Podcasts about Chiang

Last time we spoke about Operation Chahar. In July 1937, the tensions between Japan and China erupted into a full-scale conflict, ignited by the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. Following a series of aggressive Japanese military maneuvers, Chiang Kai-shek, then enjoying a brief respite at Kuling, learned of the escalating clashes and prepared for battle. Confident that China was primed for resistance, he rallied his nation, demanding that Japan accept responsibility and respect China's sovereignty. The Japanese launched their offensive, rapidly capturing key positions in Northern China. Notably, fierce battle ensued in Jinghai, where Chinese soldiers, led by Brigade Commander Li Zhiyuan, valiantly defended against overwhelming forces using guerrilla tactics and direct assaults. Their spirit was symbolized by a courageous “death squad” that charged the enemy, inflicting serious casualties despite facing dire odds. As weeks passed, the conflict intensified with brutal assaults on Nankou. Chinese defenses, though valiant, were ultimately overwhelmed, leading to heavy casualties on both sides. Despite losing Nankou, the indomitable Chinese spirit inspired continued resistance against the Japanese invaders, foreshadowing a long, brutal war that would reshape East Asia.   #156 The Battle of Shanghai Part 1: The Beginning of the Battle of Shanghai Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. On August 9, a bullet riddled sedan screeched to an abrupt halt at the entrance to the Hongqiao airport along Monument Road. The gruesome scene on the dashboard revealed that one of the victims had died in the car. He had been dragged out and subjected to brutal slashing, kicking, and beating until his body was a mangled mess. Half of his face was missing, and his stomach had been cut open, exposing the sickly pallor of his intestines, faintly glimmering in the night. The other man had managed to escape the vehicle but only got a few paces away before he was gunned down. A short distance away lay a third body, dressed in a Chinese uniform. Investigators swiftly identified the badly mangled body as belonging to 27-year-old Sub-Lieutenant Oyama Isao, while the other deceased Japanese man was his driver, First Class Seaman Saito Yozo. The identity of the Chinese victim remained a mystery. At first glance, the scene appeared to be the aftermath of a straightforward shootout. However, numerous questions lingered: What were the Japanese doing at a military airfield miles from their barracks? Who had fired the first shot, and what had prompted that decision? The Chinese investigators and their Japanese counterparts were at odds over the answers to these questions. As they walked the crime scene, searching for evidence, loud arguments erupted repeatedly. By the time the sun began to rise, they concluded their investigation without reaching any consensus on what had transpired. They climbed into their cars and made their way back to the city. The investigators were acutely aware of the repercussions if they failed to handle their delicate task with the necessary finesse. Despite their hopes for peace, it was evident that Shanghai was a city bracing for war. As they drove through the dimly lit suburbs on their way from Hongqiao back to their downtown offices, their headlights illuminated whitewashed trees, interspersed with sandbag defenses and the silhouettes of solitary Chinese sentries. Officially, these sentries were part of the Peace Preservation Corps,  a paramilitary unit that, due to an international agreement reached a few years earlier, was the only Chinese force allowed to remain in the Shanghai area. In the hours that followed, both sides presented their versions of the incident. According to the Chinese account, the Japanese vehicle attempted to force its way through the airport gate. When members of the Peace Preservation Corps stationed at the entrance signaled for Saito, the driver, to stop, he abruptly turned the car around. Sub-Lieutenant Oyama then fired at the Chinese guards with an automatic pistol. Only then did the Chinese return fire, killing Oyama in a hail of bullets. Saito managed to jump out before he, too, was gunned down. The commander of the Chinese guards told a Western reporter that this wasn't the first time someone Japanese had attempted to enter the airport. Such incidents had occurred repeatedly in the past two months, leading them to believe that the Japanese were “obviously undertaking espionage.” The Japanese account, predictably, placed the blame for the entire incident squarely on China. It asserted that Oyama had been driving along a road bordering the airfield with no intention of entering. Suddenly, the vehicle was stopped and surrounded by Peace Preservation Corps troops, who opened fire with rifles and machine guns without warning. Oyama had no opportunity to return fire. The Japanese statement argued that the two men had every right to use the road, which was part of the International Settlement, and labeled the incident a clear violation of the 1932 peace agreement. “We demand that the Chinese bear responsibility for this illegal act,”. Regardless of either side, it seemed likely to everyone in the region, war would soon engulf Shanghai.  Meanwhile, as the Marco Polo Bridge Incident escalated into a full blown in the far north, General Zhang Fakui was attending a routine training mission at Mount Lu in southeastern Jiangxi. A short and small man, not considered too handsome either, Zhang had earned his place in China's leadership through physical courage, once taking a stand on a bridge and single handedly facing down an enemy army. He was 41 years old in 1937, having spent half his life fighting Warlords, Communists and sometimes even Nationalists. In the recent years he had tossed his lot in with a rebel campaign against Chiang Kai-Shek, who surprisingly went on the forgive him and placed him in charge of anti communist operations in the area due south of Shanghai. However now the enemy seemed to have changed.  As the war spread to Beijing, on July 16th, Zhang was sent to Chiang Kai-Shek's summer residence at Mount Lu alongside 150 members of China's political and military elites. They were all there to brainstorm how to fight the Japanese. Years prior the Generalissimo had made it doctrine to appease the Japanese but now he made grandiose statements such as “this time we must fight to the end”. Afterwards Chiang dealt missions to all his commanders and Zhang Fakui was told to prepare for operations in the Shanghai area.  It had been apparent for weeks that both China and Japan were preparing for war in central China. The Japanese had been diverting naval troops from the north to strengthen their forces in Shanghai, and by early August, they had assembled over 8,000 troops. A few days later, approximately thirty-two naval vessels arrived. On July 31, Chiang declared that “all hope for peace has been lost.” Chiang had been reluctant to commit his best forces to defend northern China, an area he had never truly controlled. In contrast, Shanghai was central to his strategy for the war against Japan. Chiang decided to deploy his finest troops, the 87th and 88th Divisions, which were trained by generals under the guidance of the German advisor von Falkenhausen, who had high hopes for their performance against the Japanese. In doing so, Chiang aimed to demonstrate to both his own people and the wider world that the Chinese could and would resist the invader. Meanwhile, Chiang's spy chief, Dai Li, was busy gathering intelligence on Japanese intentions regarding Shanghai, a challenging task given his focus in recent years. Dai, one of the most sinister figures in modern Chinese history, had devoted far more energy and resources to suppressing the Communists than to countering the Japanese. As a result, by the critical summer of 1937, he had built only a sparse network of agents in “Little Tokyo,” the Hongkou area of Shanghai dominated by Japanese businesses. One agent was a pawnshop owner, while the rest were double agents employed as local staff within the Japanese security apparatus. Unfortunately, they could provide little more than snippets, rumors, and hearsay. While some of this information sounded alarmingly dire, there was almost no actionable intelligence. Chiang did not take the decision to open a new front in Shanghai lightly. Built on both banks of the Huangpu River, the city served as the junction between the Pacific Ocean to the east and the great Yangtze River, which wound thousands of kilometers inland to the west. Shanghai embodied everything that represented modern China, from its industry and labor relations to its connections with the outside world. While foreign diplomatic presence was concentrated in nearby Nanjing, the capital, it was in Shanghai that the foreign community gauged the country's mood. Foreigners in the city's two “concession” areas nthe French Concession and the British-affiliated International Settlement often dismissed towns beyond Shanghai as mere “outstations.” Chiang Kai-shek would throw 650,000 troops into the battle for the city and its environs as well as his modest air force of 200 aircraft. Chiang, whose forces were being advised by German officers led by General Alexander von Falkenhausen, was finally confident that his forces could take on the Japanese. A German officer told a British diplomat, “If the Chinese Army follows the advice of the German advisers, it is capable of driving the Japanese over the Great Wall.”   While Chiang was groping in the dark, deprived of the eyes and ears of an efficient intelligence service, he did have at his disposal an army that was better prepared for battle than it had been in 1932. Stung by the experience of previous conflicts with the Japanese, Chiang had initiated a modernization program aimed at equipping the armed forces not only to suppress Communist rebels but also to confront a modern fighting force equipped with tanks, artillery, and aircraft. He had made progress, but it was insufficient. Serious weaknesses persisted, and now there was no time for any remedial action. While China appeared to be a formidable power in sheer numbers, the figures were misleading. On the eve of war, the Chinese military was comprised of a total of 176 divisions, which were theoretically organized into two brigades of two regiments each. However, only about 20 divisions maintained full peacetime strength of 10,000 soldiers and officers; the rest typically held around 5,000 men. Moreover, Chiang controlled only 31 divisions personally, and he could not count on the loyalty of the others. To successfully resist Japan, Chiang would need to rely not only on his military command skills but also on his ability to forge fragile coalitions among Warlord generals with strong local loyalties. Equipment posed another significant challenge. The modernization drive was not set to complete until late 1938, and the impact of this delay was evident. In every category of weaponry, from rifles to field artillery, the Chinese were outmatched by their Japanese adversaries, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Domestically manufactured artillery pieces had shorter ranges, and substandard steel-making technology caused gun barrels to overheat, increasing the risk of explosions. Some arms even dated back to imperial times. A large proportion of the Chinese infantry had received no proper training in basic tactics, let alone in coordinated operations involving armor and artillery. The chief of the German advisory corps was General Alexander von Falkenhausen, a figure hard to rival in terms of qualifications for the role. Although the 58-year-old's narrow shoulders, curved back, and bald, vulture-like head gave him an unmilitary, almost avian appearance, his exterior belied a tough character. In 1918, he had earned his nation's highest military honor, the Pour le Mérite, while assisting Germany's Ottoman allies against the British in Palestine. Few, if any, German officers knew Asia as well as he did. His experience in the region dated back to the turn of the century. As a young lieutenant in the Third East Asian Infantry Regiment, he participated in the international coalition of colonial powers that quelled the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. A decade later, he traveled through Korea, Manchuria, and northern China with his wife, keenly observing and learning as a curious tourist. From 1912 to 1914, he served as the German Kaiser's military attaché in Tokyo. He was poised to put his extensive knowledge to good use in the months ahead. Chiang believed that Shanghai should be the location of the first battle. This decision was heavily influenced by Falkenhausen and was strategically sound. Chiang Kai-shek could not hope to win a war against Japan unless he could unify the nation behind him, particularly the many fractious warlords who had battled his forces repeatedly over the past decade. Everyone understood that the territory Japan was demanding in the far north did not need to be held for any genuine military necessity; it was land that could be negotiated. The warlords occupying that territory were unpredictable and all too willing to engage in bargaining. In contrast, China's economic heartland held different significance. By choosing to fight for the center of the country and deploying his strongest military units, Chiang Kai-shek signaled to both China's warlords and potential foreign allies that he had a vested interest in the outcome.  There were also several operational reasons for preferring a conflict in the Yangtze River basin over a campaign in northern China. The rivers, lakes, and rice paddies of the Yangtze delta were much better suited for defensive warfare against Japan's mechanized forces than the flat plains of North China. By forcing the Japanese to commit troops to central China, the Nationalists bought themselves the time needed to rally and reinforce their faltering defenses in the north. By initiating hostilities in the Shanghai area, Japan would be forced to divert its attention from the northern front, thereby stalling a potential Japanese advance toward the crucial city of Wuhan. It would also help safeguard potential supply routes from the Soviet Union, the most likely source of material assistance due to Moscow's own animosity toward Japan. It was a clever plan, and surprisingly, the Japanese did not anticipate it. Intelligence officers in Tokyo were convinced that Chiang would send his troops northward instead. Again in late July, Chiang convened his commanders, and here he gave Zhang Fukai more detailed instructions for his operation. Fukai was placed in charge of the right wing of the army which was currently preparing for action in the metropolitan area. Fukai would oversee the forces east of the Huangpu River in the area known as Pudong. Pudong was full of warehouses, factories and rice fields, quite precarious to fight in. Meanwhile General Zhang Zhizhong, a quiet and sickly looking man who had previously led the Central Military Academy was to command the left wing of the Huangpu. All of the officers agreed the plan to force the battle to the Shanghai area was logical as the northern region near Beijing was far too open, giving the advantage to tank warfare, which they could not hope to contest Japan upon. The Shanghai area, full of rivers, creaks and urban environments favored them much more. Zhang Zhizhong seemed an ideal pick to lead troops in downtown Shanghai where most of the fighting would take place. His position of commandant of the military academy allowed him to establish connections with junior officers earmarked for rapid promotion. This meant that he personally knew the generals of both the 87th and 88th Divisions, which were to form the core of Zhang Zhizhong's newly established 9th Army Group and become his primary assets in the early phases of the Shanghai campaign. Moreover, Zhang Zhizhong had the right aggressive instincts. He believed that China's confrontation with Japan had evolved through three stages: in the first stage, the Japanese invaded the northeast in 1931, and China remained passive; in the second stage, during the first battle of Shanghai in 1932, Japan struck, but China fought back. Zhang argued that this would be the third stage, where Japan was preparing to attack, but China would strike first.   It seems that Zhang Zhizhong did not expect to survive this final showdown with his Japanese adversary. He took the fight very personally, even ordering his daughter to interrupt her education in England and return home to serve her country in the war. However, he was not the strong commander he appeared to be, as he was seriously ill. Although he never disclosed the true extent of his condition, it seemed he was on the verge of a physical and mental breakdown after years in high-stress positions. In fact, he had recently taken a leave of absence from his role at the military academy in the spring of 1937. When the war broke out, he was at a hospital in the northern port city of Qingdao, preparing to go abroad for convalescence. He canceled those plans to contribute to the struggle against Japan. When his daughter returned from England and saw him on the eve of battle, she was alarmed by how emaciated he had become. From the outset, doubts about his physical fitness to command loomed large. At 8:30 a.m. on Tuesday, August 10, a group of officers emerged from the Japanese Consulate along the banks of the Huangpu River. This team was a hastily assembled Sino-Japanese joint investigation unit tasked with quickly resolving the shooting incident at the Hongqiao Aerodrome of the previous night. They understood the urgency of reaching an agreement swiftly to prevent any escalation. As they drove to the airport, they passed armed guards of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps stationed behind sandbag barricades that had been erected only hours earlier. Upon arriving at Hongqiao, the officers walked up and down the scene of the incident under the scorching sun, attempting to piece together a shared understanding of what had transpired. However, this proved to be nearly impossible, as the evidence failed to align into a coherent account acceptable to both parties. The Japanese were unconvinced that any shootout had occurred at all. Oyama, the officer who had been in the car, had left his pistol at the marine headquarters in Hongkou and had been unarmed the night before. They insisted that whoever shot and killed the man in the Chinese uniform could not have been him. By 6:00 pm the investigators returned to the city. Foreign correspondents, eager for information, knew exactly whom to approach. The newly appointed Shanghai Mayor, Yu Hongjun, with a quick wit and proficiency in English, Yu represented the city's cosmopolitan image. However, that evening, he had little to offer the reporters, except for a plea directed at both the Japanese and Chinese factions “Both sides should maintain a calm demeanor to prevent the situation from escalating.” Mayor Yu however was, in fact, at the center of a complex act of deception that nearly succeeded. Nearly eight decades later, Zhang Fakui attributed the incident to members of the 88th Division, led by General Sun Yuanliang. “A small group of Sun Yuanliang's men disguised themselves as members of the Peace Preservation Corps,” Zhang Fakui recounted years later in his old age. “On August 9, 1937, they encountered two Japanese servicemen on the road near the Hongqiao military aerodrome and accused them of forcing their way into the area. A clash ensued, resulting in the deaths of the Japanese soldiers.” This created a delicate dilemma for their superiors. The two dead Japanese soldiers were difficult to explain away. Mayor Yu, likely informed of the predicament by military officials, conferred with Tong Yuanliang, chief of staff of the Songhu Garrison Command, a unit established after the fighting in 1932. Together, they devised a quick and cynical plan to portray the situation as one of self-defense by the Chinese guards. Under their orders, soldiers marched a Chinese death row inmate to the airport gate, dressed him in a paramilitary guard's uniform, and executed him. While this desperate ruse might have worked initially, it quickly unraveled due to the discrepancies raised by the condition of the Chinese body. The Japanese did not believe the story, and the entire plan began to fall apart. Any remaining mutual trust swiftly evaporated. Instead of preventing a confrontation, the cover-up was accelerating the slide into war.  Late on August 10, Mayor Yu sent a secret cable to Nanjing, warning that the Japanese had ominously declared they would not allow the two deaths at the airport to go unpunished. The following day, the Japanese Consul General Okamoto Suemasa paid a visit to the mayor, demanding the complete withdrawal of the Peace Preservation Corps from the Shanghai area and the dismantling of all fortifications established by the corps. For the Chinese, acquiescing to these demands was nearly impossible. From their perspective, it appeared that the Japanese aimed to leave Shanghai defenseless while simultaneously bolstering their own military presence in the city. Twenty vessels, including cruisers and destroyers, sailed up the Huangpu River and docked at wharves near "Little Tokyo." Japanese marines in olive-green uniforms marched ashore down the gangplanks, while women from the local Japanese community, dressed in kimonos, greeted the troops with delighted smiles and bows to the flags of the Rising Sun that proudly adorned the sterns of the battleships. In fact, Japan had planned to deploy additional troops to Shanghai even before the shooting at Hongqiao Aerodrome. This decision was deemed necessary to reinforce the small contingent of 2,500 marines permanently stationed in the city. More troops were required to assist in protecting Japanese nationals who were being hastily evacuated from the larger cities along the Yangtze River. These actions were primarily defensive maneuvers, as the Japanese military seemed hesitant to open a second front in Shanghai, for the same reasons that the Chinese preferred an extension of hostilities to that area. Diverting Japanese troops from the strategically critical north and the Soviet threat across China's border would weaken their position, especially given that urban warfare would diminish the advantages of their technological superiority in tanks and aircraft. While officers in the Japanese Navy believed it was becoming increasingly difficult to prevent the war from spreading to Shanghai, they were willing to give diplomacy one last chance. Conversely, the Japanese Army was eager to wage war in northern China but displayed little inclination to engage in hostilities in Shanghai. Should the situation worsen, the Army preferred to withdraw all Japanese nationals from the city. Ultimately, when it agreed to formulate plans for dispatching an expeditionary force to Shanghai, it did so reluctantly, primarily to avoid accusations of neglecting its responsibilities. Amongst many commanders longing for a swift confrontation with Japan was Zhang Zhizhong. By the end of July, he was growing increasingly impatient, waiting with his troops in the Suzhou area west of Shanghai and questioning whether a unique opportunity was being squandered. On July 30, he sent a telegram to Nanjing requesting permission to strike first. He argued that if Japan were allowed to launch an attack on Shanghai, he would waste valuable time moving his troops from their position more than 50 miles away. Nanjing responded with a promise that his wishes would be fulfilled but urged him to exercise patience: “We should indeed seize the initiative over the enemy, but we must wait until the right opportunity arises. Await further orders.” That opportunity arose on August 11, with the Japanese display of force on the Huangpu River and their public demand for the withdrawal of China's paramilitary police. Japan had sufficiently revealed itself as the aggressor in the eyes of both domestic and international audiences, making it safe for China to take action. At 9:00 p.m. that evening, Zhang Zhizhong received orders from Nanjing to move his troops toward Shanghai. He acted with remarkable speed, capitalizing on the extensive transportation network in the region. The soldiers of the 87th Division quickly boarded 300 trucks that had been prepared in advance. Meanwhile, civilian passengers on trains were unceremoniously ordered off to make room for the 88th Division, which boarded the carriages heading for Shanghai. In total, over 20,000 motivated and well-equipped troops were on their way to battle.  On August 12, representatives from the United Kingdom, France, the United States, Italy, Japan, and China gathered for a joint conference in Shanghai to discuss ceasefire terms. Japan demanded the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Shanghai, while the Chinese representative, Yu Hung-chun, dismissed the Japanese demand, stating that the terms of the ceasefire had already been violated by Japan. The major powers were keen to avoid a repeat of the January 28 Incident, which had significantly disrupted foreign economic activities in Shanghai. Meanwhile, Chinese citizens fervently welcomed the presence of Chinese troops in the city. In Nanjing, Chinese and Japanese representatives convened for the last time in a final effort to negotiate. The Japanese insisted that all Peace Preservation Corps and regular troops be withdrawn from the vicinity of Shanghai. The Chinese, however, deemed the demand for a unilateral withdrawal unacceptable, given that the two nations were already engaged in conflict in North China. Ultimately, Mayor Yu made it clear that the most the Chinese government would concede was that Chinese troops would not fire unless fired upon. Conversely, Japan placed all responsibility on China, citing the deployment of Chinese troops around Shanghai as the cause of the escalating tensions. Negotiations proved impossible, leaving no alternative but for the war to spread into Central China. On that same morning of Thursday, August 12, residents near Shanghai's North Train Station, also known as Zhabei Station, just a few blocks from "Little Tokyo," awoke to an unusual sight: thousands of soldiers dressed in the khaki uniforms of the Chinese Nationalists, wearing German-style helmets and carrying stick grenades slung across their chests. “Where do you come from?” the Shanghai citizens asked. “How did you get here so fast?” Zhang Zhizhong issued detailed orders to each unit under his command, instructing the 88th Division specifically to travel by train and deploy in a line from the town of Zhenru to Dachang village, both located a few miles west of Shanghai. Only later was the division supposed to advance toward a position stretching from the Zhabei district to the town of Jiangwan, placing it closer to the city boundaries. Zhang Zhizhong was the embodiment of belligerence, but he faced even more aggressive officers among his ranks. On the morning of August 12, he was approached by Liu Jingchi, the chief of operations at the Songhu Garrison Command. Liu argued that the battle of 1932 had gone poorly for the Chinese because they had hesitated and failed to strike first. This time, he insisted, should be different, and Zhang should order an all-out assault on the Japanese positions that very evening. Zhang countered that he had clear and unmistakable orders from Chiang Kai-shek to let the Japanese fire first, emphasizing the importance of maintaining China's image on the world stage. “That's easy,” Liu retorted. “Once all the units are deployed and ready to attack, we can just change some people into mufti and send them in to fire a few shots. We attack, and simultaneously, we report that the enemy's offensive has begun.” Zhang Zhizhong did not like this idea. “We can't go behind our leader's back like that,” he replied. Zhang Zhizhong's position was far from enviable. Forced to rein in eager and capable officers, he found himself acting against his own personal desires. Ultimately, he decided to seek the freedom to act as he saw fit. In a secret cable to Nanjing, he requested permission to launch an all-out attack on the Japanese positions in Shanghai the following day, Friday, August 13. He argued that this was a unique opportunity to capitalize on the momentum created by the movement of troops; any further delay would only lead to stagnation. He proposed a coordinated assault that would also involve the Chinese Air Force. However, the reply from Chiang Kai-shek was brief and unwavering: “Await further orders.” Even as Chiang's troops poured into Shanghai, Chinese and Japanese officials continued their discussions. Ostensibly, this was in hopes of reaching a last-minute solution, but in reality, it was a performance. Both sides wanted to claim the moral high ground in a battle that now seemed inevitable. They understood that whoever openly declared an end to negotiations would automatically be perceived as the aggressor. During talks at the Shanghai Municipal Council, Japanese Consul General Okamoto argued that if China truly wanted peace, it would have withdrawn its troops to a position that would prevent clashes. Mayor Yu responded by highlighting the increasing presence of Japanese forces in the city. “Under such circumstances, China must adopt such measures as necessary for self-defense,” he stated. Late on August 13, 1937, Chiang Kai-shek instructed his forces to defend Shanghai, commanding them to "divert the enemy at sea, secure the coast, and resist landings."  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In July 1937, tensions between Japan and China escalated into war following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. Confident in his country's resolve, Chiang Kai-shek rallied the Chinese against Japanese aggression. On August 9, a deadly confrontation at Hongqiao Airport resulted in the deaths of Japanese soldiers, igniting further hostilities. As both sides blamed each other, the atmosphere became tense. Ultimately, negotiations failed, and the stage was set for a brutal conflict in Shanghai, marking the beginning of a long and devastating war.

Last time we spoke about the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. On July 7, 1937, tensions escalated between Japan and China as the Japanese military conducted a training exercise near the Marco Polo Bridge. During the exercise, gunfire erupted, sowing confusion and leading to the unexplained disappearance of one soldier. This incident prompted Japan to demand permission to search the nearby city of Wanping, which was denied by Chinese forces, escalating tensions further. By the next day, Japanese troops attacked, resulting in fierce fighting at the bridge. Under heavy assault, Chinese defenders fought valiantly but faced overwhelming force. As the conflict intensified, both sides struggled with heavy casualties, leading to the full-scale Sino-Japanese War. The Japanese military's aggressive maneuvers and the determined Chinese resistance marked the beginning of a brutal conflict, forever altering the landscape of East Asia. The profound toll on both nations foreshadowed the horrors of war that were to come, as China prepared to defend its sovereignty against a relentless enemy.   #155 Operation Chahar 1937 Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. By the end of July of 1937 the Japanese had overwhelmed the Beiping-Tianjin region. It's pretty understandable as to how this came so fast. As we have discussed thoroughly in this series, the Japanese had gradually seized control over Northern China going back to Operation Nekka in 1933. Little by little they had carved it out. Typically when you pull out a map of a war between two nations, one nation pierces into the other and gradually seizes control of key locations until it archives victory. However with the case of the outset of the Second Sino-Japanese War its more like the Japanese are starting at multiple key locations where they have concessions, treaties or where there are autonomous regions. Thus its honestly a huge headache to follow. When the Marco Polo Bridge Incident broke out, Chiang Kai-Shek had been in Kuling, a mountain top resort where he spent his summer vacations. He received the news with composure, but his message to the nation conveyed a sense of optimism and anticipation. The embarrassment of the Sian mutiny was a thing of the past. Although he wasn't overly confident, he believed that this was the pivotal moment China had been preparing for, more so than at any time in recent years. For nearly three weeks, efforts were made to resolve the situation through diplomatic means. For the first time, Chiang was in a position to make demands. He understood they would likely be rejected, but that wasn't the main point. He asked Japan to acknowledge its responsibility for the recent turmoil, to issue an apology, and to provide compensation. After making that request, he addressed his nation with a formal commitment: China would not accept any settlement that compromised its sovereign rights or territorial integrity. No changes would be permitted regarding the status of the Hubei-Chahar Council, and local officials would not be reassigned at the request of any foreign government. Any restrictions on the Twenty-ninth Army's positions would be unacceptable. He declared that the era of Japanese expansion in North China had come to a definitive end. The Japanese army achieved significant victories on the battlefield in China, leading to the inevitable expansion of the conflict. The first major campaign following the Nanyuan victory unfolded along the mountainous border marked by the inner Great Wall, separating northern Hubei from Chahar. On the Jinpu Railway, just south of Tianjin, lies a small station known as Jinghai. Adjacent to this station is the Jian River, which had swollen to a width of 20 meters due to intermittent heavy rains in northern China after the Japanese army's occupation of Tianjin. The embankments on either side of the river were overgrown with dense reeds and grass, and a wooden arch bridge spanned the river. After landing at Dagukou in Tianjin, the 10th Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Rensuke Isogai, advanced south along the Jinpu Railway. However, as the vanguard, the 10th Regiment of the 33rd Brigade made its way through the muddy terrain towards the Jian River's wooden bridge, they were suddenly taken aback. A group of Chinese soldiers appeared, their faces vividly painted red and armed with long-handled broadswords, a sight reminiscent of the legendary Chinese figure Guan Yu, as depicted in many traditional portraits. These soldiers belonged to the 26th Independent Brigade of the 38th Division of the 29th Army, who were in retreat from Tianjin. Following the city's fall, they had retreated southward to Jinghai Station, where they prepared to make a stand. Brigade Commander Li Zhiyuan recognized their inferior numbers and weaponry compared to the Japanese forces. Drawing from painful lessons learned during the positional battles in Tianjin, he decided to divide his troops strategically: one battalion would defend the station, another would protect the county town, and a third would engage in guerrilla tactics along the Jinpu Road. If faced with a small number of Japanese soldiers, they would fight fiercely; if overwhelmed, they would attempt to encircle the attackers to prevent a direct assault on their main position. Despite the Japanese army's attempts to advance, including efforts to send an armored train into Jinghai Station, the Chinese soldiers cleverly laid straw on the tracks and buried mines, thwarting the train's progress. Once Japanese troops disembarked to mount an offensive, they were ambushed by the battalion executing guerrilla tactics, resulting in a chaotic retreat that left behind several dozen casualties. Over the course of weeks, the divisional headquarters ordered a battalion of Japanese troops to move south along the Jinpu Road, requiring them to cross the Jian River at the wooden bridge. The 26th Independent Brigade was assigned to halt this advance, and they managed to hold their ground for over 20 days. Recognizing the gravity of their situation, Brigade Commander Li Zhiyuan gathered his group and battalion commanders to emphasize the necessity of pushing back the Japanese forces. He passionately rallied them, declaring, “We must defend this river to the death. Each regiment will select a death squad. Each member will carry a long-handled broadsword and four grenades, paint their faces red and rush across the bridge to engage in melee combat!” When Li asked for volunteers to lead the death squad, the regiment commander, Zhu, eagerly stepped forward, quickly gathering a group that followed him, uniting passionately in their cause. The death squad charged across the bridge, catching the Japanese off guard with their war paint and weapons. The sudden attack left the Japanese soldiers dazed, leading to a chaotic retreat as they struggled through the muddy terrain. In the tumult, more than 200 long-handled swords struck down a significant number of Japanese troops. Those advancing from behind panicked at the sight of their retreating comrades. An officer, dismounted during the chaos, was left behind, and the Chinese soldiers, filled with zeal, pressed forward, ignoring the orders from Brigade Commander Li Zhiyuan to fall back for their own safety. Despite moments of heroism, many fell that day by the Jian River, as the officers and soldiers burned their boats and set fire to the wooden bridge, rendering retreat impossible. As the Japanese military consolidated its power in the Pingjin region, many leaders underestimated the tenacity of Chinese resistance. Plans were made to defeat the Chinese army and air force swiftly, aiming to resolve the issue in North China decisively, with no diplomatic negotiations or external interventions allowed during military operations. Now, in late July to early August, Chiang Kai-shek issued orders to improve defenses at Nankou. He mobilized Tang Enbo's 13th Army in Suidong for battle readiness, tasked Liu Ruming to sabotage railways, and directed Fu Zuoyi and Yan Xishan in Suiyuan to prepare for conflict. Troops were reorganized rapidly, with divisions merging to strengthen the 17th Army under Liu Ruming's command. Chiang insisted that Nankou's defenses be deep and wide to thwart enemy cavalry and tank assaults, rendering Japanese mechanized advantages ineffective. He called for close cooperation among commanders and a resolute defense. Tang Enbo's 13th Army, consisted of the 4th and 89th Divisions, whom established defensive positions along the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway at Nankou, with additional units positioned further back at Juyongguan. The 13th Army, was 20,000 men strong, all motivated soldiers committed to fighting the Japanese, but their equipment was woefully inadequate. The 89th Division had a few outdated artillery pieces, whilst other units were in even worse condition, hampering their effectiveness against the well-armed Japanese forces. Liu's 17th Army stationed its 84th Division at Chihcheng, Yanqing, and Longguan, effectively securing the flank of the 13th Army against potential Japanese advances from Chahar. The 21st Division was deployed in Huailai, situated along the railway to the rear of Tang's forces. Additionally, Zhao Chengshou's 1st Cavalry Army, Liu 's 143rd Division, and two Peace Preservation Brigades commenced an offensive against Mongol forces in northern Chahar. As the Japanese launched initial assaults on Nankou on August 4, fierce fighting erupted. The Chinese defenders fought valiantly, but heavy bombardments by artillery and air raids took a toll. The Japanese began using tanks to support their infantry, yet the 530th Regiment successfully repelled an attack at Deshengkou. Meanwhile, the Japanese intensified their efforts, culminating in poison gas assaults that overwhelmed Chinese positions on Longhutai, leading to significant losses. Despite the escalating pressure and casualties, the determination to hold Nankou was unwavering. On August 5, the Kwantung Army requested permission for the advance guard to move to Changpei, arguing that the Central Army's invasion of Chahar had jeopardized the security of Manchukuo. This request was denied, yet the advance guard proceeded to Changpei on August 8. This unauthorized movement by the Kwantung Army was a serious act of defiance, as Tolun lay outside Manchukuo's borders, and troop deployments required imperial authorization. Although imperial sanction had been obtained for the move to Tolun on July 28, permission for the advance guard to proceed was only granted retroactively, with the stipulation that they would not advance further into Inner Mongolia. Nevertheless, this unauthorized action ultimately compelled the high command to approve the advance to Changpei. On August 7, the Japanese army launched a large assault on Nankou with its three main divisions, aiming to breach the Great Wall and advance westward along the Pingsui Railway to flank the strategic city of Shanxi. By August 8, the Japanese forces that had captured Beiping and Tianjin deployed the entire 20th Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Kawagishi Fumisaburo, and supplemented their efforts with the 5th and 10th Divisions, along with the Sakai Brigade, to attack Nankou along the Pingsui Railway. On August 8, the Japanese 11th Independent Mixed Brigade, led by General Shigiyasu Suzuki, initiated an attack on the left flank of the 13th Corps' position at Nankou. However, their efforts were halted after three days due to challenging terrain and the determined resistance from Chinese forces.  On the same day, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the activation of the 14th Group Army, comprising the 10th, 83rd, and 85th Divisions, under General Wei Lihuang. Elements of the 14th Group Army traveled by rail from Yingchia-chuang to Yi County and then embarked on a ten-day march through the plains west of Beiping to flank and support Tang Enbo's forces. Meanwhile, the Chinese 1st Army Region launched attacks against the Japanese in Liangxiang and Chaili to divert their attention and dispatched a detachment to Heilung Pass to cover the advance of the 14th Group Army. On August 9, the central high command ordered the China Garrison Army to eliminate resistance in the area and instructed Kwantung Army Commander Ueda Kenkichi to send reinforcements from Jehol and Inner Mongolia to support the operation. The China Garrison Army deployed its 11th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 5th Division, recently arrived from Hiroshima under Lieutenant-General Itagaki Seishirö, to launch an attack on the mountainous regions around Nankou and Pataling within the Great Wall. Following intense fighting, they succeeded in crossing into Chahar.    The Kwantung Army aimed to conquer Chahar and, upon receiving approval from the Japanese General Staff, established an expeditionary headquarters on August 14, led by its chief of staff, Lieutenant General Tojo Hideki. Yes that Tojo. Tokyo's objective was to secure the strategic flank of Manchukuo, while the Kwantung Army sought to create puppet regimes in northern China and integrate the occupied territories into a Japanese sphere of influence. The Chahar Expeditionary Force comprised three mixed brigades, including Japan's only fully mechanized unit, which was equipped with medium tanks, heavy and light armored vehicles, and light tanks. The Japanese troops shifted their main attack toward Zhangjiakou via the Pingsui Railway due to pressures from the Kwantung Army eager to occupy Inner Mongolia, Suiyuan, and Chahar. They sought to eliminate threats from the rear before launching further operations along the Pinghan Line and Jinpu Line. The 11th Independent Mixed Brigade of the 20th Division of the Chinese Garrison Army was ordered to assault Chinese defenders in the Nankou area, with the goal of capturing key locations on the Great Wall, like Badaling, to facilitate the Fifth Division's advance. The Chinese assessed the Japanese strategy, believing they would first secure critical points along the Pingsui route to facilitate further incursions into Shanxi and Zhengding. They understood that holding the Nankou line was vital for both logistical support and tactical maneuvering. Nankou, a key town on the Pingsui Railway connecting Beijing to Zhangjiakou and Baotou, was surrounded by mountains and the Great Wall, marking it a significant natural defense line. As the Japanese army aimed to capture Zhangjiakou and divide their forces into Shanxi and Suiyuan, the Chinese army's control over Nankou became crucial. A renewed assault on August 11, bolstered by tanks and aircraft, successfully captured Nankou Station, allowing General Suzuki's brigade to advance toward Juyong Pass. On August 12, Tang Enbo's army launched a counterattack, encircling the Japanese forces and severing their supply and communication lines. That day, Tang Enbo sent a telegram to Luo Fanggui: “Brother Fanggui, Commander Luo of the 529th Regiment, I have received your telegram. Your regiment has recently defeated formidable enemies, laying the groundwork for our army's future victories. Your efforts bring me great relief! The Nankou position is critical to our nation's war of resistance. Despite the enemy's numerical superiority and fierce artillery fire, we cannot surrender this area. It is our fighting spirit, not our numbers or advanced weaponry, that will help us withstand these powerful foes. We vow never to abandon our positions. Life is transient, and we must embrace our fate. A hero perishing on the battlefield is the glorious destiny of a soldier.” On the same day, he also sent a telegram to Wang Zhonglian: “Brother Jieren Wang, commander of the 89th Division, I have read your telegram. Brigade Li has triumphed against formidable foes, establishing a precedent for our army's victory. Your successes bring me much comfort! The Nankou position is our glorious objective. If I perish, the country lives on. If I survive, the country perishes. We would rather die defending this position than live in disgrace. Please convey to all the officers and soldiers of your division, who share in this struggle, the importance of striving for victory!” On August 13, Tang Enbo ordered the defensive positions at Nankou to be abandoned as the remaining troops pulled back to stronger positions at Badaling and Juyongguan. Renowned journalist Fan Changjiang noted Tang Enbo's physical and emotional toll, describing him as a mere shadow of his former self after enduring relentless battles without rest. His subsequent thoughts and fears reflected the despair of facing insurmountable odds, with the Japanese army overwhelming the Nankou defenses. Casualty reports from the Battle of Nankou reveal stark discrepancies; average estimates suggest Chinese losses neared 26,000, while Japanese casualties were around 2,600,an alarming ratio of 10 to 1. Despite the devastating defeat, Tang Enbo's leadership gained national recognition for his efforts, though he viewed the loss of Nankou as a blemish on an otherwise honorable defense. The indomitable spirit displayed during the relentless struggle at Nankou, despite the defeat and challenges faced, inspired a sense of resilience among the Chinese people, reminding them that even in dire circumstances, they would not yield to oppression. Meanwhile in response to having their supply and communication lines severed, on August 14, Seishirō Itagaki dispatched the 5th Division to relieve the 11th Independent Mixed Brigade at Juyonggua. Fu Zuoyi's troops attacked Chahar from Suidong. Dong Qiwu 's troops attacked Shangdu and recaptured it on the 14th, while Shi Yushan 's troops attacked Dehua and recaptured it on the 16th. By the 16, Itagaki had arrived at Nankou and initiated an enveloping assault targeting the right flank of the 13th Army, executing a five-pronged attack at Huanglaoyuan. In anticipation, the 7th Brigade of the 4th Division, commanded by Shi Jue, was positioned to counter this maneuver. Reinforcements, including Li Xianzhou's 21st Division and Zhu Huaibing's 94th Division, were brought in, resulting in several days of intense fighting. On August 17, General Yan Xishan, Director of the Taiyuan Pacification Headquarters, ordered the 7th Group Army, commanded by Fu Zuoyi, to move the 72nd Division and three additional brigades by rail from Datong to Huailai to support Tang Enbo's forces. Chiang Kai-shek urged steadfastness in the face of adversity, emphasizing that retreat was not an option. But with communication breakdowns and logistical challenges, Tang Enbo faced dilemmas that would lead him to issue the order for his troops to break out on August 26. As the Japanese army occupied Huailai and Yanqing, Tang Enbo's forces executed a withdrawal, retreating via various routes before suffering further losses.  Meanwhile Liu Ruming's troops of the 143rd Division of the 29th Army took Zhangbei from Zhangjiakou . Proceed to Wanquan Dam , the junction of Wanquan and Zhangbei. The members of the pseudo-Mongolian military government fled to Duolun under the leadership of King De . In order to relieve the danger in Zhangjiakou, Liu Ruming's troops began to attack the enemy in Zhangbei. On August 20, they captured key points such as Bolicai Village outside Zhangbei City. At this time, the mechanized troops of the Japanese Kwantung Army led by Hideki Tojo rushed from Rehe to support Zhangbei. When passing through Guyuan, they were divided into two groups: one group of Japanese troops, the Suzuki Brigade and Homma Brigade went south to attack Zhangjiakou. On the night of August 21, the Chinese army retreated to Shenweitai, 25 kilometers south of Zhangbei County. On August 22, the Japanese army began its attack. Shenwei Tower fell at midnight on the 23rd. At the same time, another part of the Japanese army launched a roundabout attack on Wanquan County. On the morning of August 24, they captured Wanquan County, and then headed straight for Zhangjiakou along the highway with an infantry regiment and an artillery battalion. From August 25 to 27, the Japanese army attacked Bajiaotai, the highest point of Cir Mountain west of Zhangjiakou. At noon on the 27th, Zhangjiakou fell. Gao Guizi's 17th Army marched to Dushikou to resist the enemy from Duolun Akagi and Longguan and intercepted the Pingsui Railway. Gao Guizi's troops failed to withstand the Japanese attack, and the 301st Regiment of the 29th Army stationed in Xuanhua also retreated southward. On August 28, Xuanhua fell into the hands of the enemy. Meanwhile, in northern Chahar, the Chinese 1st Cavalry Army successfully captured Shangdu, Nanhaochan, Shangyi, and Huade from the puppet Mongolian Army led by Demchugdongrub. Elements of the 143rd Division secured Zhongli, while the main force advanced to Zhangbei. During this Chinese offensive, the Japanese Chahar Expeditionary Force, consisting of the mechanized 1st Independent Mixed Brigade along with the 2nd and 15th Mixed Brigades, prepared for a counteroffensive from Zhangbei to Kalgan. Tojo personally commanded the units of the 1st Independent Mixed Brigade during Operation Chahar, which would serve as his only real combat service for his career. From August 18 to 19, the Chahar Expeditionary Force launched a counterattack from Zhangbei, capturing Shenweitaiko on the Great Wall and the Hanno Dam. The scattered and ill-equipped Chinese forces were unable to halt the Japanese advance, which now threatened the Peking–Suiyuan Railway at Kalgan. On August 20, General Fu Zuoyi's 7th Group Army diverted its 200th and 211th Brigades, which had been moving south by rail to join General Tang Enbo's forces, back to defend Kalgan. Fu's remaining 72nd Division arrived to reinforce Chenpien, while his 7th Separate Brigade was dispatched to protect the railhead at Huailai.On August 21, the Japanese forces breached the defenses at the villages of Henglingcheng and Chenbiancheng. General Tang Enbo's forces, awaiting reinforcements but having suffered over 50% casualties, continued to defend Huailai, Juyong Pass, and Yanqing. Liu Ruming's 143rd Division retreated to safeguard Kalgan from the advancing Japanese troops. On August 23, as Seishirō Itagaki's 5th Division advanced toward Huailai from Chenpien against Ma Yenshou's 7th Separate Brigade, advance elements of the 14th Army Group arrived on the Japanese flank at Chingpaikou. They successfully drove off the Japanese outpost and made contact with Japanese forces advancing toward Chenpien. However, delays in crossing the Yongding River postponed their attack until it was too late to halt the Japanese advance. Due to poor communications, they also failed to coordinate with General Tang Enbo's forces during the battle. After eight days and nights of fierce fighting, on August 24, Itagaki linked up with the Kwantung Army's 2nd Independent Mixed Brigade at Xiahuayuan. By August 24, the Japanese army breached the defensive line of the Chinese defenders' Wang Wanling Division along the western Hengling, crossed the Great Wall, and advanced into the Huailai area. At this time, the Japanese forces attacking Zhangjiakou from Chabei also secured control of the railway line west of Zhangjiakou, posing a significant threat to the Chinese defenders at Nankou. On August 25, the Chinese defenders were compelled to withdraw from Nankou and retreat to Juyongguan. By August 27, they received orders to break out and relocate southward, completely evacuating the Nankou battlefield. Since Wei Lihuang's troops lost their intended target for reinforcement and Baoding along the Pinghan Line was in a state of emergency, they engaged the enemy in the Wanping area for over a month before retreating south. Following the abandonment of both Nankou and Juyongguan, the Japanese army invaded Huailai City on the night of August 27. The Chinese army suffered over 16,000 casualties, while the Japanese army reported more than 15,000 casualties. On August 26, General Tang Enbo's forces were ordered to break out toward the Sangchien River, while Liu Ruming's troops were directed to withdraw to the opposite side of the Hsiang-yang River. On August 29, a Japanese unit known as the Oui Column by the Chinese and the Ohizumi Detachment by the Japanese launched an attack. According to Hsu Long-hsuen, this unit moved south from Tushihkou, and on August 30, it attacked Yenching via Chihcheng but was repelled by the Chinese 17th Army. The unit had moved to Guyuan by August 25 and reached Xuanhua by September 7, effectively cutting the railway behind Tang's forces and east of the Chinese defenders along the Great Wall. Following the repulsion of the Oui Column's attack, the Chinese 17th Army withdrew to join the rest of Tang Enbo's forces on the far side of the Sangchien River. Kalgan fell to the Japanese on August 27. After General Fu Zuoyi's 200th and 211th Brigades failed in their counterattack to recapture Kalgan, Fu's forces retreated to the west to defend the railway to Suiyuan at Chaikoupao.  On August 30, the army high command ordered the task force and the China Garrison Army to occupy Chahar Province. The North China Area Army deployed Lieutenant General Itagaki Seishiro's Fifth Division, the theater's strategic reserve, for this operation. The Japanese forces relied on armored units to breach Chinese defenses and utilized rail lines to transport troops and supplies effectively to critical locations throughout Chahar. Although the First Independent Mixed Brigade's tanks and armored cars demonstrated proficiency, the Kwantung Army's assessment of the operation criticized the armored units for their lack of shock effect and frequent mechanical breakdowns. Additionally, these vehicles required significant supplies and maintenance, leading the army to deem them ineffective in combat situations. The Second Air Group provided crucial support for the ground offensive in Chahar. From mid-August, this air group, stationed in Chengde and Jingzhou, conducted bombing raids on enemy positions and transport routes, performed reconnaissance missions, and even airdropped supplies to encircled Japanese forces. To match the rapid advance of the mechanized ground forces, air units were repositioned to advanced airfields. After bombing Taiyuan in late August, some units returned to their home bases, leaving behind two fighter squadrons and two heavy bomber squadrons, which formed a provisional air regiment. By mid-September, the Fifth Division and the Chahar Expeditionary Force were advancing southwest through the rugged mountains of Shanxi Province and captured Datong on September 13. Five days later, anticipating a decisive battle, Lieutenant General Katsuki ordered the Fifth Division to pivot southeast toward Baoding to encircle the retreating Chinese forces. Shortly after repositioning, Itagaki learned from aerial reconnaissance that Chinese units were assembling near Pingxingguan (Dayingzhen) Pass. Concerned that these forces might advance eastward through the pass and threaten his rear, Itagaki dispatched a regimental-sized task force under the command of Major General Miura Keiji, leader of the Twenty-first Brigade, to disperse the enemy troops and control the road on both sides of the pass. Miura's task force departed by truck in the mid-afternoon of the following day, but the overland movement proved much slower and more challenging than anticipated. Travelling along a single rutted dirt track through steep mountains, the forty-nine trucks carrying his infantry and heavy weapons, including crew-served machine guns and battalion artillery, could only manage a speed of seven miles per hour. By late afternoon, the lead elements were still about five miles east of the pass when they encountered a few hundred Chinese troops who had retreated after a brief firefight. As night fell, the Japanese moved cautiously forward and reached a village approximately a mile from the pass, where they encountered stiff resistance, including mortar and automatic weapons fire. After successfully repelling a counterattack by the Chinese Seventy-third Division, Miura launched a night assault. Supported by pack artillery and heavy machine guns, two Japanese companies pushed through the pass and seized the high ground on its west side by early morning. However, Chinese reinforcements soon arrived and attempted to reclaim the lost territory, resulting in ongoing fighting for the heights on September 24. Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist 115th Division, comprising the 685th, 686th, and 687th regiments of the Eighth Route Army, consisting of around 6,000 effective troops under the command of twenty-nine-year-old Lin Biao, maneuvered south around the Japanese rear. By September 24, they had interposed themselves on the road east of the pass, effectively cutting off Miura's task force from its supply base. That same day, the Central Army's Seventy-first Division launched several sharp counterattacks against Miura's outnumbered forces west of the pass, threatening to overrun the Japanese positions. Central Army and Communist forces had planned to attack both flanks of the Japanese at dawn on September 25, but torrential rains delayed the advance of the Central Army reserves. The downpour also muffled the sounds of an approaching Japanese night assault. Utilizing the poor night security of the Chinese, Japanese assault parties surprised the Seventy-first and Eighty-fourth divisions, pushing them from their positions west of the pass. Miura mistakenly believed he controlled both sides of the pass and assumed the Chinese forces were in full retreat. Unbeknownst to him, Lin Biao's troops had blocked the eastern entrance to the pass, prompting him to order a resupply column with rations and ammunition forward from about fifteen miles east of the pass to replenish his depleted task force. The supply train, consisting of seventy horse-drawn wagons and eighty trucks, struggled to make progress along the single dirt track, where sections had become muddy bogs due to the heavy rains. Most of the hundred-plus soldiers handling the horses and wagons were untrained and unarmed. The few regular service corps soldiers carried only ten cavalry carbines, while a single infantry platoon of thirty men provided security. The eighty trucks transported another 176 men, most of whom were not infantry. Therefore, the resupply column was ill-prepared for any trouble. Following a sunken road worn down by centuries of caravans, the column approached the pass through a narrow man-made defile, with its sides rising as high as thirty-five feet above the track. Around mid-morning, about four miles east of the pass, the Chinese Communist 115th Division launched an ambush. Communist troops rained grenades and small-arms fire from the high ground overlooking the road onto the trapped convoy. Although the Japanese fought back desperately, the combination of surprise, advantageous terrain, and overwhelming numbers turned the road into a killing ground. The ambush decimated almost all of the teamsters and the infantrymen who protected the wagons. At his field headquarters, Miura heard the heavy gunfire and explosions and quickly ordered a battalion-sized rescue force to assist the convoy. However, the Chinese 685th Regiment, blocking the only road to the trapped supply train, halted the Japanese battalion. Elements of the 685th and 686th regiments then finished off the motorized convoy, with only five trucks at the rear escaping. After looting weapons, equipment, and clothing, the Communists burned the remaining vehicles and withdrew southwest into the rugged mountains. Although the Communists claimed to have killed 3,000 Japanese troops, the more realistic number is around 200. Nonetheless, Lin Biao's guerrillas had achieved a significant tactical success. While the 115th Division destroyed the Japanese resupply column east of the pass, the Central Army's Sixth and Seventh Army Groups, including the Seventy-first Division, launched a series of day and night assaults against Miura's dispersed units west of the pass. Both sides incurred heavy losses, and the Japanese struggled to maintain control of the high ground as the Chinese fanned out through the valleys and attacked from all sides. Isolated and under heavy attack, the Japanese were low on ammunition, food, and water, lacked proper cold-weather clothing in the frigid mountains, and were greatly outnumbered. They resorted to scavenging ammunition and weapons from fallen Chinese soldiers. Itagaki promptly ordered his 41st and 21st infantry regiments, supported by an infantry regiment from the Kwantung Army located about fifty miles northeast of the pass, to rescue the beleaguered task force. These regiments moved along a narrow mountain road amidst heavy rain, which slowed their progress. The relief force split up about forty miles north of Pingxingguan, with the Twenty-first Regiment swinging westward to outflank the Chinese, while the other two regiments continued toward the pass. To the northwest, the Fifteenth Brigade of the Chahar Expeditionary Force advanced southeastward from Datong to encircle the Chinese. Central Army forces defending along the inner Great Wall, about fifty miles northwest of Pingxingguan, inflicted substantial casualties on the Japanese. The Japanese Forty-first Regiment finally reached Miura on September 28, and on the same day, the Twenty-first Regiment dislodged the stubborn defenders along the Inner Great Wall, roughly forty miles northwest of the pass, disrupting the entire Chinese defense and threatening to surround the besieging forces. Nonetheless, fighting continued through September 29, when the Second Brigade broke through the Chinese Central Army's defenses and advanced westward. Facing potential encirclement and certain destruction, the Japanese Sixth Army Group withdrew southwest the following day. Japanese accounts do not specify overall losses, but Chinese reports claim nearly 3,000 Japanese casualties while acknowledging they suffered ten times that number. After five days of intense fighting in rugged terrain, Miura's forces managed to hold their ground, but their heavy losses and those sustained by relief columns rendered it a Pyrrhic victory. Both Communist and Nationalist Chinese forces retreated southwest, surviving to fight another day. The determination of the Chinese Central Army in both offensive and defensive maneuvers, combined with the skillful hit-and-run tactics of the 115th Division, inflicted significant damage on the Japanese and became a cornerstone of Chinese propaganda. On October 1, the Japanese General Staff ordered the North China Area Army to destroy the Chinese forces in Shanxi Province, which were estimated to number over twenty divisions from either the Shanxi Army or the Central Army, and were fortifying positions in Taiyuan, Yangquan, and Yuanpingzhen. The Japanese Fifth and Twentieth Divisions advanced toward Taiyuan, while the Fifteenth Division, reinforced by a mixed brigade, launched an assault south from Yuanpingzhen on October 13. The Fifteenth Division quickly encountered strong Chinese resistance from well-prepared defenses, which halted its advance. From October 19 to 26, the Twentieth Division faced thirteen Chinese divisions entrenched near Jiuguan. Although they successfully repelled numerous fierce counterattacks, the division was unable to breach the Chinese lines. A maneuver by one of its regiments to the rear of the Chinese defenses forced a withdrawal of Chinese troops. The reconstituted Fifth Division joined the pursuit of the retreating Chinese forces on November 3, reaching Taiyuan five days later. Meanwhile, the Twentieth Division, moving westward, inflicted heavy losses on the Chinese units that were withdrawing from Taiyuan. Overall, given that the offensive aimed to secure territory, it can be considered a tactical and operational success. Shortly thereafter, all Japanese forces, except for the Twentieth Division, withdrew from Shanxi Province. The Chahar campaign concluded with the Kwantung Army in control of Chahar, Suiyuan, and the northern half of Shanxi Province. The Japanese quickly established puppet regimes in the captured territories. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In July 1937, tensions between Japan and China erupted following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, leading to fierce fighting as Japanese troops attacked. Chinese defenders, under command of Chiang Kai-shek, bravely resisted despite overwhelming odds, determined to protect their sovereignty. The Battle of Nankou saw relentless assaults, tank warfare, and desperate defense tactics, revealing the depth of Chinese resolve. 

GMO's Warren Chiang joins us for a deep dive into the art and science of systematic value investing. In this episode, Warren shares how his team has refined traditional value investing to adapt to an intangible-heavy world, the structural reasons deep value is historically cheap today, and how top-down insights from GMO's asset allocation group are implemented in practice. We also explore how ESG, momentum, macro, and geopolitical shifts—including the China decoupling—are integrated into portfolio construction, and what investors can learn from GMO's global perspective on valuations.Topics Covered:Why GMO didn't abandon value—it improved itThe difference between "value" and "valuation"How restating financial statements improves valuation accuracyGMO's two-step top-down and bottom-up ETF strategyThe deep value opportunity: why it's never been cheaperHow GMO incorporates quality in a forward-looking wayWhy momentum and macro are excluded from some strategiesHow ESG is treated as a portfolio risk—not virtue signalingThe China supply chain shift and the Beyond China strategyPassive investing's long-term impact on price discoveryManaging risk, constraints, and position sizing in quant portfoliosWhether today's market mirrors the dot-com bubbleWhat's driving valuation gaps across global markets

Last time we spoke about Japan's preparations for War. In late 1936, tensions soared in China as Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek was detained by dissenting commanders who were frustrated with his focus on communism instead of the growing Japanese threat. Faced with escalating Japanese aggression, these leaders forced Chiang into a reluctant alliance with the Chinese Communist Party, marking a pivotal shift in China's strategy. Despite this union, China remained unprepared, lacking sufficient military supplies and modern equipment. Conversely, Japan, wary of Chinese modernization efforts, pushed for a preemptive strike to dismantle Chiang's regime before it could pose a serious threat. As aggressive military exercises intensified, Japan underestimated Chinese resilience. By spring 1937, both nations found themselves on the brink of war, with Japan's divided military leadership struggling to formulate a coherent strategy. Ultimately, these miscalculations would lead to the full-scale Sino-Japanese War, altering the course of history in East Asia.   #154 The Marco Polo Bridge Incident  Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Here we are at last, the beginning of the absolute cataclysm between China and Japan. Now as many of you know I run the Pacific War week by week podcast, which technically covers the second sino-japanese war, nearly to a T. So for this podcast I want to try and portray the event from the Chinese and Japanese point of view, but not in the rather dry manner of the other podcast. In the other podcast I am hampered by the week by week format and can never dig deep into the nitty gritty as they say. On the same hand I don't want to simply regurgitate every single battle of this conflict, it would be absolutely nuts. So bear with me friends as we fall down in the rabbit hole of madness together, who knows how long it will take to get out. On the night of July 7, 1937, at approximately 19:30, the 8th Squadron of the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Regiment of the Hebian Brigade of the Japanese Army, stationed in Fengtai and led by Squadron Leader Shimizu Seiro, conducted a military exercise, heading toward Lungwangmiao, approximately just under a mile northwest of the Marco Polo Bridge The exercise simulated an operation to capture the bridge. As you may have guessed it was named after the Italian explorer Marco Polo, who described it in his travels, the bridge is renowned for its intricate carvings of lions and other sculptures. However after 1937, the Marco Polo Bridge would be far less known for its history dealing with the venetian explorer and more so with an event that many would contend to be the start of WW2. At that time, troops from Japan, Britain, France, and Italy were stationed near Peiping in accordance with the Boxer Protocol of 1901. The Japanese China Garrison Army, comprising around 4,000 soldiers and commanded by Lieutenant-General Tashiro Kan'ichirō, was based in Tientsin. Its mission was to "maintain communication lines between Peiping and the seaports in the Gulf of Chihli and to protect Japanese citizens living in key areas of North China." The protocol also permitted the garrison forces of the signatory nations to conduct field drills and rifle practice without notifying the Chinese authorities, with the exception of cases involving live fire. During this period, Japanese troops were conducting nightly exercises in anticipation of a scheduled review on July 9. The night maneuver was within the army's rights under the Boxer Protocol and was not an illegal act, as later claimed by the Chinese. However, the Japanese army had courteously informed the Chinese authorities about its training plans in advance. Despite this, the atmosphere was charged with tension, and the Japanese decision to use blank ammunition during their night exercise further escalated the already volatile situation. Earlier that evening, Captain Shimizu Setsurö, a company commander, arrived at the banks of the Yungting River, where the maneuver was to take place. He noticed that the site looked different since the last exercise had occurred; Chinese troops had recently constructed new trenches and parapets from the embankment to the Lungwangmiao shelter. While eating his dinner and surveying the area, Shimizu felt a sense of unease, harboring a premonition that “something might happen that night.” After completing the first stage of the maneuver around 10:30 PM, several live rounds were fired into the assembled company from the direction of the riverbank. Shimizu immediately conducted a roll call and found one soldier missing. He promptly sent a messenger to inform the battalion commander. The exercise was then called off, and the company moved eastward to await further orders at Hsiwulitien. Battalion Commander Itsuki Kiyonaho, upon receiving the report, deemed the situation serious. Aside from the gunfire heard in the darkness from an unknown source, he expressed concern over the soldier's disappearance and sought permission from Regiment Commander Mutaguchi Renya, an absolute moron, if you listen to the pacific war podcast, well you know. Anyways to relocate the battalion to the area where the shots had been fired and to establish surveillance. As dawn approached, the troops heard several more gunshots. Within twenty minutes of the soldier's disappearance, he returned to his ranks, but Shimizu did not report this update until four hours later. Meanwhile, midnight negotiations included a Japanese request for permission to search the city of Wanping, leading both sides to believe the incident was significant. Around 11:00 PM, the Japanese forces falsely reported that one of their soldiers had gone missing during the drill and demanded permission to enter the city for a search. This request was firmly denied by Ji Xingwen, the commander of the 219th Regiment of the 37th Division of the Chinese Army. In response, Japanese troops swiftly surrounded Wanping County. To prevent further escalation, at 2:00 AM the following morning, Qin Dechun, deputy commander of the 29th Army and mayor of Beiping, agreed with the Japanese to allow both sides to send personnel for an investigation. While Matsui, the head of the Japanese secret service in Peiping, was negotiating with North Chinese authorities based on unverified reports from Japanese troops in Fengtai, Ikki Kiyonao, the battalion commander of the Japanese garrison in Fengtai, had already reported to his regiment commander, Mutaguchi Lianya. The latter approved orders for the Japanese troops in Fengtai to “immediately move out” to the Marco Polo Bridge.  On July 8, a large contingent of Japanese troops appeared at Lugou Bridge. Shen Zhongming, the platoon leader of the 10th Company of the Reserve Force of the 3rd Battalion of the 219th Regiment of the 37th Division of the 29th Army, was assisting in guarding the bridgehead. He jumped out of the trench, stood in front of the bunker, and raised his right hand to halt the advancing Japanese troops. However, the Japanese military threatened to search for their missing soldiers, pushed forward, and opened fire. Shen Zhongming was shot and died on the spot. At 4:50 AM, the Japanese army launched a fierce assault on Wanping County, capturing Shagang in the northeast of Wanping and firing the first shot of the siege. Unable to withstand the aggression, the Chinese defenders mounted a counterattack. That day, the Japanese army assaulted Wanping City three times, targeting the Pinghan Railway Bridge and the Chinese defenders at the Huilong Temple position on the left. He Jifeng, the commander of the 110th Brigade of the Chinese defenders, issued a resolute order to “live and die with the bridge” and personally commanded the front-line battle. The Chinese defenders engaged in fierce combat, fighting valiantly despite exhausting their ammunition and resorting to hand-to-hand combat with swords against the Japanese soldiers. Tragically, over 80 Chinese defenders from two platoons were killed at the bridgehead. On the same day, the Beijing authorities instructed the garrison to hold firm at the Marco Polo Bridge. Song Queyuan sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek to report the true events of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. The National Government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged a verbal protest with the Japanese ambassador regarding the incident. Additionally, the CPC Central Committee issued a telegram urging all Chinese soldiers and civilians to unite and resist Japanese aggression. The Japanese cabinet, in a bid to mislead global public opinion, proposed a so-called policy of “resolving the incident locally without escalating it,” aiming to paralyze the KMT authorities and buy time to mobilize additional forces. In the wake of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, generals of the 29th Army, including Qin Dechun, Feng Zhian, and Zhang Zizhong, convened an emergency meeting. Following their discussions, they issued a statement demanding that their troops withdraw from the Marco Polo Bridge to de-escalate tensions. However, they expressed deep concerns about national sovereignty, stating, “We cannot simply back down. If they continue to oppress us, we will do our utmost to defend ourselves.” Concurrently, the 29th Army commanded the troops defending the Marco Polo Bridge: “The Marco Polo Bridge is your grave. You must live and die with the bridge and must not retreat.” Brigade Commander He Jifeng reinforced three directives for the defenders:  1. Do not allow the Japanese army to enter the city;  2. Firmly counterattack if the Japanese invade;  3. You are responsible for defending the territory and will never yield. If you abandon your position, you will face military law. On July 9, the 29th Army successfully eliminated a Japanese squadron and reclaimed control of the railway bridge and Longwang Temple. A temporary lull settled over the Marco Polo Bridge battlefield, during which the Japanese military made false claims that "missing Japanese soldiers had returned to their units" and described the situation as a misunderstanding that could be resolved peacefully. Subsequently, Chinese and Japanese representatives in Beijing and Tianjin engaged in negotiations. The Beijing authorities reached an agreement with the Japanese forces, which included:  (1) an immediate cessation of hostilities by both parties;  (2) the Japanese army withdrawing to the left bank of the Yongding River while the Chinese army retreated to the right bank; and  (3) the defense of Lugou Bridge being assigned to Shi Yousan's unit of the Hebei Security Team. However, the following day, while the Chinese army withdrew as agreed, the Japanese army not only failed to uphold its commitments but also dispatched a significant number of troops to launch an offensive against the Chinese forces. Reports on July 10 indicated that the Japanese army had arrived from Tianjin, Gubeikou, Yuguan, and other locations, advancing toward the Lugou Bridge with artillery and tanks, and had occupied Dajing Village and Wulidian, signaling that another outbreak of conflict was imminent. On July 11, the Japanese Cabinet decided to deploy seven divisions from the Kwantung Army, the Korean Army, and Japan to North China. On the same day, the Beiping-Tianjin authorities reached a localized agreement with the Japanese army, which entailed:  (1) a formal apology from a representative of the 29th Army to the Japanese forces, along with assurances that those responsible for the initial conflict would be held accountable;  (2) a ban on anti-Japanese activities conducted by the Communist Party, the Blue Shirts Society, and other resistance groups; and  (3) an agreement ensuring that no Chinese troops would be stationed east of the Yongding River. Concurrently, the Japanese army positioned their forces at strategic points in Wuqing, Fengtai, Wanping, and Changping, effectively encircling the city of Beijing and continuing to advance troops into its surrounding suburbs. Starting on July 11, the Japanese army began bombarding Wanping City and its surrounding areas with artillery, resulting in numerous casualties among the local population. Following the injury of regiment commander Ji Xingwen, residents were evacuated to safer locations outside the city. The conflict then spread to Babaoshan, Changxindian, Langfang, Yangcun, and other areas, with the 29th Army being deployed to various locations to confront the enemy. The Japanese military also dispatched aircraft for reconnaissance and strafing missions, leading to intermittent fighting. On July 13, Mao Zedong urged "every Communist Party member and anti-Japanese revolutionary to be prepared to mobilize to the frontline of the anti-Japanese war at any time" from Yan'an. By July 15, a CPC representative presented the "Communist Party Declaration on Cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party" to Chiang Kai-shek, proposing that this declaration serve as the political foundation for cooperation between the two parties and be publicly issued by the Kuomintang. Zhou Enlai, Qin Bangxian, and Lin Boqu continued negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek, Shao Lizi, and Zhang Chong in Lushan. Although Chiang Kai-shek recognized the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, disagreements remained regarding the reorganization of the Red Army. On July 16, the Five Ministers Conference in Tokyo resolved to mobilize 400,000 Japanese troops to invade China and to enforce a policy aimed at rapidly destroying the entire country. The following day, more than 100 Japanese soldiers arrived in Shunyi and Changping, where they reinforced fortifications on the city wall of Changping. On July 18, the Japanese army invaded Changping, Tongzhou, and other counties in the pseudo-border areas by maneuvering through various passes of the Great Wall. Japanese plainclothes teams were reported to be active in the Xiaotangshan area of Changping, raising alert levels within the Chinese army. On July 20, the Kuomintang Military and Political Department became aware that the Japanese army intended to first occupy strategic locations such as the Indigo Factory, Wanshou Mountain, and Balizhuang in the Pingxi area, before cutting off the Pingsui Road and controlling the route from Beiping to Changping. On July 21, the Japanese army violated the agreement by bombarding Wanping County and the garrison at Changxindian.  On the night of July 25, a confrontation took place at the railway station in Langfang, located between Peiping and Tientsin. The clash involved Chinese troops and a Japanese company dispatched to repair telegraph lines. General Kazuki promptly sought Tokyo's permission to respond with military force, believing that the situation required immediate action. Without waiting for authorization, he ordered a regiment from Tientsin to engage the Chinese forces and issued an ultimatum to Sung Che-yuan, stating that if the 37th Division did not completely withdraw from Peiping by noon on July 28, the Garrison Army would take unilateral action. The 77th Infantry Regiment of the 20th Division was dispatched with the Gonoi Squadron to escort a repair team to Langfang Station. Stationed near Langfang were the headquarters of the 113th Brigade of the 38th Division, along with the main force of the 226th Regiment, led by Brigade Commander Liu Zhensan and Regiment Commander Cui Zhenlun. Although the leadership of the 29th Army adopted a passive stance in the war of resistance, the forces in Langfang prepared for conflict in an organized manner. They not only evacuated the families of servicemen and relocated the regiment headquarters, but also built fortifications and deployed plainclothes teams at Wanzhuang Station, Luofa Station, and Langfang Station to swiftly destroy the railway if necessary. Despite their preparations, the commanders of the 38th Division adhered to Song Queyuan's directives. When the 5th Company, stationed at Yangcun, observed Japanese supply units continually moving toward Lugou Bridge, they sought permission to engage the enemy. However, the 38th Division later reassigned this company. The Bac Ninh Line, established after the Boxer Protocol, had granted the Japanese the right to station troops, placing the 38th Division in a vulnerable position and preventing them from stopping the Japanese before they reached Langfang. Upon the arrival of Japanese forces at Langfang Station, Chinese guards initiated negotiations, requesting the Japanese to withdraw quickly after completing their mission. The Japanese, however, insisted on establishing camps outside the station, leading to repeated arguments. As tensions mounted, the Japanese began constructing positions near the station, ultimately forcing Chinese troops to retreat and escalating the conflict. The situation reached a boiling point around 11:10 pm, when fierce gunfire and explosions erupted near Langfang Station. The Japanese army claimed they were defending the station from an attack by Chinese forces armed with rifles, machine guns, and mortars throughout the night. According to Cui Zhenlun, the head of the 226th Regiment, it was the 9th and 10th companies that could no longer tolerate the Japanese provocation and fired first, catching the enemy off guard. As the battle intensified, reinforcements from the main force of the 77th Infantry Regiment “Li Deng Unit” arrived at the scene after receiving reports of the skirmish and gradually joined the fight after 6:30 am on July 26. When dawn broke, Japanese troops stationed at Langfang began to rush out to counterattack, seeing their reinforcements arrive. Recognizing they could not eliminate the Japanese presence at the station quickly, the 226th Regiment faced heavy bombardment from the Japanese Air Force later that morning. Consequently, the headquarters of the 113th Brigade and the primary forces of the 226th Regiment hastily retreated to Tongbai Town, suffering significant losses in equipment during their withdrawal. That night, Kazuki made the unilateral decision to abandon the policy of restraint and decided to use force on July 28 "to punish the Chinese troops in the Peiping-Tientsin area." On the morning of July 27, the army high command endorsed his decision and submitted a plan to the cabinet for mobilizing divisions in Japan. The cabinet agreed, and imperial approval was sought. At that time, the Chinese army was gathering in significant numbers in Baoding and Shijiazhuang in southern Hebei, as well as in Datong, Shanxi. They had effectively surrounded the Japanese army on all sides in the Fengtai District. Meanwhile, newly mobilized units of the Kwantung Army and the Japanese Korean Army were en route to the Tianjin and Beiping areas. The 2nd Battalion of the 2nd China Garrison Infantry Regiment, commanded by Major Hirobe, was dispatched with 26 trucks to the Japanese barracks within the walls of Beiping to ensure the protection of Japanese residents. Prior discussions had taken place between Takuro Matsui, head of the Special Service Agency, and officials from the Hebei–Chahar Political Council regarding the passage of troops through the Guang'anmen gate just outside Beiping. The mayor, Qin Dechun, had granted approval for this movement. However, when Major Tokutaro Sakurai, a military and political advisor to the Council, arrived at Guang'anmen, a famous gate to Beiping, around 6:00 pm to establish contact, he found that the Chinese troops on guard had closed the gate. After further negotiations, the gates were opened at approximately 7:30 pm, allowing the Japanese units to begin passing through. Unfortunately, as the first three trucks crossed, the Chinese opened fire on them. Two-thirds of the units managed to get through before the gate was abruptly shut, leaving a portion of Hirobe's troops trapped both inside and outside. As they faced unexpectedly heavy fire from machine guns and grenades, efforts by Japanese and Chinese advisors to pacify the Chinese troops proved futile. By 8:00 pm, the Japanese launched a counterattack from both sides of the gate. The Chinese received reinforcements and encircled the Japanese forces. Despite a relief column being dispatched by Brigadier Masakazu Kawabe, commander of the brigade in the Fengtai District, by 9:30 pm, negotiations with the Chinese yielded a proposal for de-escalation: the Chinese army would maintain a distance while the Japanese inside the gate would relocate to the grounds of their legation, and those outside would return to Fengtai. Fighting ceased shortly after 10:00 pm, and at approximately 2:00 am the following day, Hirobe's unit successfully entered the barracks in the legation. The total casualties reported for the Japanese army during these confrontations were 2 dead and 17 wounded. Both fatalities were superior privates. The wounded included one major, one captain, one sergeant, two superior privates, one private first class, seven privates second class, two attached civilians, and one news reporter. Additionally, the interpreter accompanying Tokutaro Sakurai was also killed in action. On July 27, the Japanese army launched attacks on the 29th Army garrisons in Tongxian, Tuanhe, Xiaotangshan, and other locations, forcing the defenders to retreat to Nanyuan and Beiyuan. At 8:00 am on July 28, under the command of Army Commander Kiyoshi Kozuki, the Japanese army initiated a general assault on the 29th Army in the Beiping area. The primary attacking force, the 20th Division, supported by aircraft and artillery, targeted the 29th Army Special Brigade, the 114th Brigade of the 38th Division, and the 9th Cavalry Division stationed in Nanyuan. Overwhelmed by the Japanese assault, Nanyuan's defenders struggled to maintain command, leading to chaotic individual combat. Meanwhile, the main Japanese garrison brigade in Fengtai advanced to Dahongmen, effectively cutting off the Nanyuan troops' route to the city and blocking their retreat. The battle for Nanyuan concluded at 1:00 pm, resulting in the deaths of Tong Lingge, deputy commander of the 29th Army, and Zhao Dengyu, commander of the 132nd Division. As this unfolded, elements of the 37th Division of the 29th Army launched an attack on the Japanese forces in Fengtai but were repulsed by Japanese reinforcements. On that day, the Japanese Army's 1st Independent Mixed Brigade captured Qinghe Town, prompting the 2nd Brigade of the Hebei-Northern Security Force, stationed there, to retreat to Huangsi. The Japanese also occupied Shahe. In the afternoon of July 28, Song Qeyuan appointed Zhang Zizhong as the acting chairman of the Hebei-Chahar Political Affairs Committee and director of the Hebei-Chahar Pacification Office, as well as the mayor of Beiping, before leaving the city for Baoding that evening. The 37th Division was ordered to retreat to Baoding. On July 29th, a significant mutiny broke out at Tongzhou. If you remember our episode covering the Tanggu truce, Tongzhou had become the capital of the East Hubei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government headed by Yin Jukeng. In response Chiang Kai-Shek had established the East Hebei Administrative Affairs Committee, chaired by Song Queyuan. In Tongzhou, Japanese troops were stationed under the pretext of protecting Japanese residents, as stipulated by the Boxer Protocol. Initially, a unit was intended to be stationed in Tongzhou; however, Vice Minister of the Army Umezu Yoshijiro strongly opposed this plan, arguing that placing forces in Tongzhou, far from the Beiping-Tianjin Line was inconsistent with the spirit of the Boxer Protocol. Consequently, this unit was stationed in Fengtai, located southwest of Beiping. At the time of the Tongzhou Incident, the main force of the Japanese Second Regiment, which was responsible for defending Tongzhou, had been deployed to Nanyuan, south of Beijing. Consequently, only non-combat personnel remained in Tongzhou. Japan regarded the Jidong Anti-Communist Autonomous Government Security Force as a friendly ally. Back on July 27, the primary forces of the Japanese Army stationed in Tongzhou, comprising the Kayashima Unit and the Koyama Artillery Unit, received orders to advance toward Nanyuan, Beiping, leaving Tongzhou significantly under-defended. The following day, the Japanese launched a substantial attack on Nanyuan, employing aircraft to bomb Beiping. Sensing a critical opportunity, Zhang Qingyu conferred with Zhang Yantian and Shen Weigan to initiate an uprising that very night. The insurgent force included elements from the first and second corps and the teaching corps, totaling approximately 4,000 personnel. Zhang Qingyu orchestrated the uprising with a focused strategy: the first corps was divided into three groups targeting Japanese forces in Xicang, the puppet government, and various establishments such as opium dens, casinos, and brothels operated by Japanese ronin. Meanwhile, the second corps secured key intersections and facilities in Chengguan, and the teaching corps managed defenses against potential reinforcements at vital stations. At dawn on July 29, the gunfire signaling the uprising erupted. The second unit of the first corps launched an assault on the Xicang Barracks, which housed 120 troops and non-combat personnel, including the Tongzhou Guard, Yamada Motor Vehicle Unit, a Military Police Detachment, and a host of military and police units, totaling about 500 individuals. At around 3 a.m. on July 29, the sound of gunfire filled the air as the insurgents engaged the Japanese forces. Although equipped with only four field guns, several mortars, and a few heavy machine guns, the uprising's numerical superiority enabled simultaneous attacks from the east, south, and northwest. Despite their well-fortified positions and rigorous defense, the Japanese troops struggled against the relentless onslaught. For over six hours, fierce fighting ensued. The uprising troops escalated their firepower but failed to breach the Xicang Barracks initially. More than 200 members of the Japanese security forces lost their lives in the conflict. Concerned that reinforcements might arrive and flank the uprising, Zhang Qingyu ordered artillery assaults around 11 a.m., prompting a shift in the battle's dynamics. The artillery targeted a Japanese motor vehicle convoy transporting supplies and munitions, leading to the destruction of all 17 vehicles, triggering explosions that scattered bullets and shrapnel across the area. Subsequently, nearby fuel depots ignited, engulfing the surroundings in flames and creating chaos among Japanese ranks. The insurgent infantry capitalized on this confusion, wiping out most of the remaining Japanese forces, with only a handful managing to escape. As the uprising signal rang out, another faction of insurgents swiftly blocked access to Tongzhou, disrupting traffic and occupying the telecommunications bureau and radio station. They encircled the offices of the Jidong puppet government, capturing traitor Yin Rugeng, who was taken to the Beiguan Lu Zu Temple. Despite being urged to resist the Japanese, Yin hesitated and was subsequently imprisoned. The third group then targeted the Japanese secret service agency in Nishicang. Hosoki Shigeru, residing a mere lane away from the pseudo-office, responded to the gunfire by mobilizing a contingent of secret agents to confront the uprising. However, the insurgents swiftly overtook the secret service agency, resulting in Shigeru's death and the annihilation of all secret personnel. At 4:00 p.m. on July 29, the Japanese command dispatched reinforcements, compelling the insurgents to retreat from Tongzhou. The Japanese Chinese Garrison ordered air attacks on the uprising forces, with over ten bombers targeting Tongzhou. Concurrently, the Japanese Fengtai Infantry Brigade and the Second Regiment were mobilized for a rescue operation, arriving on the morning of July 30. The Japanese headquarters issued a night defense order requiring all units to be on high alert. By 5:30 p.m., commanding officers assembled to devise a strategy. With the uprising forces still positioned around the eastern, southern, and northern walls of the barracks, Tsujimura's troops implemented strict measures: all units were instructed to fortify defenses throughout the night, with the Tongzhou Guard directly protecting the barracks and the Yamada unit securing the warehouse and supply areas. They enforced silence, prohibiting any lights at night, coordinating operations under the code name "plum cherry." As the Japanese planes repeatedly bombed the area, the insurgents, lacking anti-aircraft defenses, could only mount futile counterattacks with machine guns, leading to disorder among their ranks. Many insurgents abandoned their uniforms and weapons and fled, prompting Zhang Qingyu to make the difficult decision to evacuate Tongzhou before Japanese reinforcements arrived, regrouping in Beiping with the remnants of the 29th Army. In the late hours of July 29, the security team retreated to Beiping in two groups. Upon arrival, they discovered the 29th Army had already evacuated, forcing them to retreat to Changxindian and Baoding. En route, they encountered part of the Suzuki Brigade of the Japanese Kwantung Army near Beiyuan and Xizhimen, where they faced concentrated attacks. Officers Shen Weigan and Zhang Hanming were both killed in the subsequent battles as they led their teams in desperate fights for survival. Amid the confusion, Yin Rugeng managed to escape when the convoy escorting him was broken up by Japanese forces. In a last-ditch effort, Zhang Qingyu ordered the army to split into small groups of 50 to 60, navigating through Mentougou to regroup with the 29th Army. By the time they reached Baoding, only about 4,000 personnel remained. On the morning of July 30, over a thousand troops from the Sakai Army entered Tongzhou City. They rounded up all men they encountered, searching residences for insurgents, and exhibited intentions of massacring the local population. By 4 p.m., the Kayashima Army arrived and sealed all city gates, deploying surveillance units to oversee the city and "restore public order." The Tsujimura Army removed perimeter defenses and concentrated their forces in barracks and storage facilities. Japanese troops combed through residences based on household registries, detaining those they deemed suspicious, with many later executed. As reported by the puppet county magistrate Wang Jizhang, roughly 700 to 800 individuals were executed within a few days. This brutal retaliation instilled terror throughout Tongzhou City, leading many to flee and seek refuge, often in American churches. The pervasive atmosphere of fear lasted for two to three months. The Japanese authorities framed their violent suppression as "restoring stability to East Asia" and derided the legitimate resistance of Chinese citizens as "communist harassment" and "treason." In response to the uprising, the Japanese embassy, concerned that it could trigger a repeat of the Temple Street Incident and instigate political upheaval at home, acted without government instructions. They appointed Morishima Morito to oversee negotiations with Chi Zongmo, who had replaced Yin Rugeng as the head of the "Hebei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government." On December 24, 1937, Chi submitted a formal apology to the Japanese embassy, committing to pay a total of 1.2 million yuan in reparations, with an immediate payment of 400,000 yuan, while the remaining 800,000 yuan would be disbursed by the "Provisional Government of the Republic of China." Furthermore, the Japanese demanded that the "Hebei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government" relinquish the territories where Japanese nationals had been killed and take responsibility for constructing "comfort towers." They compelled Chinese laborers to build these structures at the former site of the Governor's Office of Canal Transport in Shuiyueyuan Hutong, Nanmenli, and the northeastern corner of Xicang Square to commemorate Japanese casualties from the uprising. Additionally, they forcibly uprooted ancient trees from the Temple of Heaven, transplanting them around the "comfort towers." The Japanese military also demolished white marble guardrails at the Confucian Temple to erect a monument honoring their soldiers, resulting in the destruction of centuries-old cultural artifacts. On the morning of July 29, the Japanese Army's 11th Independent Mixed Brigade attacked Beiyuan and Huangsi. The Hebei-Northern Security Force, stationed in Huangsi, engaged the Japanese forces until 6:00 PM before retreating. Meanwhile, the 39th Independent Brigade, garrisoned in Beiyuan, fought the Japanese before withdrawing to Gucheng, eventually returning to Beiyuan. On July 31, this brigade was disarmed by the Japanese army, while the Independent 27th Brigade in the city was reorganized into a security team to maintain public order, later breaking through to Chahar Province a few days later and being assigned to the 143rd Division. Meanwhile, the 38th Division of the 29th Army, stationed in Tianjin, proactively attacked Japanese troops in Tianjin early on July 29, capturing the Japanese garrison at Tianjin General Station and launching an assault on the Japanese headquarters at Haiguang Temple and the Dongjuzi Airport. Initially, the battle progressed favorably; however, due to counterattacks from Japanese aircraft and artillery, the Chinese forces began to retreat around 3:00 PM, leading to the fall of Tianjin. Later that afternoon, the rebel forces evacuated Tong County and advanced toward Beiping. En route, they were attacked by the Japanese army north of the city and subsequently retreated to Baoding. As the 37th Division of the 29th Army received orders to retreat southward, the 110th Brigade covered the army headquarters and the Beiping troops from Wanping to Babaoshan, eventually retreating southward through Mentougou. After completing their task, they withdrew to Baoding on July 30. By the end of the 30th, the Japanese army had occupied both Beiping and Tianjin. The Japanese Independent Mixed Brigade No. 1 and the garrison brigade occupied high ground west of Changxindian and the area near Dahuichang on the evenings of the 30th and 31st, respectively. With this, the battles in Beiping and Tianjin effectively came to a close. China and Japan were at war. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. It has finally happened, China and Japan are officially at war. From 1931 until now, it had been an unofficial war between the two, yet another incident had finally broke the camel's back. There was no turning back as Japan would unleash horror upon the Chinese people. The fight for China's survival had begun. China was completely alone against a fierce enemy, how would she manage? 

  Last time we spoke about China's preparations for War. In December 1936, the tension in China reached a boiling point as Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek was captured by his own commanders, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. Disillusioned by Chiang's focus on fighting communists instead of the encroaching Japanese forces, the generals sought a unified response to Japanese aggression. After being held in Xi'an, Chiang reluctantly agreed to collaborate with the Chinese Communist Party, marking a significant shift in strategy against Japan. Amidst the rising chaos, Chiang's government reviewed historical military strategies and prepared for a prolonged conflict. However, they faced challenges, including inadequate supplies and a lack of modern equipment compared to the Japanese. By 1937, China was ill-prepared for war, with Chiang later expressing regret about their military readiness. Despite these setbacks, the alliance formed with the communists laid a foundation for a united Chinese front against the brutalities of the Sino-Japanese War that would follow.   #153 Japan Prepares for War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So in the last episode we talked about how China was preparing itself for war, now its time for Japan. Since Japan's invasion of North China, Japanese field armies had promoted a series of autonomous zones in northern China. Officers from the Kwantung Army, skeptical of China's capacity to modernize, believed that the vast region would inevitably fragment into regional factions. This policy effectively maintained a weak and divided China, which served Japan's to defend Manchukuo. However many Japanese military leaders frequently pointed to the threat posed by the KMT's five-year plan, initiated in 1933 with assistance from German military advisors, aimed at modernizing and expanding the national army. To counter what they perceived as a Chinese threat, the field armies advocated for a preemptive war to dismantle Chiang Kai-shek's regime. Any attempt by Tokyo to alter the military's China policy faced vigorous opposition from the Kwantung Army, which, in February 1937, pushed for intensified covert actions to expel the KMT from northern China and supported a preemptive war to secure strategic areas for future operations against the Soviet Union. At a March meeting in Tokyo, staff officers from the China Garrison and Kwantung armies insisted that any concessions to China would be a grave mistake and would likely yield only temporary outcomes. In early spring 1937, Prince Konoe Fumimaro inherited a China policy fraught with competing views, however, there was consensus that China must not distract the empire from its preparations against the USSR. The end goal was clear, but the means to achieve it remained uncertain. The cabinet's approval of the "Fundamentals of National Policy" in August 1936 indicated a need for stability as the army and navy reconfigured Japan's war machine. The challenge lay in aligning long-term strategic goals with practical short-term interests in northern China without upsetting the existing balance of power. Expanding demands propelled the army's contingency planning, which had traditionally focused on safeguarding Japanese interests and the approximately 13,000 Japanese citizens residing in the region. Tokyo typically responded to serious incidents by deploying troops from homeland garrisons to address localized emergencies and then withdrawing them. However, by the mid-1930s, the growing Soviet threat to Manchukuo rendered this doctrine obsolete. Incidents in northern China gained strategic importance as they diverted resources from the Kwantung Army's preparations against the Soviet Union. Disruptions in northern China hindered access to essential raw materials necessary for army modernization and rearmament, while hostile Chinese forces threatened the Kwantung Army's strategic left flank in the event of war with the Soviets. With these considerations in mind, the army revised its operational war plans, assuming that northern China would serve as Japan's strategic rear area for operations against the USSR. In 1911 Japan's plan for general war mandated thirteen divisions to occupy southern Manchuria, capture Beijing, and subsequently occupy Zhejiang and Fujian. Limited contingency operations in northern China required two divisions to secure rail communications from Beijing to the coast. In the weeks following the 1931 Manchurian Incident, the General Staff in Tokyo drafted plans to counter a Sino-Soviet alliance, anticipating a 2 month campaign involving 15-16 divisions, with the majority engaged against the Soviet Red Army. 2 divisions were designated to secure northern China, while smaller units would monitor the Inner Mongolian front to protect Japan's western flank in Manchuria. After further refinement, the General Staff identified three contingencies for China in early 1932: maintaining the traditional mission of safeguarding Japanese interests and citizens with a standard two-division force; ensuring a secure line of communication between the Chinese capital and the sea with the China Garrison Army, which consisted of approximately 1,700 officers and men, reinforced by one division; and, in a worst-case scenario of all-out war, deploying three divisions to reinforce the Kwantung Army, along with 7 additional divisions and 3 cavalry brigades to suppress resistance in northern China and the Shandong Peninsula, while two additional divisions secured key areas in central China. Between 1932-1936, China received less attention as the General Staff focused on the Soviet military buildup in the Far East. Anxiety, stemming from the Soviet buildup in the Far East, was a pervasive concern reflected in the draft rearmament plan submitted to the throne on May 21, 1936, as part of the national budget formulation process. The army proposed countering the Soviet threat by enhancing Japanese strategic mobility in Manchukuo through the renovation and expansion of airfields, ports, roads, and rail infrastructure, and by constructing army air force arsenals, storage depots, and medical facilities. The positioning of Japanese divisions in eastern Manchuria suggested their wartime objectives, with the Kwantung Army relying on a mobile independent mixed brigade composed of armored car and mounted cavalry units stationed in Gongzhuling, central Manchuria, as its immediate response force for contingencies in northern China. Major units were not concentrated in western Manchuria, where they would be expected to deploy before any planned invasion of northern China. Nevertheless, General Staff planners remained vigilant regarding developments in China, where the resurgence of nationalism, Communist movements advancing north of the Yellow River in February 1936, and the spread of anti-Japanese sentiments across northern China raised the specter of limited military operations escalating into full-scale warfare. China's improving military capabilities would likely hinder Japanese forces from accomplishing their objectives. For example, around Shanghai, Chinese defenses were bolstered by extensive, in-depth, and permanent fortifications. In mid-September 1936, the General Staff in Tokyo issued orders to preempt significant outbreaks in northern China by repositioning a division in Manchukuo closer to the boundary. If hostilities broke out, the China Garrison Army, supported by Kwantung Army units, would launch punitive operations against Chinese forces as necessary. Higher headquarters expected local commanders to act swiftly and decisively, employing rapid maneuvers and shock tactics to address outbreaks with minimal force. Given that no alternative responses were considered, Japanese operational planning for northern China relied on an all-or-nothing approach to force deployment, even for minor incidents. Yet, the senior leadership of the army remained deeply divided over its China policy. Influenced by Ishiwara, the General Staff wanted to avoid military actions that could lead to a full-scale war with China, focusing instead on advancing the army's extensive rearmament and modernization program. In contrast, a majority of high-ranking officers in the Army Ministry and General Staff, particularly within the 2nd Operations Section and the Kwantung Army, favored forceful action against China, believing it necessary to quell rising anti-Japanese sentiments. Drawing from past experiences, these officers anticipated that the Chinese would quickly capitulate once hostilities commenced. This lack of a unified military strategy reflected broader disagreements among the army's leadership regarding operations in China. While operational planning called for the permanent occupation of large regions in northern and central China, the General Staff aimed to contain outbreaks to maintain focus on Soviet threats. There was a clear absence of long-term operational planning; instead, the army concentrated on initial battles while relegating planning for prolonged combat operations to contingent circumstances. In summary, the Japanese army preferred to avoid military force to address Chinese issues whenever feasible but was equally unwilling to concede to Chinese demands. Since 1914, Tosui Koryo or “Principles of Command” had served as the foundational doctrine for senior Japanese army commanders and staff officers engaged in combined arms warfare at the corps and army levels. The advent of new weapons, tactics, and organizational changes during World War I compelled all major military forces to reassess their existing military doctrines across strategic, operational, and tactical dimensions. In response, Japan modified the Principles of Command to blend its traditional post-Russo-Japanese War focus on the intangible factors in battle with the newest concepts of modern total war. A revision in 1918 recognized the significance of “recent great advances in materiel” for total warfare, yet it maintained that ultimate victory in battle relied on dedication, patriotism, and selfless service. In the 1920s, the General Staff's Operations Section, led by Major General Araki Sadao, who would become the leader of the Kodoha faction, had produced the most significant and impactful revision of the Principles. A staunch anti-communist and ideologue who valued the intangible elements of combat, Araki appointed Lieutenant Colonel Obata Toshishiro and Captain Suzuki Yorimichi as the principal authors of the manual's rewrite. Obata, a Soviet expert, was strongly influenced by German General Count Alfred von Schlieffen's classic theories of a “war of annihilation,” while Suzuki, the top graduate of the thirtieth Staff College class, shared Araki's focus on “spiritual” or intangible advantages in warfare. Both men were brilliant yet arrogant, working in secrecy to create a doctrine based on what Leonard Humphreys describes as “intense spiritual training” and bayonet-led assaults to counter the opponent's material superiority.  The latest version of the Principles of Command preserved the operational concept of rapid Japanese mobile offensive operations, aiming to induce a decisive battle or “kaisen” early in the campaign. It reaffirmed the sokusen sokketsu or “rapid victory' principle of rapid warfare. Attaining these goals relied exclusively on offensive action, with the army expecting commanders at all levels to press forward, defeat enemy units, and capture key territories. The troops were indoctrinated with a spirit of aggression and trained to anticipate certain victory. The emphasis on offensive action was so pronounced that Araki eliminated terms like surrender, retreat, and defense from the manual, believing they negatively affected troop morale. This aggressive mindset also infused the Sento Koryo or “Principles of Operations”, first published in 1929 as a handbook for combined arms warfare tailored for division and regimental commanders. The manual emphasized hand-to-hand combat as the culminating stage of battle, a principle regarded as unchanging in Japanese military doctrine since 1910. Senior commanders were expected to demonstrate initiative in skillfully maneuvering their units to encircle the enemy, setting the stage for climactic assaults with cold steel. Infantry was deemed the primary maneuver force, supported by artillery. To complement rapid infantry advances, the army developed light and mobile artillery. Operationally, encirclement and night attacks were vital components of victory, and even outnumbered units were expected to aggressively envelop enemy flanks. In assaults against fortified positions, units would advance under the cover of darkness, avoiding enemy artillery fire and positioning themselves for dawn attacks that combined firepower with shock action to overwhelm enemy defenses. In encounters with opposing forces, commanders would maneuver to flank the enemy, surround their units, and destroy them. If forced onto the defensive, commanders were expected to seize opportunities for decisive counterattacks to regain the initiative. These high-level operational doctrines were distilled into tactical guidelines in the January 1928 edition of the Infantry Manual or “Hohei Soten”, which saw a provisional revision in May 1937 . Both editions opened with identical introductions emphasizing the necessity for a rapid victory through the overpowering and destruction of enemy forces. Infantry was identified as the primary arm in combined arms warfare, and soldiers were taught to rely on cold steel as fundamental to their attacking spirit. The 1928 Infantry Manual underscored the commander's role in instilling a faith in certain victory or “hissho shinnen”, drawing from the glorious traditions of Japanese military history. The 1928 infantry tactics employed an extended skirmish line with four paces between soldiers. Individual initiative in combat was generally discouraged, except under exceptional circumstances, as success relied on concentrating firepower and manpower on narrow frontages to overwhelm defenders. An infantry company would create a skirmish line featuring two light machine gun squads and four rifle squads, preparing for a bayonet-driven breakthrough of enemy defenses. For the final assault, the infantry company would line up along a 150-yard front, likely facing casualties of up to 50% while breaching the enemy's main defensive line. Historical analysis reveals the shortcomings of these tactics. During World War I, armies constructed extensive, multi-layered defenses, trenches, pillboxes, and strong points, each independent yet all covered by artillery. If assaulting infantry suffered heavy losses breaching the first line, how could they successfully prosecute their assault against multiple defense lines? The 1937 revision elaborated on new tactics to overcome entrenched Soviet defenses, drafted in anticipation of arms and equipment that were either in development or production but not yet available for deployment. This became official doctrine in 1940, but as early as summer 1937, units from the China Garrison Army were field-testing these new tactics. The provisional manual adopted combat team tactics, forming an umbrella-like skirmish formation. This involved a light machine gun team at the forefront with two ammunition bearers flanking it to the rear. Behind the machine gun team were riflemen arranged in a column formation, maintaining six paces between each. The light machine gun provided cover fire as the formation closed in on the enemy for hand-to-hand combat. Increased firepower expanded the assault front to 200 yards. The combination of wider dispersion and night movement aimed to reduce losses from enemy artillery fire while the infantry advanced through successive lines of resistance. Commanders at the platoon level were responsible for leading the final assault into enemy lines, with increased tactical responsibility shifting from platoon to squad leaders, allowing for greater initiative from junior officers and non-commissioned officers. This emphasis on broader dispersal and fluidity on the battlefield required frontline infantry to exhibit aggressiveness and initiative. Contrary to popular belief, the Japanese military did not solely rely on the bayonet or an offensive spirit during engagements with Chinese forces. They effectively employed superior firepower and modern equipment within their combined arms framework, using heavy weapons and artillery to soften enemy positions before launching infantry attacks. Without such firepower, unsupported infantry attacks would have struggled to achieve their objectives. In January 1937, the Imperial Japanese Army consisted of approximately 247,000 officers and men, organized in a structure comprising seventeen standing infantry divisions, four tank regiments, and fifty-four air squadrons equipped with a total of 549 aircraft. The China Garrison Army and the Taiwan Garrison Army each included two infantry regiments, while a separate independent mixed brigade was stationed in Manchuria. Two divisions were permanently based in Korea, with four more assigned on a rotating basis to the Kwantung Army in Manchukuo. The remainder of the forces were stationed in the Japanese home islands. A substantial pool of reservists and partially trained replacements was available to mobilize, enabling the expansion of peacetime units to their wartime strength as needed. Conscription provided the primary source of enlisted manpower for the army, though a handful of young men volunteered for active duty. For conscription purposes, Japan was divided into divisional areas, which were further subdivided into regimental districts responsible for conscription, mobilization, individual activations, and veteran affairs within their jurisdictions. Typically, conscripts served with the regiment associated with their region or prefecture. However, the Imperial Guards regiments in Tokyo selected conscripts from across the nation, as did the Seventh Infantry Division, which recruited from the sparsely populated Hokkaido area and from regular army units stationed in Korea, China, and Taiwan. Draftees from Okinawa Prefecture usually served with Kyushu-based regiments. All males reaching the age of 20 underwent an army-administered pre-induction physical examination conducted between December 1 and January 30 of the following year. This evaluation classified potential conscripts into three categories: A “suitable for active duty”, B1, and B2, while others were deemed unfit for the demands of military life. In 1935, 29.7% of those examined received A classifications, while 41.2% were graded as B1 or B2. Among the 742,422 individuals eligible for conscription in 1937, approximately 170,000 were drafted, amounting to 22.9% of the cohort; this figure had remained relatively consistent since the post-Russo-Japanese War years. Within the conscripted group, 153,000 men were classified as A and an additional 17,000 as B. Conscripts served for two years of active duty, with variations based on their military specialty and any prior civilian military training. After their discharge, they were subject to a lengthy reserve obligation. In total, 470,635 individuals fell into the B category, being otherwise fit for service but excess to the army's active personnel needs. These men were assigned to the First Replacement Pool, where they underwent around 120 days of basic military training, primarily focused on small arms usage and fundamental tactics. Regular officers and NCOs led the training in their respective regimental districts. Following their initial training, the army called these replacements and reservists to active duty annually for several days of refresher training. Army leaders regarded discipline as the cornerstone of military effectiveness. Basic training emphasized the necessity of unquestioning obedience to orders at all levels. Subsequent training focused on fieldcraft, such as utilizing terrain strategically to surprise or encircle the enemy. However, training exercises often lacked diversity due to the limited maneuver areas available in Japan, leading to predictable solutions to field problems. The training regimen was rigorous, merging strict formal discipline and regulated corporal punishment with harsh informal sanctions and unregulated violence from leaders to instill unwavering compliance to orders. As an undergrad taking a course specifically on the Pacific War, it was this variable my professor argued contributed the most to the atrocities performed by the Japanese during WW2. He often described it as a giant pecking order of abuse. The most senior commanders abused, often physically their subordinates, who abused theirs, going through the ranks to the common grunts who had no one else but civilians and the enemy to peck at so to speak. Of course there were a large number of other variables at play, but to understand that you outta join my Patreon Account over at the www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel , where I made a fan favorite episode on “why the Japanese army performed so many atrocities”. In there I basically hit a big 10 reason list, well in depth, I highly recommend it! As the concept of the “Imperial Army” and the cult of the emperor gained prominence, appeals to imperial symbols and authority bolstered this unquestioning obedience to superiors, who were seen as the conduits of the emperor's will. It was during this period that the term kogun or “imperial army” gained favor over kokugun or “national army”, reflecting a deliberate effort by military authorities to forge a direct connection between the military and the imperial throne. The 1937 Japanese infantry division was structured as a square formation, with a peacetime strength established at approximately 12,000 officers and men organized into two brigades, each comprising about 4,000 personnel, formed from two infantry regiments, about 2,000 men each. The division included a field artillery regiment, an engineer regiment, and a transport battalion as organic units. Each infantry regiment was composed of three battalions, approximately 600 men each, which contained three rifle companies, 160 men each and a weapons platoon. A rifle company consisted of three rifle platoons and one light machine gun platoon. Regiments also included infantry assault gun platoons, and battalions contained a heavy machine gun company. Upon mobilization, a fourth infantry company augmented each battalion, along with reserve fillers, nearly 5,000 personnel assigned as transport and service troops, raising the authorized wartime strength of an infantry division to over 25,000 officers and men.  Reforms implemented in 1922 reduced personnel numbers in favor of new and improved weapons and equipment. Among these advancements, the 75 mm Type 90 field artillery piece, which boasted increased range and accuracy, was integrated into the forces in 1930, along with the 105 mm Type 10 howitzer and 75 mm pack mountain artillery which could be disassembled for transport using pack animals. These became standard artillery components for divisions. The emphasis on light, mobile, and smaller-caliber field artillery enabled swift deployment during fast-moving engagements. By minimizing the size of the baggage train, infantry and artillery units could quickly set up off the march formation and maneuver around enemy flanks. Army leaders further streamlined road march formations by eliminating the fourth artillery battery from each regiment, thus sacrificing some firepower for enhanced speed and mobility. Heavier artillery pieces were still used in set-piece battles where mobility was less critical. In a typical 1936 division, the field artillery regiment, equipped with Type 90 field artillery or lighter Type 94 mountain artillery, had thirty-six guns. Training focused on quality rather than quantity, reflecting the conservative doctrine of “one-round-one-hit”. Live-fire training was infrequent due to the scarcity of artillery firing ranges in Japan. Ammunition stockpiles were inadequate for anticipated operational needs; government arsenals produced over 111,000 artillery shells in 1936, which was fewer than one-tenth of the quantities specified in wartime consumption tables. Similar industrial shortcomings also hampered advancements in motorization and armor. Motorization proved costly and relied on foreign supply, presenting challenges given the inferior road networks in Manchuria, northern China, and the Soviet Far East. Military estimates suggested a need for 250,000 trucks to fully motorize the army, a goal beyond the capabilities of the nascent Japanese automotive industry, which produced fewer than 1,000 cars annually until 1933. Japanese tanks, described as “handcrafted, beautifully polished, and hoarded” by Alvin Coox, suffered from shortages similar to heavy artillery and ammunition. The army prioritized light weighing ten tons or less and medium tanks sixteen tons or less due to the necessity of deploying armor overseas, size and weight were crucial for loading and unloading from transport ships. Smaller tanks were also more suitable for the terrains of northern China and Manchuria, as they could traverse unbridged rivers using pontoons or ferries. The Japanese industrial base, however, struggled to mass-produce tanks; by 1939, factories were producing an average of only twenty-eight tanks of all models per month. Consequently, in 1937, foot soldiers remained as reliant on animal transport for mobility as their ancestors had been during the Russo-Japanese War. Despite enjoying technological and material superiority over disorganized Chinese forces, these deficiencies in heavy artillery, armor, and vehicles would prove catastrophic against more formidable opponents. Another significant factor constraining Japanese industry's capacity to produce tanks, trucks, and artillery was the 1936 decision to expand the army's air wing and homeland air defense network. This policy diverted resources, capital, and technology away from the army's ground forces. The nascent Japanese Army Air Force or “JAAF” aimed to support ground operations through reconnaissance, bombing enemy bases, and achieving air superiority. However, direct support for ground operations was limited, and Japanese military planners did not anticipate that aerial bombardment could supplement or replace artillery bombardments. The expanded air arm's strategic mission centered on executing preemptive air strikes against Soviet air bases in the Far East to thwart potential air attacks on Japan. By the mid-1930s, the army had approximately 650 aircraft, roughly 450 of which were operational. The JAAF emphasized rigorous training that prioritized quality over quantity, producing only about 750 pilots annually up until December 1941. Basic flight skills were developed through this training, while specialized tactical instruction was deferred to newly established pilot units. According to logistics doctrine, Japanese maneuver units typically operated within a 120 to 180-mile radius of a railhead to facilitate resupply and reinforcement. A field train transport unit was responsible for moving supplies daily from the railhead to a division control point for distribution. The division established a field depot to manage the transfer of supplies from field transport to company and lower-echelon units. At the depot, transport troops would hand over supplies to a combat train that ferried ammunition, rations, and equipment directly to frontline units. Horse-drawn wagons and pack animals were the primary means of transportation. Each wartime division included a transport battalion, which varied in size from approximately 2,200 to 3,700 personnel, depending on the type of division supported. The division typically carried enough supplies for one day. Upon mobilization, the logistical framework was reinforced with the addition of an ordnance unit, a field hospital, a sanitation unit, and additional field and combat trains. The size of the transport regiment grew from around 1,500 officers and men with over 300 horses to nearly 3,500 troops and more than 2,600 animals. In the battalion, one company generally transported small-arms ammunition while two companies handled artillery shells and two others carried rations; this arrangement was flexible based on operational needs. Pack horses and dray horses were assigned to each company to carry or tow infantry assault artillery, mortars, artillery ammunition, and rations. Infantry soldiers carried minimal rations, approximately two and a half pounds, primarily rice, along with tinned condiments and salt. Consequently, the field train included a field kitchen stocked with fresh vegetables, rice or bread, soy sauce, and pickles. Each evening, a forward echelon train distributed supplies received from the field transport unit to the combat unit's bivouac area. When combat seemed imminent, a section of the transport battalion would move forward to deliver essential combat supplies, ordnance, equipment, medical supplies, directly to frontline units. These units would also handle resupply, medical evacuation, and repair of ordnance and equipment once fighting commenced.  On the evening of September 18, 1936, the fifth anniversary of the Manchurian Incident, Chinese troops from the Twenty-Ninth Army clashed with Japanese soldiers from the Seventh Company's rear-guard medical unit at Fengtai. When a Japanese officer arrived on horseback, a Chinese soldier struck his horse, prompting the Chinese troops to retreat to their barracks. Major Ichiki Kiyonao, the battalion commander, ordered an emergency assembly, surrounded the Chinese encampment, and demanded that Chinese authorities surrender the aggressors immediately. To defuse the situation, Major General Kawabe Masakazu, the brigade commander and Ichiki's superior, instructed Regimental Commander Mutaguchi to resolve the incident swiftly. Mutaguchi negotiated an agreement that required the Chinese to apologize, punish those responsible, withdraw from the vicinity of the Japanese barracks, and maintain a distance of two miles. Although Mutaguchi and Ichiki wanted to disarm the Chinese forces, they ultimately complied with Kawabe's wishes and allowed the Chinese to retain their weapons “in the spirit of Bushido.” Later, the Chinese claimed the Japanese had refrained from disarming them due to their fear of the strength and influence of the 29th Army. This insult infuriated Mutaguchi, who vowed not to make any further concessions and promised to eliminate the anti-Japanese provocateurs decisively if another incident occurred. He warned his officers against allowing an “overly tolerant attitude toward the Chinese” to undermine the prestige of the imperial army and emphasized the need for swift, decisive action to prevent such incidents in the future. Tensions were further exacerbated by large-scale Japanese field exercises conducted from late October to early November. These maneuvers, the largest ever executed by Japanese forces in China, mobilized about 6,700 active-duty and reserve troops for a series of complex battle drills, night maneuvers, and tactical field problems. During these exercises, Japanese troops were quartered in Chinese homes. Although local residents were compensated for any damage caused, the exercises nonetheless heightened tensions between the two sides. The fallout from the Suiyuan Fiasco in December 1936, coupled with a tumultuous summer and fall, led to rising anti-Japanese sentiment and prompted Tokyo to caution the Kawabe brigade against actions that might escalate the already precarious situation. In March 1937, during the annual personnel assignments, Ishiwara was promoted to major general and appointed chief of the 1st Department Operations of the General Staff. However, Army Vice Minister Umezu, a hardliner regarding China and a rival of Ishiwara, successfully maneuvered the Hayashi cabinet into approving the command choices for army and navy ministers, overriding Ishiwara's proposals. General Sugiyama Hajime, another hawk on China, replaced the terminally ill General Nakamura Kotaro as army minister shortly after Nakamura's appointment and remained in that position until June 1938. Lieutenant General Imai Kiyoshi, army vice chief of staff and an Ishiwara supporter, was also battling a terminal illness that rendered him largely ineffective during his short five-month tenure from March to August 1937. Imai was expected to play a crucial role in high command because the army chief of staff, Prince Kan'in, had been appointed in 1931 as a figurehead due to internal factions preventing agreement on a candidate. Ishiwara further complicated his conciliatory approach by selecting Colonel Muto Akira, a known hardliner who believed force was the only means to resolve the Japan-China conflict, for the vital position of chief of Operations Section within the General Staff. From Kwantung Army headquarters, Commanding General Ueda Kenkichi and his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Tojo Hideki, advocated for a preemptive war against China to serve the Kwantung Army's interests. In contrast, the China Garrison Army, under Lieutenant General Tashiro and his chief of staff, adopted a more moderate stance, aligning with central headquarters' policy of restraint. The China Garrison Army estimated the 29th Army to consist of 15,000–16,000 troops, with its main strength centered around Peking and an additional 10,000 troops in the surrounding area. Starting in spring 1937, Japanese units began observing tactical indicators suggesting that the Chinese were preparing for war. These indicators included increased guard presence at Peking's gates in June, bolstering units near the Marco Polo Bridge to over two battalions, preparing new fighting positions, digging trenches and constructing concrete pillboxes near the Marco Polo Bridge, infiltrating agents into Japanese maneuver areas for intelligence on night tactical exercises, and heightened strictness among Chinese railroad guards evident since late June. Nevertheless, the Japanese commanders did not view China as a formidable opponent. They believed that Chinese armies would quickly disintegrate due to what they perceived as a lack of fighting spirit and ineffective leadership. By 1937, Japan's national policy was shifting away from the persistent and aggressive efforts of field armies to undermine Chinese political authority in northern China toward a more conciliatory stance. This shift resulted in increased tensions between field armies and the General Staff in Tokyo, leading to substantial fractures among senior officers regarding the “solution” to their so-called China problem. Those tensions broke the camels back that year.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese grossly underestimated their enemy and their own logistical capabilities. There was to say “too many cooks in the kitchen” of the Japanese military and competing visions ultimately were leading Japan and China into an official full blown war. Japan assumed they could bully China until it was so fragmented it would be a simple matter of grabbing the pieces it liked, that was not to be the case at all.   

This episode features Aarti Kawlra, Academic Director of the Humanities Across Borders program at IIAS, hosting discussion about indigo with three colleagues, scholars, and educators. Jody Benjamin is an Associate Professor of History at Howard University. His recent book is The Texture of Change: Dress, Self-Fashioning and History in Western Africa, 1700-1850 (Ohio University Press, New African History Series, 2024), which explores questions of state-making, social hierarchy, and self-making across parts of Mali, Senegal, and Guinea through the lens of textiles and dress in a context shaped by an emergent global capitalism, slavery, and colonialism. Min-Chin Chiang is an Associate Professor and the Chairperson of the Graduate Institute of Architecture and Cultural Heritage in Taipei National University of the Arts. Her work focuses on heritage craft, heritage education, and heritage dynamics in relation to community and colonialism. Finally, Jocelyne Vokouma is a researcher in the Department of Socioeconomics and Development Anthropology at the Institute of Social Studies (Institut des Sciences des Sociétés / INSS-CNRST) in Burkina Faso, where she specializes in the aesthetics of indigo in clothing.Indigo occupies a haloed place as a color, a craft, and a hi(story) of global interactions. Viewed largely as a dye-yielding plant with a specific chemistry and exchange value as a commodity, in this podcast, the guests focus on indigo as a tool for African and Asian self-consciousness. Brought to you ahead of the Africa-Asia ConFest to be held next month (June 2025) in Dakar, this episode centers on indigo as a livelihood practice and techno-cultural knowhow, taking two specific examples, namely, indigo in Taiwan and indigo in Burkina Faso. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Real Life Roundup  Let's address the elephant not in the room: Devon is dead. Well, not dead-dead. Just birthday-visit-family-IRL-dead. We pour one out for our absent co-host, and prepare for his resurrection next week. Meanwhile, Steven has been watching robots get wild. The Wild Robot, that is. The new animated flick has dropped (IMDB link), and Steven's verdict is in: heartwarming vibes, metal clanking emotions, and just enough kid-friendly existentialism to make you question whether your Roomba has feelings. Also, did you know Black Adam shows up in DC League of Super Pets? Steven does. And he's not okay about it. Then came Doom. And then came… more Doom. One minute Steven's a casual fan, next he's elbows-deep in lore breakdowns and watching two-hour YouTube essays on timeline chaos. Marines killing demons across dimensions? Say less. Just hand him the BFG and back away slowly. Oh—and he's forging now. He didn't elaborate. Just forging. Like, swords? Friendships? The future? Who knows. Steven contains multitudes. Ben, on the other hand, has been diving into his subconscious with dream journaling. The result? Vivid, borderline cinematic dreamscapes. Not terrifying at all. He's also been getting deep with the Waking Up app, based on the book by Sam Harris. (Here's the app link). Ben reports that it's good for mindfulness, bad for avoiding personal epiphanies. Use at your own risk. Future or Now Ben introduces us to Space to Bark, a bizarre, short dungeon crawler where you play as a first-person Dogman navigating an underground labyrinth. Created by ComputerJames, it features: Bark-based controls ([SPACE] to BARK!) Wobbly hand-drawn dog sprites Combat! Puzzles! Dogmen lore! Dogman95 isn't just a pup with a dream—he's a legend in training, guided by the sacred Dogmaiden. This is the kind of weird internet treasure we live for. Hat tip to Web Curios for digging this one up. Devon, once again, is astral projecting or off the grid. No one really knows. Steven had… nothing. Just an existential stare. Book Club (but not really) This week's book club has been canceled due to lack of effort. Blame Devon. Blame the Void. Blame our over-scheduled lives. Either way, we didn't read anything this week, and we're not sorry. Next week, however, we're diving into “Liking What You See: A Documentary” from Stories of Your Life and Others by Ted Chiang. It's a short story about beauty, perception, and what happens when you turn off the part of your brain that notices appearances. It's Chiang, so expect deep thoughts and possible feelings. That's it from us! Come back next week for more co-host resurrection, dream logic, robotic feelings, and maybe even a book. If you like what we do, bark into the void or support us on Patreon. Your choice.

  Last time we spoke about the Xi'an Incident. In December 1936, tensions in China erupted as Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek faced a revolt led by his commanders, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. Disillusioned by Chiang's focus on battling communists instead of the Japanese invaders, the generals swiftly captured him in a coup. Confined in Xi'an, Chiang initially resisted their demands for a united front against Japan but eventually engaged in negotiation with Zhang and the Chinese Communist Party. As public sentiment shifted against him, Chiang's predicament led to urgent discussions, culminating in an unexpected alliance with the communists. This pact aimed to consolidate Chinese resistance against Japanese aggression, marking a critical turning point in the Second Sino-Japanese War. By December 26, Chiang was released, and this uneasy collaboration set the stage for a more unified front against a common enemy, though underlying tensions remained between the factions.   #152 China Prepares for War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Before we jump into the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, which I honestly have no idea how long will take us, I thought it would be a good idea to dedicate two episodes to how both China and Japan prepared themselves for war.  Going all the way back to the 1910s, Chinese intellectuals began to view an outright conflict between Japan and China was inevitable. In the discussions about China's strategic options, Jiang Fangzhen pioneered a strategy of protracted warfare, a concept that would later shape China's approach during the Sino-Japanese War. Having studied in Japan during his youth, Jiang developed a keen understanding of the Japanese government and military. As early as 1917, he predicted that China and Japan would become embroiled in a long-term conflict, with the battleground likely to be west of the Peiping–Wuhan and Guangzhou–Wuhan railways. In his work titled "Guofang Lun" or “On National Defense”, Jiang reiterated the importance of protracted warfare as a means to thwart Japan's aspirations for a swift victory. He argued that China should leverage its vast population and extensive territory to extend the conflict, gradually wearing down Japanese strength and turning the situation to its advantage. Jiang recommended that China not focus on defending its coastal regions but instead confront the enemy west of the Peking–Wuhan Railway.   Chiang Kai-shek would eventually come to share Jiang's belief that “the longer the war drags on, the more advantageous it will be for China.” Despite significant public criticism, both the Nationalist government and General Zhang Xueliang, decided against military resistance when Japan invaded Manchuria in September 1931 and attacked Shanghai in 1932. Chiang was particularly hesitant to engage Japan directly, as he was also dealing with a Communist insurgency in central China. He feared that Chinese forces would suffer quick defeat, predicting that Japan would capture key coastal areas and critical infrastructure within just three days, crippling China by dismantling its military and economic lifelines. Following the invasion of North China Chiang was forced to adopt a firmer stance. The Nationalist government proposed a dual strategy of pursuing peace and security while simultaneously preparing for war. If peace proved impossible, China would mobilize its resources for ultimate victory through prolonged conflict. This approach was formalized in the National Defense Plan, which China adopted by prioritizing protracted warfare as its core strategy. After the Sino-Japanese clash in Shanghai on January 28, 1932, the Military Affairs Commission devised a plan that divided China into four defense areas along with a preparation area. While some troops were assigned local security, commanders were directed to concentrate their remaining forces for potential confrontations with Japan. That year, the Military Affairs Commission issued General Defense Guidelines that outlined two strategic responses to a potential Japanese invasion. The first, conservative approach focused on maintaining key positions and utilizing protracted warfare to impede the enemy. The second strategy advocated for decisive battles in key regions to thwart Japan's ambitions and protect China's territorial integrity, prioritizing disengagement from Japanese forces along the Yangtze River and coastline. In August 1935, German military adviser General Alexander von Falkenhausen provided recommendations to Chiang Kai-shek based on his predictions of Japanese advance routes into China. He identified three main routes: one from northern Hebei to Zhengzhou, the second from Shandong toward Xuzhou, and the third crossing the Yangtze River to Nanjing and onwards to Wuhan. He suggested treating the Yangtze River as the primary combat zone and highlighted Sichuan as a possible retreat area. Taking all of this into consideration. in 1936, a draft of a new National Defense Plan divided the country into four zones: a war zone, a defense zone, an internal security zone, and a preparation area. The war zone encompassed ten provinces and established strategies for retreating to predetermined defensive positions when necessary, with Sichuan designated as the main base for the war. In January 1937, the Chinese General Staff Department introduced its annual War Plan, outlining three possible military conflict regions between China and Japan. It proposed two main strategies: Proposal A emphasized sustained combat and retreat to fortified positions if the situation became unfavorable, aiming to eventually go on the offensive against Japan. Proposal B focused on repelling Japanese invasions along the coast and from the north, prioritizing counter offensives against Japanese units stationed near key locations. To prepare, the NRA completed several critical projects outlined in its plans, establishing military supply depots in Nanjing, Bengbu, Xinyang, Huayin, Nanchang, and Wuchang to manage logistics for supplies across various strategic railways. These depots were equipped to sustain the military, with ample ammunition and provisions, including 60 million rounds of small-arms ammunition and food for hundreds of thousands. Despite these preparations, not all projects were completed by the time war broke out in July 1937. In contrast to the Japanese military's tactics, Chinese forces prioritized defensive strategies. For example, at the Mount Lushan Military Officer Training Camp in July 1934, Chiang Kai-shek outlined four possible approaches against Japan, favoring a defense-as-offense strategy. Other options included building fortifications, tenaciously defending key positions, and employing guerrilla warfare through irregular forces to constrain enemy advances. Chiang stressed the importance of national mobilization for the war effort.  There was a significant disparity in equipment between the Japanese and Chinese armies. To give you an idea, each Japanese division included a mechanized group featuring thirty-nine light military vehicles and 21 light armored cars, supplemented by 6,000–7,000 horses, 200–300 automobiles, and specialized troops such as poison gas teams. In contrast, Nationalist divisions lacked any of these capabilities, a typical nationalist division theoretically had an armored regiment, but this unit was equipped with fewer than 72 armored vehicles. Another major weakness of the Nationalist forces was their insufficient artillery. In 1936, a division was officially assigned one artillery battalion, which was divided into three batteries totaling twelve guns. It also included a mechanized cannon company with four direct-fire weapons. By comparison, a Japanese division boasted four infantry regiments and one mountain artillery or field artillery regiment, with each artillery regiment comprising three field artillery battalions and one howitzer battalion. The infantry regiment itself included a mountain artillery section with four mountain guns, while the infantry battalion had one Type 70 mountain gun section with two guns. In total, a Japanese division possessed sixty-four artillery pieces of various calibers, four times the number of a Chinese division and of significantly higher quality. In reality, in 1936, twelve of the twenty elite Chinese “reformed divisions” still lacked artillery battalions. The ordnance available in the “reformed divisions” mostly consisted of the outdated Type 60 mountain gun. Nationwide, very few of the 200 divisions were equipped with any artillery, and those that did often used obsolete field artillery pieces or mountain artillery provided to local forces. Some units even relied on trench mortars as a makeshift solution. The artillery weapons came from various countries, but they frequently lacked necessary observation and signal components, and were often low on ammunition. The majority of mountain guns and field artillery were of the Type 75, which, while capable of providing fire support, had limited range and inflicted minimal damage. To give you an idea of the striking inadequacy of the Chinese artillery, during the Shanghai fighting in 1937, the mountain artillery of the Guangxi 21st Army Group could only reach targets within 1,200 yards, while Japanese field artillery had an effective range of 8,000 yards. Chinese-made mountain artillery suffered due to inferior steel-making technology; the gun shields were constructed from low-quality steel, and the barrels often overheated after firing just a few rounds, increasing the risk of explosions. Additionally, the equipment of local forces varied greatly in quality. In fact, some local units had superior equipment compared to Nationalist units. For example, before the Sino-Japanese War, troops from Yunnan were equipped with French antitank guns and heavy machine guns, which were better than the German water-cooled machine guns used by the Nationalist forces. However, the majority of local troops relied on inferior equipment; the 122nd Division under Wang Mingzhang from Sichuan, noted for its brave defense of Tengxian County during the Xuzhou Battle, was armed with locally produced light and heavy machine guns that frequently malfunctioned, and their Type 79 rifles, also made in Sichuan, were often outdated, with some dating back to the Qing Dynasty. These weapons had limited range and sometimes malfunctioned after fewer than one hundred rounds. Now before the war, both Nationalist and local forces acquired weaponry from diverse foreign and domestic sources. Even domestically produced weapons lacked standardization, with those made in Hanyang and Manchuria differing in design and specifications. Arms manufactured in Germany, France, Russia, Japan, and Italy were similarly inconsistent. Consequently, even within a single unit, the lack of uniformity created significant logistical challenges, undermining combat effectiveness, particularly in the early stages of the war. Despite Nationalist ordnance factories producing over three million rounds of small-arms ammunition daily, the incompatibility of ammunition and weapons diminished the usable quantity of ammunition. Chinese communications infrastructure was inadequate. In the Nationalist army, signal units were integrated into engineering units, leading to low-quality radio communications. In emergencies, telegrams could remain undelivered for days, and orders often had to be dispatched via postal services. By 1937, the entire country boasted only 3,000 military vehicles, necessitating heavy reliance on horses and mules for transport. To effectively equip twenty Nationalist divisions, 10,647 horses and 20,688 mules were needed, but by the end of 1935, only 6,206 horses and 4,351 mules were available. A statistic from 1936 indicated a 5 percent mortality rate among military horses, with some units experiencing a rate as high as 10 percent. The distribution of weaponry led to disputes during army reorganization efforts following the Northern Expedition. Although Chiang Kai-shek's forces were part of the regular army, the quality of their equipment varied significantly. Domestic production of weapons was limited, and imports could not close the gap. Priority was given to small arms; through army reorganization, Chiang aimed to diminish the influence of forces less loyal to him. Nationalist army staff officers observed that troops loyal to Chiang received the best weapons. Northwest and Northeast forces, having cultivated good relations with the KMT, were similarly better equipped, while Shanxi troops received inferior supplies. Troops associated with the Guangxi Clique were given even poorer quality weapons due to their leaders' stronger political ambitions. Troops regarded as “bandit forces,” such as those led by Shi Yousan, Li Hongchang, and Sun Dianying, were naturally assigned the least effective weaponry. This unequal distribution of arms increased some local forces' inclination to align with the KMT while alienating others, which inadvertently led to additional turmoil in the aftermath of the Northern Expedition. Logistical accounting within the Nationalist military was severely lacking. Military expenditures accounted for a significant portion of government spending, roughly 65.48 % in 1937, with personnel costs being the largest component. However, military units prioritized boosting their own resources over accurate accounting. Surpluses were not returned but rather utilized to reward military officers and soldiers for merits in battle, care for the wounded, or to create a reserve. Conversely, if deficits arose, troops would resort to “living off vacancies,” a practice in which they would fail to report desertions promptly and would falsely claim new soldiers had arrived. Military leaders typically appointed their most trusted subordinates to serve as accountants and logistic officers. As the war commenced, these issues became readily apparent. During the Battle of Shanghai in 1937, frontline soldiers sometimes went days without food and went months without pay. Wounded soldiers and civilians had to search tirelessly for medical treatment, and when main forces relocated, they often abandoned grain, ammunition, weapons, and petroleum along the way. General Chen Cheng, the commander in chief during the Battle of Shanghai, noted, “This phenomenon clearly revealed our inability to supply frontline troops, indicating that China remains a backward country with poor management.” Many logistical shortcomings severely impacted troop morale and combat effectiveness. In a 1933 speech, Chiang Kai-shek acknowledged that poor food, inadequate clothing, and ineffective logistics contributed to widespread desertion. Soldiers were further demoralized by reduced or embezzled salaries. A lack of professional medical staff and equipment hampered healthcare efforts, leading to high disease and mortality rates. According to official statistics from 1936, approximately 10 percent of soldiers fell ill annually, with a mortality rate as high as 5 percent. Japanese military authorities reported that one in three wounded Japanese soldiers died, while a Dutch military officer present during the early stages of the Sino-Japanese War observed that one in every two wounded Nationalist soldiers perished. Due to inadequate equipment and limited transport options, Nationalist forces were compelled to recruit farmers and rent vehicles, as they lacked essential facilities such as tents. This reliance on local resources inevitably led to frequent conflicts between military personnel and civilians. China is clearly a vast nation with an extensive coastline, requiring the construction of several significant fortresses during the modern era. These included Wusong, Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Jiangning, and Wuhan along the Yangtze River, as well as Zhenhai, Humen, and Changzhou along the seacoast. Except for the Wuhan fortress, built in 1929-1930, all other fortifications were established during the late Qing Dynasty and featured uncovered cannon batteries. These fortresses suffered from inadequate maintenance, and many of their components had become outdated and irreplaceable, rendering them militarily negligible. Following the January 1932 Shanghai Incident, the Japanese military destroyed the Wusong forts, leaving the entrance to the Yangtze River completely unfortified. Consequently, there were no defenses along the coastline from Jiangsu to Shandong, allowing the Japanese to land freely. In December 1932, the Military Affairs Commission established a fortress group tasked with constructing fortresses and defensive installations, seeking assistance from German military advisers. After the North China Incident in 1935, the Nationalist government accelerated the construction of defensive structures in line with national war planning, focusing particularly on Nanjing. The Nationalists prioritized building fortifications along the seacoast and the Yellow River, followed by key regions north of the Yellow River. The government also ordered a significant quantity of heavy artillery from Germany. This included several dozen pieces of flat-fire antiaircraft and dual-purpose heavy artillery, which were installed at fortifications in Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Nanjing, and Wuhan. By the summer of 1937, the construction of nine fortified positions was complete: Nanjing, Zhenjiang, Jiangyin, Ningbo, Humen, Mawei, Xiamen , Nantong, and Lianyungang. In total, China had established 41 forts and equipped them with 273 fortress cannons. Some defensive installations were poorly managed, with many units assigned to their perimeters lacking training and access to proper maps. The barbette positions in the fortresses were not well concealed and could hardly store sufficient ammunition. Troops stationed at these fortresses received little training. Despite these shortcomings, the fortresses and fortifications were not entirely ineffective. They bolstered Chinese positions along the defense line stretching from Cangxian County to Baoding and from Dexian County to Shijiazhuang, as well as in southern Shandong.  Before the war, China's political and economic center was situated along the seacoast and the Yangtze River. As Japanese influence expanded, the Nationalist government was compelled to establish bases in China's inner regions, very similar to how the USSR pulled back its industry further west after Operation barbarossa.The Japanese attack on Shanghai in 1932 prompted the Nationalists to relocate their capital to Luoyang. On March 5, during the Second Plenary Session of the KMT's Fourth Congress, the Western Capital Preparation Committee was formed to plan for the potential relocation of all governmental bodies to Xi'an in the event of full-scale war. In February 1933, the Central Political Conference approved the Northwest Development Bill, and in February 1934, the National Economic Commission set up a northwestern branch to oversee development projects in the region. On October 18, 1934, Chiang Kai-shek traveled to Lanzhou, recording in his diary that “Northwest China has abundant resources. Japan and Russia are poised to bully us. Yet, if we strengthen ourselves and develop northwest China to the fullest extent, we can turn it into a base for China's revival.” Interestingly, it was Sichuan, rather than the northwest, that became China's rear base during the 2nd Sino-Japanese War. In October 1934, the Communist army evacuated its Soviet base in southern China, initiating the Long March that would ultimately end in the northwest. By this time, Chiang Kai-shek had decided to designate Sichuan as the last stronghold for China. In January 1935, the Nanchang Field Headquarters of the Military Affairs Commission, responsible for combatting the Communists and serving as the supreme military and political authority over most provinces along the Yangtze River and central China, dispatched a special advisory group to Chongqing. Following this, the Nationalist army advanced into Sichuan. On February 10, the Nationalists appointed a new provincial government in Sichuan, effectively ending the province's long-standing regionalism. On March 2, Chiang traveled to Chongqing, where he delivered a speech underscoring that “Sichuan should serve as the base for China's revival.” He stated that he was in Sichuan to oversee efforts against the Communist army and to unify the provincial administration.  After the Xinhai revolution, the Republic of China was still suing the Qing Dynasty's conscription system. However, once in power, the Nationalist government sought to establish a national military service program. In 1933, it enacted a military service law, which began implementation in 1936. This law categorized military service into two branches: service in the Nationalist army and in territorial citizen army units. Men aged eighteen to forty-five were expected to serve in the territorial units if they did not enlist in the Nationalist army. The territorial service was structured into three phases: active service lasting two to three years, first reserves for six years, and second reserves until the age of forty-five. The Ministry of Military Affairs divided China into sixty divisional conscription headquarters, initially establishing these headquarters in the six provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, and Hubei. By December 1936, approximately 50,000 new soldiers had been drafted. The military service law disproportionately favored the middle and upper classes. Government personnel were exempt from enlistment, allowing privileged families to register their children with government agencies. Similarly, students in middle and higher education were excused from service, while youth from poorer backgrounds often felt compelled to enlist due to financial constraints that limited their educational opportunities. Village and town leaders were responsible for executing the recruitment process and frequently conspired with army recruiters. Recruitment principles often favored wealthier families, with guidelines stating that one son should be drafted for every three sons, two for five sons, but no drafts if there was only one son. Wealthy families could secure exemptions for all their male children, while poor families might see their only son conscripted if they were unable to provide the requisite bribe. Town and village heads wielded significant power in recruitment. This new recruitment system also created numerous money-making opportunities. Military personnel assigned to escort draftees to their units would often allow draftees to escape for a fee. Additionally, draftees could monetize their service by agreeing to serve as substitutes for others. For some, being drafted became an occupation. For example, in 1936, 600 individuals were drafted in the Wuhu area of Anhui province, and accounts from regional administrators indicated that every draftee had either been traded, replaced, or seized. Beginning in 1929, the Nationalist government also instituted military training for high school students and older individuals. Students were required to participate in one theoretical class and one practical class each week, totaling three hours. Starting in 1934, students had to complete a three-month military training program before graduating. Graduates of military academies were employed as military instructors. By the end of 1936, over 237,000 high school students had undergone military training. This student military training was overseen by the Society for the Implementation of the Three People's Principles of Sun Yat-sen, which also provided political education and sometimes gathered information on students' political beliefs.  Although the Nationalists made significant efforts to improve the military training of both officers and troops, they inherited deep-seated challenges that they were unable to completely overcome. A lack of facilities, outdated training manuals, low regard for military instructors, and the ongoing influence of regionalism and warlordism hindered progress. The Japanese would also later exploit these shortcomings of the Nationalist army. The Central Military Academy, which evolved from the Whampoa Military Academy established in 1923 in Guangzhou to train officers for the Northern Expedition, became the primary training institution for junior military officers. The academy offered a basic course, lasting eighteen months, which included general education, specialized training in various subjects, and field practice. This was followed by a two-year cadet training program focused on developing the skills necessary for junior military officers. Seventeen classes were admitted before the outbreak of war. Admission to the academy was highly competitive, with military officers receiving attractive salaries. For instance, in 1935, the academy received 10,000 applications for the twelfth class, but only 7% were accepted. Upon graduation, cadets were typically assigned to divisions within the Nationalist army loyal to Chiang Kai-shek. Their training, influenced by German advisors, resulted in a high-quality cadre. In modern China, most sergeants were veterans. While some units provided training for sergeants, a lack of formal education led to their diminished status. Truly qualified sergeants were rare. During his tenure as Minister of Military Training, General Bai Chongxi proposed establishing a sergeant school and creating a professional noncommissioned officer system; however, the Ministry of Military Affairs opposed this on financial grounds. While commanding officers enjoyed rapid promotions, military instructors did not. Furthermore, there was no system for transferring instructors to field commands or assigning commanders to military academies for extended periods. Despite minor updates to cover modern warfare concepts such as tank warfare and machine guns, Qing Dynasty military manuals were still in use at the Central Military Academy at the start of the war. Yeah, 1937 they were still rocking the old Qing books. Following the establishment of the Ministry of Military Training, a bureau for military translation was set up to evaluate existing course materials and translate military manuals, but its contributions were limited. Another significant shortcoming of military instruction focused on theory at the expense of practical application.  To enhance the quality of military officers, the Nationalist army instituted specialized schools for artillery, infantry, transport, engineering, and signals starting in 1931. These institutions were considered to have high-quality administrators and facilities. The Nationalists adopted German military training models, replacing the previously used Japanese models. They appointed German advisors to oversee instructor training at military academies and established three instructional divisions. By the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, 15,000 students had graduated from programs with a German military influence, resulting in the creation of about fifty combat divisions from these instructional units. However, the progress of other Nationalist army units was limited because their training was not aligned with contemporary battlefield realities. Before World War I, troops operated in close formations due to limited firepower. The widespread introduction of machine guns after World War I necessitated a shift to dispersed formations. Although a new drill manual issued by the Ministry of Military Training in 1935 introduced small-group tactics, few units adopted these methods. General Chen Cheng highlighted another underlying issue in 1938, commenting on the outmoded focus on parade ground drills and formal military manners. He noted, “We have paid too much attention to stereotypical formality and procedures of no practical use. Sometimes, even though soldiers could not get a haircut or take a bath for several months, their camps had to be in order. They underwent intensive training in close-order drill but learned little about gun handling, marksmanship, or maneuvering. This was inappropriate in peacetime, yet we continued this practice even after the Sino-Japanese War started, even using it on highly educated youth.” In contrast, the Communist army simplified training, emphasizing two essential skills: live-fire exercises and physical endurance, which significantly enhanced troop effectiveness in the challenging terrain characteristic of the Sino-Japanese War. Ultimately, the Nationalist army's training did not reach all soldiers. Only about half of all combat soldiers received adequate training, while the rest were neglected. According to statistics from the time, there were approximately five million military personnel during the Sino-Japanese War, with three million serving in logistics. Most of these logistics personnel had received little training, leading to disastrous consequences for overall combat effectiveness. As warfare has become more complex, the role of highly trained staff officers has become increasingly important. Napoleon developed operational plans close to the front and communicated orders via courier. During World War I, military commanders collected information at their headquarters and utilized telephones and automobiles to relay orders to the front lines. In World War II, with the battlefield expanding to include land, sea, and air, senior commanders often made decisions from headquarters far from the action, relying on a significant number of staff officers with specialized skills to keep them informed. In China, however, the staff officer system was underdeveloped. By 1937, only about 2,000 commanders and staff officers had received training. Prior to the Sino-Japanese War, most commanders managed staff work themselves, with staff officers serving primarily as military secretaries who drafted orders, reports, and maps. Many staff officers had no formal military training, and as a whole, the branch lacked respect, causing the most talented officers to avoid serving in it. The situation was even more dire for staff officer departments within local forces. For example, in March 1937, Liu Ziqing, a graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy, was appointed as the director of political instruction in the Forty-fourth Army, a unit under Sichuan warlord Liu Xiang. Liu Ziqing's account illustrates the dysfunction within the ranks: “The commander in chief was not supposed to manage the army and even did not know its whereabouts... But he could appoint relatives and former subordinates—who were officials and businessmen as well—to the army. Each month they would receive a small stipend. At headquarters, there was a long table and two rows of chairs. Around ten o'clock in the morning, senior officers signed in to indicate their presence. Those with other business would leave, while the remaining officers sat down to leisurely discuss star actresses, fortune-telling, business projects, mah-jongg, and opium. Occasionally they would touch on national affairs, chat about news articles, or share local gossip. In the afternoons, they primarily played mah-jongg, held banquets, and visited madams. Most mornings, the commander usually presided over these activities, and at first, I reported for duty as well. But I soon realized it was a waste of time and came very rarely. At headquarters, most staff members wore long gowns or Western-style suits, while military uniforms were a rare sight.” Most senior military personnel were trained at the Baoding Military Academy during the early republic. 2/3rds of commanders in chief, 37 %of army commanders, and 20 % of division commanders were Baoding graduates. Higher-ranking officers were more likely to have launched their careers there. In contrast, only 10 % of division commanders and a few army commanders were graduates of the Whampoa Military Academy. Additionally, commanders trained in local military schools and those with combat experience accounted for 1/3rd of all commanders. While the prevalence of civil war provided opportunities for rapid promotion, it also hindered officers' ability to update their training or gain experience in different military branches. German advisors expressed their concerns to Chiang Kai-shek, emphasizing that officers should first serve in junior roles before taking command. During one battle in 1938, Chiang noted, “Our commanders in chief are equivalent only to our enemy's regiment commanders, and our army and division commanders are only as competent as our enemy's battalion and company commanders.” Despite not viewing high-ranking Japanese officers as great strategists, Nationalist officers respected them as highly competent, diligent, and professional commanders who rarely made critical errors. The infantry was the primary component of the Nationalist army, with middle and junior infantry officers constituting over 80 %of all army officers. A 1936 registry of military officers listed 1,105 colonels and 2,159 lieutenant colonels within the infantry, demonstrating a significant outnumbering of Baoding graduates at ranks below lieutenant colonel. However, the quality of middle and junior infantry officers declined during the Sino-Japanese War; by 1944, only 27.3 % of these officers were from formal military academies, while those promoted from the ranks increased to 28.1 %. In 1937, 80 % of officers in an ordinary infantry battalion were military academy graduates, but this percentage dropped to 20 % during the war. Its hard to tell how educated soldiers were before the war, but it is generally believed that most were illiterate. In 1929, sociologist Tao Menghe surveyed 946 soldiers from a Shanxi garrison brigade and found that only 13 percent could compose a letter independently, while the rest had either never learned to read or were unable to write. In contrast, in August 1938, General Feng Yuxiang found that 80 percent of a regiment in Hunan were literate. Regardless, during the Sino-Japanese War, the quality of recruits steadily declined. More than 90 percent of soldiers were illiterate, and few possessed any basic scientific knowledge, which hindered their ability to master their weapons. On the battlefield, they heavily relied on middle and junior officers for guidance.  In autumn 1933, General Hans von Seeckt, the architect of the post World War I German army, visited China at the personal invitation of Chiang Kai-shek. In his recommendations for military reform, he identified China's greatest problem as its excessively large forces drawn from diverse backgrounds. He stated, “At present, the most pressing goal is to... establish a small, well-equipped army with high morale and combat effectiveness to replace the numerous poorly armed and trained forces.” He suggested forming an army of sixty divisions and recommended the establishment of a training regiment for military officers to equip them with the skills needed for modern warfare. Chiang Kai-shek accepted von Seeckt's proposals, and on January 26, 1935, he convened a National Military Reorganization Conference in Nanjing. On March 1, the Army Reorganization Bureau was established in Wuchang, under the leadership of General Chen Cheng. In the same month, General Alexander von Falkenhausen took charge of the German Military Advisors Group. Before war broke out, around nineteen divisions, roughly 300,000 troops received training from German advisors and were equipped with German-style weapons. At the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, the forces stemming from the First Army of the National Revolutionary Army and the Whampoa cadets, who had fought in the Northern Expedition, held the highest reputation and were referred to as the “core central forces” by the Japanese. Other notable forces included the Guangxi Army, Northwestern Army, Northeastern Army, some Uyghur units, the Guangdong Army, and the Shanxi Army. In contrast, provincial forces such as the Yunnan Army and Sichuan Army were viewed less favorably. Nationalist forces were generally far inferior to those of the Japanese enemy. In 1937, General He Yingqin noted that Nationalist forces had failed to prevail in 1932 and 1933, even when outnumbering the Japanese by 4-1.  In November 1937, during a national defense conference, Chiang Kai-shek stated, "In recent years we have worked hard, prepared actively, and achieved national unification. By the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, we were in a better domestic situation and had improved military preparedness compared to before. Since 1935, our strength has doubled. It increased by more than two to three times since January 1932 or September 1931 [when Japan attacked Shanghai and Mukden]. If peace had been achievable, we should have delayed the war for two or three years. Given an additional three years, our defensive capabilities would have been drastically different... Now, if we merely compare the military strength of China and Japan, we are certainly inferior." However, such assessments were overly optimistic, as Chiang failed to recognize that Japan's military capabilities would not have stagnated. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek certainly was dealt a difficult hand of cards for the upcoming poker match he was to play. Yet the Chinese were resilient and they had to be for the absolute horror that would be inflicted upon them from 1937-1945. Until this point, their enemies had been far more lenient, the Empire of Japan would show no mercy.

Real Life Devon [Redacted silence.] Possibly building up for a season finale of his own. Or meditating on NASA budget cuts. Either way—stoic. Steven We wrapped Andor, and while it stuck the landing, there's still one huge question: Where are Hera, Chopper, and the Ghost crew?! Justice for space moms and droid chaos: #ReleaseAndorTheRebelsCut Also, Steven took us on a wild detour into Monopoly studies with college students—spoiler alert: inherited wealth makes people awful. Shocking, we know. Ben Fresh from science camp and rocking a healthy dose of jet lag, Ben managed to be late to his own poetry reading. But hey—archery, mountain biking, and night hikes do things to a man. Possibly became a druid out there. Future or Now Steven “Hand hand fingers thumb…” No, we didn't start a toddler book club—Steven shared research that suggests chimpanzees drum with distinct rhythmic patterns depending on their subspecies. Which means your drummer friend? Maybe not that unique. The longest drum solo in history begins now. Devon NASA is facing a 53% cut to its science budget under the proposed presidential plan. That includes major slashes to earth and space science programs. Meanwhile, human spaceflight would get a commercial makeover. We quote Devon's son: “Does Trump believe in God?” Also, we're apparently heading back to the moon—just, you know, without a weather report. Read about the cuts Ben Ben took us on an emotional journey through the 2024 animated documentary Piece by Piece, which somehow manages to combine Lego stop-motion, Carl Sagan, and protest imagery into one transcendent experience. Trailer? Here. Carl Sagan clip? Also here. “Happy”? But make it devastating: This. More? Wikipedia's got you. Book Club This week: The Evolution of Human Science by Ted Chiang What if human research became too advanced for most people to understand? No characters, just ideas. It's written like a news article, and it's fascinating. Humanity has split into Normies and Meta-Humans, the latter genetically optimized before birth to the point that they operate on an entirely different intellectual plane. They use “DNT” (Digital Neural Transfer) and leave the rest of us behind with our podcasts and spreadsheets. Thought-provoking stuff. Included with Audible [if you're listening along]. Next week: Liking What You See by Ted Chiang Yes, we're doing another Chiang short, because why not dive deeper into techno-philosophical existential dread? (Roughly 1.5 hours—get reading!) Want more? Join the Discord. Support us on Patreon to get early episodes, bonus content, playlists, and the unedited chaos. And if you're listening on YouTube—hit that subscribe button. Or don't. But then we'll tell the Meta-Humans on you.

  Last time we spoke about the February 26th incident. Within the turbulent “ government of assassination” period of 1936 Japan, a faction of discontented junior officers, known as the Kodoha, believed that their emperor, Hirohito, was being manipulated by corrupt politicians. In a desperate bid for what they termed a "Showa Restoration," they meticulously plotted a coup d'état. On February 26, they launched a rebellion in Tokyo, attempting to assassinate key figures they deemed responsible for undermining the emperor's authority. The young officers executed coordinated attacks on prominent leaders, resulting in several deaths, while hoping to seize control of the Imperial Palace. However, their plan unraveled when their actions met with unexpected resistance, and they failed to secure strategic locations. Dark snow blanketed the city as Hirohito, outraged by the violence, quickly moved to suppress the uprising, which ultimately led to the downfall of the Kodoha faction and solidified the military's grip on power, ushering in a new era marked by militarism and radicalism.   #151 The Suiyuan Operation Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So we last left off with the February 26th incident breaking out in Japan, but now I would like to return to China. Now we spoke a little bit about some influential Japanese politicians in the previous episode. Prime Minister Satio Makoto oversaw Japan from May 1932 to July 1934, succeeded by Prime Minister Keisuke Okada from July 1934 to March 1936. The foreign policy of Japan towards China during the Saitō and Okada administrations exhibited a notable paradox, characterized by two conflicting elements. On one hand, Foreign Minister Hirota championed a diplomatic approach that emphasized friendship, cooperation, and accommodation with China. On the other hand, the military actively undermined the authority of the Nationalist government in northern China, creating a significant rift between diplomatic rhetoric and military action.    The Okada cabinet then endorsed the Army Ministry's "Outline of Policy to Deal with North China" on January 13, 1936. This policy document explicitly proposed the eventual detachment of five provinces, Hubei, Chahar, Shanxi, Suiyuan, and Shandong from the Nationalist government in Nanking. The approval of this outline marked a pivotal moment, as it represented the first official government endorsement of the military's longstanding agenda and underscored the army's evolution from a mere rogue entity operating in the region to the de facto authority dictating the course of Japan's policy towards China. Despite this, on January 22, during the 68th Diet session, Hirota reaffirmed his dedication to fostering better ties with China, to which a representative from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded positively. The Nationalist government in Nanjing also expressed interest in engaging in formal negotiations. However, this diplomatic initiative quickly faltered, and the expected discussions in Nanjing never took place. Shortly thereafter, a mutiny by young army officers on February 26, 1936, led to the fall of the Okada cabinet. Following Prince Konoe Fumimaro's refusal of the imperial mandate to form a new government, Hirota stepped in to establish a cabinet on March 9. General Terauchi Hisaichi was appointed as the Minister of the Army, Admiral Nagano Osami took charge of the Navy Ministry, and Baba Eiichi became the finance minister. Hirota briefly served as foreign minister until Arita Hachirö, who had just submitted his credentials as ambassador to China on March 6, returned to Japan. The Hirota Koki cabinet, established immediately following the February 26 incident further entrenched military influence in politics while allowing interservice rivalries to impede national objectives. In May 1936, Hirota, influenced by army and navy ministers, reinstated the practice of appointing military ministers solely from the ranks of high-ranking active-duty officers. He believed this would prevent associations with the discredited Imperial Way faction from regaining power. By narrowing the candidate pool and enhancing the army's power relative to the prime minister, Hirota's decision set the stage for army leaders to leverage this advantage to overthrow Admiral Yonai's cabinet in July 1940. Arita began his new job by meeting with Foreign Minister Chang Chen while hearing views from the Kwantung Army chief of staff General, Itagaki Seishiro. Yes, our old friend received a lot of promotions. Itagaki had this to say about the Kwantung Army's policy in China "The primary aim of Japan's foreign policy, is the sound development of Manchukuo based upon the principle of the indivisibility of Japan and Manchukuo. If, as is probable, the existing situation continues, Japan is destined sooner or later to clash with the Soviet Union, and the attitude of China at that time will gravely influence operations [against the Soviet Union]." The Kwantung Army's was growing more and more nervous about the USSR following its 7th comintern congress held in July and August of 1935. There it publicly designated Japan, Germany and Poland as its main targets of comintern actions. Japanese intelligence in the Red Army also knew the Soviets were gradually planning to expand the military strength so they could face a simultaneous west and east front war. This was further emboldened by the latest USSR 5 year plan. Alongside the growing Red northern menace, the CCP issued on August 1st a declaration calling upon the Nationalist Government to end their civil war so they could oppose Japan. By this time the CCP was reaching the end of its Long March and organizing a new base of operations in Yenan in northern Shanxi. The developments by the USSR and CCP had a profound effect on Japan's foreign policy in China. The Kwantung Army believed a war with the USSR was imminent and began to concentrate its main force along the border of Manchukuo. The Kwantung Army's plan in the case of war was to seize Vladivostok while advancing motorized units towards Ulan Bator in Outer Mongolia, hoping to threaten the Trans-Siberian Railway near Lake Baikal. Their intelligence indicated the USSR could muster a maximum of 250,000 troops in eastern Siberia and that Japan could deal with them with a force two-thirds of that number. The IJA at that point had inferior air forces and armaments, thus urgent funding was needed. The Kwantung Army proposed that forces in the home islands should be reduced greatly so all could be concentrated in Manchuria. To increase funding so Kwantung leadership proposed doing away with special allowances for Japanese officials in Manchuria and reorganizing the Japanese economic structure. The Kwantung leaders also knew the submarine base at Vladivostok posed a threat to Japanese shipping so the IJN would have to participate, especially against ports and airfields. All said and done, the Kwantung Army planned for a war set in 1941 and advised immediate preparations. On July 23, 1936, Kanji Ishiwara presented the army's document titled “Request Concerning the Development of Industries in Preparation for War” to the Army Ministry. He asserted that in order to prepare for potential conflict with the Soviet Union, Japan, Manchukuo, and North China must have the industries critical for war fully developed by 1941. Ishiwara emphasized the urgent need for rapid industrial growth, particularly in Manchukuo. He followed this request on July 29 with a draft of a “Policy on Preparations for War” regarding the Soviet Union, advocating for immediate reforms to Japan's political and economic systems to facilitate economic expansion and lay the groundwork for future fundamental changes. However, he cautioned that if significant turmoil erupted in economic sectors, Japan must be ready to execute a comprehensive overhaul without delay. At the same time, the Hirota cabinet initiated a review of its policy towards China. In the spring of 1936, a secret committee focused on the Current Situation was formed, consisting of officials from the Army, Navy, and Foreign ministries. Their discussions led to the adoption of the "Measures to Implement Policy toward China" by the Four Ministers Conference on August 11, along with the "Second Outline of Policy to Address North China," which the cabinet approved as part of the "Fundamentals of National Policy" on the same day. The first of these documents outlined the following actionable steps: “1. Conclusion of an anti-Communist military pact. a) To prepare for the conclusion of such a pact, a special secret committee of military experts from both countries should be organized. b) Their discussions should cover the scope and substance of the pact and ways and means of realizing the objectives of the pact.  2. Conclusion of a Sino-Japanese military alliance. A special secret committee, composed of an equal number of delegates from each nation, should be organized to prepare for the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance against attack by a third country.  3. Acceleration of solutions of pending questions between China and Japan. a) Engagement of a senior political adviser: The Nationalist government should engage a senior Japanese political adviser to assist in the conduct of the domestic and foreign affairs of the Nationalist government. b) Engagement of military advisers: The Nationalist government should engage military advisers, along with military instructors. c) Opening of airline services between China and Japan: Airline services between China and Japan should be opened immediately. To realize such a service, various means should be used to induce the Nanking authorities to establish an airline corporation in North China, to begin flights between Formosa and Fukien province, and to start test flights between Shanghai and Fukuoka. d) Conclusion of a reciprocal tariff treaty: A reciprocal tariff treaty should be concluded promptly between China and Japan, on the basis of the policy approved by the ministries concerned, with regard to the abolition of the special trade in eastern Hopei province and the lowering of the prohibitively high tariffs. For this purpose Japan should, if necessary, propose the creation of a special committee composed of Japanese and Chinese representatives.  4. Promotion of economic cooperation between China and Japan. Japan should promote cooperation with the common people of China to establish realistic and inseparable economic relations between China and Japan that will promote coexistence and co-prosperity and will be unaffected by changes in the Chinese political situation. “ The document also included suggestions for Japan's economic expansion into South China. This included tapping into the natural resources of the provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi, building a railway between Guangzhou and Swatow, and establishing air routes between Fuchoz and Taipei, which would connect to services in Japan and Thailand. It also called for survey teams to be dispatched to explore the resources of Sichuan, Gansu, Xinjiang, and Qinghai provinces, and for support to be provided to the independence movement in Inner Mongolia. However, these initiatives presented significant challenges. The preface to the "Second Outline of Policy to Deal with North China" cautioned, "In implementing this policy, we must carefully consider the Nanking government's prestige and avoid actions that could prompt it to adopt an anti-Japanese stance in response to the desires of the Chinese people."  On September 19th, six fundamental points for a settlement in North China were dictated to China to “establish a common defense against communism, promoting economic cooperation, lowering tariffs, initiating an airline service between the two nations, employing Japanese advisers, and controlling subversive Koreans." September 22 was set as the deadline for a response from China. While agreeing to some Japanese requests, the Chinese included several counter-demands that the Japanese found completely unacceptable. These demands required Japan to “(a) refrain from using armed intervention or arbitrary actions in its dealings with China, (b) recognize China as an equal and sovereign state, (c) avoid leveraging antigovernment groups or communist elements, and (d) remove any derogatory references to China from Japanese textbooks. The Chinese also insisted that any agreement regarding North China “must precede the annulment of the Tanggu and Shanghai cease-fire agreements, the disbanding of the East Hopei regime, a prohibition on unauthorized Japanese flights over North China, a ban on smuggling activities by Japanese, the restoration of China's right to control smuggling, and the disbandment of the illegal East Hopei government along with the armies of Wang Ying and Prince De in Suiyuan”. Now that mention of a Prince De in Suiyuan brings us to a whole new incident. This podcast series should almost be called “the history of Japanese related incidents in China”. Now we've spoken at great lengths about Japan's obsession with Manchuria. She wanted it for resources, growing space and as a buffer state. Japan also had her eyes set on Inner Mongolia to be used as a buffer state between Manchukuo, the USSR and China proper. Not to mention after the invasion of North China, Inner Mongolia could be instrumental as a wedge to be used to control Northern China. Thus the Kwantung Army began fostering a Mongolian independence movement back in August of 1933. They did so through a special organ led by chief of the general staff Koiso Kuniaki. He began work with the Silingol League led by Prince Sonormurabdan or “Prince So” and another influential Mongol, Prince Demchukdongrob or “Prince De”. Prince De was the West Sunid Banner in Northern Chahar. Likewise the Kwantung Army was grooming Li Xuxin, a Mongol commoner born in southern Manchuria. He had been a bandit turned soldier absorbed into Zhang Xueliangs army. Li had distinguished himself in a campaign against a group of Mongols trying to restore the Qing dynasty to further establish an independent Mongolia. During Operation Nekka Li had served in a cavalry brigade under Zu Xingwu, reputed to be the best unit in Zhang Xueliangs Northeastern border defense army. He led the army's advance unit into western Shandong. Afterwards Li suddenly became friends with Major Tanaka Hisashi, the head of the Special Service Agency at Dungliao where he defected to the Kwantung Army. He soon was leading a force too strong to be incorporated into the Manchukuo Army, thus it was disbanded, but his Kwantung Army buddies encouraged him to move to Tolun in Rehe province. At one point during the Nekka campaign, Li's army was threatened by a strong Chinese counterattack, but they had Manchukuo air support allowing them to capture Tolun. This victory launched what became the East Chahar Special Autonomous District with Li becoming a garrison commander and chief administrator.  Back in time, upon the founding of the Chinese Republic, the affairs of Inner Mongolia fell upon the Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs. This was reorganized in 1930 into the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs when the provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan and Ningxia were organized. Prince De had been a member of a nationalist group known as the Young Mongols, although his aim was self-determination for Inner Mongolia within China, not independence. The Nationalist government's support for Chinese settlement in Mongol territories and its disregard for Mongol perspectives quickly triggered a rise in Mongol nationalism and anti-Chinese feelings. This was exacerbated by the government's introduction of a law on October 12, 1931, requiring local Mongolian administrative units to consult with hsien officials on matters concerning their administration. The nationalist sentiment was further fueled by the presence of the neighboring Mongolian People's Republic in Outer Mongolia and the establishment of Xingan province in western Manchuria by Manchukuo authorities in March 1932. This new province included the tribes of eastern Inner Mongolia and granted them greater autonomy than other Manchukuo provinces while banning Chinese immigration into it. When Nanjing did not react to these developments, Prince De and his supporters took steps toward gaining autonomy. On July 15th, 1933, Mongol leaders from western Inner Mongolia gathered at Pailingmiao for two weeks to deliberate on a declaration for regional independence. Although many princes were initially hesitant to take this step, they reconvened on August 14 and sent a cable to Nanjing announcing their decision to create an autonomous Mongolian government. The cable was signed by Prince So and Prince De. Over the following two months, additional conferences at Pailingmiao were held to organize the new government, which would operate under Nanking's guidance but without involvement from provincial chairmen. On October 22, Prince Yun, head of the Ulanchap League and a close ally of Prince De, was elected to lead the new regime, with Prince De assuming the role of chief of its political affairs bureau. After receiving a cable from the Mongolian leaders in August, Nanjing quickly sent Minister of the Interior Huang Shao-hung and Xu Qingyang, head of the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, to halt the movement. However, the Mongols declined to travel to Kalgan or Kueisui to meet Huang. In November, as the leader of a special commission appointed by Nanjing, Huang reached an agreement with Yun De and other Mongolian leaders concerning a proposal that abandoned the Mongols' demand for an autonomous government. This agreement was later altered by Nanjing, and its essential points were excluded from a measure approved by the Central Political Council of the Kuomintang on January 17, 1934. The dispute reignited, fueled by the Nationalist government's rising concerns over the anticipated enthronement of Pu Yi in Manchukuo. On February 28, the Central Political Council enacted a measure that outlined "eight principles of Inner Mongolian autonomy" and created the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Council. Since these principles did not grant authority over foreign and military affairs, powers explicitly reserved for the central government in the January measure, they were seen as a concession to the Mongols and were accepted. On March 7, the central government issued regulations to establish a semi autonomous regime for Inner Mongolia, which was officially launched at Pailingmiao on April 23. Although the council was led by three moderate princes, Prince Yun, supported by Princes So and Sha, the real administrative authority was held by Prince De, who served as the secretary-general. Most of the twenty-five council members were of Mongolian royalty, through whom Prince De aimed to fulfill his objectives. Nevertheless, the Nationalist government seemed to consider the council merely a token gesture to placate De, as Nanking never provided the promised administrative funds outlined in the "eight principle declaration." Was not much of a shock Prince De sought support from the Kwantung Army, which had established contact with him as early as June 1934. Japanese pressures in North China were starting to alter the power dynamics, and after the first Western incident in Jehol in February 1935, it compelled the relocation of Sung Queyuan's army from Chahar to Hopei, providing encouragement to Prince De. In May, he met with Kwantung Army Vice Chief of Staff Itagaki Seishirö, Intelligence Section Chief Kawabe Torashirö, and staff officer Tanaka Ryükichi, where he was officially informed for the first time about the Kwantung Army's intention to assist him. On July 25, the Kwantung Army drafted its "Essentials of Policy toward Inner Mongolia," which regarded Japanese support for cooperation between De and Li Xuxin as part of their strategic preparations for a potential conflict with the Soviet Union. Shortly after this policy was adopted, a conflict arose over who had the authority to appoint the head of the Mongol Xukung banner, situated north of the Yellow River and Paot'ou. Following the death of the previous administrator, Prince Xu declared that he had taken control of the position. In response to a request from the local abbot, Prince Yun, acting in his capacity as chairman of the Mongolian Political Council, dismissed Xu. Xu then turned to Nanking through Suiyuan Provincial Chairman Fu Zuoyi, arguing that the central government held the authority to appoint heads of administrative units. In retaliation, Prince De dispatched troops to Xukung. On November 10, Fu presented a mediation proposal, which was rejected since it not only failed to acknowledge Shih's dismissal but also demanded the withdrawal of De's forces. De refused to pull back, further intensifying his hostility toward the Nanking government. In December, the Kwantung Army attempted to move Li's forces from eastern Chahar into the six Xun to the north of Kalgan, which serves as Chahar's granary. Following the Qin-Doihara agreement, Matsui Gennosuke from the Kalgan Special Service Agency secured a deal to separate these six districts from the southern region predominantly populated by Chinese; a Mongolian peace preservation corps was tasked with maintaining order in the northern area, while a Chinese corps was responsible for the south. During the discussions for an autonomous regime centered around Song Queyuan in North China in November 1935, Kwantung Army troops were concentrated around Gubeikou. To exert pressure on Song's rear, the Kwantung Army proposed replacing the Chinese peace preservation unit in the area north of Kalgan with Li Xuxin's army, which would establish this territory as its base.   The operation commenced on December 8. In a surprise attack just before dawn, Li captured Paochang. By December 12, despite facing strong Chinese resistance and the heaviest snowfall in sixty years, Li, aided by Kwantung Army planes disguised as those of the Manchukuo Airline Corporation, had taken control of Kuyuan. Further advances were halted by an order from Kwantung Army headquarters, and on December 13, it was reported that, had the operation not been stopped, Tokyo would have issued an imperial command. The operation had faced opposition from the Tientsin army, which feared it would weaken Song Queyuan's position just as they were informing Tokyo that the autonomy movement was going smoothly. Additionally, both Britain and the United States publicly expressed strong opposition to the Kwantung Army's involvement in the autonomy movement. However, the directive was ultimately prompted by the emperor's anger upon discovering that a unit of the Kwantung Army led by Colonel Matsui Takurö had advanced to Tolun to support Li's progress. Although Li's advance was halted, the operation undeniably contributed to the formation of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council.   Although the operation was halted, the Kwantung Army remained committed to its objectives. They contended that Li's army's advance into the six districts north of Kalgan was merely a peace preservation unit moving into territory within the truce line established by the Tanggu Agreement. Consequently, on December 29, they ordered Li to advance southward. Li peacefully occupied Changpei the following day and entered Shangtu on December 31. Manchukuo civil officials were appointed to oversee the six districts, and the currency of Manchukuo was introduced, although the existing tax system initially remained unchanged. The Kwantung Army allocated silver worth 6 million yuan to support administrative expenses. This outcome, known as the Eastern Chahar incident, marked a complete success for the Kwantung Army, which then redirected its focus toward Suiyuan Province. Each year, the Kwantung Army developed a secret plan for covert operations for the following year. The 1936 plan included strategies to secure air bases for routes connecting Europe and Asia, targeting Tsinghai and Sinkiang provinces, Outer Mongolia, Western Mongolia, and even remote areas of Ningxia province. In January 1936, staff officer Tanaka Ryūkichi formulated a document titled "Essentials of Policy Toward (Northwestern) Inner Mongolia." This document advocated for the establishment of a Mongolian military government to facilitate Japanese operations in northwestern Mongolia and suggested pushing Fu Tso-yi out of Suiyuan into Shansi province. Tanaka's proposals were incorporated into the final plan of the Kwantung Army, ultimately leading to the Suiyuan incident of November 1936. In February 1936, a meeting at Pailingmiao, where Prince De proposed the independence of Inner Mongolia, resulted in the departure of Prince So and several other Mongolian leaders from the coalition. They sought to establish a rival political council at Kueisui under the protection of Fu Zuoyi. By April, De and his supporters decided to form a military government at Tehua in Chahar, which was officially inaugurated in June as the Inner Mongolian government, headed by De with Li Shou-hsin as his deputy. This new government quickly signed a mutual assistance treaty with Manchukuo, and the emperor granted De the title of prince.   In July, at a conference in Tehua, Tanaka was appointed as the head of the Special Service Agency for Inner Mongolia with the mission of implementing the army's Intelligence Section plans. He traveled to Pingtiqüan alongside Chief of Staff Itagaki and Intelligence Chief Mutō Akira to propose a local anti-Communist agreement to Fu. After failing to convince Fu, he attempted to persuade Sun Tien-ying to form a puppet army but managed to recruit only a bandit from Suiyuan, Wang Ying. The February 26 mutiny in Tokyo heightened anti-Japanese sentiments in China, resulting in increased violence. By August, the construction of an airplane hangar in Paot'ou was halted due to riots by local Chinese residents. On August 13, a group of fifteen Japanese, led by Nakajima Manzo, was ambushed while delivering ammunition to a pro-Japanese leader who was shortly thereafter assassinated. Chinese soldiers from Wang Qingkuo's 70th Division carried out the attack, and tensions escalated as the arrival of ammunition and Japanese laborers in Kalgan prompted border villages to strengthen their defenses.   By late September, Tanaka's "Guidelines for the Execution of the Suiyuan Operation" received approval, with operations set to commence in early November. The plan evolved from a covert mission into a personal initiative by Tanaka, financed largely through funds from the Kwantung Army's secret services and profits from special trading in eastern Hopei. Tanaka claimed to have transported 600,000 yen to Tehua in October and later sent 200,000 yuan into Inner Mongolia, estimating total expenses at approximately 6 million yen. He acquired new weaponry from the disbanded Northeast Army and established three clandestine forces: Wang Ying led 500 men, including artillery; Qin Xiashan commanded 3,000 from Sun Tienying's army; and Chang Futang also led 3,000 specialized units. During strategic meetings, Tanaka dismissed proposals for unified command and refusing to integrate secret units into the Mongolian army. He advocated for the slogan "Overthrow Chiang Kai-shek," while Matsui managed to include "Independence for Inner Mongolia."   The Japanese had developed the entire battle strategy. The 1st Army, commanded by Li Xuxin, would serve as the left flank, while the 2nd Army, led by Demchugdongrub, would be positioned on the right. Wang Ying's forces were designated as the central force. Their initial targets would be Hongort, Xinghe, Tuchengzi, and Guisui city, followed by a division to seize Jinging, Baotou, and Hetao. On November 13, Prince Demchugdongrub's and Wang Ying's forces left Shandu in two columns to assault Xinghe and Hongort. By the 15th, 1,500 troops reached Hongort, where they engaged the 1st Cavalry Division led by Peng Yubin. The next day, Ryukichi Tanaka, Demchugdongrub's chief advisor, sent two cavalry brigades and one infantry brigade to capture the town, effectively overrunning its defenders. Meanwhile, Wang Ying dispatched a smaller group to secure Tuchengzi.   Fu Zuoyi established his headquarters in Jining that same day. After assessing the situation, he concluded that if the enemy secured Hongort, it would diminish his defenders' morale. Consequently, he launched a counterattack. Peng Yubin led a joint force of the 1st Cavalry Division and Dong Qiwu's 218th Brigade to confront around 400 of Wang Ying's men defending Hongort and Tuchengzi. By 7 AM on the 18th, Tuchengzi was reclaimed, and at 8:30 AM, the 1st Cavalry Division entered Hongort, charging through 500 of Wang Ying's soldiers. The struggle for Hongort persisted for over three days, resulting in nearly 1,000 casualties before Fu Zuoyi regained control.   As the tide shifted against the invaders, Fu Zuoyi initiated an offensive toward the Bailing Temple, the rear base of the enemy, well-stocked and defended by 3,000 men under Prince Demchugdongrub. Fu Zuoyi ordered the 2nd Cavalry Division, along with the 211th and 315th Brigades, the 21st Artillery Regiment, and a convoy of 20 trucks and 24 armored vehicles to assault the Bailing Temple as quickly as possible. Taking advantage of the Mongolian chaos, Fu Zuoyi's 35th Brigade executed a flanking maneuver west of the Bailing Temple amid a severe snowstorm.   At 1 AM on the 24th, the battle for the Bailing Temple commenced as the Chinese engaged the Mongolians for the fortified positions around the temple. From 2 to 4 AM, the Chinese advanced closer to the temple walls, facing artillery and machine-gun fire. They launched desperate frontal assaults against the city gates, suffering heavy losses. A fierce stalemate ensued, with Japanese aerial bombardments causing significant casualties to the Chinese forces. Fu Zuoyi subsequently ordered all armored vehicles to converge at the main city gate. Despite intense fire, the armored cars managed to breach the gate, allowing Chinese infantry to flood into the temple area. The resulting carnage within the temple walls led to 900 Mongol deaths, with 300 captured as the rest fled. The Chinese suffered 300 casualties but secured the strategically vital rear base, along with a substantial stockpile of provisions, including 500 barrels of petrol, 600 rifles, 10 machine guns, vehicles, and field guns. Following the devastating defeat at Bailing Temple, the invaders regrouped at Xilamuleng Temple. On the 28th, the Japanese sent 100 vehicles to transport 3,000 troops to prepare for a significant counteroffensive to recapture Bailing Temple. On the 29th, Wang Ying personally led 2,000 cavalry north of Shangdu to Taolin in an attempt to contain the enemy. However, after he left the bulk of his forces at Xilamuleng Temple, officers from the Grand Han Righteous Army secretly began negotiating to defect to the Chinese side, undermining the forces needed for the counterattack against Bailing Temple.   The counteroffensive commenced on December 2nd, with 10 armored vehicles and 1,000 Mongol troops leading the charge at 6 AM. They were pushed back by the heavily fortified 211th Brigade, which was well-supplied with machine guns and artillery. The following day, at 3 AM, the Mongols attempted a surprise attack but faced an ambush as they crept toward the temple. They incurred hundreds of casualties, with 230 men either captured or having defected. After this, the counterattack stalled, as the Mongol forces couldn't approach within 3 miles of the temple. Subsequently, the Chinese 2nd Cavalry Division launched a pincer maneuver, causing significant casualties among the invaders. By 9 AM, the enemy had suffered 500 casualties and was in retreat. At 7 PM, Fu Zuoyi ordered another counteroffensive. By the next morning, hundreds more had been lost, and several hundred soldiers were captured. With such heavy losses, the defense of Xilamuleng Temple weakened significantly, prompting more officers to defect to the Chinese. Late on the 4th, Fu Zuoyi assembled a force comprising two cavalry regiments, one infantry regiment, one artillery battalion, four armored vehicles, and a squadron of cars to launch a nighttime assault on Xilamuleng Temple.   Meanwhile, the 2nd Cavalry Division clashed with Wang Ying's cavalry 30 miles northeast of Wulanhua. Wang Ying's 2,000 cavalry had been raiding nearby villages to create diversions, drawing enemy forces away from the Bailing-Xilamuleng theater. By the 9th, Wang Ying's cavalry were encircled in Xiaobei, where they were nearly annihilated, with Wang escaping with around a hundred guards toward Changpei. On the 7th, some Grand Han Righteous Army officers set in motion plans to defect to the Chinese side. Early on the 9th, these officers led their men to invade the residence of Japanese advisors, killing all 27 Japanese officers under Colonel Obama. Simultaneously, Fu Zuoyi's forces executed a flanking maneuver against the Xilamuleng Temple amidst the chaos. With mass defections, the Chinese forces surged into the temple area, resulting in the invader army disintegrating in confusion and surrender. After seizing the temple, the invaders were routed, their lines of communication severed, and only isolated pockets continued to resist. Taking advantage of the confusion, Fu Zuoyi launched simultaneous attacks, attempting to capture Shangdu. However, Yan Xishan sent him a telegram, ordering him to halt, stating that Shangdu fell under the jurisdiction of Shanxi and not Suiyuan.   In response to the loss, Tanaka planned a counteroffensive with Qin's troops, but Chiang kai-shek commanded a strong defense of Pailingmiao, successfully outmaneuvering Tanaka's strategies. The resurgence of Chinese forces led to the disintegration of Qin's troops, who revolted and eventually joined the Nationalist army. The Kwantung Army aimed to redeploy its forces for recovery but faced opposition from Tokyo, which criticized the situation. After Chiang kai-shek was kidnapped by Zhang Xueliang on December 12, Tanaka and Prince De seized the opportunity to reassess their strategy. Ultimately, the Kwantung Army decided to abandon efforts to reclaim Pailingmiao, marking the official end of hostilities on December 21. The Suiyuan incident ultimately strengthened Chinese resolve against Japan and increased international distrust.   The defeat of Japan's proxy forces inspired many Chinese to advocate for a more vigorous resistance against the Japanese. The triumph in Suiyuan was celebrated throughout China and surprised the international media, marking the first occasion where the Chinese army successfully halted a Japanese unit. Delegations traveled from as distant as southern Chinese provinces to encourage the defenders to continue their fight. Captured Japanese weapons and equipment served as proof of Japan's involvement in the conflict, despite Japan's Foreign Minister Hachirō Arita claiming that "Japan was not involved in this conflict in Suiyuan at all." After his defeat, Prince Demchugdongrub and his Inner Mongolian troops retreated to northern Chahar, where he had to reconstruct his army due to significant losses. The Japanese implemented new regulations for the Mongolian Army to enhance its effectiveness, and efforts to recruit new soldiers commenced.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. More incidents and more battles to seize territory raged in North China. However things did not go according to plan for the Japanese and their puppets. The tides had turned, and now a more angry and invigorating China would begin lashing out against the encroachment. It was only a matter of time before a full blown war was declared. 

Summary Dr. Elisa Chiang discussed strategies for creating predictability in unpredictable economic times, emphasizing that the fundamentals of the economy are generally sound, with current uncertainty stemming from external factors. She highlighted the importance of understanding economic interrelations and the potential impact of challenging international relationships. Dr. Chiang suggested that individuals and businesses should evaluate their dependencies and explore ways to become more self-reliant. For physicians, this includes recognizing the value of their skills and exploring options beyond traditional employment, such as private practice or becoming invaluable within their current roles. She also emphasized the importance of diversifying income streams and managing personal finances to reduce reliance on a single paycheck. The conversation also covered strategies for physicians to increase their income, such as specializing in high-value procedures, leveraging support staff, and improving efficiency. Dr. Chiang advised questioning fixed mindsets, challenging existing beliefs, and experimenting with new approaches to adapt to unpredictable times. She also discussed tax planning, investment strategies, and the importance of maintaining a long-term perspective when dealing with market volatility. For those nearing retirement, she recommended assessing risk tolerance, diversifying portfolios, and building a cash cushion. Dr. Chiang offers one-on-one coaching to help individuals navigate their financial situations and achieve their financial goals. Her podcast, 'Grow Your Wealthy Mindset,' provides financial literacy in bite-sized pieces, helping listeners build the knowledge and mindset needed to create financial stability. Chapters Introduction to Predictability in Unpredictable Times Elisa Chiang was invited to discuss creating predictability in unpredictable economic times. The discussion is framed as non-political, focusing on the factual unpredictability of the world. The goal is to provide strategies for individuals to make their financial situations more predictable. Economic Fundamentals and Global Interdependence Chiang stated that the fundamentals of the economy are still good, unlike the issues in 2008 with banking regulation. The current uncertainty is attributed to the actions and statements of certain individuals. The discussion highlights the importance of understanding the complexities of economics and global interrelations. Anytime decisions are made from an independent place, you start to realize we're actually not independent at all. Challenging Independence and Embracing Interdependence Chiang suggests challenging the idea of complete independence and recognizing interdependence on others. Asking questions about dependencies and self-reliance is valuable, but actions must be carefully considered. Many people feel dependent on their paycheck, but physicians have options due to the physician shortage. Separating the ability to produce income from the current job can create stability. Creating Independence and Managing Control The discussion covers the mentality behind creating a private practice and the desire for independence. It's noted that even in private practice, there is still interdependence on systems and people. The focus should be on how to become independent and self-determining results in situations where you don't have control over all of these things. It's important to understand what you can and can't control. Strategies for Exerting Independence Chiang suggests becoming an entrepreneur within your job to make yourself invaluable. This involves attracting patients directly and highlighting your value to the practice or institution. Employers care about generating income, so making yourself invaluable in this area is crucial. Taking care of personal finances and creating multiple income streams reduces reliance on a single paycheck. Translating Value into Income The inherent value of experience, training, and knowledge is highlighted. Physicians translate this value into income through their actions. The trap of trading time for money limits income potential unless value is translated into different income streams. The discussion explores ways physicians can generate income outside the classic RVU model. Increasing Income within the Physician Realm Specializing in specific procedures or surgeries can elevate income. Leveraging other people, such as nurse practitioners, can double clinic output. Hiring scribes can increase productivity and collections. Physicians should work at the top of their income level, delegating tasks to others. Mindset Shifts for Unpredictable Times Adopting a growth mindset can help individuals respond more effectively in unpredictable times. Questioning current beliefs and challenging the status quo is important. Comparing oneself to others who are thriving can provide insights and motivation. Willingness to spend money to make money and accepting failure are key to success. Helping Individuals Deal with Change Questioning the truth of current situations and exploring potential changes is crucial. Experimenting with small changes and learning from others can lead to improvements. Advocating for necessary resources, such as dedicated scrub techs, can increase efficiency. Believing in the potential for change and presenting a clear case for it is essential. Financial Viability in Private Practice A simple formula for private practice success is income minus expenses minus tax burden. All three factors can be influenced in different ways. Leveraging people, doing more cases, and optimizing income streams are ways to increase income. Tax burden can be managed through various strategies. Tax Planning and Side Businesses Every time is unpredictable, so framing the mindset accordingly is important. The more we think like, yeah, the world is doing whatever it's worlding. The world is doing whatever it's doing. We can make our own predictivity, then we don't have to keep thinking like, oh, it's unpredictable, and we have no way to affect it. It's just always unpredictable. As a W-2 employee, there are limited options for tax reduction. Having a side business can provide opportunities to write off personal expenses. Side hustles should align with passions and translate into value and money. Time Management and Productivity Finding something else that you need to find you having to find more time in order to do something helps you structure your time so that you are most efficient with your time. Limited time resources require careful management. Calendaring and time-blocking can improve efficiency. Having a list of tasks that can be done in 10-15 minute intervals can boost productivity. Managing Retirement Funds If retirement is 10 years or more away, continue with the financial plan and consider contributing more. Maximize retirement accounts and explore other savings options. Buying stocks when they are on sale can be a great strategy. Establish a risk tolerance and adjust investment strategies accordingly. Investment Strategies and Risk Tolerance The stock market tends to go up over time, especially with more people investing. Investing during downturns can lead to better outcomes. Even in retirement, there is still a long investing career ahead. Avoid panic selling and maintain a long-term perspective. Retirement Planning and Withdrawal Rates Assess investment strategies and consider shifting to a more conservative portfolio if nearing retirement. Develop a cash cushion to avoid selling stocks during the first few years of retirement. Understand what money is for and focus on enjoyment and security. Consider a Monte Cristo analysis to assess the chances of running out of money. Dr. Chang's Coaching and Podcast Chiang offers one-on-one coaching to help individuals reach their financial goals. She provides a judgment-free zone to discuss finances and job transitions. Her podcast, 'Grow Your Wealthy Mindset,' provides financial literacy in bite-sized pieces. The podcast helps listeners learn the information and mindset needed to create financial stability. Action Items Dr. Chiang suggested individuals and businesses should evaluate their dependencies and explore ways to become more self-reliant. Dr. Chiang advised physicians to recognize the value of their skills and explore options beyond traditional employment. Dr. Chiang emphasized the importance of diversifying income streams and managing personal finances. Dr. Chiang recommended questioning fixed mindsets and experimenting with new approaches. Dr. Chiang advised assessing risk tolerance and diversifying portfolios. Dr. Chiang recommended building a cash cushion for those nearing retirement.Growyourwealthymindset.com

“Incomprehensible guttural noises”The HeptapodsArrival is as difficult a movie to discuss in the limited space of our show notes as it is a truly great work of modern science fiction filmmaking. It's also virtually impossible to discuss without spoilers. Heck, we had trouble cramming our discussion of the central concepts of the film into  One of director Denis Villeneuve's crowning cinematic achievements (and almost certainly the thing that made us all realize that he might be the only director who would be able to get Dune right on screen), Arrival is an alien invasion movie unlike any other, one in which the humans don't cope with our new and strange looking neighbors with aggression, but rather by using science and reasoning to understand and communicate with them. Imagine that!You might fancy yourself a wiseacre and suggest the very notion of science and reasoning “does not fly” given the state of the world these days, but let's set that cynicism aside for the moment and get at the heart of this week's topic. Because in order to understand the way these aliens (the heptapods, not to be confused with Hakeem's ongoing Planet of the Cephalopods pitch) communicate via bizarre and smoky glyphs, humans are able to change their perception of time itself. You've heard of “perception determines reality” so get ready for “language affects perception which thus helps determine reality.” And if that sounds confusing, don't worry, because you've got Dr. Hakeem Oluseyi and Tamara Krinsky to hold your smoky hand (limb?) and walk you through it (forwards, backwards, and perhaps both at once). All of this and more is explored on a special, extra-sized episode of Does it Fly?...https://youtu.be/K_Duabt4f1s?si=9MGhHmj22EatyFQ8SUGGESTED VIEWING You mean you haven't seen Arrival? And you're watching and/or listening to this show? What's wrong with you! Go watch one of the most beautiful sci-fi movies of the last 25 years and THEN come back and hang out with us.FURTHER READING Do you want to delve a little deeper into the facts, concepts, and stories Hakeem and Tamara referenced in today's episode? Of course you do!Story of Your LifeArrival is based on a short story by Ted Chiang, called “Story of Your Life” which won the 1999 Hugo Award for Best Novella. It's available in a collection of Chiang's short stories, Stories of Your Life and Others.Relativity in ArrivalAlso known as the Sapir-Worf Hypothesis, based on the work of Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf, but actually first stated as such Harry Hoijer in 1954. To quote Hoijer (via the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy who have the most comprehensive explanation of this that we've been able to find): “language functions, not simply as a device for reporting experience, but also, and more significantly, as a way of defining experience for its speakers.” Arrival takes that to the next level by showing how it could define how we experience time itself! It also incorporates elements of the Many-Worlds theory, which we discussed in our Back to the Future episode!For extra credit, read up on Presentism, which postulates that only the current moment we live in is actual existence vs Eternalism, which states that our past AND future are equally real at all times. Then go take an Advil or something.The End of TimeNo, we're not talking about whatever horrors have you doomscrolling at the moment. It's Julian Barbour's book The End of Time: The Next Revolution in Our Understanding of the Universe, which argues that time as we know/perceive it, isn't really a thing.Speaking of time being an illusion…PsilocybinWe aren't endorsing anything, but…WANT MORE FROM DOES IT FLY?Speaking of some of the greatest sci-fi movies of the 21st Century, we'd like to remind you that Children of Men also exists and we dug into the disturbing real world implications of that movie right here.Andor season 2 is currently reminding people how good Star Wars can be when it actually has a conscience, so we took a look at the Star Wars franchise's most powerful and iconic megaweapon, the Death Star in one of our best episodes ever! FOLLOW US!Stay in the loop! Follow DoesItFly? on YouTube and TikTok and let us know what you think! Subscribe to Does It Fly? Pod: https://www.youtube.com/@doesitflypod?sub_confirmation=1And don't forget to follow Roddenberry Entertainment:Instagram: @RoddenberryOfficial Facebook: RoddenberryBluesky: @roddenberrypod.bsky.socialFor Advertising Inquiries: doesitfly@roddenberry.comCheck out the official Does it Fly? playlist, too!

Ep 234: Joyce Chiang A woman disappeared from Dupont Circle, DC in 1999. 25 years later, her case remains unsolved This is the Joyce Chiang story. Sources for Today's Episode: Los Angeles Times Washington City Paper NBC 4 Washington The Washington Post WTTG Fox 5 Unsolved.com Sponsors: (thanks for using our promo codes, it really does help the show!) Chewy - Chewy has everything you need to keep your pet happy and healthy. And right now you can save $20 on your first order and get free shipping by going to Chewy.com/women. Shopify - If you want to see less carts being abandoned, its time for you to head over to Shopify. Sign up for your o$1-per-month trial and start selling today at shopify.com/crimewomen Credits: Written and Hosted by Amy Shlosberg and Meghan Sacks Produced by James Varga Audio Editor, Jose Alfonzo Script Editor, Abagail Belcastro Music by Dessert Media Get Even More Women&Crime Episodes: Patreon - Ad-free shows starting at $2 a month, or upgrade for $5 a month to get a new extra episode every month, as well as exclusive virtual HappyHours with Meg & Amy. Check-out other tiers for perks such as lectures, true crime book club, and more! Visit our Patreon page for more info: https://www.patreon.com/womenandcrime Apple Subscriptions - Exclusive episodes and ad-free regular stories are now available through Apple's podcast app for only $4.99 a month, or save with an annual membership. YouTube Memberships - Exclusive episode available on YouTube for only $4.99 a month. https://www.youtube.com/@WomenandCrime/membership Help is Available: If you or someone you know is in a crisis situation, or a victim of domestic, or other violence, there are many organizations that can offer support or help you in your specific situation. For direct links to these organizations please visit https://womenandcrimepodcast.com/resources/ Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Last time we spoke about Operation Nekka, the Invasion of Rehe Province. In 1932, the Kwantung Army eyed Rehe province as vital for Manchukuo's success. General Tang Yulin, ruling Rehe, initially favored Japanese interests due to economic ties, particularly in opium. Tensions escalated after a Japanese civilian was abducted, prompting military actions that led to skirmishes in Shanhaiguan. Amidst growing conflict, Zhang Xueliang mobilized forces against Tang, who eventually conceded. As Japan prepared for invasion, both sides strategized, with Chiang Kai-Shek reluctant to engage directly, fearing Japanese influence over his rivals. Operation Nekka commenced, showcasing the Kwantung Army's efficiency as they swiftly routed Chinese forces in Rehe. By March 4th, key passes were captured, but fierce resistance emerged. General Nishi faced counterattacks, leading to strategic retreats. Meanwhile, Chiang Kai-Shek struggled with internal conflicts while managing the Japanese threat. As the Kwantung Army pushed beyond the Great Wall, logistical issues arose, prompting political maneuvers to secure local warlord alliances. However, plans faltered when Zhang Qingyao, a potential ally, was assassinated.   #147 The Battle for the Great Wall of China Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Thus in the previous episode, Operation Nekka had been unleashed. The Kwangtung Army tossed 2 divisions into Rehe province with the intent of forcing its annexation into Manchukuo. They were under strict orders to not extend operations past the Great Wall of China. However they believed it was necessary to seize the main gateways along the Great Wall of China to establish their new borders, and in order to do so this absolutely required going past them. Yet military operations were not the only means to secure their goals. The Japanese forces faced significant logistical challenges, including a shortage of troops, having advanced into Rehe with only 20,000 men. Even the most resolute general in the Kwantung Army doubted that their military strength could prevail against the vast numbers of Chinese troops in the plains of Hubei. As a result, they needed to supplement their military efforts with political strategies targeting regional warlords. The tactic of bribing local elites had proven highly effective during the pacification of Manchuria, and there was no reason to think it wouldn't work in North China as well. All of these actions were carried out without any oversight from Tokyo headquarters.   On February 13, 1933, Itagaki Seishiro, who was then the head of the Mukden Special Service Agency, was transferred to the General Staff without any formal announcement of his promotion. He took up a position in Tientsin specifically to initiate political maneuvers in eastern Hubei, leading to the establishment of the Tientsin Special Service Agency. Initially, this agency sought to engage various competing warlords in North China, including Duan Qirui, Wu Peifu, and Sun Chuanfang, but eventually focused on Zhang Qingyao. Zhang had previously been a protégé of Duan Qirui, serving as the civil and military governor of Henan province. He had fought against Zhang Zuolin in 1925 before shifting his allegiance to Wu Peifu. During the second phase of the Northern Expedition, Zhang Qingyao again battled Zhang Zuolin, who was then in control of the National Pacification Army. After the Northern Expedition concluded, he allied with Yan Xishan's forces in Shanxi. So yeah it would seem he was not a man of principles nor loyalties of any kind. The Tientsin Special Service Agency initially aimed to approach Zhang Qingyao in hopes that he could orchestrate a coup d'état against Chiang Kai-Shek. They also hoped to persuade other figures such as Song Queyuan, Zhang Zuoxiang, Fang Chenwu, Xu Yusan, Zhang Tingshu, Sun Tienying, and Feng Zhanhai to join in. If successful, this could lead to a swift takeover of North China as they were advancing towards Peiping after taking the Great Wall. However, on May 7, Zhang Qingyao was assassinated, completely derailing their plans. With Zhang Qingyao dead, the agency concentrated their efforts instead to instigate riots in the Peiping-Tientsin region. They also began encouraging and propping up new political organizations that sought to form an independent northern regime. One scheme they were performing was to form a committee composed of Northern Warlords headed by Lu Zengyu, a banker who had studied in Japan. The idea was to form an anti-Chiang Kai-Shek coalition to carve out north china. The agency received a significant amount of funds to make ends meet. Itagaki alone would spend over 50,000 yen to try and bring about an anti-Chiang regime in the north. Some sources indicated over 3 billion yen being allocated to the IJA to be dished out to various Chinese warlords and elites in the form of bribes.  Meanwhile operations in the district east of the Luan River saw attacks formed against the Xumenzhai and Lengkou gateways. On April 1st, the Kwantung Army issued Order 491, seeing the Iwata detachment of the IJA 6th Division storm through the Xumenzhai gate and succeed in securing a supply route behind the great wall to help with the assaults against the other gateways in the region. By April 10th, the IJA 6th Division was making steady progress against the Lengkou gate. The next day they stormed through and captured Qienqangying, pursuing the retreating Chinese to the banks of the Luan River. Meanwhile the IJA 8th Division were facing a much more difficult situation. On the 12th, they captured Xifengkou, but their assault against Quehlingkou was going nowhere. After repeated assaults, the Chinese finally retreated, allowing the Japanese to focus on Taitouying. Thus from the 10th to the 23rd the gateways in northeastern Hubei were all falling into Japanese hands. The Kawahara Brigade was well on its way towards Nantienmen. The Operations within the Great Wall area had been fully authorized by Generals Nishi and Sakamoto. However there still existed limits upon the operations. For example, Operations order 495 issued by General Muto given on the 11th stated "Without specific orders, pursuit by the main force of ground troops is to be limited to the line connecting Hotung, Chiench'angying, and T'ait'ouying; but air units are to be limited to the Luan River."  Meanwhile the Special Service Agency in Tientsin had reported that Zhang Qingyao would stage a coup on the 21st and this prompted Song Queyuans troops to prevent the Central Army forces from fleeing towards Peiping. The Agency requested that the Kwantung Army not return to the Great Wall and instead perform a feint attack towards Peiping and Tientsin to scare the Chinese. As the plot was reaching its climax, on the 18th the Kwantung Army chief of staff, General Koiso Kuniaki issued a order for the 8th Division to strike in full force against the Gubeikou area. The Kwantung Army's plan was to bomb Miyun while launching their feint attack in combination with an all out effort to break Gubeikou. However on the night of the 18th, all of these plans changed dramatically. Suddenly General Muto issued Operations Order 498, hastily ordering all forces to withdraw to the Great Wall. Emperor Hirohito had decided to put his foot down. In Tokyo the emperor asked the vice chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Mazaki Jinzaburö, "Has the Kwantung Army withdrawn from the Luan River line?" The vice chief retired from the imperial presence with a sense of guilt and wrote a confidential letter to the commander of the Kwantung Army. It was personally carried by Infantry Captain Katö [Michio] of the General Staff, who on April 19 arrived at the capital [of Manchukuo] bearing an imperial rescript. The vice chief also cabled to the chief of staff of the Kwantung Army a highly confidential dispatch, the main point of which stated, "Withdraw your troops immediately, or an imperial command will be issued." Thereupon the chief of staff of the Kwantung Army directed staff officer Endò Saburò to draft the withdrawal order. Thus as a result, the Kwantung Army began a withdrawal on the 21st, the same day the Peiping coup was to be unleashed. Those around Emperor Hirohito at this time have gone on the record to state it seemed to them, the emperor had hesitated heavily on issuing the withdrawal order. His motivations for giving the order are simply, the Kwantung Army had gone against his decrees, it was an identical situation to what had happened at Mukden in 1931. The Kwantung Army had no choice but to submit to what essentially was him “asking them to stop”. With that, operations east of the Luan River were over, for now. The order was certainly a critical blow to the Agency in Tientsin. How did they react? They doubled down on the coup effort. Likewise Koiso did not stop the 8th Division operation at Gubeikou. Instead the 8th Division was given orders "to maintain a menacing attitude toward hostile forces in North China." In accordance, the 3800 man Kawahara Brigade on direct orders from General Nishi, launched an attack against two Central Army Divisions numbered nearly 30,000 men stationed at Nantienmen. After a brutal week of battle the Kawahara Brigade seized the town. Meanwhile a battalion of 280 men led by Colonel Shimmura Eijiro attacked a central army force around 4000 strong at Xinglong. They suffered a 38% rate of casualties by the night of the 27th. The Battalion was nearly annihilated when suddenly the Chinese withdrew enabling the Japanese to slip by. Meanwhile the Piping coup did not materialize as planned on the 21st. Instead a secondary coup was initiated by Zhang Zuoxiang on the 26, but this misfired greatly. Reports began to emerge that troops led by Zhang Tingxu, Sun Tienying, Feng Zhanhai and Xu Yusan were willing to rebel in response to the failed coup attempts, but this proved completely false. A report issued on the 30th stated troops under Fang Chenwu were rebelling against Chiang Kai-Shek. However in reality Fang Chenwu only advanced his force north on May 10th and it was to join the anti-Japanese forces.  From mid April to mid May, the United States, Britain, France and Germany finally entered the fray in North China. It was an extremely chaotic situation for everyone. The Japanese military in Tokyo had no control nor idea what the Kwantung Army was doing, so when they tried to explain their actions to the international community, they continuously were walking over rakes. All the talk from Tokyo seemed incomprehensible to the other great powers. The Chinese were clamouring the entire time for a ceasefire agreement, but lacked the means to force the Japanese to do so. Japan had left the League of Nations, thus was extremely isolated and insecure in regards to foreign relations. Thus if a nation like Britain or the US had actually put their foot down, the Japanese more than likely would have backed off. Another element to this debacle was the stance of the Imperial Japanese Navy, who had made it adamantly clear they had zero intention of fighting off the British or Americans because of their unruly siblings within the Army. However, both Britain and America were too preoccupied with internal strife, mostly the result of the Great Depression, to devote considerable effort to the crisis in China. The League of Nations remained completely useless during the North China incident, similarly to how they were useless with the Manchurian incident. The Lytton Commission had performed an on the spot inquiry, and it did play a role in establishing a ceasefire by the time of the Shanghai incident, but did nothing to really help China. China had begun appealing to the League when Shanhaiguan was attacked and this prompted the nations of the league to rapidly agree to the Lytton Commission report's recommendations. In turn this led Matsuoka Yosuke to walk out on the league. With Japan out of the League, Wellington Koo proposed harsh sanctions upon Japan in response to their invasion of Rehe province. Yet they did nothing. China would continuously make pleas, but it was to no avail.  Rather than rely upon the League, the Chinese began secret talks with Japanese officials aiming first for a ceasefire. Tang Erho, Lee Shuzheng and Wang Komin attempted talks, but failed. Then Chen Yi the political vice minister of military affairs, secretly spoke with Nemoto Hiroshi, an army attache at the Shanghai legation on April 27th. They established negotiations with Nemoto speaking on behalf of the Kwantung Army and Chen Yi on behalf of Ho Yingqin. The Chinese were clearly more eager than the Japanese for a ceasefire, but the Japanese no longer had a rationale to continue their operation. Regardless the Japanese took the victors stance and demanded the Chinese withdraw from the battlefield as a prerequisite to further Japanese advances. In the first meeting, Nemoto told Chen that the Kwantung Army had already withdrawn from the area east of the Luan River to give Ho Yingqin an opportunity to consider a ceasefire. He described the action as a friendly gesture and suggested the Chinese reciprocate it by withdrawing their troops. Chen countered this by claiming Ho Yingqin had shown his own sincerity at the battle of Nantienmen by ordering his troops to withdraw to a second line of defense, hoping this would allow the Japanese to pull away from Nantienmen. However by May 1st, the Japanese claimed they had captured and secured Nantienmen, so Nemoto informed Chen the Chinese forces north of the Great Wall should withdraw to a line connecting Miyun, Pinkou, Yutien and the Luan River. On May 2nd, the Chinese sent a reply to this, completely ignoring the line idea and instead referred to the recent battle at Xinglong and explained the local commander there was eager for a victory and refused to withdraw despite being asked twice to do so. The Chinese also notified Nemoto that a Political affairs council headed by Huang Fu was being established at Peiping, and it should be through that body that further negotiations were held. The Japanese welcomed this development. Just as it seemed the Shanghai talks were paving a way to a ceasefire, the leadership of the Kwantung Army abandoned their political maneuvers in favor of a settlement. On April 30th the Tientsin Special Service Agency insisted to their Japanese colleagues, the Chinese were just buying time and not sincere in their actions. That same day the Army General Staff and Foreign Ministry suddenly refused to initiate a ceasefire on the grounds the Chinese had agreed to an armistice only to save face. Lt Colonel Nagatsu Sahishige, the army attache at Peiping urged the 8th Division to rapidly strike southwards as far as Miyun to annihilate He Yingqin's planned counteroffensive. Such an action would immediately threaten the Peiping-Tientsin region. To push the envelope, the Japanese could toss a new Division into the mix and force further negotiations when the Chinese withdrew south of Miyun. Clearly the Japanese had their eyes set on Miyun now. As such General Nishi was secretly told to capture it without any direction from Tokyo HQ, nor from most of the Kwantung Army leadership. The Operations department of the Kwantung Army also independently elected to move troops east of the Luan River again. They argued "the enemy again advances east of the Luan River and persists in its defiant attitude. Therefore we must again deal them a crushing blow." The IJA 6th Division had been evacuated to the Great Wall back on April 23rd and along the way were closely pursued by Chinese forces. General Sakamoto sent a plan to the Kwantung Army headquarters "to again drive the enemy west of the Luan River,". A lot of chaos was reigning within the Japanese military because they were in echo chambers and not relaying information to another. When the Kwantung Army Operations department suddenly proposed a new advance east of the Luan River, on May 2nd a heated exchange took place between them and the Kwantung Army Intelligence Section: “INTELLIGENCE SECTION: The defiant attitude of the enemy is a matter of degree. While it is indisputable that some of their forces continue defiant, their main force is still stationed west of the Luan River. Therefore, a defiant attitude on the part of the enemy is not sufficient reason to deal them a crushing blow. The Kwantung Army withdrew from the Luan River line only ten days ago. As we understand it, the purpose was to comply with the imperial wish. If the army begins operations on a flimsy pretext at this time, inviting intervention by the central leadership, how can the honor of the commander in chief be maintained? What we should now attack are rather the enemy forces facing the 8th Division. For this, we should employ additional strength. By dealing a severe blow to the Chinese Central Army forces in this area, we can threaten Peiping and the operation should be all the more effective.  OPERATIONS SECTION: Due to the limitations of our supply capacity, we cannot use more than a certain level of forces against the enemy facing the 8th Division. Since the enemy east of the Luan River maintains a defiant attitude, they must be punished regardless of their strength.  INTELLIGENCE SECTION: Since the seizure of Nant'ienmen the 8th Division lacks the capability of pursuing the enemy. This is an unavoidable consequence of the small strength of its force from the outset of the operation. Isn't the First [Operations] Section uncertain that the enemy can be defeated even by the main force of the 8th Division, and doesn't it intend ultimately to deploy the 6th Division southward in concert with action by the 8th Division? If this is the case, it is understandable, and this section is not necessarily against it.   OPERATIONS SECTION: That is not what this section is considering.  INTELLIGENCE SECTION: In that case, there is no clear justification for launching the operation. The objective of the operation must be plainly spelled out to all concerned, from His Majesty at the top down to the lowest private. There must not be the slightest doubt about it.” After this conversation the Intelligence department debated amongst themselves before relaying another response at midnight, ultimately not approving it. The next day the Operations department sent a telegram to the negotiations team in Peiping: “1) Under present conditions, the Kwantung Army has no intention of accepting a cease-fire proposal for the time being, particularly because there are signs suggesting intervention by third countries in the matter.  2) Previously the Kwantung Army suggested the Miyun-Yiit'ienLuan River line as the retreat line for the Chinese army; but this did not mean it was to be their front line after a cease-fire. It rather indicated a line to which the Chinese army should immediately and voluntarily retreat as evidence of their sincerity. In other words, a cease-fire cannot be negotiated until they retreat to this line and abandon their provocative attitude, and until this is confirmed by the Kwantung Army. Their mere retreat to the indicated line, in today's circumstances, is not sufficient reason for us to respond to the cease-fire proposal. According to Peking telegram 483 [not identified], it appears that the intentions of our army have been somewhat misunderstood. Even if the Chinese retreat to the indicated line and display the sincerity of their intentions, we may possibly demand a retreat line farther south. We believe negotiations in this region should be handled by the central leadership in Tokyo rather than by the Kwantung Army. Act on this understanding.”   So after this message, the Intelligence department accused the Operations department of trying to find any excuse to renew the advance and sent a wire to Nemoto on April 29th "If the Chinese suddenly perceive their mistake, . . . we will not make war for the fun of it." However the Intelligence department was suddenly overruled by Colonel Kita who cabled the negotiators that the Operations department now had full approval from Kwantung Army vice chief of staff Okamura Yasuji. When General Muto received this notice he questioned "This draft order, states that the enemy has moved into the region east of the Luan River and is showing a provocative attitude. I did not receive such a report from the Second [Intelligence] Section before my departure from Hsinching. Does this mean there has been a subsequent change in the situation?" After being informed more so, Muto simply stated he wished to wait until the chief of staff could speak to him. Obviously Muto was getting wet feet and did not want to perform any actions not in accordance with Tokyo HQ, as Emperor Hirohito had put his foot down.  On May 3rd, General Koiso and Operations Department staff officer Endo Saburo spoke with Muto, indicating they had approval of Tokyo HQ general staff and even the Emperor. So Muto relented for a second advance and issued Order 503 on May 3rd to the IJA 6th and 8th Divisions. Now the Army General Staff were dragged into the Kwantung Army's debacle fully. So they drew up an emergency draft plan for measures in North China. To this aim:  “Through continuing pressure by the military might of the Kwantung Army, applied in concert with various political measures in North China, the Chinese forces in North China are to be compelled to make a substantia] surrender or to dissolve, thereby resulting in the withdrawal of the Chinese army along the China-Manchukuo border and in the establishment of peace in this area”.  Added to this the General Staff suggested a large counteroffensive be driven along the Great Wall and a formal truce agreement should be concluded once three conditions had been met: “(a) that Chinese forces had retreated voluntarily south and west of a line connecting Hsuanhua, Shunyi, Sanho, Yüt'ien, Luanchou, and Lot'ing; (b) that anti-Japanese activities had been controlled; and (c) that the preceding had been verified by the Japanese army”. Under immense pressure from the renewed Japanese advance, the Chinese government on May 3rd, had pushed for a new body to tackle the North China situation. That was the Peiping Political Affairs Council. It was composed of 22 members, headed by Huang Fu. Huang Fu was notably a pro-Japanese official, having been a graduate of the Tokyo Land Survey department training institute and had served early as a minister of foreign affairs. Since China had zero faith anymore in the League of Nations and believed if they failed to resolve the North China issue, this all might see a new civil war break out between Chiang Kai-Shek and Wang Jingwei. Thus everyone felt the time for active resistance was over and they must place all their effort into negotiations. Chiang Kai-Shek placed a great amount of authority upon Huang Fu and trusted the man. Huang Fu began his new task by speaking with all the political and financial leaders from both sides of the conflict to see how a real ceasefire could be met through dealmaking.  Meanwhile on May 6th the IJA 6th Division unleashed a new offensive south of the Great Wall and were followed by the 8th Division on the 11th. General Muto at this time made public statements blaming the Chinese for the renewed hostilities, making it seem the Japanese had intended to stay within the Great Wall area. The 6th Division swept across the sector east of the Luan River and by the 11th the Chinese defensive line collapsed. On the 12th the 6th Division crossed the Luan River, pursuing Yu Xuechengs 51st Army. In turn this threatened He Yingqin's main force who were facing the 8th Division. In the previous battles, Yu Xuechengs men had performed quite poorly and now even under direct command of He Yingqin were proving themselves helpless against the 6th division. Additionally Itagaki's agency over in Tientsin were using radio facilities to dispatch false directives from Chinese high command, ordering the forces to retreat from the front battle line. Two to three Chinese divisions were neutralized by these fake radio messages and in turn the Chinese became very demoralized at their lines. The 8th division had driven into the Gubeikou area on the 11th and it took them only a day to dislodge the Chinese from their line near Xuxiachen. By the 13th Xuxiachen had fallen completely. On the 11th and 12th, Japanese aircraft began flying over Peiping, as a demonstration of the terror they could deliver to the city at any moment. These developments altogether were pushing the Chinese civilians to demand of their politicians and generals that they appease the Japanese. Huang Fu proposed to Nemoto on the 12th that all Chinese troops could be withdrawn from Miyun to a line extending from Shunyi to Yutien and Tangshan. This was an enormous concession and nearly mirrored the line the Japanese had demanded.  The Japanese however, rejected the concession. To make matters worse for the Chinese, He Yingqin had been notified of the large concession proposal in advance and expected the Japanese to take it. Thus he had refrained from operating in strength at Miyun and did not significantly defend the path towards Peiping. It was the belief of the Japanese commanders, if they performed a full-scale attack towards Peiping now, He Yingqin would have no choice but to withdraw towards Shunyi. With this in mind the Japanese made a proposal on the 14th:  “1) According to the reports of the Peiping military attaché, the 8th Division should be prepared to advance in a single sweep to the southern limit of Miyun, if it is deemed necessary. Preparations for this attack should be expedited.  2) In conjunction with the above, front-line aircraft should take actions implying that a major Japanese offensive is about to begin.  3) In Tokyo, it should be announced publicly, in liaison with the Foreign Ministry, that the security of Jehol province cannot be guaranteed as long as the Chinese army remains in Miyun. Furthermore, every so often Japanese aircraft should make demonstration flights over the Shunyi-T'ungchou area.” Confronted with this, the Chinese were pretty screwed. The Chinese negotiations team were frantically searching for any way to force a ceasefire. Then the secretary of the Shanghai legation, Suma Yakichiro showed up to Peiping, which the Chinese viewed as a golden opportunity. The Chinese complained to him that the Kwantung Army had resumed their offensive and that a political agency in Tientsin were trying to enact coups. Suma bluntly told them the Japanese actions were backed fully by Tokyo and despite the Chinese belief that this was false or that Japan was facing a major financial deficit, this was all untrue.  While the dialogue continued to go nowhere, the 6th division had pursued the Chinese forces to the vicinity of Fengjun. Muto believed this had gone to far so he issued orders on May 13th limiting operations to the area north of a line connecting Miyun, Pingkou, Fegjun and Yungping. Now the 6th and 8th divisions were to assemble around Xuxiachen and Zunhua. Two days later he issued this statement to the public "If the Chinese army immediately abandons its hitherto provocative attitude and withdraws some distance from the border, our army will quickly return to the line of the Great Wall and pursue its regular task of maintaining security in Manchukuo." Likewise Muto ordered the Tientsin group to inform the Chinese that the Kwantung Army would return to the Great Wall if the Chinese forces retreated to the Shunyi-Yutien-Tangshan line. Nemoto forwarded all of this to Chen Yi. On May 15th He Yingqin ordered the withdrawal of the Chinese forces to a line between Malanyu, Linnantsang and Pamencheng.  With what seemed a imminent ceasefire at hand, the Kwantung Army HQ ordered the 6th and 8th divisions to take up positions strategically favorable for the negotiations to finally begin in ernest. On the 17th a draft ceasefire plan was drawn up. It envisioned the withdrawal of the Chinese forces to the Shunyi-Yutien-Tangshan line and in return the Japanese would pull back to the Great Wall area. Huang Fu was on his way back to Peiping from Shanghai for probably the 10th time in two weeks, when the Japanese captured Fengjun and Zhunhua, routing the Chinese across the Qi Canal to the right bank of the Pai River. The 6th Division then advanced towards Yutien and Xumenchen as the 8th division stood around Xuxiachn. When the Chinese began retreating from Miyun on May 18th, the 8th division suddenly converged upon Miyun. Muto was of course delighted by their new advantageous position and even briefly began talking to his colleagues about the prospect of just marching upon Peiping. Instead he decided to sweep through Miyun, Pingku and the Qi Canal, going even further west than he had stated he would back on the 13th.  With these new orders in hand, the 6th Division quickly captured Qixien on the 19th and further pursued retreating Chinese forces to Sanho. The 8th Division entered Miyun and two days later began advancing to Huaijou. By the 23rd Huaijou had fallen as the 6th Division reached the Qi Canal. These advances threatened the Peiping-Tientsin region. Both Japanese divisions halted on the 25th as the ceasefire was issued. With that last strike Muto felt he had significantly increased their poker hand going forward. Meanwhile Itagaki's team at Tientsin were still trying to bring about a coup. In tandem with the 8th Divisions attack on Miyun, the agency tried to engineer a revolt by the militia troops led by Song Queyuan, Fang Chenwu, Sun Tienying, amongst others. The idea was for these forces to occupy Peiping while wrecking havoc upon the Chinese central army within th region. The agency had attempting recruiting Wu Peifu, but the old jade marshal was unwilling, so they turned to this former protege, the chairman of Hubei, Yu Xuecheng. However he also declined. Yu Xuecheng was also approached by Hu Hanmin, looking to form an anti-Chiang Kai-Shek campaign in cooperation with Han Fuqu and Feng Yuxiang. To this Yu Xuecheng declined as well. Itagaki kept searching for disgruntled warlords, and then turned to Li Qiashan and Xu Yusan. Xu Yusan was a former ally to Feng Yuxiang with a history of anti-Chiang Kai-Shek actions. If they got the backing of his personal army, roughly 10,000 men strong at Tangshan they could do some real damage. On May 16th Xu Yusan declared independence and took up the Manchukuo 5 color flag in direct opposition to the Kuomintang. He began issuing the slogan “Hubi for the people of Hubei” as his army marched west along the Peiping-Shanhaiguan railway. His force reached the vicinity of Tangu whereupon they had increased to 30,000 and rumors emerged they would occupy Tientsin. This began a mass panic. . . for literally a day. His army collapsed into nothing more than a rabble as now had the stomach to actually fight their fellow countrymen.  Despite this grand failure, the Tientsin group continued with other plots. At 8 pm on May 19th, a Peiping bound train from Tangu, carrying Chinese soldiers was bombed around Tientsin station. The Japanese love bombing trains as we all know. This resulted in small incidents involving Japanese and Chinese officials, giving precedent for 600 Japanese troops led by Lt General Nakamura Kotaro to reinforce Tientsin on May 23rd. There were a few other incidents were supposedly Chinese agents were tossing grenades at Japanese officials. One of these officials was Major Mori Takeshi of the Japanese Army General Staff who was working in Tientsin. However the grenade thrown at him was a dud, and before the Japanese could seize it, some local Chinese grabbed it, finding a stamp on it bearing “Tokyo Artillery Arsenal”, oops.  These numerous incidents influenced the Chinese who feared Japan was trying to force an invasion into North China. To these rumors, He Yingqin insisted they mount a proper defense of Peiping, but many were arguing they had to further retreat. Meanwhile the Tientsin agency was told to stop performing incidents and instead secure northern warlords to their future cause. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for the Great Wall of China was coming to a bitter end for the Chinese forces. The Japanese were using every deceptive measure to edge further and further into China proper. It seemed clear to the Chinese, nothing would stop Japanese encroachment upon their nation, while the rest of the world simply watched on doing nothing. 

In this episode of “This Is Purdue,” we're featuring the live Brands That Matter panel spotlighted at the Fast Company Grill during the annual SXSW Conference and Festivals in Austin, Texas.  Purdue President Mung Chiang took the stage as a panelist for “Innovating What Matters: Driving Pharma Forward,” along with Sean Bruich, senior vice president of artificial intelligence and data at Amgen, and Tatyana Kanzaveli, chief operating officer of Open Health Network.  This special panel discussion was sponsored by Purdue University — a four-time recipient of Fast Company's Brands That Matter distinction.  In this special recording moderated by Shibani Joshi, you will:  Learn about how the health care industry is using AI to improve the development and distribution of pharmaceuticals  Discover how Purdue and other pharmaceutical companies are leveraging cross-industry partnerships to drive innovation  Get to know how Purdue's partnership with Eli Lilly and Company and Merck & Co. Inc. is driving opportunities in America's Hard-Tech Corridor   Find out how technological advancements, including AI and research happening at Purdue, will shape the future of pharma  Don't miss this special live episode that brought together pharmaceutical industry experts at one of the nation's most esteemed festivals and conferences — SXSW.  

The DARK Truth About Mark Carney's Ties To ChinaBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/radio-baloney-the-richie-baloney-show--4036781/support.

Guest: Toronto Star reporter Raisa Patel  Liberal candidate Paul Chiang's remarks suggesting a political opponent could be handed over to Chinese authorities for a bounty has fuelled outrage, an RCMP probe and a political firestorm for the Liberals ahead of an election. Initially Liberal leader Mark Carney was seen as supporting him held back from dropping Chiang as a candidate Markham-Unionville. As backlash grew, and pressure mounted, it was Chiang who ultimately stepped down himself. This episode takes a look at how things unfolded and what it reveals about the Liberal leader's decision-making and judgement, just around the corner from a federal election. Audio sources: Global News Produced by Saba Eitizaz and Paulo Marques

Mark Carney's China Bounty FIASCO, Paul Chiang QuitsBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/radio-baloney-the-richie-baloney-show--4036781/support.

✪WordPress ✪ #JSAprilThe inaugural episode of our DC SECRET FILES podcast — the show that dares to tackle DC Comics' greatest creations in encyclopedic form! Each episode, Frank will be joined by a special guest, in this case, comics writer David Gallaher, to cover characters and concepts from across DC's history. Our discussion of the given property will be married to a piece of original art commissioned by DC to spotlight the same. This time around, we chat about 2001's Golden Age Secret Files and Origins #1, by John Ostrander & Cliff Chiang, as well as a host of other talents on the main and supplemental stories. Plus we read YOUR feedback on the show's promotion!D.E.O. Report [0:00:56]Adventure Heroes of the Pulps [0:05:25]“The Dawn of the Golden Age” by Ostrander & Chiang [0:13:43]Crimson Avenger Profile Page art by Michael Lark [0:22:42]The Golden Age Sandman by Matt Wagner & Gavin Wilson [0:33:33]Fantom of the Fair Profile Page art by Darrin Wiltshire & Chris Malgrain [0:43:34]Blue Beetle (Golden Age) Profile Page art by Darrin Wiltshire & Chris Malgrain [0:49:08]“Scenes from the Class Struggle at J.S.A. Mansion” by Peyer & Grau [0:58:40]Flash I (Jay Garrick) Profile Page art by John Byrne [1:01:14]“The Sentinel” by Peter Gross [1:09:27]Hawkman Profile Page art by Rags Morales [1:10:59]Johnny Thunder Profile Page art by Mark Props [1:19:30]Quicksilver (Max Mercury) Profile Page art by Chris Malgrain [1:27:01]“Show and Tell” by Hernandez-Rosenblatt & Igle [1:33:17]Justice Society of America Profile Page art by Mike Collins & Bob McLeod [1:34:56]Injustice Society of the World Profile Page art by Mike Collins & Bob McLeod [1:47:59]Confidential Communiqués [1:53:35]Have a question or comment? Looking for more great content? Leave comments on our website: Rolled Spine Podcasts Images from this episode on TumblrE-MAIL: rolledspinepodcasts@gmail.comTweet us @rolledspine or skeet host Diabolu Frank on BlueSkyDC Secret Files theme song by Luke Daab

This is NOT an April Fools joke! But as of 1am EST MP Paul Chiang stepped down as the MP representing Markham-Unionville leaving the Liberal Party and Mark Carney who stuck their necks out for him look foolish.Send a one-time contribution to the show - https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=XARF5X38AMZULListen to our Podcast on the go: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/elev8podcastTikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@elev8podcast X: https://twitter.com/TheElev8Podcast

Not expelling Chiang sooner was Mark Carney's first big mistake Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Paul Chiang is out as the Liberal candidate in Markham-Unionville after suggesting a political opponent should be turned over to Chinese authorities. Mark McKenzie is out as the Conservative candidate in Windsor after a podcast interview surfaced wherein he calls for Justin Trudeau's, er, execution.  3:15 | Was standing by Chiang (for a day or two, anyway) Mark Carney's biggest mistake to date? We talk to Vicky Mochama, host of the new political podcast Party All The Time.  CHECK OUT PARTY ALL THE TIME: https://rtrj.info/PATTepisodeone 40:00 | The Full House Lottery Early Bird deadline is looming! Don't miss your shot at Alberta's biggest Early Bird value: 31 cars in 31 days! Lindsay Robertson, VP at the Royal Alexandra Hospital Foundation, takes us into the $2.25M Legacy dream home (and Jespo's dream lake getaway - the Fritz Tiny Home), trips for life, and the life-saving services the Full House Lottery supports. BUY YOUR TICKETS TODAY: https://fullhouse.ca/ TOUR THE LEGACY DREAM HOME: https://youtu.be/HQ0ilISYo1g?si=aVeHRnkALlcbLBRZ 58:45 | Real Talker Sarah heard a rumour about the Mike Myers/Mark Carney ads, Janelle says there's no way Trump wrote that post about the call with Carney, Jim in B.C. says our Group Chat Round Table (March 31) missed the mark on a few things, and Sean's reminiscing about Conservative parties in past.  WATCH SEAN'S FUTURE OF FOOD EPISODE: https://www.youtube.com/live/AMsK380FbLM?si=CX05Hg2ZQSHvfiS4&t=1 1:12:45 | Jespo and Johnny have details about our YouTube channel memberships, a new perk - the Real Talk Community Chat, and an exclusive event on April 17 for our Real Talk Patrons.  SUPPORT REAL TALK on PATREON: https://www.patreon.com/c/ryanjespersen 1:23:00 | It's our first Two Million View video!  PAY LESS FOR INTERNET, ELECTRICITY, and NATURAL GAS: https://parkpower.ca/realtalk/ REGISTER FOR THE REAL TALK GOLF CLASSIC: https://www.ryanjespersen.com/real-ta... JOIN US APRIL 12 at the ICCHANGE GALA: https://www.icchange.ca/2025gala FOLLOW US ON TIKTOK, X, INSTAGRAM, and LINKEDIN: @realtalkrj & @ryanjespersen  JOIN US ON FACEBOOK: @ryanjespersen  REAL TALK MERCH: https://ryanjespersen.com/merch RECEIVE EXCLUSIVE PERKS - BECOME A REAL TALK PATRON: patreon.com/ryanjespersen THANK YOU FOR SUPPORTING OUR SPONSORS! https://ryanjespersen.com/sponsors The views and opinions expressed in this show are those of the host and guests and do not necessarily reflect the position of Relay Communications Group Inc. or any affiliates.

Elias Makos is joined by Jonathan Kalles, Vice President at McMillan Vantage, a national public affairs firm, and former advisor to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, and Justine McIntyre, strategic consultant and former city councillor, Paul Chiang has stepped down. The Liberal candidate encouraged people to bring a Conservative candidate to the Chinese consulate in Toronto to collect a $184,000 bounty placed on his head by Hong Kong police. Another Quebec gaffe for Mark Carney. He announced his plan for the government to build homes yesterday, but the french translation – Bâtir Maisons Canada – immediately became the butt of jokes, It’s April 1st, so Canada's carbon tax is done. Gas prices dropped by 20 cents a litre in Ottawa overnight!

Mark Carney is defending Paul Chiang amid condemnation for his comments suggesting people collect a Chinese bounty on a Conservative rival; and, as the date for U.S. President Trump's self-proclaimed 'Liberation Day' nears, details over what tariffs he will impose remain vague.

Last time we spoke about the January 28th Incident. In January of 1932, tensions escalated in Shanghai as anti-Japanese sentiments surged after Japan's invasion of Manchuria. Orchestrated by Yoshiko Kawashima, a Japanese spy, a provocation led to violence, sparking outrage among Japanese expatriates. Japan demanded apologies and compensation from China, threatening military action if their demands were unmet. As the Japanese military amassed forces in Shanghai, the Chinese 19th Route Army prepared to resist, igniting the conflict known as the January 28th Incident, marking the beginning of a fierce struggle for control. Amidst chaos, the Nanjing government struggled to respond to Japan's escalating aggression in Shanghai. Chiang Kai-Shek prioritized avoiding war, urging a diplomatic approach to protect Shanghai's economy. Despite pressure, the 19th Route Army was ordered to withdraw, but tensions flared when Japan attacked the Chinese garrison. The 19th Route Army fiercely resisted, leading to intense battles. As Japan sent reinforcements, Chiang faced mounting protests and criticism for his passive stance, questioning whether he could maintain his strategy against the encroaching enemy.   #144 The First Battle of Shanghai 1932 Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the last episode we covered the January 28th Incident. At 11:30 pm on January 28, Japan ordered 2,300 Japanese Marines to advance westward along every branch road on the west side of North Sichuan Road, without waiting for a response. This road, which crosses into the northern area of the International Settlement and has frequently been designated as a Japanese defense zone, includes Target Road (now known as Wujin Road in Hongkou District, Shanghai), Qiujiang Road, and Yokohama Road. Their objective was to seize the Songhu Railway defense line at Tiantong'an Station. They faced strong resistance from the 19th Route Army, further escalating the conflict. In the early hours of the 29th, Japanese aircraft launched from the Notoro seaplane carrier, which was moored on the Huangpu River, attacked the Chinese district of Zhabei. Both the Commercial Press located at No. 584 Baoshan Road and the Oriental Library, the largest private library in China with over 300,000 books, were completely destroyed. That same day the 19th Route Army sent a telegram to the entire nation concerning the situation: Do forgive me it's a rough translation “Urgent. Dear Sir and Madam, the Japanese have occupied our three northeastern provinces, changing the color of our territory and making our nation perish. Recently, they have killed and set fire in Shanghai, and vagrants are everywhere, doing the most despicable and violent things in the world. Gunboats are coming one after another, and the Marines are all landed. At 12:00 a.m. on the 28th, they openly invaded our defense line in Zhabei, Shanghai, and challenged us. Guang Nai and others are soldiers, and they only know that it is their duty to defend themselves and defend their land. They cannot give up even an inch of land or an inch of grass. They resist to save the country and protect the race. Even if they sacrifice only one person and one bullet, they will never retreat and lose the personality of the soldiers of the Republic of China. This thing and this ambition are exposed to the sun and the sun and are known to the world. The spirits of our ancestors in heaven are truly relying on it”. On the morning of January 29, Chiang Kai-shek met with He Yingqin and Zhu Peide to discuss countermeasures. Simultaneously Zhu Peide convened a meeting with He Yingqin, Gu Zhutong, Li Jishen, Deng Shizeng, Lin Wei, and others to address issues such as defense deployment, the security of Nanjing and the Yangtze River, and resistance against Japan. Chiang Kai-Shek established the principles going forward for negotiations with Japan, emphasizing the need to prepare for talks while actively resisting. He stated that negotiations must have a clear final line of defense and a maximum limit that would not compromise administrative and territorial integrity, undermine the spirit of the Nine-Power Treaty, or jeopardize national sovereignty. If these limits were exceeded and unacceptable concessions were made, a decisive battle would be fought, even at the cost of defeat and death.  The defense and military strategy for Beijing and Shanghai included the 19th Route Army defending Shanghai with full strength, while the front guard army consisting of the 87th and 88th divisions would protect Nanjing. He Yingqin would remain in Nanjing, overseeing all party, government, and military personnel left behind. Chiang, along with the Central Political Council of the Kuomintang, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the National Government, and Chen Mingshu, all expressed their commitment to resisting Japanese aggression. Chiang also sent a telegram to He Chengjun, director of the Hubei Province Pacification Office, and Xu Tingyao, commander of the Fourth Division, stating "Last night, the Japanese invaders attacked our 19th Route Defense Line in Zhabei, Shanghai, and the battle is ongoing. Our army is determined to fight to the death. Their naval forces in Han and Xun will likely engage in military operations. We urge you to remain vigilant and defend yourselves, never yielding to them. The Fourth Division should concentrate on strict defense in Wuhan and avoid dispersal. If military funds become scarce, local governments will need to raise them independently." The National Government Military Committee appointed Chiang Kai-shek, Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, and Zhang Xueliang as members responsible for mobilizing the army and commanding the Shanghai War. Chiang Kai-Shek officially resumed power after resigning to prevent a surrender and committed to a prolonged resistance. On January 30, the Chinese Nationalist Government announced the relocation of the capital to Luoyang. Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram urging resistance against the Japanese and dispatched the elite Fifth Army to reinforce Shanghai. That night, Dai Ji, the commander of the Songhu Garrison, took charge of military operations in Shanghai, overseeing the 19th Route Army. The commander-in-chief was Jiang Guangnai, with Cai Tingkai as the army commander and division commanders Qu Shounian, Mao Weishou, and Shen Guanghan. Chiang Kai-Shek then issued a telegram to his troops across the nation and again I apologize for the rough translation. "Since the Northeast Incident began, the Central Government has been enduring humiliation and maintaining peace in order to avoid war and protect the lifeline of the country. It hopes to use justice and fairness to awaken the Japanese pirates. Unexpectedly, the more we tolerate, the more arrogant they become. When the Shanghai Incident occurred, we accepted their demands with great pain, but the Japanese pirates still brazenly pressed on, repeatedly attacking our Shanghai Defense Force, bombing civilian houses, throwing bombs on the streets, and our compatriots were ravaged. The country is about to perish. Anyone with blood in his veins would rather endure it. Since the 19th Route Army has risen up to defend itself bravely, our entire army In this time of national destruction and extinction, when the revolutionary soldiers are facing imminent danger, they should fight for the dignity of the country, strive for the survival of the nation, fulfill their responsibilities for the revolution, and be determined to die rather than live in disgrace, so as to deal with the brutal Japan that destroys peace and despises faith and integrity... Chiang Kai-shek and his comrades have shared hardships for a long time. Although I am now in the opposition, I am willing to swear to live and die with the soldiers and fulfill my bounden duty. I am here to inform you in advance with my blood and sincerity, and ask you to be determined and work hard, share the same hatred with the enemy, do not be arrogant, maintain the spirit of sacrifice, stay ready to fight, and save the country from danger." From that day on, the various ministries, commissions and committees of the National Government began to move to Luoyang, but the Military Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remained in Nanjing . At the same time, the frontline troops were ordered to be jointly commanded by the Minister of Military Affairs He Yingqin and the Chief of the General Staff Zhu Peide.  Typically Chinese sources breakdown what is known as the First Battle of Shanghai into three phases. In the previous episode we looked through the event up until the point of the first phase. After the initial fighting, both the 19th route army and Japanese agreed to a ceasefire so they could strengthen their positions and at least allow some form of diplomacy to occur. This went into effect on the 29th. As we mentioned, immediately afterwards the Japanese rapidly began reinforcing their position in Shanghai. They first sent the Sasebo 26th Squadron on the 30th, bearing 474 troops of the Sasebo 3rd Special Marine Corps alongside supplies. The next day the aircraft carriers Kaga and Hosho came over with 30 aircraft from the 1st air fleet. Then the cruisers Naka, Yura and Abukuma alongside 4 torpedo boats came bearing another 2000 marines. On February 1st the Terukoku Maru brought over the Yokosuka 1st Special Marine corps, roughly 525 men who landed at Huishan Wharf. With all that said and done, roughly 7000 Japanese troops had been brought over. On February 1st, the IJN warships began bombarding Nanjing from the Yangtze River, prompting Yu Jishi to frantically demand Chiang Kai-Shek transfer more troops to Shanghai. That night the Japanese light cruiser Tenryu, the protected cruisers Hirado and Taima, and the seven ships of the Navy's 23rd Destroyer Squadron fired upon Nanjing using four 140mm guns, 12 152mm single-mounted rapid-fire guns, 12 120mm single-mounted guns, and 20 76mm single-mounted rapid-fire guns. The rich and officials fled the city for refuge, but the Japanese army did not land any men to follow up the attack. Simultaneously 40,000 Shanghai workers from over 20 Japanese owned cotton mills began an anti-Japanese strike, being heavily backed by Communists. The workers began aiding the 19th route army to blockade the Japanese in the factories and streets and sabotage what they could.  On February 2nd, the Japanese army attacked Wusong several times, but was repelled each time. On the 3rd the Japanese expanded their attacks against Zhabei, Baziqiao and other locations, but the Chinese defenders successfully repelled these assaults as well. On the 4th, the Japanese launched their first major offensive, which extended the conflict to Jiangwan and Wusong. Following a day of intense fighting, the Wusong fort was destroyed by enemy bombardment; however, the Japanese army was unable to land due to the determined resistance of the Chinese defenders. The anti-aircraft artillery company from the 88th Division, reassigned to the 4th Regiment of the 156th Brigade of the 19th Route Army, managed to shoot down a Japanese aircraft. After the failure of the general offensive, Yukiichi Shiozawa was dismissed and sent back to Japan. Vice Admiral Yoshisaburo Nomura, the newly appointed commander of the Third Fleet, succeeded Shiozawa. After Nomura assumed his role, the Japanese army began to bolster its forces. Japan had initially planned to deploy troops when tensions escalated in Shanghai, but the navy had opposed this move. However, as the situation deteriorated, the navy was compelled to seek assistance from the army. On February 2, the Japanese cabinet officially decided to send troops. In response to the urgent circumstances in Shanghai, they resolved to dispatch the Shanghai Dispatch Mixed Brigade, led by Brigade Commander Major General Shimomoto Kuma, along with the 9th Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Ueda Kenkichi. The Shanghai Dispatch Mixed Brigade and the Second Independent Tank Squadron were prioritized for transport. Concurrently, the Japanese Navy also sent the Yokosuka 2nd Special Marine Corps to Shanghai. The 24th Mixed Brigade landed in Wusong on the afternoon of February 7. By this time, the combined forces of the Japanese navy, army, and air force had exceeded 10,000 personnel. At dawn on February 8, the Japanese Army's 24th Mixed Brigade launched an attack on Zhanghuabang, Yunzaobang, and Wusong Town along three routes, but they were repelled by our forces. Meanwhile on February 4, the National Government Military Commission sent out a telegram that divided the country into four defense zones. The first zone, which includes the area north of the Yellow River, was assigned to Zhang Xueliang as the commander-in-chief. The second zone, covering the area south of the Yellow River, was placed under the command of Chiang Kai-shek. The third zone, encompassing the area south of the Yangtze River as well as Fujian and Zhejiang provinces, was led by He Yingqin. The fourth zone, which includes Guangdong and Guangxi, was commanded by Chen Jitang. The telegram also stated that, aside from maintaining troops for local stability, all commanders were to concentrate their forces within their respective defense zones to confront the aggressive Japanese. Additionally, a directive was issued for the provinces of Sichuan, Hunan, Guizhou, Hubei, Shaanxi, and Henan to send troops to serve as a general reserve. On February 5, upon learning that the Japanese army had been redeployed from mainland China to Shanghai, Chairman of the Military Commission Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram from Luoyang to He Yingqin. He instructed that if the Japanese forces landed, the Chinese Air Force would engage in combat. Additionally, Chiang sent a message of condolence to Jiang Guangnai, Cai Tingkai, and Dai Ji of the 19th Route Army, stating "Brothers, you have been fighting valiantly for a week. Each time I reflect on the tremendous sacrifices made by the soldiers and their dedication, I feel a deep sadness... If necessary, Zhong (Zheng) can come to lead in person. When the Air Force enters the fray, the Army must establish various signals in advance to communicate with it and ensure coordinated efforts..." On the same day, the 88th Division arrived in Suzhou. On February 6, Chiang ordered the 261st Brigade of the 87th Division to move from Nanjing to reinforce Kunshan. The troops reached Kunshan on February 7. On February 8, Chiang directed He Yingqin to transfer an artillery battalion to support the 19th Route Army. Then, on February 9, Chiang Kai-shek mobilized the First Division, led by Commander Hu Zongnan, and the Seventh Division, commanded by Wang Jun, to prepare for reinforcement of the 19th Route Army in Shanghai. February 8th marks the second phase of the battle. On the 10th, to ensure that the 88th Division of the Central Army complied with the orders from the 19th Route Army of the Guangdong Army, Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram to Yu Jishi insisting that "your troops must strictly follow the commands of Commander-in-Chief Chiang and coordinate their movements with allied forces." The Japanese Marine Corps, under Yukio Shiozawa, initiated a three-pronged encirclement attack from Hongkou. The National Army mounted a determined defense and ultimately repelled the Japanese forces, pursuing and destroying them, which significantly lowered their morale. On February 11, Chen Cheng, commander of the Central Army's 18th Army, sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek from Ji'an, Jiangxi, reporting that the troops had not been paid for nearly two months and were lacking food. At that time, the National Government was planning to redeploy the National Army that had been engaged in suppressing the Communists in Jiangxi to Zhejiang and Shanghai and to relocate the capital to Luoyang.  On February 12, following a battle at Caojiaqiao, the Japanese army's strategy to consolidate their forces was entirely disrupted. The next morning, February 13, the Japanese 24th Mixed Brigade crossed the Caojiaqiao Bridge in Zhuozaobang and engaged with the Nationalist army. Seizing the moment, the 19th Route Army Headquarters aimed to annihilate the Japanese forces. The Nationalist army surrounded the Japanese troops near the Yong'an Cotton Mill. Additionally, 60 members of a suicide squad launched a suicide attack, resulting in the complete destruction of 1,600 Japanese soldiers. The Japanese army faced significant losses, thwarting their attempt to swiftly capture Wusong. On February 14, Chiang ordered the 88th and 87th Divisions, which were already stationed in Nanxiang and Kunshan near Shanghai, to be reorganized into the Fifth Army. He appointed Zhang Zhizhong, a volunteer eager to fight against the Japanese, as the commander of the Fifth Army. This new army was placed under the unified command of the 19th Route Army and took over the defense line stretching from the northern end of Jiangwan through Miaoxing to the western end of Wusong. It served as the left-wing army, while the 19th Route Army acted as the right-wing, tasked with defending Jiangwan, the area south of Dachang, and the urban region of Shanghai. To replenish the 19th Route Army's losses, Chiang repeatedly ordered reinforcements from various locations. For instance, on February 15, Shangguan Yunxiang dispatched 500 active soldiers from Bengbu to the 19th Route Army; on February 17, Liang Guanying sent 500 unarmed soldiers from Qingjiangpu; and on February 19, Liu Zhi contributed 1,000 active unarmed soldiers from Henan. On February 16, Chiang Kai-shek communicated with Finance Minister Song Ziwen via telegram, stating, "Since the Japanese refuse to withdraw their troops from Shanghai, we must resist until the end. ... Food supplies in Jiangxi and Henan will dwindle, and assistance will be completely halted. Please arrange to deposit 10 million yuan in central banknotes in Nanchang and 20 million yuan in Zhengzhou. This will allow the government to continue functioning, the army to be sustained, and perhaps we can navigate this crisis and avert collapse. This is my final request. I hope you can find a way to assist." To prevent any friction between the Fifth Army and the Nineteenth Route Army over competing for military accolades, Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram to Zhang Zhizhong and Yu Jishi on February 18. "The fight against Japan is a matter of national survival and is not a matter of honor for an individual or a certain unit. Our frontline officers and men should fully understand this. Therefore, the honor of the 19th Route Army is the honor of our entire National Revolutionary Army. There is absolutely no distinction between honor and disgrace. The Fifth Army's joining the front line is feared by the enemy and will also be slandered by the reactionaries (those who oppose the Nanjing Central Government). If we can continue to fight in the name of the 19th Route Army, it will be enough to demonstrate the strength of our National Revolutionary Army. We will share life and death, let alone honor and disgrace. I hope that this will be conveyed to the officers and men of the Fifth Army. They must unite and fight with our 19th Route Army and make no sacrifices to complete the revolutionary mission." Over on the other side, following reports of significant losses suffered by the Japanese army in Wusong, Tokyo received an imperial decree from Emperor Hirohito demanding the Shanghai incident get settled quick. In response, Chief of Staff Zairen urgently ordered the 9th Army Division, commanded by Ueda Kenkichi, to swiftly reinforce Shanghai. By the afternoon of February 13, the main contingent of the 9th Division had arrived at Shanghai Port, and by February 16, all personnel had disembarked in Wusong. Consequently, Lieutenant General Ueda took over command from Nomura. At this point, the Japanese invading forces comprised over 30,000 troops from naval, land, and air units, along with 60 to 70 field artillery pieces, more than 60 aircraft, and dozens of ships concentrated at the Wusong mouth. Ueda issued a statement late on the night of the 13th, asserting, "If anyone obstructs our division from fulfilling its mission, we will take decisive action without hesitation." On the 18th, he sent an ultimatum to Cai Tingkai, demanding, "Your army must immediately cease hostilities and withdraw from the following areas by 5:00 p.m. on February 20: on the west bank of the Huangpu River, retreat from areas connecting the western end of the concession, Caojiadu Town, Zhoujiaqiao Town, and Pushong Town to the north; on the east bank, withdraw from areas connecting Lannidu and Zhangjialou Town to the north, and retreat to a zone 20 kilometers away from the border of each concession Additionally, all military installations in the specified areas must be dismantled and no new ones established. If these demands are not met, the Japanese army will have no choice but to act freely against your forces, and your army will bear all resulting consequences." In response to Ueda's ultimatum, Tsai and Chiang ordered their front-line troops to fire heavily at Japanese positions as a warning. On the morning of February 20, Ueda commanded a full-scale attack across the front, employing tactics to break through the center while flanking from both sides. The 9th Division led the assault on the junction of Jiangwan and Miaohang, aiming to encircle Wusong from the north with the Kurume Brigade and Zhabei with the Marine Corps from the south. The Japanese began with artillery bombardments, followed by infantry and tank assaults on the Zhanghuabang and Yangshupu lines, both of which were successfully repelled by Chinese defenders. Over a thousand Japanese soldiers and several tanks in Zhabei were killed or wounded due to landmines. On February 21, Ueda personally directed thousands of infantry, supported by aircraft and artillery, to attack the Chinese defensive positions. Both sides incurred heavy casualties, and the battle continued until dawn on the 23rd. The Japanese forces attempted to encircle Jiangwan Town from Jiangwan Station, but the Chinese defenders fought valiantly, launching multiple charges and capturing Japanese Major Kong Sheng along with hundreds of soldiers. Ultimately, the Japanese army was unable to withstand the resistance and began to retreat. After the Japanese 9th Division arrived in Shanghai, it prepared to initiate a second major assault on the defenders of the city. The strategy involved a comprehensive attack stretching from Zhabei to Wusong to contain the Chinese army's strength, with primary forces concentrated on Jiangwan and Miaohang. The goal was to seize these two strategic points, achieve a breakthrough in the center, sever the link between the 5th Army and the 19th Route Army, and then defeat them individually. At dawn on February 20, the Japanese dispatched over ten aircraft for reconnaissance and bombing missions over the Miaohang area. Naval artillery and heavy army cannons heavily shelled the Miaohang positions. Simultaneously, Japanese artillery bombarded the Yunzaobang area in an effort to force a crossing and facilitate the Miaohang offensive.   By 9 am, part of the Japanese forces advanced towards the Xiaochang Temple and the Maijiazhai position, immediately conducting a fire search on our troops' positions. At noon, 3,000 Japanese soldiers launched an attack against our forces. The officers and soldiers of the 527th Regiment, defending the Maijiazhai and Zhuyuandun positions, mounted a counterattack, marking the beginning of the Battle of Miaohang. After three hours of intense fighting, the Japanese suffered significant casualties and were unable to continue, retreating to their original positions. Following this, over 2,000 Japanese troops attacked the Xiaochang Temple and Jinjiatang positions. The officers and soldiers of the 523rd Regiment, taking cover in the trenches, launched counterattacks and successfully repelled the Japanese forces. As dusk fell, the Japanese infantry halted their assaults, but naval and land artillery continued to bombard our positions in an attempt to weaken our defenses and personnel for a renewed attack the following day. On February 21, Japanese artillery relentlessly shelled the positions of the 88th Division of the Fifth Army in Miaohang. Following this, thousands of Japanese infantry launched an assault on the Yanjiazhai and Miaohang Town front. As the Japanese forces advanced, the officers and soldiers of the 523rd and 524th Regiments bravely counterattacked and successfully repelled them. However, a significant number of enemy troops coordinated a comprehensive assault on the Maijiazhai, Zhuyuandun, Xiaochangmiao, and Yanjiazhai lines south of Miaohang. Our 523rd, 524th, and 527th Regiments engaged in intense combat with the enemy, particularly at the Zhuyuandun front near Maijiazhai and Xu Xu, where the fighting was especially fierce. After a day of conflict, the enemy was temporarily pushed back. On February 22, the Japanese 9th Division launched a full-scale attack on the Miaohang position held by the 88th Division of the Fifth Army. Throughout the day, aircraft bombed the Chinese defenders, and thousands of artillery shells were fired at them. However, under the direct command of Zhang Zhizhong, the enemy faced a devastating defeat due to the coordinated three-pronged assault by the Sun Yuanliang Brigade, the Song Xilian Brigade, and the 61st Division of the 19th Route Army. The Miaohang position was ultimately saved from peril, inflicting heavy casualties on the elite forces of the Japanese 9th Division and the Kurume Mixed Brigade. This victory became known as the "Miaohang Victory." In the days that followed, the enemy continued their bombardment and attacks but were consistently repelled by the defenders. The Japanese army suffered significant losses, shifting from an all-out offensive to a more focused approach before ultimately halting their attacks. By the 25th, Ueda's overall offensive strategy had also failed. On February 24, the Japanese army decided to escalate the conflict once more, transferring the 11th and 14th divisions from Japan to join the Shanghai Expeditionary Force, which included troops already engaged in the war. At that time, the flagship of the Japanese Navy's Third Fleet, the Izumo, sustained damage from a bombing raid carried out by the suicide squad of the 19th Route Army, which sent shockwaves through Japan. Additionally, the large troop presence made a quick resolution to the war impossible. Consequently, on the 23rd, the Japanese cabinet decided to promptly reinforce the army. The General Staff then established the Shanghai Expeditionary Army Command, appointing General Shirakawa Yoshinori, the former Minister of War in the Tanaka Cabinet, to replace Ueda. They dispatched the 11th Division (led by Lieutenant General Atsutarou Atsuto), the 14th Division (led by Lieutenant General Naoaki Matsuki), and over 100 aircraft to China to initiate a larger-scale offensive in Shanghai. After several reinforcements, the Japanese forces in Shanghai, under Shirakawa's command, grew to over 90,000 troops, supported by 80 warships and 300 aircraft, significantly enhancing their combat effectiveness. In contrast, the total strength of the Chinese defenders was less than 50,000, with inadequate equipment. After a month of intense fighting, the Chinese forces had suffered heavy losses, leaving their river defenses in the Taicang Liuhe area vulnerable. Learning from the failures of the previous three commanders' frontal assaults, Shirakawa opted to land at Liuhe and flank the Songhu defenders. He directed the 9th Division and other units to launch a direct attack on Songhu and Shanghai while using the 3rd Fleet to escort the 11th Division into the Yangtze River estuary. They executed surprise landings at Liuhekou, Yanglinkou, and Qiyakou, quickly outflanking the defenders. On March 1, the Japanese forces initiated attacks in Naobei, Jiangwan, and Miaohang, employing heavy artillery, field guns, and aircraft for continuous bombardment. The infantry capitalized on this to engage in close-quarters combat, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. Meanwhile, Shirakawa secretly instructed the 11th Division to exploit the weakness of the Chinese troops in Liuhe, forcibly landing at Qiyakou, Yanglinkou, and Liubinkou, ultimately capturing Liuhe. The fall of Liuhe posed a significant threat to the flank and rear of the Chinese army, compelling the entire force to retreat to the second line of defense (the Jiading-Huangdu line) by the evening of March 1.  After 34 days of intense fighting, they were forced to retreat to their second line of defense. At this point, the war had entered its final phase, resulting in a stalemate between the two sides. On the 2nd, the Japanese army seized Shanghai, and by March 3, they occupied Zhenru and Nanxiang, subsequently announcing a ceasefire. Now while we have been focused on the Japanese and Chinese perspectives in this, the international community was also heavily involved in the background. After the outbreak of hostilities, the British and American consuls in Shanghai offered to mediate. However despite a ceasefire being implemented the hostilities continued. So on February 2nd, Britain, America, France, Italy and Germany sent a notice to China and Japan "proposing to stop the conflict; (1) both sides immediately stop all violent acts according to the following conditions; (2) there will be no mobilization or preparation for any hostile acts between the two countries; (3) the Chinese and Japanese combatants in Shanghai will withdraw from the contact points; (4) a neutral zone will be established to separate the combatants of both sides to protect the public concession. The area will be garrisoned by neutral military and police, and various methods will be formulated by the consular corps; (5) once the two countries accept the treaty, they will not make any demands or reservations in advance, but will quickly negotiate with the assistance of neutral observers or participants in accordance with the spirit of the Kellogg-War Pact and the December 9th League of Nations resolution to resolve all outstanding issues..." Nanjing generally accepted the terms, but Japan instead proposed non-military zones be established 20 miles around the major ports of Shanghai, Hankou, Tianjin, Qingdao and Guangzhou as a sort of counter proposal. Meanwhile at the League of Nations, Yan Huiqing was drawing attention to the Shanghai incident, obviously linking it to the Manchuria incident and advocated for Article 10 of the League of Nations Charter, which was in regards to respecting territorial integrity and political independence of league nations. The League of Nations agreed and organized a committee to investigate the Shanghai incident. On February 4th Chiang Kai-Shek would write in his diary "As long as we do not lose our national sovereignty and territory, and the Japanese invaders do not put forward unacceptable conditions, we can take advantage of the opportunity of British and American intervention to negotiate with them; we cannot take a tough stance when other countries intervene, which will lead to adverse effects." By late February US Secretary of State Henry Stimson warned Japan for the second time, that the Nine Power Treaty and other treaties had to be maintained. Then on the 23rd he sent a letter reiterating the nine-power treaty and Kellogg War Pact to the League of Nations in regards to the Shanghai situation. On the 29th, a four-point plan for mediating the Shanghai incident was adopted at the League of Nations. The objective was to swiftly establish a local ceasefire agreement with the assistance of civil and military officials from various countries present in Shanghai. Following this, a round-table meeting was to be convened with representatives from nations with vested interests in Shanghai to discuss security measures for the International Settlement, the French Concession, and the local residents, as well as to address other issues. Subsequently, representatives from Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Spain, and other nations unanimously supported the plan, with Chinese representative Yan Huiqing and Japanese representative Sato Naotake also indicating their general agreement in principle. However, on March 2, the situation escalated when the Japanese army compelled the Chinese forces to retreat to their second line of defense. The Japanese side adopted a more aggressive stance, presenting four stringent conditions and insisting that the Chinese army withdraw first before halting their attacks. The Japanese forces were only willing to withdraw to the Shanghai and Wusong areas and refused to do so under the supervision of neutral countries, which the Chinese government firmly rejected. On March 3, the Japanese army launched another offensive. On that same day, U.S. Secretary of State Stimson summoned Japanese Ambassador to the United States Idebuchi, condemning Japan for accepting the League of Nations resolution on February 29 while simultaneously escalating military operations. On March 3rd a ceasefire came into effect as a formal meeting was held at the British consulate. The Chinese delegation was led by Guo Taiqi, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, along with military representatives Dai Ji, Huang Qiang, and seven others. The Japanese delegation included Shigemitsu Mamoru, Minister to China, and military representatives Ueda, Tashiro, and nine others. Officials from Britain, the United States, France, and other nations also participated in the meeting. During the negotiations, numerous contentious issues arose, particularly regarding the timing and location of the Japanese army's withdrawal. It would take until May 5th for a armistice agreement to be signed. The agreement designated Shanghai as a demilitarized zone, prohibiting China from stationing troops in the areas around Shanghai, Suzhou, and Kunshan, while permitting a limited number of Japanese units to remain in the city. China was permitted to maintain only a small police force within Shanghai. According to Chinese war reports, a total of 10,254 Japanese soldiers were killed or wounded in the Battle of Shanghai on January 28. According to Japanese data, a total of 3,091 Japanese soldiers were killed or wounded in the invasion of Shanghai: 620 Japanese soldiers were killed and 1,622 were wounded in the army; 149 Japanese soldiers were killed and 700 were wounded in the navy. Another Chinese report, stated the 19th Route Army and the Fifth Army suffered a total of 14,104 casualties 4,274 killed and 9,830 wounded. Among them, the 19th Route Army suffered 8,792 casualties, while the Fifth Army suffered 5,312 casualties. Shanghai residents faced bombardments from Japanese aircraft and artillery, resulting in over 6,080 fatalities, more than 2,000 injuries, 10,400 missing persons, and property losses totaling 1.6 billion yuan. At the onset of the war, the Japanese military intentionally targeted cultural institutions in Shanghai, such as the Commercial Press and the Oriental Library, leading to the total destruction of the Commercial Press, the oldest and largest publishing house in China. The Oriental Library, which housed millions of volumes, including over 100,000 rare ancient texts from the Song and Yuan dynasties and the Sikuquanshu compiled during the Qianlong era of the Qing Dynasty, was first devastated by artillery fire and then looted by Japanese forces. Reports from that time indicated that the Japanese army used trucks to transport the remaining books for seven consecutive days. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Thus what became known as the first battle of Shanghai had come to a not so swift end. Was its resolvement a victory for the League of Nations? Or was it just another indicator that the League of Nations was nothing but promises and pieces of paper? One man took notice of the Manchuria and Shanghai incidents, and he would soon bring Europe into a global war.  

Today, we're looking at Prime Minister Mark Carney standing by a Liberal candidate who made remarks calling for his Conservative opponent to be kidnapped and turned over to the Chinese Communist Party. Despite the backlash, the PM has kept his support for Paul Chiang, saying Chiang's apology and history in the community are enough for him. Plus, Tesla protests are continuing to spread across Canada, as far-left radicals target the company over owner Elon Musk's role in advising U.S. President Donald Trump. And finally, pro-Hamas hate marches are still a regular occurrence in the country, with an independent journalist being assaulted and protesters targeting Liberal Immigration Minister Rachel Bendayan in recent incidents linked to the rallies.

Liberal Leader Mark Carney says Paul Chiang's comments suggesting people turn a Conservative candidate over to the Chinese consulate to collect a bounty are 'deeply offensive,' but that Chiang will remain as the Liberal candidate in Markham-Unionville. The Power Panel and Toronto Association for Democracy in China co-chair Cheuk Kwan react to Carney's defence of Chiang. Plus, TheWrit.ca's Éric Grenier analyzes how the Liberal polling lead in CBC's Poll Tracker has grown after a week on the campaign trail. 

Liberal Leader Mark Carney says Markham-Unionville incumbent Paul Chiang will remain a candidate under the party's banner after suggesting people turn in a Conservative candidate, Joe Tay, to the Chinese consulate and collect a bounty. We discuss the fallout with Fairchild Radio and TV commentator Jimmy Yan.

It's about a month after 228, an important date in Taiwan's history, marking the 228 Massacre. 228 stands for February 28 1947. February 28th is now commemorated as a national holiday in Taiwan known as the 228 Peace Memorial Day.   For this year's 228 episode, we wanted to release my interview with Nâ Sū Phok (藍士博), the Executive Director of the 228 Memorial Foundation in Taiwan. Last July 2024, I sat down with him at the Taiwanese American Conference at West Chester University about his work for the 228 Memorial Foundation. You may be wondering why we are sharing this episode a month later.   Since Sū Phok spoke in Taiwanese Hokkien during the interview, it required translation from Taiwanese into English, and that took a bit longer than anticipated. Secondly, 228 is not a single date in history, subsequent events after February 28th lasted beyond and into March leading to what some refer to as the March Massacre.   Here's a brief summary for those unfamiliar with the 228 Massacre.   The first thing to know is that like most significant events in history, they do not just take place on a single date. There are usually circumstances and other happenings that lead up to the date in history. Two years before the 228 Massacre in 1945, at the end of World War II, the Chinese Nationalists (aka the Kuomintang/KMT) had fled from China to Taiwan bringing with them the Republic of China framework. Since then, tensions had been mounting for quite some time.   In the case of the 228 Massacre, there were conflicts and protests that began much earlier, leading up to what happened on the night of February 27th, 1947 when Tobacco Monopoly Bureau agents tried to confiscate contraband cigarettes from a 40-year-old woman and brutally knocked her out. When an angry crowd gathered in protest, one of the agents fired a shot into the crowd killing a bystander. Within 24 hours, by the next day, February 28th, the incident had escalated into bloody violence and massacres. More killings happened in March of 1947, which have led some Taiwanese dissidents to call it the March Massacre.   Under the authoritarian Chiang regime, what followed after 228 was 38 years of martial law and the White Terror era. Anyone could be disappeared, executed or worse for just saying or doing the wrong thing, or for what was seemingly wrong in the eyes of the authorities. The people of Taiwan were horrified and terrified. Generations dared not speak of 228.   228 was absent from high school textbooks until relatively recently. Denial, distrust, suppression, and the passage of time have made it hard for many to come to terms with 228.   If you'd like to learn more, I invite you to listen to our past episodes about 228 that are listed in the Related Links section below.   Special thanks to Mei-Ling Lin for her translation assistance for this episode.   This episode is sponsored in part by the Taiwanese American Council of Greater New York.   Here's a little preview of what we talked about in this podcast episode: What does 228 refer to and what is its historical significance Sū Phok's background and upbringing How Sū Phok first learned about or heard about 228 If Sū Phok has any family members/relatives that have been impacted by or victimized by 228 Why/How did Sū Phok got involved with the 228 Memorial Foundation Where does Sū Phok's interest in history comes from Why it's important to preserve history What the 228 Memorial Foundation does How what the 228 Memorial Foundation does is different from what the Transitional Justice Commission does What Sū Phok's responsibilities are as the Executive Director of the 228 Memorial Foundation What kind of work Sū Phok was doing before working for the 228 Memorial Foundation How the work of the 228 Memorial Foundation has changed since it was founded in1995 Some of the milestones/major accomplishments of the 228 Memorial Foundation News from early 2024 about how Taiwan's Transitional Justice Commission identified 42 historical sites The 228 Memorial Foundation's opinions on historical sites of injustice related to 228 Current initiatives/projects of the 228 Memorial Foundation? What Sū Phok has  learned about 228 since working for the 228 Memorial Foundation that he didn't know before What's on display at the National 228 Memorial Museum Future initiatives/projects of the 228 Memorial Foundation What Sū Phok would like us to consider about 228 and how it might be relevant to the present   Related Links:  

In this special crossover episode with Physicianary, previous Gut Talk guest, Austin Chiang, MD, and Physicianary host, Hansa Bhargava, MD, discuss the influence of social media in medicine and how AI continues to change the health care landscape. •    Intro 0:30 •    Austin Chiang, MD, MPH 0:36 •    Tell us about your journey. 1:02 •    How did you get involved with being a social media officer at your institution? 3:58 •    Where do you think doctors should see themselves in the future of social media in medicine? 6:49 •    What are the ways in which you see AI tech making a difference? 9:12 •    Do you agree that it is helpful for doctors to be involved with product development and integration on an industry level? 12:14 •    Can you give us some insight on the process of putting through new CPT codes as a company?  14:41 •    Tell me more about your book, Gut: An Owner's Guide (The Body Literacy Library). What motivated you to write this book, and what do you think people will get out of it? 18:35 •    If you were the “king of health care”, what would you work on first? What is the most important aspect of health car that you think needs fixing? 21:23 •    What's your favorite food? 25:24 •    How to reach Chiang. 26:01 •    Thanks 26:20 Austin Chiang, MD, MPH, is the first chief medical officer for the endoscopy business of Medtronic, the global leader in health technology. He is also currently an assistant professor of medicine at an academic teaching hospital in Philadelphia, PA, and serves as the director of the Endoscopic Weight Loss Program. Listen to Gut Talk's very first episode with Dr. Chiang from 2019, Social Media in Medicine. We'd love to hear from you! Send your comments/questions to guttalkpodcast@healio.com. Follow us on X @HealioGastro @sameerkberry @umfoodoc. Follow Dr. Bhargava on X @hansabhargavaMD and on Instagram @doctorhansaMD. Follow Dr. Chiang everywhere on social media @AustinChiangMD. Disclosures: Bhargava reports no relevant financial disclosures. Chiang reports he is the chief medical officer for Medtronic Endoscopy.

This week, we're diving into Dragon Chiang, a gritty comic about a Chinese communist trucker navigating the Iron Road from China to America in a dystopian near-future. With intense action and an intriguing world in the background, this book surprised us at how much more we were left wanting. ----more---- For the transcript of this episode, head over to https://www.tencenttakes.com/transcripts.   Email: tencenttakes@gmail.com Twitter: @Tencenttakes Instagram: @Tencenttakes Facebook: /Tencenttakes Mastodon: retro.pizza/@tencenttakes Our banner art is original work by Sarah Frank  (https://www.lookmomdraws.com/)

Last time we spoke about the Jinzhou Operation and Defense of Harbin. After the Mukden Incident, Zhang Xueliang, despite commanding a large army, was pressured into non-resistance against Japan. As tensions escalated, the Japanese bombed Jinzhou to intimidate Zhang Xueliang and the Kwantung Army prepared to invade. By January 1, 1932, Zhang's forces retreated, marking a significant loss for China. Meanwhile, Ma Zhanshan emerged as a resistance hero, navigating complex alliances against Japanese aggression. In the face of Japanese aggression, Ding Chao rallied forces in Harbin, a crucial city in Northeast China. Together with Ma Zhanshan and other generals, they formed the Kirin self-defense army to resist the Japanese advance. Despite fierce battles, including victories at Shuiqu and Shulan, the Japanese ultimately launched a full-scale assault. After intense fighting, Harbin fell on February 5, 1932. The resistance crumbled, leading to Ma Zhanshan's defection and the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo.   #143 The January 28th Incident Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the words of Ron Burgundy, “phew, Boy, that escalated quickly... I mean, that really got out of hand fast”. Ishiwara Kanji unleashed the Mukden Incident, beginning a series of military conflicts. The Kwantung army invaded all three provinces of Manchuria, Ma Zhanshan tried to fight back at Heilongjiang, Ding Chao at Harbin and Zhang Xueliang at Jinhouz. All of this culminated in the conquest of Manchuria and the establishment of the new puppet state of Manchukuo. Yet another significant conflict also broke out in Shanghai of all places.  Now before we start this one I want to point out there are a lot of bias issues with how this incident began. It is known as the January 28th Incident or the First Battle of Shanghai. There are a few arguments as to how exactly it began, but the two main narratives are as such. During the invasion of Manchuria, anti-Japanese demonstrations broke out across China, particularly in large cities like Shanghai and Guangzhou. In most Japanese sources, these demonstrations got out of hand, requiring military action to defend Japanese citizens and property in Shanghai. Now as for Chinese sources, and I will say it here, I place a lot more credibility on the Chinese side on this one, during the Invasion of Manchuria, the League of Nations passed resolutions to get the Japanese to withdraw their troops and many of the members expressed support for China. Although the United States was not a member of the League, Secretary of State Stimson issued a "non-recognition" note in response to Japan's occupation of Jinzhou, aiming to pressure Japan. This isolation in the international arena heightened anxiety within the Japanese government and military, prompting them to seek conflicts in other regions of China to divert attention from their invasion of Manchuria.  Now a lot of trouble had been stirred up in Shanghai ever since the Mukden Incident broke out. Shanghai's business community initiated a boycott of Japanese trade, significantly impacting Japan's coastal and Yangtze River shipping industries. To give one example the "Nissin Steamship Company" halted all operations since the incident. Between July 1931 and the end of March 1932, Japanese merchants in Shanghai reportedly suffered losses amounting to 41,204,000 yen . To give you an idea, in 1930, Japanese goods accounted for 29% of Shanghai's average monthly imports, but by December 1931, this figure had plummeted to 3%. On October 5, 1931, the Japanese government convened a cabinet meeting, resolving that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would issue a stern warning to the National Government, with the Foreign Minister and Navy Minister overseeing the issue of ship deployment. Shanghai was the key hub for Western powers in China. It was here they made significant investments and maintained strong commercial interests in the region. The political and economic dynamics among these powers were intricate. Shanghai held the largest amount of foreign settlements and concessions. Any outbreak of war in Shanghai would inevitably capture international attention and prompt intervention from nations with vested interests, such as Britain, the United States, and France.  On October 1, Tanaka Takayoshi, the assistant military attaché at the Japanese Consulate in Shanghai and head of the Shanghai Secret Service, was summoned to Shenyang by Colonel Seishirō Itagaki who told him "Our next move is to occupy Harbin and make Manchuria independent. We have sent Colonel Doihara to pick up Puyi. If we succeed, the League of Nations will have a big fight and the Tokyo government will have a headache. I want you to do something in Shanghai to divert the attention of other countries. When you cause a commotion, we will take Manchuria." Tanaka promised to complete the task and said that he was "training an excellent spy who can bribe Chinese troublemakers in Shanghai to start this fake war".  Itagaki then withdrew 20,000 yen from the Kwantung Army's secret service funds and provided it to Tanaka for operational purposes. Now here it gets wild. Tanaka took the funds and paid a Japanese female spy named Kawashima Yoshiko, known also as Jin Bihui, but whose birthname was Aisin Giori Xianyu with the courtesy name of Dongzhen, meaning “eastern jewel”. Yes Manchu royalty, to be more precise the 14th daughter of Shanqi a Manchu prince of the Aisin Gioro clan of the former Qing Dynasty. Shanqi was a descendant of Hooge, the eldest son of Hong Taiji, it all comes full circle sometimes. After the Xinhai revolution, Xianyu was given up for adoption in 1915 to her fathers friend Naniwa Kawashima, a Japanese spy and adventurer. Thus here she took the name Yoshiko Kawashima. She was raised in Tokyo and excelled at judo and fencing. In 1922 he biological father Shanqi died and as Manchu royal tradition dictated, her biological mother committed suicide to join her husband in death. On November 22nd of 1925, Yoshiko stated the she “decided to cease being a woman forever”. Henceforth she stopped wearing a kimono, undid her traditional female hair style and took a final photo to commemorate “my farewell to life as a woman”. That same evening she went to a barbershop and got a crew cut and from there went to a men's clothing store. A photo of this dramatic transformation appeared 5 days later in the Asahi Shimbun under the headline "Kawashima Yoshiko's Beautiful Black Hair Completely Cut Off - Because of Unfounded 'Rumors,' Makes Firm Decision to Become a Man - Touching Secret Tale of Her Shooting Herself". This title was in reference to a prior scandal where she allegedly shot herself in the chest with a pistol given to her by Iwata Ainosuke. Historians believe it is much more likely she chose to become a man because of the death of her parents, failed romances or possibly sexual abuse from her foster father. Kawashima would go on to explain to a new reporter two days later "I was born with what the doctors call a tendency toward the third sex, and so I cannot pursue an ordinary woman's goals in life... Since I was young I've been dying to do the things that boys do. My impossible dream is to work hard like a man for China, for Asia." She was in fact something of a tomboy in her youth, despite being quite beautiful.  Now obviously the times being the times, those close to her were, lets just say not very receptive to this dramatic change. Thus in November of 1927, at the age of 20, her brother and adoptive father arranged her marriage in Port Arthur to one Ganjuurjab, the son of the Inner Mongolian Army General Babojab, who had led the Mongolian-Manchurian Independence Movement in 1911. The marriage lasted only three years, ending in divorce. Following this, she left Mongolia and began touring coastal cities of China before adopting a bohemian lifestyle back in Tokyo, where she had relationships with both men and women. She then moved to Shanghai's foreign concession, where she met the Japanese military attaché and intelligence officer Ryukichi Tanaka. This takes us back to our story at hand.  On the afternoon of January 18th, 1932, Yoshiko Kawashima orchestrated an incident by enlisting two Japanese Nichiren monks and three other Japanese supporters to stir up trouble at the Sanyou Industrial Company headquarters on Mayushan Road, located near the East District of the Shanghai International Settlement. The group of five Japanese individuals watched the worker volunteer army training outside the factory and threw stones to provoke a confrontation, intentionally sparking a conflict. Prior to this, Yoshiko Kawashima had also hired thugs disguised as workers to blend in with the crowd. During the altercation, the five Japanese individuals were attacked by unknown assailants. The Japanese Consulate General later reported that one of the Japanese individuals had died and another was seriously injured. However, the police were unable to apprehend the culprits, prompting Japan to accuse the Chinese factory patrol team of being behind the attack. This event became known as the "Japanese monk incident."   At 2:40 am on January 20, following orders from  Yoshiko, the military police captain Chiharu Shigeto led 32 members of the Shanghai "Japanese Youth Comrades Association in China" to sneak into the Sanyou Industrial Company factory. They brought guns, bayonets, and other weapons, along with flammable materials such as saltpeter and kerosene. Dozens of members of the Japanese Youth Association set fire to the Sanyou Industrial Society at night , and hacked to death and injured two Chinese policemen from the Municipal Council who came to organize firefighting. That afternoon, Tanaka Takayoshi instigated 1,200 Japanese expatriates to gather at the Japanese Residents' Association on Wenjianshi Road, and marched along Beichuan Road to the Japanese Marine Corps Headquarters at the north end of the road, demanding that the Japanese Marine Corps intervene. When they reached Qiujiang Road, they started rioting and attacked Chinese shops. In response, Shanghai Mayor Wu Tiecheng formally protested to Japan. Japan in return demanding a formal apology from the mayor and the apprehension of the person responsible for the death of the Japanese monk. Japan also insisted that China pay compensation for medical and funeral expenses, handle the anti-Japanese protests, and immediately disband any groups hostile to Japan. China had the option to firmly reject these unreasonable demands. On the morning of January 21, Japanese Consul General Murai Kuramatsu met with Shanghai Mayor Wu Tiecheng to express regret for the Japanese arson and the killing of Chinese police officers. He promised to arrest the Japanese ronin responsible for the fire. At the same time, he presented a formal protest regarding the "Japanese monk incident" and outlined four demands: (1) The mayor must issue an apology to the Consul General; (2) The authorities should swiftly and effectively search for, arrest, and punish the perpetrators; (3) The five victims should receive medical compensation and consolation money; (4) All illegal actions against Japan should be prohibited, with the Shanghai Anti-Japanese National Salvation Association and other anti-Japanese groups disbanded promptly.  Starting on January 22, Admiral Shiozawa of the Japanese Navy and Consul General Murai demanded that Shanghai Mayor Wu dissolve anti-Japanese groups and halt any boycott activities. Representatives of Japanese business conglomerates also filed complaints with the Shanghai International Settlement's Municipal Council, calling for an official apology from China for the offensive report and attacks on monks, and demanding that the attackers be punished. As tensions rose, the Japanese Residents Association urged Japanese naval forces in Shanghai to take measures to protect their safety. That same day Yukichi Shiozawa, Commander of the 1st Japanese Expeditionary Fleet in Shanghai, made a threatening declaration, stating that if the mayor of Shanghai failed to respond adequately to the four demands presented by Matsui, the Japanese Navy would take "appropriate action." Even before this the Japanese Navy had deployed troops and sent additional warships to Shanghai under the pretext of protecting its citizens In addition to the warships that arrived in Shanghai after the Mukden incident, the Japanese Navy sent the cruiser Oi and the 15th Destroyer Squadron (comprising four destroyers) from the mainland Wu Port on January 21. They carried over 450 personnel from the 1st Special Marine Corps along with a large supply of arms and arrived in Shanghai on January 23. The following day, the Notoro special service ship (an aircraft carrier of 14,000 tons, carrying six aircraft) anchored in Port Arthur, also arrived in Shanghai. On January 22, the Japanese government convened a meeting and decided to take appropriate measures, with Navy Minister Osumi Tsuneo handling the situation as deemed necessary. By January 25, the heads of the Japanese Navy Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held a joint session, where they agreed that if the Chinese side failed to demonstrate sincerity or meet Japan's demands, force would be used to ensure compliance. They also agreed on specific “emergency actions." On January 26, the Navy Ministry met again and resolved to demonstrate Japan's military strength within the next day or two. The proposed measures were as follows: (1) If the Shanghai garrison was insufficient, the Second Fleet would be deployed; (2) Japanese citizens in Shanghai would be directly protected; (3) The Japanese Navy would secure the route from Wusong to Shanghai; (4) All Chinese vessels would be detained outside Wusongkou; (5) Additional warships would be sent to ports in Nanjing, Hankou, Guangzhou, Shantou, Xiamen, and other locations, with civil unrest in those areas also being addressed. Emperor Hirohito authorized the Japanese Navy's military actions. On the 26th, Hirohito's military meeting, led by Chief of Staff Prince Kan'in (Prince Zaihito), ordered Yukichi Shiozawa in Shanghai to "exercise the right of self-defense." That same day, the Japanese Navy Ministry urgently deployed the 1st Torpedo Squadron (flagship "Yubari" cruiser, accompanied by the 22nd, 23rd, and 30th Destroyer Squadrons, totaling 12 destroyers), with over 460 personnel from the 2nd Special Marine Corps, which arrived in Shanghai on the afternoon of January 28. By this time, the Japanese military had gathered 24 warships, over 40 aircraft, more than 1,830 marines, and between 3,000 to 4,000 armed personnel in Shanghai, stationed across the Japanese concession and along the Huangpu River. On January 28, the Japanese Navy Ministry instructed the deployment of the aircraft carriers Kaga and Hosho, the cruisers Naka, Yura, and Abukuma, and four mine carriers from the mainland to Shanghai. Back on the 24th, 1932, Japanese intelligence agents set fire to the residence of the Japanese Ambassador to China, Shigemitsu Mamoru, in Shanghai, falsely accusing the Chinese of the act. On the 27th, Murai issued an ultimatum to the Shanghai authorities, demanding a satisfactory response to four conditions by 18:00 on the 28th, threatening necessary actions if the deadline was not met. Meanwhile, with threats and rumors of a Japanese naval landing circulating in Shanghai, the nearby 19th route army units moved closer to the International Settlement's Little Tokyo. The 19th Route Army of the Guangdong Army was in charge of defending Shanghai at the time, with Jiang Guangnai serving as the commander-in-chief and Cai Tingkai as the commander. Chen Mingshu, the leader of the 19th Route Army and commander of the Beijing-Shanghai garrison, was a strong proponent of responding to the Japanese army's provocations. The Chinese public, along with critics of the Nanjing government, called for punishment of the Manchurian warlord forces who had failed to halt the Kwantung Army's blitzkrieg, which encouraged officers of the 19th Route army to take a firm stance. As the Nanjing government had not enacted any policies, General Cai Tingkai and his colleagues convened an emergency meeting on January 23, pledging to resist any potential Japanese naval invasion of Shanghai at all costs. Now the Nanjing government response to this crisis was quite chaotic as you can imagine. There was still a anti communist campaign going on, Manchuria was being taken over and Chiang Kai-Shek fully understood they could ill afford an all out war with Japan. There was a general feeling things were getting out of hand, the league of nations were failing to do anything. Thus Chiang Kai-Shek retained his passive stance. On January 23rd after extensive consultations with Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-shek, newly appointed Executive Yuan President Sun Ke urgently telegraphed Shanghai Mayor Wu Tiecheng. "Our priority should be the preservation of Shanghai as the economic center, adopting a moderate stance towards Japan's demands. We must immediately gather all sectors to diplomatically explain our position and avoid conflict to prevent Shanghai from being seized by force." That same day, Minister of Military Affairs He Yingqin also sent a telegram to Wu Tiecheng, emphasizing, "Shanghai is our economic hub, and we must continue peaceful negotiations and avoid conflict." On that same day He Yingqin instructed the 19th Route Army to withdraw from Shanghai and relocate west of Nanxiang within five days. Zhang Jingjiang then invited Cai Tingkai to Du Yuesheng's home, where he convinced the 19th Route Army to "withdraw to the Nanxiang area to avoid confrontation with the Japanese." Upon learning of the Nationalist government's position, both Chiang Kai-shek and Cai Ying-ying were disappointed, but they expressed willingness to follow military orders and withdraw from Shanghai. As Chiang Guangnai put it, "We must simply obey the government's orders." On the afternoon of January 27, Chief of Staff Zhu Peide and Minister of Military Affairs He Yingqin deployed the 6th Military Police Regiment to assume responsibility for defending the 19th Route Army's positions in the Zhabei area of Shanghai. The regiment departed Nanjing Station at 8 pm on January 27, reaching Zhenru by noon on the 28th. The first battalion arrived at Shanghai North Station that afternoon, preparing to take over defense from the 6th Regiment of the 156th Brigade of the 78th Division of the 19th Route Army in Zhabei at dawn on January 29. Back on the 27th, after Murai issued an ultimatum to the Chinese authorities in Shanghai, Mayor Wu Tiecheng, responding to a request from both the Nanjing National Government and various sectors of Shanghai, sent a letter on the 28th at 13:45 accepting all the unreasonable demands made by the Japanese. Later, at 11:05 pm the Shanghai Public Security Bureau received a response from Murai, which was directed to both Mayor Wu Tiecheng and the head of the Shanghai Public Security Bureau. In the letter, Murai expressed "satisfaction" with Shanghai's acceptance of Japan's four demands, but also insisted on the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Zhabei, citing the need to protect overseas Chinese. Wu Tiecheng received this response at 11:25 pm At 11:30 pm, without waiting for a reply from the Chinese side, the Japanese military launched an attack on the Chinese garrison in Zhabei. In response, Weng Zhaoyuan's troops from the 156th Brigade of the 78th Division of the 19th Route Army, along with part of the 6th Regiment of the Military Police that had been sent to reinforce the defense, fought back.  During the January 28 Incident, the 19th Route Army, stationed in the Beijing-Shanghai area, was the Chinese military force involved. Following the September 18 Incident, Chiang Kai-shek entered into negotiations with the Guangdong faction. As part of these discussions between Nanjing and Guangdong, the Guangdong side proposed that Chen Mingshu, a Cantonese leader, be appointed as the commander-in-chief of the Beijing-Shanghai garrison. On September 30, 1931, Chiang Kai-shek agreed to this proposal. Consequently, the 19th Route Army, under Chen Mingshu's command, was transferred from Ganzhou, Jiangxi, where it had been stationed after the September 18 Incident (following Chiang's decision to halt "suppressing the Communists"), to defend the Beijing-Shanghai area. By November, the army was fully deployed along the Beijing-Shanghai line. The military leadership included Jiang Guangnai as commander-in-chief, Cai Tingkai as army commander, and Dai Ji as the garrison commander. The army was composed of the 60th Division, led by Shen Guanghan, stationed in Suzhou and Changzhou; the 61st Division, led by Mao Weishou, stationed in Nanjing and Zhenjiang; and the 78th Division, led by Qu Shounian, stationed in Shanghai, Wusong, Kunshan, and Jiading. The total strength of the army was over 33,000 soldiers. By early November, after the 19th Route Army had secured the Beijing and Shanghai areas, the military leadership, influenced by the Shanghai populace's strong anti-Japanese sentiment, resolved to resist the impending Japanese invasion. On January 15th the 19th Route Army assessed intelligence indicating an inevitable Japanese attack and began preparing for defense, less than two weeks before the invasion. On th 19th Jiang Guangnai convened a meeting of the 19th Route Army officers in Shanghai. During the meeting, several strategic policies were decided, as recalled by Cai Tingkai. These included. Maintaining an invisible state of alert in response to potential enemy harassment. Ensuring that frontline units were adequately reinforced, with Qu Shounian's division tasked with holding for at least five days. Rapidly constructing fortifications in each defense zone, while rear units pre-select lines of resistance. Ensuring that the 60th and 61st divisions could reinforce Shanghai within five days of the start of hostilities. Establishing a stance on the Shanghai Concession. Issuing an order that, starting January 20, no officers or soldiers were to remain in the concession unless on official duty. On January 23, 1932, under mounting pressure from Japan, Chen Mingshu, Jiang Guangnai, Cai Tingkai, and others issued a "Letter to All Officers and Soldiers of the 19th Route Army," urging a great spirit of sacrifice. On the same day, the army issued a secret combat order, stating that they must be fully prepared for war to defend the nation. If the Japanese attacked, all efforts should be focused on repelling them. The 19th Route Army was poised to resist the Japanese invasion in the Songhu area.   On January 24, 1932, Cai Tingkai and his colleagues arrived in Suzhou and held an emergency meeting with senior garrison commanders, including Shen Guanghan, to communicate the secret order issued on January 23. The generals unanimously supported the directive. However, under pressure from the National Government to avoid war, Chiang, Cai, and others reluctantly agreed to comply with an order to withdraw from Shanghai. They ordered the Zhabei garrison to exchange duties with the 6th Military Police Regiment on the morning of January 29. Due to the tense situation, the commander of the 156th Brigade of the 78th Division instructed the 6th Regiment at Zhabei to remain on high alert. At 11:00 PM on January 28, Dai Ji also ordered strict vigilance to prevent the Japanese army from occupying Zhabei during the guard change, instructing all units to take their positions and be on high alert. At 11:30 pm on January 28, 1932, Major General Shiozawa and the Japanese Marine Corps unexpectedly attacked the Chinese garrison located on the west side of North Sichuan Road. In response, the 6th Regiment of the 156th Brigade of the 19th Route Army, commanded by Zhang Junsong, promptly initiated a strong counteroffensive. At that moment, the Japanese forces, spearheaded by over 20 armored vehicles, split into five groups and launched assaults from different intersections in Zhabei. Upon receiving news of the Japanese attack, Jiang Guangnai, Cai Tingkai, and Dai Ji hurried to Zhenru Station on foot during the night, established a temporary command center, and instructed the rear troops to advance swiftly to Shanghai as per the original plan. At dawn on the 29th, the Japanese forces launched a series of intense assaults, supported by armored vehicles. Aircraft from the carrier "Notoro" bombed the Zhabei and Nanshi districts, leading to rapid escalation of the conflict. The 156th Brigade of the defending forces fiercely resisted the Japanese advances, using cluster grenades against the enemy's armored units and organizing stealth squads to sabotage enemy vehicles. They held their positions and counterattacked at opportune moments under artillery cover, successfully repelling the relentless Japanese assaults. According to Japanese accounts, the battle was described as "extremely fierce, with fires raging everywhere, flames filling the sky, and the battlefield in a state of devastation." At around 10 am, Japanese aircraft dropped bombs, causing the Commercial Press and the Oriental Library to catch fire, resulting in the destruction of over 300,000 books, including many rare ancient texts. More than a thousand Japanese soldiers, shielded by heavy artillery and armored vehicles, launched a vigorous attack at the intersection of Baoshan Road and Qiujiang Road, aiming to seize the Shanghai North Railway Station. This station was a crucial land transport hub, and its control was vital for the safety of the entire Zhabei area. At 2 pm on the 29th, taking advantage of the chaos at the North Station, the Japanese forces mounted a fierce assault. A company from our military police engaged in combat with the Japanese for an hour before withdrawing from the station. By 5 pm on the 29th, the main force of the 156th Brigade entered the fray and launched a counteroffensive, reclaiming both the North Station and Tiantong'an Station. They pressed their advantage and captured the Japanese Shanghai Marine Corps Headquarters, forcing the Japanese troops to retreat east of North Sichuan Road and south of Target Road. The initial Japanese offensive ended in defeat. Following the setback, British and American consuls intervened to mediate in the afternoon of the 29th (the Shanghai government stated it was at the request of the Japanese consuls, while the League of Nations report indicated it was initiated by the mayor of Shanghai). The Chinese and Japanese forces agreed to cease hostilities at 8 pm that night. Although the 19th Route Army recognized this as a delaying tactic, they consented to the ceasefire to allow for troop redeployment. Concurrently, the 19th Route Army strengthened their positions, urgently ordering the 60th Division from east of Zhenjiang to move into Nanxiang and Zhenru, while transferring the 61st Division to Shanghai. The 78th Division, stationed in Shanghai, was fully mobilized to the front lines to bolster defenses and prepare for further combat. Following the ceasefire, the Japanese army made significant efforts to bolster its forces. The Japanese Navy Ministry promptly dispatched four destroyers from the Sasebo 26th Squadron, under the command of the cruiser "Tatsuta," to reach Shanghai on January 30 and dock at Huangpu Wharf. Accompanying the vessels were 474 soldiers from the Sasebo 3rd Special Marine Corps, along with a substantial supply of ammunition. On the morning of January 31, the Japanese aircraft carriers Kaga and Hosho reached Shanghai, bringing approximately 30 aircraft from the First Air Fleet. They anchored off the coast of the Ma'an Islands, about 130 kilometers east of Shanghai. By 4 pm, three cruisers Naka , Yura , and Abukuma along with four torpedo boats arrived in Shanghai, transporting over 2,000 marines who disembarked in groups. On February 1, the Japanese cruise ship "Terukoku Maru," carrying the Yokosuka 1st Special Marine Corps 525 men, docked at Shanghai Huishan Wharf. On the 2nd, the Japanese Navy Central Headquarters established the Third Fleet with ships from the First Overseas Fleet in the Yangtze River area, with the Izumo serving as the flagship (the Izumo arrived in Shanghai on February 6) under the command of Vice Admiral Yoshisaburo Nomura, to execute coordinated military operations. Following the reinforcement of Japanese forces, they resumed attacks on Chinese defenders in Zhabei, Baziqiao, and other locations on February 3 but were still repelled. On February 4, the Japanese launched their first major offensive, expanding the conflict to Jiangwan and Wusong. After a day of intense fighting, the Wusong open-air artillery fort suffered destruction from enemy bombardment, yet the Chinese defenders successfully prevented a Japanese landing. The anti-aircraft artillery unit from the 88th Division, assigned to the 4th Regiment of the 156th Brigade of the 19th Route Army, shot down a Japanese aircraft. Following the failure of the general offensive, Yukiichi Shiozawa was relieved of his command and sent back to Japan. Vice Admiral Yoshisaburo Nomura, the newly appointed commander of the Third Fleet, took over Shiozawa's position. Upon his appointment, the Japanese military began to bolster its forces. Even before the situation in Shanghai escalated, Japan had planned to deploy ground troops, but this was initially rejected by the navy. However, as the situation deteriorated, the navy had to request assistance from the army. On February 2, the Japanese cabinet officially decided to deploy ground forces. Due to the urgent circumstances in Shanghai, they resolved to send the Shanghai Dispatch Mixed Brigade, led by Major General Shimomoto Kuma and the 9th Division, led by Lieutenant General Ueda Kenkichi, with the Shanghai Dispatch Mixed Brigade and the Second Independent Tank Squadron being transported first. Concurrently, the Japanese Navy dispatched the Yokosuka 2nd Special Marine Corps to Shanghai. The 24th Mixed Brigade landed in Wusong on the afternoon of February 7.  Now within the backdrop of all of this Nanjing was certainly freaking out. What had started as a small incident, had escalated into a full blown battle. The Japanese were continuously sending reinforcements, and now so was China. Chiang Kai-Shek had recently resigned and came back as Generalissimo ushering in the slogan "first internal pacification, then external resistance." With that he had led a massive campaign against the Jiangxi Soviet, while avoiding a frontal war against Japan. Obviously this led to wide scale protest in China, which in turn contributed to this new incident in Shanghai. The Shanghai incident was certainly disrupting Chiang Kai-Shek's offensives against the communists, allowing those like Hu Hanmin's Guangdong based 19th Route Army to deal with the Japanese at Shanghai. Yet how long could Chiang Kai-Shek keep this up? Should he divert all attention to the Japanese? Will he step down again in shame for not facing the encroaching foreign empire?  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The January 28th Incident was yet another powder keg like moment for the very vulnerable and still fractured Chinese nation. Chiang Kai-Shek had internal enemies left-right and center and now the Empire of Japan was pressing its luck to keep seizing more and more from his nation. What was the Generalissimo to do in the face of these insurmountable odds?   

Kana Enomoto (she/her) is the director of brain health for the McKinsey Health Institute and Reina Chiang (she/her) is a college student and a mental health advocate and they are Unapologetically Black Unicorns. Kana and Reina discuss their personal experiences when crisis showed up in their home and why the emergency room could do more to support mental health crisis. They talk about why mental health and medical conditions should be treated with the same care, Reina's vision for her non-profit “u matter” and the importance for parents to seek support for their children in crisis as well as for themselves. The National Suicide Prevention Lifeline is now: 988 Suicide and Crisis Lifeline Transcripts are available on Apple Podcasts.  

In this episode of the Startup CPG Podcast, Grace Kennedy sits down with Ranwei Chiang, the CEO and owner of Abstinence Spirits, a brand redefining non-alcoholic beverages with bold flavors and sophisticated botanical blends. Ranwei shares the inspiring journey behind Abstinence Spirits, from its roots in South Africa's Cape Floral Kingdom to its expansion in the U.S. market.They discuss the rising trend of non-alcoholic options, how Abstinence Spirits differentiates itself with depth and complexity, and the challenges and successes of building a brand in an emerging category. Ranwei also dives into the company's approach to retail, e-commerce, grassroots marketing, and the importance of building strong industry relationships. Plus, she shares insights on entrepreneurship, financial strategy, and maintaining work-life balance while growing a business.Tune in to learn how Abstinence Spirits is making waves in the beverage industry!Listen in as they share about:Origin & Founding Story Abstinence SpiritsProduct Line and InnovationGrowth and Consumer TrendsMarketing and Sales StrategyRetail and Distribution ApproachEngagement with Bartenders and MixologistsAdvice for EntrepreneursEpisode Links:Website: https://drinkabstinence.com/ LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/ranwei-chiang-6b38014/ Don't forget to leave a five-star review on Apple Podcasts or Spotify if you enjoyed this episode. For potential sponsorship opportunities or to join the Startup CPG community, visit http://www.startupcpg.com.Show Links:Transcripts of each episode are available on the Transistor platform that hosts our podcast here (click on the episode and toggle to “Transcript” at the top)Join the Startup CPG Slack community (20K+ members and growing!)Follow @startupcpgVisit host Daniel's Linkedin Questions or comments about the episode? Email Daniel at podcast@startupcpg.comEpisode music by Super Fantastics

Michael Chiang started training with us back when we had a gym in our Hollywood days on Sunset and Highland blvd. For years, he led early morning classes, and many of his students from that class went on to achieve their black belts. After taking a break, he eventually found his way back to the mats. Michael has a big heart, and I'm incredibly grateful for his impact on our gym and community.ponsored by TACFIT.com “The World's Smartest Workout” Açai Jungle Cafe “Your neighborhood Paradise” AcaiJungleCafe.com

How do households react to economic surprises? While inflation affects all consumers, unexpected inflation spikes can have a more significant impact on some households than others. “For some households that find it hard to move resources around or borrow or adjust their savings, unexpected inflation will have a large effect on them,” says St. Louis Fed economist Yu-Ting Chiang. In this episode, Chiang previews his upcoming research on the effects of unexpected inflation shocks and their impact on households.

In this inspiring episode of Fearless Future w/ Catherine McCourt, we dive into the power of women's leadership, entrepreneurship, and breaking barriers in the real estate industry. Our guests, Arlene Chiang and Morgan Browne, co-founders of Oakwyn Realty, share their journey of building one of Vancouver's most dynamic real estate firms and how they're reshaping the industry with a culture of empowerment, innovation, and collaboration.Join us as we discuss:✨ The challenges and triumphs of being female leaders in real estate✨ How Oakwyn Realty is creating opportunities for women in the industry✨ The importance of mindset, mentorship, and community in achieving success✨ Advice for aspiring female entrepreneurs and professionals looking to make an impactWhether you're in real estate, entrepreneurship, or simply looking for motivation to pursue your goals fearlessly, this episode is packed with wisdom and actionable insights!About Our Guests:

Anthony Chiang talks Miami Heat & Jimmy Butler

In Episode 81 we chat about a recent paper published by Chen et al (2025) ! We discuss people's trajectories in money and time at work over time. They find that at the top, the tradeoff for more money with more work hours might not be worth it!Chen, J. H., Yang, Y., Fang, C., Huang, C. H., Chiang, C. J., Wu, C. F., ... & Drake, B. (2025). Balancing work and earnings: The long-term impact on mental health. Social Science & Medicine, 364, 117562. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit healthywork.substack.com

Miami Herald's Heat beat Reporter Anthony Chiang joins the Tobin & Leroy show to discuss the latest with the Jimmy Butler vs Pat Riley situation.

C.P. Ong is a 20th-generation Chen Family Taijiquan lineage disciple of both Chen Xiaowang and Chen Zhenglei. He has also studied extensively with Zhu Tiancai.He first began his Taiji studies in 1972 learning the Guang Ping Yang Style from Master Y.C. Chiang in Berkeley, CA. He is also a student of vipassana (insight) meditation and has attended several intensive meditation retreats in Buddhist monasteries in Yangon, Myanmar. He is the author of Taijiquan—Cultivating Inner Strength. He received his Ph.D. in Mathematics from U.C. Berkeley in 1973 and is currently the executive Vice-President, USA Wushu-Kungfu Association.C.P. Ong's WebsiteYou can visit us @Our website: Somaticprimer.comFor upcoming live courses: Vidyamethod.comOur Online Learning Platform @ Somatic Primer on PatreonPlease consider supporting the show with a monthly donation and don't to forget to like and subscribe.Support the show

C.P. Ong is a 20th-generation Chen Family Taijiquan lineage disciple of both Chen Xiaowang and Chen Zhenglei. He has also studied extensively with Zhu Tiancai. He first began his Taiji studies in 1972 learning the Guang Ping Yang Style from Master Y.C. Chiang in Berkeley, CA. He is also a student of vipassana (insight) meditation and has attended several intensive meditation retreats in Buddhist monasteries in Yangon, Myanmar. He is the author of Taijiquan—Cultivating Inner Strength. He received his Ph.D. in Mathematics from U.C. Berkeley in 1973 and is currently the executive Vice-President, USA Wushu-Kungfu Association.C.P. Ong's WebsiteYou can us @Our website: Somaticprimer.comFor upcoming live courses: Vidyamethod.comOur Online Learning Platform @ Somatic Primer on PatreonPlease consider supporting the show with a monthly donation and don't to forget to like and subscribe.Support the show

On the occasion of her 80th birthday in 2000, The Kitchen Sisters, along with food writer Peggy Knickerbocker, visited the home of Cecilia Chiang, the legendary Chinese-American restaurateur, chef and founder of The Mandarin Restaurant in San Francisco for a bit of an oral history.Cecilia Chiang introduced regional Chinese cooking to America in the 1960s, revolutionizing what most Americans thought Chinese cooking was. Elegant and savvy, her restaurant drew in celebrities and food enthusiasts, including Pavarotti, John Lennon, Jackie Onassis, Mae West, Henry Kissinger, and others. She inspired James Beard, Marion Cunningham, Alice Waters, Julia Child, and generations of chefs and restaurateurs, including her son Philip, founder of P. F. Chang's. Cecilia died in 2020 at the age of 100.

Last time we spoke about the Fujian Rebellion of 1933. In the midst of political turmoil, the 19th Route Army, once vital in campaigns for Chiang Kai-shek, found itself at odds with his leadership during Japan's invasion of Shanghai in 1932. Facing internal rebellion and external threats, Chiang Kai-Shek prioritized fighting the Communists over the Japanese. The 19th Route Army, disillusioned, resisted both Japan and the CCP but ultimately faced betrayal when Chiang Kai-Shek forced them into civil conflict in Fujian, deepening divisions within China. In 1933, Chiang Kai-shek faced opposition for his appeasement of Japan, leading the 19th Route Army, frustrated by his inaction, to plot a coup. Under Chen Mingshu's leadership, they sought alliances against Chiang Kai-Shek but struggled amid civil war pressures and Red Army conflicts. On November 20, they declared the People's Revolutionary Government in Fuzhou, aiming to unify against Japanese aggression. However, lack of support led to rapid failure; by January 1934, Chiang's forces crushed the rebellion, and its leaders fled, marking the end of the Fujian Revolution.   #130 The Long March Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. As we saw 2 episodes ago, the CCP had been taken over by the 28 Bolsheviks and Otto Braun who initiated a dramatic offensive strategy for the Red Army. Unfortunately this also came during the 5th encirclement campaign. This resulted in repeated defeats for the Red Army and the gradual shrinking of the Soviet area. In April 1934, the Central Red Army engaged in a decisive battle against the Nationalist Army in Guangchang, Jiangxi Province, suffering severe losses and now faced a critical situation. As the NRA's grip tightened, the Red Army and the Central Committee of the CCP sought new strategies. With offensive tactics no longer feasible, the Red Army considered alternative approaches to navigate its current challenges. One overarching strategy involved co-opting the NRA by harnessing nationalistic sentiment to form a united front against the Japanese. The leadership of the Red Army hoped that by identifying a common enemy, they could temporarily alleviate the conflict with the KMT. In July 1934, they attempted to implement this strategy by deploying the Seventh Red Army Corps to western Fujian to join the 10th Red Army, commanded by Su Yu. This combined force was labeled the Anti-Japanese Vanguard Column to attract Nationalist support; however, the propaganda effort failed. The NRA subsequently obliterated the Red Army Column, resulting in the death or execution of most of its members. Approximately 800 survivors escaped and regrouped as a guerrilla unit under Su Yu, continuing to fight independently until the establishment of the Second United Front in 1937. Another breakout occurred on July 23, 1934, when the 6th Red Army Corps, operating from the Hunan-Guangdong border, traversed Hunan and joined forces with the Third Red Army, forming the Second Front Red Army, led by He Long, on October 22, 1934. It is uncertain whether either operation impacted the KMT. The escalating costs and ongoing casualties placed a heavy burden on the Red Army, complicating its ability to maintain its position. A secure new location was essential for the Red Army to reorganize, resupply, and recruit personnel. In August 1934, Bo Gu and Otto Braun secretly decided to abandon the Jiangxi Soviet. Their initial plan was to head southwest towards Hunan, seeking friendlier territory and aiming to connect with the 2nd Front Red Army. While the precise whereabouts of the 2nd Front Red Army were unclear, the leadership considered Hunan the most probable destination and devised a route to reach it. Meanwhile, the rest of the Red Army intensified its recruitment efforts, raised funds, and gathered supplies. On the night of October 10, 1934, the leadership of the Red Army issued marching orders to the 1st Front Red Army, which advanced southwest in two columns, consisting of the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 8th, and 9th Red Army Corps. The total strength of this force was about 87,000 soldiers. Many of these soldiers were unaware that it would be their final sight of the Jiangxi Soviet, as most believed they were simply executing another maneuver to outflank the KMT and strike at its rear. A contingent of 16,000 troops, including several wounded soldiers like their leader Chen Yi, remained in Ruijin to defend against and delay the KMT forces, providing the First Front Red Army with the necessary time to depart unnoticed. Thus, began what has famously been called the Long March. The first few days of the Long March were relatively calm. The Red Army steered clear of significant confrontations with the NRA forces and easily maneuvered through a gap in the encirclement. Previously, Zhou Enlai had brokered a truce with the Guangdong and Guangxi warlords involved in the Extermination campaign, allowing the Red Army safe passage through the region. Meanwhile, the Red Army troops remaining in Ruijin fiercely resisted the NRA, effectively masking the fact that the main force had already departed. Until November 8, Nationalist newspapers claimed that the Red Army was nearly annihilated. The 1st Front Red Army traveled at night, using small trails to evade detection and attacks from the air. The troop formation included the 1st and 9th Red Army Corps on the left flank, the 3rd and 8th Red Army Corps on the right, with leadership and logistical units positioned in the center, while the 5th Red Army Corps provided rear guard support. The Red Army employed porters to transport heavy equipment, such as printing presses, X-ray machines, and currency. Additional porters carried litters for the wounded and key leaders. During this period, several Red Army leaders, including Zhou Enlai, were unwell or injured, while others, like Mao Zedong, rested in litters during the day after long nights of planning. By mid-November 1934, the NRA learned that the Red Army had broken free from their encirclement and was heading westward, prompting them to pursue. Observing the Red Army's movements, Chiang Kai-shek and the NRA leadership inferred that southern Hunan was likely their destination, so they deployed troops accordingly. The Red Army advanced rapidly to the west, aiming to cross the Xiang River before the NRA could catch up. On November 27, 1934, the Red Army reached Daoxian and launched an assault on the NRA blockhouses guarding the Xiang River crossings. They quickly overran these defenses and began moving troops across the river. However, the central column of the Red Army, hindered by heavy equipment and injured soldiers, fell behind the main force. On November 28, the NRA struck the rear elements of the Red Army before they could reach the river. For 5 days, the Red Army engaged in a fierce rear guard action, trying to disengage from the NRA and successfully cross the river. By December 2, 1934, all Red Army units had successfully crossed the Xiang River, albeit at a significant cost. The Red Army lost over two divisions from the 3rd and 5th Red Army Corps, leaving just over 30,000 soldiers remaining in their ranks. Furthermore, much of the Army's heavy equipment and supplies were abandoned along the way to lighten their load. After the Red Army crossed the Xiang River, it continued to evade direct confrontations with the NRA. The challenging battle at the Xiang River had a profound impact on the Red Army, leading to a rise in desertions as soldiers recognized that the movement had turned into an exodus from Jiangxi. Many porters responsible for transporting heavy equipment also began to leave during the night, especially while navigating the difficult, muddy trails in the mountains. The Red Army made several attempts to head north to join He Long and the 2nd Front Red Army, but each time, they found their routes blocked by the NRA. As a result, they altered their plans and headed west toward Guizhou, aiming to reach Sichuan and connect with the 4th Front Red Army to establish a new Soviet. Upon arriving in Liping, Guizhou province, the Red Army leadership decided on December 18th to advance north toward Zunyi in pursuit of their goal in Sichuan. Initially, Guiyang, the provincial capital, was the intended destination, but it had been fortified with seven NRA divisions. In contrast, Zunyi appeared to be a more feasible target as the second-largest city in the province, defended only by local Guizhou forces. On January 1st, 1935, the Red Army began its march toward Zunyi, crossing the Wu River under heavy fire from Guizhou provincial troops. Within three days, they successfully crossed the river and continued toward Zunyi. On January 7, the Red Army launched an attack on Zunyi, which fell two days later. Following the capture of the city, the Red Army initiated a recruitment drive, adding 30,000 new recruits to its ranks. To enhance its mobility, they buried or abandoned much of their heavy equipment. The Red Army had originally planned to remain in the area for an extended period to refit, reorganize, and bolster their forces. The staff of the Central Cadre Unit's Red Army Medical School seized the opportunity to conduct a week-long course on basic first aid for soldiers. However, local conditions hindered any long-term presence. The area's primary crop was opium, useful for barter but inadequate for sustaining the Red Army. Additionally, the city's position along a river bend restricted the Red Army's escape routes in the event of an NRA attack. Given these challenges, Communist leadership convened a conference to deliberate on their military strategy. The conference held on January 15th, 1935, marked a pivotal moment in Communist history. In attendance were Politburo members, including Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Chen Yun, Zhou Enlai, Luo Fu, and Bo Gu, along with Liu Bocheng, Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, Nie Rongzhen, Peng Dehuai, and Otto Braun. The primary focus of the meeting was the unsuccessful military strategy employed during the 5th Extermination Campaign. Bo Gu and Zhou Enlai opened the discussion, both acknowledging their mistakes and accepting responsibility for the failures. Mao Zedong followed with a sharp critique of the strategy's use of "short, swift thrusts" and the lack of cooperation with the Fujian 19th route NRA Army. The conference continued for three more days, during which much of the Red Army leadership criticized Bo Gu and Otto Braun's approach, aligning themselves with Mao. By the end of the meeting, key leaders of the CCP and Red Army had distanced themselves from the 28 Bolsheviks, effectively making Mao Zedong the de facto leader of the CCP, despite not being formally elected to any new position at Zunyi. A significant change was the disbanding of the triumvirate leadership of Bo Gu, Otto Braun, and Zhou Enlai. Zhu De and Zhou Enlai were assigned to lead the Red Army, which then moved towards Sichuan to connect with the 4th Front Red Army. Departing Zunyi, the Red Army comprised four army corps: the 1st, 3rd, 5th and 9th Red Army Corps, although all were considerably smaller than before. The total strength of the 1st Front Red Army was approximately 35,000 soldiers. The army advanced north through Tongzi, gathering gold and opium to procure food and supplies for the journey. The 1st Army Corps, led by Lin Biao, took the lead in searching for a route to cross the Yangtze River. While attempting to secure a crossing near Chishui, the remainder of the Red Army engaged in a fierce battle with a Sichuan NRA force near Tucheng. The fighting escalated to such a degree that Mao Zedong ordered Lin Biao and his corps to return and assist. Ultimately, on January 29th, 1935, the Red Army lost contact with the enemy and abandoned its plan to cross the Yangtze River, instead retreating west to Zhaxi in Yunnan province to evade NRA forces. However, this provided only a temporary reprieve, as more NRA troops moved west into Sichuan, covering all potential crossing points along the Yangtze. Faced with limited options, Mao proposed an audacious plan on February 7th: the Red Army would split into separate columns and head back east into Guizhou to mislead the NRA, then reunite and proceed southwest into Yunnan to find a safer crossing point over the Yangtze. Executing this plan, the Red Army conducted a series of feints, diversionary attacks, and deception operations to confuse NRA leadership, as well as some of its own ranks. Mao Zedong aimed to create an opening for the Red Army to escape into Yunnan and cross the Yangtze in the Jinsha River area. The Red Army began moving east, achieving victories over the NRA, such as at Loushan Pass, where they captured about a division's worth of personnel and equipment. They continued eastward, seizing the city of Maotai and acquiring additional gold and opium for trade. In March 1935, Mao was appointed as the political commissar of the Red Army, with Zhu De serving as the commander-in-chief. His leadership role was further solidified when he was included in the triumvirate Military Council alongside Zhou Enlai and Wang Jiaxiang. Mao Zedong then initiated a deception operation, sending the 9th Red Army Corps north as a feint toward the Yangtze River, intending to reinforce NRA intelligence assessments. Chiang believed that these erratic movements indicated the Red Army was preparing for a decisive battle. Consequently, he relocated his NRA headquarters to Guiyang and deployed nearly all of Guizhou's NRA forces to the Yangtze area to encircle and eliminate the Red Army. This deployment inadvertently opened a north-south corridor in Guizhou, allowing the Red Army to move south towards Guiyang, which was now vulnerable due to the concentration of NRA forces along the Yangtze. Capitalizing on these fears, Mao sent additional Red Army units toward the provincial capital. In response, Chiang hurriedly redirected NRA forces from Yunnan to bolster defenses in Guiyang, thus creating yet another escape route for the Red Army. The Red Army swiftly exploited this corridor and advanced into Yunnan. They employed a similar feint tactic as used in Guiyang, deploying units from the 1st Red Army Corps to threaten Kunming. With the main Yunnan forces still occupied in Guiyang, the Yunnan government was forced to reallocate its frontier and militia troops to defend the capital, thus opening one final corridor for the Red Army to escape through a crossing at the Jinsha River. By April 1935, the Red Army had executed one of its most daring maneuvers, evading the NRA forces by making a sweeping maneuver into Yunnan. Despite this strategy, the Red Army still needed to cross the Yangtze River. One section of the river, known as the Jinsha River, flows from Tibet through Yunnan to Sichuan and offered excellent crossing points for the Red Army. On April 29th, Mao Zedong identified three crossing locations. The 1st Red Army Corps was assigned to cross in the north at Longjie, while the 3rd Red Army Corps would cross in the center at Hongmen. The Central Cadre Unit was designated to use the southern crossing point at Jiaopingdu. Meanwhile, the Fifth and Ninth Army Corps were tasked with rear guard operations and would cross at the nearest crossing point. Although the 1st and 3rd Red Army Corps struggled to secure their crossing locations, the Central Cadre Unit successfully acquired seven boats, established security on both riverbanks, and commenced a ferrying operation that would last nine days. Consequently, the 1st and 3rd Red Army Corps abandoned their original crossing points and moved to Jiaopingdu. The 3rd Red Army Corps crossed on May 7th, followed by the 1st Red Army Corps the next day. The 5th Red Army Corps maintained its rear guard before quickly crossing at Jiaopingdu on May 9th. Upon reaching Sichuan, the weary Red Army troops began to contemplate their next steps. After nearly nine months of travel, with minimal rest and significant losses, the Red Army's numbers had dwindled to around 25,000 soldiers, with much of their heavy equipment abandoned along their retreat route. They attempted to seize Huili but were met with fierce resistance from the 24th NRA Division. Outside the city, Red Army leaders held a conference on May 12th and resolved to continue north through Sichuan, aiming to cross the Dadu River to join forces with the 4th Front Red Army. As the Red Army advanced through the territory of the Yi minority, they faced hostility from the Yi people, who harbored animosity toward the Han and attacked straggling Red Army soldiers, stealing their weapons and clothing and leaving many to perish. Fortunately, Liu Bocheng and his vanguard unit from the 1st Red Army Corps negotiated a truce with the Yi, securing safe passage in exchange for promises of equal land rights and treatment after the war. On May 23rd, the Red Army reached Anshunchang along the Dadu River. Their initial attempts to cross by ferry were thwarted by strong NRA defenses on the opposite bank, and they only managed to secure three boats, which were insufficient for a crossing. On May 27th, Red Army leaders decided to take a calculated risk and dispatched troops northward to seize Luding Bridge. This iron-chain suspension bridge, located along a challenging trail through the mountain passes, crossed the Dadu River. In a remarkable act of bravery, the 4th Regiment of the 2nd Division, 1st Red Army Corps, led by Yang Chengwu, marched nearly 100 miles in under 3 days to secure the bridge. Despite facing a defending NRA brigade on sheer cliffs, the 4 Regiment acted swiftly and captured the bridge amid constant gunfire, with only 18 of the 22 men who launched the final assault surviving. Their sacrifice allowed the Red Army to evade the main KMT force and successfully cross the Dadu River, ultimately establishing themselves in Hualingping for refitting operations. However, the challenges for the Red Army persisted even after crossing the Dadu. They were still unaware of the 4th Front Red Army's location, with one possible area being directly north behind the Jiajin Mountains. To avoid detection from NRA forces or ambushes by Tibetans, Mao opted for a central walking trail through the Jiajin Mountains rather than the more accessible eastern and western routes. For many survivors of the Long March, the leg through the Jiajin Mountains proved to be the most arduous and challenging segment. The Red Army soldiers faced hunger, cold, thirst, avalanches, and the high altitude as they attempted to traverse the snow-capped peaks with little more than the clothes on their backs. On June 12th, the first units of the Red Army arrived at Danwei, located at the northern foot of the Jiajin Mountains. By June 14th, the remaining soldiers descended from the mountains and linked up with Li Xiannian, a liaison officer from the 4th Front Red Army. Approximately 10,000 soldiers endured the harsh conditions and made it down the mountain. Thankfully, they rejoined their fellow Red Army comrades, allowing them to take a much-needed rest. On June 18, 1935, the 1st and 4th Front Red Armies finally connected at Lianghekou. The Fourth Front Red Army fared significantly better than its counterpart, having originated from the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet before relocating to the Shaanxi-Sichuan border and settling in northwest Sichuan in March 1935. Their forces numbered nearly 80,000, surpassing the 1st Front Red Army. Some soldiers from the 1st Front looked on with admiration and envy at the robust condition of the 4th Front soldiers and their horses. On June 26th, the leadership of both armies convened to discuss their future movements. Mao Zedong proposed advancing north to Gansu, then heading east toward Ningxia, with the ultimate goal of reaching Mongolia to establish communication with the Soviet Union. Conversely, Zhang Guotao suggested moving west to Xinjiang, aiming to connect with the Soviet Union via the Central Asian Republics. Beneath these military discussions lay political maneuvering as both Mao Zedong and Zhang Guotao sought to assert dominance over the Red Army. Ultimately, both sides maintained cordial relations and established a unified strategy and command. The Red Army was set to advance north to southern Gansu to establish a Soviet presence in the border areas. Zhang Guotao was appointed vice-chairman of the Military Council. By June 30, the 1st Front Red Army had moved into the Grasslands, with Zhang Guotao and the 4th Front Red Army following a day later. The meeting at Lianghekou did not resolve the political tensions between the factions led by Zhang Guotao and Mao Zedong, and these conflicts intensified over time. While Zhang Guotao continued to advocate for a westward movement toward Xinjiang, he also sought to recruit key leaders from the 1st Front Red Army to support his cause, but to no avail. Mao Zedong remained steadfast in his commitment to the agreed plan to proceed to Gansu and took measures to prevent any subversion from Zhang Guotao's camp. Tensions escalated during a conference at Maoergai on August 6th. The Red Army had arrived at Maoergai the previous day to rest and reorganize. According to one account, Mao Zedong held the meeting in the neighboring town of Shawo, securing the location ahead of Zhang Guotao arrival. As the sole representative from the 4th Front Red Army on the Politburo and Central Committee, Zhang Guotao intended to introduce additional representatives to enhance his influence, but they were unable to bypass security. This infuriated Zhang Guotao, highlighting the political maneuvering at play. Another account claims the meeting took place at Zhang Guotao's 11th Red Army Division headquarters, with his loyal soldiers ensuring that Mao Zdong could not undermine him. Regardless, no agreements were reached during this meeting. A second meeting was held on August 20th at Maoergai, resulting in a negotiated settlement. The Red Army remained under the command of Zhu De but was divided into two columns. The Right Column included the 1st and 3rd Red Army Corps, led by Lin Biao and Peng Dehuai, respectively, and also incorporated the 13th and 3th Red Armies from the 4th Front. Mao, Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu, and Otto Braun traveled with the Right Column. The Left Column comprised the remainder of the 4th Front Army, along with the 5th and 9th Red Army Corps, and was led by Zhang Guotao and Liu Bocheng, with Zhu De accompanying them. Both columns would advance north while skirting the Grasslands, with the Left Column heading toward Aba and the Right Column toward Baxi. Once the plan was finalized, they began their movement into the Grasslands on August 23rd. In the Grasslands, the Red Army encountered conditions as challenging as those in the mountains. This region was home to a minority population, and the Tibetan locals were just as hostile as the Yi had been, attacking and killing many stragglers. Food sources were scarce, and many Red Army soldiers were unfamiliar with edible plant species. Water supplies were also limited, as most sources were stagnant and contaminated. The soldiers ended up consuming wheat kernels, which severely upset their digestive systems. The trailing units faced even greater difficulties, as the vanguard troops turned the dirt paths into muddy pits, leaving little food for foraging. The Right Column reached Baxi on August 27th, suffering heavy losses during the week-long trek; the 3rd Red Army Corps alone lost 400 soldiers. The Left Column progressed more slowly and arrived in Aba about a week later. Once they exited the Grasslands, the Red Army faced another internal struggle that threatened their retreat. On September 3rd, Zhang Guotao sent a wireless message to Mao Zedong and the Right Column, stating that his forces were stationed at Aba and that the White River, north of Aba, was impassable. Mao Zedong urged Zhang Guotao to adhere to the Maoergai decision and even offered additional troops to assist in crossing the river, which Zhang Guotao politely declined. On September 9th, Mao Zedong learned of a secret message Zhang Guotao had sent to his aide in the Right Column. Zhang Guotao wanted the Right Column to move back south through the Grasslands to reunite the two columns and convene a meeting to discuss a new strategy, indicating an intention to initiate an intraparty power struggle. Fearing that Zhang Guotao would use his superior numbers to impose his strategy on the Red Army, the 1st and 3rd Red Army Corps quietly departed Baxi and continued north to Gansu. This approximately 8,000-strong force arrived at Ejie and held an emergency conference. The Red Army reorganized its forces as the Anti-Japanese Vanguard Force to garner support from the local population. They also issued a “Resolution Concerning the Mistakes of Comrade Zhang Guotao,” reprimanding his actions without expelling him from the Communist Party. On September 14th, the Red Army continued north and captured the Lazikou Pass, defeating two of Zhang Guotao's forces as he and his 4th Front Army moved south toward Chengdu. Zhang Guotao was furious upon discovering that Mao Zdong and his loyal Red Army troops had left without notice, but he chose not to pursue them and instead redirected his troops toward Chengdu. The 4th Front Red Army achieved initial victories in October 1935 against the NRA at Baoxing and Tianquan, coming within sixty miles of the Sichuan provincial capital. In response to this threat, Chiang Kai-shek dispatched over 80 NRA regiments to defend Chengdu. The NRA launched a counteroffensive at Baizhang, inflicting heavy losses on the Fourth Front Red Army, which retreated in disarray back to Ganzi in western Sichuan province, where they would remain until they linked up with the 2nd Front Army in June 1936. As the 4th Front Army moved south toward Sichuan, the Red Army completed the final stage of its arduous journey. On September 21st, 1935, Mao Zedong and the Anti-Japanese Vanguard arrived in Hadapu, a Han city in Gansu province. The soldiers rejoiced at being among their own ethnic group and took a few days to rest. During their stay, Mao Zedong and other leaders of the Red Army learned that a Soviet force, led by Liu Zhidan, a friend of Mao Zedong, was present in northern Shaanxi, supporting the 25th and 26th Red Armies. 10 days later, the Anti-Japanese Vanguard left Hadapu and swiftly moved west to avoid the NRA's Muslim cavalry units, aiming to connect with their allied units in Shaanxi. On October 19, 1935, Mao Zedong joined forces with the 25th and 26th Red Armies and settled near Wuqi. The remnants of the 1st Front Red Army had completed their year-long, 6,000-mile journey with approximately 4,000 soldiers. Once they reached the relative safety of Shaanxi, the Red Army reverted to its traditional strategy of political mobilization to gather resources, recruit new members, and propagate the communist revolution. On February 5th, 1936, the 1st Front Red Army moved east to carry out political mobilization efforts. Over the following two months, the Red Army defeated seven provincial divisions, capturing more than 4,000 soldiers. They also recruited 8,000 new members, raised $300,000 in revenue, and added 20 counties in Shanxi to their new Soviet. In May, the 1st Front Army advanced westward for a two-month operation, acquiring over 2,000 rifles and 400 horses, thereby expanding the Soviet's reach into Gansu and Ningxia. However, these efforts were ultimately thwarted by NRA forces, compelling the Red Army to relocate from Wuqi to Bao'an in June 1936. In October 1936, the 2nd and 4th Front Armies finally reached Bao'an, marking the completion of the Long March for the Red Army. With all three units reunited, the Red Army War College reopened in Dengjiaqiao, with Liu Bocheng eventually returning to lead it. Additionally, the Red Army military school began training in Tai'erwan. From 1934 to 1936, the Red Army evaded annihilation through a combination of courage, determination, and fortunate circumstances. Enduring harsh conditions and traversing some of China's most challenging terrain to escape the NRA and provincial forces, the Red Army demonstrated remarkable resilience. Mao Zedong skillfully navigated the political landscape within the Red Army, emerging as its supreme leader. The Communists also capitalized on the challenges facing the NRA and KMT leadership. The Red Army effectively utilized Chiang Kai-Sheks inability to exert full control over his subordinate warlords and their military units to avoid unnecessary confrontations. Upon reaching Shaanxi in late 1935, the survivors of the Long March were not only battle-hardened by their experiences but also carried valuable lessons learned from previous campaigns. In the relative security of the new Soviet, the Red Army expanded its ranks and resumed training and mobilization efforts. The Red Army had survived its greatest challenge to date and was poised to develop into the professional military force that would ultimately defeat the NRA and overthrow the KMT government. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Thus not only did the Red Army escape death at the hands of the NRA, but the experience of the Long March would actually contribute to the downfall of the NRA. Mao Zedong had emerged a top figure in the CCP and now would oversee it and the Red Army's future development until the ultimate clash with Chiang Kai-Shek for the future of China.

Global market intelligence firm, IDC, estimates that artificial intelligence (AI) will contribute nearly $20 trillion to the global economy by 2030 and represent nearly 4% of global GDP. Today we are joined by an AI pioneer, tech diplomat and leader of Purdue University, President Mung Chiang. We discuss: His journey as a three-time entrepreneur turned university president and how his experience has shaped his approach at Purdue Being on the cusps of the AI revolution, bringing new jobs to market and its elimination of old ones – and its potential to transform the physical world Balancing AI's opportunity for productivity versus its potential to become an adversarial threat Connecting dots from the past to the future to develop job creation and prosperity in the state – and the critical role of agbioscience to make that happen Purdue has a top 5 college of engineering and a top 5 college of agriculture – and President Chiang talks about the university's differentiation to drive big outcomes using demand-driven education President Chiang's eye on the future of Purdue and its continued service to Indiana

Last time we spoke about the fifth encirclement campaign against the CCP. After surviving four encirclement campaigns by the NRA, the CCP faced an intensified fifth campaign in 1933, as the Japanese invaded Manchuria and North China. Despite growing in numbers, the CCP struggled against the KMT's modernized army, equipped with German weapons and strategies. A combination of blockades, fortified positions, and superior tactics eroded Red Army strength. By 1934, after significant losses, the Red Army retreated, marking the campaign's end and signaling the start of the CCP's eventual Long March. In the battle between the NRA and the Red Army, the NRA employed strategic counterinsurgency techniques to block Red infiltration and gained local support through loyalty and economic pressure. Meanwhile, the Red Army, hampered by internal issues and a shift in leadership towards the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks, struggled with morale and mass recruitment of untrained peasants. As the Red Army attempted aggressive tactics and reforms, they ultimately faced defeat, leading to their strategic retreat in the historic Long March.   #129 The Fujian Rebellion of 1933 Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the previous episode, during the fifth encirclement campaign, I briefly mentioned a rebellion that took place in Fujian province. Now this story actually crosses over a few we will be covering, such as the fifth encirclement campaign, already mentioned but also the Japanese invasion of Shanghai in 1931, part of the Mukden incident. So its a bit tricky for me to cover this one without giving away too much of what we will be speaking about later, but I will try my best to be mysterious.  Now the key player I guess you can say to this story is the 19th Route Army. The 19th Route Army's history can be traced back to the 1st division of the Guangdong Army. In 1926, this division underwent a significant transformation, becoming the 4th Army of the NRA. At that time, Li Jishen was appointed as the commander, with Chen Mingshu serving as the commander of the newly formed 10th Division. Other notable figures included Jiang Guangnai as the deputy commander and Cai Tingkai leading a subordinate regiment. All of these men will be key players in the Rebellion.  During the Northern Expedition, the 4th NRA Army distinguished itself with numerous successful campaigns. The 10th Division was subsequently expanded into the 11th Army. This new formation went on to play a pivotal role in during the Central Plains War of 1930, assisting Chiang Kai-shek in his struggle against warlords' anti-chiang coalition. As a result of this success, the 11th Army was reorganized into the 19th Route Army, with Jiang Guangnai assuming the role of overall commander and Cai Tingkai becoming the army commander. Following these developments, the 19th Route Army then went on to be part of the third encirclement campaign. Now again not to give away too much, but in 1931 the Mukden incident broke out initiating a 15 year war between China and Japan. Most of the action took place in Manchuria, pouring slightly into Northern China and Inner Mongolia, but there was an expedition performed in Shanghai. In many ways it was like a dress rehearsal for what would go down in 1937 during the battle of Shanghai. During the crisis, known then as the September 18th Incident, the 19th Route Army was redeployed to Shanghai.This transition occurred during a tumultuous period when Chiang Kai-shek faced significant political pressure and was forced to resign. The Nanjing National Government, dominated by the Guangdong faction, saw Chen Mingshu appointed as the commander of the garrison responsible for defending Beijing and Shanghai. Now this was a hyper chaotic time for China, and a particularly rough time for Chiang Kai-Shek. Chiang Kai-Shek was dealing with multiple external and internal threats to China and his position as Generalissimo. First off, his encirclement campaigns against the Reds were not going well at all. His men were not accustomed nor trained properly to face guerilla warfare. When they assaulted the Jiangxi Soviet they were entering strange territory and were greeted by the countryfolk as enemies. The Reds, in contrast, felt at home among the villages. For years, they had lived alongside the people and built friendships; forging connections was a key aspect of Communist strategy. Whenever Chiang Kai-Sheks forces came too close for comfort, the guerrillas seamlessly blended into the local population. They established their own Soviets, spread their ideology at will, and disappeared when soldiers approached. They were like a fluid army. Over time, the Chinese public became less concerned about the ongoing presence of the Red Army and more weary of the topic. Those not living in areas affected by Communist infiltration struggled to grasp the urgency of this endless conflict and began to question whether the costs outweighed the benefits. Very little news was reported on the situation, and what was published came primarily from government sources, portraying it as a series of victories for the Nationalists—this battle was a success for the Nationalists, that one ended in a glorious triumph; the KMT troops had the Reds on the run. A few days later, another dispatch would reiterate the same points, as if the earlier battles had never occurred. The front lines never seemed to shift significantly. Chiang Kai-Shek maintained his position as Generalissimo like any other politician, through alliances. One of his key friends was Hu Hanmin. The relationship between Chiang Kai-Shek and Hu Hanmin was never straightforward. Their shared history was marked by significant jealousy, and in February 1931, they faced another separation. During a KMT conference, Hu Hanmin challenged the provisional constitution proposed by Chiang Kai-Shek, arguing that it was prematurely defining various governmental functions. He claimed that Chiang Kai-Shek was consolidating too much power for himself. Chiang Kai-Shek countered that Hu Hanmins concerns were mainly about party authority. This situation echoed their earlier disputes in Canton, where they had debated theories under Dr Sun Yat-sen's influence, but now their conflicts held more weight and didn't end in mere discussion. Hu Hanmin, overwhelmed by his anger, resigned from the presidency of the Legislative Yuan, a significant position at the time. In response, a similarly agitated Chiang Kai-Shek placed him under house arrest, or as the Chinese more delicately termed it, “in soft detainment.” Initially, this fact was not disclosed; Hu Hanmin simply vanished. This was quite an extreme action for someone who advocated democratic processes, leading to a barrage of inquiries from curious Europeans directed at Chiang Kai-Shek. What had happened? Where was Hu? Why had the innocuous Lin Sen been appointed as president of the Legislative Yuan? For a considerable time, the Generalissimo remained silent, but eventually, he reluctantly stated that Hu was fine—indeed, quite fine; it was simply that his personal freedom was temporarily restricted. This was all for his own benefit and that of the KMT. Without this restriction, the misguided individual might attempt to flee to Shanghai, which would only incite dissenting factions and provoke disorder. He was perfectly fine. The incident was added to the ever-growing list of accusations made by Chiang Kai-Sheks opponents, who claimed he was becoming a dictator. They argued that he was squandering the nation's resources to maintain his army while pursuing insignificant Communists, who, if left alone, might actually become good citizens. Rumors circulated that he was nurturing a group of young bullies reminiscent of the Italian "Blue Shirts." Additionally, there were concerns about the shady Chen brothers. Furthermore, it was alleged that Chiang Kai-Shek was in close contact with gangster Tu Yueh-sen in Shanghai, profiting immensely from the opium trade through this connection. In fact, Chiang had recently declared that opium would now be a government monopoly, similar to that of the British in Hong Kong, as he needed the funds. And now, this latest scandal! Criticism of the Generalissimo was rampant, especially among students. April passed, and the uproar over Hu Hanmin faded into discontented whispers, as the People's Congress approached, providing an opportunity for open discussion about the provisional constitution. However, by May 5, people were preoccupied with other concerns. The South was once again causing unrest, led by Wang Jingwei, with Eugene Chen involved as well. It began with the typical manifesto or circular telegram, signed by Wang Jingwei and the Jiangxi generals, who "impeached" Chiang Kai-Shek for his wrongdoings. Another telegram soon followed from the warlord in Canton, accusing the Generalissimo of assuming dictatorial powers. In response, Chiang Kai-Shek convened an urgent meeting of KMT leaders, asserting that the allegations must be openly discussed and investigated. He should have been able to rely on the Party's support during such a crisis, but the situation was unusual due to Hu Hanmin's detention. Some members of his own faction seized the moment to betray him. Sun Fo and Wang Chunghui retreated to Shanghai before moving on to Canton. Shortly after, the Canton warlord declared an alliance between Jiangxi and Guangdong, united in their fight, this was the Chiang-Gui War. On May 25, the southerners issued an ultimatum: Chiang Kai-Shek had to resign within forty-eight hours or face the consequences. A few days later, they established a new national government in Canton. Chiang Kai-Shek announced his intention to suppress the rebels but did not rush into action. Instead, there were discussions—more discussions—in the neutral setting of Shanghai. Throughout June and most of July, these negotiations continued, with Chiang Kai-Shek hoping to prevent a conflict that the nation could ill afford. The southerners persisted with their demands, and their appeal to Japan for support would haunt them for a long time. Their determination ultimately prevailed, and on July 21, it was announced in Canton that a punitive expedition was underway. By mid-August, Bai Chongxi's army was advancing through Hunan on the old route to Nanking. Chiang Kai-Shek prepared for the confrontation, and the capital was on high alert. Meanwhile, in the North, the Mukden Incident broke out. In the South, the generals and their associates held back, anticipating that war could be declared at any moment. However, Chiang Kai-Shek and his advisers understood that he was even less equipped than Zhang Xueliang to initiate an offensive against a powerful foreign nation. There was the League of Nations, established presumably to address crises like this, as well as the Kellogg Pact. Chiang Kai-Shek decided to refer the matter to the League, though his chances of a favorable outcome were slim: America, which might have otherwise been involved, was preoccupied with its own economic depression, and Britain remained indifferent. The more impulsive factions in China believed this response was insufficient, and the dissidents in the South demanded a stronger approach. The students were the most incensed. On September 28, hundreds of students in Shanghai took matters into their own hands. They seized control of a train at the railway station and traveled to Nanking, where they joined forces with fellow students from the capital's university. Together, they marched—five thousand strong—toward the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. They pushed past the guards, stormed the Minister's office, forcibly dragged him outside, and assaulted him. After recovering from his injuries in the hospital, the Minister chose to resign. The students then initiated a sit-in strike, declaring they would remain in Nanking until they received tangible action rather than mere diplomatic efforts. Authorities were unsure how to respond to them, as more pressing issues demanded the government's attention. It was clear that the South and Nanking needed to resolve their differences, as public opinion strongly supported this. Despite the ungracious criticisms emanating from Canton, where Eugene Chen was vocally denouncing Chiang Kai-shek for his diplomatic failures, Nanking sought to negotiate. In October, Chiang Kai-Shek released Hu Hanmin from his mild detention, and he appeared none the worse for the unexpected break. Along with three others, he traveled to Shanghai for a peace conference with the southern leaders. Hu urged the southerners to be reasonable and to cease calls for Chiang Kai-Shek's resignation. Chiang Kai-Shek remarked, “Regardless of the right or wrong of the situation, if desired, all blame can be placed squarely on me.” However, this uplifting scene was short-lived. As the Canton faction continued to insist on Chiang's resignation, Hu abruptly changed his stance and escalated the demands. He suggested that not only should Chiang resign, but he should also be exiled from China entirely. The conference ended in chaos. Various proposals were discussed and quickly dismissed. The South remained resolute; Chiang had to go. The sit-in students, frustrated with just sitting idle, started to escalate their actions. Their numbers had been steadily increasing since the initial demonstration, with boys traveling to Nanking from distant places; by the end of November, there were twelve thousand of them. They marched again to the new government buildings, demanding that Chiang Kai-Shek come out to engage in a discussion. “War on Japan!” they shouted. Chiang Kai-Shek made them wait in the cold winter weather for a full twenty-four hours before he finally appeared. He reprimanded them harshly and ordered them to return to school, leading to a subdued dispersal of the crowd. On December 15th, Chiang Kai-Shek capitulated to public pressure and resigned. Chiang Kai-Shek yet again nonchalantly got up and left heading home into the mountains. This left an extremely uneasy Sun Fo in the presidential chair facing what looked like a full blown Japanese invasion. The Japanese kept reiterating they were merely defending their citizens after the Chinese had attacked the South Manchurian Railway…but yeah they were certainly conquering. Sun Fo desperately looked to any veteran figures for help, but Hu Hanmin fled to Hong Kong, Wang Jingwei, arguably the man responsible for forcing Chiang Kai-Shek yet again to step down was suddenly far too ill to do anything and retired to the Shanghai Hospital. Meanwhile, all of the bankers had lost interest in the Nanjing government since Chiang Kai-Shek had departed, the government literally lost its coffers. The government had no means to properly pay its armies. Now the entire time the government had been tossing offers to Chiang Kai-Shek to come back, but he bided his time. Meanwhile Eugene Chen demanded China break off diplomatic relations with Japan, was told no so he resigned, followed soon after by Sun Fo. Wang Jingwei was tossed into the presidency position, which he must have relished, however it was just then when Shanghai was invaded. Chiang Kai-Shek still held his honorary position as CEC over the special committee so he simply waited and watched. Yet no one could manage the military like the generalissimo nor open the coin purses to fund it. Thus Chiang Kai-Shek was brought back, but not really as Generalissimo, now he had to work collaboratively with others, such as Wang Jingwei.  In 1932, the January 28 Incident unfolded, basically the Japanese performed another false flag operation trying to legitimize an expedition into Shanghai. Japanese marines began to land and on January 28th they were attacking in full force. The 19th Route Army met the enemy in what became a month-long resistance against great odds. Chiang Kai-Shek was being labeled a coward for not doing more against the Japanese, but he was keeping in touch with the commanders of the 19th Rout Army by telegraph. He advised them to guard Liuho, a village just across the Yangtze, believing the Japanese would make other landings to cut them off there. General Tsai neglected to take the advice, and low and behold the Japanese made the landing forcing the 19th Route Army to pull out. The entire situation looked incredibly bad for China. Fingers were pointed at the inept Nanjing government. Yet Chiang Kai-Shek was much more focused on the encirclement campaigns against the Reds. The people angrily accused him of “making war on his own people instead of attending to the real threat, Japan”. To this Chiang Kai-Shek replied “It is useless for China to talk of resisting Japan. When it has not yet stamped out the enemy in its midst. If China ventures to fight the Japanese, the Communists will attack from the rear and chaos will quickly overtake the whole country.” The 19th Route Army were hailed as heroes, receiving a lot of recognition as a prominent anti-Japanese force. Despite Japan's attempts to reinforce its troops, Chiang Kai-shek's return to leadership saw further NRA forces dispatched to join the fight. Eventually, the conflict reached a resolution through diplomatic negotiations, resulting in the withdrawal of the 19th Route Army from Shanghai. With the Japanese threat averted for the time being Chiang Kai-Shek redirected his efforts against the Reds. On May 21, 1932, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the 19th Route Army to enter Fujian and forced the army to engage in a civil war against the Communists in Fujian. On December 6 of the same year, Jiang Guangnai took over as the chairman of Fujian Province, and Cai Tingkai was appointed as the director of the Fujian Pacification Office and commander of the 19th Route Army.  At this point the leadership of the 19th Route Army were not at all happy with Chiang Kai-Shek, who to them seemed to have done little to help face the Japanese. They were not friendly to the CCP by any means and were actively suppressing Communist organizations while fighting the Japanese. When they came to Fujian they continued to suppress communists and supported people's anti-Japanese patriotic movements. On August 18, 1932, the 61st Division of the 19th Route Army collectively executed 69 CCP members and suspected individuals outside the East Gate of Quanzhou, and they also carried out mass killings of government workers from the Soviet area during their offensive against it. Despite this the CCP and 19th Route Army did agree on one thing, the Japanese were a problem.  After November 22, 1933, as Japanese imperialism intensified its invasion of China, the people across the nation once again launched a wave of anti-Japanese salvation movements. On January 17 of the same year, the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic and the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army issued a "Joint Anti-Japanese Declaration," proposing three conditions for cooperation with any armed forces to resist Japan: an immediate halt to attacks on the Soviet areas, immediate guarantees of the democratic rights of the people, and the immediate arming of the people to establish armed volunteer forces. However, Chiang Kai-shek's ruling group stubbornly persisted in its anti-Communist and anti-people policies, continuing to intensify attacks on the Red Army, and on May 31, he signed a peace agreement with the Japanese. Chiang Kai-Shek was met with another wave of opposition across the nation for appeasing the Japanese. The 19th Route Army basically concluded the Generalissimo was not going to help wage a war against their enemy. Thus in a rather insane fashion, the leadership of the 19th Route Army resolved to overthrow the Nanjing government so they could unite the anti-Japanese forces and push for a national resistance. At that time, Chen Mingshu, an early leader of the 19th Route Army who had gone abroad and had previously served as the vice president of the Executive Yuan of the National Government, returned to China in May 1933 and devoted all his efforts to opposing Chiang Kai-shek's Nanjing government. In Fuzhou, he secretly discussed three strategies with Jiang Guangnai, Cai Tingkai, and Deng Xizeng: the first was to unite with Guangdong and Guangxi to overthrow Chiang Kai-Shek, supporting Hu Hanmin to organize an independent government; the second was to unite with Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi of Guangxi, and Chen Jitang of Guangdong, seizing Guangdong; the last was to unite with the Red Army to resist Chiang Kai-Shek together.  As a result, neither the first nor the second strategies could be realized. Under Chiang Kai-shek's repeated orders to engage in civil war, the 78th Division and the 62nd Division of the 19th Route Army faced severe blows from the Red Army in Fujian between July and September 1933. Thus, the 19th Route Army found itself in a dire situation where not engaging in the "anti-Communist" actions would lead to its annihilation by Chiang Kai-shek, while engaging in "anti-Communist" actions would result in its destruction by the Red Army. In the context of rising national anti-Japanese sentiment, the upper leadership of the 19th Route Army had to swiftly make the choice to unite with the Communists to resist Chiang Kai-Shek and fight against Japan. On September 22, 1933, Chen Mingshu's main aide, Chen Gongpei, who had participated in the Nanchang Uprising and later left the CCP, secretly arrived at the command post of the 3rd Red Army Corps stationed at Wangtai, to express the political stance of the 19th Route Army to leaders of the Red Army, such as Peng Dehuai, Teng Daiyuan, and Yuan Guoping, regarding anti-Chiang resistance and cooperation with the Red Army. In October, Chen Gongpei accompanied Xu Minghong, the plenipotentiary representative of the 19th Route Army and secretary-general of its headquarters, to Ruijin. On the 26th, he signed the "Preliminary Agreement Against Japan and Against Chiang" with Pan Jianxing, a representative of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. The main contents included: both sides immediately cease military actions, temporarily define a military demarcation line, restore trade between both parties; the Fujian People's Revolutionary Government and the 19th Route Army agree to the existence and activities of all revolutionary organizations in Fujian, allow freedom of publication, speech, assembly, and strikes, and immediately release political prisoners, among other provisions. The Soviet Provisional Central Government also sent Pan Jianxing as a permanent representative in Fuzhou. Subsequently, Chen Mingshu, Li Jishen, Jiang Guangnai, Cai Tingkai, and others actively prepared to establish a new government and made military preparations against Chiang Kai-Shek. On November 20, 1933, Li Jishen, Jiang Guangnai, Cai Tingkai, and representatives from over 100 cities across the country, along with 100,000 people from various sectors in Fuzhou, convened the National People's Temporary Representative Assembly in Fuzhou. The assembly issued the "Declaration of People's Rights of the Chinese People's Temporary Representative Assembly" and decided to establish the People's Revolutionary Government of the Republic of China. They elected Li Jishen, Chen Mingshu, Chen Youren, Feng Yuxiang , Cai Tingkai, Jiang Guangnai, Huang Qixiang, Xu Qian, Fang Zhenwu, Li Zhangda, Sa Zhenbing, He Gonggan, and other 12 members to the government, with Li Jishen as the government chairman. On November 22, the People's Revolutionary Government was officially established, with the capital in Fuzhou. The People's Revolutionary Government Committee set up a Military Committee, an Economic Committee, and a Cultural Committee, chaired respectively by Li Jishen, Yu Xinqing, and Chen Mingshu; and established a Ministry of Finance, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a Supreme Court, and a Political Security Bureau, led respectively by Jiang Guangnai, Chen Youren, Xu Qian, and Li Zhangda. The People's Revolutionary Government successively issued: The People's Revolutionary Government's Internal Telegram. The People's Revolutionary Government's External Declaration.The People's Political Program - Eighteen Articles of the Minimum Program and other documents, openly announcing anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang, and proposing some domestic and foreign policies with certain progressive significance. The "Internal Telegram of the People's Revolutionary Government" announced the government's future mission: 1) to seek the liberation of the Chinese nation and establish a truly independent and free country; 2) to eliminate the counter-revolutionary Nanjing government and establish a political power of the productive people; 3) to realize the equal rights of all ethnic groups in the country; 4) to guarantee the absolute freedom and equality of all productive people; 5) to eliminate the influence of imperialism in China, overthrow the warlords, eradicate the remnants of the feudal system, develop the national economy, and liberate the working people. The "Declaration of the People's Revolutionary Government to Foreign Countries" sternly pointed out the Nanjing government's traitorous behavior and warned the powers not to cooperate with Chiang Kai-shek. The Declaration stated: "We believe that the policies of the pro-American and pro-League of Nations factions are based on dangerous principles... However, it must be recognized that the objective result of the pro-American and pro-League of Nations factions will put China under an international condominium system, which is no less harmful than Chiang Kai-shek's pro-Japanese policies... It is recognized that China's real power must be established on a national basis... We finally declare that overthrowing the Chiang regime is not only necessary for China's independence and national salvation, but also for the military and economic interests of the whole world... In order to enhance international security, we have to warn the powers not to make any loans to the Chiang Kai-shek government in Nanjing, whether it is money, goods, or weapons. We also declare that if any such loans are concluded in the future, the Chinese people and their revolutionary government will completely deny them." The People's Political Program - Eighteen Articles of the Minimum Program declared: "China is a semi-feudal society under the rule of imperialists. The greatest goal of the Chinese revolution is to eliminate the imperialist domination in China; at the same time, to sweep away all feudal forces and establish a government that fully represents the rights of the people..." The 18 articles of the minimum program are: (1) Abolish unequal treaties and renegotiate equal and mutually beneficial treaties with other countries; (2) Foreign-invested or foreign-managed enterprises and cultural undertakings that are harmful to the interests of the Chinese nation may be restricted or confiscated; (3) To sort out new and old foreign debts. All political loans that harm the country should be absolutely denied; others should be repaid conditionally; (4) Implementing foreign trade controls; (5) Strictly implement absolute tariff autonomy; (6) Open up the political system and deny all political rights to counter-revolutionaries who are dependent on imperialism and warlords; (7) All nationalities within China are equal, may freely unite for revolution, and recognize national self-determination; (8) Ensure the people's absolute freedom of body, residence, speech, assembly, association, strike, demonstration and publication; (9) Implement universal suffrage; (10) Abolish all excessive taxes and levies; (11) The principle of "everyone who tills the land owns the land" was established, and land was distributed according to the number of people. Forests, mines, and rivers were completely nationalized. (12) All important banking and transportation enterprises shall be under state control; (13) Use political power and state capital to support the scientific development of agricultural production; (14) Usury is strictly prohibited; (15) Unscrupulous merchants will be eliminated and the people's daily necessities will be sold under the state monopoly; (16) To formulate agricultural and industrial laws, improve the lives of farmers and workers, and ensure the development of agricultural and industrial organizations; (17) Promote universal education; (18) Implement conscription, arm the people, and assist them in their anti-imperialist and economic and political struggles. After the establishment of the People's Revolutionary Government, it caused a great stir domestically and internationally. However, due to Wang Ming's "leftist" closure policy, the local party organization in Fujian initially adopted a hostile strategy toward the People's Revolutionary Government. It wasn't until early December, after the Fuzhou Central Municipal Committee received a letter from the Central Committee dated October 30 addressing the Fuzhou Central Municipal Committee and all comrades in Fujian, that they began to adopt a proactive cooperative approach toward the People's Revolutionary Government and the 19th Route Army. After December 29, the Fuzhou Central Municipal Committee issued a declaration in the name of the "Far East Anti-Imperialist Non-War Anti-Fascist Alliance, Fuzhou Branch," publicly calling for the establishment of an anti-imperialist united front. The People's Revolutionary Government also fully reprinted this declaration in its official newspapers, the "People's Daily" and the "Guoguang Daily." The Fuzhou branch then mobilized people from all walks of life to establish the "Committee to Oppose Kuomintang Air Raids and Support the Soldiers of the 19th Route Army Against the Kuomintang," organizing personnel to visit the stationed troops of the 19th Route Army to comfort the soldiers. The People's Revolutionary Government also adopted a cooperative attitude toward the economic struggles of workers' organizations. On November 18, Chen Mingshu called for an emergency secret meeting of the 19th Route Army and other key figures at Heshui Rock in Gushan. The meeting took place at Longyuan Pavilion, and attendees included Li Jishen, Chen Mingshu, Cai Tingkai, Jiang Guangnai, Chen Youren, Huang Qixiang, Xu Qian, Li Zhangda, and more than ten other military commanders and the chief of staff of the 19th Route Army. The discussion, which lasted from morning until late at night, revolved around heated debates concerning the timing of the uprising. Cai Tingkai advocated for postponing the uprising by one to two months for several reasons; many generals in the 19th Route Army were still undecided or openly opposed to the rebellion, the troops had yet to be mobilized, defenses were unorganized, various forces had not surrendered, and traitors and spies were still active. Additionally, Guangdong and Guangxi were not providing support, and Chiang Kai-shek was already aware of their plans. Cai Tingkai argued for more time to accelerate preparations without drawing immediate attention from Chiang Kai-Shek. In contrast, Chen Mingshu and others believed this was the last opportunity for an uprising. They pointed out that Chiang Kai-shek's forces were concentrated in North China, and Jinpu and particularly in Jiangxi, where his main troops were engaged in the fifth encirclement campaign against the Soviet area. They estimated that only 20,000 to 30,000 troops could be redirected to Fujian. Overestimating the political instability of Chiang's regime, Chen Mingshu believed that once the 19th Route Army raised the flag of rebellion, support from other regions of China would follow. He also felt confident that one division of the 19th Route Army could resist two or three of Chiang's divisions and that with cooperation from the Red Army, even if Chiang Kai-Shek deployed ten divisions, they would prevail. Chen Mingshu concluded that regardless of the outcome, the effort would be heroic and they should proceed without hesitation. The meeting's opposing viewpoints led to intense discussions. Chen Mingshu, visibly passionate, declared that revolution required sacrifice and that delaying any longer would mean submission to Nanjing. Cai Tingkai, while originally advocating for a delay, conceded that the situation had reached a point of no return. He agreed to lead the 19th Route Army and fully back the new government. The meeting concluded with a decision to convene the National People's Provisional Congress in Fuzhou on November 20 to officially declare the uprising against Chiang Kai-Shek. Other topics discussed included replacing the blue sky, white sun party flag, military and financial logistics, and a declaration drafted by Chen Mingshu's advisors, Wang Lixi and Hu Qiuyuan. On November 20, 1933, the National People's Provisional Congress convened at the South Parade Ground in Fuzhou, with thousands of soldiers, students, merchants, and workers in attendance. A banner reading "China's National People's Provisional Congress" adorned the stage, and the leaders of the rebellion, including Cai Tingkai, Jiang Guangnai, and Li Jishen, were present, though Chen Mingshu was absent due to illness. Representatives from 25 provinces and various walks of life gathered for the event. Before the meeting, the 19th Route Army's newly formed air force performed stunts, to the applause of the crowd. At 9:40 AM, the meeting began with Huang Qixiang, who was elected chairman of the presidium, delivering an opening speech and reading the "Declaration of the People's Rights of the Provisional Chinese People's Congress." Several prominent figures spoke, and the meeting concluded with the adoption of proposals to establish the People's Revolutionary Government and a new national flag designed by Ouyang Yuqian. That evening, the presidium decided to form the People's Revolutionary Government of the Republic of China, abolishing the Nanjing government, declaring 1933 as the first year of the Republic, and establishing Fuzhou as the capital. Li Jishen was elected President, and several others, including Chen Mingshu, Jiang Guangnai, and Cai Tingkai, were appointed government members. However the Fujian Revolution failed to gain support from other forces within the KMT. The Guangxi clique was dissatisfied with the fact that the 19th Route Army reconciled with the CCP so they did not support it. Chen Jitang tossed his lot in with Chiang Kai-shek and did not support the Fujian Revolution either. At that time, the CCP was undergoing a power struggle. On December 5, the Central Committee of the CCP, headed by Wang Ming, issued a statement stating that the Fujian government was "non-people and still non-revolutionary and that anyone who wants to take a third way between revolution and counter-revolution will inevitably fail." . Thus, Chiang Kai-shek transferred eight divisions of the National Revolutionary Army into Fujian, and coordinated the attack with the air force and navy. The 19th Route Army quickly collapsed. Four out of the five armies defected before the battle even began. Most of them were disarmed by the Central Army that they had fought side by side with during the Shanghai Incident a year ago. On January 15, 1934, Chiang Kai-shek's forces captured Fuzhou. The People's Revolutionary Government and the headquarters of the 19th Route Army retreated to Zhangzhou and Quanzhou, respectively. By January 21, both Quanzhou and Zhangzhou had fallen, and the Fujian Rebellion had failed. The People's Revolutionary Government of the Republic of China collapsed within two months of its establishment. On the 21st, the remaining troops of the 19th Route Army switched over to supporting the central government, and the Fujian Revolution officially came to an end. Jiang Guangnai, Cai Tingkai, Chen Mingshu and Li Jishen fled to Hong Kong . The designation of the 19th Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army was cancelled, and the troops were dispersed and integrated. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Yes it was a tad bit of an anti climatic event in the grand scheme of things. Yet the provincial rebellion was notable because the people involved wanted to fight the Japanese and believed their government was not doing enough to challenge the external threat. The reality however was far more complicated, the Japanese were far too formidable, for now. 

This episode was originally released in Septemebr 2021, and is one of sixteen episodes from the archives we'll be bringing you every Thursday, now through end of year... for good reason! ;) We highly recommend you listen to each episode between now and end of 2024, and follow us on Instagram @crimejunkiepodcast so you're the first to know what's coming next!

Last time we spoke about the Central Plains War. Chiang Kai-Shek faced a formidable anti-Chiang coalition led by Yan Xishan, Feng Yuxiang, and Li Zongren. Zhang Xueliang, initially absent, worked tirelessly from Mukden to prevent Northern warlords from joining the coalition. The conflict, exacerbated by severe famine in Shaanxi that fueled unrest, saw major battles as Chiang's forces clashed with the anti-Chiang fronts across multiple railways. Despite initial setbacks, Chiang's strategic maneuvers and alliances, including a pivotal deal with Zhang Xueliang, gradually turned the tide. The Young Marshal's entry into the fray and the subsequent defections from Feng Yuxiang's camp weakened the anti-Chiang forces. By October, the anti-Chiang leaders, overwhelmed and isolated, sought peace. The Central Plains War, a grueling seven-month struggle, ended with the anti-Chiang factions disbanding, leaving China's civil war landscape dramatically altered. Within the vacuum, the CCP was thriving, but now the Generalissimo could direct his full attention on the Red Menace.   #125 From the Jinggangshan Mountains to the Jiangxi Soviet Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. The last time we were talking about the CCP, they had performed the Nanchang uprising, Autumn Harvest Uprisings and the Guangzhou uprising. These all did not go very well and literally saw the surviving CCP forces fleeing for their lives into the mountains. Their experiences during these uprisings reinforced the idea they required a strong military force to push forward a new agrarian-based communist revolution. To develop such conditions favoring a revolution, Mao Zedong and Zhu De adapted the Red Army and CCP policies to the local conditions in order to recruit, sustain and retain loyal troops and build a relationship between the army, local populaces and party.  After the collapse of the Harvest Autumn Uprisings, the Red Army scattered into the rural parts of China. Mao Zedong himself narrowly escaped capture by the NRA, as he made his way to Sanwan of Jiangxi province. Countless were killed, arrested or deserted. Less than 1000 Red soldiers remained from the original uprising force. Moral was law, there lacked direction, there existed conflicting loyalties and many blamed Mao Zedong for the failings. In order to counteract this, Mao Zedong held a conference on September 29th of 1927 whereupon he implemented a series of radial policies to stave off an implosion. He began streamlining the command structure, instituted political representatives within each unit to instill revolutionary spirit within the troops. A political cell was established in each squad, a branch at company levels and a party committee at the battalion and regiment level. Next he established troop soviets within the units to provide a form of democratic centralism within the units. Additional he began spinning the narrative in his own favor, shifting blame for the failed uprisings to the collective poor understanding of the revolutionary course within China, rather than upon her leadership. Now initially a large part of the Red Army wanted to return to their hometown of Anyuan, but the local military presence was too strong there. Another option was needed and quickly as they had many sick and wounded amongst their ranks. They looked to the nearby Jinggang Mountain Area as a temporary fix. Many of Mao Zdong's former Peasant Movement Training students knew the area well. Jinggangshan meaning “well ridge mountain”, derived its name from the 5 villages around its main city of Ciping: Big Well, Middle Well, Little Well, Upper Well, and Lower Well. The mountain is situated in the Luoxian range, straddling the border between Jiangxi and Hunan. It also happens to be a place where 4 counties converge: Lingxian, Suichuan, Ninggang and Yongxin. Surrounding it were factional and political enemies, thus preventing most provincial forces from really coordinating efforts or massing against them. The terrain provided ample defensive obstacles. It also stood in the midpoint between Changsha, Nanchang and Guangdong, offering the Red Army flexibility to try and finish the uprisings they started in those locations. Given the weak state the Red Army was in, it would not be feasible to occupy Jinggangshan by force. Jinggangshan was controlled by two bandit leaders named Yuan Weicai and Wang Zuo. Mao Zedong was forced to negotiate with the two to come to an arrangement. The CCP was of course concerned about the trustworthiness of the two bandit leaders. At an early meeting in Gucheng, some CCP members of the front committee doubted the revolutionary character of Yuan and Wang, believing them to only be bandits at heart. Mao Zedong on the other hand argued the two leaders and their loyal followers were crucial to the communist movement. I would argue Mao Zedong was grasping at straws.  As for Yuan and Wang, their primary concerns were the impact of a new military force affecting the regional balance of power. In essence the mountain areas outside the major cities had a complex power dynamic. Bandits and local elites maintained the status quo, any change to that power dynamic could lead to problems. There was also an ethnicity issue. Jinggangshan was considered something of a Hakka ancestral land, and the Han settlers amongst them were more like guests. There always remained a Hakka-Han tension, and this prompted Hakka to vet any Hans coming in. Mao first convinced Yuan how a partnership would be mutually beneficial. In exchange for food, housing and local support the Red Army would provide weapons, training and support Yuan and Wang's operations. Mao presented Yuan with a gift of 100 rifles to sweeten him over. Mao then made a similar gesture to Wang, sending him 70 rifles. The two bandit leaders let the Red Army right in. Upon arriving, the Red Army began conducting guerilla operations and peasant mobilization. On October 7th, 1927 the began activity in Maoping and moved to Ciping. While marching they passed through Lingixan and Shuikou villages, attacking the local elites and their militias, freeing prisoners in jails and holding mass rallies to recruit. On the 22nd they reached Dafen, where they were ambushed by a local militia. Using their knowledge of the terrain the militia inflicted severe casualties, forcing the Red Army to retreat towards Wang Zuo for aid. Wang Zuo was wary of them, but Mao Zedong won him over by promising more weapons and training for his bandits. Mao also pledged to support him against his local rivals, one of whom was Xiao Jiabi. Wang's bandits and the Reds joined forces in Dajing and together seized Shimen. Then the Reds arrived in Ciping on October 15th. They quickly seized the city center and within a month's time established a base of operations. The CCP quickly expanded its influence in the surrounding area, preying upon local populations where government control was weak or in flux. By mid November the Red Army dispatched a battalion west to capture Chaling. This success allowed them to further expand into Suichang in January of 1928. In February the Red Army occupied its first major city, Xincheng in Ningang country. Within two months of action the Reds had nearly doubled their territory now occupying portions of 3 counties. For the most part Mao Zedong was left alone because of the political shakeup after the failed uprisings in the larger metropolitan areas. Contact with the provincial and regional CCP community still existed though. Zhou Lu, a member of the southern Hunan special committee heard about the CCP expansion in the mountain areas and came to inspect them. While at Jinggangshan he gave Mao Zedong orders to dispatch his unit to support Zhu De's forces in a uprising about to hit southern Hunan. After the failed Nanchang Uprising, Zhu De took the remnants of his forces and fled into southern Jiangxi and then Fujian where he linked up with a fellow Yunnanese NRA leader, Fan Shisheng. They stayed with Fan Sisheng's unit awhile, but once rumors spread he was harboring Reds they had to go. By January of 1928 they fled for southern Hunan to try and support urban uprisings. Upon arriving, Zhu De's force began augmenting the local peasantry forces and Zhou Lu said he would get Mao Zedong to lend his support. However the uprising never really got its legs. It began in late January, but the urban workers and local populace couldn't rise as expected. Instead local support turned against the communists. Likewise Mao Zedong's men never made it to southern Hunan, he had intentionally dragged his feet on the issue. Instead Mao Zedong focused his attention in central Hunan holding rallies and mobilizing local peasant groups. Thus Zhu De was pounced upon by local warlord groups in Guangdong and Hunan. Zhu De's Red Army engaged the warlord armies as they slowly retreated into Jinggangshan. Zhu De and Mao Zedong would meet in Maoping for a conference. On May 20th, 1928 they agreed to establish the Jinggangshan Special Committee, with Mao Zedong as its general secretary. Additionally the 4th Red Army was created and nicknamed the Ironsides Army. The 4th Red Army was roughly 12,000 men strong consisting of Zhu De's Nanchang uprising force, now designated the 28th regiment, Mao Zedongs Autumn Uprising force now designated the 31st regiment, Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo's bandits, later designated the 32nd regiment and the Hunan uprising force now designed the 29th regiment. Zhu De's arrival also brought in a traditional military mindset, adding some more professionalism to the Red Army. Here Zhu De also made a famous quote “When the enemy advances, we retreat; when the enemy halts and encamps, we harass them; when the enemy seeks to avoid battle, we attack; and when the enemy retreats, we pursue”. This statement would guide much of the Red Army's actions going forward. The increase in communist numbers brought unwanted attention immediately from Jiangxi and Hunan forces. The first major military campaign against the Reds began in May of 1928 and was led by Zhu Peide wielding Jiangxi provincial military units. The campaign was based out of Yongxin with the Jiangxi government unleashing the 27th division. One regiment garrisoned at Yongxin was held as reserve while the division sent another regiment to attack the Red Army stronghold in Nanchang and another regiment flanked to the east. The Reds countered by stationing a regiment in the mountains to protect the base, another regiment to defend the mountain passes and 2 regiments to conduct spoiling attacks on the Jiangxi regiments flank. The Red Army was able to destroy the flanking unit, forcing them to retreat back to Yongxin. They pursued them to Yongxin, destroying its garrison regiment in the process. The Red Army then maneuvered to the rear of the Jiangxi division pushing them to pull back to Ji'an. Thus the Reds occupied Yongxin where they went to work establishing a worker-peasant government, expanding the Soviet across the county.  A second encirclement campaign was unleashed in late MAy, with the same Jiangxi 27th division leading the action. This time they were reinforced as they quickly recaptured Yongxin and began cautiously pursuing the Reds into the mountains. The Reds tried to exploit the terrain for guerilla warfare but was met with little success. The Red 28th regiment was soon forced to help distressed red forces at Chaling county. However the Jiangxi Division did not account for the Red Army's mobility. The Red 31st regiment quickly assumed the 28th regiments former defensive positions offering a stiff fight against the Jiangxi forces. When the 28th regiment returned to reinforce the 31st they hit the enemy's rear and advanced upon Yongxin again while the Jiangxi forces pulled back to Ji'an again.  Another encirclement campaign was unleashed the following June this time seeing Jiangxi and Hunanese forces work together against the Reds. The Jiangxi 9th division was deployed in combination with the remaining 2 regiment of the 27th Jiangxi division. The Jiangxi forces performed a frontal attack through the mountain passes using 3 regiments. Meanwhile the Red Army had to perform a feint attack in the east to occupy a Hunanese division. The Red Army deployed a battalion augmented by local guerilla groups along the western flank of the mountain passes. Guerilla attacks on the eastern flank of the Jiangxi forces caused the commander to maintain 2 regiments at Yongxin. Exploiting the mountain terrain the Red Army managed to destroy one regiment as they funneled up the passes. This small victory brought much needed arms and new soldiers who quickly recaptured Yongxin for a third time.  By the end of June, the Jinggangshan base had basically hit its apex in terms of size. They now controlled Ninggang, Yongxin, Lianhua counties and parts of Ji'an and Anfu. At this point Chiang Kai-Shek took notice of the Red gains and directed a new campaign against them. Another series of campaigns were unleashed seeing Hunanese and Jiangxi armies attack the 4th Red Army beginning in July 1928. The Hunan 8th Army began their attack from the west through Ninggang while the Jianxi army unleashed 11 regiments from the 3rd and 6th armies through Yongxin against the eastern border of Jinggangshan. To meet this threat the Reds kept 2 regiments to defend the bases while the 28th and 29th regiments advanced west to slip behind the Hunanese forces to conduct raids against their rear. Meanwhile local Red Army militia forces began a scorched earth strategy removing all food, poisoning water sources and evacuating villagers to deny their enemy. The Hunan 8th army was forced to retreat in the face of this, allowing the Reds to focus on the Jiangxi forces around Yongxin. The 28th and 29th regiments advanced west to support the attack against the Jiangxi forces, but then suddenly turned south towards southern Hunan, citing orders to assist the Southern Hunan Special Committee. Then these 2 regiments attacked the city of Chenzhou, roughly 200 kms away from the Jinggangshan mountains. There they defeated local forces. Afterwards the Red troops began strolling through the streets of Chenzhou as civilians, many of them had families in the area. Some began looting the area. They had made the egregious error of now pursuing their enemy further and gave them too much respite to reorganize themselves. The local forces counterattacked driving the 28th regiment to withdraw with little casualties. The 29th regiment fared much worse, being ambushed trying to retreat over the only bridge leading in Chengzhou. They suffered heavy casualties and many of their surviving forces simply joined the 28th regiment as a result. Meanwhile with the 2 regiments gone from the mountain, the NRA forces were emboldened. 3 Hunanese regiment joined 11 Jiangxi regiments to attack the Jinggangshan mountains. The remaining Reds employed every tactic they knew to survive. They began giving up terrain as the enemy penetrated closer to the mountain base. The 31st and 32nd regiments found themselves retreating to the protection of higher ground, where the established defensive positions along key routes to maximize casualties upon the invaders. Mao Zedong took a battalion from the 3st regiment south to escort the incoming 28th regiment, further weakening the lines. Meanwhile guerillas raided the flanks and rear of the advancing NRA forces heading up the mountain. After repeated failed attempts to get to the peaks of the mountains,the Jiangxi and Hunanese forces ultimately had to withdraw come September allowing the 28th regiment to safely get back to Jinggangshan. From there the Red Army contuined to fight and recapture lost territory. By October they retook Ninggang county and portions of Suichuang, Lixing and Yongxin, but were unable to reclaim everything they once had.  Another campaign coincided with an economic blockade and the arrival of General Peng Dehaui's 5th Army. The Jiangxi and Hunanese forces adopted blockade tactics, normally employed against bandits, to try and deprive the Reds from using markets in the lowlands. Starting in the fall of 1928, NRA and local militias established checkpoints along all routes and trails leading into the Jinggangshan mountains. Local private armies with troops familiar with the area conducted interdiction patrols to capture anyone trying to get past blockades. The blockade halted most local trade, meaning little medicine, clothing, food or salt was getting into Janggangshan. The Reds began subsisting on sweet potatoes and pumpkins, then Peng Dehuais 5th army arrived in December worsening the burden on the area. Simulteanously NRA forces from Fujian were added to the Jiangxi and Hunanese to fully surround the mountains in preparation for a offensive.  In the face of all of this the 4th Red Army's leadership convened a conference at Bailu. The attendees all were trying to figure out how to overcome the situation but their options were very limited. Many called for the same tactics that had been winning them the battles as before. Some called for withdrawing to a safer area momentarily and launch a counterattack when the enemy lightened up. The economic blockade exacerbated the civilian military relations in the mountains and it seemed the local populace was no longer willing to help the Reds. The last option many advocated for was to mount a defense of the mountain range, but this would not allow for any withdrawal route for the 6000 or so troops. Ultimately the adoptd a hybrid solution. The 4th army would break through the blockade to try and draw forces away from the mountains while also obtaining supplies. The 5th army who were pretty battered from their march would defend mountains and base. On January 14th of 1929 the 4th army led by Zhu De and Mao Zedong broke through the blockade and headed south into Jiangxi.  The 4th army at first was only meeting light resistance as they captured Suichuan and Shangyu. After this they headed for Dayu, but there found 3 Jiangxi regiments who ambushed them. The Reds were forced north into the Xingguo-Ji'an area. They marched 30 days, often 30 miles per day to avoid their pursuers, while taking casualties and losing equipment. They found themselves at Dabaidi village on February 10th where 2 regiments of the 15th NRA division fought them. The Reds routed the NRA forces and even captured the two regimental commanders alongside 800 soldiers and their equipment. This victory earned the 4th army a safe place to rest up for quite some time. As we saw in the former episodes, the Chiang-Gui and Central Plains War engulfed Chiang Kai-Sheks attention, giving the Reds some breathing space. During this period, Mao Zedong and Zhu De expanded that is referred to as the Jiangxi Soviet. They did so through a series of campaigns into western Fujian. In February 1929 the 4th army incorporated 2 independent guerilla regiments and used them to occupy Ji'an, Ningdu and Ruijin. In March they entered western Fujian and captured Tingzhou. At Tingzhou the Reds got 3000 NRA soldiers to defect. From Tingzhou they expanded the Jiangxi Soviet to encompass over 20 counties in Jiangxi and Fujian. In light of their major accomplishments, Mao Zedong dispatched word to the Central Committee proclaiming all they had done in Jiangxi and Fujian. In May the Red Army unleashed a second campaign into western Fujian, this time capturing Longyan and Yongding. With every successful campaign the Red Army recruits more soldiers, obtained more equipment, more territory and acquired further fundings sources.  The early days of the Jiangxi Soviet were quite chaotic. Despite the Red Army's expansion, in reality they were not a unified force. Numerous factions with their own ideologies existed. The Red Army was an amalgamation of different groups coming together less so of a common goal, more so out of survival. Many of the soldiers were former peasants, but there were also former NRA troops, warlord troops and bandits. The traditions of these different groups, coupled with a lack of education in the rural areas creating a boiling pot of bad behaviors and this hurt morale. To accommodate this the Red Army made itself extremely flexible in the early days. In the early days it was only about survival. Mao Zedong and Zhu De recognized the fact, in a conventional battle the Red Army stood no chance against even a Warlord Army, let alone the NRA. Thus the 4th army created a new political-military strategy within the rural areas to protect and grow the revolution. The first part of the strategy adopted by Mao Zedong was making alliances. It was a no brainer, increase numbers, gain more legitimacy, learn more about local areas, keep expanding. Yet the Central Committee frowned upon being too open to alliance, like with lets say, bandits? In 1928 a resolution from the CCP 6th Party Congress called for expelling bandits from the Red Army, but this obviously ran counter to everything going on in Jinggangshan. To remedy this, Mao Zedong simply did not comply and vetoed any plans made against the bandit leaders such as Yuan and Wang. The second strategy was adapting communist policies to local conditions. Contrary to the CCP guidance of attacking landlords and rich peasants, the Red Army tended to just attack those disliked by the local community. They often would avoid attacking popular landlords or rich peasants because it could endanger local support. Instead they would use propaganda and negotiations to win over such popular figures. Yet over time the strategies changed from survival to expansion. Mao Zedong described the CCP expansion to come in a series of waves. He believed a systematic development of rural Soviets was an effective way to encircle cities and create the conditions necessary for revolution.  To survive and expand the Red Army had to create a new way to fight their superior enemies. A famous slogan “the enemy advances, we retreat”, became doctrine quickly. The Red Army combined mobile warfare, guerilla warfare and propaganda against their rival the KMT. During the Jingangshan and Jiangxi Soviet period, guerilla warfare was the mainstay. It's purpose was not to gain victory, but to gain time, so the CCP could continue growing. The Red Army in Jinggangshan and Jiangxi focused on small-unit tactics, emphasizing scouting, patrolling, ambushing, mobility and so on. Most guerilla units were local militia units trained by Red Army officers, many of whom were also political leaders. They always sought to meet the enemy via ambush, during a raid, a feint attack or attacks to the rear and flank. Yet the Red Army did often find itself facing those like the NRA in conventional warfare. For these engagements it tended to be done only by the professional Red Army units. A major issue facing the Reds was logistics. They were guests in most of the areas they occupied and had to abide by the local customs. They also could not consume all the local resources in an area, it would hinder growth and foster resentment. Thus the Red Army had to make sure they gained as much as possible from battle. The capture of Tingzhou in 1929 was essentially an economic choice. There the Red Army captured 2 arsenals and a clothing factory. The Red Army also focused strongly on propaganda. Early on propaganda teams were created, each assigned 5 soldiers. These teams had one oratory section and one product section. The oratory section was responsible for spreading propaganda in village markets, centers and halls. The products section was responsible for creating propaganda products. They would go around towns placing up signs and banners to increase awareness. Typically in a month the propaganda teams would hold a large mass rally in the center part of town to vie for local support. They would try to tailor their messaging to meet the local needs. These efforts would help recruitment, elicit support and differentiate them from the run of the mill bandits. If the conditions became ripe and a local populace was sufficiently agitated by social inequalities, the Red Army leaders would make a call for action to topple the local government and push the people to create their own. The Red Army was very careful on who to replace in such situations as the local leadership typically proved useful at transitioning. The Red Army had a selective way of executing key leaders who would be the most troublesome towards their communist needs.  When a new local government sprung up, the CCP would entice everyone to join the Red Army. This saw people join different parts of the Red Army. For teenagers there was the communist youth organization which was basically a feeder unit into the Red Army. The Red Guard was a local militia group that protected the community and supplemented the Red Army when needed. Those who proved themselves capable could join the Red Army proper. The Red Army instituted a series of organizational changes to establish loyalty to the CCP and allow for a dispersion of forces. Initially the Red Army applied the Russian Soviet and NRA models, but changes were necessary to meet local conditions. When the 4th Red Army captured Sanwan, Mao Zedong established party rule over the army by using party representatives and soldier soviets. The party representatives and army leaders held equal footing, allowing for both to have greater oversight into the issues and concerns of the other. It was commonplace in Warlord armies and the NRA for soldiers to be abused. This quasi democratization allowed soldiers to have a greater voice. On June 22nd of 1929 the 4th Red Army held their 7th representative congress in Longyan. Mao Zedong spoke much of party control over the military, ruffling a lot of feathers and would contribute to his failure at becoming the Front Committee secretary General that year. In the wake of that loss, Mao Zedong departed for Fujian to assist the mass mobilization going on over there whence he became quite ill. During that period, Chen Yi representing the 4th Red Army in Shanghai reported to the Central Committee. Based on his reports they authorized political communist control over the Red Army units. At least vindicated that his ideas were accepted, Mao Zedong attended the 9th Representative Congress in Gutian county of Fujian. Here he would issue a famous statement “On the Rectification of Incorrect Ideas in the Party” . It outlined his views on the Red Army and what needed to be improved. That same conference gave a platform to Mao Zedong and Zhu De to push for further centralization of power within the Red Army. The Red Army had suffered numerous casualties, desertions and received numerous new recruits. Because of this Mao Zedong believed the military structure needed change. There was also the issue of factionalism within the Red Army. Mao Zedong believed more educated and centralized control would help maintain the unity of the armed forces.  In December of 1929 a conference was held in Gutian seeing more initiatives adopted to help consolidate military power under party control. The Red Army adopted the political commissariat system from the Soviet Red Army, placing greater control of the army into the hands of the political commissar. The political commissar had political training, but did not have the same power over political operations. The introduction of former KMT and NRA members into the Red Army increased a need for more political indoctrination. Alongside this the Gutian Conference reiterated the equality amongst soldiers and civilians. Mao Zedong and Zhu De understood the important role of military training for the Red Army. Two major groups of soldiers already had formal training, former NRA and graduates of the Peasant movement training institute. Many of these men were lost in the initial battles however leading the Red Army to be filled with peasants with little to any combat experience. Another issue was the Red Guards lacking any experience, requiring Red Officers to be pulled from front lines to help them out. By developing a competent and trained local force, this further allowed the Red Army to advance outside its borders and expand.  With a lack of discipline a lot of property damage became common. To combat this, Mao Zedong initially instituted three disciplines in 1927 (1) obey orders in all your actions; (2) don't take anything from the workers and peasants; and (3) when attacking the local bullies, turn over whatever you take from them. This was expanded further into 8 by 1930 (1) Put back the doors [you have taken down for bed boards]; (2) put back the straw [you have used for bedding]; (3) pay fairly for what you buy; (4) return everything you borrow; and (5) pay for anything you damage. Mao and Zhu later added two more points of attention: (7) defecate only in latrines, and (8) do not steal from captives. The purpose of such rules was two-fold, to curb reckless soldierly behavior and to not piss off local communities.  Yet discipline alone does not guarantee success in war. The 4th Army held many senior leaders who had trained at Baoding, Whampoa and the Yunnan military schools. But at the lower levels the military experience was quite uneven. The Red Army needed to create a universal standard. Mao Zedong established the first training unit, the 31st regiment training units in December of 1927 at the Longjiang academy in the Jingangshan mountains. Zhu De and Chen Yi would create similar units. Once in Jiangxi the Red Army established mobile schools that accompanied the forces to the front lines. The pressure from the KMT led encirclement campaigns made it impossible to implement a normal education system. While schools were important, for many soldiers the only way to learn was from doing. Sometimes conditions did not allow for the training, and the students were thrust into combat immediately. Mao stated “to learn warfare through warfare—this is our chief method.” However many of the new recruits and junior leaders never received formal education and found classes and training boring. To retain interest, practical exercises were used. By the beginning of 1930, the 4th Red Army had expanded from Jinggangshan to Jiangxi, Hunan and Fujian. Additionally 7 other Soviets were established in the interior of China, demonstrating the viability of the CCP model. For a large part it was the efforts of Mao Zedong and Zhu De that allowed the CCP to thrive. However major issues loomed externally and internally. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Mao Zedong had forged a seed in the Jinggangshan mountains the would grow into the base of a new 4th Red Army. Forming alliances with local groups and adopting new innovative strategies to survive allowed the 4th Red Army to expand and with it Mao Zedong's career. Yet externally and internally enemies lay everywhere.   

Last time we spoke about the Chiang-Gui War. China was reunified, but not was all well in Camelot. Chiang Kai-Shek initially popular, faced opposition from various factions, including Northern warlords and rival generals. The KMT decided to relocate the capital from Beijing to Nanking, which sparked resistance from those attached to Beijing's rich history. The KMT then struggled with demobilizing the massive National Revolutionary Army, which had over 2 million troops. Chiang Kai-Shek aimed to reduce this number significantly but faced challenges, including discontent among warlords like Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan. Tensions escalated into the Chiang-Gui War, where Chiang defeated the Guangxi Clique led by Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi. This victory, however, did not end the turmoil as Feng and Yan formed an anti-Chiang coalition with Wang Jingwei. The struggle led to a dramatic showdown, culminating in the Taiyuan Conference where Yan Xishan was promoted to commander-in-chief, setting the stage for further conflict.   #123 The Central Plains War  Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. We last left off with basically every other big dog in China getting ready to gang up on Chiang Kai-Shek. Yan Xishan was now the commander in chief of an anti-chiang coalition with his deputy commanders being Feng Yuxiang, Li Zongren and Zhang Xueliang….however Zhang Xueliang was nowhere to be found. During what has been referred to as the “telegram war” period, the Young Marshal had actually spent the entire time in Mukden frantically telegraming all the significant North Chinese warlords and generals to not join the anti-chiang movement.  To take a small sidestep. In the last episode I explained why Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi and their Guangxi clique turned against Chiang Kai-Shek, but what motivations did someone like Feng Yuxiang and his Guominjun have to do so? A severe famine hit the Guanzhong region of Shaanxi, where Feng Yuxiang held power. This famine, which occurred in the 18th year of the Republic of China, is also referred to as the "Famine of the 18th Year of the Republic of China." Within Shaanxi, a year without any harvest is called a famine year, two consecutive years of poor harvest are also labeled famine years, and three consecutive years are considered a severe famine. During the 18th year of the Republic of China, the region faced an extreme famine with virtually no harvest for six consecutive seasons over three years. Some considered it a once-in-a-century event, while others claimed it was a disaster seen once in 300 years. According to modern historical records and newspaper reports, Shaanxi experienced drought in 1928, which caused poor summer wheat yields, while autumn and winter crops could not be planted due to a lack of rain. By 1929, the drought worsened. No rain fell from spring through autumn, drying up wells and rivers like the Jing, Wei, Han, and Bao. Most trees withered, and crops failed—summer harvests only amounted to 20%, and autumn yields were nonexistent. The famine was so severe that grass roots and tree bark became scarce, with the roads littered with corpses and countless people fleeing the area. According to a report by the Shaanxi Disaster Relief Committee on September 5 of that year, 91 of the province's 92 counties were affected by the drought. Except for a few counties along the Wei River that had some green crops, the rest were barren. Among the 91 counties, 24 were extremely severely affected, 27 severely affected, 15 moderately affected, and 25 slightly affected. The most severely hit areas included Chang'an, Wugong, Fengxiang, Fufeng, Qianxian, Qishan, Meixian, Xingping, Xianyang, Lintong, Weinan, Zhouzhi, and others. Out of a total population of over 9.4 million, 2.5 million people died of starvation, approximately 400,000 fled, and over 200,000 women were sold to other regions such as Henan, Shanxi, Beiping, Tianjin, and Shandong. Back in 1927, Chiang Kai-shek established the KMT's new government in Nanking. By June, Chiang and Feng Yuxiang succeeded in uniting the two Kuomintang warlord factions during the Xuzhou Conference. In February 1928, Chiang and Feng solidified their alliance by becoming sworn brothers. Before the launch of the "Second Northern Expedition," Chiang Kai-shek had control over the central KMT government and occupied affluent areas like Shanghai, Nanjing, and Hangzhou. Feng Yuxiang, on the other hand, controlled the impoverished and remote northwest, where transportation was difficult. He saw the Northern Expedition as an opportunity to expand his own influence, particularly eyeing Beijing and Tianjin for their wealth and strategic transportation routes. After the expedition, Chiang Kai-shek, concerned about Feng's growing power, exploited tensions between Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang. He ceded control of Hebei, Beijing, and Tianjin to Yan Xishan, appointing him commander of the Beijing-Tianjin garrison and allowing his 3rd Army to enter Beijing. Feng's 2nd Army, however, was restricted to Nanyuan and denied entry into the city, which greatly displeased Feng. In response, he ordered his troops to retreat to Shandong and Henan, and feigned illness in Xinxiang, Henan, refusing to travel to Beijing. In the political realm Feng Yuxiang advocated for "civilian politics" and stood against dictatorship. Within the Kuomintang, he opposed Chiang Kai-shek's views, calling for the establishment of a clean government, promoting joint industrial development, providing aid to disaster victims, and fighting corruption. He also opposed salary increases for central government officials, argued for distributing leadership roles based on the strength of different factions, and rejected Chiang Kai-shek's dominance over party matters and the Nanjing government. These positions sharply conflicted with Chiang Kai-shek's ideas. After the success of the "Northern Expedition," Chiang Kai-shek proposed a reorganization of the army. This initiative sparked intense conflict between Chiang and Feng Yuxiang. On July 6, 1928, Chiang invited Feng, Yan Xishan, Li Zongren, and Bai Chongxi to a symposium in Beiping. However, Feng and other faction leaders strongly opposed Chiang's plan to reduce the army, leading to an unsatisfactory end to the meeting. On August 8, 1928, Chiang presided over the Fifth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang's Second Central Committee in Nanjing, where he sought to force the various factions to comply with his military reduction plan. Supported by the Guangdong-born members of the Central Committee, the proposal was passed, and the army reduction plan became part of the Kuomintang's official resolution. Feeling threatened by this plan, Feng traveled along the Longhai Railway, inspecting the Northwest Army, and held a commemorative military parade marking the second anniversary of the Northwest Army's Wuyuan Oath-taking Ceremony. In October 1928, after the reorganization of the Nanjing National Government, Chiang appointed Feng as Vice President of the Executive Yuan and Minister of Military Affairs, asking him to report to Nanjing immediately. Feng, however, refused, citing various excuses. Under increasing public pressure, Feng and other faction leaders were eventually forced to attend the demobilization meeting in Nanjing. On December 26, 1928, Chiang chaired a preparatory meeting for the demobilization conference, using factional politics to manipulate and divide his rivals. Feng proposed a "three haves and three demobilizations" plan, which was initially opposed by Yan Xishan and Li Zongren. Secretly, Chiang won over Yan, encouraging him to submit a proposal that would counter Feng's influence. When the National Demobilization Meeting convened on January 1, 1929, most attendees supported Yan's proposal over Feng's. The "Outline of the Procedure for the Demobilization Committee of the National Army" was passed, favoring Chiang's position. Eventually, Feng, Yan, and Li shifted from opposing each other to uniting against the demobilization process. In March 1929, as we saw in last episode, the Chiang-Gui War broke out. In order to concentrate military forces and eliminate the Guangxi clique, Chiang Kai-shek sent Shao Lizi and others to Huashan to win over Feng Yuxiang. They offered Feng the chance to continue cooperating with Chiang and send troops to help Chiang defeat Guangxi in exchange for the premiership of the Executive Yuan and the territory of Hubei and Hunan provinces. Feng agreed to Chiang's request on the surface. He then frequently deployed troops on the border between Henan and Hubei, hoping to seize the opportunity to send troops to occupy Wuhan when Chiang and Guangxi were both defeated. However, Chiang soon defeated the Guangxi clique, which increased Chiang Kai-shek's resentment and made the contradiction between Chiang and Feng irreconcilable. Now that pretty much covers Feng Yuxiang's motivations, but what about Yan Xishan? In January 1930, after Yan Xishan returned to Taiyuan from Zhengzhou, central Henan began to experience increasing turmoil. On February 10, Yan sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, urging a spirit of courtesy for the country's sake that they "share the burden" to resolve party conflicts. Chiang responded on February 12 with a telegram stating, "Revolution to save the country is an obligation, not a right. The country is in dire straits, and it is not the time for us to be arrogant." By February 21, Li Zongren, Huang Shaohong, Bai Chongxi, Zhang Fakui, and Hu Zongduo all stated supported Yan Xishan to be the commander-in-chief of the anti-chiang national army, navy, and air force. In many ways the issue was simply thrust onto him. Meanwhile Yan Xishan's army went to Peiping, current day Beijing, disarming the KMT forces there and setting up a HQ. With perhaps a stronger backing, Chiang Kai-Shek would have gone to war against the anti-chiang cabal much earlier, but was reluctant to do so now. The terrain was the difficulty, he would have to fight his way into Shandong, where the local sympathy rested on Feng Yuxiang. So for now he battled them through the use of diplomacy. Within the chaos, the CCP also managed to cut their own piece of the pie by capturing Changsha in late July. They would only hold the city for a few days however, before burning it down and fleeing. Early into the conflict Chiang Kai-Shek's attention was drawn to Manchuria. The Young Marshal had not made a move in either direction and he was sitting upon an army 200,000 plus strong. Where did his sympathies truly lie, everyone was waiting to see. Chiang Kai-Shek believed chances were slim the Young Marshal would rebel against him, he was not very much like his tiger of a father. Zhang Xueliang was a thinker, an idealistic and most importantly he had been an opium addict for a long time. Such a life conditioned the young man to be a lot more passive. Zhang Xueliang seemed to be looking to pledge himself to a real leader who could deliver salvation to China. But who was the better choice for him? Chiang Kai-Shek or Wang Jingwei? Chiang Kai-Shek did not wait for an official answer to this question he hastily announced that Zhang Xueliang was his new deputy commander in chief. Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan followed this up by offering Zhang Xueliang a place in the Peiping state council, yet Zhang Xueliang remained quiet until the middle of September. It was a real nail bitter for both sides, Zhang Xueliang had a large, decently trained and pretty well armed army, he would tip the tides for either side. The waiting game had Yan Xishan thinking strongly about pulling out of the coalition. In the meantime the war truly began to heat up in May when Chiang Kai-Shek swore a public oath to attack Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang. On May 11th, both sides began engaged another along a north and south front. The main battlefield in the north was centered around Henan with a secondary front in Shandong fought mainly along the Pinghan, Longhai and Jinpu railways. In the southern theater the fighting was fought mainly in the Yuezhou, Changsha and Xiangjiang river areas. To be more specific the anti-Chiang Kai-shek army organized a total of 8 war front areas: the Guangxi clique army was the 1st front, led by Li Zongren, going north from Hunan and heading towards Wuhan; the Northwest Army was the 2nd front, led by Feng Yuxiang, with Lu Zhonglin being responsible for the Longhai and Pinghan lines in Henan; the Shanxi Army was the 3rd front, led by Yan Xishan, with Xu Yongchang responsible for the Jinpu and Jiaoji lines and the eastern section of the Longhai line in Shandong; Shi Yousan's troops were the 4th front; the Northeast Army, which was designated by Zhang Xueliang, was the 5th front though whether he took up the post or not was yet to be seen; Liu Wenhui's troops were the 6th front; He Jian's troops were the 7th front, and Fan Zhongxiu's troops were the 8th front. The Northwest Army and the Shanxi Army, as the main forces, had been fully mobilized and marched to the Longhai, Pinghan, and Jinpu lines. Yan also appointed Shi Yousan as the chairman of Shandong Province, leading his troops to attack Shandong from Henan, and appointed Sun Dianying as the chairman of Anhui Province, attacking the Bozhou area of ​​Anhui. Altogether the Anti-Chiang forces were about 260,000 men strong The fighting kicked off in mid May. The strategy of the anti-Chiang army was for the first front army, the Guangxi army led by Li Zongren to march into Hunan and advance towards Wuhan; the second front army, the Northwestern Army of Feng Yuxiang, was responsible for the Longhai and Pinghan routes in Henan Province, and would attack Xuzhou and Wuhan respectively; the third front army, the Shanxi Army of Yan Xishan was responsible for the operations along the Jinpu and Jiaoji routes in Shandong Province. It would join Feng Yuxiang to attack Xuzhou, then advance southward along the Jinpu Line and attack Nanking; Shi Yousan was in charge of the Fourth Front Army, which would use its main forces to attack Jining and Yanzhou, and would use part of its forces to join the Third Front Army in the attack on Jinan; Zhang Xueliang's Northeast Army was designated as the Fifth Front Army, and efforts were made to jointly fight against Chiang Kai-shek, but again his status was still unknown; Liu Wenhui of Sichuan was appointed as the Sixth Front Army, and He Jian of Hunan was appointed as the Seventh Front Army. In order to encourage generals of non-directly affiliated units, Shi Yousan was appointed as the chairman of Shandong Province, Wan Xuancai as the chairman of Henan Province, and Sun Dianying as the chairman of Anhui Province. After this, Fan Zhongxiu was appointed as the commander-in-chief of the Eighth Front Army. Chiang Kai-Shek deployed the NRA 2nd Corps led by Liu Zhi along the Longhai railway line; the 3rd Crops of H Chengjun was deployed on the Pinhan line; the 1st Corps of Han Fuju was deployed along the Jinpu line and Chiang Kai-Shek set up his HQ in Xuzhou to personally command forces. On May 11th, Chiang Kai-Shek issued his general attack orders, with the 2nd corps attacking Guide from Xuzhou. The two sides began clashing, with the KMT gaining the upper hand rather quickly as they held an advantage in air power. A NRA division led by Chen Jicheng occupied Mamuji due east of Guide. Then Liu Maoen defected to Chiang Kai-Shek handing his forces over at Ningling while also luring Colonel Wan Xuancai into a trap. This left Guide to be easily captured by Chiang's forces as the only other enemy division was that of Sun Dianying who withdrew to Bozhou. Although Chiang Kai-Shek had won technically the first major battle, his situation was not at all enviable.  After losing Guide, Yan Xishan urgently reinforced the Longhai Railway line area with divisions led by Yang Yaofang, Sun Laingcheng and Ji Hongchang. This saw Chiang Kai-Sheks forces suffer extremely heavy losses over the course of 10 days of fighting. Chiang Kai-Sheks forces were reeling from the fierce fighting and forced to retreat into the southwestern portion of Shandong. Along the Pinghan railway, Chiang Kai-Shek ordered He Chengjun's 3rd Corps to depart the Yancheng area and attack northwards. The 3rd Corps quickly found themselves fighting the northwest Army in the Linying and Xuchang areas. The 3rd Corps were trying to contain and isolate the northwest army who were currently receiving reinforcements along the Longhai line.  On May 25th, He Jians forces began occupying Linying and by Juny 7th Xuchang. At this time the Guangxi army invaded Hunan and by the 28th of May had taken Yongzhou, Qiyang, Hangzhou and Baoqing. On June 8th they took Changsha and Yueyang, with their vanguard entering Hubei. Feng Yuxiang took advantage of the situation to launch a full scale attack along the Pingham line. After two days of fighting, Chiang Kai-Sheks men were retreating south to Luohe. However, Feng Yuxiang made an error. His subordinates urged him to link up with the Guangxi army and attack Wuhan. Instead he ordered his forces to advance into eastern Henan where he might annihilate a large portion of Chiang Kai-Sheks army. Meanwhile Chiang Kai-Shek had suffered major defeats across the Longhai and Pingham lines and lost the key city of Changsha, his men were demoralized. By mid June Feng Yuxiang adjusted his battle plan and launched another offensive along the Longhai line as Chiang Kai-Shek came to Liuhe to supervise the battle. Chiang Kai-Shek tossed some of his elite divisions equipped with heavy artillery to attack Feng Yuxiang from Qixian to Taikang, hoping to seize Kaifeng and Chenliu. Yet he fell directly into a pocket-sized encirclement and his forces were battered. Over on the Jinpu line front, Yan Xishan had organized 6 divisions and 3 artillery regiments to perform an offensive against Jinan. They advanced south along the Jinpu line and formed two pincers against the city. Han Fuju knew he would lose considerable forces in a defense of the city and ended up simply pulling out to conserve his strength, handing Jinan over.  July brought significant change to the war. Over in Hunan, Chiang Kai-Shek organized 3 armies to counterattack Changsha; a naval fleet under Chen Skaokuan would assist them and he ordered the 8th route army under Jiang Hauangnai and Cai Tingkai to retake Hengyang. The Guangxi army could not focus on two fronts, so they abandoned Yueyang and Changsha to meet the enemy at Hengyang. The two sides fought bitterly in southern Hunan, but by July 4th the Guangxi army was forced to retreat to the province of Guangxi. Afterwards Chiang Kai-Shek's forces took Bozhou within the Longhai/Jinpu triangle area, effectively trapping forces led by Sun Dianying. On July 8th Chiang Kai-Shek diverted a bunch of divisions from the Longhai line to the Jinpu Line. By the end of the month Chiang Kai-Shek unleashed a general offensive along the Jinpu line. Feng Yuxiang retaliated by launching an offensive over the Longhai line trying to seize Xuzhou. Feng Yuxiang hoped by doing so he could unite the Jinpu and Longhai lines for a combined assault of Xuzhou. Chiang Kai-Sheks Longhai forces were quickly pushed back to an area south of Guide, but mother nature tossed a curveball. Colossal amounts of rain caused river floodings, forcing Feng Yuxiangs men to advance through mud greatly diminishing his supply lines. It was enough to give Chiang Kai-Shek time to stabilize the front as his offensive on the Jinpu line successfully recaptured Jinan by August 15th.  On August 21st Chiang Kai-Shek convened a meeting in Jinan where it was decided they would divert forces from the Jinpu line to the Longhai and Pinghan lines. They would focus the most on the Pinghan line while forces on the Longhai line would try to cut off the retreat of Feng Yuxiang's army. Chiang Kai-Shek even offered 200,00 yuan for the first unit to take Gongxian and 1 million yuan for the occupation of Luoyang and Zhengzhou. On September 6th, Chiang Kai-Shek unleashed another general offensive. Feng Yuxiang believed he had the numbers to win, so he deployed his forces pretty evenly over the Pinghan, Longhai and Zhengzhou fronts. He did urge Yan Xishan to try and help him out if his fronts could afford to spare units. Yet Yan Xishan sought to preserve his strength, and moved his Longhai forces to pull back north of the Yellow River. This action made linking up with Feng Yuxiang pretty much impossible. By the 17th Chiang Kai-Shek captured Longmen very close to Luoyang, effectively cutting off Feng Yuxiang's line of retreat heading west. Thus Feng Yuxiang had no choice but to retreat into northern Henan. Taking another sidestep, you may have noticed one of the largest players remains unmentioned, what about the Young Marshal? Back in March, Zhang Xueliang issued a telegram expressing his neutrality. This of course prompted Chiang Kai-Shek to personally call him, whence negotiations began. On June 10th, Li Shi and Zhang Xueliang discussed the conditions for him to send troops to help the NRA out. The first condition was 2 million yuan to cover the cost of deployment. On June 21st the KMT officially appointed Zhang Xueliang as deputy commander. The next day Zhang Xueliang telegramed everyone suggesting that both sides agree to a cease-fire and establish a buffer zone. In August Li Shi came to meet with Zhang Xueliang again, where the Young Marshal then demanded 5 million yuan for military use and a loan of 10 million yuan to stabilize the northeast economy. Chiang Kai-Shek agreed to the terms on the spot. Then Zhang Xueliang said if Chiang Kai-Shek could capture Jinan, he would send troops. As mentioned this occurred on August 15th. Thus Zhang Xueliang began speaking with his generals. Meanwhile on the other side, the Anti-Chiang leadership began establishing a competing government in Peiping in July whereupon they appointed many Fengtian clique members to be the heads of certain departments. Yet on September 2nd, Zhang Xueliang told Fu Zuoyi, a anti-Chiang representative that he did not support their Peiping government. Then Zhang Xueliang recalled all the Fengtian members they had appointed as officials.  Then on September 18th, Zhang Xueliang issued a telegram urging "all parties to stop fighting immediately to relieve the people's suffering and wait for Nanking to take action." At the same time, he dispatched Yu Xuzhong and Wang Shuchang with the 1st and 2nd armies of the Northeast Frontier Defense army to enter the pass. On October 9th, he officially took up office as the deputy commander for the NRA. Yan Xishan soon received word from forces in Tangshan that Zhang Xuliang was advancing, so he called for a meeting to figure out countermeasures. Zhang Xueliang then sent word to Yan Xishan that he should withdraw from occupied areas. Yan Xishan did indeed comply as Zhang Xueliang quickly occupied Ping and Tianjin without firing a shot. To maintain cordial relations with Yan Xishan, Zhang Xueliang had his army only advance into Hubei and Chahar, but left Shanxi alone. This prompted Yan Xishans forces to cross the Yellow River and retreat back into Shanxi using two routes.  Meanwhile a wave of defections to Chiang Kai-Shek began in late September, severely crippling the Pinghan line for Feng Yuxiang. Along the Longhai line, Chiang Kai-Shek's forces took Kaifeng on October 3rd and were advancing towards Zhangzhou. The KMT government then began announcing amnesty for all Generals if they would stand down. The next days many of Feng Yuxiang's subordinates called upon him to issue a ceasefire. Feng Yuxiang was basically screwed, Chiang and Zhang were surrounding him slowly as his own Generals defected or abandoned the cause. On the 5th Feng Yuxiangs deputy commander withdrew to Xinxiang, due north of the Yellow River. The next day Zhengzhou fell to the NRA 11th division of Chen Cheng. On the 5th Yan Xishan, Feng Yuxiang and Wang Jingwei jointly telegrammed Zhang Xueliang expressing their desire for a ceasefire and to open up negotiations.  By the 15th Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang stepped down together as commanders in chief. Yan Xishan handed command to Xu Yongchang and Feng Yuxiang to Lu Zhonglin. Both men then stated they would go temporarily abroad, though neither truly did. In truth Yan Xishan fled to Dalian under the protection of the Japanese and Feng Yuxiang hid in Yudaohe in Shanxi. That same day Lu Zhonglin telegramed to the Northwest army "withdraw defense immediately upon order inform all injured units to stop fighting and rest the people." On November 4th, Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang telegramed the dissolution of the anti-chiang movement, ending the war. The Central Plains War lasted roughly seven months, with both sides mobilizing more than 1.1 million troops, spending 500 million yuan, and suffering 300,000 casualties. At least half of them were young and middle-aged men from Hebei, Shandong, Henan and other provinces. It was the largest civil war in China after the Northern Expedition to unify China. The war spread to Hebei, Shandong, Henan, Shaanxi, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi and other provinces. Most of the national troops originally prepared to suppress the Communists were mobilized, allowing the Chinese Communist Party to breathe and develop. Warlords imposed additional donations and taxes on the common people and issued paper money indiscriminately. As usual the ones to suffer the most were of course the common people. Within the Central Plains, 27 counties including Luoyang in Henan Province were severely affected, with agricultural losses amounting to 160.2% of the annual output value; farmers in more than a dozen counties including lost an average of 0.22 heads of livestock and 0.07 carts per household. Within Henan Province, it was said “over 120,000 people died in the war, over 19,500 were injured, over 1,185,000 fled, and over 1,297,700 were forced into exile by the army, of which over 30,000 died in combat, not including soldiers. The total property losses, including the destruction and burning of houses, amounted to over 651,469,000 yuan. It is estimated that it will take 10 years to recover all the losses.” Source in Zhengzhou stated “Since the beginning of the war, planes have been arriving every day, dropping bombs. … Every time a bomb is dropped, five or six people are killed and several buildings are destroyed. This situation is not limited to Zhengzhou. It is the same everywhere in the battlefield cities, the counties and villages near the Longhai and Pinghan railways, even in broad daylight.”  Industry declined and agriculture went bankrupt. The war caused great damage to industrial and agricultural production, seriously hindering the development of the social economy. “The national finances and social economy were both exhausted.” For railway transportation alone saw  “capital losses amounted to 22,165,504 yuan; withdrawals from garrison troops amounted to 4,206,155 yuan; military transport losses amounted to 29,958,042 yuan; and operating losses amounted to 17,018,271 yuan. The total was more than 73 million yuan.Among agricultural products, tobacco leaves were harvested in the three provinces of Henan, Shandong and Anhui, and the war was at its most intense. The losses were between 20 and 30 million yuan. The losses were twice as much as the war expenses.”  Chiang Kai-Shek had won the war, utterly breaking his opponents. Feng Yuxiangs northwest disintegrated into four factions. Yan Xishans Shanxi army took heavy losses that they would not recover from. Zhang Xueliang profited the most, his northeast army gained further territory in North China. He would gradually incorporate a large part of the forces in Shanxi and Suiyuan and would emerge the second largest military faction in China. However, when Zhang Xueliang depleted the northeast of her military forces, this left the borders weak. Zhang Xueliang soon became focused on governing North China, taking his eyes off his powerbase of Manchuria, which Japanese eyes looked upon enviously.  Overall the Central plains war weakened the NRA, the KMT, depleted China of her overall strength and lessened efforts against the CCP. Within the background of the warlord-NRA conflict, the CCP would benefit greatly. The CCP had spread to 11 provinces, including Jiangxi, Hubei, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan, Henan, Sichuan, Anhui, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang. Their Red Army formed a total of 14 armies with a total of about 100,000 people. But with the Central Plains War ended, now Chiang Kai-Shek could redirect his efforts against the Red Menace.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Chiang Kai-Shek had certainly faced a formidable enemy in the former of his past comrades in arms, Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, Li Zongren and many others. At the last minute the Young Marshal saved the day, allowing the Generalissimo to retain control over the new Republic, yet in the background lurked enemies everywhere still.