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Last time we spoke about the beginning of the battle of lake Khasan. On a frost-bitten dawn by the Chaun and Tumen, two empires, Soviet and Japanese, stared at Changkufeng, each certain the ridge would decide their fate. Diplomats urged restraint, but Tokyo's generals plotted a bold gamble: seize the hill with a surprise strike and bargain afterward. In the Japanese camp, a flurry of trains, orders, and plans moved in the night. Officers like Sato and Suetaka debated danger and responsibility, balancing "dokudan senko", independent action with disciplined restraint. As rain hammered the earth, they contemplated a night assault: cross the Tumen, occupy Hill 52, and strike Changkufeng with coordinated dawn and night attacks. Engineers, artillery, and infantry rehearsed their movements in near-poetic precision, while the 19th Engineers stitched crossings and bridges into a fragile path forward. Across the river, Soviet scouts and border guards held their nerve, counting enemy shadows and watching for a break in the line. The clash at Shachaofeng became a lightning rod: a small force crossed into Manchurian soil in the restless dark, provoking a broader crisis just as diplomacy teetered.   #179 From Darkness to Crest: The Changkufeng Battle Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. As remarked in the 19th division's war journal "With sunset on the 30th, the numbers of enemy soldiers increased steadily. Many motor vehicles, and even tanks, appear to have moved up. The whole front has become tense. Hostile patrols came across the border frequently, even in front of Chiangchunfeng. Tank-supported infantry units were apparently performing offensive deployment on the high ground south of Shachaofeng." Situation maps from the evening indicated Soviet patrol activity approaching the staging area of Nakano's unit near the Tumen, moving toward Noguchi's company to the left of Chiangchunfeng, and advancing toward Matsunobe's unit southwest of Shachaofeng. Russian vessels were depicted ferrying across Khasan, directly behind Changkufeng, while tanks moved south from Shachaofeng along the western shores of the lake. The 19th division's war journal states "Then it was ascertained that these attack forces had gone into action. All of our own units quietly commenced counteraction from late that night, as scheduled, after having systematically completed preparations since nightfall." Meanwhile, to the north, the Hunchun garrison reinforced the border with a battalion and tightened security. All evidence supported the view that Suetaka "in concept" and Sato"(in tactics" played the main part in the night-attack planning and decisions. Sato was the only infantry regimental commander at the front on 30 July. One division staff officer went so far as to say that Suetaka alone exerted the major influence, that Sato merely worked out details, including the type of attack and the timing. Intertwined with the decision to attack Changkufeng was the choice of an infantry regiment. The 76th Regiment was responsible for the defense of the sector through its Border Garrison Unit; but the latter had no more than two companies to guard a 40-mile border extending almost to Hunchun, and Okido's regimental headquarters was 75 miles to the rear at Nanam. T. Sato's 73rd Regiment was also at Nanam, while Cho's 74th Regiment was stationed another 175 miles southwest at Hamhung. Thus, the regiment nearest to Changkufeng was K. Sato's 75th, 50 miles away at Hoeryong. Although Suetaka had had time to shuffle units if he desired, Sasai suggested that troop movements from Nanam could not be concealed; from Hoeryong they might be termed maneuvers. Suetaka undoubtedly had favorites in terms of units as well as chiefs. K. Sato had served longest as regimental commander, since October 1937; Okido's date of rank preceded K. Sato's, but Okido had not taken command until 1938. He and Cho were able enough, but they were unknown quantities; T. Sato and Cho were brand-new colonels.  Thus, K. Sato was best known to Suetaka and was familiar with the terrain. While he did not regard his regiment as the equal of units in the Kwantung Army or in the homeland, K. Sato's training program was progressing well and his men were rugged natives of Nagano and Tochigi prefectures. From the combat soldier's standpoint, the Changkufeng Incident was waged between picked regulars on both sides. The matter of quantitative regimental strength could have played no part in Suetaka's choice. The 74th, 75th, and 76th regiments each possessed 1,500 men; the 73rd, 1,200. Even in ordinary times, every unit conducted night-attack training, attended by Suetaka, but there was nothing special in July, even after the general inspected the 75th Regiment on the 11th. It had been said that the most efficient battalions were selected for the action. Although, of course, Sato claimed that all of his battalions were good, from the outset he bore the 1st Battalion in mind for the night attack and had it reconnoiter the Changkufeng area. Some discerned no special reasons; it was probably a matter of numerical sequence, 1st-2nd-3rd Battalions. Others called the choice a happy coincidence because of the 1st Battalion's 'splendid unity' and the aggressive training conducted by Major Ichimoto, who had reluctantly departed recently for regimental headquarters. Coming from the 75th Regiment headquarters to take over the 1st Battalion was the 40-year-old aide Major Nakano. By all accounts, he was quiet, serious, and hard-working, a man of noble character, gentle and sincere. More the administrative than commander type, Nakano lacked experience in commanding battalions and never had sufficient time to get to know his new unit (or they, him) before the night assault. He could hardly be expected to have stressed anything particular in training. Since there was no battalion-level training, the most valid unit of comparison in the regiment was the company, the smallest infantry component trained and equipped to conduct combat missions independently. Sato valued combat experience among subordinates; Nakano's 1st Battalion was considered a veteran force by virtue of its old-timer company commanders. All but one had come up through the ranks; the exception, young Lieutenant Nakajima, the darling of Sato, was a military academy graduate. For assault actions synchronized with those of the 1st Battalion, Sato selected Ito, the one line captain commanding the 6th Company of the 2nd Battalion, and Takeshita, 10th Company commander, one of the two line captains of the 3rd Battalion. In short, Sato had designated five veteran captains and a promising lieutenant to conduct the night-attack operations of 30-31 July, the first Japanese experience of battle against the modern Red Army. During the last two weeks of July, numerous spurious farmers had gambled along the lower reaches of the Tumen, reconnoitered the terrain, and prepared for a crossing and assault. Scouts had operated on both the Manchurian and Korean sides of the river. Major Nakano had conducted frequent personal reconnaissance and had dispatched platoon and patrol leaders, all heavy-weapons observation teams, and even the battalion doctor to Sozan Hill, to Chiangchunfeng, and close to enemy positions. In Korean garb and often leading oxen, the scouts had threaded their way through the Changkufeng sector, sometimes holing up for the night to observe Soviet movements, soil and topography, and levels of illumination. From this data, Nakano had prepared reference materials necessary for an assault. Hirahara, then located at Kucheng BGU Headquarters, had established three observation posts on high ground to the rear. After Chiangchunfeng had been occupied, Hirahara had set up security positions and routes there. Regarding Changkufeng, he had sought to ensure that even the lowest private studied the layout. Formation commanders such as Takeshita had volunteered frequently. Sato had also utilized engineers. Since the order to leave his station on 17 July, Lieutenant Colonel Kobayashi had had his regiment engage in scouting routes, bridges, and potential fords. Sato's 1st Company commander had prepared a sketch during 3% hours of reconnaissance across from Hill 52 during the afternoon of 18 July. Captain Yamada's intelligence had contributed to the tactical decisions and to knowledge of Russian strength and preparations. The most important information had been his evaluation of attack approaches, suggesting an offensive from the western side, preferably against the right flank or frontally. This concept had been the one applied by the regiment in its night assault two weeks later; Yamada had died on the green slopes he had scanned. Cloudy Saturday, 30 July, had drawn to a close. The moment had been at hand for the 75th Regiment to storm the Russians atop Changkufeng. Setting out from Fangchuanting at 22:30, Nakano's battalion, about 350 strong, had assembled at a fork one kilometer southwest of Changkufeng. The roads had been knee-deep in mud due to intermittent rain and downpours on 29–30 July. Now the rain had subsided, but clouds had blotted out the sky after the waning moon had set at 22:30. Led by Sakata's 1st Platoon leader, the men had marched silently toward the southern foot of Changkufeng; the murk had deepened and the soldiers could see no more than ten meters ahead. It had taken Sakata's men less than an hour to push forward the last 1,000 meters to the jump-off point, where they had waited another two hours before X-hour arrived. Scouts had advanced toward the first row of wire, 200–300 meters away. Platoon Leader Amagasa had infiltrated the positions alone and had reconnoitered the southeastern side of the heights. Sakata had heard from the patrols about the entanglements and their distance and makeup. While awaiting paths to be cut by engineer teams, the infantry had moved up as far as possible, 150 meters from the enemy, by 23:30. Although records described Changkufeng as quite steep, it had not been hard to climb until the main Russian positions were reached, even though there were cliffs. But as the craggy peak had been neared, the enemy defenses, which had taken advantage of rocks and dips, could not have been rushed in a bound. It had been 500 meters to the crest from the gently sloping base. The incline near the top had been steep at about 40 degrees and studded with boulders. Farther down were more soil and gravel. Grass had carpeted the foot. Japanese Army radio communications had been in their infancy; wire as well as runners had served as the main means of linking regimental headquarters with the front-line infantry, crossing-point engineers, and supporting guns across the Tumen in Korea. From Chiangchunfeng to the 1st Battalion, lines had been installed from the morning of 29 July. Combat communications had been operated by the small regimental signal unit, 27 officers and men. In general, signal traffic had been smooth and reception was good. Engineer support had been rendered by one platoon, primarily to assist with wire-cutting operations. Nakano had ordered his 1st Company to complete clearing the wire by 02:00. At 23:30 the cutters had begun their work on the right with three teams under 1st Lieutenant Inagaki. Since the proposed breach had been far from the enemy positions and there were no outposts nearby, Inagaki had pressed the work of forced clearing. The first entanglements had been breached fairly quickly, then the second. At about midnight, a dim light had etched the darkness, signaling success. There had been two gaps on the right. On the left side, Sakata's company had hoped to pierce the barbed wire in secrecy rather than by forced clearing. Only one broad belt of entanglements, actually the first and third lines, had been reconnoitered along the south and southeastern slopes. Sakata had assigned one team of infantry, with a covering squad led by Master Sergeant Amagasa, to the engineer unit under 2nd Lieutenant Nagayama. Covert clearing of a pair of gaps had begun. The Russian stakes had been a meter apart and the teams cut at the center of each section, making breaches wide enough for a soldier to wriggle through. To the rear, the infantry had crouched expectantly, while from the direction of Khasan the rumble of Soviet armor could be heard. At 00:10, when the first line of wire had been penetrated and the cutters were moving forward, the silence had been broken by the furious barking of Russian sentry dogs, and pale blue flares had burst over the slopes. As recalled by an engineer "It had been as bright as day. If only fog would cover us or it would start to rain!" At the unanticipated second line, the advancing clearing elements had drawn gunfire and grenades. But the Russians had been taken by surprise, Sakata said, and their machine guns had been firing high. Two engineers had been wounded; the security patrol on the left flank may have drawn the fire. Sakata had crawled up to Lieutenant Nagayama's cutting teams. One party had been hiding behind a rock, with a man sticking out his hand, grasping for the stake and feeling for electrified wire. Another soldier lay nearby, ready to snip the wire. The enemy had seemed to have discerned the Japanese, for the lieutenant could hear low voices. Although the cutters had been told to continue clearing in secrecy, they had by now encountered a line of low barbed wire and the work had not progressed as expected. Forced clearing had begun, which meant that the men had to stand or kneel, ignoring hostile fire and devoting primary consideration to speed. The infantrymen, unable to delay, had crawled through the wire as soon as the cutters tore a gap. Ten meters behind the small breaches, as well as in front of the Soviet positions, the Japanese had been troubled by fine low strands. They had resembled piano-wire traps, a foot or so off the ground. The wires had been invisible in the grass at night. As one soldier recalled "You couldn't disengage easily. When you tried to get out, you'd be sniped at. The wires themselves could cut a bit, too." Sakata had kept up with the clearing teams and urged them on. On his own initiative, Amagasa had his men break the first and third lines of wire by 01:50. Meanwhile, at 01:20, Nakano had phoned Sato, reporting that his forces had broken through the lines with little resistance, and had recommended that the attack be launched earlier than 2:00. Perhaps the premature alerting of the Russians had entered into Nakano's considerations. Sato had explained matters carefully, that is, rejected the suggestion, saying Changkufeng must not be taken too early, lest the enemy at Shachaofeng be alerted. The entire battalion, redeployed, had been massed for the charge up the slope. In an interval of good visibility, the troops could see as far as 40 meters ahead. A little before 02:00, Nakano had sent runners to deliver the order to advance. When the final obstructions had been cut, Nagayama had flashed a light. Then a white flag had moved in the darkness and the infantry had moved forward. Sakata's company, heading directly for Changkufeng crest, had less ground to traverse than Yamada's, and the point through which they penetrated the wire had been at the fork, where there appeared to have been only two lines to cut. The soldiers had crawled on their knees and one hand and had taken cover as soon as they got through. It had been 02:15 when the battalion traversed the barbed wire and began the offensive. The Japanese Army manual had stated that unaimed fire was seldom effective at night and that it had been imperative to avoid confusion resulting from wild shooting. At Changkufeng, the use of firearms had been forbidden by regimental order. Until the troops had penetrated the wire, bayonets had not been fixed because of the danger to friendly forces. Once through the entanglements, the men had attached bayonets, but, although their rifles had been loaded, they still had not been allowed to fire. The men had been traveling light. Instead of the 65 pounds the individual rifleman might ordinarily carry, knapsack, weapons and ammunition, tools, supplies, and clothing, each helmeted soldier had only 60 cartridges, none on his back, a haversack containing two grenades, a canteen, and a gas mask. To prevent noise, the regulations had prescribed wrapping metal parts of bayonets, canteens, sabers, mess kits, shovels, picks, and hobnails with cloth or straw. The wooden and metal parts of the shovel had been separated, the canteen filled, ammunition pouches stuffed with paper, and the bayonet sheath wrapped with cloth. Instead of boots, the men had worn web-toed, rubbersoled ground socks to muffle sound. Although their footgear had been bound with straw ropes, the soldiers occasionally had slipped in the wet grass. Considerations of security had forbidden relief of tension by talking, coughing, or smoking. Company commanders and platoon leaders had carried small white flags for hand signaling. In Sakata's company, the platoons had been distinguished by white patches of cloth hung over the gas masks on the men's backs, triangular pieces for the 1st Platoon, square for the second. Squad leaders had worn white headbands under their helmets. The company commanders had strapped on a white cross-belt; the platoon leaders, a single band. Officer casualties had proven particularly severe because the identification belts had been too conspicuous; even when the officers had lay flat, Soviet illuminating shells had made their bodies visible. On the left, the 2nd Company, 70–80 strong, had moved up with platoons abreast and scouts ahead. About 10 meters had separated the individual platoons advancing in four files; in the center were Sakata and his command team. The same setup had been used for Yamada's company and his two infantry platoons on the right. To the center and rear of the lead companies were battalion headquarters, a platoon of Nakajima's 3rd Company, and the Kitahara Machine-Gun Company, 20 meters from Nakano. The machine-gun company had differed from the infantry companies in that it had three platoons of two squads each. The machine-gun platoons had gone through the center breach in the entanglements with the battalion commander. Thereafter, they had bunched up, shoulder to shoulder and with the machine guns close to each other. Kitahara had led, two platoons forward, one back. The night had been so dark that the individual soldiers had hardly been able to tell who had been leading and who had been on the flanks. The 2nd Company had consolidated after getting through the last entanglements and had walked straight for Changkufeng crest. From positions above the Japanese, Soviet machine guns covering the wire had blazed away at a range of 50 meters. Tracers had ripped the night, but the Russians' aim had seemed high. Soviet illuminating shells, by revealing the location of dead angles among the rocks, had facilitated the Japanese approach. Fifty meters past the barbed wire, Sakata had run into the second Soviet position. From behind a big rock, four or five soldiers had been throwing masher grenades. Sakata and his command team had dashed to the rear and cut down the Russians. The captain had sabered one soldier who had been about to throw a grenade. Then Master Sergeant Onuki and the others had rushed up and overran the Russian defenses. The Japanese had not yet fired or sustained casualties. There had been no machine guns in the first position Sakata had jumped into; the trenches had been two feet deep and masked by rocks. To the right, a tent could be seen. Blind enemy firing had reached a crescendo around 02:30. The Russians had resisted with rifles, light and heavy machine guns, hand grenades, rifle grenades, flares, rapid-fire guns, and a tank cannon. "The hill had shaken, but our assault unit had advanced, disregarding the heavy resistance and relying only on the bayonet." The battalion commander, Major Nakano, had been the first officer to be hit. Moving to the left of Sakata's right-hand platoon, he had rushed up, brandishing his sword, amid ear-splitting fire and day-like flashes. He had felled an enemy soldier and then another who had been about to get him from behind. But a grenade had exploded and he had dropped, with his right arm hanging grotesquely and many fragments embedded in his chest and left arm. After regaining consciousness, Nakano had yelled at soldiers rushing to help him: "You fools! Charge on! Never mind me." Staggering to his feet, he had leaned on his sword with his left hand and pushed up the slope after the assault waves, while "everybody had been dashing around like mad." Sakata had encountered progressive defenses and more severe fire. The main body of the company had lost contact with other elements after getting through the entanglements. Sakata had thought that he had already occupied an edge of Changkufeng, but about 30 meters ahead stood a sharp-faced boulder, two or three meters high, from which enormous numbers of grenades had been lobbed. The Japanese, still walking, had come across another Soviet position, manned by four or five grenadiers. Sword in hand, Sakata had led Sergeant Onuki and his command team in a rush : "The enemy was about to take off as we jumped them. One Russian jabbed the muzzle of his rifle into my stomach at the moment I had my sword raised overhead. He pulled the trigger but the rifle did not go off. I cut him down before he could get me. The others ran away, but behind them they left grenades with pins pulled. Many of my men fell here and I was hit in the thighs".  Onuki had felled two or three Russians behind Sakata, then disposed of an enemy who had been aiming at Sakata from the side. It had been around 03:00. On the right, the 1st Company had made relatively faster progress along the western slopes after having breached two widely separated belts of barbed wire. Once through the second wire, the troops had found a third line, 150 meters behind, and enemy machine guns had opened fire. Thereupon, a left-platoon private first class had taken a "do or die" forced clearing team, rushed 15 meters ahead of the infantry, and tore a path for the unit. At 03:00, Yamada had taken his men in a dash far up the right foot of the hill, overran the unexpected position, and captured two rapid-fire guns. The company's casualties had been mounting. Yamada had been hit in the chest but had continued to cheer his troops on. At 03:30, he had led a rush against the main objective, tents up the hill, behind the antitank guns. Yamada had cut down several bewildered soldiers in the tents, but had been shot again in the chest, gasping "Tenno Heika Banzai!" "Long Live the Emperor!", and had fallen dead. His citation had noted that he had "disrupted the enemy's rear after capturing the forwardmost positions and thus furnished the key to the ultimate rout of the whole enemy line." Sergeant Shioda, though wounded badly, and several of the men had picked up their commander's body and moved over to join Lieutenant Inagaki. On the left, Kadowaki had charged into the tents with his platoon and had played his part in interfering with the Russian rear. After this rush, the unit had been pinned down by fire from machine-gun emplacements, and Kadowaki had been wounded seriously. His platoon had veered left while watching for an opportunity to charge. Eventual contact had been made with Sakata's company.   The assault on the right flank had been failing. With the death of Yamada, command of the company had been assumed temporarily by Inagaki. He and his right-flank platoon had managed to smash their way through the entanglements; Inagaki had sought to rush forward, sword in hand. Furious firing by Soviet machine guns, coupled with hand grenades, had checked the charge. Losses had mounted. Still another effort had bogged down in the face of enemy reinforcements, supported not only by covered but by tank-mounted machine guns. Russian tanks and trucks had appeared to be operating behind Changkufeng. Sergeant Shioda had been trying to keep the attack moving. Again and again, he had pushed toward the Soviet position with five of his surviving men, to no avail. The left-flank platoon had sought to evade the fierce fire by taking advantage of rock cover and hurling grenades. Finally, a private first class had lobbed in a grenade, rushed the machine gun, and silenced the weapon. By now, precious time and lives had been lost. Either instinctively or by order, the 1st Company had been shifting to the left, away from the core of the enemy fire-net. Inagaki had decided to veer left in a wide arc to outflank Changkufeng from the same side where the 2nd Company and most of the battalion were at-tacking. There would be no further attempts to plunge between the lake and the heights or to head for the crest from the rear. Military maps had indicated tersely that remnants of the 1st Company had displaced to the 2nd Company area at 04:00, sometime after the last charge on the right by Yamada. On the left front, in the sector facing the main defenses on Changkufeng crest, Sakata had fallen after being hit by a grenade. A machine gunner had improvised a sling. "I had lost a lot of blood," Sakata had said, "and there were no medics. Onuki, my command team chief who had been acting platoon leader, had been killed around here. I had ordered Warrant Officer Kuriyama to take the company and push on until I could catch up." As Sakata lay on the ground, he had seen the battalion commander and the Nakajima company move past him in the darkness. Nakano had said not a word; Sakata had not known the major had been maimed. "I still hadn't felt intense pain," Sakata had recalled. "I had rested after the first bad feelings. In about 15 minutes I had felt well enough to move up the hill and resume command of my company." With both Nakano and Sakata wounded, individual officers or noncoms had kept the assault moving. The 1st Platoon leader, Kuriyama, had been securing the first position after overrunning it but had become worried about the main force. On his own initiative, he had brought his men up the hill to join the rest of the company, while the battalion aide, 2nd Lieutenant Nishimura, had made arrangements to deploy the heavy machine guns and reserve infantry in support. Before 4 A.M., these troops under Kitahara and Nakajima had caught up with the remnants of the 2nd Company, which had pressed beyond the third position to points near the Soviet Crestline.   By the time Sakata had regained his feet and moved toward the peak, somewhere between 03:30 and 04:00, the Japanese had been pinned down. Most of the losses had been incurred at this point. "Iron fragments, rock, sand, blood, and flesh had been flying around," Akaishizawa had written. Grenades had caused the preponderance of wounds after the men had penetrated the barbed wire. Deaths had been inflicted mainly by the Soviet "hurricane" of small arms and machine-gun fire and by ricochets ripping from man to man. Six Russian heavy weapons had kept up a relentless fire from three emplacements, and milk-bottle-shaped grenades had continued to thud down on the Japanese. The grenades had hindered the advance greatly. Mainly at the crest, but at every firing position as well, the Russians had used rifle grenades, primarily to eliminate dead angles in front of positions. There had been low piano wire between firing points, and yellow explosive had been planted amidst rock outcroppings and in front of the emplacements. "The Russians had relied exclusively on fire power; there had been no instance of a brave enemy charge employing cold steel." Only 20 meters from the entrenchments atop Changkufeng, Kitahara had been striving to regain the initiative and to hearten the scattered, reeling troops. One Japanese Army motto had concerned the mental attitude of commanders: "When surprised by the enemy, pause for a smoke." Kitahara had stood behind a rock, without a helmet, puffing calmly on a cigarette—a sight which had cheered the men. Sakata could not forget the scene. "It really happened," he had said, respectfully. As soon as Sakata had reached the forward lines, he had joined Kitahara (the senior officer and de facto battalion commander till then) and three enlisted men. All had been pinned behind the large boulder, the only possible cover, which had jutted in front of the Soviet crestline positions. Fire and flame had drenched the slopes, grenades from the peak, machine guns from the flank. The eastern skies had been brightening and faces could be discerned. Troubled by the stalemate yet not feeling failure, Sakata had said nothing about his own wounds but had told Kitahara he would lead his 2nd Company in a last charge up the left side of Changkufeng if only the machine gun company could do something about the enemy fire, especially some Soviet tanks which had been shooting from the right. "The enemy must have learned by now," the regimental records had observed, "that our forces were scanty, for the Soviets exposed the upper portions of their bodies over the breastworks, sniped incessantly, and lobbed illuminating shells at us." Agreeing with Sakata that the "blind" Japanese would have to take some kind of countermeasure to allow his two available heavy machine guns to go into concerted action, Kitahara had ordered illuminating rounds fired by the grenade dischargers. He had clambered atop the boulder and squatted there amidst the furious crossfire to spot for his guns, still only 20 meters from the Russian lines. Perhaps it had been the golden spark of Kitahara's cigarette, perhaps it had been the luminescence of his cross-bands, but hardly a moment later, at 04:03 am, a sniper's bullet had caught the captain between the eyes and he had toppled to his death. Nakajima had wanted to support Sakata's stricken company as well. The lieutenant had seen the advantage of outflanking the emplacements from the far left of Changkufeng where the fire of two Soviet heavy machine guns had been particularly devastating. Nakajima had swung his reserve unit around the crest to the southwest side, pressed forward through deadly grenade attacks, and had managed to reach a point ten meters from the Russian positions. Perched on the cliff's edge, he had prepared to continue: "Nakajima, who had been calming his men and looking for a chance to advance, leaped up and shouted, "Right now! Charge!" Sword in hand, he led his forces to the front on the left and edged up against the crest emplacements. But the enemy did not recoil; grenades and machine gun fusillades burst from above on all sides. Men fell, one after another. [During this final phase, a platoon leader and most of the key noncoms were killed.] A runner standing near Nakajima was hit in the head by a grenade and collapsed. Nakajima picked up the soldier's rifle, took cover behind a boulder, and tried to draw a bead on a Russian sniper whom he could see dimly 20 meters away through the lifting mist. But a bullet hit him in the left temple and he pitched forward, weakly calling, "Long Live the Emperor!" A PFC held the lieutenant up and pleaded with him to hang on, but the company commander's breath grew fainter and his end was at hand. The time was 4:10 am". Nakajima's orderly said of the event "Lieutenant Nakajima charged against the highest key point on Changkufeng, leading the reserve unit, and ensured the seizure of the hill. The lieutenant was wearing the boots which I had always kept polished but which he had never worn till this day." Akaishizawa added that Nakajima had purified himself in the waters of the Tumen before entering combat, in traditional fashion. Lieutenant Yanagihara had penned a tribute to his young fellow officer, the resolute samurai "Lt. Nakajima must have been expecting a day like today. He was wearing brand-new white underclothes and had wrapped his body with white cloth and the thousand-stitch stomach band which his mother had made for him. .. . Was not the lieutenant's end the same as we find in an old tanka verse? "Should you ask what is the Yamato spirit, the soul of Japan: It is wild cherry blossoms glowing in the rising sun."  On this main attack front, Soviet heavy machine guns and tanks had continued to deliver withering fire against the Japanese remnants, while Russian snipers and grenadiers had taken an increasing toll. Shortly after 04:00, enemy reinforcements had appeared at the northeast edge. Of the company commanders, only Sakata had still been alive; the other three officers had died between 03:30 and 04:30. A machine gunner who had been pinned down near the crest had commented: "It must have been worse than Hill 203" (of bloody Russo-Japanese War fame). Between a half and two-thirds of each company had been dead or wounded by then. Sakata had still been thinking of ways to rush the main positions. After Kitahara had been shot down, he had moved around to investigate. A colleague had added: "The agony of the captain's wounds had been increasing. He rested several times to appease the pain while watching intently for some chance to charge once more." Now, Sakata had been wounded again by grenade fragments tearing into the right side of his face. "It hadn't been serious," Sakata had insisted. As he had limped about, he could see his platoon leader, Kuriyama, sniping at a Russian grenadier.   Much would depend on the effectiveness of supporting firepower. With the death of Kitahara, control of the machine-gun company had been assumed by Master Sergeant Harayama. There had been almost no time to coordinate matters before Kitahara had fallen, but Harayama as well as Sakata had known that the infantry could not break loose until the Soviet heavy weapons had been suppressed. Working with another sergeant, Harayama had ordered his gunners to displace forward and rush the positions 20 meters away. The one heavy machine gun set up for action had been the first to fire for the Japanese side at Changkufeng, after its crew had manhandled it the last few meters to the first Soviet trench below the crest. The trench had been empty. Thereupon, the gunner had opened up against tents which could be seen 20 meters to the rear. Other friendly machine guns had begun to chatter. Kuriyama had dashed up and secured the southeast edge of the heights. Enemy resistance had begun to slacken. What appeared to be two small Soviet tanks, actually a tank and a tractor had been laying down fire near the tents in an apparent effort to cover a pullback. The two vehicles had advanced toward the Japanese and sought to neutralize the heavy machine guns. A squad leader had engaged the tractor, set it afire, and shot down the crewmen when they had tried to flee. Next, the tank had been stopped. The Japanese lead gun had consumed all of its armor-piercing (AP) ammunition—three clips, or 90 rounds—in 10 or 15 seconds. No more AP ammunition had been available; one box had been with the last of the six squads struggling up the heights. "More AP!" had yelled the 1st Squad leader, signaling with his hand—which had at that moment been hit by a Russian slug. A tank machine-gun bullet had also torn through the thumb and into the shoulder of the squad's machine gunner, whereupon the 21-year-old loader had taken over the piece. Similar replacements had occurred under fire in all squads, sometimes more than once in the same unit. "It had been a fantastic scene," Sakata had commented. "Just like grasshoppers! But they had finally neutralized the heavy weapons." The knocked-out Russian vehicles had begun to blaze while the eastern skies had lightened. New enemy tanks (some said many, others merely three) had lumbered up the slopes, but the Japanese heavy machine guns had continued to fire on them, and the tanks had stopped. If the machine guns had gone into action minutes later, the Russian armor might have continued to the top, from which they could have ripped up the surviving Japanese infantrymen: "So we gunners fired and fired. I could see my tracers bouncing off the armor, for there was still no AP. We also shot at machine guns and infantry. Since we carried little ammo for the night attack, my gun ran out, but by then the enemy had been ousted. We had originally expected that we might have to fire in support of the infantry after they took the crest. We lost none of our own heavy machine guns that night, overran four Maxims and captured mountains of hand grenades. By dawn, however, our machine gun company had lost more than half of its personnel—about 40 men".  The light-machine-gun squad leader had been wounded in the hand by a grenade near the site where Sakata had been hit. Nevertheless, the superior private had clambered up the slope with his men. After 04:00, when he and his squad had been pinned down with the infantry below the crest, he had heard Japanese heavy machine guns firing toward the foe on the right: "Our units were in confusion, bunched up under terrific fire in a small area. Getting orders was impossible, so I had my light machine gun open up in the same direction at which the heavies were firing. We could identify no targets but tried to neutralize the enemy located somewhere on the crest. Although Soviet flares were going off, we never could glimpse the enemy clearly. But we heard the Russians yelling "Hurrah!" That ought to have been the signal for a charge; here it meant a retreat".  But, of the ten men in this Japanese machine-gun squad, only four had been in action when dawn had come. The turning point had arrived when the machine-guns belonging to Sakata, and the reserves of the late Nakajima, had torn into the Russian emplacements, tanks, and tents behind. Others had said the key had been the fire of grenade dischargers belonging to the same units. A high-angle weapon, the grenade discharger, had been light, effective, and ideal for getting at dead space. In terms of ammunition, it had been especially useful, for it could fire hand grenades available to the foot soldier. Undoubtedly, the combined action of the grenade dischargers and machine guns (heavy and light) had paved the way for a last charge by the infantry. The four light machine guns of the 2nd and 4th companies had played their part by pouring flank fire against the Russians, who had clung to the position although Kuriyama's platoon had made an initial penetration. At about 04:30, Japanese assault forces could be seen dimly, in the light of dawn, exchanging fire with the Russians only a few meters away on the southern edge of Changkufeng Hill. At the same time, on the northern slopes, enemy reinforcements numbering 50 men with trucks and tanks had been scaling the hill. Around 04:45, Japanese grenades began to burst over the heads of the last enemy atop Changkufeng; the Russians had wavered. After the heavy weapons had finally begun to soften up the Soviet positions, Sakata had judged that there were not many Russians left. He had jumped into the first trench, ahead of his only surviving platoon leader, Kuriyama, and several soldiers. Two or three Russians had been disposed of; the rest had fled. By then the 2nd Company had been chopped down to a platoon; about 40 men still lived. There had been no cheer of banzai, as journalists had written; it would have drawn fire to stand up and raise one's arms. But Sakata had remained proud of the assertion by Sato that, from Chiangchunfeng, he had observed the last rush and knew the "real story," that "Sakata was the first to charge the peak." The regimental eulogist had written that Sakata's earnestness "cut through iron, penetrated mountains, and conquered bodily pain." As for Inagaki, about 15 or 20 minutes after the badly wounded Sakata had managed to reach the point where Kitahara and Nakajima had been pinned down near the Crestline, the lieutenant had arrived with the remnants of Yamada's company, probably by 04:20. The records would have us believe that Sakata had been able to coordinate the next actions with Inagaki despite the storm of fire: "The acting battalion commander [Sakata] resumed the charge with a brand-new deployment—his 2nd Company on the right wing and the 1st Company on the left." Actually, all Sakata could think of had been to charge; it had been too confused a time to issue anything like normal orders as acting battalion commander: "About all I remember asking Inagaki was: "What are you doing over here? What happened to your company commander?" I think he told me that Yamada had been killed and resistance on the right flank had been severe. Undoubtedly, he acted on his own initiative in redeploying. Nor was there any particular liaison between my company and Inagaki's force." To the left of Sakata's survivors were the vestiges of Nakajima's platoon, and further to the left, the outflanking troops brought up by Inagaki. These forces gradually edged up to the rear of the foe, in almost mass formation, on the western slope just below the top. "The enemy soldiers who had been climbing up the northern incline suddenly began to retreat, and Inagaki led a charge, fighting dauntlessly hand-to-hand." As a result of the more or less concerted Japanese assaults, "the desperately resisting enemy was finally crushed and Changkufeng peak was retaken completely by 05:15," three hours after the night attackers had jumped off. Akaishizawa had said that the troops "pushed across the peak through a river of blood and a mountain of corpses. Who could withstand our demons?" Sato's regimental attack order had called for the firing of a green star shell to signal success. At 05:15, according to the records, "the signal flared high above Changkufeng, showering green light upon the hill; the deeply stirring Japanese national flag floated on the top." Sakata thought that this must have been 10 or 20 minutes after the hill was taken, but he remembered no flare. "After the last charge I had no time to watch the sky!" The flare had probably been fired from a grenade launcher by the battalion aide or a headquarters soldier. After the final close-quarter fighting, Sakata had pressed forward while the survivors came up. The captain had deployed his men against possible counterattack. Later he had heard that Soviet tanks had lumbered up to reinforce the peak or to counterattack but that, when they observed the Japanese in possession of the crest, they had turned back. Only after his men had secured the peak had Sakata talked to Inagaki about sharing defensive responsibility. The records described Sakata's deployments at 05:20, but there had been painfully few men to match the tidy after-action maps. Did Sakata and his men push across the peak? "Not downhill a bit," he had answered. "We advanced only to the highest spot, the second, or right-hand peak, where we could command a view of the hostile slope." He had merely reconnoitered to deploy his troops. The senior surviving Japanese officer atop Changkufeng heights had been Sakata. What had happened to Major Nakano, who had been wounded shortly after jump-off? Although his right arm had been shattered, he had dragged himself to his feet, once he had regained consciousness, and kept climbing to catch up. His men had pleaded with him to look after his terrible wounds, but he had insisted on advancing, leaning on his sword and relying on spiritual strength. "Left! Move left!" he had been heard to shout, for the faltering Japanese had apparently been of the opinion that they were at the enemy's rear. Instead, they had pressed against the Russians' western wing, directly in front of the enemy works, from which murderous fire had been directed, especially from machine-gun nests ripping at their flanks. With sword brandished in his uninjured hand, high above his head, Nakano had stood at the corner of the positions. The explosion of an enemy grenade had illuminated him "like the god of fire," and he had been seen to crumple. He had died a little before 0500, to the left of where young Nakajima had fallen at 0430. His citation had said: "The battalion commander captured Changkufeng, thanks to his proper combat guidance and deployments. He provided the incentive to victory in the Changkufeng Incident." A eulogist had called Nakano a "human-bullet demon-unit commander": "All who observed this scene were amazed, for it was beyond mortal strength. One could see how high blazed the flame of his faith in certain victory and what a powerful sense of responsibility he had as unit commander. Major Nakano was a model soldier." When Nakano had pitched forward, badly wounded PFC Imamura had tried to protect the commander's corpse. Imamura had killed a soldier who appeared from behind a boulder, had lunged at another two or three, but had toppled off the cliff. Two other Japanese privates—a battalion runner and PFC Iwata—had been lying nearby, hurt seriously; but when they saw Imamura fall to his death, leaving the major's body undefended, they had dragged themselves to the corpse, four meters from the foe. Iwata, crippled and mute, had hugged Nakano's corpse until other soldiers managed to retrieve it. While death had come to Nakano, Sakata had been fighting with no knowledge of what was going on to his left. Pinned behind a boulder, he had had no way of checking on the battalion commander. Only after Sakata had charged onto the crest and asked for the major had he been told by somebody that Nakano had been killed. He had not even been sure where the commander had fallen. Such had been the time of blood and fury when battalion chief, company commanders, and platoon leaders had fought and died like common soldiers, pressing on with saber or pistol or sniping rifle under relentless cross-fire. Pretty patterns of textbook control had meant nothing. Life—and victory—depended on training, initiative, raw courage, and the will to win. The result of this combination of wills could not be ascertained, on 31 July 1938, until dawn brightened the bleeding earth on Changkufeng Hill. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Tokyo gambled on a night strike to seize Changkufeng, while diplomacy urged restraint. Amid mud, smoke, and moonless skies, Nakano led the 1st Battalion, supported by Nakajima, Sakata, Yamada, and others. One by one, officers fell, wounds multiplying, but resolve held. By 05:15, shattered units regrouped atop the peak, the flag rising as dawn bled into a costly, hard-won victory.

Picture this: the gods have come and gone, dynasties have risen and face-planted, cities have popped up and crumbled, tourists have come, posed, and posted a million thirst traps on Instagram… but the Sphinx is still just sitting there like, “Yeah, I'll wait.”Today we're heading to Giza to talk about the world's most famous stone cat with a people head: the Great Sphinx of Egypt. It's massive, it's mysterious, it's eroding faster than our faith in humanity, and it sits at the crossroads of legit science, wild speculation, and whatever the hell Edgar Cayce was doing.We're going to walk through what the Sphinx actually is, what we think we know about its history, how old it might be, why people keep insisting there's a secret Atlantean library under its paws, what modern tech like ground-penetrating radar and fancy satellite scans are actually showing under the Giza plateau, and why so many folks see Dr. Zahi Hawass as the final boss of “Nothing To See Here, Move Along.”Strap on the sunscreen, adjust your tinfoil nemes, and get ready for Hysteria 51.Special thanks to this week's research sources:Main References Mentioned in the EpisodeLehner, Mark.The Complete Pyramids: Solving the Ancient Mysteries.London: Thames & Hudson, 1997.Hawass, Zahi.The Secrets of the Sphinx: Restoration Past and Present.Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1998.Jordan, Paul.Riddles of the Sphinx.New York: New York University Press, 1998.Gauri, K. Lal, John J. Sinai, and Jayanta K. Bandyopadhyay.“Geologic Weathering and Its Implications on the Age of the Sphinx.”Geoarchaeology 10, no. 2 (1995): 119–133.Schoch, Robert M.Voices of the Rocks: A Scientist Looks at Catastrophes and Ancient Civilizations.New York: Harmony Books, 1999.Reader, Colin.“A Geomorphological Study of the Giza Necropolis, with Implications for the Development of the Site.”Archaeometry 43, no. 1 (2001): 149–159.Sharafeldin, S. M., K. S. Essa, M. A. S. Youssef, H. Karsli, Z. E. Diab, and N. Sayil.“Shallow Geophysical Techniques to Investigate the Groundwater Table at the Great Pyramids of Giza, Egypt.”Geoscientific Instrumentation, Methods and Data Systems 8 (2019): 29–43.https://doi.org/10.5194/gi-8-29-2019Biondi, Filippo, and Corrado Malanga.“Synthetic Aperture Radar Doppler Tomography Reveals Details of Undiscovered High-Resolution Internal Structure of the Great Pyramid of Giza.”Remote Sensing 14, no. 20 (2022): 5231.https://doi.org/10.3390/rs14205231Hancock, Graham, and Robert Bauval.The Message of the Sphinx: A Quest for the Hidden Legacy of Mankind.New York: Crown, 1996.Cayce, Edgar Evans, and Edgar Cayce.Edgar Cayce on Atlantis.New York: Hawthorn Books, 1968.Geology, Weathering & Age of the SphinxGauri, K. Lal.“Geologic Study of the Sphinx.”Newsletter of the American Research Center in Egypt 127 (1984): 24–43.Gauri, K. Lal.“Geologic Features and the Durability of Limestone at the Sphinx.”Environmental Geology and Water Science 16 (1990): 57–62.Chowdhury, A. N., A. R. Punuru, and K. L. Gauri.“Weathering of Limestone Beds at the Great Sphinx.”Environmental Geology and Water Science 15 (1990): 217–223.Harrell, James A.“The Sphinx Controversy: Another Look at the Geological Evidence.”KMT: A Modern Journal of Ancient Egypt 5, no. 3 (1994): 70–74.Matthusen, August.“A Rebuttal to Robert Schoch on the Weathering of the Great Sphinx.”(Online article, catchpenny.org, c. 1999.)Harrell, James A.“Comments on the Geological Evidence for the Sphinx's Age.”(Online article, Hall of Ma'at, 2000s.)Liritzis, Ioannis, and Asimina Vafiadou.“Surface Luminescence Dating of Some Egyptian Monuments.”Journal of Cultural Heritage 16, no. 2 (2015): 134–150.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.culher.2014.05.007Geophysics, Groundwater & Subsurface ScansSharafeldin, S. M., et al.“Shallow Geophysical Techniques to Investigate the Groundwater Table at the Great Pyramids of Giza, Egypt.”Geoscientific Instrumentation, Methods and Data Systems 8 (2019): 29–43.Sato, Motoyuki, et al.“GPR and ERT Exploration in the Western Cemetery in Giza, Egypt.”Archaeological Prospection (2024).(Ground-penetrating radar and electrical resistivity tomography survey west of the pyramids.)Biondi, Filippo, and Corrado Malanga.“Synthetic Aperture Radar Doppler Tomography…” (as above).(Satellite SAR micro-motion tomography on Khufu's pyramid.)Lehner, Mark.“ARCE Sphinx Project 1979–1983 Archive.”American Research Center in Egypt / OpenContext.(Field notes and geological collaboration with K. Lal Gauri and T. Aigner.)Alternative Chronologies, Orion / Leo & “As Above, So Below”West, John Anthony.Serpent in the Sky: The High Wisdom of Ancient Egypt.Wheaton, IL: Quest Books, 1993 (rev. ed.).Schoch, Robert M., and Robert Bauval.Origins of the Sphinx: Celestial Guardian of Pre-Pharaonic Civilization.Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions, 2017.Bauval, Robert, and Adrian Gilbert.The Orion Mystery: Unlocking the Secrets of the Pyramids.New York: Crown, 1994.Hancock, Graham, and Robert Bauval.The Message of the Sphinx (as above).Esoteric, Hall of Records & Atlantis MaterialCayce, Edgar Evans, and Edgar Cayce.Edgar Cayce on Atlantis.New York: Hawthorn Books, 1968.Todeschi, Kevin J.Edgar Cayce on the Akashic Records: The Book of Life.Virginia Beach: A.R.E. Press, 1998.Todeschi, Kevin J.Edgar Cayce's Atlantis.Charlottesville, VA: 4th Dimension Press, 2014.Blavatsky, Helena P.The Secret Doctrine: The Synthesis of Science, Religion, and Philosophy.London: Theosophical Publishing Company, 1888.Lewis, Harvey Spencer.Rosicrucian monographs and AMORC publications on hidden chambers at Giza (early 20th century).Zahi Hawass, Antiquities Politics & ControversiesHawass, Zahi.The Secrets of the Sphinx (as above).Murphy, Kim.“Getty Institute Probes Riddle of the Deteriorating Sphinx.”Los Angeles Times, May 16, 1990.Borger, Julian.“The Fall of Zahi Hawass.”Smithsonian Magazine, July 17, 2011.“Zahi Hawass Fired.”The History Blog, July 18, 2011.“History Catches Up to Famous Egyptologist Zahi Hawass.”The World (PRI), August 1, 2016.Egyptomania & Cultural ContextFritze, Ronald H.Egyptomania: A History of Fascination, Obsession and Fantasy.London: Reaktion Books, 2016.Email us your favorite WEIRD news stories:weird@hysteria51.comSupport the ShowGet exclusive content & perks as well as an ad and sponsor free experience at https://www.patreon.com/Hysteria51 from just $1ShopBe the Best Dressed at your Cult Meeting!https://www.teepublic.com/stores/hysteria51?ref_id=9022See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

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Last time we spoke about the beginning of a conflict between the USSR and Japan. In the frost-hardened dawns by the Chaun and Tumen, two powers eye a ridge called Changkufeng, each seeing a prize and fearing a trap. On the Soviet side, weary front-line troops tighten their grip, while Moscow's diplomats coaxed restraint through Seoul and Harbin.  As July unfolds, Tokyo's generals push a dangerous idea: seize the hill with a surprise strike, then bargain for peace. Seoul's 19th Division is readied in secret, trains loaded with men and horses, movement masked, prayers whispered to avoid widening the rift. Japanese scouts in white Hanbok disguise, peering at trenches, wire, and watchful Russians. Russian border guards appear as shadows, counters slipping into place, yet both sides hold their fire. On July 29, a skirmish erupts: a platoon crosses a shallow line, clashes flare, and bodies and banners ripple in the cold air.    #178 Night Attacks and Diplomatic Strains: The Lake Khasan Conflict Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. A second troop train was scheduled to depart Agochi for Nanam on the night of 29 July, carrying back the initial elements of the 75th Infantry. At Haigan, regimental commander Sato was pulling on his boots at 16:00 when the division informed him that fighting had broken out near Shachaofeng since 15:00 and that the Russians were assembling forces in that area. Suetaka ordered Sato's 3rd Battalion, which had not been slated to leave until the following night, to proceed to Kucheng; the remainder of the regiment was to assemble at Agochi. After consulting with Division Staff Officer Saito at Agochi, Sato returned to Haigan with the conclusion that "overall developments did not warrant optimism, it was imperative to prepare to move the entire regiment to the battlefield." One of Sato's first actions was to telephone a recommendation to the division that he be allowed to occupy Hill 52, which commanded the approaches to Changkufeng from south of Khasan. Suetaka approved, and at 17:30, Yamada's company was ordered to proceed to Shikai along with Hirahara's battalion. Meanwhile, Suzuki's 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment, which had been among the last units ordered to leave, had finished loading at Agochi by about 15:00. Sato recommended to Suetaka that a portion of Suzuki's regiment be attached to him; this was why Suetaka decided to transfer one of the two batteries to the 75th Infantry. The rest of the heavy artillery concentrated at Kyonghun. Suetaka's orders, issued at 18:20, called for Sato to have two of his battalions, the 1st and 3rd, cross the Tumen as soon as possible, with engineer support. Attached was Narukawa's heavy battery. Sato's mission was twofold: to assist Senda and to watch the enemy in the Changkufeng area. Sato arrived at 21:15 in Shikai. There, he assembled a number of his officers, including Yamada, and explained his plan: the 1st Company plus machine guns were to cross the Tumen from Sozan ahead of the other units, occupy Hill 52 with an element, and concentrate the main body at the foot of Fangchuanting to await Hirahara's battalion. A portion of the 19th Engineers would go to Sozan to assist the 1st Company with its river crossing. Amid heavy rain and darkness, the various units set out at 22:15. The platoon sent to Hill 52 arrived before dawn on the 30th, the rest of the forces somewhat later, though Sato had intended to move everybody across the river by the early hours. On the 29th the engineer regiment commander, Kobayashi, had also arrived at Shikai. He ordered Captain Tomura to handle the crossing in the vicinity of Sozan, as well as preparations for a future offensive with the main body. When Kobayashi reached Kucheng, he learned from Hirahara not only about the front-line situation but also about Sato's important plans: "The K. Sato force is going to cross the river tonight, 29–30 July. A night attack will be launched against Changkufeng on the night of 30–31 July." Kobayashi issued orders to his two commanders to assist the crossing by Nakano's infantry unit, 1st Battalion, 75th Regiment at Matsu'otsuho and Sozan, and, in addition, to cooperate with the position attack by Nakano and help in the assault at Hill 52. Most of these young officers, such as Seutaka dishing out orders were performing what the Japanese termed "dokudan senko" or "arbitrary or independent action". Japanese operational regulations actually contained a section dealing with dokudan senko, by which initiative, not imperiousness, was meant. Two elements were involved: control but encouragement of self-reliant thinking. This subject became important in training officers, all of whom, including such infantry experts as Suetaka, were well acquainted with the requirements. Combat missions were stipulated in operations orders, but, if these were not realistic, initiative was to come into play, though only when there was no time to contact superiors. By the same token, commanders had to be ready to assume full responsibility if matters turned out adversely. "We were disciples of the 'Moltke' system of AGS control, with dual authority vis-à-vis the local forces and the chief of staff."  The Korea Army's version of events on 29 July, there was no mention of any report received from the division prior to 17:30. Details did not reach Seoul, in the form of printed divisional intelligence reports and operational orders, until 1 August. The late afternoon report from Kyonghun provided the Korea Army authorities with little solid information, but Seoul had to notify higher headquarters immediately. Kitano sent messages to Tokyo and Hsinking at 19:15. The command and Kwantung Army were told that, in addition to Senda's assault party, 40 Japanese soldiers were deployed west of Changkufeng and at Yangkuanping. The division's main forces had begun the rail pullback from the 28th, leaving behind only two infantry battalions and a mountain artillery battalion for the time being. At 21:20 on 29 July, Korea Army Headquarters received the text of Suetaka's full report, which concluded: "With a view toward a possible emergency, the division suspended movement back of the 75th Regiment and is making necessary arrangements to have them advance instead. The latest affair derives sheerly from the enemy's unlawful challenge. It is my firm belief that the nature of this incident differs completely from the one at Changkufeng and should be handled separately. At present, since communication with the forward lines is not good, Lieutenant Colonel Senda (who is at the front) has been entrusted with command, but I assume entire responsibility for the consequences." Instead of boarding their trains at Agochi, Sato's regiment and supporting engineers moved to the Manchurian side of the Tumen as soon as possible. Suetaka called Sato's 2nd Battalion to Kyonghun as divisional reserve. Subsequent dispatches claimed that: (1) Senda's unit, which had driven off intruders in the Shachaofeng area once, was engaged against new Soviet forces (sent at 18:20, 29th);  (2) Senda's unit had expelled trespassers, and a combat situation had developed near Shachaofeng (22:00, 29th);  (3) fighting was going on in the vicinity of Shachaofeng (06:40, 30th).  Korea Army Headquarters, however, obtained no more important communication concerning the events of 29 July than a report, sent that evening by Suetaka, that revealed his concern about a possible Soviet attack in the Wuchiatzu sector near the neck of the long Changkufeng appendix.  After the clash at Shachaofeng, a general officer, Morimoto, happened to be visiting Colonels Okido and Tanaka in Nanam. Both of them were said to be of the pronounced opinion that no troubles ought to be provoked with the USSR while the critical Hankow operation lay ahead; yet Suetaka apparently had some intention of striking at the Soviet intruders, using the 75th Regiment. They urged that this policy not be adopted and that Suetaka be approached directly; the channel through Y. Nakamura, the division chief of staff, was hopeless. Although in agreement, General Morimoto declined to approach Suetaka; since the latter seemed to have made up his mind, it would be inappropriate to "meddle" with his command. Suetaka was functioning as an operations chief at that time. Apart from the mobilization staff officer, who was not enthusiastic about aggressive action, the only other officer who may have affected the decisionmaking process was the Hunchun OSS chief, Maj. Tanaka Tetsujiro, a positive type who shared Suetaka's views and was probably with him on the 29th as well as 30th. Although developments at Suetaka's command post were known more as the result of silence than of elucidation, we possessed considerable information about thinking at the Korea Army level: "Suetaka contacted us only after his men had driven out the enemy near Shachaofeng. Till then, the front had been relatively quiet and we were of the opinion all or most of the deployed forces were on their way home. We at Seoul had no foreknowledge of or connection with the 29 July affair. Reports came in; we never sent specific orders. Triggered by the affray at Shachaofeng, the division attacked on its own initiative. It was our understanding that very small Japanese forces had been committed to evict a dozen enemy scouts and that, when a platoon of ours got atop the hill, they observed surprisingly huge hostile concentrations to the rear. This was probably why the platoon pulied back, although much has been made of the desire to obey the nonaggravation policy to the letter. We at Seoul felt that this was a troublesome matter—that our side had done something unnecessary. When the division finally made its report, the army had to reach some decision. There were two irreconcilable ways of looking at things. We might condemn what had been done, and the division ought to be ordered to pull out promptly, having arbitrarily and intolerably acted against the known facts that Imperial sanction for use of force had been withheld and Tokyo had directed evacuation of the moved-up units. The opposing, eventually predominant view was that the division commander's course of action ought to be approved. Perusal of small-scale maps of the locale indicated a clear violation of the frontier, something not proved in the case of Changkufeng. We shared the division commander's interpretation. His BGU had its mission, and he was acting with foresight to solve matters positively and on his own, since he was the man closest to the problem. General Nakamura felt that the latest development was inevitable; our units did not cross the Tumen until the Soviets attacked us in force. Therefore, the division's actions were approved and a report was rendered promptly to Tokyo. It could be said that our outlook served to "cover" the division commander, in a way. But if IGHQ had ordered us to desist, we would have".  Nakamura added: "I was of the opinion the only solution was to drive the Soviet troops outside Manchukuoan territory; therefore, I approved the action by the division." Such sanction had been granted on the basis of information supplied to Seoul by Suetaka on the evening of 29 July, again post facto. At 01:20 on the 30th, Nakamura wired Suetaka a message characterized by gracious phrasing that suggested his grave concern: "One ought to be satisfied with expelling from Manchurian territory the enemy attacking our unit on the . . . heights southwest of Shachaofeng. It is necessary to keep watch on the enemy for the time being, after having pulled back to the heights mentioned above, but we desire that matters be handled carefully to avoid enlargement; in case the foe has already pulled back south of Shachaofeng . . . he need not be attacked." Nakamura also sent a wire to the AGS chief, the War Minister, and the Kwantung Army commander. After conveying the information received from Suetaka, Nakamura continued: "In spite of the fact that our troops have been patient and cautious . . . this latest incident [near Shachaofeng] started with Soviet forces' arrogant border trespassing and . . . unlawful challenge. Therefore, I am convinced that this affair must be dealt with separately from the incident at Changkufeng. Nevertheless, I shall endeavor to handle matters so that the incident will not spread and shall make it my fundamental principle to be satisfied with evicting from Manchurian territory the hostile forces confronting us. The Korea Army chief of staff is being dispatched quickly to handle the incident".  The Korea Army, "painfully slow to act," says a Kwantung Army major, was merely the intermediary link, the executor of Tokyo's desires. In the case of remote Shachaofeng, there was an inevitable gap between on-the-spot occurrences and AGS reactions. By then, Arisue, Kotani, and Arao, Inada's observers, had returned to Japan—an important fact, given the "Moltke" system of staff control. Nevertheless, their return must have exerted significant effects on central operational thinking. Kotani remembered that his AGS subsection had given him a welcome-home party on the night of 29 July when an emergency phone call was received from the duty officer. "It was about the clash at Shachaofeng. The festivities came to an abrupt end and I headed for the office. From then till the cease-fire on 11 August, I remained at the AGS night and day." Since the 19th Division had furnished higher headquarters with minimal information, Tokyo, like Seoul, had only a few ostensible facts to act upon. But this had been the first combat test for the Korea Army, which needed all the encouragement and assistance possible. Although Japanese field armies, notably the Kwantung Army, were notorious for insubordination, one could not overemphasize the fact that the Korea Army was meek and tractable. If Nakamura had concluded that Suetaka acted properly (which reports from Seoul indicated), the AGS could hardly demur. It would have been unrealistic to think that Tokyo, although cautious, was "softer" about the Russian problem than front-line forces. There had been no concern over time lags; details were Seoul's province. Reaction took time at every level of the chain of command. Decision making in the Japanese Army had been a many-layered process. The Army general staff had been of the opinion that initial guidance ought to have been provided to the Korea Army soon, particularly since there had been evidence of failure to convey intentions promptly to the front and no high command staff officer remained to direct matters. After hearing from Seoul twice about the Shachaofeng affair, the responsible Army general staff officers conferred at length. Stress had been laid on the indivisibility of the Shachaofeng and Changkufeng incidents. It had also been evident that further information was required. On that basis, a "handling policy for the Shachaofeng Incident" was drafted, and Tada notified the Korea and Kwantung armies accordingly on 30 July. Nakamura had received the telegram at 16:50 and had its contents retransmitted to Kitano, then at Kyonghun: "Shachaofeng Incident is progressing along lines of our policy, leave things to local units, which have been adhering to the principle of nonenlargement. Have them report on front-line situation without fail."  The Army general staff and the Korea Army were calling for prudence, but the division, well down the rungs of the ladder of command, was initiating actions that jeopardized the government's basic policy. Earlier quibbling about restraints on "unit-size" elements crossing into Manchuria had been abandoned after the firefight near Shachaofeng on 29 July. At 15:30, Takenouchi's battalion, part of the 76th Regiment, had been directed to assist Senda near Yangkuanping; at 18:20 Suetaka was ordering the 75th Regiment to head for the Kucheng sector and be ready to assault the Russians in the Changkufeng area. Support was to be provided by Kobayashi's engineers, by Iwano's transportation men, and by Suzuki's heavy guns. Of particular interest had been Suetaka's acceptance of Sato's recommendation that elements be sent to occupy Hill 52, a measure linked with a possible Japanese attack against Changkufeng.   Sato had decided by evening that the new situation required rapid deployment of his forces across the river. At Shikai, he conducted a briefing of his officers. Suetaka's orders conveyed orally by staff officers had stipulated: "The division will take steps to secure the border line immediately, even if the situation undergoes change. The Sato unit will advance immediately to the left shore, reinforce Senda's unit, and maintain a strict watch on the enemy in the Changkufeng area." Around 23:20, the last elements ordered forward arrived at Shikai station. Sato instructed only his headquarters and the Ito company to get off. The rest of the troop train primarily the 1st [Nakano's] Battalion was to move on to Hongui. From there, the soldiers proceeded to the Tumen near Sozan. With his staff and Ito's company, Sato trudged in silence through the mud from Shikai to the shore at Matsu'otsuho, starting at 00:30 and reaching the crossing site at 03:00. Reconnaissance had proved satisfactory, Sato remembered.  At the crossings, the hardworking engineers rowed his 1st and 3rd battalions across, company by company. Near dawn, around 04:30, he traversed the river. The movement had been completed in about an hour. When Sato's infantry finally got across, they proceeded to the skirt of Fangchuanting and assembled in secrecy. Not until about 08:00 did the regimental headquarters, Ito's company, and Hirahara's battalion reach Hill 147, already held by Noguchi's company west of Changkufeng. By then, plans had fallen behind schedule by at least several hours because of difficulties in train movement forward. Sato also remembered torrential rains; other officers mentioned darkness. Members of Nakano's battalion pinpointed a shortage of engineer boats from Kucheng. Engineers rowed some boats downstream during the night, but six of them were kept at Matsu'otsuho. This left only three boats for moving the 400 men of the 1st Battalion, the unit slated to storm Changkufeng, across the river at Sozan. Sato had wanted all of his troops across well before dawn on the 30th. A division staff officer rightly thought that Suetaka had already advised Sato, in secret, to "attack at an opportune time," and that the night of 29–30 July had been intended for the surprise assault. "Perhaps there was not enough time for all the attack preparations." Kobayashi's engineers admitted problems in moving boats to Sozan: "Although the water level had gone up because of daily rains recently, there were still many shallows and the current was irregular. Not only was it hard to move downstream, but dense fog also complicated the work. Nevertheless, the units at both sites were able to accomplish the river-crossing operation approximately as scheduled".  Meanwhile, after reconnoitering Soviet defenses along the Manchurian bank, Suzuki, commander of the 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment, crossed the Kyonghun Bridge on 30 July with his 1st Battery and established positions on the edge of Shuiliufeng Hill. Once Captain Narukawa was attached to the 75th Infantry on 29 July, he dispatched his 2nd Battery by train to Shikai that night. Although firing sites had been surveyed northwest of Sho-Sozan, the battery had to traverse two weak, narrow bridges in the darkness. With two 15-centimeter howitzers to haul, plus five caissons and wagons, the unit faced tense moments. The gun sites themselves were worrisome: they were scarcely masked from observation from Changkufeng, and the single road to them from the unloading station ran through a paddy area and was similarly exposed. By 1200 hours on 30 July, Sato exerted operational control over the following units: his own forces, Nakano's battalion east of Fangchuanting; Hirahara's reinforced battalion west of Chiangchunfeng; a platoon from Nakajima's infantry company on Hill 52; and Noguchi's company on Hill 147; and from other forces, Senda's 2nd (Kanda) BGU Company; two reinforced companies from Takenouchi's battalion of Okido's 76th Regiment near Shachaofeng; and a 75-mm half-battery from the 25th Mountain Artillery on the Manchurian side with Sato. On the Korean shore, another half-battery comprising two 15-centimeter howitzers from Narukawa's unit of the 15th Heavy Field Artillery was in place. The 19th Engineers operated near the crossing sites, though one platoon remained at Fangchuanting. Sato said, "We were now deployed at last, to cope with any situation." His command post was set in foxholes on open ground at Chiangchunfeng, a central hill that offered excellent observation and control over actions around Changkufeng to the east and Shachaofeng to the north. Not content with suspending the pullout of units and deploying additional combat troops across the Tumen, Suetaka decided to recall division headquarters, mountain artillery, cavalry, signal, medical, and veterinary personnel from Nanam. At dawn on 30 July, Nanam issued orders for Colonel Tanaka to move 500 men and 300 horses to Agochi by rail; most of the increment came from Tanaka's horse-drawn 25th Mountain Artillery. The colonel reached the Korean side of the Tumen at 05:00 on 31 July. The preceding emergency measures were being implemented by Suetaka, even as he received Nakamura's calming telegram of 30 July enjoining nonexpansion. Changkufeng Hill was not even mentioned. Nakamura's concern was typified by Kitano flying to the front. At 10:00 on 30 July, Kitano sent the division chief of staff a cautious follow-up cable: "Based on the consistent policy for handling the Changkufeng Incident and on the army commander's earlier telegram, kindly take steps to ensure careful action in connection with the affair in the Shachaofeng vicinity lest there be enlargement." At 13:45, Nakamura transmitted another restraining message to Suetaka: "The division is to secure … Chiangchunfeng and … the heights southwest of Shachaofeng, using present front-line units. Unless there is an enemy attack, however, resort to force will depend on separate orders." Several hours later, at 16:50, Nakamura received instructions from Tada: the Shachaofeng case was being left to the local forces, who were pursuing the desired policy of nonenlargement, but prompt reporting was desired. At 19:30, the retransmitted message was received by Kitano, already at the front with Suetaka at Kyonghun. After his units had crossed the Tumen on 30 July, Sato Kotoku ordered a strict watch and directed preparations for an assault based on the plans. He conferred with Senda at Chiangchunfeng and observed the enemy. Even after dawn, the frontline commanders who had crossed the river remained uncertain about when the attack would be staged. While Sato's force conducted reconnaissance to prepare for a daytime offensive, orders arrived around 08:00 indicating, "We intend a night attack, so conceal your activities." Daytime movements were prohibited. Sato then explained the impression he had derived from Senda and the intelligence on which he based his estimates: " Exploiting the impasse in diplomatic negotiation, the enemy side had steadily reinforced front-line offensive strength and trespassed anew near Shachaofeng. They now had a battalion and a half of infantry plus 20 artillery pieces in the area, some south of Shachaofeng and the others at four positions immediately east of Lake Khasan. At least a dozen (maybe 20) tanks were deployed in the sector opposite us. About 300 well-armed, active Russian troops were at Changkufeng. I decided that an attack ought to be staged that night. First of all, we were going to chill the insolent enemy by a courageous night assault—a method characteristic of the Imperial Army. Then all kinds of fire power were to be combined in a surprise attack against the positions. Our intention was to jo lt the Russians, demonstrate the true strength of our combat fire, and, by a combination of night and dawn attacks, cut down losses which our left-flank units would have incurred if a night assault alone were staged. We had considered two plans—a night attack against Changkufeng by the 3rd Battalion from the north, or by the 1st Battalion from the south. On 30 July, I decided to execute the second plan, using my 1st (Nakano's) Battalion, to avoid simultaneous involvement around Shachaofeng where the foe was by now alerted."  The Japanese Army ordinarily favored surprise assaults without supporting guns, since firepower was regarded as secondary in close combat and artillery was in short supply. According to the regimental journal, telephone contacts from the morning of the 30th indicated that the division commander shared the same line of thinking as Sato. By noon, Suetaka made his stance explicit. A phone call from Kucheng conveyed to Sato the gist of a critical division order: first, a detailed briefing on Soviet troop concentrations and dispositions, firing positions, troops, and armor south of Shachaofeng; entanglements and forces at Changkufeng; large concentrations behind west of Khasan; tanks and ground formations moving north of the lake; a heavy concentration near the lake to the northwest; one confirmed and two suspected positions along the eastern shore and another with artillery far to the south. Then the order stated that K. Sato's forces, including the Takenouchi battalion from the 76th Infantry, one mountain artillery platoon, and one engineer platoon were to strengthen their positions and, at the same time, promptly evict from Manchurian territory the intruding and advancing enemy. However, pursuit must not be pushed too far lest the border be crossed. Shortly after noon, Suetaka issued another order to form a new force under Senda, who was to strengthen border security along the Shuiliufeng–Hunchun line. As with Sato, Senda was to eject the intruding and advancing enemy from Manchurian soil but not pursue them across the border. By midafternoon, Sato knew not only what he wanted to do but also Suetaka's intentions. At 15:30, he assembled all subordinate officers at Chiangchunfeng and dictated minute attack instructions. Intelligence indicated that the enemy continued to fortify points of importance along the Changkufeng–Shachaofeng line. Sato's plan was to annihilate hostile elements that had crossed the border north and south of Changkufeng. His concept went beyond a frontal assault. While Nakano's battalion would jump off south of Changkufeng, one reinforced company, Takeshita's 10th was to attack north. Since the sun rose at about 05:00, Sato intended to wipe out the enemy during three hours of darkness. Another battalion, Hirahara's 3rd would be held in reserve, with Ito's 6th Company ready to launch a night attack against Changkufeng from the northwest if necessary. Small forces deployed southeast at Hill 52 were to block the arrival of Soviet reinforcements around the southern shores of Khasan. Only after Changkufeng was secured and fire swept the high ground south of Shachaofeng would a reinforced battalion, Takenouchi's 1st from the 76th Regiment undertake a dawn assault to clear the Russians from that sector. An engineer platoon would assist both the night and dawn assault battalions with obstacle clearing. There would be no artillery support until dawn, when the available guns were to provide maximum coverage. Notably, even the movement of a single antitank gun warranted mention. Sato concluded the attack order by directing that each unit mask its intentions after sunset. Takenouchi was to act to check the enemy as soon as the sun went down. In connection with the dawn barrage against the enemy southwest of Shachaofeng, key personnel were to study the best way to exploit sudden fire described as gale and lightning. They were also to be ready to destroy enemy tanks. A green star shell would be fired to signal the success of the night attack. The code words were shojiki "honesty" and ydmo "bravery". At midnight, the regiment commander would be at the northwest foot of Chiangchunfeng. The order stressed typical night-attack precautions: secrecy and concealment, avoidance of confusion, antitank defense, and flare signaling of success. Sato added his own flair with his daily motto as code words and the reference to "whirlwind" fire. Impending action times were explicitly set when the order was issued at 15:30 on the 30th, more than ten hours before the 1st Battalion was to jump off. The key to success in a night assault lay in an absolute prohibition on firing by their side, and bold, courageous charging. Sato reminded his men that life is granted again after death. Nakano then assembled his company commanders east of Fangchuanting and issued his battalion order at 18:30. A few hours after Sato's briefing of the assault commanders, Suetaka arrived at the 75th Regiment command post. This visit late on 30 July is central to allegations that Sato, not Suetaka, conceived and executed the night attack on his own initiative. Divisional orders giving Sato his core mission had already been conveyed by telephone. After 16:00, Suetaka boarded a motorboat at Kucheng and went to the Manchurian side to verify front-line conditions. Soviet snipers south of Yangkuanping fired several shots, but his craft reached the Matsu'otsuho landing and proceeded to Chiangchunfeng to meet Sato. Sato described the situation: "frontline enemy forces had been reinforced steadily and had begun a vigorous offensive. The foe was provoking us, and the matter had grown very serious. I had already issued orders at 15:30 to take the initiative and deal the enemy a smashing blow." I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. On a frost-bitten dawn by the Chaun and Tumen, Russia and Japan lock eyes over Changkufeng. Diplomats urge restraint, yet Tokyo's generals push a bold gamble: seize a hill with a surprise strike and bargain later. Japanese divisions, engineers, and artillery edge toward the border, while Soviet sentries brace for a confrontation that could widen the war. 

