Podcasts about CCP

In this hard-hitting segment, the hosts argue that recent threats and planned attacks against conservative figures are not the work of isolated, radicalized individuals, but rather a coordinated, South American-style Marxist guerrilla uprising tied to the Democratic Party. Citing a 58% spike in threats against members of Congress reported by the US Capitol Police, the discussion exposes how foreign influence networks—specifically billionaire Neville Roy Singham operating out of Shanghai—are allegedly funding CCP propaganda at US protests. The hosts sound the alarm on figures like Hasan Piker radicalizing followers toward violence, and call on the Republican party to build a unified messaging apparatus to hold the Democratic leadership accountable before a mass tragedy occurs. Political Rhetoric, Marxist Guerrilla Uprising, Democratic Party, Chinese Communist Party, Neville Roy Singham, Capitol Police Threat Assessment, Foreign Influence Networks, Anti-Semitism, Anti-Capitalism, Political Violence, Conservative Messaging, Hasan Piker

Top headlines for Tuesday, June 16, 2026President Donald Trump announces a deal to end the war with Iran and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, a new report finds anti-Christian hate crimes in Europe surged in May with dozens of attacks across 11 countries, and Chinese authorities are accused of raiding an unregistered church service and detaining pastors, members, and children. Also, a Louisiana father faces felony charges after allegedly giving abortion drugs to his pregnant teenage daughter without her consent, UFC fighter Mauricio Ruffy shares the Gospel after a first-round knockout victory, the Supreme Court declines to hear a pro-life student group's free-speech case, and Tim Tebow warns parents that smartphones are becoming an entry point for online predators targeting children.00:11 Trump announces Iran deal, reopening of Hormuz Strait00:58  Hate crimes against Christians surge in Europe: report01:48 CCP rounds up pastors, children in house church crackdown: report02:39 Man accused of secretly giving abortion drug to pregnant daughter03:29 Mauricio Ruffy declares Jesus as Lord after UFC victory04:15 Supreme Court won't overturn punishment of pro-life student org05:07 Tim Tebow warns online predators are finding ‘evil' new tacticsSubscribe to this PodcastApple PodcastsSpotifyGoogle PodcastsOvercastFollow Us on Social Media@ChristianPost on TwitterChristian Post on Facebook@ChristianPostIntl on InstagramSubscribe on YouTubeGet the Edifi AppDownload for iPhoneDownload for AndroidSubscribe to Our NewsletterSubscribe to the Freedom Post, delivered every Monday and ThursdayClick here to get the top headlines delivered to your inbox every morning!Links to the NewsTrump announces Iran deal, reopening of Hormuz Strait | WorldHate crimes against Christians surge in Europe: report | WorldCCP rounds up pastors, children in house church crackdown: report | WorldMan accused of secretly giving abortion drug to pregnant daughter | U.S.Mauricio Ruffy declares Jesus as Lord after UFC victory | SportsSupreme Court won't overturn punishment of pro-life student org | PoliticsTim Tebow warns online predators are finding ‘evil' new tactics | U.S.

Joining Audrey for this week's REELTalk - Exec. Dir. of American Constitutional Rights Union and bestselling author, LTC ALLEN WEST, will be here! PLUS, BOSCH FAWSTIN, the world's first anti-Jihad comic book author and illustrator and creator of Pigman, will be here! PLUS, Nationally syndicated Political Cartoonist (with Creators Syndicate). the Comically Incorrect AF BRANCO will be here! AND, the Host of Intellectual Froglegs, JOE DAN GORMAN will be here! In the words of Benjamin Franklin, "If we do not hang together, we shall surely hang separately." Come hang with us...  

Irish author and analyst Emmet Connor tells host Tom he has focused since 2015 on Marxism/communist indoctrination, defining it as an international revolutionary ideology aimed at destroying existing hierarchies and rebuilding a utopia. He argues “globalism” and the New World Order are communism repackaged, seen in open borders, climate policy, food controls, attacks on farming, education, and cultural issues like DEI and gender ideology, with Christians targeted. He discusses Ireland's pro-globalist politics, COVID as totalitarian economic attack linked to the CCP, and a broader China/Russia-led push for world dominance, including Africa via Belt and Road. Connor promotes his Dallas presentation and book, and provides X/email contacts.00:00 Introduction to Emmet Connor00:40 Defining Marxism02:59 Globalism and New World Order04:16 Unwitting Marxist Promotion05:52 Open Borders Policy08:31 Climate Change Movement11:44 Controlling the Food Supply13:01 War on Farming14:07 Ireland's Political Situation16:02 COVID and Great Reset19:00 Marxism as Kryptonite19:55 Marxism's Effect on Africa22:41 China's Influence in Africa24:59 Global Communist Strategy27:15 Brexit and UK Politics28:49 Trump and Marxism31:33 Elections and Global Impact33:18 Second Amendment Importance34:24 Death Toll of Marxism36:58 Attacking the Traditional Family38:53 Drag Queen Story Hour40:57 COVID and Parental Awareness42:57 Christianity Under Attack45:12 Population Control Agenda46:53 UN Socialist Leadership48:11 Stakeholder Capitalism49:08 Internationalist Groups50:27 Attacking the US Dollar53:17 Greta Thunberg and Climate56:01 Reception and Outreach58:29 Boiling It Down59:38 Final Thoughtshttps://x.com/ResolvingRRed Pandemic: The Global Marxist Cult on Amazon: https://a.co/d/079j3En7Guest spot on the Peter McCormack show: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lb-uJmcQXccEmmet's Dallas presentation on Marxism is highly recommend as an overview of the subject: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AI2cy4Dp_8M=========Slides, summaries, references, and transcripts of my podcasts: https://tomn.substack.com/p/podcast-summariesMy Linktree: https://linktr.ee/tomanelson1

Bridget sits down with Xi Van Fleet, author of Made in America: The Hidden History of How the U.S. Enabled Communist China and Created Our Greatest Threat. Xi is a survivor of China's Cultural Revolution and traces the eerie parallels between Mao's revolution and today's woke ideology. She draws on her own experience — growing up under the CCP, enduring re-education in the countryside, and eventually escaping to America — to argue that cultural Marxism is not a foreign threat but a homegrown one, and that American elites have been enabling the CCP's rise since the 1920s. They dig into the difference between economic communism and cultural Marxism, the red-green alliance between the Left and Islamism, how political correctness becomes speech control and eventually control of the mind, China's bot farms and information warfare operations, the social credit creep in the United States, why the enemy within is far more dangerous than the one overseas, why studying American history might be what saves us, and Xi's assertion that Communism is a virus that has killed hundreds of millions of people, it won't disappear, and it always needs to be fought against. Get Made In America here: https://amzn.to/4vGzbDg#CulturalRevolution #CulturalMarxism #walkinswelcome #BridgetPhetasyTopics covered: Xi Van Fleet, Made in America book, Cultural Revolution vs woke ideology, CCP history, America enabling communism, cultural Marxism vs economic communism, red-green alliance, surveillance state, social credit scores, information warfare, DEI, silent majority, Loudoun County school board

Watch the full podcast! https://chinauncensored.tv/programs/podcast-339 Taiwan is increasing its defense spending to make sure any attack from the CCP is met with strong resistance. It has taken advantage of the US's Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 to buy up some of the United States' most advanced weapons systems, turning the island into a high-tech military fortress. Taiwan Ambassador Alexander Yui Tah-ray joins us.

The Counter Momentum of Spin, with Dr. Franco Musio – Questions over China's medical scholarship, intellectual property theft, research ethics, and CCP influence raise concerns about America's trust in Chinese scientific partnerships. The discussion examines alleged fraud, organ transplant abuses, institutional infiltration, and whether academic openness leaves U.S. medicine vulnerable to exploitation and subterfuge today...

Josh Reid is back from vacation and Alpha Warrior is fired up because John Thune just said publicly he will not bring the Save America Act to the floor and laughed when asked if Trump can do anything about it. The duo opens with an LA Uber driver story that captures exactly what is happening on the ground. Spencer Pratt voters who hate Trump are watching Karen Bass steal the election in real time and finally calling it what it is. From there they dig into the Iran and Israel kabuki, the water treatment warning strike, why Iran keeps notifying US bases before missiles land, and the IDF eavesdropping on American peace negotiators in Turkey and Pakistan. They unpack NDAA Section 224, the bill Netanyahu personally helped write to integrate Israeli and US military tech, and Alpha drops what he learned from being on the call about the July 7 2025 cyber event that was not the CCP. Plus the first US Army firing squad executions since 1961, the Black Hawks rehearsing urban combat in LA during the stolen election, Bolton pleading guilty right on Alpha's six to nine month cooperation timeline, and the most provocative theory of the year. What if Q has always been cover for a second military playbook that nobody is supposed to see?

The Joint Readiness Training Center is pleased to present the one-hundredth-and-sixty-first episode to air on ‘The Crucible - The JRTC Experience.' Hosted by the Senior Enlisted Medical Advisor and Role II Observer-Coach-Trainer for the Task Force Sustainment (BSB / CSSB), MSG Timothy Sargent on behalf of the Commander of Ops Group (COG). Today's guests are four seasoned senior NCOs within one of our infantry task forces. CSM Edwards Cumming is the TF CSM, 1SG Jeremiah Guerra is a CO Team 1SG, 1SG Mark Varley is a CO Team 1SG, and SFC William Deutsch is the Senior Medical Observer – Coach – Trainer within Task Force 3 (IN BN). This episode explores the critical relationship between casualty care and maneuver operations, emphasizing that medical support cannot exist separately from the fight. Leaders discuss how the realities of Large Scale Combat Operations are forcing units to rethink long-held assumptions developed during the counterinsurgency era, particularly the expectation of rapid evacuation and uncontested medical support. Topics include self-aid, buddy-aid, casualty collection points (CCPs), ambulance exchange points (AXPs), casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), mass casualty planning, and the difficult balance between continuing the mission and treating the wounded. A recurring theme throughout the discussion is that survivability begins at the point of injury, and units that fail to train Soldiers on individual and buddy care often experience significantly higher rates of preventable losses. The episode reinforces that casualty care is not solely a medical responsibility—it is a leader responsibility that must be integrated into every operation from planning through execution.    The conversation also focuses on the importance of integrating medical personnel into the planning process at every echelon. Leaders highlight common shortcomings observed at JRTC, including poorly understood medical SOPs, ineffective CCP placement, underutilization of AXPs, and failure to include medical NCOs and medics in MDMP, rehearsals, and tactical planning. Additional discussion centers on building combat-ready medics who understand maneuver operations, establishing trust between medics and line units, developing casualty evacuation plans that are realistic for contested environments, and training medical tasks during everyday operations rather than treating them as standalone events. Ultimately, the episode argues that successful casualty care in LSCO requires synchronization between the medical and maneuver enterprises, disciplined planning, aggressive training, and leaders who understand that integrating medical capabilities into the fight saves lives while preserving combat power.    Part of S03 “Lightfighter Lessons” series.   For additional information and insights from this episode, please check-out our Instagram page @the_jrtc_crucible_podcast.   Be sure to follow us on social media to keep up with the latest warfighting TTPs learned through the crucible that is the Joint Readiness Training Center.   Follow us by going to: https://linktr.ee/jrtc and then selecting your preferred podcast format.   Again, we'd like to thank our guests for participating. Don't forget to like, subscribe, and review us wherever you listen or watch your podcasts — and be sure to stay tuned for more in the near future.   “The Crucible – The JRTC Experience” is a product of the Joint Readiness Training Center.

Send Wilk a text with your feedback! (incoming msgs only - I can't reply) Jan Jekielek spent years as a human rights worker before becoming a journalist — and the story he couldn't stop following eventually became Killed to Order, a New York Times bestselling investigation into China's forced organ harvesting industry. In this conversation, Jan and Wilk focus on a question at the center of both the book and the show: what does dehumanization actually produce when it's allowed to run all the way to its logical end? Jan explains how the Chinese Communist Party has refined what he calls a "black class" system over decades — a machinery of mass propaganda designed to strip targeted groups of their humanity in the public mind, making atrocity not just possible but rational-seeming within the regime's logic. Falun Gong practitioners, who numbered in the tens of millions and practiced truthfulness, compassion, and forbearance, became the primary target — and eventually the primary supply for an organ harvesting system that operates like an industry. One detail from this conversation will stay with you: in China, a wealthy transplant recipient can be matched with a compatible organ in roughly two weeks. In the United States, the wait is months to years. The difference is what powers that system. Jan walks through exactly how it works — and what the evidence looks like after two decades of documentation. This isn't a political episode. It's a human one. Find the book at KilledtoOrder.com and Jan's long-form show at The Epoch Times. The world is a better place if we are better people. That begins with each of us as individuals. Be kind to one another. Be grateful for all you've got. Make every day the day that you want it to be!Please follow The Derate The Hate podcast on:Facebook, Instagram, Twitter(X) ,  YouTube Subscribe to us wherever you enjoy your audio or from our site. Please leave us a rating and feedback on Apple podcasts or other platforms. You can share your thoughts or request Wilk for a speaking engagement on our contact page: DerateTheHate.com/ContactThe Derate The Hate podcast is proudly produced in collaboration with Braver Angels — America's largest grassroots, cross-partisan organization working toward civic renewal and bridging partisan divides. Learn more: BraverAngels.orgWelcome to the Derate The Hate Podcast!*The views expressed by Wilk, his guest hosts &/or guests on the Derate The Hate podcast are their own and should not be attributed to any organization they may otherwise be affiliated with.

In this week's episode of China Insider, Miles Yu observes the 37th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre, and discusses how families of the victims plan to honor their loved ones both in mainland China and abroad despite CCP censorship. Next, Miles reports on China's continued economic woes as growth rates have declined over the past few months, and assess renewed calls for CCP intervention to spark stimulus and address increasing concerns. Finally, Miles reviews an investigative report stemming from a whistleblower disclosure of non-public foreign funding to Stanford University from Chinese state-backed entities, and comments on the extent of Chinese influence in US academia. China Insider is a weekly podcast project from Hudson Institute's China Center, hosted by China Center Director and Senior Fellow, Dr. Miles Yu, who provides weekly news that mainstream American outlets often miss, as well as in-depth commentary and analysis on the China challenge and the free world's future. 

