support, first and foremost Great Britain, the US administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower sought to create what Secretary of State John Foster Dulles called a "united action" coalition. In the event, Winston Churchill's Conservative government refused to back the plan. Fearing that US-led intervention could trigger a wider war in which the United Kingdom would be the first target for Soviet nuclear attack, the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, was determined to act as Indochina peacemaker - even at the cost of damage to the Anglo-American "special relationship". In Anthony Eden, Anglo-American Relations and the 1954 Indochina Crisis (Bloomsbury, 2019), Kevin Ruane and Matthew Jones revisit a Cold War episode in which British diplomacy played a vital role in settling a crucial question of international war and peace. Eden's diplomatic triumph at the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina is often overshadowed by the 1956 Suez Crisis which led to his political downfall. This book, however, recalls an earlier Eden: a skilled and experienced international diplomatist at the height of his powers who may well have prevented a localised Cold War crisis escalating into a general Third World War. Charles Coutinho, PH. D., Associate Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, received his doctorate from New York University. His area of specialization is 19th and 20th-century European, American diplomatic and political history. He has written for Chatham House's International Affairs, the Institute of Historical Research's Reviews in History and the University of Rouen's online periodical Cercles. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In the spring of 1954, after eight years of bitter fighting, the war in Vietnam between the French and the communist-led Vietminh came to a head. With French forces reeling, the United States planned to intervene militarily to shore-up the anti-communist position. Turning to its allies for support, first and foremost Great Britain, the US administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower sought to create what Secretary of State John Foster Dulles called a "united action" coalition. In the event, Winston Churchill's Conservative government refused to back the plan. Fearing that US-led intervention could trigger a wider war in which the United Kingdom would be the first target for Soviet nuclear attack, the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, was determined to act as Indochina peacemaker - even at the cost of damage to the Anglo-American "special relationship". In Anthony Eden, Anglo-American Relations and the 1954 Indochina Crisis (Bloomsbury, 2019), Kevin Ruane and Matthew Jones revisit a Cold War episode in which British diplomacy played a vital role in settling a crucial question of international war and peace. Eden's diplomatic triumph at the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina is often overshadowed by the 1956 Suez Crisis which led to his political downfall. This book, however, recalls an earlier Eden: a skilled and experienced international diplomatist at the height of his powers who may well have prevented a localised Cold War crisis escalating into a general Third World War. Charles Coutinho, PH. D., Associate Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, received his doctorate from New York University. His area of specialization is 19th and 20th-century European, American diplomatic and political history. He has written for Chatham House's International Affairs, the Institute of Historical Research's Reviews in History and the University of Rouen's online periodical Cercles. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In the spring of 1954, after eight years of bitter fighting, the war in Vietnam between the French and the communist-led Vietminh came to a head. With French forces reeling, the United States planned to intervene militarily to shore-up the anti-communist position. Turning to its allies for support, first and foremost Great Britain, the US administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower sought to create what Secretary of State John Foster Dulles called a "united action" coalition. In the event, Winston Churchill's Conservative government refused to back the plan. Fearing that US-led intervention could trigger a wider war in which the United Kingdom would be the first target for Soviet nuclear attack, the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, was determined to act as Indochina peacemaker - even at the cost of damage to the Anglo-American "special relationship". In Anthony Eden, Anglo-American Relations and the 1954 Indochina Crisis (Bloomsbury, 2019), Kevin Ruane and Matthew Jones revisit a Cold War episode in which British diplomacy played a vital role in settling a crucial question of international war and peace. Eden's diplomatic triumph at the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina is often overshadowed by the 1956 Suez Crisis which led to his political downfall. This book, however, recalls an earlier Eden: a skilled and experienced international diplomatist at the height of his powers who may well have prevented a localised Cold War crisis escalating into a general Third World War. Charles Coutinho, PH. D., Associate Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, received his doctorate from New York University. His area of specialization is 19th and 20th-century European, American diplomatic and political history. He has written for Chatham House's International Affairs, the Institute of Historical Research's Reviews in History and the University of Rouen's online periodical Cercles. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/british-studies

With French legislative elections concluding with no firm direction, President Emmanuel Macron will have a tough job negotiating to fulfil his second term ambitions. IGTV's Jeremy Naylor discusses this with Eric Albert, from Le Monde.Any opinion, news, research, analysis, or other information does not constitute investment or trading advice.  Follow us on Twitter, Instagram and YouTube

With French legislative elections concluding with no firm direction, President Emmanuel Macron will have a tough job negotiating to fulfil his second term ambitions. IGTV's Jeremy Naylor discusses this with Eric Albert, from Le Monde.Any opinion, news, research, analysis, or other information does not constitute investment or trading advice.  Follow us on Twitter, Instagram and YouTube

Chris and Ugo speak to Premiership Rugby chief executive Simon Massie-Taylor as the season nears its conclusion. He talks about his vision for the league and how they plan to reach new audiences. With French rugby claiming the big prizes in Europe, how can Premiership clubs close the gap with the salary cap decreasing? Massie-Taylor also talks about his desire to bring back promotion and relegation and how to make the Championship more competitive.

www.loulabellesfrancofiles.comHosted by Louise PrichardKate Venter has always loved drawing. Her school books were always covered in creative doodling! So after a career in IT she made the decision to move into her own business designing party ware. But just prior to the recent COVID lockdowns she got her creative juices flowing further by moving more into the design side of things and immersed herself in her art with her Sambellina Studio.Kate loves to draw buildings and has a fascination with architecture. Her travel and architecture inspired illustrations often take me away to Paris. She confesses to having a particular affection for illustrating cafes! She loves the shadows, the light and the different colour that buildings exude at different times of day.In this lovely warm chat we hear all about how Kate creates an artwork, about her love of travel and of France and we get transported away with her description of her fave French day. With French recipes and music to quench the French vibes, join us for a little escape to France.