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Welcome to Those Days: A Michinoku Pro Retrospective!Welcome to 1995! Case (https://twitter.com/_inyourcase) and Mike (https://twitter.com/fujiiheya) lead off this edition of Those Days putting a bow on Michinoku Pro's 1994 as it relates to the Great Sasuke and his award haul for the year and a discussion on great years of Junior Heavyweights.With Michinoku Pro's usual delayed start to the calendar year, we go to stops in New Japan and Pro Wrestling Fujiwara Gumi before Michinoku's first shows of 1995 make tape, including a mysterious appearance from N.G. Hammer, a new foreigner we will never talk about again, and for the third time: Super Delfin vs SATO!A full match listing of footage covered during this episode can be found at the show post on www.voicesofwrestling.com or in the Open The Voice Gate channel on the VOW Discord.Our podcast provider, Red Circle, offers the listeners the option to sponsor the show. Click on “Sponsor This Podcaster” at https://redcircle.com/shows/open-the-voice-gate and you can donate a single time, or set up a monthly donation to Open the Voice Gate!Please Rate and Review Open The Voice Gate on the podcast platform of your choice and follow us on social media with @openvoicegate!Advertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

Last time we spoke about the Changkufeng Incident. In a frost-bitten dawn along the Chaun and Tumen rivers, a border notched with memory becomes the stage for a quiet duel of will. On one side, Japanese officers led by Inada Masazum study maps, mud, and the hill known as Changkufeng, weighing ground it offers and the risk of war. They glimpse a prize, high ground that could shield lines to Korea—yet they sense peril in every ridge, every scent of winter wind. Across the line, Soviet forces tighten their grip on the crest, their eyes fixed on the same hill, their tents and vehicles creeping closer to the border. The air hums with cautious diplomacy: Moscow's orders pulse through Seoul and Harbin, urging restraint, probing, deterring, but never inviting full-scale conflict. Yet every patrol, every reconnaissance, seems to tilt the balance toward escalation.   #177 The point of no return for the USSR and Japan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Days passed and the local emissaries had not been released by the Russians. Domei reported from Seoul that the authorities were growing worried; the "brazen" actions of Soviet front-line forces infuriated the Manchurians and Japanese. From Seoul, too, came ominous news that villagers were preparing to evacuate because they feared fighting would soon begin in the Changkufeng area. While diplomatic activity continued in Moscow without effect, the Tokyo press continued to report intense military activity throughout the Soviet Far East—the greatest massing of troops in months, with planes, armored cars, and motorized equipment choking the Trans-Siberian railway. The press was dominated by commentary about the danger of war. One enterprising Tokyo publisher ran advertisements under the heading: "The Manchukuo-Soviet Border Situation Is Urgent—Ours Is the Only Detailed Map of the Soviet Far East: Newspaper-size, in seven clear colors, offset printed, only 50 sen." Although the Manchukuoan foreign office issued a statement on 20 July about the dire consequences the Soviets were inviting, it is probable that the next Russian actions, of a conciliatory nature, were reached independently. Either Moscow had taken almost a week to make the decision, or the diplomatic conversations there had had an effect. Local Japanese authorities reported inactivity on the Changkufeng front from the morning of 23 July. On the next day, word was received that the USSR proposed to return the two emissaries as "trespassers." At midday on 26 July, the Russians released the blindfolded agents at a border site along the Novokievsk road. After completing the formalities, the Japanese asked the Russians for a reply concerning local settlement of the incident. According to Japanese sources, the "flustered" Colonel Grebennik answered: "My assignment today was merely to turn over the envoys. As for any request about the Changkufeng Incident, our guard commander must have asked for instructions from the central government. I think this is the type of matter which must be answered by the authorities at Moscow through diplomatic channels." Grebennik's postwar recollection does not differ appreciably from the Japanese version. Soviet sources mention a second effort by the Japanese military to deliver a message under more forceful circumstances. On 23 July a Soviet border unit drove off a four-man party. Russian cavalry, sent to investigate, discovered that the Japanese had pulled down a telegraph pole, severed lines 100–150 meters inside Soviet territory, absconded with wire, and left behind a white flag and a letter. Undated, unsigned, and written in Korean, the message struck Grebennik as being substantively the same as the communication delivered formally by the emissaries on 18 July. Japanese materials make no reference to a second, informal effort by local forces, but there is little reason to doubt that such an attempt, perhaps unauthorized, was made. Although Japanese efforts at low-level negotiations came to naught, two observations emerged from the local authorities and the press. First, on-the-spot negotiations had broken down; it had been difficult even to reclaim the emissaries, and the Russians in the Posyet region were using various pretexts to refer matters to diplomatic echelons. Second, the Russians had released the men. Some interpreted this as the first evidence of Soviet sincerity; possibly, the USSR would even return Matsushima's body as a step toward settlement. Other Japanese observers on the scene warned the public that it was imperative to stay on guard: "All depends on how diplomacy proceeds and how the front-line troops behave." Yet the excitement in the Japanese press began to abate. It is difficult to ascertain the nature of the decision-making process on the Russian side after the Japanese attempted local negotiations. The Soviets contend that nothing special had been undertaken before the Japanese provoked matters at the end of July. Grebennik, however, admits that after receiving the two Japanese communications, "we started to prepare against an attack on us in the Lake Khasan area." He and a group of officers went to Changkufeng Hill and sent as many border guards there as possible. Although he personally observed Japanese troops and instructed his officers to do the same, he denied categorically that the Russians constructed trenches and fortifications. Only the observation of Manchurian territory was intensified while instructions were awaited from higher headquarters. For its part, the Korea Army was carrying out Imperial general headquarters first instructions while pursuing a wait-and-see policy. On 16 July, Korea Army Headquarters wired an important operations order to Suetaka. With a view toward a possible attack against intruders in the Khasan area, the army planned to make preparations. The division commander was to alert stipulated units for emergency dispatch and send key personnel to the Kyonghun sector to undertake preparations for an attack. Lt. Col. Senda Sadasue, BGU commander of the 76th Infantry Regiment, was to reconnoiter, reinforce nearby districts, and be ready for emergencies. Particular care was enjoined not to irritate the Soviet side. Maj. Gen. Yokoyama Shinpei, the Hunchun garrison commander, was to maintain close contact with the BGU and take every precaution in guarding the frontiers. Like Senda, Yokoyama was warned against irritating the Russians. Korea Army Headquarters also dispatched staff to the front and had them begin preparations, envisaging an offensive. Upon receipt of the army order, Suetaka issued implementing instructions from his Nanam headquarters at 4:30 A.M. on the 17th. The following units were to prepare for immediate alert: the 38th Infantry Brigade Headquarters, 75th Infantry Regiment, 27th Cavalry Regiment, 5th Antiaircraft Regiment, and 19th Engineer Regiment. The same instructions applied to the next units, except that elements organic to the division were designated: the 76th Infantry Regiment, 25th Mountain Artillery Regiment, and 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment. Another order enjoined utmost care not to irritate the Russians; Japanese actions were to be masked. Next came a directive to the forces of Senda and K. Sato. The former comprised mainly the 76th Infantry BGU and a cavalry platoon. The latter was built around the 75th Infantry Regiment, the Kucheng garrison unit, another cavalry platoon, two mountain artillery and one heavy field artillery battalion, and the 19th Engineers. Suetaka's idea about a solution to the border troubles had become concrete and aggressive. From the night of July 17, concentration would be accomplished gradually. The exact timing of the attack would be determined by subsequent orders; in Senda's area, there was no such restriction regarding "counteraction brought on by enemy attack." Division signal and intendant officers would conduct reconnaissance related to communications, billeting, food, and supplies. Sato and his subordinates were to reconnoiter personally. Having ordered the division to begin concentration and to stand by, Korea Army Headquarters was prepared the next morning, July 17, to direct the movement. Nevertheless, there was concern in Seoul that Suetaka's advance elements might cross the Tumen River into Manchurian territory, which could result in a clash with Soviet troops. Such an outcome might run counter to the principle established by Imperial general headquarters. Consequently, it was decided that "movement east of the river would therefore have to be forbidden in the Korea Army's implementing order." Nakamura transmitted his operational instructions to Suetaka at 6:00 on July 17: "No great change in latest situation around Lake Khasan. Soviet forces are still occupying Changkufeng area. Diplomaticlevel negotiations on part of central authorities and Manchukuoan government do not appear to have progressed. Considering various circumstances and with view to preparations, this army will concentrate elements of 19th Division between Shikai, Kyonghun, Agochi." Restrictions stipulated that the division commander would transport the units by rail and motor vehicle and concentrate them in the waiting zone in secret. Movement was to begin on the night of July 17 and to be completed the next day. Further orders, however, must govern unit advance east of the Tumen as well as use of force. The remainder of the division was to stay ready to move out. Troops were to carry rations for about two weeks.   Late that day, Suetaka received an order by phone for his subordinates in line with Seoul's instructions. Senda would handle the concentration of elements assembling at Kyonghun, and Sato would do the same for the main units arriving at Agochi. A communications net was to be set up quickly. Caution was to be exercised not to undertake provocative actions against the opposite bank of the Tumen, even for reconnaissance. The division would dispatch two trains from Hoeryong and four from Nanam. At 11:58 pm on 18 July, the first train left Hoeryong for Agochi. Concentration of units was completed by dawn. By that time, the Japanese had dispatched to the border 3,236 men and 743 horses. Past midnight on 20 July, Division Chief of Staff Nakamura wired headquarters that the division was ready to take any action required, having completed the alert process by 11 pm. Japanese scouting of the Changkufeng sector began in earnest after mid-July. Although the affair had seemed amenable to settlement, Sato took steps for an emergency from around the 14th. His thoughts centered on readiness for an attack against Changkufeng, which simultaneously required reconnaissance for the assault and preparation to pull the regiment back quickly to Hoeryong if a withdrawal was ordered. After arriving at Haigan on 18 July, Sato set out with several engineers. At Kucheng, the officers donned white Korean clothing, presumably the disguise directed by the division—and boarded native oxcarts for a leisurely journey southward along the Korean bank of the Tumen across from Changkufeng. The seemingly innocent "farmers" studied the river for crossing sites and Changkufeng Hill for the extent of enemy activity. On the hill's western slope, in Manchurian territory, three rows of Russian entanglements could be observed 300 feet below the crest. Only a handful of soldiers were visible, probably a platoon, certainly not more than a company. Infantry Captain Yamada Teizo conducted secret reconnaissance of the entire Changkufeng-Hill 52 sector for 314 hours in the afternoon of 18 July. Even after intense scanning through powerful binoculars, he could detect no more than 19 lookouts and six horsemen; camouflage work had been completed that day, and there were ten separate covered trench or base points. Barbed wire, under camouflage, extended about four meters in depth, yet even Yamada's trained eye could not determine whether there was one line of stakes or two. He jotted down what he could see and compared his information with that learned from local police. Artillery Colonel R. Tanaka shared the view that the Soviets had intruded. When he went reconnoitering along the Korean bank, he observed Russian soldiers entrenched around the hilltop, easily visible through binoculars at a range of two kilometers. Trenches had been dug 20 to 30 meters below the crest on the western slope. Eventually, there were three rows of barbed wire, the first just below the trenches and the lowest 100 meters under the summit. Tanaka estimated Soviet strength at two companies (about 200 men). Suetaka's intelligence officer, Sasai, recalls seeing barbed wire after Japanese units deployed to the front on 18–19 July; he had surmised then that the entanglements were being prepared out of fear of a Japanese assault.   To obtain first-hand information, the Gaimusho ordered a section chief, Miura Kazu'ichi, to the spot. Between 23 July and the cease-fire in August, Miura collected data at Kyonghun and transmitted reports from the consulate at Hunchun. On 28 July he visited Sozan on the Korean bank. He observed Soviet soldiers on the western slopes of Changkufeng, digging trenches and driving stakes. These actions were clearly on Manchukuoan territory even according to Soviet maps. Miura insisted that he saw no friendly troops on territory claimed by the Russians and observed no provocative actions by the Japanese. These statements are supported by a map drawn for him in early August by Division Staff Officer Saito Toshio, a sketch Miura retained as late as 1947. Miura's testimony is tempered by his assertion that he saw a red flag flying near the top of Changkufeng Hill. This contention conflicts with all evidence, as Russian lawyers at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East argued, it is improbable that a Soviet frontier post, highly interested in camouflage, would have hoisted a pennon so large that it could be seen from Sozan. Russian sources are unanimous in stating that no flag was put up until 6 August and that no trenches or entanglements were established by Soviet border guards in July, at least prior to the 29th. The two Army General staff consultants, Arisue and Kotani, arrived in Seoul on 16 July, the day Korea Army Headquarters was ordering an alert for the 19th Division "with a view toward a possible attack against enemy intruders." Inada dispatched them mainly to inspect the frontline situation; but he had not fully decided on reconnaissance in force. At Shikai, Arisue and Kotani donned Korean garb and traveled by oxcart on the Korean side of the Tumen, reconnoitering opposite the Shachaofeng sector. Kotani was convinced that hostile possession of Changkufeng posed a serious threat to the Korean railway. He agreed with the division's estimate that, if the Japanese did decide to seize Changkufeng, it ought not to be too difficult. Arisue, as senior observer, dispatched messages from Kyonghun to Tokyo detailing their analysis and recommendations. Meanwhile, in Tokyo, on 17 July the central military authorities received a cable from the Japanese envoy in Moscow, Colonel Doi Akio, reporting that prospects for a diplomatic settlement were nil. The USSR was taking a hard line because Japan was deeply involved in China, though there were domestic considerations as well. The Russians, however, showed no intention of using the border incident to provoke war. It would be best for Japan to seize Changkufeng quickly and then press forward with parleys. Meanwhile, Japan should conduct an intensive domestic and external propaganda campaign. There was mounting pressure in the high command that negotiations, conducted "unaided," would miss an opportunity. Based on reports from Arisue and Kotani, that army seemed to be contemplating an unimaginative, ponderous plan: an infantry battalion would cross the Tumen west of Changkufeng and attack frontally, while two more battalions would cross south of Kyonghun to drive along the river and assault Changkufeng from the north. Inada sent a telegram on 17 July to Arisue for "reference." Prospects had diminished that Soviet troops would withdraw as a result of negotiation. As for the attack ideas Arisue mentioned, Inada believed it necessary to prepare to retake Changkufeng with a night attack using small forces. To avoid widening the crisis, the best plan was a limited, surprise attack using ground units. The notion of a surprise attack drew on the Kwantung Army's extensive combat experience in Manchuria since 1931.  The next morning, after the forward concentration of troops was completed, Suetaka went to the front. From Kucheng, he observed the Changkufeng district and decided on concrete plans for use of force. Meanwhile, Nakamura was curbing any hawkish courses at the front. As high-command sources privately conceded later, the younger officers in Tokyo sometimes seemed to think the commander was doing too good a job; there was covert sentiment that it might be preferable if someone in the chain of command acted independently before the opportunity slipped away. This is significant in light of the usual complaints by responsible central authorities about gekokujo—insubordination—by local commands. An important report influencing the high command's view arrived from Kwantung Army Intelligence on 19 July: according to agents in Khabarovsk, the USSR would not let the Changkufeng incident develop into war; Russians also believed there would be no large-scale Soviet intrusion into their territory. By 19 July, the Tokyo operations staff was considering the best method to restore control of the lost hill by force, since Seoul appeared to maintain its laissez-faire stance. On 18 July, Arisue and Kotani were instructed by Imperial General headquarters to assist the Korea Army and the 19th Division regarding the Changkufeng Incident. What the Army general staff operations officers sought was an Imperial General headquarters order, requiring Imperial sanction, that would instruct the Korea Army to evict the Russian troops from Changkufeng the way the Kwantung Army would, using units already under Nakamura's command. The sense was that the affair could be handled locally, but if the USSR sought to escalate the incident, it might be prudent for that to occur before the Hankow operation began. The IGHQ and War Ministry coordinated the drafting of an IGHQ order on 19–20 July: "We deem it advisable to eradicate Soviet challenges . . . by promptly delivering blow on this occasion against unit which crossed border at Changkufeng. That unit is in disadvantageous spot strategically and tactically; thus, probability is scant that dispute would enlarge, and we are investigating countermeasures in any case. Careless expansion of situation is definitely not desired. We would like you people also to conduct studies concerning mode of assault employing smallest strength possible for surprise attack against limited objective. Kindly learn general atmosphere here [Tokyo] from [Operations] Major Arao Okikatsu." The 20th of July proved to be a hectic day in Korea, and even more so in Tokyo. The division had informed the Korea Army that it was finally "ready to go," a message received in Seoul in the early hours. Then Arisue received a wire from Inada presenting limited-attack plans and noting that Arao was on the way. By that day, Japanese intelligence judged there were 400 Soviet troops and two or three mountain guns south of Paksikori. Russian positions at Changkufeng had been reinforced, but no aggressive intentions could be detected. Soviet ground elements, as well as materiel, appeared to be moving from Vladivostok and Slavyanka toward Posyet. Suetaka headed back to the front. Sato told him that it was absolutely necessary to occupy Chiangchunfeng Hill across the Tumen in Manchurian territory. Upon reaching the Wuchiatzu sector and inspecting the situation, Suetaka agreed to send a small unit to Chiangchunfeng on his own authority.  Colonel Sato Kotoku had ordered one company to move across the Tumen toward Chiangchunfeng on 21 July, a maneuver that did not escape the Russians' notice. On 24 July, the same day another Japanese unit occupied Shangchiaoshan Hill, Marshal Blyukher ordered the 40th Rifle Division, stationed in the Posyet area to be placed on combat readiness, with a force of regulars assigned to back the Soviet border guards; two reinforced rifle battalions were detached as a reserve. According to Japanese records, Russian border patrols began appearing around Huichungyuan, Yangkuanping, and Shachaofeng from 26 July, but no serious incidents were reported at that stage. At about 9:30 am on 29 July, Captain Kanda, the 2nd Company commander of Lieutenant Colonel Senda's 76th Border Garrison Unit, was observing the Shachaofeng area from his Kucheng cantonments. Through his glasses, Kanda observed four or five Soviet soldiers engaged in construction on high ground on the west side of Shachaofeng. Kanda notified Senda, who was at BGU Headquarters inspecting the forward areas. Senda transmitted the information to Suetaka. Deciding to cross the Tumen for a closer look, Senda set off with Kanda. A little after 11 am, they reached Chiangchunfeng Hill, where the men from Captain Noguchi's company were already located. Senda verified, to his own satisfaction, that as many as 10 enemy infantrymen had "violated the border" to a depth of 350 meters, "even by the Soviets' contention", and were starting construction 1,000 meters south of Shachaofeng. Senda decided to oust the Russian force "promptly and resolutely," in light of the basic mission assigned his unit. He telephoned Suetaka, who was in Kyonghun, and supplied the intelligence and the recommendation. Subordinates recalled Suetaka's initial reaction when the BGU reported a Soviet intrusion about a mile and a half north of Changkufeng. "The arrogant Russians were making fools of the Japanese, or were trying to. At stake was not a trifling hill and a few invaders, but the honor of the Imperial Army. In the face of this insult, the general became furious. He insisted upon smashing the enemy right away."  Kanda phoned 2nd Lieutenant Sakuma, who was still at Kucheng, and told him to bring his 25-man platoon across the river by 2 pm Sakuma crossed by boat and arrived at 1:30. Kanda set out from Chiangchunfeng at 2:20, took over Sakuma's unit, bore east, and approached within 700 meters of the enemy. He ordered the men not to fire unless fired upon, and to withdraw quickly after routing the Russians. It is said that the Japanese troops were fired upon as they advanced in deployed formation but did not respond at first. In a valley, casualties were incurred and the Japanese finally returned fire. Sakuma's 1st Squad leader took a light machine gun and pinned down the Russians facing him. Sakuma himself pressed forward with his other two squads, taking advantage of the slope to envelop the enemy from the right. At the same time, he sent a patrol to the high ground on the left to cover the platoon's flank. Thanks to the 1st Squad's frontal assault, the Russians had no chance to worry about their wings, and Sakuma moved forward to a point only 30 meters from the foe's rear. Kanda was now 50 meters from the Russians. When the enemy light machine gun let up, he ordered a charge and, in the lead, personally cut down one of the foe. Sakuma also rushed the Soviets, but when about to bring down his saber he was stabbed in the face while another Russian struck him in the shoulder. Grappling with this assailant, Sakuma felled him. Other Japanese attackers sabered two more Russians and shot the rest. By 3:10 pm the eight enemy "trespassers" had been annihilated. The covering patrol reported that five Soviet horsemen, with a light machine gun, were galloping up from Khasan. Sakuma had his platoon fire grenade dischargers, which smashed the enemy. Seventy more Russian soldiers now came, attacking from northwest of the lake and supported by fire from the east side. Using light machine guns and grenade dischargers, Sakuma checked them. Meanwhile, Miyashita's platoon, part of Noguchi's company, had departed from Chiangchunfeng at 2:20 pm and swung right until it reached the crestline between Changkufeng and Kanda's company. One squad faced 200 Russians on Changkufeng; the other faced the enemy south of Shachaofeng. Soviet forces opened intense machine-gun fire from Changkufeng and from the high ground east of the lake. After 20 minutes, Kanda's unit charged, two or three Russians fled, and Miyashita's platoon shot one down. Senda, who had gone with Miyashita, directed the platoon's movements and proceeded north, under fire, to Kanda's unit. Once the Russians had been cleared out, Senda forbade pursuit across the boundary and gradually withdrew his forces to the heights line 800 meters southwest. It was 4:30 then. By 5 pm Soviet reinforcements, apparently brought up from the Changkufeng and Paksikori sectors, advanced anew. With 80 men in the front lines, the enemy pushed across the border to a depth of at least 500 meters, according to the Japanese, and began to establish positions. Several tanks and many troops could be observed in the rear. Senda had Noguchi's company hold Chiangchunfeng. Kanda's unit, reinforced by 33 men from Kucheng, was to occupy the heights southwest of Shachaofeng, while Imagawa's company of the 76th Regiment was to occupy other high ground to the west. Senda then reported the situation to Suetaka in Kyonghun and asked for reinforcements. In Seoul, Army headquarters understood the developments reported by Suetaka as a response to the hostile border violation, and about 20 men of the Kucheng BGU under Lt. Sakuma drove the enemy out between 2:30 and 3 pm. Afterward, Sakuma pulled back to high ground two kilometers south of Yangkuanping to avoid trouble and was now observing the foe. Although Seoul had heard nothing about Japanese losses, Corp. Akaishizawa Kunihiko personally observed that Kanda had been wounded in the face by a grenade and bandaged, that Sakuma had been bayoneted twice and also bandaged, and that the dead lay on the grass, covered with raincoats. According to Suetaka "the enemy who had crossed the border south of Shachaofeng suffered losses and pulled back once as a result of our attack at about 2:30 pm". By about 4:30, Suetaka continued, the Russians had built up their strength and attacked the platoon on the heights southwest of Shachaofeng. Behind the Russian counterattack, there were now several tanks. Earlier, Suetaka noted ominously that several rounds of artillery had been fired from the Changkufeng area; "therefore, we reinforced our units too, between 5 and 6 pm., and both sides are confronting each other." Details as to the fate of Sakuma's platoon are not given, but it is now admitted that casualties were incurred on both sides. The Korea Army Headquarters consequently reported to Tokyo in the evening that, according to information from the division, 20 Japanese had driven out the Russians near Shachaofeng; 25 men from Senda's unit were occupying the heights 600 meters west of Changkufeng; and another 16 men were deployed in ambush at Yangkuanping. Such an enumeration would have tended to suggest that only a few dozen Japanese were across the Tumen on the 29th. But a review of the numbers of combat troops committed and the reinforcements sent by Senda reveals that Japanese strength across the river was in the hundreds by nightfall. In Moscow, Tass reported that on 29 July detachments of Japanese-Manchukuoan intruders had attempted to seize high ground apparently located 0.5 miles north of a Russian position. The assailants had been "completely repelled from Soviet territory, as a result of measures taken by Russian frontier guards," and instructions had been sent to the embassy in Tokyo to protest strongly. Walter Duranty, the veteran American correspondent in Moscow, heard that the Japanese press had published reports, likely intended for internal consumption, that hours of furious fighting had occurred at the points in question. Since the dispatches were unsubstantiated and "failed to gain credence anywhere outside Japan," Duranty claimed this may have forced the Japanese to translate into action their boast of "applying force" unless their demands were satisfied. "Now, it appears, they have applied force, unsuccessfully." The Soviet communiqué on the Shachaofeng affair, despite its firm tone, appeared unostentatiously in the following day's Pravda and Izvestiya under the headline, "Japanese Militarists Continue Their Provocation." The Japanese Embassy in Moscow heard nothing about the Shachaofeng affray until the morning of the 30th, when a wire was received from the Gaimusho that ten Russian soldiers had occupied a position northwest of Changkufeng and had begun trench work until ejected by frontier guards. Since the Russian communiqué spoke of afternoon fighting, American correspondents concluded that Soviet troops must have counterattacked and driven off the Japanese. No additional information was available to the public in Moscow on the 30th, perhaps because it was a holiday. Nevertheless, in the afternoon, Stalin's colleague Kaganovich addressed an immense crowd in Moscow on "Railroad Day" and at the conclusion of a long, vigorous speech said:  "The Soviet Union is prepared to meet all enemies, east or west." It certainly was not a fighting speech and there is no reason to suppose the Soviet will abandon its firm peace policy unless Japan deliberately forced the issue. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Diplomacy flickered as Moscow pressed restraint and Tokyo whispered calculated bravado. As July wore on, both sides massed troops, built trenches, and sent scouts across the river. A tense, hidden war unfolded, skirmishes, patrols, and small advances, until a fleeting moment when force collided with restraint, and the hill's future hung in the frost.

Anderson Valley Brewing Company taproom. Herlinda Heras and Daedalus Howell host another edition of Brew Ha Ha, featuring guests from Anderson Valley Brewing Company. They are the official beer sponsor of the Great Dickens Fair, a Christmas celebration happening at the Cow Palace now through Dec. 21. (During this show, we also got a phone call from Kevin Patterson, manager of the Great Dickens Fair. His portion of this show can be heard over here, on this other podcast episode. This way both guests have their own podcast episode, for their own linking and listener traffic.) Jason O’Connell and Ben Padrone are here from Anderson Valley Brewing Company. Jason is the new owner and Ben is the Lab Manager. They begin by tasting their Salted Caramel Porter, which gets its flavors from the malts that are used, not from any actual caramelized sugars. It is aged for 6 months in bourbon barrels and comes in at 9.5% ABV. QA and QC Jason’s background is in the wine industry and he finds the beer world to be more fun. He says he bought the brewery because he was bored. Ben’s job is QA and QC, quality assurance and quality control. They do a lot of testing on the water and the product. They get their water from wells that are on their property. Anyone visiting Anderson Valley may want to visit their 18-hole championship Disc Golf course. Next year’s Booneville Beer Fest is on May 2 next year. The theme is Godzilla vs. Barkley and there is a Japanese sake connection. Stay tuned for more information before the date. They have already about a dozen breweries signed on. Among beer producers this is one of the favorite events. Fal Allen is Back at Anderson Valley BC Fal Allen is back. Fal Allen is back on the scene at Anderson Valley Brewing Company. He has been the brewer there and a key person in the company. He left the company for a while and was working in New Zealand. Now he is working with AVBC for the moment from Hawaii. Fal Allen has a great radio voice and has been on Brew Ha Ha before. Here is his last appearance on Brew Ha Ha. Next they taste their West Coast IPA, which uses Mosaic, Citra and Ekuanot hops. All seven of the beers they brought today are available at the Great Dickens Fair. SAKE They have a plan to start making sake and to use the best possible rice. Sake is gluten free, which is an advantage for some people. They are experimenting with Sato, a kind of rice for sake. They are also making a sake flavored beer. Herlinda remembers when her friends asked her to taste a large selection of sake to help them get an import company started. Watch out for this to develop over the next five years. Russian River Brewing Co. is open in Santa Rosa on 4th St. and at their big Windsor location. Visit their website for up-to-date hours, menus, beers and more. Ben went to Humboldt State then the Master Brewers program at UC Davis. Jason studied engineering at U of British Columbia and worked in construction before working in the wine industry. He has recently acquired AVBC. Jason describes the situation as “exciting.” The sake idea is getting attention. Sake falls under the TTB brewers license but the labeling falls under wine. It is actually brewed like beer despite that some people in English refer to it as ‘rice wine.’ Visit our sponsor PizzaLeah in Windsor for the finest pizza menu, great beers and the most authentic flavors around!

In Japan nahmen sich immer mehr Menschen das Leben. Das schockierte die Öffentlichkeit. Die Zivilgesellschaft rüttelte die politischen Verantwortlichen auf, der Kampf gegen die «stille Epidemie» wurde zur nationalen Priorität. Zwanzig Jahre später zeigt sich: der Kampf war erfolgreich. Jedes Jahr 14 000 Suizide weniger. Anders gesagt: 14 000 verzweifelte Menschen in Japan, die wieder Hoffnung schöpfen – so die statistischen Zahlen im Zwanzigjahresvergleich. Die kollektive Anstrengung hat sich gelohnt. Wie es dazu kam, lässt sich in Akita im Norden von Japan gut nachvollziehen, einer Region mit hoher Arbeitslosigkeit, in der besonders viele Menschen ihr Leben beendeten. Hisao Sato ist einer der Pioniere der landesweiten Präventionskampagne. Trauer um den Verlust eines engen Freundes schlug bei ihm in Zorn übers kollektive Wegschauen um. Er schuf um die Jahrtausendwende in Akita eine Anlaufstelle und begann, Verzweifelten Beratungen anzubieten. Nach und nach liessen sich die japanischen Behörden überzeugen, dass landesweit gehandelt werden müsse - und könne. Ein nationales Präventionsgesetz schuf die Grundlagen. Parallel dazu veränderte sich die Wahrnehmung: «Suizid war ein völliges Tabu. Doch die Menschen begannen, die Selbsttötungen nicht nur als Privatsache zu betrachten, sondern als gesellschaftliches Problem», sagt Sato in der Reportage aus Japan über den Erfolg der Präventionskampagne - und düstere Aspekte, die dennoch bleiben. Wer suizidale Gedanken hat, findet bei folgenden Anlaufstellen Soforthilfe: Pro Juventute für Kinder und Jugendliche, Telefon und SMS 147; Dargebotene Hand/Sorgentelefon für Erwachsene, Telefon und SMS 143.

Armed with a press pass and the Japanese language level of a 3 year old, Ben took to the cinemas of Tokyo during the 38th Tokyo International Film Festival. Ben's coverage spans a varied 17 films over 10 days of the festival: buzzy and fresh Japanese films (Bring Him Down to a Portable Size; The Last Blossom; All Greens…) international film festival darlings (Lost Land; Palestine 36…), and a handful of exciting restorations (Demon Pond, Love Massacre…). And if you haven't listened to Ben's interviews from during the festival, what are you waiting for?114. Sato and Sato (2025): Interview with Director Amano Chihiro116. Morte Cucina (2025): Interview with Pen-ek Ratanaruang and Bella Boonsang (forthcoming!)Other Links:Chloe Zhao x Hirokazu Koreedaようこそto our FREE patreon, discord server, and our socials @ www.deepcutpod.com Timestamps:00:00:00 Intro00:04:23 TIFF38 Press Experience00:08:55 Demon Pond (1979) dir. Masahiro Shinoda00:14:28 Pale Flower (1964) dir. Masahiro Shinoda 00:17:55 Floating Clouds (1955) dir. Mikio Naruse00:23:32 Love Massacre (1981) dir. Patrick Tam00:29:01 April Story (1998) dir. April Story00:32:58 3.11 disaster sidebar00:36:10 Blonde (2025) dir. Yûichirô Sakashita00:39:35 Sato and Sato (2025) dir. Chihiro Amano00:43:41 All Greens (2025) dir. Takashi Koyama00:47:40 The Last Blossom (2025) dir. Baku Kinoshita00:52:35 Lost Land (2025) dir. Akio Fujimoto00:58:30 Echoes of the Orient (2025) dir. Yang Liping01:00:55 Labyrinth (2025) dir. Shoji Kawamori01:03:46 Bring Him Down to a Portable Size (2025) dir. Ryota Nakano01:07:18 Morte Cucina (2025) dir. Pen-Ek Ratanaruang01:12:45 Palestine 36 (2025) dir. Annemarie Jacir01:20:16 The Mastermind (2025) dir. Kelly Reichardt01:24:23 Hamnet (2025) dir. Chloé Zhao01:32:55 Wrap-up

Award-Winning Techno Radio Show Since 1992 A legendary radio show dedicated to cutting-edge Techno music, featuring exclusive DJ sets from the world's most renowned international artists. Every episode is a unique sonic journey, recorded in exclusive for one of the most iconic and respected shows in the global electronic music scene. Turn up the volume and ENJOY the experience. No - Tracklist Not - Available For - Promotional- Reasons At - the - moment Thanks - In - Advance Apologies - for - the inconvenience This show is syndicated & distributed exclusively by Syndicast. If you are a radio station interested in airing the show or would like to distribute your podcast / radio show please register here: https://syndicast.co.uk/distribution/registration

In Japan nahmen sich immer mehr Menschen das Leben. Das schockierte die Öffentlichkeit. Die Zivilgesellschaft rüttelte die politischen Verantwortlichen auf, der Kampf gegen die «stille Epidemie» wurde zur nationalen Priorität. Zwanzig Jahre später zeigt sich: der Kampf war erfolgreich. Jedes Jahr 14 000 Suizide weniger. Anders gesagt: 14 000 verzweifelte Menschen in Japan, die wieder Hoffnung schöpfen – so die statistischen Zahlen im Zwanzigjahresvergleich. Die kollektive Anstrengung hat sich gelohnt. Wie es dazu kam, lässt sich in Akita im Norden von Japan gut nachvollziehen, einer Region mit hoher Arbeitslosigkeit, in der besonders viele Menschen ihr Leben beendeten. Hisao Sato ist einer der Pioniere der landesweiten Präventionskampagne. Trauer um den Verlust eines engen Freundes schlug bei ihm in Zorn übers kollektive Wegschauen um. Er schuf um die Jahrtausendwende in Akita eine Anlaufstelle und begann, Verzweifelten Beratungen anzubieten. Nach und nach liessen sich die japanischen Behörden überzeugen, dass landesweit gehandelt werden müsse - und könne. Ein nationales Präventionsgesetz schuf die Grundlagen. Parallel dazu veränderte sich die Wahrnehmung: «Suizid war ein völliges Tabu. Doch die Menschen begannen, die Selbsttötungen nicht nur als Privatsache zu betrachten, sondern als gesellschaftliches Problem», sagt Sato in der Reportage aus Japan über den Erfolg der Präventionskampagne - und düstere Aspekte, die dennoch bleiben. Wer suizidale Gedanken hat, findet bei folgenden Anlaufstellen Soforthilfe: Pro Juventute für Kinder und Jugendliche, Telefon und SMS 147; Dargebotene Hand/Sorgentelefon für Erwachsene, Telefon und SMS 143.

In Japan nahmen sich immer mehr Menschen das Leben. Das schockierte die Öffentlichkeit. Die Zivilgesellschaft rüttelte die politischen Verantwortlichen auf, der Kampf gegen die «stille Epidemie» wurde zur nationalen Priorität. Zwanzig Jahre später zeigt sich: der Kampf war erfolgreich. Jedes Jahr 14 000 Suizide weniger. Anders gesagt: 14 000 verzweifelte Menschen in Japan, die wieder Hoffnung schöpfen – so die statistischen Zahlen im Zwanzigjahresvergleich. Die kollektive Anstrengung hat sich gelohnt. Wie es dazu kam, lässt sich in Akita im Norden von Japan gut nachvollziehen, einer Region mit hoher Arbeitslosigkeit, in der besonders viele Menschen ihr Leben beendeten. Hisao Sato ist einer der Pioniere der landesweiten Präventionskampagne. Trauer um den Verlust eines engen Freundes schlug bei ihm in Zorn übers kollektive Wegschauen um. Er schuf um die Jahrtausendwende in Akita eine Anlaufstelle und begann, Verzweifelten Beratungen anzubieten. Nach und nach liessen sich die japanischen Behörden überzeugen, dass landesweit gehandelt werden müsse - und könne. Ein nationales Präventionsgesetz schuf die Grundlagen. Parallel dazu veränderte sich die Wahrnehmung: «Suizid war ein völliges Tabu. Doch die Menschen begannen, die Selbsttötungen nicht nur als Privatsache zu betrachten, sondern als gesellschaftliches Problem», sagt Sato in der Reportage aus Japan über den Erfolg der Präventionskampagne - und düstere Aspekte, die dennoch bleiben. Wer suizidale Gedanken hat, findet bei folgenden Anlaufstellen Soforthilfe: Pro Juventute für Kinder und Jugendliche, Telefon und SMS 147; Dargebotene Hand/Sorgentelefon für Erwachsene, Telefon und SMS 143.

While attending the 38th Tokyo International Film Festival, Ben was able to interview director Chihiro Amano for her film Sato and Sato.Sato and Sato covers the 15 year span of a relationship as it slowly unravels, covering marriage, parenting, and the ways relationships morph over time. In our short interview, we talk about changing gender dynamics as depicted in Amano's film, how she worked with her cast to create the characters and relationship, and find a little resonance with other Deep Cut director Chantal Akerman. Special thanks to the festival team for arranging the interview and guiding me around the festival, and to the provided interpreter, Ninomiya Yukako.Get hitched at our FREE patreon, discord server, and our socials @ www.deepcutpod.com Timestamps:00:00 Intro01:44 Interview: Same last names03:50 Working with the cast07:47 Women's empowerment09:49 Spoiler10:40 Male insecurity12:44 What is love?13:56 Outro

Mrparka's Weekly Reviews and Update Week 444 (11.15.2025) (Mutant Aliens, Hisayasu Sato) www.youtube.com/mrparkahttps://www.instagram.com/mrparka/https://twitter.com/mrparka00https://www.facebook.com/mrparkahttps://letterboxd.com/mrparka/https://www.patreon.com/mrparkahttps://open.spotify.com/show/2oJbmHxOPfYIl92x5g6ogKhttps://anchor.fm/mrparkahttps://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/mrparkas-weekly-reviews-and-update-the-secret-top-10/id1615278571Time Stamps 0:00“Mutant Aliens” Blu-Ray Review - 0:16“Inflatable Sex Doll of the Wastelands” Blu-Ray Review - 5:50“Trilogy of Swordsmanshop” Blu-Ray Review- 10:49“The New Shaolin Boxers” Blu-Ray Review - 14:11“The Films of Hisayasu Satô: Volume #1: Re-Wind” Blu-Ray Review - 18:15“The Films of Hisayasu Satô: Volume #1: Lustmord” Blu-Ray Review - 24:56“The Films of Hisayasu Satô: Volume #1: Love Letter in the Sand” Blu-Ray Review - 29:15“Black Phone 2” Review - 35:061983  “Surf II” Blu-Ray Review - 44:351983  “Scalps” Blu-Ray Review - 51:321983  “Legend of the Cat Monster” - 54:59Patreon Pick “Full Metal Jacket” Review - 59:38Questions/Answers/ Comments- 1:07:1922 Shots of Moodz and Horror – https://www.22shotsofmoodzandhorror.com/Podcast Under the Stairs – https://tputscast.com/podcastVideo Version – https://youtu.be/f8hz_5I8CsYLinks Deaf Crocodile - https://deafcrocodile.com/Mutant Aliens Blu-Ray - https://mvdshop.com/products/mutant-aliens-blu-rayInflatable Sex Doll of the Wastelands Blu-Ray - https://mvdshop.com/products/inflatable-sex-doll-of-the-wastelands-blu-rayEureka Films - https://eurekavideo.co.uk/Furious Sword and Fantastic Warriors - https://mvdshop.com/products/furious-swords-and-fantastic-warriors-the-heroic-cinema-of-chang-cheh-5-disc-limited-edition-collection-blu-rayVinegar Syndrome - https://vinegarsyndrome.com/The Films of Hisayasu Satô: Volume #1 - https://vinegarsyndrome.com/collections/pink-line/products/sato-1-re-wind-lustmord-love-letter-in-the-sandBlack Phone 2 Rental - https://www.justwatch.com/us/movie/the-black-phone-2Surf II Blu-Ray - https://vinegarsyndrome.com/products/surf-iiScalps Blu-Ray - https://www.amazon.com/Limited-Carroll-Borland-Forrest-Ackerman/dp/B01ASBZY5GLegend of the Cat Monster YouTube- https://youtu.be/dUlTU8ixOEQ?si=lgTk0bhexCzaZsrAFull Metal Jacket 4K - https://www.amazon.com/Metal-Jacket-Ultra-Blu-ray-Digital/dp/B084WKXP77Film NotesMutant Aliens 2001 Directed by Bill PlymptonInflatable Sex Doll of the Wastelands 1967 Directed by Atsushi YamatoyaTrilogy of Swordsmanship 1972 Directed by Cheng Kang, Griffin Yueh Feng, Chang ChehThe New Shaolin Boxers 1976 Directed by Chang Cheh Re-Wind 1988 Directed by Hisayasu SatōLustmord 1987 Directed by Hisayasu SatōLove Letter in the Sand 1988 Directed by Hisayasu SatōBlack Phone 2 2025 Directed by Scott DerricksonSurf II: The End of the Trilogy 1984 Directed by Randall M. BadatScalps 1983 Directed by Fred Olen RayLegend of the Cat Monster 1983 Directed by Nobuhiko ObayashiFull Metal Jacket 1987 Directed by Stanley Kubrick

Podcast o języku z językoznawczynią profesor Joanną Satołą-Staśkowiak. Autorką kilkuset artykułów, 6 książek naukowych oraz słowników. W sferze ściśle naukowej pasjonatką najnowszych technologii lingwistycznych. Wykładowczynią na kierunkach filologicznych, m.in. Filologia, Filologia polska czy Dziennikarstwo i komunikacja społeczna, recenzentką w przewodach doktorskich. Lidia Mirowska - trenerka, wykładowczyni akademicka, nauczycielka, ekspertka e-learningu. Certyfikowana przez Stowarzyszenie E-learningu Akademickiego e-nauczycielka i e-metodyczka. Uczy kompetencji cyfrowych, testuje AI. Metodyczka zdalnego nauczania na Polskim Uniwersytecie Wirtualnym. Wykorzystuje technologię w edukacji, pracuje w projektach międzynarodowych, wdraża innowacje dydaktyczne, pracuje projektowo. Ambasadorka EPALE. dr hab. Joanna Satoła-Staśkowiak, prof. AHE w Łodzi - Filolożka, językoznawczyni, tłumaczka, slawistka, doktor habilitowana w dyscyplinie językoznawstwo na podstawie dysertacji „Najmłodsza leksyka polska i bułgarska”. Studiowała slawistykę i polonistykę na Uniwersytecie Łódzkim. Doktorat i habilitację uzyskała w Instytucie Slawistyki Polskiej Akademii Nauk w Warszawie, w którym pracowała ponad dekadę. W stolicy była także prezeską, wspierającej naukowców, Fundacji Slawistycznej. Od 2017 roku jest profesorem na Wydziale Humanistycznym Akademii Humanistyczno-Ekonomicznej w Łodzi.

Dive into a riveting conversation with Professor Yoichiro Sato, Japan's expert on foreign and security policy. Explore the Quad's evolving role, India-Japan ties, China's maritime strategy, and the delicate balance of military and economic cooperation in Asia.00:35- About Prof Yoichiro SatoProfessor Sato is a professor at the Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University.He is an expert analyst of Foreign and Security Policy, Japan, US, Indo-Pacific.He has published more than 10 academic books and countless articles and book chapters in academic journals. 

Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara on Thursday ruled out the possibility of replacing Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Kei Sato, who is one of the Liberal Democratic Party members involved in the ruling party's "slush funds" scandal.

Japanese lawmaker Kei Sato, who was at the scene of the shooting of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in the western Japan city of Nara in 2022, appeared in the trial of the suspect, Tetsuya Yamagami, as a witness Wednesday, expressing his resentment and grief over the fatal attack.

Apoie o jornalismo independente.  Assine o combo anual de O Antagonista e Crusoé com desconto utilizando o voucher ladoa10  https://bit.ly/ladoa10   Se você busca informação com credibilidade, inscreva-se agora para não perder nenhuma atualização!    

ニューヨークで武者修行に旅立つピアニスト兼プログラマーのHideya Satoをご招待！もよきの大学での友人でもある彼が、意を決してピアニストの道を歩み続ける姿に圧倒されるもよき。まだまだ夢を追いかける30代のエナジーをEarでFeel！InstagramHideya Sato: @hideya1112森: @mori_jariJomni: @jomni__Miki Kehai: @miki_kehaiもじょき宛メッセージ：mojoki@gorinrecordings.comIntro & Outro Jingle by DJ AEONM a.k.a 沼恥骨

In Episode 46, Lisa interviews Mari Sato, a Cleveland-based violinist who has enjoyed a rich and varied career as a solo, orchestra and chamber musician. Mari shares her reflections on the role of musical place in her career as well as thoughts on how being a professional musician influenced her parenting. In the second half of the episode, Season 7 co-host George Blake sets the stage for our exploration of musical place this season. He also provides further context on composer John Luther Adams and his work with musical place. YouTube video of performance of John Luther Adams's work “The Wind in High Places”- No Exit New Music Ensemble String Quartet with special guest Mari Sato YouTube video of performance of Margaret Brouwer's work “All Lines Are Still Busy” for solo violin and narrator

This week TMPT welcomes into the show for our flagship episode, former WWF Superstar, Pat Tanaka. The former WWF superstar joins the show to talk about his entire pro wrestling career. Host John Poz and Pat will discuss breaking into the business, WWF, Mr Fuji, Vince McMahon, Orient Express, Paul Diamond, Sato, AWA, DDP, WCW, Eric Bischoff, and so much more!Store - https://twomanpowertrip.dashery.com/ teepublic.com/stores/tmptFollow us @TwoManPowerTrip on Twitter and IG

We were so grateful to welcome guest ministers Kirby and Miwa Sato, who shared God's heart for missions and their vision for River Valley Tokyo and their personal journey stepping out in faith to plant a church in Japan!Kirby and Miwa pastor River Valley Tokyo, carrying the love of Jesus to one of the most unreached and influential cities in the world.

