Podcasts about confucian

Most big goals in life require sustained effort and long-term patience. Be guided as you connect with your deeper aspirations, understanding that growth and mastery take time. Ancient Wisdom Weave: Inspired by Confucian ethics on persistent self-cultivation and the enduring commitment to virtue and lifelong learning. THIS WEEK'S THEME: "The Patient Heart: Cultivating Inner Stillness" Welcome to "The Patient Heart: Cultivating Inner Stillness," a 7-part meditation series designed to help you rediscover the profound power and peace found in patience. In a world that often demands instant gratification, true tranquility lies in our ability to wait, to observe, and to trust in the natural unfolding of life. Drawing upon the timeless wisdom of ancient traditions, this series will guide you to cultivate patience not as passive waiting, but as an active, compassionate engagement with the present moment. Each episode offers a unique lens to understand and embody this vital virtue, fostering inner resilience and a deeper connection to the rhythm of existence. YOUR MEDITATION JOURNEY DURING THIS WEEK'S SERIES This is episode 6 of a 7-day meditation series titled, "The Patient Heart: Cultivating Inner Stillness" episodes 3311-3316. Day 1:  Patience Visualization Day 2:  Patience Affirmation: "I unfold with patience, presence, and peace." Day 3:  Patience Breathing Visualization Day 4:  Lotus Mudra for Patience Day 5:  Fourth Chakra focus for Patience Day 6:  Patience flow meditation combining the week's techniques. Day 7:  Weekly review meditation and closure. WEEKLY CHALLENGE: The Pause Pivot Challenge THE PAUSE (Awareness): When you feel that familiar tug of impatience (the urge to rush, frustration, annoyance, a sigh, tapping your foot, etc.), immediately internally say to yourself: "Aha! A Patience Opportunity!" Take one deep, intentional breath. Notice the sensations in your body and mind without judgment. This is your "Pause." THE PIVOT (Choice): After that single breath, consciously choose a patient response, even if it's small. This isn't about solving the problem instantly, but shifting your internal state. SHARE YOUR MEDITATION JOURNEY WITH YOUR FELLOW MEDITATORS   Let's connect and inspire each other! Please share a little about how meditation has helped you by reaching out to me at Mary@SipandOm.com or better yet -- direct message me at https://www.instagram.com/sip.and.om. We'd love to hear about your meditation ritual!  SUBSCRIBE, LEAVE A REVIEW + TAKE OUR SURVEY SUBSCRIBE so you don't miss a single episode. Consistency is the KEY to a successful meditation ritual. SHARE the podcast with someone who could use a little extra support. I'd be honored if you left me a podcast review. If you do, please email me at Mary@sipandom.com and let me know a little about yourself and how meditation has helped you. I'd love to share your journey to inspire fellow meditators on the podcast! SURVEY: Help us get to know more about how best to serve you by taking our demographics survey: https://survey.libsyn.com/thedailymeditationpodcast FOR DAILY EXTRA SUPPORT OUTSIDE THE PODCAST Each day's meditation techniques posted at: sip.and.om Instagram https://www.instagram.com/sip.and.om/ sip and om Facebook https://www.facebook.com/SipandOm/ A DIFFERENT MEDITATION TECHNIQUE EVERY DAY FOCUSED ON A WEEKLY THEME: Get ready for an exciting journey with a new meditation technique daily, perfectly tailored to the week's theme! Infuse these powerful practices into the most stressful moments of your day to master difficult emotions. These dynamic techniques will help you tame the "monkey mind," keeping your thoughts from interrupting your meditation and bringing peace and focus to your life. FREE TOOLS: For free meditation tools to help you meditate please head over to my website at www.SipandOm.com, and there you'll find free resources to help you on your Meditation Journey. Enjoy access to more than 3,000 guided meditations without ads on the Sip and Om app. Try it for 7 days of free access to the full app! Listen on iTunes for 1-Week Free! https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/sip-and-om/id1216664612?platform=iphone&preserveScrollPosition=true#platform/iphone   1-week Free Access to the Android app! https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.sipandom.sipandom   ***All meditations are Mary Meckley's original copyrighted content unless otherwise stated, and may not be shared without her written permission.   RESOURCES Music composed by Christopher Lloyd Clark licensed by RoyaltyFreeMusic.com, and also by musician Greg Keller.   I'D LOVE TO HEAR FROM YOU I'd love your feedback! Please let me know how you're enjoying the meditations by leaving me a review on iTunes.   **All of the information shared on this podcast is for your enjoyment only. Please don't consider the meditation techniques, herbal tea information, or other information shared by Mary Meckley or any of her guests as a replacement for any medical or psychological treatment. That being said, please enjoy any peace, energy, or clarity you may experience as you meditate. SHARE YOUR MEDITATION JOURNEY WITH YOUR FELLOW MEDITATORS   Let's connect and inspire each other! Please share a little about how meditation has helped you by reaching out to me at Mary@SipandOm.com or better yet -- direct message me at https://www.instagram.com/sip.and.om. We'd love to hear about your meditation ritual!  SUBSCRIBE, LEAVE A REVIEW + TAKE OUR SURVEY SUBSCRIBE so you don't miss a single episode. Consistency is the KEY to a successful meditation ritual. SHARE the podcast with someone who could use a little extra support. I'd be honored if you left me a podcast review. If you do, please email me at Mary@sipandom.com and let me know a little about yourself and how meditation has helped you. I'd love to share your journey to inspire fellow meditators on the podcast! SURVEY: Help us get to know more about how best to serve you by taking our demographics survey: https://survey.libsyn.com/thedailymeditationpodcast FOR DAILY EXTRA SUPPORT OUTSIDE THE PODCAST Each day's meditation techniques posted at: sip.and.om Instagram https://www.instagram.com/sip.and.om/ sip and om Facebook https://www.facebook.com/SipandOm/ A DIFFERENT MEDITATION TECHNIQUE EVERY DAY FOCUSED ON A WEEKLY THEME: Get ready for an exciting journey with a new meditation technique daily, perfectly tailored to the week's theme! Infuse these powerful practices into the most stressful moments of your day to master difficult emotions. These dynamic techniques will help you tame the "monkey mind," keeping your thoughts from interrupting your meditation and bringing peace and focus to your life. FREE TOOLS: For free meditation tools to help you meditate please head over to my website at www.SipandOm.com, and there you'll find free resources to help you on your Meditation Journey. Enjoy access to more than 3,000 guided meditations without ads on the Sip and Om app. Try it for 7 days of free access to the full app! Listen on iTunes for 1-Week Free! https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/sip-and-om/id1216664612?platform=iphone&preserveScrollPosition=true#platform/iphone   1-week Free Access to the Android app! https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.sipandom.sipandom   ***All meditations are Mary Meckley's original copyrighted content unless otherwise stated, and may not be shared without her written permission.   RESOURCES Music composed by Christopher Lloyd Clark licensed by RoyaltyFreeMusic.com, and also by musician Greg Keller.   I'D LOVE TO HEAR FROM YOU I'd love your feedback! Please let me know how you're enjoying the meditations by leaving me a review on iTunes.   **All of the information shared on this podcast is for your enjoyment only. Please don't consider the meditation techniques, herbal tea information, or other information shared by Mary Meckley or any of her guests as a replacement for any medical or psychological treatment. That being said, please enjoy any peace, energy, or clarity you may experience as you meditate.  

Forget everything you thought you knew about pirates—because this week, we're telling the real story of the woman who ran the South China Sea and left Blackbeard in the dust. Meet Zheng Yi Sao: sex worker turned pirate queen, ruthless businesswoman, and literal nightmare of the Qing Dynasty. In this wild ride through 18th-century China, you'll hear how a nameless girl from a fishing village built the most powerful pirate confederation the world has ever seen—and retired with her head (and fortune) intact. TLDR: She didn't die in battle. She negotiated her way out and opened a salt empire. Iconic. ⏱️ What You'll Hear The Origins – How a Tonka girl outsmarted a pirate king and negotiated her way into power Fleet Boss Moves – Zheng Yi Sao's brutal pirate code (decapitations included) Protection Rackets & Political Games – When piracy meets mafia tactics and government bribes The Retirement Plot Twist – Why this pirate queen walked away, rich and respected Legacy – Her influence on Pirates of the Caribbean, feminist history, and pop culture

In Strangers in the Family: Gender, Patriliny, and the Chinese in Colonial Indonesia (SAPP, 2023), Guo-Quan Seng provides a gendered history of settler Chinese community formation in Indonesia during the Dutch colonial period (1816–1942). At the heart of this story lies the creolization of patrilineal Confucian marital and familial norms to the colonial legal, moral, and sexual conditions of urban Java. Departing from male-centered narratives of overseas Chinese communities, Strangers in the Family tells the history of community- formation from the perspective of women who were subordinate to, and alienated from, full Chinese selfhood. From native concubines and mothers, creole Chinese daughters, and wives and matriarchs, to the first generation of colonial-educated feminists, Seng showcases women's moral agency as they negotiated, manipulated, and debated men in positions of authority over their rights in marriage formation and dissolution. In dialogue with critical studies of colonial Eurasian intimacies, this book explores Asian-centered inter-ethnic patterns of intimate encounters. It shows how contestations over women's place in marriage and in society were formative of a Chinese racial identity in colonial Indonesia. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/gender-studies

In Strangers in the Family: Gender, Patriliny, and the Chinese in Colonial Indonesia (SAPP, 2023), Guo-Quan Seng provides a gendered history of settler Chinese community formation in Indonesia during the Dutch colonial period (1816–1942). At the heart of this story lies the creolization of patrilineal Confucian marital and familial norms to the colonial legal, moral, and sexual conditions of urban Java. Departing from male-centered narratives of overseas Chinese communities, Strangers in the Family tells the history of community- formation from the perspective of women who were subordinate to, and alienated from, full Chinese selfhood. From native concubines and mothers, creole Chinese daughters, and wives and matriarchs, to the first generation of colonial-educated feminists, Seng showcases women's moral agency as they negotiated, manipulated, and debated men in positions of authority over their rights in marriage formation and dissolution. In dialogue with critical studies of colonial Eurasian intimacies, this book explores Asian-centered inter-ethnic patterns of intimate encounters. It shows how contestations over women's place in marriage and in society were formative of a Chinese racial identity in colonial Indonesia. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

In Strangers in the Family: Gender, Patriliny, and the Chinese in Colonial Indonesia (SAPP, 2023), Guo-Quan Seng provides a gendered history of settler Chinese community formation in Indonesia during the Dutch colonial period (1816–1942). At the heart of this story lies the creolization of patrilineal Confucian marital and familial norms to the colonial legal, moral, and sexual conditions of urban Java. Departing from male-centered narratives of overseas Chinese communities, Strangers in the Family tells the history of community- formation from the perspective of women who were subordinate to, and alienated from, full Chinese selfhood. From native concubines and mothers, creole Chinese daughters, and wives and matriarchs, to the first generation of colonial-educated feminists, Seng showcases women's moral agency as they negotiated, manipulated, and debated men in positions of authority over their rights in marriage formation and dissolution. In dialogue with critical studies of colonial Eurasian intimacies, this book explores Asian-centered inter-ethnic patterns of intimate encounters. It shows how contestations over women's place in marriage and in society were formative of a Chinese racial identity in colonial Indonesia. Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/southeast-asian-studies

In Strangers in the Family: Gender, Patriliny, and the Chinese in Colonial Indonesia (SAPP, 2023), Guo-Quan Seng provides a gendered history of settler Chinese community formation in Indonesia during the Dutch colonial period (1816–1942). At the heart of this story lies the creolization of patrilineal Confucian marital and familial norms to the colonial legal, moral, and sexual conditions of urban Java. Departing from male-centered narratives of overseas Chinese communities, Strangers in the Family tells the history of community- formation from the perspective of women who were subordinate to, and alienated from, full Chinese selfhood. From native concubines and mothers, creole Chinese daughters, and wives and matriarchs, to the first generation of colonial-educated feminists, Seng showcases women's moral agency as they negotiated, manipulated, and debated men in positions of authority over their rights in marriage formation and dissolution. In dialogue with critical studies of colonial Eurasian intimacies, this book explores Asian-centered inter-ethnic patterns of intimate encounters. It shows how contestations over women's place in marriage and in society were formative of a Chinese racial identity in colonial Indonesia. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies

Hello Interactors,This week, I've been reflecting on the themes of my last few essays — along with a pile of research that's been oddly in sync. Transit planning. Neuroscience. Happiness studies. Complexity theory. Strange mix, but it keeps pointing to the same thing: cities aren't just struggling with transportation or housing. They're struggling with connection. With meaning. With the simple question: what kind of happiness should a city make possible? And why don't we ask that more often?STRANGERS SHUNNED, SYSTEMS SIMULATEDThe urban century was supposed to bring us together. Denser cities, faster mobility, more connected lives — these were the promises of global urbanization. Yet in the shadow of those promises, a different kind of city has emerged in America with growing undertones elsewhere: one that increasingly seeks to eliminate the stranger, bypass friction, and privatize interaction.Whether through algorithmically optimized ride-sharing, private tunnels built to evade street life, or digital maps simulating place without presence for autonomous vehicles, a growing set of design logics work to render other people — especially unknown others — invisible, irrelevant, or avoidable.I admit, I too can get seduced by this comfort, technology, and efficiency. But cities aren't just systems of movement — they're systems of meaning. Space is never neutral; it's shaped by power and shapes behavior in return. This isn't new. Ancient cities like Teotihuacan (tay-oh-tee-wah-KAHN) in central Mexico, once one of the largest cities in the world, aligned their streets and pyramids with the stars. Chang'an (chahng-AHN), the capital of Tang Dynasty China, used strict cardinal grids and walled compounds to reflect Confucian ideals of order and hierarchy. And Uruk (OO-rook), in ancient Mesopotamia, organized civic life around temple complexes that stood at the spiritual and administrative heart of the city.These weren't just settlements — they were spatial arguments about how people should live together, and who should lead. Even Middle Eastern souks and hammams were more than markets or baths; they were civic infrastructure. Whether through temples or bus stops, the question is the same: What kind of social behavior is this space asking of us?Neuroscience points to answers. As Shane O'Mara argues, walking is not just transport — it's neurocognitive infrastructure. The hippocampus, which governs memory, orientation, and mood, activates when we move through physical space. Walking among others, perceiving spontaneous interactions, and attending to environmental cues strengthens our cognitive maps and emotional regulation.This makes city oriented around ‘stranger danger' not just unjust — but indeed dangerous. Because to eliminate friction is to undermine emergence — not only in the social sense, but in the economic and cultural ones too. Cities thrive on weak ties, on happenstance, on proximity without intention. Mark Granovetter's landmark paper, The Strength of Weak Ties, showed that it's those looser, peripheral relationships — not our inner circles — that drive opportunity, creativity, and mobility. Karl Polanyi called it embeddedness: the idea that markets don't float in space, they're grounded in the social fabric around them.You see it too in scale theory — in the work of Geoffrey West and Luís Bettencourt — where the productive and innovative energy of cities scales with density, interaction, and diversity. When you flatten all that into private tunnels and algorithmic efficiency, you don't just lose the texture — you lose the conditions for invention.As David Roberts, a climate and policy journalist known for his systems thinking and sharp urban critiques, puts it: this is “the anti-social dream of elite urbanism” — a vision where you never have to share space with anyone not like you. In conversation with him, Jarrett Walker, a transit planner and theorist who's spent decades helping cities design equitable bus networks, also pushes back against this logic. He warns that when cities build transit around avoidance — individualized rides, privatized tunnels, algorithmic sorting — they aren't just solving inefficiencies. They're hollowing out the very thing that makes transit (and cities) valuable and also public: the shared experience of strangers moving together.The question isn't just whether cities are efficient — but what kind of social beings they help us become. If we build cities to avoid each other, we shouldn't be surprised when they crumble as we all forget how to live together.COVERAGE, CARE, AND CIVIC CALMIf you follow urban and transit planning debates long enough, you'll hear the same argument come up again and again: Should we focus on ridership or coverage? High-frequency routes where lots of people travel, or wide access for people who live farther out — even if fewer use the service? For transit nerds, it's a policy question. For everyone else, it's about dignity.As Walker puts it, coverage isn't about efficiency — it's about “a sense of fairness.” It's about living in a place where your city hasn't written you off because you're not profitable to serve. Walker's point is that coverage isn't charity. It's a public good, one that tells people: You belong here.That same logic shows up in more surprising places — like the World Happiness Report. Year after year, Finland lands at the top. But as writer Molly Young found during her visit to Helsinki, Finnish “happiness” isn't about joy or euphoria. It's about something steadier: trust, safety, and institutional calm. What the report measures is evaluative happiness — how satisfied people are with their lives over time — not affective happiness, which is more about momentary joy or emotional highs.There's a Finnish word that captures this. It the feeling you get after a sauna: saunanjälkeinen raukeus (SOW-nahn-yell-kay-nen ROW-keh-oos) — the softened, slowed state of the body and mind. That's what cities like Helsinki seem to deliver: not bliss, but a stable, low-friction kind of contentment. And while that may lack sparkle, it makes people feel held.And infrastructure plays a big role. In Helsinki, the signs in the library don't say “Be Quiet.” They say, “Please let others work in peace.” It's a small thing, but it speaks volumes — less about control, more about shared responsibility. There are saunas in government buildings. Parents leave their babies sleeping in strollers outside cafés. Transit is clean, quiet, and frequent. As Young puts it, these aren't luxuries — they're part of a “bone-deep sense of trust” the city builds and reinforces. Not enforced from above, but sustained by expectation, habit, and care.My family once joined an organized walking tour of Copenhagen. The guide, who was from Spain, pointed to a clock in a town square and said, almost in passing, “The government has always made sure this clock runs on time — even during war.” It wasn't just about punctuality. It was about trust. About the quiet promise that the public realm would still hold, even when everything else felt uncertain. This, our guide noted from his Spanish perspective, is what what make Scandinavians so-called ‘happy'. They feel held.Studies show that most of what boosts long-term happiness isn't about dopamine hits — it's about relational trust. Feeling safe. Feeling seen. Knowing you won't be stranded if you don't have a car or a credit card. Knowing the city works, even if you don't make it work for you.In this way, transit frequency and subtle signs in Helsinki are doing the same thing. They're shaping behavior and reinforcing social norms. They're saying: we share space here. Don't be loud. Don't cut in line. Don't treat public space like it's only for you.That kind of city can't be built on metrics alone. It needs moral imagination — the kind that sees coverage, access, and slowness as features, not bugs. That's not some socialist's idea of utopia. It's just thoughtful. Built into the culture, yes, but also the design.But sometimes we're just stuck with whatever design is already in place. Even if it's not so thoughtful. Economists and social theorists have long used the concept of path dependence to explain why some systems — cities, institutions, even technologies — get stuck. The idea dates back to work in economics and political science in the 1980s, where it was used to show how early decisions, even small ones, can lock in patterns that are hard to reverse.Once you've laid train tracks, built freeways, zoned for single-family homes — you've shaped what comes next. Changing course isn't impossible, but it's costly, slow, and politically messy. The QWERTY keyboard is a textbook example: not the most efficient layout, but one that stuck because switching systems later would be harder than just adapting to what we've got.Urban scholars Michael Storper and Allen Scott brought this thinking into city studies. They've shown how economic geography and institutional inertia shape urban outcomes — how past planning decisions, labor markets, and infrastructure investments limit the options cities have today. If your city bet on car-centric growth decades ago, you're probably still paying for that decision, even if pivoting is palatable to the public.CONNECTIONS, COMPLEXITY, CITIES THAT CAREThere's a quote often attributed to Stephen Hawking that's made the rounds in complexity science circles: “The 21st century will be the century of complexity.” No one's entirely sure where he said it — it shows up in systems theory blogs, talks, and books — but it sticks. Probably because it feels true.If the last century was about physics — closed systems, force, motion, precision — then this one is about what happens when the pieces won't stay still. When the rules change mid-game. When causes ripple back as consequences. In other words: cities.Planners have tried to tame that complexity in all kinds of ways. Grids. Zoning codes. Dashboards. There's long been a kind of “physics envy” in both planning and economics — a belief that if we just had the right model, the right inputs, we could predict and control the city like a closed system. As a result, for much of the 20th century, cities were designed like machines — optimized for flow, separation, and predictability.But even the pushback followed a logic of control — cul-de-sacs and suburban pastoralism — wasn't a turn toward organic life or spontaneity. It was just a softer kind of order: winding roads and whispered rules meant to keep things calm, clean, and contained…and mostly white and moderately wealthy.If you think of cities like machines, it makes sense to want control. More data, tighter optimization, fewer surprises. That's how you'd tune an engine or write software. But cities aren't machines. They're messy, layered, and full of people doing unpredictable things. They're more like ecosystems — or weather patterns — than they are a carburetor. And that's where complexity science becomes useful.People like Paul Cilliers and Brian Castellani have argued for a more critical kind of complexity science — one that sees cities not just as networks or algorithms, but as places shaped by values, power, and conflict. Cilliers emphasized that complex systems, like cities, are open and dynamic: they don't have fixed boundaries, they adapt constantly, and they respond to feedback in ways no planner can fully predict. Castellani extends this by insisting that complexity isn't just technical — it's ethical. It demands we ask: Who benefits from a system's design? Who has room to adapt, and who gets constrained? In this view, small interventions — a zoning tweak, a route change — can set off ripple effects that reshape how people move, connect, and belong. A new path dependence.This is why certainty is dangerous in urban design. It breeds overconfidence. Humility is a better place to start. As Jarrett Walker puts it, “there are all kinds of ways to fake your way through this.” Agencies often adopt feel-good mission statements like “compete with the automobile by providing access for all” — which, he notes, is like “telling your taxi driver to turn left and right at the same time.” You can't do both. Not on a fixed budget.Walker pushes agencies to be honest: if you want to prioritize ridership, say so. If you want to prioritize broad geographic coverage, that's also valid — but know it will mean lower ridership. The key is not pretending you can have both at full strength. He says, “What I want is for board members… to make this decision consciously and not be surprised by the consequences”.These decisions matter. A budget cut can push riders off buses, which then leads to reduced service, which leads to more riders leaving — a feedback loop. On the flip side, small improvements — like better lighting, a public bench, a frequent bus — can set off positive loops too. Change emerges, often sideways.That means thinking about transit not just as a system of movement, but as a relational space. Same with libraries, parks, and sidewalks. These aren't neutral containers. They're environments that either support or suppress human connection. If you design a city to eliminate friction, you eliminate chance encounters — the stuff social trust is made of.I'm an introvert. I like quiet. I recharge alone. But I also live in a city — and I've learned that even for people like me, being around others still matters. Not in the chatty, get-to-know-your-neighbors way. But in the background hum of life around you. Sitting on a bus. Browsing in a bookstore. Walking down a street full of strangers, knowing you don't have to engage — but you're not invisible either.There's a name for this. Psychologists call it public solitude or sometimes energized privacy — the comfort of being alone among others. Not isolated, not exposed. Just held, lightly, in the weave of the crowd. And the research backs it up: introverts often seek out public spaces like cafés, libraries, or parks not to interact, but to feel present — connected without pressure.In the longest-running happiness study ever done, 80 years, Harvard psychologist Robert Waldinger found that strong relationships — not income, not status — were the best predictor of long-term well-being. More recently, studies have shown that even brief interactions with strangers — on a bus, in a coffee shop — can lift mood and reduce loneliness. But here's the catch: cities have to make those interactions possible.Or they don't.And that's the real test of infrastructure. We've spent decades designing systems to move people through. Fast. Clean. Efficient. But we've neglected the quiet spaces that let people just be. Sidewalks you're not rushed off of. Streets where kids can safely bike or play…or simply cross the street.Even pools — maybe especially pools. My wife runs a nonprofit called SplashForward that's working to build more public pools. Not just for fitness, but because pools are public space. You float next to people you may never talk to. And still, you're sharing something. Space. Water. Time.You see this clearly in places like Finland and Iceland, where pools and saunas are built into the rhythms of public life. They're not luxuries — they're civic necessities. People show up quietly, day after day, not to socialize loudly, but to be alone together. As one Finnish local told journalist Molly Young, “During this time, we don't have... colors.” It was about the long gray winter, sure — but also something deeper: a culture that values calm over spectacle. Stability over spark. A kind of contentment that doesn't perform.But cities don't have to choose between quiet and joy. We don't have to model every system on Helsinki in February. There's something beautiful in the American kind of happiness too — the loud, weird, spontaneous moments that erupt in public. The band on the subway. The dance party in the park. The loud kid at the pool. That kind of energy can be a nuisance, but it can also be joyful.Even Jarrett Walker, who's clear-eyed about transit, doesn't pretend it solves everything. Transit isn't always the answer. Sometimes a car is the right tool. What matters is whether everyone has a real choice — not just those with money or proximity or privilege. And he's quick to admit every city with effective transit has its local grievances.So no, I'm not arguing for perfection, or even socialism. I'm arguing for a city that knows how to hold difference. Fast and slow. Dense and quiet. A city that lets you step into the crowd, or sit at its edge, and still feel like you belong. A place to comfortably sit with the uncertainty of this great transformation emerging around us. Alone and together.REFERENCESCastellani, B. (2014). Complexity theory and the social sciences: The state of the art. Routledge.Cilliers, P. (1998). Complexity and postmodernism: Understanding complex systems. Routledge.David, P. A. (1985). Clio and the economics of QWERTY. The American Economic Review.Granovetter, M. (1973). The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology.Hawking, S. (n.d.). The 21st century will be the century of complexity. [Attributed quote; primary source unavailable].O'Mara, S. (2019). In praise of walking: A new scientific exploration. W. W. Norton & Company.Roberts, D. (Host). (2025). Jarrett Walker on what makes good transit [Audio podcast episode]. In Volts.Storper, M., & Scott, A. J. (2016). Current debates in urban theory: A critical assessment. Urban Studies.Waldinger, R., & Schulz, M. (2023). The good life: Lessons from the world's longest scientific study of happiness. Simon & Schuster.Walker, J. (2011). Human transit: How clearer thinking about public transit can enrich our communities and our lives. Island Press.West, G., & Bettencourt, L. M. A. (2010). A unified theory of urban living. Nature.Young, M. (2025). My miserable week in the ‘happiest country on earth'. The New York Times Magazine. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit interplace.io

Episode 1-125: The True Meaning of Yin and YangEveryone thinks they know yin and yang—but beneath the pop culture symbol lies a mystery that shaped the very fabric of Taoist cosmology. In this episode, Taoist Master Mikel Steenrod lifts the veil on one of the most misunderstood symbols in spiritual history.More than a balance of opposites, yin and yang represent the hidden structure of how the Dao becomes reality—through the descent of the Ching, a rarely discussed symbolic layer that bridges energy and matter. Learn why the swirling symbol once included dragons, why its orientation changed under Confucian influence, and how its true meaning could change how you see the universe—and yourself.

Following the death of Takara Hime, and the war on the Korean peninsula, Naka no Ōe was taking hold--or perhaps keeping hold--of the reins of government.  He wasn't finished with his changes to the government.  He also had a new threat--the Tang Empire.  They had destroyed Yamato's ally, Baekje, and defeated the Yamato forces on the peninsula.  While the Tang then turned their attention to Goguryeo, Yamato could easily be next.  The Tang had a foothold on the Korean peninsula, so they had a place to gather and launch a fleet, should they wish to bring Yamato into their empire. For more, especially to follow along with some of the names in this episode, check out our blogpost at https://sengokudaimyo.com/podcast/episode-125     Rough Transcript Welcome to Sengoku Daimyo's Chronicles of Japan.  My name is Joshua and this is episode 125: The Sovereign of Heavenly Wisdom The people of Baekje looked around at the strange and unfamiliar land.  They had fled a wartorn country, and they were happy to be alive, but refugee status was hardly a walk in the park.  Fortunately, they still knew how to farm the land, even if their homeland was hundreds of miles away, across the sea, and occupied by hostile forces.  Here, at least, was a land where they could make a home for themselves. Some of them had to wonder whether this was really permanent.  Was their situation just temporary until their kingdom was restored?  Or were they truly the last people of Baekje, and what would that mean? Either way, it would mean nothing if they didn't work the land and provide for their families.  And so, as with displaced people everywhere, they made the best of the situation.  They had been given land to work, and that was more than they could have asked for.  They might never return to Baekje, but perhaps they could keep a little of it alive for themselves and their descendants. Greetings, everyone, and welcome back.  Last episode we talked about the downfall of Baekje and the defeat of the Yamato forces at the battle of Hakusukinoe, also known as the Battle of Baekgang, in 663.  And yet, something else happened as well: the sovereign, Takara Hime, aka Saimei Tennou, died as the Yamato forces were setting out.  Immediately Prince Naka no Oe took the reins of government.  He would be known to later generations as Tenji Tennou, with Tenji meaning something like “Heavenly Wisdom”. Now Prince Naka no Oe has been in the forefront of many of our episodes so far, so I'd like to start this episode out with a recap of what we've heard about him so far, as all of this is important to remind ourselves of the complex political situation.  I'm going to be dropping – and recapping – a lot of names, but I'll have many of the key individuals listed on the podcast website for folks who want to follow along.  I would note that this episode is going to be a summary, with some extrapolation by me regarding what was actually happening.  Just remember that history, as we've seen time and again, is often more messy and chaotic than we like, and people are more complex than just being purely good or evil.  People rarely make their way to the top of any social hierarchy purely through their good deeds.  To start with, let's go back to before the year 645, when Naka no Oe instigated a coup against Soga no Iruka and Soga no Emishi.  In the Isshi Incident, covered in Episode 106, Naka no Oe had Soga no Iruka murdered in court, in front of his mother, Takara Hime, when she sat on the throne the first time.  And yet, though he could have taken the throne when she abdicated in apparent shock, he didn't.  Instead, he took the role of “Crown Prince”, but this wasn't him just sitting back.  In fact, evidence suggests that he used that position to keep a strong hand on the tiller of the ship of state. Prior to the Isshi Incident of 645, the rule of the Yamato sovereign had been eroded by noble court families.  These families, originally set up to serve the court and its administration, had come to dominate the political structures of the court.  The main branch of the Soga family, in particular, had found its way to power through a series of astute political marriages and the support of a new, foreign religion:  Buddhism.  Soga no Iname, Emishi's grandfather, had married his daughters to the sovereigns, and thus created closer ties between the Soga and the royal line.  He also helped ensure that the offspring of those marriages would be the ones to take over as future sovereigns.  Soga no Iname, himself took the position of Oho-omi, the Great Omi, or the Great Minister, the head of the other ministerial families.  As Prime Minister, he held great sway over the day-to-day running of the court, and execution of much of the administration.  Much of this was covered in previous episodes, but especially episodes 88, 90, 91, 92, 95, 98, 99, and 103. Soga no Umako, who succeeded his father as Oho-omi, was joined in his effort to administer the government by his grand-nephew, Prince Umayado, also known as Shotoku Taishi, son of Tachibana no Toyohi, aka Youmei Tennou, and thus grandson of Umako's sister, Kitashi-hime, and the sovereign known as Kimmei Tennou.  Umayado's aunt, sister to Tachibana no Toyohi, was Kashikiya Hime, or Suiko Tennou.  The three of them:  Soga no Umako, Prince Umayado, and Kashikiya Hime, together oversaw the development of Yamato and the spread of Buddhism.  Buddhism was also controversial at first, but they turned it into another source of ritual power for the state—ritual power that Soga no Umako, Prince Umayado, and even Kashikiya Hime were able to harvest for their own use. Unfortunately, the Crown Prince, Umayado, died before Kashikiya hime, suddenly leaving open the question of who would take the throne.  Soga no Umako himself, passed away two years before Kashikiya Hime.  When she in turn passed away, there was another struggle for the throne, this time between the descendants of Crown Prince Umayado and Soga no Umako.  Eventually, Soga no Umako's son and heir, Soga no Emishi, made sure that a more pliant sovereign, Prince Tamura, would take the throne, and Prince Umayado's own son, Prince Yamashiro no Oe, was cut out of the succession.  Soga no Emishi, serving as prime minister, effectively ran things much as his father had.  When Tamura diedhis queen, Takara Hime, took the throne, rather than passing it back to Umayado's line—no doubt with Emishi's blessing.  He was careful, however, not to provoke direct action against Yamashiro no Oe, possibly due to the reverence in which Yamashiro's father, Prince Umayado, aka the Buddhist Saint Shotoku Taishi, was held.  Meanwhile, Emishi appears to have been cultivating his grandson by way of Prince Tamura, Furubito no Oe, to eventually succeed to the throne, trying to duplicate what his own father Umako and even grandfather had been able to accomplish. Soga no Emishi's son, Soga no Iruka, was not quite so temperate, however.   Who would have thought that growing up at the top of the social hierarchy might make one feel a bit arrogant and entitled?   When Soga no Emishi was ill, Soga no Iruka took over as Prime Minister, and he didn't just stand back.  He decided that he needed to take out Furubito no Oe's competition, and so he went after Yamashiro no Oe and had him killed. Unfortunately for him, he apparently went too far.  There were already those who were not happy with the Soga family's close hold on power—or perhaps more appropriately, this particular line of the Soga family.  This kind of behavior allowed a group of discontented royals and nobility to gain support. According to the popular story recounted in the Nihon Shoki, the primary seed of resistance started with a game of kickball, or kemari.  Nakatomi no Kamako, aka Nakatomi no Kamatari, was the scion of his house, which was dedicated to the worship of the traditional kami of Yamato.  The Nakatomi were ritualists: in charge of chanting ritual prayers, or norito, during court ceremony.  This meant that their powerbase was directly challenged by the increasing role of Buddhism, one of the Soga patriarchs' key influences on the political system. Kamatari was feeling out the politics of the court, and seemed to be seeking the support of royal family members who could help challenge the powerful Soga ministers.  He found that support in two places.  First, in Prince Karu, brother to Takara Hime, the current sovereign, who had been on the throne ever since her husband, Tamura, had passed away.  And then there was the Prince Katsuraki, better known to us, today, as Prince Naka no Oe.  A game of kemari, where a group of players tried to keep a ball in the air as long as they could, using only their feet, was a chance to get close to the Prince.  When Naka no Oe's shoe flew off in the middle of the match, Kamatari ran over to retrieve it.  As he offered the shoe back to its owner, they got to talking, and one of the most impactful bromances in Yamato history was born. The two ended up studying together.  The unification of the Yellow River and Yangzi basin regions under the Sui and Tang, and the expansion of the Silk Road, had repercussions felt all the way across the straits in Yamato.  Naka no Oe and Kamatari were both avid students and were absorbing all that the continent had to throw at them about philosophy and good governance.  As is so often the case, it seems like idealistic students were the fertile ground for revolutionary new thoughts. There were problems implementing their vision, however.  Although the Nihon Shoki claims that Naka no Oe was the Crown Prince, that honor was probably given to Prince Furubito no Oe, who would have no doubt perpetuated the existing power structures at court.  This is something that the Chroniclers, or perhaps those before them, glossed over and may have even tried to retconned, to help bolster the case that Naka no Oe was actually working for the common good and not just involved in a naked power grab for himself.  There is also the question as to where Yamashiro no Oe had stood in the succession, as he likely had a fair number of supporters. With the destruction of Yamashiro no Oe's family, however, the balance of power shifted.  Although Soga no Emishi had long been an influential member of the court, and not solely because of his role as Prime Minister, Soga no Iruka was relatively new to power.  Yamashiro no Oe's family, in turn, likely had a fair number of supporters, and even neutral parties may have been turned off by Iruka's violent methods to suppress an opponent who had already been defeated politically.  Naka no Oe and Kamatari seem to have seized on this discontent againt the Soga, but they needed at least one other conspirator.  They achieved this by offering a marriage alliance with Soga no Kurayamada no Ishikawa no Maro, a lesser member of the Soga household, whose own immediate family had been supporters of Yamashiro no Oe, and so likely had plenty of grievances with his cousins.  Naka no Oe married Ishikawa no Maro's daughter, Wochi no Iratsume, also known as Chinu no Iratsume.  Together, these three—Naka no Oe, Kamatari, and Ishikawa no Maro—brought others into their plot, and finally, in 645, they struck.  Soga no Iruka was killed at court, in front of a shocked Takara Hime and Prince Furubito no Oe.  By the way, this is another thing that suggests to me that Furubito no Oe was the Crown Prince, because why was he front and center at the ceremony, while Naka no Oe was able to skulk around at the edges, tending to things like the guards?  After the assassination at the court – the Isshi Incident -- Naka no Oe gathered forces and went after Soga no Emishi, since they knew they couldn't leave him alive.  With both Soga no Emishi and Soga no Iruka dead, and Takara Hime having abdicated the throne in shock at what had just occurred, Naka no Oe could have taken the throne for himself.  However, in what was probably a rather astute move on his part, he chose not to.  He recognized that Furubito no Oe's claim to the throne was possibly stronger, and those who had supported the Soga would not doubt push for him to take the throne.  And so, instead, he pushed for his uncle, Prince Karu, to ascend as sovereign.  Karu was Takara Hime's brother, and they could use Confucian logic regarding deference to one's elders to support him.  Plus, Karu's hands weren't directly bloodied by the recent conflict. As for Prince Furubito, he saw the way that the winds were blowing.  To avoid being another casualty, he retired from the world, taking the vows of a Buddhist monk.  However, there were still supporters who were trying to put him on the throne and eventually he would be killed, to avoid being used as a rallying point. Prince Karu, known as Jomei Tennou, ruled for around a decade. During that time, Naka no Oe and his reformers helped to cultivate a new image of the state as a bureaucratic monarchy.  Naka no Oe was designated the Crown Prince, and Nakatomi no Kamatari was made the “Inner Prime Minister”, or Naidaijin.  Ishikawa no Maro was made the minister of the  Right, while Abe no Uchimaro was made Minister of the Left, and they ran much of the bureaucracy, but the Naidaijin was a role more directly attached to the royal household, and likely meant that Kamatari was outside of their jurisdiction, falling into a position directly supporting Naka no Oe.  They instituted Tang style rank systems, and set up divisions of the entire archipelago.  They appointed governors of the various countries, now seen as provinces, and made them report up to various ministers, and eventually the sovereign.  After all, if you were going to manage everything, you needed to first and foremost collect the data.  This period is known as the Taika, or Great Change, period, and the reforms are known as the Taika reforms, discussed in episode 108. They even built a large government complex in the form of the Toyosaki Palace, in Naniwa, though this may have been a bit much—for more, check out episodes 112 and 113. Years into the project, though, things seem to have soured, a bit.  Rumors and slander turned Kamatari against his ally, Ishikawa no Maro, resulting in the death of Ishikawa no Maro and much of his family.  Naka no Oe and other members of the royal family eventually abandoned the Naniwa palace complex, leaving now-Emperor Karu and the government officials there to run the day-to-day administration, while much of the court made its way back to the Asuka area.  Karu would later pass away, but the throne still did not pass to Crown Prince Naka no Oe, despite his title.  Instead, the throne went back to Takara Hime.  This was her second reign, and one of only two split reigns like this that we know of.  The Chroniclers, who were creating posthumous titles for the sovereigns, gave her two names—Kogyoku Tennou for her reign up to 645, and then Saimei Tennou for her second reign starting in 655.   During her latter reign, Naka no Oe continued to wield power as the Crown Prince, and the Chroniclers don't really get into why she came back into power.  It may be that Naka no Oe, in his role as Crown Prince, had more freedom: although the sovereign is purportedly the person in power, that position can also be limiting.  There are specific things which the sovereign is supposed to do, rituals in which they are expected to partake.  In addition, there were restrictions on who was allowed into the inner sanctum of the palace, and thus limits on who could interact with the sovereign, and how.  That meant that any sovereign was reliant on intermediaries to know what was going on in their state and to carry out their orders.  As Crown Prince, Naka no Oe may have had more flexibility to do the things he wanted to do, and he could always leverage the sovereign's authority. When Baekje was destroyed, and Yamato decided to go to their aid, Naka no Oe appears to have had a strong hand in raising forces and directing movements, at least within the archipelago.  When Takara Hime passed away rather suddenly, he accompanied her funerary procession much of the way back, and then returned to Tsukushi—Kyushu—to direct the war.   This is the same thing that Toyotomi Hideyoshi would do when he sent troops to Korea in the late 16th century.  Moving headquarters closer to the continent would reduce the time between messages.  Theoretically he could have moved out to the islands of Iki or Tsushima, but I suspect that there were more amenities at Tsukushi, where they even built a palace for Takara Hime—and later Naka no Oe—to reside in.  It was likely not quite as spectacular as the full-blown city that Hideyoshi developed in a matter of months, but the court could also leverage the facilities previously created for the Dazaifu. The war took time.  This wasn't like some “wars” that were more like specific military actions.  This was a war that dragged on for several years, with different waves of ships going over to transport people and supplies.  Things came to a head in the 9th month of 663, roughly October or November on the Western calendar.  The Baekje resistance was under siege, and their only hope was a fleet of Yamato soldiers coming to their aid.  The Yamato fleet met with a much smaller Tang fleet at the mouth of the Baek River—the Hakusukinoe.  They attempted to break through the Tang blockade, but the Tang had positional advantage and were eventually able to counterattack, destroying the Yamato fleet.  Without their relief, the Baekje resistance fell. The remnants of the Yamato army, along with those Baekje nobles that were with them, headed out, fleeing back to the archipelago.  One presumes that there may have been other Baekje nobles, and their families, who had already made the trip. After the entry describing this rout, on the 24th day of the 9th month of 663, we have a gap in the Chronicles of just a little more than 4 months.  We then pick up with Naka no Oe's government starting to look at internal affairs.  For one thing, we are told that he selected his younger brother, the Royal Prince Ohoama, as Crown Prince, and he made updates to the cap-rank system, changing it from 19 ranks to 26 ranks.  The first six ranks remained the same, but the name “kwa”, or “flower”, for the 7th through 10th ranks was changed to “Kin”, meaning “brocade”.  Furthermore, a “middle” rank was added between the Upper and Lower ranks, further distinguishing each group, and adding 6 extra ranks.  Finally, the initial rank, Risshin, was divided into two:  Daiken and Shouken.  We aren't told why, but it likely meant that they could have more granular distinctions in rank. At the same time that was going on, the court also awarded long swords to the senior members of the great families, and short swords to the senior members of lesser families.  Below that, senior members of the Tomo no Miyatsuko and others were given shields and bows and arrows.  Furthermore, the vassals, or kakibe, and the domestic retainers, or yakabe, were settled, to use Aston's translation.  The kanji used in the text appears to refer to settling a decision or standardizing something, rather than settling as in giving a place to live.  It seems to me to mean that the court was settling servants on families: determining what kind and how many servants that various houses could have based on their position in the hierarchy.  I can't help but notice that all of these gifts were very martial in nature.  That does not mean, of course, that they were necessarily because of the war over Baekje, nor that they were in response to the concern about a possible Tang invasion -- we've seen in the past where swords were gifted to people who had served the court --but it is hard not to connect these gifts with recent worries.  We also know that this year, Naka no Oe turned his focus on building defenses, setting up guards and beacon fires on the islands of Tsushima and Iki.   Should any unknown fleet be seen coming to the archipelago, the fires would alert the forces at Kyushu, so they could send word and prepare a defense. In addition, the court built an impressive defense for Tsukushi—for the Dazai itself, the seat of the Yamato government in Kyushu.  It is called the Mizuki, or Water Castle, though at the time “castle” was more about walls and fortifications than the standalone fortress we tend to think of, today.  Along those lines, the Mizuki was an earthen embankment, roughly 1.2 kilometers long, extending from a natural ridgeline to the west across the Mikasa river.  Archeological evidence shows it had a moat, and this line of fortifications would have been a line of defense for the Dazai, should anyone try to invade.  This construction was so large and impressive that you can still see it, even today.  It stands out on the terrain, and it is even visible from overhead photographs. In the third month of 664, we are told that Prince Syeongwang of Baekje and his people, were given a residence at Naniwa.  In fact, even though Baekje was no longer an independent kingdom, there appear to have been thousands of Baekje people now living in Yamato, unable to return home.  Many of these were former nobles of the Baekje court, which Yamato treated as a foreign extension of its own.  Resettling these people would be a major theme for the Chronicles, but we will also see, as we read further on, how their talents were leveraged for the state. Also in the third month, a star fell in the north—it says “in the north of the capital”, but I suspect that anywhere north, south, east, or west of the capital would have seen the same thing “in the north”.  There was also an earthquake, which isn't given any particular significance, beyond its mention as a natural phenomenon. On the 17th day of the 5th month of 664, so roughly 2 months later, we are told that Liu Jen'yuan, the Tang dynasty's general in Baekje, sent Guo Wucong  to Yamato with a letter and gifts.  We aren't told the contents of the letter, but one imagines that this may have been a rather tense exchange.  Yamato had just been involved in open warfare against Tang forces on the peninsula, and they still weren't sure if the Tang empire would come after them next.  Their only real hope on that front was Goguryeo, since the Tang and Silla were still trying to destroy the Goguryeo kingdom, and that may have kept the Tang forces tied up for a while.  No doubt Guo Wucong would have seen some of the defenses that Yamato was constructing during his visit. Guo Wucong would hang around for about seven and a half months.  He was given permission to take his leave on the 4th day of the 10th month.  Naka no Oe had his friend and Inner Prime Minister, Nakatomi no Kamatari send the Buddhist Priest, Chisho, with presents for Guo Wucong, and he and his officers were granted entertainments  before they left as well. Finally, Guo Wucong and his people returned to the Tang on the 12th day of the 12th month. While the delegation from the Tang was in Yamato, we are told of several tragedies.  First was that Soga no Murajiko no Oho-omi had passed away.  Soga no Murajiko appears to have been another son of Soga no Kuramaro, and thus brother to Soga no Ishikawa no Maro.  Unfortunately, we don't have much more on him in the record. Just a month later, we are told that the “Dowager Queen” Shima passed away.  Aston translates this as the Queen Grandmother, suggesting that she was Naka no Oe's grandmother. We are also told, that in the 10th month of 664, around the time that Guo Wucong was given leave to depart, that Yeon Gaesomun, the Prime Minister—though perhaps more correctly the despotic ruler—of Goguryeo, died.  It is said that he asked his children to remain united, but, well, even if we didn't know how it all turned out, I think we would look somewhat skeptically on any idea that they all did exactly as they were told.  Sure enough, in 667 we are told that Gaesomun's eldest son, Namseng, left the capital city of Pyongyang to tour the provinces, and while he was gone his younger brothers conspired with the nobility, and when he came back they refused to let him back in.  So Namseng ran off to the Tang court and apparently helped them destroy his own country. This is largely corroborated by other stories about Goguryeo, though the dates do seem to be off.  Tang records put Gaesomun's death around 666 CE, which the Samguk Sagi appears to follow, but on his tomb the date would appear to be 665.  Confusion like this was easy enough given the different dates and trying to cross-check across different regnal eras.  Sure, there were some commonalities, but it was very easy to miscount something. One last note from the twelfth month of 664—it seems that there were omens of apparent prosperity that came to the court from the island of Awaji.    First, there was rice that grew up in a farmer's pig trough.  The farmer's name is given as Shinuta no Fumibito no Mu, and Mu gathered this rice and stored it up, and thus, every day his wealth increased.  Then there was the bridal bed of Iwaki no Sukuri no Oho, of Kurimoto district.  They claimed that rice grew up at the head of his brides' mattress during her first night's stay with him.  And this wasn't just some brand new shoot, but overnight it formed an ear, and by the morning it bent down and ripened.  Then, the following night, another ear was formed.  When the bride went out into the courtyard, two keys fell down from heaven, and after she gave them to her husband, Oho, he went on to become a wealthy man. The exact purpose of these stories is unclear, but it seems to be that the Chroniclers are choosing to focus on stories of wealth and growth, which speak to how they wanted this reign as a whole, including the sovereign, to be remembered. However, more tragedy struck the following year, in 665,  when Hashibito, another Dowager Queen – this time the wife of Karu, aka Koutoku Tennou - passed away on the 25th day of the 2nd month.  On the first day of the 3rd month, 330 people took Buddhist vows for her sake. We are also told that in the second month the ranks of Baekje were cross-referenced with the ranks of Yamato, and then ranks were given out to some of the Baekje nobles that had come over to Yamato.  Kwisil Chipsa, who was originally ranked “Dalsol” in Baekje, was accorded “Lower Shoukin”.  That was rank 12 of the 26.  In comparison, “Dalsol” seems to have been the 2nd rank of 16 in Baekje.  Along with handing out rank, over 400 Baekje commoners, both men and women, were given residence in the Kanzaki district in Afumi.  This appears to be an area along the Aichi river, running from the Suzuka Mountains, west towards Lake Biwa. The court granted them rice-lands in the following month.  At the same time, several high ranking Baekje nobles were put in charge of building castles at strategic points around the archipelago.  These included one castle in Nagato, as well as the castles of Ohono and Woyogi, in Tsukushi.  Two years later, in 667, we also see the building of Takayasu castle, in Yamato and Yashima castle in Yamada, in Sanuki—modern Kagawa, on Shikoku, facing the Seto Inland Sea passageway.  Kaneda castle in Tsushima was also a Baekje-built one. We mentioned something about these castles last episode.  They were in the Baekje style, and as I said, the term “castle” here is more about the walls, which were largely made of rammed earth ramparts.  This means that you pile up earth and dirt in a layer and then the laborers use tools specifically to tamp it down until it is thick and hard.  Then another layer is piled on top and the process is repeated.  These walls were often placed on mountain tops, and they would follow the terrain, making them places that were easy to defend.  Beyond that, they didn't necessarily have a donjon keep or anything like that—maybe a tower so that one could see a little further, but being at the top of a mountain usually provided all the visual cues that one needed. We know there were other castles made as well.  For example, I mentioned last week about Kinojo, in Okayama, the ancient Kibi area.  Kinojo is not mentioned in the Nihon Shoki, but it clearly existed back then, and matches the general description of a 7th century mountain castle as built in Baekje.  The name means Demon Castle, and there is a story about it that is connected to the local Kibitsu Jinja—the Shrine to Prince Kibi.  According to legend, Kibitsu Hiko, aka Prince Kibitsu or, perhaps more appropriately, the Prince of Kibi, came to the area around the time of the Mimaki Iribiko, so probably about the 3rd century, at the head of a large force.  Kibitsu Hiko had come to defeat the demon, Ura, who lived in the nearby castle, hence Kinojo, and legend says that he freed the people from the demon's rule. As I also mentioned, last week, this particular castle may have ended up in the Momotaro story.  There are those who believe that the story of Momotarou is based on the story of Prince Kibitsu Hiko, and his defeat of the so-called demon, “Ura”.   Certainly the story has grown more fantastical, and less connected to the ancient history of the Kibi region, but it still may have its origin in a much more standard legend of a founding prince of the ancient Kibi kingdom that was later changed into a fairy tale.   More likely, the castle was built by a Baekje nobleman, often thought to be a prince, who settled in the area.  There is the possibility that the demon's name “Ura” came from a mistranslation of his name, or it is also possible that he was unrelated to the story at all.  The Kibitsu Hiko legend may have incorporated the castle, Kinojo, at a later date, once people had forgotten when and why the castle was actually built. It would make sense if Kinojo had been built as part of the defenses for Yamato, as that area overlooks a large part of the fertile plains of Okayama and out beyond Kojima to the Seto Inland Sea -- it is perched over a key overland route from the western edge of Honshu to Yamato, and there would have been several ways to signal boats to put to sea to intercept forces on the water.  . This all suggests to me that Kinojo was probably part of Naka no Oe's castle-building effort, even if it isn't specifically remembered in the Chronicle.  But building castles wasn't enough to bring peace of mind that Yamato would survive a Tang invasion, and it is possibly as a defensive measure that Naka no Oe would go on to do something truly incredible—he would eventually move the capital from Asuka and Naniwa all the way to the shores of Lake Biwa itself, establishing the Ohotsu palace.  This was a truly extreme step that didn't endear Naka no Oe to the court, but it had several advantages.  For one thing, this move pulled the capital further away from the sea routes, meaning that if they were attacked, they had a more defensible position.  Even more so than Yamato, the Afumi region around Lake Biwa is surrounded by mountains, with a few narrow passes that restricted movement in and out. One of these is the famous Sekigahara, which remained a choke point even up to modern times.  The name even means the Field of the Barrier, indicating the barrier and checkpoint that had been set up there in ancient times.  Moving the capital also pulled the court away from some of the previous political centers, which may have been another feature that made it attractive to Naka no Oe.  Many capital moves have been made, at least in part, to get farther away from strong Buddhist temples, and this certainly would have moved things out of the Asuka region, which by now was a hotbed of Buddhist temple activity. But we'll talk about that all more, next episode.  Until then, thank you once again for listening and for all of your support. If you like what we are doing, please tell your friends and feel free to rate us wherever you listen to podcasts.  If you feel the need to do more, and want to help us keep this going, we have information about how you can donate on Patreon or through our KoFi site, ko-fi.com/sengokudaimyo, or find the links over at our main website,  SengokuDaimyo.com/Podcast, where we will have some more discussion on topics from this episode. Also, feel free to reach out to our Sengoku Daimyo Facebook page.  You can also email us at the.sengoku.daimyo@gmail.com.  Thank you, also, to Ellen for their work editing the podcast. And that's all for now.  Thank you again, and I'll see you next episode on Sengoku Daimyo's Chronicles of Japan

Chris Do is coming to Singapore!

We follow Korea's thousand-year struggle to maintain its integrity and independence, fending off cataclysmic invasions by the Mongols, the Manchus, and the samurai of Japan, and repeatedly transforming itself -- from a confederation of Buddhist warrior-nobles, to a strictly Confucian surveillance state, to a fledgling modern industrial nation -- before finally falling to Meiji Japan. Suggested reading: Han Woo-Keun, “The History of Korea”; Michael J. Seth, “A History of Korea” & “A Brief History of Korea”; Takashi Hatada, “A History of Korea”; Ki-Baek Lee, “A New History of Korea” Image: Seokguram Grotto, outside Gyeongju, late 700s Please sign on as a patron to hear all patron-only lectures! -- www.patreon.com/c/user?u=5530632

Mencius (c. 371–289 BC) was a prominent Confucian philosopher known as the “Second Sage” after Confucius. He emphasized the innate goodness of human nature, advocating for humane governance, moral cultivation, and the welfare of citizens. His teachings greatly influenced Confucianism and later Neo-Confucian thought.

In Economic Thought in Modern China: Market and Consumption, c.1500–1937 (Cambridge University Press, 2020), Margherita Zanasi argues that basic notions of a free market economy emerged in China a century and half earlier than in Europe. In response to the commercial revolutions of the late 1500s, Chinese intellectuals and officials called for the end of state intervention in the market, recognizing its power to self-regulate. They also noted the elasticity of domestic demand and production, arguing in favour of ending long-standing rules against luxury consumption, an idea that emerged in Europe in the late seventeenth and early nineteenth centuries. Zanasi challenges Eurocentric theories of economic modernization as well as the assumption that European Enlightenment thought was unique in its ability to produce innovative economic ideas. She instead establishes a direct connection between observations of local economic conditions and the formulation of new theories, revealing the unexpected flexibility of the Confucian tradition and its accommodation of seemingly unorthodox ideas. Margherita Zanasi is Professor of Chinese History at Louisiana State University. She has published widely on different aspects of modern China's history, including her first book Saving the Nation: Economic Modernity in Republican China (University of Chicago Press, 2005). She also serves as the editor of the journal Twentieth Century China.  Ghassan Moazzin is an Assistant Professor at the Hong Kong Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences and the Department of History at the University of Hong Kong. He works on the economic and business history of 19th and 20th century China, with a particular focus on the history of foreign banking, international finance and electricity in modern China. His first book, Foreign Banks and Global Finance in Modern China: Banking on the Chinese Frontier, 1870–1919, is forthcoming with Cambridge University Press.

In Economic Thought in Modern China: Market and Consumption, c.1500–1937 (Cambridge University Press, 2020), Margherita Zanasi argues that basic notions of a free market economy emerged in China a century and half earlier than in Europe. In response to the commercial revolutions of the late 1500s, Chinese intellectuals and officials called for the end of state intervention in the market, recognizing its power to self-regulate. They also noted the elasticity of domestic demand and production, arguing in favour of ending long-standing rules against luxury consumption, an idea that emerged in Europe in the late seventeenth and early nineteenth centuries. Zanasi challenges Eurocentric theories of economic modernization as well as the assumption that European Enlightenment thought was unique in its ability to produce innovative economic ideas. She instead establishes a direct connection between observations of local economic conditions and the formulation of new theories, revealing the unexpected flexibility of the Confucian tradition and its accommodation of seemingly unorthodox ideas. Margherita Zanasi is Professor of Chinese History at Louisiana State University. She has published widely on different aspects of modern China's history, including her first book Saving the Nation: Economic Modernity in Republican China (University of Chicago Press, 2005). She also serves as the editor of the journal Twentieth Century China.  Ghassan Moazzin is an Assistant Professor at the Hong Kong Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences and the Department of History at the University of Hong Kong. He works on the economic and business history of 19th and 20th century China, with a particular focus on the history of foreign banking, international finance and electricity in modern China. His first book, Foreign Banks and Global Finance in Modern China: Banking on the Chinese Frontier, 1870–1919, is forthcoming with Cambridge University Press. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

In Economic Thought in Modern China: Market and Consumption, c.1500–1937 (Cambridge University Press, 2020), Margherita Zanasi argues that basic notions of a free market economy emerged in China a century and half earlier than in Europe. In response to the commercial revolutions of the late 1500s, Chinese intellectuals and officials called for the end of state intervention in the market, recognizing its power to self-regulate. They also noted the elasticity of domestic demand and production, arguing in favour of ending long-standing rules against luxury consumption, an idea that emerged in Europe in the late seventeenth and early nineteenth centuries. Zanasi challenges Eurocentric theories of economic modernization as well as the assumption that European Enlightenment thought was unique in its ability to produce innovative economic ideas. She instead establishes a direct connection between observations of local economic conditions and the formulation of new theories, revealing the unexpected flexibility of the Confucian tradition and its accommodation of seemingly unorthodox ideas. Margherita Zanasi is Professor of Chinese History at Louisiana State University. She has published widely on different aspects of modern China's history, including her first book Saving the Nation: Economic Modernity in Republican China (University of Chicago Press, 2005). She also serves as the editor of the journal Twentieth Century China.  Ghassan Moazzin is an Assistant Professor at the Hong Kong Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences and the Department of History at the University of Hong Kong. He works on the economic and business history of 19th and 20th century China, with a particular focus on the history of foreign banking, international finance and electricity in modern China. His first book, Foreign Banks and Global Finance in Modern China: Banking on the Chinese Frontier, 1870–1919, is forthcoming with Cambridge University Press. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

In Economic Thought in Modern China: Market and Consumption, c.1500–1937 (Cambridge University Press, 2020), Margherita Zanasi argues that basic notions of a free market economy emerged in China a century and half earlier than in Europe. In response to the commercial revolutions of the late 1500s, Chinese intellectuals and officials called for the end of state intervention in the market, recognizing its power to self-regulate. They also noted the elasticity of domestic demand and production, arguing in favour of ending long-standing rules against luxury consumption, an idea that emerged in Europe in the late seventeenth and early nineteenth centuries. Zanasi challenges Eurocentric theories of economic modernization as well as the assumption that European Enlightenment thought was unique in its ability to produce innovative economic ideas. She instead establishes a direct connection between observations of local economic conditions and the formulation of new theories, revealing the unexpected flexibility of the Confucian tradition and its accommodation of seemingly unorthodox ideas. Margherita Zanasi is Professor of Chinese History at Louisiana State University. She has published widely on different aspects of modern China's history, including her first book Saving the Nation: Economic Modernity in Republican China (University of Chicago Press, 2005). She also serves as the editor of the journal Twentieth Century China.  Ghassan Moazzin is an Assistant Professor at the Hong Kong Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences and the Department of History at the University of Hong Kong. He works on the economic and business history of 19th and 20th century China, with a particular focus on the history of foreign banking, international finance and electricity in modern China. His first book, Foreign Banks and Global Finance in Modern China: Banking on the Chinese Frontier, 1870–1919, is forthcoming with Cambridge University Press. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/intellectual-history

In Economic Thought in Modern China: Market and Consumption, c.1500–1937 (Cambridge University Press, 2020), Margherita Zanasi argues that basic notions of a free market economy emerged in China a century and half earlier than in Europe. In response to the commercial revolutions of the late 1500s, Chinese intellectuals and officials called for the end of state intervention in the market, recognizing its power to self-regulate. They also noted the elasticity of domestic demand and production, arguing in favour of ending long-standing rules against luxury consumption, an idea that emerged in Europe in the late seventeenth and early nineteenth centuries. Zanasi challenges Eurocentric theories of economic modernization as well as the assumption that European Enlightenment thought was unique in its ability to produce innovative economic ideas. She instead establishes a direct connection between observations of local economic conditions and the formulation of new theories, revealing the unexpected flexibility of the Confucian tradition and its accommodation of seemingly unorthodox ideas. Margherita Zanasi is Professor of Chinese History at Louisiana State University. She has published widely on different aspects of modern China's history, including her first book Saving the Nation: Economic Modernity in Republican China (University of Chicago Press, 2005). She also serves as the editor of the journal Twentieth Century China.  Ghassan Moazzin is an Assistant Professor at the Hong Kong Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences and the Department of History at the University of Hong Kong. He works on the economic and business history of 19th and 20th century China, with a particular focus on the history of foreign banking, international finance and electricity in modern China. His first book, Foreign Banks and Global Finance in Modern China: Banking on the Chinese Frontier, 1870–1919, is forthcoming with Cambridge University Press. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In Economic Thought in Modern China: Market and Consumption, c.1500–1937 (Cambridge University Press, 2020), Margherita Zanasi argues that basic notions of a free market economy emerged in China a century and half earlier than in Europe. In response to the commercial revolutions of the late 1500s, Chinese intellectuals and officials called for the end of state intervention in the market, recognizing its power to self-regulate. They also noted the elasticity of domestic demand and production, arguing in favour of ending long-standing rules against luxury consumption, an idea that emerged in Europe in the late seventeenth and early nineteenth centuries. Zanasi challenges Eurocentric theories of economic modernization as well as the assumption that European Enlightenment thought was unique in its ability to produce innovative economic ideas. She instead establishes a direct connection between observations of local economic conditions and the formulation of new theories, revealing the unexpected flexibility of the Confucian tradition and its accommodation of seemingly unorthodox ideas. Margherita Zanasi is Professor of Chinese History at Louisiana State University. She has published widely on different aspects of modern China's history, including her first book Saving the Nation: Economic Modernity in Republican China (University of Chicago Press, 2005). She also serves as the editor of the journal Twentieth Century China.  Ghassan Moazzin is an Assistant Professor at the Hong Kong Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences and the Department of History at the University of Hong Kong. He works on the economic and business history of 19th and 20th century China, with a particular focus on the history of foreign banking, international finance and electricity in modern China. His first book, Foreign Banks and Global Finance in Modern China: Banking on the Chinese Frontier, 1870–1919, is forthcoming with Cambridge University Press. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies

Regina Linke|Author|Ilustrator|Art, Storytelling, and Cultural Identity The Power of Visual NarrativesToday, we're joined by Regina Linke, a Taiwanese American artist who brings ancient Chinese art and philosophy to a new generation. She specializes in contemporary Chinese gongbi-style painting and is the creator of The Oxherd Boy, a bestselling webcomic-turned-book that shares heartwarming stories inspired by Taoist, Buddhist, and Confucian wisdom. Her work makes these timeless ideas accessible and engaging for modern audiences. With a background in marketing tech and a passion for East Asian folklore, Regina continues to bridge past and present through her art. Her next picture book, Big Enough, arrives in April 2025.Link:https://reginalinke.com/Support PEG by checking out our Sponsors:Download and use Newsly for free now from www.newsly.me or from the link in the description, and use promo code “GHOST” and receive a 1-month free premium subscription.The best tool for getting podcast guests:https://podmatch.com/signup/phantomelectricghostSubscribe to our Instagram for exclusive content:https://www.instagram.com/expansive_sound_experiments/Subscribe to our YouTube https://youtube.com/@phantomelectricghost?si=rEyT56WQvDsAoRprPEG uses StreamYard.com for our live podcastshttps://streamyard.com/pal/c/6290085463457792Get $10.00 Credit for using StreamYard.com when you sign up with our linkRSShttps://anchor.fm/s/3b31908/podcast/rss

We inaugurate the brilliant Taiwanese master Edward Yang with a conversation about his transcendent 1994 social satire A Confucian Confusion. Following up his staggering masterwork A Brighter Summer Day, Yang turned his attention to Taipei in the 1990s at the height of its rapid evolution into a port city of global capital and the effects this shift had on the value systems and relational dynamics of the city's people. Evoking the slapstick and breackneck pacing of more popular modes of cinema - including the American romantic comedy - the film follows a large ensemble of Taipei's young professionals caught up in the frenzy of capitalism's mechanisms of social order, all in pursuit of an irresolute alternative that can liberate them from their self-made misery and help them achieve something approaching an honest, authentic way of life. We begin with a conversation about Yang as artist, his preoccupations, his distinct convergence of heart and wit. Then, we break down A Confucian Confusion's ensemble, how the characters reflect Yang's feelings about Taipei's consumer-friendly, corporatized status, and how honest desire is sublimated into the cold calculus of business language - a phenomenon that presages and predicts modern tech culture and its bastardized language of wellness and attunement. Finally, we discuss the film's unique and delicate balance of trenchant political satire and touching character drama; how Yang achieves a profound and honest reflection of the minor victories and acts of liberation we can achieve within a totalizing capitalist milieu. Get access to all of our premium episodes and bonus content by becoming a Hit Factory Patron for just $5/month.....Our theme song is "Mirror" by Chris Fish. 

The Great Learning (Traditional Chinese: 大學, Simplified: 大学, Pinyin: Dàxué, Korean: 대학, Japanese: 大学, Vietnamese: Đại Học) is one of the Four Books (Great Learning, Doctrine of the Mean, Analects, Mencius) of Confucianism. The text consists of a short main text attributed to Confucius (孔子) and ten commentary chapters attributed to Zengzi (曾子) the disciple of Confucius. The translation also includes interspersed notes by the 12th-century philosopher Zhu Xi (朱熹). Zhu Xi's master Cheng Yi (程颐) says, "The Great Learning is a Book transmitted by the Confucian School, and forms the gate by which first learners enter into virtue. That we can now perceive the order in which the ancients pursued their learning is solely owing to the preservation of this work, the Analects and Mencius coming after it. Learners must commence their course with this, and then it may be hoped they will be kept from error."

Disagreements between the Mohists and the Confucians: is seeking benefits the right way to approach life? What motivates us to act morally, care for our loved ones or a doctrine of impartiality?

“One thing I would note about the Trumpian populists and their counterparts elsewhere in the West today is that they're a very peculiarly tribal kind of post conservative right. It's almost a kind of reassertion of paganism and tribal boundaries and grievance. That is very different from a more traditional kind of conservatism, where the texture of society and the accumulated wisdom of the past and the cultivation of virtue loomed large – at least as ideals, as aspirations. In contrast to that, this kind of contemporary populism has very little texture or wisdom or virtue – its more like a resentful atomism that is invoking certain tribal markers of membership because it's politically convenient, as it were.” – Adam Kempton Webb, NBN interview March 2025 In this expansive and thought-provoking interview, Adam K. Webb lays out a sweeping vision for a post-liberal, post-national world constitution, challenging the dominance of state sovereignty, corporate capitalism, and procedural liberalism. Drawing on over a quarter-century of scholarship culminating in his latest book The World's Constitution (Routledge, 2025) Webb proposes a system of functional sphere pluralism, where governance is rooted in ethical traditions rather than ideology – where citizenship, law, and economic participation are no longer restricted by territorial nation-states. Coming to terms with Webb's interdisciplinary and cross-cultural perspective suggests an affinity with thinkers like the late James C. Scott, in his critique of centralized control, coupled with the sensibilities of Roger Scruton and Patrick Deneen, in their defense of ethical and cultural order. Yet Webb diverges from them all in his insistence on a global, meta-constitutional framework, which might place him closer to the likes of Robert D. Kaplan, as seen in his latest work on civilizational cycles and geopolitical evolution. From his critique of elite legal capture (responding to a question on Katharina Pistor's The Code of Capital) to his historical engagement with Confucian, Islamic, and European pluralist traditions, Webb offers a bold alternative to today's stagnating governance models. Whether you are interested in constitutional theory, global governance, or the future of civilization itself, the professor's insights in this interview offers an intellectually rich and thought provoking conversation that is well worth your time. Below are links to Dr. Webb's latest books – Taylor & Francis Open Access publications: Deep Cosmopolis: Rethinking World Politics and Globalization (2015) The World's Constitution: Spheres of Liberty in the Future Global Order (2025) Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

“One thing I would note about the Trumpian populists and their counterparts elsewhere in the West today is that they're a very peculiarly tribal kind of post conservative right. It's almost a kind of reassertion of paganism and tribal boundaries and grievance. That is very different from a more traditional kind of conservatism, where the texture of society and the accumulated wisdom of the past and the cultivation of virtue loomed large – at least as ideals, as aspirations. In contrast to that, this kind of contemporary populism has very little texture or wisdom or virtue – its more like a resentful atomism that is invoking certain tribal markers of membership because it's politically convenient, as it were.” – Adam Kempton Webb, NBN interview March 2025 In this expansive and thought-provoking interview, Adam K. Webb lays out a sweeping vision for a post-liberal, post-national world constitution, challenging the dominance of state sovereignty, corporate capitalism, and procedural liberalism. Drawing on over a quarter-century of scholarship culminating in his latest book The World's Constitution (Routledge, 2025) Webb proposes a system of functional sphere pluralism, where governance is rooted in ethical traditions rather than ideology – where citizenship, law, and economic participation are no longer restricted by territorial nation-states. Coming to terms with Webb's interdisciplinary and cross-cultural perspective suggests an affinity with thinkers like the late James C. Scott, in his critique of centralized control, coupled with the sensibilities of Roger Scruton and Patrick Deneen, in their defense of ethical and cultural order. Yet Webb diverges from them all in his insistence on a global, meta-constitutional framework, which might place him closer to the likes of Robert D. Kaplan, as seen in his latest work on civilizational cycles and geopolitical evolution. From his critique of elite legal capture (responding to a question on Katharina Pistor's The Code of Capital) to his historical engagement with Confucian, Islamic, and European pluralist traditions, Webb offers a bold alternative to today's stagnating governance models. Whether you are interested in constitutional theory, global governance, or the future of civilization itself, the professor's insights in this interview offers an intellectually rich and thought provoking conversation that is well worth your time. Below are links to Dr. Webb's latest books – Taylor & Francis Open Access publications: Deep Cosmopolis: Rethinking World Politics and Globalization (2015) The World's Constitution: Spheres of Liberty in the Future Global Order (2025) Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/political-science

“One thing I would note about the Trumpian populists and their counterparts elsewhere in the West today is that they're a very peculiarly tribal kind of post conservative right. It's almost a kind of reassertion of paganism and tribal boundaries and grievance. That is very different from a more traditional kind of conservatism, where the texture of society and the accumulated wisdom of the past and the cultivation of virtue loomed large – at least as ideals, as aspirations. In contrast to that, this kind of contemporary populism has very little texture or wisdom or virtue – its more like a resentful atomism that is invoking certain tribal markers of membership because it's politically convenient, as it were.” – Adam Kempton Webb, NBN interview March 2025 In this expansive and thought-provoking interview, Adam K. Webb lays out a sweeping vision for a post-liberal, post-national world constitution, challenging the dominance of state sovereignty, corporate capitalism, and procedural liberalism. Drawing on over a quarter-century of scholarship culminating in his latest book The World's Constitution (Routledge, 2025) Webb proposes a system of functional sphere pluralism, where governance is rooted in ethical traditions rather than ideology – where citizenship, law, and economic participation are no longer restricted by territorial nation-states. Coming to terms with Webb's interdisciplinary and cross-cultural perspective suggests an affinity with thinkers like the late James C. Scott, in his critique of centralized control, coupled with the sensibilities of Roger Scruton and Patrick Deneen, in their defense of ethical and cultural order. Yet Webb diverges from them all in his insistence on a global, meta-constitutional framework, which might place him closer to the likes of Robert D. Kaplan, as seen in his latest work on civilizational cycles and geopolitical evolution. From his critique of elite legal capture (responding to a question on Katharina Pistor's The Code of Capital) to his historical engagement with Confucian, Islamic, and European pluralist traditions, Webb offers a bold alternative to today's stagnating governance models. Whether you are interested in constitutional theory, global governance, or the future of civilization itself, the professor's insights in this interview offers an intellectually rich and thought provoking conversation that is well worth your time. Below are links to Dr. Webb's latest books – Taylor & Francis Open Access publications: Deep Cosmopolis: Rethinking World Politics and Globalization (2015) The World's Constitution: Spheres of Liberty in the Future Global Order (2025) Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/world-affairs

Questions? Comments? Text Us!How do rituals, traditions, and philosophical reasoning shape our understanding of the divine and the human experience?In this episode of God: An Autobiography, The Podcast, Dr. Jerry L. Martin and Dr. Michael Poliakoff explore the evolution of thought and tradition from ancient Jewish practices and Egyptian influences to the philosophical insights of Plato, Aristotle, Confucius, and Emmanuel Levinas.The conversation examines how humanity has sought wisdom across cultures and eras—from the Torah's laws to Aristotelian virtue, Confucian ethics, and Levinas' concept of “the other.” How do ritual and habit shape moral understanding? And what happens when tradition gives way to reason?Key Themes in This Episode:Ritual and Ethical Evolution – From Jewish law and Confucian rites to Aristotle's philosophy of virtueJonah and Nineveh: God's Call Beyond Borders – What it means to be “chosen” and how divine purpose extends beyond any single traditionLevinas and the Ethics of the Other – How encountering another person transforms our understanding of self and moralityThe Power of Tradition in Daily Life – From religious rituals to simple habits, how they shape human interaction and spiritualityBreaking Down Borders: Ancient Thought and Modern Philosophy – How wisdom from across cultures connects in the search for meaningThis episode presents a rare exploration of how ritual and reason interact—not just in religious practice, but in the very fabric of human thought. Whether you're interested in philosophy, history, or spirituality, this discussion offers insights that transcend time and tradition.Other Series:The podcast began with the Dramatic Adaptation of the book and now has several series:From God To Jerry To You- a brand-new series calling for the attention of spiritual seekers everywhere, featuring breakthroughs, pathways, and illuminations.Two Philosophers Wrestle With God- sit in on a dialogue between philosophers about God and the questions we all have. What's On Our Mind- Connect the dots with Jerry and Scott over the most recent series episodes. What's On Your Mind- What are readers and listeners saying? What is God sayingResources:THE LIFE WISDOM PROJECT PLAYLISTStay ConnectedSubscribe to the podcast for free, and explore the book God and Autobiography as Told to a Philosopher by Jerry L. Martin, available on amazon and at godanautobiography.com.Share your thoughts or questions at questions@godandautobiography.com—we'd love to hear your story of God!

Regarding the Song Dynasty mandarin who defined the mission for the Confucian intelligentsia.Support the show

Fluent Fiction - Mandarin Chinese: Discovering Roots: A Journey Through Family and Time Find the full episode transcript, vocabulary words, and more:fluentfiction.com/zh/episode/2025-03-18-22-34-01-zh Story Transcript:Zh: 阳光透过图书馆的大窗户，洒在刘伟的脸上。En: Sunlight streamed through the large windows of the library, casting its glow on Liu Wei's face.Zh: 他坐在窗边，看着外面的樱花树，心里满是忧伤。En: Sitting by the window, he looked at the cherry blossom tree outside, his heart filled with sadness.Zh: 他的新家就在附近，因为父母离婚，他搬到了奶奶家。En: His new home was nearby, as he had moved to his grandmother's place after his parents' divorce.Zh: 这个春天，他特别想念过去的生活和朋友。En: This spring, he particularly missed his past life and friends.Zh: 刘伟是个内向的少年，但他也很有思想。En: Liu Wei was an introverted teenager, but he was also very thoughtful.Zh: 他知道清明节快到了，这是个祭拜祖先的日子。En: He knew that the Qingming Festival was approaching, a day to honor one's ancestors.Zh: 他很好奇自己的家族历史，却不敢问奶奶。En: He was curious about his own family history, yet didn't dare to ask his grandmother, fearing that it might bring up painful memories for her.Zh: 他怕奶奶会想起伤心的往事。En: In search of answers, he decided to start at the public library.Zh: 为了寻找答案，他决定先从公共图书馆开始。En: In this quiet room, ancient scrolls coexisted with modern books, as if to tell him that the past and present could coexist.Zh: 在这个安静的房间里，古老的卷轴与现代的书籍相依，仿佛在告诉他，过去与现在是可以共存的。En: There were many books about family history on the shelves.Zh: 书架上有很多关于家族历史的书籍。En: Liu Wei flipped through one and then another.Zh: 刘伟翻翻这本，看看那本。En: He was deeply drawn to one of them, which talked about a family sharing the same surname, Liu.Zh: 他被其中的一本深深吸引，书中讲的是一个同姓刘的家族。En: He discovered that his ancestor had once been a highly learned Confucian scholar, a finding that surprised and excited him.Zh: 他发现，自己的先祖竟然曾是个学识渊博的大儒，这让他感到意外又兴奋。En: With this discovery, Liu Wei gathered his courage.Zh: 带着这个发现，刘伟鼓起勇气。En: He decided to participate in the ancestral rites and go with his grandmother to visit the gravesite.Zh: 他决定参加祭祖活动，和奶奶一起去扫墓。En: On the day of the Qingming Festival, they arrived at their ancestors' burial ground.Zh: 清明节那天，他们来到祖先的墓地。En: As his grandmother gently cleaned the tombstone, she softly recounted stories of the past.Zh: 奶奶一边擦拭墓碑，一边轻声讲述过去的故事。En: Listening intently, Liu Wei felt his heart gradually calm down.Zh: 刘伟认真聆听，心里渐渐平静下来。En: After the ancestral rites were completed, his grandmother held Liu Wei's hand, her eyes full of affection.Zh: 祭拜完毕，奶奶握住刘伟的手，眼中满是慈爱。En: Liu Wei smiled slightly, feeling a long-lost sense of connection.Zh: 刘伟微微一笑，心中感到了一种久违的联系感。En: He realized that behind him lay a long and rich family history, and he was no longer alone.Zh: 他知道，自己的身后有一个悠久而丰富的家族，他不再是孤单的。En: On the way home, a gentle breeze blew, and cherry blossom petals fell like rain.Zh: 在回家的路上，微风轻拂，樱花瓣如雨般飘落，刘伟感到一种从未有过的平和。En: Liu Wei felt a new sense of peace he had never experienced before.Zh: 他的生活虽然有了改变，但他对这一切更加开放。En: Although his life had changed, he was more open to all of it.Zh: 他与奶奶之间的纽带也更为紧密，家族的历史像是给了他一个坚实的依靠。En: The bond with his grandmother also grew stronger, and the history of his family offered him a solid support.Zh: 这个春天，他找到了属于自己的地方和故事。En: This spring, he found his place and his story. Vocabulary Words:streamed: 透过casting: 洒introverted: 内向的thoughtful: 有思想的approaching: 快到了honor: 祭拜ancestors: 祖先curious: 好奇ascertained: 发现participate: 参加ancestral: 祖先的rites: 活动gravesite: 墓地recounted: 讲述listening intently: 认真聆听gradually: 渐渐calm: 平静affection: 慈爱connection: 联系感long-lost: 久违的breeze: 微风solid support: 坚实的依靠scholar: 大儒curiosity: 好奇心coexist: 共存scrolls: 卷轴past life: 过去的生活divorce: 离婚rich: 丰富solid: 坚实

In early nineteenth-century China, a remarkable transformation took place in the art world: artists among China's educated elites began to use touch to forge a more authentic relationship to the past, to challenge stagnant artistic canons, and to foster deeper human connections. Networks of Touch is an engaging exploration of this sensory turn. In Networks of Touch: A Tactile History of Chinese Art, 1790-1840 (Penn State UP, 2023), Michael J. Hatch examines the artistic network of Ruan Yuan (1764-1849), a scholar-official whose patronage supported a generation of artists and learned people who prioritized epigraphic research as a means of truing the warped contours of Confucian heritage. Their work instigated an "epigraphic aesthetic"--an appropriation of the stylistic, material, and tactile features of ancient inscribed objects and their reproductive technologies--in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century artwork. Rubbings, a reduplicative technology, challenged the dominance of brushwork as the bearer of artistic authority. While brushwork represented the artist's physical presence through ink and paper, rubbings were direct facsimiles of tactile experiences with objects. This shift empowered artists and scholars to transcend traditional conventions and explore new mediums, uniting previously separate image-making practices while engaging audiences through the senses. Centering on touch and presenting a fresh perspective on early nineteenth-century literati art in China, this volume sheds light on a period often dismissed as lacking innovation and calls into question optical realism's perceived supremacy in reshaping the sensory experience of the modern Chinese viewer. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

In early nineteenth-century China, a remarkable transformation took place in the art world: artists among China's educated elites began to use touch to forge a more authentic relationship to the past, to challenge stagnant artistic canons, and to foster deeper human connections. Networks of Touch is an engaging exploration of this sensory turn. In Networks of Touch: A Tactile History of Chinese Art, 1790-1840 (Penn State UP, 2023), Michael J. Hatch examines the artistic network of Ruan Yuan (1764-1849), a scholar-official whose patronage supported a generation of artists and learned people who prioritized epigraphic research as a means of truing the warped contours of Confucian heritage. Their work instigated an "epigraphic aesthetic"--an appropriation of the stylistic, material, and tactile features of ancient inscribed objects and their reproductive technologies--in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century artwork. Rubbings, a reduplicative technology, challenged the dominance of brushwork as the bearer of artistic authority. While brushwork represented the artist's physical presence through ink and paper, rubbings were direct facsimiles of tactile experiences with objects. This shift empowered artists and scholars to transcend traditional conventions and explore new mediums, uniting previously separate image-making practices while engaging audiences through the senses. Centering on touch and presenting a fresh perspective on early nineteenth-century literati art in China, this volume sheds light on a period often dismissed as lacking innovation and calls into question optical realism's perceived supremacy in reshaping the sensory experience of the modern Chinese viewer. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

Echo chambers are a growing concern in today's social and political landscape, reinforcing existing beliefs and fostering distrust. Some argue that civility isn't owed to those entrenched in these environments, while others suggest that moderate incivility is justified in response to problematic views. But what if there's a better way?In this episode, we explore an alternative vision inspired by Chinese philosophy. Emily's guest, Kyle van Oosterum, introduces the concept of ‘reparative civility'—a framework rooted in Confucian traditions that aims to rebuild fractured social relationships. Kyle is a Research Fellow in Political Philosophy at UCL's Digital Speech Lab, specializing in political theory, social epistemology, and democratic discourse.Mentioned in this episode:Digital Speech LabKyle van Oosterum (2025) Confucian Harmony, Civility, and Echo Chambers. Journal of Applied Philosophy. UCL's Department of Political Science and School of Public Policy offers a uniquely stimulating environment for the study of all fields of politics, including international relations, political theory, human rights, public policy-making and administration. The Department is recognised for its world-class research and policy impact, ranking among the top departments in the UK on both the 2021 Research Excellence Framework and the latest Guardian rankings.

In early nineteenth-century China, a remarkable transformation took place in the art world: artists among China's educated elites began to use touch to forge a more authentic relationship to the past, to challenge stagnant artistic canons, and to foster deeper human connections. Networks of Touch is an engaging exploration of this sensory turn. In Networks of Touch: A Tactile History of Chinese Art, 1790-1840 (Penn State UP, 2023), Michael J. Hatch examines the artistic network of Ruan Yuan (1764-1849), a scholar-official whose patronage supported a generation of artists and learned people who prioritized epigraphic research as a means of truing the warped contours of Confucian heritage. Their work instigated an "epigraphic aesthetic"--an appropriation of the stylistic, material, and tactile features of ancient inscribed objects and their reproductive technologies--in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century artwork. Rubbings, a reduplicative technology, challenged the dominance of brushwork as the bearer of artistic authority. While brushwork represented the artist's physical presence through ink and paper, rubbings were direct facsimiles of tactile experiences with objects. This shift empowered artists and scholars to transcend traditional conventions and explore new mediums, uniting previously separate image-making practices while engaging audiences through the senses. Centering on touch and presenting a fresh perspective on early nineteenth-century literati art in China, this volume sheds light on a period often dismissed as lacking innovation and calls into question optical realism's perceived supremacy in reshaping the sensory experience of the modern Chinese viewer. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies

In early nineteenth-century China, a remarkable transformation took place in the art world: artists among China's educated elites began to use touch to forge a more authentic relationship to the past, to challenge stagnant artistic canons, and to foster deeper human connections. Networks of Touch is an engaging exploration of this sensory turn. In Networks of Touch: A Tactile History of Chinese Art, 1790-1840 (Penn State UP, 2023), Michael J. Hatch examines the artistic network of Ruan Yuan (1764-1849), a scholar-official whose patronage supported a generation of artists and learned people who prioritized epigraphic research as a means of truing the warped contours of Confucian heritage. Their work instigated an "epigraphic aesthetic"--an appropriation of the stylistic, material, and tactile features of ancient inscribed objects and their reproductive technologies--in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century artwork. Rubbings, a reduplicative technology, challenged the dominance of brushwork as the bearer of artistic authority. While brushwork represented the artist's physical presence through ink and paper, rubbings were direct facsimiles of tactile experiences with objects. This shift empowered artists and scholars to transcend traditional conventions and explore new mediums, uniting previously separate image-making practices while engaging audiences through the senses. Centering on touch and presenting a fresh perspective on early nineteenth-century literati art in China, this volume sheds light on a period often dismissed as lacking innovation and calls into question optical realism's perceived supremacy in reshaping the sensory experience of the modern Chinese viewer. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/art

In this episode, I speak with Chi-Ming Lam, Acting Head & Associate Professor, Department of International Education in the Education University of Hong Kong.  We had a great conversation about his work "Building ethical virtual classrooms: Confucian perspectives on avatars and VR."

When the world told them to sit down, they danced. When their voices were silenced, they sang. When religion and government tried to erase them, they thrived in the shadows. Welcome to the story of mudang (무당), the women who shaped and preserved Korean shamanism (or Musok 무속) against all odds. This episode dives into their centuries-long defiance and the magic, rebellion, and resilience that kept their traditions alive. ✨ How Korean shamanism became a lifeline for women cast out by Confucian society

Was he a Confucian or a Legalist? Regarding one of the most controversial Chinese thinkers.Support the show

What is the meaning of love in modern Chinese politics? Why has 愛 ai (love) been a crucial political discourse for secular nationalism for generations of political leaders as a powerful instrument to the present day? Religion, Secularism, and Love as a Political Discourse in Modern China (Amsterdam University Press, 2025) offers the first systematic examination of the ways in which the notion of love has been introduced, adapted, and engineered as a political discourse for the building and rebuilding of a secular modern nation, all the while appropriating Confucianism, Christianity, popular religion, ghost stories, political religion, and their religious affects. The insights of this exploration expand not only the discussion of the role of emotions in the project of Chinese modernity, but also the study of affective governance and religious nationalisms around the world today. Expanding this book's sensitivity to the reinvention of traditions in modern politics, her next project will contextualise and historicise the political evolution of “Confucian patriarchy” in East Asia against two forms of binary essentialisation: the state's reinvention and the Orientalist imagination of Asian religions. The pilot research on this topic is published as “Double Decolonization: Bridging East Asia and Religious Studies in a Post-COVID World.” Another project, based on her own diasporic experience, will explore the religious role in the dynamics of “conservative minorities” in North America who align with right-wing politics despite historical experiences of racism and exclusion themselves. A brief survey of this topic is published as “On Sinophone Evangelical Conservatism and Trumpism.” She will also look at the intraminority solidarity among minorities of different racial and religious backgrounds, inspired by her pilot fieldwork in Canada with young Sinophone feminists who find solidarity and hope with Muslim, Indigenous, and Black communities and movements. By highlighting the intersections of religion, gender, and multiple imperialisms, she aims to broaden the scope of decolonial theory and offer new perspectives on the global power structures that shape contemporary religious and political identities. Works mentioned in the podcast: - (Forthcoming) “Sisters, Strangers, Friends: Queering the Political Discourse of Love.” Special issue: Feminist and Queer Critiques of Multiple Empires: The Case of Sinophone Asia, International Feminist Journal of Politics. - 2024 “Double Decolonization: Bridging East Asia and Religious Studies in a Post-Covid World.” Implicit Religion 25.3–4, pp. 399–415. 2024 Special issue on religion, identity, and social movements in Hong Kong, Journal of Asian Studies 83 (2). - 2021“Christianity and Sinophone Trumpism.” Reflexion 42, pp. 243–250. Author Ting Guo is Assistant Professor of Cultural and Religious Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong and book reviewer editor for the Journal of the American Academy of Religion. She co-hosts a podcast called 時差 in-betweenness. The episode is hosted by Ailin Zhou, PhD student in Film & Digital Media at University of California - Santa Cruz. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies

Machine learning, big data and AI are reshaping the human experience and forcing us to develop a new ethical intelligence. In Buddhism and Intelligent Technology: Toward a More Humane Future (Bloomsbury, 2021), Peter Hershock offers a new way to think about attention, personal presence, and ethics as intelligent technology shatters previously foundational certainties and opens entirely new spaces of opportunity. Rather than turning exclusively to cognitive science and contemporary ethical theories, Hershock shows how classical Confucian and Socratic philosophies help to make visible what a history of choices about remaking ourselves through control biased technology has rendered invisible. But it is in Buddhist thought and practice that Hershock finds the tools for valuing and training our attention, resisting the colonization of consciousness, and engendering a more equitable and diversity-enhancing human-technology-world relationship. Focusing on who we need to be present as to avoid a future in which machines prevent us from either making or learning from our own mistakes, Hershock offers a constructive response to the unprecedented perils of intelligent technology and seamlessly blends ancient and contemporary philosophies to envision how to realize its equally unprecedented promises. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Machine learning, big data and AI are reshaping the human experience and forcing us to develop a new ethical intelligence. In Buddhism and Intelligent Technology: Toward a More Humane Future (Bloomsbury, 2021), Peter Hershock offers a new way to think about attention, personal presence, and ethics as intelligent technology shatters previously foundational certainties and opens entirely new spaces of opportunity. Rather than turning exclusively to cognitive science and contemporary ethical theories, Hershock shows how classical Confucian and Socratic philosophies help to make visible what a history of choices about remaking ourselves through control biased technology has rendered invisible. But it is in Buddhist thought and practice that Hershock finds the tools for valuing and training our attention, resisting the colonization of consciousness, and engendering a more equitable and diversity-enhancing human-technology-world relationship. Focusing on who we need to be present as to avoid a future in which machines prevent us from either making or learning from our own mistakes, Hershock offers a constructive response to the unprecedented perils of intelligent technology and seamlessly blends ancient and contemporary philosophies to envision how to realize its equally unprecedented promises. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/buddhist-studies

Machine learning, big data and AI are reshaping the human experience and forcing us to develop a new ethical intelligence. In Buddhism and Intelligent Technology: Toward a More Humane Future (Bloomsbury, 2021), Peter Hershock offers a new way to think about attention, personal presence, and ethics as intelligent technology shatters previously foundational certainties and opens entirely new spaces of opportunity. Rather than turning exclusively to cognitive science and contemporary ethical theories, Hershock shows how classical Confucian and Socratic philosophies help to make visible what a history of choices about remaking ourselves through control biased technology has rendered invisible. But it is in Buddhist thought and practice that Hershock finds the tools for valuing and training our attention, resisting the colonization of consciousness, and engendering a more equitable and diversity-enhancing human-technology-world relationship. Focusing on who we need to be present as to avoid a future in which machines prevent us from either making or learning from our own mistakes, Hershock offers a constructive response to the unprecedented perils of intelligent technology and seamlessly blends ancient and contemporary philosophies to envision how to realize its equally unprecedented promises. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/science-technology-and-society

The President of a company is a very powerful force.  They drive the direction, the strategy and the culture formation inside the enterprise.  In Western corporations, there are big salaries and big incentives tied to the leader's performance, especially around profit achievement and share price gains for shareholders.  We project this idea on to Japanese companies and imagine they are basically built in the same way.  This idea seems fine, until you ever have to get a decision from a Japanese company.  This is when you enter the twilight zone of differences about how things are really done here. Japan has some specific features which make the leadership terrain quite unique.  Mid-career hires are the norm in the West and the exception in Japan, as far as larger firms are concerned.  New graduates are malleable and the company leadership wants to install their group think, culture and conservative action methodologies in them.  Seniority is a respected Confucian attribute in Japan, which has little currency in the Darwinian, performance outcomes oriented West.  Age and stage make sense in Japan, when you spend your entire career with the one firm and are part of the fabric of that company, gradually being stitched in over decades.  The risk aversion predominance in Japanese business weighs against change and bolsters constancy.  We foreigners represent change.  To become a trusted partner with a Japanese firm means they have to make some internal changes to accommodate the new thing we bring to them or the old thing we are tweaking in a new way.  The question is, who inside the Japanese decision making hierarchy is going to take responsibility for the change.  In Western companies there is a big personal payoff to taking risks, but Japanese salaries and bonuses are not on the same planet as a country like America. So, the upside of taking a risk in Japan is far outweighed by the potential career damage if there is a failure. We have all grown up with a British Raj model of decision making.  Convert the leaders and you get the whole company to snap into gear and get with your programme.  It doesn't work like that here unless the President is the founder or the owner.  This is the “one man shacho” formula, the classic dictator President, who rules with an iron fist and drives everyone to do what ever they say.  Most big corporates though, have a structure where the President has P&L responsibility for the whole company, but the direct reports have P&L responsibility for their part of the business. The President can't force them to make expenditure allocations impacting their turf without their agreement.  Hence the reputation of Japan as the country of glacial decision making.  I find this is a bit boring, because the Raj approach is much faster and easier for me.  No one in Japan could care less what I want. I deal with a lot of Presidents, as I try my best “convert the Raj” techniques to get them to buy my training services.  Being the President of my firm, I can get access to the senior echelons of the client company and get a hearing.  This is where Western logic departs from Japanese best practice. The leaders I speak with won't personally do anything themselves.  The company has internal compliance methodologies to reduce risk and protect the firm.  The work to investigate my idea will get sent right down to the very bottom of the pile.  That lower level designated officer or tanto will start pulling together information on our company, our offer, our pricing, the market, the competitors, resources required and the prospective ROI.  The tanto will then present that report to their superior, the next up the line, who if they approve it, will place their hanko or personal seal on the document.  This is a public acknowledgment that it has passed their stringent evaluation process and they are willing to take responsibility and place it before their superior.  The hanko marks on the document will also include any divisions or sections that will be impacted by the buying decision. This is an internal harmonisation and communication process to provide checks and balances.  In this way, there are no surprises and no issues, when it comes to coordinating the execution piece.  This process is repeated all the way up to the President's direct reports who have P&L responsibility to fund the deal.  If it is a big enough decision, there may be a senior executive meeting required.  This is usually a formality to bless the decision, rather than make a decision. The plan executive sponsor will outline the idea at the meeting, there will be no questions and it is therefore agreed. Next item! The surprising thing is that the President isn't the final decision maker.  And I had such a good meeting with that President too and I thought I had the Raj technique working on steroids! Actually, the person I needed to meet was the tanto. I could either work with them directly or I could supply the information they required, for them to do their due diligence. When meeting with the President, I need to finish the meeting off, by asking to have my people get together with their tanto, to supply whatever information they need. Japan being such a polite culture, the President will happily make that introduction even if knowing that there is no chance of this deal going anywhere.  This is because it conveniently avoids anyone having to tell me a direct “no”.  If it has legs, then the tanto's job is to navigate the decision through the system. So in Japan, it is better to start at the bottom and work your way up, than try to go top down, as we are more familiar with in the West.  The tanto has to become a key messenger for us. If we can't win over a relatively junior, seemingly unimportant staff member to our cause, then the decision outcome will be remain vague and lifeless.  Now we don't want that do we.  

In our final episode on classical Confucianism, our interview guest tells us about the surprising moral depth of the concept of "etiquette"

******Support the channel******Patreon:https://www.patreon.com/thedissenterPayPal: paypal.me/thedissenterPayPal Subscription 1 Dollar:https://tinyurl.com/yb3acuuyPayPal Subscription 3 Dollars:https://tinyurl.com/ybn6bg9lPayPal Subscription 5 Dollars:https://tinyurl.com/ycmr9gpzPayPal Subscription 10 Dollars:https://tinyurl.com/y9r3fc9mPayPal Subscription 20 Dollars:https://tinyurl.com/y95uvkao ******Follow me on******Website:https://www.thedissenter.net/The Dissenter Goodreads list:https://shorturl.at/7BMoBFacebook: https://www.facebook.com/thedissenteryt/Twitter:https://x.com/TheDissenterYT This show is sponsored by Enlites, Learning & Development done differently. Check the website here:http://enlites.com/ Dr. Elena Ziliotti is an Assistant Professor of Ethics and Political Philosophy at the Delft University of Technology. She works on Comparative political theory, focusing on debates in contemporary Confucian and Western political theory. She is the author of Meritocratic Democracy: A Cross-Cultural Political Theory. In this episode, we focus on Meritocratic Democracy. We start by talking about the premise of the book, and what democracy means for political scientists and political philosophers. We talk about Western political theory and Confucian political theory. We discuss how political parties work, political meritocracy and its shortcomings, meritocratic democracy, the role of political leaders, and meritocratic screenings. Finally, we discuss the value of cross-cultural political debates.--A HUGE THANK YOU TO MY PATRONS/SUPPORTERS: PER HELGE LARSEN, JERRY MULLER, BERNARDO SEIXAS, ADAM KESSEL, MATTHEW WHITINGBIRD, ARNAUD WOLFF, TIM HOLLOSY, HENRIK AHLENIUS, FILIP FORS CONNOLLY, DAN DEMETRIOU, ROBERT WINDHAGER, RUI INACIO, ZOOP, MARCO NEVES, COLIN HOLBROOK, PHIL KAVANAGH, SAMUEL ANDREEFF, FRANCIS FORDE, TIAGO NUNES, FERGAL CUSSEN, HAL HERZOG, NUNO MACHADO, JONATHAN LEIBRANT, JOÃO LINHARES, STANTON T, SAMUEL CORREA, ERIK HAINES, MARK SMITH, JOÃO EIRA, TOM HUMMEL, SARDUS FRANCE, DAVID SLOAN WILSON, YACILA DEZA-ARAUJO, ROMAIN ROCH, DIEGO LONDOÑO CORREA, YANICK PUNTER, CHARLOTTE BLEASE, NICOLE BARBARO, ADAM HUNT, PAWEL OSTASZEWSKI, NELLEKE BAK, GUY MADISON, GARY G HELLMANN, SAIMA AFZAL, ADRIAN JAEGGI, PAULO TOLENTINO, JOÃO BARBOSA, JULIAN PRICE, EDWARD HALL, HEDIN BRØNNER, DOUGLAS FRY, FRANCA BORTOLOTTI, GABRIEL PONS CORTÈS, URSULA LITZCKE, SCOTT, ZACHARY FISH, TIM DUFFY, SUNNY SMITH, JON WISMAN, WILLIAM BUCKNER, PAUL-GEORGE ARNAUD, LUKE GLOWACKI, GEORGIOS THEOPHANOUS, CHRIS WILLIAMSON, PETER WOLOSZYN, DAVID WILLIAMS, DIOGO COSTA, ALEX CHAU, AMAURI MARTÍNEZ, CORALIE CHEVALLIER, BANGALORE ATHEISTS, LARRY D. LEE JR., OLD HERRINGBONE, MICHAEL BAILEY, DAN SPERBER, ROBERT GRESSIS, IGOR N, JEFF MCMAHAN, JAKE ZUEHL, BARNABAS RADICS, MARK CAMPBELL, TOMAS DAUBNER, LUKE NISSEN, KIMBERLY JOHNSON, JESSICA NOWICKI, LINDA BRANDIN, NIKLAS CARLSSON, GEORGE CHORIATIS, VALENTIN STEINMANN, PER KRAULIS, ALEXANDER HUBBARD, BR, MASOUD ALIMOHAMMADI, JONAS HERTNER, URSULA GOODENOUGH, DAVID PINSOF, SEAN NELSON, MIKE LAVIGNE, JOS KNECHT, ERIK ENGMAN, LUCY, MANVIR SINGH, PETRA WEIMANN, CAROLA FEEST, STARRY, MAURO JÚNIOR, 航 豊川, TONY BARRETT, BENJAMIN GELBART, AND NIKOLAI VISHNEVSKY!A SPECIAL THANKS TO MY PRODUCERS, YZAR WEHBE, JIM FRANK, ŁUKASZ STAFINIAK, TOM VANEGDOM, BERNARD HUGUENEY, CURTIS DIXON, BENEDIKT MUELLER, THOMAS TRUMBLE, KATHRINE AND PATRICK TOBIN, JONCARLO MONTENEGRO, AL NICK ORTIZ, NICK GOLDEN, AND CHRISTINE GLASS!AND TO MY EXECUTIVE PRODUCERS, MATTHEW LAVENDER, SERGIU CODREANU, BOGDAN KANIVETS, ROSEY, AND GREGORY HASTINGS!

Rosie reflects on the concept of Ren, a Confucian practice of cultivating compassion and understanding by seeing the world through others' perspectives. Through stories of Taylor Swift's Eras Tour and Oaxacan chapulines, she explores how asking open-ended questions and practicing active listening can bring us closer to those we care about—even when we don't share their tastes. Learn how empathy and curiosity can deepen connections in everyday life. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Girl, so Confucian. We sit down to unpack Edward Yang's dark horse masterpiece, 1994's A Confucian Confusion. Eli talks about his first time watching this zany comedy and how it reminded him of a lot of college friend groups. Wilson explains why he thinks this is Yang's true deep cut film, and doubles down on the film's belief on ‘emotional work'. Ben discusses how Yang injects A Confucian Confusion with an easy relatability and argues that this is a great starting point to Yang's filmography. Is this a comedy of errors, a biting critique of modern society, or both? Join us as we unravel the layers of Yang's underappreciated classic. When Cinema Reflects the Times: Hou Hsiao Hsien and Edward Yang (1993) (Dir: Hirokazu Koreeda) Feel your way into our FREE patreon, discord server, and our socials @ www.deepcutpod.com Timestamps (00:00) Intro (04:43) General reactions (11:57) Plot summary and context (15:51) Character discussion (30:30) Themes discussion: capitalism and emotion (43:00) Behind the scenes documentary with Hou (48:33) More character discussion (55:00) Ending of the film (58:50) Yang's career

Welcome to 听故事说中文, the podcast where stories come alive to help you improve your Chinese language proficiency and cultural competency. Today, we bring you a tale that is both a glimpse into history and a lesson in courage. Set in the late 19th century, our story follows a young Sun Yat-sen, the future father of modern China, as he navigates the traditional Confucian school system. In a classroom where rote learning and strict discipline reign supreme, Sun Yat-sen finds himself questioning the meaning behind the words he is forced to memorize. One day, after flawlessly reciting his lesson, he summons the courage to ask his teacher for an explanation, a move that shocks both his classmates and the teacher. Share your comments and join the conversation. _ LCTS ************************************************************ Support Our Podcast If our podcast brings value to your life and you'd like to help us continue creating great content, consider becoming a patron for as little as $7 a month. As a patron, you will enjoy: ✨ Ad-free episodes for an uninterrupted listening experience.

Please welcome back Grant Newsham, retired marine colonel and author of When China Attacks,  A Warning to America. Grant came on the show to discuss the state of the Japan Defense Forces and the PRC threat.  This is a two-part episode. Grant's biography: https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/author/grant-newsham/ Book link: https://www.regnery.com/9781684513659/when-china-attacks/ A recent article: https://andmagazine.substack.com/p/the-us-in-the-pacific-getting-the?utm_source=substack&publication_id=746580&post_id=151553726&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&utm_campaign=email-share&triggerShare=true&isFreemail=true&r=ercjf&triedRedirect=true --- One CA is a product of the civil affairs association  and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on the ground with a partner nation's people and leadership. We aim to inspire anyone interested in working in the "last three feet" of U.S. foreign relations.  To contact the show, email us at CApodcasting@gmail.com  or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www civilaffairsassoc.org --- Special thanks to the site Cool Jazz Hot Bossa for the sample of Cool Jazz Hot Bossa. (59:00). Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bdWUj2NYDYQ --- Transcript: (Part I) 00:00:05 JACK GAINES Welcome to the 1CA Podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. 1CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on ground with the partner nation's people and leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone interested in working the last three feet of foreign relations. To contact the show, email us at capodcasting@gmail.com. Or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www.civilaffairsassoc.org. I'll have those in the show notes. Please welcome Grant Newsham, retired Marine Colonel and author of When China Attacks, A Warning to America. Grant came on the show to discuss the state of the Japan Defense Forces and the PRC threat. This is the first of a two-part episode, so let's get started. 00:00:56 GRANT NEWSHAM I was effectively MarforPak's guy in Asia for a number of years. which worked well in both directions. So I was obviously in Japan, but also did a lot of work for them throughout the region, Southeast Asia as well, Taiwan even, which was a lot of fun. 00:01:13 JACK GAINES Yeah. And you've become a foreign policy advocate in the area. 00:01:16 GRANT NEWSHAM Yeah. At some point, maybe seven or eight years ago, figured I'd actually done enough stuff to maybe have a few ideas. So I started writing and speak a lot as well. So I guess I'm part of the commentariat. But I seem to write about once a week some topic related to often Asian defense, but sometimes economics, politics, sometimes organized crime. And I do get invited to speak here and there and seem to get a number of television or radio interviews as well. That's really cool. I didn't say I get invited to good things, but I do get the occasional invitation. I used to think it was because I had such insight. Someone told me not all that long ago that actually, if you'll say yes to an interview, you're likely to get more of them. Because the people who book them, they just want to get somebody on. And I thought it was because of my particular wisdom. 00:02:07 JACK GAINES of my particular wisdom. 00:02:09 GRANT NEWSHAM I'm joking a little bit. But obviously, you must have something useful to say. But it is funny. There's one place in Singapore that calls me a lot. It's like their CNN. And they've been calling me. Probably eight years at least, or almost every time, I'll tell the presenters that basically they don't know what they're talking about. And I always think, well, this is the last one, but they keep calling me up. They mislike you because you're the contrarian. 00:02:34 JACK GAINES mislike you because you're the contrarian. 00:02:36 GRANT NEWSHAM Oh, I can blame things in a way that sort of suits broadcast and that sort of regular people can understand, you know, 00:02:42 GRANT NEWSHAM that sort of regular people can understand, you know, being a regular person myself. 00:02:47 JACK GAINES Yeah, you learn to disagree without offending. 00:02:49 GRANT NEWSHAM Usually. And it's always sort of a relief, actually, when you can have a different look at things. 00:02:56 JACK GAINES That's good. I always thought you were going to say it is a relief sometimes when you just peel the coat off and then yell at them. 00:03:02 GRANT NEWSHAM The facts speak for themselves. Right. And if it's a presenter, their role is different, and they will generally not have the substantive knowledge that most of the people on the show will have. Right. And so much of what I have to say is often not... in line with accepted wisdom, particularly when it comes to Japan. Sure. So it's often that I'll have to present a different take on things, but they don't seem to be offended. 00:03:27 JACK GAINES Right. You mostly talk about Japan in its current defense fashion or in its foreign policy actions. 00:03:33 GRANT NEWSHAM A lot of that because people have a perception of Japan, for example, as a pacifist country. It cannot fight. It's peace loving. Right. etc. They have a nuclear allergy. You know, just the idea of nuclear weapons in Japan is out of the question. You often hear, well, their constitution won't let them fight. And none of those things are actually true. But it's the received wisdom. It's what people think. And when you simply point out the realities of Japan, that ultimately, at the end of the day, it's a country just like every other. And that the stereotypes about it really aren't correct when it comes to defense security. In fact, they use that the Constitution won't let them have a military. You probably heard it. Yeah. That's the idea. And they don't even call it a military. But the fact is they've got a military, which, according to some ratings, is the fifth most powerful in the world. It depends on how you calculate it, of course. But they call it something else. And what is the actual distinction between offensive and defensive weapons? 00:04:35 JACK GAINES It's usually the strike space. If it's inside your own country defending, then it's a defense space. Once you go out and start taking out other people's cities and moving forces in. 00:04:44 GRANT NEWSHAM Well, for example, they don't have much what you call power projection capability very far off their borders. But they do have a submarine fleet, say over 20 submarines. There's no reason you couldn't send them to the coast of China and start sinking ships. 00:04:59 JACK GAINES True. 00:05:00 GRANT NEWSHAM They've got F -16s. You can put long -range missiles on them and you can fly out of ways and cause people a lot of trouble. But their military really, I would say, is not so good at offense. It's not so good at defense either. And that's something that comes as a surprise to a lot of people. 00:05:15 JACK GAINES Well, do they exercise defense and offense? 00:05:18 GRANT NEWSHAM Oh, they have exercises, training, and they put on a pretty good show, particularly when they have visitors come. But they really, until very recently, and even now, they can't do joint operations, which means the air, sea, and ground forces. can't operate together. In fact, they don't even have a radio with which they can communicate easily. They have to jury -rig some relations, these connections. And that's something most people don't understand, because you look at it on paper. Japan has 250 ,000 people in its military, and it's got ships, aircraft, all of it modern and good stuff. 150 ,000 people in its ground self -defense force, their army. But it's not even the sum of its whole. If you imagine each of your limbs, your arms and your legs, each doing whatever it wants without the coordinating function provided by a brain. 00:06:10 JACK GAINES Sounds like me dancing. 00:06:12 GRANT NEWSHAM It would be, yeah. I think that I can picture that, whereas I'm more of an Arthur Murray kind of guy. But it's like that. And nobody can believe that because they think, well, this is the Japanese. It's this advanced modern country, big military, the rich country. And I mean, they can't even do these simple things. Right. The short answer is no, except in some limited circumstances. After 60 years of the U .S.-Japan defense relationship, 80 years after World War II, they still cannot do some of the basic things that a military needs to do, or do them very well, put it that way. But they do train, they exercise, the personnel quality is excellent. You know, we tend to say, well, we've got Japan as our ally, Japan has a military. But the reality is that the U .S. and Japanese forces cannot work very well together. There's one exception, and that's the two navies. The U .S. Navy and the Japanese Navy, called the Maritime Self -Defense Force, they actually do work well. And they show what's doable. 00:07:15 JACK GAINES They probably do dynamic exercises as well as structured ones, so they have to change, have to practice new orders and maneuvers. 00:07:22 GRANT NEWSHAM Well, the nature of naval operations is you can go out... into the sea, and you have more freedom to actually do stuff. But part of it actually was when Admiral Arleigh Burke, who was later chief of naval operations for many years, he was in charge in Japan. He basically laid down the ground rules, which was that the American Navy was going to treat the Japanese like friends, like allies. And that set the tone for everything. So they had a more relationship of equals, people who wanted to operate together. And that is why they have a good relationship today. in my opinion. So as a result, after all these decades, the two militaries are not really very good at operating together. There's no joint headquarters. There never has been in Japan. At best, they've operated in isolation. Do they recognize they don't have a joint access? Oh, they know. The Japanese military knows this. And US Indo -PACOM has not pushed the issue. And then you had... The State Department side, on the civilian side, people saying, well, if we ask the Japanese to get better at defense matters, well, they'll get angry. And if they do, then the Chinese will be mad. So you have the U .S. on the U .S. side. We're thinking of at least 10 reasons why Japan cannot improve its defenses. That's changed enough in recent years. But you see how many decades we've lost. 00:08:51 JACK GAINES Right. I can see part of what the State Department is saying in that a lot of those countries along the Asian coast were under Japanese rule during World War II. They're concerned that by showing favor and coordinating with them in defense might offend places like the Philippines or Korea. It is a concern to be weighed, but I don't know how much weight you would put to it. 00:09:14 GRANT NEWSHAM I wouldn't give it hardly any. With the Japanese, when you actually think about it, I would say within... 30 years of the end of the war, but certainly today, and for the last at least 20 years ago. The new century. Even before that. The Japanese and World War II is not really an issue in almost all of Asia. The Chinese, of course... Play it up. That's a good way to put it. Of course, they do remember what the Japanese did, and it was barbaric. Although the Chinese Communist Party afterwards killed 50 million Chinese in peacetime and good weather, which the Imperial Japanese Army couldn't have dreamed of doing. But World War II is an issue in China. Korea as well, the relationship is dicey. Up to a point. I mean, little old ladies go and sit in front of the embassy still. 00:10:05 JACK GAINES the embassy still. 00:10:06 GRANT NEWSHAM There are, and then you just had a South Korean amphibious ship come to Yokosuka in Tokyo on a visit. In Korea, there's a fundamental sort of suspicion of the Japanese. Sometimes it is a real dislike. But most people, it's not a big issue. But except for those two countries, you go down the list in Asia, and there is no after effect of World War II. I find the Filipinos get along very well with the Japanese. The Indonesians do. They, in fact, see the Japanese as being the people who freed them from the colonial yoke. Okay. The Malays, they actually didn't have that bad a time during the occupation. The Chinese in Malaysia did. So the Malaysians don't have any really hard feelings against the Japanese. Taiwan, same thing. They've got a very good relationship. And then there's one plus billion Indians who actually have an excellent relationship with Japan and see Japan as real friends and vice versa. So you're starting to get a good chunk of Asia, which, as you can see, actually sees Japan as a good country, useful economically. It's been very generous. And they like to see a Japanese military that's strong enough, allied with the United States, able to deal with China. 00:11:27 JACK GAINES Right. And why would we have such a different balance as we do with Germany and Europe? Because no one's questioning this in Holland or in France. That's just another country. They freely trade, they freely access each other. So maybe mindset just needs to shift to say the reform of Japan is just like Germany, and we need to start treating them and partner nations the same and start advocating for a joint staff. 00:11:52 GRANT NEWSHAM And you could do that in an afternoon, but the Japanese will not speak up for themselves. And an old New York Times reporter, Richard Halloran, I remember him telling me once that all the people he ever dealt with in the world... The Japanese were the worst at explaining themselves. And there's a reticence which slows them down. But also the Americans are afraid to tell them what we need. And that is a huge problem, because if we don't tell them, the Japanese are not blind readers, and they won't do what we think we'd like them to do, but we're afraid to ask. And in fact, one of the Japanese prime ministers in 1970, so 50 -some years ago, He gave some very good advice to the Americans, and it was at the time the Americans were trying to put an aircraft carrier into Yokosuka, the naval base near Tokyo. They wanted to assign it there permanently. And the U .S. side was thinking of excuses why it was too hard for the Japanese. They'll cause political difficulties. The Japanese have an election coming up. The timing just isn't right. And finally, the Japanese side sent a message to the Americans saying, tell us what you need. And don't back down. And they said it out of exasperation, really. And it was the best advice the Americans have ever been given. And we've refused to follow it ever since then. And really, it's almost a cultural trait, sort of a Confucian system. They actually are happy to have experts tell them what they ought to do. Sure. Whereas we are more of the Socratic method. And it doesn't, it just doesn't work. That's why after all these years, the Americans and the Japanese forces, except for the navies, And except for missile defense, we really don't operate together anywhere near where we need to be. We're not even close. And another very interesting fact a lot of people don't know is the Japanese military missed its recruitment targets by about 50 % last year. 5 -0? 00:13:50 JACK GAINES -0? 00:13:50 GRANT NEWSHAM 5 -0. And it routinely misses them by 20 -25%. So this, you can see, is a problem. It's now an older force, doesn't have enough people. In order to fulfill its missions, it would probably have to be twice as big, both personnel -wise and in terms of ships and hardware. Its war stocks are basically non -existent, doesn't know anything really about casualty care, combat casualty replacements, logistics. 00:14:20 JACK GAINES Well, if the media looks down on it and the political class looks down on it, it's not going to get a lot of positivity in the public mindset. So that's got to be part of it. It's not a vote -getter to push for a strong defense. 00:14:31 GRANT NEWSHAM vote -getter to push for a strong defense. I mean, if you're a politician, no one's going to say, he's the defense guy, let's give him our vote. But people vote for other reasons. But you do get used to, after that horrific experience in World War II, that for decades people didn't want to really think about defense, and they were glad to have the Americans around to handle it, and particularly when it seemed like there wasn't any real threat anywhere. People were happy with that, and even the U .S. side. didn't mind it as well. But I'd say it should have started to change at least 20 years ago. And it didn't until maybe four or five years ago. Well, 00:15:10 JACK GAINES when did the risk indicators really start popping up with China? 00:15:14 GRANT NEWSHAM I think by... It can't be back when Nixon went. 00:15:15 JACK GAINES It can't be back when Nixon went. Well, it should have, 00:15:16 GRANT NEWSHAM it should have, you know, I think. But about 2005 is when it was obvious what was coming. 00:15:19 JACK GAINES But about 00:15:21 GRANT NEWSHAM when it was obvious what was coming. And even before that, if you knew what to look for. But as I said, some of us... We knew what needed done and what the problems were. And there were Japanese who did too. And that's why when we put together their amphibious force, it was sort of an effort to address the shortcomings in Japan's self -defense force. Also to improve the overall U .S.-Japan relationship because it was so imbalanced. Right. Where the Japanese weren't doing anything near enough to defend themselves. And that over time creates a lot of friction in a relationship. So we were trying to address that with the amphibious force, and that was 2011, which we were pretty successful at that because we didn't ask permission from anybody. I was going to say, if you were successful, 00:16:10 JACK GAINES did you get fired? 00:16:11 GRANT NEWSHAM Well, it's not that people didn't try. 00:16:11 JACK GAINES Well, it's not that people didn't try. Sorry, that was sarcastic. But I was a reservist, so they couldn't quite get a bead on me. 00:16:15 GRANT NEWSHAM I was a reservist, so they couldn't quite get a bead on me. Yeah. And didn't quite know what we were doing. And also you had people like General Gregson, who was then at... Department of Defense, who had been in Japan many years, and he knew the importance of it all. So he would provide some cover. But the real success there was because the Japanese side took the ideas and ran with it. And the Americans provided some cover and some know -how and some advice. But it was the Japanese who did that. Once the Japanese took on the mission, well, what are the Americans going to say? But I was even told that at Indo -PACOM, that there were people who gotten wind of this and were very much opposed because the idea that Japanese having an amphibious force was provocative. Not just provocative, but it was going to cause the Japanese to go on the rampage again, like in 1941. I'm not making this up. 00:17:11 JACK GAINES So when Germany starts building the Leopard 2, were they expected to go on a rampage too? 00:17:17 GRANT NEWSHAM No, those are Europeans. Oh, okay. You know how the Europeans are okay. 00:17:19 JACK GAINES okay. You know 00:17:21 GRANT NEWSHAM But the fact that Germans have been allowed back into polite society. tells you something, and the Japanese are just as deserving of it as well. 00:17:30 JACK GAINES Did you see the movie Godzilla Minus One? No. It's an interesting portrayal of post -World War II Japan. And Godzilla, which is this giant monster, comes out of the sea, tears up Japan, and has an atomic breath that shoots off nuclear explosions, which sounds a lot like the United States in a mythological way. One thing that... the show did that was interesting is it kind of engaged post -military era and had talked about it. And it seemed like it was trying to reconcile the past with now and build out a notion that the military is okay, that after the war, there were good things that happened and that we should embrace a military in the future. So there might be some societal impulses out there that are promoting and supporting a more built -up military in Japan. 00:18:24 GRANT NEWSHAM Well, you're actually right. The public at large has always been pretty supportive of the military. For example, when they have open base days, when they put on so -called firepower demonstrations, which is like an exercise you can watch where they shoot off stuff, that they're always oversubscribed. And people just pour into these things because they're interested. And the central government, or say the ruling class, are the ones who are gun -shy or... I'm really hesitant, but the public at large, you know, when you ask them, you know, should Japan have a normal military? The replies to that are like 85%. Well, yes, of course. And I think they would be horrified if they knew the actual state of the Japanese military. I mentioned this to a Japanese politician last year, and he was horrified at the idea. And the public as well would have a similar reaction. Regular Japanese people say they have a pretty good understanding of what Japan needs to do to defend itself and of the importance of having a national defense, but the government doesn't explain it very well. When they do, the reaction, there's a Japanese expression, it's called like, it's atarimae. And it means like, well, yeah. It's like, duh. 00:19:42 JACK GAINES Abnautually. And that's what it means. 00:19:42 GRANT NEWSHAM And that's what it means. Should Japan have a good defense? Atarimae. And yeah, what's the question here? But if you ask that question in the political world, then you'll get all sorts of emming and hawing. They wanted nothing of that. By the late 70s, certainly by the 90s, that they sort of outlived that. But it was comfortable to continue with it, particularly if you're the government, because you don't have to spend money on defense. And the Americans are covering that. So it was as if the Americans were giving. I'd say at least $50 billion a year in free defense coverage, at least, probably more. And, you know, if you're a government, you think, well, why should we do anything different? And so they got used to that. We got used to it. And then at some point, the friction builds up where you just can't do that. And the Japanese themselves start to be resentful. 00:20:37 JACK GAINES Right. Keeping them handicapped, probably. 00:20:40 GRANT NEWSHAM Yeah. You know, they're not letting us be self -fulfilled. I think that's sort of the marriage counselor's analysis. And so that imbalance was such that it was creating huge problems in the relationship. But the defense relationship, you know, pointing out, well, you know, you guys really aren't very good, except for the Navy. You know, and we can't work with you very well, except for the Navies. And as a result, that's why we are where we are today. By now, if we had a more sort of capable U .S.-Japan defense relationship, where the two services could... operate together, and we're conducting a joint defense of Japan and the surrounding areas, which includes, say, to Taiwan even, that that would have, I think, deterred a lot of the problems that we're having. But by pretending everything was okay, we've gotten ourselves in a position where we now face a real threat out there. And we're trying to make up for lost time. And I don't know. And I don't know which side I would bet on. I'd bet on ours because I'm an American. But that's how out of whack it has gotten. It used to be maybe till 20 years ago, we were in pretty good shape. But you can see that advantage eroding. And nowadays, depending on how a fight were to take place, if it does take place, it would be less of a sure thing than it once was. And that's, I think, putting it very nicely. 00:22:04 JACK GAINES Well, tell me about the threat. 00:22:05 GRANT NEWSHAM What are you seeing? It's China. led by the Chinese Communist Party. (Part II) 00:00:02 JACK GAINES Welcome to the 1CA Podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. 1CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on ground with the partner nation's people and leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone interested in working the last three feet of foreign relations. To contact the show, email us at capodcasting@gmail.com. or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www.civilaffairsassoc.org. I'll have those in the show notes. Please welcome back Grant Newsham, retired Marine colonel and author of When China Attacks, A Warning to America. Grant came on the show to discuss the state of the Japanese defense forces and the PRC threat. This is the second in a two-part episode, so let's get started. 00:00:56 SPEAKER_02 It's China. led by the Chinese Communist Party. They built up a military which is just gradually but steadily expanding its reach and its coverage. And it is compared to, say, 2020, now instead of just being able to operate a little bit off their coast, they can reach Guam, Hawaii, and onwards. The Chinese military doesn't tend to develop into a force able to operate worldwide just like the U .S. can. And their ship numbers. They've got more than we do. Something like 350 versus our 290. 00:00:58 JACK GAINES the Chinese Communist Party. 00:01:06 JACK GAINES its reach 00:01:11 JACK GAINES say, 2020, now instead of just being able to operate a little bit 00:01:15 GRANT NEWSHAM off their coast, they can reach Guam, Hawaii, and onwards. The Chinese military doesn't tend to develop into a force able to operate worldwide just 00:01:25 JACK GAINES like the U .S. can. And their ship numbers. They've got more than we do. Something like 350 versus our 00:01:37 SPEAKER_02 Well, fortunately, in terms of quality, they're pretty good. And they know what they need to do, and they're getting better. For some things like carrier operations, they're not at our level yet. But if you look at the speed at which they have developed, they're in pretty good shape. But let's just say the South China Sea, which is one and a half times the size of the Mediterranean. Whenever U .S. ships go in there, and we do publicize our transits and operations and exercises, for every ship we put in there, For every ship we put in, the Chinese can match it with at least 10. And that doesn't include ground -based and air -launched anti -ship missiles, for example. So if the Chinese pick their spot, 00:01:39 JACK GAINES they're pretty good. And they know what they need to do, and they're getting better. For some things like carrier operations, they're not at our level yet. But if you look at the speed at which they have developed, they're in pretty good shape. But let's just say the South China Sea, which is one and a half times the size of the Mediterranean. 00:02:00 JACK GAINES and we do publicize our transits and operations and exercises, for every ship we put in there, For every ship we put in, the Chinese can match it with at least 10. And that doesn't include ground -based and air -launched anti -ship missiles, for example. 00:02:16 SPEAKER_02 if the Chinese pick their spot, pick their timing, I wouldn't want to be the destroyer skipper who's got 20 anti -ship missiles coming at him. 20 anti -ship missiles coming at him. And he's got eight seconds to figure out what to do. The point is they have had de facto control of the South China Sea since about seven, eight years ago. And yes, we can go in there. But once we're gone, the Chinese close back up and they've pretty much got it. Beyond that, it's harder for them, but they're steadily expanding their capability to conduct operations. It's a military that has its problems, like every military, but they are trying to correct them. They are building a military which they want to be able to defeat a country that has aircraft carriers, which is us. In many respects, they are our equals. Have you ever heard a Korean War veteran who said he wanted to fight the Chinese again? And these were Chinese. These was the Chinese of 1950s. It's a very different place today. And I'm not saying that they can't be defeated, but I'm not saying that they can't be defeated. An adversary that could give us a lot of trouble. When their intentions are to first dominate regionally and locally, and then push that farther afield to all the Pacific and beyond. And they're setting up the infrastructure worldwide with ports and airfields to do that. They're investing in long -range transports, these naval replenishment ships that you need to be able to operate the way we do, and that's their mission. And we have pretended until about 2017 that this wasn't the case. In fact, you couldn't even say China was an adversary. And guys who did, like Captain James Fennell, who was the head of intelligence at Pack Fleet. He was cashier. He was forced to retire. He was cashier. He was forced to retire. The then administration hated him and got rid of him. And that's how bad it was. And I saw this all firsthand. Experience some of it, not as bad as Captain Fennell did. So we've allowed them to build up into a military that we had better take very seriously. And the Chinese do see this as a tool for their... 00:02:16 JACK GAINES if the 00:02:17 SPEAKER_03 Chinese pick their spot, pick their timing, I wouldn't want to be the destroyer skipper who's got 20 anti -ship missiles coming at him. 20 anti -ship missiles coming at him. 00:02:28 JACK GAINES figure out what to do. The point is they have had de facto control of the South China Sea since about seven, eight years ago. 00:02:39 JACK GAINES we're gone, the Chinese close back up and they've pretty much got it. Beyond that, it's 00:02:45 SPEAKER_03 but they're steadily expanding their capability to conduct operations. It's a military that has its problems, like every military, but they are trying to correct them. They are 00:02:55 JACK GAINES a military which they want to be able to defeat a country that has aircraft carriers, which is us. In many respects, 00:03:03 JACK GAINES our equals. Have you ever heard a Korean War veteran who said he wanted to fight the Chinese again? And these were Chinese. These was the Chinese of 1950s. It's a very different place today. And I'm not saying that they can't be defeated, but I'm not saying that they can't 00:03:22 JACK GAINES a lot of trouble. When their intentions are to first dominate regionally and locally, and then push that farther afield to all the Pacific and beyond. And they're setting up the infrastructure worldwide with ports and airfields to do that. They're investing in long -range transports, these naval replenishment ships that you need to be able to operate the way we do, and that's their mission. And we have pretended 00:03:50 SPEAKER_03 until about 2017 00:03:51 GRANT NEWSHAM that this wasn't the case. In fact, you couldn't even say China was an adversary. And guys who did, like Captain James Fennell, 00:04:01 JACK GAINES who was the head of intelligence at Pack Fleet. He was cashier. He was forced to retire. He was cashier. He was forced to retire. The then administration hated him and got rid of him. And that's how bad it was. And I saw this all firsthand. Experience some of it, not as bad as Captain Fennell did. So we've allowed them to build up into a military that we had better take very seriously. And the Chinese do see this as a tool for 00:04:30 SPEAKER_02 The idea is if you have a powerful military, well, that's when you can lean on people. That's when you can intimidate people. You can dominate them. And they're happy with the psychological domination, political domination. It doesn't have to be occupying, but dominating. And they're in every field, from outer space, long -range missiles, undersea warfare, really putting a lot of effort into it. And there is a certain sort of ingenuity that goes into their operations. Well, they can't invent things. They don't develop things on their own. They just steal things. So they reverse engineer things. So they reverse engineer. 00:04:32 SPEAKER_03 well, that's when you can lean on people. That's when 00:04:39 JACK GAINES And they're happy with the psychological domination, political domination. It doesn't have to be occupying, but dominating. And they're in every field, from outer space, long -range missiles, undersea warfare, really putting a lot of effort into it. And there is a certain sort of ingenuity that goes into their operations. Well, they can't invent things. They don't develop things on their own. They just steal things. So they reverse engineer things. 00:05:09 SPEAKER_02 Well, it... You know, it's kind of true up to a point, but look at us. The Yankee ingenuity was taking stolen British technology and making it better. And so the fact they may not be as innovative as us, well, sometimes it just has to be good enough. So they've got now a military to combine with this desire for political domination as well as considering their economic power as just as important as the military. And you see how successful that has been. When you have U .S. business leaders giving Xi Jinping two standing ovations last November in San Francisco, that tells you how successful they've been on the economic front. And the Japanese know they have a huge problem. You would often hear the Japanese military saying, one thing Taiwan's defense is Japan's defense. But I've even seen the calculations they did, like at which point the Japanese Navy would be outmatched by the Chinese Navy. And they had the date almost down to when it was. And our side, we were late recognizing this. We refused to. We refused to. 00:05:11 GRANT NEWSHAM kind of true up to a point, but look at us. The Yankee ingenuity was taking stolen British technology and making it better. And so the fact 00:05:20 SPEAKER_03 be as innovative as us, well, sometimes it just 00:05:23 JACK GAINES has to be good enough. So they've got now a military to combine with this desire for political domination as well as considering their economic power as just as important as the military. And you see how successful that has been. When you have U .S. business leaders giving Xi Jinping two standing 00:05:45 JACK GAINES San Francisco, that tells you how successful they've been on the economic front. And the Japanese know they have a huge problem. You 00:05:53 SPEAKER_03 would often hear the Japanese military saying, one thing Taiwan's defense is Japan's defense. But I've even seen the calculations they did, like at which 00:06:03 JACK GAINES point the 00:06:06 JACK GAINES be outmatched by the Chinese Navy. And they had the date almost down to when it was. And our side, we were late recognizing this. We refused 00:07:18 SPEAKER_02 Yeah, as he described it well. Ultimately, the military part of the fight is extremely important. But it's almost a sideshow. But it's almost a sideshow to the other activities, the other fight that China's been waging for the last 30, 40 years, almost ever since we opened up to them. And that has been generally referred to as political warfare, with components being economic warfare, financial warfare, drug warfare, which is the word the Chinese use. So all this fentanyl that's been pumped into America for the last decade that's killed up towards a million Americans, almost all of it comes from China. And they know exactly what they're doing. And so every year they're taking like the equivalent of two or three divisions off the battlefield. You've destroyed neighborhoods. You've destroyed successful economic warfare. Drive 30 miles up the road to Baltimore. Go to Sparrows, Baltimore. Where there used to be steel mills. And now you have Amazon fulfillment sectors at best. But you've seen just the gutting of American society, the so -called working class, the Rust Belt. And this was done intentionally. And this was done intentionally. In large part, Chinese economic warfare directed at the United States. And then you have cyber warfare as well. You have cyber espionage. Well beyond what countries normally do. But they have used it very effectively. And the Chinese just... Recently put out their new fighter. That's called the J -35. That is a dig at the Americans. Because it is based on stolen blueprints for the F -35. I don't know. 00:07:20 SPEAKER_03 Ultimately, the military part of the 00:07:26 SPEAKER_03 it's almost a sideshow. 00:07:29 JACK GAINES sideshow to the other activities, the other fight that China's been waging for the last 30, 40 years, almost ever since we opened up to them. And that has been generally referred to as political warfare, with components being economic warfare, financial warfare, drug warfare, which is the word the Chinese use. So all this fentanyl that's been pumped into America for the last decade that's killed up towards a million Americans, almost all of it comes from China. And they know exactly what they're doing. And so every year they're taking like the equivalent of two or three divisions off the battlefield. You've destroyed neighborhoods. You've destroyed successful economic warfare. Drive 30 miles up the road to Baltimore. Go to Sparrows, Baltimore. Where there used to be steel mills. And now you have Amazon fulfillment sectors at best. But you've seen just the gutting of American society, the so -called working class, the Rust Belt. And this was done intentionally. 00:08:26 JACK GAINES warfare directed at the United States. And then you have cyber warfare as well. You have cyber espionage. 00:08:34 SPEAKER_03 Well beyond what countries normally do. But they have used it very effectively. And the Chinese just... Recently put out their new fighter. That's called the J -35. That is a dig at 00:08:47 GRANT NEWSHAM it is based on stolen blueprints for the F -35. 00:08:55 GRANT NEWSHAM know. It's been a while. I don't know. It's been a while. 00:09:02 SPEAKER_02 Unfortunately, Copperfish is leapfrogging over stages. Yes, it may take them a little longer, but they will popscotch through it. And so... So I take it pretty seriously. Their Y -20, their long -range transport, is basically the C -17. And they've just been immensely successful at this sort of espionage. And at the same time, we've done nothing to push back on them. Then there's the propaganda angle of this, which really good old Jesuit meaning of the word just means to explain yourself or articulate your position. So people understand that they've been very successful in getting Americans to buy the Chinese line. China's rise is peaceful. China's rise is peaceful. China's never attacked anybody. China's never attacked anybody. It's not true. All great nations do this. So who are we to complain? America has its problems, too. America has its problems, too. Who are we to complain about the Chinese taking live organs out of Uyghurs and prisoners of conscience? And we've been able to convince ourselves that we've been able to convince ourselves that we've not only can we not do anything, we shouldn't do anything. This is changing. But you can see we were very late getting started. And this has all been done without firing a shot. Chinese economic inroads, Chinese economic inroads, which leads to political influence, is in, for example, South America and Africa. Just immense how fast that has come, how solid it is. Pacific Island, something similar is going on, something similar is going on. Look at the difficulties the Germans have had, weaning themselves off of this Chinese addiction. And as a result, 00:09:03 GRANT NEWSHAM is leapfrogging over stages. Yes, it may take them 00:09:07 SPEAKER_03 but they will 00:09:09 GRANT NEWSHAM popscotch through it. And so... So I take it pretty seriously. Their Y -20, 00:09:16 JACK GAINES their long -range transport, is basically the C -17. And they've just been immensely successful at this sort of espionage. And at the same time, we've done nothing to push back on them. Then there's the propaganda angle of this, which really good old Jesuit meaning of the word just means to explain yourself or articulate your position. So people understand that they've been very successful in getting Americans to buy the Chinese line. China's rise is peaceful. China's rise is peaceful. China's never attacked anybody. China's never attacked anybody. It's not true. All great nations do this. So who are we to complain? 00:09:49 SPEAKER_03 America has its problems, too. America has its problems, too. Who are we to complain about the Chinese taking live organs out of Uyghurs and prisoners of conscience? And we've been able to 00:10:00 JACK GAINES that we've been able 00:10:00 SPEAKER_03 to convince ourselves that we've not only can we not do anything, we shouldn't do anything. This is changing. But you can see we were very late getting started. And this has all been done without firing a shot. 00:10:10 JACK GAINES Chinese economic inroads, Chinese economic inroads, which leads to political influence, is in, for example, South America and Africa. Just immense how fast that has come, how solid it is. Pacific Island, something similar is going on, something similar is going on. 00:10:27 SPEAKER_03 Look at the difficulties the Germans have had, weaning themselves off of this Chinese addiction. 00:10:34 SPEAKER_02 as a result, they have been able to improve their position politically, psychologically, economically, and they've been able to do this globally without having to use their military. 00:10:36 SPEAKER_03 their position 00:10:40 GRANT NEWSHAM and they've been able to do this globally without having to use their military. 00:10:51 SPEAKER_02 Yeah, that's the idea. Is you don't want to. So our view of warfare is like a hundred -yard dash. Wherever the two sides come to the line, shake loose, and then someone fires a gun, and then someone fires a gun, and then it's game on. To the Chinese, the war has started long ago. And you're wearing down your opponent. You're weakening his ability to resist. You're creating chaos in his own country. There's a word called entropy. Which is just breaking down. Entropic warfare is a word that sometimes gets used. For you're breaking down his ability to resist. And at the same time, of course, the Chinese are building up a military, which is very serious. Yes, it's not showing up off of San Diego just yet. But places closer to China, it's much more of an issue. Japan knows the problem they have with the People's Liberation Army. Pacific Island, Southeast Asia. You are seeing more of a Chinese presence. And the point is, when the time comes, you may not even be able to resist if the Chinese have done this other sort of warfare. 00:10:53 JACK GAINES want to. So our view of warfare is like a hundred -yard dash. Wherever the two sides come to the line, shake loose, and then someone fires a gun, and then someone fires a gun, and then it's game on. To the Chinese, the war has started long ago. And you're wearing down your opponent. You're weakening his ability to resist. You're creating chaos in his own country. There's a word called entropy. Which is just breaking down. Entropic warfare is a word that 00:11:19 SPEAKER_03 sometimes gets used. For you're breaking down his ability to resist. And at the same time, of course, the Chinese are building up a military, which is very serious. 00:11:28 JACK GAINES Yes, it's not showing 00:11:33 JACK GAINES places closer to China, it's much more of an issue. Japan knows the problem they have with the People's Liberation Army. Pacific Island, Southeast Asia. You are seeing more 00:11:46 JACK GAINES Chinese presence. And the point is, when the time comes, you may not even be able to resist if the Chinese have 00:11:52 SPEAKER_03 this other 00:12:31 SPEAKER_02 That's exactly what it is. It's mental warfare. You're attacking the mind. You're attacking how people think about things. Some people use the word cognitive warfare. You're the popular word. Yeah, you're attacking the mind. And so you can see how well it worked. And the Russians had a much poorer hand to play than the Chinese do. Because we do so much business with China. And you see how hard it is to do things like ban TikTok. We can't even get that done. 00:12:33 JACK GAINES mental warfare. You're attacking the mind. You're attacking how people think about things. Some people use the 00:12:42 JACK GAINES You're the popular word. Yeah, you're attacking the mind. And so you can see how well it worked. And the Russians had a much poorer hand to play than 00:12:50 GRANT NEWSHAM the Chinese do. Because we do so much business with China. And you see how hard it is to do things like ban TikTok. We can't even get that done. 00:12:59 SPEAKER_02 We can't even get that done. 00:13:03 SPEAKER_02 Look, 72 hours, if that for the Indians do, we can do it. And you see how Chinese successfully use what they call lawfare, which is using our own legal system. And the idea is that you get proxies, influential foreigners in your target country to actually do your bidding for you. The Chinese have like five aces to play. The Russians might have won, but you can see how successful the Russians have been just with that. 00:13:04 JACK GAINES for the Indians do, we can do it. And you see how Chinese successfully use what they call lawfare, which 00:13:13 JACK GAINES the idea is that you get proxies, influential foreigners in your target country to actually do your bidding for you. The Chinese have like five aces to play. The Russians might have won, but you can see how successful the Russians have 00:13:41 SPEAKER_02 Uh -huh. Uh -huh. 00:13:46 SPEAKER_02 Well, you're right about the Russians, but the Chinese understand that the term gray zone paralyzes Americans. We have no idea what to do because of our view of warfare being until the shooting starts. That it is we're not really at war. There's still hope of working something out. 00:13:51 GRANT NEWSHAM paralyzes Americans. We have no idea what to do because of our view of warfare being until the shooting starts. That it is we're not really at war. There's still hope of working 00:14:03 SPEAKER_03 something out. 00:14:05 SPEAKER_02 That has been our rote response for all these years, is to not get the Chinese mad, don't provoke them, and we have convinced ourselves that we have to have Chinese help with fill -in -the -blank, North Korea transnational crime, nuclear weapons proliferation, climate change, and therefore we cannot challenge the PRC because we won't get their cooperation. That's what we've effectively handcuffed ourselves, but when it comes to that so -called hybrid warfare, it's not all that It's not all that complicated if you recognize what it is and how it fits into China's behavior, its strategy. But you also would do well to attract from other directions where they're particularly vulnerable. And that is where you take advantage of the fact, for example, the Chinese currency is not freely convertible, which means that outside of China, nobody really wants Chinese money. It's like the script at a... It's like the script where you can use it to buy caramel corn and go on the rides. 00:14:05 SPEAKER_03 has been our rote response for all these years, is to not get the Chinese mad, don't provoke them, and we have convinced ourselves that 00:14:14 JACK GAINES have Chinese help with fill -in -the -blank, North Korea transnational crime, nuclear weapons 00:14:22 JACK GAINES climate change, and therefore we cannot challenge the PRC because we won't get their cooperation. That's what we've effectively handcuffed ourselves, but when it comes to that so -called hybrid warfare, it's not all that It's not all that complicated if you recognize what it is and how it fits into 00:14:42 JACK GAINES its strategy. But you also would do well to attract from other directions where they're particularly vulnerable. And that is where you take advantage of the fact, for example, the Chinese currency is not freely convertible, which means that outside of China, nobody really wants Chinese money. It's like the script at a... It's like the script where you can use it to buy caramel corn and 00:15:06 SPEAKER_02 That's it. Nobody wants it. So choke that off and China's got some real problems. Another is the just thoroughgoing corruption of China's ruling class. And most of them have wealth overseas, foreign bank accounts. foreign bank accounts, relatives with green cards, relatives with green cards, some operate businesses overseas. And this is illegal. And this is illegal. 00:15:08 JACK GAINES it. So choke that off and China's got some real problems. Another is the just thoroughgoing corruption of China's ruling class. And most 00:15:19 GRANT NEWSHAM overseas, foreign bank accounts. foreign bank accounts, relatives with green cards, relatives with green cards, some operate businesses overseas. And this 00:15:31 SPEAKER_02 And this is where that really scares them. Because in 2011 or 2012, New York Times and Bloomberg actually put out some good stories about the overseas wealth of China's top people, including Xi Jinping's family. I've never seen a reaction from the Chinese like that one. This bothered them. 00:15:33 JACK GAINES scares them. Because in 2011 or 2012, New 00:15:37 SPEAKER_03 York Times and Bloomberg actually put out some good stories about the overseas wealth of China's top people, including Xi Jinping's family. 00:15:46 GRANT NEWSHAM I've never seen a reaction from the Chinese like that one. 00:15:53 SPEAKER_02 More than anything else we've ever done. That's... 00:15:53 GRANT NEWSHAM than anything 00:16:14 SPEAKER_02 One way to do it. Another way to do it. That would be a tactical thing. Say you were to release, say, every Friday. Say at 1 a .m. 1 o 'clock or whenever. 1 a .m. 1 o 'clock or whenever. 00:16:16 JACK GAINES way to do it. That would be a tactical thing. Say you were to 00:16:19 SPEAKER_03 release, say, every Friday. Say at 1 a .m. 1 o 'clock or whenever. 1 a .m. 1 o 'clock or whenever. 00:16:25 SPEAKER_02 Which of the top 50 Chinese Communist Party officials? And make sure it reached everywhere in China. The thing that the public really hates is this corruption. And by the top dogs. And that is something that really bothers them. And you note that the Chinese leadership is very willing to have the average Chinese citizen absorb any amount of punishment. And they even talk about it. 00:16:27 SPEAKER_03 Chinese Communist Party officials? And make sure it 00:16:29 GRANT NEWSHAM reached everywhere in China. The thing that the public really hates is this corruption. And by the top dogs. 00:16:38 JACK GAINES is something that really bothers them. And you note that the Chinese leadership is very willing to have the average Chinese citizen 00:16:49 JACK GAINES they even talk about it. 00:16:51 SPEAKER_02 But when it's personal, then they see it very differently. And this is one of the few ways to really make it personal for them is to capitalize on this corruption. So when we talk about... Dealing with Gray's own operations, we're probably not going to be all that successful. Because they have more ships, they can be in more places. 00:16:51 JACK GAINES when it's personal, then they see it very differently. And this is one of the few ways to really make it personal for them is to capitalize on this corruption. So when we talk about... Dealing with Gray's own operations, we're probably not going to be all that successful. Because they have more ships, they can be in more places. 00:17:14 SPEAKER_02 But expose that. They can do that. Have we made a concerted effort to expose Chinese bribery, the illicit payments, the corruption that they put into everywhere they go? Everywhere there's a Chinese presence, you have corruption of the society, the political class as well. And do we ever target that? Do we consider it a priority effort? I don't even think we consider it an effort at all. Exposure is the one thing that has a huge effect. This is why investigative journalists get big. It's why like Irish. gangsters try to murder them in Malta they get blown up because they're effective because they're effective which is the thing that makes it very hard for corruption to work and that's where I think 00:17:15 JACK GAINES can do that. Have we made a concerted effort to expose Chinese bribery, the illicit payments, the corruption that they put into everywhere they go? Everywhere there's a Chinese presence, you have corruption of the society, the political class as well. And do we ever target that? Do we consider it a priority effort? I don't even think we consider it an effort at all. Exposure is the one thing that has a huge effect. This is why investigative journalists 00:17:44 SPEAKER_03 get big. It's why like Irish. gangsters try to murder them in Malta they get blown up because they're effective because they're effective which 00:17:52 SPEAKER_02 is the thing that makes it very hard for corruption to work and that's where I think We have some real opportunities to make it very clear what's being done. And this is something that, if you expose it, you can really capitalize on it. Just make it too hard to do this. And it also gives oxygen to the honest people in a country. It gives them something to work with. It gives them something to work with. To take on these repressive regimes, these corrupt regimes, these corrupt regimes, administrations. And get rid of them and replace them with honest people. I've never met anywhere, anywhere I've been. Over the years. Where people like to be cheaters. Where people like to be cheaters. Where they like their leaders to be corrupt. I just haven't met it. I've been anywhere. I just haven't met it. I've been anywhere. It's just nothing you can do. But it's just nothing you can do. It really has an effect. And that's where I think government for sources could be effectively devoted. And particularly once you get local reporters in on it. Once you get the local. Honest locals in on it. Honest locals in on it. And that's where I think we could be very effective. Corruption, as you've mentioned, that really is the grease to everything the Chinese communists do globally. Take it away and then take away their access to dollars, convertible currency. And they've really got some problems. But they have played their hand very well today. But in some ways it's a house of cards. I don't think it's that hard to take on. But the longer you wait, the harder it gets. 00:17:52 SPEAKER_03 is the thing that makes it 00:17:54 JACK GAINES corruption to work and that's where I think We have some real opportunities to make it very clear what's being done. And this is something that, if you expose it, you can really capitalize on it. Just make it too hard to do this. And it also gives oxygen to the honest people in a country. It 00:18:16 JACK GAINES to work with. To take on these repressive regimes, these corrupt regimes, these corrupt regimes, 00:18:23 JACK GAINES them with honest people. I've never met anywhere, anywhere I've been. Over the years. Where 00:18:32 JACK GAINES I just haven't met it. I've been anywhere. I just haven't met it. I've been anywhere. It's just nothing you can do. But it's just nothing you can do. It really has an effect. And that's where I think government for sources could be effectively devoted. And particularly once you 00:18:46 GRANT NEWSHAM reporters in on it. Once you get the local. Honest locals in on it. Honest locals in on it. And that's where I think we could be very effective. 00:18:56 JACK GAINES Corruption, as you've mentioned, that really is the grease to everything the Chinese communists do globally. Take it away and then take away their access to dollars, convertible currency. And they've really got some 00:19:12 JACK GAINES today. But in some ways it's a house of cards. I don't think it's that hard to take on. But the longer you wait, the harder it 00:19:28 SPEAKER_02 In regards to U .S. policy, in policy, there really is a... a desire that the United States stays around in Asia, that maintains its military might, and is able to effectively safeguard what you call freedom consensual government. Because if you go around the region, nobody wants to be dominated by the PRC. But they do have a huge advantage, particularly economically, that they're seen by leaders and business people in a lot of these countries. That's really the source of... some wealth, some prosperity. And we would do well, for example, to see the fight as just as much an economic one as a military one. Because we could build up our military, rebuild it, and we could have 800 ships in the Navy, and still lose. If we don't fight on these other fronts, we don't want you here because we're doing too much business with China. And that's where the U .S., along with its friends, the Japanese, the Koreans, the Indians, the Australians, we would do well to operate together more and to see the economic front and the political warfare fronts as a priority effort as much, if not more, than the military. 00:19:30 SPEAKER_03 in policy, there 00:19:31 JACK GAINES really is a... a desire that the United States stays around in Asia, that maintains its military might, and is able to 00:19:45 JACK GAINES Because if you go around the region, nobody wants to be dominated by the PRC. But they do have a huge advantage, particularly economically, that they're seen by leaders and business people in a lot of these countries. That's really the source of... some wealth, some prosperity. And we would do well, for example, to see the fight as just as much an economic 00:20:09 GRANT NEWSHAM one as a military one. Because we could build up our military, rebuild it, and we could have 800 ships in the Navy, and still lose. If we don't 00:20:19 JACK GAINES on these other fronts, we don't want you here because we're doing too much business with China. And that's where the U .S., along with its friends, the Japanese, the Koreans, the Indians, the Australians, 00:20:30 GRANT NEWSHAM we would do well to operate together more and to see the economic front and the political warfare fronts as a priority effort as much, if not 00:20:40 JACK GAINES more, than the 00:20:45 SPEAKER_02 They have a role to play if they're properly harnessed. But you do know that these days you don't see the Yankee trader that used to exist. You'd run to Americans everywhere trying to sell something to do business. Not so much these days. And we've almost ceded the far -flung part to the world. Because, well, the return on investment isn't enough. That's not an attractive enough proposition. Well, then let's make it one. Plus, you do have, say, the Japanese, the Indians, who are much better at operating in these places, to put it together into a coherent plan. Understand what it is, political warfare, and not just block the Chinese political warfare effort, but actually have our own campaign. And it really is worth doing some homework, I think, for a lot of people into what political warfare is. One sees the opportunities, but it takes a certain type of person who's good at it. versus a civil affairs guy. Versus a civil affairs guy. He's going to see different... He's going to see parts of the battlefield in a different way. Yes, sometimes you want the tank. But then there's this other part of it all. That is almost like a liberal arts test. Here you have to figure out the motivations for things. You have to figure out how a society works. And then how do you appeal to it using the things that are parts of political warfare? And this is where you can really make some mileage. You've got to have both. Make no mistake. If you're not able to destroy things and kill people, the civil affairs part isn't going to get you very far. But combine the two, and then you've really got something that's very hard to take on if you're the bad guys. We talk about defending Taiwan, and how important it is, and it is, I think, indispensable, that China does not take Taiwan and enslave 23 million people. If they did that... 00:20:47 JACK GAINES they're properly harnessed. But you do know that these days you don't see the Yankee trader that used to exist. You'd run to Americans everywhere trying to sell something to do business. Not 00:20:59 SPEAKER_03 so much these days. And we've almost ceded the far -flung part to the world. Because, well, the return on investment isn't enough. That's not an attractive enough proposition. Well, then let's 00:21:10 GRANT NEWSHAM make it one. Plus, you do have, say, the Japanese, the Indians, who are much better at operating in these places, to put it together into a coherent plan. Understand what it 00:21:20 JACK GAINES is, political warfare, and not just block the Chinese political warfare effort, but actually have our own campaign. And it really is worth doing some homework, I think, for a lot of people into what political warfare is. One sees the opportunities, but it takes a certain type of person who's good at it. versus a civil affairs guy. Versus a civil affairs guy. He's going to see different... He's going to see parts of the battlefield in a different way. 00:21:50 SPEAKER_03 Yes, sometimes you want the tank. But then there's this other part of it all. That is almost like a liberal arts test. Here you have to figure 00:22:00 JACK GAINES for things. You have to figure out how a society works. And then how do you appeal to it using the things that are parts of political warfare? 00:22:10 JACK GAINES make some mileage. You've got to have both. Make no mistake. If you're not able to destroy things and kill people, the civil affairs part isn't going to get you very far. But combine the two, and then you've really got something that's very hard to take on if you're the bad guys. We talk about defending Taiwan, and how important it is, and it is, I think, indispensable, 00:22:32 GRANT NEWSHAM that China does not take Taiwan and enslave 23 million people. If they did that... 00:22:39 SPEAKER_02 Asia would turn red overnight, as every country tried to cut the best deal they could. No country anywhere on Earth would have much confidence in American promises that will protect them. But one of the ways to actually defend Taiwan is, yes, they could maybe use F -35s and long -range missiles and smart pines, etc. You do have to have all of this stuff. Is it enough, 00:22:39 GRANT NEWSHAM would turn red overnight, as every country tried 00:22:42 SPEAKER_03 to cut the best deal they could. No country anywhere 00:22:46 JACK GAINES on Earth would have much confidence in American promises that will protect them. But one of the ways to actually defend 00:22:51 GRANT NEWSHAM Taiwan is, yes, they could maybe use F -35s and long -range missiles and smart pines, etc. You do have to have all of this stuff. Is it enough, even? Particularly if the other side says, okay, we'll absorb whatever you can send at us, but you're finished. But one of the ways that... But one of the ways is to give them a free trade agreement to improve their economy to the point that the government felt like it had money to spend on defense. 00:23:02 SPEAKER_02 Particularly if the other side says, okay, we'll absorb whatever you can send at us, but you're finished. But one of the ways that... But one of the ways is to give them a free trade agreement to improve their economy to the point that the government felt like it had money to spend on defense. You get a certain confidence in the entire society when they're more prosperous. Salaries are very low in Taiwan. Make it so people feel like they've got more money. Can they can buy a house? Can they can buy a condominium? build up the economy and that has a ripple effect throughout the society and on their military itself. And yet we didn't do that. And I think that's where we should apply some effort. 00:23:11 JACK GAINES give them a free trade agreement to 00:23:16 JACK GAINES point that the government felt like it had money to spend on defense. You get a certain confidence in the entire society when they're more prosperous. Salaries are very low in Taiwan. Make it so people feel like they've got more money. Can they can buy a house? Can they can buy a condominium? 00:23:35 JACK GAINES the economy and that has a ripple effect throughout the society and on their military itself. And yet we didn't do that. And I think that's where we should apply some 00:24:25 SPEAKER_02 I think you're right. And it's essential that we start to understand. You look at much of the debate about us in China. What happens when the two forces go at each other? And that's almost like... Going up behind the Waffle House. Going up behind the Waffle House. To see who's the toughest guy in Prince William County. To see who's the toughest guy in Prince William County. Out back. But think of all the things that go into whether or not the two hoodlums. There's all sorts of reasons why. No, the

Can classical Confucian ideas be adapted to produce a theory of democracy fit for today's world?

Welcome to 听故事说中文, the podcast where stories come alive to help you improve your Chinese language proficiency and cultural competency. Today, we bring you a tale that is both a glimpse into history and a lesson in courage. Set in the late 19th century, our story follows a young Sun Yat-sen, the future father of modern China, as he navigates the traditional Confucian school system. In a classroom where rote learning and strict discipline reign supreme, Sun Yat-sen finds himself questioning the meaning behind the words he is forced to memorize. One day, after flawlessly reciting his lesson, he summons the courage to ask his teacher for an explanation, a move that shocks both his classmates and the teacher. Share your comments and join the conversation. _ LCTS ************************************************************ Support Our Podcast If our podcast brings value to your life and you'd like to help us continue creating great content, consider becoming a patron for as little as $7 a month. As a patron, you will enjoy: ✨ Ad-free episodes for an uninterrupted listening experience.

Last time we spoke about the fourth encirclement campaign against the CCP. In 1931, the CCP survived brutal encirclement campaigns while the threat of Japanese invasion in Manchuria shifted focus in China. The new leadership, known as the 28 Bolsheviks, seized control after the downfall of Li Lisan, leading to infighting within the CCP. Despite initial successes, Mao Zedong opposed the aggressive military strategies favored by the Bolsheviks. As the Red Army expanded, Mao's calls for caution clashed with the Central Committee's ambitions, highlighting the struggle for power and differing strategies within the party during a time of upheaval. As the 28th Bolsheviks gained power, they stripped Mao Zedong of key positions, deeming his strategies outdated. The Red Army, while suffering losses, adapted tactics and launched further offensives. Political tensions rose, leading to purges and reorganization under more orthodox leadership. Ultimately, despite setbacks, the CCP's resilience and guerrilla tactics allowed them to persist against KMT forces.   #128 the fifth encirclement campaign Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So the CCP had just survived 4 encirclement campaigns. Now each time an encirclement campaign was unleashed, it was done so during a very tumultuous time to say the least. The first three were done between 1930-1931 where the Central Plains War and multiple large scale rebellions were kicking off. It was also on the cusp of the re-unification of China, thus Chiang Kai-Shek arguably had bigger fish to fry. During the fourth encirclement campaign Chiang Kai-Shek was very much taking notice of the red menace in his interior, however a rather earth shattering moment occurred, the Japanese had invaded Manchuria. And yes, we will get to the 15 year war in good time no worries folks your boy has a lot of goodies coming. So one can understand Chiang Kai-Shek could not very well fully go after the Reds when the Japanese had invaded northeast China and there was absolutely no telling where or when they would stop. Well the fourth encirclement campaign did not provide the results the KMT needed, so obviously there was to be a fifth…and guess what, the Japanese began an invasion of North China that same year of 1933. Now if you really are itching to hear more about these events we will tackle in a few episodes, over at the Pacific War Channel on Youtube or on all major podcast platforms might I suggest the following: my Kanji Ishiwara series covering his entire involvement in these events and during WW2, my full documentary/podcast on the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and lastly my full podcast on the Japanese invasion of North China. I am a very busy boy over there as you can see.  In the late winter and early spring of 1933, the Kwantung Army had begun an invasion of North China. They specifically began by invading the province of Rehe, modern day Jehol. After this they attacked the Great Wall of China, a pretty insane story to be honest, and descended further into north china. Understandably Chiang Kai-Shek shifted his focus from the Red menace to the Japanese at his front door. Beginning in July, the KMT established a review team to examine why the encirclement campaigns were failing to provide real results and what improvements could be made. They also established division level training units to retrain the forces with the lessons learned against the Reds. There was also a lot of integration of foreign military advisers, particularly Germans who helped develop better tactics and strategies. The Germans immediately proposed a more deliberate strategy against the Soviets. The first step they argued was to establish an economic blockade. Raw materials and durable goods could not be allowed to enter or leave the Soviet areas. Foods like rice and salt were especially targeted, there was to be an absolute ban on them going in or out. The second step was to establish a series of fortifications, basically blockhouses made out of concrete to provide fire support to offensive operations in nearby cities. As NRA forces advanced into areas to clear them, the previous blockhouses would be abandoned as new ones were built. There also needed to be lines of operation, requiring road development in rear areas to expedite logistical needs to the front. Now none of this sounds new compared to what we spoke about in the previous campaigns, but what was the issue was that it was not being done by all units prior. The KMT was also going to introduce political reforms that complemented the new standardized military strategies. New slogans arose such as “Thirty Percent Military, Seventy Percent Political,”. They were going to revive the baojia system.  The Baojia system was an administrative structure that emerged during the Song Dynasty 960–1279 AD and was prevalent in various forms throughout subsequent dynasties. Its primary purpose was to enhance local governance, community responsibility, and social stability. The system was based on the grouping of households into units known as "bao" and "jia". Each bao typically consisted of ten households, while a jia consisted of ten baos, totaling about one hundred households. This hierarchical structure allowed for more manageable governance and oversight, facilitating communication and administration at the local level. Under the Baojia system, each household was assigned to a bao, and the head of the bao was responsible for maintaining order, collecting taxes, and ensuring the compliance of families with local laws and regulations. The heads of the baojia units worked in conjunction with local officials to enforce state policies and maintain social harmony. This system not only provided a means for effective local governance but also fostered a sense of community among families. Neighbors were encouraged to cooperate and support one another, creating a network of mutual responsibility. In addition to its administrative functions, the Baojia system played a significant role in maintaining social order. By organizing families into these small units, it facilitated surveillance and mutual accountability among community members. Residents were motivated to monitor each other's behavior, discouraging misconduct and promoting adherence to social norms. As a result, the system contributed to the overall stability and cohesion of society, particularly in rural areas where government presence was often limited. Now to get all of this done, the KMT increased the NRA forces deployed to Jiangxi to nearly 700,000 who were broken down into 4 area armies and 5 air corps. They deployed the Northern Route NRA Army consisting of 33 divisions in Jinzhi, Jishui, Nangeng and the Le'an front; and the Southern Route NRA Army, consisting of eleven Guangdong divisions and one independent regiment, established a blocking position along a line connecting the cities of Wuping, Anyuan, Shangyou and Ganxian. The Southern Route NRA army would move to the blocking positions north in coordination with the other NRA forces to try and squeeze the Reds. The Western Route NRA army consisting of 9 Hunanese divisions and 3 independent regiments were responsible for blocking the Reds from advancing west of the Gan River. The Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi area army HQ was assigned 11 divisions and 4 security regiments to block any Reds from escaping through northeast Jiangxi. All of this encompassed the fifth encirclement campaign.  When the NRA was ready to commence the campaign, it was too late for the Reds to properly mount a counter encirclement campaign. The only thing the Reds had going for them was their recruitment efforts that saw them grow perhaps 100,000 strong. The Red Army even began touting a slogan “Million Man Army” to further recruit. By late October 1933, the Reds were certainly numerous, but this also meant they needed more supplies and equipment. With their Eastern Front Army now in Fujian, the Central Front Army and local populace should have been raising revenues and stockpiling supplies, especially rice and salt, but that is of course if they knew a fifth encirclement campaign was coming.  On September 25th, the NRA deployed 3 divisions south from Nanchang to attack Lichuan. Within 3 days of battle, the city fell, which greatly shocked the CCP. The Central Front Red Army fell back, waiting for the Eastern Front Red Army to rush back over from Fujian to meet the threat. By October 6th both front Red armies consolidated to perform a counterattack. They first attacked Xunkou, where they annihilated 3 NRA brigades. However the success was to be short lived. For the proceeding two months, the Red Army attacked multiple NRA blockhouses in Zixi, Huwan Bajiaoting, Xiaoshi, Daxiongguan and Yuangai Mountain. Yet they were unsuccessful at breaching the defensive line. The concrete block houses were acting as pillboxes allowing the NRA to concentrate fire using brand new German made machine guns. They also were utilizing new Krupp artillery pieces and German made aerial bombs against the Red army formations whenever they assaulted the blockhouse line. By November the KMT's attention was slightly diverted as Fujian had just seen a full blown rebellion, more about that in the next episode, but to summarize a bit. On November 30th, the KMT 19th route army in conjunction with the Fujian provincial government rebelled against the KMT and set up an independent government. As you might be guessing, they were also working with the CCP. Back in October they had formed a military alliance, better said cease fire. This little arrangement did not last long and there even emerged hostilities. During this chaos the revolutionary military council held an emergency meeting to figure out a course of action. Otto Braun advocated for a strong offensive to decisively defeat the KMT. He argued the golden age of guerrilla warfare in China was over and now the Red Army must conduct convention warfare against NRA positions. Thus Mao Zedong's “lure the enemy in deep” strategy was replaced by “defending against the enemy outside the Soviet”. In January of 1934 the second soviet congress was held where a series of resolutions were passed to focus the Red Army against the fifth encirclement campaign. The resolutions reiterated Otto Braun's offensive strategy and repeatedly attacked Mao Zedong's strategies. Building upon the strategy of defending against the enemy outside the Soviets, Otto Braun also proposed using “short, swift thrusts”. This would see the employment of repeated infantry assaults to overwhelm the NRA blockhouse lines. Otto Braun also advocated for continuing the mass recruitment efforts and brought up perhaps beginning a system of conscription to fill the ranks. After the Fujian rebellion situation simmered down, the NRA refocused their attention against the Reds. The NRA established a line of blockhouses going from Lichuan to Le'an and began clearing out the area south of Ruijin using 35 divisions. The NRA forces first targeted Guangchang, lying about halfway between Nanchang and Ruijin. The NRA's Eastern Front also began advancing west, totaling some 14 divisions. By March of 1934 the NRA Northern and Eastern Fronts linked up at Deshengguan where they began coordinated efforts towards Guangchang. In response to the NRA advances towards Guangchang, the Red Army built a series of fortifications and trenchworks to defend the area. On April 9th, the NRA began its attack on Guangchang, deploying the 3rd Route army's 10 divisions from Nanfeng with heavy artillery and aircraft support. The NRA forces advanced south along both sides of the Xu River leading towards Guangchang. The Northern Route NRA Army established new blockhouses on one side of the river before clearing the other side. It took the NRA forces roughly 2 weeks to advance down the riverway to Guangchang. By April 23rd, they breached the Red Army's defensive lines and seized control over some high ground surrounding the area. The Reds were forced to pull back into the city where they continued to build fortifications and trench lines. On the 27th the NRA began to artillery and aerially bomb the city, easily destroying the wooden fortifications and trench lines constructed by the Reds. On the 28th, the NRA stormed the city forcing the Reds to retreat south. The Reds had suffered 5093 casualties, roughly 20% of their defending force at Guangcheng whereas the NRA suffered 2000 casualties. It was very evident, the NRA were wielding superior equipment, notably the heavy artillery and aircrafts that the Red's had no real answer for.  After Guangchang the NRA advanced in all four directions. By May 1, NRA forces from the Western Front had taken control of both Shaxi and Longgang. Meanwhile, the Eastern Route NRA forces advanced and captured Jianning by May 16. By June, the CCP began feeling the strain from these assaults. A combination of the blockade and the baojia system was gradually eroded local support for the CCP. The attrition warfare strategy also took a toll on the quality of leadership and experience in the Red Army, as more inexperienced soldiers filled the ranks. Under pressure, many of these recruits deserted, further weakening the Red Army's effectiveness. Additionally, the shortage of supplies and food lowered morale and diminished public support for the Red Army's offensive. Even military and party publications gradually withdrew their support for the offensive, shifting focus to the promotion of guerrilla warfare to conserve resources. Recruitment efforts to replenish losses had little impact as the NRA's superior strategy continued to stifle the Soviet, reducing its control from seventeen counties to ten. In the summer of 1934, the Red Army began exploring new strategies, establishing a defensive perimeter stretching from Ninghua to Ningdu and Xingguo. By May, the Central Committee convened and concluded that the current offensive strategy was ineffective, likely necessitating the Red Army's evacuation from the Soviet area. They sought approval from the COMINTERN to change their approach, which was granted a few days later, stressing that the CCP's priority should be preserving the Red Army's combat strength. However, Braun and Bo Gu proposed a different method. Instead of immediately preparing to withdraw from the Soviet, they advocated for a final stand, urging everyone to give their all to defend the territory and secure victory. Alongside this shift in rhetoric, the Red Army maintained its defensive posture, constructing wooden blockhouses and trenches. Additionally, the CCP approved an expansion of guerrilla warfare across multiple fronts to defeat the NRA. In July, the NRA launched another offensive, focusing this time on the city of Shicheng, positioned between Ninghua and Ningdu as their entry point. The two forces clashed fiercely along this final line of defense for nearly a month. In early August, the Red Army mounted a strong counteroffensive during the battle of Gaohunao, inflicting over 4,000 casualties on the NRA. However, the Red Army also suffered heavy losses and was forced to retreat to the last defensive line just north of Shicheng. At Shicheng, the Red Army managed to hold the NRA in a stalemate. Ultimately, the NRA deployed twelve large howitzers, breaking through the defensive line in August. Shicheng eventually fell in October. The defense cost the Red Army 5,000 casualties, leaving it severely weakened and forcing its leaders to consider drastic actions. By this point, the Jiangxi Soviet had been reduced to a small area around Ruijin and Xingguo. With mounting casualties and the imminent threat of an NRA assault on Ruijin, the Red Army made a bold decision to retreat from Jiangxi on October 10, 1934, ending the Fifth Extermination Campaign. There has been a lot of thorough investigative work into why the CCP failed during the fifth encirclement campaign. This episode will be a bit different then previous ones as I thought it might be interesting to tell the overall story and then explain the finer details as to why it went down this way. Going back to when I discussed the NRA analyzing why their fourth encirclement campaign had failed. The analytics from that were incorporated into plans formed by the German advisers such as Hans von Seeckt and Alexander von Faulkenhausen. The Germans dramatically improved the NRA's performance across the board. This was seen in terms of training, the employment of more modern military tactics and of course the Germans sold the NRA some really good toys. Now again this was done in the vacuum of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and Northern China. The real aim of the Germans' assistance was directed against the Japanese, but the advisers acknowledged how China must combat the external aggressor while not succumbing to internal threats. Ironically it was that exact situation that had toppled multiple Chinese dynasties in the past, take the Ming for example.  The NRA also employed effective counterinsurgent strategies that complimented their conventional warfare strategies. Beginning back in 1928 the KMT gradually re-instituted the baojia system. The NRA first cleared out Red areas and then established local administrators who were loyal to the KMT, protected by local militias. Through this the NRA was able to hold cleared areas and block any Red infiltration. Many residents in these areas actively began providing intel to the NRA. The Baojia system also supported the economic blockade, providing a system of sentries at the entrance of villages placing a lot of pressure on the Red Army and local populations. Chiang Kai-Shek's political reform “70% political, 30% military” also helped incorporate many disenfranchised Chinese, taking their support away from the Reds. The NRA also adopted a methodical, patient approach to tackle the Reds. The NRA quickly found out the Reds did not have the necessary weaponry to take out their concrete blockhouses, thus a war of attrition was on the table. Electing for a long campaign rather than a short one severely hurt the Reds who were incapable of conducting prolonged operations. The NRA also had learnt from the Red's usage of diversionary and feint attacks, not falling for them this time around. There was also obviously their NRA enormous advantage in numbers, they did toss nearly a million men at the Soviets. On the other side the Red Army suffered from numerous internal problems. The Red Army had undergone numerous measures to reform and professionalize the army, under the leadership of the 28 bolsheviks whom dominated the Central Committee. The mass recruitment efforts were directly primarily on uneducated peasants who required intensive training. Meanwhile the offensive strategy was decimating Red Army forces, many new recruits were tossed straight into the front lines without any training. The lack of training and political guidance, accompanied with low morale led to mass desertions. By the end of the fifth encirclement campaign the Red Army could not generate the proper forces to fill its demand and simply kept tossing more and more untrained peasants into the lines, degrading the combat effectiveness. The arrival of the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks in the CCP led to significant changes in the overall military strategy of the Red Army. Much of the new leadership's perspectives were shaped by Stalinist Soviet ideology, which markedly contrasted with the views of both Li Lisan and Mao Zedong, particularly in relation to Mao Zedong's approach, which was influenced by political considerations. These ideological differences also resulted in a substantial gap in military tactics. Nevertheless, both the Bolsheviks and Mao shared a similar stance on the expansion and training of the Red Army, emphasizing the vital importance of political training in building a robust party army. Ultimately, the CCP believed that the success of the Red Army hinged on the professionalization of the force, ensuring unity of command, a shared understanding of the mission, and an enhanced capacity to execute that mission. The primary advocate for the professionalization strategy of the Red Army was the Soviet Union. Stalin's interest in the Red Army was driven by both external and internal factors. The Soviet Union viewed an imminent threat from both Japan and Germany. Japan, a longstanding adversary of Russia, had expanded its presence in China, particularly following the 1932 occupation of Manchuria, which posed a direct risk to Russia's southern flank and national security. The Soviets believed that a large, professional Red Army, loyal to the Soviet Union, would serve as a formidable defense against Japanese aggression, and later, German threats. Additionally, the Soviets resumed discussions with the Nationalist government after years of silence to help ensure the security of their Chinese flank. For Stalin, the struggle for control over the CCP was intertwined with a broader power struggle within the Soviet Union against Trotsky. His internal conflicts with Trotsky solidified his communist ideology, resulting in a stringent approach within the COMINTERN and the new CCP. Through the COMINTERN and Bolsheviks, Stalin aimed to consolidate his power by eliminating Trotskyists in China. These internal Soviet political dynamics ultimately influenced the choice of Chinese political and military strategies, which had detrimental effects on the Red Army. At first glance, the policies of the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks closely resembled those of Li Lisan. Both groups viewed the urban proletariat as the central force in the communist revolution. They shared the conviction that merging the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat with modern strategies would empower the Red Army to achieve victory. Additionally, they felt that the conditions were ripe for revolution to spread into urban areas, emphasizing the necessity for the Red Army to engage in the cities to support students and workers involved in the movement. Wang Ming even remarked that although the 1930 assault on Changsha was a mistake, he did not see this failure as evidence against the soundness of the strategy of targeting urban centers. Upon closer inspection, the distinctions between the two factions were quite pronounced. Disputes between them arose early on; in June 1930, Li Lisan criticized Wang Ming, Bo Gu, and two other group members for opposing his plans. However, their differences ran deeper than mere political conflict. Ideologically, the Bolsheviks challenged Li Lisan's characterization of the bourgeoisie. In Wang Ming's The Two Lines, he asserted that all "capitalist bourgeois reformers were counterrevolutionary." This broadened the definition to encompass wealthy and middle-class peasants, who became targets during land reform efforts. Additionally, their strategies for confronting urban centers differed significantly. The factions also had contrasting views on the role of the Red Army: Li Lisan believed it should support urban proletariat uprisings to capture the cities, while the Bolsheviks regarded it as the primary force for seizing the metropolis. The distinctions between Mao Zedong and the 28 Bolsheviks were significant. Unlike Mao Zedong, the Bolshevik-led CCP rejected any form of alliance, insisting on the defeat of both the Nationalists and the Japanese. In their view, both groups were imperialists and posed equal threats to the Soviet Union and the communist movement. During the Mukden Incident, many nationalists and communists sought to forge a united front against Japanese aggression. However, the CCP opposed this, advocating for the overthrow of what they considered the agent of imperialism—the KMT.  The Bolsheviks also held a strong opposition to Maoist military strategies. They believed that an incorrect guerrilla warfare approach had infiltrated the Red Army, epitomized by the "lure the enemy in deep" tactic. Wang Ming likened this strategy to a form of "retreat" or "escape." The Bolsheviks advocated for the significant expansion and professionalization of the Red Army, aiming to move away from a peasant mentality. With a larger force, the Red Army could adopt an offensive stance, employing Soviet tactics to capture urban centers and extend Soviet influence. While guerrilla warfare was not entirely dismissed, it was relegated to local militias in rear and flank areas. In contrast, Mao had a more practical perspective on the capabilities of Red Army soldiers. He recognized that the Red Army lacked the technology necessary for conventional warfare. Moreover, Mao believed that achieving victory was not the sole priority; sustainability after victory and ensuring that the gains outweighed the losses were also crucial considerations. In hindsight, the positional warfare and offensive tactics advocated by Otto Braun and the students proved to be ineffective against the NRA. However, at the time, it is understandable why this approach was favored over Mao Zedongs strategy of "luring the enemy deep." This new offensive military strategy was predicated on the belief that the Red Army was strong and capable of launching attacks against the NRA. Although this assessment may have been overstated, the victories achieved during the Extermination Campaigns did boost the morale of the Red Army. Furthermore, their later success in resisting the Fourth Extermination Campaign reinforced the capabilities of the Communist military forces. This offensive strategy also marked a departure from the tactic of conceding territory, which had always posed challenges for the local population. The CCP garnered more support for its strategy by asserting that the Red Army was now strong enough to defend their territory and confront the enemy directly, allowing locals to remain in their homes. This simple shift fostered greater support for their cause. Conversely, Mao Zedong had a keen understanding of local conditions and recognized the detrimental effects of Bolshevik policies on land redistribution. The Bolshevik approach increased the burden on a larger portion of the local populace and threatened the fragile support necessary for waging a "people's war." Mao Zedong and his followers also aimed to delay and hinder large recruitment efforts, arguing that expansion would be an unnecessary distraction for locals who were already busy with agricultural work. Moreover, the Bolshevik offensive strategy was more conventional compared to Mao Zedongs concept of mobile warfare. At that time, Mao Zedongs approach of "luring the enemy deep" and other mobile warfare tactics were revolutionary in China and faced considerable criticism and skepticism. Even after the significant defeat of the Li Lisan line, the ability of the Bolsheviks and Otto Braun to revive a similar strategy two years later demonstrated the ongoing support for a more conventional military approach. In its new strategy, the Red Army blended traditional and modern tactics to engage the enemy. On the one hand, it maintained its reliance on established strengths in intelligence gathering and deception to outmaneuver the NRA. However, with the introduction of the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks and Otto Braun, the Red Army transitioned from a mobile defense approach to employing “short, swift thrusts” as offensive tactics against the NRA blockhouses during the Fifth Extermination Campaign. The Red Army also capitalized on advantages gained from previous campaigns. Improvements in signal intelligence, particularly through increased collection of wireless communications and the creation of training schools, enabled the Red Army to closely monitor NRA movements during the Fourth Extermination Campaign. Additionally, the Red Army integrated tactical intelligence into its operations, using plain-clothed soldiers and deploying double agents within KMT units to gather intelligence and disrupt them. The thoroughness of the Red Army's intelligence collection was a notable strength. For instance, an intelligence report on the KMT's Seventy-ninth NRA Division analyzed the background and motivations of its soldiers, revealing that many hailed from the same area as their commander, which fostered strong loyalties. This insight made the unit a less appealing target for subversion, given the traditional Confucian emphasis on hierarchical loyalty. The Red Army continued to execute feints and deceptive operations throughout its campaigns. The Eleventh Red Army effectively served as the main effort on two occasions. Moreover, the Red Army sent misleading communications to confuse NRA forces. For instance, while near Huangpi, NRA scouts “intercepted” a message claiming that the Red Army's main forces were positioned in Nanchang, prompting the division units to lower their guard in the city, only to be ambushed. The biggest change to Red Army tactics was the introduction of what Otto Braun described as “short, swift thrusts,” while Lin Biao defined this tactic as “sudden, rapid raids launched against the enemy who emerges from their blockhouses to advance the fortification line by a short distance, specifically between 2½ to 5 kilometers or even less. These thrusts aim to eliminate the main enemy forces before they can solidify their position. Although the tactics appeared straightforward, significant differences emerged in their application, particularly between Braun's theoretical approach and Lin Biao's practical execution. Firstly, the ultimate objectives of the tactics differed greatly. Braun's approach was part of a broader strategy aimed at safeguarding Soviet territory. Rather than seeking a decisive victory over the numerically superior NRA forces, the Red Army focused on defending territory and achieving small tactical victories that could translate into operational and strategic advantages. In contrast, Lin Biao viewed this tactic as a means to “annihilate the enemy or secure victory in the entire battle.”His emphasis was on defeating the enemy and achieving a decisive victory. Secondly, Braun promoted a more methodical strategy, where the Red Army would establish strong points with small clusters of fortifications. These areas provided defensive protection against artillery and air assaults, creating conditions conducive for the Red Army to launch rapid attacks on the NRA when they were away from their blockhouses. During an attack, Braun suggested that the Red Army should first fix the NRA in its rear, flank, or even front, followed by a strike aimed at weakening the enemy to disrupt its forces. Conversely, Lin Biao had a different perspective on the assault, prioritizing mobility and movement for the Red Army during these thrusts. The Red Army's primary defense relied on secrecy, moving quietly to occupy high ground while only establishing makeshift defensive structures for air and artillery protection. When the enemy entered their territory, the Red Army would encircle their forces, cutting off their retreat and swiftly attacking their flanks before they could construct fortifications. He advocated for the pursuit, believing it was the most effective way to convert a tactical victory into operational or strategic success. In contrast, Lin Biao rejected the idea of pursuit, reasoning that if his tactics were executed effectively, the enemy would have no escape route, making a pursuit unnecessary. These differing views on tactics underscored the challenges of translating theoretical military concepts into practical application. Otto Braun's offensive strategy stemmed from his experiences and understanding of Western military traditions. When applied to the Chinese battlefield, Lin Biao adapted his own experiences to formulate his interpretation of “short, swift thrusts,” which incorporated several of Mao's tactical principles. Given the circumstances of the Red Army, Lin Biao aimed for a quick, decisive victory, steering clear of prolonged battles with the NRA. He utilized intelligence and terrain—particularly through reconnaissance—to gain an advantage over the enemy. His strategy prioritized focusing on the enemy rather than merely securing territory, enabling his unit to engage in battle on favorable ground. While the localization of “short, swift thrusts” did not provide the Red Army with the decisive edge needed to overcome the NRA, it illustrated how the Red Army continued to adapt concepts to local conditions to achieve success in combat. Between 1932 and 1934, the Red Army reached its maximum size and level of professionalism, only to be outmatched by a stronger NRA force. With the rise of the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks, the Red Army adopted a more aggressive, offensive strategy. Although this approach would later be deemed a mistake, it initiated a series of reforms that enhanced the Red Army's professionalism. During this period, the Red Army nearly doubled its strength to six army corps. To promote uniformity and centralize command, all Red Army units, including local militia groups, were standardized. Additionally, the Red Army founded the Red Academy and the Red Army War College, alongside specialized schools to train and develop its officers. These reforms contributed to the Red Army's success in the Fourth Extermination Campaign against the NRA and facilitated the expansion of Soviet influence into four provinces. However, following their defeat, the NRA adapted and developed a more effective strategy against the Red Army. Lacking the necessary heavy weapons and supplies, the Red Army could not prevent the systematic encirclement of the Jiangxi Soviet during the Fifth Extermination Campaign. In order to survive the Red Army would have to embark on arguably one of the most important historic moments of the CCP's history, it was a notably very long march. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The 28 Bolsheviks wrestled control over the CCP and this had rather dramatic consequences. For one, Mao Zedong's strategies were thrown to the wind as full on offensive strategies took the center stage. In the face of the most intense NRA encirclement campaign as of yet, the CCP crumbled and would now have to march to away trying to survive.