Episode 58   Synth Demonstration Records, Part 1 Playlist Ondioline demonstration disc. Side 1 (circa 1955 Gaveau). With French narration, demonstrates how the Ondioline can imitate other instruments. This was a monophonic, electronic organ made famous by Jean Jacques Perrey. 7:07 RCA music synthesizer demonstration. Programmed by Dr. Harry F. Olsen, narrated by john Preston. Excerpts from side 1, “The Physical Characteristics Of Musical Sounds - Synthesis By Parts - Excerpts From Musical Selections” from The Sounds And Music Of The RCA Electronic Music Synthesizer (1955 RCA Victor Red Seal). Vinyl LP, Mono. This recording was widely distributed in the US, Canada, and Australia. My copy is an Australian copy. "On side 1 you will hear demonstrations of frequency, waveform, envelope, intensity, portamento and vibrato, synthesis by parts and excerpts from musical selections, all produced on the RCA Electronic Music Synthesizer. On side 2 you will hear complete selections produced on the RCA Electronic Music Synthesizer." 22:01 Moog 900 Series demonstration, side 1 Music by Wendy Carlos using the Moog Modular Synthesizer circa 1967, narrated by Ed Stokes - Electronic Music Systems (1969 A. Moog Company, Inc.). Vinyl, 10", Promo, Mono. This is from the second version of the release, after Wendy Carlos had released Switched-on Bach for which there are excerpts on the second side. The first edition was released in 1967 with the help of Carlos and this side remained as side 1 of this second release. This was a promotional disc for the Moog Modular Synthesizer. 8:59 Moog synthesizers, Chris Swansen and Jim Johnston, side 1 from “The Sound Of Moog (1971 Moog Music Inc.). Flexi-disc, 7", Promo, 33 ⅓ RPM. Moog played by Swansen, narrated by Johnston. This flexi-disc provided examples of the Minimoog, Moog Modular and ensemble work by Swansen. 6:37 ElectroComp synthesizer demonstration. “Fugue in G Minor” (Bach) and “Puerto Vallarta”from The Sound of E.M.L. Synthesizers (circa 1972 Electronic Music Laboratories Inc.). Flexi-disc, 7", 33 ⅓ RPM, Two Sided. Programmed and performed by W.M. Hartamon and P.J. Hartamon. Modular synthesizer circa 1972, probably including models 101 and 200. 9:47 Yamaha demonstration. Masa Matsuda, “In the World of Solitude” from International Electone Grand Prix Concours 1972 (1972 Yamaha). This is a rare album from 1972 featuring participants in the annual Electone performance competition sponsored, produced, and release on a double LP by Yamaha. This event took place at the Yamaha Music Camp in Nemu-no-Sato, Japan. Yamaha sponsored this camp around building enthusiasm and a repertory of artists who could play the Electone electronic synthesizer design for virtuosic keyboard performance. 7:25 Background Music Excerpts from the Moog 900, RCA Music Synthesizer, Sound of Moog, ARP family of instruments, E-mu Emulator, demonstration recordings. Blue Marvin, “Release Time” from the album With Arp Sinthesyzer 2600 (1973 Joker). Blue Marvin is Alberto Baldan Bembo in this Italian release of ARP Odyssey tracks. Opening and closing sequences voiced by Anne Benkovitz. Additional opening, closing, and other incidental music by Thom Holmes. For additional notes, please see my blog, Noise and Notations.

Bible Reading: Matthew 25:19-23, 34-40; Romans 12:9-13"A hamburger for me!" Lincoln announced as he set down his menu. "With French fries!"A smiling young man approached the table. "My name is Kyle, and I'll be your waiter tonight. Iheard one hamburger. Is everyone else ready to order too?" Kyle jotted down each order and soon brought them a tray filled with plates of steaming food."Why are those people called waiters?" Ashley asked as Kyle walked back to the kitchen."Because you wait while they bring you the food," Lincoln answered.Mom laughed. "Actually, to wait sometimes means to serve. That's what waiters do. They serve the customers who come in to eat. They're often called servers instead of waiters or waitresses.""I learned a Bible verse that says, 'Wait on the Lord,'" said Ashley. "Is that like being a waiter?" "Wait on God?" asked Lincoln. "We can't serve meals to Him.""Not meals, silly!" said Ashley. "But we can serve Him in other ways." "Generally, to wait on the Lord means to be patient and trust Him," Dad explained. "But I think we can apply another meaning to that verse too. Jesus tells us that when we serve other people, we're really serving Him. We're showing others what He's like by making ourselves servants the way He did when He came to earth to die for our sins." He picked up the check."Don't forget the tip, Dad," said Lincoln. "Kyle was a good waiter.""I agree," said Dad. "What makes people good waiters or waitresses?" "They need to bring you exactly what you ask for," said Ashley. "Did you see those people a couple tables over? They weren't very happy when their waiter brought them the wrong salads.""And a good server is quick," Lincoln added. "When I asked for more ketchup, Kyle brought it right away.""And they also need to be kind and courteous so people will want to eat at that restaurant again," said Mom.Dad nodded. "Doing what others ask, responding quickly, and being kind--those are some of the ways we can serve Jesus by serving others. And one day, when we get to heaven, imagine being greeted with the words, 'Well done, good and faithful servant.' I can't imagine a better tip than that!" -Robert ByersHow About You?Are you waiting on the Lord by being patient and trusting Him? That's something we all must do as we walk through life with Jesus, but it doesn't mean we don't do anything at all--we can also wait on the Lord by serving others. How can you be a good servant? By responding quickly when your parents tell you to do something? By showing kindness to someone at school? Wait on the Lord by serving others like Jesus. Today's Key Verse:His master replied, "Well done, good and faithful servant!" (NIV) (Matthew 25:23)Today's Key Thought:Serve Jesus well

With French luxury goods group LVMH now the largest company on the European stock market, how are portfolio managers thinking about the rising power of fashion? Dominic Wallington, Senior Portfolio Manager & Head of European Equities, RBC Global Asset Management (UK) Limited, shares how he is positioning his portfolio to match the current trends. (Recorded May 13, 2021)To view the transcript and disclosure for this podcast, please visit https://www.rbcgam.com/en/ca/insights/podcasts/an-investors-eye-for-fashion/detail.RBC, GAM, RBC GAM, RBCGAM, podcast, invested, investing, investment, insights, personally, learn, perspectives, personally invested

www.loulabellesfrancofiles.comIn 2017 I was fortunate enough to take part in a most amazing and life changing trip on an immersion to France.In this episode of the podcast, you will be guided through the winding roads and petit villages, bringing alive the local rustic-ness I discovered in the Dordogne. This episode will have the most impact listening on one device and accessing Google Earth on another. Or if you're wonderfully tech-savvy you may be able to access them both at the same time on the same device! Once in each village, pause the podcast chat to get down on the Google Earth ground and have a virtual walking tour around the town, then re-start the podcast to move on!We will visit:MonpazierLa Roque-GageacDommeRouffignacCadouinVézac - Les Jardins de MarqueyssacCome and enjoy a lazy afternoon meandering the Dordogne with Loulabelle - a most picturesque, historic and welcoming part of our favourite destination, France! With French music and chats about the regions food, you will feel like you've had a lovely vacances en France!

­This episode is a conversation with Danielle George, Professor of Radio Frequency engineering in the Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering (EEE) and Associate Vice President at the University of Manchester https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Manchester (University of Manchester). She is a highly-respected scientist and was made Professor in 2014 at the age of 38. Danielle gave the 2014 Royal Institution lecture, at the time only the sixth woman to do so, she was given an MBE in 2016 and was awarded the Faraday Prize in 2018. She is currently the President of The Institution of Engineering and Technology, overseeing an international programme to celebrate the Institution's 150th anniversary. If her work and plaudits sound daunting, they shouldn't because Danielle also happens to be one of the nicest and most down-to-earth people I've had the pleasure of working with. With French physicist Christophe Galforth, Danielle co-presented a programme I filmed, which featured Stephen Hawking and his central idea that human beings need to become multi-planetary species in order to survive long-term. I was fortunate to get to know Danielle well during filming, which included camping on Norwegian snow fields and venturing to South American observatories, among other places. Aswell as being super intelligent, she is great fun with a fantastic sense of humour. In many ways, Danielle's approach to science communication is perfectly captured by the Robot Orchestra project, which we touch on in our conversation. Unexpected, brilliant, fun and easy to engage with, the robot orchestra is very much like Danielle herself. Support this podcast

www.loulabellesfrancofiles.comEmbarking on an exchange to France had always been a dream for Australian teenager Grace McMahon.  She travelled to France for the Aussie Christmas/summer break and stayed in a small town, Melun a half hour drive south of Paris. French was spoken the whole time with only a tiny bit of English which gave her French language skills a huge workout!Grace loved school in France, although it was very different to what she was used to in Australia. We hear about her experiences with French food, teenage life in a French town and some surprises such as how many teenagers smoke! I have always dreamed of being in France at Christmas and was thrilled to hear of Grace travelling with her host family to Reims for the Christmas markets and all the festivities there. Being 17 and away from family for Christmas is tough, but experiencing Paris and France at a time when everything was decorated for Christmas added an extra layer of excitement for Grace. With French music and a canelé recipe to make your mouth water this is a sweet chat to leave us all dreaming of life in Paris and France again.

The title of this episode is Push-BackAs we move to wind up this season of CS, we've entered into the modern era in our review of Church history and the emergence of Theological Liberalism. Some historians regard the French Revolution as a turning point in the social development of Europe and Western Civilization. The Revolution was in many ways, a result of the Enlightenment, and a harbinger of things to come in the Modern and Post-Modern Eras.At the risk of being simplistic, for convenience sake, let's set the history of Western Civilization into these eras of Church History.First is the Roman Era, when Christianity was officially opposed and persecuted. That was followed by the Constantinian Era, when the Faith was at first tolerated, then institutionalized. With the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West, Europe entered the Middle Ages and the Church was led by Rome in the West, Constantinople in the East.The Middle Ages ended with the Renaissance which swiftly split into two streams, the Reformation and the Enlightenment. While many Europeans broke from the hegemony of the Roman Church to launch Protestant movements, others went further and broke from religious faith altogether in an exaltation of reason. They purposefully stepped away from spirituality toward hard-boiled materialism.This gave birth to the Modern Era, marked by an ongoing tension between Materialistic Rationalism and Philosophical Theism that birthed an entire rainbow of intellectual and faith options.Carrying on this over-simplified review from where our CS episodes have been, the Modern Era then turned into the Post-Modern Era with a full-flowering and widespread academic acceptance of the radical skepticism birthed during the Enlightenment. The promises of the perfection of the human race through technology promised in the Modern Era were shattered by two World Wars and repeated cases of genocide in the 20th and 21st Cs. Post-Moderns traded in the bright Modernist expectation of an emerging Golden Age for a dystopian vision of technology-run-amuck, controlled by madmen and tyrants. In a classic post-modern proverb, the author George Orwell said, “If you want a vision of the future, imagine a boot stamping on a human face – forever.”In our last episode, we embarked on a foray into the roots of Theological Liberalism. The themes of the new era were found in the motto of the French Revolution: “Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity.”Liberty was conceived as individual freedom in both the political and economic realms. Liberalism originally referred to this idea of personal liberty in regard to economics and politics. It's come to mean something very different. Libertarian connects better with the original idea of liberalism than the modern term “liberalism.”In the early 19th C, liberals promoted the political rights of the middle class. They advocated suffrage and middle-class influence through representative government. In economics, liberals agitated for a laissez faire marketplace where individual enterprise rather than class determined one's wealth.Equality, second term in the French Revolution's trio, stood for individual rights regardless of legacy. If liberty was a predominantly middle-class virtue, equality appealed to rural peasants, the urban working class, and the universally disenfranchised. While the middle class and hold-over nobility advocated a laissez-faire economy, the working class began to agitate for equality through a rival philosophy called socialism. Workers inveighed for equality either through the long route of evolution within a democratic system or the shorter path of revolution via Marxism.Fraternity, the third idea in the trinity, was the Enlightenment reaction against all the war and turmoil that marked European history till then; especially the trauma that had rocked the