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General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee Xi Jinping has urged incessant efforts in regularizing coordinated regional development to secure solid progress in advancing common prosperity for all.Xi, also Chinese president and chairman of the Central Military Commission, made the remarks in recent instructions on steadily advancing the cooperation between China's eastern and western regions. He highlighted the east-west cooperation program's significant role in supporting poverty alleviation efforts and promoting balanced regional development over the past 30 years since its initiation, which has demonstrated the political strengths of the Party, as well as the superiority of China's socialist system.Xi highlighted this year as the opening year of China's 15th Five-Year Plan, as well as the first year of the regular assistance efforts in the country's rural revitalization drive. He also called for efforts to summarize and apply the valuable experience gained from cooperation between Fujian province and Ningxia Hui autonomous region, further improve cooperation mechanisms, optimize cooperation methods, and expand the scopes of cooperation. The endeavors are expected to promote industrial complementarity, personnel exchanges, and mutual learning of technologies, ideas, and work styles between the eastern and western regions, and to achieve mutual benefits, win-win outcomes, and common development.Party committees and governments at all levels should earnestly fulfill their responsibilities for regularized assistance for western regions, firmly secure the bottom line to prevent any large-scale relapse into poverty or new cases of poverty, steadily advance rural revitalization across the board, and continuously enhance coordinated regional development, so as to make solid progress toward common prosperity for all.The important instructions of Xi were conveyed at a national work conference on east-west regional cooperation, which opened on June 17 in Yinchuan, capital of Ningxia. Liu Guozhong, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and vice premier of the State Council, delivered a speech at the meeting. Liu emphasized that General Secretary Xi's important instructions are strategically insightful, profound and incisive, demonstrating strong political, ideological and guiding significance. They provide fundamental guidance for carrying out regularized east-west cooperation, and must be thoroughly studied, fully understood and resolutely implemented.Liu underscored the need to consistently uphold the political responsibility, firmly establish and practice a correct understanding of governance performance, and draw upon the successful experience from Fujian-Ningxia cooperation, among others. Efforts should be intensified to deepen industrial and labor-service coordination between the eastern and western regions, strengthen the exchange of officials and professionals, expand cooperation in science and technology, finance and other fields. It is essential to carry out work creatively in light of local conditions, continuously improve the quality and effectiveness of collaboration, and promote complementary strengths, mutual empowerment and common development.The meeting also briefed participants on the progress of east-west regional cooperation. Officials from Ningxia Hui autonomous region and Fujian province respectively introduced the experience and practices in Fujian-Ningxia cooperation. Officials from Beijing and Shanghai municipalities, as well as Jiangsu, Guangdong, Sichuan and Gansu provinces also addressed the meeting.Officials from relevant provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities undertaking east-west regional cooperation tasks, as well as those from some member departments of the Central Rural Work Leading Group, attended the meeting.
Major cities report sharp increases in departure tax refund transactions各大城市离境退税业务量大幅增长Chinese-made drones, smartphones, action cameras and designer toys are increasingly replacing tea, porcelain and panda-themed gifts on foreign tourists' shopping lists in China, as they increasingly seek innovative, higher-value products offering strong value for money, advanced features and models often unavailable abroad, according to customs authorities across the country.全国海关表示,外国游客在华购物清单中,国产无人机、智能手机、运动相机、潮流玩具正逐步取代茶叶、瓷器、熊猫周边礼品。如今他们更青睐创意足、附加值高的商品,这类产品性价比出众、功能先进,且很多款式在海外难以买到。Bolstered by the "Shopping in China" campaign and the growing popularity of the "China Travel" trend, customs authorities in major cities have reported sharp increases in departure tax refund transactions during the first five months, and expect the momentum to continue throughout the year.依托“购在中国”活动以及“中国游”热度持续攀升,各大城市海关数据显示,今年前五个月离境退税业务量大幅上涨,业内预计这一势头将贯穿全年。Customs officials at Nanjing Lukou International Airport in Jiangsu province verified 1,171 departure tax refund applications during the January-May period, covering tax-refundable goods worth 26.67 million yuan ($3.94 million), up 173.6 percent and 32.42 percent year-on-year, respectively, said Nanjing Customs.南京海关介绍,今年1至5月,江苏南京禄口国际机场海关共审核通过1171笔离境退税申请,退税商品总值达2667万元人民币(折合394万美元),同比分别增长173.6%和32.42%。Zhang Qian, a customs official at the airport, said that as departure tax refund transactions continue to rise, new trends are emerging in shopping preferences of foreign visitors.该机场海关工作人员张茜表示,随着离境退税业务不断增多,外国游客的购物偏好也出现了新趋势。"Chinese-made smart electronic products and trendy domestic cultural and creative goods have become increasingly popular among foreign travelers, attracting growing interest with their quality, innovation and distinctive Chinese appeal," said Zhang.她说道:“国产智能电子产品、新潮文创商品深受外国游客喜爱,凭借优良品质、创新设计和浓郁的中国特色收获了越来越多关注。”Hong Yang, another customs official at Ningbo Customs' airport branch in Zhejiang province shared similar views.浙江宁波海关机场办事处工作人员洪洋也持相同看法。"Fashion apparel, beauty products and premium lifestyle goods are also gaining traction among foreign travelers departing from Ningbo," she said.她表示:“时装、美妆产品以及高端生活日用品,也越来越受到从宁波离境的外国游客青睐。”Guan Lixin, a researcher specializing in marketing and consumption at the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation in Beijing, said the shift in foreign visitors' purchasing patterns reflects how Chinese brands are moving up the value chain and gaining recognition among consumers worldwide. Many products also offer better value and a wider selection of models than those available overseas.北京商务部国际贸易经济合作研究院流通与消费研究所的研究员关利欣认为,外国游客消费偏好的转变,体现出中国品牌正迈向价值链高端,获得全球消费者认可。不少国产商品性价比更高,款式选择也比海外市场更丰富。Guan said the trend also highlights the growing appeal of shopping as part of the travel experience in China, with foreign visitors seeking unique products that combine practical value, cultural elements and memorable experiences.关利欣称,这一趋势也说明,购物已成为中国旅行体验中极具吸引力的一环,外国游客偏爱兼具实用性、文化特色且能留下美好回忆的特色商品。To further enhance the shopping experience for foreign visitors, the Shanghai municipal government recently rolled out a new departure tax refund program, introducing new measures such as upgraded end-to-end digital tax refund services and improved digital verification services at ports of departure.为进一步优化外国游客购物体验,上海市政府近期推出全新离境退税方案,升级全流程线上退税服务,并完善口岸线上核验等多项举措。Shanghai Customs processed 201,000 departure tax refund verification forms between January and May, with refund-eligible purchases totaling 1.92 billion yuan, up 300 percent and 62 percent year-on-year, respectively, underscoring the growing popularity of tax-free shopping among foreign visitors.今年1至5月,上海海关共审核20.1万份离境退税单据,退税消费总额达19.2亿元人民币,同比分别增长300%和62%,足以体现免税购物在外国游客中愈发受欢迎。In the Chinese capital, Beijing Customs verified 87,906 departure tax refund applications during the first five months, involving refund-eligible purchases worth 758 million yuan, up 612.42 percent and 53.13 percent year-on-year, respectively.首都北京方面,北京海关前五个月共审核通过87906笔离境退税申请,退税商品总额7.58亿元人民币,同比分别上涨612.42%和53.13%。In a further move to encourage spending by international travelers, the Ministry of Commerce and several other government departments unveiled a new departure tax refund program in May aimed at optimizing departure tax refund services and expanding inbound consumption.为进一步提振境外游客消费,商务部等多部门于5月发布全新离境退税相关方案,旨在优化退税服务、扩大入境消费规模。The policy package includes broader coverage of departure tax refund stores, paperless processing, enhanced refund-upon-purchase services and more efficient verification procedures.该系列政策包括扩大退税商店覆盖范围、推行无纸化办理、优化即买即退服务以及简化核验流程。The measures will make refund-upon-purchase services more convenient by enabling travelers to complete tax refund procedures at any eligible port of departure, said Yang Mu, director of the department of market operation and consumption promotion at the Ministry of Commerce.商务部市场运行和消费促进司司长杨沐表示,新规允许游客在任意合规离境口岸办理退税,将大幅提升即买即退服务的便捷度。transaction /trænˈzækʃn/交易;业务办理momentum /məˈmentəm/势头;发展趋势verification /ˌverɪfɪˈkeɪʃn/核验;审核premium /ˈpriːmiəm/高端的;优质的underscore /ˌʌndəˈskɔː(r)/强调;凸显unveil /ʌnˈveɪl/公布;推出(政策、方案)
After China's central government raised the proportion of after-tax profits that State-owned enterprises must remit to the State, a growing number of provinces are following suit, aiming to ease widening fiscal revenue-expenditure gaps and free up more funds for social welfare and livelihood programs.继我国中央政府上调国有企业税后利润上缴国家的比例后,越来越多的省份纷纷跟进效仿,旨在缓解日益扩大的财政收支缺口,为社会福利和民生项目腾出更多资金。The moves come as local governments face mounting fiscal pressures from a protracted property downturn, weak land sales and rising mandatory spending on pensions, healthcare and debt servicing, and tapping SOE profits has become an increasingly important lever, experts said.专家表示,当前地方政府受楼市长期低迷、土地出让收入疲软、养老金、医疗、偿债等刚性支出不断增加影响,财政压力持续加大,盘活国企利润已然成为愈发重要的调控手段。The provinces of Guangdong, Jiangxi, Jiangsu and Hainan have all signaled in their recently released 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-30) outlines that they will "reasonably raise" profit remittance ratios of local SOEs, and/or dynamically optimize collection rates.广东、江西、江苏、海南等省份在近期发布的“十五五”(2026-2030年)规划纲要中明确提出,将合理上调地方国企利润上缴比例,并动态优化征缴费率。Localities such as the provinces of Guizhou and Hunan, as well as the Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region, have already steadily increased their own ratios.贵州、湖南、广西壮族自治区等多地已稳步上调本地国企利润上缴比例。China launched its State capital operations budget in 2008, requiring wholly State-owned enterprises to hand over a portion of their after-tax profits. The rates have been raised several times since.我国于2008年设立国有资本经营预算制度,要求国有独资企业上缴部分税后利润,此后该上缴比例已历经多次上调。"Revenue growth has slowed in recent years, but mandatory spending has continued to climb. Increasing the share of SOE profits handed over to the State directly boosts funds available to bridge the gap between income and expenditure, which is the most immediate driver," said Luo Zhiheng, chief economist at Yuekai Securities.粤开证券首席经济学家罗志恒表示:“近年来财政收入增速放缓,但刚性支出持续攀升。提高国企利润上缴比例,能够直接增加可支配资金,填补财政收支缺口,这是当前最直接有效的举措。”Luo said State capital returns had been locked up within individual enterprises, making it hard to create coordinated policy. By centralizing those funds, the government can channel resources into priority areas such as major national initiatives, technological innovation, social programs and risk management.罗志恒称,以往国有资本收益留存于企业内部,难以形成统筹协同的政策效能。通过集中统筹这类资金,政府可以将资源精准投入国家重大战略、科技创新、社会民生、风险防控等重点领域。At the central level, the top rate for tobacco producers and resource-based firms — which account for the lion's share of central government revenue from State capital operations — now stands at 35 percent, up from 20 percent in 2014.在中央层面,烟草企业和资源型企业是中央国有资本经营收入的主要来源,这类企业的最高利润上缴比例已从2014年的20%上调至目前的35%。For local governments, rates vary but are also trending upward. Jilin province, for example, lifted its base rate from 20 percent to 30 percent in 2020.地方国企的利润上缴比例虽各地不一,但整体呈上调趋势。例如,吉林省已于2020年将基础上缴比例从20%提升至30%。Guangxi set a 35 percent rate for financial and resource enterprises and 30 percent for others starting in 2025.广西则自2025年起,将金融类、资源类国企上缴比例定为35%,其他类国企定为30%。"The general direction is a moderate increase, with rates differentiated by industry and region. Financial and resource firms typically pay more, while public-welfare enterprises pay less or may be temporarily exempted to encourage long-term investment," said Li Yan, a professor at Central University of Finance and Economics.中央财经大学教授李岩表示:“整体调控方向是适度上调比例,同时实行分行业、分地区差异化政策。金融、资源类企业上缴比例更高,公益类企业上缴比例较低,或可暂时减免,以此鼓励企业长期投入发展。”The impact on government coffers has been immediate. At the central level, after Beijing raised remittance rates in 2025, State capital operational revenue jumped 73.3 percent year-on-year to 390.3 billion yuan ($57.6 billion), far exceeding the budgeted figure, said the Ministry of Finance.财政部数据显示,政策对财政收入的提振效果立竿见影。2025年中央上调利润上缴比例后,中央国有资本经营收入同比大增73.3%,达到3903亿元(折合576亿美元),大幅超出预算规模。That allowed the central government to transfer 240 billion yuan into the general public budget — a record amount — to fund social welfare, education and infrastructure, the ministry said.财政部表示,这笔资金让中央政府得以向一般公共预算调入2400亿元资金,创下历史新高,专项用于保障社会福利、教育、基础设施建设等民生重点领域。At the local level, State capital operational revenue rose from about 94.7 billion yuan in 2015 to 464.4 billion yuan in 2025, a nearly fivefold increase. Transfers from the State capital budget to the general public budget also expanded, reaching 334.1 billion yuan last year.地方层面,国有资本经营收入从2015年的947亿元增长至2025年的4644亿元,涨幅接近五倍。国有资本经营预算调入一般公共预算的资金规模也持续扩大,去年达到3341亿元。"Raising remittance rates and expanding coverage could help local governments narrow their fiscal gaps and better reflect the public nature of State capital," said Deng Shulian, a professor at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics.上海财经大学教授邓淑莲表示:“上调国企利润上缴比例、扩大上缴范围,能够帮助地方政府缩小财政收支缺口,更好地彰显国有资本的公共属性。”Experts caution against a one-size-fits-all hike.专家提醒,利润上缴比例上调不可采取“一刀切”模式。"The increase should be moderate, differentiated by sector and enterprise type, and be periodically reviewed based on industry conditions, profitability and fiscal needs," Deng said.邓淑莲表示,比例上调应适度推进,根据行业、企业类型实行差异化标准,并结合行业发展形势、企业盈利状况和财政需求进行定期动态调整。remit /rɪˈmɪt/上缴(款项);汇款;免除fiscal /ˈfɪskl/财政的;国库的protracted /prəˈtræktɪd/持久的,长期拖延的mandatory /ˈmændətɔːri/强制的,法定的,刚性的coffer /ˈkɒfə(r)/(复数)国库,金库;资金储备differentiate /ˌdɪfəˈrenʃieɪt/区分,差异化对待;辨别
Freight rates on China-North America shipping routes have risen sharply in recent weeks as importers from the United States stepped up inventory replenishment and global shipping capacity tightened, said freight forwarders and industry analysts.货运代理和行业分析师表示,由于美国进口商加大补库存力度,加之全球运力收紧,近几周中国至北美航线的运价大幅上涨。They said space on US-bound routes has remained in short supply, with most capacity already booked through June.他们表示,美线舱位持续紧张,大部分运力直至6月已被预订一空。Freight rates on some routes have jumped more than 50 percent since late April amid strong demand and constrained vessel capacity.受强劲需求与运力受限的双重影响,自4月下旬以来,部分航线的运价涨幅已超过50%。At Pros-Forest Logistics, an international freight forwarding company based in Ningbo, Zhejiang province in East China, staffers repeatedly refreshed shipping lines‘ booking systems, closely monitoring the latest slots available.在位于浙江宁波的国际货运代理公司“普罗森林物流”(音译),员工反复刷新船公司的订舱系统,密切关注最新舱位动态。Securing vessel space and obtaining empty containers have become the company's top priorities in recent weeks.确保舱位和提取空箱已成为该公司近几周的首要任务。Jiang Lei, the company‘s president, said that since May, shipping routes between China and the US have been fully booked.该公司总裁蒋蕾(音译)表示,自5月以来,中美航线的舱位已全部订满。Vessel space has become extremely tight across East and South China, with cargo frequently being rolled over to later sailings.华东和华南地区舱位极度紧缺,货物经常被延至后续航次。“Most of the available capacity for June has already been reserved. Overall, the market has returned to the kind of tight conditions typically seen during the peak shipping season,” Jiang said.“6月的大部分舱位已被预订。总体而言,市场已恢复到航运旺季才有的紧张状态,”蒋蕾说。At the end of April, the freight rate for a forty-foot equivalent unit from Ningbo to ports on the US West Coast stood at about $2,900, while rates to the US East Coast were around $3,900, she said.她表示,4月底时,从宁波发往美国西海岸港口的40英尺集装箱运价约为2900美元,发往美国东海岸港口的运价约为3900美元。Following several rounds of increases, rates have now climbed to nearly $5,000 for the US West Coast and close to $6,000 for the US East Coast.经过数轮提价后,目前美西航线运价已攀升至近5000美元,美东航线则逼近6000美元。Meanwhile, several shipping lines are planning further rate hikes on US routes in mid-June, said Jiang.蒋蕾补充说,与此同时,多家船公司正计划在6月中旬对美国航线进一步提价。At a warehouse operated by Ningbo Ruiyuan Logistics Co, a freight forwarding company in Ningbo, consumer goods from Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces are gathered before being shipped to North America.在宁波货运代理公司“宁波瑞源物流有限公司”的一处仓库,来自江苏和浙江两省的消费品在此集结,随后运往北美。“From late April to late May, the warehouse handled an average of 70 to 80 FEUs per day, surpassing the shipping peak seen ahead of the Chinese New Year holiday this year,” said Hu Wanying, the company‘s executive vice-president.“4月下旬至5月下旬,该仓库日均处理70至80个40英尺集装箱,已超过今年春节前的出货高峰,”公司执行副总裁胡倇萤说。Qian Hanglu, an analyst at Ningbo Shipping Exchange, said that on the supply side, more than 300,000 twenty-foot equivalent units of container shipping capacity have been stranded in the Gulf due to tensions in the Middle East and disruptions to traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.宁波航运交易所分析师钱杭璐指出,从供给端看,受中东局势紧张以及霍尔木兹海峡航运中断的影响,超过30万标准箱的集装箱运力滞留在波斯湾。Meanwhile, the resumption of normal shipping through the Red Sea has been delayed, forcing vessels to continue taking longer routes around the region.与此同时,红海航线恢复正常的时间被推迟,迫使船舶继续绕行该地区更远的航线。The decline in vessel turnover has effectively reduced available capacity and added further upward pressure on freight rates, Qian said.钱杭璐表示,船舶周转率下降导致有效运力减少,进一步加大了运价上涨的压力。“We have also observed that vessel speeds across the container shipping market have been declining. Shipping companies are slowing down, primarily to reduce fuel costs. This will effectively reduce available global shipping capacity,” she added.“我们还观察到,集装箱航运市场的船舶航速正在下降。船公司降低航速主要是为了降低燃油成本。这将进一步减少全球可用运力,”她补充道。Exports from Ningbo's ports to the US totaled more than 290,000 TEUs in May, with cargo value exceeding 36 billion yuan ($5.3 billion), up more than 25 percent year-on-year.宁波海关数据显示,5月宁波口岸对美出口总量超过29万标准箱,货值超过360亿元人民币(约合53亿美元),同比增长超过25%。Major export categories included mechanical and electrical products, apparel, textile products and household goods, said Ningbo Customs.主要出口商品包括机电产品、服装、纺织品和家居用品。freight rate /freɪt reɪt/运价inventory replenishment /ˈɪnvəntri rɪˈplenɪʃmənt/补库存rolled over /rəʊld ˈəʊvə/延至后续航次forty-foot equivalent unit (FEU) /ˈfɔːti fʊt ɪˈkwɪvələnt ˈjuːnɪt/ 40英尺集装箱twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU) /ˈtwɛnti fʊt ɪˈkwɪvələnt ˈjuːnɪt/标准箱mechanical and electrical products /məˈkænɪkəl ənd ɪˈlektrɪkəl ˈprɒdʌkts/机电产品apparel /əˈpærəl/服装Ningbo Shipping Exchange /ˈnɪŋbəʊ ˈʃɪpɪŋ ɪksˈtʃeɪndʒ/宁波航运交易所
At a workshop owned by Jiangsu Zhufeng Electromechanical Technology Co in Xuzhou, Jiangsu province, a buyer evaluated an electric three-wheeler model destined for Indonesia, discussing modifications with engineers, who took detailed notes on the customer‘s requirements.在江苏省徐州市的江苏珠峰机电科技有限公司车间里,一位买家正在评估一款即将发往印度尼西亚的电动三轮车,并与工程师商讨改装方案,工程师们则认真记录着客户的每一项需求。As concerns over fuel costs and energy security grow globally, China's electric three-wheelers, widely used to transport people and goods, have seen a surge in demand in overseas markets in recent months.随着全球对燃料成本和能源安全的担忧日益加剧,近几个月来,中国用于客货运输的电动三轮车在海外市场需求激增。Jiangsu Zhufeng Electromechanical Technology Co produced nearly 30,000 units in 2025, with exports mainly destined for the United States, Turkiye, Cambodia and Indonesia. With its products having entered Brunei, Vietnam and Laos this year, the company expects its annual production to surpass 50,000 units.江苏珠峰机电科技有限公司2025年产量近3万辆,产品主要出口至美国、土耳其、柬埔寨和印度尼西亚。随着其产品今年进入文莱、越南和老挝市场,该公司预计年产量将突破5万辆。From January to April this year, exports of electric three-wheelers from Xuzhou reached 168 million yuan ($24.8 million), up 87.1 percent year-on-year, while exports of related parts and components totaled 115 million yuan, an increase of 29.6 percent from a year earlier, according to data from Xuzhou Customs.徐州海关数据显示,今年1至4月,徐州电动三轮车出口额达1.68亿元人民币,同比增长87.1%;相关零配件出口额达1.15亿元,同比增长29.6%。Dai Hui, deputy head of Xuzhou Customs, said that three-wheelers made in Xuzhou have reached more than 130 countries and regions.徐州海关副关长戴辉表示,徐州制造的电动三轮车已出口至130多个国家和地区。"In addition to emerging markets, the next frontier is North America, Western Europe and Northern Europe, where exporters are stepping up efforts to expand their presence," Dai said.戴辉说:“除了新兴市场,下一个前沿阵地是北美、西欧和北欧,出口商正在加大力度拓展这些地区的业务。”Ni Xiaofeng, president of Jiangsu Guowei Motorcycle Co, another three-wheeler manufacturer based in Wuxi, Jiangsu, said the growing appeal of low-cost, energy-efficient transportation solutions, coupled with stricter environmental regulations and efforts to reduce reliance on fossil fuels, have further boosted demand for Chinese three-wheelers in overseas markets.江苏国威摩托车有限公司总裁倪晓峰表示,低成本、高能效的交通解决方案吸引力不断提升,加之环保法规日益严格,以及各国努力减少对化石燃料的依赖,进一步提振了中国三轮车在海外市场的需求。"A standard electric three-wheeler and similar models typically sell for $3,000 to $6,000 in European and North American markets," he said.他说:“在欧洲和北美市场,一辆标准款电动三轮车及同类车型的售价通常在3000至6000美元之间。”Li Chengyun, head of the technical unit of Xuzhou Zhibo Locomotive Co in Xuzhou, said most electric three-wheelers on the market offer a driving range of 80 to 100 kilometers with standard lithium batteries. For an additional cost, customers can choose larger battery packs, which increase the range to as much as 180 to 220 kilometers.徐州智博机车有限公司技术部负责人李承运(音译)表示,市场上大多数电动三轮车标配锂电池的续航里程为80至100公里。客户可选择额外付费升级更大容量的电池包,将续航里程提升至180至220公里。"More overseas customers are demanding higher power output, prompting us to equip vehicles with larger motors," Li said. "Buyers are also requesting larger and wider tires and wheel rims, leading the company to adopt aluminum alloy wheels to better meet customers' specifications."李承运说:“越来越多的海外客户要求更高的动力输出,这促使我们为车辆配备更大功率的电机。买家还对更宽大的轮胎和轮辋提出了要求,这使得公司采用铝合金轮毂,以更好地满足客户的规格要求。”Zhang Hui, president of Xuzhou Zhibo Locomotive Co, said that in the long run, concerns over fuel supply disruptions and the search for affordable transportation alternatives will continue to drive the global adoption of electric three-wheelers.徐州智博机车有限公司总裁张辉表示,从长远来看,对燃油供应中断的担忧以及对经济型交通替代方案的探索,将持续推动电动三轮车在全球的普及。Beyond traditional cargo and passenger-carrying three-wheelers, manufacturers are increasingly branching into specialty and recreational vehicles to diversify their product offerings.除了传统的客货两用三轮车,制造商正越来越多地涉足特种车辆和休闲车辆领域,以实现产品线的多元化。He Shan, sales director at Jiangsu Shanming Shuixiu Environmental Protection Technology Co in Xuzhou, said the company's business originally focused on manufacturing cargo three-wheelers, but shifted toward developing and exporting specialty vehicles such as road sweepers after spotting growing demand in niche markets.江苏山明水秀环保科技有限公司销售总监贺珊表示,该公司原本以生产货运三轮车为主,但在发现利基市场需求不断增长后,转而开发和出口道路清扫车等特种车辆。"We are rolling out upgraded models that can sweep streets, wash surfaces, spray water mist and suppress dust. A single sweeper can do the work of more than a dozen people," He said.贺珊说:“我们正在推出能够清扫街道、清洗路面、喷雾降尘的升级版车型。一台清扫车能完成十几个人的工作量。”Household-use three-wheelers, passenger shuttles and leisure vehicles designed for tourist attractions and golf courses have become key growth segments for many traditional electric three-wheeler manufacturers, said Chen Bin, deputy director of the expert committee of the Beijing-based China Machinery Industry Federation.中国机械工业联合会专家委员会副主任陈斌表示,家用三轮车、景区摆渡车以及专为旅游景点和高尔夫球场设计的休闲车辆,已成为众多传统电动三轮车制造商的关键增长领域。Chen said the growing popularity of electric three-wheelers reflects a broader shift toward affordable, energy-efficient mobility solutions, creating new opportunities for Chinese manufacturers in global markets.陈斌指出,电动三轮车的日益普及,反映出全球交通出行正朝着经济型、高能效方向转变,这为中国制造商在全球市场创造了新的机遇。traction /ˈtrækʃən/吸引力,受欢迎程度environmental regulations /ɪnˌvaɪrənˈmentəl ˌreɡjʊˈleɪʃənz/环保法规lithium battery /ˈlɪθiəm ˈbætəri/锂电池driving range /ˈdraɪvɪŋ reɪndʒ/续航里程road sweeper /rəʊd ˈswiːpə/道路清扫车niche market /niːʃ ˈmɑːkɪt/利基市场,细分市场
China's procuratorial authorities recorded a decline in both juvenile crime cases and crimes against minors submitted for prosecution in 2025 for the first time in nearly five years, as prosecutors strengthened early intervention, targeted correction and broader social governance, the Supreme People's Procuratorate said.最高人民检察院表示,2025年,全国检察机关受理审查起诉的未成年人犯罪案件与侵害未成年人犯罪案件数量均出现近五年来首次下降,这是检察机关加强早期干预、精准帮教及社会综合治理的成果。The SPP‘s 2025 white paper on juvenile procuratorial work, published on Monday, International Children's Day, showed that procuratorial organs accepted 91,573 juvenile suspects for review and prosecution in 2025, down 9.8 percent year-on-year.最高人民检察院6月1日国际儿童节当天发布的《未成年人检察工作白皮书(2025)》显示,2025年检察机关受理审查起诉未成年犯罪嫌疑人91573人,同比下降9.8%。Theft, group fighting, rape, robbery, provocation and disturbance, and fraud accounted for 76.7 percent of juvenile crime cases.在未成年人犯罪案件中,盗窃罪、聚众斗殴罪、强奸罪、抢劫罪、寻衅滋事罪、诈骗罪等六类犯罪占比达76.7%。A total of 55,814 juvenile suspects were prosecuted, down 1.9 percent year-on-year. The number of suspects in the 14 to 16 age group dropped 13.4 percent. The SPP also approved the prosecution of 24 minors aged 12 to 14 for serious violent crimes, sending what it described as a clear message that age does not shield young offenders from criminal responsibility.2025年,全国检察机关共起诉未成年犯罪嫌疑人55814人,同比下降1.9%。其中,14周岁至16周岁的未成年犯罪嫌疑人数量同比下降13.4%。最高检依法核准追诉已满12周岁不满14周岁的未成年人严重暴力犯罪24人,向社会持续释放“低龄不是免罪金牌”的明确信号。At the same time, prosecutors continued to emphasize education and correction. In 2025, they decided not to approve the arrest of 28,200 juvenile suspects and not to prosecute another 38,100. The nonarrest and non-prosecution rates stood at 44.5 percent and 40.6 percent, respectively.与此同时,检察机关持续落实教育、感化、挽救的方针,加强对涉罪未成年人的教育矫治。2025年,全国检察机关对未成年犯罪嫌疑人依法不批准逮捕2.82万人,不起诉3.81万人,不捕率、不诉率分别为44.5%和40.6%。Follow-up education and assistance were provided after such decisions to help minors return to the right path. More than 71,000 eligible minors also had their criminal records sealed.在不捕、不诉之后,检察机关同步开展跟踪帮教,帮助涉罪未成年人回归正途。超过7.1万名符合条件的未成年人依法获得犯罪记录封存。Procuratorial organs have balanced punishment with protection, promoted graded intervention for juvenile offenses, strengthened supervision over specialized education and correction, and continued to improve juvenile crime prevention and governance, according to the SPP.最高检表示,检察机关坚持惩罚与保护并重,推动涉未成年人犯罪的分级干预矫治,加强对专门教育和专门矫治的监督,不断完善未成年人犯罪预防和治理体系。The SPP recently released typical cases involving emerging risks to minors, including school violence, cybercrime and new addictive substances, to illustrate that approach.最高检近期发布了涉及未成年人新型风险的典型案例,涵盖校园暴力、网络犯罪及新型成瘾性物质等。The SPP noted that gang-like behavior and repeat offending remain common problems in juvenile crime and major challenges for education and correction.最高检指出,团伙作案和重新犯罪仍是未成年人犯罪中较为突出的问题,也是当前教育矫治工作面临的重大挑战。In one case in Huzhou, Zhejiang province, two teenagers gathered other minors to fight for the title of "campus boss". Prosecutors handled those involved differently based on their roles, circumstances and risk of reoffending. Those who organized or actively participated in the fight were prosecuted or placed under correction measures, while those who played minor roles received targeted education and assistance.在浙江湖州办理的一起案件中,两名未成年人纠集他人,为争夺“校园老大”的称号约架。检察机关根据各人参与程度、情节轻重及再犯风险等因素,进行差别化处理。其中,对组织和积极参与斗殴的未成年人,依法予以起诉或采取矫治教育措施;对在案件中起辅助作用、参与程度较轻的未成年人,则有针对性地开展教育帮扶。The SPP said prosecutors should look beyond the offense itself and identify the roles minors play in violent conflicts and unhealthy peer relationships. It called for stricter measures for those at higher risk of reoffending and more tailored assistance for those who followed others without committing serious violence.最高检表示,检察官办案中要透过犯罪现象本身,关注未成年人在暴力冲突、畸形朋辈关系中的角色定位。对于再犯风险高的未成年人,要严格依法适用相应措施;对于在犯罪中主要受他人影响、未实施严重暴力的未成年人,要综合开展针对性的观护帮教。New addictive substances have also emerged as a prominent challenge in protecting minors.新型成瘾性物质的出现也对未成年人保护工作构成突出挑战。In one case in Shandong province, a 17-year-old boy sold nitrous oxide, commonly known as laughing gas, to other minors under the direction of a KTV and bar operator. The operator was later sentenced to life imprisonment for crimes including rape, illegal business operations and illegal detention, while the minor received a seven-year prison sentence.在山东省办理的一起案件中,一名17岁男孩在KTV和酒吧经营者的指使下,向其他未成年人销售俗称“笑气”的一氧化二氮。该经营者最终因强奸罪、非法经营罪和非法拘禁罪等被判处无期徒刑,涉罪未成年男孩被判处有期徒刑七年。Prosecutors in Shandong also proposed local legislation banning the provision and sale of nitrous oxide to minors. The proposal was adopted, resulting in China‘s first provincial-level legislation targeting the abuse of laughing gas among minors.山东省检察机关还提出地方立法建议,明令禁止向未成年人提供和销售“笑气”。该建议被采纳,推动制定了我国首部专门针对未成年人滥用“笑气”问题的省级地方性法规。The white paper also showed a decline in crimes against minors. Prosecutors approved the arrest of 56,338 suspects in such cases, down 1.4 percent year-on-year, and prosecuted 72,807 people, down 2.2 percent.白皮书还显示,侵害未成年人犯罪案件数量同比下降。2025年,全国检察机关批准逮捕侵害未成年人犯罪56338人,同比下降1.4%;起诉72807人,同比下降2.2%。A total of 42,873 people were prosecuted for sexual offenses against minors, including rape and child molestation, down 5.5 percent. The number prosecuted for crimes against children younger than 14 fell 6 percent to 38,384. Both categories declined for the first time in five years.其中,检察机关起诉强奸、猥亵儿童等性侵害未成年人犯罪42873人,同比下降5.5%;起诉侵害不满14周岁未成年人犯罪38384人,同比下降6%。这两类案件数量均为近五年来首次下降。The report also highlighted mandatory reporting and campus safety.报告同时强调了强制报告制度建设和校园安全保障工作。Under China's mandatory reporting system, people who work closely with children, including teachers, doctors and hotel operators, must immediately report suspected abuse, violence or other forms of harm involving minors to police or other relevant authorities.根据我国强制报告制度,教师、医生、宾馆经营者等密切接触未成年人的从业者,在工作中发现未成年人遭受或疑似遭受不法侵害以及面临其他危险的,应当立即向公安、民政、教育等有关部门报告。Those who fail to do so may face administrative or criminal penalties.未履行报告义务的,将视情节轻重依法予以行政或刑事处罚。In one case in Shanghai, a teacher who molested several female students was sentenced to seven years and six months in prison and barred from work involving close contact with minors. Prosecutors also found that school officials failed to promptly report earlier complaints from parents. The officials were later criticized and disciplined.在上海办理的一起案件中,一名教师因猥亵多名女学生,被判处有期徒刑七年六个月,并被处以从业禁止,不得从事密切接触未成年人的工作。检察机关同时发现,校方存在此前家长反映问题时未及时强制报告的情况,相关管理人员随后被批评处理、追责问责。The procuratorate subsequently worked with authorities in Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces to establish a cross-regional mandatory reporting mechanism in the Yangtze River Delta integrated demonstration zone.此后,检察机关还会同江苏、浙江等地的相关政府部门,在长三角生态绿色一体化发展示范区内建立了跨区域强制报告协作机制。Last year, 3,852 cases involving crimes against minors originated from mandatory reporting leads, accounting for 7.1 percent of the total. Procuratorial organs also urged relevant departments and organizations to hold more than 400 people accountable for failing to fulfill mandatory reporting obligations in cases where serious consequences occurred.2025年,检察机关办案中发现的侵害未成年人犯罪线索源于强制报告的有3852件,占办案总数的7.1%。对于因未履行强制报告义务造成严重后果的,检察机关督促相关部门和单位追责400余人。The SPP said prosecutors should move beyond handling individual cases and address broader governance issues by identifying the root causes of juvenile crime from the perspectives of individuals, families and social environments.最高检指出,检察机关应超越个案办理,从个体、家庭及社会环境等多维度,精准识别未成年人犯罪背后的深层成因,进而推动深层次的社会治理问题得到有效破解。procuratorial authorities /ˌprɒkjʊərəˈtɔːriəl ɔːˈθɒrətiz/检察机关juvenile crime /ˈdʒuːvənaɪl kraɪm/未成年人犯罪submitted for prosecution /səbˈmɪtɪd fɔː ˌprɒsɪˈkjuːʃən/受理审查起诉illegal business operations /ɪˈliːɡəl ˈbɪznɪs ˌɒpəˈreɪʃənz/非法经营罪illegal detention /ɪˈliːɡəl dɪˈtenʃən/非法拘禁罪mandatory reporting mechanism /ˈmændətəri rɪˈpɔːtɪŋ ˈmekənɪzəm/强制报告机制integrated demonstration zone /ˈɪntɪɡreɪtɪd ˌdemənˈstreɪʃən zəʊn/一体化发展示范区
Marriage: Mass weddings held across regions to promote simple ceremonies多地举办集体婚礼倡导婚事简办Couples across China are rushing to tie the knot on Wednesday and Thursday — May 20 and May 21 — two dates that sound like "I love you" when said aloud in Mandarin, with marriage registration slots fully booked weeks in advance in several major cities.全国多地情侣争相在5月20日和5月21日登记结婚——这两个日期的中文谐音均为“我爱你”。多个大城市的婚姻登记预约名额早在数周前就已约满。In Chinese, "520" is pronounced similarly to the Mandarin equivalent of "I love you", making May 20 a sought-after day for registering marriages. The following day, May 21 — or "521" — carries a similar meaning, offering a popular and much-needed alternative.在中文里,“520”的发音与“我爱你”相近,因此5月20日成为情侣登记结婚的热门日子。紧随其后的5月21日(“521”)同样寓意美好,为那些错过首日的新人提供了一个同样受欢迎且急需的备选。All slots in the 15 marriage registration offices in Guangzhou, Guangdong province, were fully booked for May 20 by the first week of this month, as they were in Shenzhen. In Nanjing, Jiangsu province, more than 1,400 couples had reserved May 20 as their chosen date by late April, with scenic registration sites such as the Confucius Temple already at capacity. Some locations were fully booked for May 21 as well.截至5月第一周,广东省广州市15个婚姻登记处5月20日的预约名额已全部约满,深圳的情况同样如此。在江苏省南京市,截至4月底已有超过1400对新人预约了5月20日登记,夫子庙等风景优美的登记点早已满额。部分登记点5月21日的名额也已约满。Wuxi, another city in Jiangsu, has no online slots left for May 20, though local authorities said that couples could still register as walk-ins.江苏省无锡市的5月20日线上预约名额也已告罄。不过当地民政部门表示,新人仍可现场直接办理登记。For one Beijing-based couple, securing a May 20 slot required a midnight digital scramble. Guo Xiangyu, 30, a doctoral student from Xi'an in Shaanxi province, and Yan Xin, 34, an internet worker from Baoji, also in Shaanxi, booked their appointment two weeks in advance. The couple and both sets of parents logged into the system at midnight across PCs and mobile devices, and Yan managed to secure a slot. "We expected it to be crowded, so we feel very lucky," she said.对北京的一对新人而言,抢到5月20日的登记名额需要一场午夜“数字鏖战”。30岁的郭翔宇(音译)是陕西西安人,目前是一名博士生;34岁的闫昕(音译)来自陕西宝鸡,从事互联网工作。两人提前两周就预约了登记。当天午夜,他们和双方父母分头用电脑和手机登录系统,最终闫昕成功抢到了名额。“我们早知道会很火爆,所以感觉特别幸运,”闫昕说。In preparation, the couple had completed free premarital medical checks at a Beijing hospital, taken registration photos at a commercial studio and hired a photographer to document their special day near the civil affairs bureau.为迎接这一天,两人事先在北京一家医院完成了免费婚检,在商业摄影机构拍好了登记照,还专门聘请了一位摄影师,计划在民政局附近记录下这个特殊的日子。The pair met via social media, bonding over photography and skiing, and dated for two-and-a-half years before deciding to marry. They chose May 20 partly because its homophone "520" is a declaration of love in Chinese and is often seen as a Valentine's Day equivalent. "We want to celebrate our anniversary and 520 together," Yan said.两人通过社交媒体相识,因摄影和滑雪结缘,恋爱两年半后决定携手步入婚姻。他们选择5月20日登记,部分原因在于“520”谐音“我爱你”,被视为中国的情人节。“我们想把结婚纪念日和520一起庆祝,”闫昕说。Both originally from Shaanxi but living in Beijing for work and study, the couple benefited from a revised marriage regulation introduced in May 2025. The rule ended a decades-old restriction that required people to register their marriage in a place where either spouse's household registration was recorded. Now, couples can marry anywhere in the country without presenting their household registration booklet. "It saved us time and travel costs, and made us feel more connected to Beijing," Guo said.两人籍贯均为陕西,但因工作和学习长期生活在北京。2025年5月出台的婚姻登记新规让他们受益良多。这项政策打破了延续数十年的限制——过去,新人必须在其中一方的户籍所在地才能办理结婚登记。如今,情侣可以在全国任意城市登记结婚,且无需出示户口本。“新规为我们节省了时间和路费,也让我们对北京更有归属感,”郭翔宇说。Thursday or May 21 is the choice of many this year as it coincides with xiao man, or Grain Buds, a traditional Chinese solar term. Song Jian, an engineer from Sichuan province, chose this date over May 20. "The solar term carries a beautiful saying — a modest half-full state is better than perfection," he said. "That fits our relationship well. You don't have to pursue perfection in life; being content with what you have is enough."今年,5月21日也成为许多新人的首选,因为这一天恰逢中国传统二十四节气中的“小满”。来自四川的工程师宋健(音译)便放弃了5月20日,选择了这一天。“小满这个节气有一句美好的说法——‘人生小满胜万全',”他说,“这正好契合我们的感情。人生不必事事追求完美,知足常乐就够了。”Multiple provincial-level regions have also organized mass wedding ceremonies on and around the two dates to promote simple ceremonies.多个省份还在5月20日及前后组织了集体婚礼,倡导婚事简办的新风尚。In Hainan province, collective weddings will be held on Wednesday at coastal venues, including Coconut Dream Corridor in Sanya and the Wenchang Spacecraft Launch Site. Zhejiang province hosted a ceremony on Saturday featuring 520 couples, with a main venue in Hangzhou linked to dozens of sub-venues across the province. Guangdong organized military-civilian collective weddings in Guangzhou on Monday, Zhaoqing on Sunday, Foshan on Friday and Zhongshan on Saturday, involving more than 1,000 couples.海南省于5月20日在三亚椰梦长廊、文昌航天发射场等海滨场地举办了集体婚礼。浙江省于上周末举行了一场集体婚礼,共有520对新人参与,主会场设在杭州,与省内数十个分会场联动。广东省则分别在广州、肇庆、佛山、中山举办了军地共建集体婚礼,参与新人超过1000对。"This collective wedding is a celebration that's both sweet and green, without the complicated preparations," one groom, Zhong Zhiyuan, who was part of the Guangzhou weddings, was quoted by the local media as saying.据当地媒体报道,参与广州集体婚礼的一位新郎钟志远(音译)说:“这场集体婚礼既甜蜜又‘环保',省去了繁杂的筹备。”But not everyone is keen on getting married on popular dates. Yang Xinran, a marketing professional from the Chinese mainland who now works in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, registered her marriage in Beijing last September and deliberately avoided peak days. "As working people, we have to prioritize our schedules," she said.不过,并非所有人都热衷在热门日子结婚。来自内地、现于香港特别行政区从事市场营销工作的杨欣然,去年9月在北京登记结婚时就特意避开了高峰期。“我们都是有工作的人,得优先考虑自己的时间安排,”她说。Yang and her husband picked several possible dates based on their work calendars, then let their parents make the final call. "Even booking a restaurant for an anniversary is hard enough on popular dates — no need to add to the trouble," she said.杨欣然(音译)和丈夫根据各自的工作日程,先圈定几个可能的日期,最后让父母拍板决定。“热门日子光是预约餐厅庆祝纪念日就已经够难了,没必要再给自己添麻烦,”她说。In the past year, authorities processed more than 682,000 interprovincial marriages, official data showed. China saw a significant surge in marriage registrations in 2025, with 6.763 million couples registering, a 10.76 percent year-on-year increase.官方数据显示,过去一年,全国共办理跨省婚姻登记超过68.2万对。2025年,全国结婚登记数量显著回升,共有676.3万对新人登记结婚,同比增长10.76%。slot /slɒt/名额,时段sought-after /ˈsɔːt ɑːftə/热门的,抢手premarital medical checks /priːˈmærɪtəl ˈmedɪkəl tʃeks/婚前医学检查,婚检civil affairs bureau /ˈsɪvəl əˈfeəz ˈbjʊərəʊ/民政局keen on /kiːn ɒn/热衷,喜爱prioritize /praɪˈɒrɪtaɪz/优先考虑
Last time we spoke about the battle Yaoyi. Japan pushed hard into Hubei with a plan: surround the main Chinese forces and seize Yichang, hoping to use it to strike at Chongqing. At first, the fighting was chaotic and punishing. The Chinese side tried to hold the line and disrupt the advance, and they even managed setbacks for the Japanese, pushing back, retaking key ground, and hitting supply and positioning weaknesses. But victory came with a cost: commanders were lost, and every gain was hard-won. Still, the battle didn't unfold as a clean Chinese retreat or a simple Japanese win. As Japanese units shifted and tested for openings, the Chinese forces adjusted—delaying, regrouping, and fighting to keep their formations from being completely trapped. Eventually, Japan managed to break through at critical moments, especially through crossings and maneuvers that the Chinese had not fully sealed off. In the end, Japan succeeded in taking Yichang, but it didn't achieve the decisive annihilation it wanted. #201 The New Fourth Army Incident and the Strained United Front Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After the catastrophe of the early 1930s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) entered the war against Japan in a political mood that was both hopeful and wary: it wanted to be seen as a genuine national leader of resistance, yet it also feared being absorbed—or destroyed—by the Guomindang (KMT) state it had spent years battling. That tension became the organizing principle of the war's early years. The turning point came from the Xi'an Incident in December 1936, which forced a new calculation in Nationalist politics. In the months that followed, agreements between KMT and CCP representatives were publicly proclaimed in August and September 1937, after the Shanghai fighting began. Under these arrangements, the CCP accepted constraints that in peacetime would have looked like surrender: it pledged to strive for Sun Yixian's "Three People's Principles," to end its former policies of armed revolt and sovietization, to abolish the soviet government, and to discontinue both the term "Red Army" and the expectation that its forces would operate outside central control. Communist troops would be treated as part of the national military under KMT command, and the revolution's old administrative structures were to be formally dismantled. In return, the KMT offered the CCP something just as important: space to exist publicly and politically. Liaison offices were permitted in key cities; the CCP was allowed to publish the New China Daily; and it could nominate representatives to KMT advisory bodies. Civil rights were extended—political prisoners were released—and subsidies were established to help cover administrative and military expenses in "reintegrated" areas and territories. The war thus transformed the tactical reality on the ground: the CCP could not treat the KMT as an immediate enemy, but it also could not afford to become politically passive. It had to learn how to fight Japan while building legitimacy fast enough to survive the next phase. In the first year and a half, the Party Center focused on three problems that kept returning in different forms: how the "united front" would be defined—especially what the CCP's relationship to the National government should be; how to coordinate military strategy and tactics with Nationalist units without losing control of its own operations; and how leadership should be consolidated, particularly for Mao Zedong in a party that still contained rival centers of authority. These disputes mattered not just for doctrine but for survival, because the CCP's autonomy was constantly being tested by the very alliance that was supposed to protect it. Mao's own approach to the united front combined cooperation with a refusal to surrender independence. Publicly, the CCP praised Jiang Jieshi and the KMT and promised unity, but it did so in language that was deliberately broad. In private (and in internal party debates), Mao treated unity as conditional: the CCP must not split the united front, but it also must not be "bound hand and foot." The strategic idea that emerged was political initiative under constraints—fighting when it could plausibly claim justification, keeping enough restraint that the CCP would not appear self-interested or anti-national, and deciding for itself when to engage and when to withdraw. This balance was reinforced through military reorganization. In August–September 1937, CCP forces were reorganized as the Eighth Route Army (8RA), with roughly 30,000 men drawn from Long March survivors, local forces, and new recruits. The 8RA was divided into three divisions: the 115th, 120th, and 129th, commanded by Lin Biao, He Long, and Liu Bocheng respectively. Shortly after the war began, the National government also authorized a second major Communist force: the New Fourth Army (N4A), to operate in central China. Its core came from those left behind when the Long March began in 1934—small groups surviving in difficult conditions against continuing KMT pressure. Officially authorized at 12,000, it took months to reach that strength. Nominally commanded by Ye Ting, actual military and political control rested with Xiang Ying and Chen Yi. From the start, then, the CCP's wartime "integration" with the National system coexisted with a clear effort to preserve internal control. Ideologically, the CCP worked to make its revolutionary program compatible—at least in appearance—with a national resistance coalition. On the New Democracy demonstrated how this strategy operated on two levels. In KMT-controlled spaces, its language could be read as aligning with liberal-democratic expectations: public participation, multi-party governance, legally protected civil rights. But in CCP-controlled areas, the same text could carry sharper class-based and authoritarian implications. The Party wanted a united front that broadened support without becoming committed to Nationalist limits on how society itself might be reorganized after victory. Meanwhile, even as the rhetoric of unity rose, the CCP worried about something more dangerous than military setbacks: the possibility that the KMT might accommodate Japan. Late 1939 and early 1940 made this fear harder to dismiss. Japan pursued collaboration with Wang Jingwei, culminating in the establishment of a "reorganized" government at Nanjing in March 1940. At the same time, Japanese intermediaries sought approaches to Chiang Kai-shek himself—an effort that the CCP tracked closely as a sign that peace negotiations might be possible even when battlefield conditions looked grim. Propaganda was involved, but the anxiety was real: if Japan and the Nationalists reached an arrangement, the CCP's whole wartime legitimacy-building effort could collapse overnight. As a result, the united front was interpreted inside the CCP not as a permanent coalition with the KMT, but as a flexible strategy with a cardinal purpose: to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Mao's position on the united front reflected this. For him, the alliance was meant to suspend the possibility of a China–Japan settlement, not to end the CCP's separate identity. The CCP could participate in a reconstituted national framework—possibly even a "democratic republic"—to gain legality and influence, but it should remain politically and, where possible, physically separate from the KMT. By 1939, however, the practical meaning of "flexibility" collided with reality. What had seemed, to some observers, like an unusually cordial entente began to fade. The KMT Central Committee adopted measures early in 1939 aimed at restricting Communist expansion, and armed clashes increased through the summer and continued into autumn and winter—especially around North China Communist bases. The period of rising conflict was later labeled by the CCP as the "first anti-Communist upsurge" (roughly spanning December 1939 into March 1940), but the crucial point was that both sides viewed each confrontation as a test of legal rights, moral legitimacy, and control over territory. Strategically, the CCP understood the KMT's effort as an attempt to check unauthorized growth of Communist armed power and to recover areas where influence had already slipped away—either to the Communists or, by indirect effect, to Japan. The KMT emphasized its traditional legal authority; the CCP countered with its claim to an "evolutionary" moral right to challenge the government's legitimacy. In practice, the conflict took the form of increasingly systematic military pressure, including a blockade around the Shen–Gan–Ning region. By this point, the blockade involved large numbers of troops (on the order of hundreds of thousands), halting Communist expansion and disrupting direct contact with other Communist forces farther afield, even as fighting flared along border zones and around vulnerable points in the Communist defensive perimeter. So, by the edge of the "middle years," the wartime alliance had not broken into open civil war—but it had also stopped being secure. The united front survived, yet it operated under strain: its language of cooperation continued, while "friction" between partners hardened into a central feature of the resistance struggle. Transition into the war's second phase began in early 1939, shaped by the stalemate Mao had already anticipated at the sixth plenum in late 1938. Mao argued that during this prolonged "new stage" the forces of resistance—above all, Communist-led forces—would strengthen. The overall result, however, was mixed. In Shandong and Central China, new Communist bases did take shape. But across much of North China, Japanese consolidation cost the resistance heavily in manpower and population. Base-area economies suffered serious strain, and the peasantry endured hardships more severe than at any earlier point. This stalemate had two main dimensions. The first was the growing resentment of the Nationalists toward Communist expansion—resentment made especially sharp by their own losses. As the Nationalists were driven out of regions that had previously provided them their greatest wealth and power in the central and lower Yangtze basin, they also lost the "cream" of their armies. In contrast, the CCP was spreading through the wider countryside behind Japanese lines, extending its influence and winning broader popular support. The second dimension was Japan's desire—and need—to consolidate territories it had only nominally conquered and to extract economic value from them. After all, the logic of the "China Incident" was to draw on China's labor and resources to strengthen Japan, not to bleed Japan's gains away by draining wealth into China's vast interior. A Japanese colonel, lamenting the situation, captured the frustration of this drift into deeper entanglement: he regretted that Japan had not ended the "China Incident" once its initial objectives were reached. Instead, Japan was drawn into the hinterland and became bogged down in endless attrition—leaving it with little more than "real estate" rather than the popular support it believed it would secure from those it claimed to "liberate." To improve their position, Japanese authorities—still fragmented by internal rivalry—pursued several strategies. One was a new peace offensive aimed simultaneously at Jiang Jieshi, alongside efforts to establish a "reformed" Nationalist government under Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing in December 1938. Japan also recruited more collaborators and puppet officials. Finally, it carried out forceful military, political, and economic measures intended to establish effective territorial control and eliminate opposition. During the middle years of the war, the Communists described their conflicts with the Nationalists using the euphemism "friction". By 1939, what many observers—possibly incorrectly—had viewed as an unusually warm alliance began to break down. In early 1939, the KMT Central Committee adopted measures meant to restrict the CCP. From the summer onward, military clashes began and continued into autumn and winter with increasing frequency and intensity, most of them concentrated around and within the North China base areas. The Communists later labeled the period from December 1939 to March 1940 the "first anti-Communist upsurge." Naturally, each side accused the other of aggression and claimed self-defense against unjust attacks. Strategically, though, the North China "upsurge" functioned as a Nationalist attempt to limit the CCP's expansion beyond the areas assigned to it and to regain influence in regions the Communists—or the Japanese—had already taken from the KMT. Jiang Jieshi framed the matter as a defense of legal rights grounded in tradition, while the Communists asserted an "evolutionary" right to challenge the moral legitimacy of those legal claims. During 1939, the Nationalists began to blockade Shen–Gan–Ning around its southern and western perimeter. Within a year, this blockade grew to nearly 400,000 troops, including some of the last remaining Central Army units under the command of Hu Zongnan. The blockade stopped further Communist expansion, especially into Gansu and Suiyuan, and severed direct contact between SKN and Communists operating in Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan) adjacent to Soviet Central Asia. The Xinjiang Communists—including Mao Zedong's brother—were eliminated in 1942. Meanwhile, fierce fighting erupted along the Gansu–Shaanxi border and in the north-eastern corner of SKN near the Great Wall at Suide, as the blockading forces probed for weak points. Elements of He Long's 120th Division were even pulled back from the Jin–Sui base across the Yellow River to strengthen SKN's regular defenses. Economically, the blockade was even more damaging. During 1939, central government subsidies to the Border Region budget were cut off. Trade between the Border Region and other parts of China nearly stopped, a devastating blow to a region unable to supply itself with many basic commodities. At the same time, Nationalist and regional forces also attempted to expand their military and administrative authority into Hebei, Shanxi, Henan, and Shandong—areas the CCP now considered its base zones. In resisting these efforts, the CCP predictable accused its rivals of harming resistance work and damaging the people's interests. The "experts in dissension" were said to cooperate with the Japanese and their puppets. Based on increasing collaboration by regional units with Japan, the CCP implied that this was a deliberate and cynical strategy—described as "crooked-line patriotism"—intended to preserve those units for future anti-Communist operations. Even so, the CCP tried to avoid an open break with the Nationalist regime in Chongqing. In public, it consistently portrayed these clashes as being initiated by local commanders acting beyond orders from higher authority—despite knowing this depiction was false. Jiang Jieshi, unable to refute the claim outright, effectively permitted it to serve as the justification for a firm Communist response. Mao Zedong outlined the general resistance policy as "justification, expedience, and restraint". The CCP was to fight when it could claim justification and when it could gain advantage, but not to press attacks beyond what the Nationalists would tolerate or in ways that could damage its image as selfless patriots. Communist forces were expected to keep initiative as much as possible in their own hands—deciding when to engage, whether to engage, and when to disengage. The most striking episode of the "first anti-Communist upsurge" was the rupture with Yan Xishan in December 1939. Tensions in Shanxi had been rising throughout the summer and autumn, as Yan and his conservative supporters—associated with the "Old Army"—linked the Sacrifice League and the Dare-to-die Corps of the "New Army" with Communist forces. When base areas and Japanese occupation eventually took over much of his province, Yan was forced into exile at Qiulin across the Yellow River in Shaanxi. In November, Yan ordered his Old Army to disarm the Dare-to-die forces with help from central units dispatched by Hu Zongnan. In the bloody fighting that followed, these elements gradually broke free of even nominal provincial control and fully completed their connection with Communist forces. More than 30,000 people went over to the Communists. One KMT intelligence agent described the process with bitterness and a sense of inevitability: the Communists were first "full of sweet words," flattery, and distortions designed to open things up and conceal their actions. But once they had fully entrenched themselves, and once the low-level base had been established, they turned and bit. The agent suggested they had suspected things might end this way, but were not aware how quickly events would move—or that it could happen precisely while Communist calls for "united front" and "maintenance of unity for resistance" filled the air. About a month later, in February and March 1940, elements of the 8RA beat back this so-called upsurge. Zhang Yinwu's forces were disarmed and dispersed across the plains of north Hebei. To the south, Chu Huaiping and Shi Yusan were pushed out of the base area, as was the KMT-appointed provincial governor Lu Zhonglin. Although some non-Communist forces remained in the region, the CCP's and CCLY bases were never again seriously threatened by forces affiliated with the central government. Reinforcing the CCP's accusations, Shi Yusan was later executed in 1940 by the central government for collaboration with the Japanese. By late 1939, CCP central authorities maintained that the areas where the CCP could expand its armed strength were mainly limited to Shandong and Central China. In those regions, the CCP continued trying to carve out bases where they could operate. The situation in Shandong was complicated. After the Japanese invasion, most Nationalist-affiliated forces stayed in the province, while Communist forces and bases were weaker and more scattered than further west. Only in late 1938 did major 8RA units from the 115th and 129th Divisions—led by Xu Xiangqian and Luo Ronghuan—enter Shandong to link up with the Shandong column and local guerrillas, including survivors of a large band recently decimated by the Japanese. Even with these efforts, Communist actions led to clashes not only with Japanese forces but also with various Nationalist-affiliated groups—groups that were stronger than the Communists at the time. Until late 1940, the CCP's clashes with Nationalist forces in Shandong were actually bloodier than clashes with the Japanese. The CCP understood that its Chinese rivals mistrusted one another, and that their attitudes toward the CCP varied widely. The main Nationalist forces were often not tightly affiliated with Chiang Kai-shek or the central government. Instead, they operated under independent—and at times disgruntled—regional commanders. Communist tactics were expressed through slogans emphasizing ways to win support and isolate hardliners: develop progressive forces and win over fence-sitters while isolating "die-hards"; flatter top echelons, enlist the middle ranks, and hit the rank and file; and win over Yi Xuezhong, isolate Shen Honglie, and eliminate Qin Qirong. Still, unlike other North China base areas, the Communists were unable for several years to neutralize Nationalist forces in Shandong. Even if Japanese mop-up campaigns had not weakened those Nationalists, the text suggests the Communists may still have struggled to do so. By November 1940, Xu Xiangqian claimed meaningful progress while admitting Shandong had not yet become a fully consolidated base. CCP successes were greatest along parts of the Shandong–Hebei border, around the Taishan massif in central Shandong, and near the tip of the peninsula far to the east. Elsewhere, "progressive forces" remained weak. Communist regular troops numbered about 70,000, which was far below the party center's goals of 150,000 regulars and between 1.5 and 2 million self-defense forces. Moreover, systematic economic reforms had barely begun. The CCP relied on familiar practices—confiscations, collections of "national salvation grain," contributions, and loans—alongside a conventional taxation system adjusted to favor poorer peasants. Communist expansion in Central China was even riskier, with a greater likelihood of large-scale conflict with central government forces than in the north. In much of North China, "friction" came primarily from rapid Communist expansion into areas with partial vacuums. In Central China, however, base-building required displacing an existing Nationalist military-administrative presence closely tied to Jiang Kai-shek and the Chongqing government. The burden of this expansion was carried mainly by the 6th Detachment (northern Anhui and Jiangsu) and the 5th Detachment, which was reinforced by 15,000 to 20,000 8RA troops under Huang K'o-ch'eng. As Chen Yi's 1st Detachment crossed from south to north through the corridor provided by Guan Wenwei's local forces, it became actively involved as well. This expansion—driven by increasingly urgent directives from Mao and Liu during the latter part of 1939 and into 1940—brought the N4A north of the river into ever more frequent and sharper clashes with Nationalist authorities in Anhui and Jiangsu, especially with units under Jiangsu governor Han Deqin. South of the river, though, Xiang Ying did not directly challenge Chongqing's commanders. Mao later charged that Xiang Ying may have been influenced by Wang Ming, or else he may simply have seen no realistic alternative. His forces—three detachments plus a headquarters unit—were heavily outnumbered by Qu Chutong's Nationalist units, not to mention Japanese forces and their puppets. Even if Mao insisted bases could be built "anywhere," the Shanghai–Hangzhou–Nanjing triangle was especially difficult terrain. Xiang Ying and his followers had survived with extraordinary tenacity in the mountains of South China between 1934 and 1937, enduring brutal search-and-destroy operations that were not lifted until the war began. It therefore seems unlikely that such survivors would suddenly become "right-wing capitulationists." Yet by spring 1940, Mao was pressing Xiang Ying more intensely. The Central Committee's message was explicit: expansion was necessary in all cases. It meant reaching into all enemy-occupied areas rather than being bound by the Kuomintang's restrictions—going beyond Kuomintang limits, not waiting for official appointments, not depending on higher-ups for financing, and instead expanding armed forces freely and independently. It also meant setting up base areas without hesitation, independently mobilizing the masses in those areas, and building united front organs of political power under Communist Party leadership. The struggle between Nationalists and Communists involved more than contests for control of territory behind Japanese lines. It also involved national-level politics, ideology, and leadership. One worrying development for the CCP was the campaign throughout 1939 to expand Jiang Kai-shek's prestige and formal power—adding more titles for him across major party, government, and military positions. In early 1939, the Central Executive Committee appointed him "director-general" of the Kuomintang, a title reminiscent of the one previously held by Sun Yat-sen. In addition, during the summer and autumn of 1939 there was talk of constitutional rule. In November, the KMT announced plans to convene a constitutional assembly the following year. If Jiang could fulfill these promises, he and his government could gain new legitimacy and wider popularity. Mao and his colleagues could not allow this to go unchallenged. If the Nationalists were to have a paramount leader and authoritative spokesperson, the CCP needed one as well. The timing of Mao's famous "On the new democracy"—written in late 1939 and published the next January—was therefore no accident. Its substance had been anticipated earlier, but its final timing and full development were shaped by the KMT's constitutional movement. The CCP's entry into this competition served as both a bid for support away from the KMT and a statement of the multi-class united front that the CCP wanted to lead. Although "On the new democracy" was written in a tone that seemed moderate, it persuaded many Chinese readers that the CCP had either diluted its revolutionary objectives or postponed them to a distant future. In Kuomintang-controlled areas, the work could be read through the liberal values associated with Anglo-American democracy—popular participation, multi-party government, legally protected civil rights. In CCP-controlled territories, the same language carried stronger authoritarian, class-based meanings. In internal documents meant for party audiences rather than public consumption, the ambiguity was removed, showing a tough but patient and flexible commitment not only to resistance but also to social control and social change. During this same period, the Communists expressed deep concern about Nationalist capitulation to Japan—not only on the battlefield behind Japanese lines but also at the highest levels. Some of this concern was propaganda, but beneath propaganda lay genuine anxiety. In late 1939 and early 1940, politically aware Chinese already knew that Japan was negotiating with the unpredictable Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing a year earlier. A "reorganized national government" in Nanjing was finally established in March 1940, representing the most formidable collaboration with Japan to date. Less well known, but equally important, was that Japan was also seeking an understanding directly with Jiang Kai-shek through intermediaries in Hong Kong. This effort, called "Operation Kiri"—described as spreading a "feast for Chiang"—combined intrigue with a kind of dark comedy. Reports suggested Chiang's reported interest in peace could have been a stratagem designed to discredit Wang Jingwei by keeping him waiting. But even if Chiang had no intention of coming to terms with Japan, the Communists could not be sure what the outcome would be until after the multi-pronged peace offensive had failed. By the middle of 1940, China had never been so isolated. In Europe, the "phony war" ended in the spring when Germany launched a blitz across the Low Countries. France fell soon after, and England appeared likely to be next. Japan used this moment to press China to sever its last tenuous connections to the outside world: cutting the Burma Road, trade with neutral Hong Kong, and the rail link running from Hanoi to Kunming. At the same time, Russia was engaged in a difficult and embarrassing war with Finland and reduced military aid to the Nationalists. The United States was only gradually moving away from isolationism and clearly regarded England as more important than China. In Chongqing and elsewhere in "Free China," signs of war weariness, despair, and demoralization were visible. Under these circumstances, Mao's insistence on aggressive expansion was a calculated risk—either it would deter any Japanese advance, or it would place the Communists in the strongest possible position in case a split between the KMT and the CCP became unavoidable. In Central China, the size and pace of the fighting kept increasing, starting in the final months of 1939. One flashpoint was the clash between Luo Pinghui's 5th Detachment and units of Han Deqin's Jiangsu force near Lake Gaoyou. In the following months, Guan Wenwei's forces ranged along the left bank of the Yangtze, repeatedly running into Luo's troops as they operated farther north. Luo also began receiving some 8RA reinforcements, moving them south through areas controlled by the 6th Detachment. Clearly, a major showdown was taking shape across north and central Jiangsu. At the same time, the South Yangtze Command was doing poorly. Nationalist commanders Leng Xin and Qu Chutong restricted its activities so severely that Mao and Liu gradually abandoned the idea of building a unified, consolidated base in that region. During late spring and early summer, Chen Yi moved most of his 1st and 2nd Detachments north of the Yangtze. In September, the 3rd Detachment followed suit, crossing the river into the area around Lake Chaohu, where the 4th Detachment was already stationed. After these moves, only the Headquarters Detachment—under Ye Ting and Xiang Ying—remained south of the Yangtze, positioned at Qingxian in southern Anhui. As the military situation edged toward an open confrontation, negotiations began in June 1940 between representatives of the KMT and the CCP. The core issues were Communist operating zones and the authorized strength of the armies led by the CCP. Proposals were exchanged, followed by equally sharp and hostile counter-proposals, but no agreement was reached. The KMT viewed it as a concession to permit the CCP "free rein" north of the pre-1938 course of the Yellow River, with the exception of southern Shanxi, which was to remain under the influence of Yan Xishan. In exchange, the KMT demanded that all 8RA and N4A units evacuate Central China. In effect, the KMT was offering the CCP something it was already prepared to allow, in return for the CCP giving up what it might soon be able to obtain by force of arms. Nationalist authorities then issued a set of deadlines, but without clearly stating what would happen if those deadlines were violated. On the surface, the CCP appeared to be complying in part. The movements of Chen Yi and the South Yangtze Command could look like obedience, but in reality they were responses to orders coming from their own superior leadership rather than instructions issued by the Nationalists. Even so, Xiang Ying's continued delays and evasions during the autumn and winter of 1940 remained puzzling. One possibility is that he felt—quite reasonably—that Mao had already lost confidence in him and that once he crossed to the north bank of the river he would lose his command. Another complication was that directives from Yan'an were sometimes ambiguous and even contradictory. He may also have been trying to reach secure understandings with KMT commanders about evacuation routes and guaranteed safe conduct out of the area. For a period, Han Teqin kept most of his forces—estimated at about 70,000 men, far outnumbering the N4A—in north Jiangsu, thereby blocking the expansion of the 6th Detachment and slowing further southern intrusions by 8RA troops. But by mid-summer he realized he would have to counter the N4A build-up in central Jiangsu, or else risk writing that region off to the Communists. A confusing sequence of engagements then unfolded, culminating in a decisive battle in early October 1940 near the central Jiangsu town of Huangjiao. Over the course of four days, several of Han's main-force units belonging to the 89th Army were destroyed, while others were scattered. That battle also served as a signal for the 6th Detachment to advance more aggressively in the north. In the aftermath, one of Han's principal commanders entered collaboration with the CCP, while another defected to the Nanjing government under Wang Jingwei. Although Han Teqin managed to maintain a foothold in Jiangsu until 1943, his real power had been broken. Relatively little attention was paid to the battle of Huangjiao in the Chinese press. The KMT did not want to publicize what it considered a disastrous defeat, while the Communists were satisfied to stay silent about an episode that conflicted with their proclaimed policy of a united front. As could be expected, during the autumn—after Han Teqin's defeat—KMT-CCP negotiations deteriorated further. In early December, Jiang Kai-shek personally ordered that all N4A forces withdraw from southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu by 31 December. He also ordered that the entire 8RA be positioned north of the Yellow River by the same deadline, followed one month later by the N4A. Discussions then followed between Ye Ting and Qu Chutong's deputies concerning the route to be taken, safe conduct, and—astonishingly—the money and supplies that were to be provided to the N4A to help it move. On 25 December, Mao Zedong ordered Xiang Ying to begin evacuating immediately. Yet it was not until 4 January 1941 that Ye and Xiang actually started moving. Almost immediately, Qu Chutong's forces harassed and dispersed the N4A Headquarters Group, which included administrative personnel, wounded soldiers and dependents, as well as combat-ready troops. In an attempt to reorganize, they moved southwest toward Maolin, where they were surrounded by Nationalists and, over the next several days, were cut to pieces. Losses were heavy on both sides. The CCP suffered an estimated 9,000 casualties. Xiang Ying tried twice to break out of the blockade on his own, but failed. He was then denounced as a deserter by Ye Ting, who took over full command of the doomed forces. Xiang Ying eventually escaped, but he was killed a couple of months later by one of his own bodyguards, motivated by the N4A gold reserves that he had taken with him. Up to the very end, Xiang either failed or refused to seek refuge in Liu Shaoqi's domain north of the Yangtze. The unfortunate Ye Ting was arrested and spent the rest of the war in prison. He was finally released in 1946, only to die one month later in a plane crash, along with several other high-ranking party members. On 17 January, Jiang Kai-shek declared that the New Fourth Army was dissolved for insubordination. Direct contacts between Yan'an and Chongqing nearly came to an end, and CCP military liaison offices in several cities held by the Nationalists were closed. This is what became known as the New Fourth Army incident, also referred to as the South Anhui incident. Clearly, it functioned as an act of retaliation for the defeats suffered by Han Teqin in north and central Jiangsu. It ended any realistic prospect of establishing a consolidated Communist base south of the Yangtze. Still, from a strategic perspective, these losses were ultimately more than offset by the gains achieved farther north. In fact, only a few months later, the reorganized N4A quietly began reintroducing some units into this region, where they carried out guerrilla activities without possessing a secure territorial base. Unlike the relative silence surrounding the fighting at Huangjiao, the New Fourth Army incident sparked bitter, prolonged controversy. The CCP argued that it was a second "anti-Communist upsurge," even more serious than the first. Presenting themselves as martyred patriots, they depicted their opponents as people who wanted to end the War of Resistance through what they called "Sino-Japanese cooperation" aimed at "suppressing the Communists." In their account, the Nationalists wanted to replace the war of resistance with civil war, substitute capitulation for independence, trade unity for a split, and replace light with darkness. People were telling each other the news and were horrified. Indeed, they claimed that the situation had never been as critical as it was at that moment. The Nationalist response, of course, was that provocations had been numerous and serious, and that violations of military discipline could not be tolerated. But the KMT's unwillingness to describe in detail its own defeats at the CCP's hands left it speaking in broad generalities. In the propaganda battle, the CCP clearly gained the better position and won more political capital. If it was politically valuable to be regarded as a national hero, it was even more valuable to be seen as a national martyr. Many Chinese—and some outside—observers were genuinely alarmed and feared that civil war might openly resume. Yet, with a few exceptions, the events that culminated in the New Fourth Army incident have generally been interpreted as marking the breakdown of the second united front. That interpretation, however, is described as being wrong in two respects. First, the CCP understood the united front not as a narrow arrangement limited to a few major partners, but as a strategy that could be applied flexibly to all political, military, and social forces in China—from the highest levels of the central government down to the smallest village. Relations with Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang regime mattered, but they did not, by themselves, constitute the whole of the united front. Even regarding Jiang and the Nationalists specifically, the common reading is said to be misguided. Throughout the war, a cardinal objective of the united front was to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Therefore, if clashes between CCP forces and those of the central government on such a large scale as at Huangjiao and Maolin could occur without leading to peace with Japan and without triggering a full-scale resumption of civil war, then this should not be understood as the end of the united front—it should be seen as its fundamental vindication. If friction at that scale could nevertheless be tolerated by Jiang Jieshi, then fears about his future accommodation with Japan were greatly reduced. Following the New Fourth Army incident, the CCP reorganized its political and military presence in Central China. The Central Plains and South-east China Bureaus were merged and renamed the Central China Bureau, with Liu Shaoqi placed in charge, reflecting the area's importance to Party Central. The New Fourth Army was also reorganized completely and substantially regularized. Chen Yi became its new acting commander, since Ye Ting was imprisoned. He directed the force, now divided into seven divisions. Each division had territorial responsibilities, and in each region the CCP claimed the establishment of a base. Indeed, base construction proceeded in earnest only after the friction of 1940 and the New Fourth Army incident. In the years that followed, the operating areas of the First through Fourth Divisions contained expanding enclaves of consolidated territory, where military dominance was joined with open party work: administrative control, the development of mass organizations, local elections, and socio-economic reforms. The other three areas fluctuated between semi-consolidated and guerrilla status. With the incident, the worst phase of the KMT-CCP conflict was now over. When CCP documents later speak of a third upsurge in 1943, they refer to something openly political. With the exception of Shandong—where a fairly strong Nationalist presence persisted for a longer time—the overall balance of power among Chinese forces behind Japanese lines had shifted in favor of the CCP by mid-1941. In subsequent years the CCP's predominance became even more pronounced, until by the end of 1943 the Communists were virtually beyond challenge by Chinese rivals. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After the CCP and KMT entered the united front, cooperation felt conditional from the start. Mao pushed the New Fourth Army to reorganize and preserve Communist autonomy, even as the 1937 agreements publicly pledged obedience to KMT leadership. In 1939–40 the Communists worried that Chiang might negotiate peace with Japan; so they expanded bases and military presence, triggering repeated clashes. The pressure intensified when KMT orders forced the New Fourth Army to evacuate south Anhui in late 1940.
En Chine, premier producteur mondial d'ail, le marché traverse une mauvaise passe. Depuis plusieurs mois, les récoltes abondantes s'accumulent dans les entrepôts, les stocks gonflent et les prix chutent. Résultat : toute la filière est sous pression, et certains producteurs comme exportateurs sont contraints de vendre à perte. De notre correspondante à Pékin, L'ail chinois n'a jamais été aussi abondant et paradoxalement, aussi peu rentable. Depuis plusieurs mois, le marché est saturé, conséquence directe de récoltes record et de stocks déjà élevés accumulés l'an dernier. Résultat : les prix s'effondrent. Aujourd'hui, ils dépassent à peine les 2 yuans par demi-kilo – un niveau insuffisant pour couvrir les coûts de production de nombreux acteurs. Produire plus… au risque d'aggraver la crise Dans les grandes régions agricoles comme le Shandong, le Henan ou le Jiangsu, les surfaces cultivées ont encore augmenté. Une stratégie classique : produire plus pour compenser la baisse des prix. Mais cette logique alimente en réalité le cercle vicieux de la surproduction. Même si certaines zones ont été pénalisées par les pluies et des rendements en baisse, la tendance nationale reste à la hausse. Face à cette offre pléthorique, la demande peine à suivre. Les entrepôts sont pleins, les volumes disponibles dès le printemps sont déjà importants, et la nouvelle récolte arrive. À lire aussiChine: les huiles usagées valent désormais plus cher que le kérosène Exporter à tout prix pour écouler les stocks Dans ce contexte, de nombreux exportateurs n'ont d'autre choix que de casser leurs marges, voire de vendre à perte, pour écouler leurs stocks. À l'international, la concurrence s'intensifie. La Chine reste ultra-dominante sur le marché mondial de l'ail, mais elle doit désormais se battre sur les prix. Certains opérateurs cherchent de nouveaux débouchés, notamment en Afrique, tandis que d'autres s'appuient sur des marchés plus stables comme la Russie. Les tensions logistiques en mer Rouge ou autour du canal de Suez compliquent aussi les exportations vers l'Europe, mais leur impact reste limité : l'essentiel des volumes part vers l'Asie. Au final, derrière ce produit du quotidien, c'est toute une filière agricole qui se retrouve fragilisée – prise entre excès de production, pression sur les prix et incertitudes à l'export. À lire aussiNourriture, énergie, métaux: comment les stocks chinois redessinent l'économie
The Chinese mainland released a set of measures on Sunday aimed at promoting peaceful cross-Strait relations and improving the well-being of people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, as a delegation led by Cheng Li-wun, chairwoman of the Chinese Kuomintang party, concluded its visit to the mainland.4月12日,在中国国民党主席郑丽文率领的代表团结束大陆之行之际,大陆方面发布一系列举措,推动两岸关系和平发展、增进两岸同胞福祉。The Taiwan Work Office of the Communist Party of China Central Committee announced a package of 10 measures covering areas such as party-to-party dialogue, youth exchanges, infrastructure connectivity, cross-Strait transportation, trade facilitation and cultural cooperation. It came following a meeting on Friday between Xi Jinping, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, and Cheng, which was the first such top-level meeting between the two political parties across the Strait in a decade.中共中央台办公布十项措施,涵盖政党对话、青年交流、基础设施联通、两岸交通、贸易便利化及文化合作等领域。此前,中共中央总书记习近平于10日会见郑丽文主席,这是两岸两党十年来首次高层会晤。At the meeting, Xi said that the goal of developing cross-Strait relations is to enable people on both sides to lead better lives.会晤中,习近平表示,发展两岸关系的目标,是要让两岸同胞过上更美好的生活。As this year marks the start of the mainland's 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-30) period, he expressed willingness to share development opportunities and achievements with Taiwan compatriots and jointly build a stronger Chinese national economy.今年是大陆“十五五”开局之年,习近平表示,我们愿同广大台湾同胞共享发展机遇和成果、共同壮大中华民族经济。Xi also said at the meeting that Taiwan's agricultural and fishery products, as well as other high-quality goods, are welcome to enter households across the mainland.习近平还指出,欢迎台湾农渔产品、优质商品进入大陆千家万户。According to the 10 initiatives announced on Sunday, the mainland proposed exploring a regularized communication mechanism between the CPC and the KMT, based on adherence to the 1992 Consensus and opposition to "Taiwan independence".根据4月12日公布的十项举措,大陆方面提议,在坚持“九二共识”、反对“台独”的共同政治基础上,探索建立国共两党常态化沟通机制。The 1992 Consensus, which embodies the one-China principle, was reached between the mainland-based Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait and the Taiwan-based Straits Exchange Foundation with authorization from authorities on both sides of the Strait in 1992.“九二共识”体现一个中国原则,是由中国大陆的海峡两岸关系协会与台湾地区的海峡交流基金会于1992年经两岸授权达成的。The measures also include strengthening youth exchanges through institutionalized programs and arranging annual visits by Taiwan delegations to the mainland.十项举措还包括:建立国共两党青年双向交流机制化平台,每年邀请岛内青年团组来大陆交流参访。It said efforts will focus on advancing utility links and bridge projects between Fujian province and the islands of Jinmen and Matsu. Authorities will also promote normalization of direct cross-Strait passenger air services and resume routes between Taiwan and selected mainland cities.推动福建沿海地区在条件具备情况下同金门、马祖通水、通电、通气、通桥;推动全面恢复两岸空中客运直航正常化,支持尽快恢复台湾与大陆部分城市两岸航班。The measures further aim to facilitate purchases of Taiwan agricultural and fishery products that meet relevant standards, support Taiwan businesses in accessing mainland markets, and improve conditions for Taiwan fishing vessels.此外,为符合检验检疫标准的台湾农渔产品输入大陆提供便利,支持台企开拓大陆市场,改善台湾渔船作业条件。In addition, the mainland will allow more Taiwan-produced content to be broadcast and encourage joint media production to promote the innovative development of Chinese culture.扩大台湾影视内容在大陆播出,鼓励两岸媒体合作制作,推动中华文化创新发展。The mainland will work toward resuming individual travel from Shanghai and Fujian to Taiwan, as only group tours are currently allowed for Fujian and Shanghai residents. Fujian individuals' tours to Jinmen and Matsu have also resumed since the second half of 2024.推动恢复上海市及福建省居民赴台(本岛)个人游试点(目前两地仅开放团队游),福建居民赴金门、马祖个人游已于2024年下半年恢复。Chang Jung-kung, a KMT vice-chairman and member of the delegation, said on Sunday that the policy package could be regarded as a "gift" from the mainland, delivered through Cheng, to the people of Taiwan, enhancing their well-being.中国国民党副主席、代表团成员张荣恭12日表示,这一政策礼包可视为大陆方面通过郑丽文主席送给台湾同胞的“礼物”,切实增进台湾民众福祉。He said it demonstrated goodwill and sincerity from the mainland and has brought tangible benefits to Taiwan.他表示,此举彰显大陆方面的善意与诚意,为台湾带来实实在在的利益。The measures came as Cheng's delegation concluded their six-day trip to the mainland from Tuesday to Sunday, which included stops in Jiangsu province, Shanghai and Beijing. The trip also marked the first visit to the mainland by a KMT chairperson in a decade.上述举措出台之际,郑丽文率领的代表团结束为期六天的大陆之行。代表团于7日至12日先后访问江苏、上海及北京,此次系国民党主席十年来首次访陆。The itinerary included traditional stops for KMT leaders visiting the mainland, such as the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing, Jiangsu province, and the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall at Biyun Temple at Xiangshan in Beijing, where the delegation paid tribute to Sun as an important founding figure of the KMT. This year also marks the 160th anniversary of Sun's birth.行程中,代表团按惯例拜谒南京中山陵、北京香山碧云寺孙中山纪念堂,纪念这位国民党重要创始人。今年正值孙中山诞辰160周年。Meanwhile, the trip featured several visits highlighting the mainland's technological development. On Sunday, the delegation visited the Xiaomi EV Hyperfactory in Beijing, where they learned about the mainland's progress in electric vehicle research and development, marking the final stop of their mainland tour.此次访问还安排多项展现大陆科技发展的参访活动。12日,代表团参访北京小米汽车超级工厂,了解大陆电动汽车研发进展,为此次大陆之行最后一站。On Saturday, the delegation toured the Zhongguancun National Innovation Demonstration Zone Exhibition Center in Beijing's Haidian district, which showcased the latest technologies, including artificial intelligence, embodied intelligence and high-end medical devices.11日,代表团参观北京海淀区中关村国家自主创新示范区展示中心,观摩人工智能、具身智能、高端医疗器械等前沿技术成果。"I found answers for Taiwan's future here," Cheng said at the exhibition center, noting that the island's service sector and traditional manufacturing industries are facing mounting challenges.郑丽文在展示中心表示:“我在这里找到了台湾未来的答案。”她指出,台湾服务业与传统制造业正面临日益严峻的挑战。Cheng said she was impressed by the mainland's applications of AI and technological innovation across sectors, describing the trip as "highly rewarding".她对大陆人工智能应用及各领域科技创新印象深刻,称“不虚此行”。"Without political barriers across the Strait, the two sides could make significant contributions to humanity," she said, calling for strengthened cross-Strait cooperation based on each side's respective strengths.“如果两岸可以毫无政治障碍,对人类的贡献将不可限量。”郑丽文呼吁,立足各自优势,深化两岸合作。She also emphasized that efforts on both sides to address differences and reduce confrontation are ultimately aimed at improving the lives of people across the Strait.她同时强调,两岸化解分歧、减少对立,最终目的是增进两岸同胞民生福祉。Li Peng, dean of the Taiwan Research Institute at Xiamen University, said Cheng's visit once again reaffirmed that both sides of the Strait should pursue peaceful development, uphold the 1992 Consensus, oppose "Taiwan independence", and work to improve the well-being of people on both sides.厦门大学台湾研究院院长李鹏表示,郑丽文此行再次表明,两岸应坚持和平发展、坚持“九二共识”、反对“台独”,共同增进同胞福祉。He noted that mainstream public opinion in Taiwan supports the resumption and expansion of cross-Strait people-to-people exchanges, with many hoping to share the benefits of mainland development.他指出,台湾主流民意支持恢复并扩大两岸民间交流,众多民众期盼共享大陆发展红利。"Cheng's trip has also achieved these objectives," Li said, adding that the policy package released by the mainland represents tangible benefits for Taiwan compatriots and constitutes an important outcome of her visit to the mainland.“郑丽文此行达成上述目标。”李鹏说,大陆方面出台的政策礼包为台湾同胞带来实实在在的好处,是此次访陆之行的重要成果。resume routes/ /rɪˈzuːm ruːts/恢复航线tangible benefits/ /ˈtændʒəbl ˈbenɪfɪts/实际利益itinerary/ /aɪˈtɪnərəri/行程安排pay tribute to/ /peɪ ˈtrɪbjuːt tuː/致敬strengthen cross-Strait cooperation/ /ˈstreŋθən krɒs streɪt kəʊˌɒpəˈreɪʃn/加强两岸合作
Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, said on Friday that regardless of how the international landscape or the situation across the Taiwan Strait evolves, the overarching trend toward the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and the prevailing momentum for Chinese people on both sides of the Strait to come closer together will not change.He made the remarks on Friday during a meeting in Beijing with Cheng Li-wun, chairwoman of the Chinese Kuomintang party. This was the first meeting between the leaders of the CPC and the KMT since 2016, when Xi met in Beijing with then KMT chairwoman Hung Hsiu-chu.Cheng is leading a KMT delegation on a six-day visit to the Chinese mainland at the invitation of Xi and the CPC Central Committee. Since arriving on Tuesday, the delegation has visited Jiangsu province and Shanghai, before traveling to Beijing.Welcoming the delegation, Xi said the meeting is of great significance for the development of relations between the two parties and across the Taiwan Strait.He said that people on both sides of the Strait hope for peace and tranquility, improved cross-Strait relations, and better lives. "This is a responsibility that the CPC and the KMT cannot shirk, and also a driving force for the two parties to work together," he said.Xi expressed the willingness to work with all political parties in Taiwan, including the KMT, as well as groups and people from all sectors, to strengthen exchanges and dialogue, promote peace across the Taiwan Strait, improve the well-being of the people and advance national rejuvenation, on the basis of the common political foundation of adhering to the 1992 Consensus and opposing "Taiwan independence".In a four-point proposal on the development of cross-Strait relations, Xi called for forging closer bonds across the Strait by upholding a correct understanding of identity.Highlighting that people on both sides of the Strait share common roots, culture and lineage, Xi said that as members of one family, as long as people communicate sincerely and consult one another when issues arise, there will be no differences or disputes that cannot be resolved."Differences in social systems should not be an excuse for secession," he stressed.Xi called for safeguarding their shared homeland through peaceful development, noting that the core issue for safeguarding the shared homeland lies in recognizing that both sides of the Strait belong to one China."We welcome any proposals conducive to the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and will spare no effort to advance any endeavors that promote such development," Xi said, adding that "Taiwan independence" is the chief culprit undermining peace across the Taiwan Strait. "We should neither condone nor tolerate it."Xi emphasized the importance of enhancing people's well-being through greater exchanges and integration, saying that the goal of developing cross-Strait relations is to enable people on both sides to lead better lives.Noting that the mainland boasts magnificent landscapes and a vast market, Xi said that Taiwan compatriots are welcome to visit the mainland, and he encouraged young people in Taiwan to seek development opportunities on the mainland. He added that Taiwan's agricultural and fishery products, as well as other quality goods, are welcome to enter households across the mainland.Xi called for joint efforts to achieve national rejuvenation. "We firmly believe that more and more Taiwan compatriots will gain a correct understanding of the mainland's social system and development path," he said."They will recognize that Taiwan's development prospects hinge on a strong motherland, and that the interests and well-being of Taiwan compatriots are closely linked to the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation," he added.As this year marks the opening year of the mainland's 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-30) period, Xi expressed willingness to share development opportunities and benefits with Taiwan compatriots and jointly strengthen the Chinese national economy.The CPC and the KMT should consolidate political mutual trust, maintain positive interactions, unite people on both sides of the Strait, and work together to create a bright future for national reunification and national rejuvenation, he said.KMT Chairwoman Cheng said that people on both sides of the Strait are all Chinese, who share a common heritage and are nurtured by the Chinese culture, and that they should work together to advance the cause of pursuing the revitalization of China envisioned by Dr Sun Yat-sen.She said the KMT and the CPC should uphold the common political foundation of adhering to the 1992 Consensus and opposing "Taiwan independence", strengthen political mutual trust, and make full use of their party-to-party platform for communication across the Strait.Cheng called for greater exchanges and cooperation in areas such as people-to-people ties, grassroots engagement, the economy and trade, and culture, as well as stronger support for youth exchanges and development.She also urged the two parties to help improve people's well-being, promote the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, build a brighter future for the two sides, and advance the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.
Oral Arguments for the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Sunco International Inc. v. Jiangsu Sunco Boiler Co., Ltd.
Cheng Li-wun, chairwoman of the Chinese Kuomintang party, leading a delegation of the KMT, arrived in Nanjing, the capital of Jiangsu province, via Shanghai on Tuesday, beginning a mainland visit that will run through Sunday.中国国民党主席郑丽文率国民党代表团于4月7日经上海抵达南京,正式开启为期一周的大陆参访行程,访问将持续至12日。The visit is considered an important part of the promotion of cross-Strait peace and dialogue.此次访问被视为推动两岸和平与对话的重要一环。Cheng and the delegation landed at Shanghai Hongqiao International Airport and traveled to Nanjing later in the day. Song Tao, head of the Taiwan Work Office of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, welcomed them at the airport.郑丽文一行搭乘班机抵达上海虹桥国际机场,当日稍后转赴南京。中共中央台湾工作办公室主任宋涛在机场迎接。At the invitation of the CPC Central Committee and Xi Jinping, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, Cheng and the delegation are scheduled to visit Jiangsu, Shanghai and Beijing.应中共中央和习近平总书记邀请,郑丽文一行将先后赴江苏、上海、北京参访。The visit is the first by a KMT chairperson to the mainland in a decade. Since taking office in October, Cheng has expressed on multiple occasions her willingness to visit the mainland.这是十年来中国国民党主席首次到访大陆。郑丽文自去年10月就任国民党主席以来,已多次表达访陆意愿。Upon arriving in Nanjing, Cheng expressed her gratitude to General Secretary Xi, thanking the mainland for the warm reception. She said that the visit aimed to safeguard peace across the Taiwan Strait and improve people's well-being, and is therefore of great significance.郑丽文抵达南京后表示,感谢习近平总书记,感谢大陆方面热情接待。此访是为了维护台海和平,增进人民福祉,意义重大。She added that the KMT will continue to uphold the 1992 Consensus, oppose "Taiwan independence", and play an active role in promoting the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations.她还表示,中国国民党将坚持“九二共识”、反对“台独”,继续发挥推动两岸关系和平发展的重要作用。Song welcomed Cheng and her delegation, saying that the visit would enable them to experience firsthand the mainland's tremendous development achievements under the leadership of General Secretary Xi and the CPC, as well as the deep friendship that mainland compatriots have for their counterparts in Taiwan.宋涛对郑丽文一行表示欢迎。他说,此次访问将让代表团亲身感受到祖国大陆在习近平总书记和中国共产党领导下取得的巨大发展成就,充分感受到大陆同胞对台湾同胞的深情厚谊Song said he believes the visit would receive strong recognition and support from people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.宋涛表示,相信此次访问会得到两岸同胞的高度肯定和支持。He stressed that both sides should prioritize national interests and the well-being of compatriots, work together to promote the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, and strive together for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.他强调,两党要以民族利益为重、以同胞福祉为念,携手推动两岸关系和平发展,共创中华民族伟大复兴。Li Zhenguang, dean of the Taiwan Research Institute at Beijing Union University, said that the visit would demonstrate the joint efforts of the CPC and the KMT to promote peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, as well as peaceful cross-Strait development and exchanges.北京联合大学台湾研究院院长李振广表示,此次访问彰显了国共两党共同维护台海和平稳定、推动两岸和平发展与交流合作的努力。"People on both sides of the Taiwan Strait hope to ease the current tensions," Li said, adding that the visit reflects a shared aspiration for peaceful development and expanded exchanges and cooperation, both on the mainland and in Taiwan.“两岸同胞都希望缓和当前紧张局势,”李振广说,此次访问反映了两岸各界期盼和平发展、扩大交流合作的共同心声。He added that Cheng's adherence to the 1992 Consensus and her opposition to "Taiwan independence" have paved the way for high-level exchanges between the CPC and the KMT.他还表示,郑丽文坚持“九二共识”、反对“台独”,为两党高层交往铺平了道路。The KMT delegation included its three vice-chairpersons — Lee Chien-lung, Chang Jung-kung and Hsiao Hsu-tsen — as well as Lee Hong-yuan, deputy chairman of the KMT-affiliated policy think tank, and Su Chi, chairman of the KMT central advisory committee, who coined the term "1992 Consensus".国民党代表团成员包括三位副主席李乾龙、张荣恭、萧旭岑,以及国民党智库副董事长李鸿源、中央评议委员会主席苏起——“九二共识”这一概念正是由苏起提出。take office /teɪk ˈɒfɪs/就职,上任1992 Consensus /ˌnaɪnˈtiːn ˈnaɪntituː ˈkɒnsensəs/九二共识cross-Strait relations /ˌkrɒs streɪt rɪˈleɪʃnz/两岸关系mainland compatriots /ˈmeɪnlænd kəmˈpeɪtriəts/大陆同胞great rejuvenation /ɡreɪt rɪˌdʒuːvəˈneɪʃn/伟大复兴
In this episode of Qingming: Beyond the Drizzling Rain, we take a warm, thoughtful deep dive into one of China's most layered traditions. Far more than a day for tomb sweeping, Qingming is revealed as a beautiful fusion of three ancient festivals: the agricultural wisdom of a Han Dynasty solar term, the quiet reverence of the Cold Food Festival's fire‑changing ritual, and the joyful riverside gatherings of the Shangsi Festival.Through a lively, conversational journey, we explore how these threads wove together over centuries to create a holiday where remembrance and spring joy coexist — expressed in cold foods, willow branches, and the lovely phrase “sorrow without devastation.” We also look at modern echoes, from six‑day school spring breaks in provinces like Anhui and Jiangsu to the rise of Cyber Qingming, where AI voices and virtual reality offer new ways to honor those we've lost.What emerges is a simple, enduring truth: Qingming has never been frozen in time. It adapts, it breathes, and at its heart, it asks us to do one thing — to remember love in the season of renewal, and in doing so, to live well.Tune in if you've ever wondered why we sweep graves and fly kites on the same day, or if you're looking for a gentle, hopeful conversation about memory, spring, and what truly lasts.
Manufacturing rebounds, but smaller enterprises remain under pressure制造业有所回暖,但中小企业仍面临压力China's manufacturing activity returned to expansion territory in March, offering an early sign that policy support is beginning to feed through to the real economy as measures to boost demand and stabilize growth gain traction, experts said on Tuesday.3月,我国制造业活动重返扩张区间。专家3月31日表示,这为观察中国经济提供了一个早期信号,表明随着提振需求、稳定增长的措施逐步显效,政策支持正开始向实体经济传导。However, they cautioned that prolonged weakness among small and medium-sized enterprises highlights lingering structural pressures and underscores the challenge for policymakers in fostering a more broad-based recovery in the world's second-largest economy.不过专家也提醒,中小企业持续疲软凸显结构性压力依然存在,也表明政策制定者在推动我国作为世界第二大经济体实现更广泛复苏方面仍面临挑战。They also said that continued countercyclical policy support, faster rollout of major government investment projects and more targeted measures to ease financing burdens on small and medium-sized enterprises will be key to boosting orders, reviving production and underpinning a solid start to the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-30) period.专家还表示,持续加强逆周期调节政策支持、加快重大政府投资项目落地、出台更有针对性的措施缓解中小企业融资压力,对于扩大订单、恢复生产、支撑"十五五"时期(2026-2030年)实现良好开局至关重要。Their comments came as China's official purchasing managers' index for the manufacturing sector stood at 50.4 in March, up from 49.0 in February and returning to expansion territory, according to data released by the National Bureau of Statistics on Tuesday. The subindex for production stood at 51.4 in March, up from 49.6 in February, while the gauge for new orders came in at 51.6, up 3 percentage points from the previous month, the NBS said.国家统计局3月31日发布的数据显示,3月份,我国制造业采购经理指数(PMI)为50.4%,比上月上升1.5个百分点,重返扩张区间。国家统计局表示,生产指数为51.4%,比上月上升1.8个百分点;新订单指数为51.6%,比上月上升3.0个百分点。Huo Lihui, an NBS statistician, attributed the rebound in manufacturing PMI to the faster resumption of work and production after the Spring Festival holiday, as well as increased market activity, with the production index and the new orders index both returning to expansion territory.国家统计局服务业调查中心首席统计师霍丽慧表示,制造业PMI回升主要是受春节后企业加快复工复产、市场活跃度提升等因素影响,生产指数和新订单指数均回到扩张区间。Wang Qing, chief macroeconomic analyst at Golden Credit Rating International, said sentiment in China's manufacturing sector improved in March, buoyed by optimism after the recently concluded two sessions, the annual gatherings of China's top legislative and political advisory bodies, which underscored that China's macro policies would remain more proactive and effective this year.东方金诚首席宏观分析师王青表示,近期闭幕的全国两会释放出今年宏观政策将更加积极有为的信号,受此鼓舞,3月份我国制造业景气水平有所改善。That policy tone was reinforced by the People's Bank of China on Tuesday. In a statement released after the first-quarter meeting of its monetary policy committee for 2026, the PBOC said it would continue to implement a moderately loose monetary policy, step up countercyclical and cross-cyclical adjustments, and improve coordination between monetary and fiscal policies to promote stable economic growth and a reasonable recovery in prices.中国人民银行3月31日进一步强化了这一政策基调。央行货币政策委员会2026年第一季度例会指出,将继续实施适度宽松的货币政策,加大逆周期与跨周期调节力度,加强货币财政政策协调配合,促进经济平稳增长和物价合理回升。Meanwhile, major manufacturing segments strengthened further and maintained a mild upward trend. High-tech manufacturing, for instance, posted a PMI reading of 52.1 in March, up 0.6 percentage point from February, and remained in expansion territory for the 14th consecutive month, the NBS reported.与此同时,重点制造业板块进一步增强,并保持温和上升势头。国家统计局数据显示,高技术制造业PMI为52.1%,比上月上升0.6个百分点,连续14个月处于扩张区间。Despite the overall expansion, small and medium-sized manufacturers remained under pressure, with activity still in contraction territory.尽管制造业总体扩张,但中小型制造企业仍面临压力,其相关活动仍处于收缩区间。According to the NBS, the subindex for medium-sized enterprises rose 1.5 percentage points to 49.0, while that for small enterprises climbed 4.5 percentage points to 49.3, but both remained below the 50-point threshold.国家统计局数据显示,中型企业PMI为49.0%,比上月上升1.5个百分点;小型企业PMI为49.3%,比上月上升4.5个百分点,但两者均仍低于50%的临界点。"Soaring raw material prices have dealt a heavier blow to small and medium-sized enterprises, which generally have weaker pricing power and thinner financial buffers," said Bai Wenxi, vice-chairman of the China Enterprise Capital Union.中国企业资本联盟副理事长柏文喜表示,原材料价格飙升对中小企业打击更大,中小企业议价能力普遍较弱,财务缓冲能力也较为薄弱。Huang Yiping, dean of Peking University's National School of Development, said China has policy room, on both monetary and fiscal fronts, to cope with the potential economic headwinds stemming from geopolitical uncertainties in the Middle East.北京大学国家发展研究院院长黄益平表示,面对中东地缘政治不确定性可能带来的经济逆风,中国在货币和财政两方面都有政策空间予以应对。Foreign companies also remain upbeat about the long-term prospects of China's manufacturing sector.外资企业也对中国制造业的长期前景保持乐观。Markus Kamieth, CEO of German chemical company BASF, said China has moved to the forefront of intelligent manufacturing and green transformation, driven by its scale, speed and innovation capacity.德国化工企业巴斯夫执行董事会主席凯礼表示,中国凭借其规模、速度和创新能力,已在智能制造和绿色转型领域走在前列。Philippe Delorme, president and CEO of Finnish elevator giant KONE Corp, said the company's core production base in Kunshan, Jiangsu province, has grown into the world's largest elevator manufacturing base. "This figure demonstrates our commitment to China's economic growth," he added.芬兰通力集团总裁兼首席执行官德龙表示,该集团位于江苏昆山的核心生产基地已发展成为全球最大的电梯制造基地。他表示:"这一事实表明了我们对中国经济增长的坚定承诺。"countercyclical /ˌkaʊntərˈsaɪklɪkəl/逆周期的purchasing managers' index /ˈpɜːrtʃəsɪŋ ˈmænɪdʒərz ˈɪndeks/采购经理指数gauge /ɡeɪdʒ/指标resumption of work and production /rɪˈzʌmpʃən əv wɜːrk ænd prəˈdʌkʃən/复工复产buoy /bɔɪ/提振;使上涨financial buffer /faɪˈnænʃəl ˈbʌfər/财务缓冲能力
Good afternoon, I'm _____ with today's episode of EZ News. Tai-Ex opening The Tai-Ex opened down 99-points this morning from yesterday's close, at 32,419 on turnover of 9.3-billion N-T. The market moved sharply lower on Monday as yet another a spike in crude oil prices led investors to trim their holdings of large-cap stocks, particularly those in the electronics sector. KMT chair 'gladly accepts' Xi's invitation to visit China next week K-M-T Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun has announced that she's "gladly accepted" an invitation from Xi Jinping to visit China next week. Speaking at a press conference after news of the invitation was released, Cheng said she believe the two sides of the Taiwan Strait must firmly pursue a path of peace to ensure regional stability, and the well-being of future generations. Cheng told reporters that the trip will "show the people of Taiwan and the world that the two sides of the Strait are not destined for war, nor do they need to remain on the brink of (處於邊緣) military conflict. The six-day trip includes stops in Jiangsu, Shanghai and Beijing. CPI will rise 1.9% in 2026 if oil prices average US$100 Central Bank Governor Yang Chin-long is warning that the consumer price index is likely to jump 1.9-per cent this year, if international crude oil prices increase to an average of 100 U-S dollars per barrel. Speaking at a meeting of the Legislative Financial Committee, Yang said although the projected 1.9-per cent growth in the consumer price index is higher than the central bank's recent estimate of 1.8-per cent, it is still below a 2-per cent alert level. Yang also told lawmakers that the central bank will raise interest rates to deal with inflationary pressure - and if inflationary concerns take hold, the bank will also take steps to tighten its monetary (金融的) policy. White House says it's not changing Cuba policy after allowing Russian oil delivery The Trump Administration says its fuel sanctions on Cuba have not been lifted, despite allowing a Russian oil tanker to make a delivery to the island. The US cut off shipments from Venezuela after deposing (罷免) the country's president and threatened steep tariffs on countries that sent fuel to Cuba -in a bid to pressure the government to collapse. Toni Waterman has more from Washington. Spain Catholic Church Takes Steps Towards Compensation for Sexual Abuse Victims Spain's Catholic bishops and the government have taken another step toward compensating victims of sexual abuse by clergy members who have died or whose possible crimes are too old to be prosecuted. Spain's Catholic bishops agreed in January to let the Spanish government's ombudsman have the final say in the church's compensation of such victims. The government and Spain's bishops signed paperwork on Monday detailing how the new church-state reparation system would work. The president of the Spanish Episcopal Conference Archbishop said that the system would take effect April 15-th. The text won't include amounts or scales for the compensation (賠償) that sexual abuse victims would be entitled to (有權獲得/享有). Compensation will be determined on a case-by-case basis. That was the I.C.R.T. EZ News, I'm _____. -- Hosting provided by SoundOn
The convergence of student spring breaks in multiple Chinese cities with the upcoming Qingming Festival, or Tomb Sweeping Day, has created an extended travel period from Wednesday to April 6, forming a key new growth opportunity for the tourism market, according to travel agencies.多家旅行社表示,国内多个城市的学生春假与即将到来的清明假期相连,从4月1日至4月6日形成了一个连续的出游周期,为旅游市场带来了重要的新增长机遇。Industry data showed that the six-day window is driving two distinct travel peaks and fueling a significant surge in domestic and outbound travel. This alignment has effectively bridged the gap between the Spring Festival and May Day holidays.行业数据显示,这六天窗口期催生了两个明显的出游高峰,带动国内游和出境游显著增长。这一安排有效衔接了春节和五一假期。According to the latest booking figures from online travel agency Tuniu, the extended break will give rise to two distinct travel peaks. The first will occur on Wednesday and Thursday, driven primarily by families taking advantage of spring break, while the second peak will fall on Saturday, the first day of Qingming Festival, as vacationers head out for spring outings and flower viewing.途牛旅游网最新预订数据显示,这次连续的假期将形成两个明显的出游高峰。第一个高峰出现在4月1日至2日,主要由利用春假出行的家庭游客构成;第二个高峰则出现在4月4日清明节假期首日,以踏青赏花的休闲游客为主。More than 70 percent of travelers planning trips in early April have chosen to set out between Wednesday and Friday, taking advantage of the staggered schedule to avoid congestion, Tuniu data showed. Nearly 65 percent of these travelers have opted for trips lasting three to five days, striking a balance between travel depth and the demands of work and school.途牛数据显示,超过70%计划在4月初出游的游客选择在4月1日至3日之间错峰出发。近65%的游客选择3至5天的行程,在游玩深度与工作学习安排之间取得平衡。The spring break has unleashed a surge in family travel, with destinations such as Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou in Guangdong province, Sanya in Hainan province, Xi'an in Shaanxi province and Nanjing in Jiangsu province emerging as top choices.春假带动了家庭出游热潮,上海、北京、广州、三亚、西安、南京等成为热门选择。Bookings have risen sharply for theme parks such as Shanghai Disney Resort, Zhuhai Chimelong International Ocean Resort and Universal Beijing Resort, as well as botanical gardens, museums and science education venues.上海迪士尼度假区、珠海长隆国际海洋度假区、北京环球度假区等主题公园,以及植物园、博物馆、科普教育场馆的预订量显著增长。The six-day break has also fueled demand for outbound travel. In addition to China's Hong Kong and Macao special administrative regions, tropical destinations such as Bangkok and Pattaya in Thailand, Bali, the Maldives, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore are among the most booked overseas choices, according to Tuniu.六天假期也带动了出境游需求。途牛数据显示,除港澳地区外,泰国曼谷、芭提雅,印度尼西亚巴厘岛,马尔代夫,马来西亚吉隆坡,新加坡等热带目的地成为预订量最高的境外选择。The travel platform Qunar also reported a marked increase in expected travel activity from Wednesday to April 6, driven by the combination of spring breaks and Qingming Festival. Bookings show that flight passenger volumes to popular cities have risen 30 percent year-on-year, with the number of under-18 air travelers expected to more than double.去哪儿平台也报告称,受春假与清明假期叠加影响,4月1日至4月6日期间的旅游出行活动显著增加。预订数据显示,热门城市机票旅客量同比增长三成,18岁以下青少年旅客出行量预计增长超一倍。Hotel bookings in Guangzhou surged 180 percent year-on-year, while Sanya saw a 140 percent increase. Luoyang in Henan province and Hangzhou in Zhejiang province each recorded gains of around 120 percent, and bookings in Beijing nearly doubled, according to Qunar.据去哪儿统计,广州酒店预订量同比增长180%,三亚增长140%,河南洛阳和浙江杭州均增长约120%,北京预订量接近翻番。Cities that implemented spring break policies are seeing particularly strong outbound travel demand. In Chengdu, Sichuan province, which accounted for the highest number of outbound flights during the period, the number of travelers scheduled to depart on Tuesday and Wednesday surged 160 percent from the previous two days. Departures scheduled for Wednesday alone rose 530 percent year-on-year.实施春假政策的城市出游需求尤为强劲。四川省成都市在该时段出境航班数量最多,3月31日至4月1日出行的旅客量较前两日增长160%,4月1日单日出行的旅客量同比增长530%。Several cities with spring break travel policies also saw gains in inbound arrivals. In Yibin, Sichuan province, where scenic spots are offering free admission to primary and secondary school students and teachers throughout April, local hotel bookings from Wednesday to April 6 rose 160 percent year-on-year. Mianyang, also in Sichuan, saw hotel bookings increase 95 percent after offering joint ticket discounts for children and parents.多个实施春假政策的城市也迎来入境游增长。四川省宜宾市4月内面向中小学生及教师实行景区免票政策,当地4月1日至4月6日酒店预订量同比增长160%。同样位于四川的绵阳市推出亲子联票优惠后,酒店预订量增长95%。Yang Han, a researcher at Qunar's big data institute, said the alignment of spring break with Qingming Festival has significantly boosted travel demand and helped smooth out peak travel periods. "It offers travelers better value and a more comfortable experience," Yang said.去哪儿大数据研究院研究员杨涵表示,春假与清明假期的叠加有效拉动了出行需求,同时起到了平抑高峰的作用。"这为游客带来了更好的性价比和更舒适的体验。""For cities that introduced spring break policies, the effect has been twofold: sending travelers out while also attracting visitors — a new driver for the cultural tourism market between the Spring Festival and May Day holidays," she added.杨涵表示,"对推行春假的城市而言,既送出了游客,也吸引了游客,成为春节后到五一长假前文旅市场的新增量。"Cheng Yuhan, a freshman at a university in Huai'an, Jiangsu province, will take a five-day break from Thursday to April 6, as her spring break aligns with Qingming Festival.江苏省淮安市某高校大一学生程雨涵今年春假与清明假期相连,将从4月2日至4月6日连休五天。She planned to volunteer at a local kindergarten, attend marathon volunteer training, and then travel with her aunt and uncle from Saturday to Sunday to Changzhou and Suzhou in Jiangsu.她计划先在当地幼儿园做志愿者,并参加马拉松志愿者培训,随后与姑姑姑父于4月4日至5日前往江苏省内常州、苏州游玩。"They are very open-minded and let me plan the whole trip — the itinerary, routes, budget, accommodations, everything," Cheng said. "I'm really looking forward to it.""他们很开明,让我全权规划行程、路线、预算、住宿等等,"程雨涵说,"我真的很期待这次旅行。" travel peaks /ˈtrævəl piːks/旅游高峰staggered schedule /ˈstæɡəd ˈʃedjuːl/错峰安排spring break /sprɪŋ breɪk/春假
Thousands of visitors flock to witness beauty of blossoms around the country数千游客争睹全国花海盛景Rising temperatures herald the season to chase flowers in China. Thousands of visitors from home and abroad descend on the nation's most picturesque spring landscapes to capture the beauty of the blossoms, boosting consumption in the process.随着气温回升,中国迎来了赏花踏青的季节。成千上万的国内外游客纷纷涌向国内风景最美的春日景观,争相定格花朵盛放的美丽瞬间,这也带动了文旅消费热潮。In mid-March, Yuantouzhu scenic area in Wuxi, Jiangsu province, entered "congestion mode". By 5 pm on March 14, the area had welcomed nearly 70,000 visitors, setting a record for this year's cherry blossom season, according to Shangyou News.3月中旬,江苏省无锡市鼋头渚景区进入"拥堵模式"。据上游新闻报道,截至3月14日下午5时,该景区已接待游客近7万人次,创下今年樱花季的单日客流量纪录。"I knew it would be crowded, but I just couldn't miss such beautiful cherry blossoms," said Zhang, a tourist from Nanjing, Jiangsu, as she navigated the sea of visitors trying to capture the perfect photo. "It's so hard to get pictures of the flowers without people in them, so I had to settle for photos with strangers included."来自南京的游客张女士在人群中寻找最佳拍摄角度时说:"我知道人会很多,但实在不想错过这么美的樱花。"她无奈地笑道:"想拍一张没有路人入镜的照片太难了,最后只能凑合拍些带陌生人的照片。"According to travel platform Qunar, the weekend of March 14 and 15 saw searches for flower viewing-related keywords increase more than 60 percent week-on-week.据去哪儿旅行平台数据显示,3月14日至15日周末期间,"赏花"相关关键词的搜索量环比增长超过60%。Traditional hot spots, including Hangzhou in Zhejiang province, Chengdu in Sichuan province, Wuhan in Hubei province, and Kunming and Dali in Yunnan province, continue to rank among the top 15 tourist destinations this season.传统的热门赏花地依然稳居今春旅游目的地前15名,包括浙江杭州、四川成都、湖北武汉、云南昆明和大理等地。In Beijing, magnolia and mountain peach trees are already blooming, painting the city with the first burst of spring colors. Mountain peach blossoms at the Summer Palace's west dike and Olympic Forest Park entered peak blooming season in mid-March. Early cherry blossoms at Yuyuantan Park can be seen now, with Qunar reporting a 50 percent year-on-year increase in flower-viewing searches in the capital. Hotels near Qianmen, the Temple of Heaven and Chaoyang Park — known for their photogenic flower spots — are witnessing brisk bookings.在北京,玉兰和山桃已经吐蕊,为城市染上第一抹春色。颐和园西堤和奥林匹克森林公园的山桃花在3月中旬进入盛花期。玉渊潭公园的早樱也已开放,据去哪儿网数据,北京"赏花"搜索量同比增长50%。前门、天坛、朝阳公园附近因拥有绝佳的花景拍摄点,酒店预订量节节攀升。Beijing resident Li Kai said that he took half a day off from work on Wednesday to enjoy the early cherry blossoms at Yuyuantan after seeing photos on social media.北京市民李凯说,他在社交媒体上看到玉渊潭公园的樱花照片后,周三专门请了半天假去赏早樱。"The blossoms looked so beautiful against the clear water and blue sky — my mood instantly lifted," he said."清澈的湖水和蓝天映衬下的樱花美不胜收——我的心情一下子就明媚起来了。"他说。In Wuhan, early cherry blossoms have entered peak viewing season. Flight bookings to the city in March increased 12.5 percent year-on-year.在武汉,早樱已进入最佳观赏期。3月飞往武汉的航班预订量同比增长12.5%。China's spring scenery is also attracting foreigners. According to Qunar, in March, domestic flight bookings made with non-Chinese passports rose 21 percent year-on-year.中国的春日美景也吸引着外国游客。根据去哪儿网数据,3月使用非中国护照预订国内航班的旅客数量同比增长21%。Nyingchi in the Xizang autonomous region saw a 630 percent surge in foreign arrivals for its pink peach blossoms. Datong in Shanxi province, famous for apricot blossoms, recorded an increase of over 900 percent. Kashgar and Yining in the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region saw foreign tourist numbers rise 500 percent and 350 percent, respectively.西藏林芝的桃花吸引了大量外国游客,相关订单量激增630%;以杏花闻名的山西大同,外国游客数量增幅超过900%;新疆喀什和伊宁的外国游客数量则分别增长了500%和350%。The spike in demand comes amid a sharp fall in airfares. Prices are lower by 30 to 70 percent on multiple routes compared with February. One-way flights from Beijing to Hangzhou, Wuxi or Wuhan are available for as little as 300 yuan ($44), making them even cheaper than high-speed train tickets.旅游需求激增的同时,机票价格却大幅下降。多条航线的机票价格较2月下降了30%至70%。从北京飞往杭州、无锡或武汉的单程机票最低仅需300元(约合44美元),比高铁票还便宜。Lyu Ning, dean of Beijing International Studies University's School of Tourism Sciences, said the focus of flower-viewing tours in 2026 is immersive experiences and scenario innovation.北京第二外国语学院旅游科学学院院长吕宁表示,2026年赏花旅游的核心在于沉浸式体验与场景创新。"There is a strong sense of immersion. There is a shift from superficial viewing to deep participation," she said.她说:"沉浸感显著增强,正在从浅层的观看式游览向深度的参与式体验转变。"Lyu added that flower-viewing also creates a full consumption chain — transportation, accommodations, dining, experiences and shopping — transforming floral landscapes into an economic driver.吕宁还补充说,赏花活动还能带动交通、住宿、餐饮、体验、购物等全链条消费,将"花海"转化为实实在在的经济动能。herald /ˈherəld/预示;宣布 magnolia /mæɡˈnoʊliə/玉兰 brisk /brɪsk/兴旺的;轻快的 airfare /ˈeə(r)fer/机票费用
In a complex global environment and amid a substantial rise in foreign-related cases, Chinese courts are committed to ensuring equal protection for all entities and have implemented various measures to enhance the nation's business environment, offering "Chinese solutions" for resolving international disputes, according to the head of China's top court.首席大法官、最高人民法院院长张军在两会期间接受《中国日报》专访时表示,面对复杂的国际形势和增多的涉外案件,中国法院坚持平等保护原则,多措并举,以优质高效司法服务持续优化营商环境,积极为国际纠纷解决贡献"中国方案"。"Openness is a key feature of Chinese modernization, and the rule of law is the foundation for achieving high-level global engagement," said Zhang Jun, president of the Supreme People's Court, in an exclusive interview with China Daily on the sidelines of the ongoing annual meetings of the nation's top legislative and political advisory bodies.张军指出,开放是中国式现代化的鲜明标识,法治是高水平对外开放的坚实保障。Citing data from the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-25) period, Zhang said that Chinese courts concluded 128,000 first-instance foreign-related civil and commercial cases involving more than 100 countries and regions, an increase of 65 percent from the previous five years."十四五"期间,中国法院审结一审涉外民商事案件12.8万件,较"十三五"期间增长65%,涉及100多个国家和地区。In 2025 alone, courts nationwide handled over 67,000 foreign-related commercial and maritime cases, up 44 percent year-on-year, he noted.据张军介绍,2025年,全国法院新收一审涉外商事海事案件达6.7万余件,同比增长44%。With global supply chains restructuring and digital trade on the rise, Zhang said that disputes over international goods contracts, service trade, and related cross-border payments, transportation and insurance are increasing.随着全球供应链的重构和数字贸易的兴起,国际货物买卖合同纠纷、服务贸易纠纷,以及与之相关的跨境支付、运输、保险纠纷持续增多。As Chinese companies expand globally and foreign investment grows, particularly with the Belt and Road Initiative, relevant cases are also rising, he said. "The rapid increase and diversity of foreign-related cases highlight China's deep integration into the global market and its shift from focusing on goods flow to regulatory and institutional opening-up," he added.张军表示,随着中国企业"走出去"和外资"引进来"的双向流动加速,以及高质量共建"一带一路"的深入推进,相关纠纷也不断涌现。他补充说:"涉外民商事案件数量的快速增长和类型的日益多样化,是中国经济深度融入全球市场的生动写照,勾勒出中国对外开放从商品和要素流动型开放向规则等制度型开放的转变。"To address the growing number of cases and meet diverse judicial needs, Chinese courts have been striving to provide more equitable, efficient and accessible services to both domestic and foreign litigants, Zhang said.张军说,"面对涉外案件数量持续攀升和当事人司法需求更为多元的新形势,中国法院努力为中外当事人依法提供更加公正、高效、便捷的司法服务和保障。"In June 2018, the first and second international commercial courts of the Supreme People's Court were established in Shenzhen, Guangdong province, and Xi'an, Shaanxi province, where litigants are allowed to resolve disputes through mediation, arbitration, or litigation, based on their needs. By the end of 2025, these two courts concluded 37 cases involving litigants from 21 countries and regions.2018年6月,最高法院第一、第二国际商事法庭分别在广东深圳和陕西西安成立,当事人可根据需要选择调解、仲裁或诉讼解决纠纷。截至2025年底,这两个法庭审结涉及21个国家和地区当事人的案件37件。China has also set up international commercial tribunals in 18 cities, including Beijing, Shanghai, and Suzhou in Jiangsu province. In 2025, these tribunals concluded more than 1,700 foreign-related commercial and arbitration review cases involving litigants from over 50 countries and regions, a year-on-year increase of 24 percent.中国还在北京、上海、苏州等18个城市设立了国际商事法庭。2025年共审结涉外商事、涉外仲裁司法审查等案件1700件,同比上升24%,当事人覆盖50多个国家。Zhang said that while respecting litigants' preferences for dispute resolution methods is important, the importance of mediation in handling foreign-related cases is also significant.张军表示,中国法院充分尊重当事人选择仲裁、调解解决争议的意愿。He cited a case involving a foreign oil tanker that was unloading at Qingdao port in Shandong province in January, noting that the dispute was resolved within 24 hours following the Xiamen Maritime Court's swift coordination with the Qingdao Maritime Court, and the use of online and offline mediation methods.他举例说,今年1月,厦门海事法院与青岛海事法院快速协调,运用线上线下调解方式,在24小时内成功化解一起外籍油轮在青岛港卸货纠纷。Expanding intl influence扩大国际影响力The international influence of China's foreign-related judiciary is also expanding, thanks to the development of foreign-related adjudication and optimized legal services, Zhang said.张军称,涉外审判的发展和司法服务的优化,也提升了中国涉外司法的国际影响力。In September 2022, a Liberian container ship and a Panamanian oil tanker collided in the Strait of Malacca, and the courts in five countries, including China, had jurisdiction over the case. The parties involved proactively chose the Ningbo Maritime Court in Zhejiang province to resolve their dispute under Chinese law, he noted.2022年9月,利比里亚籍集装箱船与巴拿马籍大型油轮在马六甲海峡发生碰撞,包括中国在内的五国法院均有管辖权。双方当事人主动选择中国宁波海事法院解决纠纷,并适用中国法律。"More parties involved in foreign-related cases, even those with no substantial connection to China, are voluntarily choosing to address their disputes in Chinese courts, which is a strong endorsement of China's judicial system and its international credibility," Zhang said."越来越多与中国并无实际联系的涉外案件,当事人自愿协议选择在中国法院诉讼,这本身就是对中国司法制度和国际公信力的充分认可。"张军补充说道。On their part, Chinese courts are continuously exploring and improving judicial services, he said. In March 2022, a Norwegian company applied to the Shanghai Maritime Court, seeking recognition of a judgment of a United Kingdom court. Despite the lack of an applicable judicial assistance treaty, the Shanghai court recognized the judgment based on the principle of reciprocity, prompting UK courts to recognize two court judgments of China later.中国法院也在不断探索和完善司法服务。2022年3月,挪威一家公司就英国高等法院的一项生效判决向上海海事法院提出承认申请。在缺乏可适用的司法协助条约的情况下,上海海事法院依据互惠原则承认了该判决,促使英国法院此后承认了中国法院的两项判决。This move not only provides a practical judicial example for establishing a reciprocal relationship, but also breaks the "zero record" of mutual recognition of commercial judgments between Chinese and UK courts. "The initiative demonstrates China's sense of responsibility and judicial confidence," Zhang said.张军表示,此举不仅为认定互惠关系提供了可操作的司法范例,也突破了中英两国法院商事判决互认"零记录"。"中国法院率先承认英国法院判决的背后是中国大国担当、司法自信的有力体现。"From 2024 to 2025, Chinese courts received 1,620 applications for recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments, and they concluded 1,510 such cases, he said. "This data shows China's determination to protect the rights of both domestic and foreign parties in foreign-related trials, maintaining a fair, open and inclusive judicial stance," he added.数据显示,2024年至2025年,中国法院共受理申请承认和执行外国民商事判决1620件,审结1510件,充分彰显了中国涉外审判平等保护中外当事人合法权益,以及公正、开放、包容的司法立场。Mission highlighted使命凸显In today's volatile global landscape, Zhang underscored the judiciary's mission to use legal certainty to address external uncertainties. "A stable, transparent legal business environment is vital for protecting foreign investments and promoting international economic cooperation," he said.当前,国际形势复杂多变,全球经济面临诸多不确定性。张军强调,在这样的时代背景下,中国司法肩负着以法治的确定性应对外部环境不确定性的重要使命。"一个稳定、公平、透明、可预期的法治化营商环境,是保护外商投资权益、保障跨境交易安全、促进国际经济合作的'压舱石'。"他说。Chinese courts have participated in the legislation and amendment of significant foreign-related laws — such as the Foreign Investment Law and the Law on Foreign Relations — to enhance China's judicial framework, Zhang said, adding that courts across the country have also shared their judicial expertise to improve international rules and promote global trade.中国法院近年来积极参与我国外商投资法、对外关系法等一批重大涉外法律的立法和修改工作,促进涉外法律体系完善。全国各地法院也分享司法经验,以完善国际规则,促进全球贸易。In December 2025, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the UN Convention on Negotiable Cargo Documents. Zhang said this convention is the first international treaty in the transportation sector that originates from Chinese judicial practice, and was initiated and developed with China's full participation.2025年12月,联合国大会审议通过《联合国可转让货物单证公约》。张军表示,该公约是首部源于中国司法实践、由中国发起并全程参与制定的运输领域国际公约。"Through judicial decisions, Chinese courts will continue to play a crucial role in guarding against external risks, stabilizing market confidence and promoting global trade and investment, thereby protecting our national interests," he said.通过司法裁判,中国法院将继续在防范外部风险、稳定市场信心、促进全球贸易和投资方面发挥重要作用,从而维护国家利益。"Through efficient judicial services, we aim to provide certainty for the stable development of both the Chinese economy and the global economy, acting as a 'navigator' for opening-up and an 'anchor of stability' for global trade," he added.以优质高效的司法服务为中国经济和世界经济的稳定发展注入宝贵的确定性,努力做高水平对外开放的'护航者'和全球经贸秩序的'稳定锚',张军补充说道。foreign-related case /ˈfɒrɪn rɪˈleɪtɪd keɪs/涉外案件first-instance /ˈfɜːst ˈɪnstəns/一审institutional opening-up /ˌɪnstɪˈtjuːʃənl ˈəʊpənɪŋ ʌp/制度型开放litigant /ˈlɪtɪɡənt/诉讼当事人mediation /ˌmiːdiˈeɪʃən/调解arbitration /ˌɑːbɪˈtreɪʃən/仲裁litigation /ˌlɪtɪˈɡeɪʃən/诉讼proactively /prəʊˈæktɪvli/主动地volatile /ˈvɒlətaɪl/动荡的
President Xi Jinping called on Thursday for provinces serving as China's economic powerhouses to pilot efforts in analyzing new circumstances and solving new problems, while stressing the need to develop new quality productive forces and promote common prosperity.The president, who represents Jiangsu province as a deputy to the 14th National People's Congress, China's top legislature, highlighted the imperative for China to cope with an even more complex environment and solve more deep-seated issues to accomplish targets and tasks set out in the nation's 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-30).Xi, who is also general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission, joined a deliberation with his fellow deputies from Jiangsu, the nation's second-largest provincial-level economy.According to the government work report of the Jiangsu provincial government, the province's economy grew 5.3 percent year-on-year in 2025, with the absolute increase remaining the largest among all provincial-level regions in the country.During Thursday's deliberation, Xi spoke after six deputies shared their insights on issues such as advancing new industrialization, promoting the integration of sci-tech innovation with industrial innovation, and accelerating breakthroughs in core technologies.The development of new quality productive forces is instrumental in advancing high-quality growth and enhancing economic competitiveness, Xi said, adding that Jiangsu should take the lead in this regard.He called for integrated efforts to promote education, science and technology and talent development, highlighting the need to secure new breakthroughs in strengthening original innovation, tackling key core technologies and securing the high ground in science and technology.New approaches should be explored to promote the integration of the innovation, industrial, capital and talent chains, and to accelerate the efficient commercialization and application of sci-tech achievements, he said.The president encouraged Jiangsu to make new progress in upgrading traditional industries, fostering and expanding emerging industries, and planning for future industries.Xi emphasized that only when major economic powerhouses maintain a strong foundation for growth and strong resilience against external shocks can they support the stability of the world's second-largest economy as a whole.According to data cited by Xinhua News Agency, China's top 10 provincial-level regions by gross domestic product accounted for 62.2 percent of the country's overall economic growth in 2025. These regions, including Guangdong, Jiangsu and Shandong provinces, helped boost the national growth rate by 3.1 percentage points, the data showed.The president said that Jiangsu should continue to strengthen economic resilience by improving its internal strengths, enhancing its own capabilities, and fully integrating into the unified national market.He called for taking steps to expand high-standard opening-up, actively explore global markets and better connect with the international economic cycle, adding that a mindset of responding to worst-case scenarios must be adopted in order to prevent various risks.Xi pointed out that Chinese modernization is the modernization of common prosperity for all, and Jiangsu authorities should accurately grasp the new expectations of the people for a better life, as well as the evolving characteristics of work related to public well-being under the new circumstances.The province should proactively address key issues such as ensuring high-quality and adequate employment, increasing incomes for both urban and rural residents, and further improving the level of basic public services and social security, while exploring effective pathways to promote common prosperity, he added.Xi stressed that the more effective the Party's self-governance is, the stronger the guarantee will be for economic and social development.He called for steps to properly carry out the Party-wide education campaign to promote a sound understanding of governance performance.
China is on alert as a fresh wave of rain and snow is expected over the next three days, potentially causing travel and tourism disruptions following the Spring Festival holiday. While less widespread and intense than recent weather events, the precipitation warrants attention.气象部门发出预警,预计未来三天我国将迎来新一波雨雪天气,可能导致春节假期结束后交通和旅游出现中断。虽然此次过程的强度和影响范围不及之前,但仍需引起注意。On Sunday, significant snowfall affected Shanxi, Hebei and Henan provinces, while heavy rains drenched much of southern China. The National Meteorological Center forecasts an eastward shift in snowfall, bringing light to moderate accumulations to the Inner Mongolia autonomous region, eastern and northern North China, most of Northeast China and the northern Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region. Inner Mongolia and Heilongjiang province may experience heavy snow and localized blizzards.3月1日,山西、河北和河南等地出现显著降雪,与此同时,强降雨影响了南方大部地区。中央气象台预计,降雪区域将向东移动,内蒙古自治区、华北中东部、东北地区大部和新疆维吾尔自治区北部等地将迎来小到中雪,累计降雪量一般有1~3毫米。其中,内蒙古和黑龙江等地局地可能出现大雪或暴雪。Simultaneously, South China is bracing for heavy rainfall, with moderate to heavy precipitation expected in the southern provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, the Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region and Taiwan. Localized downpours and possible thunderstorms are also anticipated.与此同时,华南地区将迎来强降雨,预计福建、广东、海南、广西壮族自治区和台湾等南方省份将有中到大雨。局地可能出现暴雨和雷暴天气。Offshore, strong winds will affect eastern sea areas due to an intensifying cyclone entering the sea near Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces. On Tuesday, gusts reaching 24.5 meters per second are predicted for the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, Taiwan Strait and parts of the South China Sea.在近海区域,由于入海气旋加强,江苏和浙江附近海域将出现大风。周二,预计黄海、东海、台湾海峡和南海部分海域将出现阵风达每秒24.5米的大风。Despite these localized events, forecasters predict no large-scale rain or snow across China this week, with precipitation expected to be scattered and generally light.预报员指出,尽管有这些局地天气事件,但预计本周全国范围内不会出现大范围的雨雪天气,降水总体较为分散,强度一般。However, persistent rain in eastern Southwest China will create slippery roads and reduce visibility, requiring public vigilance during travel.然而,我国西南地区东部持续的阴雨天气将导致道路湿滑和能见度降低,公众出行需注意安全。Northern China will experience a brief warming trend before a cold front arrives on Wednesday and Thursday. Conversely, the south will cool down, providing relief from recent warmth. Daytime highs in Haikou, Hainan, are expected to drop to 20 C by Wednesday.北方地区在周三和周四冷空气到来之前将经历短暂的回暖过程。与之相对,南方地区将迎来降温,使近日的回温天气得到缓解。到周三时,海南海口的白天最高气温预计将降至20摄氏度。In addition, most of China's northern winter wheat region is projected to experience near-average temperatures and 10 to 30 millimeters of rainfall over the next 10 days, which will improve soil moisture and aid the resurgence of winter wheat growth, according to agricultural forecasts.此外,农业气象预报显示,未来10天,我国北方冬麦区大部气温接近常年同期,降水量有10~30毫米。降水将有效改善土壤墒情,利于冬小麦返青生长。The Yangtze River Delta, South China and Southwest China are expected to see near-average or slightly above-average temperatures with 10 to 50 mm of precipitation, benefiting reservoir storage and providing water for spring planting, it added.预报还指出,长江中下游、华南及西南地区南部等地气温接近常年同期或偏高,降水量有10~50毫米,利于增加库塘蓄水和保障春播用水。precipitation /prɪˌsɪpɪˈteɪʃən/降水drench /drentʃ/湿透,浸透National Meteorological Center /ˈnæʃənəl ˌmiːtiərəˈlɒdʒɪkəl ˈsentər/ 中央气象台localized blizzards /ˈləʊkəlaɪzd ˈblɪzədz/局地暴雪downpour /ˈdaʊnpɔː/倾盆大雨,暴雨cyclone /ˈsaɪkləʊn/气旋gust /gʌst/一阵强风,阵风vigilance /ˈvɪdʒɪləns/警惕,警戒resurgence /rɪˈsɜːdʒəns/复苏,再现
Free trains and dedicated buses are helping a large number of migrant workers return to jobs after the Spring Festival holiday, especially those traveling from China's central and western regions to the eastern seaboard.春节假期过后,大批外出务工者踏上返岗之路。免费专列、包车等暖心服务正助力他们便捷返岗,尤其是那些从中国中西部地区前往东部沿海地区的务工人员。On Tuesday, a traveler surnamed Yang boarded a special train free of charge at Qiandongnan Miao and Dong autonomous prefecture in Guizhou province and arrived in Foshan, Guangdong province, in South China.2月24日(正月初八),春节假期后返岗首日,来自贵州省黔东南苗族侗族自治州的杨女士免费搭乘专列抵达广东省佛山市。The prefecture's human resources department provided about 500 seats for migrant workers such as her.黔东南州人力资源和社会保障局为务工者提供了约500个座位。More free trains will depart from the prefecture through Feb 28 to destinations including cities such as Hangzhou in Zhejiang province and Guangzhou in Guangdong province. Roughly 500 free seats per service are reserved exclusively for locals who work outside their hometown.到2月28日,该州还将开设更多免费专列,开往浙江杭州、广东广州等城市,每趟专列将为外出务工人员预留约500个免费座位。Each year after the Chinese New Year holiday, firms resume operations and many workers who spent the break at home must return to their posts. That produces a short surge in travel and makes securing tickets the top priority for many.每年春节假期过后,企业复工复产,回乡探亲的务工人员都得返回工作岗位,从而形成节后出行高峰,买到车票成了许多人的头等大事。Yang told China Daily that she scanned a QR code to register after her village issued the notice, and she received a confirmation message the next day. She posted about securing the free ride online and replied to fellow villagers' queries about how to apply.杨女士向《中国日报》表示,在村里下发通知后,她扫码登记,第二天就收到了确认信息。她在网上分享了乘坐免费专列的消息,并回复了同村人关于如何申请的问题。Another beneficiary, Yang Ying from Huangping county in Qiandongnan, said past returns required multiple transfers and a day or more of exhausting travel while carrying heavy luggage.另一位受益者、来自贵州省黄平县的杨英表示,过去返岗需要在多个换乘点之间奔波,耗费一天多的时间,还得拖着沉重的行李。"I have worked in Hangzhou for more than three years. Every year, the hardest task after the holiday is getting tickets. When I saw the free train notice, I scanned, applied and received confirmation within a few days. I felt relieved," she said.她说:"我在杭州务工三年多了,每年春节返岗最发愁的就是抢票,看到免费专列报名公告,我第一时间就扫码报名了,没几天就收到确认短信,心里一下子就踏实了。"Wang Wanmin, director of the prefecture's human resources and social security bureau, said they will continue to operate special trains and buses to transport 20,000 fellow townspeople to jobs, further stabilizing employment and boosting incomes.黔东南州人力资源和社会保障局局长王万敏表示,当地将继续开设专列、包车,护送2万余名外出务工人员返岗,进一步稳定就业,促进增收。Railway authorities said the China Railway Chengdu Group plans to run 32 post-festival special trains for workers, which are expected to carry about 18,000 passengers through March 6.铁路部门称,中国铁路成都局集团有限公司计划在节后开行32趟务工人员专列,预计在3月6日前运送约1.8万名旅客。The group manages lines serving provinces such as Sichuan and Guizhou, regions that are major sources of migrant labor.该公司管理四川、贵州等务工人员输出大省的铁路线路。Similar targeted services operate nationwide. Also on Tuesday, a special train for workers from Xi'an in Shaanxi province departed for Suzhou, Jiangsu province, delivering employees directly to contracted employers in Suzhou and nearby Taicang city.全国其他地方也有类似的精准服务。同样在2月24日,一列满载务工人员的专列从陕西省西安市驶往江苏省苏州市,直接将员工送至苏州及太仓市的签约企业。Officials said the transported workers had been prematched with positions in high-end intelligent manufacturing, electronic information, auto parts and precision machinery industries. Roles include technical operators, quality control staff, warehousing personnel and support service staff.据官方介绍,此次输送的务工人员已提前与高端智能制造、电子信息、汽车零部件和精密机械等行业的岗位匹配,涵盖技术操作工、品质管控、仓储物流及配套服务等。After the workers arrived at Suzhou North Railway Station, local human resources departments provided dedicated shuttle vehicles to take them directly to factory dormitories.务工人员抵达苏州北站后,当地人社部门安排专用接驳车,闭环运送务工人员直达厂区宿舍。More flexible, targeted transport has also been added. Guangdong province has introduced bus routes from labor-exporting areas to provide point-to-point service.更灵活、精准的返岗运输服务也在加码。广东省已开通从劳务输出大县到务工集中地的返岗直通车。Between Feb 19 and Feb 25, passengers could scan a code to find buses from provinces including Hunan, Jiangxi and Hubei bound for Guangzhou city, and register their return-to-work transport needs online, local media reported.据当地媒体报道,2月19日至25日,旅客可扫码查询从湖南、江西、湖北等省份发往广州的专车,并在线登记返岗出行需求。Huizhou city in Guangdong province will also set up return-to-work shuttle services at major transport hubs to provide last-mile connections for arriving migrant workers. The program is expected to serve more than 3,000 returning workers.广东省惠州市也将在主要交通枢纽设置返岗接驳专线,为返岗务工人员提供"最后一公里"的便利。该项目预计将为3000多名返岗务工人员提供服务。ree of charge /friː əv tʃɑːrdʒ/免费top priority /tɒp praɪˈɒrəti/重中之重;最优先事项shuttle services /ˈʃʌtəl ˈsɜːrvɪsɪz/接驳服务;班车服务
On today's episode we have a wide reaching, in depth and fascinating discussion on Chinese Marxism. We examine Marxism's historical emergence in China and it's adaptation to Chinese conditions - both as an idea guiding the Communist Party of China that culminated in the 1949 Chinese revolution as well as post-1949 state craft and socialist development in China. We also pay special attention to the influences of the Russian Revolution and Soviet Union on Chinese Marxism and socialism, as well as the critical differences and tensions between them from the 1920s, through Soviet collapse in 1991, to how the Soviet experience is understood in China today. Our guest is Professor of Politics and International Relations at East China Normal University Dr. Josef Gregory Mahoney. Dr. Mahoney also serves as a Concurrent Professor of Marxism and Senior Research Fellow with Jiangsu's top think tank—the Institute for the Development of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics —based at Southeast University in Nanjing. He teaches seminars on Marxism at ECNU, and his research methods emphasize dialectical and historical materialism, including his recent work on China's rise as an advanced technological society undergoing rapid green transformations.He holds a Ph.D., M.Phil., and B.A. from George Washington University; as well as an M.PA. and M.S.P.H. from the University of Alabama at Birmingham. Prior to his doctoral studies he was a public health officer with the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC/ATSDR).
El ambiente festivo por la Fiesta de la Primavera se respira en toda China, cuyos rincones se llenan de actividades festivas tradicionales, pirotecnias y drones, para dar la bienvenida al Año del Caballo. La Fiesta de la Primavera, también conocida como Año Nuevo lunar chino, cae este año el 17 de febrero. En la cultura china, el caballo representa vigor, fuerza y resiliencia. El 2026 es el año del Caballo de Fuego, un año cargado de simbolismos por esa combinación de “doble fuego”, que se interpreta como un momento ideal para tomar decisiones audaces y avanzar, aunque conlleva también el riesgo de la impulsividad y la inquietud. Por la corresponsal de RFI en China Con entusiasmo, se comienza un nuevo año, en el que las principales preocupaciones de la población china repiten respecto a años anteriores. Asegurar sus medios de vida es lo que más inquieta a la gente. Las reclamaciones están vinculadas con el incremento de la pensión básica de vejez y la mejora del sistema de asistencia social; pero también con la vivienda, que se posiciona como el problema número uno, sobre todo para los más jóvenes, que piden más oferta de vivienda asequible y que se reduzcan los tipos de interés hipotecarios. Además, la estabilidad laboral es una de las cuestiones que más afecta a jóvenes y adultos, quienes ven sus puestos de trabajo amenazados por la aceleración de la tecnología y la inteligencia artificial. Chen, una maestra del sur de China, pide al nuevo año empleo estable. “Mi única preocupación es la estabilidad de mi futuro laboral. En cuanto a mis esperanzas para el Año del Caballo, deseo salud en mi familia, y que la vida y el trabajo de todos sigan mejorando”, cuenta a RFI. Al Gobierno chino le preocupa la baja natalidad y a las parejas jóvenes les asustan los gastos que implica la crianza de los hijos. Por eso, piden ampliar la protección de derechos laborales a personas en edad fértil, así como incrementar los subsidios que reduzcan la carga de la maternidad. A pesar de las preocupaciones, la celebración de la fiesta más importante para el pueblo chino hace que se contagie el espíritu alegre. Rosalyn, propietaria de un centro de acogida de perros en Pekín, se manifiesta feliz. “Ahora no tengo preocupaciones. La verdad es que estoy muy satisfecha con la vida ideal que he creado. En el nuevo año, les deseo a mis familiares y amigos paz y salud, que pueda cuidarlos. Y que mi trabajo como madre de acogida de perritos pueda seguir mejorando”, asegura. Aunque no todos los jóvenes viven con ilusión esta fiesta. Es más, en las redes crece la queja por la presión social que llama al derroche – y que muchos critican como conservadora-. Y también, se dispara la inquietud por el mundo violento en que vivimos, como nos cuenta Li, un maestrando de la facultad de políticas de la pujante provincia de Jiangsu. “En el nuevo año, me preocupa que las fuerzas de extrema derecha sigan aumentando en todo el mundo, y espero que haya paz mundial y prosperidad económica”. En este nuevo año del caballo de fuego, la sociedad china galopa con ímpetu hacia su modernización, con grandes desafíos demográficos y económicos dentro de casa, y con enormes turbulencias y amenazas en el exterior.
As China heads into the Year of the Horse, consumer demand is being released earlier than usual, propelled by the country's longest Spring Festival holiday on record and a coordinated policy push aimed at turning seasonal spending into sustained economic momentum.随着中国迎来马年,消费需求释放时间较往年提前。这得益于创纪录的长春节假期,以及旨在将季节性消费转化为持续经济动能的协同政策推动。The 2026 Spring Festival holiday will run from Feb 15 to 23, spanning nine consecutive days. The extended break—longer than in previous years—is not only reshaping travel and spending plans, but also amplifying the effects of policies designed to unlock consumption potential, particularly in services, travel and experience-driven spending.2026年春节假期将从2月15日持续至23日,共计九天连休。较往年更长的假期不仅重塑了出行与消费计划,更放大了解锁消费潜力的政策效应,尤其在服务、旅游及体验型消费领域。From bustling shopping streets in Beijing to small factories in Zhejiang's Yiwu operating extra production lines, and from reunion dinners booked weeks ahead of Chinese New Year's Eve to a sharp rise in two-way travel, signs of renewed consumption activity are emerging well before the holiday officially begins.从北京熙熙攘攘的商业街,到浙江义乌加开生产线的中小工厂;从数周前就预订好的除夕团圆饭,到双向出行量的显著增长——在春节正式到来之前,消费活动复苏的迹象已然显现。On Beijing's Wangfujing pedestrian street, winter temperatures have done little to slow foot traffic. Flagship stores are drawing a steady stream of overseas visitors, many taking advantage of expanded visa-free access and increasingly seamless digital payment options.北京王府井步行街上,寒冬的低温并未减缓人流脚步。旗舰店吸引着络绎不绝的海外游客,许多人正享受着扩大免签政策带来的便利,以及日益便捷的数字支付方式。Daniel Chan, a tourist from Los Angeles, stepped out of an electronics store with a newly purchased DJI Osmo Nano camera.来自洛杉矶的游客陈丹尼尔(音译)从一家电子产品商店走出,手里拿着刚买到的DJI Osmo Nano相机。"I've wanted this model for months. It's almost impossible to find stock back home, yet here it was available, and the price was very friendly,"Chan said. "It's not just a souvenir—it's cutting-edge technology."陈丹尼尔(音译)说道:“我渴望拥有这款相机已有数月之久。在美国几乎找不到现货,而这里不仅有货,价格还非常实惠。这不仅是件纪念品,更是尖端科技的结晶。”He said he had already started using the camera on the day of purchase. "I haven't explored all its functions yet, but the magnetic design and image quality are quite good," he added.他表示购买当天就已开始使用这台相机。他补充道:“虽然还没完全摸清所有功能,但磁吸设计和成像质量都相当不错。”What impressed him most during his China trip, Chan said, was the speed and convenience of food delivery services. "It's incredibly fast and efficient—almost unbelievable," he said. Dining in restaurants was equally striking, with some offering dish countdown timers and guaranteed serving speeds. "I've hardly ever experienced service like this in the United States."陈丹尼尔(音译)表示,此次中国之行最令他印象深刻的是外卖服务的快捷便利。他说:“速度快得惊人,效率极高——简直难以置信。”餐厅用餐体验同样令人震撼,部分餐厅设有菜品倒计时器并承诺上菜速度。“在美国几乎从未体验过如此服务。”Such experiences are precisely what policymakers hope to encourage.此类经历正是政策制定者希望鼓励的。The "Shopping in China" campaign, first launched in April 2025, aims to create a more internationally friendly consumption ecosystem while stimulating domestic demand through higher-quality supply.“中国购物”活动于2025年4月首次启动,旨在打造更具国际友善度的消费生态系统,同时通过更高品质的供给来刺激国内需求。At the launch of the 2026 "Shopping in China" and New Year Consumption Season in Shanghai on Jan 3, Commerce Minister Wang Wentao said the initiative would focus on goods consumption, services consumption and the development of new consumption scenarios. A series of nationwide events, including apremium consumption month and an international consumption season, will be rolled out, alongside locally tailored programs in 15 pilot cities.1月3日,2026“中国购物季”暨新年消费季在上海启动。商务部部长王文涛表示,本次活动将聚焦商品消费、服务消费及新型消费场景发展。全国将推出高端消费月、国际消费季等系列活动,同时15个试点城市将推出本土化特色项目。With the nine-day Spring Festival approaching, Wang said the Ministry of Commerce, together with other central departments and local governments, will host a "happy shopping for the Spring Festival" campaign as a flagship component of the "Shopping in China" series. The campaign will span food, accommodation, transport, travel, shopping and entertainment, aiming to create an inclusive, festive consumption experience for families at home and travelers on the move.随着为期九天的春节临近,王文涛表示商务部将联合中央各部门和地方政府,推出“欢乐春节·购物中国”系列活动的旗舰项目“欢乐春节·购物中国”。活动将覆盖餐饮、住宿、交通、旅游、购物、娱乐等领域,旨在为居家过节的家庭和外出游玩的旅客创造包容、喜庆的消费体验。More than 1,200 kilometers south of Beijing, Yiwu—the world's largest small-commodities hub—offers a ground-level view of how festive demand is being converted into real orders.距离北京以南1200多公里处,全球最大的小商品集散中心义乌正展现着节日需求如何转化为实际订单的生动图景。In the plush toy section of Yiwu International Trade Market, one horse-themed product has become an unexpected viral hit. Originally launched in mid-October under the name "Mashang Youqian", meaning "immediate prosperity", the toy initially sold about 400 units a day—steady but far from a bestseller.在义乌国际商贸城毛绒玩具区,一款以马为主题的产品意外走红。这款名为“马上有钱”的玩具于十月中旬上市,最初日销量约400件——虽保持稳定但远非畅销品。Its breakout moment came in January, after a minor production-line error resulted in the toy's mouth being stitched incorrectly, giving it a seemingly "tearful" expression. Buyers who received the flawed version posted photos and chat records online while requesting exchanges. The images struck a chord with netizens, who found humor and resonance in the toy's "wronged" look, quickly propelling it to the top of social media trending lists.这款玩具的爆红时刻出现在今年1月,当时因生产线的小失误导致玩具嘴巴缝制错误,呈现出仿佛“泪眼汪汪”的表情。收到瑕疵品的买家纷纷在网上晒出照片和聊天记录要求换货。这些照片意外引发网友共鸣,大家在玩具“委屈”的表情中发现了幽默感,迅速将其推上了社交媒体热搜榜首。Dubbed the "crying horse", the toy was soon labeled the first cultural "dark horse" of the New Year. As demand surged, the factory expanded production lines from two to more than a dozen, lifting daily output to around 15,000 units. The merchant has since applied for a design patent.这款被称为“哭哭马”的玩具,很快被冠以新年首个文化“黑马”的称号。随着需求激增,工厂将生产线从两条扩充至十余条,日产量提升至约1.5万只。该商家已就此申请了外观设计专利。Behind the viral moment, the success mirrors quality and Yiwu merchants' deeply ingrained ability to respond quickly to market signals, from identifying trends to making swift decisions and scaling production with minimal delay.这场病毒式传播的背后,其成功既彰显了商品品质,更折射出义乌商人深植于骨髓的敏锐市场触觉。从洞察趋势到果断决策,再到以最小延迟实现规模化生产,他们总能迅速响应市场信号。Across the toy sector, creative interpretations of the Year of the Horse are proliferating. Products range from zodiac photo frames to blind boxes and decorative figurines.玩具行业正涌现出大量以马年为主题的创意设计,产品涵盖生肖相框、盲盒以及装饰摆件等。Some bestselling items now sell between 40,000 and 60,000 units a day. For popular designs, factories are producing between 50,000 and 100,000 units daily. To maintain speed and creativity, some merchants require their design teams to develop as many as five new styles each day.部分畅销商品目前日销量在4万至6万件之间。对于热门款式,工厂日产量可达5万至10万件。为保持生产速度和设计创新力,部分商家要求设计团队每日开发多达五款新产品。Merchants say interest from foreign buyers has risen, particularly after Spring Festival was added to UNESCO's Representative List of theIntangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity in December 2024.商户表示,外国买家的兴趣有所提升,尤其是在2024年12月春节被列入联合国教科文组织人类非物质文化遗产代表作名录之后。Consumption momentum is also visible in the catering sector, where Chinese New Year's Eve reunion dinners—a core element of Spring Festival culture—are being booked out well in advance.餐饮业的消费势头同样明显,作为春节文化核心元素的除夕团圆饭,早已被提前预订一空。In Beijing, several restaurant chains report that all private rooms across multiple branches are already fully booked, with only limited lunchtime slots remaining. Prices largely match regular menus, though advance reservations and deposits are typically required.在北京,多家连锁餐厅表示其旗下各分店的包间已全部订满,仅剩少量午间时段可预约。价格基本与常规菜单持平,但通常需要提前预约并支付定金。To cope with demand, many restaurants have introducedstaggered dining slots on Chinese New Year's Eve, offering discounts for later sittings. Others have expanded takeaway services, allowing families to enjoy freshly prepared reunion meals at home.为应对需求,许多餐厅在除夕夜推出了错峰用餐时段,晚间时段还提供折扣优惠。另有餐厅扩大了外卖服务范围,让家庭能在家中享用现做的团圆饭。One restaurant in Beijing's Guomao area has launched two takeaway packages priced at 1,988 yuan ($286) for eight to 10 people and 999 yuan for four to six people, with free delivery within the city's Fifth Ring Road. Customers can also order a la carte, providing greater flexibility.北京国贸区某餐厅推出两款外卖套餐:8-10人份售价1988元(约合286美元),4-6人份售价999元,市内五环路内免费配送。顾客也可单点菜品,提供更灵活的选择。An emerging trend is the shift toward county towns and rural venues. In Yinjiang town of Ningbo, Zhejiang province, a countryside resort that opened reservations three months ago, has already sold out large private rooms for the first two days of the holiday, attracting families traveling from neighboring Shanghai, and Jiangsu province.新兴趋势向县城和乡村场所转移。在浙江省宁波市鄞江镇,一家三个月前开放预订的乡村度假村,其大型包间在假期前两天的预订已全部售罄,吸引了来自邻近上海和江苏的家庭游客。Traditional restaurant brands are also moving into rural markets. Managers say demand for reunion dinners and banquets in these areas remains strong, while the supply of mid—to high-end dining options is relatively limited—creating new opportunities for expansion.传统餐饮品牌也正进军农村市场。经营者表示,这些地区对团圆饭和宴会的需求依然旺盛,而中高端餐饮选择的供应相对有限,这为扩张创造了新机遇。The nine-day break is also reshaping travel patterns, triggering a surge in both outbound and inbound tourism.为期九天的假期也在重塑旅游模式,引发出境游和入境游的双双激增。Major travel platforms report that Spring Festival bookings for 2026 have surpassed last year's levels across the board. According to data from Flight Master, as of Jan 16, bookings for domestic flights during the holiday exceeded 4.13 million, up about 21 percent year-on-year. Outbound and inbound flight bookings both climbed to around 700,000.主要旅游平台数据显示,2026年春节期间的预订量全面超越去年同期水平。据飞航大师平台统计,截至1月16日,春节期间国内航班预订量已突破413万次,同比增长约21%。出境及入境航班预订量均攀升至约70万次。Airbnb data show searches by Chinese travelers for overseas accommodation around the Spring Festival period have roughly doubled year-on-year. Many travelers are choosing to stagger trips before or after the official holiday to secure better prices and less crowded itineraries.爱彼迎(Airbnb)数据显示,春节期间中国游客搜索海外住宿的数量同比翻了一番。许多游客选择在法定假期前后错峰出行,以获得更优惠的价格和更宽松的行程安排。Travel agencies are embedding New Year elements into overseas tour products, allowing travelers to retain a sense of festivity even while abroad.旅行社正将新年元素融入海外旅游产品,让游客即使身处异国也能保持节日氛围。Li Mengran, marketing manager of Beijing-based travel agency Utour, said the company has continued its long-standing practices in European tour products. These include customized reunion dinners and dumpling-making activities, alongside wine tastings and interactive prize draws.北京众信旅游集团媒介公关经理李梦然表示,公司在欧洲旅游产品中延续了多年来的传统项目,包括定制团圆晚宴和包饺子活动,同时安排品酒会和互动抽奖环节。"For family travelers, we also prepare red-envelope gifts for children under 16 to enhance the sense of ritual and warmth during the journey,"Li said.李梦然表示:“针对家庭游客,我们还为16岁以下儿童准备了红包礼物,以增强旅途中的仪式感与温馨氛围。”Domestically, culturally rich "intangible heritage towns" are emerging as popular destinations. Data from Qunar show that cities such as Huangshan in Anhui, Jingdezhen in Jiangxi, Quanzhou in Fujian, Foshan in Guangdong and Zigong in Sichuan—all offering immersive intangible cultural heritage experiences—have seen particularly strong hotel booking growth during the winter holiday and Spring Festival period.在国内,文化底蕴深厚的“非物质文化遗产小镇”正成为热门旅游目的地。去哪儿网数据显示,安徽黄山、江西景德镇、福建泉州、广东佛山、四川自贡等提供沉浸式非物质文化遗产体验的城市,在寒假和春节期间酒店预订量增长尤为显著。Inbound tourism is also gaining momentum.入境旅游业也正蓬勃发展。Qunar data show that bookings for domestic flights made using non-Chinese passports during the Spring Festival holiday are up more than 20 percent year-on-year, underscoring the holiday's growing role as a window for international visitors to experience Chinese culture.去哪儿网数据显示,春节期间持非中国护照预订的国内航班量同比增长逾20%,凸显出春节作为国际游客体验中华文化的窗口正发挥着日益重要的作用。This rebound reflects sustained policy support. By the first three quarters of 2025, visa-free inbound visits reached 20.89 million, up more than 50 percent year-on-year. Since the introduction of the 240-hour transit visa-free policy, inbound arrivals across ports have risen 27.2 percent.这一回升态势反映出政策支持的持续性。截至2025年前三季度,免签入境人次达2089万,同比增长逾50%。自实施240小时过境免签政策以来,各口岸入境人次增长27.2%。The World Travel & Tourism Council forecasts that China's tourism sector will grow at an average annual rate of 7 percent over the next decade, with the country on track to become the world's largest tourism market by 2031, surpassing the United States.世界旅游业理事会预测,未来十年中国旅游业将保持年均7%的增长率,预计到2031年将超越美国,成为全球最大的旅游市场。Economists say the early consumption surge reflects the combined effects of policy support, longer holidays and evolving consumer preferences.经济学家表示,消费的早期激增反映了政策支持、假期延长以及消费者偏好变化的综合影响。The Central Economic Work Conference held in December placed expanding domestic demand as the top priority of China's economic policy in 2026, with multiple consumption-supporting policies already rolled out or in the pipeline.去年12月召开的中央经济工作会议将扩大内需确立为2026年中国经济政策的重中之重,多项支持消费的政策已陆续出台或正在酝酿中。Su Jian, a professor at Peking University's School of Economics, said consumption growth has been most visible in services and fast-evolving consumer electronics, including tourism, cultural products, sports and entertainment. Rapid upgrade cycles, he added, continue to support demand for electronics.北京大学经济学院教授苏剑表示,消费增长在服务业和快速发展的消费电子产品领域最为显著,包括旅游、文化产品、体育和娱乐等。他补充道,快速的升级周期持续支撑着电子产品需求。Since last year, targeted consumption-boosting campaigns have delivered tangible results. In 2025, trade-in-related sales exceeded 2.6 trillion yuan, benefiting more than 360 million consumer transactions. Optimized trade-in programs introduced in 2026 are now translating into concrete market activity across regions.自去年以来,定向消费提振举措成效显著。2025年,以旧换新相关销售额突破2.6万亿元,惠及逾3.6亿笔消费交易。2026年推出的优化换购方案,正逐步转化为各地市场的实际行动。International observers have also noted structural changes underway. In its latest flagship annual report, global consultancy Roland Berger said China has entered the "consumption 4.0" era, characterized by resilience.国际观察人士也注意到正在发生的结构性变化。全球咨询公司罗兰贝格企业管理有限公司在其最新旗舰年度报告中指出,中国已进入以韧性为特征的“消费4.0”时代。China's consumption structure is shifting rapidly from survival-oriented spending toward development—and experience-oriented demand, the report noted. By elevating domestic demand expansion to a strategic priority, and encouraging a move from quantitative satisfaction to qualitative enrichment, policymakers are using consumption upgrading to drive supply-side innovation and support high-quality growth.报告指出,中国消费结构正从生存型消费向发展型消费、从物质型需求向体验型需求快速转变。通过将扩大内需提升为战略重点,引导消费从数量满足转向质量提升,决策者正以消费升级为引擎,推动供给侧创新,助力高质量发展。Boosting consumption, policymakers emphasize, is not a short-term fix, but a long-term strategy.政策制定者强调,提振消费并非短期对策,而是长远之策。A State Council executive meeting held on Jan 16 reviewed progress in the consumption-boosting campaign and outlined further steps to cultivate new growth points in service consumption.2026年1月16日召开的国务院常务会议审议了提振消费行动的进展情况,并规划了培育服务消费新增长点的后续措施。The meeting called for improving long-term mechanisms for promoting consumption, raising urban and rural household incomes, implementing the paid leave system and removing unreasonable restrictive measures for consumption.会议要求完善促进消费的长效机制,提高城乡居民收入水平,落实带薪休假制度,取消限制消费的不合理措施。premium consumption/ˈpriː.mi.əm/高端消费staggered dining slots错峰用餐时段intangible/ɪnˈtæn.dʒə.bəl/adj.非物质的
Shannon opens the show with returning guest host KTLA’s Andy Riesmeyer, bouncing from sleep experiments and thermostat politics to watching Euphoria for the first time and having an unexpected cultural realization.The hour continues with The Hill’s Julia Manchester on President Trump’s renewed Insurrection Act threats, followed by updates on NASA astronauts, rising grocery prices, a college basketball betting scandal, and the surprising moment Shannon and Andy become fans of the Jiangsu Dragons.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
An incident at the People's Hospital of Xuyi county in Huai'an, Jiangsu province, has captured widespread attention after a newborn's left middle finger was accidentally severed during the cutting of the umbilical cord.江苏省淮安市盱眙县人民医院发生一起事件,一名新生儿在脐带结扎过程中左手中指意外被切断,该事件引发广泛关注。The newborn's father, surnamed Sheng, said that due to the infant's small size, the surgery was highly challenging. It took two hospital transfers before the severed finger was reattached at a specialized hospital in Wuxi.新生儿的父亲表示,因婴儿体型幼小,手术难度极大。新生儿先后转诊两家医院,最终在无锡一家专科医院完成断指再植手术。On Monday evening, the county's health commission issued a statement about the incident. On Dec 25, a woman surnamed Zhang gave birth to a baby boy via cesarean section at the hospital. During the procedure, a severe error by the attending midwife resulted in the partial severing of the newborn's left middle finger.该县卫生健康委员会于周一晚间就此事发布通报。12 月 25 日,一名张姓产妇在该院通过剖宫产诞下一名男婴。手术过程中,当班助产士操作出现严重失误,导致新生儿左手中指部分离断。The county hospital promptly contacted several other facilities before transferring the infant to a hospital where a surgery was performed that afternoon. By Dec 31, the infant had been discharged and is currently in the recovery phase.盱眙县人民医院迅速联系多家医疗机构,随即转诊新生儿,接收转诊的医院于当日下午为婴儿实施了手术。截至 12 月 31 日,新生儿已康复出院,目前处于术后恢复阶段。The statement said that the midwife involved has been suspended from her duties. The county hospital has issued repeated and sincere apologies to the infant's family and has pledged to support his treatment and rehabilitation fully.通报称,涉事助产士已被暂停执业。盱眙县人民医院已向新生儿家属多次诚恳致歉,并承诺全额承担婴儿后续的治疗与康复费用。It said the incident has highlighted deficiencies in the hospital's medical safety management procedures, and all personnel involved will be held accountable. A comprehensive medical safety inspection will be conducted throughout the county.通报指出,该事件暴露出医院在医疗安全管理流程中存在漏洞,所有相关责任人都将被追究责任。全县范围内将开展一次全面的医疗安全专项检查。According to the father, the infant's severed finger is fixed with a steel pin, causing the child to cry frequently.据新生儿父亲介绍,孩子的断指处采用钢针固定,这让孩子时常哭闹。umbilical /ʌmˈbɪlɪkl/adj. 脐带的;脐部的cesarean /sɪˈzeəriən/adj. 剖宫产的;剖腹产的rehabilitation /ˌriːəˌbɪlɪˈteɪʃn/n. 康复;复原accountable /əˈkaʊntəbl/adj. 负有责任的;应被追责的
The provincial Party committee and provincial government of Jiangsu have formed an investigation team to investigate issues related to the management and handling of donated cultural relics at the Nanjing Museum, as well as other concerns about the safety of its collections, CCTV reported on Tuesday.据央视周二报道,江苏省省委、省政府已成立调查组,就南京博物馆受赠文物管理处置问题及馆藏文物安全等相关问题展开调查。A celebrated painting from the museum's collection recently surfaced at an auction and generated widespread attention.博物馆馆藏的一幅著名画作近日现身拍卖会,引发了广泛关注。In a statement released on Wednesday, the Nanjing Museum announced that it had initiated an internal review after receiving court documents in November 2024 concerning Pang Shuling's "gift contract dispute" lawsuit.南京博物馆周三发布声明称,该馆于2024年11月收到庞叔令女士“赠礼合同纠纷”诉讼的法院文件后,已启动内部审查程序。The museum said that it had accepted 137 donated paintings from Pang Zenghe, Pang Shuling's father, in January 1959. Five of these works, including those now under dispute, were determined to beforgeries following two appraisals conducted in the early 1960s.南京博物馆表示,1959年1月曾接受庞增和先生(庞叔令之父)捐赠的137幅收藏画作。其中包括现存争议作品在内的五幅画作,经1960年代初两次鉴定后均被认定为赝品。The museum said that it disposed of the five works in the 1990s in accordance with the regulations governing museum collections at that time, adding that it would cooperate with legal proceedings. If any illegal or non-compliant actions are discovered during their disposal, it will work with the relevant authorities for strict legal handling.南京博物馆表示,其在1990年代处置这五件作品时,均遵循当时博物馆藏品管理规定,并承诺将配合司法程序。若在处置过程中发现存在违法违规行为,将协同相关部门依法严厉处理。The governmental investigation team consists of members from the commission for discipline inspection, the supervisory commission, and departments of publicity, political and legal affairs, public security, culture and tourism, and cultural relics.政府调查组由纪律检查委员会、监察委员会以及宣传、政法、公安、文化旅游、文物等部门的成员组成。Following the investigation, any illegal or non-compliant activities will be addressed with strict measures, with no tolerance for misconduct. The results of the investigation and the actions taken will be disclosed to the public.调查结束后,任何违法违规行为都将受到严厉处置,绝不容忍任何不当行为。调查结果及采取的措施将向公众公布。The National Cultural Heritage Administration released a statement on its website on Tuesday, saying that it had formed a working group. The group is already in Nanjing to investigate issues related to the management of cultural relics at the Nanjing Museum.国家文物局周二在其官网发布公告称,已成立专项工作组,该工作组已赴南京对南京博物馆文物管理相关问题展开调查。forgeryn./ˈfɔːr.dʒɚ.i/赝品
On a wintry weekend with temperatures hovering just above freezing, an indoor ski dome in the eastern Chinese city of Wuxi, Jiangsu province, buzzed with the sound of beginners shrieking their way down the slopes, many of whom had never touched a pair of skis before.在一个气温徘徊在零上几度的寒冬周末,位于中国东部江苏省无锡市的一座室内滑雪馆里,初学者的尖叫声此起彼伏。许多人滑下雪坡时都尖叫连连,其中不少人还是第一次接触滑雪板。"It's my first try," said local resident Wang Yue, still brushing off snow after a fall. "But I've already picked up the basics. I'm determined to become a cool, skilled skier this winter."“这是我第一次尝试,”当地居民王悦(音译)说着,仍在拍打身上的积雪,刚摔了一跤,“但我已经掌握了基本技巧。这个冬天,我决心成为一名酷炫又技术娴熟的滑雪者。”The Wuxi facility, mid-sized by regional standards, draws nearly half a million visits a year and generates more than 180 million yuan ($25.5 million) in sports-related spending. It is one example of how regions without natural snowfall are cashing in as China's winter sports season gains momentum.无锡滑雪场按地区标准属于中型规模,每年接待游客近50万人次,创造逾1.8亿元人民币(合2550万美元)的体育相关消费。随着中国冬季运动热潮兴起,该滑雪场成为无天然降雪地区借势盈利的典型案例。As temperatures drop, more regions are turning ice and snow into economic activity. According to an official industry report, China's ice-and-snow sector is expected to surpass 1 trillion yuan this year.随着气温下降,越来越多的地区正将冰雪转化为经济活动。根据官方行业报告,中国冰雪产业规模今年有望突破1万亿元。Sports boom体育热潮Northern China, where winter arrives early and lasts long, remains the country's primary arena for winter sports. On Nov 29, the northernmost city of Mohe in Heilongjiang province welcomed its first snow-tourism charter train of the season as more than 300 travelers set out to chase ice sculptures, forest landscapes and fresh powder.中国北方地区冬季来得早、持续时间长,仍是全国冬季运动的主要舞台。11月29日,黑龙江省最北端的城市漠河迎来今冬首列冰雪旅游专列,300余名游客踏上追寻冰雕、森林景观和新雪的旅程。In Harbin's Yabuli, a steady stream of visitors has arrived since the ski resort opened its slopes on Nov 7. "We now receive more than 2,000 visitors a day, up 12 percent from last year," said Yang Xiaodong of Yabuli's culture and tourism department.自11月7日哈尔滨亚布力滑雪场开放雪道以来,游客络绎不绝。亚布力管委会文旅处负责人杨晓冬表示:“目前日均接待游客超过2000人次,较去年同期增长12%。”As a competition venue for this year's Asian Winter Games, Yabuli plans to stage more than 30 professional events and public activities during the new snow season. It will also addacrobatic shows and other entertainment to enrich visitor experiences.作为今年亚洲冬季运动会的比赛场地,亚布力计划在新雪季期间举办30余场专业赛事和公众活动,还将新增杂技表演等娱乐项目,丰富游客体验。Data from travel platform Trip.com showed that from November to February, bookings for ice-and-snow attractions are expected to jump around 70 percent year-on-year, with inbound tour reservations rising by about half. Ski resort ticket bookings have surged more than twofold since early November.旅游平台携程数据显示,11月至次年2月期间,冰雪旅游产品预订量预计同比增长约70%,入境旅游产品预订量增长约50%。自11月初以来,滑雪场门票预订量已激增逾两倍。Such sports fever is not limited to snowfields. Across stadiums, courts and parks in cities and villages, sports are increasingly being linked with travel, food and shopping in ways that are supporting domestic demand.这种体育热潮不仅限于雪场。在城乡各体育场馆、球场和公园里,体育活动正日益与旅游、餐饮和购物相结合,从而支撑着国民需求。Few stories illustrate this better than Jiangsu's grassroots football sensation, the Su Super League. What began as a provincial competition this year exploded into a national phenomenon, with 85 matches, 2.43 million in-personspectators, average attendance nearing 30,000 and 2.2 billion online views.没有什么故事比江苏草根足球的奇迹——苏超联赛更能说明这一点了。这项今年刚起步的省级赛事,已迅速发展成为全国性的现象:共举办85场比赛,吸引243万现场观众,场均上座率接近3万人次,线上观看量达22亿次。To create a stadium atmosphere for fans unable to secure tickets, organizers set up 573 fan zones across the province, each with giant screens, food stalls, retail booths and late-night entertainment.为让未能购得门票的球迷也能感受现场氛围,主办方在全省设立了573个球迷区,每个区域都配备巨型屏幕、小吃摊、零售摊位及深夜娱乐活动。"Every one yuan spent on a ticket drove 7.3 yuan in additional consumption," said Wu Haiyun, a provincial commerce official, adding that the league brought more than 38 billion yuan in related spending.江苏省商务厅副厅长吴海云表示:“每消费1元购票款,就能带动7.3元的额外消费。”他补充表示联赛带动了超过380亿元的相关消费。Sports-led travel has become one of China's social trends. During the 15th National Games held across the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area in November, Guangzhou launched 50 sightseeing routes linking venues and city landmarks, alongside more than 2,000 cultural events.体育旅游已成为中国社会潮流之一。11月在粤港澳大湾区举行的第十五届全国运动会期间,广州推出了50条串联赛场与城市地标的观光路线,并举办了2000余场文化活动。Data from Douyin, the Chinese version of TikTok, showed that during the Games, hotel spending in Guangzhou rose 114.5 percent year-on-year, while leisure and entertainment consumption climbed more than 134 percent. Sales of Games-themed merchandise are expected to reach 1 billion yuan.抖音数据显示,全运会期间广州酒店消费同比增长114.5%,休闲娱乐消费增幅超过134%。全运会主题商品销售额预计将达10亿元。Shanghai delivered a similar surge during its National Day holiday sports calendar. Six major events, including the 2025 Shanghai Masters and the World Rowing Championships, drew more than 800,000 spectators. Luxury hotels hit near-full capacity, and sales in key commercial districts rose 42 percent year-on-year.国庆假期期间,上海的体育赛事同样掀起热潮。包括2025年上海大师赛和世界赛艇锦标赛在内的六项重大赛事,共吸引逾80万观众到场观赛。豪华酒店入住率逼近满额,核心商业区销售额同比增长42%。Beijing, hosting the 2025 China Open and WTT China Smash, also saw unprecedented crowds. The tennis tournament alone drew 360,000 spectators, generating record ticket revenue and brisk sales of licensed merchandise.北京作为2025年中国网球公开赛和WTT中国网球公开赛的举办地,也迎来了空前的观众规模。仅网球赛事就吸引了36万名观众,创下门票收入纪录,并带动了授权商品的热销。Growth engine增长引擎"Sports events, culture and tourism have formed a new ecosystem," said Si Zengchuo, a professor at Jiangsu Normal University. "This integrated model—combining sightseeing, shopping and event experiences—is now spreading nationwide."江苏师范大学教授司增绰(音译)指出:“体育赛事、文化与旅游已形成新的生态系统。这种集观光、购物与赛事体验于一体的融合模式,正在全国范围内推广。”The rise in sports spending aligns with a broader push to upgrade the consumer economy. According to China's latest blueprint, the total output of the sports industry will exceed 7 trillion yuan by 2030, driven by event-related spending and the fusion of sports, culture and tourism.体育消费的增长与推动消费经济升级的整体趋势相契合。根据中国最新规划,到2030年,体育产业总产值将突破7万亿元,其增长动力主要来自赛事相关消费以及体育、文化和旅游产业的融合发展。To accelerate that momentum, Jiangsu has announced plans to expand event-related consumption scenarios, turning stadiums, sports parks and outdoor campsites into immersive commercial hubs.为加速这一势头,江苏宣布计划拓展赛事相关消费场景,将体育场馆、运动公园和户外营地打造成沉浸式商业中心。Local authorities are encouraging the rollout of sportsvouchers, spending rebates and discount programs. Integrated packages bundling tickets, transport, hotels, dining and cultural attractions are being explored across the province.地方政府正积极推广体育活动代金券、消费返现及折扣计划。全省范围内正探索推出整合套票方案,涵盖门票、交通、酒店、餐饮及文化景点等项目。The eastern manufacturing hub also aims to boost its sports equipment sector by building industrial clusters with annual output of more than 3 billion yuan each, focusing on outdoor gear, fitness facilities and materials for sports venues.江苏省这一东部制造业中心还计划通过建设年产值均超过30亿元的产业集群,重点发展户外装备、健身器材和体育场馆材料,以推动其体育器材产业的升级。To spur winter consumption, several northern regions have introduced "snow break", encouraging schools and families to embrace winter sports programs. Ski resorts are offering winter camps, cultural workshops and discounted family packages.为提振冬季消费,北方多个地区推出“雪假”政策,鼓励学校和家庭参与冬季运动项目。滑雪场纷纷推出冬季营地、文化工作坊及家庭优惠套餐。Transport authorities, meanwhile, are adding seasonal trains and flights to meet travel demand. Some railway lines now allow passengers to carry ski equipment on board and offer designated storage space.与此同时,交通部门正增开季节性列车和航班以满足出行需求。部分铁路线路现允许乘客携带滑雪装备上车,并提供专用存放空间。Experts say such measures are turning sports into a driver of economic vitality. According to China's General Administration of Sport, the country's sports industry has grown at an average annual rate of more than 10 percent over the past five years.专家指出,这些举措正推动体育成为经济活力的引擎。据中国国家体育总局统计,过去五年间,我国体育产业年均增速超过10%。Expanded facilities have also boosted participation. By the end of 2024, China boasted 4.84 million sports venues, averaging 3 square meters of sports area per person. The number of ski resorts alone had jumped 136 percent since 2018, rising from 1,133 to 2,678.设施扩建也推动了参与度提升。截至2024年底,中国拥有484万处体育场馆,人均体育场地面积达3平方米。仅滑雪场数量就较2018年激增136%,从1133个增至2678个。"Venues are the foundation, but the real shift happens beyond the arena," said Ding Xiang, an associate professor at Nanjing University. "People are finding emotional connection and even cultural identity through sports in a city, and that's where the long-term economic value lies."南京大学副教授丁翔指出:“场馆是基础,但真正的转变发生在场馆之外。人们通过城市体育活动建立情感纽带,甚至形成文化认同,这才是长远经济价值所在。”spectatorsn./spekˈteɪ.t̬ɚ/(尤指)现场观众vouchern./ˈvaʊ.tʃɚ/代金券acrobaticadj./ˌæk.rəˈbæt̬.ɪk/杂技的
China aims to broaden insurance coverage for childbirth-related medical expenses and strengthen support for pharmaceutical innovation in the coming year, according to the National Healthcare Security Administration.国家医疗保障局表示,中国计划在未来一年扩大生育相关医疗费用的保险覆盖范围,并加强对医药创新的支持力度。The goals were outlined in a report delivered by Zhang Ke, director of the administration, at its annual work conference on Saturday. The report reviewed progress in healthcare security during the 14th Five-Year Plan period (2021-25) and detailed priority areas for 2026.这些目标由国家医疗保障局主任章轲在周六举行的年度工作会议上提交的报告中提出。该报告回顾了“十四五”规划期间(2021-2025年)医疗保障工作的进展,并详细列出了2026年的重点工作领域。To adapt to demographic shifts marked by declining birth rates and a rapidly aging population, the report said maternity insurance coverage for prenatal checkups will be reasonably expanded within the financial capacity of the insurance fund.为应对生育率下降和人口快速老龄化的人口结构变化,报告指出将在保险基金财力范围内合理扩大孕产妇保险的产前检查覆盖范围。Authorities will explore the creation of a basic service package that incorporates prenatal examinations, aiming to ease the financial burden on families.相关部门将研究推出包含产前检查的基本服务套餐,旨在减轻家庭的经济负担。By next year, the goal is to achieve nationwide full reimbursement for all policy-covered medical expenses related to childbirth, enabling insured expectant mothers to incur almost no out-of-pocket costs for covered services.到明年,目标是实现全国范围内对所有与分娩相关的保险覆盖医疗费用全额报销,使参保孕妇在享受保险覆盖服务时几乎无需承担自付费用。Additional expenses, such as those for premium hospital wards or medications not included in the reimbursement list, will remain uncovered.但例如高级病房费用或未列入报销清单的药品等的额外费用,仍将不予覆盖。So far, seven provincial-level regions, including Jilin, Jiangsu and Shandong provinces, have implemented policies that make childbirth nearly free of charge.迄今为止,包括吉林、江苏和山东在内的七个省级地区已实施政策,使生育费用几乎免费。The administration said the number of women enrolled in the national maternity insurance program has risen to 255 million, and all regions have included fertility treatment in their basic health insurance plans.国家医疗保障局表示,全国生育保险参保女性人数已增至2.55亿,所有地区均已将生育治疗纳入基本医疗保险范围。Nearly 95 percent of fund pooling regions now distribute fertility subsidies directly to beneficiaries' personal accounts rather than through employers.目前近95%的基金池地区已将生育补贴直接发放至受益人个人账户,而非通过雇主发放。For the coming year, authorities will promote participation among flexible workers, migrant workers and individuals in new forms of employment in maternity insurance, while exploring the feasibility of extending coverage to nonemployed urban and rural residents.未来一年,相关部门将推动灵活就业人员、流动务工人员及新型就业形式从业人员参与生育保险,同时研究将覆盖范围扩大至城镇非雇佣居民和农村居民的可行性。All provincial-level regions will be required to cover eligible labor pain relief procedures under insurance and further implement and refine reimbursement policies for assisted reproductive technology services.所有省级行政区都将要求将符合条件的分娩镇痛项目纳入医保范围,并进一步落实和完善辅助生殖技术服务的报销政策。To assist the 220 million people aged 65 and older — who make up 15.6 percent of China's total population as of end of 2024 — the report called for the further development of the long-term care insurance program, which currently covers about 300 million people, and encouraged commercial insurers to develop related products.为帮助2.2亿65岁及以上人口(截至2024年底占中国总人口的15.6%),报告呼吁进一步发展长期护理保险制度,该制度目前覆盖约3亿人;并鼓励商业保险公司开发相关产品。Addressing demographic challenges was also among the priorities set by the annual two-day Central Economic Work Conference that concluded on Thursday. The conference emphasized expanding rehabilitative care services, advancing the long-term care insurance program, and strengthening care and support for vulnerable groups.应对人口结构挑战也是本周四结束的为期两天年度中央经济工作会议确定的重点工作之一。会议强调要扩大康复护理服务范围,推进长期护理保险制度建设,加强对弱势群体的照护与支持。The meeting also stressed the importance of promoting positive views on marriage and childbearing and striving to stabilize the newborn population.会议还强调了倡导积极婚姻生育观念、努力稳定新生儿人口的重要性。The healthcare security report also underscored stepped-up support for innovative drugs and emerging healthcare technologies.该医疗保健安全报告还强调了对创新药物和新兴医疗技术的加强支持。Over the past five years, 949 medicines were added to the national reimbursement drug list, bringing the cumulative total to 3,253.过去五年间,共有949种药品被纳入国家医保药品目录,累计纳入药品总数达到3253种。In the latest update released earlier this month, a record 50 first-in-class novel drugs were added, accounting for nearly half of the 114 newly included products.在本月初发布的最新的医保药品目录更新中,新增了创纪录的50种首创创新药物,占新增的114种产品近半数。At the same time, the administration issued the country's first commercial insurance innovative drug list, covering 19 medicines with significant clinical value, high innovation levels and substantial patient benefits.与此同时,国家医疗保障局发布了全国首份商业保险创新药目录,涵盖19种具有显著临床价值、高创新水平和实质性患者获益的药品。The report called for active implementation of the commercial drug list and encouraged commercial health insurers to cover more reasonable medical expenses outside the basic insurance catalog. Commercial insurers will also be mobilized to increase investment in innovative drugs to support research and development.该报告呼吁积极实施商业药品目录,鼓励商业健康保险公司覆盖基本保险目录外的更多合理医疗费用。同时将动员商业保险公司加大对创新药物的投资力度,以支持研发工作。To further foster innovation, the report highlighted the need to leverage medical insurance's strategic purchasing role, guide the industry toward healthy competition and differentiated innovation, and improve multichannel payment mechanisms for innovative drugs.为进一步促进创新,报告强调需发挥医保战略采购作用,引导行业开展良性竞争和差异化创新,完善创新药多渠道支付机制。The rapid development of artificial intelligence and other smart technologies also presents opportunities to build a more digital healthcare security platform and establish an evaluation system using real-world data to comprehensively assess the value of insurance-covered medications.人工智能及其他智能技术的快速发展,也为构建更完善的数字化医疗安全平台提供了机遇,并能建立基于真实世界数据的评估体系,全面评估医保药品的价值。Authorities will support local governments in launching competitions for healthcare security application scenarios involving advanced technologies such as multimodal AI-assisted diagnosis and noninvasive brain-computer interfaces.政府将支持地方政府开展医疗健康安全应用场景竞赛,涉及多模态人工智能辅助诊断、非侵入式脑机接口等前沿技术。Official data show the national basic medical insurance coverage rate has remained stable at about 95 percent over the past five years, with total expenditures exceeding 13 trillion yuan ($1.82 trillion). Flexible workers, migrant workers and individuals in new forms of employment have increasingly been supported to enroll.官方数据显示,过去五年全国基本医疗保险覆盖率稳定在95%左右,累计支出超过13万亿元(合1.82万亿美元)。灵活就业人员、农民工和新型就业人员参保比例持续提升。During this period, China carried out eight rounds of centralized drug procurement covering treatments for diabetes, cancer, bacterial infections and other common chronic diseases, as well as four rounds of bulk purchasing for high-value medical consumables such as artificial joints, intraocular lenses and cochlear implants.在此期间,中国开展了八轮集中采购,涵盖糖尿病、癌症、细菌感染等常见慢性病的治疗药物,并进行了四轮高价医疗耗材的集中采购,包括人工关节、人工晶体和人工耳蜗等。Local authorities recovered about 120 billion yuan in misused insurance funds and prevented an additional 9.5 billion yuan in losses by using big data and smart monitoring tools. The introduction of drug traceability codes has strengthened efforts to crack down on drug resale and fraudulent reimbursement.地方政府通过运用大数据和智能监控工具,追回约1200亿元被滥用的医保资金,并防止了95亿元的损失。药品追溯码的引入,进一步加强了打击药品转售和虚假报销的力度。maternity insurance[məˈtɜːrnəti]生育保险procurement[prəˈkjʊrmənt]采购full reimbursement[ˌriːɪmˈbɜːrsmənt]全额报销migrant workers流动务工人员
13日、中国江蘇省南京市の大虐殺記念館で開かれた南京事件88年の国家追悼式【南京時事】旧日本軍による南京事件から88年を迎えた13日、中国江蘇省南京市の大虐殺記念館で国家追悼式が開かれた。 A state memorial ceremony marking the 88th anniversary of the Nanjing incident perpetrated by the former Imperial Japanese Army was held in Nanjing in the eastern China province of Jiangsu on Saturday.
Thursday marked the opening of an institution of learning that aims to upskill over 100,000 delivery workers. China's first "rider academy" was launched in Guangdong province, in a move that reflects the authorities' push to support the expanding courier workforce.周四,一个旨在提升10万余名配送员技能的教育机构正式揭牌。中国首家“骑手学院”在广东成立,体现出政府对不断壮大的快递与配送群体的支持力度。Jointly established by the Guangdong provincial education authority and e-commerce giant JD, the Modern Grassroots Workers Academy, widely referred to as the "rider academy", was inaugurated at Guangzhou Polytechnic University, marking China's first dedicated vocational education platform for full-time delivery personnel.由广东省教育部门与电商巨头京东联合共建的“现代基层劳动者学院”(广称为“骑手学院”)在广州科技职业技术大学揭牌,成为国内首个面向专职配送人员的职业教育平台。Lin Rupeng, director of the Guangdong Department of Education, said the academy reflects Guangdong's push to link education and talent chains more closely with the province's industrial and innovation needs, while building stronger safeguards for workers in emerging forms of employment and empowering them for future changes in the job market.广东省教育厅厅长林如鹏表示,学院体现了广东将教育链、人才链与产业链、创新链深度融合的努力,同时为新就业形态劳动者提供更完善保障,帮助其适应未来就业市场变化。"Through the enabling power of education, we are opening a new pathway for the career development of delivery riders, and by bringing universities and enterprises together, we are creating a more dynamic model of industry-education integration," he said.他说:“通过教育赋能,我们为外卖骑手开辟职业发展新通道;通过高校与企业协同,我们正在打造更加活跃的产教融合模式。”According to Feng Lei, a senior executive with JD, the academy will rely on university facilities, training centers and teaching staff across Guangdong, with Guangzhou Polytechnic University serving as the core base and several other colleges running satellite training points. Over the next three years, it will train more than 100,000 full-time riders and frontline couriers whom JD employs in the province.京东高管冯蕾介绍称,学院将依托广东多所高校的设施、培训中心和师资力量,以广州科技职业技术大学为核心基地,并在多所院校设置培训点。未来三年,学院将在广东培训超过10万名京东全职骑手与一线配送员工。The curriculum is designed to be practical and closely aligned with industry needs and development. Riders will access courses including food safety, mental well-being and English. To prepare for emerging delivery technologies, a training base for drone operators and related high-tech roles will be established, and qualified riders could be channeled into positions such as warehouse supervisors or drone pilots.课程设计强调实用性,与行业需求高度契合。骑手将学习食品安全、心理健康、英语等课程。为应对配送科技发展,学院还将建设无人机操作等高技术岗位的培训基地,合格学员将有机会转岗为仓储主管或无人机驾驶员。Guo Shuzhao, a JD rider, said the courses are closely aligned with their day-to-day work, covering not only operational skills but also safety regulations and service standards.京东骑手郭树钊表示,课程内容与日常工作高度相关,不仅涵盖操作技能,还包括安全规范和服务标准。"By completing the training to get certificates, our opportunities for career advancement will increase significantly," he said.他说:“完成培训并取得证书后,我们的晋升机会会明显增加。”The initiative comes as delivery riders, couriers, online shop owners, livestream sellers and ride-hailing drivers, classified in China as new forms of employment, become increasingly central to urban life. There are already 84 million workers nationwide engaged in such employment, data from the All-China Federation of Trade Unions showed.该举措出台之际,随着外卖骑手、快递员、网店经营者、直播带货者、网约车司机等新就业形态劳动者在城市生活中日益重要,全国已有8400万劳动者从事相关工作(全国总工会数据)。The size of this workforce and the volatility it faces have prompted several provinces to introduce structured training programs. Jiangsu launched a three-year action plan in October to expand skills training for people in these new forms of employment, covering smart-device use, labor rights and e-commerce entrepreneurship.由于这一庞大群体面临就业波动,多地已出台系统培训计划。例如江苏省今年10月启动三年行动方案,涵盖智能设备使用、劳动权益、电子商务创业等内容。The launch of the rider academy also comes amid rapid advances in automated delivery. Companies such as Meituan have expanded drone routes in major cities like Shenzhen in Guangdong, while completing more than 520,000 orders nationwide by early 2025, data from Meituan showed.骑手学院的成立,也正值自动化配送迅速发展之际。美团等企业已在深圳等城市扩大无人机配送航线,截至2025年初已完成52万余单(美团数据)。While drones and robots may reduce labor costs, Feng Lei from JD said that drones and related delivery equipment and technologies will not completely substitute for delivery personnel.尽管无人机和机器人有助于降低成本,但冯蕾表示,它们不会完全取代配送人员。She said emerging technologies "raise the skill requirements rather than eliminate the need for riders". Delivery personnel increasingly need to operate intelligent order systems and collaborate with drones and robots to complete deliveries, she said.她指出,新技术“提升了岗位技能要求,而非消灭岗位本身”。骑手未来需要操作智能派单系统,并与无人机、机器人协同完成配送。Feng Lipan, an e-commerce associate professor at South China University of Technology in Guangzhou, said the new academy is precisely intended to prepare riders for that transition.华南理工大学电子商务系副教授冯立攀表示,新学院正是为骑手应对这一转型而设。"It will reshape the public's stereotypical perception of the delivery rider profession, transforming it into a skilled occupation recognized for both mental agility and technical expertise," he said.他说:“这将重塑公众对配送职业的刻板印象,使其成为兼具思维敏捷与技术能力的技能型岗位。”industry-education integration产教融合emerging forms of employment新就业形态automated delivery自动化配送workforce volatility就业波动
①China's first sea-based rocket net recovery platform delivered ②Beijing to build space data center 700-800 km above Earth ③China-Laos Railway boosts regional tourism, trade connectivity ④China's "little giant" firms surge amid innovation drive ⑤Chinese team uses AI to create wide-angle 3D display not requiring glasses ⑥New all-cargo air route links China's Jiangsu with Malaysia
A powerful cold wave is gripping large parts of China this week, driving temperatures sharply lower and pushing the freezing line steadily south, according to the National Meteorological Center.据国家气象中心称,本周一股强劲寒潮正席卷中国大部分地区,气温急剧下降,冰冻线持续向南推进。The center continued to issue blue alerts — the lowest of a four-tiered color-coded warning system — for a cold wave and strong winds on Tuesday morning, forecasting that the cold air will keep moving east and south through Wednesday.气象中心周二上午继续针对寒潮和大风发布蓝色预警——这是四级颜色编码预警系统中的最低级别——并预测冷空气将持续向东和向南移动至周三。Yang Shunan, chief forecaster at the center, said the cold wave has already gripped the entire northern part of the country and continues to push south.气象中心首席预报员杨舒楠表示,这波寒潮已覆盖全国北方地区,并持续向南推进。As of Tuesday afternoon, temperatures in the Inner Mongolia autonomous region, Northeast China and North China had fallen by 6 to 10 C, with some areas recording drops of 12 to 14 C. These regions, along with the Shandong and Liaodong peninsulas, have also recorded winds of up to 39 kilometers per hour, Yang said.截至周二下午,内蒙古自治区、东北地区和华北地区气温普遍下降6至10摄氏度,部分地区降温幅度达12至14摄氏度。杨舒楠表示,这些地区以及山东半岛和辽东半岛还出现了时速达39公里的强风。On Tuesday, Beijing and Tianjin recorded their coldest morning of the second half of the year at around minus 5 C, while Changchun in Jilin province, Shenyang in Liaoning province and Shijiazhuang in Hebei province also hit new seasonal lows.周二,北京和天津录得今年下半年最低气温,约为零下5摄氏度;吉林省长春市、辽宁省沈阳市和河北省石家庄市也创下本季新低。The cold wave is set to keep pressing south over the next two days, bringing the coldest conditions of the season so far to large parts of central and eastern China. In some areas of Jiangsu, Anhui and Zhejiang provinces, temperatures are expected to plunge by more than 10 C, with wind chills exacerbating the cold conditions.未来两天,寒潮将继续向南推进,给中国中部和东部大部地区带来今冬迄今最严寒的天气。江苏、安徽和浙江部分地区气温预计将骤降10摄氏度以上,寒风将使体感温度进一步降低。"The most notable features of this cold wave are its complex weather impacts and the significant temperature plunge," Yang said.杨舒楠表示:“此轮寒潮最显著的特征在于其复杂的气象影响和显著的降温幅度。”In addition to strong winds and plummeting temperatures, sand and dust storms were reported in parts of Inner Mongolia and North China in the early stages of the cold air outbreak.在冷空气来袭初期,除强风和气温骤降外,内蒙古和华北部分地区还出现了沙尘暴。Unlike the cold wave in mid-November, which took a more westerly track and brought sharper temperature drops to southern and western regions, the current system is tracking slightly farther north, resulting in the strongest cooling being concentrated north of the Yangtze River, she said.杨舒楠指出,与11月中旬那场偏西路径、导致南方和西部地区气温骤降的冷空气不同,当前这股冷空气路径略偏北,因此强降温主要集中在长江以北地区。On Wednesday morning, the nation's coldest regions will be in parts of the northeast, northwest and North China, according to the center.气象中心称,周三上午,全国最寒冷的地区将出现在东北、西北和华北的部分地区。Minimum temperatures below minus 10 C are forecast across more than 10 provincial-level regions, including the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region as well as the provinces of Qinghai, Gansu and Hebei.预计新疆维吾尔自治区、青海省、甘肃省、河北省等十余个省级行政区最低气温将低于零下10摄氏度。Major northeastern cities such as Harbin and Changchun may see temperatures dip below minus 20 C for the first time this season. Forecasters advise commuters and students to bundle up with hats, gloves and scarves to avoid frostbite.哈尔滨、长春等东北主要城市的气温可能在本季首次跌破零下20摄氏度。气象预报员建议通勤者和学生做好保暖措施,戴好帽子、手套和围巾,以防冻伤。By Thursday, the freezing line will reach its southernmost point during this cold spell, extending into parts of Zhejiang, Anhui and Hubei. The cold wave is expected to weaken and come to an end from late Wednesday into Thursday night, Yang said.到周四,冻线将达到此轮寒潮的南端极限,延伸至浙江、安徽和湖北部分地区。杨舒楠表示,预计寒潮将于周三晚至周四夜间逐渐减弱并结束。bundle up做好保暖措施、裹紧衣物frostbite n./ˈfrɑːst.baɪt/冻伤;冻疮
China's 2026 national civil service exam for central government institutions was held on Sunday amid fierce competition, with an average of 74 applicants vying for each available position this year.2026年中国中央政府机构公务员考试于周日举行,竞争异常激烈,今年平均每个职位有74名考生角逐。A total of 3.718 million candidates passed the initial verification process and about 2.83 million people sat for the exams to compete for only 38,100 positions, making this year's recruitment process the most intense in the exam's history, according to the State Administration of Civil Service.国家公务员局数据显示,共有371.8万名考生通过初审,约283万人实际参加考试,而岗位仅3.81万个,使今年成为公务员考试史上竞争最激烈的一届。The applicant pool has increased dramatically in recent years, rising from about 2.6 million in 2023 to over 3.7 million this year.近年来申请人数激增,从2023年的约260万增至今年的370万以上。One standout example of the exam's competitiveness is a police officer position in Ruili, Yunnan province with the National Immigration Administration, which attracted 6,470 applicants for a single opening.该考试竞争激烈的一个典型例子是云南省国家移民管理局瑞丽遣返中心的一个警官职位,仅一个空缺就吸引了6470名应聘者。A significant reform to this year's exam was the relaxation of age restrictions, which is in line with China's progressive approach to delaying the legal retirement age. The general applicant age limit was raised from 35 to 38, while new graduates with master's and doctoral degrees will now be eligible up to age 43, representing a three-year extension from previous limits.今年考试的一项重大改革是放宽了年龄限制,这与中国逐步推迟法定退休年龄的政策相呼应。普通报考者的年龄上限从35岁提高到38岁,而硕士和博士学位的新毕业生现在最高可至43岁,比以往限制延长了三年。Experts said this year's national civil service exam, the first to break the "age 35 threshold", establishes a significant precedent for more inclusive public sector recruitment processes. The reforms not only expand opportunities for experienced professionals but also set important benchmarks for private sector hiring practices, promoting ability-based talent selection across Chinese society, they said.专家指出,今年全国公务员考试首次打破“35岁年龄限制”,为公共部门招聘流程建立更包容的机制树立了重要先例。他们表示,这项改革不仅为经验丰富的专业人士拓展了职业发展空间,也为私营企业招聘实践树立了重要标杆,推动全社会践行能力本位的人才选拔机制。This policy adjustment acknowledges the valuable experience and capabilities that professionals in their mid-30s have accumulated, said Zhu Lijia, a professor at the National Academy of Governance.国家行政学院教授朱立佳表示,这项政策调整充分认可了35岁左右专业人才所积累的宝贵经验和能力。Including them in the public service can significantly enhance the quality of government departments, he told China News Service.他告诉中国新闻社,将他们纳入公共服务体系,能够显著提升政府部门的质量。The age limit reform has generated substantial social impact, with many provincial-level civil service exams in regions including Shanghai and the provinces of Sichuan and Jiangsu already adopting similar relaxed age policies. Experts anticipate this trend will expand to more regions and public institution recruitment processes.年龄限制改革引发了显著的社会影响,上海、四川、江苏等地的省级公务员考试已纷纷采取类似放宽年龄的政策。专家预测,这一趋势将扩展至更多地区及公共机构的招聘流程。For many older candidates, the policy change represents a second chance at public service careers. Zhou Ming, a 35-year-old professional working in the internet industry in Guangdong province, expressed renewed hope. "This feels like an opportunity to re-enter the competition when I thought my chances had passed."对许多年长的应聘者而言,这项政策调整意味着重返公共服务岗位的第二次机会。在广东从事互联网行业的35岁专业人士周明(音译)重燃希望:“当我以为机会已经错过时,这感觉像是重新获得竞争资格的契机。”However, challenges persist for older applicants. The exam structure continues to show a strong preference for new graduates, with approximately 66.7 percent of the available positions reserved for recent graduates. This leaves limited options for experienced professionals seeking career transitions.然而,年长申请者仍面临诸多挑战。考试结构持续向应届毕业生倾斜,约66.7%的职位名额专为应届毕业生保留。这使得寻求职业转型的资深专业人士选择有限。Yi Dinghong, from Huatu Education, a training institution for civil service exams, said older candidates often face unique challenges. "They typically balance work and family responsibilities while preparing for examinations," he noted. "However, their extensive work experience and developed competencies in communication, coordination, and stress management provide distinct advantages during interview stages."华图教育公务员培训机构的易定宏指出,年长考生常面临独特挑战。“他们通常需要在备考期间兼顾工作与家庭责任,”他强调,“但丰富的职场经验以及在沟通协调、压力管理方面形成的综合能力,使他们在面试环节具备显著优势。”Ma Liang, professor of Peking University's School of Government, said that as retirement ages extend and educational periods lengthen, people enter the workforce later. Relaxing age restrictions represents an inevitable trend that aligns with evolving workforce demographics.北京大学政府管理学院教授马亮指出,随着退休年龄推迟和受教育年限延长,人们进入劳动力市场的年龄不断推迟。放宽年龄限制是顺应劳动力人口结构变化的必然趋势。Ma further suggested that future adjustments might include the complete removal of age limits, though this will be a gradual process and require corresponding reforms in career advancement systems to ensure fair development opportunities for all employees.马亮进一步建议,未来的调整可能包括完全取消年龄限制,但这将是一个渐进的过程,需要对职业晋升体系进行相应改革,以确保所有员工都能获得公平的发展机会。civil service exam国家公务员考试State Administration of Civil Service国家公务员局
①Southern Chinese metropolis fuels China-Thailand trade boom ②Hong Kong visitor arrivals up 12 pct in 10 months ③China diversifies energy mix for winter heating ④Inner Mongolia in north China controls desert area of 66 million mu in five years ⑤Prehistoric site in east China's Jiangsu dates back about 7,500 to 8,100 years
Welcome to 听故事说中文, the podcast where stories come alive to help you improve your Chinese language proficiency and cultural competency. In today's episode, we're sharing a deeply moving and personal account from a factory in Kunshan, Jiangsu in 2014, focusing on the lives of migrant women workers—who are also mothers. down her face as she writes. What she wrote was a heartbreaking, tightly-packed letter explaining one thing: "Why does mom have to go out to work?" And as always, we'd love to hear your thoughts! Share your comments, questions, or favorite parts of the episode with us. -LCTS ************************************************************ Support Our Podcast If our podcast brings value to your life and you'd like to help us continue creating great content, consider becoming a patron for as little as $7 a month. As a patron, you will enjoy: ✨ Ad-free episodes for an uninterrupted listening experience.
Welcome to 听故事说中文, the podcast where stories come alive to help you improve your Chinese language proficiency and cultural competency. In today's episode, we're sharing a deeply moving and personal account from a factory in Kunshan, Jiangsu in 2014, focusing on the lives of migrant women workers—who are also mothers. down her face as she writes. What she wrote was a heartbreaking, tightly-packed letter explaining one thing: "Why does mom have to go out to work?" And as always, we'd love to hear your thoughts! Share your comments, questions, or favorite parts of the episode with us. -LCTS ************************************************************ Support Our Podcast If our podcast brings value to your life and you'd like to help us continue creating great content, consider becoming a patron for as little as $7 a month. As a patron, you will enjoy: ✨ Ad-free episodes for an uninterrupted listening experience.
The eighth edition of the China International Import Expo is set to open in Shanghai on Wednesday, and some overseas exhibitors have already confirmed participation for next year's event, drawn by the exhibition's role as a premier platform for connecting with the Chinese market and global resources.第八届中国国际进口博览会将于周三在上海开幕,部分海外参展商已确认参加明年的展会。该展会作为连接中国市场与全球资源的顶级平台,吸引了众多参展方。International firms and government agencies said the CIIE clearly demonstrates China's dedication to progressing alongside the world and sharing growth prospects.国际企业和政府机构表示,进博会清晰展现了中国与世界共同发展、共享增长机遇的决心。Premier Li Qiang will attend the opening ceremony of this year's CIIE, which will run through Monday, and deliver a keynote speech, He Ya dong, a spokesman for theMinistry of Commerce, announced on Monday.商务部发言人何亚东周一宣布,李强总理将出席本届进博会开幕式并发表主旨演讲,展会将持续至周一。Leaders from other countries, including Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, Serbian Prime Minister Djuro Macut, Speaker of the House of Representatives of Nigeria Abbas Tajudeen, and President of the National Council of Slovenia Marko Lotric, will attend the opening ceremony of the CIIE and related events.其他国家领导人也将出席进博会开幕式及相关活动,包括格鲁吉亚总理伊拉克利・科巴希泽(Irakli Kobakhidze)、塞尔维亚总理久罗・马楚特(Djuro Macut)、尼日利亚众议院议长阿巴斯・塔朱丁(Abbas Tajudeen)以及斯洛文尼亚国民委员会主席马尔科・洛特里奇(Marko Lotric)。Herbalife, a Los Angeles, United States-based health and wellness company, is among the exhibitors that have signed up for the ninth CIIE. Having participated in every edition of the expo, the company views it as a vital window for showcasing its global innovations.美国洛杉矶健康与wellness企业康宝莱(Herbalife)已签约参加第九届进博会。该公司连续参展每一届进博会,将其视为展示全球创新成果的重要窗口。Many of the company's products have transitioned from exhibits to commodities. The Herbalife24 sports nutrition product line was first showcased at theinaugural CIIE in 2018. The products were launched in China in 2021, following positive feedback from the expo, and have since realizedlocalized production.康宝莱的多款产品已从展品转变为商品。康宝莱24运动营养系列于2018年首届进博会上首次亮相,经展会反馈良好后,于2021年进入中国市场,目前已实现本地化生产。Stella Tsai, managing director of Herbalife China, said, "We are impressed by China's robust economic development and the improving business environment, which offer stability and vast opportunities for multinational companies."康宝莱中国区总经理蔡美琳(Stella Tsai)表示:“中国强劲的经济发展和持续优化的营商环境令人印象深刻,为跨国企业提供了稳定的发展环境和广阔机遇。”She added that the company's global product innovation center, unveiled last month in Shanghai as an upgrade from its former China product innovation center, aims to swiftly transform Chinese consumers' demands into innovative products, leveraging China's unique consumer insights and innovation environment to impact the Asia-Pacific and global markets.她补充道,公司上月在上海揭牌升级了原中国产品创新中心,成立全球产品创新中心。该中心旨在依托中国独特的消费洞察和创新环境,快速将中国消费者需求转化为创新产品,进而影响亚太及全球市场。The state of Mato Grosso, one of Brazil's keyagricultural commodities and livestock producing regions, will participate in this year's CIIE for the third consecutive year with its own booth, and has confirmed its return next year with an expanded presence.马托格罗索州是巴西重要的农产品和畜牧产品产区,该州将连续第三年独立设展参加本届进博会,并已确认明年扩大规模继续参展。This year's booth of Mato Grosso will double in size to 200 square meters, and the delegation will consist of nearly 70 entrepreneurs and industry leaders led by the Mato Grosso Investment Promotion Agency and the Mato Grosso State Secretariat of Economic Development.今年马托格罗索州的展位面积将翻倍至200平方米,代表团由该州投资促进局和经济发展秘书处牵头,近70名企业家和行业领袖组成。Highlighted exhibits will include those with enormous commercial potential, such as the sesame category recently covered by a new origin export agreement with China, various beans and high-quality local beef.重点展品包括具有巨大商业潜力的产品,如近期与中国达成新原产地出口协议的芝麻品类、各类豆类以及优质本地牛肉。Cesar Miranda, secretary of the Economic Development of Mato Grosso, said: "China is currently our largest trading partner and the primary destination for Mato Grosso's agricultural exports. Participating in the CIIE is crucial for reinforcing this relationship and exploring new investment channels."马托格罗索州经济发展秘书塞萨尔・米兰达(Cesar Miranda)表示:“中国目前是我们最大的贸易伙伴,也是马托格罗索州农产品出口的主要目的地。参加进博会对于巩固这一关系、探索新的投资渠道至关重要。”German multinational company Bayer, another regular participant at the CIIE, expressed unwavering confidence in the Chinese market. He Yong, general manager of Bayer Consumer Health China, noted that the Chinese market's progress toward maturity is similar to that of developed markets.德国跨国企业拜耳(Bayer)也是进博会的常客,该公司对中国市场表达了坚定信心。拜耳消费者健康中国区总经理何勇指出,中国市场的成熟进程与发达市场相似。The general manager said the company's strategic moves, including building various mechanisms and innovation platforms as well as renewing partnerships in China, reflect its substantial confidence in the market's future.何勇表示,公司在中国搭建各类机制和创新平台、深化合作伙伴关系等战略举措,充分体现了对中国市场未来的高度信心。The new supply center project of Bayer Consumer Health in Qidong, Jiangsu province, involves a total investment of 750 million yuan ($105 million), with a gross floor area of about 53,000 sq m. Completion is expected in early 2026.拜耳消费者健康在江苏启东的新供应中心项目总投资7.5亿元人民币(约合1.05亿美元),总建筑面积约5.3万平方米,预计2026年初竣工。"The choice of Qidong for the site is due to its strategic position in the global supply chain. A significant portion of the products produced there will be supplied not just within China, but to a network of global cities that make economic sense for our business," said He.何勇表示:“选择启东作为选址,得益于其在全球供应链中的战略地位。该中心生产的大部分产品不仅将供应中国市场,还将输送至对公司业务具有经济价值的全球城市网络。”Experience from the past editions inspired him to describe the CIIE as a massive platform for multidirectional exchanges. "It serves as a venue for everything from product displays to cutting-edge technologies, covering a wide range of categories from specific product lines to almost all-encompassing areas of exhibitions and connections," he added.何勇补充道:“基于往届参展经验,他将进博会形容为一个大型多向交流平台。“这里既是产品展示的场所,也是前沿技术的交流阵地,覆盖从特定产品线到几乎全方位的展览和对接领域。”The eighth edition of the China International Import Expo第八届中国国际进口博览会Ministry of Commerce商务部inaugural/ɪˈnɑː.ɡjə.rəl/adj.就职的,就任的;首次的,初始的localized production本地化生产agricultural commodities and livestock producing regions农产品和畜牧产品产区
Last time we spoke about the fall of Wuhan. In a country frayed by war, the Yangtze became a pulsing artery, carrying both hunger and hope. Chiang Kai-shek faced a brutal choice: defend Wuhan to the last man, or flood the rivers to buy time. He chose both, setting sullen floodwaters loose along the Yellow River to slow the invaders, a temporary mercy that spared some lives while ripping many from their homes. On the river's banks, a plethora of Chinese forces struggled to unite. The NRA, fractured into rival zones, clung to lines with stubborn grit as Japanese forces poured through Anqing, Jiujiang, and beyond, turning the Yangtze into a deadly corridor. Madang's fortifications withstood bombardment and gas, yet the price was paid in troops and civilians drowned or displaced. Commanders like Xue Yue wrestled stubbornly for every foothold, every bend in the river. The Battle of Wanjialing became a symbol: a desperate, months-long pincer where Chinese divisions finally tightened their cordon and halted the enemy's flow. By autumn, the Japanese pressed onward to seize Tianjiazhen and cut supply lines, while Guangzhou fell to a ruthless blockade. The Fall of Wuhan loomed inevitable, yet the story remained one of fierce endurance against overwhelming odds. #174 The Changsha Fire Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the summer of 1938, amid the upheaval surrounding Chiang Kai-shek, one of his most important alliances came to an end. On June 22, all German advisers to the Nationalist government were summoned back; any who refused would be deemed guilty of high treason. Since World War I, a peculiar bond had tied the German Weimar Republic and China: two fledgling states, both weak and only partially sovereign. Under the Versailles Treaty of 1919, Germany had lost extraterritorial rights on Chinese soil, which paradoxically allowed Berlin to engage with China as an equal partner rather than a traditional colonizer. This made German interests more welcome in business and politics than those of other Western powers. Chiang's military reorganization depended on German officers such as von Seeckt and von Falkenhausen, and Hitler's rise in 1933 had not immediately severed the connection between the two countries. Chiang did not share Nazi ideology with Germany, but he viewed Berlin as a potential ally and pressed to persuade it to side with China rather than Japan as China's principal East Asian, anti-Communist partner. In June 1937, H. H. Kung led a delegation to Berlin, met Hitler, and argued for an alliance with China. Yet the outbreak of war and the Nationalists' retreat to Wuhan convinced Hitler's government to align with Japan, resulting in the recall of all German advisers. Chiang responded with a speech praising von Falkenhausen, insisting that "our friend's enemy is our enemy too," and lauding the German Army's loyalty and ethics as a model for the Chinese forces. He added, "After we have won the War of Resistance, I believe you'll want to come back to the Far East and advise our country again." Von Falkenhausen would later become the governor of Nazi-occupied Belgium, then be lauded after the war for secretly saving many Jewish lives. As the Germans departed, the roof of the train transporting them bore a prominent German flag with a swastika, a prudent precaution given Wuhan's vulnerability to air bombardment. The Japanese were tightening their grip on the city, even as Chinese forces, numbering around 800,000, made a stubborn stand. The Yellow River floods blocked northern access, so the Japanese chose to advance via the Yangtze, aided by roughly nine divisions and the might of the Imperial Navy. The Chinese fought bravely, but their defenses could not withstand the superior technology of the Japanese fleet. The only substantial external aid came from Soviet pilots flying aircraft bought from the USSR as part of Stalin's effort to keep China in the war; between 1938 and 1940, some 2,000 pilots offered their services. From June 24 to 27, Japanese bombers relentlessly pounded the Madang fortress along the Yangtze until it fell. A month later, on July 26, Chinese defenders abandoned Jiujiang, southeast of Wuhan, and its civilian population endured a wave of atrocities at the hands of the invaders. News of Jiujiang's fate stiffened resolve. Chiang delivered a pointed address to his troops on July 31, arguing that Wuhan's defense was essential and that losing the city would split the country into hostile halves, complicating logistics and movement. He warned that Wuhan's defense would also be a spiritual test: "the place has deep revolutionary ties," and public sympathy for China's plight was growing as Japanese atrocities became known. Yet Chiang worried about the behavior of Chinese soldiers. He condemned looting as a suicidal act that would destroy the citizens' trust in the military. Commanders, he warned, must stay at their posts; the memory of the Madang debacle underscored the consequences of cowardice. Unlike Shanghai, Wuhan had shelters, but he cautioned against retreating into them and leaving soldiers exposed. Officers who failed in loyalty could expect no support in return. This pep talk, combined with the belief that the army was making a last stand, may have slowed the Japanese advance along the Yangtze in August. Under General Xue Yue, about 100,000 Chinese troops pushed back the invaders at Huangmei. At Tianjiazhen, thousands fought until the end of September, with poison gas finally forcing Japanese victory. Yet even then, Chinese generals struggled to coordinate. In Xinyang, Li Zongren's Guangxi troops were exhausted; they expected relief from Hu Zongnan's forces, but Hu instead withdrew, allowing Japan to capture the city without a fight. The fall of Xinyang enabled Japanese control of the Ping-Han railway, signaling Wuhan's doom. Chiang again spoke to Wuhan's defenders, balancing encouragement with a grim realism about possible loss. Although Wuhan's international connections were substantial, foreign aid would be unlikely. If evacuation became necessary, the army should have a clear plan, including designated routes. He recalled the disastrous December retreat from Nanjing, where "foreigners and Chinese alike turned it into an empty city." Troops had been tired and outnumbered; Chiang defended the decision to defend Nanjing, insisting the army had sacrificed itself for the capital and Sun Yat-sen's tomb. Were the army to retreat again, he warned, it would be the greatest shame in five thousand years of Chinese history. The loss of Madang was another humiliation. By defending Wuhan, he argued, China could avenge its fallen comrades and cleanse its conscience; otherwise, it could not honor its martyrs. Mao Zedong, observing the situation from his far-off base at Yan'an, agreed strongly that Chiang should not defend Wuhan to the death. He warned in mid-October that if Wuhan could not be defended, the war's trajectory would shift, potentially strengthening the Nationalists–Communists cooperation, deepening popular mobilization, and expanding guerrilla warfare. The defense of Wuhan, Mao argued, should drain the enemy and buy time to advance the broader struggle, not become a doomed stalemate. In a protracted war, some strongholds might be abandoned temporarily to sustain the longer fight. The Japanese Army captured Wuchang and Hankou on 26 October and captured Hanyang on the 27th, which concluded the campaign in Wuhan. The battle had lasted four and a half months and ended with the Nationalist army's voluntary withdrawal. In the battle itself, the Japanese army captured Wuhan's three towns and held the heartland of China, achieving a tactical victory. Yet strategically, Japan failed to meet its objectives. Imperial Headquarters believed that "capturing Hankou and Guangzhou would allow them to dominate China." Consequently, the Imperial Conference planned the Battle of Wuhan to seize Wuhan quickly and compel the Chinese government to surrender. It also decreed that "national forces should be concentrated to achieve the war objectives within a year and end the war against China." According to Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Seiya Matsuno, Hirohito authorized the use of chemical weapons against China by specific orders known as rinsanmei. During the Battle of Wuhan, Prince Kan'in Kotohito transmitted the emperor's orders to deploy toxic gas 375 times between August and October 1938. Another memorandum uncovered by Yoshimi indicates that Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni authorized the use of poison gas against the Chinese on 16 August 1938. A League of Nations resolution adopted on 14 May condemned the Imperial Japanese Army's use of toxic gas. Japan's heavy use of chemical weapons against China was driven by manpower shortages and China's lack of poison gas stockpiles to retaliate. Poison gas was employed at Hankou in the Battle of Wuhan to break Chinese resistance after conventional assaults had failed. Rana Mitter notes that, under General Xue Yue, approximately 100,000 Chinese troops halted Japanese advances at Huangmei, and at the fortress of Tianjiazhen, thousands fought until the end of September, with Japanese victory secured only through the use of poison gas. Chinese generals also struggled with coordination at Xinyang; Li Zongren's Guangxi troops were exhausted, and Hu Zongnan's forces, believed to be coming to relieve them, instead withdrew. Japan subsequently used poison gas against Chinese Muslim forces at the Battle of Wuyuan and the Battle of West Suiyuan. However, the Chinese government did not surrender with the loss of Wuhan and Guangzhou, nor did Japan's invasion end with Wuhan and Guangzhou's capture. After Wuhan fell, the government issued a reaffirmation: "Temporary changes of advance and retreat will not shake our resolve to resist the Japanese invasion," and "the gain or loss of any city will not affect the overall situation of the war." It pledged to "fight with even greater sorrow, greater perseverance, greater steadfastness, greater diligence, and greater courage," dedicating itself to a long, comprehensive war of resistance. In the Japanese-occupied rear areas, large armed anti-Japanese forces grew, and substantial tracts of territory were recovered. As the Japanese army themselves acknowledged, "the restoration of public security in the occupied areas was actually limited to a few kilometers on both sides of the main transportation lines." Thus, the Battle of Wuhan did not merely inflict a further strategic defeat on Japan; it also marked a turning point in Japan's strategic posture, from offense to defense. Due to the Nationalist Army's resolute resistance, Japan mobilized its largest force to date for the attack, about 250,000 personnel, who were replenished four to five times over the battle, for a total of roughly 300,000. The invaders held clear advantages in land, sea, and air power and fought for four and a half months. Yet they failed to annihilate the Nationalist main force, nor did they break the will to resist or the army's combat effectiveness. Instead, the campaign dealt a severe blow to the Japanese Army's vitality. Japanese-cited casualties totaled 4,506 dead and 17,380 wounded for the 11th Army; the 2nd Army suffered 2,300 killed in action, 7,600 wounded, and 900 died of disease. Including casualties across the navy and the air force, the overall toll was about 35,500. By contrast, the Nationalist Government Military Commission's General Staff Department, drawing on unit-level reports, calculated Japanese casualties at 256,000. The discrepancy between Japanese and Nationalist tallies illustrates the inflationary tendencies of each side's reporting. Following Wuhan, a weakened Japanese force confronted an extended front. Unable to mount large-scale strategic offensives, unlike Shanghai, Xuzhou, or Wuhan itself, the Japanese to a greater extent adopted a defensive posture. This transition shifted China's War of Resistance from a strategic defensive phase into a strategic stalemate, while the invaders found themselves caught in a protracted war—a development they most disliked. Consequently, Japan's invasion strategy pivoted: away from primary frontal offensives toward a greater reliance on political inducements with secondary military action, and toward diverting forces to "security" operations behind enemy lines rather than pushing decisive frontal campaigns. Japan, an island nation with limited strategic resources, depended heavily on imports. By the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Japan's gold reserves,including reserves for issuing banknotes, amounted to only about 1.35 billion yen. In effect, Japan's currency reserves constrained the scale of the war from the outset. The country launched its aggression while seeking an early solution to the conflict. To sustain its war of aggression against China, the total value of military supplies imported from overseas in 1937 reached approximately 960 million yen. By June of the following year, for the Battle of Wuhan, even rifles used in training were recalled to outfit the expanding army. The sustained increase in troops also strained domestic labor, food, and energy supplies. By 1939, after Wuhan, Japan's military expenditure had climbed to about 6.156 billion yen, far exceeding national reserves. This stark reality exposed Japan's economic fragility and its inability to guarantee a steady supply of military materiel, increasing pressure on the leadership at the Central Command. The Chief of Staff and the Minister of War lamented the mismatch between outward strength and underlying weakness: "Outwardly strong but weak is a reflection of our country today, and this will not last long." In sum, the Wuhan campaign coincided with a decline in the organization, equipment, and combat effectiveness of the Japanese army compared with before the battle. This erosion of capability helped drive Japan to alter its political and military strategy, shifting toward a method of inflicting pressure on China and attempting to "use China to control China", that is, fighting in ways designed to sustain the broader war effort. Tragically a major element of Chiang Kai-shek's retreat strategy was the age-old "scorched earth" policy. In fact, China originated the phrase and the practice. Shanghai escaped the last-minute torching because of foreigners whose property rights were protected. But in Nanjing, the burning and destruction began with increasing zeal. What could not be moved inland, such as remaining rice stocks, oil in tanks, and other facilities, was to be blown up or devastated. Civilians were told to follow the army inland, to rebuild later behind the natural barrier of Sichuan terrain. Many urban residents complied, but the peasantry did not embrace the plan. The scorched-earth policy served as powerful propaganda for the occupying Japanese army and, even more so, for the Reds. Yet they could hardly have foreseen the propaganda that Changsha would soon supply them. In June, the Changsha Evacuation Guidance Office was established to coordinate land and water evacuation routes. By the end of October, Wuhan's three towns had fallen, and on November 10 the Japanese army captured Yueyang, turning Changsha into the next primary invasion target. Beginning on October 9, Japanese aircraft intensified from sporadic raids on Changsha to large-scale bombing. On October 27, the Changsha Municipal Government urgently evacuated all residents, exempting only able-bodied men, the elderly, the weak, women, and children. The baojia system was mobilized to go door-to-door, enforcing compliance. On November 7, Chiang Kai-shek convened a military meeting at Rongyuan Garden to review the war plan and finalize a "scorched earth war of resistance." Xu Quan, Chief of Staff of the Security Command, drafted the detailed implementation plan. On November 10, Shi Guoji, Chief of Staff of the Security Command, presided over a joint meeting of Changsha's party, government, military, police, and civilian organizations to devise a strategy. The Changsha Destruction Command was immediately established, bringing together district commanders and several arson squads. The command actively prepared arson equipment and stacked flammable materials along major traffic arteries. Chiang decided that the city of Changsha was vulnerable and either gave the impression or the direct order, honestly really depends on the source your reading, to burn the city to the ground to prevent it falling to the enemy. At 9:00 AM on November 12, Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed Zhang Zhizhong: "One hour to arrive, Chairman Zhang, Changsha, confidential. If Changsha falls, the entire city must be burned. Please make thorough preparations in advance and do not delay." And here it seems a game of broken telephone sort of resulted in one of the worst fire disasters of all time. If your asking pro Chiang sources, the message was clearly, put up a defense, once thats fallen, burn the city down before the Japanese enter. Obviously this was to account for getting civilians out safely and so forth. If you read lets call it more modern CPP aligned sources, its the opposite. Chiang intentionally ordering the city to burn down as fast as possible, but in through my research, I think it was a colossal miscommunication. Regardless Zhongzheng Wen, Minister of the Interior, echoed the message. Simultaneously, Lin Wei, Deputy Director of Chiang Kai-shek's Secretariat, instructed Zhang Zhizhong by long-distance telephone: "If Changsha falls, the entire city must be burned." Zhang summoned Feng Ti, Commander of the Provincial Capital Garrison, and Xu Quan, Director of the Provincial Security Bureau, to outline arson procedures. He designated the Garrison Command to shoulder the preparations, with the Security Bureau assisting. At 4:00 PM, Zhang appointed Xu Kun, Commander of the Second Garrison Regiment, as chief commander of the arson operation, with Wang Weining, Captain of the Social Training Corps, and Xu Quan, Chief of Staff of the Garrison Command, as deputies. At 6:00 PM, the Garrison Command held an emergency meeting ordering all government agencies and organizations in the city to be ready for evacuation at any moment. By around 10:15 PM, all urban police posts had withdrawn. Around 2:00 AM (November 13), a false report circulated that "Japanese troops have reached Xinhe" . Firefighters stationed at various locations rushed out with kerosene-fueled devices, burning everything in sight, shops and houses alike. In an instant, Changsha became a sea of flames. The blaze raged for 72 hours. The Hunan Province Anti-Japanese War Loss Statistics, compiled by the Hunan Provincial Government Statistics Office of the Kuomintang, report that the fire inflicted economic losses of more than 1 billion yuan, a sum equivalent to about 1.7 trillion yuan after the victory in the war. This figure represented roughly 43% of Changsha's total economic value at the time. Regarding casualties, contemporary sources provide varying figures. A Xinhua Daily report from November 20, 1938 noted that authorities mobilized manpower to bury more than 600 bodies, though the total number of burned remains could not be precisely counted. A Central News Agency reporter on November 19 stated that in the Xiangyuan fire, more than 2,000 residents could not escape, and most of the bodies had already been buried. There are further claims that in the Changsha Fire, more than 20,000 residents were burned to death. In terms of displacement, Changsha's population before the fire was about 300,000, and by November 12, 90% had been evacuated. After the fire, authorities registered 124,000 victims, including 815 orphans sheltered in Lito and Maosgang. Building damage constituted the other major dimension of the catastrophe, with the greatest losses occurring to residential houses, shops, schools, factories, government offices, banks, hospitals, newspaper offices, warehouses, and cultural and entertainment venues, as well as numerous historic buildings such as palaces, temples, private gardens, and the former residences of notable figures; among these, residential and commercial structures suffered the most, followed by factories and schools. Inspector Gao Yihan, who conducted a post-fire investigation, observed that the prosperous areas within Changsha's ring road, including Nanzheng Street and Bajiaoting, were almost completely destroyed, and in other major markets only a handful of shops remained, leading to an overall estimate that surviving or stalemated houses were likely less than 20%. Housing and street data from the early post-liberation period reveal that Changsha had more than 1,100 streets and alleys; of these, more than 690 were completely burned and more than 330 had fewer than five surviving houses, accounting for about 29%, with nearly 90% of the city's streets severely damaged. More than 440 streets were not completely destroyed, but among these, over 190 had only one or two houses remaining and over 130 had only three or four houses remaining; about 60 streets, roughly 6% had 30 to 40 surviving houses, around 30 streets, 3% had 11 to 20 houses, 10 streets, 1% had 21 to 30 houses, and three streets ) had more than 30 houses remaining. Housing statistics from 1952 show that 2,538 houses survived the fire, about 6.57% of the city's total housing stock, with private houses totaling 305,800 square meters and public houses 537,900 square meters. By 1956, the surviving area of both private and public housing totaled 843,700 square meters, roughly 12.3% of the city's total housing area at that time. Alongside these losses, all equipment, materials, funds, goods, books, archives, antiques, and cultural relics that had not been moved were also destroyed. At the time of the Changsha Fire, Zhou Enlai, then Deputy Minister of the Political Department of the Nationalist Government's Military Commission, was in Changsha alongside Ye Jianying, Guo Moruo, and others. On November 12, 1938, Zhou Enlai attended a meeting held by Changsha cultural groups at Changsha Normal School to commemorate Sun Yat-sen's 72nd birthday. Guo Moruo later recalled that Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying were awakened by the blaze that night; they each carried a suitcase and evacuated to Xiangtan, with Zhou reportedly displaying considerable indignation at the sudden, unprovoked fire. On the 16th, Zhou Enlai rushed back to Changsha and, together with Chen Cheng, Zhang Zhizhong, and others, inspected the disaster. He mobilized personnel from three departments, with Tian Han and Guo Moruo at the forefront, to form the Changsha Fire Aftermath Task Force, which began debris clearance, care for the injured, and the establishment of soup kitchens. A few days later, on the 22nd, the Hunan Provincial Government established the Changsha Fire Temporary Relief Committee to coordinate relief efforts. On the night of November 16, 1938, Chiang Kai-shek arrived in Changsha and, the next day, ascended Tianxin Pavilion. Sha Wei, head of the Cultural Relics Section of the Changsha Tianxin Pavilion Park Management Office, and a long-time researcher of the pavilion, explained that documentation indicates Chiang Kai-shek, upon seeing the city largely reduced to scorched earth with little left intact, grew visibly angry. After descending from Tianxin Pavilion, Chiang immediately ordered the arrest of Changsha Garrison Commander Feng Ti, Changsha Police Chief Wen Chongfu, and Commander of the Second Garrison Regiment Xu Kun, and arranged a military trial with a two-day deadline. The interrogation began at 7:00 a.m. on November 18. Liang Xiaojin records that Xu Kun and Wen Chongfu insisted their actions followed orders from the Security Command, while Feng Ti admitted negligence and violations of procedure, calling his acts unforgivable. The trial found Feng Ti to be the principal offender, with Wen Chongfu and Xu Kun as accomplices, and sentenced all three to prison terms of varying lengths. The verdict was sent to Chiang Kai-shek for approval, who was deeply dissatisfied and personally annotated the drafts: he asserted that Feng Ti, as the city's security head, was negligent and must be shot immediately; Wen Chongfu, as police chief, disobeyed orders and fled, and must be shot immediately; Xu Kun, for neglect of duty, must be shot immediately. The court then altered the arson charge in the verdict to "insulting his duty and harming the people" in line with Chiang's instructions. Chiang Kai-shek, citing "failure to supervise personnel and precautions," dismissed Zhang from his post, though he remained in office to oversee aftermath operations. Zhang Zhizhong later recalled Chiang Kai-shek's response after addressing the Changsha fire: a pointed admission that the fundamental cause lay not with a single individual but with the collective leadership's mistakes, and that the error must be acknowledged as a collective failure. All eyes now shifted to the new center of resistance, Chongqing, the temporary capital. Chiang's "Free China" no longer meant the whole country; it now encompassed Sichuan, Hunan, and Henan, but not Jiangsu or Zhejiang. The eastern provinces were effectively lost, along with China's major customs revenues, the country's most fertile regions, and its most advanced infrastructure. The center of political gravity moved far to the west, into a country the Nationalists had never controlled, where everything was unfamiliar and unpredictable, from topography and dialects to diets. On the map, it might have seemed that Chiang still ruled much of China, but vast swaths of the north and northwest were sparsely populated; most of China's population lay in the east and south, where Nationalist control was either gone or held only precariously. The combined pressures of events and returning travelers were gradually shifting American attitudes toward the Japanese incident. Europe remained largely indifferent, with Hitler absorbing most attention, but the United States began to worry about developments in the Pacific. Roosevelt initiated a January 1939 appeal to raise a million dollars for Chinese civilians in distress, and the response quickly materialized. While the Chinese did not expect direct intervention, they hoped to deter further American economic cooperation with Japan and to halt Japan's purchases of scrap iron, oil, gasoline, shipping, and, above all, weapons from the United States. Public opinion in America was sufficiently stirred to sustain a campaign against silk stockings, a symbolic gesture of boycott that achieved limited effect; Japan nonetheless continued to procure strategic materials. Within this chorus, the left remained a persistent but often discordant ally to the Nationalists. The Institute of Pacific Relations, sympathetic to communist aims, urged America to act, pressuring policymakers and sounding alarms about China. Yet the party line remained firmly pro-Chiang Kai-shek: the Japanese advance seemed too rapid and threatening to the Reds' interests. Most oil and iron debates stalled; American businessmen resented British trade ties with Japan, and Britain refused to join any mutual cutoff, arguing that the Western powers were not at war with Japan. What occurred in China was still commonly referred to in Western diplomatic circles as "the Incident." Wang Jingwei's would make his final defection, yes in a long ass history of defections. Mr Wang Jingwei had been very busy traveling to Guangzhou, then Northwest to speak with Feng Yuxiang, many telegrams went back and forth. He returned to the Nationalist government showing his face to foreign presses and so forth. While other prominent rivals of Chiang, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, and others, rallied when they perceived Japan as a real threat; all did so except Wang Jingwei. Wang, who had long believed himself the natural heir to Sun Yat-sen and who had repeatedly sought to ascend to power, seemed willing to cooperate with Japan if it served his own aims. I will just say it, Wang Jingwei was a rat. He had always been a rat, never changed. Opinions on Chiang Kai-Shek vary, but I think almost everyone can agree Wang Jingwei was one of the worst characters of this time period. Now Wang Jingwei could not distinguish between allies and enemies and was prepared to accept help from whomever offered it, believing he could outmaneuver Tokyo when necessary. Friends in Shanghai and abroad whispered that it was not too late to influence events, arguing that the broader struggle was not merely China versus Japan but a clash between principled leaders and a tyrannical, self-serving clique, Western imperialism's apologists who needed Chiang removed. For a time Wang drifted within the Kuomintang, moving between Nanjing, Wuhan, Changsha, and Chongqing, maintaining discreet lines of communication with his confidants. The Japanese faced a governance problem typical of conquerors who possess conquered territory: how to rule effectively while continuing the war. They imagined Asia under Japanese-led leadership, an East Asia united by a shared Co-Prosperity Sphere but divided by traditional borders. To sustain this vision, they sought local leaders who could cooperate. The search yielded few viable options; would-be collaborators were soon assassinated, proved incompetent, or proved corrupt. The Japanese concluded it would require more time and education. In the end, Wang Jingwei emerged as a preferred figure. Chongqing, meanwhile, seemed surprised by Wang's ascent. He had moved west to Chengde, then to Kunming, attempted, and failed to win over Yunnan's warlords, and eventually proceeded to Hanoi in Indochina, arriving in Hong Kong by year's end. He sent Chiang Kai-shek a telegram suggesting acceptance of Konoe's terms for peace, which Chungking rejected. In time, Wang would establish his own Kuomintang faction in Shanghai, combining rigorous administration with pervasive secret-police activity characteristic of occupied regimes. By 1940, he would be formally installed as "Chairman of China." But that is a story for another episode. In the north, the Japanese and the CCP were locked in an uneasy stalemate. Mao's army could make it impossible for the Japanese to hold deep countryside far from the railway lines that enabled mass troop movement into China's interior. Yet the Communists could not defeat the occupiers. In the dark days of October 1938—fifteen months after the war began—one constant remained. Observers (Chinese businessmen, British diplomats, Japanese generals) repeatedly predicted that each new disaster would signal the end of Chinese resistance and force a swift surrender, or at least a negotiated settlement in which the government would accept harsher terms from Tokyo. But even after defenders were expelled from Shanghai, Nanjing, and Wuhan, despite the terrifying might Japan had brought to bear on Chinese resistance, and despite the invader's manpower, technology, and resources, China continued to fight. Yet it fought alone. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In a land shredded by war, Wuhan burned under brutal sieges, then Changsha followed, a cruel blaze born of orders and miscommunications. Leaders wrestled with retreat, scorched-earth vows, and moral debts as Japanese force and Chinese resilience clashed for months. Mao urged strategy over martyrdom, Wang Jingwei's scheming shadow loomed, and Chongqing rose as the westward beacon. Yet China endured, a stubborn flame refusing to surrender to the coming storm. The war stretched on, unfinished and unyielding.
Amid deafening cheers from more than 62,000 fans at Nanjing Olympic Sports Center, the final whistle blew on the inaugural season of China's Su Super League, capping an amateur league that has captivated the nation's grassroots sports scene.在南京奥林匹克体育中心6.2万余名球迷震耳欲聋的欢呼声中,中国苏超联赛首个赛季终场哨声吹响。这场牵动全国草根体育界目光的业余联赛,就此落下帷幕。In a nerve-wracking penalty shootout that gripped the entire stadium, underdog Taizhou edged Nantong 4-3, handing the previously undefeated team its first and most painful loss of the season.决赛的点球大战扣人心弦,全场观众屏息关注。实力不被看好的泰州队以4:3的比分险胜南通队,给了此前保持不败的南通队本赛季首场、也是最惨痛的一场失利。"This is the pure beauty of football - raw, real and absolutely thrilling," said Wang Yong, a Taizhou supporter who traveled hours to witness the spectacle.“这就是足球最纯粹的魅力——原始、真实,且令人心潮澎湃。”为见证这场赛事专程驱车数小时赶来的泰州队球迷王永(音译)说道。Nantong launched relentless attacks in the first half, but Taizhou's defense held firm through 90 minutes of pressure, forcing the match into a shootout.上半场,南通队发起猛烈进攻,但泰州队的防守在90分钟的高压下始终坚不可摧,最终将比赛拖入点球大战。As confetti rained down, Taizhou lifted the golden trophy, a cup reminiscent of the FIFA World Cup's iconic design, symbolizing how this province of over 80 million residents has caught the fever ahead of next year's global tournament.当彩屑漫天飘落,泰州队举起了那座设计酷似国际足联世界杯冠军奖杯的金色奖杯。这一画面,也象征着这个拥有8000多万人口的省份,在明年世界杯到来之前,已然掀起了一股足球热潮。Drawing playful inspiration from both the English Premier League and the Chinese Super League, the Su Super League has emerged as a local phenomenon -- packed with derby rivalries, drama and roaring stadiums. Tickets for the final had a success rate of just 1.2 percent, while the record crowd of 62,329 set a new benchmark for amateur football events in China.苏超联赛巧妙借鉴了英格兰超级联赛与中国足球协会超级联赛的运营思路,如今已成为地方热门赛事——赛场内外既有同城德比的激烈对抗,也不乏戏剧性瞬间,座无虚席的体育场内欢呼声此起彼伏。本次决赛门票中签率仅1.2%,而62329人的观赛人数纪录,更创下了中国业余足球赛事的新标杆。Over the course of the season, total live attendance surpassed 2.43 million, averaging more than 28,000 spectators per game -- figures once thought impossible for an amateur competition.本赛季期间,联赛现场观赛总人数突破243万,场均观赛人数超2.8万——这样的数字,曾被认为是业余赛事难以企及的高度。The league's appeal lies in its roots. More than 500 players, from high school students and teachers to office workers and IT engineers, juggle day jobs with nighttime training. Their dedication has struck a chord with residents across Jiangsu, turning football into a shared passion.苏超联赛的吸引力源于其“草根本色”。联赛500余名球员涵盖多个群体,既有高中生、教师,也有上班族和IT工程师。他们白天忙于本职工作,夜晚投身训练,这份执着与热爱引发了江苏民众的强烈共鸣,让足球成为大家共同的热爱。The impact extends beyond the pitch. According to the provincial department of commerce, since the Su Super League's kickoff in May, Jiangsu's major retailers and supermarkets reported 11.64 billion yuan ($1.6 billion) in total sales during match periods, up 34.7 percent year on year, while foot traffic rose 31.2 percent.联赛的影响力早已超越球场。据江苏省商务厅数据,自今年5月苏超联赛开赛以来,赛事期间全省主要零售企业及超市销售额达116.4亿元(约合16亿美元),同比增长34.7%;客流量同比增长31.2%。Tourism also flourished. By the day of the final, host cities welcomed about 24 million visitors to key attractions on match days, a 17.7 percent increase from a year earlier. Out-of-town tourists spent 13.96 billion yuan on cultural and leisure activities via UnionPay transactions, up 26.5 percent year on year.旅游业也随之焕发活力。截至决赛当日,赛事主办城市在比赛日期间接待重点景区游客约2400万人次,同比增长17.7%;外地游客通过银联消费的文化休闲支出达139.6亿元,同比增长26.5%。Encouraged by the league's success, Jiangsu sports authorities announced plans to start next season earlier, align it with major holidays and add rules to promote youth participation, aiming to nurture grassroots talent that could one day fuel China's football ambitions.受联赛成功的鼓舞,江苏省体育部门宣布,下赛季将提前开赛,赛程安排将与重要节假日相衔接,并新增规则鼓励青少年参与,旨在培养草根足球人才,为中国足球的未来发展注入动力。inaugural/ɪˈnɔːɡjərəl/adj.开幕的;创始的;首次的underdog/ˈʌndədɒɡ/n.处于劣势的人juggle /ˈdʒʌɡl/v.尽力同时应对
The mystery of the disappearing autumn has people living in northern China baffled. Only days ago, they were happily wearing T-shirts and skirts; but now, thick coats and down jackets are out in force. Fall was just a fleeting feeling, and indications are that this weather pattern could become the norm in the future.中国北方“秋日消失”的现象让当地民众感到困惑。就在几天前,人们还身着T恤短裙,如今却已纷纷穿上厚外套与羽绒服。秋天仿佛成了转瞬即逝的感觉,且有迹象表明,这种天气模式未来可能成为常态。According to available meteorological data, the transitional period between summer and winter is shrinking in China, with autumn arriving later than usual and ending sooner.现有气象数据显示,我国夏冬两季之间的过渡时段正不断缩短,秋季不仅来得更晚,结束得也更早。Delayed autumn秋季推迟While southwestern cities such as Guiyang in Guizhou province, Chengdu in Sichuan province, and Chongqing still enjoy around 70 to 80 days of cool autumn weather — with Guiyang topping the list at 79 days — people living in the north barely experience 50 days of autumn, said Weather China, a website under the China Meteorological Administration.中国气象局旗下“中国天气网”指出,贵阳(贵州)、成都(四川)、重庆等西南城市仍能享受70至80天左右的凉爽秋季(其中贵阳以79天位居榜首),而北方民众的秋季体验时长却不足50天。An analysis of long-term weather data from the website reveals that since 1991, autumn has been delayed across much of the country. Cities such as Zhengzhou in Henan province, Ningbo in Zhejiang province, and Shenzhen in Guangdong province now see autumn arrive more than 10 days late on average, while Nanjing in Jiangsu province, Fuzhou in Fujian province, and other places have recorded delays of five to nine days.该网站对长期气象数据的分析显示,1991年以来,我国多地秋季均出现推迟现象。河南郑州、浙江宁波、广东深圳等城市的秋季平均推迟超过10天,江苏南京、福建福州等地则推迟了5至9天。Studies show that across China, the duration of winter, spring and autumn is shrinking, and these shifts are more prominent in northern and eastern regions, the website said.中国天气网表示,研究发现我国冬季、春季、秋季的时长均在缩短,且这种变化在北方和东部地区更为显著。"Maybe there will be only three seasons in the future," a netizen said on social media platform Sina Weibo. "A trench coat feels like the most impractical outfit in Beijing, "another said, indicating the sharp transition from cool to cold weather in the capital.“未来或许只剩三个季节了。”一名网友在社交平台新浪微博上留言。另一名网友则调侃道:“风衣在北京成了最不实用的衣服”,暗指北京天气从凉爽到寒冷的急剧转变。Wang Weiyue, a meteorologist at Weather China, said that given global climate change, rising temperatures across various regions have become an indisputable fact, and this delays the onset of autumn, affecting agricultural production and people's daily lives.中国天气网气象专家王伟跃表示,在全球气候变化背景下,各地气温升高已成为不争的事实,这不仅导致秋季来临时间推迟,还对农业生产和民众日常生活产生了影响。Sudden chill寒潮突至This year's northern chill has arrived abruptly.今年北方的寒潮来得格外突然。Li Duo, a senior engineer at the National Climate Center, said that since October, several regions, including parts of Heilongjiang province, the Inner Mongolia autonomous region, Hebei province, and the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region, were 1 C to 2 C colder than usual.国家气候中心高级工程师李多介绍,10月以来,黑龙江部分地区、内蒙古自治区、河北省、新疆维吾尔自治区等多地气温较常年偏低1至2摄氏度。The recent temperature drop in northern China was mainly due to two major cold-air events between Oct 9 and 10 and Oct 18 and 19, Li said.李多指出,近期我国北方降温主要受10月9日至10日、10月18日至19日两次强冷空气过程影响。The China Meteorological Administration forecasts that much of northern China will remain colder than average through Friday, while southern regions will also see temperatures drop by up to 5 C by the end of the month.中国气象局预报显示,截至周五,我国北方大部地区气温将持续低于常年同期;月底前,南方地区气温也将下降,降幅最高可达5摄氏度。Experts advised residents to dress warmly, stay alert to weather changes, and ventilate indoor spaces when using heating to avoid carbon monoxide-related risks.专家提醒,民众需注意添衣保暖,密切关注天气变化;使用取暖设备时,要注意室内通风,防范一氧化碳中毒风险。fleeting/ˈfliːtɪŋ/adj.短暂的;转瞬即逝的transitional/trænˈzɪʃənl/adj.过渡的;转变的indisputable/ˌɪndɪˈspjuːtəbl/adj.无可争辩的;不容置疑的
China is experiencing the strongest cold front so far in the second half of this year, with most parts of the nation forecast to see a sharp drop in temperatures, experts said.专家表示,我国正遭遇今年下半年以来最强冷空气,预计全国大部地区气温将显著下降。There is a high possibility that Beijing will see an early start to winter this weekend, and the temperature drop will bring the unusually persistent scorching heat in the eastern and southern provinces to an end, according to the latest forecast by the China Meteorological Administration.中国气象局最新预报显示,本周末北京大概率提前入冬,此次降温还将终结我国东部及南部省份持续多日的异常高温天气。Ma Xuekuan, chief forecaster of the National Meteorological Center, said that a strong cold front will move from the north to the south and continuously affect the nation's central and eastern parts from Thursday to Tuesday, adding that these areas will see temperature drops of 6 to 10 degrees.国家气象中心首席预报员马学款介绍,10月24日(周四)至29日(周二),一股强冷空气将自北向南影响我国中东部地区,上述地区气温预计下降6至10摄氏度。Among these provinces and areas, the Inner Mongolia autonomous region and those in the country's central part will see temperatures drop by 10 to 14 degrees, or even over 15 degrees, during the period, Ma noted.马学款指出,其中内蒙古自治区及我国中部部分地区降温幅度可达10至14摄氏度,局部地区甚至超过15摄氏度。"It's so far the strongest cold front affecting China in the year's second half based on its range and degree of influence," he said, adding that the nation's northern provinces will see the temperature keep falling next week.“从影响范围和强度来看,这是今年下半年以来影响我国最强的一股冷空气。”他补充道,下周我国北方省份气温将持续走低。He said that China's central part and provinces along the eastern part of the Yellow River and Huaihe River, including Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan and Shandong, will witness the temperature plunge by 10 degrees in five consecutive days from Saturday, with a higher possibility of the onset of winter.马学款表示,江苏、安徽、河南、山东等我国中部及黄河、淮河东部沿线省份,自28日(周六)起连续5天累计降温幅度将达10摄氏度,入冬可能性较大。Xinxin, a weather analyst from China Weather TV, said there is a very high possibility of Beijing seeing an early arrival of winter on Saturday, as reported by the People's Daily on Friday.据《人民日报》10月27日(周五)报道,中国天气电视台气象分析师信欣称,北京本周六(28日)大概率提前入冬。According to Xin, Beijing will see the average day temperature fall below 10 degrees in continuous 7 days from Saturday. Historically, from 1991 to 2020, the city has seen the start of winter on Oct 31, which will move up now because of the ongoing cold front.信欣分析,自28日起,北京连续7天日平均气温将跌破10摄氏度。1991年至2020年的气候数据显示,北京常年入冬时间为10月31日,受此次冷空气影响,今年入冬时间将有所提前。Affected by the strong cold front, provinces and regions south of the Yangtze River and the nation's southern part, such as Shanghai and Zhejiang, will also see a quick temperature change that will end the unusual heat wave there, according to Ma, the chief forecaster.马学款还提到,受强冷空气影响,上海、浙江等长江以南地区及我国南方省份气温也将快速下降,当地异常高温天气将随之结束。He added that from Sunday to Friday, the southern provinces will see temperatures 2 to 4 degrees lower than usual in previous years.他补充道,10月29日(周日)至11月3日(周五),南方省份气温将较常年同期偏低2至4摄氏度。The meeting of the cold front and warm air currents also brought torrential rains to southwestern provinces and provinces along the Yellow River and Huaihe River such as Sichuan and Chongqing on Thursday and Friday. The rains will ease from Saturday after the cold front moves southward.此外,10月24日(周四)至25日(周五),受冷空气与暖湿气流交汇影响,四川、重庆等我国西南地区及黄河、淮河沿线省份出现强降雨天气。随着冷空气南下,自28日(周六)起,上述地区降雨将趋于减弱。Noting the sharp temperature change, the China Meteorological Administration has reminded the public to be careful of weather-related risks like flu, and to be covered in adequately warm clothing.针对此次大幅降温,中国气象局提醒公众注意防范流感等天气相关健康风险,及时增添衣物,做好保暖措施。cold front/ˌkəʊld ˈfrʌnt/n.冷锋scorching/ˈskɔːtʃɪŋ/adj.酷热的;灼热的torrential/təˈrenʃl/adj.倾盆的;猛烈的
In a significant shift toward improved labor conditions, food delivery platforms Eleme and Meituan are set to abolish financial penalties for delayed deliveries, moving from a punitive model to a positive incentive-based management approach, Jiemian News reported on Tuesday.据界面新闻2月25日报道,为切实改善劳动者工作条件,外卖平台饿了么与美团正推进取消超时配送罚款措施,管理模式将从惩罚性机制转向正向激励机制,这一举措标志着外卖行业劳动保障体系建设迈出重要一步。Eleme is testing a revised service-points mechanism that replaces direct monetary penalties with point deductions to better incentivize performance and reward high-quality service. Cities participating in the trial include Nantong and Changzhou in Jiangsu province, Jieyang in Guangdong province, and Jingdezhen in Jiangxi province. There are plans to expand the initiative to more cities within October.其中,饿了么正试点优化服务积分机制,不再对超时配送直接处以罚款,而是通过积分扣除的方式规范服务,并加大对优质服务的奖励力度。目前试点范围已覆盖江苏省南通市、常州市,广东省揭阳市以及江西省景德镇市,平台计划在10月内将该机制推广至更多城市。Meituan is on a similar track. Having tested a "non-penalty mechanism" in over 30 cities, the company has publicly pledged to completely eliminate late-delivery fines by the end of 2025.美团也同步推进相关改革。此前,美团已在30余个城市试点“无罚款机制”,目前该平台已公开承诺,将于2025年底前全面取消超时配送罚款。Both companies are also upgrading safety and wellness measures, such as introducing AI voice reminders and optimizing mandatory break systems, to create a fairer and safer working environment for their food delivery drivers.此外,两大平台还在持续升级骑手安全与健康保障措施,包括上线人工智能语音提醒功能、优化强制休息制度等,切实为外卖骑手营造更公平、更安全的从业环境,进一步夯实外卖行业劳动者权益保障基础。abolishv.废除,取消/əˈbɒlɪʃ/punitiveadj.惩罚性的,惩戒性的/ˈpjuːnətɪv/incentivizev.激励,鼓励/ɪnˈsentɪvaɪz/
Last time we spoke about the Battle of Taierzhuang. Following the fall of Nanjing in December 1937, the Second Sino-Japanese War entered a brutal phase of attrition as Japan sought to consolidate control and press toward central China. Chinese defense prioritized key rail corridors and urban strongholds, with Xuzhou, the JinPu and Longhai lines, and the Huai River system forming crucial lifelines. By early 1938, Japanese offensives aimed to link with forces around Beijing and Nanjing and encircle Chinese positions in the Central Yangtze region, threatening Wuhan. In response, Chiang Kai-shek fortified Xuzhou and expanded defenses to deter a pincer move, eventually amassing roughly 300,000 troops along strategic lines. Taierzhuang became a focal point when Japanese divisions attempted to press south and link with northern elements. Chinese commanders Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, Tang Enbo, and Sun Lianzhong coordinated to complicate Japanese plans through offensive-defensive actions, counterattacks, and encirclement efforts. The victory, though numerically costly, thwarted immediate Japanese objectives and foreshadowed further attritional struggles ahead. #171 The Flooding of the Yellow River Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. We last left off with a significant event during the Xuzhou campaign. Three Japanese divisions under General Itagaki Seishiro moved south to attack Taierzhuang and were met by forces commanded by Li Zongren, Sun Lianzhong, and Tang Enbo, whose units possessed a decent amount of artillery. In a two-week engagement from March 22 to April 7, the battle devolved into a costly urban warfare. Fighting was vicious, often conducted in close quarters and at night. The urban environment negated Japanese advantages in armor and artillery, allowing Chinese forces to contend on equal terms. The Chinese also disrupted Japanese logistics by resupplying their own troops and severing rear supply lines, draining Japanese ammunition, supplies, and reinforcements. By April 7, the Japanese were compelled to retreat, marking the first Chinese victory of the war. However both sides suffered heavy losses, with around 20,000 casualties on each side. In the aftermath of this rare victory, Chiang Kai-Shek pushed Tang Enbo and Li Zongren to capitalize on their success and increased deployments in the Taierzhuang theater to about 450,000 troops. Yet the Chinese Army remained hampered by fundamental problems. The parochialism that had crippled Chiang's forces over the preceding months resurfaced. Although the generals had agreed to coordinate in a war of resistance, each still prioritized the safety of his own troops, wary of Chiang's bid to consolidate power. Li Zongren, for example, did not deploy his top Guangxi provincial troops at Taierzhuang and sought to shift most of the fighting onto Tang Enbo's forces. Chiang's colleagues were mindful of the fates of Han Fuju of Shandong and Zhang Xueliang of Manchuria: Han was executed for refusing to fight, while Zhang, after allowing Chiang to reduce the size of his northeastern army, ended up under house arrest. They were right to distrust Chiang. He believed, after all, that provincial armies should come under a unified national command, which he would lead. From a national-unity perspective, his aspiration was not unreasonable. But it fed suspicion among other military leaders that participation in the anti-Japanese war would dilute their power. The divided nature of the command also hindered logistics, making ammunition and food supplies to the front unreliable and easy to cut off. By late April the Chinese had reinforced the Xuzhou area to between 450,000-600,000 to capitalize on their victory. However these armies were plagued with command and control issues. Likewise the Japanese licked their wounds and reinforced the area to roughly 400,000, with fresh troops and supplies flowing in from Tianjin and Nanjing. The Japanese continued with their objective of encircling Chinese forces. The North China Area Army comprised four divisions and two infantry brigades drawn from the Kwantung Army, while the Central China Expeditionary Army consisted of three divisions and the 1st and 2nd Tank Battalions along with motorized support units. The 5th Tank Battalion supported the 3rd Infantry Division as it advanced north along the railway toward Xuzhou. Fighting to the west, east, and north of Xuzhou was intense, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. On 18 April, the Japanese advanced southward toward Pizhou. Tang Enbo's 20th Army Corps, together with the 2nd, 22nd, 46th, and 59th corps, resisted fiercely, culminating in a stalemate by the end of April. The 60th Corps of the Yunnan Army engaged the Japanese 10th Division at Yuwang Mountain for nearly a month, repelling multiple assaults. By the time it ceded its position to the Guizhou 140th Division and withdrew on 15 May, the corps had sustained losses exceeding half of its forces. Simultaneously, the Japanese conducted offensives along both banks of the Huai River, where Chinese defenders held out for several weeks. Nevertheless, Japanese artillery and aerial bombardment gradually tilted the balance, allowing the attackers to seize Mengcheng on 9 May and Hefei on 14 May. From there, the southern flank split into two parts: one force moved west and then north to cut off the Longhai Railway escape route from Xuzhou, while another division moved directly north along the railway toward Suxian, just outside Xuzhou. Simultaneously, to the north, Japanese units from north China massed at Jining and began moving south beyond Tengxian. Along the coast, an amphibious landing was made at Lianyungang to reinforce troops attacking from the east. The remaining portions of Taierzhuang were captured in May, a development symbolically significant to Tokyo. On 17 May, Japanese artillery further tightened the noose around Xuzhou, striking targets inside the city. To preserve its strength, the Nationalist government ordered the abandonment of Xuzhou and directed its main forces to break out toward northern Jiangsu, northern Anhui, and eastern Henan. To deter the Japanese army's rapid westward advance and penetration into northern Henan and western Shandong, many leading military and political figures within the Nationalist government proposed breaching dams over the Yellow River to delay the offensive, a strategy that would have been highly advantageous to the Nationalist forces at the time. Chiang Kai-shek vetoed the proposal outright, insisting that the Nationalist army could still resist. He understood that with tens of millions of Chinese lives at stake and a sliver of hope remaining, the levee plan must not be undertaken. Then a significant battle broke out at Lanfeng. Chiang also recognized that defeat could allow the elite Japanese mechanized divisions, the 14th, 16th, and 10th, to advance directly toward Zhengzhou. If Zhengzhou fell, the Japanese mechanized forces on the plains could advance unimpeded toward Tongguan. Their southward push would threaten Xi'an, Xiangfan, and Nanyang, directly jeopardizing the southwest's rear defenses. Concurrently, the Japanese would advance along the Huai River north of the Dabie Mountains toward Wuhan, creating a pincer with operations along the Yangtze River. Now what followed was arguably the most important and skillful Chinese maneuver of the Xuzhou campaign: a brilliantly executed strategic retreat to the south and west across the Jinpu railway line. On May 15, Li Zongren, in consultation with Chiang Kai-shek, decided to withdraw from Xuzhou and focus on an escape plan. The evacuation of civilians and military personnel began that day. Li ordered troops to melt into the countryside and move south and west at night, crossing the Jinpu Railway and splitting into four groups that would head west. The plan was to regroup in the rugged Dabie Mountains region to the south and prepare for the defense of Wuhan. Li's generals departed reluctantly, having held out for so long; Tang Enbo was said to have wept. Under cover of night, about forty divisions, over 200,000 men, marched out of Japanese reach in less than a week. A critical moment occurred on May 18, when fog and a sandstorm obscured the retreating troops as they crossed the Jinpu Railway. By May 21, Li wired Chiang Kai-shek to report that the withdrawal was complete. He mobilized nearly all of the Kuomintang Central Army's elite units, such as the 74th Army, withdrawn from Xuzhou and transferred directly to Lanfeng, with a resolute intent to “burn their boats.” The force engaged the Japanese in a decisive battle at Lanfeng, aiming to secure the last line of defense for the Yellow River, a position carrying the lives of millions of Chinese civilians. Yet Chiang Kai-shek's strategy was not universally understood by all participating generals, who regarded it as akin to striking a rock with an egg. For the battle of Lanfeng the Chinese mobilized nearly all of the Kuomintang Central Army's elite forces, comprising 14 divisions totaling over 150,000 men. Among these, the 46th Division of the 27th Army, formerly the Central Training Brigade and the 36th, 88th, and 87th Divisions of the 71st Army were German-equipped. Additionally, the 8th Army, the Tax Police Corps having been reorganized into the Ministry of Finance's Anti-Smuggling Corps, the 74th Army, and Hu Zongnan's 17th Corps, the new 1st Army, equipped with the 8th Division were elite Nationalist troops that had demonstrated strong performance in the battle of Shanghai and the battle of Nanjing, and were outfitted with advanced matériel. However, these so-called “elite” forces were heavily degraded during the campaigns in Shanghai and Nanjing. The 46th Division and Hu Zongnan's 17th Corps sustained casualties above 85% in Nanjing, while the 88th and 87th Divisions suffered losses of up to 90%. The 74th Army and the 36th Division also endured losses exceeding 75%. Their German-made equipment incurred substantial losses; although replenishment occurred, inventories resembled roughly a half-German and half-Chinese mix. With very limited heavy weapons and a severe shortage of anti-tank artillery, they could not effectively match the elite Japanese regiments. Hu Zongnan's 17th Corps maintained its national equipment via a close relationship with Chiang Kai-shek. In contrast, the 74th Army, after fighting in Shanghai, Nanjing, and Xuzhou, suffered heavy casualties, and the few German weapons it had were largely destroyed at Nanjing, leaving it to rely on a mix of domestically produced and Hanyang-made armaments. The new recruits added to each unit largely lacked combat experience, with nearly half of the intake having received basic training. The hardest hit was Li Hanhun's 64th Army, established less than a year prior and already unpopular within the Guangdong Army. Although classified as one of the three Type A divisions, the 155th, 156th, and 187th Divisions, it was equipped entirely with Hanyang-made firearms. Its direct artillery battalion possessed only about 20 older mortars and three Type 92 infantry guns, limiting its heavy firepower to roughly that of a Japanese battalion. The 195th Division and several miscellaneous units were even less prominent, reorganized from local militias and lacking Hanyang rifles. Additionally, three batches of artillery purchased from the Soviet Union arrived in Lanzhou via Xinjiang between March and June 1938. Except for the 52nd Artillery Regiment assigned to the 200th Division, the other artillery regiments had recently received their weapons and were still undergoing training. The 200th Division, had been fighting awhile for in the Xuzhou area and incurred heavy casualties, was still in training and could only deploy its remaining tank battalion and armored vehicle company. The tank battalion was equipped with T-26 light tanks and a small number of remaining British Vickers tanks, while the armored vehicle company consisted entirely of Italian Fiat CV33 armored cars. The disparity in numbers was substantial, and this tank unit did not participate in the battle. As for the Japanese, the 14th Division was an elite Type A formation. Originally organized with four regiments totaling over 30,000 men, the division's strength was later augmented. Doihara's 14th Division received supplements, a full infantry regiment and three artillery regiments, to prevent it from being surrounded and annihilated, effectively transforming the unit into a mobile reinforced division. Consequently, the division's mounted strength expanded to more than 40,000 personnel, comprising five infantry regiments and four artillery regiments. The four artillery regiments, the 24th Artillery Regiment, the 3rd Independence Mountain Artillery Regiment, the 5th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment, and the 6th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment, possessed substantial heavy firepower, including 150mm heavy howitzers and 105mm long-range field cannons, placing them far in excess of the Nationalist forces at Lanfeng. In addition, both the 14th and later the 16th Divisions commanded tank regiments with nearly 200 light and medium tanks each, while Nationalist forces were markedly short of anti-tank artillery. At the same time, the Nationalist Air Force, though it had procured more than 200 aircraft of various types from the Soviet Union, remained heavily reliant on Soviet aid-to-China aircraft, amounting to over 100 machines, and could defend only a few cities such as Wuhan, Nanchang, and Chongqing. In this context, Japanese forces effectively dominated the Battle of Lanfeng. Moreover, reports indicate that the Japanese employed poison gas on the battlefield, while elite Nationalist troops possessed only a limited number of gas masks, creating a stark disparity in chemical warfare preparedness. Despite these disparities, Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government were initially unaware of the updated strength and composition of the Doihara Division. Faced with constrained options, Chiang chose to press ahead with combat operations. On May 12, 1939, after crossing the Yellow River, the IJA 14th Division continued its southward advance toward Lanfeng. The division's objective was to sever the Longhai Railway, disrupt the main Nationalist retreat toward Zhengzhou, and seize Zhengzhou itself. By May 15, the division split into two columns at Caoxian and moved toward key nodes on the Longhai Line. Major General Toyotomi Fusatarou led two infantry regiments, one cavalry regiment, and one artillery regiment in the main assault toward Kaocheng with the aim of directly capturing Lanfeng. Doihara led three infantry regiments and three artillery regiments toward Neihuang and Minquan, threatening Guide. In response, the Nationalist forces concentrated along the railway from Lanfeng to Guide, uniting Song Xilian's 71st Army, Gui Yongqing's 27th Army, Yu Jishi's 74th Army, Li Hanhun's 64th Army, and Huang Jie's 8th Army. From May 15 to 17, the Fengjiu Brigade, advancing toward Lanfeng, met stubborn resistance near Kaocheng from roughly five divisions under Song Xilian and was forced to shift its effort toward Yejigang and Neihuang. The defense near Neihuang, including Shen Ke's 106th Division and Liang Kai's 195th Division, ultimately faltered, allowing Doihara's division to seize Neihuang, Yejigang, Mazhuangzhai, and Renheji. Nevertheless, the Nationalist forces managed to contain the Japanese advance east and west of the area, preventing a complete encirclement. Chiang Kai-shek ordered Cheng Qian, commander-in-chief of the 1st War Zone, to encircle and annihilate the Japanese 14th Division. The deployment plan mapped three routes: the Eastern Route Army, under Li Hanhun, would include the 74th Army, the 155th Division of the 64th Army, a brigade of the 88th Division, and a regiment of the 87th Division, advancing westward from Guide); the Western Route Army, commanded by Gui Yongqing, would comprise the 27th Army, the 71st Army, the 61st Division, and the 78th Division, advancing eastward from Lanfeng; and the Northern Route Army, formed by Sun Tongxuan's 3rd Army and Shang Zhen's 20th Army, was to cut off the enemy's retreat to the north bank of the Yellow River near Dingtao, Heze, Dongming, and Kaocheng, while attacking the Doihara Division from the east, west, and north to annihilate it in a single decisive operation. On May 21, the Nationalist Army mounted a full-scale offensive. Yu Jishi's 74th Army, commanded by Wang Yaowu's 51st Division, joined a brigade of Song Xilian's 71st Army, led by the 88th Division, and drove the Japanese forces at Mazhuangzhai into retreat, capturing Neihuang and Renheji. The main Japanese force, more than 6,000 strong, withdrew southwest to Yangjiji and Shuangtaji. Song Xilian, commanding Shen Fazao's 87th Division, launched a sharp assault on Yejigang (Yifeng). The Japanese abandoned the stronghold, but their main body continued advancing toward Yangjiji, with some units retreating to Donggangtou and Maoguzhai. On May 23, Song Xilian's 71st Army and Yu Jishi's 74th Army enveloped and annihilated enemy forces at Donggangtou and Maoguzhai. That evening they seized Ximaoguzhai, Yangzhuang, and Helou, eliminating more than a thousand Japanese troops. The Japanese troops at Donggangtou fled toward Lanfeng. Meanwhile, Gui Yongqing's forces were retreating through Lanfeng. His superior strength, Jiang Fusheng's 36th Division, Li Liangrong's 46th Division, Zhong Song's 61st Division, Li Wen's 78th Division, Long Muhan's 88th Division, and Shen Ke's 106th Division—had held defensive positions along the Lanfeng–Yangji line. Equipped with a tank battalion and armored vehicle company commanded by Qiu Qingquan, they blocked the enemy's westward advance and awaited Japanese exhaustion. However, under the Japanese offensive, Gui Yongqing's poor command led to the loss of Maji and Mengjiaoji, forcing the 27th Army to retreat across its entire front. Its main force fled toward Qixian and Kaifeng. The Japanese seized the opportunity to capture Quxingji, Luowangzhai, and Luowang Railway Station west of Lanfeng. Before retreating, Gui Yongqing ordered Long Muhan to dispatch a brigade to replace the 106th Division in defending Lanfeng, while he directed the 106th Division to fall back to Shiyuan. Frightened by the enemy, Long Muhan unilaterally withdrew his troops on the night of the 23rd, leaving Lanfeng undefended. On the 24th, Japanese troops advancing westward from Donggangtou entered Lanfeng unopposed and, relying on well-fortified fortifications, held their ground until reinforcements arrived. In the initial four days, the Nationalist offensive failed to overwhelm the Japanese, who escaped encirclement and annihilation. The four infantry and artillery regiments and one cavalry regiment on the Japanese side managed to hold the line along Lanfeng, Luowangzhai, Sanyizhai, Lanfengkou, Quxingji, Yang'erzhai, and Chenliukou on the south bank of the Yellow River, offering stubborn resistance. The Longhai Railway was completely cut off. Chiang Kai-shek, furious upon hearing the news while stationed in Zhengzhou, ordered the execution of Long Muhan, commander of the 88th Division, to restore military morale. He also decided to consolidate Hu Zongnan's, Li Hanhun's, Yu Jishi's, Song Xilian's, and Gui Yongqing's troops into the 1st Corps, with Xue Yue as commander-in-chief. On the morning of May 25, they launched a determined counterattack on Doihara's 14th Division. Song Xilian personally led the front lines on May 24 to rally the defeated 88th Division. Starting on May 25, after three days of intense combat, Li Hanhun's 64th Army advanced to seize Luowang Station and Luowangzhai, while Song Xilian's 71st Army retook Lanfeng City, temporarily reopening the Longhai Line to traffic. At Sanyi Village, Gui Yongqing's 27th Army and Yu Jishi's 74th Army captured a series of outlying positions, including Yang'eyao, Chailou, Cailou, Hezhai, Xuelou, and Baowangsi. Despite these gains, more than 6,000 Japanese troops offered stubborn resistance. During the fighting, Ji Hongru, commander of the 302nd Regiment, was seriously wounded but continued to fight, shouting, “Don't worry about my death! Brothers, fight on!” He ultimately died a heroic death from his wounds. By May 27, Chiang Kai-shek, concerned that the forces had not yet delivered a decisive victory at Lanfeng, personally reprimanded the participating generals and ordered them to completely encircle and annihilate the enemy west of Lanfeng by the following day. He warned that if the opportunity was missed and Japanese reinforcements arrived, the position could be endangered. The next day, Chiang Kai-shek issued another telegram, urging Cheng Qian's First War Zone and all participating units to press the offensive. The telegram allegedly had this in it “It will forever be a laughingstock in the history of warfare.” Meanwhile on the other side, to prevent the annihilation of Doihara's 14th Division, the elite Japanese 16th Division and the 3rd Mixed Brigade, totaling over 40,000 men, launched a westward assault from Dangshan, capturing Yucheng on May 26. They then began probing the outskirts of Guide. Huang Jie's Eighth Army, responsible for the defense, withdrew to the outskirts of Guide that evening. On May 28, Huang Jie again led his troops on his own initiative, retreating to Liuhe and Kaifeng, leaving only the 187th Division to defend Zhuji Station and Guide City. At dawn on May 29, Peng Linsheng, commander of the 187th Division, also withdrew his troops, leaving Guide a deserted city. The Japanese occupied Guide without a fight. The loss of Guide dramatically shifted the tide of the war. Threatened on the flanks by the Japanese 16th Division, the Nationalist forces were forced onto the defensive. On May 28, the Japanese 14th Division concentrated its forces to counterattack Gui Yongqing's troops, but they were defeated again, allowing the Japanese to stabilize their position. At the same time, the fall of Shangqiu compelled Xue Yue's corps to withdraw five divisions to block the enemy in Shangqiu, and the Nationalist Army shifted to a defensive posture with the 14th Division holding Sanyizhai and Quxingji. To the north of the battlefield, the Japanese 4th Mixed Brigade, numbering over 10,000 men, was preparing to force a crossing of the Yellow River in order to join with the nearby 14th Division. More seriously, the 10th Division, together with its 13th Mixed Brigade and totaling more than 40,000 men, had captured Woyang and Bozhou on the Henan-Anhui border and was rapidly encircling eastern Henan. By the time of the Battle of Lanfeng, Japanese forces had deployed more than 100,000 troops, effectively surrounding the Nationalist army. On May 31, the First War Zone decided to withdraw completely, and the Battle of Lanfeng ended in defeat for the Nationalists, forcing Chiang Kai-shek to authorize diverting the Yellow River embankment to relieve pressure. The consequence was a deteriorating strategic situation, as encirclement tightened and reinforcement options dwindled, driving a retreat from the Lanfeng front. The National Army suffered more than 67,000 casualties, killed and wounded more than 10,000 Japanese soldiers, Lanfeng was lost, and Zhengzhou was in danger. As in Nanjing, this Chinese army might have lived to fight another day, but the effect on Xuzhou itself was horrific. The city had endured Japanese bombardment since August 1937, and the population's mood swung between cautious hope and utter despair. In March, Du Zhongyuan visited Xuzhou. Before he left Wuhan, friends told him that “the city was desolate and the people were terrified, all the inhabitants of Xuzhou were quietly getting on with their business … sometimes it was even calmer than Wuhan.” The Australian journalist Rhodes Farmer recalled a similar image in a book published at war's end, noting the “ordinary townsfolk who became wardens, fire-fighters and first-aid workers during the raid and then went back to their civil jobs.” Yet the mid-May departure of Nationalist troops left the city and its outskirts at the mercy of an angry Imperial Army. Bombing continued through the final days of battle, and a single raid on May 14, 1938 killed 700 people. Around Xuzhou, buildings and bridges were destroyed—some by retreating Chinese forces, some by advancing Japanese troops. Taierzhuang, the scene of the earlier iconic defense, was utterly destroyed. Canadian Jesuits who remained in Xuzhou after its fall recorded that more than a third of the houses were razed, and most of the local population had fled in terror. In rural areas around the city, massacres were repeatedly reported, many witnessed by missionaries. Beyond the atrocities of the Japanese, locals faced banditry in the absence of law enforcement, and vital agricultural work such as planting seed ground to a halt. The loss of Xuzhou was both strategic and symbolic. It dealt a severe blow to Chiang's attempt to hold central China and to control regional troop movements. Morale, which Taierzhuang had briefly boosted, was battered again though not extinguished. The fall signaled that the war would be long, and that swift victory against Japan was no longer likely. Mao Zedong's Yan'an base, far to the northwest, grasped the meaning of defeat there. In May 1938 he delivered one of his most celebrated lectures, “On Protracted War,” chiding those who had over-optimistically claimed the Xuzhou campaign could be a quasi-decisive victory and arguing that, after Taierzhuang, some had become “giddy.” Mao insisted that China would ultimately prevail, yet he warned that it could not be won quickly, and that the War of Resistance would be protracted. In the meantime, the development of guerrilla warfare remained an essential piece of the long-term strategy that the Communist armies would pursue in north China. Yet the loss of Xuzhou did not necessarily portend a long war; it could, instead, presage a war that would be terrifyingly short. By spring 1938 the Chinese defenders were desperate. There was a real danger that the entire war effort could collapse, and the Nationalist governments' notable success as protectors of a shrinking “Free China” lay in avoiding total disaster. Government propaganda had successfully portrayed a plan beyond retreat to foreign observers, yet had Tokyo captured Wuhan in the spring, the Chinese Army would have had to withdraw at speed, reinforcing perceptions of disintegration. Western governments were unlikely to intervene unless convinced it was in their interests. Within the Nationalist leadership, competing instincts persisted. The government pursued welfare measures for the people in the midst of a massive refugee relief effort, the state and local organizations, aided by the International Red Cross, housed large numbers of refugees in 1937–1938. Yet there was a harsher strain within policy circles, with some officials willing to sacrifice individual lives for strategic or political ends as the Japanese threat intensified. Throughout central China, the Yellow River, China's “Sorrow”, loomed as the dominant geographic force shaping history. The loess-laden river, notorious for floods and shifting channels, was banked by massive dikes near Zhengzhou, exactly along the line the Japanese would traverse toward Wuhan. Using the river as a military instrument was discussed as a drastic option: Chiang and Cheng Qian's First War Zone contemplated diverting or breaching the dikes to halt or slow the Japanese advance, a measure that could buy time but would unleash enormous civilian suffering. The idea dated back to 1887 floods that cost hundreds of thousands of lives, and even in 1935 Alexander von Falkenhausen had warned that the Yellow River could become the final line of defense. In 1938 Chiang, recognizing the futility of defeating the Japanese by conventional means at Zhengzhou, considered unleashing the river's force if necessary to impede the invaders. The political and strategic calculus was stark: protect central China and Wuhan, even if it required drastic and morally fraught measures. A more humane leader might have hesitated to break the dikes and spare the dams, allowing the Japanese to take Wuhan. But Chiang Kai-shek believed that if the dikes were not breached and Wuhan fell within days, the Nationalist government might be unable to relocate to Chongqing in time and would likely surrender, leaving Japan in control of almost all of China. Some have compared the choice to France's surrender in June 1940, underscoring that Chiang's decision came during the country's most terrifying assault, with Chinese forces much weaker and less trained than their European counterparts. The dilemma over whether to break the Yellow River dikes grew out of desperation. Chiang ultimately ordered General Wei Rulin to blow the dike that held the Yellow River in central Henan. There was no doubt about the consequences: floods would inundate vast areas of central China, creating a waterlogged barrier that would halt the Japanese advance. Yet for the plan to succeed, it had to be carried out quickly, and the government could offer no public warning in case the Japanese detected it and accelerated their movement. Xiong Xianyu, chief of staff in the 8th Division at the time, recorded the urgency of those hours in his diary. The Japanese were already on the north bank of the Yellow River, briefly delayed when the Chinese army blew up the railway bridge across the river. The destruction of the dikes was the next step: if the area became a sea of mud, there would be no way the Japanese could even attempt to reconstruct the bridge. Blasting the dikes proved easier in theory than in practice. Holding back such a massive body of water required substantial engineering, dams thick and well fortified. The army made its first attempts to blow the dike at the small town of Zhaokou between June 4 and 6, 1938, but the structure proved too durable; another nearby attempt failed as well. Hour by hour, the Japanese moved closer. Division commander Jiang Zaizhen asked Xiong Xianyu for his opinion on where they might breach the dams. Xiong wrote “I discussed the topography, and said that two places, Madukou and Huayuankou, were both possible.” But Madukou was too close to Zhaokou, where the breach had already failed, presenting a danger that the Japanese might reach it very soon. The village of Huayuankou, however, lay farther away and on a bend in the river: “To give ourselves enough time, Huayuankou would be best.” At first, the soldiers treated the task as a military engineering assignment, an “exciting” one in Xiong's words. Xiong and Wei Rulin conducted their first site inspection after dark, late on June 6. The surroundings offered a deceptive calm: Xiong recounted “The wind blew softly, and the river water trickled pleasantly.” Yet gauging the water level proved difficult, hampered by murky moonlight and burned-out flashlights. They spent the night in their car to determine precisely where to break the dike as soon as day broke. But daylight seemed to bring home the consequences of what they planned to do, and the soldiers grew increasingly anxious. Wang Songmei, commander of the 2nd Regiment, addressed the workers about to breach the dike: “My brothers, this plan will be of benefit to our country and our nation, and will lessen the harm that is being done to the people.In the future, you'll find good wives and have plenty of children.” Wang's words were meant to reassure the men of the political necessity of their actions and that fate would not, in the traditional Chinese sense, deny them a family because of the enormity of their deeds. General Wei confirmed that Huayuankou was the right spot, and on June 8 the work began, with about 2,000 men taking part. The Nationalist government was eager to ensure rapid progress. Xiong recorded that the “highest authorities”,, kept making telephone calls from Wuhan to check on progress. In addition, the party sent performers to sing and play music to bolster the workers' spirits. Senior General Shang Zhen announced to the laborers that if they breached the dam by midnight on June 8, each would receive 2,000 yuan; if they achieved it by six the next morning, they would still be paid 1,000 yuan. They needed encouragement, for the diggers had no artificial assistance. After the initial failures at Zhaokou, Wei's troops relied entirely on manual labor, with no explosives used. Yet the workers earned their payments, and the dike was breached in just a few hours. On the morning of June 9, Xiong recorded a rapid shift in mood: the atmosphere became tense and solemn. Initially, the river flow was modest, but by about 1:00 p.m. the water surged “fiercely,” flowing “like 10,000 horses.” Looking toward the distance, Xiong felt as though a sea had appeared before him. “My heart ached,” he wrote. The force of the water widened the breach, and a deadly stream hundreds of feet wide comprising about three-quarters of the river's volume—rushed southeast across the central Chinese plains. “We did this to stop the enemy,” Xiong reflected, “so we didn't regret the huge sacrifice, as it was for a greater victory.” Yet he and the other soldiers also saw a grim reality: the troops who had taken on the task of destroying the railway bridge and the dikes could not bear the flood's consequences alone. It would be up to the government and the people of the nation to provide relief for the countless households uprooted by the flood. In fact, the previous evening Commander Jiang had telephoned to request assistance for those flooded out of their homes. Wei, Xiong, and their troops managed to escape by wooden boats. Hundreds of thousands of farmers trapped in the floods were far less fortunate. Time magazine's correspondent Theodore White reported on the devastation a few days later “Last week “The Ungovernable” [i.e. the Yellow River] lashed out with a flood which promised to change not only its own course but also the course of the whole Sino-Japanese War. Severe breaks in the dikes near Kaifeng sent a five-foot wall of water fanning out over a 500-squaremile area, spreading death. Toll from Yellow River floods is not so much from quick drowning as from gradual disease and starvation. The river's filth settles ankle-deep on the fields, mothering germs, smothering crops. Last week, about 500,000 peasants were driven from 2,000 communities to await rescue or death on whatever dry ground they could find”. Chiang's government had committed one of the grossest acts of violence against its own people, and he knew that the publicity could be a damaging blow to its reputation. He decided to divert blame by announcing that the dike had been broken, but blaming the breach on Japanese aerial bombing. The Japanese, in turn, fiercely denied having bombed the dikes. White's reporting reflected the immediate response of most foreigners; having heard about the atrocities at Nanjing and Xuzhou, he was disinclined to give the Japanese the benefit of the doubt. Furthermore, at the very time that the Yellow River was flooding central China, the Japanese were heavily bombing Guangzhou, causing thousands of casualties. To White, the Japanese counterargument—that the Chinese themselves were responsible, seemed unthinkable: “These accusations, foreign observers thought, were absurd. For the Chinese to check the Japanese advance at possible sacrifice of half a million lives would be a monstrous pyrrhic victory. Besides, dike-cutting is the blackest of Chinese crimes, and the Chinese Army would hardly risk universal censure for slight tactical gains.” But, of course, that is exactly what they had done. During the war the Nationalists never admitted that they, not the Japanese, had breached the dikes. But the truth quickly became widely known. Just a month later, on July 19, US Ambassador Johnson noted, in private communication, that the “Chinese blocked the advance on Chengchow [Zhengzhou] by breaching the Yellow River dikes.” Eventually some 54,000 square kilometers of central China were inundated by the floods. If the Japanese had committed such an act, it would have been remembered as the prime atrocity of the war, dwarfing even the Nanjing Massacre or the Chongqing air raids in terms of the number of people who suffered. Accurate statistics were impossible to obtain in the midst of wartime chaos and disaster, but in 1948 figures issued by the Nationalists themselves suggested enormous casualties: for the three affected provinces of Henan, Anhui, and Jiangsu, the number of dead was put at 844,489, with some 4.8 million becoming refugees. More recent studies place the numbers lower, but still estimate the dead at around 500,000, and 3–5 million refugees. In contrast, the devastating May 1939 air raids on Chongqing killed some thousands. Xiong reflected in his diary that the breaching of the Yellow River dikes was a sacrifice for a greater victory. Even to some Japanese it seemed that the tactic had been successful in the short term: the first secretary at the US Embassy in Wuhan reported that the flood had “completely checked the Japanese advance on Chengchow” and had prevented them taking Wuhan by rail. Instead, he predicted, the attack was likely to come by water and along the north shore of the Yangtze. Supporters of the dike breaches could argue that these acts saved central China and Chiang's headquarters in Wuhan for another five months. The Japanese were indeed prevented from advancing along the Long–Hai railway toward Wuhan. In the short term the floods did what the Nationalists wanted. But the flooding was a tactic, a breathing space, and did not solve the fundamental problem: China's armies needed strong leadership and rapid reform. Some historians suggest that Chiang's decision was pointless anyway, since it merely delayed the inevitable. Theodore White was right: no strategic advantage could make the deaths of 500,000 of China's own people a worthwhile price to pay. However, Chiang Kai-shek's decision can be partly explained, though not excused, by the context. We can now look back at the actions of the Nationalists and argue that they should not have held on to Wuhan, or that their actions in breaching the dam were unjustifiable in the extreme. But for Chiang, in the hot summer of 1938, it seemed his only hope was to deny Japan as much of China for as long as possible and create the best possible circumstances for a long war from China's interior, while keeping the world's attention on what Japan was doing. The short delay won by the flooding was itself part of the strategy. In the struggle raging within the soul of the Nationalist Party, the callous, calculating streak had won, for the time being. The breaking of the dikes marked a turning point as the Nationalists committed an act whose terrible consequences they would eventually have to expiate. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In late 1937, China's frontline trembled as Japanese forces closed in on Wuhan. Chiang Kai-shek faced a brutal choice: endure costly defenses or unleash a desperate gamble. Chiangs' radical plan emerged: breach the Yellow River dikes at Huayuankou to flood central China, buying time. The flood roared, washing villages and futures away, yet slowing the enemy. The battlefield paused, while a nation weighed courage against civilian suffering, victory against devastating costs.
During the just-concluded National Day and Mid-Autumn Festival holiday, millions of travelers across China were able to travel light—sending local specialties and souvenirs home through China's fast-growing parcel delivery network. For many, the packages may have even arrived before the travelers themselves.在刚刚结束的国庆中秋双节假期期间,中国数百万游客得以轻装出行——通过中国快速发展的包裹快递网络,将当地特产和纪念品寄回家中。对许多人而言,这些包裹甚至可能比他们先到家。According to the State Post Bureau of China, the nation's postal and courier industry handled 7.23 billion parcels during the eight-day National Day and Mid-Autumn Festival holiday, which ended on Wednesday, maintaining stable operations amid a surge in tourism and holiday consumption. The daily average parcel volume exceeded 900 million, reflecting robust consumer demand and the growing vitality of the country's holiday economy.中国国家邮政局数据显示,在周三(10月8日)结束的八天国庆中秋假期期间,全国邮政快递行业共处理包裹72.3亿件,在旅游和假日消费激增的背景下保持了运营稳定。日均包裹量超9亿件,反映出强劲的消费需求和中国假日经济日益增长的活力。Courier companies embraced new "express delivery + culture and tourism" models, setting up service outlets, smart lockers and self-service boxes at railway stations, airports, hotels and scenic areas. The move offered travelers greater convenience while turning tourism flows into new consumption momentum, the bureau said.国家邮政局表示,快递公司推出“快递+文旅”新模式,在火车站、机场、酒店和景区设立服务网点、智能快递柜和自助寄件箱。此举为游客提供了更大便利,同时将旅游人流转化为新的消费动力。In popular destinations such as Kashgar in the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region, Sanya in Hainan province, and Lhasa in the Xizang autonomous region, shipments of local specialties rose sharply during the holiday. By collaborating with merchants, courier companies helped create a "travel–purchase–ship" consumption loop. At scenic spots like Qiandao Lake in Hangzhou, Gulangyu Island in Xiamen, and Beijing Road in Guangzhou, themed courier stores and parcel lockers catered to tourists' needs for shipping souvenirs and luggage.在新疆维吾尔自治区喀什市、海南省三亚市、西藏自治区拉萨市等热门旅游目的地,假期期间当地特产的寄递量大幅增长。快递公司通过与商家合作,助力打造“旅游—购买—寄递”消费闭环。在杭州千岛湖、厦门鼓浪屿、广州北京路等景区,主题快递门店和包裹寄存柜满足了游客寄递纪念品和行李的需求。This year's "golden week" sparked strong travel and consumption momentum nationwide. By optimizing operations and diversifying services, courier firms enriched travel experiences and unlocked new consumption potential, according to the bureau.国家邮政局指出,今年“黄金周”在全国范围内激发了强劲的旅游和消费势头。快递公司通过优化运营、丰富服务类型,提升了游客的出行体验,并释放了新的消费潜力。Ahead of the holiday, shipments of popular festive goods—including mooncakes, hairy crabs, seafood, meats and fresh fruits—surged. To ensure freshness and efficiency, companies established collection points and cold-chain warehouses in provinces such as Guangdong, Guizhou, Jiangsu and Hubei, allowing goods to be dispatched directly from production sites. They also optimized trunk routes, boosted air freight capacity, and adjusted transport resources dynamically to meet the seasonal rush.假期前夕,月饼、大闸蟹、海鲜、肉类、新鲜水果等热门节庆商品的寄递量大幅上升。为保障商品新鲜度和配送效率,快递公司在广东、贵州、江苏、湖北等省份设立集货点和冷链仓库,实现商品从产地直接发运;同时优化干线运输路线、提升航空货运能力,并动态调整运输资源,以应对季节性物流高峰。On the final leg of delivery, companies adopted multi-warehouse coordination and intelligent dispatching systems to achieve "nearby delivery", speeding up services.在配送末端环节,快递公司采用多仓协同和智能调度系统,实现“就近配送”,提升了配送速度。According to the bureau, China's postal and courier sector continues to enhance service capacity while deepening integration with the cultural and tourism industries. By innovating diversified consumption scenarios, it is injecting new vitality into the holiday economy and supports stable consumption growth.国家邮政局表示,中国邮政快递行业在持续提升服务能力的同时,正深化与文旅产业的融合。通过创新多元化消费场景,快递行业为假日经济注入新活力,并助力消费稳定增长。 State Post Bureau of Chinan.中国国家邮政局 /steɪt pəʊst ˈbjʊərəʊ ɒv ˈtʃaɪnə/courier companies (in China)n.(中国的)快递公司/ˈkʊriə ˈkʌmpəniz (ɪn ˈtʃaɪnə)/
Go to http://DrinkAG1.com/adv to get a FREE Frother with your first purchase of AGZWe uncovered the sinister truth behind China's mega bridge. HAND MACHINE GHOST - LIMITED RUN! - https://thechinashow.threadless.comSupport the show here and see the Monday Exclusive show Xiaban Hou! https://www.patreon.com/advpodcastsSign up for the sticker giveaway!https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScdk5BnaNwlkH8yjt-wgUwq6xWBZIgusPRM5ifELKgPdKxLHg/viewform?usp=headerCartoon feat. Jüri Pootsmann - I Remember Uhttps://soundcloud.com/nocopyrightsoundsTrack : Cartoon feat. Jüri Pootsmann - I Remember USome Sources - https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/09/technology/nvidia-chips-china-megaspeed.htmlSalary data in Anlong https://tjgb.hongheiku.com/xjtjgb/xj2020/53025.htmlSalary data in Fenggang https://www.gzfenggang.gov.cn/zwgk/zfxxgkzl/fdzdgknr/ghjh/gmjjhshfzgh/202502/t20250220_86927630.htmlhttps://www.researchgate.net/publication/341419632_Bone_Glue_-_The_Final_Frontier_for_Fracture_Repair_and_Implantable_Device_Stabilizationhttps://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9941416/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1934590925002267https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/human-neuroscience/articles/10.3389/fnhum.2016.00033/fullhttps://www.nature.com/articles/s43587-025-00930-1https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/aging/articles/10.3389/fragi.2025.1638168/fullBRIDGE SOURCES - * 1981 Liziyida Bridge (Chengdu–Kunming Railway), Sichuan* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1981_Chengdu%E2%80%93Kunming_rail_crash* 1999 Qijiang “Rainbow” Pedestrian Bridge, Chongqing* https://www.engineeringcivil.com/civil-engineering-disasters-collapse-of-bridges.html* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qijiang_Rainbow_Bridge_collapse* 2007 Jiujiang Bridge, Foshan (Guangdong)* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collapse_of_Jiujiang_Bridge* 2007 Fenghuang (Tuojiang) Bridge, Hunan (under construction)* https://www.scmp.com/article/606792/dozens-feared-dead-after-hunan-bridge-collapse* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Fenghuang_Bridge_collapse* 2009 Hongqi Road Viaduct, Zhuzhou (Hunan)* https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-05/18/content_7790004.htm* 2010 Tangying Bridge, Luanchuan (Henan)* https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/556460.shtml* https://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?pid=S0718-915X2022000200193&script=sci_arttext* 2010 Nanjing Overpass (under construction), Jiangsu* https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-11/27/content_11617576.htm* 2011 Gongguan Bridge, Wuyishan (Fujian)* https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-07/15/content_12912763.htm* 2012 Hangzhou Viaduct dismantling accident, Zhejiang* https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/201207/716566.shtml* 2012 East Guangchang River Bridge, Jiangxi* https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/201208/721127.shtml* 2012 Yangmingtan Bridge (ramp), Harbin (Heilongjiang)* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yangmingtan_Bridge* 2013 Lianhuo Expressway Bridge (Mianchi, Henan)* https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-bridge-idUSBRE91003D20130201* https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-21300038* 2014 Gaozhou stone-arch bridge, Guangdong* https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-05/05/content_17487284.htm* 2014 Jinshan Bridge, Enshi (Hubei) (under construction)* https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/10/6/2112* 2016 Ganjiang Bridge (dismantling), Taihe (Jiangxi)* https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/201609/1009862.shtml* 2019 Wuxi S342 Overpass, Jiangsu* https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-bridge-collapse-idUSKBN1WP0JH* https://www.caixinglobal.com/2019-11-01/in-depth-overloaded-and-overturned-inside-the-deadly-wuxi-bridge-collapse-101478011.html* https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/11/deaths-reported-as-bridge-collapses-in-chinas-jiangsu-province* 2021 S2 Ezhou Expressway Ramp Bridge, Hubei* https://www.reuters.com/world/china/bridge-collapse-central-china-kills-four-2021-12-18/* 2024 Lixinsha Bridge, Guangzhou (Guangdong)* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Lixinsha_Bridge_collapse* 2024 Danning (G4015) Expressway Bridge, Zhashui (Shaanxi)* https://apnews.com/article/shaanxi-china-bridge-collapse-river-dead-b077896e4b291ef82a46ed601bfd04ca* 2024 Yakang Expressway Bridge (near Kangding), Sichuan* https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3240129/more-bodies-found-after-mountain-bridge-collapse-china* 2025 Jianzha Yellow River Bridge (under construction), Qinghai* https://abc13.com/post/china-bridge-collapse-today-kills-least-12-construction-workers-yellow-river-qinghai-province/17622521This video features copyrighted material used for commentary and educational purposes. We believe this constitutes a 'fair use' of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.
Last time we spoke about the Xi'an Incident. In December 1936, tensions in China erupted as Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek faced a revolt led by his commanders, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. Disillusioned by Chiang's focus on battling communists instead of the Japanese invaders, the generals swiftly captured him in a coup. Confined in Xi'an, Chiang initially resisted their demands for a united front against Japan but eventually engaged in negotiation with Zhang and the Chinese Communist Party. As public sentiment shifted against him, Chiang's predicament led to urgent discussions, culminating in an unexpected alliance with the communists. This pact aimed to consolidate Chinese resistance against Japanese aggression, marking a critical turning point in the Second Sino-Japanese War. By December 26, Chiang was released, and this uneasy collaboration set the stage for a more unified front against a common enemy, though underlying tensions remained between the factions. #152 China Prepares for War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Before we jump into the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, which I honestly have no idea how long will take us, I thought it would be a good idea to dedicate two episodes to how both China and Japan prepared themselves for war. Going all the way back to the 1910s, Chinese intellectuals began to view an outright conflict between Japan and China was inevitable. In the discussions about China's strategic options, Jiang Fangzhen pioneered a strategy of protracted warfare, a concept that would later shape China's approach during the Sino-Japanese War. Having studied in Japan during his youth, Jiang developed a keen understanding of the Japanese government and military. As early as 1917, he predicted that China and Japan would become embroiled in a long-term conflict, with the battleground likely to be west of the Peiping–Wuhan and Guangzhou–Wuhan railways. In his work titled "Guofang Lun" or “On National Defense”, Jiang reiterated the importance of protracted warfare as a means to thwart Japan's aspirations for a swift victory. He argued that China should leverage its vast population and extensive territory to extend the conflict, gradually wearing down Japanese strength and turning the situation to its advantage. Jiang recommended that China not focus on defending its coastal regions but instead confront the enemy west of the Peking–Wuhan Railway. Chiang Kai-shek would eventually come to share Jiang's belief that “the longer the war drags on, the more advantageous it will be for China.” Despite significant public criticism, both the Nationalist government and General Zhang Xueliang, decided against military resistance when Japan invaded Manchuria in September 1931 and attacked Shanghai in 1932. Chiang was particularly hesitant to engage Japan directly, as he was also dealing with a Communist insurgency in central China. He feared that Chinese forces would suffer quick defeat, predicting that Japan would capture key coastal areas and critical infrastructure within just three days, crippling China by dismantling its military and economic lifelines. Following the invasion of North China Chiang was forced to adopt a firmer stance. The Nationalist government proposed a dual strategy of pursuing peace and security while simultaneously preparing for war. If peace proved impossible, China would mobilize its resources for ultimate victory through prolonged conflict. This approach was formalized in the National Defense Plan, which China adopted by prioritizing protracted warfare as its core strategy. After the Sino-Japanese clash in Shanghai on January 28, 1932, the Military Affairs Commission devised a plan that divided China into four defense areas along with a preparation area. While some troops were assigned local security, commanders were directed to concentrate their remaining forces for potential confrontations with Japan. That year, the Military Affairs Commission issued General Defense Guidelines that outlined two strategic responses to a potential Japanese invasion. The first, conservative approach focused on maintaining key positions and utilizing protracted warfare to impede the enemy. The second strategy advocated for decisive battles in key regions to thwart Japan's ambitions and protect China's territorial integrity, prioritizing disengagement from Japanese forces along the Yangtze River and coastline. In August 1935, German military adviser General Alexander von Falkenhausen provided recommendations to Chiang Kai-shek based on his predictions of Japanese advance routes into China. He identified three main routes: one from northern Hebei to Zhengzhou, the second from Shandong toward Xuzhou, and the third crossing the Yangtze River to Nanjing and onwards to Wuhan. He suggested treating the Yangtze River as the primary combat zone and highlighted Sichuan as a possible retreat area. Taking all of this into consideration. in 1936, a draft of a new National Defense Plan divided the country into four zones: a war zone, a defense zone, an internal security zone, and a preparation area. The war zone encompassed ten provinces and established strategies for retreating to predetermined defensive positions when necessary, with Sichuan designated as the main base for the war. In January 1937, the Chinese General Staff Department introduced its annual War Plan, outlining three possible military conflict regions between China and Japan. It proposed two main strategies: Proposal A emphasized sustained combat and retreat to fortified positions if the situation became unfavorable, aiming to eventually go on the offensive against Japan. Proposal B focused on repelling Japanese invasions along the coast and from the north, prioritizing counter offensives against Japanese units stationed near key locations. To prepare, the NRA completed several critical projects outlined in its plans, establishing military supply depots in Nanjing, Bengbu, Xinyang, Huayin, Nanchang, and Wuchang to manage logistics for supplies across various strategic railways. These depots were equipped to sustain the military, with ample ammunition and provisions, including 60 million rounds of small-arms ammunition and food for hundreds of thousands. Despite these preparations, not all projects were completed by the time war broke out in July 1937. In contrast to the Japanese military's tactics, Chinese forces prioritized defensive strategies. For example, at the Mount Lushan Military Officer Training Camp in July 1934, Chiang Kai-shek outlined four possible approaches against Japan, favoring a defense-as-offense strategy. Other options included building fortifications, tenaciously defending key positions, and employing guerrilla warfare through irregular forces to constrain enemy advances. Chiang stressed the importance of national mobilization for the war effort. There was a significant disparity in equipment between the Japanese and Chinese armies. To give you an idea, each Japanese division included a mechanized group featuring thirty-nine light military vehicles and 21 light armored cars, supplemented by 6,000–7,000 horses, 200–300 automobiles, and specialized troops such as poison gas teams. In contrast, Nationalist divisions lacked any of these capabilities, a typical nationalist division theoretically had an armored regiment, but this unit was equipped with fewer than 72 armored vehicles. Another major weakness of the Nationalist forces was their insufficient artillery. In 1936, a division was officially assigned one artillery battalion, which was divided into three batteries totaling twelve guns. It also included a mechanized cannon company with four direct-fire weapons. By comparison, a Japanese division boasted four infantry regiments and one mountain artillery or field artillery regiment, with each artillery regiment comprising three field artillery battalions and one howitzer battalion. The infantry regiment itself included a mountain artillery section with four mountain guns, while the infantry battalion had one Type 70 mountain gun section with two guns. In total, a Japanese division possessed sixty-four artillery pieces of various calibers, four times the number of a Chinese division and of significantly higher quality. In reality, in 1936, twelve of the twenty elite Chinese “reformed divisions” still lacked artillery battalions. The ordnance available in the “reformed divisions” mostly consisted of the outdated Type 60 mountain gun. Nationwide, very few of the 200 divisions were equipped with any artillery, and those that did often used obsolete field artillery pieces or mountain artillery provided to local forces. Some units even relied on trench mortars as a makeshift solution. The artillery weapons came from various countries, but they frequently lacked necessary observation and signal components, and were often low on ammunition. The majority of mountain guns and field artillery were of the Type 75, which, while capable of providing fire support, had limited range and inflicted minimal damage. To give you an idea of the striking inadequacy of the Chinese artillery, during the Shanghai fighting in 1937, the mountain artillery of the Guangxi 21st Army Group could only reach targets within 1,200 yards, while Japanese field artillery had an effective range of 8,000 yards. Chinese-made mountain artillery suffered due to inferior steel-making technology; the gun shields were constructed from low-quality steel, and the barrels often overheated after firing just a few rounds, increasing the risk of explosions. Additionally, the equipment of local forces varied greatly in quality. In fact, some local units had superior equipment compared to Nationalist units. For example, before the Sino-Japanese War, troops from Yunnan were equipped with French antitank guns and heavy machine guns, which were better than the German water-cooled machine guns used by the Nationalist forces. However, the majority of local troops relied on inferior equipment; the 122nd Division under Wang Mingzhang from Sichuan, noted for its brave defense of Tengxian County during the Xuzhou Battle, was armed with locally produced light and heavy machine guns that frequently malfunctioned, and their Type 79 rifles, also made in Sichuan, were often outdated, with some dating back to the Qing Dynasty. These weapons had limited range and sometimes malfunctioned after fewer than one hundred rounds. Now before the war, both Nationalist and local forces acquired weaponry from diverse foreign and domestic sources. Even domestically produced weapons lacked standardization, with those made in Hanyang and Manchuria differing in design and specifications. Arms manufactured in Germany, France, Russia, Japan, and Italy were similarly inconsistent. Consequently, even within a single unit, the lack of uniformity created significant logistical challenges, undermining combat effectiveness, particularly in the early stages of the war. Despite Nationalist ordnance factories producing over three million rounds of small-arms ammunition daily, the incompatibility of ammunition and weapons diminished the usable quantity of ammunition. Chinese communications infrastructure was inadequate. In the Nationalist army, signal units were integrated into engineering units, leading to low-quality radio communications. In emergencies, telegrams could remain undelivered for days, and orders often had to be dispatched via postal services. By 1937, the entire country boasted only 3,000 military vehicles, necessitating heavy reliance on horses and mules for transport. To effectively equip twenty Nationalist divisions, 10,647 horses and 20,688 mules were needed, but by the end of 1935, only 6,206 horses and 4,351 mules were available. A statistic from 1936 indicated a 5 percent mortality rate among military horses, with some units experiencing a rate as high as 10 percent. The distribution of weaponry led to disputes during army reorganization efforts following the Northern Expedition. Although Chiang Kai-shek's forces were part of the regular army, the quality of their equipment varied significantly. Domestic production of weapons was limited, and imports could not close the gap. Priority was given to small arms; through army reorganization, Chiang aimed to diminish the influence of forces less loyal to him. Nationalist army staff officers observed that troops loyal to Chiang received the best weapons. Northwest and Northeast forces, having cultivated good relations with the KMT, were similarly better equipped, while Shanxi troops received inferior supplies. Troops associated with the Guangxi Clique were given even poorer quality weapons due to their leaders' stronger political ambitions. Troops regarded as “bandit forces,” such as those led by Shi Yousan, Li Hongchang, and Sun Dianying, were naturally assigned the least effective weaponry. This unequal distribution of arms increased some local forces' inclination to align with the KMT while alienating others, which inadvertently led to additional turmoil in the aftermath of the Northern Expedition. Logistical accounting within the Nationalist military was severely lacking. Military expenditures accounted for a significant portion of government spending, roughly 65.48 % in 1937, with personnel costs being the largest component. However, military units prioritized boosting their own resources over accurate accounting. Surpluses were not returned but rather utilized to reward military officers and soldiers for merits in battle, care for the wounded, or to create a reserve. Conversely, if deficits arose, troops would resort to “living off vacancies,” a practice in which they would fail to report desertions promptly and would falsely claim new soldiers had arrived. Military leaders typically appointed their most trusted subordinates to serve as accountants and logistic officers. As the war commenced, these issues became readily apparent. During the Battle of Shanghai in 1937, frontline soldiers sometimes went days without food and went months without pay. Wounded soldiers and civilians had to search tirelessly for medical treatment, and when main forces relocated, they often abandoned grain, ammunition, weapons, and petroleum along the way. General Chen Cheng, the commander in chief during the Battle of Shanghai, noted, “This phenomenon clearly revealed our inability to supply frontline troops, indicating that China remains a backward country with poor management.” Many logistical shortcomings severely impacted troop morale and combat effectiveness. In a 1933 speech, Chiang Kai-shek acknowledged that poor food, inadequate clothing, and ineffective logistics contributed to widespread desertion. Soldiers were further demoralized by reduced or embezzled salaries. A lack of professional medical staff and equipment hampered healthcare efforts, leading to high disease and mortality rates. According to official statistics from 1936, approximately 10 percent of soldiers fell ill annually, with a mortality rate as high as 5 percent. Japanese military authorities reported that one in three wounded Japanese soldiers died, while a Dutch military officer present during the early stages of the Sino-Japanese War observed that one in every two wounded Nationalist soldiers perished. Due to inadequate equipment and limited transport options, Nationalist forces were compelled to recruit farmers and rent vehicles, as they lacked essential facilities such as tents. This reliance on local resources inevitably led to frequent conflicts between military personnel and civilians. China is clearly a vast nation with an extensive coastline, requiring the construction of several significant fortresses during the modern era. These included Wusong, Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Jiangning, and Wuhan along the Yangtze River, as well as Zhenhai, Humen, and Changzhou along the seacoast. Except for the Wuhan fortress, built in 1929-1930, all other fortifications were established during the late Qing Dynasty and featured uncovered cannon batteries. These fortresses suffered from inadequate maintenance, and many of their components had become outdated and irreplaceable, rendering them militarily negligible. Following the January 1932 Shanghai Incident, the Japanese military destroyed the Wusong forts, leaving the entrance to the Yangtze River completely unfortified. Consequently, there were no defenses along the coastline from Jiangsu to Shandong, allowing the Japanese to land freely. In December 1932, the Military Affairs Commission established a fortress group tasked with constructing fortresses and defensive installations, seeking assistance from German military advisers. After the North China Incident in 1935, the Nationalist government accelerated the construction of defensive structures in line with national war planning, focusing particularly on Nanjing. The Nationalists prioritized building fortifications along the seacoast and the Yellow River, followed by key regions north of the Yellow River. The government also ordered a significant quantity of heavy artillery from Germany. This included several dozen pieces of flat-fire antiaircraft and dual-purpose heavy artillery, which were installed at fortifications in Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Nanjing, and Wuhan. By the summer of 1937, the construction of nine fortified positions was complete: Nanjing, Zhenjiang, Jiangyin, Ningbo, Humen, Mawei, Xiamen , Nantong, and Lianyungang. In total, China had established 41 forts and equipped them with 273 fortress cannons. Some defensive installations were poorly managed, with many units assigned to their perimeters lacking training and access to proper maps. The barbette positions in the fortresses were not well concealed and could hardly store sufficient ammunition. Troops stationed at these fortresses received little training. Despite these shortcomings, the fortresses and fortifications were not entirely ineffective. They bolstered Chinese positions along the defense line stretching from Cangxian County to Baoding and from Dexian County to Shijiazhuang, as well as in southern Shandong. Before the war, China's political and economic center was situated along the seacoast and the Yangtze River. As Japanese influence expanded, the Nationalist government was compelled to establish bases in China's inner regions, very similar to how the USSR pulled back its industry further west after Operation barbarossa.The Japanese attack on Shanghai in 1932 prompted the Nationalists to relocate their capital to Luoyang. On March 5, during the Second Plenary Session of the KMT's Fourth Congress, the Western Capital Preparation Committee was formed to plan for the potential relocation of all governmental bodies to Xi'an in the event of full-scale war. In February 1933, the Central Political Conference approved the Northwest Development Bill, and in February 1934, the National Economic Commission set up a northwestern branch to oversee development projects in the region. On October 18, 1934, Chiang Kai-shek traveled to Lanzhou, recording in his diary that “Northwest China has abundant resources. Japan and Russia are poised to bully us. Yet, if we strengthen ourselves and develop northwest China to the fullest extent, we can turn it into a base for China's revival.” Interestingly, it was Sichuan, rather than the northwest, that became China's rear base during the 2nd Sino-Japanese War. In October 1934, the Communist army evacuated its Soviet base in southern China, initiating the Long March that would ultimately end in the northwest. By this time, Chiang Kai-shek had decided to designate Sichuan as the last stronghold for China. In January 1935, the Nanchang Field Headquarters of the Military Affairs Commission, responsible for combatting the Communists and serving as the supreme military and political authority over most provinces along the Yangtze River and central China, dispatched a special advisory group to Chongqing. Following this, the Nationalist army advanced into Sichuan. On February 10, the Nationalists appointed a new provincial government in Sichuan, effectively ending the province's long-standing regionalism. On March 2, Chiang traveled to Chongqing, where he delivered a speech underscoring that “Sichuan should serve as the base for China's revival.” He stated that he was in Sichuan to oversee efforts against the Communist army and to unify the provincial administration. After the Xinhai revolution, the Republic of China was still suing the Qing Dynasty's conscription system. However, once in power, the Nationalist government sought to establish a national military service program. In 1933, it enacted a military service law, which began implementation in 1936. This law categorized military service into two branches: service in the Nationalist army and in territorial citizen army units. Men aged eighteen to forty-five were expected to serve in the territorial units if they did not enlist in the Nationalist army. The territorial service was structured into three phases: active service lasting two to three years, first reserves for six years, and second reserves until the age of forty-five. The Ministry of Military Affairs divided China into sixty divisional conscription headquarters, initially establishing these headquarters in the six provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, and Hubei. By December 1936, approximately 50,000 new soldiers had been drafted. The military service law disproportionately favored the middle and upper classes. Government personnel were exempt from enlistment, allowing privileged families to register their children with government agencies. Similarly, students in middle and higher education were excused from service, while youth from poorer backgrounds often felt compelled to enlist due to financial constraints that limited their educational opportunities. Village and town leaders were responsible for executing the recruitment process and frequently conspired with army recruiters. Recruitment principles often favored wealthier families, with guidelines stating that one son should be drafted for every three sons, two for five sons, but no drafts if there was only one son. Wealthy families could secure exemptions for all their male children, while poor families might see their only son conscripted if they were unable to provide the requisite bribe. Town and village heads wielded significant power in recruitment. This new recruitment system also created numerous money-making opportunities. Military personnel assigned to escort draftees to their units would often allow draftees to escape for a fee. Additionally, draftees could monetize their service by agreeing to serve as substitutes for others. For some, being drafted became an occupation. For example, in 1936, 600 individuals were drafted in the Wuhu area of Anhui province, and accounts from regional administrators indicated that every draftee had either been traded, replaced, or seized. Beginning in 1929, the Nationalist government also instituted military training for high school students and older individuals. Students were required to participate in one theoretical class and one practical class each week, totaling three hours. Starting in 1934, students had to complete a three-month military training program before graduating. Graduates of military academies were employed as military instructors. By the end of 1936, over 237,000 high school students had undergone military training. This student military training was overseen by the Society for the Implementation of the Three People's Principles of Sun Yat-sen, which also provided political education and sometimes gathered information on students' political beliefs. Although the Nationalists made significant efforts to improve the military training of both officers and troops, they inherited deep-seated challenges that they were unable to completely overcome. A lack of facilities, outdated training manuals, low regard for military instructors, and the ongoing influence of regionalism and warlordism hindered progress. The Japanese would also later exploit these shortcomings of the Nationalist army. The Central Military Academy, which evolved from the Whampoa Military Academy established in 1923 in Guangzhou to train officers for the Northern Expedition, became the primary training institution for junior military officers. The academy offered a basic course, lasting eighteen months, which included general education, specialized training in various subjects, and field practice. This was followed by a two-year cadet training program focused on developing the skills necessary for junior military officers. Seventeen classes were admitted before the outbreak of war. Admission to the academy was highly competitive, with military officers receiving attractive salaries. For instance, in 1935, the academy received 10,000 applications for the twelfth class, but only 7% were accepted. Upon graduation, cadets were typically assigned to divisions within the Nationalist army loyal to Chiang Kai-shek. Their training, influenced by German advisors, resulted in a high-quality cadre. In modern China, most sergeants were veterans. While some units provided training for sergeants, a lack of formal education led to their diminished status. Truly qualified sergeants were rare. During his tenure as Minister of Military Training, General Bai Chongxi proposed establishing a sergeant school and creating a professional noncommissioned officer system; however, the Ministry of Military Affairs opposed this on financial grounds. While commanding officers enjoyed rapid promotions, military instructors did not. Furthermore, there was no system for transferring instructors to field commands or assigning commanders to military academies for extended periods. Despite minor updates to cover modern warfare concepts such as tank warfare and machine guns, Qing Dynasty military manuals were still in use at the Central Military Academy at the start of the war. Yeah, 1937 they were still rocking the old Qing books. Following the establishment of the Ministry of Military Training, a bureau for military translation was set up to evaluate existing course materials and translate military manuals, but its contributions were limited. Another significant shortcoming of military instruction focused on theory at the expense of practical application. To enhance the quality of military officers, the Nationalist army instituted specialized schools for artillery, infantry, transport, engineering, and signals starting in 1931. These institutions were considered to have high-quality administrators and facilities. The Nationalists adopted German military training models, replacing the previously used Japanese models. They appointed German advisors to oversee instructor training at military academies and established three instructional divisions. By the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, 15,000 students had graduated from programs with a German military influence, resulting in the creation of about fifty combat divisions from these instructional units. However, the progress of other Nationalist army units was limited because their training was not aligned with contemporary battlefield realities. Before World War I, troops operated in close formations due to limited firepower. The widespread introduction of machine guns after World War I necessitated a shift to dispersed formations. Although a new drill manual issued by the Ministry of Military Training in 1935 introduced small-group tactics, few units adopted these methods. General Chen Cheng highlighted another underlying issue in 1938, commenting on the outmoded focus on parade ground drills and formal military manners. He noted, “We have paid too much attention to stereotypical formality and procedures of no practical use. Sometimes, even though soldiers could not get a haircut or take a bath for several months, their camps had to be in order. They underwent intensive training in close-order drill but learned little about gun handling, marksmanship, or maneuvering. This was inappropriate in peacetime, yet we continued this practice even after the Sino-Japanese War started, even using it on highly educated youth.” In contrast, the Communist army simplified training, emphasizing two essential skills: live-fire exercises and physical endurance, which significantly enhanced troop effectiveness in the challenging terrain characteristic of the Sino-Japanese War. Ultimately, the Nationalist army's training did not reach all soldiers. Only about half of all combat soldiers received adequate training, while the rest were neglected. According to statistics from the time, there were approximately five million military personnel during the Sino-Japanese War, with three million serving in logistics. Most of these logistics personnel had received little training, leading to disastrous consequences for overall combat effectiveness. As warfare has become more complex, the role of highly trained staff officers has become increasingly important. Napoleon developed operational plans close to the front and communicated orders via courier. During World War I, military commanders collected information at their headquarters and utilized telephones and automobiles to relay orders to the front lines. In World War II, with the battlefield expanding to include land, sea, and air, senior commanders often made decisions from headquarters far from the action, relying on a significant number of staff officers with specialized skills to keep them informed. In China, however, the staff officer system was underdeveloped. By 1937, only about 2,000 commanders and staff officers had received training. Prior to the Sino-Japanese War, most commanders managed staff work themselves, with staff officers serving primarily as military secretaries who drafted orders, reports, and maps. Many staff officers had no formal military training, and as a whole, the branch lacked respect, causing the most talented officers to avoid serving in it. The situation was even more dire for staff officer departments within local forces. For example, in March 1937, Liu Ziqing, a graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy, was appointed as the director of political instruction in the Forty-fourth Army, a unit under Sichuan warlord Liu Xiang. Liu Ziqing's account illustrates the dysfunction within the ranks: “The commander in chief was not supposed to manage the army and even did not know its whereabouts... But he could appoint relatives and former subordinates—who were officials and businessmen as well—to the army. Each month they would receive a small stipend. At headquarters, there was a long table and two rows of chairs. Around ten o'clock in the morning, senior officers signed in to indicate their presence. Those with other business would leave, while the remaining officers sat down to leisurely discuss star actresses, fortune-telling, business projects, mah-jongg, and opium. Occasionally they would touch on national affairs, chat about news articles, or share local gossip. In the afternoons, they primarily played mah-jongg, held banquets, and visited madams. Most mornings, the commander usually presided over these activities, and at first, I reported for duty as well. But I soon realized it was a waste of time and came very rarely. At headquarters, most staff members wore long gowns or Western-style suits, while military uniforms were a rare sight.” Most senior military personnel were trained at the Baoding Military Academy during the early republic. 2/3rds of commanders in chief, 37 %of army commanders, and 20 % of division commanders were Baoding graduates. Higher-ranking officers were more likely to have launched their careers there. In contrast, only 10 % of division commanders and a few army commanders were graduates of the Whampoa Military Academy. Additionally, commanders trained in local military schools and those with combat experience accounted for 1/3rd of all commanders. While the prevalence of civil war provided opportunities for rapid promotion, it also hindered officers' ability to update their training or gain experience in different military branches. German advisors expressed their concerns to Chiang Kai-shek, emphasizing that officers should first serve in junior roles before taking command. During one battle in 1938, Chiang noted, “Our commanders in chief are equivalent only to our enemy's regiment commanders, and our army and division commanders are only as competent as our enemy's battalion and company commanders.” Despite not viewing high-ranking Japanese officers as great strategists, Nationalist officers respected them as highly competent, diligent, and professional commanders who rarely made critical errors. The infantry was the primary component of the Nationalist army, with middle and junior infantry officers constituting over 80 %of all army officers. A 1936 registry of military officers listed 1,105 colonels and 2,159 lieutenant colonels within the infantry, demonstrating a significant outnumbering of Baoding graduates at ranks below lieutenant colonel. However, the quality of middle and junior infantry officers declined during the Sino-Japanese War; by 1944, only 27.3 % of these officers were from formal military academies, while those promoted from the ranks increased to 28.1 %. In 1937, 80 % of officers in an ordinary infantry battalion were military academy graduates, but this percentage dropped to 20 % during the war. Its hard to tell how educated soldiers were before the war, but it is generally believed that most were illiterate. In 1929, sociologist Tao Menghe surveyed 946 soldiers from a Shanxi garrison brigade and found that only 13 percent could compose a letter independently, while the rest had either never learned to read or were unable to write. In contrast, in August 1938, General Feng Yuxiang found that 80 percent of a regiment in Hunan were literate. Regardless, during the Sino-Japanese War, the quality of recruits steadily declined. More than 90 percent of soldiers were illiterate, and few possessed any basic scientific knowledge, which hindered their ability to master their weapons. On the battlefield, they heavily relied on middle and junior officers for guidance. In autumn 1933, General Hans von Seeckt, the architect of the post World War I German army, visited China at the personal invitation of Chiang Kai-shek. In his recommendations for military reform, he identified China's greatest problem as its excessively large forces drawn from diverse backgrounds. He stated, “At present, the most pressing goal is to... establish a small, well-equipped army with high morale and combat effectiveness to replace the numerous poorly armed and trained forces.” He suggested forming an army of sixty divisions and recommended the establishment of a training regiment for military officers to equip them with the skills needed for modern warfare. Chiang Kai-shek accepted von Seeckt's proposals, and on January 26, 1935, he convened a National Military Reorganization Conference in Nanjing. On March 1, the Army Reorganization Bureau was established in Wuchang, under the leadership of General Chen Cheng. In the same month, General Alexander von Falkenhausen took charge of the German Military Advisors Group. Before war broke out, around nineteen divisions, roughly 300,000 troops received training from German advisors and were equipped with German-style weapons. At the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, the forces stemming from the First Army of the National Revolutionary Army and the Whampoa cadets, who had fought in the Northern Expedition, held the highest reputation and were referred to as the “core central forces” by the Japanese. Other notable forces included the Guangxi Army, Northwestern Army, Northeastern Army, some Uyghur units, the Guangdong Army, and the Shanxi Army. In contrast, provincial forces such as the Yunnan Army and Sichuan Army were viewed less favorably. Nationalist forces were generally far inferior to those of the Japanese enemy. In 1937, General He Yingqin noted that Nationalist forces had failed to prevail in 1932 and 1933, even when outnumbering the Japanese by 4-1. In November 1937, during a national defense conference, Chiang Kai-shek stated, "In recent years we have worked hard, prepared actively, and achieved national unification. By the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, we were in a better domestic situation and had improved military preparedness compared to before. Since 1935, our strength has doubled. It increased by more than two to three times since January 1932 or September 1931 [when Japan attacked Shanghai and Mukden]. If peace had been achievable, we should have delayed the war for two or three years. Given an additional three years, our defensive capabilities would have been drastically different... Now, if we merely compare the military strength of China and Japan, we are certainly inferior." However, such assessments were overly optimistic, as Chiang failed to recognize that Japan's military capabilities would not have stagnated. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek certainly was dealt a difficult hand of cards for the upcoming poker match he was to play. Yet the Chinese were resilient and they had to be for the absolute horror that would be inflicted upon them from 1937-1945. Until this point, their enemies had been far more lenient, the Empire of Japan would show no mercy.
With tariffs of up to 145% on US imports from China, we take a look at how its playing out in the country. China's leaders are downplaying the potential impact of the trade war - we speak to Chinese exporters and economists to find out what's really happening and whether the country's economy is as resilient as senior officials are saying. The impact is already being felt in factories - so will the US or China blink first?Presenter: Will Bain Producer: Josh Martin(Image: Employees work on a production line of caps that will be exported to the US at a factory in Suqian, in eastern China's Jiangsu province on 7 April 2025. Credit: Getty Images)
Welcome to China Compass on the Fight Laugh Feast Network! I'm your China travel guide, Missionary Ben. Follow me on X (@chinaadventures) where I post detailed daily reminders to pray for China (www.PrayforChina.us). BTW, X is also the best way to get in touch with me. Either tag me with a question or comment, or follow and send a DM. Finally, PrayGiveGo.us has easy access to almost everything that I am involved in, including books, Substack, this podcast, and our dedicated pray for China website. Today we begin with some North Korea news (1:07), followed by a look at some 214 year old preaching advice from missionary William Milne (34:18). Next, we look at how to pray for China this week (39:20) and hear a number of stories, especially the one about the Chrisitan hotel near North Korea in Lucky Forest. This Week’s (North Korea) News Why China is wary of North Korea’s embrace of Russia https://www.ft.com/content/d4094f65-de08-4fcf-ab11-424ef152e89e Families of Captured North Koreans to be Executed https://www.yahoo.com/news/families-captured-north-korean-troops-090313885.html North Korea Reopens After Five Years https://www.channelnewsasia.com/east-asia/north-korea-reopens-foreign-tourists-special-economic-zone-pyongyang-closed-4966381 Western Tourists Shocked by North Korea https://www.yahoo.com/news/western-tourists-given-rare-glimpse-112527445.html North Korea Tours Quickly Suspended https://www.rfa.org/english/korea/2025/03/06/north-korea-foreign-tour-suspension/ South Korean Travel to China Surges https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2025/03/113_392898.html On This Day… 200 Year Old Preaching Advice from William Milne https://chinacall.substack.com/p/200-year-old-preaching-advice The Memoirs of William Milne (200th Anniversary Edition!) https://a.co/d/bALLtAf Pray for China (March 9-15, 2025) Systematically and Strategically Interceding for All of China https://chinacall.substack.com/p/pray-for-china-march-9-15-2025 Mar 9 - Pray for Jiaozuo (“Gee’ao-dzwah”) in heavily populated Henan Province, one of the few Chinese prefectures that I've never previously heard of. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jiaozuo Henan is paired up with Kentucky and West Virginia for prayer: www.PrayforChina.us Here's my Henan podcast (and more): https://prayforchina.us/index.php/henan/ Mar 10 - Pray for Jianli in Hubei Province's Jingzhou Prefecture, one of China's many million+ cities almost no one has heard of: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jianli Hubei (“Who-bay”) is matched with Illinois for prayer: www.PrayforChina.us For more about Hubei (incl. my podcast): https://prayforchina.us/index.php/hubei/ Mar 11 - Pray for Zhangjiajie City in the breathtaking mountains of NW Hunan: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhangjiajie. Hunan literally translates to “south of the lake” and is paired with both Indiana and Ohio for prayer: www.PrayforChina.us For more about Hunan (incl. my podcast): https://prayforchina.us/index.php/hunan/ Mar 12 - Pray for Kunshan City in Suzhou Prefecture in eastern China's Jiangsu Province: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kunshan. Jiangsu Province is paired with Tennessee for prayer: www.PrayforChina.us For more about Jiangsu (incl. my podcast): https://prayforchina.us/index.php/Jiangsu/ Mar 13 - Pray for Fengcheng (“Fungchung”) City in Yichun Prefecture in SE China’s Jiangxi Province: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fengcheng,_Jiangxi Jiangxi is paired with Georgia for prayer: www.PrayforChina.us For more about Jiangxi (incl. my podcast): https://prayforchina.us/index.php/Jiangxi/ Mar 14 - Pray for Meihekou City in Jilin Province’s Tonghua Prefecture, home of the Christian hotel I visited back in 2003: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meihekou Jilin (“Lucky Forest”) is paired with all of New England for prayer: www.PrayforChina.us For more about Jilin (incl. my podcast): https://prayforchina.us/index.php/jilin/ Mar 15 - Pray for Panjin Prefecture in NE China's Liaoning Province, a place I visited one day back in 2003: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panjin. Liaoning is paired for prayer with New York, PA, NJ & Delaware: https://prayforchina.us/states/new-york.html For more about Liaoning (& my podcast): https://prayforchina.us/index.php/Liaoning/ If you enjoy this podcast, follow or subscribe and leave a review on whichever platform you use. And don’t forget to check out everything we are involved in at PrayGiveGo.us. Luke 10, Verse 2!