Last time we spoke about the One Hundred Regiment Offensive. During Phase Three of the One Hundred Regiment Offensive, CCP forces in the Taihang/Jizhong area emphasized strongpoint attacks and transportation warfare. Rather than trying to defeat Japanese units head-on, they used tactics such as night raids and ambushes to disrupt Japanese supply routes and communications. The underlying goal was to make Japanese logistics unstable, weakening their ability to maintain control and conduct effective operations. After CCP successes, the Japanese responded with large-scale "mopping-up" operations beginning October 6. As the Eighth Route Army continued resisting, it adopted flexible methods to counter the Japanese sweeps, especially rapid repositioning and targeted ambushes. One notable action described involves an ambush of a Japanese convoy that caused substantial enemy losses, demonstrating how disrupting enemy mobility could blunt the effectiveness of larger Japanese operations. Overall, the situation remained fluid, with both sides continually adapting their tactics in an ongoing contest for control across occupied North China.   #205 The Hubei-Henan Campaign of 1940-1941 Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. By 1940, the war had settled into a grueling stalemate, with Japanese troops occupying vast swathes of central China, including parts of Hubei, but facing persistent Chinese guerrilla and conventional resistance that prevented total consolidation. In the aftermath of the Battle of Zaoyang in the summer of 1940, Japanese forces had secured the key cities of Yichang and Shashi along the middle reaches of the Yangtze River. Yet Chinese Nationalist troops of the Fifth War Area retained firm control over the vital territories east and west of the Xiang River. Their defensive lines formed a broad arc stretching from the southwest of Yuan'an through Jingmen, north of Zhongxiang, and the rugged foothills of the Dahong Mountains, extending northwest to Suixian. These positions straddled both banks of the Xiang River, anchored on the right by the Wudang Mountains and on the left by the Tongbai range. Working in close coordination with guerrilla detachments operating in the southeast, Chinese units repeatedly harassed the Japanese garrisons that had pushed into Yichang. The constant pressure on the enemy's flanks left the Japanese forces in Yichang and Shashi dangerously exposed and hemmed in, unable to expand or consolidate their gains. To the Japanese high command, this situation had become an intolerable thorn that demanded immediate removal.   Under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese Nationalist government faced severe strains as the war with Japan escalated. Its problems were not only military, but also political and economic. Deep ideological and territorial rivalries with the CCP meant that efforts to present a single front were constantly undermined. Although the two sides officially formed a United Front in 1937, earlier violence and competition, such as the 1927 Shanghai Massacre and the CCP's Long March of 1934 – 1935 had left distrust and strategic differences in place. As a result, Nationalist resistance was harder to coordinate than it would have been under full unity. Meanwhile, the CCP strengthened its position in northern China by expanding rural strongholds. Through land reforms and the use of guerrilla warfare, the communists were able to win local support and apply pressure to Japanese forces in ways that often did not require large, conventional armies. This strategy also drew influence and manpower away from the Nationalists' more traditional, state-centered military structure.   Economically, the Nationalists were squeezed from multiple directions. The loss of China's coastal industrial regions to Japanese occupation forced the government to rely heavily on the interior, with Chongqing becoming a key base. That geographic shift left the administration more vulnerable to shortages of critical supplies, especially raw materials, fuel, and modern weapons. On top of wartime disruption, the global Great Depression intensified fiscal and logistical difficulties, limiting how quickly and effectively the Nationalists could mobilize resources for large-scale operations. By late November 1940, these weaknesses intersected with renewed Japanese pressure. Japanese commanders were also concerned about the possibility of a major Nationalist push, particularly fears of a counteroffensive by the Thirty-first Army Group under General Tang Enbo.    Determined to break the stalemate, the Japanese launched a major offensive in late November 1940. Preparations had begun in earnest early that month. Engineers repaired and expanded highways and bridges, constructed new defensive works and airfields, and stockpiled vast quantities of rations, ammunition, steel-hulled boats, and rubber rafts in the Zhongxiang area. Five regiments were concentrated near Zhongxiang, while additional troops east and west of the Xiang River brought the total strength to more than three divisions. Along the Suixian–Xiangyang Highway, Japanese forces were reinforced to divisional strength, supported by increased artillery and tank detachments. These meticulous measures left no doubt that the enemy was ready for a large-scale operation.   By 23 November the Japanese had completed their deployments and moved into assault positions. The Japanese forces assigned to the Central Hubei Operation were placed under the overall command of Lieutenant General Waichirō Sonobe, who directed the campaign from his headquarters in Wuhan. Sonobe's 11th Army drew on a broad mix of formations, combining units from the 3rd, 4th, 15th, 17th, 39th, and 40th Divisions. The offensive backbone for the thrust into central Hubei province was reinforced by the 18th Independent Mixed Brigade, which helped supply the infantry strength needed for sustained fighting across difficult ground. In practice, this multi-division structure reflected the 11th Army's key mission in the region, acting as the main Japanese formation after the earlier Battle of Zaoyang and it emphasized coordinated divisional advances supported by attached brigades and specialized elements, including limited armored capabilities.   In terms of manpower, the Japanese force is commonly estimated at roughly 40,000 to 50,000 troops. This strength included several infantry regiments and artillery batteries, along with only limited armored elements rather than a fully armored formation. Because the operation depended on finding and exploiting opportunities quickly, it was supported by aerial reconnaissance and bombing carried out by the 3rd Air Brigade operating in central China. Infantry units formed the majority of the fighting power, while artillery was used to provide suppressive fire during advances. Air support, meanwhile, was intended to help identify and target Chinese positions—particularly along important riverine and rail corridors, where disruptions could slow resistance and complicate Chinese reinforcement or retreat.   To manage the operation across varied terrain and combat tasks, Sonobe's command used smaller combined formation often described as task forces, that could operate with some flexibility. Among them were the Kayashima Force, commanded by Major General Koichi Kayashima of the 18th Independent Mixed Brigade, consisting of the entire brigade reinforced by elements of the 40th Division. The Muragami Force, under Lieutenant General Keisaku Muragami, commander of the 39th Division, which included the full division plus supporting non-infantry units. The Hirabayashi Force, led by Lieutenant General Morito Hirabayashi of the 17th Division, formed from detachments of the 17th and 15th Divisions.The Kitana Force, commanded by Lieutenant General Kenzo Kitana of the 4th Division, incorporating portions of the 4th Division and the Kususe Armored Force. These four groups were deployed in parallel around Tangyang, Jingmen, Zhongxiang, and north of Jingshan. The Hanjima Force, commanded by Lieutenant General Fusataro Hanjima of the 3rd Division, positioned near Suixian along the Xiangyang–Hua Highway. This task-force approach helped tailor combat power to specific mission profiles—such as flanking movements, raids, or pressure on Chinese defensive lines—while keeping the overall campaign plan under a unified command.   Equipment choices also reflected the tactical environment of Hubei. The Japanese units made use of Type 95 Ha-Go light tanks for reconnaissance and for anti-infantry roles, typically best suited to the reconnaissance, pursuit, and screening functions that were available even with constrained armor numbers. For fire support, the force relied on conventional artillery, including 75mm Type 90 guns for field engagements and 105mm howitzers for heavier bombardment where stronger explosive impact was needed. Together, these assets were intended to allow Japanese formations to maneuver around Chinese positions and apply pressure in rugged landscapes where rivers, roads, and rail lines often determined the rhythm of battle.   Logistics were a decisive factor in whether the operation could sustain momentum. Sonobe's army depended heavily on existing transportation infrastructure, particularly rail lines radiating from the Wuhan hub toward forward areas such as Suizhou and Zaoyang. These routes were critical for moving ammunition, replacements, and other supplies closer to the front as the Japanese advanced. The campaign also used river transport along the Yangtze River, including motorized barges and steamers, to deliver supplies to units operating near waterways. However, reliance on these corridors came with risks: Chinese interdiction raids could disrupt shipments, forcing convoys to be escorted and increasing the time and resources required to keep the forward units supplied. Overall, this dependence on both rail and fluvial networks highlighted a central operational challenge, maintaining secure access to transportation arteries in contested territory so that the Japanese could keep fighting effectively rather than stalling as supplies dwindled.   The Central Hubei Operation was driven by an intelligence assessment that Chinese troop movements were signaling preparations for a Nationalist counteroffensive. Acting on that interpretation, the Japanese began tightening plans and positioning forces early in the final days of November 1940. On 23 November 1940, the Japanese 11th Army under Lieutenant General Waichirō Sonobe began organizing for the offensive in central Hubei. In order to conduct a coordinated advance across the Han River, the army arranged its forces into five groups, each tasked with moving in a way that supported the broader pincer-style pressure on Chinese positions. The approach also reflected lessons drawn from the earlier Zaoyang–Yichang campaign earlier in 1940, when Japanese divisions had been able to cross the Han River at multiple points, such as Dangyang, Jiukouzhen, and Shayangzhen—to help secure access toward Yichang and the Yangtze route. Logistics were built around infrastructure the Japanese had already established during prior operations. The Hankou hub supported the 11th Army through arrangements that included munitions storage, medical facilities, and transport coordination. Supplies and reinforcements were moved using truck convoys and river crossings, while forward depots—such as those at Shayangzhen northwest of Hankou—provided additional capacity, including freight handling and field hospitals. Because the area was not secure, these supply points were also guarded against threats from guerrilla activity, which could disrupt communications and threaten personnel and equipment.   Operationally, the offensive used limited artillery and air support, reflecting Japanese constraints and directives aimed at keeping the campaign short and avoiding commitments that could stretch units beyond their logistical reach. Instead of trying to grind down Chinese defenses through prolonged bombardment, the plan prioritized speed, reconnaissance, and focused disruption. Japanese intelligence preparation relied heavily on aerial reconnaissance over the Han River valley to locate Chinese positions and infer where resistance would likely concentrate. That information enabled Japanese units to coordinate select maneuvers, including converging pressure from different directions. Where river transport mattered, coordination with naval or riverine elements supported movement and resupply, with overall oversight connected to the China Expeditionary Army.   Anticipating the coming assault, the Chinese Fifth War Area headquarters acted swiftly on instructions from the National Military Council. Orders were issued to the River West Army Group (30th and 77th Corps), the Right Army Group (44th and 67th Corps), and the Central Army Group (41st and 45th Corps) to employ a flexible defensive strategy: hold key positions firmly while committing the main strength to strike the enemy's outer flanks at the decisive moment. The 59th Corps was directed to advance toward the Xiangfan area, ready to reinforce operations on either bank of the river as the situation developed.   As commander of the Fifth War Area, Li Zongren arranged the defense to meet a likely Japanese thrust along the Han River, particularly in the approaches to Wuhan and Yichang, following the wider stalemate that settled in after the 1938 fall of Wuhan. The Fifth War Area could draw on roughly 300,000 troops, though many units were understrength, and the overall readiness varied by locality. Among the formations Li Zongren placed in the most sensitive sectors was the 31st Army Group under General Tang Enbo, which Japanese planners had identified as a potential threat to Japanese intentions in the region. In keeping with the terrain and the limits on manpower, Li's defensive design relied heavily on natural barriers—most importantly the Han River itself—and on the defensibility of rugged ground. Forces were arrayed to hold or contest riverbank positions, supported by fortifications, trenches, and smaller auxiliary elements. Divisions such as the 44th were positioned with an eye toward slowing an enemy crossing and forcing the Japanese to fight for difficult approaches rather than moving rapidly. At the same time, irregular forces and prepared defensive works were used to complicate Japanese reconnaissance and to make it harder for the attacker to coordinate a clean operational flow. Strategically, Li Zongren leaned on elastic defense rather than attempting to win decisive battles at fixed lines. Regular units were supported by guerrilla-style harassment intended to strike Japanese vulnerabilities, especially supply and transportation, between forward bases and the front. Local operations, including actions coming from areas such as Xinyang, were designed to disrupt Japanese logistics in periods when the Nationalists were still managing shortages of ammunition and medical supplies. Militias in the inter-mountainous regions further reinforced this approach: instead of seeking costly frontal engagements, they concentrated on disruption, delaying movements, and making Japanese operations slower and more expensive.   At dawn on 25 November the Japanese offensive began, with columns advancing along multiple axes. On the western Xiangyang front, more than 1,000 troops from Tangyang and over 3,000 from Jingmen struck Hengdian and Yanzhimiao, shattering the positions of the Chinese 30th Corps. Simultaneously, a column moving from Zhujiafu toward Tunglinling split into several detachments and drove deep northward into Liangshuijing, Xiajiazi, and Kuaihuopu. By nightfall the River West Army Group had regrouped along the line from Hengdian through Yanzhimiao to Kuaihuopu. On 26 November the Japanese reached Xianzhu. The following day they assaulted Liuhouji and Lijiatang in a day-long battle that ended in stalemate. At dusk the 30th Corps launched a powerful counterattack; the 27th and 31st Divisions dispatched raiding parties into the enemy's rear. Unable to withstand the pressure, the Japanese fell back toward Jingmen and Zhongxiang, pursued by Chinese forces that inflicted heavy losses.   Along the Jingmen–Zhongxiang Highway the Japanese massed more than 3,000 troops to attack Changshoutian and Wangjiatian, encircling Changjiachi and Shahetian. The Chinese 149th Division withdrew in good order to the stronger Wangjiahe–Wulongguan line. On 26 November enemy strength grew to 4,000–5,000. One column advanced on Sanligang while the main body assaulted Peizhai, Wangjiahe, and Yunanmen. Fighting continued until dark without decisive result. On 27 November the main force of the 44th Corps counterattacked from Wangjiahe, converging with the 67th Corps advancing from the northwest. The coordinated assault inflicted severe casualties, yet the Japanese continued to fight stubbornly. On the Suixian front, more than 2,000 Japanese troops reached Liangshuikou on the morning of 25 November and launched a violent attack against the 123rd Division at Lishan. Two additional columns, each exceeding 1,000 men, pushed westward toward Hoyuantian and Qingmingpu; their numbers swelled steadily as darkness fell. On 26 November fierce combat raged against the 124th and 127th Divisions at Jinjishan and Qingmingpu. A separate force of 700–800 men advanced from Xihe via Langhetian to Tangjiafan. After clashing with the 41st Corps, the Japanese near Qingmingpu linked up with those at Jinjishan and moved toward Hoyuantian on 27 November. That night the detachment at Tangjiafan reached the vicinity of Huantan Zhen, confronting the 125th Division. Recognizing that the enemy had become dangerously dispersed, the War Area Command ordered its units to hold critical localities while the main forces exploited the mountainous terrain for ambushes. The tactic proved effective. Heavy fighting continued until 28 November, when the Japanese, unable to achieve their objectives, began a general withdrawal. Chinese forces west of Xiangyang immediately took up the pursuit. The enemy opposing the Right Army Group was routed and retreated along several routes. In the Suixian sector, Japanese units at Hoyuantian and Huantan Zhen were caught in converging attacks by the Central Army Group, driven back to high ground, and encircled. In a desperate attempt to relieve the trapped forces, the Japanese rushed 1,500–1,600 infantry and cavalry troops from Suixian and Yingshan through Shangshitian and Shatian in a flanking maneuver—only to be ambushed once more. Covered by aircraft and armor, the enemy withdrew toward Suixian and Xihe as Chinese troops pressed forward along the line from Chunchuan to Anchu, Lishan, and Gaocheng. By 30 November all Chinese Army Groups had restored their original positions.   The Central Hubei Operation produced uneven battlefield outcomes, particularly in reported casualties. Japanese accounts describe relatively limited losses, just 132 killed and 445 wounded attributed to advantages in air superiority, artillery, and armored support, even though the advance was complicated by difficult terrain. At the same time, Japanese forces faced persistent Chinese counterattacks along the Han River, which contributed to localized pressure and eventual withdrawal. The Japanese reported 6,439 Chinese killed  and 474 captured, but the evidence base is uncertain and the language of reporting suggests possible exaggeration or propaganda. Conversely, Chinese-era estimates reportedly placed Japanese losses at roughly 5,000 killed and 7,000–8,000 wounded, illustrating a substantial gap between competing narratives. Some alternate reconstructions suggest total Chinese casualties in the range of 20,000–30,000, depending on whether wounded and missing personnel are included. However, because wartime reporting was fragmented and inconsistent, there is no fully verifiable casualty ledger for all units involved.   Despite these tolls, the operation did not appear to achieve a decisive Chinese destruction of Japan's intended target force. The Chinese Fifth War Area, including elements associated with the 31st Army Group under Tang Enbo, suffered attrition but generally avoided annihilation. No major command-level losses are indicated in the surviving accounts, and unit formations were not described as collapsing permanently. On the material side, Japan reportedly seized rifles and supplies from positions that Chinese forces had encircled or abandoned in the short term, but overall equipment losses for either side were described as limited, consistent with the operation's restricted intensity.    Strategically, the operation offered Japan short-term tactical advantages—notably through localized envelopments and the temporary pressure of combined-arms support—but it failed to translate these gains into a sustained strategic result. The fighting also strained Japanese logistics in central China, especially given that the offensive was not followed by major reinforcements. At the same time, it exposed continuing vulnerabilities in rugged terrain where Chinese guerrilla activity and organized counteraction could offset superior firepower.   Ultimately, the Central Hubei Operation produced no net territorial gains. By the end of the week, Japanese troops had returned to positions that did not fundamentally alter control in central Hubei. Local clashes may have disturbed formations and disrupted movement temporarily, but the campaign did not create durable forward bases, did not change administrative control meaningfully, and did not permanently disrupt key supply corridors. The territorial status quo largely persisted: Chinese Fifth War Area forces maintained positions north of the Yangtze River, and there was no widespread abandonment of strongholds sufficient to indicate a strategic collapse.   In the months following the Japanese repulse in central Hubei in November 1940, enemy forces remained largely immobilized across the Jing-Xiang plains, their earlier ambitions checked by determined Chinese resistance. Seeking to regain momentum and draw Chinese strength away from other theaters, the Japanese high command prepared a massive offensive into southern Henan in late January 1941. By the end of the month they had concentrated an imposing array of seven infantry divisions, one independent cavalry brigade, three independent armored regiments, and one independent artillery regiment. In all, more than 150,000 infantrymen, over 8,000 cavalry, 550 artillery pieces, 300 tanks, and 200 armored cars stood ready. Over a hundred aircraft were massed at forward bases in Anyang, Xinxiang, Huaiyang, and Xinyang. From early January onward, ammunition and equipment had been laboriously shipped up the Yangtze and moved inland to Xinyang, while Japanese reconnaissance planes repeatedly overflew Chinese rear areas. Additional troops were concentrated in southern Henan itself.   On 20 January, as a preliminary move to pin down Chinese forces and facilitate the main effort in central Henan, the Japanese 18th Independent Mixed Brigade, together with elements of the 39th and 4th Divisions, launched a limited attack against the Chinese 29th and 33rd Army Groups. The principal assault, however, began on 24 January under the overall command of Lieutenant General Katsuichiro Enbu. The Japanese organized their southern Henan forces into three powerful columns: The Left Flank Force, built around the entire 3rd Division reinforced by the 8th Regiment of the 4th Division and the Mizuno Armored Unit, commanded by Lieutenant General Fusataro Hanjima of the 3rd Division. The Central Force, centered on the 17th Division (less one regiment) and strengthened by the 67th Regiment of the 15th Division and the Yoshimatsu Armored Unit, commanded by Lieutenant General Amaya of the 40th Division. The Right Flank Force, formed around the main body of the 40th Division, also under Lieutenant General Amaya.   In support of this main thrust, Japanese forces in northern Anhui and eastern Henan—principally the 4th Cavalry Brigade with the Hirabayashi Tank Regiment—advanced westward from Haozhou toward Woyang. The Ouda Regiment of the 21st Division pushed west from Suzhou, while the Uguchi and Kobayashi Regiments of the 35th Division, accompanied by engineer, cavalry, artillery, and tank units, moved from Kaifeng, Tongxu, and Zhuxian Zhen along the north bank of the Yellow River and through the flooded areas toward Zhengzhou. These supporting columns were intended to tie down Chinese reserves and prevent reinforcement of the southern front.   The National Military Council in Chongqing correctly assessed the enemy's intention: to drive north along the Beiping-Hankou Railway with their main strength, force a decisive battle against the Chinese field armies, and rely on the northern Anhui–eastern Henan forces to strike westward in coordination. Accordingly, the Council instructed the Fifth War Area to avoid a costly frontal engagement. Instead, a small portion of its troops would offer delaying resistance along the railway, while the main force would maneuver to the enemy's flanks and rear, severing communications and launching devastating counterattacks. In compliance, the Fifth War Area left only a single division near Xiping on the Beiping-Hankou line. The bulk of its strength—carefully concealed in depth on both sides of the enemy's expected axis of advance—remained highly mobile, ready to strike the Japanese flanks or rear the moment the enemy divided his forces or pushed toward Runan, Yancheng, or Wuyang. This elastic strategy proved decisive.   At dawn on 25 January the Japanese southern Henan forces advanced in three columns. The Left Flank Force moved along the line from Xiaolindian to Gucheng and Chashan. The Central Force struck northward from the Minggang area. The Right Flank Force crossed the Huai River between Huaijiao Zhen and Chengyang under heavy air support. Japanese planes bombed Chinese positions relentlessly. True to plan, Chinese units employed only light screening forces to harass the enemy with ambushes and flank attacks, preserving their main strength for the decisive moment.   By 26 January the Japanese had reached the line from Piyang to Gaoyi, Xingtian, and Queshan. On the 27th they pressed on to Chunshui, Shahetian, and Zhumadian. At this point Chinese mobile forces sprang into action. The 13th Corps of the 31st Army Group swung northward toward Xiangheguan, while the main body of the 85th Corps moved toward Shangcai to begin an enveloping maneuver. The 68th Corps of the 11th Army Group struck the enemy rear south of Xiangheguan; the 55th Corps advanced from Tanghe to Piyang; and the 59th Corps of the 33rd Army Group pushed toward Nanyang. On 29 January the 13th Corps attacked the Japanese Left Flank Force near Jieguanting and Xiaoshidian south of Wuyang, while the 85th Corps struck the Right Flank Force around Runan, southeast of Shangcai. The enemy's Central Force, advancing along and west of the railway, found the Chinese positions already evacuated and failed to trap any major units. The Japanese columns on the extreme flanks suffered over 3,000 casualties and lost six tanks in the fighting around Jieguanting.   By 31 January the enemy, desperate to rescue his exposed flank columns, reordered his forces. The Central Force executed turning movements on both sides: elements of the 15th Division swung right from Suiping through Shangcai to converge with troops moving north from Runan against the 85th Corps, while the main body of the 17th Division split into two columns and advanced from Suiping through Xiping toward Wuyang. Simultaneously, the main force of the 3rd Division and part of the 4th Division also converged on Wuyang, hoping to link with the 17th Division and crush the 13th Corps near Jieguanting and Xiaoshidian. Before the trap could close, however, the Chinese 13th and 85th Corps withdrew in good order to the area north of Ye Xian, between Yancheng and Shangshui, and north of the Sha River. When the Japanese broke through at Wuyang and Shangcai they found no major Chinese forces to destroy.   Meanwhile, Chinese troops from western Henan, the 59th, 55th, and 68th Corps, advanced from Tanghe, Piyang, and points north to strike the enemy rear at Wuyang. On 29 January the 84th Corps and local guerrillas in western Anhui recaptured Chengyang and continued the pursuit. The Japanese, having failed to concentrate superior strength or control the battlefield, now found themselves isolated. Their rear communications were severed, and they were under constant pressure from the 68th, 55th, and 59th Corps. After days of exhausting combat the enemy began to withdraw southward on the night of 2 February. Leaving only rear guards at Wuyang and Baoanzhai to tie down the 13th Corps, the main body of the 3rd Division moved from Fangcheng toward Nanyang and Zhenping. The 13th Corps immediately counterattacked, recaptured Baoanzhai and Wuyang, and pursued the enemy toward Fangcheng.   On the night of 2 February, as the Japanese main force approached Nanyang, the 17th Division together with elements of the 15th and 4th Divisions had already pushed south from Wuyang via Xiangheguan toward Piyang, hoping to link with forces moving east from Nanyang and trap the Chinese 68th, 55th, and 29th Corps. Fierce resistance by the 68th Corps near Xiangheguan inflicted heavy losses and forced the enemy to abandon large quantities of supplies. Further south, the 29th Corps exacted still greater casualties around Piyang. On the night of 7 February the trapped Japanese column split: part retreated along the Tanghe–Piyang highway, while the main body withdrew along the Tongbo–Xinyang highway toward Xinyang, leaving many dead behind. The Chinese 85th Corps pursued southeastward, while elements of the 13th, 29th, 55th, and 59th Corps harried the enemy toward Xinyang. By the time the fighting ended, all Chinese units had regained their original positions.   In coordination with the southern Henan offensive, the Japanese forces in northern Anhui and eastern Henan advanced westward in four columns on the morning of 25 January. The Ouda Regiment of the 21st Division struck west from Suzhou. The 4th Cavalry Brigade, reinforced by the Hirabayashi Tank Regiment, split into three routes from Bozhou to attack Woyang, Shanheji, and Shuangqiao, clashing bitterly with a Chinese cavalry division near Shizihe and Niqiuji. The Uguchi Regiment of the 35th Division advanced through the flooded areas from Tongxu and Zhuxian Zhen, while the Kobayashi Regiment moved westward along the north bank of the Yellow River near Zhengzhou. Japanese aircraft intensified their bombing of Chinese cities and front-line positions, including Zhoujiakou, Zhengzhou, Yancheng, Ye Xian, Xiangcheng, Wuyang, and Luoyang. On 29 January one enemy column reached Santaiji and suffered heavy losses under Chinese attack. Threatened on the left by forces near Huaiyang, two Chinese corps withdrew temporarily to the line from Fuyang to Taihe and Jieshou. On 5 February the Japanese captured Taihe and Jieshou, but a Chinese counterattack on the morning of 6 February regained both towns, forcing the enemy to retreat northeastward.   The Battle of Southern Henan, which opened on 25 January and concluded on 10 February after seventeen days of continuous fighting, ended in a clear Chinese victory. Japanese casualties exceeded 9,000; when the enemy withdrew from Nanyang more than 300 military vehicles were left burning on the battlefield. Large quantities of arms, ammunition, and supplies fell into Chinese hands. Chinese losses were significantly lighter. The enemy had hoped to force a decisive battle along the railway and shatter the Chinese armies of the Fifth War Area. Instead, skillful Chinese maneuver, timely flank attacks, and relentless pressure on the enemy's rear and communications had turned the Japanese offensive into a costly failure. The victory not only preserved the integrity of the central Chinese front but also demonstrated once again the effectiveness of elastic defense and mobile counteroffensive tactics against a numerically superior but overextended foe.   In the wake of their costly repulse in central Hubei the previous November and the even more humiliating defeat in Southern Henan between late January and early February 1941, the Japanese sought once more to regain the initiative in the spring of 1941. Their target was western Hubei, where Chinese forces continued to deny them freedom of movement along the middle Yangtze. The entire Japanese 13th Division garrisoned the Yichang salient. Its regiments were deployed in a defensive arc: the 65th Regiment and the 19th Artillery Regiment held positions east of the city at Longchuanpu, Tumenya, and Yaqueling; the 104th Regiment guarded the northwest approaches; and the 17th Cavalry Regiment patrolled the Yangchalu–Baishanao sector. On the west bank of the Yangtze, the 58th Regiment had constructed strong bridgehead fortifications between Chaojialing and Shangwulongkou, ready to support any renewed thrust westward.   Facing this entrenched enemy was the Chinese 26th Corps, entrusted with the critical mission of river defense on the west bank of the Yangtze opposite Yichang. The corps commander had organized his forces into three sectors. The 41st Division held the right zone, anchoring its line from Mujiatian and Tanjiataizi northward to the vicinity of Fanjiah u. The 32nd Division defended the left zone, stretching from Mujiatian through Ceyang to Xiangzikou. The 44th Division remained in corps reserve near Caojiafan, poised to reinforce either flank or exploit opportunities for counterattack.   On 6 March 1941 the Japanese struck. Having quietly reinforced their forces west of Yichang to more than three regiments, supported by cavalry and artillery, they opened the assault at 5:30 a.m. with a violent artillery barrage, followed immediately by infantry advances under cover of air strikes. Chinese security positions at Tanjiataizi and Chaojiadian were overrun. The enemy then hurled itself against the main line at Changgangling. Simultaneously, 600 to 700 Japanese troops, backed by planes and guns, assaulted Fanjiah u. After hours of bitter fighting both localities fell. On the morning of 7 March, Japanese aircraft again spearheaded the attack, enabling the capture of positions at Qianjiatai and Wujiaba. The enemy pressed on toward Qianjiachong and Yutaishan but was thrown back. Meanwhile, the force that had taken Fanjiah u clashed fiercely with the Chinese 44th Division around Taipingqiao; although the division was eventually compelled to withdraw to the eastern end of the bridge under relentless air attack, it continued to resist stubbornly. When the enemy seized Hut zeye from the direction of Fanjiah u, the 32nd Division fell back in good order to the line from Tunziqiao to Tuyanzhong, where it beat off further assaults. By this stage the Japanese had driven themselves into a dangerously narrow salient, exposed on both flanks.   Seizing the moment, the River Defense Force reorganized its lines. The 103rd Division of the 8th Corps relieved the sector from Mujiatang through Yingzishan to Chaotianguan, while the 26th Corps consolidated new positions at Yutaishan, Pijiashan, Qingshuiba, Guangongling, and Xiaopingshanba. The plan was clear: hold the enemy east of this line, then launch a converging counterstroke to destroy the invaders and restore the original front. On 8 March two guerrilla columns from the 41st Division struck at Changgangling and Fanjiayuan, while another detachment hit the enemy east of Pifengjian. More than 2,000 Japanese troops assaulted the 44th Division's positions from Gaolingpo and Dajiaobian toward Wanghuzizhong; determined resistance by the 44th Division, supported by elements of the 41st, brought the attack to a standstill. Later that day the enemy managed to penetrate the 32nd Division's line at Tianwangshi, forcing Chinese troops to fight a delaying action along the outskirts of the Shibai Fortress from Mingjiachong to Heitangou.   Dawn on 9 March brought renewed Chinese initiative. The 103rd Division occupied the line from Tutiling to Shizinao and advanced in several columns against the enemy. A portion of the 44th Division waged a grim holding action on the high ground flanking Guojiaba, suffering heavy losses but buying time for the main body to launch a powerful flank attack against the Japanese at Taipingqiao and Xianglingkou. By dusk Chinese forces had captured the enemy strongpoints at Dujiaoba and Dajiaobian along the highway, annihilating numerous enemy troops. The 32nd Division threw its main strength against the area northwest of Dajiaobian; heavy fighting raged around Wanghuzizhong into the afternoon until enemy reinforcements were driven off. The 41st Division, meanwhile, executed effective flank attacks that yielded significant gains. On 10 March the 103rd Division recaptured the high ground at Xiawulongkou and north of Tianzipo, while guerrillas of the 41st Division continued to harass the enemy through every gap in his lines. When positions at Hongshipo and Lungtanping held by the 44th Division were breached, the division withdrew to the western heights of Bomuping and faced the enemy anew.   At dawn on 11 March, after suffering severe casualties, the Japanese resorted to smoke screens and began withdrawing eastward along several routes. Chinese pursuit forces swiftly retook Xianglingkou, Guojiaba, Guangongling, Tianwangshi, and Dajiaobian. By 12 March the enemy had fallen back to a defensive line running from east of Taipingqiao to Hu z'ai and Huangnikeng. On 13 March Chinese units launched general counterattacks. Unable to withstand the pressure, the Japanese retreated to their original positions. The eight-day engagement thus ended exactly where it had begun.   The battle had been fought with only a portion of the available Chinese forces, yet it proved decisive. The Japanese, who had hoped to crack the river defenses and resume their westward drive, instead suffered 4,000 to 5,000 casualties. The swift and skillful Chinese counteroffensive not only restored the front but left the enemy shaken and apprehensive. Their design to push deeper into western Hubei was decisively thwarted, buying precious time for the broader Chinese war effort in the Yangtze theater and demonstrating once again that determined defense, timely reinforcement, and aggressive counteraction could blunt even the most carefully prepared Japanese offensive. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In November 1940, a Central Hubei Operation using five task forces attempted to exploit Chinese dispersal but achieved no territorial gains despite local successes. A larger January 1941 offensive into southern Henan deployed 150,000+ troops but again failed strategically. Despite Japanese tactical advantages and superior firepower, logistical constraints and rugged terrain favored mobile Chinese resistance. Both campaigns ended with Japanese withdrawals and restored Chinese positions, demonstrating that determined defense and timely counteraction could blunt large-scale Japanese operations.