continent through endless political, economic, and religious struggle. Fraternity represented a sense of brotherhood that rolled across Europe in the 19th C. And while it held the promise of uniting people in the concept of the universal brotherhood of man under the universal Fatherhood of God, it quickly devolved into Nationalism that would only lead to even bloodier conflicts since they were now accompanied by modern weapons.These social currents swirled around the Christian Faith during the first decades of the Age of Progress, but no one predicted the ruination they'd bring the Church of Rome, steeped as it was in an inviolable tradition. For over a thousand years she'd presided over feudal Europe. She enthroned dozens of monarchs and ensconced countless nobles. And like them, the Church gave little thought to the power of peasants and the growing middle class. In regards to social standing, in 18th C European society, noble birth and holy calling were everything. Intelligence or achievement meant little.Things began to heat up in Europe when Enlightenment thinkers began to question the old order. In the 1760s, several places around the world began to feel the heat of political unrest. There'd always been Radicals who challenged the status quo. It usually ended badly for them; forced to drink hemlock or such. But in the mid and late 18th C, they became popular advocates for the middle-class and poor. Their demands were similar: The right to participate in politics, the right to vote, the right to greater freedom of expression.The success of the American Revolution inspired European radicals. They regarded Americans as true heirs of Enlightenment ideals. They were passionate about equality; and desired peace, yet ready to fight for freedom. In gaining independence from the world's most formidable power, Americans proved Enlightenment ideals worked.Then, in the last decade of the 18th C, France executed its king, became a republic, formed a revolutionary regime, and crawled through a period of brutality into the Imperialism of Napoleon Bonaparte.As we saw in an earlier episode, the Roman Catholic church was so much a part of the old order that revolutionaries often made it an object of their wrath. In the early 1790s, the French National Assembly sought to reform the Church along rationalist lines. But when it eliminated the Pope's control and required an oath of loyalty on the clergy, it split the Church. The two camps faced off against each other in every village. Between thirty and 40,000 priests were forced into hiding or exile. Atheists recognized the cultural wind was now at their back and pressed for more. Why stop at reforming the Church when you could pry its grip from all society? Radicals moved to remove all traces of Christianity's influence. They adopted a new calendar and elevated the cult of “Reason.” Some churches were converted to “Temples of Reason.”But by 1794 this farce had spent itself. The following year a statute was passed affirming the free exercise of religion, and loyal Catholics who'd kept a low profile during the Revolution returned. But Rome never forgot. For now, Liberty meant the worship of the goddess of Reason.When Napoleon took control, he struck an agreement with the pope; the Concordat of 1801. It restored Roman Catholicism as the quasi-official religion of France. But the Church had lost much of its prestige and power. Europe would never again be a society held together by an alliance of altar and throne. On the other side of things, Rome never welcomed the liberalism reshaping much of Europe's courts.As Bruce Shelley aptly remarks, Jesus and the apostles spent little time talking about political freedom, personal liberty, or a person's right to their opinions. Valuable and important as those things are, they simply do not come into view as values in the appeal of the Gospel. The freedom Christ offers comes through salvation, which places a necessary safeguard on liberty to keep it from becoming a dangerous license.But during the 19th C, it became popular to think of liberty ITSELF as being free! Free of any and all restraint. Any restriction on freedom was met with a knee-jerk opposition. Everyone ought to be as free as possible. The question then became; just what does that mean. How far does “possible” go?John Stuart Mill suggested this guideline, “The liberty of each, limited by the like liberty of all.” Liberty meant the right to your opinions, the freedom to express and act upon them, but not to the degree that in doing so, you impinge others' ability to do so with theirs. Politically and civilly, this was best made possible by a constitutional government that guaranteed universal civil liberty, including the freedom to worship according to one's choice.Popes didn't like that.In the political and economic vacuum that followed Napoleon, several monarchs tried to re-establish the old systems of Europe. They were resisted by a new and empowered wave of liberals. The first of these liberal uprisings were quickly suppressed in Spain and Italy. But the liberals kept at it and in 1848, revolution temporarily triumphed in most European capitals.Popes Leo XII, Pius VIII, and Gregory XVI by all accounts were good men. But they ignored the emerging modernity of 19th century Europe by clinging to a moribund past.There are those who would say it's not the duty of the Church to keep pace with changing times. The truths of God don't change. So on the contrary, the Church is to remain resolute in holding to The Faith once and for all delivered to the saints. Faithfulness to the essentials of the Christian Faith is not what we're referring to here. You can change the flooring in your house without agreeing with the world. Some Popes of the late 18th to mid 19th century seemed to kind of pull the blinds of Vatican windows, trying to keep out the philosophical ideas then sweeping the Continent. That posture toward the wider culture tended to only further alienate the intellectual community.This early form of Liberalism wanted to address historic evils that have plagued humanity. But it refused to allow the Catholic Church a role in that work as it related to morality and public life. Liberals said politics ought to be independent of Christian ethics. Catholics had rights as private citizens, but their Faith wasn't welcome in the public arena. This is part of the creeping secularism we talked about in the last episode.One of the lingering symbols of papal ties to the Medieval world was the Papal States where the Pope was both spiritual leader and civil ruler. In the mid-19th C, a movement for Italian unity began that aimed to turn the entire peninsula into a single nation. Such a revolution wouldn't tolerate the Papal States. Liberals welcomed Pope Pius IX, who seemed a reforming Pope who'd listen to their counsel. In 1848, he installed a new constitution for the Papal States granting moderate participation in government. This movement toward liberal ideals moved some to suggest the Pope as leader over a unified Italy. But when Pius' appointed Prime Minister of the Papal States was assassinated by revolutionaries, Pius rescinded the new constitution. Instead of putting the revolution down, it broke out in Rome itself and Pius had to flee. With French assistance, he returned and returned the Papal states to an absolutist regime. Opposition grew under the leadership of King Victor Emmanuel II of Sardinia. In 1859 and 60 large sections of the Papal States were carved away by nationalists. Then in March of 1861, Victor Emmanuel was proclaimed King of Italy in Florence.But the City of Rome was protected by a French garrison. When the Franco-Prussian War forced the withdrawal of French troops, Italian nationalists invaded. After a short engagement in September of 1870, Rome surrendered. After lasting for a millennium, the Papal States were no more.Pius IX holed up in the Vatican. Then in June 1871, King Victor Emmanuel transferred his residence to Rome, ignoring the protests and threatened ex-communication by the pope. The new government offered Pius an annual salary together with the free and unhindered exercise of his religious roles. But the Pope rejected the offer and continued his protests. He forbade Italy's Catholics to participate in political affairs. That just left the field open to more radicals. The result was a growing anticlerical course in Italian civil affairs. This condition became known as the “Roman Question.” It had no resolution until Benito Mussolini concluded the Lateran Treaty in February 1929. The treaty stipulated that the pope must renounce all claims to the Papal States, but received full sovereignty in the tiny Vatican State. This condition exists to this day.1870 not only marks the end of the rule of the pope of civil affairs in Italy, it also saw the declaration of his supreme authority as the Bishop of Rome in a doctrine called “Papal Infallibility.” The First Vatican Council, which hammered out the doctrine, represented the culmination of a movement called “ultramontanism” meaning “across the mountains.” Originally referring to the Pope's hegemony beyond the Alps into the rest of Europe, the term eventually came to mean over and beyond any mountain. Ultramontanism formalized the Pope's right to lead the Church.It came about thus . . .Following the French Revolution (and here we are yet again, recognizing the importance of that revolution in European and world affairs) an especially strong sense of loyalty to the Pope developed there. After the nightmare of the guillotine and the cultural trauma of Napoleon's reign, many Catholics came to regard the papacy as the only source of civil order and public morality. They believed only popes were capable of restoring sanity to society. Only the papacy had the power to guide the clergy to protect religion from political coercion.Infallibility was suggested as a necessary prerequisite for an effective papacy. The Church had to become a monarchy adjudicating God's will. Shelley says as sovereignty was to secular kings, infallibility would be to popes.By the mid-19th C, this thinking attracted many Catholics. Popes encouraged it in every possible way. One publication said when the pope meditated, God was thinking in him. Hymns appeared that were addressed, not to God, but to Pius IX.  Some even spoke of the Pope as the vice-God of humanity.In December 1854, Pius IX declared as dogma The Immaculate Conception; a belief that had been traditional but not official; that Mary was conceived without original sin. The subject of the decision was nothing new. What was, however, was the way it was announced. This wasn't dogma defined by a creed produced by a council.  It was an ex-cathedra proclamation by the Pope. Ex Cathedra means “from the chair,” and defines an official doctrine issued by the teaching magisterium of the Holy Church.Ten years after unilaterally announcing the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, Pius sent out an encyclical to all bishops of the Church. He attached a Syllabus of Errors, a compilation of eighty evils then in place in society. He declared war on socialism, rationalism, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, public schools, Bible societies, separation of church and state, and a host of other so-called errors of the Modern Era. He ended by denying that “the Roman pontiff ought to reach an agreement with progress, liberalism, and modern civilization.”It was a hunker down and rally round an infallible pope mentality that aimed to enter a kind of spiritual hibernation, only emerging when Modernity had impaled itself on its own deadly horns and bled to death.Pius saw the need for a new universal council to address the Church's posture toward Modernity and its philosophical partner, Liberalism. He began planning for it in 1865 and called the First Vatican Council to convene at the end of 1869.The question of the definition of papal infallibility was all the buzz. Catholics had little doubt that as the successor of Peter the Pope possessed special authority. The only question was how far that authority went. Could it be exercised independently from councils or the college of bishops?After some discussion and politicking, 55 bishops who couldn't agree to the doctrine as stated were given permission by the Pope to leave Rome, so as not to create dissension. The final vote was 533 for the doctrine of infallibility. Only 2 voted against it. The Council asserted 2 fundamentals: 1) The primacy of the pope and 2) His infallibility.First, as the successor of Peter, vicar of Christ, and supreme head of the Church, the pope exercises full authority over the whole Church and over individual bishops. That authority extends to all matters of faith and morals as well as to discipline and church administration. Consequently, bishops owe the pope obedience.Second, when the pope in his official capacity, that is ex cathedra, makes a final decision concerning the entire Church in a matter of faith and morals, that decision is infallible and immutable and does not require the consent of a Council.The strategy of the ultramontanists, led by Pius IX, shaped the lives of Roman Catholics for generations. Surrounded by the hostile forces of modernity; liberalism and socialism, Rome withdrew behind the walls of an infallible papacy.

A frank discussion of the terror attacks in Paris. With over 100 innocents killed, France has now closed its borders. Too little, too late? News reports indicate that at least three of the ISIS terrorists were recent immigrants into France, as part of the many waves of "refugees" recently entering Europe from the Middle East and Northern Africa. How will the tragic events of the week affect European politics? Will European elites alter their hitherto open-door immigration policies? And how will America respond? Is it time for more "James Taylor Diplomacy" or something more to the point? With issues of immigration and national security now rising to the fore in American politics, which GOP candidates stand to benefit? Our guess: Trump. With French music and listener calls.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Further thoughts on the attacks in France. Why are Establishment pundits not discussing the immigration angle? Why does Democrat Bernie Sanders implicate "climate change" as bearing some responsibility for acts of Parisian terrorism? Does Hillary agree? Also, Sen. Lindsey Graham, from his position at Zero in the polls, advises American "boots on the ground" in the Middle East while maintaining an open-door for easy immigration into America. Is Graham confused on the concept of whose "backyard" we should be fighting in? We discuss Marco Rubio's troubling immigration record as a leader of the pro-amnesty "Gang of Eight," as we examine polling data suggesting the Rubio "surge" might not yet be transpiring. Meanwhile, frontrunner Donald Trump hits 42% in a recent Reuters/IPSOS poll. Is Trump looking eerily prescient with his "Trojan Horse" claims from some weeks ago? Why are desperate GOP Elites hoping for a Romney Revival? With French music and listener calls.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Interview with Jennifer Kerns, Beltway Correspondent. How will the brutal terrorist attacks in France affect American politics? Kerns reviews Democrat candidates' responses from last night's Democratic debate. Climate change? While each Democrat (and most every GOP candidate, actually) plans to continue allowing thousands more "refugees" into America, does their insistence on appropriate "vetting" indicate some reflexive concern? As Sen. Jeff Sessions queries, is accurate "vetting" of refugees truly possible? Meanwhile, pundit William Kristol says the Trump and Carson campaigns will "be hurt" by the events in Paris, as voters may look for more political experience in their candidates. But might Kristol be wrong -- yet again? What to make of the "draft Romney" sentiment in the GOP Establishment? We conclude with audio from a Trump speech in Beaumont, Texas as he is joined on stage by members of the "Remembrance Project" -- concerned American citizens who have lost loved ones to illegal immigrants. With French music and listener calls.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

The title of this episode is Push-BackAs we move to wind up this season of CS, we've entered into the modern era in our review of Church history and the emergence of Theological Liberalism. Some historians regard the French Revolution as a turning point in the social development of Europe and Western Civilization. The Revolution was in many ways, a result of the Enlightenment, and a harbinger of things to come in the Modern and Post-Modern Eras.At the risk of being simplistic, for convenience sake, let's set the history of Western Civilization into these eras of Church History.First is the Roman Era, when Christianity was officially opposed and persecuted. That was followed by the Constantinian Era, when the Faith was at first tolerated, then institutionalized. With the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West, Europe entered the Middle Ages and the Church was led by Rome in the West, Constantinople in the East.The Middle Ages ended with the Renaissance which swiftly split into two streams, the Reformation and the Enlightenment. While many Europeans broke from the hegemony of the Roman Church to launch Protestant movements, others went further and broke from religious faith altogether in an exaltation of reason. They purposefully stepped away from spirituality toward hard-boiled materialism.This gave birth to the Modern Era, marked by an ongoing tension between Materialistic Rationalism and Philosophical Theism that birthed an entire rainbow of intellectual and faith options.Carrying on this over-simplified review from where our CS episodes have been, the Modern Era then turned into the Post-Modern Era with a full-flowering and widespread academic acceptance of the radical skepticism birthed during the Enlightenment. The promises of the perfection of the human race through technology promised in the Modern Era were shattered by two World Wars and repeated cases of genocide in the 20th and 21st Cs. Post-Moderns traded in the bright Modernist expectation of an emerging Golden Age for a dystopian vision of technology-run-amuck, controlled by madmen and tyrants. In a classic post-modern proverb, the author George Orwell said, “If you want a vision of the future, imagine a boot stamping on a human face – forever.”In our last episode, we embarked on a foray into the roots of Theological Liberalism. The themes of the new era were found in the motto of the French Revolution: “Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity.”Liberty was conceived as individual freedom in both the political and economic realms. Liberalism originally referred to this idea of personal liberty in regard to economics and politics. It's come to mean something very different. Libertarian connects better with the original idea of liberalism than the modern term “liberalism.”In the early 19th C, liberals promoted the political rights of the middle class. They advocated suffrage and middle-class influence through representative government. In economics, liberals agitated for a laissez faire marketplace where individual enterprise rather than class determined one's wealth.Equality, second term in the French Revolution's trio, stood for individual rights regardless of legacy. If liberty was a predominantly middle-class virtue, equality appealed to rural peasants, the urban working class, and the universally disenfranchised. While the middle class and hold-over nobility advocated a laissez-faire economy, the working class began to agitate for equality through a rival philosophy called socialism. Workers inveighed for equality either through the long route of evolution within a democratic system or the shorter path of revolution via Marxism.Fraternity, the third idea in the trinity, was the Enlightenment reaction against all the war and turmoil that marked European history till then; especially the trauma that had rocked the continent through endless political, economic, and religious struggle. Fraternity represented a sense of brotherhood that rolled across Europe in the 19th C. And while it held the promise of uniting people in the concept of the universal brotherhood of man under the universal Fatherhood of God, it quickly devolved into Nationalism that would only lead to even bloodier conflicts since they were now accompanied by modern weapons.These social currents swirled around the Christian Faith during the first decades of the Age of Progress, but no one predicted the ruination they'd bring the Church of Rome, steeped as it was in an inviolable tradition. For over a thousand years she'd presided over feudal Europe. She enthroned dozens of monarchs and ensconced countless nobles. And like them, the Church gave little thought to the power of peasants and the growing middle class. In regards to social standing, in 18th C European society, noble birth and holy calling were everything. Intelligence or achievement meant little.Things began to heat up in Europe when Enlightenment thinkers began to question the old order. In the 1760s, several places around the world began to feel the heat of political unrest. There'd always been Radicals who challenged the status quo. It usually ended badly for them; forced to drink hemlock or such. But in the mid and late 18th C, they became popular advocates for the middle-class and poor. Their demands were similar: The right to participate in politics, the right to vote, the right to greater freedom of expression.The success of the American Revolution inspired European radicals. They regarded Americans as true heirs of Enlightenment ideals. They were passionate about equality; and desired peace, yet ready to fight for freedom. In gaining independence from the world's most formidable power, Americans proved Enlightenment ideals worked.Then, in the last decade of the 18th C, France executed its king, became a republic, formed a revolutionary regime, and crawled through a period of brutality into the Imperialism of Napoleon Bonaparte.As we saw in an earlier episode, the Roman Catholic church was so much a part of the old order that revolutionaries often made it an object of their wrath. In the early 1790s, the French National Assembly sought to reform the Church along rationalist lines. But when it eliminated the Pope's control and required an oath of loyalty on the clergy, it split the Church. The two camps faced off against each other in every village. Between thirty and 40,000 priests were forced into hiding or exile. Atheists recognized the cultural wind was now at their back and pressed for more. Why stop at reforming the Church when you could pry its grip from all society? Radicals moved to remove all traces of Christianity's influence. They adopted a new calendar and elevated the cult of “Reason.” Some churches were converted to “Temples of Reason.”But by 1794 this farce had spent itself. The following year a statute was passed affirming the free exercise of religion, and loyal Catholics who'd kept a low profile during the Revolution returned. But Rome never forgot. For now, Liberty meant the worship of the goddess of Reason.When Napoleon took control, he struck an agreement with the pope; the Concordat of 1801. It restored Roman Catholicism as the quasi-official religion of France. But the Church had lost much of its prestige and power. Europe would never again be a society held together by an alliance of altar and throne. On the other side of things, Rome never welcomed the liberalism reshaping much of Europe's courts.As Bruce Shelley aptly remarks, Jesus and the apostles spent little time talking about political freedom, personal liberty, or a person's right to their opinions. Valuable and important as those things are, they simply do not come into view as values in the appeal of the Gospel. The freedom Christ offers comes through salvation, which places a necessary safeguard on liberty to keep it from becoming a dangerous license.But during the 19th C, it became popular to think of liberty ITSELF as being free! Free of any and all restraint. Any restriction on freedom was met with a knee-jerk opposition. Everyone ought to be as free as possible. The question then became; just what does that mean. How far does “possible” go?John Stuart Mill suggested this guideline, “The liberty of each, limited by the like liberty of all.” Liberty meant the right to your opinions, the freedom to express and act upon them, but not to the degree that in doing so, you impinge others' ability to do so with theirs. Politically and civilly, this was best made possible by a constitutional government that guaranteed universal civil liberty, including the freedom to worship according to one's choice.Popes didn't like that.In the political and economic vacuum that followed Napoleon, several monarchs tried to re-establish the old systems of Europe. They were resisted by a new and empowered wave of liberals. The first of these liberal uprisings were quickly suppressed in Spain and Italy. But the liberals kept at it and in 1848, revolution temporarily triumphed in most European capitals.Popes Leo XII, Pius VIII, and Gregory XVI by all accounts were good men. But they ignored the emerging modernity of 19th century Europe by clinging to a moribund past.There are those who would say it's not the duty of the Church to keep pace with changing times. The truths of God don't change. So on the contrary, the Church is to remain resolute in holding to The Faith once and for all delivered to the saints. Faithfulness to the essentials of the Christian Faith is not what we're referring to here. You can change the flooring in your house without agreeing with the world. Some Popes of the late 18th to mid 19th century seemed to kind of pull the blinds of Vatican windows, trying to keep out the philosophical ideas then sweeping the Continent. That posture toward the wider culture tended to only further alienate the intellectual community.This early form of Liberalism wanted to address historic evils that have plagued humanity. But it refused to allow the Catholic Church a role in that work as it related to morality and public life. Liberals said politics ought to be independent of Christian ethics. Catholics had rights as private citizens, but their Faith wasn't welcome in the public arena. This is part of the creeping secularism we talked about in the last episode.One of the lingering symbols of papal ties to the Medieval world was the Papal States where the Pope was both spiritual leader and civil ruler. In the mid-19th C, a movement for Italian unity began that aimed to turn the entire peninsula into a single nation. Such a revolution wouldn't tolerate the Papal States. Liberals welcomed Pope Pius IX, who seemed a reforming Pope who'd listen to their counsel. In 1848, he installed a new constitution for the Papal States granting moderate participation in government. This movement toward liberal ideals moved some to suggest the Pope as leader over a unified Italy. But when Pius' appointed Prime Minister of the Papal States was assassinated by revolutionaries, Pius rescinded the new constitution. Instead of putting the revolution down, it broke out in Rome itself and Pius had to flee. With French assistance, he returned and returned the Papal states to an absolutist regime. Opposition grew under the leadership of King Victor Emmanuel II of Sardinia. In 1859 and 60 large sections of the Papal States were carved away by nationalists. Then in March of 1861, Victor Emmanuel was proclaimed King of Italy in Florence.But the City of Rome was protected by a French garrison. When the Franco-Prussian War forced the withdrawal of French troops, Italian nationalists invaded. After a short engagement in September of 1870, Rome surrendered. After lasting for a millennium, the Papal States were no more.Pius IX holed up in the Vatican. Then in June 1871, King Victor Emmanuel transferred his residence to Rome, ignoring the protests and threatened ex-communication by the pope. The new government offered Pius an annual salary together with the free and unhindered exercise of his religious roles. But the Pope rejected the offer and continued his protests. He forbade Italy's Catholics to participate in political affairs. That just left the field open to more radicals. The result was a growing anticlerical course in Italian civil affairs. This condition became known as the “Roman Question.” It had no resolution until Benito Mussolini concluded the Lateran Treaty in February 1929. The treaty stipulated that the pope must renounce all claims to the Papal States, but received full sovereignty in the tiny Vatican State. This condition exists to this day.1870 not only marks the end of the rule of the pope of civil affairs in Italy, it also saw the declaration of his supreme authority as the Bishop of Rome in a doctrine called “Papal Infallibility.” The First Vatican Council, which hammered out the doctrine, represented the culmination of a movement called “ultramontanism” meaning “across the mountains.” Originally referring to the Pope's hegemony beyond the Alps into the rest of Europe, the term eventually came to mean over and beyond any mountain. Ultramontanism formalized the Pope's right to lead the Church.It came about thus . . .Following the French Revolution (and here we are yet again, recognizing the importance of that revolution in European and world affairs) an especially strong sense of loyalty to the Pope developed there. After the nightmare of the guillotine and the cultural trauma of Napoleon's reign, many Catholics came to regard the papacy as the only source of civil order and public morality. They believed only popes were capable of restoring sanity to society. Only the papacy had the power to guide the clergy to protect religion from political coercion.Infallibility was suggested as a necessary prerequisite for an effective papacy. The Church had to become a monarchy adjudicating God's will. Shelley says as sovereignty was to secular kings, infallibility would be to popes.By the mid-19th C, this thinking attracted many Catholics. Popes encouraged it in every possible way. One publication said when the pope meditated, God was thinking in him. Hymns appeared that were addressed, not to God, but to Pius IX.  Some even spoke of the Pope as the vice-God of humanity.In December 1854, Pius IX declared as dogma The Immaculate Conception; a belief that had been traditional but not official; that Mary was conceived without original sin. The subject of the decision was nothing new. What was, however, was the way it was announced. This wasn't dogma defined by a creed produced by a council.  It was an ex-cathedra proclamation by the Pope. Ex Cathedra means “from the chair,” and defines an official doctrine issued by the teaching magisterium of the Holy Church.Ten years after unilaterally announcing the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, Pius sent out an encyclical to all bishops of the Church. He attached a Syllabus of Errors, a compilation of eighty evils then in place in society. He declared war on socialism, rationalism, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, public schools, Bible societies, separation of church and state, and a host of other so-called errors of the Modern Era. He ended by denying that “the Roman pontiff ought to reach an agreement with progress, liberalism, and modern civilization.”It was a hunker down and rally round an infallible pope mentality that aimed to enter a kind of spiritual hibernation, only emerging when Modernity had impaled itself on its own deadly horns and bled to death.Pius saw the need for a new universal council to address the Church's posture toward Modernity and its philosophical partner, Liberalism. He began planning for it in 1865 and called the First Vatican Council to convene at the end of 1869.The question of the definition of papal infallibility was all the buzz. Catholics had little doubt that as the successor of Peter the Pope possessed special authority. The only question was how far that authority went. Could it be exercised independently from councils or the college of bishops?After some discussion and politicking, 55 bishops who couldn't agree to the doctrine as stated were given permission by the Pope to leave Rome, so as not to create dissension. The final vote was 533 for the doctrine of infallibility. Only 2 voted against it. The Council asserted 2 fundamentals: 1) The primacy of the pope and 2) His infallibility.First, as the successor of Peter, vicar of Christ, and supreme head of the Church, the pope exercises full authority over the whole Church and over individual bishops. That authority extends to all matters of faith and morals as well as to discipline and church administration. Consequently, bishops owe the pope obedience.Second, when the pope in his official capacity, that is ex cathedra, makes a final decision concerning the entire Church in a matter of faith and morals, that decision is infallible and immutable and does not require the consent of a Council.The strategy of the ultramontanists, led by Pius IX, shaped the lives of Roman Catholics for generations. Surrounded by the hostile forces of modernity; liberalism and socialism, Rome withdrew behind the walls of an infallible papacy.

In this lecture, Dr. Totten argues the Vietnam War was a result of Cold War logic, where the U.S. government misinterpreted decolonization movements as communist threats. There was a brief moment where the U.S. could have supported Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese against French colonization, but since NATO needed French support, the U.S. was forced to back the French. This would later lead to Deja Vu, as the French experience in Vietnam would mirror the American experience the following decade. With French defeat, the US supported the corrupt South Vietnamese regime, which was highly incompetent and oppressive. Inside South Vietnam, a civil war emerged between the National Liberation Front, also called the Viet Cong, and the Army of South Vietnam, called ARVN. At first, ARVN was effective, since it was dependent on American weapons and advisors. With equipment support from the Soviets and Chinese, the NLF beat back ARVN and controlled most of the countryside. Due to the repression of the Diem regime, widespread protests engulfed the country. This resulted in an American supported coup to remove Diem. Unfortunately, his successors were equally corrupt but not as effective, which led successive governments to rise and fall in quick succession.American involvement in Vietnam increased after the false report of an attack on the USS Maddox and USS Turner Joy, which gave LBJ the cover he needed to expand the war. American troops flooded into the country, which resulted in North Vietnamese troops coming South to work with the NLF to overturn the government. Combat in Vietnam was brutal and American troops suffered greatly. Civilians were also caught in the crossfire, and tens of thousands were killed, due to military commanders' obsession with body count as a measure of effectiveness. In the end, LBJ was brought down by the war, and Nixon committed treason to win an election and continue the war for another five years, when it could have ended in 1968. Nixon began the gradual withdraw of American troops, but not before invading Cambodia, which destabilized the country and directly led to the Cambodian genocide under Pol Pot. Peace in Vietnam finally occurred in 1973, and South Vietnam was conquered a two years later. The legacy of the Vietnam war is tragic. American servicemen were disrespected when they came home. The people no longer trusted the government because of their lies about the war. Americans attempted to avoid large scale foreign intervention until the First Iraq War of 1991. Finally, tens of thousands of Americans and millions of Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians were killed as a result of the war. Many refugees escaped these countries and came to settle in the U.S., where they are valued members of society.Support this podcast at — https://redcircle.com/history-of-the-american-people-since-1877/donations