Podcasts about mao

Last time we spoke about the second phase of the One Hundred Regiment Offensive.  During the second phase of the Hundred Regiments offensive, CCP forces emphasized strongpoint and transportation warfare across the Taihang/Jizhong area. Units were organized with wings containing Japanese positions while a central force struck deeper, as in the Renhe Dasu fighting in early October 1940. Night raids seized strongholds, while engineers and sabotage teams disrupted roads, bridges, and mobility, and ambushes targeted Japanese foraging and supply routes. Across these theaters, the strategy was consistent: make Japanese control porous by destroying or capturing local nodes and forcing constant repairs, re-routing, escorts, and slowed reinforcement, so occupation logistics and strongpoint networks could not function reliably. This approach supported wider offensives by isolating strongpoints, draining enemy strength, and giving Communist base areas room to endure and expand.   #204 The One Hundred Regiment Offensive Phase Three Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After the two large-scale offensives carried out over wide areas of North China, the Japanese army did what it always did when control started to slip: it tried to turn mobile pressure back into something it could "manage" again. The Eighth Route Army's continued fighting had shown that Japanese-occupied space was not secure, and that base areas could still resist, strike, and persist even while under counterpressure. That was dangerous for occupation. If the enemy could keep operations going, Japanese lines of movement stayed uncertain and "stabilization" became a temporary illusion. To prevent the situation from worsening and to re-stabilize the occupied areas as quickly as possible, the Japanese mobilized heavy forces and launched retaliatory counter–"mopping-up" operations against anti-Japanese base areas in North China beginning October 6. The Japanese attempt wasn't only to punish; it was designed to take advantage of an asymmetry: the Eighth Route Army was striking and fighting continuously, and it did not have the luxury of resting, replenishing, and re-cohering as neatly as a garrison army might. Japanese commanders hoped that if they struck hard enough in enough places, the Communist main forces could be isolated, destroyed, or at least forced into a defensive posture that would break their operational tempo. At Liaodong and Yulin, Japanese reinforcements also created a second political-military stake. After the Yuliao Campaign ended, the Eighth Route Army headquarters issued instructions on October 1 to major regions, warning that enemy reinforcements in Liaodong and Yulin might use the opening to "sweep" the Taibei region. In the Communist operational mind, this wasn't just one threat; it was a pattern. A "sweep" could come as a wave that pushed inward, burned villages, destroyed supplies, and tried to force Communist forces out of their protected networks. Even if the offensive couldn't win a conventional decisive battle, it could aim to strip the base areas of people, food, and mobility—things that make guerrilla and strongpoint warfare possible. By October 19, 1940, the Eighth Route Army headquarters issued a counter–"mopping-up" operation plan, and civilian and military authorities in various regions launched counter-"mopping-up" operations accordingly. This is important background: in these campaigns, "mopping-up" was not only an army activity. The Japanese were attempting to break the base system itself—its logistics, its local administration, and the relationship between armed units and civilians who hid, moved, fed, and replaced them. So the counter-operations had to be just as systemic. The Communists needed to keep people alive, keep movement possible, and keep the enemy from consolidating inside a cleared space. In southeastern Shanxi's Taihang and Taiyue regions, the Japanese 1st Army aimed to strike the main force of the 129th Division and destroy anti-Japanese base areas by running a series of mopping operations from October 6 to December 5. The plan had a typical occupation logic: push through strongholds gradually, clear pockets methodically, and rely on local superiority—especially in manpower, logistics, and the ability to reinforce by road. And because the Communist main force had been operating without meaningful rest after the earlier offensives, the Japanese believed they could catch formations while they were still "in between battles." On October 6, in the Taihang region, more than 800 enemy troops from Wu'an in western Hebei began a "mopping-up" operation in the Yangyi area. By October 11, the Japanese posture escalated. Part of the Japanese Independent Mixed 4th Brigade departed from Liaoxian and Wuxiang, while part of the 36th Division departed from Lucheng and Xiangyuan; together they totaled over 3,000 troops. Coordinating from north and south, they carried out operations to "mop up" both banks of the Zhuozhang River between Yulin, Liaoxian, and Wuxiang, encircling and clearing the south side of the Yulin–Liaoxian highway. This emphasis on riverbanks and highway corridors reveals the Japanese method: move along terrain that controls movement, then compress enemy options until the defenders have to fight inside a narrowing space. The counter to that method required more than bravery. The Eighth Route Army's 385th and 386th Brigades, along with the 1st Column of the Decisive Battle, fought on inner lines—where they could move more rapidly between known local positions and threaten the enemy's flanks or supply behavior. Meanwhile the New 10th Brigade fought on outer lines, where it could intercept, delay, and force the enemy to spend time reacting instead of clearing. By the morning of October 15, the New 10th Brigade delivered a concrete example of that interception strategy. Two regiments ambushed an enemy motor-transport convoy at Gongjiagou on the Heliao Highway, destroying more than 40 vehicles and annihilating more than 100 Japanese soldiers escorting the convoy. The meaning of a convoy ambush is strategic even when the numbers are modest: vehicles represent speed, logistics, and reinforcement. If the enemy loses vehicles repeatedly, "mopping" becomes slower, and slower clearing creates openings for the defenders to reorganize, disperse, or shift main effort. After that, on October 17, the enemy forces that had been mopping up the convoy withdrew in different directions. Withdrawal in multiple directions is a sign that the Japanese clearing operation, meant to compress a space, had instead been forced into a reactive mode. It also hints at a recurring pattern in these years: Japanese units could clear what was already weak, but when defenders hit their movement corridors, the occupiers had to spend time and combat power simply to recover mobility. The next major sweep began October 20, 1940, and it was much larger. Nearly 10,000 troops—from the 36th Division and Independent Mixed Brigade No. 4—set off from multiple locations, including Wu'an, Liaoxian, Wuxiang, and Lucheng, to sweep the area east and west of the Qingzhang River, focusing on land between Matian and Zuohui. Crucially, that was not random ground. The Japanese sought to strike the CCP Central Committee Northern Bureau, the Eighth Route Army headquarters, and the 129th Division headquarters, along with party and government organs of the Jin-Ji-Yu Border Region, located together with Shexian and Piancheng. In other words, the Japanese targeted not just armed units but the political-administrative heart that makes base areas function. Once in the attack area, the Japanese carried out "mopping-up" operations paired with burning and killing for several days. That brutality wasn't only cruelty; it served a purpose. Burning villages, destroying crops, and killing civilians could deny the base area food and shelter while making local cooperation more difficult. Then, on October 26, the Japanese began to withdraw and carried out mopping-up in different areas on the way back. The base area was "severely damaged and destroyed," indicating that even when the Japanese didn't annihilate the main Communist force, they could still achieve degradation—hurting the system they needed to keep operating. But the Communists were not simply absorbing damage. On October 29, a force of over 500 men from the 36th Division, plus over 400 supply and laborers, was mopping up Huangyandong and advanced through Zuohui to Guanjia'nao east of Panlong, preparing to return to Wuxiang. This is where counter-mopping becomes operationally dangerous for the occupier. Supply and labor detachments move differently from combat formations, and they represent an enemy's assumption that the base area is being "cleared." The Eighth Route Army headquarters ordered, at 1:00 p.m., for the 129th Division to concentrate its main force to annihilate the enemy. That night, the 129th Division—uniting the main forces of the 385th and 386th Brigades, parts of the New 10th Brigade, and the First Column of the Death Squad—surrounded the enemy at Guanjia'nao with a plan to launch a general offensive at 4:00 a.m. The besieged enemy, besides quickly building fortifications, seized Fengkengding high ground southwest of Guanjia'nao under cover of darkness. The two high points helped defenders support one another and resist stubbornly. The battle lasted until dawn on October 31, when most of the enemy had been annihilated, leaving only more than 60 men to hold positions. Then reinforcements arrived—over 1,500 from Huangyandong—supported by more than 10 aircraft. The 129th Division withdrew, and the remaining enemy fled toward the flood, leaving behind more than 280 corpses. By then, most Japanese troops had withdrawn from the central base area. The background stake is clear: "mopping-up" could damage and burn, but if defenders could convert the Japanese attempt into a trap—especially when enemy units had become separated from their core and committed to clearing—they could turn a destructive operation into a costly one for the occupier. In early November, the Japanese continued. In Licheng south of Taihang, Japanese forces invaded Nanweiquan and Beiweiquan and then Xijing. Elsewhere, Japanese forces in Xiangyuan invaded Panlong via Xiying, attempting to attack Dongtian and the area around Zhuanbi, where the Eighth Route Army headquarters was located. In that moment, the 386th Brigade was ordered to rush to the north–south line of Damocun, east of Panlong, block the invading enemy, and cover the transfer of the Eighth Route Army headquarters. At 9:00 a.m. on November 3, 1940, fierce fighting broke out as the troops finished deploying near Damocun. The Japanese launched continuous attacks and captured some positions. The 386th Brigade held until 4:00 a.m. on November 4, then withdrew after the headquarters successfully moved. The Japanese attempt to launch a pincer attack failed, and they retreated to the Baijin Line on November 5. Even when Japanese action couldn't be fully blocked, the counter's aim was not only tactical survival but prevention of strategic encirclement—protecting the central institutions and preserving the ability to fight again. In the northern Taihang region, more than 2,500 enemy troops from Heshun arrived in Yushe on November 3 via Hanwang Town and Changcheng Town, reinforcing Japanese forces in the Yu, Liao, and Wu areas. Then they carried out repeated mopping operations south of the Yuliao Highway, including Jiangtang, Lingshang, Songjiazhuang, Guojiao, and Dayouyi. Harassment and attacks by military and civilians forced Japanese troops back into their strongholds by the 13th. A "40-day" counter-mopping operation in Taihang came to an end. The term "40-day" isn't only calendar time; it suggests that these were not one-off battles but sustained campaigns of movement, dispersal, and repeated harassment meant to drain the enemy's capacity. Starting November 17, the Japanese launched a multi-pronged attack on Qinyuan and the area north of Guodao Town. The attack involved part of the 37th Division from Qin County and Nanguan Town, part of the Independent Mixed Brigade from Pingyao, Jiexiu, and Huo County, and a battalion of the 41st Division from Hongdong—more than 7,000 troops deployed to attack Qinyuan and the north area. But the Taiyue Military Region response shows how the Communist counter-mopping wasn't always to meet force with force. To avoid the enemy's "sharp edge," the Taiyue Military Region formed two detachments—Qin East and Qin West—with leadership and main force moving to both sides of the Qin River outside the Japanese attack zone, targeting scattered Japanese troops instead of being fixed into a single killing field. By November 23, due to harassment by local armed forces, the Japanese reached the attack zone and then carried out dispersed mopping operations. Qinyuan County was the most severely damaged, with more than 5,000 people killed (about one-tenth of its population), nearly 10,000 livestock killed and over 7,000 stolen, and 30,000 to 40,000 houses destroyed. Those details are brutal, but they explain why background stakes mattered: "mopping-up" was meant to break the social base. If civilians died or fled, the guerrilla system became harder to sustain. The response from the Dayue Military Region seized the opportunity created by Japanese dispersal. On November 23, the 42nd Regiment of the Qinxi Detachment annihilated more than 100 Japanese soldiers in Guantan. On November 27, parts of the 42nd and 59th Regiments killed or wounded more than 160 in Huhanping and Mabei. The Qindong Detachment's 17th and 57th Regiments inflicted serious damage in a series of places—Guang'ao, Chenjiagou, Longfosi, Wuyuanzhen, Nanweicun, Nanli, and more. The 17th Regiment's battle at Longfosi annihilated more than 100 Japanese. Additional heavy losses were inflicted by the 212th Brigade in Jiaokou. By December 5, the Japanese were forced to withdraw from the Taiyue area in separate routes. Strategically, dispersal punished the occupier because scattered units are harder to protect and easier to ambush. Across the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region, anti-"mopping-up" operations unfolded gradually, beginning with the Pingxi area, the first target of the Japanese on the path toward the Japanese-held headquarters and rail lines. Pingxi mattered because it directly threatened the headquarters of the Japanese North China Area Army and Beiping—the puppet regime's center—and also threatened the Pinghan and Pingsui railways, North China's main transportation lines. So Pingxi became an operational priority: if the occupier couldn't keep the rail network secure, their ability to reinforce and supply their own strongpoints suffered. On October 13, 1940, more than 10,000 Japanese and puppet troops attacked Sanpo, the central area of the Pingxi base area, in 10 routes. This attack used a methodical, steady approach: advance gradually, rely on strongholds, and cover 5 to 10 kilometers each day. In response, the Pingxi Military Sub-district countered using timely maneuvers of its main forces and extensive guerrilla warfare. Over more than a week of fighting, the enemy was constantly harassed and attacked, wearing them down. Although Japanese troops penetrated deep, they failed to identify the main force's movements. By November 21, when the encirclement tightened further, the Pingxi main force jumped out from the Sanpo area and moved southwest. Encountering the enemy at Pengtou, it then moved to the Yegu and Datai line east of Bancheng. After the Japanese entered the Sanpo area, they conducted widespread burning and killing and looted grain. Starting from the 23rd, the Japanese retreated in different routes. By the end of October, the main force had withdrawn from Pingxi, but more than 2,000 troops remained in the Pingxi anti-Japanese base area to build strongholds and roads. Strongholds were added in places like Changping and Wanping—14 strongholds alone—and villages such as Dongzhaitang and Dujiazhuang came under their control. The base area began to shrink and shrink. That shrinkage is the other background stake: even when guerrilla forces avoid annihilation, the occupier may still carve away space through fortification. On October 19, 1940, the Eighth Route Army headquarters instructed that enemy attacks in Pingxi and Taihang might turn around and attack the Beiyue area. The Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region needed to prepare quickly to crush these "mopping-up" operations, coordinating Party, government, military, and civilians and conducting in-depth combat mobilization. The main force should assemble in appropriate positions and prepare to annihilate one or two enemy forces decisively. The headquarters also instructed the 129th and 120th Divisions to cooperate actively. By November 9, 1940, the Japanese struck again in a massive sweep. The 110th Division, along with other units and more than 14,000 puppet troops, launched a "mopping-up" operation in the jurisdiction of the 1st Military Sub-district. The Japanese and puppet troops moved in coordinated lines: along the line of Yi County, Dalonghua, Wang'an Town, Laiyuan, and Chajianling from north to south, while those in Baoding and Mancheng moved east to west. The intent was to squeeze Communist sub-district forces into a narrow area for a decisive battle. On November 10, the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region issued operational guidelines and deployments for countering "mopping-up" operations. By the 12th, in response to Japanese widespread burning and killing, it further instructed that without hindering mobility, the main force could disperse a portion of troops—no more than one-third—to strike resolutely at attempts to burn and kill. That instruction captures the balance commanders tried to strike: disperse too much and you lose power; disperse too little and you become trapped by the occupier's brutality. The Japanese then attempted to pressure multiple places. On November 9, more than 6,000 enemy troops from Laiyuan, Yixian, and Baoding attacked Guantou, Yinfang, Huangtuling, and Shenbei. On the 12th, their attack failed; they burned and killed people before retreating in different routes. At that time, the 1st Military Sub-district assembled the 1st and 25th Regiments to intercept them. One enemy force of more than 800 was intercepted on the 14th as it retreated from Wujiazhuang to Yuangang; some were killed or wounded. Even so, the enemy broke through under aircraft cover and retreated to Guantou. On the way, it was intercepted again by the 20th Regiment, suffering heavy casualties, and it fled back to Mancheng. Then on November 13, more than 2,700 Japanese and puppet troops attacked the 3rd Military Sub-district; on November 14, about 2,600 advanced from Dingxiang, Dongye, and Wutai toward Fuping and its southwest area in two routes. The Japanese attacked with east-west coordination, launching joint attacks on Taiyu north of Fuping. The Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region headquarters and the command organs of the 3rd and 5th military sub-districts, along with the 2nd, 3rd, and 6th regiments and other troops, transferred to the outer line before the enemy encirclement formed. On the 16th, the Japanese launched a joint attack again on Taiyu and Zhangjiayu, and the guerrillas who failed to transfer fought hard. Commander Wang Pu and Deputy Director of the Political Department Hao Yuming were killed, and troops suffered more than 100 casualties. On November 18, the enemy from Taiyu quickly occupied Hanping City. By the 21st, enemy forces from Daying via Shentangbao and Wuwangkou, and from Wutai via Taihuai, Shizui, Longquanguan, and Xiaguan, also gathered in Fuping City. After occupying Fuping, the Japanese launched repeated attacks "sweeping" areas under the jurisdiction of the 3rd Military Sub-district from both inward and outward strongholds, conducting brutal burning and killing and destruction. On the night of November 21, the 2nd Regiment dispatched more than 30 men to raid Dangcheng and attack Japanese barracks with grenades. The Japanese panicked and fired guns and cannons all night. On the 26th, four plainclothes officers infiltrated Baoding and attacked a theater where the Japanese army was holding a meeting, causing panic among the Japanese. The enemy that had invaded the base area withdrew in different routes on the 25th. By December 3, 1940, most Japanese troops had withdrawn from the Beiyue area, but more than 1,000 remained along lines including Fuping, Wangkuai, Dangcheng, and Quyang to continue building points and roads in an attempt to occupy the area long-term. To force the enemy back, eliminate occupied points, and completely crush Japanese and puppet "mopping-up," the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region organized the Fuping–Wangkuai Campaign starting December 9, with the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 6th regiments participating. At 21:00 on December 14, the 6th Regiment attacked enemy forces in Dongzhuang. The 1st Battalion captured three fortified positions on the north mountain of Dongzhuang and rushed into the village, only for Japanese counterattacks to recapture fortified positions and kill or wound more than 170 Japanese during the counterfight. The 4th Regiment attacked the enemy in Fuping; the 2nd Regiment and guerrilla forces entered Dangcheng and Lingshan. On the 21st, more than 130 enemy soldiers escorting more than 100 pack animals carrying military supplies reached Wangkuai and were completely annihilated when they reached Wanglinkou. By December 26, an ambush in the Xuancun area of the Pinghan Railway destroyed 14 Japanese trains and their vehicles as well as three heavy artillery pieces. On the 27th, more than 1,200 enemy troops advancing from Dongzhuang in Fuping were attacked in Luoyu and Tumen, suffering more than 140 casualties. The remaining Japanese withdrew from Fuping, Dongzhuang, and Wangkuai starting New Year's Day 1941. By January 4, the 55-day anti-"mopping-up" campaign had basically ended, with the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region killing and wounding more than 2,000 Japanese and puppet troops while suffering 1,382 casualties itself. These numbers and dates show why background and stakes matter: the counter-mopping effort wasn't short. It was sustained, operationally demanding, and required continued offensive action even while facing superior Japanese resources. The pressure didn't end there. From October 25 to early November, about 4,000 Japanese troops, including the 16th Independent Mixed Brigade, launched a mopping operation in the Miyu and Loufan areas of the 8th and 3rd military sub-districts in northwestern Shanxi, but they were attacked by local soldiers and civilians. In mid-December, Japanese forces transferred additional strength: parts of the 37th Division from southern Shanxi and the 41st Division from southeastern Shanxi, along with parts of the 3rd, 9th, and 16th Independent Mixed Brigades and the 26th Division from northwestern Shanxi—totaling more than 20,000 troops—to prepare for a full-scale mopping operation in northwestern Shanxi. After the second phase of the Hundred Regiments Offensive ended, the 120th Division anticipated retaliation and actively prepared for counter-mopping. On October 30, the division was ordered to establish the Jin-Northwest Military Region, and on November 7, the military region was established in Lijiawan, Xing County. The Jin-Northwest Military Region had direct military sub-districts and six military sub-districts: the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 8th, and Yanbei. Then the occupier escalated. Starting December 14, 1940, the Japanese launched a full-scale mopping operation against the Jin-Northwest region. More than 5,000 enemy troops invaded the Mi-Yu Town area of the 8th Military Sub-district, more than 4,000 invaded Lin-Xian, and more than 6,000 attacked Xing-Xian and the area south of Bao-De from strongholds such as Lan-Xian and Qi-Lan. By December 23, Japanese forces had occupied all county towns, most market towns, and Yellow River crossings in the Jin-Northwest region except for Bao-De and He-Qu counties, and began to implement a systematic policy commonly described as the "Three Alls" policy. The "Three Alls" emphasis is the clearest expression of stakes turning lethal. Japanese troops and traitors disguised themselves as the Eighth Route Army to lure and kill masses. They sent out core detachments to attack and repeatedly sweep the area, seeking to annihilate party, government, and military leadership organs—focusing on destroying the rear organs and facilities that made Communist endurance possible. According to incomplete statistics, more than 5,000 people were brutally killed during these sweeps. In Xingxian County alone, 150,000 catties of grain were looted and burned; in the 4th Military Sub-district, more than 5,000 head of livestock were looted and killed; and more than 19,000 houses and cave dwellings were burned down. In the early stage of this anti-mopping campaign, the Jin-Sui Military Region mainly used a portion of its forces to cooperate with local troops and guerrillas in widespread guerrilla warfare. They harassed and contained the attacking enemy, disrupted enemy transportation, and covered the transfer of the masses. The main force avoided the enemy's sharp edge and moved to the outer line to seek opportunities to attack the Japanese army. This describes the classic guerrilla operational pattern: avoid being fixed into a single decisive trap, but create enough friction that enemy operations degrade into a struggle they can't sustain. repeated attacks and ambushes during the mopping period across Miyu Town and other areas—units striking repeatedly, destroying roads, cutting off enemy transportation, and attacking enemy strongholds north of Dawu. To thwart the Japanese army's plans to build roads and fortifications—plans that would make future sweeps easier—the Jin-Sui Military Region instructed, on December 27, all sub-districts to mobilize forces to disrupt Japanese road construction and fortification. The 358th Brigade attacked enemy road construction from Lanxian to Dashetou and from Puming to Chijianling; the Independent 1st Brigade sabotaged the Dawu–Linxian highway; and the 4th Column of the Death Squad sabotaged the Dawu–Fangshan highway. Part of the Independent 1st Brigade's 2nd Regiment organized over 2,000 civilians to sabotage the Dawu–Sanjiao highway twice, forcing the enemy in Linxian to detour through Fangshan to contact Lishi. The Lishi guerrillas led civilians in two sabotage attacks on the Lishi–Jundu highway, destroying over 30 "li" of road. Other units attacked strongholds along key highways and destroyed or disrupted the "maintenance committees" that surrounded newly built enemy strongholds. There were also direct raids—storming into Linxian County and capturing representatives of enemy maintenance organizations. Meanwhile, the Workers' and Patriots' Brigade carried out continuous sabotage on the Taifen Highway. As the enemy plans ran into persistent disruption, Japanese and puppet forces began to retreat in different routes starting January 2, 1941, and by January 24 they returned to their original strongholds. The Jin-Sui winter counter-mopping operation lasted 40 days, annihilated more than 2,500 enemy troops, destroyed 125 kilometers of roads and 23 bridges, and recovered all towns occupied by the enemy during the campaign. Here the stakes show through most clearly: the campaign was not merely about killing enemy troops. It was about preventing the occupier from building a durable, road-connected grid that would allow future sweeps to be faster, larger, and more decisive. At the wider campaign level, the Eighth Route Army also recorded its total effects from August 20 to December 5, covering roughly three and a half months. During that period, the Eighth Route Army fought 1,824 battles of varying sizes, killing or wounding 20,645 Japanese soldiers (including senior officers), killing or wounding 5,155 puppet troops, and capturing 281 Japanese soldiers and 18,407 puppet troops. 47 Japanese soldiers surrendered voluntarily, and 1,845 puppet troops defected, totaling 46,380 people. The Communists captured 5,942 guns and 53 artillery pieces, and destroyed extensive transportation infrastructure: 474 kilometers of railway, 1,502 kilometers of highway, 213 bridges, 37 railway stations, 11 tunnels, more than 217,000 rails, more than 1,549,000 sleepers, more than 109,000 telephone poles, and more than 424,000 kilograms of telephone wire. Five coal mines and 11 warehouses were destroyed. The narrative further adds that when including casualties of Japanese and puppet forces across related engagements—such as Fuwang and the anti–mopping operations in northwest Shanxi—the total number of casualties reached more than 50,880. Japanese statistics were also cited for damage assessment, noting destruction of track and bridges across key railways (Zhengtai, Tongpu, Pinghan), telegraph pole damage, power line cuts, and effects on coal production—such as the Jingxing New Mine being unable to produce coal for at least six months. These details underline a broader background stake: infrastructure damage was meant to weaken the occupier's ability to keep its occupation apparatus working, even after the direct battles ended. The price of that multi-month struggle was high for the Eighth Route Army as well. Over the three and a half months leading up to the Hundred Regiments Offensive, the Eighth Route Army suffered 17,000 casualties, and more than 20,000 were poisoned. During the Hundred Regiments Offensive itself, post-war statistics state that the 129th Division suffered 7,362 casualties and 450 missing persons, and the entire division suffered 7,812 casualties. When you connect these lines—offensive sabotage, counter-offensives, Japanese mopping-ups, and anti-mopping resistance—you see why this second wave of fighting mattered. It wasn't only about whether the Japanese could respond to the offensive. It was about whether both sides could sustain their operational logic: the Japanese trying to stabilize occupation through "mopping," and the Communists trying to preserve base systems through dispersal, harassment, and counter-moves that convert the occupier's clearing effort into something too costly to maintain. The background of the Hundred Regiments offensive, who authorized it, who planned it, and why, remains unclear. The Japanese response was so severe that, in retrospect, it appeared to some as if the offensive had been a mistake. Some leaders, especially Mao, may have wanted to disavow it. Indirect hints in Mao's writings in subsequent months and years suggest he may have viewed it critically or harbored misgivings from the start. It was not the kind of strategy Mao preferred. More than twenty years later, during the Cultural Revolution, Red Guards charged that Mao had not even known of the plan in advance because of Peng Dehuai's alleged duplicity, at the time, Peng was being denounced. While this seems unlikely, it may contain some substance. In his own defense against these charges, Peng stated that after the 8RA headquarters—located not in Yan'an but in Jin-Cha-Ji—planned the operation, it sent mobilization orders downward to each regional command and also notified the Central Military Affairs Commission headed by Mao. In the original plan, the action would begin in early September. But, Peng wrote, to prevent enemy discovery and to ensure simultaneous surprise assaults—thereby inflicting an even greater blow to the enemy and the puppets—they began about ten days earlier than scheduled, during the last week of August. "So we did not wait for approval from the Military Affairs Commission (this was wrong), but went right into combat earlier than planned." There is also the issue of the "spontaneous" participation of more than eighty regiments without authorization from the Eighth Route Army headquarters, and not from Yan'an as well. If Peng Dehuai's account is accepted (written in 1970, shortly before his death), then Mao and Party Central had no role in conceiving or planning the Hundred Regiments campaign. In that case, the "grand strategy" motivations for undertaking it largely vanish—except perhaps insofar as they were considered by Peng and his colleagues. One alleged motive was to counter any tendency toward capitulation by Chiang Kai-shek and the Chongqing regime: if the war heated up and the CCP threw itself into fighting, any accommodation between Chiang and Japan would look like cowardly surrender. A related consideration was the Communist leadership's sensitivity to the charge that they were simply exploiting the war to expand their influence—avoiding Japanese combat while letting KMT armies bear the real burden of fighting. The Nationalists gave major publicity to the accusation that CCP policy devoted 70 percent of effort to expansion, 20 percent to coping with the KMT, and only 10 percent to opposing Japan. A third suggested motive was to divert attention from the New Fourth Army's offensives against Nationalist forces in Central China, which were peaking around the same time. Peng Dehuai acknowledged the campaign was "too protracted," yet he defended its importance in maintaining the CCP's anti-Japanese image in the wake of anti-friction conflicts, in demonstrating the failure of the cage-and-silkworm policy, in returning at least twenty-six county seats to base control, and in keeping "wavering" elements in line. Even if these reasons mattered less than regional and tactical calculations in launching the campaign, they could always be used for propaganda afterward. Whatever misgivings Mao and Party Central may have had, the Party kept them to itself. Mao radioed congratulations to Peng after his victory, and in public statements the Hundred Regiments were turned into legend. Even if the Hundred Regiments campaign aimed to defeat Japanese pacification efforts, it did not succeed in a decisive way. Shocked and stung by the 8RA's action, the North China Area Army intensified its efforts to bring North China under tighter control. Under General Tada and then his successor, General Okamura Yasuji (July 1941–November 1944), the Japanese inflicted brutal, sustained violence against all North China bases. Between 1941 and 1944, about 150,000 Japanese troops were assigned full-time to pacification duty, supported by roughly 100,000 Chinese auxiliaries of widely varying description and effectiveness. The remainder of the NCAA (about 150,000–200,000 men) was assigned to other tasks such as garrisoning major cities and containing Nationalist forces. Communist regulars were estimated at around 250,000 within base areas and 40,000 in SKN. The Japanese and their Chinese auxiliaries invested even more heavily than before in constructing moats, ditches, palisades, and blockhouses. Japanese sources claimed that by 1942 their forces had built 11,860 kilometers of blockade line and 7,700 fortified posts, mostly in the Hebei plains and the foothills of the Taihang mountains. A massive trench ran for 500 kilometers along the western side of the Pinghan railway line, with a depopulated and constantly patrolled zone on either side. The 250 Japanese outposts established in southern Hebei by December 1940 were more than quadrupled by mid-1942. These became the key means of controlling plains areas; by the end of 1941, all Communist bases in such terrain had been reduced to guerrilla status. Many main force units—such as those under Liu Cheng'ao and Yang Xiufeng—were compelled to move westward into mountains to survive. What distinguished the new Tada–Okamura approach from earlier tactics was the much larger and more protracted search-and-destroy thrust into the core mountain-base areas. They also replaced selective repression with indiscriminate, generalized violence. These infamous "Three-All" mop-up campaigns meant: kill all, burn all, loot all. Unable to distinguish ordinary peasants from Communists, the Japanese waged war on everyone. After attempting to seal off major consolidated regions in the base areas, they sent in very large detachments to search for Communist forces, civilian cadres, and activists. They also tried to destroy base facilities and war material stockpiles; to disrupt agriculture by burning crops or interfering with planting and harvesting; and to seize grain stores. Entire villages were razed, and everything alive found there was killed. Unlike earlier mop-ups that swept through an area and then departed, these campaigns left troops in the targeted zones for extended periods, "combing" the area back and forth and building at least temporary strongpoints in more accessible parts of mountain bases. These mop-up operations took a heavy and painful toll on rural populations. No doubt the harsh tactics and atrocities frequently committed during these actions did cause many peasants, rich and poor alike, to harbor deep hatred of the Japanese and to commit more fully to the Communist side. But intra-party sources also portray cases in which repression worked even more effectively than earlier attempts to drive a wedge between party and peasantry. As one internal assessment put it: If we only stress concealment… we are bound to be divorced from the masses. The morale of the masses cannot be sustained for long either. On the other hand, if we only seek fleeting gratification in careless fighting, we may also invite still more cruel enemy suppression. That will also alienate the masses. Communist spokesmen acknowledged that, in North China base areas, the population under Party control fell from 44 million to 25 million, while the Eighth Route Army declined from 400,000 to 300,000. Local records present an even grimmer picture. By 1942, 90 percent of the plains bases had been reduced to guerrilla zones or outright enemy control. In the mountainous Taiyue district within the Jin-Cha-Lu-Yi base, one cadre admitted that "not a single county was kept intact and the government offices of all its twelve counties were exiled in Jin-yuan." All twenty-six county seats occupied following the Hundred Regiments fighting were lost. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Japan tried to regain control through retaliatory "mopping-up" operations starting in October 1940. In response, the Eighth Route Army and its commanders issued counter-measures: coordinate party, government, military, and civilians; keep mobility while dispersing forces when possible; and focus on annihilating incoming enemy units decisively. Counter-sweeps and anti-pacification actions continued through December, involving repeated ambushes and sabotage of roads, highways, and fortification efforts. 

Debi Bryk has spent over eight years using functional genomics in clinical practice — and what she found changed everything about how she works with clients. In this conversation, Debi walks through the MaxGen Labs WORX panel, breaks down methylation in plain English, explains why MTHFR is only one piece of a much larger puzzle, and reveals why jumping straight to methylated B vitamins without knowing your COMT status can leave you feeling dramatically worse. She also unpacks how genetic variants in toxic response to plastics, pesticides, and seed oils can explain why some people develop chronic illness in environments that don't seem to affect others — and what you can actually do about it. Debi also explores the emerging role of lithium orotate in ADHD and Alzheimer's prevention, why low choline may be driving the mood and cognitive crisis more people experience every day, and shares her clinical framework for sequencing testing that dramatically accelerated healing and reduced costs for her clients by eliminating the guesswork entirely. Use code BEAUTIFULLYBROKEN for a discount on MaxGen Labs testing at MaxGen Labs.  Episode Highlights  [00:00] Understanding Genetic Variants and Their Impact [09:40] The Power of Genetic Testing [19:21] Methylation and Its Role in Health [29:04] Epigenetics: Environment and Gene Expression [32:17] Understanding B12 Levels and Genetic Implications [33:31] Genetic Risks: Alzheimer's and Toxins [36:33] Precision Medicine and Personal Health [38:21] Neurotransmitter Dynamics and Mental Health [38:52] The Role of MAO and COMT in Neurotransmitter Regulation [43:33] The Impact of Supplements on Mental Health [47:07] Nutritional Insights: Choline and Creatine [48:32] The Importance of Comprehensive Testing [50:09] Future of Peptide Research and Safety Concerns [54:17] Closing Thoughts on Health and Wellness   Upgrade Your Health MaxGen Labs: https://maxgenlabs.com/BEAUTIFULLYBROKEN   Code: BEAUTIFULLYBROKEN LightPathLED: https://lightpathled.pxf.io/c/3438432/2059835/25794 Code: beautifullybroken Silver Biotics Wound Healing Gel: https://bit.ly/3JnxyDD 30% off with Code: BEAUTIFULLYBROKEN StemRegen: https://www.stemregen.co/products/stemregen?_ef_transaction_id=&oid=1&affid=52 Code: beautifullybroken     . CONNECT WITH FREDDIEWork with Me: https://www.beautifullybroken.world/biological-blueprintWebsite and Store: (http://www.beautifullybroken.world) Instagram: (https://www.instagram.com/freddie.kimmelYouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@beautifullybrokenworld Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

Joining Audrey for this week's REELTalk - Bestselling author of American Betrayal, DIANA WEST will be here! PLUS, Terror Threat Analyst and former FBI Agent, JOHN GUANDOLO will be here! AND, bestselling author of Mao's America, XI VAN FLEET will be here! PLUS, Broadway critic LAUREN YARGER will be here! In the words of Benjamin Franklin, "If we do not hang together, we shall surely hang separately." Come hang with us...  

Agradece a este podcast tantas horas de entretenimiento y disfruta de episodios exclusivos como éste. ¡Apóyale en iVoox! Una de las figuras clave de la China milenaria que hemos empezado a tratar en El Abrazo del Oso es Confucio, un pensador cuya huella sigue presente a lo largo de los siglos, aunque no siempre acogida en sentido positivo. Podemos decir que Confucio ha tenido una vida póstuma agitada: de columna vertebral del Imperio paso a enemigo público en tiempos de Mao… y, hoy, se ha convertido en una pieza útil en el relato del “renacimiento” chino. En esta contraportada para mecenas, seguimos ese regreso para ver qué elementos se recuperan de su pensamiento, por qué lo hace justo ahora y qué gana el poder cuando invoca a un sabio de hace 2.500 años. Gracias por hacer posible El Abrazo del Oso con vuestro apoyo. Si tú también quieres escuchar este episodio y muchos más que nunca retiramos puedes hacerlo aquí en iVoox en el botón azul Apoyar en nuestro perfil: https://www.ivoox.com/podcast-abrazo-del-oso-podcast_sq_f13737_1.html www.elabrazodeloso.es www.latostadora.com/elabrazodeloso Canal de Telegram para estar informado: https://t.me/+T6RxUKg_xhk0NzE0 Grupo abierto de Telegram para conversar: https://t.me/+tBHrUSWNbZswNThk Twitch: https://www.twitch.tv/elabrazodeloso Escucha el episodio completo en la app de iVoox, o descubre todo el catálogo de iVoox Originals

JUST DROPPED: The most POWERFUL episode yet of the Take Your Power Back Show with Kim Yeater! Meet The Governor Candidates Wife “Born in China – Made in America” Stephanie Shields, future First Lady of California, shares her raw, firsthand story of growing up under Mao's communist regime… and how she broke free to embrace the freedom and kindness that ONLY America provides. In this explosive 57-minute interview: Brainwashed to hate America as a child Witnessed Tiananmen Square horrors on free U.S. TV Escaped the “mind virus ” of Marxism through ancient spiritual truth Fell in love with the strength and heart of the American people Her husband, gubernatorial candidate Scott Shields, connects the dots: The same atheist Marxist cancer –“the mind virus” that destroyed China is infiltrating California TODAY — and they have the plan to DE-MARXIFY our state and lead us back to freedom, prosperity, and greatness! This episode is a MUST-WATCH wake-up call for every Patriot! Watch & Share NOW: https://Rumble.com/takeyourpowerbackshow/live #TakeYourPowerBack #DeMarxifyCalifornia #ScottShieldsForGovernor #BornInChinaMadeInAmerica #AmericaFirst #FreedomOverMarxism We WILL take our California back — and America with it! Connect with Us: • Website: TakeYourPowerBackShow.com • Rumble: rumble.com/c/TakeYourPowerBackShow • Live Stream: rumble.com/TakeYourPowerBackShow/live • Social Media: o X: @realkimyeater o Facebook: kimberlyyeater o Instagram: Takeyourpowerback_kimyeater o TikTok: takeyourpowerbackshow • Email: TYPBProducer@gmail.com Related Movement: TakeOurCaliforniaBack.com TakeOurElectionsBack.com Take Our Border Back • Website: TakeOurBorderBack.com • Rumble: rumble.com/c/TakeOurBorderBack • Live Stream: rumble.com/TakeOurBorderBack/live • Social Media: o X: @Tobbconvoymain o X:Send us Fan MailSupport the show

Ho-fung Hung on the Political Economy of China. Shownotes Ho-fung Hung Prof. Ho-fung Hung at the Johns Hopkins University: https://soc.jhu.edu/directory/ho-fung-hung/ The Conference ‘China and Us: Perspectives on Peace, Human Rights and Socio-Ecological Transformation': https://www.attac.de/china-konferenz/startseite Ho-fung, H. (2015). The China Boom. Why China Will Not Rule the World. Columbia University Press.     https://cup.columbia.edu/book/the-china-boom/9780231540223/ on Citic Press:  https://www.group.citic/en/Diversified_Portfolio/New_Consumption/Citic_Publish/ on the 1989 protests in China:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_Tiananmen_Square_protests_and_massacre on the fiscal reform in China in 1994:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tax-Sharing_Reform_of_China_in_1994 on Carl Schmitt: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carl_Schmitt https://www.bpb.de/shop/zeitschriften/apuz/archiv/537943/ortung-und-ordnung-carl-schmitt-im-nationalsozialismus/ on Benito Mussolini:  https://www.dhm.de/lemo/biografie/benito-mussolini https://nationalgeographic.de/geschichte-und-kultur/2023/09/benito-mussolini-aufstieg-und-fall-eines-faschistischen-diktators/ the Constitution of the People's Republic of China:  https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/lawsregulations/201911/20/content_WS5ed8856ec6d0b3f0e9499913.html on Foucault's ‘Regime of Truth':  Lorenzini, D. (2015). What is a ‘Regime of Truth'?. Le foucaldien 1(1).  https://www.researchgate.net/publication/317961938_What_is_a_Regime_of_Truth the mentioned article by Ho-fung Hung in the Jacobin:  Ho-fung, H. (2023). Mussolini in Beijing. Jacobin.  https://jacobin.com/2023/02/mussolini-in-beijing on China's falling CO2 emissions:  https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-chinas-co2-emissions-have-now-been-flat-or-falling-for-21-months/ on renewable energy in China:  https://www.carbonbrief.org/china-briefing-5-february-2026-clean-energys-share-of-economy-record-renewables-thawing-relations-with-uk/ Ho-fung, H. (2026). The China Question. Eight Centuries of Fantasy and Fear. Cambridge University Press.  https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/china-question/C15B207366F98DC034ED279435A8CCCA on the case of Solyndra: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solyndra on the economic policy of Mao Zedong and China's relationship to the Soviet Union, Felix Wemheuer's youtube channel ‘Studying Maoist China' is recommended:  https://www.youtube.com/@felixwemheuerstudyingmaois1051 on Chile during the Cold War:  Lockhart, J. (2016). Reimagining Chile's Cold War Experience: From the Conflict's Origins to Salvador Allende's Inauguration. University of Arizona.  https://repository.arizona.edu/handle/10150/620841 on Salvador Allende:  www.britannica.com/biography/Salvador-Allende on the Paris Commune: Badiou, A. (2021). The Paris Commune: Marx, Mao, Tomorrow. Monthly Review 73(1).  https://monthlyreview.org/articles/the-paris-commune-marx-mao-tomorrow/ Weber, I. M. (2021). How China Escaped Shock Therapy. The Market Reform Debate. Routledge. https://www.routledge.com/How-China-Escaped-Shock-Therapy-The-Market-Reform-Debate/Weber/p/book/9781032008493 the mentioned publication on i.a. guerilla policymaking:  Heilmann, S. & Perry, E. J. (2011). Mao's Invisible Hand. The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China. Harvard University Press.  https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674060630 the quote ‘it's easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism' is commonly attributed to Frederic Jameson:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fredric_Jameson on Wolfgang Streeck:  https://www.mpifg.de/457994/Streeck on the 2026 Hungarian parliamentary election:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Hungarian_parliamentary_election Relevant Episodes of Future Histories  S04E02 | Merle Groneweg zu Staatskapitalismus, Ökologie und Klimapolitik in China https://www.futurehistories.today/episoden-blog/s04/e02-merle-groneweg-zu-staatskapitalismus-oekologie-und-klimapolitik-in-china/ S03E60 | Felix Wemheuer zu unserer Zukunft mit China https://www.futurehistories.today/episoden-blog/s03/e60-felix-wemheuer-zu-unserer-zukunft-mit-china/ S02E09 | Isabella M. Weber zu Chinas drittem Weg  https://www.futurehistories.today/episoden-blog/s02/e09-isabella-m-weber-zu-chinas-drittem-weg/ Future Histories Contact & Support If you like Future Histories, please consider supporting us on Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/join/FutureHistories Contact: office@futurehistories.today Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/futurehpodcast/ Mastodon: https://mstdn.social/@FutureHistories English webpage: https://futurehistories-international.com   Episode Keywords #Ho-fungHung, #JanGroos, #Interview, #JohnHopkinsUniversity, #FutureHistories, #China, #PoliticalEconomy, #Capitalism, #MarketSocialism, #Socialism, #Mao, #Governmentality, #Democracy, #Imagination, #Society, #Communism, #ClimateChange

Michael McFaul discusses his book Autocrats vs. Democrats: China, Russia, America and the New Global Disorder, reflecting on the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis as the most dangerous moment of the Cold War. He emphasizes that the primary lesson learned was the necessity of crisis management mechanisms and direct communication to prevent nuclear obliteration. McFaul argues that today's lack of connectivity with China is a major risk, as stabilization requires understanding an adversary's intentions. He compares the revolutionary "will" of Mao's China to Putin's modern revisionist imperialism, noting that high intentionality can be as destabilizing as raw capability. Effective diplomacy requires engaging adversaries without compromising democratic values. (1/8)1900 BRUSSELS

Curtis interviews Diana West to break down the critical history behind Trump's China visit. Why has America always acted so favorably toward Red China? The answer: China was taken over by Mao's Communists with the vital help of other Communists who had embedded themselves in the American State Department. The big question for today is this: Why does America, the land of liberty, continue to prop up China? They have been waging “Unrestricted Warfare” against us for over 25 years, harvesting the organs of those who challenge their regime, and implementing a total Communist surveillance state, with social credit scores, torture, and millions in slave labor camps as punishment. Diana and Curtis discuss this critical reality that Americans must understand.

In a world where the lines between freedom and oppression are increasingly blurred, a powerful voice is speaking out against the creeping influence of communism in America. This episode is a must-listen for anyone concerned about the future of our nation. Join the speaker as they delve into a conversation with a remarkable guest, a survivor of China's Cultural Revolution who shares her harrowing experiences and insights on the dangers of communism. From the devastating effects of Mao's policies to the ways in which communists are infiltrating American institutions, this conversation is a wake-up call for anyone who values freedom and democracy. The guest's story is a powerful reminder that the principles of communism are not just abstract ideas, but have real-life consequences that can be devastating for individuals and communities. She shares her personal experiences of living through the Cultural Revolution, where she was forced to work in the fields as a child and witnessed the brutal suppression of dissent. Her insights on the ways in which communists use division and propaganda to control people's minds are chilling. As the conversation unfolds, the speaker and their guest discuss the ways in which communists are infiltrating American institutions, from academia to the Democratic Party. They explore the importance of understanding the history of communism and its effects on individuals and societies, and the need for Americans to wake up to the threat of communism in their own country. If you're concerned about the future of America and the values that have made it great, this episode is a must-listen. Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/carljacksonradio X/Twitter: https://twitter.com/carljacksonshow Parler: https://parler.com/carljacksonshow Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/thecarljacksonshow http://www.TheCarlJacksonShow.com Visit our Store https://CarlJacksonStore.comSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

In a world where the lines between freedom and oppression are increasingly blurred, a powerful voice is speaking out against the creeping influence of communism in America. This episode is a must-listen for anyone concerned about the future of our nation. Join the speaker as they delve into a conversation with a remarkable guest, a survivor of China's Cultural Revolution who shares her harrowing experiences and insights on the dangers of communism. From the devastating effects of Mao's policies to the ways in which communists are infiltrating American institutions, this conversation is a wake-up call for anyone who values freedom and democracy. The guest's story is a powerful reminder that the principles of communism are not just abstract ideas, but have real-life consequences that can be devastating for individuals and communities. She shares her personal experiences of living through the Cultural Revolution, where she was forced to work in the fields as a child and witnessed the brutal suppression of dissent. Her insights on the ways in which communists use division and propaganda to control people's minds are chilling. As the conversation unfolds, the speaker and their guest discuss the ways in which communists are infiltrating American institutions, from academia to the Democratic Party. They explore the importance of understanding the history of communism and its effects on individuals and societies, and the need for Americans to wake up to the threat of communism in their own country. If you're concerned about the future of America and the values that have made it great, this episode is a must-listen. Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/carljacksonradio X/Twitter: https://twitter.com/carljacksonshow Parler: https://parler.com/carljacksonshow Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/thecarljacksonshow http://www.TheCarlJacksonShow.com Visit our Store https://CarlJacksonStore.comSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

They'll tell you the Terror was born from ideology, from fanaticism, from Robespierre's madness. That's too small. Much too small.The real engine wasn't fervor. It was a machine — a legal apparatus the Committee of Public Safety built piece by piece. The Law of Suspects in September 1793 made suspicion itself sufficient evidence. The Law of 22 Prairial in June 1794 stripped revolutionary tribunals of defense counsel, witnesses, and meaningful cross-examination. In 47 days, that machine consumed 1,376 lives in Paris alone. And in the end, it consumed the men who built it.This isn't conspiracy. It isn't ideology. It's architecture.In this video:→ Why Louis XVI's execution detonated rather than stabilized the revolution→ The Girondins, the Hébertistes, and the Dantonists — three factions consumed in eight months→ 9 Thermidor: how Robespierre's own machine ended Robespierre→ The same architecture under Stalin, Mao, and the Khmer Rouge — same playbook, different centuryCHAPTERS:00:00 The Machine, Not the Madness01:08 January 1793: Paris on the Edge02:08 Robespierre and the Definition of Virtue03:04 The Law of Suspects05:01 Three Factions Fall: Girondins, Hébertistes, Dantonists08:38 The Law of 22 Prairial10:36 Positional, Not Behavioral13:07 9 Thermidor: Robespierre Falls14:59 The Same Architecture: Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot18:01 The Architecture, Not the IdeologySubscribe to Hidden Forces in History for civilizational autopsies of the empires, institutions, and patterns shaping the world we live in now.

Last time we spoke about the New Fourth Army Incident. Across the Second Sino-Japanese War, the CCP entered after the setbacks of the 1930s, seeking to become a national leader in resistance while remaining cautious toward the Nationalist government. The 1936 Xi'an Incident reshaped politics, and by August 1937 KMT–CCP agreements defined a working arrangement: the CCP acknowledged KMT leadership and integrated its forces, while still pursuing political space and autonomy. As the war progressed, the CCP focused on defining its relationship with the KMT and keeping operational independence during cooperation. Mao Zedong managed this alliance by promoting a united front against Japan, yet protecting CCP revolutionary goals and internal control. The establishment of the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army marked this military reorganization. Throughout, the CCP feared that KMT collaboration with Japan could enable a peace settlement that would undermine communist legitimacy and restrict the party's future authority thereafter.   #202 The One Hundred Regiment Offensive Phase One Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Simultaneously with the friction between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Japanese were also working to take control of—and extract value from—most of the territory they had nominally conquered. Treating these two processes separately—"friction" on the one hand and "consolidation" on the other—does violence to the real difficulty of the CCP's dilemma: the Party often had to confront both problems at the same time. At certain moments, the CCP was effectively forced to wage a two-front struggle. Even so, if the worst of the KMT–CCP friction had already eased by 1941, the most serious and painful challenges posed by Japanese consolidation were still ahead. To recover anything close to reality, the two timelines have to be read together and placed on top of one another. The Japanese understood that consolidation could not be postponed, because much of the land behind the furthest reaches of their army was still only weakly under their actual control. In some places, order could be restored by relatively direct methods: rebuilding local administration and policy authority; repairing transportation and communications; enrolling Chinese personnel—usually, as it turned out, people of dubious reliability—as police or militia under puppet regimes; registering the local population; and requiring identity cards. In true old-style Chinese fashion, collective security practices were used widely. One form was the familiar bao-jia system, in one variant or another. Another was the so-called "railway-cherishing village": a village would be assigned a nearby stretch of track, and if residents failed to "cherish" it, they were held collectively responsible. Yet early Japanese weakness in northern China is vividly illustrated by an incident in the summer of 1938. Three young foreigners—vacationing from teaching in Peiping (Beijing)—were curious about events and about what people were doing. They loaded their bicycles on a southbound train, got off at Baoding, and rode west until they ran into Eighth Route Army detachments. In the early period of the war, commanders generally wanted to rely on more mobile forms of warfare. Mao, however, insisted on a strategy of de-escalation and dispersion: breaking the 8RA and New Fourth Army into small units as nuclei for combat, recruitment, political work, and base-area construction. Under this approach, few engagements could be truly dramatic in scale, and most were constrained by the need to survive. Each skirmish had to be carefully planned. The CCP would use local intelligence and the element of surprise so that a detachment could strike and withdraw before its limited ammunition ran out or before enemy reinforcements arrived. Small Japanese patrols and puppet units could be ambushed not only to seize weapons and other material, but also to inflict casualties. Active collaborators, or Japanese-sponsored administrative personnel, could be assassinated. Above all, Communist action aimed to disrupt transportation: mining roads; cutting down telegraph poles, stealing wire, and cutting rail lines; sabotaging rolling stock; and, at times, carrying off steel rails so that primitive arsenals could be supplied. Attempting derailments was also part of the effort. Destroying a bridge or a locomotive counted as a major achievement. Both the Communists and the Japanese understood that these tactics did not decisively shift the overall strategic balance. Still, they worked at other levels. For the Japanese, the result was a constant series of small wounds—painful, bleeding, and potentially infectious. Few areas in the countryside felt truly safe. Japanese field commanders documented growing frustration as they tried to eliminate resistance, restore administration, collect taxes, and prepare for more systematic and effective economic exploitation of conquered territory. Guerrilla warfare against the Japanese cannot be judged only in conventional battle terms—numbers of engagements, casualties, or territory occupied. It had to be evaluated politically and psychologically as well, exactly as Mao repeatedly emphasized. Since the CCP's wartime legitimacy depended on its patriotic claims, enough fighting had to be carried out to maintain credibility. Moreover, military success mattered for mobilizing the "basic masses," persuading wavering people to keep an open mind, and neutralizing opposition. As the logic put it, it was not that people always chose the side that was winning, but that few would ever join a side they believed was losing. One experienced cadre described the effect this way: Among the guerrilla units… there is a saying that "victory decides everything." No matter how hard it has been to recruit troops, supply the army, raise the masses' anti-Japanese fervor or win over the masses' sympathy, after a victory in battle the masses fall all over themselves to send us flour, steamed bread, meat, and vegetables. The masses' pessimistic and defeatist psychology is broken down, and many new guerrilla soldiers swarm in. But once the Japanese began to demand a heavy price for every engagement—whether the Communists won or not—this attitude began to change. In North and Central China, the Japanese earliest pacification sweeps created comparatively little trouble for the CCP. At first, the Japanese made few distinctions among Chinese forces. They simply tried to mop up or disperse them without regard to character. Over time, however, they realized that these sweeps actually made it easier for the CCP to expand. By the second half of 1939, Japanese methods became more discriminating. Chinese non-Communist forces would step aside while the Japanese hunted specifically for the 8RA, the N4A, and their local affiliates. The Japanese also made more direct appeals to non-Communist forces. According to Japanese army statistics, during the eighteen months from mid-1939 to late 1940, around 70,000 men from more or less regular Nationalist units in North China alone went over to the Japanese. The Japanese also reached informal "understandings" with several regional commanders whose forces together might have totaled as many as 300,000 men. This, of course, corresponded to what the CCP denounced as "crooked-line patriotism"—the "crooked-line" collaboration that preserved certain units so they could be used in future anti-Communist operations. When pacification efforts were intensified from late 1939 and throughout 1940, differences also appeared in the strategies Japanese armies used in North versus Central China. In North China, the approach relied heavily on military means, with political tactics limited largely to recruiting collaborators. In Central China, Japanese authorities did not hesitate to use military force, but they also attempted to supplement it with more comprehensive political and economic solutions by setting up tightly controlled "model peace zones." Although both approaches ultimately failed, they created enormous difficulties for Chinese Communists—until, in 1943, the Japanese were forced to ease off because the Pacific War against the United States became too burdensome. Careful reading of detailed intra-party documents suggests that repression also demobilized peasant support and terrorized populations into apathy, grudging acquiescence, or even active collaboration with the Japanese. In a locality already reduced from consolidated base status to guerrilla status, capacity and will were often too weak to administer complex reforms in systematic fashion. In other words, passive survival—defensive survival—was at least as important as what lay behind the heroic public images the Party projected. Systematic pacification in North China in late 1939 and 1940 radiated outward. It moved from areas held more or less firmly by the Japanese and their puppets into guerrilla and contested zones. The ultimate objective was to crush resistance or render it ineffective. The method was first to sweep the area clear of anti-Japanese elements, and then to establish a chain of interconnected strongpoints that could quickly reinforce one another. After that, puppet government would be expanded so it could take increasing responsibility for civil administration and "pacification maintenance," while Japanese forces repeated the initial steps further outward into contested territory. Violence was used selectively against individuals, groups, or villages accused of acts of resistance. This selective violence aimed to deter active participation in CCP-led programs, deprive Communist forces of a population willing to shelter them, and persuade informers to come forward. That was, at least, the theory of the strategy. In practice, the basic framework of the strategy depended on the main transport lines. Railways and roads—if properly fortified and protected—could separate resistance forces from one another and deny them one of their most effective weapons: mobility. These "cage" tactics (chiyu-lung, "jiu-lung") made it possible to enlarge pacified areas by "nibbling" outward, "as a silkworm feeds on mulberry leaves" (ts'an-shih). At the same time, the approach aimed to exploit North China's economy more effectively. To this end, the Japanese worked to improve and extend both railway and road networks. When the war began, in Shanxi the Cheng-Tai (Shijiazhuang–Taiyuan) and Tong-Pu (Datong–Tongguan) lines were metre-gauge, incompatible with the standard-gauge lines elsewhere in China—part of Yan Xishan's design to prevent deeper penetration into his province. By the end of 1939, the Japanese used forced labor to convert both lines to standard gauge. One benefit was the easier transportation of high-quality anthracite coal from the Qingxing mines (on the Cheng-Tai line) to industrial users in North China and Manchukuo. Of the newly constructed roads and railway lines, the most important was the Te-Shih line—from Dezhou in northeastern Shandong to Shijiazhuang. Construction began in June 1940 and finished in November, connecting the Tianjin–Pukou, Beiping–Hankou, and Cheng-Tai lines. This made it easier to move troops and transport raw cotton. Once the Te–Shih link was completed, the Japanese had direct connections between the point of their furthest advance at the elbow of the Yellow River and all major cities of North China, and beyond to Manchukuo. Communist sources began to speak of a "transportation war," noting with concern the moats and ditches, the blockhouses, and the frequent patrols protecting the lines. Both militarily and economically, these measures weighed heavily on forces led by the Communists in North China and on the populations under their control—especially the plains of central and eastern Hebei. One indicator of effectiveness was the rapid decline in "acts of sabotage" against North China railways in 1939 and the first half of 1940. A cadre in Jin-Cha-Ji reported in mid-1940: "The enemy has adopted a blockhouse policy, like that of the Jiangxi Soviet. They are spread like a constellation. In central Hebei alone, there are about 500, separated by one to three miles." Normal trading patterns were disrupted as Japanese or puppet occupiers took over administrative and commercial centers, and peasants found themselves caught between regulations imposed by the Communists on one side and those enforced by the other side. Finally, landlords, moneylenders, loafers, bandits—everyone who felt damaged by the new order inside base areas—could use pacification programs to try to recover influence or simply take revenge. Some became informers. After 8RA and local units were driven away, they could kill remaining cadres or activists and settle scores with the peasants who had supported them. Until the "first anti-Communist upsurge" was defeated, local elites and other disaffected elements might also seek support from Nationalists. It was even possible for an armed band to operate for several months inside consolidated regions of the CCP base, killing cadres as it went. Peng Dehuai later recalled this period in a way that underscored how pressure translated into wavering and collapse. Under the enemy's brutal pressure, in some districts the masses even hesitated or capitulated. From March to July 1940, large areas of the North China base were reduced to guerrilla regions. Before the "Cage-bursting battle",, they controlled only two county seats: Pingxun in the Taihang mountains and Pien-kuan in northwest Shanxi. Masses who previously had one set of obligations now had two—one toward the anti-Japanese regime and one toward the puppet regime. The situation in North China had not yet become a full crisis, but it was certainly serious. Action was needed to regain initiative. On 22 July 1940, Zhu De, Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Route Army, Peng Dehuai Deputy Commander-in-Chief, and Zuo Quan Deputy Chief of Staff jointly issued the Preliminary Battle Order, laying out the strategic goals for the coming operation. The order stated: "To respond to the enemy's 'prison cage policy,' obstruct its advance toward Xi'an, create favorable conditions in the North China theater, and strike at the national resistance initiative, we have decided to take advantage of the concealment provided by tall summer millet and the rainy season to carry out a large-scale sabotage operation on the Shijiazhuang–Taiyuan railway (Zheng–Tai Line)." It required the participation of at least 22 regiments from the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region, the 129th Division, and the 120th Division. The main objective was to "completely destroy key points along the Zheng–Tai Line" and to "cut the railway for a prolonged period." On 8 August, the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army issued the Operational Battle Order, further clarifying how forces would be deployed. The Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region was assigned to attack the eastern section of the Zheng–Tai Railway (from Niangzi Pass to Shijiazhuang). The 129th Division was assigned the western section (from Niangzi Pass to Yuci). The 120th Division was tasked with targeting the northern segment of the Tongpu Railway and the Fen–Li Highway. The order also required all troops to begin combat operations on 20 August, and emphasized that "the success of the campaign should be assessed primarily by the extent of damage inflicted on the Zheng–Tai Line." The operation was prepared under strict secrecy. Various elements of the Eighth Route Army conducted thorough preparations before the campaign. Reconnaissance teams, hidden and protected with the help of local villagers, penetrated deep into areas near the Shijiazhuang–Taiyuan railway to carefully map Japanese strongholds, enemy troop dispositions, and local terrain. At the same time, both military and civilian communities mobilized to stockpile grain, ammunition, and tools needed for railway sabotage; blacksmiths were organized to manufacture crowbars, pickaxes, and other essential equipment. Specialized military training covered demolition methods and techniques for dismantling railways, including tactics such as heating and bending steel rails. Civilian mobilization played a crucial role: militia and support teams took on tasks such as transport, medical aid, and coordination with military units. In Central Shanxi alone, more than 10,000 militia members were mobilized. The Eighth Route Army headquarters repeatedly stressed the need for operational confidentiality, stating: "Before the battle begins, the plan must remain strictly classified; until preparations are completed, the campaign objective may be disclosed only to brigade-level commanders." With the cover of dense summer millet, troops secretly assembled within their designated operational areas. Before the battle, the Japanese North China Area Army estimated the strength of the communist regular forces at about 88,000 men in December 1939. Two years later, they revised the estimate to 140,000. On the eve of the battle, communist forces had grown to between 200,000 and 400,000 men, organized in 105 regiments. By 1940, the growth had become so significant that Zhu De ordered a coordinated offensive by most of the communist regular units—46 regiments from the 115th Division, 47 from the 129th, and 22 from the 120th—against Japanese-held cities and the railway lines that connected them. According to the Communist Party's official statement, the battle began on 20 August.  On August 20, 1940, the rain didn't stop the campaign—it changed the battlefield. It slowed movement, blurred distance, and turned rivers and muddy roads into obstacles that could just as easily trap your own men as your enemy's. Along the districts bordering the Zhengtai Railway, the Eighth Route Army still moved, slipping through valleys and river crossings, bypassing Japanese posts, and positioning forces on both sides of the line as night settled in. By dark, the plan became a coordinated strike meant to hit the enemy before they could properly react. Across the entire Zhengtai Railway, attacks went out with timing designed to disorient Japanese defenders—so that their "first realization" arrived only after the railway itself was already being attacked and the window to respond effectively had slipped away.   A key portion of that strike fell to the right column of the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region, centered on the 5th and 19th Regiments, with the mission of sabotaging the Niangziguan to Luanliu section. At 20:00 on August 20, part of the 5th Regiment infiltrated Niangziguan Village for the first time, overwhelmed the puppet troops stationed there, and seized the village by dawn. After that opening cut, the main force moved in to cover the engineers, destroy enemy fortifications, and blow up the Guandong Railway Bridge. When the sabotage was done, they withdrew from Niangziguan on their own initiative, leaving the enemy to deal with the destruction rather than being pulled into a long, grinding engagement.   That same night, at Mohe Beach along the Zhengtai line, another action unfolded. The 1st Company of the 1st Battalion of the 5th Regiment attacked the station and was immediately met with a counterattack by Japanese forces. By dawn on August 21, the company withdrew—an adjustment, not defeat—and then attacked again the same night after crossing the Mian River. This time the enemy retreated into barracks to resist more stubbornly, with nearly 1,000 Japanese troops holding Mohe Beach. Heavy rain had swollen the river and made foot crossing nearly impossible, but the attackers seized the village west of the station and held it. On August 22 afternoon, more than 400 Japanese troops counterattacked; the main force of the 5th Regiment hit from the north bank of the Mian River in a fire assault, killing more than 50 before withdrawing the 1st Company out of the fighting. The 19th Regiment, meanwhile, took Jucheng and Irrang stations, tightening the pressure on the railway corridor.   On August 23, 1940, the 5th Regiment recaptured Niangziguan and blew up the stone bridge east of the village, destroying the railway segment between Chengjialongdi and Mohetan. That night the 19th Regiment stormed Yirang Station and blew up the water tower and the railway, ensuring the disruption would not be temporary. From August 24 to 27, bridges near Yanhui—stone and wooden—were destroyed again and again. Under that continuous pressure, beginning on August 25, Japanese transportation along the Niangziguan to Luanliu section of the Zhengtai Road was cut off completely. Strongholds were left to fight more or less alone, unable to coordinate or move supplies the way they normally would.   While the right column worked the railway, other forces hit the system from different angles. The Central Column of the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region—comprised of the 2nd, 3rd, and 16th Regiments—took responsibility for sabotaging the Zhengtai Road segment from Niangziguan to Weishui and for striking the Jingxing Coal Mine area. On the night of August 20, the 3rd Regiment launched coordinated attacks on the Gangtou old mine and the Dongwangshe new mine of Jingxing, and with miners assisting, the 1st Battalion quickly stormed the new mine and annihilated part of the enemy garrison. The rest withdrew into bunkers, resisting as best they could. By the afternoon of the next day, the entire enemy force had been wiped out. Afterward, major buildings in the mining area were destroyed and most materials were removed so that the mine could not resume production for more than six months. The 3rd Regiment also captured Jiazhuang, reinforcing the idea that sabotage here meant disabling not just lines of movement, but also the flow of resources.   Elsewhere, Japanese positions were disrupted in smaller, targeted strikes that still added up. After the Japanese stronghold at Nanzheng destroyed the railway between Nanzheng and Weishui, the 2nd Regiment took the eastern end fortress of the Faluling Railway Bridge, covered the engineers as they blew up a section of the bridge, and briefly occupied Caizhuang. The 2nd Battalion of the 16th Regiment attacked Beiyu on the night of August 20, annihilating most defenders, and on August 21 it covered the engineers to destroy the Beiyu Stone Bridge. Other units struck Didu and annihilated most defenders in Nanyu. By August 24, the Central Column had learned that more than 1,000 Japanese troops were stationed in Jingxing County, with additional reinforcements moving toward Nanyu and Didu. Their response was practical: detachments were assigned to watch and harass along the railway while the main force gathered in mobile positions—waiting for the next opening rather than charging blindly into concentrated strength.   Meanwhile, the left column of the Jin-Cha-Ji effort—from the 2nd Regiment of the Jizhong Garrison Brigade, the Military Region Special Service Regiment, and the Pingjinghuo Detachment—focused on sabotage from Weishui to Shijiazhuang. On the night of August 20, the Pingjinghuo Detachment attacked Yanfeng and blew up the railway. The Special Service Regiment moved with massed efforts as they destroyed power lines and highways from Yanfeng to Weizhou. On the night of August 22, the Special Service Regiment attacked Shang'an Station. On August 23, the 2nd Regiment stormed Touquan Station, captured two fortresses, then withdrew from the railway line; from August 25 to 27, they destroyed the highway connecting Pingshan, Huolu, Weishui, and Yanfeng.   While the main blow was falling along the Zhengtai Railway, the 129th Division was assigned raids on the western section. That area included the Japanese Independent Mixed Brigade No. 4 headquarters, a coal mine base at Yangquan, and support from Independent Mixed Brigade No. 9 from Yuci. These raids weren't only about destruction—they were meant to disorient, to create confusion over where the main pressure truly was. After the general offensive began at 20:00 on August 20, five companies of the 16th Regiment attacked Lujiazhuang Station and captured bunkers. Two guerrilla-operating companies in Yuci worked with engineers to destroy bridges between Lujiazhuang and Duanting. The 38th Regiment surprised Shanghu and Heshangzu stations, while the 25th Regiment captured Mashou Station and pushed Japanese troops toward Shouyang. The division's right-wing sabotage unit—28th and 30th Regiments of the newly formed 10th Brigade—took on sabotage on the Yangquan–Shouyang section, splitting routes on the night of August 20 to attack stations like Langyu, Zhangjing, Qinquan, and then striking additional positions with the 30th Regiment. Across that window, stations and strongholds such as Sangzhang, Yanzigou, Langyu, and Qinquan were taken, iron bridges were destroyed, and additional stations including Potou, Xinzhuang, Saiyu, Tielugou, Xiaozhuang, and Zhangzhuang were seized or disrupted.   As the western sabotage deepened, Japanese response hardened—but the ability to coordinate weakened. With the Zhengtai line sabotaged, the western section came under the 129th Division's control except for a few places such as Shouyang. Fierce assaults forced Japanese forces to lose contact with each other within days. Strongholds were attacked, besieged, and then annihilated as communication and coordination broke down. The 129th Division mobilized local people to destroy railway facilities, stations, and installations using demolition, burning, and flooding, moving materials so the railway and related infrastructure were effectively erased rather than merely damaged.   To cover these operations, the division occupied Shinaoshan with the 14th Regiment of the general reserve. Starting the morning of August 21, Japanese forces concentrated in Yangquan and attacked Shinaoshan daily. Enemy strength reportedly rose from more than 200 to more than 600, supported by bombing and strafing and the release of poison. The 14th Regiment held out until August 25, repelling repeated attacks, and by August 26 additional pressure came again as reinforcements increased. After six days and nights—and the annihilation of more than 400 enemy soldiers—the 14th Regiment withdrew from the main peak of Shinaoshan, continuing to contain the Japanese with smaller detachments while the main force shifted to another mission.   The first phase of sabotage had succeeded, but the campaign did not allow complacency. The Japanese strengthened their presence along the railway and launched frequent counterattacks, and Japanese divisions in southern Shanxi—including the 36th, 37th, and 41st—prepared to reinforce from the north. On August 26, the Eighth Route Army Headquarters issued instructions for a second phase: continue breaking through the road, concentrate superior forces, and annihilate Japanese units smaller than a battalion that were attacking or reinforcing. In line with that guidance, the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region ordered the Jin-You Column to keep breaking through the road on August 27 for one or two days, while the 129th Division alternated daily in breaking through. Under sustained pressure, the western section of the Zhengtai Road was basically destroyed; transportation was effectively cut off except for a few towns such as Shouyang and Yangquan.   On September 2, orders were issued to conclude the Zhengtai Campaign starting from the 3rd and shift forces according to the second-step plan. As the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region launched the Mengbei Campaign, the 129th Division shifted toward attacking invading Japanese forces, while other tasks—such as attacking the He-Liao Highway and recovering cities of He and Liao—were left for later. Beginning September 2, the Military Region deployed the 2nd, 5th, 16th, and 19th Regiments toward areas north of Meng County and Shouyang to recapture enemy strongholds. With the railway sabotaged, the Japanese main force north of Meng County shifted south to reinforce, weakening garrisons and spreading panic among the strongholds. As fierce offensives intensified, garrison troops began to waver. By the afternoon of September 5, Japanese troops at Xiashe, supported by troops from Shangshe, retreated to Shangshe and fled toward Meng County overnight. That night, the 19th Regiment arrived near Shangshe and, together with the Special Service Battalion of the 2nd Military Sub-district, pursued. The 1st Battalion of the 19th Regiment advanced into Shenquan and Putian to cut off the retreat route. By 9:00 AM on September 6 the enemy was surrounded in Xingdao Village, and after five hours of intense fighting most forces were annihilated. Survivors fled east to Luolizhang Mountain, only to be surrounded again by the 19th, 5th, and 16th Regiments. By the night of September 9, most Japanese forces had been wiped out, though more than 40 men broke through in dense fog and escaped into Meng County.   The siege continued through bitter episodes involving attacks and withdrawals under poison, with both sides paying heavily for every moment of progress. Eventually, on September 11, Japanese troops in Xiyan escaped back to Meng County, helped by more than 200 Japanese already present there. Meanwhile, the Japanese attempted to counter the pressure: on September 4 they sent more than 2,000 troops to reinforce Meng County and began a counterattack. On September 10, the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region ordered the 19th and 5th Regiments to remain east and north of Meng County to coordinate with the 129th and 120th Divisions, while the rest prepared for new missions.   As fighting intensified around Zhengtai and Meng County, a parallel pressure campaign unfolded. To contain Eighth Route Army sabotage along Zhengtai, the Japanese assembled battalions from Independent Mixed 4th and 9th Brigades to strike the 129th Division. In response, the 120th Division began large-scale sabotage against the Tongpu Railway and major highways in northwestern Shanxi starting 20:00 on August 20. They captured enemy strongholds along rail and road lines, striking major bases such as Kangjiahui on the Xinjing Highway, where more than 50 Japanese and puppet troops were stationed, and also attacking other areas like Shishen, Lizhen, and Jingle. Ambushes were set to annihilate reinforcements arriving from different directions, and at 00:30 on August 21 the 2nd Battalion of the 4th Regiment attacked Kangjiahui and annihilated the defenders by dawn. Reinforcements arriving in cars were destroyed, and subsequent actions continued to expand the disruption.   Over more than 180 battles in northwestern Shanxi, the 120th Division annihilated more than 800 Japanese and puppet troops and captured or destroyed stations and strongholds including Kangjiahui, Yangfangkou, Pingshe, and Longquan. By disrupting the Tongpu Railway and transportation along the Xinjing, Taifen, and Fenli highways, they tied down Japanese forces and made it harder to reinforce Zhengtai. In practical terms, this meant the first phase of the Hundred Regiments Offensive—lasting about three weeks—ended on September 10 with major railway lines and motor roads attacked repeatedly. Roadbeds, bridges, switching yards, and installations were hit heavily; at the Qingxing coal mines, facilities were destroyed and production was halted for nearly a year.   By the end of that first phase, the campaign's logic had become clearer: once the Japanese leaned more heavily on a "cage-and-strongpoint" defense system, the same transport network that had supported their defense became less secure. When rail and road were repeatedly disrupted, strongpoints became more vulnerable—especially if Japanese units pulled out nearby detachments to respond to sabotage. So the campaign shifted from breaking transportation to attacking blockhouses and other strongpoints in contested areas, aiming to force Japanese forces back into well-defended garrisons and leave the countryside again contested by Communist forces. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. From 20 August 1940, under secrecy and rain, units of the 8th Route Army infiltrated stations, captured villages, destroyed bridges, power lines, roads, mines, and stations across multiple columns. By early September the Zhengtai and related Tongpu transport routes were repeatedly severed, forcing Japanese troops to fight isolated strongpoints and hindering reinforcement. 

The key words to the success of the Chinese communist revolution are luck and violence — at least, that's according to Prof. Frank Dikötter.Continuing from our last episode on Prof. Frank Dikötter's new book, Red Dawn Over China, we trace the origin story of the Chinese Communist Party, and revisit how the CCP went from an obscure, unpopular, intellectual-led political force to take over the whole of mainland China.Prof. Dikötter is the Milias Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and chair professor of humanities at the University of Hong Kong. He is the most widely read living historian of modern China, with books translated into more than twenty languages. He is the author of The People's Trilogy, which includes Mao's Great Famine (2010), The Tragedy of Liberation (2013), and The Cultural Revolution (2016).We left off our story in 1929 last time, when the Soviet Union launched an oft-forgotten invasion into Manchuria and set the tone of Sino-Soviet relations. In this episode — which has been edited for clarity and brevity — we continue the story from 1929 to 1949, and trace the rise of the CCP through the Long March, the Yan'an period through the Sino-Japanese War, and how CCP emerged victorious in the civil war.The key words we explore are luck and violence. In other words, not your official nationalist communist history from the third “Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century” (emphasis added), but a history of how an incredible willingness to use force against fellow party cadres and civilians combined with extraordinary international luck. Japan, the Soviet Union, and the U.S. propelled the CCP to its self-proclaimed glorious founding of the People's Republic.Enjoy.LeoFor quick navigation to the specific sections:* The Japanese threat kept the Communists alive* Stalin, the great architect of Mao's Chinese communist revolution* How Edgar Snow put Mao on the map* The gift of Manchuria* No Stalin, no MaoBallerina - Yehezkel Raz, Artlist Original MusicPeking Hotel is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.Recommended reads* Frank Dikötter, 2026, Red Dawn Over China, Bloomsbury Publishing* Frank Dikötter, 2010, Mao's Great Famine, Bloomsbury Publishing* Frank Dikötter, 2013, The Tragedy of Liberation, Bloomsbury Publishing* Frank Dikötter, 2016, The Cultural Revolution, Bloomsbury Publishing* Paul Hollander, 1981, Political Pilgrims, Oxford University Press* Edgar Snow, 1937, Red Star Over China, Random HouseAbout usThe Peking Hotel podcast and newsletter are digital publications in which Liu He interviews China specialists about their first-hand experiences and observations from decades past. The project grew out of Liu's research at Hoover Institution collecting oral history of China experts living in the U.S. Their stories are a reminder of what China used to be and what it is capable of becoming.We also have a Chinese-language Substack. We hope to publish more conversations like this one, so stay tuned!Shoutout!We would like to say thank-you to our supporters, especially to the following people who referred us to great many friends, colleagues and acquaintances:* China Books Review* Initium* Bill Bishop & Sinocism* Jordan Schneider & ChinaTalk* PC & What's Happening in China* 《人文中国》Humanities China* The Goldkorn Newsletter* 擦星星事务所* 不如读书* Matt Turpin & China Articles* Career China Newsletter* The China Week* The China-MENA NewsletterKudos to you, our network now has more awesome people like yourselves. Please keep spreading the word for us :) I appreciate it.Thanks for reading Peking Hotel! This post is public so feel free to share it. Get full access to Peking Hotel at pekinghotel.substack.com/subscribe

Hi guys! Today we're back with part 2 of our HOT TAKE episode on whether we have the right to destroy history.In this episode we're going to look at our last 2 historical sources: Exhibits, including Hitlers Entartete Kunst & the President's House Exhibition, as well as Art/Sculpture, ranging from Mao's cultural reforms to the Bamiyan Buddhas AND the most written about example, statues of slavers/colonisers. Thanks so much for following along and contributing to this deep dive, it means the world!If you also want more Hot History you can follow along on ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Instagram⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠, ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠TikTok⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ and ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠YouTube⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ and of course, right here!Til next week, Ainslie x

« Et à la fin, c'est la Chine qui gagne », titre L'Express. « Pour la première fois depuis la fin de la Seconde guerre mondiale, nous dit l'hebdomadaire, l'Amérique fait face à un rival qui menace sa suprématie. » Les journaux reviennent tous sur l'intelligence artificielle, « mère de toutes les batailles » entre Pékin et Washington, glisse L'Express. Pour l'heure, poursuit le titre, « les États-Unis la mènent d'une courte tête grâce aux performances des modèles de langage de ChatGPT et Claude ». Mais une avance en forme de trompe-l'œil. L'économiste Benjamin Bürbaumer, interrogé dans les colonnes du Nouvel Obs, prévient : « Les États-Unis s'épuisent sur le front de l'innovation, tandis que [la Chine], placée juste derrière, bénéficie de l'aspiration. » « Les autorités politiques chinoises, nous dit l'Express, mobilisent massivement l'appareil techno-industriel pour faciliter la commercialisation des produits stratégiques. » D'autant que Pékin bénéficie d'une force de frappe que Washington n'a pas : chaque année, 1,3 million d'ingénieurs sortent de ses universités, contre 130 000 aux États-Unis. « Au même moment, croit savoir l'économiste Benjamin Bürbaumer dans Le Nouvel Obs, la Chine gagne en popularité. » « Au point que la Chine devienne même tendance, martèle L'Express. Sur TikTok, Instagram ou YouTube, le phénomène « Chinamaxxing » vante l'art de vivre à la chinoise. Une opération de propagande jamais vue depuis les années Mao. » Quant aux pays européens, les hebdomadaires sont unanimes : ils sont cantonnés au rôle de spectateur de ce duel. « L'Europe en est réduite à jouer les utilités. Voire les victimes consentantes », s'indigne Le Point. « L'effacement de l'Europe, poursuit le journal, est symbolisé par le sort réservé au Premier ministre Keir Starmer. Pour obtenir un entretien avec Xi Jinping, il a dû donner son feu vert à la construction d'une nouvelle ambassade chinoise au cœur de Londres. » Résultat ? s'interroge l'hebdomadaire. « Une concession dérisoire sur le whisky et une visite de la Cité interdite avec pour unique accompagnateur un guide local. L'image du Premier ministre britannique, errant les mains dans les poches au milieu de la foule, scelle le déclassement de l'ex-puissance coloniale de Hong Kong », sermonne Le Point. À lire aussiSommet Chine-États-Unis: accords commerciaux «fantastiques» pour Trump, la visite «fera date», dit Xi Jinping Dans un an, l'élection présidentielle en France « Ça sent la naphtaline », s'amuse Marianne, qui titre : « Le retour en force des vieux ». Dans presque tous les titres, on évoque la stratégie de François Hollande pour tenter de s'imposer comme le candidat du Parti socialiste en 2027. « Voilà des années qu'il cherche le trou de souris – l'expression lui est presque consacrée », note L'Express. « Sa force, c'est qu'il a été président. Son handicap, c'est qu'il a été président », résume dans les colonnes du magazine Pierre Moscovici, qui fut ministre du dernier quinquennat socialiste. « Sa stratégie, c'est le bordel », résume pour sa part le premier secrétaire du PS, Olivier Faure, dans L'Express, « et puis de réapparaître à la fin, fort de son expérience ». Pendant ce temps, plus au centre, un duel se profile entre Gabriel Attal et Édouard Philippe. Les deux hommes ont tous les deux été Premiers ministres et font valoir leur expérience, rappelle Marianne. « Attal est un bulldozer, pas une voiture-balai soucieuse de récupérer coûte que coûte les indécis et les critiques de son action », estime L'Express. « Edouard Philippe bénéficie d'une image de valeur sûre, de quelqu'un d'ultra compétent », juge pour sa part Marianne. La Tribune Dimanche assure que Gabriel Attal va annoncer officiellement sa candidature « dans les jours qui viennent ». « Tout va maintenant aller très vite », écrit le titre, qui publie une tribune de 500 élus locaux. Tous appellent l'ancien premier ministre à se présenter à l'élection présidentielle. « Parce que Gabriel Attal a montré ses qualités, qu'il a la force de l'expérience, l'audace de proposer et la capacité à agir : il est, pour nous, la personne dont notre pays a besoin » assurent les signataires. À lire aussiPrésidentielle 2027: Raphaël Glucksmann peut-il être le candidat de la gauche? 79e édition du Festival de Cannes « Qui veut la peau du CNC ? », s'interroge M, le Magazine du Monde. Le Centre national du cinéma et de l'image animée (CNC) est l'organe public chargé notamment de financer la création cinématographique, en reversant notamment les taxes perçues sur les ventes de tickets. « La France est dans le top 3 mondial dans trois secteurs, rappelle le patron de l'institution dans les colonnes du magazine, les exportations d'armement, le nucléaire, et le marché du cinéma. » « Le CNC est la définition même d'un outil de souveraineté », poursuit-il. « Une citadelle assiégée », s'inquiète pour sa part le M. Il est la cible « d'attaques répétées, venant notamment de l'extrême droite », « au prétexte, poursuit le journal, que le CNC dilapiderait l'argent des Français pour aider des navets et des films gauchistes pour une rentabilité nulle ». Le M décortique dans ce long papier le fonctionnement de l'institution, notamment les commissions mises en place pour attribuer des avances sur recettes, dont, s'amuse l'hebdomadaire, « le secret des délibérations [...] ferait pâlir d'envie une loge maçonnique ». Le Point, pour sa part, dévoile quelques coulisses de la Croisette. Derrière les paillettes, les robes de soirée et les rivières de diamants, le magazine s'est intéressé aux agents d'image, ces hommes et ces femmes chargés de négocier les contrats entre les acteurs et les maisons de haute couture ou de joaillerie. « Au cinéma cohabitent deux dialectes : celui de la cinéphilie et celui de l'argent », résume l'un de ces agents dans les colonnes du magazine. On apprend ainsi que pour un contrat « full égérie », certaines maisons déboursent « entre deux et trois millions d'euros par an pour une Française, davantage s'il s'agit d'une Américaine ». « Une actrice de niveau A peut facturer 50 000 euros le port d'une parure, 30 000 euros la présence à un dîner, de 15 000 euros à 100 000 euros pour assister à un défilé de mode », poursuit Le Point. À lire aussiCannes 2026: parentalités contrariées au cinquième jour du Festival Enquête sur Reza Pahlavi Le Nouvel Obs s'est intéressé au fils du dernier shah d'Iran dans un long papier, intitulé « La fabrique d'un roi ». Le magazine s'interroge : comment cet héritier en exil « s'est-il imposé en trois ans comme un symbole de l'opposition iranienne ? » « L'histoire commence en février 2023 », raconte L'Obs, en plein mouvement « Femme, Vie, Liberté », puis se poursuit lors de la guerre des douze jours, en juin dernier. Le tout secondé par des interventions dans les médias, une stratégie sur les réseaux sociaux et « tout un écosystème aux financements opaques, où se croisent lobbys d'influence et réseaux politiques », écrit le titre. Le magazine décortique ainsi l'entourage de Reza Pahlavi, galaxie d'influenceurs et de personnages sulfureux qui frôle avec l'extrême droite. M, le Magazine du Monde, consacre lui un article au père de Reza Pahlavi, le dernier shah d'Iran. L'hebdomadaire s'est penché sur sa collection de montres, qui « affole les enchères ». « Des Rolex en platine, des Patek Philippe en or, des Audemars Piguet serties de diamants » qui s'envolent pour des centaines de milliers de dollars dans les salles des ventes. « Cette collection raconte un moment particulier de l'histoire de l'Iran, note le M, elle est le symbole parfait de cette dictature moderniste et pro-occidentale qui a précédé celle des mollahs. » La passion du shah pour les montres suisses, poursuit le magazine, « a finalement surtout nourri le procès en "occidentalité" instruit par son opposition religieuse, qui finit par le renverser. » À lire aussiReza Pahlavi, le fils du dernier chah qui tente de s'imposer comme figure de ralliement en Iran « Gaza, la vie d'avant », une exposition de photographies à Marseille Le magazine du Monde dévoile aussi quelques clichés d'une exposition qui se tient en ce moment dans la cité phocéenne. Le petit-fils du photographe Kegham Djeghalian, fondateur du premier studio photo de l'enclave palestinienne en 1944, expose quelques-uns de ces clichés au Centre photographique de Marseille. On y retrouve de sublimes images en noir et blanc d'enfants qui courent sur la plage, de pique-niques sur des nappes blanches, de mariages, de sourires, d'hommes qui fument le narguilé ou qui jouent au volley. Des photos « d'une bande de Gaza qui n'existe plus », écrit le M, qui rappelle que l'enclave est aujourd'hui « détruite à plus de 80 % ».

▶️ Connect with Richard on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/richardatherton-firsthuman/   What if the movement meant to free women has actually made them less happy, and people have struggled to discuss it? In this episode of Being Human, Richard Atherton talks with Carrie Gress, a philosopher, co-founder of The Theology of Home, and author of eleven books, including The End of Woman: How Smashing the Patriarchy Has Destroyed Us. Carrie, who has a PhD in philosophy, originally planned to write a short chapter on first-wave feminism. Instead, she spent four years discovering how its roots are closely linked to socialism, the occult, and a view of womanhood shaped more by envy than by freedom. ​She links Mary Wollstonecraft's call for equality to the consciousness-raising methods used in Mao's China, revealing a history that is new to many people. Her argument is not against women. Instead, she argues for restoring what feminism has quietly removed: the unique strengths women bring to families, workplaces, and culture when they embrace their own identity. We discuss: The hidden origins of feminism Why women are less happy now Motherhood as feature, not flaw The false binary no one questions What men really love about women   Links:  Carrie Gress / The Theology of Home The End of Woman (Book) Carrie's Substack

Savage explains how the U.S. feels like a replay of the Roaring '20s—corruption, excess, and a looming crash—citing national debt surpassing GDP and high gas prices in California. He compares HBO's "Boardwalk Empire" to today's "gangster capitalism" and then shares how Napoleon III serves as a cautionary tale about prosperity undone by war costs. Savage says he's alarmed by pressure on President Trump from pro-war talkers and the military-industrial complex to escalate the war in Iran, warning this could draw in Russia and China. He then reads from Mao's "Little Red Book" where Mao calls "democratic socialism" a road to communism. He concludes by condemning Bernie Sanders and the Communist Party while calling for divine help for America.

Illness has overtaken Will again, but that doesn't mean the conversation stops. With President Donald Trump wrapping up his China summit, we've opened up the vault for you with some of our most relevant conversations about the CCP in this ‘Best Of...' edition of 'Will Cain Country.'First up, Author of ‘The Invisible Coup: How American Elites and Foreign Powers Use Immigration as a Weapon' Peter Schweizer joins Will to expose how Democratic operatives, elite-funded NGOs, and foreign powers weaponized illegal immigration to reshape U.S. politics. The most shocking example? China's use of “birth tourism” to secure long-term influence inside America.Plus, Chinese Cultural Revolution Survivor and Author of ‘Made In America' Xi Van Fleet explains how today's Left-wing protests mirror the events of Mao's Cultural Revolution in the late '60s, and how American influence set the stage for the CCP's takeover.Subscribe to ‘Will Cain Country' on YouTube here: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Watch Will Cain Country!⁠⁠⁠Follow ‘Will Cain Country' on X (⁠⁠⁠@willcainshow⁠⁠⁠), Instagram (⁠⁠⁠@willcainshow⁠⁠⁠), TikTok (⁠⁠⁠@willcainshow⁠⁠⁠), and Facebook (⁠⁠⁠@WillCainNews)Follow Will on X: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠@WillCain⁠ Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

JKL Media Reviews discusses The Expanse Season 2 finale, "Caliban's War," with hosts Karen, Jesse, and Lou praising its season-finale feel, character payoffs, and key set pieces. They highlight the striking Venus sequence where the Arbogast is disassembled by the protomolecule, noting Iturbe and Janice's banter and Adam Savage's cameo as the navigator, and speculate about the missing Mars ship and the moving crater. On the Mao ship, Chrisjen, Cotyar, and Bobbie navigate a standoff tied to Errinwright and Mao, with Bobbie retrieving her suit and saving the day. On the Rocinante, Prax's botanist insight helps lure and destroy the protomolecule hybrid while Holden, pinned and facing compartment syndrome, says potential goodbyes; Amos and Naomi confront their conflict. The episode ends with Naomi revealing she gave the protomolecule to Fred Johnson, threatening her relationship with Holden, while Strickland is shown on Io with May alive in a pod. 

Last time we spoke about the battle Yaoyi. Japan pushed hard into Hubei with a plan: surround the main Chinese forces and seize Yichang, hoping to use it to strike at Chongqing. At first, the fighting was chaotic and punishing. The Chinese side tried to hold the line and disrupt the advance, and they even managed setbacks for the Japanese, pushing back, retaking key ground, and hitting supply and positioning weaknesses. But victory came with a cost: commanders were lost, and every gain was hard-won. Still, the battle didn't unfold as a clean Chinese retreat or a simple Japanese win. As Japanese units shifted and tested for openings, the Chinese forces adjusted—delaying, regrouping, and fighting to keep their formations from being completely trapped. Eventually, Japan managed to break through at critical moments, especially through crossings and maneuvers that the Chinese had not fully sealed off. In the end, Japan succeeded in taking Yichang, but it didn't achieve the decisive annihilation it wanted.    #201 The New Fourth Army Incident and the Strained United Front Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After the catastrophe of the early 1930s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) entered the war against Japan in a political mood that was both hopeful and wary: it wanted to be seen as a genuine national leader of resistance, yet it also feared being absorbed—or destroyed—by the Guomindang (KMT) state it had spent years battling. That tension became the organizing principle of the war's early years. The turning point came from the Xi'an Incident in December 1936, which forced a new calculation in Nationalist politics. In the months that followed, agreements between KMT and CCP representatives were publicly proclaimed in August and September 1937, after the Shanghai fighting began. Under these arrangements, the CCP accepted constraints that in peacetime would have looked like surrender: it pledged to strive for Sun Yixian's "Three People's Principles," to end its former policies of armed revolt and sovietization, to abolish the soviet government, and to discontinue both the term "Red Army" and the expectation that its forces would operate outside central control. Communist troops would be treated as part of the national military under KMT command, and the revolution's old administrative structures were to be formally dismantled. In return, the KMT offered the CCP something just as important: space to exist publicly and politically. Liaison offices were permitted in key cities; the CCP was allowed to publish the New China Daily; and it could nominate representatives to KMT advisory bodies. Civil rights were extended—political prisoners were released—and subsidies were established to help cover administrative and military expenses in "reintegrated" areas and territories. The war thus transformed the tactical reality on the ground: the CCP could not treat the KMT as an immediate enemy, but it also could not afford to become politically passive. It had to learn how to fight Japan while building legitimacy fast enough to survive the next phase. In the first year and a half, the Party Center focused on three problems that kept returning in different forms: how the "united front" would be defined—especially what the CCP's relationship to the National government should be; how to coordinate military strategy and tactics with Nationalist units without losing control of its own operations; and how leadership should be consolidated, particularly for Mao Zedong in a party that still contained rival centers of authority. These disputes mattered not just for doctrine but for survival, because the CCP's autonomy was constantly being tested by the very alliance that was supposed to protect it. Mao's own approach to the united front combined cooperation with a refusal to surrender independence. Publicly, the CCP praised Jiang Jieshi and the KMT and promised unity, but it did so in language that was deliberately broad. In private (and in internal party debates), Mao treated unity as conditional: the CCP must not split the united front, but it also must not be "bound hand and foot." The strategic idea that emerged was political initiative under constraints—fighting when it could plausibly claim justification, keeping enough restraint that the CCP would not appear self-interested or anti-national, and deciding for itself when to engage and when to withdraw. This balance was reinforced through military reorganization. In August–September 1937, CCP forces were reorganized as the Eighth Route Army (8RA), with roughly 30,000 men drawn from Long March survivors, local forces, and new recruits. The 8RA was divided into three divisions: the 115th, 120th, and 129th, commanded by Lin Biao, He Long, and Liu Bocheng respectively. Shortly after the war began, the National government also authorized a second major Communist force: the New Fourth Army (N4A), to operate in central China. Its core came from those left behind when the Long March began in 1934—small groups surviving in difficult conditions against continuing KMT pressure. Officially authorized at 12,000, it took months to reach that strength. Nominally commanded by Ye Ting, actual military and political control rested with Xiang Ying and Chen Yi. From the start, then, the CCP's wartime "integration" with the National system coexisted with a clear effort to preserve internal control. Ideologically, the CCP worked to make its revolutionary program compatible—at least in appearance—with a national resistance coalition. On the New Democracy demonstrated how this strategy operated on two levels. In KMT-controlled spaces, its language could be read as aligning with liberal-democratic expectations: public participation, multi-party governance, legally protected civil rights. But in CCP-controlled areas, the same text could carry sharper class-based and authoritarian implications. The Party wanted a united front that broadened support without becoming committed to Nationalist limits on how society itself might be reorganized after victory. Meanwhile, even as the rhetoric of unity rose, the CCP worried about something more dangerous than military setbacks: the possibility that the KMT might accommodate Japan. Late 1939 and early 1940 made this fear harder to dismiss. Japan pursued collaboration with Wang Jingwei, culminating in the establishment of a "reorganized" government at Nanjing in March 1940. At the same time, Japanese intermediaries sought approaches to Chiang Kai-shek himself—an effort that the CCP tracked closely as a sign that peace negotiations might be possible even when battlefield conditions looked grim. Propaganda was involved, but the anxiety was real: if Japan and the Nationalists reached an arrangement, the CCP's whole wartime legitimacy-building effort could collapse overnight. As a result, the united front was interpreted inside the CCP not as a permanent coalition with the KMT, but as a flexible strategy with a cardinal purpose: to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Mao's position on the united front reflected this. For him, the alliance was meant to suspend the possibility of a China–Japan settlement, not to end the CCP's separate identity. The CCP could participate in a reconstituted national framework—possibly even a "democratic republic"—to gain legality and influence, but it should remain politically and, where possible, physically separate from the KMT. By 1939, however, the practical meaning of "flexibility" collided with reality. What had seemed, to some observers, like an unusually cordial entente began to fade. The KMT Central Committee adopted measures early in 1939 aimed at restricting Communist expansion, and armed clashes increased through the summer and continued into autumn and winter—especially around North China Communist bases. The period of rising conflict was later labeled by the CCP as the "first anti-Communist upsurge" (roughly spanning December 1939 into March 1940), but the crucial point was that both sides viewed each confrontation as a test of legal rights, moral legitimacy, and control over territory. Strategically, the CCP understood the KMT's effort as an attempt to check unauthorized growth of Communist armed power and to recover areas where influence had already slipped away—either to the Communists or, by indirect effect, to Japan. The KMT emphasized its traditional legal authority; the CCP countered with its claim to an "evolutionary" moral right to challenge the government's legitimacy. In practice, the conflict took the form of increasingly systematic military pressure, including a blockade around the Shen–Gan–Ning region. By this point, the blockade involved large numbers of troops (on the order of hundreds of thousands), halting Communist expansion and disrupting direct contact with other Communist forces farther afield, even as fighting flared along border zones and around vulnerable points in the Communist defensive perimeter. So, by the edge of the "middle years," the wartime alliance had not broken into open civil war—but it had also stopped being secure. The united front survived, yet it operated under strain: its language of cooperation continued, while "friction" between partners hardened into a central feature of the resistance struggle. Transition into the war's second phase began in early 1939, shaped by the stalemate Mao had already anticipated at the sixth plenum in late 1938. Mao argued that during this prolonged "new stage" the forces of resistance—above all, Communist-led forces—would strengthen. The overall result, however, was mixed. In Shandong and Central China, new Communist bases did take shape. But across much of North China, Japanese consolidation cost the resistance heavily in manpower and population. Base-area economies suffered serious strain, and the peasantry endured hardships more severe than at any earlier point. This stalemate had two main dimensions. The first was the growing resentment of the Nationalists toward Communist expansion—resentment made especially sharp by their own losses. As the Nationalists were driven out of regions that had previously provided them their greatest wealth and power in the central and lower Yangtze basin, they also lost the "cream" of their armies. In contrast, the CCP was spreading through the wider countryside behind Japanese lines, extending its influence and winning broader popular support. The second dimension was Japan's desire—and need—to consolidate territories it had only nominally conquered and to extract economic value from them. After all, the logic of the "China Incident" was to draw on China's labor and resources to strengthen Japan, not to bleed Japan's gains away by draining wealth into China's vast interior. A Japanese colonel, lamenting the situation, captured the frustration of this drift into deeper entanglement: he regretted that Japan had not ended the "China Incident" once its initial objectives were reached. Instead, Japan was drawn into the hinterland and became bogged down in endless attrition—leaving it with little more than "real estate" rather than the popular support it believed it would secure from those it claimed to "liberate." To improve their position, Japanese authorities—still fragmented by internal rivalry—pursued several strategies. One was a new peace offensive aimed simultaneously at Jiang Jieshi, alongside efforts to establish a "reformed" Nationalist government under Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing in December 1938. Japan also recruited more collaborators and puppet officials. Finally, it carried out forceful military, political, and economic measures intended to establish effective territorial control and eliminate opposition. During the middle years of the war, the Communists described their conflicts with the Nationalists using the euphemism "friction". By 1939, what many observers—possibly incorrectly—had viewed as an unusually warm alliance began to break down. In early 1939, the KMT Central Committee adopted measures meant to restrict the CCP. From the summer onward, military clashes began and continued into autumn and winter with increasing frequency and intensity, most of them concentrated around and within the North China base areas. The Communists later labeled the period from December 1939 to March 1940 the "first anti-Communist upsurge." Naturally, each side accused the other of aggression and claimed self-defense against unjust attacks. Strategically, though, the North China "upsurge" functioned as a Nationalist attempt to limit the CCP's expansion beyond the areas assigned to it and to regain influence in regions the Communists—or the Japanese—had already taken from the KMT. Jiang Jieshi framed the matter as a defense of legal rights grounded in tradition, while the Communists asserted an "evolutionary" right to challenge the moral legitimacy of those legal claims. During 1939, the Nationalists began to blockade Shen–Gan–Ning around its southern and western perimeter. Within a year, this blockade grew to nearly 400,000 troops, including some of the last remaining Central Army units under the command of Hu Zongnan. The blockade stopped further Communist expansion, especially into Gansu and Suiyuan, and severed direct contact between SKN and Communists operating in Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan) adjacent to Soviet Central Asia. The Xinjiang Communists—including Mao Zedong's brother—were eliminated in 1942. Meanwhile, fierce fighting erupted along the Gansu–Shaanxi border and in the north-eastern corner of SKN near the Great Wall at Suide, as the blockading forces probed for weak points. Elements of He Long's 120th Division were even pulled back from the Jin–Sui base across the Yellow River to strengthen SKN's regular defenses. Economically, the blockade was even more damaging. During 1939, central government subsidies to the Border Region budget were cut off. Trade between the Border Region and other parts of China nearly stopped, a devastating blow to a region unable to supply itself with many basic commodities. At the same time, Nationalist and regional forces also attempted to expand their military and administrative authority into Hebei, Shanxi, Henan, and Shandong—areas the CCP now considered its base zones. In resisting these efforts, the CCP predictable accused its rivals of harming resistance work and damaging the people's interests. The "experts in dissension" were said to cooperate with the Japanese and their puppets. Based on increasing collaboration by regional units with Japan, the CCP implied that this was a deliberate and cynical strategy—described as "crooked-line patriotism"—intended to preserve those units for future anti-Communist operations. Even so, the CCP tried to avoid an open break with the Nationalist regime in Chongqing. In public, it consistently portrayed these clashes as being initiated by local commanders acting beyond orders from higher authority—despite knowing this depiction was false. Jiang Jieshi, unable to refute the claim outright, effectively permitted it to serve as the justification for a firm Communist response. Mao Zedong outlined the general resistance policy as "justification, expedience, and restraint". The CCP was to fight when it could claim justification and when it could gain advantage, but not to press attacks beyond what the Nationalists would tolerate or in ways that could damage its image as selfless patriots. Communist forces were expected to keep initiative as much as possible in their own hands—deciding when to engage, whether to engage, and when to disengage. The most striking episode of the "first anti-Communist upsurge" was the rupture with Yan Xishan in December 1939. Tensions in Shanxi had been rising throughout the summer and autumn, as Yan and his conservative supporters—associated with the "Old Army"—linked the Sacrifice League and the Dare-to-die Corps of the "New Army" with Communist forces. When base areas and Japanese occupation eventually took over much of his province, Yan was forced into exile at Qiulin across the Yellow River in Shaanxi. In November, Yan ordered his Old Army to disarm the Dare-to-die forces with help from central units dispatched by Hu Zongnan. In the bloody fighting that followed, these elements gradually broke free of even nominal provincial control and fully completed their connection with Communist forces. More than 30,000 people went over to the Communists. One KMT intelligence agent described the process with bitterness and a sense of inevitability: the Communists were first "full of sweet words," flattery, and distortions designed to open things up and conceal their actions. But once they had fully entrenched themselves, and once the low-level base had been established, they turned and bit. The agent suggested they had suspected things might end this way, but were not aware how quickly events would move—or that it could happen precisely while Communist calls for "united front" and "maintenance of unity for resistance" filled the air. About a month later, in February and March 1940, elements of the 8RA beat back this so-called upsurge. Zhang Yinwu's forces were disarmed and dispersed across the plains of north Hebei. To the south, Chu Huaiping and Shi Yusan were pushed out of the base area, as was the KMT-appointed provincial governor Lu Zhonglin. Although some non-Communist forces remained in the region, the CCP's and CCLY bases were never again seriously threatened by forces affiliated with the central government. Reinforcing the CCP's accusations, Shi Yusan was later executed in 1940 by the central government for collaboration with the Japanese. By late 1939, CCP central authorities maintained that the areas where the CCP could expand its armed strength were mainly limited to Shandong and Central China. In those regions, the CCP continued trying to carve out bases where they could operate. The situation in Shandong was complicated. After the Japanese invasion, most Nationalist-affiliated forces stayed in the province, while Communist forces and bases were weaker and more scattered than further west. Only in late 1938 did major 8RA units from the 115th and 129th Divisions—led by Xu Xiangqian and Luo Ronghuan—enter Shandong to link up with the Shandong column and local guerrillas, including survivors of a large band recently decimated by the Japanese. Even with these efforts, Communist actions led to clashes not only with Japanese forces but also with various Nationalist-affiliated groups—groups that were stronger than the Communists at the time. Until late 1940, the CCP's clashes with Nationalist forces in Shandong were actually bloodier than clashes with the Japanese. The CCP understood that its Chinese rivals mistrusted one another, and that their attitudes toward the CCP varied widely. The main Nationalist forces were often not tightly affiliated with Chiang Kai-shek or the central government. Instead, they operated under independent—and at times disgruntled—regional commanders. Communist tactics were expressed through slogans emphasizing ways to win support and isolate hardliners: develop progressive forces and win over fence-sitters while isolating "die-hards"; flatter top echelons, enlist the middle ranks, and hit the rank and file; and win over Yi Xuezhong, isolate Shen Honglie, and eliminate Qin Qirong. Still, unlike other North China base areas, the Communists were unable for several years to neutralize Nationalist forces in Shandong. Even if Japanese mop-up campaigns had not weakened those Nationalists, the text suggests the Communists may still have struggled to do so. By November 1940, Xu Xiangqian claimed meaningful progress while admitting Shandong had not yet become a fully consolidated base. CCP successes were greatest along parts of the Shandong–Hebei border, around the Taishan massif in central Shandong, and near the tip of the peninsula far to the east. Elsewhere, "progressive forces" remained weak. Communist regular troops numbered about 70,000, which was far below the party center's goals of 150,000 regulars and between 1.5 and 2 million self-defense forces. Moreover, systematic economic reforms had barely begun. The CCP relied on familiar practices—confiscations, collections of "national salvation grain," contributions, and loans—alongside a conventional taxation system adjusted to favor poorer peasants. Communist expansion in Central China was even riskier, with a greater likelihood of large-scale conflict with central government forces than in the north. In much of North China, "friction" came primarily from rapid Communist expansion into areas with partial vacuums. In Central China, however, base-building required displacing an existing Nationalist military-administrative presence closely tied to Jiang Kai-shek and the Chongqing government. The burden of this expansion was carried mainly by the 6th Detachment (northern Anhui and Jiangsu) and the 5th Detachment, which was reinforced by 15,000 to 20,000 8RA troops under Huang K'o-ch'eng. As Chen Yi's 1st Detachment crossed from south to north through the corridor provided by Guan Wenwei's local forces, it became actively involved as well. This expansion—driven by increasingly urgent directives from Mao and Liu during the latter part of 1939 and into 1940—brought the N4A north of the river into ever more frequent and sharper clashes with Nationalist authorities in Anhui and Jiangsu, especially with units under Jiangsu governor Han Deqin. South of the river, though, Xiang Ying did not directly challenge Chongqing's commanders. Mao later charged that Xiang Ying may have been influenced by Wang Ming, or else he may simply have seen no realistic alternative. His forces—three detachments plus a headquarters unit—were heavily outnumbered by Qu Chutong's Nationalist units, not to mention Japanese forces and their puppets. Even if Mao insisted bases could be built "anywhere," the Shanghai–Hangzhou–Nanjing triangle was especially difficult terrain. Xiang Ying and his followers had survived with extraordinary tenacity in the mountains of South China between 1934 and 1937, enduring brutal search-and-destroy operations that were not lifted until the war began. It therefore seems unlikely that such survivors would suddenly become "right-wing capitulationists."  Yet by spring 1940, Mao was pressing Xiang Ying more intensely. The Central Committee's message was explicit: expansion was necessary in all cases. It meant reaching into all enemy-occupied areas rather than being bound by the Kuomintang's restrictions—going beyond Kuomintang limits, not waiting for official appointments, not depending on higher-ups for financing, and instead expanding armed forces freely and independently. It also meant setting up base areas without hesitation, independently mobilizing the masses in those areas, and building united front organs of political power under Communist Party leadership. The struggle between Nationalists and Communists involved more than contests for control of territory behind Japanese lines. It also involved national-level politics, ideology, and leadership. One worrying development for the CCP was the campaign throughout 1939 to expand Jiang Kai-shek's prestige and formal power—adding more titles for him across major party, government, and military positions. In early 1939, the Central Executive Committee appointed him "director-general" of the Kuomintang, a title reminiscent of the one previously held by Sun Yat-sen. In addition, during the summer and autumn of 1939 there was talk of constitutional rule. In November, the KMT announced plans to convene a constitutional assembly the following year. If Jiang could fulfill these promises, he and his government could gain new legitimacy and wider popularity. Mao and his colleagues could not allow this to go unchallenged. If the Nationalists were to have a paramount leader and authoritative spokesperson, the CCP needed one as well. The timing of Mao's famous "On the new democracy"—written in late 1939 and published the next January—was therefore no accident. Its substance had been anticipated earlier, but its final timing and full development were shaped by the KMT's constitutional movement. The CCP's entry into this competition served as both a bid for support away from the KMT and a statement of the multi-class united front that the CCP wanted to lead. Although "On the new democracy" was written in a tone that seemed moderate, it persuaded many Chinese readers that the CCP had either diluted its revolutionary objectives or postponed them to a distant future. In Kuomintang-controlled areas, the work could be read through the liberal values associated with Anglo-American democracy—popular participation, multi-party government, legally protected civil rights. In CCP-controlled territories, the same language carried stronger authoritarian, class-based meanings. In internal documents meant for party audiences rather than public consumption, the ambiguity was removed, showing a tough but patient and flexible commitment not only to resistance but also to social control and social change. During this same period, the Communists expressed deep concern about Nationalist capitulation to Japan—not only on the battlefield behind Japanese lines but also at the highest levels. Some of this concern was propaganda, but beneath propaganda lay genuine anxiety. In late 1939 and early 1940, politically aware Chinese already knew that Japan was negotiating with the unpredictable Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing a year earlier. A "reorganized national government" in Nanjing was finally established in March 1940, representing the most formidable collaboration with Japan to date. Less well known, but equally important, was that Japan was also seeking an understanding directly with Jiang Kai-shek through intermediaries in Hong Kong. This effort, called "Operation Kiri"—described as spreading a "feast for Chiang"—combined intrigue with a kind of dark comedy. Reports suggested Chiang's reported interest in peace could have been a stratagem designed to discredit Wang Jingwei by keeping him waiting. But even if Chiang had no intention of coming to terms with Japan, the Communists could not be sure what the outcome would be until after the multi-pronged peace offensive had failed. By the middle of 1940, China had never been so isolated. In Europe, the "phony war" ended in the spring when Germany launched a blitz across the Low Countries. France fell soon after, and England appeared likely to be next. Japan used this moment to press China to sever its last tenuous connections to the outside world: cutting the Burma Road, trade with neutral Hong Kong, and the rail link running from Hanoi to Kunming. At the same time, Russia was engaged in a difficult and embarrassing war with Finland and reduced military aid to the Nationalists. The United States was only gradually moving away from isolationism and clearly regarded England as more important than China. In Chongqing and elsewhere in "Free China," signs of war weariness, despair, and demoralization were visible. Under these circumstances, Mao's insistence on aggressive expansion was a calculated risk—either it would deter any Japanese advance, or it would place the Communists in the strongest possible position in case a split between the KMT and the CCP became unavoidable. In Central China, the size and pace of the fighting kept increasing, starting in the final months of 1939. One flashpoint was the clash between Luo Pinghui's 5th Detachment and units of Han Deqin's Jiangsu force near Lake Gaoyou. In the following months, Guan Wenwei's forces ranged along the left bank of the Yangtze, repeatedly running into Luo's troops as they operated farther north. Luo also began receiving some 8RA reinforcements, moving them south through areas controlled by the 6th Detachment. Clearly, a major showdown was taking shape across north and central Jiangsu. At the same time, the South Yangtze Command was doing poorly. Nationalist commanders Leng Xin and Qu Chutong restricted its activities so severely that Mao and Liu gradually abandoned the idea of building a unified, consolidated base in that region. During late spring and early summer, Chen Yi moved most of his 1st and 2nd Detachments north of the Yangtze. In September, the 3rd Detachment followed suit, crossing the river into the area around Lake Chaohu, where the 4th Detachment was already stationed. After these moves, only the Headquarters Detachment—under Ye Ting and Xiang Ying—remained south of the Yangtze, positioned at Qingxian in southern Anhui. As the military situation edged toward an open confrontation, negotiations began in June 1940 between representatives of the KMT and the CCP. The core issues were Communist operating zones and the authorized strength of the armies led by the CCP. Proposals were exchanged, followed by equally sharp and hostile counter-proposals, but no agreement was reached. The KMT viewed it as a concession to permit the CCP "free rein" north of the pre-1938 course of the Yellow River, with the exception of southern Shanxi, which was to remain under the influence of Yan Xishan. In exchange, the KMT demanded that all 8RA and N4A units evacuate Central China. In effect, the KMT was offering the CCP something it was already prepared to allow, in return for the CCP giving up what it might soon be able to obtain by force of arms. Nationalist authorities then issued a set of deadlines, but without clearly stating what would happen if those deadlines were violated. On the surface, the CCP appeared to be complying in part. The movements of Chen Yi and the South Yangtze Command could look like obedience, but in reality they were responses to orders coming from their own superior leadership rather than instructions issued by the Nationalists. Even so, Xiang Ying's continued delays and evasions during the autumn and winter of 1940 remained puzzling. One possibility is that he felt—quite reasonably—that Mao had already lost confidence in him and that once he crossed to the north bank of the river he would lose his command. Another complication was that directives from Yan'an were sometimes ambiguous and even contradictory. He may also have been trying to reach secure understandings with KMT commanders about evacuation routes and guaranteed safe conduct out of the area. For a period, Han Teqin kept most of his forces—estimated at about 70,000 men, far outnumbering the N4A—in north Jiangsu, thereby blocking the expansion of the 6th Detachment and slowing further southern intrusions by 8RA troops. But by mid-summer he realized he would have to counter the N4A build-up in central Jiangsu, or else risk writing that region off to the Communists. A confusing sequence of engagements then unfolded, culminating in a decisive battle in early October 1940 near the central Jiangsu town of Huangjiao. Over the course of four days, several of Han's main-force units belonging to the 89th Army were destroyed, while others were scattered. That battle also served as a signal for the 6th Detachment to advance more aggressively in the north. In the aftermath, one of Han's principal commanders entered collaboration with the CCP, while another defected to the Nanjing government under Wang Jingwei. Although Han Teqin managed to maintain a foothold in Jiangsu until 1943, his real power had been broken. Relatively little attention was paid to the battle of Huangjiao in the Chinese press. The KMT did not want to publicize what it considered a disastrous defeat, while the Communists were satisfied to stay silent about an episode that conflicted with their proclaimed policy of a united front. As could be expected, during the autumn—after Han Teqin's defeat—KMT-CCP negotiations deteriorated further. In early December, Jiang Kai-shek personally ordered that all N4A forces withdraw from southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu by 31 December. He also ordered that the entire 8RA be positioned north of the Yellow River by the same deadline, followed one month later by the N4A. Discussions then followed between Ye Ting and Qu Chutong's deputies concerning the route to be taken, safe conduct, and—astonishingly—the money and supplies that were to be provided to the N4A to help it move. On 25 December, Mao Zedong ordered Xiang Ying to begin evacuating immediately. Yet it was not until 4 January 1941 that Ye and Xiang actually started moving. Almost immediately, Qu Chutong's forces harassed and dispersed the N4A Headquarters Group, which included administrative personnel, wounded soldiers and dependents, as well as combat-ready troops. In an attempt to reorganize, they moved southwest toward Maolin, where they were surrounded by Nationalists and, over the next several days, were cut to pieces. Losses were heavy on both sides. The CCP suffered an estimated 9,000 casualties. Xiang Ying tried twice to break out of the blockade on his own, but failed. He was then denounced as a deserter by Ye Ting, who took over full command of the doomed forces. Xiang Ying eventually escaped, but he was killed a couple of months later by one of his own bodyguards, motivated by the N4A gold reserves that he had taken with him. Up to the very end, Xiang either failed or refused to seek refuge in Liu Shaoqi's domain north of the Yangtze. The unfortunate Ye Ting was arrested and spent the rest of the war in prison. He was finally released in 1946, only to die one month later in a plane crash, along with several other high-ranking party members. On 17 January, Jiang Kai-shek declared that the New Fourth Army was dissolved for insubordination. Direct contacts between Yan'an and Chongqing nearly came to an end, and CCP military liaison offices in several cities held by the Nationalists were closed. This is what became known as the New Fourth Army incident, also referred to as the South Anhui incident. Clearly, it functioned as an act of retaliation for the defeats suffered by Han Teqin in north and central Jiangsu. It ended any realistic prospect of establishing a consolidated Communist base south of the Yangtze. Still, from a strategic perspective, these losses were ultimately more than offset by the gains achieved farther north. In fact, only a few months later, the reorganized N4A quietly began reintroducing some units into this region, where they carried out guerrilla activities without possessing a secure territorial base. Unlike the relative silence surrounding the fighting at Huangjiao, the New Fourth Army incident sparked bitter, prolonged controversy. The CCP argued that it was a second "anti-Communist upsurge," even more serious than the first. Presenting themselves as martyred patriots, they depicted their opponents as people who wanted to end the War of Resistance through what they called "Sino-Japanese cooperation" aimed at "suppressing the Communists." In their account, the Nationalists wanted to replace the war of resistance with civil war, substitute capitulation for independence, trade unity for a split, and replace light with darkness. People were telling each other the news and were horrified. Indeed, they claimed that the situation had never been as critical as it was at that moment. The Nationalist response, of course, was that provocations had been numerous and serious, and that violations of military discipline could not be tolerated. But the KMT's unwillingness to describe in detail its own defeats at the CCP's hands left it speaking in broad generalities. In the propaganda battle, the CCP clearly gained the better position and won more political capital. If it was politically valuable to be regarded as a national hero, it was even more valuable to be seen as a national martyr.  Many Chinese—and some outside—observers were genuinely alarmed and feared that civil war might openly resume. Yet, with a few exceptions, the events that culminated in the New Fourth Army incident have generally been interpreted as marking the breakdown of the second united front. That interpretation, however, is described as being wrong in two respects. First, the CCP understood the united front not as a narrow arrangement limited to a few major partners, but as a strategy that could be applied flexibly to all political, military, and social forces in China—from the highest levels of the central government down to the smallest village. Relations with Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang regime mattered, but they did not, by themselves, constitute the whole of the united front. Even regarding Jiang and the Nationalists specifically, the common reading is said to be misguided. Throughout the war, a cardinal objective of the united front was to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Therefore, if clashes between CCP forces and those of the central government on such a large scale as at Huangjiao and Maolin could occur without leading to peace with Japan and without triggering a full-scale resumption of civil war, then this should not be understood as the end of the united front—it should be seen as its fundamental vindication. If friction at that scale could nevertheless be tolerated by Jiang Jieshi, then fears about his future accommodation with Japan were greatly reduced. Following the New Fourth Army incident, the CCP reorganized its political and military presence in Central China. The Central Plains and South-east China Bureaus were merged and renamed the Central China Bureau, with Liu Shaoqi placed in charge, reflecting the area's importance to Party Central. The New Fourth Army was also reorganized completely and substantially regularized. Chen Yi became its new acting commander, since Ye Ting was imprisoned. He directed the force, now divided into seven divisions. Each division had territorial responsibilities, and in each region the CCP claimed the establishment of a base. Indeed, base construction proceeded in earnest only after the friction of 1940 and the New Fourth Army incident. In the years that followed, the operating areas of the First through Fourth Divisions contained expanding enclaves of consolidated territory, where military dominance was joined with open party work: administrative control, the development of mass organizations, local elections, and socio-economic reforms. The other three areas fluctuated between semi-consolidated and guerrilla status. With the incident, the worst phase of the KMT-CCP conflict was now over. When CCP documents later speak of a third upsurge in 1943, they refer to something openly political. With the exception of Shandong—where a fairly strong Nationalist presence persisted for a longer time—the overall balance of power among Chinese forces behind Japanese lines had shifted in favor of the CCP by mid-1941. In subsequent years the CCP's predominance became even more pronounced, until by the end of 1943 the Communists were virtually beyond challenge by Chinese rivals.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After the CCP and KMT entered the united front, cooperation felt conditional from the start. Mao pushed the New Fourth Army to reorganize and preserve Communist autonomy, even as the 1937 agreements publicly pledged obedience to KMT leadership. In 1939–40 the Communists worried that Chiang might negotiate peace with Japan; so they expanded bases and military presence, triggering repeated clashes. The pressure intensified when KMT orders forced the New Fourth Army to evacuate south Anhui in late 1940. 

durée : 00:58:42 - Le Cours de l'histoire - par : Xavier Mauduit, Maïwenn Guiziou - En mai 1966, la Révolution culturelle éclate dans la Chine de Mao Zedong. En quelques mois, les Gardes rouges, mouvement de masse de lycéens et d'étudiants, pourchassent les intellectuels et bourgeois. Pour promouvoir l'idéologie révolutionnaire, des affiches sont diffusées dans tout le pays. - réalisation : Thomas Beau - invités : Yves Chevrier Sinologue et historien; Sebastian Veg Sinologue et historien

VOV1 - Ông Đinh Hùng Quân, cựu Chủ tịch hãng rượu Mao Đài nổi tiếng Trung Quốc hôm qua (8/5) chính thức bị thông báo truy tố vì tình nghi nhận hối lộ và rửa tiền. Đây là là chủ tịch thứ ba của Tập đoàn Mao Đài bị truy tố trong những năm gần đây.Thông tin trên trang web của Viện Kiểm sát Nhân dân Tối cao Trung Quốc cho thấy, vụ án của ông Đinh Hùng Quân, cựu Bí thư, Cục trưởng Cục Quản lý Thị trường tỉnh Quý Châu, cựu Chủ tịch Tập đoàn Mao Đài, bị tình nghi nhận hối lộ và rửa tiền, đã được Ủy ban Giám sát tỉnh Quý Châu kết luận và chuyển sang cơ quan kiểm sát thẩm tra, khởi tố. Vụ án cũng đã được Viện Kiểm sát Nhân dân châu Kiềm Đông Nam chuyển lên Tòa án Nhân dân Trung cấp châu này truy tố và hiện đang được điều tra thêm.Viện Kiểm sát Nhân dân châu Kiềm Đông Nam cáo buộc ông Đinh Hùng Quân lạm dụng các chức vụ trong thời gian đương chức, trong đó có Bí thư Đảng ủy kiêm Chủ tịch Tập đoàn rượu Mao Đài Quý Châu, để trục lợi và nhận hối lộ với số tiền rất lớn. Ông cũng bị cáo buộc che giấu nguồn gốc và tính chất của một số khoản hối lộ, tình tiết nghiêm trọng, do vậy phải chịu trách nhiệm hình sự về tội nhận hối lộ và rửa tiền.Ông Đinh Hùng Quân là chủ tịch thứ ba của Tập đoàn Mao Đài bị truy tố trong những năm gần đây, sau các ông Viên Nhân Quốc và Cao Vệ Đông.Theo thông tin công khai, ông Đinh Hùng Quân sinh năm 1974, quê tỉnh Hồ Bắc. Sau khi tốt nghiệp Đại học Vũ Hán năm 1995, ông ở lại trường làm giảng viên, sau đó theo học thạc sĩ và tiến sĩ tại ngôi trường này. Năm 2013, ông trở thành Phó Tổng thư ký Chính quyền tỉnh Quý Châu. Năm 2016, giữ chức Phó Thị trưởng thành phố Tất Tiết, Quý Châu. Năm 2018, được bổ nhiệm làm Bí thư Đảng ủy kiêm Cục trưởng Cục Năng lượng Quý Châu.Từ tháng 8/2021, ông làm Bí thư Đảng ủy kiêm Chủ tịch Tập đoàn Mao Đài trong gần 3 năm. Tháng 4/2024, ông được bổ nhiệm làm Bí thư Đảng ủy kiêm Cục trưởng Cục Quản lý Thị trường tỉnh Quý Châu.Tháng 1/2025, ông bị thẩm tra kỷ luật, điều tra giám sát và cách chức vì nghi ngờ vi phạm kỷ luật và pháp luật nghiêm trọng. Cuối tháng 4 cùng năm, ông bị bãi nhiệm chức đại biểu Nhân đại toàn quốc (Quốc hội) khóa XIV.Trước đó, hồi đầu tháng 2/2024, Trung Quốc đã kết án tù chung thân đối với cựu Chủ tịch Tập đoàn Mao Đài Cao Vệ Đông vì tội nhận hối lộ hơn 110 triệu Nhân dân tệ (hơn 16 triệu USD).Tháng 9/2021, một cựu Chủ tịch khác của hãng rượu nổi tiếng này là Viên Nhân Quốc cũng bị kết án tù chung thân vì nhận hối lộ 112,9 triệu Nhân dân tệ. Ông này sau đó đã qua đời vào năm 2023 ở tuổi 67./.Bích Thuận/VOV Bắc KinhÔng Đinh Hùng Quân,cựu Chủ tịch Tập đoàn rượu Mao Đài Quý Châu. Ảnh tư liệu đăng trên mạng Hoa kiều Trung Quốc.

The X-Men TAS Podcast returns to answer all your questions and dive deep into Daredevil: Born Again Season 2! Join us as we discuss...All the anime we currently love!Was the 90s all that cracked it up to be??X-Men 97 and the future of X-Men movies in the MCU!Being blown away by Daredevil but rewriting Kingpin's ending to align more with what we love from Spider-Man TAS!The X-Men TAS Podcast just opened a SECRET reddit group, join by clicking here! We are also on Twitch sometimes… click here to go to our page and follow and subscribe so you can join in on all the mysterious fun to be had! Also, make sure to subscribe to our podcast via Buzzsprout or iTunes and tell all your friends about it! Follow Willie Simpson on Bluesky and please join our Facebook Group! Last but not least, if you want to support the show, you can Buy Us a Coffee as well!  

Karen, Lou and Jesse are talking "The Monster and the Rocket," praising its strong writing and character dynamics. The hosts discuss Holden's protomolecule obsession on the Rocinante, the crew's shifting priorities toward rescuing Naomi's team, and the reveal of a stowaway on the ship. They highlight Chrisjen Avasarala's uneasy alliance with Bobbie Draper and Cotyar, including the moment Bobbie learns Cotyar's role in her son's death, and they analyze Mao's smug retreat as power shifts. A major focus is Sadavir Errinwright's complex arc—his awkward scene with his son, his murder of Mars' defense minister via a capsule, his destruction of the Ganymede pickup ship, and his ultimatum to Mao and Avasarala. The episode's most emotional sequence centers on Naomi, Melissa, and the Ganymede evacuation, including Champa's sacrifice and Amos being tranquilized.

Pastor Jake's sermon covering Acts 6–7 centers on the big idea that local faithfulness launches the gospel of forgiveness globally. He walks through the early church's organizational response to a widow-care problem, the false accusations leveled against Stephen, and Stephen's sweeping sermon before the Sanhedrin — a sermon that drew clear parallels between Moses and Jesus while declaring that God works outside of Israel and is not confined to the temple in Jerusalem. Stephen's faithfulness ultimately costs him his life, making him the first Christian martyr, but his death becomes the very spark that propels the gospel outward, fulfilling the promise of Acts 1:8 — "You will be my witnesses in Jerusalem, Judea, Samaria, and to the ends of the earth" — as seen in Acts 8:1. The podcast discussion opens up several threads that didn't make it into the sermon. Pastor Jake unpacks the nature of forgiveness, emphasizing that it is not a matter of conjuring up good feelings but rather an act of the will empowered by the Holy Spirit — the emotions and freedom often follow the choice, not the other way around. He also highlights the powerful moment in Acts 7 where Stephen sees heaven open and the Son of Man standing at the right hand of God — the only instance of that image in Scripture — suggesting that Stephen was catching a glimpse of his ultimate destination even as his life was on the line. Pastor Matt adds rich historical context, explaining that the widow problem in Acts 6 was not random but the surface-level eruption of four centuries of cultural tension between Hebraic Jews and Hellenistic Jews. He also draws a compelling through-line from Acts to church history and the present day, pointing out that persecution has never stopped the gospel — it has consistently refined and spread it, from the explosion of Christianity in China under Mao to the rapid growth of the church in Iran today. The conversation closes with a challenge for every believer to examine whether their faith depends on comfort or conviction, and to ask honestly: Where has God placed me, and am I on mission right there?

The Otalku Cafe is open! Join Mat and Chris as the cover the latest news in anime. Reviews roll on for various shows such as Wistoria, Witch Hat Atelier, Nippon Sangaku, Re:Zero, Made Friends with Second Prettiest Girl in my Class, Agents of Four Seasons, Mao, and more!You can also watch this episode in video form on the W2M Network Youtube Channel, please give us a like, comment on the episode, and give the channel a subscribe and follow as well: You can also watch this episode in video form on the W2M Network Youtube Channel, please give us a like, comment on the episode, and give the channel a subscribe and follow as well: https://youtube.com/live/sXsDFUi3hmk

Mike sits down with author and Cultural Revolution survivor Xi Van Fleet for a conversation that's equal parts personal history and cautionary tale. Xi recounts her childhood under Mao Zedong's China, where conformity wasn't encouraged—it was enforced. As a schoolgirl, she watched teachers publicly humiliated, neighbors turn on each other, and young people mobilized as ideological foot soldiers. Education gave way to indoctrination, and individuality was crushed in favor of collective obedience—the kind that produces "shiny little screws." Drawing from her first book, Mao's America, Xi lays out how mass movements rooted in ideology often rely on dividing people into opposing groups—"good" versus "bad"—to consolidate power. She also comments on how youth are frequently weaponized to accelerate cultural upheaval and dismantle traditional institutions, often by encouraging them to reject established norms and embrace radical ideologies. These patterns, she argues, aren't relics of history—they're recurring tactics. And they are showing up in America today! The conversation then turns to her latest work, Made in America, where the focus shifts from warning signs to origin stories. The central theme: the rise of Communist China wasn't inevitable—it was, in part, enabled by decisions made in the United States. Xi explores how decades of policy, economic cooperation, and ideological blind spots helped transform China into a global superpower, creating what she sees as one of America's greatest modern challenges. It's a conversation less about politics and more about people, choices, and consequences where Xi ends with a warning to America and why resisting the urge to become a "shiny little screw" might be more important than ever. Big thanks to our awesome sponsors ZipRecruiter.com/Rowe to post a job for FREE. GoodRanchers.com Use code MIKE to get $40 off your first order and free meat for life. Pestie.com/Mike to get an extra 10% off your order. AuraFrames.com/Mike Use code MIKE to get $25 off their best-selling Carver Mat frame.

Salih Hudayar is the Foreign Minister and former Prime Minister of the East Turkistan Government in Exile. He was born in East Turkistan, fled to the United States as a political refugee at age 7, and has spent his life working to bring international attention to what the US government and over a dozen Western parliaments have formally recognized as a genocide. We covered: how China invaded and occupied East Turkistan in 1949 with Stalin's help; the 1996 secret document that became the blueprint for genocidal policy; how China created a fake jihadist organization to justify its crackdown; how China and Turkey funneled 20,000 Uyghurs into Syria to manufacture a "terrorism" narrative; Xi Jinping's "show no mercy" speech and the bombing that followed two hours after his plane left; the 2.2 million Chinese officials sent to live inside Uyghur homes; the forced removal of over a million children into military boarding schools; 16,000 mosques destroyed; Muslim names, Ramadan fasting, and the Arabic greeting "Assalamu Alaikum" all banned; and the ongoing organ harvesting program in which an estimated 25,000 to 50,000 young Uyghurs are killed annually for their organs. The genocide is now in its 13th year. Millions remain in concentration camps. This is happening now. Learn more and get involved:  Follow on social media → https://x.com/ETExileGov  Recommended reading: "The Xinjiang Procedure" by Ethan Gutmann (organ harvesting research) TIMESTAMPS: 0:00 — Intro — who is Salih Hudayar? 0:25 — What is East Turkistan — and why China calls it "Xinjiang" 1:59 — Mao, Stalin, and the 1949 invasion 2:25 — Born in East Turkistan, fled to the US at age 7 4:37 — His father's mission: never forget where you came from 6:18 — Chinese raids on his family home 7:22 — ROTC, Oklahoma Army National Guard, and a kidney disease that ended his military career 8:13 — The Turkic world: Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Uzbeks 9:46 — China's 1996 Document No. 7 — the secret blueprint for genocide 11:51 — The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and crushing the independence movement 14:03 — How China created a fake jihadist group to justify the crackdown 17:31 — Were there actual terrorist attacks in East Turkistan? 18:31 — The Tiananmen Square car attack — false flag? 22:04 — How China and Turkey funneled 20,000 Uyghurs into Syria 24:23 — Grooming, brainwashing, and Chinese intelligence operations 32:23 — Xi Jinping's "show no mercy" speech 35:07 — The anti-extremism law: beards, Ramadan, and thought control 37:10 — Phase two: arresting everyone 38:12 — 2.2 million Chinese officials sent into Uyghur homes 41:02 — Children forcibly removed to state "orphanages" 43:19 — Why Muslim countries stay silent — Belt and Road leverage 44:45 — 16,000 mosques destroyed. Muslim names banned. 48:38 — Returning to East Turkistan in 2012 and 2014 53:11 — The Kant massacre: 3,000–4,000 killed 55:26 — His grandfather refused to leave 55:55 — The asylum process 59:05 — Organ harvesting: 25,000–50,000 killed annually 59:28 — How to support East Turkistan Watch full episodes on YouTube → https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J4Vb53s4I0A&list=PLb5trMQQvT077-L1roE0iZyAgT4dD4EtJ Listen on Apple Podcasts → https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-lou-perez-podcast/id1535032081 Listen on Spotify → https://open.spotify.com/show/2KAtC7eFS3NHWMZp2UgMVU  Lou's book — That Joke Isn't Funny Anymore: https://amzn.to/3VhFa1r  TheLouPerez.com |  info@thelouperez.com  Newsletter: https://substack.com/@louperez #UyghurGenocide #EastTurkistan #China #Xinjiang #SalihHudayar #CCP #HumanRights #LouPerezPodcast #Uyghur #GenocideAwareness Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Salih Hudayar is the Foreign Minister and former Prime Minister of the East Turkistan Government in Exile. He was born in East Turkistan, fled to the United States as a political refugee at age 7, and has spent his life working to bring international attention to what the US government and over a dozen Western parliaments have formally recognized as a genocide. We covered: how China invaded and occupied East Turkistan in 1949 with Stalin's help; the 1996 secret document that became the blueprint for genocidal policy; how China created a fake jihadist organization to justify its crackdown; how China and Turkey funneled 20,000 Uyghurs into Syria to manufacture a "terrorism" narrative; Xi Jinping's "show no mercy" speech and the bombing that followed two hours after his plane left; the 2.2 million Chinese officials sent to live inside Uyghur homes; the forced removal of over a million children into military boarding schools; 16,000 mosques destroyed; Muslim names, Ramadan fasting, and the Arabic greeting "Assalamu Alaikum" all banned; and the ongoing organ harvesting program in which an estimated 25,000 to 50,000 young Uyghurs are killed annually for their organs. The genocide is now in its 13th year. Millions remain in concentration camps. This is happening now. Learn more and get involved:  Follow on social media → https://x.com/ETExileGov  Recommended reading: "The Xinjiang Procedure" by Ethan Gutmann (organ harvesting research) TIMESTAMPS: 0:00 — Intro — who is Salih Hudayar? 0:25 — What is East Turkistan — and why China calls it "Xinjiang" 1:59 — Mao, Stalin, and the 1949 invasion 2:25 — Born in East Turkistan, fled to the US at age 7 4:37 — His father's mission: never forget where you came from 6:18 — Chinese raids on his family home 7:22 — ROTC, Oklahoma Army National Guard, and a kidney disease that ended his military career 8:13 — The Turkic world: Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Uzbeks 9:46 — China's 1996 Document No. 7 — the secret blueprint for genocide 11:51 — The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and crushing the independence movement 14:03 — How China created a fake jihadist group to justify the crackdown 17:31 — Were there actual terrorist attacks in East Turkistan? 18:31 — The Tiananmen Square car attack — false flag? 22:04 — How China and Turkey funneled 20,000 Uyghurs into Syria 24:23 — Grooming, brainwashing, and Chinese intelligence operations 32:23 — Xi Jinping's "show no mercy" speech 35:07 — The anti-extremism law: beards, Ramadan, and thought control 37:10 — Phase two: arresting everyone 38:12 — 2.2 million Chinese officials sent into Uyghur homes 41:02 — Children forcibly removed to state "orphanages" 43:19 — Why Muslim countries stay silent — Belt and Road leverage 44:45 — 16,000 mosques destroyed. Muslim names banned. 48:38 — Returning to East Turkistan in 2012 and 2014 53:11 — The Kant massacre: 3,000–4,000 killed 55:26 — His grandfather refused to leave 55:55 — The asylum process 59:05 — Organ harvesting: 25,000–50,000 killed annually 59:28 — How to support East Turkistan Watch full episodes on YouTube → https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J4Vb53s4I0A&list=PLb5trMQQvT077-L1roE0iZyAgT4dD4EtJ Listen on Apple Podcasts → https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-lou-perez-podcast/id1535032081 Listen on Spotify → https://open.spotify.com/show/2KAtC7eFS3NHWMZp2UgMVU  Lou's book — That Joke Isn't Funny Anymore: https://amzn.to/3VhFa1r  TheLouPerez.com |  info@thelouperez.com  Newsletter: https://substack.com/@louperez #UyghurGenocide #EastTurkistan #China #Xinjiang #SalihHudayar #CCP #HumanRights #LouPerezPodcast #Uyghur #GenocideAwareness Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Israël est-il en train de devenir un État paria ? La question est posée cette semaine dans le Nouvel Obs, qui titre en Une : « Crimes de guerre, colonisation, atteintes à la démocratie : la dérive d'Israël ». « Fondé pour être l'État refuge des juifs persécutés au lendemain de la Seconde guerre mondiale, Israël devient un état paria », estime Omer Bartov, universitaire israélo-américain, interrogé par le Nouvel Obs. Et l'hebdomadaire accuse : « Avec ses ministres messianiques et suprémacistes, le gouvernement israélien pratique une politique d'effacement des Palestiniens d'une violence inouïe et pilonne l'État de droit ». Le Nouvel Obs aligne les chiffres : « plus de 72 000 morts dont près de 30 000 enfants à Gaza, l'ouverture de six autres fronts : (Liban, Iran, Cisjordanie, Yémen, Irak, Syrie), et des frappes qui peuvent faire un carnage en quelques minutes comme à Beyrouth le 8 avril (350 morts et plus de 1200 blessés) ».   À Jérusalem-Est et Tel Aviv Le Nouvel Obs est allé à la rencontre des Israéliens et des Palestiniens. L'hebdomadaire s'est rendu à Silwa, quartier de Jérusalem-Est, en Cisjordanie occupée, où les habitants palestiniens de 150 maisons ont reçu des ordres de démolition, pour faire la place à des familles de colons. Destruction que les Palestiniens doivent effectuer eux-mêmes sous peine d'une amende de « dizaines de milliers de shekels ». C'est ainsi que Wassim Siam, « père de cinq enfants » est en train de démolir sa propre maison. « Les Israéliens ne veulent plus de nous ici », déclare-t-il au Nouvel Obs.   L'hebdomadaire s'est aussi rendu à Tel Aviv, où il a rencontré des Israéliens majoritairement favorables à la politique de Benyamin Netanyahou, comme cette jeune réserviste de l'armée israélienne qui déclare : « J'espère qu'on va reprendre Gaza. Ils doivent foutre le camp d'ici. Il y a plein d'état musulmans dans le monde, pourquoi on ne pourrait pas avoir notre petit bout de terre à nous ? » « L'immense majorité des médias israéliens, précise le Nouvel Obs, martèle désormais un discours nationaliste, guerrier et relaie la propagande gouvernementale ». Dans ces conditions, y a-t-il encore une opposition en Israël ?  « La gauche israélienne, encore favorable à une solution à deux Etats, se réduit comme peau de chagrin », reconnaît l'hebdomadaire.  Le pouvoir jusqu'au bout Le Point fait sa Une sur « Ces malades qui nous gouvernent ». Et la liste est longue, elle va de Georges Pompidou, François Mitterrand et Jacques Chirac en France, à Mao en Chine, en passant par Staline, à l'époque de l'URSS. Mais l'actualité, en la matière, nous conduit aux États-Unis. « Entre Joe Biden et Donald Trump, lequel est le plus atteint ? » interroge le Point, qui ne répond pas vraiment, mais qui publie une photo des deux hommes, chacun en public, semblant plongé dans un profond sommeil… ce à quoi l'actuel président américain a répondu « qu'on le prend en photo quand il cligne des yeux ». Le 13 avril dernier, « son médecin Sean Barbabella a publié un rapport décrivant sa santé comme "excellente", y compris sur le plan cognitif ». Mais « la majorité des Américains en doute », assure le Point, à l'appui de plusieurs sondages, dont l'un paru fin février, et selon lequel « 61 % des Américains pensent que Donald Trump est devenu "imprévisible avec l'âge" ». D'anciens soutiens du président en doutent aussi, ajoute l'Express, d'anciens soutiens qui invoquent le 25ème amendement, celui qui permettrait de chasser Donald Trump du pouvoir. Toutefois, rappelle le Point, « la révocation du président devrait être votée par le Congrès à la majorité des deux tiers. Assez peu probable », conclut l'hebdomadaire. Blocage d'Internet En Russie, plusieurs villes, dont la capitale Moscou, sont privées d'Internet, depuis plusieurs semaines, annonce l'Express, selon lequel « la grogne monte au sein de la population et des élites pro-pouvoir ». L'hebdomadaire raconte une scène courante : dans la rue, un Moscovite se bat avec un plan papier, « encombrant et chiffonné », faute de GPS. « Un comble, dans une des villes les plus digitalisées au monde », remarque l'Express, qui ajoute : « Aujourd'hui, les Russes font un grand bond en arrière. Pourquoi ? simplement par la volonté de Poutine. Plus exactement du FSB, successeur du KGB, aux manettes de cette vaste opération de censure (…) » Explications d'Alexander Kolyandr, chercheur au Centre d'analyse des politiques européennes : « Les services de sécurité russes veulent créer un goulag numérique car ils considèrent Internet comme une menace ». La tension est montée d'un cran, mi-avril, avec la vidéo d'une blogueuse, faisant partie "du cercle pro-poutine", comptant "13 millions d'abonnés", et ayant publié un post incendiaire, dans lequel « elle liste les problèmes qui s'accumulent en Russie, dont le blocage d'Internet ». Le porte-parole du Kremlin Dmitri Peskov a estimé que ce message abordait "des questions importantes", dont "aucune n'a été laissée sans réponse". C'est peu, mais aux yeux de l'Express, "c'est le signe d'une fébrilité au sein du pouvoir, à 5 mois des élections à la Douma". 

Kokekokko! That cry means it's time for the Plummet Spring Impressions for 2026!!! This week, we have everyone on board to discuss their initial thoughts on over 35 anime that are coming out this season. Tune in to find out what we're excited for and what we're dropping.Shows Covered:(00:08:58) Haibara's Teenage New Game+(00:11:17) A Hundred Scenes of Awajima(00:15:25) Yowa Yowa Sensei(00:23:14) Mao(00:32:30) Even a Replica Can Fall in Love(00:35:53) Snowball Earth(00:46:27) The Klutzy Class Monitor and the Girl with the Short Skirt(00:53:44) Rooster Fighter(00:58:18) Botan Kamiina Fully Blossoms When Drunk(01:02:21) Go For It, Nakamura-kun!!(01:03:48) Killed again, Mr. Detective(01:06:50) Petals of Reincarnation(01:08:37) I Want to End this Love Game(01:13:31) Mistress Kanan is Devilishly Easy(01:19:19) Liar Game(01:25:12) The Warrior Princess and the Barbaric King(01:34:57) Akane Banashi(01:39:21) Agents of the Four Seasons: Dance of Spring(01:49:00) NIPPON SANGOKU: The Three Nations of the Crimson Sun(01:53:26) Gals Can't Be Kind to Otaku!?(02:00:02) The Ramparts of Ice(02:03:53) I Made Friends with the Second Prettiest Girl in My Class(02:09:26) Marriagetoxin(02:15:24) Daemons of the Shadow Realm (02:21:31) Witch Hat Atelier(02:31:13) SequelsFor more info and our Anime Plummet Trucker Hats, Shirts, and Beer koozie, check out ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠AnimeSummit.net⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠. Theme Song: Toilet Paper by ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Danya Vodovoz⁠⁠⁠⁠

The Otalku Cafe is open! Join Mat and Chris as they cover the latest news in anime. Their first set of reviews for the season starts now as they cover various shows such as Rent a Girlfriend, Mao, Witch Hat Atelier, Classroom of the Elite, Petals of Reincarnation, Yowaowa Sensei, Ichijyoma Mankitsu Gurashi, and more!You can also watch this episode in video form on the W2M Network Youtube Channel, please give us a like, comment on the episode, and give the channel a subscribe and follow as well: You can also watch this episode in video form on the W2M Network Youtube Channel, please give us a like, comment on the episode, and give the channel a subscribe and follow as well: https://youtube.com/live/6DJ4opbu_Ow

Welcome, welcome! We're back with more new shows from this season and let's just say that a lot of them take place in high school. Also, your favorite segment, "Is it porn" is back... though this is an anime podcast so I probably should have called it "Is it hentrai". Please forgive the error. Shows covered on this episode: The Classroom of a Black Cat and a Witch, Even a Replica Can Fall in Love, Fist of the Northstar: Hokuto No Ken, Haibara's Teenage New Game+, I Want To End This Love Game, Ingoku Danchi: Deviant's Apartment Complex, Kill Blue, Killed Again Mr. Detective, Kirio Fanclub, Mao, Marika's Love Meter Malfunction and Yowayowa Sensei.

Alfredo Rodrighuez :L'interview de Rick BeatoOye como vaThe final countdownEmil Ernebro Covers :Ingrid Courrèges : Une souris verteLatin Jazz & Bolero covers : Street Fighter IIOtu : Master of puppets par The BeatlesPhil Collins : The end Angine de Poitrine : Full Performance Sons zarbi :Eric Poirier : Harmonica accordéonIgnacio Orga : HarmonettaTheo Myling : Cat musicEscuela de musica : BelieverBouteilles dans la rue Meara O'Reilly Reiner Sijpkens : Muziekboot Trucs en vrac :Marcin : Bite your nailsJessie ReidQueen vs Jackson : I want to black or whiteWepa Wepa : Nirvana feat. Bande organiséeCocodettes : Mashup bulgare La +BCdM :Michael Dees : What are you doing the rest of your lifepar Barbra Streisand et en répétition avec Michel Legrand - Sarah Vaughan - Frank Sinatra - Bill Evans - Joe Pass - Nathalie Dessay - Rob LeeElla Fitzgerald : In a sentimental MoodB.J. Thomas : Raindrops keep falling on my head La Playlist de la +BCdM :sur le Tube à Waltersur Spotify (merci John Cytron) sur Deezer (merci MaO de Paris)sur Amazon Music (merci Hellxions)et sur Apple Music (merci Yawourt)Vote pour la Plus Belle Chanson du Monde Le son mystère (33'10) :Paul & Linda McCartney : Hey DiddleAvec :BibouBibounetteDr ZaiusDanyAudeLe PodthécairePère de famillePop goes the WZAPat HogunCausmic BeastPinchoSephiraphMerci à :Pop goes the WZARandall FlaggNikoFifou FouBibounetteDidierDavid JDLPPodcasts & liens cités :Tumyxo saison 3 : récit au jour le jour et sur podCloudWalter sur BlueSkyWalter sur MastodonWalter sur InstagramLes 100 +BCdMLe générique de fin est signé Cousbou

Janice Trey is a Chinese labor camp survivor who spent her first nine years in a forced labor facility during Mao's Cultural Revolution, an experience that shaped her deep commitment to truth, freedom, and exposing authoritarianism. She immigrated to the United States, earned degrees, became a licensed CPA, and built a successful career as a Fortune 500 executive with expertise across industries. She later served as CEO and Board Chair of The Epoch Times and NTD TV, where she has been a vocal advocate against CCP infiltration, censorship, and propaganda, frequently speaking at congressional and public events on these issues. She is also associated as spokesperson for SafeMeet and holds MIT certification.Watch the Cornerstone Forum 26'https://shaunnewmanpodcast.substack.com/Silver Gold Bull Links:Website: https://silvergoldbull.ca/Email: SNP@silvergoldbull.comText Grahame: (587) 441-9100Bow Valley Credit UnionBitcoin: www.bowvalleycu.com/en/personal/investing-wealth/bitcoin-gatewayEmail: welcome@BowValleycu.com Get your voice heard: Text Shaun 587-217-8500

Outiller les musiciens, chanteurs et compositeurs de tout ce que l'informatique peut apporter, c'est le principe de la musique assistée par ordinateur. Au Sénégal, dans la ville de Bignona, à 450 km au sud de Dakar, en basse Casamance, des chanteurs, DJ et musiciens de la région ont pu se former pendant trois jours à ces techniques de la musique assistée par ordinateur, MAO, et développer leur créativité grâce à l'informatique. De notre envoyée spéciale de retour de Bignona, Les mines sont concentrées. Sur un grand écran s'affiche le contenu d'un ordinateur, plusieurs pistes de sons sont visibles. Alain Touchat, ingénieur du son et producteur, guide ses six élèves dans l'univers de la musique assistée par ordinateur. « C'est les bases de l'audionumérique, les bases de l'ingénierie du son, explique-t-il. Même si on ne rentre pas dans tous les calculs mathématiques qui font partie du métier, l'idée c'est de pouvoir vraiment leur transmettre tous les réglages déjà de base que l'on retrouve techniquement – la résolution, la fréquence d'échantillonnage, qu'est-ce que c'est le son, comment ça fonctionne de pouvoir sampler, de savoir comment on peut récupérer les samples, comment on peut les gérer après... » Retravailler un son, y ajouter des effets, voilà des choses que Moussa, artiste compositeur à Sédhiou, en haute Casamance, et qui finance son activité de musicien grâce à sa boutique d'accessoires informatique, fait déjà depuis plus de 10 ans. Mais en bidouillant. « J'ai commencé à faire des sons en 2020 et c'est la première fois que je me forme comme ça, témoigne-t-il. Je n'ai jamais fait de formation de ma vie. J'avais l'habitude d'aller dans les studios mais je restais derrière, pour suivre. Je me formais seul, avec Internet, je regardais les tutos. C'est comme ça que je me formais d'habitude. Mais quand je suis venu ici, je me suis rendu compte que je ne connaissais rien. Je sais faire, mais je ne connaissais pas. » À écouter dans Écouter le mondeDe l'aube à la nuit – Ziguinchor Connecter le sud et le nord Aroda Sagna, Atika Di Maléguéne de son nom de scène, chanteur de reggae originaire de Ziguinchor, confirme le côté inédit de cette formation dans une région bien éloignée de la capitale. « Ça fait deux jours qu'on fait que de la théorie, moi, c'est ce qui m'intéresse, approuve le musicien. Nous, en Casamance, c'est ça le problème, il y a tellement d'artistes, mais ce genre de formation, on n'en a jamais l'occasion. » Aroda rêve d'un État plus impliqué. « Si, par exemple, l'État ou le ministère de la Culture déployait une équipe dans chaque région, poursuit-il, où au moins les artistes et autres qui travaillent dans la musique pourraient avoir une formation d'une durée de deux mois, cela nous servirait à beaucoup de choses. » Avec son association Les Rues du Sud, voilà 8 ans qu'Alain Touchat forme des musiciens au Maroc, au Sénégal et en Guinée Conakry, mais le plus dur reste toujours de connecter le Sud et le Nord : « D'arriver à les faire exporter, de leur faire traverser les frontières musicalement, de les mettre en relation avec des producteurs à l'étranger qui sont à la recherche de beatmakers, détaille Alain Touchat, de permettre un échange avec des professionnels à l'extérieur. » En attendant, Alain Touchat a créé un Discord, une messagerie instantanée sur laquelle les artistes peuvent échanger sans visa.  À lire aussiSénégal: à Bignona, le festival des musiques urbaines, un tremplin pour jeunes rappeurs et slameurs

North Korea has nuclear weapons, a succession plan hiding in plain sight, and a personality cult that has outlasted Stalin's and Mao's combined. Wall Street Journal's Beijing bureau chief Jonathan Cheng argues the world keeps misreading Pyongyang because it insists on reducing it to an authoritarian state. North Korea is also a religious society, built on a divine rule centered on a "god-king", Cheng argues. Kim Jong Un, third generation leader of the Kim dynasty was able to consolidate his power while developping the nuclear arsenal his father had succesfully created. Now, with the Iran war reshaping global order, Kim's long bet on nuclear weapons looks like the smartest foreign policy call of the century. North Korea, long treated as a pariah nuclear nation on the international stage, seems to be taken seriously by top China has quietly dropped "denuclearization" from its own documents. Trump calls Kim Jong Un a friend. And Kim is already preparing a successor, his daughter, reportedly 12 years old, in plain sight. Subscribe to the GZERO World with Ian Bremmer Podcast on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or your preferred podcast platform, to receive new episodes as soon as they're published. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

North Korea has nuclear weapons, a succession plan hiding in plain sight, and a personality cult that has outlasted Stalin's and Mao's combined. Wall Street Journal's Beijing bureau chief Jonathan Cheng argues the world keeps misreading Pyongyang because it insists on reducing it to an authoritarian state. North Korea is also a religious society, built on a divine rule centered on a "god-king", Cheng argues. Kim Jong Un, third generation leader of the Kim dynasty was able to consolidate his power while developping the nuclear arsenal his father had succesfully created. Now, with the Iran war reshaping global order, Kim's long bet on nuclear weapons looks like the smartest foreign policy call of the century. North Korea, long treated as a pariah nuclear nation on the international stage, seems to be taken seriously by top China has quietly dropped "denuclearization" from its own documents. Trump calls Kim Jong Un a friend. And Kim is already preparing a successor, his daughter, reportedly 12 years old, in plain sight. Subscribe to the GZERO World with Ian Bremmer Podcast on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or your preferred podcast platform, to receive new episodes as soon as they're published. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

This is one of the BEST interviews we've ever done on supplements and cutting-edge supplement technology... We had Dr. Scott Sherr on the podcast — a board-certified internal medicine physician who practices health optimization medicine and hyperbaric oxygen therapy. This guy KNOWS his stuff and we break down some of the most powerful compounds you can get your hands on to improve cognitive function, athletic performance, and longevity. Here's the reality... 94% of US adults are metabolically UNHEALTHY. That means your mitochondria — the powerhouses of your cells — are struggling to produce the energy you need. Dr. Sherr explains exactly why this happens, how it connects to everything from anxiety and depression to fat loss struggles, and what you can actually DO about it. We dive DEEP into methylene blue — the first drug ever registered with the FDA back in 1897 — and why it's become one of the most powerful tools for supporting mitochondrial function and energy production. But it doesn't stop there... We cover the GABAergic system and why most people are walking around GABA deficient (hello anxiety, insomnia, and mood issues), the synergy between methylene blue and red light therapy, how to use these compounds for travel, and a complete sleep optimization stack that could finally get you those 90+ Oura Ring scores. If you're tired of being tired, stressed about being stressed, or just want to understand how to actually support your body at a cellular level — this episode is a MUST listen. MAPS PPL — https://mapsppl.com (code: ppl) SPONSORS Troscriptions — https://troscriptions.com/mindpump (code: mindpump) Seed — https://seed.com/mindpump (code: 25mindpump) 00:00 — Intro 5:56 — Dr. Scott Sherr's background and health optimization medicine framework 10:42 — Strengths and weaknesses of conventional vs alternative medicine 16:34 — Why 94% of US adults are metabolically unhealthy 22:30 — The 'sympathetic spiral of doom' and why doing MORE isn't better 25:48 — Deep dive into methylene blue — history and mechanisms 35:09 — MAO inhibition, serotonin syndrome risk, and dosing protocols 42:43 — Methylene blue and red light therapy synergy 48:55 — GABA system, B3-GABA, and the TroCalm formula explained 59:58 — Complete sleep optimization stack and nighttime routine 67:30 — Cordycepin benefits and immune support protocols PEOPLE MENTIONED Dr. Scott Sherr — Guest — board-certified internal medicine physician, health optimization medicine practitioner, co-founder of Troscriptions Dr. Ted Achacoso — Founder of Troscriptions and the Health Optimization Medicine nonprofit, mentor to Dr. Sherr Alan Sherr — Dr. Sherr's father — chiropractor for 45+ years who influenced his alternative medicine philosophy Francisco Gonzalez Lima — Researcher at University of Texas Austin studying methylene blue for Alzheimer's, TBI, and stroke Thomas DeLauer — Mutual friend who uses methylene blue 2-3 times per week on high-stress days Paul Stamets — Referenced regarding mushroom knowledge and Amanita Muscaria/Santa Claus connection

What if feeling better didn't have to take months or years to figure out, but could start today? On this episode of The Dr. Hyman Show, I sit down with Dr. Scott Sherr to talk about why so many people feel stuck in what he calls a “sympathetic spiral of doom.” Energy is low, recovery isn't what it used to be, and there's a constant sense of stress that doesn't seem to resolve. We walk through what's actually happening beneath the surface, why it can be so hard to break out of that pattern once you're in it, and how to start shifting your energy and recovery. Watch the full conversation on YouTube, or listen wherever you get your podcasts. In this episode, we discuss: • Why you feel “tired but wired” and what it actually means for your body • What's keeping your energy low even when nothing obvious is wrong • How stress from your life and environment builds up and keeps you stuck • Why calming down doesn't always work—and what to focus on instead • How to start rebuilding your energy so your body can recover and adapt We shouldn't have to wait for something to go wrong to take action. The goal is to help your body function better so you can actually feel it day to day. View Show Notes From This Episode Get Free Weekly Health Tips from Dr. Hyman https://drhyman.com/pages/picks?utm_campaign=shownotes&utm_medium=banner&utm_source=podcast Sign Up for Dr. Hyman's Weekly Longevity Journal https://drhyman.com/pages/longevity?utm_campaign=shownotes&utm_medium=banner&utm_source=podcast Join the 10-Day Detox to Reset Your Health https://drhyman.com/pages/10-day-detox Join the Hyman Hive for Expert Support and Real Results https://drhyman.com/pages/hyman-hive This episode is brought to you by Perfect Amino, Korrus, Timeline, BON CHARGE, BIOptimizers and Pique. Go to bodyhealth.com and use code HYMAN20 to get 20% off your first order. Visit korrus.com/drhyman for 15% off their newest product OIO Sphere with code HYMANSPHERE15. Visit timeline.com/drhyman for 20% off a subscription on top of the new starting price of $79. Head to boncharge.com/hyman and use code HYMAN for 15% off. Head to bioptimizers.com/hyman and use promo code HYMAN at checkout to save 15%. Secure 20% off your order plus a free starter kit at piquelife.com/hyman. (0:00) Introduction and guest Dr. Scott Scherer (3:31) Understanding the sympathetic spiral of doom (5:06) Symptoms and signs of sympathetic overdrive (7:10) Sympathetic activation, mitochondrial function, and stress (10:02) Mitochondria: their role and impact in the body (12:31) Stress, metabolic dysfunction, and their effects (17:43) Nervous system, mitochondria, and the cell danger response (21:25) Survival, stress, and breaking the sympathetic spiral (23:11) Contributors to stress: top-down and bottom-up (25:56) Mitochondria, microbiome, and medication impacts (29:38) Mitochondrial dysfunction and mental health (32:19) Limitations of parasympathetic activation and addressing root causes (36:46) How mitochondrial stress leads to fight-or-flight (37:52) Steps to break the sympathetic spiral and support mitochondria (42:41) Methylene blue: benefits, uses, and safety (50:35) Methylene blue as an MAO inhibitor and for chronic infections (57:17) Case studies, third-party testing, and Transcriptions' evolution (1:02:36) Parasympathetic edge, recovery, and the GABA system (1:07:44) GABA, supplements, and interventions for stress (1:12:23) Addressing root causes and methylene blue usage (1:17:29) Transcriptions products, sleep formula, and practitioner ecosystem (1:19:49) OneBase Health, hyperbaric space, and final information

Joining Audrey for this week's REELTalk - Exec. Dir. of American Constitutional Rights Union and bestselling author, LTC ALLEN WEST, will be here! AND, Senior Reporter & Chief European Correspondent for CBN News, DALE HURD, will be here! PLUS, bestselling author of Mao's America, XI VAN FLEET will be here to discuss her new book, Made In America! In the words of Benjamin Franklin, "If we do not hang together, we shall surely hang separately." Come hang with us...  

Joe reflects on Ryan Gosling's movie - which he enjoyed - and human fascination with an escape to another and alien culture. He talks about his experience as a participant observer at a Catholic men's Wild Man gathering and displays the merch he picked up there - including illustrated advice to "Put on the whole armour of God, that ye may be able to stand against the wiles of the devil." (which armor includes, the: helmet of salvation, breastplate of righteousness, belt/girdle of truth (loins girt with truth), shoes of peace (feet with the preparation of the gospel of peace), shield of faith and the sword of the spirit/word of God). Another amusing and insightful chat between these two longstanding cult specialists. Links: Joe's websiteFor anyone else who finds things like this as fascinating as Spike does, here's more information on the statue of Mao. And here's a great video on how Lenin's body was (and still is) preserved.

To listen to the full bonus episode, join the Empire Club at empirepoduk.com. Wild Swans author, Jung Chang, joins William to discuss her family's harrowing experiences during Mao's Cultural Revolution and how Xi Jinping continues his memory in China today.  She tells the story of how her father defied Mao and paid the price in a detention facility. She explains how she travelled across the countryside as a teenager, working as a peasant labourer and a barefoot doctor. And she discusses how Mao's legacy in China continues to shape global politics, from Iran to Venezuela. Jung Chang's Fly, Wild Swans, is available to buy now. Join the Empire Club: Unlock the full Empire experience – with bonus episodes, ad-free listening, early access to miniseries and live show tickets, exclusive book discounts, a members-only newsletter, and access to our private Discord chatroom. Sign up directly at empirepoduk.com  For more Goalhanger Podcasts, head to www.goalhanger.com. Email: empire@goalhanger.com Instagram: @empirepoduk Blue Sky: @empirepoduk X: @empirepoduk Assistant Producer: Imogen Marriott Editor: Josh Smith Social Producer: Charlie Johnson Producer: Anouska Lewis Executive Producer: Dom Johnson Wild Swans author, Jung Chang, joins William to discuss her family's harrowing experiences during Mao's Cultural Revolution and how Xi Jinping continues his memory in China today.  She tells the story of her 2 weeks as a Red Guard, and how her father defied Mao and paid the price in a detention facility. She explains how she travelled across the countryside as a teenager, working as a peasant labourer and a barefoot doctor. And she discusses how Mao's legacy in China continues to shape global politics, from Iran to Venezuela. Jung Chang's Fly, Wild Swans, is available to buy now. For more Goalhanger Podcasts, head to www.goalhanger.com. Email: empire@goalhanger.com Instagram: @empirepoduk Blue Sky: @empirepoduk X: @empirepoduk Assistant Producer: Imogen Marriott Editor: Josh Smith Social Producer: Charlie Johnson Producer: Anouska Lewis Executive Producer: Dom Johnson Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Xi Van Fleet is a survivor of Mao's Cultural Revolution and a passionate advocate for freedom. Follow her on X: @ xvanfleet, Instagram: @xivanfleet, and check out her new book Made In America: The Secret History of How the US Enabled Communist China and Created Our Greatest Threat.In The News: Nick Cannon Says Dems Are The KKK Party, Progressive Rep. Pramila Jayapal calls for reparations for illegal immigrants ‘traumatized' by ICE, Federal election complaint alleges AOC misused campaign funds for psychiatrist servicesFOR MORE WITH XI VAN FLEET:X: @ xvanfleetINSTAGRAM: @ xivanfleetBOOK: Made In America: The Secret History of How the US Enabled Communist China and Created Our Greatest ThreatFOR MORE WITH ELISHA KRAUSS: INSTAGRAM: @elishakraussWEBSITE: elishakrauss.com JOURNAL: https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/author/elisha-krauss/LIVE SHOWS: April 10 - Salt Lake City, UT (2 shows)April 11 - Salt Lake City, UT (2 shows)April 12 - San Diego, CA (Live Podcast)April 12 - San Diego, CA (Stand up)Thank you for supporting our sponsors:Protect your family with life insurance from Ethos. Get up to $3 million in coverage in as little as 10 minutes at https://ethos.com/adam. Application times may vary. Rates may vary.oreillyauto.com/ADAMRosettastone.com/ADAMSimpliSafe.com/ADAMPluto.tvSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Last time we spoke about the Wang Jingwei Regime. During the Second Sino-Japanese War, tensions between Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei escalated amid Japan's aggressive invasion. Disillusioned by Chiang's scorched-earth tactics, such as the Yellow River flood and Changsha fire, Wang defected from Chongqing in December 1938, fleeing to Hanoi to negotiate peace with Japan. An assassination attempt, likely ordered by Chiang, killed Wang's secretary Zeng Zhongming, deepening the rift and sparking retaliatory violence. Wang's group, aided by Japanese agents like Kagesa Sadaaki, navigated scandals and leaks, including a forged agreement exposed in the press. After grueling negotiations in Shanghai and Tokyo, Wang conceded to harsh Japanese terms, including limited sovereignty and economic controls. On March 30, 1940, he established the Reorganized National Government (RNG) in Nanjing, adopting the nationalist flag with a controversial yellow pennant symbolizing "peace, anticommunism, nation-building." Despite Wang's vision of constitutional democracy, the RNG functioned as a wartime puppet, isolated from Chongqing and resented as traitorous. Wang died in 1944, and the regime collapsed in 1945.   #195 The Xiang-Gan Operation Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the sweltering grip of August 1939, Chongqing languished under an unbearably hot summer, the air thick with humidity and the weight of impending doom. Perched on a sun-baked hillside along the southern bank of the Jialing River, roughly 10 kilometers from the chaotic heart of the city, loomed a two-story Western-style building. This fortress of stone and resolve, known as the "Huangshan Villa," stood as Chiang Kai-shek's official residence in Chongqing, a sanctuary amid the storm of war. Unless urgent meetings or crises at the Military Affairs Commission demanded his presence, it was here that Chiang orchestrated the fate of a nation on the brink.   One fateful evening, as shadows lengthened across the villa, the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics delivered a chilling report from Wang Pengsheng, the director of the Military Affairs Commission's Institute for International Affairs. Wang was no ordinary operative; he was a knowledgeable, experienced, and sharp-minded intellectual, a master of Japanese affairs, and one of Chiang's most trusted aides, his insights cutting like a blade through the fog of deception. In this urgent dispatch, Wang distilled the latest machinations from Japan. After the traitor Wang Jingwei defected to the enemy, Japan glimpsed a sinister new path to conquer China: ramping up political inducements for surrender, with brutal military offensives reduced to mere supporting roles. On June 20, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters unleashed "strategy" tasks upon its troops in China—to incite local armies, those ragtag "miscellaneous troops," to betray their own, isolating and pulverizing the central army units. Wang Pengsheng saw through the ruse; this "attacking the heart" and "subduing strategies," drawn from the ancient wisdom of China's military sage Sun Tzu, betrayed the Japanese army's desperate straits, manpower stretched thin, supplies dwindling to the point of desperation.   Chiang Kai-shek's eyes narrowed as he gripped his red pencil, underlining a passage in the report with deliberate strokes, marking it as a thunderclap of importance or urgency: To cooperate with the establishment of the Wang puppet regime and exert military pressure on the Chongqing government, under the direction of the Imperial General Headquarters, the commander of the Japanese 11th Army, Okamura Yasuji, had formulated the "Xiang-Gan Operation Plan" targeting the main forces of the central army in the Ninth War Zone and was intensifying preparations for its implementation. The words hung heavy in the air like a gathering storm. Chiang Kai-shek rose abruptly, his body protesting with a stiff ache from hours of unyielding vigilance. He stretched his weary waist and legs, then pushed open the wooden door beside the vast sun-facing window, stepping out onto the balcony as if seeking solace from the encroaching night.   The balcony commanded a sweeping vista, a momentary escape from the suffocating confines of strategy and betrayal. Gazing downward, the "Fog Capital" Chongqing emerged in rare clarity, serene and layered beneath the fiery embrace of the evening glow. The distant murmur of the Jialing River, flowing ceaselessly like the pulse of a defiant heart, whispered a fleeting sense of ease amid the turmoil. Yet even this pause carried the echoes of war's relentless march. After the Japanese horde seized Wuhan and surged onward to claim Yueyang—only to halt their southward thrust—both Mao Zedong in his Yan'an stronghold and Chiang Kai-shek in Chongqing etched this moment as a pivotal divide in China's War of Resistance Against Japan. Mao proclaimed the war had plunged into the "stalemate phase," a grinding impasse. Chiang, ever the resolute leader, declared the "second phase of the war of resistance" ignited from this very point.   But across the vast national battlefield, the first half of 1939 roared with unquenched fury, the air thick with the acrid smoke of gunpowder. From the year's dawn, the Japanese army, bolstered by five divisions and eight mixed brigades, launched ruthless "security consolidation" operations in North China to fortify their blood-soaked conquests, only to be harried and bloodied by the Communist Eighth Route Army slipping behind enemy lines and the valiant troops of the First and Second War Zones. In late March, the Japanese 11th Army stormed Nanchang, clashing in a maelstrom of fire with the four group armies of the Ninth War Zone under the iron command of front-line commander Luo Zhuoying. For a grueling month and a half, the battle raged, the Japanese claiming the city at a staggering cost in lives. Chiang Kai-shek, his fury mounting, demanded a counterattack from the Ninth War Zone, but it crumbled into tragedy, over 20,000 souls lost, including Lieutenant General Chen Anbao, the indomitable commander of the 29th Army. Nanchang remained in enemy hands, fueling Chiang's rage like an inferno unchecked.   Then, in May, the Japanese Kwantung Army clashed with Soviet and Mongolian forces in the epic conflagration at Nomonhan. What ignited a spark of grim satisfaction in Chiang was not merely the Japanese rout, with nearly 20,000 of their ranks obliterated, but the broader ripple: this Japan-Soviet inferno would heap pressure upon the invaders in China, weakening their grasp. As the war sank into its stalemate phase, Chiang turned his gaze inward, fiercely guarding his military strength while awaiting the winds of change. He clung to a core conviction: the essence of the War of Resistance boiled down to that single, unbreakable word—"resist." Troops could be sacrificed, territories forsaken, retreats endured when battles turned dire, but surrender was unthinkable. As long as resistance endured, the nation would hold its place among the world's powers, and its leaders their rightful thrones. In time, the tides of international intrigue would shift; the imperialist giants, driven by their own insatiable interests, would not stand idly by as China fell to Japan's maw.   With resolve hardening like steel, Chiang Kai-shek strode back to his imposing desk and seized the telephone, dialing Xu Yongchang, the Minister of Military Orders. His voice cut through the line with unyielding command: instruct Deputy Chief of Staff Bai Chongxi, currently in the Ninth War Zone dissecting the bitter lessons of the Nanchang debacle, to hasten and aid Chen Cheng in crafting ironclad military deployments against the looming Japanese "Xiang-Gan Operation" and submit them without delay.   As the last defiant ray of sunlight plunged below the horizon, the sprawl of Chongqing's urban expanse succumbed to an enveloping darkness, a shroud of uncertainty. Since the government had fled southward, Chongqing had become a relentless target for Japanese bombers, their payloads raining death and devastation in waves of tragedy. By night, the city enforced ironclad blackout controls, its citizens huddling in fear behind heavy curtains, their lives reduced to whispers in the shadows. Chiang Kai-shek's mind drifted to the pre-war nights of the mountain city, when thousands of lights danced like stars upon the river's rippling waves. A deep, weary sigh escaped him, carrying the burden of a leader who refused to yield.   Far from the shadowed balconies of Chongqing, as China's War of Resistance Against Japan plunged into its harrowing third year, the misty haven of Guilin clung to its gentle, rain-soaked serenity, a fragile oasis amid the chaos of a nation torn asunder. Farmers, oblivious to the headlines screaming from distant newspapers, trudged barefoot through the lush fields, guiding massive water buffaloes with their backward-curving horns and deceptively gentle temperaments. Verdant tea groves blanketed the undulating hills, their leaves whispering secrets to the wind, while breezes carried the haunting, sweet-and-sour melodies of mountain songs that seemed to defy the encroaching shadows of war. Those weary souls fleeing the bloodied front lines stumbled into this paradise, their eyes widening in awe, as if they had crossed into a dream untouched by the nightmare raging beyond.   Nestled in the northwestern suburbs of the city, the Guilin Office pulsed with the raw energy of command, its operations post concealed within a colossal karst cave, a labyrinth of nature's own fortifications. Amid the jagged stalagmites and dripping stalactites, wires snaked like veins, cables coiled in tense anticipation, and radio antennas reached out like desperate fingers grasping for signals. These were the nerves of war, linking this hidden nerve center to the smoke-choked, blood-drenched front lines where heroes and horrors collided in the unyielding struggle for resistance.   Deputy Chief of Staff of the Military Affairs Commission and Director of the Guilin Office—Bai Chongxi—unfolded the telegram folder thrust into his hands by his confidential staff, his heart pounding with the weight of destiny:   "To Director Bai in Guilin: Telegram received. Deploy operations according to Plan A.   Zhongzheng"   Before departing Changsha, the Second Department had already whispered warnings of the Japanese horde's intent to strike southward, and fatefully, an urgent call from Xu Yongchang had demanded the swift forging of a battle plan to confront the enemy. As Bai Chongxi devoured the enemy intelligence, a bold strategy ignited in his mind like a flare in the darkness. Chen Cheng, the steadfast Commander of the Ninth War Zone, championed the tried-and-true tactic of successive resistance, but with a grim twist: retreat would be capped north of Changsha. Front-line troops would grind down the Japanese invaders, bleeding them dry before slipping to the east and west flanks. There, they would pounce on the enemy's exposed sides as the foes pressed southward, culminating in a devastating annihilation beneath the walls of Changsha with the aid of the garrison. This blueprint minimized troop movements and promised a swift, brutal clash. Yet Chen Cheng, burdened by his dual role as Minister of the Political Department of the Military Affairs Commission, had delegated command to Xue Yue as acting Ninth War Zone Commander. In heated deliberations, Xue Yue tilted toward Chen's vision, his resolve echoing the caution of survival.   But Bai Chongxi, his strategic mind a whirlwind of innovation, saw a bolder path through the storm. The Japanese forces lurking in the Wuhan area were fractured, split between the Yangtze's north and south, facing off against China's formidable heavy troops. Though intelligence on the scale of their assault remained shrouded in mystery, Bai knew their drawable forces couldn't exceed half their might, and their endurance in sustained combat would falter like a dying flame. "To swallow the attackers whole, the battlefield must be vast and unforgiving, our forces luring them deeper while retreating to the Hengyang area, stretching the enemy thin across a sprawling 200-kilometer wasteland." There, the invaders would wither in passivity, their food and ammunition lines stretched to breaking. Then, in a masterful stroke, troops from the Jiuling and Mufu Mountains would surge westward, while those west of the Xiang River drove eastward, severing every land and water escape route in a vise of total annihilation. Both plans stood as ironclad fortresses of logic, each unassailable in its reasoning, and were dispatched simultaneously to Chiang Kai-shek, the arbiter of China's fate.   By rank and protocol, Bai's vision claimed the mantle of Plan A, while Chen's bore the label of Plan B. Bai Chongxi had voiced his conviction and released it to the winds, content to let Chiang's judgment prevail. Bai Chongxi was a master of strategy, whispered among allies as the "Little Zhuge," his intellect a weapon as sharp as any blade. Yet Chen Cheng shared Chiang's Zhejiang roots and the unbreakable bonds of Huangpu camaraderie, drawing him even closer in the inner circle of trust. On such pivotal matters, Bai Chongxi often chose the path of restraint, yielding rather than clashing in futile strife. Five agonizing days after the plans vanished into the ether, Chiang's telegram pierced the tension, affirming the adoption of Plan A. A surge of quiet triumph coursed through Bai Chongxi as he signed the missive and strode toward the operations map, his steps echoing with purpose.   While strategic minds clashed in hidden caves and distant villas, the front lines pulsed with the raw grit of soldiers readying for battle. Guan Linzheng had been assigned a mount since 1930, when he became commander of the 1st Regiment of the 2nd Training Division, during the Central Plains War between Chiang, Feng, and Yan. He led the regiment to cover the retreat of the division's main force under Zhang Zhizhong. Pursued by several times their number of Feng-Yan troops, they fought while retreating in dire straits. From night to dawn, heavy fog descended, obscuring visibility beyond dozens of paces. Guan Linzheng's chestnut horse suddenly neighed loudly and charged back toward the pursuers. After trying to rein it in unsuccessfully, Guan simply ordered the troops to countercharge into the fog. Shouts of killing filled the air, gunfire intense. The Feng-Yan troops, unclear of the situation in the fog, thought Chiang reinforcements had arrived and ordered a retreat. By the time the fog cleared, they were gone. Guan's bold cunning successfully completed the cover mission, and he was promoted to brigade commander of the division's 2nd Brigade after the war.   In July 1932, during Chiang Kai-shek's fourth encirclement of the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet, Guan Linzheng was brigade commander of the 4th Army's Independent Brigade. In battle, he was surrounded by Red Army troops led by Chen Geng and Cai Shenyi of the Red 25th Army Corps in the Anhui town of Zhuanfo Temple. His unit suffered heavy casualties, and a beloved horse was killed, leaving him distressed for a long time. With the outbreak of the War of Resistance, Guan Linzheng's military career entered its golden age. He believed this was truly raising an army of justice, fighting for the people and the nation. After promotions, though equipped with cars, he always kept a warhorse, often riding to survey terrain, inspect work, and command battles. In spare moments, he personally exercised and groomed the horse. That day, he led several staff on horseback to the Xin Qiang River front line, dismounting on the southern bank. 52nd Army Commander Zhang Yaoming and 195th Division Commander Qin Yizhi were waiting.   According to the Ninth War Zone deployment, the 15th Army Group had positioned Zhang Yaoming's 52nd Army and Xia Chuzhong's 79th Army, a formidable force of six divisions along the southern bank of the Xin Qiang River, stretching from Xin Qiang to Maishi beyond the provincial border. This ironclad first line of defense spanned over 100 kilometers, a vast bulwark against the gathering storm of invasion. Fifty kilometers to the south, Chen Pei's 37th Army, with its Divisions 60 and 95, held the Miluo River from Miluo to Pingjiang as the unyielding second line, ready to absorb any breach. Meanwhile, Li Jue's 70th Army, commanding Divisions 19 and 107 along the eastern bank of the Xiang River, was deployed north and south of Xiangyin, fiercely guarding the critical landing points like Yingtian, points that could spell victory or catastrophe.   195th Division Commander Qin Yizhi reported to Guan Linzheng with a voice charged with resolve: troop morale soared like a battle cry, fortifications stood complete and impenetrable, and the army's slogan for this fateful clash thundered: "Fight with the prestige of Taierzhuang!" The division's mobilization slogan echoed even fiercer: "Win fame in one battle!" Guan Linzheng nodded with grim satisfaction toward Zhang Yaoming, his eyes gleaming with the fire of shared history. Guan had once commanded the 52nd Army himself, leading it through a gauntlet of brilliant, blood-soaked battles on the anti-Japanese front. As the Japanese hordes prepared to surge across the Xin Qiang River southward, this was the first, most perilous barrier, a crucible where legends would be forged or shattered. He had entrusted his most loyal unit to the point of greatest impact, knowing full well the stakes. Zhang Yaoming and the division commanders, who had marched at his side for years through hellfire, understood the gravity: Commander Guan was setting an unassailable example, issuing orders that rippled through the ranks, no one could afford the slightest lapse, or face the merciless blade of military law!   "Who's on the north bank?" Guan Linzheng and the others sat on the hard earth, the weight of impending war pressing down; he pointed to the map's symbols for forward positions across the river, his finger tracing lines of fate. "Guarding the Bijia Mountain position is the reinforced 3rd Battalion of the 195th Division's 131st Regiment under Qin Yizhi," Zhang Yaoming replied without hesitation, his tone steady as stone. "Who's on the north bank?" Guan Linzheng repeated as if he hadn't heard, his voice a low rumble, demanding precision in the face of chaos.   Zhang Yaoming hesitated slightly, a flicker of uncertainty crossing his face, and Qin Yizhi stepped in: "3rd Battalion Commander Shi Enhua, Huangpu 8th Class."   The Central Military Academy had held its first five classes in Guangzhou's Huangpu, commonly called Huangpu Military Academy. Afterward, the school moved several times, but students continued using the Huangpu name, partly to inherit the revolutionary spirit against imperialism and feudalism from Huangpu's founding, and partly to indicate their central orthodoxy. Army generals, especially the "old Huangpu" big brothers, approved this practice, calling it Huangpu no matter where the school was.   Guan Linzheng glared at Zhang Yaoming, his gaze like sharpened steel, then pressed his knee and rose to his feet. Guan's left knee had been shattered by a bullet in 1925 during the Eastern Expedition against Chen Jiongming, a wound that had nearly claimed his leg and his future. Doctors had decreed amputation to save his life, but Liao Zhongkai, the party representative, had visited the wounded and intervened strenuously, preventing it. Otherwise, there would be no later glory for Guan Linzheng. After careful treatment and diligent exercise, the leg's function mostly recovered, though rising from a squat was slightly difficult. Zhang Yaoming reached out to help, but Guan pushed him away with a fierce independence born of countless battles. The group descended to the riverbank and stood in heavy silence, the air thick with unspoken tension. The horses either stood patiently with heads held high, vigilant sentinels, or lowered them to sniff the grass, casually plucking some to hold in their lips, oblivious to the human storm brewing.   The Xin Qiang River, an unnamed small river that had flowed quietly for countless years, had no great turbid waves in flood seasons and still shallow clear ripples in dry periods. It flowed peacefully from its source to Dongting Lake over dozens of kilometers. At this moment, it reflected the figures and thoughts of several soldiers, utterly unaware that in a dozen days, its name would leap to the front pages of newspapers nationwide, baptized in blood and etched into history.   Amid these preparations on the front lines, deeper internal conflicts simmered among the high command. Xue Yue regretted taking the position of provincial chairman, a decision that now haunted him like a specter from the battlefield's edge.   After the nationwide shock of the "Great Fire of Changsha," Zhang Zhizhong was punished with "suspension with retention," continuing to handle daily affairs amid the ashes. He sent several telegrams requesting resignation from the provincial chairmanship, expressing to the Executive Yuan his "shameless guilt and deep pain." On January 17, 1939, the Chongqing Executive Yuan passed a resolution to reorganize the Hunan Provincial Government. That night, Zhang Zhizhong received Chiang Kai-shek's telegram instructing him to hand over work and report to Chongqing.   In December 1938, when the Military Affairs Commission issued the order for Xue Yue to act as Ninth War Zone Commander, Chiang Kai-shek personally spoke with Xue, asking: "Brother Boling, do you think this arrangement is acceptable?" Boling was Xue Yue's courtesy name. Chiang, nine years older, addressed him as brother in private. Xue Yue said: "With Changsha in such a state, I truly lack the ability to handle such a major war zone task." Chiang Kai-shek understood Xue's implication about the disunity of military and political affairs making military work difficult. He said: "You go first; we can consider unifying military and political affairs later." According to He Yaozu, then director of the Military Affairs Commission Office who witnessed this: "My impression was that Xue Yue didn't want to avoid the acting commander role, but wanted to combine military and political powers. Chiang knew this, telling me 'If he's willing, let him do it,' words Chiang said to many seeking positions."   On February 1, 1939, the Nationalist Government officially appointed Xue Yue as Chairman of the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Kuomintang and Chairman of Hunan Province. With party, government, and military powers combined, troubles followed incessantly, piling upon him like relentless enemy fire. As war zone commander, he first thought of the troops. Upon taking office, Xue implemented a policy to restrict market rice prices for military grain procurement, proposing "flat prices" to acquire grain cheaply, forcing merchants underground. Upon hearing this, Xue angrily summoned major rice merchants, reprimanded them, and ordered them to deliver quotas. The result: insufficient low-price rice, with black market prices rising daily. After half a year, sharp-tongued Hunanese nicknamed him "Xue Pinggui," a name that became household, a mocking whisper that cut deeper than any blade.   Coincidentally, his father passed away. Whether Xue instructed it or subordinates "handled it," obituaries flew everywhere, sent to county-level units across the province. Each county had at least 20 units sending condolences, and higher-level cities and provincial units all sent, leading some to secretly calculate. After Xue Yue took charge in Hunan, his family members were transferred from other provinces, and arranging work according to their abilities was reasonable in that old society. His uncle-in-law Fang Xuefen became head of the Provincial Grain Bureau, brother-in-law Qiu Weiyi head of the Provincial Bank. His brother continued business, transporting Hunan rice to Guangdong for barter.   Xue Yue's talents shone not in officialdom. Only before military maps, on battlefields of gunfire and flying shells, could one find the general-like Xue Yue; "heaven-born talent" was for warfare. This descendant of an ordinary farming family in Lechang County, Guangdong, who entered Huangpu Army Primary School at 10, became commander of Sun Yat-sen's bodyguard regiment's 1st Battalion at 24, and once carried a machine gun through hails of bullets to protect Madame Sun Soong Ching-ling from rebel encirclement, earned the nickname "Tiger Cub" in blood and fire. What propelled him to life's peak was the Battle of Changsha.   On August 21, 1939, with war clouds over Changsha thickening like a noose, Xue Yue received telegrams and calls from Chiang Kai-shek, Bai Chongxi, and Chen Cheng. Chiang's telegram required immediate deployment according to "Plan A." Bai and Chen urged resolute implementation of the Chairman's instructions. Xue Yue stood motionless before the map, his mind a whirlwind of strategy and defiance.   Many articles recalling Xue Yue mentioned his daily habit, or hobby, of studying maps; he could do so all day. With battles, he looked; without, he still studied avidly. Perhaps map-reading had evolved from a commander's work need to a professional soldier's spiritual requirement, a way to express emotions, dispel worries, a soldier's way of existence. After Chiang's order to execute "Plan A," rather than comparing plans on the map for stronger bases for his preferred view, he was organizing thoughts, adjusting emotions, and gathering courage in this soul's sanctuary. Hours later, he turned and called Chief of Staff Zhao Zili, dictating three reasons to persist with "Plan B," instructing him to draft a telegram directly to Chiang Kai-shek.   He reminded Zhao that the wording should be forceful yet resilient, making the Chairman clearly feel his firm determination. The Ninth War Zone has sufficient forces and confidence to annihilate the Japanese north of Changsha. If our forces retreat to Hengyang, the Japanese 21st Army under Ando Toshikichi in Guangzhou (with 18th and 104th Divisions, Taiwan Brigade, and attached air units) might advance north along the Yue-Han Railway in support, forming a pincer on us, making the battle hard to control. Following Plan A and allowing the Japanese south would lead to Changsha's fall, exploited by enemy propaganda, causing adverse effects domestically and internationally. These three points presented the potential military and political disadvantages of Plan A as tangible, imminent dangers, more argumentative and unyieldingly firm than his original inclination toward "Plan B."   Zhao Zili quickly noted the points, his pen flying across the page with the precision of a seasoned warrior, before retreating to the staff office to draft the telegram that could alter the course of battle. A top student of Huangpu's 6th Class, quick-witted and resourceful, Zhao had risen like a comet through the ranks after a few blistering campaigns, pinning the insignia of major general to his shoulders at the tender age of 31, a feat that stirred envy among his classmates like a storm in their hearts. Zhao Zili, of course, understood Xue Yue's true intent, piercing through the layers of strategy to the raw undercurrent of determination and unresolved fury.   In May 1938, to avenge the stinging triumph at Taierzhuang, the Japanese had massed their forces in a vengeful storm, aiming to encircle and annihilate the Chinese main forces east of the Longhai Railway, striking from both east and north with ruthless precision. The northern route's 14th Division, under the cunning Dobashi Kenji, found itself surrounded in Lanfeng by a pantheon of fierce Chinese generals, Song Xilian, Yu Jishi, Hu Zongnan, Qiu Qingquan, Wang Yaowu, Li Hanlun, Gui Yongqing, Sun Tongxuan, and Shang Zhen, warriors whose names echoed like thunder across the battlefields. Chiang Kai-shek himself descended upon Zhengzhou to supervise the carnage, appointing Xue Yue as 1st Corps Commander to orchestrate the generals in a full-throttle offensive on the morning of May 25, with the ironclad goal of obliterating that longtime scourge of China and his 14th Division before the dawn of the 26th shattered the night.   The odds were a gambler's dream: 150,000 elite Chinese troops against a mere 20,000 second-rate Japanese soldiers. Victory seemed not just possible, but inevitable; Chiang invited journalists to the front lines for live dispatches, while the Wuhan Political Department feverishly prepared celebrations for the "second great Taierzhuang victory." Chiang Kai-shek was exceptionally angry, his rage boiling over in orders that scorched the ranks, reprimanding army commanders for "inept command, cowardly actions, leading to low morale and hesitation," and that "most army, division, and brigade commanders lacked courage and self-motivation, prolonging the battle." After the Lanfeng Battle, Chiang ordered the dismissal and investigation of future Nationalist Navy Commander Gui Yongqing and 1950s Taiwan Army Commander and Provincial Chairman Huang Jie, and executed 88th Division Commander Long Muhan. But he did not hold Xue Yue accountable for leadership responsibility. For a highly self-respecting person, self-blame is more painful than others' blame. Thereafter, Xue Yue spent more time buried in maps, his eyes tracing lines of terrain like a man possessed, seeking a monumental battle to avenge his wounded pride and redeem his tarnished honor.   On March 8, 1939, shortly after Xue Yue assumed the mantle of acting Ninth War Zone Commander, Chiang telegraphed him with urgent resolve: "To secure Nanchang and its rear lines, decide to strike first, take the offensive to thwart the enemy's intentions." Chiang valued Nanchang's strategic position, as did Okamura Yasuji, but Chiang was a step slow, his hesitation a fatal crack. The Japanese, wielding two divisions bolstered by the bulk of their army's tanks and artillery, seized the initiative like predators in the night, storming Nanchang before the Chinese heavy forces could muster. Chen Cheng remained the nominal Ninth War Zone Commander, relegating Xue Yue to a watchful perch in Changsha while entrusting the Nanchang front to his confidant Luo Zhuoying. Xue Yue haunted the command room day and night, monitoring the inferno through frantic phone calls and telegrams, his discomfort gnawing at him like an unhealed wound. He bore witness to Nanchang's fall and the counterattack's agonizing collapse.   The Nanchang Battle loss was not Xue's fault, but it scarred the Ninth War Zone under his watch, with generals' whispers spreading like venom, knotting his heart in a tangle of regret and resolve. Months of intense map study and on-site inspections had etched Hunan's terrain into Xue Yue's very soul, birthing a strategy that was bold, unique, and brimming with promise—a phoenix rising from the ashes of defeat. But as Zhao Zili understood with crystal clarity, Commander Xue's telegram to Chiang, a forceful plea to reverse the decision, sprang less from cold military "strategy" than from the seething "resentment" accumulated through repeated failures and humiliations, a fire that demanded reckoning. With Chen Cheng's help, Chiang finally agreed to change the plan, bending to the tide of persuasion. Xue Yue was delighted, his spirit soaring like a liberated eagle; Bai Chongxi was angry, his frustration simmering like a storm held at bay. After the battle erupted, Bai, dispatched by Chiang to assist Xue Yue, arrived at the war zone headquarters on Yuelu Mountain atop the Xiang River's west bank in Changsha but remained silent like a mute bodhisattva, his words locked away in disapproval. Even decades later, in his Memoirs of Bai Chongxi, discussing the First Battle of Changsha, he still did not consider it a victory, saying the Japanese "conducted a planned retreat without much loss, which is a fact."   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In 1939, amid the Second Sino-Japanese War's stalemate phase, Chiang Kai-shek received intelligence on Japan's Xiang-Gan Operation, aimed at pressuring Chongqing through military advances in Hunan. Deputy Chief Bai Chongxi proposed Plan A for a deep-lure annihilation south of Changsha, while Chen Cheng and Xue Yue favored Plan B for resistance north of the city. After tense debates, Chiang approved Plan B, influenced by Xue's insistence to avoid Changsha's fall and counter Japanese propaganda.   

What were Mao's motivations for launching The Cultural Revolution? Who were the Red Guards, and why did Mao indoctrinate teenagers? How did Mao die, and who came next? Anita and William are joined once again by Rana Mitter, author of A Bitter Revolution: China's Struggle with the Modern World, and Modern China: A Very Short Introduction, to discuss the final years of Mao's rule. Try Attio for free at attio.com/empire Join the Empire Club: Unlock the full Empire experience – with bonus episodes, ad-free listening, early access to miniseries and live show tickets, exclusive book discounts, a members-only newsletter, and access to our private Discord chatroom. Sign up directly at empirepoduk.com  For more Goalhanger Podcasts, head to www.goalhanger.com. Email: empire@goalhanger.com Instagram: @empirepoduk Blue Sky: @empirepoduk X: @empirepoduk Editor: Bruno Di Castri Researcher: Imogen Marriott Assistant Producer: Alfie Norris Producer: Anouska Lewis Executive Producer: Dom Johnson Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Why did Mao declare war on sparrows as part of The Great Leap Forward? What caused China to attack India in 1962? How did Mao use a swimming pool to embarrass Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev? Anita and William are joined once again by Rana Mitter, author of A Bitter Revolution: China's Struggle with the Modern World, and Modern China: A Very Short Introduction, to discuss The Great Leap Forward and its consequences. Join the Empire Club: Unlock the full Empire experience – with bonus episodes, ad-free listening, early access to miniseries and live show tickets, exclusive book discounts, a members-only newsletter, and access to our private Discord chatroom. Sign up directly at empirepoduk.com  For more Goalhanger Podcasts, head to www.goalhanger.com. Email: empire@goalhanger.com Instagram: @empirepoduk Blue Sky: @empirepoduk X: @empirepoduk Editor: Bruno Di Castri Researcher: Imogen Marriott Assistant Producer: Alfie Norris Producer: Anouska Lewis Executive Producer: Dom Johnson Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

On Today's Episode –The guys dive headfirst into the latest updates from the war in Iran with special guest Dr. Bonner Cohen. We're going beyond the surface level today as Bonner and Mark provide a masterclass on the region's history to explain how we got here. Plus, whatever happened to Greenland? We discuss why this massive territory has completely fallen off the news map lately.Tune in for all the Funhttps://www.cfact.org/Bonner R. Cohen is a senior policy analyst with the Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow, where he concentrates on energy, natural resources, and international relations. He also serves as a senior policy adviser with the Heartland Institute, senior fellow at the National Center for Public Policy Research, and as adjunct scholar at the Competitive Enterprise Institute. Articles by Dr. Cohen have appeared in the Wall Street Journal, Forbes, Investor's Business Daily, New York Post, Washington Times, National Review, Philadelphia Inquirer, Detroit News, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Miami Herald, and dozens of other newspapers in the U.S. and Canada. He has been interviewed on Fox News, CNN, Fox Business Channel, BBC, BBC Worldwide Television, NBC, NPR, N 24 (German language news channel), Voice of Russia, and scores of radio stations in the U.S. Dr. Cohen has testified before the U.S. Senate committees on Energy & Natural Resources and Environment & Public Works as well as the U.S. House committees on Natural Resources and Judiciary. He has spoken at conferences in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Bangladesh. Dr. Cohen is the author of two books, The Green Wave: Environmentalism and its Consequences (Washington: Capital Research Center, 2006) and Marshall, Mao und Chiang: Die amerikanischen Vermittlungsbemuehungen im chinesischen Buergerkrieg (Marshall, Mao and Chiang: The American Mediations Effort in the Chinese Civil War) (Munich: Tuduv Verlag, 1984). Dr. Cohen received his B.A. from the University of Georgia and his Ph.D. – summa cum laude – from the University of Munich.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

What is the long history behind the current Israeli strikes on Lebanon? Why did Israel sell weapons to Iran in the 1980s? How was the Lebanon's map drawn by European powers after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire?  Lebanese historian and author of Black Wave, Kim Ghattas, joins William to discuss the historical view of the current attacks on Lebanon. **To listen to the rest of the Mao series today, join the Empire Club at empirepoduk.com** Listen to Kim's previous Empire episode on Hezbollah by finding Episode 123 on Apple Podcasts or Spotify.  Join the Empire Club: Unlock the full Empire experience – with bonus episodes, ad-free listening, early access to miniseries and live show tickets, exclusive book discounts, a members-only newsletter, and access to our private Discord chatroom. Sign up directly at empirepoduk.com  For more Goalhanger Podcasts, head to www.goalhanger.com. Email: empire@goalhanger.com Instagram: @empirepoduk Blue Sky: @empirepoduk X: @empirepoduk Assistant Producer: Alfie Norris Editor: Bruno Di Castri Producer: Anouska Lewis Executive Producer: Dom Johnson Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

How did Ayatollah Khamenei ensure his son, Mojtaba, would take over after his death? How is this war a product of deep historical trends? What internal crises have been plaguing Iran's government in recent years? Is there hope for Iran after this war? **To listen to the rest of the Mao series today, join the Empire Club at empirepoduk.com** In light of the war in Iran, we disrupt our current series to bring you the vital historical view of a region we have often covered on Empire. William is joined by Ali Ansari, author of Iran (Polity Histories), to discuss the decades of history that have led to this war in 2026. Sign up and get 10% off at BetterHelp.com/EMPIRE. Join the Empire Club: Unlock the full Empire experience – with bonus episodes, ad-free listening, early access to miniseries and live show tickets, exclusive book discounts, a members-only newsletter, and access to our private Discord chatroom. Sign up directly at empirepoduk.com  For more Goalhanger Podcasts, head to www.goalhanger.com. Email: empire@goalhanger.com Instagram: @empirepoduk Blue Sky: @empirepoduk X: @empirepoduk Assistant Producer: Alfie Norris Producer: Anouska Lewis Executive Producer: Dom Johnson Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices