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Last time we spoke about the Battle for the Great Wall of China. In 1933, the Kwantung Army faced logistical struggles and sought political deals with Chinese warlords to seize North China. Despite capturing key areas, chaos reigned as their unauthorized operations defied Tokyo's orders. When Emperor Hirohito demanded a withdrawal, the army reluctantly complied, derailing a coup attempt. Though peace talks followed, distrust persisted, and rogue Japanese commanders plotted fresh offensives. The Tanggu truce was anything but fair to China. The Japanese followed it up with continuous negotiations aimed at slicing more and more out of China. By 1935 North China was practically annexed if but all in official terms. The Japanese seized postal rights, train rights, airline rights, set up puppets to police a new demilitarized zone and seemed never appeased fully. Yet they did not only have their eye on Northern China.    #149 Incidents in North China: Operation Chahar Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. May 1935, marked the peak of Sino-Japanese efforts at reconciliation. Yet this quickly fell apart in June as the Kwantung Army continued to encroach in North China. More specifically they began to look at Chahar province. Between January and May of 1935 some 50 instances of anti-Japanese violence had broken out in North China and behind these outbursts seemed to be Yu Xuecheng, the chairman of Hubei's provincial Government. He was not alone in his efforts as many KMT members, generals in the Central Army and Blue Shirt Society also had helping hands to play. The Japanese were particularly infuriated by incessant attacks from the bandit army led by Sun Yungqin and the assassinations of two pro-Japanese figures operating in Tientsin, Pai Yuhuan and Hu Enpu. Even with th support of the Kwantung Army, maintaining law and order in the demilitarized region established by the Tanggu Trace proved a serious undertaking. The Nanjing government tried exploit the situation, encouraging Sun Yungqin's bandits to create chaos in the demilitarized region. Sun Yungqin's bandit frequently crossed the Great Wall into Rehe in raids. Each time the Kwantung Army attempted to catch them as they fled into the demilitarized region. They particularly liked to do so in the Zunhua district where the official He Xiaoyi supplied the bandits with munitions and provisions. On May 17th, the Kwantung Army was fed up and elected to cross the Great Wall to crush Sun Yungqin once and for all. The Japanese army attache at Peiping, Major Takahasi Tan, notified the Chinese authorities of this decision, claiming the Kwantung Army had the authority to do so under certain provisions within the Tanggu agreement. Beginning on May 20th, the Sugihara Mixed Brigade began its hunt and claimed to have uncovered evidence that Yu Xuecheng had helped guide Sun Yingqin's bandits away from their force. The Japanese also argued the bandits were operating in Manchuria and were calling themselves the “Northeastern Patriotic Volunteers” led by General He Yingqing, the current chairman of the Peiping Branch Military Council.  The bandits were said to have been completely crushed within 5 days by a single brigade. The Japanese also forced the resignation of Yu Xuecheng who refused to organize an anti-chiang kai-shek movement. Shortly before the operation launched, two pro-Japanese newspaper publishers, secretly supported by the Japanese Special Service Agency were assassinated in Tientsin. On May 2nd, Hu Enpu of the Kuochuan pao “national rights” was shot in bed at the Peiyang Hotel in the Japanese concession. That same night, Pai Yuhuan of Chen Pa was murdered in his home. Consul General Kawagoe reported to Tokyo, Hu Enpu and Pai Yuhuan were performing a mission through their newspapers to arouse anti-chiang Kai-shek sentiment in North China. As stated by Kawagoe "Hu and Pai did not have a particularly close personal relationship, but they were regarded with extreme suspicion by the Chinese. Since they were assassinated on the same night, we immediately suspected there was some political intrigue behind these crimes."   Japanese police looked into the matter and discovered the criminals had used a car bearing the plate number 1063 which was owned by Shen Qucheng who was a resident of the Japanese concession. Many suspects were interrogated, and given what they were saying, the Japanese suspected the man behind the assassinations was General Yang Hu, the peace preservation commissioners of Shanghai and an alleged member of the Blue Shirt Society. The Japanese also believed Yang Hu was hiding in the French concessions in Shanghai. In protest of this, the Japanese invoked the Boxer Protocol and Tanggu Truce: “1) The Sun incident and the assassinations of the pro-Japan, proManchukuo newspaperpublishers violated the North China [T'angku] Cease-fire Agreement of May 1933. The North China Cease-fire Agreement stipulated that China would not take any action disturbing the peac e on either side of a line from Lut'ai to Paoti and T'ungchou. The above provision extends to all of China and should of course be applied to any defiant deeds of Chines e officials that threaten the peac e in the Peiping-Tientsin region. The Sun incident and the assassinations of Pai and Hu are clearly contrary to the above agreement.  2) The official note exchanged by China and Japan upon the return of Tientsin in 1902 is applicabl e to the murder of Pai Yühuan. This note stated: "In the event a Chines e national who is employed by a foreign army is accused of disobeying the law, the commander of the army that employs the said Chines e national, in order that the matter may be decided in the most suitable manner has the option of punishing him personally or voluntarily delivering him to the appropriate Chinese authorities. Your government must agree to this arrangement.” Since Pai, as already stated, was in the employ of the Japanese army, his murder is clearly a deed which violates the above note."  Thus the Japanese invoked the right that the commander of the Tientsin garrison had the authority to maintain security and try any criminals. Because the Japanese Army claimed it had authority to conduct investigations, trials and deal punishment within two miles of the Peiping-Shanhaigaun rail line it insisted to do so given the recent events. This actually distorted some of the specifics of the Tanggu Treaty, thus the Japanese were on loose grounds. On May 25th, Tokyo HQ was forewarned of the actions the Kwantung Army would undertake in North China. So Tokyo sent Colonel Sakai Takashi the Tientsin army chief of staff and attache Takahasi Tan called upon Yu Qiaqi, the secretary general of the Political affairs council and General He Yingqin. In fact Sakai backed this up with a threatening public statement: “The execution of anti-Manchukuo plots under the direction of the Chinese authorities, assistance to the "Chinese Patriotic Volunteer Forces," and various acts of terrorism directed against Japan are destructive of the cease-fire agreement. The headquarters for these crimes are in Tientsin and Peiping. Should this state of affairs continue, it will become necessary to incorporate the above two cities in the demilitarized zone. The murders of Hu and Pai are violations of the provisions of the Boxer Settlement and a challenge to Japan. If similar acts hereafter occur, Japan will, on the basis of its treaty rights, be forced to consider what action is necessary for the defense of its rights”. Additionally, Sakai demanded the withdrawal of all KMT aligned units, Blue Shirt Society members, the Political Training Corps of the Peiping Branch Military Council and the 3rd Regiment Military Police from North China. He also wanted Yu Xuecheng dismissed as chairman of Hubei. The next day in a move to intimidate Yu Xuecheng, the Tientsin Army deployed armored vehicles, artillery and machine guns directly in front of his official residence. It seemed now the Japanese sought to incorporate all of Hubei into the new demilitarized region. To make this happen, Sakai had independently put forward these demands, but they were recognized as an ultimatum from Japan, one for which for now had no deadline.  Chiang Kai-Shek, Wang Jingwei, Huang Fu and He Yingqin conferred over the situation and chose to informally talk with the Japanese while they kept the press quiet on the matter. The Chinese took their time, so to pressure them further, the Kwantung Army deployed a infantry battalion and one cavalry brigade at Shanhaiguan, while the Kawaguchi detachment concentrated around Gubeikou and two air force squadrons were brought over to Jinzhou. The Tientsin Army readied two battalions at Tientsin and Tangshan, both prepared to advance to Peiping at a moments notice. After sending numerous orders not to escalate things, Tokyo HQ sent Colonel Kita Seiichi, the chief of its China desk to demand the Kwantung Army not use anymore force. Meanwhile the Imperial Japanese Navy, under the fear of Anglo-American intervention avoided escalating the situation, but kept the 3rd fleet on full alert.  Under immense pressure the Chinese buckled. At 6pm on June 10th, He Yingqin orally advised Major Takahashi that Nanjing would issue a directive ordered the immediate withdrawal of local KMT organs from Hubei; that the 51st NRA Army would depart by rail from Hubei between June 11th and 25th; that the end and 25th NRA divisions of the Central Army would also depart Hubei and that the KMT would issue a directive prohibiting anti-japanese activities throughout China. It was an incredibly embarrassing act and became known as the He-Umezu agreement. Under its provisions the Japanese had expelled the Central Army from North China, Yu Xuecheng's forces, all anti-Japanese organizations of any sort and all anti-Japanese officials were removed. The Japanese had heavily capitalized on the assassinations in Tientsin, however other incidents enabled our good friend Doihara to cause further mayhem.  Following the Tanggu truce, Song Queyuan's 29th Army, consisting of the 37th, 38th and 132nd divisions had been deployed throughout Chahar with his headquarters based at Kalgan. His troops understandably displayed a lot of anti-japanese attitude and behaviors. Like a broken record, it was only a matter of time until an incident organically presented itself. One of the first ones broke out in Changpei. According to the Japanese, so get your grains of salt ready, a group of 8 led by staff officer Kawaguchi Kiyotake of the Tientsin garrison and Ikeda Katsumi of the consulate at Kalga and planned an excursion to Inner Mongolia late October 1934. After completing all the necessary paperwork and procedures, such as securing visas and giving advance notice to the Chinese officials in the areas they would voyage, the Japanese departed Kalgan for Tolun on October 27th. Upon entering Changpei's south gate they were suddenly stopped by troops under Song Queyuans 132nd division alongside some Peace Preservation Corps men. Their commanding officer punched Ikeda as the rest of the party were threatened with Dao swords and rifles. After 40 minutes a Chinese security officer showed up to allow them all to pass through the South Gate.  The Japanese foreign Ministry and Army were obviously outraged by this incident. The vice Consul at Kalgan, Hashimoto Masayasu complained to the chief of staff of the 132nd division and Major Takahasi at Peiping lodged an official complaint with Song Queyuan. On November 25th, Song Queyuan ordered the general commanding the 132nd division, Chao Tengyu, to apologize and dismissed the officer who punched Ikeda. Song Queyuan then guaranteed safe travel for all Japanese throughout Chahar, without any inspection of their possession and he promised to withdraw his troops west of the Great Wall. All of this because a guy was punched, you can really get the sense the Chinese were walking on eggshells. In late 1934, a large contingent of Song Queyuan's cavalry had deployed to the area around Fengning in Rehe. They were defending strategic positions and establishing large peace preservation corps. The Kwantung Army repeatedly demanded they withdraw from the area and the Chinese had made promises as to such by December 31st. Rather than comply, the Chinese launched an offensive and captured 40 Manchukuo militiamen. Song Queyuan rewarded his men with a bounty of 300 silver yuan and ordered the arms of the enemy by handed to the district government of Kuyuan.  On January 17th, the Kwantung Army moved the Nagami detachment of the IJA 8th Division from Chengde to launch a punitive expedition against Song Queyuan's forces in the Kuyuan area. On the 20th the Peiping Branch Military Council informed the Kwantung Army Song Queyuan was already withdrawing his men. Thus the Nagami detachment who had advanced as far as Tat'an turned around for the Great Wall on the 22nd, when they were suddenly attacked by Song Queyuan's troops near Hungnit'an. The Kwantung Army were outraged by what they were calling the first incident in western Rehe. The so-called incident would be resolved on February 2nd nar Ta'an when Zhang Yueting acting on behalf of the NRA 37th division and Major General Tani Hisao on behalf of the IJA 7th division agreed to the following terms: “1) In the future China will strictly prohibit actions that antagonize the Japanese army and will neither move troops into Manchukuo nor adopt a threatening attitude toward Manchukuo. The Chinese will completely suspend their current spying activities, such as scouting the movements of the Kwantung Army.  2) If China violates the above pledges in the future, the Japanese  army will act independently and firmly, but the responsibility will be borne by the Chinese . If the Chinese forces increase their military strength or contemplate strengthening their fortifications, the Japanese army will regard these moves as hostile acts.  3) China is to have the government of Kuyuan district return all arms confiscated (from the Manchukuo militia and turn them over to the Japanese army at Nanweitzu by February 7.  4) The outcome of this conference will be jointly announced on February 4. In particular, the Chinese should be careful that in making their announcement they do not distort the contents of the agreement or engage in counterpropaganda”. Can you imagine there was a second incident at Changpei? 4 members of the Japanese Special Services Agency based out of Abga, some 40 miles northwest of Tolun had come to the same southgate around 4pm on June 5th, traveling to Kalgan. There they were detained by units of the 132nd division who refused to recognize their identification papers. They were apparently held without proper bedding or food, threatened with Dao swords and bayonets. The Japanese claimed it was all done under orders from Song Queyuan's chief of staff and that their officials were interrogated by the chief of military police at Changpei. On June 11th, Lt Colonel Matsui Gennosuke, the head of the Japanese Special Service Agency at Kalgan, demanded an apology from Song Queyuan and for the men responsible to be punished and for further guarantees for safe travel. Matsui also insinuated that unless Song Queyuan severed ties to Nanjing and became Pro-Japanese he might suffer the same fate that had befallen Yu Xuecheng. Clearly the Kwantung Army was looking to remove Song Queyuan's army from Chahar province. There were two major reasons for such a thing, so they could better protect the northwestern flank of Manchukuo and to support Prince De who was attempting a campaign to make Inner Mongolia independent from China.  