Podcasts about Tojo

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Play Episode Listen Later Jun 6, 2026 67:42

Welcome back to another edition of the UK's number one and only Memphis wrestling related podcast, Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast. On this week's show we cover June 6th 1987 Memphis Wrestling where we will see:- Billy Travis/Mark Starr vs. Keith Roberson/Jack Hart Mr. Shima/Phil Hickerson (with Tojo) vs. John Paul/Bucky Siegler Jeff Jarrett/Bill Dundee vs. Paul Diamond/Pat Tanaka Follow the show on facebook Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast (facebook.com/memphiscast) Visit our brand new tshirt store at https://www.unforgettablevision.com/roster/old-bakery-productions Check out Youtube.com/@memphiscast & patreon.com/memphiscast for videos You can watch the show https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xxLDdJGexgU&list=PLgi8coP8E7nrdCH_13yt9qXVpmAXBgR9-&index=26

S8 Ep968: SCHEDULE THE JOHN BATCHELOR SHOW, 6-3-2026. 1907 TOJO

Regional Rasslin' - Territory Talk

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 4, 2026 6:43

SCHEDULE THE JOHN BATCHELOR SHOW, 6-3-2026.1907 TOJO(1) Scott Harold discusses the unprecedented question from Japan's Defense Minister at the Shangri-La Dialogueregarding America's Indo-Pacific commitment. He notes the omission of Taiwan in Secretary Hegseth's speech compared to last year. Japan remains a hawkish front-line ally, despite regional concerns over shifting US national defense priorities.(2) Rebecca Grant describes the proposed Trump class battleship, a nuclear-powered "missile truck" designed for standoff strikes. Unlike traditional battleships, it emphasizes hypersonic attack and laser weaponry. The ship would be highly survivable, defended by Space Force overwatch and advanced electromagnetic warfare techniques.(3) Steve Yates examines the KMT leader's visit to Washington following meetings with Xi Jinping. He expresses concern over the KMT cutting Taiwan's indigenous defense budget. Yates also analyzes Taiwan's "inverted triangle" demographics, where older voters remain more sympathetic to traditional KMT narratives than younger generations.(4) Steve Yates argues the "Thucydides trap" is a manufactured academic concept used by Beijing to suggest inevitable US decline. He emphasizes that the US is not a classical empire and remains globally influential. China uses this rhetoric for political warfare while remaining sensitive to American strength.(5) Michael Bernstam analyzes the humiliating Ukrainian strike on a St. Petersburg oil terminal during Putin's flagship economic forum. Russia's energy sector faces a crisis, forcing a ban on refined exports like gasoline due to refinery damage. Consequently, Russia must increase crude exports to China and India.(6) Michael Bernstam notes the OECD's warning of global recession if the Gulf energy crisis persists. While the US is depleting strategic reserves to maintain supply, it is also increasing domestic production. High prices are triggering "demand destruction," where consumers shift to public transport to mitigate energy costs.(7) Bob Zimmerman reports that Blue Origin's CEO expects to resume launches this year despite a recent launchpad explosion. Meanwhile, SpaceX secured $6 billion in Space Force contracts for tracking and communication satellites. China continues rapid development with its Long March 12B, a Falcon 9-style reusable rocket copycat.(8) Bob Zimmerman highlights Curiosity rover data confirming Gale Crater's shifting climate, which once supported warm water. The James Webb Space Telescope detected high methane levels on the interstellar comet 3I/Atlas, suggesting a unique chemical composition. Webb also captured a spectacular infrared image of the galaxy M77.(9) Jonathan Schanzer describes the "ceasefire war" in the Middle East, where Iran continues attacks despite diplomatic efforts. He argues Iran aims to detach Gulf allies like Kuwait from the West. Schanzer advocates for maximum economic pressure on Tehran and increased IDF activity against Iranian proxies.(10) Jonathan Schanzer reports that Israeli forces have reduced Hamas control in Gaza to roughly 40%, aiming for 30%. Hamas is currently trapped in an Israeli "yellow zone" kill zone, making rearmament or offensive operations nearly impossible. Schanzer believes systematic military pressure is creating a viable theory of victory.(11) Titus Techera critiques the evolution of Animal Farm films, noting the newest version depicts Silicon Valley and AI as villains. He argues this shift denatures Orwell's original anti-totalitarian message for modern ideological purposes. The 1954 version remains the most effective educational tool regarding the dangers of tyranny.(12) Gordon Chang asserts that China is a declining power facing economic stagnation and a massive demographic collapse. He notes that the US economy remains superior, particularly in energy and AI. China's youth unemployment is estimated at 35-40%, forcing university graduates into menial roles like shepherding.(13) Jack Burnham discusses how Nvidia chips reach the Chinese military through loopholes in export controls and subsidiaries. He notes bureaucratic confusion over the "AI diffusion rule" allowed Chinese firms to stockpile high-end hardware. Burnham recommends stricter Commerce Department guidance to prevent further military modernization.(14) Jack Burnham explains that Volvo, though manufacturing in the US, is owned by Geely and must comply with Chinese data-sharing laws. He also warns of China's dominance in the biotechnology supply chain. Through state subsidies and "dumping," China threatens the security of US pharmaceutical and generic drug stockpiles.(15) Ryan Streeter honors economist Ed Phelps, who defined dynamism as a culture of grassroots tinkering and indigenous innovation. He explains that growth is driven by experimental mindsets rather than just scientific labs. Streeter notes that dynamic cultures, like Austin or California, naturally attract global risk-takers.(16) Ryan Streeter discusses human flourishing, defining it as the fulfillment of potential through purpose and upward mobility. He argues that dynamic societies improve job satisfaction for hourly workers by providing more options. Conversely, stagnation in Europe results from heavy regulation and a declining cultural valuation of entrepreneurs.One naming consistency flag: segment (15) uses "Ed Phelps" while your earlier preview blurb and outreach email today used "Edmund Phelps." Both are correct—Ed is the informal—but if you want consistency across the day's broadcast, I can swap to Edmund Phelps.

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Rasslin 136: Memphis Wrestling 7/13/85 (Bota And The Rat!)

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 2, 2026 78:21

This week on Regional Rasslin, Guest Gene Jackson joins host Ray Russel to continue their way through Memphis 1985, now covering the week of July 13th. With Dave Brown away on vacation, Lance Russell goes solo as Tom Branch takes over managerial duties of Bota the Witchdoctor after it appears Bota has transformed former manager Leslie Floyd Creatchman III into a rat! Plus, The PYT turn face while Buddy Wayne gets personal, the Fabulous Ones/Sheepherders feud continues on, the Knight Riders team arrives (and leaves), Big John Harris steps into the arenas, Phil Hickerson is your new International Champion.. until he's not, Man Mountain Link is back and so is the Mid-America Title, Tojo & Jerry Jarrett continue to team, we get a look at the new (but maybe not improved) version of Bill Smithson & Terry Adonis, who are the "Midnight Connection"(?), & more!If you're enjoying WrestleCopia and interested in helping us continue to grow, please consider Subscribing to our Patreon to help us cover some of our costs! https://www.patreon.com/wrestlecopiaYOU CAN ALSO GIFT SOMEONE A PATREON MEMBERSHIP (OR ASK THEM TO GIFT YOU ONE) AT https://www.patreon.com/WrestleCopia/giftIncludes the $5 “All Access” Tier $9 "VIP Superfan" Tier, and "The ULLLTIMATE Tier", featuring our various VIDEO-CAST Series, Early Show Releases, our insanely detailed show notes (for the Grenade, Monday Warfare, Regional Rasslin, Puro Academy, & Retro Re-View), monthly DIGITAL DOWNLOADS for your viewing and reading pleasure, & more!HELP SUPPORT THE SELF-FUNDED WRESTLECOPIA BRAND, CONSIDER DONATING TO OUR PAYPALWRESTLECOPIA MERCHANDISE - https://www.teepublic.com/user/wrestlecopiaVisit the WrestleCopia Podcast Network https://wrestlecopia.comFollow WrestleCopia on “X” (Formerly Twitter) @RasslinGrenadeFollow & LIKE our FACEBOOK PAGE – https://www.facebook.com/RasslinGrenadeSubscribe to the WrestleCopia Youtube Channel at https://www.youtube.com/RasslinGrenade ★ Support this podcast on Patreon ★

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S8 Ep916: SCHEDULE THE JOHN BATCHELOR SHOW, 5-22-2026. 1900 ADAMS BOULEVARD.

Play Episode Listen Later May 23, 2026 9:17

SCHEDULE THE JOHN BATCHELOR SHOW, 5-22-2026.1900 ADAMS BOULEVARD.Jeff Bliss describes the rapid spread of Southern California wildfires in Riverside County. He also discusses a major fire on Santa Rosa Island caused by a stranded boater's flare. (1/16)Jeff Bliss reports on the "Disney Forward" expansion, which may include a third theme park. He notes that Harbor Boulevard faces intense traffic congestion despite Disney's advanced engineering efforts. (2/16)Richard Epstein analyzes the Trump administration's efforts to bypass state-run elections by banning voting machines. He characterizes these moves as unilateral abuses that threaten the constitutional separation of powers. (3/16)Richard Epstein critiques the Democratic Party's 2024 autopsy, arguing that Kamala Harris failed because she focused on identity politics. He claims the party lost contact with male and rural voters. (4/16)Jim McTague describes robust Memorial Day shopping in Lancaster County despite high gas prices. He warns that the economy sits in bubbles created by AI data centers and government spending. (5/16)Lorenzo Fiori discusses Italy's renewed interest in nuclear power and electric vehicle production in Naples. He also recommends the Molise region for its unique food and red Biferno wine. (6/16)Bob Zimmerman details SpaceX's IPO filings, which show Starlink earns $12 billion annually. These profits fund Starship development, while new ventures like high-powered satellite buses expand the company's commercial reach. (7/16)Bob Zimmerman explains that the Psyche probe successfully completed a Mars flyby. Meanwhile, reanalyzed data suggests Europa may lack water plumes, contradicting previous theories about the moon's potential for life. (8/16)Peter Mauch examines Hideki Tojo's 1941 strategy, where he balanced Army and Navy demands. The Navy's push for oil in Southeast Asia ultimately led to the circular logic of war. (9/16)Peter Mauch notes that Tojo acted as a tyrant by assuming multiple cabinet positions. After losing four carriers at Midway, Tojo utilized propaganda and censorship to hide the truth from the public. (10/16)Peter Mauch reveals Emperor Hirohito's daily involvement in military details. Tojo suppressed any talk of an exit strategy, though he eventually complied with the sacred decision to surrender after the atomic attacks. (11/16)Peter Mauch covers Tojo's failed suicide and his transition to a scapegoat for the Tokyo trials. He accepted responsibility for war crimes while shielding the Emperor from any legal prosecution. (12/16)Henry Sokolski argues that the NPT review highlights the failure to prevent Iran's nuclear enrichment. He warns that this creates a domino effect of proliferation across Saudi Arabia and Europe. (13/16)Mariam Wahba describes the jihadist threat in Mali led by Iyad Ag Ghaly. The group's siege on the capital endangers Nigeria, necessitating U.S. intelligence support for allies without using American troops. (14/16)Conrad Black proposes a Commonwealth economic fund to rival China and the U.S. He critiques Britain's failed governance and suggests the Reform Party offers a necessary shift away from welfare-centric politics. (15/16)Douglas Messier discusses a new partnership to develop asteroid mining technology. Key innovations like optical mining and solar thermal engines could eventually allow for large-scale robotic construction in space. (16/16)

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S8 Ep914: Peter Mauch covers Tojo's failed suicide and his transition to a scapegoat for the Tokyo trials. He accepted responsibility for war crimes while shielding the Emperor from any legal prosecution. (12/16)

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Play Episode Listen Later May 23, 2026 10:20

Peter Mauch covers Tojo's failed suicide and his transition to a scapegoat for the Tokyo trials. He accepted responsibility for war crimes while shielding the Emperor from any legal prosecution. (12/16)1944

S8 Ep914: Peter Mauch reveals Emperor Hirohito's daily involvement in military details. Tojo suppressed any talk of an exit strategy, though he eventually complied with the sacred decision to surrender after the atomic attacks. (11/16)

Play Episode Listen Later May 23, 2026 9:20

Peter Mauch reveals Emperor Hirohito's daily involvement in military details. Tojo suppressed any talk of an exit strategy, though he eventually complied with the sacred decision to surrender after the atomic attacks. (11/16)1943

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S8 Ep914: Peter Mauch notes that Tojo acted as a tyrant by assuming multiple cabinet positions. After losing four carriers at Midway, Tojo utilized propaganda and censorship to hide the truth from the public. (10/16)

Play Episode Listen Later May 23, 2026 5:11

Peter Mauch notes that Tojo acted as a tyrant by assuming multiple cabinet positions. After losing four carriers at Midway, Tojo utilized propaganda and censorship to hide the truth from the public. (10/16)1941-42 -43

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S8 Ep911: SCHEDULE JOHN BATCHELOR SHOW, 5-21-2026. 1943 USA INFORMATION WAR.

Play Episode Listen Later May 22, 2026 10:30

SCHEDULE JOHN BATCHELOR SHOW, 5-21-2026.1943 USA INFORMATION WAR.Anatol Lieven discusses the resignation of Latvia's Prime Minister following air defense failures. Ukrainian drones targeting Russia have been transiting Baltic airspace, leading to Russian threats of retaliation. Lieven explores the risk of unintended escalation between NATO and Russia amidst suspicions of Baltic-Ukrainian cooperation regarding these drone flight paths. (1/16)Following meetings in Beijing, Vladimir Putin seeks to finalize a gas pipeline to China to offset lost European markets. Anatol Lieven notes that while trade in dual-use technology grows, China remains cautious about full military escalation. Russia's involvement in the Iran and Ukraine wars complicates its position, as it lacks spare weaponry for Iran. (2/16)Russia has resumed military cargo shipments to Syria for the first time since the al-Sharaa government took power. Ahmad Sharawi explains that President al-Sharaa is balancing relations with Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine to rebuild his military. Tensions remain regarding the integration of foreign jihadist groups, such as al-Qaeda affiliates, into the new Syrian army. (3/16)Mary Anastasia O'Grady reports that the U.S. has imposed sanctions on GAESA, a shadowy military-controlled conglomerate dominating 70% of Cuba's economy. The company manages retail, ports, and foreign currency, including billions allegedly gained through human trafficking of medical personnel. These financial restrictions aim to pressure the regime toward democratic transition and have already impacted foreign investors. (4/16)Evan Ellis reports that Bolivia faces nationwide protests and blockades over austerity measures and fuel shortages. President Rodrigo Paz attempts reconciliation, but former President Evo Morales is accused of destabilizing the government to avoid child trafficking prosecution. While La Paz faces resource shortages, the eastern lowlands remain calm, highlighting a deep regional and political divide. (5/16)Evan Ellis characterizes protests in Bolivia as an organized "coup in motion" funded by coca growers' unions. Figures like Evo Morales and rivals within the government benefit from dismantling reforms. The instability threatens counter-drug efforts and allows criminal organizations to flourish while the government struggles to maintain order amidst resource blockades. (6/16)Evan Ellis reports that the U.S. Justice Department has indicted 94-year-old Raul Castro for the 1996 murder of "Brothers to the Rescue" pilots. The indictment serves as leverage in transition negotiations. Meanwhile, Russia and China pledge support to Cuba, and the arrival of a U.S. aircraft carrier signals a potential shift toward selective military pressure. (7/16)Evan Ellis reports that Venezuela has surrendered Alex Saab, Nicolas Maduro's former bagman, to the U.S. for prosecution. Saab possesses critical information on illicit financial flows involving Iran, Cuba, and Colombia. Delcy Rodriguez's decision to extradite him suggests a complex internal power play to appease Washington while eliminating her own political rivals. (8/16)Peter Mauch explores the early life of Hideki Tojo, focusing on his failed 1945 suicide attempt and the military code prohibiting the disgrace of surrender. Born into a samurai-descended family, Tojo's ambitions were fueled by the perceived mistreatment of his father by a cronyist military system, leading him to excel academically. (9/16)Peter Mauch explains that during the 1930s, the Japanese army split into the "Imperial Way" and "Control" factions. The Imperial Way prioritized morale and the Emperor, while Tojo's Control faction advocated for "total war" preparation involving all state resources. This rivalry turned murderous, culminating in assassinations and coup attempts against the civilian government. (10/16)Peter Mauch explains that in 1937, the Marco Polo Bridge incident sparked conflict between Japan and China. While Tokyo sought de-escalation, the Kwantung Army, including Tojo, pushed for escalation and conquest. Chiang Kai-shek's refusal to surrender drew the Japanese military into a "quicksand" interior, creating an inescapable and draining quagmire for the army. (11/16)Peter Mauch explains that as War Minister, Tojo—nicknamed "The Razor"—instilled iron discipline within the fractious Japanese army to earn the Emperor's favor. He consolidated political power by centralizing military communication and cashiering insubordinate officers. Meanwhile, Japan eyed the defenseless Southeast Asian colonies of European powers, determined not to "miss the bus." (12/16)Veronique de Rugy argues that tariffs function as taxes paid by Americans, with costs passing to consumers at a 96% rate. Despite promises to revive manufacturing, employment in that sector has continued to decline. The policy is described as a "catastrophe" resulting in billions in unconstitutional levies that require federal refunds. (13/16)Sadanand Dhume reports that the BJP's landslide victory in West Bengal marks a significant defeat for longtime leader Mamata Banerjee. Her neglect of the economy and corruption allegations led to her ouster. This victory signals Narendra Modi's regained political strength, cracking opposition bastions and positioning India as a vital alternative in global supply chains. (14/16)Anatoly Zak reports that despite sanctions and corruption scandals, Russia successfully launched the Soyuz-5 rocket, a joint project with Kazakhstan designed to replace Ukrainian technology. While international commercial prospects have vanished, Russia is pivoting toward domestic military payloads. Development continues on the Angara family of rockets, though the program faces significant spacecraft production delays. (15/16)Anatoly Zak reports that Russia has successfully tested the Sarmat, a heavy liquid-propellant ICBM designed to target the United States. Capable of carrying up to 20 maneuverable warheads, it replaces the Ukrainian-built "Satan" missile. While technologically complex and using toxic propellants, it represents Russia's commitment to maintaining a formidable strategic nuclear deterrent. (16/16)Notes: corrected "Akmed Sharawari" → Ahmad Sharawi; "Alshara" → al-Sharaa (Syrian president). Flag if you prefer alternate transliterations.

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S8 Ep913: TREAMING THE MAKING OF THE JBS, FEATURING JEFF BLISS, 5-22-26. 1942-43. TOJO MOCKED.

Play Episode Listen Later May 22, 2026 58:48

STREAMING THE MAKING OF THE JBS, FEATURING JEFF BLISS, 5-22-26.1942-43. TOJO MOCKED.The "Pacific Watch" transcript highlights a pivotal moment for California, characterized by early-season environmental disasters, contentious political shifts, and massive infrastructure challenges.The California wildfire season has arrived with alarming speed. A significant blaze in Hemet (Riverside County) recently threatened retirement communities, with flames cresting hills directly behind residential properties. Firefighters utilized orange fire retardant to coat vegetation and slow the fire's progress, a tactic that creates a stark visual contrast against the green hillsides. Additionally, a fire on Santa Rosa Island, reportedly ignited by a stranded boater's flare gun, has consumed nearly 20,000 acres. These events occur amidst discussions of a "Super El Niño," which experts warn could create a "one-two punch": drying out the state to fuel fires and then bringing massive storms that cause mudslides and coastal erosion.The June 2nd jungle primary is the central focus of California politics. In the Los Angeles mayoral race, incumbent Karen Bass faces a surprisingly strong challenge from actor Spencer Pratt. Pratt, who entered politics after his home burned down in the Pacific Palisades fire, has become a vessel for a "protest vote" against the city's perceived disorder. While Bass maintains institutional support from unions and identity politics, Pratt has gained traction through viral, high-quality campaign ads focusing on safety, affordability, and the failure of city hall to rebuild after disasters. A controversial endorsement from Donald Trump has complicated the race, as Bass's camp uses it to label Pratt a "MAGA" candidate, a move designed to alienate West LA voters.In the race for governor, the field is dominated by Steve Hilton, a former Fox News commentator, and Xavier Becerra, the current HHS Secretary. Hilton is currently leading, but Becerra—a late entry backed by the Democratic "machine"—is gaining momentum due to his name recognition and appeal to Latino and union voters. Despite his national profile and potential presidential ambitions, Gavin Newsom faces criticism regarding the state's homeless crisis and the ballooning costs of the high-speed rail project, which has seen estimates jump from $30 billion to potentially over $400 billion.The "homeless industrial complex" is a major theme, with billions of dollars allegedly missing or misspent by non-governmental organizations. In Los Angeles, over half of the homeless population is reportedly from outside the city, drawn by mild weather and available services. The transcript also describes a darker side to the crisis, where criminal cartels allegedly charge homeless individuals rent to live in tents or RVs on the streets.Despite these troubles, there is economic expansion in Orange County with the "Disney Forward" project. This initiative likely involves a significant expansion of the Anaheim park system, potentially adding a "third park" or new themed lands like Toy Story Land to drive attendance and merchandise sales. These developments stand in sharp contrast to the era of 1955, when gas cost 29 cents and traffic on the I-5 freeway was virtually non-existent.

S8 Ep910: Peter Mauch explains that during the 1930s, the Japanese army split into the "Imperial Way" and "Control" factions. The Imperial Way prioritized morale and the Emperor, while Tojo's Control faction advocated for "total

Play Episode Listen Later May 22, 2026 7:28

Peter Mauch explains that during the 1930s, the Japanese army split into the "Imperial Way" and "Control" factions. The Imperial Way prioritized morale and the Emperor, while Tojo's Control faction advocated for "total war" preparation involving all state resources. This rivalry turned murderous, culminating in assassinations and coup attempts against the civilian government. (10/16)1942

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S8 Ep910: Peter Mauch explains that as War Minister, Tojo—nicknamed "The Razor"—instilled iron discipline within the fractious Japanese army to earn the Emperor's favor. He consolidated political power by centralizing military communication

Play Episode Listen Later May 22, 2026 7:43

Peter Mauch explains that as War Minister, Tojo—nicknamed "The Razor"—instilled iron discipline within the fractious Japanese army to earn the Emperor's favor. He consolidated political power by centralizing military communication and cashiering insubordinate officers. Meanwhile, Japan eyed the defenseless Southeast Asian colonies of European powers, determined not to "miss the bus." (12/16)1943

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S8 Ep910: Peter Mauch explains that in 1937, the Marco Polo Bridge incident sparked conflict between Japan and China. While Tokyo sought de-escalation, the Kwantung Army, including Tojo, pushed for escalation and conquest. Chiang Kai-shek's refusal to su

Play Episode Listen Later May 22, 2026 11:57

Peter Mauch explains that in 1937, the Marco Polo Bridge incident sparked conflict between Japan and China. While Tokyo sought de-escalation, the Kwantung Army, including Tojo, pushed for escalation and conquest. Chiang Kai-shek's refusal to surrender drew the Japanese military into a "quicksand" interior, creating an inescapable and draining quagmire for the army. (11/16)2943

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S8 Ep910: Peter Mauch explores the early life of Hideki Tojo, focusing on his failed 1945 suicide attempt and the military code prohibiting the disgrace of surrender. Born into a samurai-descended family, Tojo's ambitions were fueled by the perceived mis

Play Episode Listen Later May 22, 2026 10:22

Peter Mauch explores the early life of Hideki Tojo, focusing on his failed 1945 suicide attempt and the military code prohibiting the disgrace of surrender. Born into a samurai-descended family, Tojo's ambitions were fueled by the perceived mistreatment of his father by a cronyist military system, leading him to excel academically. (9/16)1943

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S8 Ep909: STREAMING THE MAKING OF THE JOHN BATCHELOR SHOW, FEATURING JIM MCTAGUE, 5-21-2026. 1943 TOJO TOURS THE PHILIPPINE OCCUPYING FORCE.

Play Episode Listen Later May 21, 2026 59:52

STREAMING THE MAKING OF THE JOHN BATCHELOR SHOW, FEATURING JIM MCTAGUE, 5-21-2026.1943 TOJO TOURS THE PHILIPPINE OCCUPYING FORCE.In the source transcript, Jim McTague discusses a "wonderful book about Ford in his early days" that was published in 1954. While the transcript identifies the author as "Alan Nevins," this is a phonetic error or misstatement; the actual author of the definitive biography of Henry Ford published in 1954 is the historian Allan Nevins.The following details regarding this reference are found in the sources: Availability: McTague notes that the book has been long out of print and that he was only able to find a copy through a used book website called Alibris. Content: The book covers the early period of the automobile industry, describing how the technology was initially embraced by the wealthy (such as those in Newport, Rhode Island) before Ford's innovations brought it to the masses. Historical Context: McTague uses the insights from this biography to draw parallels between the "creative explosion" of the horseless carriage era and the current cycle of AI development. He characterizes Ford during the period described in the book as an "internal combustion engine nerd" who was focused on scientific competition rather than just the accumulation of wealth.

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S8 Ep908: PREVIEW for Later Today: Peter Mauch provides a biographical look at Hideki Tojo, detailing how cronyism in the Imperial Japanese Army fueled his ambitions. Tojo's direct style earned him the nickname "the razor" as he rose to power.

Play Episode Listen Later May 21, 2026 3:40

PREVIEW for Later Today: Peter Mauch provides a biographical look at Hideki Tojo, detailing how cronyism in the Imperial Japanese Army fueled his ambitions. Tojo's direct style earned him the nickname "the razor" as he rose to power.1940 OKINAWA

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S8 Ep863: Malcolm Hoenlein reveals that Israel operated a secret logistical base in Iraq to support its air campaign against Iran. He notes that Iran evades blockades by exporting 80% of its oil to China via Iraq and overland routes. The Iranian economy r

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Play Episode Listen Later May 12, 2026 7:14

Malcolm Hoenlein reveals that Israel operated a secret logistical base in Iraq to support its air campaign against Iran. He notes that Iran evades blockades by exporting 80% of its oil to China via Iraq and overland routes. The Iranian economy remains vulnerable due to aging infrastructure. (6/16)1941 Tojo and family

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GREATEST FREEDOM FIGHTER - Untold Story Of Subhas Chandra Bose I Chandrachur G On TRS

The Ranveer Show हिंदी

Play Episode Listen Later May 8, 2026 131:18

Check out BeerBiceps SkillHouse Courses Here - https://www.bbskillhouse.comFor all BeerBiceps vlog content Watch Life Of BeerBiceps - https://www.youtube.com/@LifeOfBeerBicepsCheck out my Mind Performance app: Level SuperMindLink:- https://level4665.u9ilnk.me/d/F1ZOZV4OnTShare your guest suggestions hereMail - connect@beerbiceps.comLink - https://forms.gle/aoMHY9EE3Cg3Tqdx9Join the Level Community Here:https://linktr.ee/levelsupermindcommunityFollow BeerBiceps SkillHouse's Social Media Handles:YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@BeerBicepsSkillHouseInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/beerbiceps_skillhouseWebsite : https://beerbicepsskillhouse.inFor any other queries EMAIL: support@beerbicepsskillhouse.comIn case of any payment-related issues, kindly write to support@tagmango.comFollow Chandrachur Ghose's Social Media Handles:-Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/chandrachur_ghose/YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@chandrachurg/videosLinkedIn: https://in.linkedin.com/in/chandrachurgIn this special episode 500th of The Ranveer Show, we are joined by Chandrachur Ghose, a renowned researcher and author who shares deep insights on Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose, the Indian National Army (INA), Geopolitics, and the Mystery of Gumnami Baba.In this conversation with Chandrachur Ghose, we talk about the Great Escape of 1941, Netaji's relationship with Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Sardar Patel, and the reality of the 1945 plane crash. We also understand how Netaji's military strategy and the subsequent INA trials were the actual catalysts that forced the British to leave India in 1947.This episode also covers the Mystery of Gumnami Baba, Netaji's secret life in Russia and China post-1945, his deep involvement in Tantra Sadhana, and his encounters with world leaders like Adolf Hitler and Tojo. We explore the "India First" ideology and how Netaji's legacy continues to shape modern Indian national security and foreign policy.(00:00) – Start of the episode(01:33) – Did Jinnah want Netaji as India's Leader?(03:21) – How Netaji United Hindus & Muslims(06:49) – The Truth about Gumnami Baba(09:36) – Why Netaji chose a Life of Sanyas(12:58) – Secret Geopolitics: Netaji's hidden impact(16:24) – Predicting the Fall of Communism(18:26) – Meeting Sam Manekshaw in Secret?(23:21) – Conflict with Mahatma Gandhi Explained(32:04) – Why Britain was Terrified of Bose(37:15) – Brutal Torture in Burma Prisons(41:49) – Relationship with Jawaharlal Nehru(45:23) – Respect for Bhagat Singh's Sacrifice(48:31) – The Legal Battle with Sardar Patel(53:15) – Netaji & PM Modi: The “India First” Vision(58:38) – How the INA was actually formed(1:11:38) – Why Bengal led the Freedom Struggle(1:17:27) – The Great Escape & The Quadruple Spy(1:24:30) – Meeting Hitler: What really happened?(1:32:20) – 90 Days inside a Submarine(1:40:12) – Deal with Japan: Getting Andaman & Nicobar(1:50:47) – Betrayal at the Battle of Imphal(1:57:55) – The 1946 Mutiny: Why the British Left(2:01:42) – The Fake Plane Crash Strategy(2:04:48) – Life in Russia & China after 1945(2:10:06) – End of the episode

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Peter Mauch – Tojo: the rise and fall of Japan´s most controversial World War II General...with TRE's Giles Brown

Talk Radio Europe

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 10, 2026 28:23

Catch Giles live - 'Let's Talk' - Monday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday - from 10.00 CET / 09.00 UK / 04.00 EST / 01.00 PST ...on tre.radio

Peter Mauch, "Tojo: The Rise and Fall of Japan's Most Controversial World War II General" (Harvard UP, 2026)

New Books Network

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 31, 2026 64:22

The military general who became Emperor Hirohito's prime minister, Tojo Hideki is most often remembered as an iron-fisted leader who dragged Japan into World War II and—after spectacular losses—was eventually executed as a war criminal. Yet Tojo was far more than his ignominious end. In fact, as Dr. Peter Mauch argues in Tojo: The Rise and Fall of Japan's Most Controversial World War II General (Harvard University Press, 2026), he was one of the twentieth century's most accomplished military statesmen. Over a career of some forty years, Tojo successfully launched himself into the highest echelons of political power. He was not only a tactical genius, Dr. Mauch shows, but also a savvy administrator, a fierce imperialist, and a deeply loyal advisor to the emperor. Tojo's career took off with the notorious Kwantung Army in Manchuria, where he played a key role in escalating the Sino-Japanese War during the 1930s. As he rose through the ranks, becoming minister of war and then army chief of staff, he honed the efficiency of the Imperial Army and enhanced its influence within the emperor's court. All the while, he deftly negotiated the fractious military rivalries that arose wherever he went. Brilliant, ambitious, and often ruthless, Tojo reached political heights that were perhaps matched only by his precipitous fall in the final months of World War II. Layered and evocative, Tojo is at once a riveting military history of Showa-era Japan and a nuanced portrait of the relentless personality at its center. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose book focuses on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. You can find Miranda's interviews on New Books with Miranda Melcher, wherever you get your podcasts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

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Peter Mauch, "Tojo: The Rise and Fall of Japan's Most Controversial World War II General" (Harvard UP, 2026)

New Books in East Asian Studies

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 31, 2026 64:22

Peter Mauch, "Tojo: The Rise and Fall of Japan's Most Controversial World War II General" (Harvard UP, 2026)

New Books in Military History

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 31, 2026 64:22

Peter Mauch, "Tojo: The Rise and Fall of Japan's Most Controversial World War II General" (Harvard UP, 2026)

New Books in Biography

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 31, 2026 64:22

Peter Mauch, "Tojo: The Rise and Fall of Japan's Most Controversial World War II General" (Harvard UP, 2026)

New Books in Japanese Studies

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 31, 2026 64:22

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Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast #252

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Play Episode Listen Later Mar 21, 2026 65:29

Welcome back to another edition of the UK's number one and only Memphis wrestling related podcast, Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast. On this week's show we cover March 21st 1987 Memphis Wrestling where we will see:- Southern Tag Champs Big Bubba/Goliath (with Bruno) vs. Soul Train Jones/Brickhouse Brown The Rising Suns (Shima/Mr. Helo with Tojo) vs. Ed Mattox/Randy Bryant. Alan West/Paul Diamond vs. Rough and Ready (with Boss Winters) Lord Humongous (with Paul E.) vs. David Johnson Boy Tony/Pat Tanaka (with Bruno) vs. Jerry Garmen/Benny Trailer Jeff Jarrett/BT Express vs. Thunderbird/The Hunter (with Bambi) Follow the show on facebook Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast (facebook.com/memphiscast) Visit our brand new tshirt store at https://www.unforgettablevision.com/roster/old-bakery-productions Check out Youtube.com/@memphiscast & patreon.com/memphiscast for videos You can watch the show https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FleiV8KmP0o&list=PLgi8coP8E7nrdCH_13yt9qXVpmAXBgR9-&index=15&t=24s

Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast #251

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Play Episode Listen Later Mar 14, 2026 59:42

Welcome back to another edition of the UK's number one and only Memphis wrestling related podcast, Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast. On this week's show we cover March 14th 1987 Memphis Wrestling where we will see:- Pat Tanaka/Boy Tony (with Bruno) vs. Robert Bryant/Freezer Thompson Jeff Jarrett/B.T. Express vs. Rough and Ready (with Boss Winters) Jerry Lawler/Bam Bam Bigelow vs. The Medics (with Dr. Eddie Kovac) Lord Humongous vs. Ed Mattox Shima/Mr. Helo (with Tojo) vs. Jerry Garmen/Benny Trailer Brickhouse Brown/Alan West/JT Southern/Soul Train Jones vs. Goliath/Big Bubba/Jonathan Boyd/The Hunter (with Bambi) Follow the show on facebook Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast (facebook.com/memphiscast) Visit our brand new tshirt store at https://www.unforgettablevision.com/roster/old-bakery-productions Check out Youtube.com/@memphiscast & patreon.com/memphiscast for videos You can watch the show https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vrb-jYodTfA&list=PLgi8coP8E7nrdCH_13yt9qXVpmAXBgR9-&index=12&t=6s

Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast #248

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Play Episode Listen Later Feb 21, 2026 59:07

Welcome back to another edition of the UK's number one and only Memphis wrestling related podcast, Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast. On this week's show we cover February 21st 1987 Memphis Wrestling where we will see:- Jerry Lawler vs. Boy Tony Don Bass/The Hunter (with Bambi) vs. Jerry Garmen/Alan West Lou Winston/Soul Train Jones vs. The Medics Big Bubba/Goliath (with Bruno) vs. Robert Bryant/Randy Bryant Tarzan Goto/Shima (with Tojo) vs. Soul Train Jones/Ed Mattox Follow the show on facebook Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast (facebook.com/memphiscast) Visit our brand new tshirt store at https://www.unforgettablevision.com/roster/old-bakery-productions Check out Youtube.com/@memphiscast & patreon.com/memphiscast for videos You can watch the show https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VtwrM48thsk&list=PLgi8coP8E7nrdCH_13yt9qXVpmAXBgR9-&index=9

Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast #247

uk wrestling continental tojo

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 14, 2026 68:13

Welcome back to another edition of the UK's number one and only Memphis wrestling related podcast, Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast. On this week's show we cover February 14th 1987 Continental Wrestling where we will see:- Big Bubba/Goliath (with Bruno) vs. Freezer Thompson/Ron Nations Soul Train Jones/Alan West vs. The Headhunters (Keith Roberson/Mike James) Tarzan Goto/"Mr. Rising Sun" Shima (Akio Sato) (with Tojo) vs. Jerry Garmen/Bennie Trailer Jeff Jarrett/Billy Travis vs. The Grapplers Follow the show on facebook Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast (facebook.com/memphiscast) Visit our brand new tshirt store at https://www.unforgettablevision.com/roster/old-bakery-productions Check out Youtube.com/@memphiscast & patreon.com/memphiscast for videos You can watch the show https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J7SLjjaVyvE&list=PLgi8coP8E7nrdCH_13yt9qXVpmAXBgR9-&index=8

The Secret In Tojo's Dentures

KMJ's Afternoon Drive

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 14, 2026 7:06

E.J. “Jack” Mallory, a local doctor of dentistry who practiced in Paradise and Chico from 1948 until the mid-1980s, was just a squared-away, 22-year-old Navy dentist in 1946 when he received the assignment of a lifetime: make a set of dentures for General Hideki Tojo. Please Like, Comment and Follow 'Philip Teresi on KMJ' on all platforms: --- Philip Teresi on KMJ is available on the KMJNOW app, Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube or wherever else you listen to podcasts. -- Philip Teresi on KMJ Weekdays 2-6 PM Pacific on News/Talk 580 AM & 105.9 FM KMJ | Website | Facebook | Instagram | X | Podcast | Amazon | - Everything KMJ KMJNOW App | Podcasts | Facebook | X | Instagram See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

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The Secret In Tojo's Dentures

Philip Teresi Podcasts

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 14, 2026 7:06

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Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast #246

uk wrestling continental tojo

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 7, 2026 61:05

Welcome back to another edition of the UK's number one and only Memphis wrestling related podcast, Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast. On this week's show we cover February 7th 1987 Continental Wrestling where we will see:- Jeff Jarrett/Billy Travis vs. Keith Roberson/Mike James Big Bubba/Goliath vs. John Paul/Jim Jameson The Hunter (with Bambi) vs. David Johnson Boy Tony/Tarzan Goto (with Tojo and Bruno) vs. Pat Tanaka/Alan West Follow the show on facebook Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast (facebook.com/memphiscast) Visit our brand new tshirt store at https://www.unforgettablevision.com/roster/old-bakery-productions Check out Youtube.com/@memphiscast & patreon.com/memphiscast for videos You can watch the show https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XPDefAIUIxw&list=PLgi8coP8E7nrdCH_13yt9qXVpmAXBgR9-&index=7

S8 Ep293: DISSENT, EXECUTION, AND THE SHADOW OF IMPERIALISM Colleague Professor Gary J. Bass. Judge Radhabinod Pal of India issued a massive 1,200-page dissent, arguing the tribunal was illegitimate and driven by the racism of colonial powers. Pal viewed

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 10, 2026 12:57

DISSENT, EXECUTION, AND THE SHADOW OF IMPERIALISM Colleague Professor Gary J. Bass. Judge Radhabinod Pal of India issued a massive 1,200-page dissent, arguing the tribunal was illegitimate and driven by the racism of colonial powers. Pal viewed Japanese actions as defense against Western encroachment and, controversially, questioned evidence of the Nanjing atrocities. Despite dissents from French, Dutch, and Indian judges, the executions proceeded in December 1948, with Tojo chanting "Banzai" (Long live the Emperor) on the gallows. The US Supreme Court refused to intervene, issuing a narrow ruling that it lacked jurisdiction over an international tribunal, allowing the executions to occur despite the judicial discord. NUMBER 71931 TOKYO

S8 Ep293: ARRESTING THE CABINET AND DEFINING CLASS A CRIMES Colleague Professor Gary J. Bass. As MacArthur's occupation forces arrived in a ruined Tokyo, they began arresting suspects, including former Prime Minister Tojo Hideki, who botched a suicide at

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 10, 2026 13:13

ARRESTING THE CABINET AND DEFINING CLASS A CRIMES Colleague Professor Gary J. Bass. As MacArthur's occupation forces arrived in a ruined Tokyo, they began arresting suspects, including former Prime Minister Tojo Hideki, who botched a suicide attempt. The upcoming International Military Tribunal for the Far Eastcategorized offenses into Class A (aggressive war), Class B (conventional war crimes), and Class C (crimes against humanity). Prosecutors utilized the discovered diary of Kido Koichi, the Emperor's advisor, to map decision-making, though the Emperor himself remained untouched. Notably, while General Matsui was charged for the Nanjing Massacre, the Emperor's uncle, Prince Asaka, who was also commanding troops there, escaped prosecution entirely. NUMBER 31930 TOKYO

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Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast #239

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 20, 2025 60:03

Welcome back to another edition of the UK's number one and only Memphis wrestling related podcast, Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast. On this week's show we cover December 20th 1986 Continental Wrestling where we will see:- Jerry Lawler vs. The Golden Terror Big Bubba/Goliath (with Downtown Bruno) vs. Ed Mattox/Dennis Upton Jeff Jarrett/Billy Travis vs. Rough and Ready (with Boss Winters) The Rock 'n' Roll RPM's (Mike David/Tommy Lane) vs. Tracy Smothers/John Paul Don Bass, Buddy Wayne, Boy Tony, and Tarzan Goto (with Tojo) vs. Paul Diamond, Pat Tanaka, and The Memphis Vice (Jerry Bryant/Lou Winston) Follow the show on facebook Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast (facebook.com/memphiscast) Check out Heat Stroke ( our look at Sunday Night Heat from back in the day, now available on all good podcast suppliers, just search Heat Stroke Visit our brand new tshirt store at https://www.unforgettablevision.com/roster/old-bakery-productions Check out Youtube.com/@memphiscast & patreon.com/memphiscast for videos You can watch the show https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dqa8_HblnGI&list=PLgi8coP8E7nr0n_MOjhFl271oFpn_2reL&index=49

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- 211 - Special How Tomoyuki Yamashita became the Tiger of Malaya

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 16, 2025 61:24

Hey before I begin I just want to thank all of you who have joined the patreon, you guys are awesome. Please let me know what other figures, events or other things you want to hear about in the future and I will try to make it happen. If you are a long time listener to the Pacific War week by week podcast over at KNG or viewer of my youtube channel you have probably heard me talk about Tomoyuki Yamashita, the Tiger of Malaya quite often. It goes without saying when it comes to Japanese generals of WW2 he stands out. Not just to me, from the offset of the war he made a large impression on westerners, he achieved incredible feats early on in the war. Now if you look up books about him, you will pretty much only find information in regards to his infamous war crimes trial. Hell it was so infamous the legal doctrine of hierarchical accountability for war crimes, whereby a commanding officer is legally responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by his subordinates, was created. This is known as the command responsibility or “the Yamashita standard”. His court case was very controversial, he remains a controversial figure, certainly to the people of territories he campaigned in, but I think what can be said of him the most is he was special amongst the Japanese generals. Anyways lets get the show on the road as they say. So who was Yamashita? When he was 59 years old commanding forces in the Philippines against General Douglas MacArthur, he weighed 220 ls and stood 5 feet 9 inches. His girth pressed out against his green army uniform. He had an egg shaped head, balding, wide spaced eyes and a flat nose. He wore a short mustache, sort of like Hitlers, until it grayed then he shaved it off. He was not a very attractive man, Filipinos referred to him as “old potato face” while Americans called him “a florid, pig faced man”. Tomobumi Yamashita was born in 1885, he was the second son of Dr. Sakichi Yamashita and Yuu Yamashita in Osugi village, on Shikoku island. Like most males of his day he was indoctrinated into military preparatory school from a young age. Yamashita had no chosen the army as a career, in his words ‘my father suggested the idea, because I was big and healthy, and my mother did not seriously object because she believed, bless her soul, that I would never pass the highly competitive entrance examination. If I had only been cleverer or had worked harder, I would have been a doctor like my brother”Yamashita would graduate from the 18th class of the IJA academy in november of 1905, ranked 16th out of 920 cadets. In 1908 he was promoted to the rank of Lt and during WW1 he fought against Imperial German and Austro-Hungarian forces in the famous siege of Qingdao, which if you are interested I did an episode over on my Youtube channel about this battle. Its a very overlooked battle, but many histories firsts occurred at it like the first carrier attack. In 1916 he was promoted to captain and attended the 28th class of the Army War college to graduate sixth in his class that year. He also married Hisako Nagayama in 1916, she was the daughter of the retired General Nagayama. It seems Yamashita's brush against the Germans in 1914 had a huge influence on him, because he became fascinated with Germany and would serve as assistant military attache at Bern and Berlin from 1919-1922. He spent his time in Germany alongside Captain Hideki Tojo, both men would run into each other countless times and become bitter rivals. Both men toured the western front, visiting Hamburg and witnessed first hand the crippling inflation and food prices that came from Germany's defeat. Yamashita said to Tojo then “If Japan ever has to fight any nation, she must never surrender and get herself in a state like this.” He returned to Japan in 1922, was promoted to major and served a few different posts in the Imperial Headquarters and Staff College. Yamashita became a leading member of the Kodoha faction, while Tojo became a leading member of the rival Toseiha faction. In 1927 Yamashita was sent again to Europe, this time to Vienna as a military attache. Just prior to departing he had invested in a business selling thermometers starting by one of his wife's relatives, the business failed horribly and Yamashita was tossed into debt, bailiffs literally came to seize his house. As told to us by his biographer “For a regular officer to have contracted such a debt, however innocently, was a disgrace. He felt he should resign his commission.” Yamashita's brother refused to allow him to quit, instructing him to leave for Vienna, while he resolved his debts. His days in Vienna were the best of his life, professed Yamashita. He studied economics at Vienna university and made friends with a Japanese widow, who introduced him to a German woman named Kitty and they had an affair. This would spring forward his reputation as an eccentric officer. Yamashita was obsessed over hygiene,and refused to eat fruit unless it was thoroughly washed. He avoided ice water, hated dancing and never learnt how to drive a car. One of his most notable quirks was his habit of falling asleep often during meetings where he legendarily would snore. Like I may have said in previous podcast and youtube episodes, this guy was quite a character, often described as a big bear. Now this is not a full biography on Yamashita so I cant devolve to far into things, such as his first fall from grace. During the February 26th coup incident of 1936, Yamashita was a leading member of the Kodoha faction and helped mediate a peaceful end to the standoff, however in truth he was backing the coup. He simply managed to not get caught red handed at the time doing too much for the mutineers, regardless he lost favor with the outraged Emperor and many young captains whom he loved like sons killed themselves in disgrace. If you want to know more about the February coup of 1936, check out my series on Emperor Hirohito or General Ishawara, they both talk about it in depth and touch upon Yamashita's role a bit. The coup led to the dissolvement of the Kodoha faction and the dominance of the Toseiha, led by Tojo. Yamashita tried to resign from the IJA, but his superiors dissuade him. He was relegated to a post in Korea, which honestly was a punishment. Yamashita would say “When I was posted to Korea, I felt I had been given a tactful promotion but that in fact my career was over. Even when I was given my first fighting company in North China, I still felt I had no future in the Army, so I was always on the front line, where the bullets flew the thickest. I sought only a place to die.” He had some time to reflect upon his conduct while in Korea, he began to study Zen Buddhism. He was promoted to Lt General in November of 1937 and when the China war broke out he was one of those speaking out that the incident needed to end swiftly and that peaceful relations must be made with the UK and US. He received a unimportant post in the Kwantung army and in 1938 was assigned command of the IJA 4th division. He led the forces during in northern china against insurgents until he returned to Tokyo in July of 1940. His fellow officers lauded him as Japan's finest general. Meanwhile Tojo had ascended to war minister and one of his first moves was to send a delegation to Germany. Tojo considered Yamashita a ruthless and forceful commander and feared he would become a powerful rival against him one day. Yamashita would go on the record to say then “I have nothing against Tojo, but he apparently has something against me.” You see, Yamashita had no political ambitions, unlike Tojo who was by nature a political monster. “My life, is that of a soldier; I do not seek any other life unless our Emperor calls me.” In late 1940, Tojo asked Yamashita to lead a team of 40 experts on a 6 month train tour of Germany and Italy, a move that kept him out of Tokyo, because Tojo was trying to solidify his political ambitions. This is going to become a looming theme between the two men. He was presented to Adolf Hitler in January of 1941, passing along messages from Tojo and publicly praising the Fuhrer, though privately he was very unimpressed by the man “He may be a great orator on a platform, with his gestures and flamboyant way of speaking. But standing behind his desk listening he seems much more like a clerk.” Hitler pressed upon him to push Japan to declare war on Britain and the US. At the time of course Japan was facing China and had two major conflicts with the USSR, thus this was absolutely not in her interest. “My country is still fighting in China, and we must finish that war as soon as possible. We are also afraid that Russia may attack us in Manchuria. This is no time for us to declare war on other countries.” Yamashita hoped to inspect Germany's military techniques and technology to help Japan. Hitler promised open exchanges of information stating “All our secrets are open to you,”, but this would prove to be a lie. “There were several pieces of equipment the Germans did not want us to see. Whenever I tried to persuade the German General Staff to show us things like radar—about which we had a rudimentary knowledge—the conversation always turned to something else.” Yamashita met with field Marshal Hermann Goring who gave him an overview of the war in europe. Goring would complain about Yamashita falling asleep during lectures and meetings and he believed the man was drunk often. Yamashita met Benito Mussolini in June of 1941 receiving a similar rundown to what he got in Germany. Yamashita visited Kitty in Vienna for a quick fling, but overall the trip deeply impacted Yamashita's resolve that Japan should stay out of the Europeans war and that Germany made a grievous error invading the USSR in June of 1941. This is what he said the members of the commission “You know the results of our inspection as well as I do. I must ask you not to express opinion in favor of expanding the alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy. Never suggest in your report that Japan should declare war on Great Britain and the United States. We must not and cannot rely upon the power of other nations. Japan needs more time, particularly as there may be aggression against us from Russia. We must have time to rebuild our defense system and adjust the whole Japanese war machine. I cannot repeat this to you often enough.” His report was similar, and it really pissed off Tojo who was trying to develop plans for a war against America. Yamashita would then get exiled to Manchuria in July of 1941, but Tojo's resentment towards him could only go so far, because Yamashita was one of their best generals and in his planned war against Britain and America, he would need such a man. Yamashita's time in Europe reshaped his views on how to conduct war. He saw first hand blitzkrieg warfare, it seems it fascinated him. He consistently urged the implementation of new proposals calling for the streamlining of air arms; to mechanize the Army; to integrate control of the armed forces in a defense ministry coordinated by a chairman of Joint Chiefs of staff; to create a paratroop corps and to employ effective propaganda. Basically he saw what was working for the Germans against the allies and wanted Japan to replicate it. Tojo did not like many of the proposal, hated the fact they were coming from Yamashita, so he obviously was not keen on making them happen. Luckily for Yamashita he would be given a chance to implement some of his ideas in a big way. On November 6th of 1941, Lt General Yamashita was appointed commander of the 25th Japanese army. His orders were to seize the Malay Peninsula and then the British naval base at Singapore. The Malaya Peninsula snakes 700 miles south of Thailand, a rugged sliver of land that constricts at its narrowest point to about 60 miles wide. It hold mountains that split the peninsula in half, some going as high as 7000 feet. During this time Malaya produced around 40% of the worlds rubber, 60% of its tin, two resources vital for war. At its very southern tip lies Singapore, a diamond shaped island connected to the mainland by a 1115 stone causeway. Singapore's largest asset was its naval base guarding the passage from the Pacific and Indian oceans. Together Malay and Singapore represented the key to controlling what Japan called the Southern Resource Area. Singapore was known as the gibraltar of the east for good reason. It was a massively fortified naval base. The base had been developed between 1923-1938 and cost 60 million pounds, around 2 billion pounds today. It was 21 square miles, had the largest dry dock in the world, the 3rd largest floating dock and enough fuel tanks to support the entire royal navy for 6 months. She was defended by 15 inch naval guns stationed at the Johre battery, Changi and Buona vista battery. And despite the infamous myth some of you may have heard, these guns were fully capable of turning in all directions including the mainland. For those unaware a myth perpetuated after the fall of Singapore that her large 15 inch guns could not turn to the mainland and that this spelt her doom, no it was not that, it was the fact they mostly had armor piercing shells which are using to hit ships and not land targets. Basically if you fire an armor piercing shell at land it imbeds itself then explodes, while HE shells would have torn any Japanese army to pieces. Alongside the 15 inch monsters, there were countless other artillery pieces such as 9.2 inch guns. By December of 1941 Malaya and Singapore held 164 first line aircraft out of a total of 253 aircraft, but many of the fighters were the obsolete Brewster F2A Buffalo, a pretty slow, fat little beast that could take a licking as it was armored, but against the Zero fighter it was unbelievably outmatched in speed and maneuverability. The Japanese acquired a major gift prior to the outbreak of war. On november 11th, 1940, the SS Automedon, a German raider attacked the HMS Atlantis which was carrying documents intended for the British far east command. The documents indicated the British fleet was not going to help Singapore; that Britain would not declare war if Thailand was invaded and that Hong Kong was expendable. The Germans gave the documents to the Japanese who were very excited by the information. Starting in January of 1941, Colonel Masanobu Tsuji led the Taiwan Army Research section based on Formosa to investigate how a campaign could be waged in Malay and Singapore. His findings on the defenses of Malay and Singapore were summed up in these 3 points: 1. Singapore Fortress was solid and strong facing the sea, but vulnerable on the peninsular side facing the Johore Strait; Newspaper reports of a strong Royal Air Force (RAF) presence were propaganda; Although British forces in Malaya numbered from five to six divisions (well over 80,000 men), less than half were Europeans. Now just a little bit about Tsuji as he was to become the chief of staff operations and planning under Yamashita. Tsuji was extremely insubordinate and a political schemer. He was a Toseiha faction fanatic, loyal to Tojo and thus definitely an enemy to Yamashita. Yamashita wrote of Tsuji in his war diary “is egotistical and wily. He is a sly dog and unworthy to serve the country. He is a manipulator to be carefully watched.” Tsuji would go on to have a infamous reputation for ordering atrocities in the name of his superiors, often without them knowing and this would be very much the case under Yamashita. Now using Tsuji's intelligence Yamashita began plans at his HQ at Samah, a port on Hainan island, starting in November of 1941 on how to launch the campaign. He was initially offered 5 divisions for the invasion, but he felt he could accomplish the objective with only three. There are a few reasons why he believed this; first, Tsuji's research suggested the peninsula roads would be the center of the battlefront and that the flanks would extend no more than a km or so to the left or right due to the dense jungle terrain (in fact Yamashita was planning to assault from the jungle specifically); 2nd intelligence indicated the defending troops were not of the highest caliber (the British were busy in Europe thus many of the troops in southeast asia were poorly trained, half were british regulars the rest were Australian, Indian and Malayan); 3rd Yamashita was aware “the Japanese army were in the habit of flinging more troops into the battle than could possibly be maintained” boy oh boy tell that one to the future boys on Guadalcanal. Thus he calculated 3 divisions was the maximum to be fed, equipped and supplied. Based on his recommendations the 25th army was created with 3 divisions; the 5th under Lt General Takuma Matsui; 18th under Lt General Renya Mutaguchi and the Imperial guards division of Lt General Takuma Nishimura. Supporting these would be two regiment of heavy field artillery and the 3rd tank brigade. Something that made Yamashita's campaign quite interesting was the usage and amount of tanks. He was invading with around 200 or so tanks consisting of the Type 95 Ha-Go light tank, type 97 Chi-Ha and Type 89 I-Go medium tanks and Type 97 Te-Ke tankettes. For aircraft he had the 3rd Air division, 459 aircraft strong with an additional 159 aircraft from the IJN to support them. The 3rd air division had a variety of aircraft such as Nakajima Ki-27 Nate's, Nakajima ki-43 Oscars, Kitsubishi ki-51 Sonia's, Kawasaki ki-48 Lily's, Mitsubishi ki-21 sally's, Mitsubishi ki-30 Ann's, Mitsubishi ki-15 babs and Mitsubishi ki-46 dinahs. For the IJN it was the 22nd air flotilla using Mitsubishi G3M1 Nell's, Mitsubishi A5M4 Claudes and some A6M Zeros. To say it was a lot of firepower at his disposal is an understatement, Yamashita was packing heat, heat he could use in a blitzkrieg fashion. His staff at Samah identified 5 operational objectives: 1 Simultaneous capture of Singora and Patani, Thailand and Kota Bharu, Malaya. 2 Capture of all enemy airfields in southern Thailand and Malaya. 3 Occupation of Kuala Lumpur, Malaya. 4 Occupation of Johore Bahru, and control of Johore Strait. 5 Conquest of Singapore. Colonel Tsuji, appointed Chief of Operations and Planning for the 25th Army, proposed the following plan which was readily approved: Land the main strength of the 5th Division simultaneously and without warning at Singora and Patani, and at the same time land a powerful section of the 18th Division to attack Kota Bharu. The troops disembarked at Singora and Patani to press forward immediately to attack the line of the Perak River Hand capture its bridge and the Alor Star aerodrome. The troops landed at Kota Bharu to press forward along the eastern coast as far as Kuantan. The landing at Kota Bharu, the only one in Malaya was expected to be opposed and quite risky. But if it was successful, it would create a useful diversion away from the main force landings in Thailand. The landings took place around 2:15am local time on December 8th, about an hour and 20 minutes before the attack on Pearl Harbor. The landings went largely unopposed, except at Kota Bahru where the Japanese saw heavy resistance. The British had anticipated this landing point and created operation Matador, a plan to pre-emptively invade southern thailand to secure defensive lines against the Japanese, however this plan was never accepted by British high command for obvious political reasons. But on December 5th, with a Japanese invasion looking certain, suddenly London gave permission to the Far east commanders to decide if Operation matador should be activated or not. The commander in Malaya, General Arthur Percival recommended forestalling it, fearing to violate Thai sovereignty, which ultimately would be the doom of a defense for Malaya. At the battle of Kota Bharu, the 9th infantry division of Major General Barstow attempted holding off the Japanese from taking the important Kota Bharu airfield. The 8th brigade of Billy Key had fortified the beaches with pillboxes, barbed wire and land mines. The Japanese took heavy losses, but they were able to find gaps and fill them up until Brigadier Key had to ask permission to pull out. The royal air force at Kota Bharu tossed Hudson bombers to hit the troop transports, but it was a suicide mission to do so. Meanwhile the IJA 5th division landed at Pattani and Songkhla in Thailand while the Imperial guards division marched over the border from French Indochina. The Japanese encountered very little resistance, the leader of Thailand Plaek Pibulsonggram had been trying to get assurances from the allies and Japanese all the way up until the invasion, once the Japanese landed he knew his best option was to play nice and sign an armistice. This basically spelt doom for malaya as the Japanese were given access to Thailand's airfields which they used to smash the forward airfields in Malaya. The first day of aerial encounters were a catastrophe for the British. General Percival would comment “The rapidity with which the Japanese got their air attacks going against our aerodromes was quite remarkable. Practically all the aerodromes in Kelantan, Kedah, Province Wellesley, and Penang, were attacked, and in most cases fighters escorted the bombers. The performance of Japanese aircraft of all types, and the accuracy of their bombing, came as an unpleasant surprise. By the evening our own air force had already been seriously weakened.” Brigadier Key withdrew after causing an estimated 800 casualties upon the Japanese while taking roughly 465. While Kota Bharu was being fought over, Percival unleashed Operation Krohcol, a 2.0 of Matador seeing British forces cross into Thailand to intercept the incoming enemy. It was an absolute disaster, the British attackers were defeated not only by the Japanese 5th division, but some Royal Thai police also defended their territory. The operation had basically become a race to who could seize the important focal point first and the Japanese took it first thus winning decisively. To add to that misery, force Z, consisting of the battleship HMS Prince of Wales,, battlecruiser Repulse and 4 destroyers tried to intercept the Japanese invasion fleet only to be utterly destroyed by overwhelming Japanese airforces. Within 4 days of the landings, the 5th division advanced from Singora through the town of Jitra to capture the RAF airfield at Alor star, around 100 miles away. Yamashita managed this using flanking techniques that saw his army take town after town and airfield after airfield. There were numerous natural obstacles to the advance such as dense jungles, very long supply lines, torrential rain and heat, but he had a secret weapon, bicycles. At Jitra Percival made his first major stand. Holding Jitra would safeguard the northern airfields of Malaya, but it was a folly to do so as the airfields in question were not provided adequate aircraft and the British lacked something extremely important to be able to defend themselves, tanks. Colonel Tsuji saw the fighting at Jitra first hand and reported “Our tanks were ready on the road, and the twenty or so enemy armored cars ahead were literally trampled underfoot … The enemy armored cars could not escape by running away, and were sandwiched between our medium tanks … It was speed and weight of armor that decided the issue.” The British had spread themselves far too thinly across a 14 mile front with jungle on their right flank and rubber plantations and mangrove swamps to their left. Yamashita used a innovative blitzkrieg like tactic, he combined his air, artillery, tanks and bicycle infantry to punch holes in concentrated attacks forcing allied defenders to withdraw. As Percival would write later in his memoirs “This withdrawal would have been difficult under the most favorable conditions. With the troops tired, units mixed as the result of the fighting, communications broken and the night dark, it was inevitable that orders should be delayed and that in some cases they should never reach the addressees. This is what in fact occurred … the withdrawal, necessary as it may have been, was too fast and too complicated for disorganized and exhausted troops, whose disorganization and exhaustion it only increased” Yamashita had ingeniously thought of employing large numbers of bicycles for his infantry so they could keep up momentum and speed with his mechanized forces. Oh and he didn't bring thousands of bicycles over to Malaya, the real genius was that they were there ready for him. His intelligence prior to the invasion indicated nearly all civilians in malaya had bicycles, so when the Japanese came over they simply stole them. Half of Yamashitas troops moved in motor vehicles while the rest road on 18,000 bicycles. As noted by Tsuji “With the infantry on bicycles, there was no traffic congestion or delay. Wherever bridges were destroyed the infantry continued their advance, wading across the rivers carrying their bicycles on their shoulders, or crossing on log bridges held up on the shoulders of engineers standing in the stream.” They Japanese overwhelmed the defenders who were forced to fight, flee into the jungles or flee along the roads where they were simply outsped by the faster Japanese. The defenders left numerous stores of food, abandoned vehicles, and supplies that Yamashita's men would dub “churchill's allowance”. British Lt Colonel Spencer Chapmanwas forced to hide on the sides of roads watching Japanese pedal past remarking “The majority were on bicycles in parties of forty or fifty, riding three or four abreast and talking and laughing just as if they were going to a football match.” The Japanese had the ability to carry their gear on the bicycles, giving them an enormous advantage over the allies fleeing on foot. The Japanese could travel faster, further and less fatigued. When the British destroyed 250 bridges during their flight, “the Japanese infantry (to continue) their advance, wading across the rivers carrying their bicycles on their shoulders, or crossing on log bridges held up on the shoulders of engineers standing in the stream”. The British could not escape the bicycle blitzkrieg as it became known, countless were forced to surrender under constant pressure and relentless pursuit. Alongside the bicycle warfare, whenever Yamashita faced terrain unsuitable for his tanks, he ordered amphibious landings further south to outflank the enemy's rear. Meanwhile the war in the air went equally terrible for the allies. The RAF had pulled back its best pilots and aircraft to deal with the war for Britain against the Luftwaffe. 21 airfields were in Malaya and Singapore, few of them had modern facilities, only 15 concrete runways. The heavy rain made the grass airstrips unusable. All the airfields were allocated around 8 heavy and 8 light anti aircraft guns. Quality radar units were completely inadequate. The Super Spitfires and Hyper Hurricanes were mostly in Britain fighting the Germans, while Buffaloes were allocated to Malaya. The Japanese airforces easily overcame the allied opposition and established air superiority quickly. Launching from airfields in Vietnam, they bombed all the airfields into submission and continuously applied pressure to Singapore. . The aerial dominance of the Zero and ‘Oscar' fighters served to undermine the morale of the British infantryman on the ground. As historian H. P. Wilmot has observed, “in the opening phase of the war the Zero-sen was just what the Japanese needed, and the Allies were devastated by the appearance of a ‘super fighter.' To add insult to injury, every airfield taken starting at the most northern going further and further south towards Singapore offered the Japanese new launching points to make for faster attack. Yamashita's forces reached the southern tip of the peninsula in just 8 weeks, his men had covered some 700 miles, about 12 miles a day on average. They fought 95 large and smaller battles doing so. Multiple lines of defense were erected one after another to try and halt the Japanese advance, to kill their momentum. Starting at the beach landings, to Jitra, then to Kampar, over the Slim river, then Johor. The British failed to employ “leave behind forces” to provide guerilla warfare in lost territories leading not only the Japanese to easily consolidate their gains, the Thai's also came down and grabbed some territory. At the battle of Muar Major General Gordon Bennet deployed the allied defenders south of the Muar River and it was widely believed here they would finally halt the Japanese. Then the Imperial Guards division outflanked them performing an amphibious landing and advancing down the coastal route. The 5th Japanese division followed a parallel route through the center and the 18th division landed near Endau. The allies were thus surrounded and took heavy casualties, countless were forced to flee through swamps and thick jungle abandoned their stuff. Gordons 45th brigade were absolutely shattered, effectively disbanded and left north of the Muar river as the rest of the allies fled south. The defeat at Muar broke the British belief they could hold even a toehold on Malay. Percivals strategy to fight delaying actions until the arrival of reinforcements to Singapore had fatally undermined his troops ability to hold onto defensive positions. As the British governor of the Johore straits settlement, Sir Shenton Thomas would say on January 6th ‘“We … have gone in for mechanized transport to the nth degree. It is a fearsomely cumbersome method. We have pinned our faith to the few roads but the enemy used tracks and paths, and gets round to our rear very much as he likes.”” Yet alongside the conquest came a series of atrocities. At the Parit Sulong Bridge south of the Muar, Captain Rewi Snelling was left behind with 150 wounded Australian and Indian soldiers not able to trek south. The Imperial guards division herded them into buildings, denied them medical treatment, many of the Indians were beheaded, others shot. This become known as the parit sulong massacre. Its hard to saw what Yamashita would have known about this incident, it technically was under the command of Takuma nishimura. On January 22nd, Nishimura gave the orders for prisoners to be forced outside, doused with petrol and set on fire. Nishimura would be sentenced to life in prison by a Singapore court, but on a flight back to Japan he was hijacked by Australian military police in Hong Kong who grabbed him and held a trial for the Parit Sulong massacre, finding him guilty and hanging him on june 11th of 1951. When the Japanese reached the straits of Johore, Yamashita took several days to perform reconnaissance, allowing his forces to regroup and prepare to attack the massive fortress. His plan for the invasion would see the Imperial guards perform a feint attack on the northeast side of Singapore, landing on the nearby Palau Ubin island on february 7th. The 5th and 18th division would remain concealed in the jungle until the night of the night of the 8th when they would cross the Johore and hit the northwest side of Singapore. The causeway to Singapore had been blown up by the retreating British, but the ability for Singapore to defend itself from a northern attack was lackluster. When Churchill was told by Wavell the Japanese sat on the other side of the Johore strait ready to attack the fortress he said ““I must confess to being staggered by Wavell's telegram. It never occurred to me for a moment that … Singapore … was not entirely fortified against an attack from the Northwards …”” With barely enough supplies or logistical support for his campaign, Yamashita's rapid advance down the Malay peninsula walked a tightrope of what was possible. His 70,000 men of which 30,000 were frontline troops had overcome a British force double their number. In Japan he garnered the epithet “Tiger of Malaya”, which ironically he was not too happy about. Later on in the war he would bark at a German attache “I am not a tiger. The tiger attacks its prey in stealth but I attack the enemy in a fair play”. By this point Singapore had swollen from a population of 550,000to nearly a million. Percival had a total of 70,000 infantry of mixed experience plus 15,000 clerks and support staff to man lines if necessary. 38 battalions, 17 Indian, 13 British, 6 Australian and 2 Malayan. He placed his weakest troops west of the causeway, near the abandoned naval base rather than nearby the airfield which he considered was going to be Yamashita's thrust. He placed his best forces over there, which would prove fatally wrong as Yamashita hit west of the causeway. Yamashita meanwhile could only muster 30,000 troops, he was outnumbered 2:1 and amphibious assaults called for the attacker to hold a 2:1 advantage for success. Yamashita's men were exhausted, they had suffered 4565 casualties, roughly 1793 deaths in their 55 day advance south. Worse yet, Yamashita had a critical supply issue. He had greatly exceeded his supply lines and had been surviving on the abandoned churchill stores along the way. His ammunition was critical low, it is said he was down to 18 functional tanks, allowing his men to fire 100 rounds per day, the fuel ran out, and as Yamashita put it “My attack on Singapore was a bluff—a bluff that worked. I had 30,000 men and was outnumbered more than three to one. I knew that if I had to fight for long for Singapore, I would be beaten. That is why the surrender had to be at once. I was very frightened all the time that the British would discover our numerical weakness and lack of supplies and force me into disastrous street fighting.” He told his men of the 5th and 18th division not to build any cooking fires so they could conceal their positions in the jungle as he gathered hundreds of collapsible boats and other crafts to ford the strait. He gathered 40 divisional commanders and senior officers to a rubber plantation and with a flushed red face read out his attack orders while pouring them Kikumasamune (ceremonial wine). He made a traditional toast and said “It is a good place to die; surely we shall conquer”. He had to get the British to surrender quickly, he had to essentially ‘bluff” his enemy. He had to make the British think he was fully armed and supplied for a prolonged siege, how could he do so? He fired his artillery like a mad man, knowing full well they would run out of shells. Starting on February 3rd, Yamashita's artillery supported by aerial bombings hit Singapore for 5 days. On the night of the 7th, 400 Imperial Guards crossed to the Ibin island performing their feint attack. Percivals attention was grabbed to the east successfully, while on the night of the 8th the 5th and 18th divisions assembled carefully at the water's edge. At 8:30pm the first wave of 4000 Japanese troops crossed the Johore strait aboard 150 small vessels. The noise of their engines was drowned out by artillery. The thinly spread Australian lines, 3000 or so men led by Major General Bennet were breached fast leading to pockets of surrounded australian troops. As Lewis Gunner cliff olsen recalled “We were horribly spread out and it was pitch black and they [Japanese troops] were very hard to see. They walked through us half the time.” A beachhead was formed, a soon 14,000 Japanese had crossed by dawn. Communications broke down for the allies, Percival unwilling to believe the Japanese's main thrust was in the west declined to send reinforcements there. When he did finally realize the main thrust was in the west he began to withdraw troops from quiet sectors and built up a reserve. The Japanese held air supremacy and their artillery was fierce. The big 15 inch guns of singapore held mostly armor piercing shells designed to hit ships, there were few HE shells available. When they fired upon the Japanese the shells would hit the ground they would embed deeply before exploding doing little damage. The defenders had no tanks, basically no more aircraft. The last departing ships fled the scene as everything was burning chaos around them. Morale was breaking for the defenders. By the 9th, Japanese bombers were raining bombs on allied positions unopposed. Bennet was forced to pull men back to a new line of defense from the east of the Tengah airfield to the north of Jurong. Poor communications hampered the northern sector of Brigadier Duncan Maxwell whose troops actually battered the hell out of the Imperial Guards who had landed at 10pm on the 9th. The Imperial guards gradually managed a foothold on a beach, but Maxwell feared encirclement and withdrew his men against direct orders of Bennet. The retreat opened up the flank of the 11th indian division who were overrun. All of the beaches west of the causeway fell to the enemy, when they did Yamashita brought over his tanks to smash the new Jurong line. The Japanese could have potentially stormed the city center at this point, but they held back, because in reality, Percival had created a formidable reserve in the middle. The Australian 22nd brigade took the brunt of the fighting. Yamashita was running out of reserves and his attacks were reaching their limit, but he needed the battle to end swiftly. Yamashita was shocked and shaken when he received a report that the British troop strength within the city was twice what they believed. With covert desperation, Yamashita ordered his artillery to fire until their last rounds and sent Percival a demand for surrender. “In the spirit of chivalry we have the honour of advising your surrender. Your army, founded on the traditional spirit of Great Britain, is defending Singapore, which is completely isolated, and raising the fame of Great Britain by the ut¬ most exertions and heroic feelings. . . . From now on resistance is futile and merely increases the danger to the million civilian inhabitants without good reason, exposing them to infliction of pain by fire and sword. But the development of the general war situation has already sealed the fate of Singapore, and the continuation of futile resistance would only serve to inflict direct harm and in¬ juries to thousands of non-combatants living in the city, throwing them into further miseries and horrors of war. Furthermore we do not feel you will in¬ crease the fame of the British Army by further resistance.” Singapore had received another order prior to this from Churchill “It is certain that our troops on Singapore Island greatly outnumber any Japanese that have crossed the Straits. We must defeat them. Our whole fighting reputation is at stake and the honour of the British Empire. The Americans have held out on the Bataan Peninsula against far greater odds, the Russians are turning back the picked strength of the Germans, the Chinese with almost complete lack of mod¬ ern equipment have held the Japanese for AVi years. It will be disgraceful if we yield our boasted fortress of Singapore to inferior enemy forces. There must be no thought ofsparing troops or the civil population and no mercy must be shown to weakness in any shape or form. Commanders and senior officers must lead their troops and if necessary die with them. There must be no question or thought of surrender. Every unit must fight it out to the end and in close contact with the enemy. ... I look to you and your men to fight to the end to prove that the fighting spirit that won our Empire still exists to enable us to defend it.” What was Percival to do? The Japanese had seized control over Singapore water reservoirs, the population would die of thirst within 2-3 days. Japanese shells were causing fires and death everywhere. People were panicking, trying to get on the very last boats leaving the port, even though that surely meant death to the IJN. An American sailor recalled “There was a lot of chaos and people killed on the docks during these bombardments. Everywhere you looked there was death. Even in the water there were dead sharks and people floating all around.” Defeatism was endemic. Australian troops were overheard saying “Chum, to hell with Malaya and Singapore. Navy let us down, air force let us down. If the bungs [natives] won't fight for their bloody country, why pick on me?” Sensing a complete collapse Percival formed a tight defense arc in front of the city, and by the 13th his commanders were telling him they believed Singapore was already doomed. Wavell was asked for approval for surrender, but he replied “to continue to inflict maximum damage on enemy for as long as possible by house-to-house fighting if necessary.” Percival then told him the water reservoirs were taken, so Wavell sent back “YOUR GALLANT STAND IS SERVING A PURPOSE AND MUST BE CONTINUED TO THE LIMIT OF ENDURANCE” On the 15th, Percival held a morning conference reported there was no more fuel, field gun nor bofor ammunition. In 24 hours their water would be done. He told them he would ask for a ceasefire at 4pm, by the end of the day Wavell gave him permission to surrender. Over at his HQ on the Bukit Timah heights, Yamashita was staring at a Union Jack fluttering over Fort Canning. Then a field phone rang, and a frontline commander reported the British were sending out a flag of truce. Meanwhile back on February the 14th, Japanese forces reached the Alexandra Barracks hospital at 1pm. At 1:40pm a British Lt greeting them waving a white flag and was bayoneted on the spot. The Japanese stormed the hospital and murdered the staff and patients. 200 male staff and patients, badly wounded were bound over night and marched to an industrial estate half a mile away. Anyone who collapsed was bayoneted. The survivors of the march were formed into small groups and hacked to death or bayoneted. For a few days over 320 men and women were massacred. Only 5 survivors would give recounts of the event. It is suspected by historians that Tsuji was the architect of the Alexandra hospital massacre. This is because he was the instigator of countless atrocities he ordered unbeknownst to his superior commanders such as Yamashita. Percival was ordered to go to the Ford motor factory to where he met with Yamashita. Yamashita was hiding his surprise that the surrender party came and as he glanced at the surrender terms he said through his interpreter “The Japanese Army will consider nothing but surrender,” Yamashita knew his forces were on the verge of running out of ammunition and he still held half troops Percival did, he was anxious Percival would figure it out. Percival replied “I fear that we shall not be able to submit our final reply before ten-thirty p.m.,” Percival had no intention of fighting on he simply wanted to work out specific details before signing the surrender. Yamashita was sure Percival was stalling. “Reply to us only whether our terms are acceptable or not. Things must be settled swiftly. We are prepared to resume firing.Unless you do surrender, we will have to carry out our night attack as scheduled.”” Percival replied ““Cannot the Japanese Army remain in its present position? We can resume negotiations again tomorrow at five-thirty A.M”. Yamashita screamed “Nani! I want the hostilities to cease tonight and I want to remind you there can be no arguments.” Percival replied ““We shall discontinue firing by eight-thirty p.m. Had we better remain in our present positions tonight?” Yamashita said yes and that firing would cease at 8:30pm and that 1000 allied men could keep arms to maintain order within the city. Yamashita stated “You have agreed to the terms but you have not yet made yourself clear as to whether you agree to surrender or not.” Percival cleared his throat and gave a simple nod. Yamashita looked at his interpreter “There's no need for all this talk. It is a simple question and I want a simple answer.” He turned to Percival and shouted, “We want to hear ‘Yes' or ‘No' from you! Surrender or fight!” Percival finally blurted out “Yes, I agree. I have a request to make. Will the Imperial Army protect the women and children and British civilians?”Yamashita replied “We shall see to it. Please sign this truce agreement”. At 7:50 the surrender was signed off, 40 minutes later Singapore was in the hands of the Japanese. In 70 days Yamashita took at the cost of 9824 casualties, had seized Malaya and Singapore, nearly 120,000 British surrendered. It was the greatest land victory in Japanese history. Churchill called the fall of Singapore to the Japanese "the worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history" Churchills physician Lord Moran wrote The fall of Singapore on February 15 stupefied the Prime Minister. How came 100,000 men (half of them of our own race) to hold up their hands to inferior numbers of Japanese? Though his mind had been gradually prepared for its fall, the surrender of the fortress stunned him. He felt it was a disgrace. It left a scar on his mind. One evening, months later, when he was sitting in his bathroom enveloped in a towel, he stopped drying himself and gloomily surveyed the floor: 'I cannot get over Singapore', he said sadly With the fall of singapore came another atrocity, the Sook Ching massacre. After February 18th, the Japanese military began mass killings of what they deemed undesirables, mostly ethnic Chinese. It was overseen by the Kempeitai and did not stop in Singapore, but spread to Malaya. It seems the aim of the purge was to intimidate the Chinese community from performing any resistance. According to postwar testimony taken from a war correspondent embedded with the 25th army, Colonel Hishakari Takafumi, he stated an order went out to kill 50,000 Chinese, of which 20 percent of the total was issued by senior officials on Yamashita's operations staff, most likely Tsuji. It is certain at the behest of Tsuji the orders were extended to Malay. The death toll is a tricky one, the Japanese went on the record to admit to 6000 murders, the Singaporean Chinese community and the Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew allege 70,000-100,000. Historians analyzing the scale of discovered mass graves after some decades think around 25,000-50,000. How much Yamashita knew of the massacre is debatable, the orders came from his office after all, but it seems Tsuji had orchestrated it. Many of Japan's generals wanted Yamashita to be appointed war minister, a move that obviously threatened then Prime Minister Hideki Tojo, who feared his rival. Tojo retaliated, ordering Japan's new war hero back to Manchuria. On the surface, the assignment appeared worthy as Yamashita would serve as the first line of defense against a possible Soviet invasion. But since the two nations had signed a neutrality pact in April 1941, and Soviets were bogged down fighting the Germans, immediate war appeared unlikely. In reality, Tojo had parked Yamashita on the war's sidelines. Tojo went even further, he barred Yamashita any leave in Tokyo, preventing him from visiting his wife as well as from delivering a speech he had written for the emperor. No worries though, an aide of Yamashita's sent him three geishas. Allegedly he said this “I know they want to please me with these girls. But send them back—and don't forget to tip them.” The Tiger of Malaya would maintain a low profile in Manchuria where he received a promotion to full General. As months fell to years Yamashita sat on the sidelines helpless to aid the Japanese forces. His exile would come to an end in 1944 when Tojo was outed and the Tiger was required to try and save the Philippines from General Douglas MacArthur.

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'A probar una paella'

CUBAkústica FM

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 14, 2025 63:35

Algunas producciones de la etiqueta norteamericana Víctor, editadas en la frontera de los años 30 a los 40 del siglo XX, nos permitirán revivir el fenómeno de la "cubanización" de las orquestas jazz bands. La orquesta Hermanos Castro con su cantante Miguelito García, Miguelito Valdés con la Casino de la Playa, Cascarita con la orquesta Hermanos Palau y Reinaldo Valdés "el jabao" con la orquesta del trompetista Julio Cueva nos acercan algunos clásicos de la música popular cubana. A continuación, y a propósito de la evolución de los jazz bands en la isla, un recuerdo para uno de los grandes artífices de este formato orquestal: el pianista, arreglista y compositor Ernesto Duarte. Fernando González, Tata Ramos y Rolo Martinez, grabados y producidos por el talentoso músico para su etiqueta "Duarte" llegan con la sonoridad del jazz band de los últimos años 50. Junto al contrabajista Cachao López y otros notables instrumentistas como Alejandro "el negro" Vivar en trompeta, Generoso "Tojo" Jiménez en trombón, Rogelio "Yeyito" Iglesias en los bongoes, Guillermo Barreto en pailas, Niño Rivera en el tres, Tata Güines en las tumbadoras, volvemos a los míticos estudios de Panart y a las "descargas en miniatura" que, finalizando los 50, permitieron cristalizar la categoría del jazz en el panorama discográfico cubano. En ese sentido las producciones "Tropicana", propiciadas por el genio de la emisora CMOX: Adolfo Seeman, constituyeron un paso más en el desarrollo en la discografia en función de darle más consistencia a la llamada "descarga". Frank Emilio a la cabeza del "Quinteto de Música Moderna", impulsado comercialmente por Seeman, con la complicidad de Papito Hernández en contrabajo, Gustavo Tamayo en güiro, Tata Güines en las tumbadoras y Guillermo Barreto en drum y pailas. En la despedida, y de vuelta al catálogo RCA Víctor, revisitamos el debut discográfico del Benny Moré como parte del conjunto Matamoros. Las maravillas de la música popular cubana, todos los domingos, las reservamos aquí para ti.

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Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast #238

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Play Episode Listen Later Dec 13, 2025 62:29

Welcome back to another edition of the UK's number one and only Memphis wrestling related podcast, Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast. On this week's show we cover December 13th 1986 Continental Wrestling where we will see:- Tracy Smothers vs. Boy Tony (with Bruno) Big Bubba/Goliath (with Downtown Bruno) vs. Jim Jamison/Mike Murphy The Great Kabuki (with Tojo) vs. Ed Mattox Tommy Rich vs. Keith Eric Tag Champs Jeff Jarrett/Billy Travis vs. The Rock 'n' Roll RPM's (Mike David/Tommy Lane) Follow the show on facebook Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast (facebook.com/memphiscast) Check out Heat Stroke ( our look at Sunday Night Heat from back in the day, now available on all good podcast suppliers, just search Heat Stroke Visit our brand new tshirt store at https://www.unforgettablevision.com/roster/old-bakery-productions Check out Youtube.com/@memphiscast & patreon.com/memphiscast for videos You can watch the show https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EK_Zbc5iqxM&t=6s

Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast #236

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Play Episode Listen Later Nov 29, 2025 62:57

Welcome back to another edition of the UK's number one and only Memphis wrestling related podcast, Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast. On this week's show we cover November 29th 1986 Continental Wrestling where we will see:- Big Bubba/Goliath (with Bruno) vs. Mike Murphy/Jim Jamison/Robert Bryant/Ed Mattox. Akio Sato/Tarzan Goto (with Tojo) vs. Benny Trailer/Jerry Garmen Pat Tanaka/Paul Diamond vs. Tony Burton/Great Kabuki Jerry The King Lawler/Jeff Jarrett/Billy Travis vs. Boy Tony/Memphis Vice (Jerry Bryant/Lou Winston). Follow the show on facebook Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast (facebook.com/memphiscast) Check out Heat Stroke ( our look at Sunday Night Heat from back in the day, now available on all good podcast suppliers, just search Heat Stroke Visit our brand new tshirt store at https://www.unforgettablevision.com/roster/old-bakery-productions Check out Youtube.com/@memphiscast & patreon.com/memphiscast for videos You can watch the show https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9-JwXJcth38&list=PLgi8coP8E7nr0n_MOjhFl271oFpn_2reL&index=46

- 210 - Special Failure & Responsibility Emperor Hirohito Part 2

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 25, 2025 57:53

Hello everyone, a big thanks to all of you who joined the patreon and voted for this to be the next episode, you all are awesome. This is a part 2 about Hirohito's responsibility during the wars of 1931-1945, so if you have not heard part 1, perhaps go do so, or maybe you just don't care about 1931-1940 and just want to hear about the 1941-1945 period, hell by all means enjoy. So last time we kind of left it on a bit of a dramatic cliff hanger. I spoke about Emperor Hirohito's involvement in what was called at the time the “China Incident”. It was not an official declared war until December of 1941. We left off in 1940, Hirohito was struggling with a situation of juggling two things: 1) how the hell to finally end the China War 2) how to do it without receiving horrible ramifications from the international world. On July 22nd of 1940, Konoe was back and formed a second cabinet. Notably General Hideki Tojo went from vice to army Minister during this time. If you guys ever want a podcast on Hideki Tojo, let me know, he is one rather bizarre figure that's for sure. Konoe tackled his job by holding an imperial HQ government liaison conference. For 90 minutes everyone worked on a new national policy designed to exploit the international situation, IE: Germany bulldozing europe. The result was a document on national policy dated July 27th. It shifted focus to the “southern area” IE: southeast asia and the Pacific if the China war did not end quickly. Its basis was to exploit the foreign nations that had their hands full in europe, France, Britain and the Netherlands. It called for an invasion of French Indochina to establish bases to launch assaults against the Dutch East Indies for natural resources if diplomatic means failed. It acknowledged if the Dutch East Indies were seized through military means, Japan would also seek to fight Britain, but not the US, instead Japan would prepare for a possible war with the Americans. To all of this Hirohito approved. The army also kept pressuring its desire to ally with Germany. Throughout 1939-1940 Hirohito rejected this idea, not because of any ideological differences, it was because of Germans anti aggression pact with the USSR. If Japan were to ally to Germany, Hirohito wanted it to be mutually to fight the USSR. The Navy likewise opposed allying to Germany because they believed it would force Britain and the US to increase their aid to Chiang Kai-shek. However the Blitzkrieg changed everything. Everyone was shocked at how well Germany was doing. Prince Chichibu repeatedly argued with Hirohito to change his mind over the alliance idea. Then suddenly the Navy changed their mind and began favoring an alliance. This changed came about in June of 1940 when the France fell. The Navy changed their mind based on a few factors, a major component was the belief if Germany and the USSR were allied, than at least Japan would not have to worry about the USSR and could focus on the pacific. Both the IJA and the IJN believed Hitler would soon take Britain and thus there was a huge desire to join the new international order on the winning side. A third factor was a new clause in negotiations with Germany and Japan, that if they allied Japan would not automatically be drawn into a war with Britain against her will. Some in the navy also believed perhaps Germany could help their diplomatic situation with the Americans. So the army and navy were now both demanding an alliance with Germany, it was all up to hirohito. At an imperial briefing on June 19th of 1940, Hirohito asked chief of staff Prince Kan'in and the Army Minister Hata “At a time when peace will soon come in the European situation, will there be a deployment of troops to the Netherlands Indies and French Indochina?” Such as question revealed Hirohito's perception at the time that Germany was on the verge of victory and that he was gradually considering the deployment of troops in French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies as neither parent nation were in a position to defend their holdings. In regards to the China war, the Japanese sought to end leaks of materials getting into China from places like Hong Kong. Hirohito received reports indicated Britain would not accept closing the movement of materials into China via Hong Kong. The military acknowledged it would probably be required to invade Hong Kong and thus declare war on Britain. Upon hearing of this Hirohito remarked “Should that happen, I am sure America will use the method of an embargo, don't you agree?” To this his lord of the privy seal, Kido reassured him stating “the nation must be fully resolved to resist to proceed cautiously and not to be dragged into events precipitated by the overseas agencies”. Konoe's second cabinet resolved to end the China war, construct a new order in greater east asia and to complete war preparations as a national defense state. On July 27th at a liaison conference a document was adopted, affirming a course of advancing to the south and to ally with Germany. Japan would incorporate the Dutch East Indies, British Malaya and other resource rich areas of Southeast Asia into its new order while simultaneously bolstering its relationship with the Axis states. After hearing and reading everything, Hirohito sanctioned it all. Thus Hirohito had sanctioned the preliminary actions that would set Japan into a collision course with the US. In September Japan began sending troops into northern French Indochina after concluding its Tripartite alliance with Germany and Italy. Now Hirohito was briefed beforehand by Army Minister Tojo and other chiefs of staff about securing bases in northern French indochina. Hirohito agreed to this under the belief acquiring such bases would stop more leaked materials going into China and thus contribute to the fall of Chongqing. But Hirohito also sanctioned it under the full knowledge it was preparing the Nanshin-ron advance and that carried a risk of going to war with Britain and by proxy the US. Naturally he wanted to thwart any war breaking out with the US by it seems his officials had convinced him they could manage most of their plans without aggravating the US. On July 29th with the German offensive aimed at finishing off Britain, Hirohito summoned his chiefs and vice chiefs of staff to the imperial HQ. He began to question the prospects of war with the US. Prince Fushimi replied “[u]nless we complete our domestic preparations, particularly the preparation of our material resources, I do not think we should lightly start war even if there is a good opportunity to do so.” Hirohito then asked if “the Army were planning to occupy points in India, Australia, and New Zealand.” But overall Hirohito seemed to be the most concerned about the US, Germany and the USSR. “Could Japan, obtain a victory in a naval battle with the United States as we once did in the Battle of the Japan Sea? . . . I heard that the United States will ban exports of oil and scrap iron [to Japan]. We can probably obtain oil from other sources, but don't you think we will have a problem with scrap iron?” In regards to the USSR “If a Japan-Soviet nonaggression treaty is made and we advance to the south, the navy will become the main actor. Has the army given thought to reducing the size of its forces in that case? . . . How do you assess the future national power of Germany? . . . Both Germany and the Soviet Union are untrustworthy countries. Don't you think there will be a problem if one of them betrays us and takes advantage of our exhaustion fighting the United States?I]t seems as though you people are thinking of implementing this plan by force because there is a good opportunity at this moment for resolving the southern problem even though some dangers are involved. . . . What does a good opportunity mean? [To this question Sawada replied: “For example, if a German landing in England commences.”] In that case wouldn't the United States move to aid Britain? . . . Well, I've heard enough. I take it, in short, that you people are trying to resolve the southern problem by availing yourselves of today's good opportunities.” You can tell Hirohito understood the very real threat of an Anglo-American alliance and was very cautious. It seemed to Hirohito, that his officials were trying to take the limelight off the abysmal situation in China but emphasizing a southern advance. Well Americans response to the Japanese movement into northern French indochina was to see it as a direct threat. Something I have not paid much attention to was Hirohito's decision making being the direct result of trying to mediate between competing entities, ie: the IJA and IJN. At this point in time the IJA and IJN top officials had the power to simply stop governmental functions from occurring altogether whenever they were displeased with a decision. As you can imagine the IJA and IJN were also competing for resources and political power. Thus Hirohito spent a lot of time and effort trying to formulate decisions that at a minimum kept the governance going. In the end Hirohito sanctioned Imperial HQ army order number 458, ordering the area army to begin the entry into French Indochina. Thus once again Hirohito sanctioned aggression aboard. America began what it called a “moral embargo” on aircraft parts, scrap iron and aviation gasoline. This was one of many gradual steps America took to incrementally sanction Japan, while aiding China to keep it bogged down. Japan's direct response was joining the Axis with a clause “to assist one another with all political, economic and military means if attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese conflict”. This clause was designed specifically to check Britain and the US. Hirohito knew this was a turning point carrying the possibility of war with the US. Later he would blame some officials and even his brothers Chichibu and Takamatsu, but not his own actions sanctioning the Axis pact. Speaking of his brothers, at this time Chichibu got severely ill with tuberculosis and as a result retired from active public life, now Prince Takamatsu stood as next regent. Thus Takamatsu would begin reading reports and advise Hirohito. Takamatsu like Chichibu approved the Tripartite Pact and found his brother Hirohito's performance lacking. Meanwhile Britain responded to the Tripartite pact by opening up the Burma road and America made a loan to Chiang Kai-shek. The Soviets came to Japan for a neutrality pact and sweetened the deal by offering Soviet coal and oil concessions in North Sakhalin. Hirohito ratified the treaty on April 25th of 1941. 5 weeks later on June 5th, the Japanese ambassador to Berlin, General Oshima Hiroshi reported to Hirohito and the high command that Hitler was about to invade the Soviets. The Army high command sprang into action drafting plans to open a war with the Soviets while simultaneously advancing south into French Indochina. But many in the military also sought to wait until the time was ripe, and a rift emerged. Operation barbarossa commenced and on June 23rd the IJN high command gave their opinion that Japan should seize all military bases and airfields in southern French Indochina even at the risk of war with Britain and America. Can you say boy that escalated quickly? There was obvious temptation to invade Siberia towards Lake Baikal, but at the same time the western powers were tightening sanctions on Japan, she needed resources. At this point Japan had been stuck in China for 4 years and 5 months, the army had expanded from 17 divisions totalling 250,000 men in july of 1937 to 51 divisions at 2.1 million men in December 8th of 1941. On July 2nd, 10 tens into Operation barbarossa, Konoe summoned an imperial conference to debate actions going forward. The consensus was that southern French Indochina needed to be taken and that it probably would not provoke the US going to war with Japan. Hirohito sanctioned it and on July 30th made a major operational intervention by advising General Sugiyama to build up forces in Manchukuo to prevent the Soviet Far Eastern Army. Japan negotiated with Vichy France to allow Japanese troops to occupy southern parts of French Indochina. What was to be originally just 40,000 IJA forces turned into 185,000 and in response America increased sanctions and began preparing the Philippines for war. Roosevelt froze Japanese assets in the US on July 26th and by August the 1st a total embargo of oil and gasoline exports to Japan. Konoe's cabinet, the military high command, pretty much everyone was shocked by how harsh the economic sanctions were. Emperor Hirohito told Sugiyama to halt mobilizing forces in Manchukuo and the army basically dropped all plans of attacking the USSR. A month after the US oil embargo suddenly the army had changed its mind to go all in on the southern advance. Britain likewise began sanctions against Japan and both Britain and the US managed to convince the Dutch to follow suit by refusing to sell oil to Japan. The Dutch even took it a step further and followed Americans lead in freezing Japanese assets. Konoe was in full panic mode, be believed his ambassador to washington was a moron and sought to go in person to speak to Roosevelt. At 11:40am on August 4th Konoe spoke to Hirohito about the plan, but Washington kept making up excuses prolonging any meeting from taking place. Meanwhile Washington was building up its navy, and the IJN were stressing, in the words of Admiral Takagai “As time passes and this situation continues, our empire will either be totally defeated or forced to fight a hopeless war. Therefore we should pursue war and diplomacy together. If there is no prospect of securing our final line of national survival by diplomatic negotiations, we must be resolved to fight.” Hirohito understood the predicament full well, that each day Japan was wasting its oil reserves, if they were to strike it had to be quickly. On september 3rd at a liaison conference it was decided Japan was to prepare for a war against the US, UK and Netherlands while simultaneously pursuing diplomacy. If diplomacy failed by early October the decision for war would be made. Konoe presented everything to Hirohito on September 5th and requested an imperial conference on the matter. The most important decision of his life was about to be made. Now take a second to feel the moment. Germany's invasion of the USSR was in its 6th week and not producing a decisive victory; Britain was still in the fight and the Japanese ambassador to London reported back Britain would allow Japan to maintain its great power status and exert influence in asia if they stayed out of the European War and “re-examined their current policy”. An olive branch. Hirohito had options is what I am arguing. He could stale things, he could mobilize units into Manchukuo to simply threaten the Soviet border, he could simply stay out of new wars, even it the China war would get worse, but try to profit from the situation in Europe. He could stop the southern advance, lose the chance to seize the resource in southeast asia, but perhaps the US, UK and Netherlands would lift some sanctions. After speaking back and forth with Konoe while scolding Sugiyama here is a bit of their conversation: Emperor: In the event we must finally open hostilities, will our operations have a probability of victory? Sugiyama: Yes, they will. Emperor: At the time of the China Incident, the army told me that we could achieve peace immediately after dealing them one blow with three divisions. Sugiyama, you were army minister at that time. . . . Sugiyama: China is a vast area with many ways in and many ways out, and we met unexpectedly big difficulties. . . . [ellipses in original] Emperor: Didn't I caution you each time about those matters? Sugiyama, are you lying to me? Nagano: If Your Majesty will grant me permission, I would like to make a statement. Emperor: Go ahead. Nagano: There is no 100 percent probability of victory for the troops stationed there. . . . Sun Tzu says that in war between states of similar strength, it is very difficult to calculate victory. Assume, however, there is a sick person and we leave him alone; he will definitely die. But if the doctor's diagnosis offers a seventy percent chance of survival, provided the patient is operated on, then don't you think one must try surgery? And if, after the surgery, the patient dies, one must say that was meant to be. This indeed is the situation we face today. . . . If we waste time, let the days pass, and are forced to fight after it it is too late to fight, then we won't be able to do a thing about it. Emperor: All right, I understand. [He answered in a better mood.] Konoe: Shall I make changes in tomorrow's agenda? How would you like me to go about it? Emperor: There is no need to change anything. There is no need to change anything. Konoe grabbed Hirohito for a private audience afterwards and tried to get Hirohito to revise the outline, but Hirohito ignored this. Hirohito at that point could have stopped or at least slowed down the countdown to all out war. Hirohito instead did not want to displease the pro-war factions in his military, perhaps he saw them as a threat to his authority. Hirohito was not at all pleased with the policy plan. When he was shown in on september 5th, he looked extremely irritated and blew up on Sugiyama and the army high command as a whole. 20 minutes before the Imperial conference on September 6th, Hirohito spoke with his lord of the privy Kido and told him he was going to raise some questions at the meeting. Kido told him that it would be best to leave the questions at the very end, basically he was advising to allow for things to go through. Thus Hirohito sat through the meeting and sanction the preparations for war. Here is a conversation between Hirohito and the Chiefs of the general staff: Emperor: You may go ahead and mobilize. But if the Konoe-Roosevelt talks go well, you'll stop, won't you? Chief of the General Staff: Indeed, your majesty, we will. Emperor: I will ask you one more time: Is there any possibility that the north [that is, the Soviet Union] may move against us while we are engaged in the south [emphasis added]? Chief of the General Staff: I cannot say that will absolutely not occur. However, because of the season it is inconceivable that large forces will be able to attack us Meanwhile Konoe's deadline to reach a diplomatic resolution with the US was fast approaching. On October 13th Hirohito told Kido “In the present situation there seems to be little hope for the Japan–U.S. negotiations. If hostilities erupt this time, I think I may have to issue a declaration of war.” The next day Konoe held his last cabinet meeting and Army minister Tojo took the lionshare of talking: For the past six months, ever since April, the foreign minister has made painstaking efforts to adjust relations [with the United States.] Although I respect him for that, we remain deadlocked. . . . Our decision was “to start the war . . . if by early October we cannot thoroughly achieve our demands through negotiations.” Today is the fourteenth. . . . We are mobilizing hundreds of thousands of soldiers. Others are being moved from China and Manchuria, and we have requisitioned two million tons of ships, causing difficulties for many people. As I speak ships are en route to their destinations. I would not mind stopping them, and indeed would have to stop them, if there was a way for a diplomatic breakthrough. . . . The heart of the matter is the [imposition on us of] withdrawal [from Indochina and China]. ...If we yield to America's demands, it will destroy the fruits of the China Incident. Manchukuo will be endangered and our control of Korea undermined And so Konoe resigned two days later, but before he did his last official action was to recommend Prince Higashikuni to succeed him, in fact he got Tojo to do the same. Prince Higashikuni was deemed capable of controlling both the Army and Navy. And what did Hirohito say to this? He said no, and appointed Hideki Tojo. Why? As going back to the beginning of this series, to protect the Kokutai. He did not want a member of the royal family to hold the seat as Prime Minister during a time when war might be declared, a war that Japan might lose, which would toss the responsibility onto the imperial house. It was a threat to the Kokutai. Hirohito chose Tojo because Tojo was 100% loyal subject to the emperor. Tojo was the perfect fall guy if one ever existed. Between November 8-15th, Hirohito received a full rundown of the Pearl Harbor surprise attack plan and sanctioned it. The deadline to reach a diplomatic solution with the US was set for midnight December 1st. Hirohito ever since the Mukden Incident had expressed fear that not taking warlike actions, not pumping up the kokutai or not suppressing dissent would jeopardize the imperial system of government and damage the imperial institution itself. For Hirohito domestic conflicts were more dangerous than external ones, because they carried the risk of eroding the monarchy. As the time approached for his finally decision on declaring war, Hirohito requested a last round of discussion. The carriers enroute to Pearl harbor departed on november 27th, while on December 1st, 19 leaders, the entire Tojo cabinet and Emperor met. Tojo pulled a rather cheeky maneuver, he reported the response from America, the famous Hull note by stating “the United States . . . has demanded that we withdraw troops from all of China [emphasis added],” but in fact, Hull had used only the word “China.” Hara asked “I would like to know,whether Manchukuo is included in the term ‘China'? Did our two ambassadors confirm this point?” Togo's reply to this was “However . . . the American proposal [early in the negotiations on] April 16 stated that they would recognize the state of Manchukuo, so Manchukuo would not be part of China. . . . On the other hand . . . there has been a change in their position . . . they look upon Chungking as the one and only legitimate regime, and . . . they want to destroy the Nanking regime, [so] they may retract what they have said previously” A nonsensical gibberish answer, intentionally done to make everyone think America did in fact include Manchukuo, thus forcing everyone to see the demands as impossible to comply with. Togo finished the meeting : “Once His Majesty decides to commence hostilities, we will all strive to meet our obligations to him, bring the government and the military ever closer together, resolve that the nation united will go on to victory, make an all-out effort to achieve our war aims, and set his majesty's mind at ease. I now adjourn the meeting.” Hirohito simply nodded. Sugiyama remarked that the emperor did not show the slightest sign of anxiety, in fact he looked like he was in a good mood. Hirohito's naval aid Jo Eiichiro wrote minutes on the first day of the pacific war, recording the emperors actions. 4 A.M. (Japan time): Japan issued a final ultimatum to the United States. 3:30 A.M.: the Hawaiian surprise attack was successful. 5:30 A.M.: Singapore bombed. Great results. Air attacks on Davao, Guam, Wake. 7:10 A.M.: All the above was reported to the emperor. The American gunboat Wake was captured on the Shanghai front. The British gunboat Petrel was sunk. From 7:15 to 7:30 the chief of the Navy General Staff reported on the war situation. At 7:30 the prime minister informally reported to the emperor on the imperial rescript declaring war. (Cabinet meeting from 7 A.M.). At 7:35 the chief of the Army General Staff reported on the war situation. At 10:45 the emperor attended an emergency meeting of the privy council. At 11:00 A.M. the imperial rescript declaring war was promulgated. 11:40 A.M. Hirohito conferred with Kido for about twenty minutes.] At 2:00 P.M. the emperor summoned the army and navy ministers and bestowed an imperial rescript on them. The army minister, representing both services, replied to the emperor. [At 3:05 P.M. the emperor had a second meeting with Kido, lasting for about twenty minutes.] At 4:30 P.M. the chiefs of staff formally reported on the draft of the Tripartite (Germany-Italy-Japan) Military Pact. At 8:30 P.M. the chief of the Navy General Staff reported on the achievements of the Hawaii air attack. . . . Throughout the day the emperor wore his naval uniform and seemed to be in a splendid mood. Hirohito believed Germany would win, thus if with their help he believed Japan could thwart off the US until a negotiated peace. Having made his choice, Hirohito devoted himself to presiding over and guiding the war to victory at all costs. He was a extremely cautious person, every single campaign he looked for what could go wrong, made worse case scenario predictions and was very suspicious of reports from his high officials. He was notably very harsh and critical on said high commanders. Although he did not visit the war theaters as did other commanders in chief, he exercised and controlled influence on theater operations, both in the planning and execution whenever he chose to do so. As was the same case with the China war before it, he issued the highest military orders of the Imperial HQ, performed audited conferences and led to decisions transmitted in his name. He received generals and admirals to the imperial palace who gave full reports of the battlefront. He visited bases, battleships, various army and naval headquarters. He inspected military schools, you know the full shebang. After 26 months of war, the naval air force had lost 26,006 aircraft, nearly a third of its total power, thousands of veteran pilots were dead. Hundreds of thousands of tons of warship was sunk, the merchant and transport fleet was crippled. Late 1943 saw the Americans turning the initiative of the war, Japan was on the defensive. Guadalcanal had been the major turning point. During the staled battle for the philippines, Hirohito pressed upon Army chief of staff Sugiyama to increase troop strength to knock out Bataan. The problem persisted, on February 9th and 26th Hirohito pressed Sugiyama again about getting more troops to take Bataan. Hirohito was confronted with the prisoner of war issue after the doolittle raid. When the pilots were caught, Togo initially opposed executions, but many in the IJA sought all 8 men executed. Hirohito chose to intervene and commuted the execution of 5 out of the 8. Why just 5, no one knows to this day, but its theorized it was to demonstrate his benevolence while simultaneously giving a bit of what the army wanted. The CBI theater took the lionshare of his attention in 1942, he continuously pressed up Sugiyama when a final blow would be delivered against Chongqing. When the Midway disaster occurred, Hirohito was given a full report of what happened, but he chose to hid the extent of the loss from the IJA. In fact in response to the Guadalcanal campaign he was heard once asking “I wonder if this is not the start of the AmericanBritish counteroffensive?” He urged his commanders to increase offensive activities and to toss all weapons possible at the enemy, because Japan needed more time to secure its reserves of vital oil, rubber and iron. When he heard the first report of the Ichiki detachment being wiped out, he simply stated “I am sure it [Guadalcanal] can be held.” With numerous reports pouring in about the men dying from tropical disease and starvation, Hirohito kept demanding greater efforts from them. Hirohito continuously applied pressure on his naval and land commanders to recapture the island. On September 15th, November 5th and November 11th he called for more IJA troops and aircraft to be allocated to it. Sugiyama was nervous about sending more IJA pilots as they were inexperienced in transoceanic combat and he sought to reinforce the north china army to hit Chongqing. Hirohito demanded it a second time and Sugiyama replied the IJA had deployed its air power instead to New Guinea and Rabaul. Hirohito continuously hammered the issue despite the high level commanders disagreeing with it. By late november it was clear guadalcanal was a lost cause. At an imperial HQ conference on December 31st of 1942, the chiefs of staff reported they would cancel the attempts to recapture guadalcanal. Hirohito sanctioned it but stated “It is unacceptable to just give up on capturing Guadalcanal. We must launch an offensive elsewhere.” Hirohito forced the issue and it was decided the new strategic points would be in the solomons north of New Georgia and the Stanley range on New Guinea. Hirohito in fact threatened not to authorize the withdrawal of men from Guadalcanal until such a plan was made. Hirohito would go on to oppose the withdrawal from the Munda airfield on New Georgia since it contradicted the new defensive line. As the defensive perimeter in the central and northern solomons was crumbling, Hirohito continued to demand the navy fight decisive battles to regain the initiative so ships could begin transports supplies to the countless soldiers trapped on islands without them. When Hirohito heard of the navy's failure to reinforce Lae on March 3rd he stated “Then why didn't you change plans immediately and land at Madan? This is a failure, but it can teach us a good lesson and become a source of future success. Do this for me so I can have peace of mind for awhile.” “Do this for me” would become his signature message. In August of 1943 as the fall of the solomons progressed, Hirohito lambasted “Isn't there someplace where we can strike the United States? . . . When and where on earth are you [people] ever going to put up a good fight? And when are you ever going to fight a decisive battle?Well, this time, after suffering all these defeats, why don't you study how not to let the Americans keep saying ‘We won! We won!'[emphasis added]”” Hirohito berated his chiefs of staff and in the face of mounting defeats he remained undismayed, rigidly self disciplined and aggressive as ever. When he received a report on September 21st of 1943 that the allies were heading for Finschhafen he replied “Being ready to defend isn't enough. We have to do the attacking.” When the Americans destroyed the main naval anchorage at Truk forcing the navy to evacuate it, leaving behind numerous tanks, the dream of fighting one great decisive naval battle in the central pacific was over. On February 21st of 1944, Hirohito took the unprecedented action to force Sugiyama to resign so Tojo could assume his position, alongside that of army minister and prime minister. He did this to end dissent. Hirohito and Tojo oversaw the haymaker attempts in 1944, like operation Ichi-go and the Imphal campaign fall into ruins. It looked like the Philippines, Taiwan, Okinawa, the Bonin islands and eventually the home islands would be invaded. When Saipan fell, the home islands had at last come into range of the dreaded B-29 Super flying fortresses. Hirohito had warned Tojo “If we ever lose Saipan, repeated air attacks on Tokyo will follow. No matter what it takes, we have to hold there.” For two days his chiefs of staff explained the dire situation on Saipan was hopeless, but Hirohito ignored their advice and ordered Admiral Shimada to recapture it, the first department of the navy general staff immediately poured themselves into the problem. Day and night they worked, until a draft plan was created on June 21st, 3 days later the combined fleet gave opposition. Tojo and Shimada formally reported to Hirohito the recapture plan needed to be canceled. Hirohito refused to accept the loss of Saipan and ordered his chief aide General Hasunuma to convene in his presence the board of field marshals and fleet admirals. They all met on the 25th, upon which they all unanimously stated the reports indicating Saipan was a lost cause were valid, Hirohito simply told them to put it in writing and he left the room. Hirohito finally decided to withdraw his support of Tojo, allowing Tojo's numerous enemies to take down his cabinet on July 18th 1944. But Hirohito was undaunted in determination to steal victory from the allies. Imperial HQ on October 18th ordered a decisive naval battle and the battle of Leyte Gulf was it. After the war Hirohito would go on the record stating “Contrary to the views of the Army and Navy General Staffs, I agreed to the showdown battle of Leyte thinking that if we attacked at Leyte and America flinched, then we would probably be able to find room to negotiate.” This statement shows the facts as they were, Hirohito and his chiefs of staff forced the field commander, General Tomoyuki Yamashita to engage the American invasion force in a place Yamashita did not want to fight nor prepared adequate defenses. It was a horrible loss. The Kamikaze attacks increased as Japan's desperation wore on. On new years day of 1945 Hirohito inspected the special last meal rations given to departing kamikaze units. Iwo Jima fell. Okinawa remained, and Hirohito lashed out “Is it because we failed to sink enemy transports that we've let the enemy get ashore? Isn't there any way to defend Okinawa from the landing enemy forces?” On the second day of Okinawa's invasion Hirohito ordered a counter landing by the 32nd army and urged the navy to counterattack in every way possible. It was a horrible failure, it cost the lives of up to 120,000 Japanese combatants, 170,000 noncombatants. The Americans lost 12,500 killed and 33,000 wounded. An absolute bloodbath. Konoe re-entered the stage writing to Hirohito pleading with him to order a surrender because from his perspective “The Soviet Union is Japan's biggest threat. Defeat was inevitable, but more to be feared than defeat was the destruction of the Kokutai. Sue quickly for peace, before a Communist revolution occurred that would make preservation of the kokutai impossible”. Hirohito was taken aback by this, as he shared his military's hope that the Soviets would help Japan reach a peace settlement. So he rejected the advice of Konoe. Hirohito remarked “If we hold out long enough in this war, we may be able to win, but what worries me is whether the nation will be able to endure it until then.” Then Japan's intelligence units reported the Soviets were going to break the neutrality pact and join the war once the Germans were done. Meanwhile Tokyo was turned to rubble on March 9th 1945 by 334 B-29's dropping firebombs, 40% of the capital was destroyed, up to 100,000 were dead. Hirohito remained undaunted. 60 Japanese cities were leveled by firebomb campaigns. Europe's war finished. Then the battle for Okinawa was lost, suddenly Hirohito began looking for ways to end the war. On June 22nd Hirohito personally informed the supreme war leadership council his desire to see diplomatic maneuvers to end the war. A special envoy was sent to Moscow, while Hirohito publicly issued an imperial rescript ordering the nation “to smash the inordinate ambitions of the enemy nations and achieve the goals of the war”. B-29's began dropping leaflets with joint declarations issued by the US, UK and China requesting the citizens of Japan demand their government surrender. Prefectural governors, police chiefs and officers began submitting home ministry reports on the rapid deterioration of the nations spirit. Germany signed the unconditional surrender documents on May 7th and 8th of 1945, Japan was alone. Newly installed President Truman declared on May 8th, Japan's surrender would not mean the extermination or enslavement of the Japanese people, but the unconditional surrender principles remained unaltered. The Japanese meanwhile were awaiting word from the Soviets. The Americans unleashed their first atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6th of 1945 killing up to 140,000 people. Then on August 8th the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and began an invasion of Manchuria. On August 9th the second atomic bomb hit Nagasaki killing around 40,000 people. Thus began the surrender clock as I like to say. After the first atomic bomb, Hirohito said and did nothing about the surrender terms. Hirohito then authorized Togo to notify the world on August 10th that Japan would accept the allied terms of surrender with one condition “that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler.” The next day, Secretary of State Byrnes replied by alluding to the subordination of the emperors authority to the supreme commander of the allied powers. It was ambiguous as hell. The Japanese leaders erupted into arguments, and on August 14th, Hirohito went before a microphone and recorded his capitulation announcement which aired on August 15th to all in Japan, they surrendered. Why did it take so long? The peace talks between the Japanese and Soviets went on through June, July and early August. Japan offered the Soviets limited territorial concessions and they refused to accept the envoy on July 22nd because the Japanese were being too ambiguous in their terms. There was continuous back and forth between the intelligence of Moscow and Japan trying to figure out the stance of the other, but then Stalin heard about the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, he was shocked and ordered an invasion of Manchuria in response. In the meantime the Japanese were tossing all sorts of concessions at Moscow, they stated they would allow Japanese to be used as forced laborers in Siberia, a form of reparation as it were, that they would demobilize the military and so on. The response was the invasion of Manchuria. Hirohito knew prior to the bombing of Hiroshima that the cabinet was divided on accepting the Potsdam terms. Hirohito also knew he and he alone could unify governmental affairs and military command. Why then did he wait until the evening of August 9th to surrender? The reality of the matter is its complicated, numerous variables at play, but let me try to pick at it. The people of japan under the firebomb campaigns were becoming hostile towards the military, the government and many began to criticize the emperor. Hirohito was given reports from the Home Ministry from governors and police chiefs all over Japan revealing people were speaking of the emperor as an incompetent leader who was responsible for worsening the war situation. Does that sound like a threat to the Kokutai? People were starving en masse, the atomic bomb is flashy, but what really was killing the Japanese, it was starvation. The home islands were blockaded and the sea approaches mined as pertaining to the optimally named “operation starvation”. Hirohito knew full well how bad his people were suffering but he did not surrender for so long. After Hiroshima was bombed, Hirohito delayed for 2 days before telling Kido at 10am on August 9th “quickly control the situation, the Soviet Union has declared war and today began hostilities against us”. Now here is a piece of Hirohito's surrender proclamation to the citizens of Japan “Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization. Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects, or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers... The hardships and sufferings to which Our nation is to be subjected hereafter will be certainly great. We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all of you, Our subjects. However, it is according to the dictates of time and fate that We have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is unsufferable ”. Hirohito wanted to obfuscate the issue of accountability, to prevent expressions of strife and anger and to strengthen domestic unity around himself, to protect and raise the kokutai. Did you know there was a rescript of this proclamation that was made to the entire IJA and IJN? Yes Emperor Hirohito gave out two different proclamations for surrender, here is what the armed forces heard. “ Now that the Soviet Union has entered the war against us, to continue . . . under the present conditions at home and abroad would only recklessly incur even more damage to ourselves and result in endangering the very foundation of the empire's existence. Therefore, even though enormous fighting spirit still exists in the Imperial Navy and Army, I am going to make peace with the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, as well as with Chungking, in order to maintain our glorious national polity”. The proclamation does not speak of the atomic weapons, but emphasizes the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. Hirohito was presented as a benevolent sage and an apolitical ruler that had ended the war. Hirohito sought to justify the surrender upon the bombs to the public, but did he believe so, did his armed forces believe so? People debate to this day why the surrender occurred, I love the fact there are two message offered because both are true. Hirohito's decision to surrender was based on numerous variables, the atomic bombs, the invasion of Manchuria by the soviets, but above all else, what really was important to the man, the emperor, the god? The kokutai. The Soviets were more of a threat to the kokutai, thus Hirohito jumped into the arms of the Americans. The language between the Americans and Japanese in the communications for unconditional surrender were ambiguous, but Hirohito and the high commanders knew there was zero chance of the kokutai surviving if the Soviets invaded Japan, perhaps the Americans would allow it to continue, which is just what they ended up doing. The entire purpose of this series would to emphasize how Hirohito definitely had a active role in the war of 1931-1945, he had numerous occasions where he could put the hammer down to stop the situation from escalating. But in the end when his back was against the wall, he did what he did to cling on to the Kokutai. I shall leave you with this. On August 12th, as Hirohito came to inform the imperial family of his decision to surrender, Prince Asaka asked him whether the war would continue if the Kokutai could not be preserved, what do you think he said? “Of Course”.

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S8 Ep114: The American occupation began amidst vast ruins; Japanese officials burned evidence regarding atrocities like Nanjing. Class A crimes focused on aggressive war, targeting senior leaders like Tojo Hideki. Crucial prosecution evidence was found in

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 23, 2025 13:13

The American occupation began amidst vast ruins; Japanese officials burned evidence regarding atrocities like Nanjing. Class A crimes focused on aggressive war, targeting senior leaders like Tojo Hideki. Crucial prosecution evidence was found in the detailed diary of the emperor's advisor, Kido Koichi. The US Supreme Court ruled against jurisdiction over earlier military commissions. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East was subsequently established.

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Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast #235

uk wrestling continental heat stroke tojo sunday night heat

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 22, 2025 58:20

Welcome back to another edition of the UK's number one and only Memphis wrestling related podcast, Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast. On this week's show we cover November 22nd 1986 Continental Wrestling where we will see:- The Sheepherders (Boyd/Bigfoot) vs. Jerry Garmen/Benny Trailer Jeff Jarrett/Billy Travis/Tracy Smothers/Paul Diamond vs. Keith Roberson/Dennis Hall/Boy Tony/Mike James (with Dolly Parker). Big Bubba/Goliath (with Bruno) vs. Robert Bryant/Keith Eric Rock n Roll RPMs vs. Mike Murphy/Jim Jamison. The Great Kabuki vs. Pat Tanaka Sato/Goto (with Tojo) vs. John Paul/Tony Parks Follow the show on facebook Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast (facebook.com/memphiscast) Check out Heat Stroke (our look at Sunday Night Heat from back in the day, now available on all good podcast suppliers, just search Heat Stroke) Visit our brand new tshirt store at https://www.unforgettablevision.com/roster/old-bakery-productions Check out Youtube.com/@memphiscast & patreon.com/memphiscast for videos You can watch the show https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i7Oe_EI4awc

3.176 Fall and Rise of China: Changkufeng Incident

Kings and Generals: History for our Future

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 17, 2025 36:32

Last time we spoke about the Soviet-Japanese Border Conflict. The border between Soviet Manchuria and Japanese-occupied territories emerges not as a single line but as a mosaic of contested spaces, marks, and memories. A sequence of incidents, skirmishes along the Chaun and Tumen rivers, reconnaissance sorties, and the complex diplomacy of Moscow, Tokyo, and peripheral actors to trace how risk escalated from routine patrols to calibrated leverage. On the ground, terrain functioned as both obstacle and argument: ridges like Changkufeng Hill shaping sightlines, river valleys shaping decisions, and markers weathered by snow, wind, and drift. In command tents, officers translated terrain into doctrine: contingency plans, supply routes, and the precarious calculus of restraint versus escalation. Both nations sought to establish firmer defensive barriers against the other. Inevitably they were destined to clash, but how large that clash would become, nobody knew. #176 The Changkufeng Incident Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the last episode we broke down a general history of the Soviet-Japanese Border Conflict and how it escalated significantly by 1938. Colonel Inada Masazum serving as chief of the 2nd Operations Section within the Operations Bureau in March of 1938 would play a significant role in this story. When the Japanese command's attention was drawn to the area of Changkufeng, consideration was given to the ownership and importance of the disputed high ground. Inada and his operations section turned to an appraisal of the geography. The officers had been impressed by the strategic importance of the Tumen, which served to cut off the hill country from North Korea. In the Changkufeng area, the river was a muddy 600 to 800 meters wide and three to five meters deep. Japanese engineers had described rowing across the stream as "rather difficult." Russian roads on the left bank were very good, according to Japanese intelligence. Heavy vehicles moved easily; the Maanshan section comprised the Russians' main line of communications in the rear. To haul up troops and materiel, the Russians were obliged to use trucks and ships, for there were no railways apart from a four-kilometer line between the harbor and town of Novokievsk. Near Changkufeng, hardly any roadways were suitable for vehicular traffic. On the right, or Korean, bank of the Tumen, there were only three roads suitable for vehicular traffic, but even these routes became impassable after a day or two of rain. In the sector between Hill 52 to the south and Shachaofeng to the north, the most pronounced eminences were Chiangchunfeng and the humps of Changkufeng. Rocky peaks were characteristically shaped like inverted T's, which meant many dead angles against the crests. The gentle slopes would allow tanks to move but would restrict their speed, as would the ponds and marshes. In general, the terrain was treeless and afforded little cover against aircraft. Against ground observation or fire, corn fields and tall miscanthus grass could provide some shielding. Between Chiangchunfeng and the Tumen, which would have to serve as the main route of Japanese supply, the terrain was particularly sandy and hilly. This rendered foot movement difficult but would reduce the effectiveness of enemy bombs and shells. The high ground east of Khasan afforded bases for fire support directed against the Changkufeng region. Plains characterized the rest of the area on the Soviet side, but occasional streams and swamps could interfere with movement of tanks and trucks. The only towns or villages were Novokievsk, Posyet, Yangomudy, and Khansi. At Kozando there were a dozen houses; at Paksikori, a few. The right bank was farmed mainly by Koreans, whose scattered cottages might have some value for billeting but offered none for cover. On the left bank, the largest hamlets were Fangchuanting, with a population of 480 dwelling in 73 huts, and Yangkuanping, where there were 39 cottages. Shachaofeng was uninhabited. Japanese occupation of Changkufeng would enable observation of the plain stretching east from Posyet Bay, although intelligence made no mention of Soviet naval bases, submarine pens, or airstrips in the immediate area of Posyet, either in existence or being built in 1938. As Inada knew, the Japanese Navy judged that Posyet Bay might have another use, as a site for Japanese landing operations in the event of war. In Russian hands, the high ground would endanger the Korean railway. This line, which started from Najin in northeastern Korea, linked up with the vital system in Manchuria at the town of Tumen and provided a short cut, if not a lifeline, between Japan and the Kwantung Army and Manchuria from across the Sea of Japan. Even from relatively low Changkufeng, six or seven miles of track were exposed to Soviet observation between Hongui and Shikai stations. The port of Najin, with its fortress zone, lay 11 miles southwest; Unggi lay even nearer. It was not the danger of Japanese shelling of Vladivostok, at an incredible range of 80 miles that was at stake but the more realistic hypothesis of Russian shelling of the rail line, and Russian screening of the Soviet side of the border. Hills and questions were thought to have two sides. It was the consensus of Japanese that Changkufeng Hill's potential value to the Russians far outweighed its possible benefits to them, or at least that the Japanese had more to lose if the Russians took the high ground by the Tumen. Inada nurtured few illusions concerning the intrinsic value of the heights. Despite the fact that the high command always had good reasons for quiescence in the north, Inada believed that the latest border difficulty could not be overlooked. By mid-July 1938 Inada's thoughts crystallized. The Japanese would conduct a limited reconnaissance in force known as iryoku teisatsu in the strategic sense. Whereas, at the tactical schoolbook level, this might mean the dispatch of small forces into enemy territory to seek local combat intelligence, at the Imperial General Headquarters level the concept was far more sweeping. There would also be useful evidence of mobilization and other buildup procedures. The affair at Changkufeng was merely a welcome coincidence, something started by the Russians but liable to Japanese exploration. Inada had no intention of seizing territory, of becoming involved in a war of attrition at a remote and minor spot, or of provoking hostilities against the USSR. The Russians would comprehend the nature of the problem, too. If they were interested in interfering seriously with the Japanese, there were numberless better locations to cause trouble along the Manchurian front; those were the places to watch. The cramped Changkufeng sector, described as "narrow like a cat's brow," could too readily be pinched off from Hunchun to render it of strategic value to either side. The bog land to the north interfered with the use of armored forces, while artillery sited on the heights along the Tumen in Korea could as easily control the area as batteries emplaced east of the lake. It was Inada's professional opinion that the Russians could commit three or four infantry divisions there at most, with no mechanized corps—no heavy tanks, in particular. No decisive battle could be waged, although, once the Russians became involved, they might have to cling to the hill out of a sense of honor. The military action would be meaningless even if the Japanese let the Russians have the heights. For their part, the Japanese would ostensibly be fighting to secure the boundary and to hold Changkufeng peak, beyond which they would not move a step onto Soviet soil. There would be no pursuit operations. Troop commitment would be limited to about one division without tank support. Japanese Air Force intervention would be forbidden. Matters would be directed entirely by Imperial General Headquarters working through the Korea Army chain of command and carried out by the local forces. Calm, clear, and dispassionate overall estimates and instructions would be based on materials available only in Tokyo. The command would not allow the Kwantung Army to touch the affair. Inada foresaw that the Japanese government might also seek a settlement through diplomacy. Although border demarcation was desirable and should be sought, the command would not insist on it, nor would it demand permanent occupation of Changkufeng summit. As soon as reconnaissance objectives had been achieved, the local forces would be withdrawn. As Inada described it "In the process, we would have taught the Russians some respect and given them a lesson concerning their repeated, high-handed provocations and intrusions. If a show of force sufficed to facilitate the negotiations and cause the Russians to back down, so much the better; the affair would be over and my point proved." The instrument for carrying out Inada's strategic design appeared to be ideal, the 19th Division, strenuously trained and high-spirited. It could be expected to perform very well if unleashed within defined limits. Colonel Suetaka was just the commander to direct local operations. Since he had been pleading to fight in China, an operation at Changkufeng might prove to be an excellent "safety valve." His staff was full of experienced, fierce warriors eager for battle. Until recently, the Korea Army commanding general had wisely kept the aggressive division away from Changkufeng Hill, but now Imperial general headquarters had its own overriding ideas and needs. How could the Japanese ensure that any military action would remain limited if the Russians chose to respond with vigor? Naturally, one infantry division, without armor or air support, could not withstand all of the Soviet forces in the maritime province. Inada answered that the mission to be assigned the 19th Division was merely the recapture of Changkufeng crest. If the Japanese side had to break off the operation, evacuation would be effected voluntarily and resolutely on Imperial general headquarters responsibility, without considerations of "face." At worst, the Japanese might lose one division, but the affair would be terminated at the Tumen River without fail. "Even so, we ought to be able to prove our theory as well as demonstrate our true strength to the Russians." In case the Soviets opted for more than limited war, the Japanese were still not so overextended in China that they could not alter their strategic disposition of troops. Although the Kwantung Army's six divisions were outnumbered four to one and the Japanese were not desirous of a war at that moment, the first-class forces in Manchuria could make an excellent showing. In addition, the high command possessed armor, heavy artillery, fighters, and bombers, held in check in Manchuria and Korea, as well as reserves in the homeland. There was also the 104th Division, under tight Imperial general headquarters control, in strategic reserve in southern Manchuria. Inada recalled "How would the Russians react? That was the answer I sought. Victory in China depended on it." By mid-July, the high command, at Inada's urging, had worked out a plan titled, "Imperial General headqaurters Essentials for Dealing with the Changkufeng Incident." Tada's telegram of 14 July to Koiso described succinctly the just-decided policy: the central authorities concurred with the Korea Army's opinion regarding the Changkufeng affair, then in embryo. Considering that Changkufeng Hill posed a direct threat to the frontier of Korea, Imperial General headqaurters would immediately urge the foreign ministry to lodge a stern protest. Next day, Tojo sent a telegram stating the Japanese policy of employing diplomacy; whether the Russians should be evicted by force required cautious deliberation in case the USSR did not withdraw voluntarily. On the basis of the guidance received from Imperial General headqaurters, the Korea Army drew up its own plan, "Essentials for Local Direction of the Changkufeng Incident," on 15 July. Intelligence officer Tsuchiya Sakae was sent promptly to the front from Seoul. At the same time, military authorities allowed the press to release news that Soviet troops were constructing positions inside Manchurian territory in an "obvious provocation." The government of Manchukuo was demanding an immediate withdrawal. Even then, those Japanese most closely connected with the handling of the Changkufeng Incident were not in agreement that everybody at command level was as ardent a proponent of reconnaissance in force as Inada claimed to be. Some thought that most, if not all, of his subordinates, youthful and vigorous, were in favor of the notion; others denied the existence of such an idea. Inada remained clear-cut in his own assertions. Everything done by the local Soviet forces, he insisted, must have been effected with the permission of Moscow; it was customary for the USSR not to abandon what it had once started. The Japanese Army never really thought that the Soviet Union would withdraw just as the result of diplomatic approaches. Therefore, from the outset, preparations were made to deal the Russians one decisive blow. Inada had recommended his plan, with its clear restrictions, to his colleagues and superiors; the scheme, he says, was approved 14 July "all the way up the chain of command, through the Army general staff and the ministry of war, with unexpected ease." The only real opposition, Inada recalled, came from the navy, whose staff advised the army operations staff, in all sincerity, to give up the idea of strategic reconnaissance. Inada adhered to his opinion stubbornly. He never forgot the grave look on the face of Captain Kusaka, the UN operations section chief, as the latter gave in reluctantly. The navy view was that the Changkufeng affair typified the army's aggressive policies as opposed to relative passivity on the part of the navy. Like Kusaka, Japanese Navy interviewees shared the fear that Changkufeng might prove to be the most dangerous military confrontation ever to occur between the USSR and Japan. In view of navy objections, one wonders where Inada could have drawn support for his concept of reconnaissance in force. If one accepts the comments contained in a letter from a navy ministry captain, Takagi Sokichi, to Baron Harada Kumao at the beginning of August, in the army and in a portion of the navy there existed "shallow-minded fellows who are apt to take a firm stand in the blind belief that the USSR would not really rise against us, neglecting the fact that the Russians had foreseen our weak points." Takagi also had violent things to say about "white-livered" Gaimusho elements that were playing up to the army. Although Takagi's remarks, expressed in confidence, were sharp, cautious injunctions were being delivered by the high command to the new Korea Army commander, General Nakamura Kotaro, who was about to leave for Seoul to replace Koiso. Nakamura's attitude was crucial for the course and outcome of the Changkufeng Incident. More of a desk soldier than a warrior, he characteristic ally displayed a wariness that was reinforced by the guidance provided him. This personal quality assumes even greater significance if one believes that the Russians may have initiated the Changkufeng Incident by exploiting the special opportunities afforded them by the routine replacement of the Korea Army commander, the temporary absence from Moscow of Ambassador Shigemitsu Mamoru, and the geographical as well as subjective gap between the Kwantung and Korea armies that was exposed during the Lyushkov affair. At 10:00 on 15 July Nakamura was designated army commander by the Emperor at the palace. Soon afterward, he was briefed by Imperial General headquarters officers. Hashimoto, the operations bureau chief, recalled that when he saw Nakamura off on 17 July, Hashimoto stressed prudence, limitation of any military action, and diplomatic solution of the problem. The new commanding general, Inada asserted, promised full cooperation. There was no mention, at this level, of Inada's concept of reconnaissance in force. When Nakamura reached Seoul, he found an Imperial order from Tokyo dated 16 July awaiting him. This important document stipulated that he could concentrate units under his command in Korea near the border against the trespassing Soviet forces in the Changkufeng area. Resort to force, however, was dependent upon further orders. This message was followed by a wire from Kan'in, the Army general staff chief. The Imperial order, it was explained, had been designed to support diplomatic negotiations. Simultaneous approval was granted for concentrating forces to respond swiftly in case the situation deteriorated. As for implementation of the Imperial order, discretion should be exercised in line with the opinion expressed earlier by Korea Army Headquarters. Negotiations were to be conducted in Moscow and Harbin, the location of a Soviet consulate in Manchukuo. Meanwhile, the command was dispatching two officers for purposes of liaison: Lt. Colonel Arisue Yadoru in Operations and Major Kotani Etsuo a specialist in Soviet intelligence. Inada advised Arisue that, apart from liaison flights inside the frontiers, particular care should be exercised with regard to actions that might lead to air combat. Nevertheless, although Inada stated that the Imperial order called for "a sort of military demonstration," he admitted that it meant preparatory action for an attack. The Korea Army senior staff officer, Iwasaki, recalled hearing nothing about secret intentions. Nakamura briefed his staff about the need for restraint, especially during this key period of the Wuhan operation. Koiso had disposed of speculation that he had issued an order to concentrate the 19th Division before Nakamura arrived, although he and Nakamura did have the opportunity to confer in Seoul before he departed for Japan. The Imperial order of 16 July, in response to Koiso's inquiry received in Tokyo on 14 July, had arrived in Seoul addressed to Nakamura; thereupon, the Korea Army chief of staff, Kitano, had the message conveyed to the division. By 21 July Koiso was back in Tokyo where, the day afterward, he advised the war minister, Itagaki, "to act prudently with respect to the Changkufeng problem." Why did the high command dispatch two field-grade liaison officers to Korea from the outset of the Changkufeng Incident? The Korea Army lacked operations staff. Its commander had been allotted prime responsibility, within the chain of command, for defense of northeastern Korea. At the beginning, the highest-ranking staff officer at the front was a major. Since there were no fundamental differences of opinion between the command and the forces in Korea, it was proper to send experts from Tokyo to assist. Imperial General headqaurters would observe the situation carefully, devise measures on the basis of the overall view, and issue orders which the Korea Army would implement through ordinary channels. It had not been the type of incident which required the army commander to go to the front to direct. This was the Korea Army's first test, and political as well as diplomatic problems were involved that the army in the field should not or could not handle. If Tokyo had left decisions to the division and its regiments, the latter would have been held to account, which was not proper. Imperial General headquarters had to assume responsibility and reassure local commanders of its full support. Imaoka Yutaka explained that operational guidance by Imperial General headquarters and line operations conducted by the 19th Division formed the core of the affair; the Korea Army, placed between, was "shadowy." Koiso had not been enthusiastic; this set the mood among the staff. Nakamura, who arrived with a thorough comprehension of AGS thinking, was basically passive. The Korea Army staff, in general, included no "wild boars." There was an urgent need to monitor developments. Not only was the Korea Army unfamiliar with handling this type of incident, but many hitches occurred. There had been no practice in emergency transmission of coded wires between the Korea Army and Tokyo. Now telegram after telegram had to be sent; most were deciphered incorrectly and many were not decoded at all. Another problem centered on the lack of knowledge in Tokyo about the situation on the spot, which only visual observation could rectify. As a result, the two Army general staff experts, Arisue and Kotani, arrived in Korea on 16 July. Kotani recalled that he was to collect intelligence and assist the local authorities. One of the first duties that he and Arisue performed was to disseminate the principle that use of force required a prior Imperial order. Also on 16 July, Japanese newspapers reported that the USSR was still concentrating troops, that the Manchukuoan government was watching intently, "decisive punitive measures" were being contemplated by the Japanese-Manchukuoan authorities, and there were signs of a worsening of the crisis. Despite good reasons for this gloomy appraisal, the Japanese press had not yet given the incident page-one treatment. More alarming news was being disseminated abroad. Domei, the official Japanese news agency, reported that the situation would probably become worse unless Soviet troops were withdrawn. The position of the Japanese government impressed foreign correspondents as unusually firm. Informants characterized the Changkufeng Incident as the most serious affair since the clash on the Amur River in 1937. Irked by the Korea Army's timidity and eager for first-hand information, the Kwantung Army dispatched two observers to the front: from Intelligence, Ogoshi Kenji, and from Operations, Tsuji Masanobu. If you listen to my pacific war week by week podcast or echoes of war, you know I highlight Tsuji Masanobu as one of the most evil Japanese officers of WW2. No other way to describe this guy, he was a shithead. In his memoirs, Tsuji asserted that he and Ogoshi climbed Changkufeng Hill, discerned Soviet soldiers digging across the peak in Manchurian territory, and concluded that "probably even Tokyo could not overlook such a clear-cut case of invasion." Although his account aligned with the general thrust, Ogoshi contended that Tsuji could not have accompanied him. According to sources with the 19th Division, when Koiso learned that Tsuji and Ogoshi were disparaging the Korea Army's ability to defend Changkufeng, he ordered "those spies" ousted. Ogoshi replied that the army staff was not angry, but Koiso did become furious and ordered Ogoshi "arrested for trespassing." Ogoshi surmised that Koiso's concern was that emotional outsiders such as Tsuji could provoke trouble, perhaps even war, if they visited Changkufeng. This view was widely shared. Inada stated that he made a practice of keeping away to maintain the degree of detachment and impartiality required of high command authorities. One sidelight to the "fraternal" visit to the Changkufeng area by observers from Hsinking was provided by Lt. Colonel Katakura Tadashi, chief of the Kwantung Army's 4th Section, which handled Manchukuo affairs, primarily political direction. When Katakura visited the Operations Section, Tsuji and Ogoshi told him that an intrusion had been confirmed and that the Kwantung Army staff was studying ways to evict the Soviets. Katakura consulted Maj. General Ishiwara Kanji, acting chief of staff, who was already in possession of the draft of an operations order calling for offensive preparations by the Kwantung Army against the Russians at Changkufeng. Katakura asked for reconsideration of the order. This was not a matter to be handled solely by the operations staff. Borders and international affairs were involved; hence the 4th Section, along with the Manchukuoan government, the Gaimusho, and other agencies, were concerned. Field observers were expressing exaggerated personal opinions based on having seen Soviet sentries on a hilltop. If the matter fell within the Korea Army's defensive prerogative, that army ought to handle it. Apparently the Kwantung Army commander and Ishiwara agreed with Katakura, for the draft order was not approved. The so-called private message dispatched by a Kwantung Army staff officer just before Koiso's departure may have been provoked by this rejection of direct participation by forces under Kwantung Army command. Staff officers in Tokyo believed that Hsinking could not see the forest for the trees. In the high command's view, the Kwantung Army's deliberate escalation of a negligible frontier incident undoubtedly stemmed from a failure to grasp the strategic requirements of national defense—pursuit of the campaign in China, the nurturance of Manchukuo, and the buildup of operational readiness for the ultimate solution of the Soviet problem. The high command felt obliged to remind the Kwantung Army that, in dealing with the Changkufeng Incident, the central authorities pressed for a Russian pullback through diplomacy. Consequently, the Korea Army had been instructed to be ready to concentrate troops near Changkufeng as a "background." Meanwhile, it remained the Imperial will that utmost prudence be exercised. The Kwantung Army commander accordingly issued cautious instructions to subordinate units, especially those on the eastern border. The high command's injunctions did not end the discontent and recrimination at the lower levels of Kwantung Army Headquarters, nor did they quiet the concern felt in Tokyo. A former war minister told Baron Harada repeatedly in late July that the Kwantung Army was "no good," while the superintendent of police added that the Kwantung Army was embarrassing Foreign Minister Ugaki. Nevertheless, the Kwantung Army did exert self-restraint. For its part, the Korea Army naïvely sought to achieve entente with an antagonist who considered the case nonnegotiable. First, the government of Manchukuo was asked to lodge a formal protest with the USSR. The commissioner for foreign affairs at Harbin phoned V. V. Kuznetzov, the acting consul, on the night of 14 July and saw him on the 18th. Basing its contentions on maps, the Haensing regime demanded Soviet withdrawal from Changkufeng. The Japanese government was lodging similar protests within the framework of Japanese-Manchukuoan joint defense agreements. On the spot, the situation inflamed. During the afternoon of 15 July, a Japanese military police patrol from Korea reconnoitered at the foot of Hill 52, southeast of Changkufeng. The party came under Soviet gunfire and was driven back, abandoning the body of Corp. Matsushima Shakuni. Japanese sources claimed that a Russian ambush had been set inside Manchuria. The Russian side insisted that it was the Soviet frontier that had been violated by thirty meters. Kuzma Grebennik, the colonel commanding the 59th BGU, which covered the Posyet sector, asserted that Matsushima's effects included a notebook containing reconnaissance results and a camera with film of Soviet-claimed terrain, particularly Changkufeng Hill. According to Maj. Gilfan Batarshin, a subordinate of Grebennik, two Russian border guards from Podgornaya opened fire when the Japanese fled after being challenged. Japanese protests to the USSR about the death of Matsushima and the taking of his body were added to the negotiations concerning the disputed border and the alleged trespassing. Charge Nishi Haruhiko lodged a vigorous complaint in Moscow on 15 July but was answered by a counterprotest. Ambassador Shigemitsu underwent an identical experience during a conversation with Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov on 20 July. Shigemitsu retorted that the murder tended to exacerbate the negotiations. In his memoirs, he stated that the killing of Matsushima provoked the local Japanese border garrison unit. The shooting occurred as the Soviet military buildup continued, according to Japanese sources. Mechanized units were reported moving in the direction of Kyonghun from Barabash and Posyet Bay. Biplanes were reconnoitering the Hunchun Valley, within Manchurian territory, from the afternoon of 16 July. To the local Japanese authorities, it seemed that the Russians were adopting a challenging attitude. Although the Japanese-Manchukuoan side remained willing to negotiate—that is, to take no forceful actions if the Russians would withdraw, the latter appeared not to share such an intention. The Soviets were not only misinterpreting the Hunchun treaty to their advantage but were encroaching beyond what they claimed to be the line; they "lacked sincerity." Decisive use of force might have been imperative to secure the Manchurian border, which was Japan's legal responsibility. As far north as Tungning on the eastern Manchurian frontier, two Soviet ground divisions and considerable numbers of tanks and aircraft were reported massed in full view. At Changkufeng, Russian soldiers fortified the crest. Mountain guns were now seen with muzzles pointed toward Manchuria, and Japanese intelligence estimated that Soviet troop strength near Changkufeng had grown to 120 or 130 by the evening of 18 July. As Sawamoto Rikichiro, an Imperial aide, noted in his diary, "It would seem that settlement of the affair had become increasingly difficult." Korea Army staff officer Tsuchiya sent two emissaries bearing the notice to the Soviet border. The pair, "blazing with patriotic ardor,"set out on 18 July, carrying a message in one hand and a white flag in the other. From Kyonghun came the report the next day that there had been an urgent, well-attended Soviet staff meeting at BGU Headquarters in Novokievsk all night, and that the Russian side had been discomfited by the Japanese request, which had been transmitted to higher authorities. Still, the emissaries did not return, while a stream of reports indicated a Soviet buildup along a dozen frontier sectors. Russian authorities had reportedly forced the natives to evacuate an area twenty miles behind their borders. From Japanese observation posts, Soviet convoys of men, guns, and horses could be sighted moving toward Novokievsk after being unloaded from transports originating at Vladivostok. Japanese Army Intelligence reported that on 18 July a regimental-size force had arrived at Novokievsk; artillery displacements forward were particularly visible by night east of Khasan. A confidential Gaimusho message indicated that Soviet truck movements between Posyet, Novokievsk, and the front had increased since the 20th. Russian intrusions, kidnappings, and sniping incidents were reported along the Manchurian borders, from Manchouli on the west to Suifenho on the east, between 18 and 25 July. Aircraft on daytime reconnaissance were detected as far as three miles inside Manchurian territory in the Hunchun area. Although the Japanese asserted that their forbearance was being tested, Izvestiya charged "Japanese militarists" with manufacturing an affair at Ussuri as well as at Changkufeng. The Japanese themselves received reports from the Changkufeng front that by 20 July the Soviets had 250 soldiers, armed with field pieces, trench mortars, howitzers, and light and heavy machine guns, on the southern slopes. The Russians were putting up tents capable of holding 40 men each; officers could be observed for the first time. On the evening of the 20th, the Soviets lobbed illuminating shells toward Manchurian territory. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Inada Masazum, studying maps and mud, saw Changkufeng Hill as a prize with peril, a test of nerve rather than a conquest. Tokyo's orders pulsed through Seoul and Harbin: guard, probe, and deter, but avoid full-scale war. Across the border, Soviet units pressed closer, lights and tents flickering on the hillside. The sea within sight whispered of strategy, diplomacy, and a warning: a single misstep could redraw Asia. And so the standoff waited, patient as winter.

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Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast #234

uk wrestling continental heat stroke tojo sunday night heat

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 15, 2025 58:38

Welcome back to another edition of the UK's number one and only Memphis wrestling related podcast, Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast. On this week's show we cover November 15th 1986 Continental Wrestling where we will see:- Sato/Goto (with Tojo) vs. Jarrett/Diamond Rock n Roll RPMs (Mike Davis/Tommy Lane) vs. David Razor/Keith Eric. Big Bubba/Goliath (with Bruno) vs. Jim Jamison/Benny Trailer/Jerry Garmen/David Johnson The Sheepherders (Boyd/Bigfoot) vs. Tony Parks/David Haskins Dennis Hall/Boy Tony (with Dolly Parker) vs. Jerry The King Lawler/Hillbilly Elmer. If you enjoy the show then please leave a review or comment and tell your friends! Follow the show on facebook Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast (facebook.com/memphiscast) Check out Heat Stroke ( our look at Sunday Night Heat from back in the day, now available on all good podcast suppliers, just search Heat Stroke Visit our brand new tshirt store at https://www.unforgettablevision.com/roster/old-bakery-productions Check out Youtube.com/@memphiscast & patreon.com/memphiscast for videos You can watch the show https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bd5KpX2a3es

- 208 - Special General Kanji Ishiwara part 4: Ishiwara vs Hideki Tojo

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 11, 2025 37:53

Hey guys before you listen to this one, do realize this is part 4 on a series about General Kanji Ishiwara, so if you have not already done so I would recommend listening to Part 1-2-3. This episode is General Kanji Ishiwara part 4: Ishiwara vs Hideki Tojo So I promised this would be the last one and it is, rest assured. Sheesh what started as a suggested episode turned into an entire series, but then again Ishiwara Kanji was quite a figure. I recently did a podcast with Cody from AlternateHistoryHub, and at the end of the podcast he poked at me for some alternate history ideas related to the Pacific War. My first thought was what if the Triple Intervention after the Russo-Japanese War never occurred, but then I thought….hell what if Ishiwara Kanji never existed or I dunno got hit by a car. Imagine how different things would have been if not for this one, I am just gonna say it, instigator haha. Now I think when one looks at this mans life, we attribute much of the story towards the Mukden Incident and the eventual full scale China war, but thats not where it ends of course. Ishiwara did a lot during the war and after, so to close it all up lets jump back into it. Ishiwara is now a Major General , chief of the most powerful office on the general staff. He was fighting tooth and nail to limit operations in what was the new China War. A month before everything hit the fan he declared in front of the General staff “I shall never send a single soldier to China as long as I live”. But in mid-June of 1937 rumors emerged that the China garrison was planning another incident in the Beijing area, similar to Ishiwara's famous Mukden incident of September 1931. Two weeks later the Marco Polo Bridge incident occurred on July 7th. The Japanese army were divided on the issue. There was the expansionists who sought to smash China in a single blow and the non-expansionists who sought to settle everything between their nations before the conflict became too large. Ishiwara was on the side of the non-expansionists and from the earliest hours of the war he directed a losing fight to try and localize the conflict. Fight as he must to stop mobilization of further forces, he was forced to relent multiple times and to his horror the conflict grew and grew. Ishiwara's efforts or some would say meddling, ironically made things worse for the non-expansionists. Some of the expansionists would go on the record to state Ishiwara bungled the situation, years after the China incident, Colonel Shibayama would say with bitterness “The idea that Ishiawara Kanji opposed the expansion of the China incident is nonsense. If he really had opposed it he wouldn't have agreed to the mobilization. There were certainly other ways of solving the problem” Ishiwara was stuck between a rock and a hard place. While he wanted to stop the mobilization of more forces to China, the men at the front kept sending reports that Japanese citizens were underthreat in areas like Beijing, his wrists were turned as they say. Ishiwara did not cave in without a fight however, as I said in the last episode he turned to Prime Minister Konoe to strike a deal with Chiang Kai-shek, and Konoe nearly did, but at the last minute he canceled his flight to Nanking. When the North China incident saw action spring up in Shanghai, it then became officially the China incident and Ishiwara attempted once more to push for a peace settlement in September. However by that point Ishiwara's influence had dropped considerably, few in the Operations division were still following his lead. Many of the expansionists began to bemoan Ishiwara as nothing more than a nuisance. Prince Sainji would go on the record telling Konoe “Ishiwara is like a candly in the wind ready to be snuffed out at any moment”. By late september Ishiwara was removed from the General staff by General Tada. The expansionists had won the day. There were other non-expansionists like Horiba Kazuo and Imai Takeo who carried on fighting the non-expansionist cause, but in january of 1938 Konoe decalred the Japanese government would not treat with Chiang Kai-shek. It was the nail in the coffin. The war escalted, by 1938 24 divisions were tossed into China, in 1939 it would be 34 bogged down. The IJA was without mobilization divisions and less than half the ammunition necessary for the 15 divisions assigned to the borders with the USSR and that critical weakness became only to apparent with two border clashes in 1938 and 1939. To Ishiwara it was all too predicatable, he had continuously argued the folly of a China War. He lectured about how it was impossible to conquer China “China is like an earthworm. Cut it in two and it will still keep on wriggling”. Ishiwara believed China's territory and self-sufficiency built upon its masses would always make up for Japanese military might. Ishiwara unlike his colleagues believed Japan was not capable of dealing a knock out blow against China. He would criticize many for promoting the idea stating “those who excite the public by claims of victory, just because the army has captured some out of the way little area, do so only to coneal their own incompetence as they squander the nation's power in an unjustified war”. In the fall of 1937 Ishiwara found himself back in mainland Asia with an appointed as the vice chief of staff of the Kwantung army. But he came back with a scarred reputation now, for his non-expansionist fight earned him a lot of scorn. All of his ideas of a political independent and racially equal Manchukuo in 1932 had all but disappeared. The Japanese military and civilians occupied all important positions in the puppet state. The Kwantung army authorities, particularly that of Hideki Tojo wgo was at the time a provost marshal in Manchuria had taken a stern line against any efforts to revive East Asian League or their ideals. So when Ishiwara arrived, he quickly realized his influence had deminished significantly. None the less he took up his old cause trying to work with the barely relavent Concordia association, but they were fighting against Tojo who received a promotion to chief of staff in Manchuria in March. Tojo was now Ishiwara's superior, it was a hopeless cause, but Ishiwara persisted. Ishiwara began insisting the Kwantung army must step asie to allow for self-government to reing over Manchuria. He argued Japan's special holdings in Manchuria should be turned over to the Manchukuo government and that the Concordia association should act as a guiding source. He also pointed out how dangerous the USSR was too Manchuria and that Japan must increase its forces in the border areas of Manchuria. For all of this he recommended a solution would be a Asian union, that if Manchukuo flourished under racial equality and harmony, perhaps it would show the rest of China Sino-Japanese cooperation was possible and maybe China would join an East Asian league. Ishiwara would continously hammer the idea, that the solution to the China war was to create an effective east asian league. With China in the fold, they would have unrivaled airpower, a prime element in his preparation for the Final War. Not a single one of his arguments were given any consideration. Ontop of his radical ideas, Ishiwara also advised reducing salaries for Japanese officials in Manchuria and was as you can imagine denounced quickly by his colleagues for this. Then Ishiwara found out Tojo was embezzling Kwantung army funds to the officers wives club, a pet project of Mrs Tojo. So Ishiwara went ahead by pointing out Tojo's corruption and added a large insult by suggesting Tojo had the mentality of a mere sergeant. In a public speech at the Concordia association infront of a mixed Japanese/manchurian audience he tore into many of his colleagues like General Hashimoto Toranosuke who was an honorary president of said association and Ishiwara said “he did nothing but sit around and draw a high salary, setting a disgraceful example to junior officers”. So yeah Ishiwara soon found himself very very isolated in the Kwantung army staff. Tojo received a promotion to vice minister of war in May of 1938, with the support of notable expansionist types. As for Ishiwara he had became quite a headache to his colleagues. Depressed and disgusted with the situation, Ishiwara decided to quit the army before he was tossed out. He first tried to apply at the war ministry to be placed on the reserve list but was told the matter required approval of the minister of war. At that time, it was actually his old buddy Itagaki Seishiro as minister of war. While the decision was being made, Ishiwara was authorized to return to Japan, but when he did the Kwantung army inisted he had departed without authorization to do so, basically arguing he just walked away from his desk one day. Itagaki made no move to summon Ishiwara once he was back in Tokyo, but Tojo as vice minister got wind of the situation and was all too eager to pounce. It turned out Tojo had Kenpeitai waching Ishiwara and some of his closest colleagues for awhile and he chose this moment to haul Ishiwara up for military indiscipline. The case against Ishiwara was quite a controversy and in the end all Itagaki could do for his old friend was get him an command over the Maizuru fortress area on Japan's seacost of Kyoto prefecture. The day before the orders were posted, Tojo managed to toss one last punch at Ishiwara. He order his Kenpeitai friend, special service commander Colonel Otani Keijiro to carry out a lightning raid on the Tokyo offices of the Concordia Association which saw the arrests of some of Ishiwara's close colleagues. 1939-1941 marked a terrible time for Ishiwara's military career, but he did take the time to build more so upon his Final War theory, the national defense state, the Showa restoration and the East Asian league. Ishiwara's lackluster Maizuru assignment was a quite backwater, not demanding much attention. During his leisure time he came to the conclussion based on his analysis of military history with some fresh readings of Buddhist texts that the Final War was destined to break out within the next 40 years or so. On March 10th of 1939 he made an address to the Concordia association in Toyko “a concept of world war “sekai sensokan”. He stated based on his analysis that Japan had to prepare for the final war because “world conflict is now in the semifinal round and it is for this reason that the necessity has arrived for an east asian league”. In August of 1939 Itagaki resigned as war minister to take up a position on on the chief of staff in the China expeditionary army which was then grinding to a halt. But before he did so, he made one of his final acts as war minister to give Ishiwara command of the 16th reserve division in Kyoto. It was not a frontline position, but it was an important one, as the Kyoto command was notable for developing infantry tactics. Japan had just received some major defeats to the USSR at the battle of Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol so Ishiwara went to work developing some anti soviet tactics. This led to some infiltration techniques that would see application with the IJA during the early battles of the Pacific War. But despite his work on tactics, what really consumed his mind was pressing for the East Asian League. He argued a Showa restoration needed to happen, like the Meiji restoration, but this new one would be pan-asian, to face the west. In May of 1940 he put all of his arguments together in a public address that gained fame under the title “on the final war”. It was here he unleashed two decades of his thoughts into the Japanese public. He added some new features to his theories such as a “the world had entered a second industrial revolution”. He pointed out German had pioneered in the field of electrochemistry, producing energy for both industrial production and weapons of war. Such discoveries he argued would permit Asian nations to catch up and eventually overtake the west in productive and destructive power. But above all else he kept hammering the necessity for an east asian league, which required a Showa restoration to finally bring pan-asianism. In November of 1939, as a successor to the Concordia Association, the association for an east asian league was established with its HQ in tokyo. Ishiwara was unable to officially become a member because he was part of the military, but he was an unofficial advisor and more importantly in the eyes of the public it was his association. By 1941 the association blew up to 100,000 members, mostly ex-soldiers, businessmen, journalists, farmers and such. They had a monthly magazine, training courses, meetings, lectures, the works. They extensively studied Ishiwara's writings on the history of war, the Showa restoration and his Final War theory. They spent extensive resources securing bases on the asian mainland trying to recruit supporters amongst other asian peoples to create a federation. Within Japanese controlled portions of China, they propagated the concept of the East Asian league. For the small group of collaborationists in China, many were attracted to it. In February of 1941 the General China assembly for the east asian league, was established in Nanjing with Wang Jingwei as chairman. Oh Wang Jingwei…having spent so much time learning about the Warlord Era and Northern Expedition, it never surprises me this guy would cling to anything for power. The influence of the league even found its way to Chongqing, and Chiang Kai-shek allegedly declared that peace negotiations could be pursued based on some aspects of the movement. But come spring of 1941, all of the leagues efforts would be dashed by Tojo. In early 1941, Tojo as war minister began plotting against the league and its architect Ishiwara. Tojo believed the east asian league was very defeatists and antithetical to his own hard line stance on Sino-Japanese relations. It also provided his nemesis Ishiwara with a political base to generate public opposition to his government's policies. Tojo obviously thought Ishiwara would use such a thing to overthrow him, so he went to war. His first move was to put Ishiwara on the retired list in december of 1940. However Ishiwara was still a influential figure and held some considerably powerful friends like Prince Higashikuni, so he was unable to safely pull this off. Instead he chose to harass the league. Initially Premier Konoe was backing the league, but Tojo began to pressure Konoe to take a position against it. On January 14th, the konoe cabinet stated “as it appears that they violate respect for the nation and cast a shadow on the imperial authority, theories advocating leagues of states are hereby not permitted”. Thus the east asian league became illegal. Taking the cue on the cabinets decision, the Japanese media began a running hit pieces on the league, kind of like how America works today, ompf. By february of 1941 the criticism towards the league was smashing them. All of Ishiwara's allies within the league were hit hard, some even tortured, it was a purge. For Ishiwara nothing really happened, except for the continual surveillance by the Kenpeitai. Ishiwara proceeded to vent his wrath in public speeches, pretty bold ass move if you ask me and he delivered one fiery one at Kyoto university on east asia problems where he told his audience “the enemy is not the chinese people, but rather certain Japanese. It is particularly Tojo Hideki and Umezu Yoshijiro, who, armed and pursuing their own ambition, are the enemy of Japan. As disturbers of the peace they are the enemies of the world. They should be arrested and executed”. Excuse my french, but the fucking balls on this guy haha. Ishiwara made this statement in public and at the time he was still in military service, its simply incredible he did not suffer horrible punishment after slandering the minister of war and commander of the kwantung army. Why was he not punished, well again it was awkward as he still had a cult following and going after him might see violence. Ishiwara would later state the reason he was not persecuted was because “Tojo was a coward who never had the courage to arrest me. The fact that a man like Tojo and his henchmen came to power was one reason for Japan's downfall”. Regardless Ishiwara's public statements finally led to him being placed on the retirement list on March 1st of 1941 and yes it was 100% Tojo who pushed this. Tojo ordered the Kenpeitai to watch Ishiwara closely for weeks after his forced retirement. Ishiwara enthusiastically went into retirement as he now was fully dedicated to his four great concerns: the east asian league, the showa restoration, the national defense state and of course the final war theory. In the meantime another league had opened up, the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere and you would be forgiven to believe it was the same as the east asian league if not its successor. Both perpetuated common ideology, like racial harmony, stemming from the Concordia association. Ishiwara's concepts of national defense also found their way in the Greater east asia co-prosperity sphere. It advocated for most of the basic principals of the league, common defense, political independence and integration of economic systems. How did they differ you might ask? Well Ishiwara's east asian league did not share the formers racial superiority of the Japanese as its cornerstone. The east asian league was not built upon the premise that China was incompetent as a modern state and needed to be led. For you american listeners, its actually pretty easy to summarize the co-prosperity sphere idea, its was Japan's monroe doctrine. The east asian league had been undone by the China War and then Pacific War, leaving the co-prosperity sphere to monopolize the asian continent and it did so through brute force and undermined any chance of pan-asianism. Ishiwara sought the east asian league solely because he truly believed pan-asianism would be required to build up enough forces to fight the final war. During his retirement Ishiwara went on lecturing in major universities, but Tojo unleashed the Kenpeitai upon him, whom often demanded he cancel a lecture or not talk about certain subjects. I guess its like Youtube today, haha. Though ever the more isolated, when the Pacific War kicked off, Ishiwara could not be fully muzzled. He did not opposed the surprise attack on pearl harbor publically, but privately he predicted Japan had begun a war it would lose, based solely on material terms. A famous thing he once said to Satomi Kishio which appears in an cooky anime called Zipang where some member of the SDF accidentally go back in time to june 4th of 1942 if you were curious, really funny premise, but anyways, Ishiwara said this “inevitably, we shall lose this war. It will be a struggle in which Japan, even though it has only a thousand yen in its pocket, plans to spend ten thousand, while the United States has a hundred thousand yen, but only needs to spend ten thousand…we simply cannot last. Japan started this war without considering its resources beforehand”. I love this passage. It's an excellent way to speak to a general public, very effective I find. Ishiwara criticized the military for spreading themselves out too thinly in the early months of the war, dispersing countless men on small islands in the pacific. But above all else, he kept hammering the fact the China war needed to end. China was sucking up the vast majority of Japan's military resources and men, how could Japan hope to wage a war against a nation like the US when it was stuck in China? When Saipan fell in 1944, Ishiwara said all hope was lost. He believed the only possible way Japan could avoid disaster was if the USSR broke its pact with its allies and offered a settlement to Japan, but he knew that was a long shot given how anti-communist Japan was. I have to make a point here to say a LOT of Ishiwara's talk, comes postwar and feels like a “i told you so”. Ishiwara gave testimony at the Tokyo war crime trials and declared “despite its material inferiority, Japan did not need to suffer a defeat, if its strategy had been well planned and carried out”. He even made a remark to an American correspondent named Mark Gayn in 1946 stating if he held command of the forces he would have ended the war with China, consolidated Japanese defensive lines and made a proper stand. Throughout the war, Ishiwara battled Tojo, often referring to him as a simpleton. In fact in late 1942 he arranged an audience with Tojo and told him to his face that he was too incompetent to run the nation or wage a war and that he should step down. There was a rumor Ishiwara was part of a plot to assassinate Tojo in the summer of 1944. This was a scheme hatched by some junior officers in the central HQ, and one of their members was a east asian league associate. Ishiwara was called upon to Tokyo during an investigation of the plot and as much as Tojo and his team tried to find evidence of his involvement, they were unable to nail him. The Kenpeitai chased after Ishiwara until Tojo's regime collapsed. By the end of the war, Ishiwara was asked by Prince Higashikuni if he could join the “surrender cabinet' as an advisor. Ishiwara declined on the grounds he wanted to be unsullied by Japans defeat. It should be noted again, Ishiwara was a man of countless contradictions. While he was one of the first to be outspoken against the Pacific War and predicted Japan's defeat, during the end half of the way he got really caught up in the war fever. For example in 1944 he began stating Japan needed to prepare to “shed the blood of a million lives in the south seas in a do or die battle”. He also had this blind faith that a German victory in Europe would turn the tide of the war in the east. He said of Hitler in 1944 “he is the greatest hero in Europe since Napoleon”. Some argue his later public stances were the result of him not being in the military and thus he had to conform to the wartime propaganda to get his message across to the general public. He also began linking concepts of the east asian league to the greater east asian co-prosperity sphere, which is quite the contradiction. Again personally I see him as a fence sitter, he loved to always have a backdoor in his arguments. One major thing that he faced during the Pacific War, was trying to explain to his followers, the current war was not the Final War. As he stated publicly in February of 1942 “Many people think that the greater east asian war is the final war. Nothing could be further from the truth… the greater east asian war is the grand rehearsal for the final war. In other words, it will lead to the liberation of east asia and the establishment of an east asian league and will provide to the league the necessary material and strategic base for the final war”. Well the failure of the China War, Pacific War, the complete military collapse of Japan, the take over of communism in mainland asia, the emerging cold war….I guess that all kind of ruined his final war theory. With Japan's defeat looming in 1944, Ishiwara began to shift his focus towards a reconstruction effort. He began as early as 1944 to talk about what would happen to Japan. He predicted she would lose much overseas territory, her cities would be in ruins, her people would be starving. He turned his attention to agriculture, how could food production be increased, he became particularly interested in fertilizers. By the end of the war he gathered a farming community to discuss how things could be improved. When the surrender proclamation was made, he began to ponder the meaning of his life's work. After the emperor made his speech, Ishiwara gathered his followers to speak to them about how Japan could regain world power and thus keep his theory intact. Ishiwara had many ideas going forward about how Japan could take a positive footing. He advocated Japan dismantle the remnants of its bureaucratic despotism, abolition the special police force, apologize to the global community for war crimes, but he also argued America needed to answer for her war crimes as well. He especially pointed fingers at President Truman for two atomic bombs and that efforts needed to be made to use bombings to lessen Japan's punishment. Ishiwara also argued Japan should gain sympathy from asia so their former enemies could come together to form an east asian league. Emperor Hirohito proclaimed the surrender and abolition of all stocks of war materials, and Ishiwara said that was fine because he believed the final war would require new armaments that would be completely different from what existed. He predicted the future wars would be more scientific, fought with decisive weapons developed in laboratories that did not require large organized military forces. He thought perhaps a small body of underground scientists could create terrible new weapons to prepare for the Final War, thats a terrifying idea. In autumn of 1945, Ishiwara found himself in the limelight again. His lectures had made him a viable alternative to the Tojo regime during the last year of the war and his reputation as an opponent and victim of said regime made him special. Many journalists, both Japanese and American came flooding to him followed by a legion of followers who were unable to publicly come forward during the Tojo years. Ishiwara took advantage of this new situation to make some very large speeches. He spoke about how the Tojo clique was the reason for Japan's defeat, how they all needed to establish a new Japan. He brought out the usual theories he had spoke about for years, and argued the necessity for national reconstruction to prepare for the final war. However he changed his argument a bit, stating while Japan had military been crushed, it now must prepare for the final war by building the highest culture. In this new age, Japan needed to obtain supremacy in fields of science, because he now believed that was the new power. “A single laboratory, a single factory, or perhaps a single man working alone will make the most fantastic discovery that will make war decisive”. He would continue to make speeches throughout 1945, but come 1946 the high authority, one Emperor Douglas MacArthur, haha sorry I had to say it, General MacArthur stamped down on any Japanese leader, especially former military leaders. So Ishiwara had a few months of fame, but then he found himself yet again purged, though not arrested. Alongside this came a ban on the East Asian League association. Ishiwara was then incapacitated by illness, something that plagued his life. His condition became so bad he required surgery in Tokyo. In April of 1946 he was interviewed by American correspondent Mark Gayn who left with a very memorable impression of the man, he had this to say “ Ishiwara received us in his small room, whose window frames were still buckled from bomb explosions. He is a lean man with a deeply tanned face, close shaven head and hard, unblinking eyes. He was sitting Japanese style on his cot, his hands in his lap. Even in a shapeless gown of yellow silk, his body looked straight as a steel rod… We asked Ishiwara just two questions: what of Japan in defeat and what of himself? He answered readily and at length, in a sharp firm voice. He talked like a man who believed every word he said”. Ishiwara told his life story, the Mukden incident, the China war escalation, his feud with Tojo all of his failed attempts with the East Asian League. In 1947 Ishiwara was put on a list of those Japanese who were purged from public life. He was extremely bitter about this and at the same time he was called as a defense witness in the Tokyo War Crimes Trials. Ishiwara was too sick to travel to Tokyo, so a special military court was convened in Sakata city. He made his deposition in front of 50 people, talking about his role in the Mukden incident and China War. He stated President Truman should be indicted for the atomic bombs and firebombing campaigns and turned upon his American audience about the denunciation for Japanese expansionism. “Havent you ever heard of Perry? Don't you know anything about your country's history? Tokugawa Japan believed in isolation; it didnt want to have anything to do with other countries, and had its doors locked tightly. Then along came Perry from your country in his black ships to open those doors; he aimed his big guns at Japan and warned that ‘if you don't deal with us, look out for these; open your doors, and negotiate with other countries too'. And then when Japan did open its doors and tried dealing with other countries, it learned that all those countries were a fearfully aggressive lot. And so for its own defense it took your country as its teacher and set about learning how to be aggressive. You might saw we became your disciples. Why dont you subpoena Perry from the other world and try him as a war criminal?” In November of 1948 Ishiwara declared on a home recorded video “we must utterly cast war aside. We must firmly avoid questions of interest and advantage and judge our national policy purely on a spirit of righteousness…Japan may be devastated, but we must live by a complete rejection of war. The nation must compose itself like Nichiren at Takenoguchi or Christ on his war to the crucifixion”. It seems Ishiwara at the very end gave up on his theories, and supported Japan attaining a permanent peace. That last years of his life were spent in constant pain due to his illness. In 1949 he contracted a fatal case of pneumonia and realizing he was going to die, dictated a message that summed up all his speculation in the recent years on Japan and its future. The document was originally done in English and directed at General Douglas MacArthur. A month after Ishiwara's death, a Japanese version came out titled “the course for a new Japan / Shin Nihon no Shinro”. The primary purpose of the document was to get MacArthur to lift the ban on the east asia league, but it was also a last apologia. He talked about how Germany, the USSR, Italy and Japan had started on the path of state control, and they all fell prey to group despotism, because all decisions were being made by a few men in the center. He argued Britain's socialist government, the United States New Deal and Marshall plan were great example of a good control system. He argued pure liberalism no longer existed anywhere, not even in the US, yet the US was trying to make Japan a liberal nation. He argued all nations should be allowed to move ahead freely. To end it all of he said this as well “I realize now in my predictions concerning a final war between the east and west I was supremely overconfident and that the facts have proven my wrong. I fear that the real final conflict may be the United States and USSR” At the age of 61 Ishiwara died in August of 1949, in a small house with some of his followers gathered around him. He said to them before dying he was glad to die at the same age as Nichiren

united states america jesus christ american europe english china japan germany italy german japanese asian tokyo fight britain operations adolf hitler beijing buddhist shanghai excuse napoleon depressed hq ussr truman kyoto macarthur east asian sheesh major general sdf on top nanjing meiji douglas macarthur manchuria chongqing showa kanji pacific war china china toyko nanking chiang kai tojo russo japanese war general macarthur sino japanese emperor hirohito north china manchukuo itagaki nichiren tokugawa japan hideki tojo mukden northern expedition

The Best Of Mark Levin - 11/8/25

Mark Levin Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 8, 2025 70:35

This week on the Mark Levin Show, we need to rid the Republican Party, the movement, and constitutional conservatism of bigots, racists, anti-Semites, and anti-Americans. These low lives, like Tucker Carlson, Steve Bannon and Nick Fuentes, dishonor the greatest generation that defeated Hitler, Tojo, and Mussolini. It's a time for choosing between the good guys and the bad guys, America or the Third Reich/Soviet Union. Republicans must stand up and confront the spread unlike Democrats who allowed it. Mamdani and his supporters like Linda Sarsour refuse assimilate and instead aim to conquer, devour, and dismantle the culture, police, communities, private property rights, and economy. This would attract unassimilated individuals from afar, harden electoral battles, and escalate into a cultural war beyond politics, with devastating effects on education, policing, healthcare, and wealth redistribution, driving successful people away. Tuesday's election results were no surprise because the Democrats immigration strategy to change the demographics and citizenry, without assimilation, has worked. NYC will decline, the question is by how much and Virginia is now part of the federal government. If the election was about affordability why did NJ vote to increase their property taxes and energy bills? neither the law nor the Constitution prohibits a President from imposing tariffs, which can serve purposes like rebuilding industries, countering foreign tariffs, or ensuring national security. Congress holds the power of the purse and could pass statutes to limit presidential tariff authority, but it has not done so, making judicial intervention unnecessary and a potential separation of powers issue. The Court should refrain from involvement, as any limits would come from congressional action or voter disapproval. Every conservative faith leader, organization head, think tank, legal group, media, and political entity need to boldly speak out against vile, poisonous movements on the left and the radical right, specifically fascists, thugs, and neo-Nazis, rather than true conservatives or constitutionalists. Tucker Carlson and his ilk have promoted harmful ideas and attacked traditional Christians and Jews and they need to be rejected. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

11/3/25 - Unmasking the Radical Agenda: The Rise of Mandami and Sarsour

Mark Levin Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 4, 2025 112:39

On Monday's Mark Levin Show, we need to rid the Republican Party, the movement, and constitutional conservatism of bigots, racists, anti-Semites, and anti-Americans. These low lives, like Tucker Carlson, Steve Bannon and Nick Fuentes, dishonor the greatest generation that defeated Hitler, Tojo, and Mussolini. It's a time for choosing between the good guys and the bad guys, America or the Third Reich/Soviet Union. Republicans must stand up and confront the spread unlike Democrats who allowed it. Later, electing Zohran Mamdani in New York City would lead to its downfall, causing investors, businesses and residents to flee and the city's capitalist core will be destroyed, just like London and Paris. Mamdani and his supporters like Linda Sarsour refuse assimilate and instead aim to conquer, devour, and dismantle the culture, police, communities, private property rights, and economy. This would attract unassimilated individuals from afar, harden electoral battles, and escalate into a cultural war beyond politics, with devastating effects on education, policing, healthcare, and wealth redistribution, driving successful people away. After, the Democrats in New Jersey caused high electricity bills and property taxes by cutting off traditional energy supplies and relying on ineffective primitive technologies like wind and solar, driven by ideology over practical knowledge. Voters need to reject the Democrat government mismanagement. Voting Democrat means more of the same destruction as seen in California, Finally, Winsome Earle-Sears, a Black women running for Virginia Governor, undermines the Democrat's identity politics and propaganda. Barack Obama campaigned for Abigail Spanberger, a White women running for Virginia Governor, who pretends to be moderate but votes radically left. This election is about ideology from the third world and seventh century, not race. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast #231

uk wrestling continental heat stroke tojo

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 25, 2025 57:21

Welcome back to another edition of the UK's number one and only Memphis wrestling related podcast, Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast. On this week's show we cover October 25th 1986 Continental Wrestling where we will see:- Sato/Goto (with Tojo) vs. Excitement Inc. (Ric McCord/John Paul) Larry Wright/Don Bass vs. Pat Tanaka/Tracy Smothers The Ninja (with Tojo) vs. Jeff Jarrett Big Bubba vs. Jim Jamison/ Mike Murphy The Animals vs The Bryant Brothers Memphis Vice (Jerry Bryant/Lou Winston)/Bubba Monroe vs. Jerry The King Lawler/David Haskins/Giant Hillbilly Follow the show on facebook Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast (facebook.com/memphiscast) Check out patreon.com/memphiscast for our Heat Stroke podcast (Its FREE) Check out Youtube.com/@memphiscast & patreon.com/memphiscast for videos You can watch the show https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kA36G5rauWQ&list=PLgi8coP8E7nr0n_MOjhFl271oFpn_2reL&index=41&t=1s

- 205 - Special General Ishiwara Kanji Part 1: The Mukden Incident

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 21, 2025 46:53

I would like to thank Patreon member Xizer for suggesting this one, as Xizer put it “An in depth look at General Kanji Ishiwara would be interesting. The man was the architect for the Mukden Incident that led to the Second Sino Japanese War, but he was vehemently opposed to the abuse and exploitation Japan's colonialism indulged in. His vocal condemnation of the brutality and excesses of the Imperial Japanese military foreign policy and Tojo in particular led to his removal, but he couldn't be executed for popularity in the rank and file. Even at the trials after the war he remained defiant, declaring that President Truman should be tried alongside the Axis War criminals for firebombing Japanese cities. He was truly a fascinating figure. Indeed Kanji Ishiwara is a fascinating character and his story has a startling impact on the Pacific War and global history as a whole. Now by the time I am reading this the script got out of hand, its a long one haha, so it might have to be a multi parter, but I want to limit the first part to Ishiwara and how the Mukden Incident occurred first. It might come further down the road but I will finish the story of this fascinating man later on after hitting up more Patrons desired subjects, without further adieu enjoy part one of Kanji Ishiwara. Kanji Ishiwara was born in Tsuruoka, Yamagata prefecture on January 18th of 1889. He was the second son of a policeman who was a descendent of a samurai family serving the Shonai Domain. His clan supported the Tokugawa Shogunate during the Boshin War and as a result of their defeat, alongside other Shogunal allied clans would see themselves shut off from larger governmental positions in Meiji Era Japan. Not to go too deep down that rabbit hole, but domains like Choshu and Satsuma would see the lionshare of higher positions, while domains who served on the opposite side would be cast out more. Ishiware began his army career at the military preparatory school in Sendai at the age of 13, followed up by 2 years at the Central military preparatory school in tokyo. In 1907 he entered the military academy as a member of its 21st class. He left the academy in july of 1909 with the commission of Lieutenant and an assignment as platoon commander of an infantry regiment in Tohoku. After the annexation of Korea in 1910 his regiment was shipped over to the peninsula and he served at Ch'unch'on in a small garrison. After two years of occupation duty, Ishiwara returned to Tohoku and in 1915 passed the examinations necessary to enter the Army Staff college. He held an outstanding record, graduating top of his class in november of 1918 and would be amongst the elite ranks of the Gunto Gumi, receiving the imperial sword. Now in 1920 he had a frustrating assignment with the department of military training he applied for service in China and received an assignment to the Central china garrison in Hankow. He spent a year traveling through central china before returning back to Tokyo in 1921 where he worked as a lecturer at the army staff college. He sought another China assignment, but his superiors sent him instead to Europe, as they did with all their promising young officers. He went to Germany for 3 years, studying languages and military history. In 1925, he was now a Major, 36 years of age and he received an assignment to the faculty of the army staff college to lecture about the history of war. Now from the very beginning of his character, Ishiwara proved himself a very unconventional officer. He was on the eccentric side, quite argumentative and burdened with a lot of health problems. He had multiple kidney infections, gastro-intestinal problems, tympanitis and other ailments that clawed at him. You also cant forget his ancestry which was important to the Japanese military even in the 1930s. Many of those that came from a disgraced clan had the habit of going above and beyond in terms of imperial loyalty, sort of like a way to rid themselves of the stigma of distrust that was seen in the early Meiji years. Ishiwara was a bit bizarre, he was nonconforming, quite an independent spirit you would say. Many biographers of his point out, while he held an outstanding record in his education, this went alongside things like his disregard for military punctilio, such as his dress and appearance. In his early career he spoke out against inequalities he saw within the military such as what he saw as favoritism for staff college graduates. Such talk was quite reckless. He read a lot about politics, religion, history and philosophy, he seemed to have quite the restless mind. His behavior drew attention from his colleagues, many deeming him brilliant. Now everyone in any military has to learn about military history, but not all seek to learn it outside the required readings and such. Ishiwara is one of those rare individuals who was obsessed with learning more about military history. He read about the Russo Japanese war and took quite a critical look at it. He believed the Japanese victory was due to a large part because of luck. He thought Japan had taken the von Moltke strategy of annihilation, but Russia was simply to large to be dislodged from Asia with a swift stroke. If Russia had preserved herself better, he believed Japan would have lost and it was only by a peculiar set of circumstances that Japan had avoided a war of endurance. Ishiwara believed if such a set of circumstance occurred again, Japan defense planning would need to change dramatically to base itself on the realities of modern warfare. This led him to read thoroughly about WW1 in europe and he looked critically at the differences between a short duration vs long duration war. How prolonged conflicts eventually became total wars where politics, economics and social order played larger roles, than just that of the military. This led him to think of categories for different types of war such as “kessenteki senso / decisive war” and “jizokuteki senso / continuous war”. He viewed these two types as flowing back and forth throughout history, in a cyclical rhythm. While in Germany he studied Clausewitz, von Moltke and the works of Hans Delbruck. He was particularly taken by Delbrucks niederwerfungstragie “strategy of annihilation, the decisive battle” and ermattungsstrategie “the strategy of exhaustion”. He could see his own theorizes more fleshed out in such works and took quite a liking to them. This brought him to analyze the Napoleonic war as the archetype of the war of annihilation and the wars of Frederick the Great as that of a war of exhaustion. Now further on in his studies, Ishiwara became convinced like many of his colleagues, that Japan and the United States for reasons of power and ideology were on a set course for war. He also concluded such a war would be a protracted one, that of a strategy of exhaustion. But how could Japan prepare for such a protracted war when her natural resources were so clearly inadequate. This led him to think more so about Asia. Ishiwara believed Asia was an entity distinctly different from the west. He held beliefs that Asia should be liberated and unite. During the Xinhai revolution of 1911, as a young cadet in Korea, Ishiwara was quite excited by the idea China might revitalize itself, but he became disillusioned during his time in China later. In the 1920's he dealt with bandits, warlord era conflicts, chaos and disorder, seeing poverty everywhere, all of this shattered his image of China progressing and reforming herself. He wrote this during that time “Looking at the situation in China, I came to harbor grave doubts as to the political capacities of the chinese race and came to feel that, though they were a people of high cultural attainment, it was impossible for them to construct a modern state”. Despite how disappointed he was with the political problems of China, he was likewise disgusted with how his Japanese colleagues treated the Chinese. He recalled feelings of shame when he saw fellow colleagues in Hankow descending from rickshaws and tossing coins to the ground at the rickshaw mens feet. He would constantly write of how the Japanese needed to shed their racial superiority feelings, but funny enough he would write this alongside his beliefs it was necessary for Japan to help guide nations like China to their destiny. While he may have held beliefs in racial equality between Japan and China, he certainly did not think the same of China's politics. Like the majority of his colleagues he believed China required reform and modernization that Japan should usher in. To Ishiwara the issue at hand was if Japan did not help China, the west would aggressively do so and thus subjugate her further. To Ishiwara China needed liberation. Ishiwara also linked the incoming war between Japan and the United States to play a large role for what would occur between China and Japan. Ishiwara like many Japanese officers held beliefs concerning the Kokutai. I will try to summarize exactly what the Kokutai is, but honestly its a unbelievably complex cultural phenomenon. The Kokutai was a spiritual motive force that influenced the Japanese military. It can be viewed as the national character of Japan. Japan was a constitutional monarchy that held the Kokutai (national body or character) and Seitai (government body/structure). Thus there was in reality two ideologies, one held the traditional belief focusing on that of the emperor and that of the official government. If I were to give you a overly confusing summary, I would tell you “Japan is run by the emperor and the government simultaneously” this of course if confusing as hell, and it should be. Article 4 of the former Japanese constitution held “the emperor is the head of the empire, combining in himself the right of sovereignty, uniting the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, although subject to the consent of the imperial diet”. Its like saying you have an absolute monarch, but he will be listening and following the democratically elected people. This contradiction would lead to the Pacific War. A large issue that would emerge is that the constitution literally said the navy and army were controlled by the Emperor and not the political diet. Thus many in the military viewed themselves subject to the Kokutai, which as an ideology would evolve dramatically from the Meiji era to the Showa Era. For example, what if you are a military high ranking officer who views the political elites as nothing more than criminals, taking the emperor hostage against his will and thus against the will of the Japanese people. Well this might lead you to try and overthrow the government to make sure the Emperor was really in charge as you think he should be. A real rabbit hole I could go down. Ishiwara had a unique view of the Kokutai. In his early education he wrote this about his doubt on understanding it as a principal. “Even though I, myself, because of my training…had come to have an unshakeable faith in the kokutai I began to lack confidence that I could imparts this belief to others –to the common soldier, to the civilian, to non-Japanese”. His issue was how did the Kokutai apply outside Japan? How could its value transcend the national boundaries and interests of Japan? If a Japanese soldier was to sacrifice his life for the Kokutai, how did this take on any meaning for men of all races? How could the kokutai's supra-national value by linked to other outside ideologies? Ishiwara found some answers to these questions in Nichiren Buddhism. It seems here he was able to combine his conceptions about war, history and national purpose. Now Ishiwara did not come from a religious family. He dabbled in christianity for a bit, but did not pursue it. Shinto likewise did not sufficiently fulfill Shiwara' beliefs. Nichiren Buddhism is strongly patriotic, has a apocalyptic character to it and represents a holy mission to be the religion for all mankind with the center of propagation as Japan. There was this kind of quasi idea of world regeneration behind it with Japan as the moral righteous leader. Thus as you can imagine the Kokutai and Nichiren buddhism sort of fit like a glove in many ways. Utilizing Nichiren Buddhism, the kokutai could be raised from its purely national dogma and be amplified to the entire world. Ishiwara was introduced to all of this by Tanaka Chigaku who was part of the Kokuchukai “national pillar society” a nichiren nationalist organization with an HQ in tokyo. After attending a public meeting held by Tanaka, he quickly converted to Kokuchukai and he would write down in his journal “I was attracted to the Nichiren faith's view of the kokutai”. Nichiren buddhism. One aspect of Kokuchukai's nichirenism that greatly appealed to Ishiwara was its combative passages. Ishiwara would justify and attribute much of the military force Japan used on the asian continent drawing parallels to Nicherns idea of drawing the sword to defend righteousness. He often quoted nichirens statement “that the significance of the art of war appears in the wonderful law”. Ishiwara become engulfed by the nichiren doctrine and came to believe in its prediction that there would be a “Zendai mimon no dai toso / titanic world conflict, unprecedented in human history”, something like a global armageddon. After this would come a reign of universal and eternal peace under the harmony of “the wonderful law”. While in Germany Ishiwara became convinced that if Japan and the United States were destined for war and the US won that war, the kokutai would be destroyed. He took the trans-siberian railway enroute back to Japan and stopped in Harbin. There he met with Nichiren believers and he spoke to them about his idea of “a final war”. He stated he believed it would come through religious prediction and his military analysis. He warned everyone Japan must hasten herself for it and that “the final war is fast approaching”. Ishiwara came back to Japan in 1925 fired up with conviction to lecture at the army staff college about his final war. His audience was the army's bright and youthful officers. He taught them Frederican and Napoleonic campaigns, Moltke and WW1 and of course his thoughts on the future conflict before them all. The Army staff college continuously called for him to expand his lectures because they were so popular. Then in 1927 he drafted an essay titled “Genzai oyobi shorai Nihon no kokubo / Japan's present and future national defense”. Here he spoke about the inevitable war between the US and Japan. These were quite provocative and took a hell of a lot of attention from colleagues. Later on in april of 1931, he would brief his fellow Kwantung officers using the essay, arguing the need for decisive action on the asian mainland. In 1928 he would have given another course on European war, but he came down with influenza and was forced to take leave. As he was getting better he was hit with a case of tympanitis in his ear and had to be hospitalized for 6 months. It was to be one of many ailments that would grind at his health. He eventually was drawn into an elite study circle to talk about war theories led by Major Suzuki. The group consisted of young reformist type officers who talked about political and military issues. He carried on his work on the final war and eventually wrote “Sensoshi taikan / general outline of the history of war” which was delivered as a lecture before Kwantung officers at Changch'un in Manchuria on July 4th of 1929. It would receive revisions in 1931, 1938 and became a book of the same title after 1941. As he began lecturing using Sensoshi taiken he also circulated amongst an inner circle within the Kwantung army “kokuun tenkai no konpon kokusakutaru man-mo mondai kaiketsuan / Plan for the solution of the Manchuria and Mongolia problem as a basic national policy to revolutionize our country's destiny”, what a title. As you might guess the plan called for occupying Manchuria in preparation for the upcoming war with America. By the way, all of his lectures and works would gain so much fame, he was asked in 1936 to adapt the materials for a text on military history for Emperor Hirohito. Now the 1930's were quite a tense time for Japan. The Japanese leadership saw Marxism everywhere, and believed it was withering away their nation. Japanese liberal types were arguing the military budget was out of hand, many were calling for reduction. To Ishiwara it was insanity, how could Japan not arm itself? Marxists preached communism would save Japan; Liberals preached true democracy would save Japan; Ishiwara and many in the army preached the Kokutai would save Japan. Ishiwara preached his final war theories and that the coming apocalypse would not see an American synthesis, but a supreme victory for the Japanese kokutai that would unify the world. “Japan must be victorious not for the sake of her own national interest, but for the salvation of the world. The last war in human history is approaching, Nichiren's titanic world conflict, unprecedented in human history”. From the offset of his initial theories, Ishiwara believed the final war would be a strategy of exhaustion. But WW1 and the 1920's brought technological advances such as tanks, poison gas and the airplane. The airplane in particular made Ishiwara believe the defensive stalemate seen in WW1 was coming to an end. Airpower could deliver bomb loads past all known defenses such as naval surface units, fortresses, armies with automatic weapons. He believed the final war would see absolute horrors brought upon the greatest cities of the world. London, Shanghai, Paris even Tokyo would be wiped out within a day of the commencement of hostilities. Air bombardment would deliver victory and he would be quite right about that in regards to what would happen to Japan. He believed such a war would be waged only once and “we will enter an age where war will become impossible because of the ultimate development of war technology”. Ishiwara argued Japan must directly or indirectly control Manchuria and to a lesser degree over parts of China. He asserted Japan had a moral obligation to the asian continent and a special relationship to Manchuria and China. China must be stabilized, for her people were threatened by turmoil, corruption and conflict. He argued Japan would be eventually obliged for the sake of peace and the welfare of the Chinese people to take a more active effort to stabilize her, particularly in Manchuria. He wrote in 1930 “To save China, which has known no peace, is the mission of Japan, a mission, which, at the same time, is the only means for the salvation of Japan itself. To accomplish this task it is an urgent matter that the interference of the United States be eliminated”. Ironically, he was advocating that in order to prepare for a conflict with the US, Japan must take a stronger hand in Manchuria and China…which would probably force the United States to confront her. He advocated against the strategy of a decisive battle at sea, instead emphasizing a continental strategy. “If the worst comes about and the war at sea turns against us, if proper measures have been taken, Japanese forces on the Asian mainland can be made self-sufficient and the war continued.” Above all else, Manchuria was the key, alongside parts of Mongolia and China. In 1931 he began writing about how China needed to reform and it would be in her best interest to accept Japanese guidance. He saw China as the most valuable ally to be beside Japan in the event of war with the United States. If anything he argued Japan must try to not become involved in a war with China, every effort should be made to avoid provoking such an event. Yet as he continued his writing he began to see the diplomatic issues play out between China and Japan and came to the conclusion, “every attempt should be made to avoid provoking China, but in the event that it is impossible to bring about China's understanding, then Nanking should be swiftly attacked and north and central China occupied” way to go 0-60. His attitudes to Britain and Russia were quite similar, every effort should be made to remain friendly, but in the case of war Hong Kong and Malaya should be quickly occupied or in the case of the USSR, predetermined objectives inside Siberia should be seized quickly. Now lets talk about Manchuria, specifically Manchuria in the late 1920's. Manchuria was in a huge tug of war between Russia, China and Japan. Her ties to China proper were severed by years of warlordism allowing Japan to grow her position. For Japan, the quote “manchurian problem” as it would be known centered on a single question “how to consolidate and expand it under Japanese influence in the face of an expanding China”. Japan saw 3 viable methods, taking control over the south manchuria railway, using the kwantung army and Japanese colonists, the good old filibuster approach. Each of these 3 methods offered different approaches to the same problem which of course would have very different outcomes. Controlling the railway allowed quite a lot of control over southern Manchuria. The issue with this of course being Japan having to constantly fight off Chinese political efforts against such control. Zhang Zuolin, the Tiger of Manchuria and arguably greatest of the warlords of China held control over Manchuria and was firmly acting in Japanese interests, but for how long would he play ball? To the Kwantung Army members operating in and around Manchuria, the northern expedition of Chiang Kai-shek was getting out of hand and threatening Zhang Zuolin and thus their interests as well. Anti-Japanese sentiment was only getting worse as the northern expedition climbed north. The Kwangtung army sought more than anything to assert and retain their control over Manchuria, because it offered a buffer against the USSR. Anything that threatened that control had to be dealt with. Ultimately it was believed by many in the Kwantung Army that Manchuria would have to be separated officially from China and in order for this to occur, Japan would most likely need to use force. Senior officers of the Kwantung army were invited in June of 1927 for a meeting called upon by Premier Tanaka Giichi. The purpose of the meeting was to formulate Japan's policy toward China and Manchuria. A more radical Kwantung army group headed by Colonel Komoto Daisaku sought to eliminate Zhang Zuolin, as he was increasingly being seen as a major obstacle to Japanese ambitions in Manchuria. Well they would do just that in 1928 when Zhang Zuolin was assassinated via a bomb placed on train tracks known as the Huanggutun incident. The assassination did not work out as the Kwantung Army officers thought it would. Instead of their groomed puppet General Yang Yuting taking up the role as leader of Manchuria, it went instead to Zhang Zuolin's son, Zhang Xueliang, who lets just say was not too happy the Japanese had obviously killed his father. Thus the Kwantung Army did not assert the forceful policy they wanted in Manchuria, they had actually made it worse for them. The half-hearted investigation into those responsible for killing Zhang Zuolin, led to the removal of Colonel Komoto from his post. Tanaka's cabinet was toppled. The Kwantung army were now embarrassed and angry that their stance in Manchuria was weakened. The Japanese colonists within Manchuria felt more threatened and called more so upon the Kwantung army for protection against Chinese nationalists wishing to kick them out. The Kwantung army was grasping at straws trying to think of a way to sever Manchuria from China. In 1928, Ishiwara was a lt colonel and he was consulted in length by Kwantung officers about his views on the Manchurian problem. While he had not fully hashed out his Final War theory by this point, he nonetheless spoke about the fundamentals of it, arguing the necessity of taking action to control Manchuria. For the next few years, all efforts were made by Kwantung officers to influence policy towards Manchuria. Ishiwara's ideas were being stimulated and influencing the debate over Manchuria amongst his high ranking colleagues. In October of 1928, Ishiwara sought and received an appointment to the Kwantung army staff. The assignment was to be as an operations officer and his number one backer was Colonel Komoto Daisaku. It seemed Komoto saw Ishiwara as the firebrand necessary to push the Manchurian policies they wanted. When Ishiwara arrived at Port Arthur, he found the Kwantung Army HQ in a state of confusion and demoralization. This of course was a large part due to the cluster fuck of a failure from the bombing of Zhang Zuolin. The investigation into the assassination led to many shifts within the Kwantung army staff, many quite restrictive. Even though Komoto's career was shattered by the Zhang Zuolin failure, he kept arguing to his colleagues that the Manchurian crisis hamukdend to be resolved by force. Ishiwara it seems agreed with this and during the early months of 1929 worked alongside Komoto, planning operations against Chinese forces in the Mukden area. By spring of 1929, Komoto was officially being kicked out. By May he was relegated to a divisional backwater in Japan and by June he was out of the army. This did not mean however that he lost influence on Manchurian affairs. Komoto's replacement was Lt Colonel Itagaki Seishiro and old comrade of Ishiwara since Sendai military preparatory school. For the next two and a half years, Ishiwara and Itagaki worked alongside other Kwantung Army staff to solve the Manchurian problem as they saw it. By the mid 1931's the idea Manchuria needed to be seized via force was now the mainstream viewpoint for the Kwantung army in general. Ishiwara believed firmly that Japan could no longer stand idle in Manchuria, because every day that went by saw little by little, Japan relinquishing rights and interests in Manchuria to China, and at some point they would simply be kicked out. To “quit manchuria” would be a national disaster, they would lose their buffer state, the resources and the land for their booming population to emigrate to. Simply put Manchuria was the steroid keeping Japan alive, she needed it to continue to grow. Ishiwara would often say “manchuria provides Japan with breathing space” where have we heard that type of talk before?. To the military heads in Tokyo Ishikawa would often assert Manchuria had to be seized via force, because of the soviethreat of the USSR and communism as a whole “In view of the traditional russian policy in that area, once the soviets advanced into manchuria, it would become a base for the communization of asia. Not only would the internal stability of manchuria become impossible to maintain, but Japan would be unable to maintain its own national defense, and China's defenses, too, would become imperialized". The Army HQ in Tokyo likewise agreed Manchuria was the vital defensive line against the USSR. But unlike the Kwantung army who sought all of Manchuria, the heads in Tokyo sought to absorb southern Manchuria via the south manchurian railway and did not seek anything north of it. Ishiwara however assumed the only way Japan could prevent the USSR from placing pressure on southern Manchuria was no less that Japan having to occupy northern Manchuria and even further north towards the Amur River so Japan could control the mountain ranges flanking western and eastern frontiers of northern manchuria. Once Japan controlled northern Manchuria, Ishiwara stated in 1931 “With the solution of our defense problems in the north, we would then be free to plan an advance in any direction: to China proper, for example, or even to Southeast Asia”. Ishiwara took all of this a step further, after Manchuria was conquered, Japan would have to somehow administer and pacify the peoples of it. Ishiwara argued the stability of Manchuria would be developed through the special talents of various races living there. The Chinese would develop the small businesses in the region, the Koreans would use their paddy farming knowledge, etc. These racial ideas would contribute to the development of Manchukuo and the greater east asia co-prosperity sphere. But above all else, Manchuria would serve the interests of Japan, many of which would be exploitative and economic in nature. By early 1930 Ishiwara and Itagaki worked out a plan using the same strategy used during the Russo-Japanese war, a surprise night attack. The Kwantung army would assault the Liaoning area hitting important Chinese garrisons. The plans had to be meticulous as the Kwantung army was severely smaller than most of the Manchurian forces led by Zhang Xueliang. Around Mukden alone Zhang held 20,000 men well equipped with aircraft and tanks. Throughout all of Manchuria, if a war arose, Zhang could assemble roughly 250,000 troops to bear down on an enemy. The Kwantung army meanwhile could muster 10,000 men which were basically garrison units around the railway. They did not have significant aircraft nor mechanized forces at hand, and were pretty poorly equipped to boot. Ishiwara's answer to the disparity in forces called for the use of intelligence and rigorous training. He sought to perfect specific assault techniques so that when the conflict broke out, the Japanese would use lightning speed and effective concentration of force to overwhelm the Chinese. The plan overall was remarkably simplistic, wagering everything on dealing a crushing blow at the center of Zhang Xueliangs military powerbase at the Peitaying barracks at Mukden. If this fell, he predicted the enemy's morale would break, giving the Kwantung the necessary military and psychological momentum to subdue the surrounding areas. If the USSR got involved, the plan would have gone to utter shit. One important variable Ishiwara highlighted was the necessity to pull off the operation before any attempt to restructure the domestic order in Japan occurred. Ishiwara knew his arguments and those of his colleagues would influence the heads in Tokyo, and they had to act before they did. However the heads at Tokyo and the Kwantung army held very different perspectives on when to act. In June of 1931 the Central army HQ stated in its General Outline of a solution to the Manchurian problem “we must defer the question of military action for a whole year. During this time the foreign ministry would attempt to dampen anti japanese activities in manchuria through negotiations with the government of Nanking. In the meantime the government would launch an information campaign to try and drive acquiescence at home and aboard for military action ”. Ishiwara as you can imagine was very bitter about the idea of prolonging for a year and argued the international environment meant they must strike immediately. The Soviet 5 year plan was still in mid course; the US, Britain and France had yet to overcome their financial crisis and could offer limited resistance in the far east and most obviously the Nationalist regime in China was still busy in its unification efforts south of the Great wall, but that would change soon. If they waited a year all of this would change for the worse, the time was now or never to Ishiwara. In july of 1931 Ishiwara and Itagki organized a final major staff reconnaissance designed to get the newest Kwantung officers up to date with northern Manchuria. To cover for what they were doing they told high command it was a survey against the USSR, but it was of course to investigate the Chinese power in northern manchuria. On their return trip, the party heard of the disappearance of one Kwantung staff officer, captain Nakamura Shintaro. Ishiwara and the others found out when they reached Port Arthur and the rumor spread that Captain Nakamura had been killed by Chinese soldiers under “mysterious circumstances”. Now over the past few months there had been violent riots, murders, work strikes and other incidents occurring in Manchuria. The Nakamura affair flared all of these tensions up. Seeing the paint on the wall, Chinese and Japanese foreign ministries tried to negotiate the issue, but those at the central army HQ like Nagata Tetsuzan who were sympathetic to the impatience of their Kwantung colleagues felt compelled to aid them. For Ishiwara the issue was clear as he wrote “the Nakamura incident adds just one more issue to the others. What the army should do now is to ignore the foreign ministry and solve the problem by taking matters into its own hands”. And that is just what he did. The Kwantung officers took their forces outside the railway zone, which they had been restricted to and without waiting for approval from Itagaki who was in Japan at the time, initiated the steps to despatch an armored train and a mixed regiment of infantry and artillery forces to go to Mukden to get the Chinese military to help investigate the Nakamura disappearance. Tokyo got word of this and dispatched a telegram to stop their departure from the railway and to not use the Nakamura incident as a way to use force to solve the manchurian problem. For Ishiwara this was the last straw. On August 20th he sent a message to Nagata condemning the current diplomatic situation and that negotiations were an utter waste of time. “There is no way to settle the matter except by placing it in the hands of the army. If central hq finds it so difficult to trust its field personnel then it had better replace them with representatives more suitable to the conditions it imagines to exist in Manchuria”. Ishiwara doubled down and pushed for a plot to provoke military conflict outside of Mukden. As he wrote in almost a messianic Nichiren conviction ‘I will be the pillar of Japan; I will be the eyes of Japan; I will be the great vessel of Japan” . “Gekokujo / ruling from below” is a Japanese historical term referring to when subordinates defy or manipulate their superiors. Ishiwara and his like minded close colleagues were about to perform Gekokujo. On september 18th, 1931 a bomb was planted by the Kwantung army on the tracks of the south manchuria railway at Liutiaokou and it exploded. Japanese troops under the guise the bomb was a “chinese terrorist attack” moved to swiftly overrun the Peitaying barracks. Ishiwara's plot had finally unfolded.

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Memphis Continental Wrestling Cast #229