Charles and Jon talk with carnivore conservation expert Laila Bahaa-el-din.Laila studied the near mythical African Golden Cat for her PhD in Gabon from 2010 - 2015 and was the first to study the species for a PhD.She explains how her grandfather inspired her to follow a career in conservation and how a chance encounter with a mislabeled photo of an African Golden Cat saved her from studying raptors and took her to Gabon.Laila describes how she studied the cats using camera traps and how a bird flying into a tent led to her one and only sighting during four years in the field. She also recounts some of her very many adventures in Gabon that range from pleading with a female gorilla to keep quiet so as not to alert the silverback, to fleeing from an elephant while trying to get out of a poncho.  No wonder she turned to poetry for solace!For more information visit www.mammalwatching.com/podcastNotes: Here is an African Geographic artlce from Laila about her work with the Golden Cat. And here is the video she mentioned of an African Golden Cat hunting Red Colobus in Uganda.Jon's report of his recent trip to Japan in search of Sato's Beaked Whales is here. And hs report of a weekend in China is here. Cover art: African Golden Cat, Laila Bahaa-el-din Dr Charles Foley is a mammalwatcher and biologist who, together with his wife Lara, spent 30 years studying elephants in Tanzania. They now run the Tanzania Conservation Research Program at the Lincoln Park Zoo in Chicago.Jon Hall set up mammalwatching.com in 2005. Genetically Welsh, spiritually Australian, currently in New York City. He has looked for mammals in over 110 countries.

Follow Tim on IG: @timchantarangsu Follow Rick on IG: @rickyshucks Follow Nikki on IG: @NikkiBlades Check out Goodie Brand at https://www.GoodieBrand.com Check out Tim's Patreon for exclusive content at https://www.patreon.com/timchantarangsu To watch the No Chaser podcast on YouTube go to: www.youtube.com/timothy Don't forget to subscribe to the podcast for free wherever you're listening or by using this link: https://bit.ly/NoChaserPodcast Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

July 30, 2025 - Maki Ostrander of Decatur Sister Cities and student ambassadors Mei Sato, Kanon Hikichi, and Andrew Frankovich talk about the program, how the two students from Tokorozawa, Japan are enjoying their stay in Decatur, and Andrew's experience spending time in Japan. Listen to the podcast now!See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

It's the heralding of a new era of Those Days with the introduction of Kaientai! Case (https://twitter.com/_inyourcase) and Mike (https://twitter.com/fujiiheya) discuss the end of the summer of 1994 for Michinoku Pro with focus on the televised shows from Fukushima (9/15/94) and Aomori (9/29), and Sasuke doing Japanese David Letterman, Sasuke vs Liger in MichiPro?, and how the company responded to their then “biggest match of the company's history” falling apart, and most importantly how SATO, Shiryu and Terry Boy would start the group that would make Michinoku Pro famous worldwide.A full match listing of footage covered during this episode can be found at the show post on www.voicesofwrestling.com or in the Open The Voice Gate channel on the VOW Discord.Our podcast provider, Red Circle, offers the listeners the option to sponsor the show. Click on “Sponsor This Podcaster” at https://redcircle.com/shows/open-the-voice-gate and you can donate a single time, or set up a monthly donation to Open the Voice Gate!Please Rate and Review Open The Voice Gate on the podcast platform of your choice and follow us on social media with @openvoicegate!.Advertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

We finish our talk deep dive on Jun Sato this week. We go over his time with the Alliance to Restore the Republic and his legacy. Make sure to follow us on Twitter at @SWHoloHistories. Want to suggest a future topic for us on the show? Email us at holocronhistories@gmail.com Live every Tuesday at 8pm est/5pm pst on Twitch @BenofTemeria Robot Radio Network Discord: https://discord.gg/AW5Wc4kgZb The Cups Podcast and More Discord: https://discord.gg/wYhxAfvT Ben and Friends Podcasting Discord: https://discord.gg/DmPZ2NHhFx Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/holocronhistories Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Fluent Fiction - Japanese: Trusting Instincts: A Quest for the Perfect Tea in Shirakawago Find the full episode transcript, vocabulary words, and more:fluentfiction.com/ja/episode/2025-07-13-22-34-02-ja Story Transcript:Ja: 夏のある日、静かな山村、白川郷の伝統的な茶屋にケイコが訪れました。En: One summer day, Shirakawago, a quiet mountain village, Keiko visited a traditional teahouse.Ja: 白川郷は緑豊かな山々に囲まれた美しい場所でした。En: Shirakawago was a beautiful place surrounded by lush green mountains.Ja: 彼女は特別な緑茶を探していました。その茶を見つけて、おばあさんに喜んでもらいたいと願っていました。En: She was on a quest to find a special green tea; she wished to find this tea to bring joy to her grandmother.Ja: 茶屋の中は、様々なお茶の香りでいっぱいでした。En: Inside the teahouse, it was filled with the fragrance of various teas.Ja: 棚にはたくさんのラベル付きの瓶が並んでいました。En: Shelves were lined with many labeled jars.Ja: 優しそうな顔をしたお茶マスター、ヒロが近づいてきました。En: Hiro, the tea master with a kind-looking face, approached her.Ja: 「ケイコさん、お久しぶりですね。どうしましたか？」ヒロが言いました。En: "Keiko, it's been a while, hasn't it? What's brought you here?" Hiro asked.Ja: 「ヒロさん、お手伝いが必要です。おばあちゃんに特別な緑茶を見つけたいんです。でも、どれがいいのかわかりません」とケイコは不安そうに答えました。En: "Hiro, I need your help. I want to find a special green tea for my grandmother. But I don't know which one to choose," Keiko replied anxiously.Ja: ヒロは笑顔でうなずき、「ケイコさんの感性を信じることが大事ですよ。ここにヒントがあります」と小さな紙を渡しました。En: With a smile, Hiro nodded and said, "It's important to trust your own instincts, Keiko. Here's a hint," and handed her a small piece of paper.Ja: 紙に書かれていたのは「伝統を越え、直感を信じよ」というメッセージだけでした。ケイコはちょっと戸惑いましたが、茶屋の中を歩いてみることにしました。En: Written on the paper was just a message: "Surpass tradition and trust your intuition." Although a bit puzzled, Keiko decided to walk around the teahouse.Ja: 香りを嗅ぎ、茶の色を見比べました。En: She smelled the aromas and compared tea colors.Ja: その時、地元の不思議な人物、サトウがやってきました。En: At that moment, a mysterious local, Sato, appeared.Ja: 「秘密のお茶を探しているのか？」と問いかけてきました。En: "Are you searching for a secret tea?" he inquired.Ja: 彼は茶の秘密を知っていると主張しましたが、完全には信じられませんでした。En: He claimed to know the secrets of tea, but Keiko wasn't entirely convinced.Ja: ケイコはしばらく考えましたが、結局サトウには頼らず、自分の直感を信じることにしました。En: Keiko thought for a while but eventually decided not to rely on Sato and trusted her own intuition instead.Ja: ヒロさんの言葉を思い出し、再び茶棚の前に立ちました。En: Remembering Hiro's words, she stood again in front of the tea shelves.Ja: 突然、ある一瓶の茶が彼女に呼びかけるように見えました。En: Suddenly, one jar seemed to call out to her.Ja: 「これだ！」ケイコは心の中で叫びました。En: "This is it!" Keiko exclaimed in her heart.Ja: その瓶の中のお茶は美しく、深い香りがしました。En: The tea inside the jar was beautiful, and it had a deep fragrance.Ja: この緑茶こそが特別だと直感しました。En: She instinctively felt this green tea was special.Ja: その日の夕方、ケイコはお茶を持って帰り、おばあさんに差し出しました。En: That evening, Keiko returned home with the tea and offered it to her grandmother.Ja: タンバタの夜、おばあさんは茶を淹れてくれました。En: On the night of Tanabata, her grandmother brewed the tea.Ja: お茶を飲んだおばあさんの目に涙が浮かびました。En: Tears welled up in her grandmother's eyes as she drank it.Ja: 「ケイコ、これは本当に素晴らしい茶だね。あなたの努力と成長が感じられるよ」とおばあさんは優しく言いました。En: "Keiko, this tea is truly wonderful. I can feel your effort and growth," her grandmother said gently.Ja: ケイコは、自分の決断力と伝統への理解を信じることができました。En: Keiko was able to believe in her judgment and her understanding of tradition.Ja: タンバタの星空の下、二人はお茶を楽しみ、幸せな時を過ごしました。En: Under the Tanabata starlit sky, the two enjoyed the tea and spent a happy time together.Ja: これからは、ケイコは自信を持って自分の意見を大切にすることができました。En: From then on, Keiko could confidently cherish her own opinions. Vocabulary Words:quest: 探求fragrance: 香りshelves: 棚labeled: ラベル付きapproached: 近づいてきましたinstincts: 感性hint: ヒントsurpass: 越えintuition: 直感puzzled: 戸惑いましたmysterious: 不思議なlocal: 地元の人物inquired: 問いかけてきましたsecrets: 秘密convinced: 信じられませんでしたrely: 頼らずjudgment: 決断力cherish: 大切にするaromas: 香りcompared: 見比べましたinstinctively: 直感しましたbrewed: 淹れてくれましたwelled up: 涙が浮かびeffort: 努力growth: 成長understanding: 理解starlit: 星空の下confidently: 自信を持ってexclaimed: 叫びましたtraditional: 伝統的な

We dive into our next character from Rebel High Command, Jun Sato. Jun Sato first appeared in Star Wars Rebels and is one of the best commanders for the Rebels. Make sure to follow us on Twitter at @SWHoloHistories. Want to suggest a future topic for us on the show? Email us at holocronhistories@gmail.com Live every Tuesday at 8pm est/5pm pst on Twitch @BenofTemeria Robot Radio Network Discord: https://discord.gg/AW5Wc4kgZb The Cups Podcast and More Discord: https://discord.gg/wYhxAfvT Ben and Friends Podcasting Discord: https://discord.gg/DmPZ2NHhFx Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/holocronhistories Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Japanese Surnames, Bike Accident, US Politics, and more! 夫婦別姓、自転車事故、アメリカの政治など！ Join our Discord: https://discord.gg/VGSd94Tp4P Join our Book Club! https://ko-fi.com/i/IF1F01EWI60 Support on ko-fi:  https://ko-fi.com/lazyfluency Main channel:  https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC-8_djC5_aV4Mi3o3fuLPLA Send us questions at:  lazyfluency@gmail.com  

Bright on Buddhism - Episode 118 - What is the relationship between Japanese imperialism and Japanese Buddhism? Why were Buddhist temples pro-empire? What are their stances today?Resources: Bodiford, William (1996), "Zen and the Art of Religious Prejudice. Efforts to Reform a Tradition of Social Discrimination" (PDF), Japanese Journal of Religious Studies, 23 (1–2); Crook, John (1995), The Place of the Dharma in Our Time; Crook, John (2000), The Place of Chan in Post-Modern Europe; Heisig, James W.; Maraldo, John C., eds. (1995), Rude Awakenings. Zen, the Kyoto School, and the question of nationalism (PDF), Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, archived from the original (PDF) on August 30, 2012; Hur, Nam-lin (1999), "The Sõtõ Sect and Japanese Military Imperialism in Korea" (PDF), Japanese Journal of Religious Studies, 26 (1–2); Lachs, Stuart (1999), Means of Authorization: Establishing Hierarchy in Ch'an /Zen Buddhism in America; Lachs, Stuart (2002), Richard Baker and the Myth of the Zen Roshi; Lachs, Stuart (2006), The Zen Master in America: Dressing the Donkey with Bells and Scarves; Peek, John M. (1992), Buddhism, Human Rights and the Japanese State; Sato, Kemmyō Taira (n.d.), D.T. Suzuki and the Question of War (PDF), archived from the original (PDF) on 2014-10-25; Sharf, Robert H. (August 1993), "The Zen of Japanese Nationalism", History of Religions, 33 (1): 1–43, doi:10.1086/463354; Sharf, Robert H. (1995), Whose Zen? Zen Nationalism Revisited (PDF); Tiltenberg (2002), Zen Without Dirty Hands? Report from a seminar and retreat at De Tiltenberg, Vogelenzang in the Netherlands July 17–22, 2001, Couste Que Couste, ISBN 90-807042-3-7; Victoria, Brian Daizen (2006), Zen at war (Second ed.), Lanham e.a.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers; Yasuaki, Nara (n.d.), The Soto Zen School in Modern Japan; Gier, Nicholas, F. Buddhism and Japanese Nationalism: A sad chronicle of complicity Archived 2016-10-10 at the Wayback Machine; Victoria, Brian Daizen (2010), "The "Negative Side" of D. T. Suzuki's Relationship to War" (PDF), The Eastern Buddhist, 41 (2): 97–138; Otani Eiichi, "Missionary Activities of Nichiren Buddhism in East Asia", in: "Modern Japanese Buddhism and Pan-Asianism", The 19th World Congress of the International Association for the History of Religions, Tokyo, March 28, 2005, pp. 21–22 PDF; Kawase Takaya, "The Jodo Shinshu Sectś Missionary Work in Colonial Korea"; in: "Modern Japanese Buddhism and Pan-Asianism", The 19th World Congress of the International Association for the History of Religions, Tokyo, March 28, 2005, pp. 6–7 PDFDo you have a question about Buddhism that you'd like us to discuss? Let us know by emailing us at Bright.On.Buddhism@gmail.com.Credits:Nick Bright: Script, Cover Art, Music, Voice of Hearer, Co-HostProven Paradox: Editing, mixing and mastering, social media, Voice of Hermit, Co-Host

Top 10 Greatest Players of ALL TIME, submit yours here: https://forms.gle/XeBZ9gniG18EEBm9A

Is there a better, safer, FREE alternative to Ozempic (and other GLP-1 drugs)? In this episode of Walk, Don't Run to the Doctor, Miles Hassell MD reacts to the growing buzz and shares a time-tested, evidence-based 3-step plan that outperforms popular weight loss drugs in the long run. As GLP-1 drugs like Ozempic, Wegovy, and Mounjaro surge in popularity, Dr. Hassell offers critical insight into their risks—like muscle loss, pancreatic complications, and long-term unknowns—while proposing a practical, natural alternative for lasting weight loss and better metabolic health. Key Takeaways: Why Big Pharma's track record with weight loss drugs demands caution The secret 3-step plan: Eat 6 servings of fruits & veggies, 3 minutes of daily exercise, reduce refined carbs Bonus tips: Bust cravings by eating protein with every meal, daily probiotics, and unlock the power of preemptive eating Why this plan costs nothing, has zero side effects, and starts showing results in just one week A timely message in light of the weight loss drug headlines—who should be in control of your health?  More references can be found at www.GreatMed.org Get your copy of Good Food Great Medicine. https://a.co/d/ajAzYzo Would you like Dr. Hassell to answer your question on the air? Contact us! Phone/text: 503-773-0770 e-mail: info@GreatMed.org Write us a letter. We love to hear from you. This podcast is sponsored by our generous listeners. Send questions, comments, and support to: 4804 NW Bethany Blvd., Suite I-2, #273 Portland OR 97229 References: Chen, X., et al. (2025). Association of dietary fiber intake with all-cause and cardiovascular mortality in diabetes and prediabetes. Diabetology & metabolic syndrome, 17(1), 231. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/40533827/   Look, M., et al. (2025). Body composition changes during weight reduction with tirzepatide in the SURMOUNT-1 study of adults with obesity or overweight. Diabetes, obesity & metabolism, 27(5), 2720–2729. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/39996356/   Wilding, J., et al. (2021). Once-Weekly Semaglutide in Adults with Overweight or Obesity. The New England journal of medicine, 384(11), 989–1002. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/33567185/   Tinsley, G. M., & Heymsfield, S. B. (2024). Fundamental Body Composition Principles Provide Context for Fat-Free and Skeletal Muscle Loss With GLP-1 RA Treatments. Journal of the Endocrine Society, 8(11),https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/39372917/    Neeland, I. J., et al. (2024). Changes in lean body mass with glucagon-like peptide-1-based therapies and mitigation strategies. Diabetes, obesity & metabolism, 26 Suppl 4, 16–27. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/38937282/   Sato, M., et al. (2023). Relationships among Postprandial Plasma Active GLP-1 and GIP Excursions, Skeletal Muscle Mass, and Body Fat Mass in Patients with Type 2 Diabetes Treated with Either Miglitol, Sitagliptin, or Their Combination: A Secondary Analysis of the MASTER Study. Journal of clinical medicine, 12(9), 3104. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/37176545/   Monami, M., et al. (2017). Safety issues with glucagon-like peptide-1 receptor agonists (pancreatitis, pancreatic cancer and cholelithiasis): Data from randomized controlled trials. Diabetes, obesity & metabolism, 19(9), 1233–1241. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/28244632/   Anderson, S. L., & Trujillo, J. M. (2010). Association of pancreatitis with glucagon-like peptide-1 agonist use. The Annals of pharmacotherapy, 44(5), 904–909. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/20371755/   Kapoor, I., Sarvepalli, S. M., D'Alessio, D., Grewal, D. S., & Hadziahmetovic, M. (2023). GLP-1 receptor agonists and diabetic retinopathy: A meta-analysis of randomized clinical trials. Survey of ophthalmology, 68(6), 1071–1083. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/37454782/   Bikou, A., et al. (2024). A systematic review of the effect of semaglutide on lean mass: insights from clinical trials. Expert opinion on pharmacotherapy, 25(5), 611–619. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/38629387/   Jalleh, R. J., et al. (2024). Clinical Consequences of Delayed Gastric Emptying With GLP-1 Receptor Agonists and Tirzepatide. The Journal of clinical endocrinology and metabolism, 110(1), 1–15. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/39418085/   Berg, S. AMA. (2023). Questions patients may have about weight-loss drugs. https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/public-health/questions-patients-may-have-about-weight-loss-drugs   Friedman, J. (2025). America's up-and-down history with weight-loss drugs. https://www.history.com/articles/weight-loss-drugs-america    

Last time we spoke about the victory at Okinawa.. As American forces led by General Buckner advanced, they captured strategic key points, driving the Japanese into a desperate retreat. Despite overwhelming odds, the remaining Japanese defenders, embodying the samurai spirit, fought to the bitter end, hoping to gain time for their homeland's defenses. On June 21, faced with inevitable defeat, Generals Ushijima and Cho chose to commit seppuku in honor of their duty. Their tragic decision underscored the deep commitment to their cause, an adherence to the warrior code. By this point, countless Japanese soldiers surrendered, acknowledging the futility of their fight. As the month drew to a close, the Americans secured Okinawa, a hard-won victory shadowed by staggering casualties, more than 107,000 Japanese lives lost and significant American losses. This battle not only symbolized the relentless spirit of those who fought but also the tragic costs of war, forever etched in history as a vivid reminder of sacrifice and the haunting price of conflict. This episode is Liberation of Luzon Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  For most, the battle of Okinawa basically ends the Pacific War, but the truth is the war was raging all over the place. The second most noticeable place would be Luzon, where the remnants of General Yamashit'as 14th Area Army were still resisting in the northern and eastern mountain ranges. Yet here too, the curtains were beginning to fall. As we last left off, it was mid-April 1945, and the fierce struggle for the liberation of Luzon was reaching a critical phase. General Eichelberger's 8th Army was actively engaged in offensives across the Visayas and Mindanao, while General Krueger's 6th Army focused its might on two primary sectors in Luzon. The stakes were high, the liberation of Luzon was crucial for securing Manila and restoring the Filipino government that had been disrupted by the war. In the northern sector, General Swift's 1st Corps was grappling with General Yamashita's formidable Shobu Group, who were entrenched in this mountainous terrain, making the fighting particularly arduous. Meanwhile, General Hall's 11th Corps was applying relentless pressure on the opposing Shimbu Group, led by General Yokoyama, in the vital areas east of Manila. Starting in the northern reaches of Luzon, we find General Clarkson's 33rd Division making tangible advances, having secured Route 11 up to Camp 3, as well as segments of the Galiano Road and the Tuba Trail. This area, known for its treacherous paths and thick jungle, posed significant challenges, but the troops pressed on. Northward, General Beightler's 37th Division was also on the move, with its 129th Regiment overcoming all enemy resistance along Route 9, reaching the critical town of Sablan by April 14. Not to be overlooked, Colonel Volckmann's guerrilla 121st Regiment had carved a path up Route 4 to the strategically important Bessang Pass, known for its rugged terrain that offers a natural defense. General Mullins' 25th Division was making notable progress towards Balete Pass, gaining crucial footholds on Crump Hill and Myoko Ridge. These positions were essential as they provided elevated vantage points over the surrounding valleys. On the western front, General Gill's 32nd Division had successfully secured the western Salacsac Pass but still faced stiff enemy positions in the eastern pass, where Japanese forces were well-prepared to defend. With the arrival of the bulk of the 37th Division in early April, Swift was poised to launch a dynamic two-division drive towards Baguio, a city nestled in the mountains that had become a strategic goal due to its position and resources. While Clarkson's units continued to engage in patrol actions in the Arboredo, Agno, and Ambayabang River valleys, there was limited progress in these areas. However, the 129th Regiment initiated a decisive attack on Sablan on April 11, successfully breaching Japanese defenses there by April 14. On that pivotal day, the 148th Regiment took charge of securing Route 9 through Calot, a vital corridor for advancing troops. Meanwhile, the 130th Regiment encountered fierce resistance as it pushed west of Asin along the Galiano Road, exemplifying the tenacity of Japanese forces determined to hold their ground. As the battle raged, General Yamashita was already strategizing to evacuate Baguio. By April 19, he made the decision to relocate to the Bambang front, leaving Major-General Utsunomiya Naokata, one of his trusted chiefs of staff, in command of the remaining forces.  Despite the growing pressure on Route 9, the Japanese command seemed out of touch by the second week of April 1945. They inaccurately assessed that the primary thrust of General Swift's 1st Corps would come along Route 11, allowing them to become complacent. This misplaced confidence led to a failure to redeploy troops to counter the increasing threat on their right flank. Instead of fortifying their defenses, they appeared to adopt an inexplicable, almost defeatist attitude, unusual for a military as disciplined as the Imperial Japanese Army. Compounding this lack of urgency was the intense effort from the 14th Area Army headquarters to evacuate civilians and supplies from Baguio, a city perched high in the Cordillera Central mountain range. This evacuation served as a clear signal that the situation was deteriorating, yet the Japanese command remained strangely passive. Yamashita's mindset regarding the unfolding crisis was evident when he made personal preparations to depart for the Bambang front on April 19. In a move echoing his earlier strategy for the Bambang area, he established an independent command for the Baguio front before his departure. Utsunomiya's responsibilities also included nominal command over the 19th Division, stationed north of Baguio, but his control was hampered by significant communication difficulties that plagued the Japanese forces. The first notable action Utsunomiya took was to relieve the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade from the 23rd Division's control, seeking to streamline command. Under Yamashita's directive to hold Baguio for as long as possible before retreating to a new defensive line, Utsunomiya issued an order for all troops along the existing Main Line of Resistance  "hold out to the last man." His tone betrayed the grim reality, coming across as almost ironic given the mounting pressures they faced. Meanwhile, General Sato's 58th Independent Mixed Brigade was frantically working to fortify defenses along Route 9, southeast of Calot. However, their efforts came too late to prevent the 148th Regiment from swiftly capturing Yagyagan on April 15, gaining a crucial foothold in the area. In response to this setback, Sato began sending reinforcements to the Irisan Gorge starting April 16, apparently under Utsunomiya's orders. This narrow, treacherous gorge, surrounded by steep cliffs, was seen as a pivotal point for a last-ditch defense. The Japanese troops managed to repel the initial assaults from the 148th Regiment on April 17, but as night fell, the Americans executed a series of enveloping maneuvers, ultimately securing Ridge A. The following morning, the 148th seized Ridge C; however, their frontal assaults against Ridge B were met with fierce resistance and ended in failure. On April 19, the tide began to turn. After a devastating air strike and concentrated artillery fire that neutralized most of the Japanese positions on Ridge F, the Americans finally captured Ridge B. Concurrently, other American units seized Hills D and E, effectively cutting off the Japanese retreat route. The relentless pressure continued, and the next day, Ridges F and G were subjected to intense attacks, which ultimately resulted in their capture. This relentless campaign forced the Japanese to withdraw to Ridge H, where they continued to regroup. After heavy bombardment, the Irisan Gorge was finally cleared on April 21, sending the surviving defenders scrambling in retreat. As these operations unfolded, the 130th Regiment was busy repositioning two battalions from the Galiano Road to the junction of the Yagyagan Trail along Route 9, poised to mount a coordinated attack on Asin from both the east and west. On April 22, they launched their offensive, catching the Japanese defenders by surprise and effectively dismantling their defenses. By the afternoon of April 23, the Galiano Road was opened for American forces, marking a significant advancement in their campaign. Concurrently, the 129th Regiment had taken over operations from the 148th Regiment and advanced against only scattered resistance, making significant progress as far southeast as the junction of the highway and the Galiano Road. However, their advance was ultimately halted due to concerns about a potential threat from the north. Seizing on this hesitation, General Utsunomiya decided to leave small delaying forces at Trinidad and Baguio, while initiating a general withdrawal to the north and northeast. With Utsunomiya's defensive lines weakened, American patrols were able to enter Baguio on April 24, met with surprisingly little resistance. By April 26, the 129th had effectively secured most of the city, facing only negligible opposition. Simultaneously, elements from the 123rd and 130th Regiments worked diligently to eliminate the remaining Japanese defenses on nearby Mount Calugong, along the Tuba Trail, and on Mount Mirador, ensuring the area was cleared for further American operations. Despite these American successes, Utsunomiya managed to escape with approximately 10,000 troops to the Baguio-Aritao supply road, a crucial evacuation route for Japanese forces. As the end of April approached and into the first days of May, the 37th Division continued to mop up the surrounding areas, further securing Trinidad. Meanwhile, the 33rd Division also pressed forward, capturing the Balinguay-Itogon-Pitican sector, enhancing their control over the region. Looking eastward, General Gill's demoralized 32nd Division was still engaged in fierce fighting through the Salacsac Pass, hampered in their advance along the Villa Verde Trail.  During the second week of April 1945, observers from the 6th Army headquarters reported alarming morale issues within the 32nd Division, echoing concerns that General Krueger had personally noted during previous visits to the front lines. The soldiers of the 126th and 128th Regiments were on the brink of complete mental and physical exhaustion. Front-line troops, many of whom had spent significant time overseas, were becoming overly cautious, possibly from the toll of constant combat. Conversations among the men frequently centered around one urgent topic: their rotation back to the United States. The once aggressive spirit characteristic of these combat troops was waning rapidly. With dwindling numbers and pervasive personnel issues, it was clear that the division would struggle to mount any spectacular gains in the coming days. If they couldn't quicken their pace along the critical Villa Verde Trail, reaching their objective, Santa Fe, by the targeted date of June 1 appeared increasingly unlikely. Delays would be catastrophic; they risked being trapped on the trail by the heavy rains of the impending wet season, which typically began in late May. Such circumstances would severely hinder their ability to withdraw and salvage their equipment from the treacherous mountainous terrain. Meanwhile, the Japanese forces retained key terrain advantages, allowing them to economically utilize their troops and reinforce their front lines almost at will. In stark contrast, the rugged landscape severely restricted the 32nd Division's maneuverability, forcing them to repeatedly launch costly frontal assaults with their diminishing strength. While terrain and weather conditions presented significant challenges, the growing personnel crisis loomed as a critical factor likely to further limit the division's progress in the days ahead. Compounding their challenges, General Iwanaka's reconstituted 2nd Tank Division had suffered heavy casualties, leaving General Konuma unable to provide further reinforcements. On April 17, the rested 127th Regiment finally began its move to relieve the beleaguered 128th Regiment at the western pass, launching operations to clear the last remnants of Japanese forces from the Hill 506-507 area. Although Hill 506B fell rapidly on April 19, and Hill 507C was captured three days later, American forces struggled to completely clear Hill 507D until May 2, underscoring the tenacity of the Japanese defenders. Despite the challenges, enough ground had been cleared by April 26 for the 2nd Battalion to initiate a drive east along and south of the Villa Verde Trail, aiming for the strategically important Hill 508. The Japanese forces, sensing this new threat, responded with fierce counterattacks from both the east and north, managing to delay the American capture of Hill 508 until April 29. The intense fighting illustrated the importance of this elevation, which offered vital visibility over the surrounding landscapes. In the days that followed, the 2nd Battalion expanded its control over Hill 508, establishing a defensive block on the Villa Verde Trail to the north while successfully repelling a series of heavy Japanese counterattacks. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion made significant strides by attacking and capturing Hill 509, further consolidating American positions in the area. Simultaneously, the 2nd Battalion of the 126th Regiment launched an offensive south from Hill 511, seizing Hill 515 on April 24. They advanced into the area north of Hill 508 while the 1st Battalion navigated through the rugged terrain of Hills 513 and 514, pressing southward to Hill 516. Their advance culminated in the capture of the crest of Hill 525, where they established a critical block on the Villa Verde Trail. However, the cost of these advances was significant. Due to the heavy losses incurred during these operations, the barely rested 128th Regiment began the process of relieving the exhausted 126th on May 3. Shortly after, the 128th's 2nd Battalion launched an assault southeast, successfully capturing Hill 526 on May 7, while some elements initiated a drive towards Hill 527. To the further east, General Mullins' 25th Division was persistently pushing its Santa Fe offensive against stubborn Japanese resistance. In a stroke of fortune, a successful aerial reconnaissance mission revealed that ground located just 1,000 yards west of their position might offer a more favorable route of advance to Balete Ridge, providing a welcome alternative to the challenging Myoko mass itself. On April 22, a reconnaissance force from the 27th Regiment successfully moved undetected to the southern slope of Balete Ridge, positioning themselves for a critical advance. The following day, the rest of the 2nd Battalion began to push toward Lone Tree Hill, while other units continued to exert pressure on the entrenched Japanese defenses at Myoko. Moving forward with enthusiasm and encountering negligible resistance, the Americans reached Lone Tree Hill on April 25, effectively bypassing the main concentrations of enemy forces. By April 27, the 2nd Battalion had advanced an impressive half mile beyond Lone Tree Hill, with its forward elements only three-quarters of a mile from Balete Pass. However, they were compelled to halt their advance due to the potential threat of an enemy counterattack looming on the horizon. Meanwhile, on April 23, the 35th Regiment began its ascent up Kapintalan Ridge, steadily making progress despite the challenging terrain. By April 27, their leading troops had reached a prominent knob located midway between Route 5 and Lone Tree Hill. The 161st Regiment was also making strides, continuing its attack northward towards Kembu Ridge, where they successfully secured Hill 4625 and the entirety of Highley Ridge by April 28. On that same day, the 27th Regiment began reinforcing their positions on Lone Tree Hill, while elements of the 2nd Battalion initiated a southwest push along Kapintalan Ridge to support the 35th Regiment advancing up Route 5. However, they encountered a formidable strongpoint and were only able to gain 350 yards of new ground northeast from the knob. Simultaneously, elements of the 27th Regiment advanced a modest 500 yards southwest by May 4, indicating the ongoing struggle. That morning, the 1st Battalion of the 161st Regiment seized the southeastern nose of Kembu Ridge, securing a valuable tactical position. At the same time, the 2nd Battalion pushed troops onto the ridge, extending their reach half a mile to the northwest, further consolidating American control in the area. As a breakthrough appeared imminent, General Krueger began dispatching Beightler's 37th Division to the Bambang front on May 2, with all elements of the division departing the Baguio area just three days later. With these reinforcements securing his rear and taking control of the Myoko massif, General Mullins ordered the 27th and 161st Regiments to concentrate their forces for a coordinated attack aimed at enveloping Balete Pass from both the east and west. On May 5, the 161st swiftly broke through Kembu Ridge and advanced to Haruna Ridge, while the 27th Regiment pushed west-northwest along Wolfhound Ridge. However, they faced fierce resistance, gaining only 350 yards against tenacious Japanese defenders. On May 8, Company I successfully launched a southwest offensive from their stronghold along a bare-crested ridge, while Company A deployed on Kenbu Ridge and began ascending the final sections of the Digdig River gorge. The following day, these two companies finally made contact with each other and linked up with the 161st on Haruna Ridge. By May 10, Wolfhound Ridge was secured, coinciding with elements of the 35th Regiment completing the clearance of Route 5 from Kapintalan to the pass. In the meantime, the 35th Regiment, along with units from the 27th, continued their assault on Kapintalan Ridge, which was ultimately secured by May 13. Meanwhile, the 148th Regiment renewed its attacks on Myoko Ridge, where Japanese resistance began to collapse by May 11. With these gains, Balete Pass was now secure. The Americans had incurred 565 men killed and 1,745 wounded during the drive, while General Okamoto's 10th Division experienced catastrophic losses, with nearly 7,000 men killed and a complete breakdown of their control and communications. Reflecting on the situation in Salacsac, by May 8, the Japanese position was deteriorating rapidly. In response, General Iwanaka made the critical decision to dispatch troops aimed at cutting the supply line to the 2nd Battalion of the 128th Regiment, with the intention of safeguarding his main stronghold at Mount Imugan. On that day, the 1st Battalion of the 128th Regiment began to push eastward, facing strong resistance, while elements of the 2nd Battalion moved west from Hill 526, struggling to make any significant progress. By May 10, Japanese forces successfully severed the track between Hills 525 and 516, forcing much of the 128th and one battalion of the 127th Regiment to allocate considerable resources to eliminate the Japanese pocket that had formed in that area. Meanwhile, the 33rd Division was left disheartened as it found itself assigned a holding mission to secure the Baguio-Bauang-San Fernando area. Their operations were limited to minor local gains and long-range reconnaissance, which did little to impact the overall situation.  During May 1945, the only significant action undertaken by the 33rd Division took place along a trail connecting Santa Rosa in the Ambayabang Valley to Tebbo, located on the Agno River five miles south of Pitican. The division focused its efforts on clearing Japanese forces from the high ground situated between the main trail and the upper reaches of the Ambayabang Valley. On May 9, a battalion of the 130th Regiment advanced south from Baguio via Pitican and reached Tebbo, only to find the barrio abandoned. Meanwhile, on May 5, the 136th Regiment began its advance up the Ambayabang Valley. Approximately three miles south of Tebbo, they became embroiled in a ten-day battle, resulting in the deaths of a few hundred Japanese troops. However, these enemy forces posed little threat to the 33rd Division, their primary mission being to block American attacks toward the Baguio-Aritao supply road from the south. As the rainy season approached, 1st Corps and the 33rd Division had long since abandoned plans to use the valley as a route of advance against the Japanese supply lines. Consequently, the 136th Regiment relinquished the terrain it had gained along the valley and the trail to Tebbo almost immediately after capturing it. By May 15, all troops of the 33rd Division began their withdrawal, a challenging task compounded by heavy rains that had transformed the Pitican-Tebbo trail and the trails in the Ambayabang Valley into quagmires. The final destruction of the Japanese blocking force in the valley had little impact on the strategic plans or dispositions of 1st Corps or the Shobu Group, as the Japanese quickly replenished their outposts. By the end of May, the 33rd Division was left executing reconnaissance missions without significant enemy contact or major advances. The division remained in a state of restless anticipation, awaiting developments on the Bontoc and Bambang fronts before the 6th Army would authorize a new drive deeper into the rugged mountains of northern Luzon. Turning to the north, the guerrilla 121st Regiment achieved a significant victory on April 21 by overrunning the last Japanese positions on Lamagan Ridge. About a week later, they completed their occupation of Lower Cadsu. However, during the first part of May, the 121st Regiment faced formidable challenges as they advanced over steep terrain against increasingly fortified Japanese defenses, bolstered by reinforcements from General Ozaki's 19th Division. In the south, Hall's 11th Corps made good progress throughout mid-April, successfully pushing General Yokoyama's 41st Army, previously known as the Shimbu Group, further east from Manila. Concurrently, General Hurdis' 6th Division continued its offensive against the Kobayashi Detachment at Wawa Dam, achieving a notable success by securing the crest of Mount Mataba on April 17, marking a significant tactical gain in the ongoing battle. Despite General Hurdis' hopes to swiftly advance against Mount Pacawagan and Wawa Dam, persistent personnel issues forced him to halt any offensive actions until the 145th Regiment could relieve the 20th Regiment in the Montalban area. The 145th eventually began its assault on Pacawagan on April 21. However, even with effective supporting fire that destroyed much of the enemy's defenses, American forces struggled to secure a foothold on the mountain until the end of the month. Meanwhile, the 1st and 63rd Regiments continued to hold their occupied ground until they were relieved late in April by the 151st and 152nd Regiments of General Chase's 38th Division, which then officially assumed control of the offensive operations. In the southern part of Manila, significant water supply problems prompted General Hall to redeploy General Wing's 43rd Division northward in preparation for an offensive against Ipo Dam.  By mid-April 1945, an acute water shortage had developed within the city of Manila. General MacArthur informed General Krueger about the dire situation, noting that south of the Pasig River, Manila had access to no water sources except for that supplied by Army tank trucks and shallow, often contaminated wells. This shortage significantly hampered sewage disposal throughout the city, as water pressure from the overtaxed Novaliches Reservoir, the only reliable source was insufficient to carry off waste. As a result, flush toilets were frequently clogged, forcing many citizens to resort to using gutters and esteros for defecation. Restaurants and nightclubs, which were heavily frequented by off-duty American troops, struggled to maintain even minimum sanitary standards. The situation was exacerbated by a steady influx of military units and civilians into the metropolitan area, raising concerns about the imminent threat of severe epidemics breaking out in the city. On April 19, MacArthur suggested to Krueger that the 6th Army could resolve Manila's water supply crisis by seizing "the reservoir in the Montalban area." He inquired how soon the installation could be captured. This query puzzled Krueger, who was aware that the only true reservoirs linked to the Manila water system were located west of the Marikina River and had been under American control since February. Furthermore, Krueger understood that Wawa Dam, the nearest water supply installation to Montalban, was no longer connected to the metropolitan system. He subsequently asked MacArthur if by "reservoir in the Montalban area," he meant Ipo Dam, the only major water installation still in Japanese hands. Krueger's question seemingly led to further examination of Manila's water system at General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area (GHQ SWPA). On April 22, MacArthur radioed back to Krueger, confirming that Ipo Dam was indeed the preferred objective. He emphasized that capturing the Ipo installation would effectively solve Manila's water supply problems. Upon receiving this directive, Krueger ordered the 11th Corps to launch a drive on Ipo Dam as soon as possible. This shift in forces meant the 112th Cavalry Regiment had to move south to take over the vacated positions. General Wing conducted a reconnaissance-in-force that revealed the Kawashima Force's defenses south of Route 52 were considerably weaker than those around the main highway. In light of this intelligence, the plan for assault was set into motion. On the night of May 6, the 103rd Regiment was ordered to advance towards Mount Katitinga and prepare to attack the dam. Supporting this effort, the 172nd Regiment would strike across a two-mile-wide front to the left of the 103rd towards the dam, while the 169th Regiment was tasked with demonstrating along Route 52 to pin down Japanese forces in the Bigti region. Additionally, Marking's Fil-American Yay Regiment at Norzagaray was to make a feint drive eastward north of the Angat River, targeting Mount Kabuyao. During the first three days of May, General Chase conducted probing attacks in preparation for a concerted offensive aimed at Wawa Dam, which was set to begin on May 4. Simultaneously, General Yokoyama observed what he believed to be a slowdown in enemy progress, leading him to conclude that American forces must be redeploying northward or evacuating from Luzon entirely. This prompted him to prepare a limited counteroffensive, consisting of a series of harassing and delaying actions designed to pin down enemy forces on this front. Consequently, Yokoyama was not anticipating a major offensive on May 4. However, on that day, the 145th Regiment managed to gain up to 1,000 yards along the northern and northeastern slopes of Pacawagan, while the 152nd Regiment advanced approximately 500 yards northward along Woodpecker Ridge. Although these territorial gains were not monumental, Yokoyama became increasingly concerned about the strength of the American attacks and made the urgent decision to launch his counteroffensive. As Japanese forces hurried to reposition for their counterattacks, the 145th Regiment struck eastward, successfully seizing the rocky summit of Mount Binicayan. Meanwhile, the 152nd continued its efforts along Woodpecker Ridge. This coordinated assault completely surprised General Kobayashi's troops, rendering their planned counterattack impossible as they were forced to shift their focus to defending their critical positions. In the southern sector, General Kawashima dispatched one battalion toward Montalban; however, the heavy air assaults that preceded Wing's offensive made it impossible for the Japanese unit to organize effectively for their attack. Adding to the Japanese troubles, the remnants of the Noguchi Force were unable to provide any significant reinforcements. Despite the surprise and disarray among the Japanese defenders, they could not prevent the 145th from capturing the crest of Binicayan on May 9. The troops stationed on Woodpecker Ridge experienced some success by halting the advance of the 152nd and initiated a week of increasingly aggressive dawn and dusk raids starting on May 14. Recognizing the futility of the ongoing conflict, which had resulted in over 1,300 Japanese casualties, General Yokoyama ordered an immediate withdrawal of all units involved on May 15. However, these orders would not reach the front lines until a week later. In the meantime, capitalizing on the element of surprise achieved during the night attack on May 6, General Wing launched an offensive that made excellent progress. The 103rd Regiment rapidly gained control of the western slopes of Katitinga and advanced swiftly along the ridgeline toward Hill 1000. Meanwhile, the 172nd Regiment reached the foot of a rocky ridge two miles southeast of Bigti, and the Marking Regiment encountered no resistance as it marched over seven miles eastward, ultimately halting just a mile and a half northwest of Kabuyao. The only significant resistance encountered occurred at Hill 535, where elements of a guerrilla unit were repelled by Japanese defenders. The unexpectedly weak Japanese opposition prompted the 43rd Division to sustain its offensive momentum without pause. By May 11, the 103rd had secured Hills 805 and 810, while the 172nd was probing Japanese defenses on Fork Ridge and advancing to the southwestern slopes of rocky Hill 815. The Marking Regiment had successfully overrun Kabuyao, though they were unable to capture Four-Corner Hill. At this point, Japanese resistance began to stiffen as American forces clashed with General Kawashima's main defenses. In response, Wing ordered the 169th Regiment to mount a limited attack on Osboy Ridge and directed the Marking guerrillas to launch a strong assault toward Ipo. Supported by artillery, Colonel Marcus Augustin succeeded in breaking through Four-Corner Hill on May 12, marking a critical turning point in the offensive. Unaware of Kawashima's precarious situation, Yokoyama directed the Kawashima Force to initiate a new counterattack against the left and left rear of the 38th Division, deeming the situation for the Kobayashi Force to be more critical. As a result, Kawashima was compelled to divert one battalion for this unnecessary assault, which weakened the Japanese defenses. This strategic miscalculation enabled General Wing to make significant gains on May 13, with the 103rd Regiment capturing Hill 860, the 172nd clearing much of Hill 815, and the Marking guerrillas seizing the summit of Hill 803. The extent of these advances prompted Kawashima to ultimately disregard Yokoyama's orders and recall his assault battalion. This battalion promptly mounted a counterattack against the Americans in a futile attempt to regain lost ground, managing only to restrict the 103rd and 172nd Regiments to minor gains on May 14. Simultaneously, Colonel Augustin's patrols crossed the Angat River unopposed, discovering that the dam remained intact and the powerhouse on the south bank was largely undamaged. However, the patrol force, too weak to hold these installations, retreated before dawn to the crest of Hill 803, where the remainder of the regiment was occupied with mopping up remaining resistance. Looking further south, General Griswold's 14th Corps had already secured most of southern Luzon and had successfully landed General MacNider's 158th Regiment in the Bicol Peninsula. In response, the remnants of the Fuji Force and the depleted Kogure Detachment decided to evacuate the open Santa Maria Valley, opting to retreat to more defensible positions at the Kapatalin Sawmill. This allowed Griswold to move the 7th and 8th Cavalry Regiments into the valley, with the former beginning a drive along Route 455 on May 6. Following a heavy air and artillery bombardment, the cavalrymen launched their assault on the sawmill on May 9 and swiftly overran the enemy defenses by mid-afternoon. After a brief pause to reorganize, the 7th Cavalry advanced up Route 455, leaving their vehicles behind, and reached Lamon Bay by May 13. Meanwhile, on the Bicol Peninsula, progress had been agonizingly slow throughout late April. It wasn't until April 28 that the Cituinan Hills were fully secured, leading to the collapse of organized Japanese resistance in the region. Following this, the 158th Regiment began moving northwestward toward Iriga and San Agustin, rapidly overrunning the remaining weak enemy positions along Route 1. Progress continued to be painfully slow, and it was not until 28 April that organized Japanese resistance finally collapsed. The task of clearing the Cituinan Hills cost the 158th Infantry approximately 40 men killed and 235 wounded; the Japanese lost almost 700 men killed in the region. Although the 158th RCT did not know it, the reduction of the Cituinan Hills marked the end of large-scale organized resistance on the Bicol Peninsula, where no more than 1,400 Japanese remained alive as of the end of April. Simultaneously, the 5th Cavalry Regiment captured Calauag on April 14 and began a two-pronged advance toward San Agustin by the end of the month. On May 2, San Agustin was finally taken as elements of both regiments converged there. Guerrillas had informed XIV Corps, which acquired control of the 158th RCT on 22 April, that a Japanese force of some 2,500 men was dug in along the slopes of Mt. Isarog, an extinct volcano centering eight miles northeast of San Agustin. This report the 5th Cavalry and 158th Infantry proved false in a series of patrol actions between 2 and 15 May. The next day, the 16th, General MacNider radioed to General Griswold that the Bicol Peninsula was secure and that no signs of organized Japanese resistance remained. The two regiments continued patrolling for some weeks until, on 6 June, the 5th Cavalry returned to southern Luzon. The 158th RCT busied itself with the problem of reorganizing and equipping guerrilla forces and in mid-June turned over responsibility for further mopping up to the Filipinos. To that time the operations to clear the Bicol Peninsula had cost the USArmy units involved approximately 95 men killed and 475 wounded. The Japanese had lost over 2,800 killed and 565 captured, including 350 Formosan labor troops whom the Japanese Army had left to fend for themselves. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In June 1945, amidst the Pacific War, American forces sought to liberate Luzon from General Yamashita's entrenched troops. Under Generals Eichelberger and Krueger, the 8th Army faced fierce resistance in the mountains and vital routes. As Japanese defenders struggled, the Americans advanced strategically, leading to fierce battles across treacherous terrain.  The turning point came with the seizure of Baguio, crucial for the campaign.

No nosso décimo sexto episódio, recebemos Patrícia Sato, Executive Manager do Brazil Games, programa da Abragames em parceria com a ApexBrasil que impulsiona a presença dos estúdios brasileiros no mercado internacional. Com formação em Game Design e mais de 10 anos de atuação no setor, Patrícia lidera iniciativas que conectam a indústria nacional de games com o mundo, promovendo visibilidade, crescimento e exportação.

Danilo Sato, global VP of AI with Thoughtworks, joins host Andrew Miller to discuss mastering data mesh - including the four key principles of data mesh, common misconceptions, and interesting use cases. Please visit Mastering Data Mesh: From Principles to Practice for more information on Danilo's course at TDWI San Diego. ____________ More information: ·       TDWI Conferences: https://bit.ly/3XqBhGH ·       TDWI Modern Data Leader's Summits: https://bit.ly/4902fuu ·       TDWI Virtual Summits: https://bit.ly/31HJ2xr ·       Seminars: https://bit.ly/3WxQPr4 ·       More Speaking of Data Episodes: https://bit.ly/3JsQPWo Follow Us on: ·       LinkedIn - https://bit.ly/42zCZZB ·       Facebook - https://bit.ly/49uej7j ·       Instagram - https://bit.ly/3HM8x57 ·       X - https://bit.ly/3SsYu9P

Welcome to Episode 310 of the Good Girls Get Rich Podcast and I'm your host, Karen Yankovich. You know those conversations that leave your soul lit up and your mind spinning—in the best way? That's what today's episode is. #GoodGirlsGetRich  We want to hear your thoughts on this episode! Leave us a message on Speakpipe or email us at info@karenyankovich.com.   About This Episode & Highlights: I had the absolute joy of sitting down with my friend, fellow Entrepreneurs Unfiltered co-host, and powerhouse Social Impact + Big Idea Coach, Jess Sato, for a deep, juicy conversation about something I don't think we talk about nearly enough: What it really means to take a stand in your business—and why it matters now more than ever. Because here's the thing, friend… your business already is making an impact. The question is—is it the impact you want to be making? In this conversation, Jess and I unpack the hidden (and not-so-hidden) power of social impact branding, what it looks like to weave your values into your message, and why this “new era” of entrepreneurship is less about perfection… and more about purpose.   “Your silence is not neutral." Let's be real: we were raised in a world that told us to keep things polite. Don't talk about politics, religion, or money at the dinner table. Just do good work and stay in your lane. But that's not the world we live in anymore. And honestly? That old advice is keeping too many brilliant women invisible. Jess breaks this down beautifully—reminding us that we can't afford to stay quiet anymore. If we care about creating a better world (and I know you do), then our businesses need to reflect that. People want to buy from women who stand for something. Who say the bold thing. Who show up fully aligned. And when you do that? You're not just creating revenue. You're creating ripples.   “If your message doesn't make you squirm a little… it's not bold enough.” Yes, Jess said that. And I wanted to stand up and clap. Whether you're updating your LinkedIn headline or pitching yourself to speak on a stage, your message should stretch you. Jess walks us through her signature BOLT methodology—Bold, Original, Loud, and Tenacious—and I swear, it's like she was reading the minds of every woman who's ever asked, “Is it okay for me to say this?” Here's what BOLT really means: Bold: It should make your heart race a little. Bold ideas challenge the status quo. Original: Your story, your experience, your point of view—that's your secret sauce. Loud: Are you saying what everyone else is saying… or are you cutting through the noise Tenacious: The magic doesn't happen overnight. We need to stick with it, even when it's uncomfortable. This framework is a game changer for women who know they're meant to be seen. Who are ready to go from "best-kept secret" to category of one.   Your values are your brand now. Period. One of the most powerful parts of this conversation was Jess's take on how younger generations (especially Gen Z and Millennials) are making buying decisions. Did you know that over 85% of consumers from these generations choose brands based on shared values—and stick with them for the same reason? Jess put it simply: "People want to know who they're doing business with." And let's be clear—you don't have to be divisive or controversial to take a stand. You just have to be honest. Say what matters to you. Share why you started your business. Talk about what breaks your heart and fires you up. That's what builds trust. That's what turns listeners into clients and followers into fans.   Why women staying quiet is the real risk I opened up to Jess about the fear that comes up when we start sharing our message out loud—especially when the people hearing it are friends, family, or former coworkers. And I know I'm not alone. For so many of us, it's not the internet trolls or anonymous followers we're worried about. It's the people who know us. What will they think? Will they still support me? Jess's answer? “What in the world could change if you actually said what you want to say?” Whew. Read that again. Because the truth is, your message matters. There's someone out there—probably right now—waiting to hear your story. And when you finally say it out loud, you give them permission to rise too. This is what leadership looks like in 2025. Not just revenue goals or polished branding. But real voices, taking up real space, and making real change.   So… what's your big idea? If you're feeling inspired (and I hope you are), Jess has a free resource to help you start articulating your own bold, impact-driven message. Her BOLT Assessment walks you through each pillar—bold, original, loud, and tenacious—so you can see exactly where you need to crank up the volume on your thought leadership. And when you're ready to take that voice to LinkedIn? You know I've got you. Download my free LinkedIn Visibility Checklist. Let's get your message in front of the people who need to hear it.   This Episode is For You If… You know there's more to your business than making money—you want to make a difference You've been hiding your voice because it feels “too much” or “too risky” You want to get on more stages, podcasts, or panels—but you're not sure what your “big idea” is You're tired of staying quiet and ready to be seen, heard, and paid for your brilliance   Magical Quotes from the Episode: Jessica Sato: “What in the world could change if you actually said what you want to say?” “If your message doesn't make you squirm a little, it's not bold enough.” “Your business already has a social impact. The question is: are you choosing what it is?” Karen Yankovich: “It's not the strangers I'm worried about hearing my message—it's the people who know me.” “We can't be silent. I don't know what's going to happen if we speak up—but I do know what happens if we don't.” “I believe women with money can change the world. And it's never been more important than it is right now.”   Resources Mentioned In This Episode: Check out Jessica's website for her BOLT Assessment and connect with her on socials: Facebook Instagram LinkedIn Don't forget to grab my free LinkedIn Visibility Checklist.   Help Us Spread The Word! It would be awesome if you shared the Good Girls Get Rich Podcast with your fellow entrepreneurs on Twitter. Click here to tweet some love! If this episode has taught you just one thing, I would love if you could head on over to Apple Podcasts and SUBSCRIBE TO THE SHOW! And if you're moved to, kindly leave us a rating and review. Maybe you'll get a shout out on the show!   Ways to Subscribe to Good Girls Get Rich: Click here to subscribe via Apple Podcasts Click here to subscribe via PlayerFM Good Girls Get Rich is also on Spotify Take a listen on Podcast Addict

In this 1693rd episode of Toronto Mike'd, Mike chats with 1993 World Series Champion Rob Butler about Ayami Sato pitching for the Toronto Maple Leafs of baseball, his relationship with Cito Gaston, and Snow throwing out the first pitch at Christie Pits this coming Sunday. Toronto Mike'd is proudly brought to you by Great Lakes Brewery, Palma Pasta, Ridley Funeral Home, Toronto Maple Leafs Baseball, Yes We Are Open, Nick Ainis and RecycleMyElectronics.ca. If you would like to support the show, we do have partner opportunities available. Please email Toronto Mike at mike@torontomike.com

Episode 97- Season 3 Ep 22 “The Council”  Season 3 is here and First Flight, and the Carrot Crew, have many things to discuss!  Chris and Abby talk Xindi history and betrayal. The Xindi Council begins to fracture as Archer and Sato present their evidence.  The Sphere Builders involvement, and the mysteries of the spheres themselves, begin to be revealed. Season 3 Format: -Welcome & Reed Alert (spoiler warning) -Captain's Log & Haiku (episode recap) -Pros and Decons (analysis of episode) - Viewscreen On (calling out a beautiful visual shot or director's choice of shot) - Flipping Duras and/or VAMF (Vulcan as a Mother Flipper) Awards as needed -Porthos' Pick (our favorite parts) -Trivia -Vulcans' Verdict (rating the episode on a scale of 1-10 grapplers) Feel free to let us know your Porthos' Picks and Grappler Rankings, and/or your general thoughts on this episode! We save these and share them on special Mail Bag episodes.  (Please note, contributions might be shared on the podcast!) Find Us on Bluesky, Twitter, Instagram, Threads & Facebook: @FirstFlightPod Abby: @abbymsommer Chris: @ShelfNerds  Email us feedback (90 secs or less) firstflightpod@gmail.com Find Us on YouTube: Chris' Channel : Completing the Shelf  

Jason Evans of SilverShark Media speaks to Zach Sato, Chef/Owner of Havens Harborside Fish & Chophouse & Havens Kahului Food Truck. In this podcast Zach talks about how he got his start in the restaurant industry, his favorite family dishes growing up, advancing his career once he became a chef, the decision to open his first restaurant, how the pandemic forced him to pivot on his plans, running his own restaurant vs working as a chef in an existing restaurant, the decision to launch the food truck in Kahului, the approach to menu design for his different locations, opening Havens Harborside Fish & Chophouse, navigating the challenges after the fires in 2023, jumping into action right away to help provide food to the local community after the fires, what it was like to win the 2025 Aipono Award for Chef of the Year, opening a new food truck focused on subs and sandwiches later in May, & how people can learn more about the different Havens restaurants.

#TMLX18 is May 11 at Christie Pits at 1:30pm, just beyond the left field fence. All FOTMs will receive a free gift from Toronto Maple Leafs Baseball, and we'll witness history as Ayami Sato becomes the first woman to ever play for a professional men's baseball team in Canada. So come to Christie Pits on May 11 to hang with me and fellow FOTMs but stay for the Sato show. Toronto Mike'd is proudly brought to you by Great Lakes Brewery, Palma Pasta, Ridley Funeral Home, Silverwax, Yes We Are Open, Nick Ainis and RecycleMyElectronics.ca. If you would like to support the show, we do have partner opportunities available. Please email Toronto Mike at mike@torontomike.com

That Solo Life - Episode 296: The Big Idea with Jess Sato Episode Summary  This episode of That Solo Life dives deep into the world of business growth, messaging, and creating meaningful impact. Co-hosts Karen Swim, APR of Solo PR Pro, and Michelle Kane of Voice Matters are joined by special guest Jess Sato, a business growth and visibility strategist. Jess shares powerful insights on how purpose-driven entrepreneurs and thought leaders can identify their “big idea,” use it to stand out in a crowded marketplace, and create lasting change. Whether you're looking to refine your messaging, grow your visibility, or tackle roadblocks on your entrepreneurial path, this episode offers actionable strategies and thought-provoking advice to move the needle in your work. Key Takeaways  Defining the Big Idea: A “big idea” doesn't have to be completely new. Instead, it's an audacious or bold concept that challenges the status quo, demands attention, and inspires action.  The Bolt Method Framework: Jess's Bolt Method helps clarify and amplify big ideas by focusing on four pillars - Bold, Original, Loud, and Tenacious.  Living Your Passion: Entrepreneurs can align their personal passions with business objectives to create both purpose and profit.  Overcoming Challenges: Common roadblocks like imposter syndrome, impatience, or messaging struggles can be overcome with introspection and strategy.  The Power of Rebuilding: If your work no longer feels aligned, don't be afraid to take the time to pause, reflect, and pivot to rediscover your authentic purpose. About Jessica “Jess”  Sato Jessica Soto is a business growth and visibility strategist who helps purpose-driven female entrepreneurs, thought leaders and change makers clarify their big ideas, amplify their message and create lasting social impact. In this podcast episode, she discusses her process for helping clients find their "big idea" - a bold, original perspective that challenges the status quo and inspires people to take action. Soto highlights common roadblocks her clients face, such as distilling complex expertise into a cohesive core message, and provides strategies for overcoming these challenges. She also advises on building a platform for thought leadership, evolving one's message over time, and the importance of authenticity and transparency with one's audience.    Episode Timeline  [00:00] - Introduction from co-hosts Karen Swim and Michelle Kane  [00:32] - Welcoming guest Jess Sato and learning about her background in corporate strategy and leadership development  [01:14] - Jess describes her transition to working with female entrepreneurs and social impact leaders  [03:33] - The definition of a big idea and why it doesn't have to be groundbreaking to be bold or impactful  [05:12] - How passion, experience, and identifying audience needs converge to form a functional big idea  [09:13] - Common roadblocks faced by entrepreneurs when refining and presenting their big ideas  [13:03] - The Bolt Method explained and how it helps craft unique and powerful messaging  [20:13] - Aligning your big idea with platforms, stages, and communication styles to amplify your message  [26:02] - Evolving your message and giving yourself permission to pivot when your work no longer feels aligned  [35:12] - What it means to create a lasting legacy through your work and voice  [37:05] - How to connect with Jess Sato and closing thoughts from the co-hosts  Resources & Links  Connect with Jess Sato on LinkedIn  Visit Jess Sato's website at jessicasato.com  Learn more about Solo PR Pro at soloprpro.com  Connect with the Hosts  Karen Swim, APR - Solo PR Pro, LinkedIn Michelle Kane - Voice Matters,  LinkedIn Subscribe & Review  Enjoyed this episode? Subscribe to That Solo Life on your favorite podcast platform and leave us a review! Your support helps us share inspiring conversations with solo PR pros and marketers everywhere.  We hope you enjoy this conversation with Jess, Karen, and Michelle!

Welcome to Those Days: A Michinoku Pro Retrospective!Welcome to 1994! Case (https://twitter.com/_inyourcase) and Mike (https://twitter.com/fujiiheya) begin this episode discussing 1993 Awards for Michinoku Pro and take stock of the first calendar year for the promotion. Then it's time to get into 1994, as the company takes a winter break in Tohoku, they travel to Tokyo Korakuen Hall and Osaka for the first shows outside of Northeast Japan before kicking off their ‘94 campaign in Tohoku! Along the way we see Sasuke's greatest feud that never happened, “We came to Tokyo to get scammed”, SATO vs Delfin III in Osaka and we kick off one of 1994's biggest feuds: The Great Sasuke vs Jinsei Shinzaki. Matches and Shows Discussed:2/4/94: Sasuke, SATO, & Shiryu vs. Delfin, Naniwa, & Shinzakihttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jRnjSECcNPo&feature=youtu.be3/2/94 WAR: Sasuke & SATO vs. Ultimo & Oriharahttps://vkvideo.ru/video548721036_4562392103/4: SATO vs. Delfinhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VpZwXlSsSJY3/31/94 Michinoku Pro:https://vkvideo.ru/video5773044_456243602Our podcast provider, Red Circle, offers the listeners the option to sponsor the show. Click on “Sponsor This Podcaster” at https://redcircle.com/shows/open-the-voice-gate and you can donate a single time, or set up a monthly donation to Open the Voice Gate!Please Rate and Review Open The Voice Gate on the podcast platform of your choice and follow us on social media with @openvoicegate!.Advertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

Case (https://twitter.com/_inyourcase) and Mike (https://twitter.com/fujiiheya) lead off this episode discussing the earth-shattering 1993 Antonio Inoki Embezzlement Scandal and the dissolving of his relationship with Hisashi Shinma and the end of the Showa-era Post-War Economic Miracle. From there, Michinoku Pro enters the fall of 93 in a deeper relationship with Atsushi Onita's FMW, the Indie World Junior Title tournament, Yonekawa becomes Yone Genjin and one of the biggest feuds in Michinoku Pro history kicks off between Super Delfin and SATO.Shows discussed:9/28/93 - Michinoku Pro - https://vkvideo.ru/playlist/548721036_24/video548721036_456239440Compton Lucha - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DQdfn0pT3AY&t=252sLucha Paradise Commercial DVD - https://vkvideo.ru/video587241643_45624059012/10/93 - Michinoku ProGreat Sasuke & Tarzan Goto vs. Mr Pogo & Toi - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hAQ2Me6Nv_cMascara Contra Mascara - Super Delfin vs. SATO - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dMTD1HyU7xY&t=2s12/11/93 - Michinoku Pro - https://vkvideo.ru/playlist/548721036_24/video548721036_45623919712/26/93 FMW - Sasuke, Goto, & Onita vs. Pogo, Shinzaki, & Toi - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_cSYIl5aGwEOur podcast provider, Red Circle, offers the listeners the option to sponsor the show. Click on “Sponsor This Podcaster” at https://redcircle.com/shows/open-the-voice-gate and you can donate a single time, or set up a monthly donation to Open the Voice Gate!Please Rate and Review Open The Voice Gate on the podcast platform of your choice and follow us on social media with @openvoicegate!.Advertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

Welcome to Those Days: A Michinoku Pro Retrospective!Case (https://twitter.com/_inyourcase) and Mike (https://twitter.com/fujiiheya) lead off this episode discussing Michinoku Pro coming out of their first tour and Sasuke & Delfin's complicated and deteriorating relationship with the ownership of Universal. Then, they discuss the elements leading to the collapse of Universal and try to give an updated interpretation of the promotion's dying days. As Universal putters out, Michinoku has perhaps its first last stand, television pilots with local and Japanese cable networks, and the introductions of Jinsei Shinzaki, Gran Naniwa, SATO, Wellington Wilkins Jr & Super Boy. And it's time for the Delfin Corps, the biggest show in the company's history, and Great Sasuke vs Super Delfin matches for the UWA World Welterweight Title!Shows discussed:5/5/93 FMW - CLIP of Michinoku Pro offer match - https://youtu.be/pKcthRZ5aFk?si=OLvAY5q9tZ7gT-0N&t=16256/19/93 - Michinoku Pro - https://vkvideo.ru/video587241643_4562401677/24/93 - Michinoku Pro - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ybPcMpaM09Q8/22/93 FMW - CLIP of Michinoku Pro Offer Match - https://youtu.be/MIcFfszVU4Y?si=6sgc97zulB7UdSP0&t=19998/24/93 - Michinoku ProOur podcast provider, Red Circle, offers the listeners the option to sponsor the show. Click on “Sponsor This Podcaster” at https://redcircle.com/shows/open-the-voice-gate and you can donate a single time, or set up a monthly donation to Open the Voice Gate!Please Rate and Review Open The Voice Gate on the podcast platform of your choice and follow us on social media with @openvoicegate!.Our Sponsors:* Check out NordVPN today at https://nordvpn.com/voice and use our link to get 4 extra months on the 2-year NordVPN plan.Advertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

Tonight, on a Wednesday night edition of Trackside with Kevin Lee and Curt Cavin as Kevin is live in Sebring getting ready for the 12 Hours of Sebring this weekend. They start the show recapping how Kevin’s pit reporting went from St. Petersburg on FOX. Later in the first hour of the show, Kevin and Curt talk about the St. Petersburg race, how Alex Palou managed to charge his way through the field, and how Scott Dixon and Josef Newgarden wandering by what could’ve been at the end of the race. They also talk about how Pato O’Ward could’ve saved his season by going from 23rd to 11th in the race, and how Will Power and Colton Herta need a good rebound for Thermal Club. Later, they talk about what Herta’s future could look like in Formula 1 as Cadillac was officially confirmed. To wrap up wrap up the first hour of the show, Kevin talks about Sebring, Jackson Lee, and Hampus Ericsson. To start the second hour of the show, Kevin and Curt talk about which drivers could land the Cadilac Formula 1 seats and also talk about driver contracts. They also talk about Takuma Sato returning to Rahal Letterman Lanigan for the 109th Indianapolis 500, driving the #75 AMADA Honda. Later, Marcus Ericsson joins the show to talk about his brother, Hampus Ericsson, competing in this weekend’s 12 Hours of Sebring, and to recap his last race from St. Petersburg. They also talk about with Sato’s addition to the entry list, there is officially 34 entries as they discuss if there are going to be more entries. Later in the second hour of the program, they recap the most recent testing from Barber Motorsports Park. They also talk about how Prema Racing did in their debut, and how Prema can keep Robert Shwartzman up. Later, they talk about Christopher Bell going three-in-a-row at Phoenix last weekend in the NASCAR Cup Series, along with the soon opening of the new Indianapolis Motor Speedway Museum. Finally, Kevin announces the return of the Burger Bash! Then to wrap up another addition of the show, Kevin talks about Jackson Lee’s race for this weekend in Sebring, NHRA driver Bob Tasca III making comments about FOX and their marketing, full IndyCar race replays on YouTube immediately after, and FOX Nation picking up 100 Days to Indy. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

In this week's episode we spotlight the beautiful Norwegian Jaerhon Chicken, and Dr Yuko Sato takes us on a fascinating deep dive into the science of Avian Flu. We share our recipe for Irish Soda Bread, and find some retail therapy with vintage aprons.Grubbly Farms - click here for our affiliate link.https://www.anrdoezrs.net/click-100963304-15546963Pre and Probiotic and Vitamin and Electrolyte Powders!Bright and Early Coffee - use code CWTCL15 for 15% off of any bagged coffee. K Cups always ship free!https://brightandearlycoffee.com/Omlet Coops- Use Our Affiliate Link for 10% off!https://tidd.ly/3Uwt8BfChicken Luv Box -  use CWTCL50 for 50% off your first box of any multi-month subscription!https://www.chickenluv.com/Breed Spotlight is sponsored by Murray McMurray Hatcheryhttps://www.mcmurrayhatchery.com/Metzer Farms Waterfowlhttps://www.metzerfarms.com/Avian Influenza articles, courtesy of Dr Yuko Sato:https://www.bovinevetonline.com/news/education/receptors-make-dairy-cows-prime-target-influenza-isu-team-findshttps://iowacapitaldispatch.com/2024/04/17/two-veterinarians-hundreds-of-miles-apart-solved-a-cow-sickness-whodunit/https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11645685/https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/health/2024/04/18/isu-alum-veterinarians-in-ames-texas-solve-cattle-bird-flu-mystery/73363804007/Nestera UShttps://nestera.us/cwtclUse our affiliate link above for 5% off your purchase!Roosty'shttps://amzn.to/3yMDJIrish Soda Breadhttps://coffeewiththechickenladies.com/farm-fresh-egg-recipes/irish-soda-bread/CWTCL Websitehttps://coffeewiththechickenladies.com/CWTCL Etsy Shophttps://www.etsy.com/shop/CoffeeWChickenLadiesAs Amazon Influencers, we may receive a small commission from the sale of some items at no additional cost to consumers.CWTCL Amazon Recommendationshttps://www.amazon.com/shop/coffeewiththechickenladiesSupport the show