Podcasts about sino japanese war

The extraordinary life of forgotten World War II hero Evans Carlson, commander of America's first special forces, secret confidant of FDR, and one of the most controversial officers in the history of the Marine Corps, who dedicated his life to bridging the cultural divide between the United States and China“He was a gutsy old man.” “A corker,” said another. “You couldn't find anyone better.” They talked about him in hushed tones. “This Major Carlson,” wrote one of the officers in a letter home, “is one of the finest men I have ever known.”These were the words of the young Marines training to be among the first U.S. troops to enter the Second World War—and the Major Carlson they spoke of was Evans Carlson, a man of mythical status even before the war that would make him a military legend.By December of 1941, at the age of forty-five, Carlson had already faced off against Sandinistas in the jungles of Nicaragua and served multiple tours in China, where he embedded with Mao's Communist forces during the Sino-Japanese War. Inspired by their guerilla tactics and their collaborative spirit—which he'd call “gung ho,” introducing the term to the English language—and driven by his own Emersonian ideals of self-reliance, Carlson would go on to form his renowned Marine Raiders, the progenitors of today's special operations forces, who fought behind Japanese lines on Makin Island and Guadalcanal, showing Americans a new way to do battle.In The Raider, Cundill Prize–winning historian Stephen R. Platt gives us the first authoritative account of Carlson's larger-than-life exploits: the real story, based on years of research including newly discovered diaries and correspondence in English and Chinese, with deep insight into the conflicted idealism about the Chinese Communists that would prove Carlson's undoing in the McCarthy era.Tracing the rise and fall of an unlikely American war hero, The Raider is a story of exploration, of cultural (mis)understanding, and of one man's awakening to the sheer breadth of the world. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

The transformation of Japan from hermit kingdom to imperial power happened with breathtaking speed. When American Commodore Perry's "black ships" steamed into Tokyo Bay in the 1850s, they shattered Japan's 250-year isolation with technology that seemed to come "from 200 years in the future." This technological gap created a constitutional crisis that would ultimately topple the Tokugawa Shogunate and usher in the Meiji Restoration of 1868.Jonathan Clements guides us through this pivotal period where Japan found itself facing what one historian calls "an invitation to an alien game" - forced to adopt international norms and institutions they never agreed to. Rather than becoming colonized like China or India, Japan's new leaders determined to become players in this global power game. They systematically studied Western nations, adopting what they perceived as the best elements of each: a German-style army, British naval technology, and aspects of French law.This selective modernization happened against a backdrop of growing militarism and expansionism, particularly toward Korea - strategically described as "the dagger at the heart of Japan." The 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War demonstrated Japan's new capabilities, but the subsequent "Triple Intervention" by Russia, France and Germany (forcing Japan to abandon territorial gains) created a humiliation that would fuel future aggression.Throughout this period, the Japanese government struggled with "gekokujō" - military insubordination where officers initiated "incidents" that expanded Japanese influence without authorization. The assassination of Korea's Queen Min by Japanese agents exemplifies this dangerous pattern where unauthorized actions expanded imperial control while undermining civilian government - creating precedents that would ultimately lead Japan toward its catastrophic Pacific War.Whether you're interested in East Asian history, imperial expansion, or the roots of 20th century conflict, this exploration of Japan's rapid transformation reveals how quickly a nation can reinvent itself - for better or worse.You can send a message to the show/feedback by clicking here. The system doesn't let me reply so if you need one please include your email.

  Last time we spoke about the Xi'an Incident. In December 1936, tensions in China erupted as Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek faced a revolt led by his commanders, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. Disillusioned by Chiang's focus on battling communists instead of the Japanese invaders, the generals swiftly captured him in a coup. Confined in Xi'an, Chiang initially resisted their demands for a united front against Japan but eventually engaged in negotiation with Zhang and the Chinese Communist Party. As public sentiment shifted against him, Chiang's predicament led to urgent discussions, culminating in an unexpected alliance with the communists. This pact aimed to consolidate Chinese resistance against Japanese aggression, marking a critical turning point in the Second Sino-Japanese War. By December 26, Chiang was released, and this uneasy collaboration set the stage for a more unified front against a common enemy, though underlying tensions remained between the factions.   #152 China Prepares for War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Before we jump into the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, which I honestly have no idea how long will take us, I thought it would be a good idea to dedicate two episodes to how both China and Japan prepared themselves for war.  Going all the way back to the 1910s, Chinese intellectuals began to view an outright conflict between Japan and China was inevitable. In the discussions about China's strategic options, Jiang Fangzhen pioneered a strategy of protracted warfare, a concept that would later shape China's approach during the Sino-Japanese War. Having studied in Japan during his youth, Jiang developed a keen understanding of the Japanese government and military. As early as 1917, he predicted that China and Japan would become embroiled in a long-term conflict, with the battleground likely to be west of the Peiping–Wuhan and Guangzhou–Wuhan railways. In his work titled "Guofang Lun" or “On National Defense”, Jiang reiterated the importance of protracted warfare as a means to thwart Japan's aspirations for a swift victory. He argued that China should leverage its vast population and extensive territory to extend the conflict, gradually wearing down Japanese strength and turning the situation to its advantage. Jiang recommended that China not focus on defending its coastal regions but instead confront the enemy west of the Peking–Wuhan Railway.   Chiang Kai-shek would eventually come to share Jiang's belief that “the longer the war drags on, the more advantageous it will be for China.” Despite significant public criticism, both the Nationalist government and General Zhang Xueliang, decided against military resistance when Japan invaded Manchuria in September 1931 and attacked Shanghai in 1932. Chiang was particularly hesitant to engage Japan directly, as he was also dealing with a Communist insurgency in central China. He feared that Chinese forces would suffer quick defeat, predicting that Japan would capture key coastal areas and critical infrastructure within just three days, crippling China by dismantling its military and economic lifelines. Following the invasion of North China Chiang was forced to adopt a firmer stance. The Nationalist government proposed a dual strategy of pursuing peace and security while simultaneously preparing for war. If peace proved impossible, China would mobilize its resources for ultimate victory through prolonged conflict. This approach was formalized in the National Defense Plan, which China adopted by prioritizing protracted warfare as its core strategy. After the Sino-Japanese clash in Shanghai on January 28, 1932, the Military Affairs Commission devised a plan that divided China into four defense areas along with a preparation area. While some troops were assigned local security, commanders were directed to concentrate their remaining forces for potential confrontations with Japan. That year, the Military Affairs Commission issued General Defense Guidelines that outlined two strategic responses to a potential Japanese invasion. The first, conservative approach focused on maintaining key positions and utilizing protracted warfare to impede the enemy. The second strategy advocated for decisive battles in key regions to thwart Japan's ambitions and protect China's territorial integrity, prioritizing disengagement from Japanese forces along the Yangtze River and coastline. In August 1935, German military adviser General Alexander von Falkenhausen provided recommendations to Chiang Kai-shek based on his predictions of Japanese advance routes into China. He identified three main routes: one from northern Hebei to Zhengzhou, the second from Shandong toward Xuzhou, and the third crossing the Yangtze River to Nanjing and onwards to Wuhan. He suggested treating the Yangtze River as the primary combat zone and highlighted Sichuan as a possible retreat area. Taking all of this into consideration. in 1936, a draft of a new National Defense Plan divided the country into four zones: a war zone, a defense zone, an internal security zone, and a preparation area. The war zone encompassed ten provinces and established strategies for retreating to predetermined defensive positions when necessary, with Sichuan designated as the main base for the war. In January 1937, the Chinese General Staff Department introduced its annual War Plan, outlining three possible military conflict regions between China and Japan. It proposed two main strategies: Proposal A emphasized sustained combat and retreat to fortified positions if the situation became unfavorable, aiming to eventually go on the offensive against Japan. Proposal B focused on repelling Japanese invasions along the coast and from the north, prioritizing counter offensives against Japanese units stationed near key locations. To prepare, the NRA completed several critical projects outlined in its plans, establishing military supply depots in Nanjing, Bengbu, Xinyang, Huayin, Nanchang, and Wuchang to manage logistics for supplies across various strategic railways. These depots were equipped to sustain the military, with ample ammunition and provisions, including 60 million rounds of small-arms ammunition and food for hundreds of thousands. Despite these preparations, not all projects were completed by the time war broke out in July 1937. In contrast to the Japanese military's tactics, Chinese forces prioritized defensive strategies. For example, at the Mount Lushan Military Officer Training Camp in July 1934, Chiang Kai-shek outlined four possible approaches against Japan, favoring a defense-as-offense strategy. Other options included building fortifications, tenaciously defending key positions, and employing guerrilla warfare through irregular forces to constrain enemy advances. Chiang stressed the importance of national mobilization for the war effort.  There was a significant disparity in equipment between the Japanese and Chinese armies. To give you an idea, each Japanese division included a mechanized group featuring thirty-nine light military vehicles and 21 light armored cars, supplemented by 6,000–7,000 horses, 200–300 automobiles, and specialized troops such as poison gas teams. In contrast, Nationalist divisions lacked any of these capabilities, a typical nationalist division theoretically had an armored regiment, but this unit was equipped with fewer than 72 armored vehicles. Another major weakness of the Nationalist forces was their insufficient artillery. In 1936, a division was officially assigned one artillery battalion, which was divided into three batteries totaling twelve guns. It also included a mechanized cannon company with four direct-fire weapons. By comparison, a Japanese division boasted four infantry regiments and one mountain artillery or field artillery regiment, with each artillery regiment comprising three field artillery battalions and one howitzer battalion. The infantry regiment itself included a mountain artillery section with four mountain guns, while the infantry battalion had one Type 70 mountain gun section with two guns. In total, a Japanese division possessed sixty-four artillery pieces of various calibers, four times the number of a Chinese division and of significantly higher quality. In reality, in 1936, twelve of the twenty elite Chinese “reformed divisions” still lacked artillery battalions. The ordnance available in the “reformed divisions” mostly consisted of the outdated Type 60 mountain gun. Nationwide, very few of the 200 divisions were equipped with any artillery, and those that did often used obsolete field artillery pieces or mountain artillery provided to local forces. Some units even relied on trench mortars as a makeshift solution. The artillery weapons came from various countries, but they frequently lacked necessary observation and signal components, and were often low on ammunition. The majority of mountain guns and field artillery were of the Type 75, which, while capable of providing fire support, had limited range and inflicted minimal damage. To give you an idea of the striking inadequacy of the Chinese artillery, during the Shanghai fighting in 1937, the mountain artillery of the Guangxi 21st Army Group could only reach targets within 1,200 yards, while Japanese field artillery had an effective range of 8,000 yards. Chinese-made mountain artillery suffered due to inferior steel-making technology; the gun shields were constructed from low-quality steel, and the barrels often overheated after firing just a few rounds, increasing the risk of explosions. Additionally, the equipment of local forces varied greatly in quality. In fact, some local units had superior equipment compared to Nationalist units. For example, before the Sino-Japanese War, troops from Yunnan were equipped with French antitank guns and heavy machine guns, which were better than the German water-cooled machine guns used by the Nationalist forces. However, the majority of local troops relied on inferior equipment; the 122nd Division under Wang Mingzhang from Sichuan, noted for its brave defense of Tengxian County during the Xuzhou Battle, was armed with locally produced light and heavy machine guns that frequently malfunctioned, and their Type 79 rifles, also made in Sichuan, were often outdated, with some dating back to the Qing Dynasty. These weapons had limited range and sometimes malfunctioned after fewer than one hundred rounds. Now before the war, both Nationalist and local forces acquired weaponry from diverse foreign and domestic sources. Even domestically produced weapons lacked standardization, with those made in Hanyang and Manchuria differing in design and specifications. Arms manufactured in Germany, France, Russia, Japan, and Italy were similarly inconsistent. Consequently, even within a single unit, the lack of uniformity created significant logistical challenges, undermining combat effectiveness, particularly in the early stages of the war. Despite Nationalist ordnance factories producing over three million rounds of small-arms ammunition daily, the incompatibility of ammunition and weapons diminished the usable quantity of ammunition. Chinese communications infrastructure was inadequate. In the Nationalist army, signal units were integrated into engineering units, leading to low-quality radio communications. In emergencies, telegrams could remain undelivered for days, and orders often had to be dispatched via postal services. By 1937, the entire country boasted only 3,000 military vehicles, necessitating heavy reliance on horses and mules for transport. To effectively equip twenty Nationalist divisions, 10,647 horses and 20,688 mules were needed, but by the end of 1935, only 6,206 horses and 4,351 mules were available. A statistic from 1936 indicated a 5 percent mortality rate among military horses, with some units experiencing a rate as high as 10 percent. The distribution of weaponry led to disputes during army reorganization efforts following the Northern Expedition. Although Chiang Kai-shek's forces were part of the regular army, the quality of their equipment varied significantly. Domestic production of weapons was limited, and imports could not close the gap. Priority was given to small arms; through army reorganization, Chiang aimed to diminish the influence of forces less loyal to him. Nationalist army staff officers observed that troops loyal to Chiang received the best weapons. Northwest and Northeast forces, having cultivated good relations with the KMT, were similarly better equipped, while Shanxi troops received inferior supplies. Troops associated with the Guangxi Clique were given even poorer quality weapons due to their leaders' stronger political ambitions. Troops regarded as “bandit forces,” such as those led by Shi Yousan, Li Hongchang, and Sun Dianying, were naturally assigned the least effective weaponry. This unequal distribution of arms increased some local forces' inclination to align with the KMT while alienating others, which inadvertently led to additional turmoil in the aftermath of the Northern Expedition. Logistical accounting within the Nationalist military was severely lacking. Military expenditures accounted for a significant portion of government spending, roughly 65.48 % in 1937, with personnel costs being the largest component. However, military units prioritized boosting their own resources over accurate accounting. Surpluses were not returned but rather utilized to reward military officers and soldiers for merits in battle, care for the wounded, or to create a reserve. Conversely, if deficits arose, troops would resort to “living off vacancies,” a practice in which they would fail to report desertions promptly and would falsely claim new soldiers had arrived. Military leaders typically appointed their most trusted subordinates to serve as accountants and logistic officers. As the war commenced, these issues became readily apparent. During the Battle of Shanghai in 1937, frontline soldiers sometimes went days without food and went months without pay. Wounded soldiers and civilians had to search tirelessly for medical treatment, and when main forces relocated, they often abandoned grain, ammunition, weapons, and petroleum along the way. General Chen Cheng, the commander in chief during the Battle of Shanghai, noted, “This phenomenon clearly revealed our inability to supply frontline troops, indicating that China remains a backward country with poor management.” Many logistical shortcomings severely impacted troop morale and combat effectiveness. In a 1933 speech, Chiang Kai-shek acknowledged that poor food, inadequate clothing, and ineffective logistics contributed to widespread desertion. Soldiers were further demoralized by reduced or embezzled salaries. A lack of professional medical staff and equipment hampered healthcare efforts, leading to high disease and mortality rates. According to official statistics from 1936, approximately 10 percent of soldiers fell ill annually, with a mortality rate as high as 5 percent. Japanese military authorities reported that one in three wounded Japanese soldiers died, while a Dutch military officer present during the early stages of the Sino-Japanese War observed that one in every two wounded Nationalist soldiers perished. Due to inadequate equipment and limited transport options, Nationalist forces were compelled to recruit farmers and rent vehicles, as they lacked essential facilities such as tents. This reliance on local resources inevitably led to frequent conflicts between military personnel and civilians. China is clearly a vast nation with an extensive coastline, requiring the construction of several significant fortresses during the modern era. These included Wusong, Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Jiangning, and Wuhan along the Yangtze River, as well as Zhenhai, Humen, and Changzhou along the seacoast. Except for the Wuhan fortress, built in 1929-1930, all other fortifications were established during the late Qing Dynasty and featured uncovered cannon batteries. These fortresses suffered from inadequate maintenance, and many of their components had become outdated and irreplaceable, rendering them militarily negligible. Following the January 1932 Shanghai Incident, the Japanese military destroyed the Wusong forts, leaving the entrance to the Yangtze River completely unfortified. Consequently, there were no defenses along the coastline from Jiangsu to Shandong, allowing the Japanese to land freely. In December 1932, the Military Affairs Commission established a fortress group tasked with constructing fortresses and defensive installations, seeking assistance from German military advisers. After the North China Incident in 1935, the Nationalist government accelerated the construction of defensive structures in line with national war planning, focusing particularly on Nanjing. The Nationalists prioritized building fortifications along the seacoast and the Yellow River, followed by key regions north of the Yellow River. The government also ordered a significant quantity of heavy artillery from Germany. This included several dozen pieces of flat-fire antiaircraft and dual-purpose heavy artillery, which were installed at fortifications in Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Nanjing, and Wuhan. By the summer of 1937, the construction of nine fortified positions was complete: Nanjing, Zhenjiang, Jiangyin, Ningbo, Humen, Mawei, Xiamen , Nantong, and Lianyungang. In total, China had established 41 forts and equipped them with 273 fortress cannons. Some defensive installations were poorly managed, with many units assigned to their perimeters lacking training and access to proper maps. The barbette positions in the fortresses were not well concealed and could hardly store sufficient ammunition. Troops stationed at these fortresses received little training. Despite these shortcomings, the fortresses and fortifications were not entirely ineffective. They bolstered Chinese positions along the defense line stretching from Cangxian County to Baoding and from Dexian County to Shijiazhuang, as well as in southern Shandong.  Before the war, China's political and economic center was situated along the seacoast and the Yangtze River. As Japanese influence expanded, the Nationalist government was compelled to establish bases in China's inner regions, very similar to how the USSR pulled back its industry further west after Operation barbarossa.The Japanese attack on Shanghai in 1932 prompted the Nationalists to relocate their capital to Luoyang. On March 5, during the Second Plenary Session of the KMT's Fourth Congress, the Western Capital Preparation Committee was formed to plan for the potential relocation of all governmental bodies to Xi'an in the event of full-scale war. In February 1933, the Central Political Conference approved the Northwest Development Bill, and in February 1934, the National Economic Commission set up a northwestern branch to oversee development projects in the region. On October 18, 1934, Chiang Kai-shek traveled to Lanzhou, recording in his diary that “Northwest China has abundant resources. Japan and Russia are poised to bully us. Yet, if we strengthen ourselves and develop northwest China to the fullest extent, we can turn it into a base for China's revival.” Interestingly, it was Sichuan, rather than the northwest, that became China's rear base during the 2nd Sino-Japanese War. In October 1934, the Communist army evacuated its Soviet base in southern China, initiating the Long March that would ultimately end in the northwest. By this time, Chiang Kai-shek had decided to designate Sichuan as the last stronghold for China. In January 1935, the Nanchang Field Headquarters of the Military Affairs Commission, responsible for combatting the Communists and serving as the supreme military and political authority over most provinces along the Yangtze River and central China, dispatched a special advisory group to Chongqing. Following this, the Nationalist army advanced into Sichuan. On February 10, the Nationalists appointed a new provincial government in Sichuan, effectively ending the province's long-standing regionalism. On March 2, Chiang traveled to Chongqing, where he delivered a speech underscoring that “Sichuan should serve as the base for China's revival.” He stated that he was in Sichuan to oversee efforts against the Communist army and to unify the provincial administration.  After the Xinhai revolution, the Republic of China was still suing the Qing Dynasty's conscription system. However, once in power, the Nationalist government sought to establish a national military service program. In 1933, it enacted a military service law, which began implementation in 1936. This law categorized military service into two branches: service in the Nationalist army and in territorial citizen army units. Men aged eighteen to forty-five were expected to serve in the territorial units if they did not enlist in the Nationalist army. The territorial service was structured into three phases: active service lasting two to three years, first reserves for six years, and second reserves until the age of forty-five. The Ministry of Military Affairs divided China into sixty divisional conscription headquarters, initially establishing these headquarters in the six provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, and Hubei. By December 1936, approximately 50,000 new soldiers had been drafted. The military service law disproportionately favored the middle and upper classes. Government personnel were exempt from enlistment, allowing privileged families to register their children with government agencies. Similarly, students in middle and higher education were excused from service, while youth from poorer backgrounds often felt compelled to enlist due to financial constraints that limited their educational opportunities. Village and town leaders were responsible for executing the recruitment process and frequently conspired with army recruiters. Recruitment principles often favored wealthier families, with guidelines stating that one son should be drafted for every three sons, two for five sons, but no drafts if there was only one son. Wealthy families could secure exemptions for all their male children, while poor families might see their only son conscripted if they were unable to provide the requisite bribe. Town and village heads wielded significant power in recruitment. This new recruitment system also created numerous money-making opportunities. Military personnel assigned to escort draftees to their units would often allow draftees to escape for a fee. Additionally, draftees could monetize their service by agreeing to serve as substitutes for others. For some, being drafted became an occupation. For example, in 1936, 600 individuals were drafted in the Wuhu area of Anhui province, and accounts from regional administrators indicated that every draftee had either been traded, replaced, or seized. Beginning in 1929, the Nationalist government also instituted military training for high school students and older individuals. Students were required to participate in one theoretical class and one practical class each week, totaling three hours. Starting in 1934, students had to complete a three-month military training program before graduating. Graduates of military academies were employed as military instructors. By the end of 1936, over 237,000 high school students had undergone military training. This student military training was overseen by the Society for the Implementation of the Three People's Principles of Sun Yat-sen, which also provided political education and sometimes gathered information on students' political beliefs.  Although the Nationalists made significant efforts to improve the military training of both officers and troops, they inherited deep-seated challenges that they were unable to completely overcome. A lack of facilities, outdated training manuals, low regard for military instructors, and the ongoing influence of regionalism and warlordism hindered progress. The Japanese would also later exploit these shortcomings of the Nationalist army. The Central Military Academy, which evolved from the Whampoa Military Academy established in 1923 in Guangzhou to train officers for the Northern Expedition, became the primary training institution for junior military officers. The academy offered a basic course, lasting eighteen months, which included general education, specialized training in various subjects, and field practice. This was followed by a two-year cadet training program focused on developing the skills necessary for junior military officers. Seventeen classes were admitted before the outbreak of war. Admission to the academy was highly competitive, with military officers receiving attractive salaries. For instance, in 1935, the academy received 10,000 applications for the twelfth class, but only 7% were accepted. Upon graduation, cadets were typically assigned to divisions within the Nationalist army loyal to Chiang Kai-shek. Their training, influenced by German advisors, resulted in a high-quality cadre. In modern China, most sergeants were veterans. While some units provided training for sergeants, a lack of formal education led to their diminished status. Truly qualified sergeants were rare. During his tenure as Minister of Military Training, General Bai Chongxi proposed establishing a sergeant school and creating a professional noncommissioned officer system; however, the Ministry of Military Affairs opposed this on financial grounds. While commanding officers enjoyed rapid promotions, military instructors did not. Furthermore, there was no system for transferring instructors to field commands or assigning commanders to military academies for extended periods. Despite minor updates to cover modern warfare concepts such as tank warfare and machine guns, Qing Dynasty military manuals were still in use at the Central Military Academy at the start of the war. Yeah, 1937 they were still rocking the old Qing books. Following the establishment of the Ministry of Military Training, a bureau for military translation was set up to evaluate existing course materials and translate military manuals, but its contributions were limited. Another significant shortcoming of military instruction focused on theory at the expense of practical application.  To enhance the quality of military officers, the Nationalist army instituted specialized schools for artillery, infantry, transport, engineering, and signals starting in 1931. These institutions were considered to have high-quality administrators and facilities. The Nationalists adopted German military training models, replacing the previously used Japanese models. They appointed German advisors to oversee instructor training at military academies and established three instructional divisions. By the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, 15,000 students had graduated from programs with a German military influence, resulting in the creation of about fifty combat divisions from these instructional units. However, the progress of other Nationalist army units was limited because their training was not aligned with contemporary battlefield realities. Before World War I, troops operated in close formations due to limited firepower. The widespread introduction of machine guns after World War I necessitated a shift to dispersed formations. Although a new drill manual issued by the Ministry of Military Training in 1935 introduced small-group tactics, few units adopted these methods. General Chen Cheng highlighted another underlying issue in 1938, commenting on the outmoded focus on parade ground drills and formal military manners. He noted, “We have paid too much attention to stereotypical formality and procedures of no practical use. Sometimes, even though soldiers could not get a haircut or take a bath for several months, their camps had to be in order. They underwent intensive training in close-order drill but learned little about gun handling, marksmanship, or maneuvering. This was inappropriate in peacetime, yet we continued this practice even after the Sino-Japanese War started, even using it on highly educated youth.” In contrast, the Communist army simplified training, emphasizing two essential skills: live-fire exercises and physical endurance, which significantly enhanced troop effectiveness in the challenging terrain characteristic of the Sino-Japanese War. Ultimately, the Nationalist army's training did not reach all soldiers. Only about half of all combat soldiers received adequate training, while the rest were neglected. According to statistics from the time, there were approximately five million military personnel during the Sino-Japanese War, with three million serving in logistics. Most of these logistics personnel had received little training, leading to disastrous consequences for overall combat effectiveness. As warfare has become more complex, the role of highly trained staff officers has become increasingly important. Napoleon developed operational plans close to the front and communicated orders via courier. During World War I, military commanders collected information at their headquarters and utilized telephones and automobiles to relay orders to the front lines. In World War II, with the battlefield expanding to include land, sea, and air, senior commanders often made decisions from headquarters far from the action, relying on a significant number of staff officers with specialized skills to keep them informed. In China, however, the staff officer system was underdeveloped. By 1937, only about 2,000 commanders and staff officers had received training. Prior to the Sino-Japanese War, most commanders managed staff work themselves, with staff officers serving primarily as military secretaries who drafted orders, reports, and maps. Many staff officers had no formal military training, and as a whole, the branch lacked respect, causing the most talented officers to avoid serving in it. The situation was even more dire for staff officer departments within local forces. For example, in March 1937, Liu Ziqing, a graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy, was appointed as the director of political instruction in the Forty-fourth Army, a unit under Sichuan warlord Liu Xiang. Liu Ziqing's account illustrates the dysfunction within the ranks: “The commander in chief was not supposed to manage the army and even did not know its whereabouts... But he could appoint relatives and former subordinates—who were officials and businessmen as well—to the army. Each month they would receive a small stipend. At headquarters, there was a long table and two rows of chairs. Around ten o'clock in the morning, senior officers signed in to indicate their presence. Those with other business would leave, while the remaining officers sat down to leisurely discuss star actresses, fortune-telling, business projects, mah-jongg, and opium. Occasionally they would touch on national affairs, chat about news articles, or share local gossip. In the afternoons, they primarily played mah-jongg, held banquets, and visited madams. Most mornings, the commander usually presided over these activities, and at first, I reported for duty as well. But I soon realized it was a waste of time and came very rarely. At headquarters, most staff members wore long gowns or Western-style suits, while military uniforms were a rare sight.” Most senior military personnel were trained at the Baoding Military Academy during the early republic. 2/3rds of commanders in chief, 37 %of army commanders, and 20 % of division commanders were Baoding graduates. Higher-ranking officers were more likely to have launched their careers there. In contrast, only 10 % of division commanders and a few army commanders were graduates of the Whampoa Military Academy. Additionally, commanders trained in local military schools and those with combat experience accounted for 1/3rd of all commanders. While the prevalence of civil war provided opportunities for rapid promotion, it also hindered officers' ability to update their training or gain experience in different military branches. German advisors expressed their concerns to Chiang Kai-shek, emphasizing that officers should first serve in junior roles before taking command. During one battle in 1938, Chiang noted, “Our commanders in chief are equivalent only to our enemy's regiment commanders, and our army and division commanders are only as competent as our enemy's battalion and company commanders.” Despite not viewing high-ranking Japanese officers as great strategists, Nationalist officers respected them as highly competent, diligent, and professional commanders who rarely made critical errors. The infantry was the primary component of the Nationalist army, with middle and junior infantry officers constituting over 80 %of all army officers. A 1936 registry of military officers listed 1,105 colonels and 2,159 lieutenant colonels within the infantry, demonstrating a significant outnumbering of Baoding graduates at ranks below lieutenant colonel. However, the quality of middle and junior infantry officers declined during the Sino-Japanese War; by 1944, only 27.3 % of these officers were from formal military academies, while those promoted from the ranks increased to 28.1 %. In 1937, 80 % of officers in an ordinary infantry battalion were military academy graduates, but this percentage dropped to 20 % during the war. Its hard to tell how educated soldiers were before the war, but it is generally believed that most were illiterate. In 1929, sociologist Tao Menghe surveyed 946 soldiers from a Shanxi garrison brigade and found that only 13 percent could compose a letter independently, while the rest had either never learned to read or were unable to write. In contrast, in August 1938, General Feng Yuxiang found that 80 percent of a regiment in Hunan were literate. Regardless, during the Sino-Japanese War, the quality of recruits steadily declined. More than 90 percent of soldiers were illiterate, and few possessed any basic scientific knowledge, which hindered their ability to master their weapons. On the battlefield, they heavily relied on middle and junior officers for guidance.  In autumn 1933, General Hans von Seeckt, the architect of the post World War I German army, visited China at the personal invitation of Chiang Kai-shek. In his recommendations for military reform, he identified China's greatest problem as its excessively large forces drawn from diverse backgrounds. He stated, “At present, the most pressing goal is to... establish a small, well-equipped army with high morale and combat effectiveness to replace the numerous poorly armed and trained forces.” He suggested forming an army of sixty divisions and recommended the establishment of a training regiment for military officers to equip them with the skills needed for modern warfare. Chiang Kai-shek accepted von Seeckt's proposals, and on January 26, 1935, he convened a National Military Reorganization Conference in Nanjing. On March 1, the Army Reorganization Bureau was established in Wuchang, under the leadership of General Chen Cheng. In the same month, General Alexander von Falkenhausen took charge of the German Military Advisors Group. Before war broke out, around nineteen divisions, roughly 300,000 troops received training from German advisors and were equipped with German-style weapons. At the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, the forces stemming from the First Army of the National Revolutionary Army and the Whampoa cadets, who had fought in the Northern Expedition, held the highest reputation and were referred to as the “core central forces” by the Japanese. Other notable forces included the Guangxi Army, Northwestern Army, Northeastern Army, some Uyghur units, the Guangdong Army, and the Shanxi Army. In contrast, provincial forces such as the Yunnan Army and Sichuan Army were viewed less favorably. Nationalist forces were generally far inferior to those of the Japanese enemy. In 1937, General He Yingqin noted that Nationalist forces had failed to prevail in 1932 and 1933, even when outnumbering the Japanese by 4-1.  In November 1937, during a national defense conference, Chiang Kai-shek stated, "In recent years we have worked hard, prepared actively, and achieved national unification. By the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, we were in a better domestic situation and had improved military preparedness compared to before. Since 1935, our strength has doubled. It increased by more than two to three times since January 1932 or September 1931 [when Japan attacked Shanghai and Mukden]. If peace had been achievable, we should have delayed the war for two or three years. Given an additional three years, our defensive capabilities would have been drastically different... Now, if we merely compare the military strength of China and Japan, we are certainly inferior." However, such assessments were overly optimistic, as Chiang failed to recognize that Japan's military capabilities would not have stagnated. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek certainly was dealt a difficult hand of cards for the upcoming poker match he was to play. Yet the Chinese were resilient and they had to be for the absolute horror that would be inflicted upon them from 1937-1945. Until this point, their enemies had been far more lenient, the Empire of Japan would show no mercy.

The extraordinary life of forgotten World War II hero Evans Carlson, commander of America's first special forces, secret confidant of FDR, and one of the most controversial officers in the history of the Marine Corps, who dedicated his life to bridging the cultural divide between the United States and China“He was a gutsy old man.” “A corker,” said another. “You couldn't find anyone better.” They talked about him in hushed tones. “This Major Carlson,” wrote one of the officers in a letter home, “is one of the finest men I have ever known.”These were the words of the young Marines training to be among the first U.S. troops to enter the Second World War—and the Major Carlson they spoke of was Evans Carlson, a man of mythical status even before the war that would make him a military legend.By December of 1941, at the age of forty-five, Carlson had already faced off against Sandinistas in the jungles of Nicaragua and served multiple tours in China, where he embedded with Mao's Communist forces during the Sino-Japanese War. Inspired by their guerilla tactics and their collaborative spirit—which he'd call “gung ho,” introducing the term to the English language—and driven by his own Emersonian ideals of self-reliance, Carlson would go on to form his renowned Marine Raiders, the progenitors of today's special operations forces, who fought behind Japanese lines on Makin Island and Guadalcanal, showing Americans a new way to do battle.In The Raider, Cundill Prize–winning historian Stephen R. Platt gives us the first authoritative account of Carlson's larger-than-life exploits: the real story, based on years of research including newly discovered diaries and correspondence in English and Chinese, with deep insight into the conflicted idealism about the Chinese Communists that would prove Carlson's undoing in the McCarthy era.Tracing the rise and fall of an unlikely American war hero, The Raider is a story of exploration, of cultural (mis)understanding, and of one man's awakening to the sheer breadth of the world. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/biography

The extraordinary life of forgotten World War II hero Evans Carlson, commander of America's first special forces, secret confidant of FDR, and one of the most controversial officers in the history of the Marine Corps, who dedicated his life to bridging the cultural divide between the United States and China“He was a gutsy old man.” “A corker,” said another. “You couldn't find anyone better.” They talked about him in hushed tones. “This Major Carlson,” wrote one of the officers in a letter home, “is one of the finest men I have ever known.”These were the words of the young Marines training to be among the first U.S. troops to enter the Second World War—and the Major Carlson they spoke of was Evans Carlson, a man of mythical status even before the war that would make him a military legend.By December of 1941, at the age of forty-five, Carlson had already faced off against Sandinistas in the jungles of Nicaragua and served multiple tours in China, where he embedded with Mao's Communist forces during the Sino-Japanese War. Inspired by their guerilla tactics and their collaborative spirit—which he'd call “gung ho,” introducing the term to the English language—and driven by his own Emersonian ideals of self-reliance, Carlson would go on to form his renowned Marine Raiders, the progenitors of today's special operations forces, who fought behind Japanese lines on Makin Island and Guadalcanal, showing Americans a new way to do battle.In The Raider, Cundill Prize–winning historian Stephen R. Platt gives us the first authoritative account of Carlson's larger-than-life exploits: the real story, based on years of research including newly discovered diaries and correspondence in English and Chinese, with deep insight into the conflicted idealism about the Chinese Communists that would prove Carlson's undoing in the McCarthy era.Tracing the rise and fall of an unlikely American war hero, The Raider is a story of exploration, of cultural (mis)understanding, and of one man's awakening to the sheer breadth of the world. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

The extraordinary life of forgotten World War II hero Evans Carlson, commander of America's first special forces, secret confidant of FDR, and one of the most controversial officers in the history of the Marine Corps, who dedicated his life to bridging the cultural divide between the United States and China“He was a gutsy old man.” “A corker,” said another. “You couldn't find anyone better.” They talked about him in hushed tones. “This Major Carlson,” wrote one of the officers in a letter home, “is one of the finest men I have ever known.”These were the words of the young Marines training to be among the first U.S. troops to enter the Second World War—and the Major Carlson they spoke of was Evans Carlson, a man of mythical status even before the war that would make him a military legend.By December of 1941, at the age of forty-five, Carlson had already faced off against Sandinistas in the jungles of Nicaragua and served multiple tours in China, where he embedded with Mao's Communist forces during the Sino-Japanese War. Inspired by their guerilla tactics and their collaborative spirit—which he'd call “gung ho,” introducing the term to the English language—and driven by his own Emersonian ideals of self-reliance, Carlson would go on to form his renowned Marine Raiders, the progenitors of today's special operations forces, who fought behind Japanese lines on Makin Island and Guadalcanal, showing Americans a new way to do battle.In The Raider, Cundill Prize–winning historian Stephen R. Platt gives us the first authoritative account of Carlson's larger-than-life exploits: the real story, based on years of research including newly discovered diaries and correspondence in English and Chinese, with deep insight into the conflicted idealism about the Chinese Communists that would prove Carlson's undoing in the McCarthy era.Tracing the rise and fall of an unlikely American war hero, The Raider is a story of exploration, of cultural (mis)understanding, and of one man's awakening to the sheer breadth of the world. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

Ep 054 – Nonfiction. Historian Stephen R. Platt discusses his new book, “The Raider: The Untold Story of a Renegade Marine and the Birth of U.S. Special Forces in World War II.”‘The extraordinary life of forgotten World War II hero Evans Carlson, commander of America's first special forces, secret confidant of FDR, and one of the most controversial officers in the history of the Marine Corps, who dedicated his life to bridging the cultural divide between the United States and China“He was a gutsy old man.” “A corker,” said another. “You couldn't find anyone better.” They talked about him in hushed tones. “This Major Carlson,” wrote one of the officers in a letter home, “is one of the finest men I have ever known.”These were the words of the young Marines training to be among the first U.S. troops to enter the Second World War—and the Major Carlson they spoke of was Evans Carlson, a man of mythical status even before the war that would make him a military legend.By December of 1941, at the age of forty-five, Carlson had already faced off against Sandinistas in the jungles of Nicaragua and served multiple tours in China, where he embedded with Mao's Communist forces during the Sino-Japanese War. Inspired by their guerilla tactics and their collaborative spirit—which he'd call “gung ho,” introducing the term to the English language—and driven by his own Emersonian ideals of self-reliance, Carlson would go on to form his renowned Marine Raiders, the progenitors of today's special operations forces, who fought behind Japanese lines on Makin Island and Guadalcanal, showing Americans a new way to do battle.In The Raider, Cundill Prize–winning historian Stephen R. Platt gives us the first authoritative account of Carlson's larger-than-life exploits: the real story, based on years of research including newly discovered diaries and correspondence in English and Chinese, with deep insight into the conflicted idealism about the Chinese Communists that would prove Carlson's undoing in the McCarthy era.Tracing the rise and fall of an unlikely American war hero, The Raider is a story of exploration, of cultural (mis)understanding, and of one man's awakening to the sheer breadth of the world.'Subscribe to the War Books podcast here:YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@warbookspodcastApple: https://apple.co/3FP4ULbSpotify: https://spoti.fi/3kP9scZFollow the show here:Twitter: https://twitter.com/warbookspodcastFacebook: https://www.facebook.com/warbookspodcastInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/warbookspodcast/

He was a gutsy old man.” “A corker,” said another. “You couldn’t find anyone better.” They talked about him in hushed tones. “This Major Carlson,” wrote one of the officers in a letter home, “is one of the finest men I have ever known.”These were the words of the young Marines training to be among the first U.S. troops to enter the Second World War—and the Major Carlson they spoke of was Evans Carlson, a man of mythical status even before the war that would make him a military legend.By December of 1941, at the age of forty-five, Carlson had already faced off against Sandinistas in the jungles of Nicaragua and served multiple tours in China, where he embedded with Mao’s Communist forces during the Sino-Japanese War. Inspired by their guerilla tactics and their collaborative spirit—which he’d call “gung ho,” introducing the term to the English language—and driven by his own Emersonian ideals of self-reliance, Carlson would go on to form his renowned Marine Raiders, the progenitors of today’s special operations forces, who fought behind Japanese lines on Makin Island and Guadalcanal, showing Americans a new way to do battle.Today’s guest is Stephen R. Platt, author of “ “The Raider: The Untold Story of a Renegade Marine and the Birth of U.S. Special Forces in World War II.” Tracing the rise and fall of an unlikely American war hero, The Raider is a story of exploration, of cultural (mis)understanding, and of one man’s awakening to the sheer breadth of the world.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Merriam-Webster's Word of the Day for May 5, 2025 is: plethora • PLETH-uh-ruh • noun Plethora refers to a very large amount or number of something. Plethora is most often used in the phrase "a plethora of." // The hotel offers a plethora of amenities, including indoor and outdoor pools, a fitness center, and world-class dining. See the entry > Examples: "In 1895, Japan won Taiwan from China in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, ending the Sino-Japanese War, and from 1895 to 1945, the island was a colony of Japan. The cultural influences of Japan persist to this day: in the tiny coffee shops with their enticing nutty aromas, in the plethora of Japanese-influenced sushi restaurants, and in Taiwan's highly efficient postal service and train systems." — Kim Liao, Where Every Ghost Has a Name: A Memoir of Taiwanese Independence, 2024 Did you know? Plethora was first used in English to refer to a medical condition marked by an excess volume of blood or other bodily fluid, with associated swelling and redness. (Its Greek ancestor, the noun plēthṓra, refers to a similar excess, or to general fullness or crowdedness.) These days, plethora is most often used in general contexts to refer to a large number or amount of something. While plethora conveys a plural meaning, it is a grammatically singular word, which makes choosing whether to pair it with a singular or plural verb confusing. Both can be correctly used, however; choose the singular if you wish to emphasize the grouping or collection ("a plethora of books is available"), and choose the plural if you wish to emphasize the individual elements or components ("a plethora of books have been written on the subject").

In questo secondo episodio speciale, vedremo come l'Impero nipponico, per la prima volta dopo la modernizzazione, abbia gettato uno sguardo oltre i propri confini. Per ottenere il predominio in Asia Orientale ed essere trattato alla pari dalle potenze occidentali, il Giappone dovrà confrontarsi militarmente con la Cina.Seguimi su Instagram: @laguerragrande_podcastSe vuoi contribuire con una donazione sul conto PayPal: podcastlaguerragrande@gmail.comScritto e condotto da Andrea BassoMontaggio e audio: Andrea BassoFonti dell'episodio:Michael R. Auslin, Toshihiko Kishi, Hanae Kurihara Kramer, Scott Kramer, Barak Kushner, Olivia Morello, Kaoru (Kay) Ueda, Fanning the Flames: Propaganda in Modern Japan, 2021 Rosa Caroli, Francesco Gatti, Storia del Giappone, Laterza, 2007 Chonin, Encyclopaedia Britannica L. M. Cullen, A History of Japan, 1582–1941: Internal and External Worlds, Cambridge University Press, 2003 Giuliano Da Frè, Storia delle battaglie sul mare, Odoya, 2014 John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War, Pantheon, 1986 Peter Duus, Modern Japan, Houghton Mifflin, 1998 Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, University of California Press, 1998 Bruce Elleman, Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795–1989, Routledge, 2001 Gabriele Esposito, Japanese Armies 1868–1877: The Boshin War and Satsuma Rebellion, Osprey Publishing, 2020 David Evans, Mark Peattie, Kaigun: strategy, tactics, and technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941, Naval Institute Press, 1997 Allen Fung, Testing the Self-Strengthening: The Chinese Army in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, Modern Asian Studies 30, 1996 Hane Mikiso, Modern Japan: A Historical Survey Sue Henny, Jean-Pierre Lehmann, Themes and Theories in Modern Japanese History: Essays in Memory of Richard Storry, A&C Black, 2013 James Huffman, Modern Japan: An Encyclopedia of History, Culture, and Nationalism, Garland Reference Library of the Humanities, Routledge, 1997 Marius Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan, Harvard University Press, 2002 Kim Jinwung, A History of Korea: From "Land of the Morning Calm" to States in Conflict, Indiana University Press, 2012 Philip Jowett, China's Wars: Rousing the Dragon 1894–1949, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013 Donald Keene, Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852-1912, Columbia University Press, 2002 Liu Kwang-Ching, The Cambridge History of China, Late Ch'ing, 1800–1911, Cambridge University Press, 1978 James McClain, Japan, a modern history, Norton, 2001 Naotaka Hirota, Steam Locomotives of Japan, Kodansha International Ltd, 1972 Piotr Olender, Sino-Japanese Naval War 1894–1895, MMPBooks, 2014 Christopher Paik, Abbey Steele, Seiki Tanaka, Constraining the Samurai: Rebellion and Taxation in Early Modern Japan, International Studies Quarterly 61, 2017 Sarah Paine, The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy. Cambridge University Press, 2003 Pebrina, Treccani Christian Polak, Silk and Light: 100-year history of unconscious French-Japanese cultural exchange (Edo Period – 1950), Hachette, 2001 Richard Ponsonby-Fane, Kyoto: the Old Capital of Japan, 794–1869, 1956 Mark Ravina, To Stand with the Nations of the World: Japan's Meiji Restoration in World History, Oxford University Press, 2017 Edwin Reischauer, Storia del Giappone, Bompiani, 2013 Chris Rowthorn, Giappone, EDT, 2008 Michael Seth, A History of Korea: From Antiquity to the Present, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010 John Sewall, The Logbook of the Captain's Clerk: Adventures in the China Seas, Chas H. Glass & Co., 1905 Lawrence Sondhaus, Naval Warfare, 1815–1914, Routledge, 2001 Henry Van Straelen, Yoshida Shoin Forerunner Of The Meiji Restoration, Brill, 1952 Conrad D. Totman, Japan before Perry: a short history, University of California Press, 1981 Trudy Ring, Robert M. Salkin, Paul E. Schellinger, Sharon La Boda, Noelle Watson, Christopher Hudson, Adele Hast, International Dictionary of Historic Places: Asia and Oceania, Taylor & Francis, 1994 Jacopo Turco, Come ha fatto il Giappone a diventare così ricco?, Nova Lectio, 2024 Howard Van Zandt, Pioneer American Merchants in Japan, Tuttle Publishing, 1984 Arthur Walworth, Black Ships Off Japan: The Story of Commodore Perry's Expedition, Read Books, 2008In copertina: Nessun nemico resiste dove noi ci rechiamo: la resa di Pyongyang, stampa di  Migita Toshihide, 1894, Metropolitan Museum of ArtIshikari Lore di Kevin MacLeod è un brano concesso in uso tramite licenza Creative Commons Attribution 4.0. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Fonte: http://incompetech.com/music/royalty-free/index.html?isrc=USUAN1100192Artista: http://incompetech.com/

Mounting tensions over the future of Korea turned violent after the end of the Donghak Rebellion, resulting in a war between Japan and China.Support the show My latest novel, "Califia's Crusade," is now available at Amazon, Barnes & Noble, Kobo, Apple Books, Bookshop.org, and many other online platforms!

General He Yingqin: The Rise and Fall of Nationalist China (Cambridge UP, 2016) is a revisionist study of the career of General He Yingqin, one of the most prominent military officers in China's Nationalist period (1928-49) and one of the most misunderstood figures in twentieth-century China.  Western scholars have dismissed He Yingqin as corrupt and incompetent, yet the Chinese archives reveal that he demonstrated considerable success as a combat commander and military administrator during civil conflicts and the Sino-Japanese War. His work in the Chinese Nationalist military served as the foundation of a close personal and professional relationship with Chiang Kai-shek, with whom he worked closely for more than two decades. Against the backdrop of the Nationalist revolution of the 1920s through the 1940s, Peter Worthing analyzes He Yingqin's rise to power alongside Chiang Kai-shek, his work in building the Nationalist military, and his fundamental role in carrying out policies designed to overcome the regime's greatest obstacles during this turbulent period of Chinese history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

General He Yingqin: The Rise and Fall of Nationalist China (Cambridge UP, 2016) is a revisionist study of the career of General He Yingqin, one of the most prominent military officers in China's Nationalist period (1928-49) and one of the most misunderstood figures in twentieth-century China.  Western scholars have dismissed He Yingqin as corrupt and incompetent, yet the Chinese archives reveal that he demonstrated considerable success as a combat commander and military administrator during civil conflicts and the Sino-Japanese War. His work in the Chinese Nationalist military served as the foundation of a close personal and professional relationship with Chiang Kai-shek, with whom he worked closely for more than two decades. Against the backdrop of the Nationalist revolution of the 1920s through the 1940s, Peter Worthing analyzes He Yingqin's rise to power alongside Chiang Kai-shek, his work in building the Nationalist military, and his fundamental role in carrying out policies designed to overcome the regime's greatest obstacles during this turbulent period of Chinese history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

General He Yingqin: The Rise and Fall of Nationalist China (Cambridge UP, 2016) is a revisionist study of the career of General He Yingqin, one of the most prominent military officers in China's Nationalist period (1928-49) and one of the most misunderstood figures in twentieth-century China.  Western scholars have dismissed He Yingqin as corrupt and incompetent, yet the Chinese archives reveal that he demonstrated considerable success as a combat commander and military administrator during civil conflicts and the Sino-Japanese War. His work in the Chinese Nationalist military served as the foundation of a close personal and professional relationship with Chiang Kai-shek, with whom he worked closely for more than two decades. Against the backdrop of the Nationalist revolution of the 1920s through the 1940s, Peter Worthing analyzes He Yingqin's rise to power alongside Chiang Kai-shek, his work in building the Nationalist military, and his fundamental role in carrying out policies designed to overcome the regime's greatest obstacles during this turbulent period of Chinese history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

General He Yingqin: The Rise and Fall of Nationalist China (Cambridge UP, 2016) is a revisionist study of the career of General He Yingqin, one of the most prominent military officers in China's Nationalist period (1928-49) and one of the most misunderstood figures in twentieth-century China.  Western scholars have dismissed He Yingqin as corrupt and incompetent, yet the Chinese archives reveal that he demonstrated considerable success as a combat commander and military administrator during civil conflicts and the Sino-Japanese War. His work in the Chinese Nationalist military served as the foundation of a close personal and professional relationship with Chiang Kai-shek, with whom he worked closely for more than two decades. Against the backdrop of the Nationalist revolution of the 1920s through the 1940s, Peter Worthing analyzes He Yingqin's rise to power alongside Chiang Kai-shek, his work in building the Nationalist military, and his fundamental role in carrying out policies designed to overcome the regime's greatest obstacles during this turbulent period of Chinese history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

General He Yingqin: The Rise and Fall of Nationalist China (Cambridge UP, 2016) is a revisionist study of the career of General He Yingqin, one of the most prominent military officers in China's Nationalist period (1928-49) and one of the most misunderstood figures in twentieth-century China.  Western scholars have dismissed He Yingqin as corrupt and incompetent, yet the Chinese archives reveal that he demonstrated considerable success as a combat commander and military administrator during civil conflicts and the Sino-Japanese War. His work in the Chinese Nationalist military served as the foundation of a close personal and professional relationship with Chiang Kai-shek, with whom he worked closely for more than two decades. Against the backdrop of the Nationalist revolution of the 1920s through the 1940s, Peter Worthing analyzes He Yingqin's rise to power alongside Chiang Kai-shek, his work in building the Nationalist military, and his fundamental role in carrying out policies designed to overcome the regime's greatest obstacles during this turbulent period of Chinese history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/biography

General He Yingqin: The Rise and Fall of Nationalist China (Cambridge UP, 2016) is a revisionist study of the career of General He Yingqin, one of the most prominent military officers in China's Nationalist period (1928-49) and one of the most misunderstood figures in twentieth-century China.  Western scholars have dismissed He Yingqin as corrupt and incompetent, yet the Chinese archives reveal that he demonstrated considerable success as a combat commander and military administrator during civil conflicts and the Sino-Japanese War. His work in the Chinese Nationalist military served as the foundation of a close personal and professional relationship with Chiang Kai-shek, with whom he worked closely for more than two decades. Against the backdrop of the Nationalist revolution of the 1920s through the 1940s, Peter Worthing analyzes He Yingqin's rise to power alongside Chiang Kai-shek, his work in building the Nationalist military, and his fundamental role in carrying out policies designed to overcome the regime's greatest obstacles during this turbulent period of Chinese history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies

General He Yingqin: The Rise and Fall of Nationalist China (Cambridge UP, 2016) is a revisionist study of the career of General He Yingqin, one of the most prominent military officers in China's Nationalist period (1928-49) and one of the most misunderstood figures in twentieth-century China.  Western scholars have dismissed He Yingqin as corrupt and incompetent, yet the Chinese archives reveal that he demonstrated considerable success as a combat commander and military administrator during civil conflicts and the Sino-Japanese War. His work in the Chinese Nationalist military served as the foundation of a close personal and professional relationship with Chiang Kai-shek, with whom he worked closely for more than two decades. Against the backdrop of the Nationalist revolution of the 1920s through the 1940s, Peter Worthing analyzes He Yingqin's rise to power alongside Chiang Kai-shek, his work in building the Nationalist military, and his fundamental role in carrying out policies designed to overcome the regime's greatest obstacles during this turbulent period of Chinese history.

PREVIEW: JAPAN: PRC: Conversation with colleague Grant Newsham attending the 35th Annual Indo-Pacific International Military Law and Operations Conference in Manila re the presentation by the Japan Self-Defence Force that it is ready to participate in the defense of its allies such as the Philippines and Taiwan. More later. 1895 SINO-JAPANESE WAR

PREVIEW:: PRC:US:  Conversation with  with colleague Colonel Grant Newsham, USMC (ret) for his book, WHEN CHINA ATTACKS, regarding the observation of the US National Security Council in the late 20th Century that China was not going to become a threat. More later this week. 1895 Sino-Japanese War

PREVIEW: JAPAN Conversation with Grant Newsham, author of "When China Attacks," regarding the doubts about Japanese leadership and the defense of Taiwan from PRC threats. More tonight. 1895 SINO-JAPANESE WAR.

Melville Jacoby was a U.S. war correspondent during the Sino-Japanese War and, later, the Second World War, writing about the Japanese advances from Chongqing, Hanoi, and Manila. He was also a relative of Bill Lascher, a journalist–specifically, the cousin of Bill's grandmother. Bill has now collected Mel's work in a book: A Danger Shared: A Journalist's Glimpses of a Continent at War (Blacksmith Books: 2024), with photos detailing Mel's early days as an exchange student in China, then his later work as journalist…and propagandist for Chiang Kai-shek in wartime Chongqing, then as a correspondent for Time and Life in the Philippines right as the Japanese invade. Bill is also the author of the 2016 book Eve of a Hundred Midnights: The Star-Crossed Love Story of Two World War II Correspondents and their Epic Escape Across the Pacific (William Morrow: 2016), also about Mel Jacoby and his wife Annalee Jacoby. He is also a freelance journalist. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of A Danger Shared. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at @nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Melville Jacoby was a U.S. war correspondent during the Sino-Japanese War and, later, the Second World War, writing about the Japanese advances from Chongqing, Hanoi, and Manila. He was also a relative of Bill Lascher, a journalist–specifically, the cousin of Bill's grandmother. Bill has now collected Mel's work in a book: A Danger Shared: A Journalist's Glimpses of a Continent at War (Blacksmith Books: 2024), with photos detailing Mel's early days as an exchange student in China, then his later work as journalist…and propagandist for Chiang Kai-shek in wartime Chongqing, then as a correspondent for Time and Life in the Philippines right as the Japanese invade. Bill is also the author of the 2016 book Eve of a Hundred Midnights: The Star-Crossed Love Story of Two World War II Correspondents and their Epic Escape Across the Pacific (William Morrow: 2016), also about Mel Jacoby and his wife Annalee Jacoby. He is also a freelance journalist. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of A Danger Shared. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at @nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

Melville Jacoby was a U.S. war correspondent during the Sino-Japanese War and, later, the Second World War, writing about the Japanese advances from Chongqing, Hanoi, and Manila. He was also a relative of Bill Lascher, a journalist–specifically, the cousin of Bill's grandmother. Bill has now collected Mel's work in a book: A Danger Shared: A Journalist's Glimpses of a Continent at War (Blacksmith Books: 2024), with photos detailing Mel's early days as an exchange student in China, then his later work as journalist…and propagandist for Chiang Kai-shek in wartime Chongqing, then as a correspondent for Time and Life in the Philippines right as the Japanese invade. Bill is also the author of the 2016 book Eve of a Hundred Midnights: The Star-Crossed Love Story of Two World War II Correspondents and their Epic Escape Across the Pacific (William Morrow: 2016), also about Mel Jacoby and his wife Annalee Jacoby. He is also a freelance journalist. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of A Danger Shared. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at @nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

PREVIEW: JAPAN: Conversation with colleague Grant Newsham, author WHEN CHINA ATTACKS, re the Japanese Self-Defense Force's inadequacy and poor treatment by the political class and the culture. More tonight. 1895 Sino-Japanese War

In 1938, after the Battle of Wuhan, Wang Jingwei left Chongqing and the Republic of China team in Chongqing for Hanoi. He negotiated with Japanese officials and eventually set up a puppet regime know as the Wang Jingwei Regime and also as the Reorganized National Government of the Republic of China. It was almost totally under Japanese domination, with little autonomy.Wang Jingwei's background, including his studies in Japan as a youth, his pessimism towards Japan and his lack of faith that China would ever gain allies against Japan, all contributed to his decision to set up an alternative Republic of China puppet government in Nanjing during the Second Sino-Japanese War.He died in 1944, but his successor was executed after the war for treason. Today, Wang is remembered as a hanjian (a traitor to the Han nation) and a kuilei (a puppet).The Wang Jingwei Regime complicated China's remembrance of the Sino-Japanese War. Until 1982, the Communist Party of China didn't distinguish between Wang Jingwei's Regime in Nanjing under Japanese occupation and Chiang Kai-shek's government in Chongqing resisting Japanese aggression.Over 200 million Chinese faced difficult decisions in deciding whether to flee their hometowns during the war, or to stay under Japanese occupation and puppet regimes.Support the show with Buy me a Coffee: https://www.buymeacoffee.com/thechineserevolutionPlease visit https://chineserevolution.substack.com/And please enjoy the YouTube channel too! https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCCOjBYMNC_3xjQXKv6ab9YA?sub_confirmation=1 Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Building a Nation at War: Building a Nation at War: Transnational Knowledge Networks and the Development of China during and after World War II (Harvard UP, 2022) argues that the Chinese Nationalist government's retreat inland during the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), its consequent need for inland resources, and its participation in new scientific and technical relationships with the United States led to fundamental changes in how the Nationalists engaged with science and technology as tools to promote development. The war catalyzed an emphasis on applied sciences, comprehensive economic planning, and development of scientific and technical human resources—all of which served the Nationalists' immediate and long-term goals. It created an opportunity for the Nationalists to extend control over inland China and over education and industry. It also provided opportunities for China to mobilize transnational networks of Chinese-Americans, Chinese in America, and the American government and businesses. These groups provided technical advice, ran training programs, and helped the Nationalists acquire manufactured goods and tools. J. Megan Greene shows how the Nationalists worked these programs to their advantage, even in situations where their American counterparts clearly had the upper hand. Finally, this book shows how, although American advisers and diplomats criticized China for harboring resources rather than putting them into winning the war against Japan, US industrial consultants were also strongly motivated by postwar goals. J. Megan Greene is Professor of History at the University of Kansas. Her field of study is the history of the Republic of China under the KMT both in China and on Taiwan. She is also the author of The Origins of the Developmental State in Taiwan: Science Policy and the Quest for Modernization (Harvard University Press, 2008), a study of industrial science policy in China and Taiwan under the KMT. Li-Ping Chen is a teaching fellow in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Building a Nation at War: Building a Nation at War: Transnational Knowledge Networks and the Development of China during and after World War II (Harvard UP, 2022) argues that the Chinese Nationalist government's retreat inland during the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), its consequent need for inland resources, and its participation in new scientific and technical relationships with the United States led to fundamental changes in how the Nationalists engaged with science and technology as tools to promote development. The war catalyzed an emphasis on applied sciences, comprehensive economic planning, and development of scientific and technical human resources—all of which served the Nationalists' immediate and long-term goals. It created an opportunity for the Nationalists to extend control over inland China and over education and industry. It also provided opportunities for China to mobilize transnational networks of Chinese-Americans, Chinese in America, and the American government and businesses. These groups provided technical advice, ran training programs, and helped the Nationalists acquire manufactured goods and tools. J. Megan Greene shows how the Nationalists worked these programs to their advantage, even in situations where their American counterparts clearly had the upper hand. Finally, this book shows how, although American advisers and diplomats criticized China for harboring resources rather than putting them into winning the war against Japan, US industrial consultants were also strongly motivated by postwar goals. J. Megan Greene is Professor of History at the University of Kansas. Her field of study is the history of the Republic of China under the KMT both in China and on Taiwan. She is also the author of The Origins of the Developmental State in Taiwan: Science Policy and the Quest for Modernization (Harvard University Press, 2008), a study of industrial science policy in China and Taiwan under the KMT. Li-Ping Chen is a teaching fellow in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

Building a Nation at War: Building a Nation at War: Transnational Knowledge Networks and the Development of China during and after World War II (Harvard UP, 2022) argues that the Chinese Nationalist government's retreat inland during the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), its consequent need for inland resources, and its participation in new scientific and technical relationships with the United States led to fundamental changes in how the Nationalists engaged with science and technology as tools to promote development. The war catalyzed an emphasis on applied sciences, comprehensive economic planning, and development of scientific and technical human resources—all of which served the Nationalists' immediate and long-term goals. It created an opportunity for the Nationalists to extend control over inland China and over education and industry. It also provided opportunities for China to mobilize transnational networks of Chinese-Americans, Chinese in America, and the American government and businesses. These groups provided technical advice, ran training programs, and helped the Nationalists acquire manufactured goods and tools. J. Megan Greene shows how the Nationalists worked these programs to their advantage, even in situations where their American counterparts clearly had the upper hand. Finally, this book shows how, although American advisers and diplomats criticized China for harboring resources rather than putting them into winning the war against Japan, US industrial consultants were also strongly motivated by postwar goals. J. Megan Greene is Professor of History at the University of Kansas. Her field of study is the history of the Republic of China under the KMT both in China and on Taiwan. She is also the author of The Origins of the Developmental State in Taiwan: Science Policy and the Quest for Modernization (Harvard University Press, 2008), a study of industrial science policy in China and Taiwan under the KMT. Li-Ping Chen is a teaching fellow in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

Building a Nation at War: Building a Nation at War: Transnational Knowledge Networks and the Development of China during and after World War II (Harvard UP, 2022) argues that the Chinese Nationalist government's retreat inland during the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), its consequent need for inland resources, and its participation in new scientific and technical relationships with the United States led to fundamental changes in how the Nationalists engaged with science and technology as tools to promote development. The war catalyzed an emphasis on applied sciences, comprehensive economic planning, and development of scientific and technical human resources—all of which served the Nationalists' immediate and long-term goals. It created an opportunity for the Nationalists to extend control over inland China and over education and industry. It also provided opportunities for China to mobilize transnational networks of Chinese-Americans, Chinese in America, and the American government and businesses. These groups provided technical advice, ran training programs, and helped the Nationalists acquire manufactured goods and tools. J. Megan Greene shows how the Nationalists worked these programs to their advantage, even in situations where their American counterparts clearly had the upper hand. Finally, this book shows how, although American advisers and diplomats criticized China for harboring resources rather than putting them into winning the war against Japan, US industrial consultants were also strongly motivated by postwar goals. J. Megan Greene is Professor of History at the University of Kansas. Her field of study is the history of the Republic of China under the KMT both in China and on Taiwan. She is also the author of The Origins of the Developmental State in Taiwan: Science Policy and the Quest for Modernization (Harvard University Press, 2008), a study of industrial science policy in China and Taiwan under the KMT. Li-Ping Chen is a teaching fellow in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/asian-american-studies

Building a Nation at War: Building a Nation at War: Transnational Knowledge Networks and the Development of China during and after World War II (Harvard UP, 2022) argues that the Chinese Nationalist government's retreat inland during the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), its consequent need for inland resources, and its participation in new scientific and technical relationships with the United States led to fundamental changes in how the Nationalists engaged with science and technology as tools to promote development. The war catalyzed an emphasis on applied sciences, comprehensive economic planning, and development of scientific and technical human resources—all of which served the Nationalists' immediate and long-term goals. It created an opportunity for the Nationalists to extend control over inland China and over education and industry. It also provided opportunities for China to mobilize transnational networks of Chinese-Americans, Chinese in America, and the American government and businesses. These groups provided technical advice, ran training programs, and helped the Nationalists acquire manufactured goods and tools. J. Megan Greene shows how the Nationalists worked these programs to their advantage, even in situations where their American counterparts clearly had the upper hand. Finally, this book shows how, although American advisers and diplomats criticized China for harboring resources rather than putting them into winning the war against Japan, US industrial consultants were also strongly motivated by postwar goals. J. Megan Greene is Professor of History at the University of Kansas. Her field of study is the history of the Republic of China under the KMT both in China and on Taiwan. She is also the author of The Origins of the Developmental State in Taiwan: Science Policy and the Quest for Modernization (Harvard University Press, 2008), a study of industrial science policy in China and Taiwan under the KMT. Li-Ping Chen is a teaching fellow in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

Building a Nation at War: Building a Nation at War: Transnational Knowledge Networks and the Development of China during and after World War II (Harvard UP, 2022) argues that the Chinese Nationalist government's retreat inland during the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), its consequent need for inland resources, and its participation in new scientific and technical relationships with the United States led to fundamental changes in how the Nationalists engaged with science and technology as tools to promote development. The war catalyzed an emphasis on applied sciences, comprehensive economic planning, and development of scientific and technical human resources—all of which served the Nationalists' immediate and long-term goals. It created an opportunity for the Nationalists to extend control over inland China and over education and industry. It also provided opportunities for China to mobilize transnational networks of Chinese-Americans, Chinese in America, and the American government and businesses. These groups provided technical advice, ran training programs, and helped the Nationalists acquire manufactured goods and tools. J. Megan Greene shows how the Nationalists worked these programs to their advantage, even in situations where their American counterparts clearly had the upper hand. Finally, this book shows how, although American advisers and diplomats criticized China for harboring resources rather than putting them into winning the war against Japan, US industrial consultants were also strongly motivated by postwar goals. J. Megan Greene is Professor of History at the University of Kansas. Her field of study is the history of the Republic of China under the KMT both in China and on Taiwan. She is also the author of The Origins of the Developmental State in Taiwan: Science Policy and the Quest for Modernization (Harvard University Press, 2008), a study of industrial science policy in China and Taiwan under the KMT. Li-Ping Chen is a teaching fellow in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies

PREVIEW: #JAPAN: #PRC: Conversation with colleague Lance Gatling, of Nexial Research in Tokyo, re the PLA Navy's continued provocative activity around and through the Okinawa island chain toward the South China Sea - a critical waterway that the PRC must dominate in wartime. More later tonight. 1895 Sino-Japanese War soldiers.

Who's to blame for the attack on Pearl Harbor?This week, The Alarmist (Rebecca Delgado Smith) welcomes author and journalist Jess McHugh to discuss one of America's most epic historical tragedies, the attack on Pearl Harbor. They're joined by Fact Checker Chris Smith and Producer Clayton Early. What led up to this calculated and massively devastating attack and why didn't American forces see it coming? Did an American oil embargo have something to do with it? Could the second Sino Japanese War be to blame? Or will Hitler go to THe Alarmist Jail…again?! Time to find out Alarmy!Join our Patreon!We have merch!Join our Discord!Tell us who you think is to blame at http://thealarmistpodcast.comEmail us at thealarmistpodcast@gmail.comFollow us on Instagram @thealarmistpodcastFollow us on Twitter @alarmistThe Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/alarmist. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Indoctrinating the Youth: Secondary Education in Wartime China and Postwar Taiwan, 1937-1960 (U Hawaii Press, 2024) examines how the Guomindang (GMD or Nationalists) sought to maintain control of middle-school students and cultivate their political loyalty over the trajectory of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Chinese Civil War, and postwar Taiwan. During the Sino-Japanese War the Nationalists managed middle-school refugee students by merging schools, publishing and distributing updated textbooks, and assisting students as they migrated to the interior with their principals and teachers. In Taiwan, the China Youth Corps (CYC) became a symbol of the regime's successful establishment. Tracing Nationalist efforts to indoctrinate ideology and martial spirit, Jennifer Liu investigates how GMD leaders Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo tried to build support among young people in their efforts to stabilize Taiwanese society under their rule. By comparing two key youth organizations—the Three People's Principles Youth Corps in China, and the CYC on Taiwan—Liu uses education as a lens to analyze state-building in modern China. Liu's careful analysis of the inner workings of GMD youth organizations also illuminates the day-to-day operations of military training in gender-segregated upper-middle schools—including how the government selected instructors and the skills taught to students. According to Liu, mandatory military training contributed to preventing major protest against the government but the policy was not without critics. Intellectuals, parents, and students voiced their dissent at what they perceived as excessive control by a repressive government and a waste of resources interfering with academics. The government-mandated civics curriculum, including government-approved textbooks and standards, reveals the characteristics and duties GMD officials believed modern citizens of the next generation should possess. Through provisions for refugee students, youth organizations, military training, and civics classes, GMD secondary education policy played a critical role in the process of state building in both modern China and Taiwan. Skillfully combining archival work in Nanjing and Taipei, along with oral interviews with former students and CYC administrators, instructors, and members, Liu offers a unique perspective toward a balanced assessment of Nationalist Party rule. Jennifer Liu is associate professor of East Asian history at Central Michigan University. She specializes in the political and social history of twentieth-century China, particularly education, youth culture, studen​t protest, and ethnic identity. Li-Ping Chen is a teaching fellow in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Indoctrinating the Youth: Secondary Education in Wartime China and Postwar Taiwan, 1937-1960 (U Hawaii Press, 2024) examines how the Guomindang (GMD or Nationalists) sought to maintain control of middle-school students and cultivate their political loyalty over the trajectory of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Chinese Civil War, and postwar Taiwan. During the Sino-Japanese War the Nationalists managed middle-school refugee students by merging schools, publishing and distributing updated textbooks, and assisting students as they migrated to the interior with their principals and teachers. In Taiwan, the China Youth Corps (CYC) became a symbol of the regime's successful establishment. Tracing Nationalist efforts to indoctrinate ideology and martial spirit, Jennifer Liu investigates how GMD leaders Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo tried to build support among young people in their efforts to stabilize Taiwanese society under their rule. By comparing two key youth organizations—the Three People's Principles Youth Corps in China, and the CYC on Taiwan—Liu uses education as a lens to analyze state-building in modern China. Liu's careful analysis of the inner workings of GMD youth organizations also illuminates the day-to-day operations of military training in gender-segregated upper-middle schools—including how the government selected instructors and the skills taught to students. According to Liu, mandatory military training contributed to preventing major protest against the government but the policy was not without critics. Intellectuals, parents, and students voiced their dissent at what they perceived as excessive control by a repressive government and a waste of resources interfering with academics. The government-mandated civics curriculum, including government-approved textbooks and standards, reveals the characteristics and duties GMD officials believed modern citizens of the next generation should possess. Through provisions for refugee students, youth organizations, military training, and civics classes, GMD secondary education policy played a critical role in the process of state building in both modern China and Taiwan. Skillfully combining archival work in Nanjing and Taipei, along with oral interviews with former students and CYC administrators, instructors, and members, Liu offers a unique perspective toward a balanced assessment of Nationalist Party rule. Jennifer Liu is associate professor of East Asian history at Central Michigan University. She specializes in the political and social history of twentieth-century China, particularly education, youth culture, studen​t protest, and ethnic identity. Li-Ping Chen is a teaching fellow in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

Indoctrinating the Youth: Secondary Education in Wartime China and Postwar Taiwan, 1937-1960 (U Hawaii Press, 2024) examines how the Guomindang (GMD or Nationalists) sought to maintain control of middle-school students and cultivate their political loyalty over the trajectory of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Chinese Civil War, and postwar Taiwan. During the Sino-Japanese War the Nationalists managed middle-school refugee students by merging schools, publishing and distributing updated textbooks, and assisting students as they migrated to the interior with their principals and teachers. In Taiwan, the China Youth Corps (CYC) became a symbol of the regime's successful establishment. Tracing Nationalist efforts to indoctrinate ideology and martial spirit, Jennifer Liu investigates how GMD leaders Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo tried to build support among young people in their efforts to stabilize Taiwanese society under their rule. By comparing two key youth organizations—the Three People's Principles Youth Corps in China, and the CYC on Taiwan—Liu uses education as a lens to analyze state-building in modern China. Liu's careful analysis of the inner workings of GMD youth organizations also illuminates the day-to-day operations of military training in gender-segregated upper-middle schools—including how the government selected instructors and the skills taught to students. According to Liu, mandatory military training contributed to preventing major protest against the government but the policy was not without critics. Intellectuals, parents, and students voiced their dissent at what they perceived as excessive control by a repressive government and a waste of resources interfering with academics. The government-mandated civics curriculum, including government-approved textbooks and standards, reveals the characteristics and duties GMD officials believed modern citizens of the next generation should possess. Through provisions for refugee students, youth organizations, military training, and civics classes, GMD secondary education policy played a critical role in the process of state building in both modern China and Taiwan. Skillfully combining archival work in Nanjing and Taipei, along with oral interviews with former students and CYC administrators, instructors, and members, Liu offers a unique perspective toward a balanced assessment of Nationalist Party rule. Jennifer Liu is associate professor of East Asian history at Central Michigan University. She specializes in the political and social history of twentieth-century China, particularly education, youth culture, studen​t protest, and ethnic identity. Li-Ping Chen is a teaching fellow in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

Indoctrinating the Youth: Secondary Education in Wartime China and Postwar Taiwan, 1937-1960 (U Hawaii Press, 2024) examines how the Guomindang (GMD or Nationalists) sought to maintain control of middle-school students and cultivate their political loyalty over the trajectory of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Chinese Civil War, and postwar Taiwan. During the Sino-Japanese War the Nationalists managed middle-school refugee students by merging schools, publishing and distributing updated textbooks, and assisting students as they migrated to the interior with their principals and teachers. In Taiwan, the China Youth Corps (CYC) became a symbol of the regime's successful establishment. Tracing Nationalist efforts to indoctrinate ideology and martial spirit, Jennifer Liu investigates how GMD leaders Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo tried to build support among young people in their efforts to stabilize Taiwanese society under their rule. By comparing two key youth organizations—the Three People's Principles Youth Corps in China, and the CYC on Taiwan—Liu uses education as a lens to analyze state-building in modern China. Liu's careful analysis of the inner workings of GMD youth organizations also illuminates the day-to-day operations of military training in gender-segregated upper-middle schools—including how the government selected instructors and the skills taught to students. According to Liu, mandatory military training contributed to preventing major protest against the government but the policy was not without critics. Intellectuals, parents, and students voiced their dissent at what they perceived as excessive control by a repressive government and a waste of resources interfering with academics. The government-mandated civics curriculum, including government-approved textbooks and standards, reveals the characteristics and duties GMD officials believed modern citizens of the next generation should possess. Through provisions for refugee students, youth organizations, military training, and civics classes, GMD secondary education policy played a critical role in the process of state building in both modern China and Taiwan. Skillfully combining archival work in Nanjing and Taipei, along with oral interviews with former students and CYC administrators, instructors, and members, Liu offers a unique perspective toward a balanced assessment of Nationalist Party rule. Jennifer Liu is associate professor of East Asian history at Central Michigan University. She specializes in the political and social history of twentieth-century China, particularly education, youth culture, studen​t protest, and ethnic identity. Li-Ping Chen is a teaching fellow in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

Indoctrinating the Youth: Secondary Education in Wartime China and Postwar Taiwan, 1937-1960 (U Hawaii Press, 2024) examines how the Guomindang (GMD or Nationalists) sought to maintain control of middle-school students and cultivate their political loyalty over the trajectory of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Chinese Civil War, and postwar Taiwan. During the Sino-Japanese War the Nationalists managed middle-school refugee students by merging schools, publishing and distributing updated textbooks, and assisting students as they migrated to the interior with their principals and teachers. In Taiwan, the China Youth Corps (CYC) became a symbol of the regime's successful establishment. Tracing Nationalist efforts to indoctrinate ideology and martial spirit, Jennifer Liu investigates how GMD leaders Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo tried to build support among young people in their efforts to stabilize Taiwanese society under their rule. By comparing two key youth organizations—the Three People's Principles Youth Corps in China, and the CYC on Taiwan—Liu uses education as a lens to analyze state-building in modern China. Liu's careful analysis of the inner workings of GMD youth organizations also illuminates the day-to-day operations of military training in gender-segregated upper-middle schools—including how the government selected instructors and the skills taught to students. According to Liu, mandatory military training contributed to preventing major protest against the government but the policy was not without critics. Intellectuals, parents, and students voiced their dissent at what they perceived as excessive control by a repressive government and a waste of resources interfering with academics. The government-mandated civics curriculum, including government-approved textbooks and standards, reveals the characteristics and duties GMD officials believed modern citizens of the next generation should possess. Through provisions for refugee students, youth organizations, military training, and civics classes, GMD secondary education policy played a critical role in the process of state building in both modern China and Taiwan. Skillfully combining archival work in Nanjing and Taipei, along with oral interviews with former students and CYC administrators, instructors, and members, Liu offers a unique perspective toward a balanced assessment of Nationalist Party rule. Jennifer Liu is associate professor of East Asian history at Central Michigan University. She specializes in the political and social history of twentieth-century China, particularly education, youth culture, studen​t protest, and ethnic identity. Li-Ping Chen is a teaching fellow in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies

This episode of History 102 features a follow up analysis of World War II focused on Japan, China, and the events located in the Pacific. WhatifAltHist creator Rudyard Lynch and Erik Torenberg discuss the build-up to the Pacific War, the geopolitical backdrop of Japan's militaristic expansion, and the cultural psyche that fueled its aggressive actions. Key points include Japan's transition to authoritarianism in the 1920s, its strategic ambitions in China leading to the Sino-Japanese War, and the critical battles and dynamics with other global powers including the USSR and the USA. The episode also explores the nuanced causes and justifications behind the Pacific War, Japan's wartime atrocities, and the decisive moments that led to Japan's surrender, including discussions around the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Tourism content in the episode includes the broader implications of WWII, the downfall of colonial empires, and the socio-political changes in post-war Japan.  – SPONSORS: BEEHIIV Head to Beehiiv, the newsletter platform built for growth, to power your own. Connect with premium brands, scale your audience, and deliver a beautiful UX that stands out in an inbox. 

In December 1937, the Chinese capital, Nanjing, falls and the Japanese army unleash an orgy of torture, murder, and rape. Over the course of six weeks, hundreds of thousands of civilians and prisoners of war are killed. At the very onset of the atrocities, the Danish supervisor at a cement plant just outside the city, 26-year-old Bernhard Arp Sindberg, opens the factory gates and welcomes in 10,000 Chinese civilians to safety, beyond the reach of the blood-thirsty Japanese. He becomes an Asian equivalent of Oskar Schindler, the savior of Jews in the European Holocaust. Bernhard Sindberg: The Schindler of Nanjing (Casemate, 2024) follows Sindberg from his childhood in the old Viking city of Aarhus and on his first adventures as a sailor and a Foreign Legionnaire to the dramatic 104 days as a rescuer of thousands of helpless men, women, and children in the darkest hour of the Sino-Japanese War. It describes how after his remarkable achievement, he receded back into obscurity, spending decades more at sea and becoming a naturalized American citizen, before dying of old age in Los Angeles in 1983, completely unrecognized. In this respect, too, there is an obvious parallel with Schindler, who only attained posthumous fame. The book sets the record straight by providing the first complete account of Sindberg's life in English, based on archival sources hitherto unutilized by any historian as well as interviews with surviving relatives. What emerges is the surprising tale of a person who was average in every respect but rose to the occasion when faced with unimaginable brutality, discovering an inner strength and courage that transformed him into one of the great humanitarian figures of the 20th century and an inspiration for our modern age, demonstrating that the determined actions of one person--any person--can make a huge difference. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

In December 1937, the Chinese capital, Nanjing, falls and the Japanese army unleash an orgy of torture, murder, and rape. Over the course of six weeks, hundreds of thousands of civilians and prisoners of war are killed. At the very onset of the atrocities, the Danish supervisor at a cement plant just outside the city, 26-year-old Bernhard Arp Sindberg, opens the factory gates and welcomes in 10,000 Chinese civilians to safety, beyond the reach of the blood-thirsty Japanese. He becomes an Asian equivalent of Oskar Schindler, the savior of Jews in the European Holocaust. Bernhard Sindberg: The Schindler of Nanjing (Casemate, 2024) follows Sindberg from his childhood in the old Viking city of Aarhus and on his first adventures as a sailor and a Foreign Legionnaire to the dramatic 104 days as a rescuer of thousands of helpless men, women, and children in the darkest hour of the Sino-Japanese War. It describes how after his remarkable achievement, he receded back into obscurity, spending decades more at sea and becoming a naturalized American citizen, before dying of old age in Los Angeles in 1983, completely unrecognized. In this respect, too, there is an obvious parallel with Schindler, who only attained posthumous fame. The book sets the record straight by providing the first complete account of Sindberg's life in English, based on archival sources hitherto unutilized by any historian as well as interviews with surviving relatives. What emerges is the surprising tale of a person who was average in every respect but rose to the occasion when faced with unimaginable brutality, discovering an inner strength and courage that transformed him into one of the great humanitarian figures of the 20th century and an inspiration for our modern age, demonstrating that the determined actions of one person--any person--can make a huge difference. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

In December 1937, the Chinese capital, Nanjing, falls and the Japanese army unleash an orgy of torture, murder, and rape. Over the course of six weeks, hundreds of thousands of civilians and prisoners of war are killed. At the very onset of the atrocities, the Danish supervisor at a cement plant just outside the city, 26-year-old Bernhard Arp Sindberg, opens the factory gates and welcomes in 10,000 Chinese civilians to safety, beyond the reach of the blood-thirsty Japanese. He becomes an Asian equivalent of Oskar Schindler, the savior of Jews in the European Holocaust. Bernhard Sindberg: The Schindler of Nanjing (Casemate, 2024) follows Sindberg from his childhood in the old Viking city of Aarhus and on his first adventures as a sailor and a Foreign Legionnaire to the dramatic 104 days as a rescuer of thousands of helpless men, women, and children in the darkest hour of the Sino-Japanese War. It describes how after his remarkable achievement, he receded back into obscurity, spending decades more at sea and becoming a naturalized American citizen, before dying of old age in Los Angeles in 1983, completely unrecognized. In this respect, too, there is an obvious parallel with Schindler, who only attained posthumous fame. The book sets the record straight by providing the first complete account of Sindberg's life in English, based on archival sources hitherto unutilized by any historian as well as interviews with surviving relatives. What emerges is the surprising tale of a person who was average in every respect but rose to the occasion when faced with unimaginable brutality, discovering an inner strength and courage that transformed him into one of the great humanitarian figures of the 20th century and an inspiration for our modern age, demonstrating that the determined actions of one person--any person--can make a huge difference. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

In December 1937, the Chinese capital, Nanjing, falls and the Japanese army unleash an orgy of torture, murder, and rape. Over the course of six weeks, hundreds of thousands of civilians and prisoners of war are killed. At the very onset of the atrocities, the Danish supervisor at a cement plant just outside the city, 26-year-old Bernhard Arp Sindberg, opens the factory gates and welcomes in 10,000 Chinese civilians to safety, beyond the reach of the blood-thirsty Japanese. He becomes an Asian equivalent of Oskar Schindler, the savior of Jews in the European Holocaust. Bernhard Sindberg: The Schindler of Nanjing (Casemate, 2024) follows Sindberg from his childhood in the old Viking city of Aarhus and on his first adventures as a sailor and a Foreign Legionnaire to the dramatic 104 days as a rescuer of thousands of helpless men, women, and children in the darkest hour of the Sino-Japanese War. It describes how after his remarkable achievement, he receded back into obscurity, spending decades more at sea and becoming a naturalized American citizen, before dying of old age in Los Angeles in 1983, completely unrecognized. In this respect, too, there is an obvious parallel with Schindler, who only attained posthumous fame. The book sets the record straight by providing the first complete account of Sindberg's life in English, based on archival sources hitherto unutilized by any historian as well as interviews with surviving relatives. What emerges is the surprising tale of a person who was average in every respect but rose to the occasion when faced with unimaginable brutality, discovering an inner strength and courage that transformed him into one of the great humanitarian figures of the 20th century and an inspiration for our modern age, demonstrating that the determined actions of one person--any person--can make a huge difference. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

Last time we spoke about the legendary battle of Tsushima. Admiral Rozhdestvenski traveled across the globe to bring the Baltic fleet to the Pacific to give a climactic fight to Admiral Togo's combined fleet. Yet during the journey, Port Arthur fell leaving the only destination to be Vladivostok and they would have to take a perilous journey through the Tsushima strait to get to her. Rozhdestvenski's grand journey meant his ships were ill maintained and the crews had no time for training. The Japanese meanwhile had trained vigorously and brought new technological advantages into the mix that would significantly tip the scale. The Russian baltic fleet was absolutely annihilated at a minimal lose for the IJN. The battle of Tsushima became one of the most famous naval battles in history and its decisive nature would become indoctrinated in the IJN until the end of WW2.    #84 The Russo-Japanese War part 11: The Portsmouth Treaty    Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. I have to start this podcast by repeating a funny little bit from this week. One of my bosses over at Kings and Generals suddenly messages me on discord and says “hey what's going on with the China Podcast, are we doing a series on the Russo-Japanese War now?” And to this I laughed, because he had a good point, I am sure there are a lot of you who were wondering….well why are we spending so much time on this, if the Fall and Rise of China podcast is ..well about China. The Russo-Japanese War would have a profound effect on China and global history. Something many forget, this entire war occurred within China, a nation not officially taking part in the conflict! Having a war break out between two other empires within your borders was an absolutely humiliating situation. China had just lost a war against the Russians in Manchuria. When the war broke out, China declared neutrality and asked both sides to not violate her territory, which both did without a care in the world. The Chinese did help the Japanese, especially the Honghuzi. Now the 1st Sino-Japanese War had left quite a foul taste in the mouth of the Chinese, but during the Russo-Japanese War some Pan-Asianim did develop. The Chinese public gradually began supporting the Japanese, there were quite a lot of youth in China demanding the Qing government allow them to enlist and help fight off the Russians. Countless Chinese helped with labor, working in a vast spy network and sold both sides provisions. When the Russians lost the battle of Tsushima and Mukden, there were many influential and future influential figures that celebrated this. Notably Mahatma Gandhi, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Jawaharlal Nehru and Sun Yat-Sen were deeply influenced by the Japanese victory. Why were they so influenced, because it was the first time a non-white nation had defeated a white one, and not just that, one of the great powers. The Russian Empire was in the public's mind, defeated handily by a small asiatic nation, it was a david and goliath story come true. Ironically, the Yellow Peril which Kaiser Wilhelm had utilized to usher in the war was turned up to 100 when the Japanese won.Now all that is fine and dandy, but there was another dramatic effect this war would hold over Japan and China. We technically have not spoken about “the end” of the Russo-Japanese War, there is actually another battle and the peace negotiations to discuss. It is here things will occur that will actually lay the groundwork for WW2. So now we are heading back into the story. The Japanese had won at Mukden and now at Tsushima, so that was that, they had won the war right? The Russians had taken up a new defensive position in northern Manchuria and were still being reinforced, 2 corps were enroute. In the war of attrition, the Russians would eventually win, despite having no naval ability, they would simply overwhelm the Japanese with numbers. Both nations faced bankruptcy, but the Russians were able to take larger loans from France and Germany, thus the situation was from a financial point of view more perilous for Japan. 53% of Japan's annual revenue had been devoted to the war effort. For Russia, the humiliation and financial ruin was accompanied by a full blown revolution. Thus both nations really needed the war to end and fast. Now comes in my favorite US president, Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt was one of the few at the offset of the war to place his bet on a Japanese victory. He also attempted to resolve the disputes between the two empires before the war broke out, often citing the Kaiser's Yellow Peril propaganda as being a main culprit to the hostilities. Roosevelt wrote to the British diplomat, Cecil Spring Rice that he believed Wilhelm should bear partial responsibility for the war "as he has done all he could to bring it about". Roosevelt is a fascinating figure. He was of course a product of his time, a 19th century man, he had views of white superiority, but demonstrated a certain tolerance towards nonwhites. This extended itself a lot towards the Japanese, there was a lot about the Japanese he admired. After the battle of Tsushima Roosevelt wrote “even the battle of Trafalgar could not match this. I grew so excited that I myself became almost like a Japanese, and I could not attend to official duties.” Roosevelt famously practiced judo with Japanese opponents and avidly read Nitobe Inazo's “Bushido”. Roosevelt was sent many books from his friend at Harvard, Kaneko Kentaro and wrote in appreciation “Perhaps I was most impressed by this little volume on Bushido. …It seems to me, my dear Baron, that Japan has much to teach to the nations of the Occident, just as she has something to learn from them. I have long felt that Japan's entrance into the circle of the great civilized powers was of good omen for all of the world.Certainly I myself, hope that I have learned not a little from what I have read of the fine Samurai spirit, and from the way in which that spirit has been and is being transformed to meet the needs of modern life.” In some ways perhaps you could call Roosevelt a Japanophile, but I would stress, like any white elites of the 19th century, he still had ingrained in him a sense that whites, notably white anglo saxons were the most civilized in the world.  It should come to no surprise, Roosevelt who publicly spoke well of the Japanese during the war, found the Japanese coming to him to help mediate the peace. Now as much as Roosevelt had openly favored the Japanese during the conflict, now there was a looming issue on the American president's mind. The Japanese were aggressively expanding in Asia and the Pacific, this was not something Roosevelt liked very much. After the fall of Port Arthur, Roosevelt wrote “if Japan tries to gain from her victory in the Russo-Japanese War more than she ought to have, she will array against her all the great powers, and however determined she may be she cannot successfully face an allied world”. Roosevelt was greatly troubled by the potential threat Japan posed against America's own increasing strength and influence in the asia-pacific. He would dispatch one General Arthur MacArthur, for you Pacific War week by week podcast listeners, yes I managed to bring MacArthur into this one. Arthur MacArthur was sent on a tour of the far east in 1905 and he was of course accompanied by his wife and a young Lt Douglas MacArthur who would go on to write ‘The purpose of our observations was to measure the strength of the Japanese Army and its method of warfare … But I had the uneasy feeling that the haughty, feudalistic samurai who were their leaders, were, through their victories, planting the seed of eventual Japanese conquest of the Orient.' No worries I am not going to turn this into a MacArthur rant. Roosevelt's agreed to act as a mediator before the battle of Tsushima. After the Tsushima victory, the Japanese expected they would receive large benefits from peace talks. They had good reason to believe so, Russia had lost on the land and sea, revolution was burning within the empire. Anarchists attacked the Tsar's uncle and brother in law, Grand Duke Serge Alexandroitich, the governor general of Moscow. Riots and anti-war demonstrations were widespread, violence was found in major Russian cities. From the Russian point of view, the Japanese had committed all her available manpower in the field, thus only mediation could save Japan from incoming disaster. In many ways it was a kind of race, who would run out of men first? Japan because she literally had a much smaller population, or would the Russian people simply overthrow the Tsar regime? Both regimes also were verging bankruptcy, whose dollar would run out first? Russia had not lost any of “her” territory, something Roosevelt was quick to point out to the Japanese. Thus Roosevelt was sort of winking at the Japanese that they should secure Russian territory so they had more bargaining power at the peace table, so the Japanese went to work. Japan and Russian had signed a treaty in 1875, the Treaty of Saint Petersburg that saw Japan ceding part of Sakhalin island to Russia in exchange for the Kuril islands. Now by the time of the Russo-Japanese war the population of Sakhalin was roughly 30,000 including 4000 Ainu. The island held a large prison and was used as a place for those Russia sought to exile. Overall it was not a very significant territory to the Russians. Its climate as you can imagine, was quite harsh, even by Russian standards. The Russians had a garrison of 7280 men on the island, the majority were conscripted farmers, hunters and prisoners with little in terms of training or equipment. They were led by General Mikhail Nikolaevich Lyapunov, who had been appointed military governor of Sakhalin in 1898. He had joined the military academy at the age of 16, but quickly found a talent in law, so he became a lawyer, while continuing his military career on the side. Thus the man was not particularly experienced in terms of war.  After the battle of Tsushima, the Japanese quickly wrangled together a force of 14,000 men for the brand new 13th IJA division led by General Haraguchi Kensai. Admiral Kataoka Shichiro assembled a naval force at Aomori Bay of 8 armored cruisers, 9 destroyers, 4 coastal defense ships and 12 torpedo boats to transport the division for an invasion of Sakhalin. The naval force departed on July 5th and landed in Aniwa Bay and near the port of Korsakov. They faced little opposition, a second group landed closer to Korsakov where they destroyed a battery of field artillery and defeated a small Russian force. The Japanese quickly advanced against Korsakov the next day, but the garrison of 2000 Russians led by Colonel Josef Arciszweski there had burned it to the ground. On July 8th the IJN force cleared Chitose Bay and on the 10th occupied Kindo Cape. Meanwhile the 13th division advanced north, taking the village of Vladimirovka. Colonel Arciszweski had dug to resist the Japanese, but his force was quickly outflanked and they withdrew into mountains within the interior of the island. By July 16th, Arciszweski surrendered his forces. Around 200 Russians were captured, the Japanese had suffered 18 deaths and 58 wounded. On the 17th 1905 General Lyapunov, through a representative, sent a message to General Kensai "Your Excellency! The lack of medicines and dressings and, as a result, the lack of the possibility of rendering assistance to the wounded, forced me to propose to Your Excellency to cease hostilities for purely humane reasons." General Haraguchi responded by demanding that General Lyapunov surrender all weapons and all movable and immovable state property that were intact, as well as the surrender of all maps, documents, papers related to the military department and administration. On the 19th General Lyapunov at his headquarters in the village of Onor gave the order: "The lack of food and firearms, as well as entrenching tools, the lack of sanitary facilities, the enormous numerical superiority of the Japanese army and the absence of a prepared path of retreat put us in such a situation when which further resistance would be useless bloodshed. In view of this, having received an offer from the commander of the Japanese army, which landed on the island, to surrender, I convened a military council, at which, to discuss the general situation...". On the 24th the Japanese landed in northern Sakhalin near Alexandrovsk-Sakhalinsky. The Russians had 5000 troops under the direct control of General Lyapunov. Lyapunov chose to flee the city with his forces and later surrendered seeing the Japanese capture 3200 men, 79 officers and General Lyapunov. He was the only Russian governor to surrender during the war. The Japanese would also capture another 1260 soldiers around Onor with a large stockpile of weapons, ammunition and food. After all was said and done, the battle for Sakhalin saw the Russians suffer 181 deaths, thousands taken prisoner. With that done with, the Japanese now had officially seized Russian territory. Alongside this the Japanese re-signed the Anglo-Japanese alliance for another 10 years and entered talks with the US regarding their positions over Korea and the Philippines. The Taft-Katsura agreement between William Howard Taft and Count Katsura Taro saw the US agree Japan should seek a protectorate over Korea, and Japan agreed the Philippines should be left under the good governance of the US. It should be noted this was all “a agreement” nothing was signed. In many ways it was a betrayal of Korea by the US, as the Americans and Koreans had signed an amity and commerce treaty in 1882, which the Koreans assumed was a mutual defense treaty. Regardless, the Japanese were securing their poker hand before heading into the negotiations. The peace negotiations were held at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. The Russian peace team was led by Sergius Witte who quickly stressed Russia had not been beaten and the war was very much still on. He also began privately complaining to all that it was his view the Japanese sought to gain as much loot from an agreement as possible. He was 100% correct in that assumption. Witte also made it clear, the Tsar's position in regards to Korea had not changed and that Russia would never pay a rouble in war indemnities. The Japanese were lead by Baron Komura, a harvard graduate. He came into the negotiations immediately demanding Korea was in the sphere of Japanese influence, that the Russians should depart Manchuria, the cession of Sakhalin, the granting of new fishing rights along the Russian coast, the spoils of war to be agreed upon and of course a fat sum of war indemnities. The teams had arrived on August 8th of 1905, and would stay at the Hotel Wentworth in New Castle. The actual negotiations took place at the General Stores Building, furnished with Mahogany furniture from the Cabinet Room of the White House. The conference was arranged so the most difficult parts would come last, namely, indemnities and Sakhalin. There were 12 sessions held between August 9th to the 30th. During the first 8 sessions, both sides reached an agreement on 8 points.  There should be an immediate ceasefire. The Russians would recognize  Japanese claims over Korea. The Russian forces would evacuate Manchuria.  Russia would cede its leases over Port Arthur and Dalien, the South Manchuria Railway and some mining concession, and Russia would retain the Chinese Eastern Railway in northern Manchuria. The next 4 points were much trickery.  On August the 15th the two vexed subjects were brought forth, Sakhalin and indemnity payments. It seemed the American public opinion over these issues had swung to the Russians. Witte, briefed by the Tsar stated there would be no payments for the return of Sakhalin and no indemnities, and stressed the Russians remained resolved to continue fighting. The Russians were very aware of Japan's financial distress and concluded that a demand for indemnity would be their most pressing concern. During the talks Roosevelt would later write ‘This (the indemnity) would never have been entertained by him, and he had calculated that the Peace Conference would break down on this point, and the struggle be continued until Japan could raise no more money.'On the issue Roosevelt intervened and advised the Japanese that if she did not abandon her claims for an indemnity, the world would come to believe the war had been fought for financial gain. Roosevelt on the 18th proposed dividing Sakhalin. Witte countered this on the 23rrd proposing Japan keep Sakhalin and drop her claims of indemnities. Komura rejected this proposal prompting Witte to warn him he was instructed to cease negotiations and resume the war. This ultimatum was met by 4 new Russian divisions arriving to Manchuria and Witte made a public display of literally showing everyone himself packing his bags preparing to leave. The Russians were convinced the Japanese could not afford to resume the war and were making a grand display to the Americans and Japanese that Russia would never agree to paying a single rouble. Komura was not in a good position and caved into the demands. The Japanese agreed in exchange for the southern half of Sakhalin they would drop their claims for indemnities. On September 5th, the treaty was signed, and ratified on the 10th of October in Japan, and the 14th for Russia. A random little side note, during the war Montenegro had declared war on Japan, but everyone kind of forgot about this and no mention of Montenegro was made in the treaty so technically Japan and Montenegro were at war until 2006 when Japan officially ended the war. Witte wrote to the New York Times about the treaty “The judgement of all observers here, whether pro-Japanese or pro-Russian, is that the victory is as astonishing a thing as ever was seen in diplomatic history. A nation hopelessly beaten in every battle of the war, one army captured and the other overwhelmingly routed, with a navy swept from the seas, dictated her own terms to the victory”. His rather bombastic claims were well warranted as the treaty signing had a profound effect on Japan. The Japanese public exploded. The over taxation for the war effort, the loss of so many sons and fathers had prompted the Japanese public to believe they were owed a lot. From the point of view of the Japanese public, the only news they received was endless victories over the lands and seas, they had no idea of the financial plight of their nation. When they heard the terms of the treaty, riots exploded. The most famous riots occurred in Hibiya Park in central Tokyo where activities and protesters assembled some 30,000 people strong. They marched upon the Imperial Palace grounds and rampaged the city for over 2 days. They especially targeted government buildings, the police, Russian property, but notably that of the US. From the publics view, Roosevelt and America had backstabbed them. Russian and American missionary churches were vandalized, martial law was erected. Over 350 buildings were damaged, 17 people were killed, 450 policemen, 48 firemen and civilians were injured. Prime Minister Katsura Taro's cabinet collapsed. While Roosevelt earned a nobel peace prize for his efforts, Japan's extremely positive view of America had dramatically soured. Its hard to picture it given the history of WW1 and WW2, but until this point America was kind of seen as a good big brother to Japan all things considered. The Japanese felt cheated of their rightful claims as victors of the war. Take this into consideration. During the 1st sino-Japanese War, Japan was denied her spoils by the triple intervention of France, Germany and Russia. During the Boxer Rebellion, the Russians used the situation to encroach into Manchuria, which Japan saw as a direct threat. Japan from her perspective won the Russo-Japanese War and now the US was stealing her spoils from her. From the Japanese perspective she deserved recognition as a great power and furthermore recognition as being racially equal. I wont delve to deeply into it, but after WW1, Japan would receive another similar and egregious wound when President Woodrow Wilson denied Japan's request to be recognized as racially equal to the other great powers. That would become the last straw, that drove Japan away from the west and towards WW2. But this is not a Japanese podcast haha, I apologize if I sometimes go in that direction its what I specialized in.  The Russo-Japanese War saw the Japanese suffer 58,000 to 86,000 deaths, for the Russians it was between 43,000 and 120,000. Of the casualties, the Japanese had lost perhaps 59,000 from combat, 27,000 from disease. For the Russians 34-53,000 died from combat and 9-19,000 from disease with another 75,000 captured. And let us not forget the Chinese who would see 20,000 civilian deaths and a financial loss of over 69 million taels. While the Japanese treated the tens of thousands of Russian prisoners extremely well considering what POW treatment would look like during WW1 and WW2, the treatment of Chinese was abysmal. The war between Russia and Japan occurred on Chinese soil, but China was powerless to prevent it and suffered human and financial loss. This added to the Chinese public's sense of humiliation. Alongside this, the treaty of Portsmouth basically started an annexation process of Korea to Japan, but it also handed a ton of privileges and extraterritorial rule over to Japan. Now Japan had her feet firmly set in Manchuria, weakening Qing rule. If you were part of the elites in the Qing dynasty and your responsibility was to improve the empire, it seems investigating how Japan beat Russia should be on top of your list of “to do's”.  Indeed, as we spoke a lot about during the 1st sino japanese war, Japan and China took different paths to modernization in the face of western imperialism. Japan did not defeat Russia solely because of the modernization of her army, Japan had thoroughly organized and prepared her populace for modern politics, military, economic, social and culture….while China struggled behind. China needed to emulate certain aspects, like Japan had to strengthen herself. When Japan and Russia signed the treaty of Portsmouth they were exchanging benefits and many of these were not theirs to take or give, but rather Chinas! Imagine you were a subject of the Qing dynasty living in Manchuria where your home may have been destroyed, perhaps you lost loved ones to the conflict, what did your government do? Nothing. It was a watershed moment for the common people of China, their government did absolutely nothing in the face of all of it. The intellectual class of China was enraged and invigorated by it all. There was this tremendous sense they as a people needed to improve in terms of politics, military, societal, economic, education and culture, China needed to actually modernize. The Qing dynasty was being seen by many as decrepit, too old and stuck in its ways.   In the historical context China was entering the “late Qing reforms” or “new policies” period. This actually began in 1901, but I believed it was very important to get the Russo-Japanese War story into the mix before I dabbled into this very complex part of modern Chinese history. The Qing dynasty is soon coming to its end. Stating all of that I thought it would be a cool time to do a bit of housekeeping. You Mr or Mrs listener, I'd love to hear from you. As you likely know I write and narrate the two podcast Pacific War week by week and the Fall and Rise of China Podcast's for Kings and Generals. However, I also happen to be a Youtuber, and Podcaster on the side. I have the Pacific War Channel where you can find content about the history of Asia from the 1830's until the end of the Pacific war in 1945, in many ways its like this podcast. I also awkwardly have a podcast platform called “the pacific war channel”, and as you can imagine its a bit directionless since …well lets be honest its redundant given these two podcasts I do. I have been trying to think about how to change that podcast around and I would love to hear from you guys. Best way to give feedback, toss comments on my Youtube channel, or join my Pacific War Channel discord, found on my Youtube channel page. I have a few idea's myself, perhaps doing a more general history focused podcast where I tell stories just like the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, but my god in much short series haha, let's say in 3 parters and such. Or I could do an entire other podcast series on The Rise and Fall of Japan, see what I did there with the titles? Yeah that ones been in the back on my mind for awhile. I could also take on a co-pilot for the podcasts so its not only single narration, similar to Tom Holland's “the rest is history”. There's a ton of directions I can go in, but one thing is for sure, the “Pacific War Channel Podcast” needs a new direction, probably a new name as well.  Also and I know its annoying, but a big thank you to all of you who check out the Pacific War channel on Youtube and my Patreon where I make monthly patreon exclusive podcasts. I would love to go full time one day, but alas the Youtube game is a hard one. If you get the chance please check out my Youtube channel, I am now as we speak unleashing a multiple part series on the Japanese invasion of Manchuria 1931-1932, something barely anyone covers. Most historians give it about a few paragraphs, but it was quite a complicated event. I am trying to tackle the 15 year war between Japan and China from 1931-1945 in a chronological order, event by event and such. Stating all of that I love all you guys, and here comes the same outro I do every single time haha. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. One Empire has Risen like a bright Sun as another, tumbles down like a large bear. Asia henceforth will completely change, now the Japanese dominate the landscape. Yet what of China? How will the common Chinese take to this latest round of humiliation? The Qing dynasty is hanging by a thread and that thread is about to be cut. 

4/8: Road to Surrender: Three Men and the Countdown to the End of World War II Hardcover – May 16, 2023 by  Evan Thomas  (Author) 1940 Sino-Japanese War

Last time we spoke about the Russian counter offensive at Telissu. Kuropatkin sought to maintain a defensive posture and wait for reinforcements before launching offensives, but his superiors forced him to perform a hopeless attempt to rescue Port Arthur. With multiple Japanese armies on the move, Kuropatkin could not send the appropriate numbers necessary to relieve the city, and this led to utter disaster. Lt General Stakelberg was given the unfortunate job of advancing southwest to Prot Arthur and would end up running into the Japanese around Telissu. Despite being able to fortify the position and taking up a defensive posture, the battle would prove disastrous for the Russians. Everything was going quite well until the Japanese snuck upon the Russian right flank which buckled and opened the door to a rout. Stakelberg courageously led a counter attack to try and salvage the battle, but it was lost and with it the rescue of Port Arthur.   #78 The Russo-Japanese War part 5: The Japanese advance to Liaoyang    Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After the battle of Telissu General Oku's 2nd IJA rested for four days. While this was going on, the remainder of the 6th division arrived to Oku's command. Meanwhile there was no rest for the Stakelberg's men. The Russians overestimated the 4th IJA's strength and now Stakelberg was receiving orders to occupy Kaiping to make sure the 10th IJA division could not threaten it. The battered men were not to happy to be tossed into another melting pot again. Their rearguard was provided by Lt General Simonov, but he became gravely ill and had to hand over command to Major General Samsonov. By June 20th, the 1st Siberian army corps took their new position at Kaiping. Despite the Russian losses, there was a lot of international criticism aimed at the Japanese. For all of their victories, they kept allowing the Russian forces to get away, they never pursued them too heavily. All four Japanese armies were experiencing supply issues. For example Oku's 2nd IJA were supplied via Pulantien which was being rocked around by monsoons. Over at Dalny, the Russians had abandoned countless railway wagons, but had the good sense to remove their engines at least. The Japanese had a quick answer to this, they bought some engines from America, however the naval squadron at Vladivostok made a raid and managed to intercept two steamers carrying the engines over, now they sat at the bottom of the sea. This greatly delayed some heavy siege artillery for Nogi's 3rd IJA to hit Port Arthur.  Regardless of the logistics hiccups, three Japanese armies still had to coordinate their advance upon Liaoyang. They needed to concentrate their efforts to exert a constant pressure on the Russians to thwart them consolidating properly. To gain access to the Liao valley, the Japanese were forced to go through the passes of Taling, Fenshuling and Motienling. Kuropatkin gave the job of blocking these areas to General Count Keller, who was seizing command of the Russian Eastern Force from the disgraced Zasulich from the Yalu disaster. Keller would have 25,000 men guarding the Motien Pass lying astride the Liaoyang and Antung roads. Keller was an intelligent and brave soldier, he had worked under Kuropatkin for quite some time. He was loyal to Kuropatkin, in truth they were quite good friends. Keller began to study the Japanese actions and he noticed they were extremely similar to what they had done during the Sino-Japanese War. Thus given history was to repeat itself as they say, he predicted the three Japanese armies would converge at Haicheng as they had done 10 years prior. Kuropatkin agreed with his friend's prediction and set about building up a force at Haicheng with the view it would stop the advance of the 2nd or 4th IJA.  Kuropatkin at this stage began making a bit of a mess of troop deployment and movements. He became obsessed multiple places would be hit by the Japanese and real or imaginary tried to plug said gaps in his greater manchurian defensive line. He dispatched a brigade of the 5th infantry division of Stakelberg's force to hold a position at Tashihchiao and this would affect an upcoming battle. Now Keller over at the Motien pass was already weakened, because he had forces under him taken to help at the Telissu battle. Now he was receiving orders to release two more regiments to strengthen Haicheng. Kuropatkin then believed Kuroki's 1st IJA were about to advance up Fenghuangcheng, so he ordered Keller to advance his force there to block against them. Likewise General Rennenkampf stationed at Saimachi was ordered to take his 5000 cavalry force and block Kuroki's advance at Aiyangcheng.  Keller gathered 7 and a half battalions and began his advance against Kuroki. In 36 hours his men traveled over 40 miles, they became exhausted. They were 10 miles within reach of Fenghuangcheng and not a single Japanese had been seen. Keller and his men waited awhile, then ultimately pulled back to Motienpass by June 18th. General Kashtalinski made a report of these actions to a German military observer, Von Tettau stating “all that was achieved by this action was the ruination of 8000 pairs of boots, an item we are in short supply”. On June 19th, the Japanese scouts gave word of Rennenkampfs advance against Aiyangcheng. Thus the Japanese reinforced their detachment from Fenghuangcheng over to Aiyangcheng to make a defense. Yes, it turned out when Keller advanced he stopped 10 miles away from Fenghuangcheng not bothering to check the city to see if the Japanese were there. As a result Rennenkampf launched a failed attack against Aiyangcheng on June 22nd and was easily driven off. Kuroki could have made more of these two locations and given real battle, but he chose to hold back, his attention was drawn securing the railway line to his favored target, the Motienpass.  The 1st and 4th IJA received orders on the 19th and 22nd to advance. General Kawamura with the 4th would hit the Fenshuiling pass, defended by a Russian brigade. Kuroki believed the 2nd IJA would hit Kaiping around the same time, so he planned to hit the Motienpass in unison. General Oku's advanced had stalled somewhat on June 21st around Hsiungyaocheng where he was forced to make camp and await supplies. He would remain there until July 6th as the Japanese were trying to solve numerous logistical issues. Railway carts from Pulantien heading for Telissu were improved upon, Chinese coolies were hired en masse for the job. The logistical situation did improve, but what would really make a difference was the seizure of Port Arthur that held all the facilities, equipment and railway functions necessary to send large loads.  Speaking of Port Arthur the new Admiral Witgeft was under pressure from Alexeiev and by proxy the Tsar to break out of the harbor and try to join up with the Vladivostok squadron. On June 20th there was a proposed departure for the fleet, everything was ready to go, then disaster struck. The editor of Bezobrazov's “Novoe Krai” published a special edition literally announcing the departure that very day. Witgeft was forced to abandon the break out attempt to the dismay of the sailors eager to get out of the harbor as it looked like Port Arthur was going to face a siege soon. On June 23rd the fleet did depart, traveling carefully through the mine fields. Then at 6pm the IJN warships appeared over the horizon. The Russians saw the IJN Chinyen who was patrolling the Korean straits. Witgeft believed the entire combined fleet must be in the vicinity, but in truth Togo had dispatched 8 cruisers to hit the Vladivostok squadron who downed their two steamers back on the 15th. Togo received word from the Chinyen that the Tsarevitch and Retvizan were amongst the Russian ships. Togo was shocked the two battleships were repaired and out in the open sea, the Russians held a 6-4 advantage for larger ships. The IJN still held superior numbers with 53 ships vs Witgefts 18 however. By dusk the two opposing fleets began sailing parallel from another at a course of 18 miles. It was to be a moonlit evening, fit for battle. Despite the moonlit the advantage was to be had by torpedoes rather than naval gunfire, something the IJN would become specialists at during WW2. The Japanese had much more destroyers and torpedo boats and thus held a distinct advantage. Togo steered his flagship Mikasa towards the Russian line. Witgeft lost nerve and ordered the fleet to turn to starboard trying to make a return to Port Arthur and the security of her shore batteries. Upon seeing the Russians turning, Togo ordered his destroyers and torpedo boats to launch attacks upon their own attrition, rather than risking his battleships. In retrospect, Witgeft should have given battle and done as much damage as possible to the IJN battleships, given what would occur later at Port Arthur. But that is of course retrospect, maintaining the Pacific fleet in the hopes they could join the incoming baltic fleet was the winning idea of the day. The Russian fleet made a orderly retreat to Port Arthur trying to take it slow lest they hit mines. Only the Sevastopol would run into a mine, no other Russian warships were significantly damaged by naval gunfire or torpedoes. As for the IJN smaller warships, 5 of them took some hits from shore batteries, but no one sank. While it did not look like a significant engagement, it was another blow to the morale of the Russian navy and Togo had yet again managed to bottle up the Russians.  On June the 24th a rather strange order was issued from the IJA general HQ to all units “The fact has been proved that the Russian fleet is able to issue from the harbour of Port Arthur. The transport of provisions which will be required by the combined Manchurian Armies after their arrival at Liaoyang is therefore rendered uncertain, and it is not advisable for the Second Army to advance further north than Kaiping for the present. The battle of Liaoyang, which it was anticipated would be fought before the rainy season, will now be postponed till after it. Arrange your operations accordingly.” Why was this a rather strange order? It was inconceivable for the 2nd IJA to be permitted to advance to Kaiping while the 1st and 4th IJA's had not yet broken through the Fenshuiling and Motien passes. The message thus spelt the doom of the 2nd IJA if the Russians were to find out and concentrate their forces against it. But was the order sent to the Japanese or perhaps was it a ruse for the Russians. The Japanese units uncharacteristically ignored the order, thus one would be led to believe it was a ruse. The actually Japanese plans were for the mountain passes to be secured prior to Oku closing in on the main russian forces. The supposed fake message was the contrary and exactly how the war went in 1894. Kuropatkin ended up taking forces away from the Motien pass to cover the supposed Oku advance. On June 26th Keller forfeited yet another regiment over to Haicheng and Kuropatkin went there himself that day. Thus on the 26 Haicheng held around 41 battalions and 18 cavalry squadrons.  Meanwhile the 4th IJA advanced upon Fenshuiling where the road descends to Haicheng and Tashishchiao astride the railway. The pass held high pine filled mountains to its north and less steep hills to its south with tracks running parallel in a main approach. On the pass the Russians deployed three infantry regiments, three batteries and a cossack battery. West of them was General Mishchenko with his Cossack brigade plus an infantry regiment. On the night of the 25th the Japanese advanced along an unguarded path trying to hook around the rear of the Russian right flank. They had with them some Maxim machine guns and mountain artillery pieces. Another group of Japanese took off their regulation boots and wore Japanese straw sandals to scale the northern face on the mountains undetected to get around the Russian left flank. It took both these detachments a day to maneuver. Altogether the plan was to hit the Russians on the morning of the 27th. At 5:15am on the 27th the battle commenced with an artillery duel. The Russians had camouflaged their guns using trees. The Japanese frontal assault suffered heavily and by 7am slowed down nearly to a halt. But it was just then when their left and right hooking detachments unleashed their fire power from the hilltops. The Russians were being hit from every angle and were quickly forces to pull back by 8am. As the Russian artillery began to move the Japanese pushed their frontal assault now enjoying better artillery support. By 10am the Russians were overwhelmed and retreating towards Hsimucheng. Their retreat left Mishchenko's left exposed. Mishchenko attempted a counter attack, but by 7pm was likewise retreating.  The Japanese were able with ease to outmaneuver the Fenshuiling pass, but the Motien pass was another matter entirely. Try to imagine Thermopylae, a very narrow pass that a smaller force could guard with ease, it did not offer any flanking opportunities. Yet all the meddling by Kuropatkin to aid the theoretical attack upon Haicheng depleted Keller of men. Russian morale was at an all time low, man of the soldiers were utterly confused by their superiors orders. An account from the 12th east siberian rifle regiment over the two week period had this to say “This regiment had been ordered to Anshanchan on 15 June, but on reaching that place had been at once sent back to Count Keller. On the 26th it received orders to move to Tawan; but while on the march it received another order to retrace its steps and, at 1 a.m. on the 27th, reached the camp at Chinerhtun which it had left the previous morning. There it was met by an order from General Kuropatkin directing it to march at once to Haicheng. Leaving camp again at 4 a.m. on the 27th, it reached Haicheng on the 28th only to find it was to move next day to Liaoyang, this time by rail. Arriving there on the 30th, orders were again received to rejoin Count Keller'. As formidable as the Motien Pass was, to the utter shock of the Japanese on June the 30th, they captured it unopposed, the Russians had abandoned the position. A few days before, the 9th east siberian rifle regiment had been taken away from Keller to help out at Haicheng and it seems this caused such a state of indecision, alongside the capture of the Fengshuiling pass, Keller opted to pull back. The rain continued to fall from June 27th to July 5th making movement along the roads a nightmare for carts. Kurokis 1st IJA were suffering from logistical problems, he was forced to put the 12th division on half rations. If the rain persisted for more than 48 hours Kuroki would have had to retire his force to Fenghuangcheng, but the rain came to a temporary stop. When the rain ceased both sides went to work sending scouts to see what the other side was doing. The Russians could not figure out what the Japanese were going to do next, would they try to maneuver around their left flank or perhaps cut westward to the railway? On July 4th a reconnaissance in force was launched against Motienling by three battalions and it was easily repulsed. Meanwhile the Japanese were receiving intelligence from their Chinese spies amongst the Russians who reported the Russians had taken positions on some reverse slopes north of Motienling.  Now July 6th was the date set by the IJA general HQ for the advance of the three armies. General Oku led his four divisions northward and by midday on the 7th was in the vicinity of Kaiping, experiencing little to no opposition along the way. Oku's scouts reported that Kaiping was garrisoned by Stakelberg's 1st siberian corps while due north at Tashihciao, Lt General Zarubaiev's 4th Siberian corps were in the process of reinforcing its garrison. Just above the city of Kaiping was a semicircle of hills dominating a flat open field. On these hills were 20,000 men ready to fire upon the incoming Japanese. Oku was very cautious having his men advance with their artillery placed into combat positions to hit Kaiping around 5:30am on the 9th of July. Stakelberg viewed the Japanese advance to Kaiping and feared an envelopment maneuver, so he withdrew the forces. Thus his semicircle hill position was captured by Oku's 2nd IJA without a fight and they would dig in and remain there until 22nd of July. During their time on the hill they went to work improving the road, rail and sea lanes to establish better supply lines that could maintain Oku's advance. Alexeiev had been pretty quiet for awhile, but in the face of all the territory loss he yet again began meddling. He instructed Kuropatkin that he should take offensive actions to block the advance of the 2nd and 4th IJA and push back the 1st IJA all the way back into Korea. Kuropatkin obviously thought this was folly and wanted to await further reinforcements, in particular the incoming 7th corps. Kuropatkin believed the Japanese strength was twice what it actually was, ironically Alexeiev would have a much more accurate idea of their numbers. Kuropatkin was not 100% against offensive actions however, he did favor Alexeiev's idea to engage the 1st IJA, but certainly not the multiple offensives against separate Japanese armies. Alexeiev persisted to place pressure on Kuropatkin and against his better judgment he gave orders for Keller to perform a partial offensive against the Motien pass. Kuropatkin proposed Kellers Eastern Force of 40 battalions would attack what was nearly 80 battalions of Kuroki's 1st IJA, while 97 battalions of the Russian southern force were ordered to withdraw if the 2nd and 4th IJA attacked who represented a combined for of around 90 battalions. You can see the fallacy in this. A large reason Kuropatkin gave such orders to Keller was because Keller was continuously requesting permission to retake Motienling. Keller received some reinforcements from the 9th division and had his force advance in three columns up the roads. As remarked by Kuropatkin of the small offensive “Taking into consideration the considerable increase of the Eastern Force, I ordered Count Keller to take the offensive, so as to again get possession of the passes. He did so, but although he had forty battalions under his command, he advanced with only twenty-four.'  During the night of July 16th the Russians advanced upon Japanese positions that had full telephone and alarm coverage. At 8am the Russians made a frontal assault out in the open and were absolutely cut down by Japanese artillery. The Russians artillery was not even able to help support the attack until 2:10pm whereupon their infantry were already withdrawing. Two other Russian columns advanced and met similar fates. Keller had kept one quarter of his forces in reserve. A british military observer, General Hamilton witnessed the battle and remarked the Russians were still utilizing section volley fire. It seemed to Hamilton they had no idea of the use and value of cover and that their officers led them with undue risks. He did praise their efforts at withdrawing but left the remark “It is passing strange that soldiers so steady and formidable in retreat should be so sticky in the attack”. After their loss, Keller had his men dig in a bit further north around Tawan which lies astride the Fenghuangchang-Liaoyang road. Kuroki was emboldened by the easy victories and sent the 12th division against the smaller twon of Chiaotou, hoping to use it as a springboard for a possible attack against the Russian lines of communication to Mukden. The garrison at Chiaotou was a brigade group of the 10th corps who were subjected to having their right flank attacked on july the 18th and 19th. The Russians were quickly forced to withdraw up the Liaoyang road. Rennenkampf was with his cavalry unit 25 miles due east and tried to assist them but received a wound to his thigh on the 13th and had to hand over command to General Liubavin. Liubavin dragged his feet around on the issue ultimately doing nothing to help. With the loss of Chiaotou, the rest of the 1st IJA were now advancing and this directly threatened Penshihu which lay along the railway line between Liaoyang and Mukden. Kuropatkin ordered the 10th corp to retake Chiaotou while Keller was to hold out at Tawan. Meanwhile Kuropatkin and Alexeiev continued to argue about strategy. With no real navy to administer, Alexeiev focused on the land war and was even planning the formation of two armies he would lead himself, placing Kuropatkin in command of one of them subordinate to him. You really have to be baffled by this, Alexeiev was an admiral, this was lunacy. Kuropatkin and Alexeiev met at Mukden on July 20th whereupon Alexeiev unfolded his plans to reinforce the Eastern Force who was to engage Kuroki. Kuropatkin remained unconvinced, but obedient nonetheless as he departed for Liaoyang where he publicly announced his intention to resume the offensive. The 10th and 17th corps were handed over to the Eastern Force while the 2nd IJA resumed their advance northwards, edging closer to the Eastern Force. By July 23rd Oku's intelligence indicated the enemy force was roughly 4 divisions strong and had defensive lines going 10 miles long to towards the south part of Tashihciao. Tashihciao was strategically important because it sat on the junction of the main and secondary lines of the railway leading to the port city of Yingkou. Taking such a junction would greatly benefit the Japanese logistics. Oku cautiously approached as the 1st and 4th IJA were still occupying the mountains. Oku had his men approach in an extended line going 12 miles with his cavalry brigade screening his left flank. On his right flank was the 5th division followed by the 3rd, 6th and 4th to the extreme left. The Japanese advanced within 5 miles of the southern Russian lines.  Kuropatkin had personally selected Tashihciao and had it fortified heavily. Stakelberg's 1st Siberian army corp had fallen back to join up with Lt General Zarubaiev's 4th Siberian army corp, Zarubaiev would have overall command. Zarubaiev was given orders to withdraw to Haicheng if pressed upon by the enemy, yet again you can sense the defeatist mentality amongst the Russian commanders. Stakelberg took the right flank, Zarubaiev the left. Stakelergs sector rested along the railway and to his flank was General Kossogovski's cavalry brigade, Kossogovski had taken command of the brigade from Samsonov. Zarubaievs sector was along the Tungta river with General Mishchenkos cavalry watching his flank. The Russians had a general reserve of 10 battalions and 16 artillery pieces along the center towards the left in two groupings. The left area was full of hills and ravines, while the right was low flat ground. The Russians had learnt some lessons from their defeats and made sure to have outposts on high grounds to be able to track Japanese movements.  Oku chose to advance along some fields of Kaoliang, providing some concealment, but not nearly enough to hide most of his forces advance. Oku's intelligence indicated turning either flanks of the Russians would not be easy this time around. An attempt to divert forces against either flank might expose the Japanese lines of communication and spell a disastrous counter attack upon them. Oku decided not to risk anything, he ordered the 5th, 3rd and 6th divisions to launch a frontal assault on July 24th. He believed the 4th IJA's movements would be on the Russians minds giving him an edge. Oku's 4th division was held back on the left flank, expected to act against possible counter strokes. The 4th divisions orders were ‘take up a position near Wutaishan and will hold it in strength as a protection for the left flank of the army. No advance will be made therefrom until it is observed that the general attack elsewhere is succeeding.' Along the far left was the cavalry screen and two infantry regiments held in reserve.  After the Russo-Japanese war Zarubaeiv would go on the record during a Russian staff debriefing, to state he was attacked by both the 2nd and 4th IJA at the battle of Tashihciao. It seems likely the Russians had misidentified the strength of the divisions facing them. The 4th and 6th IJA divisions were correctly identified, but the 3rd and 5th divisions in the hills it seems led the Russians to believe were only a single division and thus the confusion arrived with their movement. Alongside this General Mishchenko had apparently reported to Zarubaiev that the 10th IJA division were in the vicinity. During the early light of the 24th, the Russians saw three Japanese divisions advancing in a line. The 4 divisions was holding back as ordered and by 5:30am the Japanese artillery began to fire. The Russian left flank began an artillery duel while in the center the IJA 6th division performed what seemed to be a halfhearted assault. By midday the sun was intense and the Russian red cross found themselves extremely busy with cases of sunstroke. At 1pm Stakelberg dispatched an aide over to Zarubaiev, suggesting they should withdraw. Stakelberg stated it was his belief the Japanese main attack was about to hit and if the troops were in the forward trenches they would be met with extremely heavy casualties. He also reminded Zarubaiev, it was not Kuropatkins plan of the campaign to make a firm stand at Tashihciao. No Stakelbergs aid arrived to Zarubaiev's HQ at the exact same time Zarubaeiv received a report from Zasulich that the 4th IJA were on the move. Zarubaiev was concerned, but not enough to order a withdrawal right away, especially when the sun was blazing at 100 degrees invited disaster for marching. Instead he sent a message back to Stakelberg simply stating he would consider withdrawing by nightfall.  In reality, Stakelberg was greatly overreacting. By 2pm 12 of the 12 Japanese batteries opposing his corps were assigned counter battery operations against two of his batteries beyond the hill line. At 3pm a reinforcement Russian battery joined up with them and combined were keeping the Japanese infantry at bay well into nightfall. The Japanese were taking heavy losses. Meanwhile back at 10:30am the 4th IJA division had advanced while skirmishing with Russian cavalry. At 1pm General Kossagovski performed a halfhearted attack against the Japanese left flank. His men fought with the Japanese 1st cavalry brigade who sent them packing north. Kossagovski reported the grounds too muddy for cavalry actions, but asserted he had effectively drawn the Japanese attention to his sector. At 8pm, Zarubaeiv decided to launch a counter attack upon the left flank given this information. Oku released one of his two reserve regiments to fill a gap that was emerging between his 4th and 6th divisions. Meanwhile the 3rd and 5th IJA divisions were trying to hit a weak point along the Russian line in the center. The 4th corps tossed 72 guns of which 32 were the new quick firing model against the 12 batteries supporting the Japanese. The Japanese were gravely outgunned in rate of fire and range.  Just before noon, Zarubaeiv ordered a counter attack. General Shileiko whose position was on the extreme left of the Russian line was to hit the flank of the 5th IJA division. He was also ordered to confer with Mishchenko and the commander of the general reserve. Mishchenko agreed to release cavalry units to Shileiko's command but the commander of the general reserve refused to relinquish any of his units stating he had not received any orders to do so. The results was Shileiko's vanguard being torn to pieces, while Mishchenkos cavalry units stayed safely away on the periphery before withdrawing. The counter attack was an abysmal failure. At 2pm Oku ordered his right flank divisions to press home their attack with or without artillery support. At 3:30pm the Japanese advanced in the face of terrifying Russian artillery. The 5th IJA division were battered and based the job to the 3rd division to keep moving forward. A Japanese battalion managed to seize a key Russian feature, but were quickly met with a counterattack that dislodged them. The 3rd divisions sector continued to perform intense fighting, but alongside the heat both sides were succumbing to inactivity. Stakelberg's artillerymen were holding the Japanese at bay, effectively forcing the 2nd IJA to a grinding halt. The Russians still held 6 battalions in reserve while the Japanese held only 1.  The commander of the 5th IJA division was embarrassed by his men's performance and requested Oku allow him to launch a night attack, Oku agreed. At 10pm the 5th division surged across the valley and over some slopes screaming banzai taking the Russians by surprise. The Japanese were able to seize forward positions as the entire 5th division crashed along the front. By early afternoon on the 25th, the Russian position was in Japanese hands, the Russians rearguards were the only ones putting up a fight. Apparently the commanding Russian officer deemed it impossible to recapture the 10 mile front position and ordered a withdrawal. It's hard to find real numbers on this incredible action, but it is assumed both sides took 1000 casualties each. The taking of this position effectively drove a wedge in the Russian lines and Zarubaeiv decided to order a withdrawal, Kuropatkin gave his support to the decision.  The two Russian corps now withdrew to Haicheng as Oku's army captured Tashihciao and stayed there until August 1st. The withdrawal left General Zasulich in an exposed position at Hsimucheng. Zasulich ordered his rearguards to protect their flanks which were being harassed by the 2nd IJA. Meanwhile the 5th IJA division was transferred to General Nozu's 4th IJA. Mishchenkos cavalry joined Zasulich giving the 2nd Siberian corps + a brigade of the 10th corps a total of 33 battalions, 31 squadrons and 80 artillery pieces. Nozu now commanded the 5th, 10th and 4th divisions along with the 10th Kobi brigade. Nozu's ordered were to attack the Russians whenever possible, so he looked at Hsimucheng as a viable target.  At 2am on July 30th, the 10th division and reserve brigade advanced frontally against the Russian position at Hsimucheng while the 5th division hooked around the left of the Russians trying to cut off their line of retreat. The terrain was rocky and mountainous, not easy to fortify, thus the Russian defensive lines were not great. On the 31st the Japanese main attack hit the right side of the Russian position. Mishchenko's cavalry and the 4th siberian corp rearguards began withdrawing, but Zasulichs main force held tight, bravely tossing counter attacks against the larger Japanese army. The 5th IJA division advanced upon the Russian right, joined by a detachment from the 3rd IJA division sent over by Oku. Zasulich's men held until 11pm when orders from Kuropatkin came to withdraw to Haicheng. Yet again the Russians were retreating. At the battle of Hsimucheng the Russians took 1550 casualties and the Japanese 836. The battle of Hsimucheng also coincided with two other battles. The Russians had mobilized to regain the small town of Chiatou on July 24th and made an advance along the Lan river. The Russian 10th corp, less one brigade under General sluchevski took the lead while General Liubavin took some cavalry to guard the road to Mukden. Now the 10th corps were a European corps and there was great expectation they would walk over the Japanese. After news hit that the men were withdrawing from Tashihciao, Kuropatkin had rushed over to Liaoyang, but just prior ordered Sluchevski the same type of orders he gave Stakelberg at Telissu. The 10th corps divided itself into a vanguard, main body, left and right flank guards and advanced upon the isolated 2nd IJA right flank occupied by the 12th division. By July 30th both sides were grinding to a halt, artillery were dueling it out. 15 miles away were Keller's two divisions dug in behind the lan River around Tawan and Yangtzuling. Keller had orders to stay where he was. Thus General Sluchevski, Keller and Liubavin could not aid another given their orders. On the 31st Kuroki resumed his offensive and decided he would hit all 3 of the enemy forces in the area one by one as long as they remained divided. Kuroki was acting independently, but saw such a grand opportunity he had to grab it. Now the 12th division at Chiaotou were about as far from the 2nd division as Sluchevski was from Keller. The 2nd division were guarding Motienling and to their left was a guards division. Early on the morning of the 31st, four battalions of the 2nd IJA division advanced along a goat track to join up with the 12th so they could attack a Russian brigade currently guarding a pass at Pienling, two miles south of Yushuling. The Russian brigade was isolated, but held a great defensive position, not enough so to repel two Japanese divisions however. According to British military observation testimony “In places the path was so narrow that the Russians could not move more than four abreast, and so steep were the hill sides, that they were quite unable to deploy for attack, or to make any effective reply to the Japanese fire. In this short space the losses suffered amounted to five or six hundred killed and wounded” The Russians were only saved from complete disaster by the arrival of a Terek-kuban cavalry regiment who dismounted and aided them. Sluchevski's left flank meanwhile was caught by surprise during the night and the 12th division made a lot of progress. Then Sluchevski received a telegram from Kuropatkin telling him Keller was battling some 15 miles away. Kuropatkin had to inform him that expected reinforcements were thus not forthcoming. The 10th corps by this point had suffered 2000 casualties, their reserves were already in the battle. At 6:30 Sluchevskis cavalry left flank guard were deceived by a false report the Japanese artillery were turning to another area. The battle was going to hell in a hand basket as they say. Kuroki planned to hold the Russian front with his 2nd division while the guards division would hook into their right. The two divisions with reserves made a full assault. The Russians bravely tried to counter but failed to stop the onslaught. The Japanese gradually took the Russian forward trenches as the Russians were forced to perform a staggered retreat. The Russians and Japanese had light casualties in the few hundreds for the battle. Over in Kellers position, Japanese artillery seemed to be hunting down superior officers, Keller was hit by shrapnel tossing him to the ground with 37 wounds killing him instantly. The death of Keller destroyed the troops morale, he was a beloved commander who was notorious for leading at the front. General Kashtalinksi replaced Keller and ordered the reserves to come forward. Kuropatkin advised not tossing the reserves in, stating “hold back until the main effort of the Japanese has been disclosed”. Given the withdrawal at Hsimucheng and Yushuling, Kashtalinski was also told not to withdraw too hastily, but that is just what he did. Thus the road to Liaoyang seemed to be wide open, the Russians were offering nothing but withdrawals after withdrawals, when would they stand firm to fight? I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. As the Japanese advanced, so did the Russians, but in the opposite direction. British Lt General Sir Edward Bruce Hamley's Operations of War states “Victory can only be won by striking”. Pungent words for Kuropatkin as he scrambled to perform offensives. 

This week Kelly and Katai venture back into fantasy with “The Poppy War” by R.F. Kuang, the first book in Kuang's historical fantasy trilogy based on the second Sino-Japanese War of the early 20th century. They talk trauma trauma trauma, the Rape of Nanjing, bearing witness, how violence begets violence, the endless cycle of revenge, and more. CONTENT WARNING: due to the historical basis of the novel and our desire not to gloss over real events, there is graphic discussion of violence and rape, as well as mentions of suicideSUBSCRIBE TO THE TEEN CREEPS PATREON to get ad free episodes, bonus episodes, merch, and more:https://www.patreon.com/teencreepsCONNECT W/ TEEN CREEPS:https://twitter.com/teencreepspodhttps://www.instagram.com/teencreepspodhttps://www.facebook.com/teencreepspodBUY TEEN CREEPS MERCH:https://www.teepublic.com/stores/teen-creepsTEEN CREEPS IS A FOREVER DOG PODCASThttps://foreverdogpodcasts.com/podcasts/teen-creeps*All creepy opinions expressed are those of the hosts and guests. SUBSCRIBE TO OUR PATREON for ad free and video episodes, bonus episodes, and more:⁠https://www.patreon.com/teencreeps⁠ CONNECT:⁠https://discord.com/invite/FYp4QNhruE⁠⁠https://www.instagram.com/teencreepspod⁠⁠https://www.facebook.com/teencreepspod⁠ MERCH:⁠https://www.teepublic.com/stores/teen-creeps⁠ TEEN CREEPS IS AN INDEPENDENT PODCAST. *All creepy opinions expressed are those of the hosts and guests. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

This week Kelly and Katai venture back into fantasy with “The Poppy War” by R.F. Kuang, the first book in Kuang's historical fantasy trilogy based on the second Sino-Japanese War of the early 20th century. They talk trauma trauma trauma, the Rape of Nanjing, bearing witness, how violence begets violence, the endless cycle of revenge, and more. CONTENT WARNING: due to the historical basis of the novel and our desire not to gloss over real events, there is graphic discussion of violence and rape, as well as mentions of suicide SUBSCRIBE TO THE TEEN CREEPS PATREON to get ad free episodes, bonus episodes, merch, and more: https://www.patreon.com/teencreeps CONNECT W/ TEEN CREEPS: https://twitter.com/teencreepspod https://www.instagram.com/teencreepspod https://www.facebook.com/teencreepspod BUY TEEN CREEPS MERCH: https://www.teepublic.com/stores/teen-creeps TEEN CREEPS IS A FOREVER DOG PODCAST https://foreverdogpodcasts.com/podcasts/teen-creeps *All creepy opinions expressed are those of the hosts and guests. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Photo:1895 veterans Sino Japanese War.  No known restrictions on publication. @Batchelorshow #ISIS: In Africa rising. Bill Roggio, FDD. Husain Haqqani, Hudson https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2023/08/islamic-state-confirms-death-of-yet-another-leader-appoints-new-caliph.php