**This is a bonus episode for paid subscribers. If you would like to become a paid sub and receive bonus content, head over to Buy Me a Coffee using the link in the description, or upgrade your Substack account**An article in the Journal of Contemporary China inspire me to dip my toe in the Chinamaxxing trend and discuss how foreign influencers in China promote state approved nationalist narratives at home and abroad. We look at the different types of influencer (Western, non-Western, couples, students, teachers, and more) and get to the bottom of the types of content they produce, what's in it for them, and how the CCP maintains their control over what's produce at all times.Imported Nationalism: How Foreign Influencers and Local Followers Amplify the Chinese Dream in Weibo's Attention EconomyToo Simple, Sometimes Naive articleBuy bookclub books here            Buy me a coffeeLatest Substack postSupport the showSign up for Buzzsprout to launch your podcasting journey: https://www.buzzsprout.com/?referrer_id=162442Subscribe to the Sinobabble Newsletter: https://sinobabble.substack.com/Support Sinobabble on Buy me a Coffee: https://www.buymeacoffee.com/Sinobabblepod 

Dimitri and Khalid break down the tense geopolitical moment and the Trump administration's simultaneous military threats against Iran and Cuba, alongside some related issues: the weaponized centrality of Streamers in the current political climate, federal persecution of the leftist influencers who traveled to Cuba earlier this year, right wing allegations against Maoist centimillionaire philanthropist Neville Roy Singham funding the “radical left” who promote “CCP talking points”, why a military attack on Cuba might end up more like Iran than Venezuela, protests in Bolivia, the possible remilitarization of Germany and Japan leading to the Ukrainification of the EU/NATO countries, and more… For access to full-length premium SJ episodes, upcoming installments of DEMON FORCES, and the Grotto of Truth Discord, subscribe at https://patreon.com/subliminaljihad.

Joining Audrey for this week's REELTalk - Bestselling and Founder of Stand Up America, Major General PAUL VALLELY, will be here! PLUS, Senior Reporter and Chief European Correspondent for CBN News, DALE HURD, will be here! AND, author of the bestseller A Few Bad Men, Major FRED GALVIN will be here! PLUS, comedian and author of The Book of Outcasts, MATT NAGIN will be here! In the words of Benjamin Franklin, "If we do not hang together, we shall surely hang separately." Come hang with us...  

California has long been a blue state, but that could soon change. Conservative contenders for governor and Los Angeles mayor are now moving forward to runoff elections in November. Meanwhile, in the UK, there are now riots over the police response to a fatal stabbing in which officers arrested the young man who had been attacked. The 18-year-old university student bled out as he was accused of racism. And in other news, the CCP is developing a new pre-crime system using artificial intelligence. We'll discuss these topics and others in this episode of “Crossroads.”Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and guest, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

00:00 Intro01:14 U.S. Plans Tariffs for 60 Countries Over Forced Labor02:41 Rubio Defends Taiwan Support, Warns About China04:41 Rubio Rejects Easing Pressure on Cuba, Iran05:44 NBA–China Ties Under Scrutiny After Stephen Curry Deal08:05 Solomon Islands to Review China Security Pact08:58 Jensen Huang: Taiwan an Incredible Strategic U.S. Partner11:16 Robot Dogs May Patrol Taiwan's South China Sea Islands13:59 Chinese Citizens on Why They Quit the Communist Party15:08 VOC President: June 4th 'A Living Memory' of CCP Abuse15:39 DC Vigil Marks Tiananmen Massacre Memory16:53 Tiananmen Memory Tied to American Values17:54 Beijing Influence in Education Under Scrutiny19:35 CCP vs. Chinese People: Drawing the Line21:00 Parents Warned on Toy Safety, Supply Chain Risks

Thirty-seven years ago today, the Chinese Communist Party violently crushed freedom demonstrations in Beijing's Tiananmen Square and other cities across China. Grave insult was added to the murderous injury inflicted when the U.S. government made clear that such repression would not be allowed to interfere with business as usual between the two countries. The message was personally conveyed to that epic crime's perpetrators by President George H.W. Bush's National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft – a longtime protégé of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who blazed the path for “engagement” with the CCP.  In practice, as author Peter Schweizer has devastatingly documented in his latest best-seller, Invisible Coup, Kissinger, Scowcroft, and former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson spawned the practice of profiting immensely by selling out our country to China at the expense of Americans' economic wellbeing and national security.  That must end.

