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Last time we spoke about the fall of Wuhan. In a country frayed by war, the Yangtze became a pulsing artery, carrying both hunger and hope. Chiang Kai-shek faced a brutal choice: defend Wuhan to the last man, or flood the rivers to buy time. He chose both, setting sullen floodwaters loose along the Yellow River to slow the invaders, a temporary mercy that spared some lives while ripping many from their homes. On the river's banks, a plethora of Chinese forces struggled to unite. The NRA, fractured into rival zones, clung to lines with stubborn grit as Japanese forces poured through Anqing, Jiujiang, and beyond, turning the Yangtze into a deadly corridor. Madang's fortifications withstood bombardment and gas, yet the price was paid in troops and civilians drowned or displaced. Commanders like Xue Yue wrestled stubbornly for every foothold, every bend in the river. The Battle of Wanjialing became a symbol: a desperate, months-long pincer where Chinese divisions finally tightened their cordon and halted the enemy's flow. By autumn, the Japanese pressed onward to seize Tianjiazhen and cut supply lines, while Guangzhou fell to a ruthless blockade. The Fall of Wuhan loomed inevitable, yet the story remained one of fierce endurance against overwhelming odds. #174 The Changsha Fire Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the summer of 1938, amid the upheaval surrounding Chiang Kai-shek, one of his most important alliances came to an end. On June 22, all German advisers to the Nationalist government were summoned back; any who refused would be deemed guilty of high treason. Since World War I, a peculiar bond had tied the German Weimar Republic and China: two fledgling states, both weak and only partially sovereign. Under the Versailles Treaty of 1919, Germany had lost extraterritorial rights on Chinese soil, which paradoxically allowed Berlin to engage with China as an equal partner rather than a traditional colonizer. This made German interests more welcome in business and politics than those of other Western powers. Chiang's military reorganization depended on German officers such as von Seeckt and von Falkenhausen, and Hitler's rise in 1933 had not immediately severed the connection between the two countries. Chiang did not share Nazi ideology with Germany, but he viewed Berlin as a potential ally and pressed to persuade it to side with China rather than Japan as China's principal East Asian, anti-Communist partner. In June 1937, H. H. Kung led a delegation to Berlin, met Hitler, and argued for an alliance with China. Yet the outbreak of war and the Nationalists' retreat to Wuhan convinced Hitler's government to align with Japan, resulting in the recall of all German advisers. Chiang responded with a speech praising von Falkenhausen, insisting that "our friend's enemy is our enemy too," and lauding the German Army's loyalty and ethics as a model for the Chinese forces. He added, "After we have won the War of Resistance, I believe you'll want to come back to the Far East and advise our country again." Von Falkenhausen would later become the governor of Nazi-occupied Belgium, then be lauded after the war for secretly saving many Jewish lives. As the Germans departed, the roof of the train transporting them bore a prominent German flag with a swastika, a prudent precaution given Wuhan's vulnerability to air bombardment. The Japanese were tightening their grip on the city, even as Chinese forces, numbering around 800,000, made a stubborn stand. The Yellow River floods blocked northern access, so the Japanese chose to advance via the Yangtze, aided by roughly nine divisions and the might of the Imperial Navy. The Chinese fought bravely, but their defenses could not withstand the superior technology of the Japanese fleet. The only substantial external aid came from Soviet pilots flying aircraft bought from the USSR as part of Stalin's effort to keep China in the war; between 1938 and 1940, some 2,000 pilots offered their services. From June 24 to 27, Japanese bombers relentlessly pounded the Madang fortress along the Yangtze until it fell. A month later, on July 26, Chinese defenders abandoned Jiujiang, southeast of Wuhan, and its civilian population endured a wave of atrocities at the hands of the invaders. News of Jiujiang's fate stiffened resolve. Chiang delivered a pointed address to his troops on July 31, arguing that Wuhan's defense was essential and that losing the city would split the country into hostile halves, complicating logistics and movement. He warned that Wuhan's defense would also be a spiritual test: "the place has deep revolutionary ties," and public sympathy for China's plight was growing as Japanese atrocities became known. Yet Chiang worried about the behavior of Chinese soldiers. He condemned looting as a suicidal act that would destroy the citizens' trust in the military. Commanders, he warned, must stay at their posts; the memory of the Madang debacle underscored the consequences of cowardice. Unlike Shanghai, Wuhan had shelters, but he cautioned against retreating into them and leaving soldiers exposed. Officers who failed in loyalty could expect no support in return. This pep talk, combined with the belief that the army was making a last stand, may have slowed the Japanese advance along the Yangtze in August. Under General Xue Yue, about 100,000 Chinese troops pushed back the invaders at Huangmei. At Tianjiazhen, thousands fought until the end of September, with poison gas finally forcing Japanese victory. Yet even then, Chinese generals struggled to coordinate. In Xinyang, Li Zongren's Guangxi troops were exhausted; they expected relief from Hu Zongnan's forces, but Hu instead withdrew, allowing Japan to capture the city without a fight. The fall of Xinyang enabled Japanese control of the Ping-Han railway, signaling Wuhan's doom. Chiang again spoke to Wuhan's defenders, balancing encouragement with a grim realism about possible loss. Although Wuhan's international connections were substantial, foreign aid would be unlikely. If evacuation became necessary, the army should have a clear plan, including designated routes. He recalled the disastrous December retreat from Nanjing, where "foreigners and Chinese alike turned it into an empty city." Troops had been tired and outnumbered; Chiang defended the decision to defend Nanjing, insisting the army had sacrificed itself for the capital and Sun Yat-sen's tomb. Were the army to retreat again, he warned, it would be the greatest shame in five thousand years of Chinese history. The loss of Madang was another humiliation. By defending Wuhan, he argued, China could avenge its fallen comrades and cleanse its conscience; otherwise, it could not honor its martyrs. Mao Zedong, observing the situation from his far-off base at Yan'an, agreed strongly that Chiang should not defend Wuhan to the death. He warned in mid-October that if Wuhan could not be defended, the war's trajectory would shift, potentially strengthening the Nationalists–Communists cooperation, deepening popular mobilization, and expanding guerrilla warfare. The defense of Wuhan, Mao argued, should drain the enemy and buy time to advance the broader struggle, not become a doomed stalemate. In a protracted war, some strongholds might be abandoned temporarily to sustain the longer fight. The Japanese Army captured Wuchang and Hankou on 26 October and captured Hanyang on the 27th, which concluded the campaign in Wuhan. The battle had lasted four and a half months and ended with the Nationalist army's voluntary withdrawal. In the battle itself, the Japanese army captured Wuhan's three towns and held the heartland of China, achieving a tactical victory. Yet strategically, Japan failed to meet its objectives. Imperial Headquarters believed that "capturing Hankou and Guangzhou would allow them to dominate China." Consequently, the Imperial Conference planned the Battle of Wuhan to seize Wuhan quickly and compel the Chinese government to surrender. It also decreed that "national forces should be concentrated to achieve the war objectives within a year and end the war against China." According to Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Seiya Matsuno, Hirohito authorized the use of chemical weapons against China by specific orders known as rinsanmei. During the Battle of Wuhan, Prince Kan'in Kotohito transmitted the emperor's orders to deploy toxic gas 375 times between August and October 1938. Another memorandum uncovered by Yoshimi indicates that Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni authorized the use of poison gas against the Chinese on 16 August 1938. A League of Nations resolution adopted on 14 May condemned the Imperial Japanese Army's use of toxic gas. Japan's heavy use of chemical weapons against China was driven by manpower shortages and China's lack of poison gas stockpiles to retaliate. Poison gas was employed at Hankou in the Battle of Wuhan to break Chinese resistance after conventional assaults had failed. Rana Mitter notes that, under General Xue Yue, approximately 100,000 Chinese troops halted Japanese advances at Huangmei, and at the fortress of Tianjiazhen, thousands fought until the end of September, with Japanese victory secured only through the use of poison gas. Chinese generals also struggled with coordination at Xinyang; Li Zongren's Guangxi troops were exhausted, and Hu Zongnan's forces, believed to be coming to relieve them, instead withdrew. Japan subsequently used poison gas against Chinese Muslim forces at the Battle of Wuyuan and the Battle of West Suiyuan. However, the Chinese government did not surrender with the loss of Wuhan and Guangzhou, nor did Japan's invasion end with Wuhan and Guangzhou's capture. After Wuhan fell, the government issued a reaffirmation: "Temporary changes of advance and retreat will not shake our resolve to resist the Japanese invasion," and "the gain or loss of any city will not affect the overall situation of the war." It pledged to "fight with even greater sorrow, greater perseverance, greater steadfastness, greater diligence, and greater courage," dedicating itself to a long, comprehensive war of resistance. In the Japanese-occupied rear areas, large armed anti-Japanese forces grew, and substantial tracts of territory were recovered. As the Japanese army themselves acknowledged, "the restoration of public security in the occupied areas was actually limited to a few kilometers on both sides of the main transportation lines." Thus, the Battle of Wuhan did not merely inflict a further strategic defeat on Japan; it also marked a turning point in Japan's strategic posture, from offense to defense. Due to the Nationalist Army's resolute resistance, Japan mobilized its largest force to date for the attack, about 250,000 personnel, who were replenished four to five times over the battle, for a total of roughly 300,000. The invaders held clear advantages in land, sea, and air power and fought for four and a half months. Yet they failed to annihilate the Nationalist main force, nor did they break the will to resist or the army's combat effectiveness. Instead, the campaign dealt a severe blow to the Japanese Army's vitality. Japanese-cited casualties totaled 4,506 dead and 17,380 wounded for the 11th Army; the 2nd Army suffered 2,300 killed in action, 7,600 wounded, and 900 died of disease. Including casualties across the navy and the air force, the overall toll was about 35,500. By contrast, the Nationalist Government Military Commission's General Staff Department, drawing on unit-level reports, calculated Japanese casualties at 256,000. The discrepancy between Japanese and Nationalist tallies illustrates the inflationary tendencies of each side's reporting. Following Wuhan, a weakened Japanese force confronted an extended front. Unable to mount large-scale strategic offensives, unlike Shanghai, Xuzhou, or Wuhan itself, the Japanese to a greater extent adopted a defensive posture. This transition shifted China's War of Resistance from a strategic defensive phase into a strategic stalemate, while the invaders found themselves caught in a protracted war—a development they most disliked. Consequently, Japan's invasion strategy pivoted: away from primary frontal offensives toward a greater reliance on political inducements with secondary military action, and toward diverting forces to "security" operations behind enemy lines rather than pushing decisive frontal campaigns. Japan, an island nation with limited strategic resources, depended heavily on imports. By the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Japan's gold reserves,including reserves for issuing banknotes, amounted to only about 1.35 billion yen. In effect, Japan's currency reserves constrained the scale of the war from the outset. The country launched its aggression while seeking an early solution to the conflict. To sustain its war of aggression against China, the total value of military supplies imported from overseas in 1937 reached approximately 960 million yen. By June of the following year, for the Battle of Wuhan, even rifles used in training were recalled to outfit the expanding army. The sustained increase in troops also strained domestic labor, food, and energy supplies. By 1939, after Wuhan, Japan's military expenditure had climbed to about 6.156 billion yen, far exceeding national reserves. This stark reality exposed Japan's economic fragility and its inability to guarantee a steady supply of military materiel, increasing pressure on the leadership at the Central Command. The Chief of Staff and the Minister of War lamented the mismatch between outward strength and underlying weakness: "Outwardly strong but weak is a reflection of our country today, and this will not last long." In sum, the Wuhan campaign coincided with a decline in the organization, equipment, and combat effectiveness of the Japanese army compared with before the battle. This erosion of capability helped drive Japan to alter its political and military strategy, shifting toward a method of inflicting pressure on China and attempting to "use China to control China", that is, fighting in ways designed to sustain the broader war effort. Tragically a major element of Chiang Kai-shek's retreat strategy was the age-old "scorched earth" policy. In fact, China originated the phrase and the practice. Shanghai escaped the last-minute torching because of foreigners whose property rights were protected. But in Nanjing, the burning and destruction began with increasing zeal. What could not be moved inland, such as remaining rice stocks, oil in tanks, and other facilities, was to be blown up or devastated. Civilians were told to follow the army inland, to rebuild later behind the natural barrier of Sichuan terrain. Many urban residents complied, but the peasantry did not embrace the plan. The scorched-earth policy served as powerful propaganda for the occupying Japanese army and, even more so, for the Reds. Yet they could hardly have foreseen the propaganda that Changsha would soon supply them. In June, the Changsha Evacuation Guidance Office was established to coordinate land and water evacuation routes. By the end of October, Wuhan's three towns had fallen, and on November 10 the Japanese army captured Yueyang, turning Changsha into the next primary invasion target. Beginning on October 9, Japanese aircraft intensified from sporadic raids on Changsha to large-scale bombing. On October 27, the Changsha Municipal Government urgently evacuated all residents, exempting only able-bodied men, the elderly, the weak, women, and children. The baojia system was mobilized to go door-to-door, enforcing compliance. On November 7, Chiang Kai-shek convened a military meeting at Rongyuan Garden to review the war plan and finalize a "scorched earth war of resistance." Xu Quan, Chief of Staff of the Security Command, drafted the detailed implementation plan. On November 10, Shi Guoji, Chief of Staff of the Security Command, presided over a joint meeting of Changsha's party, government, military, police, and civilian organizations to devise a strategy. The Changsha Destruction Command was immediately established, bringing together district commanders and several arson squads. The command actively prepared arson equipment and stacked flammable materials along major traffic arteries. Chiang decided that the city of Changsha was vulnerable and either gave the impression or the direct order, honestly really depends on the source your reading, to burn the city to the ground to prevent it falling to the enemy. At 9:00 AM on November 12, Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed Zhang Zhizhong: "One hour to arrive, Chairman Zhang, Changsha, confidential. If Changsha falls, the entire city must be burned. Please make thorough preparations in advance and do not delay." And here it seems a game of broken telephone sort of resulted in one of the worst fire disasters of all time. If your asking pro Chiang sources, the message was clearly, put up a defense, once thats fallen, burn the city down before the Japanese enter. Obviously this was to account for getting civilians out safely and so forth. If you read lets call it more modern CPP aligned sources, its the opposite. Chiang intentionally ordering the city to burn down as fast as possible, but in through my research, I think it was a colossal miscommunication. Regardless Zhongzheng Wen, Minister of the Interior, echoed the message. Simultaneously, Lin Wei, Deputy Director of Chiang Kai-shek's Secretariat, instructed Zhang Zhizhong by long-distance telephone: "If Changsha falls, the entire city must be burned." Zhang summoned Feng Ti, Commander of the Provincial Capital Garrison, and Xu Quan, Director of the Provincial Security Bureau, to outline arson procedures. He designated the Garrison Command to shoulder the preparations, with the Security Bureau assisting. At 4:00 PM, Zhang appointed Xu Kun, Commander of the Second Garrison Regiment, as chief commander of the arson operation, with Wang Weining, Captain of the Social Training Corps, and Xu Quan, Chief of Staff of the Garrison Command, as deputies. At 6:00 PM, the Garrison Command held an emergency meeting ordering all government agencies and organizations in the city to be ready for evacuation at any moment. By around 10:15 PM, all urban police posts had withdrawn. Around 2:00 AM (November 13), a false report circulated that "Japanese troops have reached Xinhe" . Firefighters stationed at various locations rushed out with kerosene-fueled devices, burning everything in sight, shops and houses alike. In an instant, Changsha became a sea of flames. The blaze raged for 72 hours. The Hunan Province Anti-Japanese War Loss Statistics, compiled by the Hunan Provincial Government Statistics Office of the Kuomintang, report that the fire inflicted economic losses of more than 1 billion yuan, a sum equivalent to about 1.7 trillion yuan after the victory in the war. This figure represented roughly 43% of Changsha's total economic value at the time. Regarding casualties, contemporary sources provide varying figures. A Xinhua Daily report from November 20, 1938 noted that authorities mobilized manpower to bury more than 600 bodies, though the total number of burned remains could not be precisely counted. A Central News Agency reporter on November 19 stated that in the Xiangyuan fire, more than 2,000 residents could not escape, and most of the bodies had already been buried. There are further claims that in the Changsha Fire, more than 20,000 residents were burned to death. In terms of displacement, Changsha's population before the fire was about 300,000, and by November 12, 90% had been evacuated. After the fire, authorities registered 124,000 victims, including 815 orphans sheltered in Lito and Maosgang. Building damage constituted the other major dimension of the catastrophe, with the greatest losses occurring to residential houses, shops, schools, factories, government offices, banks, hospitals, newspaper offices, warehouses, and cultural and entertainment venues, as well as numerous historic buildings such as palaces, temples, private gardens, and the former residences of notable figures; among these, residential and commercial structures suffered the most, followed by factories and schools. Inspector Gao Yihan, who conducted a post-fire investigation, observed that the prosperous areas within Changsha's ring road, including Nanzheng Street and Bajiaoting, were almost completely destroyed, and in other major markets only a handful of shops remained, leading to an overall estimate that surviving or stalemated houses were likely less than 20%. Housing and street data from the early post-liberation period reveal that Changsha had more than 1,100 streets and alleys; of these, more than 690 were completely burned and more than 330 had fewer than five surviving houses, accounting for about 29%, with nearly 90% of the city's streets severely damaged. More than 440 streets were not completely destroyed, but among these, over 190 had only one or two houses remaining and over 130 had only three or four houses remaining; about 60 streets, roughly 6% had 30 to 40 surviving houses, around 30 streets, 3% had 11 to 20 houses, 10 streets, 1% had 21 to 30 houses, and three streets ) had more than 30 houses remaining. Housing statistics from 1952 show that 2,538 houses survived the fire, about 6.57% of the city's total housing stock, with private houses totaling 305,800 square meters and public houses 537,900 square meters. By 1956, the surviving area of both private and public housing totaled 843,700 square meters, roughly 12.3% of the city's total housing area at that time. Alongside these losses, all equipment, materials, funds, goods, books, archives, antiques, and cultural relics that had not been moved were also destroyed. At the time of the Changsha Fire, Zhou Enlai, then Deputy Minister of the Political Department of the Nationalist Government's Military Commission, was in Changsha alongside Ye Jianying, Guo Moruo, and others. On November 12, 1938, Zhou Enlai attended a meeting held by Changsha cultural groups at Changsha Normal School to commemorate Sun Yat-sen's 72nd birthday. Guo Moruo later recalled that Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying were awakened by the blaze that night; they each carried a suitcase and evacuated to Xiangtan, with Zhou reportedly displaying considerable indignation at the sudden, unprovoked fire. On the 16th, Zhou Enlai rushed back to Changsha and, together with Chen Cheng, Zhang Zhizhong, and others, inspected the disaster. He mobilized personnel from three departments, with Tian Han and Guo Moruo at the forefront, to form the Changsha Fire Aftermath Task Force, which began debris clearance, care for the injured, and the establishment of soup kitchens. A few days later, on the 22nd, the Hunan Provincial Government established the Changsha Fire Temporary Relief Committee to coordinate relief efforts. On the night of November 16, 1938, Chiang Kai-shek arrived in Changsha and, the next day, ascended Tianxin Pavilion. Sha Wei, head of the Cultural Relics Section of the Changsha Tianxin Pavilion Park Management Office, and a long-time researcher of the pavilion, explained that documentation indicates Chiang Kai-shek, upon seeing the city largely reduced to scorched earth with little left intact, grew visibly angry. After descending from Tianxin Pavilion, Chiang immediately ordered the arrest of Changsha Garrison Commander Feng Ti, Changsha Police Chief Wen Chongfu, and Commander of the Second Garrison Regiment Xu Kun, and arranged a military trial with a two-day deadline. The interrogation began at 7:00 a.m. on November 18. Liang Xiaojin records that Xu Kun and Wen Chongfu insisted their actions followed orders from the Security Command, while Feng Ti admitted negligence and violations of procedure, calling his acts unforgivable. The trial found Feng Ti to be the principal offender, with Wen Chongfu and Xu Kun as accomplices, and sentenced all three to prison terms of varying lengths. The verdict was sent to Chiang Kai-shek for approval, who was deeply dissatisfied and personally annotated the drafts: he asserted that Feng Ti, as the city's security head, was negligent and must be shot immediately; Wen Chongfu, as police chief, disobeyed orders and fled, and must be shot immediately; Xu Kun, for neglect of duty, must be shot immediately. The court then altered the arson charge in the verdict to "insulting his duty and harming the people" in line with Chiang's instructions. Chiang Kai-shek, citing "failure to supervise personnel and precautions," dismissed Zhang from his post, though he remained in office to oversee aftermath operations. Zhang Zhizhong later recalled Chiang Kai-shek's response after addressing the Changsha fire: a pointed admission that the fundamental cause lay not with a single individual but with the collective leadership's mistakes, and that the error must be acknowledged as a collective failure. All eyes now shifted to the new center of resistance, Chongqing, the temporary capital. Chiang's "Free China" no longer meant the whole country; it now encompassed Sichuan, Hunan, and Henan, but not Jiangsu or Zhejiang. The eastern provinces were effectively lost, along with China's major customs revenues, the country's most fertile regions, and its most advanced infrastructure. The center of political gravity moved far to the west, into a country the Nationalists had never controlled, where everything was unfamiliar and unpredictable, from topography and dialects to diets. On the map, it might have seemed that Chiang still ruled much of China, but vast swaths of the north and northwest were sparsely populated; most of China's population lay in the east and south, where Nationalist control was either gone or held only precariously. The combined pressures of events and returning travelers were gradually shifting American attitudes toward the Japanese incident. Europe remained largely indifferent, with Hitler absorbing most attention, but the United States began to worry about developments in the Pacific. Roosevelt initiated a January 1939 appeal to raise a million dollars for Chinese civilians in distress, and the response quickly materialized. While the Chinese did not expect direct intervention, they hoped to deter further American economic cooperation with Japan and to halt Japan's purchases of scrap iron, oil, gasoline, shipping, and, above all, weapons from the United States. Public opinion in America was sufficiently stirred to sustain a campaign against silk stockings, a symbolic gesture of boycott that achieved limited effect; Japan nonetheless continued to procure strategic materials. Within this chorus, the left remained a persistent but often discordant ally to the Nationalists. The Institute of Pacific Relations, sympathetic to communist aims, urged America to act, pressuring policymakers and sounding alarms about China. Yet the party line remained firmly pro-Chiang Kai-shek: the Japanese advance seemed too rapid and threatening to the Reds' interests. Most oil and iron debates stalled; American businessmen resented British trade ties with Japan, and Britain refused to join any mutual cutoff, arguing that the Western powers were not at war with Japan. What occurred in China was still commonly referred to in Western diplomatic circles as "the Incident." Wang Jingwei's would make his final defection, yes in a long ass history of defections. Mr Wang Jingwei had been very busy traveling to Guangzhou, then Northwest to speak with Feng Yuxiang, many telegrams went back and forth. He returned to the Nationalist government showing his face to foreign presses and so forth. While other prominent rivals of Chiang, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, and others, rallied when they perceived Japan as a real threat; all did so except Wang Jingwei. Wang, who had long believed himself the natural heir to Sun Yat-sen and who had repeatedly sought to ascend to power, seemed willing to cooperate with Japan if it served his own aims. I will just say it, Wang Jingwei was a rat. He had always been a rat, never changed. Opinions on Chiang Kai-Shek vary, but I think almost everyone can agree Wang Jingwei was one of the worst characters of this time period. Now Wang Jingwei could not distinguish between allies and enemies and was prepared to accept help from whomever offered it, believing he could outmaneuver Tokyo when necessary. Friends in Shanghai and abroad whispered that it was not too late to influence events, arguing that the broader struggle was not merely China versus Japan but a clash between principled leaders and a tyrannical, self-serving clique, Western imperialism's apologists who needed Chiang removed. For a time Wang drifted within the Kuomintang, moving between Nanjing, Wuhan, Changsha, and Chongqing, maintaining discreet lines of communication with his confidants. The Japanese faced a governance problem typical of conquerors who possess conquered territory: how to rule effectively while continuing the war. They imagined Asia under Japanese-led leadership, an East Asia united by a shared Co-Prosperity Sphere but divided by traditional borders. To sustain this vision, they sought local leaders who could cooperate. The search yielded few viable options; would-be collaborators were soon assassinated, proved incompetent, or proved corrupt. The Japanese concluded it would require more time and education. In the end, Wang Jingwei emerged as a preferred figure. Chongqing, meanwhile, seemed surprised by Wang's ascent. He had moved west to Chengde, then to Kunming, attempted, and failed to win over Yunnan's warlords, and eventually proceeded to Hanoi in Indochina, arriving in Hong Kong by year's end. He sent Chiang Kai-shek a telegram suggesting acceptance of Konoe's terms for peace, which Chungking rejected. In time, Wang would establish his own Kuomintang faction in Shanghai, combining rigorous administration with pervasive secret-police activity characteristic of occupied regimes. By 1940, he would be formally installed as "Chairman of China." But that is a story for another episode. In the north, the Japanese and the CCP were locked in an uneasy stalemate. Mao's army could make it impossible for the Japanese to hold deep countryside far from the railway lines that enabled mass troop movement into China's interior. Yet the Communists could not defeat the occupiers. In the dark days of October 1938—fifteen months after the war began—one constant remained. Observers (Chinese businessmen, British diplomats, Japanese generals) repeatedly predicted that each new disaster would signal the end of Chinese resistance and force a swift surrender, or at least a negotiated settlement in which the government would accept harsher terms from Tokyo. But even after defenders were expelled from Shanghai, Nanjing, and Wuhan, despite the terrifying might Japan had brought to bear on Chinese resistance, and despite the invader's manpower, technology, and resources, China continued to fight. Yet it fought alone. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In a land shredded by war, Wuhan burned under brutal sieges, then Changsha followed, a cruel blaze born of orders and miscommunications. Leaders wrestled with retreat, scorched-earth vows, and moral debts as Japanese force and Chinese resilience clashed for months. Mao urged strategy over martyrdom, Wang Jingwei's scheming shadow loomed, and Chongqing rose as the westward beacon. Yet China endured, a stubborn flame refusing to surrender to the coming storm. The war stretched on, unfinished and unyielding.
Why do leaders with vast expert bureaucracies at their fingertips make devastating foreign policy decisions? Tyler Jost, professor at Brown, joins ChinaTalk to discuss his first book, Bureaucracies at War, a fascinating analysis of miscalculation in international conflicts. As we travel from Mao's role in border conflicts, to Deng's blunder in Vietnam, to LBJ's own Vietnam error, a tragic pattern emerges — leaders gradually isolating themselves from their own information gathering systems with catastrophic consequences. Today our conversation covers… How Mao's early success undermined his long-term decision-making, The role of succession pressures in both Deng's and LBJ's actions in Vietnam, The bureaucratic mechanisms that lead to echo chambers, and how China's siloed institutions affect Xi's governance, The lingering question of succession in China, What we can learn from the institutional failures behind Vietnam and Iraq. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
Why do leaders with vast expert bureaucracies at their fingertips make devastating foreign policy decisions? Tyler Jost, professor at Brown, joins ChinaTalk to discuss his first book, Bureaucracies at War, a fascinating analysis of miscalculation in international conflicts. As we travel from Mao's role in border conflicts, to Deng's blunder in Vietnam, to LBJ's own Vietnam error, a tragic pattern emerges — leaders gradually isolating themselves from their own information gathering systems with catastrophic consequences. Today our conversation covers… How Mao's early success undermined his long-term decision-making, The role of succession pressures in both Deng's and LBJ's actions in Vietnam, The bureaucratic mechanisms that lead to echo chambers, and how China's siloed institutions affect Xi's governance, The lingering question of succession in China, What we can learn from the institutional failures behind Vietnam and Iraq. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
On Today's Episode –Hello again everyone…today we welcome back Bonner Cohen who is going to talk to us about Climate issues and the Supreme Court. But first, Mark tells us how we could fix the healthcare issues in about a weekend. Our FDA is an armed enforcement bureau for big pharma.We then hop into Dr. Cohen's topic…great stuff.Tune in for all the Fun Topic-https://www.cfact.org/2025/09/26/supreme-court-must-halt-states-climate-shakedowns/ Bonner R. Cohen is a senior policy analyst with the Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow, where he concentrates on energy, natural resources, and international relations. He also serves as a senior policy adviser with the Heartland Institute, senior fellow at the National Center for Public Policy Research, and as adjunct scholar at the Competitive Enterprise Institute. Articles by Dr. Cohen have appeared in the Wall Street Journal, Forbes, Investor's Business Daily, New York Post, Washington Times, National Review, Philadelphia Inquirer, Detroit News, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Miami Herald, and dozens of other newspapers in the U.S. and Canada. He has been interviewed on Fox News, CNN, Fox Business Channel, BBC, BBC Worldwide Television, NBC, NPR, N 24 (German language news channel), Voice of Russia, and scores of radio stations in the U.S. Dr. Cohen has testified before the U.S. Senate committees on Energy & Natural Resources and Environment & Public Works as well as the U.S. House committees on Natural Resources and Judiciary. He has spoken at conferences in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Bangladesh. Dr. Cohen is the author of two books, The Green Wave: Environmentalism and its Consequences (Washington: Capital Research Center, 2006) and Marshall, Mao und Chiang: Die amerikanischen Vermittlungsbemuehungen im chinesischen Buergerkrieg (Marshall, Mao and Chiang: The American Mediations Effort in the Chinese Civil War) (Munich: Tuduv Verlag, 1984). Dr. Cohen received his B.A. from the University of Georgia and his Ph.D. – summa cum laude – from the University of Munich.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.
Historian Frank Dikötter, author of How to Be a Dictator: The Cult of Personality in the Twentieth Century, discusses the dark psychology behind absolute power. From Hitler and Mao to Putin and Xi Jinping, Dikötter reveals how dictators use fear, lies, and the cult of personality to control not just people's actions—but their thoughts. Why do tyrants crave loyalty more than love? Why do they all end up surrounded by liars? And what happens when a dictator starts believing his own propaganda? Frank Dikötter gives a fascinating look at how modern dictatorships are built—and why they always collapse from within.
Los aficionados a las ucronias suelen afirmar que, si Hitler hubiera entrado en la Academia de Bellas Artes, hoy no habria documentales de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Y si Churchill no hubiera suspendido el examen militar y hubiera acabado en un cuartel remoto, lo mismo hoy hablariamos aleman. De igual manera, si Stalin hubiera seguido en el seminario, habria sido sacerdote en Georgia y no habria habido gulag. Quien sabe lo que habria pasado si Napoleon hubiera acabado como notario en Corcega, si Lenin hubiera conseguido un empleo en Zurich o si Mao hubiera triunfado en la poesia...Salvando las distancias, muchos nos hemos preguntado que habria sucedido si Marengo, el grupo de musica melodica en el que Carlos Mazon era vocalista, hubiera sido seleccionado para Eurovision, evento al que concurrio sin lograr clasificarse; que hubiera sucedido si finalmente se hubiera consolidado en los escenarios...Dice Jabois que lo unico que se recordara dentro de cien anos sera la factura del Ventorro y el paseo por el parking. Seguramente ni eso. A lo mejor dentro de cien anos nadie recuerda ni lo que era un parking. Pero hay algo que si perdura: la certeza de que lo peor que puede decirse de un politico cuando todo se ha dicho es que habriamos estado mejor si nunca se hubiera metido en politica.Ser feliz es ignorar, y nosotros ignoramos los desastres que se evitaron porque cierta gente no se metio en politica. No nos hagamos dano.
Los aficionados a las ucronias suelen afirmar que, si Hitler hubiera entrado en la Academia de Bellas Artes, hoy no habria documentales de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Y si Churchill no hubiera suspendido el examen militar y hubiera acabado en un cuartel remoto, lo mismo hoy hablariamos aleman. De igual manera, si Stalin hubiera seguido en el seminario, habria sido sacerdote en Georgia y no habria habido gulag. Quien sabe lo que habria pasado si Napoleon hubiera acabado como notario en Corcega, si Lenin hubiera conseguido un empleo en Zurich o si Mao hubiera triunfado en la poesia...Salvando las distancias, muchos nos hemos preguntado que habria sucedido si Marengo, el grupo de musica melodica en el que Carlos Mazon era vocalista, hubiera sido seleccionado para Eurovision, evento al que concurrio sin lograr clasificarse; que hubiera sucedido si finalmente se hubiera consolidado en los escenarios...Dice Jabois que lo unico que se recordara dentro de cien anos sera la factura del Ventorro y el paseo por el parking. Seguramente ni eso. A lo mejor dentro de cien anos nadie recuerda ni lo que era un parking. Pero hay algo que si perdura: la certeza de que lo peor que puede decirse de un politico cuando todo se ha dicho es que habriamos estado mejor si nunca se hubiera metido en politica.Ser feliz es ignorar, y nosotros ignoramos los desastres que se evitaron porque cierta gente no se metio en politica. No nos hagamos dano.
Trump's Tariff Policy Gains Victory in Trade Truce with China. Alan Tonelson assesses the US-China trade truce, viewing it as a major victory for President Trump's tariff policies. China agreed to delay rare earth export controls and buy US farm goods. This move is seen as desperate by Xi Jinping, whose economy is undermined by US technology curbs. China's predatory practices defined the relationship until Trump decided to use American leverage. 1919 MAO
La matinale d’AF : l’actu des instruments de musique et du matériel audio
Bienvenue dans cette 203e Matinale Audiofanzine !On revient cette semaine avec quatre annonces marquantes dans le monde de la MAO et du mixage : Antares dévoile Auto-Tune 2026, Universal Audio met à jour Luna, INA GRM Tools revient sur le devant de la scène avec Atelier et enfin, Sonarworks ouvre les précommandes de Virtual Monitoring Pro
Tonight on The Brian Crombie Hour, Brian is joined by Charles Burton, Senior Fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute and one of Canada's foremost experts on China. A former diplomat at our embassy in Beijing and longtime professor at Brock University, Charles brings decades of experience studying China's political evolution, security strategy, and its growing influence on Western democracies. Together they discuss his upcoming book, "The Beaver and the Dragon: How China Outmaneuvered Canada's Diplomacy, Security, and Sovereignty", exploring how Canada's policies toward China have evolved — from early optimism during the reform era to today's growing concerns over espionage, human rights, and global power shifts.Charles shares vivid memories from his time in China during the Mao and Deng years, offers insight into the fate of democratic movements after Tiananmen Square, and reflects on the lessons Canada must learn to defend its independence and democratic institutions."The Beaver and the Dragon" launches October 21.
Esta semana todo el programa es una enorme sección del Fondo de Armario, ese espacio en el que analizo en profundidad un álbum que merece la pena tener en nuestra discoteca. Entre el 21 y el 29 de octubre de 1981, Jean-Michel Jarre fue el primer músico occidental en realizar una gira de conciertos en la República Popular de China, en plena etapa aperturista tras la muerte de Mao. Tras esos conciertos, un álbum doble recopiló esos conciertos y el resultado fue un doble disco que supuso un antes y un después para Jarre como compositor. Esta semana escucharemos: Magnetic Fields, Pt. 1 (Magnetic Fields/Les Champs Magnetiques) Magnetic Fields 1 - Grabado en directo en los conciertos de China 1981 L'ouverture _ The overture (Live - Remastered 2022) Arpégiateur _ Arpegiator (Live - Remastered 2022) Equinoxe, Pt. 4 _ Equinoxe Part 4 (Live - Remastered 2022) Jonques De Pêcheurs Au Crepuscule _ Fishing Junks at Sunset (Live - Remastered 2022) Fishing Junks at Sunset - 1981 Radio Broadcast Version Equinoxe, Pt. 7 _ Equinoxe Part 7 (Live - Remastered 2022) Orient Express (Live - Remastered 2022) Chants Magnetiques, Pt. 2 _ Magnetic Fields Part 2 (Live - Remastered 2022) Chants Magnetiques, Pt. 4 _ Magnetic Fields Part 4 (Live - Remastered 2022) Nuit A Shanghai _ Night in Shanghai (Live - Remastered 2022) Souvenir de Chine _ Souvenir of China (Live - Remastered 2022)
GlassBlasSing : Mission Impossible sur des bouteilles Vikingur OlafssonEric Satie : Discoveries Covers :Alfredo Rodriguez : Besame Muchos - Beethoven : Für EliseUsher Medieval Bardcore versionPatrick Souza : Sweet child o'mineMarcin & Hayato Sumino : I wish Virelangue :Barbaras RhabarberbarDer dicke DachdeckerLe bar à rhubarbe de BarbaraBoby Lapointe : Ta Katie t'a quitté Sons zarbi :Encarni Rico : des mains qui tapentOpen Reel Ensemble : Tape bowingLuca Sestak : Ducktape on my pianoOld Technology : Du son en 1890Sergio Assad : Curupira Bébés et animaux :AtilaKw : Canta Junto aêFrench Fuse : Dog songsThe Kiffness : Cat song Trucs en vrac :Chorale au kazooDave Dee, Dozy, Beaky, Mick & Tich : Don JuanHermeto Pascoal & Elis ReginaDavid Gilmour : Shine on you crazy diamond La +BCdM :Robert Charlebois : Ordinairepar Julien Clerc - Gérard Lenorman - Benoît Poelvoorde - Céline Dion -Victoria Sio - Charlebois devant Céline Dion La Playlist de la +BCdM :sur le Tube à Waltersur Spotify (merci John Cytron) sur Deezer (merci MaO de Paris)sur Amazon Music (merci Hellxions)et sur Apple Music (merci Yawourt)Vote pour la Plus Belle Chanson du Monde Le son mystère (44'35) :Pam Brown à la flûteAvec :CirbafeAudePinchoCausmic BeastMerci à :OlivierPop goes the WZAMinareyRandall FlaggDavidPodcasts & liens cités :podCloudTumyxo saison 2 : récit au jour le jourWalter sur BlueSkyWalter sur MastodonWalter sur InstagramLes 100 +BCdMLe générique de fin est signé Cousbou
Está no ar a 67ª edição do Podcast do BahiaRock. Nessa edição, o site entrevistou o vocalista Mao, do Garotos Podres. Nessa entrevista ele dá uma verdadeira aula de história sobre o punk, da banda, expectativas pros shows na Bahia e muito mais. Confiram!Sobre o Podcast:Nesse podcast, apresentado por Ramon Prates, iremos conversar, bater um papo e entrevistar artistas, bandas e pessoas ligadas ao rock baiano. E claro, também gente de fora do estado que vem se apresentar na Bahia.Links comentados no programa:Garotos podres, Estrada perdida, Pastel de miolos: GIG PUNK SALVADORGAROTOS PODRES EM CRUZInstagram do Garotos Podres
Jon Czin spent years as a top China analyst at the CIA, served as China Director on Biden's National Security Council, and now works at the Brookings Institution. We discuss what Xi's fourth-term means for China's top leadership and military, Taiwan, and the US. We cover: How Xi's mafioso-style “decapitation strategy” has kept the PLA in line and why he's purged more generals than Mao. Cognitive decline and how end-of-life thinking might be shaping Xi's succession plans and Taiwan strategy. Tariffs, rare earths, and China's appetite for pain vs. America's. Beijing's parochialism and its limits in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. What intelligence work on China actually looks like and whether or not Xi's era is duller than previous generations. Plus: who might succeed Xi, comparing the Politburo Standing Committee to a frat house, and why chips and TSMC matter much less in Xi's Taiwan calculus than most think. Outtro Music: Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
This week on the Sinica Podcast, I speak with Jonathan Czin, the Michael H. Armacost Chair in Foreign Policy Studies and a fellow at the Brookings Institution's John L. Thornton China Center. His new essay in Foreign Affairs, “China Against China: Xi Jinping Confronts the Downsides of Success,” challenges the dominant Western narrative of Xi Jinping as either Mao reincarnate or a brittle autocrat presiding over imminent collapse. Instead, Czin argues that Xi's most illiberal reforms can be understood as attempts to cure the pathologies of China's own success. We discuss his framing of Xi's “Counterreformation,” how it helps explain China's current political direction, and what it reveals about our own analytical blind spots in the West.7:15 – Xi's “reformation” and Carl Minzner's “end of reform and opening”12:18 – Corruption, decentralization, and the “lost decade” under Hu and Wen20:12 – Defining “resilience” and what Xi means by “eating bitterness”29:45 – The “downsides of success”: property, corruption, and governance contradictions45:30 – Counter-reformation vs. counterrevolution: what Xi wants to preserve and discard54:20 – The myth of yes-men: triangulation and feedback in Xi's leadership style1:07:07 – Cognitive empathy and why most U.S. analysis of Xi falls short1:15:35 – Systems that can't course-correct: comparing the U.S. and China1:22:05 – Cognitive empathy, ideology, and the problem of American exceptionalismPaying it forward:Jonathan: Allie Mathias and Dinny McMahonRecommendations:Jonathan: The Thirty Years War by C.V. Wedgewood; The Betrothed by Alessandro ManzoniKaiser: Transplants by Daniel Tam-ClaiborneSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.
Chinese cinema has a long history of engagement with China's art traditions, and literati (wenren) landscape painting has been an enduring source of inspiration. Literati Lenses: Wenren Landscape in Chinese Cinema of the Mao Era (U Hawai'i Press, 2019) explores this interplay during the Mao era, a time when cinema, at the forefront of ideological campaigns and purges, was held to strict political guidelines. Through four films―Li Shizhen (1956), Stage Sisters (1964), Early Spring in February (1963), and Legend of Tianyun Mountain (1979)― Mia Liu reveals how landscape offered an alternative text that could operate beyond political constraints and provide a portal for smuggling interesting discourses into the film. While allusions to pictorial traditions associated with a bygone era inevitably took on different meanings in the context of Mao-era cinema, cinematic engagement with literati landscape endowed films with creative and critical space as well as political poignancy. Liu not only identifies how the conventions and aesthetics of traditional literati landscape art were reinvented and mediated on multiple levels in cinema, but also explores how post-1949 Chinese filmmakers configured themselves as modern intellectuals in the spaces forged among the vestiges of the old. In the process, she deepens her analysis, suggesting that landscape be seen as an allegory of human life, a mirror of the age, and a commentary on national affairs. Jing Li teaches Chinese language, literature, and film. Her research explores rural China and independent cinema. She's also guest editor for the Chinese Independent Cinema Observer. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network
Chinese cinema has a long history of engagement with China's art traditions, and literati (wenren) landscape painting has been an enduring source of inspiration. Literati Lenses: Wenren Landscape in Chinese Cinema of the Mao Era (U Hawai'i Press, 2019) explores this interplay during the Mao era, a time when cinema, at the forefront of ideological campaigns and purges, was held to strict political guidelines. Through four films―Li Shizhen (1956), Stage Sisters (1964), Early Spring in February (1963), and Legend of Tianyun Mountain (1979)― Mia Liu reveals how landscape offered an alternative text that could operate beyond political constraints and provide a portal for smuggling interesting discourses into the film. While allusions to pictorial traditions associated with a bygone era inevitably took on different meanings in the context of Mao-era cinema, cinematic engagement with literati landscape endowed films with creative and critical space as well as political poignancy. Liu not only identifies how the conventions and aesthetics of traditional literati landscape art were reinvented and mediated on multiple levels in cinema, but also explores how post-1949 Chinese filmmakers configured themselves as modern intellectuals in the spaces forged among the vestiges of the old. In the process, she deepens her analysis, suggesting that landscape be seen as an allegory of human life, a mirror of the age, and a commentary on national affairs. Jing Li teaches Chinese language, literature, and film. Her research explores rural China and independent cinema. She's also guest editor for the Chinese Independent Cinema Observer. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies
Chinese cinema has a long history of engagement with China's art traditions, and literati (wenren) landscape painting has been an enduring source of inspiration. Literati Lenses: Wenren Landscape in Chinese Cinema of the Mao Era (U Hawai'i Press, 2019) explores this interplay during the Mao era, a time when cinema, at the forefront of ideological campaigns and purges, was held to strict political guidelines. Through four films―Li Shizhen (1956), Stage Sisters (1964), Early Spring in February (1963), and Legend of Tianyun Mountain (1979)― Mia Liu reveals how landscape offered an alternative text that could operate beyond political constraints and provide a portal for smuggling interesting discourses into the film. While allusions to pictorial traditions associated with a bygone era inevitably took on different meanings in the context of Mao-era cinema, cinematic engagement with literati landscape endowed films with creative and critical space as well as political poignancy. Liu not only identifies how the conventions and aesthetics of traditional literati landscape art were reinvented and mediated on multiple levels in cinema, but also explores how post-1949 Chinese filmmakers configured themselves as modern intellectuals in the spaces forged among the vestiges of the old. In the process, she deepens her analysis, suggesting that landscape be seen as an allegory of human life, a mirror of the age, and a commentary on national affairs. Jing Li teaches Chinese language, literature, and film. Her research explores rural China and independent cinema. She's also guest editor for the Chinese Independent Cinema Observer. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/film
Chinese cinema has a long history of engagement with China's art traditions, and literati (wenren) landscape painting has been an enduring source of inspiration. Literati Lenses: Wenren Landscape in Chinese Cinema of the Mao Era (U Hawai'i Press, 2019) explores this interplay during the Mao era, a time when cinema, at the forefront of ideological campaigns and purges, was held to strict political guidelines. Through four films―Li Shizhen (1956), Stage Sisters (1964), Early Spring in February (1963), and Legend of Tianyun Mountain (1979)― Mia Liu reveals how landscape offered an alternative text that could operate beyond political constraints and provide a portal for smuggling interesting discourses into the film. While allusions to pictorial traditions associated with a bygone era inevitably took on different meanings in the context of Mao-era cinema, cinematic engagement with literati landscape endowed films with creative and critical space as well as political poignancy. Liu not only identifies how the conventions and aesthetics of traditional literati landscape art were reinvented and mediated on multiple levels in cinema, but also explores how post-1949 Chinese filmmakers configured themselves as modern intellectuals in the spaces forged among the vestiges of the old. In the process, she deepens her analysis, suggesting that landscape be seen as an allegory of human life, a mirror of the age, and a commentary on national affairs. Jing Li teaches Chinese language, literature, and film. Her research explores rural China and independent cinema. She's also guest editor for the Chinese Independent Cinema Observer. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies
Donate (no account necessary) | Subscribe (account required) Join Bryan Dean Wright, former CIA Operations Officer, as he dives into today's top stories shaping America and the world. In this Monday Headline Brief of The Wright Report, Bryan covers the “No Kings” protests against President Trump, rising ties between Marxists and Islamists in U.S. politics, the arrest of a Hamas-linked illegal in Louisiana, new calls for deportations of radicalized citizens, and global updates from Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, China, and Australia. “No Kings” Protests Fall Flat: Millions were expected at anti-Trump demonstrations over the weekend, but turnout reached only one to five percent of Kamala Harris voters. Democrats Abroad rebranded their rallies as “No Tyrants” to avoid offending actual monarchs in Commonwealth nations. Bryan says, “Democrats want no kings — except the real ones.” Radical Islamist Runs for NYC Mayor: Ugandan-born Marxist Zohran Mamdani appeared at protests alongside Imam Siraj Wahhaj, a former unindicted co-conspirator in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Wahhaj has preached jihad abroad and called for an Islamic nation in America through political activism. Bryan cites the UAE's foreign minister warning that “Western naïveté about radical Islam will destroy us.” Hamas Terrorist Arrested in Louisiana: An illegal immigrant from Gaza, Mahmoud al-Muhtadi, who joined the October 7th Hamas attacks, was living in the U.S. as a Biden-approved resident. ICE also arrested a Texas man offering bounties to kill agents, and a Michigan mayor defended naming a street after a Hamas sympathizer. Bryan warns, “These are the people we've let in — and they want to destroy this country.” DHS Embraces “Re-Migration” Policy: The Department of Homeland Security announced plans to strip citizenship from naturalized extremists, arguing that fraudulent applications and post-naturalization crimes justify “de-naturalization and return.” Critics call it racist; Bryan calls it overdue. Trump's Expanding War on Narco-Terror: The U.S. Navy sank another cartel vessel near Venezuela, killing three Marxist rebels linked to Colombia's ELN. Colombian President Gustavo Petro — himself a former terrorist — protested the strike, but Trump said Petro “doesn't want to mess with the United States.” Senator Rand Paul demanded congressional oversight, sparking debate over executive war powers. China's Internal Purge and the Mineral Wars: President Xi Jinping removed nine generals in the largest purge since Mao, signaling espionage and internal fractures. Meanwhile, Trump meets Australia's Prime Minister Albanese at the White House today to announce joint investments in rare earth minerals and new Pacific supply chains. "And you shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." - John 8:32 Keywords: No Kings protest turnout, Zohran Mamdani Imam Siraj Wahhaj jihad, Hamas terrorist Louisiana arrest, DHS remigration denaturalization policy, Trump narco-terror Venezuela Colombia ELN, Rand Paul war powers debate, Xi Jinping purge PLA generals, Trump Australia rare earth partnership
Jon Czin spent years as a top China analyst at the CIA, served as China Director on Biden's National Security Council, and now works at the Brookings Institution. We discuss what Xi's fourth-term means for China's top leadership and military, Taiwan, and the US. We cover: How Xi's mafioso-style “decapitation strategy” has kept the PLA in line and why he's purged more generals than Mao. Cognitive decline and how end-of-life thinking might be shaping Xi's succession plans and Taiwan strategy. Tariffs, rare earths, and China's appetite for pain vs. America's. Beijing's parochialism and its limits in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. What intelligence work on China actually looks like and whether or not Xi's era is duller than previous generations. Plus: who might succeed Xi, comparing the Politburo Standing Committee to a frat house, and why chips and TSMC matter much less in Xi's Taiwan calculus than most think. Outtro Music: Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
L'histoire semble absurde, presque inventée. Et pourtant, elle est vraie. En février 1973, le dirigeant chinois Mao Zedong fit à Henry Kissinger, conseiller diplomatique du président américain Richard Nixon, une proposition qui reste l'une des plus extravagantes de la diplomatie moderne : envoyer dix millions de femmes chinoises aux États-Unis.Une proposition déconcertanteLe contexte est crucial. En 1972, Nixon avait ouvert la voie à un rapprochement historique entre Washington et Pékin, mettant fin à plus de vingt ans d'hostilité. L'année suivante, Kissinger effectue une nouvelle visite en Chine pour consolider cette relation naissante. Lors d'une rencontre au ton parfois ironique, Mao, affaibli mais encore maître du verbe, lance cette idée :« Nous avons trop de femmes. Pourquoi ne pas vous en envoyer dix millions ? »Selon les notes de Kissinger, Mao disait cela avec un humour décalé, mais sur un fond de réflexion démographique réelle. À l'époque, la Chine comptait déjà plus de 800 millions d'habitants, et Mao voyait cette croissance comme un fardeau économique.Une blague… mais pas complètementCette proposition n'était évidemment pas sérieuse au sens diplomatique du terme. Kissinger l'a lui-même interprétée comme une plaisanterie politique, typique du style provocateur du dirigeant chinois. Mais elle révélait une préoccupation authentique : Mao redoutait l'explosion démographique de son pays, à une époque où la planification des naissances n'était pas encore mise en place.En même temps, l'idée contenait une pointe de calcul géopolitique. Mao suggérait, avec cynisme, que l'arrivée massive de femmes chinoises provoquerait aux États-Unis un désordre social et démographique comparable à celui que connaissait la Chine — une façon de rappeler à Kissinger la force de son pays et la complexité de sa gestion.Un symbole de la diplomatie maoïsteCette scène illustre le style unique de Mao : mélange d'ironie, de provocation et de stratégie. Il utilisait souvent l'humour pour tester ses interlocuteurs étrangers et mesurer leurs réactions. Derrière la boutade, il envoyait un message : la Chine, même isolée, était un acteur qu'il fallait prendre au sérieux.Cette anecdote, aujourd'hui encore, symbolise la transition du monde bipolaire de la Guerre froide vers une diplomatie plus subtile, où les mots – même les plus extravagants – servaient à redéfinir les rapports de force. Mao n'a jamais envoyé dix millions de Chinoises, mais il a bel et bien envoyé un signal retentissant : la Chine ne plaisantait jamais vraiment, même quand elle semblait le faire. Hébergé par Acast. Visitez acast.com/privacy pour plus d'informations.
We're joined by Samuel Kim, the Founder and President of the Center for Asia Leadership, who shares with us the unique challenges and differences of teaching leadership in Asia. Samuel has trained over 50,000 leaders across 90 countries, helping organizations, governments, and family-run businesses navigate complex leadership challenges. From his early career at the UN to military service, startups, and education reform across Asia, Samuel brings a rare cross-sector perspective on what it takes to lead well in moments of uncertainty, hierarchy, and rapid change. We explore the systemic failures of leadership in Asian institutions, the cultural legacy of power distance, and how organizations—both public and private—fall into patterns of decay when truth is suppressed, feedback is feared, and hierarchy is mistaken for competence. We also dive into the role of AI and the Fourth Industrial Revolution in reshaping leadership expectations, talent pipelines, and what future-ready organizations must do to retain their edge. This episode is part of our Emerging Market Leadership Series, created in collaboration with Strategic Counsel. We dive into: -Why the Philippines used to be Korea's role model—and what changed -How bad leadership triggers institutional decay -The four dangerous leadership responses to decline -Power distance and hierarchy in Asia vs. the West -How authoritarian cultures suppress truth and innovation -Why great leaders must spotlight what's falling apart -The trap of inherited leadership in family businesses and politics -Building microcultures of trust and feedback -AI and leadership: why future-ready leaders need both heart and hard skills -What Asia can teach the West about human-centered leadership Key Takeaways from the Episode: 1. Leadership Is About Noticing Decay: Samuel defines leadership as the ability to draw attention to what's falling apart—even when everyone else is celebrating success. 2. The Four Dysfunctional Responses to Decline: Leaders often ignore decay, delay action, blame others, or delegate responsibility away. These behaviors are the seeds of institutional collapse. 3. Power Distance Corrodes Truth: In high power-distance cultures, subordinates fear speaking up, and leaders stop hearing uncomfortable truths. This dynamic has real consequences—from Mao's famine to corporate collapse. 4. Leadership Isn't a Title—It's a Choice: Whether in politics, corporations, or NGOs, real leadership means taking responsibility before you're told to. Titles alone don't make leaders. 5. The Case for Microcultures: Even in rigid hierarchies, middle managers can build “microcultures” of open communication and feedback. Culture change doesn't always start at the top. 6. The Parachute Problem: When leaders are “parachuted” into top roles due to family connections or seniority, they often lack legitimacy. Samuel outlines how humility and listening can help rebuild trust. 7. Asia's Advantage: Loyalty, Collectivism, and Human-Centric Leadership: While the West emphasizes individualism, Samuel argues Asia's collectivist mindset—when combined with feedback culture—can build more loyal, resilient teams. 8. Leadership in the Age of AI: Modern leaders must integrate business acumen with AI fluency. Understanding how to ask better questions, leverage data, and think across disciplines is now essential. 9. The Role of Governments and Institutions: Samuel highlights how some Asian governments are adapting by reforming education, labor laws, and national KPIs to stay relevant in the Fourth Industrial Revolution. 10. The Future Belongs to Distributed Leadership: In complex, uncertain times, no single person has all the answers. Leaders must cultivate diverse allies, solicit uncomfortable perspectives, and share responsibility. Timestamps: (00:00) – Introduction to Samuel Kim and the crisis of leadership (03:00) – Why nations rise and fall based on leadership quality (06:40) – The four common leadership failures in times of decay (12:10) – Formal vs. informal authority in Asian contexts (16:00) – Power distance, speaking up, and the role of trust (20:00) – When leaders inherit power but lack credibility (26:00) – Systems vs. individuals: Why governance models matter (31:00) – Parachute leaders: How to survive and gain legitimacy (35:00) – Business acumen + people skills: What modern leaders need (39:00) – What Asian leadership models can teach the West (43:00) – Building loyalty through second chances (44:30) – The role of AI in shaping the future of leadership (48:00) – Final thoughts and how to attend Samuel's next conference Join us for a deeply personal and global conversation about power, truth, humility—and how Asia's evolving leadership models may hold the key to navigating the future. Follow our host (@iwaheedo) for more deep dives into leadership, progress, and innovation in emerging markets.
7. The Tree Sparrow: Mao's Folly and the Emu Wars AUTHOR: Stephen Moss BOOK TITLE: 10 Birds That Changed the World This excerpt details Mao's 1958 "Four Vermin" campaign targeting the Tree Sparrow. Maoordered the sparrows killed, believing they consumed grain; however, because sparrows feed their young on insects, their eradication led to an insect population boom. The subsequent crop failures caused a famine that resulted in potentially 45 to 50 million deaths, making it the worst human-created disaster in history. The segment contrasts this tragedy with the "Emu Wars" in 1930s Australia, where highly adaptable Emussuccessfully defeated the Australian army. 1938
Last time we spoke about the Battle of Taierzhuang. Following the fall of Nanjing in December 1937, the Second Sino-Japanese War entered a brutal phase of attrition as Japan sought to consolidate control and press toward central China. Chinese defense prioritized key rail corridors and urban strongholds, with Xuzhou, the JinPu and Longhai lines, and the Huai River system forming crucial lifelines. By early 1938, Japanese offensives aimed to link with forces around Beijing and Nanjing and encircle Chinese positions in the Central Yangtze region, threatening Wuhan. In response, Chiang Kai-shek fortified Xuzhou and expanded defenses to deter a pincer move, eventually amassing roughly 300,000 troops along strategic lines. Taierzhuang became a focal point when Japanese divisions attempted to press south and link with northern elements. Chinese commanders Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, Tang Enbo, and Sun Lianzhong coordinated to complicate Japanese plans through offensive-defensive actions, counterattacks, and encirclement efforts. The victory, though numerically costly, thwarted immediate Japanese objectives and foreshadowed further attritional struggles ahead. #171 The Flooding of the Yellow River Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. We last left off with a significant event during the Xuzhou campaign. Three Japanese divisions under General Itagaki Seishiro moved south to attack Taierzhuang and were met by forces commanded by Li Zongren, Sun Lianzhong, and Tang Enbo, whose units possessed a decent amount of artillery. In a two-week engagement from March 22 to April 7, the battle devolved into a costly urban warfare. Fighting was vicious, often conducted in close quarters and at night. The urban environment negated Japanese advantages in armor and artillery, allowing Chinese forces to contend on equal terms. The Chinese also disrupted Japanese logistics by resupplying their own troops and severing rear supply lines, draining Japanese ammunition, supplies, and reinforcements. By April 7, the Japanese were compelled to retreat, marking the first Chinese victory of the war. However both sides suffered heavy losses, with around 20,000 casualties on each side. In the aftermath of this rare victory, Chiang Kai-Shek pushed Tang Enbo and Li Zongren to capitalize on their success and increased deployments in the Taierzhuang theater to about 450,000 troops. Yet the Chinese Army remained hampered by fundamental problems. The parochialism that had crippled Chiang's forces over the preceding months resurfaced. Although the generals had agreed to coordinate in a war of resistance, each still prioritized the safety of his own troops, wary of Chiang's bid to consolidate power. Li Zongren, for example, did not deploy his top Guangxi provincial troops at Taierzhuang and sought to shift most of the fighting onto Tang Enbo's forces. Chiang's colleagues were mindful of the fates of Han Fuju of Shandong and Zhang Xueliang of Manchuria: Han was executed for refusing to fight, while Zhang, after allowing Chiang to reduce the size of his northeastern army, ended up under house arrest. They were right to distrust Chiang. He believed, after all, that provincial armies should come under a unified national command, which he would lead. From a national-unity perspective, his aspiration was not unreasonable. But it fed suspicion among other military leaders that participation in the anti-Japanese war would dilute their power. The divided nature of the command also hindered logistics, making ammunition and food supplies to the front unreliable and easy to cut off. By late April the Chinese had reinforced the Xuzhou area to between 450,000-600,000 to capitalize on their victory. However these armies were plagued with command and control issues. Likewise the Japanese licked their wounds and reinforced the area to roughly 400,000, with fresh troops and supplies flowing in from Tianjin and Nanjing. The Japanese continued with their objective of encircling Chinese forces. The North China Area Army comprised four divisions and two infantry brigades drawn from the Kwantung Army, while the Central China Expeditionary Army consisted of three divisions and the 1st and 2nd Tank Battalions along with motorized support units. The 5th Tank Battalion supported the 3rd Infantry Division as it advanced north along the railway toward Xuzhou. Fighting to the west, east, and north of Xuzhou was intense, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. On 18 April, the Japanese advanced southward toward Pizhou. Tang Enbo's 20th Army Corps, together with the 2nd, 22nd, 46th, and 59th corps, resisted fiercely, culminating in a stalemate by the end of April. The 60th Corps of the Yunnan Army engaged the Japanese 10th Division at Yuwang Mountain for nearly a month, repelling multiple assaults. By the time it ceded its position to the Guizhou 140th Division and withdrew on 15 May, the corps had sustained losses exceeding half of its forces. Simultaneously, the Japanese conducted offensives along both banks of the Huai River, where Chinese defenders held out for several weeks. Nevertheless, Japanese artillery and aerial bombardment gradually tilted the balance, allowing the attackers to seize Mengcheng on 9 May and Hefei on 14 May. From there, the southern flank split into two parts: one force moved west and then north to cut off the Longhai Railway escape route from Xuzhou, while another division moved directly north along the railway toward Suxian, just outside Xuzhou. Simultaneously, to the north, Japanese units from north China massed at Jining and began moving south beyond Tengxian. Along the coast, an amphibious landing was made at Lianyungang to reinforce troops attacking from the east. The remaining portions of Taierzhuang were captured in May, a development symbolically significant to Tokyo. On 17 May, Japanese artillery further tightened the noose around Xuzhou, striking targets inside the city. To preserve its strength, the Nationalist government ordered the abandonment of Xuzhou and directed its main forces to break out toward northern Jiangsu, northern Anhui, and eastern Henan. To deter the Japanese army's rapid westward advance and penetration into northern Henan and western Shandong, many leading military and political figures within the Nationalist government proposed breaching dams over the Yellow River to delay the offensive, a strategy that would have been highly advantageous to the Nationalist forces at the time. Chiang Kai-shek vetoed the proposal outright, insisting that the Nationalist army could still resist. He understood that with tens of millions of Chinese lives at stake and a sliver of hope remaining, the levee plan must not be undertaken. Then a significant battle broke out at Lanfeng. Chiang also recognized that defeat could allow the elite Japanese mechanized divisions, the 14th, 16th, and 10th, to advance directly toward Zhengzhou. If Zhengzhou fell, the Japanese mechanized forces on the plains could advance unimpeded toward Tongguan. Their southward push would threaten Xi'an, Xiangfan, and Nanyang, directly jeopardizing the southwest's rear defenses. Concurrently, the Japanese would advance along the Huai River north of the Dabie Mountains toward Wuhan, creating a pincer with operations along the Yangtze River. Now what followed was arguably the most important and skillful Chinese maneuver of the Xuzhou campaign: a brilliantly executed strategic retreat to the south and west across the Jinpu railway line. On May 15, Li Zongren, in consultation with Chiang Kai-shek, decided to withdraw from Xuzhou and focus on an escape plan. The evacuation of civilians and military personnel began that day. Li ordered troops to melt into the countryside and move south and west at night, crossing the Jinpu Railway and splitting into four groups that would head west. The plan was to regroup in the rugged Dabie Mountains region to the south and prepare for the defense of Wuhan. Li's generals departed reluctantly, having held out for so long; Tang Enbo was said to have wept. Under cover of night, about forty divisions, over 200,000 men, marched out of Japanese reach in less than a week. A critical moment occurred on May 18, when fog and a sandstorm obscured the retreating troops as they crossed the Jinpu Railway. By May 21, Li wired Chiang Kai-shek to report that the withdrawal was complete. He mobilized nearly all of the Kuomintang Central Army's elite units, such as the 74th Army, withdrawn from Xuzhou and transferred directly to Lanfeng, with a resolute intent to “burn their boats.” The force engaged the Japanese in a decisive battle at Lanfeng, aiming to secure the last line of defense for the Yellow River, a position carrying the lives of millions of Chinese civilians. Yet Chiang Kai-shek's strategy was not universally understood by all participating generals, who regarded it as akin to striking a rock with an egg. For the battle of Lanfeng the Chinese mobilized nearly all of the Kuomintang Central Army's elite forces, comprising 14 divisions totaling over 150,000 men. Among these, the 46th Division of the 27th Army, formerly the Central Training Brigade and the 36th, 88th, and 87th Divisions of the 71st Army were German-equipped. Additionally, the 8th Army, the Tax Police Corps having been reorganized into the Ministry of Finance's Anti-Smuggling Corps, the 74th Army, and Hu Zongnan's 17th Corps, the new 1st Army, equipped with the 8th Division were elite Nationalist troops that had demonstrated strong performance in the battle of Shanghai and the battle of Nanjing, and were outfitted with advanced matériel. However, these so-called “elite” forces were heavily degraded during the campaigns in Shanghai and Nanjing. The 46th Division and Hu Zongnan's 17th Corps sustained casualties above 85% in Nanjing, while the 88th and 87th Divisions suffered losses of up to 90%. The 74th Army and the 36th Division also endured losses exceeding 75%. Their German-made equipment incurred substantial losses; although replenishment occurred, inventories resembled roughly a half-German and half-Chinese mix. With very limited heavy weapons and a severe shortage of anti-tank artillery, they could not effectively match the elite Japanese regiments. Hu Zongnan's 17th Corps maintained its national equipment via a close relationship with Chiang Kai-shek. In contrast, the 74th Army, after fighting in Shanghai, Nanjing, and Xuzhou, suffered heavy casualties, and the few German weapons it had were largely destroyed at Nanjing, leaving it to rely on a mix of domestically produced and Hanyang-made armaments. The new recruits added to each unit largely lacked combat experience, with nearly half of the intake having received basic training. The hardest hit was Li Hanhun's 64th Army, established less than a year prior and already unpopular within the Guangdong Army. Although classified as one of the three Type A divisions, the 155th, 156th, and 187th Divisions, it was equipped entirely with Hanyang-made firearms. Its direct artillery battalion possessed only about 20 older mortars and three Type 92 infantry guns, limiting its heavy firepower to roughly that of a Japanese battalion. The 195th Division and several miscellaneous units were even less prominent, reorganized from local militias and lacking Hanyang rifles. Additionally, three batches of artillery purchased from the Soviet Union arrived in Lanzhou via Xinjiang between March and June 1938. Except for the 52nd Artillery Regiment assigned to the 200th Division, the other artillery regiments had recently received their weapons and were still undergoing training. The 200th Division, had been fighting awhile for in the Xuzhou area and incurred heavy casualties, was still in training and could only deploy its remaining tank battalion and armored vehicle company. The tank battalion was equipped with T-26 light tanks and a small number of remaining British Vickers tanks, while the armored vehicle company consisted entirely of Italian Fiat CV33 armored cars. The disparity in numbers was substantial, and this tank unit did not participate in the battle. As for the Japanese, the 14th Division was an elite Type A formation. Originally organized with four regiments totaling over 30,000 men, the division's strength was later augmented. Doihara's 14th Division received supplements, a full infantry regiment and three artillery regiments, to prevent it from being surrounded and annihilated, effectively transforming the unit into a mobile reinforced division. Consequently, the division's mounted strength expanded to more than 40,000 personnel, comprising five infantry regiments and four artillery regiments. The four artillery regiments, the 24th Artillery Regiment, the 3rd Independence Mountain Artillery Regiment, the 5th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment, and the 6th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment, possessed substantial heavy firepower, including 150mm heavy howitzers and 105mm long-range field cannons, placing them far in excess of the Nationalist forces at Lanfeng. In addition, both the 14th and later the 16th Divisions commanded tank regiments with nearly 200 light and medium tanks each, while Nationalist forces were markedly short of anti-tank artillery. At the same time, the Nationalist Air Force, though it had procured more than 200 aircraft of various types from the Soviet Union, remained heavily reliant on Soviet aid-to-China aircraft, amounting to over 100 machines, and could defend only a few cities such as Wuhan, Nanchang, and Chongqing. In this context, Japanese forces effectively dominated the Battle of Lanfeng. Moreover, reports indicate that the Japanese employed poison gas on the battlefield, while elite Nationalist troops possessed only a limited number of gas masks, creating a stark disparity in chemical warfare preparedness. Despite these disparities, Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government were initially unaware of the updated strength and composition of the Doihara Division. Faced with constrained options, Chiang chose to press ahead with combat operations. On May 12, 1939, after crossing the Yellow River, the IJA 14th Division continued its southward advance toward Lanfeng. The division's objective was to sever the Longhai Railway, disrupt the main Nationalist retreat toward Zhengzhou, and seize Zhengzhou itself. By May 15, the division split into two columns at Caoxian and moved toward key nodes on the Longhai Line. Major General Toyotomi Fusatarou led two infantry regiments, one cavalry regiment, and one artillery regiment in the main assault toward Kaocheng with the aim of directly capturing Lanfeng. Doihara led three infantry regiments and three artillery regiments toward Neihuang and Minquan, threatening Guide. In response, the Nationalist forces concentrated along the railway from Lanfeng to Guide, uniting Song Xilian's 71st Army, Gui Yongqing's 27th Army, Yu Jishi's 74th Army, Li Hanhun's 64th Army, and Huang Jie's 8th Army. From May 15 to 17, the Fengjiu Brigade, advancing toward Lanfeng, met stubborn resistance near Kaocheng from roughly five divisions under Song Xilian and was forced to shift its effort toward Yejigang and Neihuang. The defense near Neihuang, including Shen Ke's 106th Division and Liang Kai's 195th Division, ultimately faltered, allowing Doihara's division to seize Neihuang, Yejigang, Mazhuangzhai, and Renheji. Nevertheless, the Nationalist forces managed to contain the Japanese advance east and west of the area, preventing a complete encirclement. Chiang Kai-shek ordered Cheng Qian, commander-in-chief of the 1st War Zone, to encircle and annihilate the Japanese 14th Division. The deployment plan mapped three routes: the Eastern Route Army, under Li Hanhun, would include the 74th Army, the 155th Division of the 64th Army, a brigade of the 88th Division, and a regiment of the 87th Division, advancing westward from Guide); the Western Route Army, commanded by Gui Yongqing, would comprise the 27th Army, the 71st Army, the 61st Division, and the 78th Division, advancing eastward from Lanfeng; and the Northern Route Army, formed by Sun Tongxuan's 3rd Army and Shang Zhen's 20th Army, was to cut off the enemy's retreat to the north bank of the Yellow River near Dingtao, Heze, Dongming, and Kaocheng, while attacking the Doihara Division from the east, west, and north to annihilate it in a single decisive operation. On May 21, the Nationalist Army mounted a full-scale offensive. Yu Jishi's 74th Army, commanded by Wang Yaowu's 51st Division, joined a brigade of Song Xilian's 71st Army, led by the 88th Division, and drove the Japanese forces at Mazhuangzhai into retreat, capturing Neihuang and Renheji. The main Japanese force, more than 6,000 strong, withdrew southwest to Yangjiji and Shuangtaji. Song Xilian, commanding Shen Fazao's 87th Division, launched a sharp assault on Yejigang (Yifeng). The Japanese abandoned the stronghold, but their main body continued advancing toward Yangjiji, with some units retreating to Donggangtou and Maoguzhai. On May 23, Song Xilian's 71st Army and Yu Jishi's 74th Army enveloped and annihilated enemy forces at Donggangtou and Maoguzhai. That evening they seized Ximaoguzhai, Yangzhuang, and Helou, eliminating more than a thousand Japanese troops. The Japanese troops at Donggangtou fled toward Lanfeng. Meanwhile, Gui Yongqing's forces were retreating through Lanfeng. His superior strength, Jiang Fusheng's 36th Division, Li Liangrong's 46th Division, Zhong Song's 61st Division, Li Wen's 78th Division, Long Muhan's 88th Division, and Shen Ke's 106th Division—had held defensive positions along the Lanfeng–Yangji line. Equipped with a tank battalion and armored vehicle company commanded by Qiu Qingquan, they blocked the enemy's westward advance and awaited Japanese exhaustion. However, under the Japanese offensive, Gui Yongqing's poor command led to the loss of Maji and Mengjiaoji, forcing the 27th Army to retreat across its entire front. Its main force fled toward Qixian and Kaifeng. The Japanese seized the opportunity to capture Quxingji, Luowangzhai, and Luowang Railway Station west of Lanfeng. Before retreating, Gui Yongqing ordered Long Muhan to dispatch a brigade to replace the 106th Division in defending Lanfeng, while he directed the 106th Division to fall back to Shiyuan. Frightened by the enemy, Long Muhan unilaterally withdrew his troops on the night of the 23rd, leaving Lanfeng undefended. On the 24th, Japanese troops advancing westward from Donggangtou entered Lanfeng unopposed and, relying on well-fortified fortifications, held their ground until reinforcements arrived. In the initial four days, the Nationalist offensive failed to overwhelm the Japanese, who escaped encirclement and annihilation. The four infantry and artillery regiments and one cavalry regiment on the Japanese side managed to hold the line along Lanfeng, Luowangzhai, Sanyizhai, Lanfengkou, Quxingji, Yang'erzhai, and Chenliukou on the south bank of the Yellow River, offering stubborn resistance. The Longhai Railway was completely cut off. Chiang Kai-shek, furious upon hearing the news while stationed in Zhengzhou, ordered the execution of Long Muhan, commander of the 88th Division, to restore military morale. He also decided to consolidate Hu Zongnan's, Li Hanhun's, Yu Jishi's, Song Xilian's, and Gui Yongqing's troops into the 1st Corps, with Xue Yue as commander-in-chief. On the morning of May 25, they launched a determined counterattack on Doihara's 14th Division. Song Xilian personally led the front lines on May 24 to rally the defeated 88th Division. Starting on May 25, after three days of intense combat, Li Hanhun's 64th Army advanced to seize Luowang Station and Luowangzhai, while Song Xilian's 71st Army retook Lanfeng City, temporarily reopening the Longhai Line to traffic. At Sanyi Village, Gui Yongqing's 27th Army and Yu Jishi's 74th Army captured a series of outlying positions, including Yang'eyao, Chailou, Cailou, Hezhai, Xuelou, and Baowangsi. Despite these gains, more than 6,000 Japanese troops offered stubborn resistance. During the fighting, Ji Hongru, commander of the 302nd Regiment, was seriously wounded but continued to fight, shouting, “Don't worry about my death! Brothers, fight on!” He ultimately died a heroic death from his wounds. By May 27, Chiang Kai-shek, concerned that the forces had not yet delivered a decisive victory at Lanfeng, personally reprimanded the participating generals and ordered them to completely encircle and annihilate the enemy west of Lanfeng by the following day. He warned that if the opportunity was missed and Japanese reinforcements arrived, the position could be endangered. The next day, Chiang Kai-shek issued another telegram, urging Cheng Qian's First War Zone and all participating units to press the offensive. The telegram allegedly had this in it “It will forever be a laughingstock in the history of warfare.” Meanwhile on the other side, to prevent the annihilation of Doihara's 14th Division, the elite Japanese 16th Division and the 3rd Mixed Brigade, totaling over 40,000 men, launched a westward assault from Dangshan, capturing Yucheng on May 26. They then began probing the outskirts of Guide. Huang Jie's Eighth Army, responsible for the defense, withdrew to the outskirts of Guide that evening. On May 28, Huang Jie again led his troops on his own initiative, retreating to Liuhe and Kaifeng, leaving only the 187th Division to defend Zhuji Station and Guide City. At dawn on May 29, Peng Linsheng, commander of the 187th Division, also withdrew his troops, leaving Guide a deserted city. The Japanese occupied Guide without a fight. The loss of Guide dramatically shifted the tide of the war. Threatened on the flanks by the Japanese 16th Division, the Nationalist forces were forced onto the defensive. On May 28, the Japanese 14th Division concentrated its forces to counterattack Gui Yongqing's troops, but they were defeated again, allowing the Japanese to stabilize their position. At the same time, the fall of Shangqiu compelled Xue Yue's corps to withdraw five divisions to block the enemy in Shangqiu, and the Nationalist Army shifted to a defensive posture with the 14th Division holding Sanyizhai and Quxingji. To the north of the battlefield, the Japanese 4th Mixed Brigade, numbering over 10,000 men, was preparing to force a crossing of the Yellow River in order to join with the nearby 14th Division. More seriously, the 10th Division, together with its 13th Mixed Brigade and totaling more than 40,000 men, had captured Woyang and Bozhou on the Henan-Anhui border and was rapidly encircling eastern Henan. By the time of the Battle of Lanfeng, Japanese forces had deployed more than 100,000 troops, effectively surrounding the Nationalist army. On May 31, the First War Zone decided to withdraw completely, and the Battle of Lanfeng ended in defeat for the Nationalists, forcing Chiang Kai-shek to authorize diverting the Yellow River embankment to relieve pressure. The consequence was a deteriorating strategic situation, as encirclement tightened and reinforcement options dwindled, driving a retreat from the Lanfeng front. The National Army suffered more than 67,000 casualties, killed and wounded more than 10,000 Japanese soldiers, Lanfeng was lost, and Zhengzhou was in danger. As in Nanjing, this Chinese army might have lived to fight another day, but the effect on Xuzhou itself was horrific. The city had endured Japanese bombardment since August 1937, and the population's mood swung between cautious hope and utter despair. In March, Du Zhongyuan visited Xuzhou. Before he left Wuhan, friends told him that “the city was desolate and the people were terrified, all the inhabitants of Xuzhou were quietly getting on with their business … sometimes it was even calmer than Wuhan.” The Australian journalist Rhodes Farmer recalled a similar image in a book published at war's end, noting the “ordinary townsfolk who became wardens, fire-fighters and first-aid workers during the raid and then went back to their civil jobs.” Yet the mid-May departure of Nationalist troops left the city and its outskirts at the mercy of an angry Imperial Army. Bombing continued through the final days of battle, and a single raid on May 14, 1938 killed 700 people. Around Xuzhou, buildings and bridges were destroyed—some by retreating Chinese forces, some by advancing Japanese troops. Taierzhuang, the scene of the earlier iconic defense, was utterly destroyed. Canadian Jesuits who remained in Xuzhou after its fall recorded that more than a third of the houses were razed, and most of the local population had fled in terror. In rural areas around the city, massacres were repeatedly reported, many witnessed by missionaries. Beyond the atrocities of the Japanese, locals faced banditry in the absence of law enforcement, and vital agricultural work such as planting seed ground to a halt. The loss of Xuzhou was both strategic and symbolic. It dealt a severe blow to Chiang's attempt to hold central China and to control regional troop movements. Morale, which Taierzhuang had briefly boosted, was battered again though not extinguished. The fall signaled that the war would be long, and that swift victory against Japan was no longer likely. Mao Zedong's Yan'an base, far to the northwest, grasped the meaning of defeat there. In May 1938 he delivered one of his most celebrated lectures, “On Protracted War,” chiding those who had over-optimistically claimed the Xuzhou campaign could be a quasi-decisive victory and arguing that, after Taierzhuang, some had become “giddy.” Mao insisted that China would ultimately prevail, yet he warned that it could not be won quickly, and that the War of Resistance would be protracted. In the meantime, the development of guerrilla warfare remained an essential piece of the long-term strategy that the Communist armies would pursue in north China. Yet the loss of Xuzhou did not necessarily portend a long war; it could, instead, presage a war that would be terrifyingly short. By spring 1938 the Chinese defenders were desperate. There was a real danger that the entire war effort could collapse, and the Nationalist governments' notable success as protectors of a shrinking “Free China” lay in avoiding total disaster. Government propaganda had successfully portrayed a plan beyond retreat to foreign observers, yet had Tokyo captured Wuhan in the spring, the Chinese Army would have had to withdraw at speed, reinforcing perceptions of disintegration. Western governments were unlikely to intervene unless convinced it was in their interests. Within the Nationalist leadership, competing instincts persisted. The government pursued welfare measures for the people in the midst of a massive refugee relief effort, the state and local organizations, aided by the International Red Cross, housed large numbers of refugees in 1937–1938. Yet there was a harsher strain within policy circles, with some officials willing to sacrifice individual lives for strategic or political ends as the Japanese threat intensified. Throughout central China, the Yellow River, China's “Sorrow”, loomed as the dominant geographic force shaping history. The loess-laden river, notorious for floods and shifting channels, was banked by massive dikes near Zhengzhou, exactly along the line the Japanese would traverse toward Wuhan. Using the river as a military instrument was discussed as a drastic option: Chiang and Cheng Qian's First War Zone contemplated diverting or breaching the dikes to halt or slow the Japanese advance, a measure that could buy time but would unleash enormous civilian suffering. The idea dated back to 1887 floods that cost hundreds of thousands of lives, and even in 1935 Alexander von Falkenhausen had warned that the Yellow River could become the final line of defense. In 1938 Chiang, recognizing the futility of defeating the Japanese by conventional means at Zhengzhou, considered unleashing the river's force if necessary to impede the invaders. The political and strategic calculus was stark: protect central China and Wuhan, even if it required drastic and morally fraught measures. A more humane leader might have hesitated to break the dikes and spare the dams, allowing the Japanese to take Wuhan. But Chiang Kai-shek believed that if the dikes were not breached and Wuhan fell within days, the Nationalist government might be unable to relocate to Chongqing in time and would likely surrender, leaving Japan in control of almost all of China. Some have compared the choice to France's surrender in June 1940, underscoring that Chiang's decision came during the country's most terrifying assault, with Chinese forces much weaker and less trained than their European counterparts. The dilemma over whether to break the Yellow River dikes grew out of desperation. Chiang ultimately ordered General Wei Rulin to blow the dike that held the Yellow River in central Henan. There was no doubt about the consequences: floods would inundate vast areas of central China, creating a waterlogged barrier that would halt the Japanese advance. Yet for the plan to succeed, it had to be carried out quickly, and the government could offer no public warning in case the Japanese detected it and accelerated their movement. Xiong Xianyu, chief of staff in the 8th Division at the time, recorded the urgency of those hours in his diary. The Japanese were already on the north bank of the Yellow River, briefly delayed when the Chinese army blew up the railway bridge across the river. The destruction of the dikes was the next step: if the area became a sea of mud, there would be no way the Japanese could even attempt to reconstruct the bridge. Blasting the dikes proved easier in theory than in practice. Holding back such a massive body of water required substantial engineering, dams thick and well fortified. The army made its first attempts to blow the dike at the small town of Zhaokou between June 4 and 6, 1938, but the structure proved too durable; another nearby attempt failed as well. Hour by hour, the Japanese moved closer. Division commander Jiang Zaizhen asked Xiong Xianyu for his opinion on where they might breach the dams. Xiong wrote “I discussed the topography, and said that two places, Madukou and Huayuankou, were both possible.” But Madukou was too close to Zhaokou, where the breach had already failed, presenting a danger that the Japanese might reach it very soon. The village of Huayuankou, however, lay farther away and on a bend in the river: “To give ourselves enough time, Huayuankou would be best.” At first, the soldiers treated the task as a military engineering assignment, an “exciting” one in Xiong's words. Xiong and Wei Rulin conducted their first site inspection after dark, late on June 6. The surroundings offered a deceptive calm: Xiong recounted “The wind blew softly, and the river water trickled pleasantly.” Yet gauging the water level proved difficult, hampered by murky moonlight and burned-out flashlights. They spent the night in their car to determine precisely where to break the dike as soon as day broke. But daylight seemed to bring home the consequences of what they planned to do, and the soldiers grew increasingly anxious. Wang Songmei, commander of the 2nd Regiment, addressed the workers about to breach the dike: “My brothers, this plan will be of benefit to our country and our nation, and will lessen the harm that is being done to the people.In the future, you'll find good wives and have plenty of children.” Wang's words were meant to reassure the men of the political necessity of their actions and that fate would not, in the traditional Chinese sense, deny them a family because of the enormity of their deeds. General Wei confirmed that Huayuankou was the right spot, and on June 8 the work began, with about 2,000 men taking part. The Nationalist government was eager to ensure rapid progress. Xiong recorded that the “highest authorities”,, kept making telephone calls from Wuhan to check on progress. In addition, the party sent performers to sing and play music to bolster the workers' spirits. Senior General Shang Zhen announced to the laborers that if they breached the dam by midnight on June 8, each would receive 2,000 yuan; if they achieved it by six the next morning, they would still be paid 1,000 yuan. They needed encouragement, for the diggers had no artificial assistance. After the initial failures at Zhaokou, Wei's troops relied entirely on manual labor, with no explosives used. Yet the workers earned their payments, and the dike was breached in just a few hours. On the morning of June 9, Xiong recorded a rapid shift in mood: the atmosphere became tense and solemn. Initially, the river flow was modest, but by about 1:00 p.m. the water surged “fiercely,” flowing “like 10,000 horses.” Looking toward the distance, Xiong felt as though a sea had appeared before him. “My heart ached,” he wrote. The force of the water widened the breach, and a deadly stream hundreds of feet wide comprising about three-quarters of the river's volume—rushed southeast across the central Chinese plains. “We did this to stop the enemy,” Xiong reflected, “so we didn't regret the huge sacrifice, as it was for a greater victory.” Yet he and the other soldiers also saw a grim reality: the troops who had taken on the task of destroying the railway bridge and the dikes could not bear the flood's consequences alone. It would be up to the government and the people of the nation to provide relief for the countless households uprooted by the flood. In fact, the previous evening Commander Jiang had telephoned to request assistance for those flooded out of their homes. Wei, Xiong, and their troops managed to escape by wooden boats. Hundreds of thousands of farmers trapped in the floods were far less fortunate. Time magazine's correspondent Theodore White reported on the devastation a few days later “Last week “The Ungovernable” [i.e. the Yellow River] lashed out with a flood which promised to change not only its own course but also the course of the whole Sino-Japanese War. Severe breaks in the dikes near Kaifeng sent a five-foot wall of water fanning out over a 500-squaremile area, spreading death. Toll from Yellow River floods is not so much from quick drowning as from gradual disease and starvation. The river's filth settles ankle-deep on the fields, mothering germs, smothering crops. Last week, about 500,000 peasants were driven from 2,000 communities to await rescue or death on whatever dry ground they could find”. Chiang's government had committed one of the grossest acts of violence against its own people, and he knew that the publicity could be a damaging blow to its reputation. He decided to divert blame by announcing that the dike had been broken, but blaming the breach on Japanese aerial bombing. The Japanese, in turn, fiercely denied having bombed the dikes. White's reporting reflected the immediate response of most foreigners; having heard about the atrocities at Nanjing and Xuzhou, he was disinclined to give the Japanese the benefit of the doubt. Furthermore, at the very time that the Yellow River was flooding central China, the Japanese were heavily bombing Guangzhou, causing thousands of casualties. To White, the Japanese counterargument—that the Chinese themselves were responsible, seemed unthinkable: “These accusations, foreign observers thought, were absurd. For the Chinese to check the Japanese advance at possible sacrifice of half a million lives would be a monstrous pyrrhic victory. Besides, dike-cutting is the blackest of Chinese crimes, and the Chinese Army would hardly risk universal censure for slight tactical gains.” But, of course, that is exactly what they had done. During the war the Nationalists never admitted that they, not the Japanese, had breached the dikes. But the truth quickly became widely known. Just a month later, on July 19, US Ambassador Johnson noted, in private communication, that the “Chinese blocked the advance on Chengchow [Zhengzhou] by breaching the Yellow River dikes.” Eventually some 54,000 square kilometers of central China were inundated by the floods. If the Japanese had committed such an act, it would have been remembered as the prime atrocity of the war, dwarfing even the Nanjing Massacre or the Chongqing air raids in terms of the number of people who suffered. Accurate statistics were impossible to obtain in the midst of wartime chaos and disaster, but in 1948 figures issued by the Nationalists themselves suggested enormous casualties: for the three affected provinces of Henan, Anhui, and Jiangsu, the number of dead was put at 844,489, with some 4.8 million becoming refugees. More recent studies place the numbers lower, but still estimate the dead at around 500,000, and 3–5 million refugees. In contrast, the devastating May 1939 air raids on Chongqing killed some thousands. Xiong reflected in his diary that the breaching of the Yellow River dikes was a sacrifice for a greater victory. Even to some Japanese it seemed that the tactic had been successful in the short term: the first secretary at the US Embassy in Wuhan reported that the flood had “completely checked the Japanese advance on Chengchow” and had prevented them taking Wuhan by rail. Instead, he predicted, the attack was likely to come by water and along the north shore of the Yangtze. Supporters of the dike breaches could argue that these acts saved central China and Chiang's headquarters in Wuhan for another five months. The Japanese were indeed prevented from advancing along the Long–Hai railway toward Wuhan. In the short term the floods did what the Nationalists wanted. But the flooding was a tactic, a breathing space, and did not solve the fundamental problem: China's armies needed strong leadership and rapid reform. Some historians suggest that Chiang's decision was pointless anyway, since it merely delayed the inevitable. Theodore White was right: no strategic advantage could make the deaths of 500,000 of China's own people a worthwhile price to pay. However, Chiang Kai-shek's decision can be partly explained, though not excused, by the context. We can now look back at the actions of the Nationalists and argue that they should not have held on to Wuhan, or that their actions in breaching the dam were unjustifiable in the extreme. But for Chiang, in the hot summer of 1938, it seemed his only hope was to deny Japan as much of China for as long as possible and create the best possible circumstances for a long war from China's interior, while keeping the world's attention on what Japan was doing. The short delay won by the flooding was itself part of the strategy. In the struggle raging within the soul of the Nationalist Party, the callous, calculating streak had won, for the time being. The breaking of the dikes marked a turning point as the Nationalists committed an act whose terrible consequences they would eventually have to expiate. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In late 1937, China's frontline trembled as Japanese forces closed in on Wuhan. Chiang Kai-shek faced a brutal choice: endure costly defenses or unleash a desperate gamble. Chiangs' radical plan emerged: breach the Yellow River dikes at Huayuankou to flood central China, buying time. The flood roared, washing villages and futures away, yet slowing the enemy. The battlefield paused, while a nation weighed courage against civilian suffering, victory against devastating costs.
The other day I sat down with Pastor Doug Wilson in Moscow, Idaho to have a conversation on all things China. I was excited to get his perspective, since he has personally lived through much of China’s modern communist history. I was not disappointed. In our 30+ minute conversation, we touched on many topics including the Great Leap Forward, Mao’s Great Famine, Doug’s Submarine Adventures with a Taiwanese crew, the China Legacies of Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter, the Tiananmen Square massacre (and revival), China’s modern-day revival, C.S. Lewis’s 1946 China optimism vs. Doug’s (short-term) pessimism, Hebrews 13:3 and how to pray for the persecuted, and PrayforChina.us’s helpful strategy! Follow me on X (@chinaadventures) where I post new China city prayer profiles every single day. Feel free to send any notes or comments via email @ bfwesten at gmail dot com Find much more about our work in Asia, including my missionary biographies, at PrayGiveGo.us! Frank Dikotter (Dutch, not German) on China https://www.frankdikotter.com/ https://www.amazon.com/Maos-Great-Famine-Devastating-Catastrophe/dp/1408886367 Jimmy Carter’s Complicated China Legacy https://www.crosspoliticnews.com/news/jimmy-carters-complicated-china-legacy The C.S. Lewis China Letters https://chinacall.substack.com/p/the-cs-lewis-china-letters C.S. Lewis, Burnt Marshwiggle, and the Brainwashing of Richard Wurmbrand https://chinacall.substack.com/p/cs-lewis-burnt-marshwiggle-and-the The NBA, LeBron James, and China https://www.crosspoliticnews.com/news/nba-back-in-bed-with-china Pray for China places of the week (Follow @chinaadventures for daily updates) https://open.substack.com/pub/chinacall/p/pray-for-china-oct-13-19-2025 Subscribe to China Compass and leave a review on your preferred podcast platform. Follow us on X (@chinaadventures), and find much more @ PrayGiveGo.us. Luke 10, verse 2, the harvest is plentiful but the workers are few. Talk again soon!
The other day I sat down with Pastor Doug Wilson in Moscow, Idaho to have a conversation on all things China. I was excited to get his perspective, since he has personally lived through much of China’s modern communist history. I was not disappointed. In our 30+ minute conversation, we touched on many topics including the Great Leap Forward, Mao’s Great Famine, Doug’s Submarine Adventures with a Taiwanese crew, the China Legacies of Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter, the Tiananmen Square massacre (and revival), China’s modern-day revival, C.S. Lewis’s 1946 China optimism vs. Doug’s (short-term) pessimism, Hebrews 13:3 and how to pray for the persecuted, and PrayforChina.us’s helpful strategy! Follow me on X (@chinaadventures) where I post new China city prayer profiles every single day. Feel free to send any notes or comments via email @ bfwesten at gmail dot com Find much more about our work in Asia, including my missionary biographies, at PrayGiveGo.us! Frank Dikotter (Dutch, not German) on China https://www.frankdikotter.com/ https://www.amazon.com/Maos-Great-Famine-Devastating-Catastrophe/dp/1408886367 Jimmy Carter’s Complicated China Legacy https://www.crosspoliticnews.com/news/jimmy-carters-complicated-china-legacy The C.S. Lewis China Letters https://chinacall.substack.com/p/the-cs-lewis-china-letters C.S. Lewis, Burnt Marshwiggle, and the Brainwashing of Richard Wurmbrand https://chinacall.substack.com/p/cs-lewis-burnt-marshwiggle-and-the The NBA, LeBron James, and China https://www.crosspoliticnews.com/news/nba-back-in-bed-with-china Pray for China places of the week (Follow @chinaadventures for daily updates) https://open.substack.com/pub/chinacall/p/pray-for-china-oct-13-19-2025 Subscribe to China Compass and leave a review on your preferred podcast platform. Follow us on X (@chinaadventures), and find much more @ PrayGiveGo.us. Luke 10, verse 2, the harvest is plentiful but the workers are few. Talk again soon!
Joining Audrey for this week's REELTalk - Exec. Dir. of American Constitutional Rights Union and bestselling author, LTC ALLEN WEST, will be here! PLUS, author of American Betrayal, DIANA WEST will be here! PLUS, bestselling author of Mao's America, XI VAN FLEET will be here! AND, bestselling author LTG THOMAS McINERNEY of CCNS will be with us! In the words of Benjamin Franklin, "If we do not hang together, we shall surely hang separately." Come hang with us...
A Note from James: Bill O'Reilly's new book, Confronting Evil, is both a history lesson and a warning. It's a study of the most destructive figures in human history—from Hitler, Stalin, and Mao to Genghis Khan, Caligula, and even modern evildoers like Putin and the cartels.When I first picked it up, I thought it would be about the past. But after reading it, I realized it's really about right now—about how evil mutates, reappears, and spreads when we stop paying attention.We talked about the psychology of evil, how it manifests differently in modern life, and why we all need to look inward at how we process fear and anger. The episode ends on a note of hope—but only if we're willing to face what's real.Episode Description:In this episode, James sits down with legendary journalist and author Bill O'Reilly to discuss his new book, Confronting Evil: Assessing the Worst of the Worst. Together, they explore how history's darkest figures—Hitler, Mao, Stalin, Putin, and others—reflect modern patterns of violence, polarization, and moral decay.O'Reilly draws from decades of reporting and war correspondence to explain the difference between “personal evil” and “collective evil,” and why societies collapse when good people stop paying attention.The conversation also looks at free speech, mental illness, the internet's role in radicalization, and why mercy for the guilty so often becomes cruelty to the innocent.What You'll Learn:The 15 most destructive figures in world history—and why their patterns are repeating today.The two types of evil: personal vs. collective.How technology and echo chambers amplify hatred.Why ignoring small evils allows larger ones to grow.How to recognize and contain evil in a free society.Timestamped Chapters:[02:00] A Note from James: Introducing Confronting Evil[02:39] Are we living in a new age of violence or just a repeating cycle?[03:39] On partisanship, anger, and how fear disguises itself[04:57] Bill joins: marketing a book in the age of distraction[05:51] Why O'Reilly wrote Confronting Evil and how it differs from his “Killing” series[07:16] Putin, October 7th, and the eerie timing of the book's release[08:20] Why today's evil feels more personal than historic evil[09:39] Personal encounters with evil: chasing Ted Bundy[11:01] Witnessing atrocities: from El Salvador to Belfast[12:24] Could Hitler have been reasoned with? The psychology of the irredeemable[14:27] “Mercy to the guilty is cruelty to the innocent” — justice and accountability[15:36] The internet's role in radicalization and digital “clubs for evil”[17:00] Echo chambers, hate speech, and how the free world handles extremism[19:02] Why confronting evil matters in a “free” but apathetic society[20:00] The October 7th attacks and why O'Reilly opens his book there[21:22] “Queers for Palestine” and the IQ of modern activism[22:00] How ignorance and apathy breed delusion[23:00] When does “necessary evil” cross the line into tyranny? Augustus and strongmen[25:10] The psychology of dictators: no remorse, no redemption[26:11] The Constitution as an anti-authoritarian framework[27:50] Polarization, Portland, and the fight over federal authority[29:00] How democracies correct themselves—eventually[31:31] Data over ideology: why extremists are still a minority[32:04] Can AI detect future Hitlers?[33:28] Why people cheer for evil—and how to walk away[34:46] The 15 who made the cut: why some evildoers were left out[35:36] The drug cartels as modern-day mass murderers[36:29] O'Reilly's warning: mobilize the 85% before it's too late[36:54] Ending on hope—why good still outnumbers evilAdditional Resources
In the latest episode in our series on belief, we’re exploring the surprising revival of shamanism in China, which has made a comeback despite Mao's best efforts at eradication. Ritual healers and spirit mediums are tapping into online believers and a public thirst for authentic spirituality. Shamanism has also become a tourist draw as a form of cultural and religious heritage, with a shamanic theme park even existing in northeast China until 2021. To explore the diversity of shamanic practices across China and their survival in the face of official scepticism, Louisa and Graeme are joined by Feng Qu, an archaeologist from Nanjing Normal University and Mayfair Yang, a cultural anthropologist from UC Santa Barbara. Image: Totem poles at the Changbai Mountain Nayin Tribe Shamanic Culture Tourist Resort. Feng Qu, February 2023. Transcripts available at https://ciw.anu.edu.au/podcasts/little-red-podcast See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
For more see Rupert's Substack article on this topic
Toshi Yoshihara, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and author of Mao's Army Goes to Sea: The Island Campaigns and the Founding of China's Navy, joins the show to discuss how the PLA took Beijing in 1949 by subversion, and how they may yet seize Taiwan. ▪️ Times • 01:53 Introduction • 03:24 Peaceful liberation • 07:19 Planning and preparation • 10:36 Isolation • 17:30 A tradition of manipulation • 23:51 True believers • 28:23 Helpless • 34:55 Political warfare • 41:53 Surprise • 47:32 Holy Grail • 50:51 Fault lines • 57:44 What to read? Follow along on Instagram, X @schoolofwarpod, and YouTube @SchoolofWarPodcast Find a transcript of today's episode on our School of War Substack
In which Patrick rides solo for a brief overview of Norman Bethune's rock n' roll life. --- Further Readings Bock, Dennis. The Communist's Daughter, 2007. Tse-Tung, Mao. "In Memory of Norman Bethune." December 21, 1939.
Fascism, Normies, and the Generational Divide“Idealism increases in direct proportion to one's distance from the problem.” Or as I like to say, your ability to put up with a problem is your distance from it.If you're over 40, you probably think fascism means Mussolini's Italy or Hitler's Germany — a corporatist system where state and business fused into a one-party authoritarian project. That's the old poli-sci definition I learned back at GWU in 1988.But ask someone under 40 and you'll get a different answer. For them, “fascism” covers almost anything patriotic or traditional: flags, borders, religion, even just opposing socialism. That shift comes from Umberto Eco's Ur-Fascism, which broadened the word into a set of cultural vibes — nationalism, anti-communism, loyalty to the flag. In practice, it became a smear.By that measure, mainstream Cold War America was “fascist.” McCarthy's 1950s, Reagan's 1980s — even Obama, with his deportations and patriotic rhetoric, fits the new label. Which makes no sense to normies who grew up believing their grandparents defeated fascism in WWII.And there's a third wrinkle. Today's activist left uses “anti-fascist” in a totally different way — less Normandy, more Mao. It echoes anti-colonial rage, China's “century of humiliation,” and revolutionary energy grafted onto Western identity politics. In that frame, antifascism isn't about fighting Nazis. It's about dismantling borders, patriotism, capitalism itself.So we've got three definitions colliding. The textbook version: corporatism and dictatorship. The normie version: America killed fascism in 1945. And the activist version: fascism is anything resembling national pride. No wonder generations are talking past each other.Over-40 Americans hear “fascist” and think Hitler. Under-40 activists hear “fascist” and think Dad with a flag in the yard. And that's the trap: if everyone is fascist, then the word means nothing.This is Chris Abraham, and this has been The Chris Abraham Show.
“Idealism increases in direct proportion to one's distance from the problem.” Or as I like to say, your ability to put up with a problem is your distance from it.If you're over 40, you probably think fascism means Mussolini's Italy or Hitler's Germany — a corporatist system where state and business fused into a one-party authoritarian project. That's the old poli-sci definition I learned back at GWU in 1988.But ask someone under 40 and you'll get a different answer. For them, “fascism” covers almost anything patriotic or traditional: flags, borders, religion, even just opposing socialism. That shift comes from Umberto Eco's Ur-Fascism, which broadened the word into a set of cultural vibes — nationalism, anti-communism, loyalty to the flag. In practice, it became a smear.By that measure, mainstream Cold War America was “fascist.” McCarthy's 1950s, Reagan's 1980s — even Obama, with his deportations and patriotic rhetoric, fits the new label. Which makes no sense to normies who grew up believing their grandparents defeated fascism in WWII.And there's a third wrinkle. Today's activist left uses “anti-fascist” in a totally different way — less Normandy, more Mao. It echoes anti-colonial rage, China's “century of humiliation,” and revolutionary energy grafted onto Western identity politics. In that frame, antifascism isn't about fighting Nazis. It's about dismantling borders, patriotism, capitalism itself.So we've got three definitions colliding. The textbook version: corporatism and dictatorship. The normie version: America killed fascism in 1945. And the activist version: fascism is anything resembling national pride. No wonder generations are talking past each other.Over-40 Americans hear “fascist” and think Hitler. Under-40 activists hear “fascist” and think Dad with a flag in the yard. And that's the trap: if everyone is fascist, then the word means nothing.This is Chris Abraham, and this has been The Chris Abraham Show.
Donate (no account necessary) | Subscribe (account required) Join Bryan Dean Wright, former CIA Operations Officer, as he dives into today's top stories shaping America and the world. In this Monday Headline Brief of The Wright Report, we cover the tragic LDS church attack in Michigan, Trump's budget showdown in Washington, new federal action against Antifa, updates on James Comey and John Brennan, immigration battles over Guatemalan children, China's deepening grip on the Pacific, and promising medical research out of California. Quick hits to launch your week with the facts shaping America and the world. Michigan LDS Church Attack: A man drove his car into an LDS church, set it ablaze, and killed members at gunpoint. At least 11 were shot and three are confirmed dead. Early reports suggest the killer's mother was a church member. Bryan calls it “a very hard morning in Michigan” and urges prayers for the families. Trump's Budget Showdown and Supreme Court Ruling: With a government shutdown looming, Trump meets lawmakers knowing he holds the stronger hand. “Trump wins in either case,” the Washington Post observed, since a shutdown gives him unilateral power to cut programs and staff. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court ruled he can withhold $4 billion in foreign aid, pushing executive power back to Jeffersonian levels. Antifa Declared Terror Group and Troops Sent to Portland: Days after Trump designated Antifa as domestic terrorists, he ordered 2,000 National Guardsmen to Portland. “I am authorizing Full Force, if necessary,” Trump posted, after repeated ICE attacks. AG Pam Bondi said, “We're witnessing a new era of political violence,” vowing to use Joint Terrorism Task Forces to dismantle leftist extremists. Comey Indictment and Brennan Warnings: James Comey's indictment centers on whether he lied under oath about leaking FBI documents. His own lawyer admitted to helping him “get information out” to the press. Trump says “there will be others” prosecuted, with Brennan admitting he may be next but insisting his actions were “consistent with the law.” Guatemalan Parents Reject Their Children: Tens of thousands of kids trafficked north under Biden remain in U.S. custody after Guatemalan parents refused to take them back. Bryan asks if taxpayers should now become “the world's orphanage.” China Expands Grip in the Pacific: Trump considers shifting U.S. policy to “oppose” Taiwanese independence, aligning closer with Xi. Beijing secured a policing deal in Vanuatu and continues buying influence in the Solomons. Reuters reports China is even training villagers to spy on neighbors, reviving Mao-era tactics. Medical News from California: UC Irvine and UC San Diego researchers reversed vision loss in mice using polyunsaturated fatty acid injections, opening potential therapies for age-related macular degeneration. Bryan jokes, “If you're the first to ditch reader glasses, I demand you tell me about it.” "And you shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." - John 8:32 Keywords: Michigan LDS church shooting fire, Trump government shutdown budget fight, Supreme Court foreign aid ruling, Antifa domestic terror Portland National Guard, AG Pam Bondi political violence JTTF, James Comey indictment leaks oath, John Brennan CIA Russia ICA testimony, Guatemalan migrant children deportation refusal, Trump Taiwan independence oppose policy, China policing deal Vanuatu Solomon Islands influence, UC Irvine UC San Diego macular degeneration fatty acids
Wapx 111 Xin An Chris Cron Covers :Taimane : CarmenKfir : Hotel California par Dire StraitsPostModern JukeBox : Gimme ! Gimme ! Gimme !The Graystones : ParadiseAko : James Bond theme aux tambourins Ayna Ziordia Botella siffle Sons zarbi :Concerto pour violon et placardSolo de bouchonFlûtes à coulisse robotiséesVinheteiro : Marche impériale aux poulets Stockhausen : Gesang der Jünglinge Trucs en vrac :Mozart Group aux bras cassésMichael Manning : TetrahedronDamien Robitaille : Goodbye strangerChico & Harpo : les Marx au grand magasin La +BCdM :Billie Holiday : Gloomy Sundaypar Hal Kemp - Artie Shaw - Sarah Vaughan - Elvis Costello -Sinead O'Connor - BjorkSombre dimanche par Damia - Serge GainsbourgSeress Rezso : Szomoru Vasarnap La Playlist de la +BCdM :sur le Tube à Waltersur Spotify (merci John Cytron) sur Deezer (merci MaO de Paris)sur Amazon Music (merci Hellxions)et sur Apple Music (merci Yawourt)Vote pour la Plus Belle Chanson du Monde Le son mystère (37'50) :Guitare dans le couAvec :Causmic BeastAudeFannyWinstonPodFabDavidMerci à :DavidPop goes the WZADidierGeckaudeMichidarStéphanePodcasts & liens cités :podCloudCatch à deuxSuper cover battleMachin Truc BiduleTumyxo saison 2 : récit au jour le jourWalter sur BlueSkyWalter sur MastodonWalter sur InstagramLes 100 +BCdMLe générique de fin est signé Cousbou
0:00–15:00 — Welcome to the Tower of Truth (and the Wheel's wrath) Banter, rapture jokes, and “Wheel of Doom” rules: 7,500 points = Palace of Pleasure, under 3,000 = Land of Lunacy. Clip on Mao's Cultural Revolution sparks talk on youth control and censorship. Chicago street chaos → “Valley of Sorrow” score drop; segue into Voynich Manuscript mysteries. 15:00–30:00 — Clones, conspiracies & cursed contracts Britney Spears clone rumors, Hollywood doppelgangers. Kansas myth: alien DNA baby and vanished family. Court case: man rewrites credit card contract, wins 30% cashback. 30:00–45:00 — Math, myths & martial arts DNA claims linking Basques and Mary Magdalene relic → “Jesus lineage” theory. South of France Grail lore tangent. Karate clip lifts spirits: “Power, baby—OSS!” 45:00–60:00 — AI grows fangs; money goes digital AI fears: uncontrollability, self-preservation, code rewrites, blackmail scenarios. Real ID + stablecoin rails (“Genius Act”): freedom tool or social credit backdoor? 60:00–75:00 — Laws, riots & true crime Age-of-consent map rant, cultural whiplash, OnlyFans era maturity. Nepal protests: fires, chaos, then cleanup and stolen-goods return. True crime: Lori Shaver marries while husband's body lies under backyard concrete slab. 75:00–90:00 — Sigils, spheres & surveillance Occult: entities behind masks, sigils under skin, Spare's sigilization. Flat-earth musings: Piccard's “disk with upturned edge.” Rumor: all phone calls over 10 minutes stored in 2026. Bio-ops: insect warfare tests, Lyme, alpha-gal, Gates banter. Closing plugs: OBDM show, Sam's tour, move to Spotify video Oct 1. Watch Full Episodes on Sam's channels: - YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@SamTripoli - Rumble: https://rumble.com/c/SamTripoli Sam Tripoli: Tin Foil Hat Podcast Website: SamTripoli.com Twitter: https://x.com/samtripoli Midnight Mike: The OBDM Podcast Website: https://ourbigdumbmouth.com/ Twitter: https://x.com/obdmpod Doom Scrollin' Telegram: https://t.me/+La3v2IUctLlhYWUx
Daniil Kleyman is a real estate investor, software entrepreneur, and founder of multiple thriving companies based in Richmond, VA. Originally from snowy Moscow, Russia, Daniil immigrated to the U.S. at age 12 and eventually found himself on Wall Street—briefly, he found his true path in real estate and software development—and hasn't looked back since. He runs Evolve Development, a real estate firm focused on ground-up multi-family and mixed-use projects with a current pipeline of over $80 million. Daniil also leads True Vision Analytics, which builds tools like Rehab Valuator, helping investors and developers analyze deals, raise capital, and manage projects across the U.S. and beyond. An avid traveler, Daniil spends at least two months a year abroad. He stays active through jogging and Muay Thai, and is a hands-on leader, constantly collaborating with his software team to drive innovation. During the show we discussed: Streamlines investor decision-making. Reduces risks in property acquisition and development. Builds financial models and pro formas. Supports pitching deals to lenders or banks. Estimates ROI, cash flow, and profit margins. Determines maximum allowable offers (MAO). Evaluates property exit strategies. Simplifies rehab budgets and scopes of work. Compares financing options quickly. Enhances comp analysis vs. MLS or Zillow. Markets wholesale deals effectively. Provides pre-built flyers and presentations. Resources: https://rehabvaluator.com/
Spring Flower: A Journey Through Generational Trauma, War, and Hope with Dr. Richard Perkins-HsungEpisode Description:In this profoundly moving episode of Linda's Corner: Inspiration for a Better Life, we sit down with Dr. Richard Perkins-Hsung—university professor, son of immigrants, and the devoted compiler of his late mother Jean's extraordinary memoir, Spring Flower. Together, we explore the deep impact of the immigrant experience and generational trauma, as seen through the lens of Jean's powerful life story.Jean was born into extreme poverty in China, where girls were considered worthless, and female infants were often abandoned. Her own mother endured the ancient, brutal custom of foot binding, breaking and reshaping feet to meet cultural ideals. As an infant, Jean survived one of the deadliest natural disasters of the 20th century when the Yangtze River flooded, killing millions through drowning, famine, and disease.Miraculously, Jean was adopted by compassionate American missionaries who devoted their lives to serving the Chinese people. From there, Jean's journey would span Japanese occupation during World War II, a fateful encounter with Mahatma Gandhi, the terror of the Communist Revolution, and a dramatic escape to the United States—all while leaving behind a husband and daughter.Through Jean's story, we see history come alive—her resilience, sacrifice, and determination shaped not only her son Richard's childhood but also the generational narrative passed down through trauma and healing.In this episode, you'll hear about:The devastating culture of gender inequality in early 20th-century ChinaJean's survival through the Yangtze River flood and WWIIHer inspiring American missionary adoptive parents and their humanitarian workLife under Mao's Communist Revolution and the personal cost of political upheavalJean's heartbreaking separation from her husband and daughterRichard's journey as an immigrant boy in America and how his mother's legacy shaped himThe importance of understanding ancestral stories to find personal healing and identityThe creation of Spring Flower, Jean's posthumous memoir, honoring her voice and lifeDr. Richard Perkins-Hsung offers deep insights into how historical trauma becomes generational, and how retelling these stories with compassion can become a tool for healing.Connect with Dr. Richard Perkins-Hsung:
Eric Peters from Eric Peters Autos is my guest today. We talk about the challenge of sorting fact from fiction and how easily the populace can be swayed into chanting in unison. Article of the Day: Since the shocking assassination of Charlie Kirk, the legacy media has had ample opportunity to dial back its spin and manipulation but has chosen instead to put the pedal to the metal. El Gato Malo warns that our current reality war would amaze the likes of Stalin or Mao. Sponsors: Life Saving Food Fifty Two Seven Alliance HSL Ammo Quilt & Sew
HEADLINE: China's Deflationary Cycle: A Consequence of Overproduction and Centralized Control GUEST NAME: Anne Stevenson-Yang SUMMARY: China is mired in a fearful deflationary cycle driven by chronic overproduction and a government unable to shift from supply-side investment to stimulating consumption, perpetuating a "race to the bottom" under CCP leadership. China faces widespread deflation, causing consumer uncertainty and stemming from government-backed overproduction. The CCP leadership pours money into factories to meet GDP targets, despite overbuilt infrastructure and property. This "involution," or economy eating itself, continues due to a lack of innovative solutions and reluctance to cede economic control. 1940 MAO
Say one thing about Mao's communist China, they could kill some sparrows. Learn why and how in today's episode.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
ABOUT CONFRONTING EVILThe concept of evil is universal, ancient, and ever present today. The biblical book of Genesis clearly defines it when Cain kills his brother Abel out of jealousy. Evil is a choice to make another suffer. As long as human beings have walked, evil has been close by.Confronting Evil by Bill O'Reilly and Josh Hammer recounts the deeds of the worst people in history: Genghis Khan. The Roman Emperor Caligula. Henry VIII. The collective evil of the 19th century slave traders and the 20th century robber barons. Stalin. Hitler. Mao. The Ayatollah Khomeini. Putin. The Mexican drug cartels. Collectively, these warlords, tyrants, businessmen, and criminals are directly responsible for the death and misery of hundreds of millions of people.By telling what they did and why they did it, Confronting Evil explains the struggle between good and evil--a choice every person in the Judeo-Christian tradition is compelled to make. But many defer. We avoid the life decision. We look away. It's easier.Prepare yourself to read the consequences of that inaction. As John Stuart Mill said in his inaugural address to the University of St. Andrews in 1867: "Bad men need nothing more to compass their ends, than that good men should look on and do nothing."BILL O'REILLY BIOBill O'Reilly is a trailblazing TV journalist who has experienced unprecedented success on cable news and in writing fifteen national number-one bestselling nonfiction books. There are currently more than 17 million books in the Killing series in print. He currently hosts the 'No Spin News' on BillOReilly.com. He lives on Long Island.https://www.youtube.com/billoreillyhttps://www.billoreilly.com/Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/i-am-refocused-radio--2671113/support.Thank you for tuning in to I Am Refocused Radio. For more inspiring conversations, visit IAmRefocusedRadio.com and stay connected with our community.Don't miss new episodes—subscribe now at YouTube.com/@RefocusedRadio
We have a wonderful podacst community! Within 24 hours of our immediate past episode release, one close friend- and fellow OBGYN, Dr. Eric Colton (OB Hospitalist Group) reached out and shared valuable words of wisdom regarding a potentially deadly complication of the CS-scar defect...the CS scar ectopic pregnancy. Listen in for Dr. Colton's cameo and details. 1. Ban, Yanli MD, PhD; Shen, Jia MD; Wang, Xia MD; Zhang, Teng MD, PhD; Lu, Xuxu MD; Qu, Wenjie MD; Hao, Yiping MD; Mao, Zhonghao MD; Li, Shizhen MD; Tao, Guowei MD, PhD; Wang, Fang MD, PhD; Zhao, Ying MD, PhD; Zhang, Xiaolei MD, PhD; Zhang, Yuan MD, PhD; Zhang, Guiyu MD, PhD; Cui, Baoxia MD, PhD. Cesarean Scar Ectopic Pregnancy Clinical Classification System With Recommended Surgical Strategy. Obstetrics & Gynecology 141(5):p 927-936, May 2023. | DOI: 10.1097/AOG.0000000000005113
PREVIEW: PRC COAL: Colleague Cliff May comments on the irony that the PRC is praised for selling EVs and other green tech that is all produced by burning dirty coal emitting greenhouse gases. More tonight.1940 MAO.
Trump going back to the Supremes. No tax on tips, but content producers in radio have to share their earnings with the government. Targeting of drug boats will continue until morale improves. JD Vance: Trump Has The Legal Authority To Protect Americans, But No Immediate Plans For National Guard To Go Into Chicago. All Vaccine mandates ended in Florida. Powerball jackpot increases to $1.7B, third-largest prize in game's history. Indianapolis Councilors step forward against Google data center. Destiny Wells doesn't understand that the crime problem in Indianapolis is caused by Democrats. Hamilton County IN Dem Josh Lowry is a liar and a fraud. Heavily tatted woman selling mirror. Democrats casually dismiss America's founding principal."Journalist" Malcolm Gladwell apologizing for not standing up for women in women’s sports with Mao framed right behind him. Is Tori Amos a guilty pleasure? Pickleball chain plans to open its third Indy-area location near downtown. Spirit Airlines will exit 11 cities in October. Tony clearly wasn't a fan of Baywatch NightsSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
New Discourses Bullets, Ep. 124 Mao Zedong developed one of the most devastating dialectical techniques for mass mobilization ever conceived: the mass line. The idea with the mass line is that it is drawn from the masses, repackaged into a campaign for Communist Party goals, and then fed back to the masses to mobilize them to accomplish those goals, often including ruthless purges. For students of the New Discourses material, this pattern will seem familiar, both in terms of George Soros's (https://newdiscourses.com/2024/04/the-reflexive-alchemy-of-george-soros/) dialectic of "reflexivity" (https://newdiscourses.com/2024/06/reflexivity-leftism-in-the-21st-century/) and Paulo Freire's (https://amzn.to/4fkVck7) disastrous "generative themes" (https://newdiscourses.com/2022/05/paulo-freires-schools-new-discourses-bullets-ep-7/) method of education (which Freire (https://newdiscourses.com/2022/10/paulo-freires-critical-method-of-education/) openly admits he got from Mao). In this episode of New Discourses Bullets, host James Lindsay explains the mass line and its relationship to these other ideas. You don't want to miss it. Latest book! The Queering of the American Child: https://queeringbook.com/ Support New Discourses: https://newdiscourses.com/support Follow New Discourses on other platforms: https://newdiscourses.com/subscribe Follow James Lindsay: https://linktr.ee/conceptualjames © 2025 New Discourses. All rights reserved. #NewDiscourses #JamesLindsay
New York Times correspondent Edward Wong has reported from Beijing to Baghdad, covering the rise of China and the reach of American power. In his new book At the Edge of Empire: A Family's Reckoning with China, Wong blends geopolitics with personal history, from his father's time in Mao's army to his own years navigating censorship and nationalism in modern China. Mike talks with Wong about ideology, disillusionment, and what China's trajectory means for the United States and the world. Plus: On the 20th anniversary of Hurricane Katrina, Mike reflects on how rumors and misinformation shaped the disaster response, and what lessons still echo in today's media landscape. Use Code gist at the link to get an exclusive 60% off an annual incogni plan: https://incogni.com/gist Come See Mike Pesca at Open Debate Produced by Corey Wara Production Coordinator Ashley Khan Email us at thegist@mikepesca.com To advertise on the show, contact ad-sales@libsyn.com or visit https://advertising.libsyn.com/TheGist Subscribe to The Gist: https://subscribe.mikepesca.com/ Subscribe to The Gist Youtube Page: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC4_bh0wHgk2YfpKf4rg40_g Subscribe to The Gist Instagram Page: GIST INSTAGRAM Follow The Gist List at: Pesca Profundities | Mike Pesca | Substack
Preview: Vietnam War. Historian Geoffrey Wawro comments on the Nixon plan to end the Vietnam War with Mao's assistance. More later. 1940 MAO
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