POPULARITY
2 episodes with tigerswan
2 episodes with tigerswan
2 episodes with tigerswan
2 episodes with tigerswan
When members of the Oceti Sakowin gathered near the Standing Rock Reservation to protest the Dakota Access Pipeline, they decided on a strategy of nonviolent direct action. No violence… against people.But sabotage of property – well, that's another question entirely. Since the gathering at Standing Rock, anti-protest legislation backed by the fossil fuel industry has swept across the country.What happened? When is environmental protest considered acceptable… and when is it seen as a threat? This is the first of two episodes exploring the changing landscape of environmental protest in the United States, from Standing Rock to Cop City and beyond.Part II will be released on June 8. Featuring Chase Iron Eyes, Tokata Iron Eyes, Lesley Wood, Elly Page, and Connor Gibson.Special thanks to Phyllis Young and everyone at the Lakota People's Law Project, especially Daniel Nelson and Jesse Phelps. Thanks also to Soundings Mindful Media. SUPPORTOutside/In is made possible with listener support. Click here to become a sustaining member. Subscribe to our (free) newsletter.Follow Outside/In on Instagram or Twitter, or join our private discussion group on Facebook LINKSWe highly recommend the podcast Burn Wild, investigative reporter Leah Sottile's excellent series on the Earth Liberation Front. It centers on the question, “How far is too far to stop the planet burning?”Use the ICNL's US Protest Law Tracker to look up anti-protest and critical infrastructure bills by state or by issue.“Exploring the sound of the American Indian occupation of Alcatraz”, produced by the Berkeley Voices program, and footage of the occupation, compiled by the Bay Area TV Archive. For even more context on AIM, we recommend listening to Buffy, a podcast series on Buffy Sainte Marie, a Piapot Cree Nation singer-songwriter whose record “Now That the Buffalo's Gone” was an anthem during the occupation of Alcatraz. The Intercept's reported extensively on Standing Rock and TigerSwan. They've also made the leaked documents available for anyone to read, and recently published this investigation on TigerSwan's strategy of misinformation, in collaboration with Grist.This critique of How to Blow Up a Pipeline calls the book “reckless,” arguing that Andreas Malm “has a tendency of rehashing many well-established anarchist ideas.” CREDITSHost: Nate HegyiReported, written, and produced by Justine Paradis Mixed by Justine Paradis and Taylor QuimbyEdited by Taylor Quimby with help from Nate Hegyi, Felix Poon, Rebecca Lavoie, and Jessica HuntExecutive producer: Rebecca LavoieMusic by Podington Bear, Skylines, Cory Gray, Cooper Cannell, and Blue Dot Sessions.Outside/In is a production of New Hampshire Public Radio.
Have you heard of TigerSwan? This company profits off of the surveillance and suppression of pipeline protests. Staffed with former military personnel from the War on Terror, TigerSwan has developed a hyper-militarized counterinsurgency approach to dealing with protestors resisting fossil fuel projects. TigerSwan first made a name for itself by monitoring, infiltrating, and disrupting Indigenous-led protests against the development of the Dakota Access Pipeline. A recent article in The Intercept states “To TigerSwan, the emergence of Indigenous-led social movements to keep oil and gas in the ground represented a business opportunity” (Intercept).Much of what we now know about TigerSwan was recently revealed after the company failed to obtain a security license and was later forced to release over 50,000 pages of documents. The company fought to keep these documents private, which is no wonder since they detail the company's ruthless targeting of pipeline protestors. MAIN SOURCE: “After Spying on Standing Rock, TigerSwan Shopped Anti-Protest ‘Counterinsurgency' to Other Oil Companies” The InterceptCOCKTAIL PAIRING:THE FOREST DEFENDER 2 oz White Rum½ oz Lime Juice¼ ozSt. Germain Elderflower¼ oz Celery Juice¼ ozSimple Syrup⅛ tsp Matcha powder Cucumber wheelAdd all ingredients into a shaker, muddle a cucumber, and shake hard with ice. Double strain into a chilled coupe. Garnish with a thinly-sliced cucumber wheel.Glassware: CoupeGarnish: Cucumber wheelBIG THANKS to Jesse Torres ( @jessejamz ) for crafting this delicious custom cocktail!Support the showCocktails & Capitalism is an anticapitalist labor of love, but we could use your help to make this project sustainable. If you can support our work with even a dollar a month, that would really help us continue to strengthen the class consciousness of folks suffering under capitalism around the globe. https://www.patreon.com/cocktailsandcapitalism
Editor's note: This is a preview of a longer episode. You can watch the full episode on our YouTube channel (both linked below) or listen to it by subscribing to Red Media on Patreon for as little as $2 a month. Investigative journalist Alleen Brown (@AlleenBrown) reports on 50,000 pages of recently released TigerSwan documents, showing how the private security company tried to market its policing and surveillance of the Indigenous-led protests against the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline to other fossil fuel companies. Alleen Brown co-write this investigative report with Naveena Sadasivam (@NaveenaSivam). Read the article, "After infiltrating Standing Rock, TigerSwan pitched its ‘counterinsurgency' playbook to other oil companies" In the second half of the conversation, Nick and Alleen review the "first narrative film about "On Sacred Ground" (2023), "the first narrative film on Standing Rock." Watch the video edition on The Red Nation Podcast YouTube channel. Support www.patreon.com/redmediapr
SEASON 1: OIL, GOLD, CRYPTO & FASCISM: HOW WE GOT HERE AND HOW TO FIX IT Wesley Clark, Jr. is a US Army Veteran, climate activist, and sometimes screenwriter who got pulled into a strange world filled with oil contractors, private military companies, fake activists, and cults as part of a veteran action at the Standing Rock protests in 2016. And as it happens, this milieu is at the heart of what this podcast is all about — the intersection of oil, climate, and influence. Wes shares some of his experiences with us as well as how these issues connect directly to Vladimir Putin's illegal war in Ukraine. And if Wes' name sounds familiar, it's because his father was the former Supreme Commander Europe of NATO, and a presidential candidate in 2004. Keywords: oil, climate, gas, Standing Rock, Tigerswan, Blackwater, I AM, Koch, influence, cults, mind control, politics, 2022, democracy, midterms, crypto, Ukraine, Putin, Poland, Baltics, nuclear, war, NATO.
Get your Challenge Coin! https://train.americanwarriorsociety.com/home On today's Coffee with Rich, we will be joined by Gabe Tauscher. Gabriel served a tour of duty as an Infantry Marine, deploying once in support of the Global War on Terror. During his time on active duty, Gabriel served as an 81mm Mortar Gunner, TRAP (Tactical Recovery of Aircraft Personnel) Team member, Range Safety Officer, and Acting Platoon Sergeant. While serving with the unit's TRAP team, Gabriel received training alongside the PSD (Personal Security Detail) Platoon, specializing in close personal protection of senior military officers and government officials. Starting in 2015, Gabriel worked for Optimal Protection for 3 years, achieving the rank and title of Assistant Regional Operations Manager (Midwest). In the years after leaving Optimal Protection, he has moved around as an Independent contractor, working for companies such as RCI, BIA, Wolfgar, Lawrence Aviation, Regius Services, VSS and TigerSwan. In this time, He has participated in a variety of events and operations, including executive and dignitary protection, surveillance and private investigations, process serving, hostile terminations, security threat and risk assessments, tactical response, corporate consultations, workplace violence mitigation, as well as leading and coordinating security teams to assist with the relief efforts of hurricanes Harvey, Irma, Florence, Michael and Laura. He has worked and coordinated alongside local police departments, DHS, ATF, FEMA and the Secret Service. Check out the Training Programs: https://shooting-performance.myshopify.com Coffee with Rich Youtube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/user/rhodieusmc/videos American Warrior Show: https://americanwarriorshow.com/index.html SWAG: https://shop.americanwarriorsociety.com/ American Warrior Society please visit: https://americanwarriorsociety.com/ Watch Mike's Youtube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/user/MikeSeeklander References: News Releases - BCA Death Investigation Underway Following Pursuit, Crash and Shots Fired https://www.google.com/.../car-chase-ends-in-elk.../%3famp https://www.google.com/.../mpls-shooting-suspect.../%3famp https://www.google.com/.../3-injured-after-3.../%3famp https://www.gofundme.com/f/gabe-tauscher-the-nomad
John Birch Society, Council for National Policy, conspiritainment, Vatican intrigues, Jesuits, Knights of Malta, Opus Dei, Legatus, TigerSwan, Blackwater, private military companies, private intelligence companies, Standing Rock, Iran-Contra, Robert LeFevre, Elizabeth Clare Prophet, Thomas Schoenberger, Mighty I Am, Schlafly Eagle Forum, Michael Flynn, John Singlaub, January 6th, General Charles Flynn, Cambridge Analytica, SCL Group, The Octopus, Bitcoin, cryptocurrencies, Fourth Generation Warfare, Fifth Generation Warfare, QANon, Joint Special Operations Command, Pentagon/CIA rivalry, Stanley McChrystal, Charles de Gaule, 1961 French military revolt, OAS, Secret Army Organization, Occupy Wall Street, consenus reality, Discordianism
Episode Notes The guest, Philip, has compiled this list of further resources and encourages people to check out look into them because there are a lot of good lessons about how counterinsurgency has operated historically that can help us resist today. Know Your Rights trainings are available from the CLDC and ACLU [including the Live Like the World is Dying episode on the subject] For the history of police and state repression "Our Enemies in Blue": "Secret Police, Red Squads, and the Strategy of Permanent Repression" "Life During Wartime" - Kristian Williams, Lara Messersmith-Glavin, William Munger "Witness to Betrayal / Profiles of Provocateurs" - Kristian Williams "Basic Politics of Movement Security" - J Sakai "Policing Indigenous Movements" - Andrew Crosby & Jeffery Monaghan good for Canadian context Intercept article on TigerSwan surveillance of Standing Rock: "New State Repression" Ken Lawrence "War at Home: Covert Action Against US Activists and What We Can Do About It"- Brian Glick Government resources on counterintelligence Church Committee Report (federal committee on FBI COINTELPRO ops) "Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-Keeping" Frank Kitson The host, Margaret Killjoy, can be found on twitter @magpiekilljoy, instagram @margaretkilljoy, and on Patreon at patreon.com/margaretkilljoy. Transcript: Margaret 00:14 Hello, and welcome to Live Like the World is Dying, your podcast for what feels like the end times. I'm your host, Margaret Killjoy, and I use she or they pronouns. This week I'm talking with Philip who, among many other things, teaches security culture trainings. And I first was introduced to Philip's work on it when we had a conversation about the complexities of security culture. Security culture—we'll go over in this episode—is basically the idea of creating a culture of security, a culture of a way—creating a culture by which people don't get caught as much for the types of things that they may choose to want to do in order to advance, you know, their desires. It's for activists and revolutionaries and shit to not get fucking caught. It has lot of good tools around how to do that kind of culturally. This podcast is a proud member of the Channel Zero Network of anarchist podcasts. And—but for this week, and next week, I'm going to do it a little bit differently, and instead of running a jingle for another show on the network, I'm just gonna tell you about another show on the network because I don't think they have a jingle yet. And basically say that the Maroon Cast is now a member of the Channel Zero Network of anarchist podcasts and I'm very excited about that. And you all should go check it out. Also, the Institute for Anarchist Studies is an organization that gives grants to people who—well, I'm just about to play a fucking jingle for it. So I'll just fuckin play the jingle for it—da daaaa! Jingle 01:40 Hey, radicals, anarchists, and all of you liberatory leftists: Are you a podcaster, video maker, multimedia artist, or writer? The Institute for Anarchist Studies wants to let you know we have grants available for projects focusing on Black and indigenous anarchisms, police abolition and alternatives, and mutual aid. For details and how to apply visit anarchiststudies.org and click on the grants application post on our main page. That's anarchiststudies.org. Anarchist-studies-dot-O-R-G. Applications close January 31, 2021. Spread the word and tell your friends. Margaret 02:24 Okay, so if you could introduce yourself with whatever name you want to go by, your pronouns, and I guess kind of a little bit about what brought you to this work of teaching and security culture trainings? Philip 02:35 Yeah, my name is Philip, I use they/them pronouns. I'm living in Suquamish Territory and the Salish Sea. I've been involved in a lot of solidarity work with Indigenous liberation movements and Black liberation movements that have exposed me to a lot of frontline experiences and experiences with state repression, both immediately and down the line. And in response to those encounters with law enforcement with legal repression, and with the effect that that has on our movements, me and a lot of friends and comrades have dived into learning about security culture, learning about the tools and the techniques that we can all use to keep each other safe. And also learning about the ways that the state works to isolate our movements, to discredit our movements—basically, to disempower us—so that we're able to be more informed about how to take care of each other. So I'm definitely deeply indebted to a lot of Black and Indigenous liberation movements for developing these skills and passing them on. And I'm here to just try to contribute now what I've been taught and foster a conversation about how we can be moving into this, like, pretty unprecedented territory in the world of new state surveillance, expanding state surveillance, more encounters with police, but also with right-wing vigilantes, paramilitary groups, white supremacists, and some of the tools we can use. Margaret 04:07 That makes sense. Yeah, one of the reasons that I wanted to have you on in particular is a conversation that we had about the nuances of security culture, and I'm really excited to get into that stuff. But for people who have no idea what we're talking about, could you introduce the concept of security culture? Philip 04:26 Yeah, that's a great question. I feel like there's a lot of intersections between security culture and a lot of other topics that you've had on this show or that you might have on in the future. Ultimately, I think of security culture as this big framework. And it's a framework that helps us reduce risk for ourselves when we're engaging in social movement work, basically by protecting sensitive information. So one definition might be: It's like a mix of interpersonal and organizational and technical practices that help us be more resilient to state repression. It's a shared set of customs, that helps us minimize risk by explicitly naming some norms, over our boundaries and over our communication and that helps us lessen our paranoia, reducing ambiguity, and feeling more secure as we're engaging with the inherently risky work of challenging unjust power systems. Margaret 05:31 So what are some of the examples of that when you talk about, like, changing social norms in order to accommodate security culture? Like, you know, what comes to mind with that? Philip 05:43 Yeah, well, I think that the first thing to say is, intentionally or unintentionally, we all have a set of security practices that we do as human beings. We all have boundaries with each other, intentional or unintentional. And the point of security culture is really to be explicit about those boundaries. I, you know, I really want to do a shout out that a lot of people already practice security, culture, and situational awareness in their daily lives, you know, especially trauma survivors, people who are targeted by police and state surveillance. But some of those specific boundaries and norms that we might use would be having, you know, a clear idea of what information is sensitive, and then not sharing that information with people who don't need to know it, to protect yourself and to protect them. Margaret 06:37 Like so concretely like— Philip 06:38 That— Margaret 06:38 Go ahead. Philip 06:40 Yeah, so that would, you know, a big, obvious one is like, don't talk about illegal activities that you have done, or that you're thinking about doing or asking someone else if they've done it. A big thing might be like, "Oh, yeah, I thought I saw you at this protest the other week doing this illegal action. Was that you? How does that feel to you?" That's a big thing that we wouldn't do. That's a pretty clear violation of norms and boundaries over not wanting people to expose themselves in that way. Margaret 07:09 But what if you want to change your profile picture to, like, you throw in a brick on, like, Facebook? Philip 07:15 And that's another one, you know, it's not only the explicit things that we share with each other, but also what is available to the outside world, to law enforcement, or to right wing groups through our social media presences, through, you know, just things that are immediately perceptible like bumper stickers or, like, the Antifa uniform that we're wearing. Being aware of the information that we're communicating, even if it's non-verbal. Margaret 07:45 One of the— Philip 07:45 Though I do wanna say— One of the main things is we should be aware of the sensitivity of the information and limit the information that's sensitive. And then the flip side of that is not stressing about information that is not sensitive. So it's not only, you know, being discreet and confidential about things that could expose us to legal targeting, but also then shedding the worry and anxiety of, "Oh, do I need to be lying to everyone in my life because they asked me what kind of coffee I like, and they're trying to build a case against me?" Margaret 07:47 Go ahead. Mm hmm. Yeah, that makes sense. I—you know, it's like, when people first started talking about security culture around me, I ran into a lot of—we kind of all ran into a lot of issues of it with it, where it would cause, like, a lot of paranoia and then also a lot of like bravado and, like, it definitely, when practiced poorly, can be kind of not a very pleasant culture to be in. Like, it can become a culture of paranoia. But one of the things that I always really liked doing, you know, okay, so it's like—Alright, if you engage in a culture where you just don't talk about crime, like, you kind of have the sense that everyone around you is doing crime and that's cool (assuming they're doing cool crime, because lots of good things and bad things are crime). You can kind of just like—like, one of the things that I try and tell people is just, like, assume that everyone is a secret badass. Like, the shitty kid has been like sleeping on your couch for two weeks and like, doesn't do her dishes enough or whatever. Like, maybe she's getting up to, like, really wild shit. Or maybe she's on the run, you know, and kind of just assuming that everyone is up to something cool. And therefore you just don't need to know it. I don't know. That's something that's always worked for me. Yeah. Yeah, and I think there's absolutely something to be said there about—it takes a lot of intentional work to sort of decouple these practices from some of the, just the other cultural norms that we all have. And that being a big thing of social clout. Philip 10:00 Of, you know, wanting—especially in a movement space—to be able to, like, celebrate the badass shit that we're doing. And one of the awkward things about security culture, or that makes it a little counterintuitive to people who are just learning it is that a lot of times the things that maybe have the biggest impact on our lives, or that we're spending lots of time or energy working on, or that were these really activating, or traumatizing, or fun and exciting experiences we had, we can't really talk about with other people, both for our safety and their safety. And so it's really nice, then, to think, not only, you know, is that something that we shouldn't do, but then also allowing us to think about, well, what are some of the positive ways that we can still be fostering community connection, and, you know, healthy, strong relationships and trust with people where we're not having to communicate about risky things that could implicate us in, like, all sorts of legal entanglements, but instead we can be still be building vulnerability and trust with each other. And that's a really big, important part of security culture that I think gets missed by a lot of people is that this is a great opportunity, actually, for us to think about what are our community norms around communication and interpersonal dynamics? And what are some of the ways that we can shape those intentionally to, like, really build trust and group cohesion and the ability to make us all feel like we're able to do the things that we need to do to survive in this world while staying safe? Margaret 10:00 Yeah. Okay, so what are some of those things? Philip 11:32 So I think a big one is that building trust with each other is an active process that we all need to be doing, especially in movement work. One of the big things that I think is really important is being able to, you know, talk about harmful and difficult dynamics that come up about conflict that comes up, about addressing accountability, and how much of state repression is able to impact movements by fracturing us along pre-existing tensions that we aren't able to work through. So there's a lot of examples in that historically, of state targeting movements, basically, where there was already distrust that was unable to be resolved, and fracturing movements by encouraging people to distrust each other because they weren't able to work through conflict. Margaret 12:25 So you're basically talks about how the way that the state will essentially, like, bad-jacket or fed-jacket people, like, in order to sow distrust. Like basically, like, pick apart, like, so-and-so is unpopular, or maybe so-and-so actually caused harm, right? Like, so-and-so abuse someone or assaulted someone or is, you know, in accountability around it, or evading accountability around it, basically like sowing distrust about therefore, like, that person doing state work? Or what do you what do you mean by that? Philip 13:00 Yeah, I think that is one popular example. We can definitely talk about that—about both how the state uses false accusations, you know, maybe to break trust—but also how real continued harm, real accusations, are then downplayed when we're existing in this like defensive, reactive space of being, "Oh, well, if, you know, we're going to be talking about these things then it's obviously a bad-jacketing." And so our movements are put in between a rock and a hard place because of just the widespread norm that exists of not being able to address the conflict when it comes up. But another way that that also happens is just how not only direct state intervention can fracture movements, but even the perception of state intervention, the fear and paranoia that gets spread through knowing that we're surveilled, through knowing that there's all these historical examples of actual state harm and us imagining then that we are being actively targeted at that time and us fracturing under that stress, even when there's not active state repression happening to our specific movements. And so it ends up that we almost start policing and repressing ourselves. And we're doing the state's work for it. Margaret 14:20 I guess, like, one of the things that I think about this is I try to use history and awareness of that connection to actually—hm, how to I want to say this? It's like, I assume everyone's a cop and that makes me not paranoid. And I feel like there's a right way and a wrong way to do this. But for me, and the security culture that I practice—and this might be wildly unpopular—I just I assume that a decent portion of the people that I'm friends with and am close with, so possibly people I've been known and working with for decades, might be state agents. Or I've certainly had a lot of friends, a lot of people very close to me, become state agents, become informants in different cases. And because I'm able to do that, it kind of doesn't break my trust. Because I know that I'm, like, firewalling, all the information that I'm putting out there, right? I'm thinking about what I say to whom and because of that, you know, when someone turns out to be a state agent, I'm like, "Well, okay, like, I didn't trust them anyway so I was careful about what I said to them." And, you know, and obviously, this can be done in a very bad way. But, I don't know, I find it really useful to study basically, like—like, we can look at the history of COINTELPRO and it can, like, you know, drive us into a lot of fear and a lot of, like, just looking over our shoulders constantly, right? Or we can look at it and be like, "Okay, this is the situation that we may or may not be in, and what are the right steps to take if that's the situation we're in." And I think, for me, I mostly watch this be much harder on people for whom it's a shock, for people who come in and are like, "Wow, we're all doing this wild shit together and this is so great." And then it turns out that you're all being surveilled, or, you know, two of you are cops or something like that. And it's kind of heartbreaking and causes more fear as compared to if you just enter it knowing that that's going to be the case. Philip 16:36 Absolutely, and I think you highlight two things there that feel really important to me in a security culture practice. So one is just having those proactive boundaries and that discretion, and just making that part of your everyday life—part of your way of relating with people and not this whole other mindset that you're adopting just in moments of direct action. Basically assuming, like, I just don't want to publicly share anything that I don't want read back to me at a grand jury hearing. Margaret 17:10 Right. Philip 17:12 I think another thing that is really important with what you just said is how important learning from history and looking at the concrete and well-documented examples of state repression that we can learn from prepares us to be able to be more resilient. And that that is an actually really important part of being able to evaluate risk and being able to care for ourselves and being able to know what's coming down the line. And that that should be something that we're constantly doing. And it's a lot of work but I think that's one of the things that I've been really excited by, it's just thinking about all these different resources and tracking the terrain of state repression and being able to then sort of stay ahead of the ball as best we can with thinking about what sort of terrain we have to be working in, and the actual tools and maneuverability that the state has, or that right-wing groups have to be interfacing with us. You know, it feels—not to minimize the very real risks that many people are experiencing by confronting white supremacy and capitalism and state violence.—but thinking about this on a little bit more exploded of a level, it feels like we're, you know, kind of playing this like big elaborate board game. And that state repression isn't functioning in the way of just pure unbridled force being exacted on any sort of social movement. There are absolutely moments of that. You know, we have seen assassinations, we have seen brutalization, there are many historical examples, you know, bombs were dropped on the MOVE collective in Philadelphia, police assassinated Fred Hampton of the Black Panthers while he slept in his bed. There are big examples of that. But by and large, at least as far as, you know, the material that is publicly available to reflect from, the way that state repression happens is more by controlling dissent through these sort of like light touches, by erecting the container that social movements and public opinion exist in, and trying to have that subtle touch, you know, that sort of negotiated management or that controlled management, similar to a lot of ways of how street protests are handled by police. Now, instead of it just being an outright brutality, it's more of negotiating with movement leaders, shutting the terrain, and if we're able to track that and we're able to keep a good tab on where public opinion is at, keep a good tab on what sort of restraints the state has for interacting with us for not trying to move public opinion towards supporting popular movements, you know, we're able to then track the sort of tools that we have available to be able to challenge these systems and have a little more strategy, a little more creativity, you know, thinking outside of the box and really engaging with this in a very adaptive and flexible and, like, spontaneous way. And I think that's one of the greatest strengths of decentralized movements is being able to be really flexible and responsive in a way that the state and other authoritarian or hierarchically-organized systems aren't able to keep up with. Margaret 20:25 To keep asking you kind of the same question over and over again, but can you give examples of that? Like, what is it about decentralization that gives us that kind of advantage, like, or what are some examples of people using that advantage? Philip 20:40 So I mean, one great example is just looking at the trove of documents that gets produced through surveillance of movements, and realizing how little these different analysts and intelligence agencies actually understand about social movements and about organizing. And so one example of that is specifically, there was a great series published by The Intercept after Standing Rock about this intelligence agency, Tiger Swan, and all the surveillance that they did on the Standing Rock movement. And this is an enormous cache of documents. You know, the state spent millions of dollars surveilling and compiling networks and trying to understand how these movements were working on the ground to be able to contain them and neutralize them. And yet, at the same time, the state just didn't seem to fundamentally understand how it was possible that such a large movement wasn't operating along, like, traditional military structuring. They were naming people who were, you know, a media spokesperson, or someone who had a popular Instagram feed who was documenting a lot of it, as the leader of the movement or as supplying arms, when that was so clearly not the case to anyone who was able to participate on the ground. And so that smokescreen of the state not understanding the organic flows of movements or how it's possible for things to exist in a [inaudible] fashion, it creates this haze that allows us to kind of keep, you know, the specifics of how we're relating with each other protected from that surveillance and allows us to remain safe. Margaret 22:23 Yeah, I had a—Go ahead. Philip 22:25 I mean, the counterpoint to that is just when states—when militaries are engaging with traditionally organized enemies, you know, whatever might be a centrally-commanded military unit, it's really easy to, you know, be able to identify the central command and eliminate it. Versus, you know, states, armies, militaries engaging with irregular guerrilla warfare is a very difficult situation to be able to differentiate between combatants and non-combatants. And, you know, I really love to point at the example of the United States military losing to the Vietcong, you know, the greatest military empire power on the planet losing to some communist guerrillas in the jungle who, you know, were able to operate in a way that this empire was just not able to respond. Margaret 23:21 Yeah, so that's like, one of the things I like about security culture is it helps create that smokescreen because—and I like the way that phrasing it as a smokescreen—where they have a hard time seeing what a decentralized movement is doing. And a lot of times we don't understand what a decentralized movement is doing. It's like, I feel like whenever I'm engaged in a very chaotic and organic situation, I spend about half my time just trying to figure out what's going on, right? And—in order to understand what's happening so I can figure out how to best engage with it. But on the other hand, I like how a security culture—it's like, I don't know which of my friends are up to things besides what they talk about. And I don't need to know and it also it helps—it helps to minimize—I mean, like, you brought up earlier about the like social clout and, like, I think one of the things that destroys movements is social capitalism, is the idea of, like, everyone's trying to gain clout, everyone's trying to, you know, I mean, to say it cynically, you know, like, have the coolest podcast and get everyone to support your Patreon or whatever the fuck, right? But—and even if you're trying to do that for the best of reasons, even if you're trying to do that in order to like, you know, get out good ideas or whatever, social capital ends up playing a lot into it and social capital games are really dangerous. and way more than like being a cool podcaster or whatever, being a cool militant is like—to the people who know—that's like extra cool. And you get way too much say and what's going on if everyone like is, like, "Oh, yeah, like, she's doing all this like crazy shit," right? And it's kind of this thing, it's like a little bit hard, but you kind of like learn to just accept like, "Oh, alright, well, like I'm a secret badass and no one knows." Well like, not me, but like, you know, maybe when I was younger, I don't know. But like, I don't know—you talk about the smokescreen thing, it's just like, I literally don't know who's up to no good, you know, and that's great. It feels really good. I'm like, I literally can't snitch because I have no fucking clue. One of the things that you were talking about earlier, or that we were talking about earlier, that I feel like is worth breaking down for people who are, you know—I mean, obviously, this podcast is about preparedness, right? And I believe that revolt is an important part of preparedness. But people might not necessarily know what we're talking about when we talk about, like, snitch-jacketing, fed-jacketing, bad-jacketing, you know, which are like, slang terms or terms that we've come up with because this just happens over and over and over again and we want ways to be able to identify it quickly. But what the fuck did those mean? Are you able to break that down? Philip 26:05 Sure. Yeah. Um, let me first—first, like, explicitly name some of the tools of state repression. I think that might be a helpful thing. Margaret 26:14 Yeah. Explicit stuff. Philip 26:15 So in my like conceptualization, ultimately, we have to recognize that challenging and unjust power system, that power system has a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. So as we're challenging white supremacy, capitalism, militarism, you know, we are putting ourselves in a position where those systems are going to want to then minimize our ability to change them. And we get our power through working together collectively. And so I kind of see that fundamental tool of state repression has been isolation. A quote that I always go to of how clear that is from J. Edgar Hoover, who was the director of the FBI during the counterintelligence program against the Black Panthers, where his main objective—he, you know, writes that it's to expose, to disrupt, misdirect, discredit, and otherwise neutralize the activities of these black nationalist organizations. So there's a really intentional, conscious push from these state actors to isolate us and to neutralize us. And the ways that they do that historically has been through surveillance, both to gather information, but also as a sort of intimidation, you know, show of power through arrest, whether that's legitimate or illegitimate, through grand juries and legal intimidation, through smear campaigns in the media and discrediting movements, or, you know, saying these protesters are bad because they engage in these types of tactics, through disinformation and spreading paranoia within movements, promoting infighting, blackmail, infiltration, entrapment, threats, and you know, again, all the way up to police brutality and outright assassinations. But so a big way has been by planting informants, by planting undercover agents and those undercover agents either provoking people into committing acts of the state is then enabled us as justification for repression—so we've seen that with the RNC, the Republican National Convention, where an undercover agent encouraged two people to try to use Molotov cocktails and then that resulted in them getting arrested and facing lengthy prison sentences through federal court. But undercovers and informants also can be there to just spread misinformation to break trust, to disrupt group dynamics. And that's just been a really clear way that popular movements have been repressed historically. And so I think that's a reason that it's really easy for us now, as we're worried about security, to say, "Oh, there must be an informant," or like, "Oh, I know that this has happened in the past and so I'm extra aware of this possibility." And one of the outcomes of that is that people who are suspected of being involved in movements with bad intentions can be labeled as an informant, or as a snitch. And so that's basically snitch-jacketing is when you say, "I think this person is working for the police or is providing information," without having clear evidence. And this is something that's really personal to me because I, you know, I've learned a lot of my security practices through trial and error, and there's been error and I've messed up and I've hurt friends and I've hurt movements that have been a part of through dynamics just like this. And I think that's, you know, something I want to hold a lot of humility and hold a lot of accountability for is that I'm saying all these things, but these aren't easy things to implement. Margaret 30:05 Yeah. Philip 30:05 You know, the response to snitch-jacketing, or the response to thinking that someone might be a snitch, isn't to snitch-jacket, but to confront them directly with your concerns and be able to establish, you know, some way of trying to work through that conflict. Being able to address other people with your concerns, with your direct concerns, not things that you're assuming or projecting, and, you know, being able to name things directly, as they are. So saying, "Oh, I am skeptical of this person, because they are sketching me out by taking photos in times that I think are really inappropriate," or "Because they're always asking questions that kind of seem to be digging at trying to expose illegal activities," or "I'm not really sure if they are who they say they are because they're never telling me any information about where they're from or what they do." Margaret 31:01 Right. Philip 31:02 And so, therefore, this person clearly must be working for the FBI and is here as a plant to disrupt our movement. Therefore, this person is a snitch, and I mean, yes, sure, that has happened historically. But in my appraisal, labeling someone is a snitch does probably just as much if not more damage than just name—than that person actually being a snitch. Because it's all of a sudden creating a huge atmosphere of distrust. Margaret 31:29 Right. Philip 31:29 It's creating paranoia. It's exposing huge divisions within the movement. And so even if that person isn't a snitch, by labeling them as a snitch, you've essentially just done the state's work for them of spreading distrust and isolation within movement, Margaret 31:45 Which is cool because then you can say, "Oh, that person's snitch-jacketing people, they must be a fed." You know, because if you're doing the state's work... Obviously don't do that. And that's called "fed-jacketing." The idea of saying instead of—it's the same fucking concept. It's like, you know, someone's probably a fed instead of— Philip 32:04 Yeah. Margaret 32:05 Yeah, one of the ways that I've always heard people talk about it that I've always appreciated is just: judge people by their behavior, not whether or not, like, they're a cop. Like, so rather than assuming, "I think that person's a cop," just be like, "This person is doing something that is making us all less safe." So address that, you know. Address the fact that this person is taking pictures at inappropriate times. Address your distrust of someone, right" But not by saying, like, "I think they're a cop," unless you have hard fucking evidence that they're a cop, you know? Philip 32:41 Yeah, I really go back time and time again, in thinking about security culture, and seeing really clear intersections between security culture and harm reduction, and transformative justice and conflict resolution. You know, I think, in our society, we aren't given a lot of tools for working through conflict and that is especially aggravated by being in this very intense atmosphere that a lot of activists are existing under. But if we were able to—proactively, before engaging in movement work together, as much as possible—generate, what those norms are and what our shared agreements for how we're sharing space with each other are, then we're able to set the container. And then when someone steps over those boundaries, we're able to hold them accountable more directly. And that's ultimately what security culture is, you know, it's culture as a set of shared practices that are embodied, that we're using all the time. And I think it's really important, again, to just make that explicit. And I know that's not always possible, because sometimes we're working with people that we just met. But as much as we're able to, I really like to think about what it would look like if we were able to generate explicit norms and boundaries with each other, and then be able to hold each other to that and say, "Hey, you're making me uncomfortable right now because I told you earlier that I wasn't interested in talking about my historical involvement in that movement, and you're asking me a lot of questions about it. And so I'm just going to ask that you stop asking me those questions." Margaret 34:20 Yeah. Philip 34:21 Instead of saying, "Oh, well, this person is now a snitch." Margaret 34:23 Right. Philip 34:24 But that level of direct communication is challenging, and it's really challenging especially when we're all working in adrenalized frontline environments, or when we haven't gotten a lot of sleep and we're just existing up coffee and cigarettes. And it really speaks to me of just how much there needs to be this intentional push of like building in, like, a feminist ethic of care and of group cohesion and saying, like, we are going to work through this together. Margaret 34:56 One of the things when you talk about holding people accountable to these new social norms that we create, this sort of brings up kind of the dark side of security culture, which is cliquishness. And, well, it's tto things: when I think of the downsides of security culture—I'm clearly a proponent of security culture, I'm trying to do an episode on it. But when I think of the things that we need to be aware of as we attempt to implement it, the two biggest downsides that I think about is creating cliquish, closed off social circles and basically making, you know, obviously, we would never want to be called a Vanguard, but you know, a revolutionary clique. And also, basically making ourselves ineffective. Those are the two biggest concerns that I have. And one of the things that I would say about it is that, like, if we hold people—and it's, actually what you're talking about is great for this, because you talk about, like, trying to set these social norms explicitly, instead of just having them be implicit, right? Because when we hold people accountable to social norms that they don't know about, like, that's not a good way to build a movement, you know? If people that come in and they act in ways that are totally normal for them and, like, you know, their culture, which isn't, like, cool kid anarchy or whatever the fuck, it's really quick—it's really easy if we take these—if we—if these social norms and if these boundaries are so important to us, and, you know, many of them should be very important to us. But if we see them as, like, something that of course people should just know and respect, then we just kick everyone out and get fucking nowhere. Philip 36:41 Yeah, that is a really important thing to bring up. And, I think especially talking about security as this adaptive changing field, the practices we have in the way that we approach this work needs to change as the moment that we're organizing in changes. And I personally learned a lot of my security culture norms and practices through the lens of an anarchist punk subculture, specifically through the lens of frontline forest defense and other land defense campaigns. And the sort of tools and cultural norms that came out of that are ones that evolved really to protect people who were working in small groups or by themselves, engaging in very risky actions—you know, generally like under the cover of night, so to speak—and so it did lead to a set of practices that had a inherent cliquiness to them. I think we're in a really different historical moment right now. I think we're in a moment where mass unrest has spread all across the country in a way that I think is pretty historically unprecedented within the United States. And our security culture norms should change to reflect this mass moment we're in. So it's no longer the same situation as it was in the late 90s or early 2000s during the Green Scare. And one of the most important things that our movement can and needs to be doing during this time is being accessible to people who are newly becoming politically active, who don't have those sub cultural norms, and are coming into movement spaces for maybe the first time and are excited to be part of this huge uprising. Margaret 38:33 Yeah. Philip 38:34 And so something I've experienced a lot of the time is, just as much as there's that social clout of, you know, being the badass militant, I think there's also social clout of being the super secure militant. Margaret 38:47 Oh, yeah, totally. Philip 38:48 Who doesn't answer any questions and it's super dodgy and you don't know anything about them. And that's, I think, a really alienating experience for people who are just coming to movements for the first time without having that sort of background, and it's almost as much of a risk as the state repression itself for isolating our movements. You know, we're not existing solely in a static confrontation with state repression. But the terrain is changing a lot. And so we need to be evaluating what the different risks of our actions are. And if the risk of state repression because our security culture is too weak is lower than the risk of isolation because our security culture is too strong, then we need to be changing our security culture. Margaret 39:42 Yeah. Yeah, I um, you know, the less directly involved I am in the streets, the more I read history-which is sort of a classic getting older move, which I'm not super proud of, but whatever-and one of the things that I'm like learning more and more as I read through different revolutionary history is that, like, sometimes the only way to be safest is fucking win. Like, and there's the quote, shit. German person... I don't even remember what revolution it was from, it was like before the 1848 stuff, but it was—this revolutionist has a quote, 'Those who make half a revolution dig their own grave." And, you know, and that person watched their friends die in jail, right? And, like, because if we—if we go half way we're just gonna fucking lose and—or die or, you know, whatever. Like if, I don't know, I think about it a lot like this—in the current moment, like to just be like really concrete and to not—I am not giving advice at all. Like, I just I literally don't know what the best thing to do is, but I think we need to have a conversation about it—is that like, okay, so on one level, taking pictures of burning cop cars is a really good way to get someone sent to prison, right? Especially if you take pictures of people who are setting cop cars on fire, which I think you just shouldn't fucking do. But if it weren't— Philip 41:19 Absolutely. For all listeners, don't take photos of people doing illegal activity. Margaret 41:24 But it's also the pictures of cop cars on fire that are causing the revolt to spread, right? And a movement that says, "No journalists," or you know, certainly, like no, no—and I am not trying to fucking weigh in on this. I am way too armchair on this particular uprising because I live somewhere where it's not particularly conflictual. But it's not as simple as like, just like, no one ever take pictures of any of this, ever. No one talks about what's happening, ever. Because if people don't know that this shit is happening, no one's going to get inspired. And for me, that is always, that has always worked out to mean, take a picture of, like, the broken window rather than the person breaking the window, you know? There's like, Philip 42:19 Yeah. Margaret 42:22 But it's... Philip 42:24 Which is aa security culture tool right there of, your recognizing the different risks inherent in each activity, the risk of someone getting legally implicated through a photo, or the risk of your movement getting drowned out in the media cycle because there isn't popular media representing what we're doing. Margaret 42:45 Yeah. Philip 42:45 And then specifically, you're talking about our intentional ability to choose how to navigate those risks, and doing something that gives us the benefit of having our own popular media, of being able to build the movement while doing our best to protect people from the like actual legal evidence of, "Oh, here is this photo of you doing such and such action." Margaret 43:07 Yeah. Philip 43:07 And again, it's hard to know specifically what kind of photos might lead to incriminating evidence, hypothetically, but we can make educated guesses. And really, it is all about risk management and knowing the risks and it's not a one-sided risk. It's not, there's just the risk of state repression. You're absolutely right, that the risk of isolation and of getting swept under the rug is going to be a huge thing. And I, you know, again, it feels difficult to try to talk about this in an hour-long podcast because it feels like so many very large, important intersections between security culture and all these other fields that you could, you know, have an entire 'nother interview about. But I think one important one is movement strategy. And, you know, so being another armchair philosopher with you here. Looking at the historical moment of Biden about to enter the White House, you know, for the last four years, there's been this coalition of middle class liberals aligning themselves more actively with antifascist and radical left movements because there's been this clear enemy in the eyes of a Trump presidency. And I think historically we can see that once there's a return to quote/unquote "normalcy," you know, to attempt to reestablish the neoliberal order, there's going to be a move by the Democratic Party, by the centrists and the liberals, to separate themselves from the radical anarchists, the radical left, the militant component that has been supporting their return to power in some ways by being positioned against Trump. And I think it's really important to think about what that means for us practicing security at this time, of trying to weigh the pros and the risks of maintaining that relationship. And trying to use this as a time to continue to build power and not sort of go back to the edges of the social sphere because there's a Democrat process. Again, I'm not providing any concrete recommendations, but I think we should think about the implications of our actions. And, you know, one big place of this is thinking about how, in different contexts, militant actions can be really inspiring, or they can be really alienating for the rest of the population. And there are times that militant action can totally fractionalize and destroy a movement. And, potentially, this could be one of those times. You know, again, I'm not trying to say that people should or shouldn't do anything, but I think we should think about the coalition that has been being built for the last four years and how we can try to use this time to strengthen it and try to build more collective power with people who are shifting further and further to the left from the centrist position, instead of holing up in our militancy, in our purity of our anarchist movement, because that is going to leave us high and dry to fascists and then to state repression. And so it's going to be a good cop/bad cop of the liberals and the fascists against us. Margaret 46:20 When you talk about, like, there are times when militant action will inspire people and their time where it'll divide people, I think about, like, people often make one claim or the other, you know? They'll say like, "Oh, violence alienates people," or, "Fighting the police alienates people." And it's like, first of all, it's like, yeah, probably alienates certain people but there's other people who certainly are like, "Oh, these people are, like, actually fucking about it and they're willing to, like, defend themselves and each other." And that's really inspiring, right? It's gonna be different with different people. But I think about it when I, like—just talk about survival bullshit that I think about way too often—when I'm building a fire in a precarious situation and you, know, building a campfire in a precarious situation, there are times when if you blow on the fire, it goes out. And, but also, if you never blow on the fire, you'll never have a fire and it'll go out. And, you know, that's the main metaphor that I think of when I think of that shit. When—you just have to know the right moments. You have to know the right moments, both like sort of on a tactical level of like reading the crowd around you, and also on a strategic level. I personally think that the main way to not go back to the margins is to, like, not be fucking shy about what we believe in, and that it's a reasonable thing to believe. Philip 47:44 Yeah. Margaret 47:45 And to like— Philip 47:46 Absolutely. Margaret 47:47 —avoid cliquishness. And it even gets into some of the security culture stuff you're talking about arlier. I was thinking about it where it was like—like, I have these like fucking Nazis. Hey Nazis listening to this show. Hello. And I'm just so impressed with the fact that people might hate listen to a podcast. And you know, and like one of the things that like Nazis always try and do when they doxx people or whatever is their like, they're gonna, like, tell people, right? They're gonna be like—and like, you can't fucking call my family and be like, "Did you know your daughter's an anarchist?" You know? You can't even call the local cops and be like, "Did you know Margaret Killjoy is an anarchist?" Right? And I'm in a different position than most people, right, because I intentionally do a lot of public facing work. But still on like an interpersonal level, just fucking be about what you're about and don't be ashamed of being about what you're about without shaming other people for being about what they're about. And that's how you find common ground. And that's how you, like, one of my goals is I want people to be like—like, I know, people who don't shit on the anarchists when all this stuff started because they, like, know some good anarchists who are nice to them. Philip 48:54 Yeah. Margaret 48:55 And so a lot of people want to hide the fact that they're anarchists or whatever other given, like, radical leftist position. And sometimes that's necessary from a security point of view. But you brought it up earlier when you were talking about how there's certain things you do have to keep hush hush, right? Like, like, no one should specifically know, like—actually, it's funny. I just like basically don't commit crime. But no one should specifically know I, like, you know, graffiti-ed to building in 2002—which I actually didn't do. But, like, they don't need to know that. Right? But I'm gonna be like, "Yeah, I was involved in anti war movement in 2002," or whatever the fuck to date myself, you know. And like, it's useful, and I don't know. It's just stuff I think about way too much. And the other part of it that you were talking about that I want to bring up is that when I first got into anarchism my friend was, like, "Oh, anarchists, you're the berserkers of the peace movement." And I was like, "What?" And he was like, "Yeah, when they need people to go run at the front and die, that's you." And he was talking shit. But more and more I see that like radicals have a high risk tolerance, right? And anti-authoritarians in particular have often been willing to build coalitions with people and willing to put ourselves at risk for broader movement goals with people who turn around and, like, turn their backs on us and let us go to jail or whatever. And I don't think that means that we shouldn't be risk tolerant. I don't think that it means, like, in some ways this is our advantage. But we do have to learn how to not be useful idiots. I don't know. Philip 50:47 Yeah, and especially right now as there's a nationwide conversation about defunding and abolishing the police, it feels like such an important time to be putting these anarchist perspectives forward in a way that's actually contributing to people within the broader community being able to see us publicly and proudly, showing that we can live our values in this way. And it also, I think, is worth noting that different people have different stakes, whether that's based on social location, or the activities were involved in, the types of projects we're doing. But, personally speaking, as a white person, you know, I've got different social privileges and resources that I'm able to use. And so being able to mobilize a lot of the social capital I have and then add that with a layer of saying, "Oh, and actually I do fully believe that we should abolish the police and abolish prisons and implement transformative justice frameworks." Doing that doesn't really pose much of a risk to me. And it makes this entire project a lot more legible. And I do feel like there's been a big concern I've seen in a lot of anarchist communities about being authentic with our politics. You know, there's sort of been an emphasis that I've experienced of people, maybe downplaying their politics and trying to more just live their politics directly through the actions they do. And that's important. Of course that's important. But I do think that we're in a very different moment right now. And you're right that I think it's a bit of a sink or swim time. Margaret 52:24 Yeah. Yeah, I think that we even see this—like, to take anarchism out of it for a second—like Antifa Or, you know, antifascism. Like, they really tried to Red Scare that shit really fucking hard in the past couple years. And it clearly worked for a large minority of the population, right? Antifa is like, code for terrorists to a huge chunk of the population, but only a minority of the population. And I think it's the reason is only a minority population is that so many people of all walks of life were just like, "What? Yeah, that's normal. It's totally normal to be against fascism." And like, watching Richard Spencer get punched and then having the whole world just be like, "Ya know, that tracks. I dunno. Punch white supremacists. That make sense to me," And so when we refuse to—when we when we're about what we're about, like, I think it fucking helps. Yeah. Philip 53:30 Yeah, absolutely. And, I mean, again, I want to just go back to security culture having risk management as one of its core goals and aims. And I come from a background of doing a lot of, like, large management-type projects, where I interact with all these sort of tools that get developed in like the business world or the nonprofit world for making decisions. It's actually a really helpful, like, resource bin to go and get stuff from. And one of those tools is a risk matrix. So it's basically a graph where you have likelihood of something happening on one side, and then severity if this thing did happen or, you know, negative impact if this thing did happen. And then you can kind of plot different scenarios on their, on how likely they are to happen versus the negative impact. So the likelihood of the problem versus the severity of the problem helps us make decisions about how to approach all those problems. So like one thing would be driving is something that we do every day, it happens very frequently, and the possibility of you getting into a car crash would have really high, you know, potentially lethal consequences. And so as a result, car companies put all of this energy into safety mechanisms and airbags and all that. So thinking about this in security context situation, by actually quantifying, by explicitly naming the different potential outcomes of the work we're doing and the risks associated with them, I think it helps us visualize it more. And so the risk of us being authentic about our politics, and of then experiencing state repression, seems like a very high impact risk. And so we are risk adverse to that, or I historically have been risk adverse to being authentic about my politics. But the much higher likelihood—although lower risk—much higher likelihood outcome, is that being isolated, and not being able to build our movements has resulted in anarchism being socially isolated historically and, you know, of neoliberalism or centrist regimes being able to just marginalize them invisiblize these groups. And I know that these are things that we've already been talking about, but I think that that same sort of risk matrix can help us similarly with maybe smaller decisions. If we're making a decision about what types of actions we feel comfortable personally engaging in during a campaign, you know, we can think about, okay, these are the different frameworks that we have for what capacity the local police have, the amount of surveillance that we feel we're being under, the likelihood of this action succeeding, and actually being able to graph all these things can help us make informed decisions in a way that just thinking about or just talking about it, sometimes you can get lost. Margaret 56:50 Yeah. Philip 56:53 Another tool that I really appreciate using a little bit is kind of on that same note, it's the spectrum of risk. I think it came from CrimethInc, but it talks about different vulnerabilities of actions to state repression. Or like different levels of, like, illicit-ness of actions. So, you know, from the most mainstream and acceptable of a permitted march to, you know, the most nefarious, evil, militant anarchist thing you can imagine, and a whole spectrum in between them. And then for those different actions or activities, there's a different accompanying level of security discretion that we can use where with the mainstream march, you want to be as public as possible about it, because your objective is to get the message out, to get people out to make a big strong showing. Whereas with the evil, nefarious nighttime plot, you don't want any public attention on it whatsoever until it's completed. Margaret 57:56 Right. Philip 57:56 Theoretically, you know, whatever the objectives are. And again, a whole spectrum in the middle. And so, especially at this time, is showing us the strength of popular movements getting hundreds of 1000s of people out in the street, I do think that we're leaning maybe more towards the wanting to be public side of things. And if we're using security tools, if we're using discretion that limits the reach, then we're actually inflicting harm upon ourselves by being overly cautious. And so we are then engaging in, again, the isolation that counterintelligence is trying to inflict on us the whole time. Margaret 58:37 Yeah, and then—sorry, it's like every—I'm thinking about all this shit wile are you talking about this stuff. I was gonna make a joke earlier while you were talking about how, like, what, no, we shouldn't just make decisions about what crimes to commit based on peer pressure. And then I kind of, like, get lost in this rabbit hole, where I'm thinking about how like so much of our movement historically bases its decisions on what crimes to commit, basically, by peer pressure, which you could also call social capital, or whatever, you know. And I was thinking about in the context of, like, you know, you and I addressing the fact that like, "Hey, anyone listening to this, like, don't fucking take our word for it." Like, I really like that the way that you're describing security culture is a set of tools that people can use to make their own decisions about what risks they want to do—they want to tolerate personally. And I actually think that a security culture tool might be basically, like, if you feel like you're being peer pressured into committing a crime, that's a huge red flag, right? Like, so many of the different infiltrations that have happened, you know—the FBI fucking loves infiltrating radical movements of different types, especially at the moment Islam, you know, like, what it considers, like, Islamic movements or whatever—and manufacturing criminals to then, you know, persecute, right? You know, there's been so many instances of a lot of the actions that people go down for were always the FBI idea in the first place. And one of the main tools, I think, that that happens through is social pressure. And basically, like, I'm now turning this into the ad of like, where like, the kid walks up and is like, "Come on, man, don't you wanna be cool and, like, do drugs or whatever?" Like, no do drugs only if you want to do drugs, and if you want to do drugs, that's fucking cool. If you want to commit crimes, like, you know, whatever, think about the ethics of your actions. Make your decisions based on ethics and risk, not based on crime. Crime just affects the risk part of it. And I don't know, yeah, just like fuckin—like way too often when I meet, like, younger radicals, I just kind of want to be like, "Look, like, I'm not saying be careful but, like, be a little bit careful. And like, don't jump off a bridge because your best friends that you met two months ago are doing it." You know? Philip 1:01:12 Yeah. And I think a healthy way of doing that is really cultivating a good self-awareness of what your skills and your experience and your acceptable level of involvement is with different kinds of activities and of what you are willing to participate in, you know, ahead of time as much as possible. And being really secure in that and not feeling peer pressure. And again, I think it's easiest and healthiest if we're able to do this in our movement of making that norm established from the get-go in a really clearly articulated way of we're respecting each other's boundaries over what they do or do not want to participate in. And we aren't going to encourage people to do things that they're not comfortable in. But also being able to know what feels right or what feels wrong, having that situational awareness of, "Oh, this feels off to me." And being able to trust our gut instinct, or at least—or at least listen to our gut instinct—at least, you know, give it the time to think about the impact. Because, you know, because—and I do want to again say that, um, you know, I've made poor decisions, solely listening to my gut instinct and not thinking about the other power dynamics that were at play. And that's a real thing, too. But situational awareness and tracking how a situation feels is a big way that our bodies intuitively know to manage risk. I mean, we're living creatures who have existed in a risky world. And we do have ways that we know how to move through that world and keep ourselves safe. And obviously, we're in a totally different context. But trying to tap in to our intuitions is a really helpful way. And I think, you know, again, that goes a lot back to people already practicing security culture on a regular basis, especially people who have experienced trauma or who are targeted by violence and brutality, having a heightened awareness of their surroundings and of the risks that they're being exposed to, and making decisions in a much more intentional and active way than someone who is not at all needing to think about those things because they come from a social location and a privileged background that has insulated them. Margaret 1:03:36 Could you—like basically saying that, like, if you're a rich kid, you're a lot more—you're a lot safer from—a rich kid, or white or, you know, have different sets of privileges, you're less at risk with the decisions that you're making is that...? Philip 1:03:52 Um, well, a little bit. I mean, I am saying, if you're a rich white kid, you should go commit crime. Margaret 1:03:56 [Laughing] Philip 1:03:59 I am saying that people who have experienced marginalization and brutality, you know, oftentimes will have more situational awareness and will have just like a more natural set of security practices that they're doing to keep themselves safe than someone who hasn't experienced those things. And so being able to cultivate that awareness of what we're interacting with, with who we're interacting with, with our read on the situation, if something feels out of place, if there's a car parked behind the march with unmarked license plates, that looks brand new, and it's got tinted windows, and "Oh, that seems out of place. I wonder if I should keep an eye on that because it's either an undercover cop or a right wing vigilante who's about to drive into the crowd." Margaret 1:04:49 Right. Philip 1:04:49 You know, that is security culture and cultivating that awareness of who we're interacting with and how we're interacting with and the different risks is an important tool to just integrate into our everyday practice. Margaret 1:05:05 No, I like tha. I like this idea that being, like, conscious—like as like a personal security culture technique or whatever—being conscious about what's happening and being conscious about your own choice in the decision or whatever... [Sighs] What am I trying to say? It's like, the people who do shit because they're swept up in it—it's okay to be swept up in what's happening sometimes, right? And I'm not trying to say like, never, like, go with the crowd. Because sometimes also, like going with the crowd'a literally the safest thing. Like, even if like—like, sometimes when all your friends are jumping off a bridge you should probably fucking jump off a bridge. Like, because if you chose your friends carefully—like sometimes I pick—I think about how I like pick my friends very carefully. And so therefore, sometimes I trust their judgment more than my own. And sometimes solidarity, like, requires that. But if you're doing shit just because you're swept up in it, especially a crowd of strangers, especially something you're new to. It's not as good of a scene. And also like the people who do that are like literally more likely to roll. Like, you know, some of the people that I've seen turn state's evidence after, you know, felony arrests or whatever are the people who were just, like, kind of in it for the social capital, they were in it as a social scene. They were, like, you know, like, "Oh, I guess all my friends are an anarchist so I'm an anarchist too," or whatever the fuck, you know? Which is a great way to start getting involved in radical politics is, like, pick cool friends. And, you know, they do cool shit, break the law, breaking the laws, cool. I think I'm allowed to?—I don't know, whatever. And, but the people who don't mean it, I don't trust them as much. And I worry about, like, expressing who I do and don't trust on this show because, like, I just don't trust anyone. But that works for me, but apparently it doesn't work for most people. So, but okay, to run with this paranoia thing for a minute: Like, one of the reasons I think that way is that, like, you know, when I first got involved in political activism or whatever, you know, I was involved in forest defense community in the Pacific Northwest. And I went to some of the last meetings of this particular forest defense crew. And they were just like, tree sitters and shit, right? It was like, it was illegalism but it's, like, above ground illegalism. Like people who sit in a tree are, like, "Hey, I fuckin sit in trees." You know? Like, that's like, one thing I'll like admit to, right? I've like sat in trees. And so it's not—they're not, like, the super sketchy arsonists or whatever running around at night. They're not the ELF. But they certainly were infiltrated as though they were. And I went to some of the last meetings of this organization because I joined it near the end of its time. And then during a FOIA request—a Freedom of Information Act request where you send off to the government and say, "Please give us information about this." Or maybe it was during court discovery, I can't remember which—it came out that, like, I think about 3 out of 8 or 9 people in that meeting were informants or cops of one style or another. And so it's just like, okay. 30% of the people in this movement
In this segment of By Any Means Necessary, hosts Sean Blackmon and Jacquie Luqman are joined by Mara Verheyden-Hilliard, Executive Director of the Partnership for Civil Justice Fund, to discuss the recent exposé of mercenary security firm Tigerswan, the alarming tactics they used to infiltrate the Standing Rock anti-pipeline protests and sabotage the movement behind it, and the similarities between such tactics and the US government's COINTELPRO program.
In this episode of By Any Means Necessary, hosts Sean Blackmon and Jacquie Luqman are joined by Mara Verheyden-Hilliard, Executive Director of the Partnership for Civil Justice Fund, to discuss the recent exposé of mercenary security firm Tigerswan, the alarming tactics they used to infiltrate the Standing Rock anti-pipeline protests and sabotage the movement behind it, and the similarities between such tactics and the US government's COINTELPRO program.In the second segment, Sean and Jacquie are joined by Ken Hammond, Professor of East Asian and Global History at New Mexico State University, to discuss the announcement by the Chinese government that the country has officially eliminated extreme poverty in the nation of 1.4 billion inhabitants, why the Chinese War on Poverty is being portrayed as a 'war on the poor' by mainstream corporate media, and how anti-war activists can best push back against attempts to gin up a 'New Cold War on China.'In the third segment, Sean and Jacquie are joined by Amanuel Biedemariam, author of the book, “Eritrea and the USA: From Franklin Roosevelt to Barack Obama, and How Donald Trump Changed History,” to discuss military escalations between the Tigray People's Liberation Front and the government of Ethiopia, the latest on the ultimatum given by the central government to abandon the capital of the Tigray region, and the role of the US government in the conflict.Later in the show, Sean and Jacquie are joined by Dr. Gerald Horne, Moores Professor of History and African American Studies at the University of Houston, and author of the new book “The Bittersweet Science: Racism, Racketeering, and the Political Economy of Boxing,” to discuss the death of world soccer and anti-imperialist icon Diego Maradona, worrying new joblessness numbers, and Joe Biden's apparent lack of interest in nominating Bernie Sanders or Elizabeth Warren to his cabinet.
Host Doug McKenty discusses the state of independent media and the growing police state with investigative journalist Will Parrish, co-author of the TigerSwan Tactics series for The Intercept. The conversation goes in depth about the military security contractor hired to fight water protectors at Standing Rock. Help the water protectors here: https://waterprotectorlegal.org/ and please support The Shift https://www.patreon.com/theshift or www.theshiftnow.com.
Chelsea is joined by GSF President Stu Bradin to talk with LTC (Ret) Jimmy Reese. Reese talks about his unconventional path in the Army that ultimately led him to Delta Force, Operation Anaconda, and becoming an entrepreneur after retiring from Active Duty.Partner Highlight: The Range Complexhttps://www.therangecomplex.com/Learn More... Stu references Peter Blaber's Book on Operation Anaconda (and more), which is called, "The Mission, The Men, and Me: Lessons from a Former Delta Force Commander":https://www.amazon.com/Mission-Men-Me-Lessons-Commander/dp/0425223728Support the show (https://gsof.org/individual-membership/)
What can be done about Equifax? What is the TigerSwan leak, and what does it say about anarchism? Plus, a smaller review of the Apple Event September 2017, Nintendo Direct 2017, bullshit bloggers, and much, much more! Special Guests: N/A The Foreplay: --The Sovryn Tech Newsletter (zog.email), store.sovryntech.com, Google buying HTC smartphone business, Amazon wants an East US HQ, NES Classic returning along with more SNES Classic stock, Apple Event September 2017. Story of the Week:--“Equifax” Link: youtu.be/bvHIrTc08r0, www.identitytheft.gov/Info-Lost-or-Stolen HackSec:--“TigerSwan” Link: bit.ly/2vUcEEQ GameTalk:--“Nintendo Direct” Album of the Week:--"Prophets of Rage" Tool of the Week:--“The Parent, Educator & Youth Guide to LGBTQ Cyberbullying” Link: www.connectsafely.org/lgbtq/ Tech History:--"The Bullshit of Success Blogs" Link: bit.ly/2gKZsA1 The Climax: --"Condorman" APPENDIX: --"The Nexus Conference " Link: www.nexusearth.com/conference.html--"Roberts & Roberts Brokerage" Link: rrbi.co--"Resist The Empire Podcast" Link: resisttheempirepodcast.com/--"CryptoCompare" Link: www.cryptocompare.com/--“Unixstickers” Link: stickers.sovryntech.com--“Sovryn Tech T-Shirts!” Link: store.sovryntech.com--”Sovryn Tech Solutions” Link: solutions.zog.ninja --”Libreboot X200” Link: bit.ly/1FI57ew --"NeverAgain.tech" Link: neveragain.tech/ --"Surveillance Self-Defense" Link: ssd.eff.org/ --"That One Privacy Site" Link: thatoneprivacysite.net/ --"Privacytools.io" Link: www.privacytools.io/ --"ipleak.net" Link: ipleak.net/ --"Secure Messaging Apps" Link: www.securemessagingapps.com/ --"Lavabit" Link: lavabit.com --"Obsolete! Magazine" Link: obsolete-press.com/ --"A Graduate Course in Applied Cryptography" Link: toc.cryptobook.us/ --"URLscan.io" Link: urlscan.io/ --"TatianaCoin Campaign" Link: TatianaCoin.com --"Zcash4win" Link: zcash4win.com/--"EFF Guide to the US Border" Link: bit.ly/2m79lGe--"Max Stirner's 'The Unique and Its Property' Book" Link: amzn.to/2rCGM95--"RetroShare" Link: retroshare.net/--"PortaPow USB Condom" Link: amzn.to/2sPMuoL--“Books of Liberty” Link: booksofliberty.com/--"Dark Android: 2017 Edition" Link: darkandroid.info---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Make easy monthly donations through Patreon: patreon.com/sovryntech Donate with Bitcoin! BTC: 1AEiTkWiF8x6yjQbbhoU89vHHMrkzQ7o8d Zcash Shielded (encrypted) Address: zcfUhN29ddFdtZ1iKvv6WFFXUB9nKWwL5kXvcrvhQuB2yMw6eabshv1CGN92kkbtRt1Ykf1k2266sJvZAQQUrhmpuCwXUDD Transparent (unencrypted) Address: t1ZAA33YYzPmm4Ks5aq13N4NJBjqqSypY8G Donate with PayPal! Link: donate.zog.ninja Donate with our Amazon Wish List! Link: wishlist.zog.ninja ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You can e-mail the show at: bbs@sovryntech.comPGP key can be found here: pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vinde…=0x65FE520E51A74AA9 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You can also visit our IRC channel on Freenode: #SovNet Or just go to: irc.zog.ninja ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- sovryntech.com twitter.com/sovryntech steamcommunity.com/id/ninjaprogram
What can be done about Equifax? What is the TigerSwan leak, and what does it say about anarchism? Plus, a smaller review of the Apple Event September 2017, Nintendo Direct 2017, bullshit bloggers, and much, much more! Special Guests: N/A The Foreplay: --The Sovryn Tech Newsletter (zog.email), store.sovryntech.com, Google buying HTC smartphone business, Amazon wants an East US HQ, NES Classic returning along with more SNES Classic stock, Apple Event September 2017. Story of the Week:--“Equifax” Link: youtu.be/bvHIrTc08r0, www.identitytheft.gov/Info-Lost-or-Stolen HackSec:--“TigerSwan” Link: bit.ly/2vUcEEQ GameTalk:--“Nintendo Direct” Album of the Week:--"Prophets of Rage" Tool of the Week:--“The Parent, Educator & Youth Guide to LGBTQ Cyberbullying” Link: www.connectsafely.org/lgbtq/ Tech History:--"The Bullshit of Success Blogs" Link: bit.ly/2gKZsA1 The Climax: --"Condorman" APPENDIX: --"The Nexus Conference " Link: www.nexusearth.com/conference.html--"Roberts & Roberts Brokerage" Link: rrbi.co--"Resist The Empire Podcast" Link: resisttheempirepodcast.com/--"CryptoCompare" Link: www.cryptocompare.com/--“Unixstickers” Link: stickers.sovryntech.com--“Sovryn Tech T-Shirts!” Link: store.sovryntech.com--”Sovryn Tech Solutions” Link: solutions.zog.ninja --”Libreboot X200” Link: bit.ly/1FI57ew --"NeverAgain.tech" Link: neveragain.tech/ --"Surveillance Self-Defense" Link: ssd.eff.org/ --"That One Privacy Site" Link: thatoneprivacysite.net/ --"Privacytools.io" Link: www.privacytools.io/ --"ipleak.net" Link: ipleak.net/ --"Secure Messaging Apps" Link: www.securemessagingapps.com/ --"Lavabit" Link: lavabit.com --"Obsolete! Magazine" Link: obsolete-press.com/ --"A Graduate Course in Applied Cryptography" Link: toc.cryptobook.us/ --"URLscan.io" Link: urlscan.io/ --"TatianaCoin Campaign" Link: TatianaCoin.com --"Zcash4win" Link: zcash4win.com/--"EFF Guide to the US Border" Link: bit.ly/2m79lGe--"Max Stirner's 'The Unique and Its Property' Book" Link: amzn.to/2rCGM95--"RetroShare" Link: retroshare.net/--"PortaPow USB Condom" Link: amzn.to/2sPMuoL--“Books of Liberty” Link: booksofliberty.com/--"Dark Android: 2017 Edition" Link: darkandroid.info---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Make easy monthly donations through Patreon: patreon.com/sovryntech Donate with Bitcoin! BTC: 1AEiTkWiF8x6yjQbbhoU89vHHMrkzQ7o8d Zcash Shielded (encrypted) Address: zcfUhN29ddFdtZ1iKvv6WFFXUB9nKWwL5kXvcrvhQuB2yMw6eabshv1CGN92kkbtRt1Ykf1k2266sJvZAQQUrhmpuCwXUDD Transparent (unencrypted) Address: t1ZAA33YYzPmm4Ks5aq13N4NJBjqqSypY8G Donate with PayPal! Link: donate.zog.ninja Donate with our Amazon Wish List! Link: wishlist.zog.ninja ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You can e-mail the show at: bbs@sovryntech.comPGP key can be found here: pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vinde…=0x65FE520E51A74AA9 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You can also visit our IRC channel on Freenode: #SovNet Or just go to: irc.zog.ninja ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- sovryntech.com twitter.com/sovryntech steamcommunity.com/id/ninjaprogram
Tigerswan, the private security company notorious for its work surveilling pipeline opponents at Standing Rock is back in the news. The state of Louisiana determined that TigerSwan was unfit to obtain a license to work on the site of another controversial pipeline in the state based on a lawsuit it is facing for unlicensed security operations in North Dakota. So naturally, Tigerswan tried to create a new company to subvert the licensing debacle but the state noticed, and denied the application. (The Intercept) Soups and chutneys made from wonky vegetables, beer from stale bread, cider from blemished apples and soaps from discarded orange peels are selling fast in the Wageningen branch of Jumbo, one of the biggest Dutch supermarket chains. The "Waste is Delicious" initiative launched last week, supported by a local university as part of a new national program, United Against Food Waste. (news.trust.org) I heard a story on Science Friday today called Beyond the Hive, which provided advice to citizens worried about pollinator populations. The surprising advice was to just mow your lawn less frequently, which allows various miniature flowers to bloom, and is a lazy way to attract native bees to your yard. (Science Friday) An update to a story I’ve brought up before on the 10 in 2 about the protesters who were arrested for taking actions to stop a pipeline in West Roxbury massachusetts. This week the final 13 protesters facing charges over the demonstrations were found not responsible by a Massachusetts judge, who ruled that the potential environmental and public health impacts of the pipeline — including the risk of climate change — had made civil disobedience legally necessary. (ThinkProgress) Scientists from UNESCO say that within five to ten years, Mexico’s monstrous glaciers will be reduced to piles of ice. The disappearance of the natural structures can have global consequences as the icy surfaces which once reflected the ultraviolet rays melt away, sun rays are absorbed by the earth and the world’s temperature will rise. I have to admit that I didn't even know that Mexico had glaciers, but I do know that I already miss ‘em. (Telesur) Google created an incredible interactive website exploring how a tribe in the Brazilian state of Pará is exploring ways to use old mobile phones and machine learning to fight deforestation. The website is hard to describe, but it uses sounds, videos and photos in a unique way. Check it out right now by following the link on our website to get an idea of how it is possible to save a rainforest by listening to it. (google.co.in) a new report from Royal Dutch Shell called the “Sky scenario” envisions a world that achieves net-zero carbon emissions by 2070, thus (in the company’s accounting) holding global average temperatures beneath the international target of 2 degrees Celsius. It has garnered a lot of criticism, but at the very least, it is an ambitious idea. (Vox) On Thursday, the United Nations secretary general, António Guterres, called climate change “the most systemic threat to humankind” and like many of us he worried aloud “I am beginning to wonder how many more alarm bells must go off." (NYT) Climate change seems to be in the courts a lot these days, and this story is no different. Exxon wanted Judge Valerie Caproni in the District Court for the Southern District of New York to stop the attorneys general from issuing subpoenas and dispositions related to what Exxon executives knew about climate change and when. But in a big loss for Exxon, Caproni said the company’s allegations were “implausible,” and dismissed its case. (The Hill) A leaked memo reveals that the EPA sent employees a list of talking points on Tuesday instructing them to cast doubt on the scientific consensus about climate change. The talking points instruct employees to highlight scientific uncertainty and lack of evidence linking human activity to climate change which is in direct conflict with the 2017 federal climate assessment. Sorry to leave you on that note, but…(Shareblue) bluskye.com
Episode 10 of The Dirt features an interview with Sharon Lerner, an investigative journalist who has written extensively about water contamination around airports and military bases stemming from a chemical found in firefighting foam. Contamination from the foam, which is a chemical cousin to GenX, is being found in North Carolina and across the country. Plus, what is TigerSwan? The Dirt examines the secretive private security firm that helped suppress opposition to the Dakota Access pipeline and was operating in North Carolina post-Hurricane Matthew. And April 2nd is International Children's Book Day and we convened a panel to review some of our favorite environmentally-themed books for kids.
In today's Federal Newscast, the security contractor TigerSwan says a former recruiting vendor accidentally made thousands of its resume files publicly available. They included personal information of thousands of former servicemembers.
EP154 GunBlog VarietyCast - The Legal Episode Pacifiers & Peacemakers - What’s Wrong with Gun Violence? Felons Behaving Badly - Woman Arrested After Robbing a Charlotte Bank Flea Market - Kat Von D Special Guest - Eric Friday, lead counsel for Norman vs. Florida The Bridge - Alan Gura does it again! Blue Collar Prepping - Extinguishing Conditioned Responses This Week in Anti-Gun Nuttery - Part 2 of the Shannon Watts Interview Plug of the Week - Join GBVC Radio Facebook Group and Subscribe to the Podcast Intro Erin’s Post Explaining the Transgender Ban - http://lurkingrhythmically.blogspot.com/2017/07/trumps-no-transgender-people-in.html Erin’s Follow-up Post - https://lurkingrhythmically.blogspot.com/2017/07/follow-up-to-yesterdays-post.html SEAN - TRC One Day Introductory Pistol - http://www.therangecomplex.com/one-day-introductory-pistol.html Oct 7th, near Fayetteville, NC. Contact me for sign up info. Bloggers impressions of the last TigerSwan class - https://www.ncgunblog.com/2011/10/31/tigerswan-blogshoot-roundup/ Pacifiers & Peacemakers - What’s Wrong with Gun Violence? Felons Behaving Badly - Woman Arrested After Robbing a Charlotte Bank Woman Arrested After Robbing a Charlotte Bank - http://www.crimeincharlotte.com/woman-arrested-after-robbing-a-charlotte-bank/ Suspect - http://webapps6.doc.state.nc.us/opi/viewoffender.do?method=view&offenderID=0248835&searchLastName=McClure&searchFirstName=Shelly&listurl=pagelistoffendersearchresults&listpage=1 Flea Market of Ideas - Kat Von D Angela Corey takes on well-known legal commentator, Harvard professor Alan Dershowitz - http://jacksonville.com/news/crime/2012-06-07/story/angela-corey-takes-well-known-legal-commentator-harvard-professor-alan Gerry Spence On Why He Agreed to Defend Randy Weaver - http://www.famous-trials.com/rubyridge/1143-spenceletter Boston Massacre and the Trial - https://www.bostonteapartyship.com/john-adams-boston-massacre Special Guest - Eric Friday, lead counsel for Norman vs. Florida Florida Carry Inc. asks US Supreme Court to hear open-carry case: Norman v. Florida - https://www.thegunwriter.com/23123/florida-carry-inc-asks-florida-supreme-court-hear-open-carry-case-norman-v-florida/ Arrested for Accidental Exposure of Lawfully Carried Handgun in Florida - https://youtu.be/-qKeJ6jd2Ak Caetano v. Massachusetts - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caetano_v._Massachusetts Join Florida Carry - https://www.floridacarry.org/join-us The Bridge - Alan Gura does it again! Wren v. DC - https://www.washingtonpost.com/amphtml/local/public-safety/appeals-court-blocks-enforcement-of-districts-strict-concealed-carry-law/2017/07/25/29bcbdfc-7146-11e7-9eac-d56bd5568db8_story.html Blue Collar Prepping - Extinguishing Conditioned Responses Center for the Intrepid - https://www.bamc.amedd.army.mil/departments/rehabilitation-medicine/cfi/ CAREN Dome - https://youtu.be/dgFQcnW5DP0 This Week in Anti-Gun Nuttery - Part 2 of the Shannon Watts Interview Hellbent Podcast ep 27: Shannon Watts: https://soundcloud.com/hellbentpodcast/episode-27-fucking-up-the-cover-up-feat-shannon-watts Study Finds That Chicago Criminals Get Guns From Friends, Family: http://freebeacon.com/issues/study-finds-that-chicago-criminals-get-guns-from-friends-family/ Lying about the Brady Bill: https://www.weerdworld.com/2014/images-of-the-antis-lying-about-the-brady-bill/ Plug of the Week - Join GBVC Radio Facebook Group and Subscribe to the Podcast Join GBVC Radio Facebook Group - Android - Click Here to Subscribe in Android - https://www.androidcentral.com/how-use-podcasts-google-play-music-android Podkicker - https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ait.podka&hl=en iPhone - How to Subscribe via Apple Podcasts on Your iPhone (IOS) Overcast - https://overcast.fm
This week on Intercepted: Don Jr. is in the shit throne over a secret meeting he had with a Russian lawyer. Could this be, as many in the media are claiming, the smoking gun of Russia collusion? Intercept co-founder Glenn Greenwald weighs in and debunks a forged NSA document sent to Rachel Maddow. Intercept reporters Alice Speri and Alleen Brown talk about the shadowy mercenary company TigerSwan. We also hear music from Victoria Ruiz of the punk band Downtown Boys.
On today's episode of Loud & Clear, Brian Becker is joined by independent journalist Catherine Shakdam.An AP investigation has revealed that the United Arab Emirates is operating a series of black-site prisons in Yemen where horrific torture takes place, with the United States deeply involved. Senate Republicans have unveiled a bill to replace Obamacare. The brutal plan phases out the expansion of Medicaid and strips funding from Planned Parenthood, among other attacks on the right to healthcare. Margaret Flowers, the co-director of Popular Resistance, joins the show. New documents obtained by The Intercept reveal that a security firm called TigerSwan that spied on the Standing Rock protest movement was working with Illinois police to unconstitutionally surveil the ANSWER Coalition in Chicago while it organized anti-Trump protests this year. Brian is joined by John Beacham, coordinator of the ANSWER Coalition in Chicago.
This week we featured two conversations in the episode. "Stop The Pipelines Action Camp" Firstly, Bursts chatted with erin. erin is a resident of the Blacksburg VA area and an affiliate of Blue Ridge Rapid Response Project (or BRRRP) and is helping to organize the "Stop The Pipelines Action Camp" in that area from July 13-17th, 2017. The action camp is being organized in hopes to spread resistance to the Mountain Valley & Atlantic Coast Pipelines that are traversing Appalachian West Virginia, Virginia and, in the ACP's case, North Carolina. We talk about what it is to live in a place and defend your home, to get to know your neighbors, to build the skills needed to resist ecocidal, capitalist infrastructure projects. More info at https://blueridgerapidresponse.wordpress.com. The event is being co-sponsored by Smokey Mountain Eco-Defense (SMED). You can find a flyer, here. erin mentions pipeline security pursued by mercenary groups like TigerSwan as well as industry-sponsored astro-turf (or fake grassroots) group YourEnergy meant to muddy the water of community resistance to pipeline expansion and other infrastructural projects. Errekaleor Bizirik! After that, Bursts chatted with 2 residents of the squatted neighborhood of Errekaleor Bizirik in the Basque territory within the borders of so-called Spain. The residents talk about the history of Errekaleor Bizirik, feminism, energy infrastructure, recent attacks by police on the project and pre-figuring a post-capitalist life-way in the rubble of the existent. For more info on the project, which translates to Dry River (Errekaleor) Lives (Bizirik)!, check out: The draft wikipedia page; An IGD post about the project with links and context; Their Coopfunding page. From their post on igd, is this quote: "For those of you that are too far away to personally attend, feel free to make a quick call to the mayor of Vitoria-Gasteiz Gorka Urtaran at +34 945 16 13 82 or +34 945 16 13 83 or send us a message at errekaleorbizirik@gmail.com!" We wanted to also state that the folks at Errekaleor reached out to us for the interview, which was super awesome. If you have a project, a book, an article, a fight that seems like it'd be interesting to us and our listeners, send us an email at thefinalstrawradio@riseup.net and get the ball rolling. Find us on itunes and subscribe for free. You can rate us there as well, to help others find us more easily. Announcement The Arizona based humanitarian aid group No More Deaths (No Mas Muertes in spanish) has been under semi constant surveillance by Border Patrol for the past week. This is unprecedented attention; since its foundation in 2004 this group has had a written agreement, essentially a non interference good faith contract, with Border Patrol that names the group as a health aid and humanitarian group that has every right to be doing the work it's doing. NO More Deaths is a group based on certain faith principles (it is an official ministry of the Unitarian Universalist Church in Tuscon) and on critical engagement with policy reform, nevertheless it is a group that has a high degree of anarchist involvement and solidarity with what could be called anarchist principles. It is most famous for desert aid; volunteers hiking out and leaving supplies such as water - essential in the 100 plus degree heat - food, socks, blankets, other supplies, and directed first aid where needed along remote corridors in the Sonoran Desert. The group also engages with legal aid, abuse documentation, searching for missing or disappeared people, helping getting belongings back from Border Patrol, networking with other border solidarity groups in the area, and consciousness raising and education to subvert the extremely stale narrative that immigration has in the US. A couple of days ago, after almost a week of constant surveillance, Border Patrol raided a camp "in an unprecedented show of force, [with] approximately 30 armed agents raided the camp with at least 15 trucks, two quads, and a helicopter to apprehend four patients receiving medical care." We hope to talk with someone about this situation soon for the radio show; the fact that this raid is coming now is a clear sign of the administrations attitude toward this kind of work. For more information on this issue and to keep up with No More Deaths, you can go to their website https://nomoredeaths.org Playlist
Nathan, Mike, and Mahler tackle Trump the Climate Clown, Uber strikes, Palestinian prisoners, Colombia, Duterte the rapist, murder, mayhem, amorous camels, Komrad Kushner, Flynn, Nunes, Nigel Farage, covfefe, Merkel, Cuba, Wells Fargo, LeBron James, Portland, Tamir Rice, TigerSwan, fake tweets, and more.
This is the podcast for the documentary in progress, Indelible, for the week of June 2, 2017. Please note that I say “defense attorney” referring to the FBI’s attorney. That is a misspeaking. He is the defendant in the case, (I am the Plaintiff). I meant to say defendant. This podcast addresses an update on… Continue Reading The post Podcast: Birdsong, the FBI, and a TigerSwan appeared first on Marta Lyall | n+Fold.
On today's episode of Loud & Clear, Brian Becker is joined by Kandi Mossett of the Indigenous Environmental Network Project.As the Dakota Access Pipeline is set to become operational today, shocking revelations about spying by a private security firm called TigerSwan are showing the whole progressive movement the extent that corporate interests will go to protect their profits.Donald Trump is reportedly all set to pull the United States out of the Paris Climate Agreement as the move is condemned across the world. What will it really take to save the planet from climate change? Kevin Zeese, the co-director of Popular Resistance, joins the show.The United States is stepping up its support for Free Syrian Army groups fighting in the country’s southeast. But is this latest intervention primarily a way of stepping up aggression against Iran? Catherine Shakdam, independent political analyst, joins Brian.
The fight against the Dakota Access Pipeline led to a remarkable level of protest and solidarity, bringing together native people from all over North America, as well as their allies. It also witnessed a remarkable level of repression. Investigative journalist Will Parrish discusses leaked documents that expose the role of a private security firm TigerSwan, experienced in counterterrorism, and its surveillance and infiltration of protestors. And water protector Cassie Standing Bear Helgerson discusses other threats to water in the Great Lakes Region. Resources: Alleen Brown, Will Parrish, Alice Speri, Leaked Documents Reveal Counterterrorism Tactics Used at Standing Rock to “Defeat Pipeline Insurgencies” The Intercept Will Parrish, The Federal Government is Trying to Imprison These Six Water Protectors Shadowproof The post Repressing Pipeline Protests appeared first on KPFA.
GunBlog VarietyCast Episode 21 Blue Collar Prepping - Light and Fire Foreign Policy for Grownups - NSA Spying AlArma - Remember Paris Tech Tips with The Barron - Barron sees hacks in the wild This Week in Anti-Gun Nuttery - Child shoots mom in WalMart Blue Collar Prepping - Light and Fire Fresnel Lens - http://tinyurl.com/nuc4fvj Waterproof matches & case - http://tinyurl.com/pgqyj3c Primitive fire starting techniques - http://www.thebugoutbagguide.com/2014/09/24/primitive-fire-making/ Cree Ultrafire Mini - http://tinyurl.com/qbr625p http://gunscarstech.com/2012/03/22/edc-flashlights-fenix-pd20-vs-sipik/ Funny “carry a flashlight” story - http://www.triangletactical.net/2014/08/21/if-you-dont-edc-a-flashlight-youre-wrong/ Felons Behaving Badly Greensboro police charge man who accidentally shot himself - http://webapps6.doc.state.nc.us/opi/viewoffender.do?method=view&offenderID=0962274&searchLastName=Watts&searchFirstName=Andrew&listurl=pagelistoffendersearchresults&listpage=1 Suspect - http://webapps6.doc.state.nc.us/opi/viewoffender.do?method=view&offenderID=0962274&searchLastName=Watts&searchFirstName=Andrew&listurl=pagelistoffendersearchresults&listpage=1 Foreign Policy for Grownups - NSA Spying Leaker Snowden’s story gets leakier - http://thisainthell.us/blog/?p=36202 U.S. report says major weapons designs compromised by Chinese - http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/05/28/uk-usa-china-hacking-idUKBRE94R02H20130528# Russian hackers suspected of Kremlin ties used Windows bug ‘to spy on west’ - http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/oct/14/russian-hackers-suspected-kremlin-ties-used-windows-bug-to-spy-on-west Snowden Has One Very Important And Potentially Devastating Question To Answer - http://www.businessinsider.com/snowden-and-military-information-2014-3 NSA employee implicated in Snowden probe resigned, memo says - http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-employee-implicated-in-snowden-probe-has-resigned/2014/02/13/44f37a3e-94c7-11e3-b46a-5a3d0d2130da_story.html Strange laws Oklahoma lawmaker denies 'hoodie' ban is a thing - http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/05/living/feat-oklahoma-hoodie-sweatshirt-legislation/ AlArma - Remember Paris Cruiser Ready - https://fortress.wa.gov/cjtc/www/images/docs/classes/Firearms_Patrol_Rifle_Instructor_2014/Section%2010%20Carry%20Conditions.pdf Truck Guns - http://gunfreezone.net/wordpress/index.php/2011/05/16/truck-guns/ Project Appleseed - https://www.appleseedinfo.org/ The Range Complex (formerly TigerSwan) - http://therangecomplex.com/ Gunsite Academy - http://www.gunsite.com/ Rangemaster (Tom and Lynn Givens) - http://www.rangemaster.com/ Thunder Ranch - http://www.thunderranchinc.com/ Rogers Shooting School - http://www.rogersshootingschool.com/ Fun With Headlines Group claiming to be ISIS group hijacks news station, city paper - http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/01/07/group-claiming-to-be-isis-group-hijacks-news-station-city-paper/ Tech Tips with The Barron - Barron sees hacks in the wild How My Mom Got Hacked - http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/04/opinion/sunday/how-my-mom-got-hacked.html Gogo issues fake HTTPS certificate to users visiting YouTube - http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/01/gogo-issues-fake-https-certificate-to-users-visiting-youtube/ NSA has VPNs in Vulcan death grip - http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/12/nsa-has-vpns-in-vulcan-death-grip-no-really-thats-what-they-call-it/ Secure Secure Shell (for server operators) - https://stribika.github.io/2015/01/04/secure-secure-shell.html This Week in Anti-Gun Nuttery - Child shoots mom in WalMart Death And Denial In Idaho: How Gun Culture Killed A Mother - http://www.liberalamerica.org/2015/01/01/death-and-denial-in-idaho-how-gun-culture-killed-a-mother/ Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence Statement on Idaho Toddler's Fatal Shooting of His Mother in a Walmart - http://www.bradycampaign.org/press-room/brady-center-to-prevent-gun-violence-statement-on-idaho-toddlers-fatal-shooting-of-his Idaho Walmart shooting is latest example of fatal combination of children and guns - http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jan/01/idaho-walmart-shooting-fatal-combination-children-guns?CMP=share_btn_tw
Archaeologists from Warren Wilson College study the remains of a Spanish fort found in NC. The NCSU Garage Lab helps aspiring entrepreneurs build their businesses. And Patrick Reid talks about TigerSwan's Guardian Angel Project.
© 2020-2025 Ivy Podcast Discovery LLC
