Podcasts about sino japanese war

Last time we spoke about the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. On July 7, 1937, tensions escalated between Japan and China as the Japanese military conducted a training exercise near the Marco Polo Bridge. During the exercise, gunfire erupted, sowing confusion and leading to the unexplained disappearance of one soldier. This incident prompted Japan to demand permission to search the nearby city of Wanping, which was denied by Chinese forces, escalating tensions further. By the next day, Japanese troops attacked, resulting in fierce fighting at the bridge. Under heavy assault, Chinese defenders fought valiantly but faced overwhelming force. As the conflict intensified, both sides struggled with heavy casualties, leading to the full-scale Sino-Japanese War. The Japanese military's aggressive maneuvers and the determined Chinese resistance marked the beginning of a brutal conflict, forever altering the landscape of East Asia. The profound toll on both nations foreshadowed the horrors of war that were to come, as China prepared to defend its sovereignty against a relentless enemy.   #155 Operation Chahar 1937 Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. By the end of July of 1937 the Japanese had overwhelmed the Beiping-Tianjin region. It's pretty understandable as to how this came so fast. As we have discussed thoroughly in this series, the Japanese had gradually seized control over Northern China going back to Operation Nekka in 1933. Little by little they had carved it out. Typically when you pull out a map of a war between two nations, one nation pierces into the other and gradually seizes control of key locations until it archives victory. However with the case of the outset of the Second Sino-Japanese War its more like the Japanese are starting at multiple key locations where they have concessions, treaties or where there are autonomous regions. Thus its honestly a huge headache to follow. When the Marco Polo Bridge Incident broke out, Chiang Kai-Shek had been in Kuling, a mountain top resort where he spent his summer vacations. He received the news with composure, but his message to the nation conveyed a sense of optimism and anticipation. The embarrassment of the Sian mutiny was a thing of the past. Although he wasn't overly confident, he believed that this was the pivotal moment China had been preparing for, more so than at any time in recent years. For nearly three weeks, efforts were made to resolve the situation through diplomatic means. For the first time, Chiang was in a position to make demands. He understood they would likely be rejected, but that wasn't the main point. He asked Japan to acknowledge its responsibility for the recent turmoil, to issue an apology, and to provide compensation. After making that request, he addressed his nation with a formal commitment: China would not accept any settlement that compromised its sovereign rights or territorial integrity. No changes would be permitted regarding the status of the Hubei-Chahar Council, and local officials would not be reassigned at the request of any foreign government. Any restrictions on the Twenty-ninth Army's positions would be unacceptable. He declared that the era of Japanese expansion in North China had come to a definitive end. The Japanese army achieved significant victories on the battlefield in China, leading to the inevitable expansion of the conflict. The first major campaign following the Nanyuan victory unfolded along the mountainous border marked by the inner Great Wall, separating northern Hubei from Chahar. On the Jinpu Railway, just south of Tianjin, lies a small station known as Jinghai. Adjacent to this station is the Jian River, which had swollen to a width of 20 meters due to intermittent heavy rains in northern China after the Japanese army's occupation of Tianjin. The embankments on either side of the river were overgrown with dense reeds and grass, and a wooden arch bridge spanned the river. After landing at Dagukou in Tianjin, the 10th Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Rensuke Isogai, advanced south along the Jinpu Railway. However, as the vanguard, the 10th Regiment of the 33rd Brigade made its way through the muddy terrain towards the Jian River's wooden bridge, they were suddenly taken aback. A group of Chinese soldiers appeared, their faces vividly painted red and armed with long-handled broadswords, a sight reminiscent of the legendary Chinese figure Guan Yu, as depicted in many traditional portraits. These soldiers belonged to the 26th Independent Brigade of the 38th Division of the 29th Army, who were in retreat from Tianjin. Following the city's fall, they had retreated southward to Jinghai Station, where they prepared to make a stand. Brigade Commander Li Zhiyuan recognized their inferior numbers and weaponry compared to the Japanese forces. Drawing from painful lessons learned during the positional battles in Tianjin, he decided to divide his troops strategically: one battalion would defend the station, another would protect the county town, and a third would engage in guerrilla tactics along the Jinpu Road. If faced with a small number of Japanese soldiers, they would fight fiercely; if overwhelmed, they would attempt to encircle the attackers to prevent a direct assault on their main position. Despite the Japanese army's attempts to advance, including efforts to send an armored train into Jinghai Station, the Chinese soldiers cleverly laid straw on the tracks and buried mines, thwarting the train's progress. Once Japanese troops disembarked to mount an offensive, they were ambushed by the battalion executing guerrilla tactics, resulting in a chaotic retreat that left behind several dozen casualties. Over the course of weeks, the divisional headquarters ordered a battalion of Japanese troops to move south along the Jinpu Road, requiring them to cross the Jian River at the wooden bridge. The 26th Independent Brigade was assigned to halt this advance, and they managed to hold their ground for over 20 days. Recognizing the gravity of their situation, Brigade Commander Li Zhiyuan gathered his group and battalion commanders to emphasize the necessity of pushing back the Japanese forces. He passionately rallied them, declaring, “We must defend this river to the death. Each regiment will select a death squad. Each member will carry a long-handled broadsword and four grenades, paint their faces red and rush across the bridge to engage in melee combat!” When Li asked for volunteers to lead the death squad, the regiment commander, Zhu, eagerly stepped forward, quickly gathering a group that followed him, uniting passionately in their cause. The death squad charged across the bridge, catching the Japanese off guard with their war paint and weapons. The sudden attack left the Japanese soldiers dazed, leading to a chaotic retreat as they struggled through the muddy terrain. In the tumult, more than 200 long-handled swords struck down a significant number of Japanese troops. Those advancing from behind panicked at the sight of their retreating comrades. An officer, dismounted during the chaos, was left behind, and the Chinese soldiers, filled with zeal, pressed forward, ignoring the orders from Brigade Commander Li Zhiyuan to fall back for their own safety. Despite moments of heroism, many fell that day by the Jian River, as the officers and soldiers burned their boats and set fire to the wooden bridge, rendering retreat impossible. As the Japanese military consolidated its power in the Pingjin region, many leaders underestimated the tenacity of Chinese resistance. Plans were made to defeat the Chinese army and air force swiftly, aiming to resolve the issue in North China decisively, with no diplomatic negotiations or external interventions allowed during military operations. Now, in late July to early August, Chiang Kai-shek issued orders to improve defenses at Nankou. He mobilized Tang Enbo's 13th Army in Suidong for battle readiness, tasked Liu Ruming to sabotage railways, and directed Fu Zuoyi and Yan Xishan in Suiyuan to prepare for conflict. Troops were reorganized rapidly, with divisions merging to strengthen the 17th Army under Liu Ruming's command. Chiang insisted that Nankou's defenses be deep and wide to thwart enemy cavalry and tank assaults, rendering Japanese mechanized advantages ineffective. He called for close cooperation among commanders and a resolute defense. Tang Enbo's 13th Army, consisted of the 4th and 89th Divisions, whom established defensive positions along the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway at Nankou, with additional units positioned further back at Juyongguan. The 13th Army, was 20,000 men strong, all motivated soldiers committed to fighting the Japanese, but their equipment was woefully inadequate. The 89th Division had a few outdated artillery pieces, whilst other units were in even worse condition, hampering their effectiveness against the well-armed Japanese forces. Liu's 17th Army stationed its 84th Division at Chihcheng, Yanqing, and Longguan, effectively securing the flank of the 13th Army against potential Japanese advances from Chahar. The 21st Division was deployed in Huailai, situated along the railway to the rear of Tang's forces. Additionally, Zhao Chengshou's 1st Cavalry Army, Liu 's 143rd Division, and two Peace Preservation Brigades commenced an offensive against Mongol forces in northern Chahar. As the Japanese launched initial assaults on Nankou on August 4, fierce fighting erupted. The Chinese defenders fought valiantly, but heavy bombardments by artillery and air raids took a toll. The Japanese began using tanks to support their infantry, yet the 530th Regiment successfully repelled an attack at Deshengkou. Meanwhile, the Japanese intensified their efforts, culminating in poison gas assaults that overwhelmed Chinese positions on Longhutai, leading to significant losses. Despite the escalating pressure and casualties, the determination to hold Nankou was unwavering. On August 5, the Kwantung Army requested permission for the advance guard to move to Changpei, arguing that the Central Army's invasion of Chahar had jeopardized the security of Manchukuo. This request was denied, yet the advance guard proceeded to Changpei on August 8. This unauthorized movement by the Kwantung Army was a serious act of defiance, as Tolun lay outside Manchukuo's borders, and troop deployments required imperial authorization. Although imperial sanction had been obtained for the move to Tolun on July 28, permission for the advance guard to proceed was only granted retroactively, with the stipulation that they would not advance further into Inner Mongolia. Nevertheless, this unauthorized action ultimately compelled the high command to approve the advance to Changpei. On August 7, the Japanese army launched a large assault on Nankou with its three main divisions, aiming to breach the Great Wall and advance westward along the Pingsui Railway to flank the strategic city of Shanxi. By August 8, the Japanese forces that had captured Beiping and Tianjin deployed the entire 20th Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Kawagishi Fumisaburo, and supplemented their efforts with the 5th and 10th Divisions, along with the Sakai Brigade, to attack Nankou along the Pingsui Railway. On August 8, the Japanese 11th Independent Mixed Brigade, led by General Shigiyasu Suzuki, initiated an attack on the left flank of the 13th Corps' position at Nankou. However, their efforts were halted after three days due to challenging terrain and the determined resistance from Chinese forces.  On the same day, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the activation of the 14th Group Army, comprising the 10th, 83rd, and 85th Divisions, under General Wei Lihuang. Elements of the 14th Group Army traveled by rail from Yingchia-chuang to Yi County and then embarked on a ten-day march through the plains west of Beiping to flank and support Tang Enbo's forces. Meanwhile, the Chinese 1st Army Region launched attacks against the Japanese in Liangxiang and Chaili to divert their attention and dispatched a detachment to Heilung Pass to cover the advance of the 14th Group Army. On August 9, the central high command ordered the China Garrison Army to eliminate resistance in the area and instructed Kwantung Army Commander Ueda Kenkichi to send reinforcements from Jehol and Inner Mongolia to support the operation. The China Garrison Army deployed its 11th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 5th Division, recently arrived from Hiroshima under Lieutenant-General Itagaki Seishirö, to launch an attack on the mountainous regions around Nankou and Pataling within the Great Wall. Following intense fighting, they succeeded in crossing into Chahar.    The Kwantung Army aimed to conquer Chahar and, upon receiving approval from the Japanese General Staff, established an expeditionary headquarters on August 14, led by its chief of staff, Lieutenant General Tojo Hideki. Yes that Tojo. Tokyo's objective was to secure the strategic flank of Manchukuo, while the Kwantung Army sought to create puppet regimes in northern China and integrate the occupied territories into a Japanese sphere of influence. The Chahar Expeditionary Force comprised three mixed brigades, including Japan's only fully mechanized unit, which was equipped with medium tanks, heavy and light armored vehicles, and light tanks. The Japanese troops shifted their main attack toward Zhangjiakou via the Pingsui Railway due to pressures from the Kwantung Army eager to occupy Inner Mongolia, Suiyuan, and Chahar. They sought to eliminate threats from the rear before launching further operations along the Pinghan Line and Jinpu Line. The 11th Independent Mixed Brigade of the 20th Division of the Chinese Garrison Army was ordered to assault Chinese defenders in the Nankou area, with the goal of capturing key locations on the Great Wall, like Badaling, to facilitate the Fifth Division's advance. The Chinese assessed the Japanese strategy, believing they would first secure critical points along the Pingsui route to facilitate further incursions into Shanxi and Zhengding. They understood that holding the Nankou line was vital for both logistical support and tactical maneuvering. Nankou, a key town on the Pingsui Railway connecting Beijing to Zhangjiakou and Baotou, was surrounded by mountains and the Great Wall, marking it a significant natural defense line. As the Japanese army aimed to capture Zhangjiakou and divide their forces into Shanxi and Suiyuan, the Chinese army's control over Nankou became crucial. A renewed assault on August 11, bolstered by tanks and aircraft, successfully captured Nankou Station, allowing General Suzuki's brigade to advance toward Juyong Pass. On August 12, Tang Enbo's army launched a counterattack, encircling the Japanese forces and severing their supply and communication lines. That day, Tang Enbo sent a telegram to Luo Fanggui: “Brother Fanggui, Commander Luo of the 529th Regiment, I have received your telegram. Your regiment has recently defeated formidable enemies, laying the groundwork for our army's future victories. Your efforts bring me great relief! The Nankou position is critical to our nation's war of resistance. Despite the enemy's numerical superiority and fierce artillery fire, we cannot surrender this area. It is our fighting spirit, not our numbers or advanced weaponry, that will help us withstand these powerful foes. We vow never to abandon our positions. Life is transient, and we must embrace our fate. A hero perishing on the battlefield is the glorious destiny of a soldier.” On the same day, he also sent a telegram to Wang Zhonglian: “Brother Jieren Wang, commander of the 89th Division, I have read your telegram. Brigade Li has triumphed against formidable foes, establishing a precedent for our army's victory. Your successes bring me much comfort! The Nankou position is our glorious objective. If I perish, the country lives on. If I survive, the country perishes. We would rather die defending this position than live in disgrace. Please convey to all the officers and soldiers of your division, who share in this struggle, the importance of striving for victory!” On August 13, Tang Enbo ordered the defensive positions at Nankou to be abandoned as the remaining troops pulled back to stronger positions at Badaling and Juyongguan. Renowned journalist Fan Changjiang noted Tang Enbo's physical and emotional toll, describing him as a mere shadow of his former self after enduring relentless battles without rest. His subsequent thoughts and fears reflected the despair of facing insurmountable odds, with the Japanese army overwhelming the Nankou defenses. Casualty reports from the Battle of Nankou reveal stark discrepancies; average estimates suggest Chinese losses neared 26,000, while Japanese casualties were around 2,600,an alarming ratio of 10 to 1. Despite the devastating defeat, Tang Enbo's leadership gained national recognition for his efforts, though he viewed the loss of Nankou as a blemish on an otherwise honorable defense. The indomitable spirit displayed during the relentless struggle at Nankou, despite the defeat and challenges faced, inspired a sense of resilience among the Chinese people, reminding them that even in dire circumstances, they would not yield to oppression. Meanwhile in response to having their supply and communication lines severed, on August 14, Seishirō Itagaki dispatched the 5th Division to relieve the 11th Independent Mixed Brigade at Juyonggua. Fu Zuoyi's troops attacked Chahar from Suidong. Dong Qiwu 's troops attacked Shangdu and recaptured it on the 14th, while Shi Yushan 's troops attacked Dehua and recaptured it on the 16th. By the 16, Itagaki had arrived at Nankou and initiated an enveloping assault targeting the right flank of the 13th Army, executing a five-pronged attack at Huanglaoyuan. In anticipation, the 7th Brigade of the 4th Division, commanded by Shi Jue, was positioned to counter this maneuver. Reinforcements, including Li Xianzhou's 21st Division and Zhu Huaibing's 94th Division, were brought in, resulting in several days of intense fighting. On August 17, General Yan Xishan, Director of the Taiyuan Pacification Headquarters, ordered the 7th Group Army, commanded by Fu Zuoyi, to move the 72nd Division and three additional brigades by rail from Datong to Huailai to support Tang Enbo's forces. Chiang Kai-shek urged steadfastness in the face of adversity, emphasizing that retreat was not an option. But with communication breakdowns and logistical challenges, Tang Enbo faced dilemmas that would lead him to issue the order for his troops to break out on August 26. As the Japanese army occupied Huailai and Yanqing, Tang Enbo's forces executed a withdrawal, retreating via various routes before suffering further losses.  Meanwhile Liu Ruming's troops of the 143rd Division of the 29th Army took Zhangbei from Zhangjiakou . Proceed to Wanquan Dam , the junction of Wanquan and Zhangbei. The members of the pseudo-Mongolian military government fled to Duolun under the leadership of King De . In order to relieve the danger in Zhangjiakou, Liu Ruming's troops began to attack the enemy in Zhangbei. On August 20, they captured key points such as Bolicai Village outside Zhangbei City. At this time, the mechanized troops of the Japanese Kwantung Army led by Hideki Tojo rushed from Rehe to support Zhangbei. When passing through Guyuan, they were divided into two groups: one group of Japanese troops, the Suzuki Brigade and Homma Brigade went south to attack Zhangjiakou. On the night of August 21, the Chinese army retreated to Shenweitai, 25 kilometers south of Zhangbei County. On August 22, the Japanese army began its attack. Shenwei Tower fell at midnight on the 23rd. At the same time, another part of the Japanese army launched a roundabout attack on Wanquan County. On the morning of August 24, they captured Wanquan County, and then headed straight for Zhangjiakou along the highway with an infantry regiment and an artillery battalion. From August 25 to 27, the Japanese army attacked Bajiaotai, the highest point of Cir Mountain west of Zhangjiakou. At noon on the 27th, Zhangjiakou fell. Gao Guizi's 17th Army marched to Dushikou to resist the enemy from Duolun Akagi and Longguan and intercepted the Pingsui Railway. Gao Guizi's troops failed to withstand the Japanese attack, and the 301st Regiment of the 29th Army stationed in Xuanhua also retreated southward. On August 28, Xuanhua fell into the hands of the enemy. Meanwhile, in northern Chahar, the Chinese 1st Cavalry Army successfully captured Shangdu, Nanhaochan, Shangyi, and Huade from the puppet Mongolian Army led by Demchugdongrub. Elements of the 143rd Division secured Zhongli, while the main force advanced to Zhangbei. During this Chinese offensive, the Japanese Chahar Expeditionary Force, consisting of the mechanized 1st Independent Mixed Brigade along with the 2nd and 15th Mixed Brigades, prepared for a counteroffensive from Zhangbei to Kalgan. Tojo personally commanded the units of the 1st Independent Mixed Brigade during Operation Chahar, which would serve as his only real combat service for his career. From August 18 to 19, the Chahar Expeditionary Force launched a counterattack from Zhangbei, capturing Shenweitaiko on the Great Wall and the Hanno Dam. The scattered and ill-equipped Chinese forces were unable to halt the Japanese advance, which now threatened the Peking–Suiyuan Railway at Kalgan. On August 20, General Fu Zuoyi's 7th Group Army diverted its 200th and 211th Brigades, which had been moving south by rail to join General Tang Enbo's forces, back to defend Kalgan. Fu's remaining 72nd Division arrived to reinforce Chenpien, while his 7th Separate Brigade was dispatched to protect the railhead at Huailai.On August 21, the Japanese forces breached the defenses at the villages of Henglingcheng and Chenbiancheng. General Tang Enbo's forces, awaiting reinforcements but having suffered over 50% casualties, continued to defend Huailai, Juyong Pass, and Yanqing. Liu Ruming's 143rd Division retreated to safeguard Kalgan from the advancing Japanese troops. On August 23, as Seishirō Itagaki's 5th Division advanced toward Huailai from Chenpien against Ma Yenshou's 7th Separate Brigade, advance elements of the 14th Army Group arrived on the Japanese flank at Chingpaikou. They successfully drove off the Japanese outpost and made contact with Japanese forces advancing toward Chenpien. However, delays in crossing the Yongding River postponed their attack until it was too late to halt the Japanese advance. Due to poor communications, they also failed to coordinate with General Tang Enbo's forces during the battle. After eight days and nights of fierce fighting, on August 24, Itagaki linked up with the Kwantung Army's 2nd Independent Mixed Brigade at Xiahuayuan. By August 24, the Japanese army breached the defensive line of the Chinese defenders' Wang Wanling Division along the western Hengling, crossed the Great Wall, and advanced into the Huailai area. At this time, the Japanese forces attacking Zhangjiakou from Chabei also secured control of the railway line west of Zhangjiakou, posing a significant threat to the Chinese defenders at Nankou. On August 25, the Chinese defenders were compelled to withdraw from Nankou and retreat to Juyongguan. By August 27, they received orders to break out and relocate southward, completely evacuating the Nankou battlefield. Since Wei Lihuang's troops lost their intended target for reinforcement and Baoding along the Pinghan Line was in a state of emergency, they engaged the enemy in the Wanping area for over a month before retreating south. Following the abandonment of both Nankou and Juyongguan, the Japanese army invaded Huailai City on the night of August 27. The Chinese army suffered over 16,000 casualties, while the Japanese army reported more than 15,000 casualties. On August 26, General Tang Enbo's forces were ordered to break out toward the Sangchien River, while Liu Ruming's troops were directed to withdraw to the opposite side of the Hsiang-yang River. On August 29, a Japanese unit known as the Oui Column by the Chinese and the Ohizumi Detachment by the Japanese launched an attack. According to Hsu Long-hsuen, this unit moved south from Tushihkou, and on August 30, it attacked Yenching via Chihcheng but was repelled by the Chinese 17th Army. The unit had moved to Guyuan by August 25 and reached Xuanhua by September 7, effectively cutting the railway behind Tang's forces and east of the Chinese defenders along the Great Wall. Following the repulsion of the Oui Column's attack, the Chinese 17th Army withdrew to join the rest of Tang Enbo's forces on the far side of the Sangchien River. Kalgan fell to the Japanese on August 27. After General Fu Zuoyi's 200th and 211th Brigades failed in their counterattack to recapture Kalgan, Fu's forces retreated to the west to defend the railway to Suiyuan at Chaikoupao.  On August 30, the army high command ordered the task force and the China Garrison Army to occupy Chahar Province. The North China Area Army deployed Lieutenant General Itagaki Seishiro's Fifth Division, the theater's strategic reserve, for this operation. The Japanese forces relied on armored units to breach Chinese defenses and utilized rail lines to transport troops and supplies effectively to critical locations throughout Chahar. Although the First Independent Mixed Brigade's tanks and armored cars demonstrated proficiency, the Kwantung Army's assessment of the operation criticized the armored units for their lack of shock effect and frequent mechanical breakdowns. Additionally, these vehicles required significant supplies and maintenance, leading the army to deem them ineffective in combat situations. The Second Air Group provided crucial support for the ground offensive in Chahar. From mid-August, this air group, stationed in Chengde and Jingzhou, conducted bombing raids on enemy positions and transport routes, performed reconnaissance missions, and even airdropped supplies to encircled Japanese forces. To match the rapid advance of the mechanized ground forces, air units were repositioned to advanced airfields. After bombing Taiyuan in late August, some units returned to their home bases, leaving behind two fighter squadrons and two heavy bomber squadrons, which formed a provisional air regiment. By mid-September, the Fifth Division and the Chahar Expeditionary Force were advancing southwest through the rugged mountains of Shanxi Province and captured Datong on September 13. Five days later, anticipating a decisive battle, Lieutenant General Katsuki ordered the Fifth Division to pivot southeast toward Baoding to encircle the retreating Chinese forces. Shortly after repositioning, Itagaki learned from aerial reconnaissance that Chinese units were assembling near Pingxingguan (Dayingzhen) Pass. Concerned that these forces might advance eastward through the pass and threaten his rear, Itagaki dispatched a regimental-sized task force under the command of Major General Miura Keiji, leader of the Twenty-first Brigade, to disperse the enemy troops and control the road on both sides of the pass. Miura's task force departed by truck in the mid-afternoon of the following day, but the overland movement proved much slower and more challenging than anticipated. Travelling along a single rutted dirt track through steep mountains, the forty-nine trucks carrying his infantry and heavy weapons, including crew-served machine guns and battalion artillery, could only manage a speed of seven miles per hour. By late afternoon, the lead elements were still about five miles east of the pass when they encountered a few hundred Chinese troops who had retreated after a brief firefight. As night fell, the Japanese moved cautiously forward and reached a village approximately a mile from the pass, where they encountered stiff resistance, including mortar and automatic weapons fire. After successfully repelling a counterattack by the Chinese Seventy-third Division, Miura launched a night assault. Supported by pack artillery and heavy machine guns, two Japanese companies pushed through the pass and seized the high ground on its west side by early morning. However, Chinese reinforcements soon arrived and attempted to reclaim the lost territory, resulting in ongoing fighting for the heights on September 24. Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist 115th Division, comprising the 685th, 686th, and 687th regiments of the Eighth Route Army, consisting of around 6,000 effective troops under the command of twenty-nine-year-old Lin Biao, maneuvered south around the Japanese rear. By September 24, they had interposed themselves on the road east of the pass, effectively cutting off Miura's task force from its supply base. That same day, the Central Army's Seventy-first Division launched several sharp counterattacks against Miura's outnumbered forces west of the pass, threatening to overrun the Japanese positions. Central Army and Communist forces had planned to attack both flanks of the Japanese at dawn on September 25, but torrential rains delayed the advance of the Central Army reserves. The downpour also muffled the sounds of an approaching Japanese night assault. Utilizing the poor night security of the Chinese, Japanese assault parties surprised the Seventy-first and Eighty-fourth divisions, pushing them from their positions west of the pass. Miura mistakenly believed he controlled both sides of the pass and assumed the Chinese forces were in full retreat. Unbeknownst to him, Lin Biao's troops had blocked the eastern entrance to the pass, prompting him to order a resupply column with rations and ammunition forward from about fifteen miles east of the pass to replenish his depleted task force. The supply train, consisting of seventy horse-drawn wagons and eighty trucks, struggled to make progress along the single dirt track, where sections had become muddy bogs due to the heavy rains. Most of the hundred-plus soldiers handling the horses and wagons were untrained and unarmed. The few regular service corps soldiers carried only ten cavalry carbines, while a single infantry platoon of thirty men provided security. The eighty trucks transported another 176 men, most of whom were not infantry. Therefore, the resupply column was ill-prepared for any trouble. Following a sunken road worn down by centuries of caravans, the column approached the pass through a narrow man-made defile, with its sides rising as high as thirty-five feet above the track. Around mid-morning, about four miles east of the pass, the Chinese Communist 115th Division launched an ambush. Communist troops rained grenades and small-arms fire from the high ground overlooking the road onto the trapped convoy. Although the Japanese fought back desperately, the combination of surprise, advantageous terrain, and overwhelming numbers turned the road into a killing ground. The ambush decimated almost all of the teamsters and the infantrymen who protected the wagons. At his field headquarters, Miura heard the heavy gunfire and explosions and quickly ordered a battalion-sized rescue force to assist the convoy. However, the Chinese 685th Regiment, blocking the only road to the trapped supply train, halted the Japanese battalion. Elements of the 685th and 686th regiments then finished off the motorized convoy, with only five trucks at the rear escaping. After looting weapons, equipment, and clothing, the Communists burned the remaining vehicles and withdrew southwest into the rugged mountains. Although the Communists claimed to have killed 3,000 Japanese troops, the more realistic number is around 200. Nonetheless, Lin Biao's guerrillas had achieved a significant tactical success. While the 115th Division destroyed the Japanese resupply column east of the pass, the Central Army's Sixth and Seventh Army Groups, including the Seventy-first Division, launched a series of day and night assaults against Miura's dispersed units west of the pass. Both sides incurred heavy losses, and the Japanese struggled to maintain control of the high ground as the Chinese fanned out through the valleys and attacked from all sides. Isolated and under heavy attack, the Japanese were low on ammunition, food, and water, lacked proper cold-weather clothing in the frigid mountains, and were greatly outnumbered. They resorted to scavenging ammunition and weapons from fallen Chinese soldiers. Itagaki promptly ordered his 41st and 21st infantry regiments, supported by an infantry regiment from the Kwantung Army located about fifty miles northeast of the pass, to rescue the beleaguered task force. These regiments moved along a narrow mountain road amidst heavy rain, which slowed their progress. The relief force split up about forty miles north of Pingxingguan, with the Twenty-first Regiment swinging westward to outflank the Chinese, while the other two regiments continued toward the pass. To the northwest, the Fifteenth Brigade of the Chahar Expeditionary Force advanced southeastward from Datong to encircle the Chinese. Central Army forces defending along the inner Great Wall, about fifty miles northwest of Pingxingguan, inflicted substantial casualties on the Japanese. The Japanese Forty-first Regiment finally reached Miura on September 28, and on the same day, the Twenty-first Regiment dislodged the stubborn defenders along the Inner Great Wall, roughly forty miles northwest of the pass, disrupting the entire Chinese defense and threatening to surround the besieging forces. Nonetheless, fighting continued through September 29, when the Second Brigade broke through the Chinese Central Army's defenses and advanced westward. Facing potential encirclement and certain destruction, the Japanese Sixth Army Group withdrew southwest the following day. Japanese accounts do not specify overall losses, but Chinese reports claim nearly 3,000 Japanese casualties while acknowledging they suffered ten times that number. After five days of intense fighting in rugged terrain, Miura's forces managed to hold their ground, but their heavy losses and those sustained by relief columns rendered it a Pyrrhic victory. Both Communist and Nationalist Chinese forces retreated southwest, surviving to fight another day. The determination of the Chinese Central Army in both offensive and defensive maneuvers, combined with the skillful hit-and-run tactics of the 115th Division, inflicted significant damage on the Japanese and became a cornerstone of Chinese propaganda. On October 1, the Japanese General Staff ordered the North China Area Army to destroy the Chinese forces in Shanxi Province, which were estimated to number over twenty divisions from either the Shanxi Army or the Central Army, and were fortifying positions in Taiyuan, Yangquan, and Yuanpingzhen. The Japanese Fifth and Twentieth Divisions advanced toward Taiyuan, while the Fifteenth Division, reinforced by a mixed brigade, launched an assault south from Yuanpingzhen on October 13. The Fifteenth Division quickly encountered strong Chinese resistance from well-prepared defenses, which halted its advance. From October 19 to 26, the Twentieth Division faced thirteen Chinese divisions entrenched near Jiuguan. Although they successfully repelled numerous fierce counterattacks, the division was unable to breach the Chinese lines. A maneuver by one of its regiments to the rear of the Chinese defenses forced a withdrawal of Chinese troops. The reconstituted Fifth Division joined the pursuit of the retreating Chinese forces on November 3, reaching Taiyuan five days later. Meanwhile, the Twentieth Division, moving westward, inflicted heavy losses on the Chinese units that were withdrawing from Taiyuan. Overall, given that the offensive aimed to secure territory, it can be considered a tactical and operational success. Shortly thereafter, all Japanese forces, except for the Twentieth Division, withdrew from Shanxi Province. The Chahar campaign concluded with the Kwantung Army in control of Chahar, Suiyuan, and the northern half of Shanxi Province. The Japanese quickly established puppet regimes in the captured territories. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In July 1937, tensions between Japan and China erupted following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, leading to fierce fighting as Japanese troops attacked. Chinese defenders, under command of Chiang Kai-shek, bravely resisted despite overwhelming odds, determined to protect their sovereignty. The Battle of Nankou saw relentless assaults, tank warfare, and desperate defense tactics, revealing the depth of Chinese resolve. 

