Podcast appearances and mentions of yuen yuen ang

Daron Acemoğlu'nun Nobel ödülünü alması doğal olarak tezlerine ilişkin tartışmaları da güncelledi. En sağlam eleştirilerden birisi Prof. Dr. Nuray Mert'ten geldi. Bir diğer eleştiri kaynağı da Çinli yazar Yuen Yuen Ang. Nuray Mert “ulusların zenginliği veya fakirliği”, “demokrasilerin başarısı veya başarısızlığı”na dair iddiaların, zenginlik ve başarıya dair kural ve model bulma çabasının ürünü olduğunu söylüyor, “Daha önemlisi, zengin ve başarılı olanı ‘meşrulaştırma'ya, olmayanı mahkûm etmeye yöneliktir” diyor. Çinli yazar Yuen Yuen Ang ise şöyle diyor: “Çoğu insan bunun Batı ile Çin arasındaki bir savaş olduğunu düşünüyor. Hayır, karşıtlık kurumlara yönelik kaslı-sömürgeci bir bakış açısı ile yerli bilgelik arasındadır.”

Kina og USA er ikke to helt forskellige systemer, forklarer Yuen Yuen Ang, der er professor ved Johns Hopkins University i Baltimore. Vi skal forstå, at de blot har to forskellige strategier til at få det bedste ud af kapitalisme – og undgå det værste, forklarer hun i denne udgave af Langsomme Samtaler med Rune Lykkeberg. 

There are few stories that are more crucial to the world's future than what's happening in China. Take any of the most important issues of our time — climate change, geopolitics, the global economy, advanced technologies — and China is at the center of them. American politics itself has increasingly come to revolve around competition with China.In other words, what happens in China doesn't stay in China — it reverberates through the global economy, the American political system and the international order. And a lot is happening in China right now. In November, China experienced what many have called its most significant protests since Tiananmen Square in 1989. In response, Beijing loosened its “zero Covid” policy, demonstrating a level of public responsiveness that shocked many observers of the increasingly authoritarian regime. However, that policy shift also unleashed a huge wave of infections and hospitalizations that puts the country's immediate future in question.Yuen Yuen Ang is a professor of political economy, a China scholar at Johns Hopkins University and the author of “China's Gilded Age: The Paradox of Economic Boom and Vast Corruption.” Her basic argument is this: In order to understand what's happening in China today (and what all of it could mean for its future) you need to first understand China's unique, often misunderstood political system — one that Ang calls “autocracy with democratic characteristics.” Because we in the West are so fixated on how China selects its leaders, she argues, we've overlooked a more subtle but far more consequential revolution in how China is governed. That transformation of the Chinese political system is the deeper story behind both the country's economic success — as well as its current troubles. And it provides an illuminating lens through which to view American politics as well.Mentioned:“An Era Just Ended in China” by Yuen Yuen Ang“The Problem With Zero” by Yuen Yuen Ang“The Procedure Fetish” by Nicholas BagleyBook Recommendations:From The Soil by Xiaotong FeiFei Xiaotong and Sociology in Contemporary China by R. David ArkushThe Fractalist by Benoit MandelbrotThoughts? Guest suggestions? Email us at ezrakleinshow@nytimes.com.You can find transcripts (posted midday) and more episodes of “The Ezra Klein Show” at nytimes.com/ezra-klein-podcast, and you can find Ezra on Twitter @ezraklein. Book recommendations from all our guests are listed at https://www.nytimes.com/article/ezra-klein-show-book-recs.“The Ezra Klein Show” is produced by Emefa Agawu, Annie Galvin, Jeff Geld, Rogé Karma and Kristin Lin. Fact-checking by Michelle Harris and Kate Sinclair. Original music by Isaac Jones. Mixing by Jeff Geld. Audience strategy by Shannon Busta. The executive producer of New York Times Opinion Audio is Annie-Rose Strasser. Special thanks to Carole Sabouraud and Kristina Samulewski.

It is difficult to overstate China's rise in terms of economic development in the four decades - growing from one of the poorest countries to becoming the world's second-largest economy. China has also become an important geopolitical partner to many developing countries, and it is quite common to encounter talk of the ‘‘China model'' of development as being more suitable for many African countries that have struggled with economic transformation. Joining me on today's episode is political scientist Yuen Yuen Ang to unpack what China did during the reform years and the many ways that process is misunderstood. She has two excellent books (linked here) on China, and she is one of the most careful, thoughtful, and perceptive scholars I have read.TranscriptTobi; Welcome to Ideas Untrapped, and my guest today is Yuen Yuen Ang who is a professor of political science at the University of Michigan. She has written two very important books on China. And I want to talk to her today about the first book, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap. Welcome, Yuen.Yuen; Well, thank you very much, Tobi, thank you for having me. And I very much appreciate your support.Tobi; In global development today, it's almost impossible not to talk about China. China has become so important both economically and geopolitically, and we know that the picture or the situation was quite different 40 years ago. Another thing with what China has done in the last four decades, I mean, two-thirds of the global reduction in poverty is in China and so many other amazing things, is that there's a lot of, should I say, content on China and in my experience, it feels a bit like quantum physics and that Feynman quote, which is the more you read on China, the less we understand. But, reading your book for me as being quite illuminating. Again, I want to thank you for writing it. So the first question I'll ask you is, very early in your first book you made what I think was an important distinction, which is the difference between market-creating institutions and market-preserving institutions. Can you elaborate more on that? And how China was able to take advantage of the former?Yuen; Sure. Well, first of all, I really love the quote that you used. And before I jump into the question that you just asked, I think it's useful to respond to your comments, which I think it's very insightful, which is that everyone is very interested in China. There's a lot of talk about it, but it feels confusing. And so at the outset, when I write my books, I think one of the things that I wanted to set out to do was to provide an integrative account of China's development since its market opening in 1978. And I stress the word integrative, because I think one of the sources of confusion that you alluded to comes from the fact that there are many, many accounts about China's development, but they tend to focus on only one aspect. So some will talk about trade, others might talk about economic policy, so there are so many different topics about China. But what people need is an integrative account that puts all of these different elements and variables together. I really put them on a timeline to help people to understand, sort of, the different factors that were salient at different points in time. And this is important for correcting the misconception that there is one China model, like some kind of blueprint that was created at the outset and designed to help China take off. So that was the kind of broader backdrop that motivated the way that I write my book, in particular, the first one. Let me now come back to your original question, which is the concept of market-building and market-preserving institutions. And the important thing to understand about institutions is that economists have all agreed that good institutions, such as rule of law, such as formal accountability, such as modern courts, that all of these good institutions are essential for growth. And you have famous books like Why Nations Fail pretty much making similar arguments. And that then translated into the good governance agenda that was advanced by International Development Agencies, such as the World Bank. So for about, I would say, 1990s to the present day or so, there was a great deal of attention and hope that if poor countries could get institutions, right, if they could have first-world institutions, then they will be able to have economic growth and become developed. And when I look at the China case, that obviously does not follow that formula, because if you look at the early parts of China's growth, and even until today, there are so many dimensions of China's institutional design - everything from the ownership of companies, to the property rights, to the design of bureaucracies that just don't conform with what we think first-world good institutions should look like. So why is it that China has been able to grow its economy without those first-world institutions that economists say are the preconditions for growth, and this has been a long-standing puzzle in political economy? So from my investigation, what I find is that the fallacy with the conventional wisdom is that it thinks that there is just one universal set of institutions that are necessary for growth, namely, the first-world rich country institutions. But in fact, what really happens in the course of development is that countries actually have to develop qualitatively different institutions for early and late stages of growth. And those institutions at early stages of growth, that can support the growth process can actually look very, very different from the first-world norms. They can look in ways that conventionally we would dismiss as dysfunctional or corrupt. But those institutions can actually work very well at early growth stages. And subsequently, however, when the economy takes off, and it enters into a more mature stage of development, and then you begin to see that, yes, you do need institutions that are more like fist-world institutions, such as formal regulations, private property rights, and so forth. So that is why I make a distinction between market-building institutions and market-preserving institutions.Tobi; I mean, one important thing that I also learnt from your first book, and you can please correct me if I'm getting this wrong, is that (it's interesting you alluded to economics accounts of China's rise) ever since the works of people like [Robert] Wade and [Alice] Amsden talking about the East Asian miracle, there has always been this importance for the role of the states. And then the discussion then polarizes into, do you use the State? Or do you use the markets? And policymakers in different developing countries choose what they see, you know, and some stressed the importance of state capitalism. But what I learned from your book was that it really doesn't matter the kind of political system you run. Every political system in history that has gone through that stage has used market-building institutions. One thing you also talked about quite early in the book is this concept of directed improvisation. What is that? And how did China use that?Yuen; Yes. The conventional wisdom when people look at China's case is to assume that the recipe for its economic growth must be centralized political control because it is an authoritarian regime. So when people talk about the China model today, it's reduced or dumbed down into, basically, authoritarianism, plus some elements of capitalism. And I question that conventional wisdom in my book. If the answer was simply authoritarianism and centralized control, then China would have prospered long ago, under the reign of Mao, where you had absolute centralized power under one leader, even more centralized back then than it was today. So it couldn't be that centralized political control or authoritarianism is the answer to China's development. Instead, what really happened is that the central government under Deng Xiaoping was the reformist leader who took over thus helping change the role of the central government from that of a dictator to a director. And what the director does is that it focuses its job on setting up conducive conditions for bottom-up innovation and bottom-up adaptation, primarily among local governments. So China is politically centralized, but it's economically and administratively decentralized. But in encouraging local governments to adapt and to find local solutions to local problems. The central government still plays a crucial role in terms of providing direction, setting up the rules of the game, defining what the goals and targets should be. So these were the ways in which the central government “directed” the process of adaptation. So directed improvisation simply means you have the merger of direction from above, with bottom-up adaptation among local governments. So in the first 30 years of reform, which most people call the reform period, which is up to 2012, what you can see in China is actually a diverse range of regional economic models, and not just one. And if you take even any county or city in China, and you trace the history of development over those 30 years, you'll find that the role of the government and the development strategies that that particular city undertook kept changing over time. So I think it is this highly adaptive element of the Chinese experience that is often neglected, or not understood in the global discourse about China because people are overly distracted by stereotypes about authoritarian control. But the point that I think is most valuable, and that China should talk about more is the adaptive element under the reformist Deng government and the amount of diversity that they were able to create despite being a formerly authoritarian state. Tobi; One distinction I'll also like you to elaborate [on] is control versus influence, which was something I also got from your book and found interesting. I remember reading Robert Bates, writing about the political economy of Africa. He talked about the importance of control regimes, you know, having a closed economy, price distortion, regulation of industrial outputs, regulation of markets, these were things that were also part of China's economy and policymaking during the Mao era, you know. But we also observed that during the reform years after 1978 policymaking also was not thrown into chaos, you know, like the opposite of control. So how did China manage that balance, particularly substituting influence for direct administrative control of policy?Yuen; I'm really glad that you raised this subtle point, but an important point. So let me give some theoretical background before I elaborate on the China case. If you look at the conventional thinking about politics and economics, it is really a literature that is obsessed with control. Right? So it's always about someone controlling someone, it's like the state controlling civil society, or politicians controlling bureaucracy, central governments controlling local governments. And this fixation with control is, I think, an extension of a mechanical intellectual paradigm. So if you look at the beginning of my book, I talked about how and why I use a complexity paradigm to interpret the Chinese development process. The conventional paradigm is a mechanical one. So things about how things work as if it functions as a machine. And indeed, the top economists do explicitly say that they think in machine mode. So when you think in machine mode, everything looks like a control problem. And so that's why you see the literature and Political Economy being so fixated on control. But what we don't talk about enough, or sometimes not at all, is the other element of human activity, which is, apart from trying to control we also adapt all the time, including in Nigeria, and we have very little understanding in the political economy context of how do people adapt? Why do they adapt? What are the conditions that make adaptation possible? What are the products of adaptation? These are the various questions that we don't ask in political economy. So once you move to the Chinese context, and you apply the lens of adaptation, it immediately opens up a very different story from the traditional one that was entirely about control. One of the things that is important to know when we think about China is that control is always an element present in the Chinese political context. And it's present in a big way because it is a top-down political system. So I'm not saying that there is no control in China. Of course, there is; such as censorship. But what I'm saying is that as the reformed leadership under Deng took over from Mao, it dramatically change the role of government as well as the mixture of control and adaptation. So on under Deng, of course, there were still policies of repression and control. The family planning policy, for instance, required a great deal of forceful implementation. But it also dramatically increase the amount of adaptive activity that the government carried out. So the distinction I make is that when you are fixated on control, what we conceptualize is that politicians want to control the outcome. So they already have a predetermined outcome or solution, and they're just trying to control everyone so that they can get there. Right? When I use the term influence, however, the assumption is that oftentimes, the leaders actually do not know what the best outcome should be. They don't have the solutions to the problems that they face. And this was absolutely evident in China's market transition process, because that was something that China had never tried before, it had never tried to move from communism to a market economy. So oftentimes, these leaders themselves do not actually know what is the best solution that they should create. And so what they did is instead of trying to control outcomes, which presumes that you have a lot of knowledge and know exactly what's best for you, they instead try to influence the process of coming up with solutions by, for example, encouraging local governments to come up with solutions that are tailored to local conditions, but at the same time setting up some guardrails in this process of experimentation. So that is what I mean by the difference between trying to control an outcome versus influencing the process of problem-solving.Tobi; One thing I so love about your first book, which you've also alluded to in your answer is appreciating that a society and the economy is a complex system. And you said that an alternative to control in complex systems is to influence the process of adaptation and change. So I want you to talk briefly about how these influence the design of the reform packages themselves in the China reform experience, particularly the three key mechanisms you talked about in the book, which were variation, selection, and niche creation. How did that work?Yuen; Yes, I'm happy to do that. Let me focus on the first two parts because of time, which are variation and selection. And these terms come from the well-established scientific literature about how adaptation happens. So adaptation begins with generating a variety of possible solutions. So that's why the first mechanism is variation. And this is followed by selection. So from the possible pool of solutions, you pick one, and you test it out, collect feedback and decide "do you want to continue with this solution? Do you want to share this solution with others, or perhaps you find out the solution I picked didn't actually work so well, so let's select another one."And niche creation is about creating differences among members of the units so that these members can coexist, instead of competing head-on with one another. So I use these mechanisms to organize different parts of the book in explicating what were the mechanisms that the central government designed in order to structure the process of adaptive governance in China.And on variation, I look specifically at the system of political communication in China. China is a top-down political system. So the way the top government sends commands - written directives to the local governments - is the primary and most important mechanism by which it commands, instructs, and guides the whole bureaucracy. And normally, this is a system that, frankly, almost nobody studies because it doesn't really seem interesting. It's a command system. So you think that, you know, whatever, if Beijing wants to send a command. But what I argue and actually show in the book is that the command system in China actually functions in ways much more interesting way can imagine. And specifically, what I show is that in the Chinese political system, the central government would send out three different types of signals. The first signal is what I call black signals. These are written directives, where the language is explicitly clear, saying, "yes, you can do this. Yes, the local governments all over China, you can do this." And the second type of directive is what I call red signals, which explicitly says, "no, you cannot do this." So, for example, "no, you cannot exceed the amount of water use by this amount." And then the most interesting one is the third category, which is the grey directives. So commands that are deliberately ambiguous. And there are a lot of ambiguous commands and instructions that occur in the Chinese political system. And they still do today. And I argue that what these ambiguous commands do is that they actually provide room for experimentation. Because from the perspective of the local officials when the command is vague and ambiguous, and broadly stated, it means that they are free to interpret how to implement that particular instruction. And when they experiment and try things out, it produces, generates a variety of possible solutions. And from these possible solutions, the regulators in Beijing can then take a look at these options, many of which they had never thought about before and then decide, "among these possible solutions, are there some really good ones that we should scale up to regional or national levels," or sometimes they might also realize, oh, some local experiments turn out to be not good. And we are going to change our commands from grey to red and say, No, I don't want you guys to try this anymore. So through this varied and dynamic system of commands, is one example of a mechanism by which the central government in China is able to calibrate the amount of discretion that it gives local officials, allowing them to experiment when the central government wants to experiment, and then also providing a mechanism for the central government to collect feedback to scale things up if they want to. And also to scale things down, if they decide that that is the right thing to do.Tobi; So it's really hard to talk about China, at least the way China is being written about generally, without talking about state capacity. Like you talked about in the early part of the discussion that analysts and scholars usually take one thing and focus on that when discussing China, and there is always this talk about state capacity being the be-all of how China was able to reform itself and become rich. You know.Some say it's the bureaucracy that was inherited from the communist regime, some talk about the 5000-year history of civilization, and so many other theories. But you've discussed this often on your Twitter feed, and in other appearances, that when we talk about the bureaucracy, we usually have the Weberian Western-type democracy in mind, and that the way scholars and people discuss this is like, it's the only way to achieve bureaucratic coordination. But you've also challenged the idea that there are other forms of bureaucracy. So I want to ask you, how did China achieve that bureaucratic coordination without feeding into the Weberian archetype? You know, so to speak, because the challenge with most developing countries like Nigeria, which I am familiar with, is that you often have pockets of effectiveness in different arms of the government, but it's usually difficult for one vision to be projected, you know, and be implemented. So how did China achieve this through its bureaucracy, what were the design elements?Yuen; I am very glad that you brought up this important point. It is a point that I keep making in my books and in other forms of speaking. It is also a point that many people find hard to accept. The reason for this is that for a very long time, the conventional wisdom has always subscribed to the view that there is only one standard for good institutions, for stake capacity, for good governance and that is to look like rich Western nations. Now, the conventional wisdom doesn't put it this way, but if you look at all of the global metrics that are created, regardless of the names that are coined for them, it's always the same countries that are ranked in the top 10. And it's always the same group of countries, including Nigeria, and sometimes China that's ranked at the bottom, right?And so this is very deeply entrenched in both academic and popular thinking that there is only one standard in this world for good governance and good institutions. And that we should only use that benchmark. And when we look at developing countries, their situation is only accessed in terms of their distance from this ideal type. So things in developing countries are not perceived as being qualitatively different, they are instead perceived as deficient because they don't comply with the standard expectation of how things should function. And so including in the discussion about state capacity, one of the core elements of state capacity is bureaucratic capacity. And so as you alluded to, everyone subscribes to the legal-rational model that Max Weber had portrayed 100 years ago. And it is assumed that the only kind of effective bureaucracies are the ones that have these Weberian qualities, and everything else must be corrupt or dysfunctional. And the reason that I questioned this conventional wisdom is that I think it is... first of all, it reflects a first-world bias that people are either unaware of or unwilling to admit. And second of all, it is limiting and distorting. Because when you assume that there is only one standard, you cannot see qualitative or categorical differences. Meaning that perhaps in this world, we are actually comparing apples, oranges, bananas and guavas. But when you say only the Apple is the legitimate fruit, and then you look at the banana, and you think, "Oh no, the banana is deficient, because it doesn't look like an apple," right? So that is why it becomes this very narrowing logic. And what I find from both my historical research and my field research, in the case of China, as a very good example is that the qualities of an effective bureaucracy were actually very different at the early and late growth stages. So the given example, I show that in the early 1980s, 1990s, when markets first opened in China, the country actually relied on bureaucracies that had non-Weberian characteristics. So they were not specialized. Local governments would mobilize every agency to go and recruit investors. And this defies Weber's rule of specialization and technocracy. They also create a mechanism where these bureaucrats were basically taking a cut from the investments they could bring in which in economics, we say high-powered incentives. And in Weberian bureaucracy, you're not supposed to provide high-powered incentives, you're supposed to have these very modest rule-abiding and somewhat boring bureaucrats in office. And the reason why these non-Weberian qualities work very well, in the beginning, is because they made the best use of what China had in the beginning, which is it had a communist apparatus and a communist apparatus [that] is good at mobilization. It made use of the personal connections of local government officials and these personal connections substituted for formal property rights, and so forth. And so even though these individual characteristics would appear to be wrong from the first-world perspective, they were actually functionally a good fit with the objectives of early development. However, as the process goes on, income rises, the markets become more complex, businesses grow and so forth, the society and the economy had different objectives, had different priorities about growth. They no longer wanted just any type of growth they wanted, instead, quality growth in states-selected priority sectors. And that's when you begin to see an evolution in the bureaucracy towards the more specialized and technocratic forms that we see in first-world countries today. So to sum it all up, there are two takeaways. The first takeaway is [that] the good institutions that are often touted as universally ideal institutions are actually good institutions suitable for advanced stages of growth. But early stages of growth may actually require functionally and qualitatively different institutions that make the best use of what low-income societies have. So that is the first takeaway. And the second takeaway is that we should drop this assumption that there is only one standard because that prevents us from seeing potentially creative solutions throughout the developing world.Tobi; So your second book, "China's Gilded Age: the paradox of economic boom and vast corruption," I would say, also slayed another dragon for me personally, only that the dragon is not China. So from my experience in Nigeria, when you talk about corruption, the almost - I should say, self-interested response you get from politicians is that there is corruption in other places. And from somebody coming from a civil society background or even an average citizen, that answer is unpalatable, because the way we have been made to think about corruption is usually about the overall level of corruption, the quantitative level of corruption. But in your book, you made it important that the qualitative aspect of corruption is also important. So can you please briefly explain the difference? How did you come about this insight of unbundling corruption, so to speak?Yuen; Yes. So the second book is called China's Gilded Age. And it is a sequel to my first where I zoom in on the relationship between corruption and capitalism. And the core argument of the second book is actually quite simple. What I argue is that corruption comes in different types. And different types of corruption have different forms of harm. And I focus on one particular type of corruption that I call access money: elite exchanges of power and wealth. And I show that in many contexts, not just in China, access money can actually encourage businesses to do more business; because politicians provide them with conducive conditions. But that this form of corruption results in indirect risk and harm that is nearly impossible to quantify. And so once we, in particular, zoom in on access money, we can understand why there are many economies that are prosperous, on the one hand, but on the other hand, have many structural distortions and risks. And in addition to China, the other country that fits this model is actually the United States. So whether you look at the United States in the late 19th century, the original Gilded Age, or whether you look at the United States during the 2008 financial crisis and today, you'll find that these are wealthy capitalist economies that produce rapid growth, but also [produce] inequality - a great deal of inequality and a great deal of policy distortions and systemic risk. And that is the kind of corruption that is neglected that people don't look at. The reason for this is that most people, when they think about corruption, they immediately think about the forms of illegal corruption that they encounter in their daily lives. So when a policeman stops you and extracts a bribe from you. Now that is obviously corrupt. It is an act of bribery, it is illegal, it is extortion. And so the focus is on this type of corruption. Whereas a lot of the popular discourse neglects the other type of corruption - access money - which has always been actually central to the history of capitalism.Tobi; I find that book very insightful. I'll give you a brief anecdote. The former president during one of his media appearances went on television and made, I would say, the error at the time of saying that corruption is different from stealing. And it happened to be one of the things that became a public relations nightmare for him. So I just want to ask you, for countries that are dominated by the destructive types of corruption, can they transition to access money types of corruption, and can they also avoid the inequalities that come with it? And I should say that you stressed in the book that corruption is not good, which is another wrong message that a lot of people take from the book.Yuen; So my book, China's Gilded Age, unfortunately, as you pointed out, is widely misunderstood. As soon as people see the story of corruption coexisting with growth, they take that argument out of context, and start screaming that, "oh, my god, she's saying corruption is good for growth, and she's saying we should do more corruption."And so there have been quite a lot of nonsensical reactions to the argument. So at the outset, let me stress that actually, I made clear throughout the book, and over and over again in my speaking that all corruption is bad. This is not an argument about corruption being good in any way. All corruption is bad, but the harm is expressed in different ways. And so that is why I use the analogy of drugs. I used the analogy of toxic drugs to refer to extortion and embezzlement. These types of corruption have absolutely no benefit, you immediately see the harm, and it immediately destroys the economy. And Nigeria is a good example of this type of highly destructive corruption. And the second type of corruption I call speed money, I refer to that as painkillers. So you can think about a business that pays a small bribe so that it can get a business license faster. And that corruption is a painkiller in the sense that it allows the business to buy some conveniences, gets rid of some headaches, but that doesn't actually help the business to make more money. Ultimately, for the business owner, it is a hassle. And it is a cost. So that's not good, either. And the last type of corruption, access money, I call it steroids. So steroids, as we know, is a kind of drug that dishonoured athletes use to help them grow muscles and perform superhuman feats. But if you keep using steroids, then ultimately it's really going to have a whole range of serious side effects that accumulate over time. And access money is a type of corruption that you find in high growth or wealthy, crony capitalist economies, right? So what people should take away from this book is not that corruption is good, or that countries should do more corruption, which obviously would be nonsensical. Instead, they should really think about the following issues. First of all, countries should take a look at what is the dominant type of corruption that exists in their country, and think about the appropriate methods to fight the dominant type of corruption. For instance, in the United States, extortion, petty bribery, these sometimes happen, but it's not common in the United States. But over there, the dominant type of corruption is legalized access money. So lobbying has become a gigantic industry. And so the United States would have to come up with very different ways of fighting the kind of corruption that dominates in their society. Conversely, when you look at Nigeria, it has all four types of corruption that I talk about and so in a country like Nigeria, there has to be a focus on fighting all of these four types of corruption, but particularly the toxic ones. So embezzlement, extortion, imposing petty bribes, and thuggery on people. These types of corruption have no benefits at all. They drain the economy and the burden falls most heavily on the poor. So countries have to think about what are the measures they can take to bring down this overtly, growth-dampening corruption. And if you look at the Chinese experience, what happens as it developed over time is that the structure of corruption changed, and it invested at least 20 years of efforts to really bring down extortion and embezzlement.And although I had an entire chapter devoted to that topic, a lot of people just ignore it. And instead, they run with the misleading conclusion that oh, we should do more corruption. They ignore my discussion about the 20 years of effort that China put into bringing down extortion and embezzlement. So for readers in Nigeria, start with the obvious things, things like extortion, embezzlement… of course, they're wrong; of course, they're terrible; of course, they're damaging, so do something about that first before you even attempt to think about how can we transition to more advanced forms of crony capitalism like we might see in some advanced economies. The other takeaway I would add... the third takeaway that I would emphasize is that the part about access money, it's not about how do we encourage more access money corruption… the way to think about that takeaway is how do countries like Nigeria, create incentives for government officials to have a personal stake in economic outcomes? Right.And so what happened in the Chinese case is the system that I call profit sharing. Meaning local officials have a stake in economic growth, which comes both in terms of their career, as well as in their financial payoffs. And that shows up as access money.It doesn't mean that other countries should have more of that kind of corruption. Instead, the real lesson is, if not this type of corruption, are there other less damaging ways in which we can create incentives for government officials to actually have a personal stake in economic development?Tobi; One final question, I know our time is gone. I know scholars usually, sometimes, shy away from making policy proposals but for countries that are also interested or ambitious about escaping the poverty trap, what… maybe theoretically speaking, or practically, what are the three things that you would recommend from your research on the China experience? Not necessarily copying China, we know that has pitfalls, so what would you recommend? Yuen; It's a good final question to wrap up. Um, I would sum up with three takeaways. The first takeaway is, really work hard on fighting the overtly growth damaging types of corruption. It is a simple takeaway, but a lot of people actually forget about it. So things like embezzlement, things like extortion. If Nigeria could bring down the level of these damaging types of corruption, of course, immediately, you will see the economic and social benefits. So work hard on that. And then the second takeaway is, how is it possible for government officials in Nigeria to have a personal stake in collective outcomes? I don't have the answer. But I think it is a question that Nigerians have to sit down and think about. One of the things that are often missing in developing countries is a discussion about incentives and also about a sense of personal ownership in shared outcomes. People prefer to invest their energies in criticizing politicians and so forth. But if you think about it from an institutional perspective, why should that particular politician care about the collective outcome? Right. So how can we create those incentives, which doesn't necessarily have to be monetary. It could also be non-monetary, it could be reputational, how do we make them care? Right? So that's the second thing to think about. The third thing I would emphasize is a principle that I call using what you have, and China illustrates that principle, richly. Using what you have means that every society, even one that is a low-income society has a lot of indigenous resources, they have human capital, they have creativity. So the first step of development is not to go and copy rich countries, it is also not to sell your oil resources, but to really make the best use of these indigenous resources. And so for those who know my first book, actually, in the conclusion, I have a chapter about Nollywood. And that's an excellent example whereby under desperate circumstances, the people in Nigeria actually created an industry from the bottom up using what Nigeria had at that particular time. And so there are so many instances throughout the developing world where there are actually a lot of indigenous resources, they are untapped, or they are ignored or they're dismissed. Because we are so used to thinking that the only right solution is to look like rich countries. And we have to drop that mindset. I think it's part of an extension of a colonial mindset as well. And developing countries have to develop a certain sense of intellectual independence, as well as confidence in seeing the potential that is already existent in every society, and make the best use of those resources to kickstart entrepreneurship and new industries.Tobi; Thank you very much, Yuen Yuen Ang, it's been fantastic talking to you.Yuen; Thank you very much. It's a real pleasure to speak with you. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.ideasuntrapped.com/subscribe

This week on Sinica, Kaiser welcomes back University of Michigan political scientist Yuen Yuen Ang, who discusses a recent piece in the Journal of Democracy titled "How Resilient is the CCP?" The essay examines how China's bureaucracy remains surprisingly competent and even relatively autonomous despite Xi Jinping's highly personalistic style of rule.3:51 – Summarizing debates on Chinese governance in the current China watcher field 8:43 – Defining the concept of institutionalization and contextualizing it to China13:39 – Explaining Xi's bureaucratic objectives: maintaining competence but limiting autonomy18:57 – Remaining areas of autonomy for China's state bureaucracy22:11 – Key areas where Xi weakened bureaucracy26:08 – Institutionalization prior to the Xi era 29:00 – Main sources of resilience and threat under Xi's new model for authoritarianism 31:45 – Fundamental difference between Mao and Xi34:52 – The revival of state bureaucracy and technocrats after Mao's death40:13 – How do we understand the tension between expertise and ideology in Xi's governance agenda? 46:15 – Historical roots of technocracy in the Chinese government49:09 – The CCP's technocratic bureaucracy as an integral source of resilienceA complete transcript of this podcast is available on TheChinaProject.com.Recommendations: Yuen Yuen: Chinese drama series Zǒuxiàng gònghé 走向共和 (Towards the Republic); and Lenin's Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire by David RemnickKaiser: Children of Earth and Sky, A Brightness Long Ago, and All the Seas of the World — a historical fantasy novel trilogy by Guy Gavriel Kay See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Development is one of the major challenges of our time. Unfortunately, it's often approached in a way that does more harm than good. Efosa Ojomo has a better solution, and he's here today to share it. Efosa is the leader of the Global Prosperity Research Group at the Clayton Christensen Institute for Disruptive Innovation, the co-author of The Prosperity Paradox, and the author of the upcoming book, The Prosperity Process. In this episode, Efosa explains how his first foray in the development space (building wells in Nigeria) catalyzed a journey of discovery which led him to realize that, in order to truly change the world, we need to implement pull strategies instead of push strategies and focus on market creating innovations. He shares some examples of what these innovations look like and we discuss what it takes to be a market creating innovator, how regulation impacts innovation, a new way to think about corruption, and more! Make sure to tune in today.   Key Points From This Episode:   •  The lesson Efosa learned through his first foray in the development world. •  Definitions of the three types of innovation that Efosa and his co-authors explain in depth in their book, The Prosperity Paradox. •  Efosa shares the story of Mo Ibrhaim to highlight the power of market creating innovations. •  Push versus pull development strategies and the problem with the former. •  The story of Indomie Noodles as an example of the huge amount of change that can be made through the implementation of a pull strategy. •  How a proliferation of government agencies negatively impacts a country's entrepreneurial ecosystem. •  The type of person who is best suited to be a leader in the market creating innovation space. •  Aid for developing countries: how the approach needs to change. •  Efosa explains why good laws are not enough to create thriving communities. •  Key factors that resulted in the rise and fall of Venice. •  How Efosa believes we should be tackling the issue of corruption. •  A tribute to Clayton Christenson. •  The Prosperity Process; Efosa's future book.     Links Mentioned in Today's Episode:   http://www.apple.com (Efosa Ojomo) https://twitter.com/EfosaOjomo (Efosa Ojomo on Twitter) https://www.christenseninstitute.org/global-prosperity/ (Global Prosperity Research Group at the Clayton Christensen Institute for Disruptive Innovation) https://www.amazon.com/Prosperity-Paradox-Innovation-Nations-Poverty/dp/0062851829 (The Prosperity Paradox) https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mo-Ibrahim (Mo Ibrahim) https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/gambling-on-development/ (Gambling on Development) https://www.linkedin.com/in/yuen-yuen-ang-35a93920/ (Yuen Yuen Ang) https://www.amazon.com/Why-Nations-Fail-Origins-Prosperity/dp/0307719227 (Why Nations Fail) https://www.amazon.com/Innovators-Dilemma-Revolutionary-Change-Business/dp/0062060244 (The Innovator's Dilemma) https://www.amazon.com/Innovators-Solution-Creating-Sustaining-Successful/dp/1422196577 (The Innovator's Solution) https://www.chartercitiesinstitute.org/ (Charter Cities Institute) https://www.facebook.com/Charter-Cities-Institute-424204888015721/ (Charter Cities Institute on Facebook) https://twitter.com/CCIdotCity (Charter Cities Institute on Twitter)

The political scientist Yuen Yuen Ang argues that different forms of government create different styles of corruption. The U.S. and China have more in common than we'd like to admit — but Russia is a different story, which could explain its willingness to invade Ukraine. 

How did China sustain meteoric economic growth amid vast corruption? Yuen Yuen Ang joins Nate Sibley to explore what powers China's crony capitalism, the impact of Xi's anti-graft campaign, and why it's time to rethink our approach to measuring corruption.

Bincang akhir pekan (23/01/2022) kali ini fokus membahas buku “How China Escaped the Poverty Trap” dari Yuen Yuen Ang. Buku yang terbit pada 2016 tersebut merupakan karya penting kalau kita ingin tahu apa yang dilakukan Cina sampai mampu menjadi raksasa ekonomi baru dunia sekarang. Pada kesempatan ini, hadir Faishal Rahman (Peneliti Sigmaphi), Novi Basuki (Pemimpin Redaksi Aseng.id), Dr. Vivi Alatas (Ekonom), dan Dr. Arif Budimanta (Direktur Eksekutif Megawati Institute) untuk berbagi perspektif.

Yuen Yuen Ang, political science professor at the University of Michigan and author of the book, China's Gilded Age, argues that the US and China have more in common than we usually think and that it makes more sense to see the conflict as a clash of two gilded ages instead of a clash of civilizations.

Guest lecturer, Yuen Yuen Ang joins us from Michigan to talk to us about "Unbundling Corruption: Why it Matters and How to Do It". The lecture is part of the LSE ID Cutting Edge Issues in Development Thinking & Practice series.

If corruption is a drag on economic growth, why does China appear to have undergone some of its fastest growth during its periods of deepest corruption? This week on Sinica, Kaiser chats with Yuen Yuen Ang, an associate professor of political science at the University of Michigan, about her book China's Gilded Age: The Paradox of Economic Boom and Vast Corruption, which sets out to explain this apparent contradiction. The author highlights the inadequacies of existing measures of corruption, suggests her own alternative means of measuring it, and explains how the prevalence of one particular form of corruption — what she calls “access money” — is something China has in common with the United States in the age of robber barons.5:00: A typology of corruption, and how drugs are a useful analogy10:05: Why all corruption is ultimately bad for a country20:25: Is the “revolving door” in the U.S. equivalent to access money corruption?27:44: The relationship between corruption and regime type41:45: Profit-sharing with Chinese characteristics59:37: Xi Jinping's anti-corruption drive: are officials spared because of performance, or patronage?RecommendationsYuen Yuen: The documentary film Generation Wealth Kaiser: The Netflix miniseries The Chair and the podcast Chinese Whispers by Cindy YuSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Political scientist, China scholar, and University of Michigan professor Yuen Yuen Ang, PhD, joins the CIPE Anti-Corruption & Governance Center podcast this week to provide an expert’s guide to how corruption has supercharged and complicated China’s blistering rate of economic growth. Sharing insights from her new book, China's Gilded Age: The Paradox of Economic Boom and Vast Corruption, Ang distinguishes between four kinds of corruption: petty theft, rent theft, speed money, and access money, the last of which she dubs “the steroids of capitalism”. Listen now to hear her share how different forms of corruption have harmed or in some cases accelerated China’s growth, and why she believes the pervasiveness of access money threatens a long-run economic blowout. Ang is joined by ACGC Director Frank Brown and CIPE’s Asia Senior Program Officer Catherine Thai.

Yuen Yuen Ang is an associate professor of political science and a China scholar at the University of Michigan, with a Ph.D. from Stanford University. Her works center around China's rise – one of the most significant disruptions of our times – and its global consequences. She studies China both as a disruptor to the global order and how its government adapts (or fails to adapt) to twenty-first-century challenges. She offers a bold and innovative framework for understanding economic development, which challenges current wisdom from modernization and institutionalist perspectives. She is the author of two award-winning books: "How China Escaped the Poverty Trap" (2016) and "China's Gilded Age: the Paradox of Economic Boom & Vast Corruption" (2020).

How do we make sense of the “durability and gigantic scale” of China's economic expansion alongside the reports of “rising” and “explosive” corruption? How has China moved from an “impoverished communist regime to a capitalist superpower rivaling the United States” despite a crisis of corruption that its own leadership describes as “gave” and “shocking”? Dr. Yuen Yuen Ang's her new book China's Gilded Age: The Paradox of Economic Boom and Vast Corruption (Cambridge University Press, 2020) argues corruption comes in different forms and she “unbundles” different types of corruption to explain not only why China can boom but why political scientists need to “fundamentally revise our believes about the relationship between corruption and capitalism.” The book demystifies the Chinese paradox of growth with corruption by unbundling the four types of corruption and placing China in comparative-historical perspective. China is an outlier but not in the ways that most analysts assume. The closest parallel is the United States in the late 19th century, a gilded age characterized by both feverish growth and glaring inequality, conniving plutocrats and corrupt politicians. The book offers a four-part explanation for this paradox focused on the dominant type of corruption (access money which stimulates growth but generates distortions and risks), the relationship between the profit sharing model (where the rewards of leaders and bureaucrats are linked to economic performance) and access money, the role of capacity-building reforms in curtailing corruption involving theft and speed money, and the checking of predatory corruption by regional competition (spurring development and deal-making). Dr. Yuen Yuen Ang is an associate professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan. She works at the intersection of business, governance, and innovation to better understand how governments and organizations respond to deep uncertainty and complex, novel problems and which institutions are able to adapt. She considers China's Gilded Age to be a sequel to her award-winning book, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap (Cornell University Press, 2016) and you can hear her conversation with my NBN colleague here. Dr. Ang translates her ideas to wider audiences in Foreign Affairs, Project Syndicate, and the South China Morning Post. Susan Liebell is an associate professor of political science at Saint Joseph's University in Philadelphia. Why Diehard Originalists Aren't Really Originalists recently appeared in the Washington Post's Monkey Cage and “Retreat from the Rule of Law: Locke and the Perils of Stand Your Ground” was published in the Journal of Politics (July 2020). Email her comments at sliebell@sju.edu or tweet to @SusanLiebell.

How do we make sense of the “durability and gigantic scale” of China’s economic expansion alongside the reports of “rising” and “explosive” corruption? How has China moved from an “impoverished communist regime to a capitalist superpower rivaling the United States” despite a crisis of corruption that its own leadership describes as “gave” and “shocking”? Dr. Yuen Yuen Ang’s her new book China’s Gilded Age: The Paradox of Economic Boom and Vast Corruption (Cambridge University Press, 2020) argues corruption comes in different forms and she “unbundles” different types of corruption to explain not only why China can boom but why political scientists need to “fundamentally revise our believes about the relationship between corruption and capitalism.” The book demystifies the Chinese paradox of growth with corruption by unbundling the four types of corruption and placing China in comparative-historical perspective. China is an outlier but not in the ways that most analysts assume. The closest parallel is the United States in the late 19th century, a gilded age characterized by both feverish growth and glaring inequality, conniving plutocrats and corrupt politicians. The book offers a four-part explanation for this paradox focused on the dominant type of corruption (access money which stimulates growth but generates distortions and risks), the relationship between the profit sharing model (where the rewards of leaders and bureaucrats are linked to economic performance) and access money, the role of capacity-building reforms in curtailing corruption involving theft and speed money, and the checking of predatory corruption by regional competition (spurring development and deal-making). Dr. Yuen Yuen Ang is an associate professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan. She works at the intersection of business, governance, and innovation to better understand how governments and organizations respond to deep uncertainty and complex, novel problems and which institutions are able to adapt. She considers China’s Gilded Age to be a sequel to her award-winning book, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap (Cornell University Press, 2016) and you can hear her conversation with my NBN colleague here. Dr. Ang translates her ideas to wider audiences in Foreign Affairs, Project Syndicate, and the South China Morning Post. Susan Liebell is an associate professor of political science at Saint Joseph’s University in Philadelphia. Why Diehard Originalists Aren’t Really Originalists recently appeared in the Washington Post’s Monkey Cage and “Retreat from the Rule of Law: Locke and the Perils of Stand Your Ground” was published in the Journal of Politics (July 2020). Email her comments at sliebell@sju.edu or tweet to @SusanLiebell. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

China's rapid rise may seem unprecedented, but its journey is oddly familiar. The question is, where have we seen this type of development before, and what does the future have in store? Joining us today to answer this is Yuen Yuen Ang, Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan. Her research lies at the intersection of governance, bureaucracy, business and innovation and she explores which institutions best enable adaptation. A major focal point of Yuen Yuen's research is China's rise since 1978. We open our conversation with Yuen Yuen by asking her about how her cultural nomadism has put her in a good position to understand China's impressive 43-year development. After hearing how her experiences in Hong Kong, Singapore, and the United States have helped her gain a useful perspective on her studies, we dive into the concept of complex development and talk about why its needs are greater than ever. Following this, we talk to Yuen Yuen about her two books, namely China's Gilded Age and How China Escaped the Poverty Trap. To help listeners understand China's meteoric rise in development, Yuen Yuen compares the state to Mcdonald's and the concept of franchising. She touches on their powerful nature of being centralized, yet having versatility through local variation. China's “franchised” development is also linked to the way they have used corruption to bolster their development. That isn't to say that corruption is good though, as Yuen Yuen rather points out how corruption changes in tandem with development. To hear more on China's current state, their trajectory, and much much more, join us in this deeply insightful and thought-provoking episode.   Key Points From This Episode:  ●     Introducing today's guest, Yuen Yuen Ang. ●     How cultural nomadism has helped Yuen Yuen's approach to development processes. ●     Yuen Yuen talks about Singapore's most underrated development factors. ●     Hear about Yuen Yuen's background working in complexity studies. ●     The best book that helped Yuen Yuen get to grips with complexity studies. ●     Yuen Yuen tells us about her book, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap. ●     We boil down development into its most fundamental forms, as written about in How China Escaped the Poverty Trap. ●     Why a lot of people in international development are uncomfortable with Yuen Yuen's book. ●     Comparing Chinese bureaucracy to Mcdonald's. ●     The role of SEZs in China. ●     We talk to Yuen Yuen about her most recent book, China's Gilded Age. ●     Exploring the nature of corruption in capitalism and how it morphs over time. ●     How China's corruption has evolved as the country has developed. ●     Yuen Yuen contrasts her two books. ●     Hear about China's grand crackdown on corruption. ●     The drawbacks and doubts that come from China's efforts to reduce corruption. ●     Yuen Yuen talks about her published articles on the Belt and Road Initiative. ●     Hear about the beehive campaign. ●     We answer: Will China become a technological leader of the future? ●     Stay tuned to hear details on Yuen Yuen's upcoming book.    Links Mentioned in Today's Episode: https://www.chartercitiesinstitute.org/ (Charter Cities Institute) https://www.facebook.com/Charter-Cities-Institute-424204888015721/ (Charter Cities Institute on Facebook) https://twitter.com/CCIdotCity (Charter Cities Institute on Twitter)... Support this podcast

How do we make sense of the “durability and gigantic scale” of China’s economic expansion alongside the reports of “rising” and “explosive” corruption? How has China moved from an “impoverished communist regime to a capitalist superpower rivaling the United States” despite a crisis of corruption that its own leadership describes as “gave” and “shocking”? Dr. Yuen Yuen Ang’s her new book China’s Gilded Age: The Paradox of Economic Boom and Vast Corruption (Cambridge University Press, 2020) argues corruption comes in different forms and she “unbundles” different types of corruption to explain not only why China can boom but why political scientists need to “fundamentally revise our believes about the relationship between corruption and capitalism.” The book demystifies the Chinese paradox of growth with corruption by unbundling the four types of corruption and placing China in comparative-historical perspective. China is an outlier but not in the ways that most analysts assume. The closest parallel is the United States in the late 19th century, a gilded age characterized by both feverish growth and glaring inequality, conniving plutocrats and corrupt politicians. The book offers a four-part explanation for this paradox focused on the dominant type of corruption (access money which stimulates growth but generates distortions and risks), the relationship between the profit sharing model (where the rewards of leaders and bureaucrats are linked to economic performance) and access money, the role of capacity-building reforms in curtailing corruption involving theft and speed money, and the checking of predatory corruption by regional competition (spurring development and deal-making). Dr. Yuen Yuen Ang is an associate professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan. She works at the intersection of business, governance, and innovation to better understand how governments and organizations respond to deep uncertainty and complex, novel problems and which institutions are able to adapt. She considers China’s Gilded Age to be a sequel to her award-winning book, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap (Cornell University Press, 2016) and you can hear her conversation with my NBN colleague here. Dr. Ang translates her ideas to wider audiences in Foreign Affairs, Project Syndicate, and the South China Morning Post. Susan Liebell is an associate professor of political science at Saint Joseph’s University in Philadelphia. Why Diehard Originalists Aren’t Really Originalists recently appeared in the Washington Post’s Monkey Cage and “Retreat from the Rule of Law: Locke and the Perils of Stand Your Ground” was published in the Journal of Politics (July 2020). Email her comments at sliebell@sju.edu or tweet to @SusanLiebell. Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies

How do we make sense of the “durability and gigantic scale” of China’s economic expansion alongside the reports of “rising” and “explosive” corruption? How has China moved from an “impoverished communist regime to a capitalist superpower rivaling the United States” despite a crisis of corruption that its own leadership describes as “gave” and “shocking”? Dr. Yuen Yuen Ang’s her new book China’s Gilded Age: The Paradox of Economic Boom and Vast Corruption (Cambridge University Press, 2020) argues corruption comes in different forms and she “unbundles” different types of corruption to explain not only why China can boom but why political scientists need to “fundamentally revise our believes about the relationship between corruption and capitalism.” The book demystifies the Chinese paradox of growth with corruption by unbundling the four types of corruption and placing China in comparative-historical perspective. China is an outlier but not in the ways that most analysts assume. The closest parallel is the United States in the late 19th century, a gilded age characterized by both feverish growth and glaring inequality, conniving plutocrats and corrupt politicians. The book offers a four-part explanation for this paradox focused on the dominant type of corruption (access money which stimulates growth but generates distortions and risks), the relationship between the profit sharing model (where the rewards of leaders and bureaucrats are linked to economic performance) and access money, the role of capacity-building reforms in curtailing corruption involving theft and speed money, and the checking of predatory corruption by regional competition (spurring development and deal-making). Dr. Yuen Yuen Ang is an associate professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan. She works at the intersection of business, governance, and innovation to better understand how governments and organizations respond to deep uncertainty and complex, novel problems and which institutions are able to adapt. She considers China’s Gilded Age to be a sequel to her award-winning book, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap (Cornell University Press, 2016) and you can hear her conversation with my NBN colleague here. Dr. Ang translates her ideas to wider audiences in Foreign Affairs, Project Syndicate, and the South China Morning Post. Susan Liebell is an associate professor of political science at Saint Joseph’s University in Philadelphia. Why Diehard Originalists Aren’t Really Originalists recently appeared in the Washington Post’s Monkey Cage and “Retreat from the Rule of Law: Locke and the Perils of Stand Your Ground” was published in the Journal of Politics (July 2020). Email her comments at sliebell@sju.edu or tweet to @SusanLiebell. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/political-science

How do we make sense of the “durability and gigantic scale” of China’s economic expansion alongside the reports of “rising” and “explosive” corruption? How has China moved from an “impoverished communist regime to a capitalist superpower rivaling the United States” despite a crisis of corruption that its own leadership describes as “gave” and “shocking”? Dr. Yuen Yuen Ang’s her new book China’s Gilded Age: The Paradox of Economic Boom and Vast Corruption (Cambridge University Press, 2020) argues corruption comes in different forms and she “unbundles” different types of corruption to explain not only why China can boom but why political scientists need to “fundamentally revise our believes about the relationship between corruption and capitalism.” The book demystifies the Chinese paradox of growth with corruption by unbundling the four types of corruption and placing China in comparative-historical perspective. China is an outlier but not in the ways that most analysts assume. The closest parallel is the United States in the late 19th century, a gilded age characterized by both feverish growth and glaring inequality, conniving plutocrats and corrupt politicians. The book offers a four-part explanation for this paradox focused on the dominant type of corruption (access money which stimulates growth but generates distortions and risks), the relationship between the profit sharing model (where the rewards of leaders and bureaucrats are linked to economic performance) and access money, the role of capacity-building reforms in curtailing corruption involving theft and speed money, and the checking of predatory corruption by regional competition (spurring development and deal-making). Dr. Yuen Yuen Ang is an associate professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan. She works at the intersection of business, governance, and innovation to better understand how governments and organizations respond to deep uncertainty and complex, novel problems and which institutions are able to adapt. She considers China’s Gilded Age to be a sequel to her award-winning book, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap (Cornell University Press, 2016) and you can hear her conversation with my NBN colleague here. Dr. Ang translates her ideas to wider audiences in Foreign Affairs, Project Syndicate, and the South China Morning Post. Susan Liebell is an associate professor of political science at Saint Joseph’s University in Philadelphia. Why Diehard Originalists Aren’t Really Originalists recently appeared in the Washington Post’s Monkey Cage and “Retreat from the Rule of Law: Locke and the Perils of Stand Your Ground” was published in the Journal of Politics (July 2020). Email her comments at sliebell@sju.edu or tweet to @SusanLiebell. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/economics

How do we make sense of the “durability and gigantic scale” of China’s economic expansion alongside the reports of “rising” and “explosive” corruption? How has China moved from an “impoverished communist regime to a capitalist superpower rivaling the United States” despite a crisis of corruption that its own leadership describes as “gave” and “shocking”? Dr. Yuen Yuen Ang’s her new book China’s Gilded Age: The Paradox of Economic Boom and Vast Corruption (Cambridge University Press, 2020) argues corruption comes in different forms and she “unbundles” different types of corruption to explain not only why China can boom but why political scientists need to “fundamentally revise our believes about the relationship between corruption and capitalism.” The book demystifies the Chinese paradox of growth with corruption by unbundling the four types of corruption and placing China in comparative-historical perspective. China is an outlier but not in the ways that most analysts assume. The closest parallel is the United States in the late 19th century, a gilded age characterized by both feverish growth and glaring inequality, conniving plutocrats and corrupt politicians. The book offers a four-part explanation for this paradox focused on the dominant type of corruption (access money which stimulates growth but generates distortions and risks), the relationship between the profit sharing model (where the rewards of leaders and bureaucrats are linked to economic performance) and access money, the role of capacity-building reforms in curtailing corruption involving theft and speed money, and the checking of predatory corruption by regional competition (spurring development and deal-making). Dr. Yuen Yuen Ang is an associate professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan. She works at the intersection of business, governance, and innovation to better understand how governments and organizations respond to deep uncertainty and complex, novel problems and which institutions are able to adapt. She considers China’s Gilded Age to be a sequel to her award-winning book, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap (Cornell University Press, 2016) and you can hear her conversation with my NBN colleague here. Dr. Ang translates her ideas to wider audiences in Foreign Affairs, Project Syndicate, and the South China Morning Post. Susan Liebell is an associate professor of political science at Saint Joseph’s University in Philadelphia. Why Diehard Originalists Aren’t Really Originalists recently appeared in the Washington Post’s Monkey Cage and “Retreat from the Rule of Law: Locke and the Perils of Stand Your Ground” was published in the Journal of Politics (July 2020). Email her comments at sliebell@sju.edu or tweet to @SusanLiebell. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

One of the dominant explanations for elusive development in many parts of the world is the negative role played by corruption in the development process. And many national and local governments as well as international aid agencies have spent considerable time and resources trying to come up with plans to combat the corruption menace. But anti-corruption policy has often been difficult to implement and many well-intentioned efforts have had limited impact. Despite the challenges associated with researching the phenomenon, corruption has attracted considerable academic interest over the years. And one of the leading thinkers on anti-corruption, governance and economic development is my guest this week. Mushtaq Khan is a professor of economics at SOAS, University of London where he directs the Anti-Corruption Research Consortium (ACE).Mushtaq Khan and Anti-Corruption Research Consortium on TwitterDan Banik and In Pursuit of Development on Twitter

Speaker: Yuen Yuen Ang, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan Portrayals of China’s political economy tend to be divided, with one side depicting it as a Confucian-style meritocracy, and the other arguing that the regime is a kleptocracy. In fact, neither view is correct: in the Chinese officialdom, competence and corruption can go hand in hand. Drawing on her new book, China’s Gilded Age (Cambridge University Press, 2020), Ang underscores that paradoxes define China’s political economy. Chinese growth is speedy yet risky and imbalanced. Corrupt officials worship the pursuit of prosperity. China’s regime is authoritarian yet its regions are decentralized and highly competitive. Understanding China requires that we grasp these seeming paradoxes, which will persist well into the next decade. Yuen Yuen Ang is the inaugural recipient of the Theda Skocpol Prize, awarded by the American Political Science Association for “impactful empirical, theoretical and/or methodological contributions to the study of comparative politics.” She is also named an Andrew Carnegie Fellow for “high-caliber scholarship [on] the most pressing issues of our times.” Her first, award-winning book, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap (2016), is acclaimed as “game changing” and “field shifting.” The sequel to this book, China’s Gilded Age: the Paradox of Economic Boom & Vast Corruption, is released in 2020. She writes for a broad audience in Foreign Affairs and Project Syndicate. Ang is a graduate of Colorado College and Stanford University, and a Public Intellectual Fellow at the National Committee of US-China Relations.

Today I talked to Yuen Yuen Ang, a Professor of political science and China expert at the University of Michigan. We spoke already in summer 2019 to discuss her previous book: How China Escaped the Poverty Trap. In that book she anticipated the theme of this book: corruption. She explains that 'contrary to conventional wisdom, rich nations became rich by first eliminating corruption, the real history is that corruption was never eliminated, it changes in form and structure as an economy becomes richer.' We started our conversation with a definition of corruption and her typologies: petty theft, grand theft, speed money, access money. The argument in China's Gilded Age: The Paradox of Economic Boom and Vast Corruption (Cambridge University Press, 2020) has been widely taken out of context, as ‘corruption is good for growth'. I asked Yuen to clarify. She believes that not all types of corruption carry the same harm and have the same impact on growth. She explained this with the analogy of types of drugs. Corruption is a complex phenomenon. She argues that we fail to understand it when we adopt one-dimensional measures. Some countries appear free of corruption but instead they are just characterized by more sophisticated forms of corruption. Yuen gave us a short outlook on the state of research in the field of corruption and her contribution. The book, 150 pages organized in seven chapters, is rich of tables and pictures. Yuen created a database with hundreds of party leaders and bureaucrats, and their fate. We learn about tigers and flies, in the terminology of Xi's campaign against corruption.  In your previous book, she described the strange case of China's meritocracy. Despite absence of democracy and freedom of press, since Deng, in most cases, the Chinese Communist Party has been selecting a good ruling elite. Overall, the promotion of local cadres and their careers from village level to Zhongnanhai has been based on their ability to meet objective, measurable targets. To some extent, corruption is the opposite of the ideal of meritocracy. I have asked what is the interplay between the two in China. In the section Chinese Bureaucracy 101, Yuen argues that we commonly use public administration theories that are based on ahistorical and wester-centred principles. This is not helpful to understand China she concludes. The book ends with conclusions in the form of five questions. In fact, the very end is a final, timely, note on the risk of a new cold war between the USA and China. Yuen argues that stereotypes and misunderstandings are dangerously fueling commercial and political confrontation. Her study on corruption, and the parallel between China's and the American Gilded age, is an example of how perhaps China is not that exceptional, exotic and hence dangerous to us.  This is a great new book that contributes to the study of corruption in two ways: with a methodological innovation and with a comparative historical analysis. It is a must have for the libraries of economists, sociologists, political scientists and much more. It is also accessible to non specialists and a pleasure to read.

Today I talked to Yuen Yuen Ang, a Professor of political science and China expert at the University of Michigan. We spoke already in summer 2019 to discuss her previous book: How China Escaped the Poverty Trap. In that book she anticipated the theme of this book: corruption. She explains that 'contrary to conventional wisdom, rich nations became rich by first eliminating corruption, the real history is that corruption was never eliminated, it changes in form and structure as an economy becomes richer.' We started our conversation with a definition of corruption and her typologies: petty theft, grand theft, speed money, access money. The argument in China's Gilded Age: The Paradox of Economic Boom and Vast Corruption (Cambridge University Press, 2020) has been widely taken out of context, as ‘corruption is good for growth’. I asked Yuen to clarify. She believes that not all types of corruption carry the same harm and have the same impact on growth. She explained this with the analogy of types of drugs. Corruption is a complex phenomenon. She argues that we fail to understand it when we adopt one-dimensional measures. Some countries appear free of corruption but instead they are just characterized by more sophisticated forms of corruption. Yuen gave us a short outlook on the state of research in the field of corruption and her contribution. The book, 150 pages organized in seven chapters, is rich of tables and pictures. Yuen created a database with hundreds of party leaders and bureaucrats, and their fate. We learn about tigers and flies, in the terminology of Xi’s campaign against corruption.  In your previous book, she described the strange case of China’s meritocracy. Despite absence of democracy and freedom of press, since Deng, in most cases, the Chinese Communist Party has been selecting a good ruling elite. Overall, the promotion of local cadres and their careers from village level to Zhongnanhai has been based on their ability to meet objective, measurable targets. To some extent, corruption is the opposite of the ideal of meritocracy. I have asked what is the interplay between the two in China. In the section Chinese Bureaucracy 101, Yuen argues that we commonly use public administration theories that are based on ahistorical and wester-centred principles. This is not helpful to understand China she concludes. The book ends with conclusions in the form of five questions. In fact, the very end is a final, timely, note on the risk of a new cold war between the USA and China. Yuen argues that stereotypes and misunderstandings are dangerously fueling commercial and political confrontation. Her study on corruption, and the parallel between China’s and the American Gilded age, is an example of how perhaps China is not that exceptional, exotic and hence dangerous to us.  This is a great new book that contributes to the study of corruption in two ways: with a methodological innovation and with a comparative historical analysis. It is a must have for the libraries of economists, sociologists, political scientists and much more. It is also accessible to non specialists and a pleasure to read. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Today I talked to Yuen Yuen Ang, a Professor of political science and China expert at the University of Michigan. We spoke already in summer 2019 to discuss her previous book: How China Escaped the Poverty Trap. In that book she anticipated the theme of this book: corruption. She explains that 'contrary to conventional wisdom, rich nations became rich by first eliminating corruption, the real history is that corruption was never eliminated, it changes in form and structure as an economy becomes richer.' We started our conversation with a definition of corruption and her typologies: petty theft, grand theft, speed money, access money. The argument in China's Gilded Age: The Paradox of Economic Boom and Vast Corruption (Cambridge University Press, 2020) has been widely taken out of context, as ‘corruption is good for growth’. I asked Yuen to clarify. She believes that not all types of corruption carry the same harm and have the same impact on growth. She explained this with the analogy of types of drugs. Corruption is a complex phenomenon. She argues that we fail to understand it when we adopt one-dimensional measures. Some countries appear free of corruption but instead they are just characterized by more sophisticated forms of corruption. Yuen gave us a short outlook on the state of research in the field of corruption and her contribution. The book, 150 pages organized in seven chapters, is rich of tables and pictures. Yuen created a database with hundreds of party leaders and bureaucrats, and their fate. We learn about tigers and flies, in the terminology of Xi’s campaign against corruption.  In your previous book, she described the strange case of China’s meritocracy. Despite absence of democracy and freedom of press, since Deng, in most cases, the Chinese Communist Party has been selecting a good ruling elite. Overall, the promotion of local cadres and their careers from village level to Zhongnanhai has been based on their ability to meet objective, measurable targets. To some extent, corruption is the opposite of the ideal of meritocracy. I have asked what is the interplay between the two in China. In the section Chinese Bureaucracy 101, Yuen argues that we commonly use public administration theories that are based on ahistorical and wester-centred principles. This is not helpful to understand China she concludes. The book ends with conclusions in the form of five questions. In fact, the very end is a final, timely, note on the risk of a new cold war between the USA and China. Yuen argues that stereotypes and misunderstandings are dangerously fueling commercial and political confrontation. Her study on corruption, and the parallel between China’s and the American Gilded age, is an example of how perhaps China is not that exceptional, exotic and hence dangerous to us.  This is a great new book that contributes to the study of corruption in two ways: with a methodological innovation and with a comparative historical analysis. It is a must have for the libraries of economists, sociologists, political scientists and much more. It is also accessible to non specialists and a pleasure to read. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Today I talked to Yuen Yuen Ang, a Professor of political science and China expert at the University of Michigan. We spoke already in summer 2019 to discuss her previous book: How China Escaped the Poverty Trap. In that book she anticipated the theme of this book: corruption. She explains that 'contrary to conventional wisdom, rich nations became rich by first eliminating corruption, the real history is that corruption was never eliminated, it changes in form and structure as an economy becomes richer.' We started our conversation with a definition of corruption and her typologies: petty theft, grand theft, speed money, access money. The argument in China's Gilded Age: The Paradox of Economic Boom and Vast Corruption (Cambridge University Press, 2020) has been widely taken out of context, as ‘corruption is good for growth’. I asked Yuen to clarify. She believes that not all types of corruption carry the same harm and have the same impact on growth. She explained this with the analogy of types of drugs. Corruption is a complex phenomenon. She argues that we fail to understand it when we adopt one-dimensional measures. Some countries appear free of corruption but instead they are just characterized by more sophisticated forms of corruption. Yuen gave us a short outlook on the state of research in the field of corruption and her contribution. The book, 150 pages organized in seven chapters, is rich of tables and pictures. Yuen created a database with hundreds of party leaders and bureaucrats, and their fate. We learn about tigers and flies, in the terminology of Xi’s campaign against corruption.  In your previous book, she described the strange case of China’s meritocracy. Despite absence of democracy and freedom of press, since Deng, in most cases, the Chinese Communist Party has been selecting a good ruling elite. Overall, the promotion of local cadres and their careers from village level to Zhongnanhai has been based on their ability to meet objective, measurable targets. To some extent, corruption is the opposite of the ideal of meritocracy. I have asked what is the interplay between the two in China. In the section Chinese Bureaucracy 101, Yuen argues that we commonly use public administration theories that are based on ahistorical and wester-centred principles. This is not helpful to understand China she concludes. The book ends with conclusions in the form of five questions. In fact, the very end is a final, timely, note on the risk of a new cold war between the USA and China. Yuen argues that stereotypes and misunderstandings are dangerously fueling commercial and political confrontation. Her study on corruption, and the parallel between China’s and the American Gilded age, is an example of how perhaps China is not that exceptional, exotic and hence dangerous to us.  This is a great new book that contributes to the study of corruption in two ways: with a methodological innovation and with a comparative historical analysis. It is a must have for the libraries of economists, sociologists, political scientists and much more. It is also accessible to non specialists and a pleasure to read. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Today I talked to Yuen Yuen Ang, a Professor of political science and China expert at the University of Michigan. We spoke already in summer 2019 to discuss her previous book: How China Escaped the Poverty Trap. In that book she anticipated the theme of this book: corruption. She explains that 'contrary to conventional wisdom, rich nations became rich by first eliminating corruption, the real history is that corruption was never eliminated, it changes in form and structure as an economy becomes richer.' We started our conversation with a definition of corruption and her typologies: petty theft, grand theft, speed money, access money. The argument in China's Gilded Age: The Paradox of Economic Boom and Vast Corruption (Cambridge University Press, 2020) has been widely taken out of context, as ‘corruption is good for growth’. I asked Yuen to clarify. She believes that not all types of corruption carry the same harm and have the same impact on growth. She explained this with the analogy of types of drugs. Corruption is a complex phenomenon. She argues that we fail to understand it when we adopt one-dimensional measures. Some countries appear free of corruption but instead they are just characterized by more sophisticated forms of corruption. Yuen gave us a short outlook on the state of research in the field of corruption and her contribution. The book, 150 pages organized in seven chapters, is rich of tables and pictures. Yuen created a database with hundreds of party leaders and bureaucrats, and their fate. We learn about tigers and flies, in the terminology of Xi’s campaign against corruption.  In your previous book, she described the strange case of China’s meritocracy. Despite absence of democracy and freedom of press, since Deng, in most cases, the Chinese Communist Party has been selecting a good ruling elite. Overall, the promotion of local cadres and their careers from village level to Zhongnanhai has been based on their ability to meet objective, measurable targets. To some extent, corruption is the opposite of the ideal of meritocracy. I have asked what is the interplay between the two in China. In the section Chinese Bureaucracy 101, Yuen argues that we commonly use public administration theories that are based on ahistorical and wester-centred principles. This is not helpful to understand China she concludes. The book ends with conclusions in the form of five questions. In fact, the very end is a final, timely, note on the risk of a new cold war between the USA and China. Yuen argues that stereotypes and misunderstandings are dangerously fueling commercial and political confrontation. Her study on corruption, and the parallel between China’s and the American Gilded age, is an example of how perhaps China is not that exceptional, exotic and hence dangerous to us.  This is a great new book that contributes to the study of corruption in two ways: with a methodological innovation and with a comparative historical analysis. It is a must have for the libraries of economists, sociologists, political scientists and much more. It is also accessible to non specialists and a pleasure to read. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Today I talked to Yuen Yuen Ang, a Professor of political science and China expert at the University of Michigan. We spoke already in summer 2019 to discuss her previous book: How China Escaped the Poverty Trap. In that book she anticipated the theme of this book: corruption. She explains that 'contrary to conventional wisdom, rich nations became rich by first eliminating corruption, the real history is that corruption was never eliminated, it changes in form and structure as an economy becomes richer.' We started our conversation with a definition of corruption and her typologies: petty theft, grand theft, speed money, access money. The argument in China's Gilded Age: The Paradox of Economic Boom and Vast Corruption (Cambridge University Press, 2020) has been widely taken out of context, as ‘corruption is good for growth’. I asked Yuen to clarify. She believes that not all types of corruption carry the same harm and have the same impact on growth. She explained this with the analogy of types of drugs. Corruption is a complex phenomenon. She argues that we fail to understand it when we adopt one-dimensional measures. Some countries appear free of corruption but instead they are just characterized by more sophisticated forms of corruption. Yuen gave us a short outlook on the state of research in the field of corruption and her contribution. The book, 150 pages organized in seven chapters, is rich of tables and pictures. Yuen created a database with hundreds of party leaders and bureaucrats, and their fate. We learn about tigers and flies, in the terminology of Xi’s campaign against corruption.  In your previous book, she described the strange case of China’s meritocracy. Despite absence of democracy and freedom of press, since Deng, in most cases, the Chinese Communist Party has been selecting a good ruling elite. Overall, the promotion of local cadres and their careers from village level to Zhongnanhai has been based on their ability to meet objective, measurable targets. To some extent, corruption is the opposite of the ideal of meritocracy. I have asked what is the interplay between the two in China. In the section Chinese Bureaucracy 101, Yuen argues that we commonly use public administration theories that are based on ahistorical and wester-centred principles. This is not helpful to understand China she concludes. The book ends with conclusions in the form of five questions. In fact, the very end is a final, timely, note on the risk of a new cold war between the USA and China. Yuen argues that stereotypes and misunderstandings are dangerously fueling commercial and political confrontation. Her study on corruption, and the parallel between China’s and the American Gilded age, is an example of how perhaps China is not that exceptional, exotic and hence dangerous to us.  This is a great new book that contributes to the study of corruption in two ways: with a methodological innovation and with a comparative historical analysis. It is a must have for the libraries of economists, sociologists, political scientists and much more. It is also accessible to non specialists and a pleasure to read. Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies

Today I talked to Yuen Yuen Ang, a Professor of political science and China expert at the University of Michigan. We spoke already in summer 2019 to discuss her previous book: How China Escaped the Poverty Trap. In that book she anticipated the theme of this book: corruption. She explains that 'contrary to conventional wisdom, rich nations became rich by first eliminating corruption, the real history is that corruption was never eliminated, it changes in form and structure as an economy becomes richer.' We started our conversation with a definition of corruption and her typologies: petty theft, grand theft, speed money, access money. The argument in China's Gilded Age: The Paradox of Economic Boom and Vast Corruption (Cambridge University Press, 2020) has been widely taken out of context, as ‘corruption is good for growth’. I asked Yuen to clarify. She believes that not all types of corruption carry the same harm and have the same impact on growth. She explained this with the analogy of types of drugs. Corruption is a complex phenomenon. She argues that we fail to understand it when we adopt one-dimensional measures. Some countries appear free of corruption but instead they are just characterized by more sophisticated forms of corruption. Yuen gave us a short outlook on the state of research in the field of corruption and her contribution. The book, 150 pages organized in seven chapters, is rich of tables and pictures. Yuen created a database with hundreds of party leaders and bureaucrats, and their fate. We learn about tigers and flies, in the terminology of Xi’s campaign against corruption.  In your previous book, she described the strange case of China’s meritocracy. Despite absence of democracy and freedom of press, since Deng, in most cases, the Chinese Communist Party has been selecting a good ruling elite. Overall, the promotion of local cadres and their careers from village level to Zhongnanhai has been based on their ability to meet objective, measurable targets. To some extent, corruption is the opposite of the ideal of meritocracy. I have asked what is the interplay between the two in China. In the section Chinese Bureaucracy 101, Yuen argues that we commonly use public administration theories that are based on ahistorical and wester-centred principles. This is not helpful to understand China she concludes. The book ends with conclusions in the form of five questions. In fact, the very end is a final, timely, note on the risk of a new cold war between the USA and China. Yuen argues that stereotypes and misunderstandings are dangerously fueling commercial and political confrontation. Her study on corruption, and the parallel between China’s and the American Gilded age, is an example of how perhaps China is not that exceptional, exotic and hence dangerous to us.  This is a great new book that contributes to the study of corruption in two ways: with a methodological innovation and with a comparative historical analysis. It is a must have for the libraries of economists, sociologists, political scientists and much more. It is also accessible to non specialists and a pleasure to read. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

China has not only achieved impressive economic growth in recent decades, but has also managed to lift hundreds of millions people out of poverty. How was this possible? What role did Chinese institutions, leaders and bureaucrats play in achieving this impressive result? And how and why China has managed to grow so fast for so long despite pervasive corruption?Yuen Yuen Ang is a professor of political science and an expert on China at the University of Michigan. She has written two award-winning books.In her first book, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap (2016), she explains how policymakers in China were able to design national reform packages and were thus able to create an adaptive environment around the bureaucracy. Local governments also played a key role in achieving poverty reduction. Yuen argues that China’s rise was not the result of top-down control, but rather of so-called “directed improvisation” within a single-party regime.Yuen's most recent book is China’s Gilded Age: the Paradox of Economic Boom & Vast Corruption (2020), where she challenges the conventional wisdom that rich countries became rich by first eradicating corruption. She argues that dominant type of corruption in China is not petty bribery or outright looting but access money – that is elite exchanges of power and wealth. Follow Yuen Yuen Ang on TwitterFollow Dan Banik and In Pursuit of Development on Twitter 

I had a conversation with Efosa Ojomo of the Clay Christensen Institute. He is the co-author of the book The Prosperity Paradox - along with Karen Dillon and the late Harvard management guru Clayton Christensen. The central argument of the book is that economic development happens when businesses innovate by creating a previously non-existent market. The book has been largely shunned by development scholars and this is where I started my conversation with Efosa. I also go through some other criticisms of the book, and Efosa had interesting answers. The book relies on case studies and might be considered not empirically rigorous by development scholars. Regardless of critics, the argument is powerful and hard to ignore. I read it as changing the overall incentives of all stakeholders in the process of economic development - when bureaucrats, the private sector can all benefit from making the pie bigger, things can move very quickly.TranscriptTL: Hi, and this is Ideas Untrapped. My guest today is Efosa Ojomo. Efosa is a senior research fellow at the Clay Christensen Institute. He has written a book called The Prosperity Paradox. It's a bestseller, and personally, one of the most refreshing books that I have read on the subject in the last couple of years. You're welcome, Efosa.EO: Thank you very much, Tobi. It's a pleasure to be here with you. I can't wait to dive in. Thank you.TL: Okay, so I'll start with the book and the central thesis, which I know as also appeared in your other publications, be it essays and articles. You talked about market-creating innovations as the key to prosperity, to getting the process of development started, to fighting poverty. What is your convincing evidence, so to speak, for this particular paradigm you're advocating? And why is the "Development Establishment", you know, aid agencies and scholars working in that area, why are they missing that point of view?EO: Wow, so that is a great question to start. Unfortunately, it's not a question I can answer with one answer, so let me unpack the question. Because you asked what's the evidence for market-creating innovation? Why do development practitioners approach development and antipoverty programs a certain way? And why haven't they bought into this idea - the notion of market-creating innovation? So let me start with diagnosing the problem. When you want to address any issue you have to make sure you spend a lot of time diagnosing it. Let's go back to the aid industry and when it really began.1949, Harry Truman gave a speech where he actually, unintentionally, I believe, catalyzed the beginning of the modern-day development industry. And in his speech (it was his inaugural address, you know, president of the US at the time), he defined the problem of development as rich versus poor. Developed versus undeveloped. First world versus third world. He didn't use all that language, but that's essentially how he defined it. As, you know, we are developed and we have all these resources, these poor countries are not developed, they don't have these resources, let us transfer resources to them and help them develop.That is the main way the development industry works today. It's this idea that you are not developed, we are developed, we're going to transfer resources to you. So that's number one, right, [on] why the industry operates the way it does. Number two is that the development industry is an industry that attracts certain types of people. And so if you look at big players in the development industry, what you're going to see are people who have gone to school to get typically a PhD or Masters degree in the area of development. And so they study development as a whole as an entire entity and the research they do is often very focused on how one element impact entity.So you might write a PhD thesis on how education of girls in this part of Ghana impacts their ability to go to school. Now, that's an interesting paper and you may find out, oh, if we educate girls, more of them will have fewer kids and they'll get advanced degrees, but that will not lead to the development of Ghana as a country. It answers, oftentimes, what I think is an inconsequential question. And so the development industry has a lot of players trying to do good work, unfortunately, they're answering the wrong or I would say inconsequential questions.The third thing I would say with regard to development and why it's practice the way it is [is], in a weird way, we know what the answer is. The answer to development looks like, right, in our minds, whether it's right or wrong, it looks like America. It looks like Japan. It looks like France and England. In other words, you go to these countries that are wealthy, and generally speaking, things work. The roads are good, the electricity does not go out, the law enforcement, for the most part, works. And so you say, "you know what? The problem in our countries that are not yet developed is all these things don't work. So let us make them work." Let us fix the roads. Let us fix the laws. Let us fix the schools.What these three things I just discussed are missing is the fundamental mechanism that helps these things work. Right, the fundamental mechanism that actually provides the resources or creates the value that really enables these things to work. And that fundamental mechanism is market-creating innovations. Which is connected to the initial question you asked: "what's the evidence that this actually worked?" Again, to answer that, we have to go back in time. We have to say, "if we have this hypothesis that market-creating innovations work, how can we show that? We had to go back to a time when these wealthy countries, the United States, countries in Europe, Japan and so on were not wealthy. We had to go back to when they had demographics that are similar to many poor countries today. And we said, what happened? Did these countries simply build the great infrastructure all of a sudden? The government, were they never corrupt and they just woke up one day and began to institute good laws and practices? Or was it a more dynamic nonlinear process of entrepreneurs across the country creating new markets, employing people, generating tax revenues, enabling the government to overtime improve its institutions? What we found was the latter. It was a more dynamic and nonlinear process.And so that kind of finding is really hard to document at scale and what I mean is, you know, when you pass a law, it's in the record books, we know exactly when this law was passed and so we can look at society before the law and we can look at how society evolves after the law. The problem with innovation is it's really hard to say, okay, this is the date - on November 5th, 2006, this is the date this innovation came and created all this impact. It's a process. And so instead of looking at oh, these were the laws that were passed, this is how society evolved, that's how the institution changed the society. What's more important to do is say "what led to the passage of those laws? Who fought for the passage of those laws? Where did they get the resources to fight for the passage of those laws? Where did the government get the resources to enforce the laws?"And so these questions are a lot more difficult to answer, but when you begin to unpack them, it's hard to divorce development from innovation and more specifically market-creating innovation. My hope is that development practitioners begin to ask the tougher questions and begin to engage in what a wise man, once called "intellectual honesty." And really assess - are our programs working? Are they working the way we want them to work? We've been doing development like this for over the past 20 years, over the past 30 years. How has that resulted in prosperity? COVID-19 has come around and all of a sudden development is pushed back 25 years. Uh, was it really pushed back 25 years or were we celebrating a false sense of progress? Because development is not pushed back 25 years in Japan, it's not pushed back 25 years in France, I can tell you that. And so we have to get to the point where we are asking the difficult questions on how to truly do sustainable development.TL: I want to go to your latest article in Project Syndicate where you challenged African entrepreneurs and business people to rethink the way they do business, and invests more in market-creating innovations. My question is why are they not thinking about this already, what are the barriers if the returns are there given some of the examples and evidence you've cited?EO: Well, first of all, market-creating innovations are innovations that transform complicated and expensive products into products that are simple and affordable. Now, these innovations make these products more accessible to many, many more people in society. And so an example would be the proliferation of mobile phones all across Africa, for instance. Or a company in Ghana called mPharma that is making medication drugs more affordable, more accessible to people. Micro Insurer is another example, making insurance more affordable to people who historically would not be able to afford existing insurance products. So examples abound. Now the question you ask about why if these things are so interesting and exciting, why are they not being pursued?A couple of reasons, the first is there is a sense that innovation is something that happens after a society develops and becomes prosperous [because] it's only people with, you know, disposable income, with extra income that can actually afford many products on the market. So that belief is widespread. And unfortunately, it's really hard to go against a belief. One of the things we're trying to do is say no, no, no, innovation is not something that happens after a society develops, innovation is the process by which society develops. So that's one. The second thing is this concept of non-consumption.Now, non-consumption is a phenomenon that happens in every society, but it's more prevalent in emerging economies or poorer countries. It describes how many people in the society would benefit from gaining access to a product or service, but because of the cost of the product, because of the skill necessary to use the product or the time needed to actually purchase and consume the product, or the simple fact that the product is just not available, many people cannot access these products. It doesn't mean they wouldn't benefit, but there are obstacles or barriers.Now, the non-consumption economy as we like to call it contains all these individuals. The problem is when you do market research on opportunities, a lot of times the insights we get from our market research point to what we call the consumption economy. It points to people who already consuming. And so when you look at the market research for televisions in Nigeria or refrigerators in Ghana, what you are measuring is not all the people who would benefit if they had access to these products or services. What the market research data is measuring is all the people who can afford the services. And so? You say oh, refrigerators in Nigeria, only 2 million people have them, as an example - I actually don't know the number off the top of my head. Only 2 million people, that's a very small market. That doesn't warrant our investment especially when you compare it to a hundred million in the US, there's no market in Nigeria.What market research does not take into account is what about nonconsumption? What about all the people who would benefit from gaining access to these refrigerators? [But] because we don't measure and value nonconsumption, it's hard to even see it as an opportunity. And the last reason I would give, you know, I'd be remiss if I didn't say [is] it's really difficult to go after nonconsumption. It's difficult for the first two reasons I described and it's difficult because you are literally creating a market that does not exist.And so in the research that we've done on just studying market-creating innovators, whether the ones in the US, in Europe, in Africa, in Asia it doesn't matter. Before these innovators create the market, there is widespread disbelief, especially from those who are experts these economies. They tell them there's no way that this market exists. These people are too poor. They're not educated enough, they can't afford these products. And so, to go against the grain when there's no market, the people are poor, the environment is difficult to work in, those are obstacles that are really difficult for entrepreneurs and investors. And so part of our work, what we're trying to do is, say, look, many of these demographics we see, many of these characteristics of these economies are very normal. They're not easy, they're simply incredibly normal. You're not doing what has not been done before. And if we can normalize these difficulties and say if you take a more predictable approach to innovation and investment, we can't guarantee success but we can help mitigate failure. We think you can actually do better in these emerging economies.TL: Do you think that there are conflicts of interest in most of the boardrooms of African businesses? I mean, in that piece you challenged Milton Friedman's opinion of the responsibility of a business in society, which he says is solely to the shareholders or the stakeholders. So, do you think that there's a conflict of interest in most boardrooms, where some of the things that entrepreneurs and some business leaders are interested in, in this case, market-creating innovations, are not things that investors really think can give them returns on their capital?EO: Yeah, so I think there's a lot to unpack in that...because of the abundance of data all over the place, unfortunately, we now live in a world of short-termism. There's more short-term thinking going around. What do I mean? Well, you know, if I'm watching the news and I hear about this company, this investor that made a lot of money on some investments, was able to cash out in a few years, that affects the way I think, it affects the way I measure my own performance. And so this abundance of data has created short-term thinking.In addition, what you also have is a lot of the literature on finance, what constitutes a good investment comes from countries that are already prosperous. They come from countries where I would say they are no longer, generally speaking, in the market creation phase. And so they are more in the efficiency phase. So they have roads, they have institutions, they have organization building companies and the question is often, oh, how do we make this more efficient? How do we make better products? When you use those same metrics to analyze projects and organisations in Africa or other emerging regions, you have a mismatch because the continent is still in a market-creating phase. And so to use private equity metrics that I would use in New York to measure projects in Lagos or Abuja or Accra or Nairobi makes absolutely no sense. Literally no sense. It's akin to using the same metrics to analyze the development of a 3-year-old and a 30-year-old. It makes no sense. And so instead of a conflict of interest, I think I would say it's a mismatch of metrics.If, as the CEO of an African company or the board chair of an African company, I had the goal to grow my market size and capture 60 percent of the customers in Africa. Say, I make baby food or something 'cause you know Africa is a growing continent. Well, I'm not going to measure my performance the same way Gerber babies measures its performance in other countries. I'm going to say look, what did baby food companies go through when the US was a poor country? What did they invest in? How long did it take? How did they manage the relationship with government? How did they manage relationship with the community stakeholders? How did they develop their staff? And I'm going to use those metrics. 'Cause if I use the metrics that these companies today are using, I cannot develop. It's not like it'll take time. No no no, like, we will never develop.Now, you know, there will be some wins here and there, there will be some lucky breaks here and there and that's what we see from time to time. But to truly develop in the circumstance we find ourselves, we need to step away from using metrics that are propagated all over the place and develop a core set of metrics that are contextualized to our own circumstance.TL: Do you think that this framework that you describe - [that is] businesses really innovating their business models to target nonconsumption and grow the pie, so to speak. Do you think it's the absolute fundamental thing that has to happen, 'cause the way I read your book and some of your works is like a chicken and egg problem, right? Like, what has to happen first, you know? Some in the development literature would say that you need institutions, you need good institutions first before you can do some of these things that you say. What is your response to that?EO: I mean, I empathize with those who say we need good institutions, but that is not really a value-add statement. The reason I say that is, okay, we need good institutions, what do we do next? We look at the Nigerian government, at least the federal government...in addition to the lack of managerial and technical capabilities, the government has roughly $200 or so to spend per year per Nigerian. Of that, maybe fifty to $75 goes out the door to service its debt. So roughly $125 to a $150. In addition, when you look at where it's starting, I mean, nobody would look at Nigeria and say we practice good governance, so it's starting from the back of the pack, and so it needs even more resources to get to good governance. When you compare where Nigeria is and what it has, the resources to, again, you know, whether it's Norway, Denmark, America. Norway spends twenty to $30,000 per person per year. And so the idea that, oh, Nigeria needs good institutions, that's like saying a homeless person needs more money. If they had more money, they wouldn't be homeless. That's not a value-add statement.The question is, how do we get to good institutions? How did the US get to good institutions when it was poor? And so if somebody comes up and says - you know what Efosa, Nigeria spends $150 per year per person, here's how they can actually get good institutions and it's a realistic model. Then we can start the conversation. But when, you know, these experts throw out blanket statements oh, we need good institutions... I'm like, okay, what am I gonna do with that? What is the police officer who is demanding brides, making $50 a month going to do with you need to have better institutions? What is that politician who has made a bunch of deals before he or she becomes a senator or a governor and they get into office and they have to square all those they made deals with? They have to figure out how to amass as much wealth as they can because there are little to no economic opportunities in the country, what are they going to do with the "you need good institutions?" There are no incentives. Right? To live out that statement. So we do need to move a lot further from the "we need good institutions" argument because it has not done anybody any good.You know, there's a paper we referenced in the book - how not to fix problems that matter? And ultimately what happens is a majority of institutional reform programs funded by big development players do not work. You know, you come to my country, you tell me, oh, I should behave this way, I should do this, I should make sure this is easier for people and many of the public sector participants on the ground just listen, they take the development dollars, they reformed the institutions in a way that makes the donors happy and they keep doing what they're doing. Because it doesn't cut deep. It doesn't fundamentally change how people think about society. The incentive systems, they don't change. So, do we need good institutions? Absolutely. How do we get there? That's a tougher question.TL: Staying with that thought. Now, isn't there a case for, well, maybe it depends on what we mean when we talk about institutions right? And I know that scholars and even people who work in development are guilty of trying to imagine already formed institutions in developed nations and trying to graft a lot of their features in countries that do not have them. But for businesses to take risks, you know, don't you think that institutions like basic property rights protection, contract enforcement and things that create the environment for you to be able to take risk, however minimally, don't you think those should come before market-creating innovations or targeting non-consumption in the way you describe it?EO: It's a good one. I think the better question to ask has to be more specific. Now, I'm not saying investors should just go and put their money in any country. And there no, at least, limited guarantees, that's not what I mean. I mean, after all, businesses are operating in Nigeria as we speak. I mean you are speaking to me through an Internet service connection. So the idea that somehow institutions don't work and we need better institutions, I mean, it's not too mature. We have to mature that idea. So we have to be specific. We have to say, if you are going to invest in this space, in this country, in this region, you have to ensure the specific fundamental requirements that as best as you can, no investment is ever secure or ever guaranteed... But you have to ensure there are fundamental, sort of legitimate, base-level institutions exist.And I think if we went in with those sorts of questions, not ways Nigeria on the ease of doing business index, how is Nigeria's corruption perception ranking? That's too broad, generic, and that's not helpful to anybody. If the folks who are providing us with this Internet connection went into Nigeria with that thinking they would not have gone in. And so, somehow, that question forces an answer that is not helpful. The question has to be, look, I'm a transportation investor, I wanna go and make transportation more affordable for people in Malawi. Alright, let me look at who the transportation players are. Let me understand that sector. Let me understand who the government players are. Let me understand what the regulations are, how have they changed it over the last five years. How might they change it over the next year?You have to do your homework. And, no offence, many investors are not willing to do the homework. And so of course, you're gonna not find Nigeria attractive when you go in with the oh, don't we need the baseline this and that? No, no, no, no, that's a lazy way to think about investing and more specifically, development. We go in more targeted. And if we do that, again, no guarantees we will be successful but that's a much better problem-solving exercise than oh, yeah, let Nigeria move up some rankings. Let's improve. What does a good institution look like? I mean, like you know, in the broad sense, what does that really even look like?I mean, I think I would be more targeted than looking at Nigeria or, really, any country from a high level, like, how are the institutions? Don't we need this base level?TL: That's a good point, but here is another way to look at this from my perspective. Some of the examples you cite like Mo Ibrahim, Celtel; Tolaram in Nigeria, don't you think that there's a bit of a survivorship bias in some of those examples? Like, for example, if we look at the case of Tolaram, yes, it has done really well. Well, "well" is relative here, so, but it has survived.EO: It has.TL: Yes, and it's become a household name and it may well be a replicable model for investing and doing business in this environment. But you can also argue that over those decades, a lot of businesses have also tried and failed.EO: Yes.TL: And aren't you picking winners? And in that sense, not really robust with your sample set in that sense. Because a lot of entrepreneurs who are trying to do things differently would tell you how hard it is. Some of them are losing money, some of them are losing their skin, some are highly demotivated and these are people that really, really want to do bold and innovative things. But the general, again, institutional environment, and in this case, specific policies that worked against them are serious barriers. So aren't you effectively simply picking winners and just ignoring the other side?EO: It's a good question. I think I would answer, yes, if there was something anomalous about Tolaram in the context it finds itself. And so if I did not see similarities between Tolaram and Isaac Singer, who we wrote about, or Henry Ford who we wrote about, if I did not see similarities in how they had to engage with government, how they had to raise capital, how they had to almost lose their skin (in your language), then I would say, oh, yeah, we're just picking winners. But there's nothing anomalous about what they've done. In fact, I expect winners to look like Tolaram, Mo Ibrahim and several other companies that we talk about.If they don't look like them, then the chances that they will win, at least market-creating, are very very slim. The other way I would respond to that is, I have never once and I will never say this is the easy path. This is incredibly difficult. It's so difficult that I am convinced this is the critical missing piece. It's paradoxical, but that is why we are not developing. Because there is this incredibly difficult thing we have to do, but we believe the only way we can do it is if the environment allows us do it and so we have to fix the environment. Now we believe that so strongly that we are willing to invest billions of dollars to try and fix the environment, with no connection to this mechanism that's gonna make the environment thrive. That's how strongly we believe in educating the public, in institutional reform, in fixing infrastructure whether or not it makes sense.We're trying to do all that and we're paying little attention to empowering entrepreneurs. And so if I, for instance, were Mo Ibrahim, after I sell my Celtel and I become a billionaire, I would say okay, what's the next industry I want to democratize? And I go, and I do the hard work of building that I will not do governance. Nobody is winning the prizes. It's incredibly difficult to do any meaningful reform because the equation, we have the backwards. Development is difficult. There are no easy answers here. What we have to do is ask, what gives us the best chance? Does wishful thinking in light of poorly paid civil servants who have little to no incentive to improve the system give us the best shot at success? Or does figuring out a way to empower and create new markets where some of the revenues from those markets can be pumped into the institution and overtime maybe it gets better. Does that give us a better shot? I think I'm gonna put myself in that camp.The last thing I would say on this is, there's a professor out of [the] University of Michigan. Yuen Yuen Ang who just published a book called China's Gilded Age - The paradox of economic boom and vast corruption.TL: I know her.EO: Yes, and so she talks a little bit more about the public sector side of things. I mean, no two countries are alike or identical, but she does a really good job of explaining how even in light of China's vast corruption, there was an economic development push that prioritized investors, markets and as a result, China, for all its problems, has been able to lift a billion people out of poverty, grow 10 percent over the last four decades, and improve. So, there no easy answers here, it's just we have to pick the camp we think makes the most sense, and I don't think the camp where a monopoly entity with little to no incentive to change, trying to incentivize them to change by giving them more resources and empowering them when the incentive system in society hasn't changed, like, somehow, that makes no sense to me.TL: I like the Ang Yuen Yuen example. It's a great example and I've read both her books, I think what she's doing is fantastic. So here is my question on that. You gave the example of Mo Ibrahim. Now, don't you think that people like Mo Ibrahim - and of course this is not really about him - or people like him who focus on the issue of governance... now we may critique or find some fault in how we've been going about this. But don't you think they focus on the issue of governance because it is through governance, again, I reiterate, that you can get a hundred Mo Ibrahims?Because, Tolaram may have adapted well, it may have really found a way to survive through thick and thin in Nigeria, however difficult others may say it is, by doing its homework and making targeted informed investments like you said. But, in the end, Tolaram doing well may not necessarily raise the GDP per capita of Nigeria.EO: Yeah.TL: Which in terms of poverty and prosperity that is what really matters at the end of the day, income for people. So don't think governance may not be the only way, but it's an easier, faster way for the kind of entrepreneurship that you are advocating to scale, really, really fast, you know. I mean, in America, yeah, Ford had an innovative business model that changed its generation and maybe the way business was done in America after. But also, there was an environment that did not entrench Ford, but that allowed others, Dodge, GM and most of these other companies to emerge and improve on those things and create tons of jobs.So don't you think that governance is vital in a way that it allows businesses that really want to innovate to scale their business model really fast and for other businesses to look at their success and be encouraged to enter that space and do even better things?EO: Absolutely governance is important. We say it in the book. Entrepreneurs ignite the fire, the government fans the flame. You can not have a developed prosperous society without ultimately getting governance involved, it's a matter of sequencing and incentives. Now, I would agree governance is important insofar as we're talking about the same thing. Again, I don't want us to limit our conversation to oh, good institutions are important, you know, that's a non-value-add statement. Governance is important if what we mean by that is working with economic development stakeholders to make sure the incentive systems in society benefit those who work in government. I, right now, can give you not one reason why a poorly paid civil servant who exists in a system that is steeped in corruption to go to work every day, do a great job, do as much as he or she can for the society that already thinks he or she is stealing money, not have enough money for rent, for health care needs, education need and go home because Mo Ibrahim Index says you need to have good institutions. No, No, No. That makes, again, no sense. I would not do that. You would not do that, I don't think.Now if what we mean by governance is vital is, look, let us sit down here and let's do it the way the Chinese did. Let us align your incentives with how much investment dollars are coming into your state. Let us make sure that, you know, yeah, you get paid $100 a month, but if you are able to attract this much investment, if you are able to make sure these entrepreneurs thrive, then you get a 50 percent bonus. You get a 100 percent bonus. You develop the incentives to help the government do the job that we're asking them to do. Because it is a thankless job. It is a terrible job. It is a job where everybody thinks you're stealing money, whether or not you are. And we know this. So the idea that we should just keep measuring, saying, "what's wrong with these guys? Why we need to fix it" without sitting down and saying, how can we realistically fix this so we limit the incentive for government officials to steal? We're going to be spinning our wheels for years to come, right? That is what I think we can do from a governance standpoint. Align incentives, make sure, me as a public servant, I benefit if my society benefits.If my society benefits, and I don't benefit, well, forget about it. It's not going to happen.TL: I agree with you, we need to move away from some of these useless indices, to be honest. So do you think that changing incentives the way you analyzed, do you think that there are some, I don't want to say natural disadvantages or barriers that are specific to certain societies. For example Nigeria, there is oil and the so-called resource curse.EO: Yeah.TL: How do you think that can work with incentive problem? You know, because you have bureaucrats and public servants who have no incentive in the success of the private sector. They can simply sell oil licenses and drilling rights and keep collecting taxes from that same sector and borrow to plug the other fiscal holes and live like that for decades.EO: Yeah. So, that's a tough question, right? And, again, I want to be as practical ask as possible. If you had a trust fund baby, you had a really wealthy person who didn't manage their money well, allowed their kids to do whatever they wanted, the question you're asking is, how can we incentivize this trust fund baby to actually care about self-improvement and development? I mean, that's difficult, right? What I would do is try and find the officials who will be open to a different way of creating value and wealth. I can guarantee you not all 36 governors in Nigeria are extremely corrupt, or at least corrupt at the same level. Not all of them will be uninterested or disinterested in an idea to create a new industry in their region.TL: Certainly not.EO: So it's not to say this is an easy road or, you know, you're just going to find people willy nilly. But you go to the first governor... I'm simplifying because we're on the podcast, right? I know people in government right now, and I can give names of people I trust. People who are trying their best to do well by the community. So the idea that oh, everybody 'cause I think that is what we imply when we say the government has access to oil and you're right, they do. But there are still going to be people in government who we take interesting ideas to and in communicating those ideas, we help them see if this works out, you would have generated this much income for this state. You would have created this much value if you allow this to work out. These many constituents would get jobs. You can talk about this in your next campaign.Now, if you take that message to every governor in Nigeria, maybe they will all say get out of here, I am not buying it. If that happens, then go to Ghana. Go to Cameroon. Go to Rwanda. Go somewhere until you find a country where it will work. Again, I'm not advocating this because I think it's easy. In fact, I'm advocating it precisely because I think it's difficult. But, unfortunately, I do not see another way we can develop. I just do not. And once I do, I will start promoting that because before we started the podcast, you and I discussed the idea of intellectual honesty and I suppose I just do not see how we get out of the rut we're in if we don't start to think differently.TL: One final area I'll like us to explore is culture. I mean, one of the books you cited in the book, which I like very much, is Deirdre McCloskey's Bourgeois Dignity, and she talked about how the social embrace, so to speak, of the culture of Commerce, sort of laid the groundwork for some of the things that happened in the West, you know?EO: Yeah.TL: So what role do you see for culture here? I mean, it's easy to talk about hard metrics and talk about governance and you know, but we know that culture is the software of society. So what role do you see for culture in this?EO: You are absolutely right, culture is key. Culture is the software. But culture runs on hardware. And culture is connected to hard metrics. And so if I use your analogy of software and hardware, there is no software I know that runs on software like every piece of software runs on hardware and depending on the makeup of the hardware, if you have a really fast processor hardware, then your software will run faster if it has the capabilities to. And so culture might seem like software that's malleable, and it is valuable, but it is not malleable without hard metrics.What do I mean? Well, let's think about why we may not value commerce as much as we should or why we value corruption as much as we do. Well, look at the hard metrics. If you're fortunate to get into a position of power in many of our countries, there are hard metrics in your life that increase - your access to the elites in society, certainly your bank account, your homes, your car, your children access to better education. Those are hard metrics. So the idea that somehow our culture values that practice makes complete sense. The idea that we value entrepreneurship and innovation in the US is connected to hard metrics as well, right? Look at the richest people here. It's all these innovators.So for me, the two are sort of one and the same. What we know is that you can't change the software if it has no bearing on the hardware, if you don't change the hardware. In other words, if we don't figure out how to increase or improve those hard metrics, it's gonna be very difficult for us to change the software, sustainably. We might for a little while, right, we might for a political term or two. But what we're talking about here is long term development, decades-long. And if we don't figure out how to help people in society make progress in a way that they lead better lives, their kids lead better lives, they have access to better healthcare and so on... Unfortunately, the software is not going to change, the culture is not gonna change. And so I do think we can connect the two better.TL: One final questions before I let you go, which is also a tradition on the podcast is, what is the one big idea right now that... it may be something you're working on or something you'll like to see. So what's that one big idea that you're thinking about right now that you will like to see spread and see the world adopt and see people believe more?EO: Yeah, so I think for me, in the context of my work, it is this - innovation and entrepreneurship are not things that happen after a society fixes itself. They are actually the process by which society fixes itself. If more people can believe that then we can begin to talk about the “how”. We can begin to say okay, Efosa I get that, but this is my circumstance, this is my context. How can that hold true in my circumstance? There are things like political innovation. When I talk about incentivising the government, that is an innovation. When I talk about entrepreneurs figuring out how to manage the governance issue, that's part of their innovation. So, I think, for me, it would be innovation is something that happens not after society fixes itself, but it's the process by which society fixes itself.TL: We'll do our best to help that idea spread.EO: Thank you.TL: Thank you so much. My guest today has been the author and prosperity researcher, Efosa Ejomo. Thank you very much for being with us, Efosa.EO: Absolutely, it's my pleasure. Thank you. This is a public episode. Get access to private episodes at www.ideasuntrapped.com/subscribe

Income inequality has received considerable attention in recent years. Very few would have predicted that a very thick academic book on wealth and income inequality in Europe and the United States since the 18th century would go on to become an international bestseller. I am of course referring to Capital in the Twenty-First Century– the book published by the French economist Thomas Piketty in 2013. Income inequality was rising in many countries before the pandemic, and recent reports suggest that the Covid crisis is widening inequalities globally. Indeed, the global economy, according to the International Monetary Fund, is expected to contract 4.4 percent cent in 2020. This is bad news for the world’s poor, whose numbers are expected to sharply increase. But Covid has also made the world’s richest even richer. A recent analysis by UBS concludes that the world’s billionaires have grown wealthier in 2020 compared with 2019. And this is not just in the United States or Germany but also in Brazil and China. Thus, the pandemic will most likely deepen inequalities of various kinds.To discuss how global income inequality looks like today, I am joined by Branko Milanovic, one of the world’s most well-known scholars on inequality. He is a visiting presidential professor at The Graduate Center at the City University of New York, and a senior scholar at the University’s Stone Center on Socio-economic Inequality. Professor Milanovic has published extensively on income inequality, in individual countries and globally, including in preindustrial societies. For almost two decades, he served as the lead economist in the World Bank’s Research Department.We discussed income inequality within specific countries and whether the gains of the emerging global middle class in Asia are responsible for the losses of the lower middle class of the rich world. We also spoke about Branko’s latest book, Capitalism Alone: The Future of the System That Rules the World (2019), in which he argues that for the first time in human history, the globe is dominated by one economic system – capitalism. So, what are the prospects for a fairer world now that capitalism is the only game in town?Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization (2016)Branko Milanovic on TwitterDan Banik and In Pursuit of Development on Twitter

How has China grown so fast for so long despite extensive corruption? In China's Gilded Age, Yuen Yuen Ang argues that although all corruption is harmful, it does not always hurt growth. Different forms of corruption have disparate impact; certain types actually stimulate investment and development while simultaneously posing serious risks for economic and political systems. Using a range of sources, Dr. Ang explains the evolution of Chinese corruption, how it differs from that of the West and other developing countries, and how President Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign could affect growth and governance. On September 30, 2020, the National Committee hosted a virtual program with Professor Yuen Yuen Ang.

Why has modern China prospered in spite of vast corruption? On this episode of ChinaTalk, Jordan Schneider talks with Yuen Yuen Ang, associate professor of political science at the University of Michigan, about her new book, "China's Gilded Age: The Paradox of Economic Boom and Vast Corruption." She draws comparisons between U.S. history and the China of today, arguing that access money in China functions like campaign finance in the States. They also discuss the implications of corruption for regime stability.

Yuen Yuen Ang discusses her new book on how the 'right kind' of corruption has created growth on steroids in China, what it tells us about the nature of capitalism, and what the future might hold

How can China be so corrupt and yet grow so fast? What's the relationship between corruption and competent governance? How does 'access money' at the higher levels differ from the 'profit-sharing' you see lower down in the bureaucracy? How does China in the 21st century compare with America's gilded age? And why won't anyone give me dinosaur eggs? To discuss, Prof. Yuen Yuen Ang joins the show to talk about her fantastic new book, China's Gilded Age. Please subscribe to my Patreon! Or better yet, a full-time job offer as your humble host is very much unemployed! Patreon will suffice though. The incredible propaganda rap song feat. Xi Jinping here.  And the best Chinese tv show of the decade.

How can China be so corrupt and yet grow so fast? What's the relationship between corruption and competent governance? How does 'access money' at the higher levels differ from the 'profit-sharing' you see lower down in the bureaucracy? How does China in the 21st century compare with America's gilded age? And why won't anyone give me dinosaur eggs? To discuss, Prof. Yuen Yuen Ang joins the show to talk about her fantastic new book, China's Gilded Age. Please subscribe to my Patreon! Or better yet, a full-time job offer as your humble host is very much unemployed! Patreon will suffice though. The incredible propaganda rap song feat. Xi Jinping here.  And the best Chinese tv show of the decade. Get bonus content on Patreon See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Why does China seem to be upsetting countries around the world? Beijing's recent clampdown on Hong Kong with a new security law has led many countries to condemn the Chinese leadership. It's also put more pressure on the trade war with the US. So what's in it for Beijing to apparently spur international hostility over Hong Kong and a number of other regional border conflicts? George Magnus, an economist and an associate at the China Centre at Oxford University, believes the domestic unemployment issue is a big determining factor in Beijing's thinking. Yuen Yuen Ang, a political scientist and an expert on China and emerging economies at the University of Michigan, says it's all a symptom of President Xi's and Donald Trump's insecurities at home. And Ian Bremmer the President of the risk consultancy the Eurasia Group, says despite the Chinese always having been thought of long term, strategic thinkers they are now not even thinking six months ahead. (Picture: Cargo containers with US and China flags hoisted by crane hooks clash with each other; Credit: cybrain/Getty Images)

Dr. Yuen Yuen Ang joins Hamsini Hariharan to discuss China's experiences with corruption and how it compares with experiences in India. For comments or questions, reach out to the host For questions or comments, reach out to the host on twitter @HamsiniH (https://twitter.com/HamsiniH ) or on Instagram @statesofanarchy ( https://instagram.com/statesofanarchy )Read More:China's Gilded Age (now available on Kindle at Amazon.in) by Yuen Yuen Ang (https://amzn.to/2TCjDkn)China's Gilded Age: Audio excerpt of the conclusion: (https://bit.ly/2X1VMN7)China's Gilded Age: Other chapter excerpts: (https://bit.ly/2AZKccQ)"Why ‘I-Paid-A-Bribe’ Worked in India but Failed in China” - Yuen Yuen Ang (https://bit.ly/2TztCa2)“Unbundling Corruption: Revisiting Six Questions on Corruption" - Yuen Yuen Ang (https://bit.ly/2zhYRQd)Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern America - Richard White (https://amzn.to/2ywgivP)Talons and Teeth: County Clerks and Runners in the Qing Dynasty - Bradly W Reed (https://amzn.to/3geYsyB)How China Escaped the Poverty Trap - Yuen Yuen Ang(https://amzn.to/2ZxwZSC)You can listen to this show and other awesome shows on the IVM Podcasts app on Android: https://ivm.today/android or iOS: https://ivm.today/ios, or any other podcast app.

Leadership in both China and the United States continue to face the common crisis of a once-in-a-century pandemic and its aftermath. Political scientist Dr. Yuen Yuen Ang uses power insecurity to explore the apparent contradiction of worsening U.S.-China relations despite the powerful and ongoing incentive for collaboration.  Dr. Ang is an associate professor of political science at the University of Michigan. She is the author of, "How China Escaped the Poverty Trap" (Cornell, 2016), and the forthcoming, "China’s Gilded Age: The Paradox of Economic Boom and Vast Corruption" (Cambridge, 2020).  This episode is part of the National Committee's Coronavirus Impact Series: http://www.ncuscr.org/coronavirus

As the novel coronavirus and resulting illness, COVID-19, spread across China and now the United States and much of the world, national governments have had to scramble to address this unprecedented health threat. At the same time, the pandemic has caused an enormous strain in U.S.-China relations at a time when the two countries are contending with an on-going trade war and other sources of friction. On April 14, 2020, the National Committee hosted a virtual program with three experts: Yuen Yuen Ang of the University of Michigan, Amy Celico of the Albright Stonebridge Group, and Elizabeth Knup of the Ford Foundation. Committee president Steve Orlins moderated the conversation as they considered how the rampant spread of the virus is affecting the U.S.-China relationship, and what the long-term impact may be in the political, economic, and social realms.

Why has China grown so fast for so long despite vast corruption? In China's Gilded Age, Professor Ang argues that not all types of corruption hurt growth, nor do they cause the same kind of harm. Ang reveals that the rise of capitalism was not accompanied by the eradication of corruption, but rather by its evolution from thuggery and theft to access money. In doing so, she challenges the way we think about corruption and capitalism, not only in China but around the world. This is an excerpt, read by Alice Evans. Professor Ang tweets @yuenyuenang Book details: https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/yy-ang/chinas-gilded-age/

China is 70 years old. Its growth has been staggering from rural economy to industrial powerhouse. We explore the many issues, both positive and negative, around this with founding executive of the Libra Association, Dante Disparte, and journalist Mehmal Sarfraz. We also look at what the nation's unique path has meant for its people with Yuen Yuen Ang, author of forthcoming book, China's Gilded Age: The Paradox of Economic Boom & Vast Corruption. Meanwhile, Facebook's plans to get the world to use its digital currency Libra continue apace. We discuss what Libra is and what it means for you. And, we talk trains! Africa's first high speed train was opened to the public in Morocco at the end of last year.The BBC's Nora Fakim is in Casablanca to see how it's doing. Picture credit: Getty Images

I spoke with Dr Yuen Yuen Ang, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. She published in 2016 a great new book How China Escaped the Poverty Trap (Cornell University Press, 2016). This is a very original and non-conformist book on China. It is also an important contribution to political economy and to development economics. We started with the origin of her book and a brief definition of ‘poverty trap’. Her book explains what went right in China and how other developing countries could follow a similar approach to reform and institutional transition. We discussed why traditional contributions such as those by Acemoglu and Robinson cannot explain the success of China’s reform. On the one hand, the fail to understand Chinese reforms, including political ones under Deng, on the other hand, they are biased. They were developed looking at traditional western development paths that cannot and should not be treated as a universal recipe for any other country in the world. We discussed about property rights, transitional institutions and the performance evaluation system of local cadres. The author defines China as an ‘autocracy with democratic characteristics’ and, since Deng, the systematic evaluation of local political leaders worked well as a proxy of democratic control. We also discussed how China avoided the mistakes of the Russian transition. And we learnt how China traditionally is not monolithic in its economic policy because allows decentralization and experimentation. The book is very strong in its theoretical framework but is also based on an extensive fieldwork across three provinces that exemplify the diversity within the Chinese sub-continent and the act of balancing between uniformity and variety, center and periphery. We concluded talking about the challenges ahead for China and the next books being prepared by prof. Yuen Yuen Ang. A great book, and I hope a good podcast too. Andrea Bernardi is Senior Lecturer in Employment and Organization Studies at Oxford Brookes University in the UK. He holds a doctorate in Organization Theory from the University of Milan, Bicocca. He has held teaching and research positions in Italy, China and the UK. Among his research interests are the use of history in management studies, the co-operative sector, and Chinese co-operatives. His latest project is looking at health care in rural China. He is the co-convener of the EAEPE’s permanent track on Critical Management Studies. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

I spoke with Dr Yuen Yuen Ang, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. She published in 2016 a great new book How China Escaped the Poverty Trap (Cornell University Press, 2016). This is a very original and non-conformist book on China. It is also an important contribution to political economy and to development economics. We started with the origin of her book and a brief definition of ‘poverty trap’. Her book explains what went right in China and how other developing countries could follow a similar approach to reform and institutional transition. We discussed why traditional contributions such as those by Acemoglu and Robinson cannot explain the success of China’s reform. On the one hand, the fail to understand Chinese reforms, including political ones under Deng, on the other hand, they are biased. They were developed looking at traditional western development paths that cannot and should not be treated as a universal recipe for any other country in the world. We discussed about property rights, transitional institutions and the performance evaluation system of local cadres. The author defines China as an ‘autocracy with democratic characteristics’ and, since Deng, the systematic evaluation of local political leaders worked well as a proxy of democratic control. We also discussed how China avoided the mistakes of the Russian transition. And we learnt how China traditionally is not monolithic in its economic policy because allows decentralization and experimentation. The book is very strong in its theoretical framework but is also based on an extensive fieldwork across three provinces that exemplify the diversity within the Chinese sub-continent and the act of balancing between uniformity and variety, center and periphery. We concluded talking about the challenges ahead for China and the next books being prepared by prof. Yuen Yuen Ang. A great book, and I hope a good podcast too. Andrea Bernardi is Senior Lecturer in Employment and Organization Studies at Oxford Brookes University in the UK. He holds a doctorate in Organization Theory from the University of Milan, Bicocca. He has held teaching and research positions in Italy, China and the UK. Among his research interests are the use of history in management studies, the co-operative sector, and Chinese co-operatives. His latest project is looking at health care in rural China. He is the co-convener of the EAEPE’s permanent track on Critical Management Studies. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

I spoke with Dr Yuen Yuen Ang, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. She published in 2016 a great new book How China Escaped the Poverty Trap (Cornell University Press, 2016). This is a very original and non-conformist book on China. It is also an important contribution to political economy and to development economics. We started with the origin of her book and a brief definition of ‘poverty trap’. Her book explains what went right in China and how other developing countries could follow a similar approach to reform and institutional transition. We discussed why traditional contributions such as those by Acemoglu and Robinson cannot explain the success of China’s reform. On the one hand, the fail to understand Chinese reforms, including political ones under Deng, on the other hand, they are biased. They were developed looking at traditional western development paths that cannot and should not be treated as a universal recipe for any other country in the world. We discussed about property rights, transitional institutions and the performance evaluation system of local cadres. The author defines China as an ‘autocracy with democratic characteristics’ and, since Deng, the systematic evaluation of local political leaders worked well as a proxy of democratic control. We also discussed how China avoided the mistakes of the Russian transition. And we learnt how China traditionally is not monolithic in its economic policy because allows decentralization and experimentation. The book is very strong in its theoretical framework but is also based on an extensive fieldwork across three provinces that exemplify the diversity within the Chinese sub-continent and the act of balancing between uniformity and variety, center and periphery. We concluded talking about the challenges ahead for China and the next books being prepared by prof. Yuen Yuen Ang. A great book, and I hope a good podcast too. Andrea Bernardi is Senior Lecturer in Employment and Organization Studies at Oxford Brookes University in the UK. He holds a doctorate in Organization Theory from the University of Milan, Bicocca. He has held teaching and research positions in Italy, China and the UK. Among his research interests are the use of history in management studies, the co-operative sector, and Chinese co-operatives. His latest project is looking at health care in rural China. He is the co-convener of the EAEPE’s permanent track on Critical Management Studies. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

I spoke with Dr Yuen Yuen Ang, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. She published in 2016 a great new book How China Escaped the Poverty Trap (Cornell University Press, 2016). This is a very original and non-conformist book on China. It is also an important contribution to political economy and to development economics. We started with the origin of her book and a brief definition of ‘poverty trap’. Her book explains what went right in China and how other developing countries could follow a similar approach to reform and institutional transition. We discussed why traditional contributions such as those by Acemoglu and Robinson cannot explain the success of China’s reform. On the one hand, the fail to understand Chinese reforms, including political ones under Deng, on the other hand, they are biased. They were developed looking at traditional western development paths that cannot and should not be treated as a universal recipe for any other country in the world. We discussed about property rights, transitional institutions and the performance evaluation system of local cadres. The author defines China as an ‘autocracy with democratic characteristics’ and, since Deng, the systematic evaluation of local political leaders worked well as a proxy of democratic control. We also discussed how China avoided the mistakes of the Russian transition. And we learnt how China traditionally is not monolithic in its economic policy because allows decentralization and experimentation. The book is very strong in its theoretical framework but is also based on an extensive fieldwork across three provinces that exemplify the diversity within the Chinese sub-continent and the act of balancing between uniformity and variety, center and periphery. We concluded talking about the challenges ahead for China and the next books being prepared by prof. Yuen Yuen Ang. A great book, and I hope a good podcast too. Andrea Bernardi is Senior Lecturer in Employment and Organization Studies at Oxford Brookes University in the UK. He holds a doctorate in Organization Theory from the University of Milan, Bicocca. He has held teaching and research positions in Italy, China and the UK. Among his research interests are the use of history in management studies, the co-operative sector, and Chinese co-operatives. His latest project is looking at health care in rural China. He is the co-convener of the EAEPE’s permanent track on Critical Management Studies. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

I spoke with Dr Yuen Yuen Ang, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. She published in 2016 a great new book How China Escaped the Poverty Trap (Cornell University Press, 2016). This is a very original and non-conformist book on China. It is also an important contribution to political economy and to development economics. We started with the origin of her book and a brief definition of ‘poverty trap’. Her book explains what went right in China and how other developing countries could follow a similar approach to reform and institutional transition. We discussed why traditional contributions such as those by Acemoglu and Robinson cannot explain the success of China’s reform. On the one hand, the fail to understand Chinese reforms, including political ones under Deng, on the other hand, they are biased. They were developed looking at traditional western development paths that cannot and should not be treated as a universal recipe for any other country in the world. We discussed about property rights, transitional institutions and the performance evaluation system of local cadres. The author defines China as an ‘autocracy with democratic characteristics’ and, since Deng, the systematic evaluation of local political leaders worked well as a proxy of democratic control. We also discussed how China avoided the mistakes of the Russian transition. And we learnt how China traditionally is not monolithic in its economic policy because allows decentralization and experimentation. The book is very strong in its theoretical framework but is also based on an extensive fieldwork across three provinces that exemplify the diversity within the Chinese sub-continent and the act of balancing between uniformity and variety, center and periphery. We concluded talking about the challenges ahead for China and the next books being prepared by prof. Yuen Yuen Ang. A great book, and I hope a good podcast too. Andrea Bernardi is Senior Lecturer in Employment and Organization Studies at Oxford Brookes University in the UK. He holds a doctorate in Organization Theory from the University of Milan, Bicocca. He has held teaching and research positions in Italy, China and the UK. Among his research interests are the use of history in management studies, the co-operative sector, and Chinese co-operatives. His latest project is looking at health care in rural China. He is the co-convener of the EAEPE’s permanent track on Critical Management Studies. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

I spoke with Dr Yuen Yuen Ang, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. She published in 2016 a great new book How China Escaped the Poverty Trap (Cornell University Press, 2016). This is a very original and non-conformist book on China. It is also... Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies

Yuen Yuen Ang on how to make your data more meaningful, the dangers of big data in cases of oppression, and whether political freedom is really a requirement for technological development.

Dr Yuen Yuen Ang, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan delivers the Adrian Leftwich Memorial Lecture. For decades, Western policymakers and observers assumed that as China’s economy prospers, it will eventually and inescapably democratize. Today, however, the West is alarmed that not only does China appear more authoritarian than before, the new leadership is perceived to harbor ambitions to compete with Western powers for world dominance. This turn of events has triggered fear around the world. Today, the so-called “China model” is seen as a fundamental threat to liberal-democratic values. How did the West get China wrong? Yuen Yuen Ang argues that many observers have misunderstood the political foundation underlying China’s rise. Her research reveals that since market opening, China has in fact pursued significant political reforms, just not in the manner that Western observers expected. Instead of introducing multiparty elections, the reformist leadership realized some of the key benefits of democratization through bureaucratic reforms, thereby creating a unique political hybrid: autocracy with democratic characteristics. In other words, it is not autocracy but rather the injection of democratic, adaptive qualities into a single-party regime that drives China’s economic dynamism. But, Ang cautions, bureaucratic reforms cannot substitute for political reforms forever. Going forward, China must release and channel the immense creative potential of civil society, which would necessitate greater freedom of expression, more public participation, and less state intervention.

Yuen Yuen Ang discusses her amazing book on the politics of China's escape from poverty.

Will China rule the world? Laurie Taylor talks to Yuen Yuen Ang, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan, and author of a study which explores China's unusual route out of poverty. They're joined by David Tyfield, Co-Director of the Centre for Mobilities Research at Lancaster University, and author of new book examining the prospects for an alternative global power regime. Producer: Jayne Egerton.

Why do some countries enjoy steady and sustained growth, others, periods of boom and bust, while others hardly experience growth at all? The answer to this question affects the rise and fall of nations and the life chances of billions of people—yet until recently economists have failed to answer it. This event brings together ground-breaking researchers providing new approaches to this important conundrum. Among them are Kunal Sen and Yuen Yuen Ang, whose recent work offer radical explanations for how some states have achieved transformative growth, as well as innovative ideas for how others might emulate them. Building on a combination of their findings plus landmark research from other distinguished economists, the event will kick-start a discussion on the politics of growth. In so doing, it seeks to provide actionable levers and policy recommendations for countries seeking to grow, transform, and escape the poverty trap.

How did China escape the poverty trap? And what can other emerging economies learn from China's success of 'directed improvisation'? Dr. Ang discusses findings from her fascinating new book: http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100715940

Before 1978, China was a poor country with a planned economy overseen by a Maoist bureaucracy. Today it has the world’s second largest economy, a robust and growing middle class, and is a key driver of global growth. What explains this rapid transformation? In her new book, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap, Yuen Yuen Ang traces the joint evolution of the economy and governance, describing how China employed a strategy of “directed improvisation” to harness weak institutions to build markets, which in turn stimulated the growth of strong institutions; they then preserved markets. Dr. Ang compares China’s reform experience to late medieval Europe, pre-Civil War America, and contemporary Nigeria.  Dr. Ang is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Michigan, where she studies developing countries, emerging markets, and China. On February 22, she joined National Committee President Stephen Orlins in New York City for a discussion of her book, its striking conclusions about China’s development path, implications for our understanding of Western history, and how others can escape the poverty trap.  Yuen Yuen Ang is assistant professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan. Her research features a unique blend of international development, complex systems, and Chinese political economy. Her first book, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap (2016), was published by the political economy series of Cornell University Press.