Podcasts about Li

We're done with performative “women supporting women” while the DMs and side-eyes tell a different story. This conversation gets real about ditching scarcity, gossip, and grown-ass mean girl behavior and replacing it with unapologetic ampleship—front-row friends who say your name in rooms you're not in, transfer social capital, and clap loud enough for the world to hear. Our guest, Erin Gallagher—the unapologetic powerhouse behind the Hype Women movement—is on a mission to end Mean Girl culture and build a global sisterhood of women who celebrate, amplify, and rise together. She's the CEO & Founder of Hype Women, author of Hype Women: Breaking Free from Mean Girls, Patriarchy and Systems Silencing You, and host of the Hype Women podcast. Erin's work is part social justice, part straight talk, and 100% revolution. She's here to remind us that supporting other women isn't a brand strategy—it's a power move. We dig into: The difference between “support” and performative support (and how to spot the fake hype) How to do an honest audit of your circle—and yourself—to see where Mean Girl energy might still be lurking. Why women are conditioned to compete and how to rewrite that programming How to use your human, social, political, and financial capital to amplify other women (and yourself) What to do when you're faced with a grown-ass Mean Girl at work or online Why real confidence starts with self-trust, boundaries, and giving up the illusion of “doing it all alone” The internal work that makes external hype possible—because we can't celebrate others if we're still betraying ourselves This one's part pep talk, part wake-up call, and full-on invitation to step into your front-row era. Connect with Erin: Website: https://www.hypewomen.com/  Book: https://www.hypewomen.com/  IG: instagram.com/erin.gallag.her  FB: facebook.com/eringogallagher  LI: linkedin.com/in/erinfgallagher  Related Podcast Episodes: 137 / Ampliship (Mean Girls Part 2) with Caroline Adams Miller 136 / Mean Girls with Caroline Adams Miller Be A Likeable Badass with Alison Fragale | 230 Share the Love: If you found this episode insightful, please share it with a friend, tag us on social media, and leave a review on your favorite podcast platform!

Dr. Andrew Krieger, DSW, MBA, LCSW-S, LCDC, is a private practice psychotherapist with extensive experience in direct practice social work, clinical program design and development, addiction treatment, and group psychotherapy. He received his Doctor of Social Work from the University of Southern California and holds both a Master of Clinical Social Work and a Master of Business Administration from the University of Houston. Over the past 20 years, Dr. Krieger has worked with individuals and families as a private practice and group psychotherapist, specializing in addictive disorders, family therapy, group psychotherapy, and process addictions. He's also held clinical positions at some of the leading addiction treatment programs in Texas.  As Chief Executive Officer of Contemporary Medicine Associates (CMA) — the primary practice of Dr. Bo Allaire and Dr. Andrew Krieger — he leads a team specializing in the diagnosis and treatment of substance use disorders. CMA also provides third-party medical services for psychiatric and addiction treatment facilities, as well as clinical and business consulting services for mental health providers.  Originally founded over 20 years ago by Dr. Eugene Degner, one of the first board-certified addiction medicine doctors in Texas and a pioneer in the medical treatment of alcohol and drug addiction, CMA continues to honor Dr. Degner's legacy through compassionate, expert care.  Today, their doctors, nurses, and mental health professionals serve patients and families at every stage of addiction and recovery — providing a caring, non-judgmental environment where healing can truly begin. They also offer comprehensive support for individuals with mental health conditions such as depression, trauma, and anxiety. In this conversation, Dr. Jason Powers and Dr. Andrew Krieger discuss the different phases of recovery, the science behind post-acute withdrawal syndrome, and the meaning of emotional sobriety. Together, they explore how long-term recovery is less about counting the years and more about integrity, emotional growth, and learning to live a life that's genuinely fulfilling. Topics Discussed: Defining Post-Acute Withdrawal Syndrome (PAWS) The difference between co-occurring disorders & substance use disorder Breaking down emotional sobriety into 3 main categories Understanding the phases of recovery and personal growth How perspective and integrity define Long-Term Sobriety, not just time Finding fulfillment beyond survival in recovery — CHAPTERS:  00:00 Introduction to Positive Recovery MD 01:09 Meet Our Guest: Andrew Krieger 01:40 Andrew's Journey to Sobriety 03:45 Career Transition and Professional Growth 06:36 Phases of Recovery 09:57 Understanding Post-Acute Withdrawal Syndrome & Co-Occurring Disorders 15:48 Emotional Sobriety Explained 20:00 Why Length of Abstinence Doesn't Equate to Emotional Maturity 21:40 Personal Stories in Early Recovery 23:55 The Importance of Supportive Relationships and Accountability 27:55 Finding a Balance in Sobriety and New Experiences in Recovery  31:58 Reflections on Personal Journey and Finding Peace  — Connect with Dr. Andrew Krieger:  Website: www.cmamed.com  LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/andrew-krieger-6864745  — Connect with PRC on Social: IG: https://www.instagram.com/positiverecoverycenters  FB: https://www.facebook.com/PositiveRecoveryCenters  TT: https://www.tiktok.com/@positiverecoverycenter  LI: https://www.linkedin.com/company/positiverecoverycenters  YT: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC4JcDF1gjlYch4V4iBbCgZg Want even more expert insights and support on the recovery journey? Subscribe to our newsletter for inspiration, mental health tips, and community updates—straight to your inbox!

Why Long Island stand-up crowds are tough but loyal Tom's Best of LI nomination and why he's counting on YOU The eternal war: LIRR vs. Metro North (spoiler: Janette is Team Connecticut) Losing keys in New Haven, surviving Penn Station, and a surprise Uber rescue mission Hilarious stories of dating, aging, and performing on the Island

Last time we spoke about the Battle of Taierzhuang. Following the fall of Nanjing in December 1937, the Second Sino-Japanese War entered a brutal phase of attrition as Japan sought to consolidate control and press toward central China. Chinese defense prioritized key rail corridors and urban strongholds, with Xuzhou, the JinPu and Longhai lines, and the Huai River system forming crucial lifelines. By early 1938, Japanese offensives aimed to link with forces around Beijing and Nanjing and encircle Chinese positions in the Central Yangtze region, threatening Wuhan. In response, Chiang Kai-shek fortified Xuzhou and expanded defenses to deter a pincer move, eventually amassing roughly 300,000 troops along strategic lines. Taierzhuang became a focal point when Japanese divisions attempted to press south and link with northern elements. Chinese commanders Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, Tang Enbo, and Sun Lianzhong coordinated to complicate Japanese plans through offensive-defensive actions, counterattacks, and encirclement efforts. The victory, though numerically costly, thwarted immediate Japanese objectives and foreshadowed further attritional struggles ahead.   #171 The Flooding of the Yellow River Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. We last left off with a significant event during the Xuzhou campaign. Three Japanese divisions under General Itagaki Seishiro moved south to attack Taierzhuang and were met by forces commanded by Li Zongren, Sun Lianzhong, and Tang Enbo, whose units possessed a decent amount of artillery. In a two-week engagement from March 22 to April 7, the battle devolved into a costly urban warfare. Fighting was vicious, often conducted in close quarters and at night. The urban environment negated Japanese advantages in armor and artillery, allowing Chinese forces to contend on equal terms. The Chinese also disrupted Japanese logistics by resupplying their own troops and severing rear supply lines, draining Japanese ammunition, supplies, and reinforcements. By April 7, the Japanese were compelled to retreat, marking the first Chinese victory of the war. However both sides suffered heavy losses, with around 20,000 casualties on each side. In the aftermath of this rare victory, Chiang Kai-Shek pushed Tang Enbo and Li Zongren to capitalize on their success and increased deployments in the Taierzhuang theater to about 450,000 troops. Yet the Chinese Army remained hampered by fundamental problems. The parochialism that had crippled Chiang's forces over the preceding months resurfaced. Although the generals had agreed to coordinate in a war of resistance, each still prioritized the safety of his own troops, wary of Chiang's bid to consolidate power. Li Zongren, for example, did not deploy his top Guangxi provincial troops at Taierzhuang and sought to shift most of the fighting onto Tang Enbo's forces. Chiang's colleagues were mindful of the fates of Han Fuju of Shandong and Zhang Xueliang of Manchuria: Han was executed for refusing to fight, while Zhang, after allowing Chiang to reduce the size of his northeastern army, ended up under house arrest. They were right to distrust Chiang. He believed, after all, that provincial armies should come under a unified national command, which he would lead. From a national-unity perspective, his aspiration was not unreasonable. But it fed suspicion among other military leaders that participation in the anti-Japanese war would dilute their power. The divided nature of the command also hindered logistics, making ammunition and food supplies to the front unreliable and easy to cut off. By late April the Chinese had reinforced the Xuzhou area to between 450,000-600,000 to capitalize on their victory. However these armies were plagued with command and control issues. Likewise the Japanese licked their wounds and reinforced the area to roughly 400,000, with fresh troops and supplies flowing in from Tianjin and Nanjing. The Japanese continued with their objective of encircling Chinese forces. The North China Area Army comprised four divisions and two infantry brigades drawn from the Kwantung Army, while the Central China Expeditionary Army consisted of three divisions and the 1st and 2nd Tank Battalions along with motorized support units. The 5th Tank Battalion supported the 3rd Infantry Division as it advanced north along the railway toward Xuzhou. Fighting to the west, east, and north of Xuzhou was intense, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. On 18 April, the Japanese advanced southward toward Pizhou. Tang Enbo's 20th Army Corps, together with the 2nd, 22nd, 46th, and 59th corps, resisted fiercely, culminating in a stalemate by the end of April. The 60th Corps of the Yunnan Army engaged the Japanese 10th Division at Yuwang Mountain for nearly a month, repelling multiple assaults. By the time it ceded its position to the Guizhou 140th Division and withdrew on 15 May, the corps had sustained losses exceeding half of its forces. Simultaneously, the Japanese conducted offensives along both banks of the Huai River, where Chinese defenders held out for several weeks. Nevertheless, Japanese artillery and aerial bombardment gradually tilted the balance, allowing the attackers to seize Mengcheng on 9 May and Hefei on 14 May. From there, the southern flank split into two parts: one force moved west and then north to cut off the Longhai Railway escape route from Xuzhou, while another division moved directly north along the railway toward Suxian, just outside Xuzhou. Simultaneously, to the north, Japanese units from north China massed at Jining and began moving south beyond Tengxian. Along the coast, an amphibious landing was made at Lianyungang to reinforce troops attacking from the east. The remaining portions of Taierzhuang were captured in May, a development symbolically significant to Tokyo. On 17 May, Japanese artillery further tightened the noose around Xuzhou, striking targets inside the city.  To preserve its strength, the Nationalist government ordered the abandonment of Xuzhou and directed its main forces to break out toward northern Jiangsu, northern Anhui, and eastern Henan. To deter the Japanese army's rapid westward advance and penetration into northern Henan and western Shandong, many leading military and political figures within the Nationalist government proposed breaching dams over the Yellow River to delay the offensive, a strategy that would have been highly advantageous to the Nationalist forces at the time. Chiang Kai-shek vetoed the proposal outright, insisting that the Nationalist army could still resist. He understood that with tens of millions of Chinese lives at stake and a sliver of hope remaining, the levee plan must not be undertaken. Then a significant battle broke out at Lanfeng. Chiang also recognized that defeat could allow the elite Japanese mechanized divisions, the 14th, 16th, and 10th, to advance directly toward Zhengzhou. If Zhengzhou fell, the Japanese mechanized forces on the plains could advance unimpeded toward Tongguan. Their southward push would threaten Xi'an, Xiangfan, and Nanyang, directly jeopardizing the southwest's rear defenses. Concurrently, the Japanese would advance along the Huai River north of the Dabie Mountains toward Wuhan, creating a pincer with operations along the Yangtze River.  Now what followed was arguably the most important and skillful Chinese maneuver of the Xuzhou campaign: a brilliantly executed strategic retreat to the south and west across the Jinpu railway line. On May 15, Li Zongren, in consultation with Chiang Kai-shek, decided to withdraw from Xuzhou and focus on an escape plan. The evacuation of civilians and military personnel began that day. Li ordered troops to melt into the countryside and move south and west at night, crossing the Jinpu Railway and splitting into four groups that would head west. The plan was to regroup in the rugged Dabie Mountains region to the south and prepare for the defense of Wuhan. Li's generals departed reluctantly, having held out for so long; Tang Enbo was said to have wept. Under cover of night, about forty divisions, over 200,000 men, marched out of Japanese reach in less than a week. A critical moment occurred on May 18, when fog and a sandstorm obscured the retreating troops as they crossed the Jinpu Railway. By May 21, Li wired Chiang Kai-shek to report that the withdrawal was complete. He mobilized nearly all of the Kuomintang Central Army's elite units, such as the 74th Army, withdrawn from Xuzhou and transferred directly to Lanfeng, with a resolute intent to “burn their boats.” The force engaged the Japanese in a decisive battle at Lanfeng, aiming to secure the last line of defense for the Yellow River, a position carrying the lives of millions of Chinese civilians. Yet Chiang Kai-shek's strategy was not universally understood by all participating generals, who regarded it as akin to striking a rock with an egg. For the battle of Lanfeng the Chinese mobilized nearly all of the Kuomintang Central Army's elite forces, comprising 14 divisions totaling over 150,000 men. Among these, the 46th Division of the 27th Army, formerly the Central Training Brigade and the 36th, 88th, and 87th Divisions of the 71st Army were German-equipped. Additionally, the 8th Army, the Tax Police Corps having been reorganized into the Ministry of Finance's Anti-Smuggling Corps, the 74th Army, and Hu Zongnan's 17th Corps, the new 1st Army, equipped with the 8th Division were elite Nationalist troops that had demonstrated strong performance in the battle of Shanghai and the battle of Nanjing, and were outfitted with advanced matériel. However, these so-called “elite” forces were heavily degraded during the campaigns in Shanghai and Nanjing. The 46th Division and Hu Zongnan's 17th Corps sustained casualties above 85% in Nanjing, while the 88th and 87th Divisions suffered losses of up to 90%. The 74th Army and the 36th Division also endured losses exceeding 75%. Their German-made equipment incurred substantial losses; although replenishment occurred, inventories resembled roughly a half-German and half-Chinese mix. With very limited heavy weapons and a severe shortage of anti-tank artillery, they could not effectively match the elite Japanese regiments. Hu Zongnan's 17th Corps maintained its national equipment via a close relationship with Chiang Kai-shek. In contrast, the 74th Army, after fighting in Shanghai, Nanjing, and Xuzhou, suffered heavy casualties, and the few German weapons it had were largely destroyed at Nanjing, leaving it to rely on a mix of domestically produced and Hanyang-made armaments. The new recruits added to each unit largely lacked combat experience, with nearly half of the intake having received basic training. The hardest hit was Li Hanhun's 64th Army, established less than a year prior and already unpopular within the Guangdong Army. Although classified as one of the three Type A divisions, the 155th, 156th, and 187th Divisions, it was equipped entirely with Hanyang-made firearms. Its direct artillery battalion possessed only about 20 older mortars and three Type 92 infantry guns, limiting its heavy firepower to roughly that of a Japanese battalion. The 195th Division and several miscellaneous units were even less prominent, reorganized from local militias and lacking Hanyang rifles. Additionally, three batches of artillery purchased from the Soviet Union arrived in Lanzhou via Xinjiang between March and June 1938. Except for the 52nd Artillery Regiment assigned to the 200th Division, the other artillery regiments had recently received their weapons and were still undergoing training. The 200th Division, had been fighting awhile for in the Xuzhou area and incurred heavy casualties, was still in training and could only deploy its remaining tank battalion and armored vehicle company. The tank battalion was equipped with T-26 light tanks and a small number of remaining British Vickers tanks, while the armored vehicle company consisted entirely of Italian Fiat CV33 armored cars. The disparity in numbers was substantial, and this tank unit did not participate in the battle.  As for the Japanese, the 14th Division was an elite Type A formation. Originally organized with four regiments totaling over 30,000 men, the division's strength was later augmented. Doihara's 14th Division received supplements, a full infantry regiment and three artillery regiments, to prevent it from being surrounded and annihilated, effectively transforming the unit into a mobile reinforced division. Consequently, the division's mounted strength expanded to more than 40,000 personnel, comprising five infantry regiments and four artillery regiments. The four artillery regiments, the 24th Artillery Regiment, the 3rd Independence Mountain Artillery Regiment, the 5th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment, and the 6th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment, possessed substantial heavy firepower, including 150mm heavy howitzers and 105mm long-range field cannons, placing them far in excess of the Nationalist forces at Lanfeng. In addition, both the 14th and later the 16th Divisions commanded tank regiments with nearly 200 light and medium tanks each, while Nationalist forces were markedly short of anti-tank artillery. At the same time, the Nationalist Air Force, though it had procured more than 200 aircraft of various types from the Soviet Union, remained heavily reliant on Soviet aid-to-China aircraft, amounting to over 100 machines, and could defend only a few cities such as Wuhan, Nanchang, and Chongqing. In this context, Japanese forces effectively dominated the Battle of Lanfeng. Moreover, reports indicate that the Japanese employed poison gas on the battlefield, while elite Nationalist troops possessed only a limited number of gas masks, creating a stark disparity in chemical warfare preparedness. Despite these disparities, Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government were initially unaware of the updated strength and composition of the Doihara Division. Faced with constrained options, Chiang chose to press ahead with combat operations. On May 12, 1939, after crossing the Yellow River, the IJA 14th Division continued its southward advance toward Lanfeng. The division's objective was to sever the Longhai Railway, disrupt the main Nationalist retreat toward Zhengzhou, and seize Zhengzhou itself. By May 15, the division split into two columns at Caoxian and moved toward key nodes on the Longhai Line. Major General Toyotomi Fusatarou led two infantry regiments, one cavalry regiment, and one artillery regiment in the main assault toward Kaocheng with the aim of directly capturing Lanfeng. Doihara led three infantry regiments and three artillery regiments toward Neihuang and Minquan, threatening Guide. In response, the Nationalist forces concentrated along the railway from Lanfeng to Guide, uniting Song Xilian's 71st Army, Gui Yongqing's 27th Army, Yu Jishi's 74th Army, Li Hanhun's 64th Army, and Huang Jie's 8th Army. From May 15 to 17, the Fengjiu Brigade, advancing toward Lanfeng, met stubborn resistance near Kaocheng from roughly five divisions under Song Xilian and was forced to shift its effort toward Yejigang and Neihuang. The defense near Neihuang, including Shen Ke's 106th Division and Liang Kai's 195th Division, ultimately faltered, allowing Doihara's division to seize Neihuang, Yejigang, Mazhuangzhai, and Renheji. Nevertheless, the Nationalist forces managed to contain the Japanese advance east and west of the area, preventing a complete encirclement. Chiang Kai-shek ordered Cheng Qian, commander-in-chief of the 1st War Zone, to encircle and annihilate the Japanese 14th Division. The deployment plan mapped three routes: the Eastern Route Army, under Li Hanhun, would include the 74th Army, the 155th Division of the 64th Army, a brigade of the 88th Division, and a regiment of the 87th Division, advancing westward from Guide); the Western Route Army, commanded by Gui Yongqing, would comprise the 27th Army, the 71st Army, the 61st Division, and the 78th Division, advancing eastward from Lanfeng; and the Northern Route Army, formed by Sun Tongxuan's 3rd Army and Shang Zhen's 20th Army, was to cut off the enemy's retreat to the north bank of the Yellow River near Dingtao, Heze, Dongming, and Kaocheng, while attacking the Doihara Division from the east, west, and north to annihilate it in a single decisive operation.  On May 21, the Nationalist Army mounted a full-scale offensive. Yu Jishi's 74th Army, commanded by Wang Yaowu's 51st Division, joined a brigade of Song Xilian's 71st Army, led by the 88th Division, and drove the Japanese forces at Mazhuangzhai into retreat, capturing Neihuang and Renheji. The main Japanese force, more than 6,000 strong, withdrew southwest to Yangjiji and Shuangtaji. Song Xilian, commanding Shen Fazao's 87th Division, launched a sharp assault on Yejigang (Yifeng). The Japanese abandoned the stronghold, but their main body continued advancing toward Yangjiji, with some units retreating to Donggangtou and Maoguzhai. On May 23, Song Xilian's 71st Army and Yu Jishi's 74th Army enveloped and annihilated enemy forces at Donggangtou and Maoguzhai. That evening they seized Ximaoguzhai, Yangzhuang, and Helou, eliminating more than a thousand Japanese troops. The Japanese troops at Donggangtou fled toward Lanfeng. Meanwhile, Gui Yongqing's forces were retreating through Lanfeng. His superior strength, Jiang Fusheng's 36th Division, Li Liangrong's 46th Division, Zhong Song's 61st Division, Li Wen's 78th Division, Long Muhan's 88th Division, and Shen Ke's 106th Division—had held defensive positions along the Lanfeng–Yangji line. Equipped with a tank battalion and armored vehicle company commanded by Qiu Qingquan, they blocked the enemy's westward advance and awaited Japanese exhaustion. However, under the Japanese offensive, Gui Yongqing's poor command led to the loss of Maji and Mengjiaoji, forcing the 27th Army to retreat across its entire front. Its main force fled toward Qixian and Kaifeng. The Japanese seized the opportunity to capture Quxingji, Luowangzhai, and Luowang Railway Station west of Lanfeng. Before retreating, Gui Yongqing ordered Long Muhan to dispatch a brigade to replace the 106th Division in defending Lanfeng, while he directed the 106th Division to fall back to Shiyuan. Frightened by the enemy, Long Muhan unilaterally withdrew his troops on the night of the 23rd, leaving Lanfeng undefended. On the 24th, Japanese troops advancing westward from Donggangtou entered Lanfeng unopposed and, relying on well-fortified fortifications, held their ground until reinforcements arrived. In the initial four days, the Nationalist offensive failed to overwhelm the Japanese, who escaped encirclement and annihilation. The four infantry and artillery regiments and one cavalry regiment on the Japanese side managed to hold the line along Lanfeng, Luowangzhai, Sanyizhai, Lanfengkou, Quxingji, Yang'erzhai, and Chenliukou on the south bank of the Yellow River, offering stubborn resistance. The Longhai Railway was completely cut off. Chiang Kai-shek, furious upon hearing the news while stationed in Zhengzhou, ordered the execution of Long Muhan, commander of the 88th Division, to restore military morale. He also decided to consolidate Hu Zongnan's, Li Hanhun's, Yu Jishi's, Song Xilian's, and Gui Yongqing's troops into the 1st Corps, with Xue Yue as commander-in-chief. On the morning of May 25, they launched a determined counterattack on Doihara's 14th Division. Song Xilian personally led the front lines on May 24 to rally the defeated 88th Division.  Starting on May 25, after three days of intense combat, Li Hanhun's 64th Army advanced to seize Luowang Station and Luowangzhai, while Song Xilian's 71st Army retook Lanfeng City, temporarily reopening the Longhai Line to traffic. At Sanyi Village, Gui Yongqing's 27th Army and Yu Jishi's 74th Army captured a series of outlying positions, including Yang'eyao, Chailou, Cailou, Hezhai, Xuelou, and Baowangsi. Despite these gains, more than 6,000 Japanese troops offered stubborn resistance. During the fighting, Ji Hongru, commander of the 302nd Regiment, was seriously wounded but continued to fight, shouting, “Don't worry about my death! Brothers, fight on!” He ultimately died a heroic death from his wounds. By May 27, Chiang Kai-shek, concerned that the forces had not yet delivered a decisive victory at Lanfeng, personally reprimanded the participating generals and ordered them to completely encircle and annihilate the enemy west of Lanfeng by the following day. He warned that if the opportunity was missed and Japanese reinforcements arrived, the position could be endangered. The next day, Chiang Kai-shek issued another telegram, urging Cheng Qian's First War Zone and all participating units to press the offensive. The telegram allegedly had this in it “It will forever be a laughingstock in the history of warfare.” Meanwhile on the other side, to prevent the annihilation of Doihara's 14th Division, the elite Japanese 16th Division and the 3rd Mixed Brigade, totaling over 40,000 men, launched a westward assault from Dangshan, capturing Yucheng on May 26. They then began probing the outskirts of Guide. Huang Jie's Eighth Army, responsible for the defense, withdrew to the outskirts of Guide that evening. On May 28, Huang Jie again led his troops on his own initiative, retreating to Liuhe and Kaifeng, leaving only the 187th Division to defend Zhuji Station and Guide City. At dawn on May 29, Peng Linsheng, commander of the 187th Division, also withdrew his troops, leaving Guide a deserted city. The Japanese occupied Guide without a fight. The loss of Guide dramatically shifted the tide of the war. Threatened on the flanks by the Japanese 16th Division, the Nationalist forces were forced onto the defensive. On May 28, the Japanese 14th Division concentrated its forces to counterattack Gui Yongqing's troops, but they were defeated again, allowing the Japanese to stabilize their position. At the same time, the fall of Shangqiu compelled Xue Yue's corps to withdraw five divisions to block the enemy in Shangqiu, and the Nationalist Army shifted to a defensive posture with the 14th Division holding Sanyizhai and Quxingji. To the north of the battlefield, the Japanese 4th Mixed Brigade, numbering over 10,000 men, was preparing to force a crossing of the Yellow River in order to join with the nearby 14th Division. More seriously, the 10th Division, together with its 13th Mixed Brigade and totaling more than 40,000 men, had captured Woyang and Bozhou on the Henan-Anhui border and was rapidly encircling eastern Henan. By the time of the Battle of Lanfeng, Japanese forces had deployed more than 100,000 troops, effectively surrounding the Nationalist army. On May 31, the First War Zone decided to withdraw completely, and the Battle of Lanfeng ended in defeat for the Nationalists, forcing Chiang Kai-shek to authorize diverting the Yellow River embankment to relieve pressure. The consequence was a deteriorating strategic situation, as encirclement tightened and reinforcement options dwindled, driving a retreat from the Lanfeng front. The National Army suffered more than 67,000 casualties, killed and wounded more than 10,000 Japanese soldiers, Lanfeng was lost, and Zhengzhou was in danger.  As in Nanjing, this Chinese army might have lived to fight another day, but the effect on Xuzhou itself was horrific. The city had endured Japanese bombardment since August 1937, and the population's mood swung between cautious hope and utter despair. In March, Du Zhongyuan visited Xuzhou. Before he left Wuhan, friends told him that “the city was desolate and the people were terrified, all the inhabitants of Xuzhou were quietly getting on with their business … sometimes it was even calmer than Wuhan.” The Australian journalist Rhodes Farmer recalled a similar image in a book published at war's end, noting the “ordinary townsfolk who became wardens, fire-fighters and first-aid workers during the raid and then went back to their civil jobs.” Yet the mid-May departure of Nationalist troops left the city and its outskirts at the mercy of an angry Imperial Army. Bombing continued through the final days of battle, and a single raid on May 14, 1938 killed 700 people. Around Xuzhou, buildings and bridges were destroyed—some by retreating Chinese forces, some by advancing Japanese troops. Taierzhuang, the scene of the earlier iconic defense, was utterly destroyed. Canadian Jesuits who remained in Xuzhou after its fall recorded that more than a third of the houses were razed, and most of the local population had fled in terror. In rural areas around the city, massacres were repeatedly reported, many witnessed by missionaries. Beyond the atrocities of the Japanese, locals faced banditry in the absence of law enforcement, and vital agricultural work such as planting seed ground to a halt. The loss of Xuzhou was both strategic and symbolic. It dealt a severe blow to Chiang's attempt to hold central China and to control regional troop movements. Morale, which Taierzhuang had briefly boosted, was battered again though not extinguished. The fall signaled that the war would be long, and that swift victory against Japan was no longer likely. Mao Zedong's Yan'an base, far to the northwest, grasped the meaning of defeat there. In May 1938 he delivered one of his most celebrated lectures, “On Protracted War,” chiding those who had over-optimistically claimed the Xuzhou campaign could be a quasi-decisive victory and arguing that, after Taierzhuang, some had become “giddy.” Mao insisted that China would ultimately prevail, yet he warned that it could not be won quickly, and that the War of Resistance would be protracted. In the meantime, the development of guerrilla warfare remained an essential piece of the long-term strategy that the Communist armies would pursue in north China. Yet the loss of Xuzhou did not necessarily portend a long war; it could, instead, presage a war that would be terrifyingly short. By spring 1938 the Chinese defenders were desperate. There was a real danger that the entire war effort could collapse, and the Nationalist governments' notable success as protectors of a shrinking “Free China” lay in avoiding total disaster. Government propaganda had successfully portrayed a plan beyond retreat to foreign observers, yet had Tokyo captured Wuhan in the spring, the Chinese Army would have had to withdraw at speed, reinforcing perceptions of disintegration. Western governments were unlikely to intervene unless convinced it was in their interests. Within the Nationalist leadership, competing instincts persisted. The government pursued welfare measures for the people in the midst of a massive refugee relief effort, the state and local organizations, aided by the International Red Cross, housed large numbers of refugees in 1937–1938. Yet there was a harsher strain within policy circles, with some officials willing to sacrifice individual lives for strategic or political ends as the Japanese threat intensified. Throughout central China, the Yellow River, China's “Sorrow”, loomed as the dominant geographic force shaping history. The loess-laden river, notorious for floods and shifting channels, was banked by massive dikes near Zhengzhou, exactly along the line the Japanese would traverse toward Wuhan. Using the river as a military instrument was discussed as a drastic option: Chiang and Cheng Qian's First War Zone contemplated diverting or breaching the dikes to halt or slow the Japanese advance, a measure that could buy time but would unleash enormous civilian suffering. The idea dated back to 1887 floods that cost hundreds of thousands of lives, and even in 1935 Alexander von Falkenhausen had warned that the Yellow River could become the final line of defense. In 1938 Chiang, recognizing the futility of defeating the Japanese by conventional means at Zhengzhou, considered unleashing the river's force if necessary to impede the invaders. The political and strategic calculus was stark: protect central China and Wuhan, even if it required drastic and morally fraught measures. A more humane leader might have hesitated to break the dikes and spare the dams, allowing the Japanese to take Wuhan. But Chiang Kai-shek believed that if the dikes were not breached and Wuhan fell within days, the Nationalist government might be unable to relocate to Chongqing in time and would likely surrender, leaving Japan in control of almost all of China. Some have compared the choice to France's surrender in June 1940, underscoring that Chiang's decision came during the country's most terrifying assault, with Chinese forces much weaker and less trained than their European counterparts. The dilemma over whether to break the Yellow River dikes grew out of desperation. Chiang ultimately ordered General Wei Rulin to blow the dike that held the Yellow River in central Henan. There was no doubt about the consequences: floods would inundate vast areas of central China, creating a waterlogged barrier that would halt the Japanese advance. Yet for the plan to succeed, it had to be carried out quickly, and the government could offer no public warning in case the Japanese detected it and accelerated their movement. Xiong Xianyu, chief of staff in the 8th Division at the time, recorded the urgency of those hours in his diary. The Japanese were already on the north bank of the Yellow River, briefly delayed when the Chinese army blew up the railway bridge across the river. The destruction of the dikes was the next step: if the area became a sea of mud, there would be no way the Japanese could even attempt to reconstruct the bridge. Blasting the dikes proved easier in theory than in practice. Holding back such a massive body of water required substantial engineering, dams thick and well fortified. The army made its first attempts to blow the dike at the small town of Zhaokou between June 4 and 6, 1938, but the structure proved too durable; another nearby attempt failed as well. Hour by hour, the Japanese moved closer. Division commander Jiang Zaizhen asked Xiong Xianyu for his opinion on where they might breach the dams. Xiong wrote “I discussed the topography, and said that two places, Madukou and Huayuankou, were both possible.” But Madukou was too close to Zhaokou, where the breach had already failed, presenting a danger that the Japanese might reach it very soon. The village of Huayuankou, however, lay farther away and on a bend in the river: “To give ourselves enough time, Huayuankou would be best.” At first, the soldiers treated the task as a military engineering assignment, an “exciting” one in Xiong's words. Xiong and Wei Rulin conducted their first site inspection after dark, late on June 6. The surroundings offered a deceptive calm: Xiong recounted “The wind blew softly, and the river water trickled pleasantly.” Yet gauging the water level proved difficult, hampered by murky moonlight and burned-out flashlights. They spent the night in their car to determine precisely where to break the dike as soon as day broke. But daylight seemed to bring home the consequences of what they planned to do, and the soldiers grew increasingly anxious. Wang Songmei, commander of the 2nd Regiment, addressed the workers about to breach the dike: “My brothers, this plan will be of benefit to our country and our nation, and will lessen the harm that is being done to the people.In the future, you'll find good wives and have plenty of children.” Wang's words were meant to reassure the men of the political necessity of their actions and that fate would not, in the traditional Chinese sense, deny them a family because of the enormity of their deeds. General Wei confirmed that Huayuankou was the right spot, and on June 8 the work began, with about 2,000 men taking part. The Nationalist government was eager to ensure rapid progress. Xiong recorded that the “highest authorities”,, kept making telephone calls from Wuhan to check on progress. In addition, the party sent performers to sing and play music to bolster the workers' spirits. Senior General Shang Zhen announced to the laborers that if they breached the dam by midnight on June 8, each would receive 2,000 yuan; if they achieved it by six the next morning, they would still be paid 1,000 yuan. They needed encouragement, for the diggers had no artificial assistance. After the initial failures at Zhaokou, Wei's troops relied entirely on manual labor, with no explosives used. Yet the workers earned their payments, and the dike was breached in just a few hours. On the morning of June 9, Xiong recorded a rapid shift in mood: the atmosphere became tense and solemn. Initially, the river flow was modest, but by about 1:00 p.m. the water surged “fiercely,” flowing “like 10,000 horses.” Looking toward the distance, Xiong felt as though a sea had appeared before him. “My heart ached,” he wrote. The force of the water widened the breach, and a deadly stream hundreds of feet wide comprising about three-quarters of the river's volume—rushed southeast across the central Chinese plains. “We did this to stop the enemy,” Xiong reflected, “so we didn't regret the huge sacrifice, as it was for a greater victory.” Yet he and the other soldiers also saw a grim reality: the troops who had taken on the task of destroying the railway bridge and the dikes could not bear the flood's consequences alone. It would be up to the government and the people of the nation to provide relief for the countless households uprooted by the flood. In fact, the previous evening Commander Jiang had telephoned to request assistance for those flooded out of their homes.   Wei, Xiong, and their troops managed to escape by wooden boats. Hundreds of thousands of farmers trapped in the floods were far less fortunate. Time magazine's correspondent Theodore White reported on the devastation a few days later “Last week “The Ungovernable” [i.e. the Yellow River] lashed out with a flood which promised to change not only its own course but also the course of the whole Sino-Japanese War. Severe breaks in the dikes near Kaifeng sent a five-foot wall of water fanning out over a 500-squaremile area, spreading death. Toll from Yellow River floods is not so much from quick drowning as from gradual disease and starvation. The river's filth settles ankle-deep on the fields, mothering germs, smothering crops. Last week, about 500,000 peasants were driven from 2,000 communities to await rescue or death on whatever dry ground they could find”. Chiang's government had committed one of the grossest acts of violence against its own people, and he knew that the publicity could be a damaging blow to its reputation. He decided to divert blame by announcing that the dike had been broken, but blaming the breach on Japanese aerial bombing. The Japanese, in turn, fiercely denied having bombed the dikes. White's reporting reflected the immediate response of most foreigners; having heard about the atrocities at Nanjing and Xuzhou, he was disinclined to give the Japanese the benefit of the doubt. Furthermore, at the very time that the Yellow River was flooding central China, the Japanese were heavily bombing Guangzhou, causing thousands of casualties. To White, the Japanese counterargument—that the Chinese themselves were responsible, seemed unthinkable: “These accusations, foreign observers thought, were absurd. For the Chinese to check the Japanese advance at possible sacrifice of half a million lives would be a monstrous pyrrhic victory. Besides, dike-cutting is the blackest of Chinese crimes, and the Chinese Army would hardly risk universal censure for slight tactical gains.” But, of course, that is exactly what they had done. During the war the Nationalists never admitted that they, not the Japanese, had breached the dikes. But the truth quickly became widely known. Just a month later, on July 19, US Ambassador Johnson noted, in private communication, that the “Chinese blocked the advance on Chengchow [Zhengzhou] by breaching the Yellow River dikes.” Eventually some 54,000 square kilometers of central China were inundated by the floods. If the Japanese had committed such an act, it would have been remembered as the prime atrocity of the war, dwarfing even the Nanjing Massacre or the Chongqing air raids in terms of the number of people who suffered. Accurate statistics were impossible to obtain in the midst of wartime chaos and disaster, but in 1948 figures issued by the Nationalists themselves suggested enormous casualties: for the three affected provinces of Henan, Anhui, and Jiangsu, the number of dead was put at 844,489, with some 4.8 million becoming refugees. More recent studies place the numbers lower, but still estimate the dead at around 500,000, and 3–5 million refugees. In contrast, the devastating May 1939 air raids on Chongqing killed some thousands. Xiong reflected in his diary that the breaching of the Yellow River dikes was a sacrifice for a greater victory. Even to some Japanese it seemed that the tactic had been successful in the short term: the first secretary at the US Embassy in Wuhan reported that the flood had “completely checked the Japanese advance on Chengchow” and had prevented them taking Wuhan by rail. Instead, he predicted, the attack was likely to come by water and along the north shore of the Yangtze. Supporters of the dike breaches could argue that these acts saved central China and Chiang's headquarters in Wuhan for another five months. The Japanese were indeed prevented from advancing along the Long–Hai railway toward Wuhan. In the short term the floods did what the Nationalists wanted. But the flooding was a tactic, a breathing space, and did not solve the fundamental problem: China's armies needed strong leadership and rapid reform. Some historians suggest that Chiang's decision was pointless anyway, since it merely delayed the inevitable. Theodore White was right: no strategic advantage could make the deaths of 500,000 of China's own people a worthwhile price to pay. However, Chiang Kai-shek's decision can be partly explained, though not excused, by the context. We can now look back at the actions of the Nationalists and argue that they should not have held on to Wuhan, or that their actions in breaching the dam were unjustifiable in the extreme. But for Chiang, in the hot summer of 1938, it seemed his only hope was to deny Japan as much of China for as long as possible and create the best possible circumstances for a long war from China's interior, while keeping the world's attention on what Japan was doing. The short delay won by the flooding was itself part of the strategy. In the struggle raging within the soul of the Nationalist Party, the callous, calculating streak had won, for the time being. The breaking of the dikes marked a turning point as the Nationalists committed an act whose terrible consequences they would eventually have to expiate. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In late 1937, China's frontline trembled as Japanese forces closed in on Wuhan. Chiang Kai-shek faced a brutal choice: endure costly defenses or unleash a desperate gamble. Chiangs' radical plan emerged: breach the Yellow River dikes at Huayuankou to flood central China, buying time. The flood roared, washing villages and futures away, yet slowing the enemy. The battlefield paused, while a nation weighed courage against civilian suffering, victory against devastating costs.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6V6c-9O3UHk Podcast audio: In this episode of The Ayn Rand Institute Podcast, Tristan de Liège and Ben Bayer discuss the widespread claim that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza. Among the topics covered: Decoupling from the confusion of “international law” Validating the concept of “genocide”; The invalid collectivist elements of the concept; The absurd UN definition of “genocide”; Why the valid concept does not apply to Israel; Sidebar on the issue of just and unjust war; The genocidal intent of Hamas Recommended in this podcast is Elan Journo's book What Justice Demands: America and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Ben Bayer's essay "We Ignore the Unconditional Right to Self-Defense at Our Peril", and the podcast with Elan Journo and Nikos Sotirakopolous, "Did Israel Steal Palestinian Land?" The podcast was recorded on October 3, 2025, and posted on October 7, 2025. Listen and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts. Watch archived podcasts here.

Thể thao tuần này khiến cảm xúc thăng hoa và kịch tính. Từ thất bại gây sốc của Indonesia tại Vòng loại World Cup, đến cuộc chiến sinh tử giữa Liverpool và Man Utd. Liệu Chelsea và HLV Ange Postecoglou có thoát khỏi chuỗi khủng hoảng?

In this solo episode, we dive into the controversial concept of 'high value' men and women. We critique the term popularised by Kevin Samuels and its perpetuation by the red pill community. The episode argues against using subjective and superficial measures to determine someone's worth, emphasising instead the importance of core values, character, and emotional intelligence in choosing life partners. Marcia also shares personal anecdotes and stresses the inherent value of all individuals, encouraging listeners to trust their intuition over online trends in dating. 00:41 Personal Update and Podcast Return 01:11 Exploring the Concept of High Value 03:18 Critique of High Value Standards 05:22 Subjectivity of Value in Relationships 08:51 Aligning Values in Relationships 12:37 Trusting Intuition and Emotional Intelligence IG: @marciacolosi | TikTok: @marciacolosi LI: @marciacolosi | FB: @marciamiatke  Ready to take your life and relationships to the next level? Follow The EQ Academy Official where you'll learn to optimise your emotions, leverage your feminine and masculine energies and show up your most confident and radiant self!

Tựa Đề: Chuyện... Mục Sư (Phần 2); Tác Giả: Mục Sư Nguyễn Đình Liễu; Loạt Bài: Bài Viết

What if the very thing you're calling a failure... is actually proof of God's favor?Here's the truth: too many Christian business owners have bought into a toxic lie—that favor equals ease. That if you're really called, anointed, or blessed, your path should be smooth. It's not just wrong—it's dangerous.In this eye-opening episode of The Estherpreneur Podcast, I expose seven deceptive lies about favor that could be sabotaging your business growth, delaying your breakthrough, and distorting your theology. After years of studying favor and walking through fire myself, I'm revealing what no one else is saying:1. Warfare is often confirmation, not condemnation.2. Failure is preparation, not disqualification.3. And favor isn't about your comfort—it's about your calling.You'll hear personal stories of pain, pruning, and the price of saying “yes” to God. And most importantly, you'll walk away with a new lens: one that doesn't flinch in the face of struggle—but recognizes it as a sign you're right where you need to be. If this episode stirred something in you, it's time to take the next step. Join my Business Unlimited Group Mentoring Program—a Christ-centered community where we fast, pray, plan, and build together with prophetic precision and practical strategies.

Các dự luật đã được trình lên Quốc hội Liên bang nhằm ngăn chặn các chủ lao động hủy bỏ quyền nghỉ phép của nhân viên khi gia đình họ phải đối mặt với bi kịch thai chết lưu hoặc mất con sơ sinh.

It’s a Big Show edition of Calm Down with Erin and Charissa — and Erin Andrews & Charissa Thompson are fired up! First up: Week 5 in the NFL didn’t disappoint! From shocking upsets to unexpected performances, the ladies break down all the wild storylines in the most unpredictable league in sports. Then, it’s all about eras — find out which “Showgirl Era” Erin and Charissa are in right now (it’s giving Wi$h Li$t energy). Plus, Charissa shares hilarious stories from her high school reunion and the very on-brand award she took home!See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Send Dr. Li a text here. Please leave your email address if you would like a reply, thanks.In this episode of Make Time for Success, Dr. Christine Li shares her latest productivity technique: the "continuous to-do list." She explains how this analog journaling method reduces stress, prevents tasks from being forgotten, and helps boost creativity and enjoyment alongside productivity. Dr. Li also offers practical tips for working with any to-do list, such as leaving emotions out of routine tasks, aiming for speed, focusing on end results, being kind to yourself, celebrating progress, and making sure your list covers all areas of life. Listeners are encouraged to try out the continuous to-do list and can grab a free worksheet to get started.Timestamps:00:01:43 – Blending productivity and fun; importance of releasing pressure for better results.00:03:19 – Introduction to the continuous to-do list technique and journaling approach.00:04:19 – Why the continuous to-do list works and how it reduces stress and increases flow.00:06:29 – Invitation to try the technique and share feedback.00:07:14 – General tips for better to-do lists:Don't put feelings into routine tasksAim for speedFocus on end resultsDon't self-criticize for unfinished itemsCelebrate completed tasksRemember all life areas on your list00:13:55 – Encouragement to take small steps and use the free worksheet download.To get the free download that accompanies this episode, go to https://maketimeforsuccesspodcast.com/todoTo sign up for the Waitlist for the Simply Productive Program, go to https://maketimeforsuccesspodcast.com/SPFor more information on the Make Time for Success podcast, visit: https://www.maketimeforsuccesspodcast.comGain Access to Dr. Christine Li's Free Resource Library -- 12 downloadable tools and templates to help you bypass the impulse to procrastinate: https://procrastinationcoach.mykajabi.com/freelibraryTo work with Dr. Li on a weekly basis in her coaching and accountability program, register for The Success Lab here: https://www.procrastinationcoach.com/labConnect with Us!Dr. Christine LiWebsite: https://www.procrastinationcoach.comFacebook Group: https://www.facebook.com/groups/procrastinationcoachInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/procrastinationcoach/TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@procrastinationcoachThe Success Lab: https://maketimeforsuccesspodcast.com/lab                        Simply Productive: https://maketimeforsuccesspodcast.com/SP

Send Carla a message!If your business looks great on paper but still feels heavy, frantic, or out of control, you're not alone. In this conversation with agency operations expert Melissa Morris, we explore what happens when strong systems meet outdated thinking.We explore why success built on survival mode will always lead to burn out and how upgrading your thinking foundation can transform not just your business, but your life. Listen in if you're ready to stop spinning and start creating what you set out to build.Learn more about Melissa & Agency Authority:WebsiteHer previous episode:  Get Off the Hamster Wheel with Melissa MorrisLearn more about Carla:Website: https:/www.carlareeves.com/Connect on LI: https://www.linkedin.com/in/reevescarla/Connect on Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/@differentlythepodcastGo to https://carlareeves.com/free-class to get The Class schedule, sign up, and/or pass it on to a friend. Each month is a new topic. Come hang out and learn with us for FREE! Book a Complimentary Strategy Call with Carla: https://bookme.name/carlareeves/strategycall If you enjoyed this episode, be sure to share it with a friend. A free way to support our show is by leaving a five-star rating and review on your favorite podcast player. It's a chance to tell us what you love about the show and it helps others discover it, too. Thank you for listening!

Tựa Đề: Chuyện... Mục Sư (Phần 1); Tác Giả: Mục Sư Nguyễn Đình Liễu; Loạt Bài: Bài Viết

On this episode of Health Gig, Doro and Tricia welcome Dr. William Li, Medical Director of the Angiogenesis Foundation, to talk about metabolism and fat as an organ. He begins the conversation with the assertion that health is not merely the absence of disease but a result of our body's hardwiring and defense systems. He then outlines the four phases of metabolism throughout a person's life and highlights the importance of stress management, sleep, and nutrition in maintaining a healthy metabolism. Dr. Li provides listeners with key concepts to focus on for proactive, informed health management. This is the second of a two-part episode.

SoftWave TRT is a non-invasive medical treatment that uses shockwave technology to stimulate the body's natural healing processes. It's often used in orthopedics, sports medicine, chiropractic care, and even aesthetics. On this episode of The Wednesday Match Play Podcast, brought to you by Eden Mill St Andrews, Laura explains what SoftWave is and how it works, details TRT, and gives an overview of their flagship device, the Li-500. She also outlines what being FDA cleared means, highlights their focus on education and marketing efforts, addresses misconceptions about the technology, and shares why it is so important that SoftWave is non-invasive. This was a fascinating conversation and an honor having Laura on the show. Let's tee off.

Nous sommes le 20 juin 1918, à Liège. Georges Simenon, qui n'a pas 16 ans, quitte le collège Saint-Servais sans passer ses examens de fin d'année. Quelques temps plus tard, il se présente à La Gazette de Liège où il obtient un poste de petit reporter, chargé de la rubrique des « chiens écrasés ». Un boulot qui est un sésame. Celui qui va lui ouvrir les portes de la vie nocturne et interlope de la cité ardente. Le jeune homme observe tout, il côtoie les filles publiques, les bagarreurs, les poivrots, les petits trafiquants, les truands plus ou moins dangereux. Et quotidiennement, il assiste au rapport des commissaires. Le futur auteur de Maigret enregistre dans sa mémoire les innombrables scènes de violence et de détresse. Il assiste aux conférences sur la police scientifique, il rôde autour du Palais de Justice : il « cherche, dira-t-il plus tard, à comprendre la mécanique judiciaire et à récolter de l'humain ». Cet apprentissage, qui dura près de trois ans, va lui permettre de saisir que « la réalité des faits divers dépasse souvent la fiction du plus imaginatif des auteurs ». En 1922, Simenon prend le départ pour Paris où il va prolonger son enseignement à Pigalle, cœur du crime. Partons aux racines de l'inspiration criminelle de Georges Simenon… ______________________________________________________________ Avec nous : Michel Carly, écrivain, biographe de Simenon. « Simenon au cœur du crime », Weyrich, Noir Corbeau. Sujets traités : Georges Simenon, Liège, reporter, Maigret , Police, faits divers, crimes, inspiration, criminelle Merci pour votre écoute Un Jour dans l'Histoire, c'est également en direct tous les jours de la semaine de 13h15 à 14h30 sur www.rtbf.be/lapremiere Retrouvez tous les épisodes d'Un Jour dans l'Histoire sur notre plateforme Auvio.be :https://auvio.rtbf.be/emission/5936 Intéressés par l'histoire ? Vous pourriez également aimer nos autres podcasts : L'Histoire Continue: https://audmns.com/kSbpELwL'heure H : https://audmns.com/YagLLiKEt sa version à écouter en famille : La Mini Heure H https://audmns.com/YagLLiKAinsi que nos séries historiques :Chili, le Pays de mes Histoires : https://audmns.com/XHbnevhD-Day : https://audmns.com/JWRdPYIJoséphine Baker : https://audmns.com/wCfhoEwLa folle histoire de l'aviation : https://audmns.com/xAWjyWCLes Jeux Olympiques, l'étonnant miroir de notre Histoire : https://audmns.com/ZEIihzZMarguerite, la Voix d'une Résistante : https://audmns.com/zFDehnENapoléon, le crépuscule de l'Aigle : https://audmns.com/DcdnIUnUn Jour dans le Sport : https://audmns.com/xXlkHMHSous le sable des Pyramides : https://audmns.com/rXfVppvN'oubliez pas de vous y abonner pour ne rien manquer.Et si vous avez apprécié ce podcast, n'hésitez pas à nous donner des étoiles ou des commentaires, cela nous aide à le faire connaître plus largement. Hébergé par Audiomeans. Visitez audiomeans.fr/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

In this episode of The Yegi Project, financial coach and author Veronica Deraleau shares her unique journey that intertwines her passion for music and finance. She discusses her dual career, the challenges of managing debt, and the importance of strategic financial planning. Veronica introduces her ARIA money model, which emphasizes awareness, reframing, intention, and action in financial management. She provides insights on overcoming mental resistance, creative strategies for debt repayment, and the significance of aligning spending with personal values. The conversation concludes with advice on investing and the importance of taking calculated risks in life.Connect with Veronica Deraleau!Buy the book on Amazon: https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0DGGSMWRYVisit the website: https://makingmoneyissimple.com/Veronica's singing website: https://www.veronicaderaleau.com/Veronica's LI: https://www.linkedin.com/in/veronica-deraleau/IG: https://www.instagram.com/makingmoneyissimple/FB: https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61575215157056LI: https://www.linkedin.com/company/makingmoneyissimple/Pinterest: https://www.pinterest.com/makingmoneyissimple/Takeaways• Veronica Deraleau is a financial coach and author of 'Making Money is Simple'.• She has a dual career as an opera singer and a senior manager at a fintech company.• Understanding your financial reality is the first step to improvement.• The ARIA money model includes Awaken, Reframe, Intention, and Action.• Creative strategies can help in paying down debt effectively.• Renegotiating contracts can lead to significant savings.• It's important to align spending with personal values and goals.• Time management is crucial for achieving financial and personal success.• Overcoming mental resistance is key to making lasting changes.• Investing in experiences that align with your values enriches life.If you would like to be a guest on a future episode of The Yegi Project, please email info@yegiproject.comThe Yegi Project is available on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher and more!https://linktr.ee/theyegiprojectDisclaimer: This podcast or any other The Yegi Project episodes on this platform or other podcast streaming platforms is not legal business or tax advice. I make this content based on my own experience as a business owner and MBA for educational and entertainment purposes only.

Ngành điều dưỡng ở Úc mở ra cơ hội nghề nghiệp và định cư hấp dẫn, nhưng thực tế làm việc không hề dễ dàng: áp lực cao, ca làm việc dài, và khối lượng công việc lớn. Liệu bạn đã sẵn sàng đối mặt với thử thách này chưa?

Tân Ủy viên Cảnh sát Liên bang Úc (AFP) Krissy Barrett đã bắt đầu nhiệm kỳ của bà bằng một lời cảnh báo gửi tới các cá nhân, tổ chức hoặc thế lực nước ngoài đang tìm cách gieo rắc nỗi sợ hãi trong cộng đồng. Bà khẳng định: “Chúng tôi sẽ hành động.”

動畫 dòng huà – animation; cartoon漫畫 màn huà – comic; manga花樣男子 Huā yàng nán zǐ – Boys Over Flowers (Japanese manga)貴族學校 guì zú xué xiào – aristocratic school; elite private school囂張 xiāo zhāng – arrogant; overbearing愛欺負人 ài qī fu rén – likes to bully others傲嬌 ào jiāo – proud and aloof (often with a hidden warm side)被翻拍成電視劇 bèi fān pāi chéng diàn shì jù – to be remade into a TV drama流星花園 Liú xīng huā yuán – Meteor Garden (TV drama)紅遍整個亞洲 hóng biàn zhěng ge Yǎ zhōu – to become famous all over Asia租書店 zū shū diàn – rental bookstore經典 jīng diǎn – classic淘氣小親親 Táo qì xiǎo qīn qīn – Itazura na Kiss (Japanese manga, literally “Mischievous Kiss”)呆呆的 dāi dāi de – blank-faced; slow-witted (in a cute way)傻傻的 shǎ shǎ de – silly; foolish (in a harmless or cute way)執著 zhí zhuó – persistent; determined一見鍾情 yí jiàn zhōng qíng – love at first sight追 zhuī – to pursue (someone or something)被改編成電視劇 bèi gǎi biān chéng diàn shì jù – to be adapted into a TV drama惡作劇之吻 È zuò jù zhī wěn – It Started with a Kiss (TV drama)眼光 yǎn guāng – judgment; taste (in choosing things)熱血 rè xiě – passionate; hot-blooded冒險 mào xiǎn – adventure類型 lèi xíng – type; genre棋靈王 Qí líng wáng – Hikaru no Go (Japanese manga/anime)棋魂 qí hún – the spirit of a Go player (refers to the character in Hikaru no Go)圍棋 wéi qí – the board game Go獵人 Liè rén – Hunter × Hunter (Japanese manga/anime)精彩 jīng cǎi – wonderful; splendid名偵探柯南 Míng zhēn tàn Kē nán – Detective Conan (Japanese manga/anime)進擊的巨人 Jìn jī de jù rén – Attack on Titan (Japanese manga/anime)死亡筆記本 Sǐ wáng bǐ jì běn – Death Note (Japanese manga/anime)排球少年 Pái qiú shào nián – Haikyuu!! (Japanese manga/anime)Feeling stuck or frustrated with your Chinese progress? Book a one-on-one trial lesson with me

Taylor Swift's twelfth album has sparked endless speculation about who each song is "really about," but that might be the wrong question entirely. The Life of a Showgirl isn't biography, it's polyphonic auto-fiction, where Swift writes from multiple character perspectives while blurring the lines between autobiography and theatrical performance. The album's "showgirl sound" traces from Shakespearean tragedy (Ophelia's drowning rewritten as salvation) through Golden Age Hollywood orchestration to contemporary pop production with Max Martin and Shellback. Unusual musical choices like the jarring five-measure phrase in "Fate of Ophelia" reinforce the album's central theme: the tension between public performance and private reality. By treating the album as a theatrical show rather than a celebrity tell-all, listeners can finally hear what Swift is actually saying… or can they? Taylor Swift "Love Story" Taylor Swift "Blank Space" Taylor Swift "The Fate of Ophelia" Taylor Swift "Elizabeth Taylor" Irving Berlin "A Pretty Girl Is Like a Melody" Fred Astaire "Puttin' on the Ritz" Taylor Swift "Opalite" George Michael "Father Figure" Taylor Swift "Father Figure" Taylor Swift "Eldest Daughter" Taylor Swift "Tim McGraw" Taylor Swift "Ruined the Friendship" Weezer "Beverly Hills" Pixies "Where Is My Mind" Charli XCX "Sympathy Is a Knife" Charli XCX "Everything Is Romantic" Taylor Swift "Actually Romantic" Mean Girls "Meet the Plastics" Taylor Swift "Wi$h Li$t" Stevie Wonder "Superstition" The Jackson 5 "I Want You Back" Taylor Swift "Wood" Nirvana "Lithium" Nirvana "Something in the Way" Taylor Swift "Canceled" Taylor Swift "Honey" Taylor Swift feat. Sabrina Carpenter "Life of a Showgirl" Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

IT IS HERE!! Taylor Swift's 12th album, "The Life of a Showgirl", has been on repeat all weekend and we're back to share our thoughts on this incredible album! We discuss the general reception of the album, initial thoughts, the movie experience and then go track by track talking through each song! We end the episode with our (way way wayyyy too early rankings of each song)! Can't wait to see how they might change but one thing is for sure, this is a FUN album full of bop bop bops and hot girl walks will never be the same!!  Timestamps: General album discussion / Fan/Critic Reception / The Movie - First 40 mins 1. The Fate of Ophelia - 39:50 2. Elizabeth Taylor - 47:33 3. Opalite - 59:43 4. Father Figure - 1:11.44 5. Eldest Daughter - 1:21.54 6. Ruin the Friendship - 1:31.05 7. Actually Romantic - 1:38.18 8. Wi$h Li$t - 1:47.59 9. Wood - 1:53.36 10. CANCELLED! - 2:01.23 11. Honey - 2:05.11 12. The Life of a Showgirl (feat. Sabrina Carpenter) - 2:09.05 Closing Thoughts - 2:19.01 Way Too Early Song Rankings - 2:27.24   Contact and/or Follow Us: Instagram: dropeverythingnowpodcast Gmail: dropeverythingnowpodcast@gmail.com TikTok: TheStephs13 Find this episode on YouTube as well!!

Tune in to this soulful conversation between Siddhesh Mukerji and Rev. Liên on the intersections of Engaged Buddhism & Buddhist Social Work. GUEST:SIDDHESH MUKERJI (he/him) is a Zen practitioner and a scholar of engaged Buddhism and Buddhist social work. He was born in India, grew up in the United States, and currently lives in Ireland.Siddhesh writes and does research on social work and engaged Buddhism.HOST:REV. LIÊN SHUTT (she/they) is a recognized leader in the movement that breaks through the wall of American white-centered convert Buddhism to welcome people of all backgrounds into a contemporary, engaged Buddhism. As an ordained Zen priest, licensed social worker, and longtime educator/teacher of Buddhism, Shutt represents new leadership at the nexus of spirituality and social justice, offering a special warm welcome to Asian Americans, all BIPOC, LGBTQIA+, immigrants, and those seeking a “home” in the midst of North American society's reckoning around racism, sexism, homophobia, and xenophobia. Shutt is a founder of Access to Zen (2014). You can learn more about her work at AccessToZen.org. Her new book, Home is Here: Practicing Antiracism with the Engaged Eightfold Path. See all her offerings at EVENTS

When we discuss artificial intelligence, what metaphors do we use to illustrate what we mean? Is artificial intelligence some sort of robot—like Ultron—or is it an organism—like a beehive? What happens to our expectations, our thinking, and our conclusions when we change these metaphors, say, from an entitative metaphor (say, an agent) to a relational metaphor (say, belonging to our work network)? We discuss these points with and who wrote a very interesting paper on how management scholars think about artificial intelligence.   Episode reading list Ramaul, L., Ritala, P., Kostis, A., & Aaltonen, P. (2025). Rethinking How We Theorize AI in Organization and Management: A Problematizing Review of Rationality and Anthropomorphism. Journal of Management Studies, . Berente, N., Gu, B., Recker, J., & Santhanam, R. (2021). Managing Artificial Intelligence. MIS Quarterly, 45(3), 1433-1450. Alvesson, M., & Sandberg, J. (2020). The Problematizing Review: A Counterpoint to Elsbach and Van Knippenberg's Argument for Integrative Reviews. Journal of Management Studies, 57(6), 1290-1304. Berente, N. (2020). Agile Development as the Root Metaphor for Strategy in Digital Innovation. In S. Nambisan, K. Lyytinen, & Y. Yoo (Eds.), Handbook of Digital Innovation (pp. 83-96). Edward Elgar. Pepper, S. C. (1942). World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence. University of California Press. Brynjolfsson, E., Li, D., & Raymond, L. R. (2025). Generative AI at Work. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 140(2), 889-942. Russell, S. J., & Norvig, P. (2010). Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (3rd ed.). Prentice Hall. Jarrahi, M. H., & Ritala, P. (2025). Rethinking AI Agents: A Principal-Agent Perspective. California Management Review Insights, . Boxenbaum, E., & Pedersen, J. S. (2009). Scandinavian Institutionalism – a Case of Institutional Work. In T. B. Lawrence, R. Suddaby, & B. Leca (Eds.), Institutional Work: Actors and Agency in Institutional Studies of Organizations (pp. 178-204). Cambridge University Press. Iivari, J., & Lyytinen, K. (1998). Research on Information Systems Development in Scandinavia-Unity in Plurality. Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems, 10(1), 135-186. Alvesson, M., & Sandberg, J. (2024). The Art of Phenomena Construction: A Framework for Coming Up with Research Phenomena beyond ‘the Usual Suspects'. Journal of Management Studies, 61(5), 1737-1765. Brunsson, N. (2003). The Organization of Hypocrisy: Talk, Decisions, and Actions in Organizations. Copenhagen Business School Press. Floyd, C., Mehl, W.-M., Reisin, F.-M., Schmidt, G., & Wolf, G. (1989). Out of Scandinavia: Alternative Approaches to Software Design and System Development. Human-Computer Interaction, 4(4), 253-350. Grisold, T., Berente, N., & Seidel, S. (2025). Guardrails for Human-AI Ecologies: A Design Theory for Managing Norm-Based Coordination. MIS Quarterly, 49, . Forster, E. M. (1909). The Machine Stops. The Oxford and Cambridge Review, November 1909, .   

This week on Am I Ovary Acting, the girls are giving their takes on Taylor Swift's new album - The Life of a Showgirl. Is it a flop, or has there been a societal shift in how we perceive her now she's engaged? From whether her whole career has been built on 'diss tracks' to whether she should be speaking out about Palestine - should this be an album for your Wi$h Li$t, or is it time she was CANCELLED!? amiovaryactingpod@gmail.com@amberizzo@annabelgurnett Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                      Last time we spoke about the continuation of the war after Nanjing's fall. The fall of Nanjing in December 1937 marked a pivotal juncture in the Second Sino-Japanese War, ushering in a brutal phase of attrition that shaped both strategy and diplomacy in early 1938. As Japanese forces sought to restructure China's political order, their strategy extended beyond battlefield victories to the establishment of puppet arrangements and coercive diplomacy. Soviet aid provided critical support, while German and broader Axis diplomacy wavered, shaping a nuanced backdrop for China's options. In response, Chinese command decisions focused on defending crucial rail corridors and urban strongholds, with Wuhan emerging as a strategic hub and the Jinpu and Longhai railways becoming lifelines of resistance. The defense around Xuzhou and the Huai River system illustrated Chinese determination to prolong resistance despite daunting odds. By early 1938, the war appeared as a drawn-out struggle, with China conserving core bases even as Japan pressed toward central China.   #170 The Battle of Taierzhuang Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Following their victory at Nanjing, the Japanese North China Area Army sought to push southward and link up with the Japanese Eleventh Army between Beijing and Nanjing. The two formations were intended to advance along the northern and southern ends of the JinPu railway, meet at Xuzhou, and then coordinate a pincer movement into Chinese strongholds in the Central Yangtze region, capturing Jiujiang first and then Wuhan. Recognizing Xuzhou's strategic importance, Chinese leadership made its defense a top priority. Xuzhou stood at the midpoint of the JinPu line and at the intersection with the Longhai Line, China's main east–west corridor from Lanzhou to Lianyungang. If seized, Japanese control of these routes would grant mobility for north–south movement across central China. At the end of January, Chiang Kai-shek convened a military conference in Wuchang and declared the defense of Xuzhou the highest strategic objective. Chinese preparations expanded from an initial core of 80,000 troops to about 300,000, deployed along the JinPu and Longhai lines to draw in and overstretch Japanese offensives. A frightening reality loomed by late March 1938: the Japanese were nearing victory on the Xuzhou front. The North China Area Army, led by Generals Itagaki Seishirô, Nishio Toshizô, and Isogai Rensuke, aimed to link up with the Central China Expeditionary Force under General Hata Shunroku for a coordinated drive into central China. Li Zongren and his senior colleagues, including Generals Bai Chongxi and Tang Enbo, resolved to meet the Japanese at the traditional stone-walled city of Taierzhuang. Taierzhuang was not large, but it held strategic significance. It sat along the Grand Canal, China's major north–south waterway, and on a rail line that connected the Jinpu and Longhai lines, thus bypassing Xuzhou. Chiang Kai-shek himself visited Xuzhou on March 24. While Xuzhou remained in Chinese hands, the Japanese forces to the north and south were still separated. Losing Xuzhou would close the pincer. By late March, Chinese troops seemed to be gaining ground at Taierzhuang, but the Japanese began reinforcing, pulling soldiers from General Isogai Rensuke's column. The defending commanders grew uncertain about their ability to hold the position, yet Chiang Kai-shek made his stance clear in an April 1, 1938 telegram: “the enemy at Taierzhuang must be destroyed.” Chiang Kai-shek dispatched his Vice Chief of Staff, Bai Chongxi, to Xuzhou in January 1938. Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi were old comrades from the New Guangxi Clique, and their collaboration dated back to the Northern Expedition, including the Battle of Longtan. Li also received the 21st Group Army from the 3rd War Area. This Guangxi unit, commanded by Liao Lei, comprised the 7th and 47th Armies. Around the same time, Sun Zhen's 22nd Group Army, another Sichuan clique unit, arrived in the Shanxi-Henan region, but was rebuffed by both Yan Xishan, then commander of the 2nd War Area and Shanxi's chairman and Cheng Qian, commander of the 1st War Area and Henan's chairman. Yan and Cheng harbored strong reservations about Sichuan units due to discipline issues, notably their rampant opium consumption. Under Sun Zhen's leadership, the 22nd Group Army deployed four of its six divisions to aid the Northern China effort. Organized under the 41st and 45th Armies, the contingent began a foot march toward Taiyuan on September 1, covering more than 50 days and approximately 1,400 kilometers. Upon reaching Shanxi, they faced a harsh, icy winter and had no winter uniforms or even a single map of the province. They nevertheless engaged the Japanese for ten days at Yangquan, suffering heavy casualties. Strapped for supplies, they broke into a Shanxi clique supply depot, which enraged Yan Xishan and led to their expulsion from the province. The 22nd withdrew westward into the 1st War Area, only to have its request for resupply rejected by Cheng Qian. Meanwhile to the south Colonel Rippei Ogisu led Japanese 13th Division to push westward from Nanjing in two columns during early February: the northern column targeted Mingguang, while the southern column aimed for Chuxian. Both routes were checked by Wei Yunsong's 31st Army, which had been assigned to defend the southern stretch of the Jinpu railway under Li Zongren. Despite facing a clearly inferior force, the Japanese could not gain ground after more than a month of sustained attacks. In response, Japan deployed armored and artillery reinforcements from Nanjing. The Chinese withdrew to the southwestern outskirts of Dingyuan to avoid a direct clash with their reinforced adversaries. By this point, Yu Xuezhong's 51st Army had taken up a defensive position on the northern banks of the Huai River, establishing a line between Bengbu and Huaiyuan. The Japanese then captured Mingguang, Dingyuan, and Bengbu in succession and pressed toward Huaiyuan. However, their supply lines were intercepted by the Chinese 31st Corps, which conducted flanking attacks from the southwest. The situation worsened when the Chinese 7th Army, commanded by Liao Lei, arrived at Hefei to reinforce the 31st Army. Facing three Chinese corps simultaneously, the Japanese were effectively boxed south of the Huai River and, despite air superiority and a superior overall firepower, could not advance further. As a result, the Chinese thwarted the Japanese plan to move the 13th Division north along the Jinpu railway and link up with the Isogai 10th Division to execute a pincer against Xuzhou. Meanwhile in the north, after amphibious landings at Qingdao, the Japanese 5th Division, commanded by Seishiro Itagaki, advanced southwest along the Taiwei Highway, spearheaded by its 21st Infantry Brigade. They faced Pang Bingxun's 3rd Group Army. Although labeled a Group Army, Pang's force actually comprised only the 40th Army, which itself consisted of the 39th Division from the Northwestern Army, commanded by Ma-Fawu. The 39th Division's five regiments delayed the Japanese advance toward Linyi for over a month. The Japanese captured Ju County on 22 February and moved toward Linyi by 2 March. The 59th Army, commanded by Zhang Zizhong, led its troops on a forced march day and night toward Linyi. Seizing the opportunity, the 59th Army did not rest after reaching Yishui. In the early morning of the 14th, Zhang Zizhong ordered the entire army to covertly cross the Yishui River and attack the right flank of the Japanese “Iron Army” 5th Division. They broke through enemy defenses at Tingzitou, Dataiping, Shenjia Taiping, Xujia Taiping, and Shalingzi. Initially caught off guard, the enemy sustained heavy losses, and over a night more than a thousand Japanese soldiers were annihilated. The 59th Army fought fiercely, engaging in brutal hand-to-hand combat. By 4:00 a.m. on the 17th, the 59th Army had secured all of the Japanese main positions. That same day, Pang Bingxun seized the moment to lead his troops in a fierce flank attack, effectively supporting the 59th Army's frontal assault. On the 18th, Zhang and Pang's forces attacked the Japanese from the east, south, and west. After three days and nights of bloody fighting, they finally defeated the 3rd Battalion of the 11th Regiment, which had crossed the river, and annihilated most of it. The 59th Army completed its counterattack but suffered over 6,000 casualties, with more than 2,000 Japanese killed or wounded. News of the Linyi victory prompted commendations from Chiang Kai-shek and Li Zongren. General Li Zongren, commander of the 5th War Zone, judged that the Japanese were temporarily unable to mount a large-scale offensive and that Linyi could be held for the time being. On March 20, he ordered the 59th Army westward to block the Japanese Seya Detachment. On March 21, the Japanese Sakamoto Detachment, after a brief reorganization and learning of the Linyi detachment, launched another offensive. The 3rd Corps, understrength and without reinforcements, was compelled to retreat steadily before the Japanese. General Pang Bingxun, commander of the 3rd Corps, urgently telegraphed Chiang Kai-shek, requesting reinforcements. Chiang Kai-shek received the telegram and, at approximately 9:00 AM on the 23rd, ordered the 59th Army to return to Linyi to join with the 3rd Corps in repelling the Sakamoto Detachment. Fierce fighting ensued with heavy Chinese losses, and the situation in Linyi again grew precarious. At a critical moment, the 333rd Brigade of the 111th Division and the Cavalry Regiment of the 13th Army were rushed to reinforce Linyi. Facing attacks from two directions, the Japanese withdrew, losing almost two battalions in the process. This engagement shattered the myth of Japanese invincibility and embarrassed commander Seishirō Itagaki, even startling IJA headquarters. Although the 5th Division later regrouped and attempted another push, it had lost the element of surprise. The defeat at Linyi at the hands of comparatively poorly equipped Chinese regional units set the stage for the eventual battle at Tai'erzhuang. Of the three Japanese divisions advancing into the Chinese 5th War Area, the 10th Division, commanded by Rensuke Isogai, achieved the greatest initial success. Departing from Hebei, it crossed the Yellow River and moved south along the Jinpu railway. With KMT General Han Fuju ordering his forces to desert their posts, the Japanese captured Zhoucun and reached Jinan with little resistance. They then pushed south along two columns from Tai'an. The eastern column captured Mengyin before driving west to seize Sishui; the western column moved southwest along the Jinpu railway, capturing Yanzhou, Zouxian, and Jining, before turning northwest to take Wenshang. Chiang Kai-shek subsequently ordered Li Zongren to employ “offensive defense”, seizing the initiative to strike rather than merely defend. Li deployed Sun Zhen's 22nd Group Army to attack Zouxian from the south, while Pang Bingxun's 40th Division advanced north along the 22nd's left flank to strike Mengyin and Sishui. Sun Tongxuan's 3rd Group Army also advanced from the south, delivering a two-pronged assault on the Japanese at Jining. Fierce fighting from 12 to 25 February, particularly by the 12th Corps, helped mitigate the reputational damage previously inflicted on Shandong units by Han Fuju. In response to Chinese counterattacks, the Japanese revised their strategy: they canceled their original plan to push directly westward from Nanjing toward Wuhan, freeing more troops for the push toward Xuzhou. On March 15, the Japanese 10th Division struck the Chinese 122nd Division, focusing the action around Tengxian and Lincheng. Chinese reinforcements from the 85th Corps arrived the following day but were driven back on March 17. With air support, tanks, and heavy artillery, the Japanese breached the Chinese lines on March 18. The remaining Chinese forces, bolstered by the 52nd Corps, withdrew to the town of Yixian. The Japanese attacked Yixian and overran an entire Chinese regiment in a brutal 24-hour engagement. By March 19, the Japanese began advancing on the walled town of Taierzhuang. To counter the Japanese advance, the Chinese 2nd Army Group under General Sun Lianzhong was deployed to Taierzhuang. The 31st Division, commanded by General Chi Fengcheng, reached Taierzhuang on March 22 and was ordered to delay the Japanese advance until the remainder of the Army Group could arrive. On March 23, the 31st Division sallied from Taierzhuang toward Yixian, where they were engaged by two Japanese battalions reinforced with three tanks and four armored cars. The Chinese troops occupied a series of hills and managed to defend against a Japanese regiment (~3,000 men) for the rest of the day. On March 24, a Japanese force of about 5,000 attacked the 31st Division. Another Japanese unit pressed the Chinese from Yixian, forcing them to withdraw back into Taierzhuang itself. The Japanese then assaulted the town, with a 300-strong contingent breaching the northeast gate at 20:00. They were subsequently driven back toward the Chenghuang temple, which the Chinese set on fire, annihilating the Japanese force. The next day, the Japanese renewed the assault through the breached gate and secured the eastern portion of the district, while also breaking through the northwest corner from the outside and capturing the Wenchang Pavilion. On March 25, a morning Japanese onslaught was repelled. The Japanese then shelled Chinese positions with artillery and air strikes. In the afternoon, the Chinese deployed an armored train toward Yixian, which ambushed a column of Japanese soldiers near a hamlet, killing or wounding several dozen before retreating back to Taierzhuang. By nightfall, three thousand Chinese troops launched a night assault, pushing the Japanese lines northeast to dawn. The following three days subjected the Chinese defenders to sustained aerial and artillery bombardment. The Chinese managed to repulse several successive Japanese assaults but sustained thousands of casualties in the process. On March 28, Chinese artillery support arrived, including two 155 mm and ten 75 mm pieces. On the night of March 29, the Japanese finally breached the wall. Setting out from the district's southern outskirts, a Chinese assault squad stormed the Wenchang Pavilion from the south and east, killing nearly the entire Japanese garrison aside from four taken as prisoners of war. The Chinese then retook the northwest corner of the district. Even by the brutal standards already established in the war, the fighting at Taierzhuang was fierce, with combatants facing one another at close quarters. Sheng Cheng's notes preserve the battlefield memories of Chi Fengcheng, one of the campaign's standout officers “We had a battle for the little lanes [of the town], and unprecedentedly, not just streets and lanes, but even courtyards and houses. Neither side was willing to budge. Sometimes we'd capture a house, and dig a hole in the wall to approach the enemy. Sometimes the enemy would be digging a hole in the same wall at the same time. Sometimes we faced each other with hand grenades — or we might even bite each other. Or when we could hear that the enemy was in the house, then we'd climb the roof and drop bombs inside — and kill them all.” The battle raged for a week. On April 1, General Chi requested volunteers for a near-suicide mission to seize a building: among fifty-seven selected, only ten survived. A single soldier claimed to have fired on a Japanese bomber and succeeded in bringing it down; he and his comrades then set the aircraft ablaze before another plane could arrive to rescue the pilot. One participant described the brutal conditions of the battle “"The battle continued day and night. The flames lit up the sky. Often all that separated our forces was a single wall. The soldiers would beat holes in the masonry to snipe at each other. We would be fighting for days over a single building, causing dozens of fatalities." The conditions were so brutal that Chinese officers imposed severe measures to maintain discipline. Junior officers were repeatedly forbidden to retreat and were often ordered to personally replace casualties within their ranks. Li Zongren even warned Tang Enbo that failure to fulfill his duties would lead him to be “treated as Han Fuju had been.” In Taierzhuang's cramped streets, Japan's artillery and air superiority offered little advantage; whenever either service was employed amid the dense melee, casualties were roughly even on both sides. The fighting devolved into close-quarters combat carried out primarily by infantry, with rifles, pistols, hand grenades, bayonets, and knives forming the core of each side's arsenal. The battle unfolded largely hand-to-hand, frequently in darkness. The stone buildings of Taierzhuang provided substantial cover from fire and shrapnel. It was precisely under these close-quarters conditions that Chinese soldiers could stand as equals, if not superior, to their Japanese opponents, mirroring, in some respects, the experiences seen in Luodian, Shanghai, the year before. On March 31, General Sun Lianzhong arrived to assume command of the 2nd Army Group. A Japanese assault later that day was repulsed, but a Chinese counterattack also stalled. At 04:00 on April 1, the Japanese attacked the Chinese lines with support from 11 tanks. The Chinese defenders, armed with German-made 37mm Pak-36 antitank guns, destroyed eight of the armored vehicles at point-blank range. Similar incidents recurred throughout the battle, with numerous Japanese tanks knocked out by Chinese artillery and by suicide squads. In one engagement, Chinese suicide bombers annihilated four Japanese tanks with bundles of grenades. On April 2 and 3, Chi urged the Chinese defenders around Taierzhuang's north station to assess the evolving situation. The troops reported distress, crying and sneezing, caused by tear gas deployed by the Japanese against Chinese positions at Taierzhuang's north station, but the defenders remained unmoved. They then launched a massive armored assault outside the city walls, with 30 tanks and 60 armored cars, yet managed only to drive the Chinese 27th Division back to the Grand Canal. The fighting continued to rage on April 4 and 5. By then, the Japanese had captured roughly two-thirds of Taierzhuang, though the Chinese still held the South Gate. It was through this entry point that the Chinese command managed to keep their troops supplied. The Chinese also thwarted Japanese efforts to replenish their dwindling stocks of arms and ammunition. In consequence, the Japanese attackers were worn down progressively. Although the Japanese possessed superior firepower, including cannon and heavy artillery, the cramped conditions within Taierzhuang nullified this advantage for the moment. The Chinese command succeeded in keeping their own supplies flowing, a recurring weakness in other engagements and also prevented the Japanese from replenishing their dwindling stock of arms and bullets. Gradually, the Japanese maneuvered into a state of attrition. The deadlock of the battle was broken by events unfolding outside Taierzhuang, where fresh Chinese divisions had encircled the Japanese forces in Taierzhuang from the flanks and rear. After consulting their German advisors earlier, the commanders of the 5th War Area prepared a double envelopment of the exposed Japanese forces in Taierzhuang. Between March and April 1938, the Nationalist Air Force deployed squadrons from the 3rd and 4th Pursuit Groups, fighter-attack aircraft, in long-distance air interdiction and close-air support of the Taierzhuang operations. Approximately 30 aircraft, mostly Soviet-made, were deployed in bombing raids against Japanese positions. On 26 March, Tang Enbo's 20th Army, equipped with artillery units, attacked Japanese forces at Yixian, inflicting heavy casualties and routing the survivors. Tang then swung south to strike the Japanese flank northeast of Taierzhuang. Simultaneously, the Chinese 55th Corps, comprised of two divisions, executed a surprise crossing of the Grand Canal and cut the railway line near Lincheng. As a result, Tang isolated the Japanese attackers from their rear and severed their supply lines. On 1 April, the Japanese 5th Division sent a brigade to relieve the encircled 10th Division. Tang countered by blocking the brigade's advance and then attacking from the rear, driving them south into the encirclement. On 3 April, the Chinese 2nd Group Army launched a counter-offensive, with the 30th and 110th Divisions pushing northward into Beiluo and Nigou, respectively. By 6 April, the Chinese 85th and 52nd Armies linked up at Taodun, just west of Lanling. The combined force then advanced north-westward, capturing Ganlugou. Two more Chinese divisions arrived a few days later. By April 5, Taierzhuang's Japanese units were fully surrounded, with seven Chinese divisions to the north and four to the south closing in. The Japanese divisions inside Taierzhuang had exhausted their supplies, running critically low on ammunition, fuel, and food, while many troops endured fatigue and dehydration after more than a week of brutal fighting. Sensing imminent victory, the Chinese forces surged with renewed fury and attacked the encircled Japanese, executing wounded soldiers where they lay with rifle and pistol shots. Chinese troops also deployed Soviet tanks against the defenders. Japanese artillery could not reply effectively due to a shortage of shells, and their tanks were immobilized by a lack of fuel. Attempts to drop supplies by air failed, with most packages falling into Chinese hands. Over time, Japanese infantry were progressively reduced to firing only their machine guns and mortars, then their rifles and machine guns, and ultimately resorted to bayonet charges. With the success of the Chinese counter-attacks, the Japanese line finally collapsed on April 7. The 10th and 5th Divisions, drained of personnel and ammunition, were forced to retreat. By this point, around 2,000 Japanese soldiers managed to break out of Taierzhuang, leaving thousands of their comrades dead behind. Some of the escapees reportedly committed hara-kiri. Chinese casualties were roughly comparable, marking a significant improvement over the heavier losses suffered in Shanghai and Nanjing. The Japanese had lost the battle for numerous reasons. Japanese efforts were hampered by the "offensive-defensive" operations carried out by various Chinese regional units, effectively preventing the three Japanese divisions from ever linking up with each other. Despite repeated use of heavy artillery, air strikes, and gas, the Japanese could not expel the Chinese 2nd Group Army from Taierzhuang and its surrounding areas, even as the defenders risked total annihilation. The Japanese also failed to block the Chinese 20th Group Army's maneuver around their rear positions, which severed retreat routes and enabled a Chinese counter-encirclement. After Han Fuju's insubordination and subsequent execution, the Chinese high command tightened discipline at the top, transmitting a stringent order flow down to the ranks. This atmosphere of strict discipline inspired even junior soldiers to risk their lives in executing orders. A “dare-to-die corps” was effectively employed against Japanese units. They used swords and wore suicide vests fashioned from grenades. Due to a lack of anti-armor weaponry, suicide bombing was also employed against the Japanese. Chinese troops, as part of the “dare-to-die” corps, strapped explosives such as grenade packs or dynamite to their bodies and charged at Japanese tanks to blow them up.  The Chinese later asserted that about 20,000 Japanese had perished, though the actual toll was likely closer to 8,000. The Japanese also sustained heavy material losses. Because of fuel shortages and their rapid retreat, many tanks, trucks, and artillery pieces were abandoned on the battlefield and subsequently captured by Chinese forces. Frank Dorn recorded losses of 40 tanks, over 70 armored cars, and 100 trucks of various sizes. In addition to vehicles, the Japanese lost dozens of artillery pieces and thousands of machine guns and rifles. Many of these weapons were collected by the Chinese for future use. The Chinese side also endured severe casualties, possibly up to 30,000, with Taierzhuang itself nearly razed. Yet for once, the Chinese achieved a decisive victory, sparking an outburst of joy across unoccupied China. Du Zhongyuan wrote of “the glorious killing of the enemy,” and even Katharine Hand, though isolated in Japanese-controlled Shandong, heard the news. The victory delivered a much-needed morale boost to both the army and the broader population. Sheng Cheng recorded evening conversations with soldiers from General Chi Fengcheng's division, who shared light-hearted banter with their senior officer. At one moment, the men recalled Chi as having given them “the secret of war. when you get food, eat it; when you can sleep, take it.” Such familiar, brisk maxims carried extra resonance now that the Nationalist forces had demonstrated their willingness and ability to stand their ground rather than retreat. The victors may have celebrated a glorious victory, but they did not forget that their enemies were human. Chi recalled a scene he encountered: he had picked up a Japanese officer's helmet, its left side scorched by gunpowder, with a trace of blood, the mark of a fatal wound taken from behind. Elsewhere in Taierzhuang, relics of the fallen were found: images of the Buddha, wooden fish, and flags bearing slogans. A makeshift crematorium in the north station had been interrupted mid-process: “Not all the bones had been completely burned.” After the battle, Li Zongren asked Sheng if he had found souvenirs on the battlefield. Sheng replied that he had discovered love letters on the corpses of Japanese soldiers, as well as a photograph of a girl, perhaps a hometown sweetheart labeled “19 years old, February 1938.” These details stood in stark contrast to news coverage that depicted the Japanese solely as demons, devils, and “dwarf bandits.” The foreign community noted the new, optimistic turn of events and the way it seemed to revive the resistance effort. US ambassador Nelson Johnson wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull from Wuhan just days after Taierzhuang, passing on reports from American military observers: one had spent time in Shanxi and been impressed by Communist success in mobilizing guerrilla fighters against the Japanese; another had spent three days observing the fighting at Taierzhuang and confirmed that “Chinese troops in the field there won a well-deserved victory over Japanese troops, administering the first defeat that Japanese troops have suffered in the field in modern times.” This reinforced Johnson's view that Japan would need to apply far more force than it had anticipated to pacify China. He noted that the mood in unoccupied China had likewise shifted. “Conditions here at Hankow have changed from an atmosphere of pessimism to one of dogged optimism. The Government is more united under Chiang and there is a feeling that the future is not entirely hopeless due to the recent failure of Japanese arms at Hsuchow [Xuzhou] . . . I find no evidence for a desire for a peace by compromise among  Chinese, and doubt whether the Government could persuade its army or its people to accept such a peace. The spirit of resistance is slowly spreading among the people who are awakening to a feeling that this is their war. Japanese air raids in the interior and atrocities by Japanese soldiers upon civilian populations are responsible for this stiffening of the people.”. The British had long been wary of Chiang Kai-shek, but Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, the British ambassador in China, wrote to the new British foreign secretary, Lord Halifax, on April 29, 1938, shortly after the Taierzhuang victory, and offered grudging credit to China's leader “[Chiang] has now become the symbol of Chinese unity, which he himself has so far failed to achieve, but which the Japanese are well on the way to achieving for him . . . The days when Chinese people did not care who governed them seem to have gone . . . my visit to Central China from out of the gloom and depression of Shanghai has left me stimulated and more than disposed to believe that provided the financial end can be kept up Chinese resistance may be so prolonged and effective that in the end the Japanese effort may be frustrated . . . Chiang Kai-shek is obstinate and difficult to deal with . . . Nonetheless [the Nationalists] are making in their muddlIn the exhilaration of a rare victory”. Chiang pressured Tang and Li to build on their success, increasing the area's troop strength to about 450,000. Yet the Chinese Army remained plagued by deeper structural issues. The parochialism that had repeatedly hampered Chiang's forces over the past six months resurfaced. Although the various generals had agreed to unite in a broader war of resistance, each prioritized the safety of his own troops, wary of any move by Chiang to centralize power. For example, Li Zongren refrained from utilizing his top Guangxi forces at Taierzhuang, attempting to shift the bulk of the fighting onto Tang Enbo's units. The generals were aware of the fates of two colleagues: Han Fuju of Shandong was executed for his refusal to fight, while Zhang Xueliang of Manchuria had allowed Chiang to reduce the size of his northeastern army and ended up under house arrest. They were justified in distrusting Chiang. He truly believed, after all, that provincial armies should come under a national military command led by himself. From a national-unity standpoint, Chiang's aim was not unreasonable. But it bred suspicion among other military leaders that participation in the anti-Japanese war would erode their own power. The fragmented command structure also hindered logistics, making ammunition and food supplies to the front unreliable and easy to cut off a good job of things in extremely difficult circumstances. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Chinese victory at the battle of Tairzhuang was a much needed morale boost after the long string of defeats to Japan. As incredible as it was however, it would amount to merely a bloody nose for the Imperial Japanese Army. Now Japan would unleash even more devastation to secure Xuzhou and ultimately march upon Wuhan.

Last time we spoke about the Nanjing Massacre. Japanese forces breached Nanjing as Chinese defenders retreated under heavy bombardment, and the city fell on December 13. In the following weeks, civilians and disarmed soldiers endured systematic slaughter, mass executions, rapes, looting, and arson, with casualties mounting rapidly. Among the most brutal episodes were hundreds of executions near the Safety Zone, mass shootings along the Yangtze River, and killings at improvised sites and “killing fields.” The massacre involved tens of thousands of prisoners, with estimates up to 300,000 victims. Women and children were subjected to widespread rape, mutilation, and terror intended to crush morale and resistance. Although the Safety Zone saved many lives, it could not shield all refugees from harm, and looting and arson devastated large parts of the city. Foreign witnesses, missionaries, and diary entries documented the extensive brutality and the apparent premeditated nature of many acts, noting the collapse of discipline among troops and orders that shaped the violence.    #169 Nanjing has Fallen, the War is not Over Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Directly after the fall of Nanjing, rumors circulated among the city's foreigners that Tang Shengzhi had been executed for his inability to hold the city against the Japanese onslaught. In fact, unlike many of his subordinates who fought in the defense, he survived. On December 12, he slipped through Yijiang Gate, where bullets from the 36th Division had claimed numerous victims, and sailed across the Yangtze to safety. Chiang Kai-shek protected him from bearing direct consequences for Nanjing's collapse. Tang was not unscathed, however. After the conquest of Nanjing, a dejected Tang met General Li Zongren at Xuzhou Railway Station. In a brief 20-minute conversation, Tang lamented, “Sir, Nanjing's fall has been unexpectedly rapid. How can I face the world?” Li, who had previously taunted Tang for over-eagerness, offered sympathy. “Don't be discouraged. Victory or defeat comes every day for the soldier. Our war of resistance is a long-term proposition. The loss of one city is not decisive.” By December 1937, the outlook for Chiang Kai-shek's regime remained bleak. Despite his public pledges, he had failed to defend the capital. Its sturdy walls, which had withstood earlier sieges, were breached in less than 100 hours. Foreign observers remained pessimistic about the prospects of continuing the fight against Japan. The New York Times wrote “The capture of Nanking was the most overwhelming defeat suffered by the Chinese and one of the most tragic military debacles in modern warfare. In defending Nanking, the Chinese allowed themselves to be surrounded and then slaughtered… The graveyard of tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers may also be the graveyard of all Chinese hopes of resisting conquest by Japan.” Foreign diplomats doubted Chiang's ability to sustain the war, shrinking the question to whether he would stubbornly continue a losing fight or seek peace. US Ambassador Nelson Johnson wrote in a letter to Admiral Yarnell, then commander of the US Asicatic Fleet “There is little left now for the Chinese to do except to carry on a desultory warfare in the country, or to negotiate for the best terms they can get”.  The Japanese, too, acted as if Chiang Kai-shek had already lost the war. They assumed the generalissimo was a spent force in Chinese politics as well, and that a gentle push would suffice to topple his regime like a house of cards. On December 14, Prime Minister Konoe announced that Chiang's losses of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and now Nanjing, had created a new situation. “The National Government has become but a shadow of its former self. If a new Chinese regime emerged to replace Chiang's government, Japan would deal with it, provided it is a regime headed in the right direction.” Konoe spoke the same day as a Liaison Conference in Tokyo, where civilian and military leaders debated how to treat China now that it had been thoroughly beaten on the battlefield. Japanese demands had grown significantly: beyond recognizing Manchukuo, Japan pressed for the creation of pro-Japanese regimes in Inner Mongolia and the north China area. The same day, a puppet government was established in Japanese-occupied Beijing. While these demands aimed to end China as a unitary state, Japanese policy was moving toward the same goal. The transmissions of these demands via German diplomatic channels caused shock and consternation in Chinese government circles, and the Chinese engaged in what many regarded as stalling tactics. Even at this late stage, there was division among Japan's top decision makers. Tada, deputy chief of the Army General Staff, feared a protracted war in China and urged keeping negotiations alive. He faced strong opposition from the cabinet, including the foreign minister and the ministers of the army and navy, and ultimately he relented. Tada stated “In this state of emergency, it is necessary to avoid any political upheaval that might arise from a struggle between the Cabinet and the Army General Staff.” Although he disagreed, he no longer challenged the uncompromising stance toward China. On January 16, 1938, Japan publicly stated that it would “cease henceforth to deal with” Chiang Kai-shek. This was a line that could not be uncrossed. War was the only option. Germany, the mediator between China and Japan, also considered Chiang a losing bet. In late January 1938, von Dirksen, the German ambassador in Tokyo, urged a fundamental shift in German diplomacy and advocated abandoning China in favor of Japan. He warned that this was a matter of urgency, since Japan harbored grudges against Germany for its half-hearted peace efforts. In a report, von Dirksen wrote that Japan, “in her deep ill humor, will confront us with unpleasant decisions at an inopportune moment.” Von Dirksen's view carried the day in Berlin. Nazi Germany and Hirohito's Japan were on a trajectory that, within three years, would forge the Axis and place Berlin and Tokyo in the same camp in a conflict that would eventually span the globe. Rabe, who returned to Germany in 1938, found that his account of Japanese atrocities in Nanjing largely fell on deaf ears. He was even visited by the Gestapo, which apparently pressed him to keep quiet about what he had seen. Ambassador von Dirksen also argued in his January 1938 report that China should be abandoned because of its increasingly friendly ties with the Soviet Union. There was some merit to this claim. Soviet aid to China was substantial: by the end of 1937, 450 Soviet aviators were serving in China. Without them, Japan likely would have enjoyed air superiority. Chiang Kai-shek, it seemed, did not fully understand the Russians' motives. They were supplying aircraft and pilots to keep China in the war while keeping themselves out. After Nanjing's fall, Chiang nevertheless reached out to Joseph Stalin, inviting direct Soviet participation in the war. Stalin politely declined, noting that if the Soviet Union joined the conflict, “the world would say the Soviet Union was an aggressor, and sympathy for Japan around the world would immediately increase.” In a rare moment of candor a few months later, the Soviet deputy commissar for foreign affairs spoke with the French ambassador, describing the situation in China as “splendid.” He expected China to continue fighting for several more years, after which Japan would be too weakened to undertake major operations against the Soviet Union. It was clear that China was being used. Whatever the motive, China was receiving vital help from Stalin's Russia while the rest of the world stood on the sidelines, reluctant to upset Japan. Until Operation Barbarossa, when the Soviet Union was forced to the brink by the German Army and could no longer sustain extensive overseas aid, it supplied China with 904 planes, 1,516 trucks, 1,140 artillery pieces, 9,720 machine guns, 50,000 rifles, 31,600 bombs, and more. Despite all of this, all in all, China's position proved less disastrous than many observers had feared. Chinese officials later argued that the battle of Nanjing was not the unmitigated fiasco it appeared to be. Tang Shengzhi had this to say in his memoirs“I think the main purpose of defending Nanjing was to buy time, to allow troops that had just been pulled out of battle to rest and regroup. It wasn't simply because it was the capital or the site of Sun Yat-sen's mausoleum.” Tan Daoping, an officer in Nanjing, described the battle “as a moderate success because it drew the Japanese in land”. This of course was a strategy anticipated by interwar military thinker Jiang Baili. It also allowed dozens of Chinese divisions to escape Shanghai, since the Japanese forces that could have pursued them were tied down with the task of taking Nanjing. Tan Daoping wrote after the war “They erred in believing they could wage a quick war and decide victory immediately. Instead, their dream was shattered; parts of their forces were worn out, and they were hindered from achieving a swift end”. Even so, it was a steep price was paid in Chinese lives. As in Shanghai, the commanders in Nanjing thought they could fight on the basis of sheer willpower. Chinese officer Qin Guo Qi wrote in his memoirs “In modern war, you can't just rely on the spirit of the troops. You can't merely rely on physical courage and stamina. The battle of Nanjing explains that better than anything”. As for the Brigade commander of the 87th division, Chen Yiding, who emerged from Nanjing with only a few hundred survivors, was enraged. “During the five days of the battle for Nanjing, my superiors didn't see me even once. They didn't do their duty. They also did not explain the overall deployments in the Nanjing area. What's worse, they didn't give us any order to retreat. And afterwards I didn't hear of any commander being disciplined for failing to do his job.” Now back in November of 1937, Chiang Kai-shek had moved his command to the great trinity of Wuhan. For the Nationalists, Wuhan was a symbolically potent stronghold: three municipalities in one, Hankou, Wuchang, and Hanyang. They had all grown prosperous as gateways between coastal China and the interior. But the autumn disasters of 1937 thrust Wuhan into new prominence, and, a decade after it had ceased to be the temporary capital, it again became the seat of military command and resistance. Leading Nationalist politicians had been seen in the city in the months before the war, fueling suspicions that Wuhan would play a major role in any imminent conflict. By the end of the year, the generals and their staffs, along with most of the foreign embassies, had moved upriver. Yet as 1937 slipped into 1938, the Japanese advance seemed practically unstoppable. From the destruction of Shanghai, to the massacre in Nanjing, to the growing vulnerability of Wuhan, the NRA government appeared powerless against the onslaught.  Now the Japanese government faced several options: expanding the scope of the war to force China into submission, which would risk further depletion of Japan's military and economic resources; establishing an alternative regime in China as a bridge for reconciliation, thereby bypassing the Nationalist government for negotiations; and engaging in indirect or direct peace negotiations with the Nationalist Government, despite the failure of previous attempts, while still seeking new opportunities for negotiation. However, the Nanjing massacre did not compel the Chinese government and its people to submit. On January 2, Chiang Kai-shek wrote in his diary, “The conditions proposed by Japan are equivalent to the conquest and extinction of our country. Rather than submitting and perishing, it is better to perish in defeat,” choosing to refuse negotiations and continue resistance.  In January 1938 there was a new escalation of hostilities. Up to that point, Japan had not officially declared war, even during the Shanghai campaign and the Nanjing massacre. However on January 11, an Imperial Conference was held in Tokyo in the presence of Emperor Hirohito. Prime Minister Konoe outlined a “Fundamental Policy to deal with the China Incident.”The Imperial Conference was attended by Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, Army Chief of Staff Prince Kan'in, Navy Minister Admiral Fushimi, and others to reassess its policy toward China. Citing the Nationalist Government's delay and lack of sincerity, the Japanese leadership decided to terminate Trautmann's mediation. At the conference, Japan articulated a dual strategy: if the Nationalist Government did not seek peace, Japan would no longer regard it as a viable negotiating partner, instead supporting emerging regimes, seeking to resolve issues through incidents, and aiming either to eliminate or incorporate the existing central government; if the Nationalist Government sought reconciliation, it would be required to cease resistance, cooperate with Japan against communism, and pursue economic cooperation, including officially recognizing Manchukuo and allowing Japanese troops in Inner Mongolia, North China, Central China, and co-governance of Shanghai. The Konoe cabinet relayed this proposal to the German ambassador in Japan on December 22, 1937: It called for: diplomatic recognition of Manchukuo; autonomy for Inner Mongolia; cessation of all anti-Japanese and anti-Manchukuo policies; cooperation between Japan, Manchukuo, and China against communism; war reparations; demilitarized zones in North China and Inner Mongolia; and a trade agreement among Japan, Manchukuo, and China.  Its terms were too severe, including reparations payable to Japan and new political arrangements that would formalize the separation of north China under Japanese control. Chiang's government would have seventy-two hours to accept; if they refused, Tokyo would no longer recognize the Nationalist government and would seek to destroy it.  On January 13, 1938, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Chonghui informed Germany that China needed a fuller understanding of the additional conditions for peace talks to make a decision. The January 15 deadline for accepting Japan's terms elapsed without Chinese acceptance. Six days after the deadline for a Chinese government reply, an Imperial Conference “Gozen Kaigi” was convened in Tokyo to consider how to handle Trautmann's mediation. The navy, seeing the war as essentially an army matter, offered no strong position; the army pressed for ending the war through diplomatic means, arguing that they faced a far more formidable Far Eastern Soviet threat at the northern Manchukuo border and wished to avoid protracted attrition warfare. Foreign Minister Kōki Hirota, however, strongly disagreed with the army, insisting there was no viable path to Trautmann's mediation given the vast gap between Chinese and Japanese positions. A second conference followed on January 15, 1938, attended by the empire's principal cabinet members and military leaders, but without the emperor's presence. The debate grew heated over whether to continue Trautmann's mediation. Hayao Tada, Deputy Chief of Army General Staff, argued for continuation, while Konoe, Hirota, Navy Minister Mitsumasa Yonai, and War Minister Hajime Sugiyama opposed him. Ultimately, Tada acceded to the position of Konoe and Hirota. On the same day, Konoe conveyed the cabinet's conclusion, termination of Trautmann's mediation, to the emperor. The Japanese government then issued a statement on January 16 declaring that it would no longer treat the Nationalist Government as a bargaining partner, signaling the establishment of a new Chinese regime that would cooperate with Japan and a realignment of bilateral relations. This became known as the first Konoe statement, through which Tokyo formally ended Trautmann's mediation attempt. The Chinese government was still weighing its response when, at noon on January 16, Konoe publicly declared, “Hereafter, the Imperial Government will not deal with the National Government.” In Japanese, this became the infamous aite ni sezu (“absolutely no dealing”). Over the following days, the Japanese government made it clear that this was a formal breach of relations, “stronger even than a declaration of war,” in the words of Foreign Minister Hirota Kōki. The Chinese ambassador to Japan, who had been in Tokyo for six months since hostilities began, was finally recalled. At the end of January, Chiang summoned a military conference and declared that the top strategic priority would be to defend the east-central Chinese city of Xuzhou, about 500 kilometers north of Wuhan. This decision, like the mobilization near Lugouqiao, was heavily influenced by the railway: Xuzhou sat at the midpoint of the Tianjin–Pukou Jinpu line, and its seizure would grant the Japanese mastery over north–south travel in central China. The Jinpu line also crossed the Longhai line, China's main cross-country artery from Lanzhou to the port of Lianyungang, north of Shanghai. The Japanese military command marked the Jinpu line as a target in spring 1938. Control over Xuzhou and the rail lines threading through it were thus seen as vital to the defense of Wuhan, which lay to the city's south. Chiang's defense strategy fit into a larger plan evolving since the 1920s, when the military thinker Jiang Baili had first proposed a long war against Japan; Jiang's foresight earned him a position as an adviser to Chiang in 1938. Jiang had previously run the Baoding military academy, a predecessor of the Whampoa academy, which had trained many of China's finest young officers in the early republic 1912–1922. Now, many of the generals who had trained under Jiang gathered in Wuhan and would play crucial roles in defending the city: Chen Cheng, Bai Chongxi, Tang Shengzhi, and Xue Yue. They remained loyal to Chiang but sought to avoid his tendency to micromanage every aspect of strategy.  Nobody could say with certainty whether Wuhan would endure the Japanese onslaught, and outsiders' predictions were gloomy. As Wuhan's inhabitants tasted their unexpected new freedoms, the Japanese pressed on with their conquest of central China. After taking Nanjing, the IJA 13th Division crossed the Yangtze River to the north and advanced to the Outang and Mingguang lines on the east bank of the Chihe River in Anhui Province, while the 2nd Army of the North China Front crossed the Yellow River to the south between Qingcheng and Jiyang in Shandong, occupied Jinan, and pressed toward Jining, Mengyin, and Qingdao. To open the Jinpu Railway and connect the northern and southern battlefields, the Japanese headquarters mobilized eight divisions, three brigades, and two detachments , totaling about 240,000 men. They were commanded by General Hata Shunroku, commander of the Central China Expeditionary Army, and Terauchi Hisaichi, commander of the North China Front Army. Their plan was a north–south advance: first seize Xuzhou, a strategic city in east China; then take Zhengzhou in the west along the Longhai Railway connecting Lanzhou and Lianyungang; and finally push toward Wuhan in the south along the Pinghan Railway connecting Beijing and Hankou. At the beginning of 1938, Japan's domestic mobilization and military reorganization had not yet been completed, and there was a shortage of troops to expand the front. At the Emperor's Imperial Conference on February 16, 1938, the General Staff Headquarters argued against launching operations before the summer of 1938, preferring to consolidate the front in 1938 and undertake a large-scale battle in 1939. Although the Northern China Expeditionary Force and the Central China Expeditionary Force proposed a plan to open the Jinpu Line to connect the northern and southern battlefields, the proposal was not approved by the domestic General Staff Headquarters. The Chinese army, commanded by Li Zongren, commander-in-chief of the Fifth War Zone, mobilized about 64 divisions and three brigades, totaling roughly 600,000 men. The main force was positioned north of Xuzhou to resist the southern Japanese advance, with a portion deployed along the southern Jinpu Railway to block the southern push and secure Xuzhou. Early in the campaign, Chiang Kai-shek redeployed the heavy artillery brigade originally promised to Han Fuju to Tang Enbo's forces. To preserve his strength, Shandong Provincial Governor Han Fuju abandoned the longstanding Yellow River defenses in Shandong, allowing the Japanese to capture the Shandong capital of Jinan in early March 1938. This defection opened the Jinpu Railway to attack. The Japanese 10th Division, under Rensuke Isogai, seized Tai'an, Jining, and Dawenkou, ultimately placing northern Shandong under Japanese control. The aim was to crush the Chinese between the two halves of a pincer movement. At Yixian and Huaiyuan, north of Xuzhou, both sides fought to the death: the Chinese could not drive back the Japanese, but the Japanese could not scatter the defenders either. At Linyi, about 50 kilometers northeast of Xuzhou, Zhang Zizhong, who had previously disgraced himself by abandoning an earlier battlefield—became a national hero for his determined efforts to stop the Japanese troops led by Itagaki Seishirō, the conqueror of Manchuria. The Japanese hoped that they could pour in as many as 400,000 troops to destroy the Chinese forces holding eastern and central China. Chiang Kai-shek was determined that this should not happen, recognizing that the fall of Xuzhou would place Wuhan in extreme danger. On April 1, 1938, he addressed Nationalist Party delegates, linking the defense of Wuhan to the fate of the party itself. He noted that although the Japanese had invaded seven provinces, they had only captured provincial capitals and main transport routes, while villages and towns off those routes remained unconquered. The Japanese, he argued, might muster more than half a million soldiers, but after eight or nine months of hard fighting they had become bogged down. Chiang asserted that as long as Guangzhou (Canton) remained in Chinese hands, it would be of little significance if the Japanese invaded Wuhan, since Guangzhou would keep China's sea links open and Guangdong, Sun Yat-sen's homeland, would serve as a revolutionary base area. If the “woren” Japanese “dwarfs” attacked Wuhan and Guangzhou, it would cost them dearly and threaten their control over the occupied zones. He reiterated his plan: “the base area for our war will not be in the zones east of the Beiping–Wuhan or Wuhan–Guangdong railway lines, but to their west.” For this reason he authorized withdrawing Chinese troops behind the railway lines. Chiang's speech mixed defiance with an explanation of why regrouping was necessary; it was a bold public posture in the face of a developing military disaster, yet it reflected the impossible balance he faced between signaling resolve and avoiding overcommitment of a city that might still fall. Holding Xuzhou as the first priority required Chiang Kai-shek to place a great deal of trust in one of his rivals: the southwestern general Li Zongren. The relationship between Chiang and Li would become one of the most ambivalent in wartime China. Li hailed from Guangxi, a province in southwestern China long regarded by the eastern heartland as half civilized. Its people had rarely felt fully part of the empire ruled from Beijing or even Nanjing, and early in the republic there was a strong push for regional autonomy. Li was part of a cohort of young officers trained in regional academies who sought to bring Guangxi under national control; he joined the Nationalist Party in 1923, the year Sun Yat-sen announced his alliance with the Soviets. Li was not a Baoding Academy graduate but had trained at Yunnan's equivalent institution, which shared similar views on military professionalism. He enthusiastically took part in the Northern Expedition (1926–1928) and played a crucial role in the National Revolutionary Army's ascent to control over much of north China. Yet after the Nanjing government took power, Li grew wary of Chiang's bid to centralize authority in his own person. In 1930 Li's so‑called “Guangxi clique” participated in the Central Plains War, the failed effort by militarist leaders to topple Chiang; although the plot failed, Li retreated to his southwest base, ready to challenge Chiang again. The occupation of Manchuria in 1931 reinforced Li's belief that a Japanese threat posed a greater danger than Chiang's centralization. The tension between the two men was evident from the outset of the war. On October 10, 1937, Chiang appointed Li commander of the Fifth War Zone; Li agreed on the condition that Chiang refrain from issuing shouling—personal commands—to Li's subordinates. Chiang complied, a sign of the value he placed on Li's leadership and the caution with which he treated Li and his Guangxi ally Bai Chongxi. As Chiang sought any possible victory amid retreat and destruction, he needed Li to deliver results. As part of the public-relations front, journalists were given access to commanders on the Xuzhou front. Li and his circle sought to shape their image as capable leaders to visiting reporters, with Du Zhongyuan among the most active observers. Du praised the “formidable southwestern general, Li Zongren,” calling him “elegant and refined” and “vastly magnanimous.” In language echoing the era's soldiers' public presentation, Du suggested that Li's forces operated under strict, even disciplined, orders “The most important point in the people's war is that . . . troops do not harass the people of the country. If the people are the water, the soldiers are the fish, and if you have fish with no water, inevitably they're going to choke; worse still is to use our water to nurture the enemy's fish — that really is incomparably stupid”.  Within the southern front, on January 26, 1938, the Japanese 13th Division attacked Fengyang and Bengbu in Anhui Province, while Li Pinxian, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the 5th War Zone, directed operations south of Xuzhou. The defending 31st Corps of the 11th Group Army, after resisting on the west bank of the Chi River, retreated to the west of Dingyuan and Fengyang. By February 3, the Japanese had captured Linhuai Pass and Bengbu. From the 9th to the 10th, the main force of the 13th Division forced a crossing of the Huai River at Bengbu and Linhuai Pass respectively, and began an offensive against the north bank. The 51st Corps, reorganized from the Central Plains Northeast Army and led by Commander Yu Xuezhong, engaged in fierce combat with the Japanese. Positions on both sides of the Huai shifted repeatedly, producing a riverine bloodbath through intense hand-to-hand fighting. After ten days of engagement, the Fifth War Zone, under Zhang Zizhong, commander of the 59th Army, rushed to the Guzhen area to reinforce the 51st Army, and the two forces stubbornly resisted the Japanese on the north bank of the Huai River. Meanwhile, on the south bank, the 48th Army of the 21st Group Army held the Luqiao area, while the 7th Army, in coordination with the 31st Army, executed a flanking attack on the flanks and rear of the Japanese forces in Dingyuan, compelling the main body of the 13th Division to redeploy to the north bank for support. Seizing the initiative, the 59th and 51st Armies launched a counteroffensive, reclaiming all positions north of the Huai River by early March. The 31st Army then moved from the south bank to the north, and the two sides faced across the river. Subsequently, the 51st and 59th Armies were ordered to reinforce the northern front, while the 31st Army continued to hold the Huai River to ensure that all Chinese forces covering the Battle of Xuzhou were safely withdrawn. Within the northern front, in late February, the Japanese Second Army began its southward push along multiple routes. The eastern axis saw the 5th Division moving south from Weixian present-day Weifang, in Shandong, capturing Yishui, Juxian, and Rizhao before pressing directly toward Linyi, as units of the Nationalist Third Corps' 40th Army and others mounted strenuous resistance. The 59th Army was ordered to reinforce and arrived on March 12 at the west bank of the Yi River in the northern suburbs of Linyi, joining the 40th Army in a counterattack that, after five days and nights of ferocious fighting, inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese and forced them to retreat toward Juxian. On the western route, the Seya Detachment (roughly a brigade) of the Japanese 10th Division crossed the Grand Canal from Jining and attacked Jiaxiang, meeting stiff resistance from the Third Army and being thwarted, while continuing to advance south along the Jinpu Railway. The Isogai Division, advancing on the northern route without awaiting help from the southeast and east, moved southward from Liangxiadian, south of Zouxian, on March 14, with the plan to strike Tengxian, present-day Tengzhou on March 15 and push south toward Xuzhou. The defending 22nd Army and the 41st Corps fought bravely and suffered heavy casualties in a hard battle that lasted until March 17, during which Wang Mingzhang, commander of the 122nd Division defending Teng County, was killed in action. Meanwhile, a separate Japanese thrust under Itagaki Seishirō landed on the Jiaodong Peninsula and occupied Qingdao, advancing along the Jiaoji Line to strike Linyi, a key military town in southern Shandong. Pang Bingxun's 40th Army engaged the invaders in fierce combat, and later, elements of Zhang Zizhong's 333rd Brigade of the 111th Division, reinforced by the 57th Army, joined Pang Bingxun's forces to launch a double-sided pincer that temporarily repelled the Japanese attack on Linyi. By late March 1938 a frightening reality loomed: the Japanese were close to prevailing on the Xuzhou front. The North China Area Army, commanded by Itagaki Seishirō, Nishio Toshizō, and Isogai Rensuke, was poised to link up with the Central China Expeditionary Force under Hata Shunroku in a united drive toward central China. Li Zongren, together with his senior lieutenants Bai Chongxi and Tang Enbo, decided to confront the invaders at Taierzhuang, the traditional stone-walled city that would become a focal point of their defense. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Nanjing falls after one of humanities worst atrocities. Chiang Kai-Shek's war command has been pushed to Wuhan, but the Japanese are not stopping their advance. Trautmann's mediation is over and now Japan has its sights on Xuzhou and its critical railway junctions. Japan does not realize it yet, but she is now entering a long war of attrition.

Why just manifest your dreams when you can dreamifest them? Harness the power of your nighttime dreams to make your daytime dreams come true! Eleven-time author and popular podcaster Kelly Sullivan Walden, aka Doctor Dream, joins us for a magical romp through her ideas around why it’s so hard to create the lives we want, and how dreams will help us finally do it! Kelly talks about how to be clear in how we ask for help from our dream world and about the difference between soul goals and ego goals. She also describes how to set up your own sleep cocoon. After the break, Kelly guides Katherine through her JETSET formalism to help find meaning in a dream. BIO: Kelly Sullivan Walden s a dream expert, TEDx speaker, and bestselling author devoted to awakening the world to the power of dreams. Kelly is passionate about empowering her clients to manifest their deepest, most soulful desires by allowing their dreaming mind to do the heavy-lifting. She has eleven books, seven oracle decks, and is host of the Dreamifesting podcast. Find our guest at: Dreamifesting.com KellySullivalWalden.com FB @KellySullivanWaldenDreams IG @kellyswalden LI @kellysullivanwalden YT @KellySullivanWalden TT @kellyswalden SS @kellysullivanwalden This show, episode number 331, was recorded during a live broadcast on October 4, 2025 at KSQD.org, community radio of Santa Cruz. Intro and outro music by Mood Science. Ambient music new every week by Rick Kleffel. Archived music can be found at Pandemiad.com. Many thanks to Rick for also engineering the show and to Erik Nelson for answering the phones. The Santa Cruz Festival of Dreams will be at the Museum of Art and History October 10-12, 2025! Information at FestivalofDreams.net Follow us at our FB group page HERE or follow #KeepSantaCruzDreaming on FB and IG. SHARE A DREAM FOR THE SHOW or a question or enquire about being a guest on the podcast by emailing Katherine Bell at katherine@ksqd.org. Follow on FB, IG, LI, & YT @ExperientialDreamwork #thedreamjournal. To learn more or to inquire about exploring your own dreams go to ExperientialDreamwork.com. The Dream Journal aims to: Increase awareness of and appreciation for nightly dreams. Inspire dream sharing and other kinds of dream exploration as a way of adding depth and meaningfulness to lives and relationships. Improve society by the increased empathy, emotional balance, and sense of wonder which dream exploration invites. A dream can be meaningful even if you don’t know what it means. The Dream Journal is produced at and airs on KSQD Santa Cruz, 90.7 FM. Catch it streaming LIVE at KSQD.org 10-11am Pacific Time on Saturdays. Call or text with your dreams or questions at 831-900-5773 or email at onair@ksqd.org. Podcasts are available on all major podcast platforms the Monday following the live show. The complete KSQD Dream Journal podcast page can be found at ksqd.org/the-dream-journal/. Closed captioning is available on the YouTube version of this podcast and an automatically generated transcript is available at Apple Podcasts. Thanks for being a Dream Journal listener! Available on all major podcast platforms. Rate it, review it, subscribe, and tell your friends.

Today supply chain success is driven by a combination of speed, reliability and innovation.  The concept is easy to understand.  Executing on this is where it gets tricky.Especially in a global landscape that seems to be constantly changing - with no indication of settling down any time soon.Today we're joined by Sean Coxall, chairman of 707 Limited, a leading provider of worldwide sourcing options and innovative supply chain solutions.  Previously, he served as President of Li & Fung's  Branded Fashion and Sportswear Group.With a major focus on speed and innovation, both in terms of product and new business models, Sean pioneered the use of digital technology in particular through the use of virtual sampling.In this podcast, he'll be sharing what he sees as both the challenges - and the opportunities  - in an apparel supply chain that is quite a lot different from what it was a few short years ago.Visit A Seat at The Table's website at https://seat.fm

Fluent Fiction - Mandarin Chinese: Rediscovering Home: A Mid-Autumn Reunion Story Find the full episode transcript, vocabulary words, and more:fluentfiction.com/zh/episode/2025-10-06-22-34-02-zh Story Transcript:Zh: 小镇的天空挂满了各色的灯笼，金桂的香气弥漫在空气中。En: The sky of the small town was filled with lanterns of various colors, with the scent of jingui permeating the air.Zh: 小镇在桂林的郊外，这里的人们正在为中秋节做准备。En: The town is on the outskirts of Guilin, where the people are preparing for the Mid-Autumn Festival.Zh: 美，来自城里，刚回来几天。En: Mei, who came from the city, has just returned a few days ago.Zh: 她原本是个在城里工作的年轻女人，但心里始终有个缺憾——和家人的距离越来越远。En: She was originally a young woman working in the city, but in her heart, there was always a regret—the growing distance from her family.Zh: 美在这个秋天回到这个小镇。她想在热闹的节日中找回失去的亲情。En: Mei returned to this small town this autumn, hoping to regain the lost kinship amidst the festive celebration.Zh: 小镇的广场上，李和陈正在和其他家人一起忙着准备月饼。En: In the town square, Li and Chen are busy preparing mooncakes with other family members.Zh: 月亮快要升起来了，人们正聚集在广场上，期待着迟来的团圆。En: The moon is about to rise, and people are gathering in the square, anticipating a long-awaited reunion.Zh: 美忽然心生畏惧，害怕长时间的离开让自己变得生疏。En: Suddenly, Mei felt a pang of fear, afraid that her long absence had made her estranged.Zh: 她走到奶奶身边，轻声问：“奶奶，你们会不会觉得我离开太久了？”En: She walked over to her grandmother and softly asked, "Grandma, do you feel I've been away for too long?"Zh: 奶奶笑了，轻拍美的肩膀，“傻孩子，不管多久，你永远都是我们家的一员。”En: Grandma smiled, gently patting Mei's shoulder, "Silly child, no matter how long it's been, you'll always be part of our family."Zh: 美的心里一暖，眼眶湿润。En: Mei's heart warmed, and her eyes moistened.Zh: 灯笼队伍开始行进，美决定参与其中。En: The lantern parade began, and Mei decided to join in.Zh: 灯笼的光芒温暖着小镇，也温暖着她的心。En: The glow from the lanterns warmed the small town as well as her heart.Zh: 她和家人一起提着灯笼，感受着家乡的气息。En: She carried a lantern with her family, embracing the essence of her hometown.Zh: 灯笼映出的光中，美第一次觉得安心。En: In the glow of the lanterns, Mei felt at ease for the first time.Zh: 晚些时候，全家人坐在庭院里，看月亮。En: Later, the whole family sat in the courtyard, watching the moon.Zh: 满月的光撒在每个人脸上，连同笑声一起，洒向夜空。En: The full moon's light shone on everyone's face, along with laughter, spreading into the night sky.Zh: 美望着身边的亲人，心中有了新的方向。En: Mei looked at her relatives beside her and found a new direction in her heart.Zh: 这个秋夜，灯笼的光暖了她的心，En: On this autumn night, the light of the lanterns warmed her heart.Zh: 她发现，不论时间和距离如何变换，家的温暖永在，亲情恒久不变。En: She realized that no matter how time and distance change, the warmth of home remains, and family ties endure.Zh: 美知道，她真正的归属，还是这里。En: Mei knew that her true belonging is here.Zh: 中秋的团圆夜，周围是温柔的微风，点点灯火与满月的光辉互相辉映，美不再迷失，En: On the Mid-Autumn reunion night, surrounded by gentle breezes, flickering lights, and the brilliance of the full moon, Mei was no longer lost.Zh: 她重新找到了属于自己的位置。En: She had rediscovered her place. Vocabulary Words:lanterns: 灯笼various: 各色permeating: 弥漫outskirts: 郊外regret: 缺憾distance: 距离kinship: 亲情anticipating: 期待pang: 心生estranged: 生疏relatives: 亲人moistened: 湿润festive: 节日patting: 轻拍embracing: 感受courtyard: 庭院brilliance: 光辉reunion: 团圆laughter: 笑声endure: 恒久belonging: 归属guilty: 愧疚essence: 气息unfamiliar: 生分flickering: 点点gentle: 温柔rediscovered: 重新找到awaited: 迟来的warming: 温暖amidst: 在...中

De manicure a fundadora de uma escola que já formou mais de 30 mil alunos: a jornada de Flávia Leal é uma aula sobre fé, disciplina e coragem.Neste episódio emocionante, Flávia compartilha tudo — da faxina ao império da belez.Uma brasileira que chegou nos EUA sem falar inglês, enfrentou a perda da mãe, sobreviveu a um casamento abusivo, foi à falência…e deu a volta por cima construindo uma das maiores escolas de beleza para imigrantes nos Estados Unidos.Por que assistir:• Uma história real de superação e propósito• Como recomeçar do zero e transformar dor em missão• O papel da fé, da educação e da comunidade na jornada do imigrante• Lições de liderança feminina e empoderamento profissionalO que você vai aprender:• Como abrir uma escola nos EUA — estrutura, licenças e regulação• Por que mindset e espiritualidade são armas poderosas no empreendedorismo• Como encontrar força nas adversidades mais profundas• O impacto de formar outros imigrantes e multiplicar oportunidades• O que significa, na prática, prosperar com propósito nos Estados UnidosUma conversa honesta, sem romantização, sobre recomeços, fé inabalável e a força de uma mulher que decidiu mudar não só a própria vida, mas a de milhares.

De au pair em Nova York a eletricista licenciada em Massachusetts, Jana construiu uma trajetória marcada por resiliência, planejamento e reinvenção.Após perder tudo em um divórcio, ela recomeçou do zero — conciliando maternidade, estudo e trabalho pesado — até conquistar 9 licenças e se tornar referência em um setor dominado por homens.Por que assistir:• História real de superação de uma imigrante brasileira nos EUA• Como transformar necessidade em oportunidade• O impacto do inglês, da integração cultural e da mentalidade de crescimento• A força das mulheres na construção civil e na elétricaO que você vai aprender:• Passo a passo para tirar a licença de eletricista em Massachusetts (8.000h de campo + 600h de teoria)• A importância de planejamento e diversificação para empreendedores imigrantes• Como recomeçar após grandes perdas pessoais e financeiras• Lições sobre liderança, networking e resiliência• O que significa prosperar de verdade como imigrante nos EUAUma conversa inspiradora, sem romantização, sobre recomeços, disciplina e a construção de um legado.• Canal do IR: /@imigranterico• IR Educação: instagram.com/imigranterico.ofc• Redes da convidada: instagram.com/srzjana• Parcerias / contato comercial: info@imigranterico.com

Listen now: Spotify, Apple and YouTubeIf you've ever considered turning your expertise into a scalable product—or wondered what it actually takes to build and sell a useful AI copilot—this episode is for you.In this episode, Ben shares the full behind-the-scenes story of how he packaged his product management knowledge into a sellable, high-leverage AI Practice Copilot. From initial validation to prototyping in Claude to vibe coding in Cursor and shipping using various AI tools, he walks through every decision point in the journey. You'll learn how to pick the right use case, what tools to use at each step, and the key insights that helped him turn his ideas into a real product in the market.Whether you're a founder, PM, coach, or subject matter expert, this conversation is packed with actionable tactics to help you create, position, and monetize your own AI-native product.All episodes of the podcast are also available on Spotify, Apple and YouTube.New to the pod? Subscribe below to get the next episode in your inbox

Tựa Đề: Chuyện... Dạn Dĩ (Phần 2); Tác Giả: Mục Sư Nguyễn Đình Liễu; Loạt Bài: Bài Viết

本期我们邀请主播邱老师来和我们讨论野火。邱老师最近发表在Nature的文章讨论了美国野火在气候变化影响下的空气污染和健康影响。Qiu, M., Li, J., Gould, C. F., Jing, R., Kelp, M., Childs, M. L., ... & Burke, M. (2025). Wildfire smoke exposure and mortality burden in the US under climate change. Nature先导：00:10 邱老师的文章讲了什么？02:26 邱老师为什么感兴趣野火？目前关于野火的研究主要关注什么？08:30 介绍Nature文章的缘由、经过？11:00 发表后的采访关注的问题是什么？13:15 为什么顶刊能发这么多野火的文章？（最近一个月超过五篇Nature和Science关注野火！）第一部分：野火的主要科学事实：16:55 全球野火是在增加吗？从发生次数和强度来说？哪些区域比较特殊？21:17 近年来野火增多的主要归因是什么？26:30 野火的发生未来会更频繁吗？28:00 野火的发生会有正反馈/负反馈吗？30:00 富人郊区化会导致野火在人类居住地更频发吗？野火可以被人为控制吗？33:00 野火对全球碳排放的影响有多大？第二部分：野火的健康影响34:00 野火对空气污染的影响如何？36:00 野火烟雾对健康危害有多大？39:00 如何模拟未来野火的影响？42:00 富人居住区会不会受到野火影响更大？44:00 野火的健康影响链条评估哪里可以提升？48:00 野火是第几大污染源？49:00 未来如何应对野火本期剪辑：觉狐碳笑风生关注全球和中国的能源转型、气候变化和可持续发展问题，特别是中国实现碳达峰、碳中和的科学、技术、政策、政治、经济、社会和文化问题。大家可以在小宇宙播客、喜马拉雅、QQ音乐、Podcast等平台收听我们，我们同步更新的微信公众号“环境科学与政策”会有更多的专业讨论。大家也可以通过留言或在微信公众号“环境科学与政策”联系我们。 开场、转场、结尾音乐来自The Podcast Host and Alitu: The Podcast Maker app.

Fluent Fiction - Mandarin Chinese: Harvesting Friendship: A Rice Farmer's Journey to Unity Find the full episode transcript, vocabulary words, and more:fluentfiction.com/zh/episode/2025-10-05-07-38-20-zh Story Transcript:Zh: 秋天的天空清澈如洗，金色的稻田在夕阳的映照下，散发着温暖的光芒。En: The autumn sky was as clear as if it had been washed, and the golden rice fields shone warmly under the glow of the setting sun.Zh: 稻田边缘是连绵的山峦，仿佛为这个小村庄围上了一道天然的屏障。En: At the edges of the fields were rolling mountains, as if they were a natural barrier enclosing this small village.Zh: 魏是一名勤劳的农夫。En: Wei was a hardworking farmer.Zh: 他的家庭对他来说是最重要的。En: His family was the most important thing to him.Zh: 他希望在中秋节前完成稻谷的丰收，让家人过一个温暖的团圆节。En: He hoped to finish the harvest of the rice before the Mid-Autumn Festival so that his family could have a warm reunion.Zh: 然而，几天前，魏不小心扭伤了脚踝。En: However, a few days ago, Wei accidentally sprained his ankle.Zh: 虽然疼痛不已，他却不愿开口向人求助，心里始终觉得自己能做到。En: Despite the significant pain, he was reluctant to ask for help, feeling convinced that he could manage on his own.Zh: 每天早晨，魏都会拄着拐杖走进田地。En: Every morning, Wei would hobble into the fields leaning on a crutch.Zh: 尽管步履蹒跚，他心里只有一个目标：按时收割稻谷。En: Although he walked with a limp, he had only one goal in his heart: to harvest the rice on time.Zh: 可是，随着日子一天天过去，魏的疼痛加剧，工作进度却远远落后。En: But as the days went by, his pain worsened and his progress lagged far behind.Zh: 看着满田的稻谷，他心急如焚。En: Seeing the field full of rice left him both anxious and worried.Zh: 一天，魏拖着重重的双腿走在田埂上，终于到达了顶点。En: One day, Wei dragged his heavy legs across the narrow paths between the fields, finally reaching his limit.Zh: 疼痛和疲惫使他无法再继续下去，他一下子瘫坐在田间。En: The pain and exhaustion made it impossible for him to continue, and he collapsed into the field.Zh: 那一刻，他终于意识到自己一个人根本无法应对，骄傲使他迟迟不愿开口求助。En: At that moment, he finally realized that he couldn't handle it all alone, and it was his pride that had kept him from seeking help.Zh: 这时，村里的朋友李和金碰巧路过。En: Just then, his village friends Li and Jin happened to pass by.Zh: 他们见状，赶忙上前搀扶魏。En: Seeing his plight, they hurried over to help Wei up.Zh: “魏，我们来帮你！”他们齐声说。En: "Wei, we'll help you!" they said in unison.Zh: 魏犹豫了一下，但看到朋友们真挚的眼神，他终于点了点头。En: Wei hesitated for a moment, but seeing the sincere looks in his friends' eyes, he finally nodded.Zh: 在李和金的帮助下，魏终于放下了负担。En: With the help of Li and Jin, Wei finally let go of his burdens.Zh: 三个人齐心协力，不到几天，就完成了整个稻田的收割。En: The three of them worked together, and in just a few days, they completed the harvest of the entire field.Zh: 中秋节的晚上，大家围坐在一起，品尝着月饼，欣赏着那轮圆月。En: On the night of the Mid-Autumn Festival, they all sat together, savoring yuebing (mooncakes) and admiring the full moon.Zh: 魏感受到了从未有过的温暖和满足。En: Wei felt a warmth and satisfaction he had never experienced before.Zh: “谢谢你们。”魏诚恳地对李和金说。En: "Thank you both," Wei said earnestly to Li and Jin.Zh: “我学会了依靠朋友的重要性。En: "I've learned the importance of relying on friends.Zh: 原来，合作才是最强大的力量。”En: It turns out that cooperation is the strongest power."Zh: 那是一个充满团结和友情的中秋节。En: It was a Mid-Autumn Festival filled with unity and friendship.Zh: 魏不仅收获了稻谷，还收获了珍贵的友谊。En: Wei not only harvested the rice but also gained a precious friendship.Zh: 月光铺满大地，稻田在秋风中轻轻摇曳，仿佛在述说着这个关于合作的故事。En: The moonlight covered the earth, and the rice fields swayed gently in the autumn breeze, as if narrating this story about cooperation. Vocabulary Words:autumn: 秋天barrier: 屏障hardworking: 勤劳reunion: 团圆sprained: 扭伤ankle: 脚踝hobble: 蹒跚crutch: 拐杖limp: 瘸着anxious: 心急如焚plight: 困境burdens: 负担savoring: 品尝earnestly: 诚恳unity: 团结cooperation: 合作exhaustion: 疲惫collapse: 瘫坐pride: 骄傲let go: 放下breeze: 微风narrating: 述说satisfaction: 满足significant: 显著的pain: 疼痛realized: 意识到hesitated: 犹豫sincere: 真挚的admiring: 欣赏fields: 田地

Taylor Swift has merged pop royalty and football aristocracy! This episode dives into the cultural chaos ignited by a single line in her new song, "Wi$h Li$t," which name-drops Real Madrid. We explore why a Real Madrid contract is Swift's perfect metaphor for global, elite ambition, and how the football world—including a brilliant clap-back from rivals Atlético Madrid —responded. From her record-breaking Eras Tour concerts at the Santiago Bernabéu to her recent ties to the NFL, we analyze how Swift is seamlessly erasing the lines between music, celebrity, and global sports fandom.Taylor Swift, Real Madrid, Wish List, Soccer Pop Culture, Santiago Bernabéu

Mark discusses the Obamas hanging out on Steven Spielberg's yacht; people in Chicago are complaining about the Obama Presidential library; Putin's calling up 135,000 more soldiers to go to Ukraine; LI pizza place fighting back against bad customers; 7-11 starting in-store dining and offering fresher food; AOL getting rid of dial-up Internet service; US test scores for kids are at all-time lows; major changes at NBC and MSNBC; luxury housing market in NYC is going crazy, bucking national trends in real state and the downsides to Ozempic. 

Mark discusses the Obamas hanging out on Steven Spielberg's yacht; people in Chicago are complaining about the Obama Presidential library; Putin's calling up 135,000 more soldiers to go to Ukraine; LI pizza place fighting back against bad customers; 7-11 starting in-store dining and offering fresher food; AOL getting rid of dial-up Internet service; US test scores for kids are at all-time lows; major changes at NBC and MSNBC; luxury housing market in NYC is going crazy, bucking national trends in real state and the downsides to Ozempic. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

"But you don't know the life of a showgirl, babe." Join us for our immediate reactions to Taylor Swift's The Life of a Showgirl album! We break down our first impressions track by track, exploring the sophisticated lyricism hidden beneath high-energy pop production, the album's theatrical motifs, and how Taylor uses the showgirl concept as both performance and vulnerability. From the literary references in "Fate of Ophelia" to the musical callbacks throughout, we discuss how this album ties together themes from across Taylor's discography while introducing bold new perspectives on fame, relationships, and growing up in the spotlight. Mentioned in this episode: Hamlet  Macbeth Dante's Inferno Rapunzel fairy tale Elizabeth Taylor Jackson 5  George Michael The Godfather  Scandal (TV show) Episode Highlights:  [00:30] Our initial reactions to “The Life of a Showgirl” [07:39] Fate of Ophelia - Shakespeare references and literary vibes [12:28] Elizabeth Taylor - Loneliness of fame and purple eyes [14:34] Opalite - ABBA vibes and haunted houses [17:42] Father Figure - Industry power dynamics and masculinity [21:42] Eldest Daughter - Track 5 emotions and millennial core [27:06] Ruin the Friendship - High school storytelling and Abigail callback [30:55] Actually Romantic - Diss track energy but supportive message [34:39] Wi$h Li$t - Evolving desires and life phases [40:02] Wood - Adult themes with childhood superstitions [45:03] Canceled! - Something wicked this way comes [47:54] Honey - Terms of endearment and passive aggression [52:00] The Life of a Showgirl - Behind the scenes vs performance   Follow AP Taylor Swift podcast on social!  TikTok → tiktok.com/@APTaylorSwift Instagram → instagram.com/APTaylorSwift YouTube → youtube.com/@APTaylorSwift Link Tree →linktr.ee/aptaylorswift Bookshop.org → bookshop.org/shop/apts Libro.fm →  tinyurl.com/aptslibro Contact us at aptaylorswift@gmail.com  Affiliate Codes:  Krowned Krystals - krownedkrystals.com use code APTS at checkout for 10% off!  Libro.fm - Looking for an audiobook? Check out our Libro.fm playlist and use code APTS30 for 30% off books found here tinyurl.com/aptslibro   This podcast is neither related to nor endorsed by Taylor Swift, her companies, or record labels. All opinions are our own. Intro music produced by Scott Zadig aka Scotty Z.

This week on The Estherpreneur Podcast, I'm sharing a message I didn't plan to record—but one the Holy Spirit pressed on my heart for you.If you've ever walked through a season where God seemed silent or the future felt uncertain, this conversation will help you:Discern the difference between God's discipline and rejection.See how loss can become protection, not punishment.Anchor yourself when answers feel delayed.Uncover the hidden direction tucked inside God's quiet seasons.It's raw. It's timely. And it may be exactly what you didn't know you needed today.If this episode stirred something in you, it's time to take the next step. Join my Business Unlimited Group Mentoring Program—a Christ-centered community where we fast, pray, plan, and build together with prophetic precision and practical strategies.

Send Dr. Li a text here. Please leave your email address if you would like a reply, thanks.In this inspiring solo episode, Dr. Christine Li invites you to discover how to get more done by thinking bigger and making small, positive shifts in your mindset. Fresh from leading her signature Vision Board Workshop, Christine shares practical steps for moving past limiting beliefs, using affirmations, and harnessing the power of visualization to craft your ideal future. You'll learn how to identify and challenge the thoughts that keep you stuck, embrace courageous action, and choose the kind of energy you want to bring to your goals. Whether you're looking to reignite your motivation or clarify your vision for success, this episode is packed with exercises and encouragement to help you move forward—one empowered step at a time. Plus, don't miss her special free download on taking more action, available at maketimeforsuccesspodcast.com/action.Timestamps:To get the free download that accompanies this episode, go to https://maketimeforsuccesspodcast.com/actionTo sign up for the Waitlist for the Simply Productive Program, go to https://maketimeforsuccesspodcast.com/SPFor more information on the Make Time for Success podcast, visit: https://www.maketimeforsuccesspodcast.comGain Access to Dr. Christine Li's Free Resource Library -- 12 downloadable tools and templates to help you bypass the impulse to procrastinate: https://procrastinationcoach.mykajabi.com/freelibraryTo work with Dr. Li on a weekly basis in her coaching and accountability program, register for The Success Lab here: https://www.procrastinationcoach.com/labConnect with Us!Dr. Christine LiWebsite: https://www.procrastinationcoach.comFacebook Group: https://www.facebook.com/groups/procrastinationcoachInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/procrastinationcoach/TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@procrastinationcoachThe Success Lab: https://maketimeforsuccesspodcast.com/lab                        Simply Productive: https://maketimeforsuccesspodcast.com/SP

Send Carla a message!This episode is a calm, practical reset for the final quarter of the year: clear the mental clutter, refocus on what you can influence, and choose a posture that steadies your next steps. By the end, you'll have a short list of priorities, a next right step, and a posture that supports the life you want to live now. Learn more about Carla:Website: https:/www.carlareeves.com/Connect on LI: https://www.linkedin.com/in/reevescarla/Connect on Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/@differentlythepodcastGo to https://carlareeves.com/free-class to get The Class schedule, sign up, and/or pass it on to a friend. Each month is a new topic. Come hang out and learn with us for FREE! Book a Complimentary Strategy Call with Carla: https://bookme.name/carlareeves/strategycall If you enjoyed this episode, be sure to share it with a friend. A free way to support our show is by leaving a five-star rating and review on your favorite podcast player. It's a chance to tell us what you love about the show and it helps others discover it, too. Thank you for listening!

In this episode of the Epigenetics Podcast, we talked with Mo Motamedi from the Center for Cancer Research at Massachusetts General Hospital about his work on RNA-mediated epigenetic regulation. The Interview starts with Dr. Motamedi sharing his personal journey into the realm of biology, sparked by a familial inclination towards science and a challenge to excel in a field that initially felt daunting. His passion was ignited during a genetics class, as he recognized the quantitative nature of the discipline amidst the evolution of modern techniques like qPCR and high-throughput sequencing. Dr. Motamedi goes on to articulate the importance of understanding the interplay between genetics and broader biological systems, emphasizing that an insightful grasp of evolution is vital for decoding cellular mechanisms. He reflects on his time in a postdoctoral lab under Danish Moazet, investigating RNA interference (RNAi) and its unexpected nuclear roles, contributing significantly to the understanding of how RNAi is involved in gene silencing via chromatin interaction. As his narrative unfolds, Dr. Motamedi provides deep insights into his own lab's work, which focuses on the establishment and maintenance of epigenetic states and their implications in cancer epigenetics. He discusses groundbreaking discoveries related to RNAi and heterochromatin, detailing experiments that unveil how specific proteins contribute to transcriptional and post-transcriptional gene silencing. A pivotal theme emerges: the complex dynamics of genome evolution and chromatin organization can be reshaped under various biological contexts, including the quiescent state of cells under stress. Moreover, the discussion traverses recent publications from Dr. Motamedi's lab, revealing how they identify long non-coding RNAs that function as silencers at centromeres, an essential mechanism that aids in the establishment of heterochromatin independently of RNAi. His findings advocate for the idea that well-structured genome organization can lead to more efficient gene regulation, which can also be crucial in therapeutic contexts for various cancers. References Motamedi, M. R., Hong, E. J., Li, X., Gerber, S., Denison, C., Gygi, S., & Moazed, D. (2008). HP1 proteins form distinct complexes and mediate heterochromatic gene silencing by nonoverlapping mechanisms. Molecular cell, 32(6), 778–790. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.molcel.2008.10.026 Joh, R. I., Khanduja, J. S., Calvo, I. A., Mistry, M., Palmieri, C. M., Savol, A. J., Ho Sui, S. J., Sadreyev, R. I., Aryee, M. J., & Motamedi, M. (2016). Survival in Quiescence Requires the Euchromatic Deployment of Clr4/SUV39H by Argonaute-Associated Small RNAs. Molecular cell, 64(6), 1088–1101. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.molcel.2016.11.020 Joh, R. I., Lawrence, M. S., Aryee, M. J., & Motamedi, M. (2021). Gene clustering drives the transcriptional coherence of disparate biological processes in eukaryotes. Systems Biology. https://doi.org/10.1101/2021.04.17.440292 Related Episodes Evolutionary Forces Shaping Mammalian Gene Regulation (Emily Wong) Chromatin Evolution (Arnau Sebé-Pedrós) The Role of lncRNAs in Tumor Growth and Treatment (Sarah Diermeier) Contact Epigenetics Podcast on Mastodon Epigenetics Podcast on Bluesky Dr. Stefan Dillinger on LinkedIn Active Motif on LinkedIn Active Motif on Bluesky Email: podcast@activemotif.com

On this episode of Health Gig, Doro and Tricia welcome Dr. William Li, Medical Director of the Angiogenesis Foundation, to talk about metabolism and fat as an organ. He begins the conversation with the assertion that health is not merely the absence of disease but a result of our body's hardwiring and defense systems. He then outlines the four phases of metabolism throughout a person's life and highlights the importance of stress management, sleep, and nutrition in maintaining a healthy metabolism. Dr. Li provides listeners with key concepts to focus on for proactive, informed health management. This is the first of a two-part conversation.