On June 11th the Kwantung Army directed the Mukden Special Service Agency chief of staff, our old buddy, Doihara, currently in Peiping, to confer with the army attache there and with the Tientsin garrison. They were to push for Song Queyuan's army to be withdrawn south of the Yellow River as rapidly as possible. Tokyo HQ always keeping a close eye on their troublesome Kwantung Officers dispatch this notice to Doihara "Although we desire the evacuation of Song Queyuan's army from Chahar province, we disagree that we should, at this time, demand its withdrawal south of the Yellow River. Rather, its transfer to the Peiping-Hankow Railway line would be advisable." On June 13th, the General Staff advised the Kwantung Army the same message. The General staff then ordered every detachment in North China to act discreetly "If we shun excessive publicity at this time, we should, in view of the present situation, be able to achieve practical results without publicity." Since they were already getting their way in Hubei, Tokyo HQ did not want to risk rocking the boat in Chahar concurrently.  Then came a second western Rehe incident, according to the Chengde Special Service Agency, "On June 11, when a party led by a senior official of Fengning hsien was about to enter the town of Tungchatzu [in Manchukuo, about eight kilometers north of Tushihk'ou], it was attacked by rifle fire from Sung Che-yuan's troops stationed at Tushihk'ou. The next day, June 12, a member of the border police force in Hsiaoch'ang [in Manchukuo, about fifteen kilometers north of Tushihk'ou] was also fired upon by the same troops of Sung in the vicinity of Hsiaoch'ang."  On June 17th, the Kwantung Army General Minami Jiro met with the Tientsin Army chief of staff Sakai and the Special Service Agency chief at Kalgan, Matsui for a full report on the incident. After reviewing it, Minami drafted a policy to guide the Kwantung Army:  “The withdrawal of Sung Che-yuan's army will worsen the confusion in the Peiping-Tientsin region. This incident should be handled separately from the North China problem and should be negotiated locally with Sung Che-yuan. Our demands will be limited to the following:  1) withdrawal of the troops invading Manchukuo, together with their advance unit at Tolun;  2) removal of the forces back to the Kalgan area;  3) an apology by Sung Che-yuan;  4) punishment of those directly responsible for the Changpei incident; and  5) prohibition of anti-Japanese actions in the future.” The Chinese realized they needed to reach a quick settlement with the Kwantung Army. On the 18th He Yingqin met with Consul General Suma over in Nanjing. Suma was presented with a set of harsh demands from the Kwantung Army and that same day reported to the Executive Yuan he had decided to relieve Song Queyuan of his posts as governor and commander of the 29th Army. He then appointed as acting governor and provincial commissioner of civil affairs, Qin Dechun, who would take the 132nd division implicated in the Changpei incident south. The message was relayed to the Japanese military attache in Nanjing, Lt Colonel Amamiya Tatsumi. The man who relayed the message was Vice Foreign Minister Tang Yujen who also stated this "In view of the fact that China has moved voluntarily to dismiss Sung Che-yuan, to transfer his army, and to punish those responsible, we request that we not be confronted with an ultimatum in the form of various demands from the Kwantung Army with a deadline for reply." On June 19th, Nanjing officially implemented the promises made by He Yingqin and Tang Yujen and in turn the Kwantung Army wired Doihara in Peiping to stand down and wait to see if the Chinese did what they said they would. Doihara was probably disappointed he could not perform his 100th false flag operation he must have been cooking up. For any of you who watch my Youtube content, I used clips from the Chinese WW2 Drama series “Young Marshal” that depicts Doihara hilariously. You can check it out in my long format documentary on the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, its meme gold Doihara's clips, freaking out and smashing phones and such.  At 10 pm on June 23rd, Doihara, alongside Matsui and Takahasi visited Qin Dechen at his residence to negotiate a final understanding. There Doihara demanded China implement several measures to promote better relations with Japan such as withdrawing Song Queyuan's army southwest; give an apology for the Changpei incident; punish all those responsible; dissolve all the anti-japanese organizations in the region; ban Chinese immigration into Inner Mongolia; cease any oppressive actions against Mongolians and cooperate and encourage trade between Manchukuo, Inner Mongolia, North China; and appoint more Japanese military and political advisers. Just a laundry list he had worked up. So Qin Dechen apologized for the Changpei incident, stated they were already withdrawing Song Queyuan's men and dissolving all the anti-japanese organizations. Now he was orally agreeing to all of this, but he refused to put it in writing, prior to receiving the greenlight from Nanjing. Doihara understood and gave him time to talk to his government. The next day however another incident occurred, this time near Tuxukou. There a contingent of Song Queyuan's withdrawing troops fired upon Manchukuo police forces and in response the Tolun Special Service Agency dispatched a Mongolian unit led by Li Shuxin. It was not really much of an incident, just a minor confrontation all things given, so the Kwantung Army told Doihara to deal with Qin Dechen in private about it.On June 27th, Qin Dechen sent a formal reply to Doihara's demands in what became known as the Qin-Doihara agreement. It conformed with all the demands, seeing Song Queyuan's troops depart southwest while the security of Chahar was entrusted to two peace preservation units. One unit was responsible for the Chinese population, the other over the Mongolian. On August 28th, Song Queyuan was appointed garrison commander over the Peiping-Tientsin region with his 29th division joining Chao Tengyu's 132nd division and Liu Juming's 2nd division. Thus after the He-Umezu and Qin-Doihara agreements the Japanese had now expanded their influence into both Hubei and Chahar. 1935 saw a wave of incidents break out in the demilitarized region, prompting the Japanese to go into numerous negotiations with the Chinese to clamp down on anything they didn't like. Then on October 4th, Japan unleashed a document titled  “Concerning Policy towards China”: “The goal of our foreign policy is the development of East Asia and the maintenance of the security of East Asia through the cooperative concert of Japan, Manchukuo, and China, with Japan as the nucleus; this is likewise the objective of our policy toward China. To realize this objective on the basis of the outline below, the central and regional authorities of China must, by fair and just means, adjust their relations with Japan and Manchukuo so as to bring about an environment favorable to the establishment of basic relations between Japan, Manchukuo, and China.  1) China should adopt a good neighbor policy toward Japan, thoroughly suppress anti-Japanese activities, and abandon its policy of reliance on Europe and the United States. It should put this policy into practice and as a matter of course cooperate with Imperial Japan on practical problems.  2) Although China must eventually extend formal recognition to Manchukuo, until then it must recognize de facto the independence of Manchukuo and abandon its anti-Manchukuo policy. At least in North China, which borders on Manchukuo, the Chinese should promote economic and cultural cooperation with Manchukuo.  3) In view of the Communist threat emanating from Outer Mongolia and posing a common menace to Japan, Manchukuo, and China, China should cooperate in measures aimed at eliminating this menace from the region bordering Outer Mongolia.  4) When the above points have been put into effect and we recognize the good faith of China concerning friendly cooperation with Japan and Manchukuo, we shall first conclude comprehensive agreements on friendly cooperative relations between China and Japan, and thereafter draw up the agreement needed for regulating new relations between Japan, Manchukuo, and China” To this Chiang Kai-Shek replied could not recognize Manchukuo but that his government would do whatever it could peacefully to maintain economic activity between the people north and south of the Great Wall. He also stated no other country on earth was more concerned with the Communist menace in Mongolia than China. All of the appeasement efforts had brought Wang Jingwei to his boiling point and on August 8th he departed for Shanghai as he and his entire cabinet resigned. Chiang Kai-Shek personally came over and asked Wang Jingwei to withdraw his resignation given he offered him further support, and Wang Jingwei relented. Then on the morning of November 1st, after attending a meeting, Wang Jingwei was shot by a Chinese reporter for the Chenkuang Press, a company notably associated with Chiang Kai-Shek. Rumors spread the assassination attempt was inspired by anti-japanese elements such as Generals Yang Qi and Tang Shengzhi. With Wang Jingwei in the hospital, Chiang Kai-Shek was forced to take a larger role with the North China situation. Then Wang Jingwei departed for Europe seeking better medical care and wired his resignation on November 29th. Thus Chiang Kai-Shek succeeded him as president of the Executive Yuan and the coalition between him and Wang Jingwei had officially ended. With Chiang Kai-Shek now the only funnel from which action could be directed, the Japanese sent Ambassador Ariyoshi to China to persuade Chiang Kai-Shek to grant some form of autonomy for North China. By this point autonomy for North China had become part of Japan's national policy. Chiang Kai-Shek in response to this growing threat went to Taiyuan, the capital of Shanxi, to meet with Yan Xishan. There he proposed that if Yan Xishan could unite the Northern Warlords, Chiang Kai-Shek would appoint him chairman of the political affairs council, with added authority over finances and diplomacy. Chiang Kai-Shek urged him to come attend the 6th plenum of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee scheduled for November 1st. At this time Yan Xishan's Shanxi was struggling financially so he reconciled with Chiang Kai-Shek. To this effect Chiang Kai-Shek sent his vice chief of the Army General Staff Xing Pin to tour the north trying to persuade those like Song Queyuan and Han Fuju to not support the North China autonomy movement. The Japanese interpreted these efforts to thwart the autonomy movement as the underlying cause of all the anti-japanese incidents breaking out continuously. To this the Nanjing government disclaimed no responsibility and insisted they were doing everything the Japanese asked of them.  The Japanese began a massive campaign aimed at all the important leaders in North China. One man they managed to gain influence over was Yin Jukeng who on November 25th at Tungzhou, announced the inauguration of the East Hubei Anti-Communist Autonomous Council, claiming autonomy for the entire demilitarized region. Yin Jukeng's council consisted of 9 members whereupon he was chairman and took charge of foreign relations and military affairs. As you can imagine Nanjing immediately labeled him a traitor and ordered his arrest. Chiang Kai-Shek then rapidly sent word to the Japanese an official response to their “Concerning Policy towards China” document:  “To satisfy the various demands from the Japanese side, there should first of all be established in Hopei province an autonomous political administration; ultimately, this administration should be similar to that governing the southwestern region. Whether or not this administration should be extended to other regions will be determined after the results in Hopei have been ascertained.  1) Although the campaign to wipe out the Communists is progressing, the Communist bandits have fled toward Kansu. Since this raises the danger that the Communists may spread into Inner Mongolia, the defense against the Communists in North China should be conducted jointly.  2) Certain aspects of the new monetary system are not suited to North China, and appropriate modifications will be made in this respect.  3) Efforts are to be made to harmonize economic interchange among the people on both sides of the Great Wall.  4) To meet the special needs of the region, the local administration should be given authority to enable it to exercise suitable control over financial matters in North China.  5) Pending issues are to be settled locally in a rational manner.  6) The aim will be to employ talented people to carry out the above tasks and to establish an ideal government.” Chiang Kai-Shek dispatched He Yingqin to reign in the situation at Peiping, but upon his arrival he believed the situation was beyond his control. He Yingqin reported that it was his belief the only way for Nanjing to retain some degree of authority in the region was to create a new political organ to do so. Thus on December 11th, the Nationalist government established the Hubei-Chahar Political Council chaired by Song Queyuan. Song Queyuan declared the new council would assume all responsibility for administering Hubei and Chahar and promised  "to respect the wishes of the people, endeavor in particular to relieve the economic distress of the region, and maintain the peace of East Asia on the basis of Sino-Japanese amity."  Thus within all this madness now two autonomous regimes co-existed in North China. The East Hubei Anti-Communist Autonomous Council would administer 22 prefectures while the Hubei-Chahar Political Council would administer Hubei, Chahar, Peiping and Tientsin. As you might imagine, relations between these two councils was complex and ambiguous. The 22 prefectures the former administered were under the jurisdiction of the other. One was a Japanese puppet, the other was controlled by Nanjing who refused to recognize the other. Japan immediately exploited their newfound chaotic gains in North China. In May of 1936 the 2000 troops of the Tientsin garrison army was boosted to 5600 led by General Tashiro Kan'ichiro. This was done under the guise it was to defend against communists and protect Japanese citizens. The position of the commander of the Tientsin garrison was officially promoted to encompass full responsibility for the situation in North China, exactly the same as the Kwantung Army's role over Manchukuo. Thuse both the Kwantung Army and what was henceforth called the China Garrison had clearly defined roles. One would be responsible for Manchukuo, the other over North China. Japan had neutralized Rehe, Chahar and Hubei, all of whom would fall directly under their influence. But was Japan satisfied?  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Its not always through military means that nations can encroach upon other nations. Japan was showcasing how it could bully away parts of China through threats alone it was working miracles. How long could Chiang Kai-Shek carry on like this? Would it be Japan or his own people that would hang him for losing China?

Last time we spoke about Manchukuo. In the early 1930s, Ishiwara Kanji sought to dominate Manchuria to secure resources and counter American influence. He envisioned Manchukuo as a Pan-Asian league promoting racial cooperation, despite it being a puppet state under Japan. With Puyi as a figurehead, Ishiwara aimed for autonomy, but his plans faced resistance from the Kwantung Army, which prioritized control. As conflicts arose, Ishiwara's vision of unity clashed with military interests, leading to his eventual isolation and reassignment, marking a tumultuous chapter in Manchukuo's history. In November 1931, Doihara orchestrated the "Tianjin Incident," facilitating the removal of Puyi from his home to establish the puppet state of "Manchukuo." By March 1932, Puyi was declared its ruler, but his authority was merely symbolic, overshadowed by Japanese control. Despite international condemnation, Japan solidified its grip on Manchuria, exploiting its resources and suppressing local resistance. By the late 1930s, Manchukuo became a colonial entity, suffering under harsh economic policies while Puyi's regime served as a facade for Japanese imperial ambitions.   #146 Operation Nekka: the Invasion of Rehe Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. From the very beginning of their consolidation of Manchukuo, the Kwantung Army regarded the province of Rehe, today's Jehol province, to be an integral part of it. According to some of the Kwantung Army leadership, all of Rehe would be necessary to consummate Manchukuo. In April of 1932, the IJA 8th Division based at Hirosaki in Aomori prefecture was transferred to Manchukuo under secret orders to prepare for an invasion of Rehe. Now Rehe province covers 160,00 square kilometers and back then held some 2.3 million people. Since 1926 it was ruled by General Tang Yulin. His direct command was over the NRA 36th division, consisting of 13,000 regular troops with a provincial militia of 8500 men. As was the Warlord practice of the time, Tang Yulin exploited his population. Now until July of 1932, Tang Yulin's attitude towards the emerging state of Manchukuo directly to his east was certainly favorable. That is because Tang Yulin favored the Japanese. During the debacle that was the invasion of Manchuria, Tang Yulin had done everything possible to prevent Zhang Xueliang from moving into Rehe whenever he was trying to consolidate forces there. Now Tang Yulin had no greater aspirations, its not like he loved Japan, or believed the Japanese were better leaders for his nation. What he was motivated by was a very practical concern, economics, more precisely the opium trade. Rehe number one source of income was opium, and they number one purchaser of it, was Manchuria. Thus as one can imagine, when Manchukuo was being formed, and the opium door closed on him, well he took heavy financial losses.  On July 17th of 1932, an incident broke out between the towns of Chaoyangxu and Nanling. A Japanese civilian employed by the Kwantung Army, Ishimoto Gonshiro was abducted by a Rehe militia group while taking the train from Jinzhou to Chaoyang. General Nishi Yoshikazu, the commander of the IJA 8th Division stationed at Jizhou, dispatched a small unit to rescue Ishimoto. In doing so they occupied Chaoyangxi, where they also protested the Rehe provincial government. This did not see Ishimoto handed over to them, so General Nishi bombarded Chaoyangxu and then had his forces advance upon Nanling. Even doing so, no Ishimoto to be found. So Nishi withdrew back to Jinzhou. The following year during what would become the invasion of Rehe, Ishimoto's body would be found at Chaoyangxu. Zhang Xueliang utilized this small incident to advance into Rehe. Claiming he was acting upon orders from Nanjing, he moved his Northeastern Army to the border of Rehe, due south of the Great Wall. Zhang Xueliang then threatened Tang Yulin and bribed his subordinates to defect over to him. Consequently, by late July, Tang Yulin tossed the towel and for the first time sanctioned passage of a volunteer army through Rehe. Come August Zhang Xueliang organized a volunteer force 40,000 strong, obviously all from his Northeastern army to advance from Gubeikou into Rehe, where he sought to confront the Kwantung Army if they advanced. Zhang Xueliang was heavily in contact with Chiang Kai-Shek during this period. Zhang Xueliang was making multiple proclamations about retaking Manchuria, and Chiang Kai-Shek was supporting him in that endeavor as best as he could. Meanwhile Tang Yulin was sort of stuck in the middle.  Between October 1932 to January 1933, Shanhaiguan, the strategic gateway and midpoint between Mukden and Beijing became the focal area of 3 major skirmishes.  The Boxer Protocol of 1901 dictated that some of the 8 nation alliance members, notably, France, Italy and Japan were allowed to maintain small contingents at Shanhaiguan. In 1932, the Japanese garrison there was 261, France had 61 men and Italy 69. After the establishment of Manchukuo, Japan had increased its garrison to have some more border guards in the town of Shanhaiguan itself. Of course the Chinese also had local troops, that was the 9th Independent Brigade commanded by Ho Chukuo, a force roughly of 9000 men. The first skirmish at Shanhaiguan broke out on October 1st, between Ho Chukuo's men and an armored train of troops from the IJA 8th Division. Another exact same event occurred on December 8th, both occasions were settled locally and peacefully with the Chinese offering an apology and indemnity payment. Then a third clash broke out on January 1st, but this one got out of hand.  The mastermind behind the third incident was Major Ochiai Jinkuro, the leader of the Japanese garrison at Shanhaiguan. Upon his orders, at 9pm, 3 Japanese soldiers tossed two hand grenades each into the backyard of the Japanese military police detachment and the railway track running in front of the Japanese garrison. This was of course immediately blamed upon the Chinese and at 11:30 pm Ochiai presented the local Chinese with 2 demands. The first was to evacuate the Chinese force and the second to allow the Japanese to occupy their south gate at Shanhaiguan for the time being. Now the Japanese had legitimate pretext for these demands based off the Boxer Protocol. It allowed them the right to ensure the security of the railway and telegraph lines and to defend their citizens and property within two miles of the railway zone. Since Ho Chukuo's troops allegedly disturbed the peace in said zone, the Japanese were in their right to ask them to depart.  According to Japanese sources, the Chinese refused at first then consented at 4:50 am on January 2nd. This effectively saw them surrender the south gate. However at 9:30 am the chief of staff for the Chinese Brigade requested that the takeover of said gate be postponed until the scheduled arrival of Ho Chukuo, coming over from Beiping. Ochiai turned down this request, whereupon the Chinese agreed that the south gate would be included within the area overseen by the Japanese. Yet at 10:50 am Japanese troops went to take over guarding the south gate whence Chinese guards tossed grenades at them. Yes, it is most certainly the Japanese who tossed those grenades. The Chinese account of this event is somewhat different. It asserts the Japanese attacked the gate while the issue of surrender was still being negotiated. By January 11th, China sent a formal appeal to Britain, France, the US and other signatories of the Boxer Protocol charging the Japanese for perverting the treaty to seize the south gate of Shanhaiguan. Meanwhile General Ho Chukuo called Ochiai from Qinhuangdao to tell him he would arrive by 8am on January 3rd to negotiate. But by 10am he failed to show up, as the Chinese and Japanese fired upon another. Ochiai thereupon resolved to take the south gate by force. By that point the IJA 8th Division had strengthened its position in front of Shanhaiguan. Two companies had become 10 and one air force company was made ready to strike. Additionally the commander of the 2nd China Fleet, Tsuda Shizue dispatched Hirado and the 16th Destroyer Squadron to Shanhaiguan and Qinhuangdao “to defend Japanese residents and assist the troops in case of hostilities”. At dawn on January 3rd, the Japanese launched a combined land, sea and air assault and by 2pm had taken Shanhaiguan. Ho Chukuo's forces were pushed to the Shih River where they were reinforced during the night and hastily constructed fortifications against the incoming Japanese. Henceforth a propaganda war emerged over Rehe. Japan charged that Zhang Xueliang was mobilizing large forces to advance into Rehe, while China claimed the same of the Japanese. The Chinese protested the Japanese seizure of Shanhaiguan, but none of the western powers would intervene. However the League of Nations constant condemnation of Japan ever since the Mukden incident provoked the Japanese on march 27th to simply walk out on the league. The ordeal also prompted Prince Saioji Kimmochi to dispatch Major General Umezu Yoshijiro, the chief of General affairs of the army general staff and Consul Tanaka Sotaro of the foreign ministry to go over and restrain the unruly troops at various positions in the Beiping-Tientsin region. Saionji's main concern was elevated by Army Minister Araki Sadao, who on March 6th stated to Harada Kumao “that if Japan were to land about 3 divisions at Qingdao and they strike into the Peiping-Tientsin region via Tsinan, Zhang Xueliang will probably flee even before they reach Tsinan. If we do anything at all, I'd like to act boldly and go that far”. Despite claims by various sources, mostly Chinese, the Shanhaiguan incident as it became known was not actually preplanned by the Kwantung Army, it really was an arbitrary act on the part of the garrison commander. How everything went down at Shanhaiguan provided vital intel on the Northeastern Army, and what to expect in Rehe. In December of 1932, the IJA 6th Division was dispatched to Manchuria and assigned security detail in southern Jilin province. They were given further secret orders to participate in what was going to be an operation in Rehe once they arrived to Manchuria. When the Shanhaiguan incident broke out, the Rehe operation was expedited rapidly. Therefore the IJA 6th and 8th Divisions west of the Liao River were immediately tossed into the operation. Given the foreign and domestic conditions, the Rehe operation was extremely dangerous. Tokyo HQ yet again sought to reign in the men, so they sent General Umezu to Manchuria to talk to the Kwantung leadership. The Kwantung leadership was adamant the operation be unleashed before the spring that, provided the operation did not extend beyond the Great Wall. To this Tokyo HQ yet again relented.  On January 27th of 1933, General Muto Nobuyoshi, then commander of the Kwantung Army, issued the following general order for the Rehe operation designated, Operation Nekka “The situation in Jehol has become increasingly serious day by day and has now developed into a state of affairs necessitating intervention. To strengthen the foundations of Manchukuo, the time is close at hand, as far as military operations by the Kwantung Army are concerned, to put the finishing touch on our sublime task. First, the affairs of Jehol province are unquestionably an internal problem of Manchukuo. They neither embrace nor are accompanied by any international implications. Because subjugation of the province is designed to strike a fatal blow to anti-Manchukuo, anti-Japan elements, these elements purposely confuse the distinction between Jehol and North China. They move troops into the province and, glossing over these matters, raise a loud outcry, propagandizing that Japan harbors designs of territorial aggression. In this manner they have endeavored to draw the restraining attention of the world, and every move of the Kwantung Army in Jehol—even the slightest raising of a hand or the stretching of a leg—is now the object of worldwide surveillance” At this stage the Kwantung Army treated the Rehe Operation as an internal matter of Manchukuo and did not openly talk about extending it beyond the Great Wall into Hubei. But their gunna. On January 26th, General Muto issued Order 466, kinda funny how its almost order 66, but I digress. This order directed the IJA 6th and 8th Divisions to prepare to invade Rehe. On February 9th, Muto drafted the “Rehe Subjugation Plan” to some staff officers. It stated “without specific orders, operations are not to be carid out in Hubei”. It also stipulated they should “foster and promote a climate leading to the downfall of Zhang Xueliang in North China, which is the strategic base for the disturbance of Manchukuo”. On February 27th, Muto issued Order 473 which repeated to the men again not to move into Hubei. On the 29th, Muto issued another  order “The subjugation of Jehol is purely and simply an internal problem of Manchukuo. In the light of our national policy, it must not develop into a provocation for war with China. This is why Kwantung Army Operations Order 473 stipulated that, unless specific orders are issued, operations are not to be conducted beyond the Great Wall in Hopei province. I fully expect you to issue strict orders to the various units under your command that, although our forces may act freely in Jehol, which is a part of Manchukuo, they are not, without an imperial command, allowed to take any action in Hopei province, which is separated from Jehol by the Great Wall. They should be admonished that, even in the light of local circumstances, they must never be blinded by tactical considerations and miss the main point of our national policy. (In particular, the garrison at Shanhaikuan should be doubly careful and not act beyond its authorized limits.) I have learned that His Imperial Majesty, the supreme commander, is gravely concerned about the foregoing and again issue these instructions in awe of His Majesty's concern”. Thus one can read between the lines here. Emperor Hirohito put his foot down and demanded no forces go past the great wall and to this the Kwantung Army obeyed. For Operation Nekka, the IJA 6th and 8th Division would have their own theaters of operation along a line running from Paotzu, the eastern most town in Rehe to Chaoyang. The northern zone was the IJA 6th divisions theater, the southern one was the 8th's. Geneal Sakamoto Masemon led the 6th Division and ordered his forces on February 23rd to advance north along the rail line between Tahushan and Tungliao, then on towards Tienshan, Xiawa and Chaoyang. Afterwards they would carry out operations in the Chifeng-Linxu-Tolun region.  General Nishi ordered his 8th Division, excluding one unit to advance along the border around Peipiao, towards Suichung on the 27th, then into the Lingyuan region. The other unit would secure as fast as possible the important gateways along the Great Wall of China: Qilingkou, Lenkou, Xufengkou, Lowenyukou and Manlankuan to protect their divisions flank. Afterwards they would seie Chengde and Gubeikou. However he also gave explicit orders "Without specific orders, operations must not be extended beyond the Great Wall into Hopei province,". So yeah, while they had direct orders to not advance beyond the Great Wall. . . they were going to basically capture all of the key passes of the Great Wall. Kind of playing with fire.  On the other side, on January 23rd, Zhang Xueliang was meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek and our old friend Duan Qirui to discuss how to prepare for what seemed to be an impending invasion of Rehe. Chiang Kai-Shek politely said to Duan Qirui "I sincerely hope that you will come south and give me your guidance at this time of national crisis,". The real reason he sent this request was because he did not want the Japanese to enlist their former lacky against him. At the meeting, according to a Japanese intelligence report, Zhang Xueliang insisted that Chiang Kai-Shek personally come north and assume direct command of the Northern troops. Chiang Kai-Shek refused on the grounds he had to deal with the communists in Jiangxi and sent in his place Yang Que, the current president of the Army Staff College and a graduate of the Japanese Army War College. Yang would arrive to Peiping with his staff on January 30th, where he devised a plan for joint operations with Zhang Xueliang. They anticipated the Kwantung Army would cross the Great Wall at Shanhaiguan, so their basic strategy was to concentrate a large force in its region, especially east of the Luan River. That forces mission would be to defend at all costs the front line at Qinhuangdao. The Japanese intelligence indicated the Chinese had roughly 50,000 men, including 7700 men of the 25th Division ld by Kuan Lincheng and 12800 men of the 2nd Division led by Yang Que who were sent to Miyun and Gubeikou. There were also reports that ancient art objects and documents from Peiping were being transported to Nanjing, beginning on January 10th. To the Chinese public this was shocking news as one could imagine. Operation Nekka was unleashed and showcased the rapid efficiency of the Kwantung Army. By March 2nd, the IJA 6th Division routed the 41st Army of General Sun Tienying; the IJA 14th Mixed Brigade of the IJA 8th Division captured the Lengkou pass on March 4th; while the Kawahara detachment captured Chengde near the border with Hubei. General Nishi then assembld his main force at Lingyuan as the 14th Mixed Brigade withdrew to Chapeng. On March 4th, Muto issued Order 480, directing the troops "to make preparations for operations in North China, firmly seizing the major passes along the Great Wall, mopping up resistance by remnant troops and bandits, and restoring peace and order in Jehol province." One unit of the IJA 8th Division was given the task of seizing the Gubeikou Pass and advanced to such on the 7th. Within the vicinity of Changshanyu, around 40 kilometers southwest of Chengde, they encountered 5000 advancing Chinese forces. Here one of the first of many fierce battles along the Great Wall came to be. Until roughly March 20th, the Kwantung Army was met with fierce counterattacks, coming from the main gateways of the Great Wall. Initially the fighting went tremendously wall for the Japanese, yet by March 10th, the 14th Mixed Brigade had taken Tungqiaku, Tiehmenkuan and Xifengkou. Two days later the IJA 8th Division began an assault upon Gubeikou. Nishi then sent the Hayakawa Brigade to seize Lowenyukou. Then on the 10th, after receiving reports the main passes were secured, General Muto took his HQ from Jinzhu to Changchun, believing everything was already won and done. However he would be very wrong, they had misjudged the Chinese strength.  On the 13th, Muti and Nishi received a report, that on the night of the 10th, the 14th Mixed Brigade at Xifengkou had come under heavy attack by a Chinese force led by General Song Qeyuang. Reinforcements were rapidly sent over, but they were unable to relieve the trapped brigade. On the 14th, Muto ordered Genera Sakamoto to lead the Mukai unit from the 6th Brigade to help out. With this the Chinese forces were driven off and then the Japanese began assaults upon Lengkou, Lowenyukou and Quehlingkou. On the 16th, the IJA 8th Division took Quehling, but the next day received a vicious counterattack by the NRA 116th Division. At Lowenyukou the Hayakawa Brigade was counterattacked by Song Cheyuan. The Hayakawa Brigade was still able to secure on portion of the Great Wall, it was constantly under attack and unable to progress further.  On the 22nd, Nishi was forced to order his Brigade to pull back to Chengde. Over at Lengkou, the Mukai unit managed to capture the town as the 14th Mixed Brigade at Xifengkou was attacked by the NRA 139th Division. Unable to repel the counterattacks, Nishi ordered his forces back 13 kilometers on the 24th. The battles at Quehlingkou and Lowenyukou were very intense. On March 18th, Muto realized the casualties were severe and taking the gateways was not showing progress. He therefore decided to divert the 6th Divisions attention to Lengkou in a flanking maneuver aimed at severing the Chinese supply lines to the gateways and as a result this would extend operations south of the Great Wall into the region east of the Luan River. Thus there we have it, they were going past the Great Wall against Emperor Hirohito's orders.  Operation Nekka, similar to Operation Jinzhou was deemed essential to establish and protect Manchukuo. However while the battles along the Great Wall were deemed necessary to create the borders for Manchukuo, their extension past that boundary literally brought them into the heart of North China. Unlike in Manchuria, the Chinese forces in North China held excellent morale, they were very willing to fight. On top of that, they had better logistics and were fighting on top of the Great Wall, which offered significant advantages. Thus from a tactical standpoint, the Japanese had to seize the gateways and flush out the Chinese from the areas. The Chinese remained defiant. Atop the walls the Chinese defenders would shout at the Japanese waving anti-Manchukuo and anti-Japanese flags.  Outside the ongoing battle, Chiang Kai-Shek had his own, perhaps in his mind, more important battle, the one with the communists. The encirclement campaigns had all gone to shit thus far. Added to this was the invasion of Manchuria and Shanghai. As Chiang Kai-Shek would later put it "tantamount to subjecting the Government to a pincer attack both from within and without." Basically Chiang Kai-Shek could choose to focus on the Japanese or communists. He figured going into a full war against Japan would be the end of himself and his government. Thus he worked to reach an agreement with the Japanese in May of 1932 which had ended the Shanghai incident. After doing so he released a slogan "first internal pacification, then resist external aggression". Upon doing so he unleashed his full attention upon the communists. As we have seen, Chiang Kai-Sheks last encirclement campaign proved successful. But as he was in the middle of it, Operation Nekka was unleashed. It looked extremely bad for Chiang Kai-Shek, for the KMT and for China in general. On March 20th, as a gesture to indicate to the masses Chiang Kai-Shek was doing his job, he dispatched 5 divisions, roughly 50,000 men from the Central Army north. Chiang Kai-Shek personally traveled north from Hankou to Beiping, but no further than that. Back on the 10th he had received the resignation of Zhang Xueliang, who had publicly been calling for a massive war against Japan so that Manchuria could be recovered. Chiang Kai-Shek had to replace him with General He Yingqin.  Another major development at this time, was our old and dear friend who never causes any trouble, Wang Jingwei returned from I believe his 20th time in exile. He came to resume his post as president of the Executive Yuan. Yet again Wang Jingwei was trying to reconcile with Chiang Kai-Shek. In reality and as many of you might guess, the only reason Chiang Kai-Shek never had this guy shot was because Wang Jingei had the firm backing of the left, thus in order to really grab the majority of the political class he had to play nice with him. For Wang Jingwei's part, much like starscream in transformers, yes I am using this as an analogy, hes just trying to overthrow megatron every chance he gets, but always fails like a dumb idiot. There was also the dichotomy between the two men. Wang Jingwei was seen as a civilian leader while Chiang Kai-Shek was seen as a military leader. So together they seemed like a perfect team, despite the fact they loathed each other. So Wang Jingwei became the civil administrator while Chiang Kai-Shek focused on the military. In regards to Japan, Wang Jingwei was following a conciliatory policy of "resistance on the one hand and negotiation on the other,” based on Chiang Kai-Sheks slogan "first internal pacification, then resist external aggression."  Following a fight with Zhang Xueliang in August of 1932 over the issue of defending Manchuria against the Kwantung Army, Wang Jingwei had resigned, trying to strongarm Chiang Kai-Shek to get rid of the young marshal. Thus like what had happened countless times before, Wang Jingwei said he was out on sick leave, and departed for Europe for supposed treatment. When he returned 6 months later, Operation Nekka had begun, although the Japanese troops had not yet then reached the Great Wall. Wang Jingwei immediately became acting foreign minister in place of Lu Wenkuan, a supporter of Zhang Xueliang, who was notably anti-japanese. Wang Jingwei kicked Lu Wenkuan over to Xinjiang to deal with some conflicts breaking out there, fun times for him as we know.  Meanwhile He Yingqin had been placed as the head of the Peiping branch military council, entrusted with control over all military matters in North China. He Yingqin went to work reorganizing the forces in north china in mid March, forming them into an effective battle order to face the Japanese. By bringing together the local, very disorganized forces into a unified command, He Yingqin hoped they would be capable alone to block the Japanese advance, leaving the central army out of the conflict. This was because Chiang Kai-Shek did not want to risk losing his central army, considered the most elite one in all of china. But Chiang Kai-Shek did come around to the idea of at least testing some units against the Kwantung forces. Above all Chiang Kai-Shek wanted to have his cake and eat it to. He wanted he population of China to think he was actively resisting, while in reality he was biding time. Central army units deployed around Gubeikou, the main gateway leading to the Peiping-Tientsin region. When the Kwantung army leaders were planning operation Nekka, they had believed it would not be necessary to go beyond the Great Wall, but once the fighting around the walls and gateways kicked off, they knew immediately they could not hope to take the wall areas without getting behind the enemy. Particularly they needed to get past the area east of the Luan River. Some 20 Chinese divisions had assembled in the Peiping-Tientsin region and were tossing endless counter attacks along the line of the Great Wall. In the Lengkou region a force of 7000 Central Chinese Army units had penetrated deep into Rehe and smashed the Mukai detachment of the IJA 8th Division. These counterattacks reaffirmed the Kwantung Army leadership it was necessary to go beyond the Great Wall. It should also be noted the Kwantung Army's operations in North China were not just military. The Japanese were plagued with logistical problems. There was a shortage of troops because they had driven into Rehe with only 20,000 men. Even the most determined Kwantung general did not believe their military prowess could overcome the plains of Hubei packed with an immeasurable amount of Chinese troops. Therefore they had to augment this military operation with political schemes aimed at the regional warlords. During the pacification of Manchuria, the tactic of bribing local elites had worked wonders and there was zero reason to believe it would not work in North China. All of this was done without any supervision from Tokyo HQ. On February 13th of 1933, Itagaki Seishiro, at the time chief of the Mukden Special Service Agency, was transferred to the General Staff without any official announcement of this promotion. He took a post in Tientsin, specifically to begin political maneuvers in eastern Hubei. This saw the birth of the Tientsin Special Service Agency. Initially this agency was attempting to lure all the competing warlords in North China, such as, Duan Qirui, Wu Peifu, Sun Chuanfang, but then began targeting Zhang Qingyao. Zhang Qingyao had once been the protege of Duan Qirui, acting as the civil and military governor of Henan province. He had fought against Zhang Zuolin in 1925 whereupon his allegiance had shifted over to Wu Peifu. During the second phase of the Northern Expedition, Zhang Qingyao had fought again against Zhang Zuolin, then controlling the National Pacification Army. When the Northern expedition was over, he joined Yan Xishans forces in Shanxi. Thus one could easily see he was not a man of many principals, nor any specific loyalties. The Tientsin Special Service Agency first proposed to reach out to Zhang Qingyao in the hopes he could organize a coup d'etat against Chiang Kai-Shek. It was further hoped he could get Song Queyuan, Zhang Zuoxiang, Fang Chenwu, Xu Yusan, Zhang Tingshu, Sun Tienying and Feng Zhanhai to join in. If they managed this, North China would fall in a single stroke. It was hoped this would be achieved as they were taking the Great Wall and were enroute towards Peiping. However on May 7th, Zhang Qingyao was assassinated, completely ruining the plan. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Nekka had been unleashed with a large bang. 20,000 Japanese troops stormed Rehe province under strict orders not to go past the Great Wall of China. So they immediately began planning how to go past the Great Wall of China. Yet what they did not expect was the determination of the Chinese defenders, who were not going to allow them an easy time.

It's hard to imagine that in 2025, a 70-plus-year-old slow train is still shuttling back and forth between Xinglong County and the city center of Chengde. During the #ChineseNewYear, China Daily reporter boarded this slow train, tasted locally grown fruits, made friends, and listened to the heartwarming stories volunteers and conductors had to share. Who hasn't boarded the train yet? Hurry up, we're about to depart! #SpringFestival #CulturalJourney

Last time we spoke about the first Jiangsu-Zhejiang War. Wu Peifu and Zhang Zuolin became swift rivals after the first Zhili-Fengtian War. The Zhili clique remained in control of Beijing and began bullying everyone into submission, trying to unify China under their thumb. Zhang Zuolin went to work reorganizing and retraining his army, for another war was looming over the horizon. Then in the southeast of China, conflict emerged between Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces. The Zhili backed Qi Xieyuan wanted to control Shanghai, which was under the control of Lu Yungxiang of the Anhui clique. The Anhui clique were on the death bed, Zhejiang was the last province under their control, thus he elected to fight for it. Lu Yungxiang sought help from anyone who possibly could help him, such as Zhang Zuolin and Dr Sun Yat-Sen, but little did he know but he was contributing to a much larger war.    #105 the Second Zhili-Fengtian War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Hello again, so after the first Zhili-Fengtian war of 1922, the Zhili warlords seized control over Beijing. Cao Kun bribed his way into the presidency as Zhang Zuolin licked his wounds and went back to Manchuria where he rebuilt his entire army. Zhang Zuolin appointed Yang Yuting as inspector general of the Mukden arsenal and Wang Yintai as director of the department of materials. He began purchasing more Renault FT tanks, increased his military production, now seeing 150 artillery pieces, 1000 machine guns, 60,000 rifles, 100,000 artillery shells and 600,000 rifle rounds pumping out of factories annually. He increased his navy and airforce, naming his son Zhang Xueliang as director of the aviation office. He purchased German and Italian aircraft, nearing 300 planes within 4 groups. Air bases and fields were built alongside naval headquarters and training schools in places like Harbin. To improve communications, additional water and coal supply stations were built in Suizhong, Xingcheng and Dayaogou so he could rapidly deploy troops via rail. Roads were further developed to increase transportation in areas without rail, each army was given wire communications such as telegraph or telephone lines, linking them to their general HQ's. Radio communication units were also developed, radio stations were built in Shenyang, Harbin and Jin county. The Fengtian military was reformed. Commanders like Bao Deshan and Xu Changyou who were blamed for losing the first zhili-fengtian war were court-martialed and executed in the spring of 1923. The rising star, Dogmeat General Zhang Zongchang aided Zhang Zuolin by massively recruiting White Russians who brought over all sorts of expertise and skills. The White Russians were commanded by Konstantin Petrovich Nechaev, alongside them Zhang also hired Japanese units. The Fengtian army expanded to 27 brigades from its original 25, organized into 3 armies of 3 divisions. Each division had three brigades. The cavalry was expanded from three to four divisions, with three brigades forming a division and the rest attached to infantry divisions as cavalry companies. The artillery regiments expanded from 4 to 10. Each division consisted of three brigades with either an infantry brigade or a combined brigade, and every division had an engineering battalion and a transportation battalion attached. Combined brigades were bolstered with an engineering company and a transportation company. All said an done the strength of the Fengtian army totaled more than 250,000 troops, and its performance was significantly improved. The best troops were found in the 2nd Brigade, commanded by Zhang Xueliang, and the 6th Brigade, commanded by Guo Songling, and they were viewed as the model units of the Fengtian army. The catalyst for what would be known as the second Zhili-Fengtian War, occurred on September 3rd of 1924, the first Jiangsu-Zhejiang War. When Lu Yungxiang of Zhejiang refused to cede administration of Shanghai to Qi Xieyuan, both Zhang Zuolin and Dr. Sun Yat-sen pledged to defend the neutrality of Zhejiang and end pulling everyone into a larger war. On September 4th, Dr Sun Yat-Sen held a meeting at his mansion in Guangzhou. There he announced he would assist Zhejiang to preserve Guangdong, thus he was enacting the Northern Expedition. His plan for the northern expedition was to first attack Jiangxi, after it was conquered next was Anhui. From there his KMT forces would link up with the Zhejiang forces, near the Jinpu road where they could march north to take Beijing. On September the 5th Dr Sun Yat-Sen publicly denounced Cao Kun and Wu Peifu and asked the people of Guangdong to work harder than they ever have so they could eliminate the warlords and China could be ruled by her people again. On September the 4th, in response to the war in the southeast, Zhang Zuolin declared war on the Zhili clique on the grounds of being in an alliance with Zhejiang and Dr Sun Yat-Sen. He also denounced Cao Kun, bringing up his bribery scheme. Zhang Zuolin's statement, and forgive me its poorly translated went something like this. "Curse Cao Kun with Power who bribed congressmen, raising teeth and claws, and stole power. Cao Kun harms the people. Now I Zhang Zuolin in charge of Manchuria and her people, and who is loyal to the people, and  is duty-bound will lead the three armies to wipe out the thieves." On September the 9th, Duan Qirui added his voice in a telegram against Cao Kun accusing him "of not knowing who the country and the people are, what ethics, justice and integrity are and unleashing four provinces to attack Zhejiang, excluding dissidents, hurting innocent people, and greedy for his own dignity. You have committed a heinous sin, and you have gone too far. How can you survive? The virtuous and powerful people in the world, who have great responsibilities for a while, will definitely be able to do their duty and act bravely when they see justice." On the 15th of September, Zhang Zuolin issued another telegram to Cao Kun, in the form of an ultimatum "This year natural disasters are prevalent and hungry people are everywhere. I have tried to say that attacking Zhejiang is wrong, and I have the strength to respond in favor of peace. However, the ink has not yet dried. Yet at the same time, the Zhili marched into Fengtian, detained Shanhaiguan trains, and blocked traffic. What was the purpose of this? In recent years, Cao Kun has been a puppet of Wu Peifu, which has caused public resentment. The impossibility of a military expedition is evident from the successive defeats of the Zhili army. We planned to send another envoy, but the train traffic has been cut off and we cannot enter Beijing. Therefore, we wait for the final answer." Indeed on September the 13th suddenly all the trains running along the Beijing-Fengtian railway stopped on Zhili orders. The war in Zhejiang had provided Wu Peifu with the occasion to force a showdown with Zhang Zuolin. Wu Peifu felt confident he would win. Wu Peifu had mobilized over a quarter of a million troops, divided into 3 armies. Wu Peifu trusted his military abilities and felt his subordinates were loyal to him, he was highly mistaken in that last part.  It would turn out, the christian general, Feng Yuxiang had major grievances. If you remember from the last episode, when ordered to attack Lu Yungxiang, Feng Yuxiang had refused. Instead Feng Yuxiang weaved a web, he pulled Wang Huaiqing to his side, the Beijing garrison commander Sun Yueh and Hu Qingyi. He complained to them about his army being slighted in the distribution of munition and supplies and he would move his troops very slowly out of Beijing when the war began. As it turned out, secret negotiations had been made. Zhang Zuolin's son Zhang Xueliang in the spring of 1923 had sent a letter to Feng Yuxiang and then his most trusted lt, Fu Xingpei to Beijing to secretly meet with him. Fu Xingpei met with Feng Yuxiang and his chief of staff Liu Ji at a secluded location in Nanyuan. The first meeting was brief, but fruitful as follow up meetings were made, now mediated through Duan Qiriu. Duan Qiriu brought the parties over to his residence in the Japanese quarter of Tientsin. There Feng Yuxiang was given a bribe between 1-2.5 million Japanese Yen. This bribe came from Zhang Zuolin's Japanese supplied war chest. Zhang Zuolin afterwards had every reason to believe Feng Yuxiang was in his pocket so he concentrated most of his forces around Shanhaiguan. The Zhili Cliques forces would come from the provinces of Henan, Shandong, Rehe (knowns as Jehol today), Chahar and Suiyuan. Meanwhile the Fengtian would have troops from Jilin, Heilongjiang and Fengtian. The 2nd war certainly exceed the first by a large margin and it would also involve battles over land, sea and air. The Zhili held an edge in numbers, but alienated generals would ultimately lose them the war. There was also an enormous technological gap between the Zhili and Fengtian armies. As I had mentioned the Fengtian had purchased a lot of western and Japanese weaponry and equipment. The Zhili clique also purchased western materials, but they were far behind the Fengtian army. Furthermore the Zhili clique had just experienced a series of small wars in Sichuan, Hunan, Fujian, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Guangdong. Their troops were exhausted, lacked pay, and thus morale was not high. Zhang Zuolin's Fengtian army faced 4 major objectives to see the Zhili clique defeated. Ultimately they needed to capture Beijing and Tianjin. Yet to do so they first had to retake Shanhaiguan so their forces could enter Xujialing. Thus Zhang Zuolin would need to gather his forces near Shanhaiguan to capture it. This task fell to his 1st and 2nd army led by Jiang Dengxuan and Zhang Xueliang. If Shanhaiguan could not be taken, at least two brigades would be needed in the Qiansuo region, where a railroad station was roughly 20 kms east of Shanhaiguan. Once that region was secured, the main force could redeploy around Suizhong county for a second attempt against Shanhaiguan. Next the 2nd army would advance into Rehe, Yi County and Dayaogou. They would then take Chaoyang, Jianping, Chengde and Lingyuan. Most of this responsibility fell onto Zhang Zongchang's 3rd Combined Brigade and Li Jinglin's 1st Division. After they completed this they would enter the Lengkou pass and take Luanzhou. A Fengtian cavalry group would attack Rehe with the objective of taking Chifeng. The cavalry group would also cover the flank of other Fengtian forces and mop up the enemy left behind. If the situation arose, the Cavalry group could also attack along the Great Wall via the Xifengkou or Gubeikou pass. The Fengtian reserve forces would be deployed between Xingcheng and Suizhong to guard Jinzhou. The Fengtian air forces headquartered at Shenyang would mobilize 3 groups for the war effort under the direct command of the 1st and 2nd Armies known as the Combined Corps. Other air units would be deployed to Yi county under the command of Zhang Xueliang. Wu Peifu took the title of commander in chief and set up his headquarters in Sizhaotang. Wu Peifu made special arrangements for the battle; his 1st army led by Peng Shouxin would take an eastern route advancing along the Beijing-Fengcheng line to attack Liaoshen from Shanhaiguan; the 2nd army of Wang Huaiqing would advance along the middle route from Xikou to attack Rechao; and the third army of Feng Yuxiang would take the western route from Gubeikou to attack Kailu. Wu Peifu also had set up a commander in chief of maritime defense Zheng Shiqi stationed at Shandong and a naval commander in chief Du Xiui. His air force was organized into 4 groups stationed in Beidaihe, Luanxian, Chaoyang and the Zhili aviation department, over 70 aircraft in total.  On September the 14th, Zhang Zuolin as commander in chief of the Fengtian army led them down the border area. Likewise Wu Peifu did the same from Luoyang. On the 15th the 23rd Brigade of Li Shuangkai, part of Li Jinglin's 2nd army engaged the Zhili 4th battalion of Yijun Zhenbiao around Yizhou, Jiuguan and Taimen. This effectively kicked off the war. From there the war front would run from Chaoyang to Jidong, with major battles taking place in Rehe, Shanhaiguan, Chaoyang, Chifeng, Jiumenmen and Shimenzhai.  The Fengtian forces planned to unleash their offensive against Shanhaiguan once the initiative was won in Rehe. Therefore Zhang Zuolin personally led the battle in Rehe. The 1st Fengtian army divided into a north and south group. The southern group attacked from Beizhen, passing through Chaoyang and Lingyuang to enter Xifengkou with Wu Junsheng's cavalry as the main force. The north group ran from Tongliao to Kailu, then headed south to Chengde via Chifeng, then would launch an attack at the western part of Xifengkou.  The southern attack went pretty smooth as the Zhili army did not put up serious resistance. On the 16th the Fengtian forces seized Yizhou and Fuxin. After this they concentrated their attacks against Chaoyang. Liu Fufu defended Chaoyang with the Zhili 26th brigade of the 12th division, but he only put up a symbolic defense, quickly abandoning the city. On the 23rd Chaoyang was occupied by Fengtian forces who scoured the county. Meanwhile the northern group attacked Jianping, Lingyuan and Chifeng. During the battle for Lingyuan, the Fengtian encountered determined resistance from Zhili forces led by Wang Huaiqing and Dong Zhengguo. Both sides suffered heavy casualties, but the Fengtian managed to take the city. Simultaneously the 2nd Fengtian army forces led by Xu Lanzhou and Wu Guangxin attacked Chifeng. The battle for the city raged for a few days seeing Fengtian air forces bomb the city until October 8th when it was captured. The fall of Chifeng marked a decisive moment in the battle for Rehe, the Fengtian had taken the initiative. Now the leading Fengtian troops began a rapid advance towards Lengkou at the foot of the Great Wall. Both sides knew the entire battle depended on Shanhaiguan. The Zhili had heavily fortified it and following the loss of Rehe they continued to strengthen it. Wu Peifu dispatched Peng Shouxin to setup the defenses of Shanhaiguan. Zhang Zuolin had Jiang Dengxuan and Zhang Xueliang form a new headquarters near Shanhaiguan as Guo Songling led the 2nd and 6th Brigades to frontally attack it. As Guo Songling did so, Jiang Dengxuan  and his deputy commander Han Linchun led the 4th and 16th brigades to face the Zhili forces north of Jiumenmen. Small scale battles broke out on the 17th that gradually escalated. On the 29th and 30th, the Fengtian began unleashing artillery and aerial bombardment upon the Zhili positions between Shanhaiguan and Changli. During that process the Fengtian forces seized Wanjiatun, Longwang Temple, Yaojiazhuang and other towns. By October 4th the Fentgian army approached the position of the Zhili 15th division. On the 7th Zhang Zuolin issued a general attack order, sending Fengtian forces across the board. The first line of Zhili troops relied on the solid fortifications and fired back upon the advancing enemy. The Fengtian gradually turned their attention to the Jiumenmen Gate located at the northwest part of the Shanhaiguan pass. On the 8th Jiang Dengxuan personally led the 19th Brigade to attack the Haungtu Ridge on the northside of Jiumenmen. His forces quickly encircled Jiumenmen before the 2nd and 6th brigades stormed and occupied it. The fall of Jiumenmen severed demoralized the Zhili defenders whose lines began to waiver. The Fengtian began breaching lines, capturing Liyu, Waiyu, Xiangmayu and now outflanked Shanhaiguan. At this point a brigade was sent to attack Shimenzhai along the north side of Jiumentou. Shimenzhai is roughly 25 kms away from Shanhaiguan, if captured the Fengtian could use it as a springboard to attack Qinhuangdao, cutting off the Zhili armies line of retreat. In order to protect the line of retreat, Peng Shouxin organized a force to reinforce Shimenzhai. On the 11th, Wu Peifu came over to Shanhaiguan, while also inspecting Shimenzhai, Zhaojiayu, Shahezhai and other significant Zhili positions. Seeing Jiumenmen had fallen, Wu Peifu ordered forces to recapture it on the 14th. The Fengtian defenders there were put into a desperate battle to hold onto it. On the 15th, a Fengtian regiment led by Sun Xuchang broke through the Zhili defensive line. On the 16th the Fengtian forces surged through the breach and stormed Shimenzhai. The Zhili forces routed in the area allowing the Fengtian forces to quickly seize Liujiang. On the 17th Zheng Xizhen led the Zhili 6th brigade to reinforce the battlefield emerging north of Qinhuangdao. Now we need to take a step away from the battle, because a lot of things were happening all over the place, that would have a deep impact on the war. While all of this was going on in the far north, in the south, Dr Sun Yat-Sen personally led the KMT forces north to try and prevent Zhili commander Sun Chuanfang from reinforcing his Zhili comrades in the north. Yet like again, in a fashion that just kept recurring, an issue came about. The Guangzhou merchants corps and forces led loyal to Chen Jiongming began an uprising in Guangzhou. Sun Yat Sen was forced to turn his army back to quell the rebellion. As Sun Yat-Sen pulled back, Sun Chuanfang had brought his forces into Zhejiang and Shanghai.  Meanwhile another ploy on the part of Zhang Zuolin paid off big time. The christian general Feng Yuxiang who was commanding the Zhili 3rd army began making some trouble. When the Zhili 2nd army suffered its initial defeat, Wang Huaiqing sent word asking for help from Feng Yuxiang. Instead he ordered his 3rd army to stay put at the Gubeikou pass.  Now back in the battle Wu Peifu had come to the front lines and was taking charge of operations. Zhili reinforcements arrived from Henan and Shanxi led by Zhang Fulai and began helping a counter attack against Shimenzhai. The Fengtian defenders also reinforced their lines, with Jiang Dengxuan taking command of the front lines personally. Despite the reinforcements, the Fengtian defenses were beginning to crumble, their casualties mounting. At the same time the main Fengtian forces were fighting at Shanhaiguan, failing to make progress. Then the Fengtian army received unconfirmed intelligence from the Japanese, that the Zhili clique had enlisted the Zhengji shipping company to use 13 transports to move 4 divisions directly into the rear of the Fengtian forces via the Taku Forts. The Japanese intelligence did not indicate where the landings would be made however. The Fengtian commanders believed it was possibly Yingkou or Huludao, perhaps both. Many Fengtian commanders called for deploying the general reserve as a rear guard, but the deputy chief of the general staff, Fu Xingpei opposed the idea, claiming the Jiumenkou sector required them. Yang Yuting the chief of the general staff worried the terrain of Jiumenkou was far too narrow and restrictive to deploy such large number of troops. Finally Zhang Zuolin ended the debate by ordering the General Reserve, under the command of Zhang Zuoxiang to rush to Jiumenkou. Despite committing the General reserve, things did not improve. In fact some interpersonal problems emerged. Zhang Xueliang and Guo Songling had secretly redeployed 8 infantry regiments and two artillery brigades from Shanhaiguan to the Jiumenkou sector. These units were to be led by Guo Songling, but the artillery battalion commander, Yan Zongzhou, a classmate of Guo Songling was removed from command by the artillery regiment commander Chen Chen. Upon hearing the news from Yan Zongzhou, enraged Guo Songling removed Chen Chen of command and gave it back to Yan Zongzhou. However Jiang Dengxuan and Han Linchun had given approval to Chen Chen when he asked to remove Yan Zongzhou, so now they were embarrassed. They then complained to Zhang Zuolin about Guo Songling's actions. Zhang Zuolin ordered both Chen Chen and Yan Zongzhou to go back to their original commands, and this only pissed off Guo Songling more. Like a kindergarten aged child Guo Songling took his 8th infantry regiment out of the battlefield and retreated to the rear. Zhang Xueliang then hunted him down and smooth-talked him to come back and engage the enemy. This entire stupid situation could have very well cost them the battle, fortunately it happened at night and the Zhili army none the wiser did not exploit the situation.  Back over in the Rehe front, Zhang Zongchang stormed the Lengkou pass against 4 Zhili divisions; the 9th led by Dong Zhengguo, the 20th led by Yan Zhitang, the 1st Shaanxi division led by Hu Jingyi and the 23rd led by Wang Chengbin. Unfortunately Wang Chengbin and Hu Jingyi had formed a pact with Feng Yuxiang and literally stepped aside during Zhang Zongchangs attack. To add insult to injury, Yan Zhitang and Dong Zhengguo hated each other and each held back to preserve their own strength. Again in the warlord era, petty warlords would pull this kind of shit all the time. As Zheng Zongchangs forces attacked, basically everyone fled Lengkou. Seizing the opportunity Zhang Zongchang pushed even deeper into the enemy lines. It was around this time, word spread that the First Jiangsu-Zhejiang War had concluded in a Zhili victory, thus it seemed if Shanhaiguan was not taken swiftly, the Zhili would win the war.  Yet the dark horse that was General Feng Yuxiang struck. On October 22nd, Feng Yuxiang betrayed the Zhili Clique. Feng Yuxiang formed a truce with the Fengtian commander Li Jingling on the night of October 20th. He then suddenly withdrew 8000 troops of Wu Peifu's 3rd and 26th Divisions, leaving only 4000 men at their defensive lines. He took said troops and secretly stormed Beijing where he performed a coup against President Cao Kun. At midnight on October 23rd the commander of the Beijing guards, Sun Yueh admitted Feng Yuxiang and his men into Beijing. Together they seized control over  key government buildings and gates. Feng Yuxiang then forced Cao Kun to dismiss Wu Peifu from his military positions. stripped him of the presidency and placed him under house arrest. Afterwards Feng Yuxiang issued a public statement denouncing the civil war and urged the warlords to settle their differences via negotiations. Feng Yuxiangs subordinates then took control of the railway line between Tientsin and Shanhaiguan and the railway line at Changhsintian south of Beijing. Meanwhile Yan Xishan dispatched a force from Shanxi to seize the railway junction at Shihchiachuang, blocking any movement from Hunan along the Peking-Hankou railway. Thus Qi Xieyuan and Sun Chuanfang could no longer advance north to aid Wu Peifu. Back at the battle, Zhang Zongchang saw the thinning of the defensive lines when Feng Yuxiang pulled men out and stormed it alongside Li Jinglin. Their forces broke through and advanced south along the Luan River towards Luanzhou, then in the direction of Tianjin. They seized the train station at Luanzhou as Sun Xuchang's 10th Brigade captured Jiumenkou. The Fengtian cavalry then stormed the Xifengkou pass and pushed forward. By this point the Zhili morale had all but disappeared as news of Feng Yuxiang's coup in Beijing was spreading along the lines. Even cry baby Guo Songling, hearing the news, grabbed his force and performed an all out charge into the Zhili lines breaking through and advanced eastwards. Now cut off between Qinhuangdao and Shanhaiguan, on the 31st of October, many high ranking Zhili officers began fleeing via ships at Qinhuangdao. Countless Zhili forces were surrounded and began mass surrendering. Wu Peifu meanwhile fled first to Tianjin where he began frantically telegraphing Zhili armies in Jiangsu, Henan, Hubei and Zhejiang for help. Things got even worse, more railway lines were cut by Anhui clique members such as Zheng Shiqi in Shandong, Cangzhou and Machang. Likewise Zheng Shishangs cut lines of the Jinpu railway at Hanzhuang and even Yan Xishan came out of his turtle shell to cut the Jinghan railway line at Shijiazhuang. The Fengtian army overran Tangshan and Lutai asFeng Yuxiang's forces stormed Yangcun and Beicang, forcing Wu Peifu to flee to Junliangcheng. Then Duan Qiriu sent a message to Wu Peifu advising he should depart by sea. Completely surrounded with no allies, Wu Peifu fled with 2000 troops on the transport Huajia on November 3rd. He went to Tanggu where Sun Chuanfang defended him.  It had been the most impressive war of the warlord period to that point. Nearly 450,000 troops had been involved in a month-long war along the Great Wall area from Shanhaiguan to Beijing. The casualties are tough to estimate, perhaps 20-30,000 perished. After taking Beijing, Feng Yuxiang reorganized his forces in the 1st Guominjun army, hiring his co-conspirators such as Sun Yueh and Hu Chingyi who would eventually lead the 2nd and 3rd armies. On November 5th, Zhang Zuolin removed Emperor Puyi from the Forbidden City. Puyi went into exile in Tianjin where the Japanese would keep a close eye upon.  Zhang Zuolin, Feng Yuxiang and Duan Qiriu then met in Tianjin where they agreed to form a provisional government with Duan Qiriu as its figurehead. The choice of Duan Qiriu seemed to be palatable to everyone, including the remaining Zhili warlords in the Yangtze region. On December 9th, Duan Qiriu's government was recognized. Dr Sun Yat-Sen of course refused to recognize the new Beiyang government and would begin to flirt more with the CCP and their larger backer, the Soviet Union.  For now the Beiyang government, for whatever it was actually worth, remained in the hands of three players. Duan Qiriu who no longer possessed a strong army, Feng Yuxiang who had just shown himself to be quite a treacherous man and did not wield a very strong army and lastly Zhang Zuolin who now wielded the largest army in China, was backed by Japan and controlled vast sums of territory.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. So the First Jiangsu-Zhejiang and Second Zhili-Fengtian Wars were now over. It seems Zhang Zuolin had just become king of the hill, but what did that mean for China? Would Zhang Zuolin pursue a policy of reunifying China? Would he expand south? Or would the chaos continue, what do you think?  

Don't forget I have a patreon now where you can get exclusive Podcasts like "General Tomoyuki Yamashita: becoming the Tiger of Malaya" check it out here ⤵️ https://www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel   The Empire of Japan invaded Manchuria following the Mukden Incident of 1931 and established the puppet state of Manchukuo by 1933. The Kwantung Army aimed to expand their control to include the Rehe province due to its strategic and economic significance. Initially, attempts to integrate Rehe through negotiations failed, leading the Japanese to take direct action. The Japanese launched Operation Nekka on February 23, 1933, aiming to conquer Rehe and annex it to Manchukuo. This operation involved a coordinated three-pronged advance with the ultimate goal of seizing Chengde, the capital of Rehe. Japanese forces comprised the 6th and 8th Divisions, supported by puppet forces. Despite some resistance, Chinese defenses were weak, and Japanese forces quickly advanced, taking key cities such as Kailu, Chaoyang, and Chifeng. The rapid Japanese advance led to the fall of Rehe's capital, Chengde, on March 4, 1933, as Chinese forces either surrendered or fled. The Japanese success in Rehe emboldened the Kwantung Army for further aggression. Japanese forces quickly overwhelmed Chinese troops, pushing them to defend positions along the Great Wall and in northern Hebei province. Despite the dire situation, Chinese leader Chiang Kai-Shek prioritized combating communist insurgents in Jiangxi Province over sending reinforcements to northern China. Japanese forces, under Field Marshal Baron Nobuyoshi Muto, advanced towards the Great Wall, capturing significant areas and confronting Chinese troops in multiple battles, including Gubeikou and Nantianmen. Though the Chinese attempted to resist, their forces suffered heavy casualties, reaching around 40,000, while Japanese casualties were likely higher than the reported 2,400. The Japanese ultimately gained control of key areas, leading to the Tanggu Truce, in which China recognized Manchukuo and ceded territory. Despite the treaty, this did not mark the end of Japan's ambitions in China.

Last time we spoke about the New Policies of the ailing Qing Dynasty and the rise of revolutionaries, such as Dr. Sun Yat-Sen. Empress Dowager Cixi begrudgingly had to endorse major reforms to try and keep her ailing dynasty alive. It was a step in the right direction, however it came far too late. The Qing dynasty was simultaneously trying to please the foreign powers and her populace. Yet her populace were being strangled with taxes, their faith in their government had never sunk so low and in general many simply felt it was time for real change. Once intellectuals who went abroad came back with new ideologies, it was like death coming to the door. Revolutionaries began protests, strikes, assassinations and uprisings. Dr Sun Yat-sen became one of the most prolific backers of the major uprisings, traveling around the globe trying to received funding support from Overseas Chinese and allies. It was only a matter of time.   #86 The Wuchang Uprising   Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. There was a little something I glossed over in the last podcast and I did so on purpose, I just felt this episode needed to start with this event. 1900-1908 saw an incredible amount of change for China. As much as I am foreshadowing the downfall of the Qing dynasty, it has to be said the efforts to modernize during this time period were colossal. In their own little way, the Chinese had a sort of Meiji restoration. But while it was going on, at full speed, the year 1908 would change a lot. Despite all of these changes there was a looming, a rather glaring problem. The Manchu minority still dominated the Han majority. Cixi resisted tooth and nail to make sure the inner circle was Manchu. Even Li Hongzhang, whom held a very special relationship with Cixi and was arguably one of the most important people of the empire, was never made a member of the Grand Council. Cixi clinged to the notion the Dragon throne must be occupied by a Manchu and she would undermine the chance of a parliamentary monarchy for a Republic. One of the most fervent advocates of military action to overthrow the Manchu dynasty, is the man we have come to talk about in the last podcast, Dr Sun Yat-Sen. He had been attempting uprising since 1895 and not only would he not give up, he just kept gaining more traction. The empress dowager did not take the uprisings lightly, in her words 'these flames that could spark off a prairie fire', and cable after cable urged them to 'extinguish them; do not let them spread'. The Empress Dowager had a lot on her plate, the western powers were ever encroaching, the Boxer protocol had China paying incredible sums to them. Reforms were likewise expensive, the populace were being fleeced dry and certainly not happy about it. Revolutionaries were trying to kill her and overthrow the Manchu run dynasty. Hell I have not really gone into it, but Japan was spending an incredible amount of money and getting as close as possible to any high ranking official within the dynasty to try and dominate it. The Japanese figured the Empress Dowager was going to die sooner or later so they tossed their efforts at trying to make Guangxu a puppet, then something happened.  In 1908 Emperor Guangxu became gravely ill, doctors from multiple provinces were summoned to Beijing. Guangxu wrote notes to his doctors complaining about hearing noises , 'sometimes distant wind and rain and human voices and drum beating, other times cicadas chirping and silk being torn. There is not a moment of peace.' He described 'great pains from the waist down', difficulty in lifting his arms to wash his face, deafness and 'shivering from cold even under four quilts'. He berated his doctors for not curing him or making him feel better. But he hung on tenaciously to life. Now during the summer of 1908, Cixi began to suffer from diarrhea. The year was an extremely busy one for her. She was micromanaging countless aspects of reforms and was meeting with the 13th Dalai Lama, a very important issue as the British had recently encroached upon Tibet. After her 73th birthday on November 3rd of 1908, she felt death was on its way. She ordered Prince Qing to go to the eastern Mausoleums to check out her burial ground and in the meantime she focused her attention upon keeping the empires affairs in order. Then there was the issue of Guangxu. He was bedridden, seemingly on the verge of death, but refused to die. In her mind if he survived her, he might send the empire straight into the hands of the Japanese. And thus Empress Dowager Cixi ordered her adoptive son to be killed. Some of you older listeners or those who've heard about the history of Cixi, might be gasping. But yes indeed since 2008 it a forensic examination of Guangxu's remains have indicated he had a level of arsenic over 2000 times that of an ordinary person. Guangxu was certainly poisoned with arsenic, but who did it, hmmm. There are some who believe it was Yuan Shikai who poisoned the emperor because he knew he would be executed if Cixi died before him. Now Cixi would have had a much easier time poisoning him as she had better access to him. Regardless, at 6:33pm on November 14th Guangxu was pronounced dead by the royal physicians.The Grand Council gathered at Cixi's bedside while Guangxu lay dying and when she learnt of his death, Cixi arranged his succession. Zaifeng was made regent and his two year old son Puyi, Cixis great nephew was named the new emperor of the Qing dynasty. Cixi was said to work throughout the night until 11am in the morning, getting everything settled. 3 hours later she died. And so went one of the most influential figures in modern Chinese history, love her or hate her. Now something else was brewing in the empire. All of the reforms and modernization led to a China to dramatically expand her railways. In the last years of the Qing dynasty the governments railway policy experienced a transition however. The Qing prior to 1908 had supported the provinces efforts to build railways. Then in 1908, Zhang Zhidong was appointed superintendent of the Guangzhou-Hankou railway, and in December of that same year also superintendent over the Sichuan-Hankow line. Alongside the Minister of Communications Sheng Xuanhuai, these two men began shifting the Qing policy to nationalize the two mentioned railways and would rely on foreign investments for railway construction. Historian Sun Zijian has this to say about the issue “Preparations were inadequate. The government neither offered extensive persuasive propaganda nor obtained the approval of the National Assembly or provincial assemblies. The court simply nationalized the railways in an autocratic manner. When nationalization met with opposition, instead of defusing the crisis flexibly, the government persisted in its arbitrary ways. When it found mistakes in the decision-making, the government refused to make any modifications. In the end, the crisis spun out of control. A reasonable policy properly executed could have succeeded'. According to historian Chen Tingxiang the Qing government's response to the backlash, that would become known as the Railway Protection Movement, failed for 3 reasons. 1) The announcement and implementation of the railway nationalization was reckless. 2) the government was internally divided on the issue. 3) the officials suspicions of each other led to the failure in quelling the unrest. Historian Chen Xiaodong also had 3 points to make about the issue. He stated first the Qing government did not present the two issues: railway nationalization and foreign loans to the provincial assemblies and national assembly. Second they violated the new corporation law and attempted to confiscate the shares of the commercial company. And three the Qing government refused to listen to the pleas of the Sichuan provincial officials and were unwilling to compromise forcing the people into desperate actions.  Now going back in time to explain some of this, in 1898 and 1900 Sheng Xuanhuai negotiated the Guangzhou-Hankou railway loan protocol with the “American China Development Company” receiving the right to build the line. But the company breached the contract by failing to finish the line on time and secretly sold 4000 of the 6000 shares of the company to Belgium. By 1905 Zhang Zhidong recommended negotiations and recovered the rights to the line. Though the Chinese got back the rights to the line, they still lacked funds to build it. In Zhang Zhidong's words “at present, the only way to do this great project is to rely on borrowed money.” In 1907 to build up the Hubei portion of the line, Zhang Zhidong sought to burrow 2 million pounds from Everard Fraser, the British consul general in Hankou. The following year Zhang Zhidong was appointed the supervisor over the Guangzhou-Hankou line and the Hubei portion of the Sichuan line. On June 6th of 1909 Zhang Zhidong drafted a loan agreement with Germany's Deutsche Bank, the British Hongkong and Shanghai banking corporation and France's Banque Indoseuz. The US wanted to get in on that sweet piece of pie, but during the process on October 4th, Zhang Zhidong died of illness. Because they were in the process of negotiations everything would be shuffled around.  On November 5th of 1909, the Hubei railway association opposed the loan and abrogated the protocol. On the 14th a coalition of Hubei gentry, merchants, military officials and educational representatives got together and announced they would fund the railway. They asked the Ministry of Communications and Board of Revenue to cancel the draft agreements with the foreigners. In March of 1910 the coalition was given the right to establish a railway company, but many knew their fund raising could be untrustworthy. This prompted the officials from Britain, France, Germany and America to angrily demand their rights and interests be met. The Qing foreign ministry and ministry of communications offered no answer to this. They both tossed the buck as they say to the board of revenue, who was pissed they were evading responsibility. The foreigners then sent direct communications to the Qing government, receiving no reply. Thus the initial loan was shelved. In August of 1910 Sheng Xuanhuai reported  “setting up associations in Hunan and Hubei to resist foreign loans, raise funds, and build the railway on their own are only empty promises of no use in solving real problems. … Their claimed fund-raising figures are unreliable.” The matter was investigated  at multiple levels. On October 14th, Sheng Xuanhuai reported regent Zaifeng the Hunan portion of the line required 34 million taels of silver, but the railway company had only collected 1.7 million silver dollars. The Hubei portion required 67 million but the railway company only raised just under 1 million silver collars. If the two railway lines were to be built, they simply had to borrow from foreigners. Zaifeng appointed Sheng Xuanhuai as the minister of communications on January 6th of 1911, and Sheng secretly began to negotiate with the representatives of the 4 nations. By late april they reached an agreement and in may Zaifeng made an imperial edict announcing the nationalization of the railway lines. Its also important to note some other external factors. In june of 1910, the Japanese and Russians signed a second agreement stipulating the boundaries of there sphere of influence over Manchuria. Once that was signed Japan formally annexed Korea. Then Russia on January 12th of 1911 requested the Qing government release them rights in Xinjiang, Mongolia and parts of Manchuria. On March 25th the Qing government was forced to agree and then Britain came and stepped up aggression in Tibet. By January of 1911 the British army was occupying Pianma in Yunnan province. It was under these circumstances, the Qing sort of buried their heads in the sand and focused on the railway projects.  Zaifeng was determined to pursue railway nationalization. In order to carry this out he had to adopt a series of radical actions. On May 9th of 1911, Zaifeng canceled the earlier approval of the private railway companies rights to the Hubei and Hunan portions of the line. Then on the 18th he appointed Duanfang as minister in charge of the Guangzhou-Hankou and Sichuan-Hankou lines. Then on May 23rd and 30th he ordered the provinces of Sichuan and Hunan to stop collecting taxes to support the public shares on their rail lines. All of this was designed to get the railway companies to come to new terms. The nationalization of the rail lines was met with fierce opposition from the people of Hunan, Sichuan, Guangdong and Hubei. Zaifengs immediate problem was dealing with the funds collected by the private companies, he needed to buy them out. Many called to have the government bail the companies out, others said they should be held accountable and audited. Zaifeng decided to collect all the shares and issue railway bonds at same value, thus the people who wished to de-vest could. The investors were not happy, specifically the Sichuanese who had the largest public shareholding. Basically all of the investors would only be partially compensated by the government bond scheme, what they wanted was a proper buyout, silver not bonds. The Sichuan railway company by 1911 had raised 14 million taels, 4 of which had been expended and 3 were lost in speculation. Zaifeng was not happy with the governor general of Sichuan and hastily appointed  General Zhao Erfeng to replace him by August 4th to force the issue to a resolvement. Zhao Erfeng made his way to Chengde and made sure to bring numerous military and police units to maintain order. On August 5th Zhao Erfeng was given orders to force the shareholders in Sichuan to take the bonds. It should be noted Zhao Erfeng had the nickname “the butcher”.  On August 11th, more than 10,000 protestors began rallies against the proposals in Chengdu and organized a series of strikes and boycotts. Students, merchants and workers were showing solidarity. Zaifeng was outraged at the situation and ordered Zhao Erfeng to “firmly suppress the unrest”. This was sweet music to Zhao Erfengs ears and he began requesting funds for additional troops, too which Zaifeng approved. Yet Zhao Erfeng soon found out, the situation was much more dire than they all believed. Zhao Erfeng began sending requests to Zaifeng to reach some sort of solution to the crisis. But on September 2nd Zaifeng issued strict orders to him stating  “ suppress [the disturbance] effectively, disperse [the protesters] quickly, and not let the situation lead to chaos. If the troubles persist and lead to unrest, you will be punished” Zhao Erfeng was pushed into a corner, he had no choice.  On September 7th he lured out Luo Lun, Pu Dianjun and other leaders of what was then being called the Railway Protection League, the Provincial assembly and the private railway company to the governor general's office by falsely telling them “a telegram from Beijing brings good news. We need to exchange views right away.” Once the men arrived, they were arrested. News broke out of the act and the city of Chengde erupted. Thousands of people flocked to the governor generals office. Zhao Erfeng dispatched troops to cut them off at street corners, but the angry crowd broke through barricades and poured into the governor general's office. At this point Zhao Erfeng ordered the troops to fire upon the people. The angry mob suffered heavy casualties. Despite this the next day more protestors showed up and dozens more were shot. All of Sichuan rose up in arms. On the 7th Zhao Erfeng reported “thousands of people fiercely attacking the governor-general's office. It is not sure whether stability can be restored. We need the court to dispatch thousands of strong troops from the capital to rush to Sichuan to prepare for trouble.” Zaifeng had gambled on forcing the railway protestors into submission and now he had provoked a rebellion. There was no other action than to push forward. On September 9th, Zaifend issued a decree praising Zhao Erfengs performance and gave out the order “select a capable general to quickly lead nearby troops to Sichuan, where Zhao Erfeng will assume command.” On the 12th Zaifeng against the pleas of numerous advisors to peacefully comply with the public opinion, ordered Zhao Erfeng “to direct the new and old armies to destroy those promoting rebellion so that [the unrest] does not spread”. The next day Zaifeng received a telegram, stating Chengdu was surrounded. At this point Zaifeng was sort of grasping at straws. He appointed Cen Chunxuan to deal with the Sichuan situation. Cen Chunxuan was “to work with Zhao Erfeng in calming and suppressing the unrest in Sichuan.” But Cen Chunxian instead advocated for completely reversing the course of action and try to regain the publics confidence through a gentle approach. Cen Chunxian telegram the court advising “the temporary release under guarantee of the detained gentry, and promise the Sichuan people will not lose a penny of their capital; and that no innocent people will be killed. The people and the government must move forward together. There should be some words of self-reproach in the edict. If the court could do this, public opinion will be calmed, … people everywhere will dance for joy”. Prince Qing and his colleagues disagreed with the stance and the Ministry of Communications told the Qing court they rejected the idea all together. Zaifeng took the advice and rejected it as well. Cen Chunxuan telegram the Qing Court “a wind-heat (fengre) has aggravated my old illness and makes it very hard to go to my post. Please relieve me of my position.” By rejecting Cen Chunxians proposal, Zaifeng had lost the last chance to resolve the Sichuan railway crisis. Now going a little bit back a bit because its important, we talked a lot about the new policies. Within Hubei province a sort of elite army had been developed. As part of the New Army program, Hubei like other provinces modernized its military force. French, German, American advisors had come to help with the process. In the end the Hubei new Army became one of the best armies in China, second pretty much only to Yuan Shikai's Beiyang Army. Because of this the Hubei army became a sort of model for neighboring provinces' programs. Now Yuan Shikai had strict political controls over the Beiyang army ‘soldiers who form an association, or spread rumors, should be executed.” He privatized his army, by promoting officers from within, building internal cliques around himself. And it was pretty insane stuff, he had an altar for his men to pray to him where they would kowtow every day. The Hubei New Army on the other hand was more loosely controlled by the Qing court. This left some room for revolutionaries to get in. The distribution of the Hubei army garrisons helped facilitate the rapid spread of revolutionary influence. A few amount of troops were scattered throughout the countryside, with the vast majority concentrated around Wuchang. The urban social networks thus crept into the military. Now just before the year 1911 its estimated 2000 of the 15,000 troops were members of the  “wenxue she” Literature Society and perhaps another 2000 were members of the “gongjin hui” Forward Together society. The Hubei army is thought to have had roughly 5000 revolutionaries, 4000 who were lukewarm on revolutionary ideas and only 1000 firmly loyal to the Qing. With everything going on, by fall of 1911, the revolutionaries in the Hubei army were preparing an uprising. The revolutionary groups I mentioned, began talks with the Tongmenghui in September of 1911. They were attempting to collaborate to perform an uprising, set for October 6th, during the mid-autumn festival in the Wuhan area. They were forced to postpone a bit. On October the 9th, one of the revolutionary leaders, Sun Wu was supervising the making of explosives in the Russian concession in Hankou when one of the devices accidentally exploded. Sun Wu was hospitalized and the hospital staff discovered his identity and reported him to the Qing authorities. Fearing the jig was up, the revolutionaries within the Hubei army in Wuchang led by Jiang Yiwu, the leader of the Literary Society decided to launch the uprising immediately. However disaster struck twice as the plot was leaked to the viceroy of Huguang who immediately ordered a crackdown. General Ruicheng the Viceroy of Huguang and the divisional commander of the Hubei army Zhang Biao fled for their lives. The previously elected revolutionary commander in chief, Liu Gong was in Hankou, the vice commander Liu Ying was stuck in Jingshan. Jiang Yiwu had also fled and Sun Wu was gravely wounded. Within the catastrophe, provincial commander Wu Zhaolin stepped up to take charge. On the night of October 10th, Wu Zhaolin led revolutionary elements of the Hubei ne army and staged a mutiny at the Huguang garrison. In the process they captured the viceroy's residence, but the viceroy managed to escape. The city was thrown into disorder and many Manchu were killed. “From the night of the 10th to noon of the 11th … the casualties of the revolutionary army were about 20 … while more than 500 Manchu soldiers were killed, and over 300 captured.” The next day, one of the high ranking officers within the Hubei army, Li Yuanhong was persuaded to become the temporary leader of the movement. Wu Zhaolin stated “After the uprising, both military and civil administration will be needed. I propose that we elect Li Yuanhong as military governor of Hubei, and Tang Hualong as head of the civil administration. These two are highly respected in Hubei, so if they agree to be in charge, other provinces are likely to respond and support us” Li Yuanhong was initially very hesitant about it screaming at Wu Zhaolin after his statement “Why do you want a revolution? You put your own family in danger! You are a scholar, not a revolutionary. Don't join the revolution!” But he came around. On October 11th, the mutineers formed a military government representing Hubei. Li Yuanhong led the charge in cutting off his queue and was appointed military governor. At this time Hubei had just suffered some major floods, thus Li Yuanghong began his tenure by ordering “let government employees and civilians go back to work, and give a tax break for a year to alleviate their financial difficulties”. The governments miliary organization was quite chaotic from the offset, it was said “The revolution had just broken forth and many different ideas were put forth. Departments were established and abolished one after the other, and responsibilities kept changing.” It was quickly decided the military would deal with military affairs, leaving civil affairs to civil administrators. The new chief of the civil government, Tang Hualong ordered the existing treaties to be respected hoping foreigners would recognize their new military government. On the 15th the US consul met with Li Yuanhong and Tang Hualong asking about the their treaties and debts with the Qing government. Tang Hualong responded ‘The military government will only recognize debts of the Qing government if they were incurred before October 10; the relief funds for the Hubei floods should be raised locally from wealthy gentry; as for the government structure, there will be no more imperial system, and a republican government will be established after the revolution”. This prompted the US to declare neutrality, followed by Britain, France, Russia and Japan. Prior to the revolution, Tang Hualong had encouraged individual security forces in Hankou to join a Federation of Hankou associations with Ma Zhongji as their president. After the revolution he began arming them to help the revolutionary forces and maintain order. They would become instrumental against Qing forces. 2 days after the Wuchang uprising, the Qing court ordered Admiral Sa Zhenbing to take his fleet to Hubei. However Sa Zhenbing also happened to be Li Yuanhongs teacher at the Tianjin naval academy. Tang Hualong thus proposed Li write him a letter urging for a naval mutiny. Meanwhile Tang Hualong wrote to his brother, Tang Xiangming, who happened to be an aide to Sa Zhenbing “the Wuchang Uprising is justified, and is supported all over the country. Revolution is inevitable. We hope you encourage the navy to abandon the Qing and thus earn special merit.” Many of the naval officers were sympathetic to the revolution and soon gave up on the confrontation. Sa Zhenbing in response to a potential mutiny simply left the fleet and retired in Shanghai. The entire fleet left the Wuhan battleground and headed for Jiujiang. At Jiujiang the navy would mutiny on October 23rd Tang Xiangming was elected interim naval commander. Another revolutionary leader, Huang Xing who helped Sun Yat-sen found the Tongmenghui came to Wuchang to meet Li Yuanhong. On October 28th, Huang Xing and Song Jiaoren came to Wuchang and Huang Xing asked to become wartime commander in chief, while Song Jiaoren asked to assist the military government of hubei with foreign affairs. By early November Li Yuanhong told the men, since their province had the first successful uprising, they needed to set an example for the nation. They needed to form a constitutional document to form a new republic of China. They would model it on the constitution of the US, advocating for a federal system based on the principles of local self governance, guaranteed civil rights and the establishment of a separation of powers. It was the first time in Chinese history that a principle of separation of powers would be adopted in fundamental law. The revolutionaries were all busy planning, however the Qing were not going to just sit back idle. The wrath of the Qing was about to be unleashed. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. What began as a railway protection movement had spiraled out of control when Zaifeng unleashed the butcher known as General Zhao Erfeng upon Sichuan. In his attempts to quell the protestors, Zhao Erfeng had ushered in a full blown revolution. The Wuchang Revolution would springforth multiple revolutions and soon the Qing dynasty would come to an end.

The Perils of Interpreting: The Extraordinary Lives of Two Translators Between Qing China and the British Empire (Princeton UP, 2021) is a fascinating history of China's relations with the West--told through the lives of two eighteenth-century translators. The 1793 British embassy to China, which led to Lord George Macartney's fraught encounter with the Qianlong emperor, has often been viewed as a clash of cultures fueled by the East's lack of interest in the West. In The Perils of Interpreting, Henrietta Harrison presents a more nuanced picture, ingeniously shifting the historical lens to focus on Macartney's two interpreters at that meeting--Li Zibiao and George Thomas Staunton. Who were these two men? How did they intervene in the exchanges that they mediated? And what did these exchanges mean for them? From Galway to Chengde, and from political intrigues to personal encounters, Harrison reassesses a pivotal moment in relations between China and Britain. She shows that there were Chinese who were familiar with the West, but growing tensions endangered those who embraced both cultures and would eventually culminate in the Opium Wars. Harrison demonstrates that the Qing court's ignorance about the British did not simply happen, but was manufactured through the repression of cultural go-betweens like Li and Staunton. She traces Li's influence as Macartney's interpreter, the pressures Li faced in China as a result, and his later years in hiding. Staunton interpreted successfully for the British East India Company in Canton, but as Chinese anger grew against British imperial expansion in South Asia, he was compelled to flee to England. Harrison contends that in silencing expert voices, the Qing court missed an opportunity to gain insights that might have prevented a losing conflict with Britain. Uncovering the lives of two overlooked figures, The Perils of Interpreting offers an empathic argument for cross-cultural understanding in a connected world. Sarah Bramao-Ramos is a Research Assistant Professor at the Society of Fellows in the Humanities at the University of Hong Kong. She can be reached at sarahbr@hku.hk Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

The Perils of Interpreting: The Extraordinary Lives of Two Translators Between Qing China and the British Empire (Princeton UP, 2021) is a fascinating history of China's relations with the West--told through the lives of two eighteenth-century translators. The 1793 British embassy to China, which led to Lord George Macartney's fraught encounter with the Qianlong emperor, has often been viewed as a clash of cultures fueled by the East's lack of interest in the West. In The Perils of Interpreting, Henrietta Harrison presents a more nuanced picture, ingeniously shifting the historical lens to focus on Macartney's two interpreters at that meeting--Li Zibiao and George Thomas Staunton. Who were these two men? How did they intervene in the exchanges that they mediated? And what did these exchanges mean for them? From Galway to Chengde, and from political intrigues to personal encounters, Harrison reassesses a pivotal moment in relations between China and Britain. She shows that there were Chinese who were familiar with the West, but growing tensions endangered those who embraced both cultures and would eventually culminate in the Opium Wars. Harrison demonstrates that the Qing court's ignorance about the British did not simply happen, but was manufactured through the repression of cultural go-betweens like Li and Staunton. She traces Li's influence as Macartney's interpreter, the pressures Li faced in China as a result, and his later years in hiding. Staunton interpreted successfully for the British East India Company in Canton, but as Chinese anger grew against British imperial expansion in South Asia, he was compelled to flee to England. Harrison contends that in silencing expert voices, the Qing court missed an opportunity to gain insights that might have prevented a losing conflict with Britain. Uncovering the lives of two overlooked figures, The Perils of Interpreting offers an empathic argument for cross-cultural understanding in a connected world. Sarah Bramao-Ramos is a Research Assistant Professor at the Society of Fellows in the Humanities at the University of Hong Kong. She can be reached at sarahbr@hku.hk Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

The Perils of Interpreting: The Extraordinary Lives of Two Translators Between Qing China and the British Empire (Princeton UP, 2021) is a fascinating history of China's relations with the West--told through the lives of two eighteenth-century translators. The 1793 British embassy to China, which led to Lord George Macartney's fraught encounter with the Qianlong emperor, has often been viewed as a clash of cultures fueled by the East's lack of interest in the West. In The Perils of Interpreting, Henrietta Harrison presents a more nuanced picture, ingeniously shifting the historical lens to focus on Macartney's two interpreters at that meeting--Li Zibiao and George Thomas Staunton. Who were these two men? How did they intervene in the exchanges that they mediated? And what did these exchanges mean for them? From Galway to Chengde, and from political intrigues to personal encounters, Harrison reassesses a pivotal moment in relations between China and Britain. She shows that there were Chinese who were familiar with the West, but growing tensions endangered those who embraced both cultures and would eventually culminate in the Opium Wars. Harrison demonstrates that the Qing court's ignorance about the British did not simply happen, but was manufactured through the repression of cultural go-betweens like Li and Staunton. She traces Li's influence as Macartney's interpreter, the pressures Li faced in China as a result, and his later years in hiding. Staunton interpreted successfully for the British East India Company in Canton, but as Chinese anger grew against British imperial expansion in South Asia, he was compelled to flee to England. Harrison contends that in silencing expert voices, the Qing court missed an opportunity to gain insights that might have prevented a losing conflict with Britain. Uncovering the lives of two overlooked figures, The Perils of Interpreting offers an empathic argument for cross-cultural understanding in a connected world. Sarah Bramao-Ramos is a Research Assistant Professor at the Society of Fellows in the Humanities at the University of Hong Kong. She can be reached at sarahbr@hku.hk Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

The Perils of Interpreting: The Extraordinary Lives of Two Translators Between Qing China and the British Empire (Princeton UP, 2021) is a fascinating history of China's relations with the West--told through the lives of two eighteenth-century translators. The 1793 British embassy to China, which led to Lord George Macartney's fraught encounter with the Qianlong emperor, has often been viewed as a clash of cultures fueled by the East's lack of interest in the West. In The Perils of Interpreting, Henrietta Harrison presents a more nuanced picture, ingeniously shifting the historical lens to focus on Macartney's two interpreters at that meeting--Li Zibiao and George Thomas Staunton. Who were these two men? How did they intervene in the exchanges that they mediated? And what did these exchanges mean for them? From Galway to Chengde, and from political intrigues to personal encounters, Harrison reassesses a pivotal moment in relations between China and Britain. She shows that there were Chinese who were familiar with the West, but growing tensions endangered those who embraced both cultures and would eventually culminate in the Opium Wars. Harrison demonstrates that the Qing court's ignorance about the British did not simply happen, but was manufactured through the repression of cultural go-betweens like Li and Staunton. She traces Li's influence as Macartney's interpreter, the pressures Li faced in China as a result, and his later years in hiding. Staunton interpreted successfully for the British East India Company in Canton, but as Chinese anger grew against British imperial expansion in South Asia, he was compelled to flee to England. Harrison contends that in silencing expert voices, the Qing court missed an opportunity to gain insights that might have prevented a losing conflict with Britain. Uncovering the lives of two overlooked figures, The Perils of Interpreting offers an empathic argument for cross-cultural understanding in a connected world. Sarah Bramao-Ramos is a Research Assistant Professor at the Society of Fellows in the Humanities at the University of Hong Kong. She can be reached at sarahbr@hku.hk Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/biography

The Perils of Interpreting: The Extraordinary Lives of Two Translators Between Qing China and the British Empire (Princeton UP, 2021) is a fascinating history of China's relations with the West--told through the lives of two eighteenth-century translators. The 1793 British embassy to China, which led to Lord George Macartney's fraught encounter with the Qianlong emperor, has often been viewed as a clash of cultures fueled by the East's lack of interest in the West. In The Perils of Interpreting, Henrietta Harrison presents a more nuanced picture, ingeniously shifting the historical lens to focus on Macartney's two interpreters at that meeting--Li Zibiao and George Thomas Staunton. Who were these two men? How did they intervene in the exchanges that they mediated? And what did these exchanges mean for them? From Galway to Chengde, and from political intrigues to personal encounters, Harrison reassesses a pivotal moment in relations between China and Britain. She shows that there were Chinese who were familiar with the West, but growing tensions endangered those who embraced both cultures and would eventually culminate in the Opium Wars. Harrison demonstrates that the Qing court's ignorance about the British did not simply happen, but was manufactured through the repression of cultural go-betweens like Li and Staunton. She traces Li's influence as Macartney's interpreter, the pressures Li faced in China as a result, and his later years in hiding. Staunton interpreted successfully for the British East India Company in Canton, but as Chinese anger grew against British imperial expansion in South Asia, he was compelled to flee to England. Harrison contends that in silencing expert voices, the Qing court missed an opportunity to gain insights that might have prevented a losing conflict with Britain. Uncovering the lives of two overlooked figures, The Perils of Interpreting offers an empathic argument for cross-cultural understanding in a connected world. Sarah Bramao-Ramos is a Research Assistant Professor at the Society of Fellows in the Humanities at the University of Hong Kong. She can be reached at sarahbr@hku.hk Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The Perils of Interpreting: The Extraordinary Lives of Two Translators Between Qing China and the British Empire (Princeton UP, 2021) is a fascinating history of China's relations with the West--told through the lives of two eighteenth-century translators. The 1793 British embassy to China, which led to Lord George Macartney's fraught encounter with the Qianlong emperor, has often been viewed as a clash of cultures fueled by the East's lack of interest in the West. In The Perils of Interpreting, Henrietta Harrison presents a more nuanced picture, ingeniously shifting the historical lens to focus on Macartney's two interpreters at that meeting--Li Zibiao and George Thomas Staunton. Who were these two men? How did they intervene in the exchanges that they mediated? And what did these exchanges mean for them? From Galway to Chengde, and from political intrigues to personal encounters, Harrison reassesses a pivotal moment in relations between China and Britain. She shows that there were Chinese who were familiar with the West, but growing tensions endangered those who embraced both cultures and would eventually culminate in the Opium Wars. Harrison demonstrates that the Qing court's ignorance about the British did not simply happen, but was manufactured through the repression of cultural go-betweens like Li and Staunton. She traces Li's influence as Macartney's interpreter, the pressures Li faced in China as a result, and his later years in hiding. Staunton interpreted successfully for the British East India Company in Canton, but as Chinese anger grew against British imperial expansion in South Asia, he was compelled to flee to England. Harrison contends that in silencing expert voices, the Qing court missed an opportunity to gain insights that might have prevented a losing conflict with Britain. Uncovering the lives of two overlooked figures, The Perils of Interpreting offers an empathic argument for cross-cultural understanding in a connected world. Sarah Bramao-Ramos is a Research Assistant Professor at the Society of Fellows in the Humanities at the University of Hong Kong. She can be reached at sarahbr@hku.hk Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies

The Perils of Interpreting: The Extraordinary Lives of Two Translators Between Qing China and the British Empire (Princeton UP, 2021) is a fascinating history of China's relations with the West--told through the lives of two eighteenth-century translators. The 1793 British embassy to China, which led to Lord George Macartney's fraught encounter with the Qianlong emperor, has often been viewed as a clash of cultures fueled by the East's lack of interest in the West. In The Perils of Interpreting, Henrietta Harrison presents a more nuanced picture, ingeniously shifting the historical lens to focus on Macartney's two interpreters at that meeting--Li Zibiao and George Thomas Staunton. Who were these two men? How did they intervene in the exchanges that they mediated? And what did these exchanges mean for them? From Galway to Chengde, and from political intrigues to personal encounters, Harrison reassesses a pivotal moment in relations between China and Britain. She shows that there were Chinese who were familiar with the West, but growing tensions endangered those who embraced both cultures and would eventually culminate in the Opium Wars. Harrison demonstrates that the Qing court's ignorance about the British did not simply happen, but was manufactured through the repression of cultural go-betweens like Li and Staunton. She traces Li's influence as Macartney's interpreter, the pressures Li faced in China as a result, and his later years in hiding. Staunton interpreted successfully for the British East India Company in Canton, but as Chinese anger grew against British imperial expansion in South Asia, he was compelled to flee to England. Harrison contends that in silencing expert voices, the Qing court missed an opportunity to gain insights that might have prevented a losing conflict with Britain. Uncovering the lives of two overlooked figures, The Perils of Interpreting offers an empathic argument for cross-cultural understanding in a connected world. Sarah Bramao-Ramos is a Research Assistant Professor at the Society of Fellows in the Humanities at the University of Hong Kong. She can be reached at sarahbr@hku.hk

The Perils of Interpreting: The Extraordinary Lives of Two Translators Between Qing China and the British Empire (Princeton UP, 2021) is a fascinating history of China's relations with the West--told through the lives of two eighteenth-century translators. The 1793 British embassy to China, which led to Lord George Macartney's fraught encounter with the Qianlong emperor, has often been viewed as a clash of cultures fueled by the East's lack of interest in the West. In The Perils of Interpreting, Henrietta Harrison presents a more nuanced picture, ingeniously shifting the historical lens to focus on Macartney's two interpreters at that meeting--Li Zibiao and George Thomas Staunton. Who were these two men? How did they intervene in the exchanges that they mediated? And what did these exchanges mean for them? From Galway to Chengde, and from political intrigues to personal encounters, Harrison reassesses a pivotal moment in relations between China and Britain. She shows that there were Chinese who were familiar with the West, but growing tensions endangered those who embraced both cultures and would eventually culminate in the Opium Wars. Harrison demonstrates that the Qing court's ignorance about the British did not simply happen, but was manufactured through the repression of cultural go-betweens like Li and Staunton. She traces Li's influence as Macartney's interpreter, the pressures Li faced in China as a result, and his later years in hiding. Staunton interpreted successfully for the British East India Company in Canton, but as Chinese anger grew against British imperial expansion in South Asia, he was compelled to flee to England. Harrison contends that in silencing expert voices, the Qing court missed an opportunity to gain insights that might have prevented a losing conflict with Britain. Uncovering the lives of two overlooked figures, The Perils of Interpreting offers an empathic argument for cross-cultural understanding in a connected world. Sarah Bramao-Ramos is a Research Assistant Professor at the Society of Fellows in the Humanities at the University of Hong Kong. She can be reached at sarahbr@hku.hk Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The Perils of Interpreting: The Extraordinary Lives of Two Translators Between Qing China and the British Empire (Princeton UP, 2021) is a fascinating history of China's relations with the West--told through the lives of two eighteenth-century translators. The 1793 British embassy to China, which led to Lord George Macartney's fraught encounter with the Qianlong emperor, has often been viewed as a clash of cultures fueled by the East's lack of interest in the West. In The Perils of Interpreting, Henrietta Harrison presents a more nuanced picture, ingeniously shifting the historical lens to focus on Macartney's two interpreters at that meeting--Li Zibiao and George Thomas Staunton. Who were these two men? How did they intervene in the exchanges that they mediated? And what did these exchanges mean for them? From Galway to Chengde, and from political intrigues to personal encounters, Harrison reassesses a pivotal moment in relations between China and Britain. She shows that there were Chinese who were familiar with the West, but growing tensions endangered those who embraced both cultures and would eventually culminate in the Opium Wars. Harrison demonstrates that the Qing court's ignorance about the British did not simply happen, but was manufactured through the repression of cultural go-betweens like Li and Staunton. She traces Li's influence as Macartney's interpreter, the pressures Li faced in China as a result, and his later years in hiding. Staunton interpreted successfully for the British East India Company in Canton, but as Chinese anger grew against British imperial expansion in South Asia, he was compelled to flee to England. Harrison contends that in silencing expert voices, the Qing court missed an opportunity to gain insights that might have prevented a losing conflict with Britain. Uncovering the lives of two overlooked figures, The Perils of Interpreting offers an empathic argument for cross-cultural understanding in a connected world. Sarah Bramao-Ramos is a Research Assistant Professor at the Society of Fellows in the Humanities at the University of Hong Kong. She can be reached at sarahbr@hku.hk Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/british-studies

Since the 1990s, the New Qing History school has loomed large in the study of the Qing dynasty. It has greatly informed not only the study of the Qing but study of other dynasties as well. Yet what exactly is New Qing History? What is "new" about it? How did it come into being? How was it received in China and the West? To answer these questions, we talked to Professor Joanna Waley-Cohen of NYU, one of the leading scholars of the Qing dynasty. Contributors Joanna Waley-Cohen Professor Joanna Waley-Cohen is the Provost for NYU Shanghai and Julius Silver Professor of History at New York University. Her research interests include early modern Chinese history, especially the Qing dynasty; China and the West; and Chinese imperial culture, particularly in the Qianlong era; warfare in China and Inner Asia; and Chinese culinary history, and she has authored several books and articles on these topics. In addition, Professor Waley-Cohen has received many honors, including archival and postdoctoral fellowships from the American Council of Learned Societies, Goddard and Presidential Fellowships from NYU, and an Olin Fellowship in Military and Strategic History from Yale.  Yiming Ha Yiming Ha is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of History at the University of California, Los Angeles. His current research is on military mobilization and state-building in China between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries, focusing on how military institutions changed over time, how the state responded to these changes, the disconnect between the center and localities, and the broader implications that the military had on the state. His project highlights in particular the role of the Mongol Yuan in introducing an alternative form of military mobilization that radically transformed the Chinese state. He is also interested in military history, nomadic history, comparative Eurasian state-building, and the history of maritime interactions in early modern East Asia. He received his BA from UCLA and his MPhil from the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. Credits Episode no. 12 Release date: June 25, 2022 Recording location: Los Angeles, CA/New York, NY Transcript Bibliography courtesy of Professor Waley-Cohen Images Cover Image: The Qianlong Emperor, who reigned from 1735 to 1796. After he abdicated, he continued to retain power as retired emperor until his death in 1799. He is the longest-reigning monarch in Chinese history and one of the longest in the world (Image Source). The headquarters of the First Historical Archives in Beijing, which houses documents from the Qing. The opening of this archive and access to the Manchu-language documents held within helped give birth to New Qing History. (Image Source) A copy of a Qing-era civil service examination answer sheet. Note the Manchu script on the seal. Currently held in UCLA Library Special Collections (Photo by Yiming). The Putuo Zongcheng Temple, a Buddhist temple in the Qing's Rehe Summer Resort (in today's Chengde, Hebei province). The temple was built between 1767 and 1771 by the Qianlong Emperor and was a replica of the Potala Palace in Lhasa. It is a fusion of Tibetan and Chinese architectural styles and is one of the most famous landmarks in the Chengde Summer Resort. (Image Source) A painting of a European-style palace constructed by the Jesuits for the Qing emperors in the Old Summer Palace (Yuanmingyuan). Note the fusion of Chinese and European styles. The Old Summer Palace was looted and burned by Anglo-French forces in 1860. The twelve bronze head statutes in front of the building have mostly been repatriated back to China, although some are in the hands of private collectors. (Image Source) The Qianlong Emperor commissioned a series of artwork commemorating the "Ten Great Campaigns" of his reign. This particular piece of artwork depicts the Battle of Thọ Xương River in 1788, when the Qing invaded Vietnam. These artworks were collaborative pieces between Chinese and Jesuit painters. (Image Source) References Patricia Berger, Empire of Emptiness: Buddhist Art and Political Authority in Qing China. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2003. Pamela K. Crossley, A Translucent Mirror:  History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology.  Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1999. Mark C. Elliott, The Manchu Way:  The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China.  Stanford, CA:  Stanford University Press, 2001. Johan Elverskog, Our Great Qing: The Mongols, Buddhists, and the State in Late Imperial China. Honolulu: University of  Hawaii Press, 2006. Philippe Foret, Mapping Chengde:  The Qing Landscape Enterprise.  Honolulu:  University of Hawaii Press, 2000. Jonathan S. Hay, Shitao:  Painting and Modernity in Early Qing China.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2001. Ho Ping-ti, “The Significance of the Ch'ing Period in Chinese History,” Journal of Asian Studies 26.2 (1967):  189-95 Ho Ping-ti, “In Defense of Sinicization: A Rebuttal of Evelyn Rawski's `Reenvisioning the Qing,'” Journal of Asian Studies 57.1 (1998):  123-55. Laura Hostetler, Qing Colonial Enterprise:  Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 2001. Susan Mann, Precious Records:  Women in China's Long Eighteenth Century.  Stanford, CA:  Stanford University Press, 1997. James P. Millward, Beyond the Pass:  Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864.  Stanford, CA:  Stanford University Press, 1998. Ronald C. Po, The Blue Frontier: Maritime Vision and Power in the Qing Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. Evelyn S. Rawski, The Last Emperors:  A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions.  Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1998. Evelyn S. Rawski, “Presidential Address: Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance of the Qing Period in Chinese History,” Journal of Asian Studies 55.4 (1996):  829-50.

Chinese President Xi Jinping visited the Chengde Mountain Resort, a village and a community-based service center for elderly home care.

In 1702, the second emperor of the Qing dynasty ordered construction of a new summer palace in Rehe (now Chengde, Hebei) to support his annual tours north among the court's Inner Mongolian allies. The Mountain Estate to Escape the Heat (Bishu Shanzhuang) was strategically located at the node of mountain “veins” through which the Qing empire's geomantic energy was said to flow. At this site, from late spring through early autumn, the Kangxi emperor presided over rituals of intimacy and exchange that celebrated his rule: garden tours, banquets, entertainments, and gift giving.  Stephen Whiteman's book, Where Dragon Veins Meet: The Kangxi Emperor and His Estate at Rehe (University of Washington Press in 2020) draws on resources and methods from art and architectural history, garden and landscape history, early modern global history, and historical geography to reconstruct the Mountain Estate as it evolved under Kangxi, illustrating the importance of landscape as a medium for ideological expression during the early Qing and in the early modern world more broadly. Examination of paintings, prints, historical maps, newly created maps informed by GIS-based research, and personal accounts reveals the significance of geographic space and its representation in the negotiation of Qing imperial ideology. The first monograph in any language to focus solely on the art and architecture of the Kangxi court, Where Dragon Veins Meet illuminates the court's production and deployment of landscape as a reflection of contemporary concerns and offers new insight into the sources and forms of Qing power through material expressions. Suvi Rautio is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Helsinki. As an anthropologist, her interests delve into themes, such as Chinese state-society relations, space and memory, to deconstruct the social orderings of marginalized populations living in China and reveal the layers of social difference that characterize the nation today. suvi.rautio@helsinki.fi Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In 1702, the second emperor of the Qing dynasty ordered construction of a new summer palace in Rehe (now Chengde, Hebei) to support his annual tours north among the court’s Inner Mongolian allies. The Mountain Estate to Escape the Heat (Bishu Shanzhuang) was strategically located at the node of mountain “veins” through which the Qing empire’s geomantic energy was said to flow. At this site, from late spring through early autumn, the Kangxi emperor presided over rituals of intimacy and exchange that celebrated his rule: garden tours, banquets, entertainments, and gift giving.  Stephen Whiteman's book, Where Dragon Veins Meet: The Kangxi Emperor and His Estate at Rehe (University of Washington Press in 2020) draws on resources and methods from art and architectural history, garden and landscape history, early modern global history, and historical geography to reconstruct the Mountain Estate as it evolved under Kangxi, illustrating the importance of landscape as a medium for ideological expression during the early Qing and in the early modern world more broadly. Examination of paintings, prints, historical maps, newly created maps informed by GIS-based research, and personal accounts reveals the significance of geographic space and its representation in the negotiation of Qing imperial ideology. The first monograph in any language to focus solely on the art and architecture of the Kangxi court, Where Dragon Veins Meet illuminates the court’s production and deployment of landscape as a reflection of contemporary concerns and offers new insight into the sources and forms of Qing power through material expressions. Suvi Rautio is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Helsinki. As an anthropologist, her interests delve into themes, such as Chinese state-society relations, space and memory, to deconstruct the social orderings of marginalized populations living in China and reveal the layers of social difference that characterize the nation today. suvi.rautio@helsinki.fi Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies

In 1702, the second emperor of the Qing dynasty ordered construction of a new summer palace in Rehe (now Chengde, Hebei) to support his annual tours north among the court’s Inner Mongolian allies. The Mountain Estate to Escape the Heat (Bishu Shanzhuang) was strategically located at the node of mountain “veins” through which the Qing empire’s geomantic energy was said to flow. At this site, from late spring through early autumn, the Kangxi emperor presided over rituals of intimacy and exchange that celebrated his rule: garden tours, banquets, entertainments, and gift giving.  Stephen Whiteman's book, Where Dragon Veins Meet: The Kangxi Emperor and His Estate at Rehe (University of Washington Press in 2020) draws on resources and methods from art and architectural history, garden and landscape history, early modern global history, and historical geography to reconstruct the Mountain Estate as it evolved under Kangxi, illustrating the importance of landscape as a medium for ideological expression during the early Qing and in the early modern world more broadly. Examination of paintings, prints, historical maps, newly created maps informed by GIS-based research, and personal accounts reveals the significance of geographic space and its representation in the negotiation of Qing imperial ideology. The first monograph in any language to focus solely on the art and architecture of the Kangxi court, Where Dragon Veins Meet illuminates the court’s production and deployment of landscape as a reflection of contemporary concerns and offers new insight into the sources and forms of Qing power through material expressions. Suvi Rautio is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Helsinki. As an anthropologist, her interests delve into themes, such as Chinese state-society relations, space and memory, to deconstruct the social orderings of marginalized populations living in China and reveal the layers of social difference that characterize the nation today. suvi.rautio@helsinki.fi Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In 1702, the second emperor of the Qing dynasty ordered construction of a new summer palace in Rehe (now Chengde, Hebei) to support his annual tours north among the court’s Inner Mongolian allies. The Mountain Estate to Escape the Heat (Bishu Shanzhuang) was strategically located at the node of mountain “veins” through which the Qing empire’s geomantic energy was said to flow. At this site, from late spring through early autumn, the Kangxi emperor presided over rituals of intimacy and exchange that celebrated his rule: garden tours, banquets, entertainments, and gift giving.  Stephen Whiteman's book, Where Dragon Veins Meet: The Kangxi Emperor and His Estate at Rehe (University of Washington Press in 2020) draws on resources and methods from art and architectural history, garden and landscape history, early modern global history, and historical geography to reconstruct the Mountain Estate as it evolved under Kangxi, illustrating the importance of landscape as a medium for ideological expression during the early Qing and in the early modern world more broadly. Examination of paintings, prints, historical maps, newly created maps informed by GIS-based research, and personal accounts reveals the significance of geographic space and its representation in the negotiation of Qing imperial ideology. The first monograph in any language to focus solely on the art and architecture of the Kangxi court, Where Dragon Veins Meet illuminates the court’s production and deployment of landscape as a reflection of contemporary concerns and offers new insight into the sources and forms of Qing power through material expressions. Suvi Rautio is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Helsinki. As an anthropologist, her interests delve into themes, such as Chinese state-society relations, space and memory, to deconstruct the social orderings of marginalized populations living in China and reveal the layers of social difference that characterize the nation today. suvi.rautio@helsinki.fi Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In 1702, the second emperor of the Qing dynasty ordered construction of a new summer palace in Rehe (now Chengde, Hebei) to support his annual tours north among the court’s Inner Mongolian allies. The Mountain Estate to Escape the Heat (Bishu Shanzhuang) was strategically located at the node of mountain “veins” through which the Qing empire’s geomantic energy was said to flow. At this site, from late spring through early autumn, the Kangxi emperor presided over rituals of intimacy and exchange that celebrated his rule: garden tours, banquets, entertainments, and gift giving.  Stephen Whiteman's book, Where Dragon Veins Meet: The Kangxi Emperor and His Estate at Rehe (University of Washington Press in 2020) draws on resources and methods from art and architectural history, garden and landscape history, early modern global history, and historical geography to reconstruct the Mountain Estate as it evolved under Kangxi, illustrating the importance of landscape as a medium for ideological expression during the early Qing and in the early modern world more broadly. Examination of paintings, prints, historical maps, newly created maps informed by GIS-based research, and personal accounts reveals the significance of geographic space and its representation in the negotiation of Qing imperial ideology. The first monograph in any language to focus solely on the art and architecture of the Kangxi court, Where Dragon Veins Meet illuminates the court’s production and deployment of landscape as a reflection of contemporary concerns and offers new insight into the sources and forms of Qing power through material expressions. Suvi Rautio is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Helsinki. As an anthropologist, her interests delve into themes, such as Chinese state-society relations, space and memory, to deconstruct the social orderings of marginalized populations living in China and reveal the layers of social difference that characterize the nation today. suvi.rautio@helsinki.fi Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In 1702, the second emperor of the Qing dynasty ordered construction of a new summer palace in Rehe (now Chengde, Hebei) to support his annual tours north among the court’s Inner Mongolian allies. The Mountain Estate to Escape the Heat (Bishu Shanzhuang) was strategically located at the node of mountain “veins” through which the Qing empire’s geomantic energy was said to flow. At this site, from late spring through early autumn, the Kangxi emperor presided over rituals of intimacy and exchange that celebrated his rule: garden tours, banquets, entertainments, and gift giving.  Stephen Whiteman's book, Where Dragon Veins Meet: The Kangxi Emperor and His Estate at Rehe (University of Washington Press in 2020) draws on resources and methods from art and architectural history, garden and landscape history, early modern global history, and historical geography to reconstruct the Mountain Estate as it evolved under Kangxi, illustrating the importance of landscape as a medium for ideological expression during the early Qing and in the early modern world more broadly. Examination of paintings, prints, historical maps, newly created maps informed by GIS-based research, and personal accounts reveals the significance of geographic space and its representation in the negotiation of Qing imperial ideology. The first monograph in any language to focus solely on the art and architecture of the Kangxi court, Where Dragon Veins Meet illuminates the court’s production and deployment of landscape as a reflection of contemporary concerns and offers new insight into the sources and forms of Qing power through material expressions. Suvi Rautio is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Helsinki. As an anthropologist, her interests delve into themes, such as Chinese state-society relations, space and memory, to deconstruct the social orderings of marginalized populations living in China and reveal the layers of social difference that characterize the nation today. suvi.rautio@helsinki.fi Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In 1702, the second emperor of the Qing dynasty ordered construction of a new summer palace in Rehe (now Chengde, Hebei) to support his annual tours north among the court’s Inner Mongolian allies. The Mountain Estate to Escape the Heat (Bishu Shanzhuang) was strategically located at the node of mountain “veins” through which the Qing empire’s geomantic energy was said to flow. At this site, from late spring through early autumn, the Kangxi emperor presided over rituals of intimacy and exchange that celebrated his rule: garden tours, banquets, entertainments, and gift giving.  Stephen Whiteman's book, Where Dragon Veins Meet: The Kangxi Emperor and His Estate at Rehe (University of Washington Press in 2020) draws on resources and methods from art and architectural history, garden and landscape history, early modern global history, and historical geography to reconstruct the Mountain Estate as it evolved under Kangxi, illustrating the importance of landscape as a medium for ideological expression during the early Qing and in the early modern world more broadly. Examination of paintings, prints, historical maps, newly created maps informed by GIS-based research, and personal accounts reveals the significance of geographic space and its representation in the negotiation of Qing imperial ideology. The first monograph in any language to focus solely on the art and architecture of the Kangxi court, Where Dragon Veins Meet illuminates the court’s production and deployment of landscape as a reflection of contemporary concerns and offers new insight into the sources and forms of Qing power through material expressions. Suvi Rautio is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Helsinki. As an anthropologist, her interests delve into themes, such as Chinese state-society relations, space and memory, to deconstruct the social orderings of marginalized populations living in China and reveal the layers of social difference that characterize the nation today. suvi.rautio@helsinki.fi Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Every Place Is The SamePart travelogue, Part challenge, Part comedic stint. Everyplace Is The Same tries to prove the ridiculous notion that every place Is in fact the same.Special Guest: Billy KidEpissode Challenge: Chengde (China) & Bath (UK)Host: Daniela VlaskalicDirector: Marco TimpanoTheme Music: Royalty FreeWanna support this podcast and get some great extras!Go to our Patreon page:www.patreon.com/everyplaceisthesame See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Vicina a Pechino, ma lontana dal caos e dallo smog della capitale: Chengde era la residenza estiva degli imperatori, luogo prediletto per la caccia e altre attività ricreative. Andiamo a scoprire questa piccola ma suggestiva località!

Not all Chinese cities are alike, and these differences are reflected in the challenges posed by urbanization and the corresponding responses cities undertake. From a national perspective, however, similarities are essential for formulating broad urbanization strategies. Our research addresses this dilemma through a cluster analysis based on key word coding of principal tasks outlined in the 11th Five-Year Plans of 286 major cities in China. In effect, the Five-Year plan becomes a proxy survey instrument. Seven distinct clusters emerge, and an additional analysis using socio-economic data from the China City Statistical Yearbook is undertaken to further identify the defining characteristics of each cluster and prototypical cities within them (Jilin, Liuzhou, Zhuzhou, Nanping, Xinyu, Chengde and Mianyang). Finally, implications for national urban planning strategies are discussed. Speaker: Eric Heikkila is Professor and Director of International Initiatives at the School of Policy, Planning, and Development (SPPD) at the University of Southern California (USC), where he has been a member of the faculty for twenty-five years. His research addresses a wide range of topics bearing on the geographical, economic, cultural and historical factors that influence urban development trajectories. He has applied spatial analysis, fuzzy sets and agent based modeling to study urban structure. Other aspects of his work include a more qualitative, policy oriented approach to urban development issues, especially in the context of the Asia Pacific region. He is conversant in several languages, including French and Mandarin, and has spent sabbatical leaves as a visiting scholar on separate occasions at National Taiwan University (Department of Geography), Peking University (Department of Urban and Environmental Sciences), and Chinese University of Hong Kong (Department of Geography and Resource Management). Shortly after joining USC, he became founding Executive Secretary of the Pacific Rim Council on Urban Development (PRCUD), a globally based non-governmental organization that continues to thrive under his initiative, and that organizes regular forums in host cities throughout the Asia Pacific region. As Director of International Initiatives, Dr. Heikkila has broad responsibility for planning and coordinating SPPD’s global engagement.

Jim shows his New England knowledge with a Thanksgiving lesson. This week all on CrossFeed News: Are commandments allowed the school to view? Would you take the eucharist? Would you from unapproved priests? Would you pardon infidels? What about some oil wells?

Jim shows his New England knowledge with a Thanksgiving lesson. This week all on CrossFeed News: Are commandments allowed the school to view? Would you take the eucharist? Would you from unapproved priests? Would you pardon infidels? What about some oil wells?