Last time we spoke about Japan's preparations for War. In late 1936, tensions soared in China as Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek was detained by dissenting commanders who were frustrated with his focus on communism instead of the growing Japanese threat. Faced with escalating Japanese aggression, these leaders forced Chiang into a reluctant alliance with the Chinese Communist Party, marking a pivotal shift in China's strategy. Despite this union, China remained unprepared, lacking sufficient military supplies and modern equipment. Conversely, Japan, wary of Chinese modernization efforts, pushed for a preemptive strike to dismantle Chiang's regime before it could pose a serious threat. As aggressive military exercises intensified, Japan underestimated Chinese resilience. By spring 1937, both nations found themselves on the brink of war, with Japan's divided military leadership struggling to formulate a coherent strategy. Ultimately, these miscalculations would lead to the full-scale Sino-Japanese War, altering the course of history in East Asia.   #154 The Marco Polo Bridge Incident  Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Here we are at last, the beginning of the absolute cataclysm between China and Japan. Now as many of you know I run the Pacific War week by week podcast, which technically covers the second sino-japanese war, nearly to a T. So for this podcast I want to try and portray the event from the Chinese and Japanese point of view, but not in the rather dry manner of the other podcast. In the other podcast I am hampered by the week by week format and can never dig deep into the nitty gritty as they say. On the same hand I don't want to simply regurgitate every single battle of this conflict, it would be absolutely nuts. So bear with me friends as we fall down in the rabbit hole of madness together, who knows how long it will take to get out. On the night of July 7, 1937, at approximately 19:30, the 8th Squadron of the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Regiment of the Hebian Brigade of the Japanese Army, stationed in Fengtai and led by Squadron Leader Shimizu Seiro, conducted a military exercise, heading toward Lungwangmiao, approximately just under a mile northwest of the Marco Polo Bridge The exercise simulated an operation to capture the bridge. As you may have guessed it was named after the Italian explorer Marco Polo, who described it in his travels, the bridge is renowned for its intricate carvings of lions and other sculptures. However after 1937, the Marco Polo Bridge would be far less known for its history dealing with the venetian explorer and more so with an event that many would contend to be the start of WW2. At that time, troops from Japan, Britain, France, and Italy were stationed near Peiping in accordance with the Boxer Protocol of 1901. The Japanese China Garrison Army, comprising around 4,000 soldiers and commanded by Lieutenant-General Tashiro Kan'ichirō, was based in Tientsin. Its mission was to "maintain communication lines between Peiping and the seaports in the Gulf of Chihli and to protect Japanese citizens living in key areas of North China." The protocol also permitted the garrison forces of the signatory nations to conduct field drills and rifle practice without notifying the Chinese authorities, with the exception of cases involving live fire. During this period, Japanese troops were conducting nightly exercises in anticipation of a scheduled review on July 9. The night maneuver was within the army's rights under the Boxer Protocol and was not an illegal act, as later claimed by the Chinese. However, the Japanese army had courteously informed the Chinese authorities about its training plans in advance. Despite this, the atmosphere was charged with tension, and the Japanese decision to use blank ammunition during their night exercise further escalated the already volatile situation. Earlier that evening, Captain Shimizu Setsurö, a company commander, arrived at the banks of the Yungting River, where the maneuver was to take place. He noticed that the site looked different since the last exercise had occurred; Chinese troops had recently constructed new trenches and parapets from the embankment to the Lungwangmiao shelter. While eating his dinner and surveying the area, Shimizu felt a sense of unease, harboring a premonition that “something might happen that night.” After completing the first stage of the maneuver around 10:30 PM, several live rounds were fired into the assembled company from the direction of the riverbank. Shimizu immediately conducted a roll call and found one soldier missing. He promptly sent a messenger to inform the battalion commander. The exercise was then called off, and the company moved eastward to await further orders at Hsiwulitien. Battalion Commander Itsuki Kiyonaho, upon receiving the report, deemed the situation serious. Aside from the gunfire heard in the darkness from an unknown source, he expressed concern over the soldier's disappearance and sought permission from Regiment Commander Mutaguchi Renya, an absolute moron, if you listen to the pacific war podcast, well you know. Anyways to relocate the battalion to the area where the shots had been fired and to establish surveillance. As dawn approached, the troops heard several more gunshots. Within twenty minutes of the soldier's disappearance, he returned to his ranks, but Shimizu did not report this update until four hours later. Meanwhile, midnight negotiations included a Japanese request for permission to search the city of Wanping, leading both sides to believe the incident was significant. Around 11:00 PM, the Japanese forces falsely reported that one of their soldiers had gone missing during the drill and demanded permission to enter the city for a search. This request was firmly denied by Ji Xingwen, the commander of the 219th Regiment of the 37th Division of the Chinese Army. In response, Japanese troops swiftly surrounded Wanping County. To prevent further escalation, at 2:00 AM the following morning, Qin Dechun, deputy commander of the 29th Army and mayor of Beiping, agreed with the Japanese to allow both sides to send personnel for an investigation. While Matsui, the head of the Japanese secret service in Peiping, was negotiating with North Chinese authorities based on unverified reports from Japanese troops in Fengtai, Ikki Kiyonao, the battalion commander of the Japanese garrison in Fengtai, had already reported to his regiment commander, Mutaguchi Lianya. The latter approved orders for the Japanese troops in Fengtai to “immediately move out” to the Marco Polo Bridge.  On July 8, a large contingent of Japanese troops appeared at Lugou Bridge. Shen Zhongming, the platoon leader of the 10th Company of the Reserve Force of the 3rd Battalion of the 219th Regiment of the 37th Division of the 29th Army, was assisting in guarding the bridgehead. He jumped out of the trench, stood in front of the bunker, and raised his right hand to halt the advancing Japanese troops. However, the Japanese military threatened to search for their missing soldiers, pushed forward, and opened fire. Shen Zhongming was shot and died on the spot. At 4:50 AM, the Japanese army launched a fierce assault on Wanping County, capturing Shagang in the northeast of Wanping and firing the first shot of the siege. Unable to withstand the aggression, the Chinese defenders mounted a counterattack. That day, the Japanese army assaulted Wanping City three times, targeting the Pinghan Railway Bridge and the Chinese defenders at the Huilong Temple position on the left. He Jifeng, the commander of the 110th Brigade of the Chinese defenders, issued a resolute order to “live and die with the bridge” and personally commanded the front-line battle. The Chinese defenders engaged in fierce combat, fighting valiantly despite exhausting their ammunition and resorting to hand-to-hand combat with swords against the Japanese soldiers. Tragically, over 80 Chinese defenders from two platoons were killed at the bridgehead. On the same day, the Beijing authorities instructed the garrison to hold firm at the Marco Polo Bridge. Song Queyuan sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek to report the true events of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. The National Government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged a verbal protest with the Japanese ambassador regarding the incident. Additionally, the CPC Central Committee issued a telegram urging all Chinese soldiers and civilians to unite and resist Japanese aggression. The Japanese cabinet, in a bid to mislead global public opinion, proposed a so-called policy of “resolving the incident locally without escalating it,” aiming to paralyze the KMT authorities and buy time to mobilize additional forces. In the wake of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, generals of the 29th Army, including Qin Dechun, Feng Zhian, and Zhang Zizhong, convened an emergency meeting. Following their discussions, they issued a statement demanding that their troops withdraw from the Marco Polo Bridge to de-escalate tensions. However, they expressed deep concerns about national sovereignty, stating, “We cannot simply back down. If they continue to oppress us, we will do our utmost to defend ourselves.” Concurrently, the 29th Army commanded the troops defending the Marco Polo Bridge: “The Marco Polo Bridge is your grave. You must live and die with the bridge and must not retreat.” Brigade Commander He Jifeng reinforced three directives for the defenders:  1. Do not allow the Japanese army to enter the city;  2. Firmly counterattack if the Japanese invade;  3. You are responsible for defending the territory and will never yield. If you abandon your position, you will face military law. On July 9, the 29th Army successfully eliminated a Japanese squadron and reclaimed control of the railway bridge and Longwang Temple. A temporary lull settled over the Marco Polo Bridge battlefield, during which the Japanese military made false claims that "missing Japanese soldiers had returned to their units" and described the situation as a misunderstanding that could be resolved peacefully. Subsequently, Chinese and Japanese representatives in Beijing and Tianjin engaged in negotiations. The Beijing authorities reached an agreement with the Japanese forces, which included:  (1) an immediate cessation of hostilities by both parties;  (2) the Japanese army withdrawing to the left bank of the Yongding River while the Chinese army retreated to the right bank; and  (3) the defense of Lugou Bridge being assigned to Shi Yousan's unit of the Hebei Security Team. However, the following day, while the Chinese army withdrew as agreed, the Japanese army not only failed to uphold its commitments but also dispatched a significant number of troops to launch an offensive against the Chinese forces. Reports on July 10 indicated that the Japanese army had arrived from Tianjin, Gubeikou, Yuguan, and other locations, advancing toward the Lugou Bridge with artillery and tanks, and had occupied Dajing Village and Wulidian, signaling that another outbreak of conflict was imminent. On July 11, the Japanese Cabinet decided to deploy seven divisions from the Kwantung Army, the Korean Army, and Japan to North China. On the same day, the Beiping-Tianjin authorities reached a localized agreement with the Japanese army, which entailed:  (1) a formal apology from a representative of the 29th Army to the Japanese forces, along with assurances that those responsible for the initial conflict would be held accountable;  (2) a ban on anti-Japanese activities conducted by the Communist Party, the Blue Shirts Society, and other resistance groups; and  (3) an agreement ensuring that no Chinese troops would be stationed east of the Yongding River. Concurrently, the Japanese army positioned their forces at strategic points in Wuqing, Fengtai, Wanping, and Changping, effectively encircling the city of Beijing and continuing to advance troops into its surrounding suburbs. Starting on July 11, the Japanese army began bombarding Wanping City and its surrounding areas with artillery, resulting in numerous casualties among the local population. Following the injury of regiment commander Ji Xingwen, residents were evacuated to safer locations outside the city. The conflict then spread to Babaoshan, Changxindian, Langfang, Yangcun, and other areas, with the 29th Army being deployed to various locations to confront the enemy. The Japanese military also dispatched aircraft for reconnaissance and strafing missions, leading to intermittent fighting. On July 13, Mao Zedong urged "every Communist Party member and anti-Japanese revolutionary to be prepared to mobilize to the frontline of the anti-Japanese war at any time" from Yan'an. By July 15, a CPC representative presented the "Communist Party Declaration on Cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party" to Chiang Kai-shek, proposing that this declaration serve as the political foundation for cooperation between the two parties and be publicly issued by the Kuomintang. Zhou Enlai, Qin Bangxian, and Lin Boqu continued negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek, Shao Lizi, and Zhang Chong in Lushan. Although Chiang Kai-shek recognized the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, disagreements remained regarding the reorganization of the Red Army. On July 16, the Five Ministers Conference in Tokyo resolved to mobilize 400,000 Japanese troops to invade China and to enforce a policy aimed at rapidly destroying the entire country. The following day, more than 100 Japanese soldiers arrived in Shunyi and Changping, where they reinforced fortifications on the city wall of Changping. On July 18, the Japanese army invaded Changping, Tongzhou, and other counties in the pseudo-border areas by maneuvering through various passes of the Great Wall. Japanese plainclothes teams were reported to be active in the Xiaotangshan area of Changping, raising alert levels within the Chinese army. On July 20, the Kuomintang Military and Political Department became aware that the Japanese army intended to first occupy strategic locations such as the Indigo Factory, Wanshou Mountain, and Balizhuang in the Pingxi area, before cutting off the Pingsui Road and controlling the route from Beiping to Changping. On July 21, the Japanese army violated the agreement by bombarding Wanping County and the garrison at Changxindian.  On the night of July 25, a confrontation took place at the railway station in Langfang, located between Peiping and Tientsin. The clash involved Chinese troops and a Japanese company dispatched to repair telegraph lines. General Kazuki promptly sought Tokyo's permission to respond with military force, believing that the situation required immediate action. Without waiting for authorization, he ordered a regiment from Tientsin to engage the Chinese forces and issued an ultimatum to Sung Che-yuan, stating that if the 37th Division did not completely withdraw from Peiping by noon on July 28, the Garrison Army would take unilateral action. The 77th Infantry Regiment of the 20th Division was dispatched with the Gonoi Squadron to escort a repair team to Langfang Station. Stationed near Langfang were the headquarters of the 113th Brigade of the 38th Division, along with the main force of the 226th Regiment, led by Brigade Commander Liu Zhensan and Regiment Commander Cui Zhenlun. Although the leadership of the 29th Army adopted a passive stance in the war of resistance, the forces in Langfang prepared for conflict in an organized manner. They not only evacuated the families of servicemen and relocated the regiment headquarters, but also built fortifications and deployed plainclothes teams at Wanzhuang Station, Luofa Station, and Langfang Station to swiftly destroy the railway if necessary. Despite their preparations, the commanders of the 38th Division adhered to Song Queyuan's directives. When the 5th Company, stationed at Yangcun, observed Japanese supply units continually moving toward Lugou Bridge, they sought permission to engage the enemy. However, the 38th Division later reassigned this company. The Bac Ninh Line, established after the Boxer Protocol, had granted the Japanese the right to station troops, placing the 38th Division in a vulnerable position and preventing them from stopping the Japanese before they reached Langfang. Upon the arrival of Japanese forces at Langfang Station, Chinese guards initiated negotiations, requesting the Japanese to withdraw quickly after completing their mission. The Japanese, however, insisted on establishing camps outside the station, leading to repeated arguments. As tensions mounted, the Japanese began constructing positions near the station, ultimately forcing Chinese troops to retreat and escalating the conflict. The situation reached a boiling point around 11:10 pm, when fierce gunfire and explosions erupted near Langfang Station. The Japanese army claimed they were defending the station from an attack by Chinese forces armed with rifles, machine guns, and mortars throughout the night. According to Cui Zhenlun, the head of the 226th Regiment, it was the 9th and 10th companies that could no longer tolerate the Japanese provocation and fired first, catching the enemy off guard. As the battle intensified, reinforcements from the main force of the 77th Infantry Regiment “Li Deng Unit” arrived at the scene after receiving reports of the skirmish and gradually joined the fight after 6:30 am on July 26. When dawn broke, Japanese troops stationed at Langfang began to rush out to counterattack, seeing their reinforcements arrive. Recognizing they could not eliminate the Japanese presence at the station quickly, the 226th Regiment faced heavy bombardment from the Japanese Air Force later that morning. Consequently, the headquarters of the 113th Brigade and the primary forces of the 226th Regiment hastily retreated to Tongbai Town, suffering significant losses in equipment during their withdrawal. That night, Kazuki made the unilateral decision to abandon the policy of restraint and decided to use force on July 28 "to punish the Chinese troops in the Peiping-Tientsin area." On the morning of July 27, the army high command endorsed his decision and submitted a plan to the cabinet for mobilizing divisions in Japan. The cabinet agreed, and imperial approval was sought. At that time, the Chinese army was gathering in significant numbers in Baoding and Shijiazhuang in southern Hebei, as well as in Datong, Shanxi. They had effectively surrounded the Japanese army on all sides in the Fengtai District. Meanwhile, newly mobilized units of the Kwantung Army and the Japanese Korean Army were en route to the Tianjin and Beiping areas. The 2nd Battalion of the 2nd China Garrison Infantry Regiment, commanded by Major Hirobe, was dispatched with 26 trucks to the Japanese barracks within the walls of Beiping to ensure the protection of Japanese residents. Prior discussions had taken place between Takuro Matsui, head of the Special Service Agency, and officials from the Hebei–Chahar Political Council regarding the passage of troops through the Guang'anmen gate just outside Beiping. The mayor, Qin Dechun, had granted approval for this movement. However, when Major Tokutaro Sakurai, a military and political advisor to the Council, arrived at Guang'anmen, a famous gate to Beiping, around 6:00 pm to establish contact, he found that the Chinese troops on guard had closed the gate. After further negotiations, the gates were opened at approximately 7:30 pm, allowing the Japanese units to begin passing through. Unfortunately, as the first three trucks crossed, the Chinese opened fire on them. Two-thirds of the units managed to get through before the gate was abruptly shut, leaving a portion of Hirobe's troops trapped both inside and outside. As they faced unexpectedly heavy fire from machine guns and grenades, efforts by Japanese and Chinese advisors to pacify the Chinese troops proved futile. By 8:00 pm, the Japanese launched a counterattack from both sides of the gate. The Chinese received reinforcements and encircled the Japanese forces. Despite a relief column being dispatched by Brigadier Masakazu Kawabe, commander of the brigade in the Fengtai District, by 9:30 pm, negotiations with the Chinese yielded a proposal for de-escalation: the Chinese army would maintain a distance while the Japanese inside the gate would relocate to the grounds of their legation, and those outside would return to Fengtai. Fighting ceased shortly after 10:00 pm, and at approximately 2:00 am the following day, Hirobe's unit successfully entered the barracks in the legation. The total casualties reported for the Japanese army during these confrontations were 2 dead and 17 wounded. Both fatalities were superior privates. The wounded included one major, one captain, one sergeant, two superior privates, one private first class, seven privates second class, two attached civilians, and one news reporter. Additionally, the interpreter accompanying Tokutaro Sakurai was also killed in action. On July 27, the Japanese army launched attacks on the 29th Army garrisons in Tongxian, Tuanhe, Xiaotangshan, and other locations, forcing the defenders to retreat to Nanyuan and Beiyuan. At 8:00 am on July 28, under the command of Army Commander Kiyoshi Kozuki, the Japanese army initiated a general assault on the 29th Army in the Beiping area. The primary attacking force, the 20th Division, supported by aircraft and artillery, targeted the 29th Army Special Brigade, the 114th Brigade of the 38th Division, and the 9th Cavalry Division stationed in Nanyuan. Overwhelmed by the Japanese assault, Nanyuan's defenders struggled to maintain command, leading to chaotic individual combat. Meanwhile, the main Japanese garrison brigade in Fengtai advanced to Dahongmen, effectively cutting off the Nanyuan troops' route to the city and blocking their retreat. The battle for Nanyuan concluded at 1:00 pm, resulting in the deaths of Tong Lingge, deputy commander of the 29th Army, and Zhao Dengyu, commander of the 132nd Division. As this unfolded, elements of the 37th Division of the 29th Army launched an attack on the Japanese forces in Fengtai but were repulsed by Japanese reinforcements. On that day, the Japanese Army's 1st Independent Mixed Brigade captured Qinghe Town, prompting the 2nd Brigade of the Hebei-Northern Security Force, stationed there, to retreat to Huangsi. The Japanese also occupied Shahe. In the afternoon of July 28, Song Qeyuan appointed Zhang Zizhong as the acting chairman of the Hebei-Chahar Political Affairs Committee and director of the Hebei-Chahar Pacification Office, as well as the mayor of Beiping, before leaving the city for Baoding that evening. The 37th Division was ordered to retreat to Baoding. On July 29th, a significant mutiny broke out at Tongzhou. If you remember our episode covering the Tanggu truce, Tongzhou had become the capital of the East Hubei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government headed by Yin Jukeng. In response Chiang Kai-Shek had established the East Hebei Administrative Affairs Committee, chaired by Song Queyuan. In Tongzhou, Japanese troops were stationed under the pretext of protecting Japanese residents, as stipulated by the Boxer Protocol. Initially, a unit was intended to be stationed in Tongzhou; however, Vice Minister of the Army Umezu Yoshijiro strongly opposed this plan, arguing that placing forces in Tongzhou, far from the Beiping-Tianjin Line was inconsistent with the spirit of the Boxer Protocol. Consequently, this unit was stationed in Fengtai, located southwest of Beiping. At the time of the Tongzhou Incident, the main force of the Japanese Second Regiment, which was responsible for defending Tongzhou, had been deployed to Nanyuan, south of Beijing. Consequently, only non-combat personnel remained in Tongzhou. Japan regarded the Jidong Anti-Communist Autonomous Government Security Force as a friendly ally. Back on July 27, the primary forces of the Japanese Army stationed in Tongzhou, comprising the Kayashima Unit and the Koyama Artillery Unit, received orders to advance toward Nanyuan, Beiping, leaving Tongzhou significantly under-defended. The following day, the Japanese launched a substantial attack on Nanyuan, employing aircraft to bomb Beiping. Sensing a critical opportunity, Zhang Qingyu conferred with Zhang Yantian and Shen Weigan to initiate an uprising that very night. The insurgent force included elements from the first and second corps and the teaching corps, totaling approximately 4,000 personnel. Zhang Qingyu orchestrated the uprising with a focused strategy: the first corps was divided into three groups targeting Japanese forces in Xicang, the puppet government, and various establishments such as opium dens, casinos, and brothels operated by Japanese ronin. Meanwhile, the second corps secured key intersections and facilities in Chengguan, and the teaching corps managed defenses against potential reinforcements at vital stations. At dawn on July 29, the gunfire signaling the uprising erupted. The second unit of the first corps launched an assault on the Xicang Barracks, which housed 120 troops and non-combat personnel, including the Tongzhou Guard, Yamada Motor Vehicle Unit, a Military Police Detachment, and a host of military and police units, totaling about 500 individuals. At around 3 a.m. on July 29, the sound of gunfire filled the air as the insurgents engaged the Japanese forces. Although equipped with only four field guns, several mortars, and a few heavy machine guns, the uprising's numerical superiority enabled simultaneous attacks from the east, south, and northwest. Despite their well-fortified positions and rigorous defense, the Japanese troops struggled against the relentless onslaught. For over six hours, fierce fighting ensued. The uprising troops escalated their firepower but failed to breach the Xicang Barracks initially. More than 200 members of the Japanese security forces lost their lives in the conflict. Concerned that reinforcements might arrive and flank the uprising, Zhang Qingyu ordered artillery assaults around 11 a.m., prompting a shift in the battle's dynamics. The artillery targeted a Japanese motor vehicle convoy transporting supplies and munitions, leading to the destruction of all 17 vehicles, triggering explosions that scattered bullets and shrapnel across the area. Subsequently, nearby fuel depots ignited, engulfing the surroundings in flames and creating chaos among Japanese ranks. The insurgent infantry capitalized on this confusion, wiping out most of the remaining Japanese forces, with only a handful managing to escape. As the uprising signal rang out, another faction of insurgents swiftly blocked access to Tongzhou, disrupting traffic and occupying the telecommunications bureau and radio station. They encircled the offices of the Jidong puppet government, capturing traitor Yin Rugeng, who was taken to the Beiguan Lu Zu Temple. Despite being urged to resist the Japanese, Yin hesitated and was subsequently imprisoned. The third group then targeted the Japanese secret service agency in Nishicang. Hosoki Shigeru, residing a mere lane away from the pseudo-office, responded to the gunfire by mobilizing a contingent of secret agents to confront the uprising. However, the insurgents swiftly overtook the secret service agency, resulting in Shigeru's death and the annihilation of all secret personnel. At 4:00 p.m. on July 29, the Japanese command dispatched reinforcements, compelling the insurgents to retreat from Tongzhou. The Japanese Chinese Garrison ordered air attacks on the uprising forces, with over ten bombers targeting Tongzhou. Concurrently, the Japanese Fengtai Infantry Brigade and the Second Regiment were mobilized for a rescue operation, arriving on the morning of July 30. The Japanese headquarters issued a night defense order requiring all units to be on high alert. By 5:30 p.m., commanding officers assembled to devise a strategy. With the uprising forces still positioned around the eastern, southern, and northern walls of the barracks, Tsujimura's troops implemented strict measures: all units were instructed to fortify defenses throughout the night, with the Tongzhou Guard directly protecting the barracks and the Yamada unit securing the warehouse and supply areas. They enforced silence, prohibiting any lights at night, coordinating operations under the code name "plum cherry." As the Japanese planes repeatedly bombed the area, the insurgents, lacking anti-aircraft defenses, could only mount futile counterattacks with machine guns, leading to disorder among their ranks. Many insurgents abandoned their uniforms and weapons and fled, prompting Zhang Qingyu to make the difficult decision to evacuate Tongzhou before Japanese reinforcements arrived, regrouping in Beiping with the remnants of the 29th Army. In the late hours of July 29, the security team retreated to Beiping in two groups. Upon arrival, they discovered the 29th Army had already evacuated, forcing them to retreat to Changxindian and Baoding. En route, they encountered part of the Suzuki Brigade of the Japanese Kwantung Army near Beiyuan and Xizhimen, where they faced concentrated attacks. Officers Shen Weigan and Zhang Hanming were both killed in the subsequent battles as they led their teams in desperate fights for survival. Amid the confusion, Yin Rugeng managed to escape when the convoy escorting him was broken up by Japanese forces. In a last-ditch effort, Zhang Qingyu ordered the army to split into small groups of 50 to 60, navigating through Mentougou to regroup with the 29th Army. By the time they reached Baoding, only about 4,000 personnel remained. On the morning of July 30, over a thousand troops from the Sakai Army entered Tongzhou City. They rounded up all men they encountered, searching residences for insurgents, and exhibited intentions of massacring the local population. By 4 p.m., the Kayashima Army arrived and sealed all city gates, deploying surveillance units to oversee the city and "restore public order." The Tsujimura Army removed perimeter defenses and concentrated their forces in barracks and storage facilities. Japanese troops combed through residences based on household registries, detaining those they deemed suspicious, with many later executed. As reported by the puppet county magistrate Wang Jizhang, roughly 700 to 800 individuals were executed within a few days. This brutal retaliation instilled terror throughout Tongzhou City, leading many to flee and seek refuge, often in American churches. The pervasive atmosphere of fear lasted for two to three months. The Japanese authorities framed their violent suppression as "restoring stability to East Asia" and derided the legitimate resistance of Chinese citizens as "communist harassment" and "treason." In response to the uprising, the Japanese embassy, concerned that it could trigger a repeat of the Temple Street Incident and instigate political upheaval at home, acted without government instructions. They appointed Morishima Morito to oversee negotiations with Chi Zongmo, who had replaced Yin Rugeng as the head of the "Hebei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government." On December 24, 1937, Chi submitted a formal apology to the Japanese embassy, committing to pay a total of 1.2 million yuan in reparations, with an immediate payment of 400,000 yuan, while the remaining 800,000 yuan would be disbursed by the "Provisional Government of the Republic of China." Furthermore, the Japanese demanded that the "Hebei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government" relinquish the territories where Japanese nationals had been killed and take responsibility for constructing "comfort towers." They compelled Chinese laborers to build these structures at the former site of the Governor's Office of Canal Transport in Shuiyueyuan Hutong, Nanmenli, and the northeastern corner of Xicang Square to commemorate Japanese casualties from the uprising. Additionally, they forcibly uprooted ancient trees from the Temple of Heaven, transplanting them around the "comfort towers." The Japanese military also demolished white marble guardrails at the Confucian Temple to erect a monument honoring their soldiers, resulting in the destruction of centuries-old cultural artifacts. On the morning of July 29, the Japanese Army's 11th Independent Mixed Brigade attacked Beiyuan and Huangsi. The Hebei-Northern Security Force, stationed in Huangsi, engaged the Japanese forces until 6:00 PM before retreating. Meanwhile, the 39th Independent Brigade, garrisoned in Beiyuan, fought the Japanese before withdrawing to Gucheng, eventually returning to Beiyuan. On July 31, this brigade was disarmed by the Japanese army, while the Independent 27th Brigade in the city was reorganized into a security team to maintain public order, later breaking through to Chahar Province a few days later and being assigned to the 143rd Division. Meanwhile, the 38th Division of the 29th Army, stationed in Tianjin, proactively attacked Japanese troops in Tianjin early on July 29, capturing the Japanese garrison at Tianjin General Station and launching an assault on the Japanese headquarters at Haiguang Temple and the Dongjuzi Airport. Initially, the battle progressed favorably; however, due to counterattacks from Japanese aircraft and artillery, the Chinese forces began to retreat around 3:00 PM, leading to the fall of Tianjin. Later that afternoon, the rebel forces evacuated Tong County and advanced toward Beiping. En route, they were attacked by the Japanese army north of the city and subsequently retreated to Baoding. As the 37th Division of the 29th Army received orders to retreat southward, the 110th Brigade covered the army headquarters and the Beiping troops from Wanping to Babaoshan, eventually retreating southward through Mentougou. After completing their task, they withdrew to Baoding on July 30. By the end of the 30th, the Japanese army had occupied both Beiping and Tianjin. The Japanese Independent Mixed Brigade No. 1 and the garrison brigade occupied high ground west of Changxindian and the area near Dahuichang on the evenings of the 30th and 31st, respectively. With this, the battles in Beiping and Tianjin effectively came to a close. China and Japan were at war. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. It has finally happened, China and Japan are officially at war. From 1931 until now, it had been an unofficial war between the two, yet another incident had finally broke the camel's back. There was no turning back as Japan would unleash horror upon the Chinese people. The fight for China's survival had begun. China was completely alone against a fierce enemy, how would she manage? 

L'esercito giapponese riesce finalmente nel difficile scopo di conquistare le fortificazioni di Port Arthur. Tuttavia la guerra a terra finirà per divenire uno stallo. Lo scontro fra i due imperi verrà deciso in una delle battaglie navali più importanti della storia. Le conseguenze dell conflitto russo-giapponese avranno ripercussioni geopolitiche di lunghissimo termine.Seguimi su Instagram: @laguerragrande_podcastSe vuoi contribuire con una donazione sul conto PayPal: podcastlaguerragrande@gmail.comScritto e condotto da Andrea BassoMontaggio e audio: Andrea BassoFonti dell'episodio:Jesse Alexander, World War Zero - The Russo Japanese War 1904-1905, The Great War, 2022 Herbert Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, HarperCollins, 2000  Georges Blond, Admiral Togo, Jarrolds Publishers, 1961  Noel Busch, The Emperor's Sword: Japan vs Russia in the Battle of Tsushima, Funk and Wagnalls, 1969  Shannon R. Butler, Voyage to Tsuhima, Naval History 26, 2012  Franco Cardini, Sergio Valzania, La scintilla: da Tripoli a Sarajevo. Come l'Italia provocò la Prima Guerra Mondiale, Mondadori, 2014  Micheal Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts, a statistical reference, Volume II 1900–91, McFarland, 2017  Richard Connaughton, Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear, Cassell, 2003  J. Corbett, Maritime Operations In The Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905, Naval Institute Press, 1915  Marc Ferro, Nicholas II: Last of the Tsars, Oxford University Press, 1995  Orlando Figes, A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891-1924, Jonathan Cape, 1996Robert Forczyk, Russian Battleship vs Japanese Battleship, Yellow Sea 1904–05, Osprey, 2009  R. Garson, Three Great Admirals – One Common Spirit?, The Naval Review 87, 1999  Andrew Gordon, Social Protest In Imperial Japan: The Hibiya Riot of 1905, Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 12, 2014  Stephen Gwynn, Spring Rice to Robert H. M. Ferguson. The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice: A Record, Houghton Mifflin, 1929  Kyung Moon Hwang, A History of Korea, Palgrave, 2010  Marius Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan, Harvard University Press, 2002  Geoffrey Jukes, The Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905. Essential Histories, Osprey Publishing, 2002  Yōko Katō, What Caused the Russo-Japanese War: Korea or Manchuria?, Social Science Japan Journal 10, 2007  Donald Keene, Emperor of Japan, Meiji and his World, 2005  Eugene Kim, Japanese Rule in Korea (1905–1910): A Case Study, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 106, 1962  Yoji Koda, The Russo-Japanese War: Primary Causes of Japanese Success, Naval War College Review 58, 2005  William Koenig, Epic Sea Battles, Octopus Publishing Group, 1977  Rotem Kowner, Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War, The Scarecrow Press, 2006  Thomas Lyell, Case History of Japan, 1948  Cristopher Martin, The russo-japanese war, Abelard Schuman, 1967  Francis McCullagh, With the Cossacks; Being the Story of an Irishman who Rode with the Cossacks throughout the Russo-Japanese War, Nash, 1906  Bruce Menning, Bayonets before bullets: The Imperial Russian Army, 1861–1914, Indiana University, 1992  Ian Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese war, Longman, 1985  John Noss, Man's Religions, 1980  Oyama Iwao, The National Archives of Japan, National Diet Library  Sarah Paine, The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy, Cambridge University Press, 2003  Costantine Pleshakov, The Tsar's Last Armada: Epic Voyage to the Battle of Tsushima, 2002  Roger Reese, The Imperial Russian Army in Peace, War, and Revolution, 1856-1917, University Press of Kansas, 2019  Geoffrey Regan, The Battle of Tsushima 1905, The Guinness Book of Decisive Battles Guinness Publishing, 1992  Edwin Reischauer, Storia del Giappone, Bompiani, 2013  Edward Rhoads, Manchus and Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861–1928, University of Washington Press, 2011  Andrew Rhodes, Same Water Different Dreams: Salient Lessons of the Sino-Japanese War for Future Naval Warfare, Journal of Advanced Military Studies 11, 2020  John Röhl, Wilhelm II: Into the Abyss of War and Exile, 1900–1941, Cambridge University Press, 2014   Lawrence Sondhaus, Naval Warfare, 1815–1914, Routledge, 2001  Richard Storry, Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia, 1894–1943, St. Martins' Press, 1979  Hew Strachan, The First World War. To Arms, Oxford University Press, 2003  The San Bernardino Daily Sun, 30 May 1934  The Straits Times, 4 June 1934  Hesibo Tikowara, Before Port Arthur in a Destroyer: The Personal Diary of a Japanese Naval Officer, John Murray, 1907  Togo Heihachiro, Encyclopaedia Britannica  Ko Unoki, International Relations and the Origins of the Pacific War, Springer, 2016  Vauvineux, Affairs du Corée, 1897  Denis e Peggy Warner, The Tide at Sunrise: A History of the Russo-Japanese War: 1904-1905, Charter House, 1974  Anthony Watts, The Imperial Russian Navy, Arms and Armour Press, 1990  Allen Wildman, The End of the Russian Imperial Army: The Old Army and the Soldiers' Revolt (March-April 1917), Princeton University Press, 1980In copertina: Il capitano Lebediev, in servizio presso una delle fortificazioni di Port Arthur, difende uno dei bastioni della fortezza da solo contro centinaia di soldati giapponesi che eseguono una "scala umana", dal Petit Journal del 25 settembre 1904.Ishikari Lore di Kevin MacLeod è un brano concesso in uso tramite licenza Creative Commons Attribution 4.0. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Fonte: http://incompetech.com/music/royalty-free/index.html?isrc=USUAN1100192Artista: http://incompetech.com/

Links1. Sea Control 379: Pacific Wars 1864-1897 with Dr. Tommy Jamison2. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Perceptions, Power and Primacy, by SCM Paine, Cambridge University Press, 2002. 3. The Pacific's New Navies: An Ocean, It's Wars and the Making of US Sea Power, by Tommy Jamison, Cambridge University Press, 2024. 4. Tommy Jamison Linkedin.

The extraordinary life of forgotten World War II hero Evans Carlson, commander of America's first special forces, secret confidant of FDR, and one of the most controversial officers in the history of the Marine Corps, who dedicated his life to bridging the cultural divide between the United States and China“He was a gutsy old man.” “A corker,” said another. “You couldn't find anyone better.” They talked about him in hushed tones. “This Major Carlson,” wrote one of the officers in a letter home, “is one of the finest men I have ever known.”These were the words of the young Marines training to be among the first U.S. troops to enter the Second World War—and the Major Carlson they spoke of was Evans Carlson, a man of mythical status even before the war that would make him a military legend.By December of 1941, at the age of forty-five, Carlson had already faced off against Sandinistas in the jungles of Nicaragua and served multiple tours in China, where he embedded with Mao's Communist forces during the Sino-Japanese War. Inspired by their guerilla tactics and their collaborative spirit—which he'd call “gung ho,” introducing the term to the English language—and driven by his own Emersonian ideals of self-reliance, Carlson would go on to form his renowned Marine Raiders, the progenitors of today's special operations forces, who fought behind Japanese lines on Makin Island and Guadalcanal, showing Americans a new way to do battle.In The Raider, Cundill Prize–winning historian Stephen R. Platt gives us the first authoritative account of Carlson's larger-than-life exploits: the real story, based on years of research including newly discovered diaries and correspondence in English and Chinese, with deep insight into the conflicted idealism about the Chinese Communists that would prove Carlson's undoing in the McCarthy era.Tracing the rise and fall of an unlikely American war hero, The Raider is a story of exploration, of cultural (mis)understanding, and of one man's awakening to the sheer breadth of the world. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

The transformation of Japan from hermit kingdom to imperial power happened with breathtaking speed. When American Commodore Perry's "black ships" steamed into Tokyo Bay in the 1850s, they shattered Japan's 250-year isolation with technology that seemed to come "from 200 years in the future." This technological gap created a constitutional crisis that would ultimately topple the Tokugawa Shogunate and usher in the Meiji Restoration of 1868.Jonathan Clements guides us through this pivotal period where Japan found itself facing what one historian calls "an invitation to an alien game" - forced to adopt international norms and institutions they never agreed to. Rather than becoming colonized like China or India, Japan's new leaders determined to become players in this global power game. They systematically studied Western nations, adopting what they perceived as the best elements of each: a German-style army, British naval technology, and aspects of French law.This selective modernization happened against a backdrop of growing militarism and expansionism, particularly toward Korea - strategically described as "the dagger at the heart of Japan." The 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War demonstrated Japan's new capabilities, but the subsequent "Triple Intervention" by Russia, France and Germany (forcing Japan to abandon territorial gains) created a humiliation that would fuel future aggression.Throughout this period, the Japanese government struggled with "gekokujō" - military insubordination where officers initiated "incidents" that expanded Japanese influence without authorization. The assassination of Korea's Queen Min by Japanese agents exemplifies this dangerous pattern where unauthorized actions expanded imperial control while undermining civilian government - creating precedents that would ultimately lead Japan toward its catastrophic Pacific War.Whether you're interested in East Asian history, imperial expansion, or the roots of 20th century conflict, this exploration of Japan's rapid transformation reveals how quickly a nation can reinvent itself - for better or worse.You can send a message to the show/feedback by clicking here. The system doesn't let me reply so if you need one please include your email.

  Last time we spoke about China's preparations for War. In December 1936, the tension in China reached a boiling point as Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek was captured by his own commanders, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. Disillusioned by Chiang's focus on fighting communists instead of the encroaching Japanese forces, the generals sought a unified response to Japanese aggression. After being held in Xi'an, Chiang reluctantly agreed to collaborate with the Chinese Communist Party, marking a significant shift in strategy against Japan. Amidst the rising chaos, Chiang's government reviewed historical military strategies and prepared for a prolonged conflict. However, they faced challenges, including inadequate supplies and a lack of modern equipment compared to the Japanese. By 1937, China was ill-prepared for war, with Chiang later expressing regret about their military readiness. Despite these setbacks, the alliance formed with the communists laid a foundation for a united Chinese front against the brutalities of the Sino-Japanese War that would follow.   #153 Japan Prepares for War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So in the last episode we talked about how China was preparing itself for war, now its time for Japan. Since Japan's invasion of North China, Japanese field armies had promoted a series of autonomous zones in northern China. Officers from the Kwantung Army, skeptical of China's capacity to modernize, believed that the vast region would inevitably fragment into regional factions. This policy effectively maintained a weak and divided China, which served Japan's to defend Manchukuo. However many Japanese military leaders frequently pointed to the threat posed by the KMT's five-year plan, initiated in 1933 with assistance from German military advisors, aimed at modernizing and expanding the national army. To counter what they perceived as a Chinese threat, the field armies advocated for a preemptive war to dismantle Chiang Kai-shek's regime. Any attempt by Tokyo to alter the military's China policy faced vigorous opposition from the Kwantung Army, which, in February 1937, pushed for intensified covert actions to expel the KMT from northern China and supported a preemptive war to secure strategic areas for future operations against the Soviet Union. At a March meeting in Tokyo, staff officers from the China Garrison and Kwantung armies insisted that any concessions to China would be a grave mistake and would likely yield only temporary outcomes. In early spring 1937, Prince Konoe Fumimaro inherited a China policy fraught with competing views, however, there was consensus that China must not distract the empire from its preparations against the USSR. The end goal was clear, but the means to achieve it remained uncertain. The cabinet's approval of the "Fundamentals of National Policy" in August 1936 indicated a need for stability as the army and navy reconfigured Japan's war machine. The challenge lay in aligning long-term strategic goals with practical short-term interests in northern China without upsetting the existing balance of power. Expanding demands propelled the army's contingency planning, which had traditionally focused on safeguarding Japanese interests and the approximately 13,000 Japanese citizens residing in the region. Tokyo typically responded to serious incidents by deploying troops from homeland garrisons to address localized emergencies and then withdrawing them. However, by the mid-1930s, the growing Soviet threat to Manchukuo rendered this doctrine obsolete. Incidents in northern China gained strategic importance as they diverted resources from the Kwantung Army's preparations against the Soviet Union. Disruptions in northern China hindered access to essential raw materials necessary for army modernization and rearmament, while hostile Chinese forces threatened the Kwantung Army's strategic left flank in the event of war with the Soviets. With these considerations in mind, the army revised its operational war plans, assuming that northern China would serve as Japan's strategic rear area for operations against the USSR. In 1911 Japan's plan for general war mandated thirteen divisions to occupy southern Manchuria, capture Beijing, and subsequently occupy Zhejiang and Fujian. Limited contingency operations in northern China required two divisions to secure rail communications from Beijing to the coast. In the weeks following the 1931 Manchurian Incident, the General Staff in Tokyo drafted plans to counter a Sino-Soviet alliance, anticipating a 2 month campaign involving 15-16 divisions, with the majority engaged against the Soviet Red Army. 2 divisions were designated to secure northern China, while smaller units would monitor the Inner Mongolian front to protect Japan's western flank in Manchuria. After further refinement, the General Staff identified three contingencies for China in early 1932: maintaining the traditional mission of safeguarding Japanese interests and citizens with a standard two-division force; ensuring a secure line of communication between the Chinese capital and the sea with the China Garrison Army, which consisted of approximately 1,700 officers and men, reinforced by one division; and, in a worst-case scenario of all-out war, deploying three divisions to reinforce the Kwantung Army, along with 7 additional divisions and 3 cavalry brigades to suppress resistance in northern China and the Shandong Peninsula, while two additional divisions secured key areas in central China. Between 1932-1936, China received less attention as the General Staff focused on the Soviet military buildup in the Far East. Anxiety, stemming from the Soviet buildup in the Far East, was a pervasive concern reflected in the draft rearmament plan submitted to the throne on May 21, 1936, as part of the national budget formulation process. The army proposed countering the Soviet threat by enhancing Japanese strategic mobility in Manchukuo through the renovation and expansion of airfields, ports, roads, and rail infrastructure, and by constructing army air force arsenals, storage depots, and medical facilities. The positioning of Japanese divisions in eastern Manchuria suggested their wartime objectives, with the Kwantung Army relying on a mobile independent mixed brigade composed of armored car and mounted cavalry units stationed in Gongzhuling, central Manchuria, as its immediate response force for contingencies in northern China. Major units were not concentrated in western Manchuria, where they would be expected to deploy before any planned invasion of northern China. Nevertheless, General Staff planners remained vigilant regarding developments in China, where the resurgence of nationalism, Communist movements advancing north of the Yellow River in February 1936, and the spread of anti-Japanese sentiments across northern China raised the specter of limited military operations escalating into full-scale warfare. China's improving military capabilities would likely hinder Japanese forces from accomplishing their objectives. For example, around Shanghai, Chinese defenses were bolstered by extensive, in-depth, and permanent fortifications. In mid-September 1936, the General Staff in Tokyo issued orders to preempt significant outbreaks in northern China by repositioning a division in Manchukuo closer to the boundary. If hostilities broke out, the China Garrison Army, supported by Kwantung Army units, would launch punitive operations against Chinese forces as necessary. Higher headquarters expected local commanders to act swiftly and decisively, employing rapid maneuvers and shock tactics to address outbreaks with minimal force. Given that no alternative responses were considered, Japanese operational planning for northern China relied on an all-or-nothing approach to force deployment, even for minor incidents. Yet, the senior leadership of the army remained deeply divided over its China policy. Influenced by Ishiwara, the General Staff wanted to avoid military actions that could lead to a full-scale war with China, focusing instead on advancing the army's extensive rearmament and modernization program. In contrast, a majority of high-ranking officers in the Army Ministry and General Staff, particularly within the 2nd Operations Section and the Kwantung Army, favored forceful action against China, believing it necessary to quell rising anti-Japanese sentiments. Drawing from past experiences, these officers anticipated that the Chinese would quickly capitulate once hostilities commenced. This lack of a unified military strategy reflected broader disagreements among the army's leadership regarding operations in China. While operational planning called for the permanent occupation of large regions in northern and central China, the General Staff aimed to contain outbreaks to maintain focus on Soviet threats. There was a clear absence of long-term operational planning; instead, the army concentrated on initial battles while relegating planning for prolonged combat operations to contingent circumstances. In summary, the Japanese army preferred to avoid military force to address Chinese issues whenever feasible but was equally unwilling to concede to Chinese demands. Since 1914, Tosui Koryo or “Principles of Command” had served as the foundational doctrine for senior Japanese army commanders and staff officers engaged in combined arms warfare at the corps and army levels. The advent of new weapons, tactics, and organizational changes during World War I compelled all major military forces to reassess their existing military doctrines across strategic, operational, and tactical dimensions. In response, Japan modified the Principles of Command to blend its traditional post-Russo-Japanese War focus on the intangible factors in battle with the newest concepts of modern total war. A revision in 1918 recognized the significance of “recent great advances in materiel” for total warfare, yet it maintained that ultimate victory in battle relied on dedication, patriotism, and selfless service. In the 1920s, the General Staff's Operations Section, led by Major General Araki Sadao, who would become the leader of the Kodoha faction, had produced the most significant and impactful revision of the Principles. A staunch anti-communist and ideologue who valued the intangible elements of combat, Araki appointed Lieutenant Colonel Obata Toshishiro and Captain Suzuki Yorimichi as the principal authors of the manual's rewrite. Obata, a Soviet expert, was strongly influenced by German General Count Alfred von Schlieffen's classic theories of a “war of annihilation,” while Suzuki, the top graduate of the thirtieth Staff College class, shared Araki's focus on “spiritual” or intangible advantages in warfare. Both men were brilliant yet arrogant, working in secrecy to create a doctrine based on what Leonard Humphreys describes as “intense spiritual training” and bayonet-led assaults to counter the opponent's material superiority.  The latest version of the Principles of Command preserved the operational concept of rapid Japanese mobile offensive operations, aiming to induce a decisive battle or “kaisen” early in the campaign. It reaffirmed the sokusen sokketsu or “rapid victory' principle of rapid warfare. Attaining these goals relied exclusively on offensive action, with the army expecting commanders at all levels to press forward, defeat enemy units, and capture key territories. The troops were indoctrinated with a spirit of aggression and trained to anticipate certain victory. The emphasis on offensive action was so pronounced that Araki eliminated terms like surrender, retreat, and defense from the manual, believing they negatively affected troop morale. This aggressive mindset also infused the Sento Koryo or “Principles of Operations”, first published in 1929 as a handbook for combined arms warfare tailored for division and regimental commanders. The manual emphasized hand-to-hand combat as the culminating stage of battle, a principle regarded as unchanging in Japanese military doctrine since 1910. Senior commanders were expected to demonstrate initiative in skillfully maneuvering their units to encircle the enemy, setting the stage for climactic assaults with cold steel. Infantry was deemed the primary maneuver force, supported by artillery. To complement rapid infantry advances, the army developed light and mobile artillery. Operationally, encirclement and night attacks were vital components of victory, and even outnumbered units were expected to aggressively envelop enemy flanks. In assaults against fortified positions, units would advance under the cover of darkness, avoiding enemy artillery fire and positioning themselves for dawn attacks that combined firepower with shock action to overwhelm enemy defenses. In encounters with opposing forces, commanders would maneuver to flank the enemy, surround their units, and destroy them. If forced onto the defensive, commanders were expected to seize opportunities for decisive counterattacks to regain the initiative. These high-level operational doctrines were distilled into tactical guidelines in the January 1928 edition of the Infantry Manual or “Hohei Soten”, which saw a provisional revision in May 1937 . Both editions opened with identical introductions emphasizing the necessity for a rapid victory through the overpowering and destruction of enemy forces. Infantry was identified as the primary arm in combined arms warfare, and soldiers were taught to rely on cold steel as fundamental to their attacking spirit. The 1928 Infantry Manual underscored the commander's role in instilling a faith in certain victory or “hissho shinnen”, drawing from the glorious traditions of Japanese military history. The 1928 infantry tactics employed an extended skirmish line with four paces between soldiers. Individual initiative in combat was generally discouraged, except under exceptional circumstances, as success relied on concentrating firepower and manpower on narrow frontages to overwhelm defenders. An infantry company would create a skirmish line featuring two light machine gun squads and four rifle squads, preparing for a bayonet-driven breakthrough of enemy defenses. For the final assault, the infantry company would line up along a 150-yard front, likely facing casualties of up to 50% while breaching the enemy's main defensive line. Historical analysis reveals the shortcomings of these tactics. During World War I, armies constructed extensive, multi-layered defenses, trenches, pillboxes, and strong points, each independent yet all covered by artillery. If assaulting infantry suffered heavy losses breaching the first line, how could they successfully prosecute their assault against multiple defense lines? The 1937 revision elaborated on new tactics to overcome entrenched Soviet defenses, drafted in anticipation of arms and equipment that were either in development or production but not yet available for deployment. This became official doctrine in 1940, but as early as summer 1937, units from the China Garrison Army were field-testing these new tactics. The provisional manual adopted combat team tactics, forming an umbrella-like skirmish formation. This involved a light machine gun team at the forefront with two ammunition bearers flanking it to the rear. Behind the machine gun team were riflemen arranged in a column formation, maintaining six paces between each. The light machine gun provided cover fire as the formation closed in on the enemy for hand-to-hand combat. Increased firepower expanded the assault front to 200 yards. The combination of wider dispersion and night movement aimed to reduce losses from enemy artillery fire while the infantry advanced through successive lines of resistance. Commanders at the platoon level were responsible for leading the final assault into enemy lines, with increased tactical responsibility shifting from platoon to squad leaders, allowing for greater initiative from junior officers and non-commissioned officers. This emphasis on broader dispersal and fluidity on the battlefield required frontline infantry to exhibit aggressiveness and initiative. Contrary to popular belief, the Japanese military did not solely rely on the bayonet or an offensive spirit during engagements with Chinese forces. They effectively employed superior firepower and modern equipment within their combined arms framework, using heavy weapons and artillery to soften enemy positions before launching infantry attacks. Without such firepower, unsupported infantry attacks would have struggled to achieve their objectives. In January 1937, the Imperial Japanese Army consisted of approximately 247,000 officers and men, organized in a structure comprising seventeen standing infantry divisions, four tank regiments, and fifty-four air squadrons equipped with a total of 549 aircraft. The China Garrison Army and the Taiwan Garrison Army each included two infantry regiments, while a separate independent mixed brigade was stationed in Manchuria. Two divisions were permanently based in Korea, with four more assigned on a rotating basis to the Kwantung Army in Manchukuo. The remainder of the forces were stationed in the Japanese home islands. A substantial pool of reservists and partially trained replacements was available to mobilize, enabling the expansion of peacetime units to their wartime strength as needed. Conscription provided the primary source of enlisted manpower for the army, though a handful of young men volunteered for active duty. For conscription purposes, Japan was divided into divisional areas, which were further subdivided into regimental districts responsible for conscription, mobilization, individual activations, and veteran affairs within their jurisdictions. Typically, conscripts served with the regiment associated with their region or prefecture. However, the Imperial Guards regiments in Tokyo selected conscripts from across the nation, as did the Seventh Infantry Division, which recruited from the sparsely populated Hokkaido area and from regular army units stationed in Korea, China, and Taiwan. Draftees from Okinawa Prefecture usually served with Kyushu-based regiments. All males reaching the age of 20 underwent an army-administered pre-induction physical examination conducted between December 1 and January 30 of the following year. This evaluation classified potential conscripts into three categories: A “suitable for active duty”, B1, and B2, while others were deemed unfit for the demands of military life. In 1935, 29.7% of those examined received A classifications, while 41.2% were graded as B1 or B2. Among the 742,422 individuals eligible for conscription in 1937, approximately 170,000 were drafted, amounting to 22.9% of the cohort; this figure had remained relatively consistent since the post-Russo-Japanese War years. Within the conscripted group, 153,000 men were classified as A and an additional 17,000 as B. Conscripts served for two years of active duty, with variations based on their military specialty and any prior civilian military training. After their discharge, they were subject to a lengthy reserve obligation. In total, 470,635 individuals fell into the B category, being otherwise fit for service but excess to the army's active personnel needs. These men were assigned to the First Replacement Pool, where they underwent around 120 days of basic military training, primarily focused on small arms usage and fundamental tactics. Regular officers and NCOs led the training in their respective regimental districts. Following their initial training, the army called these replacements and reservists to active duty annually for several days of refresher training. Army leaders regarded discipline as the cornerstone of military effectiveness. Basic training emphasized the necessity of unquestioning obedience to orders at all levels. Subsequent training focused on fieldcraft, such as utilizing terrain strategically to surprise or encircle the enemy. However, training exercises often lacked diversity due to the limited maneuver areas available in Japan, leading to predictable solutions to field problems. The training regimen was rigorous, merging strict formal discipline and regulated corporal punishment with harsh informal sanctions and unregulated violence from leaders to instill unwavering compliance to orders. As an undergrad taking a course specifically on the Pacific War, it was this variable my professor argued contributed the most to the atrocities performed by the Japanese during WW2. He often described it as a giant pecking order of abuse. The most senior commanders abused, often physically their subordinates, who abused theirs, going through the ranks to the common grunts who had no one else but civilians and the enemy to peck at so to speak. Of course there were a large number of other variables at play, but to understand that you outta join my Patreon Account over at the www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel , where I made a fan favorite episode on “why the Japanese army performed so many atrocities”. In there I basically hit a big 10 reason list, well in depth, I highly recommend it! As the concept of the “Imperial Army” and the cult of the emperor gained prominence, appeals to imperial symbols and authority bolstered this unquestioning obedience to superiors, who were seen as the conduits of the emperor's will. It was during this period that the term kogun or “imperial army” gained favor over kokugun or “national army”, reflecting a deliberate effort by military authorities to forge a direct connection between the military and the imperial throne. The 1937 Japanese infantry division was structured as a square formation, with a peacetime strength established at approximately 12,000 officers and men organized into two brigades, each comprising about 4,000 personnel, formed from two infantry regiments, about 2,000 men each. The division included a field artillery regiment, an engineer regiment, and a transport battalion as organic units. Each infantry regiment was composed of three battalions, approximately 600 men each, which contained three rifle companies, 160 men each and a weapons platoon. A rifle company consisted of three rifle platoons and one light machine gun platoon. Regiments also included infantry assault gun platoons, and battalions contained a heavy machine gun company. Upon mobilization, a fourth infantry company augmented each battalion, along with reserve fillers, nearly 5,000 personnel assigned as transport and service troops, raising the authorized wartime strength of an infantry division to over 25,000 officers and men.  Reforms implemented in 1922 reduced personnel numbers in favor of new and improved weapons and equipment. Among these advancements, the 75 mm Type 90 field artillery piece, which boasted increased range and accuracy, was integrated into the forces in 1930, along with the 105 mm Type 10 howitzer and 75 mm pack mountain artillery which could be disassembled for transport using pack animals. These became standard artillery components for divisions. The emphasis on light, mobile, and smaller-caliber field artillery enabled swift deployment during fast-moving engagements. By minimizing the size of the baggage train, infantry and artillery units could quickly set up off the march formation and maneuver around enemy flanks. Army leaders further streamlined road march formations by eliminating the fourth artillery battery from each regiment, thus sacrificing some firepower for enhanced speed and mobility. Heavier artillery pieces were still used in set-piece battles where mobility was less critical. In a typical 1936 division, the field artillery regiment, equipped with Type 90 field artillery or lighter Type 94 mountain artillery, had thirty-six guns. Training focused on quality rather than quantity, reflecting the conservative doctrine of “one-round-one-hit”. Live-fire training was infrequent due to the scarcity of artillery firing ranges in Japan. Ammunition stockpiles were inadequate for anticipated operational needs; government arsenals produced over 111,000 artillery shells in 1936, which was fewer than one-tenth of the quantities specified in wartime consumption tables. Similar industrial shortcomings also hampered advancements in motorization and armor. Motorization proved costly and relied on foreign supply, presenting challenges given the inferior road networks in Manchuria, northern China, and the Soviet Far East. Military estimates suggested a need for 250,000 trucks to fully motorize the army, a goal beyond the capabilities of the nascent Japanese automotive industry, which produced fewer than 1,000 cars annually until 1933. Japanese tanks, described as “handcrafted, beautifully polished, and hoarded” by Alvin Coox, suffered from shortages similar to heavy artillery and ammunition. The army prioritized light weighing ten tons or less and medium tanks sixteen tons or less due to the necessity of deploying armor overseas, size and weight were crucial for loading and unloading from transport ships. Smaller tanks were also more suitable for the terrains of northern China and Manchuria, as they could traverse unbridged rivers using pontoons or ferries. The Japanese industrial base, however, struggled to mass-produce tanks; by 1939, factories were producing an average of only twenty-eight tanks of all models per month. Consequently, in 1937, foot soldiers remained as reliant on animal transport for mobility as their ancestors had been during the Russo-Japanese War. Despite enjoying technological and material superiority over disorganized Chinese forces, these deficiencies in heavy artillery, armor, and vehicles would prove catastrophic against more formidable opponents. Another significant factor constraining Japanese industry's capacity to produce tanks, trucks, and artillery was the 1936 decision to expand the army's air wing and homeland air defense network. This policy diverted resources, capital, and technology away from the army's ground forces. The nascent Japanese Army Air Force or “JAAF” aimed to support ground operations through reconnaissance, bombing enemy bases, and achieving air superiority. However, direct support for ground operations was limited, and Japanese military planners did not anticipate that aerial bombardment could supplement or replace artillery bombardments. The expanded air arm's strategic mission centered on executing preemptive air strikes against Soviet air bases in the Far East to thwart potential air attacks on Japan. By the mid-1930s, the army had approximately 650 aircraft, roughly 450 of which were operational. The JAAF emphasized rigorous training that prioritized quality over quantity, producing only about 750 pilots annually up until December 1941. Basic flight skills were developed through this training, while specialized tactical instruction was deferred to newly established pilot units. According to logistics doctrine, Japanese maneuver units typically operated within a 120 to 180-mile radius of a railhead to facilitate resupply and reinforcement. A field train transport unit was responsible for moving supplies daily from the railhead to a division control point for distribution. The division established a field depot to manage the transfer of supplies from field transport to company and lower-echelon units. At the depot, transport troops would hand over supplies to a combat train that ferried ammunition, rations, and equipment directly to frontline units. Horse-drawn wagons and pack animals were the primary means of transportation. Each wartime division included a transport battalion, which varied in size from approximately 2,200 to 3,700 personnel, depending on the type of division supported. The division typically carried enough supplies for one day. Upon mobilization, the logistical framework was reinforced with the addition of an ordnance unit, a field hospital, a sanitation unit, and additional field and combat trains. The size of the transport regiment grew from around 1,500 officers and men with over 300 horses to nearly 3,500 troops and more than 2,600 animals. In the battalion, one company generally transported small-arms ammunition while two companies handled artillery shells and two others carried rations; this arrangement was flexible based on operational needs. Pack horses and dray horses were assigned to each company to carry or tow infantry assault artillery, mortars, artillery ammunition, and rations. Infantry soldiers carried minimal rations, approximately two and a half pounds, primarily rice, along with tinned condiments and salt. Consequently, the field train included a field kitchen stocked with fresh vegetables, rice or bread, soy sauce, and pickles. Each evening, a forward echelon train distributed supplies received from the field transport unit to the combat unit's bivouac area. When combat seemed imminent, a section of the transport battalion would move forward to deliver essential combat supplies, ordnance, equipment, medical supplies, directly to frontline units. These units would also handle resupply, medical evacuation, and repair of ordnance and equipment once fighting commenced.  On the evening of September 18, 1936, the fifth anniversary of the Manchurian Incident, Chinese troops from the Twenty-Ninth Army clashed with Japanese soldiers from the Seventh Company's rear-guard medical unit at Fengtai. When a Japanese officer arrived on horseback, a Chinese soldier struck his horse, prompting the Chinese troops to retreat to their barracks. Major Ichiki Kiyonao, the battalion commander, ordered an emergency assembly, surrounded the Chinese encampment, and demanded that Chinese authorities surrender the aggressors immediately. To defuse the situation, Major General Kawabe Masakazu, the brigade commander and Ichiki's superior, instructed Regimental Commander Mutaguchi to resolve the incident swiftly. Mutaguchi negotiated an agreement that required the Chinese to apologize, punish those responsible, withdraw from the vicinity of the Japanese barracks, and maintain a distance of two miles. Although Mutaguchi and Ichiki wanted to disarm the Chinese forces, they ultimately complied with Kawabe's wishes and allowed the Chinese to retain their weapons “in the spirit of Bushido.” Later, the Chinese claimed the Japanese had refrained from disarming them due to their fear of the strength and influence of the 29th Army. This insult infuriated Mutaguchi, who vowed not to make any further concessions and promised to eliminate the anti-Japanese provocateurs decisively if another incident occurred. He warned his officers against allowing an “overly tolerant attitude toward the Chinese” to undermine the prestige of the imperial army and emphasized the need for swift, decisive action to prevent such incidents in the future. Tensions were further exacerbated by large-scale Japanese field exercises conducted from late October to early November. These maneuvers, the largest ever executed by Japanese forces in China, mobilized about 6,700 active-duty and reserve troops for a series of complex battle drills, night maneuvers, and tactical field problems. During these exercises, Japanese troops were quartered in Chinese homes. Although local residents were compensated for any damage caused, the exercises nonetheless heightened tensions between the two sides. The fallout from the Suiyuan Fiasco in December 1936, coupled with a tumultuous summer and fall, led to rising anti-Japanese sentiment and prompted Tokyo to caution the Kawabe brigade against actions that might escalate the already precarious situation. In March 1937, during the annual personnel assignments, Ishiwara was promoted to major general and appointed chief of the 1st Department Operations of the General Staff. However, Army Vice Minister Umezu, a hardliner regarding China and a rival of Ishiwara, successfully maneuvered the Hayashi cabinet into approving the command choices for army and navy ministers, overriding Ishiwara's proposals. General Sugiyama Hajime, another hawk on China, replaced the terminally ill General Nakamura Kotaro as army minister shortly after Nakamura's appointment and remained in that position until June 1938. Lieutenant General Imai Kiyoshi, army vice chief of staff and an Ishiwara supporter, was also battling a terminal illness that rendered him largely ineffective during his short five-month tenure from March to August 1937. Imai was expected to play a crucial role in high command because the army chief of staff, Prince Kan'in, had been appointed in 1931 as a figurehead due to internal factions preventing agreement on a candidate. Ishiwara further complicated his conciliatory approach by selecting Colonel Muto Akira, a known hardliner who believed force was the only means to resolve the Japan-China conflict, for the vital position of chief of Operations Section within the General Staff. From Kwantung Army headquarters, Commanding General Ueda Kenkichi and his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Tojo Hideki, advocated for a preemptive war against China to serve the Kwantung Army's interests. In contrast, the China Garrison Army, under Lieutenant General Tashiro and his chief of staff, adopted a more moderate stance, aligning with central headquarters' policy of restraint. The China Garrison Army estimated the 29th Army to consist of 15,000–16,000 troops, with its main strength centered around Peking and an additional 10,000 troops in the surrounding area. Starting in spring 1937, Japanese units began observing tactical indicators suggesting that the Chinese were preparing for war. These indicators included increased guard presence at Peking's gates in June, bolstering units near the Marco Polo Bridge to over two battalions, preparing new fighting positions, digging trenches and constructing concrete pillboxes near the Marco Polo Bridge, infiltrating agents into Japanese maneuver areas for intelligence on night tactical exercises, and heightened strictness among Chinese railroad guards evident since late June. Nevertheless, the Japanese commanders did not view China as a formidable opponent. They believed that Chinese armies would quickly disintegrate due to what they perceived as a lack of fighting spirit and ineffective leadership. By 1937, Japan's national policy was shifting away from the persistent and aggressive efforts of field armies to undermine Chinese political authority in northern China toward a more conciliatory stance. This shift resulted in increased tensions between field armies and the General Staff in Tokyo, leading to substantial fractures among senior officers regarding the “solution” to their so-called China problem. Those tensions broke the camels back that year.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese grossly underestimated their enemy and their own logistical capabilities. There was to say “too many cooks in the kitchen” of the Japanese military and competing visions ultimately were leading Japan and China into an official full blown war. Japan assumed they could bully China until it was so fragmented it would be a simple matter of grabbing the pieces it liked, that was not to be the case at all.   

Dopo aver dato prova di sé nel conflitto contro la Cina, il nuovo Giappone moderno si ritrova a dover affrontare un avversario apparentemente fuori dalla sua portata: la Russia dello zar Nicola II. Il conflitto che scoppierà fra i due paesi avrà delle ripercussioni a livello mondiale.Seguimi su Instagram: @laguerragrande_podcastSe vuoi contribuire con una donazione sul conto PayPal: podcastlaguerragrande@gmail.comScritto e condotto da Andrea BassoMontaggio e audio: Andrea BassoFonti dell'episodio:Jesse Alexander, World War Zero - The Russo Japanese War 1904-1905, The Great War, 2022 Herbert Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, HarperCollins, 2000  Georges Blond, Admiral Togo, Jarrolds Publishers, 1961  Noel Busch, The Emperor's Sword: Japan vs Russia in the Battle of Tsushima, Funk and Wagnalls, 1969  Shannon R. Butler, Voyage to Tsuhima, Naval History 26, 2012  Franco Cardini, Sergio Valzania, La scintilla: da Tripoli a Sarajevo. Come l'Italia provocò la Prima Guerra Mondiale, Mondadori, 2014  Micheal Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts, a statistical reference, Volume II 1900–91, McFarland, 2017  Richard Connaughton, Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear, Cassell, 2003  J. Corbett, Maritime Operations In The Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905, Naval Institute Press, 1915  Marc Ferro, Nicholas II: Last of the Tsars, Oxford University Press, 1995  Orlando Figes, A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891-1924, Jonathan Cape, 1996Robert Forczyk, Russian Battleship vs Japanese Battleship, Yellow Sea 1904–05, Osprey, 2009  R. Garson, Three Great Admirals – One Common Spirit?, The Naval Review 87, 1999  Andrew Gordon, Social Protest In Imperial Japan: The Hibiya Riot of 1905, Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 12, 2014  Stephen Gwynn, Spring Rice to Robert H. M. Ferguson. The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice: A Record, Houghton Mifflin, 1929  Kyung Moon Hwang, A History of Korea, Palgrave, 2010  Marius Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan, Harvard University Press, 2002  Geoffrey Jukes, The Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905. Essential Histories, Osprey Publishing, 2002  Yōko Katō, What Caused the Russo-Japanese War: Korea or Manchuria?, Social Science Japan Journal 10, 2007  Donald Keene, Emperor of Japan, Meiji and his World, 2005  Eugene Kim, Japanese Rule in Korea (1905–1910): A Case Study, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 106, 1962  Yoji Koda, The Russo-Japanese War: Primary Causes of Japanese Success, Naval War College Review 58, 2005  William Koenig, Epic Sea Battles, Octopus Publishing Group, 1977  Rotem Kowner, Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War, The Scarecrow Press, 2006  Thomas Lyell, Case History of Japan, 1948  Cristopher Martin, The russo-japanese war, Abelard Schuman, 1967  Francis McCullagh, With the Cossacks; Being the Story of an Irishman who Rode with the Cossacks throughout the Russo-Japanese War, Nash, 1906  Bruce Menning, Bayonets before bullets: The Imperial Russian Army, 1861–1914, Indiana University, 1992  Ian Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese war, Longman, 1985  John Noss, Man's Religions, 1980  Oyama Iwao, The National Archives of Japan, National Diet Library  Sarah Paine, The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy, Cambridge University Press, 2003  Costantine Pleshakov, The Tsar's Last Armada: Epic Voyage to the Battle of Tsushima, 2002  Roger Reese, The Imperial Russian Army in Peace, War, and Revolution, 1856-1917, University Press of Kansas, 2019  Geoffrey Regan, The Battle of Tsushima 1905, The Guinness Book of Decisive Battles Guinness Publishing, 1992  Edwin Reischauer, Storia del Giappone, Bompiani, 2013  Edward Rhoads, Manchus and Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861–1928, University of Washington Press, 2011  Andrew Rhodes, Same Water Different Dreams: Salient Lessons of the Sino-Japanese War for Future Naval Warfare, Journal of Advanced Military Studies 11, 2020  John Röhl, Wilhelm II: Into the Abyss of War and Exile, 1900–1941, Cambridge University Press, 2014   Lawrence Sondhaus, Naval Warfare, 1815–1914, Routledge, 2001  Richard Storry, Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia, 1894–1943, St. Martins' Press, 1979  Hew Strachan, The First World War. To Arms, Oxford University Press, 2003  The San Bernardino Daily Sun, 30 May 1934  The Straits Times, 4 June 1934  Hesibo Tikowara, Before Port Arthur in a Destroyer: The Personal Diary of a Japanese Naval Officer, John Murray, 1907  Togo Heihachiro, Encyclopaedia Britannica  Ko Unoki, International Relations and the Origins of the Pacific War, Springer, 2016  Vauvineux, Affairs du Corée, 1897  Denis e Peggy Warner, The Tide at Sunrise: A History of the Russo-Japanese War: 1904-1905, Charter House, 1974  Anthony Watts, The Imperial Russian Navy, Arms and Armour Press, 1990  Allen Wildman, The End of the Russian Imperial Army: The Old Army and the Soldiers' Revolt (March-April 1917), Princeton University Press, 1980In copertina: Battaglia del fiume Sha, Yoshikuni, 1904Ishikari Lore di Kevin MacLeod è un brano concesso in uso tramite licenza Creative Commons Attribution 4.0. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Fonte: http://incompetech.com/music/royalty-free/index.html?isrc=USUAN1100192Artista: http://incompetech.com/

  Last time we spoke about the Xi'an Incident. In December 1936, tensions in China erupted as Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek faced a revolt led by his commanders, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. Disillusioned by Chiang's focus on battling communists instead of the Japanese invaders, the generals swiftly captured him in a coup. Confined in Xi'an, Chiang initially resisted their demands for a united front against Japan but eventually engaged in negotiation with Zhang and the Chinese Communist Party. As public sentiment shifted against him, Chiang's predicament led to urgent discussions, culminating in an unexpected alliance with the communists. This pact aimed to consolidate Chinese resistance against Japanese aggression, marking a critical turning point in the Second Sino-Japanese War. By December 26, Chiang was released, and this uneasy collaboration set the stage for a more unified front against a common enemy, though underlying tensions remained between the factions.   #152 China Prepares for War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Before we jump into the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, which I honestly have no idea how long will take us, I thought it would be a good idea to dedicate two episodes to how both China and Japan prepared themselves for war.  Going all the way back to the 1910s, Chinese intellectuals began to view an outright conflict between Japan and China was inevitable. In the discussions about China's strategic options, Jiang Fangzhen pioneered a strategy of protracted warfare, a concept that would later shape China's approach during the Sino-Japanese War. Having studied in Japan during his youth, Jiang developed a keen understanding of the Japanese government and military. As early as 1917, he predicted that China and Japan would become embroiled in a long-term conflict, with the battleground likely to be west of the Peiping–Wuhan and Guangzhou–Wuhan railways. In his work titled "Guofang Lun" or “On National Defense”, Jiang reiterated the importance of protracted warfare as a means to thwart Japan's aspirations for a swift victory. He argued that China should leverage its vast population and extensive territory to extend the conflict, gradually wearing down Japanese strength and turning the situation to its advantage. Jiang recommended that China not focus on defending its coastal regions but instead confront the enemy west of the Peking–Wuhan Railway.   Chiang Kai-shek would eventually come to share Jiang's belief that “the longer the war drags on, the more advantageous it will be for China.” Despite significant public criticism, both the Nationalist government and General Zhang Xueliang, decided against military resistance when Japan invaded Manchuria in September 1931 and attacked Shanghai in 1932. Chiang was particularly hesitant to engage Japan directly, as he was also dealing with a Communist insurgency in central China. He feared that Chinese forces would suffer quick defeat, predicting that Japan would capture key coastal areas and critical infrastructure within just three days, crippling China by dismantling its military and economic lifelines. Following the invasion of North China Chiang was forced to adopt a firmer stance. The Nationalist government proposed a dual strategy of pursuing peace and security while simultaneously preparing for war. If peace proved impossible, China would mobilize its resources for ultimate victory through prolonged conflict. This approach was formalized in the National Defense Plan, which China adopted by prioritizing protracted warfare as its core strategy. After the Sino-Japanese clash in Shanghai on January 28, 1932, the Military Affairs Commission devised a plan that divided China into four defense areas along with a preparation area. While some troops were assigned local security, commanders were directed to concentrate their remaining forces for potential confrontations with Japan. That year, the Military Affairs Commission issued General Defense Guidelines that outlined two strategic responses to a potential Japanese invasion. The first, conservative approach focused on maintaining key positions and utilizing protracted warfare to impede the enemy. The second strategy advocated for decisive battles in key regions to thwart Japan's ambitions and protect China's territorial integrity, prioritizing disengagement from Japanese forces along the Yangtze River and coastline. In August 1935, German military adviser General Alexander von Falkenhausen provided recommendations to Chiang Kai-shek based on his predictions of Japanese advance routes into China. He identified three main routes: one from northern Hebei to Zhengzhou, the second from Shandong toward Xuzhou, and the third crossing the Yangtze River to Nanjing and onwards to Wuhan. He suggested treating the Yangtze River as the primary combat zone and highlighted Sichuan as a possible retreat area. Taking all of this into consideration. in 1936, a draft of a new National Defense Plan divided the country into four zones: a war zone, a defense zone, an internal security zone, and a preparation area. The war zone encompassed ten provinces and established strategies for retreating to predetermined defensive positions when necessary, with Sichuan designated as the main base for the war. In January 1937, the Chinese General Staff Department introduced its annual War Plan, outlining three possible military conflict regions between China and Japan. It proposed two main strategies: Proposal A emphasized sustained combat and retreat to fortified positions if the situation became unfavorable, aiming to eventually go on the offensive against Japan. Proposal B focused on repelling Japanese invasions along the coast and from the north, prioritizing counter offensives against Japanese units stationed near key locations. To prepare, the NRA completed several critical projects outlined in its plans, establishing military supply depots in Nanjing, Bengbu, Xinyang, Huayin, Nanchang, and Wuchang to manage logistics for supplies across various strategic railways. These depots were equipped to sustain the military, with ample ammunition and provisions, including 60 million rounds of small-arms ammunition and food for hundreds of thousands. Despite these preparations, not all projects were completed by the time war broke out in July 1937. In contrast to the Japanese military's tactics, Chinese forces prioritized defensive strategies. For example, at the Mount Lushan Military Officer Training Camp in July 1934, Chiang Kai-shek outlined four possible approaches against Japan, favoring a defense-as-offense strategy. Other options included building fortifications, tenaciously defending key positions, and employing guerrilla warfare through irregular forces to constrain enemy advances. Chiang stressed the importance of national mobilization for the war effort.  There was a significant disparity in equipment between the Japanese and Chinese armies. To give you an idea, each Japanese division included a mechanized group featuring thirty-nine light military vehicles and 21 light armored cars, supplemented by 6,000–7,000 horses, 200–300 automobiles, and specialized troops such as poison gas teams. In contrast, Nationalist divisions lacked any of these capabilities, a typical nationalist division theoretically had an armored regiment, but this unit was equipped with fewer than 72 armored vehicles. Another major weakness of the Nationalist forces was their insufficient artillery. In 1936, a division was officially assigned one artillery battalion, which was divided into three batteries totaling twelve guns. It also included a mechanized cannon company with four direct-fire weapons. By comparison, a Japanese division boasted four infantry regiments and one mountain artillery or field artillery regiment, with each artillery regiment comprising three field artillery battalions and one howitzer battalion. The infantry regiment itself included a mountain artillery section with four mountain guns, while the infantry battalion had one Type 70 mountain gun section with two guns. In total, a Japanese division possessed sixty-four artillery pieces of various calibers, four times the number of a Chinese division and of significantly higher quality. In reality, in 1936, twelve of the twenty elite Chinese “reformed divisions” still lacked artillery battalions. The ordnance available in the “reformed divisions” mostly consisted of the outdated Type 60 mountain gun. Nationwide, very few of the 200 divisions were equipped with any artillery, and those that did often used obsolete field artillery pieces or mountain artillery provided to local forces. Some units even relied on trench mortars as a makeshift solution. The artillery weapons came from various countries, but they frequently lacked necessary observation and signal components, and were often low on ammunition. The majority of mountain guns and field artillery were of the Type 75, which, while capable of providing fire support, had limited range and inflicted minimal damage. To give you an idea of the striking inadequacy of the Chinese artillery, during the Shanghai fighting in 1937, the mountain artillery of the Guangxi 21st Army Group could only reach targets within 1,200 yards, while Japanese field artillery had an effective range of 8,000 yards. Chinese-made mountain artillery suffered due to inferior steel-making technology; the gun shields were constructed from low-quality steel, and the barrels often overheated after firing just a few rounds, increasing the risk of explosions. Additionally, the equipment of local forces varied greatly in quality. In fact, some local units had superior equipment compared to Nationalist units. For example, before the Sino-Japanese War, troops from Yunnan were equipped with French antitank guns and heavy machine guns, which were better than the German water-cooled machine guns used by the Nationalist forces. However, the majority of local troops relied on inferior equipment; the 122nd Division under Wang Mingzhang from Sichuan, noted for its brave defense of Tengxian County during the Xuzhou Battle, was armed with locally produced light and heavy machine guns that frequently malfunctioned, and their Type 79 rifles, also made in Sichuan, were often outdated, with some dating back to the Qing Dynasty. These weapons had limited range and sometimes malfunctioned after fewer than one hundred rounds. Now before the war, both Nationalist and local forces acquired weaponry from diverse foreign and domestic sources. Even domestically produced weapons lacked standardization, with those made in Hanyang and Manchuria differing in design and specifications. Arms manufactured in Germany, France, Russia, Japan, and Italy were similarly inconsistent. Consequently, even within a single unit, the lack of uniformity created significant logistical challenges, undermining combat effectiveness, particularly in the early stages of the war. Despite Nationalist ordnance factories producing over three million rounds of small-arms ammunition daily, the incompatibility of ammunition and weapons diminished the usable quantity of ammunition. Chinese communications infrastructure was inadequate. In the Nationalist army, signal units were integrated into engineering units, leading to low-quality radio communications. In emergencies, telegrams could remain undelivered for days, and orders often had to be dispatched via postal services. By 1937, the entire country boasted only 3,000 military vehicles, necessitating heavy reliance on horses and mules for transport. To effectively equip twenty Nationalist divisions, 10,647 horses and 20,688 mules were needed, but by the end of 1935, only 6,206 horses and 4,351 mules were available. A statistic from 1936 indicated a 5 percent mortality rate among military horses, with some units experiencing a rate as high as 10 percent. The distribution of weaponry led to disputes during army reorganization efforts following the Northern Expedition. Although Chiang Kai-shek's forces were part of the regular army, the quality of their equipment varied significantly. Domestic production of weapons was limited, and imports could not close the gap. Priority was given to small arms; through army reorganization, Chiang aimed to diminish the influence of forces less loyal to him. Nationalist army staff officers observed that troops loyal to Chiang received the best weapons. Northwest and Northeast forces, having cultivated good relations with the KMT, were similarly better equipped, while Shanxi troops received inferior supplies. Troops associated with the Guangxi Clique were given even poorer quality weapons due to their leaders' stronger political ambitions. Troops regarded as “bandit forces,” such as those led by Shi Yousan, Li Hongchang, and Sun Dianying, were naturally assigned the least effective weaponry. This unequal distribution of arms increased some local forces' inclination to align with the KMT while alienating others, which inadvertently led to additional turmoil in the aftermath of the Northern Expedition. Logistical accounting within the Nationalist military was severely lacking. Military expenditures accounted for a significant portion of government spending, roughly 65.48 % in 1937, with personnel costs being the largest component. However, military units prioritized boosting their own resources over accurate accounting. Surpluses were not returned but rather utilized to reward military officers and soldiers for merits in battle, care for the wounded, or to create a reserve. Conversely, if deficits arose, troops would resort to “living off vacancies,” a practice in which they would fail to report desertions promptly and would falsely claim new soldiers had arrived. Military leaders typically appointed their most trusted subordinates to serve as accountants and logistic officers. As the war commenced, these issues became readily apparent. During the Battle of Shanghai in 1937, frontline soldiers sometimes went days without food and went months without pay. Wounded soldiers and civilians had to search tirelessly for medical treatment, and when main forces relocated, they often abandoned grain, ammunition, weapons, and petroleum along the way. General Chen Cheng, the commander in chief during the Battle of Shanghai, noted, “This phenomenon clearly revealed our inability to supply frontline troops, indicating that China remains a backward country with poor management.” Many logistical shortcomings severely impacted troop morale and combat effectiveness. In a 1933 speech, Chiang Kai-shek acknowledged that poor food, inadequate clothing, and ineffective logistics contributed to widespread desertion. Soldiers were further demoralized by reduced or embezzled salaries. A lack of professional medical staff and equipment hampered healthcare efforts, leading to high disease and mortality rates. According to official statistics from 1936, approximately 10 percent of soldiers fell ill annually, with a mortality rate as high as 5 percent. Japanese military authorities reported that one in three wounded Japanese soldiers died, while a Dutch military officer present during the early stages of the Sino-Japanese War observed that one in every two wounded Nationalist soldiers perished. Due to inadequate equipment and limited transport options, Nationalist forces were compelled to recruit farmers and rent vehicles, as they lacked essential facilities such as tents. This reliance on local resources inevitably led to frequent conflicts between military personnel and civilians. China is clearly a vast nation with an extensive coastline, requiring the construction of several significant fortresses during the modern era. These included Wusong, Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Jiangning, and Wuhan along the Yangtze River, as well as Zhenhai, Humen, and Changzhou along the seacoast. Except for the Wuhan fortress, built in 1929-1930, all other fortifications were established during the late Qing Dynasty and featured uncovered cannon batteries. These fortresses suffered from inadequate maintenance, and many of their components had become outdated and irreplaceable, rendering them militarily negligible. Following the January 1932 Shanghai Incident, the Japanese military destroyed the Wusong forts, leaving the entrance to the Yangtze River completely unfortified. Consequently, there were no defenses along the coastline from Jiangsu to Shandong, allowing the Japanese to land freely. In December 1932, the Military Affairs Commission established a fortress group tasked with constructing fortresses and defensive installations, seeking assistance from German military advisers. After the North China Incident in 1935, the Nationalist government accelerated the construction of defensive structures in line with national war planning, focusing particularly on Nanjing. The Nationalists prioritized building fortifications along the seacoast and the Yellow River, followed by key regions north of the Yellow River. The government also ordered a significant quantity of heavy artillery from Germany. This included several dozen pieces of flat-fire antiaircraft and dual-purpose heavy artillery, which were installed at fortifications in Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Nanjing, and Wuhan. By the summer of 1937, the construction of nine fortified positions was complete: Nanjing, Zhenjiang, Jiangyin, Ningbo, Humen, Mawei, Xiamen , Nantong, and Lianyungang. In total, China had established 41 forts and equipped them with 273 fortress cannons. Some defensive installations were poorly managed, with many units assigned to their perimeters lacking training and access to proper maps. The barbette positions in the fortresses were not well concealed and could hardly store sufficient ammunition. Troops stationed at these fortresses received little training. Despite these shortcomings, the fortresses and fortifications were not entirely ineffective. They bolstered Chinese positions along the defense line stretching from Cangxian County to Baoding and from Dexian County to Shijiazhuang, as well as in southern Shandong.  Before the war, China's political and economic center was situated along the seacoast and the Yangtze River. As Japanese influence expanded, the Nationalist government was compelled to establish bases in China's inner regions, very similar to how the USSR pulled back its industry further west after Operation barbarossa.The Japanese attack on Shanghai in 1932 prompted the Nationalists to relocate their capital to Luoyang. On March 5, during the Second Plenary Session of the KMT's Fourth Congress, the Western Capital Preparation Committee was formed to plan for the potential relocation of all governmental bodies to Xi'an in the event of full-scale war. In February 1933, the Central Political Conference approved the Northwest Development Bill, and in February 1934, the National Economic Commission set up a northwestern branch to oversee development projects in the region. On October 18, 1934, Chiang Kai-shek traveled to Lanzhou, recording in his diary that “Northwest China has abundant resources. Japan and Russia are poised to bully us. Yet, if we strengthen ourselves and develop northwest China to the fullest extent, we can turn it into a base for China's revival.” Interestingly, it was Sichuan, rather than the northwest, that became China's rear base during the 2nd Sino-Japanese War. In October 1934, the Communist army evacuated its Soviet base in southern China, initiating the Long March that would ultimately end in the northwest. By this time, Chiang Kai-shek had decided to designate Sichuan as the last stronghold for China. In January 1935, the Nanchang Field Headquarters of the Military Affairs Commission, responsible for combatting the Communists and serving as the supreme military and political authority over most provinces along the Yangtze River and central China, dispatched a special advisory group to Chongqing. Following this, the Nationalist army advanced into Sichuan. On February 10, the Nationalists appointed a new provincial government in Sichuan, effectively ending the province's long-standing regionalism. On March 2, Chiang traveled to Chongqing, where he delivered a speech underscoring that “Sichuan should serve as the base for China's revival.” He stated that he was in Sichuan to oversee efforts against the Communist army and to unify the provincial administration.  After the Xinhai revolution, the Republic of China was still suing the Qing Dynasty's conscription system. However, once in power, the Nationalist government sought to establish a national military service program. In 1933, it enacted a military service law, which began implementation in 1936. This law categorized military service into two branches: service in the Nationalist army and in territorial citizen army units. Men aged eighteen to forty-five were expected to serve in the territorial units if they did not enlist in the Nationalist army. The territorial service was structured into three phases: active service lasting two to three years, first reserves for six years, and second reserves until the age of forty-five. The Ministry of Military Affairs divided China into sixty divisional conscription headquarters, initially establishing these headquarters in the six provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, and Hubei. By December 1936, approximately 50,000 new soldiers had been drafted. The military service law disproportionately favored the middle and upper classes. Government personnel were exempt from enlistment, allowing privileged families to register their children with government agencies. Similarly, students in middle and higher education were excused from service, while youth from poorer backgrounds often felt compelled to enlist due to financial constraints that limited their educational opportunities. Village and town leaders were responsible for executing the recruitment process and frequently conspired with army recruiters. Recruitment principles often favored wealthier families, with guidelines stating that one son should be drafted for every three sons, two for five sons, but no drafts if there was only one son. Wealthy families could secure exemptions for all their male children, while poor families might see their only son conscripted if they were unable to provide the requisite bribe. Town and village heads wielded significant power in recruitment. This new recruitment system also created numerous money-making opportunities. Military personnel assigned to escort draftees to their units would often allow draftees to escape for a fee. Additionally, draftees could monetize their service by agreeing to serve as substitutes for others. For some, being drafted became an occupation. For example, in 1936, 600 individuals were drafted in the Wuhu area of Anhui province, and accounts from regional administrators indicated that every draftee had either been traded, replaced, or seized. Beginning in 1929, the Nationalist government also instituted military training for high school students and older individuals. Students were required to participate in one theoretical class and one practical class each week, totaling three hours. Starting in 1934, students had to complete a three-month military training program before graduating. Graduates of military academies were employed as military instructors. By the end of 1936, over 237,000 high school students had undergone military training. This student military training was overseen by the Society for the Implementation of the Three People's Principles of Sun Yat-sen, which also provided political education and sometimes gathered information on students' political beliefs.  Although the Nationalists made significant efforts to improve the military training of both officers and troops, they inherited deep-seated challenges that they were unable to completely overcome. A lack of facilities, outdated training manuals, low regard for military instructors, and the ongoing influence of regionalism and warlordism hindered progress. The Japanese would also later exploit these shortcomings of the Nationalist army. The Central Military Academy, which evolved from the Whampoa Military Academy established in 1923 in Guangzhou to train officers for the Northern Expedition, became the primary training institution for junior military officers. The academy offered a basic course, lasting eighteen months, which included general education, specialized training in various subjects, and field practice. This was followed by a two-year cadet training program focused on developing the skills necessary for junior military officers. Seventeen classes were admitted before the outbreak of war. Admission to the academy was highly competitive, with military officers receiving attractive salaries. For instance, in 1935, the academy received 10,000 applications for the twelfth class, but only 7% were accepted. Upon graduation, cadets were typically assigned to divisions within the Nationalist army loyal to Chiang Kai-shek. Their training, influenced by German advisors, resulted in a high-quality cadre. In modern China, most sergeants were veterans. While some units provided training for sergeants, a lack of formal education led to their diminished status. Truly qualified sergeants were rare. During his tenure as Minister of Military Training, General Bai Chongxi proposed establishing a sergeant school and creating a professional noncommissioned officer system; however, the Ministry of Military Affairs opposed this on financial grounds. While commanding officers enjoyed rapid promotions, military instructors did not. Furthermore, there was no system for transferring instructors to field commands or assigning commanders to military academies for extended periods. Despite minor updates to cover modern warfare concepts such as tank warfare and machine guns, Qing Dynasty military manuals were still in use at the Central Military Academy at the start of the war. Yeah, 1937 they were still rocking the old Qing books. Following the establishment of the Ministry of Military Training, a bureau for military translation was set up to evaluate existing course materials and translate military manuals, but its contributions were limited. Another significant shortcoming of military instruction focused on theory at the expense of practical application.  To enhance the quality of military officers, the Nationalist army instituted specialized schools for artillery, infantry, transport, engineering, and signals starting in 1931. These institutions were considered to have high-quality administrators and facilities. The Nationalists adopted German military training models, replacing the previously used Japanese models. They appointed German advisors to oversee instructor training at military academies and established three instructional divisions. By the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, 15,000 students had graduated from programs with a German military influence, resulting in the creation of about fifty combat divisions from these instructional units. However, the progress of other Nationalist army units was limited because their training was not aligned with contemporary battlefield realities. Before World War I, troops operated in close formations due to limited firepower. The widespread introduction of machine guns after World War I necessitated a shift to dispersed formations. Although a new drill manual issued by the Ministry of Military Training in 1935 introduced small-group tactics, few units adopted these methods. General Chen Cheng highlighted another underlying issue in 1938, commenting on the outmoded focus on parade ground drills and formal military manners. He noted, “We have paid too much attention to stereotypical formality and procedures of no practical use. Sometimes, even though soldiers could not get a haircut or take a bath for several months, their camps had to be in order. They underwent intensive training in close-order drill but learned little about gun handling, marksmanship, or maneuvering. This was inappropriate in peacetime, yet we continued this practice even after the Sino-Japanese War started, even using it on highly educated youth.” In contrast, the Communist army simplified training, emphasizing two essential skills: live-fire exercises and physical endurance, which significantly enhanced troop effectiveness in the challenging terrain characteristic of the Sino-Japanese War. Ultimately, the Nationalist army's training did not reach all soldiers. Only about half of all combat soldiers received adequate training, while the rest were neglected. According to statistics from the time, there were approximately five million military personnel during the Sino-Japanese War, with three million serving in logistics. Most of these logistics personnel had received little training, leading to disastrous consequences for overall combat effectiveness. As warfare has become more complex, the role of highly trained staff officers has become increasingly important. Napoleon developed operational plans close to the front and communicated orders via courier. During World War I, military commanders collected information at their headquarters and utilized telephones and automobiles to relay orders to the front lines. In World War II, with the battlefield expanding to include land, sea, and air, senior commanders often made decisions from headquarters far from the action, relying on a significant number of staff officers with specialized skills to keep them informed. In China, however, the staff officer system was underdeveloped. By 1937, only about 2,000 commanders and staff officers had received training. Prior to the Sino-Japanese War, most commanders managed staff work themselves, with staff officers serving primarily as military secretaries who drafted orders, reports, and maps. Many staff officers had no formal military training, and as a whole, the branch lacked respect, causing the most talented officers to avoid serving in it. The situation was even more dire for staff officer departments within local forces. For example, in March 1937, Liu Ziqing, a graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy, was appointed as the director of political instruction in the Forty-fourth Army, a unit under Sichuan warlord Liu Xiang. Liu Ziqing's account illustrates the dysfunction within the ranks: “The commander in chief was not supposed to manage the army and even did not know its whereabouts... But he could appoint relatives and former subordinates—who were officials and businessmen as well—to the army. Each month they would receive a small stipend. At headquarters, there was a long table and two rows of chairs. Around ten o'clock in the morning, senior officers signed in to indicate their presence. Those with other business would leave, while the remaining officers sat down to leisurely discuss star actresses, fortune-telling, business projects, mah-jongg, and opium. Occasionally they would touch on national affairs, chat about news articles, or share local gossip. In the afternoons, they primarily played mah-jongg, held banquets, and visited madams. Most mornings, the commander usually presided over these activities, and at first, I reported for duty as well. But I soon realized it was a waste of time and came very rarely. At headquarters, most staff members wore long gowns or Western-style suits, while military uniforms were a rare sight.” Most senior military personnel were trained at the Baoding Military Academy during the early republic. 2/3rds of commanders in chief, 37 %of army commanders, and 20 % of division commanders were Baoding graduates. Higher-ranking officers were more likely to have launched their careers there. In contrast, only 10 % of division commanders and a few army commanders were graduates of the Whampoa Military Academy. Additionally, commanders trained in local military schools and those with combat experience accounted for 1/3rd of all commanders. While the prevalence of civil war provided opportunities for rapid promotion, it also hindered officers' ability to update their training or gain experience in different military branches. German advisors expressed their concerns to Chiang Kai-shek, emphasizing that officers should first serve in junior roles before taking command. During one battle in 1938, Chiang noted, “Our commanders in chief are equivalent only to our enemy's regiment commanders, and our army and division commanders are only as competent as our enemy's battalion and company commanders.” Despite not viewing high-ranking Japanese officers as great strategists, Nationalist officers respected them as highly competent, diligent, and professional commanders who rarely made critical errors. The infantry was the primary component of the Nationalist army, with middle and junior infantry officers constituting over 80 %of all army officers. A 1936 registry of military officers listed 1,105 colonels and 2,159 lieutenant colonels within the infantry, demonstrating a significant outnumbering of Baoding graduates at ranks below lieutenant colonel. However, the quality of middle and junior infantry officers declined during the Sino-Japanese War; by 1944, only 27.3 % of these officers were from formal military academies, while those promoted from the ranks increased to 28.1 %. In 1937, 80 % of officers in an ordinary infantry battalion were military academy graduates, but this percentage dropped to 20 % during the war. Its hard to tell how educated soldiers were before the war, but it is generally believed that most were illiterate. In 1929, sociologist Tao Menghe surveyed 946 soldiers from a Shanxi garrison brigade and found that only 13 percent could compose a letter independently, while the rest had either never learned to read or were unable to write. In contrast, in August 1938, General Feng Yuxiang found that 80 percent of a regiment in Hunan were literate. Regardless, during the Sino-Japanese War, the quality of recruits steadily declined. More than 90 percent of soldiers were illiterate, and few possessed any basic scientific knowledge, which hindered their ability to master their weapons. On the battlefield, they heavily relied on middle and junior officers for guidance.  In autumn 1933, General Hans von Seeckt, the architect of the post World War I German army, visited China at the personal invitation of Chiang Kai-shek. In his recommendations for military reform, he identified China's greatest problem as its excessively large forces drawn from diverse backgrounds. He stated, “At present, the most pressing goal is to... establish a small, well-equipped army with high morale and combat effectiveness to replace the numerous poorly armed and trained forces.” He suggested forming an army of sixty divisions and recommended the establishment of a training regiment for military officers to equip them with the skills needed for modern warfare. Chiang Kai-shek accepted von Seeckt's proposals, and on January 26, 1935, he convened a National Military Reorganization Conference in Nanjing. On March 1, the Army Reorganization Bureau was established in Wuchang, under the leadership of General Chen Cheng. In the same month, General Alexander von Falkenhausen took charge of the German Military Advisors Group. Before war broke out, around nineteen divisions, roughly 300,000 troops received training from German advisors and were equipped with German-style weapons. At the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, the forces stemming from the First Army of the National Revolutionary Army and the Whampoa cadets, who had fought in the Northern Expedition, held the highest reputation and were referred to as the “core central forces” by the Japanese. Other notable forces included the Guangxi Army, Northwestern Army, Northeastern Army, some Uyghur units, the Guangdong Army, and the Shanxi Army. In contrast, provincial forces such as the Yunnan Army and Sichuan Army were viewed less favorably. Nationalist forces were generally far inferior to those of the Japanese enemy. In 1937, General He Yingqin noted that Nationalist forces had failed to prevail in 1932 and 1933, even when outnumbering the Japanese by 4-1.  In November 1937, during a national defense conference, Chiang Kai-shek stated, "In recent years we have worked hard, prepared actively, and achieved national unification. By the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, we were in a better domestic situation and had improved military preparedness compared to before. Since 1935, our strength has doubled. It increased by more than two to three times since January 1932 or September 1931 [when Japan attacked Shanghai and Mukden]. If peace had been achievable, we should have delayed the war for two or three years. Given an additional three years, our defensive capabilities would have been drastically different... Now, if we merely compare the military strength of China and Japan, we are certainly inferior." However, such assessments were overly optimistic, as Chiang failed to recognize that Japan's military capabilities would not have stagnated. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek certainly was dealt a difficult hand of cards for the upcoming poker match he was to play. Yet the Chinese were resilient and they had to be for the absolute horror that would be inflicted upon them from 1937-1945. Until this point, their enemies had been far more lenient, the Empire of Japan would show no mercy.

The extraordinary life of forgotten World War II hero Evans Carlson, commander of America's first special forces, secret confidant of FDR, and one of the most controversial officers in the history of the Marine Corps, who dedicated his life to bridging the cultural divide between the United States and China“He was a gutsy old man.” “A corker,” said another. “You couldn't find anyone better.” They talked about him in hushed tones. “This Major Carlson,” wrote one of the officers in a letter home, “is one of the finest men I have ever known.”These were the words of the young Marines training to be among the first U.S. troops to enter the Second World War—and the Major Carlson they spoke of was Evans Carlson, a man of mythical status even before the war that would make him a military legend.By December of 1941, at the age of forty-five, Carlson had already faced off against Sandinistas in the jungles of Nicaragua and served multiple tours in China, where he embedded with Mao's Communist forces during the Sino-Japanese War. Inspired by their guerilla tactics and their collaborative spirit—which he'd call “gung ho,” introducing the term to the English language—and driven by his own Emersonian ideals of self-reliance, Carlson would go on to form his renowned Marine Raiders, the progenitors of today's special operations forces, who fought behind Japanese lines on Makin Island and Guadalcanal, showing Americans a new way to do battle.In The Raider, Cundill Prize–winning historian Stephen R. Platt gives us the first authoritative account of Carlson's larger-than-life exploits: the real story, based on years of research including newly discovered diaries and correspondence in English and Chinese, with deep insight into the conflicted idealism about the Chinese Communists that would prove Carlson's undoing in the McCarthy era.Tracing the rise and fall of an unlikely American war hero, The Raider is a story of exploration, of cultural (mis)understanding, and of one man's awakening to the sheer breadth of the world. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/biography

The extraordinary life of forgotten World War II hero Evans Carlson, commander of America's first special forces, secret confidant of FDR, and one of the most controversial officers in the history of the Marine Corps, who dedicated his life to bridging the cultural divide between the United States and China“He was a gutsy old man.” “A corker,” said another. “You couldn't find anyone better.” They talked about him in hushed tones. “This Major Carlson,” wrote one of the officers in a letter home, “is one of the finest men I have ever known.”These were the words of the young Marines training to be among the first U.S. troops to enter the Second World War—and the Major Carlson they spoke of was Evans Carlson, a man of mythical status even before the war that would make him a military legend.By December of 1941, at the age of forty-five, Carlson had already faced off against Sandinistas in the jungles of Nicaragua and served multiple tours in China, where he embedded with Mao's Communist forces during the Sino-Japanese War. Inspired by their guerilla tactics and their collaborative spirit—which he'd call “gung ho,” introducing the term to the English language—and driven by his own Emersonian ideals of self-reliance, Carlson would go on to form his renowned Marine Raiders, the progenitors of today's special operations forces, who fought behind Japanese lines on Makin Island and Guadalcanal, showing Americans a new way to do battle.In The Raider, Cundill Prize–winning historian Stephen R. Platt gives us the first authoritative account of Carlson's larger-than-life exploits: the real story, based on years of research including newly discovered diaries and correspondence in English and Chinese, with deep insight into the conflicted idealism about the Chinese Communists that would prove Carlson's undoing in the McCarthy era.Tracing the rise and fall of an unlikely American war hero, The Raider is a story of exploration, of cultural (mis)understanding, and of one man's awakening to the sheer breadth of the world. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

The extraordinary life of forgotten World War II hero Evans Carlson, commander of America's first special forces, secret confidant of FDR, and one of the most controversial officers in the history of the Marine Corps, who dedicated his life to bridging the cultural divide between the United States and China“He was a gutsy old man.” “A corker,” said another. “You couldn't find anyone better.” They talked about him in hushed tones. “This Major Carlson,” wrote one of the officers in a letter home, “is one of the finest men I have ever known.”These were the words of the young Marines training to be among the first U.S. troops to enter the Second World War—and the Major Carlson they spoke of was Evans Carlson, a man of mythical status even before the war that would make him a military legend.By December of 1941, at the age of forty-five, Carlson had already faced off against Sandinistas in the jungles of Nicaragua and served multiple tours in China, where he embedded with Mao's Communist forces during the Sino-Japanese War. Inspired by their guerilla tactics and their collaborative spirit—which he'd call “gung ho,” introducing the term to the English language—and driven by his own Emersonian ideals of self-reliance, Carlson would go on to form his renowned Marine Raiders, the progenitors of today's special operations forces, who fought behind Japanese lines on Makin Island and Guadalcanal, showing Americans a new way to do battle.In The Raider, Cundill Prize–winning historian Stephen R. Platt gives us the first authoritative account of Carlson's larger-than-life exploits: the real story, based on years of research including newly discovered diaries and correspondence in English and Chinese, with deep insight into the conflicted idealism about the Chinese Communists that would prove Carlson's undoing in the McCarthy era.Tracing the rise and fall of an unlikely American war hero, The Raider is a story of exploration, of cultural (mis)understanding, and of one man's awakening to the sheer breadth of the world. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

Ep 054 – Nonfiction. Historian Stephen R. Platt discusses his new book, “The Raider: The Untold Story of a Renegade Marine and the Birth of U.S. Special Forces in World War II.”‘The extraordinary life of forgotten World War II hero Evans Carlson, commander of America's first special forces, secret confidant of FDR, and one of the most controversial officers in the history of the Marine Corps, who dedicated his life to bridging the cultural divide between the United States and China“He was a gutsy old man.” “A corker,” said another. “You couldn't find anyone better.” They talked about him in hushed tones. “This Major Carlson,” wrote one of the officers in a letter home, “is one of the finest men I have ever known.”These were the words of the young Marines training to be among the first U.S. troops to enter the Second World War—and the Major Carlson they spoke of was Evans Carlson, a man of mythical status even before the war that would make him a military legend.By December of 1941, at the age of forty-five, Carlson had already faced off against Sandinistas in the jungles of Nicaragua and served multiple tours in China, where he embedded with Mao's Communist forces during the Sino-Japanese War. Inspired by their guerilla tactics and their collaborative spirit—which he'd call “gung ho,” introducing the term to the English language—and driven by his own Emersonian ideals of self-reliance, Carlson would go on to form his renowned Marine Raiders, the progenitors of today's special operations forces, who fought behind Japanese lines on Makin Island and Guadalcanal, showing Americans a new way to do battle.In The Raider, Cundill Prize–winning historian Stephen R. Platt gives us the first authoritative account of Carlson's larger-than-life exploits: the real story, based on years of research including newly discovered diaries and correspondence in English and Chinese, with deep insight into the conflicted idealism about the Chinese Communists that would prove Carlson's undoing in the McCarthy era.Tracing the rise and fall of an unlikely American war hero, The Raider is a story of exploration, of cultural (mis)understanding, and of one man's awakening to the sheer breadth of the world.'Subscribe to the War Books podcast here:YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@warbookspodcastApple: https://apple.co/3FP4ULbSpotify: https://spoti.fi/3kP9scZFollow the show here:Twitter: https://twitter.com/warbookspodcastFacebook: https://www.facebook.com/warbookspodcastInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/warbookspodcast/

He was a gutsy old man.” “A corker,” said another. “You couldn’t find anyone better.” They talked about him in hushed tones. “This Major Carlson,” wrote one of the officers in a letter home, “is one of the finest men I have ever known.”These were the words of the young Marines training to be among the first U.S. troops to enter the Second World War—and the Major Carlson they spoke of was Evans Carlson, a man of mythical status even before the war that would make him a military legend.By December of 1941, at the age of forty-five, Carlson had already faced off against Sandinistas in the jungles of Nicaragua and served multiple tours in China, where he embedded with Mao’s Communist forces during the Sino-Japanese War. Inspired by their guerilla tactics and their collaborative spirit—which he’d call “gung ho,” introducing the term to the English language—and driven by his own Emersonian ideals of self-reliance, Carlson would go on to form his renowned Marine Raiders, the progenitors of today’s special operations forces, who fought behind Japanese lines on Makin Island and Guadalcanal, showing Americans a new way to do battle.Today’s guest is Stephen R. Platt, author of “ “The Raider: The Untold Story of a Renegade Marine and the Birth of U.S. Special Forces in World War II.” Tracing the rise and fall of an unlikely American war hero, The Raider is a story of exploration, of cultural (mis)understanding, and of one man’s awakening to the sheer breadth of the world.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Merriam-Webster's Word of the Day for May 5, 2025 is: plethora • PLETH-uh-ruh • noun Plethora refers to a very large amount or number of something. Plethora is most often used in the phrase "a plethora of." // The hotel offers a plethora of amenities, including indoor and outdoor pools, a fitness center, and world-class dining. See the entry > Examples: "In 1895, Japan won Taiwan from China in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, ending the Sino-Japanese War, and from 1895 to 1945, the island was a colony of Japan. The cultural influences of Japan persist to this day: in the tiny coffee shops with their enticing nutty aromas, in the plethora of Japanese-influenced sushi restaurants, and in Taiwan's highly efficient postal service and train systems." — Kim Liao, Where Every Ghost Has a Name: A Memoir of Taiwanese Independence, 2024 Did you know? Plethora was first used in English to refer to a medical condition marked by an excess volume of blood or other bodily fluid, with associated swelling and redness. (Its Greek ancestor, the noun plēthṓra, refers to a similar excess, or to general fullness or crowdedness.) These days, plethora is most often used in general contexts to refer to a large number or amount of something. While plethora conveys a plural meaning, it is a grammatically singular word, which makes choosing whether to pair it with a singular or plural verb confusing. Both can be correctly used, however; choose the singular if you wish to emphasize the grouping or collection ("a plethora of books is available"), and choose the plural if you wish to emphasize the individual elements or components ("a plethora of books have been written on the subject").

In questo secondo episodio speciale, vedremo come l'Impero nipponico, per la prima volta dopo la modernizzazione, abbia gettato uno sguardo oltre i propri confini. Per ottenere il predominio in Asia Orientale ed essere trattato alla pari dalle potenze occidentali, il Giappone dovrà confrontarsi militarmente con la Cina.Seguimi su Instagram: @laguerragrande_podcastSe vuoi contribuire con una donazione sul conto PayPal: podcastlaguerragrande@gmail.comScritto e condotto da Andrea BassoMontaggio e audio: Andrea BassoFonti dell'episodio:Michael R. Auslin, Toshihiko Kishi, Hanae Kurihara Kramer, Scott Kramer, Barak Kushner, Olivia Morello, Kaoru (Kay) Ueda, Fanning the Flames: Propaganda in Modern Japan, 2021 Rosa Caroli, Francesco Gatti, Storia del Giappone, Laterza, 2007 Chonin, Encyclopaedia Britannica L. M. Cullen, A History of Japan, 1582–1941: Internal and External Worlds, Cambridge University Press, 2003 Giuliano Da Frè, Storia delle battaglie sul mare, Odoya, 2014 John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War, Pantheon, 1986 Peter Duus, Modern Japan, Houghton Mifflin, 1998 Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, University of California Press, 1998 Bruce Elleman, Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795–1989, Routledge, 2001 Gabriele Esposito, Japanese Armies 1868–1877: The Boshin War and Satsuma Rebellion, Osprey Publishing, 2020 David Evans, Mark Peattie, Kaigun: strategy, tactics, and technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941, Naval Institute Press, 1997 Allen Fung, Testing the Self-Strengthening: The Chinese Army in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, Modern Asian Studies 30, 1996 Hane Mikiso, Modern Japan: A Historical Survey Sue Henny, Jean-Pierre Lehmann, Themes and Theories in Modern Japanese History: Essays in Memory of Richard Storry, A&C Black, 2013 James Huffman, Modern Japan: An Encyclopedia of History, Culture, and Nationalism, Garland Reference Library of the Humanities, Routledge, 1997 Marius Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan, Harvard University Press, 2002 Kim Jinwung, A History of Korea: From "Land of the Morning Calm" to States in Conflict, Indiana University Press, 2012 Philip Jowett, China's Wars: Rousing the Dragon 1894–1949, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013 Donald Keene, Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852-1912, Columbia University Press, 2002 Liu Kwang-Ching, The Cambridge History of China, Late Ch'ing, 1800–1911, Cambridge University Press, 1978 James McClain, Japan, a modern history, Norton, 2001 Naotaka Hirota, Steam Locomotives of Japan, Kodansha International Ltd, 1972 Piotr Olender, Sino-Japanese Naval War 1894–1895, MMPBooks, 2014 Christopher Paik, Abbey Steele, Seiki Tanaka, Constraining the Samurai: Rebellion and Taxation in Early Modern Japan, International Studies Quarterly 61, 2017 Sarah Paine, The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy. Cambridge University Press, 2003 Pebrina, Treccani Christian Polak, Silk and Light: 100-year history of unconscious French-Japanese cultural exchange (Edo Period – 1950), Hachette, 2001 Richard Ponsonby-Fane, Kyoto: the Old Capital of Japan, 794–1869, 1956 Mark Ravina, To Stand with the Nations of the World: Japan's Meiji Restoration in World History, Oxford University Press, 2017 Edwin Reischauer, Storia del Giappone, Bompiani, 2013 Chris Rowthorn, Giappone, EDT, 2008 Michael Seth, A History of Korea: From Antiquity to the Present, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010 John Sewall, The Logbook of the Captain's Clerk: Adventures in the China Seas, Chas H. Glass & Co., 1905 Lawrence Sondhaus, Naval Warfare, 1815–1914, Routledge, 2001 Henry Van Straelen, Yoshida Shoin Forerunner Of The Meiji Restoration, Brill, 1952 Conrad D. Totman, Japan before Perry: a short history, University of California Press, 1981 Trudy Ring, Robert M. Salkin, Paul E. Schellinger, Sharon La Boda, Noelle Watson, Christopher Hudson, Adele Hast, International Dictionary of Historic Places: Asia and Oceania, Taylor & Francis, 1994 Jacopo Turco, Come ha fatto il Giappone a diventare così ricco?, Nova Lectio, 2024 Howard Van Zandt, Pioneer American Merchants in Japan, Tuttle Publishing, 1984 Arthur Walworth, Black Ships Off Japan: The Story of Commodore Perry's Expedition, Read Books, 2008In copertina: Nessun nemico resiste dove noi ci rechiamo: la resa di Pyongyang, stampa di  Migita Toshihide, 1894, Metropolitan Museum of ArtIshikari Lore di Kevin MacLeod è un brano concesso in uso tramite licenza Creative Commons Attribution 4.0. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Fonte: http://incompetech.com/music/royalty-free/index.html?isrc=USUAN1100192Artista: http://incompetech.com/

Mounting tensions over the future of Korea turned violent after the end of the Donghak Rebellion, resulting in a war between Japan and China.Support the show My latest novel, "Califia's Crusade," is now available at Amazon, Barnes & Noble, Kobo, Apple Books, Bookshop.org, and many other online platforms!

General He Yingqin: The Rise and Fall of Nationalist China (Cambridge UP, 2016) is a revisionist study of the career of General He Yingqin, one of the most prominent military officers in China's Nationalist period (1928-49) and one of the most misunderstood figures in twentieth-century China.  Western scholars have dismissed He Yingqin as corrupt and incompetent, yet the Chinese archives reveal that he demonstrated considerable success as a combat commander and military administrator during civil conflicts and the Sino-Japanese War. His work in the Chinese Nationalist military served as the foundation of a close personal and professional relationship with Chiang Kai-shek, with whom he worked closely for more than two decades. Against the backdrop of the Nationalist revolution of the 1920s through the 1940s, Peter Worthing analyzes He Yingqin's rise to power alongside Chiang Kai-shek, his work in building the Nationalist military, and his fundamental role in carrying out policies designed to overcome the regime's greatest obstacles during this turbulent period of Chinese history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

General He Yingqin: The Rise and Fall of Nationalist China (Cambridge UP, 2016) is a revisionist study of the career of General He Yingqin, one of the most prominent military officers in China's Nationalist period (1928-49) and one of the most misunderstood figures in twentieth-century China.  Western scholars have dismissed He Yingqin as corrupt and incompetent, yet the Chinese archives reveal that he demonstrated considerable success as a combat commander and military administrator during civil conflicts and the Sino-Japanese War. His work in the Chinese Nationalist military served as the foundation of a close personal and professional relationship with Chiang Kai-shek, with whom he worked closely for more than two decades. Against the backdrop of the Nationalist revolution of the 1920s through the 1940s, Peter Worthing analyzes He Yingqin's rise to power alongside Chiang Kai-shek, his work in building the Nationalist military, and his fundamental role in carrying out policies designed to overcome the regime's greatest obstacles during this turbulent period of Chinese history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

General He Yingqin: The Rise and Fall of Nationalist China (Cambridge UP, 2016) is a revisionist study of the career of General He Yingqin, one of the most prominent military officers in China's Nationalist period (1928-49) and one of the most misunderstood figures in twentieth-century China.  Western scholars have dismissed He Yingqin as corrupt and incompetent, yet the Chinese archives reveal that he demonstrated considerable success as a combat commander and military administrator during civil conflicts and the Sino-Japanese War. His work in the Chinese Nationalist military served as the foundation of a close personal and professional relationship with Chiang Kai-shek, with whom he worked closely for more than two decades. Against the backdrop of the Nationalist revolution of the 1920s through the 1940s, Peter Worthing analyzes He Yingqin's rise to power alongside Chiang Kai-shek, his work in building the Nationalist military, and his fundamental role in carrying out policies designed to overcome the regime's greatest obstacles during this turbulent period of Chinese history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

General He Yingqin: The Rise and Fall of Nationalist China (Cambridge UP, 2016) is a revisionist study of the career of General He Yingqin, one of the most prominent military officers in China's Nationalist period (1928-49) and one of the most misunderstood figures in twentieth-century China.  Western scholars have dismissed He Yingqin as corrupt and incompetent, yet the Chinese archives reveal that he demonstrated considerable success as a combat commander and military administrator during civil conflicts and the Sino-Japanese War. His work in the Chinese Nationalist military served as the foundation of a close personal and professional relationship with Chiang Kai-shek, with whom he worked closely for more than two decades. Against the backdrop of the Nationalist revolution of the 1920s through the 1940s, Peter Worthing analyzes He Yingqin's rise to power alongside Chiang Kai-shek, his work in building the Nationalist military, and his fundamental role in carrying out policies designed to overcome the regime's greatest obstacles during this turbulent period of Chinese history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

General He Yingqin: The Rise and Fall of Nationalist China (Cambridge UP, 2016) is a revisionist study of the career of General He Yingqin, one of the most prominent military officers in China's Nationalist period (1928-49) and one of the most misunderstood figures in twentieth-century China.  Western scholars have dismissed He Yingqin as corrupt and incompetent, yet the Chinese archives reveal that he demonstrated considerable success as a combat commander and military administrator during civil conflicts and the Sino-Japanese War. His work in the Chinese Nationalist military served as the foundation of a close personal and professional relationship with Chiang Kai-shek, with whom he worked closely for more than two decades. Against the backdrop of the Nationalist revolution of the 1920s through the 1940s, Peter Worthing analyzes He Yingqin's rise to power alongside Chiang Kai-shek, his work in building the Nationalist military, and his fundamental role in carrying out policies designed to overcome the regime's greatest obstacles during this turbulent period of Chinese history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/biography

General He Yingqin: The Rise and Fall of Nationalist China (Cambridge UP, 2016) is a revisionist study of the career of General He Yingqin, one of the most prominent military officers in China's Nationalist period (1928-49) and one of the most misunderstood figures in twentieth-century China.  Western scholars have dismissed He Yingqin as corrupt and incompetent, yet the Chinese archives reveal that he demonstrated considerable success as a combat commander and military administrator during civil conflicts and the Sino-Japanese War. His work in the Chinese Nationalist military served as the foundation of a close personal and professional relationship with Chiang Kai-shek, with whom he worked closely for more than two decades. Against the backdrop of the Nationalist revolution of the 1920s through the 1940s, Peter Worthing analyzes He Yingqin's rise to power alongside Chiang Kai-shek, his work in building the Nationalist military, and his fundamental role in carrying out policies designed to overcome the regime's greatest obstacles during this turbulent period of Chinese history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies

General He Yingqin: The Rise and Fall of Nationalist China (Cambridge UP, 2016) is a revisionist study of the career of General He Yingqin, one of the most prominent military officers in China's Nationalist period (1928-49) and one of the most misunderstood figures in twentieth-century China.  Western scholars have dismissed He Yingqin as corrupt and incompetent, yet the Chinese archives reveal that he demonstrated considerable success as a combat commander and military administrator during civil conflicts and the Sino-Japanese War. His work in the Chinese Nationalist military served as the foundation of a close personal and professional relationship with Chiang Kai-shek, with whom he worked closely for more than two decades. Against the backdrop of the Nationalist revolution of the 1920s through the 1940s, Peter Worthing analyzes He Yingqin's rise to power alongside Chiang Kai-shek, his work in building the Nationalist military, and his fundamental role in carrying out policies designed to overcome the regime's greatest obstacles during this turbulent period of Chinese history.

PREVIEW: JAPAN: PRC: Conversation with colleague Grant Newsham attending the 35th Annual Indo-Pacific International Military Law and Operations Conference in Manila re the presentation by the Japan Self-Defence Force that it is ready to participate in the defense of its allies such as the Philippines and Taiwan. More later. 1895 SINO-JAPANESE WAR

PREVIEW:: PRC:US:  Conversation with  with colleague Colonel Grant Newsham, USMC (ret) for his book, WHEN CHINA ATTACKS, regarding the observation of the US National Security Council in the late 20th Century that China was not going to become a threat. More later this week. 1895 Sino-Japanese War

PREVIEW: JAPAN Conversation with Grant Newsham, author of "When China Attacks," regarding the doubts about Japanese leadership and the defense of Taiwan from PRC threats. More tonight. 1895 SINO-JAPANESE WAR.

Melville Jacoby was a U.S. war correspondent during the Sino-Japanese War and, later, the Second World War, writing about the Japanese advances from Chongqing, Hanoi, and Manila. He was also a relative of Bill Lascher, a journalist–specifically, the cousin of Bill's grandmother. Bill has now collected Mel's work in a book: A Danger Shared: A Journalist's Glimpses of a Continent at War (Blacksmith Books: 2024), with photos detailing Mel's early days as an exchange student in China, then his later work as journalist…and propagandist for Chiang Kai-shek in wartime Chongqing, then as a correspondent for Time and Life in the Philippines right as the Japanese invade. Bill is also the author of the 2016 book Eve of a Hundred Midnights: The Star-Crossed Love Story of Two World War II Correspondents and their Epic Escape Across the Pacific (William Morrow: 2016), also about Mel Jacoby and his wife Annalee Jacoby. He is also a freelance journalist. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of A Danger Shared. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at @nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Melville Jacoby was a U.S. war correspondent during the Sino-Japanese War and, later, the Second World War, writing about the Japanese advances from Chongqing, Hanoi, and Manila. He was also a relative of Bill Lascher, a journalist–specifically, the cousin of Bill's grandmother. Bill has now collected Mel's work in a book: A Danger Shared: A Journalist's Glimpses of a Continent at War (Blacksmith Books: 2024), with photos detailing Mel's early days as an exchange student in China, then his later work as journalist…and propagandist for Chiang Kai-shek in wartime Chongqing, then as a correspondent for Time and Life in the Philippines right as the Japanese invade. Bill is also the author of the 2016 book Eve of a Hundred Midnights: The Star-Crossed Love Story of Two World War II Correspondents and their Epic Escape Across the Pacific (William Morrow: 2016), also about Mel Jacoby and his wife Annalee Jacoby. He is also a freelance journalist. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of A Danger Shared. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at @nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

Melville Jacoby was a U.S. war correspondent during the Sino-Japanese War and, later, the Second World War, writing about the Japanese advances from Chongqing, Hanoi, and Manila. He was also a relative of Bill Lascher, a journalist–specifically, the cousin of Bill's grandmother. Bill has now collected Mel's work in a book: A Danger Shared: A Journalist's Glimpses of a Continent at War (Blacksmith Books: 2024), with photos detailing Mel's early days as an exchange student in China, then his later work as journalist…and propagandist for Chiang Kai-shek in wartime Chongqing, then as a correspondent for Time and Life in the Philippines right as the Japanese invade. Bill is also the author of the 2016 book Eve of a Hundred Midnights: The Star-Crossed Love Story of Two World War II Correspondents and their Epic Escape Across the Pacific (William Morrow: 2016), also about Mel Jacoby and his wife Annalee Jacoby. He is also a freelance journalist. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of A Danger Shared. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at @nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

PREVIEW: JAPAN: Conversation with colleague Grant Newsham, author WHEN CHINA ATTACKS, re the Japanese Self-Defense Force's inadequacy and poor treatment by the political class and the culture. More tonight. 1895 Sino-Japanese War

In 1938, after the Battle of Wuhan, Wang Jingwei left Chongqing and the Republic of China team in Chongqing for Hanoi. He negotiated with Japanese officials and eventually set up a puppet regime know as the Wang Jingwei Regime and also as the Reorganized National Government of the Republic of China. It was almost totally under Japanese domination, with little autonomy.Wang Jingwei's background, including his studies in Japan as a youth, his pessimism towards Japan and his lack of faith that China would ever gain allies against Japan, all contributed to his decision to set up an alternative Republic of China puppet government in Nanjing during the Second Sino-Japanese War.He died in 1944, but his successor was executed after the war for treason. Today, Wang is remembered as a hanjian (a traitor to the Han nation) and a kuilei (a puppet).The Wang Jingwei Regime complicated China's remembrance of the Sino-Japanese War. Until 1982, the Communist Party of China didn't distinguish between Wang Jingwei's Regime in Nanjing under Japanese occupation and Chiang Kai-shek's government in Chongqing resisting Japanese aggression.Over 200 million Chinese faced difficult decisions in deciding whether to flee their hometowns during the war, or to stay under Japanese occupation and puppet regimes.Support the show with Buy me a Coffee: https://www.buymeacoffee.com/thechineserevolutionPlease visit https://chineserevolution.substack.com/And please enjoy the YouTube channel too! https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCCOjBYMNC_3xjQXKv6ab9YA?sub_confirmation=1 Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Building a Nation at War: Building a Nation at War: Transnational Knowledge Networks and the Development of China during and after World War II (Harvard UP, 2022) argues that the Chinese Nationalist government's retreat inland during the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), its consequent need for inland resources, and its participation in new scientific and technical relationships with the United States led to fundamental changes in how the Nationalists engaged with science and technology as tools to promote development. The war catalyzed an emphasis on applied sciences, comprehensive economic planning, and development of scientific and technical human resources—all of which served the Nationalists' immediate and long-term goals. It created an opportunity for the Nationalists to extend control over inland China and over education and industry. It also provided opportunities for China to mobilize transnational networks of Chinese-Americans, Chinese in America, and the American government and businesses. These groups provided technical advice, ran training programs, and helped the Nationalists acquire manufactured goods and tools. J. Megan Greene shows how the Nationalists worked these programs to their advantage, even in situations where their American counterparts clearly had the upper hand. Finally, this book shows how, although American advisers and diplomats criticized China for harboring resources rather than putting them into winning the war against Japan, US industrial consultants were also strongly motivated by postwar goals. J. Megan Greene is Professor of History at the University of Kansas. Her field of study is the history of the Republic of China under the KMT both in China and on Taiwan. She is also the author of The Origins of the Developmental State in Taiwan: Science Policy and the Quest for Modernization (Harvard University Press, 2008), a study of industrial science policy in China and Taiwan under the KMT. Li-Ping Chen is a teaching fellow in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Building a Nation at War: Building a Nation at War: Transnational Knowledge Networks and the Development of China during and after World War II (Harvard UP, 2022) argues that the Chinese Nationalist government's retreat inland during the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), its consequent need for inland resources, and its participation in new scientific and technical relationships with the United States led to fundamental changes in how the Nationalists engaged with science and technology as tools to promote development. The war catalyzed an emphasis on applied sciences, comprehensive economic planning, and development of scientific and technical human resources—all of which served the Nationalists' immediate and long-term goals. It created an opportunity for the Nationalists to extend control over inland China and over education and industry. It also provided opportunities for China to mobilize transnational networks of Chinese-Americans, Chinese in America, and the American government and businesses. These groups provided technical advice, ran training programs, and helped the Nationalists acquire manufactured goods and tools. J. Megan Greene shows how the Nationalists worked these programs to their advantage, even in situations where their American counterparts clearly had the upper hand. Finally, this book shows how, although American advisers and diplomats criticized China for harboring resources rather than putting them into winning the war against Japan, US industrial consultants were also strongly motivated by postwar goals. J. Megan Greene is Professor of History at the University of Kansas. Her field of study is the history of the Republic of China under the KMT both in China and on Taiwan. She is also the author of The Origins of the Developmental State in Taiwan: Science Policy and the Quest for Modernization (Harvard University Press, 2008), a study of industrial science policy in China and Taiwan under the KMT. Li-Ping Chen is a teaching fellow in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

Building a Nation at War: Building a Nation at War: Transnational Knowledge Networks and the Development of China during and after World War II (Harvard UP, 2022) argues that the Chinese Nationalist government's retreat inland during the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), its consequent need for inland resources, and its participation in new scientific and technical relationships with the United States led to fundamental changes in how the Nationalists engaged with science and technology as tools to promote development. The war catalyzed an emphasis on applied sciences, comprehensive economic planning, and development of scientific and technical human resources—all of which served the Nationalists' immediate and long-term goals. It created an opportunity for the Nationalists to extend control over inland China and over education and industry. It also provided opportunities for China to mobilize transnational networks of Chinese-Americans, Chinese in America, and the American government and businesses. These groups provided technical advice, ran training programs, and helped the Nationalists acquire manufactured goods and tools. J. Megan Greene shows how the Nationalists worked these programs to their advantage, even in situations where their American counterparts clearly had the upper hand. Finally, this book shows how, although American advisers and diplomats criticized China for harboring resources rather than putting them into winning the war against Japan, US industrial consultants were also strongly motivated by postwar goals. J. Megan Greene is Professor of History at the University of Kansas. Her field of study is the history of the Republic of China under the KMT both in China and on Taiwan. She is also the author of The Origins of the Developmental State in Taiwan: Science Policy and the Quest for Modernization (Harvard University Press, 2008), a study of industrial science policy in China and Taiwan under the KMT. Li-Ping Chen is a teaching fellow in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

Building a Nation at War: Building a Nation at War: Transnational Knowledge Networks and the Development of China during and after World War II (Harvard UP, 2022) argues that the Chinese Nationalist government's retreat inland during the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), its consequent need for inland resources, and its participation in new scientific and technical relationships with the United States led to fundamental changes in how the Nationalists engaged with science and technology as tools to promote development. The war catalyzed an emphasis on applied sciences, comprehensive economic planning, and development of scientific and technical human resources—all of which served the Nationalists' immediate and long-term goals. It created an opportunity for the Nationalists to extend control over inland China and over education and industry. It also provided opportunities for China to mobilize transnational networks of Chinese-Americans, Chinese in America, and the American government and businesses. These groups provided technical advice, ran training programs, and helped the Nationalists acquire manufactured goods and tools. J. Megan Greene shows how the Nationalists worked these programs to their advantage, even in situations where their American counterparts clearly had the upper hand. Finally, this book shows how, although American advisers and diplomats criticized China for harboring resources rather than putting them into winning the war against Japan, US industrial consultants were also strongly motivated by postwar goals. J. Megan Greene is Professor of History at the University of Kansas. Her field of study is the history of the Republic of China under the KMT both in China and on Taiwan. She is also the author of The Origins of the Developmental State in Taiwan: Science Policy and the Quest for Modernization (Harvard University Press, 2008), a study of industrial science policy in China and Taiwan under the KMT. Li-Ping Chen is a teaching fellow in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/asian-american-studies

Building a Nation at War: Building a Nation at War: Transnational Knowledge Networks and the Development of China during and after World War II (Harvard UP, 2022) argues that the Chinese Nationalist government's retreat inland during the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), its consequent need for inland resources, and its participation in new scientific and technical relationships with the United States led to fundamental changes in how the Nationalists engaged with science and technology as tools to promote development. The war catalyzed an emphasis on applied sciences, comprehensive economic planning, and development of scientific and technical human resources—all of which served the Nationalists' immediate and long-term goals. It created an opportunity for the Nationalists to extend control over inland China and over education and industry. It also provided opportunities for China to mobilize transnational networks of Chinese-Americans, Chinese in America, and the American government and businesses. These groups provided technical advice, ran training programs, and helped the Nationalists acquire manufactured goods and tools. J. Megan Greene shows how the Nationalists worked these programs to their advantage, even in situations where their American counterparts clearly had the upper hand. Finally, this book shows how, although American advisers and diplomats criticized China for harboring resources rather than putting them into winning the war against Japan, US industrial consultants were also strongly motivated by postwar goals. J. Megan Greene is Professor of History at the University of Kansas. Her field of study is the history of the Republic of China under the KMT both in China and on Taiwan. She is also the author of The Origins of the Developmental State in Taiwan: Science Policy and the Quest for Modernization (Harvard University Press, 2008), a study of industrial science policy in China and Taiwan under the KMT. Li-Ping Chen is a teaching fellow in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

Building a Nation at War: Building a Nation at War: Transnational Knowledge Networks and the Development of China during and after World War II (Harvard UP, 2022) argues that the Chinese Nationalist government's retreat inland during the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), its consequent need for inland resources, and its participation in new scientific and technical relationships with the United States led to fundamental changes in how the Nationalists engaged with science and technology as tools to promote development. The war catalyzed an emphasis on applied sciences, comprehensive economic planning, and development of scientific and technical human resources—all of which served the Nationalists' immediate and long-term goals. It created an opportunity for the Nationalists to extend control over inland China and over education and industry. It also provided opportunities for China to mobilize transnational networks of Chinese-Americans, Chinese in America, and the American government and businesses. These groups provided technical advice, ran training programs, and helped the Nationalists acquire manufactured goods and tools. J. Megan Greene shows how the Nationalists worked these programs to their advantage, even in situations where their American counterparts clearly had the upper hand. Finally, this book shows how, although American advisers and diplomats criticized China for harboring resources rather than putting them into winning the war against Japan, US industrial consultants were also strongly motivated by postwar goals. J. Megan Greene is Professor of History at the University of Kansas. Her field of study is the history of the Republic of China under the KMT both in China and on Taiwan. She is also the author of The Origins of the Developmental State in Taiwan: Science Policy and the Quest for Modernization (Harvard University Press, 2008), a study of industrial science policy in China and Taiwan under the KMT. Li-Ping Chen is a teaching fellow in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies

PREVIEW: #JAPAN: #PRC: Conversation with colleague Lance Gatling, of Nexial Research in Tokyo, re the PLA Navy's continued provocative activity around and through the Okinawa island chain toward the South China Sea - a critical waterway that the PRC must dominate in wartime. More later tonight. 1895 Sino-Japanese War soldiers.

Who's to blame for the attack on Pearl Harbor?This week, The Alarmist (Rebecca Delgado Smith) welcomes author and journalist Jess McHugh to discuss one of America's most epic historical tragedies, the attack on Pearl Harbor. They're joined by Fact Checker Chris Smith and Producer Clayton Early. What led up to this calculated and massively devastating attack and why didn't American forces see it coming? Did an American oil embargo have something to do with it? Could the second Sino Japanese War be to blame? Or will Hitler go to THe Alarmist Jail…again?! Time to find out Alarmy!Join our Patreon!We have merch!Join our Discord!Tell us who you think is to blame at http://thealarmistpodcast.comEmail us at thealarmistpodcast@gmail.comFollow us on Instagram @thealarmistpodcastFollow us on Twitter @alarmistThe Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/alarmist. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Indoctrinating the Youth: Secondary Education in Wartime China and Postwar Taiwan, 1937-1960 (U Hawaii Press, 2024) examines how the Guomindang (GMD or Nationalists) sought to maintain control of middle-school students and cultivate their political loyalty over the trajectory of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Chinese Civil War, and postwar Taiwan. During the Sino-Japanese War the Nationalists managed middle-school refugee students by merging schools, publishing and distributing updated textbooks, and assisting students as they migrated to the interior with their principals and teachers. In Taiwan, the China Youth Corps (CYC) became a symbol of the regime's successful establishment. Tracing Nationalist efforts to indoctrinate ideology and martial spirit, Jennifer Liu investigates how GMD leaders Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo tried to build support among young people in their efforts to stabilize Taiwanese society under their rule. By comparing two key youth organizations—the Three People's Principles Youth Corps in China, and the CYC on Taiwan—Liu uses education as a lens to analyze state-building in modern China. Liu's careful analysis of the inner workings of GMD youth organizations also illuminates the day-to-day operations of military training in gender-segregated upper-middle schools—including how the government selected instructors and the skills taught to students. According to Liu, mandatory military training contributed to preventing major protest against the government but the policy was not without critics. Intellectuals, parents, and students voiced their dissent at what they perceived as excessive control by a repressive government and a waste of resources interfering with academics. The government-mandated civics curriculum, including government-approved textbooks and standards, reveals the characteristics and duties GMD officials believed modern citizens of the next generation should possess. Through provisions for refugee students, youth organizations, military training, and civics classes, GMD secondary education policy played a critical role in the process of state building in both modern China and Taiwan. Skillfully combining archival work in Nanjing and Taipei, along with oral interviews with former students and CYC administrators, instructors, and members, Liu offers a unique perspective toward a balanced assessment of Nationalist Party rule. Jennifer Liu is associate professor of East Asian history at Central Michigan University. She specializes in the political and social history of twentieth-century China, particularly education, youth culture, studen​t protest, and ethnic identity. Li-Ping Chen is a teaching fellow in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Indoctrinating the Youth: Secondary Education in Wartime China and Postwar Taiwan, 1937-1960 (U Hawaii Press, 2024) examines how the Guomindang (GMD or Nationalists) sought to maintain control of middle-school students and cultivate their political loyalty over the trajectory of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Chinese Civil War, and postwar Taiwan. During the Sino-Japanese War the Nationalists managed middle-school refugee students by merging schools, publishing and distributing updated textbooks, and assisting students as they migrated to the interior with their principals and teachers. In Taiwan, the China Youth Corps (CYC) became a symbol of the regime's successful establishment. Tracing Nationalist efforts to indoctrinate ideology and martial spirit, Jennifer Liu investigates how GMD leaders Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo tried to build support among young people in their efforts to stabilize Taiwanese society under their rule. By comparing two key youth organizations—the Three People's Principles Youth Corps in China, and the CYC on Taiwan—Liu uses education as a lens to analyze state-building in modern China. Liu's careful analysis of the inner workings of GMD youth organizations also illuminates the day-to-day operations of military training in gender-segregated upper-middle schools—including how the government selected instructors and the skills taught to students. According to Liu, mandatory military training contributed to preventing major protest against the government but the policy was not without critics. Intellectuals, parents, and students voiced their dissent at what they perceived as excessive control by a repressive government and a waste of resources interfering with academics. The government-mandated civics curriculum, including government-approved textbooks and standards, reveals the characteristics and duties GMD officials believed modern citizens of the next generation should possess. Through provisions for refugee students, youth organizations, military training, and civics classes, GMD secondary education policy played a critical role in the process of state building in both modern China and Taiwan. Skillfully combining archival work in Nanjing and Taipei, along with oral interviews with former students and CYC administrators, instructors, and members, Liu offers a unique perspective toward a balanced assessment of Nationalist Party rule. Jennifer Liu is associate professor of East Asian history at Central Michigan University. She specializes in the political and social history of twentieth-century China, particularly education, youth culture, studen​t protest, and ethnic identity. Li-Ping Chen is a teaching fellow in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

Indoctrinating the Youth: Secondary Education in Wartime China and Postwar Taiwan, 1937-1960 (U Hawaii Press, 2024) examines how the Guomindang (GMD or Nationalists) sought to maintain control of middle-school students and cultivate their political loyalty over the trajectory of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Chinese Civil War, and postwar Taiwan. During the Sino-Japanese War the Nationalists managed middle-school refugee students by merging schools, publishing and distributing updated textbooks, and assisting students as they migrated to the interior with their principals and teachers. In Taiwan, the China Youth Corps (CYC) became a symbol of the regime's successful establishment. Tracing Nationalist efforts to indoctrinate ideology and martial spirit, Jennifer Liu investigates how GMD leaders Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo tried to build support among young people in their efforts to stabilize Taiwanese society under their rule. By comparing two key youth organizations—the Three People's Principles Youth Corps in China, and the CYC on Taiwan—Liu uses education as a lens to analyze state-building in modern China. Liu's careful analysis of the inner workings of GMD youth organizations also illuminates the day-to-day operations of military training in gender-segregated upper-middle schools—including how the government selected instructors and the skills taught to students. According to Liu, mandatory military training contributed to preventing major protest against the government but the policy was not without critics. Intellectuals, parents, and students voiced their dissent at what they perceived as excessive control by a repressive government and a waste of resources interfering with academics. The government-mandated civics curriculum, including government-approved textbooks and standards, reveals the characteristics and duties GMD officials believed modern citizens of the next generation should possess. Through provisions for refugee students, youth organizations, military training, and civics classes, GMD secondary education policy played a critical role in the process of state building in both modern China and Taiwan. Skillfully combining archival work in Nanjing and Taipei, along with oral interviews with former students and CYC administrators, instructors, and members, Liu offers a unique perspective toward a balanced assessment of Nationalist Party rule. Jennifer Liu is associate professor of East Asian history at Central Michigan University. She specializes in the political and social history of twentieth-century China, particularly education, youth culture, studen​t protest, and ethnic identity. Li-Ping Chen is a teaching fellow in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

Indoctrinating the Youth: Secondary Education in Wartime China and Postwar Taiwan, 1937-1960 (U Hawaii Press, 2024) examines how the Guomindang (GMD or Nationalists) sought to maintain control of middle-school students and cultivate their political loyalty over the trajectory of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Chinese Civil War, and postwar Taiwan. During the Sino-Japanese War the Nationalists managed middle-school refugee students by merging schools, publishing and distributing updated textbooks, and assisting students as they migrated to the interior with their principals and teachers. In Taiwan, the China Youth Corps (CYC) became a symbol of the regime's successful establishment. Tracing Nationalist efforts to indoctrinate ideology and martial spirit, Jennifer Liu investigates how GMD leaders Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo tried to build support among young people in their efforts to stabilize Taiwanese society under their rule. By comparing two key youth organizations—the Three People's Principles Youth Corps in China, and the CYC on Taiwan—Liu uses education as a lens to analyze state-building in modern China. Liu's careful analysis of the inner workings of GMD youth organizations also illuminates the day-to-day operations of military training in gender-segregated upper-middle schools—including how the government selected instructors and the skills taught to students. According to Liu, mandatory military training contributed to preventing major protest against the government but the policy was not without critics. Intellectuals, parents, and students voiced their dissent at what they perceived as excessive control by a repressive government and a waste of resources interfering with academics. The government-mandated civics curriculum, including government-approved textbooks and standards, reveals the characteristics and duties GMD officials believed modern citizens of the next generation should possess. Through provisions for refugee students, youth organizations, military training, and civics classes, GMD secondary education policy played a critical role in the process of state building in both modern China and Taiwan. Skillfully combining archival work in Nanjing and Taipei, along with oral interviews with former students and CYC administrators, instructors, and members, Liu offers a unique perspective toward a balanced assessment of Nationalist Party rule. Jennifer Liu is associate professor of East Asian history at Central Michigan University. She specializes in the political and social history of twentieth-century China, particularly education, youth culture, studen​t protest, and ethnic identity. Li-Ping Chen is a teaching fellow in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

This episode of History 102 features a follow up analysis of World War II focused on Japan, China, and the events located in the Pacific. WhatifAltHist creator Rudyard Lynch and Erik Torenberg discuss the build-up to the Pacific War, the geopolitical backdrop of Japan's militaristic expansion, and the cultural psyche that fueled its aggressive actions. Key points include Japan's transition to authoritarianism in the 1920s, its strategic ambitions in China leading to the Sino-Japanese War, and the critical battles and dynamics with other global powers including the USSR and the USA. The episode also explores the nuanced causes and justifications behind the Pacific War, Japan's wartime atrocities, and the decisive moments that led to Japan's surrender, including discussions around the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Tourism content in the episode includes the broader implications of WWII, the downfall of colonial empires, and the socio-political changes in post-war Japan.  – SPONSORS: BEEHIIV Head to Beehiiv, the newsletter platform built for growth, to power your own. Connect with premium brands, scale your audience, and deliver a beautiful UX that stands out in an inbox. 

Last time we spoke about the legendary battle of Tsushima. Admiral Rozhdestvenski traveled across the globe to bring the Baltic fleet to the Pacific to give a climactic fight to Admiral Togo's combined fleet. Yet during the journey, Port Arthur fell leaving the only destination to be Vladivostok and they would have to take a perilous journey through the Tsushima strait to get to her. Rozhdestvenski's grand journey meant his ships were ill maintained and the crews had no time for training. The Japanese meanwhile had trained vigorously and brought new technological advantages into the mix that would significantly tip the scale. The Russian baltic fleet was absolutely annihilated at a minimal lose for the IJN. The battle of Tsushima became one of the most famous naval battles in history and its decisive nature would become indoctrinated in the IJN until the end of WW2.    #84 The Russo-Japanese War part 11: The Portsmouth Treaty    Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. I have to start this podcast by repeating a funny little bit from this week. One of my bosses over at Kings and Generals suddenly messages me on discord and says “hey what's going on with the China Podcast, are we doing a series on the Russo-Japanese War now?” And to this I laughed, because he had a good point, I am sure there are a lot of you who were wondering….well why are we spending so much time on this, if the Fall and Rise of China podcast is ..well about China. The Russo-Japanese War would have a profound effect on China and global history. Something many forget, this entire war occurred within China, a nation not officially taking part in the conflict! Having a war break out between two other empires within your borders was an absolutely humiliating situation. China had just lost a war against the Russians in Manchuria. When the war broke out, China declared neutrality and asked both sides to not violate her territory, which both did without a care in the world. The Chinese did help the Japanese, especially the Honghuzi. Now the 1st Sino-Japanese War had left quite a foul taste in the mouth of the Chinese, but during the Russo-Japanese War some Pan-Asianim did develop. The Chinese public gradually began supporting the Japanese, there were quite a lot of youth in China demanding the Qing government allow them to enlist and help fight off the Russians. Countless Chinese helped with labor, working in a vast spy network and sold both sides provisions. When the Russians lost the battle of Tsushima and Mukden, there were many influential and future influential figures that celebrated this. Notably Mahatma Gandhi, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Jawaharlal Nehru and Sun Yat-Sen were deeply influenced by the Japanese victory. Why were they so influenced, because it was the first time a non-white nation had defeated a white one, and not just that, one of the great powers. The Russian Empire was in the public's mind, defeated handily by a small asiatic nation, it was a david and goliath story come true. Ironically, the Yellow Peril which Kaiser Wilhelm had utilized to usher in the war was turned up to 100 when the Japanese won.Now all that is fine and dandy, but there was another dramatic effect this war would hold over Japan and China. We technically have not spoken about “the end” of the Russo-Japanese War, there is actually another battle and the peace negotiations to discuss. It is here things will occur that will actually lay the groundwork for WW2. So now we are heading back into the story. The Japanese had won at Mukden and now at Tsushima, so that was that, they had won the war right? The Russians had taken up a new defensive position in northern Manchuria and were still being reinforced, 2 corps were enroute. In the war of attrition, the Russians would eventually win, despite having no naval ability, they would simply overwhelm the Japanese with numbers. Both nations faced bankruptcy, but the Russians were able to take larger loans from France and Germany, thus the situation was from a financial point of view more perilous for Japan. 53% of Japan's annual revenue had been devoted to the war effort. For Russia, the humiliation and financial ruin was accompanied by a full blown revolution. Thus both nations really needed the war to end and fast. Now comes in my favorite US president, Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt was one of the few at the offset of the war to place his bet on a Japanese victory. He also attempted to resolve the disputes between the two empires before the war broke out, often citing the Kaiser's Yellow Peril propaganda as being a main culprit to the hostilities. Roosevelt wrote to the British diplomat, Cecil Spring Rice that he believed Wilhelm should bear partial responsibility for the war "as he has done all he could to bring it about". Roosevelt is a fascinating figure. He was of course a product of his time, a 19th century man, he had views of white superiority, but demonstrated a certain tolerance towards nonwhites. This extended itself a lot towards the Japanese, there was a lot about the Japanese he admired. After the battle of Tsushima Roosevelt wrote “even the battle of Trafalgar could not match this. I grew so excited that I myself became almost like a Japanese, and I could not attend to official duties.” Roosevelt famously practiced judo with Japanese opponents and avidly read Nitobe Inazo's “Bushido”. Roosevelt was sent many books from his friend at Harvard, Kaneko Kentaro and wrote in appreciation “Perhaps I was most impressed by this little volume on Bushido. …It seems to me, my dear Baron, that Japan has much to teach to the nations of the Occident, just as she has something to learn from them. I have long felt that Japan's entrance into the circle of the great civilized powers was of good omen for all of the world.Certainly I myself, hope that I have learned not a little from what I have read of the fine Samurai spirit, and from the way in which that spirit has been and is being transformed to meet the needs of modern life.” In some ways perhaps you could call Roosevelt a Japanophile, but I would stress, like any white elites of the 19th century, he still had ingrained in him a sense that whites, notably white anglo saxons were the most civilized in the world.  It should come to no surprise, Roosevelt who publicly spoke well of the Japanese during the war, found the Japanese coming to him to help mediate the peace. Now as much as Roosevelt had openly favored the Japanese during the conflict, now there was a looming issue on the American president's mind. The Japanese were aggressively expanding in Asia and the Pacific, this was not something Roosevelt liked very much. After the fall of Port Arthur, Roosevelt wrote “if Japan tries to gain from her victory in the Russo-Japanese War more than she ought to have, she will array against her all the great powers, and however determined she may be she cannot successfully face an allied world”. Roosevelt was greatly troubled by the potential threat Japan posed against America's own increasing strength and influence in the asia-pacific. He would dispatch one General Arthur MacArthur, for you Pacific War week by week podcast listeners, yes I managed to bring MacArthur into this one. Arthur MacArthur was sent on a tour of the far east in 1905 and he was of course accompanied by his wife and a young Lt Douglas MacArthur who would go on to write ‘The purpose of our observations was to measure the strength of the Japanese Army and its method of warfare … But I had the uneasy feeling that the haughty, feudalistic samurai who were their leaders, were, through their victories, planting the seed of eventual Japanese conquest of the Orient.' No worries I am not going to turn this into a MacArthur rant. Roosevelt's agreed to act as a mediator before the battle of Tsushima. After the Tsushima victory, the Japanese expected they would receive large benefits from peace talks. They had good reason to believe so, Russia had lost on the land and sea, revolution was burning within the empire. Anarchists attacked the Tsar's uncle and brother in law, Grand Duke Serge Alexandroitich, the governor general of Moscow. Riots and anti-war demonstrations were widespread, violence was found in major Russian cities. From the Russian point of view, the Japanese had committed all her available manpower in the field, thus only mediation could save Japan from incoming disaster. In many ways it was a kind of race, who would run out of men first? Japan because she literally had a much smaller population, or would the Russian people simply overthrow the Tsar regime? Both regimes also were verging bankruptcy, whose dollar would run out first? Russia had not lost any of “her” territory, something Roosevelt was quick to point out to the Japanese. Thus Roosevelt was sort of winking at the Japanese that they should secure Russian territory so they had more bargaining power at the peace table, so the Japanese went to work. Japan and Russian had signed a treaty in 1875, the Treaty of Saint Petersburg that saw Japan ceding part of Sakhalin island to Russia in exchange for the Kuril islands. Now by the time of the Russo-Japanese war the population of Sakhalin was roughly 30,000 including 4000 Ainu. The island held a large prison and was used as a place for those Russia sought to exile. Overall it was not a very significant territory to the Russians. Its climate as you can imagine, was quite harsh, even by Russian standards. The Russians had a garrison of 7280 men on the island, the majority were conscripted farmers, hunters and prisoners with little in terms of training or equipment. They were led by General Mikhail Nikolaevich Lyapunov, who had been appointed military governor of Sakhalin in 1898. He had joined the military academy at the age of 16, but quickly found a talent in law, so he became a lawyer, while continuing his military career on the side. Thus the man was not particularly experienced in terms of war.  After the battle of Tsushima, the Japanese quickly wrangled together a force of 14,000 men for the brand new 13th IJA division led by General Haraguchi Kensai. Admiral Kataoka Shichiro assembled a naval force at Aomori Bay of 8 armored cruisers, 9 destroyers, 4 coastal defense ships and 12 torpedo boats to transport the division for an invasion of Sakhalin. The naval force departed on July 5th and landed in Aniwa Bay and near the port of Korsakov. They faced little opposition, a second group landed closer to Korsakov where they destroyed a battery of field artillery and defeated a small Russian force. The Japanese quickly advanced against Korsakov the next day, but the garrison of 2000 Russians led by Colonel Josef Arciszweski there had burned it to the ground. On July 8th the IJN force cleared Chitose Bay and on the 10th occupied Kindo Cape. Meanwhile the 13th division advanced north, taking the village of Vladimirovka. Colonel Arciszweski had dug to resist the Japanese, but his force was quickly outflanked and they withdrew into mountains within the interior of the island. By July 16th, Arciszweski surrendered his forces. Around 200 Russians were captured, the Japanese had suffered 18 deaths and 58 wounded. On the 17th 1905 General Lyapunov, through a representative, sent a message to General Kensai "Your Excellency! The lack of medicines and dressings and, as a result, the lack of the possibility of rendering assistance to the wounded, forced me to propose to Your Excellency to cease hostilities for purely humane reasons." General Haraguchi responded by demanding that General Lyapunov surrender all weapons and all movable and immovable state property that were intact, as well as the surrender of all maps, documents, papers related to the military department and administration. On the 19th General Lyapunov at his headquarters in the village of Onor gave the order: "The lack of food and firearms, as well as entrenching tools, the lack of sanitary facilities, the enormous numerical superiority of the Japanese army and the absence of a prepared path of retreat put us in such a situation when which further resistance would be useless bloodshed. In view of this, having received an offer from the commander of the Japanese army, which landed on the island, to surrender, I convened a military council, at which, to discuss the general situation...". On the 24th the Japanese landed in northern Sakhalin near Alexandrovsk-Sakhalinsky. The Russians had 5000 troops under the direct control of General Lyapunov. Lyapunov chose to flee the city with his forces and later surrendered seeing the Japanese capture 3200 men, 79 officers and General Lyapunov. He was the only Russian governor to surrender during the war. The Japanese would also capture another 1260 soldiers around Onor with a large stockpile of weapons, ammunition and food. After all was said and done, the battle for Sakhalin saw the Russians suffer 181 deaths, thousands taken prisoner. With that done with, the Japanese now had officially seized Russian territory. Alongside this the Japanese re-signed the Anglo-Japanese alliance for another 10 years and entered talks with the US regarding their positions over Korea and the Philippines. The Taft-Katsura agreement between William Howard Taft and Count Katsura Taro saw the US agree Japan should seek a protectorate over Korea, and Japan agreed the Philippines should be left under the good governance of the US. It should be noted this was all “a agreement” nothing was signed. In many ways it was a betrayal of Korea by the US, as the Americans and Koreans had signed an amity and commerce treaty in 1882, which the Koreans assumed was a mutual defense treaty. Regardless, the Japanese were securing their poker hand before heading into the negotiations. The peace negotiations were held at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. The Russian peace team was led by Sergius Witte who quickly stressed Russia had not been beaten and the war was very much still on. He also began privately complaining to all that it was his view the Japanese sought to gain as much loot from an agreement as possible. He was 100% correct in that assumption. Witte also made it clear, the Tsar's position in regards to Korea had not changed and that Russia would never pay a rouble in war indemnities. The Japanese were lead by Baron Komura, a harvard graduate. He came into the negotiations immediately demanding Korea was in the sphere of Japanese influence, that the Russians should depart Manchuria, the cession of Sakhalin, the granting of new fishing rights along the Russian coast, the spoils of war to be agreed upon and of course a fat sum of war indemnities. The teams had arrived on August 8th of 1905, and would stay at the Hotel Wentworth in New Castle. The actual negotiations took place at the General Stores Building, furnished with Mahogany furniture from the Cabinet Room of the White House. The conference was arranged so the most difficult parts would come last, namely, indemnities and Sakhalin. There were 12 sessions held between August 9th to the 30th. During the first 8 sessions, both sides reached an agreement on 8 points.  There should be an immediate ceasefire. The Russians would recognize  Japanese claims over Korea. The Russian forces would evacuate Manchuria.  Russia would cede its leases over Port Arthur and Dalien, the South Manchuria Railway and some mining concession, and Russia would retain the Chinese Eastern Railway in northern Manchuria. The next 4 points were much trickery.  On August the 15th the two vexed subjects were brought forth, Sakhalin and indemnity payments. It seemed the American public opinion over these issues had swung to the Russians. Witte, briefed by the Tsar stated there would be no payments for the return of Sakhalin and no indemnities, and stressed the Russians remained resolved to continue fighting. The Russians were very aware of Japan's financial distress and concluded that a demand for indemnity would be their most pressing concern. During the talks Roosevelt would later write ‘This (the indemnity) would never have been entertained by him, and he had calculated that the Peace Conference would break down on this point, and the struggle be continued until Japan could raise no more money.'On the issue Roosevelt intervened and advised the Japanese that if she did not abandon her claims for an indemnity, the world would come to believe the war had been fought for financial gain. Roosevelt on the 18th proposed dividing Sakhalin. Witte countered this on the 23rrd proposing Japan keep Sakhalin and drop her claims of indemnities. Komura rejected this proposal prompting Witte to warn him he was instructed to cease negotiations and resume the war. This ultimatum was met by 4 new Russian divisions arriving to Manchuria and Witte made a public display of literally showing everyone himself packing his bags preparing to leave. The Russians were convinced the Japanese could not afford to resume the war and were making a grand display to the Americans and Japanese that Russia would never agree to paying a single rouble. Komura was not in a good position and caved into the demands. The Japanese agreed in exchange for the southern half of Sakhalin they would drop their claims for indemnities. On September 5th, the treaty was signed, and ratified on the 10th of October in Japan, and the 14th for Russia. A random little side note, during the war Montenegro had declared war on Japan, but everyone kind of forgot about this and no mention of Montenegro was made in the treaty so technically Japan and Montenegro were at war until 2006 when Japan officially ended the war. Witte wrote to the New York Times about the treaty “The judgement of all observers here, whether pro-Japanese or pro-Russian, is that the victory is as astonishing a thing as ever was seen in diplomatic history. A nation hopelessly beaten in every battle of the war, one army captured and the other overwhelmingly routed, with a navy swept from the seas, dictated her own terms to the victory”. His rather bombastic claims were well warranted as the treaty signing had a profound effect on Japan. The Japanese public exploded. The over taxation for the war effort, the loss of so many sons and fathers had prompted the Japanese public to believe they were owed a lot. From the point of view of the Japanese public, the only news they received was endless victories over the lands and seas, they had no idea of the financial plight of their nation. When they heard the terms of the treaty, riots exploded. The most famous riots occurred in Hibiya Park in central Tokyo where activities and protesters assembled some 30,000 people strong. They marched upon the Imperial Palace grounds and rampaged the city for over 2 days. They especially targeted government buildings, the police, Russian property, but notably that of the US. From the publics view, Roosevelt and America had backstabbed them. Russian and American missionary churches were vandalized, martial law was erected. Over 350 buildings were damaged, 17 people were killed, 450 policemen, 48 firemen and civilians were injured. Prime Minister Katsura Taro's cabinet collapsed. While Roosevelt earned a nobel peace prize for his efforts, Japan's extremely positive view of America had dramatically soured. Its hard to picture it given the history of WW1 and WW2, but until this point America was kind of seen as a good big brother to Japan all things considered. The Japanese felt cheated of their rightful claims as victors of the war. Take this into consideration. During the 1st sino-Japanese War, Japan was denied her spoils by the triple intervention of France, Germany and Russia. During the Boxer Rebellion, the Russians used the situation to encroach into Manchuria, which Japan saw as a direct threat. Japan from her perspective won the Russo-Japanese War and now the US was stealing her spoils from her. From the Japanese perspective she deserved recognition as a great power and furthermore recognition as being racially equal. I wont delve to deeply into it, but after WW1, Japan would receive another similar and egregious wound when President Woodrow Wilson denied Japan's request to be recognized as racially equal to the other great powers. That would become the last straw, that drove Japan away from the west and towards WW2. But this is not a Japanese podcast haha, I apologize if I sometimes go in that direction its what I specialized in.  The Russo-Japanese War saw the Japanese suffer 58,000 to 86,000 deaths, for the Russians it was between 43,000 and 120,000. Of the casualties, the Japanese had lost perhaps 59,000 from combat, 27,000 from disease. For the Russians 34-53,000 died from combat and 9-19,000 from disease with another 75,000 captured. And let us not forget the Chinese who would see 20,000 civilian deaths and a financial loss of over 69 million taels. While the Japanese treated the tens of thousands of Russian prisoners extremely well considering what POW treatment would look like during WW1 and WW2, the treatment of Chinese was abysmal. The war between Russia and Japan occurred on Chinese soil, but China was powerless to prevent it and suffered human and financial loss. This added to the Chinese public's sense of humiliation. Alongside this, the treaty of Portsmouth basically started an annexation process of Korea to Japan, but it also handed a ton of privileges and extraterritorial rule over to Japan. Now Japan had her feet firmly set in Manchuria, weakening Qing rule. If you were part of the elites in the Qing dynasty and your responsibility was to improve the empire, it seems investigating how Japan beat Russia should be on top of your list of “to do's”.  Indeed, as we spoke a lot about during the 1st sino japanese war, Japan and China took different paths to modernization in the face of western imperialism. Japan did not defeat Russia solely because of the modernization of her army, Japan had thoroughly organized and prepared her populace for modern politics, military, economic, social and culture….while China struggled behind. China needed to emulate certain aspects, like Japan had to strengthen herself. When Japan and Russia signed the treaty of Portsmouth they were exchanging benefits and many of these were not theirs to take or give, but rather Chinas! Imagine you were a subject of the Qing dynasty living in Manchuria where your home may have been destroyed, perhaps you lost loved ones to the conflict, what did your government do? Nothing. It was a watershed moment for the common people of China, their government did absolutely nothing in the face of all of it. The intellectual class of China was enraged and invigorated by it all. There was this tremendous sense they as a people needed to improve in terms of politics, military, societal, economic, education and culture, China needed to actually modernize. The Qing dynasty was being seen by many as decrepit, too old and stuck in its ways.   In the historical context China was entering the “late Qing reforms” or “new policies” period. This actually began in 1901, but I believed it was very important to get the Russo-Japanese War story into the mix before I dabbled into this very complex part of modern Chinese history. The Qing dynasty is soon coming to its end. Stating all of that I thought it would be a cool time to do a bit of housekeeping. You Mr or Mrs listener, I'd love to hear from you. As you likely know I write and narrate the two podcast Pacific War week by week and the Fall and Rise of China Podcast's for Kings and Generals. However, I also happen to be a Youtuber, and Podcaster on the side. I have the Pacific War Channel where you can find content about the history of Asia from the 1830's until the end of the Pacific war in 1945, in many ways its like this podcast. I also awkwardly have a podcast platform called “the pacific war channel”, and as you can imagine its a bit directionless since …well lets be honest its redundant given these two podcasts I do. I have been trying to think about how to change that podcast around and I would love to hear from you guys. Best way to give feedback, toss comments on my Youtube channel, or join my Pacific War Channel discord, found on my Youtube channel page. I have a few idea's myself, perhaps doing a more general history focused podcast where I tell stories just like the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, but my god in much short series haha, let's say in 3 parters and such. Or I could do an entire other podcast series on The Rise and Fall of Japan, see what I did there with the titles? Yeah that ones been in the back on my mind for awhile. I could also take on a co-pilot for the podcasts so its not only single narration, similar to Tom Holland's “the rest is history”. There's a ton of directions I can go in, but one thing is for sure, the “Pacific War Channel Podcast” needs a new direction, probably a new name as well.  Also and I know its annoying, but a big thank you to all of you who check out the Pacific War channel on Youtube and my Patreon where I make monthly patreon exclusive podcasts. I would love to go full time one day, but alas the Youtube game is a hard one. If you get the chance please check out my Youtube channel, I am now as we speak unleashing a multiple part series on the Japanese invasion of Manchuria 1931-1932, something barely anyone covers. Most historians give it about a few paragraphs, but it was quite a complicated event. I am trying to tackle the 15 year war between Japan and China from 1931-1945 in a chronological order, event by event and such. Stating all of that I love all you guys, and here comes the same outro I do every single time haha. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. One Empire has Risen like a bright Sun as another, tumbles down like a large bear. Asia henceforth will completely change, now the Japanese dominate the landscape. Yet what of China? How will the common Chinese take to this latest round of humiliation? The Qing dynasty is hanging by a thread and that thread is about to be cut. 

4/8: Road to Surrender: Three Men and the Countdown to the End of World War II Hardcover – May 16, 2023 by  Evan Thomas  (Author) 1940 Sino-Japanese War

Last time we spoke about the Russian counter offensive at Telissu. Kuropatkin sought to maintain a defensive posture and wait for reinforcements before launching offensives, but his superiors forced him to perform a hopeless attempt to rescue Port Arthur. With multiple Japanese armies on the move, Kuropatkin could not send the appropriate numbers necessary to relieve the city, and this led to utter disaster. Lt General Stakelberg was given the unfortunate job of advancing southwest to Prot Arthur and would end up running into the Japanese around Telissu. Despite being able to fortify the position and taking up a defensive posture, the battle would prove disastrous for the Russians. Everything was going quite well until the Japanese snuck upon the Russian right flank which buckled and opened the door to a rout. Stakelberg courageously led a counter attack to try and salvage the battle, but it was lost and with it the rescue of Port Arthur.   #78 The Russo-Japanese War part 5: The Japanese advance to Liaoyang    Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After the battle of Telissu General Oku's 2nd IJA rested for four days. While this was going on, the remainder of the 6th division arrived to Oku's command. Meanwhile there was no rest for the Stakelberg's men. The Russians overestimated the 4th IJA's strength and now Stakelberg was receiving orders to occupy Kaiping to make sure the 10th IJA division could not threaten it. The battered men were not to happy to be tossed into another melting pot again. Their rearguard was provided by Lt General Simonov, but he became gravely ill and had to hand over command to Major General Samsonov. By June 20th, the 1st Siberian army corps took their new position at Kaiping. Despite the Russian losses, there was a lot of international criticism aimed at the Japanese. For all of their victories, they kept allowing the Russian forces to get away, they never pursued them too heavily. All four Japanese armies were experiencing supply issues. For example Oku's 2nd IJA were supplied via Pulantien which was being rocked around by monsoons. Over at Dalny, the Russians had abandoned countless railway wagons, but had the good sense to remove their engines at least. The Japanese had a quick answer to this, they bought some engines from America, however the naval squadron at Vladivostok made a raid and managed to intercept two steamers carrying the engines over, now they sat at the bottom of the sea. This greatly delayed some heavy siege artillery for Nogi's 3rd IJA to hit Port Arthur.  Regardless of the logistics hiccups, three Japanese armies still had to coordinate their advance upon Liaoyang. They needed to concentrate their efforts to exert a constant pressure on the Russians to thwart them consolidating properly. To gain access to the Liao valley, the Japanese were forced to go through the passes of Taling, Fenshuling and Motienling. Kuropatkin gave the job of blocking these areas to General Count Keller, who was seizing command of the Russian Eastern Force from the disgraced Zasulich from the Yalu disaster. Keller would have 25,000 men guarding the Motien Pass lying astride the Liaoyang and Antung roads. Keller was an intelligent and brave soldier, he had worked under Kuropatkin for quite some time. He was loyal to Kuropatkin, in truth they were quite good friends. Keller began to study the Japanese actions and he noticed they were extremely similar to what they had done during the Sino-Japanese War. Thus given history was to repeat itself as they say, he predicted the three Japanese armies would converge at Haicheng as they had done 10 years prior. Kuropatkin agreed with his friend's prediction and set about building up a force at Haicheng with the view it would stop the advance of the 2nd or 4th IJA.  Kuropatkin at this stage began making a bit of a mess of troop deployment and movements. He became obsessed multiple places would be hit by the Japanese and real or imaginary tried to plug said gaps in his greater manchurian defensive line. He dispatched a brigade of the 5th infantry division of Stakelberg's force to hold a position at Tashihchiao and this would affect an upcoming battle. Now Keller over at the Motien pass was already weakened, because he had forces under him taken to help at the Telissu battle. Now he was receiving orders to release two more regiments to strengthen Haicheng. Kuropatkin then believed Kuroki's 1st IJA were about to advance up Fenghuangcheng, so he ordered Keller to advance his force there to block against them. Likewise General Rennenkampf stationed at Saimachi was ordered to take his 5000 cavalry force and block Kuroki's advance at Aiyangcheng.  Keller gathered 7 and a half battalions and began his advance against Kuroki. In 36 hours his men traveled over 40 miles, they became exhausted. They were 10 miles within reach of Fenghuangcheng and not a single Japanese had been seen. Keller and his men waited awhile, then ultimately pulled back to Motienpass by June 18th. General Kashtalinski made a report of these actions to a German military observer, Von Tettau stating “all that was achieved by this action was the ruination of 8000 pairs of boots, an item we are in short supply”. On June 19th, the Japanese scouts gave word of Rennenkampfs advance against Aiyangcheng. Thus the Japanese reinforced their detachment from Fenghuangcheng over to Aiyangcheng to make a defense. Yes, it turned out when Keller advanced he stopped 10 miles away from Fenghuangcheng not bothering to check the city to see if the Japanese were there. As a result Rennenkampf launched a failed attack against Aiyangcheng on June 22nd and was easily driven off. Kuroki could have made more of these two locations and given real battle, but he chose to hold back, his attention was drawn securing the railway line to his favored target, the Motienpass.  The 1st and 4th IJA received orders on the 19th and 22nd to advance. General Kawamura with the 4th would hit the Fenshuiling pass, defended by a Russian brigade. Kuroki believed the 2nd IJA would hit Kaiping around the same time, so he planned to hit the Motienpass in unison. General Oku's advanced had stalled somewhat on June 21st around Hsiungyaocheng where he was forced to make camp and await supplies. He would remain there until July 6th as the Japanese were trying to solve numerous logistical issues. Railway carts from Pulantien heading for Telissu were improved upon, Chinese coolies were hired en masse for the job. The logistical situation did improve, but what would really make a difference was the seizure of Port Arthur that held all the facilities, equipment and railway functions necessary to send large loads.  Speaking of Port Arthur the new Admiral Witgeft was under pressure from Alexeiev and by proxy the Tsar to break out of the harbor and try to join up with the Vladivostok squadron. On June 20th there was a proposed departure for the fleet, everything was ready to go, then disaster struck. The editor of Bezobrazov's “Novoe Krai” published a special edition literally announcing the departure that very day. Witgeft was forced to abandon the break out attempt to the dismay of the sailors eager to get out of the harbor as it looked like Port Arthur was going to face a siege soon. On June 23rd the fleet did depart, traveling carefully through the mine fields. Then at 6pm the IJN warships appeared over the horizon. The Russians saw the IJN Chinyen who was patrolling the Korean straits. Witgeft believed the entire combined fleet must be in the vicinity, but in truth Togo had dispatched 8 cruisers to hit the Vladivostok squadron who downed their two steamers back on the 15th. Togo received word from the Chinyen that the Tsarevitch and Retvizan were amongst the Russian ships. Togo was shocked the two battleships were repaired and out in the open sea, the Russians held a 6-4 advantage for larger ships. The IJN still held superior numbers with 53 ships vs Witgefts 18 however. By dusk the two opposing fleets began sailing parallel from another at a course of 18 miles. It was to be a moonlit evening, fit for battle. Despite the moonlit the advantage was to be had by torpedoes rather than naval gunfire, something the IJN would become specialists at during WW2. The Japanese had much more destroyers and torpedo boats and thus held a distinct advantage. Togo steered his flagship Mikasa towards the Russian line. Witgeft lost nerve and ordered the fleet to turn to starboard trying to make a return to Port Arthur and the security of her shore batteries. Upon seeing the Russians turning, Togo ordered his destroyers and torpedo boats to launch attacks upon their own attrition, rather than risking his battleships. In retrospect, Witgeft should have given battle and done as much damage as possible to the IJN battleships, given what would occur later at Port Arthur. But that is of course retrospect, maintaining the Pacific fleet in the hopes they could join the incoming baltic fleet was the winning idea of the day. The Russian fleet made a orderly retreat to Port Arthur trying to take it slow lest they hit mines. Only the Sevastopol would run into a mine, no other Russian warships were significantly damaged by naval gunfire or torpedoes. As for the IJN smaller warships, 5 of them took some hits from shore batteries, but no one sank. While it did not look like a significant engagement, it was another blow to the morale of the Russian navy and Togo had yet again managed to bottle up the Russians.  On June the 24th a rather strange order was issued from the IJA general HQ to all units “The fact has been proved that the Russian fleet is able to issue from the harbour of Port Arthur. The transport of provisions which will be required by the combined Manchurian Armies after their arrival at Liaoyang is therefore rendered uncertain, and it is not advisable for the Second Army to advance further north than Kaiping for the present. The battle of Liaoyang, which it was anticipated would be fought before the rainy season, will now be postponed till after it. Arrange your operations accordingly.” Why was this a rather strange order? It was inconceivable for the 2nd IJA to be permitted to advance to Kaiping while the 1st and 4th IJA's had not yet broken through the Fenshuiling and Motien passes. The message thus spelt the doom of the 2nd IJA if the Russians were to find out and concentrate their forces against it. But was the order sent to the Japanese or perhaps was it a ruse for the Russians. The Japanese units uncharacteristically ignored the order, thus one would be led to believe it was a ruse. The actually Japanese plans were for the mountain passes to be secured prior to Oku closing in on the main russian forces. The supposed fake message was the contrary and exactly how the war went in 1894. Kuropatkin ended up taking forces away from the Motien pass to cover the supposed Oku advance. On June 26th Keller forfeited yet another regiment over to Haicheng and Kuropatkin went there himself that day. Thus on the 26 Haicheng held around 41 battalions and 18 cavalry squadrons.  Meanwhile the 4th IJA advanced upon Fenshuiling where the road descends to Haicheng and Tashishchiao astride the railway. The pass held high pine filled mountains to its north and less steep hills to its south with tracks running parallel in a main approach. On the pass the Russians deployed three infantry regiments, three batteries and a cossack battery. West of them was General Mishchenko with his Cossack brigade plus an infantry regiment. On the night of the 25th the Japanese advanced along an unguarded path trying to hook around the rear of the Russian right flank. They had with them some Maxim machine guns and mountain artillery pieces. Another group of Japanese took off their regulation boots and wore Japanese straw sandals to scale the northern face on the mountains undetected to get around the Russian left flank. It took both these detachments a day to maneuver. Altogether the plan was to hit the Russians on the morning of the 27th. At 5:15am on the 27th the battle commenced with an artillery duel. The Russians had camouflaged their guns using trees. The Japanese frontal assault suffered heavily and by 7am slowed down nearly to a halt. But it was just then when their left and right hooking detachments unleashed their fire power from the hilltops. The Russians were being hit from every angle and were quickly forces to pull back by 8am. As the Russian artillery began to move the Japanese pushed their frontal assault now enjoying better artillery support. By 10am the Russians were overwhelmed and retreating towards Hsimucheng. Their retreat left Mishchenko's left exposed. Mishchenko attempted a counter attack, but by 7pm was likewise retreating.  The Japanese were able with ease to outmaneuver the Fenshuiling pass, but the Motien pass was another matter entirely. Try to imagine Thermopylae, a very narrow pass that a smaller force could guard with ease, it did not offer any flanking opportunities. Yet all the meddling by Kuropatkin to aid the theoretical attack upon Haicheng depleted Keller of men. Russian morale was at an all time low, man of the soldiers were utterly confused by their superiors orders. An account from the 12th east siberian rifle regiment over the two week period had this to say “This regiment had been ordered to Anshanchan on 15 June, but on reaching that place had been at once sent back to Count Keller. On the 26th it received orders to move to Tawan; but while on the march it received another order to retrace its steps and, at 1 a.m. on the 27th, reached the camp at Chinerhtun which it had left the previous morning. There it was met by an order from General Kuropatkin directing it to march at once to Haicheng. Leaving camp again at 4 a.m. on the 27th, it reached Haicheng on the 28th only to find it was to move next day to Liaoyang, this time by rail. Arriving there on the 30th, orders were again received to rejoin Count Keller'. As formidable as the Motien Pass was, to the utter shock of the Japanese on June the 30th, they captured it unopposed, the Russians had abandoned the position. A few days before, the 9th east siberian rifle regiment had been taken away from Keller to help out at Haicheng and it seems this caused such a state of indecision, alongside the capture of the Fengshuiling pass, Keller opted to pull back. The rain continued to fall from June 27th to July 5th making movement along the roads a nightmare for carts. Kurokis 1st IJA were suffering from logistical problems, he was forced to put the 12th division on half rations. If the rain persisted for more than 48 hours Kuroki would have had to retire his force to Fenghuangcheng, but the rain came to a temporary stop. When the rain ceased both sides went to work sending scouts to see what the other side was doing. The Russians could not figure out what the Japanese were going to do next, would they try to maneuver around their left flank or perhaps cut westward to the railway? On July 4th a reconnaissance in force was launched against Motienling by three battalions and it was easily repulsed. Meanwhile the Japanese were receiving intelligence from their Chinese spies amongst the Russians who reported the Russians had taken positions on some reverse slopes north of Motienling.  Now July 6th was the date set by the IJA general HQ for the advance of the three armies. General Oku led his four divisions northward and by midday on the 7th was in the vicinity of Kaiping, experiencing little to no opposition along the way. Oku's scouts reported that Kaiping was garrisoned by Stakelberg's 1st siberian corps while due north at Tashihciao, Lt General Zarubaiev's 4th Siberian corps were in the process of reinforcing its garrison. Just above the city of Kaiping was a semicircle of hills dominating a flat open field. On these hills were 20,000 men ready to fire upon the incoming Japanese. Oku was very cautious having his men advance with their artillery placed into combat positions to hit Kaiping around 5:30am on the 9th of July. Stakelberg viewed the Japanese advance to Kaiping and feared an envelopment maneuver, so he withdrew the forces. Thus his semicircle hill position was captured by Oku's 2nd IJA without a fight and they would dig in and remain there until 22nd of July. During their time on the hill they went to work improving the road, rail and sea lanes to establish better supply lines that could maintain Oku's advance. Alexeiev had been pretty quiet for awhile, but in the face of all the territory loss he yet again began meddling. He instructed Kuropatkin that he should take offensive actions to block the advance of the 2nd and 4th IJA and push back the 1st IJA all the way back into Korea. Kuropatkin obviously thought this was folly and wanted to await further reinforcements, in particular the incoming 7th corps. Kuropatkin believed the Japanese strength was twice what it actually was, ironically Alexeiev would have a much more accurate idea of their numbers. Kuropatkin was not 100% against offensive actions however, he did favor Alexeiev's idea to engage the 1st IJA, but certainly not the multiple offensives against separate Japanese armies. Alexeiev persisted to place pressure on Kuropatkin and against his better judgment he gave orders for Keller to perform a partial offensive against the Motien pass. Kuropatkin proposed Kellers Eastern Force of 40 battalions would attack what was nearly 80 battalions of Kuroki's 1st IJA, while 97 battalions of the Russian southern force were ordered to withdraw if the 2nd and 4th IJA attacked who represented a combined for of around 90 battalions. You can see the fallacy in this. A large reason Kuropatkin gave such orders to Keller was because Keller was continuously requesting permission to retake Motienling. Keller received some reinforcements from the 9th division and had his force advance in three columns up the roads. As remarked by Kuropatkin of the small offensive “Taking into consideration the considerable increase of the Eastern Force, I ordered Count Keller to take the offensive, so as to again get possession of the passes. He did so, but although he had forty battalions under his command, he advanced with only twenty-four.'  During the night of July 16th the Russians advanced upon Japanese positions that had full telephone and alarm coverage. At 8am the Russians made a frontal assault out in the open and were absolutely cut down by Japanese artillery. The Russians artillery was not even able to help support the attack until 2:10pm whereupon their infantry were already withdrawing. Two other Russian columns advanced and met similar fates. Keller had kept one quarter of his forces in reserve. A british military observer, General Hamilton witnessed the battle and remarked the Russians were still utilizing section volley fire. It seemed to Hamilton they had no idea of the use and value of cover and that their officers led them with undue risks. He did praise their efforts at withdrawing but left the remark “It is passing strange that soldiers so steady and formidable in retreat should be so sticky in the attack”. After their loss, Keller had his men dig in a bit further north around Tawan which lies astride the Fenghuangchang-Liaoyang road. Kuroki was emboldened by the easy victories and sent the 12th division against the smaller twon of Chiaotou, hoping to use it as a springboard for a possible attack against the Russian lines of communication to Mukden. The garrison at Chiaotou was a brigade group of the 10th corps who were subjected to having their right flank attacked on july the 18th and 19th. The Russians were quickly forced to withdraw up the Liaoyang road. Rennenkampf was with his cavalry unit 25 miles due east and tried to assist them but received a wound to his thigh on the 13th and had to hand over command to General Liubavin. Liubavin dragged his feet around on the issue ultimately doing nothing to help. With the loss of Chiaotou, the rest of the 1st IJA were now advancing and this directly threatened Penshihu which lay along the railway line between Liaoyang and Mukden. Kuropatkin ordered the 10th corp to retake Chiaotou while Keller was to hold out at Tawan. Meanwhile Kuropatkin and Alexeiev continued to argue about strategy. With no real navy to administer, Alexeiev focused on the land war and was even planning the formation of two armies he would lead himself, placing Kuropatkin in command of one of them subordinate to him. You really have to be baffled by this, Alexeiev was an admiral, this was lunacy. Kuropatkin and Alexeiev met at Mukden on July 20th whereupon Alexeiev unfolded his plans to reinforce the Eastern Force who was to engage Kuroki. Kuropatkin remained unconvinced, but obedient nonetheless as he departed for Liaoyang where he publicly announced his intention to resume the offensive. The 10th and 17th corps were handed over to the Eastern Force while the 2nd IJA resumed their advance northwards, edging closer to the Eastern Force. By July 23rd Oku's intelligence indicated the enemy force was roughly 4 divisions strong and had defensive lines going 10 miles long to towards the south part of Tashihciao. Tashihciao was strategically important because it sat on the junction of the main and secondary lines of the railway leading to the port city of Yingkou. Taking such a junction would greatly benefit the Japanese logistics. Oku cautiously approached as the 1st and 4th IJA were still occupying the mountains. Oku had his men approach in an extended line going 12 miles with his cavalry brigade screening his left flank. On his right flank was the 5th division followed by the 3rd, 6th and 4th to the extreme left. The Japanese advanced within 5 miles of the southern Russian lines.  Kuropatkin had personally selected Tashihciao and had it fortified heavily. Stakelberg's 1st Siberian army corp had fallen back to join up with Lt General Zarubaiev's 4th Siberian army corp, Zarubaiev would have overall command. Zarubaiev was given orders to withdraw to Haicheng if pressed upon by the enemy, yet again you can sense the defeatist mentality amongst the Russian commanders. Stakelberg took the right flank, Zarubaiev the left. Stakelergs sector rested along the railway and to his flank was General Kossogovski's cavalry brigade, Kossogovski had taken command of the brigade from Samsonov. Zarubaievs sector was along the Tungta river with General Mishchenkos cavalry watching his flank. The Russians had a general reserve of 10 battalions and 16 artillery pieces along the center towards the left in two groupings. The left area was full of hills and ravines, while the right was low flat ground. The Russians had learnt some lessons from their defeats and made sure to have outposts on high grounds to be able to track Japanese movements.  Oku chose to advance along some fields of Kaoliang, providing some concealment, but not nearly enough to hide most of his forces advance. Oku's intelligence indicated turning either flanks of the Russians would not be easy this time around. An attempt to divert forces against either flank might expose the Japanese lines of communication and spell a disastrous counter attack upon them. Oku decided not to risk anything, he ordered the 5th, 3rd and 6th divisions to launch a frontal assault on July 24th. He believed the 4th IJA's movements would be on the Russians minds giving him an edge. Oku's 4th division was held back on the left flank, expected to act against possible counter strokes. The 4th divisions orders were ‘take up a position near Wutaishan and will hold it in strength as a protection for the left flank of the army. No advance will be made therefrom until it is observed that the general attack elsewhere is succeeding.' Along the far left was the cavalry screen and two infantry regiments held in reserve.  After the Russo-Japanese war Zarubaeiv would go on the record during a Russian staff debriefing, to state he was attacked by both the 2nd and 4th IJA at the battle of Tashihciao. It seems likely the Russians had misidentified the strength of the divisions facing them. The 4th and 6th IJA divisions were correctly identified, but the 3rd and 5th divisions in the hills it seems led the Russians to believe were only a single division and thus the confusion arrived with their movement. Alongside this General Mishchenko had apparently reported to Zarubaiev that the 10th IJA division were in the vicinity. During the early light of the 24th, the Russians saw three Japanese divisions advancing in a line. The 4 divisions was holding back as ordered and by 5:30am the Japanese artillery began to fire. The Russian left flank began an artillery duel while in the center the IJA 6th division performed what seemed to be a halfhearted assault. By midday the sun was intense and the Russian red cross found themselves extremely busy with cases of sunstroke. At 1pm Stakelberg dispatched an aide over to Zarubaiev, suggesting they should withdraw. Stakelberg stated it was his belief the Japanese main attack was about to hit and if the troops were in the forward trenches they would be met with extremely heavy casualties. He also reminded Zarubaiev, it was not Kuropatkins plan of the campaign to make a firm stand at Tashihciao. No Stakelbergs aid arrived to Zarubaiev's HQ at the exact same time Zarubaeiv received a report from Zasulich that the 4th IJA were on the move. Zarubaiev was concerned, but not enough to order a withdrawal right away, especially when the sun was blazing at 100 degrees invited disaster for marching. Instead he sent a message back to Stakelberg simply stating he would consider withdrawing by nightfall.  In reality, Stakelberg was greatly overreacting. By 2pm 12 of the 12 Japanese batteries opposing his corps were assigned counter battery operations against two of his batteries beyond the hill line. At 3pm a reinforcement Russian battery joined up with them and combined were keeping the Japanese infantry at bay well into nightfall. The Japanese were taking heavy losses. Meanwhile back at 10:30am the 4th IJA division had advanced while skirmishing with Russian cavalry. At 1pm General Kossagovski performed a halfhearted attack against the Japanese left flank. His men fought with the Japanese 1st cavalry brigade who sent them packing north. Kossagovski reported the grounds too muddy for cavalry actions, but asserted he had effectively drawn the Japanese attention to his sector. At 8pm, Zarubaeiv decided to launch a counter attack upon the left flank given this information. Oku released one of his two reserve regiments to fill a gap that was emerging between his 4th and 6th divisions. Meanwhile the 3rd and 5th IJA divisions were trying to hit a weak point along the Russian line in the center. The 4th corps tossed 72 guns of which 32 were the new quick firing model against the 12 batteries supporting the Japanese. The Japanese were gravely outgunned in rate of fire and range.  Just before noon, Zarubaeiv ordered a counter attack. General Shileiko whose position was on the extreme left of the Russian line was to hit the flank of the 5th IJA division. He was also ordered to confer with Mishchenko and the commander of the general reserve. Mishchenko agreed to release cavalry units to Shileiko's command but the commander of the general reserve refused to relinquish any of his units stating he had not received any orders to do so. The results was Shileiko's vanguard being torn to pieces, while Mishchenkos cavalry units stayed safely away on the periphery before withdrawing. The counter attack was an abysmal failure. At 2pm Oku ordered his right flank divisions to press home their attack with or without artillery support. At 3:30pm the Japanese advanced in the face of terrifying Russian artillery. The 5th IJA division were battered and based the job to the 3rd division to keep moving forward. A Japanese battalion managed to seize a key Russian feature, but were quickly met with a counterattack that dislodged them. The 3rd divisions sector continued to perform intense fighting, but alongside the heat both sides were succumbing to inactivity. Stakelberg's artillerymen were holding the Japanese at bay, effectively forcing the 2nd IJA to a grinding halt. The Russians still held 6 battalions in reserve while the Japanese held only 1.  The commander of the 5th IJA division was embarrassed by his men's performance and requested Oku allow him to launch a night attack, Oku agreed. At 10pm the 5th division surged across the valley and over some slopes screaming banzai taking the Russians by surprise. The Japanese were able to seize forward positions as the entire 5th division crashed along the front. By early afternoon on the 25th, the Russian position was in Japanese hands, the Russians rearguards were the only ones putting up a fight. Apparently the commanding Russian officer deemed it impossible to recapture the 10 mile front position and ordered a withdrawal. It's hard to find real numbers on this incredible action, but it is assumed both sides took 1000 casualties each. The taking of this position effectively drove a wedge in the Russian lines and Zarubaeiv decided to order a withdrawal, Kuropatkin gave his support to the decision.  The two Russian corps now withdrew to Haicheng as Oku's army captured Tashihciao and stayed there until August 1st. The withdrawal left General Zasulich in an exposed position at Hsimucheng. Zasulich ordered his rearguards to protect their flanks which were being harassed by the 2nd IJA. Meanwhile the 5th IJA division was transferred to General Nozu's 4th IJA. Mishchenkos cavalry joined Zasulich giving the 2nd Siberian corps + a brigade of the 10th corps a total of 33 battalions, 31 squadrons and 80 artillery pieces. Nozu now commanded the 5th, 10th and 4th divisions along with the 10th Kobi brigade. Nozu's ordered were to attack the Russians whenever possible, so he looked at Hsimucheng as a viable target.  At 2am on July 30th, the 10th division and reserve brigade advanced frontally against the Russian position at Hsimucheng while the 5th division hooked around the left of the Russians trying to cut off their line of retreat. The terrain was rocky and mountainous, not easy to fortify, thus the Russian defensive lines were not great. On the 31st the Japanese main attack hit the right side of the Russian position. Mishchenko's cavalry and the 4th siberian corp rearguards began withdrawing, but Zasulichs main force held tight, bravely tossing counter attacks against the larger Japanese army. The 5th IJA division advanced upon the Russian right, joined by a detachment from the 3rd IJA division sent over by Oku. Zasulich's men held until 11pm when orders from Kuropatkin came to withdraw to Haicheng. Yet again the Russians were retreating. At the battle of Hsimucheng the Russians took 1550 casualties and the Japanese 836. The battle of Hsimucheng also coincided with two other battles. The Russians had mobilized to regain the small town of Chiatou on July 24th and made an advance along the Lan river. The Russian 10th corp, less one brigade under General sluchevski took the lead while General Liubavin took some cavalry to guard the road to Mukden. Now the 10th corps were a European corps and there was great expectation they would walk over the Japanese. After news hit that the men were withdrawing from Tashihciao, Kuropatkin had rushed over to Liaoyang, but just prior ordered Sluchevski the same type of orders he gave Stakelberg at Telissu. The 10th corps divided itself into a vanguard, main body, left and right flank guards and advanced upon the isolated 2nd IJA right flank occupied by the 12th division. By July 30th both sides were grinding to a halt, artillery were dueling it out. 15 miles away were Keller's two divisions dug in behind the lan River around Tawan and Yangtzuling. Keller had orders to stay where he was. Thus General Sluchevski, Keller and Liubavin could not aid another given their orders. On the 31st Kuroki resumed his offensive and decided he would hit all 3 of the enemy forces in the area one by one as long as they remained divided. Kuroki was acting independently, but saw such a grand opportunity he had to grab it. Now the 12th division at Chiaotou were about as far from the 2nd division as Sluchevski was from Keller. The 2nd division were guarding Motienling and to their left was a guards division. Early on the morning of the 31st, four battalions of the 2nd IJA division advanced along a goat track to join up with the 12th so they could attack a Russian brigade currently guarding a pass at Pienling, two miles south of Yushuling. The Russian brigade was isolated, but held a great defensive position, not enough so to repel two Japanese divisions however. According to British military observation testimony “In places the path was so narrow that the Russians could not move more than four abreast, and so steep were the hill sides, that they were quite unable to deploy for attack, or to make any effective reply to the Japanese fire. In this short space the losses suffered amounted to five or six hundred killed and wounded” The Russians were only saved from complete disaster by the arrival of a Terek-kuban cavalry regiment who dismounted and aided them. Sluchevski's left flank meanwhile was caught by surprise during the night and the 12th division made a lot of progress. Then Sluchevski received a telegram from Kuropatkin telling him Keller was battling some 15 miles away. Kuropatkin had to inform him that expected reinforcements were thus not forthcoming. The 10th corps by this point had suffered 2000 casualties, their reserves were already in the battle. At 6:30 Sluchevskis cavalry left flank guard were deceived by a false report the Japanese artillery were turning to another area. The battle was going to hell in a hand basket as they say. Kuroki planned to hold the Russian front with his 2nd division while the guards division would hook into their right. The two divisions with reserves made a full assault. The Russians bravely tried to counter but failed to stop the onslaught. The Japanese gradually took the Russian forward trenches as the Russians were forced to perform a staggered retreat. The Russians and Japanese had light casualties in the few hundreds for the battle. Over in Kellers position, Japanese artillery seemed to be hunting down superior officers, Keller was hit by shrapnel tossing him to the ground with 37 wounds killing him instantly. The death of Keller destroyed the troops morale, he was a beloved commander who was notorious for leading at the front. General Kashtalinksi replaced Keller and ordered the reserves to come forward. Kuropatkin advised not tossing the reserves in, stating “hold back until the main effort of the Japanese has been disclosed”. Given the withdrawal at Hsimucheng and Yushuling, Kashtalinski was also told not to withdraw too hastily, but that is just what he did. Thus the road to Liaoyang seemed to be wide open, the Russians were offering nothing but withdrawals after withdrawals, when would they stand firm to fight? I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. As the Japanese advanced, so did the Russians, but in the opposite direction. British Lt General Sir Edward Bruce Hamley's Operations of War states “Victory can only be won by striking”. Pungent words for Kuropatkin as he scrambled to perform offensives. 

This week Kelly and Katai venture back into fantasy with “The Poppy War” by R.F. Kuang, the first book in Kuang's historical fantasy trilogy based on the second Sino-Japanese War of the early 20th century. They talk trauma trauma trauma, the Rape of Nanjing, bearing witness, how violence begets violence, the endless cycle of revenge, and more. CONTENT WARNING: due to the historical basis of the novel and our desire not to gloss over real events, there is graphic discussion of violence and rape, as well as mentions of suicideSUBSCRIBE TO THE TEEN CREEPS PATREON to get ad free episodes, bonus episodes, merch, and more:https://www.patreon.com/teencreepsCONNECT W/ TEEN CREEPS:https://twitter.com/teencreepspodhttps://www.instagram.com/teencreepspodhttps://www.facebook.com/teencreepspodBUY TEEN CREEPS MERCH:https://www.teepublic.com/stores/teen-creepsTEEN CREEPS IS A FOREVER DOG PODCASThttps://foreverdogpodcasts.com/podcasts/teen-creeps*All creepy opinions expressed are those of the hosts and guests. SUBSCRIBE TO OUR PATREON for ad free and video episodes, bonus episodes, and more:⁠https://www.patreon.com/teencreeps⁠ CONNECT:⁠https://discord.com/invite/FYp4QNhruE⁠⁠https://www.instagram.com/teencreepspod⁠⁠https://www.facebook.com/teencreepspod⁠ MERCH:⁠https://www.teepublic.com/stores/teen-creeps⁠ TEEN CREEPS IS AN INDEPENDENT PODCAST. *All creepy opinions expressed are those of the hosts and guests. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

This week Kelly and Katai venture back into fantasy with “The Poppy War” by R.F. Kuang, the first book in Kuang's historical fantasy trilogy based on the second Sino-Japanese War of the early 20th century. They talk trauma trauma trauma, the Rape of Nanjing, bearing witness, how violence begets violence, the endless cycle of revenge, and more. CONTENT WARNING: due to the historical basis of the novel and our desire not to gloss over real events, there is graphic discussion of violence and rape, as well as mentions of suicide SUBSCRIBE TO THE TEEN CREEPS PATREON to get ad free episodes, bonus episodes, merch, and more: https://www.patreon.com/teencreeps CONNECT W/ TEEN CREEPS: https://twitter.com/teencreepspod https://www.instagram.com/teencreepspod https://www.facebook.com/teencreepspod BUY TEEN CREEPS MERCH: https://www.teepublic.com/stores/teen-creeps TEEN CREEPS IS A FOREVER DOG PODCAST https://foreverdogpodcasts.com/podcasts/teen-creeps *All creepy opinions expressed are those of the hosts and guests. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices