Podcasts about Shandong

In this episode I'm joined by author Eve J. Chung to discuss her latest book The Young Will Remember, a historical fiction novel set during the Korean War. We discuss her book, different historical narratives and memories of the Korean War, complex questions of identity on the Korean Peninsula, how the war affected Asian Americans back in the United States, imperialism and strategic bombing, the sexual abuse of women by the Japanese military during World War II as well as it's legacy and impact, women's experience of the Korean War, the psychology of ordinary people during the war, and much more. Eve J. Chung is a Taiwanese American lawyer and women's human rights specialist. She has worked on a range of issues, including torture, sexual violence, contemporary forms of slavery, and discriminatory legislation. Her writing is inspired by social justice movements, and the continued struggle for equality and fundamental freedoms worldwide. She currently lives in New York with her husband, two children, and two dogs.  Eve was also on the podcast a few years ago to discuss her first book, Daughters of Shandong. You can listen to that one here.  -Consider Supporting the Podcast!- Leave a rating or review on apple podcasts or spotify! Support the podcast on Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/reflectinghistory Check out my podcast series on Aftersun, Piranesi, Arcane, The Dark Knight Trilogy, and Nazi Germany and the Battle for the Human Heart here: https://www.reflectinghistory.com/bonuscontent Try my podcast series "Nazi Germany and the Battle for the Human Heart"-- What led to the rise of Nazi Germany? The answer may surprise you…Why do 'good' people support evil leaders? What allure does fascism hold that enables it to garner popular support? To what extent are ordinary people responsible for the development of authoritarian evil? This 13 part podcast series explores these massive questions and more through the lens of Nazi Germany and the ordinary people who collaborated or resisted as the Third Reich expanded. You'll not only learn about the horrifying, surprising, and powerful ways in which the Nazis seized and maintained power, but also fundamental lessons about what fascism is-how to spot it and why it spreads. Through exploring the past, I hope to unlock lessons that everyone can apply to the present day. Check it out on my Patreon page at: https://www.patreon.com/reflectinghistory. Try my podcast series "Piranesi: Exploring the Infinite Halls of a Literary Masterpiece"-- This podcast series is a deep analysis of Susanna Clark's literary masterpiece "Piranesi." Whether you are someone who is reading the novel for academic purposes, or you simply want to enjoy an incredible story for it's own sake, this podcast series goes chapter by chapter into the plot, characters, and themes of the book..."The Beauty of the House is immeasurable; it's kindness infinite." Piranesi lives in an infinite house, with no long-term memory and only a loose sense of identity. As the secrets of the House deepen and the mystery of his life becomes more sinister, Piranesi must discover who he is and how this brings him closer to the "Great and Secret Knowledge" that the House contains. Touching on themes of memory, identity, mental health, knowledge, reason, experience, meaning, reflection, ideals, and more…Piranesi will be remembered as one of the great books of the 21st century. Hope you enjoy the series as much as I enjoyed making it. Check it out at https://www.patreon.com/reflectinghistory. Subscribe to my newsletter! A free, low stress, monthly-quarterly email offering historical perspective on modern day issues, behind the scenes content on my latest podcast episodes, and historical lessons/takeaways from the world of history, psychology, and philosophy: https://www.reflectinghistory.com/newsletter.  

Last time we spoke about the first phase of the One Hundred Regiment Offensive. On 20 August 1940, forces launched the Zhengtai Campaign, part of the "Hundred Regiments Offensive," aiming to disrupt Japan's transport network and thus weaken its "cage-and-strongpoint" defense. Orders from the Eighth Route Army split tasks: the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region attacked the eastern Zheng–Tai line, the 129th Division struck the western section , and the 120th Division hit the Tongpu Railway and the Fen–Li Highway. Success was to be judged by the damage inflicted on the Zheng–Tai line. Preparations were conducted under strict secrecy: reconnaissance teams mapped Japanese strongholds with help from villagers; communities stockpiled grain, ammunition, and tools, and trained for demolition, including heating and bending rails. At night, units infiltrated stations and villages, seized positions, and destroyed bridges, power lines, roads, and mines across multiple columns; rain slowed movement and shaped the fighting. By early September, the Zheng–Tai line and related transport routes were severed, isolating strongpoints and hindering reinforcement.    #203 The One Hundred Regiment Offensive Phase Two Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. During the second phase, the Hundred Regiments Offensive stopped being a single burst of action and became a sustained attempt to keep the Japanese occupation system off-balance. More regiments entered the fighting until, by the scale of commitment on the map, 104 regiments were involved. This matters because it changes what the campaign was: not merely a set of raids, but an effort to broaden pressure so that the enemy could not concentrate everything in one place at one time. Years later, Peng Dehuai—the commander closely associated with the Hundred Regiments offensive—described how the entry of these units felt as "spontaneous." That word can sound mysterious, so it helps to interpret it in operational terms. "Spontaneous" here does not mean unplanned chaos; it means that once the offensive logic took hold—once units saw that Japanese movement and control were being disrupted—local commanders and regiments felt empowered to join the fight without always waiting for the Eighth Route Army headquarters to issue fresh, detailed instructions for each smaller step. In other words, the campaign became something like an expanding network: local success and shared strategic perception fed into more participation across regions. Strategically, the campaign was guided by political and military guidance issued on September 10, 1940 by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. That instruction tied current operations to the earlier political-military framework of the July 7 Declaration and the July 7 Decision. The instruction argued that the moment mattered: it called for focusing "main efforts" on striking the Japanese army during a period when unity was being strengthened. It specifically urged that, based on the experience of the North China Hundred Regiments Offensive, Communist forces should organize one or more planned large-scale offensive operations in Shandong and Central China. In North China, the instruction pushed for expansion into Japanese army areas that had not yet been attacked—because the battlefield effect of the campaign was not only measured in immediate battlefield outcomes, but in reducing enemy-occupied space, enlarging base areas, breaking through blockade lines, and improving combat effectiveness. That last phrase—"Striking the enemy and attacking our allies is the general policy of military operations at present"—was the harsh shorthand for the operational reality: the campaign had to prevent Japanese occupation from appearing stable and manageable. If the occupation system could treat insurgency as "localized trouble," it would recover quickly. If, instead, occupation became dangerous in multiple places at once—requiring constant defense, constant movement, constant reinforcement—then the Japanese would be forced into a defensive posture that undermined their ability to exploit control. On September 16, 1940, the headquarters issued the second phase plan with a clear aim: expand results from the first phase. The headquarters explained the second phase would continue with an emphasis on disrupting Japanese transportation and destroying some strongholds that had penetrated deep into the base areas. This reveals the campaign's real "background and stakes": the offensive wasn't built around capturing territory in the traditional sense alone. It was built around breaking the system that makes occupation work. In the enemy's logic, occupation relies on movement: soldiers need to move, supplies need to be shipped, and reinforcement must be routed quickly to where trouble appears. Transportation infrastructure—roads, railways, bridges, power lines—forms the skeleton of control. Strongholds and outposts are the organs that occupy space, but they depend on that skeleton. If transportation becomes unreliable, strongholds become isolated islands. If strongholds become isolated, the Japanese must decide between (1) defending each island and spreading themselves thin, or (2) leaving some islands to contain the rest—either way, control weakens. Strongpoints—whether forts, fortified villages, gatehouses, or road blocks—also function as a "cage-and-silkworm" system: they are placed so Japanese forces can consolidate inside them, while routes outside are controlled or denied. In that model, even a small disruption can trigger a major ripple effect. When highways or key segments of rail are repeatedly broken, Japanese units cannot move "cleanly." They must detour, slow down, repair under threat, or escort repairs with larger forces than they prefer. Every extra hour spent repairing is an hour not spent consolidating. Every detour is a chance for ambush or for further sabotage. The second phase sought to exploit that dependency deliberately. That strategic framing explains why, even as the campaign broadened, different regions emphasized different battles. The Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region mainly fought the Lai-Ling Campaign, the 129th Division mainly fought the Yu-Liao Campaign, and the 120th Division focused on attacking the Tong-Pu Railway. They were not separate stories. They were different methods of attacking the same underlying vulnerability: the occupier's ability to move, reinforce, and coordinate. In Jin-Cha-Ji's sector, the stakes were especially sharp around Laiyuan and Lingqiu. The Japanese forces stationed in Mongolia had occupied those areas and penetrated deeply into the northwestern parts of the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region. Japanese strength around these positions included elements of the 2nd Independent Mixed Brigade and the 26th Division, totaling more than 1,500 men, plus more than 1,000 puppet troops. The presence of puppet forces mattered not only for manpower, but because puppet troops supported the occupier's local control apparatus: they served as locally sourced enforcers, scouts, guards, and "administration-adjacent" security. Removing or weakening them was part of disrupting occupation credibility and local stability. Because the Japanese had been attacked in the first phase, they did not respond by retreating into passivity. They increased troops at each stronghold. Laiyuan City alone was reinforced to around 500 men, and the Japanese strengthened fortifications and stockpiled food and ammunition. This meant the defenders were preparing for a second round: not a sudden surprise raid, but a sustained threat that would test their ability to endure isolation and keep their network intact. Under these conditions, the Jin-Cha-Ji leadership decided to mobilize forces for the Lai-Ling Campaign, beginning at 22:00 on September 22, 1940. Here the background and stakes show up in the campaign's timing and tactics. The objective was not to "beat the defenders in open battle" only; it was to attack in ways that would prevent consolidation. By pushing on county areas and surrounding strongholds immediately, the attackers aimed to force the defenders into reactive mode—closing gates, shifting forces into defensive positions, and preparing for fights that would consume time and ammunition. The right wing launched a fierce attack on Laiyuan County and surrounding strongholds. After a night of hard fighting, the east, west, and south gates were taken, and the Japanese troops retreated into the city. Taking gates matters because it compresses space. It turns a wider defensive perimeter into a narrower, more concentrated posture. It also creates a psychological and operational trap: defenders who retreat into the city may survive longer as a fortified concentration, but their ability to conduct aggressive movement outside their walls—and their ability to receive reinforcements through many approaches—becomes more limited. In the night of September 23, the 2nd Regiment, supported by a battalion of the 1st Regiment and artillery, attacked Sanjia Village, described as an important enemy stronghold on the Laiyuan–Yixian highway, roughly 10 kilometers east of Laiyuan City. Highways are not just routes; they are corridors that connect strongholds to each other and to supply lines. By capturing a stronghold on a highway, the campaign attempted to break a portion of the corridor network feeding the city. The attackers annihilated most of the enemy and captured the village. At the same time, the 3rd Regiment attacked Dongtuanbao, northeast of Laiyuan City, and by the night of September 24, they had taken surrounding fortifications and forced remaining enemies into only a few houses inside the village. Then, on September 25, the enemy burned weapons, supplies, and food stored at the stronghold, preparing for a breakout. That detail reveals a key stake of stronghold warfare: if defenders believe they cannot hold and cannot escape, they may destroy supplies rather than let attackers seize them intact. It's a grim tactical psychology—destroying stores can deny the enemy immediate benefit, even if it reduces defenders' chances of future endurance. When the attackers launched another fierce assault and the remaining defenders, with no hope of escape, threw themselves into the flames and perished, the event underscored the "closed-options" nature of the battle: the stronghold system was being compressed until breakout became impossible. On September 26, other right-wing units, together with the 9th Regiment of the Pingxi Military Sub-district, captured 13 strongholds including Taohuabao, Bailebao, Jijiazhuang, Xinzhuang, Beikou, Xiabeitou, Baishikou, Zhongzhuang, Wangxidong, Liujiazui, Zhangjiayu, Beishifo, and Jinjiajing. Capturing strongholds in clusters has a strategic function. It doesn't just remove personnel; it interrupts local control geography. It makes it harder for defenders inside the city to extend influence outward and harder for them to create new safe points for movement. But the Japanese did what well-prepared occupiers can do: reinforce at the most important time and the most important place. On the second day after the start, Japanese reinforcement began from Zhangjiakou and other locations. Roads had not been completely destroyed, so the Japanese could advance rapidly. This becomes a major background lesson of the second phase. The first phase had demonstrated the power of sabotage to disrupt Japanese movement. But by the time second-phase campaigns began, the Japanese were not ignorant—they were learning. Where sabotage had fully severed roads, reinforcement could be delayed or routed into danger. Where sabotage remained incomplete, reinforcement could arrive quickly, changing the battle's character from attack-dominant to defense-dominant. By noon on September 28, over 3,000 Japanese and puppet troops arrived in Laiyuan City by car, supported by 20 tanks and 4 aircraft. This mechanized support was not just "extra firepower." It was a statement about how the Japanese aimed to retain control: tanks and aircraft increase defenders' ability to resist assault and keep morale from collapsing. Under these conditions, the right wing found it difficult to launch a favorable offensive. So the Jin-Cha-Ji leadership shifted offensive focus to the Lingqiu area, rather than forcing the original plan to continue against reinforced mechanized defense. The first step was to eliminate enemy strongholds between Lingqiu and Hunyuan. The second step was to seize enemy strongholds along a line from southeast of Daying to Shentangbao, and in mountainous areas north of Daying and Shahe. This shift highlights a core strategic principle: when a target becomes too fortified, the offensive can still succeed by moving the pressure elsewhere—aiming to break the enemy's network of strongpoints and keep forcing them to respond across space. On October 2, the headquarters ordered the main force of the right wing to concentrate in the area east and southeast of Laiyuan. Part of the force was assigned to monitor and contain the enemy in Laiyuan, while the 1st and 2nd Regiments were placed under the left wing's command and joined the left wing in combat. This reallocation reflects operational adaptability. If a city becomes a fortress, smaller units may be better employed as containment—tying down defenders—while the main effort moves to seize other stronghold lines where the Japanese might still be vulnerable. The fighting continued with tactical attacks that show how strongpoint warfare unfolded in the field. On the night of October 8, the 1st Battalion of the 1st Regiment launched an attack on the 2nd Regiment while a portion of the Japanese army in Nanpotou was attacking it. The attackers broke into enemy lines, annihilated most of the enemy, and drove the rest off. At the same time, the 1st Battalion of the 6th Regiment captured Qiangfengling, and the Japanese forces in Qingciyao fled in panic. The campaign also included actions such as attacks on Jinfengdian by the 3rd Battalion of the 6th Regiment on the night of September 9, and mention that the 26th Regiment entered Huangtai Temple on the night of October 8 while attacking between Lingqiu and Guangling. By understanding the background and stakes, you can see what these actions were really doing. They weren't random. They were repeated attempts to keep dismantling the enemy's ability to maintain a functioning strongpoint chain. Each captured stronghold reduces the enemy's ability to create secure corridors. Each panic-driven retreat increases their time burden and may cause breakdown in communication between local nodes. Even when the battle remains fierce and deadly, these changes in tempo can accumulate into operational outcomes. The Lai-Ling Campaign lasted 18 days, producing concrete results: killing and wounding over 1,000 Japanese and puppet troops, capturing 49 Japanese and 237 puppet troops, and leaving 1,419 casualties for the Eighth Route Army. The losses show the campaign was not a "clean victory." It was expensive. But the operational logic—disrupting a strengthened occupation zone, capturing strongholds, and forcing enemy reinforcements to concentrate—was consistent with the second phase's broader mission. Support for Lai-Ling came from the Jizhong Military Region through the Renqiu–Hejian–Dacheng–Suning Campaign from October 1 to October 20, simultaneously sabotaging the Cangshi, Deshi, Beining, and Jinpu railways. This is where "background and stakes" become especially clear. The Japanese, even when they defend in one area, have to move elsewhere to respond. When you attack multiple transportation lines and strongpoint zones at once, you prevent the enemy from solving one problem cleanly before moving to the next. You make the enemy chase multiple fires. After the Hundred Regiments Offensive began, Japanese forces in Jizhong moved west to reinforce in some cases, but most were tied down on important transportation lines. That relative weakening meant defenses in Jizhong's interior became weaker—creating space where a larger contest could occur. Jizhong decided to deploy 10 battalions totaling more than 8,500 men from the 18th, 23rd, and 30th Regiments across left wing, center, and right wing roles, fighting in the area. The plan was not only to attack; it was to manipulate where the Japanese had to respond. The two wing units would contain and draw Japanese forces away from the central Renhe Dasu zone, and then the central unit would break into that central area to open the situation. In other words: wings would pull; center would punch. The Renhe Dasu battle began on October 1, 1940. On the left wing, the 18th Regiment entered an area east of the Zhulong River and west of Hejian and Renqiu, capturing Lianjiazhuang, Dongguxian, and Liangcun between October 2 and October 6. By the night of October 7, Japanese troops at strongholds including Yuhuangmiao, Fenglebao, and Liushansi fled in panic—another reminder that once stronghold cohesion fractures, the enemy's ability to endure a second phase of pressure drops. On the right wing, the 30th Regiment operated with four battalions east of Dacheng and east of the Ziya River, capturing a series of strongholds including Liminju, Dengzhuangzi, Shigeju, Xiliuzhuang, Zangzhuangzi, and Chencun, while engaging in road-breaking and ditch digging. These actions show the campaign's "method," not just its target. Even when the opponent could be fought directly, sabotage and engineering measures could amplify the damage by reducing mobility and forcing time-consuming repairs. The central unit, the 23rd Regiment, had two battalions crossing the Hutuo River northward. On October 1, it ambushed more than 100 Japanese troops coming from Shangjialin to seize grain, killing more than 90 and capturing all their weapons. On October 9, it ambushed the enemy from Liugezhuang to Litan at Baimatang, annihilating 20 Japanese and puppet troops. These ambushes illustrate a second background principle: occupiers need sustenance and extraction operations, and those operations follow routes and patterns. By striking troops during foraging or supply-related movement, the offensive attacks not only the army but also the logic that keeps occupation armies fed and maintained. From October 15 to October 20, the second stage of those operations targeted the east and west banks of the Ziya River, leaving only a small force in the central Renhe River Great Suppression area. On the night of October 19, the central force captured Banjiehe and destroyed a bridge over the nearby Guyang River. On the night of October 16, the left wing captured Daqudi and the Renqiu Shimen Bridge, and on October 18 it captured the stronghold at Wangpan. A note in the operational description also indicates that the right wing faced a serious enemy situation and could not take major action during one segment—another reminder that even a planned operation cannot control all battlefield variables. What matters is whether the operation still meets its strategic purpose, not whether every segment goes perfectly. In the Battle of Renhe Dasu, Japanese and puppet losses were heavy: 805 killed or wounded, and 3 Japanese and 326 puppet troops captured. The campaign took 29 strongholds. The Jizhong Military Region suffered 573 casualties. Strategically, this battle contained enemy forces and effectively supported the Battle of Lai-Ling. Again, support here is not just "help in the same region," but redistribution of pressure: by forcing the enemy to allocate troops to Jizhong, Japanese defenders around Lai-Ling face more difficulty maintaining overall operational coherence. While Jin-Cha-Ji and Jizhong fought around Laiyuan and Lingqiu, a deeper pressure developed in the Taihang base region—through the Yuliao (Yu-Liao) Campaign, fought mainly by the 129th Division. The background stakes in the Yu-Liao theater were the highway route from Yangquan through Pingding, Heshun, Liaoxian to Yushe, described as the deepest penetration route through which the Japanese penetrated the Taihang base area. The Japanese tried to extend this road southwestward and connect it with the Baijin Railway through Wuxiang, aiming to split the Dahang area and deploy forces flexibly along the Zhengtai and Baijin lines. This was about strategic mobility and operational geometry. A road connection isn't only "transport"; it reshapes where the enemy can exert pressure and how quickly they can shift forces from one axis to another. The Yuliao section measured 45 kilometers and included eight strongholds: Yushe, Yanbi, Wangjing, Guantou, Pushang, Xiaolingdi, Shixia, and Liaoxian. These were guarded by the 13th Battalion of the Japanese 4th Independent Mixed Brigade. A line of strongholds along a highway is the occupier's version of a corridor defense: it enables them to keep movement inside a protected chain. If that chain is cut, movement becomes vulnerable and the "deep penetration route" turns into a dangerous liability. On September 22, 1940, the 129th Division issued basic orders: launch a surprise attack to eliminate the enemy from Yushe to Xiaolingdi, recapture strongholds, destroy the highway, and then press forward toward Liaoxian to recapture it when the opportunity arose. This is a textbook example of how the offensive combined surprise, seizure, and destruction. Surprise prevents the defenders from organizing a coordinated response. Seizure eliminates their nodes. Highway destruction prevents them from restoring their corridor quickly, forcing time and labor—exactly what the second phase wanted. The assault began on the night of September 23. On September 24, the left wing captured Yanbi and Wangjing, while the right wing captured Pushang and Xiaolingdi. By September 25, Yushe and Jucheng had also fallen, leaving only the enemy at Guantou on the Xiaolingdi–Yushe line still resisting. Concurrently, detachments attacked on related axes: the Pingliao Detachment captured Hanwang Town north of Liaoxian; the Qinbei Detachment sabotaged roads and attacked frequently, pinning Japanese forces on the Wuxiang and Baijin routes. On September 26, the 129th Division ordered part of the right wing to continue besieging the enemy at Guantou, while the main force and the left wing moved east to recapture Liaoxian and eliminate reinforcements. At dawn on September 27, the right wing attacked Shixia west of Liaoxian and captured it that night. On September 28, the left wing reached near Majiu in preparation for an attack on Liaoxian that night. Then battlefield logic reasserted itself: the Japanese did not sit idle once their corridor was threatened. Troops from Heshun and Wuxiang reinforced Liaoxian and Guantou respectively. The Eighth Route Army headquarters ordered the Liaoxian attack halted. Some forces were to contain the enemy advancing south from Heshun, while the main force moved to the Hongyatou and Guandinao areas to prepare to annihilate enemy reinforcements arriving from Wuxiang. This decision reveals a deeper stake: even if an army can seize targets, it must avoid exhaustion and must avoid allowing the enemy to convert a partial tactical loss into a larger opportunity. Headquarters essentially chose the operation's "survival path": shift from capturing more nodes to annihilating the reinforcements that would otherwise restore the corridor. Following these orders, the 129th Division attacked Guantou and took it at 24:00 on September 29. In the narrative description that follows, the enemy reinforcements moving through ambush terrain clashed with Communist formations in an engagement where aircraft coverage and terrain allowed the enemy to seize high ground and resist stubbornly. The battle lasted two days and one night, with heavy casualties on both sides. That is an important background lesson: the offensive could still destroy corridor nodes, but the enemy's ability to bring aircraft support and seize terrain meant that the "destroy and move on" approach wasn't always enough. Sometimes, momentum had to be re-channeled into another kind of contest—one closer to a blocking ambush and a battle of endurance. By the evening of October 1, more than 500 Japanese troops from Liaoxian broke through the right wing's blockade and approached near the left wing's command post. The left wing was ordered to withdraw from the battle. Headquarters then assessed that Japanese troops from Liaoxian and Wuxiang had joined and that more than 1,000 Japanese troops from Yangquan had reached Hanwang Town north of Liaoxian. Combined with the 129th Division's exhaustion and heavy casualties, headquarters decided to end the Yulin–Liaoxian Campaign—not because the offensive had no value, but because the risk of allowing the enemy to "sweep" the Taibei area could outweigh further gains. This termination decision illustrates a stake that is often overlooked: in insurgency-style campaigns, operational survival is part of success. The second phase did not merely chase targets; it sought to transform conditions so that the enemy would have to spend strength defending a failing network. If continuing a battle risks letting the enemy regroup into a larger counter-offensive that clears base zones, then ending becomes strategic. While the 129th Division wrestled with corridor defense around Liaoxian and Guantou, the 120th Division pursued a transport-centered strategy against the Tong-Pu Railway—because rail disruption was not a supporting detail; it was a main axis of pressure. On September 12, 1940, the 120th Division issued an action plan for the northern section of the Tongpu Railway, deciding to attack the Ningwu and Xinxian sections (with emphasis on the section between Ningwu and Daniudian) starting September 20. This timing shows planning designed to synchronize with broader operational pressure. Rail sabotage required engineering preparation and coordination across units, and the campaign sought to create disruption when the enemy would be most vulnerable to delayed reinforcement. On September 14, the 358th Brigade left its base west of Loufan and crossed the Jingle–Lanxian Highway to the north. It assembled at Majiagou on the 16th, then launched an attack on Toumaying using its 3rd Detachment (comprising the 7th and 8th Regiments and the special service battalion). At 24:00 on September 18, that detachment attacked Touma Camp, while the 7th and 8th Regiments attacked reinforcements. Fighting continued until the following morning when more than 40 Japanese soldiers from Ninghuabao reinforced Touma Camp. Once reinforcements reached Shanzhai Village, they were surrounded and annihilated. On September 20, around 200 Japanese soldiers from Yangquanling went to Liyan Village to counterattack. The 716th Regiment attacked at 14:00, and by dawn the next day, the enemy fled back to Yangquanling. These battles are more than local clashes. They serve the background logic of sabotage campaigns: before destroying rail infrastructure, you need to reduce the enemy's ability to respond instantly. Fighting reinforcements and counterattacks clears windows of time. Those windows can then be used to sabotage tracks, bridges, and related installations. If sabotage occurs under active reinforcement pressure, the enemy can repair quickly or trap the sabotage teams. If sabotage occurs after the enemy's response capacity is disrupted, repair becomes slower and the operational effects last longer. Parallel operations reinforced this logic. On the night of September 16, the Independent 1st Brigade crossed the Fen River east. On September 18, it was learned that more than 400 Japanese troops had attacked the Yanbei Detachment at Yangquanling but returned to Shangzhuang after failing to find them. The brigade then chose to encircle and annihilate the enemy rather than chase endlessly. The attack began at 13:00 on September 18 and lasted until early morning on September 19. The main force withdrew to sabotage the railway, while the remaining enemy retreated to Yangquanling. The engagement inflicted 105 casualties on the Independent 1st Brigade, while killing or wounding about 200 Japanese. Once the blocking threat was removed, units quickly moved into sabotage actions on the Tongpu Railway. Then sabotage itself proceeded systematically. On the night of September 22, the 4th Regiment of the 358th Brigade—attached to the division's engineering company—and the division's special service regiment advanced to the area between Duanjialing and Xuangang to sabotage several sections of the Tongpu Railway. At the same time, the 2nd Regiment attacked Qicun, and the 715th Regiment attacked Xinkou and Loubanzhai. On the night of September 23, the 2nd Regiment sabotaged the railway south of Xinkou while the 715th Regiment sabotaged it north of Xinkou. On the night of September 25, the 715th Regiment sabotaged between Daniudian and Xuangang. The Independent 2nd Brigade also sabotaged several railway sections between Shuoxian and Ningwu. After six days of sabotage operations, the 120th Division again caused the Tongpu Railway to be interrupted. The background stakes here are straightforward but huge: a rail interruption forces the occupier into repair work, escorts, and re-routing. During the second phase—when the Japanese were already under pressure across multiple theaters—the need to continuously handle repair reduces the capacity for offensive operations and for rapid reinforcement to any single contested point. It also slows their ability to respond to new threats as quickly as they would like. By connecting all these threads—Laiyuan and Lingqiu strongholds, Renhe Dasu containment and roadbreaking, the Yuliao highway corridor fight, and repeated Tongpu railway sabotage—you can see the deeper logic of the second phase. The campaign aimed to create a battlefield environment where Japanese forces could not enjoy stable mobility and where strongpoints could not function as a reliable cage. Transportation disruption isolated strongholds. Stronghold destruction and capture shrank the enemy's local control points. Highway and rail sabotage forced the Japanese to defend not only troops and walls, but also the infrastructure that enabled their coordination. That's why the second phase emphasizes disrupting transportation and destroying some strongholds penetrated deep into base areas. It wasn't simply "hit more places." It was a deliberate attempt to force the Japanese to abandon their preferred operational pattern: a networked system of strongpoints supported by transportation reliability. If that reliability breaks down, the occupier's "cage" becomes porous and unstable, and Communist base areas gain room to expand and persist. By early October, the second phase was winding down, while a third phase was developing: reinforced Japanese columns sought to engage and destroy 8RA units. Over the next two months, several fierce counterattacks occurred, and after that the Hundred Regiments campaign was considered to be finished. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After earlier setbacks in the 1930s, the CCP sought national leadership in resistance while maintaining political room to maneuver within an uneasy arrangement with the KMT. By early 1940–1941, the strategy shifted toward "strongpoint" and transportation warfare: guerrilla actions were used to fracture Japanese defensive networks and sabotage logistics. Japanese attempts to consolidate territory, through local administration and security practices—often provoked the CCP's dual struggle, militarily and politically. As Japanese sweeps temporarily gave the CCP advantages, the situation forced rapid adaptation.

Last time we spoke about the New Fourth Army Incident. Across the Second Sino-Japanese War, the CCP entered after the setbacks of the 1930s, seeking to become a national leader in resistance while remaining cautious toward the Nationalist government. The 1936 Xi'an Incident reshaped politics, and by August 1937 KMT–CCP agreements defined a working arrangement: the CCP acknowledged KMT leadership and integrated its forces, while still pursuing political space and autonomy. As the war progressed, the CCP focused on defining its relationship with the KMT and keeping operational independence during cooperation. Mao Zedong managed this alliance by promoting a united front against Japan, yet protecting CCP revolutionary goals and internal control. The establishment of the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army marked this military reorganization. Throughout, the CCP feared that KMT collaboration with Japan could enable a peace settlement that would undermine communist legitimacy and restrict the party's future authority thereafter.   #202 The One Hundred Regiment Offensive Phase One Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Simultaneously with the friction between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Japanese were also working to take control of—and extract value from—most of the territory they had nominally conquered. Treating these two processes separately—"friction" on the one hand and "consolidation" on the other—does violence to the real difficulty of the CCP's dilemma: the Party often had to confront both problems at the same time. At certain moments, the CCP was effectively forced to wage a two-front struggle. Even so, if the worst of the KMT–CCP friction had already eased by 1941, the most serious and painful challenges posed by Japanese consolidation were still ahead. To recover anything close to reality, the two timelines have to be read together and placed on top of one another. The Japanese understood that consolidation could not be postponed, because much of the land behind the furthest reaches of their army was still only weakly under their actual control. In some places, order could be restored by relatively direct methods: rebuilding local administration and policy authority; repairing transportation and communications; enrolling Chinese personnel—usually, as it turned out, people of dubious reliability—as police or militia under puppet regimes; registering the local population; and requiring identity cards. In true old-style Chinese fashion, collective security practices were used widely. One form was the familiar bao-jia system, in one variant or another. Another was the so-called "railway-cherishing village": a village would be assigned a nearby stretch of track, and if residents failed to "cherish" it, they were held collectively responsible. Yet early Japanese weakness in northern China is vividly illustrated by an incident in the summer of 1938. Three young foreigners—vacationing from teaching in Peiping (Beijing)—were curious about events and about what people were doing. They loaded their bicycles on a southbound train, got off at Baoding, and rode west until they ran into Eighth Route Army detachments. In the early period of the war, commanders generally wanted to rely on more mobile forms of warfare. Mao, however, insisted on a strategy of de-escalation and dispersion: breaking the 8RA and New Fourth Army into small units as nuclei for combat, recruitment, political work, and base-area construction. Under this approach, few engagements could be truly dramatic in scale, and most were constrained by the need to survive. Each skirmish had to be carefully planned. The CCP would use local intelligence and the element of surprise so that a detachment could strike and withdraw before its limited ammunition ran out or before enemy reinforcements arrived. Small Japanese patrols and puppet units could be ambushed not only to seize weapons and other material, but also to inflict casualties. Active collaborators, or Japanese-sponsored administrative personnel, could be assassinated. Above all, Communist action aimed to disrupt transportation: mining roads; cutting down telegraph poles, stealing wire, and cutting rail lines; sabotaging rolling stock; and, at times, carrying off steel rails so that primitive arsenals could be supplied. Attempting derailments was also part of the effort. Destroying a bridge or a locomotive counted as a major achievement. Both the Communists and the Japanese understood that these tactics did not decisively shift the overall strategic balance. Still, they worked at other levels. For the Japanese, the result was a constant series of small wounds—painful, bleeding, and potentially infectious. Few areas in the countryside felt truly safe. Japanese field commanders documented growing frustration as they tried to eliminate resistance, restore administration, collect taxes, and prepare for more systematic and effective economic exploitation of conquered territory. Guerrilla warfare against the Japanese cannot be judged only in conventional battle terms—numbers of engagements, casualties, or territory occupied. It had to be evaluated politically and psychologically as well, exactly as Mao repeatedly emphasized. Since the CCP's wartime legitimacy depended on its patriotic claims, enough fighting had to be carried out to maintain credibility. Moreover, military success mattered for mobilizing the "basic masses," persuading wavering people to keep an open mind, and neutralizing opposition. As the logic put it, it was not that people always chose the side that was winning, but that few would ever join a side they believed was losing. One experienced cadre described the effect this way: Among the guerrilla units… there is a saying that "victory decides everything." No matter how hard it has been to recruit troops, supply the army, raise the masses' anti-Japanese fervor or win over the masses' sympathy, after a victory in battle the masses fall all over themselves to send us flour, steamed bread, meat, and vegetables. The masses' pessimistic and defeatist psychology is broken down, and many new guerrilla soldiers swarm in. But once the Japanese began to demand a heavy price for every engagement—whether the Communists won or not—this attitude began to change. In North and Central China, the Japanese earliest pacification sweeps created comparatively little trouble for the CCP. At first, the Japanese made few distinctions among Chinese forces. They simply tried to mop up or disperse them without regard to character. Over time, however, they realized that these sweeps actually made it easier for the CCP to expand. By the second half of 1939, Japanese methods became more discriminating. Chinese non-Communist forces would step aside while the Japanese hunted specifically for the 8RA, the N4A, and their local affiliates. The Japanese also made more direct appeals to non-Communist forces. According to Japanese army statistics, during the eighteen months from mid-1939 to late 1940, around 70,000 men from more or less regular Nationalist units in North China alone went over to the Japanese. The Japanese also reached informal "understandings" with several regional commanders whose forces together might have totaled as many as 300,000 men. This, of course, corresponded to what the CCP denounced as "crooked-line patriotism"—the "crooked-line" collaboration that preserved certain units so they could be used in future anti-Communist operations. When pacification efforts were intensified from late 1939 and throughout 1940, differences also appeared in the strategies Japanese armies used in North versus Central China. In North China, the approach relied heavily on military means, with political tactics limited largely to recruiting collaborators. In Central China, Japanese authorities did not hesitate to use military force, but they also attempted to supplement it with more comprehensive political and economic solutions by setting up tightly controlled "model peace zones." Although both approaches ultimately failed, they created enormous difficulties for Chinese Communists—until, in 1943, the Japanese were forced to ease off because the Pacific War against the United States became too burdensome. Careful reading of detailed intra-party documents suggests that repression also demobilized peasant support and terrorized populations into apathy, grudging acquiescence, or even active collaboration with the Japanese. In a locality already reduced from consolidated base status to guerrilla status, capacity and will were often too weak to administer complex reforms in systematic fashion. In other words, passive survival—defensive survival—was at least as important as what lay behind the heroic public images the Party projected. Systematic pacification in North China in late 1939 and 1940 radiated outward. It moved from areas held more or less firmly by the Japanese and their puppets into guerrilla and contested zones. The ultimate objective was to crush resistance or render it ineffective. The method was first to sweep the area clear of anti-Japanese elements, and then to establish a chain of interconnected strongpoints that could quickly reinforce one another. After that, puppet government would be expanded so it could take increasing responsibility for civil administration and "pacification maintenance," while Japanese forces repeated the initial steps further outward into contested territory. Violence was used selectively against individuals, groups, or villages accused of acts of resistance. This selective violence aimed to deter active participation in CCP-led programs, deprive Communist forces of a population willing to shelter them, and persuade informers to come forward. That was, at least, the theory of the strategy. In practice, the basic framework of the strategy depended on the main transport lines. Railways and roads—if properly fortified and protected—could separate resistance forces from one another and deny them one of their most effective weapons: mobility. These "cage" tactics (chiyu-lung, "jiu-lung") made it possible to enlarge pacified areas by "nibbling" outward, "as a silkworm feeds on mulberry leaves" (ts'an-shih). At the same time, the approach aimed to exploit North China's economy more effectively. To this end, the Japanese worked to improve and extend both railway and road networks. When the war began, in Shanxi the Cheng-Tai (Shijiazhuang–Taiyuan) and Tong-Pu (Datong–Tongguan) lines were metre-gauge, incompatible with the standard-gauge lines elsewhere in China—part of Yan Xishan's design to prevent deeper penetration into his province. By the end of 1939, the Japanese used forced labor to convert both lines to standard gauge. One benefit was the easier transportation of high-quality anthracite coal from the Qingxing mines (on the Cheng-Tai line) to industrial users in North China and Manchukuo. Of the newly constructed roads and railway lines, the most important was the Te-Shih line—from Dezhou in northeastern Shandong to Shijiazhuang. Construction began in June 1940 and finished in November, connecting the Tianjin–Pukou, Beiping–Hankou, and Cheng-Tai lines. This made it easier to move troops and transport raw cotton. Once the Te–Shih link was completed, the Japanese had direct connections between the point of their furthest advance at the elbow of the Yellow River and all major cities of North China, and beyond to Manchukuo. Communist sources began to speak of a "transportation war," noting with concern the moats and ditches, the blockhouses, and the frequent patrols protecting the lines. Both militarily and economically, these measures weighed heavily on forces led by the Communists in North China and on the populations under their control—especially the plains of central and eastern Hebei. One indicator of effectiveness was the rapid decline in "acts of sabotage" against North China railways in 1939 and the first half of 1940. A cadre in Jin-Cha-Ji reported in mid-1940: "The enemy has adopted a blockhouse policy, like that of the Jiangxi Soviet. They are spread like a constellation. In central Hebei alone, there are about 500, separated by one to three miles." Normal trading patterns were disrupted as Japanese or puppet occupiers took over administrative and commercial centers, and peasants found themselves caught between regulations imposed by the Communists on one side and those enforced by the other side. Finally, landlords, moneylenders, loafers, bandits—everyone who felt damaged by the new order inside base areas—could use pacification programs to try to recover influence or simply take revenge. Some became informers. After 8RA and local units were driven away, they could kill remaining cadres or activists and settle scores with the peasants who had supported them. Until the "first anti-Communist upsurge" was defeated, local elites and other disaffected elements might also seek support from Nationalists. It was even possible for an armed band to operate for several months inside consolidated regions of the CCP base, killing cadres as it went. Peng Dehuai later recalled this period in a way that underscored how pressure translated into wavering and collapse. Under the enemy's brutal pressure, in some districts the masses even hesitated or capitulated. From March to July 1940, large areas of the North China base were reduced to guerrilla regions. Before the "Cage-bursting battle",, they controlled only two county seats: Pingxun in the Taihang mountains and Pien-kuan in northwest Shanxi. Masses who previously had one set of obligations now had two—one toward the anti-Japanese regime and one toward the puppet regime. The situation in North China had not yet become a full crisis, but it was certainly serious. Action was needed to regain initiative. On 22 July 1940, Zhu De, Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Route Army, Peng Dehuai Deputy Commander-in-Chief, and Zuo Quan Deputy Chief of Staff jointly issued the Preliminary Battle Order, laying out the strategic goals for the coming operation. The order stated: "To respond to the enemy's 'prison cage policy,' obstruct its advance toward Xi'an, create favorable conditions in the North China theater, and strike at the national resistance initiative, we have decided to take advantage of the concealment provided by tall summer millet and the rainy season to carry out a large-scale sabotage operation on the Shijiazhuang–Taiyuan railway (Zheng–Tai Line)." It required the participation of at least 22 regiments from the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region, the 129th Division, and the 120th Division. The main objective was to "completely destroy key points along the Zheng–Tai Line" and to "cut the railway for a prolonged period." On 8 August, the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army issued the Operational Battle Order, further clarifying how forces would be deployed. The Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region was assigned to attack the eastern section of the Zheng–Tai Railway (from Niangzi Pass to Shijiazhuang). The 129th Division was assigned the western section (from Niangzi Pass to Yuci). The 120th Division was tasked with targeting the northern segment of the Tongpu Railway and the Fen–Li Highway. The order also required all troops to begin combat operations on 20 August, and emphasized that "the success of the campaign should be assessed primarily by the extent of damage inflicted on the Zheng–Tai Line." The operation was prepared under strict secrecy. Various elements of the Eighth Route Army conducted thorough preparations before the campaign. Reconnaissance teams, hidden and protected with the help of local villagers, penetrated deep into areas near the Shijiazhuang–Taiyuan railway to carefully map Japanese strongholds, enemy troop dispositions, and local terrain. At the same time, both military and civilian communities mobilized to stockpile grain, ammunition, and tools needed for railway sabotage; blacksmiths were organized to manufacture crowbars, pickaxes, and other essential equipment. Specialized military training covered demolition methods and techniques for dismantling railways, including tactics such as heating and bending steel rails. Civilian mobilization played a crucial role: militia and support teams took on tasks such as transport, medical aid, and coordination with military units. In Central Shanxi alone, more than 10,000 militia members were mobilized. The Eighth Route Army headquarters repeatedly stressed the need for operational confidentiality, stating: "Before the battle begins, the plan must remain strictly classified; until preparations are completed, the campaign objective may be disclosed only to brigade-level commanders." With the cover of dense summer millet, troops secretly assembled within their designated operational areas. Before the battle, the Japanese North China Area Army estimated the strength of the communist regular forces at about 88,000 men in December 1939. Two years later, they revised the estimate to 140,000. On the eve of the battle, communist forces had grown to between 200,000 and 400,000 men, organized in 105 regiments. By 1940, the growth had become so significant that Zhu De ordered a coordinated offensive by most of the communist regular units—46 regiments from the 115th Division, 47 from the 129th, and 22 from the 120th—against Japanese-held cities and the railway lines that connected them. According to the Communist Party's official statement, the battle began on 20 August.  On August 20, 1940, the rain didn't stop the campaign—it changed the battlefield. It slowed movement, blurred distance, and turned rivers and muddy roads into obstacles that could just as easily trap your own men as your enemy's. Along the districts bordering the Zhengtai Railway, the Eighth Route Army still moved, slipping through valleys and river crossings, bypassing Japanese posts, and positioning forces on both sides of the line as night settled in. By dark, the plan became a coordinated strike meant to hit the enemy before they could properly react. Across the entire Zhengtai Railway, attacks went out with timing designed to disorient Japanese defenders—so that their "first realization" arrived only after the railway itself was already being attacked and the window to respond effectively had slipped away.   A key portion of that strike fell to the right column of the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region, centered on the 5th and 19th Regiments, with the mission of sabotaging the Niangziguan to Luanliu section. At 20:00 on August 20, part of the 5th Regiment infiltrated Niangziguan Village for the first time, overwhelmed the puppet troops stationed there, and seized the village by dawn. After that opening cut, the main force moved in to cover the engineers, destroy enemy fortifications, and blow up the Guandong Railway Bridge. When the sabotage was done, they withdrew from Niangziguan on their own initiative, leaving the enemy to deal with the destruction rather than being pulled into a long, grinding engagement.   That same night, at Mohe Beach along the Zhengtai line, another action unfolded. The 1st Company of the 1st Battalion of the 5th Regiment attacked the station and was immediately met with a counterattack by Japanese forces. By dawn on August 21, the company withdrew—an adjustment, not defeat—and then attacked again the same night after crossing the Mian River. This time the enemy retreated into barracks to resist more stubbornly, with nearly 1,000 Japanese troops holding Mohe Beach. Heavy rain had swollen the river and made foot crossing nearly impossible, but the attackers seized the village west of the station and held it. On August 22 afternoon, more than 400 Japanese troops counterattacked; the main force of the 5th Regiment hit from the north bank of the Mian River in a fire assault, killing more than 50 before withdrawing the 1st Company out of the fighting. The 19th Regiment, meanwhile, took Jucheng and Irrang stations, tightening the pressure on the railway corridor.   On August 23, 1940, the 5th Regiment recaptured Niangziguan and blew up the stone bridge east of the village, destroying the railway segment between Chengjialongdi and Mohetan. That night the 19th Regiment stormed Yirang Station and blew up the water tower and the railway, ensuring the disruption would not be temporary. From August 24 to 27, bridges near Yanhui—stone and wooden—were destroyed again and again. Under that continuous pressure, beginning on August 25, Japanese transportation along the Niangziguan to Luanliu section of the Zhengtai Road was cut off completely. Strongholds were left to fight more or less alone, unable to coordinate or move supplies the way they normally would.   While the right column worked the railway, other forces hit the system from different angles. The Central Column of the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region—comprised of the 2nd, 3rd, and 16th Regiments—took responsibility for sabotaging the Zhengtai Road segment from Niangziguan to Weishui and for striking the Jingxing Coal Mine area. On the night of August 20, the 3rd Regiment launched coordinated attacks on the Gangtou old mine and the Dongwangshe new mine of Jingxing, and with miners assisting, the 1st Battalion quickly stormed the new mine and annihilated part of the enemy garrison. The rest withdrew into bunkers, resisting as best they could. By the afternoon of the next day, the entire enemy force had been wiped out. Afterward, major buildings in the mining area were destroyed and most materials were removed so that the mine could not resume production for more than six months. The 3rd Regiment also captured Jiazhuang, reinforcing the idea that sabotage here meant disabling not just lines of movement, but also the flow of resources.   Elsewhere, Japanese positions were disrupted in smaller, targeted strikes that still added up. After the Japanese stronghold at Nanzheng destroyed the railway between Nanzheng and Weishui, the 2nd Regiment took the eastern end fortress of the Faluling Railway Bridge, covered the engineers as they blew up a section of the bridge, and briefly occupied Caizhuang. The 2nd Battalion of the 16th Regiment attacked Beiyu on the night of August 20, annihilating most defenders, and on August 21 it covered the engineers to destroy the Beiyu Stone Bridge. Other units struck Didu and annihilated most defenders in Nanyu. By August 24, the Central Column had learned that more than 1,000 Japanese troops were stationed in Jingxing County, with additional reinforcements moving toward Nanyu and Didu. Their response was practical: detachments were assigned to watch and harass along the railway while the main force gathered in mobile positions—waiting for the next opening rather than charging blindly into concentrated strength.   Meanwhile, the left column of the Jin-Cha-Ji effort—from the 2nd Regiment of the Jizhong Garrison Brigade, the Military Region Special Service Regiment, and the Pingjinghuo Detachment—focused on sabotage from Weishui to Shijiazhuang. On the night of August 20, the Pingjinghuo Detachment attacked Yanfeng and blew up the railway. The Special Service Regiment moved with massed efforts as they destroyed power lines and highways from Yanfeng to Weizhou. On the night of August 22, the Special Service Regiment attacked Shang'an Station. On August 23, the 2nd Regiment stormed Touquan Station, captured two fortresses, then withdrew from the railway line; from August 25 to 27, they destroyed the highway connecting Pingshan, Huolu, Weishui, and Yanfeng.   While the main blow was falling along the Zhengtai Railway, the 129th Division was assigned raids on the western section. That area included the Japanese Independent Mixed Brigade No. 4 headquarters, a coal mine base at Yangquan, and support from Independent Mixed Brigade No. 9 from Yuci. These raids weren't only about destruction—they were meant to disorient, to create confusion over where the main pressure truly was. After the general offensive began at 20:00 on August 20, five companies of the 16th Regiment attacked Lujiazhuang Station and captured bunkers. Two guerrilla-operating companies in Yuci worked with engineers to destroy bridges between Lujiazhuang and Duanting. The 38th Regiment surprised Shanghu and Heshangzu stations, while the 25th Regiment captured Mashou Station and pushed Japanese troops toward Shouyang. The division's right-wing sabotage unit—28th and 30th Regiments of the newly formed 10th Brigade—took on sabotage on the Yangquan–Shouyang section, splitting routes on the night of August 20 to attack stations like Langyu, Zhangjing, Qinquan, and then striking additional positions with the 30th Regiment. Across that window, stations and strongholds such as Sangzhang, Yanzigou, Langyu, and Qinquan were taken, iron bridges were destroyed, and additional stations including Potou, Xinzhuang, Saiyu, Tielugou, Xiaozhuang, and Zhangzhuang were seized or disrupted.   As the western sabotage deepened, Japanese response hardened—but the ability to coordinate weakened. With the Zhengtai line sabotaged, the western section came under the 129th Division's control except for a few places such as Shouyang. Fierce assaults forced Japanese forces to lose contact with each other within days. Strongholds were attacked, besieged, and then annihilated as communication and coordination broke down. The 129th Division mobilized local people to destroy railway facilities, stations, and installations using demolition, burning, and flooding, moving materials so the railway and related infrastructure were effectively erased rather than merely damaged.   To cover these operations, the division occupied Shinaoshan with the 14th Regiment of the general reserve. Starting the morning of August 21, Japanese forces concentrated in Yangquan and attacked Shinaoshan daily. Enemy strength reportedly rose from more than 200 to more than 600, supported by bombing and strafing and the release of poison. The 14th Regiment held out until August 25, repelling repeated attacks, and by August 26 additional pressure came again as reinforcements increased. After six days and nights—and the annihilation of more than 400 enemy soldiers—the 14th Regiment withdrew from the main peak of Shinaoshan, continuing to contain the Japanese with smaller detachments while the main force shifted to another mission.   The first phase of sabotage had succeeded, but the campaign did not allow complacency. The Japanese strengthened their presence along the railway and launched frequent counterattacks, and Japanese divisions in southern Shanxi—including the 36th, 37th, and 41st—prepared to reinforce from the north. On August 26, the Eighth Route Army Headquarters issued instructions for a second phase: continue breaking through the road, concentrate superior forces, and annihilate Japanese units smaller than a battalion that were attacking or reinforcing. In line with that guidance, the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region ordered the Jin-You Column to keep breaking through the road on August 27 for one or two days, while the 129th Division alternated daily in breaking through. Under sustained pressure, the western section of the Zhengtai Road was basically destroyed; transportation was effectively cut off except for a few towns such as Shouyang and Yangquan.   On September 2, orders were issued to conclude the Zhengtai Campaign starting from the 3rd and shift forces according to the second-step plan. As the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region launched the Mengbei Campaign, the 129th Division shifted toward attacking invading Japanese forces, while other tasks—such as attacking the He-Liao Highway and recovering cities of He and Liao—were left for later. Beginning September 2, the Military Region deployed the 2nd, 5th, 16th, and 19th Regiments toward areas north of Meng County and Shouyang to recapture enemy strongholds. With the railway sabotaged, the Japanese main force north of Meng County shifted south to reinforce, weakening garrisons and spreading panic among the strongholds. As fierce offensives intensified, garrison troops began to waver. By the afternoon of September 5, Japanese troops at Xiashe, supported by troops from Shangshe, retreated to Shangshe and fled toward Meng County overnight. That night, the 19th Regiment arrived near Shangshe and, together with the Special Service Battalion of the 2nd Military Sub-district, pursued. The 1st Battalion of the 19th Regiment advanced into Shenquan and Putian to cut off the retreat route. By 9:00 AM on September 6 the enemy was surrounded in Xingdao Village, and after five hours of intense fighting most forces were annihilated. Survivors fled east to Luolizhang Mountain, only to be surrounded again by the 19th, 5th, and 16th Regiments. By the night of September 9, most Japanese forces had been wiped out, though more than 40 men broke through in dense fog and escaped into Meng County.   The siege continued through bitter episodes involving attacks and withdrawals under poison, with both sides paying heavily for every moment of progress. Eventually, on September 11, Japanese troops in Xiyan escaped back to Meng County, helped by more than 200 Japanese already present there. Meanwhile, the Japanese attempted to counter the pressure: on September 4 they sent more than 2,000 troops to reinforce Meng County and began a counterattack. On September 10, the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region ordered the 19th and 5th Regiments to remain east and north of Meng County to coordinate with the 129th and 120th Divisions, while the rest prepared for new missions.   As fighting intensified around Zhengtai and Meng County, a parallel pressure campaign unfolded. To contain Eighth Route Army sabotage along Zhengtai, the Japanese assembled battalions from Independent Mixed 4th and 9th Brigades to strike the 129th Division. In response, the 120th Division began large-scale sabotage against the Tongpu Railway and major highways in northwestern Shanxi starting 20:00 on August 20. They captured enemy strongholds along rail and road lines, striking major bases such as Kangjiahui on the Xinjing Highway, where more than 50 Japanese and puppet troops were stationed, and also attacking other areas like Shishen, Lizhen, and Jingle. Ambushes were set to annihilate reinforcements arriving from different directions, and at 00:30 on August 21 the 2nd Battalion of the 4th Regiment attacked Kangjiahui and annihilated the defenders by dawn. Reinforcements arriving in cars were destroyed, and subsequent actions continued to expand the disruption.   Over more than 180 battles in northwestern Shanxi, the 120th Division annihilated more than 800 Japanese and puppet troops and captured or destroyed stations and strongholds including Kangjiahui, Yangfangkou, Pingshe, and Longquan. By disrupting the Tongpu Railway and transportation along the Xinjing, Taifen, and Fenli highways, they tied down Japanese forces and made it harder to reinforce Zhengtai. In practical terms, this meant the first phase of the Hundred Regiments Offensive—lasting about three weeks—ended on September 10 with major railway lines and motor roads attacked repeatedly. Roadbeds, bridges, switching yards, and installations were hit heavily; at the Qingxing coal mines, facilities were destroyed and production was halted for nearly a year.   By the end of that first phase, the campaign's logic had become clearer: once the Japanese leaned more heavily on a "cage-and-strongpoint" defense system, the same transport network that had supported their defense became less secure. When rail and road were repeatedly disrupted, strongpoints became more vulnerable—especially if Japanese units pulled out nearby detachments to respond to sabotage. So the campaign shifted from breaking transportation to attacking blockhouses and other strongpoints in contested areas, aiming to force Japanese forces back into well-defended garrisons and leave the countryside again contested by Communist forces. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. From 20 August 1940, under secrecy and rain, units of the 8th Route Army infiltrated stations, captured villages, destroyed bridges, power lines, roads, mines, and stations across multiple columns. By early September the Zhengtai and related Tongpu transport routes were repeatedly severed, forcing Japanese troops to fight isolated strongpoints and hindering reinforcement. 

With less than a month remaining before the FIFA World Cup 2026 kicks off in Mexico City, a wave of Chinese-made products, from footballs and flags to fan jerseys and drinkware, is already flowing into the tournament's host countries and beyond.距离2026年世界杯在墨西哥城开幕仅剩不到一个月，从足球、国旗到球迷球衣、水杯等一大批“中国制造”产品，正源源不断涌入赛事主办国及其他市场。The tournament between June 11 and July 19 will be the first World Cup to feature 48 teams, with matches across 16 cities in the United States, Canada and Mexico.本届世界杯将于6月11日至7月19日举行，是历史上首届有48支球队参赛的世界杯，比赛将在美国、加拿大和墨西哥三国的16座城市展开。In April, workers at the production workshop of Qingdao Wonderful Flag Industry Co, a Qingdao, Shandong province-based flag maker, were busy sewing and assembling national flags of countries participating in the World Cup.今年4月，位于山东青岛的青岛万德隆纺织品科技有限公司生产车间里，工人们正忙着缝制、组装参加世界杯的各参赛国国旗。"On April 1, right after the final World Cup qualifying match concluded and the list of the 48 teams was confirmed, orders flooded in almost immediately," said Xiao Chang'ai, chairman of the company.公司董事长肖常爱介绍说：“4月1日，世界杯预选赛刚刚结束，48支参赛队伍名单一经确认，订单几乎立即蜂拥而至。”According to Xiao, the company is now running at full capacity to fulfill orders for national flags, covering both traditional soccer powerhouses such as Brazil, Argentina and Germany, as well as newly qualified teams making their World Cup debut.据肖常爱介绍，公司目前正全力运转，赶制各国国旗订单，既有巴西、阿根廷、德国等传统足球强国的旗帜，也有首次闯入世界杯的新军。"By the end of March, most flags for traditional powerhouse teams had already been produced and shipped," she said. "But the real challenge for us will begin once the tournament starts in June."“到3月底，大部分传统强队的国旗已经生产完毕并出货，”她说，“但真正的挑战将在6月赛事开赛后到来。”As the competition unfolds, overseas buyers closely track match results and place orders almost in real time, often demanding delivery within just one or two days, Xiao added.肖常爱补充说，随着比赛推进，海外买家会紧盯赛果，几乎实时下单，往往要求一两天内就要交货。To keep pace with the surge in last-minute demand, the company has all production lines running round the clock, with daily output now exceeding 100,000 flags of various sizes, according to Qingdao Customs.据青岛海关数据，为了应对这种临时的紧急订单需求，公司所有生产线全天候运转，目前各类尺寸国旗的日产量已超过10万面。Ningbo Eco-will Technology Co, a manufacturer of luggage tags, ceramic cups and insulated tumblers in Ningbo, Zhejiang province, saw its exports to the US, Canada and Mexico jump 47 percent year-on-year to 40 million yuan ($5.89 million) in the first four months of 2026, as local sellers actively stocked up on merchandise ahead of the World Cup sales season.浙江宁波的宁波爱可唯科技有限公司是一家生产箱包挂牌、陶瓷杯和保温杯的企业。2026年前四个月，由于当地商家为迎接世界杯销售旺季而积极备货，该公司对美国、加拿大和墨西哥的出口额同比增长47%，达到4000万元人民币（约合589万美元）。Qiu Chunmiao, the company's foreign trade manager, said the World Cup has significantly boosted the firm's exports of sports-themed products this year, especially insulated tumblers carrying officially licensed soccer team logos.公司外贸经理邱春苗表示，世界杯显著带动了今年公司体育主题产品的出口，尤其是印有官方授权球队标志的保温杯。Ningbo Customs said exports of sporting goods and equipment through Ningbo's ports reached 5.74 billion yuan between January and April, up 11.34 percent on a yearly basis.宁波海关数据显示，今年1月至4月，宁波口岸出口体育用品及设备达57.4亿元人民币，同比增长11.34%。Wang Xiaohong, a researcher at the China Center for International Economic Exchanges in Beijing, said China's flexible manufacturing ecosystem offers exporters a clear advantage in responding to short-cycle demand generated by major sporting events.中国国际经济交流中心研究员王晓红表示，中国灵活的制造业生态使其在应对大型体育赛事带来的短周期需求方面具有明显优势。Wen Congjian, chairman of Yiwu Danna Silk Import and Export Co, a Yiwu, Zhejiang-based apparel maker that designs patented soccer fan jerseys, said Chinese companies are no longer competing solely on volume, but are placing greater emphasis on value-added products.浙江义乌的丹娜丝进出口有限公司是一家设计生产拥有专利的球迷球衣的企业。公司董事长温从见表示，中国企业已不再单纯以量取胜，而是更加注重产品的附加值。"With patent protection, we can better protect our designs and lift product prices by around 20 percent," Wen said, adding that the company has secured overseas patents for more than 40 fan jersey designs related to the World Cup.“拥有专利保护后，我们的设计更有保障，产品价格也可以提高20%左右。”温从见说。他还透露，该公司已为40多款与世界杯相关的球迷球衣设计获得了海外专利。Yiwu's exports of sporting goods and equipment reached 2.83 billion yuan in the first quarter, up 12 percent year-on-year, data from Yiwu Customs showed.义乌海关数据显示，今年一季度，义乌体育用品及设备出口额达28.3亿元，同比增长12%。tournament /ˈtʊənəmənt/锦标赛，赛事flooded in /ˈflʌdɪd ɪn/涌入unfolds /ʌnˈfəʊldz/展开，推进exceeding /ɪkˈsiːdɪŋ/超过

Last time we spoke about the battle Yaoyi. Japan pushed hard into Hubei with a plan: surround the main Chinese forces and seize Yichang, hoping to use it to strike at Chongqing. At first, the fighting was chaotic and punishing. The Chinese side tried to hold the line and disrupt the advance, and they even managed setbacks for the Japanese, pushing back, retaking key ground, and hitting supply and positioning weaknesses. But victory came with a cost: commanders were lost, and every gain was hard-won. Still, the battle didn't unfold as a clean Chinese retreat or a simple Japanese win. As Japanese units shifted and tested for openings, the Chinese forces adjusted—delaying, regrouping, and fighting to keep their formations from being completely trapped. Eventually, Japan managed to break through at critical moments, especially through crossings and maneuvers that the Chinese had not fully sealed off. In the end, Japan succeeded in taking Yichang, but it didn't achieve the decisive annihilation it wanted.    #201 The New Fourth Army Incident and the Strained United Front Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After the catastrophe of the early 1930s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) entered the war against Japan in a political mood that was both hopeful and wary: it wanted to be seen as a genuine national leader of resistance, yet it also feared being absorbed—or destroyed—by the Guomindang (KMT) state it had spent years battling. That tension became the organizing principle of the war's early years. The turning point came from the Xi'an Incident in December 1936, which forced a new calculation in Nationalist politics. In the months that followed, agreements between KMT and CCP representatives were publicly proclaimed in August and September 1937, after the Shanghai fighting began. Under these arrangements, the CCP accepted constraints that in peacetime would have looked like surrender: it pledged to strive for Sun Yixian's "Three People's Principles," to end its former policies of armed revolt and sovietization, to abolish the soviet government, and to discontinue both the term "Red Army" and the expectation that its forces would operate outside central control. Communist troops would be treated as part of the national military under KMT command, and the revolution's old administrative structures were to be formally dismantled. In return, the KMT offered the CCP something just as important: space to exist publicly and politically. Liaison offices were permitted in key cities; the CCP was allowed to publish the New China Daily; and it could nominate representatives to KMT advisory bodies. Civil rights were extended—political prisoners were released—and subsidies were established to help cover administrative and military expenses in "reintegrated" areas and territories. The war thus transformed the tactical reality on the ground: the CCP could not treat the KMT as an immediate enemy, but it also could not afford to become politically passive. It had to learn how to fight Japan while building legitimacy fast enough to survive the next phase. In the first year and a half, the Party Center focused on three problems that kept returning in different forms: how the "united front" would be defined—especially what the CCP's relationship to the National government should be; how to coordinate military strategy and tactics with Nationalist units without losing control of its own operations; and how leadership should be consolidated, particularly for Mao Zedong in a party that still contained rival centers of authority. These disputes mattered not just for doctrine but for survival, because the CCP's autonomy was constantly being tested by the very alliance that was supposed to protect it. Mao's own approach to the united front combined cooperation with a refusal to surrender independence. Publicly, the CCP praised Jiang Jieshi and the KMT and promised unity, but it did so in language that was deliberately broad. In private (and in internal party debates), Mao treated unity as conditional: the CCP must not split the united front, but it also must not be "bound hand and foot." The strategic idea that emerged was political initiative under constraints—fighting when it could plausibly claim justification, keeping enough restraint that the CCP would not appear self-interested or anti-national, and deciding for itself when to engage and when to withdraw. This balance was reinforced through military reorganization. In August–September 1937, CCP forces were reorganized as the Eighth Route Army (8RA), with roughly 30,000 men drawn from Long March survivors, local forces, and new recruits. The 8RA was divided into three divisions: the 115th, 120th, and 129th, commanded by Lin Biao, He Long, and Liu Bocheng respectively. Shortly after the war began, the National government also authorized a second major Communist force: the New Fourth Army (N4A), to operate in central China. Its core came from those left behind when the Long March began in 1934—small groups surviving in difficult conditions against continuing KMT pressure. Officially authorized at 12,000, it took months to reach that strength. Nominally commanded by Ye Ting, actual military and political control rested with Xiang Ying and Chen Yi. From the start, then, the CCP's wartime "integration" with the National system coexisted with a clear effort to preserve internal control. Ideologically, the CCP worked to make its revolutionary program compatible—at least in appearance—with a national resistance coalition. On the New Democracy demonstrated how this strategy operated on two levels. In KMT-controlled spaces, its language could be read as aligning with liberal-democratic expectations: public participation, multi-party governance, legally protected civil rights. But in CCP-controlled areas, the same text could carry sharper class-based and authoritarian implications. The Party wanted a united front that broadened support without becoming committed to Nationalist limits on how society itself might be reorganized after victory. Meanwhile, even as the rhetoric of unity rose, the CCP worried about something more dangerous than military setbacks: the possibility that the KMT might accommodate Japan. Late 1939 and early 1940 made this fear harder to dismiss. Japan pursued collaboration with Wang Jingwei, culminating in the establishment of a "reorganized" government at Nanjing in March 1940. At the same time, Japanese intermediaries sought approaches to Chiang Kai-shek himself—an effort that the CCP tracked closely as a sign that peace negotiations might be possible even when battlefield conditions looked grim. Propaganda was involved, but the anxiety was real: if Japan and the Nationalists reached an arrangement, the CCP's whole wartime legitimacy-building effort could collapse overnight. As a result, the united front was interpreted inside the CCP not as a permanent coalition with the KMT, but as a flexible strategy with a cardinal purpose: to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Mao's position on the united front reflected this. For him, the alliance was meant to suspend the possibility of a China–Japan settlement, not to end the CCP's separate identity. The CCP could participate in a reconstituted national framework—possibly even a "democratic republic"—to gain legality and influence, but it should remain politically and, where possible, physically separate from the KMT. By 1939, however, the practical meaning of "flexibility" collided with reality. What had seemed, to some observers, like an unusually cordial entente began to fade. The KMT Central Committee adopted measures early in 1939 aimed at restricting Communist expansion, and armed clashes increased through the summer and continued into autumn and winter—especially around North China Communist bases. The period of rising conflict was later labeled by the CCP as the "first anti-Communist upsurge" (roughly spanning December 1939 into March 1940), but the crucial point was that both sides viewed each confrontation as a test of legal rights, moral legitimacy, and control over territory. Strategically, the CCP understood the KMT's effort as an attempt to check unauthorized growth of Communist armed power and to recover areas where influence had already slipped away—either to the Communists or, by indirect effect, to Japan. The KMT emphasized its traditional legal authority; the CCP countered with its claim to an "evolutionary" moral right to challenge the government's legitimacy. In practice, the conflict took the form of increasingly systematic military pressure, including a blockade around the Shen–Gan–Ning region. By this point, the blockade involved large numbers of troops (on the order of hundreds of thousands), halting Communist expansion and disrupting direct contact with other Communist forces farther afield, even as fighting flared along border zones and around vulnerable points in the Communist defensive perimeter. So, by the edge of the "middle years," the wartime alliance had not broken into open civil war—but it had also stopped being secure. The united front survived, yet it operated under strain: its language of cooperation continued, while "friction" between partners hardened into a central feature of the resistance struggle. Transition into the war's second phase began in early 1939, shaped by the stalemate Mao had already anticipated at the sixth plenum in late 1938. Mao argued that during this prolonged "new stage" the forces of resistance—above all, Communist-led forces—would strengthen. The overall result, however, was mixed. In Shandong and Central China, new Communist bases did take shape. But across much of North China, Japanese consolidation cost the resistance heavily in manpower and population. Base-area economies suffered serious strain, and the peasantry endured hardships more severe than at any earlier point. This stalemate had two main dimensions. The first was the growing resentment of the Nationalists toward Communist expansion—resentment made especially sharp by their own losses. As the Nationalists were driven out of regions that had previously provided them their greatest wealth and power in the central and lower Yangtze basin, they also lost the "cream" of their armies. In contrast, the CCP was spreading through the wider countryside behind Japanese lines, extending its influence and winning broader popular support. The second dimension was Japan's desire—and need—to consolidate territories it had only nominally conquered and to extract economic value from them. After all, the logic of the "China Incident" was to draw on China's labor and resources to strengthen Japan, not to bleed Japan's gains away by draining wealth into China's vast interior. A Japanese colonel, lamenting the situation, captured the frustration of this drift into deeper entanglement: he regretted that Japan had not ended the "China Incident" once its initial objectives were reached. Instead, Japan was drawn into the hinterland and became bogged down in endless attrition—leaving it with little more than "real estate" rather than the popular support it believed it would secure from those it claimed to "liberate." To improve their position, Japanese authorities—still fragmented by internal rivalry—pursued several strategies. One was a new peace offensive aimed simultaneously at Jiang Jieshi, alongside efforts to establish a "reformed" Nationalist government under Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing in December 1938. Japan also recruited more collaborators and puppet officials. Finally, it carried out forceful military, political, and economic measures intended to establish effective territorial control and eliminate opposition. During the middle years of the war, the Communists described their conflicts with the Nationalists using the euphemism "friction". By 1939, what many observers—possibly incorrectly—had viewed as an unusually warm alliance began to break down. In early 1939, the KMT Central Committee adopted measures meant to restrict the CCP. From the summer onward, military clashes began and continued into autumn and winter with increasing frequency and intensity, most of them concentrated around and within the North China base areas. The Communists later labeled the period from December 1939 to March 1940 the "first anti-Communist upsurge." Naturally, each side accused the other of aggression and claimed self-defense against unjust attacks. Strategically, though, the North China "upsurge" functioned as a Nationalist attempt to limit the CCP's expansion beyond the areas assigned to it and to regain influence in regions the Communists—or the Japanese—had already taken from the KMT. Jiang Jieshi framed the matter as a defense of legal rights grounded in tradition, while the Communists asserted an "evolutionary" right to challenge the moral legitimacy of those legal claims. During 1939, the Nationalists began to blockade Shen–Gan–Ning around its southern and western perimeter. Within a year, this blockade grew to nearly 400,000 troops, including some of the last remaining Central Army units under the command of Hu Zongnan. The blockade stopped further Communist expansion, especially into Gansu and Suiyuan, and severed direct contact between SKN and Communists operating in Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan) adjacent to Soviet Central Asia. The Xinjiang Communists—including Mao Zedong's brother—were eliminated in 1942. Meanwhile, fierce fighting erupted along the Gansu–Shaanxi border and in the north-eastern corner of SKN near the Great Wall at Suide, as the blockading forces probed for weak points. Elements of He Long's 120th Division were even pulled back from the Jin–Sui base across the Yellow River to strengthen SKN's regular defenses. Economically, the blockade was even more damaging. During 1939, central government subsidies to the Border Region budget were cut off. Trade between the Border Region and other parts of China nearly stopped, a devastating blow to a region unable to supply itself with many basic commodities. At the same time, Nationalist and regional forces also attempted to expand their military and administrative authority into Hebei, Shanxi, Henan, and Shandong—areas the CCP now considered its base zones. In resisting these efforts, the CCP predictable accused its rivals of harming resistance work and damaging the people's interests. The "experts in dissension" were said to cooperate with the Japanese and their puppets. Based on increasing collaboration by regional units with Japan, the CCP implied that this was a deliberate and cynical strategy—described as "crooked-line patriotism"—intended to preserve those units for future anti-Communist operations. Even so, the CCP tried to avoid an open break with the Nationalist regime in Chongqing. In public, it consistently portrayed these clashes as being initiated by local commanders acting beyond orders from higher authority—despite knowing this depiction was false. Jiang Jieshi, unable to refute the claim outright, effectively permitted it to serve as the justification for a firm Communist response. Mao Zedong outlined the general resistance policy as "justification, expedience, and restraint". The CCP was to fight when it could claim justification and when it could gain advantage, but not to press attacks beyond what the Nationalists would tolerate or in ways that could damage its image as selfless patriots. Communist forces were expected to keep initiative as much as possible in their own hands—deciding when to engage, whether to engage, and when to disengage. The most striking episode of the "first anti-Communist upsurge" was the rupture with Yan Xishan in December 1939. Tensions in Shanxi had been rising throughout the summer and autumn, as Yan and his conservative supporters—associated with the "Old Army"—linked the Sacrifice League and the Dare-to-die Corps of the "New Army" with Communist forces. When base areas and Japanese occupation eventually took over much of his province, Yan was forced into exile at Qiulin across the Yellow River in Shaanxi. In November, Yan ordered his Old Army to disarm the Dare-to-die forces with help from central units dispatched by Hu Zongnan. In the bloody fighting that followed, these elements gradually broke free of even nominal provincial control and fully completed their connection with Communist forces. More than 30,000 people went over to the Communists. One KMT intelligence agent described the process with bitterness and a sense of inevitability: the Communists were first "full of sweet words," flattery, and distortions designed to open things up and conceal their actions. But once they had fully entrenched themselves, and once the low-level base had been established, they turned and bit. The agent suggested they had suspected things might end this way, but were not aware how quickly events would move—or that it could happen precisely while Communist calls for "united front" and "maintenance of unity for resistance" filled the air. About a month later, in February and March 1940, elements of the 8RA beat back this so-called upsurge. Zhang Yinwu's forces were disarmed and dispersed across the plains of north Hebei. To the south, Chu Huaiping and Shi Yusan were pushed out of the base area, as was the KMT-appointed provincial governor Lu Zhonglin. Although some non-Communist forces remained in the region, the CCP's and CCLY bases were never again seriously threatened by forces affiliated with the central government. Reinforcing the CCP's accusations, Shi Yusan was later executed in 1940 by the central government for collaboration with the Japanese. By late 1939, CCP central authorities maintained that the areas where the CCP could expand its armed strength were mainly limited to Shandong and Central China. In those regions, the CCP continued trying to carve out bases where they could operate. The situation in Shandong was complicated. After the Japanese invasion, most Nationalist-affiliated forces stayed in the province, while Communist forces and bases were weaker and more scattered than further west. Only in late 1938 did major 8RA units from the 115th and 129th Divisions—led by Xu Xiangqian and Luo Ronghuan—enter Shandong to link up with the Shandong column and local guerrillas, including survivors of a large band recently decimated by the Japanese. Even with these efforts, Communist actions led to clashes not only with Japanese forces but also with various Nationalist-affiliated groups—groups that were stronger than the Communists at the time. Until late 1940, the CCP's clashes with Nationalist forces in Shandong were actually bloodier than clashes with the Japanese. The CCP understood that its Chinese rivals mistrusted one another, and that their attitudes toward the CCP varied widely. The main Nationalist forces were often not tightly affiliated with Chiang Kai-shek or the central government. Instead, they operated under independent—and at times disgruntled—regional commanders. Communist tactics were expressed through slogans emphasizing ways to win support and isolate hardliners: develop progressive forces and win over fence-sitters while isolating "die-hards"; flatter top echelons, enlist the middle ranks, and hit the rank and file; and win over Yi Xuezhong, isolate Shen Honglie, and eliminate Qin Qirong. Still, unlike other North China base areas, the Communists were unable for several years to neutralize Nationalist forces in Shandong. Even if Japanese mop-up campaigns had not weakened those Nationalists, the text suggests the Communists may still have struggled to do so. By November 1940, Xu Xiangqian claimed meaningful progress while admitting Shandong had not yet become a fully consolidated base. CCP successes were greatest along parts of the Shandong–Hebei border, around the Taishan massif in central Shandong, and near the tip of the peninsula far to the east. Elsewhere, "progressive forces" remained weak. Communist regular troops numbered about 70,000, which was far below the party center's goals of 150,000 regulars and between 1.5 and 2 million self-defense forces. Moreover, systematic economic reforms had barely begun. The CCP relied on familiar practices—confiscations, collections of "national salvation grain," contributions, and loans—alongside a conventional taxation system adjusted to favor poorer peasants. Communist expansion in Central China was even riskier, with a greater likelihood of large-scale conflict with central government forces than in the north. In much of North China, "friction" came primarily from rapid Communist expansion into areas with partial vacuums. In Central China, however, base-building required displacing an existing Nationalist military-administrative presence closely tied to Jiang Kai-shek and the Chongqing government. The burden of this expansion was carried mainly by the 6th Detachment (northern Anhui and Jiangsu) and the 5th Detachment, which was reinforced by 15,000 to 20,000 8RA troops under Huang K'o-ch'eng. As Chen Yi's 1st Detachment crossed from south to north through the corridor provided by Guan Wenwei's local forces, it became actively involved as well. This expansion—driven by increasingly urgent directives from Mao and Liu during the latter part of 1939 and into 1940—brought the N4A north of the river into ever more frequent and sharper clashes with Nationalist authorities in Anhui and Jiangsu, especially with units under Jiangsu governor Han Deqin. South of the river, though, Xiang Ying did not directly challenge Chongqing's commanders. Mao later charged that Xiang Ying may have been influenced by Wang Ming, or else he may simply have seen no realistic alternative. His forces—three detachments plus a headquarters unit—were heavily outnumbered by Qu Chutong's Nationalist units, not to mention Japanese forces and their puppets. Even if Mao insisted bases could be built "anywhere," the Shanghai–Hangzhou–Nanjing triangle was especially difficult terrain. Xiang Ying and his followers had survived with extraordinary tenacity in the mountains of South China between 1934 and 1937, enduring brutal search-and-destroy operations that were not lifted until the war began. It therefore seems unlikely that such survivors would suddenly become "right-wing capitulationists."  Yet by spring 1940, Mao was pressing Xiang Ying more intensely. The Central Committee's message was explicit: expansion was necessary in all cases. It meant reaching into all enemy-occupied areas rather than being bound by the Kuomintang's restrictions—going beyond Kuomintang limits, not waiting for official appointments, not depending on higher-ups for financing, and instead expanding armed forces freely and independently. It also meant setting up base areas without hesitation, independently mobilizing the masses in those areas, and building united front organs of political power under Communist Party leadership. The struggle between Nationalists and Communists involved more than contests for control of territory behind Japanese lines. It also involved national-level politics, ideology, and leadership. One worrying development for the CCP was the campaign throughout 1939 to expand Jiang Kai-shek's prestige and formal power—adding more titles for him across major party, government, and military positions. In early 1939, the Central Executive Committee appointed him "director-general" of the Kuomintang, a title reminiscent of the one previously held by Sun Yat-sen. In addition, during the summer and autumn of 1939 there was talk of constitutional rule. In November, the KMT announced plans to convene a constitutional assembly the following year. If Jiang could fulfill these promises, he and his government could gain new legitimacy and wider popularity. Mao and his colleagues could not allow this to go unchallenged. If the Nationalists were to have a paramount leader and authoritative spokesperson, the CCP needed one as well. The timing of Mao's famous "On the new democracy"—written in late 1939 and published the next January—was therefore no accident. Its substance had been anticipated earlier, but its final timing and full development were shaped by the KMT's constitutional movement. The CCP's entry into this competition served as both a bid for support away from the KMT and a statement of the multi-class united front that the CCP wanted to lead. Although "On the new democracy" was written in a tone that seemed moderate, it persuaded many Chinese readers that the CCP had either diluted its revolutionary objectives or postponed them to a distant future. In Kuomintang-controlled areas, the work could be read through the liberal values associated with Anglo-American democracy—popular participation, multi-party government, legally protected civil rights. In CCP-controlled territories, the same language carried stronger authoritarian, class-based meanings. In internal documents meant for party audiences rather than public consumption, the ambiguity was removed, showing a tough but patient and flexible commitment not only to resistance but also to social control and social change. During this same period, the Communists expressed deep concern about Nationalist capitulation to Japan—not only on the battlefield behind Japanese lines but also at the highest levels. Some of this concern was propaganda, but beneath propaganda lay genuine anxiety. In late 1939 and early 1940, politically aware Chinese already knew that Japan was negotiating with the unpredictable Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing a year earlier. A "reorganized national government" in Nanjing was finally established in March 1940, representing the most formidable collaboration with Japan to date. Less well known, but equally important, was that Japan was also seeking an understanding directly with Jiang Kai-shek through intermediaries in Hong Kong. This effort, called "Operation Kiri"—described as spreading a "feast for Chiang"—combined intrigue with a kind of dark comedy. Reports suggested Chiang's reported interest in peace could have been a stratagem designed to discredit Wang Jingwei by keeping him waiting. But even if Chiang had no intention of coming to terms with Japan, the Communists could not be sure what the outcome would be until after the multi-pronged peace offensive had failed. By the middle of 1940, China had never been so isolated. In Europe, the "phony war" ended in the spring when Germany launched a blitz across the Low Countries. France fell soon after, and England appeared likely to be next. Japan used this moment to press China to sever its last tenuous connections to the outside world: cutting the Burma Road, trade with neutral Hong Kong, and the rail link running from Hanoi to Kunming. At the same time, Russia was engaged in a difficult and embarrassing war with Finland and reduced military aid to the Nationalists. The United States was only gradually moving away from isolationism and clearly regarded England as more important than China. In Chongqing and elsewhere in "Free China," signs of war weariness, despair, and demoralization were visible. Under these circumstances, Mao's insistence on aggressive expansion was a calculated risk—either it would deter any Japanese advance, or it would place the Communists in the strongest possible position in case a split between the KMT and the CCP became unavoidable. In Central China, the size and pace of the fighting kept increasing, starting in the final months of 1939. One flashpoint was the clash between Luo Pinghui's 5th Detachment and units of Han Deqin's Jiangsu force near Lake Gaoyou. In the following months, Guan Wenwei's forces ranged along the left bank of the Yangtze, repeatedly running into Luo's troops as they operated farther north. Luo also began receiving some 8RA reinforcements, moving them south through areas controlled by the 6th Detachment. Clearly, a major showdown was taking shape across north and central Jiangsu. At the same time, the South Yangtze Command was doing poorly. Nationalist commanders Leng Xin and Qu Chutong restricted its activities so severely that Mao and Liu gradually abandoned the idea of building a unified, consolidated base in that region. During late spring and early summer, Chen Yi moved most of his 1st and 2nd Detachments north of the Yangtze. In September, the 3rd Detachment followed suit, crossing the river into the area around Lake Chaohu, where the 4th Detachment was already stationed. After these moves, only the Headquarters Detachment—under Ye Ting and Xiang Ying—remained south of the Yangtze, positioned at Qingxian in southern Anhui. As the military situation edged toward an open confrontation, negotiations began in June 1940 between representatives of the KMT and the CCP. The core issues were Communist operating zones and the authorized strength of the armies led by the CCP. Proposals were exchanged, followed by equally sharp and hostile counter-proposals, but no agreement was reached. The KMT viewed it as a concession to permit the CCP "free rein" north of the pre-1938 course of the Yellow River, with the exception of southern Shanxi, which was to remain under the influence of Yan Xishan. In exchange, the KMT demanded that all 8RA and N4A units evacuate Central China. In effect, the KMT was offering the CCP something it was already prepared to allow, in return for the CCP giving up what it might soon be able to obtain by force of arms. Nationalist authorities then issued a set of deadlines, but without clearly stating what would happen if those deadlines were violated. On the surface, the CCP appeared to be complying in part. The movements of Chen Yi and the South Yangtze Command could look like obedience, but in reality they were responses to orders coming from their own superior leadership rather than instructions issued by the Nationalists. Even so, Xiang Ying's continued delays and evasions during the autumn and winter of 1940 remained puzzling. One possibility is that he felt—quite reasonably—that Mao had already lost confidence in him and that once he crossed to the north bank of the river he would lose his command. Another complication was that directives from Yan'an were sometimes ambiguous and even contradictory. He may also have been trying to reach secure understandings with KMT commanders about evacuation routes and guaranteed safe conduct out of the area. For a period, Han Teqin kept most of his forces—estimated at about 70,000 men, far outnumbering the N4A—in north Jiangsu, thereby blocking the expansion of the 6th Detachment and slowing further southern intrusions by 8RA troops. But by mid-summer he realized he would have to counter the N4A build-up in central Jiangsu, or else risk writing that region off to the Communists. A confusing sequence of engagements then unfolded, culminating in a decisive battle in early October 1940 near the central Jiangsu town of Huangjiao. Over the course of four days, several of Han's main-force units belonging to the 89th Army were destroyed, while others were scattered. That battle also served as a signal for the 6th Detachment to advance more aggressively in the north. In the aftermath, one of Han's principal commanders entered collaboration with the CCP, while another defected to the Nanjing government under Wang Jingwei. Although Han Teqin managed to maintain a foothold in Jiangsu until 1943, his real power had been broken. Relatively little attention was paid to the battle of Huangjiao in the Chinese press. The KMT did not want to publicize what it considered a disastrous defeat, while the Communists were satisfied to stay silent about an episode that conflicted with their proclaimed policy of a united front. As could be expected, during the autumn—after Han Teqin's defeat—KMT-CCP negotiations deteriorated further. In early December, Jiang Kai-shek personally ordered that all N4A forces withdraw from southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu by 31 December. He also ordered that the entire 8RA be positioned north of the Yellow River by the same deadline, followed one month later by the N4A. Discussions then followed between Ye Ting and Qu Chutong's deputies concerning the route to be taken, safe conduct, and—astonishingly—the money and supplies that were to be provided to the N4A to help it move. On 25 December, Mao Zedong ordered Xiang Ying to begin evacuating immediately. Yet it was not until 4 January 1941 that Ye and Xiang actually started moving. Almost immediately, Qu Chutong's forces harassed and dispersed the N4A Headquarters Group, which included administrative personnel, wounded soldiers and dependents, as well as combat-ready troops. In an attempt to reorganize, they moved southwest toward Maolin, where they were surrounded by Nationalists and, over the next several days, were cut to pieces. Losses were heavy on both sides. The CCP suffered an estimated 9,000 casualties. Xiang Ying tried twice to break out of the blockade on his own, but failed. He was then denounced as a deserter by Ye Ting, who took over full command of the doomed forces. Xiang Ying eventually escaped, but he was killed a couple of months later by one of his own bodyguards, motivated by the N4A gold reserves that he had taken with him. Up to the very end, Xiang either failed or refused to seek refuge in Liu Shaoqi's domain north of the Yangtze. The unfortunate Ye Ting was arrested and spent the rest of the war in prison. He was finally released in 1946, only to die one month later in a plane crash, along with several other high-ranking party members. On 17 January, Jiang Kai-shek declared that the New Fourth Army was dissolved for insubordination. Direct contacts between Yan'an and Chongqing nearly came to an end, and CCP military liaison offices in several cities held by the Nationalists were closed. This is what became known as the New Fourth Army incident, also referred to as the South Anhui incident. Clearly, it functioned as an act of retaliation for the defeats suffered by Han Teqin in north and central Jiangsu. It ended any realistic prospect of establishing a consolidated Communist base south of the Yangtze. Still, from a strategic perspective, these losses were ultimately more than offset by the gains achieved farther north. In fact, only a few months later, the reorganized N4A quietly began reintroducing some units into this region, where they carried out guerrilla activities without possessing a secure territorial base. Unlike the relative silence surrounding the fighting at Huangjiao, the New Fourth Army incident sparked bitter, prolonged controversy. The CCP argued that it was a second "anti-Communist upsurge," even more serious than the first. Presenting themselves as martyred patriots, they depicted their opponents as people who wanted to end the War of Resistance through what they called "Sino-Japanese cooperation" aimed at "suppressing the Communists." In their account, the Nationalists wanted to replace the war of resistance with civil war, substitute capitulation for independence, trade unity for a split, and replace light with darkness. People were telling each other the news and were horrified. Indeed, they claimed that the situation had never been as critical as it was at that moment. The Nationalist response, of course, was that provocations had been numerous and serious, and that violations of military discipline could not be tolerated. But the KMT's unwillingness to describe in detail its own defeats at the CCP's hands left it speaking in broad generalities. In the propaganda battle, the CCP clearly gained the better position and won more political capital. If it was politically valuable to be regarded as a national hero, it was even more valuable to be seen as a national martyr.  Many Chinese—and some outside—observers were genuinely alarmed and feared that civil war might openly resume. Yet, with a few exceptions, the events that culminated in the New Fourth Army incident have generally been interpreted as marking the breakdown of the second united front. That interpretation, however, is described as being wrong in two respects. First, the CCP understood the united front not as a narrow arrangement limited to a few major partners, but as a strategy that could be applied flexibly to all political, military, and social forces in China—from the highest levels of the central government down to the smallest village. Relations with Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang regime mattered, but they did not, by themselves, constitute the whole of the united front. Even regarding Jiang and the Nationalists specifically, the common reading is said to be misguided. Throughout the war, a cardinal objective of the united front was to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Therefore, if clashes between CCP forces and those of the central government on such a large scale as at Huangjiao and Maolin could occur without leading to peace with Japan and without triggering a full-scale resumption of civil war, then this should not be understood as the end of the united front—it should be seen as its fundamental vindication. If friction at that scale could nevertheless be tolerated by Jiang Jieshi, then fears about his future accommodation with Japan were greatly reduced. Following the New Fourth Army incident, the CCP reorganized its political and military presence in Central China. The Central Plains and South-east China Bureaus were merged and renamed the Central China Bureau, with Liu Shaoqi placed in charge, reflecting the area's importance to Party Central. The New Fourth Army was also reorganized completely and substantially regularized. Chen Yi became its new acting commander, since Ye Ting was imprisoned. He directed the force, now divided into seven divisions. Each division had territorial responsibilities, and in each region the CCP claimed the establishment of a base. Indeed, base construction proceeded in earnest only after the friction of 1940 and the New Fourth Army incident. In the years that followed, the operating areas of the First through Fourth Divisions contained expanding enclaves of consolidated territory, where military dominance was joined with open party work: administrative control, the development of mass organizations, local elections, and socio-economic reforms. The other three areas fluctuated between semi-consolidated and guerrilla status. With the incident, the worst phase of the KMT-CCP conflict was now over. When CCP documents later speak of a third upsurge in 1943, they refer to something openly political. With the exception of Shandong—where a fairly strong Nationalist presence persisted for a longer time—the overall balance of power among Chinese forces behind Japanese lines had shifted in favor of the CCP by mid-1941. In subsequent years the CCP's predominance became even more pronounced, until by the end of 1943 the Communists were virtually beyond challenge by Chinese rivals.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After the CCP and KMT entered the united front, cooperation felt conditional from the start. Mao pushed the New Fourth Army to reorganize and preserve Communist autonomy, even as the 1937 agreements publicly pledged obedience to KMT leadership. In 1939–40 the Communists worried that Chiang might negotiate peace with Japan; so they expanded bases and military presence, triggering repeated clashes. The pressure intensified when KMT orders forced the New Fourth Army to evacuate south Anhui in late 1940. 

Ralph welcomes back Adolph Reed, Professor Emeritus of political science at the University of Pennsylvania and Distinguished Visiting Professor at Mount Holyoke College to discuss the latest Supreme Court decision gutting the Voting Rights Act. Then, Ralph and our resident constitutional scholar, Bruce Fein, talk about what ordinary citizens can do to pressure their reps to impeach Donald Trump.Adolph Reed is Professor Emeritus of political science at the University of Pennsylvania and Distinguished Visiting Professor at Mount Holyoke College. His most recent books are The South: Jim Crow and Its Afterlives, No Politics but Class Politics (co-authored with Walter Benn Michaels), and Black Studies, Cultural Politics, and the Evasion of Inequality: The Farce this Time (co-authored with Kenneth W. Warren).I think the issues are a lot more complex than they seem to be or than seems to be the way that they are represented in the debate [over the Voting Rights Act]…To cut straight to the political case, I think there's a distinction between the Act's guarantee that black citizens and others (where pertinent) who live in areas where there's been a history of suppression of the right to vote have the support of the federal government to make certain that Black voters have the ability to vote for and to elect candidates of their choosing. Which is not the same thing as a right of Black individuals to be elected to office. And I think that's one of the confusions that characterizes, frankly, both sides of the debate at this point. And I think that's definitely something that needs to be clarified.Adolph ReedSome of my friends and I have been talking about this, and have been bouncing this idea back and forth since, frankly, even before the court handed down the [Louisiana v Callais] decision. In thinking about developments in black politics across the board, the idea that all that Black voters are supposed to get out of politics is the representation of people who look like them and share in the same racial identification has also fueled backward turns. Like how all of a sudden the biggest issue in Black American politics supposedly had become the racial wealth gap, which boils down to a complaint that rich Black people aren't as rich as rich white people are. So, yeah, shaking up or reshuffling the deck for how we might begin to try to determine the stakes of Black Americans' engagement in national politics is something that needs to happen. No matter what brings it about.Adolph ReedBruce Fein is a Constitutional scholar and an expert on international law. Mr. Fein was Associate Deputy Attorney General under Ronald Reagan and he is the author of Constitutional Peril: The Life and Death Struggle for Our Constitution and Democracy, and American Empire: Before the Fall.My website is www.lawofficesofbrucefein.com and my email address is Bruce@feinpoints.com. And I'll respond and give you guidance as to how you can help be part of this effort to impeach and remove by far the most dangerous President in the history of the United States. And he's most dangerous to the world as well.Bruce FeinNews 5/8/26* Our top story this week comes to us from the Bulwark, which reports that dissatisfaction with Democratic National Committee Chair Ken Martin is reaching a fever pitch. Martin has faced criticism over the course of his tenure for reneging on his promise to release an autopsy on the 2024 presidential campaign and for his decidedly lackluster fundraising efforts. The DNC has reportedly “spent more money than it has raised” and “has more debt than cash on hand,” while the Republican National Committee enjoys a “roughly seven-to-one money advantage.” According to this report, high-level DNC members are now privately discussing ousting Martin, only tabling these discussions “after members failed to identify an alternative candidate willing to step into the role.” Martin's failures have even led Democrats to openly wonder “whether the 178-year-old committee should even exist anymore.” Martin was elected DNC Chair last year, beating out Wisconsin Democratic Party chair Ben Wikler, who helped rebuild the party and raise tremendous amounts of money in that critical swing state.* Speaking of money in politics, this week POLITICO released a damning report on End Citizens United, the good-government focused 501(c)(4) that has in past years been a “fundraising behemoth” but has now faded nearly into complete irrelevancy. The issues highlighted in this piece will be familiar to many who have worked in this world. Despite raising $14.8 million, the group's PAC arm is burning through the money more quickly than it can raise it, having just $324,000 on hand at the end of March. What are they spending the money on? According to POLITICO, about $650,000 has gone to candidates and party groups and about the same amount has been bundled. Meanwhile, payments to fundraising firms have eaten up an astonishing $5.3 million. This is just another case of Democratic Party aligned consulting firms run amok and growing fat off of small dollar donations.* Another disappointing story comes to us from the Teamsters. According to Bloomberg, the union has forfeited a hard-won union foothold – the first ever unionized Chipotle – following three years of battling the company and failing to secure a contract. A Teamsters local president said in an email to the National Labor Relations Board that the union “officially withdraws and disclaims interest” at the Lansing, Michigan location. Legally speaking, this means the company will no longer be “required to recognize or negotiate with the union.” The employees of this location voted to unionize in 2022 by a margin of 11-to-3. Chipotle corporate has been decried for seeking to bust this union, with Biden NLRB General Counsel Jennifer Abruzzo accusing them of employing illegal anti-union tactics like “withholding raises from the store's staff and telling workers that the union was keeping their pay frozen…[and punishing] a pro-union employee to discourage activism.” However, it was the Teamsters themselves who ultimately gave up, paving the way for the demise of the workers' heroic stand against corporate power. As the saying goes, with friends like these.* In more positive political news, during the Washington DC mayoral debate last week, the Washington Post reports democratic socialist mayoral hopeful Janeese Lewis George seemed to endorse the idea of opening municipal grocery stores in DC food deserts, including the impoverished and majority Black Wards 7 and 8. Asked about this topic, Councilmember Lewis George committed to bringing at least one more grocery store to Ward 7 and at least two more to Ward 8, noting that she would seek to shore up investor confidence with public dollars. If private options do not materialize however, she vowed that “we will work towards” a publicly-owned store. Municipally-owned grocery stores were a much publicized part of the Zohran Mamdani campaign platform and, if Lewis George is elected, his success or failure in carrying out that pledge is sure to impact her decision making on this issue.* Meanwhile, in media news, the New York Times reports Lupa Systems – the private holding company representing the interests of James Murdoch, son of conservative media mogul Rupert Murdoch – is “in talks to acquire major parts of Vox Media.” Vox, founded in the 2010s by journalists Ezra Klein, Matt Yglesias, and Melissa Bell, now owns major media properties including New York magazine, the Verge, Eater and a podcast network featuring Kara Swisher and others. Murdoch, through Lupa, owns a “majority stake in Tribeca Enterprises, the parent company of the Tribeca Film Festival.” Additionally, the Times notes that Quadrivium, the foundation founded by Mr. Murdoch and his wife, Kathryn, has financial interests in “The 19th, a nonprofit newsroom focused on gender and politics, and The Bulwark, a so-called ‘Never Trump' digital media company.” James Murdoch, along with his sister Elisabeth, are seen as far more liberal than the Murdoch patriarch and his other son, Lachlan, who together successfully ousted the other family members from control of the family trust in a recent legal battle.* Turning to international news, yet another deadlocked presidential election in Peru is looming. A new Ipsos poll, taken near the end of April, shows an exact 50-50 split between the two candidates in the runoff: the left-wing member of Congress Roberto Sánchez and Keiko Fujimori, daughter of former Peruvian dictator Alberto Fujimori. This election was always going to be close – Peruvian politics have been deadlocked for years, resulting in ultra-narrow presidential victories frequently followed by impeachments. Fujimori has been a runoff candidate in every presidential election going back to 2011, losing each by extremely narrow margins. Most recently, she lost to Pedro Castillo by a margin of 50.13% to 49.87% in 2021. Castillo however was thwarted by, and ultimately ousted by, the Congress. The runoff will be held on June 7th.* In India, the Left suffered catastrophic defeats in this week's state elections, Al Jazeera reports. The state of Kerala – “the first in the world to have a democratically elected communist government” and “the last state in India where communists were in power” – will now be led by the United Democratic Front, a coalition headed by the Congress party, which won over 100 out of 140 seats. The Left bloc will likely capture around 35 seats. Beyond Kerala however, the Left has seen setbacks throughout the country, with no state now being ruled by the Left for the first time since 1977 and the national parliamentary Left bloc declining from 62 in the 2004 election to just eight seats today. Different factors are cited for the general decline of the Left in India, including an inability to adapt Marxist analysis to non class-related issues in the country, such as caste and gender, as well as the decline of industrial trade unions and a general trend towards Right-wing Hindu nationalism. Hopefully, the Left will take this electoral rout as an opportunity to rebuild itself into a viable force for 21st century Indian politics.* Turning to East Asia, the Financial Times reports North Korea has subtly revised its constitution to drop references to reunification of the two Koreas. Specifically, the new text reads “the territory of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea includes the territory bordering the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation to the north and the Republic of Korea to the south, and the territorial sea and airspace established on it”. In acknowledging the existence of the Republic of Korea, more commonly known as South Korea, experts see a move away from the long-held North Korean contention that the peninsula is a single country illegally partitioned. The revision was “disclosed by an academic at a press conference hosted by the South Korean Ministry of Unification on Wednesday.” Though this article notes that “North Korea has not made any comment on the revised constitution and the source of the text revealed by the unification ministry was not disclosed,” it highlights that Kim Jong-un has increasingly moved in this direction in recent years, renaming Tongil (“reunification”) metro station in Pyongyang and dismantling an Arch of Reunification monument.* Our last two stories have to do with the People's Republic of China. First, Reuters reports China's Commerce Ministry has issued an injunction to “block U.S. ​sanctions imposed on five Chinese refiners accused ‌of buying Iranian oil.” Hengli Petrochemical, one of the five small “teapot” refineries primarily located in China's Shandong province, was slapped with sanctions last month, when the Trump administration accused the company of purchasing billions ​of dollars in Iranian oil. The other four have been sanctioned since last year. However, the Ministry now argues that the sanctions violate “international law and ‌the ⁠basic norms of international relations,” and with the injunction in place, “the United States cannot recognize, ​implement, or comply ​with the ⁠sanctions imposed on the aforementioned five Chinese companies.” This is perhaps the most significant challenge to the American-led international sanctions regime in decades and whatever reaction issues from the U.S. will surely inform other states on just how far they can go in flouting such sanctions.* Finally, in a stunning legal decision, Fortune reports Chinese courts have ruled that “companies cannot terminate employees just to replace them with artificial intelligence systems.” The case in question hinged on whether a tech firm in eastern China had acted illegally when firing one of its workers, a “quality assurance professional…identified only as Zhou” after he “refused to take a demotion” and a 40% pay cut, when his job was automated by AI. The court found that the termination did not meet established standards, such as business downsizing or operational difficulties, and the court separately stated that “Companies cannot unilaterally lay off employees or cut salaries due to technological progress.” This stunning legal victory for workers in the face of challenges by technology is bittersweet – heartening in that it's happening at all, yet at the same time depressing because it is almost impossible to imagine an equivalent worker protection regime being implemented in the United States.This has been Francesco DeSantis, with In Case You Haven't Heard. Get full access to Ralph Nader Radio Hour at www.ralphnaderradiohour.com/subscribe

Bem-vindo à Rádio Minghui. As transmissões incluem assuntos relativos à perseguição ao Falun Gong na China, entendimentos e experiências dos praticantes adquiridas no curso de seus cultivos, interesses e música composta e executada pelos praticantes do Dafa. Programa 1552: Experiência de cultivo da categoria Autoaprimoramento intitulada: “Deixar de lado o ressentimento e ser gentil com minha sogra”, escrita por uma praticante do Falun Dafa na província de Shandong, China.

An 80-year-old Chinese woman with heart disease video-chats daily with her late son, never knowing she is actually speaking to an AI clone built by his own family.PRINT VERSION OF THIS STORY: https://weirddarkness.com/ai-clone-son-chinaLook for this podcast on YouTube Music, Apple Podcasts, Spotify, iHeart Radio, Amazon Music, Pandora, TuneIn Radio, and numerous other podcast apps. Get the full list of options here: https://pod.link/1078714736*No AI Voices Are Used In The Narration Of This Podcast*WeirdDarkness® is a registered trademark. Copyright ©2026, Weird Darkness.#WeirdDarkness, #WeirdDarkNEWS

En Chine, premier producteur mondial d'ail, le marché traverse une mauvaise passe. Depuis plusieurs mois, les récoltes abondantes s'accumulent dans les entrepôts, les stocks gonflent et les prix chutent. Résultat : toute la filière est sous pression, et certains producteurs comme exportateurs sont contraints de vendre à perte. De notre correspondante à Pékin,  L'ail chinois n'a jamais été aussi abondant et paradoxalement, aussi peu rentable. Depuis plusieurs mois, le marché est saturé, conséquence directe de récoltes record et de stocks déjà élevés accumulés l'an dernier.  Résultat : les prix s'effondrent. Aujourd'hui, ils dépassent à peine les 2 yuans par demi-kilo – un niveau insuffisant pour couvrir les coûts de production de nombreux acteurs. Produire plus… au risque d'aggraver la crise Dans les grandes régions agricoles comme le Shandong, le Henan ou le Jiangsu, les surfaces cultivées ont encore augmenté. Une stratégie classique : produire plus pour compenser la baisse des prix.  Mais cette logique alimente en réalité le cercle vicieux de la surproduction. Même si certaines zones ont été pénalisées par les pluies et des rendements en baisse, la tendance nationale reste à la hausse. Face à cette offre pléthorique, la demande peine à suivre. Les entrepôts sont pleins, les volumes disponibles dès le printemps sont déjà importants, et la nouvelle récolte arrive. À lire aussiChine: les huiles usagées valent désormais plus cher que le kérosène Exporter à tout prix pour écouler les stocks Dans ce contexte, de nombreux exportateurs n'ont d'autre choix que de casser leurs marges, voire de vendre à perte, pour écouler leurs stocks. À l'international, la concurrence s'intensifie. La Chine reste ultra-dominante sur le marché mondial de l'ail, mais elle doit désormais se battre sur les prix. Certains opérateurs cherchent de nouveaux débouchés, notamment en Afrique, tandis que d'autres s'appuient sur des marchés plus stables comme la Russie. Les tensions logistiques en mer Rouge ou autour du canal de Suez compliquent aussi les exportations vers l'Europe, mais leur impact reste limité : l'essentiel des volumes part vers l'Asie. Au final, derrière ce produit du quotidien, c'est toute une filière agricole qui se retrouve fragilisée – prise entre excès de production, pression sur les prix et incertitudes à l'export. À lire aussiNourriture, énergie, métaux: comment les stocks chinois redessinent l'économie

In 1995, 10-year-old Zhou Qinggui from Hangtou, a village in the city of Linyi, Shandong province, was expected to drop out of school after elementary level due to poverty. A passionate reader who carried books while tending livestock and gathering pigweed, Zhou was heartbroken.1995年，山东临沂杭头村10岁的周庆贵因家境贫寒，小学毕业后便面临辍学。这个放牧、打猪草时都手不释卷的孩子，伤心欲绝。To allow the boy to continue his education, his mother borrowed money, and his elder brother and younger sister both gave up schooling, one after the other.为了让周庆贵继续读书，母亲四处借钱，哥哥和妹妹也先后辍学。In 2021, Zhou and six childhood friends — truck drivers, ride-hailing drivers, decorators, small hardware store owners — raised more than 80,000 yuan ($11,730) and turned Zhou's old, 240-square-meter house into a library where village children could study and read.2021年，周庆贵与六位儿时伙伴——如今是货车司机、网约车司机、装修工、五金店小老板——共同筹资八万余元，将周家240平米的老宅改造成了一座图书馆，供村里孩子们学习阅读。In 2019, Zhou, then a PhD candidate at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, returned to the village — which has a population of 8,000 to 10,000, including many children whose parents work elsewhere — for thesis work.2019年，当时还是上海交通大学博士研究生的周庆贵，为撰写论文回到这个拥有八九千人口、留守儿童众多的村庄。Walking around, he found that despite economic gains, with factories replacing wheat fields, there was a lack of quiet reading spaces. While many families were better off than before, the absence of a reading culture had led to excessive time spent on entertainment, and without college graduate role models, children hesitated to dream big.走访中他发现，尽管麦田变工厂，经济条件改善了，但村里缺少安静的阅读空间。许多家庭虽比以前富裕，阅读氛围的缺失却让孩子们把大量时间花在娱乐上；加之缺乏大学生榜样，孩子们不敢怀揣远大梦想。"To improve the cultural climate, education is key, and building a library could be a concrete step forward," Zhou wrote in his WeChat public account."要改善文化风气，教育是关键，而建一座图书馆是实实在在能迈出的一步。"周庆贵在个人微信公众号中写道。"It should be a cultural space that can provide a wider spiritual world for children to elevate their confidence and broaden their vision, rather than a space for kids to finish their homework," Zhou said."它应该是一个文化空间，能为孩子们提供更广阔的精神世界，提升他们的自信心，开阔他们的眼界，而不仅仅是写作业的地方。"周庆贵说。He named the library Siyuan — which means "remember the source" in Chinese — after his alma mater's motto: "Drink water and remember the source; love your country and honor your school."他将图书馆命名为"思源"，取自母校上海交大"饮水思源，爱国荣校"的校训。His 70-year-old father manages the library as a volunteer. Retired teachers from nearby schools also help, organizing books, creating reading lists and guiding children.他70岁的父亲义务管理着图书馆。附近学校的退休教师也来帮忙，整理图书、制定阅读书单、给孩子们以指导。Over five years, the library has collected more than 20,000 volumes, from children's picture books to classics.五年间，思源图书馆的藏书从儿童绘本到经典名著，已超过两万册。Now the Siyuan Library serves as a study and reading space for over 30 people, and its visitor register has recorded more than 1,000 names. To attract more children, Zhou, now a teacher at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, gives remote lessons on a regular basis. During winter and summer breaks, he returns to the village to discuss daily studies, college entrance exam goals and career planning. He also invites the university's alumni to give talks, and organizes exchange activities with key city middle schools.如今，思源图书馆可供30余人同时学习阅读，来访登记簿上已记录了一千多个名字。为了吸引更多孩子，已是上海交大教师的周庆贵定期远程授课。寒暑假时，他便回到村里，和孩子们探讨日常学业、高考目标及职业规划。他还邀请大学校友前来讲座，并组织与城市重点中学的交流活动。Gradually, Zhou has seen the library grow into a cherished learning space. In the beginning, bad habits such as littering were common. But he stressed that the library was meant to teach not only knowledge, but also moral values. Now, students tidy up before they leave.渐渐地，周庆贵看着图书馆成长为一方备受珍视的学习天地。起初，乱扔垃圾等不良习惯很常见，但他强调，图书馆不仅要传授知识，也要涵养品德。现在，学生们离开前都会主动收拾整洁。Furthermore, while village children pick up good study habits and confidence, their parents have also embraced a new habit — reading together with their children.不仅如此，村里的孩子们在养成良好学习习惯和树立自信的同时，家长们也养成新习惯——与孩子一起阅读。Zhou took great pride when 14 village students entered universities in 2024. In 2025, that number rose to 34, making him even happier.2024年，村里有14名学生考上大学，这让周庆贵倍感自豪。到了2025年，这个数字增至34人，更令他欣喜不已。He plans to open two or three more branches in other villages, using the same principles — the libraries should genuinely help a large number of people, and access should always be free.他计划在其他村子再开办两到三个分馆，遵循同样的原则——图书馆要实实在在惠及更多人，且永远免费开放。"I hope to use a platform like the Siyuan Library to leverage the power of the humanities to help drive economic and social progress," he said."我希望借助思源图书馆这样的平台，发挥人文的力量，助力推动经济和社会进步。"他说。Zhou's efforts are part of a broader national movement to promote reading and cultivate a book-loving society in China.周庆贵的努力是中国推动全民阅读、建设书香社会这一广泛国家行动的一部分。In a letter to the First National Conference on Reading in April 2022, President Xi Jinping said: "Reading is an important avenue for humans to acquire knowledge, expand wisdom and cultivate virtues. It enlightens us and helps us aim high and stand upright. … I hope that all our children will have a habit of reading, enjoy reading and grow up in a healthy way. I wish all of our people are engaged in reading and contribute to an atmosphere where everyone loves reading, has good books to read and knows how to gain from reading."2022年4月，习近平主席在致首届全民阅读大会的贺信中指出："阅读是人类获取知识、启智增慧、培养道德的重要途径，可以让人得到思想启发，树立崇高理想，涵养浩然之气。……希望孩子们养成阅读习惯，快乐阅读，健康成长；希望全社会都参与到阅读中来，形成爱读书、读好书、善读书的浓厚氛围。"For decades, China has been trying to provide an environment conducive to reading, including the promotion of reading among all people in the annual government work report for 13 consecutive years.数十年来，中国一直致力于营造有利于阅读的环境，已连续13年将"全民阅读"写入政府工作报告。And so, thanks to years of effort, a book-loving society is taking shape. Between 2012 and 2024, the overall reading rate among adult citizens in China rose steadily, from 76.3 percent to 82.1 percent, according to Xinhua News Agency.经年努力，书香社会渐成风气。据新华社报道，2012年至2024年间，我国成年国民综合阅读率从76.3%稳步提升至82.1%。During the 2025 two sessions, the annual gatherings of the nation's top legislative and political advisory bodies, Xi pointed out that the "aroma of books" represents a desirable cultural atmosphere, and he called for fostering a book-loving society in which people read widely, choose good books and draw wisdom and nourishment from them.在2025年全国两会期间，习近平指出，"书香"是一种令人向往的文化氛围，要倡导人们广泛阅读、选择好书，从中汲取智慧和营养，推动书香社会建设。On Feb 1, a State Council regulation to promote reading among the public took effect. The regulation establishes the fourth week of April each year as "National Reading Week", with the first such week running from Monday to April 26 this year.今年2月1日，国务院颁布的《全民阅读促进条例》正式施行。条例明确，每年4月第四周为"全民阅读活动周"。首个全民阅读周于今年4月20日至26日举行。In Beijing, the 2026 Spring Book Fair — the city's first large-scale cultural gathering centered around physical bookstores — kicked off on Saturday and will run through May 17. With over 2,000 bookstores participating in four major venues — Chaoyang Park, Nanyuan Forest Wetland Park, Shougang Industrial Heritage Park and the Old Summer Palace — the fair offers readers an engaging and interactive cultural environment.在北京，2026年春季书市于上周六（4月18日）拉开帷幕，将持续至5月17日。这是北京今年首个以实体书店为核心的大型文化盛会。全市超过2000家书店在朝阳公园、南苑森林湿地公园、首钢工业遗址公园、圆明园四大主会场亮相，为读者营造出沉浸互动式的文化氛围。In addition, Nanchang, Jiangxi province, is hosting this year's National Conference on Reading from Monday to Wednesday, featuring a series of events such as book fairs and exhibitions.此外，今年的全民阅读大会于4月20日至22日在江西南昌举办，配套举行书展、展览等系列活动。Speaking at a symposium at China University of Political Science and Law on May 3, 2017, President Xi called for young people to cherish their time, be diligent in their studies and settle down to read more classics.2017年5月3日，习近平在中国政法大学考察时勉励青年，要珍惜时光，勤奋学习，静下心来多读经典。Dan Hansong, a professor of English language and literature at Nanjing University, said that teachers should create an environment in which genuine reading is valued, rather than overwhelming them with excessive assignments.南京大学英语语言文学教授但汉松认为，教师应创造重视真正阅读的环境，而不是让学生被过重的课业负担压垮。Because he finds it difficult to ensure independent work when assigning take-home final papers, he focuses instead on the reading process itself and encourages students to share personal reactions to texts.他坦言，布置期末论文带回家写，很难保证学生独立完成，因此他更侧重于阅读过程本身，鼓励学生分享个人的阅读感悟。As public libraries play a crucial role in the building of a book-loving society, China now has over 3,200 public libraries at the county level and above, along with nearly 68,000 library branches and service points.公共图书馆在建设书香社会中扮演关键角色。目前，中国共有县以上公共图书馆超过3200个，图书馆分馆及服务点近6.8万个。In a reply letter to experts from the National Library of China on Sept 8, 2019, Xi said that libraries are an important symbol of a country's cultural development and an important place to nourish the people's spiritual world and cultivate cultural confidence.2019年9月8日，习近平在给国家图书馆老专家的回信中指出，图书馆是国家文化发展水平的重要标志，是滋养民族心灵、培育文化自信的重要场所。ride-hailing driver /raɪd ˈheɪlɪŋ ˈdraɪvər/网约车司机better off /ˈbetər ɒf/更富裕的；境况更好的alma mater /ˌælmə ˈmɑːtər/母校alumnus /əˈlʌmnəs/校友；毕业生（男性）embrace /ɪmˈbreɪs/拥抱；欣然接受cultivate a book-loving society /ˈkʌltɪveɪt ə bʊk ˈlʌvɪŋ səˈsaɪəti/建设书香社会enlighten /ɪnˈlaɪtən/启迪；启发conducive to /kənˈdjuːsɪv tuː/有助于……的；有益于……的two sessions /tuː ˈseʃənz/两会diligent /ˈdɪlɪdʒənt/勤奋的；勤勉的

In Cina, un anziana signora crede di parlare con il figlio lontano che promette di tornare presto. Il figlio è morto però da un anno e il nipote ha creato un clone di intelligenza artificiale per mantenerle questa illusione. Superbrain, un'azienda specializzata, ha realizzato l'avatar con foto e video del defunto, materia prima di un business che gioca con le emozioni umane.Stiamo trasformando il lutto in un prodotto da vendere, sostituendo il dolore reale con una consolazione artificiale. L'illusione può sembrare benefica, ma impedisce l'elaborazione del lutto e alimenta un mercato senza regole chiare. La storia della signora di Shandong è solo la punta dell'iceberg, un esempio di come il bisogno umano di conforto venga sfruttato per profitto. Chi decide quando una bugia finisce e quanto siamo disposti a pagare per essa?Dove tracciamo la linea tra consolazione e inganno?~~Ciao Internet! - TECH POLICY - Matteo FloraINFO E AZIENDE: https://matteoflora.comIl CORSO di AI: https://zero.matteoflora.comNewsletter: https://link.mgpf.it/nlSocial: https://io.matteoflora.comEnglish: https://www.youtube.com/@CiaoInternetMail #adv: sales (at) matteoflora.com

Sanction contre un proche de la Première ministre japonaise, incursion d'un militaire japonais dans l'ambassade de Chine à Tokyo, la tension est vive entre les deux plus grandes économies d'Asie. Des propos de la Première ministre japonaise Sanae Takaichi évoquant une potentielle réaction de son pays en cas de blocus ou d'invasion de Taïwan ont ouvert une phase gel dans les relations sino-nippones. RFI s'est rendu au Japon à l'invitation du FPCJ (Foreign Press Center Japan), une institution en partie financée par le gouvernement japonais.  De notre envoyé spécial, Une poignée de touristes, de scientifiques et d'amoureux de la nature, partagent la trentaine de sièges d'un Dash 8, turbopropulseur qui effectue le trajet entre Naha, la capitale de la préfecture d'Okinawa et Yonaguni. Il faut survoler durant plus d'une heure et quart des eaux limpides avant d'apercevoir les falaises encerclant l'îlot de 1 600 habitants. Au milieu de ce décor de carte postale où des chevaux sauvages gambadent dans les prairies verdoyantes, une structure s'impose dans le paysage : la base militaire, installée depuis 2016. Nous sommes à à peine plus de 100 kilomètres de Taïwan. L'île de facto indépendante que Pékin souhaite récupérer est au cœur de la brouille entre Tokyo et Pékin. La dispute entre voisins a éclaté en novembre 2025. À la Diet, le Parlement japonais, la Première ministre a évoqué une potentielle réaction de son pays en cas de blocus ou d'invasion de Taïwan, en vertu du principe de « légitime défense collective ». Une brèche ouverte en 2015 dans la Constitution pacifiste du pays, lui autorisant une action militaire en cas de menace sur sa propre existence. En réponse, la Chine a multiplié les mesures : limitation des vols vers le Japon, boycott touristique, restrictions sur les exportations de terres rares, sanctions sur un député japonais proche de Sanae Takaichi, mais aussi manœuvres militaires. À Yonaguni, le point le plus à l'ouest de l'archipel, les soubresauts géopolitiques entraînent depuis de longues années des conséquences concrètes. Drones, missiles sol-air Quelques jours après les déclarations polémiques de la cheffe du gouvernement japonais et au lendemain d'une visite du ministre de la Défense sur l'île, des avions de chasse ont décollé à la hâte. Un drone soupçonné d'être chinois a été détecté entre Taïwan et le petit rocher nippon à 2.000 km de la capitale. Un accident loin d'être isolé, amené à se reproduire. Tokyo augmente le budget de sa défense à 2% du PIB et souhaite poursuivre la militarisation de Yonaguni, au grand dam de Pékin. Depuis dix ans, 230 soldats d'une garnison de surveillance côtière sont venus assister aux premières loges à l'intensification des manœuvres chinoises autour de Taïwan. Une unité de guerre électronique puis des missiles sol-air de moyenne portée seront installés en 2030, dans ce site stratégique à quelques encablures de Taipei. « Compte tenu de la situation à Taïwan, et de la nécessité de protéger le territoire, la présence de militaires ici est inévitable, explique Tsueno Uechi le maire de l'îlot. L'homme pourtant réputé moins belliqueux que son prédécesseur a accepté l'installation. Il faut dire que l'île a pris l'habitude d'être au cœur du jeu géopolitique, particulièrement la quarantaine de pêcheurs qui arpentent les eaux à la recherche d'espadon. « Les navires chinois nous suivent systématiquement » « En 2022, quand Nancy Pelosi, présidente de la Chambre des représentants américaine était en visite à Taïwan, cinq missiles chinois sont tombés dans la zone économique exclusive du Japon, raconte Hiromoto Ogimi dans son salon, entouré de ses prises les plus imposantes, notamment les rostres, le nez pointu des espadons, soigneusement empaillées ». « Quand il y a des exercices militaires chinois, je ne sors plus en mer. Si on va vers les îles Senkaku, on voit souvent les garde-côtes japonais qui nous disent de ne pas trop rapprocher. Parce que les navires chinois y sont et nous suivent systématiquement ». Car en plus d'être proche de Taïwan, Yonaguni est située à moins de 150 kilomètres d'un autre point de tension clé : Senkaku en japonais, Diaoyu en chinois. Huit rochers sous souveraineté nippone, revendiqués par Pékin. « Presque chaque jour, nous constatons la présence de navires de la police maritime chinoise », assure un officiel des garde-côtes nippons, tout en estimant que la situation dans la zone est restée stable depuis novembre et le début du nouveau froid entre les deux voisins. Mais la tension entre les deux géants asiatiques est aussi palpable dans la capitale japonaise. Les groupes de touristes chinois ont déserté les rues animées d'Asakusa, quartiers prisés des visiteurs étrangers. En bordure du temple Senso-ji, la plupart des magasins affichent la possibilité de régler par Wechatpay ou Alipay. Des moyens de paiement privilégiés par les 9 millions de visiteurs annuels venus de l'Empire du milieu, une catégorie à part, si importante que l'industrie dédiée à leur accueil a un surnom Yi Tiao Long : « un dragon ». Mais le Parti communiste chinois a poussé sa population à renoncer à ces voyages au Japon. Une mesure efficace : leur nombre a chuté de 54% sur le début de l'année selon les chiffres officiels. « Maintenant il y a autant de touristes chinois que de visiteurs qui viennent d'autres pays... avant ils représentaient 70% de nos clients... », déplore la responsable chinoise d'un magasin de location de Kimono. Certains sont plus impactés que nous. Plusieurs boutiques de location de Kimono ont même dû fermer, car elles dépendaient à 80 ou 90% des touristes chinois. Même si les Européens et Américains viennent, ils ne consomment pas autant, les Chinois eux sont souvent plus dépensiers ». Ils représentaient 11 milliards d'euros de dépenses l'année dernière (2025). Une perte compensée par la hausse des touristes étrangers souhaite rassurer l'agence de tourisme japonaise. Attirés par la chute du Yen, les Américains, Canadiens, Européens ou Sud-Coréens se sont rués à Kyoto, Tokyo et Osaka, portés aussi par une stratégie visant à diversifier les visiteurs. « Parallèlement, nous souhaitons mener des promotions stratégiques pour accueillir des touristes de nombreuses autres régions et pays du monde », explique avec prudence Mr Nakano Takeshi, vice-commissaire de l'Agence de Tourisme du Japon. En creux, l'objectif est de réduire la dépendance, en privilégiant des voyageurs individuels occidentaux ou sud-coréens plutôt que les groupes de touristes chinois. « Tout le monde préfère la paix » D'autant que dans un pays où la colère de la population vis-à-vis du surtourisme est palpable, s'ajoute une défiance bien ancrée vis-à-vis des voisins chinois. Plus de 80% des Japonais déclarent avoir une opinion négative de la Chine depuis 2013. Une méfiance réciproque et particulièrement difficile à vivre pour les près d'un million de Chinois vivant dans l'archipel. Certains tentent malgré tout de plaider pour la coexistence et le dialogue au plus bas niveau. En témoignent les éclats de rire résonnant devant la station de métro d'Ikebukuro. Chinois et Japonais sont venus échanger et débattre. « Beaucoup de Chinois qui vivent ici n'ont pas d'amis japonais. Parce que les Japonais sont xénophobes mais également assez introvertis », confie Shigeru Takano, un Japonais qui a lancé ce groupe d'amitié il y a trois ans et demi. Il voit désormais chuter le nombre de participants. Tous estiment que le froid politique est là pour rester, mais placent leur foi dans les échanges humains. « Les gouvernements sont les gouvernements et les gens sont les gens. Ici tout le monde préfère la paix », souffle un expatrié chinois. Derrière lui, un autre rend ses autorités responsables. « Tous ces problèmes politiques dépendent directement des hauts dirigeants chinois. En une phrase, tout peut être réglé par Xi Jinping. S'il veut que ça se passe bien, alors les choses se passeront bien. Assure cet homme originaire du Shandong qui requiert l'anonymat. En Chine, les gens sont hostiles aux Japonais à cause de la propagande anti-américaine et anti-occidentale : ils subissent un lavage de cerveau ». Un discours en écho avec celui que tient l'homme à l'origine du groupe. « Le gouvernement japonais actuel, avec des politiciens d'extrême droite comme notre Première ministre Sanae Takaichi, est xénophobe, renchérit Shigeru Takano. Cela va limiter le développement économique du Japon. Je pense que le peuple japonais finira par se réveiller. Aux prochaines élections, ces politiciens d'extrême droite devront quitter le gouvernement ». Un vœu loin d'avoir été exaucé. La ligne ferme de Sanae Takaichi, refusant de céder face à la pression de Pékin a été largement récompensée par un raz-de-marée électoral en février. Elle n'a pas rétropédalé, ni présenté des excuses après ses propos sur Taïwan contrairement à nombre de ses prédécesseurs. Si Tokyo assure que la politique de l'archipel n'a pas évolué sur ce dossier ultra-sensible, « les propos de la Première ministre ont pu surprendre à Pékin », estime Hotaka Machida, ancien diplomate japonais en Chine, désormais chercheur invité à l'Institut de géoéconomie de l'International House of Japan. Mais en même temps, les Chinois étaient ultra-vigilants du fait de la réputation de Sanae Takaichi et ils en ont profité pour pousser le Japon à clarifier sa position ». Révisionnisme La réputation corrosive de la « dame de fer japonaise » n'est peut-être pas étrangère à l'intensité de la réaction chinoise. La Première ministre a longtemps été une habituée du sanctuaire Yasukini. En ce dimanche de printemps, les visiteurs sont nombreux à s'incliner devant le gigantesque Toori, porte rouge marquant l'entrée dans ce lieu hautement polémique. Un geste qui marque leur respect envers les plus de deux millions d'âmes honorés dans ce temple shinto. Ici sont déifiés les morts des guerres du Japon aux XIXème et XXème siècle, dont 1 618 criminels de guerre, certains condamnés pour crime contre l'humanité pour leurs responsabilités dans les horreurs commises par l'armée nippone durant son occupation d'une large partie de l'Asie. Chaque visite de politicien provoque l'ire de Séoul et de Pékin. « Je ne comprends absolument pas pourquoi la Chine et la Corée du Sud critiquent ce lieu », souffle Oga Toko, venu rendre hommage à son grand-père, mort durant la Seconde guerre mondiale. « Personnellement, je serais touchée de voir la Première ministre venir ici. » « La Chine et la Corée du Sud prennent le Japon comme bouc émissaire. Nous étions obligés d'envahir nos voisins à cause de la menace militaire américaine.... renchérit un passant. Le massacre de Nankin par exemple n'a jamais eu lieu. » Des propos révisionnistes qui font référence aux crimes de masse commis par l'armée impériale japonaise en 1937, dans l'ex-capitale chinoise. Durant six semaines d'horreur, des centaines de milliers de civils sont assassinés, et des dizaines de milliers de personnes violées. Des faits largement documentés notamment par des historiens japonais, mais contestés par une partie des soutiens de Sanae Takaichi, qui a elle-même flirté avec cette ligne tout en évitant soigneusement pour l'instant des propos ou une visite polémique qui provoqueraient l'ire de Pékin. Un paradoxe alors qu'elle assume ses ambitions sur un autre dossier : celui de la réforme constitutionnelle permettant d'abandonner le pacifisme. « L'heure est venue », a-t-elle déclaré ce dimanche (12 avril) aux délégués du Parti Libéral Démocrate à l'occasion de la convention annuelle. Avec une promesse, se présenter à cette réunion en 2027 avec un plan précis pour réformer la constitution. « Un rêve de longue date » selon elle, qui se fera certainement au détriment des relations avec son imposant voisin.

Episode 523 / Chenlu Hou & Chiara NoBorn in Shandong, China in 1989, Chenlu Hou is currently based in Providence, RI. She earned her MFA in Ceramics from the Rhode Island School of Design in 2019. Since then, she has completed residencies at Museum of Arts and Design in New York, Penland School of Craft, Houston Center for Contemporary Craft, and Archie Bray Foundation. Her works have been included in exhibitions at Kristen Lorello, New York; YIRI Arts, Taipei City, Taiwan; the Houston Center for Contemporary Craft, Texas; and the Archie Bray Foundation, Helena, MT; among other venues. Hou is currently a resident artist at Harvard Ceramics and a Visiting Critic in Ceramics at the Rhode Island School of Design.Chiara No was born in 1981 in Key West, FL, and currently lives and works in Johnson, VT. She studied Art and Theory at the Glasgow School of Art in 2002-03 and received a BA in Art History from Towson University in 2005 and an MFA from the University of Pennsylvania in 2015. She has been on faculty at School of the Art Institute of Chicago and an instructor at University of Pennsylvania. She has shown at Spring Break New York, NY; MoCA Westport, Westport, CT; Field Projects and Bible, New York, NY; Vox Populi, Philadelphia, PA; EXILE, Vienna, Austria; Johalla Projects, Chicago, IL; and has participated Printed Matter's Art Book Fair in both New York and Los Angeles. Her works on paper are included in the Whitney Museum of American Art's Special Collection, the Walker Art Center's Library and Archives, the Art Institute of Chicago's Joan Flasch Artists' Book Library. Chenlu Hou and Chiara No: What the Hands Remember to Hear. A joint exhibition at the Aldrich Museum of two artists who use ceramic sculpture to explore storytelling and spirituality up through MAY 25, 2026. 

The National Meteorological Center said a prolonged spell of wet weather is set to affect large parts of China next week, raising concerns about potential secondary disasters as some areas will receive above-average rainfall.中央气象台预计，未来一周我国大部地区将出现持续降雨天气，部分地区降雨量将超过常年同期平均水平，需警惕可能引发的次生灾害。Starting on Sunday, parts of central, eastern and southern China will experience a 10-day spell of rainy weather, with affected areas likely to receive rainfall 30 to 70 percent above the seasonal average, while more than double the average rainfall is expected in some locations, the center said.中央气象台预计，3月22日起，中部、东部和南方大部地区将出现持续10天的阴雨天气，受降雨影响地区降雨量将较常年同期偏多3～7成，部分地区偏多1倍以上。From Sunday through Thursday, heavy rainfall is expected to drench southern China, according to Weather China, a website affiliated with the China Meteorological Administration.中国天气网预计，3月22日至26日，南方大部地区将出现强降雨过程。The heaviest rainfall is forecast for Monday, when eastern parts of Jiangxi province and northwestern parts of Fujian province are likely to witness very heavy downpours, the website said.预计23日降雨最强，江西东部、福建西北部等局地有暴雨。Ma Xuekuan, the National Meteorological Center's chief forecaster, said the weather pattern is the result of the interaction between frequent weak cold air masses and active warm, moist currents from the south. He warned that parts of Guizhou and Hunan provinces could experience severe convective weather, including thunderstorms, strong winds and hail.中央气象台首席预报员马学款介绍，南方地区降雨主要是由于频繁的弱冷空气与活跃的暖湿气流共同作用所致。贵州、湖南等地的部分地区将出现雷暴大风、冰雹等强对流天气。"Until late March, southern China will see frequent rain, with fresh downpours hitting already soaked areas. Guizhou, Hunan, Jiangxi and Zhejiang provinces, and northern parts of the Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region will face heightened risks of secondary disasters from prolonged rainfall," he said.马学款提醒，3月下旬，南方地区降雨天气频繁，部分强降雨落区与前期重叠，贵州、湖南、江西、浙江、广西等地发生降雨次生灾害的风险较高，需加以警惕。Feng Lei, a senior engineer at the China Meteorological Administration's Public Meteorological Service Center, advised people to monitor weather warnings closely and avoid traveling during periods of intense rain or storms.中国气象局公共气象服务中心高级工程师冯蕾提醒公众密切关注天气预警信息，尽量避免在降雨集中时段外出。She said the rainy weather could also affect renewable energy, adding that the sector should adjust energy distribution and storage plans to mitigate the impact. She also urged authorities to guard against infrastructure risks posed by severe convective weather.冯蕾表示，降雨天气会对电力新能源领域产生影响，相关行业需根据天气变化调整能源调配和储存方案。冯蕾提醒，强对流天气会对城市安全运行造成影响，需警惕大风、雷电等对基础设施的影响。The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs and the China Meteorological Administration issued a joint risk warning on Saturday for farmland waterlogging, which is expected to affect parts of Guizhou, Hunan and Jiangxi provinces from Sunday to Thursday.3月21日，农业农村部和中国气象局联合发布农田渍涝灾害风险预警，预计3月21日至26日，贵州、湖南、江西等地部分地区有农田渍涝灾害风险。Authorities have urged affected regions to strengthen ditch and canal clearance to ensure proper drainage, and ensure low water levels in reservoirs and ponds.气象和农业部门提醒相关地区及时清理沟渠，保持排水通畅，并降低水库、池塘水位。Meanwhile, northern China is experiencing a spell of unseasonal warm weather.与此同时，北方大部则正在经历一轮快速升温天气过程。Temperatures across the region are expected to remain above average for the next few days. On Wednesday, Taiyuan in Shanxi province, Jinan in Shandong province and Zhengzhou in Henan province are forecast to see new seasonal high temperatures of up to 25 C, according to Weather China.预计未来几天，北方多地气温将维持在较常年同期偏高水平。中国天气网预计，25日，山西太原、山东济南、河南郑州等城市可能迎来今年以来气温新高，最高气温预计可达25℃左右。The website cautioned that despite high maximum temperatures, northern China still faces large temperature swings, with a difference of more than 20 C between day and night temperatures in some areas. Residents are advised to dress in layers.中国天气网提醒，尽管北方地区白天最高气温回升迅速，但昼夜温差普遍较大，部分地区的昼夜温差可达20℃以上，公众请适时调整着装。a prolonged spell of /ə prəˈlɒŋd spel əv/一段长时间的secondary disaster /ˈsekənderi dɪˈzɑːstə(r)/次生灾害convective /kənˈvektɪv/对流的hail /heɪl/冰雹farmland waterlogging /ˈfɑːmlænd ˈwɔːtəlɒɡɪŋ/农田渍涝

A new trend of young people battling stress by rediscovering beauty in their surroundings is sweeping through Chinese social media, amassing millions of views on platforms such as Dou yin and Xiao hong shu.通过在周边环境中重新发现美来缓解压力，这一新趋势正在中国社交媒体上流行开来，在抖音和小红书等平台上积累了数百万浏览量。Color Walk, as it is called, involves participants selecting a specific color theme before heading out and then documenting everything that matches the chosen shade during a leisurely stroll through a neighborhood, or even during daily commuting.Color Walk（色彩漫步）指的是参与者先选定一个颜色主题，然后在街区悠闲散步甚至日常通勤时，记录下与该颜色相关的一切。Yang Zheng, 29, who works in the publishing industry in Qingdao, Shandong province, said the idea of Color Walk had thrilling resonance when she first came across it on Dou yin. "Whether one is experiencing cultural settings or passing through natural scenery, it's a great thing to share," she said.29岁的杨铮在山东省青岛市从事出版行业。她说，当她在抖音上第一次看到Color Walk的想法时，产生了强烈的共鸣。"无论是在文化氛围中还是在自然风光中，分享都是一件很棒的事情，"她说。A week ago, Yang started a Color-Walk sharing group on WeChat, which has since attracted about 45 members, mostly from Generation Z. Every evening, the group decides on a "Color of the Day" and members share photos matching the theme.一周前，杨铮在微信上成立了一个色彩漫步分享群，吸引了约45名成员，其中大多数是Z世代。每天晚上，群里决定一个"今日颜色"，成员们分享与主题相符的照片。The activity is aimed at helping people rediscover amusement in their otherwise monotonous lives, she said, adding that it also helps participants unwind and relieve stress.她说，这项活动旨在帮助人们在原本单调的生活中重新发现乐趣，并补充说，这也有助于参与者放松身心，缓解压力。Yang cited her own example. A few days ago, when she got carsick on her way home from work, she remembered the day's Color Walk theme and started looking for matches in the passing scenery outside the window.杨铮以自己为例。几天前，她在下班回家的路上晕车，她想起了当天的色彩漫步主题，开始在窗外的风景中寻找相匹配的颜色。"Quite unexpectedly, it slowly relieved my motion sickness. In addition, I also happened to notice things that I had barely noticed before," she said."出乎意料的是，它慢慢地缓解了我的晕车。此外，我也注意到了以前几乎没有注意到的东西，"她说。Hu, a 19-year-old university student in Lu'an, Anhui province, was drawn to Color Walk as a natural extension of his love for documenting life.胡先生是安徽省六安市的一名19岁大学生，他被色彩漫步吸引，因为这满足了他对记录生活的热爱。"It lets me record my days in a more interesting way," he said, adding that the activity's core appeal lies in its ability to arouse people's love for life. "We usually overlook many small details in our everyday life, like say a fire hydrant, which becomes more visible during a Color Walk themed 'red'. It makes our ordinary feel a little extraordinary."他说："这让我以一种更有趣的方式记录我的生活。"他补充说，这项活动的核心吸引力在于它能唤起人们对生活的热爱。"我们通常忽略了日常生活中的许多小细节，比如消防栓，在以'红色'为主题的色彩漫步中，消防栓变得更加显眼。它让我们的平凡感觉有点不平凡。"Xu Gaoyang, a psychotherapist at Beijing Anding Hospital of Capital Medical University, said the activity is a practical application of a psychological technique known as "grounding", which has two objectives — actively diverting attention and setting a small, controllable goal.首都医科大学附属北京安定医院心理治疗师徐高阳表示，这项活动是一种被称为"接地气"的心理技术的实际应用，它有两个目标——积极转移注意力和设定一个可控的小目标。"Think of our mood as an airplane. When it hits turbulence, 'grounding' helps it land steadily. By fixing our attention on something in the external environment — in this case, a color — we can quickly anchor ourselves in the present moment, leading to a sense of stability and calm," he said.他说："把我们的情绪想象成一架飞机。当它遇到湍流时，'接地气'帮助它平稳着陆。通过将注意力集中在外部环境的某个东西上——比如一种颜色——我们可以迅速让自己扎根于当下，从而产生稳定和冷静的感觉。"Physiological effects生理效应Xu noted that different colors can have varied physiological effects. Cooler tones, such as blue and green, tend to activate the parasympathetic nervous system, slowing heart rate and promoting relaxation. Warmer colors, such as red and orange, can stimulate the sympathetic nervous system, boosting energy and alertness.徐高阳指出，不同的颜色会产生不同的生理效应。较冷的色调，如蓝色和绿色，往往会激活副交感神经系统，减缓心率，促进放松。较暖的颜色，如红色和橙色，可以刺激交感神经系统，增加能量和警觉性。Choosing a theme color and engaging with one's surroundings provides a sense of control and self-care that is often more significant than the color itself, he said.他说，选择一个主题色并与周围环境互动会带来一种控制感和自我关怀，这往往比颜色本身更重要。According to Xu, young people today experience a kind of "purpose fatigue", as they are inundated by achievement-oriented goals, career pressures and societal expectations. As a result, they are creating activities that seem purposeful, but at the same time are not very demanding and allow them the opportunity to relax, he added.徐高阳称，如今的年轻人经历着一种"目标疲劳"，因为他们被以成就为导向的目标、职业压力和社会期望所淹没。他补充说，因此，他们正在创造一些看似有目的，但同时又要求不高，让他们有机会放松的活动。Wang Wenda, director of psychological health education at Xinhua College of Ningxia University, said these small goals and actions activate the brain's drive, and the sense of achievement from completing minor tasks helps alleviate feelings of powerlessness while enhancing self-efficacy.宁夏大学新华学院大学生心理健康教育教研室主任王文达表示，这些小目标和行动激活了大脑的动力，完成小任务带来的成就感有助于减轻无力感，同时提高自我效能感。The popularity of Color Walk reflects a broader shift among young people, as it is a low-cost, easily accessible and achievable positive experience, Wang said.王文达说，色彩漫步的流行反映了年轻人的一个更广泛的转变，因为它是一种低成本、容易获得和可以达成的积极体验。"You don't have to wait for life to be perfect to allow yourself to feel good. You can use small actions to gain a sense of pleasure, relaxation and control. In an environment of intense competition and uncertainty, it allows people to carve out a small world of their own," he added."你不必等到生活完美才让自己感觉良好。你可以通过微小的行动获得愉悦感、放松感和掌控感。在激烈竞争和不确定的环境中，它可以让人们开辟出属于自己的小世界，"他补充说。grounding /ˈɡraʊndɪŋ/ n. 接地气，立足当下parasympathetic /ˌpærəˌsɪmpəˈθetɪk/ adj. 副交感神经的sympathetic /ˌsɪmpəˈθetɪk/ adj. 交感神经的self-efficacy /ˌself ˈefɪkəsi/ n. 自我效能感

Program description: China Business Uncovered takes listeners inside China's business world through the eyes of reporters who investigate it firsthand. Featuring open conversations with Caixin journalists, each episode breaks down the most complex developments inside Chinese companies. Tune in to understand how critical stories are covered, what's really happening beneath the surface, and why it matters for businesses and investors operating in and around China.  Recorded in Mandarin and produced in English with the help of AI, China Business Uncovered brings Caixin's in-depth investigative reporting to a global audience. Episode intro: With humble beginnings as a textile factory in Shandong, Ruyi dreamed of becoming China's version of LVMH. In this episode of China Business Uncovered, host Kelsey Cheng speaks with reporter Yue Yue about how the company's debt-fueled shopping spree backfired. Chapters: (01:41) From textile mill to "China's LVMH" (06:52) Ruyi's worldwide shopping spree (09:21) Where did Ruyi's money come from (13:15) The 1 euro transfer scandal (18:22) Asset freezes and the larger lesson This episode of China Business Uncovered was recorded in Mandarin and produced in English with the help of AI. Based on this story: In Depth: How Ruyi's 'LVMH of China' Dream Unraveled Subscribe now to unlock full access to Caixin Global and The Wall Street Journal for $200 a year. Group discounts are available — contact us for a customized plan.      

Probe finds firms use online marketing tool to manipulate product information调查发现企业利用在线营销工具操控产品信息Regulators and experts in China have warned of "artificial intelligence data poisoning" after the annual 315 consumer rights gala, which was held on Sunday, exposed the fabrication of promotional content to influence AI-generated response.在周日举行的年度"3·15"消费者权益日晚会曝光了为影响AI生成回复而编造推广内容的行为后，中国的监管机构和专家已对"AI数据投毒"发出警告。The findings of an investigation conducted by China Media Group, which were revealed during the live broadcast of the gala, showed the gross abuse of an online marketing tool called generative engine optimization, or GEO, that aims to enhance content visibility.中央广播电视总台在晚会直播中披露的一项调查结果显示，一种旨在提高内容可见度的名为"生成式引擎优化"（GEO）的在线营销工具遭到了严重滥用。The probe revealed that companies have been using GEO to mass-feed promotional articles in an attempt to manipulate the information AI retrieves when answering user queries.调查发现，企业一直在利用GEO技术批量投送推广文案，试图操控AI在回答用户提问时检索的信息。China Media Group reporters created a fake product — a smart wristband named "Apollo-9" — and claimed it had features such as quantum-entanglement sensors, a noninvasive blood glucose monitor and an ultra-long battery life.总台记者创建了一款名为"阿波罗9号"的智能手环的虚构产品，并声称其具备量子纠缠传感器、无创血糖监测功能以及超长续航能力等特性。Within hours of more than a dozen promotional articles about the nonexistent wristband being uploaded to a platform called Liqing GEO, two mainstream AI models began recommending the product in response to queries about smart wearable devices.当十多篇关于这款不存在的手环的推广文案被上传至名为"力擎GEO"的平台后，短短数小时内，两款主流AI模型在回答有关智能穿戴设备的提问时，就开始推荐这款产品。Li Fumin, a researcher of intelligent social governance at Shandong University of Finance and Economics in Jinan, the capital of Shandong province, said businesses that use GEO services to deliberately train AI models to promote specific products are essentially fabricating facts and engaging in bogus marketing.山东财经大学社会冶理智能化研究院专家李富民表示，企业利用GEO服务刻意训练AI模型以推广特定产品，本质上是在虚构事实并进行虚假营销。"On the one hand, the practice leverages AI and algorithms to make false advertising, which results in unfair competition. On the other hand, this kind of behavior allows people to receive implanted marketing content without knowing it, which violates their consumer rights," Li said.李富民说："一方面，这种做法利用人工智能和算法进行虚假宣传，导致不公平竞争；另一方面，这种行为让人们在不知不觉中接收到植入的营销内容，侵犯了他们的消费者权益，"。Generative engine optimization is widely considered the AI-era evolution of search engine optimization, or SEO. China's search engine companies, such as Baidu Inc, have previously faced scrutiny over paid ranking practices that blur the line between advertising and organic search results.生成式引擎优化被广泛视为人工智能时代对搜索引擎优化（SEO）的演进。中国的搜索引擎公司，如百度，此前曾因竞价排名做法模糊了广告与自然搜索结果之间的界限而面临审查。Several Chinese AI developers have responded cautiously to the investigation. ByteDance said that its chatbot, Doubao, was unaffected by such systems, while Alibaba said the core reasoning capability of its Qwen model was not affected by similar technologies.数家中国人工智能开发商对此次调查作出了谨慎回应。字节跳动表示，其聊天机器人"豆包"未受此类系统影响，而阿里巴巴则表示，其通义千问模型的核心推理能力未受类似技术的干扰。Industry experts said the issue reflects a broader structural challenge rather than a flaw in any single model. They said that most AI systems rely heavily on accessible internet content, which can be mass-produced or manipulated.行业专家表示，这一问题反映的是一个更广泛的结构性挑战，而非单个模型的缺陷。他们表示，大多数人工智能系统严重依赖可访问的互联网内容，而这些内容可以被批量生产或操纵。Expediting legislation加快立法进程Song Xiangqing, vice-president of the Commerce Economy Association of China, said that regulators should accelerate the formulation of new legislation to make deliberate pollution of AI data sources illegal.中国商业经济学会副会长宋向清表示，监管机构应加快制定新的法律法规，将蓄意污染人工智能数据源的行为定为非法。China currently has no specific regulations governing GEO services. According to a work priority guideline on advertising recently released by the State Administration for Market Regulation, the nation will step up efforts to streamline digital advertising market strategies, including AI-generated content.中国目前没有针对GEO服务的具体法规。根据国家市场监督管理总局近期发布的一份关于广告业工作重点的指导意见，我国将加大力度整顿数字化广告营销策略，包括人工智能生成内容。Song suggested drawing up a "white list" to identify trusted information sources and building a coordinated governance framework involving government oversight, corporate self-regulation and public supervision. "Without these safeguards, GEO services could evolve into a widespread source of information pollution, enabling data poisoning to spread throughout the AI ecosystem," he said.宋向清建议制定一份"白名单"以识别可信的信息来源，并构建一个涵盖政府监管、企业自律和公众监督的协同治理框架。他说："如果没有这些保障措施，GEO服务可能会演变为普遍的信息污染源，使数据投毒在整个人工智能生态系统中蔓延。"generative engine optimization(GEO)/ˈdʒenərətɪv ˈendʒɪn ˌɒptɪmaɪˈzeɪʃən/生成式引擎优化retrieve /rɪˈtriːv/检索quantum-entanglement /ˈkwɒntəm ɪnˈtæŋɡlmənt/量子纠缠noninvasive /ˌnɒnɪnˈveɪsɪv/无创的ultra-long /ˈʌltrə ˈlɒŋ/超长的bogus marketing /ˈbəʊɡəs ˈmɑːkɪtɪŋ/虚假营销expedite /ˈekspədaɪt/加快

To understand the significance of the sweeping military purges in China and how Beijing is reacting to America's war with Iran, I'm sitting down with eminent China scholar Robert Suettinger, a former CIA and State Department intelligence analyst, a senior advisor at The Stimson Center, and author of “The Conscience of the Party: Hu Yaobang, China's Communist Reformer.”“There's no question of the fact that Xi Jinping is now less of a dominant leader than he was six or eight months ago,” Suettinger says.Earlier this year, Xi purged two top generals from the CCP's military brass, on the heels of earlier purges last year. Now, only two of the originally seven members of the Central Military Commission remain. One of them is Xi himself; the other one, General Zhang Shengmin, is a political commander and has, like Xi, no combat experience.After the January purges, Xi issued an order to the military demanding that everyone acknowledge him as the head of the military commission. “The silence from all those military commands has been deafening and has been noticed by everybody,” Suettinger says.In the Chinese Communist Party itself, Xi is also facing trouble.The CCP is not a monolithic party, he told me, but a complex entity with many competing factions: “There's a Shanghai group, there's a Shandong group, there's a Shaanxi group, and they all don't like each other,” Suettinger says.Suettinger believes that Xi's many purges have unified opposition against him not only in the military but also within the Communist Party. “Xi is hated by almost everybody in China,” he said.Another reason the cracks in the system, as he put it, are beginning to be more evident, is that the Chinese economy hasn't been doing well in many years: “The Chinese people are very unhappy that their wealth opportunities are disappearing. Graduates coming out of colleges are not able to find good jobs. People who have good jobs are losing them. People who are operating in the gig economy are losing their jobs. The farmers don't have anything to do when they go back home.”People outside of China don't usually know how poor vast numbers of Chinese citizens still are, Suettinger told me. China's Premier Li Keqiang himself stated in May 2020 during a press conference that 600 million people live below the poverty line and don't even earn enough to rent a room in mid-sized Chinese cities.Where is China's totalitarian system headed? The system, Suettinger argued, is way more fragile than it looks. “It is brittle, and when it breaks, it tends to break hard, and it tends to melt in ways that are not predictable,” he said.Notably, the CCP has not come out to meaningfully support its longtime ally, Iran. The CCP has long utilized Iran to distract America and keep its focus on the Middle East, Suettinger says, but now, to Beijing's chagrin, America is effectively neutralizing this longtime CCP proxy.Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and the guest, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

In a complex global environment and amid a substantial rise in foreign-related cases, Chinese courts are committed to ensuring equal protection for all entities and have implemented various measures to enhance the nation's business environment, offering "Chinese solutions" for resolving international disputes, according to the head of China's top court.首席大法官、最高人民法院院长张军在两会期间接受《中国日报》专访时表示，面对复杂的国际形势和增多的涉外案件，中国法院坚持平等保护原则，多措并举，以优质高效司法服务持续优化营商环境，积极为国际纠纷解决贡献"中国方案"。"Openness is a key feature of Chinese modernization, and the rule of law is the foundation for achieving high-level global engagement," said Zhang Jun, president of the Supreme People's Court, in an exclusive interview with China Daily on the sidelines of the ongoing annual meetings of the nation's top legislative and political advisory bodies.张军指出，开放是中国式现代化的鲜明标识，法治是高水平对外开放的坚实保障。Citing data from the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-25) period, Zhang said that Chinese courts concluded 128,000 first-instance foreign-related civil and commercial cases involving more than 100 countries and regions, an increase of 65 percent from the previous five years."十四五"期间，中国法院审结一审涉外民商事案件12.8万件，较"十三五"期间增长65%，涉及100多个国家和地区。In 2025 alone, courts nationwide handled over 67,000 foreign-related commercial and maritime cases, up 44 percent year-on-year, he noted.据张军介绍，2025年，全国法院新收一审涉外商事海事案件达6.7万余件，同比增长44%。With global supply chains restructuring and digital trade on the rise, Zhang said that disputes over international goods contracts, service trade, and related cross-border payments, transportation and insurance are increasing.随着全球供应链的重构和数字贸易的兴起，国际货物买卖合同纠纷、服务贸易纠纷，以及与之相关的跨境支付、运输、保险纠纷持续增多。As Chinese companies expand globally and foreign investment grows, particularly with the Belt and Road Initiative, relevant cases are also rising, he said. "The rapid increase and diversity of foreign-related cases highlight China's deep integration into the global market and its shift from focusing on goods flow to regulatory and institutional opening-up," he added.张军表示，随着中国企业"走出去"和外资"引进来"的双向流动加速，以及高质量共建"一带一路"的深入推进，相关纠纷也不断涌现。他补充说："涉外民商事案件数量的快速增长和类型的日益多样化，是中国经济深度融入全球市场的生动写照，勾勒出中国对外开放从商品和要素流动型开放向规则等制度型开放的转变。"To address the growing number of cases and meet diverse judicial needs, Chinese courts have been striving to provide more equitable, efficient and accessible services to both domestic and foreign litigants, Zhang said.张军说，"面对涉外案件数量持续攀升和当事人司法需求更为多元的新形势，中国法院努力为中外当事人依法提供更加公正、高效、便捷的司法服务和保障。"In June 2018, the first and second international commercial courts of the Supreme People's Court were established in Shen­zhen, Guangdong province, and Xi'an, Shaanxi province, where litigants are allowed to resolve disputes through mediation, arbitration, or litigation, based on their needs. By the end of 2025, these two courts concluded 37 cases involving litigants from 21 countries and regions.2018年6月，最高法院第一、第二国际商事法庭分别在广东深圳和陕西西安成立，当事人可根据需要选择调解、仲裁或诉讼解决纠纷。截至2025年底，这两个法庭审结涉及21个国家和地区当事人的案件37件。China has also set up international commercial tribunals in 18 cities, including Beijing, Shanghai, and Suzhou in Jiangsu province. In 2025, these tribunals concluded more than 1,700 foreign-related commercial and arbitration review cases involving litigants from over 50 countries and regions, a year-on-year increase of 24 percent.中国还在北京、上海、苏州等18个城市设立了国际商事法庭。2025年共审结涉外商事、涉外仲裁司法审查等案件1700件，同比上升24%，当事人覆盖50多个国家。Zhang said that while respecting litigants' preferences for dispute resolution methods is important, the importance of mediation in handling foreign-related cases is also significant.张军表示，中国法院充分尊重当事人选择仲裁、调解解决争议的意愿。He cited a case involving a foreign oil tanker that was unloading at Qingdao port in Shandong province in January, noting that the dispute was resolved within 24 hours following the Xiamen Maritime Court's swift coordination with the Qingdao Maritime Court, and the use of online and offline mediation methods.他举例说，今年1月，厦门海事法院与青岛海事法院快速协调，运用线上线下调解方式，在24小时内成功化解一起外籍油轮在青岛港卸货纠纷。Expanding intl influence扩大国际影响力The international influence of China's foreign-related judiciary is also expanding, thanks to the development of foreign-related adjudication and optimized legal services, Zhang said.张军称，涉外审判的发展和司法服务的优化，也提升了中国涉外司法的国际影响力。In September 2022, a Liberian container ship and a Panamanian oil tanker collided in the Strait of Malacca, and the courts in five countries, including China, had jurisdiction over the case. The parties involved proactively chose the Ningbo Maritime Court in Zhejiang province to resolve their dispute under Chinese law, he noted.2022年9月，利比里亚籍集装箱船与巴拿马籍大型油轮在马六甲海峡发生碰撞，包括中国在内的五国法院均有管辖权。双方当事人主动选择中国宁波海事法院解决纠纷，并适用中国法律。"More parties involved in foreign-related cases, even those with no substantial connection to China, are voluntarily choosing to address their disputes in Chinese courts, which is a strong endorsement of China's judicial system and its international credibility," Zhang said."越来越多与中国并无实际联系的涉外案件，当事人自愿协议选择在中国法院诉讼，这本身就是对中国司法制度和国际公信力的充分认可。"张军补充说道。On their part, Chinese courts are continuously exploring and improving judicial services, he said. In March 2022, a Norwegian company applied to the Shanghai Maritime Court, seeking recognition of a judgment of a United Kingdom court. Despite the lack of an applicable judicial assistance treaty, the Shanghai court recognized the judgment based on the principle of reciprocity, prompting UK courts to recognize two court judgments of China later.中国法院也在不断探索和完善司法服务。2022年3月，挪威一家公司就英国高等法院的一项生效判决向上海海事法院提出承认申请。在缺乏可适用的司法协助条约的情况下，上海海事法院依据互惠原则承认了该判决，促使英国法院此后承认了中国法院的两项判决。This move not only provides a practical judicial example for establishing a reciprocal relationship, but also breaks the "zero record" of mutual recognition of commercial judgments between Chinese and UK courts. "The initiative demonstrates China's sense of responsibility and judicial confidence," Zhang said.张军表示，此举不仅为认定互惠关系提供了可操作的司法范例，也突破了中英两国法院商事判决互认"零记录"。"中国法院率先承认英国法院判决的背后是中国大国担当、司法自信的有力体现。"From 2024 to 2025, Chinese courts received 1,620 applications for recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments, and they concluded 1,510 such cases, he said. "This data shows China's determination to protect the rights of both domestic and foreign parties in foreign-related trials, maintaining a fair, open and inclusive judicial stance," he added.数据显示，2024年至2025年，中国法院共受理申请承认和执行外国民商事判决1620件，审结1510件，充分彰显了中国涉外审判平等保护中外当事人合法权益，以及公正、开放、包容的司法立场。Mission highlighted使命凸显In today's volatile global landscape, Zhang underscored the judiciary's mission to use legal certainty to address external uncertainties. "A stable, transparent legal business environment is vital for protecting foreign investments and promoting international economic cooperation," he said.当前，国际形势复杂多变，全球经济面临诸多不确定性。张军强调，在这样的时代背景下，中国司法肩负着以法治的确定性应对外部环境不确定性的重要使命。"一个稳定、公平、透明、可预期的法治化营商环境，是保护外商投资权益、保障跨境交易安全、促进国际经济合作的'压舱石'。"他说。Chinese courts have participated in the legislation and amendment of significant foreign-related laws — such as the Foreign Investment Law and the Law on Foreign Relations — to enhance China's judicial framework, Zhang said, adding that courts across the country have also shared their judicial expertise to improve international rules and promote global trade.中国法院近年来积极参与我国外商投资法、对外关系法等一批重大涉外法律的立法和修改工作，促进涉外法律体系完善。全国各地法院也分享司法经验，以完善国际规则，促进全球贸易。In December 2025, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the UN Convention on Negotiable Cargo Documents. Zhang said this convention is the first international treaty in the transportation sector that originates from Chinese judicial practice, and was initiated and developed with China's full participation.2025年12月，联合国大会审议通过《联合国可转让货物单证公约》。张军表示，该公约是首部源于中国司法实践、由中国发起并全程参与制定的运输领域国际公约。"Through judicial decisions, Chinese courts will continue to play a crucial role in guarding against external risks, stabilizing market confidence and promoting global trade and investment, thereby protecting our national interests," he said.通过司法裁判，中国法院将继续在防范外部风险、稳定市场信心、促进全球贸易和投资方面发挥重要作用，从而维护国家利益。"Through efficient judicial services, we aim to provide certainty for the stable development of both the Chinese economy and the global economy, acting as a 'navigator' for opening-up and an 'anchor of stability' for global trade," he added.以优质高效的司法服务为中国经济和世界经济的稳定发展注入宝贵的确定性，努力做高水平对外开放的'护航者'和全球经贸秩序的'稳定锚'，张军补充说道。foreign-related case /ˈfɒrɪn rɪˈleɪtɪd keɪs/涉外案件first-instance /ˈfɜːst ˈɪnstəns/一审institutional opening-up /ˌɪnstɪˈtjuːʃənl ˈəʊpənɪŋ ʌp/制度型开放litigant /ˈlɪtɪɡənt/诉讼当事人mediation /ˌmiːdiˈeɪʃən/调解arbitration /ˌɑːbɪˈtreɪʃən/仲裁litigation /ˌlɪtɪˈɡeɪʃən/诉讼proactively /prəʊˈæktɪvli/主动地volatile /ˈvɒlətaɪl/动荡的

President Xi Jinping called on Thursday for provinces serving as China's economic powerhouses to pilot efforts in analyzing new circumstances and solving new problems, while stressing the need to develop new quality productive forces and promote common prosperity.The president, who represents Jiangsu province as a deputy to the 14th National People's Congress, China's top legislature, highlighted the imperative for China to cope with an even more complex environment and solve more deep-seated issues to accomplish targets and tasks set out in the nation's 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-30).Xi, who is also general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission, joined a deliberation with his fellow deputies from Jiangsu, the nation's second-largest provincial-level economy.According to the government work report of the Jiangsu provincial government, the province's economy grew 5.3 percent year-on-year in 2025, with the absolute increase remaining the largest among all provincial-level regions in the country.During Thursday's deliberation, Xi spoke after six deputies shared their insights on issues such as advancing new industrialization, promoting the integration of sci-tech innovation with industrial innovation, and accelerating breakthroughs in core technologies.The development of new quality productive forces is instrumental in advancing high-quality growth and enhancing economic competitiveness, Xi said, adding that Jiangsu should take the lead in this regard.He called for integrated efforts to promote education, science and technology and talent development, highlighting the need to secure new breakthroughs in strengthening original innovation, tackling key core technologies and securing the high ground in science and technology.New approaches should be explored to promote the integration of the innovation, industrial, capital and talent chains, and to accelerate the efficient commercialization and application of sci-tech achievements, he said.The president encouraged Jiangsu to make new progress in upgrading traditional industries, fostering and expanding emerging industries, and planning for future industries.Xi emphasized that only when major economic powerhouses maintain a strong foundation for growth and strong resilience against external shocks can they support the stability of the world's second-largest economy as a whole.According to data cited by Xinhua News Agency, China's top 10 provincial-level regions by gross domestic product accounted for 62.2 percent of the country's overall economic growth in 2025. These regions, including Guangdong, Jiangsu and Shandong provinces, helped boost the national growth rate by 3.1 percentage points, the data showed.The president said that Jiangsu should continue to strengthen economic resilience by improving its internal strengths, enhancing its own capabilities, and fully integrating into the unified national market.He called for taking steps to expand high-standard opening-up, actively explore global markets and better connect with the international economic cycle, adding that a mindset of responding to worst-case scenarios must be adopted in order to prevent various risks.Xi pointed out that Chinese modernization is the modernization of common prosperity for all, and Jiangsu authorities should accurately grasp the new expectations of the people for a better life, as well as the evolving characteristics of work related to public well-being under the new circumstances.The province should proactively address key issues such as ensuring high-quality and adequate employment, increasing incomes for both urban and rural residents, and further improving the level of basic public services and social security, while exploring effective pathways to promote common prosperity, he added.Xi stressed that the more effective the Party's self-governance is, the stronger the guarantee will be for economic and social development.He called for steps to properly carry out the Party-wide education campaign to promote a sound understanding of governance performance.

Bem-vindo à Rádio Minghui. As transmissões incluem assuntos relativos à perseguição ao Falun Gong na China, entendimentos e experiências dos praticantes adquiridas no curso de seus cultivos, interesses e música composta e executada pelos praticantes do Dafa. Programa 1528: Experiência de cultivo da categoria Entendimentos obtidos pelo cultivo intitulada: “Minha nova compreensão do ensinamento Fa: ‘Pacifique o exterior cultivando o interior'”, escrita por uma praticante do Dafa na província de Shandong, China.

主播：Flora（中国）+ Adrian（美国） 音乐：Kung Fu Fighting今天我们要走进一段独特的美食探索之旅——从山东鲁菜大赛的烟火气，到跨越太平洋的饮食文化碰撞，一起品味中餐背后的故事与温度。01. Shandong Cuisine 山东鲁菜主播Adrian以外国媒体记者（foreign media correspondent）的身份参与了一场非常有趣的event——山东鲁菜美食大赛（Shandong Lu Cai Food Competition）。There were chefs (厨师) from 16 cities in Shandong province who all gathered in 崂山 to showcase their local cuisines (展示当地美食).作为在山东生活了近十年的外国人，主播Adrian有了“山东胃”——已经习惯了山东菜系的风味和佐料（accustomed to the flavors and ingredients）。主播Adrian觉得Shandong cuisine和中国其他菜系相比，其中的一个特别之处就是对大蒜的运用（the use of garlic）。山东作为“世界大蒜之都（the garlic capital of the world）”，菜里面的大蒜不会少。在青岛，有很多海鲜在做的时候都会放garlic，比如：烤生蚝（grilled oysters）。They have so much garlic on them. 主播Flora和主播Adrian都纷纷表示：Grilled oysters是他们逛小吃街（snack streets）或夜市（night markets）的“go-to”snacks（必点美食）。02. Food Culture Shock 饮食文化冲击刚到中国时，主播Adrian也经历过food culture shock（饮食文化冲击）。But luckily, they are all positive shock (正向的冲击)。地道的Chinese food与过去Adrian在美国所熟悉的中餐截然不同。In America, Chinese food is usually quite Americanized or localized (本土化的).*一般被本土化的中国菜和正宗的Chinese dishes，有什么区别？会有什么调整呢？在美国，许多中国菜肴大多是deep fried（油炸的），而且通常very salty（非常咸）or very sweet（非常甜）。And they are not as diverse (多样化的) as authentic (正宗的) Chinese food.当主播Adrian来到中国的时候，he was like a kid in a candy shop。He was trying everything he could find, 因为每一道菜都与家乡熟悉的味道如此不同、如此独特（so different and unique）。During one of his visits back to the U.S. to see his family (回美国探亲)，他在一家中餐馆点了“饺子”（ordered dumplings），端上来的却是“包子形状”的饺子。It just tasted like basic pork baozi (猪肉包子)，which isn't bad, 但这确实不是主播Adrian点饺子时所期待的样子。03. Authentic Chinese Food in US 美国的正宗中餐主播Adrian在美国也发现过正宗的中餐馆。一家hotpot restaurant（火锅店）让他印象深刻。因为在来中国之前，he had never heard of hotpot。Hotpot is a super common and popular meal in china, 但是在美国比较少见。这和美国的食品安全法规（food safety regulations in America）有关系：很多美国地区的餐厅是 are not allowed to serve raw foods (不允许提供“生食”)，like chicken and pork，所以hotpot就很难普及了。美国的中餐馆取名多采用English names，例如：“Bamboo Garden (竹园)”，“Golden Dragon (金龙饭店)”；也有像“Chengdu Taste (舌尖上的成都)”这样包含中国地名的店名。主播Adrian有一次还在中餐馆里点了土豆丝，which is not on their menu.04. Food: A Bridge Connecting Cultures and Memories 食物：连接文化与记忆的桥梁主播Adrian有一次和一位特别想体验地道中餐（experience authentic Chinese food）的朋友在中餐馆里点餐，the menu was very huge so they ordered a wide variety of dishes (各式各样的菜品). 这让Adrian感觉像是在中国。这家店所在的城区有不少华人和Asian communities（亚裔社区），and some big universities with many international students (国际生).这和青岛很像，青岛也有不少留学生和外国人在这里学习、工作，而且这里也有不少西餐厅，这些餐厅可能也会让他们想起家乡的味道（remind them of their home countries food）。无论是在中国的国际都市，还是在美国的华人社区，food really does connect people to places and memories (食物总是能把人和特定的地方或者记忆关联在一起).欢迎大家在评论区分享：你有什么地道中国菜想推荐给我们吗？Do you have any authentic Chinese dishes to recommend?

The weather in Beijing trended on social media sites over the weekend as unusually heavy snowfall blanketed the capital in a thick white sheet, even as the National Meteorological Center issued a yellow alert — the third-highest level after red and orange — for cold waves across central, eastern and southern China over the next few days. A yellow alert for freezing conditions and a blue alert for blizzards were issued for some parts of Shaanxi, Henan, Anhui and Hubei provinces.周末期间，北京天气登上社交媒体热搜。异常强降雪使首都披上厚厚一层“白衣”。与此同时，国家气象中心发布寒潮黄色预警——这是仅次于红色和橙色的第三高等级预警——提示未来几天中部、东部和南部地区将出现寒潮天气。此外，陕西、河南、安徽和湖北部分地区还发布了低温冰冻黄色预警和暴雪蓝色预警。According to meteorological authorities, the snowfall and accumulation on Saturday and Sunday in Beijing was heavier in the western mountainous areas of the capital.据气象部门介绍，北京周六和周日的降雪及积雪主要集中在西部山区，降雪量明显偏大。The weather event was the result of a "return-flow snowfall pattern" in North China, which saw moisture-laden cold air move inland toward Beijing from Bohai Bay.此次天气过程源于华北地区出现的“回流降雪型”天气形势，携带充足水汽的冷空气自渤海湾向内陆推进并影响北京。As the moist air moved over the city's western terrain, clouds formed at temperatures ranging between — 10 C and — 20 C, which is optimal for rapid snowflake formation. As they fell, the snow crystals collided and bonded, creating flakes that appeared to be oversized, meteorologists said.气象专家表示，当湿润气流越过北京西部地形时，在零下10摄氏度至零下20摄氏度这一最有利于雪花快速生成的温度区间内形成云系。雪晶在下落过程中不断碰撞并相互黏结，从而形成看起来“体型较大”的雪花。The snowfall in Beijing occurred as a strong cold wave swept much of China. The National Meteorological Center said that from Sunday to Wednesday, the cold wave will bring strong winds, sharp drops in temperatures and widespread rain and snow.北京的降雪正值强寒潮影响全国大部分地区。国家气象中心表示，从周日至周三，寒潮将带来大风、显著降温以及大范围雨雪天气。The center issued a yellow cold wave alert on Sunday, warning that temperatures in central and eastern China will drop 6 C to 12 C during the period, with some areas experiencing declines of 16 C or more. The current severe winter condition is expected to peak on Monday.气象中心周日发布寒潮黄色预警，指出中东部地区气温将下降6至12摄氏度，部分地区降温幅度可能达到或超过16摄氏度。本轮严寒天气预计将在周一达到最强。On Sunday evening, the national disaster prevention, reduction and relief commission activated a Level IV emergency response — the lowest in its four-tier system — to address the rising risk of low temperature-, snow — and ice-related disasters in Anhui, Henan, Hunan and Guizhou provinces. A working group previously dispatched to Henan will continue assisting local response efforts, while additional working groups have been sent to Hunan and Guizhou to provide on-site guidance.周日晚间，国家防灾减灾救灾委员会启动四级应急响应（四级为最低级别），应对安徽、河南、湖南和贵州等地低温、雨雪和冰冻灾害风险上升的情况。此前派驻河南的工作组将继续协助地方开展应对工作，同时，新增工作组已赴湖南和贵州开展现场指导。In Altay prefecture of northern Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region, the minimum temperature in Qinghe county plunged to — 40.8 C over the weekend.在新疆维吾尔自治区北部的阿勒泰地区，青河县周末最低气温骤降至零下40.8摄氏度。Gui Jin, a homestay host in Hemu village in Altay, said the temperature there was — 38 C on Saturday. "I'd rather be in Antarctica," he joked, where he said the lowest temperature was around — 32 C on the same day.阿勒泰禾木村民宿经营者桂进表示，当地周六气温为零下38摄氏度。他打趣道：“我宁愿去南极。”他说，当天南极的最低气温大约为零下32摄氏度。Hu Xiao, an analyst with the China Meteorological Administration, said the current cold wave is bringing about dramatic changes in temperatures.中国气象局分析师胡啸表示，此次寒潮正在引发气温的剧烈变化。Earlier this month, the traditionally coldest period of winter, the weather was unusually warm nationwide, making it the third warmest on record. Now the situation has changed. "People will feel as if the weather has suddenly become frigid," Hu said.本月初，本应是一年中最寒冷的时段，全国气温却异常偏高，成为有记录以来第三暖的同期。如今形势已发生变化。胡啸表示：“人们会明显感觉到天气突然变得异常寒冷。”The cold wave is moving relatively slowly and is accompanied by ample moisture. Snowfall began in North China on Saturday, intensified in Henan province and Shandong province on Sunday, and is expected to be most widespread and strongest on Monday.此次寒潮移动速度相对缓慢，并伴有充足水汽。降雪于周六在华北地区开始，周日在河南和山东显著增强，预计周一将达到范围最广、强度最强。The weather event also marks the first widespread freezing rain of this winter. From Monday to Wednesday, sleet is expected in parts of Hubei, Hunan and Guizhou provinces and in Chongqing, with Hunan and Guizhou expected to face the brunt of it.本轮天气过程还将带来今冬首场大范围冻雨。预计周一至周三，湖北、湖南、贵州以及重庆部分地区将出现雨夹雪，其中湖南和贵州受影响最为严重。Wang Xiangxi, minister of emergency management, called for enhanced coordination and preparedness to address risks posed by low temperatures, snow, ice and freezing rain.应急管理部部长王祥喜呼吁，加强统筹协调和应急准备，切实防范低温、雨雪、冰冻和冻雨带来的风险。Officials warned that the weather event would be the largest of its kind so far this year, with complex precipitation types and elevated disaster risks in some regions. With the approach of the Spring Festival holiday and increased travel volume, they emphasized the need to be ready for worst-case scenarios.有关部门警告称，此次天气过程可能是今年以来范围最大、降水形态最为复杂的一次，部分地区灾害风险较高。随着春节临近、人员流动增加，各地需做好最不利情况的应对准备。In Hubei, China Railway Wuhan Bureau activated emergency plans to safeguard rail operations, conducting advance risk assessments about the effect of low temperatures on key equipment such as rail switches and tracks.在湖北，中国铁路武汉局集团有限公司启动应急预案，提前评估低温天气对道岔、线路等关键设备的影响，确保铁路运输安全。Crew members were deployed to remove ice and snow from tracks and carry out preventive maintenance to ensure the safety and smooth operation of railway services, the bureau said.该局表示，已组织人员清除线路冰雪并开展预防性检修，保障铁路运输安全平稳运行。In Gansu province, protective steps have been taken to reduce weather-related losses to crops. Local governments have been urged to take windproof measures for construction sites, billboards and livestock enclosures.在甘肃，各地已采取防护措施，减少恶劣天气对农作物造成的损失，并督促对施工工地、广告牌和牲畜圈舍落实防风加固措施。Energy authorities were also making efforts to ensure stable operation of electricity, gas and heating systems as the cold wave continued to affect large parts of the country.随着寒潮持续影响全国多地，能源主管部门也在采取措施，保障电力、燃气和供暖系统平稳运行。cold wave /koʊld weɪv/寒潮yellow alert /ˈjeloʊ əˈlɜːrt/黄色预警return-flow snowfall pattern /rɪˈtɜːrn floʊ ˈsnoʊfɔːl ˈpætərn/回流降雪型emergency response (Level IV) /ɪˈmɜːrdʒənsi rɪˈspɑːns/四级应急响应freezing rain /ˈfriːzɪŋ reɪn/冻雨sleet /sliːt/雨夹雪

For Li Wan, a 25-year-old living alone in East China's Shandong province, the blunt question "Are you dead?" wasn't an insult, but rather an 8-yuan ($1.14) investment in peace of mind.对于25岁的李婉（音译）来说，这位独自生活在中国东部山东省的年轻人，面对“你死了吗？”这样直白的问题，并非感到被冒犯，反而视作一项8元（约合1.14美元）的安心投资。Li is one of thousands of young professionals driving a viral surge for "Sileme" — translated as "Are You Dead?" — a minimalist safety app that has recently dominated the paid charts on China's Apple App Store. The app, branded as Demumu in its English version, requires no login or personal data; users simply tap a "check in today" button once a day. If they miss their check-in for consecutive days, the system automatically emails a designated emergency contact.李婉（音译）是数千名推动“Sileme”（意为“死了吗”）病毒式传播的年轻专业人士之一。这款极简安全应用近期在中国苹果应用商店的付费榜单上独占鳌头。这款英文版名为Demumu的应用无需登录或提供个人信息，用户只需每日点击一次“今日签到”按钮。若连续多日未签到，系统将自动向指定紧急联系人发送邮件。"I downloaded it because the name was amusing," said Li, who has lived alone for over a year and is often on the receiving end of her mother's concerns about lack of communication. "With the app, my mom will receive an email and can reach me if I don't check in. It enhances communication with my family."李婉（音译）她独自生活已逾一年，常因缺乏联系而成为母亲担忧的对象，她表示：“我下载这个应用是因为名字有趣。有了这个应用，如果我不按时报平安，母亲会收到邮件并能联系到我。这增强了我和家人的沟通。”The app's sudden popularity highlights a growing "safety anxiety" among China's solo dwellers. According to the 2025 China Statistical Yearbook, single-person households now account for approximately 20 percent of the country's sampled population. Industry forecasts from Beike Research Institute suggest this demographic could swell to between 150 million and 200 million people by 2030.该应用的突然走红凸显了中国独居人群日益增长的“安全焦虑”。据《2025年中国统计年鉴》显示，单人家庭目前约占全国抽样人口的20%。Beike研究院的行业预测指出，到2030年这一群体规模可能膨胀至1.5亿至2亿人。Developed by three Gen Z creators in just one month, the app was born from social media discussions about the risks of living alone. One of the developers, surnamed Guo, noted the user base has increased 50-fold since its launch.这款应用由三位Z世代创作者仅用一个月时间开发完成，其灵感源于社交媒体上关于独居风险的讨论。开发者之一郭姓人士指出，自上线以来用户基数已增长50倍。Guo said the cost of developing the app, about 1,000 yuan, has been recovered and the team plans to add the function of text messaging in the near future.郭先生表示，该应用的开发成本约1000元，现已收回成本，团队计划近期增加短信功能。While some users have criticized the name as "ominous" or "blunt", suggesting alternatives like "Are You Alive?" or "Are You Okay?", Guo argues the name is direct and reflects a shifting cultural attitude. Younger generations, he says, are becoming less hesitant about discussing mortality.尽管部分用户批评该名称“不祥”或“直白”，并建议采用“你还活着吗？”或“你还好吗？”等替代方案，郭先生认为“死了吗”这个名称直截了当，反映了文化态度的转变。他表示，年轻一代在讨论死亡话题时正变得越来越坦然。Some copycat apps with names such as "Huozheme", or "Are You Alive?" have already sprung up.一些模仿应用已如雨后春笋般涌现，其名称诸如“活着吗？”或“你还活着吗？”。The success of Sileme reflects a broader social trend where technology and community initiatives are stepping in to replace traditional family safety nets.“死了吗”的成功反映出一种更广泛的社会趋势：技术与社区倡议正逐步取代传统的家庭安全网。In Taiyuan, Shanxi province, community workers have launched a "curtain signal" initiative where elderly residents indicate they are safe by opening their curtains every morning. Meanwhile, on social media platforms like Douban, female solo dwellers have formed mutual aid communities to trade services like appliance repairs and furniture assembly, avoiding the need to invite strangers into their homes.在山西省太原市，社区工作者推出“窗帘行动”，老年居民每天早晨拉开窗帘示意自己平安无事。与此同时，在豆瓣等社交平台上，女性独居者们组建互助社区，互相提供家电维修、家具组装等服务，避免让陌生人进入家中。Wen Jun, a professor of social sciences at East China Normal University, emphasized that while apps like Sileme provide a starting point, they are not a complete solution. He argues that the government and local communities must work together to establish an "online-offline synergy" that ensures no one, whether young or old, is left truly alone in an emergency.华东师范大学社会科学教授文军强调，虽然“失联报警”这类应用程序提供了起点，但并非完整的解决方案。他认为政府和社区必须携手建立“线上线下协同机制”，确保无论老少，在紧急情况下都不会真正陷入孤立无援的境地。For now, the developers of Sileme say they are considering a name change to address user feedback, even as the app continues to trend under its provocative original title.目前，“死了吗”的开发者表示正考虑更名以回应用户反馈，尽管该应用仍以其原先的挑衅性名称持续走红。ominous/ˈɑː.mə.nəs/adj.不详的provocative/prəˈvɑː.kə.t̬ɪv/adj.挑衅性的

Leave your recommendations below. Merry Christmas and Happy New Year!Chapters (00:00) About the books(2:20) The Dean of Shandong(12:35) Private Revolutions(20:35) The New China Playbook(29:20) I Deliver Parcels in Beijing(40:40) Final thoughts(42:30) Books for next year, book club?Buy me a coffee: https://www.buymeacoffee.com/sinobabblepodLatest Substack post: https://substack.com/@sinobabble/p-178934152Links to everything: https://linktree.com/sinobabbleSupport the showSign up for Buzzsprout to launch your podcasting journey: https://www.buzzsprout.com/?referrer_id=162442Subscribe to the Sinobabble Newsletter: https://sinobabble.substack.com/Support Sinobabble on Buy me a Coffee: https://www.buymeacoffee.com/Sinobabblepod

Good afternoon, I'm _____ with today's episode of EZ News. Tai-Ex opening The Tai-Ex opened up 290-points this morning from yesterday's close, at 27,987 on turnover of $10.5-billion N-T. The market ended up last week Friday, as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing last week recorded an increase in shareholders to the highest number in almost eight months. Analysts say TSMC is expected to continue to benefit from strong global demand for its high-end processes to meet strong global demand for artificial intelligence applications. Air pollution warning issued for sensitive groups The Ministry of Environment is warning that northeasterly monsoon winds will continue to bring increased pollution to southern and central parts of the island today. The ministry says pollutants from overseas are forecast to bring air quality to an orange alert level in those areas and sensitive groups are advised to avoid outdoor activities. Under the ministry's Air Quality Index system, during an orange alert, people with heart, respiratory, or cardiovascular conditions, as well as children and the elderly, are advised to reduce physical exertion (體力消耗/勞動) and limit outdoor activity or wear a mask when going out. According to the environment ministry, the concentrations of fine particulate matter are being brought to Taiwan by a northeasterly monsoon from China's Shanghai and Shandong areas. The impact of transboundary pollution is expected to ease later today. Coast Guard is pursuing another tanker allegedly helping Venezuela skirt sanctions US officials say the Coast Guard is pursuing another tanker is says is helping Venezuela skirt (避開，繞開) sanctions. AP correspondent Julie Walker reports Israel Approves Settlements in West Bank Israel's far-right finance minister says the Cabinet has approved 19 new Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank. The decision announced Sunday is part of a broader push by the government to expand settlements, which threatens the possibility of a Palestinian state. The Peace Now anti-settlement group says the approval increases the number of settlements in the West Bank by nearly 50% during the current government's tenure (任期). Settlements are widely considered illegal under international law. The decision comes as the U.S. is pushing Israel and Hamas to advance a Gaza ceasefire plan that includes a possible pathway to a Palestinian state. France to Build New Aircraft Carrier French President Emmanuel Macron has announced plans to build a new aircraft carrier. The vessel will have the capacity for 30 fighter jets and 2,000 sailors. Macron described it as a display of national power. The announcement was made to French troops in Abu Dhabi. The new carrier is set to replace the aging Charles de Gaulle by 2038. It will be nuclear-powered and equipped with Rafale M fighter jets. The project is expected to benefit (對……有益) many small- and medium-sized businesses. Macron has also announced increased military spending, aiming for 64 billion euros by 2027. That was the I.C.R.T. EZ News, I'm _____. －－－－以下為 SoundOn 動態廣告－－－－ 新鮮事、新奇事、新故事《一銀陪你聊“新”事》 第一銀行打造公股銀行首創ESG Podcast頻道上線啦 由知名主持人阿Ken與多位名人來賓進行對談 邀請您一起落實永續發展 讓永續未來不再只是想像 各大收聽平台搜尋：ㄧ銀陪你聊新事 https://sofm.pse.is/8hffq6 -- 全台南最多分店、最齊全物件，在地團隊懂台南，也懂你的需求。 不管是買屋、賣屋，還是從築夢到圓夢， 房子的大小事，交給台南住商，讓你更安心。 了解更多：https://sofm.pse.is/8h3vax -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

China has revised and abolished more than 10,000 problematic policy documents nationwide this year as it reviews laws and regulations involving the unequal treatment of enterprises, with a focus on grassroots authorities, according to the Ministry of Justice.据司法部介绍，今年以来，中国在审查涉及企业不平等对待的法律法规过程中，已在全国范围内修订和废止1万余份存在问题的政策文件，重点聚焦基层执法和行政部门。Key grassroots issues have also been addressed, including government failures to fulfill obligations, illegal debt raising and the practice of "new officials disowning past obligations".同时，一批基层突出问题得到整治，包括政府不履行承诺、违法举债，以及“新官不理旧账”等现象。Launched in March, a special operation led by the ministry to standardize enterprise-related law enforcement has rectified 54,000 prominent cases across the country, assisting enterprises recover 28.92 billion yuan ($4 billion) in economic losses.今年3月启动的由司法部牵头的涉企执法规范化专项行动，已在全国纠治5.4万起突出问题，帮助企业挽回经济损失289.2亿元人民币（约合40亿美元）。To unify law enforcement standards, the Ministry of Justice, in collaboration with departments such as market supervision and firefighting, has urged local governments to introduce more than 330 standardized measures.为统一执法标准，司法部会同市场监管、消防等部门，推动地方出台330余项执法规范化措施。In addition, more than 50 million entries on enterprises' abnormal operation lists have been restored, and 3.5 million penalty records removed, in a bid to ease hurdles hindering enterprises' credit restoration and access to financing and bidding opportunities.此外，已有5000多万条企业经营异常名录记录被修复，350万条行政处罚记录被依法撤销，着力破解企业信用修复、融资和参与招投标等方面的障碍。Following the operation, arbitrary fines nationwide have dropped by 8.2 percent year-on-year, with stricter oversight imposed on regions registering abnormal hikes in fines.专项行动开展后，全国乱罚款现象同比下降8.2%，对罚款异常增长地区实施了更严格的监督。Meanwhile, departments including the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and the Ministry of Finance have advanced long-term supervision of enterprise-related charges, prompting regions and departments to generally establish catalogs of such charges and release them to the public.与此同时，国家发展改革委、工业和信息化部、财政部等部门推进涉企收费长效监管，推动各地区、各部门普遍建立涉企收费目录并向社会公开。Illegal cross-regional and profit-driven law enforcement has also been targeted, with relevant cases screened, irregularities rectified and root causes identified. Cross-provincial jurisdiction systems and collaborative mechanisms have been established following comprehensive case reviews.跨区域、逐利性执法问题也被纳入重点整治范围，通过筛查案件、纠正违规行为、查找问题根源，推动建立跨省管辖制度和协作机制。In one typical case, a county-level comprehensive law enforcement bureau in Shandong province was found in April 2025 to have illegally penalized an out-of-town seed business.在一起典型案例中，2025年4月，山东省某县综合执法局被查出对一家外地种子企业实施了违法处罚。The bureau fined the company in March for failing to label variety right numbers on corn seeds but failed to transfer jurisdiction to the relevant local agricultural authority as required. The municipal supervision bureau issued a rectification order and transferred the case to disciplinary authorities.该执法局于3月以玉米种子未标注品种权编号为由对企业罚款，但未按规定将案件移交当地农业主管部门。市级监督部门随后下达整改通知，并将案件移送纪检部门处理。According to the ministry, the operation, coupled with supporting policies, has boosted market vitality.司法部表示，专项行动及配套政策有效激发了市场活力。The number of national market entities has seen a net increase of more than 5 million, while newly registered private enterprises rose by 6.8 percent in the first eight months, 18.6 percentage points higher than the growth rate for the entire last year.全国市场主体数量净增500多万户，前八个月新登记民营企业同比增长6.8%，比去年全年增速高出18.6个百分点。Vice-Minister of Justice Hu Weilie said that despite progress, deep-seated problems remain in administrative law enforcement.司法部副部长胡卫列表示，尽管取得积极成效，但行政执法领域仍存在一些深层次问题。Some entities, he said, have failed to strictly implement the "two separate lines for revenue and expenditure" system to tighten oversight of public fund management.他说，一些单位未严格落实“收支两条线”制度，公共资金监管不到位。Instead, they have set quotas and targets for confiscated income or linked such income to performance assessments.相反，有的地方设定罚没收入指标，或将罚没收入与绩效考核挂钩。Others have not fully advanced the reform of administrative law enforcement, leading to recurring issues such as overlapping and redundant enforcement as well as shirking responsibilities.还有一些地方行政执法体制改革推进不到位，导致多头执法、重复执法和推诿扯皮等问题反复出现。Some have abused discretion in administrative penalties, arbitrarily imposing maximum fines and substituting penalties for proper management, Hu said.胡卫列表示，还有个别执法人员滥用自由裁量权，动辄顶格处罚，以罚代管。He said these problems have persisted for a long time and stem from deep-rooted causes that include misplaced performance concepts, insufficient professional law enforcement capabilities, weak oversight, and inadequate institutional development. More in-depth research and targeted efforts are needed to address the challenges, he added.他指出，这些问题长期存在，根源在于政绩观偏差、执法专业能力不足、监督乏力以及制度建设不健全等深层因素。他补充说，必须开展更深入研究，采取更有针对性的举措，才能有效破解这些难题。To improve and standardize long-term mechanisms for enterprise-related law enforcement, the ministry will accelerate the introduction of regulations, including measures for the administration of law enforcers and policy documents advancing the rule of law in comprehensive administrative law enforcement reform.为健全和规范涉企执法长效机制，司法部将加快出台相关法规制度，包括执法人员管理办法以及推进综合行政执法改革法治化的政策文件。Approval, supervision and law enforcement powers will be more scientifically delineated, and regular training and proficiency tests for law enforcement personnel expanded.审批权、监管权和执法权将更加科学划分，同时扩大执法人员常态化培训和能力考核。Authorities will also intensify efforts to align administrative law enforcement standards across regions and review laws, regulations and policies that hinder the construction of a unified national market.有关部门还将加大行政执法标准跨区域统一力度，系统清理妨碍全国统一大市场建设的法律法规和政策措施。The ministry will promote the development of a national unified administrative law enforcement supervision platform to strengthen full-process, real-time and precise oversight of enforcement activities.司法部还将推动建设全国统一的行政执法监督平台，强化对执法活动的全过程、实时化、精准化监督。ease business issues优化营商环境 new officials disowning past obligations新官不理旧账enterprise-related law enforcement涉企执法credit restoration信用修复profit-driven law enforcement逐利性执法unified national market全国统一大市场

China aims to broaden insurance coverage for childbirth-related medical expenses and strengthen support for pharmaceutical innovation in the coming year, according to the National Healthcare Security Administration.国家医疗保障局表示，中国计划在未来一年扩大生育相关医疗费用的保险覆盖范围，并加强对医药创新的支持力度。The goals were outlined in a report delivered by Zhang Ke, director of the administration, at its annual work conference on Saturday. The report reviewed progress in healthcare security during the 14th Five-Year Plan period (2021-25) and detailed priority areas for 2026.这些目标由国家医疗保障局主任章轲在周六举行的年度工作会议上提交的报告中提出。该报告回顾了“十四五”规划期间（2021-2025年）医疗保障工作的进展，并详细列出了2026年的重点工作领域。To adapt to demographic shifts marked by declining birth rates and a rapidly aging population, the report said maternity insurance coverage for prenatal checkups will be reasonably expanded within the financial capacity of the insurance fund.为应对生育率下降和人口快速老龄化的人口结构变化，报告指出将在保险基金财力范围内合理扩大孕产妇保险的产前检查覆盖范围。Authorities will explore the creation of a basic service package that incorporates prenatal examinations, aiming to ease the financial burden on families.相关部门将研究推出包含产前检查的基本服务套餐，旨在减轻家庭的经济负担。By next year, the goal is to achieve nationwide full reimbursement for all policy-covered medical expenses related to childbirth, enabling insured expectant mothers to incur almost no out-of-pocket costs for covered services.到明年，目标是实现全国范围内对所有与分娩相关的保险覆盖医疗费用全额报销，使参保孕妇在享受保险覆盖服务时几乎无需承担自付费用。Additional expenses, such as those for premium hospital wards or medications not included in the reimbursement list, will remain uncovered.但例如高级病房费用或未列入报销清单的药品等的额外费用，仍将不予覆盖。So far, seven provincial-level regions, including Jilin, Jiangsu and Shandong provinces, have implemented policies that make childbirth nearly free of charge.迄今为止，包括吉林、江苏和山东在内的七个省级地区已实施政策，使生育费用几乎免费。The administration said the number of women enrolled in the national maternity insurance program has risen to 255 million, and all regions have included fertility treatment in their basic health insurance plans.国家医疗保障局表示，全国生育保险参保女性人数已增至2.55亿，所有地区均已将生育治疗纳入基本医疗保险范围。Nearly 95 percent of fund pooling regions now distribute fertility subsidies directly to beneficiaries' personal accounts rather than through employers.目前近95%的基金池地区已将生育补贴直接发放至受益人个人账户，而非通过雇主发放。For the coming year, authorities will promote participation among flexible workers, migrant workers and individuals in new forms of employment in maternity insurance, while exploring the feasibility of extending coverage to nonemployed urban and rural residents.未来一年，相关部门将推动灵活就业人员、流动务工人员及新型就业形式从业人员参与生育保险，同时研究将覆盖范围扩大至城镇非雇佣居民和农村居民的可行性。All provincial-level regions will be required to cover eligible labor pain relief procedures under insurance and further implement and refine reimbursement policies for assisted reproductive technology services.所有省级行政区都将要求将符合条件的分娩镇痛项目纳入医保范围，并进一步落实和完善辅助生殖技术服务的报销政策。To assist the 220 million people aged 65 and older — who make up 15.6 percent of China's total population as of end of 2024 — the report called for the further development of the long-term care insurance program, which currently covers about 300 million people, and encouraged commercial insurers to develop related products.为帮助2.2亿65岁及以上人口（截至2024年底占中国总人口的15.6%），报告呼吁进一步发展长期护理保险制度，该制度目前覆盖约3亿人；并鼓励商业保险公司开发相关产品。Addressing demographic challenges was also among the priorities set by the annual two-day Central Economic Work Conference that concluded on Thursday. The conference emphasized expanding rehabilitative care services, advancing the long-term care insurance program, and strengthening care and support for vulnerable groups.应对人口结构挑战也是本周四结束的为期两天年度中央经济工作会议确定的重点工作之一。会议强调要扩大康复护理服务范围，推进长期护理保险制度建设，加强对弱势群体的照护与支持。The meeting also stressed the importance of promoting positive views on marriage and childbearing and striving to stabilize the newborn population.会议还强调了倡导积极婚姻生育观念、努力稳定新生儿人口的重要性。The healthcare security report also underscored stepped-up support for innovative drugs and emerging healthcare technologies.该医疗保健安全报告还强调了对创新药物和新兴医疗技术的加强支持。Over the past five years, 949 medicines were added to the national reimbursement drug list, bringing the cumulative total to 3,253.过去五年间，共有949种药品被纳入国家医保药品目录，累计纳入药品总数达到3253种。In the latest update released earlier this month, a record 50 first-in-class novel drugs were added, accounting for nearly half of the 114 newly included products.在本月初发布的最新的医保药品目录更新中，新增了创纪录的50种首创创新药物，占新增的114种产品近半数。At the same time, the administration issued the country's first commercial insurance innovative drug list, covering 19 medicines with significant clinical value, high innovation levels and substantial patient benefits.与此同时，国家医疗保障局发布了全国首份商业保险创新药目录，涵盖19种具有显著临床价值、高创新水平和实质性患者获益的药品。The report called for active implementation of the commercial drug list and encouraged commercial health insurers to cover more reasonable medical expenses outside the basic insurance catalog. Commercial insurers will also be mobilized to increase investment in innovative drugs to support research and development.该报告呼吁积极实施商业药品目录，鼓励商业健康保险公司覆盖基本保险目录外的更多合理医疗费用。同时将动员商业保险公司加大对创新药物的投资力度，以支持研发工作。To further foster innovation, the report highlighted the need to leverage medical insurance's strategic purchasing role, guide the industry toward healthy competition and differentiated innovation, and improve multichannel payment mechanisms for innovative drugs.为进一步促进创新，报告强调需发挥医保战略采购作用，引导行业开展良性竞争和差异化创新，完善创新药多渠道支付机制。The rapid development of artificial intelligence and other smart technologies also presents opportunities to build a more digital healthcare security platform and establish an evaluation system using real-world data to comprehensively assess the value of insurance-covered medications.人工智能及其他智能技术的快速发展，也为构建更完善的数字化医疗安全平台提供了机遇，并能建立基于真实世界数据的评估体系，全面评估医保药品的价值。Authorities will support local governments in launching competitions for healthcare security application scenarios involving advanced technologies such as multimodal AI-assisted diagnosis and noninvasive brain-computer interfaces.政府将支持地方政府开展医疗健康安全应用场景竞赛，涉及多模态人工智能辅助诊断、非侵入式脑机接口等前沿技术。Official data show the national basic medical insurance coverage rate has remained stable at about 95 percent over the past five years, with total expenditures exceeding 13 trillion yuan ($1.82 trillion). Flexible workers, migrant workers and individuals in new forms of employment have increasingly been supported to enroll.官方数据显示，过去五年全国基本医疗保险覆盖率稳定在95%左右，累计支出超过13万亿元（合1.82万亿美元）。灵活就业人员、农民工和新型就业人员参保比例持续提升。During this period, China carried out eight rounds of centralized drug procurement covering treatments for diabetes, cancer, bacterial infections and other common chronic diseases, as well as four rounds of bulk purchasing for high-value medical consumables such as artificial joints, intraocular lenses and cochlear implants.在此期间，中国开展了八轮集中采购，涵盖糖尿病、癌症、细菌感染等常见慢性病的治疗药物，并进行了四轮高价医疗耗材的集中采购，包括人工关节、人工晶体和人工耳蜗等。Local authorities recovered about 120 billion yuan in misused insurance funds and prevented an additional 9.5 billion yuan in losses by using big data and smart monitoring tools. The introduction of drug traceability codes has strengthened efforts to crack down on drug resale and fraudulent reimbursement.地方政府通过运用大数据和智能监控工具，追回约1200亿元被滥用的医保资金，并防止了95亿元的损失。药品追溯码的引入，进一步加强了打击药品转售和虚假报销的力度。maternity insurance[məˈtɜːrnəti]生育保险procurement[prəˈkjʊrmənt]采购full reimbursement[ˌriːɪmˈbɜːrsmənt]全额报销migrant workers流动务工人员

The legend of the Eight Immortals, which gradually arose starting during the Tang Dynasty, particularly associated with the town of Penglai in Shandong.Support the show

A powerful cold wave is gripping large parts of China this week, driving temperatures sharply lower and pushing the freezing line steadily south, according to the National Meteorological Center.据国家气象中心称，本周一股强劲寒潮正席卷中国大部分地区，气温急剧下降，冰冻线持续向南推进。The center continued to issue blue alerts — the lowest of a four-tiered color-coded warning system — for a cold wave and strong winds on Tuesday morning, forecasting that the cold air will keep moving east and south through Wednesday.气象中心周二上午继续针对寒潮和大风发布蓝色预警——这是四级颜色编码预警系统中的最低级别——并预测冷空气将持续向东和向南移动至周三。Yang Shunan, chief forecaster at the center, said the cold wave has already gripped the entire northern part of the country and continues to push south.气象中心首席预报员杨舒楠表示，这波寒潮已覆盖全国北方地区，并持续向南推进。As of Tuesday afternoon, temperatures in the Inner Mongolia autonomous region, Northeast China and North China had fallen by 6 to 10 C, with some areas recording drops of 12 to 14 C. These regions, along with the Shandong and Liaodong peninsulas, have also recorded winds of up to 39 kilometers per hour, Yang said.截至周二下午，内蒙古自治区、东北地区和华北地区气温普遍下降6至10摄氏度，部分地区降温幅度达12至14摄氏度。杨舒楠表示，这些地区以及山东半岛和辽东半岛还出现了时速达39公里的强风。On Tuesday, Beijing and Tianjin recorded their coldest morning of the second half of the year at around minus 5 C, while Changchun in Jilin province, Shenyang in Liaoning province and Shijiazhuang in Hebei province also hit new seasonal lows.周二，北京和天津录得今年下半年最低气温，约为零下5摄氏度；吉林省长春市、辽宁省沈阳市和河北省石家庄市也创下本季新低。The cold wave is set to keep pressing south over the next two days, bringing the coldest conditions of the season so far to large parts of central and eastern China. In some areas of Jiangsu, Anhui and Zhejiang provinces, temperatures are expected to plunge by more than 10 C, with wind chills exacerbating the cold conditions.未来两天，寒潮将继续向南推进，给中国中部和东部大部地区带来今冬迄今最严寒的天气。江苏、安徽和浙江部分地区气温预计将骤降10摄氏度以上，寒风将使体感温度进一步降低。"The most notable features of this cold wave are its complex weather impacts and the significant temperature plunge," Yang said.杨舒楠表示：“此轮寒潮最显著的特征在于其复杂的气象影响和显著的降温幅度。”In addition to strong winds and plummeting temperatures, sand and dust storms were reported in parts of Inner Mongolia and North China in the early stages of the cold air outbreak.在冷空气来袭初期，除强风和气温骤降外，内蒙古和华北部分地区还出现了沙尘暴。Unlike the cold wave in mid-November, which took a more westerly track and brought sharper temperature drops to southern and western regions, the current system is tracking slightly farther north, resulting in the strongest cooling being concentrated north of the Yangtze River, she said.杨舒楠指出，与11月中旬那场偏西路径、导致南方和西部地区气温骤降的冷空气不同，当前这股冷空气路径略偏北，因此强降温主要集中在长江以北地区。On Wednesday morning, the nation's coldest regions will be in parts of the northeast, northwest and North China, according to the center.气象中心称，周三上午，全国最寒冷的地区将出现在东北、西北和华北的部分地区。Minimum temperatures below minus 10 C are forecast across more than 10 provincial-level regions, including the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region as well as the provinces of Qinghai, Gansu and Hebei.预计新疆维吾尔自治区、青海省、甘肃省、河北省等十余个省级行政区最低气温将低于零下10摄氏度。Major northeastern cities such as Harbin and Changchun may see temperatures dip below minus 20 C for the first time this season. Forecasters advise commuters and students to bundle up with hats, gloves and scarves to avoid frostbite.哈尔滨、长春等东北主要城市的气温可能在本季首次跌破零下20摄氏度。气象预报员建议通勤者和学生做好保暖措施，戴好帽子、手套和围巾，以防冻伤。By Thursday, the freezing line will reach its southernmost point during this cold spell, extending into parts of Zhejiang, Anhui and Hubei. The cold wave is expected to weaken and come to an end from late Wednesday into Thursday night, Yang said.到周四，冻线将达到此轮寒潮的南端极限，延伸至浙江、安徽和湖北部分地区。杨舒楠表示，预计寒潮将于周三晚至周四夜间逐渐减弱并结束。bundle up做好保暖措施、裹紧衣物frostbite n./ˈfrɑːst.baɪt/冻伤；冻疮

Follow me on Twitter/X (@chinaadventures) where I post (among other things) daily reminders to pray for China.You can also email me @ bfwesten at gmail dot com. Last but not least, to learn more about our ministry endeavors or get one of my missionary biographies, visit PrayGiveGo.us! My Op-Ed for Crosspolitic News: Trump Making US-Malaysia Relations Great Again https://www.crosspoliticnews.com/news/trump-making-us-malaysia-relations-great-again Five Prayer Requests from the Wives of Imprisoned Pastors https://backtojerusalem.com/wives-of-arrested-pastors-of-chinas-zion-church-share-5-urgent-prayer-requests/ Please pray for our Christian brothers and sisters connected to the Zion Church in China. There has been another wave of arrests. Here is a list of Those Taken Away (23 People): Shanghai- Pastor Wang Lin 2. Liu Jiang Beijing- Preacher Wu Qiuyu 4. Pastor Wang Cong 5. Pastor Sun Cong 6. Sister Li Shengjuan Pastor Gao Yingjia 8. Sister Ming Li 9. Sister Hu Yanzi 10. Preacher Misha 11. Sister Cui Xiaole Jiaxing, Zhejiang- 12. Preacher Zhan Ge Hangzhou, Zhejiang-13. Sister Mei Liming (arrested Oct 11) Beihai, Guangxi- Pastor Jin Mingri (arrested for “illegally using info network,” held at Beihai #2 Detention Center) Pastor Yin Huibin 16. Pastor’s wife Yang Lijun 17. Sis Tuya 18. Sis An Mei 19. Sis Huang Chunzi Qingdao, Shandong- 20. Pastor Liu Zhenbin (aka Liu Shanyi) Chengdu, Sichuan- 21. Pastor Lin Shucheng (Mu Chenglin) Zhengzhou, Henan- 22. Preacher Sun Xue (arrested Oct 12) Shenyang, Liaoning- 23. Elder Wang Zhong (arrested Oct 17) Follow China Compass Subscribe to China Compass on whichever platform you use, including Apple Podcasts! You can also contact me anytime on X: @chinaadventures or via email (bfwesten at gmail dot com). Hebrews 13:3!

Follow me on Twitter/X (@chinaadventures) where I post (among other things) daily reminders to pray for China.You can also email me @ bfwesten at gmail dot com. Last but not least, to learn more about our ministry endeavors or get one of my missionary biographies, visit PrayGiveGo.us! My Op-Ed for Crosspolitic News: Trump Making US-Malaysia Relations Great Again https://www.crosspoliticnews.com/news/trump-making-us-malaysia-relations-great-again Five Prayer Requests from the Wives of Imprisoned Pastors https://backtojerusalem.com/wives-of-arrested-pastors-of-chinas-zion-church-share-5-urgent-prayer-requests/ Please pray for our Christian brothers and sisters connected to the Zion Church in China. There has been another wave of arrests. Here is a list of Those Taken Away (23 People): Shanghai- Pastor Wang Lin 2. Liu Jiang Beijing- Preacher Wu Qiuyu 4. Pastor Wang Cong 5. Pastor Sun Cong 6. Sister Li Shengjuan Pastor Gao Yingjia 8. Sister Ming Li 9. Sister Hu Yanzi 10. Preacher Misha 11. Sister Cui Xiaole Jiaxing, Zhejiang- 12. Preacher Zhan Ge Hangzhou, Zhejiang-13. Sister Mei Liming (arrested Oct 11) Beihai, Guangxi- Pastor Jin Mingri (arrested for “illegally using info network,” held at Beihai #2 Detention Center) Pastor Yin Huibin 16. Pastor’s wife Yang Lijun 17. Sis Tuya 18. Sis An Mei 19. Sis Huang Chunzi Qingdao, Shandong- 20. Pastor Liu Zhenbin (aka Liu Shanyi) Chengdu, Sichuan- 21. Pastor Lin Shucheng (Mu Chenglin) Zhengzhou, Henan- 22. Preacher Sun Xue (arrested Oct 12) Shenyang, Liaoning- 23. Elder Wang Zhong (arrested Oct 17) Follow China Compass Subscribe to China Compass on whichever platform you use, including Apple Podcasts! You can also contact me anytime on X: @chinaadventures or via email (bfwesten at gmail dot com). Hebrews 13:3!

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Wuhan Campaign. As Japanese forces pressed toward central China, Chiang Kai-shek faced a brutal choice: defend Wuhan with costly sieges or unleash a dangerous flood to buy time. The Yellow River breached its banks at Huayuankou, sending a wall of water racing toward villages, railways, and fields. The flood did not erase the enemy; it bought months of breathing room for a battered China, but at a terrible toll to civilians who lost homes, farms, and lives. Within Wuhan's orbit, a mosaic of Chinese forces struggled to unite. The NRA, split into competing war zones and factions, numbered about 1.3 million but fought with uneven equipment and training. The Japanese, deploying hundreds of thousands, ships, and air power, pressed from multiple angles: Anqing, Madang, Jiujiang, and beyond, using riverine forts and amphibious landings to turn the Yangtze into a deadly artery. Yet courage endured as troops held lines, pilots challenged the skies, and civilians, like Wang Guozhen, who refused to betray his country, chose defiance over surrender. The war for Wuhan was not a single battle but a testament to endurance in the face of overwhelming odds.   #173 The Fall of Wuhan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the last episode we began the Battle of Wuhan. Japan captured Anqing and gained air access to Jiujiang, Chinese defenses around the Yangtze River were strained. The southern Yangtze's Ninth War Zone held two key garrisons: one west of Poyang Lake and another in Jiujiang. To deter Japanese assault on Jiujiang, China fortified Madang with artillery, mines, and bamboo booms. On June 24, Japan conducted a surprise Madang landing while pressing south along the Yangtze. Madang's fortress withstood four assaults but suffered heavy bombardment and poison gas. Chinese leadership failures contributed to the fall: Li Yunheng, overseeing Madang, was away at a ceremony, leaving only partial contingents, primarily three battalions from marine corps units and the 313th regiment of the 53rd division, participating, totaling under five battalions. Reinforcements from Pengze were misrouted by Li's orders, arriving too late. Madang fell after three days. Chiang Kai-shek retaliated with a counterattack and rewarded units that recaptured Xiangshan, but further progress was blocked. Li Yunheng was court-martialed, and Xue Weiying executed.   Madang's loss opened a corridor toward Jiujiang. The Japanese needed weeks to clear minefields, sacrificing several ships in the process. With roughly 200,000 Chinese troops in the Jiujiang–Ruichang zone under Xue Yue and Zhang Fukui, the Japanese captured Pengze and then Hukou, using poison gas again during the fighting. The Hukou evacuation cut off many non-combat troops, with over 1,800 of 3,100 soldiers successfully evacuated and more than 1,300 missing drowned in the lake. Two weeks after Hukou's fall, the Japanese reached Jiujiang and overtook it after a five-day battle. The retreat left civilians stranded, and the Jiujiang Massacre followed: about 90,000 civilians were killed, with mass executions of POWs, rapes, and widespread destruction of districts, factories, and transport. Subsequently, the Southern Riverline Campaign saw Japanese detachments along the river advance westward, capturing Ruichang, Ruoxi, and other areas through October, stretching Chinese defenses thin as Japan pressed toward Wuchang and beyond. On July 26, 1938, the Japanese occupied Jiujiang and immediately divided their forces into three routes: advancing toward De'an and Nanchang, then striking Changsha, severing the Yue-Han Railway, and surrounding Wuhan in an effort to annihilate the Chinese field army. The advance of the 101st and 106th Infantry Divisions slowed south of the Yangtze River, yet the Central China Expeditionary Army remained intent on seizing Ruichang and De'an to cut off Chinese forces around Mount Lu. To this end, the 9th and 27th Infantry Divisions were deployed to the sector, with the 9th regarded as an experienced unit that had fought in earlier campaigns, while the 27th was newly formed in the summer of 1938; this contrast underscored the rapidly expanding scope of the war in China as the Japanese Army General Staff continued mobilizing reservists and creating new formations. According to the operational plan, the 101st and 106th Divisions would push south toward De'an to pin Chinese defenders, while the 9th and 27th Divisions would envelop Chinese forces south of the river. Okamura Yasuji ordered five battalions from the 9th to move toward De'an via Ruichang, and the Hata Detachment was tasked with securing the area northwest of Ruichang to protect the 9th's flank. North of the Yangtze, the 6th Infantry Division was to move from Huangmei to Guangji, with Tianjiazhen as the ultimate objective; capturing Tianjiazhen would allow the 11th Army to converge on Wuhan from both north and south of the river.  The operation began when the 9th Division landed at Jiujiang, threatening the left flank of the Jinguanqiao line. The Chinese responded by deploying the 1st Corps to counter the 9th Division's left flank, which threatened the Maruyama Detachment's lines of communication. The Maruyama Detachment counterattacked successfully, enabling the rest of the 9th Division to seize Ruichang on August 24; on the same day, the 9th attacked the 30th Army defending Mount Min. The Chinese defense deteriorated on the mountain, and multiple counterattacks by Chinese divisions failed, forcing the 1st Corps to retreat to Mahuiling. The seizure of Ruichang and the surrounding area was followed by a wave of atrocities, with Japanese forces inflicting substantial casualties, destroying houses, and damaging property, and crimes including murder, rape, arson, torture, and looting devastating many villages and livelihoods in the Ruichang area. After Ruichang and Mount Min fell, the Maruyama Detachment and the 106th Infantry Division advanced on Mahuiling, seeking to encircle Chinese forces from the northwest, with the 106th forming the inner ring and the Maruyama Detachment the outer ring; this coordination led to Mahuiling's fall on September 3. The 27th Infantry Division, arriving in late August, landed east of Xiaochikou, providing the manpower to extend Japanese offensives beyond the Yangtze's banks and outflank Chinese defenders along the river. Its main objective was to seize the Rui-wu highway, a vital route for the continued advance toward Wuhan. After the fall of Mahuiling, Japanese command altered its strategy. The 11th Army ordered the Maruyama Detachment to rejoin the 9th Infantry Division and press westward, while the 101st Infantry Division was to remain at Mahuiling and push south toward De'an along with the 106th Infantry Division. This divergent or “eccentric” offensive aimed to advance on Wuhan while protecting the southern flank. The renewed offensive began on September 11, 1938, with the 9th Infantry Division and Hata Detachment advancing west along the Rui-yang and Rui-wu highways toward Wuhan, followed days later by the 27th Infantry Division. Initially, the Japanese made solid progress from Ruichang toward a line centered on Laowuge, but soon faced formidable Chinese defenses. The 9th and 27th Divisions confronted the Chinese 2nd Army Corps, which had prepared in-depth positions in the mountains west of Sanchikou and Xintanpu. The 27th Division encountered stiff resistance from the 18th and 30th Corps, and although it captured Xiaoao by September 24, its vanguard advancing west of Shujie came under heavy attack from the 91st, 142nd, 60th, and 6th Reserve Infantry Divisions, threatening to encircle it. Only the southward advance of the 101st and 106th Divisions relieved the pressure, forcing the Chinese to redeploy the 91st and 6th Reserve Divisions to the south and thereby loosening the 27th's grip. After the redeployment, the 9th and 27th Divisions resumed their push. The 9th crossed the Fu Shui on October 9 and took Sanjikou on October 16, while the 27th seized Xintanpu on October 18. The Hata Detachment followed, capturing Yangxin on October 18 and Ocheng on October 23, further tightening Japanese control over the highways toward Wuhan. By mid-October, 11th Army commander Okamura Yasuji resolved to sever the Guangzhou-Hankou railway to disrupt Chinese lines. On October 22, the 9th and 27th Divisions attacked toward Jinniu and Xianning. By October 27, the 9th had captured Jinniu and cut the railway; the 27th Division extended the disruption further south. These actions effectively isolated Wuchang from the south, giving the Imperial Japanese Army greater leverage over the southern approaches to Wuhan. The push south by the 101st and 106th Infantry Divisions pressed toward De'an, where they encountered the entrenched Chinese 1st Army Corps. The offensive began on September 16 and by the 24th, elements of the 27th Division penetrated deep into the area west of Baishui Street and De'an's environs. Recognizing the growing crisis, Xue Yue mobilized the nearby 91st and 142nd Divisions, who seized Nanping Mountain along the Ruiwu Line overnight, effectively cutting off the 27th Division's retreat. Fierce combat on the 25th and 26th saw Yang Jialiu, commander of the 360th Regiment of the 60th Division, die a heroic death. Zhang Zhihe, chief of staff of the 30th Group Army and an underground CCP member, commanded the newly formed 13th Division and the 6th Division to annihilate the Suzuki Regiment and recapture Qilin Peak. Learning of the 27th Division's trap, Okamura Yasuji panicked and, on the 25th, urgently ordered the 123rd, 145th, and 147th Infantry Regiments and mountain artillery of the 106th Division on the Nanxun Line, along with the 149th Regiment of the 101st Division on the Dexing Line, to rush to Mahuiling and Xingzi. To adapt to mountain warfare, some units were temporarily converted to packhorse formations. On the 27th, the 106th Division broke through the Wutailing position with force, splitting into two groups and pushing toward Erfangzheng and Lishan. By the 28th, the three regiments and mountain artillery of the 106th Division advanced into the mountain villages of Wanjialing, Leimingguliu, Shibaoshan, Nantianpu, Beixijie, and Dunshangguo, about 50 li west of De'an. On the same day, the 149th Regiment of the 101st Division entered the Wanjialing area and joined the 106th Division. Commanded by Lieutenant General Junrokuro Matsuura, the 106th Division sought to break out of Baicha and disrupt the Nanwu Highway to disrupt the Chinese retreat from De'an. At this juncture, Xue Yue's corps perceived the Japanese advance as a predatory, wolf-like maneuver and deemed it a strategic opportunity to counterattack. He resolved to pull forces from Dexing, Nanxun, and Ruiwu to envelop the enemy near Wanjialing, with the aim of annihilating them. Thus began a desperate, pivotal battle between China and Japan in northern Jiangxi, centered on the Wanjialing area. The Japanese 106th Division found its rear communications cut off around September 28, 1938, as the Chinese blockade tightened. Despite the 27th Division's severed rear and its earlier defeat at Qilin Peak, Okamura Yasuji ordered a renewed push to relieve the besieged 106th by directing the 27th Division to attack Qilin Peak and advance east of Baishui Street. In this phase, the 27th Division dispatched the remnants of its 3rd Regiment to press the assault on Qilin Peak, employing poison gas and briefly reaching the summit. On September 29, the 142nd Division of the 32nd Army, under Shang Zhen, coordinated with the 752nd Regiment of the same division to launch a fierce counterattack on Qilin Peak at Zenggai Mountain west of Xiaoao. After intense fighting, they reclaimed the peak, thwarting the 27th Division's bid to move eastward to aid the 106th. Concurrently, a portion of the 123rd Regiment of the 106th Division attempted a breakout west of Baishui Street. Our 6th and 91st Divisions responded with a determined assault from the east of Xiaoao, blocking the 123rd Regiment east of Baishui Street. The victories at Qilin Peak and Baishui Street halted any merger between the eastern and western Japanese forces, enabling the Chinese army to seal the pocket and create decisive conditions for encircling the 106th Division and securing victory in the Battle of Wanjialing. After the setback at Qilin Peak, Division Commander Masaharu Homma, defying Okamura Yasuji's orders to secure Baishui Street, redirected his focus to Tianhe Bridge under a pretext of broader operations. He neglected the heavily encircled 106th Division and pivoted toward Xintanpu. By September 30, Chinese forces attacked from both the east and west, with the 90th and 91st Divisions joining the assault on the Japanese positions. On October 1, the Japanese, disoriented and unable to pinpoint their own unit locations, telegrammed Okamura Yasuji for air support. On October 2, the First Corps received orders to tighten the encirclement and annihilate the enemy forces. Deployments were made to exploit a numerical advantage and bolster morale, placing the Japanese in a desperate position. On October 3, 1938, the 90th and 91st Divisions launched a concerted attack on Nantianpu, delivering heavy damage to the Japanese force and showering Leimingguliu with artillery fire that endangered the 106th Division headquarters. By October 5, Chinese forces reorganized: the 58th Division of the 74th Army advanced from the south, the 90th Division of the 4th Army from the east, portions of the 6th and 91st Divisions from the west, and the 159th and 160th Divisions of the 65th Army from the north, tightening the surrounding cordon from four directions. On October 6, Xue Yue ordered a counterattack, and by October 7 the Chinese army had effectively cut off all retreat routes. That evening, after fierce hand-to-hand combat, the 4th Army regained the hilltop, standing at a 100-meter-high position, and thwarted any Japanese plan to break through Baicha and sever Chinese retreat toward De'an. By October 8, Lieutenant Colonel Sakurada Ryozo, the 106th Division's staff officer, reported the division's deteriorating situation to headquarters. The telegram signaled the impending collapse of the 106th Division. On October 9, Kuomintang forces recaptured strategic positions such as Lishan, tightening encirclement to a small pocket of about three to four square kilometers in Nantianpu, Leimingguliu, and Panjia. That night, the vanguard attacked the Japanese 106th Division's headquarters at Leimingguliu, engaging in close combat with the Japanese. Matsuura and the division's staff then took up arms in defense. In the early hours of October 10, Japanese forces launched flares that illuminated only a narrow arc of movement, and a limited number of troops fled northwest toward Yangfang Street. The two and a half month battle inflicted tremendous casualties on the Japanese, particularly on the 101st and 106th divisions. These two formations began with a combined strength of over 47,000 troops and ultimately lost around 30,000 men in the fighting. The high casualty rate hit the Japanese officer corps especially hard, forcing General Shunroku Hata to frequently airdrop replacement officers onto the besieged units' bases throughout the engagement. For the Chinese, the successful defense of Wanjialing was pivotal to the Wuhan campaign.  Zooming out at a macro level a lot of action was occurring all over the place. Over in Shandong, 1,000 soldiers under Shi Yousan, who had defected multiple times between rival warlord cliques and operated as an independent faction, occupied Jinan and held it for a few days. Guerrillas briefly controlled Yantai. East of Changzhou extending to Shanghai, another non-government Chinese force, led by Dai Li, employed guerrilla tactics in the Shanghai suburbs and across the Huangpu River. This force included secret society members from the Green Gang and the Tiandihui, who conducted executions of spies and perceived traitors, losing more than 100 men in the course of operations. On August 13, members of this force clandestinely entered the Japanese air base at Hongqiao and raised a Chinese flag. Meanwhile, the Japanese Sixth Division breached the defensive lines of Chinese 31st and 68th Armies on July 24 and captured Taihu, Susong, and Huangmei Counties by August 3. As Japanese forces advanced westward, the Chinese Fourth Army of the Fifth War Zone deployed its main strength in Guangji, Hubei, and Tianjia Town to intercept the offensive. The 11th Army Group and the 68th Army were ordered to form a defensive line in Huangmei County, while the 21st and 29th Army Groups, along with the 26th Army, moved south to outflank the Japanese. The Chinese recaptured Taihu on August 27 and Susong on August 28. However, with Japanese reinforcements arriving on August 30, the Chinese 11th Army Group and the 68th Army were unable to sustain counteroffensives and retreated to Guangji County to continue resisting alongside the 26th, 55th, and 86th Armies. The Chinese Fourth Army Group directed the 21st and 29th Army Groups to flank the Japanese from the northeast of Huangmei, but they failed to halt the Japanese advance. Guangji fell on September 6, and while Guangji was recovered by the Chinese Fourth Corps on September 8, Wuxue was lost on the same day. Zooming back in on the Wuhan Front, the Japanese focus shifted to Tianjiazhen. The fortress of Tianjiazhen represented the 6th Infantry Division's most important objective. Its geographic position, where the Yangtze's two banks narrow to roughly 600 meters, with cliffs and high ground overlooking the river, allowed Chinese forces to deploy gun batteries that could control the river and surrounding terrain. Chinese control of Tianjiazhen thus posed a serious obstacle to Japan's amphibious and logistical operations on the Yangtze, and its seizure was deemed essential for Japan to advance toward Wuhan. Taking Tianjiazhen would not be easy: overland approaches were impeded by mountainous terrain on both sides of the fortress, while an amphibious assault faced fortified positions and minefields in the narrow river. Recognizing its strategic importance, Chinese forces reinforced Tianjiazhen with three divisions from central government troops, aiming to deter an overland assault. Chinese preparations included breaching several dykes and dams along the Yangtze to flood expanses of land and slow the Japanese advance; however, the resulting higher water levels widened the river and created a more accessible supply route for the Japanese. Instead of relying on a long overland route from Anqing to Susong, the Japanese could now move supplies directly up the Yangtze from Jiujiang to Huangmei, a distance of only about 40 kilometers, which boosted the 6th Division's logistics and manpower. In August 1938 the 6th Infantry Division resumed its northward push, facing determined resistance from the 4th Army Corps entrenched in a narrow defile south of the Dabie Mountains, with counterattacks from the 21st and 27th Army Groups affecting the 6th's flank. The Dabie Mountains are a major mountain range located in central China. Running northwest to southeast, they form the main watershed between the Huai and Yangtze rivers. The range also marks the boundary between Hubei Province and its neighboring provinces of Henan to the north and Anhui to the east. By early September the 6th had captured Guangji, providing a staging ground for the thrust toward Tianjiazhen, though this extended the division's long flank: after Guangji fell, it now faced a 30-kilometer front between Huangmei and Guangji, exposing it to renewed Chinese pressure from the 21st and 27th Army Groups. This constrained the number of troops available for the main objective at Tianjiazhen. Consequently, the Japanese dispatched only a small force, three battalions from the Imamura Detachment, to assault Tianjiazhen, betting that the fortress could be taken within a week. The KMT, learning from previous defeats, reinforced Tianjiazhen with a stronger infantry garrison and built obstacles, barbed wire, pillboxes, and trench networks, to slow the assault. These defenses, combined with limited Japanese logistics, six days of rations per soldier, made the operation costly and precarious. The final Japanese assault was postponed by poor weather, allowing Chinese forces to press counterattacks: three Chinese corps, the 26th, 48th, and 86th, attacked the Imamura Detachment's flank and rear, and by September 18 these attacks had begun to bite, though the floods of the Yangtze prevented a complete encirclement of the eastern flank. Despite these setbacks, Japanese riverine and ground operations continued, aided by naval support that moved up the Yangtze as Matouzhen's batteries were overtaken. After Matouzhen fell and enabled a secure riverine supply line from Shanghai to Guangji, 11th Army commander Okamura Yasuji quickly sent relief supplies upriver on September 23. These replenishments restored the besieged troops near Tianjiazhen and allowed the Japanese to resume the offensive, employing night assaults and poison gas to seize Tianjiazhen on September 29, 1938, thereby removing a major barrier to their advance toward Wuhan along the Yangtze. The 11th Army pressed north along the Yangtze while the 2nd Army, commanded by Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni, concentrated the 3rd, 10th, 13th, and 16th Infantry Divisions around Hefei with initial aims at Lu'an and Heshan and the broader objective of moving toward the northern foothills of the Dabie Mountains. When Chinese forces began destroying roads west of Lu'an, Naruhiko shifted the 2nd Army's plan. Rather than pushing along a line from Lu'an to Heshan, he redirected toward the Huangchuan–Shangcheng corridor, where more intact roads remained accessible, and Chinese withdrawals in the Huangchuan–Shangceng area to counter the 11th Army's Yangtze advance allowed the 2nd Army to gain speed in the early stage of its offensive. The 10th and 13th Infantry Divisions were ordered to begin their advance on August 27, facing roughly 25,000 Chinese troops from the Fifth War Zone's 51st and 77th Corps, and achieving notable early gains. The 10th captured Lu'an on August 28, followed by the 13th taking Heshan on August 29. The 10th then seized Kushi on September 7. Meanwhile, the 13th crossed the Shi River at night in an attempt to seize Changbailing, but encountered stiff resistance from multiple Chinese divisions that slowed its progress. To bolster the effort, Naruhiko ordered the Seiya Detachment from the 10th Division—three infantry battalions—to reinforce the 13th. Despite these reinforcements, momentum remained insufficient, so he deployed the 16th Infantry Division, which had arrived at Yenchiachi, to assault Shangcheng from the north. After crossing the Shi River at Yanjiachi, the 16th outflanked Shangcheng from the north, coordinating with the 13th from the south; the Chinese withdrew and Shangcheng fell. Following this success, Naruhiko ordered the 13th and 16th Divisions to push deeper into the Dabie Mountains toward Baikou and Songfu, while the 10th and 3rd Divisions moved toward Leshan and Xinyang, with Xinyang, a crucial Beijing–Wuhan Railway node, representing a particularly important objective. The Japanese advance progressed steadily through the Dabie Mountains, with the 10th executing bold maneuvers to outflank Leshan from the south and the 3rd penetrating toward the Beijing–Wuhan railway north of Xinyang, collectively disrupting and cutting the railway near Xinyang in October. An independent unit, the Okada Detachment, operated between these forces, advancing through Loshan before sealing Xinyang on October 12. The seizure of Xinyang effectively severed Wuhan's northern artery from external reinforcement and resupply, signaling a decisive turn against Wuhan as a Chinese stronghold. While the 2nd Army advanced in the Dabie Mountains, another critical development was taking place far to the south. By the end of 1937, southern China became more crucial to the Republic of China as a lifeline to the outside world. Guangzhou and Hong Kong served as some of the last vital transportation hubs and sources of international aid for Chiang Kai-Shek, with approximately 80 percent of supplies from abroad reaching Chinese forces in the interior through Guangzhou. Imperial General Headquarters believed that a blockade of Guangdong province would deprive China of essential war materiel and the ability to prolong the war. As I always liked to term it, the Japanese were trying to plug up the leaks of supplies coming into China, and Guangzhou was the largest one. In 1936 the Hankow-Canton railway was completed, and together with the Kowloon-Canton railway formed a rapid all-rail link from south China to central and northern China. For the first sixteen months of the war, about 60,000 tons of goods transited per month through the port of Hong Kong. The central government also reported the import of 1.5 million gallons of gasoline through Hong Kong in 1938, and more than 700,000 tons of goods would eventually reach Hankou using the new railway. In comparison, the Soviet Union in 1937 was sending war materiel through Xinjiang to Lanzhou using camels, with Chinese raw materials traveling back either the same route or via Hong Kong to Vladivostok. By 1940, 50,000 camels and hundreds of trucks were transporting 2,000–3,000 tons of Soviet war material per month into China. Japanese planning for operations began in early November 1937, with the blockade's objectives centered on seizing a portion of Daya Bay and conducting air operations from there. In December 1937, the 5th Army, including the 11th Division, the Formosa Mixed Brigade, and the 4th Air Brigade, were activated in Formosa under Lt. Gen. Motoo Furusho to achieve this objective. Due to the proximity of Daya Bay to Hong Kong, the Japanese government feared potential trouble with Britain, and the operation was subsequently suspended, leading to the deactivation of the 5th Army. By June 1938, the Battle of Wuhan convinced Imperial General Headquarters that the fighting could not be localized. The headquarters reversed policy and began preparations to capture Guangzhou and to expedite the settlement of the war. During the peak of the battles of Shanghai and Nanjing, urgent demands for aerial support at the Battle of Taiyuan in the north and at Canton in the south forced the Nationalist Air Force of China to split the 28th Pursuit Squadron and the 5th Pursuit Group , based at Jurong Airbase in the Nanking defense sector. The squadron was divided into two smaller units: Lt. Arthur Chin led one half toward Canton, while Capt. Chan Kee-Wong led the other half to Taiyuan. On September 27, 1937, the 28th PS under Lt. Arthur Chin dispatched four Hawk IIs from Shaoguan Airbase, and the 29th PS under Lt. Chen Shun-Nan deployed three Hawk IIIs from Tianhe Airbase. Their mission was to intercept Japanese IJNAF G3M bombers attempting to strike the Canton–Hankow railway infrastructure. The two flights engaged the Japanese bombers over Canton, claiming at least two kills; one G3M dumped fuel and ditching off the coast of Swatow, with its crew rescued by a British freighter, though one of the gunners died of battle injuries. In October 1937, amid mounting demands and combat losses, the Chinese government ordered 36 Gloster Gladiator Mk.I fighters, whose performance and firepower surpassed that of the Hawk IIs and IIIs, and most of these would become frontline fighters for the Canton defense sector as the war extended into 1938. On February 23, 1938, Capt. John Huang Xinrui, another Chinese-American volunteer pilot, took command of the renewed 29th PS, now equipped with the Gladiators. He led nine Gladiators from Nanxiong Airbase on their first active combat over Canton, supporting three Gladiators from the 28th PS as they intercepted thirteen Nakajima E8N fighter-attack seaplanes launched from the seaplane tenders Notoro Maru and Kinugasa Maru. The battle proved challenging: most of the Gladiators' machine guns jammed, severely reducing their firepower. Despite this, five of the E8Ns were shot down, confirmed by Capt. Huang and his fellow pilots who managed to strike the Japanese aircraft with only one, two, or three functioning guns per Gladiator. Chin later revealed that the gun jams were caused by defective Belgian-made ammunition. The combat nevertheless proved tragic and costly: Lt. Xie Chuanhe (Hsieh Chuan-ho) and his wingman Lt. Yang Rutong pursued the E8Ns but were stymied by inoperable weapons, with Lt. Yang killed in the counterattack, and Lt. Chen Qiwei lost under similar circumstances. The 4th War Area Army, commanded by He Yingqin, was assigned to the defense of south China in 1938. General Yu Hanmou led the 12th Army Group defending Guangdong province. The region's defense included about eight divisions and two brigades of regular army troops stationed around Guangzhou, with an additional five divisions of regular troops deployed in Fujian. The 4th War Area Army totaled roughly 110,000 regular army troops. By this time, most regular army units in Guangxi and four Guangdong divisions had been redirected north to participate in the Battle of Wuhan. Beyond the regular army, two militia divisions were deployed near Guangzhou, and the Guangxi militia comprised five divisions. Militia units were typically raised from local civilians and disbanded as the army moved through new areas. Their roles centered on security, supply transportation, and reconnaissance. Guangdong's main defensive strength was concentrated in Guangzhou and the immediate environs to the city's east. Other Chinese forces defended Chaozhou and western Guangdong. Defensive fortifications included the Humen fortress guarding the Pearl River mouth and three defensive lines near Daya Bay. Guangzhou housed three batteries of four three-inch guns, a battery of three 120mm guns, and Soviet-supplied 37mm anti-aircraft guns. The Imperial Japanese Navy conducted an aerial and naval interdiction campaign aimed at China's communication lines to neighboring regions. Japan believed that the blockade would hasten the end of the war, and disruption of the Chinese logistics network was the primary objective in Guangdong province from August 1937 until October 1938. The 5th Fleet's blockading actions extended along the coast from Haimenchen, Zhejiang to Shantou, with the 5th Destroyer Squadron patrolling the coast south of Shantou. At times, units from the Marianas were deployed to support coastal blockade operations in south China, usually consisting of cruisers accompanied by destroyer flotillas. One or two aircraft carriers and fleet auxiliaries would also be on station. Naval interdictions focused on stopping junks ferrying military supplies from Hong Kong to coastal China. The first recorded attack occurred in September 1937 when eleven junks were sunk by a Japanese submarine. Although Japan successfully blockaded Chinese shipping and ports, foreign shipping could still enter and depart from Hong Kong. The central government had established Hong Kong as a warehouse for munitions and supplies to pass through. Aerial interdictions targeted Chinese railway bridges and trains in Guangdong. Starting in October 1937, the Japanese launched air raids against the Sunning railway, focusing on government facilities and bridges in Jiangmen and towns along the railway. By 1938, airstrikes against the Kowloon–C Canton railway became common, with damaged trains periodically found along the line. An air-defense early warning system was created to divert trains during raids into forested areas that offered overhead concealment. In May 1938, the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office approved a Chinese request to construct and operate a locomotive repair yard within the New Territories to keep the railway operational. Airstrikes against rail facilities in Guangzhou were designed to interrupt rail supplies from Hong Kong so Japan would not need to commit to land operations in south China. However, the air raids did not severely impede railway operations or stop supplies moving through Hunan or Guangxi. The blockade in south China also targeted aircraft flying out of Hong Kong. In November 1937, a Royal Navy aircraft from HMS Eagle encountered Japanese naval anti-aircraft fire off the coast of Hong Kong. In December 1937, fifteen Japanese bombers overflew Lantau Island and the Taikoo docks. In August 1938, Japanese naval aircraft shot down a China National Aviation Corporation passenger plane, and two Eurasia Aviation Corporation passenger planes were shot down the following month. Beyond military targets, the Japanese conducted politically motivated terror bombing in Guangzhou. Bombing intensified from May to June 1938 with incendiary munitions and low-level strafing attacks against ships. The Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service, operating from Formosa and the carrier Kaga, conducted about 400 airstrikes during this period and continued into July. By the end of the summer, Guangzhou's population had dwindled to approximately 600,000 from an original 1.3 million. From August 1937 to October 1938, casualties in Guangzhou were estimated at 6,000 killed and 8,000 injured. On October 12, 1938, Japanese forces from the 21st Army, including the 5th, 18th, and 104th Infantry Divisions, landed in Guangzhou, launching the operation at 4:00 am with elements of the 5th and 18th Divisions hitting Aotou and elements of the 104th Division landing at Hachung in Bias Bay. Initially totaling about 30,000 men, they were soon reinforced by a further 20,000, and resistance was minimal because most of Yu Hanmou's 12th Army Group had been redeployed to central China to defend approaches to Wuhan, leaving only two regular Chinese divisions, the 151st and 153rd, to defend the region. By the night of October 12, the Japanese had established a 10-kilometer-deep beachhead and advanced inland; on October 13 they seized the towns of Pingshan and Tamshui with little opposition, and on October 15 they converged on Waichow and captured it. The fall of Pingshan, located on the Sai Kong River with a deep, broad river and only a flimsy crossing, and Waichow, where Chinese defenses included trenches and concrete pillboxes, surprised observers since these positions had been prepared to resist invasion; nonetheless, Chinese forces fled, opening the road to Guangzhou for the Japanese. Between October 16 and 19, three Japanese columns pushed inland, with the easternmost column crossing the East River on the 16th and the 5th Infantry Division capturing Sheklung on the 19th as Chinese forces retreated. By the night of October 20, Guangzhou's defenders withdrew and adopted a scorched-earth policy to deny resources to the invaders. On October 21, Japanese tanks entered Guangzhou without infantry support, and a regiment from the 5th Infantry Division captured the Bocca Tigris forts with no resistance. With Guangzhou secured, the Guangzhou–Wuhan railway and the Hong Kong–Guangzhou railway were severed, supplies to Wuhan were cut, Chiang Kai-Shek faced a daunting and depressing task, he had to abandon Wuhan. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Yangtze became a bloodied artery as Chinese and Japanese forces clashed from Anqing to Jiujiang, Madang to Tianjiazhen. A mosaic of Chinese troops, filled with grit and missteps, held lines while civilians like Wang Guozhen refused to surrender. The siege of Wanjialing crowned Chinese resilience, even as Guangzhou buckled under a relentless blockade. The Fall of Wuhan was all but inevitable.

Last time we spoke about the flooding of the Yellow River. As Japanese forces pressed toward central China, Chiang Kai-shek weighed a desperate gamble: defend majestic Wuhan with costly sieges, or unleash a radical plan that would flood its heart. Across/Xuzhou, Taierzhuang, and the Yellow River's bend near Zhengzhou, commanders fought a brutal, grinding war. Chinese units, battered yet stubborn, executed strategic retreats and furious counteroffensives. But even as brave soldiers stalled the enemy, the longer fight threatened to drain a nation's will and leave millions unprotected. Then a striking idea surfaced: breach the dikes of the Yellow River at Huayuankou and flood central China to halt the Japanese advance. The plan was terrifying in its moral cost, yet it offered a temporary shield for Wuhan and time to regroup. Workers, farmers, soldiers, laborers—pushed aside fear and toiled through the night, water rising like a raging tide. The flood bought months, not victory. It punished civilians as much as it protected soldiers, leaving a nation to confront its own hard choices and the haunting question: was survival worth the price?   #172 The Road to Wuhan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Following the Battle of Xuzhou and the breaching of the Yangtze dykes, Wuhan emerged as Japan's next military objective for political, economic, and strategic reasons. Wuhan served as the interim capital of the Kuomintang government, making it a crucial center of political authority. Its fall would deprive China of a vital rail and river hub, thereby further crippling the Chinese war effort. From a strategic perspective, Japanese control of a major rail and river junction on the Yangtze would enable westward expansion and provide a base for further advances into central and southern China. For these reasons, the Intelligence Division of the Army General Staff assessed that the capture of Wuhan would likely deliver the decisive blow needed to conclude the Second Sino-Japanese War.  Recognizing Wuhan's strategic importance, both the National Revolutionary Army and the Imperial Japanese Army committed substantial forces to the city and its approaches. The IJA deployed roughly 400,000 troops, while the NRA fielded at least 800,000. China began the war with an estimated regular force of 1.7 to 2.2 million men, organized into six broad loyalty-based categories around Chiang Kai-shek's command. Directly loyal troops formed the first group, followed by a second tier of soldiers who had previously supported Chiang but were less tightly controlled. The next category consisted of provincial troops that Chiang could ordinarily influence, while a fourth group included provincial units over which his sway was weaker. The fifth category comprised Communist forces, the Eighth Route Army in the northwest and the New Fourth Army forming in the central Yangtze region. The final category consisted of Northeastern or Manchurian units loyal to Zhang Xueliang, known as the “Young Marshal.” The first two categories together accounted for roughly 900,000 men, with about a million more in independent provincial armies, and roughly 300,000 in Communist and Manchurian forces. As commander-in-chief, Chiang could effectively command only about half of the mobilizable units at the outbreak of war in July 1937, which meant that military decisions were often slow, fraught with negotiation, and administratively cumbersome. Division-level coordination and communication proved particularly challenging, a stark contrast to the Japanese command structure, which remained clean and disciplined. Geographically, most of Chiang's loyal troops were located in the corridor between the Yangtze and the Yellow rivers at the start of 1938. Having participated heavily in the defense of Shanghai and Nanjing, they retreated to Wuhan at about half strength, with an already decimated officer corps. They then numbered around 400,000 and were commanded by generals Chen Cheng and Hu Zongnan. The northern regional armies, especially Han Fuju's forces in Shandong, had suffered severe losses; some units defected to the Japanese and later served as puppet troops. After six months of Japanese onslaught that cost the coastal and central regions—Peiping-Tianjin to Shanghai and inland toward Nanjing—much of the relatively autonomous, sizable armies remained from the southwest or northwest, under leaders such as Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi (Guangxi), Long Yun (Yunnan), and Yan Xishan (Shanxi and Suiyuan). Roughly 700,000 of these troops—predominantly from Guangxi under Li and Bai—were committed to the defense of Wuhan. The Communist forces, by contrast, numbered about 100,000 and remained relatively unscathed in bases north and east of Xi'an. In total, approximately 1.3 million men were under arms in defense of Wuhan. In December 1937, the Military Affairs Commission was established to determine Wuhan's defense strategy. Following the loss of Xuzhou, the National Revolutionary Army redeployed approximately 1.1 million troops across about 120 divisions. The commission organized the defense around three main fronts: the Dabie Mountains, Poyang Lake, and the Yangtze River, in response to an estimated 200,000 Japanese troops spread over 20 divisions of the Imperial Japanese Army. Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi, commanding the Fifth War Zone, were assigned to defend the north of the Yangtze, while Chen Cheng, commanding the Ninth War Zone, was tasked with defending the south. The First War Zone, situated to the west of the Zhengzhou–Xinyang segment of the Pinghan Railway, was responsible for halting Japanese forces advancing from the North China Plain, and the Third War Zone, located between Wuhu, Anqing, and Nanchang, was charged with protecting the Yuehan Railway. Following the Japanese occupation of Xuzhou in May 1938, they sought to expand the invasion. The IJA decided to dispatch a vanguard to occupy Anqing as a forward base for an assault on Wuhan. The main force would then advance north of the Dabie Mountains along the Huai River, with the objective of eventually capturing Wuhan via the Wusheng Pass. A second detachment would move west along the Yangtze. However, a flood from the Yellow River forced the IJA to abandon plans to advance along the Huai and instead to attack along both banks of the Yangtze. Despite Chinese numerical superiority on the Wuhan front, roughly a 2:1 advantage, the offensive faced several complicating factors. The NRA was a heterogeneous, fragmented force with a variety of tables of organization and equipment, and it lacked the unified command structure that characterized the IJA. Historian Richard Frank notes the broad diversity of Chinese forces at the outbreak of the war, which hindered cohesive mobile and strategic operations: “Chiang commanded armies of 2,029,000 troops of highly variegated capability and loyalty. His personal forces included an elite cadre of three hundred-thousand German-trained and eighty-thousand German armed men. A second stratum of the Chinese armies, numbering roughly 600,000 included various regional commands loyal to Chiang in the past that generally conformed to his directives. These troops were better armed and trained than the rest. The third category encompassed a million men who were neither loyal nor obedient to Chiang”. The NRA faced a significant disadvantage in both quantity and quality of equipment compared to the Japanese. The disparity was stark in artillery allocations. An IJA infantry division possessed 48 field and mountain guns, whereas a German-equipped Chinese division had only 16. In terms of regiment and battalion guns, a Japanese division had 56, while a German-equipped Chinese division possessed just 30. Of roughly 200 Chinese infantry divisions in 1937, only 20 were German-equipped, and merely eight of those met their paper-strength standards. Many Chinese divisions had no artillery at all, and those that did often lacked radios or forward-observation capabilities to ensure accurate fire. These deficiencies placed the NRA at a clear disadvantage in firepower when facing the Japanese. These equipment gaps were compounded by poor training and tactical doctrine. The NRA lacked adequate training facilities and did not incorporate sufficient field maneuvers, gun handling, or marksmanship into its program. Although the 1935 drill manual introduced small-group “open order” tactics, many formations continued to fight in close-order formations. In an era when increased firepower rendered close-order tactics obsolete, such formations became a liability. The NRA's failure to adapt dispersed assault formations limited its tactical effectiveness. Defensively, the NRA also faced serious shortcomings. Units were often ordered to create deep positions near key lines of communication, but Chinese forces became overly dependent on fixed fortifications, which immobilized their defense. Poor intelligence on Japanese movements and a lack of mobile reserves, there were only about 3,000 military vehicles in China in 1937, meant that Japanese infantry could easily outflank fixed NRA positions. Moreover, the Japanese enjoyed superiority in artillery, enabling them to suppress these fixed positions more effectively. These realities left Chinese defenses vulnerable, especially in the war's first year. The leadership deficit within the NRA, reflected in limited officer training, further constrained operational effectiveness. Chiang Kai-shek reportedly warned that Chinese commanders often equaled their counterparts in rank but did not outmatch them in competence. Only 2,000 commanders and staff officers had received training by 1937, and many staff officers had no military training at all. Overall, about 29.1 percent of NRA officers had no military education, severely limiting professional development and command capability. With the exception of the Guangxi divisions, Chinese units were hampered by an unnecessarily complex command structure. Orders from Chiang Kai-shek needed to pass through six tiers before action could be taken, slowing decision-making and responsiveness. In addition, Chiang favored central army units under direct control with loyal commanders from the Whampoa clique when distributing equipment, a pattern that bred discord and insubordination across levels of the Chinese field forces. Beyond structural issues, the Chinese force organization suffered from a lack of coherence due to competing influences. The forces had been reorganized along German-inspired lines, creating large field armies arranged as “war zones,” while Russian influence shaped strategic positioning through a division into “front” and “route” armies and separate rear-area service units. This mix yielded an incoherent force facing the Japanese. Troop placement and support procedures lacked rationalization: Chiang and his generals often sought to avoid decisive confrontation with Japan to minimize the risk of irreversible defeat, yet they also rejected a broad adoption of guerrilla warfare as a systematic tactic. The tendency to emphasize holding railway lines and other communications tied down the main fighting forces, around which the Japanese could maneuver more easily, reducing overall operational flexibility. Despite these deficiencies, NRA officers led roughly 800,000 Chinese troops deployed for the Battle of Wuhan. On the Wuhan approaches, four war zones were organized under capable if overextended leadership: 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 9th. The 5th War Zone, commanded by Li Zongren, defended north of the Yangtze to protect the Beijing–Wuhan railway. Chen Cheng's Ninth War Zone defended south of the Yangtze, aiming to prevent seizure of Jiujiang and other key cities on approaches to Wuhan. The 1st War Zone focused on stopping Japanese forces from the northern plains, while Gu Zhutong's 3rdWar Zone, deployed between Wuhu, Anqing, and Nanchang, defended the Yuehan railway and fortified the Yangtze River. Japan's Central China Expeditionary Army, commanded by Hata Shunroku, spearheaded the Wuhan advance. The CCEA consisted of two armies: the 2nd Army, which included several infantry divisions under Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni, and the 11th Army, advancing along the Yangtze's northern and southern banks under Okamura Yasuji. The 2nd Army aimed to push through the Dabie Mountains and sever Wuhan from the north, while the 11th Army would converge on Wuhan in a concentric operation to envelop the city. The Japanese forces were augmented by 120 ships from the 3rd Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy under Koshirō Oikawa, more than 500 aircraft from the Imperial Japanese Army Air Service, and five divisions from the Central China Area Army tasked with guarding Shanghai, Beijing, Hangzhou, and other key cities. These forces were intended to protect the back of the main Japanese thrust and complete the preparations for a major battle. The Kuomintang, led by Chiang Kai-shek, was acutely aware that Japan aimed to strike at Wuhan. Facing Japan's firepower and bold offensives, Chiang and his commanders pursued a strategy of attrition at the Wuchang conference in January 1938. Central China would be the primary theater of China's protracted struggle, distant from Japan's existing center of gravity in Manchuria. Chiang hoped Japan's manpower and resources would be exhausted as the empire pushed deeper into Central China. Eventually, Japan would be forced either to negotiate a settlement with China or to seek foreign assistance to obtain raw materials. The mountainous terrain to the north and south of the Yangtze presented natural obstacles that the Chinese believed would hinder large-scale concentration of Japanese forces. North of the Yangtze, the Dabie Mountains provided crucial flank protection; to the south, rugged, roadless terrain made expansive maneuvering difficult. In addition to these natural barriers, Chinese forces fortified the region with prepared, in-depth defenses, particularly in the mountains. The rugged terrain was expected to help hold back the Japanese offensive toward Wuhan and inflict substantial casualties on the attackers. The Yangtze itself was a critical defensive factor. Although the Chinese Navy was largely absent, they implemented several measures to impede amphibious operations. They constructed gun positions at key points where the river narrowed, notably around the strongholds at Madang and Tianjiazhen. Specialized units, such as the Riverine Defense Force, were deployed to defend these river fortifications against amphibious assaults. To reinforce the Riverine Defense Force, Chinese forces sank 79 ships in the Yangtze to create obstacles for potential Japanese naval advances. They also laid thousands of mines to constrain Japanese warships. These defensive measures were designed to slow the Japanese advance and complicate their logistics. The Chinese aimed to exploit stalled offensives to strike at exposed flanks and disrupted supply lines, leveraging terrain and fortified positions to offset Japan's superior firepower. On 18 February 1938, an Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service strike force comprising at least 11 A5M fighters of the 12th and 13th Kōkūtais, led by Lieutenant Takashi Kaneko, and 15 G3M bombers of the Kanoya Kokutai, led by Lieutenant Commander Sugahisa Tuneru, raided Wuhan and engaged 19 Chinese Air Force I-15 fighters from the 22nd and 23rd Pursuit Squadrons and 10 I-16 fighters from the 21st Pursuit Squadron, all under the overall command of the 4th Pursuit Group CO Captain Li Guidan. They faced a Soviet Volunteer Group mix of Polikarpov fighters as well. The 4th Group fighters claimed at least four A5Ms shot down, while the Soviet group claimed no fewer than three A5Ms. Both the Japanese fighter group commander, Lieutenant Kaneko, and the Chinese fighter group commander, Captain Li, were killed in action during the battle. A largely intact A5M downed in the engagement was recovered with a damaged engine; it was the second intact A5M to be recovered, repaired, and flight-tested in the war, following the first recovered-intact A5M credited to Colonel Gao Zhihang during an air battle over Nanjing on 12 October 1937. On 3 August 1938, 52 Chinese fighters, including 20 I-15s, 13 I-16s, 11 Gloster Gladiators, and 7 Hawk IIIs, intercepted at least 29 A5Ms and 18 G3Ms over Hankou. The Guangxi era pilots Zhu Jiaxun and He Jermin, along with Chinese-American fighter pilots Arthur Chin and Louie Yim-qun, all flying Gladiators, claimed at least four A5Ms shot down on that day. The Wuhan Campaign began in earnest when the Imperial Japanese Army's 3rd and 13th Infantry Divisions advanced north of the Yangtze River. Central China Expeditionary Army commander Hata Shunroku designated Shouxian, Zhengyangguan, and the Huainan coal mine as the objectives for the 3rd and 13th Infantry Divisions. Meanwhile, the 6th Infantry Division, part of the 11th Army, advanced toward Anqing from Hefei. The 6th Infantry Division coordinated with the Hata Detachment, which launched an amphibious assault from the river. The 2nd Army's sector saw immediate success. On June 3, the 3rd Infantry Division seized the Huainan coal mine; two days later, it captured Shouxian. The 13th Infantry Division also secured Zhengyangguan on that day. The 6th Infantry Division then made rapid progress immediately north of the Yangtze River, taking Shucheng on June 8 and Tongcheng on June 13. These advances forced the Chinese 77th Corps and the 21st and 26th Army Groups to withdraw to a line spanning Huoshan, Lu'an, and Fuyang. More critically, the Hata Detachment crossed the Yangtze River and landed behind the Chinese 27th Army Group's 20th Corps. The sudden appearance of Japanese forces in their rear forced the two Chinese divisions defending Anqing to withdraw. The fall of Anqing represented a major Japanese success, as they gained control of an airfield crucial for receiving close air support. After battles around Shucheng, Tongcheng, and Anqing, all three cities and their surrounding countryside suffered extensive damage. Much of this damage resulted from air raids that indiscriminately targeted soldiers and civilians alike. In Shucheng, the raids were reportedly aided by a Chinese traitor who displayed a red umbrella to guide daylight bombing on May 10, 1938. This air raid caused substantial destruction, killing or wounding at least 160 people and destroying more than a thousand homes. The town of Yimen also endured aerial destruction, with raids killing over 400 people and destroying 7,000 homes. Yimen and Shucheng were among many Chinese towns subjected to terror bombing, contributing to widespread civilian casualties and the destruction of livelihoods across China. The broader pattern of air raids was enabled by a lack of quality fighter aircraft and trained pilots, allowing Japanese bombers free rein against Chinese cities, towns, and villages. While the aerial assaults caused immense damage, the atrocities committed in these cities were even more severe. In Anhui, where Shucheng, Anqing, and Tongcheng were located, the Japanese brutality was on full display. The brutality can be partly understood as an attempt to destroy China's will and capacity to wage war, yet the extremity of some acts points to a warped martial culture within the Japanese Army, which appeared to encourage murder, torture, rape, and other crimes. Indeed, the Army eventually enshrined this brutality in its doctrine with the so-called “three alls”: kill all, burn all, loot all.  These acts, and more, were carried out in Anhui during the summer of 1938 as the Japanese advanced up the Yangtze River. In Anqing, the Hata Detachment killed at least 200 people without compunction. A further 36 civilians on a boat were detained and killed by Japanese marines, who claimed they were potentially Chinese soldiers. The countryside around Anqing, Shucheng, and Tongcheng witnessed continued atrocities. In Taoxi village of Shucheng County, the Japanese burned over 1,000 houses and killed more than 40 people. At Nangang, Japanese soldiers killed more than 200 people and committed numerous rapes, including many victims over 60 years old. Tongcheng also became a site of forced sexual slavery. The Japanese atrocities, intended to terrify the Chinese into submission, did not achieve their aim. Chinese resistance persisted. After a brief withdrawal, the 20th Army held stoutly at Jinshan for four days before retreating to Xiaochiyi and Taihu. These withdrawals, while costly, lured the Japanese deeper into the interior of China. As the Japanese advanced, their flanks became increasingly vulnerable to counterattack. On June 26, 1928, the Chinese 26th Army Group attacked the flanks of the 6th Infantry Division at Taihu. The 26th Army Group was supported by the 20th and 31st Armies, which attacked from the front to pin the 6th Infantry Division in place. The 6th Infantry Division was ill-prepared to respond, suffering a malaria outbreak that left about 2,000 soldiers unfit for combat. Fighting continued until June 29, when the Japanese withdrew. The focus of operations north of the Yangtze shifted to Madang, a key river fortress protected by obstacles and river batteries. Roughly 600 mines were laid in the Yangtze near Madang, and the fortress was largely manned by the Riverine Defense Force, with a small garrison; including stragglers from the 53rd Infantry Division, the Madang garrison totaled roughly 500 men. Initial expectations had Madang holding, since Japanese ships could not easily remove obstacles or suppress the batteries. On the dawn of June 24, however, news reached Madang that Xiangkou had fallen to the Japanese, enabling a land threat to Madang, and many Madang defenders, including most officers above the platoon level, were absent at a nearby ceremony when the attack began.  On 24 June, Japanese forces conducted a surprise landing at Madang, while the main body of the Japanese Eleventh Army advanced along the southern shore of the Yangtze. The Chinese garrison at the Madang river fortress repelled four assaults, yet suffered casualties from intense bombardment by Japanese ships on the Yangtze and from poison gas attacks. Compounding the difficulty, most of the Chinese officers responsible for Madang's defense were absent due to a ceremony at a local military school by Li Yunheng, the overseeing general. Consequently, only three battalions from the second and third Marine Corps and the 313th regiment of the 53rd Division took part in the defense, totaling no more than five battalions. When the 167th Division, stationed in Pengze, was ordered by War Zone commander Bai Chongxi to move swiftly along the highway to reinforce the defenders, divisional commander Xue Weiying instead sought instructions from his direct superior, Li Yunheng, who instructed him to take a longer, more navigationally challenging route to avoid Japanese bombers. Reinforcements arrived too late, and Madang fell after a three-day battle. Chiang Kai-shek promptly ordered a counterattack, offering a 50,000 yuan reward for the units that recaptured the fortress. On June 28, the 60th Division of the 18th Corps and the 105th Division of the 49th Corps retook Xiangshan and received 20,000 yuan, but made no further progress. As the Japanese army pressed the attack on Pengze, Chinese units shifted to a defensive posture. Chiang Kai-shek subsequently had Li Yunheng court-martialed and Xue Weiying executed. After the fall of Madang, the broader Wuhan campaign benefited from Madang as a foothold along the Yangtze, as the river continued to function as a dual-use corridor for transport and amphibious landings, aiding later operations and complicating Chinese defensive planning. The rapid capture of Madang demonstrated the effectiveness of combined arms, amphibious insertion, and secure supply routes along a major river, while Chinese defenses showed weaknesses such as reliance on rough terrain, underestimation of Japanese amphibious capabilities, and delayed reinforcement, which, coupled with gas warfare, produced a swift loss. The fall influenced subsequent Chinese fortifications and defensive doctrine along the Yangtze and affected decisions regarding garrison allocations and riverine operations. After Madang fell, Japan's 11th Army pressed toward its next major objectives, Jiujiang, Huangmei, and Xiaochikou. It took nearly three weeks for the Japanese to clear the waterway around Madang of mines, costing them five minesweepers, two warships, and a landing craft full of marines. Jiujiang stood out as the most important due to its status as a key river port and railway junction. To defend these targets, China deployed the 1st Army Corps to Jiujiang, the 2nd Army Corps to cover the area west of Jiujiang, and the 4th Army Corps to defend Xiaochikou. Despite these reinforcements, the Japanese continued their advance.  The Japanese initially captured Pengze but met strong resistance at Hukou, where they again deployed poison gas during a five-day battle. During the breakout, there were insufficient boats to evacuate the auxiliary troops of the defending 26th Division from Hukou, leaving only a little over 1,800 of the more than 3,100 non-combat soldiers able to be evacuated, and the majority of the more than 1,300 missing soldiers drowned while attempting to cross the Poyang Lake. On July 23, they conducted an amphibious operation at Gutang, with the Hata Detachment landing at Jiujiang shortly thereafter. These landings south of the Yangtze represented another step toward Wuhan, which lay about 240 kilometers away. The Chinese responses consisted of relentless counterattacks, but they failed to dislodge the Japanese from their bridgeheads. Consequently, the Japanese captured Xiaochikou by July 26 and Jiujiang by July 28, with a note that poison gas may have been used at Jiujiang. North of the Yangtze, the 6th Infantry Division moved forward and seized Huangmei on August 2. Despite stubborn Chinese resistance, the Japanese had gained considerable momentum toward Wuhan. Soon after the fall of Jiujiang and surrounding areas, the local population endured a renewed surge of war crimes. The Imperial Japanese Army sought to break China's will to resist and its capacity to endure the onslaught. Male civilians were executed indiscriminately, along with any POWs unable to retreat in time, while women and children were subjected to mass rape. In addition, numerous urban districts and suburban villages were deliberately razed, including the city's ceramics factories and its maritime transportation system. The widely documented “three alls” policy proved devastating in the Yangtze region: in Jiujiang alone, as many as 98,461 people were killed, 13,213 houses destroyed, and property losses reached 28.1 billion yuan. Yet numbers fail to convey the brutality unleashed in Jiujiang, Hukou, and Xiaochikou south of the Yangtze. On July 20, the Japanese confined 100 villagers in a large house in Zhouxi village, Hukou County, and erased them with machine guns and bayonets. Tangshan village witnessed similar brutality on July 31, when eight people were drowned in a pond and 26 houses burned. That September, learning that children and the elderly at Saiyang Township were taking refuge in caves on Mount Lushan, the Japanese proceeded to bayonet defenseless civilians, many beheaded, disemboweled, or amputated. These acts, among others, were carried out on a mass scale south of the Yangtze, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths around Jiujiang. Despite the enormity of these crimes, Chinese people did not surrender. Among those who resisted was Wang Guozhen of Wang Village in Pengze County. Upon learning of the Japanese approach to Pengze on July 1, Wang, a teacher, led women, children, and the elderly into mountains and forests to seek safety. However, Wang and his followers soon encountered Japanese troops who attacked them, instantly killing over 20 people. Wang denounced their actions as the Japanese took him captive and had him whipped for over an hour. They had hit him so hard his skin was peeling off and he had broken his left thigh. They then demanded he collaborate with them, but to this Wang responded “a common man cannot resist the enemy for his country and he will only die”. After hearing these words, the Japanese simply stabbed him with a bayonet in his left eye and in his chest area, ultimately killing him. Wang's small act of defiance would earn him a plaque from the KMT that states “Eternal Heroism”. Even though Wang's heroism was commendable, bravery alone could not halt the Japanese advance along the Yangtze. After securing Jiujiang, Xiaochikou, and Gutang, the 106th and 101st Infantry Divisions carried out amphibious operations further upriver. The 106th Infantry Division landed on the Yangtze's east bank, pushing south of Jili Hu. Concurrently, the Sato Detachment, two infantry battalions plus a field artillery battalion from the 101st Infantry Division, landed east of Xiaochikou and concentrated on the east side of Mount Lu. The Japanese advance soon faced firm Chinese resistance despite these early gains. The 106th Infantry Division encountered the in-depth defenses of Xue Yue's 1st Corps. These defenses formed an isosceles triangle with Jiujiang at the apex and the Jinguanqiao line at the base. Although Jiujiang was abandoned in late July, the triangle's base at Jinguanqiao remained strong, with the 8th, 74th, 18th, 32nd, 64th, 66th, 29th, 26th, 4th, and 70th Armies concentrated in the Jinguanqiao area. These forces inflicted heavy losses on the 106th Infantry Division, which saw nearly half of its captains killed or wounded during the fighting. To aid the 106th Division's breakthrough near Jinguanqiao, the 11th Army deployed the 101st Infantry Division to the area east of Xiaochikou in mid-August. From there, the division pushed toward the east side of Mount Lu, aiming to seize Xingzi in an amphibious assault via Lake Poyang. The objective was to outflank De'an and the nearby Nanxun Road. On August 19, the 101st Infantry Division executed the plan and landed at Xingzi, where they faced strong resistance from the 53rd Infantry Division. However, the division found itself isolated and thus vulnerable to being outflanked. By August 23, the 53rd Infantry Division had withdrawn to the east. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In 1938 Wuhan stood as China's fragile beacon. Wuhan's defense hinged on a patchwork of war zones and weary commanders, while Japan poured in hundreds of thousands of troops, ships, and air power. The Yangtze became a deadly artery, with river fortresses, brutal bombings, and mass casualties. Yet courage endured: individuals like Wang Guozhen chose defiance over surrender.

China is experiencing the strongest cold front so far in the second half of this year, with most parts of the nation forecast to see a sharp drop in temperatures, experts said.专家表示，我国正遭遇今年下半年以来最强冷空气，预计全国大部地区气温将显著下降。There is a high possibility that Beijing will see an early start to winter this weekend, and the temperature drop will bring the unusually persistent scorching heat in the eastern and southern provinces to an end, according to the latest forecast by the China Meteorological Administration.中国气象局最新预报显示，本周末北京大概率提前入冬，此次降温还将终结我国东部及南部省份持续多日的异常高温天气。Ma Xuekuan, chief forecaster of the National Meteorological Center, said that a strong cold front will move from the north to the south and continuously affect the nation's central and eastern parts from Thursday to Tuesday, adding that these areas will see temperature drops of 6 to 10 degrees.国家气象中心首席预报员马学款介绍，10月24日（周四）至29日（周二），一股强冷空气将自北向南影响我国中东部地区，上述地区气温预计下降6至10摄氏度。Among these provinces and areas, the Inner Mongolia autonomous region and those in the country's central part will see temperatures drop by 10 to 14 degrees, or even over 15 degrees, during the period, Ma noted.马学款指出，其中内蒙古自治区及我国中部部分地区降温幅度可达10至14摄氏度，局部地区甚至超过15摄氏度。"It's so far the strongest cold front affecting China in the year's second half based on its range and degree of influence," he said, adding that the nation's northern provinces will see the temperature keep falling next week.“从影响范围和强度来看，这是今年下半年以来影响我国最强的一股冷空气。”他补充道，下周我国北方省份气温将持续走低。He said that China's central part and provinces along the eastern part of the Yellow River and Huaihe River, including Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan and Shandong, will witness the temperature plunge by 10 degrees in five consecutive days from Saturday, with a higher possibility of the onset of winter.马学款表示，江苏、安徽、河南、山东等我国中部及黄河、淮河东部沿线省份，自28日（周六）起连续5天累计降温幅度将达10摄氏度，入冬可能性较大。Xinxin, a weather analyst from China Weather TV, said there is a very high possibility of Beijing seeing an early arrival of winter on Saturday, as reported by the People's Daily on Friday.据《人民日报》10月27日（周五）报道，中国天气电视台气象分析师信欣称，北京本周六（28日）大概率提前入冬。According to Xin, Beijing will see the average day temperature fall below 10 degrees in continuous 7 days from Saturday. Historically, from 1991 to 2020, the city has seen the start of winter on Oct 31, which will move up now because of the ongoing cold front.信欣分析，自28日起，北京连续7天日平均气温将跌破10摄氏度。1991年至2020年的气候数据显示，北京常年入冬时间为10月31日，受此次冷空气影响，今年入冬时间将有所提前。Affected by the strong cold front, provinces and regions south of the Yangtze River and the nation's southern part, such as Shanghai and Zhejiang, will also see a quick temperature change that will end the unusual heat wave there, according to Ma, the chief forecaster.马学款还提到，受强冷空气影响，上海、浙江等长江以南地区及我国南方省份气温也将快速下降，当地异常高温天气将随之结束。He added that from Sunday to Friday, the southern provinces will see temperatures 2 to 4 degrees lower than usual in previous years.他补充道，10月29日（周日）至11月3日（周五），南方省份气温将较常年同期偏低2至4摄氏度。The meeting of the cold front and warm air currents also brought torrential rains to southwestern provinces and provinces along the Yellow River and Huaihe River such as Sichuan and Chongqing on Thursday and Friday. The rains will ease from Saturday after the cold front moves southward.此外，10月24日（周四）至25日（周五），受冷空气与暖湿气流交汇影响，四川、重庆等我国西南地区及黄河、淮河沿线省份出现强降雨天气。随着冷空气南下，自28日（周六）起，上述地区降雨将趋于减弱。Noting the sharp temperature change, the China Meteorological Administration has reminded the public to be careful of weather-related risks like flu, and to be covered in adequately warm clothing.针对此次大幅降温，中国气象局提醒公众注意防范流感等天气相关健康风险，及时增添衣物，做好保暖措施。cold front/ˌkəʊld ˈfrʌnt/n.冷锋scorching/ˈskɔːtʃɪŋ/adj.酷热的；灼热的torrential/təˈrenʃl/adj.倾盆的；猛烈的

Last time we spoke about the Battle of Taierzhuang. Following the fall of Nanjing in December 1937, the Second Sino-Japanese War entered a brutal phase of attrition as Japan sought to consolidate control and press toward central China. Chinese defense prioritized key rail corridors and urban strongholds, with Xuzhou, the JinPu and Longhai lines, and the Huai River system forming crucial lifelines. By early 1938, Japanese offensives aimed to link with forces around Beijing and Nanjing and encircle Chinese positions in the Central Yangtze region, threatening Wuhan. In response, Chiang Kai-shek fortified Xuzhou and expanded defenses to deter a pincer move, eventually amassing roughly 300,000 troops along strategic lines. Taierzhuang became a focal point when Japanese divisions attempted to press south and link with northern elements. Chinese commanders Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, Tang Enbo, and Sun Lianzhong coordinated to complicate Japanese plans through offensive-defensive actions, counterattacks, and encirclement efforts. The victory, though numerically costly, thwarted immediate Japanese objectives and foreshadowed further attritional struggles ahead.   #171 The Flooding of the Yellow River Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. We last left off with a significant event during the Xuzhou campaign. Three Japanese divisions under General Itagaki Seishiro moved south to attack Taierzhuang and were met by forces commanded by Li Zongren, Sun Lianzhong, and Tang Enbo, whose units possessed a decent amount of artillery. In a two-week engagement from March 22 to April 7, the battle devolved into a costly urban warfare. Fighting was vicious, often conducted in close quarters and at night. The urban environment negated Japanese advantages in armor and artillery, allowing Chinese forces to contend on equal terms. The Chinese also disrupted Japanese logistics by resupplying their own troops and severing rear supply lines, draining Japanese ammunition, supplies, and reinforcements. By April 7, the Japanese were compelled to retreat, marking the first Chinese victory of the war. However both sides suffered heavy losses, with around 20,000 casualties on each side. In the aftermath of this rare victory, Chiang Kai-Shek pushed Tang Enbo and Li Zongren to capitalize on their success and increased deployments in the Taierzhuang theater to about 450,000 troops. Yet the Chinese Army remained hampered by fundamental problems. The parochialism that had crippled Chiang's forces over the preceding months resurfaced. Although the generals had agreed to coordinate in a war of resistance, each still prioritized the safety of his own troops, wary of Chiang's bid to consolidate power. Li Zongren, for example, did not deploy his top Guangxi provincial troops at Taierzhuang and sought to shift most of the fighting onto Tang Enbo's forces. Chiang's colleagues were mindful of the fates of Han Fuju of Shandong and Zhang Xueliang of Manchuria: Han was executed for refusing to fight, while Zhang, after allowing Chiang to reduce the size of his northeastern army, ended up under house arrest. They were right to distrust Chiang. He believed, after all, that provincial armies should come under a unified national command, which he would lead. From a national-unity perspective, his aspiration was not unreasonable. But it fed suspicion among other military leaders that participation in the anti-Japanese war would dilute their power. The divided nature of the command also hindered logistics, making ammunition and food supplies to the front unreliable and easy to cut off. By late April the Chinese had reinforced the Xuzhou area to between 450,000-600,000 to capitalize on their victory. However these armies were plagued with command and control issues. Likewise the Japanese licked their wounds and reinforced the area to roughly 400,000, with fresh troops and supplies flowing in from Tianjin and Nanjing. The Japanese continued with their objective of encircling Chinese forces. The North China Area Army comprised four divisions and two infantry brigades drawn from the Kwantung Army, while the Central China Expeditionary Army consisted of three divisions and the 1st and 2nd Tank Battalions along with motorized support units. The 5th Tank Battalion supported the 3rd Infantry Division as it advanced north along the railway toward Xuzhou. Fighting to the west, east, and north of Xuzhou was intense, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. On 18 April, the Japanese advanced southward toward Pizhou. Tang Enbo's 20th Army Corps, together with the 2nd, 22nd, 46th, and 59th corps, resisted fiercely, culminating in a stalemate by the end of April. The 60th Corps of the Yunnan Army engaged the Japanese 10th Division at Yuwang Mountain for nearly a month, repelling multiple assaults. By the time it ceded its position to the Guizhou 140th Division and withdrew on 15 May, the corps had sustained losses exceeding half of its forces. Simultaneously, the Japanese conducted offensives along both banks of the Huai River, where Chinese defenders held out for several weeks. Nevertheless, Japanese artillery and aerial bombardment gradually tilted the balance, allowing the attackers to seize Mengcheng on 9 May and Hefei on 14 May. From there, the southern flank split into two parts: one force moved west and then north to cut off the Longhai Railway escape route from Xuzhou, while another division moved directly north along the railway toward Suxian, just outside Xuzhou. Simultaneously, to the north, Japanese units from north China massed at Jining and began moving south beyond Tengxian. Along the coast, an amphibious landing was made at Lianyungang to reinforce troops attacking from the east. The remaining portions of Taierzhuang were captured in May, a development symbolically significant to Tokyo. On 17 May, Japanese artillery further tightened the noose around Xuzhou, striking targets inside the city.  To preserve its strength, the Nationalist government ordered the abandonment of Xuzhou and directed its main forces to break out toward northern Jiangsu, northern Anhui, and eastern Henan. To deter the Japanese army's rapid westward advance and penetration into northern Henan and western Shandong, many leading military and political figures within the Nationalist government proposed breaching dams over the Yellow River to delay the offensive, a strategy that would have been highly advantageous to the Nationalist forces at the time. Chiang Kai-shek vetoed the proposal outright, insisting that the Nationalist army could still resist. He understood that with tens of millions of Chinese lives at stake and a sliver of hope remaining, the levee plan must not be undertaken. Then a significant battle broke out at Lanfeng. Chiang also recognized that defeat could allow the elite Japanese mechanized divisions, the 14th, 16th, and 10th, to advance directly toward Zhengzhou. If Zhengzhou fell, the Japanese mechanized forces on the plains could advance unimpeded toward Tongguan. Their southward push would threaten Xi'an, Xiangfan, and Nanyang, directly jeopardizing the southwest's rear defenses. Concurrently, the Japanese would advance along the Huai River north of the Dabie Mountains toward Wuhan, creating a pincer with operations along the Yangtze River.  Now what followed was arguably the most important and skillful Chinese maneuver of the Xuzhou campaign: a brilliantly executed strategic retreat to the south and west across the Jinpu railway line. On May 15, Li Zongren, in consultation with Chiang Kai-shek, decided to withdraw from Xuzhou and focus on an escape plan. The evacuation of civilians and military personnel began that day. Li ordered troops to melt into the countryside and move south and west at night, crossing the Jinpu Railway and splitting into four groups that would head west. The plan was to regroup in the rugged Dabie Mountains region to the south and prepare for the defense of Wuhan. Li's generals departed reluctantly, having held out for so long; Tang Enbo was said to have wept. Under cover of night, about forty divisions, over 200,000 men, marched out of Japanese reach in less than a week. A critical moment occurred on May 18, when fog and a sandstorm obscured the retreating troops as they crossed the Jinpu Railway. By May 21, Li wired Chiang Kai-shek to report that the withdrawal was complete. He mobilized nearly all of the Kuomintang Central Army's elite units, such as the 74th Army, withdrawn from Xuzhou and transferred directly to Lanfeng, with a resolute intent to “burn their boats.” The force engaged the Japanese in a decisive battle at Lanfeng, aiming to secure the last line of defense for the Yellow River, a position carrying the lives of millions of Chinese civilians. Yet Chiang Kai-shek's strategy was not universally understood by all participating generals, who regarded it as akin to striking a rock with an egg. For the battle of Lanfeng the Chinese mobilized nearly all of the Kuomintang Central Army's elite forces, comprising 14 divisions totaling over 150,000 men. Among these, the 46th Division of the 27th Army, formerly the Central Training Brigade and the 36th, 88th, and 87th Divisions of the 71st Army were German-equipped. Additionally, the 8th Army, the Tax Police Corps having been reorganized into the Ministry of Finance's Anti-Smuggling Corps, the 74th Army, and Hu Zongnan's 17th Corps, the new 1st Army, equipped with the 8th Division were elite Nationalist troops that had demonstrated strong performance in the battle of Shanghai and the battle of Nanjing, and were outfitted with advanced matériel. However, these so-called “elite” forces were heavily degraded during the campaigns in Shanghai and Nanjing. The 46th Division and Hu Zongnan's 17th Corps sustained casualties above 85% in Nanjing, while the 88th and 87th Divisions suffered losses of up to 90%. The 74th Army and the 36th Division also endured losses exceeding 75%. Their German-made equipment incurred substantial losses; although replenishment occurred, inventories resembled roughly a half-German and half-Chinese mix. With very limited heavy weapons and a severe shortage of anti-tank artillery, they could not effectively match the elite Japanese regiments. Hu Zongnan's 17th Corps maintained its national equipment via a close relationship with Chiang Kai-shek. In contrast, the 74th Army, after fighting in Shanghai, Nanjing, and Xuzhou, suffered heavy casualties, and the few German weapons it had were largely destroyed at Nanjing, leaving it to rely on a mix of domestically produced and Hanyang-made armaments. The new recruits added to each unit largely lacked combat experience, with nearly half of the intake having received basic training. The hardest hit was Li Hanhun's 64th Army, established less than a year prior and already unpopular within the Guangdong Army. Although classified as one of the three Type A divisions, the 155th, 156th, and 187th Divisions, it was equipped entirely with Hanyang-made firearms. Its direct artillery battalion possessed only about 20 older mortars and three Type 92 infantry guns, limiting its heavy firepower to roughly that of a Japanese battalion. The 195th Division and several miscellaneous units were even less prominent, reorganized from local militias and lacking Hanyang rifles. Additionally, three batches of artillery purchased from the Soviet Union arrived in Lanzhou via Xinjiang between March and June 1938. Except for the 52nd Artillery Regiment assigned to the 200th Division, the other artillery regiments had recently received their weapons and were still undergoing training. The 200th Division, had been fighting awhile for in the Xuzhou area and incurred heavy casualties, was still in training and could only deploy its remaining tank battalion and armored vehicle company. The tank battalion was equipped with T-26 light tanks and a small number of remaining British Vickers tanks, while the armored vehicle company consisted entirely of Italian Fiat CV33 armored cars. The disparity in numbers was substantial, and this tank unit did not participate in the battle.  As for the Japanese, the 14th Division was an elite Type A formation. Originally organized with four regiments totaling over 30,000 men, the division's strength was later augmented. Doihara's 14th Division received supplements, a full infantry regiment and three artillery regiments, to prevent it from being surrounded and annihilated, effectively transforming the unit into a mobile reinforced division. Consequently, the division's mounted strength expanded to more than 40,000 personnel, comprising five infantry regiments and four artillery regiments. The four artillery regiments, the 24th Artillery Regiment, the 3rd Independence Mountain Artillery Regiment, the 5th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment, and the 6th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment, possessed substantial heavy firepower, including 150mm heavy howitzers and 105mm long-range field cannons, placing them far in excess of the Nationalist forces at Lanfeng. In addition, both the 14th and later the 16th Divisions commanded tank regiments with nearly 200 light and medium tanks each, while Nationalist forces were markedly short of anti-tank artillery. At the same time, the Nationalist Air Force, though it had procured more than 200 aircraft of various types from the Soviet Union, remained heavily reliant on Soviet aid-to-China aircraft, amounting to over 100 machines, and could defend only a few cities such as Wuhan, Nanchang, and Chongqing. In this context, Japanese forces effectively dominated the Battle of Lanfeng. Moreover, reports indicate that the Japanese employed poison gas on the battlefield, while elite Nationalist troops possessed only a limited number of gas masks, creating a stark disparity in chemical warfare preparedness. Despite these disparities, Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government were initially unaware of the updated strength and composition of the Doihara Division. Faced with constrained options, Chiang chose to press ahead with combat operations. On May 12, 1939, after crossing the Yellow River, the IJA 14th Division continued its southward advance toward Lanfeng. The division's objective was to sever the Longhai Railway, disrupt the main Nationalist retreat toward Zhengzhou, and seize Zhengzhou itself. By May 15, the division split into two columns at Caoxian and moved toward key nodes on the Longhai Line. Major General Toyotomi Fusatarou led two infantry regiments, one cavalry regiment, and one artillery regiment in the main assault toward Kaocheng with the aim of directly capturing Lanfeng. Doihara led three infantry regiments and three artillery regiments toward Neihuang and Minquan, threatening Guide. In response, the Nationalist forces concentrated along the railway from Lanfeng to Guide, uniting Song Xilian's 71st Army, Gui Yongqing's 27th Army, Yu Jishi's 74th Army, Li Hanhun's 64th Army, and Huang Jie's 8th Army. From May 15 to 17, the Fengjiu Brigade, advancing toward Lanfeng, met stubborn resistance near Kaocheng from roughly five divisions under Song Xilian and was forced to shift its effort toward Yejigang and Neihuang. The defense near Neihuang, including Shen Ke's 106th Division and Liang Kai's 195th Division, ultimately faltered, allowing Doihara's division to seize Neihuang, Yejigang, Mazhuangzhai, and Renheji. Nevertheless, the Nationalist forces managed to contain the Japanese advance east and west of the area, preventing a complete encirclement. Chiang Kai-shek ordered Cheng Qian, commander-in-chief of the 1st War Zone, to encircle and annihilate the Japanese 14th Division. The deployment plan mapped three routes: the Eastern Route Army, under Li Hanhun, would include the 74th Army, the 155th Division of the 64th Army, a brigade of the 88th Division, and a regiment of the 87th Division, advancing westward from Guide); the Western Route Army, commanded by Gui Yongqing, would comprise the 27th Army, the 71st Army, the 61st Division, and the 78th Division, advancing eastward from Lanfeng; and the Northern Route Army, formed by Sun Tongxuan's 3rd Army and Shang Zhen's 20th Army, was to cut off the enemy's retreat to the north bank of the Yellow River near Dingtao, Heze, Dongming, and Kaocheng, while attacking the Doihara Division from the east, west, and north to annihilate it in a single decisive operation.  On May 21, the Nationalist Army mounted a full-scale offensive. Yu Jishi's 74th Army, commanded by Wang Yaowu's 51st Division, joined a brigade of Song Xilian's 71st Army, led by the 88th Division, and drove the Japanese forces at Mazhuangzhai into retreat, capturing Neihuang and Renheji. The main Japanese force, more than 6,000 strong, withdrew southwest to Yangjiji and Shuangtaji. Song Xilian, commanding Shen Fazao's 87th Division, launched a sharp assault on Yejigang (Yifeng). The Japanese abandoned the stronghold, but their main body continued advancing toward Yangjiji, with some units retreating to Donggangtou and Maoguzhai. On May 23, Song Xilian's 71st Army and Yu Jishi's 74th Army enveloped and annihilated enemy forces at Donggangtou and Maoguzhai. That evening they seized Ximaoguzhai, Yangzhuang, and Helou, eliminating more than a thousand Japanese troops. The Japanese troops at Donggangtou fled toward Lanfeng. Meanwhile, Gui Yongqing's forces were retreating through Lanfeng. His superior strength, Jiang Fusheng's 36th Division, Li Liangrong's 46th Division, Zhong Song's 61st Division, Li Wen's 78th Division, Long Muhan's 88th Division, and Shen Ke's 106th Division—had held defensive positions along the Lanfeng–Yangji line. Equipped with a tank battalion and armored vehicle company commanded by Qiu Qingquan, they blocked the enemy's westward advance and awaited Japanese exhaustion. However, under the Japanese offensive, Gui Yongqing's poor command led to the loss of Maji and Mengjiaoji, forcing the 27th Army to retreat across its entire front. Its main force fled toward Qixian and Kaifeng. The Japanese seized the opportunity to capture Quxingji, Luowangzhai, and Luowang Railway Station west of Lanfeng. Before retreating, Gui Yongqing ordered Long Muhan to dispatch a brigade to replace the 106th Division in defending Lanfeng, while he directed the 106th Division to fall back to Shiyuan. Frightened by the enemy, Long Muhan unilaterally withdrew his troops on the night of the 23rd, leaving Lanfeng undefended. On the 24th, Japanese troops advancing westward from Donggangtou entered Lanfeng unopposed and, relying on well-fortified fortifications, held their ground until reinforcements arrived. In the initial four days, the Nationalist offensive failed to overwhelm the Japanese, who escaped encirclement and annihilation. The four infantry and artillery regiments and one cavalry regiment on the Japanese side managed to hold the line along Lanfeng, Luowangzhai, Sanyizhai, Lanfengkou, Quxingji, Yang'erzhai, and Chenliukou on the south bank of the Yellow River, offering stubborn resistance. The Longhai Railway was completely cut off. Chiang Kai-shek, furious upon hearing the news while stationed in Zhengzhou, ordered the execution of Long Muhan, commander of the 88th Division, to restore military morale. He also decided to consolidate Hu Zongnan's, Li Hanhun's, Yu Jishi's, Song Xilian's, and Gui Yongqing's troops into the 1st Corps, with Xue Yue as commander-in-chief. On the morning of May 25, they launched a determined counterattack on Doihara's 14th Division. Song Xilian personally led the front lines on May 24 to rally the defeated 88th Division.  Starting on May 25, after three days of intense combat, Li Hanhun's 64th Army advanced to seize Luowang Station and Luowangzhai, while Song Xilian's 71st Army retook Lanfeng City, temporarily reopening the Longhai Line to traffic. At Sanyi Village, Gui Yongqing's 27th Army and Yu Jishi's 74th Army captured a series of outlying positions, including Yang'eyao, Chailou, Cailou, Hezhai, Xuelou, and Baowangsi. Despite these gains, more than 6,000 Japanese troops offered stubborn resistance. During the fighting, Ji Hongru, commander of the 302nd Regiment, was seriously wounded but continued to fight, shouting, “Don't worry about my death! Brothers, fight on!” He ultimately died a heroic death from his wounds. By May 27, Chiang Kai-shek, concerned that the forces had not yet delivered a decisive victory at Lanfeng, personally reprimanded the participating generals and ordered them to completely encircle and annihilate the enemy west of Lanfeng by the following day. He warned that if the opportunity was missed and Japanese reinforcements arrived, the position could be endangered. The next day, Chiang Kai-shek issued another telegram, urging Cheng Qian's First War Zone and all participating units to press the offensive. The telegram allegedly had this in it “It will forever be a laughingstock in the history of warfare.” Meanwhile on the other side, to prevent the annihilation of Doihara's 14th Division, the elite Japanese 16th Division and the 3rd Mixed Brigade, totaling over 40,000 men, launched a westward assault from Dangshan, capturing Yucheng on May 26. They then began probing the outskirts of Guide. Huang Jie's Eighth Army, responsible for the defense, withdrew to the outskirts of Guide that evening. On May 28, Huang Jie again led his troops on his own initiative, retreating to Liuhe and Kaifeng, leaving only the 187th Division to defend Zhuji Station and Guide City. At dawn on May 29, Peng Linsheng, commander of the 187th Division, also withdrew his troops, leaving Guide a deserted city. The Japanese occupied Guide without a fight. The loss of Guide dramatically shifted the tide of the war. Threatened on the flanks by the Japanese 16th Division, the Nationalist forces were forced onto the defensive. On May 28, the Japanese 14th Division concentrated its forces to counterattack Gui Yongqing's troops, but they were defeated again, allowing the Japanese to stabilize their position. At the same time, the fall of Shangqiu compelled Xue Yue's corps to withdraw five divisions to block the enemy in Shangqiu, and the Nationalist Army shifted to a defensive posture with the 14th Division holding Sanyizhai and Quxingji. To the north of the battlefield, the Japanese 4th Mixed Brigade, numbering over 10,000 men, was preparing to force a crossing of the Yellow River in order to join with the nearby 14th Division. More seriously, the 10th Division, together with its 13th Mixed Brigade and totaling more than 40,000 men, had captured Woyang and Bozhou on the Henan-Anhui border and was rapidly encircling eastern Henan. By the time of the Battle of Lanfeng, Japanese forces had deployed more than 100,000 troops, effectively surrounding the Nationalist army. On May 31, the First War Zone decided to withdraw completely, and the Battle of Lanfeng ended in defeat for the Nationalists, forcing Chiang Kai-shek to authorize diverting the Yellow River embankment to relieve pressure. The consequence was a deteriorating strategic situation, as encirclement tightened and reinforcement options dwindled, driving a retreat from the Lanfeng front. The National Army suffered more than 67,000 casualties, killed and wounded more than 10,000 Japanese soldiers, Lanfeng was lost, and Zhengzhou was in danger.  As in Nanjing, this Chinese army might have lived to fight another day, but the effect on Xuzhou itself was horrific. The city had endured Japanese bombardment since August 1937, and the population's mood swung between cautious hope and utter despair. In March, Du Zhongyuan visited Xuzhou. Before he left Wuhan, friends told him that “the city was desolate and the people were terrified, all the inhabitants of Xuzhou were quietly getting on with their business … sometimes it was even calmer than Wuhan.” The Australian journalist Rhodes Farmer recalled a similar image in a book published at war's end, noting the “ordinary townsfolk who became wardens, fire-fighters and first-aid workers during the raid and then went back to their civil jobs.” Yet the mid-May departure of Nationalist troops left the city and its outskirts at the mercy of an angry Imperial Army. Bombing continued through the final days of battle, and a single raid on May 14, 1938 killed 700 people. Around Xuzhou, buildings and bridges were destroyed—some by retreating Chinese forces, some by advancing Japanese troops. Taierzhuang, the scene of the earlier iconic defense, was utterly destroyed. Canadian Jesuits who remained in Xuzhou after its fall recorded that more than a third of the houses were razed, and most of the local population had fled in terror. In rural areas around the city, massacres were repeatedly reported, many witnessed by missionaries. Beyond the atrocities of the Japanese, locals faced banditry in the absence of law enforcement, and vital agricultural work such as planting seed ground to a halt. The loss of Xuzhou was both strategic and symbolic. It dealt a severe blow to Chiang's attempt to hold central China and to control regional troop movements. Morale, which Taierzhuang had briefly boosted, was battered again though not extinguished. The fall signaled that the war would be long, and that swift victory against Japan was no longer likely. Mao Zedong's Yan'an base, far to the northwest, grasped the meaning of defeat there. In May 1938 he delivered one of his most celebrated lectures, “On Protracted War,” chiding those who had over-optimistically claimed the Xuzhou campaign could be a quasi-decisive victory and arguing that, after Taierzhuang, some had become “giddy.” Mao insisted that China would ultimately prevail, yet he warned that it could not be won quickly, and that the War of Resistance would be protracted. In the meantime, the development of guerrilla warfare remained an essential piece of the long-term strategy that the Communist armies would pursue in north China. Yet the loss of Xuzhou did not necessarily portend a long war; it could, instead, presage a war that would be terrifyingly short. By spring 1938 the Chinese defenders were desperate. There was a real danger that the entire war effort could collapse, and the Nationalist governments' notable success as protectors of a shrinking “Free China” lay in avoiding total disaster. Government propaganda had successfully portrayed a plan beyond retreat to foreign observers, yet had Tokyo captured Wuhan in the spring, the Chinese Army would have had to withdraw at speed, reinforcing perceptions of disintegration. Western governments were unlikely to intervene unless convinced it was in their interests. Within the Nationalist leadership, competing instincts persisted. The government pursued welfare measures for the people in the midst of a massive refugee relief effort, the state and local organizations, aided by the International Red Cross, housed large numbers of refugees in 1937–1938. Yet there was a harsher strain within policy circles, with some officials willing to sacrifice individual lives for strategic or political ends as the Japanese threat intensified. Throughout central China, the Yellow River, China's “Sorrow”, loomed as the dominant geographic force shaping history. The loess-laden river, notorious for floods and shifting channels, was banked by massive dikes near Zhengzhou, exactly along the line the Japanese would traverse toward Wuhan. Using the river as a military instrument was discussed as a drastic option: Chiang and Cheng Qian's First War Zone contemplated diverting or breaching the dikes to halt or slow the Japanese advance, a measure that could buy time but would unleash enormous civilian suffering. The idea dated back to 1887 floods that cost hundreds of thousands of lives, and even in 1935 Alexander von Falkenhausen had warned that the Yellow River could become the final line of defense. In 1938 Chiang, recognizing the futility of defeating the Japanese by conventional means at Zhengzhou, considered unleashing the river's force if necessary to impede the invaders. The political and strategic calculus was stark: protect central China and Wuhan, even if it required drastic and morally fraught measures. A more humane leader might have hesitated to break the dikes and spare the dams, allowing the Japanese to take Wuhan. But Chiang Kai-shek believed that if the dikes were not breached and Wuhan fell within days, the Nationalist government might be unable to relocate to Chongqing in time and would likely surrender, leaving Japan in control of almost all of China. Some have compared the choice to France's surrender in June 1940, underscoring that Chiang's decision came during the country's most terrifying assault, with Chinese forces much weaker and less trained than their European counterparts. The dilemma over whether to break the Yellow River dikes grew out of desperation. Chiang ultimately ordered General Wei Rulin to blow the dike that held the Yellow River in central Henan. There was no doubt about the consequences: floods would inundate vast areas of central China, creating a waterlogged barrier that would halt the Japanese advance. Yet for the plan to succeed, it had to be carried out quickly, and the government could offer no public warning in case the Japanese detected it and accelerated their movement. Xiong Xianyu, chief of staff in the 8th Division at the time, recorded the urgency of those hours in his diary. The Japanese were already on the north bank of the Yellow River, briefly delayed when the Chinese army blew up the railway bridge across the river. The destruction of the dikes was the next step: if the area became a sea of mud, there would be no way the Japanese could even attempt to reconstruct the bridge. Blasting the dikes proved easier in theory than in practice. Holding back such a massive body of water required substantial engineering, dams thick and well fortified. The army made its first attempts to blow the dike at the small town of Zhaokou between June 4 and 6, 1938, but the structure proved too durable; another nearby attempt failed as well. Hour by hour, the Japanese moved closer. Division commander Jiang Zaizhen asked Xiong Xianyu for his opinion on where they might breach the dams. Xiong wrote “I discussed the topography, and said that two places, Madukou and Huayuankou, were both possible.” But Madukou was too close to Zhaokou, where the breach had already failed, presenting a danger that the Japanese might reach it very soon. The village of Huayuankou, however, lay farther away and on a bend in the river: “To give ourselves enough time, Huayuankou would be best.” At first, the soldiers treated the task as a military engineering assignment, an “exciting” one in Xiong's words. Xiong and Wei Rulin conducted their first site inspection after dark, late on June 6. The surroundings offered a deceptive calm: Xiong recounted “The wind blew softly, and the river water trickled pleasantly.” Yet gauging the water level proved difficult, hampered by murky moonlight and burned-out flashlights. They spent the night in their car to determine precisely where to break the dike as soon as day broke. But daylight seemed to bring home the consequences of what they planned to do, and the soldiers grew increasingly anxious. Wang Songmei, commander of the 2nd Regiment, addressed the workers about to breach the dike: “My brothers, this plan will be of benefit to our country and our nation, and will lessen the harm that is being done to the people.In the future, you'll find good wives and have plenty of children.” Wang's words were meant to reassure the men of the political necessity of their actions and that fate would not, in the traditional Chinese sense, deny them a family because of the enormity of their deeds. General Wei confirmed that Huayuankou was the right spot, and on June 8 the work began, with about 2,000 men taking part. The Nationalist government was eager to ensure rapid progress. Xiong recorded that the “highest authorities”,, kept making telephone calls from Wuhan to check on progress. In addition, the party sent performers to sing and play music to bolster the workers' spirits. Senior General Shang Zhen announced to the laborers that if they breached the dam by midnight on June 8, each would receive 2,000 yuan; if they achieved it by six the next morning, they would still be paid 1,000 yuan. They needed encouragement, for the diggers had no artificial assistance. After the initial failures at Zhaokou, Wei's troops relied entirely on manual labor, with no explosives used. Yet the workers earned their payments, and the dike was breached in just a few hours. On the morning of June 9, Xiong recorded a rapid shift in mood: the atmosphere became tense and solemn. Initially, the river flow was modest, but by about 1:00 p.m. the water surged “fiercely,” flowing “like 10,000 horses.” Looking toward the distance, Xiong felt as though a sea had appeared before him. “My heart ached,” he wrote. The force of the water widened the breach, and a deadly stream hundreds of feet wide comprising about three-quarters of the river's volume—rushed southeast across the central Chinese plains. “We did this to stop the enemy,” Xiong reflected, “so we didn't regret the huge sacrifice, as it was for a greater victory.” Yet he and the other soldiers also saw a grim reality: the troops who had taken on the task of destroying the railway bridge and the dikes could not bear the flood's consequences alone. It would be up to the government and the people of the nation to provide relief for the countless households uprooted by the flood. In fact, the previous evening Commander Jiang had telephoned to request assistance for those flooded out of their homes.   Wei, Xiong, and their troops managed to escape by wooden boats. Hundreds of thousands of farmers trapped in the floods were far less fortunate. Time magazine's correspondent Theodore White reported on the devastation a few days later “Last week “The Ungovernable” [i.e. the Yellow River] lashed out with a flood which promised to change not only its own course but also the course of the whole Sino-Japanese War. Severe breaks in the dikes near Kaifeng sent a five-foot wall of water fanning out over a 500-squaremile area, spreading death. Toll from Yellow River floods is not so much from quick drowning as from gradual disease and starvation. The river's filth settles ankle-deep on the fields, mothering germs, smothering crops. Last week, about 500,000 peasants were driven from 2,000 communities to await rescue or death on whatever dry ground they could find”. Chiang's government had committed one of the grossest acts of violence against its own people, and he knew that the publicity could be a damaging blow to its reputation. He decided to divert blame by announcing that the dike had been broken, but blaming the breach on Japanese aerial bombing. The Japanese, in turn, fiercely denied having bombed the dikes. White's reporting reflected the immediate response of most foreigners; having heard about the atrocities at Nanjing and Xuzhou, he was disinclined to give the Japanese the benefit of the doubt. Furthermore, at the very time that the Yellow River was flooding central China, the Japanese were heavily bombing Guangzhou, causing thousands of casualties. To White, the Japanese counterargument—that the Chinese themselves were responsible, seemed unthinkable: “These accusations, foreign observers thought, were absurd. For the Chinese to check the Japanese advance at possible sacrifice of half a million lives would be a monstrous pyrrhic victory. Besides, dike-cutting is the blackest of Chinese crimes, and the Chinese Army would hardly risk universal censure for slight tactical gains.” But, of course, that is exactly what they had done. During the war the Nationalists never admitted that they, not the Japanese, had breached the dikes. But the truth quickly became widely known. Just a month later, on July 19, US Ambassador Johnson noted, in private communication, that the “Chinese blocked the advance on Chengchow [Zhengzhou] by breaching the Yellow River dikes.” Eventually some 54,000 square kilometers of central China were inundated by the floods. If the Japanese had committed such an act, it would have been remembered as the prime atrocity of the war, dwarfing even the Nanjing Massacre or the Chongqing air raids in terms of the number of people who suffered. Accurate statistics were impossible to obtain in the midst of wartime chaos and disaster, but in 1948 figures issued by the Nationalists themselves suggested enormous casualties: for the three affected provinces of Henan, Anhui, and Jiangsu, the number of dead was put at 844,489, with some 4.8 million becoming refugees. More recent studies place the numbers lower, but still estimate the dead at around 500,000, and 3–5 million refugees. In contrast, the devastating May 1939 air raids on Chongqing killed some thousands. Xiong reflected in his diary that the breaching of the Yellow River dikes was a sacrifice for a greater victory. Even to some Japanese it seemed that the tactic had been successful in the short term: the first secretary at the US Embassy in Wuhan reported that the flood had “completely checked the Japanese advance on Chengchow” and had prevented them taking Wuhan by rail. Instead, he predicted, the attack was likely to come by water and along the north shore of the Yangtze. Supporters of the dike breaches could argue that these acts saved central China and Chiang's headquarters in Wuhan for another five months. The Japanese were indeed prevented from advancing along the Long–Hai railway toward Wuhan. In the short term the floods did what the Nationalists wanted. But the flooding was a tactic, a breathing space, and did not solve the fundamental problem: China's armies needed strong leadership and rapid reform. Some historians suggest that Chiang's decision was pointless anyway, since it merely delayed the inevitable. Theodore White was right: no strategic advantage could make the deaths of 500,000 of China's own people a worthwhile price to pay. However, Chiang Kai-shek's decision can be partly explained, though not excused, by the context. We can now look back at the actions of the Nationalists and argue that they should not have held on to Wuhan, or that their actions in breaching the dam were unjustifiable in the extreme. But for Chiang, in the hot summer of 1938, it seemed his only hope was to deny Japan as much of China for as long as possible and create the best possible circumstances for a long war from China's interior, while keeping the world's attention on what Japan was doing. The short delay won by the flooding was itself part of the strategy. In the struggle raging within the soul of the Nationalist Party, the callous, calculating streak had won, for the time being. The breaking of the dikes marked a turning point as the Nationalists committed an act whose terrible consequences they would eventually have to expiate. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In late 1937, China's frontline trembled as Japanese forces closed in on Wuhan. Chiang Kai-shek faced a brutal choice: endure costly defenses or unleash a desperate gamble. Chiangs' radical plan emerged: breach the Yellow River dikes at Huayuankou to flood central China, buying time. The flood roared, washing villages and futures away, yet slowing the enemy. The battlefield paused, while a nation weighed courage against civilian suffering, victory against devastating costs.

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Last time we spoke about the Nanjing Massacre. Japanese forces breached Nanjing as Chinese defenders retreated under heavy bombardment, and the city fell on December 13. In the following weeks, civilians and disarmed soldiers endured systematic slaughter, mass executions, rapes, looting, and arson, with casualties mounting rapidly. Among the most brutal episodes were hundreds of executions near the Safety Zone, mass shootings along the Yangtze River, and killings at improvised sites and “killing fields.” The massacre involved tens of thousands of prisoners, with estimates up to 300,000 victims. Women and children were subjected to widespread rape, mutilation, and terror intended to crush morale and resistance. Although the Safety Zone saved many lives, it could not shield all refugees from harm, and looting and arson devastated large parts of the city. Foreign witnesses, missionaries, and diary entries documented the extensive brutality and the apparent premeditated nature of many acts, noting the collapse of discipline among troops and orders that shaped the violence.    #169 Nanjing has Fallen, the War is not Over Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Directly after the fall of Nanjing, rumors circulated among the city's foreigners that Tang Shengzhi had been executed for his inability to hold the city against the Japanese onslaught. In fact, unlike many of his subordinates who fought in the defense, he survived. On December 12, he slipped through Yijiang Gate, where bullets from the 36th Division had claimed numerous victims, and sailed across the Yangtze to safety. Chiang Kai-shek protected him from bearing direct consequences for Nanjing's collapse. Tang was not unscathed, however. After the conquest of Nanjing, a dejected Tang met General Li Zongren at Xuzhou Railway Station. In a brief 20-minute conversation, Tang lamented, “Sir, Nanjing's fall has been unexpectedly rapid. How can I face the world?” Li, who had previously taunted Tang for over-eagerness, offered sympathy. “Don't be discouraged. Victory or defeat comes every day for the soldier. Our war of resistance is a long-term proposition. The loss of one city is not decisive.” By December 1937, the outlook for Chiang Kai-shek's regime remained bleak. Despite his public pledges, he had failed to defend the capital. Its sturdy walls, which had withstood earlier sieges, were breached in less than 100 hours. Foreign observers remained pessimistic about the prospects of continuing the fight against Japan. The New York Times wrote “The capture of Nanking was the most overwhelming defeat suffered by the Chinese and one of the most tragic military debacles in modern warfare. In defending Nanking, the Chinese allowed themselves to be surrounded and then slaughtered… The graveyard of tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers may also be the graveyard of all Chinese hopes of resisting conquest by Japan.” Foreign diplomats doubted Chiang's ability to sustain the war, shrinking the question to whether he would stubbornly continue a losing fight or seek peace. US Ambassador Nelson Johnson wrote in a letter to Admiral Yarnell, then commander of the US Asicatic Fleet “There is little left now for the Chinese to do except to carry on a desultory warfare in the country, or to negotiate for the best terms they can get”.  The Japanese, too, acted as if Chiang Kai-shek had already lost the war. They assumed the generalissimo was a spent force in Chinese politics as well, and that a gentle push would suffice to topple his regime like a house of cards. On December 14, Prime Minister Konoe announced that Chiang's losses of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and now Nanjing, had created a new situation. “The National Government has become but a shadow of its former self. If a new Chinese regime emerged to replace Chiang's government, Japan would deal with it, provided it is a regime headed in the right direction.” Konoe spoke the same day as a Liaison Conference in Tokyo, where civilian and military leaders debated how to treat China now that it had been thoroughly beaten on the battlefield. Japanese demands had grown significantly: beyond recognizing Manchukuo, Japan pressed for the creation of pro-Japanese regimes in Inner Mongolia and the north China area. The same day, a puppet government was established in Japanese-occupied Beijing. While these demands aimed to end China as a unitary state, Japanese policy was moving toward the same goal. The transmissions of these demands via German diplomatic channels caused shock and consternation in Chinese government circles, and the Chinese engaged in what many regarded as stalling tactics. Even at this late stage, there was division among Japan's top decision makers. Tada, deputy chief of the Army General Staff, feared a protracted war in China and urged keeping negotiations alive. He faced strong opposition from the cabinet, including the foreign minister and the ministers of the army and navy, and ultimately he relented. Tada stated “In this state of emergency, it is necessary to avoid any political upheaval that might arise from a struggle between the Cabinet and the Army General Staff.” Although he disagreed, he no longer challenged the uncompromising stance toward China. On January 16, 1938, Japan publicly stated that it would “cease henceforth to deal with” Chiang Kai-shek. This was a line that could not be uncrossed. War was the only option. Germany, the mediator between China and Japan, also considered Chiang a losing bet. In late January 1938, von Dirksen, the German ambassador in Tokyo, urged a fundamental shift in German diplomacy and advocated abandoning China in favor of Japan. He warned that this was a matter of urgency, since Japan harbored grudges against Germany for its half-hearted peace efforts. In a report, von Dirksen wrote that Japan, “in her deep ill humor, will confront us with unpleasant decisions at an inopportune moment.” Von Dirksen's view carried the day in Berlin. Nazi Germany and Hirohito's Japan were on a trajectory that, within three years, would forge the Axis and place Berlin and Tokyo in the same camp in a conflict that would eventually span the globe. Rabe, who returned to Germany in 1938, found that his account of Japanese atrocities in Nanjing largely fell on deaf ears. He was even visited by the Gestapo, which apparently pressed him to keep quiet about what he had seen. Ambassador von Dirksen also argued in his January 1938 report that China should be abandoned because of its increasingly friendly ties with the Soviet Union. There was some merit to this claim. Soviet aid to China was substantial: by the end of 1937, 450 Soviet aviators were serving in China. Without them, Japan likely would have enjoyed air superiority. Chiang Kai-shek, it seemed, did not fully understand the Russians' motives. They were supplying aircraft and pilots to keep China in the war while keeping themselves out. After Nanjing's fall, Chiang nevertheless reached out to Joseph Stalin, inviting direct Soviet participation in the war. Stalin politely declined, noting that if the Soviet Union joined the conflict, “the world would say the Soviet Union was an aggressor, and sympathy for Japan around the world would immediately increase.” In a rare moment of candor a few months later, the Soviet deputy commissar for foreign affairs spoke with the French ambassador, describing the situation in China as “splendid.” He expected China to continue fighting for several more years, after which Japan would be too weakened to undertake major operations against the Soviet Union. It was clear that China was being used. Whatever the motive, China was receiving vital help from Stalin's Russia while the rest of the world stood on the sidelines, reluctant to upset Japan. Until Operation Barbarossa, when the Soviet Union was forced to the brink by the German Army and could no longer sustain extensive overseas aid, it supplied China with 904 planes, 1,516 trucks, 1,140 artillery pieces, 9,720 machine guns, 50,000 rifles, 31,600 bombs, and more. Despite all of this, all in all, China's position proved less disastrous than many observers had feared. Chinese officials later argued that the battle of Nanjing was not the unmitigated fiasco it appeared to be. Tang Shengzhi had this to say in his memoirs“I think the main purpose of defending Nanjing was to buy time, to allow troops that had just been pulled out of battle to rest and regroup. It wasn't simply because it was the capital or the site of Sun Yat-sen's mausoleum.” Tan Daoping, an officer in Nanjing, described the battle “as a moderate success because it drew the Japanese in land”. This of course was a strategy anticipated by interwar military thinker Jiang Baili. It also allowed dozens of Chinese divisions to escape Shanghai, since the Japanese forces that could have pursued them were tied down with the task of taking Nanjing. Tan Daoping wrote after the war “They erred in believing they could wage a quick war and decide victory immediately. Instead, their dream was shattered; parts of their forces were worn out, and they were hindered from achieving a swift end”. Even so, it was a steep price was paid in Chinese lives. As in Shanghai, the commanders in Nanjing thought they could fight on the basis of sheer willpower. Chinese officer Qin Guo Qi wrote in his memoirs “In modern war, you can't just rely on the spirit of the troops. You can't merely rely on physical courage and stamina. The battle of Nanjing explains that better than anything”. As for the Brigade commander of the 87th division, Chen Yiding, who emerged from Nanjing with only a few hundred survivors, was enraged. “During the five days of the battle for Nanjing, my superiors didn't see me even once. They didn't do their duty. They also did not explain the overall deployments in the Nanjing area. What's worse, they didn't give us any order to retreat. And afterwards I didn't hear of any commander being disciplined for failing to do his job.” Now back in November of 1937, Chiang Kai-shek had moved his command to the great trinity of Wuhan. For the Nationalists, Wuhan was a symbolically potent stronghold: three municipalities in one, Hankou, Wuchang, and Hanyang. They had all grown prosperous as gateways between coastal China and the interior. But the autumn disasters of 1937 thrust Wuhan into new prominence, and, a decade after it had ceased to be the temporary capital, it again became the seat of military command and resistance. Leading Nationalist politicians had been seen in the city in the months before the war, fueling suspicions that Wuhan would play a major role in any imminent conflict. By the end of the year, the generals and their staffs, along with most of the foreign embassies, had moved upriver. Yet as 1937 slipped into 1938, the Japanese advance seemed practically unstoppable. From the destruction of Shanghai, to the massacre in Nanjing, to the growing vulnerability of Wuhan, the NRA government appeared powerless against the onslaught.  Now the Japanese government faced several options: expanding the scope of the war to force China into submission, which would risk further depletion of Japan's military and economic resources; establishing an alternative regime in China as a bridge for reconciliation, thereby bypassing the Nationalist government for negotiations; and engaging in indirect or direct peace negotiations with the Nationalist Government, despite the failure of previous attempts, while still seeking new opportunities for negotiation. However, the Nanjing massacre did not compel the Chinese government and its people to submit. On January 2, Chiang Kai-shek wrote in his diary, “The conditions proposed by Japan are equivalent to the conquest and extinction of our country. Rather than submitting and perishing, it is better to perish in defeat,” choosing to refuse negotiations and continue resistance.  In January 1938 there was a new escalation of hostilities. Up to that point, Japan had not officially declared war, even during the Shanghai campaign and the Nanjing massacre. However on January 11, an Imperial Conference was held in Tokyo in the presence of Emperor Hirohito. Prime Minister Konoe outlined a “Fundamental Policy to deal with the China Incident.”The Imperial Conference was attended by Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, Army Chief of Staff Prince Kan'in, Navy Minister Admiral Fushimi, and others to reassess its policy toward China. Citing the Nationalist Government's delay and lack of sincerity, the Japanese leadership decided to terminate Trautmann's mediation. At the conference, Japan articulated a dual strategy: if the Nationalist Government did not seek peace, Japan would no longer regard it as a viable negotiating partner, instead supporting emerging regimes, seeking to resolve issues through incidents, and aiming either to eliminate or incorporate the existing central government; if the Nationalist Government sought reconciliation, it would be required to cease resistance, cooperate with Japan against communism, and pursue economic cooperation, including officially recognizing Manchukuo and allowing Japanese troops in Inner Mongolia, North China, Central China, and co-governance of Shanghai. The Konoe cabinet relayed this proposal to the German ambassador in Japan on December 22, 1937: It called for: diplomatic recognition of Manchukuo; autonomy for Inner Mongolia; cessation of all anti-Japanese and anti-Manchukuo policies; cooperation between Japan, Manchukuo, and China against communism; war reparations; demilitarized zones in North China and Inner Mongolia; and a trade agreement among Japan, Manchukuo, and China.  Its terms were too severe, including reparations payable to Japan and new political arrangements that would formalize the separation of north China under Japanese control. Chiang's government would have seventy-two hours to accept; if they refused, Tokyo would no longer recognize the Nationalist government and would seek to destroy it.  On January 13, 1938, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Chonghui informed Germany that China needed a fuller understanding of the additional conditions for peace talks to make a decision. The January 15 deadline for accepting Japan's terms elapsed without Chinese acceptance. Six days after the deadline for a Chinese government reply, an Imperial Conference “Gozen Kaigi” was convened in Tokyo to consider how to handle Trautmann's mediation. The navy, seeing the war as essentially an army matter, offered no strong position; the army pressed for ending the war through diplomatic means, arguing that they faced a far more formidable Far Eastern Soviet threat at the northern Manchukuo border and wished to avoid protracted attrition warfare. Foreign Minister Kōki Hirota, however, strongly disagreed with the army, insisting there was no viable path to Trautmann's mediation given the vast gap between Chinese and Japanese positions. A second conference followed on January 15, 1938, attended by the empire's principal cabinet members and military leaders, but without the emperor's presence. The debate grew heated over whether to continue Trautmann's mediation. Hayao Tada, Deputy Chief of Army General Staff, argued for continuation, while Konoe, Hirota, Navy Minister Mitsumasa Yonai, and War Minister Hajime Sugiyama opposed him. Ultimately, Tada acceded to the position of Konoe and Hirota. On the same day, Konoe conveyed the cabinet's conclusion, termination of Trautmann's mediation, to the emperor. The Japanese government then issued a statement on January 16 declaring that it would no longer treat the Nationalist Government as a bargaining partner, signaling the establishment of a new Chinese regime that would cooperate with Japan and a realignment of bilateral relations. This became known as the first Konoe statement, through which Tokyo formally ended Trautmann's mediation attempt. The Chinese government was still weighing its response when, at noon on January 16, Konoe publicly declared, “Hereafter, the Imperial Government will not deal with the National Government.” In Japanese, this became the infamous aite ni sezu (“absolutely no dealing”). Over the following days, the Japanese government made it clear that this was a formal breach of relations, “stronger even than a declaration of war,” in the words of Foreign Minister Hirota Kōki. The Chinese ambassador to Japan, who had been in Tokyo for six months since hostilities began, was finally recalled. At the end of January, Chiang summoned a military conference and declared that the top strategic priority would be to defend the east-central Chinese city of Xuzhou, about 500 kilometers north of Wuhan. This decision, like the mobilization near Lugouqiao, was heavily influenced by the railway: Xuzhou sat at the midpoint of the Tianjin–Pukou Jinpu line, and its seizure would grant the Japanese mastery over north–south travel in central China. The Jinpu line also crossed the Longhai line, China's main cross-country artery from Lanzhou to the port of Lianyungang, north of Shanghai. The Japanese military command marked the Jinpu line as a target in spring 1938. Control over Xuzhou and the rail lines threading through it were thus seen as vital to the defense of Wuhan, which lay to the city's south. Chiang's defense strategy fit into a larger plan evolving since the 1920s, when the military thinker Jiang Baili had first proposed a long war against Japan; Jiang's foresight earned him a position as an adviser to Chiang in 1938. Jiang had previously run the Baoding military academy, a predecessor of the Whampoa academy, which had trained many of China's finest young officers in the early republic 1912–1922. Now, many of the generals who had trained under Jiang gathered in Wuhan and would play crucial roles in defending the city: Chen Cheng, Bai Chongxi, Tang Shengzhi, and Xue Yue. They remained loyal to Chiang but sought to avoid his tendency to micromanage every aspect of strategy.  Nobody could say with certainty whether Wuhan would endure the Japanese onslaught, and outsiders' predictions were gloomy. As Wuhan's inhabitants tasted their unexpected new freedoms, the Japanese pressed on with their conquest of central China. After taking Nanjing, the IJA 13th Division crossed the Yangtze River to the north and advanced to the Outang and Mingguang lines on the east bank of the Chihe River in Anhui Province, while the 2nd Army of the North China Front crossed the Yellow River to the south between Qingcheng and Jiyang in Shandong, occupied Jinan, and pressed toward Jining, Mengyin, and Qingdao. To open the Jinpu Railway and connect the northern and southern battlefields, the Japanese headquarters mobilized eight divisions, three brigades, and two detachments , totaling about 240,000 men. They were commanded by General Hata Shunroku, commander of the Central China Expeditionary Army, and Terauchi Hisaichi, commander of the North China Front Army. Their plan was a north–south advance: first seize Xuzhou, a strategic city in east China; then take Zhengzhou in the west along the Longhai Railway connecting Lanzhou and Lianyungang; and finally push toward Wuhan in the south along the Pinghan Railway connecting Beijing and Hankou. At the beginning of 1938, Japan's domestic mobilization and military reorganization had not yet been completed, and there was a shortage of troops to expand the front. At the Emperor's Imperial Conference on February 16, 1938, the General Staff Headquarters argued against launching operations before the summer of 1938, preferring to consolidate the front in 1938 and undertake a large-scale battle in 1939. Although the Northern China Expeditionary Force and the Central China Expeditionary Force proposed a plan to open the Jinpu Line to connect the northern and southern battlefields, the proposal was not approved by the domestic General Staff Headquarters. The Chinese army, commanded by Li Zongren, commander-in-chief of the Fifth War Zone, mobilized about 64 divisions and three brigades, totaling roughly 600,000 men. The main force was positioned north of Xuzhou to resist the southern Japanese advance, with a portion deployed along the southern Jinpu Railway to block the southern push and secure Xuzhou. Early in the campaign, Chiang Kai-shek redeployed the heavy artillery brigade originally promised to Han Fuju to Tang Enbo's forces. To preserve his strength, Shandong Provincial Governor Han Fuju abandoned the longstanding Yellow River defenses in Shandong, allowing the Japanese to capture the Shandong capital of Jinan in early March 1938. This defection opened the Jinpu Railway to attack. The Japanese 10th Division, under Rensuke Isogai, seized Tai'an, Jining, and Dawenkou, ultimately placing northern Shandong under Japanese control. The aim was to crush the Chinese between the two halves of a pincer movement. At Yixian and Huaiyuan, north of Xuzhou, both sides fought to the death: the Chinese could not drive back the Japanese, but the Japanese could not scatter the defenders either. At Linyi, about 50 kilometers northeast of Xuzhou, Zhang Zizhong, who had previously disgraced himself by abandoning an earlier battlefield—became a national hero for his determined efforts to stop the Japanese troops led by Itagaki Seishirō, the conqueror of Manchuria. The Japanese hoped that they could pour in as many as 400,000 troops to destroy the Chinese forces holding eastern and central China. Chiang Kai-shek was determined that this should not happen, recognizing that the fall of Xuzhou would place Wuhan in extreme danger. On April 1, 1938, he addressed Nationalist Party delegates, linking the defense of Wuhan to the fate of the party itself. He noted that although the Japanese had invaded seven provinces, they had only captured provincial capitals and main transport routes, while villages and towns off those routes remained unconquered. The Japanese, he argued, might muster more than half a million soldiers, but after eight or nine months of hard fighting they had become bogged down. Chiang asserted that as long as Guangzhou (Canton) remained in Chinese hands, it would be of little significance if the Japanese invaded Wuhan, since Guangzhou would keep China's sea links open and Guangdong, Sun Yat-sen's homeland, would serve as a revolutionary base area. If the “woren” Japanese “dwarfs” attacked Wuhan and Guangzhou, it would cost them dearly and threaten their control over the occupied zones. He reiterated his plan: “the base area for our war will not be in the zones east of the Beiping–Wuhan or Wuhan–Guangdong railway lines, but to their west.” For this reason he authorized withdrawing Chinese troops behind the railway lines. Chiang's speech mixed defiance with an explanation of why regrouping was necessary; it was a bold public posture in the face of a developing military disaster, yet it reflected the impossible balance he faced between signaling resolve and avoiding overcommitment of a city that might still fall. Holding Xuzhou as the first priority required Chiang Kai-shek to place a great deal of trust in one of his rivals: the southwestern general Li Zongren. The relationship between Chiang and Li would become one of the most ambivalent in wartime China. Li hailed from Guangxi, a province in southwestern China long regarded by the eastern heartland as half civilized. Its people had rarely felt fully part of the empire ruled from Beijing or even Nanjing, and early in the republic there was a strong push for regional autonomy. Li was part of a cohort of young officers trained in regional academies who sought to bring Guangxi under national control; he joined the Nationalist Party in 1923, the year Sun Yat-sen announced his alliance with the Soviets. Li was not a Baoding Academy graduate but had trained at Yunnan's equivalent institution, which shared similar views on military professionalism. He enthusiastically took part in the Northern Expedition (1926–1928) and played a crucial role in the National Revolutionary Army's ascent to control over much of north China. Yet after the Nanjing government took power, Li grew wary of Chiang's bid to centralize authority in his own person. In 1930 Li's so‑called “Guangxi clique” participated in the Central Plains War, the failed effort by militarist leaders to topple Chiang; although the plot failed, Li retreated to his southwest base, ready to challenge Chiang again. The occupation of Manchuria in 1931 reinforced Li's belief that a Japanese threat posed a greater danger than Chiang's centralization. The tension between the two men was evident from the outset of the war. On October 10, 1937, Chiang appointed Li commander of the Fifth War Zone; Li agreed on the condition that Chiang refrain from issuing shouling—personal commands—to Li's subordinates. Chiang complied, a sign of the value he placed on Li's leadership and the caution with which he treated Li and his Guangxi ally Bai Chongxi. As Chiang sought any possible victory amid retreat and destruction, he needed Li to deliver results. As part of the public-relations front, journalists were given access to commanders on the Xuzhou front. Li and his circle sought to shape their image as capable leaders to visiting reporters, with Du Zhongyuan among the most active observers. Du praised the “formidable southwestern general, Li Zongren,” calling him “elegant and refined” and “vastly magnanimous.” In language echoing the era's soldiers' public presentation, Du suggested that Li's forces operated under strict, even disciplined, orders “The most important point in the people's war is that . . . troops do not harass the people of the country. If the people are the water, the soldiers are the fish, and if you have fish with no water, inevitably they're going to choke; worse still is to use our water to nurture the enemy's fish — that really is incomparably stupid”.  Within the southern front, on January 26, 1938, the Japanese 13th Division attacked Fengyang and Bengbu in Anhui Province, while Li Pinxian, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the 5th War Zone, directed operations south of Xuzhou. The defending 31st Corps of the 11th Group Army, after resisting on the west bank of the Chi River, retreated to the west of Dingyuan and Fengyang. By February 3, the Japanese had captured Linhuai Pass and Bengbu. From the 9th to the 10th, the main force of the 13th Division forced a crossing of the Huai River at Bengbu and Linhuai Pass respectively, and began an offensive against the north bank. The 51st Corps, reorganized from the Central Plains Northeast Army and led by Commander Yu Xuezhong, engaged in fierce combat with the Japanese. Positions on both sides of the Huai shifted repeatedly, producing a riverine bloodbath through intense hand-to-hand fighting. After ten days of engagement, the Fifth War Zone, under Zhang Zizhong, commander of the 59th Army, rushed to the Guzhen area to reinforce the 51st Army, and the two forces stubbornly resisted the Japanese on the north bank of the Huai River. Meanwhile, on the south bank, the 48th Army of the 21st Group Army held the Luqiao area, while the 7th Army, in coordination with the 31st Army, executed a flanking attack on the flanks and rear of the Japanese forces in Dingyuan, compelling the main body of the 13th Division to redeploy to the north bank for support. Seizing the initiative, the 59th and 51st Armies launched a counteroffensive, reclaiming all positions north of the Huai River by early March. The 31st Army then moved from the south bank to the north, and the two sides faced across the river. Subsequently, the 51st and 59th Armies were ordered to reinforce the northern front, while the 31st Army continued to hold the Huai River to ensure that all Chinese forces covering the Battle of Xuzhou were safely withdrawn. Within the northern front, in late February, the Japanese Second Army began its southward push along multiple routes. The eastern axis saw the 5th Division moving south from Weixian present-day Weifang, in Shandong, capturing Yishui, Juxian, and Rizhao before pressing directly toward Linyi, as units of the Nationalist Third Corps' 40th Army and others mounted strenuous resistance. The 59th Army was ordered to reinforce and arrived on March 12 at the west bank of the Yi River in the northern suburbs of Linyi, joining the 40th Army in a counterattack that, after five days and nights of ferocious fighting, inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese and forced them to retreat toward Juxian. On the western route, the Seya Detachment (roughly a brigade) of the Japanese 10th Division crossed the Grand Canal from Jining and attacked Jiaxiang, meeting stiff resistance from the Third Army and being thwarted, while continuing to advance south along the Jinpu Railway. The Isogai Division, advancing on the northern route without awaiting help from the southeast and east, moved southward from Liangxiadian, south of Zouxian, on March 14, with the plan to strike Tengxian, present-day Tengzhou on March 15 and push south toward Xuzhou. The defending 22nd Army and the 41st Corps fought bravely and suffered heavy casualties in a hard battle that lasted until March 17, during which Wang Mingzhang, commander of the 122nd Division defending Teng County, was killed in action. Meanwhile, a separate Japanese thrust under Itagaki Seishirō landed on the Jiaodong Peninsula and occupied Qingdao, advancing along the Jiaoji Line to strike Linyi, a key military town in southern Shandong. Pang Bingxun's 40th Army engaged the invaders in fierce combat, and later, elements of Zhang Zizhong's 333rd Brigade of the 111th Division, reinforced by the 57th Army, joined Pang Bingxun's forces to launch a double-sided pincer that temporarily repelled the Japanese attack on Linyi. By late March 1938 a frightening reality loomed: the Japanese were close to prevailing on the Xuzhou front. The North China Area Army, commanded by Itagaki Seishirō, Nishio Toshizō, and Isogai Rensuke, was poised to link up with the Central China Expeditionary Force under Hata Shunroku in a united drive toward central China. Li Zongren, together with his senior lieutenants Bai Chongxi and Tang Enbo, decided to confront the invaders at Taierzhuang, the traditional stone-walled city that would become a focal point of their defense. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Nanjing falls after one of humanities worst atrocities. Chiang Kai-Shek's war command has been pushed to Wuhan, but the Japanese are not stopping their advance. Trautmann's mediation is over and now Japan has its sights on Xuzhou and its critical railway junctions. Japan does not realize it yet, but she is now entering a long war of attrition.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                      Last time we spoke about the continuation of the war after Nanjing's fall. The fall of Nanjing in December 1937 marked a pivotal juncture in the Second Sino-Japanese War, ushering in a brutal phase of attrition that shaped both strategy and diplomacy in early 1938. As Japanese forces sought to restructure China's political order, their strategy extended beyond battlefield victories to the establishment of puppet arrangements and coercive diplomacy. Soviet aid provided critical support, while German and broader Axis diplomacy wavered, shaping a nuanced backdrop for China's options. In response, Chinese command decisions focused on defending crucial rail corridors and urban strongholds, with Wuhan emerging as a strategic hub and the Jinpu and Longhai railways becoming lifelines of resistance. The defense around Xuzhou and the Huai River system illustrated Chinese determination to prolong resistance despite daunting odds. By early 1938, the war appeared as a drawn-out struggle, with China conserving core bases even as Japan pressed toward central China.   #170 The Battle of Taierzhuang Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Following their victory at Nanjing, the Japanese North China Area Army sought to push southward and link up with the Japanese Eleventh Army between Beijing and Nanjing. The two formations were intended to advance along the northern and southern ends of the JinPu railway, meet at Xuzhou, and then coordinate a pincer movement into Chinese strongholds in the Central Yangtze region, capturing Jiujiang first and then Wuhan. Recognizing Xuzhou's strategic importance, Chinese leadership made its defense a top priority. Xuzhou stood at the midpoint of the JinPu line and at the intersection with the Longhai Line, China's main east–west corridor from Lanzhou to Lianyungang. If seized, Japanese control of these routes would grant mobility for north–south movement across central China. At the end of January, Chiang Kai-shek convened a military conference in Wuchang and declared the defense of Xuzhou the highest strategic objective. Chinese preparations expanded from an initial core of 80,000 troops to about 300,000, deployed along the JinPu and Longhai lines to draw in and overstretch Japanese offensives. A frightening reality loomed by late March 1938: the Japanese were nearing victory on the Xuzhou front. The North China Area Army, led by Generals Itagaki Seishirô, Nishio Toshizô, and Isogai Rensuke, aimed to link up with the Central China Expeditionary Force under General Hata Shunroku for a coordinated drive into central China. Li Zongren and his senior colleagues, including Generals Bai Chongxi and Tang Enbo, resolved to meet the Japanese at the traditional stone-walled city of Taierzhuang. Taierzhuang was not large, but it held strategic significance. It sat along the Grand Canal, China's major north–south waterway, and on a rail line that connected the Jinpu and Longhai lines, thus bypassing Xuzhou. Chiang Kai-shek himself visited Xuzhou on March 24. While Xuzhou remained in Chinese hands, the Japanese forces to the north and south were still separated. Losing Xuzhou would close the pincer. By late March, Chinese troops seemed to be gaining ground at Taierzhuang, but the Japanese began reinforcing, pulling soldiers from General Isogai Rensuke's column. The defending commanders grew uncertain about their ability to hold the position, yet Chiang Kai-shek made his stance clear in an April 1, 1938 telegram: “the enemy at Taierzhuang must be destroyed.” Chiang Kai-shek dispatched his Vice Chief of Staff, Bai Chongxi, to Xuzhou in January 1938. Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi were old comrades from the New Guangxi Clique, and their collaboration dated back to the Northern Expedition, including the Battle of Longtan. Li also received the 21st Group Army from the 3rd War Area. This Guangxi unit, commanded by Liao Lei, comprised the 7th and 47th Armies. Around the same time, Sun Zhen's 22nd Group Army, another Sichuan clique unit, arrived in the Shanxi-Henan region, but was rebuffed by both Yan Xishan, then commander of the 2nd War Area and Shanxi's chairman and Cheng Qian, commander of the 1st War Area and Henan's chairman. Yan and Cheng harbored strong reservations about Sichuan units due to discipline issues, notably their rampant opium consumption. Under Sun Zhen's leadership, the 22nd Group Army deployed four of its six divisions to aid the Northern China effort. Organized under the 41st and 45th Armies, the contingent began a foot march toward Taiyuan on September 1, covering more than 50 days and approximately 1,400 kilometers. Upon reaching Shanxi, they faced a harsh, icy winter and had no winter uniforms or even a single map of the province. They nevertheless engaged the Japanese for ten days at Yangquan, suffering heavy casualties. Strapped for supplies, they broke into a Shanxi clique supply depot, which enraged Yan Xishan and led to their expulsion from the province. The 22nd withdrew westward into the 1st War Area, only to have its request for resupply rejected by Cheng Qian. Meanwhile to the south Colonel Rippei Ogisu led Japanese 13th Division to push westward from Nanjing in two columns during early February: the northern column targeted Mingguang, while the southern column aimed for Chuxian. Both routes were checked by Wei Yunsong's 31st Army, which had been assigned to defend the southern stretch of the Jinpu railway under Li Zongren. Despite facing a clearly inferior force, the Japanese could not gain ground after more than a month of sustained attacks. In response, Japan deployed armored and artillery reinforcements from Nanjing. The Chinese withdrew to the southwestern outskirts of Dingyuan to avoid a direct clash with their reinforced adversaries. By this point, Yu Xuezhong's 51st Army had taken up a defensive position on the northern banks of the Huai River, establishing a line between Bengbu and Huaiyuan. The Japanese then captured Mingguang, Dingyuan, and Bengbu in succession and pressed toward Huaiyuan. However, their supply lines were intercepted by the Chinese 31st Corps, which conducted flanking attacks from the southwest. The situation worsened when the Chinese 7th Army, commanded by Liao Lei, arrived at Hefei to reinforce the 31st Army. Facing three Chinese corps simultaneously, the Japanese were effectively boxed south of the Huai River and, despite air superiority and a superior overall firepower, could not advance further. As a result, the Chinese thwarted the Japanese plan to move the 13th Division north along the Jinpu railway and link up with the Isogai 10th Division to execute a pincer against Xuzhou. Meanwhile in the north, after amphibious landings at Qingdao, the Japanese 5th Division, commanded by Seishiro Itagaki, advanced southwest along the Taiwei Highway, spearheaded by its 21st Infantry Brigade. They faced Pang Bingxun's 3rd Group Army. Although labeled a Group Army, Pang's force actually comprised only the 40th Army, which itself consisted of the 39th Division from the Northwestern Army, commanded by Ma-Fawu. The 39th Division's five regiments delayed the Japanese advance toward Linyi for over a month. The Japanese captured Ju County on 22 February and moved toward Linyi by 2 March. The 59th Army, commanded by Zhang Zizhong, led its troops on a forced march day and night toward Linyi. Seizing the opportunity, the 59th Army did not rest after reaching Yishui. In the early morning of the 14th, Zhang Zizhong ordered the entire army to covertly cross the Yishui River and attack the right flank of the Japanese “Iron Army” 5th Division. They broke through enemy defenses at Tingzitou, Dataiping, Shenjia Taiping, Xujia Taiping, and Shalingzi. Initially caught off guard, the enemy sustained heavy losses, and over a night more than a thousand Japanese soldiers were annihilated. The 59th Army fought fiercely, engaging in brutal hand-to-hand combat. By 4:00 a.m. on the 17th, the 59th Army had secured all of the Japanese main positions. That same day, Pang Bingxun seized the moment to lead his troops in a fierce flank attack, effectively supporting the 59th Army's frontal assault. On the 18th, Zhang and Pang's forces attacked the Japanese from the east, south, and west. After three days and nights of bloody fighting, they finally defeated the 3rd Battalion of the 11th Regiment, which had crossed the river, and annihilated most of it. The 59th Army completed its counterattack but suffered over 6,000 casualties, with more than 2,000 Japanese killed or wounded. News of the Linyi victory prompted commendations from Chiang Kai-shek and Li Zongren. General Li Zongren, commander of the 5th War Zone, judged that the Japanese were temporarily unable to mount a large-scale offensive and that Linyi could be held for the time being. On March 20, he ordered the 59th Army westward to block the Japanese Seya Detachment. On March 21, the Japanese Sakamoto Detachment, after a brief reorganization and learning of the Linyi detachment, launched another offensive. The 3rd Corps, understrength and without reinforcements, was compelled to retreat steadily before the Japanese. General Pang Bingxun, commander of the 3rd Corps, urgently telegraphed Chiang Kai-shek, requesting reinforcements. Chiang Kai-shek received the telegram and, at approximately 9:00 AM on the 23rd, ordered the 59th Army to return to Linyi to join with the 3rd Corps in repelling the Sakamoto Detachment. Fierce fighting ensued with heavy Chinese losses, and the situation in Linyi again grew precarious. At a critical moment, the 333rd Brigade of the 111th Division and the Cavalry Regiment of the 13th Army were rushed to reinforce Linyi. Facing attacks from two directions, the Japanese withdrew, losing almost two battalions in the process. This engagement shattered the myth of Japanese invincibility and embarrassed commander Seishirō Itagaki, even startling IJA headquarters. Although the 5th Division later regrouped and attempted another push, it had lost the element of surprise. The defeat at Linyi at the hands of comparatively poorly equipped Chinese regional units set the stage for the eventual battle at Tai'erzhuang. Of the three Japanese divisions advancing into the Chinese 5th War Area, the 10th Division, commanded by Rensuke Isogai, achieved the greatest initial success. Departing from Hebei, it crossed the Yellow River and moved south along the Jinpu railway. With KMT General Han Fuju ordering his forces to desert their posts, the Japanese captured Zhoucun and reached Jinan with little resistance. They then pushed south along two columns from Tai'an. The eastern column captured Mengyin before driving west to seize Sishui; the western column moved southwest along the Jinpu railway, capturing Yanzhou, Zouxian, and Jining, before turning northwest to take Wenshang. Chiang Kai-shek subsequently ordered Li Zongren to employ “offensive defense”, seizing the initiative to strike rather than merely defend. Li deployed Sun Zhen's 22nd Group Army to attack Zouxian from the south, while Pang Bingxun's 40th Division advanced north along the 22nd's left flank to strike Mengyin and Sishui. Sun Tongxuan's 3rd Group Army also advanced from the south, delivering a two-pronged assault on the Japanese at Jining. Fierce fighting from 12 to 25 February, particularly by the 12th Corps, helped mitigate the reputational damage previously inflicted on Shandong units by Han Fuju. In response to Chinese counterattacks, the Japanese revised their strategy: they canceled their original plan to push directly westward from Nanjing toward Wuhan, freeing more troops for the push toward Xuzhou. On March 15, the Japanese 10th Division struck the Chinese 122nd Division, focusing the action around Tengxian and Lincheng. Chinese reinforcements from the 85th Corps arrived the following day but were driven back on March 17. With air support, tanks, and heavy artillery, the Japanese breached the Chinese lines on March 18. The remaining Chinese forces, bolstered by the 52nd Corps, withdrew to the town of Yixian. The Japanese attacked Yixian and overran an entire Chinese regiment in a brutal 24-hour engagement. By March 19, the Japanese began advancing on the walled town of Taierzhuang. To counter the Japanese advance, the Chinese 2nd Army Group under General Sun Lianzhong was deployed to Taierzhuang. The 31st Division, commanded by General Chi Fengcheng, reached Taierzhuang on March 22 and was ordered to delay the Japanese advance until the remainder of the Army Group could arrive. On March 23, the 31st Division sallied from Taierzhuang toward Yixian, where they were engaged by two Japanese battalions reinforced with three tanks and four armored cars. The Chinese troops occupied a series of hills and managed to defend against a Japanese regiment (~3,000 men) for the rest of the day. On March 24, a Japanese force of about 5,000 attacked the 31st Division. Another Japanese unit pressed the Chinese from Yixian, forcing them to withdraw back into Taierzhuang itself. The Japanese then assaulted the town, with a 300-strong contingent breaching the northeast gate at 20:00. They were subsequently driven back toward the Chenghuang temple, which the Chinese set on fire, annihilating the Japanese force. The next day, the Japanese renewed the assault through the breached gate and secured the eastern portion of the district, while also breaking through the northwest corner from the outside and capturing the Wenchang Pavilion. On March 25, a morning Japanese onslaught was repelled. The Japanese then shelled Chinese positions with artillery and air strikes. In the afternoon, the Chinese deployed an armored train toward Yixian, which ambushed a column of Japanese soldiers near a hamlet, killing or wounding several dozen before retreating back to Taierzhuang. By nightfall, three thousand Chinese troops launched a night assault, pushing the Japanese lines northeast to dawn. The following three days subjected the Chinese defenders to sustained aerial and artillery bombardment. The Chinese managed to repulse several successive Japanese assaults but sustained thousands of casualties in the process. On March 28, Chinese artillery support arrived, including two 155 mm and ten 75 mm pieces. On the night of March 29, the Japanese finally breached the wall. Setting out from the district's southern outskirts, a Chinese assault squad stormed the Wenchang Pavilion from the south and east, killing nearly the entire Japanese garrison aside from four taken as prisoners of war. The Chinese then retook the northwest corner of the district. Even by the brutal standards already established in the war, the fighting at Taierzhuang was fierce, with combatants facing one another at close quarters. Sheng Cheng's notes preserve the battlefield memories of Chi Fengcheng, one of the campaign's standout officers “We had a battle for the little lanes [of the town], and unprecedentedly, not just streets and lanes, but even courtyards and houses. Neither side was willing to budge. Sometimes we'd capture a house, and dig a hole in the wall to approach the enemy. Sometimes the enemy would be digging a hole in the same wall at the same time. Sometimes we faced each other with hand grenades — or we might even bite each other. Or when we could hear that the enemy was in the house, then we'd climb the roof and drop bombs inside — and kill them all.” The battle raged for a week. On April 1, General Chi requested volunteers for a near-suicide mission to seize a building: among fifty-seven selected, only ten survived. A single soldier claimed to have fired on a Japanese bomber and succeeded in bringing it down; he and his comrades then set the aircraft ablaze before another plane could arrive to rescue the pilot. One participant described the brutal conditions of the battle “"The battle continued day and night. The flames lit up the sky. Often all that separated our forces was a single wall. The soldiers would beat holes in the masonry to snipe at each other. We would be fighting for days over a single building, causing dozens of fatalities." The conditions were so brutal that Chinese officers imposed severe measures to maintain discipline. Junior officers were repeatedly forbidden to retreat and were often ordered to personally replace casualties within their ranks. Li Zongren even warned Tang Enbo that failure to fulfill his duties would lead him to be “treated as Han Fuju had been.” In Taierzhuang's cramped streets, Japan's artillery and air superiority offered little advantage; whenever either service was employed amid the dense melee, casualties were roughly even on both sides. The fighting devolved into close-quarters combat carried out primarily by infantry, with rifles, pistols, hand grenades, bayonets, and knives forming the core of each side's arsenal. The battle unfolded largely hand-to-hand, frequently in darkness. The stone buildings of Taierzhuang provided substantial cover from fire and shrapnel. It was precisely under these close-quarters conditions that Chinese soldiers could stand as equals, if not superior, to their Japanese opponents, mirroring, in some respects, the experiences seen in Luodian, Shanghai, the year before. On March 31, General Sun Lianzhong arrived to assume command of the 2nd Army Group. A Japanese assault later that day was repulsed, but a Chinese counterattack also stalled. At 04:00 on April 1, the Japanese attacked the Chinese lines with support from 11 tanks. The Chinese defenders, armed with German-made 37mm Pak-36 antitank guns, destroyed eight of the armored vehicles at point-blank range. Similar incidents recurred throughout the battle, with numerous Japanese tanks knocked out by Chinese artillery and by suicide squads. In one engagement, Chinese suicide bombers annihilated four Japanese tanks with bundles of grenades. On April 2 and 3, Chi urged the Chinese defenders around Taierzhuang's north station to assess the evolving situation. The troops reported distress, crying and sneezing, caused by tear gas deployed by the Japanese against Chinese positions at Taierzhuang's north station, but the defenders remained unmoved. They then launched a massive armored assault outside the city walls, with 30 tanks and 60 armored cars, yet managed only to drive the Chinese 27th Division back to the Grand Canal. The fighting continued to rage on April 4 and 5. By then, the Japanese had captured roughly two-thirds of Taierzhuang, though the Chinese still held the South Gate. It was through this entry point that the Chinese command managed to keep their troops supplied. The Chinese also thwarted Japanese efforts to replenish their dwindling stocks of arms and ammunition. In consequence, the Japanese attackers were worn down progressively. Although the Japanese possessed superior firepower, including cannon and heavy artillery, the cramped conditions within Taierzhuang nullified this advantage for the moment. The Chinese command succeeded in keeping their own supplies flowing, a recurring weakness in other engagements and also prevented the Japanese from replenishing their dwindling stock of arms and bullets. Gradually, the Japanese maneuvered into a state of attrition. The deadlock of the battle was broken by events unfolding outside Taierzhuang, where fresh Chinese divisions had encircled the Japanese forces in Taierzhuang from the flanks and rear. After consulting their German advisors earlier, the commanders of the 5th War Area prepared a double envelopment of the exposed Japanese forces in Taierzhuang. Between March and April 1938, the Nationalist Air Force deployed squadrons from the 3rd and 4th Pursuit Groups, fighter-attack aircraft, in long-distance air interdiction and close-air support of the Taierzhuang operations. Approximately 30 aircraft, mostly Soviet-made, were deployed in bombing raids against Japanese positions. On 26 March, Tang Enbo's 20th Army, equipped with artillery units, attacked Japanese forces at Yixian, inflicting heavy casualties and routing the survivors. Tang then swung south to strike the Japanese flank northeast of Taierzhuang. Simultaneously, the Chinese 55th Corps, comprised of two divisions, executed a surprise crossing of the Grand Canal and cut the railway line near Lincheng. As a result, Tang isolated the Japanese attackers from their rear and severed their supply lines. On 1 April, the Japanese 5th Division sent a brigade to relieve the encircled 10th Division. Tang countered by blocking the brigade's advance and then attacking from the rear, driving them south into the encirclement. On 3 April, the Chinese 2nd Group Army launched a counter-offensive, with the 30th and 110th Divisions pushing northward into Beiluo and Nigou, respectively. By 6 April, the Chinese 85th and 52nd Armies linked up at Taodun, just west of Lanling. The combined force then advanced north-westward, capturing Ganlugou. Two more Chinese divisions arrived a few days later. By April 5, Taierzhuang's Japanese units were fully surrounded, with seven Chinese divisions to the north and four to the south closing in. The Japanese divisions inside Taierzhuang had exhausted their supplies, running critically low on ammunition, fuel, and food, while many troops endured fatigue and dehydration after more than a week of brutal fighting. Sensing imminent victory, the Chinese forces surged with renewed fury and attacked the encircled Japanese, executing wounded soldiers where they lay with rifle and pistol shots. Chinese troops also deployed Soviet tanks against the defenders. Japanese artillery could not reply effectively due to a shortage of shells, and their tanks were immobilized by a lack of fuel. Attempts to drop supplies by air failed, with most packages falling into Chinese hands. Over time, Japanese infantry were progressively reduced to firing only their machine guns and mortars, then their rifles and machine guns, and ultimately resorted to bayonet charges. With the success of the Chinese counter-attacks, the Japanese line finally collapsed on April 7. The 10th and 5th Divisions, drained of personnel and ammunition, were forced to retreat. By this point, around 2,000 Japanese soldiers managed to break out of Taierzhuang, leaving thousands of their comrades dead behind. Some of the escapees reportedly committed hara-kiri. Chinese casualties were roughly comparable, marking a significant improvement over the heavier losses suffered in Shanghai and Nanjing. The Japanese had lost the battle for numerous reasons. Japanese efforts were hampered by the "offensive-defensive" operations carried out by various Chinese regional units, effectively preventing the three Japanese divisions from ever linking up with each other. Despite repeated use of heavy artillery, air strikes, and gas, the Japanese could not expel the Chinese 2nd Group Army from Taierzhuang and its surrounding areas, even as the defenders risked total annihilation. The Japanese also failed to block the Chinese 20th Group Army's maneuver around their rear positions, which severed retreat routes and enabled a Chinese counter-encirclement. After Han Fuju's insubordination and subsequent execution, the Chinese high command tightened discipline at the top, transmitting a stringent order flow down to the ranks. This atmosphere of strict discipline inspired even junior soldiers to risk their lives in executing orders. A “dare-to-die corps” was effectively employed against Japanese units. They used swords and wore suicide vests fashioned from grenades. Due to a lack of anti-armor weaponry, suicide bombing was also employed against the Japanese. Chinese troops, as part of the “dare-to-die” corps, strapped explosives such as grenade packs or dynamite to their bodies and charged at Japanese tanks to blow them up.  The Chinese later asserted that about 20,000 Japanese had perished, though the actual toll was likely closer to 8,000. The Japanese also sustained heavy material losses. Because of fuel shortages and their rapid retreat, many tanks, trucks, and artillery pieces were abandoned on the battlefield and subsequently captured by Chinese forces. Frank Dorn recorded losses of 40 tanks, over 70 armored cars, and 100 trucks of various sizes. In addition to vehicles, the Japanese lost dozens of artillery pieces and thousands of machine guns and rifles. Many of these weapons were collected by the Chinese for future use. The Chinese side also endured severe casualties, possibly up to 30,000, with Taierzhuang itself nearly razed. Yet for once, the Chinese achieved a decisive victory, sparking an outburst of joy across unoccupied China. Du Zhongyuan wrote of “the glorious killing of the enemy,” and even Katharine Hand, though isolated in Japanese-controlled Shandong, heard the news. The victory delivered a much-needed morale boost to both the army and the broader population. Sheng Cheng recorded evening conversations with soldiers from General Chi Fengcheng's division, who shared light-hearted banter with their senior officer. At one moment, the men recalled Chi as having given them “the secret of war. when you get food, eat it; when you can sleep, take it.” Such familiar, brisk maxims carried extra resonance now that the Nationalist forces had demonstrated their willingness and ability to stand their ground rather than retreat. The victors may have celebrated a glorious victory, but they did not forget that their enemies were human. Chi recalled a scene he encountered: he had picked up a Japanese officer's helmet, its left side scorched by gunpowder, with a trace of blood, the mark of a fatal wound taken from behind. Elsewhere in Taierzhuang, relics of the fallen were found: images of the Buddha, wooden fish, and flags bearing slogans. A makeshift crematorium in the north station had been interrupted mid-process: “Not all the bones had been completely burned.” After the battle, Li Zongren asked Sheng if he had found souvenirs on the battlefield. Sheng replied that he had discovered love letters on the corpses of Japanese soldiers, as well as a photograph of a girl, perhaps a hometown sweetheart labeled “19 years old, February 1938.” These details stood in stark contrast to news coverage that depicted the Japanese solely as demons, devils, and “dwarf bandits.” The foreign community noted the new, optimistic turn of events and the way it seemed to revive the resistance effort. US ambassador Nelson Johnson wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull from Wuhan just days after Taierzhuang, passing on reports from American military observers: one had spent time in Shanxi and been impressed by Communist success in mobilizing guerrilla fighters against the Japanese; another had spent three days observing the fighting at Taierzhuang and confirmed that “Chinese troops in the field there won a well-deserved victory over Japanese troops, administering the first defeat that Japanese troops have suffered in the field in modern times.” This reinforced Johnson's view that Japan would need to apply far more force than it had anticipated to pacify China. He noted that the mood in unoccupied China had likewise shifted. “Conditions here at Hankow have changed from an atmosphere of pessimism to one of dogged optimism. The Government is more united under Chiang and there is a feeling that the future is not entirely hopeless due to the recent failure of Japanese arms at Hsuchow [Xuzhou] . . . I find no evidence for a desire for a peace by compromise among  Chinese, and doubt whether the Government could persuade its army or its people to accept such a peace. The spirit of resistance is slowly spreading among the people who are awakening to a feeling that this is their war. Japanese air raids in the interior and atrocities by Japanese soldiers upon civilian populations are responsible for this stiffening of the people.”. The British had long been wary of Chiang Kai-shek, but Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, the British ambassador in China, wrote to the new British foreign secretary, Lord Halifax, on April 29, 1938, shortly after the Taierzhuang victory, and offered grudging credit to China's leader “[Chiang] has now become the symbol of Chinese unity, which he himself has so far failed to achieve, but which the Japanese are well on the way to achieving for him . . . The days when Chinese people did not care who governed them seem to have gone . . . my visit to Central China from out of the gloom and depression of Shanghai has left me stimulated and more than disposed to believe that provided the financial end can be kept up Chinese resistance may be so prolonged and effective that in the end the Japanese effort may be frustrated . . . Chiang Kai-shek is obstinate and difficult to deal with . . . Nonetheless [the Nationalists] are making in their muddlIn the exhilaration of a rare victory”. Chiang pressured Tang and Li to build on their success, increasing the area's troop strength to about 450,000. Yet the Chinese Army remained plagued by deeper structural issues. The parochialism that had repeatedly hampered Chiang's forces over the past six months resurfaced. Although the various generals had agreed to unite in a broader war of resistance, each prioritized the safety of his own troops, wary of any move by Chiang to centralize power. For example, Li Zongren refrained from utilizing his top Guangxi forces at Taierzhuang, attempting to shift the bulk of the fighting onto Tang Enbo's units. The generals were aware of the fates of two colleagues: Han Fuju of Shandong was executed for his refusal to fight, while Zhang Xueliang of Manchuria had allowed Chiang to reduce the size of his northeastern army and ended up under house arrest. They were justified in distrusting Chiang. He truly believed, after all, that provincial armies should come under a national military command led by himself. From a national-unity standpoint, Chiang's aim was not unreasonable. But it bred suspicion among other military leaders that participation in the anti-Japanese war would erode their own power. The fragmented command structure also hindered logistics, making ammunition and food supplies to the front unreliable and easy to cut off a good job of things in extremely difficult circumstances. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Chinese victory at the battle of Tairzhuang was a much needed morale boost after the long string of defeats to Japan. As incredible as it was however, it would amount to merely a bloody nose for the Imperial Japanese Army. Now Japan would unleash even more devastation to secure Xuzhou and ultimately march upon Wuhan.

1ER PODCAST DEL MISTERIO EN HABLA HISPANA DESDE 1993 TEMPORADA 32 DE LA LUZ DEL MISTERIO Vive el Misterio... Pasa, ponte cómodo y disfruta... FROM LONDON: Comenzamos la tercera experiencia de la temporada 32 de La nueva Luz del Misterio. Una experiencia única de comunicación de La Luz del Misterio esta semana a las impactantes imágenes muestran el impacto directo de un misil sobre un OVNI en China Una impactante explosión se registró después de que un misil aparentemente destruyera un objeto volador no identificado, lo que desató numerosas teorías sobre el verdadero impacto. Residentes de la provincia china de Shandong grabaron un objeto brillante y lento volando cerca del suelo momentos antes de que pareciera desintegrarse en un destello brillante y caer a la Tierra. Luego haremos un homenaje a la figura de Bram Stoker y sus escarceo con el mundo del misterio. Bram Stoker se asoció profundamente con el misterio y el terror, principalmente a través de su icónica novela Drácula, que estableció el arquetipo del vampiro moderno y fusionó mitos y realidad para crear una historia gótica. Su propia vida también estuvo marcada por el misterio, ya que de niño enfermizo se recuperó milagrosamente y, tras su muerte en 1912, su figura quedó eclipsada, pero su obra fue y sigue siendo fundamental en el género. Su madre le contaba historias de terror y misterio durante su infancia, una experiencia que influyó profundamente en su obra posterior. Cerraremos La Luz del Misterio de esta semana con un reportaje conociedo la Golden Dawn. La Orden Hermética de la Aurora Dorada (en latín: Ordo Hermeticus Aurorae Aureae, en inglés: Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn) fue una sociedad secreta dedicada al estudio y la práctica del ocultismo, el hermetismo y la metafísica entre finales del siglo XIX y comienzos del siglo XX. Es conocida como una orden mágica. Estuvo activa en Gran Bretaña y centró sus prácticas en la teúrgia y el desarrollo espiritual. Muchos de los conceptos actuales de rituales y de magia, como la Wicca y el Thelema, fueron inspirados por la Aurora Dorada, que se convirtió en una de las organizaciones más influyentes del ocultismo occidental del siglo XX. Un viaje apasionante hacia la historia de ser humano que puedes conocer a través de La Luz del Misterio en London Radio World y sus plataformas. ——————————————————— Síguenos a través de: edenex.es ZTR Radio.online London Radio World En Ivoox Itunes Spotify Amazon YouTube Si deseas apoyarnos: https://www.ivoox.com/ajx-apoyar_i1_support_29070_1.html Más información: laluzdelmisterioradio.blogspot.com laluzdelmisterio@gmail.com

NASA's SpaceX Crew 10 returns to Earth in a splash down off the coast of California. A Jielong-3 carrier rocket launched the Geely Constellation Group 04 satellites from the coastal waters off Shandong, China. ISRO announces that it will be launching another American satellite in the coming months, and more. Remember to leave us a 5-star rating and review in your favorite podcast app. Be sure to follow T-Minus on LinkedIn and Instagram. T-Minus Guest Our guest today is Patrick O'Neill, Public Affairs and Outreach Lead at the International Space Station US National Laboratory. You can connect with Patrick on LinkedIn, and learn more about the ISS National Lab on their website. Selected Reading NASA's SpaceX Crew-10 Mission Returns, Splashes Down Off California Zoomlion's Corporate-Named Satellite Enters Orbit, Marking a New Era in Engineering Machinery with Digital, Intelligent, Green, and Global Vision India's giant space leap: After NISAR mission, Isro to launch 6,500-kg US satellite DGX closes a €2.3M funding round to boost onboard AI compute for satellites Blue Origin Spaceflights Aboard New Shepard Can Now Be Purchased With Crypto and Stablecoins Through Shift4 Space log: Spacesuit unpacking, research and more for Shenzhou-20 crew - CGTN Safran DSI to Supply Electric Propulsion Systems for AstroForge's Upcoming Vestri Asteroid Mission Acting NASA Administrator Reflects on Legacy of Astronaut Jim Lovell T-Minus Crew Survey Complete our annual audience survey before August 31. Want to hear your company in the show? You too can reach the most influential leaders and operators in the industry. Here's our media kit. Contact us at space@n2k.com to request more info. Want to join us for an interview? Please send your pitch to space-editor@n2k.com and include your name, affiliation, and topic proposal. T-Minus is a production of N2K Networks, your source for strategic workforce intelligence. © N2K Networks, Inc. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In this week's episode of China Insider, Miles Yu discusses the Dalai Lama's 90thbirthday, and the implications of his succession for the future of Tibetan Buddhism, culture, and identity in the face of aggressive CCP interference. Next, Miles unpacks the extended docking of the Shandong carrier fleet in Hong Kong and highlights the significance of the local celebrations hosted by the CCP government in Hong Kong. Lastly, Miles details the preparations for China's 80th anniversary of victory in World War II, and examines the importance of the month's long celebrations to bolster CCP legitimacy.China Insider is a weekly podcast project from Hudson Institute's China Center, hosted by China Center Director and Senior Fellow, Dr. Miles Yu, who provides weekly news that mainstream American outlets often miss, as well as in-depth commentary and analysis on the China challenge and the free world's future.

①Chinese Premier Li Qiang calls on China, Egypt to deepen strategic coordination to safeguard common interests. (00:37)②The 11th Nishan Forum on World Civilizations takes place in China's Shandong province. How does it contribute to mutual understanding in today's polarized world? (12:19)③Donald Trump says the 50% tariff on copper imports will take effect on August 1. How will it impact US industries and consumers? (24:58)④Scientists warn that climate change is fueling more extreme weather. (34:46)⑤An interview with European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde (44:40)

Welcome to The Times of Israel's newest podcast series, Friday Focus. Each Friday, join diplomatic reporter Lazar Berman and host deputy editor Amanda Borschel-Dan for a deep dive into what's behind the news that spins the globe. We're still sifting through the facts and figuring out the results of the 12-day Israel-Iran war. But after every earthquake, there are aftershocks. Today, we’ll look at how this war has far-reaching effects on countries such as Russia, China, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. We begin the program by looking at China, which is hosting a gathering of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a China- and Russia-led regional security grouping. In attendance is Iran’s defense minister, Aziz Nasirzadeh. The conference is an attempt to build alternative international blocs to those backed by the United States, according to reporting on CNN. So, how does China fit in with the 12-day war? Our next stop is Russia. The world learned again that Russian military tech is no match for a first-class air force like the IDF after it failed to repel the Israeli attacks on Iranian nuclear sites. Berman weighs in on Russia's nuanced approach to the Israel-Iran war and its cautious moves to not upset the Trump administration. Reports of Iranians fleeing to bordering Turkey during the conflict were unsurprising, said Berman, since the NATO nation is a gateway to Europe. We hear how Turkey responded to the war. Looking towards Saudi Arabia, US special envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff reiterated Wednesday his belief that additional countries will join the Abraham Accords, which normalized ties between Israel and several Muslim nations. We learn what would have to happen for this to occur and how there may be a softening on Israel's part following the recent conflict with Iran. Friday Focus can be found on all podcast platforms. This episode was produced by the Pod-Waves and the video was edited by Thomas Girsch. IMAGE: (L-R) India's Defense Minister Rajnath Singh, Iran's Defence Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh, Kazakhstan's Defense Minister Dauren Kossanov, China's Defense Minister Dong Jun, Kyrgyzstan's Defense Minister Ruslan Mukambetov, Pakistan's Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif, and Russia's Defense Minister Andrei Belousov gather for a group photo during the Defense Ministers' Meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Member States in Qingdao, in eastern China's Shandong province on June 26, 2025. (Photo by Pedro PARDO / AFP) See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

  Last time we spoke about the Xi'an Incident. In December 1936, tensions in China erupted as Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek faced a revolt led by his commanders, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. Disillusioned by Chiang's focus on battling communists instead of the Japanese invaders, the generals swiftly captured him in a coup. Confined in Xi'an, Chiang initially resisted their demands for a united front against Japan but eventually engaged in negotiation with Zhang and the Chinese Communist Party. As public sentiment shifted against him, Chiang's predicament led to urgent discussions, culminating in an unexpected alliance with the communists. This pact aimed to consolidate Chinese resistance against Japanese aggression, marking a critical turning point in the Second Sino-Japanese War. By December 26, Chiang was released, and this uneasy collaboration set the stage for a more unified front against a common enemy, though underlying tensions remained between the factions.   #152 China Prepares for War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Before we jump into the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, which I honestly have no idea how long will take us, I thought it would be a good idea to dedicate two episodes to how both China and Japan prepared themselves for war.  Going all the way back to the 1910s, Chinese intellectuals began to view an outright conflict between Japan and China was inevitable. In the discussions about China's strategic options, Jiang Fangzhen pioneered a strategy of protracted warfare, a concept that would later shape China's approach during the Sino-Japanese War. Having studied in Japan during his youth, Jiang developed a keen understanding of the Japanese government and military. As early as 1917, he predicted that China and Japan would become embroiled in a long-term conflict, with the battleground likely to be west of the Peiping–Wuhan and Guangzhou–Wuhan railways. In his work titled "Guofang Lun" or “On National Defense”, Jiang reiterated the importance of protracted warfare as a means to thwart Japan's aspirations for a swift victory. He argued that China should leverage its vast population and extensive territory to extend the conflict, gradually wearing down Japanese strength and turning the situation to its advantage. Jiang recommended that China not focus on defending its coastal regions but instead confront the enemy west of the Peking–Wuhan Railway.   Chiang Kai-shek would eventually come to share Jiang's belief that “the longer the war drags on, the more advantageous it will be for China.” Despite significant public criticism, both the Nationalist government and General Zhang Xueliang, decided against military resistance when Japan invaded Manchuria in September 1931 and attacked Shanghai in 1932. Chiang was particularly hesitant to engage Japan directly, as he was also dealing with a Communist insurgency in central China. He feared that Chinese forces would suffer quick defeat, predicting that Japan would capture key coastal areas and critical infrastructure within just three days, crippling China by dismantling its military and economic lifelines. Following the invasion of North China Chiang was forced to adopt a firmer stance. The Nationalist government proposed a dual strategy of pursuing peace and security while simultaneously preparing for war. If peace proved impossible, China would mobilize its resources for ultimate victory through prolonged conflict. This approach was formalized in the National Defense Plan, which China adopted by prioritizing protracted warfare as its core strategy. After the Sino-Japanese clash in Shanghai on January 28, 1932, the Military Affairs Commission devised a plan that divided China into four defense areas along with a preparation area. While some troops were assigned local security, commanders were directed to concentrate their remaining forces for potential confrontations with Japan. That year, the Military Affairs Commission issued General Defense Guidelines that outlined two strategic responses to a potential Japanese invasion. The first, conservative approach focused on maintaining key positions and utilizing protracted warfare to impede the enemy. The second strategy advocated for decisive battles in key regions to thwart Japan's ambitions and protect China's territorial integrity, prioritizing disengagement from Japanese forces along the Yangtze River and coastline. In August 1935, German military adviser General Alexander von Falkenhausen provided recommendations to Chiang Kai-shek based on his predictions of Japanese advance routes into China. He identified three main routes: one from northern Hebei to Zhengzhou, the second from Shandong toward Xuzhou, and the third crossing the Yangtze River to Nanjing and onwards to Wuhan. He suggested treating the Yangtze River as the primary combat zone and highlighted Sichuan as a possible retreat area. Taking all of this into consideration. in 1936, a draft of a new National Defense Plan divided the country into four zones: a war zone, a defense zone, an internal security zone, and a preparation area. The war zone encompassed ten provinces and established strategies for retreating to predetermined defensive positions when necessary, with Sichuan designated as the main base for the war. In January 1937, the Chinese General Staff Department introduced its annual War Plan, outlining three possible military conflict regions between China and Japan. It proposed two main strategies: Proposal A emphasized sustained combat and retreat to fortified positions if the situation became unfavorable, aiming to eventually go on the offensive against Japan. Proposal B focused on repelling Japanese invasions along the coast and from the north, prioritizing counter offensives against Japanese units stationed near key locations. To prepare, the NRA completed several critical projects outlined in its plans, establishing military supply depots in Nanjing, Bengbu, Xinyang, Huayin, Nanchang, and Wuchang to manage logistics for supplies across various strategic railways. These depots were equipped to sustain the military, with ample ammunition and provisions, including 60 million rounds of small-arms ammunition and food for hundreds of thousands. Despite these preparations, not all projects were completed by the time war broke out in July 1937. In contrast to the Japanese military's tactics, Chinese forces prioritized defensive strategies. For example, at the Mount Lushan Military Officer Training Camp in July 1934, Chiang Kai-shek outlined four possible approaches against Japan, favoring a defense-as-offense strategy. Other options included building fortifications, tenaciously defending key positions, and employing guerrilla warfare through irregular forces to constrain enemy advances. Chiang stressed the importance of national mobilization for the war effort.  There was a significant disparity in equipment between the Japanese and Chinese armies. To give you an idea, each Japanese division included a mechanized group featuring thirty-nine light military vehicles and 21 light armored cars, supplemented by 6,000–7,000 horses, 200–300 automobiles, and specialized troops such as poison gas teams. In contrast, Nationalist divisions lacked any of these capabilities, a typical nationalist division theoretically had an armored regiment, but this unit was equipped with fewer than 72 armored vehicles. Another major weakness of the Nationalist forces was their insufficient artillery. In 1936, a division was officially assigned one artillery battalion, which was divided into three batteries totaling twelve guns. It also included a mechanized cannon company with four direct-fire weapons. By comparison, a Japanese division boasted four infantry regiments and one mountain artillery or field artillery regiment, with each artillery regiment comprising three field artillery battalions and one howitzer battalion. The infantry regiment itself included a mountain artillery section with four mountain guns, while the infantry battalion had one Type 70 mountain gun section with two guns. In total, a Japanese division possessed sixty-four artillery pieces of various calibers, four times the number of a Chinese division and of significantly higher quality. In reality, in 1936, twelve of the twenty elite Chinese “reformed divisions” still lacked artillery battalions. The ordnance available in the “reformed divisions” mostly consisted of the outdated Type 60 mountain gun. Nationwide, very few of the 200 divisions were equipped with any artillery, and those that did often used obsolete field artillery pieces or mountain artillery provided to local forces. Some units even relied on trench mortars as a makeshift solution. The artillery weapons came from various countries, but they frequently lacked necessary observation and signal components, and were often low on ammunition. The majority of mountain guns and field artillery were of the Type 75, which, while capable of providing fire support, had limited range and inflicted minimal damage. To give you an idea of the striking inadequacy of the Chinese artillery, during the Shanghai fighting in 1937, the mountain artillery of the Guangxi 21st Army Group could only reach targets within 1,200 yards, while Japanese field artillery had an effective range of 8,000 yards. Chinese-made mountain artillery suffered due to inferior steel-making technology; the gun shields were constructed from low-quality steel, and the barrels often overheated after firing just a few rounds, increasing the risk of explosions. Additionally, the equipment of local forces varied greatly in quality. In fact, some local units had superior equipment compared to Nationalist units. For example, before the Sino-Japanese War, troops from Yunnan were equipped with French antitank guns and heavy machine guns, which were better than the German water-cooled machine guns used by the Nationalist forces. However, the majority of local troops relied on inferior equipment; the 122nd Division under Wang Mingzhang from Sichuan, noted for its brave defense of Tengxian County during the Xuzhou Battle, was armed with locally produced light and heavy machine guns that frequently malfunctioned, and their Type 79 rifles, also made in Sichuan, were often outdated, with some dating back to the Qing Dynasty. These weapons had limited range and sometimes malfunctioned after fewer than one hundred rounds. Now before the war, both Nationalist and local forces acquired weaponry from diverse foreign and domestic sources. Even domestically produced weapons lacked standardization, with those made in Hanyang and Manchuria differing in design and specifications. Arms manufactured in Germany, France, Russia, Japan, and Italy were similarly inconsistent. Consequently, even within a single unit, the lack of uniformity created significant logistical challenges, undermining combat effectiveness, particularly in the early stages of the war. Despite Nationalist ordnance factories producing over three million rounds of small-arms ammunition daily, the incompatibility of ammunition and weapons diminished the usable quantity of ammunition. Chinese communications infrastructure was inadequate. In the Nationalist army, signal units were integrated into engineering units, leading to low-quality radio communications. In emergencies, telegrams could remain undelivered for days, and orders often had to be dispatched via postal services. By 1937, the entire country boasted only 3,000 military vehicles, necessitating heavy reliance on horses and mules for transport. To effectively equip twenty Nationalist divisions, 10,647 horses and 20,688 mules were needed, but by the end of 1935, only 6,206 horses and 4,351 mules were available. A statistic from 1936 indicated a 5 percent mortality rate among military horses, with some units experiencing a rate as high as 10 percent. The distribution of weaponry led to disputes during army reorganization efforts following the Northern Expedition. Although Chiang Kai-shek's forces were part of the regular army, the quality of their equipment varied significantly. Domestic production of weapons was limited, and imports could not close the gap. Priority was given to small arms; through army reorganization, Chiang aimed to diminish the influence of forces less loyal to him. Nationalist army staff officers observed that troops loyal to Chiang received the best weapons. Northwest and Northeast forces, having cultivated good relations with the KMT, were similarly better equipped, while Shanxi troops received inferior supplies. Troops associated with the Guangxi Clique were given even poorer quality weapons due to their leaders' stronger political ambitions. Troops regarded as “bandit forces,” such as those led by Shi Yousan, Li Hongchang, and Sun Dianying, were naturally assigned the least effective weaponry. This unequal distribution of arms increased some local forces' inclination to align with the KMT while alienating others, which inadvertently led to additional turmoil in the aftermath of the Northern Expedition. Logistical accounting within the Nationalist military was severely lacking. Military expenditures accounted for a significant portion of government spending, roughly 65.48 % in 1937, with personnel costs being the largest component. However, military units prioritized boosting their own resources over accurate accounting. Surpluses were not returned but rather utilized to reward military officers and soldiers for merits in battle, care for the wounded, or to create a reserve. Conversely, if deficits arose, troops would resort to “living off vacancies,” a practice in which they would fail to report desertions promptly and would falsely claim new soldiers had arrived. Military leaders typically appointed their most trusted subordinates to serve as accountants and logistic officers. As the war commenced, these issues became readily apparent. During the Battle of Shanghai in 1937, frontline soldiers sometimes went days without food and went months without pay. Wounded soldiers and civilians had to search tirelessly for medical treatment, and when main forces relocated, they often abandoned grain, ammunition, weapons, and petroleum along the way. General Chen Cheng, the commander in chief during the Battle of Shanghai, noted, “This phenomenon clearly revealed our inability to supply frontline troops, indicating that China remains a backward country with poor management.” Many logistical shortcomings severely impacted troop morale and combat effectiveness. In a 1933 speech, Chiang Kai-shek acknowledged that poor food, inadequate clothing, and ineffective logistics contributed to widespread desertion. Soldiers were further demoralized by reduced or embezzled salaries. A lack of professional medical staff and equipment hampered healthcare efforts, leading to high disease and mortality rates. According to official statistics from 1936, approximately 10 percent of soldiers fell ill annually, with a mortality rate as high as 5 percent. Japanese military authorities reported that one in three wounded Japanese soldiers died, while a Dutch military officer present during the early stages of the Sino-Japanese War observed that one in every two wounded Nationalist soldiers perished. Due to inadequate equipment and limited transport options, Nationalist forces were compelled to recruit farmers and rent vehicles, as they lacked essential facilities such as tents. This reliance on local resources inevitably led to frequent conflicts between military personnel and civilians. China is clearly a vast nation with an extensive coastline, requiring the construction of several significant fortresses during the modern era. These included Wusong, Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Jiangning, and Wuhan along the Yangtze River, as well as Zhenhai, Humen, and Changzhou along the seacoast. Except for the Wuhan fortress, built in 1929-1930, all other fortifications were established during the late Qing Dynasty and featured uncovered cannon batteries. These fortresses suffered from inadequate maintenance, and many of their components had become outdated and irreplaceable, rendering them militarily negligible. Following the January 1932 Shanghai Incident, the Japanese military destroyed the Wusong forts, leaving the entrance to the Yangtze River completely unfortified. Consequently, there were no defenses along the coastline from Jiangsu to Shandong, allowing the Japanese to land freely. In December 1932, the Military Affairs Commission established a fortress group tasked with constructing fortresses and defensive installations, seeking assistance from German military advisers. After the North China Incident in 1935, the Nationalist government accelerated the construction of defensive structures in line with national war planning, focusing particularly on Nanjing. The Nationalists prioritized building fortifications along the seacoast and the Yellow River, followed by key regions north of the Yellow River. The government also ordered a significant quantity of heavy artillery from Germany. This included several dozen pieces of flat-fire antiaircraft and dual-purpose heavy artillery, which were installed at fortifications in Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Nanjing, and Wuhan. By the summer of 1937, the construction of nine fortified positions was complete: Nanjing, Zhenjiang, Jiangyin, Ningbo, Humen, Mawei, Xiamen , Nantong, and Lianyungang. In total, China had established 41 forts and equipped them with 273 fortress cannons. Some defensive installations were poorly managed, with many units assigned to their perimeters lacking training and access to proper maps. The barbette positions in the fortresses were not well concealed and could hardly store sufficient ammunition. Troops stationed at these fortresses received little training. Despite these shortcomings, the fortresses and fortifications were not entirely ineffective. They bolstered Chinese positions along the defense line stretching from Cangxian County to Baoding and from Dexian County to Shijiazhuang, as well as in southern Shandong.  Before the war, China's political and economic center was situated along the seacoast and the Yangtze River. As Japanese influence expanded, the Nationalist government was compelled to establish bases in China's inner regions, very similar to how the USSR pulled back its industry further west after Operation barbarossa.The Japanese attack on Shanghai in 1932 prompted the Nationalists to relocate their capital to Luoyang. On March 5, during the Second Plenary Session of the KMT's Fourth Congress, the Western Capital Preparation Committee was formed to plan for the potential relocation of all governmental bodies to Xi'an in the event of full-scale war. In February 1933, the Central Political Conference approved the Northwest Development Bill, and in February 1934, the National Economic Commission set up a northwestern branch to oversee development projects in the region. On October 18, 1934, Chiang Kai-shek traveled to Lanzhou, recording in his diary that “Northwest China has abundant resources. Japan and Russia are poised to bully us. Yet, if we strengthen ourselves and develop northwest China to the fullest extent, we can turn it into a base for China's revival.” Interestingly, it was Sichuan, rather than the northwest, that became China's rear base during the 2nd Sino-Japanese War. In October 1934, the Communist army evacuated its Soviet base in southern China, initiating the Long March that would ultimately end in the northwest. By this time, Chiang Kai-shek had decided to designate Sichuan as the last stronghold for China. In January 1935, the Nanchang Field Headquarters of the Military Affairs Commission, responsible for combatting the Communists and serving as the supreme military and political authority over most provinces along the Yangtze River and central China, dispatched a special advisory group to Chongqing. Following this, the Nationalist army advanced into Sichuan. On February 10, the Nationalists appointed a new provincial government in Sichuan, effectively ending the province's long-standing regionalism. On March 2, Chiang traveled to Chongqing, where he delivered a speech underscoring that “Sichuan should serve as the base for China's revival.” He stated that he was in Sichuan to oversee efforts against the Communist army and to unify the provincial administration.  After the Xinhai revolution, the Republic of China was still suing the Qing Dynasty's conscription system. However, once in power, the Nationalist government sought to establish a national military service program. In 1933, it enacted a military service law, which began implementation in 1936. This law categorized military service into two branches: service in the Nationalist army and in territorial citizen army units. Men aged eighteen to forty-five were expected to serve in the territorial units if they did not enlist in the Nationalist army. The territorial service was structured into three phases: active service lasting two to three years, first reserves for six years, and second reserves until the age of forty-five. The Ministry of Military Affairs divided China into sixty divisional conscription headquarters, initially establishing these headquarters in the six provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, and Hubei. By December 1936, approximately 50,000 new soldiers had been drafted. The military service law disproportionately favored the middle and upper classes. Government personnel were exempt from enlistment, allowing privileged families to register their children with government agencies. Similarly, students in middle and higher education were excused from service, while youth from poorer backgrounds often felt compelled to enlist due to financial constraints that limited their educational opportunities. Village and town leaders were responsible for executing the recruitment process and frequently conspired with army recruiters. Recruitment principles often favored wealthier families, with guidelines stating that one son should be drafted for every three sons, two for five sons, but no drafts if there was only one son. Wealthy families could secure exemptions for all their male children, while poor families might see their only son conscripted if they were unable to provide the requisite bribe. Town and village heads wielded significant power in recruitment. This new recruitment system also created numerous money-making opportunities. Military personnel assigned to escort draftees to their units would often allow draftees to escape for a fee. Additionally, draftees could monetize their service by agreeing to serve as substitutes for others. For some, being drafted became an occupation. For example, in 1936, 600 individuals were drafted in the Wuhu area of Anhui province, and accounts from regional administrators indicated that every draftee had either been traded, replaced, or seized. Beginning in 1929, the Nationalist government also instituted military training for high school students and older individuals. Students were required to participate in one theoretical class and one practical class each week, totaling three hours. Starting in 1934, students had to complete a three-month military training program before graduating. Graduates of military academies were employed as military instructors. By the end of 1936, over 237,000 high school students had undergone military training. This student military training was overseen by the Society for the Implementation of the Three People's Principles of Sun Yat-sen, which also provided political education and sometimes gathered information on students' political beliefs.  Although the Nationalists made significant efforts to improve the military training of both officers and troops, they inherited deep-seated challenges that they were unable to completely overcome. A lack of facilities, outdated training manuals, low regard for military instructors, and the ongoing influence of regionalism and warlordism hindered progress. The Japanese would also later exploit these shortcomings of the Nationalist army. The Central Military Academy, which evolved from the Whampoa Military Academy established in 1923 in Guangzhou to train officers for the Northern Expedition, became the primary training institution for junior military officers. The academy offered a basic course, lasting eighteen months, which included general education, specialized training in various subjects, and field practice. This was followed by a two-year cadet training program focused on developing the skills necessary for junior military officers. Seventeen classes were admitted before the outbreak of war. Admission to the academy was highly competitive, with military officers receiving attractive salaries. For instance, in 1935, the academy received 10,000 applications for the twelfth class, but only 7% were accepted. Upon graduation, cadets were typically assigned to divisions within the Nationalist army loyal to Chiang Kai-shek. Their training, influenced by German advisors, resulted in a high-quality cadre. In modern China, most sergeants were veterans. While some units provided training for sergeants, a lack of formal education led to their diminished status. Truly qualified sergeants were rare. During his tenure as Minister of Military Training, General Bai Chongxi proposed establishing a sergeant school and creating a professional noncommissioned officer system; however, the Ministry of Military Affairs opposed this on financial grounds. While commanding officers enjoyed rapid promotions, military instructors did not. Furthermore, there was no system for transferring instructors to field commands or assigning commanders to military academies for extended periods. Despite minor updates to cover modern warfare concepts such as tank warfare and machine guns, Qing Dynasty military manuals were still in use at the Central Military Academy at the start of the war. Yeah, 1937 they were still rocking the old Qing books. Following the establishment of the Ministry of Military Training, a bureau for military translation was set up to evaluate existing course materials and translate military manuals, but its contributions were limited. Another significant shortcoming of military instruction focused on theory at the expense of practical application.  To enhance the quality of military officers, the Nationalist army instituted specialized schools for artillery, infantry, transport, engineering, and signals starting in 1931. These institutions were considered to have high-quality administrators and facilities. The Nationalists adopted German military training models, replacing the previously used Japanese models. They appointed German advisors to oversee instructor training at military academies and established three instructional divisions. By the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, 15,000 students had graduated from programs with a German military influence, resulting in the creation of about fifty combat divisions from these instructional units. However, the progress of other Nationalist army units was limited because their training was not aligned with contemporary battlefield realities. Before World War I, troops operated in close formations due to limited firepower. The widespread introduction of machine guns after World War I necessitated a shift to dispersed formations. Although a new drill manual issued by the Ministry of Military Training in 1935 introduced small-group tactics, few units adopted these methods. General Chen Cheng highlighted another underlying issue in 1938, commenting on the outmoded focus on parade ground drills and formal military manners. He noted, “We have paid too much attention to stereotypical formality and procedures of no practical use. Sometimes, even though soldiers could not get a haircut or take a bath for several months, their camps had to be in order. They underwent intensive training in close-order drill but learned little about gun handling, marksmanship, or maneuvering. This was inappropriate in peacetime, yet we continued this practice even after the Sino-Japanese War started, even using it on highly educated youth.” In contrast, the Communist army simplified training, emphasizing two essential skills: live-fire exercises and physical endurance, which significantly enhanced troop effectiveness in the challenging terrain characteristic of the Sino-Japanese War. Ultimately, the Nationalist army's training did not reach all soldiers. Only about half of all combat soldiers received adequate training, while the rest were neglected. According to statistics from the time, there were approximately five million military personnel during the Sino-Japanese War, with three million serving in logistics. Most of these logistics personnel had received little training, leading to disastrous consequences for overall combat effectiveness. As warfare has become more complex, the role of highly trained staff officers has become increasingly important. Napoleon developed operational plans close to the front and communicated orders via courier. During World War I, military commanders collected information at their headquarters and utilized telephones and automobiles to relay orders to the front lines. In World War II, with the battlefield expanding to include land, sea, and air, senior commanders often made decisions from headquarters far from the action, relying on a significant number of staff officers with specialized skills to keep them informed. In China, however, the staff officer system was underdeveloped. By 1937, only about 2,000 commanders and staff officers had received training. Prior to the Sino-Japanese War, most commanders managed staff work themselves, with staff officers serving primarily as military secretaries who drafted orders, reports, and maps. Many staff officers had no formal military training, and as a whole, the branch lacked respect, causing the most talented officers to avoid serving in it. The situation was even more dire for staff officer departments within local forces. For example, in March 1937, Liu Ziqing, a graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy, was appointed as the director of political instruction in the Forty-fourth Army, a unit under Sichuan warlord Liu Xiang. Liu Ziqing's account illustrates the dysfunction within the ranks: “The commander in chief was not supposed to manage the army and even did not know its whereabouts... But he could appoint relatives and former subordinates—who were officials and businessmen as well—to the army. Each month they would receive a small stipend. At headquarters, there was a long table and two rows of chairs. Around ten o'clock in the morning, senior officers signed in to indicate their presence. Those with other business would leave, while the remaining officers sat down to leisurely discuss star actresses, fortune-telling, business projects, mah-jongg, and opium. Occasionally they would touch on national affairs, chat about news articles, or share local gossip. In the afternoons, they primarily played mah-jongg, held banquets, and visited madams. Most mornings, the commander usually presided over these activities, and at first, I reported for duty as well. But I soon realized it was a waste of time and came very rarely. At headquarters, most staff members wore long gowns or Western-style suits, while military uniforms were a rare sight.” Most senior military personnel were trained at the Baoding Military Academy during the early republic. 2/3rds of commanders in chief, 37 %of army commanders, and 20 % of division commanders were Baoding graduates. Higher-ranking officers were more likely to have launched their careers there. In contrast, only 10 % of division commanders and a few army commanders were graduates of the Whampoa Military Academy. Additionally, commanders trained in local military schools and those with combat experience accounted for 1/3rd of all commanders. While the prevalence of civil war provided opportunities for rapid promotion, it also hindered officers' ability to update their training or gain experience in different military branches. German advisors expressed their concerns to Chiang Kai-shek, emphasizing that officers should first serve in junior roles before taking command. During one battle in 1938, Chiang noted, “Our commanders in chief are equivalent only to our enemy's regiment commanders, and our army and division commanders are only as competent as our enemy's battalion and company commanders.” Despite not viewing high-ranking Japanese officers as great strategists, Nationalist officers respected them as highly competent, diligent, and professional commanders who rarely made critical errors. The infantry was the primary component of the Nationalist army, with middle and junior infantry officers constituting over 80 %of all army officers. A 1936 registry of military officers listed 1,105 colonels and 2,159 lieutenant colonels within the infantry, demonstrating a significant outnumbering of Baoding graduates at ranks below lieutenant colonel. However, the quality of middle and junior infantry officers declined during the Sino-Japanese War; by 1944, only 27.3 % of these officers were from formal military academies, while those promoted from the ranks increased to 28.1 %. In 1937, 80 % of officers in an ordinary infantry battalion were military academy graduates, but this percentage dropped to 20 % during the war. Its hard to tell how educated soldiers were before the war, but it is generally believed that most were illiterate. In 1929, sociologist Tao Menghe surveyed 946 soldiers from a Shanxi garrison brigade and found that only 13 percent could compose a letter independently, while the rest had either never learned to read or were unable to write. In contrast, in August 1938, General Feng Yuxiang found that 80 percent of a regiment in Hunan were literate. Regardless, during the Sino-Japanese War, the quality of recruits steadily declined. More than 90 percent of soldiers were illiterate, and few possessed any basic scientific knowledge, which hindered their ability to master their weapons. On the battlefield, they heavily relied on middle and junior officers for guidance.  In autumn 1933, General Hans von Seeckt, the architect of the post World War I German army, visited China at the personal invitation of Chiang Kai-shek. In his recommendations for military reform, he identified China's greatest problem as its excessively large forces drawn from diverse backgrounds. He stated, “At present, the most pressing goal is to... establish a small, well-equipped army with high morale and combat effectiveness to replace the numerous poorly armed and trained forces.” He suggested forming an army of sixty divisions and recommended the establishment of a training regiment for military officers to equip them with the skills needed for modern warfare. Chiang Kai-shek accepted von Seeckt's proposals, and on January 26, 1935, he convened a National Military Reorganization Conference in Nanjing. On March 1, the Army Reorganization Bureau was established in Wuchang, under the leadership of General Chen Cheng. In the same month, General Alexander von Falkenhausen took charge of the German Military Advisors Group. Before war broke out, around nineteen divisions, roughly 300,000 troops received training from German advisors and were equipped with German-style weapons. At the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, the forces stemming from the First Army of the National Revolutionary Army and the Whampoa cadets, who had fought in the Northern Expedition, held the highest reputation and were referred to as the “core central forces” by the Japanese. Other notable forces included the Guangxi Army, Northwestern Army, Northeastern Army, some Uyghur units, the Guangdong Army, and the Shanxi Army. In contrast, provincial forces such as the Yunnan Army and Sichuan Army were viewed less favorably. Nationalist forces were generally far inferior to those of the Japanese enemy. In 1937, General He Yingqin noted that Nationalist forces had failed to prevail in 1932 and 1933, even when outnumbering the Japanese by 4-1.  In November 1937, during a national defense conference, Chiang Kai-shek stated, "In recent years we have worked hard, prepared actively, and achieved national unification. By the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, we were in a better domestic situation and had improved military preparedness compared to before. Since 1935, our strength has doubled. It increased by more than two to three times since January 1932 or September 1931 [when Japan attacked Shanghai and Mukden]. If peace had been achievable, we should have delayed the war for two or three years. Given an additional three years, our defensive capabilities would have been drastically different... Now, if we merely compare the military strength of China and Japan, we are certainly inferior." However, such assessments were overly optimistic, as Chiang failed to recognize that Japan's military capabilities would not have stagnated. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek certainly was dealt a difficult hand of cards for the upcoming poker match he was to play. Yet the Chinese were resilient and they had to be for the absolute horror that would be inflicted upon them from 1937-1945. Until this point, their enemies had been far more lenient, the Empire of Japan would show no mercy.

  Last time we spoke about the February 26th incident. Within the turbulent “ government of assassination” period of 1936 Japan, a faction of discontented junior officers, known as the Kodoha, believed that their emperor, Hirohito, was being manipulated by corrupt politicians. In a desperate bid for what they termed a "Showa Restoration," they meticulously plotted a coup d'état. On February 26, they launched a rebellion in Tokyo, attempting to assassinate key figures they deemed responsible for undermining the emperor's authority. The young officers executed coordinated attacks on prominent leaders, resulting in several deaths, while hoping to seize control of the Imperial Palace. However, their plan unraveled when their actions met with unexpected resistance, and they failed to secure strategic locations. Dark snow blanketed the city as Hirohito, outraged by the violence, quickly moved to suppress the uprising, which ultimately led to the downfall of the Kodoha faction and solidified the military's grip on power, ushering in a new era marked by militarism and radicalism.   #151 The Suiyuan Operation Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So we last left off with the February 26th incident breaking out in Japan, but now I would like to return to China. Now we spoke a little bit about some influential Japanese politicians in the previous episode. Prime Minister Satio Makoto oversaw Japan from May 1932 to July 1934, succeeded by Prime Minister Keisuke Okada from July 1934 to March 1936. The foreign policy of Japan towards China during the Saitō and Okada administrations exhibited a notable paradox, characterized by two conflicting elements. On one hand, Foreign Minister Hirota championed a diplomatic approach that emphasized friendship, cooperation, and accommodation with China. On the other hand, the military actively undermined the authority of the Nationalist government in northern China, creating a significant rift between diplomatic rhetoric and military action.    The Okada cabinet then endorsed the Army Ministry's "Outline of Policy to Deal with North China" on January 13, 1936. This policy document explicitly proposed the eventual detachment of five provinces, Hubei, Chahar, Shanxi, Suiyuan, and Shandong from the Nationalist government in Nanking. The approval of this outline marked a pivotal moment, as it represented the first official government endorsement of the military's longstanding agenda and underscored the army's evolution from a mere rogue entity operating in the region to the de facto authority dictating the course of Japan's policy towards China. Despite this, on January 22, during the 68th Diet session, Hirota reaffirmed his dedication to fostering better ties with China, to which a representative from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded positively. The Nationalist government in Nanjing also expressed interest in engaging in formal negotiations. However, this diplomatic initiative quickly faltered, and the expected discussions in Nanjing never took place. Shortly thereafter, a mutiny by young army officers on February 26, 1936, led to the fall of the Okada cabinet. Following Prince Konoe Fumimaro's refusal of the imperial mandate to form a new government, Hirota stepped in to establish a cabinet on March 9. General Terauchi Hisaichi was appointed as the Minister of the Army, Admiral Nagano Osami took charge of the Navy Ministry, and Baba Eiichi became the finance minister. Hirota briefly served as foreign minister until Arita Hachirö, who had just submitted his credentials as ambassador to China on March 6, returned to Japan. The Hirota Koki cabinet, established immediately following the February 26 incident further entrenched military influence in politics while allowing interservice rivalries to impede national objectives. In May 1936, Hirota, influenced by army and navy ministers, reinstated the practice of appointing military ministers solely from the ranks of high-ranking active-duty officers. He believed this would prevent associations with the discredited Imperial Way faction from regaining power. By narrowing the candidate pool and enhancing the army's power relative to the prime minister, Hirota's decision set the stage for army leaders to leverage this advantage to overthrow Admiral Yonai's cabinet in July 1940. Arita began his new job by meeting with Foreign Minister Chang Chen while hearing views from the Kwantung Army chief of staff General, Itagaki Seishiro. Yes, our old friend received a lot of promotions. Itagaki had this to say about the Kwantung Army's policy in China "The primary aim of Japan's foreign policy, is the sound development of Manchukuo based upon the principle of the indivisibility of Japan and Manchukuo. If, as is probable, the existing situation continues, Japan is destined sooner or later to clash with the Soviet Union, and the attitude of China at that time will gravely influence operations [against the Soviet Union]." The Kwantung Army's was growing more and more nervous about the USSR following its 7th comintern congress held in July and August of 1935. There it publicly designated Japan, Germany and Poland as its main targets of comintern actions. Japanese intelligence in the Red Army also knew the Soviets were gradually planning to expand the military strength so they could face a simultaneous west and east front war. This was further emboldened by the latest USSR 5 year plan. Alongside the growing Red northern menace, the CCP issued on August 1st a declaration calling upon the Nationalist Government to end their civil war so they could oppose Japan. By this time the CCP was reaching the end of its Long March and organizing a new base of operations in Yenan in northern Shanxi. The developments by the USSR and CCP had a profound effect on Japan's foreign policy in China. The Kwantung Army believed a war with the USSR was imminent and began to concentrate its main force along the border of Manchukuo. The Kwantung Army's plan in the case of war was to seize Vladivostok while advancing motorized units towards Ulan Bator in Outer Mongolia, hoping to threaten the Trans-Siberian Railway near Lake Baikal. Their intelligence indicated the USSR could muster a maximum of 250,000 troops in eastern Siberia and that Japan could deal with them with a force two-thirds of that number. The IJA at that point had inferior air forces and armaments, thus urgent funding was needed. The Kwantung Army proposed that forces in the home islands should be reduced greatly so all could be concentrated in Manchuria. To increase funding so Kwantung leadership proposed doing away with special allowances for Japanese officials in Manchuria and reorganizing the Japanese economic structure. The Kwantung leaders also knew the submarine base at Vladivostok posed a threat to Japanese shipping so the IJN would have to participate, especially against ports and airfields. All said and done, the Kwantung Army planned for a war set in 1941 and advised immediate preparations. On July 23, 1936, Kanji Ishiwara presented the army's document titled “Request Concerning the Development of Industries in Preparation for War” to the Army Ministry. He asserted that in order to prepare for potential conflict with the Soviet Union, Japan, Manchukuo, and North China must have the industries critical for war fully developed by 1941. Ishiwara emphasized the urgent need for rapid industrial growth, particularly in Manchukuo. He followed this request on July 29 with a draft of a “Policy on Preparations for War” regarding the Soviet Union, advocating for immediate reforms to Japan's political and economic systems to facilitate economic expansion and lay the groundwork for future fundamental changes. However, he cautioned that if significant turmoil erupted in economic sectors, Japan must be ready to execute a comprehensive overhaul without delay. At the same time, the Hirota cabinet initiated a review of its policy towards China. In the spring of 1936, a secret committee focused on the Current Situation was formed, consisting of officials from the Army, Navy, and Foreign ministries. Their discussions led to the adoption of the "Measures to Implement Policy toward China" by the Four Ministers Conference on August 11, along with the "Second Outline of Policy to Address North China," which the cabinet approved as part of the "Fundamentals of National Policy" on the same day. The first of these documents outlined the following actionable steps: “1. Conclusion of an anti-Communist military pact. a) To prepare for the conclusion of such a pact, a special secret committee of military experts from both countries should be organized. b) Their discussions should cover the scope and substance of the pact and ways and means of realizing the objectives of the pact.  2. Conclusion of a Sino-Japanese military alliance. A special secret committee, composed of an equal number of delegates from each nation, should be organized to prepare for the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance against attack by a third country.  3. Acceleration of solutions of pending questions between China and Japan. a) Engagement of a senior political adviser: The Nationalist government should engage a senior Japanese political adviser to assist in the conduct of the domestic and foreign affairs of the Nationalist government. b) Engagement of military advisers: The Nationalist government should engage military advisers, along with military instructors. c) Opening of airline services between China and Japan: Airline services between China and Japan should be opened immediately. To realize such a service, various means should be used to induce the Nanking authorities to establish an airline corporation in North China, to begin flights between Formosa and Fukien province, and to start test flights between Shanghai and Fukuoka. d) Conclusion of a reciprocal tariff treaty: A reciprocal tariff treaty should be concluded promptly between China and Japan, on the basis of the policy approved by the ministries concerned, with regard to the abolition of the special trade in eastern Hopei province and the lowering of the prohibitively high tariffs. For this purpose Japan should, if necessary, propose the creation of a special committee composed of Japanese and Chinese representatives.  4. Promotion of economic cooperation between China and Japan. Japan should promote cooperation with the common people of China to establish realistic and inseparable economic relations between China and Japan that will promote coexistence and co-prosperity and will be unaffected by changes in the Chinese political situation. “ The document also included suggestions for Japan's economic expansion into South China. This included tapping into the natural resources of the provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi, building a railway between Guangzhou and Swatow, and establishing air routes between Fuchoz and Taipei, which would connect to services in Japan and Thailand. It also called for survey teams to be dispatched to explore the resources of Sichuan, Gansu, Xinjiang, and Qinghai provinces, and for support to be provided to the independence movement in Inner Mongolia. However, these initiatives presented significant challenges. The preface to the "Second Outline of Policy to Deal with North China" cautioned, "In implementing this policy, we must carefully consider the Nanking government's prestige and avoid actions that could prompt it to adopt an anti-Japanese stance in response to the desires of the Chinese people."  On September 19th, six fundamental points for a settlement in North China were dictated to China to “establish a common defense against communism, promoting economic cooperation, lowering tariffs, initiating an airline service between the two nations, employing Japanese advisers, and controlling subversive Koreans." September 22 was set as the deadline for a response from China. While agreeing to some Japanese requests, the Chinese included several counter-demands that the Japanese found completely unacceptable. These demands required Japan to “(a) refrain from using armed intervention or arbitrary actions in its dealings with China, (b) recognize China as an equal and sovereign state, (c) avoid leveraging antigovernment groups or communist elements, and (d) remove any derogatory references to China from Japanese textbooks. The Chinese also insisted that any agreement regarding North China “must precede the annulment of the Tanggu and Shanghai cease-fire agreements, the disbanding of the East Hopei regime, a prohibition on unauthorized Japanese flights over North China, a ban on smuggling activities by Japanese, the restoration of China's right to control smuggling, and the disbandment of the illegal East Hopei government along with the armies of Wang Ying and Prince De in Suiyuan”. Now that mention of a Prince De in Suiyuan brings us to a whole new incident. This podcast series should almost be called “the history of Japanese related incidents in China”. Now we've spoken at great lengths about Japan's obsession with Manchuria. She wanted it for resources, growing space and as a buffer state. Japan also had her eyes set on Inner Mongolia to be used as a buffer state between Manchukuo, the USSR and China proper. Not to mention after the invasion of North China, Inner Mongolia could be instrumental as a wedge to be used to control Northern China. Thus the Kwantung Army began fostering a Mongolian independence movement back in August of 1933. They did so through a special organ led by chief of the general staff Koiso Kuniaki. He began work with the Silingol League led by Prince Sonormurabdan or “Prince So” and another influential Mongol, Prince Demchukdongrob or “Prince De”. Prince De was the West Sunid Banner in Northern Chahar. Likewise the Kwantung Army was grooming Li Xuxin, a Mongol commoner born in southern Manchuria. He had been a bandit turned soldier absorbed into Zhang Xueliangs army. Li had distinguished himself in a campaign against a group of Mongols trying to restore the Qing dynasty to further establish an independent Mongolia. During Operation Nekka Li had served in a cavalry brigade under Zu Xingwu, reputed to be the best unit in Zhang Xueliangs Northeastern border defense army. He led the army's advance unit into western Shandong. Afterwards Li suddenly became friends with Major Tanaka Hisashi, the head of the Special Service Agency at Dungliao where he defected to the Kwantung Army. He soon was leading a force too strong to be incorporated into the Manchukuo Army, thus it was disbanded, but his Kwantung Army buddies encouraged him to move to Tolun in Rehe province. At one point during the Nekka campaign, Li's army was threatened by a strong Chinese counterattack, but they had Manchukuo air support allowing them to capture Tolun. This victory launched what became the East Chahar Special Autonomous District with Li becoming a garrison commander and chief administrator.  Back in time, upon the founding of the Chinese Republic, the affairs of Inner Mongolia fell upon the Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs. This was reorganized in 1930 into the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs when the provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan and Ningxia were organized. Prince De had been a member of a nationalist group known as the Young Mongols, although his aim was self-determination for Inner Mongolia within China, not independence. The Nationalist government's support for Chinese settlement in Mongol territories and its disregard for Mongol perspectives quickly triggered a rise in Mongol nationalism and anti-Chinese feelings. This was exacerbated by the government's introduction of a law on October 12, 1931, requiring local Mongolian administrative units to consult with hsien officials on matters concerning their administration. The nationalist sentiment was further fueled by the presence of the neighboring Mongolian People's Republic in Outer Mongolia and the establishment of Xingan province in western Manchuria by Manchukuo authorities in March 1932. This new province included the tribes of eastern Inner Mongolia and granted them greater autonomy than other Manchukuo provinces while banning Chinese immigration into it. When Nanjing did not react to these developments, Prince De and his supporters took steps toward gaining autonomy. On July 15th, 1933, Mongol leaders from western Inner Mongolia gathered at Pailingmiao for two weeks to deliberate on a declaration for regional independence. Although many princes were initially hesitant to take this step, they reconvened on August 14 and sent a cable to Nanjing announcing their decision to create an autonomous Mongolian government. The cable was signed by Prince So and Prince De. Over the following two months, additional conferences at Pailingmiao were held to organize the new government, which would operate under Nanking's guidance but without involvement from provincial chairmen. On October 22, Prince Yun, head of the Ulanchap League and a close ally of Prince De, was elected to lead the new regime, with Prince De assuming the role of chief of its political affairs bureau. After receiving a cable from the Mongolian leaders in August, Nanjing quickly sent Minister of the Interior Huang Shao-hung and Xu Qingyang, head of the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, to halt the movement. However, the Mongols declined to travel to Kalgan or Kueisui to meet Huang. In November, as the leader of a special commission appointed by Nanjing, Huang reached an agreement with Yun De and other Mongolian leaders concerning a proposal that abandoned the Mongols' demand for an autonomous government. This agreement was later altered by Nanjing, and its essential points were excluded from a measure approved by the Central Political Council of the Kuomintang on January 17, 1934. The dispute reignited, fueled by the Nationalist government's rising concerns over the anticipated enthronement of Pu Yi in Manchukuo. On February 28, the Central Political Council enacted a measure that outlined "eight principles of Inner Mongolian autonomy" and created the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Council. Since these principles did not grant authority over foreign and military affairs, powers explicitly reserved for the central government in the January measure, they were seen as a concession to the Mongols and were accepted. On March 7, the central government issued regulations to establish a semi autonomous regime for Inner Mongolia, which was officially launched at Pailingmiao on April 23. Although the council was led by three moderate princes, Prince Yun, supported by Princes So and Sha, the real administrative authority was held by Prince De, who served as the secretary-general. Most of the twenty-five council members were of Mongolian royalty, through whom Prince De aimed to fulfill his objectives. Nevertheless, the Nationalist government seemed to consider the council merely a token gesture to placate De, as Nanking never provided the promised administrative funds outlined in the "eight principle declaration." Was not much of a shock Prince De sought support from the Kwantung Army, which had established contact with him as early as June 1934. Japanese pressures in North China were starting to alter the power dynamics, and after the first Western incident in Jehol in February 1935, it compelled the relocation of Sung Queyuan's army from Chahar to Hopei, providing encouragement to Prince De. In May, he met with Kwantung Army Vice Chief of Staff Itagaki Seishirö, Intelligence Section Chief Kawabe Torashirö, and staff officer Tanaka Ryükichi, where he was officially informed for the first time about the Kwantung Army's intention to assist him. On July 25, the Kwantung Army drafted its "Essentials of Policy toward Inner Mongolia," which regarded Japanese support for cooperation between De and Li Xuxin as part of their strategic preparations for a potential conflict with the Soviet Union. Shortly after this policy was adopted, a conflict arose over who had the authority to appoint the head of the Mongol Xukung banner, situated north of the Yellow River and Paot'ou. Following the death of the previous administrator, Prince Xu declared that he had taken control of the position. In response to a request from the local abbot, Prince Yun, acting in his capacity as chairman of the Mongolian Political Council, dismissed Xu. Xu then turned to Nanking through Suiyuan Provincial Chairman Fu Zuoyi, arguing that the central government held the authority to appoint heads of administrative units. In retaliation, Prince De dispatched troops to Xukung. On November 10, Fu presented a mediation proposal, which was rejected since it not only failed to acknowledge Shih's dismissal but also demanded the withdrawal of De's forces. De refused to pull back, further intensifying his hostility toward the Nanking government. In December, the Kwantung Army attempted to move Li's forces from eastern Chahar into the six Xun to the north of Kalgan, which serves as Chahar's granary. Following the Qin-Doihara agreement, Matsui Gennosuke from the Kalgan Special Service Agency secured a deal to separate these six districts from the southern region predominantly populated by Chinese; a Mongolian peace preservation corps was tasked with maintaining order in the northern area, while a Chinese corps was responsible for the south. During the discussions for an autonomous regime centered around Song Queyuan in North China in November 1935, Kwantung Army troops were concentrated around Gubeikou. To exert pressure on Song's rear, the Kwantung Army proposed replacing the Chinese peace preservation unit in the area north of Kalgan with Li Xuxin's army, which would establish this territory as its base.   The operation commenced on December 8. In a surprise attack just before dawn, Li captured Paochang. By December 12, despite facing strong Chinese resistance and the heaviest snowfall in sixty years, Li, aided by Kwantung Army planes disguised as those of the Manchukuo Airline Corporation, had taken control of Kuyuan. Further advances were halted by an order from Kwantung Army headquarters, and on December 13, it was reported that, had the operation not been stopped, Tokyo would have issued an imperial command. The operation had faced opposition from the Tientsin army, which feared it would weaken Song Queyuan's position just as they were informing Tokyo that the autonomy movement was going smoothly. Additionally, both Britain and the United States publicly expressed strong opposition to the Kwantung Army's involvement in the autonomy movement. However, the directive was ultimately prompted by the emperor's anger upon discovering that a unit of the Kwantung Army led by Colonel Matsui Takurö had advanced to Tolun to support Li's progress. Although Li's advance was halted, the operation undeniably contributed to the formation of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council.   Although the operation was halted, the Kwantung Army remained committed to its objectives. They contended that Li's army's advance into the six districts north of Kalgan was merely a peace preservation unit moving into territory within the truce line established by the Tanggu Agreement. Consequently, on December 29, they ordered Li to advance southward. Li peacefully occupied Changpei the following day and entered Shangtu on December 31. Manchukuo civil officials were appointed to oversee the six districts, and the currency of Manchukuo was introduced, although the existing tax system initially remained unchanged. The Kwantung Army allocated silver worth 6 million yuan to support administrative expenses. This outcome, known as the Eastern Chahar incident, marked a complete success for the Kwantung Army, which then redirected its focus toward Suiyuan Province. Each year, the Kwantung Army developed a secret plan for covert operations for the following year. The 1936 plan included strategies to secure air bases for routes connecting Europe and Asia, targeting Tsinghai and Sinkiang provinces, Outer Mongolia, Western Mongolia, and even remote areas of Ningxia province. In January 1936, staff officer Tanaka Ryūkichi formulated a document titled "Essentials of Policy Toward (Northwestern) Inner Mongolia." This document advocated for the establishment of a Mongolian military government to facilitate Japanese operations in northwestern Mongolia and suggested pushing Fu Tso-yi out of Suiyuan into Shansi province. Tanaka's proposals were incorporated into the final plan of the Kwantung Army, ultimately leading to the Suiyuan incident of November 1936. In February 1936, a meeting at Pailingmiao, where Prince De proposed the independence of Inner Mongolia, resulted in the departure of Prince So and several other Mongolian leaders from the coalition. They sought to establish a rival political council at Kueisui under the protection of Fu Zuoyi. By April, De and his supporters decided to form a military government at Tehua in Chahar, which was officially inaugurated in June as the Inner Mongolian government, headed by De with Li Shou-hsin as his deputy. This new government quickly signed a mutual assistance treaty with Manchukuo, and the emperor granted De the title of prince.   In July, at a conference in Tehua, Tanaka was appointed as the head of the Special Service Agency for Inner Mongolia with the mission of implementing the army's Intelligence Section plans. He traveled to Pingtiqüan alongside Chief of Staff Itagaki and Intelligence Chief Mutō Akira to propose a local anti-Communist agreement to Fu. After failing to convince Fu, he attempted to persuade Sun Tien-ying to form a puppet army but managed to recruit only a bandit from Suiyuan, Wang Ying. The February 26 mutiny in Tokyo heightened anti-Japanese sentiments in China, resulting in increased violence. By August, the construction of an airplane hangar in Paot'ou was halted due to riots by local Chinese residents. On August 13, a group of fifteen Japanese, led by Nakajima Manzo, was ambushed while delivering ammunition to a pro-Japanese leader who was shortly thereafter assassinated. Chinese soldiers from Wang Qingkuo's 70th Division carried out the attack, and tensions escalated as the arrival of ammunition and Japanese laborers in Kalgan prompted border villages to strengthen their defenses.   By late September, Tanaka's "Guidelines for the Execution of the Suiyuan Operation" received approval, with operations set to commence in early November. The plan evolved from a covert mission into a personal initiative by Tanaka, financed largely through funds from the Kwantung Army's secret services and profits from special trading in eastern Hopei. Tanaka claimed to have transported 600,000 yen to Tehua in October and later sent 200,000 yuan into Inner Mongolia, estimating total expenses at approximately 6 million yen. He acquired new weaponry from the disbanded Northeast Army and established three clandestine forces: Wang Ying led 500 men, including artillery; Qin Xiashan commanded 3,000 from Sun Tienying's army; and Chang Futang also led 3,000 specialized units. During strategic meetings, Tanaka dismissed proposals for unified command and refusing to integrate secret units into the Mongolian army. He advocated for the slogan "Overthrow Chiang Kai-shek," while Matsui managed to include "Independence for Inner Mongolia."   The Japanese had developed the entire battle strategy. The 1st Army, commanded by Li Xuxin, would serve as the left flank, while the 2nd Army, led by Demchugdongrub, would be positioned on the right. Wang Ying's forces were designated as the central force. Their initial targets would be Hongort, Xinghe, Tuchengzi, and Guisui city, followed by a division to seize Jinging, Baotou, and Hetao. On November 13, Prince Demchugdongrub's and Wang Ying's forces left Shandu in two columns to assault Xinghe and Hongort. By the 15th, 1,500 troops reached Hongort, where they engaged the 1st Cavalry Division led by Peng Yubin. The next day, Ryukichi Tanaka, Demchugdongrub's chief advisor, sent two cavalry brigades and one infantry brigade to capture the town, effectively overrunning its defenders. Meanwhile, Wang Ying dispatched a smaller group to secure Tuchengzi.   Fu Zuoyi established his headquarters in Jining that same day. After assessing the situation, he concluded that if the enemy secured Hongort, it would diminish his defenders' morale. Consequently, he launched a counterattack. Peng Yubin led a joint force of the 1st Cavalry Division and Dong Qiwu's 218th Brigade to confront around 400 of Wang Ying's men defending Hongort and Tuchengzi. By 7 AM on the 18th, Tuchengzi was reclaimed, and at 8:30 AM, the 1st Cavalry Division entered Hongort, charging through 500 of Wang Ying's soldiers. The struggle for Hongort persisted for over three days, resulting in nearly 1,000 casualties before Fu Zuoyi regained control.   As the tide shifted against the invaders, Fu Zuoyi initiated an offensive toward the Bailing Temple, the rear base of the enemy, well-stocked and defended by 3,000 men under Prince Demchugdongrub. Fu Zuoyi ordered the 2nd Cavalry Division, along with the 211th and 315th Brigades, the 21st Artillery Regiment, and a convoy of 20 trucks and 24 armored vehicles to assault the Bailing Temple as quickly as possible. Taking advantage of the Mongolian chaos, Fu Zuoyi's 35th Brigade executed a flanking maneuver west of the Bailing Temple amid a severe snowstorm.   At 1 AM on the 24th, the battle for the Bailing Temple commenced as the Chinese engaged the Mongolians for the fortified positions around the temple. From 2 to 4 AM, the Chinese advanced closer to the temple walls, facing artillery and machine-gun fire. They launched desperate frontal assaults against the city gates, suffering heavy losses. A fierce stalemate ensued, with Japanese aerial bombardments causing significant casualties to the Chinese forces. Fu Zuoyi subsequently ordered all armored vehicles to converge at the main city gate. Despite intense fire, the armored cars managed to breach the gate, allowing Chinese infantry to flood into the temple area. The resulting carnage within the temple walls led to 900 Mongol deaths, with 300 captured as the rest fled. The Chinese suffered 300 casualties but secured the strategically vital rear base, along with a substantial stockpile of provisions, including 500 barrels of petrol, 600 rifles, 10 machine guns, vehicles, and field guns. Following the devastating defeat at Bailing Temple, the invaders regrouped at Xilamuleng Temple. On the 28th, the Japanese sent 100 vehicles to transport 3,000 troops to prepare for a significant counteroffensive to recapture Bailing Temple. On the 29th, Wang Ying personally led 2,000 cavalry north of Shangdu to Taolin in an attempt to contain the enemy. However, after he left the bulk of his forces at Xilamuleng Temple, officers from the Grand Han Righteous Army secretly began negotiating to defect to the Chinese side, undermining the forces needed for the counterattack against Bailing Temple.   The counteroffensive commenced on December 2nd, with 10 armored vehicles and 1,000 Mongol troops leading the charge at 6 AM. They were pushed back by the heavily fortified 211th Brigade, which was well-supplied with machine guns and artillery. The following day, at 3 AM, the Mongols attempted a surprise attack but faced an ambush as they crept toward the temple. They incurred hundreds of casualties, with 230 men either captured or having defected. After this, the counterattack stalled, as the Mongol forces couldn't approach within 3 miles of the temple. Subsequently, the Chinese 2nd Cavalry Division launched a pincer maneuver, causing significant casualties among the invaders. By 9 AM, the enemy had suffered 500 casualties and was in retreat. At 7 PM, Fu Zuoyi ordered another counteroffensive. By the next morning, hundreds more had been lost, and several hundred soldiers were captured. With such heavy losses, the defense of Xilamuleng Temple weakened significantly, prompting more officers to defect to the Chinese. Late on the 4th, Fu Zuoyi assembled a force comprising two cavalry regiments, one infantry regiment, one artillery battalion, four armored vehicles, and a squadron of cars to launch a nighttime assault on Xilamuleng Temple.   Meanwhile, the 2nd Cavalry Division clashed with Wang Ying's cavalry 30 miles northeast of Wulanhua. Wang Ying's 2,000 cavalry had been raiding nearby villages to create diversions, drawing enemy forces away from the Bailing-Xilamuleng theater. By the 9th, Wang Ying's cavalry were encircled in Xiaobei, where they were nearly annihilated, with Wang escaping with around a hundred guards toward Changpei. On the 7th, some Grand Han Righteous Army officers set in motion plans to defect to the Chinese side. Early on the 9th, these officers led their men to invade the residence of Japanese advisors, killing all 27 Japanese officers under Colonel Obama. Simultaneously, Fu Zuoyi's forces executed a flanking maneuver against the Xilamuleng Temple amidst the chaos. With mass defections, the Chinese forces surged into the temple area, resulting in the invader army disintegrating in confusion and surrender. After seizing the temple, the invaders were routed, their lines of communication severed, and only isolated pockets continued to resist. Taking advantage of the confusion, Fu Zuoyi launched simultaneous attacks, attempting to capture Shangdu. However, Yan Xishan sent him a telegram, ordering him to halt, stating that Shangdu fell under the jurisdiction of Shanxi and not Suiyuan.   In response to the loss, Tanaka planned a counteroffensive with Qin's troops, but Chiang kai-shek commanded a strong defense of Pailingmiao, successfully outmaneuvering Tanaka's strategies. The resurgence of Chinese forces led to the disintegration of Qin's troops, who revolted and eventually joined the Nationalist army. The Kwantung Army aimed to redeploy its forces for recovery but faced opposition from Tokyo, which criticized the situation. After Chiang kai-shek was kidnapped by Zhang Xueliang on December 12, Tanaka and Prince De seized the opportunity to reassess their strategy. Ultimately, the Kwantung Army decided to abandon efforts to reclaim Pailingmiao, marking the official end of hostilities on December 21. The Suiyuan incident ultimately strengthened Chinese resolve against Japan and increased international distrust.   The defeat of Japan's proxy forces inspired many Chinese to advocate for a more vigorous resistance against the Japanese. The triumph in Suiyuan was celebrated throughout China and surprised the international media, marking the first occasion where the Chinese army successfully halted a Japanese unit. Delegations traveled from as distant as southern Chinese provinces to encourage the defenders to continue their fight. Captured Japanese weapons and equipment served as proof of Japan's involvement in the conflict, despite Japan's Foreign Minister Hachirō Arita claiming that "Japan was not involved in this conflict in Suiyuan at all." After his defeat, Prince Demchugdongrub and his Inner Mongolian troops retreated to northern Chahar, where he had to reconstruct his army due to significant losses. The Japanese implemented new regulations for the Mongolian Army to enhance its effectiveness, and efforts to recruit new soldiers commenced.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. More incidents and more battles to seize territory raged in North China. However things did not go according to plan for the Japanese and their puppets. The tides had turned, and now a more angry and invigorating China would begin lashing out against the encroachment. It was only a matter of time before a full blown war was declared. 

More than 300 guests from 95 countries and regions attended the 4th CMG Forum in Qufu, Shandong province with the aim to strengthen communication and mutual learning, deepen innovation collaboration, and inject new momentum into building an open and inclusive international communication ecosystem. / Is stress inherited (13:22)? On the show: Steve Hatherly, Niu Honglin & Laiming

China surrounded Taiwan with warships and jets in a major military drill, calling it a warning to President Lai Ching-te. The PLA deployed the Shandong carrier group and practiced joint air-land strikes. The Philippines' top general said war is “inevitable” if Taiwan is invaded and warned that China is infiltrating Filipino institutions. U.S. and Philippine forces will soon launch large-scale joint drills. Meanwhile, Russia expanded its military draft, Germany deployed troops to NATO's eastern flank, and Britain declared Russia a national threat.Rick Wiles, Doc Burkhart. Airdate 4/1/25Join the leading community for Conservative Christians! https://www.FaithandValues.comYou can partner with us by visiting TruNews.com, calling 1-800-576-2116, or by mail at PO Box 399 Vero Beach, FL 32961.Get high-quality emergency preparedness food today from American Reserves!https://www.AmericanReserves.com             It's the Final Day! The day Jesus Christ bursts into our dimension of time, space, and matter. Now available in eBook and audio formats! Order Final Day from Amazon today!https://www.amazon.com/Final-Day-Characteristics-Second-Coming/dp/0578260816/Apple users, you can download the audio version on Apple Books!https://books.apple.com/us/audiobook/final-day-10-characteristics-of-the-second-coming/id1687129858Purchase the 4-part DVD set or start streaming Sacrificing Liberty today.https://www.sacrificingliberty.com/watchThe Fauci Elf is a hilarious gift guaranteed to make your friends laugh! Order yours today!https://tru.news/faucielf

Welcome to China Compass on the Fight Laugh Feast Network! I'm your China travel guide, Missionary Ben. You can follow me on X (@chinaadventures) where I post daily reminders to pray for China (PrayforChina.us). You can also email me with any questions or comments @ bfwesten at gmail dot com. You can also find easy links to everything we are involved in @ PrayGiveGo.us! Summary Today I begin by discussing Jimmy Lai (the Hong Kong Tucker Carlson) and his bold comments about Xi Jinping (2:11), followed by looking at the Chinese dictator's struggle with his military and his weaponization of China's endemic corruption (12:42). Next we look at China's flip flopping its private tutor laws (22:18), which I know quite well. Finally I talk all about Shandong (29:50) and share fascinating stories of the missionaries and martyrs who lived and died there, including the famous “Chariots of Fire” Olympian Eric Liddell (41:29). In the News: Jimmy Lai’s Criticism of Xi Jinping: https://hongkongfp.com/hong-kongs-jimmy-lai/ https://hongkongfp.com/2024/12/19/chinas-problems-with-the-west-could-only-be-resolved-by-xi-jinping-stepping-down-jimmy-lai-tells-security-law-trial/ Xi Jinping’s Military Troubles: https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/Analysis-China-military-in-disarray-over-Xi-s-monopoly-on-power https://www.cfr.org/blog/six-takeaways-pentagons-report-chinas-military https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/05/china/china-xi-military-purge-analysis-intl-hnk Xi Jinping’s Tutoring Ban Backfires https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/Analysis-How-Xi-Jinping-s-tutoring-school-ban-backfired Pray for China Province of the Week: Shandong (East of the Mountains) Shandong on China’s Eastern Seaboard is matched up with the state of Virginia for prayer. See which Chinese province your state is praying for @ PrayforChina.us! Wikipedia Profile: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shandong Asia Harvest Overview & Intro: https://www.asiaharvest.org/china-resources/shandong https://www.asiaharvest.org/china-resources/shandong/introduction-to-shandong-province Shandong Missionaries & Martyrs: https://www.asiaharvest.org/china-resources/shandong/1899-sidney-brooks https://www.asiaharvest.org/china-resources/shandong/1945-eric-liddell https://www.asiaharvest.org/china-resources/shandong/1967-pastor-tian https://www.asiaharvest.org/china-resources/shandong/2003-zhang-hongmei Recommended Resources: Shandong: The Revival Province (China Chronicles #1) https://www.asiaharvest.org/bookstore/Shandong-The-Revival-Province-The-China-Chronicles-N%C2%BA1-p283331051 UNBEATEN: Arrested, Interrogated, and Deported from China www.Unbeaten.vip