Rep. Michael Baumgartner, who represents Washington's 5th Congressional District, joins the show from Singapore at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue. What was the tone and significance of Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth's speech? How are the Asian economies fairing in lieu of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz? And what is the future of the American-led order in East Asia? 03:07 - Tone of the Shangri-La Dialogue 05:30 - Asia and the Strait of Hormuz 09:35 - The UAE's Distance from Iran 11:47 - America's Role in Asian Security 13:06 - Asia's Reaction to Trump's China Summit 15:25 - The Diversity of Asia 16:54 - Pete Hegseth's Speech 19:07 - The CCP's Control of China 20:59 - Korean and Japanese Views on China 24:07 - Drones and Autonomous Warfare 24:50 - Vietnam's Reinvention 28:07 - Singapore-U.S. Relations 30:21 - Paused Arms Sales 34:00 - Iran and Electoral Politics Follow along on Instagram, X @schoolofwarpod, and YouTube @SchoolofWarPodcast Find more at The Free Press. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Last time we spoke about the second phase of the One Hundred Regiment Offensive.  During the second phase of the Hundred Regiments offensive, CCP forces emphasized strongpoint and transportation warfare across the Taihang/Jizhong area. Units were organized with wings containing Japanese positions while a central force struck deeper, as in the Renhe Dasu fighting in early October 1940. Night raids seized strongholds, while engineers and sabotage teams disrupted roads, bridges, and mobility, and ambushes targeted Japanese foraging and supply routes. Across these theaters, the strategy was consistent: make Japanese control porous by destroying or capturing local nodes and forcing constant repairs, re-routing, escorts, and slowed reinforcement, so occupation logistics and strongpoint networks could not function reliably. This approach supported wider offensives by isolating strongpoints, draining enemy strength, and giving Communist base areas room to endure and expand.   #204 The One Hundred Regiment Offensive Phase Three Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After the two large-scale offensives carried out over wide areas of North China, the Japanese army did what it always did when control started to slip: it tried to turn mobile pressure back into something it could "manage" again. The Eighth Route Army's continued fighting had shown that Japanese-occupied space was not secure, and that base areas could still resist, strike, and persist even while under counterpressure. That was dangerous for occupation. If the enemy could keep operations going, Japanese lines of movement stayed uncertain and "stabilization" became a temporary illusion. To prevent the situation from worsening and to re-stabilize the occupied areas as quickly as possible, the Japanese mobilized heavy forces and launched retaliatory counter–"mopping-up" operations against anti-Japanese base areas in North China beginning October 6. The Japanese attempt wasn't only to punish; it was designed to take advantage of an asymmetry: the Eighth Route Army was striking and fighting continuously, and it did not have the luxury of resting, replenishing, and re-cohering as neatly as a garrison army might. Japanese commanders hoped that if they struck hard enough in enough places, the Communist main forces could be isolated, destroyed, or at least forced into a defensive posture that would break their operational tempo. At Liaodong and Yulin, Japanese reinforcements also created a second political-military stake. After the Yuliao Campaign ended, the Eighth Route Army headquarters issued instructions on October 1 to major regions, warning that enemy reinforcements in Liaodong and Yulin might use the opening to "sweep" the Taibei region. In the Communist operational mind, this wasn't just one threat; it was a pattern. A "sweep" could come as a wave that pushed inward, burned villages, destroyed supplies, and tried to force Communist forces out of their protected networks. Even if the offensive couldn't win a conventional decisive battle, it could aim to strip the base areas of people, food, and mobility—things that make guerrilla and strongpoint warfare possible. By October 19, 1940, the Eighth Route Army headquarters issued a counter–"mopping-up" operation plan, and civilian and military authorities in various regions launched counter-"mopping-up" operations accordingly. This is important background: in these campaigns, "mopping-up" was not only an army activity. The Japanese were attempting to break the base system itself—its logistics, its local administration, and the relationship between armed units and civilians who hid, moved, fed, and replaced them. So the counter-operations had to be just as systemic. The Communists needed to keep people alive, keep movement possible, and keep the enemy from consolidating inside a cleared space. In southeastern Shanxi's Taihang and Taiyue regions, the Japanese 1st Army aimed to strike the main force of the 129th Division and destroy anti-Japanese base areas by running a series of mopping operations from October 6 to December 5. The plan had a typical occupation logic: push through strongholds gradually, clear pockets methodically, and rely on local superiority—especially in manpower, logistics, and the ability to reinforce by road. And because the Communist main force had been operating without meaningful rest after the earlier offensives, the Japanese believed they could catch formations while they were still "in between battles." On October 6, in the Taihang region, more than 800 enemy troops from Wu'an in western Hebei began a "mopping-up" operation in the Yangyi area. By October 11, the Japanese posture escalated. Part of the Japanese Independent Mixed 4th Brigade departed from Liaoxian and Wuxiang, while part of the 36th Division departed from Lucheng and Xiangyuan; together they totaled over 3,000 troops. Coordinating from north and south, they carried out operations to "mop up" both banks of the Zhuozhang River between Yulin, Liaoxian, and Wuxiang, encircling and clearing the south side of the Yulin–Liaoxian highway. This emphasis on riverbanks and highway corridors reveals the Japanese method: move along terrain that controls movement, then compress enemy options until the defenders have to fight inside a narrowing space. The counter to that method required more than bravery. The Eighth Route Army's 385th and 386th Brigades, along with the 1st Column of the Decisive Battle, fought on inner lines—where they could move more rapidly between known local positions and threaten the enemy's flanks or supply behavior. Meanwhile the New 10th Brigade fought on outer lines, where it could intercept, delay, and force the enemy to spend time reacting instead of clearing. By the morning of October 15, the New 10th Brigade delivered a concrete example of that interception strategy. Two regiments ambushed an enemy motor-transport convoy at Gongjiagou on the Heliao Highway, destroying more than 40 vehicles and annihilating more than 100 Japanese soldiers escorting the convoy. The meaning of a convoy ambush is strategic even when the numbers are modest: vehicles represent speed, logistics, and reinforcement. If the enemy loses vehicles repeatedly, "mopping" becomes slower, and slower clearing creates openings for the defenders to reorganize, disperse, or shift main effort. After that, on October 17, the enemy forces that had been mopping up the convoy withdrew in different directions. Withdrawal in multiple directions is a sign that the Japanese clearing operation, meant to compress a space, had instead been forced into a reactive mode. It also hints at a recurring pattern in these years: Japanese units could clear what was already weak, but when defenders hit their movement corridors, the occupiers had to spend time and combat power simply to recover mobility. The next major sweep began October 20, 1940, and it was much larger. Nearly 10,000 troops—from the 36th Division and Independent Mixed Brigade No. 4—set off from multiple locations, including Wu'an, Liaoxian, Wuxiang, and Lucheng, to sweep the area east and west of the Qingzhang River, focusing on land between Matian and Zuohui. Crucially, that was not random ground. The Japanese sought to strike the CCP Central Committee Northern Bureau, the Eighth Route Army headquarters, and the 129th Division headquarters, along with party and government organs of the Jin-Ji-Yu Border Region, located together with Shexian and Piancheng. In other words, the Japanese targeted not just armed units but the political-administrative heart that makes base areas function. Once in the attack area, the Japanese carried out "mopping-up" operations paired with burning and killing for several days. That brutality wasn't only cruelty; it served a purpose. Burning villages, destroying crops, and killing civilians could deny the base area food and shelter while making local cooperation more difficult. Then, on October 26, the Japanese began to withdraw and carried out mopping-up in different areas on the way back. The base area was "severely damaged and destroyed," indicating that even when the Japanese didn't annihilate the main Communist force, they could still achieve degradation—hurting the system they needed to keep operating. But the Communists were not simply absorbing damage. On October 29, a force of over 500 men from the 36th Division, plus over 400 supply and laborers, was mopping up Huangyandong and advanced through Zuohui to Guanjia'nao east of Panlong, preparing to return to Wuxiang. This is where counter-mopping becomes operationally dangerous for the occupier. Supply and labor detachments move differently from combat formations, and they represent an enemy's assumption that the base area is being "cleared." The Eighth Route Army headquarters ordered, at 1:00 p.m., for the 129th Division to concentrate its main force to annihilate the enemy. That night, the 129th Division—uniting the main forces of the 385th and 386th Brigades, parts of the New 10th Brigade, and the First Column of the Death Squad—surrounded the enemy at Guanjia'nao with a plan to launch a general offensive at 4:00 a.m. The besieged enemy, besides quickly building fortifications, seized Fengkengding high ground southwest of Guanjia'nao under cover of darkness. The two high points helped defenders support one another and resist stubbornly. The battle lasted until dawn on October 31, when most of the enemy had been annihilated, leaving only more than 60 men to hold positions. Then reinforcements arrived—over 1,500 from Huangyandong—supported by more than 10 aircraft. The 129th Division withdrew, and the remaining enemy fled toward the flood, leaving behind more than 280 corpses. By then, most Japanese troops had withdrawn from the central base area. The background stake is clear: "mopping-up" could damage and burn, but if defenders could convert the Japanese attempt into a trap—especially when enemy units had become separated from their core and committed to clearing—they could turn a destructive operation into a costly one for the occupier. In early November, the Japanese continued. In Licheng south of Taihang, Japanese forces invaded Nanweiquan and Beiweiquan and then Xijing. Elsewhere, Japanese forces in Xiangyuan invaded Panlong via Xiying, attempting to attack Dongtian and the area around Zhuanbi, where the Eighth Route Army headquarters was located. In that moment, the 386th Brigade was ordered to rush to the north–south line of Damocun, east of Panlong, block the invading enemy, and cover the transfer of the Eighth Route Army headquarters. At 9:00 a.m. on November 3, 1940, fierce fighting broke out as the troops finished deploying near Damocun. The Japanese launched continuous attacks and captured some positions. The 386th Brigade held until 4:00 a.m. on November 4, then withdrew after the headquarters successfully moved. The Japanese attempt to launch a pincer attack failed, and they retreated to the Baijin Line on November 5. Even when Japanese action couldn't be fully blocked, the counter's aim was not only tactical survival but prevention of strategic encirclement—protecting the central institutions and preserving the ability to fight again. In the northern Taihang region, more than 2,500 enemy troops from Heshun arrived in Yushe on November 3 via Hanwang Town and Changcheng Town, reinforcing Japanese forces in the Yu, Liao, and Wu areas. Then they carried out repeated mopping operations south of the Yuliao Highway, including Jiangtang, Lingshang, Songjiazhuang, Guojiao, and Dayouyi. Harassment and attacks by military and civilians forced Japanese troops back into their strongholds by the 13th. A "40-day" counter-mopping operation in Taihang came to an end. The term "40-day" isn't only calendar time; it suggests that these were not one-off battles but sustained campaigns of movement, dispersal, and repeated harassment meant to drain the enemy's capacity. Starting November 17, the Japanese launched a multi-pronged attack on Qinyuan and the area north of Guodao Town. The attack involved part of the 37th Division from Qin County and Nanguan Town, part of the Independent Mixed Brigade from Pingyao, Jiexiu, and Huo County, and a battalion of the 41st Division from Hongdong—more than 7,000 troops deployed to attack Qinyuan and the north area. But the Taiyue Military Region response shows how the Communist counter-mopping wasn't always to meet force with force. To avoid the enemy's "sharp edge," the Taiyue Military Region formed two detachments—Qin East and Qin West—with leadership and main force moving to both sides of the Qin River outside the Japanese attack zone, targeting scattered Japanese troops instead of being fixed into a single killing field. By November 23, due to harassment by local armed forces, the Japanese reached the attack zone and then carried out dispersed mopping operations. Qinyuan County was the most severely damaged, with more than 5,000 people killed (about one-tenth of its population), nearly 10,000 livestock killed and over 7,000 stolen, and 30,000 to 40,000 houses destroyed. Those details are brutal, but they explain why background stakes mattered: "mopping-up" was meant to break the social base. If civilians died or fled, the guerrilla system became harder to sustain. The response from the Dayue Military Region seized the opportunity created by Japanese dispersal. On November 23, the 42nd Regiment of the Qinxi Detachment annihilated more than 100 Japanese soldiers in Guantan. On November 27, parts of the 42nd and 59th Regiments killed or wounded more than 160 in Huhanping and Mabei. The Qindong Detachment's 17th and 57th Regiments inflicted serious damage in a series of places—Guang'ao, Chenjiagou, Longfosi, Wuyuanzhen, Nanweicun, Nanli, and more. The 17th Regiment's battle at Longfosi annihilated more than 100 Japanese. Additional heavy losses were inflicted by the 212th Brigade in Jiaokou. By December 5, the Japanese were forced to withdraw from the Taiyue area in separate routes. Strategically, dispersal punished the occupier because scattered units are harder to protect and easier to ambush. Across the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region, anti-"mopping-up" operations unfolded gradually, beginning with the Pingxi area, the first target of the Japanese on the path toward the Japanese-held headquarters and rail lines. Pingxi mattered because it directly threatened the headquarters of the Japanese North China Area Army and Beiping—the puppet regime's center—and also threatened the Pinghan and Pingsui railways, North China's main transportation lines. So Pingxi became an operational priority: if the occupier couldn't keep the rail network secure, their ability to reinforce and supply their own strongpoints suffered. On October 13, 1940, more than 10,000 Japanese and puppet troops attacked Sanpo, the central area of the Pingxi base area, in 10 routes. This attack used a methodical, steady approach: advance gradually, rely on strongholds, and cover 5 to 10 kilometers each day. In response, the Pingxi Military Sub-district countered using timely maneuvers of its main forces and extensive guerrilla warfare. Over more than a week of fighting, the enemy was constantly harassed and attacked, wearing them down. Although Japanese troops penetrated deep, they failed to identify the main force's movements. By November 21, when the encirclement tightened further, the Pingxi main force jumped out from the Sanpo area and moved southwest. Encountering the enemy at Pengtou, it then moved to the Yegu and Datai line east of Bancheng. After the Japanese entered the Sanpo area, they conducted widespread burning and killing and looted grain. Starting from the 23rd, the Japanese retreated in different routes. By the end of October, the main force had withdrawn from Pingxi, but more than 2,000 troops remained in the Pingxi anti-Japanese base area to build strongholds and roads. Strongholds were added in places like Changping and Wanping—14 strongholds alone—and villages such as Dongzhaitang and Dujiazhuang came under their control. The base area began to shrink and shrink. That shrinkage is the other background stake: even when guerrilla forces avoid annihilation, the occupier may still carve away space through fortification. On October 19, 1940, the Eighth Route Army headquarters instructed that enemy attacks in Pingxi and Taihang might turn around and attack the Beiyue area. The Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region needed to prepare quickly to crush these "mopping-up" operations, coordinating Party, government, military, and civilians and conducting in-depth combat mobilization. The main force should assemble in appropriate positions and prepare to annihilate one or two enemy forces decisively. The headquarters also instructed the 129th and 120th Divisions to cooperate actively. By November 9, 1940, the Japanese struck again in a massive sweep. The 110th Division, along with other units and more than 14,000 puppet troops, launched a "mopping-up" operation in the jurisdiction of the 1st Military Sub-district. The Japanese and puppet troops moved in coordinated lines: along the line of Yi County, Dalonghua, Wang'an Town, Laiyuan, and Chajianling from north to south, while those in Baoding and Mancheng moved east to west. The intent was to squeeze Communist sub-district forces into a narrow area for a decisive battle. On November 10, the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region issued operational guidelines and deployments for countering "mopping-up" operations. By the 12th, in response to Japanese widespread burning and killing, it further instructed that without hindering mobility, the main force could disperse a portion of troops—no more than one-third—to strike resolutely at attempts to burn and kill. That instruction captures the balance commanders tried to strike: disperse too much and you lose power; disperse too little and you become trapped by the occupier's brutality. The Japanese then attempted to pressure multiple places. On November 9, more than 6,000 enemy troops from Laiyuan, Yixian, and Baoding attacked Guantou, Yinfang, Huangtuling, and Shenbei. On the 12th, their attack failed; they burned and killed people before retreating in different routes. At that time, the 1st Military Sub-district assembled the 1st and 25th Regiments to intercept them. One enemy force of more than 800 was intercepted on the 14th as it retreated from Wujiazhuang to Yuangang; some were killed or wounded. Even so, the enemy broke through under aircraft cover and retreated to Guantou. On the way, it was intercepted again by the 20th Regiment, suffering heavy casualties, and it fled back to Mancheng. Then on November 13, more than 2,700 Japanese and puppet troops attacked the 3rd Military Sub-district; on November 14, about 2,600 advanced from Dingxiang, Dongye, and Wutai toward Fuping and its southwest area in two routes. The Japanese attacked with east-west coordination, launching joint attacks on Taiyu north of Fuping. The Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region headquarters and the command organs of the 3rd and 5th military sub-districts, along with the 2nd, 3rd, and 6th regiments and other troops, transferred to the outer line before the enemy encirclement formed. On the 16th, the Japanese launched a joint attack again on Taiyu and Zhangjiayu, and the guerrillas who failed to transfer fought hard. Commander Wang Pu and Deputy Director of the Political Department Hao Yuming were killed, and troops suffered more than 100 casualties. On November 18, the enemy from Taiyu quickly occupied Hanping City. By the 21st, enemy forces from Daying via Shentangbao and Wuwangkou, and from Wutai via Taihuai, Shizui, Longquanguan, and Xiaguan, also gathered in Fuping City. After occupying Fuping, the Japanese launched repeated attacks "sweeping" areas under the jurisdiction of the 3rd Military Sub-district from both inward and outward strongholds, conducting brutal burning and killing and destruction. On the night of November 21, the 2nd Regiment dispatched more than 30 men to raid Dangcheng and attack Japanese barracks with grenades. The Japanese panicked and fired guns and cannons all night. On the 26th, four plainclothes officers infiltrated Baoding and attacked a theater where the Japanese army was holding a meeting, causing panic among the Japanese. The enemy that had invaded the base area withdrew in different routes on the 25th. By December 3, 1940, most Japanese troops had withdrawn from the Beiyue area, but more than 1,000 remained along lines including Fuping, Wangkuai, Dangcheng, and Quyang to continue building points and roads in an attempt to occupy the area long-term. To force the enemy back, eliminate occupied points, and completely crush Japanese and puppet "mopping-up," the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region organized the Fuping–Wangkuai Campaign starting December 9, with the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 6th regiments participating. At 21:00 on December 14, the 6th Regiment attacked enemy forces in Dongzhuang. The 1st Battalion captured three fortified positions on the north mountain of Dongzhuang and rushed into the village, only for Japanese counterattacks to recapture fortified positions and kill or wound more than 170 Japanese during the counterfight. The 4th Regiment attacked the enemy in Fuping; the 2nd Regiment and guerrilla forces entered Dangcheng and Lingshan. On the 21st, more than 130 enemy soldiers escorting more than 100 pack animals carrying military supplies reached Wangkuai and were completely annihilated when they reached Wanglinkou. By December 26, an ambush in the Xuancun area of the Pinghan Railway destroyed 14 Japanese trains and their vehicles as well as three heavy artillery pieces. On the 27th, more than 1,200 enemy troops advancing from Dongzhuang in Fuping were attacked in Luoyu and Tumen, suffering more than 140 casualties. The remaining Japanese withdrew from Fuping, Dongzhuang, and Wangkuai starting New Year's Day 1941. By January 4, the 55-day anti-"mopping-up" campaign had basically ended, with the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region killing and wounding more than 2,000 Japanese and puppet troops while suffering 1,382 casualties itself. These numbers and dates show why background and stakes matter: the counter-mopping effort wasn't short. It was sustained, operationally demanding, and required continued offensive action even while facing superior Japanese resources. The pressure didn't end there. From October 25 to early November, about 4,000 Japanese troops, including the 16th Independent Mixed Brigade, launched a mopping operation in the Miyu and Loufan areas of the 8th and 3rd military sub-districts in northwestern Shanxi, but they were attacked by local soldiers and civilians. In mid-December, Japanese forces transferred additional strength: parts of the 37th Division from southern Shanxi and the 41st Division from southeastern Shanxi, along with parts of the 3rd, 9th, and 16th Independent Mixed Brigades and the 26th Division from northwestern Shanxi—totaling more than 20,000 troops—to prepare for a full-scale mopping operation in northwestern Shanxi. After the second phase of the Hundred Regiments Offensive ended, the 120th Division anticipated retaliation and actively prepared for counter-mopping. On October 30, the division was ordered to establish the Jin-Northwest Military Region, and on November 7, the military region was established in Lijiawan, Xing County. The Jin-Northwest Military Region had direct military sub-districts and six military sub-districts: the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 8th, and Yanbei. Then the occupier escalated. Starting December 14, 1940, the Japanese launched a full-scale mopping operation against the Jin-Northwest region. More than 5,000 enemy troops invaded the Mi-Yu Town area of the 8th Military Sub-district, more than 4,000 invaded Lin-Xian, and more than 6,000 attacked Xing-Xian and the area south of Bao-De from strongholds such as Lan-Xian and Qi-Lan. By December 23, Japanese forces had occupied all county towns, most market towns, and Yellow River crossings in the Jin-Northwest region except for Bao-De and He-Qu counties, and began to implement a systematic policy commonly described as the "Three Alls" policy. The "Three Alls" emphasis is the clearest expression of stakes turning lethal. Japanese troops and traitors disguised themselves as the Eighth Route Army to lure and kill masses. They sent out core detachments to attack and repeatedly sweep the area, seeking to annihilate party, government, and military leadership organs—focusing on destroying the rear organs and facilities that made Communist endurance possible. According to incomplete statistics, more than 5,000 people were brutally killed during these sweeps. In Xingxian County alone, 150,000 catties of grain were looted and burned; in the 4th Military Sub-district, more than 5,000 head of livestock were looted and killed; and more than 19,000 houses and cave dwellings were burned down. In the early stage of this anti-mopping campaign, the Jin-Sui Military Region mainly used a portion of its forces to cooperate with local troops and guerrillas in widespread guerrilla warfare. They harassed and contained the attacking enemy, disrupted enemy transportation, and covered the transfer of the masses. The main force avoided the enemy's sharp edge and moved to the outer line to seek opportunities to attack the Japanese army. This describes the classic guerrilla operational pattern: avoid being fixed into a single decisive trap, but create enough friction that enemy operations degrade into a struggle they can't sustain. repeated attacks and ambushes during the mopping period across Miyu Town and other areas—units striking repeatedly, destroying roads, cutting off enemy transportation, and attacking enemy strongholds north of Dawu. To thwart the Japanese army's plans to build roads and fortifications—plans that would make future sweeps easier—the Jin-Sui Military Region instructed, on December 27, all sub-districts to mobilize forces to disrupt Japanese road construction and fortification. The 358th Brigade attacked enemy road construction from Lanxian to Dashetou and from Puming to Chijianling; the Independent 1st Brigade sabotaged the Dawu–Linxian highway; and the 4th Column of the Death Squad sabotaged the Dawu–Fangshan highway. Part of the Independent 1st Brigade's 2nd Regiment organized over 2,000 civilians to sabotage the Dawu–Sanjiao highway twice, forcing the enemy in Linxian to detour through Fangshan to contact Lishi. The Lishi guerrillas led civilians in two sabotage attacks on the Lishi–Jundu highway, destroying over 30 "li" of road. Other units attacked strongholds along key highways and destroyed or disrupted the "maintenance committees" that surrounded newly built enemy strongholds. There were also direct raids—storming into Linxian County and capturing representatives of enemy maintenance organizations. Meanwhile, the Workers' and Patriots' Brigade carried out continuous sabotage on the Taifen Highway. As the enemy plans ran into persistent disruption, Japanese and puppet forces began to retreat in different routes starting January 2, 1941, and by January 24 they returned to their original strongholds. The Jin-Sui winter counter-mopping operation lasted 40 days, annihilated more than 2,500 enemy troops, destroyed 125 kilometers of roads and 23 bridges, and recovered all towns occupied by the enemy during the campaign. Here the stakes show through most clearly: the campaign was not merely about killing enemy troops. It was about preventing the occupier from building a durable, road-connected grid that would allow future sweeps to be faster, larger, and more decisive. At the wider campaign level, the Eighth Route Army also recorded its total effects from August 20 to December 5, covering roughly three and a half months. During that period, the Eighth Route Army fought 1,824 battles of varying sizes, killing or wounding 20,645 Japanese soldiers (including senior officers), killing or wounding 5,155 puppet troops, and capturing 281 Japanese soldiers and 18,407 puppet troops. 47 Japanese soldiers surrendered voluntarily, and 1,845 puppet troops defected, totaling 46,380 people. The Communists captured 5,942 guns and 53 artillery pieces, and destroyed extensive transportation infrastructure: 474 kilometers of railway, 1,502 kilometers of highway, 213 bridges, 37 railway stations, 11 tunnels, more than 217,000 rails, more than 1,549,000 sleepers, more than 109,000 telephone poles, and more than 424,000 kilograms of telephone wire. Five coal mines and 11 warehouses were destroyed. The narrative further adds that when including casualties of Japanese and puppet forces across related engagements—such as Fuwang and the anti–mopping operations in northwest Shanxi—the total number of casualties reached more than 50,880. Japanese statistics were also cited for damage assessment, noting destruction of track and bridges across key railways (Zhengtai, Tongpu, Pinghan), telegraph pole damage, power line cuts, and effects on coal production—such as the Jingxing New Mine being unable to produce coal for at least six months. These details underline a broader background stake: infrastructure damage was meant to weaken the occupier's ability to keep its occupation apparatus working, even after the direct battles ended. The price of that multi-month struggle was high for the Eighth Route Army as well. Over the three and a half months leading up to the Hundred Regiments Offensive, the Eighth Route Army suffered 17,000 casualties, and more than 20,000 were poisoned. During the Hundred Regiments Offensive itself, post-war statistics state that the 129th Division suffered 7,362 casualties and 450 missing persons, and the entire division suffered 7,812 casualties. When you connect these lines—offensive sabotage, counter-offensives, Japanese mopping-ups, and anti-mopping resistance—you see why this second wave of fighting mattered. It wasn't only about whether the Japanese could respond to the offensive. It was about whether both sides could sustain their operational logic: the Japanese trying to stabilize occupation through "mopping," and the Communists trying to preserve base systems through dispersal, harassment, and counter-moves that convert the occupier's clearing effort into something too costly to maintain. The background of the Hundred Regiments offensive, who authorized it, who planned it, and why, remains unclear. The Japanese response was so severe that, in retrospect, it appeared to some as if the offensive had been a mistake. Some leaders, especially Mao, may have wanted to disavow it. Indirect hints in Mao's writings in subsequent months and years suggest he may have viewed it critically or harbored misgivings from the start. It was not the kind of strategy Mao preferred. More than twenty years later, during the Cultural Revolution, Red Guards charged that Mao had not even known of the plan in advance because of Peng Dehuai's alleged duplicity, at the time, Peng was being denounced. While this seems unlikely, it may contain some substance. In his own defense against these charges, Peng stated that after the 8RA headquarters—located not in Yan'an but in Jin-Cha-Ji—planned the operation, it sent mobilization orders downward to each regional command and also notified the Central Military Affairs Commission headed by Mao. In the original plan, the action would begin in early September. But, Peng wrote, to prevent enemy discovery and to ensure simultaneous surprise assaults—thereby inflicting an even greater blow to the enemy and the puppets—they began about ten days earlier than scheduled, during the last week of August. "So we did not wait for approval from the Military Affairs Commission (this was wrong), but went right into combat earlier than planned." There is also the issue of the "spontaneous" participation of more than eighty regiments without authorization from the Eighth Route Army headquarters, and not from Yan'an as well. If Peng Dehuai's account is accepted (written in 1970, shortly before his death), then Mao and Party Central had no role in conceiving or planning the Hundred Regiments campaign. In that case, the "grand strategy" motivations for undertaking it largely vanish—except perhaps insofar as they were considered by Peng and his colleagues. One alleged motive was to counter any tendency toward capitulation by Chiang Kai-shek and the Chongqing regime: if the war heated up and the CCP threw itself into fighting, any accommodation between Chiang and Japan would look like cowardly surrender. A related consideration was the Communist leadership's sensitivity to the charge that they were simply exploiting the war to expand their influence—avoiding Japanese combat while letting KMT armies bear the real burden of fighting. The Nationalists gave major publicity to the accusation that CCP policy devoted 70 percent of effort to expansion, 20 percent to coping with the KMT, and only 10 percent to opposing Japan. A third suggested motive was to divert attention from the New Fourth Army's offensives against Nationalist forces in Central China, which were peaking around the same time. Peng Dehuai acknowledged the campaign was "too protracted," yet he defended its importance in maintaining the CCP's anti-Japanese image in the wake of anti-friction conflicts, in demonstrating the failure of the cage-and-silkworm policy, in returning at least twenty-six county seats to base control, and in keeping "wavering" elements in line. Even if these reasons mattered less than regional and tactical calculations in launching the campaign, they could always be used for propaganda afterward. Whatever misgivings Mao and Party Central may have had, the Party kept them to itself. Mao radioed congratulations to Peng after his victory, and in public statements the Hundred Regiments were turned into legend. Even if the Hundred Regiments campaign aimed to defeat Japanese pacification efforts, it did not succeed in a decisive way. Shocked and stung by the 8RA's action, the North China Area Army intensified its efforts to bring North China under tighter control. Under General Tada and then his successor, General Okamura Yasuji (July 1941–November 1944), the Japanese inflicted brutal, sustained violence against all North China bases. Between 1941 and 1944, about 150,000 Japanese troops were assigned full-time to pacification duty, supported by roughly 100,000 Chinese auxiliaries of widely varying description and effectiveness. The remainder of the NCAA (about 150,000–200,000 men) was assigned to other tasks such as garrisoning major cities and containing Nationalist forces. Communist regulars were estimated at around 250,000 within base areas and 40,000 in SKN. The Japanese and their Chinese auxiliaries invested even more heavily than before in constructing moats, ditches, palisades, and blockhouses. Japanese sources claimed that by 1942 their forces had built 11,860 kilometers of blockade line and 7,700 fortified posts, mostly in the Hebei plains and the foothills of the Taihang mountains. A massive trench ran for 500 kilometers along the western side of the Pinghan railway line, with a depopulated and constantly patrolled zone on either side. The 250 Japanese outposts established in southern Hebei by December 1940 were more than quadrupled by mid-1942. These became the key means of controlling plains areas; by the end of 1941, all Communist bases in such terrain had been reduced to guerrilla status. Many main force units—such as those under Liu Cheng'ao and Yang Xiufeng—were compelled to move westward into mountains to survive. What distinguished the new Tada–Okamura approach from earlier tactics was the much larger and more protracted search-and-destroy thrust into the core mountain-base areas. They also replaced selective repression with indiscriminate, generalized violence. These infamous "Three-All" mop-up campaigns meant: kill all, burn all, loot all. Unable to distinguish ordinary peasants from Communists, the Japanese waged war on everyone. After attempting to seal off major consolidated regions in the base areas, they sent in very large detachments to search for Communist forces, civilian cadres, and activists. They also tried to destroy base facilities and war material stockpiles; to disrupt agriculture by burning crops or interfering with planting and harvesting; and to seize grain stores. Entire villages were razed, and everything alive found there was killed. Unlike earlier mop-ups that swept through an area and then departed, these campaigns left troops in the targeted zones for extended periods, "combing" the area back and forth and building at least temporary strongpoints in more accessible parts of mountain bases. These mop-up operations took a heavy and painful toll on rural populations. No doubt the harsh tactics and atrocities frequently committed during these actions did cause many peasants, rich and poor alike, to harbor deep hatred of the Japanese and to commit more fully to the Communist side. But intra-party sources also portray cases in which repression worked even more effectively than earlier attempts to drive a wedge between party and peasantry. As one internal assessment put it: If we only stress concealment… we are bound to be divorced from the masses. The morale of the masses cannot be sustained for long either. On the other hand, if we only seek fleeting gratification in careless fighting, we may also invite still more cruel enemy suppression. That will also alienate the masses. Communist spokesmen acknowledged that, in North China base areas, the population under Party control fell from 44 million to 25 million, while the Eighth Route Army declined from 400,000 to 300,000. Local records present an even grimmer picture. By 1942, 90 percent of the plains bases had been reduced to guerrilla zones or outright enemy control. In the mountainous Taiyue district within the Jin-Cha-Lu-Yi base, one cadre admitted that "not a single county was kept intact and the government offices of all its twelve counties were exiled in Jin-yuan." All twenty-six county seats occupied following the Hundred Regiments fighting were lost. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Japan tried to regain control through retaliatory "mopping-up" operations starting in October 1940. In response, the Eighth Route Army and its commanders issued counter-measures: coordinate party, government, military, and civilians; keep mobility while dispersing forces when possible; and focus on annihilating incoming enemy units decisively. Counter-sweeps and anti-pacification actions continued through December, involving repeated ambushes and sabotage of roads, highways, and fortification efforts. 

On Two Mikes with Dr. Michael Scheuer and Col. Mike, Jack Maxey and I pulled the curtain back on the ugly machinery hiding behind the patriotic bumper stickers: alleged donor fraud, agency coverups, political pardons, CCP-linked corruption, and the uncomfortable reality that “justice” in America now seems to come with a VIP entrance and a very flexible moral code. “Be sure your sin will find you out” was not a suggestion box item in Numbers 32:23.Follow Dr Michael Scheuer on Pickax - https://pickax.com/RealDrMichaelScheuerFollow Col Mike on Pickax - https://pickax.com/twomikes Follow Jeff Dornik on Pickax - https://pickax.com/jeffdornikTune into The Jeff Dornik Show LIVE daily at 4pm ET on Rumble. Subscribe on Rumble and never miss a show. https://rumble.com/c/jeffdornikPickax is where people who are done renting their voice from Big Tech can actually support what we are building, connect directly, and become part of a real community instead of just feeding another rigged algorithm that pretends to care. Sign up today and download the app in the iOS and Android App Stores: https://pickax.com/?referralCode=y7wxvwq&refSource=copyBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-jeff-dornik-show--4788100/support.Follow The Jeff Dornik Show on Apple Podcasts and leave a 5-star review. That's how we reach more people and bypass Big Tech suppression.Watch LIVE daily at 7pm ET on Rumble and subscribe so you never miss a show:https://rumble.com/c/jeffdornikBig Tech is silencing truth while harvesting your data to feed the machine. That's why I built Pickax, a free speech platform where creators own their content and your voice isn't controlled. Join now:https://pickax.com/?referralCode=y7wxvwq&refSource=copy

Could communist Chinese infiltration of Canada become an existential threat to American security—or is it already one?Scott McGregor has spent decades in the Canadian military and Canadian intelligence studying the threat that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) poses to Canada and North America more broadly. He has known about the CCP's infiltration of Canada for many years and briefed major intelligence agencies in both Canada and the United States about it.According to McGregor, the strategic partnership between Canada and China is extremely detrimental to Canada's interests—and also poses a major security threat to America.McGregor, who is the co-author of the book “The Mosaic Effect,” told me the partnership “came as quite a shock. ... This strategic alliance ... cuts the legs out of the people that have been trying to bring awareness to the threat of China to Canada and North America.”U.S. President Donald Trump's comments last year about Canada becoming America's 51st state alienated many Canadians to such a degree that they are eager to distance themselves from America. But McGregor says the reality is that Canada very much depends on the United States. It's by far Canada's most important trading partner and an indispensable military partner.“Canada relies on the United States as a partner in logistics support, especially militarily. When I deployed, we had Canadians that were saved because Americans had helicopters that could operate in regions that we just couldn't. We didn't have the capability. The same goes for weaponry,” he says.Without American military support, McGregor warns, “We are left on our own. ... Canada needs the United States.”But do Canadians want to hear such warnings? Do Canadians perhaps tend to overestimate their country's military strength? Do they understand the depth of the threat from a China under CCP rule? Are they aware of the extent to which Canadian society has already been undermined over the last half century?And are Canadians perhaps too trusting to realize that the CCP has a plan for Canada and is executing it?He tells me: “China has a goal, an objective. It's not destruction at this point. It's disruption, and the disruption is working. They've outflanked us. We're fighting amongst ourselves—exactly what they want.”Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and the guest, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

How do you evaluate an AI model for a war you can only fight once? Ike Harris, a Naval officer turned Hill staffer turned AI policy operator, joins the show to discuss his effort to bridge the gap between the labs that build frontier models and the operators who'll deploy them. Ike Harris is the executive director of the newly launched Frontier Security Institute, and was most recently the Republican tech lead on the House Select Committee on the CCP, with prior stints in OSD and as a surface warfare officer. We discuss… The GAIN AI and Overwatch acts: and Congress's most aggressive attempt to wrest export-control authority from the executive branch since the Cold War Why you can't just "buy AI": and why national security evals look nothing like the SWE benchmarks the labs optimize for Strategic-level evals :for problems you can't run ten times, from Iran negotiations to targeting at the COCOM level China's robot-army advantage: open-weight models at the edge, Ukraine-style drone iteration soaked up via Russia, and a casualty tolerance the US can't match The "no more NASA" problem: how risk tolerance, mission command, and law-of-armed-conflict constraints shape who wins the deployment race Breaking into tech policy: Ike's case for why every aspiring policy person should spend a year on the Hill Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

While the Amplify team is busy saving lives, please enjoy a replay of part one of our PSM: BACK to Basics series! This episode is all about acronyms. The world of process safety is chock-full of acronyms. In this episode, recorded in 2020, co-founder Wesley and former producer Jo tackle the essential acronyms that PSM newbies need to know, providing an explanation and context for each term. You'll learn about AIChE, API, ASME, CCPS, CCPSC, C&Es, CFR, CSB, CSP, EPA, ERP, II, MI, (e)MOC, NURF, PFDs, PHA, P&IDs, PSI, PSM, PSSR, RAGAGEP, and RMP. Looking for more from the PSM: Back to Basics series? Check out the episodes below!PSM: Back to Basics, Part 2 - Open Source ResourcesPSM: Back to Basics, Part 3 - Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)PSM: Back to Basics, Part 4 - Management of Change (MOC)PSM: Back to Basics, Part 5 - Even More AcronymsPSM: Back to Basics, Part 6 - Mechanical Integrity (MI)

Listen Now to 011 WTFuture Watch 011 WTFuture This week’s show kicks off with the hosts untangling the literal and figurative wires of modern podcasting before nerding out over “Edge AI” running locally on smartphones to save energy and protect privacy. The banter takes a wonderfully weird turn when Al brainstorms an AI assistant specifically designed to intentionally repeat sentences not heard properly in a soothing voice to hearing-impaired friends to save them from social isolation. This quickly spirals into a debate over the origins of tinnitus; Bobby suspects it’s triggered by high-frequency Bluetooth headphones and EMFs, while Al hopefully wonders if the ringing is actually a neural data channel or a precursor to telepathy. The crew then marvels at AL’s one minute cinematic video recreating the exact day a dinosaur-killing asteroid hurled molten glass beads into the gills of paddlefish in North Dakota. Before diving into global politics, they take a delightful detour into inter-species communication, pondering whether a local crow leaving a dead bat as a “gift” is a sign of cross-species neighborliness, which even prompts them to trick the backyard flock by playing crow sounds from an app. The conversation blasts into orbit with a breakdown of recently released footage showing a pod of UFOs swarming a nuclear submarine, but the real fireworks explode during a heated debate over the impending arrival of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). Bobby and Al take a pragmatic, geopolitical stance, warning that owning personal, localized AI is necessary to defend against global manipulation, specifically citing fears that the CCP wants to win the AGI race to implement the “great firewall of all time”. This triggers a passionate disagreement with Sun, who accuses the guys of falling into a fear-mongering, male-centric “dominate and subjugate” mindset that mirrors a perpetual arms race. Hurt feelings emerge as Sun advocates for trusting our collective intelligence to build an abundant, Star Trek-style utopia rather than focusing on apocalyptic Terminator scenarios, forcing AL to frantically defend himself as a fun “cheerleader for AI” rather than a pessimist. Ultimately, the trio cools down and finds common ground in their hopes for joining a peaceful galactic community, perfectly capped off by Sun referencing Iain M. Banks’ sci-fi Culture series as a brilliant blueprint for a post-scarcity society that has successfully conquered traditional cultural hierarchies. Enjoy!

How do you evaluate an AI model for a war you can only fight once? Ike Harris, a Naval officer turned Hill staffer turned AI policy operator, joins the show to discuss his effort to bridge the gap between the labs that build frontier models and the operators who'll deploy them. Ike Harris is the executive director of the newly launched Frontier Security Institute, and was most recently the Republican tech lead on the House Select Committee on the CCP, with prior stints in OSD and as a surface warfare officer. We discuss… The GAIN AI and Overwatch acts: and Congress's most aggressive attempt to wrest export-control authority from the executive branch since the Cold War Why you can't just "buy AI": and why national security evals look nothing like the SWE benchmarks the labs optimize for Strategic-level evals :for problems you can't run ten times, from Iran negotiations to targeting at the COCOM level China's robot-army advantage: open-weight models at the edge, Ukraine-style drone iteration soaked up via Russia, and a casualty tolerance the US can't match The "no more NASA" problem: how risk tolerance, mission command, and law-of-armed-conflict constraints shape who wins the deployment race Breaking into tech policy: Ike's case for why every aspiring policy person should spend a year on the Hill Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Joining Audrey for this week's REELTalk - Bestselling author of American Betrayal, DIANA WEST will be here! PLUS, Terror Threat Analyst and former FBI Agent, JOHN GUANDOLO will be here! AND, bestselling author of Mao's America, XI VAN FLEET will be here! PLUS, Broadway critic LAUREN YARGER will be here! In the words of Benjamin Franklin, "If we do not hang together, we shall surely hang separately." Come hang with us...  

Chris Cuomo explains why the Texas Senate race between Ken Paxton and James Talarico may be the clearest test yet of whether MAGA politics are finally colliding with economic reality. Cuomo argues that Republicans are increasingly leaning on culture-war outrage while voters become more focused on affordability, wages, healthcare costs, and economic frustration. He also breaks down why he believes Democrats may have finally found the right kind of anti-MAGA candidate in Talarico — and why Trump's decision to back Paxton could become a major political liability. Cuomo analyzes the messaging strategies behind both campaigns, Paxton's ethical baggage, Trump's influence over the Republican Party, and why he believes this race could become a national bellwether for the 2026 midterms. The episode also explores populism, culture wars, economic inequality, tariffs, Christian politics, the future of Democratic messaging, and why Cuomo believes voters are increasingly exhausted by outrage-driven politics. He argues that the core fight in American politics is no longer left versus right, but “MAGA versus reality” — and says this race may reveal whether Trump-style politics still works outside the Republican base. #news #politics #trump #maga #texas #cuomo Join The Chris Cuomo Project on YouTube for ad-free episodes, early releases, exclusive access to Chris, and more: https://www.youtube.com/@chriscuomo/join Follow and subscribe to The Chris Cuomo Project on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and YouTube for new episodes every Tuesday and Thursday: https://linktr.ee/cuomoproject Ready to reach your goals? Visit https://hims.com/CCP to get a personalized, affordable plan that gets you. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

On today's show Andrew and Bill begin with the news that Beijing moved to further ease hukou restrictions, including why this is a welcome change for millions of Chinese citizens, as well as a look at questions and challenges as the reforms are implemented. Then: A report that Chinese AI talent has been restricted from leaving China, while Beijing continues its efforts to control capital outflow and offshore investments. From there: Indications that the US has indeed paused its second tranche of arms sales to Taiwan, and more details on a US-China board of investment. Then: PRC-Japan updates, including reports of Takaichi recriminations from Xi in his meeting with Trump, heavy rare earth shipments restricted for the past four months, the cards Japan has yet to play, and Mao's strategic stalemate as a stage of protracted war, not an endgame. At the end: An American journalist for Xinhua and other state outlets is arrested and accused of acting as an unregistered agent of the CCP.

In this episode, I'll take you through the critical steps in exposing the operation being played on us all. Also, some critical election updates and how the president's endorsements performed. Find the video podcast of The Dan Bongino Show exclusively on Rumble at https://Rumble.com/bongino Heatwave latest: Experts warn of 'very real risk' of swimming in open water - as fifth child dies https://news.sky.com/story/weather-latest-temperatures-could-hit-30c-as-bank-holiday-weekend-begins-13546607 Hasan Piker names pro-CCP tycoon Singham as financier of 'political movements' despite nonprofit veneer https://www.foxnews.com/politics/hasan-piker-names-pro-ccp-tycoon-singham-financier-political-movements-nonprofit-veneer Federal officials tout success of FBI agent surge in St. Louis region https://www.stlpr.org/government-politics-issues/2026-05-26/federal-officials-tout-success-of-fbi-agent-surge-in-st-louis-region Sponsors: All Family Pharmacy - https://allfamilypharmacy.com/bongino - code: Bongino10 Supersure Insurance - https://supersure.com/bongino American Financing - NMLS 182334, nmlsconsumeraccess.org. APR for rates in the 5s start at 6.327% for well qualified borrowers. Call 888-994-7600 for details about credit costs and terms. Visit AmericanFinancing.net/Bongino. Average savings based on borrowers who save over $199.99 Brickhouse Nutrition - https://BrickhouseNutrition.com/dan - code: dan Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

This episode is presented by Create A Video – A call from a 25-year tech expert, Craig Reynolds,  prompts a very informative discussion about the kinds of data centers as well as the costs and benefits of various projects and impacts. Reynolds also spoke last night at the Charlotte City Council public hearing on a potential data center moratorium. Plus, the campaign against data centers in America is apparently being funded by the Chinese Communist Party.Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-pete-kaliner-show--6946691/support.Subscribe to the podcast My preferred podcast platform: SpreakerAll the links to Pete's Prep are free!Get exclusive content here!Media Bias Check: GroundNews promo code!Advertising and Booking inquiries: Pete@ThePeteKalinerShow.com  

DESCRIPTION Tara connects the fall of the Bush political machine in Texas to what she says is a larger battle over globalism, election power, and the future of America. From Ken Paxton's stunning victory to South Carolina GOP infighting, Chinese Communist Party influence allegations, and radical property seizure proposals in New York, Tara says conservatives are witnessing a political realignment unlike anything in modern history. PODCAST SUMMARY On today's AMPERWAVE DAILY, Tara celebrates what she calls the collapse of the Bush political machine after Ken Paxton's dominant victory over John Cornyn in Texas. Tara traces the roots of Republican globalism back to George W. Bush's governorship in Texas, arguing that policies supporting open borders and international governance reshaped the Republican establishment for decades. The show revisits the Bush family's “New World Order” ideology, efforts to move immigration authority to multinational bodies, and the rise of Karl Rove's political fundraising network. Tara argues the Bush-era political structure is finally breaking apart after years of conservative backlash. Attention then turns to South Carolina, where Tara blasts Republican leadership for failing to advance election and district reform efforts supported by Donald Trump and House Speaker Mike Johnson. Tara sharply criticizes lawmakers she says slow-walked reform efforts until early voting began, especially targeting Republican Representative Richard Cash despite acknowledging his historically conservative voting record. The episode escalates into a broader warning about what Tara describes as growing influence from the Chinese Communist Party inside American politics. She discusses allegations involving activist organizations, data center opposition campaigns, New York City politics, and nonprofit networks tied to Democrat fundraising operations. Tara also sounds the alarm over proposals in New York City involving housing regulation and property transfers, arguing that progressive policies are evolving into outright collectivism and government-controlled redistribution of property. The show closes with a warning that conservatives are now engaged in a fight over political power, civil liberties, and the direction of the country itself. KEY TOPICS Ken Paxton vs. John Cornyn Collapse of the Bush political machine Republican globalism debate Open borders controversy South Carolina GOP infighting Richard Cash backlash Henry McMaster criticism Chinese Communist Party influence concerns New York housing controversy Election integrity debate Karl Rove and GOP establishment politics Donald Trump-backed election reforms SEGMENTS Segment 1: “The Bush Machine Is DEAD” Tara celebrates Ken Paxton's Texas victory as the symbolic collapse of the Bush-era Republican establishment. Segment 2: Globalism Started In Texas? A deep dive into the origins of Republican globalism, open border policies, and international governance efforts tied to the Bush family. Segment 3: South Carolina Republicans Under Fire Tara criticizes GOP lawmakers and Governor Henry McMaster for failing to move election reform efforts before voting began. Segment 4: CCP Influence & Democrat Activist Networks Discussion shifts to claims of Chinese Communist Party influence inside Democrat political organizations and activist fundraising networks. Segment 5: “They're Taking Property In New York” Tara warns progressive housing policies in New York City could lead to government-controlled property transfers and expanded collectivist policies. QUOTE OF THE DAY “This isn't a game anymore, folks. This is the final battle.” SEO KEYWORDS Ken Paxton, John Cornyn, Bush machine, Tara Servatius, globalism, South Carolina politics, Richard Cash, Henry McMaster, Donald Trump, Chinese Communist Party, CCP influence, Karl Rove, New York housing, election integrity, conservative talk radio, AMPERWAVE DAILY

EPISODE DESCRIPTION Ken Paxton's landslide victory over John Cornyn is being called the final blow to the Bush-era globalist machine inside the GOP. Tara breaks down the political earthquake in Texas, the collapse of the establishment donor network, and why the fight is now shifting directly to South Carolina. Plus: explosive allegations involving Democrat activist groups, Chinese Communist Party influence campaigns, AI data center sabotage, and the growing battle over election integrity and open primaries. FULL SHOW SUMMARY A political earthquake rocked Texas as Ken Paxton delivered a crushing defeat to longtime establishment Republican John Cornyn despite more than $100 million being poured into the race by GOP donor networks aligned with the Bush-era political machine. Tara argues this wasn't simply a primary loss — it was the symbolic collapse of the globalist wing of the Republican Party that originated in Texas during the Bush governorship years. The show traces the roots of modern globalism, open-border politics, and international trade governance back to the Bush family's influence in Texas politics. Tara claims Paxton became the biggest threat to that political infrastructure after aggressively targeting NGOs accused of facilitating illegal immigration and voter registration efforts in Texas. The discussion expands into South Carolina politics, where Tara argues the same establishment political network still dominates through figures like Lindsey Graham, Henry McMaster, and legislative leadership. The show heavily criticizes South Carolina Republicans who opposed redistricting changes and calls for conservative primary challenges. The episode also dives into claims of coordination between Democrat-aligned activist groups and entities connected to the Chinese Communist Party. Tara highlights reports involving opposition campaigns against AI data centers and references commentary from investor Kevin O'Leary regarding alleged online influence operations tied to Chinese interests and progressive activist organizations. Additional segments cover: The SAVE Act and election integrity battles Open primaries and Republican establishment politics Allegations surrounding activist funding networks Communist rhetoric in New York housing policy debates The future of the Republican Party after the Texas political shift KEY TALKING POINTS Ken Paxton defeats John Cornyn in a political landslide GOP establishment reportedly spent over $100 million defending Cornyn Tara argues the “Bush machine” lost its remaining grip on Texas Debate over globalism, immigration, and GOP identity South Carolina Republican infighting intensifies Criticism of open primaries and establishment conservatives Discussion of SAVE Act voter ID legislation Allegations involving Democrat activist networks and CCP influence AI infrastructure and data center political battles Calls for major conservative primary challenges in South Carolina SEO KEYWORDS Ken Paxton, John Cornyn, Texas GOP, Bush machine, globalism, Lindsey Graham, South Carolina politics, SAVE Act, voter ID, Donald Trump, Republican primary, Karl Rove, CCP influence, Kevin O'Leary, Democrat Party, Texas election, open borders, MAGA movement, GOP establishment, election integrity

The political world erupted after Democrats turned on one of their own for condemning a Maine Senate candidate tied to Nazi imagery and socialist extremism. Meanwhile, the Trump administration says it's uncovering staggering levels of government fraud that could potentially balance the federal budget if eliminated. Tara breaks down the shocking details behind the Democrat civil war, the rise of radicalism, and the massive fraud crackdown led by JD Vance and Stephen Miller. CLICKABLE HEADLINE OPTIONS Democrats TURN on Jewish Congressman Over Nazi Candidate JD Vance Drops MASSIVE Fraud Bombshell Democrats DEFEND Socialist With SS Tattoo White House Claims Fraud Could Balance Federal Budget Trump DOJ Targets Massive Fraud Networks Democrat Party Faces Nazi Candidate Firestorm Billions Recovered as Fraud Crackdown Intensifies Democrats REFUSE Fraud Summit as Billions Disappear SEO KEYWORDS JD Vance fraud crackdown, Graham Plattner controversy, SS tattoo candidate, Democrat civil war, Trump administration fraud investigation, Stephen Miller fraud comments, Maine Senate race, Hassan Piker subpoena, government fraud scandal, Chinese Communist Party Democrats, Arabella Advisors controversy, Kevin O'Leary data centers, Democrat socialist controversy, Susan Collins Maine, federal fraud recovery PODCAST SUMMARY Today's episode dives into the growing chaos inside the Democrat Party as party leaders and activists clash over Maine Senate candidate Graham Plattner and allegations surrounding Nazi symbolism and extremist rhetoric. Massachusetts Congressman Jake Auchincloss drew fire from fellow Democrats after publicly criticizing Plattner, triggering outrage from progressives who accused him of helping Republicans. Tara also unpacks explosive claims from the Trump administration regarding widespread fraud inside federal programs. JD Vance and Stephen Miller argue the government has already recovered hundreds of billions of dollars through aggressive investigations into COVID relief, student aid, and small business loan fraud. According to the administration, eliminating fraud entirely could potentially balance the federal budget. The show also explores allegations of coordination between left-wing activist groups and entities tied to the Chinese Communist Party, alongside new scrutiny surrounding anti-AI data center campaigns across the country. FEATURED STORIES Democrat infighting erupts over controversial Maine Senate candidate Jewish Democrat condemned after criticizing alleged Nazi imagery JD Vance announces massive federal fraud recovery efforts Stephen Miller claims fraud elimination could balance U.S. budget Blue state attorneys general refuse to join fraud summit New allegations emerge involving CCP-linked activist funding Kevin O'Leary raises alarms over anti-data center campaigns SOUND BITES “The Democrat Party is eating its own over this candidate.” “They're saying fraud alone could balance the federal budget.” “This isn't just politics anymore — this is ideological warfare.” “Americans are watching billions disappear while politicians look away.” “The backlash wasn't against the tattoo — it was against calling it out.” THUMBNAIL TEXT OPTIONS DEMS DEFEND THIS?! FRAUD BOMBSHELL NAZI CANDIDATE CHAOS $160 BILLION RECOVERED PARTY IN MELTDOWN VANCE DROPS RECEIPTS YOUTUBE DESCRIPTION The Democrat Party is facing major internal backlash after a Massachusetts congressman criticized Maine Senate candidate Graham Plattner over alleged Nazi imagery and extremist rhetoric — only to be attacked by members of his own party. At the same time, JD Vance and Stephen Miller say the Trump administration is uncovering massive fraud networks involving COVID relief, student aid, and federal handouts. Could fraud elimination actually balance the federal budget? Tara breaks down the political firestorm, the escalating fraud investigations, CCP-linked activist allegations, and why the fight over America's future is intensifying heading into 2 ...

DESCRIPTION Tara unloads on Republican leadership after South Carolina lawmakers fail to move on election reforms backed by Donald Trump and Mike Johnson. She warns that America is no longer fighting a traditional political battle, but a direct ideological war against what she describes as a fusion between the Democrat Party and the Chinese Communist Party. Plus: Richard Cash under fire, New York politics, DOJ investigations, and why Tara says conservatives can no longer afford to “play by old rules.” PODCAST SUMMARY On today's AMPERWAVE DAILY, Tara sounds the alarm on what she calls the growing merger between the Democrat Party and the Chinese Communist Party. Citing recent Department of Justice activity, Chinese political influence concerns, and New York primary politics, Tara argues that America is now engaged in an ideological and political struggle unlike anything seen in previous decades. A major focus of the episode is South Carolina Representative Richard Cash, whom Tara sharply criticizes for voting with Democrats during a fight over election timing and Republican primary reforms. While acknowledging Cash's long conservative voting record, Tara argues that Republican lawmakers can no longer afford procedural caution while facing what she describes as coordinated political warfare from the left. The show also revisits allegations of election interference, federal investigations involving Donald Trump, surveillance claims against Republican officials, and frustrations with GOP leadership. Tara says the stakes are no longer simply electoral losses, but the potential erosion of civil liberties and political freedoms. The episode closes with a warning to conservatives that future elections will determine the survival of constitutional rights and that Republican leaders unwilling to aggressively fight Democratic political strategies risk losing the support of the conservative base. KEY TOPICS Chinese Communist Party influence concerns Department of Justice investigations Hassan Piker controversy South Carolina Republican politics Richard Cash criticism Open primary debate Donald Trump election strategy Mike Johnson and GOP leadership Election integrity concerns Conservative movement frustrations SEGMENTS Segment 1: “Fusion of Democrats & The CCP?” Tara argues the Democrat Party has become ideologically aligned with the Chinese Communist Party and warns about growing foreign political influence. Segment 2: Richard Cash Faces Conservative Backlash Tara criticizes Representative Richard Cash for siding with Democrats during a key election reform fight despite his strong conservative record. Segment 3: Trump, DOJ Battles & Political Warfare Discussion centers on investigations involving Donald Trump, accusations of political targeting, and fears about government overreach. Segment 4: “This Is The Final Battle” Tara warns listeners that conservatives can no longer approach politics with a “business as usual” mindset and says future elections could determine the fate of civil liberties. QUOTE OF THE DAY “We do what we have to — not just to win, but to survive.” SEO KEYWORDS Tara Servatius, Chinese Communist Party, Democrat Party, Richard Cash, South Carolina politics, Donald Trump, Mike Johnson, election integrity, conservative talk radio, DOJ investigation, Hassan Piker, Republican primary reform, CCP influence, GOP politics, AMPERWAVE DAILY

The Chinese Communist Party is no friend of Christians. While persecution has been happening for decades, in 2018 the CCP drastically accelerated their nationwide campaign to silence Christian leaders by rounding up and arresting many pastors. Among them was Zion Church founder and pastor, Ezra Jin. His daughter, Grace Jin Drexel, and Family Research Council's Travis Weber join host Casey Harper to share her father's story and what life is like for Christians in China. Grace describes what it was like growing up in China, the start of Zion Church, and the eventual arrest and imprisonment of her father. These last few years have not been easy, but Grace's story is one of powerful faith and trust that God is moving in China and among her family.

A growing political controversy is erupting after allegations surfaced claiming organizations tied to the Chinese Communist Party may be funding activist networks and political movements inside the United States. The discussion centers around investigative reporting into alleged financial links involving activist groups, foreign influence concerns, and calls for federal investigations into whether U.S. laws governing foreign political activity were violated. The episode examines accusations involving online political commentator Hasan Piker, businessman Neville Singham, and activist Jodie Evans, along with broader concerns surrounding foreign-funded activism, political protests, and alleged influence operations tied to the Chinese Communist Party. The conversation also explores comparisons to prior investigations into alleged Russian influence campaigns, debates over free speech protections, and growing scrutiny over foreign money in American political movements. KEY TOPICS Allegations of Chinese Communist Party influence in U.S. activism Claims involving funding pipelines connected to activist groups Discussion surrounding Hasan Piker and political commentary Federal subpoena and foreign agent registration debates Comparisons to past Russia influence investigations Foreign funding and protest movement allegations Questions surrounding political activism and free speech Investigative reporting into activist networks CCP influence concerns in American politics Debate over enforcement of foreign influence laws SEO KEYWORDS China influence allegations, CCP funding controversy, Hasan Piker, Neville Singham, foreign agent registration, political activism, China political influence, ActBlue controversy, communist revolution claims, protest funding allegations, foreign influence investigation, Democrat activist groups, political funding controversy, free speech debate, geopolitical tensions CHAPTERS 00:00 Allegations of CCP Funding Emerge 03:14 Claims Surrounding Democrat Activist Networks 07:05 Discussion of Protest Funding Allegations 10:42 Spotlight on Hasan Piker 14:18 Foreign Agent Registration Debate Explained 18:06 Comparisons to Russia Influence Investigations 22:11 Questions Over Political Activism and Speech 26:33 Neville Singham and Funding Allegations 30:40 Federal Investigations and Subpoena Discussions 34:12 The Growing Political Fallout YOUTUBE DESCRIPTION A major controversy is unfolding after allegations surfaced claiming activist groups connected to progressive political movements may have received support linked to organizations associated with the Chinese Communist Party. This episode examines: Investigative reporting into alleged funding pipelines Questions surrounding foreign influence in American politics Claims involving Hasan Piker and activist organizations Debate over foreign agent registration laws Comparisons to previous Russia-related investigations The role of billionaire businessman Neville Singham Concerns surrounding political protests and activism funding The conversation also explores broader debates over free speech, political influence operations, and whether federal investigations into foreign-backed activism could expand in the months ahead. THUMBNAIL TEXT OPTIONS CCP FUNDING U.S. ACTIVISTS? FOREIGN INFLUENCE SCANDAL CHINA MONEY ALLEGATIONS INVESTIGATION EXPANDS POLITICAL FIRESTORM ERUPTS WHO'S FUNDING THE PROTESTS? SOCIAL MEDIA POST

EPISODE SUMMARY A stunning new report claims the federal government may have lost more than $3 trillion to fraud and improper payments since 2003 — and the Trump administration says that number could actually be much higher. Tara and Lee break down the jaw-dropping welfare and Medicare overpayment scandal, why DOGE and JD Vance are aggressively auditing decades of federal spending, and how COVID-era policy changes allegedly supercharged abuse in blue states. Then, the conversation turns global as allegations intensify over Chinese Communist Party influence operations inside the Democrat activist ecosystem, including claims of funding connected to radical protest movements and political influencers. The show also dives into escalating tensions with Iran, mining operations in the Strait of Hormuz, and concerns surrounding ongoing Middle East negotiations tied to the Abraham Accords. From massive government waste to international power plays, this episode connects the dots between fraud, foreign influence, and geopolitical instability. FEATURED STORIES Trump administration estimates at least $3 trillion lost to fraud and improper payments since 2003 Welfare and Medicare “overpayments” surged to $186 billion in the final Biden fiscal year JD Vance and DOGE intensify anti-fraud investigations across federal agencies Questions emerge about state-level oversight failures after COVID policy changes Allegations of Chinese Communist Party funding tied to activist and political networks Growing scrutiny of foreign influence laws and political funding pipelines Iran accused of mining the Strait of Hormuz amid ongoing negotiations Debate intensifies over Middle East strategy and Abraham Accords diplomacy KEY TAKEAWAYS Federal anti-fraud investigations are now reaching back decades, not just targeting recent spending. Improper payment estimates may represent one of the largest financial scandals in U.S. history. Debate is growing over how states handled welfare eligibility verification during and after COVID. Foreign influence and activist funding networks are becoming a larger political flashpoint. Middle East negotiations remain volatile as tensions with Iran continue escalating. SEO KEYWORDS Trump fraud investigation, JD Vance DOGE, $3 trillion fraud, Medicare fraud, welfare overpayments, government waste, China influence operations, Democrat protests, Iran Strait of Hormuz, Abraham Accords, Trump administration news, political podcast, federal fraud scandal, CCP funding allegations, foreign agent registration SOCIAL MEDIA POST

Summits between US and Chinese leaders are important events. They provide opportunities to discuss sensitive issues, manage friction, and to identify ways to solve problems and promote cooperation where possible. A great deal of preparation usually goes into a US-China summit, involving hundreds of phone calls, virtual, and in-person meetings between US and Chinese officials.   The May 14-15 summit in Beijing was atypical, perhaps not surprisingly since Donald Trump is a very atypical president. Today we are going to talk about the summit – the process and well as the outcomes and the implications for the US-China relationship and American interests.  Joining us today to talk about these issues is Sarah Beran. Sarah Beran was senior director for China and Taiwan affairs in the National Security Council during the Biden administration from 2022 to 2024. She was subsequently deputy chief of mission at the US Embassy in Beijing. At the NSC, she led strategic preparations for multiple summits between President Joe Biden and Xi Jinping. After her 23 years in government service, Sarah joined Macro Advisory Partners.   Timestamps:   [00:00] Introduction   [01:45] Differences in Preparing for the Summit   [03:33] What Was Missing from Trump's Itinerary   [08:18] US and Chinese Objectives for the Summit   [12:30] Constructive Strategic Stability as a Framework   [18:09] Iran, North Korea, and Denuclearization in Chinese Policy [23:55] Tension over Taiwan Language   [29:15] Potential Reactions to Trump Calling President Lai   [30:12] Future of US-China Relations and Ally Reactions 

Last time we spoke about the first phase of the One Hundred Regiment Offensive. On 20 August 1940, forces launched the Zhengtai Campaign, part of the "Hundred Regiments Offensive," aiming to disrupt Japan's transport network and thus weaken its "cage-and-strongpoint" defense. Orders from the Eighth Route Army split tasks: the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region attacked the eastern Zheng–Tai line, the 129th Division struck the western section , and the 120th Division hit the Tongpu Railway and the Fen–Li Highway. Success was to be judged by the damage inflicted on the Zheng–Tai line. Preparations were conducted under strict secrecy: reconnaissance teams mapped Japanese strongholds with help from villagers; communities stockpiled grain, ammunition, and tools, and trained for demolition, including heating and bending rails. At night, units infiltrated stations and villages, seized positions, and destroyed bridges, power lines, roads, and mines across multiple columns; rain slowed movement and shaped the fighting. By early September, the Zheng–Tai line and related transport routes were severed, isolating strongpoints and hindering reinforcement.    #203 The One Hundred Regiment Offensive Phase Two Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. During the second phase, the Hundred Regiments Offensive stopped being a single burst of action and became a sustained attempt to keep the Japanese occupation system off-balance. More regiments entered the fighting until, by the scale of commitment on the map, 104 regiments were involved. This matters because it changes what the campaign was: not merely a set of raids, but an effort to broaden pressure so that the enemy could not concentrate everything in one place at one time. Years later, Peng Dehuai—the commander closely associated with the Hundred Regiments offensive—described how the entry of these units felt as "spontaneous." That word can sound mysterious, so it helps to interpret it in operational terms. "Spontaneous" here does not mean unplanned chaos; it means that once the offensive logic took hold—once units saw that Japanese movement and control were being disrupted—local commanders and regiments felt empowered to join the fight without always waiting for the Eighth Route Army headquarters to issue fresh, detailed instructions for each smaller step. In other words, the campaign became something like an expanding network: local success and shared strategic perception fed into more participation across regions. Strategically, the campaign was guided by political and military guidance issued on September 10, 1940 by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. That instruction tied current operations to the earlier political-military framework of the July 7 Declaration and the July 7 Decision. The instruction argued that the moment mattered: it called for focusing "main efforts" on striking the Japanese army during a period when unity was being strengthened. It specifically urged that, based on the experience of the North China Hundred Regiments Offensive, Communist forces should organize one or more planned large-scale offensive operations in Shandong and Central China. In North China, the instruction pushed for expansion into Japanese army areas that had not yet been attacked—because the battlefield effect of the campaign was not only measured in immediate battlefield outcomes, but in reducing enemy-occupied space, enlarging base areas, breaking through blockade lines, and improving combat effectiveness. That last phrase—"Striking the enemy and attacking our allies is the general policy of military operations at present"—was the harsh shorthand for the operational reality: the campaign had to prevent Japanese occupation from appearing stable and manageable. If the occupation system could treat insurgency as "localized trouble," it would recover quickly. If, instead, occupation became dangerous in multiple places at once—requiring constant defense, constant movement, constant reinforcement—then the Japanese would be forced into a defensive posture that undermined their ability to exploit control. On September 16, 1940, the headquarters issued the second phase plan with a clear aim: expand results from the first phase. The headquarters explained the second phase would continue with an emphasis on disrupting Japanese transportation and destroying some strongholds that had penetrated deep into the base areas. This reveals the campaign's real "background and stakes": the offensive wasn't built around capturing territory in the traditional sense alone. It was built around breaking the system that makes occupation work. In the enemy's logic, occupation relies on movement: soldiers need to move, supplies need to be shipped, and reinforcement must be routed quickly to where trouble appears. Transportation infrastructure—roads, railways, bridges, power lines—forms the skeleton of control. Strongholds and outposts are the organs that occupy space, but they depend on that skeleton. If transportation becomes unreliable, strongholds become isolated islands. If strongholds become isolated, the Japanese must decide between (1) defending each island and spreading themselves thin, or (2) leaving some islands to contain the rest—either way, control weakens. Strongpoints—whether forts, fortified villages, gatehouses, or road blocks—also function as a "cage-and-silkworm" system: they are placed so Japanese forces can consolidate inside them, while routes outside are controlled or denied. In that model, even a small disruption can trigger a major ripple effect. When highways or key segments of rail are repeatedly broken, Japanese units cannot move "cleanly." They must detour, slow down, repair under threat, or escort repairs with larger forces than they prefer. Every extra hour spent repairing is an hour not spent consolidating. Every detour is a chance for ambush or for further sabotage. The second phase sought to exploit that dependency deliberately. That strategic framing explains why, even as the campaign broadened, different regions emphasized different battles. The Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region mainly fought the Lai-Ling Campaign, the 129th Division mainly fought the Yu-Liao Campaign, and the 120th Division focused on attacking the Tong-Pu Railway. They were not separate stories. They were different methods of attacking the same underlying vulnerability: the occupier's ability to move, reinforce, and coordinate. In Jin-Cha-Ji's sector, the stakes were especially sharp around Laiyuan and Lingqiu. The Japanese forces stationed in Mongolia had occupied those areas and penetrated deeply into the northwestern parts of the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region. Japanese strength around these positions included elements of the 2nd Independent Mixed Brigade and the 26th Division, totaling more than 1,500 men, plus more than 1,000 puppet troops. The presence of puppet forces mattered not only for manpower, but because puppet troops supported the occupier's local control apparatus: they served as locally sourced enforcers, scouts, guards, and "administration-adjacent" security. Removing or weakening them was part of disrupting occupation credibility and local stability. Because the Japanese had been attacked in the first phase, they did not respond by retreating into passivity. They increased troops at each stronghold. Laiyuan City alone was reinforced to around 500 men, and the Japanese strengthened fortifications and stockpiled food and ammunition. This meant the defenders were preparing for a second round: not a sudden surprise raid, but a sustained threat that would test their ability to endure isolation and keep their network intact. Under these conditions, the Jin-Cha-Ji leadership decided to mobilize forces for the Lai-Ling Campaign, beginning at 22:00 on September 22, 1940. Here the background and stakes show up in the campaign's timing and tactics. The objective was not to "beat the defenders in open battle" only; it was to attack in ways that would prevent consolidation. By pushing on county areas and surrounding strongholds immediately, the attackers aimed to force the defenders into reactive mode—closing gates, shifting forces into defensive positions, and preparing for fights that would consume time and ammunition. The right wing launched a fierce attack on Laiyuan County and surrounding strongholds. After a night of hard fighting, the east, west, and south gates were taken, and the Japanese troops retreated into the city. Taking gates matters because it compresses space. It turns a wider defensive perimeter into a narrower, more concentrated posture. It also creates a psychological and operational trap: defenders who retreat into the city may survive longer as a fortified concentration, but their ability to conduct aggressive movement outside their walls—and their ability to receive reinforcements through many approaches—becomes more limited. In the night of September 23, the 2nd Regiment, supported by a battalion of the 1st Regiment and artillery, attacked Sanjia Village, described as an important enemy stronghold on the Laiyuan–Yixian highway, roughly 10 kilometers east of Laiyuan City. Highways are not just routes; they are corridors that connect strongholds to each other and to supply lines. By capturing a stronghold on a highway, the campaign attempted to break a portion of the corridor network feeding the city. The attackers annihilated most of the enemy and captured the village. At the same time, the 3rd Regiment attacked Dongtuanbao, northeast of Laiyuan City, and by the night of September 24, they had taken surrounding fortifications and forced remaining enemies into only a few houses inside the village. Then, on September 25, the enemy burned weapons, supplies, and food stored at the stronghold, preparing for a breakout. That detail reveals a key stake of stronghold warfare: if defenders believe they cannot hold and cannot escape, they may destroy supplies rather than let attackers seize them intact. It's a grim tactical psychology—destroying stores can deny the enemy immediate benefit, even if it reduces defenders' chances of future endurance. When the attackers launched another fierce assault and the remaining defenders, with no hope of escape, threw themselves into the flames and perished, the event underscored the "closed-options" nature of the battle: the stronghold system was being compressed until breakout became impossible. On September 26, other right-wing units, together with the 9th Regiment of the Pingxi Military Sub-district, captured 13 strongholds including Taohuabao, Bailebao, Jijiazhuang, Xinzhuang, Beikou, Xiabeitou, Baishikou, Zhongzhuang, Wangxidong, Liujiazui, Zhangjiayu, Beishifo, and Jinjiajing. Capturing strongholds in clusters has a strategic function. It doesn't just remove personnel; it interrupts local control geography. It makes it harder for defenders inside the city to extend influence outward and harder for them to create new safe points for movement. But the Japanese did what well-prepared occupiers can do: reinforce at the most important time and the most important place. On the second day after the start, Japanese reinforcement began from Zhangjiakou and other locations. Roads had not been completely destroyed, so the Japanese could advance rapidly. This becomes a major background lesson of the second phase. The first phase had demonstrated the power of sabotage to disrupt Japanese movement. But by the time second-phase campaigns began, the Japanese were not ignorant—they were learning. Where sabotage had fully severed roads, reinforcement could be delayed or routed into danger. Where sabotage remained incomplete, reinforcement could arrive quickly, changing the battle's character from attack-dominant to defense-dominant. By noon on September 28, over 3,000 Japanese and puppet troops arrived in Laiyuan City by car, supported by 20 tanks and 4 aircraft. This mechanized support was not just "extra firepower." It was a statement about how the Japanese aimed to retain control: tanks and aircraft increase defenders' ability to resist assault and keep morale from collapsing. Under these conditions, the right wing found it difficult to launch a favorable offensive. So the Jin-Cha-Ji leadership shifted offensive focus to the Lingqiu area, rather than forcing the original plan to continue against reinforced mechanized defense. The first step was to eliminate enemy strongholds between Lingqiu and Hunyuan. The second step was to seize enemy strongholds along a line from southeast of Daying to Shentangbao, and in mountainous areas north of Daying and Shahe. This shift highlights a core strategic principle: when a target becomes too fortified, the offensive can still succeed by moving the pressure elsewhere—aiming to break the enemy's network of strongpoints and keep forcing them to respond across space. On October 2, the headquarters ordered the main force of the right wing to concentrate in the area east and southeast of Laiyuan. Part of the force was assigned to monitor and contain the enemy in Laiyuan, while the 1st and 2nd Regiments were placed under the left wing's command and joined the left wing in combat. This reallocation reflects operational adaptability. If a city becomes a fortress, smaller units may be better employed as containment—tying down defenders—while the main effort moves to seize other stronghold lines where the Japanese might still be vulnerable. The fighting continued with tactical attacks that show how strongpoint warfare unfolded in the field. On the night of October 8, the 1st Battalion of the 1st Regiment launched an attack on the 2nd Regiment while a portion of the Japanese army in Nanpotou was attacking it. The attackers broke into enemy lines, annihilated most of the enemy, and drove the rest off. At the same time, the 1st Battalion of the 6th Regiment captured Qiangfengling, and the Japanese forces in Qingciyao fled in panic. The campaign also included actions such as attacks on Jinfengdian by the 3rd Battalion of the 6th Regiment on the night of September 9, and mention that the 26th Regiment entered Huangtai Temple on the night of October 8 while attacking between Lingqiu and Guangling. By understanding the background and stakes, you can see what these actions were really doing. They weren't random. They were repeated attempts to keep dismantling the enemy's ability to maintain a functioning strongpoint chain. Each captured stronghold reduces the enemy's ability to create secure corridors. Each panic-driven retreat increases their time burden and may cause breakdown in communication between local nodes. Even when the battle remains fierce and deadly, these changes in tempo can accumulate into operational outcomes. The Lai-Ling Campaign lasted 18 days, producing concrete results: killing and wounding over 1,000 Japanese and puppet troops, capturing 49 Japanese and 237 puppet troops, and leaving 1,419 casualties for the Eighth Route Army. The losses show the campaign was not a "clean victory." It was expensive. But the operational logic—disrupting a strengthened occupation zone, capturing strongholds, and forcing enemy reinforcements to concentrate—was consistent with the second phase's broader mission. Support for Lai-Ling came from the Jizhong Military Region through the Renqiu–Hejian–Dacheng–Suning Campaign from October 1 to October 20, simultaneously sabotaging the Cangshi, Deshi, Beining, and Jinpu railways. This is where "background and stakes" become especially clear. The Japanese, even when they defend in one area, have to move elsewhere to respond. When you attack multiple transportation lines and strongpoint zones at once, you prevent the enemy from solving one problem cleanly before moving to the next. You make the enemy chase multiple fires. After the Hundred Regiments Offensive began, Japanese forces in Jizhong moved west to reinforce in some cases, but most were tied down on important transportation lines. That relative weakening meant defenses in Jizhong's interior became weaker—creating space where a larger contest could occur. Jizhong decided to deploy 10 battalions totaling more than 8,500 men from the 18th, 23rd, and 30th Regiments across left wing, center, and right wing roles, fighting in the area. The plan was not only to attack; it was to manipulate where the Japanese had to respond. The two wing units would contain and draw Japanese forces away from the central Renhe Dasu zone, and then the central unit would break into that central area to open the situation. In other words: wings would pull; center would punch. The Renhe Dasu battle began on October 1, 1940. On the left wing, the 18th Regiment entered an area east of the Zhulong River and west of Hejian and Renqiu, capturing Lianjiazhuang, Dongguxian, and Liangcun between October 2 and October 6. By the night of October 7, Japanese troops at strongholds including Yuhuangmiao, Fenglebao, and Liushansi fled in panic—another reminder that once stronghold cohesion fractures, the enemy's ability to endure a second phase of pressure drops. On the right wing, the 30th Regiment operated with four battalions east of Dacheng and east of the Ziya River, capturing a series of strongholds including Liminju, Dengzhuangzi, Shigeju, Xiliuzhuang, Zangzhuangzi, and Chencun, while engaging in road-breaking and ditch digging. These actions show the campaign's "method," not just its target. Even when the opponent could be fought directly, sabotage and engineering measures could amplify the damage by reducing mobility and forcing time-consuming repairs. The central unit, the 23rd Regiment, had two battalions crossing the Hutuo River northward. On October 1, it ambushed more than 100 Japanese troops coming from Shangjialin to seize grain, killing more than 90 and capturing all their weapons. On October 9, it ambushed the enemy from Liugezhuang to Litan at Baimatang, annihilating 20 Japanese and puppet troops. These ambushes illustrate a second background principle: occupiers need sustenance and extraction operations, and those operations follow routes and patterns. By striking troops during foraging or supply-related movement, the offensive attacks not only the army but also the logic that keeps occupation armies fed and maintained. From October 15 to October 20, the second stage of those operations targeted the east and west banks of the Ziya River, leaving only a small force in the central Renhe River Great Suppression area. On the night of October 19, the central force captured Banjiehe and destroyed a bridge over the nearby Guyang River. On the night of October 16, the left wing captured Daqudi and the Renqiu Shimen Bridge, and on October 18 it captured the stronghold at Wangpan. A note in the operational description also indicates that the right wing faced a serious enemy situation and could not take major action during one segment—another reminder that even a planned operation cannot control all battlefield variables. What matters is whether the operation still meets its strategic purpose, not whether every segment goes perfectly. In the Battle of Renhe Dasu, Japanese and puppet losses were heavy: 805 killed or wounded, and 3 Japanese and 326 puppet troops captured. The campaign took 29 strongholds. The Jizhong Military Region suffered 573 casualties. Strategically, this battle contained enemy forces and effectively supported the Battle of Lai-Ling. Again, support here is not just "help in the same region," but redistribution of pressure: by forcing the enemy to allocate troops to Jizhong, Japanese defenders around Lai-Ling face more difficulty maintaining overall operational coherence. While Jin-Cha-Ji and Jizhong fought around Laiyuan and Lingqiu, a deeper pressure developed in the Taihang base region—through the Yuliao (Yu-Liao) Campaign, fought mainly by the 129th Division. The background stakes in the Yu-Liao theater were the highway route from Yangquan through Pingding, Heshun, Liaoxian to Yushe, described as the deepest penetration route through which the Japanese penetrated the Taihang base area. The Japanese tried to extend this road southwestward and connect it with the Baijin Railway through Wuxiang, aiming to split the Dahang area and deploy forces flexibly along the Zhengtai and Baijin lines. This was about strategic mobility and operational geometry. A road connection isn't only "transport"; it reshapes where the enemy can exert pressure and how quickly they can shift forces from one axis to another. The Yuliao section measured 45 kilometers and included eight strongholds: Yushe, Yanbi, Wangjing, Guantou, Pushang, Xiaolingdi, Shixia, and Liaoxian. These were guarded by the 13th Battalion of the Japanese 4th Independent Mixed Brigade. A line of strongholds along a highway is the occupier's version of a corridor defense: it enables them to keep movement inside a protected chain. If that chain is cut, movement becomes vulnerable and the "deep penetration route" turns into a dangerous liability. On September 22, 1940, the 129th Division issued basic orders: launch a surprise attack to eliminate the enemy from Yushe to Xiaolingdi, recapture strongholds, destroy the highway, and then press forward toward Liaoxian to recapture it when the opportunity arose. This is a textbook example of how the offensive combined surprise, seizure, and destruction. Surprise prevents the defenders from organizing a coordinated response. Seizure eliminates their nodes. Highway destruction prevents them from restoring their corridor quickly, forcing time and labor—exactly what the second phase wanted. The assault began on the night of September 23. On September 24, the left wing captured Yanbi and Wangjing, while the right wing captured Pushang and Xiaolingdi. By September 25, Yushe and Jucheng had also fallen, leaving only the enemy at Guantou on the Xiaolingdi–Yushe line still resisting. Concurrently, detachments attacked on related axes: the Pingliao Detachment captured Hanwang Town north of Liaoxian; the Qinbei Detachment sabotaged roads and attacked frequently, pinning Japanese forces on the Wuxiang and Baijin routes. On September 26, the 129th Division ordered part of the right wing to continue besieging the enemy at Guantou, while the main force and the left wing moved east to recapture Liaoxian and eliminate reinforcements. At dawn on September 27, the right wing attacked Shixia west of Liaoxian and captured it that night. On September 28, the left wing reached near Majiu in preparation for an attack on Liaoxian that night. Then battlefield logic reasserted itself: the Japanese did not sit idle once their corridor was threatened. Troops from Heshun and Wuxiang reinforced Liaoxian and Guantou respectively. The Eighth Route Army headquarters ordered the Liaoxian attack halted. Some forces were to contain the enemy advancing south from Heshun, while the main force moved to the Hongyatou and Guandinao areas to prepare to annihilate enemy reinforcements arriving from Wuxiang. This decision reveals a deeper stake: even if an army can seize targets, it must avoid exhaustion and must avoid allowing the enemy to convert a partial tactical loss into a larger opportunity. Headquarters essentially chose the operation's "survival path": shift from capturing more nodes to annihilating the reinforcements that would otherwise restore the corridor. Following these orders, the 129th Division attacked Guantou and took it at 24:00 on September 29. In the narrative description that follows, the enemy reinforcements moving through ambush terrain clashed with Communist formations in an engagement where aircraft coverage and terrain allowed the enemy to seize high ground and resist stubbornly. The battle lasted two days and one night, with heavy casualties on both sides. That is an important background lesson: the offensive could still destroy corridor nodes, but the enemy's ability to bring aircraft support and seize terrain meant that the "destroy and move on" approach wasn't always enough. Sometimes, momentum had to be re-channeled into another kind of contest—one closer to a blocking ambush and a battle of endurance. By the evening of October 1, more than 500 Japanese troops from Liaoxian broke through the right wing's blockade and approached near the left wing's command post. The left wing was ordered to withdraw from the battle. Headquarters then assessed that Japanese troops from Liaoxian and Wuxiang had joined and that more than 1,000 Japanese troops from Yangquan had reached Hanwang Town north of Liaoxian. Combined with the 129th Division's exhaustion and heavy casualties, headquarters decided to end the Yulin–Liaoxian Campaign—not because the offensive had no value, but because the risk of allowing the enemy to "sweep" the Taibei area could outweigh further gains. This termination decision illustrates a stake that is often overlooked: in insurgency-style campaigns, operational survival is part of success. The second phase did not merely chase targets; it sought to transform conditions so that the enemy would have to spend strength defending a failing network. If continuing a battle risks letting the enemy regroup into a larger counter-offensive that clears base zones, then ending becomes strategic. While the 129th Division wrestled with corridor defense around Liaoxian and Guantou, the 120th Division pursued a transport-centered strategy against the Tong-Pu Railway—because rail disruption was not a supporting detail; it was a main axis of pressure. On September 12, 1940, the 120th Division issued an action plan for the northern section of the Tongpu Railway, deciding to attack the Ningwu and Xinxian sections (with emphasis on the section between Ningwu and Daniudian) starting September 20. This timing shows planning designed to synchronize with broader operational pressure. Rail sabotage required engineering preparation and coordination across units, and the campaign sought to create disruption when the enemy would be most vulnerable to delayed reinforcement. On September 14, the 358th Brigade left its base west of Loufan and crossed the Jingle–Lanxian Highway to the north. It assembled at Majiagou on the 16th, then launched an attack on Toumaying using its 3rd Detachment (comprising the 7th and 8th Regiments and the special service battalion). At 24:00 on September 18, that detachment attacked Touma Camp, while the 7th and 8th Regiments attacked reinforcements. Fighting continued until the following morning when more than 40 Japanese soldiers from Ninghuabao reinforced Touma Camp. Once reinforcements reached Shanzhai Village, they were surrounded and annihilated. On September 20, around 200 Japanese soldiers from Yangquanling went to Liyan Village to counterattack. The 716th Regiment attacked at 14:00, and by dawn the next day, the enemy fled back to Yangquanling. These battles are more than local clashes. They serve the background logic of sabotage campaigns: before destroying rail infrastructure, you need to reduce the enemy's ability to respond instantly. Fighting reinforcements and counterattacks clears windows of time. Those windows can then be used to sabotage tracks, bridges, and related installations. If sabotage occurs under active reinforcement pressure, the enemy can repair quickly or trap the sabotage teams. If sabotage occurs after the enemy's response capacity is disrupted, repair becomes slower and the operational effects last longer. Parallel operations reinforced this logic. On the night of September 16, the Independent 1st Brigade crossed the Fen River east. On September 18, it was learned that more than 400 Japanese troops had attacked the Yanbei Detachment at Yangquanling but returned to Shangzhuang after failing to find them. The brigade then chose to encircle and annihilate the enemy rather than chase endlessly. The attack began at 13:00 on September 18 and lasted until early morning on September 19. The main force withdrew to sabotage the railway, while the remaining enemy retreated to Yangquanling. The engagement inflicted 105 casualties on the Independent 1st Brigade, while killing or wounding about 200 Japanese. Once the blocking threat was removed, units quickly moved into sabotage actions on the Tongpu Railway. Then sabotage itself proceeded systematically. On the night of September 22, the 4th Regiment of the 358th Brigade—attached to the division's engineering company—and the division's special service regiment advanced to the area between Duanjialing and Xuangang to sabotage several sections of the Tongpu Railway. At the same time, the 2nd Regiment attacked Qicun, and the 715th Regiment attacked Xinkou and Loubanzhai. On the night of September 23, the 2nd Regiment sabotaged the railway south of Xinkou while the 715th Regiment sabotaged it north of Xinkou. On the night of September 25, the 715th Regiment sabotaged between Daniudian and Xuangang. The Independent 2nd Brigade also sabotaged several railway sections between Shuoxian and Ningwu. After six days of sabotage operations, the 120th Division again caused the Tongpu Railway to be interrupted. The background stakes here are straightforward but huge: a rail interruption forces the occupier into repair work, escorts, and re-routing. During the second phase—when the Japanese were already under pressure across multiple theaters—the need to continuously handle repair reduces the capacity for offensive operations and for rapid reinforcement to any single contested point. It also slows their ability to respond to new threats as quickly as they would like. By connecting all these threads—Laiyuan and Lingqiu strongholds, Renhe Dasu containment and roadbreaking, the Yuliao highway corridor fight, and repeated Tongpu railway sabotage—you can see the deeper logic of the second phase. The campaign aimed to create a battlefield environment where Japanese forces could not enjoy stable mobility and where strongpoints could not function as a reliable cage. Transportation disruption isolated strongholds. Stronghold destruction and capture shrank the enemy's local control points. Highway and rail sabotage forced the Japanese to defend not only troops and walls, but also the infrastructure that enabled their coordination. That's why the second phase emphasizes disrupting transportation and destroying some strongholds penetrated deep into base areas. It wasn't simply "hit more places." It was a deliberate attempt to force the Japanese to abandon their preferred operational pattern: a networked system of strongpoints supported by transportation reliability. If that reliability breaks down, the occupier's "cage" becomes porous and unstable, and Communist base areas gain room to expand and persist. By early October, the second phase was winding down, while a third phase was developing: reinforced Japanese columns sought to engage and destroy 8RA units. Over the next two months, several fierce counterattacks occurred, and after that the Hundred Regiments campaign was considered to be finished. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After earlier setbacks in the 1930s, the CCP sought national leadership in resistance while maintaining political room to maneuver within an uneasy arrangement with the KMT. By early 1940–1941, the strategy shifted toward "strongpoint" and transportation warfare: guerrilla actions were used to fracture Japanese defensive networks and sabotage logistics. Japanese attempts to consolidate territory, through local administration and security practices—often provoked the CCP's dual struggle, militarily and politically. As Japanese sweeps temporarily gave the CCP advantages, the situation forced rapid adaptation.

HASAN PIKER WENT TO CUBA, LIVESTREAMED FROM A GENERATOR-POWERED FIVE-STAR HOTEL, AND NOW THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT IS ASKING QUESTIONS. THIS IS WHERE THE COMMUNIST LARP GETS PAPERWORK. The Communist Control Act passed the Senate 85-0 in 1954, survived in Title 50, and was built around one basic distinction: Americans can hold ugly political opinions, but organizations taking direction or support from foreign communist governments are a different legal animal. Seventy years later, Hasan Piker, CodePink, the Nuestra América Convoy, Cuba, CCP-linked influence networks, and OFAC subpoenas are dragging that old question back into the room. Today we break down the law, the money, the Cuba trip, and whether “it was just political speech” works when federal investigators start asking about sanctions, travel, logistics, and coordination with a regime on the State Sponsor of Terrorism list.

Trump just sat across from Xi Jinping holding more leverage than any American president in 40 years — and what he said next has the spin machines scrambling. "They want help. We don't need help." Victor Davis Hanson breaks down why Trump's refusal to bargain may have just changed the entire game. Lance Wallnau pulls back the curtain on what really happened in China — plus the behind-the-scenes story from America's 250th rededication that mainstream media is desperate to bury. Did Trump just outplay the entire CCP without firing a shot? Lance unpacks Trump's Bret Baier and Hannity interviews, the Panama-Venezuela-Cuba-Greenland chessboard Trump is quietly clearing of Chinese influence, the Putin-Xi meeting happening right now, and the U.S./Nigerian military strike that killed Abu Bilal al-Munuki — the #2 ISIS leader globally — for the slaughter of Christians in Nigeria. Then — the story almost nobody is telling about May 17. Was America's 250th rededication actually a hinge of history moment? In this episode: • Victor Davis Hanson on why Trump holds the upper hand against China • Trump's "no quid pro quo" doctrine and what it means for Iran • How Trump pushed China out of Panama, Venezuela — and now Cuba • The Putin-Xi meeting and Trump's quiet offer to flip Russia • The U.S./Nigerian strike that killed ISIS's #2 commander for hunting Christians • The man who gave up his 6 minutes on the National Mall so Lou Engel and Dutch Sheets could speak • Paula White's quiet stand against interfaith dilution at the 250th • Trump personally reading 2 Chronicles 7:14 — "If my people..." • Why the New York Times and Sojourners are in full panic over a Christian rededication This wasn't a normal week. This is the kind of week historians look back on as the turning point — if we don't miss it. Podcast Episode 2126: What Really Happened In China - Plus the Behind the Scenes Story at America's 250th | don't miss this! Listen to more episodes of the Lance Wallnau Show at lancewallnau.com/podcast

Patrick explores the history and challenges of the Catholic Church in Mexico, tracing the shift from a nearly universal Catholic identity to intense government persecution and connecting Enlightenment influences to these dramatic changes. Listeners call with personal stories of family resistance during the Cristero era, while questions about sacraments, faith routines, and the Vatican’s handling of Church matters in China prompt frank exchanges. In the midst of heavy history, Patrick debates Catholic comedians, workplace faith moments, and why keeping memories alive matters for everyone listening. Tony - Today is the Feast of the Cristeros. What is the connection between the Cristeros and Enlightenment? Here’s a link to Patrick’s talk: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z__ti5BiQz0 (00:55) Here’s a link to Patrick and Fr. Schmitz’s debate: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MtRkdoF_siY Zoila – The grandmother of a friend carried ammunition to the Cristeros in Mexico. (31:35) Tim (email) – I told a young man he can only be baptized once. Did I do the right thing? (38:08) Anne - I am on Day 46 of a novena. Do I have to start my novena over if I missed a day? (43:43) Irene - Where does the Church stand with the CCP in China electing bishops? (47:17)

Patrick responds directly to listeners, offering guidance on spirituality, relationships, and daily challenges through heartfelt exchanges and practical wisdom. Questions range from Catholic teaching on end-of-life care and feeding tubes to the nuances of physical attraction in marriage, and the risks parents might encounter in family court or when trusting neighbors. Faith, experience, and a willingness to address the tough stuff keep the conversation real and, at times, unexpectedly moving. Irene – Why hasn’t anyone spoken out against the CCP in China electing bishops? (00:28) Judy (email) – If there’s a problem with a Catholic school, I would go to the bishop. Maria (email) – Should I let my daughter babysit for a family that practices yoga? Maria - I am a single woman in my 40s. How much physical attraction do I need to find a holy spouse? (10:34) Paul (email) - How do I go about finding a spiritual director? (22:58) Tim - I had to talk my wife into marrying me. (26:47) Rose – Is it a sin if you can't concentrate during the Rosary? (29:22) Ted - You said you are not a spiritual advisor, but I think you are to me. I say you are my spiritual advisor when people ask where I get my advice from. Should I not say that anymore? (33:50) Mary – My father is in the ICU. Does the Catholic Church approve of putting someone on a feeding tube? (40:46) Matt - No Christian legal expert would help me because they didn’t want to get involved in family court. (46:53)

Trump defends 500,000 Chinese students as lifeblood of US universities while Pat warns 25,000 could be CCP spies. A busted California mayor, failing American schools, and Beijing's leverage expose the hidden national security risk on our campuses.

On this episode of The Federalist Radio Hour, Sam Brownback, former governor of Kansas and former ambassador-at-large for International Religious Freedom, and pro-democracy activist Frances Hui join Federalist Elections Correspondent Matt Kittle to discuss China's relationship with religion and explain how hostility toward faith and freedom affects U.S.-China relations. Hui also shares her experience as a victim of communism. You can find Brownback's new book, China's War on Faith, here. The Federalist Foundation is a nonprofit, and we depend entirely on our listeners and readers — not corporations. If you value fearless, independent journalism, please consider a tax-deductible gift today at TheFederalist.com/donate. Your support keeps us going.

Illness has overtaken Will again, but that doesn't mean the conversation stops. With President Donald Trump wrapping up his China summit, we've opened up the vault for you with some of our most relevant conversations about the CCP in this ‘Best Of...' edition of 'Will Cain Country.'First up, Author of ‘The Invisible Coup: How American Elites and Foreign Powers Use Immigration as a Weapon' Peter Schweizer joins Will to expose how Democratic operatives, elite-funded NGOs, and foreign powers weaponized illegal immigration to reshape U.S. politics. The most shocking example? China's use of “birth tourism” to secure long-term influence inside America.Plus, Chinese Cultural Revolution Survivor and Author of ‘Made In America' Xi Van Fleet explains how today's Left-wing protests mirror the events of Mao's Cultural Revolution in the late '60s, and how American influence set the stage for the CCP's takeover.Subscribe to ‘Will Cain Country' on YouTube here: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Watch Will Cain Country!⁠⁠⁠Follow ‘Will Cain Country' on X (⁠⁠⁠@willcainshow⁠⁠⁠), Instagram (⁠⁠⁠@willcainshow⁠⁠⁠), TikTok (⁠⁠⁠@willcainshow⁠⁠⁠), and Facebook (⁠⁠⁠@WillCainNews)Follow Will on X: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠@WillCain⁠ Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Buck breaks down President Donald Trump’s high-stakes visit to China and what it could mean for America’s future. From trade negotiations and tariffs to Taiwan, Iran, rare earth minerals, and the growing power of the Chinese Communist Party, Buck dives into the geopolitical battle shaping the 21st century. He also discusses the CEOs traveling with Trump, the economic leverage at play, and why this meeting with Xi Jinping could have major consequences for global trade, energy markets, and U.S.-China relations. Plus, Buck shares insights from his recent trip to Taiwan and explains why the CCP remains America’s greatest strategic rival. Never miss a moment from Buck by subscribing to the Buck Sexton Show Podcast on IHeart Radio, Apple Podcasts or wherever you get your podcasts! Connect with Buck Sexton:Facebook – / bucksexton X – @bucksexton Instagram – @bucksexton TikTok - @BuckSexton YouTube - @BuckSexton Website – https://www.bucksexton.com/See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

President Trump's state visit to China was over before he even left the ground. In his comments to reporters before departing for Beijing, Trump said he doesn't even consider Americans' financial situation when making foreign policy decisions — that the only thing that matters to him is keeping Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. That admission, paired with what's actually happening at this summit, is a campaign ad for the midterms. Chris breaks down why this trip was a failure before it started: the economic crisis Trump is ignoring at home, the Iran war that's bled his leverage, the Taiwan ask that reveals how China sees American weakness, and why the Democrats are still barely beating MAGA in the polls despite every economic metric going the wrong way. Join The Chris Cuomo Project on YouTube for ad-free episodes, early releases, exclusive access to Chris, and more: https://www.youtube.com/@chriscuomo/join Follow and subscribe to The Chris Cuomo Project on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and YouTube for new episodes every Tuesday and Thursday: https://linktr.ee/cuomoproject Get 30% off Soul Mood Gummies at https://GetSoul.com with promo code CUOMO. Unlock your best hair & skin with @iRestorelaser and HUGE savings on iRESTORE with code CHRIS at https://irestore.com/CHRIS ! #irestorepod Ready to reach your goals? Visit https://hims.com/CCP to get a personalized, affordable weight loss plan. #news #trump #china #politics #cuomo Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

On this episode of “The Liz Wheeler Show,” Liz dives into a scandal that keeps getting worse for Democrats — one that exposes their ties to the CCP. Like & subscribe to make sure you don't miss a single video: https://youtube.com/lizwheeler?sub_confirmation=1 SPONSORS: ALL FAMILY PHARMACY: Go to http://www.allfamilypharmacy.com/LIZ to get 10% off with my code LIZ10! PREBORN: To donate, dial #250 and say the keyword “BABY.” Or visit http://www.PreBorn.com/LIZ that's PreBorn.com/LIZ Get the full audio show on all major podcast platforms: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-liz-wheeler-show/id1567701295 Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/4LhlHfocr5gMnLj4l573iI iHeart: https://www.iheart.com/podcast/269-the-liz-wheeler-show-82737301/ Subscribe to The Liz Wheeler Show newsletter: https://www.theblaze.com/newsletters/lizwheeler Get VIP access to The Liz Wheeler Show on Locals: https://lizwheeler.locals.com/. Stay in touch with Liz on social media: Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/OfficialLizWheeler Twitter: https://twitter.com/Liz_Wheeler Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/OfficialLizWheeler Rumble: https://rumble.com/LizWheeler Website: https://lizwheeler.com Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices